Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceRecovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction:４）Great East Japan Earthquake 2011
Item

Sub-item
Date and Timeof Occurrence

Data on Hazard

Information
2:46PM, March 11, 2011(JST), 05:46 (UTC)

Data
SourceJMA
JMA
USGS
ERI-UT

MagnitudeDepth

Mw. 9.0, Mj 8.4, 24 km (JMA)
M.9.0 (USGS)
Mw 8.8, 23.7 km (Univ. of Tokyo)

Epicenter

N38.1, E142.9 (130km ESE off Oshika Peninsula)
Off Pacific Coast of Tohoku (North East) Region, Japan

JMA

Intensity of
Shaking

JMA Intensity scale:7,
Max. Ground Acceleration: 2933gal

JMA
K-NET

47

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceGround Motion

A strong ground acceleration of over 2933 cm/s/s was observed in
K-NET Tsukidate observation station (Miyagi pref.) near the
hypocenter, and the strong ground acceleration propagated in broad
area. According to the distribution of ground displacement, there
was a major ground motion of maximum above 50cm from Tohoku
to Kanto area. Especially in Sendai plain there was a huge grounddisplacement of more than 100cm.

ERI-UT

average
Northern part of Tohoku
about 15m
(Sanriku)
Southern part of Tohoku
about 5m
(South of Sendai, Ibaraki, Chiba)

Joint
SurveyGroup

Tsunami(maximumheight)Major Affected
Area
Human
DamageDamage of
Buildings

max
more than 30 m
about 10m

Pacific coast of the Tohoku area - Boso Peninsula (Near Tokyo)
Dead:15,845

Missing:
Injured:

3,380
5,894

NPA
(Jan.20,
2012)Complete destruction:

128,471 houses

Partial destruction:
Partial damage:
Fully/partial burned:

242,309 houses
662,514 houses
281 houses

NPA(Jan.20,
2012)

Road

Data onDamages

Infrastructure/Li
feline Damage- Highway:- National Road:
Railway- Shinkansen:- Main lines:
Major Port:
Airport:Electricity:
Water Supply:

Sewage System:

979 km (closed to traffic)
1,119 km (closed to traffic)
990 km (Stop Operation)
1,012 km (Stop Operation)
15 Port
13 Airport
2.6 million houses power outages (Mar. 12)
1.8 million houses out of water supply (Mar.
16)
in 19 Prefectures
48 waste water treatment plants and 78
pumping stations stop operation in 7
prefectures.

CAO1

Gas
- piped:420,000 houses out of supply- supply by cylinders: 1,660,000 houses out of supply
Telephone:- Land line
1 million lines stop operation- Cell phone
14,800 base-station stop operation

Main Damage
Cause

Most of human and physical damages were caused by the tsunami.
More than 90% death and missing were killed by the tsunami(drowning).
It is difficult to identify or distinguish the damages by theearthquake in the tsunami affected area, however according to thesurveys conducted by the some research team (e.g. Architectural
Association), not many buildings were severely damaged by theearthquake.

48

SC

Item

Sub-item

Information

Characteristics
of Damages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

Majority of human casualties were caused by the tsunami. Thoughdeath and missing were reached almost 20 thousands, amount of
injured people of 3,300 was very small, and it would be a typicalcharacteristic of the tsunami disaster.
The majority of the building damages were also caused by thetsunami while many of collapsed houses were found and certain
amount of damages by earthquake was recognized in some inland
areas.
Many of damaged building were constructed before theenforcement of new building codes which was enforced in 1981.
Damaged to the infrastructures were also limited. Effects of theretrofitting were observed.
Factories in the disaster area were kept stop operation for a while
and it affected the global “supply chain” (especially parts production
to car industry), and eventually it affected to the global industry andeconomy.
Nuclear power plant located on the pacific coast was damaged by
the tsunami and totally lost power supply. Due to this power
failure, reactors were uncontrolled and damaged. A radiation
leaked to the atmosphere and it caused nuclear disaster.
Negative impact to the nation’s economy by shortage of electricity
due to power plant failure. Wide range and complexity damage
characteristics

Data
SourceSC
Sangiin

Total: about 16.9 trillion yen

DirectEconomic Loss

Buildings (House, Shop, Office, Factory, etc.):
about 10.4
trillion yen
Lifelines (Water, Gas, Electricity, Telephone, etc.): about 4.3
trillion yen
Infrastructures (Road, River, Port, Airport, etc.): about 2.2
trillion yen
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheryabout 1.9
trillion yen
Others (School, Gov office, Hospital, etc.).:about 2.5
trillion yen(1 trillion yen = 12.5 billion USD)

49

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceLessons
Learned<Gap between pre-disaster assumption and the actual hazards>
Because the actual earthquake and tsunami differed from theassumptions, the tsunami height and extent, and the inundation
area exceeded expected levels.
The estimated inundation area
was used for disaster management material including hazard maps.
It is possible that the hazard maps that were prepared based on the
pre-disaster hazard assumptions lead to providing false sense of
security to people, and that the tsunami that exceeded theseassumptions led to an expansion of the damage.
In such situation, some school students evacuated to the safer placethan that of designated place on their own decision, and this shows
the good example of disaster education and proper risk
communication.
<Damage to structures>
Looking at the structure measures, while these are effective against
tsunamis with tsunami heights within the scope of their design, themassive tsunami and colossal damage witnessed during thisdisaster exposed the limitations of disaster management measuresthat rely on coastal protection facilities to an excessive degree.
<Under-estimation of the first tsunami warning and its effects>
The estimation of earthquake magnitude and the tsunami height by
JMA immediately after the earthquake vastly underestimated, andthe size of the earthquake and the tsunami warnings were
subsequently repeatedly revised upwards over time. It is consideredthat the impact of the initial tsunami height prediction wasparticularly great, and it is possible that the evacuation actions ofresidents and volunteer fire fighters were blunted by the initialtsunami warning, leading to expansion of damage incurred.
<Disaster Management Measures>
As damages by the disaster greatly exceeding the damage estimate,
the former principles for hazard assumption need to befundamentally reviewed and the disaster management measures
have to be rebuilt.

SC

Rescueactivities

Rescue activities were carried out mainly by police, firefighter, coast
guard and Self Defense Force (SDF). As for the SDF case, about
107,000 personnel were dispatched for SAR and other emergency
operation activities.
As a result of the efforts, about 27,000 people were rescued.

CAO2

Medicalservices

DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team): Total of 193 teams weredispatched and provided medical service for about 2 weeks.
Other Medical Team: Total of 2,656 teams (12,264 members) frommedical association, Red Cross, national hospitals, medical
volunteers, etc. provided emergency medical services. In addition
to the emergency medical care, some teams have being provided
mental care for the disaster victims.
Also received medical teams from four countries.

CAO2

Evacuation
shelter

Public facilities e.g. schools, community centers, public gymnasium
were played as evacuation shelter and most of them were
designated as shelters.
3 days after the disaster event, about 470 thousand people were
kept evacuate in more than 2,100 shelters.

Food, water andother relief
goods supply

Foods and other relief goods were supplied by the central
government, local government and others (NGO, other institutions,etc.)Central government provided 26.2 million meals and 7.9 million
water bottles for evacuees during 2 months and a half from thedisaster.

Emergency
Response

50

CAS
recon1

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceInformation andcommunication

To provide the information to the evacuee, the followings wereconducted.
1. Handbook- Livelihood support- Livelihood and business reconstruction- Guide for temporary shelter life
2. Flyer
3. Special TV and Radio program for evacuees
4. Newsletter through electric media (Internet)
Handbooks and flyers were distributed through not only official
channel but also various channels e.g. volunteers (with explanation)and shops.

CAS

Support from
PrivateCompanies

Many private companies provided food and relief goods to theevacuated people in their areas of expertise. Logistics for relief
goods were also supported by private companies.
Privatecompanies donated money for disaster victims.
Internet service providers, other website operators and privatecompanies who had intention to contribute to assist disaster victims
opened the special site for donation to the public, and donation
through the Internet becomes one of the channels for donation.

wiki

163 countries and territories and 43 int’l agencies stated assistance.

Support fromabroadRecoveryReceived rescue team (incl. medical assistance team) from 29
counties, territories and agencies.
Received relief goods from 63 counties, territories and agencies.
Received donation (money) from 93 counties, territories andagencies and total amount of donation was more than 17.5 billion
yen (USD219 million).
US military forces provided special support called “Tomodachi
Operation” with more than 20,000 military personnel.

Lessons
LearnedBased on the lessons learned previous large-scale disasters,
mobilization of SDF, DMAT, Tech-Force and other government
institutions were rapidly conducted. A principle for emergency
road recovery called “Kushinoha sakusen” was contributed to start
the early relief activities, and it was effective to supply relief goods
to the affected areas.
While many collaboration activities were made, supply of relief
goods to the affected area was in trouble because the affected areas
were too big and roads along the coast were severely damaged by
the tsunami.

Infrastructure/
Lifeline

Roads and highways were re-opened in two weeks except thesections that bridges were washed away.
50% of railways were restored in one month. About 1.5 months
after the disaster, Shinkansen was return to the full operation whilesome main railway lines were still under restoration because somesegments were completely washed away and new alignments of therailways have not been decided yet.
Electricity: Restored in about 1 week
Water Supply: 50% was restored in 1 week and mostly restored in
one monthGas: 50% was restored in 3 weeks and mostly restored in 1.5
months
Telephone: 50% was restored in 3 days and 90% restored in 2
weeks
Note: Lifelines were restored only the areas where not affected by
the tsunami. Restoration of lifelines in the areas affected by thetsunami will be done in accordance with the implementation ofreconstruction plan.

Other services

N/A

51

CAO2

SC
MILT1

SC
JSCE1

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceTemporaryHouse

Provided by prefecture government (Subsidized by the central gov.)
Required number of temporary houses: 53,013 (Completed:
52,182 as of end of Dec. 2011)
Iwate:
Required: 13,984, Completed: 13,984
Miyagi:
Required: 22,095, Completed: 22,095
Fukushima:
Required: 16,619, Completed: 16,226
Start construction: 2 week after disaster
50% completion: middle of June
More than 90%: middle of Aug.

CAO2
MLIT
kasetuDisaster
Waste/Debris

The tsunami produced huge amount (about 23 million tons) of
disaster waste. The amount of waste is the equivalent to 19 years’
waste amount (15.7 million tons) for Miyagi and 11 years’ waste
amount (4.8 million tons) for Iwate.
As of Nov. 2011, about 62% of waste was removed, however, due tolimitation of the processing and disposal capacity, progress of waste
disposal was not sufficiently progressed. As capacity of waste
dumping sites in the disaster affected area is limited, wide area
collaboration for waste disposal is being conducted.

CASdebrisFinance

Since the scale of damage was huge, local governments could not
bear the cost for recovery. Therefore, central government allocate
contingent budget for recovery by supplementary budget
arrangement, and almost all recovery costs will be bared by thecentral government.

MIC
news1

Support from
PrivateCompanies

N/A

Support from
AbroadN/ALessons
LearnedAs the measures had been taken in the various sectors such as road,railways and lifeline service providers etc. based on the lessons
learned from the past disasters, rapid recovery was made possible.
On the other hand, the scale of disaster was huge and affected wide
area and sectors including provision of electricity and supply chains,necessity of BCP (Business Continuity Plan) has been strongly
emphasized.

52

MILT2
news2
ntt

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourcePrinciples

The Reconstruction Design Council in response to the Great East
Japan Earthquake prepared the report and seven principles forreconstruction were proposed.
(1) For us, the surviving, there is no other starting point for thepath to recovery than to remember and honor the many lives
that have been lost. Accordingly, we shall record the disaster for
eternity, including through the creation of memorial forests andmonuments, and we shall have the disaster scientificallyanalyzed by a broad range of scholars to draw lessons that will
be shared with the world and passed down to posterity.
(2) Given the vastness and diversity of the disaster region, we shallmake community-focused reconstruction the foundation ofefforts towards recovery. The national government shallsupport that reconstruction through general guidelines andinstitutional design.
(3) In order to revive disaster-afflicted Tohoku, we shall pursue
forms of recovery and reconstruction that tap into the region’s
latent strengths and lead to technological innovation. We shallstrive to develop this region’s socioeconomic potential to leadJapan in the future.
(4) While preserving the strong bonds of local residents, we shallconstruct disaster resilient safe and secure communities andnatural energy-powered region.
(5) Japan’s economy cannot be restored unless the disaster areas
are rebuilt. The disaster areas cannot be truly rebuilt unless
Japan’s economy is restored. Recognizing these facts, we shallsimultaneously pursue reconstruction of the afflicted areas andrevitalization of the nation.
(6) We shall seek an early resolution of the nuclear accidents, andshall devote closer attention to support and recovery efforts forthe areas affected by the accidents.
(7) All of us living now shall view the disaster as affecting our own
lives, and shall pursue reconstruction with a spirit of solidarityand mutual understanding that permeates the entire nation.

recon

Key issues

N/A

Reconstruction

National Level: Reconstruction Agency (established in Feb. 2012)

Organizations

Finance

Prefecture level:
Branch office of Reconstruction Agency
Reconstruction Headquarters of prefectural government
City/Town Level:
Implementing body for reconstruction esp. land use
planning
Since required amount of fund for reconstruction is too large to bearby the local governments. Therefore, central government will
directly provide fund to the local governments as well as subsidy tothe activities done by local governments.
To secure the fund for reconstruction, central government
established “Special Tax for Reconstruction” and will raise a “Special
Bond for Reconstruction”.
Reconstruction funds in prefectural level will be prepared and someof reconstruction works will be done using the funds.

Support from
PrivateCompanies

N/A

Support fromabroadN/A

53

recon1

MOF
recon3

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceReconstruction
Schedule

Reconstruction of major infrastructures e.g. roads, rivers, transportfacilities are being implemented and it planned to be completed in a
few years.
33 out of 43 cities/towns have already prepared their reconstructionplans.
Many of the reconstruction plans have target period ofreconstruction with the range of 7 to 10 years, and also set phasesof reconstruction e.g. years for recovery, rehabilitation andreconstruction with development.

recon1
miyagikesen
rikuzen

Key Target,featured
strategies/
approaches etc.

Key target, strategies and approaches for reconstruction are varied
depending on the existing situation of the cities/towns.
Some approaches, i.e. “creating a safe city for disasters”, “creating avibrant city”, are common in many cases.
To create a safe city, especially for avoiding any human land use
plans have been prepared by restricting the residents in tsunami
affected areas and relocation of village to the high land.

Economic
Recovery
Other
Characteristics
Lessons
LearnedN/A (Reconstruction is on progress.)
N/A
N/A (Reconstruction is on progress.)

54

recon1
miyagikesen
rikuzenItem

Sub-item

Information

Reports

JMA: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html
USGS:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/
ERI-UT:
http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eqvolc/201103_tohoku/eng
K-NET:
http://www.kyoshin.bosai.go.jp/kyoshin/topics/html20110311144
626/main_20110311144626.html
Joint Survey Group: http://www.coastal.jp/tsunami2011/
NPA: http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/index.htm
CAO1: http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/2-shien/1-infra.html
CAO2: http://www.bousai.go.jp/
Sangiin:http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/keizai_prism/ba
cknumber/h23pdf/20119201.pdf
CAS: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/fukkou/
MIC: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000117828.pdf
MILT2:
http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/road/jisinkannrenjouhou_110311/kushi
nohasakusen.html
MILT2:
http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/road/jishinkanrenjouhou_110311/fukky
uuriyuu.pdf
MOF: www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/201112e.pdf
recon1: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/
recon2: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/fukkou/english/index.html
recon3:www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/doc/20110729houshin.pdf
debris: http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/material/
SC:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/higashinihon/index_higas
hi.html
JSCE1: http://committees.jsce.or.jp/2011quake/node/86
news1:
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110327/dst110327120200
31-n1.htm
news2:
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/news/110605/biz1106052327
0007-n1.htm
rekuzen:
http://www.city.rikuzentakata.iwate.jp/kategorie/fukkou/fukkou-k
eikaku/fukkou-keikaku.html
kesen:
http://www.city.kesennuma.lg.jp/www/contents/1318004527115/index.html
miyagi:
http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/seisaku/sinsaihukkou/keikaku/index.htmntt; http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-04/index.html
wiki: ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/東日本大震災に対する支援活動

Data/photos<Photo>http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/tohokuoki/photo_001.html
http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/snd-doboku/
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/etc/photo.html
http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/tsunami/
http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/

References

55

Data
Source