NO,--N--PROL-,IFER,AT'"ýION T'R,EATrY
O R IG IN A N'D IM PLEMN4ENTATIO0N
1959
-1979

V oý lume 'Ii/)YMolhamiaed IL Sh"aker

1980
OCEANA PUBLICATIONS, INC.
London a Rýom-ce aNewý, YorkLibrary of Congress cataloging in Publication Data
Shaker, Mohamed Ibrahim.
The nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

A revision of the author's thesis, Geneva, publishedin 1976 under title: The treaty on the non-proliferationof nuclear weapons.
Bibliography: v. 3, p.
Includes index.
1. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation. I. Title.
80-17359
341 7'34WO26
1980
JXI 974.73.S5
ISBN 0-379-20470-3 (V.1)

0 Copyright 1980 by Oceana Publications, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, recording, xerography, or any information
storage and retrieval system. without permission in writing from theManuactrcdin the United States of America

To Mlona'
Shahira And M0ahrnoudS1,UMMARY OF CONTENTS
VOLUMTE 1
PARTI1 DRAFTFINGITHE TREA-,TY: THIEFOUJNDATIOIbN AND,:COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONSCHAPTER I

The Form,-ulation of a G3uiding Concept:
The Irish ResolutIon1

CHAPTER 2 The Formulation of Guliding Principles:
GA Resolution'2028 (XX)CHIAPTEIR 3 The Formulation ofdtheTreaty:GA Rýesolution. 2373 (XXII,`)P ARF'T 2 PR IN CIPL E(aCHAPTER 4

Pln o ula hrn
and Non-Proliferation1

CH'APTER. 5

Basic Obligation,s: Articl"es I anid' I

ihnNATOPART 3 PR INCIPLFb
CHAPTER 6 The Peacexful U_ses of Nuclear- Energy:
Article i"V
CHAPTER 7 The- Peaceful Applications of Nuclear
Explosions: Article V
VOLUME 2PART 3 PRINCIPLE (b) contdl.
CHAPTER 8 Nuclear Security Guarantees and UN
Security Council Resolution 255
PART 4PRINCIPLE (c)CHAPTER 9

Prospects for Arms Control and Disarmament: Article VI
PART 5 PRINCIPLE (d)CHAPTER 10

International Safeguards: Article III

CHAPTER 11I

Universality of Adherence: Article IX

CHAPTER 12

Adaptability to Changing Circumstances:
Articles VIII and X
VPART 6 PRINCIPLE (e)CHAPTER 13

Nuclear-Weapon-~Free Zones: Article V11

CONCLUSIONSVOLUME 3
APPENDICES 1-27
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX TO VOLUMES ONE AND TWOvi

TABLE OF CONTENTSABBREVIATIONSXPREFACEI

PART I DRAFTING THE TREATY: THE FOUNDATIONAND COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONSCHAPTERI1 The Formulation of a Guiding Concept:
The Irish Resolution,
The Irish Proposals of 1958

3
3

The Irish Resolution of 1959

12

The Five-Power Resolution of 1960

17

The Irish Resolution, 1961

24

The Significance of the "Irish Resolution"

28

CHAPTER 2 The Formulation of Guiding Principles:
GA Resolution 2028 (XX)35

Principle (a)49

Principle (b)522

Principle (c)57Principle (a)58

Principle (e)60

CHAPTER 3/ The Formulation of the Treaty:
GA Resolution 2373 (XXII)

67

I.The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament

11.

69

Establishment and Composition

69

Method of Work75

Delegations to the Conference

78

First phase of the Negotiations:
14 March 1962 - 16 June 1965

84

Non-Proliferation in GCD Schemes
and as a "Collateral Measure," 1962

84

Vii

Ill.

PART I1

The Test-Ban Treatýy, 1963

88

The ENDC, 1964

89

China's Ascendancy to Nucle!,:.
Status, 1964

90

The Disarmament Commission, 1965

91

Second Phase of the Negotiations:27 July 1975 - 5 March 1970

9The ENDC in 1965 and the American
Draft Treaty of 17 August 1965
The UN General Assembly in 1965 andthe First Soviet Draft of 24 September 1965

97

The ENDC in 1966 and the American
Amendment of 21 March 1966

99

The Pastore Resolution, 17 May 1966

100

Bilateral Diplomacy, 1966

101

The UN General Assembly, 1966
The ENDC in 1967 and the IdenticalTreaty Drafts of 24 August 1967

103

The UN General Assembly, 1967

110

The ENDC, 1968: The Identical Treaty
Drafts of 18 January 1968 and the
Joint Treaty Draft of I11 March 1968

113

The General Assembly, Twenty-Second
Resumed Session, 1968

116

The Security Council Resolution 255,1978

117

Entry Into Force of the NPT

118

Czechoslovakia and the NPT

119

106

127

PRINCIPLE (a)CHAPTER 4

94

Plans for Nuclear Sharing Within NATOand Non-Proliferation

I. Nassau: Multilateralism versus
Multinationalism
viii

129
131

il,

Th

Mul tilateralNulaFoc13

and Control of theML13
2. The Positions of NATO Allies,
Warsaw Pact Members and the Non-i
Aligned14(a)

NATO Allies14(i) The Federal Republic of
Germany14

111.

(ii) The United Kingdom

147(iii) France

151(iv) The Other NATO Allies

156

(b)

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact Members15(c)

The Non-Aligned Members of the
ENDC

167]

The Atlantic Nuclear Force

1'74

1. The Components and Control of the ANF

175

2.

The Objectives of the ANF

1 77

3.

Reactions to the ANF

1,78

IV. The Emergency of the Nuclear PlanningGroup18

CHAPTER5

Basic Obligations: Articles I and 1119

I. The Parties to the Treaty: The Questionof Definition
1I. The Object of NPT's Obligationls;
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Explosilve
Devices
1. Nuclear Weapons20
2.

Other Nuclear Explosive De,ývics20
ix

14

2010

Il, Th1e "Rainson d'Etre": Non-Transfer and
Non-Acquisitioni of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

214

1. Non-Tr-ansfer and Noni-Receipt

214

(a.)

Articles I and 1I in the First
American and Soviet Drafts andNuclear-Sharing Arrangements(i) 'The Amnerican Draft of 17
August 1965

215
215

(il) The American Amendm.ents of
21Mrch 196621(Iii) The Soviet Draft of 24
Septemiber 11965

227(b) The Compromise on Nuclear Sharing and the "European Option"

232(c) Noni-Tran,sfer and Non-Receipt:
Final Analysis

235(i) Any Recipient Whatsoever/
Any Transferer Whatsoever

235(ii) Direct and Indirect Transfer

237(iii) Control

239

Consultations and Planningon Nuclear Defence
Deployment of Nuclear Weapons
Within Allied Territory

240

European Unity

247

239

2. Manufacture249

3. Assistance, Encouragement or Inducement

255

(a)

Assistance, Encouragement or Inducement from Nuclear-Weapon States
256
to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States(b) Assistance from a Nuclear-Weapon
State to Another Nuclear-Weapon
State
X

259

(c) Assistance fromn Non-Nucicar-Weapoll
States to Nuclear-Weapon States

PART' 11I(d) Assistance from a Non.-Nuclear[--Weapon,
State to An-other No
ularWao
State
PRINCIPLE (b))

CHAPTER 6 Th)e Peaceful Uses of Nuclý.-ear Ener-gy:
Article TV
I. The Peaceful Uses of NuclearEnry
A Brief Outineri
1. The Five Mahin Braniches of'N-uclear
TeChno1logy

216 1
62

23
2),79Q
282,(a), The IM3ininig and Concentrat,fionof Nuclear Raw Materilals28(b) The Production of EnrichiedUran.iuim(c).

The Fabricatoion of Fuel
ElIemrne nt(d) Nuclear Reactors

283
285
286

(e)

Facilities for Fuel Reprocessing
and the Extraction of Plutonium
2. The Uses of Nuclear Technology

289
290

(a)

Thie Generatoion of Energy

290

(b)

The Uses of Ionizing Radiation
and Radio-active Isotopes

292

11.

The Inalienable Right

293

111.

The Balance of Obligations and Rights

299

1. The Fullest Possible Exchange of
Equipment, Materials and Scientificand Technological Information

300

(a)

The Obligation to Facilitate
and the Right to Participate in
the Fullest Possible Exchange

xi

300

Te ExcangeofEqimnad(b)Mateials302(c he E'XChanjge ofScetii and
Infrmaion312
Techoloica
2. Co-operation inDotibtn to
the Further DevelopmfenIt of, theApplications of Nuclear Energy
for Peaceful Purposes
(a)

IV.

The Contributing States

3 16
317

(b) The Benificiaries

320(c) The Obligation to Contribute

328

Channels of Co-operation

337

1. Bilateral Co-operation

338

2. Multilateral Regional Co-operation(a) Euratomn(b) The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
(c)

CERN

(d) The Agency for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (OPANAL)
3. International Co-operation ThroughInternational Organizations
(a)

342
344
346
347

348
349

The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)

355(i) Finance for Nuclear Energy
Activities

356(ii) Special Fissionable Materials
and Equipment359(iii) Nuclear information

361(iv) Composition of IAEA Boardof Governors: Amendment of
Article VI of IAEA Statute

362

X11

(b)

Uhtnitd ations

evlpmn Po

Explosions: Article V
1.The Peaceful Applications of Nuclear
Explosions: A Brief Outline

385

1I. Some Characteristics of Nuclear
Explosives

386

2.

Existing Programmes

389

3.

Potential Applications

394

4.

The Feasibility of Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions

396

Future Perspectives

402

5.
11.

111.

379

The Obligation to Take Appropriate
Measures to Ensure the Potential
Benefits404

1. The Supplier States

405

2.

The Recipients

407

3.

The Obligation

417
421

The Modalities
1.

Compatibility with Treaty Provisions

422

2.

Non-Discrimination

422

3.

Charges for Explosive Devices

424

4.

Appropriate International Observation

428

(a)

The Purpose of the Observation

430

(b)

The Circumstances Requiring theObservation

432

The Role of the Agency andOther States

435

(c)

Xiii.

of Observation43n,l Charcter(d)The437()Procedure's
5.App)ropriate Mnternaioa Poedures(a) Gen-eral Ideas and the Role of
1AEA(b) Comnprehensive Test Ban andPeaceful Nuclear Explosions

IV. Channels of Supply
1. Bilateral Agreements
2. The Appropriate international Body
Special International Agreement(b) The IAEA as the, "International
(a)

Body"

xiv

438
439
443

447
447
450
451
459

LIST OF ABB3PREVIATIONS,
A:
ABM:
AC.:
ACDA:
Add.:
AEC:
a.i.:Agenda
ANF:
Ann (s).:
ASBM:
C. 1:
C.2:
CCD:
CD:
CEA:
CERN:
CIA:
CIEN:
COM.:
COMECON:CONF:
COPREDAL:
Corr.:
Cttee:DC:
DCOR:
DOC. (Doc.):
DOSB:
EAEC:
ECSC:
EDC:
EEC:
ENDC:
ENEA:
Euratom:

Generall Assemblyv
Anlti-ballistic Missile
Ad Hoc Commiittee1
United States Arms Control and Disarmament
AgencyAddendum 3
Atomic Energy Commissioni
item (s)Atlantic Nuclear Force
Annex (es)Air-to-surface ballistic missiles
First Committee 1
Second Committee1
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament1
Committee on DisarmamentCommisariat ý I' 6nergie atomnique
Conseil Europ6en pour la Recherche Nucl&aire (nowOrganisation Europ6ene pour la Recherche Nucle'aire)
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission
Committeeý 2
Council for Mutual Economic AssistanceConference 3
Comision Preparatoria para la Desnuclearizacion de la
America Latina (Preparatory Commission for the
Denuclearization of Latin America)
Correction
Committee
Disarmament Commission1
Disarmament Commission, Official Records
Document
Department of State Bulletin
European Atomic Energy Community
European Coal and Steel Community
European Defence Community
European Economic Community
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Commitee on
Disarmament 1
European Nuclear Energy Agency
European Atomic Energy Community

I Abbreviations used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences served by theUnited Nations Secretariat.
2 Abbreviations used in documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
3 Abbreviations used in the documents referred to in I and 2.

XV

EurocemicEurpeanCompny fr the Chemical Processinagof IraIated Fuels.
FAO:
Food and Agrlicultre Organisation
FRG.'Federfal Republic of GeranGA:
Gen-eral Assembly
GAOR:
G7eneral Assembly, Official Recordls.
General Conference 2
GC,:
GCD:
General and Complete Disarmament.
GDR:
German Democratic Republic
Board of Governors 2
GOV:
HMSO:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office
IAEA:
International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD:
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM:

Intercontinental ballistic missile

ICJ:

International Court of Justice

IEA:
IISS:
INF:
INFCE:INFCIRC:
INIS:
IRBM:

International Energy Agency
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Information I
International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
Information circular I
International Nuclear Information System
Intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISS:
JCS:
KMP:
MARV:
MBA:
MBFR:
MIRV:
MIT:
MLF:
MRMB:
MRV:
mtg:
MUR:
M W (e):MW (th):
NATO:
NEA:
NNWS:
NPG:
NPT:
NWS:
OAS:

Institute for Strategic Studies
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Key measurement point
Limited Distribution /Draft (e.g., resolution or
working paper)I
Maneuverable re-entry vehicle
Material balance area
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Multiple, independently-targeted re-entry vehicle
Massachusetts institute of Technology
Multilateral Nuclear Force
Medium-range ballistic missile
Multiple re-entry vehicle
Meeting
Material unaccounted for
Megawatts (electrical)
Megawatts (thermal)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Nuclear Energy Agency
Non-nuclear-weapon States
Nuclear Planning Group
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ot'Nuclear Weapons,
Nuclear-weapon States
Organisation of American States
xvi

OAU:
OECD:
OPANAL:OR.:
PL:

plen.:
PNE:
prov.:
Pu-:
PV.:
R&D:
RES (Res.):
Rev.:
S:
SAC:
SACEUR:
SCOR:
Sec:
Sess.:
SIPRI:
SLBM:
SR.:
SSR:
Suppi.:

SWU:
U-:
UAR:
UF 6 :
UK:
UN:
UNDP:
UNESCO:UNGA:
UNIDO:UNITAR:UNSCEAR:UNTS:
U3 0 8 :US:
USSR:

Org-aniJsation- of Africanj Uniity
Organisation for Econ-omick Co-operationanid. Development'
Organismo para la Proscripcioni de las Armias
Nucleares en la America Latina (Agency for tHec
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Amxerica)
Official Record (S)2
Panel 2Plenary

Peaceful nuclear explosions
Provisional

PlutoniumProcýs-verbal (verbatim record),'Research and development
Resolution'

Revision 3
Security Council
Strategic Air Command
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Security Council, Official Records
SectionSession
Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute
Submarine- or sea-launched ballistic missile
Summary record I
Soviet Socialist Republic
Supplement
Separative work unit
Uranium
United Arab Republic
Uranium hexafluoride
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organisation
United Nations General Assembly.
United Nations Industrial Development
Organisati on
United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
United Nations Treaty Series
Uranium oxide
United States
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
xvii

INE'U:

WHO0:

Western European Union.
World Health Organisation.

xviii

It is irmp-erative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arm-1s
race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear nonproliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emnergence of any additional
nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weaponl States, and on
the other progressively to reduce and eventually elimfinate nuclear weapons
altogether.
"FinalDocument of the Tenth Special
Session ofithe UIN General,-Assembly,
decvoted to disarmament, 30,June 1978"

PRE,FACE
Ever since the droipping, of at omric bombs on irohim andthe world has niot ceased to fear these lethal wý,eapons of mass, Naga,,salk.i,
des,truction.
Efforts to limit the spread of theýse weapons have not stopp;,ed ever"Baruchi Plan" was pre-sentaed by the Ufnited' States to thle Unhited sinfce the194,6._ The" "lan" pro posed the creat-ioni of an international AtomnicNations in
Developmewnt Authorityv ent.rusted with all phases of the developmrentý anduse of atomiucenergy, icungmanagerial control or ownership of all
atomnic
acIVtivitis potenY,tially dIangerous to world1 secu-rity; power to contlrol, enlergy",
inls pec"tand licenise all other atomic atvie;and th'e dutyý, of f"osterinig
the beneficýial
use of atomic energy.
The failure of the "Baruch Plan" led to further efforts w,-hich culminaatedin the adoption by the United Nations General Assemb,lly in 1961iof the socalled "Irish Resolution." This resolution is the starting pointof thle present
study, since it contains the guiding concept of non-proliferati
on whi'ch has
been embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons(NPT).
The "Irish Resolution" was followed four years later by thle UN
Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) which contained the five princ6iplesGeneralon thebasis of which the NPT was to be negotiated.
The two resolutions dominated the negotiations of the NPT
until theTreaty itself was finally drafted and opened for signature on 1
July
1968.
Part Iof this study contains three introductory chapters dealing withboth resolutions and the course of the NPT negotiations.
The purpose of this study is not only to analyse the NPT itself
assess the steps taken towards its implementation. The study covers but also to
the period
between 1959, when the UN General Assembly adopted the firstversion of the"Irish Resolution", and the end of 1979, when the preparatory
work for theSecond NPT Review Conference was about to enter its lastphase.
This study was originally completed at the end of 1974 as a dissertation
submitted for the degree of docteur ýs sciences politiques at
Institute of Higher International Studies, University of Geneva, the Graduate
Switzerland.
It has, hence, been revised so as to include the many relevant
developmentsthat have, since 1974, taken place in the ever rapidly evolving fieldof nuclear
energy harnessed for peace or for war.
The most relevant significant events since 1974 are: the convening
in 1975of the First NPT Review Conference; the 1976 Treaty on Underground
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNRs) concluded between
theUnited States and the Soviet Union; the 1977 Organizing ConferenceoftheInternational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation; the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978; the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assemblyin1978 devoted to disarmament; and the 1979 SALT 1I Agreement.
Xxi

Several organization,s have also been since 1974 heavily involved in the~implementation of the NPT; f~oremost among 'them is the International
Atomnic Energ,y Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, which has been very active in thefield of peaceful uses ofinuclear energy, including peaceful nuclek eplsions
and 'the application of international safeguards. The CofrneOf theComumittee on, Disarmamen-t (CCD) and its successor since 1979, theCommittee on, Disarmament (CD), have attached particular attention to theanrms control and d.isarmamnent aspects of the NPT and the imnplementation of"
its provisions in this respect. On a regional level, the Agency for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) has also been
involved in the implemnentation of the provisions of the 1967 Treaty for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. the so-called Treaty7 of
1tlatelolco.
Ever since the Indian explosion of a "peaceful" nuclear device on 18 May
1974, the accelerated nuclear activities of a number of potential nuclearweapon Powers or the so-called Threshold countries have continued to be asýource of great conacern for all those devoted to the cause of nuclear nonproliferatiOnl.
The basic method followed -in this study is that of analysing 'theprovisions of the NPT and their implementation on the basis of the fiveprinciples of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).
On, the basis of the first principle of resolution 2028 (X X.), principle (q),prescribing that the Treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might
permnit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly,
nuclear weapons in any formn, an analysis is undertaken in Part 1H of this studyof Articles I and II of the NPT. The two articles contain the basic obligationisof the P1-arties to the Treaty imipos-ing certain restrictions on the transfer7 andacusition of nuclear weapons. Since plans for nuclear sharing within NATO,andi more particularly the multilateral nuclear force (MLF'), were at the originof principle (a) as well ais the formulation of Articles I and 11, the first chapter
of Part II is devoted to the study of this issue. This would perm-it a clearer
understanding of Articles I and, 1I, which are treated in the following chapter.
Under Part 1II, three aspects of the NPT are analysed on the basis ofprinciple (b)), which states that the Treaty should embody an acceptableblneof mnutual responsibilities and obligations of the niuclear and nonnnuclear Powers. The three aspects are: the peacefuil uses of nuclear energy(Article IV), peaceful nuclear explosions (Article V) and nuclear secur-ity
guarantees. Thle latterý was dealt withi outside the framiework of theP-NPT but inclose Conkjunction with 'it in resolution 255 of 19 Jun,e 1968 of the Security
Council of the United Nat.ionis.
In Part IV, Ar,ticle V1 of the NPTFis analysed on the basisiof principlie(e),which provides that the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement ofG"eneral and Complete disarmnament and more particularly nuclear disarmamnt.[I In1 this context, prosp)ects and achievements in the field of arms control
an isarmamient, 'Including SALT I and 11 Agreements, are treated.
Xxii

Part V 'examines Article III of th~e NPT relating tobq
ap-1--,ion o)finternational
laeards as well as Articles Vill, IX and >Xrelat
t'o theadhrene t th NE ad its provisions ondunration amendmnents,
rviewanwitdr~a1 Ths earination is to ascerai, Wete
workable prev"-ios to ensure the eff'ctý; ,ivenss of principle (cl)requir'ing
the Treaty has been
sufficiently observed. This part of the study, dwells extensively
on the role of'
the IAEA in the application of safeguards on the Parties
to
the
NPT
and on thequestion of univers -ality of adherence to the Treaty including
the
study
of thepositioniiof a number of reticent threshold States. The
fact
that
the
Treaty,asprovided for in Article X, has an initial durationof twenty-five years which
may even be extended indefinitely at the end of thisperiod, gives this study an
added significance.
Lastly, Part V1 deals with Article VII of the NET on
the basis of principle(e)recognizing the right of any group of States to conclude
regional treaties inorder to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons
in
theirterritories. Thispart concentrates, on the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an
example to be followed in
the establishment of future nuclear-weapon-freezones, In this regard, asecond section of Part VI is devoted to the "Comprehensive
Study of theQuestion of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its
Aspects" prepared by agroup of governmental experts in 1975, which stands
as a useful guide to all
those interested in establishing nuclear-weapon-freezones of their own.
In the conclusions, an overview of the application oftheGeneral Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) 'to all the provisionsfive principles ofof the NET isundertaken. In anticipation of 'the 1980 NET Review
Conference, an overall
assessmrent of the 1975 NET Review Conference andFinallyý,, some general considerations are emphasizedits follow uip is also mnade.
for future action if the
NET :is to survive as a viable and effective arms control
measure.
In dealing with thle issue of nuclear non-proliferation)complex aspects, it Is hoped that this study will be of in all its varied andinterest to all1 thosedevoted to the halting of the spread of nuclear weapons,vertically andhorizonitally, and to the reversal of the nuclear arms race,
quantitatively
andqualitatively. It is hoped that it would be of use to governmients,
internationaland regional organizations, educational institutions aswell as to individual
lawyers, political scientists and historians. It is equally hopedthat the global
and comprehensive nature of this study will comaplemnenit
earlierworks whichhave dwelled on the issue of nuclear non-proliferationfrom one angle oranother.
In preparation of this study I had t1he special benefit of beinga member ofthe Egyptian delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee
on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva during the crucial
period of negotiating
the NPT in 1965-1968 and later as a participant in the
Conference. However, so much has been contributed by 1975 NET Review
the attempt to mention them all by name would extend so many people that
this preface to undue
length.
Xxiii

Spe lal thaunks mnust first be offered to~the Graduate Institute of Higher
internation,al Studie-s in Gieneva, withouit its generosity this study would havenever been pos'sible. I wish in particular to express my deep appreciation arid
gratlitude to Professor Urs Schwarz who had kindly directed the original study
ais a doct,orate dissertation. Professor Schwarz's experience and interest in thesubj;ct of this study was of irreplaceable value. I am also much indebted toP'rofessor Loulis, J. Halle -whose semkinar on strategic studies at the Graduate
Institute -was partially responsible for the interest I have gained in the problemof the proliferation of'nuclear weapons. Among the professors of the Graduate
Institute, I wlish to pay special tribute to mly good friend Professor Georges
AbI)-Saab to whomi I am indebted in many respects, especially his advice Onlsome of thie legal aspects of this studly.
i also wish to thank a number of institutions without whomn I would not
hiave been able to gathier all the data -included in this study, more particularlythle UN Library in Geneva and its mnost devoted personnel, the International
Institute for S'trategic Studies (IISS) in London and the IAEA in Vienna. With
regard to the latterý I wish to thank mny colleagues at the Egyptian Embassy in.
Vienna wh)o miade thie contacts with the Agency possible and fruitful.
I also wish to take this opportunity to express my goratitude to
Am-bassa-dor Hussein Khaflaf and Ambassador Ashrafg'Ghiorbal of Egypt who
hav,e encouraged -meand allowed mne thle necessary timre to comrplete this study
init originial form in Geneva and in its revised and expanded formT HIn
WashingTonIDC.
I cannot omnit to menition M4rs. Frances Mvorris, to whom has fallen theuingrateful but Uindispensa'ble task of typing and ret-ypilng the maYnuiCrIpt as itstanlds in its piresent shape.
In conclusion, i must emphasize that opinions expressed in this study are
entIr-ely m-y own, and do not necessarily represent the views of my Government
onl the issues treated therein.

Mea,Va., January 1980

Mohamed I. Shaker

xxiv

PART IDRAFTIN,G THE TREATY:
TPHE FOUNý,DATION AND COURSE OF
NEGOTIATIONSCHAPTER 1

The Formu-latiloni of a Guidin,

ocp
The Irish Resolution1

It

was ini response -to Irish endeavouars inl the United
Nations in the years 1958-1961 that a concept of nion-proliferation of nuclear weapons was laid down in a United 1Na-tlionis
General Assembly resolution. This concept served
as a-gujide
to successive steps within and outside the United
Nations with
the intention of arresting
the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. It is through the study of that earlier phaseof non11proliferation efforts that the limits of the concept
as wellas the problems raised during the process of its
formulation,of which some are still reflected in the Treaty
on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, can be better
understood.
Before embarking on this study, it appears to us thatnospecial reasons pertaining particularly to Ireland
had motivated this country's efforts in that earlier phase.
The high
ideals of the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland,
Mr.
Frank Aiken, as can be deduced from his statements
and writings, were apparently the catalyzers for his country's
stand.
Moreover, Ireland's stand on non-proliferation is no
exception
to the increasing role played by other small countries
membersof the United Nations in the peaceful resolution of many
problems pertaining to world peace and security and, mc5reparticularly, in the field of disarmament and arms control.
The Irish Proposals of 1958
The initial steps that were taken by -the Irish delegationin the thirteenth session of the UN General Assembly had
two3objcties.The first

step,

in.the form oýf a-draft resolution,sought to "establish an ad hoc committee to staudy tMe dangers
inUhe.rent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons andrecommend to the General Assembly at its fourteenth sessionaýppropriate measures for averting these dangers". The second
preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, which revealed
the Irish thinking on the problem, recognized that "the danger
now exists that an increase in the number of States possessing
nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension
and the difficulty of maintaining world peace, and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of general disarmament
agreement ... 1
The second step, a set of proposed additions in the formof americ-Ients to a seventeen-Power draft resolution on thesuspension of nuclear weapons tests, 2urged the parties involved in the negotiations on the suspension of tests, that they"shall not supply other States with nuclear weapons while these negotiations are taking place and during the period of any
suspension of tests that may result therefrom", and also conversely called upon "all States which are not now producing
nuclear weapons to refrain from undertaking their manufacture"
during the same period.3
1

GAOR, 13th Sess., Anns., a.i. 64, 70 and 72, Dcc. A/C.l/
L.206, 17 Oct. 1958.

2

Ibid., Doc. A/C.1/L.205, 10 Oct. 1958.

3

ibid., Doc. A/3974 and Add, 1 and 2, 3 and 4 Nov. 1958,
para. 22. Those formal steps were less ambitious than those advocated by the Chairman of the Irish delegation in
his speech before the General Assembly under the general
debate item. He had proposed that the nuclear Powers should
undertake not to supply nuclear weapons to any other country, and that the Assembly should then adopt a resolution
calling on all other States to refrain from manufacturing
or acquiring such weapons. The resolution could be followed by a convention in which those States would bind themselves not merely to renounce nuclear weapons, but to accept United Nations supervision of their nuclear development for peaceful purposes. See Ibid., 751st plen. mtg, 19
Sept. 1958, paras. 82-84.

4In exlinn

his prpsLs toth Fis Commnite ofth
Generýal Assemý,Lbly, th
iitrfor'ExenlA
isorland,
dwelt on the danger of the proliferation of
nuclear, weaýponsý,the urgency of checking the problem and the essenceof obligations introduced in the proposed amendmenits,
The danger was conceived by Mr. Aiken as increasing
notonly in proportion to the number of States possessing
nuclearweapons but in geometric progression. W'hile nuclear
weapons
were in the hands of a few highly developed States
which hadmuch to lose and little to gain by a nuclear war,and therefore
felt a sense of deep responsibility regarding
their use, thesmaller States would have much less to lose anda temptation to
exploit the enormous temporary advantage derivingfrom the possession of these weapons. Also by falling into thehands of revolutionary groups and organizations - and as history
hasshown, local wars and revolutions almost always
involved greatPower rivalry - the use of nuclear weapons by asmall State ora revolutionary group could easily set off a world-wide
nuclearwar.4
For _1vr.
Aiken, there were two imperative reasons why the
proliferation of nuclear weapons should be checked
as soon as
possible. "The first was the slowness with which
negotiations
towards general disarmament were proceeding. The second
wasthat failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons
during thelong period of negotiations on general disarmament
was likely
to make those negotiations abortive.115

4 Ibid., 1st Cttee, 953rd mtg, 17 Oct. 1968, para. 5.
5 Ibid., 970th mtg, 31 Oct. 1958, para. 49. The reasons given

by Tr. Aiken reflected a widespread view that so longasgeneral disarmament negotiations were lengthy and complicated, certain identified problems amenable to solution should
be attacked separately. For example, nuclear testing had
already gained prominent attention. Measures aimed at suchproblems were later called "collateral measur.es".,5essence. of teobýIligýations in thle Proposed
As, to, thejý:amndens oChej1 seventee2n-Power draft re-solut-ion, Mr. Aikenl"twas essential that the inueciear Powers' should
undertake not to transfer nuclear iieapons to otherStates, if manufacture of those weapons by the'non-nuclear Powers' was to be avoided. Indeed,
unhtil the 'nuclear Powers' formally undertook torefrain from doing so, the 'non-nuclear Powers'
might fear a possible transfer to an enemy or rival, Iand strive to offset that risk by trging to
manufacture their own nuclear weapons ...1
In submitting his proposals to the First Committee of theGeneral Assembly, Mr. Aiken had anticipated some of the arguiments that were later invoked against the suggested amendments:
to the seventeen-Power draft resolution. They wereFirst :The establishment of "have" and "have not" Statesw.ith respect to nuclear weapons would infringe the principleof the sovereign equality of States and reduce the prestige ofthe "have not" States, There is no better illustration of thisargument than the position of France which was still in 1958
a non-nuclear-weapon State.
sentative, stated that:

Jules Moch,

Mr.

the French repre-"France would not accept being excluded from thenumber of 'nuclear Powers' so long ýLs other Powers
continued to increase their stockpiles of nuolear
weapons and consequently, the risks of war."
The argument was also advanced by States not striving fora nuclear armament of their own, such as Argentina whose
6

Ibid., para. 52.

7

Ibid., 953rd mtg, 17 Oct. 1958, paras. 5-9.
I,bid., 964th mtg, 27 Oct. 1958, para. 17. France exploded
atomic device on 13 Feb. 1960 in the Sahara
it-s first-testing-grounds near the Reggane oasis about 700 miles
south-west of Algiers. See Keeping's Contemporar:y Archives,
Vol. XII, 1959-1960, PP. 17279-17280A.

S

6

representative ýstateud thiat th
dpinof thie amendmecbjntsý
1twould mean giving- legal saiiction to t,he unequal situationi resulting from the fact that only a few Powers possessed nucle_arweapons. The effect would be to create a gulf between the small
9Powers and the great Powers."
Second :By limiting freedom of action in the disposal of
nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of various systems of defensive alliances would be impaired. The Canaadian representative while agreeing that the indiscriminate transfer of nuclear
weapons to nations that did not possess them should be discouraged, was of the view that the transfer "should not be prohibited completely until appropriate disarmament measures had
10been agreed upon."
Third :Since the presence of nuclear weapons was virtually impossible to detect, it would be impossible to control
compliance with the requirement that States possessing such
weapons should not hand them over to the States which did inot
yet possess them. Ambassador Cabot Lodge, the United States
representative, was categorical on this point. He said that"the United States could not accept an oI<LIigation the observ11
ance of which could not be verified."
Mr. Aiken, who tried to answer in advance the arguments
he himself anticipated and which were later raised by otherparticipants in the First Committee discussions, wrote an article three years later in which he developed his ideas moreclearly12 . They can be summarised as follows

9 GAOR, 13th Sess., 1st Cttee, 957th mtg, 21 Oct. 1958,
para. 27.

954 mtg, 20 Oct. 1958,.para. 23.

10

Ibid.,

11

Ibid., 969th mtg, 31 Oct. 1958, para. 21,

12Frank Aiken, "Can We Limit the Nuclear Club ?", Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XVII, No, 7, Sept. 1961,
pp. 263-266,

7

On,,
the, q-uestion of

it waLoneitsriht to) thedesruciv
totwoLv;ablcasIing
categoriesOf States,out that any Stae wic

etothrstodo, liews

volun_-.tarilýy for-,-ýewen

pow,er of, nulclear wý,eapons inl orde-,rwa-ie-Lytoserve i11ts, ownvia

intress
ettr tanby increasi-ng tGhe danger of theý destrquction,,,o)f c-:-ivilization.
On the,, question of defensive alliance1-s, keeping nuclear
weaponis on the territory of the allies of nuclear States under
the latter's control, though regrettable, was regarded as necessary in an atmosphere of distrust. The proposals were considered moderate and having a strictly limited objective, namely the prevention of nuclear anarchy while steps were being
taken to achieve permanent peace.
On the question of the clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons by a nuclear Power to its allies, the answer was that it
was hardly likely that a nation which had. thereby increased its
own military strength and standing among others nations would
choose to reduce its influence over them by sharing its nuclear
weapons, even with one of its allies. If a country saw temporary advantage in breaking the agreement,itwould run the riskof being pilloried as a violator of a pledge to the United Nations, In Mr. Aiken's view it would be foolish to become so
preoccupied with the question of physical control measures thatsight was lost of the fact that the keeping of a given agreement
might be so clearly in the interests of all nations that fully
effective physical control measures might not be necessary.
These three questions which were raised at an early stageof the non-proliferation efforts were to become serious problems to reckon with during the later stages of the NPT negotiations.
In an effort to secure the widest possible agreement,

theIrish r_-epresentative had considered it wise to separate thequestion o-f the restriction of dissemination of nuclear weapons from that of the discontinuance of tests. And since itwas clear that no substantive rPesolution, on1i
disoarmamLientu couLld
13
bei
adptd he wtd r ew, hiJ_s amiend,i0m enits,
As to t1he draft resolution submitted by the Irish delegation to establish an ad hoc committee, the trend was in favouriof existing. bodies dealing with disarmament problems insteadof establishing a new committee to study the problem of theproliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States, among
other delegations, did not support the idea of a new committee"because such a committee would in effect be a committee to
examinethe whole disarmament question thus duplicating thework of the Disarmament Commission".,1 4 The Disarmament Commission was about to be enlarged at the same session of the Assembly to include all members of the United Nations and thisfurther explains the reluctance towards establishing a newcommittee. 15
The Irish delegation had asked, however, for a separate
roll-call vote on the second preambular paragraph of its draft
resolution (already quoted above). The paragraph was approvedbY 37 votes in favour (including the USSR and the Eastern
European States), none against and 44 abstentions (including
the United States and other NATO members), 1 The Irish representative was gratified to note that no delegation had
voted against that paragraph. Nevertheless, he did not wish
to recommend any particular method for the study of the problem and he therefore withdrew the draft resolution, hopingthat the Disarmament Commission would give the matter prior-ity.1 7 Mr. Jules Moch, the then French representative in the
13

GAOR, 13th Sess., 1st Cttee, 969th mtg., 31 Oct, 1958,
para. 38.

14
15

Ibid., para. 22,
GA Res. 1252 D(XIII), 4 Nov. 1958. Ibid., Anns., a.i.64,
70 and 72, pp. 28-29.

16

Ibid., 1st Cttee, 970th mtg, 31 Oct. 1958, para. 87.

17

Ibid., para. 88.

9in a booFirstý
Cmitesd,

ris rsoltipof
thedrftwihdanpoheinitac!pheublished mu-ch later,that

1958 mihthve been- quiicklyof one of the States on the ver-ge~~~~ ofbcmngancer Power, thus leaving the impression
that, 11it,was upon France's insistance that the draft was withdan1 8
in withdrawing its amendment7,'s and draft resolution, the Irish delegation must ha-e fel that the atmosphere was not yet ripe to discuss and snyaproblem of great
f irstfrthe
complexity brought bef ore the United 2a1c
At any rate,

I:radisarmament

time as a side-issue to the discussf:.
and a test ban. However,

the tactic rythe Irish

c~i~pream-u-iscnd

delegation in requesting a separate vc-1bular paragraph of the draft resolution was..
ed to put on record the recognition by member_

iosl

intend-nations of an

existing danger necessitating an urgent solution.
Before turning to the subsequent phases cf Irish endeayours,

an explanation ought to be given,of non-proliferation

at that early stage

efforts, of the attitudes of the Soviet

Union and the United States, the two countries which later
played central roles in the formulation of a basic treaty
text which they co-sponsored.
The Soviet delegation,

though voting in favcur of the se-cond preambular paragraph of the Irish draft resolution,did

not comment at all on any of the proposals. 19It is to be
noted that at that time the Soviets had not taken any firm
18

Jules Moch, Destin de la paix (Paris :Hercure de France,1969), pp. 143-144.

19

All Eastern European delegations had the same attitudewith the exception of the Albanian delegation which wasofThle view that the amendments proposed by Ireland in no
wa _caged the substance of the seventeen-Power draft
resolut
onio nuclear testing considered to be unacceptaltoit. See GAOR, 13th Sess., 1st Ottee, 954th mtg,
2 o,1958,, para. 10.

declaratory positioni against proliferationl
1952,

however,

As early as

and especially from 1958, theý Soviets, beg,1an toshow a decided interest in the establishmeent of variousý atomfree zones. They also pushed strenuously for a nuclear test
ban. But the dominant feature of that period was a growing
ambivalence on the part of the Soviet Union towards the wholu
question of proliferation coupled with a tendency to conceptualize the question of proliferation primarily in terms of
the Sino-Soviet relationship. The USSR had signed an agreement with the Chinese on 15 October 1957 concerning the transfer of nuclear technology and sample materials from the Soviet
Union to China, which was unilaterally abrogated by the Soviet
Union on 20 June 1959. 21It was abrogated in the aftermath of
the Taiwan Straits crisis, when The People's Republic of China
attempted to wrcest the offshore island of Quemoy from Taiwan
in the summer of 1958. The Soviets, alerted by the enormous
explosiveness of the situation, were awakened to the ominous
prospect that in some future crisis, in which China possessed
its own atomic bom-bs, Moscow might be dragged into a catalytic nuclear confrontation with the United States because ofsome irresponsibility on the part of its erstwhile ally. The
20

Oran R. Young, "The Soviet Stand on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Foreign,Affairs Reports, Vol. XV, No. 7,
July 1966, p. 84. An analytic study of the Soviet publicstatements on non-proliferation from November 1966 to October 1968, a period marked by intense negotiations on a
non-proliferation treaty, reached the conclusion thateven until April 1968 only slightly more than one per centof Soviet statements gave expression to the anti-proliferation argument, i.e., proliferation confronts the world
with the prospect of uncontrollable nuclear conflict and,for that reason, must be regarded as a capital threat.
See G-erhard Wettig, "Soviet Policy on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1966-1968", Orbis, Vol. XII,
No. 4, Winter 1969, p. 1060.

21

0. Young, joc.cit., pp. 83-84. On, the importance of Soviet
aid to China resulting in the October 1964 detonation ofa Chinese nuclear device, see Morton Halperin, China andthe Bomb (London :Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 78-82.

11f te cisi makeda sig,nificant, watershed not
expriecebut also
f heSio-ovetrelationshipnheersinonytein evlut

onof NosowSpposition to nuclear prolifer-

memAs for the, _6a*Unitd States, as well as for other NATOneeds tobers, the displeasure caused by the Irish proposals
in the United
be explained beyond their declaratory,positions
the 'Sputnik'
Nations. The successful launching by the USSR ofof Soviet
on 4 October 1957, and the subsequent emplacementof both
,missiles aimed at Europe, had shaken the confidenceofthe United States and Western Europe in the effectivenessStatesthe American deterrent system. As a result, the Unitedintermedecided to deploy nuclear delivery systems includingindiate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), Thors and Jupiters,
stockEurope, and entered into a series of bilateral nuclear
pile arrangements with over half of its NATO allies. Basicalreleasely, these arrangements provided the authority for theappropriof American nuclear weapons stored in Europe to theate NATO commanders in the event of hostilities. Therefore,a psya non-proliferation resolution in 1958 would have beenchological barrier to the type of nuclear arrangements theUnited States was negotiating. The United States was putting
flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons above the internaof
tional efforts to erect barriers against the acquisition
nuclear weapons. 2
The

Irish Resolution

of1959In 1959, upon Ireland's request the question of the "prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" was22

23

Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet
Arms Control Policy", Orbis, Vol. XIV, No. 2, Summer 1970,
PP. 300 and 309-311. For a brief account of the Quemoy
crisis, see Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention
in the Modern World (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications','1970),PP. 70-71.
William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968), PP. 38-40.

.12included as a separate item in the agenda of the fourteenthtl
24
session of the General Assembly.
As a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee was'~set up in 1959
by an agreement reached among the governments of France, theUSSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to consider
disarmament matters, 2 5 the Irish delegation submitted to theFirst Committee of the General Assembly a draft resolution
suggesting that the Ten-Nation Committee should, in the course of its deliberations on disarmament, consider appropriate
means whereby the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapens might be averted "including thefeasibility of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons
would refrain from handing over the control.on such weapons
to any nation not possessing them and whereby the Powers notpossessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturingthem", 2(Emphasis added.)

The draft resolution of 195-9, which incorporated theadopted second preambular Paragraph of the withdrawn Irish
draft resolution of 1958 as a first preambular paragraph,went further than the previous Irish proposals in suggestingand singling out an international agreement as one means tocheck the proliferation problem. Another important development
24
25

26

GAOR, 14th Sess., Anns., a.i. 67, Does. A/4125, 18 June
1959 and A/4286, 18 Nov. 1959.
DCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1959, Doc. DC/144, S Sept.
1959, Anns., para. 1. The participants in the "Committee"
in addition to the four Powers were Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland and Romania. It should be
noted that the enlarged Disarmament Commisbion had only
met once in 1959 and had dealt solely with a resolution
welcoming the setting up of the Ten-Nation Committee.
Ibid., Doc. DC/146, 11 Sept, 1959.
GAOR, 14th Sess., Anns., a.i. 67, Dec. A/4286, 18 Nov.
1959, para. 5,
1.3

Was the intUrou4ction1 of the_ term "control" as opposed to the2terms "supply" and "Possession" in the 1958 propoEfalo.
The discussion of the Irish item before the First Committee was very brief. The attention was focused rather on 11gean item which was inneral and complete disarmament" (GCD),
cluded for the first time in the agenda of the fourteenthsession of the General Assembly at the request of the Soviet
Union,2 on whose behalf Premier Khirushchev, addressing theAssembly on 18 September 1959, proposed a new disarmament programme.2
The Irish draft was welcomed by most delegations participating in the debate. It was supported especially because of
its procedural character, as it did not propose specific so3 0 Thus
lutions and in no way committed the General Assembly.
the approach to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear
cautious and in the sphere of exploring ways
weapons was' still

and means of checking it,
The United States, which was displeased with the 1958
Irish proposals, supported the 1959 draft resolution. By thattime certain developments had moved the United States in the
direction of an active non-proliferation policy. The WhiteHouse realized that Congress would not consent to a major extension of nuclear-weapon cooperation to any country but Great
27

The Irish representative in submitting the draft resolution did not define what exactly was meant by the term
"tcontrol". See note 34 below.

28

GAOR, 14th Sess., Anms., a.i. 70, Doos. A/4218 andA/4219, 19 Sept. 1959.
Ib-id., 799th plen. mtg, 18 Sept. 1959, paras. 2-106.

29
30

For excample, see Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1054th mtg, 13 Nov.
1959, para. 17 (Netherlands) and para. 18 (Ceylon);
1055th mtg, 16 Nov. 1959, para. 17 (Greece), and para. 27(Uruguay); and 1056th mtg, 16 Nov. 1959, para. 18 (UAR).

14

Br'itain.31(Subsequently France made it clear th)at des'pite,
this rebuff it was going to defy Washington and build a national atomic force.32 ) The United States was also beginniing

to suspect that it had overreacted to 'Sputnik' and that itwas capable of handling the Soviet missiles without the aid ofallies. It also came to the conclusion that its 'atoms forpeace' approach to halting the spread of nuclear weapons was
not only ineffective but was actually helping countries to develop at least a threshold nuclear capability.553
Moreover, it was argued that whatever the origins of theidea of "control", the language of the 1959 draft resolution
was tailored to the developing American position on the proliferation question, i.e., willingness to pledge adherence toany doctrine creating barriers to any additional independent
nuclear forces but maintaining the right to provide information, weapons and technology to any established nuclear force
51

52

55

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended in 1958 authorized
the transfer to allies of the non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons, fissionable nuclear materials suitable for thedevelopment of, or use in, nuclear weapons, and sensitive
information concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear equipment such as military reactors. The transfer was restricted to nations which had already made substantial progressin the development of atomic weapons. For the text of the1958 Act amendment, see United States Statutes at LaMge,
85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, (Vol. 72, Part I, Public
Laws and Reorganization Plan) (Washington, D.C. ;US Government Printing Office, -1-959), pp. 276-279. ft~r the meaningof the term "substantial progress", see IBader, The UnitedStates and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, PP. 30-33.
At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, France
maintained its previous position during the thirteenthsession. The French delegate explained that his delegation would not vote for the Irish draft because the measures envisaged in it were not disarmament measures. GAOR,
14th Sess., lst.Cttee, 1056th mtg, 16 Nov. 1959, para. 25.
Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. 40. See also, for action-reaction to "Sputnik"
and Soviet missiles, Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear
Years. The Arms Race and Arms Control', 1945-70 (New York
Praeger, 1970), PP. 42-45.

15

ano

rviewapn

adtaining;

to a.ny non-nuclear Poweras ong as, thj Un
11ited Stateoýj mýaint.ained 1'conitrol" of the fir3 4ij
s,ystemeli.
ing'q
The Sovieot Union d.id not si)pport the Irish draft resolutioni because the draft'L, did not prohilbit States from having nu-

clear weapons outs-ide their own territory, outlawing such weapons and destroying their stockpiles, or eliminating foreign
bases. For the Soviet Union, those problems had ~to be resolved
if the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was to be prevented at all. 3 5 It is obvious that the Soviet Union was unhappy that nuclear weapons were being placed on European soil
under United States control. Moreover, since the Soviet Union
had, under its 1957 agreement with the People's Republic ofChina, helped to transfer nuclear technology by giving a significant nuclear weapons technical aid - an agreement abrogated in June 1959 -it was not unexpected to find the Soviet

Union hesitant and embarassed at the prospects of pushing a
policy of non-proliferation too strongly. There were alsostrong indications that effective steps to prevent proliferation during this period would have resulted in

an exacerbat-

ion of the Sino-Soviet rift with a disruptive effect-'on the36
cohesion of the communist camp.

34

Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. 41. The term "control" was later defined by theUnited States to mean "right or ability to fire nuclear
weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing
nuclear-weapon State". This definition was included in aset of amendments introduced by the United States on 21
March 1966 to its own first draft treaty presented on 17
August 1965. DCOR, Suppl. for Jan, to Dec. 1965, Dcc.
DC/227, Ann. 1, Sec. A(ENDC/152, 17 Aug. 1969) and Ibid.,
Suppl. for 1966, Dcc, DC/228, Ann. 1, Sec. K(ENDC/l15_7
Add.1, 21 Mar, 1966).

35

G-AOR, 14th Sess., 1st Cttee, 1056th mtg, 16 Nov. 1959,
para. 24. See also the positions of Czechoslovakia andBulgaria at the same meeting.

36

0. Young,

loc.

cit., PP. 85-86.

16

The Iria8h d)raf;_T waN

dotd

yth

irtComtteon1

November 1959, 7and a-.1ew days ltrbthGeraAsmlyon 20 November by 68 votes in favour, none agaiiist aniid 12ý
abstentions (including the UJSSR, Eastern European countries-.
and France).38
The importance of that first Irish resolution lies primarily in the recognition by the General Assembly, the plenaryorgan of the United Nations, of an existing danger in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The danger was stated, in thefirst paragraph of the resolution, as tending to aggravate international tension, and rendering more difficult the maintenance of world peace and the attainment of an agreement on general disarmament. That concept of danger was maintained during different phases of NPT negotiations.
The Five-Power Resolution of 1960
The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee, during themeetings it held from 15 March to 28 June 1960, did not consider the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons as had
been suggested by the Irish resolution of 1959, The Conference's attention was mainly devoted to general and conplete disarmament (GCD) until it came to an end on 28 June 1960 upon
the withdrawal, the day before, of the Soviet Union and theother four Eastern European participants.,3

Consequently, upon

37

GAOR, 14th Sees., 1st Cttee, 1056th mtg, 16 Nov. 1959,
para. 29.

38

GA Res. 1380 (XIV), 20 Nov. 1959. Ibid., Anne., a.i. 67,
P. 3. For the detailed results of the voting, see Ibid.,
841st plen. mtg, 20 Nov. 1959, para. 10.
For an account of the Conference, see Hugh Thomas, Deathof a Conference :An Account of the Negotiations for General Disarmament (London :The United Nations Associationof Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1960), See also,
Bernhard G. BechThoefer, PotaeoitinorsC
trol (Wash~ington, D.C. ;The Brýookinýgs
Instituition,
ý1961),
pp. 536-557, The withdrawal took place in the aftermathof the American U-2 photographic reconnaissance aircraft39

17

Ireland'sý
requestthusino'"rventiorn of the -vi-derdi
Assem Inatiýon
,oT' nuc;learti weLapons" was incluzdeýd f or a seco-nd
timein the(, agenda of the General Assembly at its fif'teenth.
sessi-ýon .4
Ireland submitted a draft resolution to the First Committbee which was subsequently co-sponsored by Japan, Ghana, Mexico and Morroco. By virtue of' the five-Power draft resolution, the General Assembly would:"(1) call upon all governments to make every effort
to achieve permanent agreement on the preventionof the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons;(2) call upon Powers producing such weapons, as atemporary and voluntary measure pending the negotiation of such a permanent agreement, to refrainfrom relinquishing control of such weapons to any
nation not possessing them and from transmitting
to it the information necessary for their manufacture; and(3) call upon Powers not possessing such weapons,
on a similar temporary and voluntary basis, torefrain from manufacturing these weapou and fromotherwise attempting to acquire them."(Emphasis
added.)
The 1960 Irish text went further than the Irish resolution of .1959 in several respects. First, a permanent agreement
became a definite choice for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, the new text called upon the nonnuclear States to declare at once their intention neither tomake nor to acquire such weapons. It also called upon theincident over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union and the crisis atmosphere resulting,from the abandonment of the summit meeting between the heads of Governments of France,
the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, which
was to be held in Paris on 16 May 1960.
40

GAOR, 15th Sess. Anns. (Vol. II), a.i. 67, 86, 69 and73, Doe. A/4434, 15 Aug. 1960 and Doc, A/4680, 20 Dec.
1960, para. 2.
41

Ibid., Doc. A/4680, 20 Dec. 1960, para. 10.

18

non-nuclear States, as a temporary measure, todeco_lareI' mediately their intention neither to make nor to auquiresuchweapons.4 Moreover, the text called upon the
nuclear States,
not only to refrain from relinquishing control
of nuclear
weapons but also to refrain from transmitting
the informationnecessary for their manufacture. Lastly, thePowers not possessing nuclear weapons were not only called
upon to refrainfrom manufacturing such. weapons but also to
refrain from making other attempts to acquire them. As a whole,for the firsttime, the new text dealt with the substanceof the matter incontrast with the two previous Irish Dttempts
which were of arather dominant procedural character.
In explaining the new draft, MLr. Aiken clearly
demonstrated its limits and shortcomings. He explained
that:"The draft resolution took account of the difficulties of the nuclear Powers - the fact that
their
defence now depended upon nuclear weapons,
that
there was no infallible method of inspection
andcontrol, and that a secretly retained stockpileofnuclear weapons would give an unscrupulousStatethe power to dominate the world. For that reason,
the draft did not call for immediate surrender
destruction of nuclear weapons, and would not or
prohibit the nuclear Powers from retaining
such
weapons, pending future agreement, provided thatthey were kept in the possess i?n and under thecontrol of their own forces."~The item proposed by Ireland did not receive
much attention in the phase of the general debate in theFirst Committee where all items on disarmament were discussed
together
and where the main attention was focused on C-CD,
alreadytaken up by the abortive Conference of the Ten-Nation
Committee on Disarmament. Special attention to the Irish
item was42

43

See the statement made by the Irish representative.
GAOR, 15th Bess. (Part I), 1st Cttee, 1120th
mtg, 1 Dec.
1960, para. S.
Ibid., para. 10,

19

,esolutiL_on- andintephase of consideration of the fiePoe
anyrpeetonyamong few members of the Firs Comte
inig Eastern European Countries and NATO.
were
The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries
in favour of the draft resolution. One country, Bulgaria,
anotherwhile ready to vote for the Irish draft, noted that
4 4 had the advantage ofdraft resolution presented by Poland
weapons
explicitly calling upon States not possessing nucLear
other terto refrain from manufacturing them on their own orabout "theritory. 4 5 The Bulgarian representative was worried
the militardanger that nuclear weapons might be consigned tocountry,
ist designs against neighbouring countries". 46 Another
did not
Poland, explained that its support for the Irish draft
should posimply acceptance of the idea that the great Powers
4
The importance of thesess nuclear weapons indefinitely.
a future
Bulgarian stand is that it was very indicative ofoppersistent theme in Soviet and Eastern European statements
posing nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO. Generally
thespeaking, the USSR, at that time, was apparently viewing
solution of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons rather in the context of creating a favourable atmosphere
44

45
46

47

A/C.l/
Ibid., Anns, (Vol. II), a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73, Doc.
"Esentitled
was
draft
The
1960.
Oct.
24
1,
Rev.
T-.252/
tablishment of Conditions Conducive to Reaching Agreement
on General and Complete Disarmament". The draft was not
put to the vote in the First Committee.
Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1120th mtg, 1 Dec. 1960, para. 4.
Ibid., para. 3. It is to be noted that in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture inits territory any atomic weapons as part of the arrangements for its accession to NATO. This undertaking is incorporated into the protocols modifying and extending theBrussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, which were signed in
Paris on 23 October 1954, See UNTS, Vol. 211, pp. 364 and
368,
GAOR, 15th Sass. (Part I), lst Cttee, i135th mtg, 19 Dec.
1960, para. 38.

20

for the solutioni of the problemof geeaarmament .48

atopeedsThe NATO countries were divided on the Irish draft. Thosein favrour of it were Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway.
Among those not in favour of it were the Netherlands, Italy
and the United States, the oountries whioh expressed theirviews in the First Committee. The Netherlands doubted whether
the Assembly would be aoting wisely in expressing an opinion
on the substance of the matter in the manner recommended in
the draft resolution. It regretted that the idea of a study
had been omitt'ed from the draft resolution, while the object,
namely, an international agreement, had been relegated to -thesecond place, nuclear and non-nuclear Powers being requested
to accept a unilateral moral obligation. It noted further thatthe draft did not propose any time-limit for the obligationand it did no-t offer sufficient assurances of substantial control.4 9 The Italian representative equally expressedrerv
50
ations on de facto moratoria unaccompanied by controls.
The United States objections to the Irish draft were, as
stated in the First Committee, based. on two arguments. One wasthat it called for -unverified commitments of indefinite duration.5

The other was that:"The nuclear Powers cannot expect other nations indefinitely to deny to themselves such weapons as48

Ibid., 1119th mtg, 29 Nov. 1960, para. 38. See also Romania, 1120th mtg, 1 Dec. 1960, para. 22.

49

Ibid.,

50

Ibid., 1.135th mtg, 19 Dec. 1-960, para. 36. Italy, a few
years ltater, on 14 September 1965, presented to the ENDC
a "Draft of a.Unilateral Non-acqu-isition Declaration",containing an undertaking to accept inspection. See, DCOR,
Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1965, Doc. DC/227, Ann. 1, Sec. D(ENDC/1557, 14 Sept. 1965).

51

US Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960
(Pub, No. 7172, July 1961) (WýIashington, D.C. :US Government Printing Office, 1961), P. 372.

-para. 44.

21

o th-1eir defenc;e if
euie
thiey maiy believe r
to accept the resrefuse
they, the nuclear Powers,of nuclear
build-upown
theirhalting
ponsibility ofof theirprocess
the
begin
to
refuseandweaponssoughtdestruction. This is why we have for so long
Powers.
nuclear
the
by
field
action in the nuclear
One of our concerns with the resolution therefore,
responis that it does not recognize thý2 central
Powers."sibility of the nuclear
argument was also
An interesting point here is that theof the Assembly
made in similar terms during the same session
text "because it wasby India but which voted for the Irish
5
representative exthe least we could obtain". 3 The Indian
not in any way be inplained that their vote on this "should
India has changed its
terpreted to mean that the Government ofof nuclear weaposition with regard to the total abandonment
the argument whichpons." 5 4 A more interesting point is that
other countries in thewas later resorted to by India and many
abandoned by thedifferent phases of the NPT negotiations wasan NPT free of any
United States itself, which was pushing forStates to halt
obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon
their means of delitheir own build-up of nuclear weapons andvery.
to theIt seems, however, that United States' objections
opposiIrish text in 1960 stemmed from the well-establishedrestrictions ontion of the Eisenhower Administration to any
allies. 5 5 The
the transfer of American nuclear technology -toin 1959 drew
Irish resolution supported by the United States. But, the 1960
a distinction between 'control' and 'possession'
52

Ibid.

55

GAOR, 15th Sess. (Part I), 960th plen. mtg, 20 Dec. 1960,

54
55

para. 53.
Ibid., para. 35.

opposiFor an account of an explanation of United States'I
UnitedThe
Bader,
see
1960,
of
text
tion to the Irish
States and the S-Pread of Nuclear_Weapons,p.427,fo
P.427,fodrawn.
which the following is partly

22

Irish text went beyond that distinction and called into question the concept of transfer of "information". In the fall of
1960, an important development was evolving in the field of
the control and use of nuclear weapons within the Atlantic
alliance. At the December 1960 NATO ministerial meeting, United States Secretary of State, MAr. Christian Herter, suggested
the idea of a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM')

multi-

lateral force; a force which was envisaged as a means of satisfying lEuropean allies desirous of having a larger share in
the nuclear defence of the alliance by providing a means bywhich they could at least 'own' but not 'control' nuclear weapons. An interesting point here is that on 19 December 1960,
when the NATO communiqu4 including the suggestion of a MRBBM
multilateral force was released,56 the voting was taking placeon the Irish draft in the First Committee of the General Assembly. At that time too, the Kennedy Administration was about
to take over in January 1961, and it seems that the departing
administration was not willing to prejudice the future of any
nuclear arrangement the United States might make with its NATO
allies by subscribing to the Irish text. Moreover, according
to one study, the opposition of the United States and other57
Francewestern Powers was determined by the French attitude,

having detonated its first atomic device on 13 February 1960,
the seoond on 1 April 1960, and was about to detonate thethird one on 27 December 1960.58

56

57

58

DOSB, Vol. X~LIX, No. 1124, 9 Jan. 1961, pp. 39-40. For thesuggested MREBM multilateral force, see para. 7 of the communiqu4.
Harold Keran Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists
and Politicians. The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban
Ne--otiations (Ann Arbor :University of Michigan Press,
1966), p. 268.
,rhives,Vol. XII, 19.59-1960,,
Cotmorr
Keesin'pp. 17279-17280A and 17349A; and Vol. XIII, 1961-1962,
P. 17844B.

23

the First Committee on 19
on theD)ecember, 1960, 59 and approve,i by the General Assemblyand 26 absfollowing day by 68 votes in, favour, none against
and other NATOtentions (including the United States, Franoecountries). 60
TheýIriish draftwsadpe

in

The Irish Resolution, 1961
Assembly,
It was only on 4 December 1961 that the General
adopt unanimousupon another Irish initiative, 61 was able toofly a resolution on the "prevention of wider dissemination
to be widelynuclear weapons", 62 a resolution which has comecontrol negotiaknown and referred to in disarmament and arms
tions' jargon as the "Irish Resolution". The Resolution"1. Calls upon all States, and in particular upon
the States at present possessing nuclear weapons,
to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States notpossessing such weapons, and provisions under which
States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons;
ends."16 3
2. EUres all States to co-operat6 to those
The Irish resolution of 1961 is different from the previfor
ous one of 1960 in that it is categorical in calling only
an international agreement subject to inspection and control

60

GAOR, 15th Sess. (Part I), 1st Cttee, 1135th mtg, para. 23.
20 Dec. 1960. Ibid., Anns. (Vol. II),GA Res. 1576(XV),
a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73, p. 27. For the detailed resultsof the voting, see Ibid., 960th plen. mtg, 20 Dec. 1960,
para. 28.

61

GAOR, 16th Sess.,
16 Aug. 1961.

62

GA Res. 1665(XVI), 4 Dec. 1961. Ibid., P. 3.

63

Ibid.

59

Anus.

(Vol.

24

III),

a.i.

81,

Dcc.

A/4845,

without first seeking temporary and voluntary measures. Secondly, States possessing nuclbar weapons were primarily held
responsible to secure the conclusion of the international
agreement. 64Thirdly, States not possessing nuclear weapons
were also called upon to undertake not to acquire control of
nuclear weapons. 65
Since there was general support for the Irish text, thediscussions in the First Committee were very brief. Some States, however, regretted that the text did not cover the contingency of a nuclear State delivering nuclear weapons to a
non-nuclear State or training troupe belonging to the latterin the use of such weapons, while the former still retained
control over them. 66Fears were expressed by the two Eastern.
Euiropean countries participating in the discussions, Ukra,nian
SSR and Poland, that the plans to supply NATO forces with nuclear weapons might lead to the acquisition of those weapons
by the Federal Republic of Germany, "a breeding place of militarism an
64

65

66

67

eacim,

67and a country "committed to a -policy

M6r. Aiken, in introducing the Irish text in the First Committee, suggested the setting up of a small committee ofexperts from the nuclear Powers to work out a draftG agreement for submission to their own governmnents in -the first
instance. When the agreement had been signed by the nuclear Powers, it would be submitted to the UN for its approval and the accession of the non-nuclear Powers. Ibid.,
1st Cttee, 1208th mtg, 30 Nov. 1961, para. 28.
The phrases "acquire control of" and "relinquishing control of" were put in the resolution so that the UnitedStates would be able to vote for it, thus allowing arran.g ements with allies for a certain sharing in the use of
nuclear weapons. E.L.N. Burns, "Can the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons be Stopped ?", InternationalOrganization, Vol.
XIX, No. 4, Autumn 1965, P. 858.
G-AOR, 16th Sees., let Cttee, 1208th mtg, 50 Nov. 1961,
para. 51 (Ukranian SSR) and 1209th mtg, 50 Nov. 1961,
para. 10 (India).
Ibid., 1208th mtg, 30 Nov. 1961 (Ukranian SSR).

25

ofannexing the German Democratic Republic and one-thrd of
Plish territory".6
The support brought to the Irish resolution in 1961 byboth the United States and the Soviet Union was in line with
the non-proliferation provisions included in the disarmament
proposals put forward that year by each of them to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.
The United States proposals entitled "Declaration on Disarmament: The United States Programme for General and Comple-69
te Disarmament in a Peaceful World" , dated 25 September
1961, included the following provision:"States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish
control of such weapons to any nation not owningthem and shall not transmit 'to any such nation theinformation or material necessary for their manufacture, States not owning nuclear weapons shallnot manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain
control of such weapons belonging to other States,or seek or receive informati9 or materials necessary for their manufacture."
The Soviet,Union proposals under the heading "Mlemorandumof the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Measures to Base International Tension, Strengthen Confidence among States and Contribute to General and Complete Disarmament", dated 26 September 1961, 71included three paragraphs
under the sub-heading "(m)easures to prevent the further spread
The first paragraph read as follows"The Soviet Government considers that there is atpresent a possibility of concluding an agreement
by which the nuclear Powers would undertake not toof nuclear weapons".

69

Ibid,., 1209th mtg, 30 Nov. 1961 (Poland),
GAOR, 16th Sess., Anns. (Vol. I), a.i, 19,
Sept. 1961.

70

Ibid.,

71

Ibid.,,Dcc, A/4892, 27 Sept. 1961.

68(Stage I, para. C, sub-para. (e)),

26

Dcc. A/4891,

25

give nuclear weapons to other countries, and thoseStates which do niot possess nuclear weapons would
undertake not to7 ake them or obtain them from thenuclear Powers."'
In supporting the Irish resolution of 1961, the Soviet
Union was oonsistent with its position the previous year. However, it did not partioipate at all in the discussions on the
non-proliferation item in the First Committee. The Soviet support for a non- proliferation policy was manifested in theabove mentioned "Miemorandum". But a very important developmentin the declared Soviet stand linked the danger of an increasein the number of Powers possessing nuclear weapons with Soviet
preoccupation with the Federal Republic of Germany. The paragraph immediately following the firs,t paragraph quoted abovefrom the Soviet "Mvemorandum", included the following:"It should be clearly realized what would be theresult of placing atomic weapons at the disposalof the Federal Republic of Germany, where there
are many people who cherish revanchist dreams andwould itop at nothing to achieve their agression
ends."
This linkage was later accentuated, as this study will demonstrate, by the plans for nuclear sharing within NATO, i.e.,the Multilateral Nuclear Force (M~LF) and the Atlantic Nuclear
74
Force (AMYF).
The United States' favourable position in 1961, at variance with its position on the Irish resolution of 1960, can be
explained by President Kennedy's new policy in the field ofarms control and disarmament. He had long been interested inthis field. HIe had come to office determined to do what hebelieved President Eisenhower had not done - press I)ard. for72

Ibid., para. 22.

73

ibid., para. 25.

74

See Part II of this study.

27

gremnt.n
menigflArscon-trol- anLd Di*sarm,,-amfenLt Ageni-

ACD esablihedoii 26 S-eptember 1961 upon President
cy" wa5
Kenedys request, to deal with all arms control matters.7 On
teis;sue of nuclear proliferation, the Kennedy Administration
to pacify non-nuclear allies, by giving thempol,icy was firsta greater voice in the management of the nuclear affairs of
the alliance, by elaborating the idea of a multilateral nuclear force previously suggested by the outgoing Administration, and thirdly by perpetuating the established nuclear Powers' control of nuclear arms through a test ban and an activc non-proliferation policy.76
The Si nificance of the I"Irish Resoluition"
The "Irish Resolution" was the outcome of four sessions of
the United Nations General Assembly. Neither the DisarmamentCommission nor the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on
Disarmament were able to discuss the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The discussions were on the wholevery brief in a period of intensive debate on General disarmament and a test ban. The process was long but inevitable inan organ. meeting once a year, and in an atmosphere of distrust
and with coi-,plicated problems to resolve, especially in thecontext of alliance rel-ationshi,ps.
The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons increasing in geometrio progression, as seen by Ireland when it
first brought the question before the United Nations, was neverquestioned during the four-year debate.

There was a generaltendency to accept a statistical danger in proliferation, i.e.,

75

Roberts, 22,cit,, pp. 52-54. For the "Arms Control andDisarmament Act" of 26 September 1961 establishing the"Agency", see US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961 (Pub.
No. 5, Aug. 1962) (Washington, D.C. :US Government Printing Office, 1962), PP, 482-495.

76

Bader, The United States
22ls pp. 44--46.

and the Spread of Nuclear Wea-

28

pobablityof nuclear war inrasn
theLhrclear Poesicessof the dangerý.

a

elyn

aI th

nImbe

of nu-

rfudaayi

Referl-ence, was occasionally mliade toite dnge

78
The danger ofprlfof catalytic war or war by accident.
ation seemed to be accepted as such, withouat need for concept-

ualization, probably on the grounds of the great destructiveness and horrifying effects of a nuclear weapon's use in warfare.
The non-proliferation concept confronted, as it was evolving during the four years, many problems which -were either resolved later on in the process of treaty-making or lingeredon, after the NPT had entered into force, awaiting to be solved. All problems were mainly the result of the inescapable distinction between countries having nuclear weapons and countries
not having such weapons.
The concept as sanctioned by the General Assembly in 1961
was twofold. First, the problem was to be dealt with by meansof concluding an international agreement. This method of solution was accepted as such. As one writer explains, "(t)he impulse to discuss treaties stems, first of all, from the tendency of participants in the discussions unconciously to callfor discussion of the most traditional and formal methods ofsolution
77

78

79

..
, ,79

This is not to say that no other method was

On the statistical danger, see F.C. Ik14 "Nth Countries
and Disarmajient", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.
XVI, No. 10, iDec. 1960, P. 391.
For an extensive discussion of catalytic war, see Donald
H. Kobe, "A Theory of Catalytic War", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VI, No. 2, June 1962, pp. 125-142.
See also, Henry Alfred Kissinger, The Necessitv for
Choice. Proslpecots of American Foreign Policy New York
Harper, 1961), pp. 242-244.
Jeremy J. Stone, Strategic,.Persuation. Arms Limitations:rColumbia UiestPrss,throu. h Dialogue (Nw196_7 ,'pp. 85-86. Mfr. Stone, though sceptical of formal
agreements, concedes that a treaty to prevent the spread29

coceve,f aCt Hthtime:,(Uiaea

declarat,iio.ns_ were sugges,,t-

ed~~~~~~ 90
byIeadistmoaymasres, Hfowe-ver
sem ht
wela

th

crIcs

_i
t

of nnilaTeral declarations as

fteie

sdden res,umption of nuclear teýsting by the UISSR'

on1 September 1961,

after a three-year moratorium agreed tob',ythe three nuclear-weapon States in 1958, had an effect intediscarding of this method of solution in 1961.

On the oth-erhand, a non-proliferation treaty was not considered as the
so.-le measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
A test-ban treaty was receiving high priority at the time of
the adoption of the 1961 Irish resolution. Nuclear-free zones
were also proposed and considered as effective non-proliferation measures. An international agreement as a general measure did not mean the neglect of other measures. On the contrary, these other measures, in conjunction with the international agreement, were given a part to play in erecting a nonproliferation regime.
Secondly, the international agreement was to be based on
certain basic obligations on the part of both nuclear-weapon
States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The former would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons
and from transmitti-ng the information necessary for their manufacture to the second group of states. The latter would
undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control ofsuch weapons. We can distinguish here between three different
situations:of nuclear weapons has some real urgency. Another writer
explains that "(o)ne manner in which any group deters
action it considers 'anti-social'is to articulate its
feeling in some form that is generally acknowledged asbinding. This is part of the function of Law in a local
community, and of treaty law in the legally more primitive international community." Michael E. Sherman, Nuclear
Proliferation :The Treaty and After (Toronto :The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), P. 40,
hereinafter cited as Nuclear Proliferation.

30

FJirst,nIOn-pr,,o_liferaPLIti on- of nu1clea

weapon

In

by,.
barn

dependent nationlal _manucfacture.8 Onlynonula-epnttswould. unldertake,_ not to manufacture nucle_ar epns:uclear-weapon SDtat-es would not be restricted quantitati_vely tandqualitativelly in continuing the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
This unchecked activity can be defined as vertical proliferation. It should be noted, however, that the whole idea of the
Irish resolution was based on the assumption that the nuclearweapon-States themselves were going to disarm in the foreseeable future. Its support by the Assembly cannot therefore beinterpreted as implying approval of the quantitative and qualitative armse race by the nuclear-weapon States.
Second, non-dissemination of nuclear weapons by both restricting the flow of information necessary for their manufacture and the transfer of control over the weapons. The nuclearweapon States wou-ld refrain from transmitting the information,and the two categories of States would be bound by synallagmatic obligations as to control. The free transmission of information and transfer of control can be defined as horizontal
proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States, however, would befree to transmit information and transfer the control to eachother. Moreover, according to the letter of the resolution,
non-nuclear-weapon States advanced in the field of nuclear research were not prohibited from transmitting information pertaining to the making of nuclear weapons to other non-nuclearweapon States.
Third, dispersion of nuclear weapons beyond the territories of the manufacturing Power. This situation is allowed tocontinue as long as the weapons are under the control of the
manufacturing country;

as is

still

the case with the American

nuclear weapons located in the Federal Republic of Germany.
80

According to the dictionary of the "Encyclopaedia Britannica"l, to proliferate is "to produce, reproduce, or grow,especially with rapidity, as in tissue formation". Britannica World Language Dictionary (New York :Funk andWagnalls, 1960).

Wt heesiuaios
tesreen,anýd for thoonsistenoy,~1,ý--ý
we opederrh ueofoe emtnthis

aeof

tudy.

itmspopsd býy Irel_and asweLl as all Iri.sh resolUtionsý
aotdbyý thie Assembly, we opted for the use of the term "nonprlieration" for two obvious reasons. The first is that effrsto oheok the spread of nuclear weapons were mainly direoted -towards those oountries oapable of developing an independent nuclear-weapon oapability without external help, if
they took the politioal deoision to do so. 81That, and not thedissemination of nuclear weapons by the nuoilear-weapon Statesto the non-nuclear-weapon States was the main preoooupation.
This is not to say that the danger of dissemination was underestimated or that no element of dissemination exists in developing independently a nuolear weapon oapability. The seoond
reason is that the term 'non-proliferation' was used in thefollowing phases of the negotiations towards the formulationof a definite treaty text, which also uses that term. 8
Now that a concept had been formulated, the way would haveseemed open for negotia ting a treaty in which States possessing
81

According to a study published in 1960, it was found thatseveral countries had the necessary knowledge, materials,
and technicians to make nuclear weapons if they so wished.
Potential nuclear Powers had been divided roughly into
three groups with respect to nuclear capabilities. The
firstgroup comprises the highly industrialized countries,
the second, the economically capable, technically fairly
competent but perhaps somewhat more limited in scientificmanpower, and the third group, the economically capable
but more limited in industrial resources and scientificmanpower. National Planning Association, The Nth Country
Problem and Arms Control (Washington, D.C. :National Planning Association, Special Project Committee on Security
Through Arms Control, Pamphlet No. 108, Jan. 1960).

82

It was only at -the 19th Session of the General Assemblythat an agenda item proposed by India was entitled nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. See G-AOR, 19th Sess.,Anns. (Vol. I), Ann, No. 2, Doc. A/5758, 10 Oct. 1964.

32

nuclear weapons were primarily held responsible, by the 1961
resolution, to'lead. the way towards securing its final conciusion. Meaningf-ul negotiations were, however, delayed until
draft treaty texts, were presented and certain guiding principles were formulated upon which a treaty was to be negotiated.

33

CHAPTER 2
The Formulation of Guiding PrinciDles
GA Resolution 22aLxx)l
In view of the unanimous approval of the "Irish Resolution" in 1961 and the importance given to non-proliferation in
the United States and the USSR proposals on disarmament, 1Ireland saw little need, during the 17th session of the General
Assembly, for a further resolution on non-proliferation. The
Irish representative had hoped, however, that without protracted negotiations, the nuclear Powers would agree at once amongst
themselves not to give nuclear weapons or the knowledge of making them to countries which neither made nor possessed such
weapons. Once such an agreement was arrived at by the nuclear
Powers, it would be reciprocated by the agreement of the nonnuclear Powers and to accept international inspection of theirterritories as a guarantee of their good faith. 2But though1

By 1962, the USSR went further than its own proposals of
1961, referred to in Chapter 1, by submitting to the ENDC
on 15 March 1962 a "1(d)raft treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict international control", which provided, among the first-stage measures, an article on the"1(p)revention of the further spread of nuclear weapons"(article 16). DOOR, Suppl. for Jan. 1961 to Dec. 1962,
Dcc. DC/203, Ann.. 1, Sec. C(ENDC/2, 15 MYar. 1962). The United States too went further than its proposals of 1.961, also
referred to in the previous chapter, by submitting to the
ENDC on 18 April 1962 an "1(o)utline of basic provisions ofa treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peacefulworld", which provided also among the first stage measuresa paragraph on "(n)on-transfer of nuclear weapons". Ibid.,Doc. DC/203, Ann. 1, Sec, F(ENDC/30, 18 Apr. 1962).* Bothproposals will be reverted to in Chapter 3 of this study.

2

UN Doc. A/C.I/PV.1267 (prov.), 6 Nov. 1962, pp. 57-62 in
US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1962 (Vol. II) (Pub. No.
19, Nov. 196ý3) _(Washington, D.C. :US Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 1205-1208.

35

supr
conideabowasurewere speof icall

o nonprlierton, n-.o mea-giementione11aýd inaIny resouton adopteon17th- sesio.
diarmament, at theýi
18th session of the General Assembly, an attempt intheirst Committee to specify in a resolution on GCD "'measýures intended to prevent the proliferation of nuolear weapons"At,th

did not suooeed. The sponsors of the draft of that resolutiondroýpped any mention, in its revised form, of the speoifio measuares whioh were previously enumerated, in its first form, asserving to reduoe international tension, lessen the possibility of war and facilitate agreement on GCD. The omission wasin response to objections raised by the Soviet Union that it
was improper to specify measures proposed by oertain ooiuntries
3
while making no mention of those proposed by others.
At the 19th session of the Assembly, an agenda item entitled "1(n)on-proliferation of nuclear weapons" was proposed by4
But due to the special circumstances prevailing at
India,.
that session caused by the conflict ovcor payment of expenses
incuirred through th1e peace-keeping operations in the Middle-

East and the Congo, and the threat of the application of artiole 19 of the UN Charter, 5the General Assembly was paralysed
to the extent of not being able to draw up its own final agenda, It only adopted very few resolutions most of which were3

18th Se,ss., A3ms. (Vol. II), a.i. 26, PP. 5-7, Doc,
A/5571/Add, I, 20 Nov. 1963, and Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1338th
mtg, 15 Nov. 1963, para. 2.
GAOR,

4 Ibid., 19th Sess., Anns. (Vol. I), Ann. No.2, Doc. A/5758,
10 Oct. 1964.

5

Article 19 stipulates that :"A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in
the Gene--al Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals
or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it forthe preceding two full years .. 1

6

For the status of the agenda of the 19th session, see GAOR,
19th Sess., Anns. (Vol. I), Ann. No.2, Doc. A/5884, 10 Feb.
1965, and Ibid., 1330th plen. mtg, 18 Feb. 1965, paras.
280-336.

36

nesary to seuethe(- minimu

1 tjhefort

reureet
IOlUI

1ontilnu-

organýization]01
ingmachine11ry oýf the1,CIt
bly inwas only durngth

2th sesoMfheerlAsm1965 thýat a resolu,.tion on th!-e no-roieato

clear weapons was adopted

Co u

for the first time since 1961. Thec

.resolution called for the negotiation of an international
treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on thebasis of -the following five main principles:(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes whichmight permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate,
directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.
(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of muttual respons'Lbilities and obligations of the nuclear andnon-nuclear Powers.
(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievementof general and comp-ete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disnrmament.
,(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions toensure the effectiveness of the treaty.
(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect theright of any group of States to conclu-de regi'onal treaties in order to ensure the 8total absence of nuclear weapens in their -territories.8
Befor'e discussing each of the five principles and the immediate debates preceding their adoption by the Assembly, it
should be pointed out that the principles were not simply theoutcome of one session of the General Assembly. They had theirroots in the Irish era of 1958-1961 and the four years that
followed, especially in the EINDC and the Disarmament Commis-

sion debates.
In 1961, when the "Irish Resolution" was adopted, the General Assembly passed three resolutions on the "Question of Disarmament", two of which had dealt with three questions most7

Ibid., "-uppl. No.15 (A/5815).

8GA Res. 2028(XX), 19 Nov. 1965. Ibid., 20th Sess., knns.
(Vol. III), a.i. 106, p. 5.

37releantto ngtaiga

non-proliferation

treaty and conse-

qetyhaid a bearing, oni paving- thie way for the eventual for11ul1ation ofL the fiv
FirT.st,up,1,on aprincipýles.
weihiniýtiative,9 the United Nations Se--cretary-Ceneral-Was re_quested by the General Assembly to makeaný inqCUJiry about the conditions under which countries not posses-sing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specif-ic unudertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise
acquir:ing such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future,nulgear weapons in their territories on behalf of any othercountry. 1
The results of the inquiry were included in a report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Disarmament Commission
on 2 April 1962. The report was virtually a presentation of thetext of replies received by the Secretary-General from sixty11
It would be useful to pretwo members of the United Nations.,
sent here a very brief summary which was later made of those
replies by the UN Secretariat. The summary goes as follows
9

Ibid., 16th Sess., Anns., a.i. 19, Doc. A/4980, 22 Nov.
19_61, para. 5 and Doc. A/4980/Add. 1, 30 Nov. 1961, paras.
2-5.

10

GA Res. 1664(XVI), 4 Dec. 1961. Ibid., P. 31. The UnitedStates (as well as other NATO memTbers) opposed the resolution on the ground that it would prejudice existing def ensive arrangements. The inquiry seemed to the United Statesas academic, since the circumstances that had made def ensive agreements necessary must cease to exist before thoseagreements could be ended. Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1208th mtg,
though objecting to the
30 Nov. 1961, para. 7. The U-Se-,words "in the future", supported the resolution as a stepin the right direction. Ibid., para. 17.

11

DOOR, Suppl. for Jan. 1961 to Dec. 1962, Docs. DC/201,
2 Apr. 1962 and DC/201/Add. 2, 22 Mar. 1962. In addition,
a communication was received from the German Democratic
Republic, Ibid., Doc. DC/201/Add. 3, 13 Mar. 1962.

38

"As to the conditions for adherenceý to the trecatyi
mentioned by the responding Governments, that ofrecproitywas most frequent. Some singled out
speoific States or all States within specified
areas whose reciprocal adherence was required;
others demanded universal adherence, including,especially, non-members of the United Nations.
Some countries also called for the implementationof measures affectin,g the nuclear Powers, andothers viewed the objective in the context of general and complete disarmament, believing that until it was achieved, national and collective security interests were likely to determine defence policy.
The three Western nuclear Powers indicated thatthe best solution was general and complete disarmament under effective international control andincluding nuclear weapons; the USSR supported theidea of nuclear-free zones, which, it felt, would
contribute towards building confidence between
States and reduce 1ýe threat of an outbreak of military conflicts."(Emphasis added.)No action was taken by the General Assembly on the basis ofthat inquiry.
Secondly, the General Assembly recommended that negotiations on GCD should be based on a joint statement of the Governments of the USSR and the United States on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations. 13The joint statement which
was included in a report submitted to the General Assembly by
the two countries on 20 September 1961 comprised two principles, 14which, though pertaining to negotiating an agreement
on GCD, were particularly relevant to the NIPT negotiations.
One of them reads as follows:"All measures of general and complete disarmamentshould be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or
12

The United Nations and Disarmament :1945-1270 (New York
United Nations, 1970), p. 266.

13

GA Res. 1722(XVTI), Part 1, 20 Dec. 1961. GAOR, 16th Sess.,
Anms., a.i. 19, P. 31.

14

Ibid., pp. 1-2.

39

rOuof Sttsgain miilitary advanta~ and thatsecritL,y i.s ensured 'equally for all."'(Emphasis
added,)
Thejothec.r principle, in the first sentence, r-uns as fol'"All disarmament measures should be implemented
from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide
firm assurance that,gll parties are honouring
their obligations." _L0(Emphasis added.)
Thirdly, the General Assembly endorsed an agreement reached by the USSR and the United States on the composition of a
new negotiating body on disarmarýent which was later called"Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".17
The ENDC played a central role in negotiati,ng the NPT. Its
debates in the years 1962-1965 on the proliferation of nuclear
weapons had provided a valuable background for the later formulation of the five principles. The same can be said of thesession held by the Disarmament Commission, upon the requestof the USSR,'18 from 21 April to 16 June 1965, The presentation of the first American draft treaty on non-ýprolife:ý'ation to
the ENDC on 17 August 1965, 19 as well as the presentation of
the first Soviet draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly at its 20th session on 24 September 1965, 20had also
initliated interesting discussions which equally provided a useful backcground for the formulation of the principles.

15

IPrinciple 5. Ibid., p. 2.

16

Principle 6, Ibid.

17

GA Res. 1722(XVI), IPart 1I, 20 Dec. 1961. Ibid., p. 31.
DCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1965, Doc. DO/210, 31 Mar.
1965,

18
19
20

Ibid., Doc. DC/227, Ann. 1, Sec. A(ENDC/152, 17 Aug. 1965),
GAQR, 20th Sess. Anns., a.i. 106, Doc. A/5976, 24 Sept.
1965.

40

agend-iýa of the 20t

attached tosesý:ýsionuo

hcrqetojheUSlhc
itsi-requesJt)its fis
draf treaty

Fo

th

fis

time sinoe ireljand'sý i-nitbiative in 1958-, the first Committeeof the General Assembly devoted consider-able attention to theproliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem was disoussed in
19 consecutive meetings of the Committee. Without going into
the detailed discussions of the two draft treaties submitted
by the United States and the USSR, which shall be dealt within different par'ts of this study, we shall concentrate on
those parts of the discussions aimed at the formulation of theguiding principles.
There were three main trends, the first represented by theUnited States, the second by the USSR and the third, the mostdominant, by other countries, and more particularly by theeight non-aligned members of the ENDC.
The United States was of the opinion that the guiding principles for the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation
were clearly expressed in the "Irish Resolution".
"2,Anyattempt to press for further agreement in the First Committee on
principles or guidelines was bound to result in the reiteration of known positions; and efforts should ...
be directedaway from generalities and towards detailed negotiations in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee."2
Accordingly, the United States submitted a draft resolution urging the ENDhC to reconvene as early as possible in orderto accord special priority to continued efforts to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
21

Ibid.

22

GAOR, 20th Seess.,para. 24.
Ibid., para. 27.

23

1st Cttee, 1366th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965,41

wepn,an-d to areoni other- re_Late,ýd steps to halt anid turnbackritinclecarvrsrae

The1USSals"o sbitda

2

draft resolution., the secon-.doper,ativeý paragraph of' whlichi rea-nds as follows.
treaty, on thie non-proliferat-ion"Considercs thi-at- the,:of nuclear weapons should be based on the following- mr,ain principles(a) States possessing nuclear weapons should undertaknot to transfer to States not possessing nuC-Lear weapons, in any manner - directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States,or through military alliances - nuclear weapcns or
the right to participate in the ownership of such
weapons or in the possession, control, emplacement
or use of nuclear weapons; not to assist thoseStates in the manufacture, in preparation for the
manufacture, or in the testing of such weapons andnot to transmit to them any information which canbe used in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.
(b) States not possessing nuclear weapons should
undertake not to devise, manufacture or prepare to
manufacture nuclear weapons, either independently
or jointly with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States, andshould renounce access to nuclear weapons in any
form whatsoever - direct or indirect, thromh
third States or through groups of States."
The third trend was directed towards the necessity of form-alating a set of principles detached from the provisions of
the two draft treaties, The first major statement in that direct,ion was made in the First Committee on 22 October 1965 byM~r. Ismael Fahmy, the representative of the United Arab Repubilic (UAR), a State member of the ENfDC, who was also acting
26
during the 20th session as a rapporteur of that Committee.
24

Ibid., Ainns.,

a.i. 106, Doc. A/C.1/L.337, 26 Oct. 1965.

ibid., Dcc. A/C.1/L.338, 27 Oct. 1965.
.26 UN Doc. A/C.1/PV.1359 (prov.), 22 Oct. 1965, pp. 21-35 in
US AODA, Documents on Digarmament,,1965 (Pub. No. 34, Dec.
1966) (Washington, D.C. :US G-overnment Printing Office,1966), pp. 485-490. Mir. Fahmy had also served as Chairmanof the First Co)mm.ittee during the 22nd session of the25

42

ThaLIt st ateet,1,de lvereýd aLfe
and USSR prpslswr

days., bLef'orie the Unt)ited Stte

iade , served asý a spr

Cor theIfor011Mu-la--tiOn o'f the" pýý-rinc'iplS.
The repre.sentative of the UAR expressed the. -view tha?t i,t'
was not the right approach to discuss non-proliferation o-f niuclear weapons on the basis of one draft, two drafts or evenmore. The woequestion should be approached on the basis ofagreed fundamnental principles. The starting point, in his view,
was to focus attention and to try to find agreement on theobjectives behind any non-proliferation treaty.2 7 Convinced of
the soundness of that approach, he believed that an attemptshould be made to find frank and real answers to the 11 following points"(1) whether there is at this stage real readinessand a sincere desire to put the names of our respective Governments on a formal treaty which binds
us all, nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;(2) whether the political atmosphere is auspicious
enough for the conclusion of an international instrument of such magnitude;(3) that, if we are firmly dedicated to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, thenwe should have an international agreement whichreally, and not artificially, ensures and safeguards this goal;(4) if we agree on this paramount point, we shouldbe able to agree on another basic principle, namely, that international agreement should be astight as possible and should indeed be free of any
loop-holes whatsoever;(5) any international treaty dealing with non-proliferation would not only take into account the interests of the nuclear Powers but should also reflect the relationship and obligations of thosePowers vis-h-vis the non-nuclear Powers;
General Assembly (1967-1968) which contributed to theformulation of the final text of the NPT. He later
became Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt from
November 1973 to November 1977.
27

Ibid. ,

p.

486.
43

(6)hat, an inentonaI agreement1on3no-proliLertio t shoUl,d Io be
12ca,ideý on the, assumiiýt ion th
L1a t
itlhudkite ula Powej.s cer,tain priy-iLeesatith expentse-s of the( non--nuiclear,. Powers, becaul,se
would
,it
then be a-one-s-ided agreemn towhnichl m1an1y, -if nlot the1muajority,, would hesitate -to('7) -that any international agreement sh-ould beviewed as a permanent international obligation and,as such, should not embody vague or controversial
provisions which, for one reason or another, could
be used by the signatories as a pretext for taking
action, either individually or collectively, which
would defeat its very purposes;(8) that any international agreement on non-proliferation should not have what are known as "escapeclauses", drafted in a way which weakens the agreement's importance from the very beginning, even
before it is signed; otherwise it would be not areal agreement but an artificial fagade to deceive
world public opinion;(9) that an international agreement on non-proliferation should be worked out in such a manner that
all Powers of the world would adhere to it;(10) that any international agreement, while preserving the nuclear status quo as it exists in theworld at present, should not permit in any form
whatsoever a changing of the nuclear balance; rather we expect that agreement to diminish all incentives, legitimate or otherwise, to increase thenumber of potential nuclear Powers;(11) that any international treaty on non-proliferation would be a step towards reaching agreement on
the prohibition of the us ý.Of, and the destructionof, all nuclear weapons".
(Emphasis added.)
The UAR representative went on to say:
"We have outlined some of the main principles whichshould be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon before we embark on the process of drafting any international document which deals with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, If we cannot agree
on those basic issues and if they are not made asclear as possible, then we do not expect that it
will be possible in the foreseeable future toagree on the basic points which, in all candour,28

bIbd.,

PP. 486-487.

44

t ret hc
areprreuiits o ay ntrntina
we rell mean itfdelswthnn-roierton
ieyapi
n a
psil
fetve
to ea
aUdýde)(mpai
cable as possible."
The statement aroused great interest amo.ng_
number of delegations,a oonsiderab,hLe

especially the delegations of the otherseven non-aligned members of the ENDC. 30 The latter, in thefirst informal meeting held by the eight non-aligned following
the UJAR statement, requested Mr. Fahmy to prepare a draft re-solution which would take into consideration the eleven points
raised in his statement.
Other statements in the First Committee followed the sameline. The representative of Ethiopia expressed the view that
the ENDC task would be made more difficult if not impossible if
the Assembly did not provide it with guide-lines embodying theprinciples upon which there seemed to be general agreement. He
cited four principles. 1 The representative of Tanzania enumerated six features that should be embodied in any treaty on nonproliferation.)2 The representative of Finland hoped that thePowers principally concerned would make an effort at the 20th
session, if not on a treaty, then at least on a set of basic
principles. 3
On 4 November 1965, a draft resolution was tabled by theeight non-aligned delegations. 34 It was introduced to the First
Committee on 8 November by the representative of the UAR on
29

Ibid., P. 487.

30

The seven are Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico,
Nigeria and Sweden.

'51 GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Cttee, 1366th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965,
paras. 33-34.
28 Oct. 1965, paras. 2-5.

52

Ibid., 1368th mntg,

35

Ibid., 1365th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965, para. 25.

34

UN Doc. A/C.1/L.339, 4 Nov. 1965.

45

behal1f, of" iltheEiht 3

Tht: dtraft' contiLned the list,of the fivepricipes
lradyquoedabove. Thie. fi_rst. four principles wer,edra,ft, submf)itted by the UAR representati-ve
prnil (eto hissevencollegues.The, fift1h, prinipe

includedrin*the firs

reaigto the1)right to est,
ab-lish denucle-arizL 7,ed0-zone1S, wassuggstebytheMexican rep,resentative.

in introducing the eight-Power draft, the bA.R representative hoped that the United States and the USSR delegations would
not press their respective d~raft resolutions to the vote. He
accordingly moved that the Committee should proceed forthwith
to vote on the draft.)6 As the United States and the USSR wereready to yield priority to the eight-Power Draft, and as there
was no objection to the UAR motion to proceed to the vote, the7debate was declared closed.3
The Eight-Power Draft was adopted by the First Committee,
at the same 'Meeting in1which it was introduced and without discussion, by 83 votes in favour, none against and six abstentions. The countries abstaining were Cuba, France, Guinea, Mali,
Pakistan and Romania.38 Consequently both the United States andthe USSR declared that they would not press for a vote on theirrespective draft resolutions.3 A few days later, the draft was
adopted by the General Assembly by 93 votes in favour, none
against and the abstention of the same countries except for
Mali which was absent.4

One country, Albania, declared that

35

GAOR, 2Qth Sess., 1st Cttee, 1373rd mtg, 8 Nov. 1965,
paras. 2-7.

36

Ibid., paras. 4-5.

37

Ibid., paras. 6-7.

38

Ibid., para. 10.

39

Ibid., para. 19 (United States) and para. 48 (USSR).

40

GA Res. 2028(XX), 19 Nov. 1965. GAOR, 20th Sess., Anns.
(Vol. III), a.i. 106, P. 5. For the detailed results ofthe vote in the Assembly, see Ibid., 1382nd plen. mtg, 19
Nov. 1965, para. 20.

46

itwas not takinge, partvot
in the(A1lof su-ch a prom'lpt approv"al of th eIght-,
Power d-raft, by the Fi,rst Comm-iittee cnbe folund in th11e, introductory st-atement made by the UAIR re,prlesentative.Hc
xlie
Theepanto

that"First, that in spite of the fact that the joint
draft is an initiative of the eight Powers, it is
the result of thorough and long negotiations, which
made it possible to have an agreed draft..
Secondly, while the eight Powers in their contacts
have no doubt benefited from the advice, constructive suggestions and proposals of many countries,
extensive and almost daily negotiations took place
and, particularly, with the United States and theSoviet Union.
Thirdly, this is a compromise resolution ...
Fourthly, the Eight-Power draft ...
is in fact acompromise draft, even as far as the eight Powers
are concerned ...
Fifthly, after extensive negotiations with boththe Soviet Union and the United States delegat4ýns,..both ... endorsed the draft as it stands."
The compromise resolution, however, was not acceptable to
Albania and the five abstaining countries, three of which explained, in the First Committee, the reasons for their abstentions,
Albania considered that to admit non-proliferation as agoal independently of the important problem of eliminating
nuclear weapons would be the wrong approach, since it would
guarantee the monopoly of certain great Powers in nuclear
weaponry. The Albanian representative referred, in this context, to the Test-Ban Treaty which was designed, into prevent the People's Republic of China from possessing nu4
clear weapons. 3
41

Ibid., paras. 8-19.

42

UN Doc. A/C.l/PV.1373 (prov.), 8 Nov. 1965, pp. 3-25 inDocuments on Disarmament,_1965, p. 516.
GAOR, 20th Sess., l382nd plen. mtg, 19 Nov. 1965, paras.

45

8-19.
47

As forththrevotethe fist

cosdeeLana

ed t acout
tae ino thurgetmasuescounrieabtinnwhc

ex

tat the resolutio

neessty ogiingpri,orit

f diaaetwihwould pre ven

Theoscnconr,

Guinea,laned th!Iei r
fail-toavir anL-d re-had ab staine_ýd f rom vot ing f or

sevealeasns.it did not believe that non-proliferation of
nucearweaonswas the most fundamental or the most urgent
aspet ofthe nuclear weapons' problem. It believcd that thenucleariPo,wers were intending merely to legalize their exist-

ing monopoly of nuclear weapons. Moreover, a NPT would be oflittle value without the participation of the People's Republicof China. It therefore considered the resolution as a partial
45
and one-sided solution similar to the Test-Ban Treaty.
Pakistan was the only country among,, the three to criticise
directly the five principles. Its representative could not help
considering whether the compromise resolution. had not beenreached at the cost of substance, and whether its deliberate
ambiguity did not merely reflect the postponement of difficult
decisions and the evasion of questions which defied easy answers. He found the principles so vaguely worded that theysounded platitudinous, and considered that this might lead to46
conflicting interpretations of their general meaning.
Interpretations of the ftve principles were made by somemembers of the First Committee. But the first interpretations,though vague and repetitious, were made by the UAR representative on behalf of -the eight co-sponsors of the resolution.

44
45

Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1373rd mt-, 8 Nov. 1965, para. 730.

46

Ibid., paras. 34-35. See also the Statement made by the
representative of Tanzania who regretted that the principleý haad been stated in rather vague and ambiguous terms.
Lbid., para. 41.

Ibid., paras. 17-18.

48

Thi

vagý1uenes

even exete

represe-nted,

and repttvns

eeudrtnal_n viwottedl

caeblnetepicls

patiulrl
iih

betee

th

thmslvsquently theA riin

fCrrom whýich thepicplswr

not clear--ly, s'tatd

The fiv

prnipe

n

Cose

danwr

shall threor

be ex-

amined on the basis of their first or original interpreL,_tations
as well as the early ones made during the 20th session of theAssembly. Their origins are also traced as far back as possible. This will enable us later on in this study to see how theinterpretation of those principles developed and varied in the
different phases of the NPT negotiations. Above all, it will
enable us to use the five principles as a sound basis for analysing the Treaty's provisions.
PrinciEle ýaýThis principle is "meant to ensure that a treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would not permit nuclear andnon-nuclear Powers to proliferate these weapons, directly or
indirectly, in any form." 47 It is obvious that this explanation adds nothing to what is already in the text of the resolution. The eight non-aligned members of the ENDCO, in a joint
memorandum on non-proliferation submitted to the ENIDC on 19
August 1966, stated in connexion with principle (a) that
"They wish to draw attention to the usefulness ofclearly defined terms in order to prevent any misunderstanding or cptradictory interpretation now
or in the future."
The only two other interpretations of this principle madeat the 20th session were those of the representatives of the
USSR and the United States. The former explained that:"The obvious meaning of that provision was that itwas necessary to halt the spread of nuclear weapons
in any possible or conceivable form, including the
granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West47

Documents on Disarmament, 1965, P. 517.

48

DCOR, Suppl. for 1966, Doc. DC/228, Ann. 1, Sec. P(ENiDC/
178, 19 Aug, 1966), pars. 8.

49Stte draf tray left no loop-holes"The~ Ute
It wudwouldany suc prlfrain
permitthat
inthieth1rough
o
drecA
ethe
baranyacion
famlar'y alliance3, which would
drct rotr,esult in) an increase in the total number of entit;ics having independent powers to use nuclear weaponis; no proposal which the United States had cons_idered in NATO would place control of nuclear
weapons, or information on their manufacture, inthe hands of any non-nuclear country. Operative
paragraph 2 (a) was therp6ore compatible with theUnited States position." ýThese two interpretations were indicative of the origins of
this principle. The question of loop-holes was originally closely associated with the plans for nuclear sharing within NATOand more particularly the American proposal for establishing
the MLF. The USSR was of the view that the first American draft
treaty of 17 August 1965 permitted the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force which would have allowed the Federal
Republic of Germany to have access to nuclear weapons. Without
going into the details of this aspect, which is analysed inPart II of this study, the following statement made by the representative of the USSR in the ENDC, commenting on the first
American draft of 17 -August 1965, used the term "loopholes" inclose conjunction with military alliances. The statement goesas follows:"The Soviet Union sees in an agreement on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons a practical meansof really stopping the process of the continuous
extension of access to nuclear weapons, whether
through the emergence of new nuclear Powers possessing their own nuclear weapons, or through accessto them in the form of participation in collective
ownership, collective use or collective control ofthem within the framework of a military alliance49

GAOR, 20th Sess., lot Cttee, 1373rd mtg, 8 Nov. 1965,
para. 45.

50

Ibid., para. 20.

50

non-dissem inIatio of nucarwea(1Uesti-on of tý0CLhe
pos-1 on doe not alo of an1oohle,rx
is, of any vau%o tecuefpae
Cetonst
to insistS
onl this(EphaLsis added.)

In Par-t II of this study, we shall focus our attention on
articles I and II as far as principle (a) is conccrned. Those
two articles were lengthily negotiated between the United States and thc USSR in order to preclude any possibility of loopholes, especially those which could lead to the proliferationof nuclear weapons through military alliances, This does notmean the neglect of the rest of the NPT as far as loopholes
are concerned. Mvany of the countries participating in the NPT
negotiations had their own views as to the meaning of a loophole. Their views shall be referred to in different parts ofthis study, as long as they were more related to the applibation of one of the other main principles. To cite one example,
the representative of India, commenting on thc absence of article III relating to "International Control" in the first two
identical treaty drafts submitted to the ENIDO on 24 August
1967 by the United States and the USSR, 5 2 said:"There will be in fact a real and dangerous loophole if there is no sat.isfactory control to ensure observance of the Lprovisions in the present
draft that the nuclear weapon Powers should nottranxsfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly, and that non-nuclear
weapon Powers should not receive such weapons or
assistance in their manufacture ... When there isso much talk of loopholes and of stringent provisions of control of manufacture of weapons, andthat also in a discriminatory mranner, it is worth
remembering that there is equal, if not greater,
justification for effective provisions to ensurethat there is no dissemination of weapons or
51

EN]DC/PV.228, 31 Aug. 1965, p. 55.

52

DOOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec. 6 (ENhDC/192, 24 Aug. 1967) and Sec. 8(ENDhC/193, 24 Aug. 1967).

wepotothe
any ~~~ný

ed byiPowerýI toancerwao

chnlg

added,)athersý- as'-india as well aýs bymn

wasphsi,omr~of ensuring-manthe effectiveness of the tr,eaty. The_relfore, a_s demonstrated
below in this chapter, it was preferred in the analysis of article III of the NPT to be guided by the fourth principle ofGeneral Assembly Resolution 2028(XX) stipulating that "(t)here
should be acceptable and workable provisicns to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty".
Prin,1cýleb

In introducing principle(b),

on behalf of the eight non-the representative of the UAR said that"it is abundantly clear from the consensus of thegeneral debate in this Committee that the very
nature, scope and import of the treaty and the future of both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers makeit necessary that the legal, political and otherobligations arising from the treaty should constitute an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilitly and obligation between the nuclear and nonnuclear Powers. It should represent a new era ofpartnership, of obligations and responsibilities.
Otherwise, the treaty provisions would lack themain force necessary for its validity. No treaty
0.n non-proliferation should be drafted on the assiumption that it takes care only of the interestsof the nuclear Powers. This is what paragraph 2B
is meant to convey. I may add, at this stage, thatthe wide acceptance of this draft could be considered as -the firsý 4 step in implementing the spiritof paragraph 2B."aligned States,

Several interpretations were made of this principle at the20th Session of the Assembly. The following three examples reflect a mixture of worries about security and disarmament measures.
J,~pCP,54
54ý joc.-vents

28 Sept.

1967,

on Disarmament,

paras.

6-7

p.

517.

1965,

52

speifian fomalundertakýing by the nuc-Lear'
Powersot to se their atomic weapons and notLt
exerth any pýressýure, political or military, base,,don the possession of such weapons. It was in thatsense that his delegation understood oDpwative paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution.ý,)
The Nigerian representative, also worried about security
reouirements of non-nuclear weapon States, stated the follow"If nuclear Powers really desired agreement, and expected the non-nuclear Powers to forswear for ever
the right to acquire nuolear weapons, they must be
prepared to pay the reasonable price asked by the
non-nuclear States. Perhaps a line would have tobe drawn between the security requirements of those- non-nuclear Powers which were members of alliances which included nuclear Powers and those of
non-nuolear Powers which were not.
17isdelegation took some comfort from the thoughtthat operative parag-raph 2 (b) of the draft resolution, although less explicit than might havebeen desired, would permit fgther discussion ofthat question at Geneva.."
Commenting also on principle (b), the representative of the
Democrati c Republic of the Congo -said that:"In his delegation's view, the responsibilities of
the nuclear Powers should be -to refrain from manufacturing additional weapons, to start the destruotion of existing stockpiles and to reconvert the
producing industries. The main effort had to comefrom the nuclear Powers, since it was they who possessed the weapons and could use them, the adoption of such measures by the nuclear Powers would
strengthen the case for the adoption by the nonnuclear States of unilateral dec ý1rations of nonacquisition of nuclear weapons."

55

GAOR, 20th Sess., lst Cttee, 1373rd mtg, 8 Nov. 1965,
para. 14.

56

Ibi-d.,

paras. 28-29.

57

Ibid. ,

para.

51.

which abstained fro-i voting, on the
resolution, wTas aceptical about the idea of a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuOne cou-,try,

Pakistan--,cloar Powers as advocated by another country. Its representative said that:"With regard to operative paragraph 2 (h), one representative had stated in the General Aýssemblythat the only practical approach to the problem ofproliferation was for the non-nuclear Powers torenounce the production, acquisition, control of,and access to nuclear weapons, while the nuclear
Powers simultaneously undertook to refrain fromproducing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles
and to reach agreement on the reduction of existIngý stockpiles. If that was the idea reflected inoperative paragraph 2 (b), the Committee was taking a retrograde step in endorsing it. Pending
agreement between the nuclear Powers on nuclear
disarmament, the question of preventing othercountries from acquiring, manu-facturing, or preparin1g to manufacture nuclear weapons should becojisidered separately from all other questions o68
disarmament, as a matter of highest importance."
Apparently the delegate of Pakistan was referring to a statem,ent made by Serdar Swaran Singh, the Minister for External
Affairs of India, during the general debate in the General Assembly.5
The United States held almost the same view as Pakistan.
While sympathizing with the feeling of many non-nuclear Statesthat there should be a balance between the obligations assumed
by the respective groups under the treaty anid while statingthat the principle was directed essentially to the associationof a non-proliferation treaty and various collateral measures,the United States was of the view that "it was important, however, not to permit the absence of agreement on any one measure
58

Ibid., para. 36.

59

Ibid.,

13158th plen.

m-tg,

12 Oct.

54

1965, para.

72.

It,wasý, obiu

thei

that

wa

priciplIb

aleda controversy overL itsý mteaning and future appic_atio,n.

r

Iin

Anýd

though the principle reflected the wishes of the non-nucle_ar6
States, as rightly stated by 'the representative of Cyprus, 1
those States were divided on its interpretation. Even the eight
non-aligned members of the ENDC, as early as 1965, had alreadydeveloped different approaches to non-proliferation. A carefully worded joint mcmorandum submitted by the Eight to the ENDC
on 15 September 1965, placing on record their basic approach tonon-proliferation, reflected their differences, The joint memorandum can be considered as the immediate origin of principle(b). The relevant paragraph stated that:"The eight delegations are convinced that measures
to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should..be coupled with or followe2d byr tanZible step2s
to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduceand eliminate the stocks p,nuclear weapons and the(Emphasis added.)means of their delivery."uThe phrase "coupled with or followed by" was introduced to
draw a balance between those who were advocating that a non.proliferation treaty should be coupled at the some time withother measures, like India and Sweden,6hoping -that this could be realized-

and those who - while

had felt, however, thatan alternative should not be disregarded.
60

Ibid., 1st Cttee, 1373rd mtg, 8 Nov. 1965, para. 21.

61

Ibid., 1372nd mtug, 5 Nov. 1965, para. 5.

62

DCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to IDec. 1965, Doc, DC/227, Ann. 1,
Sec. E(ENIDC/158, 15 Sept. 1965), para. 3.

63

India suggested during the 1965 session of the DisarmamentCommission an integrated solution of the problem of proliferation comprising 5 elements. See DCORI, 75th mtg, 4 May
1965, para. 35 in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 148,
As for Sweden, it advocated a package linking a non.-proliferation agreement with a comprehensive test ban and acutoff of fissionable materials' production. DCORI, 77th
mt-, 10 May 1965, para. 74.

55

"Tangible stoýps"ý

weeltrnmrtd`in their s-econid

reere to ab)ove,, subnoproifra tio,
joint memorandum n
96,Tlhey wreneatdin
9 uus
otho
mitd IfD
th,- folwJ

gmne"Theihtdelegations_ have individually put forward
a number of suggestions as to such tangible steps,
including a comprehensive ban of nuclear weapon
testing, a complete cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, both inthemselves effective non-proliferation measures, afreeze and a gradual reduction of the stocks ofnuclear weapons and the means of their delivery,
the banning of the -use of nuclear weapons and assurance of the security of non-nuclear weapon States. Such different steps could be embodied in atreaty asL art if its Erovisions or as declaration.of_intention."U (Emphasis added.)

The second joint memorandum not only preserved a balance
between the different approaches but alsc went further than thefirst joint memorandum in reflecting the view of some that
other measures should become part of the treaty and not merely
coupled with it. The second memorandum also reflected the differences among the Eight in their preferences for other tangible steps.
However, what the nuclear-weapon States should have accomplished or were asked to accomplish in the field of arms control and disarmament will not be treated in Part III of thisstudy relating to the application of principle Q2). Althoughclosely connected with that principle, it is more appropriate
to study arms control and disarmament in Part IV of this study
relating to the application of principle (c). In Part III, we
will treat rather three issues which later became very muchidentified with the application of principle (b). They are thepeaceful uses of nuclear energy; peaceful nuclear explosions

64

Ibid., Suppl. for 1966, Doc. DC/228,
178, 19 Aug. 1966), para. 15.

56

Ann.

1,

Sec.

P(ENDC/anid stcurvitguatcs

6

In introducing principle (c) , the representati-ve:

of: Lthe UAl

said:"As to paragraph 2 C, it is self-explanatory, However, it should be clear that a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in
itself, but must lead to further steps towards therealization of general and complete disarmament,
gradually dispensing with nuclear weapons,in orderto achieve complete nuclear disarmament.""
The principle was, as pointed out, self-explanatory. It did
not raise any direct comments in the First Committee. The principle originated di-rectly from the 1965 Eight non-aligned joint
memorandum on non-proliferation. The memorandum states that
"A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
is not an end in itself but only a means to an end.
That end is the achievement of General and Complete
Disarmamený, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament."
In their 1966 joint memorandum on non-proliferation,

theEight interpreted principle (c2) as emphasizing that the treaty
68
should be "an integral part of the process of disarmament."
The principle is closely related to principle (b) as far as
the type of balanced responsibilities and obligations in disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament, is concerned. Can the NPT be considered, as it has finally materialized, as a step towards that goal ? Was it coupled with or65

See Articles IV and V of the NPT and Security Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968.

66

Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 517.
DCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1965, Doc. DC/227, Ann, 1,Sec. E(ENDC/158, 15 Sept. 1965), para. 3.
Ibid., Suppl. for 1966, Doc. DC/228, Ann. 1, Sec. P(ENDC/
178, l9 Aug. 1966), para. 10.

67
68

57

followed by other)esre
f arms control1 or dislarmTainent?

Wh4at sort of specific probl,ems were3 contemplateýd as mo-st a.me-,nable, to solution ?
These are the kinds of questions we shall try to answer inPart IV of this study, in the application of principle (c) to
the NITT and more specifically to article V! of the treaty.
PrinciLple ±d)
In introducing this principle, the representative of the
UAR said, on behalf of the Eight, that:"kany treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has to be an effective instrument if it isreally irit.nded to be an instrument of peace. That
is why, iLn paragraph 2 D, the jocint draft resolution speaks of 'acceptable and workable provisions'
to be embodied in the treaty to ensure its effectiveness. As members are aware, some of the ideasthat may come to mind in this connexion are mentioned in certain proposals which are before theCommittee. But this does not foreclose other ideas
or proposals aiWgd at ensuring the effectivenessof the treaty."
The proposals referred to in this statement were not identified, at the time, by any of the co-sponsors of the resolution. Many of the proposals and suggestions made before theFirst Committee or elsewhere could be considered in one way or
another as contributing to the effectiveness of a non-proliferation

treaty.

That the treaty be void of loop-holes,

ensurethe security of non-nuclear weapon States and lead to disarmament-

these were all proposals that could be considered ascontributing to the cffectiveness of a treaty. But, as referred
to above, those proposals are covered by the three previous
princiLples of General Assembly resolution 20238(XX),The effectiveness of the treaty was more directly related
to the question of inspection.
69

The United States r'epresentative,

Documents on Disarmament, 19)65,pp

58

517-518.

commenti-ng- on pr,inciJpIe, (d ) Jin the F1i rst Conmmittee, was r,ightlyI
relatingý

e,ffectiveness t

gret that the principle

nsetinwhieni he exp.ressed hli_,;e"fa'iled to r-eflect more clearLly -thle

wide support voiced in the First Committee for the applicationof IAEA or equivalent international1 safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities.1,,70
The 1966~joint memorandum of the non-aligned shed some lighton the Eight's conception of principle(a).

It stated that"Principle (1) requires that there should be workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of thetreaty. The eight delegations consider that suchprovisions should Mlarantee compliance with the
obligations of the treaty. They, furthermre, believe that an essential provision to ensure theeffectiveness of the treaty, not least in the context of the undertakings on further steps towards
disarmament ... , would be thaýl of making the treaty
subject to periodic reviews." 1(Emphasis added.)
The principle of universality of adherence to the Treaty',right of withdrawal, duration and amendments are also questions
that could be considered as being closely related to the application of principle (dj).
Therefore, Part V of this study will analyse the effectiveness of the Treaty on the basis of the following criteria-

International Safeguards-

Universality of Adherence-

Adaptability to changing circumstances

The analysis will entail the discussion of Articles III,
VIII, IX, X and XI of the NPT.

70

GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Cttee, 1373rd mtg, 8 Nov. 1965,
para. 22.

71

]DCOR, Suppl. for 1966, Doc. ]DC/228, Ann. 1, Sec. P(ENI)C/
178, 19 Aug. 1966), para. 14.

59

nrouing t,he f ifCth andIn

Las principle,

the
i TJAR repre

1Prgrp21Es rel_liy a deosirablIe add-i-tion totheprncile ciedinparag,'rap,ýh 12-It comp)lements
the, iadwe lbeli_ever that-,
if it is respected andcarrid-ou it will doubtless add to the effectivenesOf, the treaty. It is, therefore, a very commendble rincip;ý supported by many delegations in
Ivloeove,nth

eight non-aligned members of the ENDC in

their1966 joint meoadmon non-proliferation stated the following"The eight delegations find principle (e) of greatinterest to countries in some regions where it ispossible to reach agreement on a treaty on denuclearization, which is in itself a measure of nonproliferation. They trust that there will be no
difficulty in embodying a provision corresponding
to this principý5 in the text of a treaty on nonproliferation."
The principle was in fact an addition to the four previous
principles. It was added, as already mentioned, upon the request of Mexico at the informxal meeting held by the Eight tofinalize their draft resolution.
The M'exican Representative had also made a statement in
the First Committee, a few days before the introduction of theeight-Power Draft, in which he considered that any draft treaty
on non-proliferation drawn up by the United Nations should contain a provision drafted along the following line:"This treaty shall be without prejudice to the rightof any group of States to conclude regional treaties designed to ensure the total absenace of nuclear
weapons and launching devices for such weapons in
the group.ctW territories of the States members of
72

Douet

75

DOOR,

nDsmmn,165,

P.518.

Sup.fr16,Dcc, DO/228,

74- -AO,1es.
L 20th 3ttee
S5Ann., 1,

hmg

60

Sec.

29 Oct.

P(ENDO/1965,

interes'0tý Lt 11
ha i1lexiv_coMha
id sh own fo thU1ie
addIi t,iono
princ:ipleoe and theIinicluitJon of an rtceithe tevxt ofa future ýNFT wal-s untý-derstanýdable. By 16,teLtnAeia
Th

countGries, w-ere already d"e.ply involv_Ied in1 t1he pVOCe(Ss Of esta
blishing

a dncerzdoeintlheir con-tinent.Jt

1965,
the Pr esidentof Boiva

Brzlthl,

On29ApicaonMexico issued a joint declaration announicing thattei (Tovernments are prepared to sign a multilateral Latin Americanagreement whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear
launching devices .. 1175 The United Nations General Assemblyat its 18th session in 1963 adopted a resolution approving theidea. 7 6 A major step that followed was the establishment of a"Preparatory Commission" on 27 November 1964 by the "Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America" held in
Mexico City from 23 to 27 November 1964. 77 The "Commission"
which had held four sessions succeeded in drafting a treaty
which was open for signature on 14 Februar Iy1967. 78 The treaty
came to be widely known and refe ,rred to as the "Treaty of
Tlatelolco", a district of Mexico City.
Principle (.t),

however, was of interest not only to States

which were in the process of negotiating a denuclearized zone,such as the Latin American States, but also to States whichwere still contemplating doing so, such as the African States.
Several African States were prompted in this field, even
earlier than the Latin American States, by the detonation of75

Ibid., 18th Sess., Anns.
Rev, 1, 14 Nov. 1965.

76

GA Rep. 3.911(XVIII), 27 Nov. 1963. Ibid., pp. 3-.4.

77

For the final Act of the Preliminary Meeting, see UN Dcc.
A/5824, 3 Dec. 1964.
DCOR, Suppi, for 1967 and 1968, Docs.ý DC/23jo and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec, 2(ENDC/186, 21 -Feb. 19)67).

78(Vol. III), a.i. 74, Doc. A/5415/

61

Pranc's frst atomic, devioet_

in the-. Alg-erilan Sahara on 13 Fe-

bray1960. It was only ina No-vembe(r 1961 that thaey succeededin securing a resolution from the General Assemýily aimed at
79
considering and respecting Africa as a de4uclearized zone.
In 1964, the Assembly of African Heads of State and Governmentof the OAU, at its first regular session, held in Cairo from17 to 21 July 1964, issued a declaration on the denuclearization of Afrioa in which they announced their readiness to undertake in an international treaty, to be concluded under the
auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire
control of nuclear weapons. 80In 1-965, an item entitled "Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa" was included in
the agenda of the 20th session of the General Assembly upon
the request of 34 African States. 81At that session, the Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the African declarationand calling upon all States to respect the declaration and82
conform to it.
Part VI of t1iis study will deal with the formulation of
Article VII of the NIT which embodies principle (f) in similarterms. Then, without overlooking the different achievements
and proposals pertaining to the establishment of denuclearizedzones in different parts of the world, some aspects of theTreaty of Tlatelolco will be treated in order to demonstrate
the issues and problems which can also confront the establishment of future deniuclearized zones.
In the latter phases of the NET negotiations in the ENDC,

7980

GA Roes. 1652(XVI), 24 Nov. 1961. GAOR, 16th Seas. Anus.
(Vol. IJII), a.i. 72 and 73, p. 17.
For the tex,t of the declaration, see Ibid., 20th Sees.,
Anus., a.i. 105, Doc. A/5976, 23 Sept. 1965.

81

Ibid., Doc. A/6127, 2 Dec. 1965, para. 1.

82

GA Res. 2033(XX),

3 Dec. 1965. Ibid., PP. 3-4.
62

two proposals aimed at explicitly referring to General Assembl~yresolution 2028 in the preamble of the NPT,The first proposal was made by Romania on 19 O0ýtober 1967.,83
Ina working paper containing amendments and additions to thefirst identical draft treaties submitted by the United States
and the USSR to the BNDC on 24 August 1967,84 Romania proposed
the ernumeration of the five principles of resolution 2028 in
the fourth preambular paragraph of the identical drafts which
was simply ref erring, in general terms, to General Assembly
resolutions calling for the conclusion of an agreement on "theprevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weVpons". 8 5 (Emphasis added.)
The second proposal was made by thc representative of the
UAR in the course of the debate that followed the presentationof the revised identical draft treaties of 18 January 1968. 86
Prompted by the Romanian proposal, the representative of the
UAR suggested that the fourth preambular paragraph should be
redrafted -,,read as follows:"In conformity with the resolutions of the General
Assembly and notably resolution 2028(xIX) calling
for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevent.ion of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons
83

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Doos, DC/230 and Add. 1,
Arin, IV, Sec. 14(ENDC/199, 19 Oct. 1967),

84

Ibid., Sec. 6(EN~DC/192, 24 Aug. 1967) and Sec. 8(EN]DC/193,
24 Aug. 1967).

85

The use of the term "dissemination" instead of "proliferation" in the fourth preambular paragraph might leave theimpression that the authors of the two identical drafts
had intended to emphasize the prominence of earlier resolutions on non-proliferation which were all entitled, including the "Irish Resolution" of 1961, "1(p)revention of
the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons".

86

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Doos. DC/230 and Add, 1,Ann. IV, Sec. 7(ENDC,/192/Rev, 1, 18 Jan. 1968) and Sec, 9(ENDC/192/Rev, 1, 18 Jan. 1968).
63

and~~

th~

pic
rnnin
1eea
iplso

suc 1 anTh

repres ent
iat-ive of the UAR hoped that the mention ofresolution 2028, considered in some way tile charter,of nonproliferation, would contribute to the proper implementationand sound interpretation of the treaty.8 8
The United States mildly objected to the two proposals
inthe following terms:"The cc-Chairmen 89have made clear several timed
the importance which they attached to this resolution in formulating their drafts, and have also
dwelt at length on the extent to which the present
draft accords with its principles. As the Committee knows, however, the resolution has been subject to interpretations about which some controversy unfortunately has arisen, At this stage in
our work, I am convinced that we would not risk
transferring this controversy about interpretation to the treaty itself by making the changes
which the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Romania proposed. In any event, thepresent fourth preambular paragraph encompasses
this and othe§ qal important General Assembly
It is obvious from that statement that in rejecting
theRomanian and UAR proposals, the United States was
not contesting the value and importance of resolution 2028.
Even earlier
in the debate, when the United States introduced
to the ENDC
its first identical draft of 24 August 1967, its
representative explained that the draft was based not only upon
resolution 2028, but also upon the principles enunciatedby the Eightin their 1966 joint memorandum on non-proliferation,9
which
87
88

ENTDC/PV. 367, 20 Feb. 1968, para. 8.
Ibid., para. 7.

89

The two co-Chairmen of the ENIDC were the representativesof the United States and the USSR.

90

ENDC/PV. 370, 27 Feb. 1968, para, 88,
ENDC/PV. 325, 24 Aug. 1967, para. 7,

9164containMcý

theirt inerreato

of th

fiv

rnilstathýey co-dra.fted in 1965.-

To sum up, the five main principles of General Assembly
resolution 2028 were the result of an initiative which spontaneously drew from past experience. They oould be oonsidered asa natural result of non-proliferation efforts since Ireland
first brought the issue, as distinct from other issues, before
the United Nations in 1958. The principles, which borrowed
from American, Soviet and non-aligned sources, are the resultof a compromise. They were the prerequisites for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Resolution 2028 does not detract from the value of the "Irish Resolution". On the contrary,
they supplement each other. W'hile the latter stands as an instrument for defining a non-proliferation concept, the former
is instrumental in trying to formalize that concept in a treaty
based on certain basic principles.
The principles followed the presentation of the first t~wodraft treaties submitted by the United States and the USSR in
1965. The two drafts had to be, therefore, reconsidered fromnew perspectives paying full attention to resolution 2028. 92
The principles were to play an important role in NPT negotiations. Their role was enhancedby the varied interpretations

given to them in the course of the negotiations, a,s to their
meaning and application. The failure to make in the NIPT specific reference to the principles or to resolution 2028 as a92

For the views of the eight non-aligned on this, see their
1966 joint memorandum on non-proliferation. IDCOR, Suppl.
for 1966, Doc. DC/228, JAnn. 1, Sec. P(ENiDC/178, 19 Aug.
1966), para, 4.

65

whole,,Qý
does

derc

Mo terCro value as guJidJing, cr!teri afor treaty analysis. It was even claimed by the two main coauthors of the NhPT, the United States and the USSR, that the
NPT was based upon the five principles.
Each of the following five Parts of this study will correspond to a principle. This does not necessarily mean a rigid
separation of the principles in their application to the treaty.
They are very much inter-related and consequently each might
be referred to in more than one part.
However, before analysing the Treaty's provisions, a thirdand last chapter in Part I will be devoted to an outline ofthe different phases of the NPT negotiations within and outside the United Nations since the establishment of the ENDC in
1961. It shall also highlight the major problems encounteredin the process of the Treaty's formulation.

66

CHAPTER 3
The Formulation of the Treatv
GA Resolution 237ý(XXII)With the formulation of a non-proliferation concept in 1961
and the formulation of the guiding principles in 1965, as wellas the presentation in the same year of the two draft treatiesby -the United States and the Soviet Union, negotiations on atreaty had entered a new and aotive phase.
The treaty as it finally materialised is the fruit of long
and arduous negotiations within and outside the United Nations.
Negotiations and discussions took place in the General Assemblyof the United Nations, the First Committee of -the Assembly entrusted with political matters, the UN Disarmament Commission,
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament(EN-DC) and tho Conferenoe of Non-Nuolear-Weapon States. NATO,
Raratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are
the main forums where the Treaty or oertain aspects of it werenegotiated and discussed and will continue to be discussed in
the phase of its implementation. Western European countries of
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Western European
Union, Warsaw Pact countries, non-aligned States, and manyother States such as the Latin American States, which had
succeeded in drafting a Treaty on the denuclearization of theircontinent, played a role in one way or another in the historyof the Treaty-~~making. Bilateral and multilater'al negotiations
outside the United Nations and other governmental organizations
were, at diff'erent stages of the elaboration of the Treaty, thecentre of all activity. Bilateral consultations were taI,)kDing
place sometimes on a weekly and even on a daily basis.

67

inl

oryLoutie,
ulicopinion strongly favoured thecon11clus-ion of the NPT, but at times was divided in countries
having special problems of their own. Non-governimental groups
were also very active in educating the public on the problem of
nuclear weapons' proliferation suoh as the United Nations national associations and private institutions interested in promoting peaoe and security through dialogue. 1The International
Conferences on Science and World Affairs, commonly known as
Pugwash Conferences, had also contributed to a better understanding of the technical and scientific issues related to disarmament and arms control measures.,
The ENDOC was a focal point in the negotiations. It was the
crossroads for the resolutions of the General Assembly and theDisarmament Commission, of the several treaty drafts negotiatedelsewhere, and of numerous proposals which were introduced to
the Conference not only by its members, but also from non-par3
ticipants who wanted their views to be taken into consideration.,1

For example, see Alastair Buchan (Ed.), A World of Nuclear
Powers ? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. :Prentice-Hall, 1966),.
The volume was initially prepared for the International
Assembly on. Nuclear Weapons, a co-operative undertaking of
the Canadian Institute of international Affairs (Toronto),
the Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Carnegie Endowment for international Peace and the American Assembly.
See the final report of the International Assembly which
was held in the month of June 1966 in Scarborough, Ontario,
Canada in Survival, Vol. VIII, No. 9, Sept. 1966, pp. 278281.
2 See J. Rotblat, Lmqh-TeFirst Ten Years (LondonHeinman, 1967). See also Leonard B.ESchwartz, "Perspectiveon Pugwash", International Affairs (London), Vol. 43, No. 3,
July 1967, PP. 498-515. The Pugwash Continuing Committee
publishes the quarterly 44jg.ws Newsletter and organizes
symposia on specific problems such as the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. See C.F. IBarnaby (Ed.), PrevenLjEg__theSaread of Nuclear Weapons (London :Souvenir Press, 1969).PgwashMonograph I) Pugwash activities are also reported in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
3 See DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add.
1, Ann. IV, See, 21(ENDC/204, 24 Nov. 1967 XSwitzerland))and Sec. 35(ENDC/219, 27 Feb. 1968 (Spain)). See also the

68

The
onfeencehad lo

rece'-ýtivd commmunicationsý from nn-ovrn

mental organization,sSince the establishmiientof the EN4IDC ini 1961,

negotiations,ý,on the NPT went throughi two phases. The first phase, marked by
the conclusion of the Test-Ban Treaty, ran from 14 March 1962,,the inaugural day of the EN(! to 16 June 1965 when the UN Disarmament Commission terminated its 1965 session held in New
York upon the request of the Soviet Union. The second and active phase on non-proliferation ran from the summer of 1965 andthe presentation on 17 August 1965 of the first American treaty
draft to the ENTDC to 5 March 1970, when the treaty entered into
force. Its entry into force was again the beginning of an intensive new round of negotiations

on certain aspects of theTreaty, in a phase of implementation. This last phase is integrated in the following parts of this study related to theanalysis of the Treaty. But before tracing the first two phases,
special attention should be given to the E4DOC as an organ which
was at the centre of NPT negotiations.
I. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation_Cormmittee on Disarmament
Establishment and ComEosition
By 1958 the United States and the Soviet Union leaned towards the establishment of a conference machinery on disarmatwo memoranda of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany (ERG) in US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1967
US Government(Pub. No. 46, July 1968.) (Washington, D.C,
Printing Office, 1968), pp. 179-182, and US ACDA, Documents
on Disarmament, 1968 (Pub. No. 52, Sept. 1969) (Washington,
D.C. :US Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 152-155.
The two memoranda were informally transmitted to ENIDO members. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) had also made its
views known, to the members of the ENDC through the Soviet
delegation. For example, see ENDC/151, 10 Aug. 1965. In suchcases the United States delegation considered GDR's views
as communications from a non-governmental organisation submitted as such by the Soviet Union. For example, see ENDC/
PV. 222, 10 Aug. 1965, P. 10.

69

men,
a~ oa

~ic 1asi,

inked to but niot anl integrýal paýrt
ofhe nitd Nations,. The composition of the new forum reflctd,at that -timc, the claim of the Soviet Union for parityof representation with the West.4 The Conferenoe of the TenNation Comrflittec on Disarmament established in 1959 was thelas,t ad hoc body with an East-West parity representation. The
ten members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania,
and the Soviet Union on the Eastern side; and Canada, France,
Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the West5
ern side.
By 1960 thc non-aligned countries had won for themselves a
prominent position in the United Nations on matters of disarmament. Their new position was effectively demonstrated at the
fifteenth session of the General Assembly (1960-1961) when the
non-aligned opposition to any move *which could give the impression that the Assembly approved the position of one side or theother resulted in the Assembly's failure to adopt a whole sheafof draft resolutions on disarmament. 6The non-aligned countries
had also made practical contribution to the peace-keeping effort of t1he United Nations and to ad hoc international Conferences. Moreover 'the failure of the Conference of the Tcn4

For a brief summary of the evolution of the negotiatingmachinery on disarmament, see The United Nations and Disarmainent :_1945-1970, pp. 2-5.

5

DCOR, Suppi. for Jan. to Dec. 1959, Doc, DC/144, 8 Sept.
1959, Ann., para. 1.
6 Arthur S. Lall, Negotiating Disarmament. The EightfEMEnL-Na
tion Disarmament Conference :The First Two Years, 1962]1964 (Ithaca, New York :Center for International Studies,
Cornell University, 1964) (Cornell Research Papers in International Studies II,), P. 3, hereinafter cited as Negotiatin,
Disarmament, Besides the "Irish Resolution" of 1960 and a
resolution on suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
tests, the Assembly had merely adopted a resolution deciding to take up for consideration at its sixteenth session
the problem of disarmament and all pending proposals relating to it. See G-AOR, 15th Sess., Anns. (Vol. II), a.i.
67, 86, 69 and 73, pp. 27-28.

70Nati'Cmmte

on Disraet

orvdihtriiyodirect, confrontati_on type of neigotiationsý betee
8States and the Soviet Union.

thU

theý
ite

Am~on,- the victims of the General- Assembly's failure toadopt a whole series of draft resolutions on disarmament during, its fifteenth session was a Soviet draft resolution suggesting the broadening of the membership of the Ten-Nation
Committee to include in addition to the ten members, India,
9
Indonesia, the UJAR, Ghana and Mexico.
The first Conference of Hteads of Stbate or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in Septem~ber 1961 hadconsidered, in its 6 September declaration, that the non-alignod nations should be represented in all' future world Conferen10

ces on disarmament.,

After four months of bargaining, 11the United States andthe Soviet Union -i.ndicated on 13 December 1961 to the UN General Assembly that they had reached an agreement on the

39 in Chapter 1.

7

See note

8Arthur S. Lall, "The nonaligned in Disarmam-ent Negotiations", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XX(, No. 5,
May 1964, PP. 17-18. MLr. Lall, who was the Indian permanent
representat-ive to the UN, explained that in 1957 there wasan unsuccessful trial, in which he took part, to work out
with the United States and the Soviet Union representatives the composition of a disarmament body with a participation of countries varying from 21 to 25.

9 GAOR, 15th Seess., Anns. (Vol. II), a.i. 67, 86, 69 and 73,
A/4509, 26 Sept. 1960. The Western Powers rejected
the suggestion, principally because the addition of fivenon-aligned nations could give the impression of accepting
the Soviet "1trolkall concept. See Jacobson and Stein, 9_R.
Doc.

cit., P. 357.
10

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of NonAligned Countries. Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961 (Beograd
PublicistiZýko-Izdavahi Zavod "Jugoslavija", 1966), p. 259.

11

M. Samir Ah.med, "The Role of Neutrals in the Geneva Negotiations", Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. I, No.1,
Summer 1963, p. 20.

71

comosiioofthe ENDC.

12

On2

eebr1961,hgemn

unaniLmously by teAssembly-1 The m-,embership oomp,ri$ed the ten previous members of the Ten-Nation Committee,- aMaeight additional countries :Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India,
was,ndor)ie-,

Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the UAR. The Assembly had also recommended that the ENDC, as a matter of urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of thejoint statement of agreed principles,1 agreement on Generaland Complete Disaýrmanent (GCD) under effective international
control, France, a member of the defunct Ten-Nation Committee,
disassociated itself from the ENDC. President de Gaulle explained France's position in a letter to Chairman Kh'rushchev on 18
February 1962. He made it clear that France would only participate in talks that would be between the nuclear Powers andthat would have as their immediate goal the destruction, theweapons.1
ban and control of all means of delivery of nuclear
The choice of the additional 8 members raised problems concerning their number, identity and status in the Conference.
The number was a compromise that took into consideration thedesired compactness of a negotiating forom conducive to orderly
12

Gk0R, 16th Sess. Anns., a.i. 19, Doc. A/4980/Add. 2, 14
Dec. 1961, para. 4. Earlier in the same session the Assembly had urged the two countries to reach an agreement that
could be regarded as satisfactory. GA Res. 1660(XVI), 28
Nov. 1961, Ibid., pp. 30-31.

13

GA Res. 1722(XVI), 20 Dec. 1961, Ibid., P. 31.
See note 13 in Chapter 2.

14
15

The New York Times, 20 Feb. 1962. It is to be noted thatPrýance'-s-absence in the ENDC led to some confusion as tothe composition of the ENDC. Reference to the Conference
was frequently made as the 17-Nation Committee. But thefact remained that it was an 18-Nation Committee. France's
seat was reserved at all time and it could have joined upon its own decision. There had been informal moves to bringFrance to the Conference table but there was no change inFrance's position. See Lall, Negotiating Disarmament,
p. 16.

72

anid rianag,eablie neg-ot:i,a1,0tio.

At, th'e samle t-ime,

to accommriodate t,he difeenesbtween
the idenitity and nature of the Eight, 1 India,
enoughlitwsagasanld Weýst on

Yoexico and thet

UAjR were previously suggested by the Soviet Union in 1960.
Sweden and Brazil, were added upon a United States request.
Burma, Ethiopia and Nigeria comprised the final elemQnt of thecompromise. They were considered by the United States lessanti-Western than Ghana and Indonesia which were originallyproposed by the Soviet Union in 1960.17 Practical considerations also seem to have influenced the choice of some of theEight which were looked upon as pot,'ential nuclear Powers. 18As
to their status in the Conference, the Eight were full members
as the Soviet Union had advocated and not merely observers as
the United States reportedly had preferred. 19However, full
membership did not mean the same thing as in United Nationsorgans and subsidiary organs. 20At the beginning, the Soviet
Union had called the Eight the "neutral" or "non-committed"
members. The United States had preferred to call them the"eight new members", chosen to represent different geographic
regions of the world,.2

Later, the term "non-aligned", which

was used by the Eight themselves, was well-established. In
16

M. Samir AlLned, The Neutrals and the Test Ban Negotiations :An Analysis of the Non-alignedýStates'Efforts be-,tween 1962-1963 (New York :Carnegie Endowment for International Pea_ce, Feb. 1967) (Occasional Paper No. 4), p. 5,
hereinafter cited as The Neutrals_and the Test Ban Negotiations.

17

Jacobson and Stein, op.cit., p. 358. Since the membership
could not be divided into equal third's the West felt it
had avoided creating a precedent in favour of the "trolka".
Ibid.

16

See L411t, "The Nonaligned in Disarmament Negotiations",
p. 1,8. Mr. Lall mentions India, Sweden and the UAR.

19

Ahmed, The Neutrals and the Test Ban Negotiations, P. 5.

20

See below.

21

Ahmred, The Neutrals and the Test Ban Negotiations, p. 6.

73

I964 joinl meoa uio nuclear testring, the E-ight ret1e-i;Jrtthmevsas "teeigh't nion-aligned States partie erýd2the. Conforenco".L,,-'atngin
The, CIonfe"-rence, w-,as nýot an organ or even a subsidiary organof tihe nie Nations' G3enera,l Assembly within the meaning of
Article ~2) of th.e UN Charter. The Assemblyý merely endorsed the23
Ulnito'd Statesý / Soviet agreemen-t on establishiing the ENDC.
This, ha,d been amrfply demonstrated in 1-969 when the EIDC was enlagdtwiAce utpon an agreement reached between the t1wo coClha,irmi-eni ofl thle Conference (United States and Soviet Union reto add 8 additional members h we,re iivited
prsnaIve)
Cafonference table wýithout even pirior endorsement by -theto theL_Geneýral Assem,bly, Representatives of Japan and Mongolia joinedthle Co)nfe,-rence oni 3-July 1969. A month later, on 7ýAugust, repL-reseontati-ves of Arg,,entina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands,
Pakistan and Yug,,oslavia also joined the Conference. The Confe.re,nce's namie was not changed until 26 August 1969 when thenew,, nLame wsdecided

22

to be "The Conference of the Committee

DCOR, Suppl, for jan. to Dec. 1964, Doc. DC/209, Ann. 1,
Sec, O(ENDC/145, 14 Sept. 1964). However, Brazil added areservation to the joint memorandum which read as follows"The expression 'non-aligned States' used in this memorandumr is u:nders-tood by the Delegation of Brazil to have thespecific sense in relation -to Brazil of 'States which donot, belong.ý either to NATO or to the Warsaw Pact' and torefer only to the participation of Brazil in the EighteenNation, Disarmamaý,ent Committpee." For a commenitary on thatinterpretation, see Ah-med, The- Neutrals and the Test Ban
Negoiatins,pp.,811
23Article 22 stipulates that "the General Assembly miay establish suchi subsidiary organs as it, deems necessary for the
perform-,ance of its functions," (Emiphasis added.) For a
discu.-ssion of this aspect, see Andrew Martin, L2g~al Aspects
of Disarmamien t (L,ondon ;, The British Inist-itut e of Internand ompratve Law, 1963), p.0-5Mr. Martin
tioal
notes the careful avoidance in the Assembly's resolutionof any formi of words that would clearly establish an organc relationship between the General Assem,'bly and the74

on DJ,sarmament."(CI)'4
Method of Worký
As a conseqýuence
General Assembly,

subs,,idiJary orga'ýn of theof not beig

the EINDO haýd its

own peu_Ql'iariethod of' workwith -the ni-ted Natio'an)d a sieeisrlationship

The Conference had two Permanent

co--Chairmen,

2th(erpesentatives of the United States, and the. Soviet6 Unýion ani-d rotlatling Chairmený according to tI.he alphabe-tical o:rder of the pri
cipating, couintries.
ed,

As fLar, as the NPT negot-i.ations are conce'rn1

the two co-Ch-airmnen were the -twvo chief negotiators of tbheir

respective Governments,

They were responsible for neg,otiatJIng

the draft treaties they introduced to the Ei~DC,
form of identical drafts or jointly,

eit'her in theLamong themselve-s and, wit.h,other countries whether members of the ENDC or not. The UnitedStates chief negotiator was William Foster, the Director of
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)IThe Soviet Union was first represented by SemyoAi 9sarapkin who
became Ambassador to Bonn in 1966 and then by Alexis Roschin,
who remained Chairman of the Soviet Union's delegation to the
ENDC until after the final formulation of the NPT. Since thepresentation of the first identical treaty drafts of 27 August
2!4

For a useful background of the Conference's enlargement,
see Georges Fischer, "Chronique du contr8le des arTre-ments", Annuaire 7-ran?ais -le Droit lnternational, Vo_l.
As ofC january 1979, t,he CCD has
XV, 1969, pp. 122-127.
been replaced by the Comttee on Disarmamient-- (CD').
25an Fo xcelent reatent of the organi-zational and pro.cedural aspects, see Lnil, N,'eLotiati_ng Disarmiament, Chapter
II, pp. 9-18 . See also Allan Gotlieb, Disarmament and In-A Stud- of the Role of Law in the Dis-ternational Law
The Canadian Institu.te of In,)Trno
armament Prcs
t,ernational Affairls, _)1965), Ch.apter 10, pp. 635-67, For,
ENDC dociumients on t_h.e procedure, see DCOR, Sujppi, for Jan.
Sec. A(ENTDC ., 14
1961 -to Dec. 1962, Doc, DCIL2o-,) Ann,3,Mar. 1962) and Sec. B(ENDC/1/Ad.d, 1, 28 Mar. 1962); and.
Doc. DC/205,, Aun. 1, Se.A(ENDIC/l/Add, 2, -1-6 July, 1962).

75

1967, the two co-Chairmen acted at the EN~DC in complete harmony,taking turns in interpreting drafts' provisions, trying to convince other members of the validity of their drafts and at one
point going to the extent of insinuating in a vehement tone theunfavourable implications in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for those who might refuse to become parties tothe treaty. In general, the influence of the two co-Chairmen
in all phases of the NPT negotiations, whether on substantial
or procedural matters pertaining to the conduct of negotiat26
ions, was considerably felt.,

All meetings of the Conference were held in private unlessotherwise decided. The inaugural meetings of the ENDC's sessions were partly held in public to allow for publicity andcoverage by the press. This was especially useful when newtreaty drafts were presented such as the introduction of thesecond identical drafts on 18 January 1968. Formal publicityof the discussions took the form of a very brief communiqu6
issued at the end of each meeting. As final records of the Conference were not available for some time due to procedural aswell as practical considerations, delegations to the ENDC madetheir speeches at the Conference available to the press on thesame day. This practice was widely followed during the NPT negotiations when delegations were keen to make their views, proposals and suggested amendments to the treaty drafts known tothe public as widely as possible. 27Informal meetings were held
as appropriate, provided the two co-Chairmen agreed. Very few
26

One writer, in his analysis of the evolution of relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union , treatedthe NPT under a phase of those relations that he rightly
called "solidarity". J.C. Venezia, Strate6gie nucl4aire et
relations internationales (Paris :Armand Colin, 1971),,
PP. 44-66.

27

For press arrangements in G-eneva, see Loyal N. Gould, The
ENTDC and the Press (Stockholm :Almcivist and Wiksell,
1969
-~PR
Stockholm Papers, No. 3), PP. 9-15.

76inf ormal meetings were held during theý NPT n,egotýiat c,ion-.
Th
co-Chairi-on were not very much infavour of such meetings.

The direction of work at the beginning of the Conferencein1962 was to devote plenary sessions to reaching an agree-

ment on General and Complete Disarmament (GOD). A Committee ofthe Whole was constituted to eonsider "eollateral measures"
For the first three months or so of the Conference's existence,
one meeting a week was held by the sub-committee of the nuclear
Powers members of the Conference 'to reach an agreement on nuclear testing. NIPT negotiations at the BNDC were always heldin plenary sessions, and sometimes along with other "collateral measures" at the same meeting. A Canadian suggestion in1966 to devote reg-ular or informal meetings once a week, or atleast once every two weeks to the process of constructing anagreed draft on non-proliferation was disregarded by the coChairmen.

28

There was no provision for taking votes at the Conference.
But this did not mean that a consensus was expected on all
Questions. The report of the two co-Chairmen on 1-9 MVarch 1968
to the General Assembly incorporating the joint United States/
Soviet Union NPT draft of 11 March 1968 was carefully worded
so as not to leave the impression that it was a draft emanating from the Conference as a whole. 2 9 This entailed talks, justbefore the Conference's recess, between the two Co-Chairmen andAmbassador Azim Hussein, the representative of India, on behalfof the Eight.
The United Nations Secretariat served the Conference andthe UN Secretary-General was represented at all times by a special representative. The Conference sent its reports and records to the UN Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.
28

See ENDC/PV.270, 5 July 1966, p. 19.

29

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230 and Add. 1,
p. 1. See in particular paras. 4 and 5 of the report.

77

Membrslo

the, CoDnfeIrence weerepresented by especiallycontittedd lgaions._, Eaclh group of delegations,
thyrersnd East,
ica
dbate

whetherWest or the Eig-ht, used to hold period--

inormlmetigsto diýscuss matters pertaining to thetknplce at the Confer,ence.

W.Iith reýspect to the

NTaswill beýlater demonstrateýd in this study,

not- a single

group:naitain,ed a harmi-onious and coherent stand in

all phasesof' the, neg:"otiationls.
Aogthe Eastern European delegations, the Romanian had
devloeda distinct position. It was the only Eastern Europendelegation to submit proposals and amendments concerning
Lr-_aty drafts.?0 Romania's independent stand on the NPT was
but a reflection of its growing independent policy among the
Warsaw Pact members. Since 1963, it had been engaged in an uninterrupted attack on Soviet-dominated instrumeienmo of political,
economic and military control in Eastern Europe.3

Romania did

niot attend the Karlovy Vary Conference of April 1967 which wasapparently intended as a display of European conmmunist unity
vis-h-vis both China and the United States. The Conference inits declaration expressed support of the NET as an important
32
step in the direction of achieving a European security system.
A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia inMý1artch 1968 was apparently called at the request of Romani.a todicusthe ITET. It was the only country not to call for the
33
aproa of the treaty.
30Ibid., Ann. IV, Sec. 14(ENIDC/199, 19 Oct. 1967); Sec. 39(-ENIDC/223,
S Mar. 1968); and Sec. 40(ENDC/223/Rev. 1,
1 Mar. 196-8).
31Por a br-,ieof swiitary of -the, Soviet-Romanian rift,see
Anidrze ) Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact", International Con-..

3ý2

cijliJatilon, No, 573, May 1969, PP. 49-55.
JIbd., P. 53, For thie texts of the Coimminique and Statement of the,ý, K`arlovry Vary Conference, see,7 World Marxist, RevLiewý, Vol.- 10, No. 6, June 19,67, Pp.

33
KrboskiL)C"ci,,p5.
78

The NAT,deýLeaton

were evnLeoss

oeett

tHe War.'-sawý, Pact members. Upon the prsnainof tAien
ri-can draft ofL a no-roierto trat o17
the ENDC,

the United Kingdom, w,as critical of its,

I and 1.4Lateron inthe neotaton,

irt
e~61
,)t tokey artcoLese Ujnited K,ing,dompresented its own formal amendments t1o the f'irs-t and s-eoond
identical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967 and 18 JanuarLy l6i
Italy, on its own initiative, submitted to the same session ojf
the ENDC in which the first American draft was presented, adraft of a unilateral non-acquisition declaration. 36Italy also
had its own amendments to propose to the first and second identical treaty drafts. 3 7 Canada had always tended in the direction of possible compromise solutions. Typical of Canada's position is the Canadian working paper presented to the ENDC in
1966 giving an article-by-article comparison of the Americanand Soviet first treaty drafts. 538 The ob~jective of the Canadiandelegation was, hopefully, to transcribe a language that all
could agree upon. 39As one representative noted in 1964, Canada
was jiokingly referred to at Geneva as the ninth non-aligned
40
member.,France's representatives to the UN Headquarters in

34

ENDC/PV.225, 19 Aug. 1965, p. 10. See below the second phase of the negotiations as well as Part II of this study.

35]DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec. 19(END~C/203, 22 Nov. 1967) and Sec. 20(ENDC/
205/Rev, 1, 22 Feb. 1968).

36

Ibid. Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1965, Doc. DC/227, Ann, 1,Sec. D(ENDC/157, 14 Sept. 1965). See below the second phaseof the negotiations.

37

Ibid. Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. 230 and Add.,l, Ann.
I, Sec. 15(ENDC/200/Rev. 1, 26 Oct. 1967) and Sec. 34(ENDC/218, 20 Feb. 1968).

38

DOOR,

Suppl.

for 1966,

Doc.

DC/228,

AUn,. 1,

Sec.

M(EITUCI

175, 5 July 1966).
39

ENTDC/P'V,, 270, 5 JuLay 1-966, p. 19.
Disar:mament, p, 12. This vie w,as alsoentaiL
Lal
40~~&
expressed by a 'Br~itish disarmamient negotiat.or. See Sir
M4ichael
Wright, Disarm and Veri'fy. An Rxrlana-tion. of79Gýeneýva ýIwere disocreetl
thrughtheriforalJowinghthe debates at the- EN'DO
foll
ontctswiýth the mem,,bers of the Con-ferece.The FedeIral Repubid.c, of Gemn,iwhich wTas very activeceidtesee
obseverof th-e EtNDOC in
asthesixh
NTO mmbeing

41

by someIn gene,ral,

at t)he, EN.IDO weore but a re-of the djiffic(ulti:es w,,hichIer

ucha teatwscalled

oftheEND.

tepstostatken by NýATO_ members-1%
fleitctiontGe,ýneva,

involve)-d innegotiatu-

even among allie-s.

BHy conitrast to the other delegations, the eight non-aligned
de.Legations were not parties to an alliance or a pact. ThreeofL them.

Brazil, Mexico and Sweden, had not even participatedas- full members of the two non-aligned Conferences held in Belgrade in September 1961 and in Cairo in October 1964. Brazil
had participated in the first Conference as an observer andMexico had joined it, also as an observer, in the second Conference, 42 The Eight, however, had made every possible use of
the declarations of the two non-aligned conferences, either individually in their statements to the EN]DC, or together intheir joint memoranda to the ENDC, as well as in their common
4efforts at the United Nations. 3
Since the begining of the ENDC, the Eight had avoided giving the impression of forming a bloc, or even constituting aControl Difficulties and of National Policies (London
Chatto and Windus, 1964), P. 152.
41

See the two memoranda presented by the FRG to members of
the EN\]DC referred to in note 3 above.

42

For Brazil's definition of "non-aligned" in the context
of the ENDC, see note 22 above. For an excellent analysisof the Eight's style and method of work, see Ahmaed, The
Neutrals and the Test Ban Negotiations, Chapter II, Pp. 5114 and Chapter V, pp. 90-101, from which the fofllowing ispartly drawýTn.

45 or the- tex-t of tLhe Belgrade Declaratio-N,

see note 10
above. For the,-I
t1ext of the. Cairo Declarati.oni, see UN Doe..
A/76, 9Oct.b 1964, See in particular pý-art VII1 of t-he
Declaraion petainiing to the questiLon of disarmlament, andgrUp Wit!

thLoneene1
ism! '1t,ery WeI,llmhavebe

igcomple,,1t e detachmenrlt anId idpnec,eefagoponon- a igne,11jr
or- iidependent S,t ates,t;was s,ub secIuIty
I./p ossi
blefolteEighit to( beýcome-, nceinyted
togeithe bya
similarity of cirýcumstances (membership in- theo foru),iaýnd,
later, even by solidarity of purpose rather than by antYpoi
tical, doctrinal, or other influences. The closest fitting
description of th-.e Eight was that thcy were a "diplomaticgroup", to indicate that they would be united on some common
diplomatic endeavour. This was an altogether different proposition from the notion of "bloc", "camp", or even "permanentgroup".4
The Eight found themselves united in many instances, as
their joint memoranda on nuclear testing clearly demonstrate. 4 5This was equally true of General Assembly resolution 2028(XX)and the Eight's two joint memoranda on non-proliferation, earlier treated in Chapter 2, and that in spite of an attempt inthese memoranda to strike a balance between their different
approaches.
There were, however, instances in which the Eight failed toact in unison, or did not try or want to agree on a common lineof action. Individually they often made important statements ofpolicy without any consultation within the group. Sometimes,
important or original suggestions, proposals, or compromise
formulas had been "sprung" upon the Conference by one of theEight simply in order to score a point for its proponent. 46The
Eight's failure to act in unison was most apparent after the44

Ahmed, The Neutrals and the Test Ban Negotiations, pp. 7-9.
45 For example, see DCOR, 3uppl. for Jan 1961 to Diec.,92
Doc. 1)C/2C3ý, Ann, 1, SeIýc. JEIC2,16 Appr.
96)
46' Arime3d. Thie NTeut-rals an-d t6Tes,tl Ban] eotatios p. 1081presentation of the first two American/Soviet identical draftsof 24 August 1967. Thei.r views came to be so varied and evenso conflicting that it was no longer possible for them to draft
joint memoranda that would even strike a balance between theirdifferent attitudes. They obviously oeased to be the conciliators between the United States and the Soviet Union on the nonproliferation issue. The 24 August draft put them for the firsttime in sharp confrontation with the United States and theSoviet Union. This sort of confrontation seemed to have been acatalyst for deepening the divergences of views among the Eight,
which led to their individual independent course in the NPT
negotiations Ifhidch followed. Each of the Eight submitted its
own p,ý, )sals or amendments to the different treaty drafts. But
not one of them presented its own NPT draft. The Eight werealways waiting for the two Co-Chairmen to take the initiative. 4
Freedom of action among the Eight, as rightly noted by one
writer, was not without benefits. Some ideas that could nothave been recommended for joint attention were later supportedby them and even -improved upon or elaborated further. The Eightderived much of their effectiveness both from their solidarityand from their diversity and versatility. 48 Their contribution
47

48

At an early stage, in 1964, the Indian representative at
the ENUDC had, with the approval of his governiient, handed
copies of a non-dissemination agreement to the United Sta,tes and the Soviet Union delegations. Many months later,
the Indians were told that the two countries were discussing the matter bilaterally, as they both wanted to reachagreement on the issue, but did not wish it to be discussed
at the Conference. See Lall, Negotiating Disarmament, p. 66.
Sweden, upon. the introduction of the 24 August draft inwhich article III on inspection was left blank, had introduced a few days later its own draft of article III. See
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs, DC/230 and Add, 1,Ann. IV, Sec. ll(ENIDC/195, 30 Aug. 1967).
Ahmed, The Neutrals and the Test Dan Negotiations, pp. 1011. Professor Georges Fischer missed that point on the advantages of the Eight's freedom of action when he expressed his regrets that the UAR and Nigeria among others had
proposed amendments without consulting the others, Georges82

to the drafting of the NPT was felt, as some of their indiviLdual proposals were accepted and incorporated in the final
treaty draft sent to the General Assembly's twenty-second resumed session in 1968. Even those proposals and amendments
which were not acoepted or taken into consideration by the two
co-Chairmen in drafting that final draft, had oontributed inmany instances in generating useful original interpretationsof the Treaty provisions by the two co-authors. The role played by the Eight was considerably different than the role they
had played in negotiating the Test-Ban Treaty. It was finallynegotiated in Moscow only between the United States, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The non-nuclear-weapon States
could not have been disregarded as far as the NTPT was concerned. They were the countries aimed at by the Treaty and theirinterests and security were at stake.

The ENDC received continuous support from the UN General
Assembly in its endeavours to reach an agreement on non-proliferation. However, many UN members were very interested in participating in such important negotiations, The following statement made by the representative of Pakistan to the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1965 illustrated that concern. He said:"Only eighteen countries were able to take part in
the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee; yetmany other States were vitally interested in the
problem of disarmament - in some cases more interested than the members of -the Committee. Since
the emergence of political grouping on which the

Fischer, La Non-Prolif4ration des armes nucl6aires (Paris
Librairie Te;n-4rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1969),
P. 52, note 48, In 1967, the Eight had reached a stage at
which ~joint endeavours were not possible due to theirsometimes sharply divergent views.

83hadbenhage

in the World

...'(

That

-onicern led to the enlargement of the EN~DC only a few
years later, in 1969, as mentioned above. It also led Pakistan
to formally propose at the twenty-first session of the General
Assembly the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon
States not later than July 1967. 50 However, before dealing
with that proposal, which is included in the analysis of thesecond phase of the NPT negotiations, attention is now devoted
to the first phase of those negotiations. The analysis of thetwo phases is essentially concerned with drawing an outline of
the course of negotiations without going very much into thesubstance of treaty drafts or proposals which are the subject
matter of the following parts of this study.
II. First Phase of the Negotiati.ons :14 March 1262 - 16 June 1965
Non-Proliferation in GCD Schemes and as a "Collateral Measure", 1962
At the outset of the ENDC's existence, the Soviet Union,
on 15 March 1962, submitted a "Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" which provided among the first-stage measures an article on the "(p)revention of the further spread of
nuclear weapons" (Article 16). The article reads as fellows"The States parties to the treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclLear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production
to States not possessing such weapons. The States
parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons -undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to49

G-AOR, 20th Sess,, 1st Cttee, 1372nd mtg, 5 Nov. 1965, para.

10ý.
50

Ibid.,

21st Sess., Anns., a.i. 26, Doe, A/6509, para. 5.

84their territories
A month later, on 18 April 1962, -the United States assubmitted to the ENDC an "Outline of Basic Provisions of aTreaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World"which provided also among the first stage measures a paragraphon 11(n)on-transfer of nuclear weapons" which reads as follows"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek toprcvent the creation of further national nuclear
forces. To this end, the Parties would agree that(a) Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured,or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapen would:(i) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons
to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear
weapon before an agreed date;(ii) Not assist any such State in manufacturing
any nuclear weapons.
(b) Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed datewould:(i) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control
over any nuclear weapons;(ii) Not manufacture, 5 gr attempt to manufacture,
any nuclear weapons."
Put besides the question of GCD discussed in the plenary
sessions of the ENDC, members of the latter had put forward
several questions for discussion in the Committee of the Wholeentrusted with the consideration of "collateral measures". On
25 May 1962, upon the recommendations of the two co-Chairmen,
the Committee of the Whole agreed that the next priority on its
agenda should be the concurrent consideration of proposals on"(m)easures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons" and "1(r)eduction of the possibility of war by accident,
51

DOOR, Suppl. for Jan. 1961 to Dec. 1962, Doc. DC/203, Ann.
1, Sec. C(ENDJC/2, 15 March 1962), p. 122,

52

Ibid., Doc. DC/203, Ann. 1, Sec. F(ENJDC/30, 18 Apr. 1962),
p. 145.

85

failure,of colmmuic)-a-ins
The co-Chai-rmen10
recmmede tha one-o the two topics_ý be prese-ated by onIeo c-Qaine,and theý o:ther present,-ed b)y tGhe other comiscalulatiooChairman,.tIwa not util
a mjeet_ing- hield oni 19 July 19)62
by h Co( *tteeA""of the Wholeý, theý last one to behel-d by thýe
Co~ý
ittee
thatIte toa'bo-v-menjtjioned itemis we re peetd
non-isseinaton

y theiSovie(t Uinand the reduction of thepo,,ssIbiity of- wvar by the Ulnite-1-d StatLes .55 The latter question
waspuruedvigroulyin 1963- by th-e two countries and led totheignaureon 220 June 1963 in 'Geneva of a "Memorandum ofUndestaningRegarding the Establis.hment of a Direct Communicain id-k" which is widely known and referred to as the"ho-lie"agreement. 5 6 The system became operational in Octpbe 19b3.~ Although the agreement is not strictly speaking anarms control measure, the system's subsequent employment demjýonstrated its usefulness in time of crisis. The "hot-line"
was one of the consequences of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. 58
As to the question of non-dissemination presented by the
Sov,iet Union to the Committee of the Whole, the statement made53
541

For the list of questions suggested, see ENDC/C.1/2, 2 Apr.
1962.
ENDC/C.1/19, 25 May 1962. The first item which was discussed-In homtea "(c)essation of war propaganda".

55E,"DýC/C.l/PV.9, 19 July 1962, p. 5.
561 FoLr the. text of the "M'emorandum" and its Annex, see The
Un-~dNations and Disarmament ; 1945190, Appendix V,
1F
47-449.
57
Te sytemamounts to a teletype link passing through London,, Stloc,kholm and Helsinki, with instant coding and decodringby American and Soviet equipment in each capital. On
30 eptmbr 171a further agreement was signed in Washi_ngtoni, D,.C., by the Un-Ited States and the Soviet Union toestabis a faster "hlot-Jline"l operating vi_stlltsLr
bt iin ab)ov theý earth) in- place of the peiu
ytm
FoIr
the
tet of the nevf a,greement andit ann,_ex,,se DOSB,
Vol. EIV, N1,o. 1686n, 18 Oct. 1971, pp. 01-.403ý,580 SeRbrsp,ýci,
p. 66-67,

86

LY its rereenatve-I AsdocusationsLdl

was do;iiitatcd b-0'Urinagis

the1e)FdraL Repu
Plficýi
of,T
theCiround that itLas drIin toadacs-tjulerwa
poJt~

epcaILLY thrug

NATO plA ns for etbihn

ropean~- nula-r]

orcement amonth NulaPtcon,trol

ve

Zoi
no

to delve

them or iniformiation neesr

pro
1mbssdo

c

ayo
nitga
an
L, ageencea1 1r weapns
for ter manufact-

ure to States wl4h did not poss;ess themi
ý. 9
The United States representative, Ambass3ador Deani,rple
the Soviet accusations and referred, among others, to the ERGundertahing in 1954 not to manufacture in its territory any
atomic weapons. Ile also explained that nuclear weapons locatedon German territory among the NATO forceswere entirely under

United States and British cnrl60President Kennedy said,_11a litessage to the ENDC on 14 July 1962, that the United States would continue -to seek an agreement on non-proliferation. 6 1
As this -was the last meeting of the Committee of the Whole,the question was not pursued at Geneva at that time, because ofa decision to hold informal American-Soviet bilateral talks
62
elsewhere.
59
60

ENDC/C.1/PV.9, 19 July 1962, pp. 11-17, especially pp. 1213 and 17.
Ibid., pp. 20-22. For the ERG undertaking, see note 46 in
Chapter 1.

61

ENDC/144, 16 July 1962.

62

US ACDA, International Negotiations on the. Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Th_ýb. No, 48, Jan,1969) (Washington, D.C. :US Government P?rinting Office,1969), p. 6, hereinafter cited as International Negotiations,
On 25 August 1962, the Soviet Government niotýLfied China t1hat
United St4tes Secretary of State Ruisk had proposed to diLScuss aii agreem-en.t and that the Sovriet; Gov,,ernmenat -ave an af.firmativ,e re-ply to 4r.P Ruask"s pooa.See "Statem,ient b)Y
the Sp_,okesman-, of th-e. Chinesýe Go-)verinmen-t, A Comment on theS3oviet Governi-ent's Statem-ient of Augu_1t-st 5,dated 1-5 Auguast,196,
ekig eviw,Vol._ VI, No, 5,16 Aug. 19)635, p
587

IhTes-a

TraL,16
AsnoedinChptr,

heevaos n'o spe(cif.-i.c rýesýolution on

non-rolie ~thny the- Genera

196C)

co

n

Asiehly in

19ý62 and 193

LI

tnue
idsuson nion-pr-ol-iferat1ion',iai,t the ENDC

twcChareremained precisely ast,
het ha-,d b,c,eni týn -1962 on
NATOnuclar-efene arangmens.Hwvr 1963 wi tnes,sed'ý in-teniv
neotatinsle,adin

to tesucsful' co)ncluas ion of

was signed on 5 August 1963 inl Moscow
and enjteý.red into -force on 10 October 1965. 6 But as the TesttheestBanT:reoaty- It

BnTreaty is an arms control measure closely linked with theNP,especially as a limited non-proliferation measure, thestudy and the analysis of its provisions is an integral partof the study and analysis of NPT provisions, which is undertaken in the following parts of this study. Some provisions of
the NPT were even tailored on some provisions of the Test-Ban
Treaty. 64
Mr. Averell Harriman, the head of the United States delegation, sent to Moscow to negotiate the conclusion of the TestBan Treaty, had apparently suggested to Mr. Khrushchev the ideaof a non-proliferation treaty forbidding the transfer of63

For the text of the Treaty, see DOOR, Suppl. for Jan, to
Dcc. 1965, Doc. DC/208, Ann, 1, Sec. E(ENDC/lOO/Rev. 1,
30 July 1965). The treaty was circulated to the ENDC before
its signature but after it had been initialed on 25 July
1965.
64' Thec long history of the Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations isbeyond the scope of this study. However, it will be sometimaes touched upon in the course of the analysis of someofL its provisions. The following works are suggested fortheý hisýtory of the negotiations :Ahmed, The Neutrals andtheBTest Ban,Negotiations; Arthur Hobson Dean, Test Ban
an Dsameset.Th PthofNgotiations (New York
Haprandc Row,- 1966-_); Tvarie-'F)_an,o!_se Fure-t, Ex_permn
tatin
ds aesnoc-16aire-s et dotintýernational public,(Pais. Pdon 196);and aobo an4d SteiýJn,pc,
Mr. hrnd
as r.
aswelean ereinvovedat sme
7oinn11the tet-a neotaios

nu"Clear weaon.ý)_ýts fro)MUJ
one

outry1to anoth

backfroaguin thi,tht a

Ban Tre-aty, it woul

hav

nion--t ransf er:, tre at1y ShoudITheý ENDC,

ate
r.

T

othr ntion

sined

an anipoifrto
be- defre

foý!J'1,
r fuur

drew
1
he

effct

e~j
but! acons;idrt

164

In 1964,

non-proliferation figured inboth President

ohnson' s message to the ENDC on 21 January 1964, 66 and the So)viet
Government's memorandum dated 28 January 1 9 64 i 7 Both the United States and the Soviet Union, whether in the aforementioned
texts or in statements made at the ENDC, favoured an agreement
on non-prolif'eration on the basis of the "Irish Resolution".
However, their basic difference remained the nuclear-defense
arrangements in NATO and more precisely the multilateral nu.clear force (MLF). The Soviet memorandum made it clear that"transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not takeplace directly, through military blocs, for example, through6
the so-called multi-lateral nuclear force of NATO." 8Since the presentation of the American message and the Soviet memorandum to the ENDS in January 1964, definite agreement at the ENDDO for putting non-proliferation on the active
agenda of items was not reached till 18 June 1964. The MVLFJwas
also at the centre of the exchange of views that took place inthe meetings of the Sonference between the United States andthe Soviet Union representatives, the former trying to provethat the MIF would not lead to proliferation, 69Views on the
65
66
67

Arthur M, Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Davs. John F. Kennedv
in the White House (London :Andr6 Deutsch, 1965 , p. 774.
DCOR, Suppi. for Jan. to Dec. 1964, Doc. DS/209, Ann. 1,
Sec. B(ENDC/120, 21 Jan, 1964).
Ibid., Sec.,EED/2,2
a,16)

68 Ibd1
ara.
69TES/_PV, 195,

0
2 Julý_y 196b4,

theý NP, ENDS/13'7, 15Jl

pp, 57)-38.' ýS(eeasthnosex
94a

dB

/42

0Spt

94

BI$C~~~~~

The19hesio

whfadthtteuetowol

ofth

U

paralysed,~noe in Chate

Gnejeariefforts to

1Asseý(mbl-y inL1964 was

2, becusliothqusinofof ariJ
19ýof the UNChrtr

Chi.v'
Asendncyto Nuc-lear.Statuis, 196402
6October 1964, the People's Republic of China explodedisfirst nuclear device in the atmosphere, thus becomin'tefifth Power to have exploded such devices. China's
asceda_ncy to nuclear status brought the non-proliferation
quesHtion to public attention]'1 In the United States two events
took place that had a direct bearing on subsequent negotiations on a NPT. The first was President Johnson's announcement
in a radJi-o-television address on 18 October 1964, that
"The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need strong support
against some threat 7 9f nuclear blackmail, thenthey will have itu."
This statement brought to the fore the question of nuclear
guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that led four years
later t.o the adoption of Security Council Resolution 255. 73
The second event was the creation in November 1964 of a
Peietial Panel headed by Roswell Gilpatric, the former
Undr-Screaryof I)efense, to draft a comprehensive policy on
ho utprevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
70
See

ater nte

71

Foa brefacotunt ofL the 16 October detonation, see
KeesiQs
Cntemorar Arcives,, Vol. XIV, 1963-64,

149 inChapter 4.

p. 20572nA

72 Documets
on Diarmament

196,p.48

Panel's reýport sumttehh,
U0d to thw,ýhich wa

meant,
Soieoa

21Jnur

1965,

In
th

srits

iereyhdiaeto

pavin

the way tola

ageeenwit

thwhiich had relentlessly attack-edt thie

!Jl`

rjet

shroudd

athtimec
Unton

PrIdn

th

The Disarmament Commission, 1965
In spite of the rising attention given to the problem of
nuclear weapons' proliferation as a result of China's emergence
as a nuclear Power, the ENDC was not convoked by the two CoChairmen at the beginning of 1965. The failure to agree to summon the Conference was attributed to a variety of reasons. In
the first place, the atmosphere of crisis that prevailed during the 19th session of the UN General Assembly, paralysed by
the possible invocation of article 19 against the Soviet Union,
had not yet faded. The American involvement in the Vietnamese
war was being intensified. There was also a new leadership in
the Soviet Union after Mr. Krushchev's disappearance from thepolitical scene in October 1964. Moreover, the FVLLF question
was still hindering any possible agreement between the Soviet
Union and the United States.
On the other hand, as no disarmament matters were really
discussed during the 19th. session of the Assembly, the majority of the members of the ENDC felt that it could not usefully
discuss the items on its agenda

including non-proliferation,-

until all members of the United Nations had had an opportunity
to give their views upon them.7
74

The deadlock came to an end

The New York Tim-es, 24 and 257 June( _1966,.nand New York Hrl
rbn,54Jl
95

75--E.L,TN.7

Jujly 1,966;

Burn,ls, "The opoierto
ratteo_tit,uion and' Popcts" Inentoa Oraiato,Vol.

"The Nopoifrto

I9'Treaty"Pmemer

of th

Unte

Naios

e76

-0e -n'Naions.
The Commnisslion -met fro-i 21
Apri
to 16 June 1965. This was its last meeting before its
reestablishment by the Tenth Special Session of the UN General
Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.
At the Disarmament Commission meetings, as one negotiator
noticed, the problems which had taken almoost exactly three
years to solve were apparent in -the statements made at thosemeein,",77
eeigs,The major problem was still the controversial issueof the MLF,7 which was then extended to the British proposal
for an Atlantic Nu)clear force (ANE).7 Several questions relating to a non-proliferatiLon treaty were raised by the non-nu-clear-weapon S`Gates and especially by the non-aligned membersof the ENDC, such as nuclear gua-rantees, peaceful -uses of atomic

energy,tangible stops leading to disarmament including acomprehensive -test ban, freeze on the production of nuclear
weapons anld -the cutoff of fissionable material for military
purposes. India suggested an integrated solution of nuclear
weapons' proliferation comprising five elements, and Sweden
advocated a poackage linkiing a non-proliferation agreement witha comp:rehensive test ban and fissionable materials production
cuatoff .8
76

77

DCOR, Suppl. for Jan, to Bee. 1965, Boo. DC/210, 31 Mar.
1965. General Burns, the Canadian representative at the
ENDO had suggested, during the Assembly's session, to -Ambassador Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative at the ENDC,
to convoke -the Disarmrament Commission. The latter said at
the timne -that he did not think -that that would be possible.
E.L,M, Burns, "The Nonproliferation Treaty", P. 790.
Ibid,

78

See BOOR, 72nd mtg, 26 Apr. 1964 (USSR) and 73rd mtg, 26
Apr. 1964. (USA).

79

See Lord Chalfont's statement, Ibid., 74th mtg, 28 Apr.
1964, paras. 28-34 and Soviet Ambassador Federenikols response, 87-th mtg, 24 May 1965, paras. 60-06l.

80

See note 63 in Chapter 2.

92On- 15; June 196,thesored by 31 countries,Itomsinadpe

eolto

pn

recoimmended the ENDC to "acco;,rd spe-,cial priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty
or a convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions thata,Zreement could be facilitated by adopting aorogramme of certain related measures."'8 (Emphasis added.) The resolution was
adopted by 83 votes in favour, 1 against (Albania) and 18
abstentions including the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries.,8 2 The Soviet Union abstained on the resolution for
two main reasons, The first was that the wording of the passage relating -to non-proliferation failed to ensure the necessary solution of the problem, "This wording...

invites us to

shut our eyes to the granting of access to nuclear weapons to
the West German militarists and revanchists within the framework of NATO," 8 3 The second reason was that the same wording
made the solution of nuclear proliferation dependent upon the84
solution of a whole seri.es of other complex problems.
With the adoption of that resolution the road was paved
towards a new round of negotiations at the ENDC which met a
few weeks later, on 27 July 1965, marking the beginning of a
81

83

DCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to Dee, 1965, Doe, DC/225, 15 June 1965. The resolution also dealt with other questions
such as nuclear testing. The Disarmament Commission also
adopted a second resolution welcoming the proposal adopted at the second non-aligned conference in 1964 for theconvening of a world disarmament conference and recommending the General Assembly to give urgent consideration
to the proposal at its 20th session. See 'Ibid., Dcc, DC/
224, 11 June 1965, For a brief summary of the proposal,
see The United Nations and Disarmament :1945-1970, pp.
103-107.
For the details of the voting, see DOOR, 102nd mtg, 15June 1965, para. 21.
Ibid., 99th mtg, 14 June 1965, para. 80,

84

Ibid., para. 83,

82

93and acAew -vphase of1,1negoiationsý towards- the c;onclusion
of th
P 85
Iii,iTh

Second Phase of the Negotiations :27 July 1965

-

Farch
M

1970
The ENDC in _1965 and the American Draft Treaty of 17 Augusnt
1-965
The time that had elapsed between the winding-up ofthe1965 session of the Disarmament Commission and the reconveningof the ENDC on 27 July 1965 had not been wasted. A draft
treaty on non-proliferation was already being worked out
beforeand during the Disarmament Comnmission's session, As an
official British publication notes, the draft treaty submitted
tothe ENDC in the Summer of 1-965 "owed much to British
thinking
and was formally tabled by the United States aftera seriesof discussions in NATO,118 As a matter of fact -the British
and
85

86

It was reported that most delegations in Geneva believedthat the Soviet Union's main reason for resuming
the talksat Geneva was the Disarmament Commission's 83 votes
in favour of it, an expression of non-aligned opinion theSoviet Union could scarcely ignore. Another reason mentioned
was that China's political reverse in Algiers (whereanAfro-Asian Conference failed to take place on 26
June 1965)
encouraged the Soviet Union to feel that there waslittlerisk in putting more emphasis on peacefol co-existence
policy, Vietnam notwithstanding. There was also someevidencethat the Soviet Union was impressed by William Foster's
article in tihe July issue of Foreign Affairs which
seemedto have been in4terpreted by th Soviets as indicatingthat
the United States was ready to envisage the weakeningofexisting alliances as part of the price to be paid
for anon-proliferation agreement. See The Sýunda Time,
1 Aug.
1965. For the article referred to, see William C.
Foster',"New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 43, No, 4, July 1965, pp. 587-601.
DisLarmament: The Path to Peace (London: Her
Majesty's
Stationary Office, 19687,,
para. 22.

94

the Canadians had-1 bee_ýn wokngsnc

alys 1965 o"ntetdrafts and they beg,,aný compi.aringL terescivtxswhile
the Disarmament Commission -was stillin progress.

It w,asý deciýd-ed not to attempt to amalgamate them until the views of NATOnations not represented in the ENDOC had been obtained. The
draft treaties were circulated to the NATO Council in July
1965. 87 However, it seemed that the British had originally intended to table their draft in the ENDC in Geneva even if it
failed to gain the full support of all NATO members. 8 8
The British draft presented to the NATO Council meeting in
Paris on 26 July 1965 raised a major difference of views between the British and the Americans. It forbade Nuclear Powers
to hand over control of nuclear weapons even to any association of States unless subject to veto by the United Kingdom andthe United States. The latter differed from the British inwanting to keep the way open for the possible evolution of the
MLF into a partnership between the United States and a collective European nuclear force in which the veto might give way to89some form of majority decision.,
Disagreement also existed
over Britain's insistence that a draft treaty should be astarkly simple document in itself, uncluttered with inspection
clauses. Against this position were the United States as wellas the FRG, Italy and Canada. 90 The latter's draft was more
complicated, introducing issues which were liable to give riseto protracted negotiations as they included the fundamental
principle of inspection, a provision on collective security
guarantees, minimum adherence to the treaty and sanctions. 987

E.L.M., Burns, Lm~murder (London :George G. Harrap, 1966),
p. 265.

88

See the remarks made by Lord Chalfont to the press representatives. The Times, 23 July 1965,

89

The__O.b.s.erver, 25 July 1965,

90

The Sundav Times, 1 Aug. 1965.

91

The.,Times,-, 1 Aug. 1965.

95

histhdrf to

h cDB r-Afe he coneigo
theV"four NAOtm1eso
Itus
gee

ht

Candia,wthhh

ND on 27 Juy16,Itto

the ConeeCeI
to r,eah' aomrmie
UiedSaeswulJu

forw,%ard aon

heUnit'ed Kingdom,

Italy and Canada reserving
thirpoitiJons on specific aspects. 9 3 Thus, the first American
drf traty
was Presented to the ENDC on 17 August 1965, refletngthe prevailing American position on the MLF which was
also backed by -the Federal Republic of Germany. 94The represientative of the United Kingdom had discreetly expressed his
Government's views on this latter question at the ENDC by stating that artilese

I and II of the American draft did not ruleout the possibility that an association of States might be set
up with the capacity to make use of nuclear weapons by the decision of a miajority of its members without the veto of an existing nuclear Power.95 The Italians presented the draft of aunilateral non-acquisition declaration which amounted to a moratorium agreed to by the non-nuclear States renouncing theacquisition of nuclear weapons for a specific period of time,after which thely would be free to act if the nuclear Powers had
not yet agreed aong themselves on a non-proliferation treaty) 6
92

The New York Times, 27 July 1965.

93

The Observer, 15 Aug. 1965.
DCCOR, Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1965, Doc. DC/227, Ann. 1,
Se.A(ISNDC/152, 17 Aug. 1965).

94

95 ~NDCPV.25,19

ug.1965, p. 1-0. See also the declaratiosmd
y LodCa-nt at- a _press confe_reýnce following
the tabinofUnte Stats'taedrafit. TeTimies,, 189

96

ForL the firtimte Confeorenc.e JeaIt, wit,I a'de_t!ý 'ince
tex,,t ulhich included a, preamble_ anid sevetl art ls,(SeAppendixý- 3-A. ) The,ý
firi_st two articles conuitain)e th miobi-gations,-the, thjird contained a l_oose oblig'ationonipetn
the fourth defin,ed the term "nuclear State", adlteiemin
articlecs contain,ed the. finial clause,_-s icunga
withdra,wa-lclauseý
The major prýoblem between the United States and thje
Sov7ietUnion in the Conference was still
the nuclear defense arne
ments within NATO. The problem was even aggravatedfor thefirst time by an explicit text which did not preclude
a.multilateral nuclear force with the capacity of using nuclear
weapons some time in the future by a majority decisionof itsmembers,
The Vietnam war was also a problem which was raisedby
the Soviet and Eastern European representatives in theirstatements to the Conference. In their view the American
involvement
and the escalation of the war would perturb negotiationsin
Geneva.9
The UN General Assembly in 1q96 and the First Soviet
Draft of24 SeEtember 1965
At the UN General Assembly's 20th session, the Soviet
Union
submitted its first NPT draft which was attached to its
requestCavaletti, "A Italian Proposal of Nuclear MYoratorium"inJames E. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman, Jr. (Eds.), Arms Control for the Late Sixties (Princeton, New jersey :D.
Van
Nostrand,' 1967), pp. 157-161.

97

For example, see ENDC/PV.220, 3 Aug. 1965 (USSR) o,1espeCially PP. 13-14. See also the editorial of International1 Af__
fairs (MToscow), No. 10, Oct. 1965. It
best way to pave the road to progress sa,TF~Th
in Genea is oso
the U.ýS, aggression in,jVTiet.-Nami-ii
Peace. in Vietiana WOUJC
be a guarantee of success in Genevýa."l (p. 6).

97

of 24 September 1965 to include "non-proliferatj,on of nuclear
weapons" in its agenda,9 8 The Soviet draft consisted of a pr'eamble and seven articles. (See Appendix 3-B.) The first threearticles, which contained the main obligations, foreclosed any
possibility for the creation of a multilateral force or anequivalent association within NATO. Contrary to the American
draft, the Soviet draft contained no provision on inspection.
The remaining articles contained the final cla:uses including a
withdrawal clause.
The First Committee of the Assembly had the two drafts tocompare, but still no progress could be achieved as both theSoviets and the Americans held theiLr positions on nuclear sharing within alliances.
The Italian draft on the non-acquisition declaration received some attention by some members of the First Committee.
Views expres,3ed on the draft were evenly divided between supporters and opposers. The former saw in it a valuable contribution towards an early NPT,9 a positive step on the long roadtowards a general treaty on disarmament, 10and ýameasure that
could serve to contain the da-nger until a binding treaty could
be agreed uDon. 10LOthers qualified their support for the propos4l by requesting that the moratorium should be fixed for acertain limited duration such as two years, or that the moratorium should be matched by another moratorium on underground98

GAOR, 20th Sess., Anns. (Vol. III), a.i. 106, Dcc. A/5976,
24 Sept. 1965. The text of the Soviet draft was also latercirculated as a document of the ENIDC. See ENDC/164, 27
Jan. 1966.

99

GAQR, 20th Sesa,, 1st Cttee, 1359th mntg, 22 Oct. 1964,
para. 10 (Liberia); 1360th mtg, 22 Oct. 1965, para. 14(Chili); and 1363rd mtg, 20 Oct. 1965, para. 21 (Iran).'100

Ibid., 1350th mtg, 6 Oct. 1965, para. 54 (Venezuela).
Ibid., 1366th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965, para. 37 (Somalia).

101

98

nuclear tests by the nuclear Powers.10 Those opposed to the,proposal doubted its value and effectiveness as long as the nuclear Powers were not committed to it.10 The moratorium wasalso criticised for not laying down contractual obligations.1 0
The Italian proposal was not, however, seriously discussed
later in the negotiations. The drive had been persistent foradefi'Lnite treaty text. 1 0 5
The General Assembly adopted at the end of the debate its
resolution 2028(XX) on the five principles dealt with in
Chapter 2. The ENDC was requested, by virtue of the same resolution,
to submit to the Assembly at an early date a report on the
results of its work on the NPT.
The ENDC in 1966 and the American amendments of 21 March 1966
The ENDC reconvened on 27 January 1966. It held two sessions in 1966, the first from 27 January to 10 May and thesecond from 14 June to 25 August. During the two sessions, noprogress had been achieved on a draft treaty text because ofthecontinuing controversy over nuclear-sharing arrangements in
NATO. On 21 March the United States introduced a set of amendments to the EN7DC which had the objective of allaying Soviet
fears of the possibility that a NATO multilateral nuclear force
could use nuclear weapons without the agreement of the United102

Ibid., 1365th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965, para. 14 (Sweden) and
1367th mtg, 28 Oct. 1965, para. 28 (Zambia).

103

lbi.
1356th mtg, 19 Oct. 1965, para. 24 (Lybia); 1361st
mtg, 22 Oct. 1965, para. 7 (Peru); 1366th mtg, 27 Oct.
1965, para. 15 (Ghana); and 1367th mtg, 28 Oct. 1965,
para. 17 (Uganda).
Ibid., 1365th mtg, 27 Oct. 1965, para. 7 (Hungary). See
al-so 1360th mtg, 22 Oct. 1965, para. 24 (Czechoslovakia),
For a further discussion of the weaknesses of the Italian
proposal, see G-.Fischer, La non--prolif4ration des armes
ncl4aires, pp. 54-55.

104
105

99

stats,

SeeAupnadix 30. The)
Ilndets
owever, h-ad not
chage
te o&ioni of' thew Soviet Union which continued toattack a yof nuc(ear _shaIring wtiNATO alloyng, theFe ra pub]jc. of G'I.rmany a,n acce.ss to nuclear weapons,
H-v,th,-, diLsCussIOns' atc the( ENDC in 1966 were not with-i
outvaue.P1ny new ideas; and _proposais weýre plut forward. The
eigt nn-li~d embrstried to crysTtallize, and demonstr,ate_theimorane
solutio

2028XXf tefive, pýrinciples of General Assembly reTheir second joint memorandum on non-proli-

ferationlý,referred to in Chapter 2, threw more light on themeaingan the value of the five principles.
ThePasoreResolution, 17 May 1966
W,ihi'Le discussions in 1966 were taking place at, the ENDC,
an- impor"U1tant development was taking place in the United States
thlat had a direct bearing on future NPT negotiations. The Joint
Coaimittee on Atomic Energy held hearings on February 23 andMarch 1 and 7 to discuss a Senate draft resolution submitted
by Senator Pastore, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee, to the
Senate on 18 January 1966 and, referred to -the Committee for itij
consideration, The operative part of the resolution read as
fol,lows"Resolved that the Senate commends the President's
serious and urgent efforts to negotiate international agreements limiting the spread of nuclear
weapons and supports the principle of additional
efforts by the President which are appropriate andneoessary in the interest of peace and forl1 ýe solution of nuclear proliferation problems."
106,

For,hcDC/28

sto amendments, see DCOR, S'uppl. for 1966, Doc.
[-m
-1,Sec. K(EN~DC/152/Add. 1, 21 Mar. 1966).

107
S Cngres,loint Commrittee_ on Atomic Energy, Hearings
onrolfrto ofý: NuclearP WeaLýpons, 89th Congress, 2rid,
Sess;-ion On 5.Es
7,16
Wsigon, D.C0
US GOve~mntPriniting" Office, "196)6), Appendix 13ý, p. 179,
heenatrcited as Hernson Nron,--Prol ife rati on,i 1966ý
Forlento PasLore) stteen,nheSeae, see !bid.-,
Alpen2d-ix, 1:2, pp, 4-11

Senator Pastole,O

wa

tho
no

;stsfiewitJ
h th

n1o1onI-colt itI-

tal phaigof artlic.le. II] of thel fircst L11erican draft, treaýty
on insp"'ection, had a-lso s,,j(trongly re,commendedi aLelanug
for ar,ticle liII which- later, Ser1ved. as a, basis forJ the1(
forMUlI
ation. of the finial tx of th,Ie Article.l 108 On 7
iy 196jý6,th
Sente
ppove th'Tastore Resoltion without a dissenting,L

The "Pastore Resolution" is a very good example of how pu,blic opinion in a country can give a boost to its Government's
efforts in a field pertaining to peace and security. The discussions that took place in the Senate and the Joint Committee
had helped in elucidating many aspects related to the NIPT negotiations. 10The debate had also shown that the Senate would
not allow United States' nuclear weapons to be transferred toany proposed YMIF. This had also helped the American Administration in orientating its policy on this question.1ill
Bilateral Diplomýac,1966
The impasse in the negotiations existing during the 1966
session of the ENDC was broken, following the adjournment of
108

Ibid., Appendix 12, PP. 147-148.

109

International Negotiations, p. 31.
The NhPT was also extensively discussed in several committees of the American Congress as well as in the Senate itself. It was especially discussed in the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in 1968 and 1969. They had all contributed to a deeper understanding of the treaty's objectives and provisions.
By that time the American Administrationi had op)ýted fOr
consultations on nuclear strategy, by propos-Ing- t.heeta
blishment of a "Special Committee" within NATO (see Chapter 4), However, all American officials questioned( on thle
MLJF in the Joint- Committee had seýemied t1o av7oid leaving.Eý
the impression -that thie TIJ= was shelved., Th.ey usu,ally saiýd
-that the MIJF was justL a proJect, amiong ot-hers un1der' con1Sideration for better defence arrangements withi.n tbhe Alliance,

110

111

the Conference in August 1-966, when the ENhDC's co-Chairmen be,
12gan a series of bilateral talks.'1
The UN General Assembly had also started its 21st session
during which two important meetings took place in Washington.
The first was in September 1966 between President Johnson and
Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the Chancellor of the FRG. The latter seemed to have been either convinced or told by the President of
the United States, that the MIF was not a very good idea in itself and, moreover, that it was an apparently insuperable obs-.
tacle to a non-proliferation treaty that was as important toGermany as to anyone else.113 The second meeting was in Octobcr between President Johnson arid Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister. That meeting seemed to have been a turning
point towards the conclusion of the NPT. In their talks, on
the 10th of October, the President and Secretary Rusk gave Mr.
Gromyko a strong indication that the previous United States'
reservations aimed at according some nuclear-sharing device in
4NATO had been withdrawn."1112

US Congress, House of Representatives, Com~mittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings :Arms Control and Disarmament
Act Amendments, 90th Congress, 2nd Session on H.R. 14940,
1968 (Washington, D.C. :US Government Printing Office,1-968), p. 29, hereinafter cited as Hearings on Arms Control, 1968.

113

Sherman, Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 44-45. For the communiqu4 dated-27 Sept. 1966, see Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, Vol. XV, 1965-1966, p. 21784 A.
The New York Times, 25 Aug. 1967. The paper's report wasquoted in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs without
being contradicted by any official of the American Administration attending the Committee's hearings. See Hear-,ings on Arms Control, 1968, p. 108, See also The Observer,
23 Oqt. 19W66,_which reported that Mr. Gromyko raised nostrong objections to the idea of establishing the "Special
Committee" as a substitute for the MLIF (see note 111
above).

114

102

Following the Washington meetings, the ENDC'scohare
renewed bilateral discussions in New York during the Assembly's
session. These resulted in a wide measure of US-.Soviet agreement on oentral artioles of a non-proliferation treaty.11 By
mid-December 1966, the United States was able to submit to theNATO allies new draft formulations of the main parts of thetreaty that the United States thought it might be able to negotiate with the Soviets while still maintaining US and NATOsecurity objectives. This stage of consultations with allies
continued through January and early Fe-bruary, prior to the reopening of the ENDC on 21 February 1967.116
The UN General Assembly, 1966
On the wider scale of multilateral diplomacy, the UN General Assembly in 1966 adopted, after a laborious session onquestions of disarmament and arms control, a whole set of resolutions most of which were either on non-proliferation orclosely related to it. Four of those resolutions should be mentioned here in the context of the general outline.
The first two resolutions were adopted under the item
"Non-Prolife-ration of Nuclear Weapons :Report of the Conference of the Eighteen.-Nation Committee on Disarmament". 1 1 7The first of the two resolutions reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 2028(XX) and called upon all States to adhere
strictly to the principles laid down in that resolution for
the negotiation of the treaty, and called upon the ENTDC as wellto give high priority to non-proliferation in accordance withthe mandate contained in the same resolution. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution related to the non-use of
115
116
117

Disarmament :The Path to Peace, p.. 5.
Hearinas on Arms Control, 1968, p. 29.
G-AOR, 21st Sess., Anns.
14 Nov. 1966.

(Vol. II), a.i. 26, Dcc. A/6509,

103

agis
nuclear~!_Cý
wepL
i
1nd
:nognr4agans
teritoies. 118

Sttslctdin d.en)uc_eari4edi 70ones

States withoýut nuclear weapons on theirý

The second resolution, which was originally a Pakistaniidea, 19decided -to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon
States to meet not later than July 1968,120 to consider the fo.1lowing and other related questions:"(a) How can the security of the non-nuclear States
best be assured ?
(b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-oper'ate among
themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons ?
(c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes ?"The President of the General Assembly was immediately requested
to set up a preparatory committee, widely representative of the
non-nvclear-weapon States, to make appropriate arrangements forconvening thie oonfvýrecne and to consider the question of association of nuclear States with the work of the conference and121report thereon to the General Assembly at its 22nd session.
On 20 December 1966, the President of' the Assembly designated the members of the "Preparatory Committee". They were
Chile, Dahomey, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria,
118

GA Res! 2153 A(XX(I), 17 Nov. 1966. GAOPR, 21st Sees.,
Suppl. No. 16(A/6316), pp. 9-10. The resolution was adopted by 97 votes to 2, with 3 abstentions. Ibid., 1469th
plen. mtg, 17 Nov. 1966, para. 65.

119

See the statement by the Pakistani representative in Ibid.,
1st Cttee, 1442nd mtg, 4 Nov. 1966, paras. 2-21.

120

The original proposal was to hold the conference not later
than July 1967. But the sponsors of the resolution subsequeatly accepted an amendment proposed by Kuwait to change
the da~te as indicated above. Ibid., Anne. (Vol, II), 4.i. 26
Doc. A/65Q9, 14 Nov. 1966, paras. 8 and 111.

121

GA Res. 2153 IB(XXI), 19 Nov. 1966. Ibid.,_Suppl. No. 16(A/6316), p. 10. The idea of associating the nuclear-weapon
States with the conference was also proposed by Kuwait.

104

aksa,Peru, Lpain and theIjL
United- Republi,c Of Tanzania
The, resý,,-olutiý,on did not, ga-in wide supotas-onlyý 418 vtote'd fori,t,wh-iie5)9 a-bst,ained. Indi a was, thagainst it .

123

nycunrovt

The domilnant fee-1Ling- of th-'ose- wgho ab)stained wasd

that the proposed conferencee maight pr)Iejudice the effo.rts ofJ
the ENDC in reaching a non-proliferation treaty. India's ex-planation of her vote was summed up in that 'the basic features of this draft resolution are contrary to those in the otherdraft and to those in resolution 2028(XX); that it suggests remedies which are incomnplete, ineffective and undesirable; and124
that its timing, in any case, is inappropriate."
The third resolution relating to non-proliferation adopted
by the Assembly was under the item "Question of general andcomplete disarmament".1 2 5 The UN Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, on the effect of thepossible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implication for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. 16The report was issued in October 1967 for the consideration of the 22nd session of the General Assembly.1 27 The report will be referred to in the courseof our analysis of the Treaty's provisions.
122

Ibid., 1500th plen. mtg, 20 Dec. 1966, paras. 191-193.

123

For the details of the voting, see Ibid., 1469th plen.
mtg, 17 Nov. 1966, para. 67.

124

Ibid. para. 15. For the full text, see paras. 8-27 and29--31,'125

GAOR, 21st Sess., Ann@., a.i. 27, Doc. A/6529, 24 Nov. 1966,
GA Res. 2162 A(XXI), 5 Dec. 1966. GAOR, 21at Sess., Suppl.
No. 16 (A/6316), pp. 10-11.

126
127

UN Doc. A/6858, 10 Oct. 1967. Later issued as Effects of
the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and _the Scrtn
Econondo Implicatilons for States of the Aoqiito andFurther'Development of These Weapons (New York :UN Pub.
No, E.68,I.1, 19-68), hereiniaft'eýr cited as Effects of the
Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons,.

The ouri.th reoltin
prpse

yV h

asaopted inl relýat,ion to an iteml
Soviet Uniýon enii-tled. "Ren.iaweition by Statesof apUtiojis, heaýpering the conclusion of an agreement on the
non-pVroliferation of nuclear weapons" .128 The resolution urgently appealed to all States, pending the conclusion of a
NPT"(a) To take all the necessary steps to facilitate
and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons in accordance with the principles laid downin G-eneral Assembly resolution 2028(XX);(b) To refrain from any actions conducive to theproliferation of nuclear weapons or which might
hamper the conclusion of an agreemiý on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."
The ENDC in 1267,and the Identical Treaty Drafts of 24 Aug-ust
When the ENDUC reconvened on 21 February 1967, there washope that the consultations the United States was carrying out
with the Soviet Union as well as with her NATO allies would
have led to the tabling of an agreed draft to the Conference.
However, as the nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO seemed to have been settled, new difficulties arose. The main problem then was the degree of inspection which must be acceptedon civil nuclear programmes to ensure that they are not divert-Qd to military purposes.
The United States had originally hoped to complete the negotiations on certain points with the Soviets and submit them
1128

129

GAOR, 2jst Seass., Arns. (Vol. III), a,i. 97, Docs. A/6398,
23 Sept. 1966 and A/6496, 2 Nov. 1966, T?he main preoccupation of the Soviet Union was also the access to nuclear
weapons by non-n:uclear States, members of NATO and par'tipularly the FRG, through the "division of nxuclear res'pqnsibility" within the alliance.
GA Res, 2149(XXI), 4 Nov. 1966. Ibid., Suppl. No. 16(A/ý3l6), p. 9. The resolution was adopted by 101 votes
to 1, with 1 abstention, Ibid., 1458th plen. rntg, 4 Nov.
1966, para. 43.

106

for the C.onsidJ_Jeratiýon of the' Clonferencek2 wahe't) J[ItopJened onl 21
February.

The Soviets ob jected, -and said thten thaýtthe

p-refer-

red to wait un~til a complete treaty draft had been worked out,
before agreeing to the submission of any text. The mnost important provision which was still missing was an Article III governing inspection.
The safeguards problem arose out of the existence of two
international safeguards systems; one established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, and anotherset up earlier by the European Atomic Energy Community, The
Common Market countries were reluctant to allow the IAEA safeguards system to operate in their countries,for fear-it would
result in abandonment of the Euratom system. They felt thatsuch a result would have an unfavorable effect on progress towards European unity. The United States therefore had beenclear that both systems should be permitted to continue.
The Soviet Union was agreeable to mandatory safeguards on
the non-nuclear signatories of the treaty, but believed thosesafeguards should be administred by the IAEA. From the outset,
the Soviets opposed the idea that the Euratom system was equivalent to IAEA, on the ground that Euratom inspection amounted
to self-inspection.
The U~nited States was trying to work out a solution satisfactory to their NATO allies in Euratom and, at the same time,
acceptable to the Soviet Union. The official negotiations continued at the ENDC, which only discussed the question in a
general way since no new draft text had been introduced at theConference.130
The ENDC held two sessions in 1967, the first from 21 February to 23 March, and the second from 18 Nay to 14 December,
The recess that took place on 23 March, just after a one-monthsession, was at the request of the United States.
130

See Hearings on Arms Control, 1968, pp. 29-30.

107

J
Nr. WilltheRuopen

kstr
aptalsuý

Represen ýtatUive
thA US11
huEns,

Rlome

Brssl,

madn

a1 to,r of
The 14ague--

a special 'Interest to consult further in

whIchA ha. eprssd

the iiqht of developm~ents concerning ani article III. When it
appeared that still more extensive consultations would be necessary before

a oomplete text could be submitted, the US re-quoQted the recess.
After further extensive consultations with the United States' allies in Washington and other capitals, and, in the North
Atlantic Council,

the US obtained a "green light" in

the Coujin-

cii on April 20 to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union
with a view to submitting a joint draft when the ENDC reconvened, which was on May 18.
A great deal of progress was made toward an agreed text
during the recess. The US and its allies concurred that the
major part of the agreed text could be presented to the Conference, leaving the unagreed portions, foremost of which was
still the article ona safeguards, for further negotiations be1 1
tween the US and the Soviet Union., 3
When the ENDC reconvened on 18 Nay 1967, there was still
no text of a draft treaty before the Conference. Besides theinspectioni issue there were many other issues to deal with,which were of special interest to non-nuclear-weapon States.
The dominaint cnes were the peaceful uses of nuclear energy andespecially -the peaceful uses of' nuclear explosions, security
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States renouncing the rightto acquire nuclear arms, and the measures of nuclear disarmament that should be undertaken by the 4ucleoar-weapon States.
In general the sessions he~ld by the ENDC in 1967 were the longest in its history and they constituted an important part in thenegotiating haistory of the NPT, especially after the present,-151Ibidý, P. 30.

108ati-on, of

heirstý two) idetia drat by th Unte
Unio on21uut19713
SeApniState

and thelSoit

)-,)

It

was apparently upon the Soviet Union's insisýýItene onra
principle of equality that two identical drafts were itoued.13 3 The 24 Augu.st draft included a longer preamble than theprevious American and Soviet 1965 separate drafts, and eightarticles including an article III on inspection which was left
blank. Negotiations on Article III continued throughout thesummer. The Soviets suggested a new compromise draft safeguards
article based in part on the April 20 NATO draft. This proposal was presented to the North Atlantic Council for discussion.
The draft article was also discussed in the capitals of thealliance and in 'the European Atomeic Energy Community (Euratom).134
The first two articles contained the main obligations which
foreclosed the possibility of establishing a MVLF or an ANF. Article IV was on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the restof the articles, the final clauses, were related, inter alia,
to signature, adherence, entry into force, amendments procedures, revision, duration, and a withdrawal clause.
The discussions at the ENDC took a new turn. Instead of
dealing with generalities, the delegations had a definite text,
agreed to by the co-Chairmen, to deal with, Several proposals
and amendments were submitted to the 24 August draft, not only
132
133

134

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Ann. IV, Sec. 6 (ENIDC/
192, 24 Aug. 1967) and See, 8(ENDC/193, 24 Aug. 1967),
Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation TreatyýFrameýwork _forNuclear Arms Control (Charlottesville, Virginia :The
iMichie Company, 1969), p. 63, hereinafter cited as NonProliferation Treaty. Concern for possible reactions from
China was also offered as an explanation by one writer.
James E. Dougherty, "The Treaty and the Nonnuclear States",
2rbis, Vol. XI, No. 2, Summer 1967, P. 360,
See Hearings on Arms Control, 196,p0

L_,09,p.3

fro th on~alinedStaes
eiht

utaLso fý'om NATO and Wýýar-saw Pactl- members,in viwof the a,pýproac,hiing adjourn-mient of the 22nid sessiono)f the General Assembly, the ENDC had decided to submit aninterim status report to the Asý3embly, which was a very brief
one.136 Since the ENDC had intended to continue its work witha view to negotiating a NPT, it was unable to provide a comprehensive +'eport on the question for the consideration of theAssembly. The ENIDC had intended to submit a full report as
1 37soon as possible.,
The UN General Assesmbly,16
The General Assembly at its 22nd. session had very little
time left Ln 1967 to consider its item on non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which was divided into two suib-items :thereport of the ENDQ and the report of the Preparatory Committee
for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The two subitems were considered by the First Committee of the Assemblyfrom. 15 to 18 December 1967.138 There was also the r'eport of
the UN Secretary-General on the "Effects of the possible useof nuclear weapons _11
2 referred to above. It was discussed at
the Assembly as a sub-item (b) of the question of general andcomplete disarmam-ent.139

J,35
136

137
1383
139

See DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Ann. IV.
Usual,ly the scssions of the ENDC came to an end before
the beginning of the UN General Assembl,y so it could submit its reports in due time for the Assembly's consideration. But in 1967 the EN]DC's second session continued
till December to allow for some progress on the 24 August
draft,
GAOR, 22nd Sess., Anns. (Vol. II), a.i. 28, Doc. A/6951,
7 Dec. 1967,
Lbid.,, Doc. A/7016, 18 Dec. 1967.
Ibd, a.i. 29, Dcc. A/7017, 18 Dec, 1967,. parap. 5, 8
and 10?

110

Ont 19 Decemlber 197,te semlyaope a resolution( r-pquLestingt the- ENDO to su,ibmnit toi
no bfr05Mac
98
a full report on the negotiatikons regar,dingý thePT. -It al-so
recommended, the setting of an early date after 15 Marchi 1968
for the resumption of the 22nd session of the Assembly to consider the full report. 1 4 0
As for the Preparatory Committee set up to prepare for the
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, its report was submitted to the Assembly on 19 September 1967. 141 In the courseof 1967, the Committee held ten meetings at United Nations
Headquarters in New York. A provisional agenda for the Conference was recommended by the Committee. The five items included in the agenda were:- Methods of assuring the security of non-nuclear
weapon-States,
Implications of productions and acquisition of
nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States.
- Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through co-operation among non-nuclear-weapon States.
Programme for the peaceful uses of nu.clear energy.
-

Implementation of Conference decisions.14

The Committee also decided to recommend that nuclear-weapon States should be invited to participate in the Conferencewith full rights except the right to vote,
As to the place and date of the Conference, the Committee
recommended Geneva, from 11 March to 1.0 April 1968.,143
140

G-A Res. 2346 A(XXII), 19 Dec. 1967, Ibid., Suppl. No. 16(A/6716), pp. 16-17. The resolution was adopted by 112
votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. A/PV. 1640 (proy.), 19
Dec. 1967, pp. 68-70.

141

UN Doc. A/6817, 19 Sept. 1967.

142

Ibid., Ann. I.

143

The UN Secretariat h-ad informed the Committee that theabove mentioned date was the only suitable date for holding the Conference in Geneva. Ibid., para. 27.

111J

On.19eceber196,
te Asemly(adoptejd a resolu,tiOn. ap-

proin
th rcomenatinsofthe Prepaýratory Committe
oneexcpton

onernngthe date of

withI

hthe
Conferenceý.- Tt was

fixe1td1 fromn 29 August to 28 September 1968. The Unitedl States
and thio Soviet Union had, in fact, waged a successful campaign
for the postponement of the Conference until the treaty was
opened for signature. It was feared that the Conferenoce would
provide an opportunity for opponents of the NPT to mobilize
their foroes against it. 14 4 UN members as well as members of
the specialized agencies and the IAEA were invited to partici145
pate in the Conference.
The resolution as opposed to the 1966 resolution was widely
supported. T~t was adopted by 110 votes to none, with 8 abstentions including India which had voted against the previous resolution. 16The wide support for the resolution was due tothe fact that many non-nuclear-weapon. States who were not infavour of the Conference at the 21st session of the Assembly
were irritated over the fact that the ENhDC was not very active
during its last session. 4
The third questiLon relating to non-proliferation was theaforementioned report of the Secretary-General on the "Effectsof the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons.

KOn 19 December

1967, the Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the ENDC
Sherman, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 67, See alý,o the tepttmony of Adrian Fisher,' the Deputy Director of the ACDA in
Heariun-s on Arms Control, 1968, PP. 59-60, Mr. Fisher explained that in accepting the adjournment of the Conference to August 1968, the proponents of the Conference
had asked, in return, for a prompt resolution from theAssembly to the ENDC on a NPT.
145 GA Res. 2346 B(XXII), 19 Dec. 1967. GAOR, 22nd Sess.,
Suppl. No. 16 (A/6716), P. 17.
.146 For the results of the voting, see A/PV.1640 (prov.), 19
Dec. 1967, p. 71.
147 Mr. Fiqher's testimony in Hearings on Arms Control, 1_968,
p. 59.
144112

to tuake in-'to a ccounLýt t,hereotadteonlsoshrofi
its

efot

tl'S1owardC's' the -achivmn ofýGO- uneLefctv

interna_tional

otrl

Convinced that, theiide di-ssemintiO'on,of the report would contribute to a better understanding of
the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage steadyprogress in the prevention of their spread, as well as inother measures of nuclear disarmament, the Assembly requested
the UN Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of
the full report as a UN publicationl 4 8 and publicize it in as
many languages as were considered desirable and practicable..
Other measures were also recommended to acquaint the public
49
with its contents.,'

The ENDO, 1968 :The IdenticalTrayDftof1Jnuy
1968 and the Joint Treaty Draft of 11 MVarch_1968
On 18 January 1968, the ENDO reconvened again. By thattime, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on adefinite article III on inspection. Negotiations on article
III to allow continuation of the Euratom safeguards was the
subject of most elaborate consultations during the fall of
1967. As the United States is not a member of Euratom, its representatives attended NATO meetings in which Euratom countries expressed their point of view. The consultations cameup with a formula which the United States presented to theSoviet Union on 2 November 1967, but these consultations broke
up on 15 December in a rather inconclusive way. When the ccChairmen came to Geneva, for the new round of talks at the
ENDO, they met on 15 January, three days before the opening of
the Conference. In that meeting the Soviets indicated that148

See note 127 above.

149

See GA Res. 2342 A(XXII), 19 Dec. 1967. GAOR, 22nd Sess.
Suppl. No. 16 (A/6716), p. 15. The resolution was adopted
by 115 votes to none, with 1 abstention, A/PV. 1640
(prov.), 19 Dec. 1967, p. 22.

.13

the

weepeaeber frmula

oacp
T

h

anguageq-oOft1he, s-co._nd Nov-em-

Soviet approval of article, III wa com
muniatototimUnited States representative on the miorningof: 18_January, just a few hours before the inaugural meeting'ifinaof the ne~w session. 1-5 There were also many other changes
inthe previous 24 August draft that were agreed upon by
the CoChairmen in thoir meetings in Geneva between 15 and18 Janua,151
Two identical texts of a draft NPTT were introduced
to the
ENDC on 18 January, 152 The draft consiýsted of a preamble
andeleven articles (see Appendix 3-H). The preamble wasslightly
shorter than t
24 August draft as some of its paragraphs
were worked upon and developed into articles, Articles
I and
Il remained unchanged. Article III contained four paragraphs.
Article IV,on peaceful uses, was more elaborate than the preceding one. Articles V, VI and VII were all added
to the new
text. Article V is related to peaceful uses of nuclear
explosions, Article VI to measures regarding cessation of
the nuclear arms race and disarmament and Article VII to
the right
to estabis h denuclearized zones. The remaining
Articles VIII
to XI, tIhe final clauses, were analogous to Articles
V -to VIIIof the 24 August draft. However, they have all undergone
considerable changes or additions except for the lastone. Thechanges concerned amendments' procedures, entry
into force andduration.
The ENDC during its short ses:;ion of 1968, whichcame toan end on 14 Mdarch, was the most active sessioi)of the Conference~ on DPT.
150
151
152

-it was realized then that the session was theSee Hr. Fisher's testimony in Heol
1968, pp. 61-062,.
rnso
Am
oto
Ibid., p. 62.
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230 a~na
Add. 1,
Ann. IV, See, 7 (ENDC/192/Rev. 1, 18 Jan, 1968) andSec.
9 (EIVDC/193/Rev, 1, 18 Jan. 1968).

114

last chanlce to contribt

to thi'e final ela'boration of theýtreaty. On1 the one hand, -the meetings of the Conference weremore frequent. More questions and inquiries about the draft's
provisions wer'e addressed to the co-Chairmen, Thte latter provided extensive answers and interpretations of treaty provisions. Thie Conference became for the first time a virtual negotiating forum and not merely a place where statements were madeto score a point for one country or another. Informal consultations were taking place almost daily and the two co-Chairmen
took pains in those consultations to argue in favour of theirdrafts. Article III, for the first,time submitted to the Conference, was the main subject of those consultations. On theother hand, several delegations either repeated their proposals and amendments which were not taken into consideration in
the 18 January draft, or introduced new ones.
As the 18 January text was also silent on security assurances, several proposals were introdaced to the Conference inthis respect. But cc 7 March 1968, the three nuclear-weapon
States participating in the Conference submitted to it a draft
Security Council resolution on the question. 13The represent-.
atives of the three countries had stated that their Governments
would make declarations of intention closely connected withthe resolution.

1 54

On 11 March 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union
submitted, for the first time, to the ENDC a joint draft treaty
which took into consideration some of the suggested amendments
and proposals made since the introduction of the 18 January

153
154

]DCOR, SuppI. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. II (EITDC/222, 7 MVar. 1-966).
See ENDC/PV. 375, 7 Mar. 1968, pp. 5-6 (United States),
pp. 8-10 (USSR); and p. 10 (United Kingdom).

115thepreiou
on i

thee

espctsJL addekd a nle-w preamlbularpargrahn dscotiuane)f nularwapn
VJ
waslgtly moifidtdnt
Ithgading cesaion of'uarms r'ace

uests,

Articleuir,-enrcy of' measure"cS re-and Articole VIII wasiodified

anduppemetedto allow for periodic review oonferences.
T2he improvements realised by the 11 March draft were very
meagre when compar'ed to the considerable set of proposals andamendments submitted. The co-Chairmen were particularly unrelenting as far as Ar'ticles I, II, and III were concerned,
They categorically refused any modifi~cations to these articles
which were, as pointed out above, carefully worked out and reflecting a delicate balance.
The full report of the Conference by the two co-Chairmen
to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission was
carefully drafted so as not to leave an impression that the 11
156
March draft was the draft of the Conference.,
The General Assembly, Twenty-Second Resumed Session, 1268
The General Assembly resumed its 22nd session on 24 April
1968. The joint draft treaty was the subject of an exten 'sive
debate in the First Committee of the Assembly from 26 April to
10 June 1968.
On 1 May, 'the United States, the Soviet Union and 18
other co-unitries submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution enosln

the 11 March text. A revised version of thedraft was submitted on 3 May which was co-sponsored by ninemore countries. On 28 May, a second and last revised version
155

For the text of the 11 March joint draft which was latertransmitted to the Assembly, see DCOR, Suppl. for 1967
and 1968, Does. DC/230 and Add. 1, Ann, I.

156

For the text of the report, see Ibid., Does. DC/230 and
Add, 1, 19 Mar. 1968, PP. 1-37.

116

was, inrdcdbShadd

tosiniicn
NPT rahe

CtS~

pnos
changeof which wa
th

ocre

h

rabewsoagda~

inteoertv

thtte

ebl

ar,ms

oldcmenh5-edorseit,'

The 11, March draft treaty had also bEe,n iAevised oný 31 ay
The changes which occurred in the draft were discreet changes,
and not on the basis of formialV amendments. The preamble had
been slightly changed and added to, Article IV was changed tomeet the needs of the developing countries, and Article V wasrevised in the same direction. Moreover, the names of the Depository Governments :the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, were inserted in Article IX. The treaty's entry into force was to take place when the instrumentsof ratification had been deposited by these three States and40 other countries.
The 51 May draft treaty was attached to the 28 May draft
resolution which was adopted by the Assembl.y on 12 ~June 1968.,158(See Appendix 3-G.) The resolution was adopted by 95 votes to4, with 21 abstentions, The four countries voting against were
Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and Zambia. Among the abstainers wereFrance and three members of the ENDC; Brazil, Burma and India, 159 The positions of countries dissatisfied with the NPT
will be treated in the course of the treaty's analysis.
The Security Council Resolution 255,

96

On the same day of the adoption of the Assembly's resolut-,ion, the United States, the Soviet Onion and the United Kingdom submitted to the Security Council their draft resolution

157

158
159

For these developments, see UN Doos, A/C.l/L.421, 1.Nay
ýL968; 4/C.1/L.421, Rev. 1, 3 Nay 1968; and A/C.l/Ib,44
Rev. 2, 28 Nay 1968, See also GAOR, 22nd Sess., Anns.
(Vol, II), a.i. 28, Doc. A/7016/Add. 1, 10 June 1968.
GA Res. 2373 (XXII), 12 J Lne 1968ý`, Ibid,,up
No 16(A/6716/Add.
)
p.57
A/ PV. 1672 (prov2,
12 Juine 198 )pl.2-0
so
1 January 1980 nonle Of the hsacdd
to th
PT

117

of'7Mach198

n ecrty suacs
The Coulc.il_mtbewe
17
19June1968wheraddeLaraýtions were made bjy t'he threeJue,thdaftcounrie iuconuncionwithther daftresluton,
On 19
was adopted by the Coiuncil without Qhange.ldl1(See
Apendix d..) Ten countri~es voted in favour and five abstai.ned. 162
Entry into force of the NPT
On 1 July 19,64;&the Treaty was opened for signature at
Washington, London and Moscow.
It was signed on the same dayby the three Depositary Governments and more than 50 countries.
The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970 when, according
to Article IX, the three Depositary Governments and forty otherStates signatory to the Treaty had ratified it and depositedtheir instruments of ratification.
By 1 January 1980, the NPT
had been ratified or acceded to by 112 States. 16 3
But between -the 1st of July 1968 and the 5th of March 1970
events were taking place that had a direct bearing on the NPT.
The Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact members intervened
militarily in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, The Conference of
the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States took place in Geneva between 29
160
161
162

163

SCOR, 1430th mtg, 17 June 1965.
Res. 255, 19 June 1968. SCOR, 23rd Yr., 1968.
The resolution was supported by the sponsors as well as
by Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Piaraguay
andSenegal. Those which abstained were Algeria, Bra4il,
France, India and Pakistan. SCOR, 1433rd mtg, 19 June
1968, para. 115,
See Appendix 26.
Both the United States and the Soviet
Union managed to ratify the Treaty on the same day, on
241 Nov. 1969, They had also deposited their instrumentsof ratification on the same day, on 5 March 1970.
their ratifications, see 'DOSB, Vol. LXI, Nc. 1590, For
19
Dec 1969, pp. 544-545 and New Times, No. 48,
3 Dec., 1969,
p. 26,
fication on the same day, on 5 March 1970, For theirratifications, see DOSB, Vol. LXI, No, 1590, 19 Dec. 1969,
pp. 544-r545 and NewPie,N.48,
3 Dec, 1-969, p. 26.

118

Aug-us t ant8Spebr
Talksý

('SAL,T)98hstarte,_d in Hesn

ternatidonai. Atomlic

tatgcAssiitatioil
n17 Noemer169(Te nithaerg,y Agency(1AEA) in
ienna hiad alreadystarted to -a-dertake studies on the impact of the NPIPT on t1he,
Agency and more particularly on its safeguards system.
Czechoslovakia and the NPTThe Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia had its
repercussions on the NPT. In the United States, M4r. Richard
Nixon, who was then the Republican presidential nominee, called
for Senate delay in consenting to the NPT. 16 4 By that time,
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had already terminated its hearings on the NPT. 15The events in Czechoslovakia
and their relationship to the Treaty became of great concern
to that Committee and were the subject of considerable discussions, particularly as to the appropriateness of approving
the Treaty while Czechoslovakia was occupied by Soviet troops. 1 6 6The prevailing view in the Committee was that, while the Soviet actions were deplorable, the Treaty itself was multilateral in character and of such significance as a potential
barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons that any delay in taking final Committee action was inadvisable. On 17
September 1968, the Committee, by voting 13 in favour, 3against, with 3 abstentions, recommended the Senate to give

164
165

166

International Herald Tribune, 9 Sept. 1968.
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings :Nonproliferation Treaty, 90th Congress, 2ndSession on Executive Hf, 1968 (Washington, D.C. ;US Government Printing Office, 1968), hereinafter cited as
Helarings. o 'nNPT, 1968.
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Report Together With Supplement Views
Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsý, Senate Executive
Reporýt N!To,91,
91st Congress, 1st Ses7sion (ahntn
D.C. :US Government FPrintýing Cffice, 11_969), p.1-4
hereinafter cited as- Repor_-t on,,N`T, -1969.,

119

Lts

dvic tandconsnt
raifictionof

te Tra

67
1y
Hw

168

n_tce

thatuhhad decideo notL to call, the- TrLeaty ap.for considratonin the Senate becau~se of the "formidable procedural

obstacle" arising from the election campaign.1 6 9
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a second
round of hearings in February 1969, 17
n which the new American Administration took part. President Nixon was then in fayour of' the Treaty, 1 71 In the Committee the view prevailed
again that while the Soviet action warranted continued condemnation, the prompt ratification of the Treaty was in the national interest. On 25 February 1969, the Committee by a vote of
14 in favour, with one Senator not taking part in the vote, recommended the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the pending Treaty,17

The United States Senate

gave its advice anid. consent on 13 March 1969 by a vote of 85
to 15,
167

168
169

Ibi,d,, p. 20, For the minority views of the Senators onl
the events in Czechoslovakiq, see the Committee's first
Executive Report No. 9, dated 26 Sept. 1968 in Con-ressjonal_i-est, Vol. 48, No. 1, Jan. 1969, P. 15.Lý
The,Tmesq, 12 Oct. 1968,
ItrainlHr6Trbn,12-13
October 1968.

170

US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings :Nonproliferation_Treat(Part 2), 91st Congress,
lst Session on Eýxecutive H, 199(Washington, D.C. ; USqovernmnent Printing Office, 1969), hereinafter cited as

171

In his press conference on. 6 Feb, 1969, President Nixon
said that hie did not gloss over the fact that he still
very strongly disappr'oved of what the Soviet Union had
done in CzeqhQslovakia and what it still was doing. IButon balance he considered that it, was the time to move
forward on the Treaty. See statement by Secretary of Ota-172

te Rogers in Hearinon N13

Report oPIT,_ý69,

p. 20,

120

1969, P. 306.

lt,,,qin

in, Czýecholoaa haIlocnrbtdt

thie Triea ty'sJ
sintur

CiaLtly Ittaly and
1 the
N Fe'deraýlL1ý Repbi)
Th)eSoitUno'ea

byv soeoutre

roe

se

of Gemanll I I

intevent-Ioinzehlvaahda

great imipact on Soviet inform,ationi stratUegy. Untýil miidA-September,the Soviet information media remained. silent on teNPT,
seemingly lacking instructions on how to deal with the new po-sition. When the NPT was taken up again, serious concern overthe influence of anti-non-proliferation proponents in the United States and over increasingly negative attitude of the West
German leaders was clearly discernable. The Soviet information
media tried in various ways to counteract the trend. 7 4 For
example, the United States was warned th-at a change of attitude might render the relations between the greatest world
Powers as bad as they had been during the first days of thecold war. The United States was informed that Bonn was exploiting the events in Czechoslovakia in order to juLsti-*fy its Un1175
willingness to sign the NPT. -The Soviets, at one point, claimed the right under articles
53 and 107 of the UN Charter to intervene by force unilaterally
in the FRG. 17 6 The United States, the United Kingdom and France
issued statements in September 1968, which made clear that theSoviet Union had no right under these articles to intervene byforce unilaterally in the ERG. The United States had also stated at that time that it believed the Soviets clearly understood173

Italy signed on 28 Jan, 1969 and the ERG on,28 Nov. 1.969.
SIPRI Yearbook2197,
pp. 444 and 450.

174

Wettig, loc.cit., PP. 1079-1080.

175

Ibid.

176

Article'107 stipulates that -'Nothing
in the present
Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation
to any State which during the Second World War has- b,een
an enemy of any sig;natory to, thec present C1hartte,tke
or authorized as a result of thiat w,7ar bY the GAenmns

having responsibility for, such acin,
53.
[21

Iee also aRItiltht-ts

tI'intevul)
tin by)orc

mediaterýýoýopos

by NATO.

inl the FRGC would lead to an im-

In early 1969,

Secretaryr of StateRo6ers met the Soviet Ambassador to urge Soviet adoption of adifferent position on these articles. Afterwards, in a seriesof meetings between German and Soviet officials, an additional
assurance was given by the Soviet Union to the FRG which gavethem some consolation.177
As to the three remaining events, they are very much related to the implementation phase of the NPT and accordingly they
will be treated in the context of the Treaty's analysis. The
Conference of Nonu.Nuclear-Weapon States dealt with all the,questions that were raised da~ring the formulation phase of theNPT IIt issued a declaration and adopted a set of resolutions,thelfinal one of which invited the General Assembly to consider
the ways and means of implementing the decisions taken by the
Conference.17 The SALT continued taking place alternativelyinHelsinki anO Vienna,and later in

Geneva.

These talks will

be dealt with in conjunctiony with the study of Article VI of
the NPT, The IAEA work relating to the NPT w{ill be studied in
the context of the analyses of Articles III, IV and V of theTreaty.

177

See the answer of Gerard Smith, Director of the ACDA toa question asked by Senator Thurmond in US Congress, Senate, Committee on Amred Services, Hearinc)-s
I_Militarý
Nuclie_ar Wea_po-ns, 91st Congr -ess, 1st Session, 1969 (Washýngtoni D,C.
US Government Printing Office, 1969),
p. 123, hereinafter cited as Hearings on Military Implications of NFT,.

178

For the final document of the Conference, see UN Dec.
A/CONF-35/10, 1 Oct. 1968. For a brief summxary of theresults of the Conference, pee the information furnishedby the ACDA for the record of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations in aHearings on NPT, 1,96
pp. 342-345.
For a survey of views and pr9posa sa the Conference,see Ibid., PP. 450-461,

122

To sui upi1,the t0at-1akn proc!s of teo-2olFer
ation Treaty was a long,- anel aý complicateýd one-, jiince theadpt
ion of the "Irish Resoluti.on't of 1961, it took almost ten
years
of' continued effort to accomplish the Treaty. Yet, the Treatyts
entry into force was just the beginning of a new negotiatingphase to makc out of it an effective instrinnent to avert'theproliferation of nuclear weapons.
At the beginning, the process was very slow and cautious.
It took the form of either a general. discussion of thesubject
matter of the Treaty or bilateral talks between *the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. The meeting of the Disarmament
CoiimTission in 1965 was a dividing line between the former
phase
and a new active one starting with the 1965 session of
the ENDC
and the introduction of a first treaty draft. Since then,theprocess of treaty-making took a variety of forms. A general
discussion of the problem had continued, but bilateral andmultilateral negotiations in various places and different
organswere intensified, more treaty drafts were introduced, counter
proposals and amendments were also presented and the negotiations tended towards the solution of specific problems in orderto reach a final agreement. The ENDC was at the centre ofallthese negotiations.
The problems encountered were not only arising in the relations between East and West or between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, but also between allies, members of analliance or between non-committed nations such as the nonaligned countries. Problems were not always solved to thesatisfaction of all participants in the negotiations. This was
impossible to attain in view of their divergent interests andpriorities,
In the two phases of the negotiations, the outstanding
problem between East and West was the nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. Countries members of the latter were also

123

not
ject
sAc

o-t tLhe- proposedopro-

iagemnontefablity
LAIay
as theInecnd
he

or th
tL
hae,

AN
of ArticleI

heformikiatioll

inspctinme conideablhaEurtomcoutris wo wshe

III ondif~cutiesraiedbyth
ctcontinue, waltitthi

own1

systemof inpCtion.
The non-nuclear-weapon States were particularly concernedwith problems of vital interest to their security and economic
development.

Disarmamaent measures by the nuclear-weapon States

and nuclear guarantees were sought. Peaceful uses of nuclear
energy qnd the development of peaceful nuclear explosions received considerable attention from the developing and developed countries alike.
In general, there was a persistent trend for a definite
treaty text rather than unilateral undertakings sulch as thenon-~acquisition declaration suggested by Italy. The persistence was most apparent in the attitude of the United States andthe Soviet Union, especially since the presentation of theirfirst identical drafts of 24 August 1967. The Vietnam war did
not seem to be an obstacle for negotiating the treaty. Soviet
negotiators had sometimes left the impression that it would.
The Middle-East war of June 1967 had no effect on the continuation of the negotiations between theco-Chairmen of the

ENDC that led to the tabling two months later of their 1967
identical drafts. The Czechoslovak crisis of August 1-968,al-most iwo mpnths after the N~PT was opened for signature, hadraised doubts for some time as to the possibility that thetreaty would ever enter into force.
A remarkable feature of the NPT negotiations was the perseverance with which b9th the United States and the Soviet'
Union pursued their common drive for urgently concluding theTreaty.

Weý nee,d not reiterate- here the'motives that had driven

the two countrie-:Ls to fýollow such a course.

124Now that thýe foundatio-4n and th coreofngtatoso
the NPT- have be-en diwelt- onj, i is possible,' to analyseith
Treatyýýs provisions and its implementation on the basis oýf theýfive principles of General Assembly Resolution 2028(XX).
Under:
principle(a), however, the problem of nuclear sharing within
NATO ought to be explored much further.

125

PART 11"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might
permit nuclearor non-nuclearPowers toproliferate,directly or
indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form"(Principle (a))

CHAPTER 4
Plans for Nucl-ear Sharing within NATOand Non-Proliferation

In Chapter 2, it has been shown that principle (a) of General Assembly Resolution 2028(XX) was originally closely associated with the plans for nuclear sharing within NATO and,more specifically, the American proposal for establishing a
multilateral nuclear force (NLP). As previously demonstrated
in Chapter 3, the MLF was for a certain timc the major obstacle
to progress in negotiating the NPT. In particular, the formulation of Articles I and II, as they have finally materialised,entailed lengthy bilateral negotiations between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union towards an agreement precluding
any possibility of loop-holes especially those which could leadto the proliferation of nuclear weapons through military alliances.
It is therefore in the first -place appropriate to tackle
the pr'oblem of nuclear sharing within NATO, and this especiallymay permit a clearer understanding of the limits imposed by
Articles I and II. It will also be shown how far this problem
was at the centre of the debates on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe as was the credibility of United States'
guarantees to its allies in NATO. Moreover, the fact that there
was no prospect of success for a non-proliferation treaty without settling the problem of nuclear sharing within NATO to thesatisfaction of the two blocs facing each other in 7Earope,1
makes a study of the problem

senilInwthdalig herobem,whih iof s;uchcomplexitythat ~~ efulitmynoI.xplored within the limits of thiswe s3hall confine ourselves to the direct issues involved
inLhe NPT negotiations. We therefore have no intention to go-tudy

into the origins and earlier de_-velopments of nuclear sharing
within NATO which could be traced back to what may be called
the pre-Nassau era. 1In Nassau (The Bahamas), where the iPresident of the United States, John F. Kennedy, and the Prime
M~inister of the United Kingdom, Harold Macmillan, met in December 1962, two different approaches to the problem of nuclear
sharing within NATO could be discerned :a multilateral approach espoused by the United States and a multinational one
favoured by the United Kingdom. The post-Nassau era was dominated by the MLF for almost two years (1963-1964) after which
the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), a basically multinational
project, was propcsed by the United Kingdom at the end of 19641

For a reasonable understanding of the origins and earlier
developments of nuclear sharing within NATO the following
works and articles are recommended
Christian A. Herter,
Towr anAlni
omnt
NwYr
aper and Row,
196)
Her
.Ksigrh ruldPrnership. A ReApria ofteAlMtcAlacc(eokNGraw-Hill,
196)
heenfeie
sTeTobeatesi;
Urs
Schrz AmrcnSrtg
eesetve.
The GrowthofTininteU
1oiioYiltr
ted States (Garden
City, New York
Doubleday, 1966); Alastair Buchan, "TheMultilateral Force :An Historical Perspective", Institutefor Strategic Studies (London), AdelEhi Papers, No. 13,
Ocot, 1964, hereinafter cited as "The Multilateral Force";
Robert Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO (Washington, D.C.
The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research,1962),and The Case for the MLF :A Critical Evaluation (Washingtor, DC. :The Washington CenterofFrinPlc
Res(.arch, 1964); Irving Heymont, "The NATO Bilateral Forces",
Orbis, Vol. IX, Winter 1966, pp. 1025-1041; Jeffrey
Smith,"NATO- Nuclear Information-Sharing Arrangements and the NonProliferation Treaty :Collective Defence Confronts Arms
Control", Atomic EnerazLaw Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, Winter1972, pp. 356-357; and Thoma C. Wieple, "The Origins of the
MLF Concept, 1957, 1960", Orbis, Vol. XII, No, 2, Summer
1968, PP. 465-489.

130

0,SCO MpI)eti tor . Since ne,itheas a seriou

proC0,t, met wih(theapproval o.f all TIATO P)JAlles, n-ot to men tion lt-he, oons-,i deýrableý
re,sistanýce they had enoutee

bitiouso substituite,tin
the S,ovieCt-bo,

a leooam

NAVTO',s Nucle-.ar Planning,,- Gj(Lrop(P)thc,ý

has emerg,ed as thec only a cc eptable

aLt,
Lerntve for, nuicle(arstrategy plan,ning within NATO.
Before dealing with the three schemes, i.e., the MLF, theANF and the NfPG it is necessary to treat briefly the Nassau
meeting, which may be considered as the direct instigator ofthese concrete schemes for nuclear sharing.
I. Nassau :Multilateralism versus Multinationalism
The Nassau meeting had been scheduled originally to review
the world situation in the aftermath of the October 1962 Cuban
missile crisis. In December 1962, however, the United States
had cancelled the Skyolt-_missile programme, an air-to-surface
missile, which the United Kingdom Conservative Government had
hoped to rely upon to bolster its independent deterrent by extending the life of its V-bombers threatened with obsolescence.
The Nassau meeting was therefore transformed into a redefinition of the American-British nuclear relationship. 2The outcomeof the meeting was in this respect reflected in the "Statement
on Nuclear Defence Systems" attached to the Joint Communiqueof 21 December 1962. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the "Statement"
read as follows:"16. The Prime Minister suggested, and the President agreed, that for the immediate future a start
could be made by subscribing to NATO some part of2

Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 80-82. For an
account of the Skybolt affair, see Henry Brandon, "Skybolt. The Pull Inside Story of How a Missile Nearly Split
the West", The Sunday Times (Weekly Review), 8 Dec. 1965,
pp. 29-31; A.J.R. Groom, British Thinking about Nuclear
Weapons, IUHEI, Th6se No. 210, 1971, PP. 243-245 (m1imeo)
Clm
Richard B. Neustadt, Alliance_ Politics (NwYorkp0-;adbia University Press, 190,CatrII
A, Schlesinger, op.cit., pp. 730-736.ý

theI foc
aledneitnehi.s could include
a_Lloca tions fr-,omn UI,ILted Sta tes strtategc. forces,from
Unte Kindom Bomber Oommand, and f-romn tactical nuýclear _for'ces now hlId in.- E,.rop-_e,, Su'tch
forces. woUld be ssigne_d as part of a NýAT) ýnucleaýr
for-ce and tlarge(ted ini ac-o_rdance with NATO plans.
7. Returning to Polaris, the President and thePrime Minister agreed that the purpose of their
two Governments with respect to the provision of
the Polaris missiles must be the development of amultilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest
consultation with other NATO allies. They will
use their best endeavours to this end.
8, Accordingly, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States will make available on a continuing basis Polaris missiles (lesswarheads) for British submarines. The UnitedStates will also study the feasibility of making
available certain support facilities for such submarines. The United Kingdom Government will construQt the submarines in which these weapons will
be placed and they will also provide the nuclear
warheads for the Polaris missiles. British forcesdeveloped under this plan will be assigned andtargeted in the same way a-s the forces describedin Paragr 'aph 6.
These forces, and at least equal United Statesforces, would be made available for inclusion ina NATO multilateral nuclear force. The Prime Minister -made it clear that, except where her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national inter'ests are at stake, these British forces
will be used for the purpose of international defence 3of the Western Alliance in all circumstances."11

The ambiguities of the "Statement" raised a series of interpretations. Ambiguities were due to both sides being uncertain as to what was meant and wanted and to the absence ofboth State Department experts and an agreed United States positionL.,

Western experts had made varied interpretations which

not onily demonstrated the complexity of the language in which

3 DýOSB
4

Iol.
X VII

Thooe0No.ý1229, 14 JaRn. 1963, P. 44.
oesn
end
London ;Hodder and Stough-,ten,, 19065), Ppp

567-5ý,68._132

The cocuinthat,! maýy bdrwisthat,th-ere we,re in fact-tC
twio CILJL

enL apra

Nassau Statemeint .aone.

hesIintermiinginwihac

multilateral as wel

The term "multilateral" inaoother:I in- theutntoathe few weeks after_

Nassau. w,as

used interchangeably for either approach. 6Only later developments drew the two approaches distinctively apart, the UnitedStates espousing the MLF and the United Kingdom favouring a
multinational force.
The Nassau meeting was a great su.ccess for the Conservative
Government of Mr. Macmillan which managed to conserve a measureof independence for the British nuclear deterrent.
The goals that the United States had sought to pursue in
Nassau by a multilateral force had appeared to be the following:-

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe
by bringing United Kingdom an.d France nuclear
forces into an integrated multilateral force.
This would have had the particular effect of discouraging an independent German nuclear force.

-

Minimizing United States' preferential treatmentof the United Kingdom, thus paving the road toEuropean unity.

-

Meeting charges of American Nuclear Monopoly andat the samne time reducing United States defence
spending in Europe by creating a force in whichcosts would be shared,
7
Improving Western strategic defence forces.

-

5

See Kissingerc, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 82-83; A.
P. 758; Sorensen, op.cit., p. 567;
Schlesinger, opci.
Buchan "The Multilateral Force", p. 7; adnr6Beaufre,"IThe Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities. A Problem'in
Need of Solution", International Affairs (London), Vol,, 41,
No. 3, Jul-y 1963, p. 412.

6

Kissinger,

7

For example,

The Troubled Partniershilip,
see Sorensen,

o,i.

133

p. _131.
.58

Ho~ar oalswereattaned
tose
ould only beýappreciat.
jdithe2 l(gt*o tht3 deve;lopments that had takenplace intecouple of, yaars following the Nassau meeting.
It waiý in line with the aforementioned second
goal that it
was decided iTi Nassau to offer President
de Gaulle Polaris
missiles on the same terms. In his biographyof President
Kennedy, Artnur Schlesinger explains that theoffer was anentirely genuine proposal, though made publicly,
informally andwithout the ceremony de Gaulle might have expected.
Kennedy
had hoped that it might throw the French abridge back to NATO .
Presideiit Kennedy, impressed by the contention
that Nassau
had given Bonn a dangerous sense of exclusion,and sensitive
as always to immediate pressures, agreed thata modest refloating of the KLF might pull the Federal Republicof Germany (FRG)
back towards the Alliance and offset Chancellor
Adenauer's
growing fascination with de Gaulle. Accordingly,
early in January 1963, Under-Secretary George Ball wassent to Europe toreassure the Germans., 9
But in both Paris and Bonn the course of events
took a dramatic turn in January 1965 which was to give
the MIIF a newlease of life.
In Paris, on the 14th of January, President
de Gaulle, ina press conference vetoed British entry into
the Common Market
and refused the Polaris offer. 10He said thefollowing
8

A. Schlesinger, 22.cit., Pp. 738-739.
9 Ibid., p. 739,
10 For a full account of the press conference,see Le Monde,
16 Jan, 1965, pp. 2-3. For an English translationof theparts related to de Gaulle's views on the
Nassau agreement,
the Atlantic Alliance and the principles of a national
nuclear force, see "President De Gaulle's
Views", Survival,
Vol. 5, No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1965, pp. 58-59 and,
62,

134

would reLally not!e" f s to blLyPlrsms
sub martýInes, toslswhen we have neýtiteir theIi,
iau,ohlilhem nor the- thermo-nuicla heads- to arlm
them.I"It

But the reasons were miore complex than just a mere, quesbtion oftechnical capabilities, De Gaulle continued to say..this affair is of no apparent interest to us.
What is more it does not comply with the principle
which for us consists of having at our dispos...
al our own atomic force.
If we subscribe our means to a multilateral force,
under foreign command, we shall contravene thiscapital principle of our defence and our policy.
It is true that we, too, could retain, theoretically, the possibility of recovering our atomic weapons in a supreme contingency. But how would we doit, practically, in the unparallelled moment of theatomic apocalypse ? And, moreover, this multilateral force would forcibly entail such a tangle ofliaison, communications, interferences, and an envelopment of external servitude, that if an integral part were suddenly torn from it, it would beparalysed just at the moment when perhaps it should
go into action.
All things considered we hold to the decision that
we have made :build and, should the need arise,use our own atomic force, without of course refusing co-operation, be it technical or strategig, if
such co-operation is desired by our allies."
The Nassau meeting had confirmed to de Gaulle the special
Anglo-American relationship and its domination of the Alliance.
The most fandamental reason for his rebuttal of the MIF was his
fear of American management of the force de frjppt. 13
In Paris, on 22 January 1963, just a few days after de
Gaulle's press conference, the Treaty on France-German Co-oper4
ation was signed by President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.
11

Ibld., p. 59.

12

Ibid., p. 62.

13

For an analysis of de Gaulle's refusal of the Polaris offer,
see Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomaýcy (Princeton,
N.J. :Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 233-235.
For the text of the Treaty, see Le _Monde, 24 Jan. 1963,
p. 2. For a translation of the Treaty parts relating to

]_4

135

eveýr,Theobjctiesto,( be prudin the fiel_Jd of def ence do notinclude~~inte iooepto
eld of nucleaýjr armiamenJ] ts, Howit,wa
rcsly United States' fear of such co-operationin the future., plus tbhe exclusion of the United Kingdom fromthe BEG and French refusal of the ML1F, that generated UnitedStates' enthusiasm and determination to go ahead with a MLF
without France, and apparently to isolate France and arrest
Franco-German co-.operation, among other objectives.1 5
IIL. The Multilater'al Nuclear ForceOn March 1965, a first concrete proposal on a MIF was submitted by the United States to its allies. 16For almost two
years after, contacts had not ceased to take place in different
capitals as well as within NATO. Emissaries were sent by theUnited States to Europe to explain and exchange views. On theother hand European statesmen visited the United States to explore and measure American determination to continue with thescheme. The zeal of the Americaa Administration to push ahead
with the MIF varied between leaving Europeans to make up theirown minds about it,
as President Kennedy preferred,1 7 to strong
defence as well as Le Monde's report on the fields in which
Franco-German co-operation would be carried out, see "TheFrance-German Treaty", Survival, Vol. 5, No. 2, MVar.-Apr.
1965, p. 65,
15

16

17

For example, see Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership,
pp. 127-128, 158 and 206-207, and Buchan, "The Multilateral Force", p. 10.
See President Kennedy's press conference on 6 March 1963
in which he tackled the MIF and the mission of Ambassador Livingston Mer'chant, his special envoy to Europe, who
was visiting Bonn at the time. The New York Times (Western
Edition), 7 Mar. 1963, pp. 1-2'and 4. See also Buchan, "TheMultilateral Force", p. 8.
See A. Schlesinger, 0o2.cit., p. 725, US Under-Secretary ofState George Ball related the MLF's failure to Kennedy's
indecisiveness during the crucial years of 1961-1962. Kennedy was hesitant and not convinced, George Ball, The
DisciDline of Powe-r. Essentials of Modern World Structure(Boston :Little, Brown and Co., 1968),' p-p'. 207-209.

I-aftýErasi)nport aýnd prssur

Peident JonnIormagav

itsoci ated Press, on 20 April1
at tent ioni at. aimee,t-Iin - of th A',s
1964.18 For t'Uhe dedicated advocates of the NIP ini theu State
Department it was an occasion to act swiftly. A special NIP
task force was established in the State Department headed byGerard Smith, who was given the title of Special Adviser to19
the Secretary of State.
Our object is first to examine the latest conceived NIPtplan. Secondly, to examine the positions of United States allies, the Soviet Union and its allies and the non-aligned mem-bers of the ENDC who were in a delicate position, being at theconference table where a substantial controversy between the
United States and the Soviet Union was taking place on the NIP.
Thirdly, a final assessment of the MLF will be made in thelight of the goals the proposal sought to attain. As to the.developments which had led to its demise, they are examined il14
conjunction with the ANlE' proposal and the emergence of the NATO
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).
1. Envisaaed Composition, Operation and Control of the NIP
Since 11 October 1965, a working group composed of the NATOAmbassadors of seven interested allies had been meeting in
Paris and conducting technical discussions on the NIP. The

18

19

See Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World(New York :Praeger, 1966), p. 160. Por the text of Johnson's statement, see The New York Times, 21 Apr. 1964,
P. 14. Prime Minister Harold Wilson had found President
Johnson to be pressing the NIP with more fervour than Kennedy. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970. A
Personal Record (London :Weidenfeold and Nicolson andMichael Joseph, 1971), p. 43.
Geyelin, 9p.cit., p. 164. One of the best early accounts
on the NIP was made by Gerard Smith before the US Naval
Academy Poreign Affairs Conference at Annapolis, Md. on
22 April 1964. See DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299, 18 May 1964,
pp. 783-790,

137

countries~(
rersnejwrhniteýd States ,FedrauRpubilic of Germany, Italy,

the Ujnitýed KingýBelgium, Greece
anid Turkeky. The Netherlands joined the group in January 1964. 20
The gpoup was meeting at NATO Headquarters
but was not a NATObody to avoiLd French objections. 21The
group was divided in Qe-veral sub-groups. 22
do,thThe group's primary tasks were first,
to draft official military and legal reports to be submitted
to Governments in preparation for drawing up a MLF charter,
which must be ratified
by the Governments participating in theforce, and secondly to
prepare for an experiment of a mixed-manned surface
ship .2 3
As far as the United States was concerned,
the MLTF, in or~der to represent a truly international
force, was to meet four
conditions :to be assigned to NATO by
the participating countries and not by any one country; notbo be predominantly basedon the soil of any one nation; to be managed
and operated bynationals of all participating countries
in such a way as tobe u-navailable for withdrawal to serve
the national interestsof any participating government; and theuse of the force to bepolitically controlled by a collective
decision of the participating 4ations,,24
By the end of October 1964, the elaborated
MIF plan was
substantially the same as the M4arch 1963
plan. Tt had also reflected the above mentioned requirements.
20

21
22
25
24

See Wilfrid L. Kohl, "Nuclear Sharingin NATOtilateral Force", Political Science guarterly, and the Mul.
Vol. LXXX,
No. 1, Mdar. 1965, P. 91.
Harlan Cleveland, NATO. The Transatlantic
Bargain (NewYork :Harper and Ro-w, 1970), p.
49.
Andr4 Fontaine, "Hiistoire de la force
multilat4rale", Le
Monde, Vth article, 20 Nov. 1964,
P. 3.
Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in NATO and theMultilateral Force",p. 21,
G. Bqll, "The Nuclear Deterrent and theAtlantic Alliance"]DOSB, Vol. XLVIITI, No. 1246, 15 May
1963, p. 738.

138

The TILE was to beompse

of 25 surfaceu shps

eac

carC

ing eight A-S Polaris missiles with a range o)f 2.500 mls
Each ship was to be manned by crews drawn from at least threenationalities. No nation was to contribute more than 40 per
cent of the total. Command of the ships was to be in proportion to the financial contribuxtioni. The Federal Republic of Germany was to be by far the largest contributor, paying close to
70 per cent of the European share. The Control System was riot
decided, but it seemed that an executive body in which all participants would be represented would make decisions, at least
initially, on the basis of unanimity. The timetable called forsigning a treaty on the PILE by the end of 1964, with ratification taking place sometime during 1965. 25
Without going into a closer examination of the TILE components, 26we would single out the control system, the most thorny
and central aspect of the TILE. What is meant by control here is

25

Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 155.

26

For a closer examination of MILE components, see Robert
Bowie in Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings,
9th Sess., Part 2, IV, Dec. 1965, pp. 126 and 151; Cleveland, op-cit., p. 49; Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in NATO andthe Multilateral Force", pp. 91-92 and 94-95; A. Schlesinger, op.cit., P. 725; Ball, "The Nuclear iDeterrent anot
the Atlantic Alliance", P. 94; Michel Eyraud, "La force
multilat4rale", Strat4gie, No. 2, Oct.-Dec. 1964, p. 108;
Eug6ne Hinterhoff, "Reflexions sur la force multilat6rale",
Politique Etrang6re, 30e ann4e, No. 1, 1965, P. 52; andClaude Ricketts, "The Case for the Multilateral Force",
European Review, Vol. XIII, No. 5, Summer 1963, pp. 9-12.
With respect to the experiment of a mixed-manned surface
ship (USS Biddle renamed Claude Ricketts), see Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XX, No. 7, Sept. 1964., P. 5;
Cleveland, 22.cit., P. 50; Neville Brown, "A New Policy
for NATO ?", The World Today, Vol. 20, No. 10, Oct. 1964,
P. 424; Eyraud, "La force multilat6rale", p. 106 (footnote1); and TI. MIaratov, "Non-Proliferation and NATO Nuclear
Plans", International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, Jan. 1966,
p. 19.

139

notPL,J.MJ somui'i-oertncIhnlin of1the -Corce bat rathie,rtepo ,JLtoIcal eciio tO ueý or no0t, to use, the force ,27Cena
s id,esýtepped s-I.mply becaulse Am11erican negotiatTn. tatc
wer dlbr1
atel,,y desig.ned to avoid difficult politica
isues 28Durng"he MIE& negotiations, little attentionwasý,,
pa,id to the1 ssue The Unti-ted Statesý took the. view thats,jincec the( NýILE did noc-t exist the issue of nuclear control neednotfaed
e utilater

29

O,ffIcial spokesmen implied, however, that the United States
was, w,illing to consider a modification of the initial control
ar_(ranigements including giving up the veto on the use of theforce. 30To be specific, pending proposals at the end of 1964
called for two things:
First, all of the members would consult and share by majority rule in the strategic planning on the use of the MILF. In a
crisis a smalleii group composed of the major participants would
share in the control over the use of the missile force accord,

ing to the unanimity principle; each major participant would
have a veto. This control body would probably have been madeup of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and either Italy or possibly a rotatingsmall-power representative. Such a formula would not have beena final solution.3 1

27

Alastair B3uchan makes a distinction between the French concept of 2ontr8le which means examination, verification andthe righ~t to critioise, and the English word fq ntrol whichmeans the phNsical grasp of the buttons and levers, Alasta-_I-ll3ucihan, "The Reform of NATO", f2K2JZn Affairs, Vol.
40, No, 2, Jan. -1962, P. 134.
28 issinger, Tf,)e Tr-oubletd Paýýrtne-rship7, p. 134.

29

Ibi_d., p).144,

31

K,ohl ,

"INuocalea

sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force",140

.A f(ew days before. he
Lyndon Jotanson sai d in

eaePrsdn
rssl

of tEL

on 8Loebr

Uii iteodStes
93ta

Euzropeaný uniýty miakes, this1th"The moeet,ostoe,,_ towar,d a g,reaitur
FLLF) desira'ble -- as a first
Evolution, ofEuropean, voice,_ in nulerlatters.
sthis mis-isile fleetl towardErorpean, cat1
Europe mnachaLEs toward unity, is by nio mec,ans excluded.")It

seemed clear that the United States -would hiaveueaie

its veto in the MELF for sonmc time, probably for at least a decade, since about six years would have been required to put
the full force into operation. 53Later on the MLF could have
evolved in either of two ways. Robert Bowie, who is supposed
to be one of the originators of the MLF idea, maintained theview that it was feasible to start towards the,,creation of an
integrated force without waiting to settle finally the form ofcontrol. 34In his view, it was almost certain that control"1would evolve in such a way as to get away from the unanimity
principle towards some form,of an Atlantic force controlledwith less than unanimity, or a European force which the European members would control according to whatever formula theydecided upon ..
option".,36

,."

32

33
34

35This has come to be knoiwn as the "European

DOSE, Vol. XLIX, No. 1275, 2 Dec. 1963, pp. 853-854.
Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force",
p. 98.
See Robert Bowie, "Tensions within the Alliance", foreiZnALffairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, Oct. 1963, p. 67. For a further
understanding of Bowie 's views, see also "Strategy and theAtlantic Alliance", Intr'nationial Organiza,tion, Vol. XVII,No, 3, Summer 1963, pp. 709-711.

Robert Bowie in Assembly of Western European Union, Proceein,s,9th Sess. , Part 2, IV, Dec. 1963, pp., 1_27-1T28.
'36 Wý,illiam Bader notes t6hat the, "Europrean option"-has its,
root, if it has roots an,ýywvhere, ini a s,peech giv-en by
McGeorge Bundy (the Sp,-ecaia Assistant to Pre'sdoidet Kernlcedy
for Natioinal Security Affair,s) in,) Oopernlagagen in Se,pt-emb&er
1962), For the relý_evant part, see William Biaderi,, Theý. Unite1d
Stbat'es and. theo Sporead of Nu,clear_ Weaponis, p. 47
35

1414

2, The Positions of NATO Allies, Warsaw' Pact Members and the,
Non-AlIgned(a) NATO A4dlie s
Due to the limits imposed by the scope of the study, thepositions of the major allies will receive our primary attent-.
ion but without neglecting to state briefly the position of
the other allies. As the Federal Republic of Germany was at
the centre of all the discussions on MIJF, we will start firstwith her position, followed by that of the United Kingdom, themajor nuclear ally, and then France, which had kept its distance from the discussions. A final section is allotted to theremaining allies.
Wi

The Federal Republic of Germany :One of the MLF object-

ives, as previously mentioned, was to discourage the emergenceof an independent German nuclear deterrent. But, in the firstplace, was there really a German appetite for nuclear wea-

posý37The 1954 undertaking by the Federal Republic of Germany38
not to manufacture on its own territory any atomic weapons
has never been questioned by any Government official. The Government, as well as the opposition, have repeatedly statedthat national control of nuclear weapons cannot and must not
39
be an 4im of German policy.
Moreover, a study of current and prospective European attitudes to arms control and disarmament undertaken in 19631965 has shown that an overwhelming majority of Germans rejected nuclear weapons for Germany, as neither necessary nor

37

See Theo Sommer, "The objectives of Germany" in Buchan (Ed.),
A World of Nuclear Powers ?, pp. 39-54 and John N, Zedier,the
7ut-J17eia-t
TCfo-ý rcle: A Misreading of German Aspirations(Los Ane~:UiestfClfria, 1968) (Security
Studies Paper No, 14).

38

See UNTS, Vol. 211, PP. 364 and 368,

39

Sommer, "The Objeytives of Germany", P. 39,

142

credible, and
-

-this

latter, too, by a staggering 95 per centnot worth the cost. German demand for nuclear weapons wasconsidered a myth. There was not sufficient strength behind any
such demand in the Federal Republic of Germany, either among40
the masses or the elite.
American-German divergences in the wake of the concept of"flexible response" 4 1 had sometimes left the impression that
the Federal Republic of Germany might have nuclear amb.itions.4
Those divergences were most apparent during Franz Joseph
Strauss' leadership of the German defence apparatus. 4 3 Strauss'lack of confidence in the American will to use nuclear weapons
infused a sense of urgency into his quest for German influenceon the decision to use them.4 4 The Federal Republic of Germany
was originally interested in exercising some degree of meaningful control over the tactical nuclear weapons stationed on its
territory.4 5 If Germans were worrying at all, it was about
40

See Karl Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in theEuropean Political Environment :A Summary Report", The
American Political Science Review, Vol. LX, No, 2, June
1966, P. 363; "Arms control and European Unity :The Ten
Years", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XXIII,
No. 5, May 1967, p. 23; and Arms Control and the Atlantic
Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York
Alliance,
John Wiley, 1967), pp. 15, 58 and 61. See also Richard L.
Merrit and Donald J. Puchala (Eds.), Western European
Perspectives on International Affairs. Public Opinion Studies and Evaluatýions (New York :Praeger, 1968), p. 403.

41

See James L. Richardson, Germany and the Alantic Alliance.
The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts :'Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 73-85.
Kissinger noticed that "once the theory of a German appetite for nuclear weapons had become established, every
German proposal was interpreted to become consistent with
p. 142.
it." Kissinger, Th.ruldPrnr"

42

43
44
45

Richardson, ap_.cit-, pp. 75-83.
Ibid,, p. 80. See also Sommer, "The Objective of Germany",p. 43.
Zedler, op.oit., p. 26.- See also Hinte:rhoff',loc.'cit.,;Uwe Nerlich, "L'Allemagne ,et 1'arýme_ment nuPp. 47-4ý8 -andcl4aire", Sta6i,No. 5, Juil.-Sept. 1965, pp. 36 and 39.

143thirj,,their nuolear status, 46

andt noýt aousecur111it

When the1United States pushedahead for the MIP after de

Gaulle's press cod(nfernc of January 1963, the German Governmenmt wasnn an extremeldy uncomfortable position, having signed
if! the, same mnhisooperation Treaty with France. That delinat sldiltionwnas to prevail in the different phases of thennL " jigtntion,
Every gesure by the Federal Republic of
Geranytowrdsone
prcsiweof the protagonists used to evoke so many

bythe other that a compensatory move had to bebyth cpost
tino ~

ledof the Summer of 1963,:Vh

the German Government' s

iP had changed from an intelligent interest

toý; smtig oRecosely resembling a demand. 48It seems thattheignaureof the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty in Aqgust 1963,
handled by b
ThaLndon and Washington with the Minimum of consulatin
the NVi:h Bnan,po

had convinced the German Government that
sal mwst be firmly embraced as the only modificat-

pon in allianc=Arrangments that was available; partly to bind
Amrian QDK-tay power inexorably and permanently to Europe;
paTlytoepre7v
partytoconp

stronger German voice in Washington; andnsoe for the Pentagon's declining interest in

Mveii
othr:reslon
Germnyeretaonet onalnuclar

given by the supporters of the MIF in
ollwinenticing de Gaulle to give up his
oorfor participation inwhat many Germans

hopd
mghtevetualybecomEz a European nuclear force; seeingGooner."Te S Iectveof Germany", P. 40.
V&isingr~
Se
ToubldFPrtnership, op.

40 eettd,aso Rcharson
0at~~~~~aemene~~~TeIsen,ielhr

207-208t-n11,,
pp, 6-0
fGra

n
ula

ra

PartnershI
IIJip whict
h would gve thitas a bagin inponermansý

with the Soit

con-,t inueid nuclea
no to maecocs

sions; oni the qUestilon of German reunificatGioni in,etrnfo
Germany dropping the MLF; seeing in the MLF a method tostrengthen NATO by giving it a nuclear voice; and seEinlg in it
a way to heal a growing Franco-German split over NATO and national nuclear forces by getting France to work actively in an
organization which included German participation. 5 0
The political motives for the MIP were more stressed thanthe others. Strengthening the ties between Europe and the United States was oonsidered primordial.5

On the other hand, theGerman Defence Minister, Mr. Von Hassel, had expressed the viewthat in order to maintain the effectiveness of the deterrence,the principle of unanimity on the release of nuclear weapons
could not be maintained forever.5
The political future of the three leading figures in theGerman Government in 1964 :Erhard, Schrbder and Von Hassel,
became entangled with the future of the NIP as a touchstone ofAtlanticism. 5 3 By the Spring of 1964 a firm split had developedin Bonn's ruling party (CDU-CSU). On the one side were the50

Zedler, op.cit., p. 26.

51

For examples, see Kai-UJwe von Hassel, "Detente ThroughFirmness", ForeiL2n Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, Jan. 1964,
p. 1.89; and "O01ganizing Western Defence", Foreign Affairs,Vol. 43, No. 2, Jan, 1965, p. 213. For another article
stressing the importance of transatlantic links, see Theo
Sommer, "lFor an Atlantic Future", Foreign Affairs, Vol.
43, No. 1, Oct. 1964, P. 114.

52

Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings, 9th Ss.
Part 1, 11, June 1963, P. 156.

53

Buchan, "The Multila,-teral,,For,ce", p9.See alsoi Z7edLler,op,ct,,pp. 8-9, who e_xplain,sthinvdulmieso
each of the thrýee lIeader,s.

145

Atlantiker led by, Foreign MVinister Schrbder, who based his foreign policy on close ties with the United States. On theother were the so-called Gaullisten led by Adenauer and Strauss
who gave priority -to close understanding with France although
they did not share all of de Gaulle's ideas about the future
4of Burope.5

The United States had vested interests in the political
future of the moderate centre in the Federal Republic of Germany, Collapse of the MLF would have meant a setback to Erhard,a strengthening of the German right wing and a revival of
French-German entente .5
The study referred to earlier had shown 'that a MLF within
the NATO system, and hence largely under American control
split the German elite evenly, with only 34 per cent clearlyin favour, and another 34 per cent clearly opposed. An MULF
force outside NATO was definitely rejected by four-fifths of
the German leaders. If a MLF under NATO should have become an
accepted fact, then three-fifths of the German leaders, defi56
nitely would have wanted their own country to join it.
The same otudy had also shown the following remarkable results
respondents in Germany volunteered to comment that they were willing to support the MIF
chiefly because it appeared to be desired by
the United States.

-Many

-

71 per cent of the military definitely favoured
the NILF.
of the definite support and presumably also
some of the conditional support for the MIFNATO proposal was given on the explicit grounds

-Part

54
55

Kohl, French Nuclear DiEloma_cy, p. 288.
Buchan, "The Multilateral Force", p. 11,

56

Deutsch, "Arms Control and European Unity :The Ten Years",
pp. 23-24. See also Sommer, "The Objectives of Germany",p. 52.

146

that the German leaders wanted to go along withwhat they consid5rd to be an American initiative and desire.
(ii) The United KinCdom :The Nassau meeting had shown to what
extent the United Kingdom Conservative Government was keen topreserve an independent nuclear deterrent, 5 8 It was 'basicallyfor that reason that it was reluctant to endorse the MILF proposal. Within the Government, there were public and endemic
differences of opinion between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The former argued that the United Kingdom
could not afford to stand aside from an important developmentin the relations between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany, 5 9 while the Ministry of Defence resolutely opposed the MIP as costly, vulnerable, unnecessary, destabilizing, and likely to encourage a German appetite for nuclear
weapons. 60The consequence was an announcement by the Prime
Minister on the first of October 1963 that the United Kingdom
would join the discussions of the Paris working group on the
MLF but without commitment. 61One of the motives for the United

57

Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, Europe
faces Coming Policy Decisions, pp. 62 and 64.

58

For a basic understanding of the issue of the British independent nuclear deterrent, see Richard Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm, British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch(New -York:Columbia University Press, 19-68); Groom, 2Pciýt.; Andrew Pierre, "Britain's Defence Dilemmas", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. XIXIX,
No. 2, 1968, pp. 64-79 and "Nuclear Diplomacy :Britain,
France and America", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2, Jan.
1971, especially pp. 288-293.

59

Harold Wilson estimated that the Foreign Office was anxious
to please the US, Wilson, op.cit., P. 37.

60

Mr. Harold Watkinson, a predecessor of Mr. Thorneycroft,
the UK Defence Minister, was also very critical of theidea of a mixed-manned ship which he considered to be avery strong provocation in a time of very high tension.
Harold Watkinson in "Evolution of NATO", The Institute forStrategic Studies (London), Adelphi Papers, No. 5, Oct.

1963, p. 37,
61

See Buchan, "The Multilateral Force", p. 10

147

Kindomconideingthe MLF seemed to have been to obtain ave_to ovrthe development of the idea of a "European option",to which it was very hostile. 6 2
Consequen-tly the Conservative Government had failed to takea clear stand on the MIF. The Government throughout the MLF debate of 1963-19641 was willing to integrate the British deterrent into a NATO framework which would have allowed it a certain measure of independence and influence. A -multinational
approach favoured in Nassau was still dominant. It would haveoffered the United Kingdom the possibility of finding a lesscostly way of maintaining and developing her deterrent by including it in an interallied system such as the one confirmed
by NATO Ministers -in Ottawa in May 1965. 65 By virtue of her
contribution the United Kingdom would have had a prominent posit ion. 6
All that the Conservative Government was ready to concede
was apparently a symbolic participation in the NIP which would
have meant merely putting at the disposal of the mixed-manned
62
65

64j

Kissinger, The Troubled PartnershiE, p. 76.
At the Ottawa Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council from 22 to 24 Nay 1965, the following steps wereapprovTed:a) assignment of the UK V-bomber force and three US Polaris
submarines to SACEUJR.
b) establishment by SACEUR on his staff of a Deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs.
c) arrangements for broader participation by officers ofNATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied
Command Europe and in co-ordination of operational
planning at Omaha (the Headquarters of the US Strategic
Air Command (SAC)).
d) fuller information to national authorities, both political and military.
Those arrangements have been described as the Inter-Allied
NATO Force (IkN~F). See Keesing's Contemporary Archives,
Vol. XIV, 1965-1964, P. 19525 A,
See Fontaine, loc.cit., IVth article, 19, Nov. 1964, P. 3
and Kohl, French _Nuclear_21i1lomac,
pp. 335-537.

148fleet,shipyards eand harbour installations,ý 6 5 Býut fýor afe

months before the 1964 British elections, Hr. Thovneycroft submitted on July 1964 to the Paris working group on MILF a plan
for a mixed-manned land force located in Europe and equipped
66
with V-bombers, TSR-2 bombers and Pershin misls
Mr. Harold Wilson, 'the Labour Party leader in the Opposit-

ion, opposed the decision taken in Nassau and opposed still
more the pretence that the United Kingdom had an independent
nuclear deterrent. 6 7 For Hr. Wilson, not only could the Polaris
fleet not be maintained without United States' support but also
the weapons could never be used independently. He believed that
the Nassau clause on British freedom of action in a case where
suprcme national interests were at stake was a fictitious assertion of independent nuclear action. "This clause had never68
been taken seriously in the United States or in Britain."Labour leaders also expressed precise objections to the
MVLF proposal.

Its main weakness was the question of confusing

the physical possession of nuclear weapons with their control.
Supporters of the MIL7 inEurope were considered to be backing

itwith the hope of alleviating the United States veto and as

65

Fontaine,

66

Soc Neville Brown, A New Policy for NATO ?,Hinterhoff, loc.cit., p. 54.

67

p. 40. Hr. Wilson refers to the experience
Wilson, opci.
of the Blue streak, a liquid-fueled missile, that the UK
had failed to develop.

68

Ibid., pp. 54-55. Two other leaders of the Labour Party,
Foreign Minister
Gordon Walker, who was to become the firstin the Labour Govermnent of October 1964, and Frederick
Mulley, who was to become Hinister of State for Disarmameat, had expressed similar views and recognized the needto surrender Britain's claim to be an independent Power,
P.O. Gordon Walker, "The Labour Party's Defence and Foreign
Policy", Forein Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 5, Apr, 1964,
PP. 393-394 and Frederick W. Mlulley, "NATO's Nuclear Protati
omn
blems :Control or Consultation", Th
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 5, Fall 1964-, p. 465.

loc.cit.,IVth article,

149

1-9 Nov.

1-964,p.

p.

3.

425 andiioeauciear force, th-us leadingý to the pýroli69
of nuclear weapons and the division of the Alliance.

a watoaferaionuii

It was thought unwise to launch an elaborate plan for a weaponof little importance in order to secure only a short-term solution to the German problem. It would simply divert European
efforts and resources from conventional forces to a nuclear
weapon that would add nothing to the reality of Europe's defences and the strength of the West.7
Mr. Grimond, the leader of the Liberal Party, and George
Brown, who was to become a Labour Foreign Minister, as well asother political leaders, feared that Ambassador Merchant's
Mission to the Federal Republic of Germany in early 1963 washaving the effect of generating a demand for nuclear weapons
where none existed before. They thought that if such a demand
ever came into being it was not likely to be satisfied by the71
secondary symbolism of mixed-manning.

Buring the British election campaign at the end of 1964,
the British~ independent deterrent was the principal foreignand defence issue between the two main pclitical parties. The
new Labour Government had found, however, that it was not thateasy to give up the independent nuclear deterrent. As Mr.
Wilson explained in his memoirs:"It was clear that the production of the Z11olaris7
submarines was well past the point of no return;there could be no question of cancelling them,
except at inordinate cost. We decided to go ahead
with four of the projected five submarines, andto ensure their deployment as a full committed
part of the NATO defence forces. There was to be
no nuclear pretence or suggestion of a go-it-aa} ne
British nuclear war against the Soviet Union."69

See Ibid., PP. 454-462.

70

Walker, loc.cit., P. 394.

71

A. Schlesinger,

72

Wilson, op-cit., P. 40.

.p,cit,, PP. 745-746,

150

After his elcin(by a minutsciile majority)

WJ,onsemeto have taken into account Conservative sentimeýnt forrean
ing British nuclear capability, and a widespread British reluctance to let the Germans anywhere near atomic weapons.]3 it
was also recognized that the configuration of the problem of
nuclear spread had altered since the time when it could be argued that Britain, by voluntarily renouncing her nuclear arms,
could strongily influence other countries to desist from acquiring them. Nuclear proliferation in Asia and the Middle East
seemed on the horizon. In addition, little enthusiasm could bearoused in London for an act of self-abnegation which would
leave France as the only European nuclear Power. Moreover, thenuclear force was seen as an important bargaining asset and an
instrument of diplomacy. Its existence ensured that special
regard was given to Britain's point of view on such matters as
the Multi-lateral Nuclear Force, NATO strategy and the nonproliferation treaty. The nuclear force would give Britain adecisive role in shaping a future European deterrent or any
other European nuclear arrangement. Labour ministers responsible for handling foreign relations acknowledged that somehow74
it intangibly enhanced Britain's influence.
In such circumstances, the Labour Government came up with
the ANF? proposal, the discussion of which will be deferred toa following section.
(iii) France :The immediate negative reaction of President de
Gaulle to the Nassau meeting and the MIF was not surprising.
First, de Gaulle's stand in January 1965 was in conformity withhis drive for establishing an independent French deterrent not
amenable to any foreign influence. The "counter force" doctrine
which was very critical of independent national deterrents as73

Geyelin, op.cit., p. 166.

74

Pierre, "Britain's Defence Dilemmas", pp. 74-75.

151

well an the
1rg-Aemoaicn sE"cial rolatioDship in the fieldof nlchar weaponry, an Vurther confirmed in Nassau, had contributed n cpsenting the French position. In the second place,the perniobence of the Uninted States Administration to go ahead
with the RLF and the favourabLe Gennan attitude to it had led
France to be more intransigent in its stand.
The French strategic doctrine need not be exposed within
the ltm~itH of this study. After all, the French position on75
the MLIF in eomonstrative of several facets of that doctrine. ýHowever, the basic theme of the doctrine is that nuclear wea-pons have ma de alliances obsolete. Faced with the risk of total
destruction, no) coýuntýry will jeopardize its survival for another. eance, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal
6
to defend itself against direct attack.]
The unfavourable position of the French Government which
hAnd developed in relation to the M1LF in the course of the twoyears that followed the Nassau meeting can be explained asfollows 17
First, the objective of integrating the existing national
nuclear forces too place them, through the MvILF, under collective

7R

For a basic understanding of the French strategic doctrine,
see Pierre Gallois, 1L_§jtratQgie_de_YAgy_nuclQaire (Paris
CalannI~6y,1960), especially chapter 4 and Paradoxes dela ix(Patris :Presses du Temps Pr'snt 197 -pp.19
147; and Charles de Gaulle, AYlmoires dlesDoirs. Le renou86
Pais
Pon 17),p. 211-282. See also,the major works of Wolf Mend!, Deterrence and Persuation.
FrechuclarArmamenit_in the ConteKt of %a±ionalPolicy.
194-l%(T,ondon ;Faber and Faber, 1970)Tand Kohl, Frenchi`hcl~
DloaY, ~ct
76 po-r a critic of the French doctrine, see Kissinger, Th
T~'ub}dPr nrshn,chapter 2, pp. §1-64.
77 For a succinct exposition, see jacques Vernant, "Washington,
Londres, Paris et la IMF'", Revue- de_16fense Nationale,
20e Ann6e, D6'c, 16,p
97

152

control, is impossible to aph&eve as Long ao Daaional ýnd so-~vereign States oNAKt.

The MYL

had ofKered on Ly 1Llusory posnm-

h'biliteus of any rcal sharing of unuclear popponuHibiltie" Yem
rai annauthority 1aforce would have remained who Lly under79
duweision.
andcontrol
all Matters of
was cnsidereto

DMe to its vnulnerabilitLy As well as to thAme-

From the military point of view the MYL
have no value.

ricanr veto on its Use, the force would have Contributed nothingto the 1wuroyean security. GenEral Paul

Mtuhln, the Chief ofStaff of thE French Air Fnorce in 1965, had evenconsiywdered thatý
the ELF would, in a sense, have reultked in the denckearikation of Europe just as much as the RapanLi Plan; anod with an iLl

will could be regarde

as an American contribution to the So-

viet endeavour to maintain the bipolar struicture of the presnt0
day world, the pole opposed to the Soviet Union being not Mth
80
West as a whole, but the United States alone. o
It was feared that the MIF being short of satisfying German
demands for equality might whet German appetite for nuclear
weapons. The thrust of French anti-MIF was directed against
the Federal Republic of Germany 81in order to force it to alignwith France in the context of the Francs-German Treaty of January 1963. As an alternative to German participation in the
MLF, de Gaulle had offered the Federal Republic of Germany theprotection of the force de frappe, 8 2 and had, during his visit
to Bonn in July 1964, warned for the first time against th
consequences of an eventual German pArticipation in the

78
79

lPY oný

Beaufre, "The Sharing of Nauclear Responsibilities. A Problem in Need of Solution", p. 415.
General Paul Stehldn, "The Evolution of Western Defennc",
Affirs Vol. 42, No, 1 , Oct.ý 1963, P. 77.
Foen

80

Ibd,p. 76,

81

oh,FehNulaDilmc,p.

82

Ibi_.,jp!

242.

2L87-288153to hano oC

rj etec

b

nd

1!thi

cane

Jate
on,th

nc

ii~~~~~~~~

hi todelrain
theoveroetocnliae thL Aerca,giof th8otnntsidpn

Pri me 'MinlIster,,.(eoge Pompdu
tAscaiosds
urnaise parlemetaies"on
Noembr 164,hadals unduerlined thje incopaibliy ozfGerman participation in the MIF with the
FracoGema Treaty.8 4 French denunciation of that Treaty wassaposelythe price the Federal Republic of Germany would have
paid:,
If it had participIated in the MLJF. 85
Moreover, there was the difficulty of coaývincing the Soviet
Uniion and its allies that the M:LF was essentially designed toreinforce the control over the Federal Republic of Germany,
while at the same time assuring the latter that the force would
grant it equality. 86
Lastly, the TiPF was considered to block the evolution towards an independent European political and military organization. In de Gaulle's views Europe should concert its own policy
an,-[d then deal with the United States as a unit. The force would
haemade Europe completely dependent on the United States, 8
teeyex.cluding any hope that a real European force might
eventuLl be established. 88In his aforementioned declarations,Mr.
om~dousaid that83
Fntaie,joc.cit., IVth article, 19 Nov. 1964,
84 ~7iov. 1964, p. 2.
85

P. 3.

Atleastthat as what de Gaulle told US Ambassador Charles
Bohen
i Pars inDeceber1.964, Kohl, French Nuclear88

BeaufreThe Sharig of Nu4ea

154

Responsiblitie!,s. A Pro-nou

-DeASnde 1o1'Isi Contcueo

irt

plu

pe
11tiionfnu~
fialemnineetl in an evnta
Europeanizationofth

1Ce
for_'

,,,

onmm

ao

ot;el

Euoenncear det

renwihoudforce de- f'rLLLe,

The twvo other major European countries in

Europe, West`Gerl-many and the United Kingdom,

were opposed to the idea of a s:e-parate European force not in

close conjunction with the UnitedStates. For Mr. Von Hassel, the basis of a European force would
be a politically united Europe and even then the European nuclear force should play an active part in the nuclear weaponssystems of the Atlantic community.9 1 By the Spring of 1965 the92
Mr.
Federal Republic of Germany rejected French overtures.,

Harold Wilson, in November 1964, did not conceal his hostility
to the idea of a European force. In his view, it would divide
NATO, prompt the United States to reappraise its attitude towards Europe and be a grave step towards the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.9
It

remains to be said that the MLF had seem)ed to unite

Gaullistz and the opposition in refuting it. 9 4 In the study
referred to earlier in counexion with the German position, it
was found that there was overwhelming and deep rooted French
hostility to any idea of a German national nuclear weapon, or

89

Le Monde, 7 Nov. 1964, p. 2.

90Kohl, French Nuclear Di-plomacy, p.2226

91

Von Hassel,

92

Kohl, Frenchý Nuiicle(,ar Dpoay

94

Ibd,

p

"Organizýing Westeýrn

23-240!55

eene,p.24
.28

Othe

mcnt

AJie f)v
th Th

whIch
were, apoce

even~~ shrIAeactiontisine Europ1(*,se to-eisuhaore~bouAthco1stL ofaI~sml epealy0
i f thealso~~~~~
to Aria
to aced demnd
tioal

ord

orcs,
ava stffswer

tsreghn

hir

werei

conven-scptical about the operation-

iailtyofsuh a fl-eet and public opinion was also seepticaor dhs1-i'terLested. 97Only eight NATO countries participatedn terar'Is working group. Their participation, however,alwa Jitout further commitment. As previously mentioned, they
weeBelgium, West G-ermany, Greece, the United Kingdom,,taly, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United States. The otherseven non-participantp were Canada, Denmark, Prance, Iceland,
Luxem~bourg, Norway and Portugal.
As to the participants in the working group other than West
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, Belgium's
and the Netherlands' positions were very near to that of theCo,nservative Government in the United Kingdom, The fear of too
getan influence being acquired by Germany had, to a great
uxet,
detexriAined their attitude. 98 Belgium's position was
paxtiulaiytimid because of the elevated cost of the project. 9 9Itwahe only country out of the seven which, for financial
95iDeutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, Europe
Pa,,es Comin-~ Policy Decisions, P. 15 and "lrms Control andE,'urop)ean Unity :The Ten Years", pp. 23-24.
96
Buhan,"The Multilateral Force", p. 8.

6trn~e,ol

VAI,No6 ,Nov.

-1964, pp772-773,

reaSonlS, did no t take par

in

th
1

m1
ite!

El-ropeati and the1ScandCjJ!-,InV :Zia membterIN
p-o rItinthe projctu

the NP

01

hav
bee

of'TlATO

eiet
on of thei0a0TheoirI'ParticipatmIerel_ydeJtio
1 inthe Paris, grou

sem,

toD

symbolic. 1 0

Italy endorsed the concept in 1965. The Italian elec;tionsý
that year avoided the issue.1 0 3 In general, Italy was quitefavourable to the project which would have allowed it an im10 4
portant position in the defence of the West.
As to the non-participants in the Paris group other thanFrance, Canada had affirmed that it could not afford to financesimultaneously the NIP, the Canadian participation in the North
American Defence Organization (NORAD) and a well-equipped Canadian conventional force. The Government of Mir. Lester Pearson
10 5
had definitely opted for the latter two.

100

Buchan, "The Multilateral Force", p. 15.

101

Sorensen, oE.cit., p. 568.

102

Eyraud, "La force multilat6rale", p. 115.

105

Sorensen, 22.cit., P. 568.

104

Eyraud, "La force multilat4rale", p. 114. See also Kohl,
Prench Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 259 and Don Cook, "The Art
of Non-Proliferation", Encounter, Vol. XXVII, No. 1,
July 1966, p. 5.

105

Eyraud, "La force multilat6rale", p. 115. See alUSO
Sherman, Nuclear Proliferation, -p. 82. Sherman report'L-s
that many Canadians considered the sacrifice of thetNIP
a reasonable price for a Sovieýt sig1'natulre of tHePT,; an,d
had little
patioene withl' a CndaGoemntlthatu fai.le,d tL-o attack Lth,esupsdsubesof the 1kimeritcanl
n,egotic,athoris.

157

clea

osnt>v
tar

Beor

hv

enageentin
ts oloiesandlac

cocudnthall~ ti ~ obentdta
~
~

pato3

n

re

ofunom,hepsto_rpn.Jead
orces.1 0p)reventeGd iýtof the NATOý Lcin theýcontroversy which had
taenplcebeween the United State,s and the Soviet Uniop on
theNI ithe disarmiament forums, the countriLes non-participant ofthe Paris group, with the exception of Canada, had
eitheýr abstained from taking a position or
made general statement'us alluding to the desirability to reach soon a non-proliferation treaty.

Canada,by virtue of 1,'ts partipipation in the
ENIDC, could not avoid givTing its views on the issue. It considered the arrangements under discus-sion to be consistent withthe terms of the "Irish Resolution". It even expiained thereason why the idea of the HI'VL
had, developed in NATO and that it
was designed as an alternative to the possible proliferationof national possession of nuclear weapons.,0
As to the par-ticipants in the Paris group, the other tw 'oNATO partlicipating, members of the ENDC, Italy and the United
Kingdom, had stressed~ along with the United States, the nonproliferation aspect of the MLF, 109-1The British Foreign Mliniste Mr. Butler, had emphasized that a non-proliferation agreemev ould in itself constitute a saf e,-Uard against a multi106 ,L,Coffey, "Strategy, Alliance Policy and Nuclear ProLiferation", Orbis, Vol. XI, No. 4, Winter 1968, p. 977
andý Evraud, "fLa force multilat6rale", p. 115.
308

NBOPV,201

27

Juy 1964, p. 27 and ENDO/PV. 203,

July
. 39964,

30

te16

hei

w Dposeso

Iersnaituc

In the Irish era of 1958-1961 when thie non-proliferation!)ý
concept was being formulated, the Soviet Union and someý Eastern
European couantries expressed their fears of a German drive fornuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany was describedas "a breeding place of militarism and revanchism," This sortof fear was accentuated by the MLF proposal. The attack on the
M4LF escalated as developments towards a possible materializationof the scheme manifested themselves. The attacks continued evenwhen it was obvious that the scheme was losing ground before
less ambitious proposals. However, these latter attacks had
actually originated from United States non-proliferation treaty
drafts which left the possibility open for such schemes toemerge in the future. The attacks were more of a general nature
at the beginning, but as the MLF negotiations progressed andmore details were known about its components and potential operation, they became more detailed and concrete.
In the period from 1963 to the beginning of 1965 when thediscussions were at their peak, the ENDO and the Disarma-

MFIL

ment Commission in particular served as arenas for a NATO/
Warsaw debate on the issue and consequently as useful indicators of the position of the Soviet Union and its allies andcounter United States arguments in defence of the scheme.

10

BNDG//PV

111

LC()R,

112Ibid.

169), 25 Pe.16,p

1

83rd

18Jay 1965, para,, 57.
Itg,I-)rd itg,

7 June,95,pra'2

The

rguentresrtetoby the Sov!iet Uliion and its!astern.-.roeL,,!
allies to discredit the MVI,F can be surmmarisedas, 1,ollows ýThe basic theme of the campaign was that the 16fF would
mean
the proliloeration of nuclear weapons and in particular
the access to these weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany
as astep towards possessing its own nuclear weapons. It
was fearedthat Genoany's Rccess to the weapons would encourage
the desireof the revenge-seeking forces there to alter the situation
which took shape in Europe after the Second World War,and topursue their territorial claims against the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) azid other States. 1 1 3
Susoicion of the Federal Republic of Germanyls intentions
was very noticeable in the Soviet position. The FRG's
manifest
interest and active support of the MILF was interpreted
to meannuclear ambitions. 14It was feared that concessions on
the MLIF
would lead to other concessions which would be detrimental
tothe world as past recent history had demonstrated. 15The
history of the two World Wars was repeatedly invoked
to warn

113

1114

115

See the communiqu6 issued by the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation meetinginWarsaw on 19-20 January 1965, in Keesinr's Co,ntempLorary
Archives, Vol. XV, 1965-1966, p. 20589 A. See also
"Note
0Y7KYF oviet Government to the Government of the UnitedStates" dated 8 Apr, 1965 circulated later to the ENDC
asDoc. ENDO0/84, 17 Apr. 1965, p. 2. (The Note was distributed to all NATO countries except Portugal).
See particularly the note of the Soviet Government totheGovernment of the FRG dated 1-1 July 1964 in ENDC/137,
15
July 1964, pp. 5-7.
ENDC/84, l7 Apr. 1965, PP. 7-10 and the note addressedby the Soviet Government to the Government of the
US on
11 July 1964 in ENPC/137, 15 July 1964, p. 2. See
also'
N, Talensky, "A NATO Nuclear Force is a Dangerous
Venture", International Affairs (M6oscow), No. 5,
May 1965,
p. 24.

160

against t00 MUCh- cofdneiJutr
many was considre

o

egr

emnGr

nuclear weaipon-s,fLirst(ssm

bol of sovereignty and equality in international affairs; second, as a means of political blackmail and diplomatic bargaining; and third, as weapons of war.117 The Soviet Union also
considered thc non-proliferation argument for the MLF as reconciling things which were clearly irreconcilable.'11 8
The M4LF was looked upon as increasing to a great extent thedanger of a therimo-nuclear conflict. It was considered impossible to invent some "intermediate" approach without startinga chain reaction with all the dangerous consequences deriving
frmi.119 The danger of accidental war was stressed.1 2 0 Th
MLF as an instrument of aggression was viewed as a reflection
121of NATO's aggressiveness.
The Soviets were very doubtful of the validity of American
retention of its veto on the use of the Force. It was impossible for them to believe that the Federal Republic of Germany
wanted to join the MITF simply to have a finger on the safety
116

117

118

For Soviet statements, see, for example, DCOR, Suppi. forJan. to Dec. 1964, pp. 1-4-18, Doc. DC/209, Ann. 1, Sec. E(ENDC/123, 28, Jan. 1964) and Ibid., 72nd mtg, 26 Apr.
1965, para. 106. See also ENDC7-PV. 195, 2 July 1964,
pp. 24 and 26 (Poland) as well as Talensky, loc.cit.,p. 25 and A. Yeremenko, "Absurd Plans, Ridiculous Ropes",International Affairs (Moscow), No, 6, June 1963, P. 17.
Y. Novoseltsev, "Bonn's Excessive Ambitions", International Affairs (Mvoscow), No. 2, Feb. 1966, P. 33. See
also the article by N. Andreyev, "Revanchism and the Atomic Bomb"?, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, Nov.
1966, Pp. 74-78, which is a vivid example of Soviet worries of German nuclear ambitions.

119

ENDC/137, 15 July 1964, p. 3..
See ENIDC/84, 17 Apr. 1963, pp. 2, 4-5.

120

Talensky, loc.cit., pp. 24-25.

121ýIbid., p. 23.

161

9ath,ermnshavingz oltained at first a somewhat restricted
accesstoncerwepn
~
~
~

11

'nthe
NIF, would try, it

was argued,ol most of the restrictions one by one,jutas it had secured the abolition of most of the restrict-

tosCur)blto

ions laid down for the Federal Republic of Germany in the Paris
22
agreement of 1954 in the sphere of conventional armaments. 1
Electronic devices to prevent unauthorized use of the weaponis
12
were considered easily removable. 3
Moreover, the Soviet Union objected to the idea of surface
ships Qarrying nuclear missiles, on the ground that they might
be disguised as peaceful mercantile vessels. It invoked The
Hague ITConvention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships
Into Warships", signed on 18 October 1907, forbidding, even inwartime, the secret arming of merchant ships, thereby converting them into warshi~ps.12
The MIJF was also considered contrary to the letter andspirit of the "Irish Resolution" which prohibited non-nuclear
States from manufacturing nuclear weapons or "to otherwise
125
acqtuire control of such weapons".
It was feared that the MLF would lead to the creation of aEuropean nuclear force which would be under the aegis of the
1 26Feder;--l 2-epublic of Germoany.

It was also feared that the MLF2 would lead to an intensification of imperialist and nec-colonialist pressure on thepeoples Nho obtained their independence or were struggling for
it.
122
123

1 27

ENDC/PV. 195, 2 July 1964, pp. 9-10 and 15.
Talensky, loc.cit, p. 26.

124

ENDC/84, 17 Apr. 1965, p. 6. For the text of The Hague
Convention, see British and Foreig;n State Papers, Vol.
C (1906-1907) (I:Ondon :HM'SO, 1911), PP. 577-389,

125

ENDC/PV, 195, 2 July 1964, P. 59 (USSR).

126

EITDC/137, 15 July 1964, p. 2.
DCOR, 72nd mtg, 26 Apr. 1965, para. 106 (USSR).

127

162

The scheme was; fin-ally found inc,ompat!ible withdiamen
and the establishment of denuclearized zones .12
The Soviet Union and its allies, in a communiqu6 issued by
the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty organization meeting in Warsaw on 19-20 January 1965, threatened
that if M4LF plans were implemented they "would be forced tocarry out the necessary defence measures in order to ensure
their security... J,29
As a counter measure to the XILF, Albania, which did notattend the meeting, proposed, in a note to Poland published on
2 February 1965, that the Warsaw Pact should formally declarethat all the Socialist countries should be equipped with nuclear weapons.

1 30

History was a driving force for Soviet opposition, not only
as far as recent experiences with Germany in both World Wars
I and II, but also as far as Russian history itself, which was
dominated by constant fear of foreign intervention, 1 31 Soviet
fear from a German finger on the nuclear trigger, if seen inthis context, could be very well considered as genuine. Those
who talked to Soviet officials closely and privately derived
the impression that the Soviet opposition was not ritualistic
and was based on a fear that important technical information
128

129
130

131

Ibid., para. 112 (USSR), The Moscow Test-Ban Treaty wasconnected with a Soviet calculation that it would lead tothe abandonment of the MIF. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Moscow
and the MLF
Hostility and Ambivalence", Foreig~nAffairs,Vol. 43, No. 1, Oct. 1964, P. 130.
See Keesina's ContemDorary Archives, Vol. XV, 1965-1966,
p. 20589 A.
Ibid. See also Albania's attack on NIP and German militarism and revanchism in DCOR, 78th mtg, 11 Nay 1965,
para. 82,
For an excellent analysis of Noscow's behaviour as a reflection of Russia's historic experience, see Louis J.
Halle,, The Cold War AsLHistor (London :Chatto and Windus, 1967) , chapter II, pp. 10-19.

163

on arhadsand~cisi1 sytem woldpass gr_-adually into Germanhnds8 anld bro,aden the ption of a future nationalistic
G'erman Governmpent, either to develop a national nuclear force
or for some co-operation ventures with France.13 In fact, Germany's E'uropean allies were as worried as the Soviets about
German participation in the MLF.
It should be borne in mind that the Soviets had been for a
Iong- time hostile to European Unity as a political objective tobe pursued and attained by the European Economic Community. Anymeasures aimed at such an objective were unwelcome. As one ofthe objectives to be pursued by the M~LlF was European unity,
Soviet opposition was therefore inevitable. The Soviets' continued attacks on the IMFJ even in the period when it was obvious to them that the NATO allies were divided could be interpreted as having the objective of widening further allies' divergences. 1ý3The Soviets might not have hoped to destroy NATOas an organization, but its weakening had apparently been forecasted. 134
However, the PVULF offered the opportunity to the new Soviet
leadership, after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, to reassert
the importance of the Warsaw Pact and to argue that the political situation necessitated its strengthening. 15The seventhmeeting of the Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty

132

Buchan, "The Multilateral Force", P. 14. One writer hadargued, on the contrary, that those consequences could be
the result of a MVLF defeat. Brzezinski, loc.cit., p. 127.

.133

On Soviet stimulation of opposition to the MLF in Western
Europe, see Ibid., pp. 125-150.

154

The US had interpreted Soviet attacks on the KILF and Germany as mainly designed to disrupt, divide and weaken theNATO Alliance. See Hearings on Nonproliferation, 1966,
p. 5 (Secretary of State Dean Rusk)--and- pp. 36 and 42(William Foster).

155

Korbonski, locccit., P. 45.

164

Organization haad actall

conentate

NI.bV

The, A_uF
could have embarassedý, the Soviet Unioni. ItGs allies, could haveasked for an equal role as their counterparts in NATO. Howeveron th

it seems doubtful that the Soviets would have taken the riskin sharing their know-how with their allies.137

MFIL

Fears of escalation and accidental war as a result of awere a reflection of Soviet mounting appreciation of thedangers inherent in a general nuclear war. Since the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, a reinterpretation of Leninist
views on the inevitability of war, and on the role of war inextending communism had taken place. War was no longer regarded
as inevitable, and deterrence of war became primordial. 15 8
In the face of increasing Soviet opposition, the UnitedStates had taken the lead in defending the MILE and in demonstrating its usefulness. In the first place, the need for theforce was stressed as a device to enable members of NATO tocope with a range of threats which they might face. "(S)o longas hundreds of Soviet nuclear-tipped rockets are arrayed against
Europe, effective European participation in strategic deterrence should be provided,"1 5 9 Strengthening NATO and the political ties which bound together the nations of the Alliance
was cited as one of the principal objectives of the force. 1 4 0
156

KeesinZls Contemporary Archives, Vol. XV, 1965-1966,
p. 20589 A.

137

Brzezinski, locc.cit ., P.130,
For a basic understanding of the Soviet doctrine on military strategy, see Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky (Ed,), E1111iaay
Strateg.y. Soviet Doctrine and Concepts (London andDunmnaw '-all Hall Press, 1965).
-Seealso William Kintnerand Harriet Fast Scott (Eds.), The Nuclear Revolution in
Soviet Militarv Affairs (Norman, Oklahoma ;University ofOklahoma Press, 1968) and Bowie, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance", pp. 712-715.
ENIDC/PV. 195, 2 July 1964, p. 37.

138

159
140

See United States' reply to the Soviet Union note on NFIL,
dated 28 Aug. 1964 in ENDC/142, 10 Sept. 1964, PP. 1-'2.

165

heNPwsdefe'tnded bylte,Unjited States as ainon-proliu
E. y offer,ing, an alte,rnative to nationlc
easu
feraionwould increase incentives andeponpodc
cances for the 'limitatios of nat_iona
imprvehe Soviet, Uniion) was reminded that the People's
ing
entrs.
on a
Ltepublic of China was the only country to have embarked
42
nuclear Power.'1
nuc__lear weapoAs programme with the help of aclearrweaponsLaprogramme,it

The Federal Republic of Germnany was defended. For the United States, tensions in Europe emanated from the unnatural division of Germany and the refusal of the Soviets to agree togrant the German people their inherent right of self-determination.1 4 3 The Federal Republic of Germany's renunciation ofnu
144
clear weapons was repeatedly referred to.
As to the control of the force, it was explained that no
single participant would be able to fire the missiles, since
firing the missiles in wartime would be by decision of the American President and an agreed number of other participants.
Moreover, no participant would be able to withdraw any elementof the force and to place it under its national control. 15The
force would have been sub~ject to safeguards to prevent its use
in an accidental or unauthorized manner.14
It was also pointed out that surface ships would not be
disguised as merchant ships. Those ships would be warships in
141

142

See United States' note to the Soviet Union on the MLF,
dated 18 May 1963 in ENDC/90, 24 May 1963, p. 3. See also
ENDC/PV. 195, 2 July 1964, P. 37 and ENIDC/142, 10 Sept.
1964, p. 1.
Statement by Ambassador Stevenson in the Disarmament Commission on 26 Apr. 1965 in Documents on Disarmament, 1965,
p. 64.

143

ENDC/90, 24 May 1963, Pp. 3-4.

144

For example, see Documents

145

ENIDC/PV. 195, 2 July 1964, p. 37.
ENDC/142, 10 Sept, 1964, pp. 1-2.

146

166

on

Disarmament,_1965, p. 64.

lwand in fLa ct cleartly id enIt,i fied as Pa"'t, of, tlhe Wesetern defenisive, aiiioury . 147(c)

The Non-AL14,-3ed Members of the, ENDO
The non-aligned members of the ENDC were caughtiL up :ina
thecontroversy over the MIF which was taking place at the Conference. The problem of nuclear sharing within NATO seemed to themto unjustly dominate the debate on non-proliferation. Nothing
could have better expressed their feelings than the following
statement made by the Nigerian representative in the First Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly at its 20th
session:it would be wrong to approach the problem ofproliferation from the sole angle of preoccupation
with theiwgintenance of the status quo, in Central
Europe."At the ENhDC, the non-aligned members were, at the beginning, shying away from indulging in the discussi,on of a problem
which seemed to them so thorny. In 1964, at the peak of the MIF
discussions among NATO members and in the debates at the ENDC
between the two camps facing each other in" Europe, the individual positions of the eight non-aligned members ranged fromcomplete silence on the issue as was the case with Brazil,
Burma, Ethiopia and Sweden to various views expressed by theother four members reflecting a certain trend of uneasinesswith respect to the MLF and an apparent caution so as not to149
appear to be taking sides.
147

ENDC/90, 24 May 1963, p. 3.

148

GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Cttee, 1356th mtg, 19 Oct. 1965,
para. 18.

149

See "Memoranda by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab
Republic containing brief r6sum6As of the suggestions andproposals on disarmament and collateral measures made byeach delegation that were discussed during 1964". DOOR,
Suppl. for Jan. to Dec. 1964, Doc, DO/209, A-nn, 1, Sec. N

167T e)Vrep
1-vie

11etatJV~ a Lt, ItheI965

c.2session of the P.is-armmenstronglCmmisinhd itepreedthese,non-aligned views ais
opposedCo th,e JVIF,Ji'
an- inter,pretation whiich was

nether1,Jconese

Th
linth

j)

býy the, aforemnentioned four, non-alig-ned

dele-

Fi
FLnal AnaLy si ,Scou-Lrseý of -this Chapter,the-_ merits_, and demerits ofthec 1ILF w;ere demonstrated. It is our puarpose here to concretizýe them in the light of the objectives which were set for the
MLF.
(a) The Non-Proliferation Argument
It was thought that by bringing the United Kingdom andFrance's nuclear forces into the MIF where the Federal Republicof Germany would have a role to play, it would discourage thelatter's nuclear ambitions for an independent deterrent. There
could have been a certain merit in such an objective but theUnited Kingdom and France did not accept to integrate even apart of their nuclear forces in the MLF. Secondly, German nuclear ambitions were misinterpreted. To use the words of one
writer, there was a misreading of German aspirations. 11What
the Germans wanted originally was not a newly constituted strategic force but a meaningful role for the tactical nuclear weapons paralysed by the "counter force" strategy and a role forGermany to play in planning the use of those weapons placed on
its ter'ritory. The Germans had only become interested in the
MLF when. the United States had fervently pushed it ahead.
The Soviet Union and its allies were not alone in expressing their fears of a German finger on the trigger. Allies of(ENDC/l-44. 14 Sept. 1964). See especially P. 37, para.
e(ii) (India); -p.39, IV(D) (Mexico); P. 41, II(a) (Nigeria);
andp.47 item 2 B(2) (United Arab Republic).
15 ICO,7t

mg,2'4 Na1y 19)65,

168

para.s.

64-.-65.

haGemnIVrs

expresý

nIbutteIIi')aio
herCoIC Jce.

Who epssd
thelon

Liane

nuat

-,
romnen ,pu n(roasila

run i,naýdeqL'uate to mee-Loleinteucarsae

Eithr jp_iresrbe exetewould',

the Untethat prveStates vet

unsucessfu,

onth

~p

astainso)hlongteralisi_cmaigu

rt
exp11

y!fAh

Al

atte
to aleiaeo

iseofc-lthey woul1d' proce

the foro,o,i
to devloinde-ýý,CI1

pendently, their own- nauclear weapons withi the added siuu
and know-how provided by the MILF. The MILF wa_s considereda to be
the easiest way to get the Federal Republic of Germany into the
nuclear business.15(b) The European Unity Argumecnt
By bringing the United Kingdom into the NIPF it was hopedthat United States preferential treatment of the former would
be minimised, thus paving the road to European unity. The TILE
was seen by one of its fervent supporters, former Under-Secretary of State George Ball, not as a final proposal but rather
as a pragmatic step until a transatlantic or a strictly European nuclear force could provide an educational opportunity
for preparing non-nuclear countries of Europe for the nuclear
15
responsibilities of a common Europe. 3
However, the Polaris offer in Nassau to the United Kingdom
without previously conferring seriously with France had the effect of confirming to France the special Anl-mrcnrelationship and thus deepening the rift between France and the twoallies to the extent of vetoing British entry into the Common
Market. Nassau in itself might not have been the principle cause but it had certainly contributed to the French veto.
152

ate
rule
For example, see Kissinger, Th
PP. 146, 148, 154, 164-170 and John Silard, "The TIultila.'of theý Atomnic,
teral Force. The Case Against", Bulletini
Scientists, Vol. YX, N.7, sept.L 1964!, p.ý 18,

153

Ball,

The icpieo
Structure, ipp. 205--206,

Pwr

setas

fKdr

ol

heo

Io
toe
s ofteN1F, su%chl as Kr. Kijssingt oe'r,

sceewould haveý had theprctca
the~~"
eneo
eme0rCD1 uopa
ed
a

th'e,

conseqýuence of preýventi_ng

Oinlt Of VieW on1 nuc-lear mattes

As r,K~sine
xplind,thle Ame-r-icani attitude had inhlibituro)pean uest foratonmy ItL had even caus-ed somie advoaeso
rpenident-Aity in, theldfenc fieldl to give(7 th11ei r

caseanati-Aerian cast.-L 4 For, T,r.
isigr
as well as
otHers L,`Eur1op-1ean,1pol-iLtical] UnitJY ms precede nuel-ear initegration~~~
o
an
ievra
t was p ojiinte d ouat that a Eurpea
deeretpresupposeýs a Etiro-pe-an Federationý anid more specially,a 'Europeian President able to act in any crisis with unquestion156e)d autihority.
(c) The. Sharing of Control._Arajaent
The United States had sought to meet the charges of American monopoly of the nuclear strategy of the Alliance by conferring to the European allies, through their participation in
theMLF, a share in the control of the nuclear armanents. In return,force expenses would have been shared collectively and would
have allowed a reduction of American defence spending in Europe.
The significant point in all the negotiations that had
taken place on the MIF is that control, the key issue, had
notreceived the attention it deserved. Attention was rather
focused on the mixed-manned element. Moreover, the United Statesv7arious proposals on nuclear sharing had always retaineditLýSVeto on1 t,he use of the nuclear weapons,thus United States
mi,-ion,opoly wouýld remain intact. The so-called "European
option"wa7Ls a far-fetcihed eventuality. 'United States' renunciationof
iný its

itLs veto in

15 4
155

favýou_r of the formation of a European force was not

Ki,ssing-er,

The Troubl.ed Partnership,p.

Ib-id-, p. 1-73; Mulley, loc__cit,, pp.
ran, AtlIantic 1Future", pD,1-16.

-15"6 Ibid.

1701

241.
461-4zi621; a,nd Sominmer,

taken very seriously by State Depaittml-rent polic(ypanesal
though they frequentlly stliesse,d it1iýnestoswth
17
C,e rmans.
Th-ere-as)oAmeýrican. offic,Ial supp-ort f7or a Europe,an deterrent6 thatG c-ould be only co-ordin ited wittherc
an de terrenit.

5

A-voidýanc,e of t1he control iýssue wats due to thec intrl,,icate
problem-cs it

wou-ld have raise,d.

FiLrst of all,rin
thA-eUntdta,tes, theý- McMahon Act wcul-d have. had to b'e furthier amenoided t,oallow for the co-ownership of the force, it would

aveý

been!

rather difficult to convince the American Congr-ess thatLmei
can nuclear weapons could be shared with others and even moredifficult if not impossible to grant its approval for a "European option". At the.beginning, the MILF seemed to have been
kept away from the Congress, but at the end of 1964 soundings
on Capitol Hill had shown that the Congress did not accept the
MILF. Opposition came both from liberals who disliked the ideaof giving the Germans even a pinch of nuclear power, fearing
this would blight disarmament proposals, and from conservatives
159
who wanted to cling to the American nuclear monopoly.
It could have been psychologically undesirable to codify ade__jure control rule recognizing a US veto on the use of theforce. 10It could have raised difficulties in the Alliance157

Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy,

158

Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, "The Control of Western
Strategy", The Institute for Strategic Studies (ILondon),
Aepi Papers. No, 3, Apr. 1963, pp. 12-13.

159

Geyelin, op.cit., pp. 169-170. The majority of members of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy were reluctanit toaccept the MIP, not because it constituted proliferation,
but just in opposition -to the concept. Senautor Pasto.re in
Hearinas on NonDroliferation, 1966, p. 43.

160

See Sir John Slessor, "Comim-and and Control of Allied Nluclear Forces. A British View", The Institute for St'rat,,egiJ_c
Studies (ILand.on), Ldtlh Paprs No 222, Aug. 1965' .5

171i

p. 24-1.

ooa
chh
hand,
Z
al I ~o r-iy
pos-silCo oso eri

Sat1,es. If, on- theC. ot,her1

etti- erie coiie,ý

di_ssenters w,oul_d hav\)en)
iot respectedt t,he d-c iso'oion ofi the maJority.

AssersurvivalJ wTas,atae

le tioantmighy y p

regrd isopaticpatonn tha i,as t6hat, whi-

vto righ-t as a condition.

IYLF,Eurpeans wvanted to be sure thatth'le Unit1'Ced Staýtes wýould intervenei
i'lon

the dJJ.e?iifth-ey so desired.

In theran,L_Lt w,asý becotause o.f this lattter a,spect th-at no NATOss emocould 'be a,ttr-active to theiiairopýeans if the- Ulnited Sta.ce
co ul

si ngl y ve,to !tS use.

Dueto tGhe difficulties raised by the cont'6rol issue,

it

was

suggested by several experts that what was really needed was
not joint ownership and the sharing of the decision on the -useof nuclear weapons but rather sharing in strategic planning.
That sort of sharing might lead later to the sharing of decision. Thie establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
was, in a sense, a step in that direction.
As to the sharing of costs, it would have been prohibitive
for many allies who were asked at the same time to increase
their conventional forces in compliance.with the "flexible response" doctrine.
It seemed that some United States officials hoped that the
NIJF would be discussed long enough and in sufficient depth so
thtEuropeans asking for a greater voice in nuclear affai 'rs
woulId discover how costly and complicated it all was.16

161

For an excellent discussion of the control issues, see
Klaus Knorr, A NATO Nuclear Force, The Problem of Managemeant (Princeton, N.J. :Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, 1963) (Center of InternationalStu,dies, Policy" Nemorandum No. 26),
162Geyelin, o'.it,pp. 165166

for(d) ArCgIentý Theý,ThI ,-ro,1Imp.o~ trIeiithojientýs, of the1MILEde. endedL,'

L-r- Bowie coGdd

it was no)

esen;

but,
L if
'
theForcecrea-teýd it,coutld hav

faouof theas follv,
1

ILEJraa counteur forc e d1eterrent;It

wol

a

C,c

U

nl'ayvau.A

a lgtmte miitarwrThei,Poa i-1si
fil

the

AT Need fo

MRBMs to mee(t mislstarge-ted at Wetrkurp
Union; it

et

t

mitrC

would diversczify the wea-pons arsenial of NATO;Pc

Sovie
lythe
it woul

add to Western superiority by comiplicating Sovie;tdencs
and it would take over part of the Soviet targets cojvtvereby:,

the United States strategic forces. The surface ship was de--64
fended as invulnerable and efficient.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff never liked theMILE. The Army and Air Force were negative. Only the Navy had
65found the MILE technically feasible.
The opponents of the MILE in academic circles were very
critical of the military value of the Force. Their arguments
ran as follows :NMLE was too much a military response to a political problem; 16it would distract from finding a common
strategy for the Alliance; 167 it could not be used independently
163
164

Robert Bowie in Assembly of Western European Union, Pro.ceedings, 9th SaSs., Fart 2, IV, Dec. 1965, P. 126.
See Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the MultilateralA
Force", pp. 96-97 and Osgood, "The Case for the MILE
Critical Evaluation", pp. 12-20.

165

A. Schlesinger, o1.cit., p. 728 and Sorensen, 22.qit_,
P. 568,166

David S. McILellan, "The ChangAing Nature of Soviý!,Etiad(al)oAmerican Relations with Wester,n Europe", The,,
the American Academy of PoliticalPand, Soia ScieneVol. 572, July 1.967, p. 25.Seas7isigr,hp156
Troubled Partnershp

167

Joji- Nehosei Appraisalc3-1,"Th Mu,ltilatea Force,etVoL. XX,N,7
cniss
Bulletin of the Aomi

173

[Ii.

it
wuldnot-add to the
exJ st JIngP
supei
P
ority ofJL11 :itLe~forceýs ; It

the supe?riority of the Weýst andwasl nlot ncsaybaueof

the ~S,t ates' straei
1~~ deraigSvittra;( q anid i-t was conisidered. that

instaceon cetaie

taeywiediplom-,acyr,emained

Onbalance, by the end of 1964, the MLF appeared to be avery iragile project. All1 sorts of inherent difficulties persisted. Neither the NATO allies nor their counterparts of the
Warsaw iPact welcomed it. In the UJnited States, the State Department and the Navy were the only official organs of the Administration promoting the project. Among all NATO allies,
only the Federal Republic of Germany continued to support the
project until thc end of 1965 when it was overtaken by internal as well as international events connected with the British
ANF proposal and the NPG to which the study now turns its attention,

The Atlantic Nuclear Force
When the British Labour Party acceded to power in October
1964, it was faced with the problem of what to so with the
British independent nuclear deterrent. The solution sought was
to seek its internationalization. An alternative to the MLF
had to be found which would avoid the insoluble problems of
mixed-manning and the political objections of appearing togive the Germans a finger on the nuclear trigger. 11The outcome was the AN{F proposal.
168

Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma", The Reporter,Vol. 28, No. 7, 28 MIar. 1965, p. 32.

169 intrhff
170

Ksigr

lDc cit.,ph55-60.

ruldPrnrhp

17Wlsn,opct.,p

44.
174

.13

The ~~~ .Laorpooaweeirt~~~ faueotmain~feýd intan arti_cle in The Timeswtof Londoint of 25 Ocoe

ree
V
196

b)(hy

its efene
crr'
ondnt,Alu Gw,ynn Jo sc ae
obcm
7
Lo.rd ChalfonAt aind MJinist-ILer ofFttfoisxmet.
Thep`lan wasý furth11er_L de(,v,el_oped,,
Prime Minister Haro_tld Wiloby theIo riento the Presýidn

and pr seeb
of

-ithe
Unitd
ý

States L,yndon Jnhii8cn2-in D.-,ecember, 1964, duAringthifrmrvisit to Washington D.C. The details of the plan were revealed
by MVr. Wilson in the House of Commons on 16 December 1964.173
1. The Components and Control of the ANF
The components of the force were suggested to be"First, the British V-bomber force except for thoseaircraft which are needed for existing commitments
out-side the NATO area. Those are reserved. Second,
the British fleet of Polaris submarines ...
Third,
at least an equal number of United States Polaris
submarines. Fourth, some kind of mixed-manned andjointly owned element in which the existing nonnuclear Powers could take part, and fifth .. 1.4
forces which France may decide to subscribe."
The Force would have been committed to NATO under the unequivocal control of SACIEUR.17 5 The British national element
would have been irrevocably committed to NATO as long as NATOlasted as an effective organization. Only in the event of a172

The Times, 25 Oct. 1964. The article is entitled "NewBritish Ideas on Multilateral Force, Double Veto Proposal
for Political Control".

173

Parliamentarv Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, 196419_65, (Vol1._ 704b)-, pp. 430-4355,

174

Ib_id., p. 543. See also Statement on Defense Estimates,
1965 (London :-BHMSO, Feb. 1965), Pp. 7-8. The mixedmanmed and jointly owned element would have been 18 surface ships and 144 Polaris missiles instead of 25 ships
and 200 missiles in the MIF proposal, Zedler,, op.cit_,p. 16.

175

Wilson, op.cit., P. 44, Thae, _ANF a,_pparen,tl1y w,ou_ld haýýve hiad,
also conitrol over all NýATO tactJi-cal ncerwaose
Ze dIeC,
o,cit
p 16.
P,

175

braLponac'
jAOAs~C) totepltclcntro

imntI
wrouldJ have r\Ievert ed toof the fore, Kr,ý W1ilson ex-

whch l L1C,ountre tain pa1)rt wouild be,-enti tled
tberpeetd The Unite STýtatels, th-ie UJnited
Kigdm,and France, if sh-oo
art, wouild hvaýVet overý thle use of allmnsin teforce
an ioeany changes which might at any time be
prioposed in t'he control system - . Any other country participating would also have a veto if it
wanted, though collectively they could, if they sodesired, exercise their veto as a single group. In
other words, European countries could either havea single veto, or if they wanted to do it on somegroup basis, that would be a matter for them.
The authority governing the force, acting entirely
on instructions from Governments, would have theseduties :To provide the force commander with political guidance; to approve the force commander'stargeting and operational plans for the use of all
weapons of the force; to take the decision to release nuclear weapons to the force commander; todevelop agreed policy on the role of all types ofstrategic and tactical nuclear weapons; and, fifthly, to consult and discuss possible contingencies
anywhere in the world which could give rise to thepossibility of nuclear weapons being used. There
would be co-ordination of targeting by the Atlantic nuclear force with the targeting of all UnitedStates forces in the Atlantic area.
To ensure that the new arrangements could not result in, or be accused of leading to, dissemination of nuclear weapons, and in particular to ensure that they could not be represented as bringing any new fingers nearer to the nuclear trigger,
the charter of the force should have clauses underwhich nuclear members would undertake not to disseminate nuclear weapons, and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to acquire them or toacquire control over them,,,. There should be afurther prohibition of nuclear weapons passing

-into tlheconor ow Ii

notony1i)hpidi

2.The Ob;ectives of t,he ANComp)aritg- te,,AMP withý
underlinedmor

the

Erth
_JL,1'

betie

oudb

cleýarlLy.

First, thf141F would have been a ne,wlycosiuefre
with newly inicurred expenses which were estimatedi tohigh.

In the ANF,

British contribution from itse(erexi_-sting na

tional deterrent forces would have virtually meant no extr,aexpenses.
Second, in the M.LF, the Federal Republic of Germany would
have been the largest contributor, paying close to 70 per centof the European share, which would have meant a great German
influence in the Force and in the Alliance. In the ANYF,

by vir-tue of the participation of almost all of its strategic forces,
the United Kingdom would have had the greatest influence inthe force and would have been on an equal footing with theUnited States, while the Federal Republic of Germany would
have been relegated to a second-class category by virtue of
its participation in a reduced mixed-manned element.
Third, in contrast to the MlF there would have been no "European option" in the AN-F. Under the latter the veto was not
negotiable. Mr. Wilson was very hostile to the idea of a separate European deterrent. For him, the possibility of a futuremajority rule in some consortium, meant that

PnuclearPower

had been created. 18The ANF without a "European option" would
have also comforted the Soviets.
House of Commons, 1964-1965, (Vol-, 704), pp. 434435. On the non-proliferation aspects oif the, IJTF, seec a-;lso

177

Hansard,

178E

ILord Chalfont's statement in 1965 s_essionl of the IN Dis-armament Commissionin DOOR, 74111th mtgý, 28Apr 1965,P1)1parýas_ 28-355.
of Cmos16495,(V/ol. 7041), p, 452,;
asrd'osFou,,f?,itheF, Brih detterr)_ent forces would haveet inatwhlJnth-N1lms
l British deterrent

benforcesý
wol hav

be-irvcbycmitdto

it, Thuis theavekpt, it's poieto give u.p the inde-ndn ainldetercretit andirwvould have setl ani exami)ple for
all
nclro
sitns,h m_igh1t be, willing- to follow a national
LabourPartywould

cours7e 17 9

nucea

Ls ly,ý fro m,a miL 4taryip oinof vi wmuch more" pwc)erfuCLd and invulnerableý

t w u d h v

thnteilF
180
cnrlof the _UqF was more clearly defined.,ee nPolitically,

3,Reactions to the ANF
For obvious reasons the Germans were not expect~ed to beenthusiastic about a scheme which offered them much less thana previous one. It could have very well appeared to them as atactical move to delay the M1F.1 8 1
The French were not expected to join the ANF at the beginning as could be deduced from Mr. Wilson's declaration in theHouse of Commons, There was no reason to believe that France
would have followed a different attitude in the case of the
ANFF. Its basic objections to the MLF were still valid for the
ANF.

179

180
181

18 2

See Frangois DuchAne, "Beyond Alliance", The Atlantic
Institute (Boulogne-sur-Seine, France), The Atlantic Pa22ers, NATO series I, 1965 (?).
For a brief comparison, see Hinterhoff, loc.cit., pp. 7072.
See Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, P. 337. The ANFJ's
main purpose, in Kohl's view, might well have been tokill the MILE.
12AGaullist parliamentarian, Mr. Baumel, had the followigto say about the ANF
militairement absurde,techiqueentind4fendable, politiquement tout-hL-fait
irralite"
Qote inHinerofflo,ci,,p. 73"...

sumtted 1his pro:Lposal_ to PeietJhsn

an,y sugetoniiow)everidrc,oaG-atl-ie nucle-ar-, trige;
fThencin~~~~~

n

io

xli

iger even i-

heSvitojeton.I

easing_ of tenion was whlat wýýas hoped for,ý,teNPcoudb
fatal porovocationi 13P resident Johniaon wasprpre,toni

der the idea and instrupted the United States delegationiat,NATO to enter into full discussion with the United Kingdom andothers and to prepare a full study of what was involved. For
Fir. Wilson it

was already a success. 184 He was left with the185task of talking to the Germans about the AN'.
But before Wilson's visit,

was receding in

the tide of suppo~rt for -the NIF

Washington which in fact explains Johnson's

receptiveness to the new proposal. 16Johnson and. his advisers
were split on the MLF. 18 7 As shown earlier, Congress was notinclined to accept it. 18Johnson was advised that nobody inEurope wanted it. 8 9 There was even an indication that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was reluctant topush ahead with the MLF. 1 9 0 And though the State Department was183

For an account of Mr. Wilson's conversation with President
Johnson on the IPF and the ANF, see Wilson, ok,,cit.,
pp. 49-50.

184

Ibid., P.

185

Geyelin, op.cit., p. 175.

186

For an interesting account, see Ibid., chapter 7, especially pp. 167-180..

187

Ibid.,

188

Ibid., p17.See also Lyndon BainesJonsn,Th Van1-9316
tage Poinit. Perspectives of the Peiec(Lodon ; Weidenfeld and Nicolson,,, 1972), pF. 477,

189

GeyeIlin, qp. c:It_, p. 17-1_ NoGeorgeý Btl111dy woetercm
mendation that enrded US support fortle N4LUP. Se;, ýL,so
Cleveland, o.i,
.14

50.

pp. 167-168.

179,

were toceaseas

seem tohav

bee

mad

easie

coulwel

eneo

the

copnn

of a lage

IL inisoiial for a,'_ts an, integrLal
se uC 5 ioin
nil Deý-ceme 195i

hareaiecomteby thidatattepr-c

to a vaito

at les of th1e AN
TF for-mindedabouLt some,: applicationl of tLhe m1ixdmn
no,d fLeatUure if the Germans were adamant.1 9
muladpeIt was precisely the mixed-manned element in the ANF which
had led the Soviet Union to consider the situation basicallyunaltered. 1 9 7 The Soviet representative to the 1965 session of
the Disarma;ment Commission expressed his Government's worries
in the following terms:"Access to nuclear weapons will be gained indirectly, through the NATO bloc, on the pretext that theWest German military are for the time being subordinated to the NATO command. Not only will theWest German generals be members of the staff having control over nuclear weapons, but units of theBundeswT4E will have those weapons at their disposal."

191

Ibid., pp. 174-175.

192

Kohl, Erench.Nuclear Diplomagc,

195

Geyelin, O.U.cit., P. 175.

194

See Wilson, 2j.i.

195

Geyelin,196

p. 243.

PP. 79-80.

pp.cit., PP. 177-178.
Ibid., p. 180. Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara on their way toth-e NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1965 stopped in
ILondon on 17 December with a last attempt to revive, in
Mr. Wilson words, the "ghost" of the MILE. Wilson, op.cit.,,
197
OOR

72n
198 ~~
87t

mt,26 Apr ý

0165,

mtc2
~
~ IbdIa~j_r95

para,, 102.
aa. 1

the1c ANF11 would_bin

But1,C1:coin

the no-ncla

memerbacký to, B)F"r itihGraand wIth the subsequen

taJ

notcto,j
ac ure suchabou

rehufing of Erhard

th

AG.te

GoenmnWh a-t e-ver;c parliament_larcy
1
support there' use-d to be- fcor anw integrated NATO niuclear: force,such as the MLF orth. Alntc

uclear Force (ANF), crumbled in December 1965. The M4ajority
Leader, Herr Barzel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
carefully skirted the issue. Franz Josef Strauss, leader of theChristian Socialist Union (CSU), dismissed the idea of a multilateral force and advised instead co-operation within the newly
established "MclNamara Committee". The Free Democrats likewise
had abandoned the idea of co-ownership and talked only about
1political solutions." So did Herr Helmut Schmidt, speaking for201
the Social Democratic opposition (SPD).
The Free Democrats were against the MLF for fear of worsen.ing relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The CSU,
and the Free Democrats as well, for fear of worsening relations
with France. The SPD, while in principle it was in favou.r of
the MLF, was more flexible because of France and the Eastern
European countries. 20Noreover, given the adverse developmentof the Federal Republic of Germany's trade and payments balance,
as well as the budget deficits of 1965 and 1966, no costly

199

The Soviet representative was referring to Lorýd Cafn'
statement referred to earlier in note `;77

200

Geyelin, op.cit., p, 1'76.

201

SommIer,202

See,,de,o.it,p.1-0"The Objectivesý of1 GemayLI

1(87-1.7

solton:avlvn
ne weponsytem

woldhaole been lik,eliy

Inthsecicustncs,Erh ard pad a -visit to Washington
in Dcembr
195. n WahingonLhe NLP and the ANTF were just
prpoalPUon
otesIhoisnEhr C0Mmun1i,]qu6 hadi shiown
pat o
tha
whic
innclathirPaker
oue on thle new diSCUSSIOios
haaleadystatedin ITATU on theinecessitky of improvar,rangemients,ithi

thie All'iance-., That was an implicit reference to the McNamara proposed committee later tobecome the Nuclear Planning Group. 2 0 4
At the end of 1965, therefore, the original NIP formula
was dead. The MIP, as rightly said, had quietly but not officially receded. 25Politically, this was obviously face-saving
for all concerned,
As to the AN7F, Mr. Schrbder, the German Foreign Minister,
expressed his readiness, at the NATO Ministerial Meeting ofDecember 1965, to discuss the proposal. 20
ut in London, although the AN-F was still figuring in the Defence White Paper
of1966, 207 itwas no longer pursued. 208Lodnsitrtwa
also focused on 'the "McINamara Committee",

203
204
205

206
207

Somiier,"The Objectives of Germany", p. 47.
For the text of the Communiqu4 related to nuclear matters,
see He -arings on Nonproliferation,__1966, p. 166.
Ruth Russell, The United Nations and United States Security__Policy (Washington, D.C. :The .Brookings Institution,1968), p. 100. See also Cleveland, pE.cit., P. 53 and note
111 in Chapter 3 of this study.
Zedler, 22.cit., p. 20.
Statement on Defence Estimates -1966(Part I), The
De-f ence_R_ev-iew- 75ondo
I
Feb. 1966), Chapter II,
para. 11.
208
Khl, Fench ucl.ear Diplomay----,---LL :182

ý

p.39

,

3

IV,. The-- himenronce of the, Ifuc',- iaý1':1
lann
-I

ou

Thie e-nd of the il-aedNPan
Was the1 esultcpeitoof a comcbin0ation of fcos

o

l

t,he
liswr

satisfied wýith onie schemel( or the ote.TeSve
non ann
its allieS wvere stbonyIgis'bt.Telrvlorann
proliferation-- trat

iasbonighcemshdt

esci

ficed for the sak'e of paving the way for tbheuocuinohTreaty. After all, the sacrifice was not so dramati, C ifth
allies' divergences were taken into account. The"NaarCommittee" had helped in soothing down the sorrow and disap-,pointment pf some and raised new hopes and expectations forwhat had seemed to be a less ambitious venture but with perhaps more potential for success than its predecessors.
Before Mr. McNamara had put forward his -proposal in May

1965, many critics of nuclear-sharing schemes were of the viewthat the best solution for taking part in the nuclear strategyof the Alliance was better co-ordination in targeting and plan209
ning phases of strategy.
Mr. McNamara's proposal was very much in line with thoseviews. 20In May 1965, with the agreement of Secretary Rusk,
Mr. McNamara proposed at a NATO Council meeting that the Alliance establish a five-member "select committee",
There followed a complex of private negotiations among thepermanent representatives in Paris. In November 1965,

the NATO

Council, meeting in Paris, established a special committýee ofall the Defence Ministers who wanted to join, whic:h treu209

For example, see Silard, loc.cit,, p1 20'Kisine,hTroubled Partnership, pp. 165-171;
lsarBca,"hChanged Sottiing of the Atlantic Delbate",FoenAa'a
Vol. 43, No. 4, July 19-65, p.585-5896; anid Be0aufre',"hSharing of Nuclear Respons:iboilitiJe s. A Po
, bl-em- i-n Neeof
Soluton",pp, 1-49

210

in 19,57 US SecretLlary of SaeFtr
idea of establishinganclai1
loc,cit., p. 48,

183

ue
n

op

efsd aeeWg

hey mt
to beten.

an
Kigo
wishe
tobe

th

Unte
bete'cthat time,:

1ot,he frttime Ain Pria

Stts-infre

adtepasfrfuture change

Tet
the naturn,hadcide-d that tlhe,yof the Unitd Statcs,

ini the force. Th

Irou',ips
mittLee was di'"vided into three subg

spca

OM-

One dc!aling with com-munications, i.e., the capability for prompt consultation in
the event of potential use of the force; another dealing withthe basis of such a decision, i.e., the intelligence information which would be available at the time to heads of Statesprior to consultation; and the third, of which MVr. McNamara213
was Chairman, dealing with the planning of nuclear operations.
The first two working groups were later deactivated.

214

Further negotiations narrowed participation on the third
subgroup, i.e., the nuclear planning working group, which was
known to become the centre ring, to five. They were the UnitedStates, the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy andTurkey (which was elected to represent the small countries).
The subgroup was promptly dubbed, by the newspapers, the211

See Cleveland, 2E.,cit., p. 53 and Robert McNamara in
96 p. 82. Mr. Chet
opoieain
HernsoHollifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy had left the impression in the 1968 hearings on the
NPT in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that theidea of a Committee was recommended by him to Harlan Cleveland who was then US Ambassador to NATO. See Hearings on
ELL, 1968, p. 147.

212

W.B, Bader, "Nuclear Weapons Sharing and the 'German Problem'", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1966,
p. 700.

213LRbert McNamara in Hearings on Nonproliferation, 1966,
214Cofy

iSraeylliacloiy
p.
987.
atin"

and Nucea

Proife'r-

"PCCa)r I CoI

t!'

1

Frnc

ope

out oý th-eIwhl

mlacy of theý nucle_ar planlning wýorkiing group coud)e mladec towork, temember agr_-eed at their fall 1966 meetýting- in Romeý torecomenda tweo-tie.red set-up; an open-ended NuclearDenc

Affairs Commpýi4ttee_ which would supposedly hold all the poweran
do none of the work; and a permanent Nuclear Planning Group to
do the work and therefore make allied nuclear policy. Despite
the political complications of doing so, the NhPG was to be kept
as small as possible, to engage the personal participation of217
the Defence Ministers.,
McNamara felt especially strongly about keeping the NPG
small. At the regular December meeting of the NATO Council in
1966, France, Iceland, and Luxembourg stayed off the Nuclear
Defence Affairs Committee by their own choice. Of the remaining twelve Portugal and Norway decided at the time not to join
the nominally subordinate Nuclear Planning Group. That Group
had to be expanded to seven to accommodate the ambitions of theremaining ten, and even so two classes of membership had to be

215
216

217

Cleveland, 2y.cit., p. 54.
The McNamara proposal appeared to France a.s an attempt toassociate her with other non-members of the nuclear cluýb
in decision making on secondary nuclear problems, France,
however, did not oppose the existence of the Committee,
Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, opct.
.245,
See also
Gallois, Paradoxes de la Paix, pp. 92-96. Goieneral_ (a.llois
was very critical of the "T4c,Nuliara Comnmittbee", One of hisarguments rums as follow%s`F'e Comit'-6 !"!oNam ara nie poulvait
8tre qu'un leurre destin116
fourir'1u1
gouvernemen deBonn les appare-nces dfune solution i un,,problThme pa_rfaýiJtement insoluble :Garantir l1A11eiia,gnJe F6derale an courir.les risques inh6jrents "L paroille, garantie," (p. 941).
Cleveland, oct,p.56-

185

estaflihePnFou

permanentG se!atus were gi.v.,n to the UTK,Germnany,lt;aly and the L,nited StaLtes; a)nd th(, three-ý other SeatLS were to
r'otateý

amfongý, Belgiumi,Ti)rk ey. It

ail

lthNPGý

Canada,D)enLmark,

Gree_ýce, the Netherlands
was deci.ded that b)oth- thie larger Committee andrould be chai`red by -the Secretary-General1 of NATO.2 1

By the,, time(- -the NPC- be3gan its oýf,ficial existence inearly

its wor,k focused on inquiring into the usability of tactical- nuclear weapons. Since the emergence of the "flexible res1967

ponse" doctrine, the need was felt for a reconsideration in
depth of when and under what conditions tactical weapons could
219
be used.
lIt is beyond the scope of this study to go into reviewing
the work of the NP2G. The significant fact is that a frameworkfor discussions on nuclear strategy had been created wheresharing of knowledge and planning had been substituted forsharing of ownership and control in the previous schemes.
It remains to be said that the Soviet Union was very prompt
in d-2-c.unc:Oi1, the McNamara proposal soon after its

submission

to United States allies in NATO on Nay 31, 1965, Two days later,on the second of June, the Soviet representative at the 1965
session of thie Disarmament Commission qualified the proposal as"the most dangerous proposal for placing nuclear weapons within the grasp of West Germany, for allowing West Germany tohave a hand in working out the strategy of their use and toparticipate in their control." 20The "McNamara Committee" wasput on the same level as the MLF and the ANF? as leading to theindirect access of nuclear weapons to States which did not possess them. In Soviets' view, a non-proliferation treaty must
218

Ibid.,

219

For' t.he heandling of the tactical nuclear weapons by the"G3rouip", see Ibid. , pp. 60-65),

pp. 5657

20DOOR, 90th -mtg,,,

21 June 1965,

186

para.

34.

bar all thýose forms of proliferation,
SxI_ MOnth
8December 1965, Foreig, Minister, Gromyko, sad, i

a

o

na
before the Supreme Sovietý, týhat. atteiýmpts"tcaofgth
EGs ac cession to, n*uclear weapons througthe esabjDenof some, sort, of committee" woulld conti'lradi-1ct ti-e Poi-ntsEmlAre

ment and other allie(d coulm_itmen-ts to prohibit

cema _1 t
object ion,s to the NEG( p)roved nout t,obe a serious obstacle towards the f inal conc.clusi-On oflthe.Nhe,ism.

H-owever,SovietTo sum up, the TaF, which would have allowed for joint
ownership and control of a strategic nuclear system, had met
with insurmountable difficulties. Instead of solving the nuclear-sharing problem, it exploded and brought.to the fore allkinds of problems pertaining to European rivalries, nuclear
ambitions and competing priorities.
MLFE objectives were also very questionablo. The MLF devised
as a non-proliferation measure could have very well, on thecontrary, led to proliferation. Secondly, there were certainly
other means for attaining European unity other than devisinga system which, in the long run, would have deepened European
rivalries and conflicting interests. Sharing control of nuclear
weapons was in fact a fictitious assertion as long as the United States nuclear monopoly continued through the right to exercise its veto on the use of the force. Militarily, the, force,
would not have added much to the Alliance's nuclear capabýilijties.
221

Ibid. , para. 38 and 90,th mtg, 14 June 1965, ýpara. 79.ý See
also JL.Vidyasova, "New Debates in -the 'At-lantic Clu,b"',International Affairs (Moscow), No, 4, Ap.- 196'pI3

222

The Current Digest of the Soviet
12 Jan., 196 ,p.5-6,

187

2-reS,Vl

VIo1

Te~ ne hTiay be d a n flrom the ME,!F eC
aprec
are
maI (I J ti2s
edha
l-I,Iin~ the wer
W l',1iimi ts on- wh1a t NAT0 as a
cciton ofsoerin Sta,tesz width di ve.rgent i,nt-erests andl
proite canlother.ealmt of nnc_lea!r def'ence.ý Tt demonsý
trte tha the
aRpbl1iic-_Ioof German_ffy wao not ye-,t wholly
trteanwssIl fear-ed b)y i_t-s ovTn allies, n'ot to mention
th Svit ninanýd i'(s allies, The United King,ý'dom's Persistence
toprsrv~~
L 1amasure_ of ineednefor its nuclear
detrret nd rane' develjop)ment of ilts force, de fra)ppa hadl
exepliiedtheirrevers,ible trenid of rnuclear wveapons' proliferatonione it; had taken place. Proposals for including theiindependent deterrents in a larger set-up, either a multinational force as suggested by the United Kingdom or a force inthe service.of a future united. Europe as alluded to by,France,
had appeared to be founded on national objectives of prestige
and hegemony. Lastly, the United States was under no conditions
ready to relinquish control over its own nuclear weapons.
The MLF's apparent virtue was to allow the steam off. It
was something to be discussed when there was great need for
discussing the nuclear affairs of the Alliance. It may havebeen an inescapable exercise for self-appraisal and a better
understanding of alliance relationships on the road to more
realistic approaches.
The ANF seemed to have been cleverly devised to kill the
MLF. The NPG had led to the final abandonment of both proposals. Co-ordination and planning of strategy had become the objective. Although it was rather difficult to predict and plan
for all future contingencies, the NPG appeared to be a necessaryo-rgan in this respect and the best available solution for nucersharing in the context of the Alliance.
n_concluio, all nuclear sharing plan,-, whether th.,e two~eys'se~-o-prainregarding
atom-lic informjiationý for pnirpoe Afdfne the PLF, the A1Te or the. NPG-mihveywl

1ý o s,m Clatei,-188l

Pj'ový, tLo be in,, t-viLt-jve a--nd
ucf,na i cas"ne uclear dete
Lrrent Olt' a flutime unitLed lEurolpe isJ, C,
ected,oowA t eoý
ndpedntyor J.,n close conjunctiAoný w-i h1a 'United stnttedteýrirent. Nutclear: oharingý exerise miht prvLn suich ý,In
eventalitythat the(?y have noct been stler-iýle
e
l

189

CHAPTER 5
BasjcfO_LII_atiLons.Article

I and~ Ii

Texts

Article I
Each nuclear,~weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-:nuclear-weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
explosive devices.

Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferer whatsoever ofnuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or in-directly; niot to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not -to seek orreceive any assistance in the manufacture of nuiclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices,

Articles I and I1 of the NPT were,as we havýe seen,theresult of l-engt1hy negotiat.ions between the United States a-r)dthe Sov\iet Union as, to preclude any possibilityý of loop-holes'

191,

I

eaou
cler trogh
wihnLT
arrangemente~~~of- thion~

mrcndatfisralincs~eathhe nu Lear, harting

centre of theof! 17Agut16anth

oiain

frt

b.y the S iucn mcnt
ov iet drafýt of 24 Septemboer 1965 foLlowD
of Its draft on. 21 March 1966, took two ye_ars of laborious nethe UnitZotiat]'.ons, Once the two articles were agreed upon byidentical drafts
ed States and the Soviet Union. in their firstof 24 Aul;ust 1967, they remained unaltered until the NPT was
finally coiiunended by the UN General Assembly at its twentysecond resumed session in 1968.'the final formulation of both Articles wereconsidered satisfactory by the United States and the Soviet
Union, as far' as -principle (aý) is cý,ii,ýrned, this was not thie
However,ifease with many other 'States participating in the negotiationsor the discussioni-s which. led to the final formTfulatiori of theTreaty. Their varnJous concepts of loop-holes in relations toArtielos I and. IT differed from those of t1-he two super-Powers,
vh-1-h were ei,-aiiily preoccilpied with NATO arneetsand nnoproliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-wealpon. States.
Some partGicipantGs in the negotiations put forward suggestions
and even formal amendments wi th a view to redrafting or modifying the two Articles. HowevQr, they were all unacceptable -to
the twe sum,er-Powers_

is

The analysis of Articles I and TI as far as principle (aý)
concerned leads inevitably to a minute study of both Arti-cles and their future implications,which would extend sometimes

3.Fora bief sumamary of the formulation ofJL
Se
1Apendx
ad II ~e Buns,"The \N(-1-r,oliferation
ArtilesI

219

beon

of th
telimts,jcd[

otheor hand,ol
anapllc'I'At,i -Ionl pi") inoChe (a)inJ1-r(elation[ toc tho other prvs

the exen

to whicthy coplyp

folund prtef (--,,abLe to

wIt

Onhe

on l, the Tl eatJ

prnil(a), it wa

to t;h e app_1cato-ri
oelaiaý

m in
istudythe,of thie rteiia-in2iin,g fouLr prYinciples wthout-

CjV11
overlooing) theirin thýe followýing sectlions, we shallt enrdeavour.i to anls
two Articles inLhdiscus-..
the light of previous draifts and blthesions which took place thereupon. First of all, we shiallad
dress ourselves to the definition of the contracting parties,i.e., the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon
States. Secondly, we shall deal with the Rhec of the obligations incurred by the NPT, i.e., nuclear weapons and othernuclear explosive devices. Thirdly, we shall dwell on the
11raison d18tre" of the Treaty, i.e., non-transfer and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices so as to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons
2
to non-nuclear-weapon States.

IBut before going into the detailed analysis of the two artidles, two brief remarks are most pertinent. Articles I and II
3
were considered by some as two sides of the same coin., Artdcle
II was even considered as "almost the mirror reflection of Ar-

ticle I,.4 This sort of oversimplification overshadows thedifferent far-reaching obligations of the two categories ofStates. Moreover, it was argued that there was nothing in

2

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy and thec peacef-uilueof nuclear explosions (Articles IV and VT)are a.lso the_- subject matter of NPT obligations alhugMncdna"L to0 themain purpose of the Treaty,3

For example, see A/G,i/I'V.
(Netherlands).

1561-,

6 Ha_iy 196"8,

par.6

4George Bn,"ointlProlijfe,ration of N lea r Weaonsinenet Hcke,y an-d Kasoni WiL]Arich (Ede._), 1nuclear Pro0rospeýcts fOr Contrl-D,: (New York :Puneýlle,I)lieato19y70),p31

193

A'ticleLO

whic

wav

led

Articlewa

reudn

aV I teed et)us
l
the
~~
shw
ae

n

h

ialt-doleJcandthrfe

raycolhve
bee 1Conclud1, 1the no-ncle-ewear-w-eaponi States wi;Jt hout
Stte
nuler
C benJ-epo ate to itA Aswl hetd,th is, soto juidgmntý1
doe s iot tAke

StateIlJ_s' ob,_ligatio s ithe co 't
ex of a i di g in er a io a
legal
~
~
~
~steNTwichý
intuetsc
go beyorid the basic
obligations in Article I.
I. The Parties to the Treaty :The Question of Definition 6
The NPT deals with two categories of States"nuclearweapon States" and "non-nuclear-weapon States". In thefirst
American draft of 17 August 1965, the terms used were
"nuclearStates" and "nion-nuclear States", and in the Soviet firstdraft
of 24 September 1965, the terms used were 'Parties totheTreaty possessing nuclear weapons" and. "Parties to theTreatynot possessing nuclear Weapons". The American draft
as amended
on 21 M4arch 1966 used for the first time the terms
which finally appear in the Treaty. The American representativein submitting the amendments to the ENDC explained thatthe new terms
were inspired by the representative of India who had
pointedout that there were States with important programmes
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy which had wisely chosen
to refrainfrom manufacturing or acquir'ing nuclear weapons, andtherefore
it was inaccurate to define such States as "non-nuclear'7
5 K. Narayan~a Rao, "The Draft Treaty on Non Prolifere,tion
Nuclear Weapons: A Critical Appraisal", Indian Journal of'ofInternational Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, Apr. 1968,
p. 227)ý
6
7

The question of 'universality" is treated in Part
V of thestudy.
See ENDC/PV. 250, 22 Mar. 1966, pp. 250-251
ý and Gecorge
Dunn"!qon-._Pro(lifepration policy",, in Dougherty andLehmn,o,cit,J.,
pp 154155.For t-he Tinidian-satemen,se II\DC ~. 23,12 Aug. 19-6.5, p. 14. T1he Inýdian

194

Th

"uoea-eaoitte'arl- def Jinedl tin Atieý

YX.,

paragýr,aph) 3 oF tLhe Trety
crlat-iing tow igaur,raicao
and entry Iinto foc,as thjefolwn'.FO-r teproeOf this Trayinoernweapon- St-ate is, oneý whii.ch has mnfcue
waOn r otheiýr nuLclear e?x-explodecd a nuclear1
plo,sive de-vi;ce-( Prior t1o 1 -Jainuary 1967,"ý
In the, first Ajiericwan draft of 17l August,J 1965, ar,ticle

P!

sti-_

pulated that:"(a) --'nuclear State' means a State possess!8ing6
independent power to use nuclear weapons as of_________(date).

(b) --'non-nuclear State' means any State which
is not a nuclear State,"
Article IV in the US amendments to its draft of 17 August1965 presented on 21 March 1966 used different definitions. It
stipulated that:"(a)'Nuclear-weapon State' means a State control-l-ing nuclear weapons as of..........

(date).

(b) 'Non-nuclear-weapon State' means any State
which is not a 'nuclear-weapon State'."As will be explained in Section III of this Qhapter, thesedefinitions in both the original draft and the amendments werein concert with the non-proliferation concept of Articles I
and II of both texts.
The Soviet draft of 24 September 1965 did not include any

separate definitions though it used the terms "possessing"~ andJ
"not possessing". The term "possessing" was severely cr,i,ti,cisedby the United Kingdom representative -to the ENDO on t1wo groundics,
First,

the term was not tied to an,y base date wvith t1he pos--sible consequence that a State would delay its

ratificat'ion of

the treaty until it

built it-s own _nu-clear weapons.

a State could havq7

m,,ere custlody,

Secon)dly,

and therefore po'ssession, ofthie nuclearý w%eapons w-ithi the paradoxic.al stainof bDecom-ing

195

Articlepaarp
AJ gut167adnuar an11

L

te

Articl IXL

idnia
dI
aa~

1 (1jeLis
rat s of) 24
p
ofF the 18ja-

arh16drafts

Accoroding,tthdefinit`io0

prvie in theLa6Satewould qualify as a nLuclearL--weaporn State, in meeting three conditions; to manufacture a nuclear weaponi or other nuclear explosive device, to explode the weapon or the deV~ice and tohave accomplished both before the first of January 1967. 9 The
definition actually covers the United States, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China,
However,tion.

a hypothetical loop-hole could be found in the definiIf' a State had manufactured and exploded in s2EceCy anluciear weapon or a device before thc prescribed date without
the explosion being detected. or identified, it could later
makec itknown and. qualify as a "lnuclear-weapon. State" in the
con-text of the Treaty. This hypothesis led one representative
to declare that "this definition actually leads to a limitat-ion of the five Powers which are at present the only ones knocvrn
to have manuffactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or othernuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967." 1l0 (Empphasis
added.)
8
9

ENDC/PV. 270, 5 July 1966, PP. 35-36.
It had been argued,, before a definition was finaTly foninifm-ated, that the best criterion for defining a "niuclear-wuapon State" was the national decision to fabricate or otherwise possess a nuclear explosive as opposed to other possibilities such as the actual test of a nuclear weapon.
See D.G. Brennan, Some Remarks on the Spread ofý Nu2jea
njons (Croton-o-Hudson, New York
Hudson Institute Paper,
I-827P 4A-pr, 1967) , p.1
PV.A
Set.197,paa
333,;
26s(

33(CR)

oth ri ypot
an-td wh11ichl was raised
foloin.Wht

v
urin]

laeioch prei uson
yluc
islth
dissin o4the NPT
tlheloudbe theu sLtatus of anemrin

bccom.ý
woulfd wýish
I to(_
Le,a-weapl.)StatelwhiI

jions i:ncurrerd,.

Thel IueýstiLon obiosl

new, n)uclear StaLte is

alpartLy t1otha_re im1!portant1t in'term

NT?Thempictindoe11ýw liln!"of' theb1

iat

if ti
1e'
not ai-seýa Party to thePreatys. FThis woul]d bewa

extreme case of violation of its undeýrtakings- undercT he
But if the new nu.clear State is

not yet a party to theuray

the first proper questions to be asked (as in the prevliouscase of violation) would be rather :Is not the objectiveý of.
the NPT lost by the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power ? Will
the Treaty last ? The answers would be hard to predict in future prevailing circumstances which we intend to treat elsewhere in this study. However, if the Treaty survives the painful test, the new emerging nuclear State could accede to the
NPT by the mere deposit of its instrumnent of acccssion with
one of the three Depositary Governments according to Acticle
IX, unless the three Governments, in retaliation, refuse toreceive the instrument of accession and prevent thereby the
new nuclear State from becoming a party to the Treaty. If it
were to become a party, a strict interpretation of Article IX,
paragraph

3 would exclude the new nuclear State from the de-finition of a nucle4r-weapon State under the NET, 1 The new
State would find itself in the peculiar position of not being
a nucleav-weapon State,

but rather a non-nuclear-weapon

Sta-te,as there is no third category of States in the NET, In suichi an
eventuality it

would find itself,

gation of Article II,1112

for example,

unmder- theý oblij-

not to manu-factýure nuclear weaponis or

3 May 19)681, p. 412 (Brazl,J),
Adr,iani Fishler, thJ,eSee Hearingg on -N,",jC-3 p. 359, M'lr,
See A/C.l/PV.

1560 (prov.),

Deputy Director of the, US Arms Control andDiametAýgency- confirmend thfat the definition would e:xclude aoy
na,tion which acquýires a nuclear capacity afte;kr thýIefiedateý.

197

sucahypthtialasules3s eit-her thle new nuclear Stýate

ots, afera apeIf-ime, to- frLee-e i ts prdcto of nuclear
weapons)-I an,d other nuclearL explosive deviýces, or succeeds insec"u_ring e1,it,_her: th!e a,menldment olf Ar,ticle lvX, paragraph- 5ý of thie
N,PT,isoEthat a new de-finition of a nucl.ear-w,.eapon State would
engiLobe it,or, the amendmen,tof certain provi1sions of the NPT

wihwould allow the Partiesý to it the right to manufacture
and apply nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

How-

ever, it is reasonable to concede that such hypotheses are farfetched.

The example of India, which exploded its "peaceful"

nuclear device on 18 May 1974, confirms so far such an assessment.
Another significant implication of the definition is thata nuclear State which is
NPT,

not a n-uclear-weapon

State under thewould be precluded from qualifying, urnder the UJS Atomic

Energy Act,for assistance inthe design,

brication of atomic weapons. 13However,
the ol,ly nuclear-weairco

development and fa-

the United Kingdom wasState to have benefitted

so far fromsuch provisions of the Act.
Articles I anad II of the NPT neither take into consideration the level a-ttained by the nuclear-we-apon States indevelop-

ing their nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices nor thelevel- attained by 'the non-nuclear-weapon States intheir peace-

ful uses of nuclear energy. The distinct-Jo.q between the twocategories

is, therefore, a simple one. Itis,however,atechno-loc-ical distinction and a de jure one whereas before
1 4
there was only a de facto distinction. 13

14

Memorandum Furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission to the
US Senate Committee on Armed Services in Hearings on Military Implications of NPT, p. 1A1.
Article I of -the Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 imposes oneach of the Parties the same obligations (see Appendix).One French writer commenting on the distinction be-tween
Sttes in thýe NET hias qualifie the nuclear-weapon
Stte s thel riicg4 and, th,ennncerwao
Staes,s th'ir-r~"subje,cted1
to t,he -ood-will of
the formr. ich'e-l Eyraud,!,rli6atodanger
(imm

198

Thr

wa)-tmdnyal-1ý,10Nrs1t, iv1yr
1,categorI,ies

th

tL

rtte
hoevr
cla toirepresntative a

Swedenino IIths
INDO

nucleasuper-Powers, other Powers with cer
tainnucearweaon,apabili ties, States wit1h Potential nui-clear-weapon capabilities 16and definitely non-nuclear-weapon
countries. KIrs. Myrdal wondered whether these highly different
situations could be,encompassed in

one and -the same treaty.17

However, the out3ome was a simple division of countries
into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.
Asthe representative of Japan to the First Committee of the UN
General Assembly rightly pointed out, "(t)he distinction will
be dissolved only when all nuclear weapons are eliminated fromthe national arsenals of all States. tl18
The simple division of countries adopted by Articles I and
II of the NPT did not, in fact, withstand the test of time, notonly because of India's emergence in May of 1974 as a new nuclear
Power but also because of the emergence in February of 1975
ofa group of nuclear suppliers, the so-called London Suppliers'
15

16

17

For example, see ENDC/PV. 240, 15 Feb. 1966, pp. 16-17(India); JýNDC/PV. 243, 24 Feb. 1966, p. 8 (Sweden); andGAOR, 21st Seess, 1st Cttee, 1438th. mtg, 1 Nov. 1966,
para. 34 (Kuwait). In the academic circles, see,_for example, Keijo Korhonen, "Disarmament Talks as aInstraiment1of International Politic-s", CoetinandConlit
No. 3, 1970, p. -154.
States with poeta nula-wao caab iIitije s are Variantly called ; hehodncla-eponi Powers,Iua,inuclear Powers, nernula naton
0.t. See later
Part V of this sýtudy.
ENDC/PV,T 24,2 e.16,ptNa
ydl
ho'wever,199

Club,rep
eentTh 16 UCle'ar-weaponý andao-ulerwao
qtatWt a ie o complemi-enting, thle provi.sionIs of thle NI?T
bya r teolf a,greed export, constcra-ints and afgars
thLe
gou ha-,1rawn a,setý o' g)uidel ines which were released only in
ealy_,L 19781
The cre-ý,atýion of suých- a group highliýghts and.
sharensalso the division of States into two n-ew categor,ies,
J_e. suap,pli-ers an,d reci.pilents, a diiinhtwilb-ae
expord
it

rgad

prom
notion. of peace-u

o tL,he NPT p.rovisions relatIng to theu,ses of nuclear enlergy.

ii. The Obje;ct of NPT's Obligations

Niuclear Wea-oons and Nuclear

Explosive Devices
1. Nuclear We,apons
No definition of "nuclear weapons" appears in the text of
the Treaty. The US amendments to its first treaty draft of 17
August 1965 submitted to the ENDC on 22 March 1966 included areference to "nuclear weapons" followed by a blank (Article
IV(d)). The United States explained that it was "convinced of
the need for such a definition, but believe that it is notessential at this point in our negotiations and can be formulated at an appropriate technical level at the appropriate
time."-When Gerard Sr.ni.thi,the newly appointed Director of the 13S
Armfs Control and Disarnanient Agency, was asked by one senator,
in

thec

19

For the guidelines see IAEA Docc. INFCTRC/254, Feb. 1978
and !NFCIRC/254/Add.1, Mar. 1979. The guidelines are
reproduced in Appendix 19.
The State members of the groupas deduced from the above documents.are: Australia, BelgiUM,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the FRG, the GDR, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK,
UiS anTh
SR

He~ar!,:-igs held in February 1969 by the US Senate Coimnittee, on Arined Services en the military implications of the NIT,
A!ly a definition was not prov-jjl.,d for both "nuclear weapons"

20ENCP\.

5,

represetative)

2Ma.

96,p

1

(dla

iser

heU

and"othrnclearýýw
'lexpýlo"ive, ýcOicet,C,r
cused~~~~~~~~~'ro1 deiigtet
n
o
h1enn
not efinditheETT21 W ted
toare
Nason~~~~~~~~~
ilrc,aoierAstat
edSae(Treat
ca -

imilr
tothe

uo

the
IPr

Artic-_vewf

onslinteUnt,

Agnyne povidd by the,_ Tret
,ohibiti o n of Nclea

o

hywr
itth

Geeý1

rsCnrladIsr'~tionoUhsan~

Weaon

tha

a

eii-

of Taeooi!

5)vwould p erhaps hVehglhtdh

at-in

meri

Svt

Union's concession to the status quo- regard-1ing" the- Unite
States'arrangemi-.nts within. NATO. 23

Definitions were provided, for example, in the fo_lLowi!ng,
national and international legal instruments:
The United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
provides the following definition:"The 'atomic weapon' means any device utilizing
atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means
is a separable and divisible part of the device)
the princinal purj2ose of which,is for use as, ordevelopment of, a weapH, a weapon prototype, ora weapon test device."(Emphasis added.)
Article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides a similar
definition which seems to have been derived from the previous
text"For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon
is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and whlich
has a group of characteristics that are apprpi,c-ýj-21

Hearing,s on Mvilitary Tmpli cations of NP,
No. 110) .

22
23

See this section below.
Mason Willrich, "The_ Treaty onNnPolfrto

Weapons :Nucleanr TeChnolog
J
Confronts-Wor
The 'Yale Lawiora,Vo.7,N..,Jl

24 Uni,te
11States Code,, Vol.
(d), p. 103,16,

9),

201

Titl

42,

_1970,.12(ustoof Nuclear
PoitC'JI
96,p43

Setý-,,i on 20'14

at walie prpses
ALintumn that may
beused, for the tran_usport or pr_iopulsionofth
devceiýsno icl_uded in- this defCi.nitiJ1on if it
is eprabemthe, device and not an- aindividu.al
patthereoo±Thrisr,hwVer,1
a sig,n ifi cant dJLs-t iinot--ion be-twe en th etw"o de,fintit(ions, Th
ujcieeeetoitn"or,"pur.pose IIoly maietisln th)e UTS defin_riti.on-. The, absence
ofa simrilajr sujcieelement-L in the -Latin American text
raised a controversy related to the right of Parties to manufacture nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, as
will be shown below. It is also quite obvious from the above
definitions that nuclear delivery and military propulsion systems are excluded.
Until very late in the discussions of the NPT in thetwenty-secoond resumed session of the UN General Assembly (1968),
there was still confusion and inadequate consensus on what precisely was to be understood by the term "nuclear weapons". 26
The term had only been clearly understood from the Statements
made by US officials in the hearings held by the different Coinmittees of the US Congress.
The term "nuclear weapons" meant nuclear bombs and warheads. US Secretary of State, MVr. Dean Rusk, stated in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the Treaty "does notdeal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear
delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them toany recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs
or warheads." 27 The Soviets raised no objection to this inter-

25

ENDC/186, 21 Feb. 13,67, PP. 12-33

26

For example, see A/C.1/PV. 1571 (prov.), 20 may 1968, P. 56(South Africa).
Hearingis on NPT,- 1968, P. 5. Mr. Rusk was in fact repeating the answer to the first question in "Questions on the
DraftNon--Proli_feration Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Togethewith AnwrsGvn by the United States" quoted in
Ibid,
pp 262265 For tHe remainiaig questions and answers

27

202

(-see

Appendix8).

28
conideeda weapon.29 /lie TJPT appl[ie s niot o,ny to oFfesv
ula,epnualso to defenisive_ onies sýuch as, atomic demijoliti'on munitiL,ons(ADMVs),30

and nuclear warheads associatued wqithanibalstc
missiles' defence systems (AiBMVs).31
2. Other Nucl ear ExDlosive Devices
The term "oth~er nuclear explosive devices" appeared forthe first time in the two identical treaty drafts of 24 August
1967. However, it was evoked in the debates on non-proliferation since August 19t56 when the US delegation to the ENDC raisedfor the first time in the Conference the question of nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes, pointing out that no State
could develop a capability of detonating nuclear devices forpeaceful purposes without also acquiring a capability of detonating nuclear weapons. The US believed, therefore, that a
28

29

30

31

Adrian Fisher in HearinEs on NhPT, 1969, p. 540. Mr. Fisher
explained that the aforementioned "Questions and Answers"
were seen by the Soviets and key members of the ENhOC before it was made public and there was no objection.
Ibid. Robert McNamara said, in answer to a question addressed to him in the 1966 hearings held on -non-proliferationof nuclear weapons by the US Congress Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, that a nuclear-powered submarine is not aweapon within the meaning of a non-proliferation pact. H
went on to say :"The submarine of course is a weaponr,stem, itself. But it is not a nuclear weapon, the nuclear
power would be used solely for the purpose of prý;,opelling,
the submarine." (Emphasis added.) Hearings on Nonprolif'eration, 1966, p. 79. See the implicationsofscadei
nition in Section III below.
See General Earle Wheeler, ChLairman of the Jloint Chiefs ofStaff of the US Army in Hearings oni Military fimpl-i-cationlsof NPT, p. 20,
Dr. Edward Teller, reniowned Jamierican scienti-st, and a criti*c of the 14P'T, deplored -the weakness of the NPT whiiich
depriv,ed US Ali-es from AjbM defense systems of thaer own
with 'the consequaence of driving more Altlies ou~t of NAT'O.
Hearngson Arms Control. 1968
p.27

203

non

folcatLiMtrat

shout1d cover both nu4clear weapolns Ealduplsi
~e e e fo peaeftipuroses -without prejudicing
teavýailabjity of suct explosions for other States when they
become te iall andl economically feasibl'.e on condition
that
thywoulc, be performed utnder the control of the State furn-ishAlth-JoughL no speccific de!fiýnition wasprvddorote
nuclearexplsi-veý dev--ýices"l in the text of the,NPT., the n-.ego-titn
iLstory of thie Trýeatuy, since the US raised the, iissuje
in1966o, demonstrated that "other nuclear explosiv7e devices"'meant nuclear explosive devices used for peacefulpurposes,such as digging canals and building dams, After all,the phrase "other nuclear explosive devices" seems to haveits origin
in the first paragraph of Article I of the 1963 "Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Spaceand Under Water" which reads:"1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes
to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any
nuclear weapon test,,Splosion, or any other nuclear explosion . ."(Emphasis added.T
The negotiating history of the Test-Ban Treaty revealed
that explosions for peaceful purposes were permitted
according to Article II of an August 1962 US draft treaty
subject tocontrols, because of the difficulty of distinguishingpeaceful
purpose explosions from weapon tests. But as theSoviet Union
rejected that article because of controls, nuclear
explosions
for peaceful purposes were banned in the final
Treaty text and32

See ENfDC/PV. 280, 9 Aug. 1966, PP. 13-16 (Mr. Fisher),
Before the adjournment of the ENTDC session in 1966, US
views were commented on only by the United Kingdom andCanada who were favourable to them, See ENDC/PV. 281,
11
Au.1966, pp. 18-19 (UY) and E,ND('/PIT, 285, 24 Aug. 1966,
pp`51-15 (Cana"da).

33DOOR,, SuJPpI, for, jan, to Dec, 1-963, Dcc. D01208, Anni.
1,ý
Sec,. G(END'/IO/Re?v. 1, 30 Jutly 1963-),'204the phrase "any other nuclear explosion" was inserted in Arti4
cle I at the appropriate points.2
Moreover, the negotiating history of the NPT also demonstrated that there was a u-nanimous conviction that nucleash explosive devices were indistinguishable from nuclear wuapons.
As the representative of one country put it in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly at its twenty-second session, ".. we find difficulty in knowing where to draw theline, since we are told - and have no reason to doubt - that
there is no difference in technology between military and nonmilitary explosions " 3 5 This technological fact was confirmedby the study prepared by the group of consultant experts appointed by the UN Sepretary-General on "Effects of the Possibk'e
Use of Nuclear Weapons .. ." referred to earlier in Chapter V3Consequently, the majority of States held that the prolifurationof peaceful nuclear explosives should be prohibited in a non-34

For the comparison between the 1962 US draft And the Trea-,ty text, see US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings :The Treat _Banning -Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater, 88th
Congress, 1st Session on Executive M (Washington, D.C.
US Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 814-816, hereinafter cited as Hearings on Test Ban. See also the leltterof the General Council of the Deece Department to the.
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations3 in Ii.
PP. 177-178.

55

A/C.l/PV. 1552 (prov.), 15 Dec. 1967, pp. 38-40 (Malaysia).
For other examples, see UN Doc. A/6817, 19 Sept. 1967,
Annex V.
See note 125 in Chapter 3. See also the paper prepared by
Dr. Ulf Ericsson, renowned Swedish scientist, for the Conference of Non--Nuoclear-,We:apon States. Ulf Ericsson, "TheQuestion of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes by
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the Possibility of Misuse o!Such Tech-nology for the Production of Nuclear Weapons",
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Geneva, 1968
(AICORY, 35/DOC. 3, 3 July 1968), pn 9, hereinafter citeJ
as "The Question of Nuclear Explosions".

56

205

proifeatir~
reay t avida looP-hole. 7 Some States defunded such prouhi)bition with the same zeal as the original codrafters, i.e., the US and the Soviet Union.38 This, however,
did not mean prohibiting the proliferation of future benefitsof the application of nuclear explosions for peaoeful purposes,
a question which Article V of the NLPT deals with as will beshowrn in Chapter 7.
Approval of the prohibition was qualified by some States,
It was pointed out by one State representative that if and when
the advance of nuclear knowledge makes a distinction between
nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices possible, "thenit is only logical to believe that the restrictions concerning
nuclear explosive devices contained in a non-proliferation
treaty will no longer be applicable".39
Without denying the assertion that the technology was thesame for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives for peaceful37

For examples, see UN Doc. A/6817, 19 Sept. 1967, Ann. V,
pp. 21-24.

38

For example, the representative of the UAR to Committee
Two of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States remarked
that some statements, as well as some draft resolutions,referred only to the renunciation of the acquisition andproduction of nuclear weapons. He said that any legallybinding renunciation should also cover all nuclear explosive devices. AICONF. 35/C.2/SR. 12, 20 Sept. 1968,
pp. 126-127

39

A/C.1/PV. 1565 (prov.), 10 May 1968, P. 37 (Japan). See
also A/PV. 1672 (prov.), 12 June 1968, p. 62 (Italy). In
its note to the Depositary Governments upon its signatureof the Treaty on 28 January 1969, the Italian Government
had once more expressed the view that when technologicalprogress would allow the development of peaceful explosive devices differentiated from nuclear weapons, the prohibition relating to their manufacture and use should nolonger apply. See the text of the Italian note in Assemblyof Western European Union,
roeedings, 15th Sess., Part2, 111, Dec. 1969, Dcc. 499, Appendix II, pp. 220-221, It
seems doubtful, however, that it can ever be possible to invent a nuclear explosive which cannot be used as a nuclear
weapon. See ENDC/PV. 291, 7 M4ar. 1967, para. 28 (UnitedStates).

206

purposes,very few States,

led by Brazil aind

Jnia
lidno
accept that a non-proliferation treaty should cover nucle_ar,
explosive devices.
At the beginning, India was more explicit than Brazil in
rejecting what its representative called "non-proliferation inscience and technology". 0 By 1967, during the debates in the
BNDC, Brazil became very explicit in pointing out that it was
not ready to waive its right to manufacture nuclear explosive
devices. The tone of the Statements delivered by its representative to the Conference was sometimes very vehement inrelation to this question. One of Brazil's first importantstatements on the subject explained that:"Brazil does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons
either by receiving or manufacturing them; but weshall not waive the right to conduct researchwithout limitation and eventually to manufactureor receive nu.clear explosives that wil ilenable us
to perform great engineering work .. 1
The Indian representative in a following meeting had also,in similar terms, refused to waive that right. He said:"It is a q~uestion of what a country would like to
do in its economic interests. In ...
Switzerland,for example, which is a very developed country,
they do not manufacture motor-cars. ...
That does
not mean that Switzerland would like to sign away
the right to manufacture motor-cars if it is considered economically desirable for Switzerland,
Well, we would much rather import peaceful nuclear
devices. But that would be our oe decision andnot because of any prohibition."
This principle of not waiving a potential right had been
defended by both countries in all the phases of NPT negotiations and, after its signature, in the Conference of Non-Nuclear40

41

GAOR, 21st Sess., lst Cttee, 1436th mtg, 31 Ot
96
para. 15. For views similar, but less exp)li`cit, to thatof India, see UTN Doc. A/6817, 19 Sept. 1967, Ann, V,
pp. 8-10
ENDC/PV. 297, 18 May 1967, paraý.48

42

ENDC/PV. 303, 8 June 1967, parýa. 335

207

Wea1taesoY
The
upotd,-I, sstantd by a.,Se ofLular" ýtmei)uts. F' 'UC)tof'_al
the pro ibition of' nula
xlsve de-,vi!LCes

sembl

was

osideeslton
L202

pon-s,
Brzi

to g.ýuo
'beyonid principle (ai)of' Gene0,ralAs
w"IJ_

h1ad onlm1ýentI,JioneCd nucl,,Ieaýtr wea-

repesetatve at the ENýDC s _u trJarise(d theýTh
deelpmetuf' reeac in he]ied
of' inucler negy
neitblyinlues , at a, certainsta, the useý of' xlsos
to blar access to
exlsin0
Would E_un tohidrig h development of' the peacef'ul uses of' nucle_ar energy;
Banning nuclear explosions would not be an absolute means of' checking the spread of' nuclear weapons for, at the present level of' technology, nuclear weapons cani be manufactured without resort
to nuclear explosions;
Even af'ter attaining capability to carry out explosions f'or peaceful purposes, non-nuclear-weapon
States would still have to take several additional
steps to embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons;
To contend that non-nuclear-weapon countries ought
to relinquish the possibility of developing by
national means nuclear technology for peacefulpurposes is, grosso modo, tantamount to requiringthat peaceful countries refrain from producing
conventional explosives for industrial purposes;
Peaceful nuclear explosions may provide a solution
to many of the serious problems which confront
Latin American countries and developing countries
in general in the economic field, such as the digging of canals, the connexion of hydrographic
basins, the recovery 2
oil fields, the releaseof natural gas, etc. " ý6
Both Brazil and India also expressed their worries about
the widening of the technological gap between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States if the latter remained technologically dependent on the former in the field of208

paragraph 2 of' th
F BrlazLil

Tratj

umtetoT

th
Y

NCfra

mnmnsthfcle VI in the August _1967 dra ft)prangtohediiioof the nula-epnState.47 The amiendments
weriseareby the United S3tates and the Soviet Union
which mitiehview that if there were to be no loop-holes
in the Treaty,thproliferation of devices which could be usedas nuclear weapons
should riot be allowed. No other member of the
ENDC, except
India, sympathised with the objectives theBrazilian amendments
had tried to attain. The amendments were not
re-introduced in
the twenty-second resumed session of
the UN General Assembly,
which commended the final Treaty text, although
they appearedin the ENDC's report to the Assembly.
In addition to the previous arguments, Brazil,
as well as
two other signatories of the Tlatelolco Treaty,
Argentina andNicaragua, 48argued that Article 18 of theTreaty permits theParties to carry out nuclear explosions forpeaceful purposes.!9Paragraph 1 of Article 18 stipulates:"The Contracting Parties may carry out explosL.ions:,of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes - includ46

47

ENJDC/PV. 363, 8 Feb. 16,para, '56 (B'razil-)anid ENLDC;/PV,
370, 27 Feb. 1968, para. 19 (rindia).
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 196,( os_1/3
anid Add, 1,Ann. IV, Sec. 16(RNDC/2 d, 351 Oct. 1967)
and Secý. -1-7
(ENDC/201/Rev. 2, 8 Feb. 19-,68).,

48

Davis R. Robtnson,,, "Th'le Treaty of' Tlatelodco anid
thle Untd,edStates :A Latin kimeri'can, Nuclear Free Z,onel",
Amrica_n
Jouarnal of' nentoa Law, Vol., 64, No, 2,Ap)r, 1970,
p, 290.
49See BND/PV
29,14 f4iar. 1967 p)aras, 35-'16; I'0PV
27,
31 ug
96
paa.18;) an EN1DC/PV,. 367, 20 Feb. 1-968,
para, 67,

209

ng ~

~~

plosione"dev ce1mia
s Ihc
ino

to

w th d a ie-' for, the(:u Oa poiet'athydosJnlcodac' thec prov("i.sions
ol th a'ic
an th oJ11the ar idS
thIe
pc-t,:pat' u Larly a tI e
)nd 15.
1 aC
Brazil,~-ý
uosingadrtfyi
51iýo

ng- the Tray oTate--int-erpretation-of the me;aning of Arýticle 1-8 ofthis instrument. It is the under,standing of theBrazilian Goverimient that the aforementioned Article 18 allows the signatory States to carry out
with their own means, or in association with third
parties, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,
including exLDlosions which may,involve d-evýres
similar to those used in nuclear weapons.
Emphasis added.)
Mexico, as well as other signatories of the Treaty of
Tlateloloo, which held a position, interpretýed Article 18 differently. Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico, considered to be the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, explained that for one of the States Party to the Treaty to carry out
a peaceful nuclear explosion, it would have to prove previously that a nuclear weapon would not be required for that explosion in accordance with the objective definition contained in
Article 5 of the Treaty.53 And since the consensus of the ex50

See Appendix 6. Article I contains the essential obligations and Article 5 contains the definition of nuclear weapon quoted earlier in this Chapter.

51

Brazil signed the Treaty on 9 May 1967 and ratified it on
29 Jan. 1968. See SIPRI Yearbook 1973, PP. 438-439.
52 As quoted by the representative of Brazil in ENDC/PV. 367,
20 Feb. 1968, para. 67.
53Article 3 of the draft treaty which resulted from thethýird ses4sionl of the Prepar-atory Commission held in Mexicoo City fCrom 19I Aprlj to4Ny166,contained a Sub-ia
deie
itendej)td
J.
tc be used frMIlIta-ry'.
purposes"
SeeAIfoniso GarCiLa RobLIes, Thie,Dncerzto
ofLtnAerc
NwYo rk
Carniiegide En-Ldo-ý,meni.t for Inter-pe rts in th mJa,tter was tChat tI
difeetao
wsipssibe
Larca AmJsao
obl- s wcntýL
onrto
s.ayv thiatI Jimustobvý!iously beý coniolude,ý that thtts ateo the TreatyV
wilnot be, able to m,anufatr o)raournuea
xpov
unless anid until tecýhniological prgrs

haIae,osbl

hdevelopment of devioes for suchi explosions which- cano,bused for nuolear weapons."'5 4
The United States was categorical in rejecting the Brazilian contentions, William Foster, the US representative to the
ENDC, explained that "... .unless someone can some day invent a
nuclear explosive device which cannot be used as a nuclear
weapon... the treaty will prohibit contracting parties fromcarrying out such explosions.,,5Moreover, the Soviet Union
had been reluctant to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treatyof Tlatelolco relating to the obligations of nuclear-weapon
States, on the ground that, inter alia, Article 18 of the Treaty
permits the explosion for peaceful purposes of devices t1similar
to those used in nuclear weapons", thus leaving an obvious
loop-hole for the production of nuclear weapons.
Apparently
the Soviet Union was alarmed by the controversy among theContracting Parties to the Treaty over the interpretation of
Article 18. However, the Soviet Union signed Additional
Protocol II on 18 May, 1978 and ratified it on 8 January 19')79

national Peace, 1967), p. 118, Because of that suojectiLveelement, Article 13 of the draft treaty emanating fromthe third session of the Commissioin allow,ed parties,udecertain arrangements, to develop and ex,ýplode nuclear explosive devices for peace-ful purposes,ý Ibid.l,
pp, 124125,

54

55

A/C.l/PV. 15-9 (prov,ý), _16 May -1,968, p.4lFoh uerouis statements made by the Mexican- representati-ve's on1
ArtijQ.,e 18, see ENIDC/PV. 297, 18, May 1967, paras. 53-54
and ENITC/PV, 374, 6 Mar. 1968,, para.s. 6-11.
EN.DC,/PV, 291, '7 Mar, 19)67, para., 28, For more US' statem,e,nts oi.- Article -1-8, see Rob_-inson, 1o,2it,,
p 289 and3ý05--306 anýd Ainternational Ne-otiations, rp.65.

with a statement that it "proceeds from the assumption that theerrect of Article 1 or the Treaty extends, as speciried in
Article 5 of the Treaty, to any nuclear explosive device andthat, accordingly, the carrying out by any party to t1he Trýeaýty
of explosions of nuclear devices ror peaceful purposes would
be a violation or its obligations under Article 1 and would be
6,,tatu,0
incompatible with its non-nuclear
We believe it was a necessary prerequisite for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to cover both nuclear weapons
and all other forms of nuclear explosive devices in one andthe same treaty, lest a dangerous loop-hole be created. Logically speaking, if it were not for the current use of the ter1m"nuclear weaponas", it would have sufficed to mention in the
NPT the term "nuclear explosive devices" which obviously englobes nuclear weapons.
The NET and the Treaty of Tiatelolco, if the latter iscorrectly interpreted, are compatible in imposing restrictions
on nuclcar explosive devices other than weapons. The displeasure of India and Brazil with regard to the NPT and Brazil's
contentions with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco seem to reflect a genuine desire not to forego an important option, i.e.,
the production and use of nuclear explosives for their economic
development independently with their own means. However, thestudies and experiments carried out in a country like the United States in the field of application of nuclear explosions forpeaceful purposes are still, as will be shown in Part III, in
an embryonic stage faced with all sorts of difficulties. Thesedifficulties have not discouraged India from indicating its
intentions to conduct underground nuclear tests when it develops the technology. The Defence Minister of India, Mr.

56 'See World Armaents and Disarmament, SIPRI Year Book 1979
(Lo0i (ndo:_Taylor &racstdndNew

York-:7--rane,

Russak & Co., inc., 1979) (Stockholm International Peace
Research institute), pp. 612 and 613, hereinafter referred
to as SIPRI Year Book 1979. See also CCD/PV, 553, 22 Mar.,1972, pp. 3"-K.

212

JajianRa,
scetitJro

tol t( In;a Palaeto
Ia
92ta
th
n ia Atmi E
yCmmsin"aesuy
ing~~~~
te M lthe
gFoc
n uc
n e g o n
uc e i e po,

because, t'JpsiiniscnIstn

ihIdasaaeesta

a programincudn

domestic nuclear ex.plosiois wouldgv
India much o,f the prestige China has won with its epnspo
gramn - but, in the Indian case, at far less cost and with noneiiof the onu,s of becoming a nuclear weapons country." 5 8
The consequences of developing nuclear explosive devices
for peaceful purposes by a non-nuclear-weapon State, such as
India, could be far reaching. It might be hard to convinceneighbours or rivals that the devices were strictly intended
for peaceful puarposes, 59and thus eventually generating a process of proliferation of nuclear weapons not only in a region
but in different parts of the world. The development of nuclear
explosive devices f'or peaceful purposes could very well become
the pretext for all those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons.
In conclusion, it is interesting to note hovw principle (a)of resolution 2028(XX) was interpreted with regard to nuclear
explosive devices. For the very few, the principle referred
only to nuclear weapons, thus permitting nuclear explosive deývices.

For the majority,

the Treaty incompliance with prinple (aý)had to cover both nuclear weapons and. othe,Frnula
explosive devices so as to avoid a serious, loop-ho1ile, _theuat
57

International Herald Tribune,_, '5Mtay -P1972. It istobenoe
tht7t-within.
the terms of teTest-BlanTray nulrex
plosions for peaceful pupssare r-iitdin the th-ree
other environments,.

5ý8

Badle:.

59Se

TheUnitedc St_atesý andý theS! ea

ADC/21

7 Ha.19(67,, ara. 2'7

J EsB.Duhry

of

UlniteWea ons,
-ucea
--

Sttin

`Thec Tre,aty antd th-1Nila

2131

Sae"

te vieis deI-il

plosie

whic

-vene
!_

futureýn I,
finte

wi

coul

the vaId one, However, if
not be usd

Nula

epn

wea pon, were inasnuclearý
ctheu EPT could bDe amended In accordance

tthArtillIe V11I oflth

II,The "Raison d'Etre"linucle-ar ex-Treýat-y in

er_ to coi.,ply. wiith suih.l a
ord-c

Noni--Tr,ansf;er and Non-A."cuitino

rOhNuccla

xloieDvices

Articles I and II contain three different sets of obligations. With the exception of one of them, the obligations of
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are notsyni-allagmat ic.
First, nuQlear-weapon States undertake not to transfer toany recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nu,clear explosive devices or control over such weapons,or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Here, synallagmatically, nonnuclear-weapon States undertake not to receive the transferfrom any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nu
clear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosiv-e devices directly, or indirectly.
Second-and here ends the symmetry-

only non-nuclear-

weapon States undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Third, nuclear-weapon States undertake not in

any way toassist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices.
1. Non-Transfer and Non-Receipt
The key word in Articles I and II and more specifically i
thi
fist

et

f oligationis Is "control".

to the poblem
o nuclearsharing

214

This takes, us.ýback,.

arra ngemntswihnNT

deres, for a muiti-Latera1' pton
The oieDrfof
24'Setmbeý196:ossibiLlity of su3,ch- a multlatr al op tioanal,so other form- fncershrnch-icusos*

avie

ot ony

th

-in
1ft
e,bu
h

disarmamenit forj.umsý

focj.sed th,en on the opto rahe than on,ýthe MYJLF project ituse-Lft or its counterpart the AiNTbl which,atthe end of 1965, as demonstrated in the previous chapter,weýre
receding to leave way for the "MvcNamara Committee".
The ensuing
first set of obligations in the definite texts ofArticles I
and II as well as their implications cannot, therefore,
beunderstood and appreciated without evoking first
their histo"
rical legislative background.
(a) Articles IT and II in the First American and Soviet
Draftsand Nuclear- SharingAranemnt(i) The American Draft of 17 Augu;st_1965

ArticlelI, paragraph

1, read as follows:"Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons
into the national control of any non-nuclear State,either directly, or indirectly through a,military
alliance, and each undertakes not to take anyother action which would cause an increase in the
total number of States and other organizations
having independent power to use nuclear weapons."(Emphasis added.)
Conversely,

Article II,paragraph 1,
obligations with regard to non-nuclear

containe.d s,imilar
6bUte.

The American draft banned not only direct, transfer ofnuclear weapons but also indirect transfer-, which, wqas qu-oalified
as "indirectly through a mili.tary7 alliance". Th'is restricte,_dqualification of the term "inidirectlly" was, duec to t6hefact thatl
the draft left open the possibility of establishing an-ultilaý
teral nuclear force within NATO whiých, as the UnitedStatesexplained, wouild not have led to,_ thl-e inidirect t6ransfer
of riu60

SeeApeix3A21

ThetrnprohTitedJI
ws t,etra,

a1y nnncer
1

cotro
wa o

e

e

Stat

to us

the

t,10o
th

nainalT n ifer of nucle-ar weaoonls

eic,btJntoa,cnrl

theJ
capbiitcineedetyaauni-der,stood toýitcould be -implied

from the last sentuenc,e of the firs6t paragraph of Article I.
Under the American Draft, however, the setting up of a neworganization having independent power to use nuclear weapons
would have been all-owed, provided that no increase in the total
number of States and "other organizations" having independent
power to us-e nuclear weapons would have occurred. To be more
specific, three different situations would have been possible
It would have been possible to create a multilateral nuclear force as long as it did not constitute an entity withpower to use nuclear weapons independently of the participating
nuclear States, i.e.,

subject to the latter's right of veto.6

This possibility was in fact the direct reason for formulating
the draft in such a way. Although the idea of the MLF was losing ground at the time, it would have allowed for the mixedmanned element in the AN-F and wou_iA have appeased the Germans
who were still attached to the YLLF in its original form.
It would also have been possible to create a new -entity-to
which a nuclear State would have turned over all its nuclear
weapons and renounced its right of veto over the use of theforce, Decision on use could have been taken by a majority
vote. The United States explained that even in the event ofsuch a possibility "no non-nuclear nation could acquire independent power touencerwaos..6.
61

1ENDCO/PV,
2Ibd.

2281, `1 Aug., 1965,

This would havep.

38.

~th1e

J.eft
o

o-cle
J

Lpt
opa

`nied;Wa'
on1 Asý theseara-,te naina
oponents8 some of whic areno
nulaPwr.Suc_h a development,,ý coULdLInd6
rednuce t,he number of nuclear power centreýS.6'~

The third situation which would have been permitted iunderi
the first American draft could have been "the creationof a,newnu.cl,ear entity composed entirely of non-nuclear States,'in theevent that a pre-existing nuclear-weapon State had
previously
unilatberally disarmed itself of nuclear weapons". 65The
UnitedStates had conceded that this possibility was notintended,6 6
It is interesting to note that the first possibility
wasintended, -the second one was not excluded but consideredasunlikely to happen and the third not intended at all.
But as theUnited Kingdom was opposed in principle to the second
possibility, Lord Chalfont, the UK representative to the
ENhDC, statedin the Conference that his country would prefer to
see thispossibility closed. 6 7
As the Soviet Union was vehemently opposed to the MLFI
andother forms of nuclear sharing within NATO, its oppositiontothe draft was to be expected. The draft was crtii
ýdorleaving the door open for the establishmenti ofth-_Padh64

Ibid.,

P. 39.

65

ENDO/PV.

250,

66

Ibid.

67

ENDC/PV. 225, 19 Aug.16,p0.Seasor
hlot"Alternatives to Prolife_rato
InitonbAgemt"
in Buchan, A
Wor_-ldofNu1 cla Poer,
pP2.Oew t
considere- tuhat t6h e British weem'
e
nte
1Oo
accede to, Sovietapehninswhr'atLes,~maniy's -nuoclearabtin.Kel 1 anu-r
egcD
trines and t-he-utr ofT
Soe al tis
Coation andCoifliot,,Vol
N o,I. 1196,22 Mar,196L.

UitdSae)acoes twepon
nulea by
and~Stte.
othe

Afe
Cthe subis

insstehetha1)t a noio of threnmets
theAmricnnUnion
in crtcsn
viet~~týý
questons
f th NIPor thedeal

Sovietepulicof Germany
Jpolferaztion treaty

dra,ft of 2

etme

1966 to theENDC, the So-

2 Nro
h

rcaný draft,. wen

ATh.

Th

beyond thedrat was unaucceptable,

asAmbiilassador To,araphini had explai_ned, because of three omissions:"First, in the United States draft there is rno mention of any obligation not to grant non-nuclear
States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, disposal and use of nuclear
weapons.
Secondly, the United States draft fails to include
the important provision that a party to the treaty
possessing nuclear weapons must not place theseweapons or control over them and over their emplacement and use at the disposal of units of thearmed forces or military personnel of States notpossessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or
military personnel are under the command of a military alliance.
Thirdly, where the United States draft treaty mentions the obligations of non-nuclear Powers, there
is missing the important provision that such States undertake to refrain from receiving nuclear
weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or inditrectly, for their ownership, control or use andtic.-at they will not participate in the ownership,
control or use of such weapons or in the testingof such weapons.
It should be obvious to all -that the lack of theafore-mentioned provisions in the United States
draft leaves precisely those loop-holes of which,as indicated in General Assembly 99solution 2028
(XX), the treaty should be void.'
68

From the several statements made by the Soviet Representaýtives with respect to the first American draft of 1965,
seRNDC/PV. 228, 31 Aug. 1965, PP. 34-36; GAOR, 20thSes, tte,135t
lt
mg,18 Oct. 1965, paa.16-19;,
and 41,17
hi~iO/V.Fb. 966 esecillypp. 24l-25,

in.the,N,on the August,16

aeo

ed to beAs

the Unte

iiam Fotr

Stte

appar

AOarneeTs(l

ics

euigt

cli

withih- SveIUin

draft

1teUSrpesna

ilntprionre
NTtive, pitdot
mentof their collective niuclear dtefenioe arrange,

to

uso
h
ecmethsubject of negotiation with. the Soviet Union" 7
None of the non-aligned members of the ENDC took apoition on the issue in the 1965 Session of the Conference, H11ow-_
on the non-proliferation of

ever, in their joint memorandum

nuclear weapons submitted to the Conference on 15 September
1965, they expressed their regret that "it has not yet beenpossible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate
or adequate treaty .. "71
Mvoreover, very few countries expressed their views on theissue of nuclear sharing within NATO in the following 20th
Session of the UN General Assembly. From those few, we haveselected 5 countries not belonging to either of the two alliances in Europe. One, Nigeria, compl.ained about the preoccupat72
ion with the maintenance of the status guo in Central Europe.,Three others, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Kenya, were not favourable to the MLF project either for being incompatible with nonproliferation, 73leading to some form- of proliferation, 74or
hampering measures to curb non-proliferation in Central
Europe,.7 The f if th c ount ry , Finl and, conc eded thie poli ticalfact that plans for nuclear sharing within NATO a bcmea
7

obstacle to an effective treaty on nnpoieain
In general, the attitud6 of cutiso72

0
ENDC/PV. 228, 51 Aug. 16,p
DCORI, Suppi. for Jan, toCc09
Ann. 1, Sec. E(EEC15.15Spt:96)
See note 147 nCatr4

74

par.2-1uolai)
6Ot
155dmg
IbdT

70
71

h

Dc

,p.4-5

76 ~

~

L)_

t,2

Cp

96,pD.5

6,16t
Oc t.

95,pra

219

ol

hr

2

)

C27

submissioofAt th~~~EIiUCn ~~196Stata endms
nts to

7
the
NP
Swde

Tm
I

dr ft
an

e oe tb

he 1 65

avietknraf ,u msio
fi e

f

U ie

n n-a igne

me berpoito aon teissof

the MLF and the ANI by urging the nuclear super-Powers to agree
upon the issues. 78Burma referred to a 1963 statement made by
its representative in the First Committee of the General Assembly expressing grave concern over the MLF project] 9
The UAR was then the only member of the ENDC to make anoutright criticism of the 1965 American draft. It had difficulty in accepting Article I which left open the possibility
that an org-anization having independent power to use nuclear
weapons might one day take the place of one of the present
nuclear States. Ani organization, in its view, would cause a whole
series of serious problems and difficulties which sooner orlater would brýeach the non- prolif erati on concept, becauseof afundamentlal di:Cference bt 1
nthe definite concep)t of Stateand the indlefin_4te concep3t of an org-anization, To illustrate
his point, the UAR representative, Ambassador Khallaf, gave
the following example:"If the organization were one day dissolved, what
would happen to the nuclear arsenal over which it
has autonomous power ? Would this not be divided
amongst its members ? And how do we know that the77

ENDJC/FV, 2355 27 Jan, 1966, P. 30 (Nigeria) and
ENBDC/PV.
242, 22 Feb. 1966, P. 1.7 (Ethiopia).

tatmenanteENChd

olwe

h

saeet

miade- b)y

to e
U

is

tk '~ igh

to wiha-nZh I t, by acepi
ptateodseiai
1n

on

thi

tt
ote

to

tetet

we shudb
words

uneCoeof prvnigdseiaintdYweh&ldraybe p)a vingý
. the waro ftr dseination() by acertaina category of countr-Uies and. conliti,,nents.,
Moreover, such an organization, by incr,eas:ingý its;nuclear arsenal and extending its political action
and interests over a wider geographical and stra-,tegic area, would increase the risks of a nuclear
confrontation. We do not need a 6on-dissemination
treaty to achieve this result."(ii) The American Amendments of 21 March 1966 :Article I was-ý
redrafted to read as follows:"Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to thistreaty undertakes:
1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, orinto the control of any association of non-nuclearweapon States.
2. ..

(assistance and encoufragement)

3. Not to take any other action which would cause
an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear
weapons.
4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited injthe preceding paragraphs of this Articlediecly
or indirectly through third States or ascainof States, or through units of the armedi foce,rmilitarv Personnel of any State, e-venif SUChL
u1nits or personnel are udrtecmadoilitary alliance,"(mhside.
Conversely,

Art-icle TI,

similar obligations,wt

paarps1,5an4cotie

eadt

o-ucerwao

SO EIDOPV 245-, 5-MPar, 16,pp. -9
dered tha,, thie prinýcj,ipe of ancero

The UA

tts

alo
nsto

ih

The
riho

ermcontol
asfind ibiiYtofrncla

Ariole, LV

wepn

dfeTtransfe_r of nuclear weapons

wthoutA(c) asLth
a
thL

ocr

bo-utlealsoeaonindiret trans-

still allowed. The prohibited transfer was, as in the previous
text, the transfer into the national control of any non-nuclear
State plus the transfer into the control of any association of
non-nuclear-weapon States.
Under the new formulation of Articles I and II togeýther
with the definition of control in Article IV, the third possibility referred to in jrelation to the 1965 draft was excluded,i.e., the creation of a new nuclear entity composed entirelyof non-nuclear States. The two following situations were possible under the redrafted text:
The creation of the MLLF as long as the US and/or
UK conserved the right to veto the use of theforce. However, the US did not seem to have contemplated the possibility that an tILF would be
used by,the mere concurrent decision of the UK
alo.ne,u- Moreover, the ANhF would also have been
allowed. The mere transfer of nuclear weapons
81

82

See Appendix 3-C. Commenting on the definition of "Control", the US representative explained that the decision
to fire "would have to be explicit, it would have to be
concurrent in time with the event; it could not be in theform of a general approval given in advance, Moreover..
control relates not merely to the right, but also to theability to fire nuclear weapons." ENIDC/PV. 250, 22 Mar.
1966, p. 6.
As the US representative conceded, paragraph 4 of the redralft6ed Articole I borýrowed from the formulations in all
thre
pragaphof Article. I of LIhe 1965 Sloviet draft,
E1TDC/PV,~~25,2ba,16,p~~~
1
See WIt_r1ich,
85
onrlieaonTrea ty, p
5222

to nucormatioars eial ntoos.~e to_-constL ýo iitot
proliferanto aston asuthe US mantinw,ýith the_ federal authority controlling the, wea
ponls. The US representative explained, "1since
this would not involve any increase in the number of nuclear-ýeapon Powers, no proliferation
would result"it.8
The amended American draft generated a heated controversy
between the United,States and the Soviet Union andtheir allies
which dominated the debate on non-proliferation in
the two se.9sions held by the ENDC in 1966. The controversy centredaroundthe "control" issue. The arguments of the Soviet Union
againstthe amended draft and the counter-arguments of theUnited States could be summarized as follows ;8
The definition of control was objected to by the Soviet
Union on the premises that it would not prohibit the different
forms of nuclear sharing within NATO. It would allow
a nonnuclear-weapon State to possess phscal and 1Peggq11r
nuclearweapons and not to be considered a nuclear-weapon Stateaslong as it had no right to use them independently. 86The
definition would lead to a widening of the circle of Powers-

which would have physical access to nuclear weaporns, ohcwould have the right to participate in deciSionsH,, on1 mIatters,of nuclear strategy, and in decisions cocrnn
Lhe ueof
84

85
86

ENDC/PV. 250, 22 Mar. 1966', p., 10. Foroe wrýý_iter,I,
thIJe
intent was clear : to pe!rmiiit -th,e Euoe
Stat1'es at sorfe
point tq form a nuclea_r-sharin)g aragmn
nowihtheUS would merge its own Tnuclea-r forces, Bader,-ý The UnitedStates and the Srread of Nuclear 'Wea-n, p. 9.
For a succinct su,Mm,1,ary, see ItrainlNgtaos
pp, 36-41 an)d 47-50.
EfOC/PV, 252, 29Mr.16,q.7

223

ucleaweaonsTh

deiitoa~~ deuaio
fro a prvou
mclPanwic

waD cosdeeconsýt itutIe

toof coniitr,Lol1

in- the0 "Ba-cveedthe prnod'iucltion0,oneshp

hand-Ling

Scoop

and disoa

of atomic materials,atomic ený,erg,-y- an atomi weaIrsh eslut;ion" wsreferrced, tuo more tha ono
touphold th Soie viwo
hnntaseof ncerwa
8pons
to an assocition an inietyt ismmes
on, heThe United St'Uates thought tht the Sov-iect Union was lessthan c,-andid in failing to discuss Warsaw Treoaty unclear arrangements, although there was evidence to show that Soviet allies
were being trained in the use of nuclear weapons, 9 The UnitedStates referred to the complex codes and electronic devices
which wore developed and applied to prevent an unauthorized useof nuclear weapons, It was also pointed out that allied defenceplans would not lead to proliferation, since the participatingstates would not get their own nuclear weapons or an independent right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. It was argued
that the American draft would in fact reinsure the already existing American policy and legislation, As for the Soviet comments on the concept of control in the Baruch plan, they wereconsidered a debater's point which did not advance negotiations. 91-The right to veto the use of nuclear weapons by the UnitedStates was contested by the Soviet Union, The latter raised thefollowing series of questions:
87
88

89

ENIDC/PV, 255, 5 Apr. 1966, p. 22,
ENDC/PV. 260, 28 Apr, 1966, p. 5, For the "Baruch Plan",see US Department of State, Documents on Disarmament ,1945l99i9 (Vol. I :1945-1956) (Pub. No,_1
7008, Aug. 19_60)(Washington, D.C. :US Government Printing Office, 1960),
PP. 7-16.

ENIDC/PV. 269, 30 June 1966, p. 37 and ENTDC/PV. 276, 26
Julyl,
1966,
90

.

3

ND/P,
60
2

Ar,196,p.14 and Inenaina

eLo-

"We mýIgt,,foexmL,
Is whatvý
LLthe situatiowoul]d be- If theparner orteUitd,atsi
NATO were to rejct-he
4egaity oC theil01n[tdStaltesý veýto at, a decsvV orC,l,cr1'UcJ_ial momellntý ?4What
would hiappen If the p1artner
1, P Of the United Statesýý
in NAýTO were to fi_nd' means, Of open)cng th
tock onnucl_ear, weaponfs inccLvninof thecnie
StateveouWowudihriohntdSaerigh-t of veto if ýNATO ce,asezd to eIs,,t?
Can it be seriously s,uggested thatc a vita muti
lateral international agreement, to which accord-ing to our calculations many States, probably evenmore than a hundred, could become parties, should
be based on the unilateral right of veto of one ofthe parties to this agreement, the United States ?
Neither the Soviet Union nor the many otherStates ...
can base their security on the UnitedStates right of veto on decisions withO NATO relating to the use of nuclear weapons."
The Suviet Union held the view that the veto would not prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons :"it merely introduces a certain element of restriction on the use of such weapons." 9 3 The Soviet representative maintained that there wasno place for the veto right in a non-proliferation treaty because "the treaty should prohibit any transfer by a nuclear
Power of nuclear weapons, conditionally or unconditionally, toa non-nuclear State.",9 4 If the veto right "appears as an integral part of the treaty, it assumes as a consequence that nn
nuclear Powers will get nuclear weapons, will possess thlem-,will control them and will be able to fire themr, subjectý toonly one limlitation -the right of ye_to." 9 5
The United States explained thatL A-merican sttmnson tisdý,veto indicated greater control ove-nc-lea-rweapo,-ns and not
92

ENDC/PV.

255,

5 Ap)r. 1966,

pp. 19)-2-0,

93

ENDC/PV. 260, 28 Apr. _19b66, p. 7.
94 ERNDO /PV, 2691-5ýý0 Jun e 1966, p6 34.
95 FEDC/PV, 263', 10 Zay 1966c), p, 2`52215

Pro1ieain

twsage

"riht
b

als
I

on1th

answesome

f1th

PutO to us-1 -.

tathephd

noonyote"abi,i ty" t-o fire nu1ClIear wea pons 11iimay
quesotionls whiclh thie Soviet representative

The US,'repres,,entati.ve_

considered that it wasAr
h SovietL Uniloni to ar,nte that it could not basejt
securit-1y oAercan výeto. He noted tha-t '"bothi the Soviet
Unonan th UniTt-e d St ate6,s deýp eni-id
for thIiei-r s ecurit on the
sel-rstait,Judgment and wiJsdom wh-ich,- arýe brought to bear
")

u~ot
elf

on the international scene by both sides." 97
As the MTLF and the ANWF projects receded to leave way forthe "McNamara Committee", the Soviet Union concentrated its at-tack on the "European option" which was left open in the re-.
drafted text. In its view this was an additional loop-hole"which would enable a single nuclear rower to transform itself
into an association of nuclear Powers, so that, instead of asingle nuclear power, there would emerge two, three or more
98
such Powers."
The United States pointed out that it would require "a very
profound change in the political relationships existing between
States" for a nuclear-weapon State to give up control of its
entire arsenal of nuclear weapons to an association of States.
Moreover, it would be quite unlikely to do so if the result
would be the domination of the association by another member. 9 9
It was also considered "fanciful" to suggest that the "European
option" would somehow increase the number of nuclear Powers. 10 0
As to the non-aligned members of the EN~DC, they refrained
from indulging them~selves too much in that heated and
96

97
98

EN~DC/PV. .255, 5 Apr. 1966, p. 29.
ENDC/PV. 263, 10 May 1966, P. 15.
ENDC/PV. 260, 28 Apr. 1966, p. 6. See also ENDC/PV, 267,
27)June 166, p.,5
9 N/P,253_,_31l Mar, 19ý66, p.12.

226

uncompl:omjisin-de1bat,e.

W]ith the extofsoeeer.
marks on ArtGicles I anid II_ of thie amendeýd Americaýn d_raft 1t0 1

and wiTjthout o-veplo-_ok,ing the possi-bilitL-y tUhatt nt_Uclearprif
ation could takIe p)lace within al_iaýnce,-(I,t0herýe waýs a tn

dency to leave to the,_ maJor- Powers themýselve)s
ing their alliance problems.'0

the

taský

This tendency WaIs asofs3olIv-rvl

ent among the members of the First Commitutee of t.he IIN Gener,alAssembly at its 21st Session in 1966.104(iii) The Soviet Draft of--24,,September 19_65

Article I, para-graph 1 read as follows:"Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons
undertake not to transfer such weapons in any formd~irectly or indirectly, through third States orgroups of States - to the ownership or control ofStates or groups of States not possessing nuclear
weapons and not to accord to such States or groups
or States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons.
The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer
nuclear weapons, or control over them or overtheir emplacement and use to units of the armed
forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance." (Emphasis added.)Paragraph 2 of the same article contained a prohibition totransmit "any kind ...
of information or documentation whic,hcan be employed f'or purposes ofConversely,

Article II,...

use of nuclear weapons."

paragraphs 1 and 2 containýedsmi

l4r obligations with regard to the "Parties of the Treaty iiot

274, 19 July 1966, pp. 6-13ý (Miexico).

101

See rWDC/PV.

102

See EN~DC/PV. 283, 18 Aug. 1966, pp. 11-12 (iei)
See ENDC/'PV, 274, 1-9 July 1-966, p. 8 (Mexi.co); ENDC`/PlV.
283, 4 Aug
o196,
p_ 4j (Sweden.); andý EN.DC/PV. 2835, 18 Au,r1966, pp, 11-12 (Nigeria).
F'or examiple, see GAOR, 2,1-st Sess,,, 1st, Ct,tee., 1434Zjthj mt-g
28 Oct. 1966 , paqra. 45) (PakiLstan) and 144rd tg 7ftv,
1966), para. 2 (F-1-inantd) .

103
104

22'7

TheISov,iet, drf

alsbanneIlId dir'ct, anjd ind_irectb transfer
o uceawepos,Thlttr. fo)rmj wVas qiual-ified as being)
thrUgh ' thr Stte or gro(,ý'ups of States.,,
The'c!;
trnfedroiied was not only t1he transf er of nu'cler
waposLo the1owesi or contrl
ofStateýs or grouýIps
of State_s niot possessing nuc!lear wqeapons- but also thetranssferof nuclear weapons, or control over them or over theiremplacemerit and use, to "units of the armed forces., -". MYoreover,suchStates or groups of States were not to be accorded theright toparticipate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear
weapens.
The transfer of nuclear weapons to States "possessing
nuclear weapons" was not prohibited as was the case in
the twoversions of the American draft.
Under the Soviet draft the following NATO nuclear-sharing
arrangements would have ceased to apply or would havebeen prevented:
Bilateral agreements for cooperation on theuse ofatomic energy for mutual defence purposes, as theyentailtraining programmes for the armed forces of NATOcountries tolearn how to operate and maintain US nuclear weaponssystemo.loC
The "Agreement Between the Parties of the North
Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information",
as it entails, inter alia, the training of personnel
in theemployment of anid defence against atomic weapons andother military applications of atomic energy. 1 0 7
-

105
106
107

See Appendix 3-lB.
For a study of these arrangements, see Heymont,
loc.cit,and J,H. Smith, loc.cit., PP. 356-357.
Thea,"Aremet wa
ined ini -Pari-s on-, 18 June 1964 andetrdinto forýce on 1-2 MVar_ch-j 1965,, It dtoeso suipersee,hoevr,thie eaýi,Jer, bilaterals, For the teKt of
the Agremen",eeiNTSý,
Vol, 542, 16 5, pp.- 145-10

228thie PIL4F,

the AN-F an)d the_ "Buropnean1 opfJon"
w,ould have conistitiuted ori: le--d to the c aino"rusof
-

sato'

StatesIl not allow-,ed to own or, control-0 nucleaIr wea'pons.
__ the NPIG, asý it enal0onutton,nnclajta
tegy and on the eventuial use of nuclear

0
Ieao
OH~

The following remarks made by George-, 1all, týhe 0S Under-_Secretary of State, in his news conference on 6Jl196reflected in a way the US reaction to the Soviet draft and, Llthe
Soviet attack~s on the American draft. He said:
we are very determined that we are not going
to invite the Soviet Union to sit at thyO4ATO table and determine NATO nuclear policy.'
On the Conference table, at the ENDC, the US representative
explained that:"There must be ...
a measure of consultation in any
military alliance ...
on the overall strategy orplan of use of all the integrated forces available
to the alliance, whether for air defence or otherpurposes. This consultation must above all seek toachieve an understanding as to the circumstancesin which the most devastating of all weapons that is, nuclear weapons - could be used.
Further, the Soviet Union would apparently prohibit giving non-nuclear weapon States any information which could be employed for the use of nuclear'weapons. This would prevent even training
the armied forces of non-nuclear weapon States
which are members of alliances in the tactical
employment of nuclear weapons, or even in defenice

The Soviet Union considered th,e "Agreem~enIt` incomp)atib-lewith the non-proliferation concept. See ENDC/1,58, 27 Juýly
1964 and ENDC/PV. 207, 13 Aug. 1964,
lOB

109,

Tn his Memoirs, President Johnson explained tha_-t there
were doubts that the US under the S3oviet draft "could
have carried ouft even the kind of intensive, conISuIl-tait,ionson nuclear matters within NATO that (it)plannaed to develop". Johinson, oci,p.477, See also Fisher in
Herigson Armis Control, 19ý68, -p. 90.
DOB Vol1, LV, No, 1413, 23 Julty 19)66, p. 122,2299

gaLITtem"athus, would ma.ke -it,
impossý_ible
frmemi-bers% o-F an, alliancJt p,ate effectivel
asýa team in their de-ence
T (eJanadianert s atv cosdred
the Soviet draft asconrary to p_rinciPle 5 (balaniced measu,res)
Of the agr eed princip
Le s f,or-armameiit nlegotiat oios forif-ulated bDy
theUanthe" Soýviýet U1nion) in11 9

6 1 jLý

Whilepco,paring the treaty drafts with e?achother, the nionlali-ned iiembors of the ENDC as wellas their colleagues in the
UN General Assembly irarely took sides
with regard to the question of nuclear-sharing arrangements withinalliances. For example, on the one hand, the UJAR found
Article I of the Soviet
draft more in line with principle (a)than its Americancounterpart, 12while, on the other hand,
Mexico and Nepal consi,dered that the Soviet draft went too
far in its prohibitions 1 1
The representative of Nepal to theFirst Committee of the UN
General Assembly was unique in his
frankness and awareness of
the realities of East-West confrontaLion
in Europe. He said
that..the provisions contained in article
I of theSoviet draft seemed to be an ideal
solution to the
problem of proliferation, but they
did not take
into account, the existence of military
allianices
and the fact that by the very natureof such alliances, strategic readjustments tomeet changing
defence requirements were inevitable.
His
ion was opposed to all military alliances, delegatbut so
110

ENDC/PV. 253, 31 Mar, 1966, PP. 14-15.
Apparently theUnited States abstained in the voteon the "Irish Resolution"of 1960 because it called into question

111

112

the transfer of "information", See Chapter
1.
GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Cttee, 1356th
mtg, 19 Oct. 1965,
para. 3. For the agreed principles,
see note 13 in Chapter 2.
ENDC/IPV. 24-9, 3 Ma.1966, p, 7,
113NDC/V, 74, 19 July 1966, p. 12(Mexico) and GAOR, 20thSeas,,
s1st
Ottee, 1359th mitgg 22 Oct. 1965',
para,. 23(Nepal)230l0nC~ as they existed oach of them would undovbtLdAly attempt to increase its defence capabilities'."4

But besides the question of nuclear sharing, some nonaligned cou~ntries had specific remarks to maýke on Ar,t' d,es I
and KI of both the American and Soviet drafts. It was noticed
that both drafts did not prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons
from a nuclear Power to another nuclear Power. India asked for
and Cyprus preferred the prohibition of such a transfer. 11 5
Deploym~ent by a nuclear Power of its own weapons on foreign
territories, which was not forbidden in either the American or
the Soviet drafts so long as the weapons were kept under the
nuclear Power's control, was considered, however, a form of
proliferation. 11
oreover, it was noticed by MIalta that thetwo drafts did not prohibit transfer to individuals or entitles
other than States.,1 The UIAR also pointed out that the effectiveness of a treaty may depend to a large extent on the way it
is observed by persons, companies, firms or other private, public or semi-public bodies engaged in nuclear activities. "Theactivities of such persons or bodies may afford a kind of loophole impairing the effectiveness of the treaty." The UAR conesidered that this question should be studied and the responsibilities of the contracting parties towards their nationals inthis field established. 18The UkAR also warned against anotheri.
loop-hole which in its view was not envisaged in the two draft
treaties and that was :transfer or assistance resulting from

114

Ibid.

115

IENDC/PV. 265, 10 May 1966, pp, 9-10 (India) and GAOR,
21st Sess., 1st Ctte, 1447th mtg, 9 Nov. 1966, para, 9(Qyprus).
GAOR, 20th Sess., 1st Cttee, In61st mtg, 25 Oct. 1965,

116

para. 25 (Yugoslavia). See also ENDC/PV, 274, 19 July
1966, pp. 10-11 (Xexico).
117

GAORo 21st Sess., 1st Ottee, 1434th mtg, 28 Oct. 1966,

para, 33.
118

ENLO/PV. 245, § Mar, 1966, p. 10.

231

omission,~:_nelgne(tp to
nci lecaeLsIs
,
hc(d

rhbt

or eIeaciet

oieainirefernIa

demonstrates thtthvere -two)diffrn approaches to) nonproifeatin.The one considered that collectivelownershipofnuclear weapons did not constitute proliferation
so long as theright and thc ability to use nuclear weapons were
not relinquished by a nuclear-weapon State and so long as
no increase
would have occurred in the number of States andassociationsof States having the ri-ght to independent use of
nuclear weapons. The other considered that collective ownershipin itself
constituted proliferation and that it would have
led to further
proliferation by way of access to nuclear
weapons. Moreover,it considered various aspects of nuclear sharing
such as training and consultations on the use of nuclear weapons
as otherforms of proliferation. Both approaches in fact
went beyond thelimits of the non-proliferation concept as formulated
in the"Irish, Resolution".
The formulation of Articles I and II as they
appeared in
the 24 August 1967 identical treaty drafts,
which remained -unchanged in the following negotiating phases,
were the resultof a compromise which was in fact in line withthe "Irish Resolution".
The compromise was not reached without difficulty
and itappears, as previously mentioned in Chapter 3,that M'r. Gromyko's visit to Washington, D.C. in October 1966
was a turning
point. 10This visit was preceded by talks in
New York between
L19
bid,

p 7.Itzs;t
vit ratnvsaedth120
Se Heaingson

be noticed, howý,ever, that theý, Sonn-ran-sfer ofL n,-ucle-ar w,eaponis
198,p.19
1,7T,

232

K'r.

GrCIIomyl o an-ýd 1,l,*n isrnmirs&might,a1cCept, arus-k, wich;as PIet,JoedtheUSto conIc!lude that
rmla

llwin

te

thing-s wihwcosdrdesnil
arrangemnc Its,sJiinten siv
J_0c onsuIL;Lt ation(,ItlatiLc aleheteestinw-e

on, nuol ea-r matters in the,1

NATO al,ianýce, andc pre-serv\atLI_ion of theern Larope, if it ever deveL-oped,epan

he Sviet Uln,onI-Crigt) of a unted West-leal(oscedteUit-:ed Kingdom and France as atnuclear power.

Pres2iden tJonn

went on to tay that "(i)t was clear, however, that MvoscoW wouC)Lld
oppose any transfer of ownership of nuclear weapons within
NATO. 1121
The effects of the New York talks and the Washington visit
were apparent in the 21st Session of the UN General Assembly
where the debates on non-proliferation were very mild with regard to the question of nuclear-sharing arrangements. In thefollowing 1967 sessions of the ENDOC this question faded awaywith the emergence of other serious problems requiring solution.
The ensuing result was the dropping of the multilateral
option by the United States.. In return, the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on discontinuing the already existing nuclear-sharing arrangements. Adrian Fisher, the Deputy Directorof the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, explained that
it was possible to foreclose the "NATO option" because, itwa
not realistic and that the US "would not acce-:ptL it anld did nlot;
1 22
intend to exercise it."

121

Johnson, opci.
PP. 477-478. -Pre'sIdent Johnison. e.xpkA.inedJ
that the W _est
Germans ha-,d -insisted ha the to-eysyte
and n~uclear consultation-s be protected in any NPT.9' Sueealso 1'ýurn, "Horizonýtal_ Pro,litfer,ation)1 ofý Nuclea,IrWapn"
p.52 and Aarian Fi1-she r-int,a r i7s-iArýIsCoIIlýo_)68
p.200,

122

I-bid.

233

"Qstnsotn the, Drat'
IJSAllesTogthr wth

onroiferý,Ajatio

Trea.ty Asked byswers Giveni b-y the United States" 12 3`

whic
wee atachd toc the, "Letter of Submittal." oni the NPT
setto theý US Pre"sid-ent, by the Secretary of State, Dean) Rusk,
onr2 July 19-68,24 r0eveale-,d ioratnepeainsof
the N4PT
bthUSeseialy wýith re,gard to-allacerelat'ionships); an-d
unty- Asý pre_viously menatione,_d, they were shown to theiuropan
SoitUnioni and key membeýrs of the ENDC whioh raised no ob-

jection. 2 The answers, in fact, reflected the compromisereached. They read as follows:"The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, notwith what is permitted.
It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoeverof 'nuclear weapons' or control over them, meaningbombs and warheads. It also prohibits 1ý8 transferof other nuclear explosive devices..
It does not deal with allied consultations andplanning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.
It does not deal with arrangements for deploymentof nuclear weapons within allied territory as
these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time thetreaty would no longer be controlling.
It does not deal with the problem of European
unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status ofone of its former components. A new federated
European state would have to control all of its
external security functions including defense andall foreign policy matters relating to external
security, but would not have to be so centralized
as to assume all governmental functions. While
not dealing with succession by such a federated
123
124
12

~26

H-,earinigs on NhPT, 19668, pp. 262-263.
Ibld-, pp.,ý
1ý51-257,
See naote 28 above.
See. Sejction !I in., this Chapter.

234

state, -the, tr,eaty woizld brtransz,fr o,clea
weapon,s (euigownershi_jp) or contýrol vrte
to any rec-Ipient, includciniig a multcIlJaterl. enýtitly."

2

These interpr.etations shed ligh-,t On certlainiplctinof Articles T and II, For a fuller iundertndn of these im11-

plications as welil as others, the anialysis of bothl arcticles,,after this inevitaýble survey of their legipslative h,istory, can1
now be easily undertaken.
,(c) Non-Transfer and Non ReceýDipt :Final Analvsis
Articles I and II wereldrafted in a much simpler language
when compared with the previous drafts. The transfer of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was prohibited toflany recipient whatsoever". As one representative
pointed out,
the prohibitive sense of the words "any", "whatsoever" and"otherwise" allows no exception. 18The transfer is prohibited
whether "directly, or indirectly" without any qualification or
definition, "Control" was not defined and was not even qualified as being "national control" as was the case in the American draft or as "control of States or groups of States" as was
the case in the Soviet draft. It is on the basis of the previous terms that we undertake our final analysis as to nontransfer and non-receipt.
(j) Any Recipient Whatsoever / Any Transferer Whatsoever .The)
terms are qui~te simple and categorical so as to preclude anytransfer or receipt of nuclear weapons or explosive devices or,control over them whether to or from Parties to the NPT, o-r nqt.lk
Transfer and receipt are therefore not permitted t-o or by iz)dividual States, groups of States or physical and legal perso.ns.

Transfer and receipt are prohibited between nuceLear-weapon
States, which was not the case in both the American an.d Soviet,
127
128

Hearings on NPT, 98 pp. 262-263,
ENDC/PV, 3ý26, 29Lp
Aug. 1967, para. 6 (Poland)ý,235

draftsa
w: i

so

`]on
hc lh)
Unites

w~apv'
o tiUnto~ D-cne92
avlab

h

in

b

e on a con iun

enIsgeIVrea
Vt lef
a.

2

c

oee

he tii 'tc
ba

t

rt

Rn
e

Ie
uIIis

tt1s)rnoe
teNsa

gemn

Statj'Lý- (WOCdertooklz

ak

PolaIs missileskto 1th,e UnllitIed

Transf er and receipt are also prohibited to or ftrom groupsof States so as to-,preclude the establishment of multilateral
nuclear entities such as a multilateral nuclear force.'513
The NPT w~as also interpreted as prohibiting-the transfer ofnuclear weapons to a UN peace-keeping force established in accordance with Articles 45, 44 and 45 of the UN Charter.13

Apparently, Article I was very carefully drafted so as to preelude a nuclear-armed UN force. 15 3 As Mason Willrich notes,"this issue has theoretical interest in relation to plans forgeneral and complete disarmament. The question of whether the
possibility should be left open of providing a United Nations
Peace Force with nuclear weapons in the later stages of a comprehensive disarmament plan was hotly debated at the ENDC in
1962. The United States wished to leave such a possibility
open to ensure that, when disarmament was complete, the Peace
Force would have sufficient armament 'so that no state could
challenge it', The Soviet Union wanted any such possibility
closed.",134129

For example, see US Deputy Secretary of Defenoe Paul
Nitze's statement iiu Hearings on NPT, 1968, p. 89.

150

See Section I of Chapter 4.

1371
15

Adrian Fisher in Hearing-s on Armus Control,_1968, p, 205.
Pauil Nii,-,-e in HerigPon
6S,_6
p. 88. See also
-Gerard9 Smjith and Adrian Fisher in Hearings on M'ilitay
Implcatonsof ETPT, pp.) 152-133.
15EizbehYoung1LC, AL Far-ewell to-Ar-ms Control ? (London
Pegun ooks,, 1,972)
p.14
154 Wllrih,
Nn-ProifertionTreatv, p5

236

ploivI'cs

wo

tat,io oe
dS,

not

ontr

)d
J

,

recud

itAiletheVttsetoitrth

NLTh whc provJde
onclathat ptnIaLIL I benef Its -frýom peaceulý aplcain
explosions:_ wil

beW maeavialet

nnnclawao

Statesý

"Pursuant tou a special interi,ational agreement ori
agr-eements,
throu-h an. appropriate internationa
Iody. " (em4,phasis added.) The "Agency" would be a link between the nuclear-weapon
States and the nonl-nuclear-weapon States in esta:blishing, forexample, international standards for the performance of theservices rendered and in performing administrative functionsin this fleld. 1 3 5 But under no circumstances could the
IAEA own
or apply with its own means nuclear explos'ive devices forpeaceful purposes.
(ii) Direct and Indirect transfer :Direct transfer of nuiclear
weapons or other explosive devices needs no explanation,
As, fa-r
as indirect transfer is concerned, the legislative historyý,ofArticles I and II is indicative of the different qualifications
which were attached to it. As the term "indirect" was not
explicitly defined since the submission of the first identicaltreaty drafts of 24 August 1967, one country, Swit'zeri-and,undertook to define it in its "Aide-Mdmoire" prsne on 17
Novemb er 19 67 t o the Co-Chai_rme,(,n of' theLýi
E1TDFC.,it' statesý
"The Swiss authorities conide
ltatl the te-rm, '-indix,ect' concerns the upl of a-rmns, expýloisi_ve,sor technical assistan)ce formitayproe
through the agency of aLtir
whether a
3 tt
Party to the treaty or not-,"

135

See Firmiage,. loc ,cit,,p.7273
stGudLy

136

D-CC)R, Supl-pl. for- 1967 and-r'196,Dc,D/3
Aj,nn. IV, S)ec. 21t (MC
4 24Nv 197),

2\3 7

e

hpe70t.1

It, wsater1,xlained -it199bIeadSih
retr of th)

h

Di-

AC
4Si'A,ta"Thwods di-rectly o,r indi,rec-tly' were used, as
in_1
man'ly US_' lawsýF,to p.revýent e\7asion,i of thiepoi
bItIon of t-he treat-y by inidire,ct meaý,ns - such aarnfrof a-nucl_ear wýeapon throughýl' ani intermediary hichý was not plarty to thle t-reayc uha
inircttrnserwould be qiieby our, own
atmi nerg-,y legislation."'Someit worr2ies weýre ex,pressed in the Amierican debate. that theSoviets at some future date would interpret the term "inidirectly", as they did before, to mean participation in nuclear decisions such as in NATO. It was pointed out that the Soviets were
aware of US interpretations with respect to participation in
NATO nuclear decisions and they had not objected to them. 1 3 8
In the last analysis, it could be construed from reading
the term "indirectly" in close conjiuniction with the terms "anyrecipient whatsoever" and "any transferer whatsoever" that theprohibited indirect transfer would not only be through "third
States", whether parties to the Treaty or not, but also throughindividuals, physical or legal, or international organizations
which by definition are not Parties to the Treaty which is concluded only am-ong States.
Before turning to the term "control", it is worth notingthat the UAR1 submitted an official amendment to Article I to
add the words "in any form whatsoever" after the words "anyrecipient whatsoever".,3 The UAR representative explained thattransfer might take a great variety of forms. "It may be gratuitous, in the form of a gift, or may be made against payment.
It may result in full ownership or perhaps in only certain

137

Hearin-cs on Militarv Implications of NPT, p. 122.

13'

DO,CupIfor 1967 an)d 196,
ocs. D(O/230 anýd Add.
26Sept. 196ý_7).

Ann, -IV, Sec. 13` (EEDIC/197,

238

1,

attributes of owesi,It may be deFinKiti
or tem ,pomal"1
He r0forrOd tO pviacipi (a) of lvgoluljon WYM(X), which stated explicitly that nuclear Weapons should not be proliferated"directly or indirectly...

in any form".

BothR the sovinet
and AMerican representatives defended Arti-cles I and 1I
as Coro~~closing nuclear proliferation in any form.,
142
The addition of
the words "in any form whatsoever" was not consideredasstrengthening Article 1, which "is already free ofloop-holes.",143(iii) Control :Before formulating a final definitionof "control" in the context of the NPT, let us in the firstplace
examine closely the last three answers given by theUnitedStates to its allies quoted above and which relate toconsultations and planning on nuclear defence, deploywaent of nuclear
weapons within allied territory and European unity. Control
isa common denominator of all three.
- Consultations and Planninn onr Nuclear
Defence :The US contention that the NPT does not deal with allied consultations
and planning on nuclear defense seems to be plausible
for thefollowing, reasons:
The prohibition contained in paragraph 2 of Article I of
the Soviet treaty draft of 24 September 1965 on transmitting
information or documentation on the-use of nuclear weaponsdid140~ RMDC/PV. 333, 26 Sept. 1967, para,. 10, One wvitur mentioned outright gift as one way to disseminate nuclear weapons
by nuclear Powers. Robert R. Ranger, "Death of a Treaty
A Diplomatic Obituary ?", international Relat.ions, Vol,
III, No. 7, Apr. 1969, p. 484.
141 ENDC/PV. 340, 19 Oct. 1967, para. 13. The UAR Representative had previously referred to the words "any form" In
principle (a) with respect to "omission, negligence, care.lessnessO. See note 119 above.
142 ENDC/PT? 370, 27 Feb. 1968, para. 56 (USSR.) and para. 79(United States).
143 Ibid., para,. 79 (United States).

239

!ot reapea
.I

lte

Tray
!1,,

Pt(he
Sovietdraft, w,ouild have de,-prved nonii-nuclea-wapn States, fromlf anlyifraincnen
in-g M4AC

staeyihetcncluse of nuclea.r weapon,,sNATO,Moreo,ver, tche Nu.cle.ar, Flanning Group insidereýd týo be the centr= ring in, the AlliJancefor

which iscn

consultations

and planninG on niuclear strýat,egy, is not entitlIed to receive
the tranisfer of ncerweapons-. 14rIts compositions andfunctions seem not to be incompatible with the provisions of
the NPT.l145 Consultations and planning on nuclear strategy
whether within or outside the NPG, or in the Warsaw Pact set
up, are not incompatible with the NPT so long as no transfer ofnuclear weapons or control over them occurs.
-

Deployment of Nuclear WeaEons within Allied Territory :The

Treaty, in -fact, does not deal with oommonn arrangements for
deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory. As previously mentioned, deployment was not prohibited in any of theprevious drafts,
The Soviet Union did not object to the interpretation givenby the United States in answer to its allies. Apparently theSoviets did not indicate acquiescence or agreemnent because"Wthey can't be asked to agree about certain arrangements
6
that (the US) keep secret."14
Allowing deployment under the NPT was objected to by anumber of non-aligned countries. It was regretted that no attem-pt was made to deal with the transfer of nuclear weapons
144

For an interesting assessment of a possible future roleof the NPG, see Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty,
pp. 79-81,

145

See Adrian Fisher in Hearings on Arms Control, 1968
p, 90; Paul Nitze in Hearingson NPT,_1968, p. 56; andAdpiýJan-! Fish'Iir in_ He-rng on PT,16T
p, 58
146Adran
shr i

Herigsn NT,196,

24 0

p

54.

to aNd;tt Lr
Ls'ýC tatIonn inJtethcle-ar ntosinj

tertre

of

co1

es

the useI ofncerwaos0hswscni

dre d t orjiepr'esent one oF, thie imoran fatreo,f dismntonjIt was conidere that on

of

h

rbe

of th

iek-

niesses ofth

PT woýas tuhat'L it did niot prohibItJtoigJntransport_ing nuaclear weapons, within the territories of non

nuclear-weapon States as well as ovarflying those territorcies,,by bomb-carrying aircraft of nuclear-weapon States.1 4 8 A quesý-ition was raised on how to guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon
States would not have access to the weapons deployed on theirterritory. 1 4 9 There was doubt that deployment of nuclear wa
pons within NATO was compatible with non-proliferation.15 Deployment was considered by one country as against the spiritof the NPT and the 1964 Declaration of the Cairo Conference of
Non-Aligned Countries.1 5 1 Cne country considered that the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclearweapon States constituted a loop-hole. It was of the opinion
that the area of any non-nuclear-weapon State should automatic2
ally become nuclear free. 1 5
The implications with respect to the deployment of nuclear
weapons not prohibited under the NPT are manifold. Within
the NATO Alliance, the modernization of the long-range theatre
nuclear force is qUi te compatible with the NPT, such as thedecision to deploy in Europe US ground-launched ssescm
prising 108 Pershing-2 and147

4054 ground-launchedl cruisemsie

ENDC/PV. 334, 28 Sept. 1967, paaJ7(nia.Seas
A/C.1/PV. 1567 (prov.), 14 X.ay 1968 pp. 65-6

(ina

146

A/CONF. 35/SR.l5, 13 Sept

149

A/C.1/PV. 1571 ()-ro.,2150.2('Tan-a ni'a).
AI/CON~F, 35//'S'R 7, 9 Sep-t. 198.86(eb)orlevant par ithCarDelaio,seeu
Dc
A/7 ,29Ot
94~
222

151

_196,pa98
P/,lI/MT, 15770 (prov,)V,-17 Kay 198I

-152 A/"C,l/APV,

1,566- (prov.,

202(larts).3

13 NaI-y 1966, p. 27 (

AJg

241ý

)

Lana)

allýý
wih

nLe.wahads,6

a decision which was tlaken on 12
Deemer199At~pca
etn of Foreign and Defense
Minstes-cf ATO' in Bru,tSseIS) 5
Moreover, thle armed forcesofth alis w,ýould cotnet.o receivýe training progras on
how
to oprttn~
I'
miti
S nuclear wTeapons systems so longas,octansfe
of nucl-ear, weapons or, control over them, results.
Th164' "Agreet
for Cooperatýion Rega.rdinig Atomicj Tynformain wol
tais,intr

aprently notG be affected by the NPT as it enlla tainngon use anL-d defe-nse again.st atomic

S3imilar arr,ange_ments between the: members of thl-e Warsaw
Pact which have certain reciprocal relations with the Soviet
Union would also be permitted to continue under the NPT.15 5
A US official in an answer to a question as to whether the
NPT prohibited the Soviet Union from placing nuclear weaponsin Cuba said that "a,,,long as the Soviets maintained control
over their weapons, didn't transfer the weapons or control
over them -to any country, this treaty would not prohibit it". 1 56
However, he wont on to say that the US would regard the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba on a dILfferent basis. He assumed that the US would react the same way as it did in 1962.157
The question also arises with respect to the two-key system
as to whether a US ally on whose territory American nuclear

153

For the Text of the Joint Communiqu6 of the NATO meeting,see US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Current Policy, No. 122.

154

One writer concludes that the 1964 NATO Agreement isoverly broad and. is inconsistent with the NPT. He contends that the 'Agreement' could be of material assistanceto a nation willing to break its undertaking not to produce nuclear weapons. J.H. Smith, loc.cit., P. 370.
ENDC/PV. 263, 10 May 1966, p. 26 (USSR). Nuclear-sharing
arrangements in the context of the Warsaw Pact were notanL issjue i1n th:1e7
formulatio of Artcle Ieand TT of the

155

15 Ar

An ihri

eaig

nAm

242

Control,198,p.89

weapons a0de, _ c)lyed would

otip

to enjothright tovt

thennnula-ao
thatV

Iea vetthei ir ttiuse.ViWould tIs

State has cont,11rol overtewapn
the NIPT Y It sem

tha

the veoS ev,.er,al gr-o unds.

Ve to on

irin

ne

rhbie

i

ho

ee

ihsoldbothe wepnsi,otteafim

atcive and fin-,al decisoio-maing poer

it isaJddtoa

safeguardi ag-an!'St theuseofthewaosin
an attribute o)f t-erritorial sovereignty.

ti

fe

l

5

If, under the two-key system, a decision wasý madeý by the
US and the allied host countries to use nuclear weapons, therelease of the weapons to the allies would in all probability
lead to the end of the NPT. But as this eventuality is closely
related to the more general question raised by the United Statee in its answers to its Allies as to the effect of war on
the Treaty, the discussion of this aspect is dealt with inPart V,of this study in conjunction with the Treaty's adaptability to changing circumstances.
It remains to be said that the deployment of nuclear weapons permitted under the NPT is restricted by other interna259
tuional legal instruments. They are the following 1-The Antarctic Treaty :This Treaty, which was signed.
in Washington, ]D.Q. on 1 December 1959, stipulates in paragraph
1 of its first article that : 'Antarctica shall be used forpeaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia,suoch as the esta,9blish1me.nt
of military bases and fortificatL.oios,, the carigouIT of, mi_.any measures of a military nature,litary manoeuvres,as well as

hetstnof any typ!je ofiea

pons." Article V prohibits also"ayncer

xpois"16llHori--158

and B rl1,
p.5-5
See Hearings on NPT, 1969,ý
zontal Proliferation of Nuiclear Weap-ons",p.34

159

seents,71
For a brief anjalysi-s of thfe followjings ln'st
Eri c Stelin, "Legal Retansin Modern) Armls Contro-J
Vol.
Agreements", Ameri 'can Jou-ýrn ,al,of ,Init-er,,na,"tiona Law,i,66, Nio. 2, Ap-r 1972,p.2529
1946- 19(70, .41
The Unai'ed NatJions anLd DisarmamEn

160

243

Treaty ~ ~ thtsexlso~Pate~~carynprhbt ous, or anohenuclear1

an)nular wapo

explsio, pnere
at aplacedey

itlImisinldn ouer Spae
Cnitidor
eri wLatLe.r, incuding
tertorial waer 0Lor hig ses
Unegon ncl ear wao
testn

or exlsin

ar

aloe

providedtha

no _r,adioa1ctive

debris are prsn

outside te teroia lmtsoF the State
underwhos
juridicton o controlu
uc expl.osions are conducted. HIowever, they -are subjected to certain restrictions
under the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
Weapon Tests, the so-called "Threshold Test Ban Treaty," andthe Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed between the United States and the Soviet Union
in Moscow on 3 July 1974 and, in both Washington and Moscow on
28 May 1976 respectively.
Both instruments will be dealt with
161
later.
The Outer Space Treaty : The Treaty, which was open
for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on 27 January-

1967, stipulates in its Article IV the following:"States Parties to the Treaty undertakce not to placein orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons ofmass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer spacein any other mariner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be usedby all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively
for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, thetesting of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military manoeY5es on celestial bodies shall be-

The Treaty of Tiatelolco : Article I of the Treaty

161

See.Appendices 6,

1612

See Appen dix 7, Moreover, a draft agreement worzked out bytheUNoteeon tChe Peacefu-L Uses of Outer Space Gov7ernng
he c iites o:., States on the,Mo and Other
Ceesiaodiýes iLno!,clues similýar provis.ions,
See "UN Doc.
A/RE/34/8, 1 De.
199, Anex/-.4

14 and 18.

7

n244

int eir te, ritorJlies

IthrcIpt, stoae

intlltonalia, the sam-e obligations withn respeo totertertre
within thýe zone. Moreover, this is also the case in AdditilonalProtocol 11 whioh is addressed to the nuclear-weapon States
who are called upon, interý-alia, not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.
Although the prohibition in Article I as well as in thecorresponding obligations in Additional Protocols I and II
appears to be comprehensive, an official interpretation of the
Final Act of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission
for the Denuclearization of Latin America specified that Ltransit of nuclear weapons by non-Contracting Parties was neither
addressed in nor affected by Article I of the Treaty.16
Permitting the transit of nuclear weapons is one reason,
besides that pertaining to peaceful nuclear explosions referred
to above, why the Soviet Union had been reluctant to adhere to
Additional Protocol II. Transit, in its view, provides an"'obvious loop-hole" for violation of the rules governingth
nuclear-weapon free zone.

As the Soviet representative t

CCD put it:"The transit of nuclear weaponsthogtat
could serve as a screen -for the dvlpeta
well as for the use of nucle-ar. weap,,ons fromterritory of the
znelS

on
he

163

See Appendix 8..

16~4

See Robinson, loc.cit ,rpp. 236 and DOI~-302.
"Hcob-in Sonc
points out tht he term'trasit'shIud Ie Odistigs
fromr dJeployment. whiiih ismoesainr
adpraetin charact.er-pc,
0)

165

CC/P,

5

,23 Mar.

)172,p36

25

h

nthe
,
sat11iýement,md by teSoviet
LUnior upo'n signing an,dj~ L,il- Ad
Pooo
1to.
T., th-1e So viet Un io n r ea f'fi rm11ed
ts ition
Lo h
athOrizngq thne transit o.f nuclear w,,eaponqsi
any a in woul
cbe,
ontr,a,.ry t o thl!ýe objectives of thie Treaty of
Tlatelolco~1
annoptilihthe non-nuclear status of tlheStte
arte to th Treat andwth their obligations as laid,r h'e se-ed Treaty:
The Treaty,, w,hich wias opened for
SlJignatur in
London!Coscow and ashingtn oný 11 Febru,ýary 1971,
sti.-puiates in paarps1and,2 of AIrticle I the f'ollowing:

Il1.

The States Partýies to this Treaty undertake notto emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean
floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer
limit of a sea-bed zone, as defined in Article II,
any nuclear weapons or any other types of weaponsof mass destruction as well as structures, launching
installations or any other facilities specificallydesigned for storing, testing or using such weapons.
2. The undertaking of paragraph 1 of this article
shall also apply to the sea-bed zone referred toin the same paragraph, except that within suchsea-bed zone, they shall not apply either to thecoastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters.,1167

Lastly, at the initiative of the Soviet Union and its allies,
the UN General Assembly at its 33rd session in 1978 adopted aresolution calling upon all nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear
weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons interritories where there are no such weapons at present.
The

Assembly at its 324th Session in 1979 raised the possibility of68
concluding an international agreement in this respect.l1
But as far as existing nuclear weapons in the territories
of States allied to one of the two super-Pawers, it should be

166

SRIYear Book

167

Se

1979, p.619.

Appni z I10.J

16ARe.
I/9 ,1
Dec
178,i GOR, 303Rrd S ess.
Sup.N,J~(/34)
pp61-S2 and UN Doc. A/RES/3 1 4/26

pointed out that at the 1975 N?T Review Conference, a nubrof'
non-nuclear-weapon States proposed to limit and ultimately
withdraw from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party
to the NPT of all nuclear-weapon delivery systems, especiallytactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union then considered1
that the proposal fell outside the purview of the Review Conference and as counter productive with regard to ongoing EastWest negotiations.
Unit-EuroDeah: The answer given by the United States to

its allies on the compatibility of the saccession by a new federated European State to the nuclear-weapon statns of oneof itsded,

former components with the NPT seems to be well foundprovided that the new fedora-ted state would oontrol allof its external security functions including defence.

In

the

case of such form of unity, the newly established State succeeds to the nuclear status of the nuclear State or States
which join the Union; no transfer takes place.
tes'

The United Sta-interpretative answer was not challenged even when theSoviet instrument of ratification was being signed at the meet-~ing held on 24 November 1969 by the Presidium o-f the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR.

Mir.

Gromyko,the M6inister of Foreign

spoke then of the prohibited transfer of nuclear wea169
pons to separate States and to any group_off States.

Affairs,

It would be absurd, as one writer.notes, to pretend that

the Treaty had fixed forever the structure of States and thuýs
blocked the historical evolution of certain countries towards
unification. It would not be possible, on purely legal grohunds,170
to suggest that the Treaty prohibits political unification.

On this latter point, it

is quite significant that both the

3 Dec. 1969, p. 27.

169

New Times, No. 48,

170

See Emmanuel i, Roucounas, "L'Quilibre entre la non pro-lifdration des armes nncl6aires, Ja prolif6ratlop des connaissances nucY6aires Iciviles' et los gaiantjes descurMt nucH~aire", Qevue HelYnh-up eoDroIt Interaytiona1,
21e Ann6e, Nos. 1-4, 11nv.-Dec. 1968, pp. 147-148.

247

Jauay96.nd28Noemer 199repcively, salid tha,ýt they weresigning`th.-.,"ay on the understanding that it did not hamper
European unification. 7l7
It would be right to assume that all possible forms of political unity between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclearweapon States are possible provided that the new State would
have full control of its defence and foreign affairs. In Europe, for example, if the members of the EEC succeed in achieving a politically united Europe, the new State would succeed
to the nuclear status of both France and the United Kingdom.
The latter States could also merge to constitute a more powerful nuclear-weapon State; 1 7 2 but in this case too the new State
would have to control its defence apparatus. It should be remembered thnt the transfer of nuclear weapons or control overhem arc, proh-iib-iited between two nuclear-weapon States. A merger
betwcen a nuclear-weapon
would also be possible.

17

State and non-nuclear-weapon
3

State

To conclude the discussion of this aspect on European contro~l of nuclear weapons 'it should be noted that both France
and the tUnj-ted Kin-gdom hold the. view that political unity is
1 74
a prereqjuisite for close nuclear defence co-operation.
At this stage,-itis

possible to provide a comprehensive

definiti on as to what is meant by non-transfer of control over171

Assembly of Western European Union, Prcedns 15th
Sess., Part 2 111, Dec. 1969, Doc. 499, Appendix II,
p. 221 (Italy3 and pp. 223 and 225 (FRG).

172

On the complementarity of French and British Nuclear forces, see Ian Smart, "Future Conditional. The Prospect for
Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation", Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Adelphi Papers, No. 78, Aug. 1971.

1753

Adrian Fisher in Herig174

See Smart, "Future Conditional. The Prospect for AngloFrench Nuclear Cooperation", pp. 22-31.

16NP,__9,
P. 556.

248nu)clear werapons inr the context of tLhe IN
PT.
sor Eric Stein puts it,Itthat nuclear-,weapon

up physical custody of their nuclear weaponsmans, asllliPr" ofes-

Stte

icnniot,gv(or othernucea

explosive devices) or provide sufficient access to thmso thatthey could be taken away by anyone else; nor can the nuclearweapon States give up their power to makýe the final decision175
on firing their nuclear weapons.
2. Manufacture
The NPT prohibits only the non-nuclear-weapon States frommanufacturing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It neither imposes a freeze on the production of nuclear
weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, nor prescribes the destruction of their existing stockpiles.
The prohibition on manufacture was envisaged in all theprevious treaty drafts. The Soviet draft of 24 September 1965
also envisaged the undertaking by the States "not possessing
nuclear weapons" not to "prepare for the manufacture" ofnuclear weapons. The American draft as amended on 21 Harsh 1966
included the preparations for the manufacture but only with respect to the prohibition on assistance. This means that nonnuclear-weapon States would have been allowed, under the American draft, to prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons
as long as no assistance was provided from outside. Another
difference between the above-mentioned American and Soviet
drafts was that the latter specified that the manufacture or
the preparation for manufacture of nuclear weapons was prohibited whether they were undertaken "independently or together
with other States, in their own territory or in the te,rritoryof other States." It seems that the Sovilet drafters hDad theFederal Republic of Germany in mind whichunetoin15

175

Stein, "Legal Rest-ra-intis ini VFloden
inents", p. 275.

rs

onrl

gre

nt toWauatreinritsýte rr-i tory, aniy at omic weTapons,arranemenlts for its, accessi,ýon to NATO,of' the,ýas par't

76Butýwhiat do we understanid by "mianaufacture" as prohibiýted
byj the, NPT ?"Tho re.'pr,esentati1ve of S-veden-ý to th e ENDC raisedth-e qu,estion w.idth- res_,pect to -the uise of -the phrase "prepare
for mnanuAfacture". Mhrs. Myrdal, while agreeing that it was importanit to block the, road to nucle-ar weapon development as
early as possible, noticed that manufacture was a long ladderwith many rungs and asked "on which of these I'rungs' is it
reasonable and feasible to introduce the international blocking ?11177 She went on to say the following:"To prohibit just the final act of 'manufacture'would seem to come late in these long chains ofdecisions. On the other hand, already to probe thepreliminary thinking of politicians and the laboratory research of scientists obviously is as diffioult, as it would be considered undesirable intervention. Could a middle link be found on which
the prohibito1 ý.regulation should most definitely
be focused ?"The Swiss Government in its "Aide-M4moire"l presented on 17
N~ovember 1967 to the Co-Chairmen of the ENJDC interpreted thephrase "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices" as not covering "exploitationof uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or
heavy water, when these processes are carried out for civil
purposes.,17 The Swiss authorities noted that such an interpretation could be confirmed by the co-authors.
176

See note 46 in Chapter 1.

177

ENDC/PV. 243, 24 Feb. 1968, p. 11.

178

Ibid.

179

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec. 21 (ENIDC/204, 27 Nov. 1967). Japan considered thFt fast critical assemblies, reactor excursion
experiment- facilities, and thermionuclear fusionreatr
should niot, come under the prohibiti-ons of the NPT,
A/,/F.1565 (po,,10 May 1968, p. 57.

p. 12.

250

Th-e United Statesý b-eliev,ed thatil it

was ot poM Tl

at ti

tj_

time t1o formulate, a comiPreh,.ensive- def_inLitioýn or1:illto1rprel-Atatonof what would cosiueianfcue
kNPT,

Moreover,lnde.r Art,ýicle IIit- made somegnra

berainsa

o

f]
hte

or not a spe'cific activity cntuesprohibitedmnfatr
under -the ýPJT,as follows;"For example, facts indicating that thie purýposeý ofa particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-com-,pliance. (Thus, the construction of an experimental prototype nuclear explosive device would becovered by the term 'manufacture' as would be theproduction of components which would only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again,
while the placing of a particular activity undersafeguards would not, in and of itself, settle thequestion of whether that activity was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance.
It may be useful to point out, for illustrative
purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of
the prohibitions in Article,II. Neither uranium
enrichm~ent nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would
violate Article II so long as these activities
were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly
permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the de,velopment or.Aae of fast breeder reactors undersafeguards."
It can be deduced from~ the above that the application ofsafeguards required by Article III of the NPT would help toclarify the situation with respect -to -the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Tjhe prohibition of manufacture which islimited -to non--nu-

clear,-weapon States raised conside'rable discontent, and resist180

Extension of remarks by 'William Fos-ter -in response -toquestions regarding nuclear explosive devices in Hearin;gs
on NP,16,p.
39.

251

enc amngsom
no-aignd emberis ofth EAD0 as well11 asothemebr of
ithUnited Nati ons. it wqas, sh)owni in Chapter2
thathe twoio
joneoanda of 196 and 1966 suibmnitted to theiý
ENDO
byLhe eigtlon-aligngjed mebr
eecarfll-111y dr_afted
intl
orde"r uo stiea blalance býetween th-ose who were advocatingthat a non-proliferation treaty should be coupled at the sametime with other measures or that they should be embodied in atreaty as part of its provisions, and those who were hopingthat this would materialize, but who felt, however, that a NPT
181
should at least be followed by tangible steps.

India led the campaign against the continued manufactureof nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, i.e., the vertical proliferation or what was sometimes called by India further proliferation or intra-spatial proliferation. 12India
arguied that the real problem was the existence of vertical proliferation. As explained by its representative in the END~C,"(f)uture or horizontal or extra-spatial proliferation is only
the consequence and not the cause of the present armaments tension in the world. Once the cause is remedied, the consequence
automatically eliminated'. 1 8 3 He further argued that principie (a) of resolution 2028(XX)' forbade not only non-nuclear
isPowers but also nuclear Powers to proliferate, "It says so.specifically and qategorically. It does not say that the nonnuclear Powers shall not proliferate but the nuclear Powers
may proliferate and the nuclear Powers will agree only not tQ
disseminate weapons and weapons technology. It says that nei181
182

185

See principle (b2)in Chapter 2.
From the numerous statements made by India on this aspect,
see GAOR, 20th Sess.i 1st Cttee, 1363rd mtg, 26 Oct. 1965,
paras. 1-10; ENDC/PV. 240, 13 Feb. 1966, pp. 16-17; ENIDC/
PV. 263, 10 May 1966, pp. 4-15 (especially p. 11); ENDC/PV.
570, 27 Feb. 1968, para. 13; and A/C,l/PV. 1567 (prov.),
14 May 1968, p. 66, See also V.C, Trivedi, "Vertical
Versus Horizontal Proliferation :An Indian view"~ inDougherty and Lehman, Jr., 02-cit., PP. 195-203,
Trivedi,.1oc.cit.,
p. 197.

2'52'

ReeecC,ifeae-i8
thrsalI prolof týhe U'N Sertr-eea

wa

repor
madet to theýC
of
C)fet
th

nthe,

of Nu1-clear,, Weapons, ...

,Poss'-wý
[,Ibe Use
frhreacniedthtaY

wic

ariasenals would ledtgrar

boratoion of eitnnul

tension and greater instability in the world aýt large,
certain stage in

At aI

the negotiations India suggested that the pro-duction of nuclear weapons be prohibited in a first article ofa non-proliferation treaty. As to the dissemination problem(horizontal proliferation) and reduction of stockpiles, it wassuggested that they be treated in articles 2 and 3 respectively.l18

6

On the basis of principle (a), Brazil also criticised the
18 7continuation of vertical proliferation allowed -under the NPT.
Sweden too was very critical of the non-prohibition on manufacture with respect -to nuclear Powers but.was less intransigent in its position than India and Brazil. Sweden tried to
improve the treaty drafts, as will be shown later, in order todraw concessions from the two co-authors with regard to their
obligations relating to disarmament and, more particularly,
nuclear disarmament. 188
At the 22nd resumed session of the UN General Assembly in1968 a number of countries considered that the exemption of
the nuclear-weapon States from the prohibition on manufactureof nuclear weapons constituted a loop-hole in the meaning of189
principle ()184

ENDC/PV. 240, 15 Feb. 1966, pp. 16-17.

185

186

ENDC/PV. 270, 27 Feb. 1968, para. 15. For the releva-nt
part of the UN Secretary-General's report, see Effeýcts
of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons, para.82
ENDC/PV. 263, 10 Mlay 1966, p. 11.

187

ENDC/PV. 363,

188

See Chapter 9.

189

For example,

8 Feb. 1968, para, 39,
see A/C.l_]/PV.

p. 47 (Cuba); A/C.l/PV.
(Dahomey);

11566 (pM.,1

1568ý

iand A/C.l/PV. 1573,

253

ly 1968,1

1-5 May 19ý68, p. 41
23 May 19.68, para. 63.

(pýrOy.),Since Lhe PreontaVnti-

ofl theiCr idei.tical treaty drýafts of'States and theo Sovi_etno

~~~49
Auus
16,both the UYnite

insstd thliat, thei,or drafts wer

Unite

SttA

rersnttv

antatioaboutýh so-c(aIlle,d

that
is,

alting1ý

Void of any loop-holes,

to theiEIQDOCPuit it,Asý the"ný
iio amount`- of' vert-ical non- proliferationil

the nucLear arms race

Ivoeoe,theýy botAh i.ndicated th,atL-

can h_Ide, that; fact~."`-the conclutsion of the _HPT

shlouLd not) be- delýayed untLil agreement was reach-ed on certain
191
mjeasureýs of njuc;lear disarmament.
Before turning to the following section,.qe should pointout that a literal interpretation of the phrase "to proliferate" in principle(a1)

non-proliferationof nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon Sta-

may lead to the conclusion that verticaltes can be deduced from the text. Moreover, the two co-authors,in defending the lack of prohibition on manufacture with regard
to the nuclear-weapon States, did not really contest the concept of vertical proliferation. They rather raised the questionof the time and effort needed to reach agreements on other measures related to nuclear-weapon States' activities in the nuclear-weaponry field. In their view, a non-proliferation treaty
should not wait for such measures lest the problem of nuclear
proliferation should become more dangerous.
However, it must be said that the Treaty as -it finally materialised is in concert with the non-proliferation concept as
formulated in the "Irish Resolution", which had envisaged that
only "States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of (nuclear)
weapons."

Without underestimating the difficulties involved,(Jordan). The title of the N~PT was also considered misledig s the Treaty dealt with non-dissemination only.
A/O./PV156 (pov.)
YSlay 1968, p. 21 (.Malaysia).

19 %NCP,30 4Sp.16,pr,519

oreaml,se

I~CP.

6,

2Fb. 198

aa0

itL ýould have b)een a consi-de-rable stp orward -I-I the N~P],ohaLIve gone JfurtherI thIian th-ri`61les -s)olut Lioi in extni 11o the,0p)rohý)ibt io

c man ufa ctuýre to the ncerwaon
on

StGa tewaosbeýtween niuclear-wjeapoDn S3'taýtLe s, whi ch was nAot th
in the "Iris 11,Reýsolu-tion".
1

On the one hand,tes,

as, it1
oIs

ArticLe- I imposes on nuclear-wýeapon Sa"not iAn any way to assist,encourage or iLnduce any non1-

nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nu-clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control
over such weapons or explosive devices". On the other hand,by virtue of Article II, non-nuclear-weapon States undertake
11not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
192
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In analysing those provisions, we have to distinguish between four kinds of relationships. First, assistance, encouragement or inducement from nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclearweapon States which are prohibited by both Articles I and II,
the latter having prohibited the non-nuclear-weapon States fromseeking or receiving any assistance. Second, assistance from anuclear-weapon State to another nuclear-weapon State which is
not prohibited under the NPT.

Third,

assistance from non.-nu-aclear-weapon States to nuclear-weapon States which' seemis to beallowed.

And finally the controversial issue of asis stan-,c e froml

non-nuclear-weapon

States to non-nuiclear-weapon

literally could be considered not prohibited if
ing or receiving thie assistance is
Article II

States wh41iich
the State. seek-,

not- a Party to the Treaty as

prohibits the Parties not -to seek or receive anY

assistance.

192

See Appendix 3-G.

193

AppDendices 3-A,

BS and C,

255

AsitneT(a)Th firs

Tety
T,ria drf

it~~~~~orC)or,~mnof 17* Auus

alorrhiiedteiateifo-se

anceEnouaemn

a-d inuemn

inuomnlý_-tfrom 11uler-Weapon

wer

ingo
ade

196 JL prohibitL

receivasin

assistby therAmeica

i ng o f nuithn pr p ra i n fo ma uf ct r or i th e tes t-Ucleaý,r weapons,.
The lattLer prohibi-tionis are not included in
final treaty text. In view of the absence of prohibition on assistance in the preparations for manufacture, it is possible
to conclude that the non-nuclear-weapon States could seek orreceive assistance from nuclcar-weapon States with respect tothose activities which do not constitute or involve the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
as demonstrated abovc. As to assistance, encouragement or inducement with respect to the testing of nuclear weapons, it is
to be noted that such prohibition on encouaragement or inducement already exists in the Moscow Test Ban Treaty in which thewords encouragement a:nd inducement have their origin in paragLraph 2 cf Article I which roads as follows"Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes..
to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any
way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion, anywhere which would ta
place in anyof the environments described,...

The tenmýi assistance in both Articles I and II can raise
problems as to its interpretation. Almost any kind of international nuclear assistance is potentially useful to a nuclearweapon pro-rarm.15 However, *the application of safeguards toall peaceful nuclear assistance to non-nuclear-weapon
19~Se0pedx6

States,clnythe peacefu ±uesof puurpoe

fos

fntrm,torla

as-

nucla

ecopoessedl thatithveprhiteio-il onastiioita-,enouragemewthort induerente mihtcasenuclear-weapon States.t
trnfear oaf

dicrmiatablgations

thecpeaceflwuespo

iniidannnuclear-weapon Statesiooasitnon

nucliear energyl The former mighte dhenytherofte

economicallysensitiveumterial, instrements aonontransfern ofhe
Teolgtoofnuclear-weapon States not toassist non-s.19

Shortly after the presentation of the first identical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967, the UAR introduced an amendment
to Article I which covered both non-transfer and non-assistance. It aimed at adding at the end of the article the following
new paragraph:"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that no person, company,
enterprise or private, public or semi-public bodythat is subject to its jurisdiction and is engag-ed in nuclear activities participates,6§ any act
which is prohibited by this article."
Nigeria also submitted an amendment which contained. a si-_
196

Ibid.

197

See H. Liton KellerjL, Hein Býo `llge And PeterýL B. Kalfý1f1,
opoi"On the Economic Implicaztioný,s o-f thýe Pooe

198
199

feration Treaty", Revueý dc Droit,ItrainldsSin
oiiu,No 1, 1968 (Extrait)
ces DiDlomatiques et
11-12.
pp.
Willrich, Non--Prolife,-ratoion Treaty, p. 9)5,
Add. 1,0ao 196'7 and 19168, DoescDi.
DCOR,, Suppl.
tiad
UA
Thne
19)67).
26 Sep,._t,_Ann,tIV, Sec, _13 (EIIDC/1-97,
notlk
(See
EN,VDO.
I-1ea-tt
earl`I-ermurch
raised thLat, ques-t.ion
11-8 abovýe), See a-,lso KNDC./PV. 2-94, 16 Nan., 1967, Pa,)raý 14.,2571

miarolig,atiLon butt, WhiCh Would haveý applie,d to. eachpat
andno -tmeel
nclar-eaon taes 2 0 0 The, amnendi-ientnotreaper iadidubequntset of am-,endmien-ts presented by

The" jf.AR re".PresenTAative epandtha"t the amn-endmh,ent -propsdby his, djelegý,ationt wastý!intend-_ed to close a definite andimprtat
lop-oleHe arudthatiItvas3 not- e,nough for theý goverinments and official organsengýaged in nuclear activities to respect the provisions of theTreaty in all good faith.20

n the field of conventional andnuclear weapons a large part was played by certain companies,
firms or other bodies which are independent of the State. 2 0 4The fate of such an. important treaty should not be exposedto the hazards of divergent inlrerpretations or differences be,n-tween national legal systems. 20 5
Similar texts, as the one proposed, are often found inother treaties and fulfil a very useful function; that of assuring the contracting State against any actions by nationalsof another signatory State contrary to the text or the spirit-of -the treaty concluded between them. 2 0 6
The principle of good faith that should prevail in the interpretation of treaties had never obviated the need for a-

200

Ibid., Sec. 18 (ENDC/202, 2 Nov. 1967), Article IV-C. See
also ENI)CD/PV. 351, 28 Nov. 1967, para. 14.

201
202

Ibid., Sec. 36 (ENDC/220, 28 Feb. 1968) and Sec. 37(EJýDC/220/Rev. 1, 14 Mar. 1968).
ENIDn/IPV. 367, 20 Feb. 1967, para. 11.

203

EN]DC/PV. 333, 26 Sept. 1967, para. 9.

204A

REISO/-7,
206
E

/V,

3'40, 19 Oct. 19)67, para. 11,36,

20 F1eb. 1967, para. 11,

Bot
th

So)Vie

Uno

an

th

nie
h

courpo ra te theURaedeti

Sta

raydats reusni

The Scovit,,6 re,-Artilesan IIIwhih wee cnsidredbroad inicpi
knowni t1o cover76

to

adwl

aLl possible recipients of nuclearwepos

non-nuclear-weapon

States,multilateral orgeanisatiuns or asso-

ciations, and any private individuals or associations. 28The
AmeriLcan representative mainly based the refusal of his country on the laws of the United States, which oblige theGovernment -to "continue to be in control of work on nuclear
weapons. Accordingly, it is the undertaking of governments with
20 9
which we must be concerned in the treaty.1"
The UAR did not insist on the amendment after the clarifi210
cations furnished by the two co-authors.
It must be said,
however, that any violation of the Treaty by any of those persons or entities who are subject to the jurisdiction of States
Party to the Treaty would engage the international responsibility of the latter according to well-established international
legal nonms.
(b) Assistance from a Nuclear-Weapon State to another NuclearWeapon State
This sort of assistance isallowed under the NIPT which only

207

Ibid. Part of the arguments were in answer to the rep)resentative of Canada who considered thatb Arti;cle i implicitly covers any practical problem that mgtar,ise Concerning the activities mentioned in the 'LAF.aedet
See ENT)C/PV. 338, 12 Oct. 1967, plara. '7.

2081

ENDC/PV.

209

Ibid., paras. 81-82.

210

Professor George Fischer is of -the view, that6 both the DAR
arid the Nigerian amendmients should have bee'n retaine-d becauise of the increasingý role playe,_d by thne priJvate ýsectoro do-r1fr
de S
in the inuclear field. Flischer, La
arMes nucl-4a-ires, p.67.

570,

27 Feb.

16,prs259

65

prohibits~~ancerwaoweapn Sttei

Thi

a

Ste

s asisin
from1

encnimdb

1any
non-nuclear-C

sevieral, ofziciý!alao State wasJ
to ncler-ejnfact assistancestatementsa
sitneadcniudcoope
intended in the HPT týo alo
ingdm, 1 whi-chi is assist1ed by thie U1S
K,J) L
aton wth th Unite
eelpetanid farcat,ion) of ýatomiic wýeapn thrug
ondsgnonLftcnlg,nnncercmoet
21
nfarictednuclear mate-rial
and

povs
th

of weapons,

Hoee,in the case of France, for example, assistancethemight be restricted by the Test-Ban Treaty. Each :Party toalatter undertakes not to assist any other country, whether
kindParty or not, in carrying out nuclear explosions of theto theprohibited under the Treaty. For example, in a letter
US
Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
given
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated that the authorityofin the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as amended for transfer
materials and informnation to nations which made substantial
limitprogress in the development of atomic weapons, would betoed by the Test-Baai Treaty if a country engaged or proposed
engage in nuclear-weapon tests in the prohibited environments. 214
If France, which as of June 1975 carried out only underground nuclear explosions, were to resume its atmosphericnuclear-weapon tests in the Pacific, it would be reasonable

211

212
215

For example, see EN~DC/PV. 369, 22 Feb. 1968, para. 51 andofNPT,
Gerard Smith in Hearin s on Military Imlicat-ionsp. 122.
Adrian Fisher in Hearin,-s-on NPT, 1969, p. 356.
See the "Memorandum" furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission to the US Senate Committee on Armed Services in
fNT p. 141.
mlct7niiaroHeta-rings

Ba, pp. 976-977, The United States has
onTet
J1 HTri(it the F-renchi for sup)ply of fuelaIdomntaremn
prtotypeý reacto-r fo)r submar-ineý;lundbase
mtrasfor260

in prin Cip,le, be re eovnhassilstance ini the mianuý,factur"e of nutc,lear waosfo
Pristthe,t.im,eParties to the NPýT -whichý are atlthe sam-ie
Howoever, it,ma be difficu)lt smtmst
Test-Bani Treatýy.

to conclude that France woutldnt,

vrerify that thýe assistance rend(ered hýad a,drc

bear,ingL on

th.e nuclear-weapon--t eStin,g programm-e,.
tt

A,ssist,-an,ce fromý a ncerwao

oaohrncer

wea~pon StaTe was criticised by India on the- groundl that- suchý'assistance migh~t be rendered to a nuclear-weapon State 1'whiich
may not have reached the same degree of sophistication in th.e
21 5Japan pointdevelopment of its nuclear-weapon technology".
qd out that lack of restriction should by no means be taken as
an implicit authorization and that self-restraint would be in216
Actually, assistaccordance with the spirit of the Treaty.
ance froma nuclear-weapon State to another nuclear-weapon

State contributes to the vertical proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
(c)

fom on-Ncler-WapossitaneSttes to Nuclear-

Weapon States
Non-nuclear-weapon States undertake, under Article II of
the NPT, "not to seek or receive any assistance", but they are
not prohibited f'rom assisting others including assistance tonuclear-weapon States.
Non-nuclear States under the first

American traydraftof 17 August l96ý were generally prohibited f rom grnin assistance. Prohibition on 'providing -assistance0 by non-nuc'lelearweapon States was also included in the US Amiendments,,- olf 21
Article 3 of the Soviet draft of 24 sep)tember 1965 stipulated that -. "The Parties to thi_s T'reaty shallrefrain from offerinig any support, encouira,gemient or -inducement

March 1966.

Moreover,215

A/C.1/PV,

156ý7 (prov..),

1-4 May 1967,

p.63-65,_

216

A/C.l/PV.

1-566 (prov.),

1.0 May 1-968,

p. 32,.

2,61

to~~~~~~~~~~~~
oon mnfcueo
Stte sekn

eecs

otol over

Parie
t th

NT hoareatte,eti,me Parties to theýTretyofTLa-te_1o1(.o wouLd, hoee,not be3 alloweýd -to assist
nucleýlar-weaponi Statues. Pa-ragriaph) 2 of Article I prohibits theContracting Parties "from engagýing in, encouraging or authoriz-ing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in thetesting, use, manufacture, production, possession or control
of any nuclear weapons." 2 18
For those non-nuclear-weapon States permitted to assist
nuclear-weapon States, they could, for example, furnish thelatter the uranium necessary for their nuclear weapons'
production, However, one of these countries, Canada, d~oes notagree to sell uranium unless for peaceful purposes and undersafeguards.
Another possibility raised by a Swedish scientist, Dr.
UJlf Ericsson, is that non-nuclearrweapon States are formally
free to assist nuclear-weapon States in the development ofpeaceful nuclear-explosives techniques. In his view,
however,
it is Practically difficult or even impossible to do this without great controversy. What the non-nuclear-weapon States cando, in his view, is to assist in the study and development ofpeaceful effects of nuclear explosions. 219(d)Assistance from a Non-Nuclear-Weapn State to Another NonNuclear-We1pon State
Assistance is obviously prohibited if the receiving country is a Party to the Treaty, The question arises only whenthereceiving country is

not a Party to the Treaty.

The UJAR raised
the question for the first time at the ENDC on 26 September
217
218

See Appendix 3-B.
See Appendix 8,219

Ericsson, "'The Question of Nuclear Explosions",
p. 10.

262

to Articleo
represenitative, submitLted ansdet
which amdat insiertjing ait the end of the,- lasý,t snec

-it1967 whaen
IIthe followingr'.,and not ini any wqay to assist,enorg,
manufacýture
toState
induce anv non--nuclear-weapon
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nu-~
clear explosive devices, and coýMol over suoh
(Emphasis adweapons and explosive devices."ded.)
The UAR representative explained that the 24 August 1967
treaty draft contained a gap where "lies a possibility of theproliferation of nuclear weapons which must and can easily beeliminated by including this prohibition in the text ofArticle II ..." 21The UAR representative argued that:
It could very well happen that a non-nuclear country party
to the treaty, having certain aggressive designs and taking
advantage of certain favourable international conditions, might
assist another non-nuclear country not party to the treaty toobtain nuclear weapons. 22Although the country would be acting counter to the whole intent and purpose of the NIPT, it
might assert that it had not violated the letter of the treaty.

223

The loop-hole in Article II was not a theoretical one of
no practical significance. The importance of the distinction
between theoretical and practical was entirely relative and-might change with the circumstances of time and place. If it

and AdId. tL,

220

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230
Ann. IV, Sec. 13 (ENDC/197, 26 Sept. 1967).

221

ENDC/PV.

222

ENDJC/PV. 340, 19 Oct. 1967, para. 5. Eliza'betih Youing
thought that the UIAR re_prese-ntative hiad Isra.el or So-u.thAfrica in mind. E, Young,, A Farew,,ell -to Armi,gs Control ?
PP. 104-105.
ENDC/PV. 340, 19 Oct. 1967, para.- 6.

223555, 26 Sept. 1967, para. 8,263

were~~~~~~~~ a2- tertcllohoe
whwaitlimntIOed bof ~~ Inaey!Lýf Artcl
tewrigontwic

riltheLsýponsors of thetwo drf-L-tsiad rao Iichdý
agreoement 2 2I,International censurýe and effective corrective measures by
the permanent members of the UN Security Council for those who
would take advantage of the loop-hole were either vague withrespect to the first or needed a very clear and well-defined226
text with respect to the second.,

Both the Soviet Union and the United States refuised to accept the UAR amendment to Article II. They based their refusal
on two basic arguments. First, if a non-nuclear-weapon State
party to the treaty were to assist another non-nuclear-weapon
State to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, such a casewould be regarded as a violation of the Treaty. 27The presumption would irmmediately arise that such an act had the purpose of developing nuclear weapons for the State rendering theassistance. 28Second, paragraph 2 of Article III contains aprovision to the effect that all parties to the treaty under-

224

Ibid., para. 7.

225

Ibid., para. 8.

226

227

Ibid., para. 9. The arguments were, in fact, an answer
to Canada's representative who mainly argued that theloop-hole was a theoretical one. See ENDC/PV. 338, 12
Oct. 1967, paras. 8-10. The United Kingdom also objected
to all the UAR amendments on the ground that Articles 1
and IT were the result of long discussions on the part ofthe co-Chairmen so as to close all loop-holes of practical significance. Any addition was considered to add further complications which seemed to the UK representative
as a dangerous course to follow. ENDC/PV, 337, 10 Oct.
1~967, para. 54.
ENT)C/PV. 370, 27 Feb. 1968, para. 59 (USSR).

228

Ibid.,, para. 83 (US),204

an no-nuclerI-wapo Stat wihiin
take not, to provi
prcsigopoutonf
eq3mn
1orth
able mtral orthte fisoal mteriaýi
special fissionable ma-,te-rial_nls
22subject to the safeguards required by, t,he Trety
The UAR representative commented on, the caiiain
UAR
ven by the Soviet Union and the US with respect to allamendments by making the following significant statement:

1"Presumably those clarifications have been given bythem not only as co-Chairmen but also as co-authors
which confers imporof the draft treaty, a
them.
upon
weight
tant

ýt

for
Apparently, the opening up of the core of the Treaty
fromthe PAR amendment might well have resulted in pressureother countries -to have the Treaty bar assistance by non-nuclear-weapon States not only to other non-nuclear-weapon2 1
States themselves. 3
States, but also to the nuclear-weapon
in theThe PAR amendment received considerable attention
5
that "thedisarmament literature.,3 Mason Willrich consideredin this resreluctance of the superpowers to amend their draft
there waspect seems difficult to justify, especially since
Stasupport for such an amendment from the non-nuclear-weapon
the supertes, and since there was no latent conflict between
25 3 Moreover, Willrich noticed
powers as to interpretation".
applicablethat under Article III, paragraph 2, safeguards arefor "peaceful
only to nuclear materials and equipment provided

229
250
251
252

235

Ibid., para. 61 (USSR). See also para. 84 (US).
Ibid., para. 95.
Willrich, Non-,Proliferation Treaty, p. 98.
"TheýFor example, see Ibid., pp. 95-98; Elizabeth YunginHidgh
Treatý-y
1968:The
ProliferationofControl(Lonand Forecast". The Institute for Strat-eg-ic St-uýdies
J_H.
15);
p--)
1969,
Apr,ý
56,
Pes,No.
dehi
don),to ýtArms
Smith, loc.cit., P. 347; and E,. You~ng, A1,Far:ewell17.
?,p.
Controlf
97-8pWillrich, No-rlfrtoCray'265puroseVitherefo'Lre, Lunder the Treaty as it stands, there
wouLld sýeem to) be no legal obstacle to a non-nuiclear-weapon
party furinishing material assistance, such as uranium, to another non-nuclear-weapon state not a party to the Treaty for234
a nuclear weapons program."

To Elizabeth Young, the US assurance that no government
would have any reason for helping others except to acquire nuclear weapons for itself in violation of the Treaty seemed
little unworldly. "If a government decided to go nuclear, would
it not seek to hire help, and denounce the treaty only at thelast moment ?" Mrs. Young, in support of her argument also
referred to a statement by the US representative to the ENDC
who conceded that wThat the treaty did not specifically prohibit was permitted. 2 35 In fact, the very first statement madein, "Questions and Answers to Allies" referred to above conceded that :"The treaty deals only with what,,is prohibited,
not with. what isItpermitted'. 236

We must conclude that a loop-hole does exist in Article II.
-is a danc-erous one even if' it is considered by some as atheore~tipal loop-hole.
*

*

*

X-

To sum up, in the first place principle (a) of GA resolution 2028(XX) has been variously interpreted with respect to
Articles I and II, thus reflecting the difference of views on
the non-proliferation concept that should be embodied in a nonproliferation treaty.
For the co-authors, i.e., the United States and the Soviet
Union, the Treaty embodics the non-proliferation concept as234

Ibid.,

235

E.

236

See note 127 above.

p. 96.

Young, A Farewell to Arms Control ?, P. 117.

266

the "Irish Resoluationl" anid therefor_e Jis.oio
cea
any loop-holes which might lead to the proliferationof,,
weaponis, In fact the Treaty goes beyond the "Irish Resýolution)_"formulated innuclearin prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons between
weapon States, which was not envisaged in 1961.
For many others, the Treaty suffers from serious loopin
holes because it does not go beyond the "Irish Resolution"
weapons byrestricting the vertical proliferation of nuclea.r
dispersal of
the nuclear-weapon States or in prohibiting theStatesnuclear weapQ.,Ls in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
such disperand the nuclcar-sharing arrangements attached tosal.
But regardless of this basic conceptual difference, theTreaty as it stands was found to suffer from loop-holes because
assistof certain omissions such as not restricting explicitly
ance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons between non-nuclearweapon States.
On the conceptual issue, it must be said that almost ten
consiyears after the "Irish Resolution" it would have been a
the verderable step forward if it were possible to restrict
tical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon
weaStates and to bring to an end the deployment of nuclear
The
pens outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States.
failure of the NPT to attain such objectives is due to majordifficulties pertaining to East-West confrontation. Unfortunanutely, in permitting the assistance in the manufacture offromclear weapons between nuclear-weapon States as well as
Treatynon-nuclear-weapon States to nuclear-weapon States, thenuis in fact contributing to the vertical proliferation ofh-av\eclear weapons. Banning such forms of assistance would
restGricting,been a first step towards more drastic meiasures .1in
nuclear-weapon States! vertical proliferation.
The Treaty as it

stands has certainliy avoided seriAous loop-

267

I,ter11a1 op6 on and ban11ing ulthIIullteho es by o(ýcLosingIthe)n conteIxt ofC
vn weapons0n
aij" exP1
psveC dJ cs othier tha
pe1ut insit that" onle serious.
owe er
A tces -1 an I
loop-.hole1 a"" b)een lefi 1 openi and th!at,i the as,Jsistance in thte
MIanu11facturý ofncla we'apo'ns or othier nuclear ex,plosive dý-Vce from o-ulerwaonSae Par-ties -to the Treaty toý
nonnuler-eaoxStatel-s notL Parties to teTreaty, It is r,egrettable th L- _-tJArticl 1L was not amiended so as to pL,reclude
expicilyuc anevetuait. Athoghassuiran,ce--s were gi-ven

by thie tLwo co-auth,Iors th-at, suýých assiýstance, if it tak,es plac',e,wouild be co)nsidered as, a violation of the Treatýy are certainlyof considerable value, they do not really substitute for a
precise legal prohibition. We do believe, therefore, that theloop-hole should be remedied by resorting to the amendment
procedure prescribed in Article VIII-1 and 2 of the NPT.
In spite of the shortcomings of Articles I and II, it
should be noted, however, that the first Review Conference of
the Parties to the NPT in 1975 confirmed that the obligations
undertaken under these articles have been faithfully observedby all Parties. The Conference was convinced that the continued
strict observance of these articles remained central to theshared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. 27Moreover, and as reported so far by the UN
Secretariat to the second session of the Preparatory Committee
for the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT
meeting in Geneva during August 1979, there have been no complaints or suggestions that the nuclear-weapon States or the
non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT have failed tocarry out the respective obligation assumed by them under
Articles I and 11.238

27'

Fi1nal Declar,,ation of the Revýiew Conference of t1he Parties
to t.he Treaty on the Non-Prol_iferation of N1,uclear Weapons(NPTF1CONF135/1),, Annex I, p., 2.

2338

Dec.

IP/OFI/P.I3
Aug. 1.97[9, para., 13.'268

much ~~~~

-pr( l e-aion~ T~ graeripat0nasesngte

ratnt,he accepta:ble aac
dr i t helihto pinile (bularwa-1 ies a-Jnd obiatosofte1~~
esoiTJitof mutual"pect,ýto
W,ýýit res1ýctýao Statiý.11e,s.
pon S tat1,es arnd theý noni--nu c Ieaý r-We,,and II, the oo-aut.hOr5: antrd
the basic obligat1ions Iin Articles I
referred to the "Irish Retheir supporters, on the one hand,
was faithful to that,solution" to demonstrate that the Treaty
therein were wellresolution and therefore the obligation~s
I and II, on the other hand,balanced. The critics of Articles
gone beyond the "Irish
maintained that the NPT should have
above; and having failed
Resolution", in the manner describedaffected by loop-holes but
to do this, the Treaty was not only
also suffered from inbalance.
obligations Iin Articles
It is quite obvious that the basic
demonstrate that the obligaI and II analysed in this Chapter
are basically different.
tions of the two categories of States
States for thisIn order to compensate the non-nuclear-weapon
by Article III, which exdiscriminatory treatment accentuated
Articles IV, V
em-ots nuclear-weapon States from inspection,
were devIsed.
_, Security Council resolution 255
and VI as we. ý
words, certain guIarantees
as compensatorýy measures. In otherenergy and to security
relating to peaceful uses of nuclear
provisions of Articles
were sought to redress the unbalanced
States.
I and II in favour of the non-nuclear-weaponof the Security
How far these Articles and the resolution
with Articles I,
Council reflect, especially in conjunction
and responsibili.ties,,ý, c-an
II and III, a balance of obligations
very end, of this stuady, -In
only be completely assessed at thein Part TITI, toc ana-lyse_ý Ar_ýthe meantime, we shall endeavour,oft nucloar eeg,aticles IV and, V on the peaceful uses,

on ula'surtwell as Security Council resoliiution 255
anitreýýats iametas
assurano ýB As for Article VI, which_,i
as founLd preferaL,ble toexin
other aspect o- seurty
itintielihoif p)r-1incýiple (c269PART III"The Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual
responsibilitiesandobligations of the nuclearand non-nuclear
Powers"(Principle (b))

CH. PTTER
The Peacefu

tJse

oýCf

~At1ce

e

oerIc

Texts
Preamble
applicaAffirmina: the principle that the benefits of peaceful
Ti7o"nsof nuclear technology, including any technological by-fromproducts which may be derived by nuclear-weapon Statesavailbeshoulddevices,
explosive
nuclearofdevelropment
thewheTreaty,
thetoable for peaceful purposes to all Parties
States,ther nuclear-weapon or non-znnclear-wpaPofl
PartiesConvinced that, in furtherance of this princip~le, allpos.f~ullest
theinparticipate
toentitled
Tot-he Treaty arecontributetosible exchange of scientific information for, anddealone or in co-operation with other States to, the ~further
Peacefulforenergyatomicofvelopment of the applications
purposes,
Article IVthe
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting
developtoinalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty
research, production and use of nuclear ene:rgy for peacefuýl
with Harticeýs
purposes without discrimination and in, conf ormýý ity
Treaty,thisof
I and IIan
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertapke tofaitteexýchang
possLbeifullestthein,participate
tohave the rightnfr
of equipment, materials and scientific an tclnco-Oltlhe
toPartiesenry,
nuclearofmation for the peaceful usesonri
in1
aloco-operateII.
shall
so
do
to
Treaty in a position
buting alone or together withi othecr, States' or i_ntenaioa
organizations, to the furthIep_ devýýelopm-fent oft t1te aiictnsoi
t'he te-cr-1-nuclear energy for peaceful puýqrposes, espqecihl_ly in¶'et,wt
thje
to
sPrty
St
tories of no-ularWao!Itheas
deve,l,,,_o,,I-ing
due consijderca-tion for tbe iieeds of tL-he2
world.
*

*

273

*

X

t1a adenotrpi yposof 1945
managetht,o nule

e w-t

fis t

ý,,
d Nag asak,inHILroshIimiua ant

aa-,man- hasfor his, welfar,e adprosperLi ty.
a1welo u,e the atom)rý

"The, At_oms1.1 fQr, Peaceseech by Pres-Iident Eisenhowe,-r at, thie T)N
GeealAsebyoni 8 Decembehr P19)53 opc,ened a newa era of cooperatonlit'he fielId of pe2acefalkseof n'uclear energy mark-by t'he creati,ol) of t-he Internat-I.onalO Atomic Energy Agency
ad1-J
which cparne into existence on 29 July 1957.1
The wide progressive spread of the use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes in many areas of the world, and the promising future potentials of the peaceful atom are fraught,
however, with dangers due to the close parallels between thepeaceful and military nuclear technologies. The NPT is in essence aiming at preventing nuclear energy exploited for peaceful purposes from being used to serve military ends. Articles
II and III of the NPT are in fact the basic instruments forprohibiting and checking against the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices by the non-nuclear-weapon States.
Fears were expressed by the latter States that the NET, byinstituting such a control on their peaceful nuclear activities
in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, would
hamper their full access to the knowledge and technology of thepeaceful atom most needed for their future progress and prosperity; tha.t international inspection might turn into industrial espionage; and that the Treaty would place them at themercy of the nuclear-weapon States which woulId continue to enjoy their privileged position as the major suppliers of nuclear
fuel and necessary equipment.
Freedom to exploit the atom for peaceful purposes to thebenefit of the non-~nuclear-weapon States was considered by the
II1 For "The Atomiis for Peace" speech, see G-AOR, 8th Sass.
Plnay MIeetings, 4'70th plen. mtg, 8 Dec. 1953,paas274

latter as theo most tanyible counterparts to khriei rennnciatonl
gewnda 0o tO'e
eqpns.TAe provisionaluclar
to cqure
Confrene oLth Nohn-Nuclea-Weapon Hhttes, drafted by hhc
for thn Conference, relecned cleary
the balAhn cxpected between nuaiear weapons renunciatio andc
peaceful atom exp ctuatio_ns.- The final agenda of the Conf,erencc
reparatory KwOWmitewith respect to co-operation in the field of peaceful uses a,'
nuclear cnergy was more or less tailored to the provisions ofArticles IV and V of the NPT.3
i s against this background that the importance and significance of Article IV and the corresponding preambular paragraphs can be understood and appreciated. In contrast withIt

Articles 1, !I and III which have all remained unaltered since
they were first presented in identical treaty drafts by theoriginal co-authors, (i.e., the United States and the Soviet
Union), Article IV was not only introduced for the first timeby the latter upon the request and initiative of non-nuclearweapon States but also underwent considerable changes before
its final formulation to satisfy non-nuclear-weapon States,
demands. Its subject matter, as well as that of Article V, re-lated to peaceful nuclear explosions, received the major partcf the comments on the NPT at the ENDC after 1967. It was infact the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, a question raised by the United States in August 1966 at
the ENDC , 4which had triggered in dramatic proportions the moregeneral question of the peaceful uses of nuclear enorgy. As'
peaceful nuclear explosions were to be the reserved domain of
the nuclear-weapon States, fears were expressed that otherdomains would be restricted as well,
2
3
4

UN Doc. A/6817, 19 Sept. 1967, Ann. I, p. 2 (item 4() andQb).
See MIal Doonment of the Conference of No-Nucelar-WeaPon
States (A/CONW, T5/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Ann. III, Pp. 1-2.
See section if in Chapter 5,

275

o1

tu
heW'nd1
tta
og
wlyA
ex he eallal
1967~r)

th
In

whehe

r

be1 or in

Of th

196
eica

an

and i n1 n'iO
1esip

ovit dra:ifof 1965,

he oprtve parIt.

draftNs of' 24 Augusý__t 1967 cýontiaJ inedh
rablrpaýragraphs, twohefisttet f rtcl1V aneandexacýtly the same i.n the finval. t-ex&t as quotedof whctreatyaboveý. The third had moved in the following identiýcal
Ardrafts of 18 January 1968 to the operative part to composeThertio-' catrat

ticle V as will be shown in Chapter 7.
asArticle IV of the 1967 identical drafts was the result,many suggestconceded by the US representative to the ENhDC, c-fthations by the -ion-nuclear-weapon States. He further concededfrom thethe idea for such an article was originally derived
representaTreaty of Tlatelolco. It was in fact the Mexican
concretetive at the EN_DC, in March 1967, who had put forward
uses
ideas as to the formulation of an article on the peacefulof nuclear energy.7
to moSeveral formal amendments were proposed at the EN~DC
Brazildify Article IV. They were suggested by Mexico, Romania,
accepted by
and Nigeria. 8Only the Mexican proposal was partly
identical
the United States and the Soviet Union in their second
567S

See Appendix 3-D.
See text of Article
ENDC/PV. 325, 2~4 Aug. 1967, para. 17.
17 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Appendix 8).
ENIDO/PV. 295, 21 Mar. 1967, paras. 12-13.
1,
DCOR, $uppl. for 1967 and 1968, ]Docs. DC/230 anld Add.
Sec.
(Mexico));1967
Ann. IV, Sec. 12 (ENDC/196, 19 Sept.
(ENIDC/201,
14 (ENDC/199, 19 Oct. 1967 (Romania)); Sec. 16
Nov. 1967
2(ENDC3/202,
18
Sec,
31t Oct' 19647 (Bai);and(Njgra)

276

o 18
drafs

anury i68.

non ofwhc

wer

So-viedrat-ý

ia

inororteinL

which. Artiýcle, I

dau

1te I

196

Lon
S

intctl;remained

lesumedthe First Committee during the, 2ýd rwhichsession of the UN General Assembly in April-June 1968, intothe NFT was finally formulated, had introduced three changes
theArticle IV, two ef which were in partial compliance withwas
previous Italian and Nigerian amendments. The third change
resintroduced in response to concerns expressed by Chile withn.,upect to the status of the less developed countri es in the2clear field,'1
Thdbaesof

This brief survey of the formulation c-f Article IV servesto demonstrate how much this article is the fruit of non-n-uclear-weapon States' endeavours. The representative of Italyato the ENDC considered Article IV as an attempt to codify
new human right. 13But like all human rights, whether codified
or not, their value can only be appreciated by the measurestbat must be taksen to ensure their respect and free enjoly-Uent.
This was the prevailing concern at the Conference of Non-Nua_.fter, theclear-Weapon States held in Geneva almost two months

10

epe
See Appendix 3-E. See also the statement ofteUSetaursentative at the ENDC introducing te1
9-0
ENJDC/PV. 357, 18 Jan. 1.968, paras,
d.1n
IDCOR, Suppl, for 1967 and 19)68,,De.D/5
e.5
ai))
196_1
Feb.
Sec.- 17 (ENDC/20l/Rev. 2,13
ED/2,2(IayUSc66
1968_
Feb.
20
'EIT_DC/218,
96
Feb. 1968); and Se,,7, 5-,7(NC/2Rv.114Ta(Nigeri.ja,)

11

SeeApedx

123

/./V

9

15

-F

59(rv)

ENC/P.567,

0 Feb

6Ny16,p.7-5
196,Z

p7~

7

NPT ~~~~~

frtof July 19-)68. 'Thewa
~onhe
oedfosintrtrpenatve,
Iris
to Commi(ittee Twvo ofL teConlferen-ce, entrse

ithxmiainothe f"IeLd ofpaeu

porme

for co-operation, 'inssof nucLear, e,nerg,y,wýas rfetn

thisprvail-,ing,[C coA-cen whnie notedi that Articlie TV "afforded no aslt

gurte"that thie b-enefits. of thIje peaceful.

appictinsOf nulaveeg
Staes
quiabl.

14

iould bie miadie ava'ilable to- allI

Theedas a strong_ need to reinlforceý thie

.Arti,,1cle by a set of s,upplementiary measures to ensure its prompt
im4plementation.

Th'e result was -that half of the resolutions

adopted by the Conference were related to the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy.L
The peaceful uses of nuclear energy have also received
great attention at the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties
to the NPT as well as at the 1978 United Nations General
NeedAssembly Tenth Special Session devoted to disarmament.
less to say that the implementation of Article IV of the NPT
also continues to be one of the main preoccupations of the
IAEA and its Nember States, as will be shown below.
In a first section we shall deal with paragraph 1 of Article
IV which contains the basic right :the inalienable right -todevelop research, production and useof nuclear energy forpeaceful pur-poses. A second section will dwell on the balanceof obliga-tions and rights contained in paragraph 2 of Article
IV. The paragraph contains in fact two sets of obligations andrights which will be analysed separately. The first, whichconstitutes the first part of paragraph 2, is of general application to all the Parties to the NPT. They undertake to facilitate,. and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and

14

A/CONY., 35/C.2//SR.9, 17 Sept. 1968, p. 95. See alsooACN'
35/. R7 -15 Sepýrt. 1968, p. 71 (Switzerland).
15Seeinal Douetof t5he Coniference of No--cla-We:apont
States (ACN.5/0
c.168), esltos,
I
1,
K, L,
J anýd E,,p.1-9278

the z,,onid part oC(t,consti1tu1ýtes,C
applicaýtioý to Paties to the0 Treacý
pcfic
or t-rty in~ a positioni to co-op,eratte in contriibuLtting alon
raiaiost1hgethe with ohe States, or international
whI

g.Thie, oecond
enpar'agýrap2, is of

furherevlopentofthe apLicaltin of nuclear enery
fnnncei th territý'o rie
peacfu pupss'sily

1oarty to the Treaty, wihdue considerait,_io for
But as th'e mothe needs of the developing areas of the world,or thrnouighdes of co-operaticn, whether bilateral, multilateral-the first set ofinternational organizations, equally apply toof equipment,
obligations and rights related to the exchange
a sematerials and scientific and technological information,

weapon Stteof coparate third section will be devoted to the channels
6
1
IAEA,
the
on
operation with Darticular emphasisof the obBut before going into all this, a brief outline
for peaceject of Article IV, i.e., the use of nuclear energy
help toful purposes, is most pertinent, It would especiallyinterests cof
appreciate the different priorities and divergent
in this field withthe developed and the developing countries
enunciated in
respect to the balance of rights and obligations
Article IV.

I. ThePeaceful Uses

of

Nuclear

Energ,yA Býrief

putlinýe

precludedb--e
NQ area of peaceful nuclear energy seems touof paeuby the NPT including the development and' use.
strict domain" of [the'clear explosions which are, hiowe!ver,, t`he
was n urg-e byýmany
nuclear-weapon States. Nvrhls,th)ere
ofnulaeer
States to define expliýctl"y tepeacef-ul uises,
FRG i_n CoaLJttee Two-,the'_gy. For example, thejC represenati-Lve of
taltos f'oaad tliai "tlheof the Conference- of N1u3arWaO
to permll%
ufietyexplicit
was
T-inotwrdin, ot the TratIe I 'A watith resý:pect to Ai,tic:(;
16Terole of tI'
epectCively,n1teated Jin, Oh.tr

279

nd I![ areAa ~ ~~~~~ ss~

prodctin weaonsc- suLea~ ~deLiinc'pae
sdsic~ ~~~)urmtopoibie
whch d.dot

endtsef tdi ferert iterpetatonjThegtainitorvy of the NPT` isfull oýf examples oftheeacfulsesof nuclear energy and their future prospects
cited by tLheý reýpresentatives of the two original co-authors aswell as by others. 18

The excellent guides, however, to thevaried and different peaceful uses of the atom, their development, actual status and future prospects are to be found in theproceedings of the four Geneva conferences on the peaceful usesof the atom, held consecutively in 1955, 1958, 196~4 and 1971 as
well as the1977 Salzburg international Conference on Nuclear

Power and its Fuel Cycle.

Moreover, at the initiative of theUnited States, the latter conference was followed by the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) held in Washington, D.C. on 19-21 October, 197 7.
The final results of the evaluation which are expected to beapproved by the INFCE plenary in Vienna at the end of February
1980 should also be instructive in this respect. We shall haveample opportunities to revert to the 1971 and 1977 conferences
19in the present chapter and in other parts of this study.
As INFCE results have not been finalized to this date of

1-7

A/COITF.35/C.2/SR.4, 10 Sept. 1968-18

For example, see A/C.1/PV.1568
32 (United States).

19

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proceedings of the FourthIntern-at-ional Conference, Geneva, 6-16 September 1971,
jointly sponsored by the UN and the IAEA (15 Volumes)(New York:
United Nations and Vienna:
International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), hereinafter cited as PeacefulUses of Atomic EnerEy, and Nuclear Power and Its F'uel Cycle.
Proce-ed-ing-s of an Internatioa Conference on Nuclear Powerand its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, 2-13 May 1977 (8 Volumes)(Vienna:International Atomic Energy Agency, 1977), hereinafter cited as Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle.
For theOrganizing Conference~~ofIPE_see__D_OSB ,'Voi. LXVII, No.
2003, Nov. 14, 1977, pp. 659-665.
The text of the Final
Communiqu6 of the Conference is reproduced in Appendix 20.

280(prov.),

15 May 1968, PP. 31-

writing,
and aslte Gonvernmentsivle

npeprnhiareor,t of' the eva luýation have optefocnidtalyutl
the Ferur!180penary acts on the ia
eot,w
aet
contend ourselves,

before tackling the sever.al brncesofnu

clear technology, with a brief background of the6vnt
ha
led to the 1977 Organizing Conference. The ongoingFvluto
is,

in

as it

a

fact,
is

investigating all branches of nuclear tcnlg
indicated in the final Communiqu6 of the Conference-t

attaohed to this study.
The United States,

concerned about the consequences of thefurther proliferation of nuclear weapons and believing that thedangers would be increased by the further proliferation of sensitive technologies that entail the production of plutonium andhighly enriched uranium, started to investigate on an internationalýlevel a sure safe nuclear f'uel cycle.
In its efforts
it emphasized the great risks involved of plutorium reprocessing and recycling and of fast breeder reactors.
At the 1977
Salzburg Conference, several countries resisted United States
overtures on the basis that in an era of energy crisis,, plutonium as a fuel is vital if they were to meet future needs.
At the summit meeting held in London on 7 and 8 May 1977
the Heads of State or Government of Canada, France, the FRG,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States committed themselves to increase nuclear energy to heŽlp meet theworld's energy requirements while reducing the risks3 of nuclear
proliferation.
They decided to launch an urgent study to determine how best they can fulfill this objective.
Throughout thesummer of 1977, experts of the seven countries held meetings in
Paris to consider the idea of INFCE. The United States,- also
held informal discussions with a number of conris
which it decided to convene the three-day Cnfernce
As INFCE isopen to all inter.ested( Sttsflointh"nmeroparticipants increased from '40 iný 19`771t
6i
97,wihiindicative of týhe getitrs
NC
a
eeae.
I
a
been agreed that INO
satehiasud,ntaegiton
and governments are ina nol w-a.y comte

toacetisruls

Th

fiv

bInce

ful~~ fal
seto int

five

rou

prouctonf nrihedurniu; teelements;
thwein~Iai

Intepa-theamiin

adcnettion

onceatcnlogy

abric__atUion1

ofnClafuel~ osrcioýand operation of niuclear,
reator; ad fel-eproce .ssing (recovery of enriched uranium
an e'tacionof plutoniumi). 20The objectiLve of these technolo,--ical acti-vities is either the generation of energy or theuse of ionizing radiation and radio-active isotopes.i1
1.

The Five Main Branches of Nuclear Technolo_Ey(a)The Mining and Concentration of Nuclear Raw Materials
Uranium and thorium ores are the nuclear source materials
of primary interest.
Only uranium is currently used in thepeaceful applications of nuclear energy. 22The technical methods
used for mining and concentrating natural uranium are relatively
simple and not very costly. Some twenty countries at least are
working their own deposits of uraniferous minerals, having
mastered the methods used for concentrating natural uranium.
The reasonably assured cummulative uranium resources at thecost of $30/lb U3 08 were estimated in 1978 by the Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) and the IAEA to be around 1,700,000 tons. About85'% of the reserves '-urn out to be in four countries, namely
20

21

22

See Achille Albonetti, "Access for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Who Have Renounced the Production, Acquisition and
Use of NTuclear Weapons, to Technology for Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy", Conference of Non-,Nuclear-Weapon States,
Geneva, 1968 (A/CONF.35/Doc. 6, 3 July 1968), Pp. 4-9.
See Contributions of Nuclear Technolog to the Economic
and Scientific Advancement of the Develoning Countries.
Report of the Secretary-General UBo.A76,24
July1969), para. 8, hereinafter cited as Contributions of Nuclaecio(A/756s). The following is based on
Albonettils paper and the Report of the Secretary-Generalunless otherwise indicated..
On the status of thorium technology, see Peaceful Uses ofAtomic Energy, Vol. 9, pp, 237-300 and Nula-o-erntFnýýcýýe,Vol. 2, PP. 37-53 and )455-4~71. In INFCE it wasestimated that commercial deployment of thorium cycles
probably could not be available until after the year 2000.

282

Australi,
1978

Canaa,

tts

h

/

y18,)

SotjfiaadteUie

It coul d be inrae

osomei100tn

It is estimated that the annual demand for uranium could
theoretically range from 32,000 to 143,000 tons in 1980. 25 The
Director General of the IAEA, Dr. S igvard Eklund, in presenting
the Agency's report for the year 1971-1972 to the 27th Sessionof the UN General Assembly, indicated that 2.5 million metrictons of uranium must be explored in the next -.two decades to meetthe requirements of the nuclear industry towards the end of the
century.,26(b), The Production of Enriched Uranium
Enriching uranium means the alteration of the natural mixture of the isotopes to increase the concentration of one or
Uranium 235 which is the fissile material needed
more of them.
for either peaceful or military purposes is onlY 0.7 per centof natural uranium, the rest being U-238. For peaceful purposes
3
uranium could be slightly enriched, containing as little as
For military purposes, the enrichment inper cent in U-235.
U-235 could reach as high as 90 per cent.
The separation of U-235 from U-238 is a,most complicated
The methods used for producing enrichedand costly enterprise.
in principle,
uranium were among the most well-kept secrets.

23

TAEA, The Annual Report for 1978 (GC(XXIII)/610), figure 14,
nowhich uranium isp. 21. U3 08 is the oxide fr
Assured resources could be defined as
usually milled.
known deposits which can be recovered within the given cs
range with currently proven mining and processing Echooy214

INFCE sources.

25

Nuclear26-0
A/PV. 2076 (pro,v.), 31Oct., 1972 pc
EVeeS,resourcuraIu
Ofsive studyof anidioyGopietn
rceig
Resources.,
tmcEnryAecy(inanizzed by theIntraina
IAEA, 1979 ).

Power

and

Its

Fuel

283

Cycle,Vo.2p.18
o
io

netn
fUrnu
ra

C,

They

a gaeousform(uraium exafuorie) and then separating the
frm theve
oeue.
By repeating the separation
proessman thusadsof tie,it is possible gradually toconcentrai -,te the, U-235., In gaseous diffusion, the gas is pumped
up aanta wall containing billions of microscopic holes
through which the lighter molecules tend to pass more easily.
In a gas centrifuge, the gas rotates at a very high speed andthe heavier atoms tend to concentrate around the periphery.28
ligte

Until recently, the only countries producing enriched uranium have been the five nuclear-weapon States. The rest of theworld had to depend on them to acquire the enriched uranium
needed for their peaceful programs. The Americans so far are
in a dominant position in this respect. The gaseous diffusion
is the only method at present being used on a vast scale bythose countries.
As to the centrifuge method, the Americans
built a plant as part of their wartime effort, but later decided
that the basic t-echnology was not sufficiently developed to makeit efcie29However, on 4 March 1970, the FRG, the Netherlands and the UK signed at Almelo, the Netherlands, an agreementon collaboration in the development and exploitation of the gas
centrifuge process.3
2'7

They were prompted by the commercial

For other methods being investigated or developed forcommercial applications; such as nozzle, chemical andlaser, see Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferati on(London:TaEylor &TFrancis Ltd-,-1-9-7977stockholm Int-er--national Peace Research Institute), Chapter 2, pp. 49-90.
28
29

See Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread?
Penguin Books, lq66)_,p`-.-T--93T.-(Harmondsworth:

Ibid. See also John Maddox, "The Nuclear Club", The Listener7TLondon), 5 June 1969 reprinted in Survival, Vo.
XI,
N's. 9, Sept. 1969, p. 275. The difficullty was not a difficulty of principle, or even initial cost, but of practice.
30For the text of the agreement, see Nuclear Law Bulletin,
No. 6, November 1970, pp. 41-54.
S-e`--11s3-7.-C.---V_ryand
Others, "Centrifuge Plants in Europe" (A/CONF.49/P/493:

284

atatVenes

oftiJehdt,uratei

h

uuea

oe
undertaken seýems to conf irm. tha thLpcfi
consumption of the ce-ntrifuge process is muchi loe than that of1
the gaseous diffusion process.)

Work alrad

It is expected that most nuclear reactors built in the 1980's
will burn enriched uranium, hence the need to accelerate its
At one point the United States
production to meet future needs.
plant. 32
was consideringý building a fourth uranium enrichment(c) The Fabrication of Fuel Element
Fuel elements are among the most important components - if
not the most important component -of nuclear reactors. The
techniques employed in their fabrication vary with the type ofreactor for which they are designed. Advanced reactors, forexample, need fuel elements that involve particularly heavy
capital outlay and complex technological features which only

31

32

United Kingdom) and M. Bogaardt; K. Einfeld; and J. Tatlock, "Objectives and Progress in the Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Industry" (A/CONF.)49/P/382: The Netherlands)
in Peaceful Uses of Atomic EnerE;y, vol. 9, pp. 53-61 and63-c8 respectýively.
For the advantages of the gas centrifuge
Ibid., p. 66.
method, see also Leonard Beaten, "Controlling the Atom
Menace", The Times, 32 Jan. 1969, p. 8. The advantages
ele~ctrcty cost will be only a fraction of thatare:required in a diffusion plant; centrifuge cascades canwork on a much smaller scale and so can be progressively
built up over a period of time; and consequently centrifuge designed to do the early stages of uranium enrichment
can be later adapted for the higher enrichment stages. For
centrifuge advantages based on six years of operation by
Urenco, see D. Aston and E. Raetz, "Status of the Urenco/
Centec Centrifuge Project and Advantages of the Process-,ý"in Nuclear Power and Its F.uel Cy,,c-le, Vol.!_(IAEA-CN-36/99)
3, pp. 1)43-152.
aua,K.
The three US plants are at Oak Ridge, Tn.
and Portsmouth, Ohio. For a g.,Lobal viewa_ ofthsausonaenrichment facilities in op ato,udrcosr
Pdr
Ole
se
stae.
in the research and developmn.ent
esistpsduaum
Jeaato"I'I industrie de leFeb
6valuation r6cente," LIEABA Bulti,Vol.! 19, JNo.
p.4-2
1977 (French edition-),theinusrJl
dutra

plnt

advnce

conre

main

can comad

eeaeInelmet
Lo in the US,(ue theTherar man type of ractors. Thr is an infinite numberof
ossblecominations of fuels, moderators, cooling system,
colatsand reflectors by which the energy generated in
the core can be extracted from the reactor. The techniques
usedin designing, building and operating a nuclear reactor arealmost invariably regarded as trade secrets. They call for highlysophisticated techniques which, as a rule, are available only
in industrially advanced countries.
Reactor systems can be classified at present in three maincategories :light water reactors (LWR), heavy water reactors(HWR) and gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactors.
Light water reactors (so-called because they use7light orordinary water as the moderator) include the boiling waterandpressurized water types using enriched uranium fuel. They
have
been developed p~rincipally jin the United States and the USSR.
Most of the reactors that have become competitive, and whichhave therefore been sold and exported, are of the Amierican
type.
Heavy water reactors (which use heavy water as the moderator) have six or more variants using natural or enricheduranium, pressure tubes or pressure vessels, and different
coolants, such as light water, heavy water, gas cr organic
liquids.
Gas-cooled reactors include the carbon dioxidecooled,graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors developedin theUX and France.
High- temperature gas"cooled reactors (HTR) using
enriched uranium fuel are under development ,33

Contributions of Nuclear,Technology (A/7568),
P. 7.

34

For more details about nuclear power reactors, see
Ibid.,
Annex II.

286

tion _is whtefuel,

ointr,oduce a system thatue-ntrl

or one thtuses lightly enriched uranium,rnu

The lattematerial is actually produced by very few countries and, not All
Th-e formerof them are exporting it on a substantial scale,material is more widely available, as shown above, and allows
for those countries having an indigenous supply to be selfsufficient and independent in their peaceful nuclear endeavors.
On economic and technical grounds, the reactors using enricheduranium have lower capital, but somewhat higher fuel costs thanthose using natural uranium. However, the latter material imposes severe limitations on reactor design and operation.

Onthe other band, reactors using natural uranium produce more
plutonium, a very necessary material for future fast breeder
reactors.

Militarily, a country keeping an option for producing

atomic bombs would most probably opt for reactors using naturaluranium, unless it can indigenously invest in the production ofhighly enriched uranium suited for nuclear-weapon manufacturing.
With regard to the future fast breeder reactors, which will
be us-Lng- pluton_iu-. mixed with some uranium as a fuel,called "breeders"consume;they arebecause they produce more plutoniu-m than ti ey"fast breeder" because they use fast neutrons (notbecause they breed fast). The time it takes to accumulate enoughexcess plutonium to start another reactor of the same type istypically about 10 years.3 If we add to this that the breeders
3
use about 100 times less uranium than thermal convertors, 06
the demand on uranium might considerably decrease, thus alleviating the strain on this source material.
A firstgeneration of breeders have been develroped and-are
the Soviet Union,

the Unitedt Kigo

and Frneinoperation in

35

Vict-or G-ilinsky, Breeder Reactor,s andthL SradofPlutLoThe R,an,d. Cr(Porýitiýon,nium (Santa Monica, Californiýa
P-3483, Nov. 1966),p.3
Ibid., P. 4. See also, ffor thle s all hor Wheý( e-is Nuclearc
Us- ?'Santa Mon.icauQli,ri
Reactor Techrnolo2Sj_T,,LJ,,,
The Rand Corporation, P-5
p.19 67),

36

287

JW

representing
Other boreeders aretheculintin o teevlopmen_ýtt ph1ase
ontrctonby the FRG and Japan as well as jointly byundr
the hR, Belgiumr and the Netherlands.3
rttp

oe

ln

ftect

es

fLos

As to the United States, concern over nuclear-weapon proliferation and the desire to examine fuel cycle alternatives thatminimize the risks of proliferation prompted the President todecide on 7 April 1977, inter alia, to restructure the US breeder
programme to give greater priority to alternative designs of thebreeder and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be
put into commercial use, a decision he hoped would set an example
8
to other nations to follow.3
Research -isalso b, ing undertaken to prove the feasibilityof cons truct ing a fusion reactor - a thermionuclear device reiore e~nergy through a controlled -nuclear fusion thanleassir< mthr_-uJn a controllcd nuclear fLission.3 In the words of Dr.
G-l,ni" Seaborg, the then, chairmian of the US Atomic Energy Coinmiss559cc (AEC), "(t)he successful development of a controlled
thermonuclear fusion reactor would mean the availability of an
e011r gsource eqjual to 500 Pacif ic

Petrolcum

37

38
39

40

Oceans full of high grade... 114

See IAEA, The Annual ReDort for 1978 (EC(XXIII)/610), paras.
CooperatT-cn on Breeder Reactors-ntenatioal
68-72 and T
TeoceelrFudto,17)(nraional(New York:
Policy Studies), especially Chapter 2, On the French programme; see G. Besse, M. Rozenholc, B. Saitcevsky and G.
Vendryes "Situation et perspectives du programme frangais
de r6acteurs a neutrons rapides" in Nuclear Power and Its
Fuel Cycle, Vol. 1, pp. 371-39,2.
US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1977 (Pub. No. 101, June
1979)(MasH-ington, D.C.: US Government-Printing Office, 1979),
p. 220,
IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 13,
See "Fusion: Where Do We Stand?"See also IAEA, The Annual Report
No. 5, 1971, pp. 2~4-30.
for 1978 (GC(_XXIII)/610J, paras. l39-1l4l.__The___So_vie_t Union-recentlyreported a major step toward a fusion plant.
has
The New York Times, 20 Oct. 1979..
GleŽm' T. Seaborg, "Need We Fear our Fuiture ?", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Jan. 1968, p. 37.

288

Inpracticet, onliy a small-ar of thie fisionab1LUDemtrain the natural urani-wu, or in the enriched uranium is consumea,din the reactor core. The rest can be used again in anotherreactor if, after a lapse of some time, it is suitably treatedin so-called fuel reprocessing facilities or chemical separation plants. These plants are essential to the production of
plutonium, the basic raw material for warlike nuclear devices.
With the advent of fast breeder reactors, plutonium- might displace uranium as the primary nuclear fuel. Furthermore, thepotential of recycling plutonium in thermal reactors indicatesits future commercial importance.
Until recently, fuel reprocessing plants were known only to
At present, there are such facilities innuclear-weapon States.
a number of non-nuclear States, among them India, Italy, the FRG,
Japan and Belgium. The latter took over, in October 1978, theEuropean company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels(Eurochemic), which was previously a joint project of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), a specialized agency of the Organi41
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Concern over nuclear-weapon proliferation around the world
also prompted the President of the United States to couple his
decision on fast breeders referred to above with another decision deferring indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the US nuclear power programmes. 42Those decisions paved the way to the US initiative
41

For the texts of the convention constituting the Company and
IAEA,
its Statute, see Multilateral Ageemýents (Vienna:1969) (Legal Seri-e-s-N-o.7 1)T7For the takeover of the company
by Belgium, see Nuclear Law Bulletin (NEA), Vol. 22, Dec.

1978, pp. 38-39.
42

Documents

on Disarmament,

1977, p. 220.

The. Presi.dent

po6inted out in his statement of 7 April. 1_977 thnat thepln

at Barnwell, South Carolina, will recei'ýve nei_therfera
encouragement nor funding for its completion as areocs
However, thne rercsigof plutoninuml forsing.facility.
underway at the avannah, R,iverc
weapon purposes is still

Plant in Aiken, South,Car.olina,
Dec. 1979.

28

The Washing.ýton 'Post,27(

in IN*'FC wi.thl a view of invest-[gat,ing potential- nuclear fu.,elcycles,iore resista;ýnt to nuclear-weapon proliferation projects
than thne present cycles, whereby plutonium is produced', reproThose decisions also paved the- waycesýsed and used as a fuel.
Nuclear No-Poif era tion Act of 10 March 1978,~to t'he UýJSwhich prohibits the export of sensitive nuclear material andequipment t.o nion-nuclear weapon States, such as plutonium andreprcesingplants; and requires the tightening of international
saeurso

tercpetcountries.

_Iation will be later assessed,

The new American legis-

especially in conjunction withth.,e study of itraonlsafeguards.
2. The Uses of-Nuclear Technoloý_v(a) The Generation of Energy
The energy is generated by nuclear reactors and peaceful
nuclear explosions. As the latter's potential applications aretreated in Chapter 7, we will confine ourselves here to thepeaceful applications of nuclear reactors.
The energy generated by reactors is used either for electricity production or as heat in industrial processes, as motive power (including ship propulsion) or in deQalination.
As pointed out by the IAEA, nuclear power has become
an accepted component of electric power in many parts of
the world.

It is beginning to be treated as a ??conventional"tmethod of producing electricity and is selected primarily on
the basis of economic considerations. By the end of 19.78

43

Public Law 95-2)42, Mar. 10, 1978 in the US Congress, Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Legislative History of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 9-77, H.R. b636 (Public'Law 95-242) (Prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 1979), 96th Congress, 1stSession (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office,
1L979), pp. 6-39, hereinafter cited as Legislative History
In Iviýew of th7e iMpiDJofthie Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.
cat,ions and effects of ths Act on UnulacoprtIo
other countr,ies, thie A1ct is reproduced in Appendix 21
w-Ith11t'o t.hi`s StCud'y.

290the world's -installed nuclear power capcitlaounted to,110.000 mnegcawatts,~ or about 6 percent of the world's total,electric generating capacity Cl,9OQ,000MIW(e)), By 18,on
the basis of plants now beiýng built, the share ofL nuclea_r
power will increase to about 12 percent of t."e elerct
actually produced -2.'700.000 MW(je)). Th'is share represents
the equivalent of more than 400 million tons of o-Ill a year.
Moreover, present forecasts by the IAEA inrdiCate thjat ula
capacity could be between 20 and 26' percent of a total world
electrical generating capacity by the year 2000, UP to,1972,
only two developing countries had nuclear power generating
facilities in operation, namely India and Pakistan, financed
respectively by the US and Canada. In 19-78 it was estimatedthat twelve developing countries are scheduled to have powerreactors in operation by 1984. All these projections.are morecautious than earlier ones, The rising political opposition
to nuclear power, new regulatory demands and stricter export
conditions have contributed to the cutting back on plans fornuclear power. 4
Nuclear energy as a notive power for space power and marine
propulsion is a field where nuclear-weapon St~ates have madeconsiderable achievements. Only very few advanced non-nuclearweapon States, namely t-he FRG, Italy and Japan, have also madesome progress in ship propulsion.4
Desalting of sea-water to satisfy increasing demandý forwater has great possibilities. To date, the desalting of' waFt-er
for municipal and industrial uses has been applied on a,smaill
scale, the process still being very expensiýve. In exist-Ing
desalting plants, the chief source of energy is fossil-fuel.

44

45

See IAEA, Annual Report for 1978

(GC(XXIII)/61j0),

paras. 47-_4_8;9Sttment of Eigvaýr d Eklund th1
1e Dir,,eCtor0
General of the IAEA before the UN GeealAsmbyo
2 November 1979 in UN Doc, A/34/PV, 52 (po.,5 Nov.
1979, p. 7; and S-PRI Yýear Book 1979, pp. 3531
Peaceful Uses of Atom-iic Energy., Vol. 7, pp. 247--322 and,
Nulear ower and its Fu,)el Cycle, Vol. 1.. pp, 683-6 q14.

291

nuclearsince very large nuc ear reantor3 produce cheap energy,
desaltingenergy look ospecially attractive for the very large[n particular, large agro-industrial nuclear-poweredplantsandplantsý producing desalted water for agricultural purposesA
2eletr,icity for power-intensive industries look promising.
Laboratory
study has been cavried out by the Oak Ridge Nationalin the US and the TAEA on the potentialities of these plants,
so far, has
but the first dual-purpose plant, and the only one
in the town
beon sýet up in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
6
cubic meters per day. 4of Shevchenko. it produces 120.000ofLastly, it has to be pointed out that the expansion
on energy needs
nuclear power in the future would greatly depend
March 1979
and acceptance by public opinion. For example, thehasaccident at the Three Mile Island near Philadelphia
and expotriggered an intensive debate between the proponents
to assessnents of nuclear energy. Although it is too early
power,
the effect of the accident on future plans for nuclear
deep
one fact is quite apparent, namely, public opinion's
one of theconcern about nuclear safety. This aspect has beenon themain preoccupations of the US President's Commission
preoccupation,
accident. Internationally, it has been an ongoinginternafor example, at the IAEA, which is convening a major
Stockholm during 1980. 47
tional conference on nuclear safety inisoto2es
Wb The Uses of Ionizing Radiation and Radio-Active
the utilThe uses are so numerons. In food and agriculture,of hectares
ity of nuclear methods is evidenced by the millions
varieties areof land ovi which high-yiel14 radiation-mutant crop
nuiclearalready uinder cultivation, In medicine and biology,
Contributions of Nuclear Technolog (A/7568), P. 37 and
Nenad TaIsicT, "Dessalement de lleau de mer au mpyenld?
6nergie d1origine nucl6aire", IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 19,
No. 1, Feb. 1977, (French edition) pp. 21 and 22.
ofthe,fresident's Commission on the Acciýdent)47 See Report
The!egacy
frchange:
Ned
The
Iland.
at
Tre-iehe-reiLna.fTer_
oTMI Wsigo,DC,Otbr17)
A/34/PV, 52
referred to as RoronTeeMile Island and 1,,IjA
s'.1,SgadElnd,(pro".), 5 NOV. 199
Director General).

46

292

nmdc
are usd
efrxaTIR staer
Snvest igatonI
Las in clinlical. danssad
mdent of canceýr. In inusry lar
rditot

r$erI swl
in th%ret
souce hav been
installed for výarious purpses chifl fo ste iato,
Ra,d io-is otop)es h,1a
ve f ounic gr'teat ap1)pliJLc,at1doio inmesrnad
conitrolling physical parameter_s in induastry. In geology andhydrology, nucleear technilques haývej been suaccessfully appliedin theý searceh of petro-Le.um. Radio-isotopes are making a major
8
contribution to locate water sources, especially in arid areas.4
In conclusion, the States which master most of the branchesof nuclear technology and their different applications forpeaceful purposes as described above are very few. At the otherend of the ladder, a great many countries have not yet started
to develop any nuclear technological competence. The majorityof them do not yet have nuclear research reactors most needed
to develop the iinow-how in the nuclear field. Between the twocategories and in different degrees, a number of countries aremaking headway in the peaceful atom.
II. The 1Inalienable._Right
The language of paragraph 1 of Article IV stating the inalienable right to develop research, production and uase of nuclear energy for peaceful, purposes has not undergone any chaiiges since the presentati1on of the identical tureaty d-rafCts of
24 August 1967. In the latter drafts, however, thispagrh
constituted the fl,rst phrase of the only paragra,ph of Article
IV. It was later separated as an- independent paragraph in t;heidentical treaty drafts of 18 January 1968', in compliaiioe with
4 Mexican proposal, so as to distinguish it from the- right topartioipate in the fullest possible exchange of in:foriisation on
the peacef-ul uses of nuclear en7ergy. 4 T.he paýragraphlsana
plicatior, of the principle einunciatedl in the preaaible of th11-e
48

49

S3ee Contributions of Ruclear Te,_olg (A/756 8) pp1. 1,2
p 38-54,e,il,seas
13. o'mrSee EPMC/PVý, 1331, 19 Sept'. 196)7, para, 7(exc)293peacefuL applications of nuclear
houLld be avIailabl fOr peacef ul purposes toto the Treaty, whether nularwapno nonl-nu-Tray thtnLhe be,,e,rtjLo
tecnoog..

a ltPrties
clear-weapon States."'

he dic erent phases of the NPT negotiations, there
Lrn
not hamper full
wasinanimity that the Treaty should certainly
field of the peacefulaccess to knowledgep and technology in thedelegate attending theuses of nuclear energy. An well put by a"the right of every
Conference of Nýoin-1uclear-Weapon States,
purposes was inherent
State to use nuclear energy for peacefuldevelopment,
in its sovereign right to independent economic
sovereignty and inand was an essential attribute of national
dependence."5
purposes is
The right to use nuclear energy for peacefulwell as to developingof equal significance to developed asWilly Brandt,
countries as will be shown later in this chapter.
example, stated bethe then Foreign Minister of the FRG, forGermany was not reafore the Bundestag, on 27 April 1967, thatthe peaceful utildy to acnept anything at all which hinderedextent of saying thatisation of nuclear energy. He went to theas a modern inthe future of the Federal Republic of Germany
51 For the developing
dustrial State depended on this principle.
in the nuclear age
countries, it is a matter of participation
technologies.
even if they are lagging behind in conventionalof peace hias inAs explained by one writer, "(t)he problem
a minimum membershipcreasingly become one of trying to keep
the problem of humanof the nuclear club. On the other hand,

98 (Romania).
A/CONF. 35/C.2/SR.9, 17 Sept. 1968, p.
1i See Treatyj_on_the Non7-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Documentation [Bohn
ad Cntrbution.
AtitdeGermn
Federal Government,
theofOfficeInformation
Press and5O

294

digniy JI

ArtLiclntinc)reasn&i

nt

rrttonni

rcud

fmxmsn

at
Jeoi

ia

oVs hreby thets exriL:might contfli]Ct Wit th exeýrcise' of th11a t rIght
noun-di,_erimnto
however, in subjec(t to two, coinditions
conforfiity with Articles i and II of the NPT.

PT
n

oeof
The phrase "without discrimination" in parag,raphe
ENDC not t
Article IV had seemed to one, delegation at theof the atomT.
cure enou-h -raarantee for the peaceful enjoyment
treatyRomania, I~n a set of amendments to the 1967 identical"on a basis ofdrafts, suggested the insertion of the words
phrase, 54 oequality" lirinediately be.fore the above-mentioned
It seems to havemania did not pursue her suggestion further,of its suggestion.5
been dissuaded by the redundancy
research,
The conformity cf the inalienable right *to develop
purposes withi
production and -use of nuclear energy for peaceful
the observance ofArticles I and II of the NPT virtually means
the transfer andthe restrictions imposed in both Articles on
acq1uisitioii of nuclear explosive devices.

5ý

55
54

55

Status in
Ali A. Ma7.rui, "Numjerical Strength and Nuclear of Politics,
Journalthe Folitics of the Third World", The
Vol. 29, No. 4, Nov. 1967, pp. 809-810,
See ENDC/PV. 551, 19 Sept. 1967, para. 7(Ieic)

and Add- -1,
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230
Romniaalo1967),
GOct.
19(ENDC/1-99,
Ann, IV, Sec. 14
Ofthsuggested, after the sixth pre&mibuiar parag,ýrýaph neuw paa
ofC
inse,(rtiont
1967 identical treaty drafts, thecra,graph which combined equality wJtitnodirintin
Ibid.
thlat, "withlout dsie
The repe:etAatj.voe of Canada cand therefore
crimi0natilon" mieantl "on a b)asis of equl-_iity",
redundlclant.
be_to
the Romian,.ian, ami,endmIýient seemied to h-imf
EtqJ)C/-PV.

345, 6 Nov.

97

para. 35,'.

295

B i,n Consistuuuy with ts previous wnendments to Ar11, had also tried twice to amend Article 1V to
tjc anoallow 03 tW Partesu W inalienable right to develop refor
Seavch, producton and use of nuclear explosive devices
6
cH01 uses.5 However, to compensate the non-nuclear-weapon
Mtates Cor their abstention from exercising the latter right,
benethe MPT in its prenamble affirms the principle th-at "theincu;nfits of peaceful applications of nuclear technolog',y,echn~o~calbprodotswhich may be derived by nuclearwepnStates from the develomnun-it of n-uclear explosive devices,...
should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties
any

It(Emphasis added.) This is what is known as the "spin-off".
of theshoold,not be confased with the more specific question

purposes

applications of nuclear explosive devices for peacefulunder Article V of the NPT.
of
It is to be noted that the preambular paragraph speaks
the devetechnological by-products which may be derived fromlopment of nuclear explosive devices and not nuclear weapons,here isthough the former englobes the latter. The discretionside byunderstandable. If nuclear weapons had been mentioned
case inside with other nuclear explosive devices, as is thetheboth Articles I and II, it would have virtually meant
to theacquiescence of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties
weapons
NPT tQ the continued vertical proliferation of nuclear
haveby the nuclear-weapon States, a situation which the former
discrettried unsuccessfully to limit or put an end to. Thisasion might have been in response to the observations suchmonthsthose made by the UAR representative at the ENOC~ several
drafts.
before the presentation of the 1967 identical treaty
He said that
56

57

DOOR, Wupl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230 and Add. 1,
IV, Sec. 16 QWND/201, -51 Oct. 1967) and Sec. 17
Ann,
qwND/201/Rev, 2, 13 Feb, 1968),
See ApPendix j.

296

iiary programs aerieto-c
II,,,I evni
"othaLt wouldI 11ot be sluffc iet' tous
atn adVanI-Itaget,
tify it's menýltion1 "inanly formni in a treatLY on Lthe
no-polfeatonof nmclear wepn,frtheInastarting- p,-oint of suochl a ment11ion wudrs_imiplicit and grtiosbleýssing by us of the miitlit'ary nutclear-' pro grammiiies, whiý th treaty is inl"tended to help, to eliminaten
The inteorest'iin spin-off', h1oweveIr,- emnae spcfcly
and basically from the fact that the g-reat scientific andc
technological progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon Statesin the field of nuclear energy was the direct as well as theindirect result of military research and development (R & D).
For example, the separation of uranium isotopes was a direct
result of the atomic bomb project. Extraction of plutonium
frem irradiated fuel is another example. Development of highspeed scientific computers and data processing devices is an
59
example of an indirect benefit.
Fu~ture spin-off benefits can be expected in the form of
prime stimuli to high frequency, laser, neutron and controlled
fusion research, and in the form of technical axid managerial
6skills in these probable future fields. o
The question of spin-off had received considerable attention from a number of non-nuclear-weapon States and especially
58

59

60

ENDC/PV. 294, 16 Mar. 1967, para. 34. The United Statesused to speak of benefits of peaceful nuclear technologythat are by-products of weapons research. For example, see
the Message of President Johnson to the ENIDC on-21 Februnpry
1967. ENIDC/187, 21 Feb. 1967.
For more examples, see Ryokichi Sagane, "~Assistance, to NfonNuolear 7 Weapon States, Who Have Renounced 'the Production,
Acquisition and Use of Nuclear Weapons, 'i-n thle 1mýpl.ement-ation of Programmes of Peacefui-l Uses of Nucolear Eery"
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon Sta-tes, Ge'neva.), 1968)(A/CONF.35/Doo. 5, 3 Juy1968), ipp. 5-7.
Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, Ioq,Oit(.,, pp. 33_-354.

297

thse
fro ostadvnce

inthenuclear field such as the, Fe-

The lat-t-er had
Reuli111emayad SwýitzerTiland.
deral
ha th inentone_xpzressz,ed in the preamble
eve sugesed
should be transfrred,- ýinto a Juri1d-icalI commiiitmncit in thLe body
aper p_resenited to theofthe trat 6 Nigeria, ini a orina prpslin tIhis sense but
C967iputforarid
1NDin NoembeSome advanced non-nuclear-weapon States maintained thattspin-off" was very slight and that their peaceful nuclear
energy programmes had not suffered because they had chosen not
64
For example, the reto produce nuclear explosiIve devices.
presentative of Sweden to the EN{DC stated that:"Relying on our experience, my delegation is convinQed that research, development and production
in reactor technology and similar fields would
not have to be hampered by lack of the knowledge
obtained through manlifactur~e of nuclear weapons. ,,65
TwNenty years ago that may have been the case..

The United States representative to the ENDC had, in fact,
pointed out that the PeacefUl "spin-off" was largely obtained
long ago. He promised, however, that the US would continue tomake it available to other countries. 66 Mr. Dean Ru.sk, thethen US Secretary of State, had also pointed out much earlier
that the actual industrial spin-off "is very small-,infinitesimal." 67
61

62
63

indeed,See "Statement by Foreign Minister Brandt to the Bundestag
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (extracts),-February 1,
1967"1 in Documents on Disarmament, 1967, p. 49.
ENDC/204, 24 Nov. 1967, p. 2.
See DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs., DC/230 anýd Add.
1,Ann. PV, Sec, 18 (FNDC/202, 2 Nov. 1967).
'17lc1Sept, 19-6'7, Ann. Vs,see UN Dc1'A/
64Foeaml

65

mN/V 30,3-a97, pDara.

9.

lee
iow thie-pebua parq-[agrAph On
TIt remiansuý to) be"spn-of"
1ilbe implemenited by the nuoclerwao Staes,t,akýing into cons,-,ideration th-at, it
C.i-Litmen,

Ho-wever,possible ecaGefenitails noleabidn

the obligation to facilitate theo ful-lest

imateriJa..Lc, an-d informationi inequipme,nt,

the secon4 paragraph of Art-icle IV accommrtodlates the "s-pinl-of,f"benefits as will be shown below.
But before embarking on the analysis of Article IEV,2,
it should be pointed out that the 19-75 Review Conference of
the Parties to the NPT reaffirmed in its "Final Declaration"that nothing in the NPT should be interpreted as affecting,and noted with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty had been
identified as affecting, the inalienable right prescribed in
Moreover, the 1978 Tenth Special Session of the
UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament pointed out in its"Final Document" that non-proliferation measures should not
Article IV.l.

jeopordize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all
States to apply and develop their programmes for the peacefuluses of nuclear energy for economic and social development inconformity with their priorities, interests and nes68Such
reaffirmaticns are significant and reflect, in fact, increasing
concern ever the restrictions which have been imposed by nuclear
supplier States affecting the full exercise of these "tinalienable rights"j as will be shown in the course of our review of
the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article
IV.

III,

The Balance of OblIiZations and RiChtsE
Turning- now to paragraph 2 of Article IV,that the paragraph isitis

to be noted

an application of the Principle enunciat-

the preamble that "all Parties to the Treat-y are enatitb_edl
to participate inr -the fullest p)ossible exzchang.-e of scientIL1fic
information for, and -to conitribuite alone or in1 co-operation
ed in

68

See Appendices 17- (Review of Article IV)
respectively.

299

and 22 (para,

68)~

Stt

wtote

aora
ionsa
1.

to,h
t

ute

enegyEOr peýacefI4
es ul osibl

deve-lopmen` of the applicatpurpo'ses1.

Echageof E,uITMO-ntL,

t-Ji'c an(j Tec -inoloca Ind_Dformaltion1(-,enAcrngto Tie f:irst part of paragraln,,ýphý-Matterials and.

2 of" Article IV"'All, thle aristo the Treaty iundertake -to facilan ~caeterght -to participa7te in, thne
itate,
fulestposs,ible ech=range of equipment, Materials
andsientiiciad t.ech-nological information forular energy."
tepeaceful usso
In contrast with paragraph one of Article IV, this partof paragraph two was only finally shaped during the last phaseof the NPT's formulation at the UN General Assembly's twentysecond resumed session in 19,68, Article IV in the first identical drafts of August 19-67 spoke only of "the right of theParties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of6Upon a Mexican proposal, 9 Article IV of theinformation."January 18 identical treaty drafts spoke of "'the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific andtechnological informatlion ..." 70In the final treaty draft formulated in New York, the undertaking to facilitate was added
to the right to participate, and the exchange of equipment andmaterials was added to the exchange of scientific and technological information, in partial compliance with previous Niger1
iaa and Italian amend.ments respectively.](a) TheObiaint0aiiaeadteRgtt

atcpt

xhag
FullstPssbe
W~hen the Nigerian representative to the ENIDC twice introduced his amendment to Article TIV, the intention was to replacein the69

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec. 12 (ENDC/196, 19 Sept. 1967).

70O

See, Appendix 3,E,71

for 1967 and 196D8, Does. DC/250 and. Add. 1,_DOOR, up
ý.nn. IVý See, 356 (ETECO/220, 28, Feb. 1-968) aý,nd Sec, 37\ENDC/'220/,Rev. 1, 141 Mar. 19j68 (iei);anid. Sec., 34(EtNDC/4128, 20ý Feb. 19,68 (Italy)),300,

th'Ie wqords

4th
I t'he ordartioi(-Jpate"have the7 ri gh t to p)

dert-ake. -to facilitate,ý".

7

restlL

wý\as the iperonofthgerheeifai~tle fo rmier

lat-ter w:tode-e1ati onýound tlhat"Part icipat i-on po stu1-a tes3 a dJLalogue ano no` a monofaile,-d to seeýlogue and hi-aenq

clause to the partiesl""how theigt acode

who(- m,ay want to ao

inl thatiý

ustoscnobx

the part-icipation of those; parties,, whOilLak73
right meaningful is not guaranteed."'ercised ifch

The United States at the beginning saw no need to accept
the Nigerian amendment. It was noted that the second part ofparagraph 2 establishing the obligation of the parties to cooperate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not
be overlooked. Moreover, it was considered that an obligation
expressed in a provision of this nature must of necessity bea general one. 7 4 Later, when the United States introduced thelast formulation of Article IV, its representative to the First
Committee of -the General Assembly commenting on the words "theright to participate in"and "undertake to facilitate", madethe following significant statement:
the right to such sharing is recogniz,ed explicitly not only as a right of non-nuclear Powers
but also as a commitment to action by nuclear
Powers aný5 all others in a position to contribute
thereto."The balance was thus established between the rights,- of t1he
non-nuclear-weapon States and the commitment to actioln bhy theSep.

37 (ENDC/220 and 220/Rev.

72

Ibid.,

73

EN'DC/PV.

371,

28 Feb.

1968,

Pa,ra._974

ENDC/PV.

378,

13 MJar, 1968,

para.

75

A/0.lý/PV.
sertio.n1,

14 Nlar. 1968).R

4

Mpo.,3ay -19ý68, p. 77, 13uefo~re the,-. intGo facilitlateo" intefinal_undertake_,
words
fth
text, Mexic(o had sugLýgested to add. thle "r_ighJt tGo a,ccess" tothe "righj-t to particoipate" in orý_der--' to ma_ke mor,Ye preiClicse
the imoanaing of theý fiýrst part of" parIiagraphi 2. soe, A/0.1/1PV.
p., 31.
1569ý. (prov, ), 16 May ]_)6196,
1577

301

ncerwaoStatsa

well- as b)y othe,rs in1 a po0si tiot,oThiJs led,otne couintries to conside-r that the exý-teso7
chnedid noCt necsarl impl reirct

cotiute,ýaodn Canadla, whTlat was, intended was no t a prolieAut
gramme ofulmi_ted gfsanid grants, b)ut genuine,, co-operative
7

e-ffourts wýith divided res_,ponsibili)41ýtieS] 7
Teworcds

lfujllesýt, poýssibleý exchange"

Dr, GlenlSabr,nh

were. int'erpreted bythe-n Chairman of tb,ýe US Atomic Energy

CommissJ,on, in astatemeýnt before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, as implying that "the parties will be expected to cooperate only to the extent that they are in a position to doso, and that reciprocity may well be a factor in determining
78
what may be done in certain circumstances.1"
In the light of -those statements and explanations it isreasonable to conclude that more is expected on -the part of thenuclear-weapon States and advanced non-nuclear-weapon States
towards the other non-nuclear-weapon States. The situation,
however, gets more complicated if it is realised that -the advanced non-nuclear-weapon States themselves expect much morefrom the nuclear-weaDon States in certain branches of the p)eaceful uses of nuclear energy as will be further explained below.
(b)

The Exchangýe of Equipment and Materials

In introducing the addi4 tion of the words "equipment" and"1materials" to the text of Article IV, the US representativerSt Committee of the General Assembly acknowledged
to the Fi4that this change corresponded to a vicý,, stro.agly voiced by the
representative of Italy end others. '9 The Italian representat(proy.), 31 May 1968, p. 32

76

For example,(Jamaica).

77

Liawrence Scheinman, "Nuclear Safeguards, the iPeaceful Atom.,and, tLIe ILAEA", I1nt ernat ion-a,l, Concil-1iat ion, No. 572, Mar.

see A/C.1/PV. 15771

78 earngsOn-----1iiav
79

AC.lPV.157(pey,,

mlctons_, of NTT,
3

p.86.

May 1968F, P, 7 7.

302

La211-nd11ment

Ato
t Ie

graph afe

su1bite Ct1by*: is dl, a,tiýon t-4o t- i
NOC tar theLT inrduto
theparagaph 1 ofn,aLd 1968ofýAr3t-1i
cle
whic
o

,fcC
theCJ-"toeply of 1sour1c
,
aiii

END.

rea)1d as

speia

olow

f,IsIonablJaeii
r qimn for theýusC. ofsouc
nspreci a i_`'_ssionable materials for neace-ful purýIn introducing the proposal, the Italian representative
explained that to make it possible for the good intentions expressed in Article IV to attain their full practical scope,
the non-nuclear-weapon States must be sure that they could relyat all times on access to the supply of raw materials-

a sup-

ply which alone would, in practice, give access to the world of82
modern science and technology.
The Italian proposal received wide support from non-nuclear-weapon States. 8 3 The United States at the beginning wasof the view that the undertaking in the second part of paragraph 2 of Article IV on co-operation would include the supplyof nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Moreover, reference was made to paragraph 3 of Article III on safeguards prescribing that the safeguards shall avoid hampering the economicor technological development of the parties or international-,]
p.

7

80

A/C.1/PV. 1565 (prov.), 10 May 19,68,

81

DCOR, Suppl. for l1967 and 1968, Docs. P/20 ad Add.,
Suceadse
Ann. IV, Sec. 34 k'END)C/218, 20 -eb. 198
1ocial fissionable materials are define.d in, Artcl
the TAEA Statute.

82

See EMDC1/PV. '567, 20Feb. 1.968,

83

6
see- EXOPV, 374I, 6 IMar. 198-aa
156(prov,), 13ý May 19)68, p. 83 Pakistýa,n); A/C ,1/?,V J15 70 (ray,),. 17 Ma y 19)68, p. 22(Pan-]52 22 Maýy 1968, paras-.901
zania);, and A/C./V
For exa-mple,(India); A/C,l]/PV.

303

para.

57.

ativ itie, inof paeunclar
e Jied~ opernt
io
co~~~
c nuclear material and~thCnentoa~xhneo~~~cluding

The ierinothwod"eupetinan"mterials"-1 1V ore eýlaborate Itallian~~~
wa-tatilasert
Articleutrbfore tha--t isronhaýd taken Place, -to satisfy
thepreccuatinsof Ital,y andcl others, a new preamibular para-

propoal.

grPh was adde

reSolu1'Jtion
to the0LJ

UNof theienra

Assemblycommending the fin,L'al treaty draft which reads as follows'... pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, allsignatories have the right to engage in rese,irch,
production and use of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes and will be able to acquire source andspecial fissionable materials, as well as equipment for -the processing, use and produoýion of nuclear material for peaceful purposes"
The Italian interest at the ENIDC with respect to special
fissionable materials, dates back to 1 August 1967 when MVr.
Amintory Fanfani, the then M4inister for Foreign Affairs of
Italy, put before the Conference a proposal for the supply offissionable materials. 86The essence of the proposal was that
nuclear-weapon States, in order to strike a balance with the
obligations imposed by a non-proliferation treaty on the nonnuclear-weapon States, should commit themselves to transfer tothe latter certain amounts of fissionable material - to be
84
85

86

ENDC/PV. 378, 13 MYar. 1968, paras. 12-14.
See Appendix 3-G. The resolution adopted was the revised
draft submitted on 28 May 1-968, three days before the presentation of the revised treaty text. A/C.1/L.421/Rev. 2,
28 May 1968.
ENDC/PV. 518, 1 Aug. 1967, paras. 14-21. Mr. Fanfani's
proposal was later incorporated in a working paper submitted by the Italian delegation to -the ENDC. The text is similar to Mvr. Fanfani's statement before the EN~fDC. See DCOOR,
Slvppl, f'or 1967 and 1968, Doos. DC/230 and Add. 1, Ann. IV,
Sec 22(EUDC/205, 30 No-v. 1967). The proposal sh(iould not
wih th oter, "Fanfani! Proposal" suýbmittdo
be cnfusd
29JuLy 196 totheEPC concer-ning-, tLhe. unilateral non1hapter 5.acqusiton11declaration . SE-e noteý 96i

tondaerst

pod ithatversion aofnthsate

tofwheamousparid, wudis

devolveto.I

pop
isosable maatercircladetied torteCneec

ofaceoululcearoeapnula

etaesgas a wokngn-papear-waonSahthe aalobwectpive thattalyr wishedto vattain wand tohrelpfold

toetaelpn
acositrivesste

towardpartoial dpsrogrentbycreatinga

UN fund to support projects for the practical application of
nuclear energy.
The "Fanfani Proposal" was highly praised but was neverseriously examined at the ENTDC due to the fact that the latter
was very much involved in late 1967 and early 1968 in drafting
the N7PT. The Italian proposal on "equipment" and "materials"
might have been considered as a more tangible proposition tosecure a free flow of fissionable materials than a more complex
scheme entailing a disarmament measure and an economic venture.
On the ether hand, discussions at the ENDC were also taking
place on measures of disarmament and arms control, in the context of the NPT or connected with it, more drastic than t-he,modest transfer of fissionable materials from miiayto
peaceful uses.
Nevertheless,the "Fanfani. Proposal" had 'the effect of, ins-

tigati-ng another ambitious scheme at, the Colnferen-,ce ofo-uclear-Wecapon States and tha t iS thýe prop_-osal_ tGo esta,Iblish ýa

87/C./P.
165(pr,ov.), 1,0 4a,y 198

SR6828et

1968,ep.t49

305'

.4

Iay)'

sted by i-ts two c on-

icr~~~
fiioalmaeil,mife
scrn
secutiLe
prpsas

stem

mts

fro

tlys owbtasorflcsthepeocpai,
and~-spatcualmor

requijre-of Other countrie(s,the inutilzed_
couniitrlies of E'urope

In Itl,telmt
reouce,o

speciafepninhaýhydr-elctric pow11e_r.

enrahdinthe

Coal anid oil arec totallyhasbeemiigaedby thae use o,f natural gas and the importation of fuel from abroad.

The difficulties that Italy had ex-perienced in providing itself with German coal during the Second World War were not easily forgotten. 90Hence, the keen
In 1957, Italy started a
Italian interest in nuclear energy.
nuclear power-station programme which by 1978 had led to theconstruction of four power reactors, three of which are based
1By 1984, it ison American designs using enihduaim
92This programme
of
7
power
reactors.
expected to have a total
would at least prevent or lessen the growth of'oil imports whose
But at the same time, it
prices are constantly increasing.
would mean increasing dependence on nuclear fuel and especiallyenriched uranium which is produced predominantly by the UnitedStates.9
Therefore, securing a continuous flow of enriched
89

90

91

See Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution J (B) and(C), p. 17.
See Also Cussuto, "Competition in Nuclear Energy:International Issues", The World Today, Vol. 20, No. 7, July 1964,
PP. 281-283.
Cussuto mentions that Italian requirements ofsolid fuel were guaranteed by means of continuous dispatchby rail of coal from the Ruhr and the Silesian coalfields.
Some 100 trains were running a day from North to South andSouth to North.
See Power Reactors in Member States (Vienna: IAEA, 1979),
p. 40-, _ Theýy_ became critical
in-December 1962, June 1963,
jun-Ie 1964 and December 1977.
92
Ibi., p.30.

93 hrehe Amricn gseus dIiffulsion plant.s,
milooperating at
ful caaciy,areestmatd o be capable to produce 17.1
sep aie wo
unis
4(SWý,U)of enriched urani_um

306

o
u as
l
ur,an-Aiumn becomies primordial not onl foother coun Itries whiichj have: larg,elyivseinpwreats
Theominant Amreri can

00si

is a1sourc

Cof conernotpossible futlure politicalraifcaios
but also because there is no guarantee that the Swol beable to cope with future rising demands for enrichled uaim

sector with all its

The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, preýviously
referred to, has dramatically amplified the above concern notof
only with regard to the supply of nuclear material but also
Apart from the burdensome fact that
equipment and technology.
all countries have to renegotiate their nulcear co-operation
line
agreements with the United States in order to bring them inwith the provisions of the new law, the Act, for example, imposes certain restrictions on the export of sensitive nuclear
facilities or technologies, the latter being defined as any
unavailable information to the public relating to the design,
construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a facility
heavy
used for uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing or
water production.
The United States has even decided for the time being not
The new or
to export sensitive facilities and technologies.
o)nly,
annually while the British facility at Capenhurst has jpla,-nt
Pierlatte
Frenchtheandthe capacity of 4I00.000 SWU
a capacity ranging between 200.000 and 300.000 SWUj a ya
A"sprtwhich in both cases can meet domestic needs.
in a nu clea r
expendedefforttheofmeasureaiswork unit"
agieasyof'plant to separate a quantity of uranium
into two components, one having a higher.erenag of ra
Sepnaraýtiv-e wr
nium-235 and one having a lowi pe.rcenýtage.,gietthtotsuini,kilogramis generally expressed in
Lsaw nc
SeequantittiLes.
materi-Al.
asdimensions
same

Case
Scheinman, "Security and,- a.Iransnationail ystoemn: The XXV
ato,Vol.
Ognlnteronatlional
Energy"ý,of Nuclear
No. 3,Smer17 ,p.460, The 17 frilL_oAi SWU are equi.y'avalent to 14,000 ton-s of 3 per-etLanu-3.
ol suc,1.000 MW lgtwerreactor consumnes about 140ton SihaniridLR
ilinskyý,See Vicor
f-uel per year,"Civilian Nuclear Power and

XII,

Nio.3

Fall .1968, p. 821,

307

Po'y

ris
boeg Volcooerto agemet wol sti-pul--atI,e tha t thle
nless thAe ajgreementstý a-re spec-±_.ltewoul not be trnsere
Paaoicly thi obvious
icl amne to proid fo themwapons rn
Ve coner wit the prlieato of1ncer
4
NLP T and
Vofthei
oAtce
prt
n
~~i
toteltecounteirne
otite

To di\versi!_fy th,eir sourcýes, three different courses arebeing followed by the industrialized countries of Western Euthe establishment of multinational Europeanrope, and Japan:
projects for enriching uranium, bilateral projects in which
the United States play a part and toll enrichment or buying
enriched uranium in the Soviet Union.
In Europe, two multinational projects are competing witheach other. The first is the "Europe diffusion" (Eurodif) based
The Eurodifon the gaseous diffusion method favoured by France.
By 1981, the plant
plant is located in the latter at Tricastin.
is expected to be capable of producing 10.8 million SWU of enriched uranium annually. The other partners of France are
Belgium, Iran, Italy and Spain. 94The Netherlands and theUnited Kingdom withdrew from the Eurodif on 30 April 1973 folSweden also withdrew in March
lowed by the FRG ten days later.
1974. 95 The Netherlands, the UK and the FRG seem to havedefinitely opted for the centrifuge method they are developing
6This
together as previously referred to in this Chapter.
competition put the Commission of the European Communities in
It seems that the Commission, beinga very difficult position.

94

See J. F. Petit, "Enrichissment de lluranium par le proc6d6
de diffusion gazeuse" (UAEA-CN-36/323) in Nuclear Powerand its Fuel Cycle, Vol. 3, PP. 111-126 an-d-Tedersen, loc.
Iran has tried to withdraw its ten per-,ci.eouinr
cent share in Eurodif, but the Court of Paris on 22 November
1979 having found that such withdrawal would incur a 2 billioni dollar 'Loss, has ordered the blockage of that amountasa preliminar measure.
12May1973 and 2March 1974.
e95 Mndeoauopnurime-i,n fav,our- of arapidesalsenof gaseous dq.i"ffuasi-orn

It lateraore

pro-vid-ed tIhey devel,o'pedcin concerhtw.o prjcs

in oreJoaodape

matur e over-pri,o du-ic ti oni
Japan has shown considerable interest in various

rjet

for the construction of a multinational plant for enriching
It has also built a pilot enrichment unit at Tokal_uranium.
Mura.98
Several Western European countries are in the course ofbuying enriched uranium from the Soviet Union, or sending theiruranium there to be enriched (toll enrichment) in the two isotopic separation plants they are known to have. France and theSoviet Union, on 15 March 1971, signed an agreement under which
the Soviets were to enrich French uranium for a nuclear power99
At the end ofreactor which was being built in the Alsace.
the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Alexei Kosygin, toSweden in April 1973, it was revealed that Sweden would enrich
its uranium in the Soviet Union. 10At that time, Switzerland
01
the Soviet Union.1
was envisaging buying enriched uranium fromThe Supply Agency of Euratom and a Germlan delegation were also

99

The joint cmuiu
Le Monde, 12 May and 21 Nov. 1973.
i_ssued by the Heads of State or Government of t'he nýine
countries members of the EEC, at their December- 1973(_ su-Ut
mit conference in Copenhagen, has underlined the impr
tance of a concerted and harmonious devjelopmen't ofth1-e
93
Le Monde, 18 Dec,
existing projects.
Richard Ellingworth. "Japaniese Econ)omic Po1 Clces and Se-(onfCorStaei Sudecurityt 1 , International Institute--ý
QOc0t, 19_72,, p.26eder-conIdon), Adelphi Papers, Nlo.9,
The-ý Annutal_Rpr fr17
cit. ,p 45; and iLAEA,-.
1oc.
,p55
TGC(CX XI II/6
Herald' TriLbune, 16 arh191
InIternrati onal

100

Le

101

Ibid.

97

98

Monde, 7Api

193

30)9

astrn he
Inuroe,SSRteorpowr rector

nriheduraiumisprovi;ded by theLovebilt b,y the latr Th

echnologj(-,y of p1ower reactors
GhetdvlpeoUnionq)-,hawhiichi e:xist-s in g,reat
:poe
urni
rauum.Th
nturl
usig
quatiie in-eholvka is3 se_nt to5 the Soviet Union where

it is enriched in the two isotopic separation plants. Among theEastern European countries, Romania was the first country to
try to diversify its peaceful nuclear activities by applying
to purchase two reactors from Western Europe an.d the UnitedStates. Like Czechoslovakia, it was more interested in reactors of the natural uranium type which would allow for more autorlomy from the Soviet Union.10
In the developing countries, the problem of securing enriched uranium has started to gain considerable attention.
Two developing countries are already known to have ambitious
schemes entailing the construction of enrichment facilities,
namely Brazil and Pakistan; the former in the context of a
nuclear co-operation agreement with the FRG and the latterindigenously by importing discretely the necessary equipment.
We shall revert to both experiences at a later stage of thisHowever, it must be pointed out that the immediate
preoccupations of the developing countries are related toother aspects of the peaceful atom as will be shown below.

study.

102

103

Ibid., 11 Apr. 1975, p. 10. All orders of enriched uranium
for the 9 members of Euratom should be placed through the
Supply Agency which was given an exclusive right to "conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, source material anad special fissionable material originating within
the Community or outside it." (Euratom Treaty, Article52). UNTS, Vol. 298, No. 4301, P. 159.
For more details, see J-Urgen Nbitzold, "Nuclear Energy inEast Europe", EuoaAci,No. 21, 1967 in Survival,
Ma.1,968, pp .91-96 and Jearoslav G,,
TN.5
Vo.
tujdy in3
3NcerEeg
Polach,~~~~~~~ nCehsoai
p.8318,
19G6
Fall
5
,
I,No.
ol
Obs
FrsrtoI310

1re-tenTh,e Conferne of No-ularWao

Stte

xetps
uls
h
clear-wve-ap,on States "to fcltt,tmiaterýiasfrtepcfssionableofvilbltthsible,~to-ula-epnSae
ful nuclear programm-1noes of th
ing the application of salfegu,ard,cs as evagdiArcle
htteTAA"td
It further rýcom,,mendedof the Treaty".

cetIIIý

the most effective means of ensuring access to special fssone
The Conference as
able materials on commercial basis".
esthequested the General Conference of the IAEA to consider
Materials",10)4
tablishment of a "Fund of Special Fissionable
At the1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT,

it has been recognized that there continued to be a need forthe fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment
and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent
with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the NPT. In

its "Final Declaration" the Conference has also recognized that
regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres (withfuel fabrication facilities, plutonium reprocessing plants, andwaste management and storage facilities) might be an advantageous
way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many statesin the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing
IAEA studies in this area haveto the goals of the Treaty.
been welcomed and encouraged to continue expeditiously as possible.
Access to modern nuclear technology for peaceful
has also continued to be an important subject mattertive resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly.
Tenth Special Session devoted to disarmament. he-ld 'in
its Preparatory Committee, many developing, ocountriýes

puirpose6ofJ-,onsecu-At, its19781 ýandvie

concern about recent restrictive trenidS in the araofnCla
In order to arrive at a con--sensu.s in droaftCJ,ing theexports.
rmlaedirýeieeva,7nt paragraphswa"Final Document", th104

See Fiýnal Dcmeto thel Confer", ence od[_N11oiL-Nucle -Wao
esoliut-ions H (I)c.16)
State's (AqII.51,
7'
anid (a,an J (1B')
p.14z

311

emphasized, in-ter a-lia,
The "FnlDcmn"has
e f re e toc acquiire~ Stte ýn
allll
cest
~
shudhv~
eupm1entI and materilý__s for, the peaceful. uises of
tecnolgy
sostated that eachi country's ch-oices
It haýts anulareeryand~~~ dcsosith fIel of peaceful uzses of nuiclear energy
genralters.
that~jeprizing their respective fuelccl polcie orc initernat,ional co-operation, agreements or conIntis res pect, it is quite significant that the
trcs
repce
should~

be
~~
wihu

UN General Assembly has been put on the nations'r,espective fuel cycle policies without specifically mentioning
multinational or regional fuel cycles, an idea which, in fact,
has not yet captured the imagination and enthusiasm of theemphasisLat thdeveloping countries.
Under this chapter, we shall have ample opportunity to
examine the implementation of the results of all these meetings.
cetific and Technological Information
xhneo(c) ThThe exchange of scientific and technological informationin the text of Article IV raised a few interesting interpretthe
ations and brought to the fore -the question of divulging
kept
secret techniques of enriching uranium, techniques so far
under the strict control of the nuclear-weapon States.
The Nigerian representative at the ENDC considered that-the first part of paragraph 2 of Article IV could be said to cover the exchange of information obtained during research on nu10
The "US reclear explosive devices (the so-called spin-off).
presentative at the ENIDC confirmed that the paragraph coveredQ.

the exchangýe of information on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. 106
The representative of Pakistan at Committee Two of the Conference of' Non-Nuclear-Weapon States also considered-that access to scientific institutions and establishments in the advanced nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States by the
ear-weaoni States, particularly those ofAfia
ote to-,nu!ILIatin America and AMan. cawe within the definition or Moiontific, and technologica
uLiMinnfomtion", 10 7 The Caonfrence adopted a resolution in this ruspect, the only uoinrtivP. paragraphof whch reads as follows ý"AgaaesIL all nuclear-weapon Statesý a,nd hoenonnuclear-weapon States which are in a position to
do so, to provide access for students and scientists for purposes of training and acquisition ofknowledge on a non-discriminatory basis to theirscientific institutions and nuclear establishments
engaged in research and deveR8 ment of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.'
The question wrhich is of immediate concern to the advanced
non-nuclear-weapon States is not only the free flow of fissionable materials(as previously shown), but also the techniquesof enriching uranium and building power reactors, Spain's re-presentative at Committee Two of the Conference of Non-NuclearWeapon States, for example, considered that the fact that thenuclear-weapon States kept the information relating to the processing of slightly enriched uranium to themselves was contrary109
to the spirit of Article IV.
On the question of divnlging the secrets of uranium enrichment, Switzerland had played an instigating role at the Conference. Considering that the balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon States in the matter ofnuclear technology must be achieved by precise undertakingsentered into by the former, the Swiss draft had rated in thefirst place the "effective access to advanced nuclear technology, including that hitherto kept secret, and in particular
11that relating to uranium enrichmen!"t",

107
108
109

110

A/CONF.35/C.2/SR-4, 10 SePt. 1968, P. 27.
Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CONF.S5/10, 1 Oct. 1965), Resolution M, p. 19.
A/00AY-~35/0.2/SR.17, 25 Sept. 1968, p. 178
A/COIITF,55/C,2/L.l, 12 Sept. 1968.

313

The Wws
eveV, t, o.

Confuerence had accepted, howouwer draft r ownution with Aus--

MwejaW on to thsolunor a navan

1
The draft,
trin, Danmnok, Mand, Man, Nuimny and. Gueden..
ehy te conaraence as resoution U,merely~hw~ adwv-eapon Atakeo to aviLse the IAEA at regular
tMNiurwr
invit!ninteval as to "tho possiUdLty of thoir declasnifying scien-and Lechnicul inFormation which has become essential forthe develoment of the peaceful uses of nu-clea-r ene_rg1y, as soon.
as ther- is no longer any rEason for its classification on
trifi

to
natioPal seoyrity grounds, bearing in mind all the benefits 1 1 2knowledge."
be derived from Ithe dissemination of scientific
The same resolution also called upon the IAEA to continue
its utmost efforts for "compilation and dissemination of public
information concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
including~ those related to the peaceful application of nuclear
explosions." It further recommended the IAEA to "study approof
priate international arrangements to facilitate exchangeorscientific and technical information which have commercial
makeindustrial value and are not publicly available, so as tothe exit possible for the countries with interest to know ofinistence and outline of such information and to enable theterested parties to enter into negotiations about the acquithereof".~113
sition of such information with the owners
The effect ofl the Conference on the nuclear-weapon States
enwit~h respect to divulging the secret techniques of uranium
cenricizent was not apparent. It seems that it was rather thetrifuge project sponsored by the FRG, the Netherlands and theUnited Kingdom which was effective in prompting the UnitedStates, in October 1970, to show signs of readiness to share
A/Q0Y\F.4n/0.2/L.4/gev. 2, 24 Sept. 1968.
cen of the COnference of NonM\uclear-Weapon
112FinaL,
3/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Reoolutiou H (I),QQOAMCI
Autatep. 14K

111

314

its know-ledgoe of gaseous di-ffusionlit

Western Erp

h Uicou,,nt,ries, Canada, Australi'a and Japan. 1 Howeve,r,Intstbis!
countrl'ies
those
of
some
whilich h,as jo4ined
StatesLo-ndon Supopliers' Group, h-as decided, aspre,-so-called
th`e
n
n
en
odvlefrtetm
vi_ousl.ypointed out, notinform-ýation to the public relating t-o d'esigrn, conistruction, fabrication, operation or maintenance o)furnm
enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing or heavy water pouto
facilities. 115
available

Going back to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,
it is to be noted that the interest in the exchange of equipment,materials and scientific and technological information was mostapparent in the attitudes of Japan and the advanced non-nuclearJapan and six European States in fact
weapon States of Europe.
co-sponsored Resolution H which included all the recommendations
referred to above and pertaining to the exchange of materials andinformation. This does not mean that the "exchange". received
On thelittle interest on the part of the developing countries.
contrary, it might represent to the least developed of thedeveloping countries the first step in learning the nuclear
alphabet. But as one writer notes, "no matter how widely disseminated scientific information may be, relatively few states
have the industrial infrastructure adequate to the task of translating this scientific and technological knowledge into an operational nuclear program." 11l6 The right to know, however, willcontinue to be reckoned with, as it has also been demonstrated
at the first NPT Review Conference and the UN General Assembly.

Tribune,24-25 Oct.

1970,andý 51

114

InternatiLonal Herald
July.-! Aut. 19,711.

115

See Ronald J. Bettauer, "The Nuclear Non-Proli.feration Act
1,
of 1978", Law and Poiyin Dnternational Busines "s, Vo,-ýlo
No. 14, 17,p.15-18

116
Cas

lcelmnsecu,rity andl a Tran,_,national S)ystemrEergy", p. 63ý7.
of Nule315

Tlie

4. Cottioltinto
o-orn

2.

A i,

l

IV o

lincluded theigoniahof tMePatepplcaton,s of nucea
theheurterDeveomet- of

aydrafTs'of 24Auusj16"to c"OntLributL Ie aIone or inenrg(orpace.ful.1 pu-rp_-oses'"'seconid part of paragraphi 2 whiich
to do so shallrýeads :"Partý,es to týhe Treaty in a positionor *together with otheralso co-operate in contributing alone
to the further developStates or international organizations
for peaceful purment of the applications of nuclear energy
non-nuclear-weapon Staposes, especially in the territories ofof the Treaty,tes Par~ty to the Treaty." 19In the final text
the phrase "with due
as formulated at the UN General Assembly,
areas of theconsideration for the needs of the developing
to meet certain
world" was added at the end of the paragraphCommittee of theconsiderations raised by Chile in the Firstof the less developGeneral Assembly with regard to the needs
nuclear energy.12
ed countries in the field of
iýt,o anobia

tini,hof Article IV,
in analysing this second part of paragraph 2
definition of the "Parwe shall first address ourselves to the
co-operate in contrities to the Treaty in a position to ...
applications c-f nubuting" to the further development of the
we shbll address
clear energy for peaceful purposes. Secondly,of the obliourselves to the beneficiaries or the recipientsand more partigation, i.e., the non-nucleCar-weapon States,

1-17

See Appendix 3-D.

L118, J)U'R, SpppilP1 for 1967 and 1968, Docs.
Slec. 12 (ElNDC,/19ý6, 19 Sept, -1967).
L119 See Appeondix 7)-E,
120A/,lPV15

DC/230 and Add.

prv2, 16 MiNay 1968, pp. 71-75.

316

I.,

Etel
0t

theo ob.igat ion(a) The Contrib,Uatijjn-

co-opýera,t-,e inI otýlribýtinL 'In

StateLs

ofit ted outý bydnrdcs,aPa-,rag,raph- 2Lof Article IV
one writer., a newi categL,ory of' StaItes,braethnucaweaon tat.es and narrowver than o-ucerwepnStts
peios iIn
which hie calls the "contlribiuti ng satsgerian w,orking, paper, the obligationt to co-operate,- wa
122
bent on each Party to the Treaty.

Lincum-The Soviet representative at the ENIDC, commenting on. para-,graph 2 of Article IV, said that:"The purport of this provision is that States whichhave achieved the highest level of development in
the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
and in the first place the nuclear Powers, shallcontribute to the development of the peaceful23States."I1
atomic activities of non-nuclear-weapon
There was certainly no doubt that the nuclear-weapon States
1 2 4 As
were viewed in the first place as "contributing States".
them
far as non-nuclear-weapon States are concerned, those ofwithinadvanced in nuclear technology were considered to fallof nuclear
the new category. There are in fact different levels
progress. One country's representative had roughly classified:thosethe non-nuclear-weapQn States into two distinct groups
skills rewith, and those without, the capacity and technicalquired to maintain a programme of peaceful uses of nuclear
Staenergy. The first group was termed the non-nuclear-Reapon
tes and the latter the non-nuclear States, the distinction
121
122

123
124

Tat,P. 130.

WillIrich, NnPoieaon

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs, DC/230 and Add. 1,
2 Nov. 1-96'71), paragraph 1 ofAnn. IV, Sec. 18 (ENDC/202,
Article IV-A.
ENDC/PV. 366, 16 -Feb. 1968, para. 10, See also A/C,1//PV,
1571 (pr,ov-,),, '20 May 1968, p. 18.
For example, see Ak/OI-/PV. 1562] (prey-.), 7ýMay _1968,
p.8-10 (Denmark) and A,/C,l/PV. 16350 (pro-v.), 5 Dec.
1-968, p. 51 (Mexico).

317

-sp
cor.~ d-gruhytota

crtei
are~
p
Past

the benfo

1ce! iiewe"develop-qed anid unider-advancedJ~

the aplcto1oril

Sttte re1lating to t1he comnpositioniof th

VI of IAEFA 's

AEA B oard o f Go-,the field of nuclear energýy, Practice has
advnceSatesý -inidemonlstrated that the five members of the 1AEA -most advancedin the technology of atomic energy and thus designated as members of the Board were Canada, France, USSR, United Kingdom
and the United States. None of these States have been replacedor challenged as members of the Board. The other members, designated by the early Board as the most advanced in their regions, were Brazil in Latin America, South Africa in Africa
and the Middle East, India in South Asia, Australia in South
East Asia and the Pacific, and Japan in the Far East. 12 Over1 2 7 However, thethe years these designations were challenged.
125
126

127

A/CONF.35/SR.11, 11 Sept. 1968, p. 146 (Jamaica).
Article VI before being amended in 1970 stipulated in its
paragraph A.1 that the outgoing Board "shall designate
for membership on the Board the five members most advancedin the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials and the member most advanced in
the technology of atomic energy including the productionof source materials in each of the following areas not
represented by the aforesaid five :(1) North America(2) Latin America (3) Western Europe (4) Eastern Europe(5) Africa and the Middle East (6) South Asia (7) South
East Asia and the Pacific (8) Far East."
See Paul C. Szasz, The Law and Practices of the International Atomic Energy__Agency (Vienna :IABA, 1970), pp.
144-151. Article VI before being amended in 1970 had also
emipowered the outgoing Board to designatt, for one year
t-wo me-mbers from among Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland andPotualas othe_r piroducers of souorce materials. The Board
to design_0ate one other mýemlber for one
right1hlad a_lso thej,
yeArUa aLsupp-ier_(,j of thechniceal.asstne Thisý thGi_rtUeen`th1
Cd t o r otatDe amýýong the Scandiý,navian
des..Ignat'led sIea use20
counries.,

31

~
~
statustm~ a ormniidtnmmbr

which boadnethAe-J.ganelr- of therwheich''oftetowsmr
theABAStatute,iient ig

~ of, i

~

ecn

o-!
Bord
o -dbe,r

i

oteI

Board

ae:or pointhedtodekicexamineouncrainl.ý;jbut also In determini-ng -the level,o

dvne

okit

aacd

c

eneral.±2

we must say that althcugh the designatedmember of the !A'EA Board, according, to the amended Artuiclo V1of IAEA Statute, a--e to be considersi the most advanced counIn conclusion,

the technology of ator.mic energy, the iuc.sotion. of'der,fyn the "cont-ibuting States" in the context of Article
will remain a relative one. The Faradox is that
IV of the NETotries

ina coun.try desig'.na-ted as a.member of th,:. IAEA Board. as the mosta,d1va?nred -in itus region can. be considered much lesp advanced
me..qdmembes an,-d therefore cualallfies not only
ot'h.er deslg____nbut also as a beneficiary. On theothe.r ho.nd. a o-or s_ignated memberý of the IAEA Bnard may quas a conmib-ating State" if its level of advancement is
lify
as a

"_nib.ngStat-el"

msuch higher than other States seek.'nEg its co-operation. In
a complex epracti',ce, naragraph 2 of Article IV might.raiseof re1ationsh,,ii3s.
This conclusion is borre out by the membershýip of the Londonl
Suppliers' Club totalling sixteen States, onily four of wýhich ar,eself-sufficient in the field of nuclear tech-nology anid materials,
while the others are suppliers an,,d recipients of suchi technology.
The members of the group are Austr-alia, Belgium,, Canada, Czeoho126

IV_ za)blwc
See secton,jpp. 14-14Zi5
ooci.
C.cas ,,)
129 Pul319

Fra e,the RG, hC DR., Italyv, Japan,
sj.oakia
SwterlandI, ULK, US and th1ie USSR.
Sween
?oand

PlaVap of Aril'
IV stiultes

the Netherlands,

hat c:.o-oporation ino nn~nclar-eaonStates aryto thle
theteritrisof the developing
Tray, wit due conii deration for the needsar,eas of the jTorld," (Emphasis added.)is the
The first question which arises in this respectaccording tofollowing : Do the beneficiaries of co-operation? Basing ourselves
Article IV have to be Parties to the Treaty
co-authors, onon the interpretations given by the original
conjunction with thethe interpretation of the text itself inat the ConIAEk Statute as well as on a specific experienceanswer must be thatference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, theonly. However, nonco-operation is not limited to the Parties
standard of behavparties will have to comply with a minimumr
iour.
of the Soviet Union
To be more specific, the representativeof co-operating
to the ENhDC did not discard the possibility
who adopt a positive
with non-parties. He explained that "thoseto it will en!oY
attitude towards the treaty and become partiesof co-opera greater degree of confidence in the developmentof the peaceful use
ation in the nuclear field, in the field
Secretary of State,of nuclear energy. 110 (Emphasis added.) US
the hearings held on
William Rogers, asked by one Senator, at
Relations, if
the NPT before the Senate Committee on Foreign
or intended by it
there was any di4stinction made in the NPTsign it andconernngnuclear co-operation with those who

130ED/PVo36, J6

eb

1968, para,

32 0

24.

o
ntwo gnthoet,ansereithngatvesayingt"' thcat,

Trea,t1Y PProvJidedta.
the1(f Aricleo 1V seens toTh-e wýord "lespqcoiallJy" Inl thOex
vJ__-be miore patiulrl ad notco)nfirm, thiat co-operat.-iowil
N4ETJAny othe'lexc-tsi-Voly woitl thiosewoaeadee to thellof Article IV woutld be. in confict']ý
iit-arPret--tioin of t.he 'text!-_
with the 1LAD Statute which applies to all1 J.AEAmebrrgad

hie did n-ot thinkl

areetoless of whether they are parties to a certain
not.132
Zakistani
At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,
all States which
had introduced a draft resolution which urged
nuclear assistwere in a position to do so, not to provide any
not signed theance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that had
acquiNPT nor subscribed to it, nor renounced the production,
an instrum-ent
sition and use of nuclear weapons according to
into a safeguard
having the mandatory force of law, nor entered
to have been aimed
agreement.133 The Pakistani proposal seemed
the NPT. The
at India which raised a series of objections to
was objectdraft resolution was revised three times, 14but
being discrimined to by several countries including India as
noted that "(i)t
atory and r'estrictive. India's representative

131

132

133

13 4

by
HearinCs_on NPT,__196_9, p. 362. Followed immediatelythenegotiator,
Mr. Adrian Fisher, the US disarmamentor alatter explained that "there might be a greater
to theadherents
thewithreadier degree of cooperation"363.
p.
Ibid.,
Treaty.
partiesFears of discrimination within the IAEA between
Stateýs.
somebyexpressed
wereNET
and non-parties. to the(Ghana)
39-4
pp.
1968,
Sept.
11
See A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.5,
23 Sept. 1968, P. 136 an)d A,/C.1/1EV.
A/CO,NF,35/C.2/SR.13,mb)ia); and1702 (prov.), 27 Nov. 1969, PP. 44-45 (4Z,a6-65(lei)
pp.
969
Nov.7
289
(prov.),
A/C.1'PV. 1703

C1NF,,35/1
98 See al-so Ak//
Se_-pt.
A/CO1T?.35/C.2/IL.3, 16i2"SIR, 6,
A/COiT,F,35/C
n98,pt2Set.)
10)
C.2/SR. 4,
57-58.
12 Sept,1.)~683, pp)-.
1, 23) Sept 198 Rev 2, 24 Set
AOF3/O2L3Rev.
98
Sept.
196; ad ev. ,2321ý

would b,

the Nrt time that the developAng countries themseltrunkrtionsvQw had fixodttoý sciqnU in
iqvAnhion

ly

t'he

saJ.iets"

tuAtAono and
lst
1n

3

The draft,mutilated in the voting"versio.n waa,tprocesNw an wnely povidu
to the scinkfc

oar teohnical assistance and accessuopocss for &Ruonts

Wnstituto

nnannuclear esalsm

and thula-epnSae

ad scientists
sofadvanced non-nuclear-weapon

36
The PaSAtes3 (Resolution N previously referred to above). 1

Aistani experienc

indicates that future co-operation is notviewed as necessarily being tied up with the status of beinga party or not to the NPT.
However, in one Conference resolution, Resolution H, thenuclear-weapon States were urged "to facilitate, to the fullest
extent possible, the availability of fissionable materials forthe peaceful nuclear programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon States accepting the a2plication of safeauards-as envisaged in
Article III of the Treaty". 1 37 (Emphasis added.) It is quite
legitimate in this case to apply IAEA safeguards on all transfers of fissionable materials to non-nuclear-weapon States
whether th-ey are parties or not to the NPT. Cc-operation with
non-parties without such safeguards might be a step towards
nuclear proliferation and it would constitute a serious dis138
crimination against the complying States Party to the NPT.

135

A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.13, 23 Sept. 1968, P. 145. See also Canadals objections. Ibid.

136

See note 108. For the result of the vote on A/CONF.,35/
C.2/L.3/Rev. 3, see A/CONF-35/C.2/SR.17, 25 Sept. 1968,
pp. 176-177L

137

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CONhF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution H (III),
p. 14.

138

Indonesia, for example, expressed the view that no diference should be made between signatories and non-signatorieo prepared to submit themselves to the necessary
safeguards. AN/M~/P. 1628 (provd), 3 Dec. 1968, p. 37.

322

'NIPT
Review Conife_rence oftePate to t-hen,treaý,tmen
the developing- counrt-r.ies called for, a pr,e.eie,rentiL!
Of nuclear, ma1"tefavor, of the Parties to the NPT in t,,he supPlY
Egypt, wh'i-ch had signLgred buit not,rial, equipmentl and tech-nology.
to att-end the Revie
yet ratif'ied the NPT1 a-nd which was entit'Led
a preferentia,lI
ýConference as a, signatory, objected to suchd.iscriminatory and th,attreatm-ent on the basis that. it would bewor,ld comm.uniticy atndl
it would create another division in the
The IAEA was, ini
further complicate international relations.
was unacceptable
fact, of the view that preferential treatment
assistance funds allocatedwith regard to the Agency's technical
The IAEA,
to the members of the Agency without discrimination.
treatment in the field
however, was in favor of a preferential
the capital costs ofof concessionary financing to help meetto the
The three nuclear-weapon States Parties
nuclear plants.
in favor of preferences
Treaty held an opposite view. They were
but not in the field of
in the field of technical assistancefinancing.
export of nuclear installations or theirreached a
The Review Conference in its "Final Declaration"alia, prescribed the provague compromise formula which, interuses of nuclear
vision of special assistance in the peaceful
the NPT, and recommended
energy for developing States Party toof equipment, matethat in reaching decisions on the provision
terms, Statesrials and services on concessional financial
adherence to the Treaty
Party to the NPT should give weight toby recipient States.
At the first

United States anFollowing the NPT Review Conference, theto the Parties to the NPTnounced that it would give preferencethprovides each year-t1
in allocating the in-kind support itprogramme. More:-over, the
IAEA's regular technical assistancehenceforth itý wou)ld give
United States announced in 1976 thatin allocating its, annu,alpreference to the Parties to the N-PT
special nuclea.r m,,ateri$50,000 dolrsgf to thIe AAof
to disELrmia-Lient', th-e U,niteýd
At the 197 UN Secial Sessio'n devoted
outie Pr
toate developing
Stte off'e.red furth.cer beeis
andic Canada,,
The Sovielt Union, t,he UJnited Kingdomt,
tcies of t-he NFT.

323,

oimiln'L!ar offýeris; t-o be p,,rový,id ed to the PIarti4e s
niade,

It

toth

NPT

s qitesigifiantthat all these mneasurres have niot

touhedupn coopraio wth States no parties to the NP inhthefiel of, export of nuc,Lear installaion;freape
US uclarNonProifratonAct of 198does not precluLýde cýoo-p±te to, the NPT p.rovided the latter acceptý
op,erat_i on.wt
ineratonlsafeguardls on, all their nuýclear activities.
in the last analysisý, it is quite conceivable to say thatnioin-parties to the Treaty must not expect, however, to be put
on equal footing with the Parties in enjoying the full benefitsof co-operation. If equality of treatment for both is felt,
the latter mig_ht call into question their adherence to the NPT.
If the Treaty is to have a meaningful advantage in the fieldof the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for those who adhere toit, some nuances in treatment could be established between thetwo categories without prejudicing the right of non-parties todevelop research, production and use of nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes.
A second question which arises is that paragraph 2 of Article IV speaks of territories of non-nuclear-weapon Statesand developing areas. Does this mean that the beneficiaries ofco-operation will enjoy its advantages only in a regional setup ? Although the negotiating history of the NPT does not provide a clear answer to this question, the deliberate use of thewords "-ter'ritories" and "areas" would indicate at least a pre-~ference for co-operation to the benefit of not only one or moreStates but to a whole region. The choice of those words might
Conference139) See Preparatory Committee for the Second Review
Article TV
under
Activitiesof tý-he Parties to the NPT, IAEAt
July19),p.3-I
25
NPT/CONF.II/PC.II/8,
ofNP
be poýinted out that the guidinig principoles and genshal
erlopFer,ati.ng rules governinglc th'e provision of techn'Jcal
asitneby the, IAE'A do not, discrim-,inate rcetweený Stat,es
See IAEA Dcc. INFCIRC/267, Mar,3ch
Memibe_rs oft, thFe Agenicy.
197("9, repr.,odu.ced Jin App)endixý- 2LER,324

y theAe onegtaosUnedtte
have. bee_n rOoe
wih Er ~m ight-,have inlfluený ec t st ndto
co-pertio
tilelUited Stateýs ha,_d always shýown! i ers
warus reinaim
0[" a egon
s01,
tpoe
and readiness1 to sLpport certain nucea
Pow
atl basis sL10.h as thLe cSt,ruction Of c")ombine,J nuLe
1 40 ThI,e Uni teýdLStatIidlle Eas"t.
patsinthdealinsnot o'nLy mtvedby eo
imperatives. ein
nomic considerations, but also by security
allow each partial setups for peaceful nuclear co-operationand to makecipating State to check the activities of others
the peaceful to thesure that no diversion is being made fromto the complexities
military uce of the atom. At any rate, due
is being intensiof nuclear technology, regional no-operationin this field.
fied even among the most advanced States

its policy oDf nulaeinls

United States that
In fact, it was at the initiative of theregional nuclear
the IAEA undertook the studies on establishingas previously menfuel cycle centres, and which were welcomed,
By 1977 the technicaltioned, by the 1975 NPT Review Conference.
a future phase it
and economic studies were completed. 11Atof any specificwould be possible to take up in-depth evaluation
regional centre proposal.
most from co-operaThe non-nuclear-weapon States to benefit
in the nuclear fieldtion are expected to be those less advanced
are "in a position"
than other non-nuclear-weapon States which
The question of idento play the role of "contributing States".
one exactly as in thetifying these less advanced is a relative
case of the "contributing States".
a third
As to the developing countries, which constiLtutethe question of
category among the non-nuclear-weapon States,
defi.ning 'Gthedefinition is also a relative one. But before
140
141

Herns

o

P~16,p.258-290.ý

1,977
iRegioal Nucle'ar Fuel Cycle Centres, Vol. L- SuImmarY,
Sttud,ie s
ic
s
BE3a
1_:
Vol.
and
Project
Study
1AEA
ReDport,( oY th1leI-AEA, 1977).
(Vienna:

325

'ist
us
ounris in the context Of AIrticle !V, let
Of' the p)hras edsusthe origý-in of the addition to thiat, art-icle
tio of the need's of th1-e developing areas of
43wi,t due consder
devlopng

At, theýtwnyscd

feuel

eso

f

h

N5eea

As-

Frt Comite airatrflwo co_-operat'ion and contri_bu1;tcuntie lssdevloedinthe nuclear field. In
iontothis the niatural way of avoiding discrimination"hi
hisvie,which is banned
among the parties to the treaty, discrimination.
applied, thoseby the treaty, for, if such discrimination were142
would get even more,11
countries which already have the most
-text-of Article
Accordingly, the above phrase was added to theIV.
EiTNDC, in
In fact, the eight non-alig-ned members of theto the ENDC on 19
their joint memorandum on non-proliferation
time similar
August 1966, had voiced together for the firstwith a NIPT,
preoccupations. They trusted that in connectionof developing"intentions be explicitly stated that assistanceaccelerate theircountries should be increased in order to help
for peaceful purprogrammes of development of atomic energy
poses.iI,143
theBoth the United States and the Soviet Union stressedthat "(a)importance of the addition.14 The latter explained
will be had by the treaty for thoseparticular importance ...
the resources
developin6, countries which do not so far possess
use of nuclear
for major independent work in the field of the142

A/C.1/PV. 1569 (prov.), 16 May 1968, Pp. 72-75.

P(ENDC/178, 19
143'ýD"OR, Suppl, for 1966, Doc. DC/228, Sec.
Au-g. 19)66), p1are- 16.
United Sta'64
1,44" A/PV. 1j672' (pr,ov-), 12June 1968, -pp.
p. 71
1968.,
Nay31t:es) an-d A/'0,1/P-V, 1577 (prov.),(USSR).

326

at
fti
pa cefluLlpiurp-oses , and whJicuh,eas
fore
Energyeard" 1 4
rec,u,ire- assistaince from statels m1ore advancd i tht
o t he( deveIopn
GIc11efbaId cfiniion.Fjot o ne gL,,Io

is 11tcounrieand the. Dniiited Na,ti.ons_; Qon-fer rice on Trjade aindanoffiDeveloýpment, (UNC'TAD) Secrptariuts h-ave never adopted

possible.

h'e 1I

as, "deývecial listý of countrýies to be c;lassified cand treate'dloping"apA criterion which could be used for the purpose of thedevelopplication of Article IV is the political grouping of
its name
ing countries-called the "Group of 77" which derived
firstfrom a joint declaration made by 77 countries at thecountries
session of UNCTAID in 1964. With the newly independentthe "Group of77"1 includes more countries than the original 77.

IV, twoIn the specific case of the application of Artfcle
is thatcriteria, in our view, are most pertinent. The firstfordeveloping countries could be defined as those countriesofwhich a programme under the technical assistance component
been apthe United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had
had in factproved by its Governing Council. This criterion
nuclear probeen used by the IAEA in a study on financing ofSecondly, the International
jects in developing countries. 4
in itsBank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) includes
for deannual report a table on selected economic indicators
The Bank criterion isveloping and industrialized countries.
nuclear power
specifically important with respect to financing
4
as will be shown below. 1 7reactors in the developing countries
develop.The significance of emphasizing the neods of the
one delegate
in- areas in Article IV was best described byas; makOý-Jingý
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly
ýL11an2,d ob)igatý
for a more equitable balance of respo,)sibi-lities

145

Ib id,,

146

See TAADcc. GC(XIV1)/43ý6, 19 Aug. 1.970, Anin. 1, p.,3
17, Table 1, pp. 1350--131_
A-nn-ual Report
See World Bank,

V147

327

I
th1n
Ln
mo

o

I
an rnon-nuclear- We'apo

ý,atteCneec,J,Ges.
Statý0Stts

onNcerWao

Fu rth1er-thews"t)h thtdeeloingcoutris soulid not be turnied
a waninarkt ompraleto(the_ Old semi-colon,ia marntoa uclar
advne StJats frL,om wi-hi,ch they woLd
tothe
mtril
ra
fiihdinutil rdcs, thus wden,ing thega
ac4uire~,tc
hedvacedandthedevlopng
betwenthLateountrie,:s an-d p)Lacing

14
Listate,- Of nluclear depenýtdenicy.

jhIsL

brings us

pa~ragrýaph 2
toteoblig_,ationis incurred by the second partu of-L
of Article IV, and more particularly to the main preoccupationsof the non-nuclear-weapon States and especially the developing
countries in the field of peaceful nuclear co-operation.
(c) The Oblitation to Contribute
The original Mexican proposal upon which Article IV wasprincipally based stipulated that:"Those Parties that are in a position to do so,have the duty to contribute, according to theirability, alone or in co-oDeration with other States or international organizations, to the further
development of the produaction, industries, and
Dther applications of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes, especially inl1 6e territories of non(Emphasis added.)nuclear-weapon States."
The Mexican representative at the ENDC explained that thisdu1ty "can and should be enunciated as a true legal obligation,although the obligation is imperfect and general and its practical significance will continue to depend ultimately on thewill of the nuclear Powers", He further explained that thephrase "according to their ability" referred "not only to theparties' fineancial. and technical ability but also to their le-

6 June 1968,

148 /C-l/PV. 158C,0
149~
15)0

~

~

i' Set13

para. 72 (Pakistan).
"198 p. 66
I/OF3/./R7(UAR).

DCOR, Suppl. for 19)67 an..d 1968, Docs. DC/1230 a_nd, Add,
Annl, ]IV, Sec, 12 (ENjDC/L196, 19 Sept. 1-967).,

32'8

I

Is covered by pagal abil-Iity? since0 Mluch of (the') knowledge
15
tents. owned by private persons."
the first to
The Canadian representative at the ENDC was
was worried that theobject to the wording of the proposal. He
as-, an. unrest.rlcted
use of the word "duty" might be interpreted
from nnnCerWao
obligation to comply with all requestsof the views exStates. 1 52 The UK representative in support
also expressed concernpressed by the Canadian representative
to expect to re-that the wording "could lead some countries
have worked hard to proceive for nothing what other countries
5 3 The United States, while sharing the objectives
duce." 1that "the Mexican forsought by Mexico, had supported the view
sweeping and too gemulation may in some respects create too
154
neral an obligation."assessment canIn the light of these objections a betterin contributbe made of the mere obligation to "co-operate
Article IV after the preing", as it was finally formulated inof 18 January 1968. As
sentation of the identical treaty drafts
is even less firm
it has been rightly noted, the obligation
make available". l5than one simply "to contribute" or "tothe obligation.
Several countries belittled the value ofany binding commitment,15
It was considered as not constituting
the non-nuclear-weaponor as hardly adequate, 157 thus leaving
18One of the most severe
States in a position of inferiority.
the representative of
warnings in this respect was voiced by
151

152
15W
154
155
156
157
158

6

11.
RNDC/PV. 331, 19 Sept. 1967, para.

INDC/PV. 336, 5 Oct. 1967, para. 11.
ENDC/PV. 337, 10 Oct. 1967, para, 42.
16.,
ENDC/PV. 3>58, 12 Oct. 1967, para.

Tet,p.11
Willrich, Noyl-1ro1iferatiO
72 (India).
A/C.l/FV. 1567 (prov.), 14 May 1968, p,
61 (South Africa).
A/C.I`/P``/. 1571 (prov.), 20 May 1968, p.
(Ghana).
A/COXSF,35/0.2/SR.5, 11 Sept. 1968, p. 42329

Ieliu,iim

to the Firs,,t Committe,'e of the UN General AIssembly said

that:
"The needs of industrial and scientifio development
make this co-operation imperative if we want toavoid introducing into the civilian area the distinction accepted in the military area, which
would be unacceptable and would inevitably1
to the calling into question of the treaty.)'
But what is meant by co-operation ? Co-operation was understood to niean assistance provided by the advanced to the lessC6
oadvanced countries in the field of nuclear technology.operation, however, was not considered to be limited to meretechnical assistance. As one UN delegate put it, co-operation"should be of a multiple character". A policy of extensive credits to encourage and generalise the use of nuclear energy -for16
peaceful purposes was considered to be an urgent task.l l"Assistance", as noted in a paper prepared for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, is a word which may be defined in a number of different ways, even within the context
of the NPT. 6

In the latter case, assistance could extend fromaccess to scientific and technological information to building
63
The use of theresearch reactors and nuclear power plants.
words "to the further development_"2certainly means that co-operation is not limited to the exchange of equipment and in-

161

A/C.1/PV. 1571 (prov.), 20 MVay 1968, pp. 49-50.
For example, see A/CO1NF.35/C.2/SR.6, 12 Sept. 1968, p. 56(Pakistan).
A/C.1/PV. 1627 (prov.), 2 Dec. 1968, pp. 41-42-(Columbia).

162

See Ryokichi Sagane, loc.cit.., p. 1.

163

See Ibd. PP. 1-4 and M.A. El-G-uebeiýy, "Submission of
Periodic Reports by Countries, to an International Agenpy,
on the Nature and the Extent of Nuclear Technical Assistance and Fissionable Material Snppliýd by Thema to NonNuolear-Weapon States for Peaceful Purposes", PonferpAceof Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Geneva.1968 (A/CONF.35/Doc.
4, 3 July 1968), pp. 2-4.

159
160

330

partofpaa
formation which is already covered by theý fiLrst
graph 2 of Article TIV.
otherAssistance could be on a purely commercial basis or
act of bewise. 16 4 It "should not be interpreted simply as an
the former
nevolen~ce in which the rich give to the poor what
6 5 Some generosity on the part of the "conno longer need." 1Thetributing States" towards the reoipients is expected.
to"Fanfani Proposal" on the transfer of fissionable materials
is but one
the non-nuclear-weapon States at a reduced pricecompensate theexample oCtthe expected generosity which would,
latter for renounicing nuclear weapons.
to foresee.
The extont and limits of co-operation were hard
had referThe three nuiclear-weapon: States Party -to tho Treaty
and
red on several occasionls during the Treaty's negotiations
and promised
after, to their previouas reoords of co-operation,from theto intensify this co-operation which would result
However, the US
tnist and confidence g-enerated by the NPT. 6
toAtom-,ic Energy Comm-ission, for exampie, had the followingsay:"We do notc, however, interpret Article IV as meanany
ing- that the US will be compelled to embark on
meet
to
US
the
obligingasorprograms
costly new
all requests and demands. Neither do we construe
US
Article IV as overriding the provisions of thediscretthe
remove-itwill
Atomic Energy Act, nor
ion we have in determining the nature of our coon
operative relationship Mh'ith other countries,
a case by ease basis."
were even
Limits on co-operation do in fact exist. They
its
realistically acknowledged by Mlexico when it presented
P. 3.

164

Ibid.,

165

Ryokichi Sagane, loc-cit., P. 4.
For example, see ENDC/PV. 297, 18 Mlay 1967, para. 17(USSR); ENDC/PV. 303, 8 June 1967, paras. 12-14 (UnitedandStates); EN]DC/PV. 307, paras. 16-17, 22 June 1967,
Kingd-ýomi).
(United71
A/C.1/PV. 1575, 28 May 1968, para.

166

167

Hearings

onNPT,

1969, P.

498.

331

pooaofAtcl

SigardEkluidteIV which incueI"a11, th

Drecor-enealof

Ccord(1,In

phastH)e IA,noted

that

with' the growin,g free e_xchange of information about research,
the_re was a contrary trend in that commercialization had
69
brought increasing secrecy. 1
The guidelines for nuclear transfer worked out by the
London Suppliers' Club are a vivid proof that constraints andlimitations imposed on nuclear co-operation do in fact exist.
Although the objectives pursued by the "Club" are quite legitimate, i.e., the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the elimination of commercial competition as afactor in negotiating safeguards, the guidelines may well leadsome supplier States to follow the US example in refraining
from the transfer of basic technology and know how, especiallyin the sensitive areas of uranium enrichment, reprocessing andheavy water production. Moreover, in the process of restricting the transfer of technologies which have potential military
nuclear applications, the guidelines may have the impact of restricting as well the flow of basic knowledge in areas notnecessarily confined to the nuclear field.
In fact, in examining closely the guidelines and the export
trigger list and agreed on common criteria for technology transfers, all of which are attached to this study, it is reasonable
to conclude that the problem with the guidelines does not lie
in their content as much as it lies in the spirit which inspired
their formulation, a spirit very much in favor of denying certain technologies to the developing countries regardless of theprinciples enshrined in Article IV of the NPT.

The mere factthat the guidelines have been worked out in secrecy and without
168

See N/C.1/PV. 1.570 (prov.), 1-7 May 1968, PP. 13-15,
tralia).

169

A/PV. 1979 (prov.), 8 Nov. 1971, P. 13.

332

(Aus-

th-1-e pairticiLpation of the dev,elop.ingio counAtriesý anId kepý`t seCret
fo ogperiod of time befo)re be,in,g releLased iS als aLvio
lat Io of th.,e essence of co-operatioýn prescribed by Article1
Atc the Sixth Confe-rence of Heads of State or Government of
Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana, Cuba, from 3 to 9 September 1979, this issue had not been left untackled. After aseries of preparatory meetings, the Conference devoted a considerable part of its "Political Declaration" to the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In one of the most important segments of this part, the Conference expressed concern at "the monopolistic policies of nuclear supplier countries restricting and limiting the transfer of technology andimposing conditions which are incompatible with the sovereignty
and independence of the developing countries". The Conference
called for full observance of the principles of indiscrimination and free access of nuclear technology. It reaffirmed theright of each country to develop programmes for the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with their171
own freely determined priorities and needs.
Turning now to the fields of co-operation of direct interest to the non-nuclear-weapon States, a distinction could bemade between the advanced States and those less advanced andmore particularly the developing countries.
The main preoccupation:. of the advanced non-nuclear-weapon
Otates, as treated earlier in this chapter, are the supply of
nuclear fuel and information on uranium enrichment techniques
and reactor construction. We need not repeat here those pre170

171

See Appendix 19. For a critical analysis of the London
Suppliers' Club and its guidelines, see Mounir Ahmad Khan,
A Third
Nuclear Energy and International Cooperation:ofCnfdnce (ew' okWorld Perception of Its Eroio
ThRylIstue
Th-e-To-ckefeller FoundationanLodn
thle(Sosrdby
1979)
Sept.
Affairs,
InternationalofInternational Consultative Group oný Nu)clear Ener,gy), pp.
13-18.
UN Doc. A/31 4/542, 11 Oct. 1,979, Ane,pp. 374_333

occuption wIc h,!ave l-ed! to cooeaieventures among, those
adacdState n-ot ol as far. as ura.nium enrichmifent techn iqusrecncrndbuit a_Lso in- thl,e fi;ýeld of advancwed reactor
tates, and mocre par,_-ticuAs ol- otýher,L no3ularwao
contres,their needs are quite dýifferenttedvelpinlary
In1 1978, the number of developing countries
andaore pressing.
wit.h firm nuclear power prograimmes - once expected to growrapidly during the 1970s - remained stable. As mentioned
earlier, only 12 developing countries are scheduled to havepower reactors in operation by 1984.
The developing countries in general are more in need of
economic and technical assistance, training and capital investments. 172 Later on, they could produce nuclear equipment on asmall scale but it would not be possible or even economically
venture into
practical for them, at least for some time, 7to3
construction.uranium enrichment or reactor
Upon the initiative of Brazil and supported by other Latin
America countries, 1 7 4 the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States adopted a resolution which requested the UN SecretaryGeneral to appoint a group of experts to prepare a full reporton "all possible contributions of nuclear technology to theeconomic and scientific advancement of the developing coun-

172

For example, see A/CONF.35/SR.6, 8 Sept. 1968, p. 75(Uganda); A/CONF.35/SR.7, 9 Sept. 1968, p. 87 (Ceylon);
A/CONF.35/SR.8, 10 Sept. 1968, p. 104 (UAR); A/CONF.35/
C.2/SR.4, 10 Sept. 1968, p. 35 (Philippines); and A/C.l/
PV. 1711 (prov.), 3 Dec. 1969, p. 79 (Indonesia).

173

For example, see A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.8, 16 Sept. 1968, pp.
81-82 (Yugoslavia).

174

2
A/CONF.35/SR.6, 6 Sept. 1968, p. 78 and A/CONF.35/C.2/L. ,13 Sept. 1968; Rev. 1, 17 Sept. 1968; and Rev. 2, 23 Sept.
1_968.

tries"7

The reor

ws submitte tohh4hssinoThe Report- is1no onl usefu as far as the devel.ýopi_ng
aS to the mor
countries are concerned but is,,alsocnfratv
The11
of nuc-lear eniergy.
general aspects of the peaceful use'S
aspects
report was in fact useful in exposing those general
under the first part of this chapter.
the reAs far as the developing countries are ooncerned,
port could be summarized as follows:
for moreOn the transfer of nuclear technology, the needa valuable link
nuclear centres is stresscd, as they can form
scientists
in this transfer. When a strong cadre of research
nuclear researchis available, consideration may be given toreactors.
more substantial
On nuclear mine_rals, it is expected that ain the future
proportion of the uranium reserves to be located
The experts consider
will be found in the developing countries.
is one -of the mostthat more intensive exploration for uranium
could be proimportant ways in whicli international assistancevided to developing countries,
shouldThe group of experts recommended that encouragement
interest in medium,rbe given to manufacturers to take a greater
the needs of asized nuclear power plants more suitable forgrowing number of developing countries.
are conFor the remote future, agro-industrial complexes
sidered to be promising.
need not reOn radio-isotopes and ionizing radiation, weand could be ofpeat here their valuable effects which are
great benefit to the developing countries.

175

lear,,ea_On
Final Document of the Conferpene of, NOnLI-,
2
98,Rsltn
States (A/0ONW.5l,1Ot
A/56)
ecn]
Contributionsjof Nula,p

176

ýo fo0r promt iig)pacefultc)inentoa1c-prfo
A~~~tJ1o"ntries,
he d evelopn
ncertcooyto th-eeftothet ireoi de te follwing emarkýs andrcoledain

exchange
it took nto fc,' the ysemfo thel intern1ational
wich was beng,deýveo](ped by thJe, Interna-ýtiona
ofnf mti
frmaionSysemof thTABA JINIS,)
NucearI
experts beivdthatl the, teclinical co-operatchief
ionL projects_ carried out býy theit1AEA woulId remain the
The grupo

technoofassiJstanice, in int.roducing. nuclear science andconlogy intlo many oLf the deýveloping countries. It ex,pressedfelt
at theo diffiQult financial position of -the,IAEA and
cern_cavailthat there should be a steady increase in the resourcesable for multilateral technical assistance.
sourCe,requested to
The governments of developing countries wereare concernre-exam~ine their positions as far as UNIDP projects
alreadyed, taking into consideration the success of projects
executed in other countries.
espeit was hoped that international sources of finance,on the proscially 'the IBRD, would "review the positions taken
nuclearpects, criteria and conditions for financing major
benefits
installatiLons, bearing in mind not only the immediatefrom initial projects but also the long-term contributions
that such projects could make to developing countries".1-7
the report
It was only this last specific recommendation of
resowhich was textually mentioned in the UN General Assembly
In essence,lution which, inter alia, commended the report.17
fromthis particular recommendation as well as others emanating
the group of experts were in line with the recommendationsin itsadopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.
17 Ii.,

aa

262....

GA es(XXV),16Dec
178265336

169,oprati-vel p_aragraL-ph.S2

resLution "J" whic

wa

)Ita s 01eroican coIr
odthe- 1AkEA

es lu iofCrnc
e_-ne-raL-d

tc contoutceraintassls an itraonlcnelof
come:" now to the last, part ofti

we hav

the as"rýcon0eer the etý
whc

redtoqt,,t,earier int this chatrnnot- oJl"J

Latrils
Y"Fund of SpcaFisoblaiou,nakit"te

by a

als

CCer-

was als t

co-opratnILWe
hpe

lotd

to he chanO-nel's ofcooeain
At the 1975 NPT Review Conf_erence, týhe IkEA was also the;focal point of the Conference's recommendations in itsý re-vieýw
of the implementation of Article IV, as has already been demonstrated and as will further be shown below.
IV. Channels of Co-operation
Article IV of the identical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967
spoke of the right of the parties "to contribute alone or in
co-operation with other States" to the further development of
the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In
accordance with the Mexican proposal of 19 September 19,67, theidentical treaty drafts of 18 Januiary 1968 also included the181
co--operation with international organisations.
179

180

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
J, pp. 16States (A/CON-F.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution
6
17 Sept,,
A/CON--P,35/C.2/T,.
see
draft,
basic
17. For the
1968; Add. 1, 18 Sept. 1968; and Add. 2, 20 Sýept. 1968.
The resolution wasý objected to by fi-ve Sovi'et, bl,oc States.
Seventeen other States abstained in.clu,iding- Canada, Japan,
the Scandinavianx countries anid most, -Western EU.rop)eant States. It seems that the advanced no-ula-epnStatUes
realized that in thie longn run, costs incurred by such aresolution would not be limite-d toth,ucea-eao
States, See SchieLinan, "INuclear S'affeguat)rds,, tUhe Peacefl'_
Atom, and the 1AEA", p.55
Sppl fo 197 anid,168 Docs. 230 and Add,, 1-,AnT,n.
181DCO,
IV, SePo, 1? (ETTDC/196, 19 Sept. 1967). Th,e Mfexicanl propoosa],)rosa
gaincd. preferience in comparison with a Nieia
wqhich- st'ipu-,alat,ed that, "ea(_-h Party ton the Treaty vundertakes337

co0-oper ton djd not pnKnive enourh attettio
nNcer
eNPfT negotiat.junp . At Lhw ConferennCe Of
dung
Of the debhtes
Wepnstawas thY werp, however, at KhQ cenatrebY th COnan th pubject mKAtte of wwny CPHOMMo~S adopted
onjvup cAnil appA:icationu of nuclear energy,
e~~ejn,"
Chane

sOt

and regional mulWithout belittling the value of bilateralat the Conference of Non-Nutilateral co-operation, the trend
in the direction of co-operaclear-weapon States was very muchand more particularlytion through international organizations
which was later confirmed
through the IALA in Vienna, a trend
as well as by the 1975 NPT
by the members of the-IAEA itself
we will tackle bilateral
Review Conference. In a first section
on multilateral reco-operation followed by a second section
on co-operation throughgional co-operation and a third one
international organizations.
i.Bilateral Co-_operation
States, bilateral
At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
but its equal importance
co-operation received little attention
organisations was streswith co-operation through internationalof international organisased.'18 2 However, the increasing role
was favoured.
tions vis-invis that of bilateral arrangements
for some advanced nonThe Conference was also an occasion
assistance they have ginuclear-weapon States to refer to the
18 3field of the peaceful atom.
ven to other countries in theof which attended the
As to the nuclear-weapon States, four
participate at all in its
Conference as observers and did not

182
183

international Atomic
to co-operate directly or through the
2 Nov. 1967), ArtiAency ... " Ibid., Sec. 18 (ENDC/202,
organisa"internationalcle IV-A. The use of the phraseof thementioning
sole
the
than
tiono" is more pertinent
1AAA whatever its leading position is.
6
57 (Pakistan) andA/C00,.35/0.20SR. , 12 Sept. 1968, p.
141-142 (Canada).
QMCNF.In/0.20SR.13, 23 Sept. 1968, pp.,6
, 12 Sept. 1968, p. 55 (MP); A/CONE
AlCOUP.15/C0"/IM
35/O2/S.7,13 Sept. 1968, p. 69; and ACIT.5C2S.3
23 Sept 1968, PP. 141-142 (Canada).,338

dle_iber_Latin,

he

a

t

C
caion
omnta

to

tý eirnuiiclIe ar co-operatl-ion h-as mlade-, newstie, espe
evicially betw",eena t,he United St,ateý.s anýd the SieUno,as
Ricar
den_edJ by the a-,reemient siýgned in Ju,,ne 19735 byV PrI'esident
among the,Nix:on and Part"Y Secretary Leonid Brez:hnev, as woell as
The late cuty,
advTanced count'ries of Eurc-pe anL-d Japan, 1.
for, example, sig;ned in 1972 an agrteemeant withAutalainofanother with France for co-operation in thae peacýeful uses
nuclear energy. 17Specific agreements on uranium enrichmiiient,era
B ,iatas previously noted, have been negotiated and signed between
Western European countries and the Soviet Union.
As far as the developing countries are concerned, the UnitedStates, for example, has arranged for the supply of Mexico's
asfirst power reactor, which is expected to operate by 1982,
applies
The samewell as the provision of enrichment services.
reactorto an agreement with Mvexico relating to a second powerreactorto be operational by 1983 and to the supply of a power
haveto Yugoslavia. These bilateral co-operation agreements
thebeen communicated by the United States to the IAEA after
prefer1975 NPT Review Conference as an indication of American
for the proential policies in favor of the Parties to the NPT
motion of their peaceful nuclear activities.

184
185

186

187

The People's Repu"blic of China though invited to attend
the Conference had disregarded the invitation,
For example, see ENDC/PV. 366, 16 Feb. 1968, paras. 2021 (USSR) and Hearings on NPT, 1969, P. 487 (US agreements
for co-operation in the civil uses of atomic energy in.
effect in 1969).
Cooperat-For the 1973 US/Soviet "Agreement on ScIriet-Ific
Vo-L,
DOS-R,
ion in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", see,
abre
Forý
LXIX, No. 1778, 23 July 1973, Tpp. 159-160,
nd itsSi
discussion of the obJectives of thle ageeen
i-nti
a-ccor,ds
previous
thfe
wit-h
comparis-on
iJn
gnificanceRussia EpaieNwTypeýs
field, see John W. iny "US(O,25ý Junec 1973.
her.ald Tr:i:-1bunec,
Of A1-power",JInentioa,,o
Le Monde, 19 Feb. 19W72 and _27-28 Feb. 19c72. Se alsp46(Aus'-tralia,).
276 pro.),31 Oc.197-2,
A/P.

339

ri,emaina, the maiLn cha,ýnnel 4Lor' 0r'0'hey we(-re preflerre,,d as a chlannelT1.
viin issio,tnable:, miatLeralscovasopsdto the IEA bcaus,:e SUPPlY arry,angem-ients normally
ooUid be in adanthmaealfunse
red lnepeid
Te AEA had di'ffi CultY in acting asf
mmditeneds
vane
i trl

abeen,

anicenrichament. and to arrange for third,tl
Th1le bilatera-ls had al,so be-e.n the only
coutryfue,srvice.
thechannel~~~~~~~ thog.wihte1eeoin-onries had financed

anl inemeiryi

consructon fnCla

pow,,er stations.

sugConference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Kny
reports on the nage_-6ed that the nuclear Powers submit annual
assistance to an inture and extent of their nuclear technical
1 8 9 Ghana had also suggested to lay before
ternational agency.
on bilateral coan international body the agreements concluded
90
first coccasion when
operation.'1 This, however, was not thethe reporting issue was raised.
At theý

to theTo minimize the ground for suspicion by Parties
activities, the NiTreaty with respect to inter-State nuclear
article to be includgerian delegation to the ENIDC proposed an
ed in the MhPT which read as follows:"Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate
annually to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
results
full information on the nature, extent andor group
Party
other
any
with
co-operation
itsofenergyof Parties, in the development of nuclear
byreceivedsoreportsThe
for peaceful purposes.
beshall
the International Atomic Energy Agency
to thecirculatTýlby the Agency to all the PartiesTreaty."
188
189
190

9-10, para. 18.
See UN Dcc. A/7677/Add. 2, 7 Nov. 1969, pp.
A/CONF.35/SR.8, 10 Sept. 1968, p. 98.
hoped that
A/O0Nq7,35/C.2/SR.5, 11 Sept. 1968, P. 42. Ghana
for theagreementsinternationalofsýome s,tan_tjdardlsation
mnightco-operatinn
exChangecc of tcnclifraonand

191. DO()R,Supl, )r 196)()7 ad196,Dcs,3 and Add., 1, Aýnfl
foand2?Nov. 1967), Articlie(R1-1D VV,ec18(ED/02,

1401

on
Later

the;

e prpo;iswaVh Laadtion

ofCJt,h e I AEA.'ENDOICoeut)so

a

ýi
diioa
an a is

pa

vrs

t

oojc

oteNgrarpslo

Nigerian delegateu-

at, theý

This2 led thetan, argument as oontrary to the Statute o

docu.ments which the Agency had issued about
the IAEA and theý(its statutory -funct,ionso and activities. 9
The United Statesý

also rejected the proposal on the grounds

that "(m)aking the reports compulsory for each party could prove unnecessarily burdensome to many, as well as to IAEA, especially in view of the expected acceleration and expansion ofsuch co-operation and exchaniges.1"19 The provisions of Article
IV were fou-nd to encourage and facilitate the circulation ofsuch information reports through the IAEA and other international organisations and at periodic international conferenceson the peaceful uses of atomic energy.19
The Nigerian proposal was dropped in its revised working
paper of 14 Mvarch 1968.197 Its acceptance by the original ccauthors of the NPT would certainly have been of great value inreflecting the status of biLlateral and multilateral cc-operation in the field of nuclear energy. How(aver, the Nigerian worries were met by the safeguards provisions of Articl-e III with
192

193

DO-OR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Doc_s. 230and Addio,
Ann. IV, Sec. 36 (EN)L20 28 Fb.C 968 and N-3 PV
371, 28 Feb. 1968, para. 13.,EN`DC/PV. 346, 9 Nov, 19617, para. 8.ý

195

ENDC/PV. 3-51, 28 Nov.16,prs 8-3
ENDC/PV. 378, 13 ]ar 196, paa 7n

196

ibid

194

0adAdd- 1,
C
r 97 and 196, Dcc
Spp.
19 DORAn 1V' Sec. 37(NC22/e.1, 14 Mar.' 1968).

3 41

o

or poct~ue Po~silthofsei1fisoalýinstlitIutions andLuclear, esStates and -the non-nucleartablishme,ntS. of the nuclear-weapon
1 9 8 The
to do likewise.,
wcapon States 1"which are in a position"
usually takes place in acexchange of students and scientists
agreements.
cordance with bilateral cultural
NPT Review Conference
In its "Final Declaration", the 1975
to the developing counhas also encouraged increased assistancemultilateral channels.
tries bilaterally as well as throughrecommended that States
Moreover, the NPT Review Conference
do so, meet, to the fullest
Party to the NPT in a position torequests for technical assisextent possible, technically soundto the Treaty which thetance made by developing States Party
Accordingly,
resources.
IAEA is unable to finance from its own
for various projects forin 1975 for example, lack of funds
contributions from thetechnical assistance were met by special
Philippines and Thailand.
United States for Malaysia, Mexico,?,endcetistto th.e sci,ientif'ic

Multilateral Regional Co-operation
co-operation will
It is expected that multilateral regional
IV is drafted in a way
increase as a result of the NPT. Article
We have previously demonas to encourage such co-operation.
and "areas" instrated that the use of the words "territories"
indication of preference
the second part of paragraph 2 is an
for regional co-operation.
organizations speIn Europe, for example, there are three
namely thecifically engaged in nuclar energy co-operation,
the OECD Nuclear
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),2.

198~~~~~

Final ~~ ofof1the Cofrec

0oumn 11~larWa

Organization for Nuclear,
Energy Agenoy (NEA) and the European
for "Conseil euY0
Research better known as CERN (whica stands
body which was
p6en pour la recherche nuel6aire", the interim
the Organisaestablished to lay the grounds for establishingtion). 199)
1973 Middle East
Moreover., in the aftermath of the October
Energy Agency (TEA)
war and. the oil embargo, the International
an autonomous body withint
was established in November 19Y)4 as
responsibility to
the framework of the OECD with an overall
Programme with a m,,ajor objecimplement an International Energy
on oil and the development
tive of reducing excessive dependence
including nuclear energy,.0
of alternative energy sourcesin Latin America,
Apart from Europe, and more specificallyof Nuclear Weapons in Latinthe "Agency for the Prohibition
virtue of Article 7 of theAmerica" (OPANAL), established by
as a useful framework for in-~
Treaty of Tlatelolco, could serve
atom among the Latin Amercreased co-operation in the peacefuland supplement the work of
ican countries Party to the Treaty,Commission of the Organization
the Inter-American Nuclear Energyof American States (OAS).
to dwell on the
In the present chapter we neither intend
organisations, whichfunctions and practices of those existing
nor shall we deal with theiris beyond the scope of this study,
later be discussed infunctions as inspectorates which will
Article 1I1 of the NPT,
conjunctionf with the application ofthc different roWfhat is of importance hcre is to distinguish

199

200

field oK nuclear energy
International co-operation in the
Erope takes place
Easternofin the Socialist Countries
for Mutual Ecownoica As_in the framework of teCounL,cil
Qpruyvj, 8 Nov. 1971,
sistance (COMEQOT). See A/PV. 197
p. 67 (USSR),
197
TEACountriesq
ofProgramýimes
andPolicies
See Energy
and,
1
2,a
OECD, 1979), especially p.
Reviewl(PArTs:

201
other11

eac
pSen
(a

IJ

the~

~

and aimfectiv,ns

Euopa'.i anCoelmomuit

toal

202
undi theErpanCmo

raIng

spcfclyathle "cnditionSatsne-

Agency of thevirtue of agreements concluded through the Supply
Community.
research
Euratom not only co-ordinates national nuclear
Its Joint
programmes but also has its own research programme.
centres loNuclear Research Centre consists of four research
Geel (Belcated at Ispra (Italy), Petten (the Netherlands),
the base of itsgium) and Karlsruhe (FRG). The Ispra centre is
nuclearmajor research project, the ORGEL second-generation
201

202

European organisaFor a succinct exposition on the three
for the Heari_ngs
preparedwastions, see the paper which
Relations on
Foreignon
Committee
held by the US Senate
Non-Proliferthe-the NPT :Ellen C. Collier, "Effects ofInstitutions", He2arigs Eu oation Treaty on Internationalalso
Achille Albonetti,
See466-41
199,pp.
NPT
for Internarope and Nuclear Energy", Atlantic InstituteNo. 2, 1972.
tional Affairs (Paris), The Atlantic Pa-pers,
0G.Polach,
For substantial studies on EURATOMI, see jaroslav 1964);
Publications,(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. :Oceana
EURTO
an InternatioHugo J. Hahn, "Euratom :The Conception of71, No. 6,Vol.
IRevieýw,Lawi
Harvardnal Personality",:a'EuratomApr. 1958, pp. 1001-1056; H.L. Nieburg,
XV,
_Vol.
Politics,
World
Study in Coalition Politics",
Scheinman,
Lawrence
and597-622;
No. 4-,J-unie 1965, PP.
Lntjern0-½onal"Euratom :Nuclear Integration in Europe",
Conciliation, No. 563, May 1967.
For thetext
AtileI f the- Tety salsigErt
20
UTS, Vol.
of th Tre_-at,y with Annexes and Protbocol)Is, see

344

om

recor,
I
organtisa

rese,archylteo~cn

e

olx

sas

s

thois
ment.~~~~~~~

lc,tedsovr

afteorma th of1thiie Se

of laIsn

cris of 196

whc

deoiioadrsltdi
y ain
ekee

ls
a
shortage of oil in Europe . Euratom
and thenulantiais
al disparities in nuclear energy
France which w-asof its members States, especially5deterrent.2
to build an indepoendent nuclear

eerie

for a rejuvenate-.,.d, enHowever, several factors are making
increase in oil prices in-rcent
larged Euratom. The continuous
Europe's sources of energy ha-s
years and the need to diversify
in nuclear power by Euratom
intensified co_ operative efforts
crisis" and mou-nting
members in an era marked by the "energy
oreover, the NPT, in206
pressure for environment protection.
members
fact, brought the original five non-nuclear-weapon
future application of Art-LL_
closer together as a result of theeconomic discrimination andcle III in the Community. Fears ofraise the importance of Euraindustrial espionage led them toas the effectiveness of
tom for their nuclear future as wellalso become more willing t
its inspection system. France haswith the otherStts
share its uranium enrichment techniques
as evidenced by the Eurodif project.

"Buratom204

Scheinman,
p. 13.

205

For a detai*LLole

NulaanlssLe

InertobinEop,,p.3-ly~e-nepeace fu;l nClea7'
26 This does. notl- mýean to) Say that,ýýTe3n~
n.
teevr
or
riks
wi_tholut- ha,-ýzardous
htto
hwv
m
accidentis but, onýe eapeimTi ,e tho)se r sks
effortsare. being JIep loy ed to tinJ

34,5

On~~

the ~
whic

19- 3

~

Awa_ fompuey]1oefisfim~
asevrnetpoeto~~included

cotiueiecec an ý technolog0Y
3 SerurteCmuiyss

to suriv

inte

~
pas

nula resac.
adapled dataTuhara
on annabudet

an

B3y 1978,, Eur'atom1
ppropria t"Ios
otl
onee
sometime
eveal rojctspert1ýaining notlredy
eenenggedinhas
but als to thermonuclear fuonly- oncerfsineeg(b)

The Nuclear _EnerýA eýnc

NEA

for Economic
It is a specialized agency of the Organisation
was formerly the Orco-operation and Development (OECD) which(OEEC) createdganisation for European Economic Co-operation
Marshall Plan aid
by the West European countries to co-ordinate
with domestic European. efforts.
replacing-OECD's EuNEA was established on 20 April 1972,
upon the adhesion of Japan
ropean Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA),
fact that Japan has become
as a full member. 28In view of the"European" in the title
the first non-European member, the word
2 0 9 Canada andand in Article 1 (a) of the Statue was deleted.
the OECD were associatedthe United States, which as members ofand 1976 respectively.
members of NEA, followed Japan in 1975
also takes part in
The Commission of the European Communiti*es
the work of the Agency.
those of ENEA.
The objectives of NEA remain substantiallynuclear development
It provides a framework for co-operation in
207

Monde,
See International Herald Tribune, 7 Feb. 1973,,Le
-the
ais
well
as
1973
7 Feb. 197an The Times, 7 Feb.
Europeantheof
Activities
theon
ReportTwelfth General
CCEC
1 7 Brussels an Luxembourg:
Communitiespp.ý 215-218.
e.17
EAE,
20 De.embe_r 1957' ITs memfiibeýrshipwsetbihdo!
208EVEuroeanmemersof the OECD.
teeghtencomrisd5o. 0 Nov. 192,p
Law Buleti,
209 SeeNucear

ameng the member States with less favr,-reachýing
jectives than in the case of Euratom, 210

oitcl

The Agency has organized several joint projec"twhich is an independent entity with its own cnetosmmbeach of,amstyu tn
Th'ber_shLp, and adm,inistvaratve structure,of these projects in operation is the Eurochemic plant for reprocessing irradiated fuel at Mol, Belgium-, which was transfered to Belgium in 1973, as mentioned earlier,During the NPT negotiations, and in contrast witAh Eratom,
there was little concern by ENEA that the Treaty would affectit in any way.
(c) CERN
It was established on 29 September 1954, after the entry
into force of a Convention drawn up the previous year by a
UNESCO-sponsored conference. The founding States were Belgium,
Denmark, France, the FRG, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Aorway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and Yugoslavia. Subsequently,
Austria and Spain joined the Organisation, Both Yugoslavia andSpain withdrew later for financial reasons but the former joined once more as an observer State following the example ofTurkey. CERN's Headquarters are in Geneva.
CERN's idea emanated from a r6alisation by nuclear physicists in Europe that further advances in pure research on apar with those taking place in the United States could only-,
come through the construction of particle accelerators of at
size and cost beyond the means of individual ntosof the Convention stipuaTeis that the PrginiHanintion "shall provide for collaboration among European Sttenuclear research of a pure scientfic and fundamn-tal characgai
ter, and in research essent3ially relVate thereton. Thwp
requirewith work for militar
sation shall have no concern2
Article II210

For NEA's principle

211

Coliter,

Wcivitins.
V.49
0oct,

347

see Ibiýd.

alh aciitn

mmer
KOf thea Sttehcýa

orSoomarlenopuplicoatent.

and pure scienthe organization is interested in fundamental
to have no concern
research and its convention undertakestific
the (NET) and CERN arewith work for military requirements, boththe peaceful uses
working in the sane direction of encouraging
214of the atom."Wd

The A-e.ncv' for the Prohibitiono' ihMclear

Weawohsin

Latin

City. In contrast
The Agency has its headquarters in MVexico
been essentiallywith the previous organisations, it hasin order to ensure
established as an arms control organisation
Tlatelolco Treaty. Howcompliance with the obligations of the
Agency from promoting
ever, nothing in the Treaty prevents thethe Contracting Parthe peaceful uses of nuclear energy among
acknowledge the rights
ties. Articles IL7 and 18 of the Treaty
peaceful purposes andof the Parties to use nuclear energy for
21 5 The 1972 agreeto benefit from peaceful nuclear explosions.

212
213

see CERN,
For a short history and evolution of CERN,
5-6.
Annul Report, 1979 (Geneva, 1979). PP.
from EURATOM",
See J. G-ueron, "The Lessons to be Learned
No. 5,XXIII,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.
,ar 71967, P. 58.
JLo,cpit'.,. p.
ýlCollier,

215

471,

will be later
See Appendix 8. The activities of OPANAL
study.
reviewed in Chapter 13 of this348

metorcooprtio
caI,t ivela tte'

fh

thl

rol

inLi:felae

aIon
Co-prtioottsas
councilsorl

oodntnAAodte

bten

cmite

PNLi

ni

h

omo

laei

uhasteJitAa

nryetbihdi

ordina-tioýn CmitefrAoi

9quite significant that as far as Ther picfiue
of nuclear energy are concerned, none of the resolaýutinsofth
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was related to the( worký,Itisof any of the regional nuclear organisations or groupings. IvLu8t
of these resolutions were mainly addressed to internationa,l organisations and more particularly to the IAEA.
The IAEA was also at the centre of the review of Article IV
It would also beof the NPT at the 1975 NPT Review Conference.
quite pertinent before concluding this section to recall once
more the interest that the NPT Review Conference has shown to
the idea of establishing regional or multinational nuclear fuel.
cycle centres.

3. International Co-cL)erat-.o enlruhInLrnLoal
Organi sations
At the Conference of Non--Nuclear-Weapon States, the-ý prefier216
217

218

See Articles I, paragraph 2 and IV, paragraph 1 in. IAEA
Dcc. INhFCIRC/25/Add. 4., 15 Dec. 1972.
See M.H. Ghanem, "Les Organisations Sp4c-iaLie daelcadre de la Ligue des Etats Arabes" (enaab)
EKvDtienne du Droit International, Vol, 27, 1971, pp. 52eogemn
53. See Also the text of the 1971 lN
LlCC/
IAE
operation with the Ar,ab League inicc
Add. 3, 14 Jan. 1972),
F.R. Marcus, "An Appoac to Reioa Cooeaio in0Nu(/CQoFI4/Pi
clear En.ergy :The Nord ic Collbrain,Vol I,
AtmcE
ofUe
007 :Finland), inPecfDopp. 627-639. For a succinct sur,ve.y ofr othe4r om
ogsRbntiu ndoperation, see Georg,esý Deci
tsstms dec
Non--Prolif rton deýs arm snolars
erst
d7 'n
Soolgi
de
tutLI
TnsT
3luxeli-est (rLib re d e BPuoeiles, 19Ic)70),p.4-7349

o;ga~tJonw

oetmonpatcuaying~~

oraian

whil

th

eto
"ranYtiu

ofa theartcipating
muosgtheU

t

ito

oe

Wsed

one betwe

unecdeorr naCca

path y tdfrigstrenthsugeningitns
rtios naf gnraandr the esals

existing~~~
Thweissu

itea new macine-f
Stats inE

fro antdrorganshingthemcinoreritw

asaeeslto
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
iedo

for
g~iumi enterta-ined the idea c-f creating a.new organisationas part ofalli peak technologies;, the IAEA being integrated
IAEA and ait. 2 Ghana, while hesitating between a reformed
was of the view that if a new body were established,"IAEA wculd
the TkEk would become its technical arm. MVoreover,assistancecarry on with lits existing programmes of technicalof technical.. while the new body would take general chargeplanning such asassistance activities and be responsible forlevels."24
sistance at the regional and international
1963, p. 87
219 For example, soo A/COWI?.J'5/'SR-7, 9 Se!"i.
p. 125) (Soma1968,(Ceylon) and A/CONF.35/SR.9, N0 Sept.
iia).
220 For example, see A/CUQUNFjr/'C.2/SR.4, 10 Sept. 1968,
1968,
p. 29 (Pakistan) and A/CONF.35/SR.11, 11 Sept.
(Afghanistan).
P. 151
P. 75
221 For example, see A/ICONF.15/SR.6, 6 Sept. 1968,
11 Sept.
A/CONF.35/SR.11,
and(Brazil),78
V.
and(Uganda)P. 154 (Chile).
222 For example, see A/CONF.35/0 2/SR.4, 6 10 Sept. 1968,
1968,
p.35 (Venezuela); A/CONF.35/C.2/SR. , 12 Sept.
p. 71
1968,
Sept.
15
A/CONF.A5/C.2/`SR.7,
p.55(weden);
199
p.
(Indo-Sia); an A/CONF.35I/SR.l5, 13 Sept. 196,

new body,

224A/CThES5/.2/R,5

11Sept. 1968, pp. 59-41.

3501

resec

emnae

fro

na

1J

th on'd subtati
However

dtecnvngo0h

Itl.Ippot
prom1,

neesf

fo

actio

sth

yye

aswl

th

imlmntto
theat egu.larintervls eve
Confereice

ancoi

nt

ugeto

'3a

oI

tteCn
eeto
lith a coThie italian propos3al met
ference. The Conference had merely adopted a-resPolution in,viting the UN General Assembly to consider the beust ways andiman
for the implementation of its decisions, and the continuity of'
the work undertaken and, at a subsequent session of the General
Assembly, to consider the convening of a second Conference of
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Fear of duplication with the wcrkof the IAEA was expressed. The latter was considered capable ofhandling the questions raised in the Conference pertaining to
2 6
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2 Italy was not discouraged by that cool reception. On the contrary, at the twentythird session of the General Assembly, it raised withgrae
omitvigour the establish[mfent this time of a United Nations
tee on the peaceful- uses of nuclear energy. 27Oppositionl to0
that idea was very strong not only from non-nuclear-wea-pon- Sta225

226

A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.13, 23 Sept. 1968, p. 158 andi A/CONF.35/,'
C.2/L.11, 19 Sept. 1968. See also A/CONF35/,2/R.5
suggeste
9 Sept, 1968, pp. 16-17 where Italy haý-d frt
Comiteethe idea of a permanent United Nationu
p 2-2(rgnia
9Sp.198
A/CON3F.35/C.2/SR.5,
and p. 22 (Austria);ACOT3/C/S4,1 Set 198
98
et
p. 34 (Australia); ACN.5C2S.,1
6(uky;ACN.5C2S.
p
andP.- 55 (Sweden )13 Sept. 1968, p. 71 (Idnsa) rnWl CN.5C./R8
_rso
o! th
0o th1t,
16 Sept,. 19 68, p-c9 (Tanzaniiia).
ctofteCn
ia,De
bv,se
lution refer-red to,1Ot
earWaponr tts(/OT.5
fp.ereneof. NVlNc
1,9 68) Reou n N, p
,1920

227

A/C,__!/PV.

1609- (prov,), 18Nov.

351A

198

p.

8-4

als
but 22teUe

froiucl aWepnStewicweentfllo(

United!

Stte
Jigdm,hoUntd

a

hI

ove

ýIJ
no

The Sc229t_---body afaseiaatogyopsdteceto

al6
had

So-vietu -Union to, express
This was an,othaer occasion for theof Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
its discontent with the Conference
opposes the division of the
explaining that "Wthe Soviet Union
2 3 1 as if the NPTTStates",world into nuclear and non-nu)clear
divided the world into
had not in fact formally and juridicallytwo parts.
feared that in a new bodyIn essence, nuclear-weapon States
mobilize opinion against-the non-nuclear-weapcn States would
23 2
against the NET itself.
particularly
more
and
them
to its proposal
Italy, ccnfronted with strong opposition
228

229

21 Nov. 1968,
For example, see A/C.1/PV. 1614 (proy.),
1616 (prey.),
A/C.1/PV.
(Ireland);P. 7 (Norway) and p._33
A/C,1/PV. 1627
22 Nov. 1968, PP. 48-50 (Australia);
and(Czechoslovakia);(prey'.), 2 D4c. 1968, pp. 23-25(Indonesia).
37
P.
1968,
Dec.
3
A/C,'1,/PV. 1628 (prov.),
the Italian idea orAmong the few States which supported
Chile, Japan and Sudan.
favoured a similar one were Spain,
respectively.
1623
A/C,I/-PV, 1614, 1615, 1616 andP. 37 (U,nited KingA/C.l/PV. 1609 (prey.), 18 Nov. 1968, 1968, p. 28 (UnitedNov.
19(prey.),
dom); A/C.1/PV. 1611
28 Nov. 1968, pp. 21States); and A/C.1/PV. 1624 (prov.),
26 (USSR).

230

Ibid., pip, 21-25.

231

p. 6. See also V.
A/C.1/FV. 1634 (prey.), 9 IDec. 1968, Countries", Iner
Shestov, "Conference of Non-Nuclear
p. 30,
tioal ffars(Moscow), No, 11, Nov. 1.968,
and-L the:-cý11

AAlollpq59

from all quarters,co.sPonsored. a draft reoooLKtion wAth Agen--tina, Brazil, chile, Pakistan and Yugosinva which, 11toy U11aa,
intended to convok~e the Disarmwament Com:miss-ion atL anl eaýrly dt
to consider among other questions "... further McteMattonallmn
the peaceful uses of nuclear eeg
2States .......3 To Italy, this was the second best Matrnatve.
The new proposal was also criticised on practical as weLl as
fundamental grounds. Such functiona were considered as being
co-operation incompletely outside the purview of the Disainament Commission,
The six:-power draft resolution was discarded in favour ofanother draft sponsored by 14 countries, 26which requested the
UN Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions of the Conference to the various international bodies concerned, to ask
those bodies to report to the Secretary-G-eneral on the action
taken by them, and who would prepare a comprehensive report on
the basis of the information received.

237

The fourteen-power resolution was objected to only by theSoviet Union,, other Socialist States of Eastern Europe and.
Mongolia.238 The Soyiet Union objeczed for various reasons but
all emanated from its displeasure with the Conference of NonNuclear-Weapon States altogether, and its fear that it might39

detract from the NPT.2
233
234

235

236

G-AOR, 23rd Session, Anns., a.i. 96, Dcc. A/7445, 19.Dec.
1968, para. 7(C) (k/C.1/L.451).
See A/C.1/PV. 1630 (prov.), 5 Dec. 1968, pp. 53-60.
A/C,l/PV. 1634 (prov.), 9 Dec. 1968, p. 11 (USR). See
also A/C.1/PV. 1633 (prov.), 9 Dec. 1968, pp, 6-12'(Canada).
A/7445, 19 Dec.
GAOR, 23rd Sess,, Anns., a,i, 96, Duc.
196,araV7E) (A/CQlLAY5 and Add.1)

237

GA Res, 2456 (XXIiI), 20 Dec. 1968. G-AOR, 23rd Sess.,
Suppl. No. 18 (A/721e), p. 13.

238

For the results of the voting, see GAOR, 23rd Bess.,,An.
a.i. 96, D~oc, A/7445, 19 Dec. 1968, para. O1().
A/C.1/PV. 1643 (prov.), 17 Dec. 196B, pp. 13-17.

239

353

use
thul pea

pc

gnlyannew1 orgsn
wacaofýnu0e Ialanprpoalqn
manl otvtdbthpecflue

clyt

Ct
Ni wLt11r~

al

eal_I with3
other1issonýT was alsc)
heDiaramntCoflll
ow,ever, th'eof' th aom

eep aI,N_, tocotne,dwa adisbl tha theit thatoutt
Ofee eoluionan unvesal imjplemeintationlo thwathfuto constitutewas not developed. further
the VFT ain idea@ w,,hich40a definite proposal.2
coa new body for international
The issue of establishing
was not seuses of nuclear energy
operation in the peacefulduring thefor some sporadic remarks
riously pursued,9 except
in 1969. 241of the UN General Assembly
sessiontwenty-~fourthreits attention on the reports
The Assembly was then focusinginand other organisatiofls
ceived from the UN Secretary-General
General Assembly resolution.
compliance with the 1968
UNDP andapart from the IAEA, theIt is to be noted -thatonly ther~eports on implementation,
submitted
which
the IBFID,(FAO), among all the specialFood and Agriculture Organisationon the action
invit.ed as well to reportized agencies which were
containedwith the recommendations
connexioyi
in
them
by
taken
of the Con-ferencle of Non-Nuclearin the rQspectlive resolutions
Secrereported back to the UN
substantiallyhadStates3,
Weaponjoint FAO/
was even prepared by thereportThe
tqry-General,
and wasin Food and Agriculture
PinergýT
Atomicof
IAEA Divisionlof the group of
aforementioned reportthetorelatedclosely
to the Ecoionls of Nuclear Technology
experts on the "Contributof the Developing Countries"
nomic and Scientific Advancement240
41

paraq. 28-30.
RNDO1/PV, 7390, 15 Au,g. 1968,

FJor

xac .e"e

A/C.1/IRV. 16912 (po62(Ygolvi)
p~9

354'

Nov.
o,1

1969,

t
Theý

tha

4

IIiue.
f ooi ad

e

ii
t 0h

ie

no aciocaieaca 1cewhiTcare tto~

or comnwa

caleon thifo pat

1

ot
o

d-eal-bifywt"'r the following sections, we shall firstthe IAEA which not only remains the leadingoraiton nth
field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy but whih-asoemrs
impeetto
as the focal point in this field as far as the-J
Secondly, we shall deal withi thie UNDEof the NPT is concerned.
which is the main source of multilateral assistance for projects
Lastly, the role ofof the pilot plant and pre-investment type.
the IBRD will be assessed as an organisation well suited forsupporting major nuclear projects.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
What is of direct relevance here is the expanding role of
the Agency in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy inthe light of the NPT and more particularly as a consequence ofthe results of both the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
the NT 4
and the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to
The role of the IAEA was further reaffirmed in 1973 in the"Final Document" of the Tenth Special Session of the UN General(a)

The Expanding role of the Agency
Assembly devoted to disarmament.
is most apparent in the fields of finance for nuclear eeg
the procurement of special fissionab.-lemaeil
nfrmtinand equipment and the dissemination of nuc.learl
iad
The NPT and the Conference of Non-Nuc-lear Weapon Stteactivities,

A/7677,24 Sepot.- 1969,

par,a,D).

242

UN Doc.

243

Ibid., para. 11.

244

For a major work on th TE'A, s3e e PaLO tI C. zz
nFoenPAtm
Paeu
See also Arnold ris,TendLwech3
HapradRo,liy(New Yorký
ondoýiini)iimi~ i Robeýrt, W. 0(oxAtomScheinman, "TAFUA
nutmhand Hqa-ol11d k.,aosnadOhrs
Naking in IteRna'Otioa L raiaios(eence, Decisio
22
p
J97)
la,veýi ; ale, Jiertj-rep355

hecompoýsiti-on of thle prýin_-cipal or,gan
the B oard. of Gov erniio rs2
oftý he Agr,enrcly, ie.
As fr a s
Atviteor N,1ucla Enr
(i)~
Fiac
wo esoutins f thbe Conferenace of Non)IAEAwasconernd,
it
Sttue

rgad

o

reNulermeaonStateýs dealt w,.ith this3 question. The f irst
solution recommended that the IAEA study further the ways and24 6means of increasing funds available for technical assistance.
At that time and, since 1962, the target for volunitry contributions to the A~gency-'s regular programme of technical assistancewas yearly established at 2 million dollars. The target wasnever met and the percentage of assistance requested which
could be approved by the IAEA Board of Governors steadily declined. By 1972, the target reached the figure of ý million
dollars. 27However, the real value of the assistance which
was to be provided in 1972 was expected to be about the sameas that of teni years ago, because of the effects of inflationand currency adjustmen~ts. 28Pledges for 1973 reached over 90
4
per cent of the 3 million-dollar target.2 9

The 1978 NPT Review Conference recommended that any special
measures of co-operation to meet the growing need of developing
States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering
funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.
245

See note l2ý above.

246

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (k/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution Hi(II),p. 14. The draft of that resolution was submitted byAustria, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland (A/CONF.35/C.2/L.4/Rev. 2, 24 Sept. 1968).
IABA Doc. GC(XV)/RBS/281-, 27 Sept. 1971.

247
242

249

See the statement made by the Director-General of IAEA
in the 26th session of the UN General Assembly in A/PV.
1979 (prov,), 8 Nov. 1971, pp, 7-10,
The IAEA Director-General before the General Conferenceof the IAEA, September 1973. IAEA, Press Release C/XVII/4,
18 Sept. 1973, p. 4.

356

rneits:reprt
to the Seeond Sesio of the, Prprtro
mi_1tteýe for the Second N?f Review Conference
tleetnineev
in Auigust of 1979q, the 1AEA pointed!
out. thatIý d'urin th fIIIVeP
Year period 19174-1978 technical assistance
UPrOVided by the
Agency amounted to $45.7 million comparedwith $23.8 million
during the preceding five years.
The Agency also pointed outthat the target for voluntary contributions
in respect of the1980 regular programme should be $10.5
million as compared to$14.5 million in 1975. The Agency
warned, however, that such arise will still be offset to someextent by inflation.
Moreover, the IAEA reported thatover and above the voluntary
contributions to the General Fundwhich are given without limitation as to use, certain Member
States have also made additionalamounts available for technicalassistance on the understandingthat such funds be used for non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties
to the NPT, an issue that we havealready dealt with above.
In its report, the IAEA concedesthat it should recognize
the strong interest in nuclear powerin many of its developing
Member States and plan its programmes
accordingly,
The Agency
points out that it could, with increased
funds and withoutchanging the basic element of its
technical assistance, play amore important role in assuming
the availability of specialized
knowledge not only in pre-project
phases and for regulatory
activities, but also for the execution
and operation of plants
for power production and for fuelcycle processes,.2
The second resolution adopted by
the Conference recommended that "the IAEA should undertake
to examine the basis onwhich arrangements can be made by
the Agency to secure -finanqes from international sources for thecreation of a SpeIa
Nuclear Fuind ...
for financing nuclear projects -In t1heter:,-i.

250

See PreparatorY

Comlmittee for the Second ReviAew Conferenc,eIAE.A
A1ctiVitiJes undeýr Artic_Le IVof the NPT (NPT/CCNF,'Ll/P,I,
2.5 July17)pp4,,
7_156,-ad-37-40; and Ann1-ex I, A, B, D,
E'and F.

of the Parties to the NP'Y

35'7

po
to .e f nn-ndee-w~ttes,, 25The't"fund" idea,istlorýn, In its firstI report. relating to theed ios,the Bar of Gvrosof theýConernc'sec
that
iMAAecedh conclusiýon th1,At ter was,- inocpr,osp)ect~tats hos sppor-t w,oulj, be inidispensable forthoe mmbr,d ma inteIt)nan ce of such a fund woud be
teetb ji-'s; en0 an2
howycwa5
Th Ageny coniýinued, ho)w-,
to it esalsin.
agreeJablet sek wysand met_ans 'to seuefinancingL for nuel-ear
eve,
Phe Fourth International
prjetsInt developing co-urtrie-s.

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in GeneI
onLhestimulat e the issue further.A a rsul,t,
VaL _n 17hepdto
assess the extent
th JAEA onacentrat;ed on an in-depth survey tovarious types andof t,he market in 14 developing countries forreasons could
sizes of nuclear power plants that for economic
The IBRD, the Interjustifiably be built during 1980-1989.
helped to finance
American Development Bank and several States
were first made availthe project. The results of the survey
1974, taking intoable in August 1973 and later reviewed inprices which occurredaccount the drastic increase in world oilchanges in the ecoin the latter part of 1973 as well as theearly 1974.
nomics of nuclear power that took place inat that
The survey has shown, under conditions prevailingcommissioned intime, that for nuclear power plants to be
there is no ecodeveloping countries in the year 1980-1989,
200MW. The
nomically justifiable market in unit sizes below
disposal admarket survey has helped to put at the Agency's
making estimates
vanced computer-based analytical methods forConferen

For the full text of the resolution, see Final Documentof the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/CONFT.
draft
35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution I, pp. 15-16. The(A/CONF.35/
of that resolution was submitted by Pakistan
C.2/L,.5/Rev. 2, 23 Sept. 1968).
para. 101.
?52 IAEA Doc. GC(XIII)/INF/110, 29 July 1969,
A/7677/Add.-3 2,Doc.
Q IAIA Docs,, G,C(-TTT)/'RES/256 In UN
253
117; GC-(,xIV)/436, 19 Auýg. 1970, pars
7Nov. 196,
nd II pp. 3-15; andl IAE1A., Annuail Reoort,a,I?-t anll
93........
pa.
~yj 0 J n~~..GC.....5)

251

150

of t,-he costs of alterniativ,,e on-rmpatterrns ot expnsinf
national or reg-Iional electLIric power sys,tem,,s.
This eapa
tyliU,
has been used intechinical assi-stance 'projects and, inladvnýisiTngý

Mem-,ber States of the planning of nu ,,lear powesp'oa-At thie 1975, NPT Review,, Co,nference, Mexicoo, NJger,,JaanthPhilippines submi-itted a draft resolution calling for thec
establish,ment ofALa "Special Fund" fina,nced by thedelod
non-nuclear-weapoon States and thethenula-apnSts
Parties to t,he NPT to proviLde the dev,eloping nnncerwao
States Parties to the Treaty with assistance i,n the peacefuluses of nuclear energy research- reactors and fuelsThe
f. samiedraft resolution also called for the establishment of a "pca
Nuclear Fund" financed in the same manner, to provildefiacn
under concessional terms for nuclear projects in thne territUoriesof the developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to thne
Treaty. 2 5 5 These two ideas were not supported by developed
States at the Conference. These ambitious schemes were reduced
to the mere recommendation, earlier referred to., that developed
States would respond to "technically sound" requests for te4chnical assistance.
So far, financing of major nuclear projects have been provided through bilateral arrangements.
(ii) Special Fissionable Materials.: As previously menti_oneýd,the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States requested t,-he IASA
to consider the establishment of a "Fund of SpecialFisoal
Materials". Although a so-called fund did. exist; wJithin theframework of the 1AEA, the Conferenceýs request had tevirtueof providing a new impetus to the availability and provrision of
special fissionable materia,ls through. the T,AEA, on the sam,,e ge-neral conditions as those applying to bilatera,l, supply,
254

255

See Market Survey for Nuclear Power in DevelopIng Cou.ntýr.ie.:
AA1974) and Review Conference of
1974-81d-tion Vina
the PaRTies'to the NPT, I-AEA Activities Under A_rticle IV ofthe -NIPT: Analytical and Technical R,eport (NPTqONF.,
1
Feb...
1975)....
pp.2-29Doc. NPTICONFPIC.111L.2, 20 May 1975.

359

Ses:sionl of the7ofJuly 1979 toth"econd
Conlfer'ence of tht-e
PreaaoyCmiteo the Second Reviewý
experience has
tothje NPTE, t1he I-A&A points out that
P1ar.tie,sby the supplying Member
shonJhat.- the-, n'uc,leýar mat_erial off`ýered
By Augustasso arbeenA suff'icient to meet demands.
Staes
f such material, some of them gifts,
25 trnsfrs
1978abot
Almost all transfers
had been made to 38 recipient countries.
Conresearch purposes.
were for research reactors or othersupply of enriched uranium
tracts have been concluded for theand one in Yugoslavia.
for only two power reactors in Mexico
Canada, France, the FRG,
Supplier States have been Belgium,
Apart from this and as
Sweden, the USSR, the UK and the US.
and the Soviet Union showedearlier mentioned, the United Statesmaterial to the Parties
readiness to allocate special nuclear
United States announced into the NPT. More specifically, thepreference to NPT Parties in1976 that henceforth it would give
gift of special nuclear
allocating its annual $50,000 dollars
was prepared to contrimaterial. As to the Soviet Union, it
to the Agency's
bute 50 Kilogramls of 235 U free of charge
to meet the needs of nonfund for the five-year period ahead
6
to the NPT.25
nuclear-weapon States Party
provision by theWith regard to equipment, their direct
to it is one of the three
IAEA from resources made available
assistance programmes
principal elements of IAEA's technicalIn the period 1970-1978, the equipto developing countries.
and fellowships
ment element was 37%, whereas the experts
In its role as anelements were 33% and 30% respectively.
to, in many cases, byintermediary, the IAEA has been turned
Furthermore,or by both.
a supplier, by a potential recipient,or purchasers in conthe IAEA assists potential recipients
which they want totacting pot-ential suppliers of equipment
laboratories use donatedobtain bilaterally. The Agency's own
isIn rpor256

Conference of the
Preparatory Committee of the Second Review Article IV of NPT
Under
Activities
IAEA
Parties,to the NPT,
(NPT/CONF.II/PC. I/,2Juy17)p.1-0,37-4407and
Ann.II.C.

360

equipmentO'

ecflus'es ofncer1nry
i.n tht)e d evelIop--ýing countrie'S. 5

to prmt

pa rti cual1hadoupted by thL ofrneof,nNcer
258t,o expl_ain_ its eýxpand_ingrol
Weapon States on thisi, aspect,
in compiling and disseminating information concerning -the peac-ity of thie resolution)'

ful uses of nuaclear energy, especially its project of the com(INIS). 2 5 9puter-based International Nuclear Information System
However, and aside from information on the techniques of enrich.ing uraniLuai, -the Agency noted that some technological information, particularly that involving manufacturing processes,
was being withhold for commercial reasons. It realised that noscheme for dealing with this matter byaction was likely to emerge. In its view, it

workable and acceptableintergover-nmental

could probably best be tackled. either bilaterally or within260
the framework of close regional arrangements.
In its aforementioned report to the Preparatory Committeeby the Second NPT Review Conference, the IAEA has also seized
the opportunity to elaborate on its role in the field of transfer of scientific and technical information. The IAEA pointed
out that it organizes an average of 14 international scientific
It referred to its role inconferences and symposia a year.
convening the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its
It
Fuel Cycle, which was held in Salzburg, Austria in 1977.
emphasized the fact that it became one of the leading publishers
in the world in the field of nuclear science and technology.
257

Ibid., p. 17 and Ann.II.B.

258

Final Documient of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Wea-pon
States (A/CODTF.35/1O, 1 Oct. 19,68), Resolution H ()p. 14.
See IAEA Does. GC(XIIIV/INF/110, 29 July 19169,paa.47n3158; GC(XIV)/IN7/2,6Ag 1970, prs
CCX)
ue17
90-3
Jl
1
,
Report!AEA, Annual455), paras. 105-109; and IAEA, Anual Rpr,1Jl
110-109
paras- 17 a
1271- 30Junel972 (GC(X-VI)/48()
See IAEA Does. G-C(XIII)/IJF/ll0-, 29duly19,pra60
6aa
63 and G-C(XIV)/IN\F/120, 6Aug.__ 19170,

259

260

31i

hatat peset 6 couintri_es anid 13 internati,onal
It eplaneds estim ate dprovidce linpuýt to TINTIS, an-d that it iLorganisati,nJ
ovrtNSapp ro-x,Jimaat,eIy 90%' of' th1e. world's pu,.blicat;ionsthaItsý role in co-operatingý LearI sc ;ience and t chnolo gy.
onnc"
in gtheingnuceardataý and in making fellowships available
in 1975, the IAEA expanded the objectives
stressed.
of its training programme by offering courses on nuclear power
More scientific visits were awarded to research
projects.
These are just a few examples
workers from developing countries.
of the expanding role of the IAEA in this field.
hasee(iv) Compositio,n of IAEA Board of Governors ;Amendmentof Article VI of IAEA Statute :The Conference of Non-NuolearWeapon States adopted two resolutions in this respect, whichreflected two complementary preoccupations. In a first resolution which was sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Japan,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, the Conference expressed its
assum-otion that IAEA "will examine at an appropriate time its
procedures and arrangements, as well as the question of thecompQs!ttiio:n of the Board. of Governors, with a view to adapting
responsibilities."26
them as necessary in the lipht of its new_
(Emnphasis added.) The other resolution which was sponsored by
Cameroon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania andZambia, recommended to the Agency that "representation on its
Board of Governors be broadened so as to reflect equitable Keoaraphical distribution and the views of a broad spectrm. of the6developiangE countries.l12 2(mpaiade.
At the same time, the Twelfth General Conference of IAEA
also adopted a resolution requesting the Board of Governors to6
review Article VI. 3
261

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CON7F,35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution H (V),P. 15.

262

Ibid., Resolution K, PP. 17-18.
GQ(XII)/RES/241, 30 Sept. 1968 in IAEA Doc. GC(XII)/Resolutions (1968),.

265

3624

ThI
e partLiculaar- iitrs

atace to11
th Boad' compoitio
emanates Jfromi the fattaJh
or i
h
eta
ra of
the Or_gaý,nisation. Its roei
mlmnigterlvn
rVi_,sions of' the 1QT wvas eýxpected tbea

mjroe

In February 1969, the Board of Governors of tche IAEA decided to set up an Ad Hoc Committee of the W'hole to Review Articlq VI, Around 50 members of the IAEA took part in its work.2 6
Without going into the several proposals submitted to theCommittee, 25which is beyond the scope of this study, each
proposal, as well put by one observer, "was more or less subtly
designed to assure the sponsor of either a para-permanent seaton the Board, or at least of an improved chance of periodic
election by increasing the number of seats of its area or by
reducing the number of States in that area or by changing the66
selection criteria."'2
In part.Tcular, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany,neither of which enjoyed a designated seat in the Board, andwhich have made considerable progress in the field of nuclear
energy, were very active and keen on guaranteeing such a seatin a newly~-constituted Board.. As a matter of fact, it was basically an Italian proposal sponsored by another 21 countries
which was finally approved by the Fourteenth General Conferenceof the IAEA held in Vienna in September 1970. 267 Sub-paragraphs
264

For the records of the Committee, see IAEA Does, (GOV/COM.
20/OR,.1-11.

265

See IAEA Doos. GOV/COM.20/2 (Mexico); 4 (UAR); 5 (the Democratic Republic of Congo); 8 and 8/Mod. 1 (Belgium);
10 (Italy); 14 (Nigeria); 15 (UAR); 15/Add, 1 and 15/
Rev, 1/Add, 1 (22 countries led by Italy); and 18 (7Eastern European States). See also IAEA Does, GC(X2EV)/437'_,
7 Aug. 1970 and Adds. 1-2,
Paul C. Szasz, 2p.cit., p. 143,

266
267

GC(XIV)/RES/272, 28 Sept, 1970, The pr-oposal1 was, appr,ove,,by 54 votes in favour, 9 ag,aiJns,t (-the Soviet11 Union andc
other Eastern European counitrieso) and 1` abs-tcAn-tions,,
GC(XIV)/OR.142, 28 Sept. 1970, para. 19. BothJ the, F1R-LT

363

AIfAtceVwr
2, a] SCof pararap
1,~~~~~

elc

b

the

Io atomiic enlergy inmaterLials, andmemeriost advanced inL the technology ofthe,ý

aDvace in; the tec)oog
rdutoIolore
uludinig thsourceatomic energy including the produotion of.
which
in
areas
following
theofmaterials in eachlocatedisnineaforesaid
the
of
none
(1) North America(2) Latin America(3) Western Europe(4) Eastern Europe(5) Africa(6) Middle East and South Asia
(7) South East Asia and the Pacific(8) Par East.
mnember2. The General Conference shall elect toship of the Board of Governors:
equitable(a) Twenty members, with due regard toof the
whole
a
as
Board
the
on
representationsuab-paragraphinmembers in the areas listedshall
A-1 of this article, so that the Board
refivecategory
thisinat all times include
America,presentatives of the area of Latin
four representatives of the area of Westernarea ofEurope, three representatives of theof therepresentatives
four
Eastern Europe,of thearea of Africa, two representatives
one
Asia,
South
area of the Middle East and
Asia
East
South
of
area
representative of thetheofrepresentativeone
andand the Pacific,
catethisarea of the Far East. No member ineligory in any one term of office will beforcategory
same
the
in
Lible for re-election
the following term of office; andmembers in(b) One further member from among thethe folloiqing areas:
Middle East and South Asia,
South East Asia and the Pacific,
Far East;
members in(o) One further member from among thepressure
anid Italy are known to have exerted diplomatic
amendment.
theof
acceptanceoni IARA members for a rapid364

Southýýi _-Eas

the3aifc2
Asia anLýd

The possibility that both the ERG Land italy wiould bede
signated among the nine most advanced to serve as membersý ofthe Board, seems to have been the main reason why the Soviet
Ujnion~ and other Eastern European countries voted against theamendment. For the Soviet Union "the changes made in the courseof its evol:ution have not eliminated a fundamental weakeness,
namely that it would lead to an unwarranted alteration and enlargement of the designated membership of the Board."' It stressed that the amendment "would upset the political balance thatis essential to the Ac,ency if it is to carry out its activiwhich, in the light of its
ties in a normal way
new and importaiit responsibiiLities in connection with the-activities

Treaty on the Nen-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
tic,uiar inipo_rtance. 12 ()9assume par-the represen:tativ,e of the Soviet Union, while
explaininEg -the position of his country just before the voting
Moreover,the General Conf erence of IAAk,
said that the countries which were so insistently cla-Iming permnanent seats on the Board should ratify the NPT as soon as pos-on the a-mendmient took place insible. 7 0This was an iLmplicit allusion to the ERG and Italy
which were postponing their ratifications until they had concluded together with, oth-er Euratom countries an a-reement with
the IAEA on the application of safeguards as required by Arti7of t-he NI-T.T2 1
cle III
268

For other minor corresponding adjustments finparagCraphs,ý
B, 0, and B of Article VI, see the full text of the,aed
ment in paragraph 1 of IAEA 's General Conf erentce reoltion GC(XIV)/RES/272, 28 Sept. 1970.

269

0
IAEA Boo. GC(XI-V)/437, 7 Aug, 1970-, p
IAEk Doc. GC(XIV)/OR.142, 28ý SetJ190

270
271

rs
-1193J AB
The Agreement was signed oni5cA
0ae Cat~Release 73/5, 5 Apr. 1975,365

At anrt,

thncesei
the

rer

naio

of th

miht n te log rm poveto,be satisfactory
eleciveseas

The

fac,
menmen,ipoviedhe2ollowing significant

The niumboýr of detsigae members most advanced in the technoclo-y of atomic cnergy, including the production of source ma-tc,rials was increased from 51 to 9.
South
The area of Africa and the 'Middle East, and the area of.
of Middle
Asia were replaced by the area of Africa and the area
withEast and South Asia. This change was made in compliance-

African wishes.
of
Designations were no ionger provided for the categories
and "a"other producers of source material" which had 2 seats
seat.
supplier of technical assistance" which had one-

to 22, andThe number of elected members increased from 12
modified so
the representation of areas in this category wasfor Latin
as to allow for a better representation especially-

America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa.
filledThe number of "floating" seats (non-geographic seatsin paraby election) increased from one to tw~o as indicatedseats weregraph 2(b) and (c) above. However, the "floating"-reserved for four areas.
the date
The amendment entered into force on 1 June 1973,
members ofon which it had been accepted by two thirds of all272
of the Statute.
XVIII.C(ii)
Articletoaccording
IAEA
thewere designatFew days later, on the 13th of June, 12 countries
The 12
ed by the Board for membership of the Board in 1973/74.
the Federal
countries are :Australia, Brazil, Canada, France,
Africa,Republic of Germany (FRG), India, Italy, Japan, South
272

IAEA Doo, IN.FQIRC/159/Rev. 3, 12 June 1973.

366

thelUSS17R,

the Un-ited Einidom anid the tni,Jte,d Stts 7 At
A th
l17th session of the- !AEA GeealCnfrne
Sptmer17),
elections were held to filIl elecýtive sea-ts andWthe newBoar
was finally constituted for the first
time_ of 34 KmberSta
tes. 274
It is to be noted that all the designated countries, withthe exception of Italy and the FRG, were designated- members of
the outgoing Board. The Board, however, in designating the 12
members did not specify which were the members designated as
the nine most advanced and those designated as the most advanced
intheiir areas.

This vaguieness should later help to accommodate

the People's Republic of China as one of the nine most advanced
members. 2 7 5 This would bring the number of designated members
to 13 and total membership to 35. The attribution of the designatedt seats would be as fellows:

Area

North America

Designated as oneof the nine mostadvanced States

274
275

NumberCanada and theUnited States

Latin America

273

Designated as themost advanced in
its area

2
Brazil (and Argentina alternating)

1

IAEA ]Docs. GOV/OR.456 (prov.), 27 June 1973, p. 10 andGC(XVIT)/502, 12 July 1973.
IAEA Press Release 73/14, 25 Sept. 1973.
Since the expulsion of "Chiang Kai-Shek's representatives"
from the IAEA in December 1971, the People's RepublIic ofChina has so far refrained from becoming a member of thie
Agency.
China's position is mainly due to the involvemientof the IAEA in implementing the NPT, a treaty th-at ChIna
has not approved and especially wh~en it, woudave toreview, as a member of the Board, IAEA safeguard.satities in Taiwan considered to be Part of China, a-i
StUatewhich also happens to be a nuclear?-weapo-.n State as definedby the NPT exempted from the application of NPT safeguard's.

3167

Itl
Germany,
anndi

th1nieMiddle Eas t andmnda
South AsiaAutai1
South East AisiaAutai1
and the ?acific2
China and Japan2
Far East
Total

14

9

13

*As of 197? Egypt replaced South Africa which was removed frompolicies. Egypt's
this position as a result of its apartheidsuch ascountries
fromchallenge
without
notposition iscountry.
Niger, a uranium producingof IAEA's activitties, it
1n concludinS this brief review
be expected from the Agency
must be said that much is and willof nuclear energy as ain the promotion of the peaceful uses
so far achieved in thisresult of the NPT. Although the rasults
fall short of the high expecrespect are significant, they still
First steps have been taken fortations of the developing world.
funds and financing the introsecuring more technical assistancethe developing countries.
duction of nuclear power plants inof special fissionable
Better conditions for the procurement
the field of exchange ofmaterials have been promised. In
as a result of commercial
information, difficulties still persist
It is considered, however,competition and industrial secrets.
encourage the disseminathat scientific conferences and meetings
information. Thetion and the declassifications of important
as will be shown in the next
Agency is also very much involved,
nuclear explosions.
chapter, in the field of the peaceful
Board has been sought for
Finally, the enlargement of the IAEA
has materialized, it ismany years and now that this objective
to pursue with more vigour
hoped that the Agency will continue
the NPT.
anmd determination its expanded role under368

UN GeneralAsely"ocnieatistet-hrrglr

session theesals

en,utith

evop

ntdNtos)evel,opof' a 'Nuclear Technology Research andiment Programme' to be executed as a matter of priorityý withthe co-operation of the International Atomic Energy Ag'ency forment Programme,

the benefit of the developing counLr,ies". 276
The resolution was dully transmitted -by the _UN SecretaryGeneral to the Administrator of the UNDP. The latter repliedthat "the Governing Council policy has not been to approve autonomous programmes such as would seem to be implied by the
proposed 'nuclear tecluiology research and development programrme'." The Administrator believed, however, that the activities
of UNDP in the field of nuclear energy constitiUuted an on-goingprogramme which. could be strengthened to conform to the intention of the resolution of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States, provided that the Governments of developing countries
assigned sufficiently high priority to additional activities
2 77
The
in this field when requesting assistance from the UNDP.
idea of the new "programme" , therefore, was not welcomed byand except for a UN General Assembly resolution adopted at its twenty-third session inviting, inter alia, the UNDP
to continue the study of the recommendations of the Conferenthe UNDP,

ce,2 7 8 the idea did not receive further attention.
The Administrator of the UNDP, in his answer to the UN
Secretary-General-, also stated276

Final Documnent of the Conference of Non-Nuclerý-We po
States (A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolutui:on J (.
3, and C), p. 17.

277

GAOR, 23rd Sess. ,29 Nov. 1968.

278

20Dc-98,prh.Iio
GA Res. 2456 A(XXIIl:
Suppl. No. 18 (A/7218), p, 15.ý

Anns.

(Vol.

369

1),

a.."96

DoC, A/T-6o,l

n

e1e

ia
tha~

' would a'gree
heCoenigo
ost a)ppropriatei
a
Otu
thJg
~
oucl
~

nulaeorg; t o triain ingit'"Iýec-cA-1f,U
g sa
L,
d o',
dvi,tsoýyfýý'ctJo s ýin theý_ý!
alInulhstree , nonzn rdaions,; a-nd to
fedoistps n
thý-e fildo~ ~ ý Iatec
~ an~ eooistdsin
ifthis fieldnulea
peac 'u exposies,onl
on in -theappLlicati
practical1ofstag
reC he theStates.Ntrly
inont,nuclear-we!apo
cas
of th
the
nconsdrn reues'ts fc"r asistnei
Governt-he
hat-tel:ieveb1
enrg,y,fI d of atmi
gu,ided,dbe,to'C' on tinueytttCo)unci would' wish toingýitýs uýýsuital- crid.t'eriCa o f p)roby,,Ic
fiLds:(otherasiin
an prrit, icluingthe abillity
joe ounnes
the approoi theý requesýting over en tbo provide,
ed -naqlualifi
aindepart faci_Lite
priate co
ikliý
the
Of
taigacucountandtinasaff,cases.
riate
ofinvesmn follow-upIinapprop
has been -the subTh- role of he Ulffill in thic nu-clear fieldof -the resul11ts
jeto6ucce02ssive re- orts onuthe impleiientat-ioniStates.
of theu Confeirenice of' Non-Nuciear-Weapon
reportF that for
Briefly, it appeared from one of thoseper cent (approximately
the past several years, only about 2
assistance comone million Dollars) of the UNDP technicalBy
nuclear technology.
ponent was devoted to applications of
In 1978 it
Dollars.
1971l, the amount estimated was 1.132.000
20The funds arereýachied the figure of 2.954.000 Dollars.
of Technical Assistance.
administered by the IAEA's Divisionin the nuclear
With respect to UNDP large-scale projects
Fund) projects,
field, which used to be called UNDP (ýSpecial
UNDP largethe IAEA is the executing Agency. By mid-1972,
IAEA numbered ninescale projects being carried out by the
In June 1979, the IAEA wasprojects in eight countries.
279
280

29 Nov. 1968,
Ibid., Anns. (Vol. I), a.i. 96, Doc. k/7364,
p. 7.
30 June 1972 (GC (XVI)/IAEA, Annual Report, 1 July 1971Report
197(ýGC(XXIII)/for
Annual
The
and
21
para.
4~80),
610), para. 35.

370

executinlg 25ý largý --scale UTIP ~&ccompaý_"'wv7ih

BE1,k1i a

ndwlt

June 1971(428).
The Director.-Goeneralof IAE'A, Prn eutthie la.r.-e-scal.e p-ro ects tbhat thIe IAo,A iso
tad aa;2tof the U.NDP "oef'lects the g_rowing negcarrying- outd 1'-C1

1r1pojets

Tt also iLndicatets t ahlc

developing counitrie_-s in
nucl,ear' energy fLield,

certa-inly be caLledt upo)n to fulfl

th

the
Lj

I '
Citnt
cc1ý

made in, Artiole I V of, the Tret'y."fUD
To con,cluade thi_s bifrveof n!Iuclea

oei

enr,Itmsbeai

developing-- ccu'ountries must takeI

inutt

nuclerwao`Sae,wl

an,d particularly thei

the peaceful us.es_

forf

teo

In Lthsý

inte?rnationaLI aossistafncce iný'ltJi2il iC gow,.
t"(thconnexion,, r. Eklu_cd we-nt onl tsath
count,r ie s

the)

ful

available for tecdi ica-l assisancadanag
wihi

Iave

rmtn

th

ht

of th

fud

the, N1?pogame

As noted bly teiAEA,nulaenrypoet
relegated to such a lowý proiy that -no sc

arinmycss
rjcscnb

carried out with the UJNDP res6ourýes available oths cutries. 2 8 3 As to the large-scale projects, it is sugges-te,-d thaItl
the developing countries should review their requirements'ý toý
ascertain whether they wish to give higher priority to nu0'i,.:rprojects, especially of the kind already successful-ly execute.d
in other countries. 284 On the other hand, the advanced countries should make more funds available so that the UNDPh may beable to cope with future requests for technical assistance andlarge-scale projects.
281

For a comparison between 1972 and 1979, see IAEA, Annual

Report,1 July 1971-30 June1972 (GC(XVI)/~480), para. 29;

and Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference?
of the Parties to the NPT, IAEA Activities under Article 7.V7of NPT (NPT/CONF.II/PC.II/8, -25-J-ul-y 19-7-9-, p-. -- "ýand Ann.)-i--'(prov.), 8 Nov. 1971, p. 11.

282

A/PV. 1979

283

IAEA Dcc. GC(XIII)/INF1,1-0l,

284

Contributionsof Nuclear

29 July71969
Technolo

371

para

,
8C;

(/56),pra

20) ~ in~or~nt'rncoT-~yamost tevoen"IBDt eoo~ula-epf

anic,e. w-ouLd be granted, on thu
alas rgardsinteest nd rpayment penewhch

rasm_itted by7 the, UNo.-.cetlary--Generalincluded th e
p _epye(ýt of tie lEND The late

9 e'putin
otp, Pl es

andLw e eq
Sttsrfeteoiorenle
The~~~ot)-I p rýIw
oII

po
0ap

a"

to- the"Theank,aSgie cons-ide-rable thoughtbe,ýcomemiay
energynucl,earý
conitonsUnerwIehi
desalinwater
economic'or poweri geeainandWe are contiat' on1in the- d1-\evelping count_ries,indevelopm,)i.ents
with
touch
close
!teeinnuing 1toConic
are, ready tou give symipatheýti
this fiel-d, and.(for the inancingy of econorequests
sidertionuo
poet of th_;6 kind. We would
jsiid
laicall,
to apply to them the
hw~r
ecsay
finid
of our other proall
to
apply
we
same crite~(Emphasis added.)1
jeots ...
answer to the UN SecreIt is quite significant that in hisof the IEND did not mentary-General's letter, the President"Programme for the Usetion in a sinZle paragraph the proposed
Projects". Except
of Nuclear Energy in Economic Development
adopted at its twentyfor a UN Qenera,l Assembly resolution
the IEND to continue the'third session inviting, inter ali,a,Conference, 27the proposstudy of the recommendations of theattention.
ed "Programmne! did not receive any

285

286

287

Final Documnent of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
J (A.2-3
States (A/CONI'.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution
17.
and C), P.
23rd Sess.,
For the full text of the reply, see GAOR,
1968,
Nov.
14
A/7327,
Dcc.
96,
a.i.
A-rns. (Vol. I),
PP. 5-,ý6.
5. Ibid.,
GA Res. 2456 A(XIXIIi), 20 Dec. 1968, para.
Sivppl. No. 18 (A/7218), P. 13.

372

ol
In applying normal Daking wrUtrda to uny appliton,0
W O accOunt t4e
a loan, the IURD was rouna not to be takinindi~rect benefits that werw likely to reoul fom he itroduction~ of nuclnar teochnoioy W a developin country that haJ
sufficient industrial and technical, infrastructurin o het

respects.28
bywthW UN Genuan
AledW
MY 1970, La respans- t- a renwA
Assembly at its 24th session for co-operation in "fiding waystJI,
and mcans of >nanCin MeritON riOUS nuclearo pr'ojectn aý
iertr-eeapresident ofC the lIVRL informed thn PW
was riady to help the WAB
in connexidan with its MStd of the possible ways And means of'financing nuclear pronjcts. Ae further Wnoip.d th S crearny-more wncourain,0Generalnote tnha

the BaQthat

the Banký is prepared to ounsider request forhi
the financing of nuiclear energy proQects whe-neve
they represent the most advantageous of the A,Lternatives for expanding generating capacity ionour
member countries. In this respect I should notethat in appraising projects, the Bank always conshort- and long-term benefits to thesiders Of~
economy.'A further encouraging development was the estbibyun
the IBRD in 1970 of a Special Projects Department, one of wh"osfunctions is to seek out and try to develop nuclear power pro91

jects satisfying the Bank's criteria.)

Moreover, the IBRD, among others, helped to finance theto asaforementioned "in-depth survey" carried out by the IAEA
sess the extent of the market in 14 developing countries forvarious types and sizes of nuclear power plants.
288

289
290
291

(A/7568), paras.
See Contributions of Nuclear KTetchqnolLý
29 July
GC(XIII)/110,
Doo.
IAEA
and
262;
144,'255 and1969, para. 97.
GA Res. 2605 A(XXIVJ), 16 Dec. 1969, para. 4, GAOR, 25ýrd
Sess., Suppl. No. 18 (A/7218), p. 19.
UN Doe. A/8079, 6 Oct. 1970, Puara 10,
A/PV. 1917 (proy.), 4 Dec. 1970, pp. 12-15
or-General).

373(WAYA'

Pirect-reot,o the Preparatory,
9o tan te,A,,A n e t
So cn Rve Confer,ence of the_ Parti es to theoefr omiIBRD is not likely
neinl iacin
PT0t t at 'ncomletenuclear power ProjeCts inl view ovato b bleefr financingi in thre nuclearsetr
nsaal
imhe~~~~teV

RD cold, as, pointed out by thefrm
ci-siwould helýýp considralyi
mprac
otiigad asTrn the, ma in iPar of the loans from otherhs cnet ha teIEAnoted that somne
t isi
soucesprtil
Howverbe- of gra
TARA,ý'~n

strssed thie nieed for an ex.Panded
countiL;es haý,iveinutiaie
IBD nrgaizatonsincluding
sme
nteratinal
roleofOECDi

enrg

deveomnadfnanic ing in

te developinig

inolved in into) 'hE fatthtevni the fiacilnobes
hr remains a
troducing, nucler poer Plants; aire eovdof theofXa different kind and thtis the protection

problemi

elec-of
environment from the effects of large-scale production
The problem was examined intric power by nuclear power plants.
Condifferent forums, e.g. the IAEA, the Fourth International1971),
ference of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva,(Stockthe United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
Powe- andholm, 1972), the International Conference on Nuclear
Nuclear Fuelits Fuel Cycle (Salzburg, 1977), the International
Committee on
Cycle Evaluation and the United Nations Scientificin its 1972
the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) whichto thisreport for the first time devoted much of its attention
will
aspect. 2 9 3 The spread of nuclear power plants, therefore,
292

293

of
Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference IV of
ArticleUnder
the Parties to the NPT, IAEA Activities
NPT (NPT/CONF.IEI/PC.II/8, 25 July 1979), p..
Vol. 11; UN Doe.
See Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
3ulY 1972; and GAOR, 27th Sess., Suppl.
A/CO,of IAEA
No. 25 (A/8725). Dr. Eklund, the Director Generalpointing
inpower
nuclearof
has tried to dispel fears
out to the 1979 UN General Assembly Session that thefindings of the UNSCEAR in its 1977 report indicatedthat the radiation emitted by all nuclear power plants
now'operating throughout the world may cause about 60

374

envi on:also depend to a large extrent oil tche solut'ionf of he11
welanteir c ptn
mental problem,,s connected withl- theml a,aEn'uTee, M:leosa
The accident, atiteby public opin-i.on.
Sut
United States, and the renegation oi a ouny u;n e e1 tri ain 1978 of the use of nuclear fiss-_on foprov
penergy 4are certainly serious setbacks forc the peaocfulonot --eem,hwvr
cati-on of nuclear energy. They doAcu th r developmrenCýtt
stitu.te so far a tr-en(d ora thr,eat, to thic
in this field.

To si't Up, if

Articleý

IV of the' NMTIs

edlteal,icaluaeofýmay -leave the impression that It rFleflects a sortbalance of rights and obligations betweeni thýenula-epo
artilcl,mre
and the nQn-nuclear-weaponl States. However, theýno) dou.-bt, thaitand evolved under certain conditions that leaveof theýnýonit is a compensatory article to the sole benefito)fnuclear-weapon States for having renounced the acquis-itlion
neverzntr
nuclear weapons, As the majority of countries has
any circumstained the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons undor
to belong totances, and as the majority is also not expected
would appear
the category of "contributing States", Article IV'
as a gratuitous gain.
to the
The gain,, however, cannot be easily measured due
was drafted.
vagueness of the language in which the article
history ofThis vagueness is compensated by the negotiatingphases have coniArticle IV and its early implementation.~ Both
7O
deaths from cancer each year. This compares with X-ryofuses
medicalthefromresultingcancer deaths
fro-mnaul
and radiation and with 35.000 cancer deaths
p
99
Nv
5
(prov.)
52
A/3~4/PV.
UN Doc,radiation,
8-10Q.
.899
Vol. 2,Jn
294~ See N.uclear Law Bulletin (NEA),

375

d

i

nw

ta

ýrcbu

d
in t,

-wulIn thIe r al1-nn

rtd

andt

i'

a

va)ut' Jratst' I,t'cle I is

that

it g

arWepoanItte implemenotthr

of1o-cIofreoare taigng placectin
Proe,mneeopgentsawhichsý)falteitrational
wthe fheldo peaceful uses of nuclear energy, cthl alsernbeiin-l
byAtiloIIthens
theclnmatelcreaed
amredtodtoirctlyerel Atec
ioes aendgmn
two
the suebto.oeation. oetwipeennin
iveanuceis
Erpandsrnthenebut one exampleGveror
tahe isaremn

nuclaor coopterationiwhetheithin ortous
brought nultilaterald
anointerdgovurbyethe orAEAitsation is eithedinvclve iosightltofth.vriu
oldstrings
srnthenigrot
newtvmntueshwm or
or orantcnnctedI
pofralle the itrattiontable torganispemnation
thenomleontofthernAtioAls
tofulanry
with thewpacefulduses
thtflmotheriniptheucallene
Atomic Enterg Aghenc hasd emege ase
being
implemeontinge th e Tisprtn
orgnisationofAtsirle In
strEAngthenedtand ithe ewnlsargement ofjeitsveBoardofuGoverors.
broughr,thnew bloo goand viour tof the Organizatin. bubtte aspe
thaefvariousla
growth and dhevfelopen of
esimated ithow mucht of ithe
ArticleIeurdbof
implemenation
sfgad
the
eprogramms areatiutbet
tothandhow micuch, iswduer
veloping meentringis

fhel

norma

of theevoluoy.Tioned

dAeA-

own statuntorytobfectoives and. functions

sourosyhoee,imote
pitcturassstne,

376

The needseo the doe-

with the assistanece requested. in th Field oY Onanucin
nuciear projects, no immediate results ac fOrOPO-n,

ii

jorl

In conclusion, it is quite pauiadoxicni that in seeking t e
prevention of nuclear weaponis' proliferation by means of an
a:ris contrýol measure, the question of peaceful uses or nuclear,energy starts progressively to take dramati dimnsisons and introduces new problems in need of solutions. The problemu arereal and if they are not solved to the uSAAlsaction of the Parties to te Treaty, there will always be a danger WhtWhy may
call the Treaty into question.

377

The

Ons 0of Nocea0liat-I
aeceuArtiýct_e V

E.po"tArticle, V
Each Party to) the Tre,aty unidertLakes -to tailleap ortemsures to en,sure thiat, Ain accordaneeý w_ith this Treat,-y, unlder tprpappropriate int-ernati,onial osrainadtho 6
eeisfrmaypce
poeta
proceduires,internationalalbl
lful application-s Of nuclearyxloin wa.ll be miadeanodioný
Trtea)_ty
t,he
to
Party
States,to non-n-aclear-weaponthý,criminatory basis and that theý chiarge. t,o 3uch Paýrt-,ies for
exci_udi_ýandpossJb1,e
explosive devices used will be as low as
rwao
nno
any charge for research and developmentL.
such beneobtain
to
able
be
shall
TreatyStates Party to theoý'ageeagreemei,nt
international
specialatofi~ts, pursuant
adeqluate
withulbody
ments, through an appropriate international
on1
Negzotiationis
States.
representation of non-nuclear-weapon
the,afteri,possibleassoon
asthis subject shall commencetoTreaty enters into force. N~on-nuclear--weapoa States Party
pursuant~
benefits
the Tpreaty so desiring may Ialso obtain suchto bilateral agreements

The peaceful applications of nuclear explosions constituteto
one specific aspect of the peaceful uses of nuclear enerý,gy
Arwhich Article IV equally applies. Therefore, in analysing,,,in theticle V of the NPT, the general principles enunciatedpreceding Article should always be kept in mind.

379ý

KOL es and the Soviet Union exPres-,ons ons,or comtiding t" truoaty, s inbibiti
"LOH
nt
Wh
devices , the peace-i
uc weponSto oh,r nuc lear umpLosivea
explosions had received wide ato in,

se

ul

ta
pplc

teuniL
LHconuclearThis attention was greatly
tent'oi duw tAw NePT negotiationB.
benefits ofhy enpc tL promises that the potential
aMpHYfbe made available to non1wavc!'ul n"clear' explosions would
terms. These promises were
nnna.i-ar'Wapon States on favourabln
compensation for their renunc-lookedj upon by the latter as adevices. This compensatory
iAtion of all nmucJear explosive
in different forums
aspeact w~aa reflected in their statementsof the Conference of Non-Ruas weLL ns in the final agendaa, it should be recalled that
Awar-Weaoun States., Howeveridea
brazil and india resisted themninor'ity view represented byby their own means, nuclearof waiving the right to produce,
purposes.
xKpLooiva devics for peaceful
nuclear explosions was raisSince the question of peaceful
midthe first time at the ENDO in
ed by the United States forinof 1965 and 1966 were silent
1966, 3 the early treaty drafts
this respect,States proposed at the EN\DC
On 21 March 1967, the Unitedbasis of which the sharing offive general principles on the
nuclear explosions might be
any potential benefits of peacefulwaswas of the opinion that thisorganized. The United States4
by a separate agreement. Thea separate issue to be settled
31 Aug. 1967, para. 57
For example, see ENDJC/'PV. 527,
1967, paras. 12-13 (Me(Nigeria); EhDO/PV. 351, 19 Sept.
1967, para. 22 (UAR); ENIDC/
xico); ENDO/PV, 5353, 26 Sept.
(Ethiopia); A/C.1/PV. 1567
PV. 356, 5 Oct. 1967, para. 49
Zealand); and A/CONY.35/(New(Prov.), 14 May 1968, p. 26(Ireland).
0.2/SR.9, 17 Sept. 1968, P. 95
1968, Ann. III, p. 2.
Q2 UN Doc. A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct.
14-15.
5 ENDJC/17. 280, 9 Aug. 1966, PP.
paras. 72-79. On 21 February
4 ENDC0/PV. 295, 21 Mar. 1967, Lyndon Johnson, in a message
1967, the US President, Mr.
is prepared to join otherto the ENDbO, stated that the US

1

380

aoee
illoteUno Itwa ouii

So Vi.

Crnplsas we:_Llsepp atej 11ternation01tal
thle fiVe rnpcsi

y

the

it

of a

etigte~sebmn

t

cmn.
otr

tn

01ue tO teip
to theac

ibatooA-

Pekti'11ent1- to eitelý tlem(11UPT, -it,would bequtýj'solwyauts,,et of th'is catr
cepaeulalcaoodnd"First, if anwe
t-a
ho
une
cex'plos'ives thlat are_ pewýýl issThleia~ooialatnd
pru'ove techn10ically
Tireaty ...
,'hlableavam
shol-_dSaesnIla-wao
siblioxlsvesrieto othýer- State'ýs niucLaleati,cet Y of thieat tof performing the deired nuclerdtntc

ne

LservI cc.
the,Ctrol of theo State whi'ýc_h pierfo e,,(dSecond,, there ShoUld be, a meas prvde for...
t110 enon-i-nuclear-wua1pon: StatesIwishIingW tO o1
Lheoulersevcsfo
explosive
nuQlearquest'inweapon States through anineatioa body,par''1tici4-w'ould
Stvatesý'which the non-nuclear--veapo1)npate. The international body might cosdrsuichmatters as the feasibility of requesteýd poJc
sa"fet'ypriority among such requests, and necessar-"1yprecautions..
forý..Third, costs to non-nuclear-weapon States
Statesnuclearbydetonations
peaceful-purpose
would be kept as low as possible. They should not,defor example, include the costs of research andvelopment.
..Fourth, there should be,full consultation among
nuclear and non-nuclear Parties to the limited
Treatytest-ban Treaty about any amendment of thatprojects.
feasiblerequired in order to carry out

5
6

nuclearnuclear States in a commitment to make available
non-discrimina
onpurposes
explosive devices for peacefulsafeguards,
atory basis under appropriate internationaland Add. 1,
DC/230
DoQs.
1968,
and
1967
for
Suppl.
DCOR,
1967).
Feb.
21
Ann. IV, Sec. 3 (ENDC/187,
126.
HearinCs onMilitary Implications of NPT, p.
31,15
ENDC/PV. 297, 18 May 1967, para. 21 and ENDC/PV,
July 1967, para. 15.

381

,..

th~~' coidi.to
jJt

poeue
and
at

o

ould bedeeodo~loiepoet

caro2. ýueSt te,

co itent1 onR
tj; ND oýno ted,d towartds, a baLISictI~ ~ oein t hW teXt, Of a tioii-pro1-ifera -t-ilntet
167ý merely
I ciotitýccA,l itreat dr,,afts, of 241 Augut-.;
Th fi
ara,graphL which-O alddressed Dtself partiLUdC a prabua
1 et1Cof peacefuil n cleIar exp)losiloS 9sThe in1sissue
tcie
atrl toIl
only by aof thi parcagraphl was found satisfactoryIon)t
IclUsý
commuritment in the
111ilorit'y wC ilomembers of teENDC. A cleare--r
reaty te--xt was favou.ro.d, The Mexican
oprtIePLart of tL
the text of andelgaionunertokthie taský of foriputating
The text borrowednariceto: bý inserted Jin, the, treaty draft.
picpe
f'ive
the language of the aforementio-ned
from1
Other mint-or amendments
the Augu-ist 1967 prabLar patlragraphi
wore al;so suggeý6sted by Roto the,' 24 Auga6t 1967 treaity drafts
1
mania and Nigeria.

which was taken into
Tho Mexican proposal was the only one
and the Soviet Union inconsideration by the United States
7
8

9

10

11

'73-78.
ENDC/PV, 295, 21 Mar. 1967, paras.
Feb. 1967, para. 20
For example, see ENDC/PV. 288, 25
3 Aug. 1967, para. 355(United Kingdom) and ENDC/PV. 319,
(Canada).
Does. I)C/230 and Add. 1,
DOOR, Suppl . for 1967 and 1968,1967) and Sec. 8 (INDC/
Aug.
Ann. IV, See. 6 (ENiDC/192, 24
3-D.
Appendix
193, 24 Aug. 1967). See
1967), Article IV-A.
Ibid., Sec, 12 (ENDC/196, 19 Sept.
on 17 November=wflzerland, in its aide-m6moire submittedsuggested that
ENDC,
1967 to the two co-Chairmen of theshould constitutepreambletheinproposed
the intentions(ENDC/204, 24
21
Sec.
an article of the Treaty. ibid.,(b).
3
Nov. 1967), para.
1967), Preamble (para. 5)
Ibid., See, 14 (ENDC/199, 19 Oct.
Nov. 1967), Article
70-1-fania) and Sec. 18 (ENDJC/202, 2
VI-A (third paragraph) (Nigeria).

382

trea"CLty 6x
t'cal
LJ
id(od
first te:xt of AtcDVwas to2 aCCi)Jugstdbyt IJlines

the irof 'L8 JaTay118
Lecal n
td
eat:I

flN1
Th,ie new article wa s wecmdby all thi ememb r,'~ of tlheana
Sedenwas thec only memb-er, to subihti t,~er
N~ eles,I
N4e'io1a ha-1d alo soubmt
fr alamendmenhtcýis to t.he articl-e,.
to t'hesam artic-L bL it wsltrdroptw,
amean, Eicut
In the 11 Tia,rch 1L968 JoLint IjS-;-ovieý t dra:i't-, sbm iý,ttýdt
_ ed se,ssion of theU ONGeraAsmbyty-second rem
the tweAtClIin_ )tact, 1
remained]

Itced
trodu
i,ýi1
wI
I
iLjral AsL,semblY, se veral chane
Atithe UN Geneeiad, by thtoAt ice V in c-iom-pli ance with suggre stc)ionLs,1 ra
Iexicoantw
and~ orke3d out in parti cul)r wVit haelegat ion
anLd ChneY
other Latin American countries, name,_ly Colomlbi a
V wil bi1(
Those developments in the elaboratiL'on of ArtJoIcle
its final
evoked in detail in the course of our analysis of".
the leadingprovisions. This brief survey helps to demon st'rateGcý
bUat
AtceV
role Mexico played not only in bringing forward
satisfaction of'also ir further -.Lor.vn)lating the Article to thethe large majority of non-nuclear-weapon States

1213Sec. 9Ibid,, Sec. 7 (ENDC/192/Rev. 1, 18 Jan. 1968) and
The Au3-E.
AppendixSee1968).
Jan.
18
1.
(ENDC/193/Rev.
maintained.
gust 1967 preambular paragraph was not
Ib1id., Sec. 32 (ENDC/216, 13 Feb. 1968).

l6Sec. 37 (ENDC/
I[bid., Sec. 36 (ENDBC/220, 28 Feb. 1968) andwhich
amendment,
7220/Rev. 1, 14 Mar. 1968). The Nigerian
instiat
aimed
was
6,
Chapter
was already referred to in
of
field
the
in
co-operationonsystemtuting a reporting
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
See. Appendix 3.-F.
A/C.1/PV. 1569 (prov.), 16 May 1968, PP. 31-40.

17

A/C.1/PV. 1577 (prov.), 31 May 1968, pp. 78-80.

14

15

383

iýt

o11qiier

ait imp pmwnetaL ion, ArM cloe

as

arq
!1.&

Oit

NL

[poeion,o,KVa

of Non-.Nuolp"ai-Wwapon

toppaceful usus
Wa w!Uivv-rt to thoK ineLatr in thisd wo rsoi
op wLch
Stata
0:,j

ro

cCn

racaivod can-

iov'

.ati

In reviewing the result o f the Conference of Non-NuclearWeapon States, the twenty-third session of the UN General Assembly had given further attention to the issue, a practicewhich was followed by the subsequent sessions of the Assembly,
At the centre
especially after the 1975 N?T Review Conference.
of all the discussions that had taken place in this forum was
the role to be played by the MAEA in the domain of peaceful
The latter organization had, in fact,
nuclear explosions.
taken important steps in this respect.
, V will be made in, three parts.Th
Yirst Wil de"a with the obli!Cation to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applcations of aupdear explosions will be made available to nonTheý

an,

o

Aysi
ri

nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. The second part willdeal with the modalities of enjoying the potential benefits ofthe technology and the third part with the channels throughwhich suchi benefits could be obtained.
Bult before going into this analysis, a brief outline ofthe object of Article V, i.e. the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, is necessary. It would particularly help todiscover thip potentially new technological and economical
field and the prospects it holds for the near future in thelight of the promises given and the obligations formally undertaken in the NP~T.

18

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution H (I),P. 14 and Resolution L, pp. 18-19.

384

L
i,Te

r

posoa.

AppliA,i
cfu -on

The ngtaightoyof

rpl~o04

f'11ullthe N-P,T

tepotent-i-al peacefuil application1s, of nula e p ) Isn
setiVesr-evealed and o-, lained by th,Ine Uniiýt ed S Ltat, re
The 'Soviet- Union,

on the oth.er ha,nd,

did not, eveal,ispln

ioh,is domnai-n duýrin,-g, theiNT negotiaing Cp1er
Lt was-, lateir done? in a differenit conlt,ext asvill] be shiown beýinth
l-ow. As to thJe t.hird nula-epnSt-ate ar'can
and p,rojects ini

negoiatonsi..

onl its pat-Itovntureiy

to c(.onen-trate,thie

Un-i'te,.d Kingdom-,threwaintGo t1his fielýd. It

toitnioitees

as, mere-P-on, peihrlsudeueaignotetco

The sources on the development and status of 1peaceful nuclear explosions' technology are to be found eithaer in th,eproceedings of international scientific and technao-Logical mecet-,ings which have discussed the issue as part of thae g2eneral]1
question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, (e.gý., theGeneva conferences on the peaceful uses of the atom) 20or inl
the results of those meetings which have concentrated solely
on the issue as was the case with the five technical panels
held in Vienna under the auspices of the IAEA in 1970, 1971,
1972, 1975 and 1976 as well as the Ad hoc Advisory Group on
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes established by the
IAEA Board of Governors on 11 June 1975, which was required
inter alia to examine the aspects of PNE's coming within the
Agency's sphere of competence. The latter Group held fivesessions in the period between September 1975 and August 1977
paras. 17-4.2
for gas s-.ti-

19

For example, see ELUDCý/PV, 359, 25 Jan. 1968,
and ENDC/213, 25 Jan. 1968 (Pro~ject Gasbugg
mulation).

20

For the fourth conference held in Geneva in 1971,se
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energ, Vol. 7, pp.,0-25

385

produced a. major report dealing with21
a.1aspects rela ing to thi.s technologY,
soe haacerstcsof nucea exl-oli he~istplce
t holog'y appa feas;ible miust be- L11m eth neve~titautaof whiloh itn"ý prorme
1d~lndeit'in
ecdly,
expo

newi_ll betheeni<agd a

týc 11'ology1"

wAll1

a ce,fl nucl0e arof pe-"lll1

disjcusseid, followed by a suýimmary of
tstdippli1cat-1ions. Theo feasiýbility of therifl

he-Ln be, asese

in the,lghof certa-in inter-tiol legal a3id- politi]cal c-ons __ideriat:iios . Finally, a prona,,
expected, to gaiýn the full beinef'its of thegnos onwhenitis'y wil

But beoe emrbaýrking-0Ton all th11i s,
inthi ism_Lerey aýb0rief outline little

C,hl
be evkd

epet tht
we mut+h co scintiic
liate
volvd

n

tehnoogi

alaspects.

tu assessý how far -the obliitations under-ptaken by virtue of Article V will probably be fulfilled in the

Thet: m,ain, obljectiýve isnear future.

1. Some Characteristics of Nuclear Explosives
The early nuclear weapon tests carried out by the UnitedStates in the Pacific and more specifically the first underwater nuclear test at Bikini Atoll in 1946, and the firstthermonuclear explosion in 1949 gave birth to the idea that21

Phenomenology and Status RePeaceful Nuclear Explosions:aort, 1970. Proceedings of a Panel,I Vienna, 2-6 March 1970
IAEA, 1970), Peaceful Nuclear Explosions II:
Menna:
Pr-oc eedings of a Panel1, Vien-~
Their Practical Applications.
IAEA, 1971), Peaceful Nuna, lb-22 January 1971 (Vienna:
Applications, Character-is-t-icsand
clear Explosions III:
Proceedings of a Panel, Vienna, 27 NovemberEffects.
1 D-ecember 1972 (Vienna: IAEA, 197~4), Peaceful Nuclear
Ex2losions IV. Proceedings of a Techni-calT Committee on the'eaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions, Vienna, 20-24 January
IAEA, 1975) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
1975 (Vienna:
V. Proceedings of a Technical C-ommittee on the Peaceful'Uses of Nuclear Explosions, Vienna, 22-24 November 1976
(Vienna: IAEA, 1978); and Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nu-clear
Pupss
Expl1o sions for Peaceful Purposes (Special reprint of IAEA
Doc. GOV/1854 and attached as Annex H to Dcc. NPT/CONF.II/
PC.II/9, 25 JulY 1979), hereinafter cited as Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

386

Thec iuiderw,ateýrBi

that a l-argi.

itsemntadthtneteeyraleav ing- a ca-,vity -ýhere an islnobrding_-s lus to th1'e fiýrs;t chrateisc
xlsvs
as comfpare,_d to c mclhg

pe-r unii-it ofama PacOL'I,c kto]lI

ao.e

la-epoincolTlosyese.
nuoclr

xpos

tevr

airt

e

or) woiht

thec produkction o:f temncirepoie,bt-woustoe of
which energy is generated by the fusion ofjthe',cedcthydrogen :deuterium and tritium, made it posilf h pro(the cost of nuclear explosives and bring the scope
Secondly,T"he,isblem of radiation down to more manageable proportions,,.
esion explosives made of uranium are too expensive adte2lease too much radiation. 3
By lowering the fission-to-fusion ratio in the therwonudevice,clear explosives, which must be triggered by a fission
It might
radioactivity can be reduced to negligible levels.
theeven bu possible, some time in the future, to eliminate
or the sofission device by creating a pure fusion explosive
2
called "clean" explosive.
uranium
It was eloquently observed. that "where in 1945 theelecbomb offered the potential of vast supplies of low-cost
22
25

24

Uses of Nuclear
Frank Barnaby, Man and the Atom. The 1971),
p.-1-69.
Thames and Hudson,
Eiaergy(onoof
See Diavid B. Brooks and John V. Krutilla, Peaceful Uses
Wshington,
Aspects
Economic
Some
Explosions:
Nuclear
D.C. :Resources for the Future, 1969), pp. 5-6.
Van
For some research done on pure fusion, see William R.
ExFission-FreeandTreatyCleave, "The Nonproliferation
1968,
Winter
4,
No.
XI,
Vol.
Orbis,
plosive Research",
Pp. 1055-1066.

387

oge' bmeagy'bll
a

t emo
va

of

Ao1Mo
(AlC

nP1964 to0

nu1
I noi

ikot

e

abado

ci~

01a

eot

for ex-caLcensitable,ed by theý US Al-ltJomi Ene g-y
fo-r 10
C0000 'dolL a_rroge'ý1ý"tto 6000.O0

ri

fed
o1e

dolar

forýý a 2-megaton.Iarge.s cover thI,e coats of the nuclear materials,
26
Thec
ibIy , anid arigand firing services.
fabictin,nd a s-semm
milion,200
andLImillioncsao fth eqialn TINT wudbe

ye Id

Thie

7' This is ju)stc to shoýw thatýO goinýg byno _llarsý resýpctv ely
a certain yield i.n nu,.clear e.',plosives, cliarges tend to decreaseý
of chiarges waould be deve.loped_
An itrmschedule
consderably.
if commercial p)roj)ects were to becomie poc)s si ble2.

P,-notUh1 .'ar-a.cte-, ýri st11ic cl[os,eIyhl,oi nnýc ted wi th co)S ts is th et1he, nuclear eýxplIosI vc,. KFor exý:ample a '25o_,ýcf
euv'alent -in eýxplosive power.: tojIIclear devic
k ilotLoi nu
lcd Jin a cylindrical bore-e pi~ toso~~IT-cul~
25,000Gcd' sizy Limiteer-Less, than a mtein diameUterJ wýheýreas this q,uantit'y of
TNT would require a spherical cavity 30 meesacross result29
inc in an enormous cost of emplacement.
hleuýThe last main characteristics relate to the two types ofunderground peaceful nuclear explosions so far being investigated. The nuclear explosive can be detonated near the surface,25

26

Brooks and Krutilla, 22.ct., p. 5. This is not to overlook
the fact that fusion might one day be the cheapest sourceof electrical energy,
US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing
Nuclear Explosion Services for Domestic and ForeignpUsers7
91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C. :US Government Printing Office, 1969), P. 59, hereinafter cited as
Hearin-s on Nuclear ExLEosion Services. The charges mentioned do not include safety studies, site preparations,transportation and emplacement.

27

F. Barniaby, Man

28

HearCLings

29

F. Barnaby, Manand

on1Nuclear
and

the

Atom, p. 174.

Explosion_Serice,
the

Atom,

388

-P. 174.

P. 41.

atisojha t &e

o

am~

aae

o

uo

atdnsoooaaýone'yucemr
thelexplosiv" caý bej
Alternativ,e y,'re tot ed, r ef(
s uiill1y coii1Lý
gý"rounld so hlat tbe. lblt,ast
Ioa cf1rnt yIAl~'n In t1he lae type a cclid
cotaindji
is(-rine~

to as

ref
ri

i to tmLun 1' grun,'G1,co1ýl0vet I in5
Vyshinsky, the thI
As early as 19 49 Andrel-Cat the (hnited Nater f Foreign, Af-fatiir-s , ýinasteetmd
delae

tins

th
that Lareiriaigdserts

USd

wt,l

devlo

we aecttn

a nude r e

throC)ughthqcavt

jungLe anJd

5
Teovets did some thI,eorej,t ical
seen for, a thousand years."
wer knlown1 tohaepoed
work on the excavation technique: andwih owerfulIaed since the mid-1950s with some experiments
i th fieltd ofiapl
chemical explosions. 2 Soviet ventures
weeolyrvaldad
caios f eaeful nuclear explosions

explained in 1969.
co)ncrete', Stbeps,1
the United States that the first
explosives for civil_
in exploring the application of nuclear
uses have received wide publicity.
It

is

in

Lawrence Radiationl LaboIn 1956, several physicists at theBerkeley, outlined
ratory of the University of California,
peaceful uses for thermotheir ideas for the development of
the Atomic Energy Commission
nuclear explosives in a letter to

31

types of underground nu-o
For a brief discussion of the two"The Question ofGinsburg,
clear explosions, see Thee
Non-Nuolear,-WeapontofBenefitthefor
Peaceful Explosions
States,Geva
Non-Nuclear-WeaponofStates", Conference
pp. 2-5,1968),July
3
2,(A/CONIF.355/Doc.
1968
Quoted by Ginsburg, Ibd,p. 1,

52

Ibid., pp. 5, 8 and

30

9,
389

Wn Yeray15,

I-LI
Jui

th

I d r way
I INu

I.~ ~~a~~rs ~anl( i[

1961

a

bee

t, t1tlonlderi vedttersodil
on ti ~~~~;~ ~~ yshlina

ln_y deoitedanid aIerg

it 'hl ]iTh1' frs,3t nueIc a1

Amer-i canii oaeder cralte rint,Shone,Car
Cari

plosonh

AEC fome

Explosions

thIrmaj l(
Very- oflLa p;i" tions1,"-yps1idatPermore.

ýd inlIto a1
Itwas
Vj formalizeý
sugrto Ie"[ý c cald"lwh

rogr

h

wa

al

(A~~C).

tioii of Peýac0-"PLowshI are" tes,tsal,t, domei l deep

vocabuý lary,, ii thi

i_in thefielýd has

we he:ar of edan
exeimetalliad Chariot Por containLdled exSlo

RulsonPy

her of Gabkoeandn croneo

For different reasons, as will be e_xplained below, the"Plowshare" programmie was gradually oriented towards contained
nuclear explosions, especifically those aimed at gas stimulation. As a consequence of general financial restraints, the programml-s budget was gradi)a.lly reduced ever the years by thethe prog-ramme's budget was 13.7 million dollars. For 1975, tho. budget as requested by the Admi57
nistration was only 7 million dollars.
Administration.

In 1970,

In pursuing the g-oals of peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had sometimes

53

Brooks and Krutilla, op.cit., p. 1.

54

Ibid.

55

Ginsburg, lee. cit.,

36

For a brief description of those o)rojects and others,
Ibid. , PP. 5-15.

37

For a comparison of budget appropriations for "Plowshare",see the hearings which were held every year by the US
Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the budget
and programme of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

P. 15.

390

see

egss
worke,d ha-nci in hanid witith private ntýtr
t&at
bio.Tefnac"YpationIprojects Gash1l"yasciieal inýtho-c tLwopretS
sr
jCIon ,piv' oio-in the i-ý, stPrivate indi.stry's cost sharing ratio wvas 40%
iiopeanu
A consoirtiuim of TJS ani
and 84% in the second).
ject,

explosýions.firms was also soughtc to p:romote peaceful nuclear
The compLany, 'iobelAn international compan-y was formed in 19-68.ý
El Pa,so Naturýal
Paso Geonuclear, was a partnership between the
Bosch of' Fra.rce anid
GTas Compiiany of the United States anid Nobel
The. latter two are
Poudrerie R6unies de Bel,ique of Belgiuim.
TLhe newý Com1-1
experienced manufacturers o-f chemi,ical explosives.
and as a sertvicýe
pany planned to function both as a consultant
firm for possible uses of nuclear explosives,
proWith the demise of the AEC in 1974 the "Plow,ýsharle"
Research andgramme had come under the control of the Energ-y
was later, absorbed by
Development Administration (ERDA) (which
1977). The namethe Department of Energy established in August
simple descriptiLve"Plowshare" had been dropped in favor of the
There had been no Test of
title, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.
The funding for fiscal
PNEs by the United States since 1973.
The programme
year 1977 amounted to only a total of $1 million.
appropriations.
is effectively suspended with virtually nocarrying out projects
It was found that conventional means forwould be preferable
originally contemplated with the use of PNEs
reasons.
for economic, environmental and political38

39

in US Congress, Joint
See -fact sheets on the two projects
AEC Anthorizing
Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings
91st Congress, 2nd
1)(Part
Le-islation. Fiscal Year 1971
Printing Office,
Government:US
D.C.
Session (Washington,oýnAEC
as Hearings1970), pp. 306-312, hereinafter cited
Au.thorizin-, ýLegislatioýn 17ý1.
Relations
See US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreignand InterOceans
Control,and Its Sub-Committee on Arms
Ban and
Test
Thresholdon
Hearings
national Environment,nd9=hogesreatie,Peaceful Nuclear Explos53io:nPrinting
Government
-US
D.C.:
S'ession, 1977 (Washi3ngt'on,
cited asOffice, 1977), pp. 12 and 134, hereinafter
Ban.
t
dC
hr5h
Hear

391

At, Uie

94I(b'oPner y, in lirIýteý
cotrs
aUS

aeon"lo sae
pr~
tna"

~

ec

nteeacefLUPee
i0s.es of Ato-the158 COnfferenIce at wh-dclh

cevda

otl

reoepti)[on, t'he UJS

h~ se-Licie keen jnteýres.t and( fa-vouirb e etoomtheeleat s'-)of a numbder of colinrtrie-s includ n L [eý So
3cUni)_onIe, A So'ovieýt- deleg-ate me.nt,i onied an inýt ti 1e11 ponssibleuse of rnuclear explos,ives to accompldsli
svea speci,jc exaain irgti,
on and gas_ stimula ti,onab"c-inth
Sv_iet!I UniiotL?ncl
andisugested the possýibility of40
U-Svitsudy of thecse p,rojjects .
o'nUS-Sove,"1o-opeuratI.icon in) h-iefiýeld o f pe
oa cefu - ýppli
acationscof1 nuLcle[ar ex;p Lo s ion on1,S
ily stuarteý,d in 11969,j in a me etiiing
whc waheld in_Vit n

fro

14 to0 16 April . IT wc-,as f o Llowedbyoh"
to metigs,oneý in Mocwfrom 1-2 to 17 Febru.ary
1970andtheothr *WahintonD..

from-j 12 t1o 23July 1971,1

The, three, meetings have contributed in revealin-g the progress
miade, by the Soviet Union in this field unknown up till then by
United States' experts. US-Soviet co-operation took the formof technical discussions and exchange of information relating
to the many aspects of the technology.
Moreover, the parallel participation of the Soviet Union
in the five technical panels held under the auspices of the
IAEA in Vienna between 1970 and 1976 brought to the world

40

Jacob Koop, "tPlowshare and the Nonproliferation Treaty",
grbis, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 1968, p. 806. The desirability of US/Soviet co-operation is stressed by the author(p. 814).

41

For a brief accouint of the three meetings, se~e respectively UTS Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearin s
AFCAutoriingLegislation. Fiscal Year 1_970 (Part 1
91st Congress, 1seso
Wzigo,D.C . :US Government Printing Office, 19609), pp. 316-322, hereinafter cited as Hearing-s on AEC Authorizing,Legislation 1970; Hearin-gs on ABC Authorizing Legislation 1971 (Part 2), pp. 635641;, and CD/PV. 53, 7 Sept. 1971, para, 0 On the third
meeting, see also International Herald Tribune, 30 July
11971.

392

scientifJ_c community valuable information on the stat.us oll
Soviet technology.
In general terms, the Soviet programme was found to be e,x-ploring the samie sorts of questi_ons as that, of the Unit],-edStesAlýthough- it was difficult t1-o reach, conclusions as to which
the two countries was more advanced thian the other, t1heUnt
States' experts were impressed by the fact that, the Sovi-et, Union
had carried out c.ertain experiments and evenrplcain wit-ri
Most of them werelout parallel in the American progra,mmie.
contained explosions, a field towards which the. Soviet Union
It reported su,ccessful
seemts to have oriented it-Self as well.
use of PNEs in extinguishing a gas well fire, st,...-iimulat,,ýingi--ý anl
oil field and developing an underground storage cavity for gals.
In 1972, while the United States was winding up- itS te-st S of
PNEs, the Soviet Union was reported to have conducted at Least
19 tests, seven of which were presumably for pea-ceful purposes.
In 1978, according to preliminary reports, the Soviet Unrionl
conducted 27 tests, seven of which might have been for peacefulpurposes in view of their location outside the usual weapon
4
testing sites. 3

With respect to the other nuclear-weapon States, the United
Kingdom, as previously indicated, has no intention to venture
into the field. The People's Republic of China has not indicated or revealed any particular interest so far. Only France, inthe mid-1960's,

started to consider seriously future industrial

and scientific applications.

This interest emerged during the1961 - 1966 underground contained nuclear-weapon tests carried
In 1969, a newout in granite formations in Hoggar, Algeria.
organ called APEX (applications des explosions) was created42

For exaiiple, see HearinEs on AEC A-athorizing Legislation
1971 (Part 2), pp. 640-641. For a comparison between US
and Soviet nuclear explosive civil-application projects,
see World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI(_Year Book 1 22
(Stockholi Almqvist and Wikself,_1972)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), P. 467.

43

SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p. 427 and Appendix 130 (pp.
and SIPRI Yearbook 1979, pp. 651 and 654.

393

475-476)

towards contained
It was also orientinge itself(,jectspro
During 1976 France started to carry out
unde.vground explosions.
During t~hose experiunderg,round explosions using boreholes.
mentcs, the phenomenology was studied in detail and considerable
The "commissariat" hoped tote chnological data were obtained,
finanundertake actual applications in the near future provided
availcial support from French private industry would be madeabie. 1114

pr e cs

the general status of' peaceful nuclear
Some nonexplosions' programmes in the nuclear-weapon States.
closely
nuclea-r.-weapon States are following those programmesappliand are already entertaining the possibility of precise
For example, India submitted tocat.ions on their tLerritories.
held
the fkourth technical panel on peaceful. nuclear eXplosions,"tpeaQefull,in Vi,enna in 197[5 the rýesults of its studies on its
Egypt
nuclear explosion experiment of 18 May 197'4.45 Moreover,Conference
submitted to the same panel as, well as the 1.971 Geneva
the possibleon the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.few ideas onof theapplications of PNEs in Egypt including the development
channel Medi"Qattara Depression Project", a scheme designed toWesternterranean Sea water into a depression located in the
using
Desert of Egypt, about 170 Kin to the West of Alexandria,
46We
the difference in Ilevels to produce hydroelectric power.
shall revert to this project when we examine IAEA proceduresThis is,in brief,

in providing PNEs services.
Applications
The applications can be divided into four groups according
to the kind of services they would provide. They are natural

3,

Potential

143

SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p. 427 and Appendix 13C (pp. 1475-476)
and -SIPRI Yearbook 1979, pp. 651 and 6514,
Peaceful Nuclear.Explosions (I), PP. 5-8; (11), pR. 5-6 and(V)- p7.6(IV), pp. 421-436.
Ibid.
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Vol. 7, pp. 232-~242 andpp.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (III), PP. 3-11 and MV,
9-7-123.

144
145

146

394

t
I' ýsoMurIC",ýex pL oitato,,`.
st,orgG-J,icJ r

aiid sc)Ion

Orwaýs te dsio

pot

1,t

!'achY

With reg;ar,d tocnatuiral resou1rce0 (xplldoiLtatLIon,mosýt o~ingteapp iýapplicjations w,,ould use, contane!id epoin.
ilsmuaio,reo
arle g,as an
catuions testeýd or entvisagedOvery of shiale, oil, cope1eahngad
Anohe

aplcation

a-ti*on isthi coseleoter1hetý rocOverY.

cnecewt

xtiý1nction of g-as, or olwl

resurcpLo-i

rs

all the, p)otentJ,ialapiain
tisto bne ntoted thait ofv.
of nluclearexlsie

for petacefuilpuoss

cntieexl-

retrecei!vjIngions for the exploitatioun of natural reore
high priority in research and develo_pmient'. in- view-of theoneg
crisis, gas and oil stimulation is gannGniprac.0a
stimulation in particular is of great importance ýin the lightILof rising worries about the environment. Moreo-veri, due_, to theenormous energy to volume ratio of contained explos,ion-s, t,helatter are in most cases the onl1y feasible means of exploiting those resources. In cratering or excavation the tec_hniiqu,e.
is merely an alternative. With regard to international legal
commitments, fully contained explosions do not raise any problem as far as the application of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty
is concerned. Cratering applications raise problems of theTreaty's interpretation and even its modification,
The applications for storage and waste disposal would use
either contained or cratering explosions. Among the applica-47

For a basic understanding of the different applications,see the review paper which was especially prepared for the
first panel on peaceful nuclear explosions in Vienna 1970:
M.D. Nordyke, "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions", inPeaceful Nuclear Explosions (I), pp. 49-107. See also A.R.W.
Wilson, "ATReview o_f__Cu_rrent Status of Civil Engineeringand Mineral Resources Development Applications of Peaceful
Invited review paNuclear Explosions" (A/CONF.49/P/762:
Vol. 7, pp. 211Energy,
Atomicof
Uses
Peacefulin
Per)
For Soviet appli1cations, -s-ee6 also "Ideas for Peacefull
231.
Nuclear Explosions in USSR", IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 12, -No. 2,
For a detai-le-d-a-nalysis of).specific
Apr. 1970, PP. 11-21.
applications of PNEs, see Appendix 24E to this suy

395

or

tonstedin.poIst,AnvL.g arlan

waIrs'voirfiýeq of(-)C
In thýI(use)teinorunld, 1ýrrOIUIId ý3r

inlu,]ldin- darn cor)1n.t1ctLion.

all the a-qpplicati,ons Wouldsomewt;imes ca-Lled "geogr,alvlae applicati-ons are ca-

ott~n
owt,i

e_plsinphicalC,1"
n1c erg"

radlioactivenhead harbouiýr conais tr uct ion
eXCa'ý,,vat - ýionj

nasty, sCienthI-Jfic appliations seek to utilizj-,e the nuclea
explsveas asouce o enrgy or elIemenitary parti cles fo-r
sciettifiL

JC stu,~physiýcs, he_afields3 of research are neutron
eemntpodcto anid seism11ology.4
Th-e, miaintTh
Fesbltyb4,of Peaceful, Nu\-iclear Ex-prlý osi on sinasesin~Lý

f peacefu.l inuclear explosions,th)esblt

severl apcshaýve to bLe taken) into consideration.

They areof a technical, environmental, economical, legal and politicalnature. Without goin,-- into the discussion of the first three
aspects which all raise considerable problems in need of solutions, it must be pointed out that a paramount considerationin any application is environmental safety; the principle safe49
ty hazard s being radioactivity, ground motion and air blast.
If these problems were resolved, legal and political restraints
would have to be tackled. They deserve special attention in thecontext of our study of.the NPT and especially in conjunction
with another international arms-control agreement, i.e.,, the1963 Test-Ban Treaty as well as two bilateral agreements be48

It is to be noted that nuclear weapon tests, and Plowshare
explosions from which scientific seismic results have beenobtained should not be confused with I'Vela tests" in the
United States which are nuclear explosions designed to provide basic infoi-mation on the geological effects of nuclear
explosions so as to improve the capability of detecting andidentifying unknown events.

149

For a thorough discussion of all the above aspects see IAEA,
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, PP. 7-39. These
aspects are also discussed with regard to specific applications of PNEs in Appendix 214E to this study as reproduced
from the above IAEA document.

396

yte 9tween the Uinited States and the Soviet U0nion
Treaty on the limitatiLon of UndergroundI Nuclear w,ea-pon Tes;ts,
the so-called Threshold Tr,:eat,-y, and the 197,6 'T'rea.ty on Undt g.rou,.nd Nuclear Explosion for Peacefiul Purp,,oses, boCt]h of w1lich
have not yet e-ýntered into force but- whichn the Patisave
t1_-if'Jed
pledged tco abide by their spirit uintil both h)ave bt-een
according to thie Parties' respectilve c,onstuitcution,alreuemns
Before turning to the latte-r aggreements, it. is7 t.o be notedthat the pea-ceflul applications of nuclear explosions are resIn the UCnited States,
trained by national- legal instruments.
for example, the deflunct Atomic Energy 'Commi-.Lssion (A1EC) was
limiited to prýoviding- a nuclear explosion service fo.r. researchand development including demonstration projects: that4futhe
AEC programmatic interests. PractUical applications wýe_re therefore not authorized. But as some applications were togtto
be feasible and in compliance with its obligations under the NPT,the United States Administration had engaged a leg,)al process
aimed at making peaceful nuclear explosion services available
50
to domestic and foreign users for practical applications.
On the international level, the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty im,poses certain limitations. According to paragraph 1 of Article 1,
nuclear weapon tests as well as "any o-ther nuclear explosion"(~i.e.,

peaceful nuclear explosion) are prohibited inthe "at-mospheru~, beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including tervitorial waters or high seas." They arefurther Drohibited'in

any other environment if

such explosion

causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territor-

ial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control
51
such cxplosion is conducted."1 Accordingly, all peaceful nuclear explosions are prohibited except those carried out underevcs pp. 1-6. Willrichxlso
ula
observes that the US in concentrating its efforts on gas
stimulation is reconciling between protecting its own interests and EPT obligations. Willrich, Non-Proliferation
TreatyZ, p. 147.

50 Hernso

51

See Appendix 06.

397

tt

cause,daioac,Lv(. debrcis, beyondo'4t iiO yotdO4It
r [rro Ja1 1n s0o th; COUnIt 1y oc tlrv,iory wfh'e thelFurtermoe
ea P u

er

u
rtke

-he

t

19kThreshold Test Ban Treaty,
oprevent, and not to carryroibt

ouCtany und1ergr_-tound nuclear we-apon test having a yield exceed15ý0 !Kil,otonsq at any place unde-r, its
J,urisdiction or con-trol,
1976.Hoevr the Threshold Treaty stipu-b,eginningý MarchI 31-,
inl,a tePs in'rits Aruticl1,e '=I that "th povision of the Treaty donotextend to un d ergroundc' nuclear: explosions carried out by theParties for- peacefull purposes" on the understanding that the
PNEs will be governed by an agreement negotiated and concludedby the Partiesý at -the earliest, possible time.
ment,hichasý concluded in

1976,This latter agree-

impose certain limitations on

PNP-s conducted not only within areas under the jurisdiction orcontrol of the States Parties to the Treaty but also those conducted by these States within the Territory of other States.
The 1976 Treaty also contains a number of provisions which
specify what PNEs are not to be carried out by the Parties to
the Treaty, and which include specifications of the yields andemplacement depths for individual and group explosions and theemplacement geometries and time intervals between explosions forgroup explosions.

More specifically, Article III of the PNE

Treaty reads as follows:"1. Each Party, subject to the obligations
assumed under this Treaty and other international agreements, reserves the right to:(a) carry out explosions at any place under
its jurisdiction or control outside the geographical boundaries of test sites specified
under the provisions of the Treaty on the
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests; and52

U1f Ericsson, renowned Swedish scientist, observes thatsome conceivable peaceful scientific applications in thefields of space science and geophysics are affected by the
Moscov Test-Ban Treaty. He further observes that the limited developmental work on excavation applications are confined to countries with large territories. Ericsson, "TheQuestion of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes",p. 18.

398

(b) carry out, participate or assist, incarrying out explosilons in the territory of
another State at the request o.- such- otheState.
2.Each Party undertakes to prohiit toprevent and niot to carry out at any placte
under its jurisdiction or control, andfurther undertakes not to carry out, part.icipate or,. assist in carrying out anywhlere:(a) any individual explosion having ayield exceeding 150 k,ilotons;(b) any group explosion:(1) having an aggregate yield exceed,iLng 150 kilotons except in ways thatwill permit identification of each individual explosion and determination of theyield of each iýndiLvidual explosion in thegroup in accordance with the provisions ofArticle IV of and the Protocol to thisTreaty;(2) having an aggregate yield exceeding
one and one-half megatons;(c) any explosion which does not carryout a peaceful application;(d) any explosion except in compliancewith the provisions of the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and other international agreements enteredinto by that Party.
(3) The question of carrying out any individual explosion having a yield exceeding theyield specified in paragraph 2(a) of thisarticle will be considered by Parties at an
approriate time to be agreed."Moreover, Articles I, VI.7, VI.,8 and VIII of the Protocol
to the PNE Treaty and the attached Agreed Statement containfurther particularly relevant provisions.
Under the aforementioned provisions, fully contained under-~ground applications such as gas stimulation can take place.
With regard to excavation applications in whicli -the explosiveis also buried underground, it would be hardly rare if the explosion does not cause long-range fallout beyond national territorial limits, especially as this type of applicationwol

399

Ieur. I,,g pro cts-_ such as, diggng caIý,eatgý enginei
usn LY I!~._ EjvenI a smiallcatinexeharbo
nalsconstracting
anda Shone whiichi was; carried ouit In Neva.d.a on 8 IDemen,t, sc~me968isn"a 35kit nincleýar evc detonated at a
Lst ILevelo
inrthe atmsc)ý:phlere the h'lighe
I oea ýedpho30 1: ete in Lthe,-etr areas of the. United
oirdociItrc~tt nethe Test,- Ban Trea,ty. Rladioa,ctivity froml the,bas
een dteced
Schoner
exavtin
Theefre5
samlingstaios in Canlada,

pplic-ations a,ndt (.ven smiall experimfents

arnMost,case in,ompatlJUe w,,ith the T2est-Ban- Treaty. An
amedmett th Tratyor a, new inte-rnational legal insti-unent
or bothl wou1ldc be neddif ex--cavat-ion applicationsý are to bepermitted.

This que1stJion w.ill1 be fui.rtheLr dev,elopeld in

seof our analysisý

the. cour-

V of theu NPT.
iof Aric'le

If we turn to the more general question of arms control,
there is a school of thought adopting the view that if a choicemust be made between peaceful nuclear explosions and meaningful
armps control ineasi)res,

the choice must be the achievement of

the latter. This view is based on the argument that the potential of this new technology has not been clearly established,
and that in many cases its value remains marginal. Moreover,
the world's need for peaceful nuclear explosions is nowhere
near as great as the world's need for arms control and disarmament. 54For example, it is feared that the advocates of peace-53

See Barnaby, Man and the Atom, pp. 181-182 and Marvin
Kalkstein, International ArranEements and Control for thePeaceful ApDlications of Nuclear ExElosions (Stockholm
Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970) (SIPRI, Stockholm Papers,
No. 4), p. 22.

54

Ibid,, p. 27. See also David P. Inglis and Carl L. Sandier,"A Special Report on Plowshare. Prospects and Problems:
The Noomilitary uses of Nuclear Explosions", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XXIII, No. 10, Dec. 1967,
pp. 51-52. "Project Cabriolet", a cratering experiment carried out at the beginning of 1968, was delayed because ofpolitical considerations relating to the NPT and the Treatyof Tlatelolco negotiations. Willrich, Non-Proliferation
Trea ty, pp, 295-296 (note 25).

400

fulnucleatrhLicl.sot
Tes-Baeretyiolcsayv oppose any ".attemp;t toj
t,rnclear tMOC n

in al

xtend
niL

heJoý

oC h nt lc.

bu)t ma-y alsoý teýnd -to rmv,or atlesdiu,prenihii

bn ard usi.ng, nmcýlear wea,,'ponLS III WE_eL,..'towa
fview ý Ireflect serGious, Con1cer'l abou

-IIthCu
1,fh th11os

thle fu-tue seý of p_,eacefuil rnucla exloios
they arelot1ay
well1-fou-nded. The,re inonecpbeconflict,btc,ween thsnew
technology anid arýms ctrlmaue.The

NPT, forL exampl)Ie, in-,eludes se-veral provisions pertaining to peacef,.Lul nucleacr eýxplosions, which, although they do not mneet -the satis6faction ol
a minority of countries, have promised potential benefits froýi-,the technology without necessarily endangering the non-prolIiferation of nuclear weapons. As to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it has been delayed for many years forlack of political will by the two super-Powers which are continuing underground nuclear testing to further improve their
weapons systems. Once the will exists to stop nuclear-weapon
testing, it will not be difficult to regulate the applications
c-f peaceful nuaclear explosions as an exception to a generalprohibition. Lastly, the temptation for some non-nuclear-weapon States to produce nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes,with all the complications that may follow, would not necessarily. emanate from the wide use of such explosives but rather
from the conditions and the modalities worked out to secure

55

For a succinct discussion of such arguments and counterar-oments, see Koop, loc.cit., pp. 806-811. See also Hedley
Bull, "On Non-Proliferation", jnElrplay, Vol. 1, No. 6,
Jan, 1968, p. 10, Bull invokes hazards to.security thatpeaceful nuclear explosions are likely to bring in theirtrain. He goes to the extent of proposing the closing, downof "Plowshare".

401arc secued to allfv eft
ourable conditi on
sciiiinathi-ot and t,nrder _La)Vc
to tl
t w
t eýrel w' .1 be no n ed no onula-epon Stateq -to Produace
x 1o q ivcs unileOSS th)ey wi-8h 'Go keep an) option as ae,th, ownc),f~cpe as is,th case withi Bra ýii and Ind.i.a, or
te of
etc tor-concealeI_d military purp)oses. Moreover, -to saýyasthat the%use of nuclear exp)Losives for peacefuil purp"oses may
emveprsnt ini ibitionis toward usi_ng nuclear weap)ons, inl war',fare 's a far.-fetcled proposition. As noted by one, writer, a
Lhe bent.cc)tf th,Llo-

dietcausal1 relatjionshi!p cf this type has not been noted inotheýr ar,,eas of tocchn.olog,,y. 6
most serious prbeAn relation to -the peaceful appliThe,ý
ctonCo nuclearL explosion,s, hoee,is pub)lic acceptance,
espe,,cially wit-h ýregýTard to Large 1"geographic engineering"
proect3sch asýtheý proposed sea-level Panamia canial whichýlivcould eni-tail -the dis_placeýmen-t of aboLit 3.ý0.000 huaman beings
7 But evening ini relatively primitive tropical conditilons.fvithi regard to much smaller projects public opinion could well
become a serious problem. Experience from siting nuclear powerreactors has shown that such a problem does exist, If the application of peaceful nuclear explosions becomes a feasible
technology on a wide scale, an intensive information process
asshould be initiated on all the questions involved so as toefsure the public of its utility as well as of its harmlessfects.
5.

FuturePerspectives

When the United States first brought the question of peace1966,
ful applications of nuclear explosions before the ENDC inin the context of its examination of a non-proliferation treaty,
56

Koop, loc.cit., p. 811.

57

For the political aspects relating to the sea-level Isthmian canal, see James H. Stratton, "Sea-Level Canal : How
and Where", Foreirn Affairs, Vol, 43, No. 3, Apr. 1965,
PP. 513-518.

402

the prospects appeared t'Uo
be very promising'. At that t-iLe the"Plowshare" programme was active in several directions, in,contained as well. as in cratering experiments.
"Plowsharel" wa,receiving generous financial support to cope with1- ILt researchand development act iViti eýs
A few1 years later, by the, ti_me the
NPT had entered into force and after, the "Plowshare" pr.ogra-mme had waned. It was then only concentrating on contained
experiments and more speciLfically on gas stimulation.
Itsfinances, as pointed out earlier, decreased sharply in comý,parison with the mid-sixties.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union's prograimme, iff judged
by existing literature, is energiticali.y pursuing the goal-J ofachieving certain applications, Tmostly in the field of contained applications. However, some progress is being made in excavation explosions.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union, have adopted
a more cautious approach in their recent declarations as tofuture prospects to the extent that the United States appears
to be in favor of a comprehensive test ban prohibiLting all nu-clear explosions in order to exclude the possibility of weapon
benefits resulting from peaceful explosions. Cratering applications are rarely mentioned. They-seem to be have been left
dormant, at least for the near future, because of problems
mainly relating to radioactivity and international legal andpolitical restraints.. Contained applications, on the other
hand, seems to hold a sound promise especially for gas and oil
stimulation. The question is when commercial exploitation canstart. Different estimates have been made. It was hoped thatby the end of the 1970's, commercial exploitation would starton a limited scale. This could be followed in the 1980ts or by
the 1990's by "geographic engineering" projects, if radioactive
problems become less hazardous and if international politic.alconditions are more favorable. As estimated by one scientist,"there is high probability that, by t1he end of t.his century,403

-,arc
Thet

Uno

aebcm

ecm

thoLigh not aa standard,

Iauti1uh, St'atesý_ anýd tlhe S"oviet,
fthutdpos'tt ekned [Or' moreCL recotetio~ AeisLedbytoithaaaogfutyIand thaL-t con'itinue_d stud_ies wer

domn

recovry of gas

poite

tlwý

SereIy,erl
stg01,

avhw

g na intenuinC1 Lj

oil and miLLeIrals.

tt iLs inthisiI

counl-J

requredlattler field

hope to gain the firstthat the non-nuclear-weapon States may
By then, the applicabenefits of peaceful nuclear explosions.
into play.
tion of Article V of the NPT would come
expectations of NonAt the 1975 NPT Review Conference, theAs well put by the
Nuclear-Weapon States were still high.
at the end of the
Chairman of the Conference in a statement
ready to exclude,
general debate, very few delegations seemed
benefits to be derived
completely and finally, some potential
In its review of Article V,
from peaceful nuclear explosions.
the technology of
the Conference, inter alia, conceded thatand study and that
PNEs was still at the stage of development
legal and other
there are a number of interrelated international
to be investigated.
aspects of such explosions which still need
Obl!L.:ation_ tG Take
T).-TheAppropriate

Measuresto

Ensuretheappropriate
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take-from any peacefulmeasures to ensure that potential benefits
made available toappliJ,k~tioI15 of nuclear explosions will beStates Party to the Treaty.

non-nuclear-weapon

and

58

Barnaby, Man

59

UNA Doo, A/7678,

theAtom, P.

29 Sept.

1969,

404

183.
para.

6.

thi obiato
ates whi'ii ahInIanLL

elvs,to ths

aste ircl eltdseve
r t
gush

Pyo ,1 Stautes ca't,c

V of the NPT,
Seody
recipinsed

th no
iI. .asly,w

will~
dea t wit

the obiattached t,o them.[!

WichiswedshllL ca Ll thýjat :the othe

'tdd s011
wejwl
t;1
eý
fo
ur.l ½
in
11 positn

e1 trýl

here the,11

To di,;tLnj 1
lited i
Stats
'Lpp,

i
weiLl;ddrs ourselIVe to theStaesularwao
Io itslttaeaprpit

As can be deduced f'romL the pril-ced,L,-atofti,catr
the United States and the Soviet Un.lon are, the only, nuoclear-lde)velop theweapon States that can be relied upon so far to-,technology of the peaceful application of nucle3areplins
Although Fran~ce has started a programme in this field, it isstill in a very embryonic stage. If France establishes itself
as a potential supplier in this domý,ain, there is nothing in
the NPFT which would deprive any Party to it from benefitingfrom France's contribution (in case it continues not to be a
Party to the Treaty) provided that due respect c-f the relevant
provisions of the NPT is assured.
The United States in all the -phases of NPT negotiations
had identified itself as a future supplier of peaceful nuclear
explosion services. The Soviets, although defending the merits
and benefits of Article V in the course of those negotiations,for the first time publicly acknowledged that they visualise
themselves as sup*~pliers of such services on an international
basis at thie firstin April 1969. 60
60

Hern158.

US/Soviet experts' meeting held in

Srie,P,15,

Nulalxlso

405

pp.

Vienna145n

eoe had n1o iýntereýSt ýinetoe
o ecfu nular expLOsIonIs. It is:,venturingtýe-.
~ "rnobJeCtion to the" article
th
~ ae
~
~ hti
~
o es
T

n

s

oedby fvexico in Septembuer -1967 AccordingL to
gap ofths r-t-i_cle, the oblig-ation to p,rovide
ar e p osion sevosWas incumbent on tte unpI'l~l 111lloc
61
Stateýs Party t the trealty.T The, t1k representatcl_a -weL-laon,1
ivetj thle ETMDO hadl the fol-Lowing to say"irThe ge,'ography and popuýlation de,:nsity of GreaLt Britaai mak")e it, uncerltaAin whetheur Peaceful nuclear'exp"Losvi es wi_11 be an, ind-ustrialyufltehi
islands in the, foresueeable future.
qu-Le in1o'Ur own11
Weoav not so far puLrsued any extensive progfraxemne
in a posItiton -toiný this fil,and arle simpldy not-lbeniefits of
th-e.
for
facilities
andmeanosmfak--e theý_peaceful nuclear exýplosions a-Vailable to-thrs
lanWe should therefore have difficulty with aýnywhh sprptie~r

the Mexican
guage such as that proposed in ...
amendment..
(it) could be interpreted as..In our view, ...
a peaceobliging nuclear-weapon States to develop the beforserviceandful explosives technology
the Wsire
nef it of ethers even if they had neither
service."asuchdeveloptonor the resources
Article V was
The objection was well taken and ever sinceof 18 January
first submitted in the identical treaty drafts
take appropriate
1968, the obligation "to co-operate" or "toHowever, the UK
measres remained incumbent on each Party.
the unlikelihood
representative at the ENDC, while restatingof peaceful exthat his country would develop the technology
its contribution
plosions, pointed out that the UK will makedevelop the technounder the terms of the article if it should63
logy.
the Nuclear-Weapon
Supplier States, however, are not merely
also those States
States able to offer explosive services but

62

1,
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Docs. DC/230 and Add,.
IV-A.
Article1967),
Sept.
19
Ann. IV, Sec. 12 (ENDC/196,
BNDCO/PV. 557, 10 Oct. 1967, paras. 45-46.

63

ENIDC/PV. 358, 25 Jan. 1968, para. 22.

61

406

able to offer ancillary PNE project services ot,her tlhan nuclea
explosive related servi-ces, such- as pre- feý-as ibilitýy or feasibility studies including technical, health" and safety assess,ments,.
This new category of States can be called "Consuiltant'States". The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, is oneof the first States to have shown grecat interest i.n providing
PNE ancillary PNE project services. A Ge.riran fi_rm, ad been
involved in studiýes related to the Qattara project in Egypt
referred to earlier. Moreover, ancillary services can also be
provided by an international Agency such as the IAEA, as, will
be shown below.
Art,icle V stipuLlate.s thlat "potenýttial be_ýne-fits,_ fromi anMy
pe5aceful appiialations of nucle:,ar e_xp)losions w,,ill be mlade, ava.ilable to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty...'Three pertinent questions arise here. What about t-he ncer
weapon States at present not in a position to be a supplierState such as the United Kingdom ? Secondly, what about the
non-parties to the NTT ? Are they to be denied altogether the
potential benefits of the new technology ? And thirdly, whichareas of the world will be able to avail themselves of thisnew technology ?
The non-nnclqar-weapon States are specifically mentioned
in Article V for the very simple reason that this article wasdrafted as 4 compensatory measure for having renoun.ced the production of all nuqclar explosive devices. However, there is nothing to prevent a State such as the UY enjoying the status ofa beneficiary with regard to the application of Article V. This
would even reinforce the regime established for this)urposeincluding the institution of "appropriate internatiorm1 observation" ensuring that the peaceful applications are carried out
in accordance with the declared purposes. For this reason any
future co-operation between the two super-Powers in the fieldof actual applications should also come, in our view, within
the scope of Article V.

407

At t,h e ENDtena1ueton-

tn
hebecftable~~~

wa

rpoe

bepe

y Swqedten iin FebruLary

ettito beumde avail1Lhl[tats"I in Sp[it~to alle.hshppeneod
irg

menmens amed at keeping(,
openi Jthe optiiLn to conlud mre Spc,,if-ically a comprehensive"
ban treU at;y a a spIe'C,ialagrCI'1'eetent o_n p eaceful nuLclear exte
6
pl uin wihu hain to nend the, WT at a futuire, date.
at
ws prtmentn

As; thLoseý
procedures"

f asetofcies

re cLoS'ely related to thle "ap)propriate

referrto din Artice-t V, as,wel

as wihtechan-

their discus;sion wil take place under thethird and fourth parts of this chapter respectively.

nels of supplies,

Parties
If we turn now to the second question of whether
benefits
to the NPFT alone have the right to enjoy the potential
simpleof peaceful nuclear explosions, the answer is much lessa greatthan the preceding one and it would. affect this timenumber of countries.
should be recalled that in analysing Article IV of the
coNPT, we recahed the conclusion, not without nuances, that
theoperation in contributing to the further development ofItnotapplications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes islimited to -the Parties alone. This being the general principle
to be followed, it remains to be found out whether the provisions of Article V are in conformity with this principle orwhethcr t,hey constitute an exception to it.
64

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Doos. IDC/230 and Add. 1,
Ann. IV, Sec. 732 (ENIDC/216, 15 Feb. 1968) and ENDC/PV. 564,
15 Feb. 1968, para, 9.

65

ENDC/PV, 369% 22 Feb. 1968, para. 52,
ENDC/PV. 364. 15 Feb. 1968, para. 7.

66

408

ý
am thea' t'tiAat Artio

The1fiuLty etrlanteI

ftsn'~

iLUly inýrela,tio

therawriOf
~~,I
theit
TA EA

t1jo the,, etablIýishetwti

an itraionaii,eývoketd inl theý ilas-t parof thiconjunc
iit io -3)itw
Aril

V of the NIT

estabishýing aservic

States and theic Sovie
t4y iswihi

Unioquiite explicit in

at

chptr

thet frLr

hodtotesricefrpa

b!t ithmenIme

In fatthe ideVo

oft theLlAA haposiiot-hat ý it cl-ealy provi_des

ha

tetra

that tLheonnuclear-weapon States Parýties to the Treaty would benefit fo
the Peaceful applications of nuclear epoin.67Thesa
blisliment ofL an international service for such applLications
within the framework of the IAEA islooked upon by both,well as by other countries,

inof Article V of the NPT.,6

For this reason among others,asthe context of the application

it wasnot possible for these countries to support the UIN General Assembly resolution adopted at its-twenty-third sessiLon in 1968

requesting the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on theestablishment of such an international service,a resolution

which made no reference at all to Article V of the NPT or to
the Treaty itself, 69Some countries, such as the Soviet Uniion-

5 (pama.

59.

67

UN Doo. A/7678,

68

ibid., PP. 36 and 59. This point will be further deve-loped
under the fourth part of this chapter.

69

GA Res. 2456C (XXIII),(A/72l8), p. 14.

29 Sept. 1969,

20 Dece,

409

pp.

1968.

11),

36 andGAOR, Suppi.N.1

an

wit

itX
teinhohaa conrt,voedag~nt

so

signe

thd
th

hle o)ther

PT

merey

t-he supJprovde

uli fied statement is of gratb signficnce assoul be g V,Ive tO nucl0-1ear-weap[onriniaetha prortade.)TIs
it(-teaIosi Februq,ary 19)69i th qest
on Foegwth
ionwasbroghtup y itsý ChaiLan SenatorIFubigt-eadrof, a ha-i
fo th cntcioil
to1
"Pojr
respectcC
Nr. Talinite nort h wsenpart.of Westrn Asrlabourlodd" to chnoose a counlittlebright wondered if it was nt"asigned it on 27 Feb.
try that has not signed the NPT (it only
be favoured.
1970) while there are other countries that couldof the US Atomic
The clarification given by the then Chairman
the Australian project
Energy Commission, Dr. Seaborg, was that
nuclear explosions
was not an actual application of peacefulwhich conformed to
but was a research and development project
an experiment
AEC's own -Programatic interests, and replaced
72
done elsewhere.
that it would have otherwisea large number
A sccoiad position, reflecting the views of
an internationalof coulitrics, led by Muxico, upholds that once
been establishedservice for )eacefail nuclear explosions has
benefits ofwithd-in tlie frameiiork of the IAEA, the potentialýComitenate

see'70 For the results of the vote in the First Commcittee,
66-70. Among

71

A,/C.1/PV. 1643 (Prov.), 1-7 Dec. 1-968, pp.
those who had voted against or aIbstain ed.,adhdmd
United Kingtheir positions clear orl thi.s point, were theand 71 res36-37
33,
dom, Canada and -the UAR. Ibid., PP.
pectively.
75
I-earin-s on Peaceful Nucltear Explosion Services, pp.

7?

Hearinv-s

on NTIT 96-,

pp.- 317 aýnd 328.

410'

the Pakitie

hihoshould be maue avnAnkinsuch wxp1uwosion

to tW

NPT us well an to w1i those who have rnwounced the qacuiaitl ow
oC nuovear ouapoans. The riniumciaition &hould be cepictAo 7
binin

ýLti!POatera
1nso
a mu1

by m

dAwAnration],bymansof a uniUatoraK
Ne XiCO , indOcUMent SUMitted

a. wUOTirkn

of Nuclear Explosions.."
expesIoto thWConferenCeW
l Proglnmme

LnSatas on nanIneatoof No-GlerWa
prv=sion

no.V"Ha"t Me PQ,
ag"reemen,pn

had pre!t rred the use of th ecxnuclear weapons" to the

VWtats which have renoncdha

KPartpieos to theu NPT%. The
Stae"nlon-nuclear-weapona!pOWhichfoluner expression PHgljoduSate

are Parties to the HUTor to the Treaty of T1ate1oco,

or wnich had entered into an,yother syecial or regional agemnt

for the prohibitLion oF nu-

clear weapons inplained,their respective

for example,

terri toriesu,-1iexio

had ex-that the Treaty of TWaeOu.co had goneeven further than the RPT, since its object was to ensure thetotal absence of nuclear weapons. Mexico had also pointed out.
that the international contractual instrument should provide
for an international control system which was at least as ef-,76
fective as, or more effective than, that provided in the NPT.
This second position was very much inline with the final

agenda of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In contrast with sub-items 14 (a) and (b of the agenda on peacefuluses of nuclear energy, the provisions of which applied to all
States in general, sub-item 14 (d) on peaceful nuclear explos-

73
74
75
76

UN Doc. A/7678, 29 SepL. 1969, p. 21 (Jamaica).
A/C.I/PV. 1629 (prey.), 4 Dee. 1968, pp. 23-26 (Pakistan).
A/CQLNF.35/C.2/SR.10, 18 Sept. 1968, p. 109 (Canada).
See Mexico, "International Programme of Nuclear Explosionsfor Peaceful Purposes for the Benefit of States Which Have
Re,no-unced Nuulear Weapons", Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Geneva, 1968 (A/CONF.35/Doc. 15, 22 Aug. 1968),
p. 5 and Ann. I, p. 1, hereinafter cited as "Interrational
Prog'ramme of Nuclear Explosions". See also TIN Dor. A/7678,
29 Sept. 1969, pp. 26-27.

411

ous
me

tnr- weapon Statc
on d'"non-no Qe
-Vo
~0qi

toal-N'cal
AtLh
iej
krw

1od

a~t
ad usea or

hoavae renounced

nuclaea

wecapons pursuant

itLarnalional agca"meHL or agreewento
and last POKKtOn isboy Baýil andQndia.

77."

upheld by a numer of coua-The

consider tha

the benefits

posions should be made available to all
ux1edStatesember od tie IAEA whethae they are Parties to the NPTo- membership do the JAEA, which was esV&ac
nt' TVhe iJMor p ace

O

A

acH

whc

u&wn

tablished to pomooto the peAace*ul uses of nuclear energy, onthe peacefrul appli cations,
tit len every membpnV to beeit faCLromw
ent of an Jnof n ulc ,av oiplsuioun . Th,nvefov , thKe- abi
teriational service within the framework of the LAEA should be8
members: of that organizsati on]R
totheH benefi of al Ltatesbiasil, which wouQld have benefitted from the position talen
by Kneicou a4d others (being a signatory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco), had persisted, however, that an 1AEA service should
be enjoyed by all members of the organization on a non-discriminatory basis with no conditions attached other than a4equate
control and supervision by the Agency of the execution of the
projects, lIt referred to several Articles of IAEA Statute including Article XI on Agency projects. It also pointed out thatthat position would render possible the co-operation between anuclear and a non-nuclear-weapon State non-Parties to the NPTwith the application of appropriate TAEA safeguards.
The B3razilian Government,inconsistency with. its previous-

ly known positions, went to the extent of stating that the benefits from the "service" should not preclude the right to manufacture and detonate - either by its own means or throughagreements with other nations whether nuclear or non-nuclear
77
78

Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon
States (A/CONTF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Ann, III, pp. 1-2.
For example, see A/C.1/PV. 1572, 22 May 1968, para. 11(Zambia) and A/CONF.35/SR.13, 17 Sept. 1968, p. 174(India).

412-

ao duly

PusataeaRpef"I pur asýsunder adequate control andnnen~oa
upwiviolon. As

arnuclear explosio'ns

as Aric Le V of' the NUTi aonocerned and toe moda aiit ie

apo toapplication such as the "special intwrynWtual u;ivwmenk" andthe "international body", these were matters, in tbe PraviJi al.
view, which only concerned Parties aothe NTT but whiph should
not affect the rights of other nmembes of the KAEA under isItismainly becapuse of thido latte

cut tHaBrazil
narionand many other countries including India absaiuned on a 11 Up
neral Asoembly resolution adopted at its 24th senssion in 1461M
The resolution
servi7tce"

in their' opinion confused the "intrnational

andte impnlementation of Article V of the NPT.

80

The conclusion that we can arrive at is that the pvovisionn,of Article V, including the specific modalitieVis of its app1ication, can neither be invoked against the non-PartieS To the
NPT nor can they be resorted to for their benefit. This is afundamental legal rule.
On the other hand, it would seem quite legitimste to saythat third parties can obtain the benefits of peaceful uuclear'
explosions outside the framework of the N2T, under conditionsprescribed by the suppliers and the recipients. It should. berecalled, however, that Article V was introduced to compensate
those who had renounced the production and acquisition of all
nuclear explosive devices. Mvoreover, the idea of establishingan international service within the framework of the IAEA might
not have occurred if it were not for the SPT and the eventual
imnplementation of Article V.
7980

See UN Doc. A/7678, 29 Sept. 1969, pp. 9-10; UN Doc. A/7678/
Add. 2, 7 Noy. 1969, p. 7; and A/C.1/PV. 1692 (prov.), 18
Nov. 1969, pp, 31-37.
GA Resolution 2605B (XiXIV), 16 Dec. 1969, GAOR, Suppl, NW,,
30 (A/7630), p. 20. The resolution was adopted by 80 votesý
in favour, one against (Kenya) and 37 abstentions. For the,tdiscussions of the draft resolution in the First C
see A/C.l/PV, 1718 (prov.), 10 DWc. 1969,413

on allw!
gt

to bon

it

0
roCcd
ro

of1aan inentoal legal

by meannncea

ffu ,xl
loil es,alncouiraget- a lalol
PiEA,To
1Aron hi thrQeo countI J'es to :onfformn tuo a, nonanprojliýferation
0einbTo saytha onily Pristo theC TIPT,,ep
esoitc,-;widelyline
vould, on the
xpoin
bene itCfromj pecflnula
wouldas, B.,ra'zil toconris suchc-J- 1
enorg heitn
cotay
Ipr,oducin theýjir ownj nulclearexls
d,ffollW one, da,y the paththat, migh'jt
ith al the ptnial dagru conseuencs
ives

if It iso'dtFor) those coutreswh

have notA

recnounced nui-clear weapons
it would btý rather diffi-

or- other nuclear explosive devices,peaceful nuclear excult to argue in their favour unless theas part of a pusplosives are made available for their benefit
them from productamned non-proliferati'Lon policy to dissuade
such as the case might
ing the explosives by their own means,difficulties for Brabe with a displeased Brazil(technologicalif this should
should not be underestimated). However,ziltheir adherence into
take place, parties to the NPT might callbe established toquestion, Nuances in treatment could thenCharges for the nuclear
appease or avoid any misapprehensions.
on a different
explosives used, for example, can be establishedThe main preoccupation
criterion than the one under Article VT.
always be to satisfyof thie supplier States, however, should
non-proliferation
the needs of those who hamý, adhered to theto the NPT.
regime and more particularly the Parties
very much inSome of these considerations were apparently
the 1975 NPT
the minds of the Parties to the NPT attending
In its Final Declaration, the Conference
Review Conference.
Article V to theafter it had confirmed the provisions ofthat any potential
benefit of the Parties to the NPT, noted
non-nuclear-.weapon
benefits could also be made available to414

x"plooTflereaty by wýay" o nuIC ,el"aservices provided by nuftclearý-weap,on StatEes aIs Ielme by thenentoaobTrýeaty, and conduicted un1-der the aprpit
1lservat-ion and, inter-national proceduý,res clled( fLor in' A

Stat.es not party

toý thebgand in accordance wJthi other applica,ble internat,ioa
The confe,rence consideredJ it '_imiperati_Jve that accestIo ns.
potential benefits of "N"Es not, lead to3 any poieaino
clear explosive capability,toun
upypstonte exception of tepeeeta
pý,ref'erential ch)arges for, the explosives fo'r nnncerwao
States Parties to th,,e NFT, the IAEA Ad Hoc Adý,vi,sory G"roup on
PNEs is also in favor,ý, that ilnternatcional aragmnsin providing PNEs be the same fLor all- non-nuclear-weapon St-at-es,
Wit

In extending the potential benefits of PNFs to non-par-ti`es,5
the nuclear-weapon States must have come to realize t,hat tne.i.
previous positions denying PNEs to non-parties would not be
helpful in containing the spread of indigenous nuclear cap,abilities. They hoped that such a shift in their attitude might
dissuade certain States from taking an independent course without the blessing and control of an international regime.
Although the declaration of the NPT Review Conference inthis respect has generally been well received by non-parties,
India was the first to disagree with the view that peaceful
nuclear explosions should not be permitted outside the frameIt held that if such a view were
work of Article V of the NPT.
accepted, it would mean the establishment of the monopoly of
nuclear-weapon States in peaceful nuclear explosions technology
for all time to come. The declaration of the NPT Review Conference also appeared not to be an inducement to Pakistan whichis reported to be on the verge of exploding in the course of ayear or two a nuclear device using enriched uranium produced
indigenously by a gas-centrifuge facility that Pakistan has
managed to assemble by itself.
Turning now to the last question pertaining to the areasof the world which.might avail themselves of the peacefuli ap

415

i:~~

uc

spars

Vn
ye

itsufiestozytht

areanbviininely.-)nlyAcI

ma=,edSpopulatfdevelopmento

at madelot

oT ot) !intenid
tp
Uo
poLbe

LL
, tInlwhch IsLo
sve

mal oIr wl-W

whi

weto~

~

~
~ epoonr

S

I10 !1-of-es,1opin

ALen

couvtra-iecs

onmost efficientes
etmthess oog

pviltemsele

Afiafford h
cctan
theifrhr explogita1ien
suc f esseor a er
h faaaiyt(omryUR
requis4tEs
nraigwtrrsucs

escience and tehnolog

hioutie,dr dneepeed piailoncyneea
rsucessary
82adflthei
nteAhpreaadoidom.frmnt
applications.nldn
feerasilndismtimes portepred roug
andcavetnevelsninmiigcountriedgs,siuareiontrse

theesotimnates of thoe nes
furthwethern-eexpotation

6 and India in copper exMladag.ascar in harbour construction;87
the Indian territory.
inareas
severalfromtractionp. 4.5.
81 Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, loc.cit.,
Explosives" in Barnaby
82 D.R. Inglis, "Civil Uses of Nuclear
Weal2ons, P. 87.
Nuclearof
Spreadthe(Ed.), Preventinpp. 98-99 (Bolivia) and
85 A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.9, 17 Sept. 1968,
was seriously conp. 102 (South Africa). Bolivia, however,cerned about safety hazards,
p. 106. However, Canada
84 A/CONF,35/C.2/SR.10, 18 Sept. 1-968,
in thisexperiments
was waiting for the results of US
field.
p. 126; Peaceful. U.ses
85 A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.12, 20 Sept. 1-968,
preof.tomc ELjýy,Vol. 7, pp. 233-242; and the paper
exnuclearpeacefulsented by Egypt to the third panel on(PL/388-3/2).
plosions in Vienna 1972
Dr. Ekiund, at
86' Statement of Director-General of the IREA,
A/PV.1979
Assembly.
Generalthe 26th session of the UN
12.
p.
1.971,
Nov.
(prov.), 8
pp. 9-10.
(I),
87 Peceu

416-

(thIar-advanced nnncerwao

theli r iniit _!re'E3tthttsaeofein thei: fieL d opea_tce uanuclea

stuý'1y of thir1
phenomenlogy, theC,irI

anýd tlhe stuidy of thle ara
out,lIne p,Os,ons.

,cJ mologic
ý1ol

CeC L

mnsto be)1
mlad. forI

lhrusetkIn

these dOm1aJins ,C,,especioa]Ly w Ith1recIt, to ZaIrill

Un110er Art-cLO-e V of the! 18ý Januar11ýy 198C'tcl

contraoIlt('eatieacth party to the,, tre'at-y woull_d havet1d(1rt'a-Ien1

diraftst,
opeýraljte"

toec-nsiAre theý potenitial, benefitscc.

Anaystco-operate"l was a vag-ue onet_.

obs1vedIt"to,( co-8

lhoiave;
cOii:(ented onl thLre,_aty draf

finial formulatý:iolnhaveý rigtl

to

L~
oe.

s

Ohat aý_obligation "towIas poýinGted ouit thatý

Lthe obl i--gation need not enitail a positive obligationý oni thetarof,uclear-Weapon States to. make available the explos3ives, simply uoppan request and after a project had beea found to be a sound90
one. oAt the 22nd resumed session of the UN General Assembly in1968 where the treaty draft was finally formulated, the obligation "to co-operate" was criticized by several countries.
India, for example, noted that "there is no binding commitment
or a positive juridical obligation to provide the assistancesince the undertaking is only to co-operate."191
Upon a suggestion made by Mexico that each party to the NPT"undertakes to adopt the pertinent measures to ensure" the potential benefits, 92the final treaty draft now reads ;"Each88

Ibid., p. 15.

89

See Appendix 3-E.

90

See Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, op-cit., P. 41.

91

A/C.1/PV. 1567 (prov. ), 14 Nay 1968, p. 72. See also,,
PV. 1572, 22 May 1968, para. 81 (Argentina).
A/C.1/PV. 1569 (pray.), 16 May 1968, p. 351.

92

A/IC.1/

toý
Party

Tý ealy undrt

1e tak e_L-'to)e1measures to,1,cihoth15Jaiuary treatly draf'tthereenat.
Upot~~~~
Ar.that,ot
NIDO poite
re rsenttiv aith
Unit~Jta

1arly upoDthpesenltation Ofth
Simil1
peCfu purýposes.
in theý FirstG
inal ndrato''a16,teU relpresentat iveýout that lltheý newCoite of th Gena Asse mbly poin_2ted
9
SUCh
P,Lic Itl1y and emfphaticaLlly."inds theýIpa-rte exSt
-wgug'morthemnreýndertostaemnt nL~ to be conrete in ordeýr
doing so, attentuiILi on1 should be, drawn toby the US Atomnic Enerthe ollowringL commeý:nts on Article2 V madedelivered at he(arings heldgy Commission (AEC) in a statement
on Atomicý Energy:
in 19'70 by the Congress Joint Committee
no explicit sta"Trhe language of Article V contains
mea'appropZriate
tement as to what constitutes
bewill
benefitssures to ensure' that potentia]lspeforthsetV
made available; nor does Articleof anycific obligations regarding the development explosnuclearofapplication
particular peacefulleWg ofions; nor does it specify any particulardevelopment."
effort or tixme scale for suchmenigfl.Bt before',

Chairman of the AEC
In an earlier statement made by the
US Senate Committee on
during the hearings on the NPT in theon the obligations
Foreign Relations, Dr. Seaborg elaborated
Article V. He said:
the United States would assume under
to be feas"When particular applications are foundservicenuclear-explosionaible, we. plan to makeusers
domeptic
tobasis
commercialaavailable on
Nonpz'olithe
and to non-nuclear-weapon parties toinclude theferation Treaty. Such a service would93

See Appendix 3-G.

94

ENDC/PV. 357,

95
96

18 Jan. 1968, para. 62.
p. 78.
A/C.1/PV. 1577 (prey.), 31 May 1968,

Hearin,,sp. 628.

on AEC

Autho,rizing

418

LegiLslation

1971 (Part 2),

f,abricati'on of the nuclar expo3iv devýce, iýts,traspotatonf-rom the asebyplanit to tGhe project site', its emplacemejlnt at the pkpr" ~solhe srcan)d its arming, and,J fiin.
include appropri,ateý tcohnical eiw of the p)reto helthý1
pa-red detonaýjilon, suchi astoserlt
and safety,"
The foreign u,sers of tlheerics on t'he oth"r h1And, weidok
thý1 Xý
1,,e11
to faciite
have to tak-e local appropriateoesue
cuti-'on of the project, They wiould aLso pyfor the ser,viceý in"accordance wit-h rates e-stabl.1ished fCor its, var,iouslementItis icnevbeto 1have,epete

Article, V to speJ1 outspýecif_i c obl]-igcations regarding the- development of aniy p arti-cular application. The -tech.nology, asý it has been demonstrated in
the first part of this chapter, is still in the_- rese,iarch andidevelopment stage. Nuclear-weapon States at thp time of' 'theformulation of the NPT were still exploring all possibilities
including natural resource exploitation whichi seems lately tohave received high priority by both the United States and theo
Soviet Union.
The use of the phrase '12otential benefits from An_y peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" (emphasis added.) indicates, amoong other things, that the choice of specific applications has not been made due to the fact that the technology itself is not yet feasible.
"Potential benefits" has been interpreted with scepticism
to mean "anything from hurricane or weather control, new insights into the dynamics of earthquaakes and crater formation,
to new findings of soil mechanics, seismology, meteorology,
radiobiology and thermodynamics, none of which would necessarily entail the application of a nuclear explosive in a non-nuclear-weapon,,country."19 9 (Emphasis added.)

97

Report on,NPT, 1969, p. 9.

98

Ibid

99

Keller, IBolliger and Kalff, loc.cit., p. 4-1.

419

however,Th flexibytty of the -tei "potential benefits",
aPPlica-is or rreat utility as it c,n not only cover actual
also all sorts oftions, which is the 0timate objective, butof information re-uHMulseenti ic and. technological exchangeof those pertaining,late to peaceful nuclear explosives, shortfor example, suggested.
to dowiKn an fabrcoation. When Nigeria,
facilities for scenthat nuclear-weapona States should. provide
to collaborate with theirtists from non-nuclear-weapon States
0 0 the United.
devices, 1scientist working on nuclear explosivewith the former scienStates expressed its readiness to sharet-ch-nology of applications. 101 Ths
tists inomt ononGheoccasions and. technicalwillingness had been expressed. on many
to non-nuclearassistance was promised to be made available
peaceful applicaweapon States seeking the study of specifictions. 102

US State Department
However, it was pointed out by both thethe negotiating record
and the Atomic Energy Commission that
V contemplated. the perof the NPT made it clear that Article
services only for deveformance of peaceful nuclear explosions 103
The Treaty thereloped_aEplicatioas on a commercial basis.
the nuclear-weapon Statesfore did not impose an obligation10 on
4abroad.
to carry out fexygeriments
sustained and
The two super-Powers were expected to make
57. Nigeria introduced
100 ENDC/PV. 327, 51 Aug. 1967, para.
this effect but whichtoan article including a provisionand 1968, Does.
1967
for
Suppl.
was later dropped. DCOR,(ENDC/202, 2 Nov.
DC/230 and Add. 1, Ann. IV, Sec . 18
1967), Article IV-A (third paragraph).
18. See also ENDC/PV.
101 ENDC/PV. 330, 14 Sept. 1967, para.
(UK).
557, 10 Oct. 1967, para. 47
p. 104 (AEC Chair102 For example, see Hearings_on NPT,_1968,
man Seaborg).
of the Chairman of
105 Hearings on NPT,_19269, P. 527 (Letter
Committee on Fothe AEC to the Chairman of the US Senate
reign Relations).
onand. Hearings
104 See Ibid., P.-528 (AEC Chairman Seaborg)
86.
p.
of_NPT,
MiiQVryj_Iyplications

420

vigrorons_, e:ýffortstoLO1CeeaC0(:.h alnId d.evelop ll fesilap1
tions of peaceful- nucle,areplsn.Smworshaevn
benexpre.ssed by laigmmr
h
SCnrs
on
o
miitteeýo on AGomic Ene-rgy aboutý Lthe sl,owniess- of theu "Plosaeprorame hich wouild haprthec United StL, es f omýli!vingq, upý0
to its treaty o1b1ig,ations3 unde,r Artcl
L,
Those worriesý
have been met by offi'cial asuasOf conlt11ued 3And inlcreaselld
involvc,fement in activilties ,a_-ssociaLted w"ith wrigotdtie
arrangments

One ledn

energy has eveni expressedthseilst in, thle fedofnula
prtnetiethatl ifncla

be hýaltLed one, day, ncerwao
States; will still hiave_ to- mraintain. anid perhapS refin
nuclear explosives expe,,_rti,_se:.07
we,_aponsý_,'poutnweeto

otheiIII. The Mvodalities
The obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure thepotential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions has to comply with certain rules of conduct, According to the provisions of Article V of the NPT, the potential
benefits provided, whether they entail actual applications or
not, have to be in accordance with the Treaty and to cause nodiscrimination. The charges for the explosive devices usedshould be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Moreover, the applications should be
carried out uinder appropriate international observation and1015

For example, see Hearings on AEC Authorizing,Legislation
1970 (Part 1), p. 309 (Representative Hosmer).

106

US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Rearmngs
AEC Authorizing Legislation. Fiscal Year_1972 (Part 4
92nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.
UIS Gfove,rnment Printing Office, 1971), p. 2320.

107

Arnold Kramish, "The Proliferationi of N,ucýlearWepn"iCyril E. Black and. Richard A. Falk,. (Eds), hefututre ofInternational Legal Order (VolI. 1TI) .Conflict
14n mn(PrInlcbtop, N.-J.
Princet on U,niversit'uy Pr-es.s,p 191TY

p. 258.
421

6inte natiioai p_rocedaures

ip
IqropIate

pat, 1hrCor,t aIt, we prqlopoe 1thesus

lIJtLy withi Trea,ty,, piovisionts, nndsriiain
tlt_, xlsvei~,uentoa

Arcticle V

iit wathvilbiyof

onlo

comipatibi-L
chargeýs for

obs,_-ervation and interna-

formLated duoring- the 2_2nd re-.

fýiinally1ý

ui As~sionof the UNý Coe
timte tha,,t t.heblgaio

It is,un11der thisalA,ssembly provided for the firstto tajke, appropri-ate measu,res tothl'e potentiýal

ancwth this TreatIy ". IThisý
10 8
gest_ý'ýior made by Mexico.

ensureb)ene(fi_ts sh,ould be "inl accord~-

was donie in compliance with a sugý-The addition of the words "in accordance with this Treaty!'
should in essence be taken to mean that the undertaking to makeavailable the nuclear explosives or any information relating
to them should be in conformity with Articles I and II of the
NIPT. It means that neither can the explosives be transferred
to non-nuclear-weapon States nor can any information pertaining to their design and fabrication be divulged. Although theaddition may seem superfluous, it could be considered a useful
one in the light of the objections raised by some countries
such as Brazil and India to Articles I and II.
2. Non-Discrimination
The principle of non-discrimination has been recognised
since the presentation of the first identical treaty drafts of
24 August 1967. It is also included in Article IV of the NPT
as previously indicated.
BoLth the UOni.ted States and the Soviet Union have tried todisipteany fears of discrimination. They pointed out thattheavailability of the benefits either on a bilateral basis

108A/.l/V.1569 hprov.), 16 May 1968, P. 31. Mexico sug-gested-ýc

theladdiitionl of "in422

conformity with the Treaty".

or through an internatLional b)ody wit-h adqutof 1101-1-1tclen.r-weapoln State's w,as a gaateo
ation .

rpentatJ
o-ici

Secondly , ass urances weýre g)jýIven by Ijlthe
US that_there

would be no scar'city of devices once thle paeu
plcnbecamet -feasible. Nqon-discrimji.nation wouild Lilso ýmean that the,tcharges for the nuclea_r explosive devices for1 foreign
ýusrwounld -not be -'reat-er tlhian tjhose fo)r dom,iestýic u1ser-s. P5oreover,.
assuranc,es wueret 11made that the, availlabilitly of theexloiv
devices would not be subject to politica.l bargainingor), prý:essure ,0One of the coun--tries whdiich was par-ticul,ýarly setclabout
those assurances was South Africa. For, obv,ýious reaCtsons,it
representative to the UN explained that theirixerecewt
many international bodies showed that discriminati1on wseecs
ed ~- on political or other grounds-

to deprive certain-ebr

of rights to which they regarded themselves as legitimate-Ly entitled when originally they became parties.1 1
Mexico, in it:ý previously mentioned working document to theConference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States on an international
programme of peaceful nuclear explosions, stressed the non-interference of the States furnishing the services in the internal affairs of the beneficiaries. The services, in its view,should not be based upon or prompted by any political consideration. They should meet "the real needs of -the benefitting
1
Member in the opinion of that Member's G-overnment". ill
109

For example, see .ENDC/PV. 369, 22 Feb. 1968, paras. 4142 (United States) and A/C.1/PV. 1571 (prov.), 20 May
1968, p. 21 (USSR).

110

A/C.1/PV. 1571 (prov.), 20 May 1968, P. 56. Fears of pressures were evoked by Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, loc,cit_,
PP. 47-48 and Koop, loc.cit., p. 813.
Mexico, "International Programme of NuA,clear, Explosions",
Ann. I, P. 3 and Ann. II, Article 30o, Thne"Mme"rfred to iq the member of the prop,osed rgam.Mxc'
firstproposal for an article onl peaefuanclear e pbsoions in Septemberc 1967 pr-ovided! thaasistance-inth is,

111

4123

vi

hld ab)ove all moCaI tllat onc a sermao
No~-di'i
Al ther should be no,bjhe wiiY
Iho
bee
,

l

dis~m
atin aonglb

rouo~onananucexlov6

e

embrs

te,
If EAEA who have reniounced[eaons, andote
uiitonof nulaevesby,meý,ans of an internationLallgaa3.Chrgesfor, e'xlosive(evce
UiJte!d S tates putifrwýard! the geneural pri nc0ipl e.s
thencle ar e xplosioni s
L, pot1,enrit ial beneii)fij-ts of pea cefuiiY
whichi theupOn1
hias maintain-rled th-e view that thee ogaize,Jt
migt
Sne

fo
theexploive
chargsevic

susd shouL]-

be as l,ow as pos-This
sible and exclude aniy charge for research anid develruopment.
was clearly stated in treaty drafts ever since the presentationof the identical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967.
We mentioned in the first part of this chapter the potentfor
ial costs of certain nuclear explosive devices. it remains
us to examine the meaning of the lowest possible charge excluding research and development to be set for future beneficiar'ies.
thatConcern over this question was expressed in the debate
wastook place on the NIPT. The expression "as low as possible"
found to be a vague one. 13One country representative also
wondered to what extent "(the) price could be made to departfrom conformity with the well-known principle of the monopolistic price mechanism." 1 Sweden, for example, raised anotherpertinent question. The creation of the international company

112
113

field "shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations." DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does. DC/230
and Add. 1, Ann. IV, Sec. 12 (ENDC/196, 19 Sept. 1967),
Article IV-A (para. 2).
ENIDC/PV. 295, 21 Mar. 1967, para. 76,
A/C,1/PV. 1570 (prey.), 17 Mlay 1968, p. 22 (Tanzania).
1141\JC/P")64

17 Feb. 1968, para. 45 (Ethiopia).

424

QNobelpaso

encla

previously referred to inpart of thiO chapter,

the OirMt

was found to be hardly COVAnsistnt wit h

the promiseas that pea cefu I nuclear

MpLexpoions0' Servi ces Wouldbe made available on the basis of very low chaarges au a kindof tachnidoul assistancee. As tHe SwedIPh rePresentatve at the
ENDC put it, "(0)he profit inceNtive is evidently not eczHud5ed."i ýThe United SAtesn and the Soviet U1nio

have tried

sipate those worries. The formerls rersettiea

to diothe EN&Q

assured that the Pechanism for price setting wulnd not be thatof any monopolistic prince mechanism, J
The Soviet UN repr"sentative was even more outspoken. He interpreted the charges
def ined in

Article V a s makngitn"impossbl

f,ýýo;oiorany,,, nuclejar

power in any way to manipulate prices for the purpose of gaining a profit from the carrying out of peaceful explosions in
non-nuclear countries,.,117
This was an occasion for both countries,inparticular,

as well as Canada

to remind the non-nuclear-weapon States of theenormous costs they would incur i f they wore to venture intio
producing themselves the nuclear explosives. 18References weremade by the Canadian representative at the ENiDC to the reportof the UNt Seeretary General on the "Effects on the Possible Useof Nucelar Weapons. .. "

to demonstrate that the high costs forweapons production mentioned in that report could very wellstand for the costs of manufacturing other nuclear explosive
devices for peaceful purposes.19

115

ENDC/PV. 575,

116
117

ENDC/PV. 569, 22 Feb. 1968, para. 46.
A/C.1/PV. 1571 (prey.), 20 May 1968, pp. 21-22.

118

For example, see Ibid., p. 22 (USSR); ENDC/PA. 568, 21
Feb. 1968,' paras. 4-12 (Canada); and =0D/709, 22 Feb.
1968, para. 46 (United States).

119

Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear
epn.Prgah
44-49 and 52 as well as Ane
Vwere specifTicnAly refVrred to by the Canadianreesnaie

5 Mar. 1968, para. 16.

425

1ttethindvlpnweo

technýoloy

ofbut also -all the111

I
To be moreý
the bai teholg ofJnuclear
vide
Lo
1
reero,nIdvlomn~ the ~
~
exldn
~~
raon
specific,1
ML r iný
1
11mra'I
Stt Deprtencot
wer exlie in, at
tohelof inatermsjCC1

iperre (y f ar thLare part of whi7chk hasý inorthe, develiopmeunt of nuclearben
fac icured
we would have incurred
whic;hthoseofwapons),,irrespective of the treaty, for researchlHd development on nuclear explosive devices. "however, it was pointed out that the research and develo,Pwith thement costs exempted by Article V are those associatedwhich
initial development and design of the particular devices
thosewould become available for commercial purposes but notdewhich would be necessary in connection with the planning,
the besign and carrying out of a particular application for
nefit of a specific user.12
Both. domestic and foreign users of peaceful nuclear explosandions will be exempted on an equal footing from research120

For example, see E11DO/PV. 359, 25 Jan. 1-968, para. 35(United States). It was estimated that nuclear explosives
supplied by the super-Powers may cost as little as 350.000
dollars per megaton compared with a cost of about 50 million dollars per megaton if the receiving State had tobear the total cost of the research and development of thenuclear explosives. Barnaby (Ed.), PreventinZ the Spreadof Nuclear Weapons, p. 241.
on

121

Hearin-sb org)

1221

See .Hearirgs
andHeaings

NPT,' 1969, P. 312. See also P. 314 (Dr. Seaon Nuclear Explosion Services, pp. 66 and 147
o Military Implications of NPT, p. 120.

(426ýUSmallcntitute only aJJ10,incluAdin,
con'lteýMplated-L

an d posil

moin

loa

a

fatonftettottaeysreof eniern

inaiat.

cof prjet0t

aC

Mroe,i

a1

ehgc
ol
of
hre
,-t the intrm shdul
tiillalted" thaiInthian those_, chargeswhih uiltiaeywullvle"hehgand:tal charge,.s woutld deraeif th demanid becmelarge :WIfJ
vo
prjct
tm for- hadln comrca
prceursancsl
1
ed. ;6h
To alleviate further the burden of' theU hihcot'opeaceful applications of nuclear explosions, seerlreede
were suggested, in particular by Malta and Mexico,.Frto
all, it was suggested that the cost of the nuclear explosivebutb byý
devices shlould be laid down not by the supplier States
the basisa "Programme" established to -provide the services on
Secondof objective criteria and at the lowest possible level.
of transly the supplier States should bear the entire cos3t
benefitporting the explosive devices to the territory of theout ining States; the cost of the engineering work carriedaspreparation for the explosion; and of suach safety measures
States forcannot be adopted or implemented by the benefiting
Thirdlack of the necessary technical facilities or knowledge.
should bely, a special fund based on voluntary contributions
finance pro-established to help States which cannot afford to6
jects in their -territories.12
123
124

125
126

For example, see Hearings
p. 65.

on

Nuclear

Explosion

Services,

canal
Cost estimates for nuclear excavation of a sea-levelchargesthat
1965
across the Isthmus of Panama showed inroughly
for explosive and firing services would amount toWillrich),
S_,ecosts.
project
total
15 I)er cent of the
Non-Proliferation TEreaty, p. 140.
Serices, p, 41,
onNceas~.ion
HearisSee A/C.1/PV. 1575, 28 May 1968, paras. 29-0 (Mat)A/C.1/PV, 1630 (prov.), 5 Dec. 1968, pi 47(eic)/n

on thias.oar~~~~~_~ ~ ~ eveswudbproe
nuci~
edlso

epiosnfai'shagth

sevie

cot
il almtrls
the~~oilye deics

die~"loncl dinamong otheý ceeomnexposiv~onular

~

and
~

th

an

firin

thigs

xplosthfbicion of th
of thm,wol be bo-irne, by the fo--

H,17no- qet
TherC, was

use
reig

tso

'
Onofpro)vj'idighlEver since the United States proposed the general principies upon which the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions would be organised,12 it has maintained the view thatthe nuclear detonation should be performed under appropriate
international observation with the nuclear device remaining
under the custody and control of the State which performs theservice. In spite of the attention attached to this aspect byseveral members of the ENDC especially with regard to bilateralarrangem.ents,13 no provisions were included to that effect inany of the identical treaty drafts or in the joint draft submitted by the ENDC to the UN General Assembly at its twentysecond resumned session. It was upon a suggestion made by Mexicoin the First Committee of the Assembly,131 that the final provisions of Article V included the phrase "under appropriate
international observation".
Mexico, "International Programme of Nuclear Explosions"p, 6, Anni. I (PP. 3-4) and Ann. II (Articles 27, 28, 29,

54 and 35).
on IT,1ý969 , P. 514 (Dr.

Seaborg) .

1,27

Heaing128

Ibid., P. 511 (Mem.orandaar of US State Department).
ENDC/PV. 295, 21 Mar. 1967, para. 75.

129
150

For example, see ENDC/PV. 568,
(Canada).

151

AL/C- ,l/T; 1569 (prov. ),21 Feb. 1968, para. 14

16 May 1968,

P. 51,

tcle V was)Ii.wthin-,thuAecystehiaLo:

-y ,
ingl

Confr,ence of 1AA

the Genera

General and the B)oard to continu

tc Ompt, n'hrEkuse
stuie

thi

an

lea.l

ietp

iths

field.133 Moreover, the UN General Assemibly at0itsý twentyfourth session suggested that the Agency initiatestdeso
the character of the international observation in which i134

might engage p-ursuant to Article V.

A group of experts convened by the Director-General of IAEA
met in Vienna from 23 to 27 November 1970 to study -the question
1 3 5 which reof international observation. It produced a report
ceived preliminary consideration by the Board of IAEA in Fobruary 1971.13 The Board gave further consideration to the questMember
ion in the light of comments on the report received fromStates, and on 21 June 1972 finally adopted the guidelines fornuclear explosionis.13
the observation by the Agency of -peaceful
The document on guidelines "shiall be subject to review and may

132
133
134
135

136
1-37

IAEA Doc. GC (XIII)/410, 31 July 1969, para- 13(b). The
report is also annexed to UN Doe. A/7678, 29 Sept. 1969.
IAEA Doc. GO (X[Il)/RiES/258, 29 Sept. 1969.
GA Rcs. 2605 B(XXIV), 16 Dec. 1968. GAOR, 23rd Sass.,,
Suppl. No. 18 (A/7218).
The report was issued on 13 Jan. 1971 as a document of
the Board of Governors. it was circulated. to the membersof the Agency for official use only.
June _1 71 GCWI(X-V)/
10-0
u
IAEA, Annual Reot

4-55), para. 94.

Reot1Juy1971
IAEA, Ana480), para. 89. For the guidelines,
169, 16 Jan. 1973.

-

429,

30 Junesee IkLAN

1972," (GO(xvI)
Dc IKCI.

b Wlywfd

hy t

Bonrd OF joveOC01

in theLght of experi-

teckuology and ma-

aspapaiucerejo~Usince,jenc

th is on the basis of these guidelines and thedicson
thathadpreedethirý fo,rmulation that the examination of theintratioal observation is undertaben in some dcquestion of
efntioDnUo theP purposes of the obseryk
Ths ntil tetail,~
thevation

ircum

tace

entrusted with the task of

the role of the Agency
nobsrvathon as well as that of therequiring it,

and ry"eiving States, the character of observation,out theand finally the procedures to be followed in carrying
suple

observation.
(a)TePXpsZ2LGsrji
The main purpose of international observation, as it has
explosbeen recognized by all States, is'to make sure that theives used remain under the custody and control of the supplierStates so that no transfer may occur to non-nuclear-weapon"isStates. The Soviet Union has even stated that the purpose
explosions
to exclude the possibility of using peaceful nuclear
inas a means for non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain special 1 3 9
nuclear weapons."'
formation necessary for the production of
A second purpose, which has also been acknowledged by all
carStates, is to make sure that nuclear explosions are notried out for other than the declared purposes, i.e, for miliSwetary ends, It is for this reason that it was suggested byden, as will be shown below, that under a comprehensive testout
ban on nuclear weapon testing, nuclear explosions carried
Bubject
in territories of nuclear-weapon States should also be
to internation-al licensing.
In order to comply with this second purpose, a partial orcomplete declassification of the design of "Plowshare" devices

34.
P8 Iid,,para.
139 A/O,IV, 1577 (provi), 31 May 196B, pp, 68-70.

430'ýasheen &uagestod to improve the assurance thAt the detonatA,
n nut
ions are not being Used to advniane the stt-fth-r

Thix, however. WOUld undemine the flrct
purpose by furNshning Wrinnomtionk tha can be urod Or the
wepo0yclearMYproduction of nuclear weaonsnh.

Other in"mencany be tesOrted towithout divulging any informatnon whiA couK

WONtribu

eWt

the production of these weapons. InformatiVon cany be give"nhaoutK
for example, how much earth the explosive canu move, hOW Much21
Atitpoucesq or ILow larg amuch hrock it can cushA, huown
The specificatiop of the caracteristi oifccts makes it likely that the explosive deviuc has already,been tested, Eowever, information relevant to weaupomnsefc,
cavity it

makes.

for example, might be revealed duri~ng the proce6S ofmasrn
werand checking to sec that the effects of the application
instrathose intended. This could be controlled by keeping theformentation used to measure effects to the minimumwi necessary
a successful application.

1 41

A third purpose not related to armes control is environment
inprotection. As mentioned earlier, this is a major concern
imporany application. Many countries have attached primordialtance to safety moeasures.14
the group of experts which was convened to study
the question of international observaticon agreed that IAEA's
However,

140
141

142

Keep, loc-cit., P. 815.
of
Sep Kalkstein, op.cit., pp. 29-32. Dr. Ulf Ericsson
control.
onal
observati
Sweden suggests that internationalof co-operation in the study and use of peaceful nuclear
or
explosion effects should be able to prevent misuses
Question"The
Ericsson,misuses.
such
about
apprehensions
25. Dr.
of Nuolear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes", p. theunderestimate
to
seem
not
does
Ericsson, however,peaceproblems involved in preventing the misuse of thedeclared,
those
ful applications for purposes other thanDee, 19h,
For example, see A/C.1/PV. 1628 (prov.), 5
1969, p.,1
Sept.
Pp. 42-41 (Bolivia); UiN Doe. A/7678, 29
./
99
Ot
30
1,
A/7678/Add.
(Canada); and UN IDoc.
(Philippines).

spetsOf pea_ceful nu,clear expIDOe te su,bjiect, of thoroughstudy b
ituId
atD 1,Of P
Gudlns fo(Dr thie initernational
eefr, the~thny~~
address th-emselves to thi4S
jrainb
ono
gny
h
ob~ ~
competenýt Orgjanis ofLIhch has bee tae crobyte
isu
ion- wihteiterniati'onal Observation- car-IjE
in c~ntthe~ ou h ý'w othier purlýposes.
~~
riedncmlacewt
a ey
eath
n

o a~n

tat
leostteocviflitvrf

hebaicpurpose- of ntrntinal ob!hecus of Con uicting- a
ha,i

he
te,

ntetIad letterz

ofa.aLogous orovisionso)rare n)io-t -v-iLollzattl,eýd,"(NPT)
IndIof;thc"
in other internatGiona-L agreementsof Artcl

1 4 4 - (Emphasis

added.).

The verification would

8 (d) of the same doalso make sure, as stated in paragraphor explosions are carried
cument, "1(t)hat the nuclear explosion
purpose." 1145 The remainingout in accordance with the declaredas paragraphs 9 and 10
sub-paragraphas of paragraph 8 as wellscope of observation.
address themselves to the purpose andnecessary information
Paragraphi 9(d), for example, deals with1lJ
declared purpose of the projects.
theoutcarryingtorei-ati-n,(,Circ-umstances Requiring the Ob,servation
made for internaDue to the fact that no provisions wereof the NPT was fortional observation iLntil the final draft
negotiations, weremulated, some couatries, during the NPT
nuclear explossceptical. and evcn very much against providing
17The United States
ion sorvices through bilateral agreements.
international obserhas confirmied, however, that appropriate
nuclear explosions
vation shall be provided whether peaceful(b) The145

See note _135 alibove.
IAEA Doo. INFCIRC/169,
Ibid., p. 4.

146

Ibid.,

147

para. 9 andFor ex-ample, see ENDC/PV. 564, 15 Feb. 1968,
75'7, 5 MIar. 19)68, paras. 15-1.5 (Sweden).
EUIC/P

145
144

1-6 Jan. 1975, p.

2.

pp. 4-5.

I43ý2

b ilý t era'LL-Ly '

Yetý

thI

y onle wrter, m

sered

ti e- wodisi-i it,v ableo,b

onaeJateet

inecJae~ni
allow
,,I

A

h)e charnel.
1in wi k
hiow've,

Ion inI tile trea tment accordeý,d depeýitdl,] .id iffeurentLia_t i onl woulId bet

a
on

u

ct takn int accun botfl"
ýde taJIled arrangements1inoach proj
artiLCUlAr codtos perwtechn,1ologicual deeopetsad haICknwede by the)taJi nin to eachl case. ThiýjS fact ha bee
grou

exet

nrste
161f

Par-agraph 2-of thie IIA-LA

Lues1itstudyv of thew-i,,ii thl, thejonl

ocenonGudel1ines," sae

that"Obs;ervation is required where peaceful n,uclearie,
plosion services are carried out either(a) Through the Agency; or(b) Pursuant to bilateral agreements, in accordance with Article V of NPT or with provisions
in other internati?ýýl agreements, calling forsuch observation."
It is commendable to have given consideration to other international agreements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This
Treaty not only provides in its Articles 12 and 18 (paragraphs
2 and3) for TAEk observation and pertinent information relat-~1 5 2 but is also connected with the Agency
ing to this task,
through the 1972 agreement of co-operation between the latterand the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America (OPANAL).153

on NPT,.1968, P. 103 (Dr. Seaborg).

14-8

Heard-nas

149
150

Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty, P. 143.
See note 155 above.
IAEA Doc. INTFCIRC/169, 16 Jan. 1975, p. 2.

151
152

155

See Appendix 6. Argentina, for examople, would havebeein favour of a formula in the NPT similýar tothtoAr
ticle 18 of the Treaty of Tlateloico. AO1P.17,2
May l968, para. 80.
IAEA Doc. INTCIRC/25/Add. 4, 15De.192

433

n'other,' ilportan_tconcernstheileu

cie ono-uo

pont

relatinof apLica1tion
r-epo

to the croufllnc;
he1 wds
T Inmnspe

Itates .1in Articl

V, were in fact ai-m-,

h NPT with a fu1ture7, Oom'Prehesv ~tb
peaceful nuclear xposon
anda
treqt spcialagrementon
explosions, wherqwheureb)y any peacefutl app)[lication of nuclear
a inuclearve t aes p)lace, even if it is car ried, out by
not only toweapýon, SFtate onL its own ter-ritory, will be subject
IceSing b_internti,tiona L contGrol b-ut also -to internat-ional
not accepted bya.n inte-,rnational organ. 14The amendments werebe evoked later. Apthe two co-authors for reasons which will

ed aJt hpoisn

would be related toparently, then, international observation
States only. This wasprojects executed in non-nuclear-weaponby the US Congressconfirmed in the hearings held, for example,
nuclear explosJoint Committee on Atomic Energy on peacefulin its155
as well as by the IAEA document on "Guidelines"
ions
first paragraph referred to above.
concluded between
Unfortunately, the 1976 bilateral Treaty
on underground peaceful
the United States and the Soviet Union
to it while pronuclear explosions and the Protocol attached
for on-site
viding the establishment of bilateral procedures
and an extensive
access by observers with technical equipment
observation fordata exchange, do not provide for international
territories.
PNEs carried out by them in their respective
however, each Party
According to Article VII of the Treaty,
or assist in theundertakes not to carry out, participate
of anothercarrying out of any explosions in the territory
in itsState unless that State agrees to the implementation
contemplated byterritory of the international observation
Article V of the NPT.
154

DC/230 and Add.
See IDCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, IDocs.
ENDC/PV.
1968);
Feb.
13
1, Ann. IV, Sec. 32 (ENDC/216,
5 MYar, 1968,
373,
ENIDC/PV.
and
9;
para.
364, 13 Feb. 1968,
paras. 13-15.
onNuiclear Explosion Services, p. 75.
155Heaing

434

It

is hoped', however,,Li thainIu

pro jets1
reC arrL I *1,e ets_ý,the tercritlorles o)f iiuclea-r-weapon ýSt'-ates wul
be subje-.-ct to internat-ianal_ obseOrvat_ion. THIJs wudbe veory muchl
in line, with the principle of no-iciiainandi aga,inccorzdaniceranteeý that projects exctdare carietitd out'bj
cLarried ouzt inJwith their declared peaceful purposes- i-nler a c-omp_rehensi.ve
test-ban treaty.

Unite_-d 'States,- and theo
The pl1edg_,e made_ by Uhthe

United King-dom t'-o accepT- volun,tarily IAAsafeguarids on th-eir

peacef:Iul nuclear activities,

whichi will be evokeod lae'in

connexion With ArtiClE! i1i Of t-he NPT,

should be carriedrfur

ther and even strengthened by means of a legal conn,L',tmonlu wittl
regard to the peaceful applications of -nuclear explos,i,ons,(c) The Role of the Agencv and Other States
The question of entrusting the IAEA with the task of observation, whether or not in conformity with Article V of the
NPT, has raised no controversy. Likewise, the question of keeping the explosive under the custody and control of the nuclearweapon States was never questioned, especially since under Articles I and II of the NPT no transfer of the explosives cantake place even to an international organisation as previously
noted in Chapter 5. On the other hand, the non-nuclear-weapon
States benefiting from the services will have to contribute to
the successful outcome of the observation operation. Therefore,
an efficient and successful international observation cannot be
achieved without the co-operation of the -three parties.
The IAEA, in carrying out its function, would not have beenable to rely upon. Article III of the NPlT on safeguards. Suchreliance would entail the dissemination of information concerning design and manufacture of the explosive devices such as
the quantities of the special fissionable materials contatined
in

them.

This would be contrary to the objecti'ý,es- of -Articles(

6
I and II of the NPT. 15 Therefore,

156

specialgidlnswr

ACaswr1
See Hearings,on lilT,_1968,Qp
ions prepared by the Joint CmiteoAoic
staff).

435

oqet
Enlergyj'

ou
wor anincu~ inthIEk doen-hihin itLspa(I Coor an obe0,vaýItio agremen[t siýmilar tothI
ageemritpr-ovided1 for jlargrp 4 of Article~a ~a'5 reads as,- f'ollowSc_~ teNT
ntneopaarph
~t
~he
o~
p o 1

ragph

agLee
ed ~ ~
iow
this co cumentiScbe eonclua dF, ,ýjo t,
fr observation,ofiacranewt
aplcbepoiions~~
the Agen1LcY and theo Staite or

obiips4tou 7 of the IAEL dioeýii .nmetdje al wiJth thethe observation
atoso the Age,ney andl theý oth`er 'parties toarrangemenit
agreemets.TheAgenyls ob,ligations incelude, thenecessary to maintainto provide *the minimum number of observers
and the carrying out
surveillance; the request of information
its task; nononly of those activities needed to performthe provision ofhindrance to the conduct of the operations;NET, analogous agreeinformation on aniy contravention to therequest for approments or observation agreements; and the5in this respect.1 8
taken
be
to
actionpriateagainst the
Other parties' obligations include protection
explosive design indirect or indirect disclosure of nuclear
for observation andformation, thus providing the opportunity
nuclear-weapon State
co-operation with the Agency. The supplierpersons other thanshall take appropriate steps to ensure that
do not have acits authorized nationals acting on its behalf
any documents orcess to the design information contained inState. 1 5 9 The
materials transported to the non-nuclear-weapon
aa

157
158
159

p. 2.
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/169, 16 Jan. 1975,
Ibid., paragraph 4, P. 3.
of Sweden
See Ibid., paragraphs 5-7, p. 5. Dr. Ericssonof State
out
let
be
not
observes that operations should
engineering
privateexpectedisitascontrol, even ifof the tasks
enterprises provide their services for many
uses ofinvolved in peaceful domestic or international Nuclearof
Question"The
nuictLear explosions. Ericsson,
Exposinsfor Peaceful Purposes", pp. 10-11.

4316

cu,isto,dy anid contirol- of the, uc,lear' ý'Xpe
all ti_mesýw11eman aWith the supli"erý Inuclear-weaponSte()The Charýacter of observIation

ý

M

16

Le

thble precedýLing as3pects.ý The IAEA documeiýnt- on "Guideies,i
its paraggraphs 11 to 15, addreszýýses it
te.rnational observation.

-l1t-tisido of in-

For exml,obser'vation, shall beg,-in

whllen the nuclear expl_osive dev,ice oreie-eveetech

territory,, or the means, ofc trnprtlwich-j is, under theo jurisodictio,.n anid cont -,I of tthe
whiichi,ever occursý

upirncea-epnSae

oont,ilwoed on a-laer:. Surveillance) sha1 'be--

24-hour per day basis.

Continuous visual observat,ion

able unless other means are at least as effecti-veus
161
mer,

'is,esrhfr(e) Procedures
The IAEA docum-ent on "Guidelines" includes several provisions pertaining to the designation and visits of IAEA observers as well as to their reports. They appear to have followed
to a great extent procedures established by the TAEA in applying safeguards on other peaceful nuclear activities. It suffices to refer here simply to paragraphs 16 to 18 and 20 to31

of the !AEA document.16
Before concluding, it is to be noted that the observation
function -need not be performed where the opportunity for observation is provided in accordance with the observation agreement, and no fault can be attributed to the supplier and the160

For measures contemplated by the US G-overnment to assure
US physical custody of a "Plowshare" device, see Hjearingýs
on Nuclear Bxplosion Services, p. 97. The measuires coul11d
in-clude a guard force, mechanical or electroniic proectveu
systems, the use of rapid means of transportbation toCre:duce time of exposure, etc.

161

IAEA Doe. INFOIRC/ib69,

162

Ibid,, pp, 6,8.,

16 J an. 19,

437

paas

111,pp76.

canowhere~~11J

ci'iaprva-Finly th

cun

be

fth

t,ion
(!Iay
theoerib~vdi

6
AA Býoard of GoeroS is accrdd,

Aýd Hoc Advisory Gryoup on PNEs r-ecomm111ended in

197eort that thse "gui-d eIiiines" sho uldc be kept underits
reiwToIesur their cont.inued adequacy, par-ticular-ly in

re,latio,n to-the acq.uisition of information relevant to thed--%evelopýment of a--ny nuclear weapon or the effects of any such
wea pon.
Since the presenitation of the identical 'treaty drafts of
24 August 196'?, all -treaty drafts maintained the provision thatthe potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate
international procedures.
The United States, in putting forward in March 1967 thegeneral principles upon which the potential benefits might beorganised, had indicated that the conditions and proceduresfor international collaboration in accomplishing peaceful nuclear explosive projects would be developed in full consultation with the non-nuclear-weapon States. Pull consultation
should also take place, as indicated by the United States inthose principles, among nuclear and non-nuclear Parties to the
Test-Bari Treaty about any amendment of the Treaty required in
1 6 4 As the United Statesorder to carry out feasible projects.
representative at the ENDC later put it:"These 'appropriate international procedures' , once
established and whatever the particular form theymight take, would apply -to both bilateral and multilateral projects. If, under a comprehensive test-

165

See Ibd. para. 7, P. 3 and paraq. 3 and 1-9, pp. 2 and 7
respecti77vel1y.
Mar. 1967, paras. 77-78.
E CPY29,2
164~

438,

ban r ay,ntraonlapoathondc oaeu
a. a nucea
purposes,0such apr ova
Vexlto
ol,osiut

e
nddo
or p
n!p

(a) General Ideas and the Role of the T-AEA

In the first, place, certain basic elemlent_s canle edcefrom previ*ous discuissions of the N""T as welas from domTTes-ti_Cexperience in the sup,plier States and !mo,re peilyth,e U,nitýed
States.

Procedures envisaged should per-tai 1-o t matters suhas
health and safety not covered, as mentioned above, by thýe 1AEA
document on international observation. They should also pert_ain
to economic feasibility of projects proposed and priority among
them. 166
international procedures for he-,althý and safety would not
only establish public confidence inpeaceful :n-ucolear explosions

but also establish~ ani impartial set of standards applicable toall St4tes. Certai'n general criteria could also be established
to measure the economic feasibility of proposed projects without overlooking the special needs of States and the circLunsLances surrounding each project.

Such crtraCuDgar

aga inst discrimination as well as against pressuroes to ass-ist,
projects of doubtful value.16
International procedures, as clearly stated by the UnitedStates, will be applicable to services conducted bilaterally,
multilaterally or through an appropriate international body.
As to projects carried out unilaterally, i.e., those carriedout by the nuclear-weapon States in their own territories,
there seems to be no urge to decide about them except for thebilateral procedures worked out in the 1976 US/Soviet PNE Treaty.
The Swedish amendments previously referred to and wh-icýh Weref_

4165

ENiDC/PV. 369, 22 Feb. 1968, parýa.

166
-1-67

For examcple, see ENDC/PV. 295,21fa.96,pr.7(S.
See WillViclh, Non-P_roliferatonTeayp.
4-16

439

nyazpeaceýful application- o' nquclear explDCC4OsIoS
licensi"ng
1.Mn.'er a comprel)ensive tcest-ban s-ubject' to internationaal
th.e prohibi
baninternati.onal body w,ýould have virtually meantof any unilateral decisions in th,is domain.
t.ion),
anat main

treaty,with ul a bl,hinecesarecoua.er

tol make:

Iirtoiaccdun16()
However, the Swedish~ re!presuýntative at
at the proper tim.o,~for amending
the ENDC reminded both countries that procedures
testthe NPT -to make it consistent with a future comprehensive
if theban would be of a very cumbersome nature, especiallyto rejectveto right of a nuclear-weapon State is exercised

the amend-ment.1l70
ional
The question of bilateral arrangements and internat
part of thislicensing will be further developed in the last
suffices to say
chapter relating to the channels of supply. It
to unihere that the application of international procedures
no less thanlateral projects could raise formidable problems
such projects.
those relating to international- observation on
on theBoth would in fact impose unprecedented limitationsin the field of
freedom of action of the nuclear-weapon States
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
non-nuAother basic element is the full participation ofinternationclear-weapon States in developing the appropriate

168

ENDC/PV. 369, 22 Feb. 1968, paras. 43-44 (US)570, 27 Feb. 1968, paras. 52-53 (USSR).

169"

Fbid-

170

iENDO/PV.

53.

para.

57

,

51Mar.

1975,

440

para.

11.

and ENDC/PV.

alprocedurLIee.

7" There isconsensL,us- t,hat ths ra.J 0tiP'pai

shouldJ t-ahe pl.ace wi-ithin theýfram1),,ewo_rk4

of thAe

11

AA.Arti cclof the 1AEA Statute oný agen--,icy projecLts. is cýoisidere,d to be) a
goodasisfor working out the appropriýate
-interatna pro
Infact ,

in 197(2,the third IAEA techn-i cal pan,el oni

recommiended thatii),wic
et-the Agency shoulId develop detýailed

procedures f or responding to requies ts frcom Member States f orassistance in obtaining -PNE- se.rv,ices.
Accordingly, the IAEA convened a Group of Experts,i

ApriL1

197)4 with representation both from supplier States and non-nuclear-weapon States to advise on these procedures.

The group

decided to concentrate on appropriate procedures for the early'
stag,es of a possible PNE project including the guidelnes forrequesting States and Agency procedures to meet the requests
before the conclusion of pertinent agreements between the
Agency, the requesting States and the supplier States.

More

specifically, early stages of a project would entail inter aliapreliminary review, pre-feasibility and feasibility studies,
technical screening and the provision upon request of individual
reviews of technical studies and of health and safety assessments.
This approach was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors
in September 1974.

The IAEA has also established at the end of

197)4 a Register of supplier and consultant States to enableinterested Member States of the IAEA to be aware of the kind172of services that could be provided.
171

172

In a Romanian working paper containing amendments to theidentical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967, it was suggestod that the words "accepted by all States signatories to
the Treaty" should be added after the words "through appropriate international procedures" in the ninth preambular paragraph. DCOR, Suppi. for 1967 and 1968, Docs.
DC/230 and Add, 1, Ann. IV, Sec. 14 (ENDC/199, 19) Oct.
1967). Romania did not pursue its ameni-dment fur'therL af_te_r
the presentation of the second identical tre-atly draft's of
18 January 1968 which included for t-he firs_t timel ýan rticle on peaceful nuclear explosions.
See Review Conference of the Parties, to the NPT1, 'JAF,A Acti"vcE"Ijities Under Article V of NPT.' Analytical and T
Report_ (9?T/-C_0N_F71T2', 17___Fe-b_.195,p.-9ad227IA
nIB
Nuclear Exposon fr Peacefu' upss p

441

The. above procledures were reviewed by the, Ad Hoc Advisor:yIn itsGroup on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful. Purposes.
rePori- of' 1977ý it expressed the view that the adequacy of
thej present procedures will need to be reassessed in the lightof any new legal instruments which are drawn up. In the meantimie, the G3roup accepts that the procedures already establishedby the IAEA are appropriate t1o its purposes. As to appropriate
procedures for later stages o,.fa possible PNE project, i-e,,
project, definitiLon, project execution, past-project evaluation
anid project termiination phases,
out,which stillh.ave to be worked

the IAEA haas suggested it could contribute by way of obser-

vati-on,, monitoring and reporting.
The Director General of IAEA has informed the Ad Hoc Advisory Group that the procedures worked out by the IAEA haveprovided adequate guidance in the one instance in which theirapplication has been required to date.

In response to an in-vitation extended by the Egyptian Ministry of Electricity andEnergy, an Agency fact-finding mission visited the Qattara Depression site, earlier referred to in this Chapter, in April!
May 1976 in order to obtain first-hand information about various
technical aspects of the project, including the possible use of
PNE techniques in canal excavations, which was the object of afeasibility study financed by a West German firm.

The IAEA

fact-finding mission felt that it was able to complete the preliminary screening according to the procedures worked out by the
Agency in 197,4.173

173

The latter document, which contains theDoc. GOV/1691.
procedures adopted by the IAEA, is reproduced in its
entirety in Appendix 2,4D to this study.
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, p. 6 and Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of theParties to the NPT, IAEA Activities Under Article V of NPT(NPT/CONF.II/PC.Ii/9, 25 July 1979), pp. 6-7.
In 1971 theDepartment of Mines and Power of Madagascar requested
information on the possible use of PNEs for blowing up arock obstruction in a harbour construction project.
At
its request the Agency contacted France, UK, US and USSR
all of which expressed their willingness to supply theservices of experts for an appraisal of the feasibilityof using PNE for this purpose. This was conveyed to theM.adagascar authorities but there was no further developm'lent's
See Doc. HPT/CONF/12, 17 Feb. 1975, PP-9-10.

442) Comprehens ive Tes t Ban a nd Peac eful 'NuclIe ariExpI,,loSon(Ib
Arrange,ments to be m,.ade for maki'ngý, avai_labl,e Peaceful niuclear explosions withi.n t,he fr-am,ework of a comprehýenls'-ve týest
ban and in conjunction wiLth Article V of' the NPT woulLd constitute international procedures even if they do not. require i-n-,This w1ould be the case, wit,h b-i_lall,,teral1
arrangements wh-ereby the TAEA plays t.he role of an .. intermedýi.ary,
ternational approval.

part or this chIapter we reach,ed thýecnlso
In the firstthat under the Test-Ban Treaty only underground peaceful nu.clear explosions that do not cause radioactive fallout. outLside,
the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdictiLonor control such explosions are conducted would be permitted.
In the state of the art as it stands at present this would virtually mean only fully contained peaceful nuclear explosions.
With regard to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 197~4 and the
PNE Treaty of 1976 the same applies provided the prescribed ceilings on yields as well as other conditions, referred to earlier,are strictly observed.
Efforts are still being deployed in different forumns of'negotiations to reach an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.
The question arises, how are we to accommodate peaceful nuclear
explosions under such a comprehensive test ban?
In the first place, the close link between peaceful nuclear
explosions and a comprehensive test ban has been well.established. Upon Sweden's initiative, 14the Conference of NonNuclear-Weapon States adopted a resolution endorsing such alink and u~nderlining the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem compatible with a comprehensive
test-ban treaty. 15In fact the resolution was endorsing the
174

175

See A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.10, 18 Sept. 1968, pp. lC9-1-1-2 andSR.12, 20 Sept. 1968, p. 130; A/CONF.35/C.2/L.ltG0, 19 Sept.
1968; 1.10/Rev. 1, 24 Sept. 1968; and Rev. 1/Add., 1, 241
Sept. 1968 (with Nigeria as a co-sponsor).
Final Document oC the Conferencec of Non-Nu,ýcleýar-WdeapoStates (A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 196 8), Refsolution ,Pp.18
19. Very few countries abstained oni tL-he reouinforl

443

rmeiiIberi-o of' the ENOi thei10
onajn
o nio i tlhoeih
a comjprýe. ensive tetban trea1mo
Auct1_96d8C inlt meorn
176
hud not; be a reason to delay the,Hoee,tiIlI,yntaind nuclear explosions fort the
cto_fce cc 1abenefrit of nonl-nucl-ear-weap-oni Statesý, once it proves to bee tt would be compatiJble withL thne Partial Test-Ban
Ceasible,77
TrecLty 1~cnl,the prob)lem,i . ýisow to estLablis,h, such a link.,
e svealalternatives whiclh have been sugse.They
Th~e
The( ouncýludiont of' a cýomprehe(nsive tes,t-ban, treaty proIWbiting in principle 411l nuclear explosions and tUhe working
out of a separate international instrumient for allowing peaceful nuclear explosions as exceptions and under specific rules
as to international management and control. This alternative
17 8
was favoured, for example, by Sweden (1967-68) and India(i)different reasons. Italy, for example, had abstained be-cause the close link might delay the conclusion of an

176
177

178

agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions (A/CONF.35/C.2/
SR,17, 25 Sept, 1968, p. 179). Moreover, Australia abstained bacause of the lack of any reference to bilateralarrangements in the text of the resolution -which were provided for in Article V of the NPT (Ibid., p. 180).
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Doc. DC/231, Ann. I, Sec.
10 (ENDC/235, 26 Aug. 1968).
Italy expressed the view that the regulation of under-

ground explosions for peaceful purposes under an acceptable form of control would help to facilitate an overallprohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, Ibid., Sec. 9 (ENDC/
234, 23 Aug. 1968); A/C.1/PV. 1606 (prov.), 12 Nov. 1968,
PP. 32-35; and A/C.1/PV. 1655 (prov.), 10 Dec. 1968,
PP. 17-20. Burma also pointed out that international observation for peaceful nuclear explosions could conceivably be acceptable to the two super-Powers to perform thefunctions of on-site inspection in relation to a comprehensive test ban. A/C.1/PV. 1697 (prov.), 24 Nov. 1969,pm, 38-40.
For example, see ENDC/PV. 502, 6 June 1967, para. 16 (ýweden) and A/CONF-35/SR.13, 12 Sept. 1968, p.- 174 (India).
Thej,initia S,41_1ýwedish position has undergone considerable
cagsas is shiown below.

444,

nprgah(d)elce

and wasoluton adptedat the ConlferenceO
179C
teS,
(Iii.)

o11ticpb

ate-

of0niu'arWaOSa

THe concý,lusoion ofL a coprhesietot-antray vwh100

8 0

Suclh as theic Nehelad and Aust,ralJý,'Ia?H
Th conclulsi on o)f an underground)Lt!ý
(iii)

ltes,t-atreywhh
ecflncere.xpnl osions from its'

would exlctyeep

withproviLded. they were carried out Jin, cofrmt
than international agreement negotiated separately. This wa
the,position in April 1969 of Sweden which had submitted 'to
ENDC a working paper on possible provisions of an underground,iýýprovýisions:,

test-ban treaty.

1 81(iv) The conclusion of an underground test-ban treaty which
would explicitly exempt peaceful nuclear explosions from its
sepprovisions, provided they took place in conformity with aalsoarate protocol annexed to the treaty. This was a proposal

179

1-80

181

in theIt is to be noticed that 55 countries abstainedof theTwo
Committee
in(d)separate vote on paragraph6
p. 175.
1968,
Sept.
25
,
A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.1
Conference.
A/C.l/PV. 1699 (prov.), 25 Nov. -1-969, p). 27 (Netherlands)
and A/C.1/PV./1704 (prov.), 28 Nov, 1969, P. 55 (Austraabout alia). The Netherlands, however, being scepticalnupeacefulofmisusetheagainstwatertight guarantee
later
weapons,ofdevelopment
theforclear explosions
be to
expressed the view that the only alternative would
it were"if
exceptions
without
agree on a nuclear test ban
explosions
peacefulofbenefits
economicthedecided thatthemwere so doubtful that it would be better to forgo
loopa
creatingofrisk
completely rather than run the
CCD/!
race."
arms
nucleartheofh.ole for the continuation
47.
para.
1971,
Apr.
29
512,
PV.
DCOR, Suppl. for 1969, Doc. DC/232, Ann. C, Sec. 6 (ENDCý/242, 1 Apr. 1969), Article I (paragraph 3) and ENIDC/PV.
tha.-t the599, 1 Apr. 1969, para. 40. India was of the view
nu,clearpeacefulinternational agreement on underground
explosions should be negotiated sulaeuywithý aon
ParY'197,
underground test-ban treaty. CC_b/PV. 504, 25,para. 110.

niade by Sweden in, a second vrsion oits previous workigpae

ndhihwas submitted t,o t-he CCD in September 19719.182(v)

The conclus:.on of' a treaty on the completce and general.

f nuclear weapon tests which would provide, interalia, thalt in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, peaceful
nuclear ex,plosions would. be conducted in conformity with theprohibtion

Provisions of Article V of thne NPT,

while inth-e case of nuc lear-wieaponi States the procedu.re for conducting them would be establis,hed by a special agreement, which could be conciluided as speedily
as possible.
atý-the CCD in

The Soviet; Unio.n tabled a draft of such a treaty
1977.

(vi) Thne conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon test
in all environments. The treaty would leave room for special
arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions underinternational supervision, the details of which could be worked
out later in protocols to the treaty.
made by Sweden at the CCD in 1977. 183

This was another proposal

In 1978, at the CCD, it was reported on behalf of the delegations of the UK, USA and USSR that in the tripartite negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests the threenegotiating parties were in agreement that the treaty should
establish a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion in any
environment and that the provisions of a protocol, which would
be an integral part of the treaty, would apply to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Final Document of the TenthSpecial Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, made reference to such a treaty and pointed out that itshould be concluded.18
182
183

CCD/PV. 524, 27 July 1971, paras. 8 and 13 and CCD/348,
2 Sept. 1971, Article II.
For the Soviet and Swedish draft treaties see CCD/523 andCCD/526 respectively in Documents on Disarmament 1977, pp.

8o-8~4 and 112-115.
18)4

See Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conferenceof the Parties of the NPT, IAEA Activities Under Article V.2adApno)f NPT (NPT/CONF.II/PC.II/9, 25 July 17)
WIT~~ to his study, para. 51.

A446

Other po'ssibiL)'tie

can cet ii

bleiii can easilý]y be, solved, hoevr

be t
onc

te

o)
Iut,

ThC po

oP

ýcl

ula

xlso

<l

of t hetosprPertohlalnulawepnttn
existsLam]d once, theuecflapiaino

fina.lly p)rove-s a fIeasýible

ecnloy'V. Channlll,s of, Sumpll
Tlie remiainingi- part-s ofý Art:icle V of' th NLH reat to the
mlucLarchannels3 through wh.ichi potetntial beftofpeatcefl't
explosions will be made available. According6 to teAtcesuch benefits may be obtained through an appropriate iterna
tional body and pursuant to bilateral agreements. In picpe
there should also be no obstacle to making available suchbefits through multilateral arrangements whereby several countries
agree with the supplier State or States to carry out projectsof common interest to the recipients or to both.. However, we
will confine ourselves to the two basic channels specificallymentioned. in
1.

Article V.

Bilateral

AGreement,sBilateral arrangements as channels of supply of peaceful
nuclear explosions did not figure in the preambular paragraph
They figuredof the identical treaty drafts of 24 August 1967.
1968
for the first time in the text of Article V of the January
identical treaty drafts. They were maintained in the joint
draft of 11 March 1968 in spite of the strong opposition theyencountered from some members of the ENDC and more particularly
V to
by Sweden, which presented a formal amendment to Article
Bilateral agreements
eliminate any reference to bilaterals.18
text of Article V
reformulatedtheinwere finally maintainedin the final NPT draft commended by the UN General Assembly.
"Non-nuclear-weapon
The last sentence of the article reads:
States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtaina such
benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements."

185

DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Does.
IV, Sec. 32 (ENDC/216, 13 -Feb. 1968ý).

447

230 and A';dd-

1, iAon,to bilateral agrueements emanated from a combinn~ol OC woyrLoo ad preoccupations. In the first place, thelack of any pvovwAoD in all treaty drafts on internationale,sistan,.

nhbwrvatiou of pýacefuA nuclpar explosions was a sopurce of conWýrn that biateral arrangements could serve as a guise forpurposes.18
cKandastWne nuclear co-operation for military
astly, someAncon0ly, discriindautory treatment was feuared. 187
form of intenationalisation was favoured whereby licensing byThis
an international organ of each project would be ruquired.
latter goal had in fact prompted Sweden to present its aforementioned amendments including the omittap cG of any referencethatto bilaterals in the text of Article V.18It was fearedofbilaterals might hinder rather than promote the formulation
generally acceptable procedures and the creation of suitableinternational instruments providing for peaceful nuclear explosions. 189
On the other hand, and as conceded by the representative
theof Canada at the ENDC, not all the States represented at
ENIDC "would consider the entire ruling out of bilateral arran9
somegements ... to be desirable." 1 0 This was also the view ofStates represented in other forums.19

189

For example, see ENDC/PV- 558, 25 Jan. 1968, para. 62(Canada); ENDC/PV~. 567, 20 Feb. 1968, paras. 31-33 (UAR);
ENDC/PV. 573, 5 Mar. 1968, para. 13 (Sweden); and A/C.l/
PV. 1565 (prov.), 10 May 1968, p. 12 (Ceylon).
For example, see A/C.1/PV. 1567 (prov.), 14 May 1968,
PP. 72-75 (India).
See al~so ENDhC/PV. 575, 5 Mar. 1968, para. 15 (Sweden) andA/C.1/PV. 1624 (prov.), 28 Nov. 1968, PP. 48-5O (India).
See Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, l10c.cit., P. 49.

190

ENDC/PV. 568, 21 Feb. 1968, para. 14.

191

One of the countries which was remarkably insistent onbilaterals is Australia. A/CONF.35/C.2/SR.14, 24 Sept.
1968, P. 157 and SR.17, 25 Sept. 1968, p. 180; A/C.1/PV.
1616 (prov.), 22 Nov. 1968, PP. 43-45; and A/C.1/`PV. 1704
(pray.), 28 Nov. 1969, PP. 54-35.

186

187
188

448

UJI on haV

iBothIIItie
Ui ed LSta-,tesan the SýovdIi ssi pa t. th!os e wors and procpaos
CTe argue thatILm!
e~ th ritof poaceful nule_lear- exýplos3 one_ shul

the usments- ofAl tiJ.cles

L andof peacefudl n'ucl ear

Apfp0op1,Iat

11 of thto anIY

xloie

int erýna tional prco ceduretioned earlicr,that the optý_iono

tr jcd to

JIP
includintheL non-tLraýnsferoVec

wh Lts9oe)Ient;''Iwer) ýrvatIonit
and1obsebannther bilaterally or through an interný,jiational

pro-

i

tebnftoyws

02

tive assurance against discrimination. Itwsalopineuthat there would be no scarcity of devicesoncteteholg
became feasible.19
Now that the bilateral option has been confirmed in thelast sentence of Article V, it is quite correct to say, as explained by Mr. William Foster, the then Director of the US
ACDA, that the last sentence "peere the option ...without
the need to await multilateral agreement or action concerning
the provision of ...services through an international body."193
However, it should be noticed that bilateral agreements will
be subject to appropriate rules of international observation
already worked out by the IAEA which will also be responsible
for their application. Moreover, appropriate international procedures which will be applicable to bilaterals, as previously
mentioned, have been worked out for the early stages of PNE
projects within the framework of the IAEA.
it

was estimated,in-the America,n debate,

the pat-the case of nuclear power

tern which has been followed inp,,lants J.s followed in'that ifthe case of peaceful nalcear explosions,many US 1`nternational arrangements

are expected to be bila-

teral. 14However, this analogy might prove to be

rrneus192

ENDC/PV. 369, 22 Feb. 1968, paras. 57-42 (Lwnited-, ts(US)
and ENDO/PV. 570, 27 Feb. 1968, paras.485

195

flearngs on NPT, 1968, p. 12.

194

Hearngson Nuclear

2

ineXce,p449

Y5

id stll)unxplJo"ted bybiaelt, heefoe,offers a great opporýtunity for anlarrngeens.
Article V
ineraioalrgiewhicLh al,re,ady has its roots -ina nw onenolo~ysof t,he:L)T.
2. Th

ApproprLiate

internationalBd

its principles Put ýforcward ini MKarchmeans provided for
1967, pointed out that "there should be ato request nuclear
non-nuclear-weapon States wi2h~ing to do soStates through an
explosive services from the nuclear-weapon
States wouldinternational body in which the non-nuclear-weapon
1 9 5 This, however, was not reflected in the pre-.
participate."1treaty drafts.
ambular paragraph of the August 1967 identicalTheý Uniited States,infor a separate
The Mexican proposal of 19 September 1967
the provision
article on peaceful nuclear explosions included
through apthat "assistance shall be requested and channeled
representation of
propriate international bodies with adequate
to be estanon-auclear-weapon States, subject to procedures
added.) This
blished in a special agreement .. " 9 (Emphasis
nuclear explosions
was the only channel through which peacefulat thewould have been provided. As the Mexican representative
are quite rightly
ENDC explained "non-.nuclear-.weapon States ...
nuclear Powers
reluctant to be subject to the good will of thein using thefor the performance of that service." 17Mexico,
either alone
word "body" in the plural, had in mind the ]IAEA,
agreement wasor in association with other bodies. The special
195
196

ENDC/PV. 259, 21 Mar. 1967, para. 74.
Add. 1,
DCOR, Suppl. for 1967 and 1968, Boos. DC/230 and
IV-A,
Article1967),
Sept.
19
Ann. IV, Sec. 12 (ENDC/196,
2.
para.
1, 19 Sep)t. 1967, para. 15.
NBC/V. 3
197

450

o

providedJ for t1o 1L.iy dovwn tefniosathe*nera
8

body.

in for bil.at16eraL

arranemens, als o p_rovie

rntoa

priatea.dequtoywth-vltate", prsuatut
nucler-wepon

o

a

p

rpresel!knzt,t-On of no[ -a spec_ialineatol

ThLis prova-ision was manaien th'eo f 11 Marcho 1968, and, with some rep)hr,asin,,in theagroeement or agreens
oint dra,ft

ov-t,biesThe Jlanuýary 198ietcltreaL,tydr

final tre'aty draft,

whi-ch re-ad

States Prty to the Treat,y"No-nulea-wepo
shall be abl'e to obtain such benef:its, pursuan-ot
to a special international agreement oragemts
through an appropriate international body wý,ithl
adequate representation of non-niuclear-weapon S"tates. Negotiations on this subject shall commence
as soonAg possible after the Treaty enters into
force."The last sentence was in partial compliance with a Mexican
suggestion. The urgency in the Mexican suggestion was not related to the commencement of the negotiations, as provided forin Article V, but was rather related to UN General Assembly
approval of the special international agreement "which doubtless will have to contain the statute of the 'appropriate in2 00
ternational organ' to be set up",.
Before turning to the identification of the "appropriate
international body", some precisions should be made with regard to the "special international agreement or agreements"
connected with that "body".
(a) The Special-International Agreement or Agreements
At the outset of this chapter, we indicated that both theSoviet Union and the United States were in favour of a special
international agreement, separate from the NPT, on t-he questAionof peaceful nuclu~ar explosions. This was their view befo-re thfw
198
199
200

Ibid.
See Appendix 3-G-.
A/C.I/PV. 1569 (prov.) ,16My98,p.1-2

451,

atydrat's olo th r iential~ubnssio

heip

tate

ttoasmlthelmet

to Janurym1968
of suich an agree-te rfernceto a,s,peciaLl Jintlernat,Lionalagemt
incudigs re-viouisly -indiJcated, frmMexýico.
hademaatd,
Theo pre"sealitrainlarentof, ArIticled V cotmpaes
tn-tetteor ag-reements""

ts explained by theubas3ic arentdeýfi'ni-ng the fuinctionsi of theSttc,"
Unitedpossibility
appr,opri`a,te i.nternational body and holds open thedealing withof a series of separate international agreementsinternaparticular projects." 23This means tha .tthe "special
tional agreement" would designate or create an international
nuclear exbody, define its functions with regard to peacefulin obtainplosions and establish the procedures to be followed
constituteing their potential benefits. The "agreements" would
the interestthose signed between the "international body" andFollowed parties for the carrying out of particular projects.
as an intering, for example, the 1AEA experience in serving
material.
mediary between States for the supply of fissionable
the reand equipment, an- agreement could be concluded between
questing non-niuclear- weapon State, the supplier nuclear-weapon
forState and the IAEA, setting forth the terms and conditions
by Caproviding the service. They could also be, as suggested
economic asnada, similar *to the project agreements normal in
the "agreesistance relationships. 24The form and content of
the "special
ments", however, would depend on the provisions of
201
202
205
2ý04

See ENDO/PV. 295, 14 Mar. 1967, para. 65 (USSR) and ENIDC/
PV. 295, 21 Mar. 1967, para. 72 (United States).
ENDC/PV. 529, 12 Sept. 1967, paras. 19-22.
A/C.I/PV. 1577 (Prov.), 31 May 1968, P. 78.
AVCOYF.35/C.2/SR.l0, 18 Sept. 1968, p. 109.

452

internationl-trsedwt

a.ru.
11:-

r sponib))i Lit i

egtationtointo fo ,c2e o ' the N PT

tent
I

al

,"ssonaril

en-

1 field

Int'a
nl

ee

psil

p eprtorfore,
ito0oevr

ener

sideraýt ionris o f thJinmateAtn thD new, t,c]Inogp
theI
oncrn(ýCIngI

to
acrin
wer~~star~,aftLer the1T eat

bo dyvýJ o' Iitena

and/ort the
[It,"

con-1

th en1try
wertnotui p,recluded beft-1ori-

20

thet,
Conýfere.nceý ci' No-ula-,Weapýon States, 1exico had

expressed thc1viw that one of th
the C1onf eren-,,ce wat,ions; ofmost usef"l contLr ibu-)

to d rawi up a prliinr
ý-ýft

draft111
N of the1 ý fspe-fac
hadin

umt tedI t,othe Conference a woroking documienit which hadincudd

basIc pr-cial internationa-L ageeen"Iposals for the preparation of the "agreement"

and prel:im,I inatry

draft articles for such an "agreement" ,27Without going into
the content of that document which we have occasionally ref erred to in relation to certain aspects treated above and which
we shall later resort to with regard to the "international body", it must be said that the document was the only serious attempt to draft a "special international agreement". However, it
was not possible for the Conference, which was dealing with allsorts of complicated problems, to allot enough attention to the
Mexican basic p~roposals and draft articles.
Mexico pursued the matter further at the twenty-third session of the UN General Assembly in 1968 and was the first country to suggest the preparation of a report by the UN SecretaryGeneral to serve as a basis for the Assembly's discussions on
205

A,/C.1/PV.1577 (prey,), 31 May 1968, pp. 79-80 (United States). Yugoslavia was of the view -that negotiations shouldcommence immiediately after the signature of the NP~T, A/C,ý
1/PV..1567 (prov.), 14 May 1968, p.. 16.

206

A/CONF.35/SR-.4,

207

MVexico,4 Sept,"International

1968,

p. 41.ý

rgam

45

fNcla

xlsos'

The Mexican sugduring t,he fol,low,ing session,.)gesti-on had dleveloped into a dr,af t resolution co-sponsored bytwety-ourcouýntries which had requested the UN SecretaryGenercal to preý,pareý, more precisely, a. report on th,,e est.ablish-.1
th,is subjec.lt

ment within thte frameworkl ofL the IAEA, o,f an international ser209
vice for peaceful nuclear explosions.
Since then, -atutention has ma-inly focused. on the TAEA, andthtuestion of a "special I'international ag-reement" has rarely

been raised until thI-e convenaing of thIe 1975 NPT Review Confer,Atb the Conference eight count;ries; Ghana, 14exico, Nigeria,
Peru, Phiilipines, Romania, Syria and Yugoslavia submitted adraft resolution urging the Depositary Governments of the NPT toinitiate immediate consultations with all of the other States
ence,

Party to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the mostappropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the Parties
in order to conclude the basic special international agreement.
The Depositary Governments, i.e., the three nuclear-weapon States
Parties to the NPT, and their allies opposed such a proposal andinsisted that the issue of a "special international agreement"
should be left to the IAEA. As a result, the NPT Review Conference in its review of Article V, urged the IAEA to commence
consideration of the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V. However, at the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly, which
followed the NPT Review Conference, the eight countries succeeded not only in making reference of this proposal in a resolution adopted by the Assembly on General and Complete Disarmament but also in reextending an invitation to both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to provide information on consultations "as they may have entered into or may intend to enter into
21
for the conclusion of the special international agreement"

208
209

2_10

A/C.1/PV. 1630 (prey.), 5 Dec. 1968, pp. 48-51.
1
GAOR, 23 Sess., Anns. (Vol. 1), a.i. 96, Doc. A/7 445, para.
7(g) (A/C.1/L.460 and Add. 1), p. 18. See also A/C.1/PV.
1640 (prov.), 13 Dec. 1968, PP. 57-63 (Mexico).
GA Res. 3)484A-(xxx), 12 Dec. 1975 in GAOR, 30th Sess., SuPPl.
No. 34 (A/1003 1 4), PP. 30-31. For the draft resolution sub-45-4

Ser ioaus c onsaul1t.a tions,

how,e ve,tookýpIlac--e witLhin the frame
oni PNE in wihersnaie

work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Gou
of ~41 Stat~es includi`ngp th-e Un ited Sateos ani
d thAe Soviet Unon
discuissed and suibmitted in it S 1977 r',epr thi,Ie posbe) otn
of the agreemnent-s requi-red under AtleVof t,he NPT11 i,n the11form, of a list
ofsoeprnipes or m-Iatter,s to be considered
in form,iulating international arra-ngýem-.ents fýor providiing n,uclear
explosions for peacefulI purp,oseý-s as wiell as the possi'ýbleý structcture of' the agreements in the form. of four m-iain altrernativez,

internat-ional leg,al instrum,en)ts for providtin
with the NPT.

PNIin accordance,

The results ofI the_ st.udy can be siumm,arie

as fol-lows: 211(i) The Contents:

Principles or Materctbe C.onsideredJ _in
Formulating International Arrangements:
Apart from taking fullaccount of Article V of the NPT as well as the provisions ofinternational treaties and agreements and other international
legal instruments relevant to this question, and without prejudice to negotiations designed to achieve further limitation
on nuclear-weapon test explosions or a comprehensive ban thereon,
the most salient principles or matters listed by the Ad Hoc Groupare:_ All States should be given the opportunity to participate,
as appropriate, in any negotiation of the international arrangements.
They should also have the right of access to thei PNE
project services provided under such arrangements, when established.
All PNE project services should be subject to observationand governed by the "Guidelines" worked out by the IAEA.
-

There should be no derogation from the sovereign right of
any State to determine for itself policies and aspects which do-

211

mitted by the eight countries at the NPT Review Confere:nce,
see Docs. NPT/CONF/C.II/L. 1, 20 May 19ý75 and.NTCOFIC.II/L. 1/Add. 15 26 May 1975 in Review Conference of tche
Parties to the NPT., Final Document, Part II,
Geneva, 19075)(NPT/CONF/35/II).
For the complete results see, Nuclear ExplosiLons for Pae
ful Purposes, pp. 0-16,455

1LaWr (e.g..', choice
not aN'e_ct its ob1i-gations under i,nternatioal,
S_'tates)o.f te(- nýo.logy ar use of conslultant
reco-mmendations
1international arrang-ements and technicalof t;-heir effectivenessshdbe, subject, to review o-_n the basis
f helthand saf"ety exýperience.
andresponsiwill1 have to be made for, determ-iining
any studies or assistance car-biit"Or thne p_ayment of costs of)L
ried ouzt by or on behalf of the Ageny
CostIs for nuc-Lear
The need tl-o have access to indicatI'Ve
excplosi.ve relateýd services.
of the interests of non- Full account should be taken
should also be given
participating third States. Consideration
under which the conto defining whether there are circumstances
be affected should be resent of a State whose territory may
quired.
the settlement of disputes should- Provisions relating to
be included.
party liability will
Detailed questions relating to third
have to be addressed in the arrangements.
-The,-Provis.i,on-

Alternative International Legal Instru(ii) The Structure:
points out that in conside ringments: The Ad Hoc Advisory Group
in mind that the Parties tothe alternatives it should be borne
conclude, in accordance with
the NPT retain the legal right toagreement or agreeArticle V of the NPT, special international
alternatives discussed byments for PNE project services. The
the Group are:
Agreinternational multilateral agreement ("Umbrella"- An
and procedures, annexingment) establishing binding principlesAgýreeforeseeing s.eparate Projecta Model Project Agreement andments.
comprehensive proThe multilateral agreement would containthe relevant principles anr,dvisions covering, at the least, allalso incorporate the "appromatters discussed above. It wouldin Article V of the'priate international procedures" mentioned,456

NPT as develo)ped boy the TABAý,wol deint
77appropriate internatýional body"/r" redt
and def'ine its role,

and- wvoudld

th

AAate

nhtAril

diinlypoiefrAec

obs er-vat ion in a:iccordan-ce, with- the, "GIdlns wokd utbthýe TAEA, It is al so, sugg-estedtht
heesol beanxdothie uý,mbrella agreemien,t a m.odlel pr-ojectagemn whc wol
assist in the n egotia,tion of individual proec a
ee1s

SuchJ

agre ement s miight thnemselvs
umbrella agreemTent.

foeee

eb1 spcfial

Thý,e A'd Hoc Avsr

this alternative w14oiujld iml

tha

n

h

it wolGoppitsotta
bencesrytycn

sider how to bring about the neotatonoftemliaea
agreement.

One way might be for thle 1-ALAitefocnvea

diplomatic conference. 'The Agency might provide the conferencewith a draft agreement as a basis for negotiation.
-

General principles established within the IAEA,

An appropriate organ of the IAEA, in consultation with allinterested Member States, could draw up a comprehensive list ofgeneral principles which should govern agreements for PNE project services.

Such a list would form the basis of all PNE project agreements to which the Agency became a party.
It would besubmitted for approval by the Board of Governors of the IAEA andcontained in a document analogous, for example, to the system ofsafeguards worked out with regard to the implementation of
Article III of the NPT.

In addition, as a further derivative of

this alternative, there could be annexed to the general principles a model project agreement which could form the basis forthe negotiation of any actual project agreement between the
Agency and the States interested in proceeding with a project.
Bilateral master agreements between the IAEA and individual
supplier nuclear-weapon States or consultant States and separate-

K:ydeyveToned

accuntof
ag,reements for projects taking_2,
guidelines.

oudhaetob
atheLeat

Under this approach too, a bascdouen
worked out and the contents of whic wudcvr
all of the principles

and matt-ers stotb

4AhdHcAvsr

t-is env,iiaged tl)at i.ndiviýdual supplier nuclear-wepo
Stae wuldconlud b'ateal aste agýreemen ts with te IAEA~
fWhich would confforým to the. contents of thi sevsin
underas cmnIt, In the, master agreement the State wouldit b bondbYits pr,ovi.SionCS in all projectS in wqhichtakexplonuclearofaLpplicati_Jons
patiipte ivovigpeac.eFul
nStates in whichn the Agency wa'sio-ns innnncer_epn
withconcluded
ia'ster agreement.s could al'so be
vove.iimla
G op.

oDm it fLe atuýr es concerýned solely
coni,s ultc.anit St"atýe s,,wh11ich iý w ou ald
supply of nuclear eýxplosive related services.
Wit t-L1,.he-Memorandum of Understanding

govern PNE
Under this approach, the principl,es which should
and matters set
project services modelled upon the principles
in such aout by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group would be embodied
basis and contemMemorandum which would operate on a good-faithbinding under interplate the creation of rights and obligations
The prinnational law through individual project agreements.
the conclusion of
ciples of the Memorandum would contemplate
recipient andindividual project agreements between supplier,a flexible instruconsultant States. The Memorandum would beformal framework.
ment while constituting a rather strong anddevelopment of
Such a Memorandum, while encouraging the uniform
PNE project services, would not guarantee it.
of
The Ad. Hoc Advisory Group also raised the possibility
above four alternacontemplating a number of variations on thetives.
AsThis writer's preference is the second alternative.
"international
general opinion was settled for the IAEA as theof a "special
body" or international organ, the "raison d19tre"
two basic
international agreement" seems to be doubtful forthe question ofreasons, Now that the IAEA has taken charge offor such an agreepeaceful nuclear explosions, there is no needbody". Secondly,
ment to designate or create an "international
to govern the prothe functions of the IAEA and the principles
and laid down
viinof PNE services could very well be developed458

in an. 1AE,A dcmn
iia
otedcmninternati onal Obs erv;atin,nti-aeth
internationail aigl'trIeement"1
frsheer _Legal cnieain

wvould,_

o

hae

pca
be dpiefaymaiguls
hrsapeeecosrcl

abide by th-e text of- the),
NPT!rqiin
ag-reem-ient to lay downi thJucin
Agency,, an, agreement whch3 in ourTh,e TABA"ý hIas suicceedeýd

ngieieuhanitrntoa
nepniiiisohview woul be unecSsay
IndvLOpigec of thcudlieof PNE pDroj-ects as wel as a new systetion to the im-:plementation of_F
Artcl
I

,o

of saeUadin rela-1
heei
wihte7iepatc

fteNT.

no reason to believe it shul no sucedipation of its Member States an.d a rene;wed !AhA Board, inde
limiting more precisely its functions and procedures to makeý
available the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions
without recourse to a "special international agreement".
This,
however, would bring us more closely to the discussion of the
choice of the IAEA as the "international body".
(b)

The IAEA as the "International -Bod,)"

The selection of the IAEA was contemplated long before thefinal for.aulation of the NPT. The final choice, however, did
not come about without considering other alternatives and without ignoring the complementary roesi
that can be played byother international organisati ons.
The establishmentof a new international organisation wascontemplated by very few countries such as Brazil in 1967 and
Italy in 1968. 212 The latter country was also ready, as an alternative, to go along with Mexico's proposal for a new auto21
nomous body to function within the framework of the IAEA. 3
The reasons invoked for the establishmentL of anwbn
212

See ENDPQ/PV. 297, 18 May 1967, paa.4
A/CONF.35/C.2/2,
9 Sept. 1968 (tl)213

See Mexico, "International Programmeýý'C ofula
xls
ions". Mexico had no objectiontch-ie,fanatnm
ous body to function within theTN, yte.Ibd,,.6

4591

(rai)

n

Stte

wh

o,
t~~~~~~

eo

wol

wis

to cotibt,

a wepos
Ynuc
at

h e,
t
afl.Intefrtpae

r

P IAA

1hthe o)ther
and whli ch, on

It shulLu
alobeealdta

te ompsiionofthe I-AEA T)oar-d was.onsideredhattiemorparicuary of the de-.ve_lopinig cýountries6. Secondly, thle
IA_0A, w,,as fotuad to lack the organisation necessary to undertakesuch a task, since it had other priorities, and it was fearedthat matters relating to peaceful explosions would be neglected, Instead of overhauling the Agency from top to bottom it wasconsidered wiser to set up a separate body. The idea of an autonomous body was based on precedents such as the autonomous
institutions already existing within the OECD, e.g. the Nuclear
2
Energy Agency (NEA).

15

Without going much deeper into the idea of an autonomousinternational body which had in fact Prompted the adoption by
the twenty-third session of the UN General Assembly of theaforementioned draft resolution sponsored by Mexico and twentythree other States including Italy, 26it must be said that
there was a str'ong counter-trend. against the establishment of

214
215

jbiq,, P. 5. The People's Republic of China at that time
was neither represented at the UN nor at the IAEA.
Sec A/CON-Fh.35/C.2/SR.3, 9 Sept. 1968, PP. 17-18 (Italy).
See also the reasons invoked by Dr. Ericsson of Sweden andMarvin Kalkstein, the former favouring the establishmentof an international expert organisation and the latter favouring. a new UN forum for initial discussions. Ericsson,"~The Question of Nuclear Explosions", PP. 7-8 and Kalk-

stein,
216_o.i.

PP. 35-37.

GA Res. 2456 C (XXIII), 20 Dec. 1968. GAOR, 23rd Sess.,
Su,pp'f- Nqo. 18 (A/7218), p. 14.

organisLer,atin

we
11 e'onLopti to bI Ihadout

an

toI

i nbto rinst i21n81a
Besids theIAEA, thI

neral ,

inl his16

ordHelhOraistol(H)Pol

reotothesalsen

mework of thle JAEA ofLa

intrainl

wihnhefevc,poneuthat WHO had expesdisitrs

in asitn1
nteitrnational evaluation ini co.neionwt thle pr,oblems of radiation exposure of populatiLons, radioactive contamination of theenvironment,,changes in the ecology due to radiation and otherý
21 9
related risks.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and theInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRID)
as well as regional development banks might also assume great
responsibilities in financing peaceful nuclear explosion projects. 20The UNDP, in particular, is well suited for such pro217

218

219
220

See the voting results on the 24-power draft resolution.
GAOR, 23rd Seass., Anna. (Vol. 1), a.i. 96, Dcc. A/74-45,
para. 13(b). The draft was adopted by a roll-call vote of
59 to 9 with 35 abstentions. The dissensions were reflecting, inter alia, the desire to let the IAEA study the matter without need for a parallel UN study.
IAEA co-operation with other UN agencies was recommended
by the group of experts on the contributions of nuclear
technology to the economic and scientific advancement of
the developing countries, Contributions of LNucleaPr Tee.boLoZy (A/7568), para. 40.
UN Doe. A/7678, 29 Sept. 1969", p
56
For example, see A/C.1/PV, _156-4 (pov
9 Nay198
Q
PP. 13-15 (Sweden); A/C.l/I`V. 1-572, 221Hy16,pr.4(Netherlands); and A/CON_F,35/a.2/8,lOE,J,
1L5 ;-ept- 1968O,
p. 109 (Canada).

461

jct

wI Ch LaI

pie,

the
HoCvr1AIEhaestblshen

withi

It

the fii

emre

of

i~n
nturalII

asthYreplmothert

th
organ

ation1t!VICeoý1, an inenainal sevc_`,_1_)f
frmwr

aswel as theý s,tudies: requesýted by it's owr Gnea Confeirence
to affirm its predominant role in this domain. In
in 1968, 2
reportresponse, to those requests, the IAEA Board, in its first
funcon this question, concluded that the performance of the
V of thet-ions of the international body referred to in Article
NPT were within *the Agency's technical competence and clearly22
3 But befailed within the scope of its statutory functions.
and didfore evoking the detailed functions that the IAEA could
needperform in this domain, two basic interrelated qu.estions
natureto be examined, i.e. the organisational set-up and theof the !AEA role.
The general consensus that IAEA should bear the main responsibiiities in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions entailed, however, some divergencies of view with,regard to its organisational set-up. As previously mentioned,
Mexico and a group of Latin American countries were in favourof an autonomous body within the framework of IAEA. They enterfortained the idea of establishing an "International Programme
22 4
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes."'
221

222
225

224

Keller, Bolliger and Kalff, loc-cit., P. 45. Nuclear explosives are likely to involvýe a-few large blasts thatmust be detonated before other mining or construction activities can comnmence. See Brooks and Krutilla, 2p.cit., p. 18.
IAEA Doc. GC (XII)/RES/245, 50 Sept. 1968.
IAEA Doc, G-C (XIII)/410, 31 July 1969, para. 13(b). For
the Agency's position under its Statute, see Ibid., paras.
4-5,
theSee the draft resolution submitted to Committee Two of462

osderntietbihntftv,

wthi - thapiainonulrexosn,tofor theI peceu*1videtd
fo r ina Proo-nspio,jori,otha drf t resoutio

Non-NIuc.i ear-Welap on
Explosions for

ttueo
t
sCite

in
Ltte
vie

ecflProei

A1A

ofadprmn
beroheA,nyto thPoneeCeoof esalsigwt

InJh

hedat

hc
a
proved by Committee Two of the Cnrec,failed, howe,ver,obtain the required two-thirds majority in the Plenary. 2 27

p
toThose who opposed the resolution had mainly considered premature the decision to establish such a deDartment before any,rogrecohad been achieved in the actaal application of peaceful nuclear explosions.28
The IAEA's Board,in

its first

ponsibIlity to provide services inreport -in 1969 on its
this field,res-reached the fol-lowing- conclusion"At this stage the tasks of the Agency in relation
to peaceful nuclear explosions can be carried out
bythe Deparý
of Technical Operations of the

225

226
227

228
229

Conference of Non-Nucl ear- Weapon States by Mexico a_ndý
eight other Latin American countries. A/COINF.35/C.2/L.12,
20 Sept. 1968. For the detailed organisational aspect ofsuch a "Programme" t , see Mexico, "International Programmeof Nuclear Explosions".
See the draft resolution submitted to Committee Two of theConference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States by Argentina, Brazil and Peru. A/CONF.35/C.2/L.9, 20 Sept. 1968.
A/CON7F.35/C.2/L.13,
20 'Sept. 1968 and Corr. 1, 21 Sept.`U
1968.
See the results of votiig in A/CONF.35/C.2/R16,
25 Sept
1968, pp. 173-174 and A/CON.F.35/SR.17,
26 Set. 1968,p). 211.
For example, see A/CONF.35/C.2/SiR.14,2
et98
Pp. 1-56-157 (Hungary and UAR) and A/C0N?,"5C,/R,,
25 Sept. 1968, p. 182 (Switzerlanid).
IAEA Doe, GC (XIII)/410, 51lJuly,99,prai5()463

Aeyeslat.er and ni ,omi,pliance wvith a resolui.--ion of
heIAAcBar o GIoverno)rs on 13` September 19'74, a lunit was
the IAADepartment of Technicaled n'1
Janar 17inestabiatotoeawi.th the technological, economic., safety and
The uni is responsible forle 1spct o teuse of FNITE
colletingand echaning all relevant information, for, takingOpaci-on on the reqpuest.s for Services relatled to the use of PNEeonýom,ic s o f tI,-s and alterznati ve techanolanlo ureigte

f AlrticlIe V of thie NPT, the 1975 NPT Review
Coný,ference considered the IAEA to be the appropriate interIt urged
national body, referred to in Article V of the NPT.
the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which interreiew
In isgovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice
can be given on the Agency's work in the field of PNEs.
In fact, a few months before the NPT Review Conference convened, the IAEA Board of Governors at its February 1975 session
discussed the possibility of establishing a special committee
for PNE. On 11 June 1975, a few days after the Conference wound
up its review, the Board established the intergovernmental Ad
Hoc Advisory Group on PNEs, which we have so far reviewed its
basic results and recommendations.
Between September 1975 and August 1977 the Ad Hoc Advisory
The Group als.oGroup composed of 41 States held five sessions.
made arrangements whereby States Party to the NPT but not members of the IAEA, which would wish to do so, could participate
in its work.
Noting that the IAEA has established a PNE unit within its
Secretariat and has adopted the procedures for the Agency to use
in responding to requests for early phases of PITS project services, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group has interpreted its mandate as
being to advise the IAEA Board of Governors on the factors involved in extending the Agency's role in arrangements for theprovision of PNES project services to include also later project
staqges such as project definition, project execution, past-

460ý4

project evaluation and proj ect termnto
hssocarried out under Agency observation andprcdes

On 23 September 1977,~~

the lAEA Board of GovernL'Tors hvn

examined the report of the Ad Hoc Advisory GTroup,
dcddtkýeep the subject matter of the report under 1:review
and to conitinue consideration of the matter w1hen appropriate-.
Itl also
decided that the services of' the Ad Hoc Advisor,y Gr,oupsoulconitinue to be available as required. 23
The second question concerns theo na'iture of til hE A'Srole)in this domain. Is the role going t.o be meel an adminIsta
tive one or also rýegulator,y '? The ge-erail trendIc, as canibece
duced from the 1969 UN Scecretary-General's report,- on theestablishment within the framework of the IABA of an international
service and the discussions thereupon, is in favour of an intermediary role for the IAEA.2 3 1 On the other hand, it istobe noticed that Sweden, which had played a leading role in requesting that any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
should be subject to international licensing by an international body, was not of the opinion that IAFA should carry the responsibility for the crucial "go ahead" decision. In its view,
some more central UN body, or a body explicitly representativeof the parties to relevant treaties, should be charged withthat responsibility. 232
The TAEA Board of Governors, in its aforementioned 1969
report, while not taking a definite stand on this question,

230

See Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, IAEA Activities -UnderArticle V of NPT. Analy -t
ic-aland Technýical
ppt(NPT/CONF/12, 17 Feb. 1975), p. 8 and Preparatory;C05-Mo-rittee for the Second Review Conference of the Parties
to the NPT, IAEA Activities Under Article V of NPT (APT/CONF.II/PC.II/9, _25__J'ulY 197)
PP. 4-5 and, Ann1.H,epc
P. 103.

231

See UN Doo. A/7678, 29 Sept. 1969 and Add. 1,30Ot
1969, Some countries argued that IKELA sho). uldrglt`lnuclear explosions. See Ibid., para. 13.

232

Ibid., p. 33,465

o fthe eX perimIIenrt al.
)nteigt
thit subteAg,,ency should approachi.
devot,ing its att-enti-on initially1Isiry
ctonanev uti
ofinfrmaton. 2 3 3 It isneri eoisemiatio
to te
h~s tterfunion hatwas sin-gled out by the Conference ofThe nature of
NonNucea WeaonStat-es In its RFesluin.

~pI s eteiwta
o e noogt teroe, oweer,has evolved greatIly since this Conference,
theIAS
ast cn cealn.,y be asc.e_rtained from the analysis undertaken so
frudrthis Cha-_pter, b)ut as it appears it Will1 basically be an
in:tereiary role.li.il-,,,Nevert;heless, 1AEA could exert great influencao deci6ions that, will have to be made by States embarking
oni a PNE project. The Agency's involvement in arrangements forthe provision of PNE project services would be crucial in bringing about a fruitful outcome.
Apart from the detailed functions envisaged and carried out
by the IAEA, which have been discussed here so far, it remains
for us to tackle some remaining aspects of the role of 1AEA in
the field of exchange and dissemination of scientific and technical information pertaining to PNEs. The first panel of experts
to study the phenomenology and applications of PNEs, which washeld in Vienna in 1970, recommended the early preparation of an
introductory review of PNEs' technology and the publication ofa multiling-dal glossary of terms. 235 The glossary in four
languages (English, French, Russian and Spanish) was completed
and published in 1979. 236 The IAEA also published in 1970 abibliography on PNEs containing 1759 references to literature
published up to June 1969, 237 Work on updating and revising thePNE bibliography has been continued and the revised bibliography

233
234

235
236
2357

IAEA Dcc. GC (XIII)/)410, 31 July 1969, para. 13(c).
Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (A/CONF.35/10, 1 Oct. 1968), Resolution H (I),p. 14.
See IAEA Doc. GC (XIV)/INF1121, 25 Aug. 1970, paras. 19-20.
Doc. NPT/CONF.II/PC.II/9, 25 July 1979, P. 7.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions (Vienna: IAEA, 1970)(Bibliographical Series, No. 3d).

4-66

iS to b e PuQbI ish1e d in 1902Moreýover,at. thehtchiapanel held inl Vienna in 1976), iLt wa,s f'eitý thý1a t-,j ,vrwolt

be pJpopr-Late for thle IAEA toconiu to pr,ovid(eths oruoech-ýI
nical meetings about thie deve,.lopmentof tehiusfor,using
PNEs, as sufficient new information became
aalbe
it
technical panel was scheduled for. 1979,23
The role of the 1AEA continues to lbe, thesukbjýect Ofreis
by its own organs as well as by the UJ General
Assembly onl thle
occasioni of its anniual consideration of TARp,ý,aM1ul1epotMand more par,ticu_arl]y since- thec 27th Lsessi,onof teAsml
when the item on peace--ful nuclear explosi'ons
ceasecd to figuJýre
on its agenda. In that session, the r,ole of
IABI 'was als'-o considered for the last time in connexion with
the item related
to the "Implementation of the Results of theConference of NonNuclear-Weapon States", which did not figureon the, agenda ofthe 28th u_i.,ssion of the Assembly. With the disappearanceof thelatter two items, the IAEA emerges as an unchallenged
organisation not only with respect to peaceful nuclear
explosions but
also with respect to the other questions pertaining
to its competence and treated by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States, namely the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and nuclear
safeguards. The symbolic consideration of IAEA reportsby theUN General Assembly should not, in principle, detractfrom its
confirmed and growing authority.
The confirmation by the 1975 NPT Review Conferenceof the
IAEA as the "international body", through which
potential
benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions could
be made available, has enhanced the prestige
and the central
role of the IAEA in this domain, which so far remains
unchal,lenged.

238

239

Dcc. NPT/CONF.Il/PC,,I/9,
Ibid., p. 6.

25 July 1979,

467,

p. 7.

etechnology of Peaceful inuclear explosions
To u,
ome
I
i i he eeac anid deovelopmnt stage. Athog
isse achieve inthcield of actual apd po rss aslimapp)ijcations are expected to materplicati no largesae
lalis-oror Some ye(-ars to co-me, in fact suc lage-scale promay evn e considereýd altAogether -un'acceptable in view'jects

feasi(ýJbi.ity prbem .hey present. However, efforts in
th-is2 dom-aini seemi not to be fuieand the enormous difficulties_enclountereod should not, In p)rinciple, l-essen the determinoffth

huma,41
ation to pursue these efforts more vigorously. In any new
venture, initial efforts are usually painful and sometimesoffraught with considerable risks. Human ingenuity in facepressing needs has rarely failed to find the proper solutions
for more complicated problems. The results would be of significant importance to both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.
In an era of energy crisis, contained nuclear explosions offer
the possibility not only of increasing fossil fuel production
but also of releasing new energy sources. Cratering explosions,on the other hand, provide for example an opportunity for many
developing countries with vast arid areas to increase theirwater resources. One can even envisage that applications entailing minor ecological risks could be carried out, for energy
needs may become so great that some risks will -be tolerated byboth governments and public opinion.
The introduction of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the NPT to the benefit of nonnuclear-weapon States is another manifestation of the attempt
to realise an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities andobligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The
remarkable fact is that by virtue of Article V certain basic
rules of conduct have been formulated before any actual peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are known to be imminent
on an international level. MYoreover, efforts to translate someof those rules into detailed guidelines or definite choices for

468

e-,Ven]tu,a-L im)Pl-ementation of- rtcl Vweepotanseou
sutch as thle case OJ` internatioaloberai
on and th choice o
the I AEA as -the intlernatilonal bLody,Smteue,hwvr
willI in all probability reml-ain a deadleterntil theý(t,)c.[ology becomes a feasible onie, On th1terhn,0t chioioc of
the IAEA and the working ouit of itrainlpoeeii
lar to those work-ed out forinentoaobrvinmylae
littleroom for a. special inento
cludled.ý

al :)agreement tob

co.n-

TepotentiaLl benefits of peacefu nuclar
explosion si-ho)ujd
be made available without discrimination
and at thellowest Possible charge to all those woha-ve, rený_ounced
the production andacquisition of nuclear explosive dcvices.
International observation should be equally applicable tonuclear and non-nuclear-~
weapon States. This would guarantee thatpeaceful nuclear explosions are carried out according to theirdeclared purposes
especially under a comprehensive test ban
on nuclear weapons.
The achievement of a comprehensive banl
whereby peaceful nuclear explosions are permitted as exceptions
would be a necessary pre-t.-quisite for an orderly enjoymentof such explosions.
The choice of the IAEA as a basic channelof supply was
without serious challenge. Its organisational
set-up and thenature of its role in this domain can
only be finally settled
in the light of future experience.
Bilateral~ arrangements
kept to a minimuminas a channel of supply should beorder to facilitate the establishment ofa truly internationa2 regime.
To conclude,

the obligation to make available the potential
benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions is being
seriously taken up by non-nuclear-weapon States. For many
States-, thlis obligation is a quid pro quo for their renunciation.
of all nuclea--r
explosive devices. However, in view of tGhe eniormoius-dlil""Jcu1ties involved in the technology of peace_ful nuiclearexlso,
a technology unattainable by most, couýntriýes ap)a-rt
fr-om the.- tlwo

469

uo-owis the, ,dbLgation in Ar-tic-le V appears -tonul~ccssfo_,t tha non-nuclear-weapon, st,ates which, byb~gea
11tniclear e-xp)losive devices. are no,,t really sacrienounc.
f icn-.a imporýtant poten.tial within their grasp.
The 1975 NPT Review Conference was an opportunity for non-nuciear-w,eapon States to examine more closely the progressachieved in this domain and to judge for themselves if there
were any signs of neglect on the part of nuclear-weapon States
An eventual nuclear-weapon States' disinterestin thi's respect.
in peaceful nuclear, explosions might have serious repercussions
and might affect an orderly adherence to the NPT.
The buil-.4cu of obligations and responsibiJýtlies is not on±ly
so0Ugh1t in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy so
far examined but is also sought in the field of security whether through guarantees of nuclear protection against nuclear
attacks or threats or through disarmament and more particularly nuclear disarmrament. In the following two chapters we turntowards those two aspects of security :nuclear guarantees anddisarmament.

470