20192019

The Warning Level is used tocommunicate the timing of evacuation.

Warning Level
土砂災害から身を守るには

The government has been using the
土砂災害は主に台風や長雨、
集中豪雨などの大雨により、地盤がゆるむことによって発生します。
four-level warning system
to provide
多発する土砂災害から避難するタイ
ミングや被害を最小限に抑えるポイントを知っておきましょう。
evacuation information
since the flood
season (around June) of 2019.

Warning Level

土砂災害の多くは雨が原因で起こります。
雨量をチェックして十分な注意を払いましょう。

・大雨注意報の雨量基準(松山市) ‥‥平坦地で1時間雨量30ｍｍ、平坦地以外で3時間雨量70ｍｍ
・大雨警報の雨量基準(松山市) ‥‥平坦地で1時間雨量45ｍｍ、平坦地以外で3時間雨量100ｍｍ※松山市の年間雨量（平年値）は1,300mmほど。

Evacuate
now!

Start evacuation immediately if
１.松山市内には1,652ヵ所の危険箇所
Warning Level 3 or 4 is issued in

White Paper
3.避難のポイント
Disaster Management
雨 量
in JapanWhite Paper on Disaster Management in Japan

サバイバルへの道

第2章

your 現在、
municipality.
松山市には、
土砂災害の発生のおそれのある「土砂災害危避難のポイント

Evacuate
now if you
need time!

険箇所（土石流危険渓流・急傾斜地崩壊危険箇所、
地すべり危険箇
Warning Level所）」
は、
1,280ヵ所あります。土砂災害危険箇所のうち、
現地調査を
行い、
土砂災害防止法に基づき区域指定されたものが、「土砂災害
警戒区域・土砂災害特別警戒区域」
です。
現在松山市内の危険箇所
Warning
Level
でも、
愛媛県により順次指定作業が進められています。
さぼう
土石流による被害を防ぐために砂防 土石流危険渓流の看板
土砂災害は、
被害規模が大きく、人命や財産などを奪う危険性がえんてい堰堤を整備した（松山市の畑寺谷川）あります。
危険箇所はＰ39〜の地図ページのほか、国交省砂防部のホームページなどでも確認できますので、自分の家や近所が危険箇所、警戒区域等に指定されていないか、確認しておきましょう。
また、松山市には、372ヵ所の山地災害危険地（山腹崩壊危険地・崩壊土砂流出危険地、
地すべり危険地）があります。
これは山地災害防止の観点から都道府県により整理されたもので、土砂災害危険箇所と同様に人命に対する危険がありますので注意が必要です。

1
その がけのそばにいる場合は、がけの高さの2倍の距離 の所まで離れましょう。土石流の場合
は、流れから直角方向に向かって、高い所に逃げてください。

Check where toThose who need time
Stay
alert
Evacuate to a safe place「防災マップ」で危険箇所や避難場所・避難経路を確認しておきましょう。
日頃の心得(Announced by theevacuateshould evacuate(Issued by municipalities)
避難所でなくても、周囲に山のない広い駐車場など、逃げられそうな場所を事前に想定しておきましょう。
(Announced
by the(Issuedby municipalities)
JMA)
JMA)

2. 土砂災害の前兆現象
（サイン）

土石流の
速度は時速30〜40km
発生してから避難
Various signs are often observed before a sediment disaster. Payもあるので、extra attention during
heavy rainfall
土砂災害には前兆現象がよく見られます。
次のような
and watch for大雨の時はとりわけ注意し、
signs such as those listed below.
If you are seeingしても間に合いません。
any of the following phenomena,
前兆現象
Signs
of
Sediment
contact the fire department and other relevant authorities and evacuate from the area immediately.
現象を見つけたら、消防などに連絡してすみやかに避難しましょう。
に注意しましょう。
You should also evacuate voluntarily if you are concerned about your safety
during rainfall, even if you■Signs of Debris Flow1

The river water is muddy and somedriftwood is observed.

2

The water level drops while it is still raining or
stays the same when the rain has alreadybecome lighter. (The river flow may be being
blocked upstream by collapsed land.)

3

市民の声
20

1

2

3

Pebbles
continuously
falling.

The slope iscracked or looks“swollen.”
You hear
unusual or
rumbling sounds
from the slope.

Water is gushingout from the cliff.
(Also be warned
when you see
muddy waterflowing out fromthe cliff.)■Signs of Landslide

1

2

You see a dramatic change in the quality
or quantity of underground or springwater. (This is a phenomenon that occurs
when a new water passage
is created underground orwhen an existingwater passage
has been
expanded due toincreased water
flow.)● 高野町で発生した土石流災害

2
その 「土砂災害警戒情報」が発表された

場合は、危険度があがっている状態なので、気象情報や防災情報に注意。
「避難準備情報」（P96）が発令される前でも、身の危険を感じた時は自主的に避難しましょう。
また、夜間に大雨が予想される時には、
暗くなる前に避難する の が
安全です。

ゆる

こうばい

樹園で土石流が発生し、1人の方が犠牲になりました。斜面勾配は20゜
〜25゜
と緩く、普

段は全く水のない谷でした。このあたり一帯は果樹園が広がっており、多くの斜面で崩壊や土石流が発生しました。

この時 の土石流の 流 下 距 離 は 約300m 。地質は土石流発生域の上半分1★島のため、
孤立してしまうことの不安が大きい。
子供と離れて生活しているため、連絡の取り方を早急に話し合いたいと思います。
(50歳・女性）

避難

山で土砂災害が発生し、愚陀佛庵が倒壊しました。崩壊源は登山道脇の斜面で、そこから70m程度の距離を流れ下っています。地質は和泉層群で、風化土層と比較的新鮮な砂岩層の境界部がすべり面になっています。

かこう

城山は花崗岩と和泉層群の境界部に位が砂質のホルンフェルス、下半分が花崗置しています。城山の大半が史跡ですからやすい性質を有しています。松山の南部

め、表層土は根茎によりしっかりと保護さ岩です。何れの地質も豪雨時に崩壊し一帯には和泉層群が広く分布しています
が、これも崩壊しやすい性質の土です。

3

Water is gushing out from the slope.
(Trees are inclined or collapsed.)

数以上は、お年寄りなどの避難
行動要支援者です。
避難所までの移動に時間がかかるので、早めに避難をさせましょう。

平成22年（2010） 7月12日の早朝に城かこう

The ground is cracked. (You see cracks
in farmland, a road, a house, etc.)

3
その 土砂災害の犠牲者の半● 城山で発生した土砂災害

平成13年（2001） 6月19日からの豪雨により、松山市高野町の緩やかな勾配の果

Cabinet Office

You hear a rumbling sound from or in themountains. (Also be warned when you hearsounds of trees splitting or boulders rolling in
the river.)■Signs of Slope Failure

松山市高野町で発生した土石流。普段は水のないみかん山を、土石流が流れくだった。

土砂災害の多くは、木造1階で被災しています。雨が激しくて避難所への避難が困難な場合は、次善の策として近くにある頑丈な建物の2階以上に避難しましょう。さらに外に出るのも危険な時には、家の中のより安
全な場所（がけから離れた部屋や2階など）に避難しましょう。

DisasterPrecursors do not降雨に不安を感じる時は自主避難をしましょう。
これらの前兆現象がない場合でも、
see any of these signs.

土砂災害

立派な雑木林が広がっています。そのたれています。しかし、近年の異常豪雨が崩壊を引き起こしているようです。

★ニュースで見て、おそろしいと思うけれど、
いざ、
自分のところとなると、パニックになってしまって、
本当に冷静に行動できるか心配です。
(61歳・女性)

21

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Special Feature

Consecutive Disasters--Toward the Establishment of a Disaster Conscious Society--

Chapter 1
Disasters in 2018................................................................................................ 1
Section 1 Consecutive Disasters ...................................................................................... 1
1-1 The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (Western Japan) ......................................... 1
1-2 Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake .......................................................... 14
1-3 Damage from Typhoon Jebi (1821) ................................................................. 17
1-4 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake ........................................................ 22
1-5 Support for Reconstruction in 2018 ................................................................ 34
1-6 Introduction of Scientific Disaster Response Measures in 2018 ...................... 36
1-7 Support Activities by Volunteers and NPOs .................................................... 39
Section 2 Future Challenges Concerning Evacuation ..................................................... 44
2-1 Review of Government’s Evacuation Measures after the Heavy Rain Event ofJuly 2018 ........................................................................................................ 44
2-2 Report (Proposal) by the Working Group on the Review of Evacuation from
Flood and Sediment Disasters Caused by the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 .. 46
Chapter 2

Measures for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and National Resilience
Reflecting Disasters in 2018 ............................................................................. 48
1-1 Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure .............................................. 48
1-2 Approval of the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention,
Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience ..................................... 49
1-3 Implementation of the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster
Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience .................. 50

Chapter 3

Preparedness for Nankai Trough Major Earthquakes: Research on Disaster Risk
Management for Anomalous Phenomena....................................................... 52
1-1 Research on Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the
Nankai Trough ................................................................................................ 52
1-2 Disaster Risk Management for the Case of a Partial Area Rupture .................. 54
1-3 Disaster Risk Management for the Case of a Limited Area Rupture or a Slow
Slip ................................................................................................................. 56
1-4 Announcement of Information ....................................................................... 58
1-5 Guidelines and Future Steps ........................................................................... 59

Part 1 Current Disaster Risk Management Measures in Japan
Chapter 1
Current Disaster Risk Management Policies .................................................... 61
Section 1: Reducing Disaster Risk in Advance through Self-help and Mutual Support andPromotion of Disaster Risk Reduction Activities in Cooperation with Various
Stakeholders .................................................................................................. 61
1-1 Raising Awareness of Disaster Risk Reduction among the Public .................... 61
1-2 National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction and the National
Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction ......................................... 66
1-3 Initiatives for Disaster Drills ............................................................................ 69
1-4 Tsunami Preparedness Initiatives ................................................................... 71
1-5 Citizen-led Initiatives (Promoting Community Disaster Risk Management
Plans) ............................................................................................................. 76
1-6 Development of an Enabling Environment for Volunteer Activities ................. 80
1-7 Development of Business Continuity Systems ................................................ 83
1-8 Partnerships with Private Sector..................................................................... 89
1-9 Initiatives by Academic Communities ............................................................. 91
1-10 Initiatives from the Perspective of Gender Equality....................................... 92
Section 2: Disaster Management Frameworks, Disaster Response, and Preparation ...... 96
2-1 Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction .................................... 96
2-2 Establishment of the System for Designating Cities Conducting Relief
Operations Pursuant to the Amended Disaster Relief Act ............................... 97
2-3 Publication of the Case Studies on the Formulation of Evacuation Plans for
Volcanic Eruptions, Etc. .................................................................................. 99
2-4 Enhancement of the Training Contents for Local Government Heads andOfficials ........................................................................................................ 101
2-5 Securing Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites and Designated Shelters .. 102
2-6 Use of ICT in Disaster Risk Management....................................................... 105
Section 3 Responding to Disasters Anticipated to Occur ............................................. 107
3-1 Development of Countermeasures against Wide-Area Ash Falls from Major
Volcanic Eruptions ........................................................................................ 107
3-2 Deliberations on Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation from Flooding or Storm
Surge Inundation in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area ........................................ 108
Section 4: International Cooperation for Disaster Risk Reduction ................................. 110
4-1 Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the UN and Other International
Organizations ............................................................................................... 110
4-2 Bilateral Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation .............................................. 113
4-3 Development of the Overseas Expansion Strategy in Disaster Risk
Management ............................................................................................... 115
Section 5: Initiatives to Promote National Resilience ................................................... 117
5-1 Approval of the Action Plan for National Resilience 2018 ............................. 117
5-2 Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience ............................ 117
5-3 Support for the Formulation of Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience .. 118
5-4 Promotion of Private Sector Initiatives Contributing to National Resilience .. 119

Chapter 2
Progress of Measures for Nuclear Disasters .................................................. 120
Section 1: Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems .................................................. 120
1-1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System under Non-Emergency Conditions..........................................................................................................................
1-2 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System in an Emergency ......................... 120
Section 2: Bolstering Nuclear Disaster Management and Radiation Monitoring Under the
NRA ............................................................................................................. 122
2-1 Initiatives in Nuclear Disaster Management ................................................. 122
2-2 Emergency Response Initiatives ................................................................... 123
2-3 Emergency Radiation Monitoring Initiatives.................................................. 123
2-4 Accidents and Problems................................................................................ 123
Section 3: Enhancing and Strengthening Local Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Systems ....................................................................................................... 124
3-1 Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction /Evacuation Plans .......................................................................................... 124
3-2 Support and Initiatives for Other Prefectures ............................................... 129
3-3 Training and Seminars on Regional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness .......... 131
3-4 Strengthening International Partnerships ..................................................... 135
Section 4: 2018 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise ...................... 136
4-1 Overview of Exercise .................................................................................... 136
4-2 Overview of Performance............................................................................. 138
4-3 Post-exercise Initiatives ................................................................................ 140

AppendixSpecial Feature
Consecutive Disasters--Toward the Establishment of a Disaster Conscious
Society-In 2018, many disasters occurred consecutively in various parts of Japan, including earthquakes, heavy rains,
and typhoons. In particular, the earthquake that hit the northern part of Osaka Prefecture on June 18, theHeavy Rain Event of July 2018 centered on West Japan starting June 28, Typhoons Jebi (1821) and Trami (1824),
and the earthquake that stroke the eastern Iburi region, Hokkaido Prefecture on September 6 caused damage
to a wide area throughout Japan. The damage from the disaster was further extended due to other disasterthat occurred subsequently in the same areas. The consecutive occurrence of major disasters highlighted theimportance of disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience, which will lead topreparing for natural disasters and protecting people’s lives and assets. In order to continue to maintain andimprove Japan’s DRR measures into the future, it is necessary to build a "disaster conscious society" where eachmember of society has an awareness and a sense of responsibility for protecting their own life.
The “Special Feature” of the Reiwa Era’s first White Paper on Disaster Management covers major disasters
that occurred during the last year of the Heisei era. Chapter 1, Section 1 gives an overview of those that caused
especially extensive damage among a series of major disasters that occurred in 2018, while also looking backat response measures taken by the government. Chapter 1, Section 2 and Chapter 2 discuss the outline ofdisaster prevention and mitigation measures and national resilience initiatives that the government as a wholewill promote over the next years based on the lessons learned from the major disasters in 2018. Chapter 3
covers a Nankai Trough Megathrust Earthquake, the largest expected disaster in Japan, explaining the steps
being taken by the government and preparedness measures to be implemented in the future.

Chapter 1 Disasters in 2018
Section 1 Consecutive Disasters
1-1 The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (Western Japan)(1) Overview
The rain front that had moved from Central China up through the Japan Sea was stalling in northern Japan
from June 28, 2018. It then further moved north and reached the vicinity of Hokkaido Prefecture on July 4. On
July 5, the rain front moved down south and stalled in western Japan. From July 5 to 8, fifteen line-shaped
precipitation systems were formed over the Tokai region to western Japan. With nine of these systems, themaximum three-hour total rainfall exceeded 150 mm. In addition, Typhoon Prapiroon (1807) formed as atropical storm around the sea south-southeast of Okinawa Island on June 29 and was upgraded to typhoon
intensity around Okinawa Island on July 2. Due to the effects of the rain front and Typhoon Prapiroon (1807),
warm and very moist air kept flowing into the vicinity of Japan, causing record-breaking heavy rains across awide area throughout Japan, especially in western Japan.
1Daily Precipitation (Analyzed Precipitation)
July 6
July 7

July 3Note) Analyzed precipitation: 1-km-mesh precipitation distribution obtained by analyzing data from weather radars, AMeDAS,
and other rain gauge systems
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/data/bosai/report/2018/20180713/20180713.html)

The total precipitation from June 28 to July 8 exceeded 1,800 mm in some areas of the Shikoku region and
1,200 mm in some areas of the Tokai region, recording two to four times the average monthly precipitation in
July. In addition, the largest 24-hour, 48-hour, and 72-hour precipitations in recorded history were observed atmany observation points in the northern Kyushu, Shikoku, Chugoku, Kinki, Tokai, and Hokkaido regions. The
record-breaking heavy rainfalls affected an enormous area of Japan over a long period of time.

Precipitation distribution during the event(between 00:00 on June 28 and 24:00 on July 8)Distribution of the maximum 72-hour precipitation during the event(between 00:00 on June 28 and 24:00 on July 8)

Gifu Prefecture
Okayama Prefecture

Maximum 72-hour precipitation during the event
Period: June 28 to July 8, 2018

Kyoto Prefecture
Tottori Prefecture

Hiroshima Prefecture

Fukuoka Prefecture

Greatest precipitation
ever recorded
Greatest July precipitation
ever recorded

Saga Prefecture

Hyogo Prefecture

Nagasaki Prefecture

Ehime Prefecture

Kochi Prefecture

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/data/bosai/report/2018/20180713/20180713.html)

2

Track of Typhoon Prapiroon(1807)

3:00 p.m. on July 4Transformed into an
extra-tropical cyclone

9:00 a.m. on July 4985 hPa

9:00 a.m. on July 3
965 hPa

9:00 a.m. on July 2
965 hPa

9:00 a.m. on July 1
985 hPa

9:00 a.m. on June 30
992 hPa

9:00 a.m. on June 29
Central pressure: 998 hPa
19.8 degrees north latitude and130.3 degrees east longitude
Formed as a tropical storm

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/jma-eng/jma-center/rsmc-hp-pub-eg/bstve_2018_m.html)

After mid-July, temperatures rose significantly in northern, eastern, and western Japan. The monthly averagetemperature for July in eastern Japan was the highest ever recorded in July since statistics began in 1946. This
record high temperature was due to the North Pacific Subtropical High and the Tibetan high both continuing toextend to Japan. One of the causes was the sea surface temperature near the northern hemisphere tropics
being higher than normal, which caused more active cumulus convection than usual.
The series of extensive heavy rainfalls that affected a vast area of Japan, mainly western Japan, was namedby the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) as “the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018.” The JMA convened a special
meeting of the Japan Meteorological Agency Advisory Panel on Extreme Weather Events on August 10, 2018.
The Advisory Panel concluded that the torrential rains were caused as a massive amount of water vapor
continued to flow into the Baiu front, which was stalling in western Japan over the four days due to themeandering of the upper two jet streams. It also suggested that the Heavy Rain Event may be linked to global
warming, associated with a long-term trend of temperature increase and a similar increasing trend in theamount of water vapor in the air (Source:https://ds.data.jma.go.jp/tcc/tcc/news/press_20180822.pdf).
(2) Damage
The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 caused river flooding, inundation, and sediment and other disasters, whichleft 237 people dead (115 in Hiroshima Prefecture, 66 in Okayama Prefecture, 31 in Ehime Prefecture, 25 inother prefectures), 8 persons missing, and 432 people seriously or lightly injured. (Information by the Fire andDisaster Management Agency, as of January 9, 2019. Reference: https://www.fdma.go.jp/disaster/info/2018/).
3

○Human casualties (as of January 9, 2019)
Prefecture

Fatality

Missing persons

Seriously injured

Lightly injured

Okayama

66

3

9

152

Hiroshima

115

5

61

85

Ehime

31

33

2

Others

25

20

70

Total

237

123

309

8

In Hiroshima Prefecture, debris flows occurred concurrently in several locations, including Hiroshima City,
Kure City, and Saka Town. In Okayama Prefecture, a massive flooding disaster occurred in Mabi Town, Kurashiki
City, and other areas due to the breach of levees along the Odagawa River and other rivers. This levee breach
was caused by the water level remaining high over a long period of time due to a “backwater phenomenon”(meaning that there was no or little current of water) at the point where the tributary, the Odagawa River, met
the main stream, the Takahashigawa River. In Ehime Prefecture, river flooding occurred due to a heavy rainfall
exceeding the capacity of river control facilities. Debris flows occurred in Yoshida Town, Uwajima City, whichcaused a sediment disaster that destroyed a water purification plant.
Nationally, the heavy rainfalls caused damage to 346 points in 47 government-administered rivers of 22
riverine systems, and 267 prefectural government-administered rivers of 69 riverine systems. Inland inundation
occurred in 88 municipalities in 19 prefectures. 2,581 sediment disasters occurred in 32 prefectures (debris
flow: 791; landslide: 56; cliff failure: 1,734). (Information by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport andTourism, as of January 9, 2019. Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/index.html)

Flood in Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture

Damage from a sediment disaster in Yasu-ura Town, Kure
City, Hiroshima Prefecture

4

A road cave-in in Mizushiri District, Saka Town, Aki-gun,
Hiroshima Prefecture(Hiroshima-Kure Road)Sediment disaster near Yoshida Town,
Uwajima City, Ehime Prefecture

Flood in Higashi-Ozu District, Ozu City, Ehime Prefecture(Photo by courtesy of Ozu City)

Levee breaches in the Takahashigawa River, Okayama Prefecture
Extent of the Damage of the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (Odagawa River of the Takahashigawa River System)○ During the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the water level of the Odagawa River of the Takahashigawa River System remained high over a long period of time due to a backwater
phenomenon and other factors. This caused levee breaches at eight locations in Mabi Town, Kurashiki City, along the Odagawa River and tributaries flowing into it.
○ The flood exceeded 5 m in depth and caused many deaths.

Odagawa[Levee breach] L = approx. 100m
Around 3k400 of left side of Odagawa

Odagawa[Levee breach] L = approx. 50m
Around 6k400 of left side of Odagawa[Levee breach] Left side: L = approx. 200m
Right side: L = approx. 300m
Around 0k700 of both side of Suemasagawa(Prefecture)[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 80m
Around 4k200 of left side of Odagawa[Levee breach]
Left side: L = approx. 20m (Around 0k of left side of
Takamagawa)Right side: L = approx. 100m (Around 0k100 of rightside of Takamagawa)[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 30m
Around 0k600 of right side of
Odagawa[Overtopping]Around 3k200 of rightside

Odagawa

Odagawa[Overtopping]Around 7k000 of right side

[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 50m
Around junction of Obutanigawa and Odagawa[Levee breach] L = approx. 20m
Around 0k400 of left side of Suemasagawa(Prefecture)

Takaharigawa<Damage related to the Odagawa River>
Flood area: Approx. 1,200 ha
Number of flooded houses: Approx. 4,100
Levee breach: 2 locations (administered by the national
government)
6 locations (administered by the prefectural
government)
Levee slope failure: 6 locations (administered by the national
government)
1 location (administered by the prefectural
government)
Overtopping: 3 locations (administered by the national
government)[Levee breach] L = approx. 100m
Around 1k600 of left side of Madanigawa(Prefecture)[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 70m
Around 4k400 of right side of
Odagawa[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 1,000m (scattered)Around 2k800 to 3k800 of right side of Odagawa[Overtopping]Around 4k000 of right side

[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 16m
Around 4k200 of right side of
Odagawa[Levee slope failure] L = approx. 15m
Around 4k200 of right side of
Odagawa

Legend*As of 3:00 p.m. on July 16. Including prefecture-managed area.

Levee breachPartial levee
breachOvertopping

Source: Material provided at the First Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure held
on September 21, 2018
(Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html)

5

[Column]
Soil Piping
Soil piping is a type of internal erosion phenomenon where a pipe-like structure connecting the inside andoutside of a levee is developed. When the river level rises and the pressure of seepage water on thefoundation ground increases, soil particles of the ground (solid particles composing the soil) begin to bedischarged to the other side of the bank along with the seepage water. This creates and expands a pipe-likehollow structure that eventually becomes a conduit for water to flow. Growing erosion may degrade thesecurity of levees and may eventually cause a levee breach. It has been pointed out that a piping
phenomenon can occur in many rivers across Japan. During the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, piping
phenomena were observed at 28 locations in 12 government-administered rivers. In response to this, thegovernment has implemented retrofitting measures as needed, such as installing metal plates (sheet piles)
and impervious sheets in the river to reduce water permeation.
There are a few reasons why many rivers are prone to piping phenomena. Firstly, the foundation groundof every river includes some permeable parts (such as the ruins of old rivers) in an intricate manner. The
second reason is that the quality of soil and soil compaction methods used are inconsistent for different partsof the same river, because reinforcement works have been conducted on different parts as needed indifferent times over the long history. Lastly, rising river levels due to heavy rainfalls in recent years andincreasing water pressure on levees are also considered to have contributed to piping phenomena.
Levee breach due to seepage of river water

Water penetrates into the ground andcreates a pipe-like conduit.

If left unattended, the conduit expands
and the embankment starts to slip.

The levee is hollowed out and becomesprone to collapse.

Levee failure
due to piping
Conduit

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Damage to houses included 6,767 completely destroyed, 15,234 half-destroyed or partially damaged, and28,469 flooded. (Information by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, as of January 9, 2019. Reference:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/index.html)○Houses damaged (as of January 9, 2019)
Completely

Half-

Partially

Above-floor

Below-floor

destroyed

destroyed

damagedflooding

flooding

Okayama

4,828

3,302

1,131

1,666

5,446

Hiroshima

1,150

3,602

2,119

3,158

5,799

Ehime

625

3,108

207

187

2,492

Others

164

1,231

534

2,162

7,559

Total

6,767

11,243

3,991

7,173

21,296Prefecture6Damage to lifeline utilities included power outages affecting a maximum of approximately 80,000
households (approximately 60,000 households serviced by the Chugoku Electric Power Company andapproximately 20,000 serviced by the Shikoku Electric Power Company). Power supply for residential areas wasrecovered on July 13, 2018. There were also disruptions to gas supply affecting approximately 290 households.
This was recovered on July 8. (Information by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, as of January 9,
2019. Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/index.html)
Water outages occurred in 80 municipalities in 18 prefectures, affecting a maximum of approximately
260,000 households. Water supply was restored in all areas by August 13. (Information by the Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare, as of January 9, 2019. Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/index.
html)○Damage to lifeline utilities
Maximum number ofhouseholds affected
Power

Approx. 80,000

Water

263,593

RecoveryRecovered on July 13 (residential areas)
Recovered on August 13 (excluding the areas
where houses were damaged)

The total number of shelters in all prefectures was 3,779 at its peak, including 436 in Okayama Prefecture,
660 in Hiroshima Prefecture, and 462 in Ehime Prefecture. The maximum number of evacuees wasapproximately 28,000 (approximately 2500 in Okayama Prefecture, approximately 12,000 in Hiroshima
Prefecture, and approximately 800 in Ehime Prefecture). (Information by the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency, as of July 7, 2018. Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/index.html)
About a month later, the number of evacuees dropped to below 3,500. All of the general shelters were closed
by December of the same year (some welfare shelters continued to open until March 2019).

7

(3) Response of Government Ministries and Agencies

Government’s Disaster Emergency Response

Receive and communicate
disaster information●24-hour operation●Contact all ministries andagencies and all members of theemergency meeting team at
once
Information gathering (extent of damage,
response measures being taken)●Gather and integrate information fromgovernment ministries and agencies and otherpublic institutions●Distribute and share information inside thegovernment●Deploy advance information-gathering teams

Information gathering and emergency
response coordination●Hold Inter-Agency Disaster
Management Meetings●Coordinate emergency response
measures among ministries andagencies●Coordinate the deployment ofgovernment investigation teams●Direct the National On-Site Disaster
Management Office, etc.

Source: Cabinet Office

DisasteroccursConvene teammembers
When the establishment of theheadquarters is unnecessary forthe moment

Establish the Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
Manager: Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Location: Cabinet OfficeSecretariat: Cabinet Office
Management of the Headquarters
・Manage and coordinate response measurestaken by individual ministries and agencies
・Coordinate the deployment of government
investigation teams
・Direct the National On-Site Disaster
Management Office, etc.

The Emergency Meeting Team (Director-General class officials
from government ministries and agencies) ascertains thesituation of the disaster and integrates and coordinates firstresponse measures
Ascertain the situation of the disaster. Collect and integrate
information on response measures being taken (incoordination with the Cabinet Secretariat and liaison officers ofgovernment ministries and agencies)
Collect general information on the damage:・Image information (captured by helicopters, security
cameras, etc.)
・Primary information from ministries and agencies and otherpublic institutions

Ascertain the extent of the damage
When the establishment of the headquarters isnecessaryDiscuss response policies at an emergency Ministerial
meeting, etc.
Establish the Headquarters in an extraordinary Cabinet
meeting
Establish the Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters
Manager: Prime Minister
Location: Prime Minister’s OfficeSecretariat: Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office
Management of the Headquarters
・Manage and coordinate response measures taken byindividual ministries and agencies
・Coordinate the deployment of government investigation
teams
・Direct the National On-Site Disaster Management Office,etc.

From July 2, 2018, the government held a series of Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meetings to prepare for
emergencies. Through Cabinet Meetings, the government ministries and agencies coordinated with each otherfor managing the disaster under the direction of the Prime Minister. Based on the damage information gatheredby the Cabinet Office information-gathering teams, the government established the Major Disaster
Management Headquarters headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management at 8:00 a.m. on July 8.
The Headquarters held a total of 23 meetings (Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/
h30typhoon7/taisakukaigi.html). The Prime Minister attended most of the meetings and led activities to grasp
the extent of the damage, the overall coordination of response measures, and the prevention of secondary
disasters.

8

Response to the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
July 2
July 5
July 6

July 7
July 8July 9July 10
July 11
July 12
July 13Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting
Press conference by the JMA (regarding the heavy rain that would last until around the 8th); Inter-Agency Disaster
Alert Meeting
Press conference by the JMA (regarding the possibility of the announcement of an emergency warning); instruction
given by Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga; Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meeting
Hiroshima Prefecture invokes the Disaster Relief Act with respect to Hiroshima City and Saka Town, Aki-gun (date of
invocation: July 5).
(The Act was invoked with respect to 110 municipalities in 11 prefectures as of September 5.)
Cabinet meeting; instructions given by Prime Minister Abe
Deployment of Cabinet Office advance information-gathering teams (to Okayama and Hiroshima Prefectures)
Establishment of the Major Disaster Management Headquarters (a total of 23 meetings were held by September 6)
Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team (to Ehime Prefecture)
Hiroshima Prefecture decides to invoke the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due toDisaster with respect to Hiroshima City (date of invocation: July 5).
(The Act was invoked with respect to 88 municipalities in 12 prefectures as of September 26.)
Deployment of a government investigation team led by H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster
Management to Okayama and Hiroshima Prefectures
Establishment of a Team to Support the Daily Lives of the Affected[The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018] Relief Goods Procurement and Transport Team was established under the Team to
Support the Daily Lives of the Affected.
Prime Minister Abe visits one of the affected areas (Okayama Prefecture).
Cabinet approval on the use of contingency reserves (approx. 2 billion yen)Prime Minister Abe visits one of the affected areas (Ehime Prefecture).

First meeting of the Major Disaster Management
Headquarters (July 8)

July 14
July 15

July 21
July 22
July 24
July 31
August 2
August 3
August 5

H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster Management
visiting a shelter in Okayama Prefecture as the leader of thegovernment investigation team

Designation as a Specified Disaster
H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster Management visits one of the affected areas (Hiroshima
Prefecture).
The first announcement of the possibility of designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity
The announcement of the Support Measures for the affected of the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
H.E. Mr. Abe, Prime Minister visits one of the affected areas (Hiroshima Prefecture). The second announcement of thepossibility of designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity
H.E. Mr. Abe, Prime Minister instructs the government to develop a package for the restoration of lives and livelihoodsof the affected.
Designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity (Cabinet approval on the 24th; promulgated on the 27th)
H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster Management visits one of the affected areas (Ehime Prefecture).
Approval on the Support Package for the Life and Livelihood Restoration from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
Cabinet approval on the use of contingency reserves (approx. 105.8 billion yen)
H.E. Mr. Abe, Prime Minister visits one of the affected areas (Hiroshima Prefecture).

October 21 to 22 H.E. Mr. Yamamoto, Minister of State for Disaster Management visits affected areas (Okayama, Ehime, andHiroshima Prefectures).
November 7 Approval of the FY2018 supplementary budget, including expenses for recovery and reconstruction from the Heavy
Rain Event of July 2018 (503.4 billion yen)

H.E. Mr. Abe, Prime Minister, visiting an affected area (Ehime
Prefecture)

H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster Management
explaining to the affected the Support Measures

Source: Cabinet Office9

<Rescue Operation>
The government immediately started rescue operations from early July. The police, the Fire and Disaster
Management Agency, the SDF, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and otherorganizations dispatched rescue units from across Japan to the affected areas to conduct rescue and search
operations as well as secondary damage prevention activities and life support activities.
<Invocation of the staff allocation system to support local governments in affected areas>
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) invoked the staff allocation system to support
local governments in affected areas, a national system to send government staff to support affected local
governments, for the first time since its establishment in March 2018. 29 prefectures and cities sent 15,033
government officials to 20 local governments in the affected areas until September 15 to help the managementof shelters, issuance of Disaster Affected Certificates, and other administrative tasks.
This system uses a counterpart method, meaning that each affected municipality is paired to a supporting
prefecture or designated city basically on a one-on-one basis. For the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, Okayama
City was supported by Yokohama City while Kurashiki City was supported by Tokyo, Saitama, Fukuoka, andNiigata Prefectures. The system was amended in March 2019 based on the lessons learned from the disaster.

10

The staff allocation system to support local governments in affected areas
Purposes of the support staff dispatch under the system(1) To support disaster-related administrative tasks, such as the shelter
management and issuance of Disaster Affected Certificates(2) To support disaster management efforts by affected municipalities

Short-term deployment(1) To support disaster-related administrative tasks, such as the shelter
management and issuance of Disaster Affected Certificates
Disaster

Affected
municipalities

Support Phase I

Ascertain
whether support
employees areneededNotify that the
deployment of local
government employees
within the affected
prefectures is not
sufficient

Affected
prefectures

The deployment of local government employees
within the affected prefectures is not sufficient

Chief prefecture in theaffected regional block

MIC<When an earthquake with a seismic
intensity of 6 Lower is observed, the MIC andother relevant institutions gather and share
information>

Dispatch support employees from local governments in the affected regional block・Allocate a supporting counterpart (prefecture or designated city) to each affected municipality on a one-on-one basis
Field coordination meeting(Affected prefectures, chief prefecture in the affected
regional block, the National Governors’ Association, theJapan Association of City Mayors, the National
Association of Towns and Villages, Designed city
conference for Mayors, the MIC)

National coordination
headquarter
Report・Gather and share information on affected municipalities

Support Phase II

When Support Phase I is not enough(The National Governors’ Association, the Japan
Association of City Mayors, the National Association ofTowns and Villages, Designed city conference forMayors, the MIC (secretariat))

・Information gathering and sharing
・Total coordination and decision
makingDeploy additional support employees from local governments across Japan・Coordinate the deployment of additional support employees from other prefectures and designated cities across Japan

Prefectures work closely with municipalities in their jurisdictions to support affected local governments.

(2) To support disaster management efforts by affected municipalities(Deployment of a General Adviser Team)
What is a General Adviser
Team?

Role

Under the direction of the leader of the affected municipality, a General Adviser Team provides total support for disastermanagement efforts by the affected municipality.
The General Adviser Team gives advice to the leader of the affected municipality and engages in such activities as coordination with senior employees,
determination of the needs of support employees working in the affected municipality, and coordination with affected prefectures and other relevant
institutions as well as the MIC.

Structure A team consisting of several members, including a General Advisor for Disaster Management and a few Advisors for Disaster
Management
・General Advisor for Disaster Management (GADM): A person with knowledge in disaster response and experience of serving as a manager at a local government
・Advisor for Disaster Management (ADM): A person knowledgeable in disaster-related administrative tasks, such as the management of evacuation centers and issuance ofDisaster Affected Certificates*The content of “disastermanagement”

・Know-how on disaster response
・Administrative management,
including the development of acoordination body・Communication and coordination
with the MIC, etc.

Structure of
a General
Adviser Team

General Advisor for Disaster
Management (GADM)(1 person)

ADMs or other persons(1-2 persons)knowledgeable in disaster response
Communication and coordination
officers(1-2 persons)

The system for the registration and deployment of ADMs, etc.
(1) Government officials nominated by prefectures, designated cities, etc. can be registered on the ADM list after receiving training at theFire and Disaster Management Agency, MIC.
(2) In principle, a supporting prefecture or designated city should deploy a General Adviser Team with a GADM prior to counterpart
support.

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications website(Reference: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/jichi_gyousei/koumuin_seido/hisai_chiho_kokyodantai.html)<Push-Mode Support>
For the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the government conducted “push-mode support,” which had been
carried out in the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake. From July 8, under the coordination of the Cabinet Office,ministries and agencies requested the industries under their supervision to procure relief supplies. Under thisscheme, food, air conditioners, toilets, and other relief supplies were delivered to the affected areas up to July
26th.
11

Water restored

Government’s relief supply
procurement terminatedPower restored

Cabinet approval on theuse of contingency
reserves

Relief supply support
started

Deployment of anadvance informationgathering team (Ehime)

Timeline

Deployment of an advance
information-gathering team(Okayama, Hiroshima)

Push-mode support

OkayamaPrefecture

Deployment of Cabinet Office staff
Establishment of an On-Site Life Support Team in Kurashiki City
SDF supports the disposal of disaster waste
Provision of rental-type emergency temporary housing (application started on July 17)
Construction of construction-type emergency temporary housing (commenced on August 3)

All of the 312 units
were completed by
October 14.

Hiroshima
Prefecture

Deployment of Cabinet Office staff
SDF supports the disposal of disaster waste*On July 18, the Hiroshima Prefectural Government established the Sediment and Waste Disposal Team consisting of prefectural government
employees. The team supported activities of local governments.

Provision of rental-type emergency temporary housing (application started on July 20)
Construction of construction-type emergency temporary housing (commenced on July 30)

All of the 209 units
were completed by
September 28.

Deployment of Cabinet Office staff

Ehime
Prefecture

Establishment of an On-Site Life Support Team in Uwajima City
SDF supports the disposal of disaster waste
Restoration and coordination of the Yoshida Water Purification Plant
Provision of rental-type emergency temporary housing (application started on July 23)
Construction of construction-type emergency temporary housing (commenced on July 23)

172 units werecompleted by
November 9.

Source: Cabinet Office<Deployment of the Information Support Team>In the event of a disaster, various organizations carry out support activities simultaneously. Information
sharing is essential for efficient disaster response by these organizations. For this reason, the government
established the Information Support Team (ISUT) led by the members of the Cabinet Office and sent it to theHiroshima Prefectural Government in the disaster-affected area. (See Chapter 1, Section 1, 1-6 and Chapter 1,
Section 2, 2-6.)<Support by Volunteers>
A series of Disaster Volunteer Centers were established in the affected areas, to which many volunteers came
to offer support. A total of 260,000 volunteers from across Japan came to disaster-affected areas, including
Hiroshima, Okayama, and Ehime Prefectures, to help remove mud from houses and tidy up rooms and furniture.
In order to coordinate support activities among volunteers, NPOs and local governments, information sharing
meetings were held on a regular basis in Tokyo, Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures. (See Chapter 1,
Section 1, 1-7 and Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, 1-6.)<Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster, and Designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity>
Due to this disaster, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked with respect to 110 municipalities in 11 prefectures,
while the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster was invoked withrespect to 88 municipalities in 12 prefectures.
A series of major disasters caused by the seasonal rain front, including Severe Tropical Storm Maliksi (1805),
Tropical Storm Gaemi (1806), Typhoons Prapiroon (1807) and Maria (1808) and the Heavy Rain Event of July
2018, comprised a Disaster of Extreme Severity in 2018. On July 24, the Cabinet issued a Cabinet Order todesignate this series of disasters as a Disaster of Extreme Severity. (See Appendix 14-3 “The Heavy Rain Event12

of July 2018” (A-30 to 33).)<Watch-Over Care and Counseling Services>
Affected people may need to move into a very different environment after the disaster, such as temporary
housing. They also may face various issues regarding the reconstruction of their lives. In order to ensure that
affected people are able to lead their lives with a sense of ease, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare(MHLW) provided watch-over care and counseling services to prevent isolation, give advice on life-related
issues, and create social opportunities among residents in the areas affected by the Heavy Rain Event of July
2018, namely, Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures.

Visiting the affected as part of watch-over care and counseling services(Mabi Mutual Support Center, Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture))(4) Future Challenges and Measures
The government established the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 Initial Response Review Team chaired by
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sugita in order to analyze and review initial response measures taken by
government officials and utilize the lessons learned from this disaster for future disaster response initiatives(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon7/h30typhoon7/shodotaio.html).
In this disaster, many government officials carried out various support activities at affected local
governments. The Review Team had discussions based on reports on measures taken by individual ministries
and agencies as well as reports submitted by 79 government officials, including senior officials from the Cabinet
Office who were in charge of on-site coordination (Deputy Director-Generals and Directors) and other senior
officials from ministries and agencies (Director-General/Director-level officials) dispatched to the affected areas.
The Review Team outlined items that should be appreciated and those that require some improvement inrelation to the following five areas where most initial response efforts were focused: (1) ascertainment of the
shelter situation, (2) debris disposal and sediment removal, (3) water supply support and restoration of water
service, (4) securing housing, and (5) support for local governments.
Many of the emergency response measures taken in the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 were based on what
was pointed out in the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake Initial Response Review Report. (Reference:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h280414jishin/h28kumamoto/shodotaio.html)
For example, the establishment of a Team to Support the Daily Lives of the Affected immediately after thedisaster, the early dispatch of senior officials from ministries and agencies, push-mode support, and theestablishment of the Relief Goods Procurement and Transport Team are all based on the lessons learned fromthe Kumamoto Earthquake. The government intends to work with ministries and agencies to review manuals
13based on the Review Report from 2016 and the report on this disaster to further improve the government’s
disaster response capabilities. (See Chapter 1, Section 1, 1-5 for support for reconstruction from a series of2018 disasters, including the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018.)[Column]
The Record Breaking Number of Sediment Disasters
Japan is a country prone to storm, flood and sediment disasters due to its natural environment. From olddays, the country has been hit by major disasters, such as Typhoon Kathleen which took almost 2,000 lives
and Typhoon Vera (Ise-bay Typhoon) which claimed more than 5,000 lives. In recent years the country has
also been struck by frequent storms, floods and sediment disasters, including Hiroshima Sediment Disasterin August 2014, Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions, Typhoon Lionrock in2016 and July 2017 Northern Kyushu Torrential Rain. The number of sediment disasters in 2018 was 3,459,
more than twice that of 2017. This was the highest number since the statistics were started in 1982 (thenumber of damaged houses was also the highest at 1,505). (See Appendix 20 (A-42).)3459
disasters
In 2018

August 2014 Torrential
Rains

Great Kii Peninsula
Flood Disaster
The Great East Japan
Earthquake

The Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake

August 1993
Torrential Rains

Nagasaki Flood
Disaster

Mid Niigata
Prefecture
Earthquake
Typhoon Tokage

June 1999 Torrential Rains

Number of Sediment Disasters (from 1982)(No. of disasters)

Average no. ofdisasters

1982

1984
1984 1986
1986 1988
1988 1989
1990

1990
1992

1992
1994 1994
1996

1996
1998 1998
2000 2000
2002 2002
2004 2004
2006 2006
2008 2008
2010

2016
2018

No.

Largest no. in thepast decade

Ranking in thepast decade1

Hiroshima

1,243

182 (2014)

1st

2

Ehime

419

58 (2016)

1st

3
4

Hokkaido
Yamaguchi237
193

56 (2014, 2016)
197 (2009)

1st
2nd

5

Kochi

171

122 (2014)

1st

3,459

[Damage]
Fatalities: Death toll 161
Injured 117
Housing damage:Completely destroyed 415
Half-destroyed 566
Partially destroyed 524

2014
2016

Prefecture

No. of sediment disasters
Debris flow, etc.: 985
Landslide: 131
Slope failure: 2,343

2010
2012 20122014

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism website(Reference: http://www.mlit.go.jp/report/press/sabo02_hh_000049.html)

1-2 Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake(1) Overview
At 7:58 a.m. on June 18, 2018, a magnitude-6.1 earthquake hit northern Osaka Prefecture. Kita-ku in Osaka
City, Takatsuki City, Hirakata City, Ibaraki City, and Minoh City registered an intensity of 6 Lower, while othermunicipalities in Osaka, Kyoto, Shiga, Hyogo, and Nara Prefectures recorded an intensity of 5 Lower or more.
14

After that, 12 earthquakes with an intensity of 1 or more occurred by 9:30 a.m. (four earthquakes with anintensity of 2, and eight earthquakes with an intensity of 1).

LegendIntensity 7
Intensity 6
Upper
Intensity 6
Lower
Intensity 5
Upper
Intensity 5
Lower
Intensity 4
Intensity 3
Intensity 2
Intensity 1Note) The “×” indicates the epicenter.
Source: Press release from the JMA (as of June 18, 2018)(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1806/18a/201806181000.html)(2) Damage
Casualties of this earthquake were 6 deaths, of which two people were killed by collapse of concrete block
walls. Damage to houses included 21 completely destroyed, 454 half-destroyed, and approximately 57,000
partially damaged in Osaka Prefecture and other areas. There were three fires in Osaka City and four fires in
Amagasaki City, Hyogo Prefecture. They were both extinguished on the same day. No person died from thesefires. (Information by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, as of February 12, 2019. Reference:https://www.fdma.go.jp/disaster/info/2018/)
Damage to lifeline utilities included power outages affecting a maximum of approximately 170,000
households (Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures) and water outages, which were restored in the morning of the dayof the disaster, and on the next day, respectively. At one point, gas supply was suspended for a maximum of
approximately 110,000 households in four cities in northern Osaka Prefecture (Ibaraki City, Takatsuki City, Settsu
City, and Suita City). However, it was completely restored within a week.

15

A concrete block wall along a swimming pool, which collapsed during the earthquake(Takatsuki Municipal Juei Elementary School, Osaka Prefecture)

27 shelters were opened, to which a maximum of approximately 2,700 people evacuated (2,397 in Osaka
Prefecture and 279 in Kyoto Prefecture). (Information from the Cabinet Office, based on the materials provided
by the Disaster management Headquarters in Osaka and Kyoto Prefectures, as of July 5, 2018. Reference:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30jishin_osaka/index.html)
The earthquake greatly affected the operation of companies in western Japan. Many companies temporarilysuspended business activities as the supply of necessary components and materials was stopped. On the other
hand, there were also some examples of good practices. Some companies sent support teams to affectedsuppliers to assist restoration according to the BCPs (Business Continuity Plans) developed following the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. An automobile manufacturer even managed to reopen its factory on the day
following the disaster thanks to such efforts. It was a good lesson for future disaster response that BCPs
formulated beforehand in preparation for disasters, greatly helped the restoration of business.
(3) Response of Government Ministries and Agencies
The government established the Emergency Response Office in the Prime Minister's Office on June 18, 2018and held a Cabinet Meeting on the Earthquake Centered on Northern Osaka Prefecture. On the 21st, Prime
Minister Abe visited affected areas and shelters in Takatsuki City to ascertain the extent of the damage.
Since many houses were damaged, the SDF conducted emergency disaster management support in 90
locations to seal damaged roofs with blue tarps. Due to this disaster, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked withrespect to twelve cities and one town, and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster was invoked with respect to one city. (See Appendix 14-2 Earthquake centered in the northern
Osaka Prefecture (A-29 to 30).)
In response to the incident of a concrete block wall failure, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology (MEXT) instructed Boards of Education in Osaka and other prefectures to strengthen DRR
measures to secure students’ and facilities’ safety. On the following day of the disaster (the 19th), the MEXT
issued a notification to all Boards of Education across Japan to urge them to carry out safety inspections ofconcrete block walls in schools. The MLIT published the Check Points for the Safety Inspection of Concrete Block
Walls on June 21 and asked local governments to warn wall users. In addition, the government amended a partof the Order for Enforcement of the Act on Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting of Buildings in order to obligate
the implementation of the same seismic tests as buildings for concrete block walls along evacuation routes.
16

The amended Order entered into force in January 2019. In line with this, a budget to aid expenses for theremoval of concrete block walls that failed the seismic test and diagnosis was allocated from the second
supplementary budget for FY2018.
1-3 Damage from Typhoon Jebi (1821)(1) Overview
Typhoon Jebi (1821) formed as a tropical storm around the Marshall Islands on August 28, 2018 and was
upgraded to typhoon intensity around the sea east of the Mariana Islands on August 29. It moved
northwestward over the sea south of Japan and made landfall on the southern part of Tokushima Prefecture
before noon on September 4. It made landfall with very strong typhoon intensity for the first time in 25 years
since 1993 Typhoon Yancy (9313). The typhoon again made landfall around Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture before
2:00 p.m. on the same day. It crossed the Kinki region while accelerating and then transformed into an extratropical cyclone as it moved northward over the Japan Sea. During the approach and passage of the typhoon,very intense winds and rainfalls hit western to northern Japan. Especially, the areas that were still in recovery
from the Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake in June suffered further damage and economic losses.

Track of Typhoon Jebi (1821)
Track of Typhoon Jebi (1821)

9:00 a.m. on September 5
Transformed into an extratropical cyclone

9:00 a.m. 5th

Before 2:00 p.m. on September 4Made landfall again around Kobe City,
Hyogo Prefecture
Before 12:00 p.m. on September 4Made landfall on the southern partof Tokushima Prefecture

9:00 a.m. 4th

9:00 a.m. 3rd

At 3:00 a.m. on August 28
Central pressure: 1004 hPa
14.5 degrees north latitude and 157.9
degrees east longitude
Formed as a tropical cyclone

9:00 a.m. 2nd

9:00 a.m. Sep. 1st
9:00 a.m. 31th

9:00 a.m. 28th
9:00 a.m. 30th 9:00 a.m. 29th

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/jma-eng/jma-center/rsmc-hp-pub-eg/bstve_2018_m.html)

The Shikoku and Kinki regions experienced intense winds, rainfalls, and storm surges. The largest maximum
wind velocity in Japan was observed in Muroto-Misaki Cape, Muroto City, Kochi Prefecture (maximum windvelocity: 48.2 m/s). There were also 53 AMeDAS stations that registered record-breaking maximum wind17

velocities, including the Kankuu Island (Kansai International Airport) in Tajiri Town, Osaka Prefecture (maximum
wind velocity: 46.5 m/s; maximum momentary wind velocity: 58.1 m/s), and Wakayama, Wakayama City,
Wakayama Prefecture (maximum wind velocity: 39.7 m/s; maximum momentary wind velocity: 57.4 m/s).
Top five AMeDAS stations registering the highest maximum wind velocity

Ranking1
2
3
45(from 0:00 on September 3 to 24:00 on September 5)
Maximum wind velocity
AMeDAS
Prefecture
Municipality
Wind
station(m/s)
Date
direction
Muroto-Misaki
Kochi
Muroto City
48.2
West
9/04
Cape
Tajiri Town,
SouthOsaka
Kankuu Island
46.5
9/04
Sennan-gun
southwest
Wakayama Wakayama City Tomogashima
42.9
South)
9/04
SouthWakayama Wakayama City Wakayama
39.7
9/04
southwest
Chuo-ku, Kobe
SouthHyogo
Kobe Airport
34.6
9/04
City
southwest

Time
11:53
13:47
13:18
13:26
13:59

Note) “South)” means that some data are missing (i.e. subnormal values).
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/data/bosai/report/2018/20180911/20180911.html)

In addition, some locations in Osaka, Wakayama, Hyogo, and Tokushima Prefectures observed recordbreaking tidal levels.
Stations that Observed Record-Breaking Tidal Levels
Location

Prefecture

Maximum tidal level due toTyphoon Jebi (1821)(cm)
Starting time

Highest tidal level in the past
(Altitude in cm)

Osaka

Osaka

329

9/4 14:18

293

Gobo

Wakayama

316

9/4 12:48

241

Kobe

Hyogo

233

9/4 14:09

230

Awayuki

Tokushima203

9/4 12:08

189

Date (cause)
1961/9/16(Typhoon Nancy (6118);
2nd Muroto Typhoon)
2012/6/19(Typhoon Guchol (1204))
1961/9/16(Typhoon Nancy (6118);
2nd Muroto Typhoon)
2014/8/10(Typhoon Halong (1411))

Note) The standard altitude was the Tokyo Peil (TP) or the one used by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan.
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1903/29c/press_highestsealevel.html)

18

[Column]
Causes and Damage of Storm Surges

Storm Surge●Causes of Storm Surges

Center of the typhoon(2) Wind setup effect(1) Inverse barometer
effectLevee
Breakwater

Normal tidal level

A storm surge is a phenomenon where the sea level increases to anabnormal level mainly due to the inverse barometer effect and thewind setup effect.
(1) Inverse barometer effectSince the air pressure is lower at the center of a typhoon or cyclone,
the sea water is “sucked” upward and the water level increases. The
tidal level increases by approximately one centimeter with every 1
hPa decrease in air pressure.
(2) Wind setup effect
When a strong wind blows from the sea toward the coast, the sea
water is pushed toward the coast and the sea level increases. Since
the increase becomes larger in shallower oceans, the tidal level
becomes particularly high on shoals.

●Damage from Storm Surges
Typhoon or cyclone

The extent of flooding may expand if high waves
occur when the water level is already high due to astorm surge.

Wind direction

If the water level rises due to a storm surge and the coastal
levee is breached, the sea water can immediately flood thecoastal area.
If high waves occur when the water level is already high due toa storm surge, waves can reach above the normal point and canfurther expand the extent of flooding.

Normal tide
(astronomical tide)

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1809/28a/2018092813.html)(2) Damage
The typhoon caused 12 sediment disasters across Japan. (Information by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, as of October 2, 2018.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon21/index.html
The record-breaking strong winds caused 14 fatalities (8 in Osaka Prefecture, 2 in Aichi and Shiga Prefectures,
1 on Mie and Wakayama Prefectures) and 46 seriously injured as well as damage to more than 80,000 housesin the Kinki region and other areas. (Information by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, as of February
12, 2018. (Reference: https://www.fdma.go.jp/disaster/info/2018/) Osaka Prefecture suffered the worst
damage to houses from this typhoon, with 28 completely destroyed, 436 half-destroyed and approximately
65,000 partially damaged.

19

Utility poles overthrown by Typhoon Jebi (1821)(Sennan City, Osaka Prefecture)

Damage to lifeline utilities was also enormous. There were power outages affecting 157 medical institutions
and water outages affecting 23 medical institutions (information by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,
as of October 2, 2018; reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h30typhoon21/index.html). In particular,
in the Kinki region, there were major blackouts and accompanying water outages due to the suspension ofwater supply pumps (up to about one week, depending on the area), resulting in serious disruptions toresidents’ lives, such as the suspension of drinking water and sewage services.
The Kansai International Airport was flooded from high waves caused by strong winds. There were runway
failures and power outages in some parts of the passenger terminal. Moreover, tanker Hounmaru (length: 89
m; weight: 2,591 tons), which was anchored in Osaka Bay, drifted away by the strong winds and eventually
collided with the bridge that connected the Airport and the opposite shore. This collision damaged the mediumpressure gas pipeline, resulting in the suspension of gas supply to the airport. With both air transportation andland transportation shut down, passengers were trapped inside the airport.

Flood at Kansai International Airport

Tanker that collided with the connecting
bridgeIn the Port of Kobe and other ports, container cranes and the management building stopped working as thepower source was down due to flooding from the storm surge. This resulted in the temporary closure ofterminals, which caused great disruptions to industrial and economic activities. Containers also collapsed and20were scattered due to winds. Some of the containers drifted away from the quay into ship courses and harbors,
disrupting the navigation of sailing ships.
The urban areas of Osaka City managed to avert flooding thanks to the Osaka Bay Storm Surge
Countermeasures and the appropriate opening and closure of the Yodogawa Floodwall Gate and the major
three floodgates in Osaka Prefecture (Ujigawa-Ajigawa Floodgate, Shirinashigawa Floodgate, and Kizugawa
Floodgate).

Management of the Yodogawa Floodgate, Kema Drainage Pumping Station, and the major
three floodgates in Osaka Prefecture
Yodogawa Floodgate

Yodogawa Floodgate [National](completed in 1983)

Around 3:30 p.m.
on September 4

Kema Drainage Pumping Station [National](renovated in 1983)

Yodogawa River(3) Draining

Kema Drainage Pumping Station(3) Neyagawa’s
water level
lowered(Dojimagawa River)Ujigawa Floodgate(2) Close(5) Open

Tosaborigawa
River(6) Draining
suspended
Old Yodogawa
River (Okawa
River)(2) Neyagawa’s
water level rose
Storm surge

Neyagawa River
Second Neyagawa
River(1) Storm surge(2) Close

Hiranogawa River(7) Open

Shirinashigawa Floodgate(1) Storm surge(2) Close(4) Open

Kizugawa Floodgate(1) Storm surge

Around 2:00 p.m.
on September 4

Ajigawa Floodgate(prefectural)

Around 2:00 p.m.
on September 4

Shirinashigawa
Floodgate (prefectural)

Around 2:00 p.m.
on September 4

Kizugawa Floodgate(prefectural)<Operation of the three major floodgates in Osaka Prefecture and Kema Drainage Pumping Station>(1) Storm surge alert issued for the three major floodgates (6:30 a.m. on September 4) → (2) The three major floodgatesclosure operation completed (1:43 p.m. on September 4) → (3) Kema Drainage Pumping Station started operation (1:45
p.m. on September 4) → (4) Kizugawa Floodgate opening operation completed (6:36 p.m. on September 4) → (5)Ajigawa Floodgate opening operation completed (6:49 p.m. on September 4) → (6) Kema Drainage Pumping Stationsuspended operation (7:55 p.m. on September 4) → (7) Ajigawa Floodgate opening operation completed (9:07 p.m. on
September 4)

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Kinki Regional Development Bureau) website(Reference: https://www.kkr.mlit.go.jp/news/river/disaster/2018/h30_september_typhoon21.html)(3) Response of Government Ministries and Agencies
The government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting on September 3, 2018. On the 11th, thegovernment sent a government investigation team led by H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster21

Management to Hyogo and Osaka Prefectures.
The Kansai International Airport reopened some of the domestic lines on September 7, and internationallines on September 8, after draining water and cleaning the runways. On the 21st, all the lines were almost fully
restored to the same state as before the disaster.
On September 21, 2018, it was announced that this disaster could be designated as a Disaster of Extreme
Severity as part of a series of major disasters caused by the seasonal rain front, including Typhoons Soulik(1819), Cimaron (1820) and Jebi (1821). On July 24, the Cabinet issued a Cabinet Order to designate said set of
disasters as a Disaster of Extreme Severity. (See Appendix 14-4 “Typhoon Jebi (1821)” (A-34 to 35).)(4) Future Challenges and Measures
In response to the damage to the airport due to Typhoon Jebi (1821), the MLIT established the Review
Committee on Countermeasures of Large-Scale Natural Disaster for Major Airports in Japan. The Committee
determined the direction of preparedness measures and identified urgent issues concerning large-scale natural
disasters, in order to secure air transportation networks even in the event of a major disaster. The government
intends to promote the updating of airport BCPs and flood countermeasures for the maintenance andrestoration of airports as a whole and for securing the stable functioning of major airports in the times ofdisasters. As for the Kansai International Airport, the government will provide a fiscal loan for the reinforcementof the airport’s disaster management capability, taking advantage of the current low interest rate, to thefounding company of the airport, which would pay a half of the expenses for short-term and long-term antiflood measures conducted by the airport operator, including the elevation of the bank protection,enhancement of draining capabilities, and anti-flood retrofitting of the power system.
In addition, in order to introduce countermeasures for storm surges and strong winds based on the lessons
learned from Typhoon Jebi (1821), the MLIT established an expert review committee to update the Guidelines
on Storm Surge Risk Reduction Measures for Areas Surrounding Ports and Harbors. Through emergency
inspections of international container terminals and critical infrastructure, it has become clear that storm
surges entail the risk of causing containers to drift away as well as the risk of power outages due to flood. The
government is also working on the flood countermeasures and enhancement of port BCPs for these terminals.
In response to the tanker incident, the Japan Coast Guard established the Expert Panel on the Prevention of
Recurrence of an Accident Caused by Dragging Anchors under Hard Weather in October 2018. At the end of
December 2018, the Panel stated in its interim report that “regulation by law would be required in order toprevent the recurrence of incidents due to dragging anchors under hard weather in the surrounding areas of
the Kansai International Airport.” Based on this opinion, the government promoted the enforcement ofregulation in the areas surrounding the airport from January 31, 2019. In the report issued on March 19, 2019,
the Expert Panel pointed out that “necessary incident prevention measures should be taken in relevant water
areas in cooperation with maritime experts and relevant local governments, while keeping in mind thesurrounding environment.” Following this suggestion, the government intends to develop recurrence
prevention measures in water areas surrounding Japan, including those near the Kansai International Airport.
1-4 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake(1) Overview
At 3:07 a.m. on September 6, 2018, a magnitude-6.7 earthquake hit the central eastern part of Iburi,
Hokkaido Prefecture. The earthquake registered a seismic intensity of 7 in Atsuma Town, of 6 Upper in Abira
Town and Mukawa Town, and of 6 Lower in Higashi-ku, Sapporo City. A vast area ranging from Hokkaido to apart of the Chubu region registered an intensity between 1 and 6 Lower. On the same day, the JMA named it22

“2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake”.
Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1809/06h/201809061730_4.html
This was the first earthquake with an intensity of 7 observed in Hokkaido Prefecture. It was also the firstearthquake with said intensity for Japan since the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (6th earthquake with anintensity of 7 in recorded history in Japan). After that, there were 344 earthquakes with an intensity of 1 orhigher by the end of March 2019 (1 earthquake with an intensity of 6 Lower, 2 earthquakes with an intensity of
5 Lower, 21 earthquakes with an intensity of 4, 38 earthquakes with an intensity of 3, 89 earthquakes with anintensity of 2, and 193 earthquakes with an intensity of 1).

LegendIntensity 7
Intensity 6
Upper
Intensity 6
Lower
Intensity 5
Upper
Intensity 5Lower

6 Upper: Motomachi, Higashi-ku, Sapporo City

Intensity 4
Intensity 3

7: Shikanuma, Atsuma Town
6 Upper: Matsukaze, Mukawa Town

Intensity 2

6 Lower: Hayakitahokushin, Abira Town

Intensity 1Note) The “×” is the epicenter.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from JMA

Daily number of earthquakes during the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
Number(Earthquakes with an intensity of 1 or higher from 3:00 a.m. on September 6, 2018
to 4 p.m. on April 5, 2019)

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (As of April 5, 2019)(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/menu/20180906_iburi_jishin_menu.html)

23

The Earthquake Research Committee established under the government’s Headquarters for Earthquake
Research Promotion concluded that the earthquake did not occur in relation to the Ishikari-teichi-toen fault
zone, but it was rather a reverse fault-type inland earthquake (i.e. one bedrock slides up onto another one (onthe fault surface)) caused around a different fault where the blocks moved a maximum of approximately 30 km
north-south. The southern central part of Hokkaido Prefecture near the epicenter tends to accumulate pressure
due to stress from east and west, which is said to tend to cause earthquakes like this one. The same area has
also experienced magnitude-5 to 6 earthquakes in the past.

Landslide due to a slip on the fault overapproximately 30 km north-south(southern central Hokkaido)

Landslide (Atsuma Town, Hokkaido Prefecture)(2) Damage
Casualties of the earthquake totaled 42 fatalities (36 in Atsuma Town, 2 in Tomakomai City, 1 in Mukawa
Town, 1 in Shin-hidaka Town, and 2 in Sapporo City) and 762 lightly and seriously injured. The main cause ofdeaths was sediment disasters (including landslides and debris flows). In particular, a major landslide on the hillin Atsuma Town left many people dead or lightly and seriously injured. There were 227 sediment disasters (allin Hokkaido Prefecture), including 133 cliff failures (including 111 in Atsuma Town and 3 in Mukawa Town), and94 debris flows (90 in Atsuma Town) (information by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency and theMinistry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, as of January 28, 2019;reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/index.html#h30).
Damage to houses included 462 completely destroyed (including 222 in Atsuma Town, 95 in Sapporo City,and 93 in Abira Town), 1,570 half-destroyed (including 684 in Sapporo City, 351 in Abira Town, and 308 in
Atsuma Town), and 12,600 partially damaged (including 4,352 in Sapporo City, 3,147 in Mukawa Town, 2,412 in
Abira Town, and 1,045 in Atsuma Town).

Damage to buildings along shopping streets(Mukawa Town and Abira Town)

24

There were many water pipe bursts and ground subsidence due to the earthquake. In particular, dozens ofhouses were damaged in Kiyota-ku and other residential areas in the hill zone in southeastern Sapporo City.
Satozuka District in Kiyota-ku had been reclaimed by filling a valley with volcanic sandy soil. As the groundwaterlevel was high due to Typhoon Jebi (1821), the shocks from the earthquake liquefied the soil deeper than the
groundwater level, which was eventually discharged from locations with lower altitudes, causing great damage
to houses in the area.

Flood due to a water pipe burst(Kiyota-ku, Sapporo City)

Road failure due to ground subsidence(Hiraoka District, Kiyota-ku)

In addition, there was a fire at a petroleum industrial complex in Muroran City and another at the TomatoAtsuma Thermal Power Station in Atsuma Town. Both fires were extinguished in the morning of the day of theearthquake. No person died in these fires. (Information by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, as ofJanuary 28, 2019. Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/index.html)
Two of the three units (Units 2 and 4) of the Tomato-Atsuma Thermal Power Station (a major power plantaccounting for approximately 40% of power produced in Hokkaido Prefecture) were automatically shut down
immediately after the earthquake. The other unit (Unit 1) was shut down later due to damage to the boiler
tube and lowering pressure. The demand (consumption) of power exceeded supply (servicing amount) by far
due to the suspension of the above power station as well as the suspension of hydropower plants due todisruptions to four power lines affecting three routes. As power source to adjust frequencies was in short supply,
it resulted in the first major blackout affecting the whole service area in Hokkaido. A maximum of approximately
2.95 million households across Hokkaido Prefecture were affected by this power outage. It took about 45 hours
until power came back in almost all areas.
In addition, there were water outages affecting a maximum of approximately 68,000 households in 44
municipalities due to water pipe bursts and other reasons. With the restoration of power supply and water
pipes, water supply was restored in all areas after about a month.
○Damage to lifeline utilities
Maximum no. of affectedhouseholds
Power outage

Approx. 2.95 million

Water outage

68,249

Restoration
Restored on September 11 (excluding areas inaccessible
due to landslides, etc.)

Restored on October 9

10 shelters were opened in Hokkaido Prefecture, to which a maximum of approximately 17,000 people
evacuated.
25

The number of evacuees dropped to below 500 after a month. The shelters in Atsuma Town was closed downon December 6, 2018. The last shelter in the prefecture, located in Mukawa Town, was closed down on
December 21, 2018.
[Column]
Causes for the Blackout
There were significant economic losses due to a blackout during the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake.
What were the causes of this blackout?
Electricity service operates based on the balance between demand and supply. Power companies
constantly adjust power generation according to consumption as they distribute power to consumers. A huge
fluctuation in the alternating current frequency (Hz) of transferred power interferes with powertransmission. When power supply exceeds demand, the frequency goes up; when power supply is below
demand, the frequency goes down. This slows down the rotation rate of the power generator’s motor. Suchabnormality in motor rotation adds great stress on the power generator. Power generators are designed toautomatically shut down when the motor rotation rate falls below a certain threshold in order to prevent
failure. After the earthquake, the demand (consumption) largely surpassed the supply (power transmission)
due to the suspension of Units 1, 2, and 4 at the Tomato-Atsuma Thermal Power Station located near the
epicenter and the suspension of hydropower stations caused by the failure of four power lines of threeroutes. As power to adjust the frequencies was also in short supply, the first massive blackout affecting thewhole service area in Hokkaido occurred.
One of the important lessons from this massive incident is that it is crucial for companies and hospitals tohave their own emergency power generation facilities in order to continue operation. For households, it isadvised to have a small generator as well as a portable stove and gas cartridges to prepare for gas outages.

26Damage to the power supply infrastructure due to the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake○ A major blackout affecting 2.95 million households across Hokkaido Prefecture occurred as the power supply-demand balance was upset due to troubles at the TomatoAtsuma Thermal Power Station and other facilities caused by the earthquake with a seismic intensity of 7.
○ This affected a wide range of social and life activities, such as disruptions to medical services due to power outages affecting most medical institutions in the prefecture.
○ A third party committee established under the Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators will analyze the causes and develop recurrence
prevention measures.

Status of major power sources in Hokkaido Prefecture(As of Thursday, September 20)

Weekly supply capacity＝3.91 (+0.4) million kW
Mombetsu*0.4 million kW from the
HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu
is a backup power sourcefor emergencies and forrenewable energy innormal operation

Sunagawa
Naie(Ishikariwan Shinko)(Tomari) Ebetsu

Onbetsu

Kyogoku Tomakomai
Tomato-Atsuma
Date
Takami

Mori
Shiriuchi

HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu (600,000 kW)
New HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu (300,000 kW)(under construction)*Purple: Nuclear Red: Coal
Brown: Petroleum Orange: LNG
Blue: Hydropower Light blue: Pumping
Green: Geothermal and biomass

Suspended
4.46 million kW*Periodical check, etc.

Under construction

Naie Unit 1 (coal) (175,000 kW) 1968
Recovered at 4:24 a.m. on the 7th
To be closed down inMarch 2019
Naie Unit 2 (coal) (175,000 kW) 1970
Recovered at 0:20 a.m. on the 7th
To be closed down inMarch 2019
Sunagawa Unit 3 (coal) (125,000 kW) 1977
Recovered at 1:35 p.m. on the 6th
Sunagawa Unit 4 (coal) (125,000 kW) 1982
Recovered at 0:57 a.m. on the 7th
Tomato-Atsuma Unit 1 (coal) (350,000 kW) 1980
Recovered at 9:00 a.m. on the 18th (shut down due tothe earthquake)
Shiriuchi Unit 1 (petroleum) (350,000 kW) 1983 Recovered at 3:45 a.m. on the 7th
Date Unit 1 (petroleum) (350,000 kW) 1978 Recovered at 11:30 a.m. on the 7th
Date Unit 2 (petroleum) (350,000 kW) 1980 Recovered at 7:25 p.m. on the 7th
Onbetsu Unit 1 (petroleum) (74,000 kW) 1978 Recovered at 8:10 p.m. on the 6th (shut down at 6:30 a.m.
on the 7th due to trouble)→Recovered at 4:07 p.m. on the 11th To be decommissioned in February 2019
Hydropower (300,000 kW +)Hydropower (140,000 kW +) [JPOWER]
Kyogoku Unit 1 (pumping) (200,000 kW) 2014
Recovered at 3:56 p.m. on the 13th
Kyogoku Unit 2 (pumping) (200,000 kW) 2015
Recovered at 3:00 p.m. on the 14th
Hydropower: Approx. 840,000 kW*Changes depending on the water level
Geothermal, biomass, and waste-to-energy power (approx. 200,000 kW) [Mori, Mombetsu, Oji-Ebetsu, etc.]*The output of waste-to-energy plants reduced.
In-house power generation (approx. 200,000 kW9 *Procurement of privately generated power that had
influence on production activities (300,000 kW) was terminated.
Procured from Honshu through the HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu (a maximum of 600,000 kW)*0.4 million kW from the HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu is a backup power source for emergencies and forrenewable energy in normal operation.
Tomato-Atsuma Units 2 and 4 (coal) (1.3 million kW): Suspension due to the earthquake
Unit 2: Under recovery work (600,000 kW)(1985)
Unit 2: Under recovery work (700,000 kW)(2002)
Onbetsu Unit 2 (coal)(74,000 kW) 1978 Recovered at 9:08 a.m. on the 7th→Shut down due to trouble at
2:16 p.m. on the 11th To be decommissioned in February 2019
Shiriuchi Unit 2 (petroleum)(350,000 kW) 1998 Periodical inspection (to be completed by October 27)
Tomakomai Unit 1 (petroleum)(250,000 kW) 1973 Periodical inspection (to be completed by October 31)
Tomakomai Joint Thermal Power Plant (petroleum)(250,000 kW) 1974 Periodical inspection (to becompleted by November 22)[Hokkaido Power Engineering]Takami Unit 2 (pumping)(100,000 kW) 1983 Periodical inspection (to be completed by December 20)
Hydropower (70,000 kW) [JPOWER]
Tomari Units 1, 2, and 3 (2,070,000 kW) (Unit 1) 1989, (Unit 2) 1991, (Unit 3) 2009
Ishikariwan Shinko Unit 1 (LNG) (570,000 kW) To be open in February 2019 (pilot operation will start in
October 2018)
New HVDC Hokkaido–Honshu facilities (300,000 kW) To be open in March 2019

*Figures after the commission of Tomato-Atsuma Unit 1 are not simple sums of output power for each plant, due to the suspension of procurement from privately generated power that
had influence on production activities and other measures.

Source: Material provided at the first Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure on September 21, 2018
(Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html)

There were major disruptions to medical institutions. There were power outages affecting 349 hospitals in
Hokkaido Prefecture. These hospitals had to transfer patients who needed medical ventilators and dialysis
treatment to other hospitals. Some hospitals also had water and medical gas outages and many of them had
to suspend accepting outpatients. 34 disaster base hospitals (hospitals that run 24 hours to provide first-aid
medicine in emergencies) in the power outage areas were able to switch to in-house power generation andcontinue medical services as their in-house power generators (emergency power source) had a capacity of 60%of the normal power source and they also stored three days equivalent of fuels.
The New Chitose Airport shut down air transportation services immediately after the earthquake. As a result,many foreign tourists were stacked in the urban area of Sapporo City. Those who could not secureaccommodation had to spend a few nights in the Hokkaido Prefectural Government’s buildings or undergroundpassages in Sapporo City. On the following day of the earthquake, nearly half of the domestic lines wererecovered. International services were also recovered after two days.
Traffic lights stopped working in many areas due to power outages, which interfered with long-distance truck
transportation. This resulted in shortage of necessities, such as food, daily supplies and petroleum fuels invarious areas in Hokkaido Prefecture, especially in urban areas including Sapporo City. Cargo trains in theprefecture were also suspended from immediately after the earthquake. This affected the shipment ofagricultural products, such as potatoes and onions, which were in their prime season at the time. In response,
the government provided truck services as an alternative shipment means.
The massive blackout forced many manufacturers to temporarily close their factories. Some companies
supplied products and components from Honshu by air or sea. Also, there was a nation-wide shortage of milk
27

supply as the dairy industry in Hokkaido Prefecture, which normally accounts for approximately 50% of thenational production, was not able to produce as much milk as normal because the blackout interfered with the
production processes (e.g. milking, cooling) of raw milk (raw material for drinking milk and butter) and because,out of all the 39 dairy products factories in the prefecture, only two that had in-house power generators wereable to continue operation.
The blackout and its consequences made the public realize how all social activities in Japan heavily dependon electricity and highlighted the importance of emergency power as an urgent issue for the future.
[Column]
Importance of Business Continuity in the Agricultural Industry
The development of a business continuity plan (BCP) is an important issue in the agricultural industry.
According to the results of the FY2017 Fact-Finding Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster
Preparedness Initiatives conducted by the Cabinet Office, only 6 % of businesses in the agriculture, forestry
and fisheries industries had a BCP in place, which is much lower compared to the figures for all industries(64% for major companies and 32% for SMEs).
The major blackout across Hokkaido Prefecture caused by the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake caused
serious damage to the agricultural industry. In particular, there was approximately 20,000 tons of milk that
could not be shipped out, which was equivalent to about 2.4 billion yen of losses. This was due to the shut
down of dairy products factories, automatic milking equipment and bulk coolers during the blackout. This
forced many farms to dispose of the milk. In addition, many cows suffered mastitis.
Regional efforts for business continuity in the event of a blackout are not as advanced as other regions inJapan. The Cabinet Office conducted the Fact-Finding Survey on Corporate Efforts in Response to Natural
Disasters in FY2018 targeting private companies in the prefectures hit by disasters in FY2018, namely, Osaka,
Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures. The survey included a question on mutual support plans withneighboring companies to prepare for blackouts. According to the results, most companies hoped to work
toward such partnership, but they had not been able to. The survey results showed the stagnation in bringing
such system into reality although many companies were aware of its necessity. It is hoped that companies
promote coordinated preparedness initiatives with their neighboring companies.

28

Has your company worked to establish a mutual support plan with your neighboring companies after the blackout incident?

We already have a coordinated blackout
preparedness plan in place with our neighboring
companies.
We have established a mutual support networkwith neighboring companies, but have notdeveloped a blackout preparedness plan yet.
We are working on it.

Hokkaido

Tokyo

Osaka

We wish to work on it, but we have not.

Okayama

There is no need.
The company’s intention is unclear.

Hiroshima

Others

Ehime
Note) The numbers indicated on the bars divided according to the region are the number of responses.
Note) Number of responses by region: Hokkaido Prefecture (total: 198; no response: 85), Tokyo (total: 383; no response: 209), Osaka Prefecture (total: 216; noresponse: 113), Okayama Prefecture (total: 173; no response: 115), Hiroshima Prefecture (total: 199; no response: 130), and Ehime Prefecture (total: 153;
no response: 94).
Source: Prepared by the Cabinet Office based on the results of the Fact-Finding Survey on Corporate Efforts in Response to Natural Disasters in FY2018

A weakening cow lying down (Shibecha Town, Hokkaido Prefecture)

Source: Photo by courtesy of the Japan Agricultural News(3) Response Measures of Government Ministries and Agencies
On September 6, 2018, the government established the Emergency Response Office in the Prime Minister's
Office and held a Cabinet Meeting on the Earthquake Centered on the Central Eastern Iburi Region (the meeting
was called “Cabinet Meeting on the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake” form the second round on). On
the 9th, H.E. Mr. Abe, Prime Minister, visited the affected area to ascertain the extent of the damage andconsole the affected. On the 19th, the government sent a government investigation team headed by H.E. Mr.
Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster Management, to the affected area, while individual government
ministries and agencies also carried out on-site investigations.
While there were still major confusion and disruptions to logistics in the prefecture, the relevant ministries
and agencies worked together to carry out push-mode supply support in coordination with designated public
corporations. In addition, the ministries and agencies and petroleum companies worked together in securing
fuel supply for hospitals and other important facilities that made emergency requests.
The MIC deployed a total of 2,951 employees from seven prefectures to three affected towns under the staff

29

allocation system to support local governments in affected areas.

On-site investigation of a sediment disaster(Atsuma Town, Yūfutsu-gun, Hokkaido Prefecture)

H.E. Mr. Okonogi, then Minister of State for Disaster
Management, led the government investigation teamResponse to the FY2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
3:09 a.m. on September 6
3:10 a.m.

Establishment of the Emergency Response Office in the Prime Minister's OfficeIssuance of instructions from the Prime Minister

1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking
emergency disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected people.
3. Fully implement measures to prevent further damage.

6:10 a.m.
7:37 a.m.
6:00 p.m.
11:00 p.m.
September 6
September 7
September 9
September 10

September 13
September 14

September 19
September 21
September 28

October 17
November 7

A Cabinet Office information-gathering team departs for Hokkaido
First Cabinet Meeting
Second Cabinet Meeting (a total of 9 Cabinet Meetings were held by September 28)
Establishment of the local liaison and coordination office in Hokkaido Prefecture
Government Office (closed on September 28)
The Hokkaido Prefectural Government decided to invoke the Disaster Relief Act with respect to
179 municipalities (date of invocation: September 6)
Establishment of the Push-Mode Supply Support Coordination Council (push-mode disaster relief
support continued until September 21)
Prime Minister Abe visits affected areas in Hokkaido Prefecture
Cabinet approval on the use of contingency reserves (approx. 540 million yen)Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meeting (a total of 5 Inter-Agency Disaster Management
Meetings were held by September 20)
First Announcement of the possibility of designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity
The Hokkaido Prefectural Government decided to invoke the Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster with respect to Sapporo City, Kita-Hiroshima City, andAtsuma Town, Yūfutsu-gun (date of occurrence: September 6) (invoked with respect to all areasin Hokkaido Prefecture on September 26)
Deployment of a government investigation team led by then Minister of State for Disaster
Management Okonogi to Hokkaido Prefecture
Second Announcement of the possibility of designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity
Cabinet approval on the designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity (cabinet approval on
September 28; promulgation and entry into force on October 1)
Support measures are decided at a Cabinet meeting
Cabinet approval on the use of contingency reserves (approx. 15.3 billion yen *includes thebudget for support related to Typhoon Jebi)
Minister of State for Disaster Management Yamamoto visits affected areas in Hokkaido
Prefecture
Approval of the FY2018 Supplementary Budget, which includes budgets for recovery andreconstruction from the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (118.8 billion yen)

Source: Cabinet Office30

<Relief supplies><Immediately after the earthquake /initial stage>
Public-private cooperation: Delivery of emergency supplies
Designated public corporations deliver relief supplies to shelters upon requests from
affected local governments.

Process of relief
supply delivery

2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake(Municipality-level)
Secondary distribution base(Prefecture-level)
Primary distribution base

Manufacturers/
transporters

Procurement/
transportation
Company A

Transportation

Transportation

Company B

Company C(Immediately after the earthquake)
Emergency measures for disruptions to logistics networks due to the blackout
Transportation of emergency supplies coordinated by
the SDF and designated public corporations
・September 7
Transportation of 1,920 cases of 2liter water bottles by three SDF helicopter flights (Iruma
Air Base to Chitose Air Base)

Evacuation center

Air transportation of relief supplies under cooperation
among designated public corporations
・September 6 to 12: A total of 47 flights (from Haneda
Airport to Asahikawa, Hakodate, and New Chitose
Airports)(2 weeks after the earthquake)
Designated public corporations manage
inventory and transportation among
distribution bases.

<Kita-Hiroshima City><Mukawa Town >Source: SDF website

Source: Cabinet Office

The MAFF carried out push-mode food and drink support. It also developed and announced a support
package for the affected working in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industries on September 28, 2018, inorder to help them rebuild their businesses with hope as early as possible (Reference:
http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press/kanbo/bunsyo/saigai/180928_5.html).
In accordance with the package plan, the government carried out various meticulous support measures, suchas disaster restoration projects, including the early restoration of farmland and agricultural facilities, fishingfacilities, the forestry industry, support for the logging and transportation of damaged timber from affected
forests, reconstruction and restoration of agricultural greenhouses and machines, support for re-starting theoperation of farms, technological support for restoration of farmland provided by more than 1,000 national
government employees (the Midori Disaster Relief Squad), and support concerning secondary damage due tothe blackout. In addition, in order to build a strong and sustainable milk production and logistics system inpreparation for blackouts, the MAFF conducted emergency inspections of dairy farmers, dairy facilities, andmilk storage facilities. As a result, it was found that some facilities did not have any power outage preparedness
plan in place. To improve this situation, designated milk producers’ groups, dairy product companies andrelated organizations worked together with relevant local people to develop blackout preparedness plans basedon the situation of the wide milk distribution network that extends beyond prefectural borders, in order toestablish a system to secure milk production and distribution in the event of power outages or other disasters.
The MLIT deployed the TEC-FORCE consisting of more than 3,000 experts from across Japan to the affectedareas to provide technical support and guidance on prompt determination of the extent of damage, occurrence
and prevention of damage, early restoration of affected areas, and other emergency disaster management31

measures. The MLIT also supported local governments in relation to the allotment of vacant rooms in public
housing and provision of emergency temporary housing in order to secure makeshift housing for the affected
people. As for damage to houses due to liquefaction, the MLIT supported Sapporo City and other local
governments with conducting investigations and developing measures to build permanently secure ground. As
for the massive landslide on the hill in Atsuma Town, the government has started on the construction oflandslide barriers under the sediment disasters-related project and other public projects. Moreover, thegovernment also worked with the private sector to promote tourism.
<Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster, and Designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity>
Due to this disaster, the Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of theAffected due to Disaster were invoked with respect to 179 municipalities across Hokkaido Prefecture. On
September 13 and 21, 2018, the government announced the possibility of designating the 2018 Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi Earthquake as a Disaster of Extreme Severity. On the 28th, the Cabinet approved the Cabinet
Order on this designation (see 14-5 “2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (A-35-37)).
The government intends to spare no effort in continuing to work for the recovery and reconstruction of theaffected areas.
[Column]
Diversifying Construction-Type of Emergency Temporary Housing:
Using Trailer Houses and Mobile Houses
There were a series of major disasters across Japan in 2018, including the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
and the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake.
The Disaster Relief Act was invoked in relation to each of these disasters to provide emergency temporary
housing for the affected people whose houses were completely destroyed and who found it difficult to secure
housing at their own expenses.
The government provided 4,406 units of rental-type emergency temporary housing and 697 constructiontype emergency temporary housing in Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures for the Heavy Rain Eventof July 2018, as well as 173 units of rental-type emergency temporary housing and 413 construction-type
emergency temporary housing for the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake. Details are shown in the following
table.
〇Number of units of construction-type emergency temporary housing for the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
PrefabricatedWoodenTrailer and mobile
Total
temporary housing temporary housing
houses, etc.
Okayama
158
103
51
312
Hiroshima
178
31
0
209
Ehime
12
164
0
176
Total
348
298
51
697
〇Number of units of construction-type emergency temporary housing for the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake
PrefabricatedWoodenTrailer and mobile
Total
temporary housing temporary housing
houses, etc.
Hokkaido
352
0
61
413
(As of March 31, 2019) (Source: Cabinet Office)32

For the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 and the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, trailer and mobile
houses were introduced as a new type of temporary housing in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture, andAtsuma Town, Abira Town, and Mukawa Town, Hokkaido Prefecture.
When asked why they introduced this type of housing, the local governments pointed out many benefits,
including integrated interiors and equipment, which ensures great resistance against earthquakes, effective
thermal insulation and airtightness, and the fact that it can be readily built from one unit depending on thesituation of the affected.
With a view to diversifying emergency temporary housing for future disasters, the Cabinet Office intends
to examine the readiness, usability, comfort and durability of the trailer and mobile houses while continuing
its meticulous support for the affected people.

Yanaihara Temporary Housing Complex inKurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture (51 units)
Trailers and mobile houses were provided.
(Photo by courtesy of Kurashiki City, Okayama
Prefecture)

Temporary housing for students in Mukawa Town, Hokkaido
Prefecture (for 36 people)
Mobile houses were provided.
(Photo by courtesy of Mukawa Town, Hokkaido Prefecture)33

1-5 Support for Reconstruction in 2018
(1) Support for Reconstruction from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
In August 2018, the government announced the Support Package for the Life and Livelihood Restoration fromthe Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, which contained urgent measures to help affected people rebuild their lives
and livelihoods. The government promoted projects for the restoration of infrastructure as well as life andlivelihood of the affected people through the FY2018 contingency reserves, the first and second FY2018
supplementary budgets, and FY2019 budget.
Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/ooame201807/info_support_life.html

1. Basic Principles

Support Package for the Life and Livelihood Restorationfrom the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

August 2, 2018
Team to Support the Affected People of the
Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

 The government will formulate urgent measures to support the restoration of affected people’s lives and livelihoods and swiftly implement them using contingency reserves and other financial resources. The
government will continue to allocate budgets as needed based on the package plan into the future, using the contingency reserves and other sources, so that those affected can live with a sense of ease andthe affected governments can promote restoration and reconstruction projects without worrying about funds.
 The government will swiftly promote meticulous reconstruction measures according to the characteristics of damage in each region, while also promptly implementing support measures for the restoration ofregional economy tailored to the needs of the affected areas, so that affected SMEs can work for continued business with predictability and hope.

2. Urgent Measures(1) Rehabilitation of livelihoods
 Disposal of waste, debris, and sediment
・Provision of relevant financial support to municipalities for the disposal of waste,debris, and sediment and the restoration of affected waste disposal facilities.
・Establishment of a system which allows municipalities to dispose of waste, debris,and sediment in the city areas all at once.
・Clarification of the rules concerning the post-hoc claims of expenses for the disposalof waste, debris, and sediment conducted by affected people themselves

 Reconstruction of houses, etc.
・Provision of emergency temporary housing for the affected people and emergency repair of houses
・Centralized management of the available number of emergency housing units and provision of suchinformation to affected people
・Provision of support grants for reconstructing livelihoods of the affected up to 3
million yen to households with completely destroyed houses
・Development of post-disaster public housing for people who lost their homes Financial support, etc.
・Expansion of the scope of life and welfare fund loans toinclude affected households and postponement of the due dateof redemption by two years.
・Financial support for insurers and local governments implementing special measures for
affected people, such as reduction of or exemption from insurance premiums

 Seamless affected people support
・Watch-over services to prevent isolation, consultation on life-related matters, mental health care, etc.
・Dissemination of information on the special consumer hotline and implementation of countermeasures against
billing frauds(3) Urgent Recovery from the Disaster Acceleration of disaster recovery projects(2) Reconstruction of Livelihoods
 Support for SMEs (establishment of a tailored support system)
・Group grants: Group of affected SMEs develop reconstruction project plans. If approved, a part of the expenses for the restorationof facilities, etc. will be covered (up to three-fourths). The companies can also take an interest-free loan to cover the rest of theexpenses.
・Grants for business continuity: The upper limit is raised from 0.5 million yen to 2 million yen per company. This grant covers a wide
range of business activities, from the purchase of machines and vehicles and renovation of shops to advertising and promotion
expenses when reopening the business (up to two-thirds). There is also a different measure to support companies with the portionof expenses they need to pay themselves.
・Financing support through the expansion of the scope of low interest loans provided by the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC);
grants for shopping districts, etc.

 Support for the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries (for business continuity and theearliest reopening possible)
・Support for the reconstruction of shared shipment facilities, agricultural greenhouses and machines, and the purchase ofpesticides and fertilizers
・Early recovery of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries-related facilities, such as farmlands and farming facilities
・Transplanting of fruit trees (e.g. citrus trees: 230,000 yen/10 a); support for the non-harvesting period (220,000 yen/10 a)・Emergency inspection and development of farm ponds

 Measures against harmful rumors affecting the tourism industry
・Stimulation of demand in the tourism industry from as early as this summer through an accommodation fee support campaign (upto 6,000 yen per customer per night)
・Communication of accurate information regarding the affected areas through social andother media.

 Regional employment measures
・The relaxation of the qualification standards for employment support grants and theincrease of the coverage (SMEs: two-thirds → four-fifths; large companies: one-half →two-thirds)
・Provision of unemployment allowances under the employment insurance system tothose whose income is disrupted due to the temporary closure of the company after thedisaster Dredging of rivers, removal of trees, and disposal of rocks and sediment・Swift implementation of disaster recovery projects for public civil engineering works, water facilities, schools and social
education facilities, and medical and welfare facilities, by such means as cutting down on the tasks and time required fordisaster assessments.

(4) Disaster Relief
 First aid
・Establishment of shelters, securing of drinking water, provision of emergency temporary housing, and emergency repair ofhouses (partly aforementioned)
・Provision of d loans for the affected by disasters and disaster condolence grants

・Swift repair of government-administered rivers. The government also supports the repair ofprefectural government-administered rivers by providing technical assistance and financial
resources, including the grant for disaster risk reduction and safety.
・Urgent implementation of measures for rocks and sediment with risks of secondary disasters

 SDF activities
・ SDF activities during the disaster deployment, including the disposal of debris,
epidemic prevention, bathing services, securing of water supply, etc.

Source: Cabinet Office(2) Support for Reconstruction from the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
The government decided to implement a similar reconstruction package for the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake as the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (see Chapter 2 for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, andbuilding national resilience measures based on the lessons learned from a series of disasters in 2018).

34

Support for Reconstruction and Recovery from the Damage of the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
1. Basic Principles  The government will formulate urgent measures for reconstruction and recovery from the damage of the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake. These measures will be
implemented using contingency reserves, supplementary budgets, and other resources as necessary.
 The government will swiftly carry out robust support measures for the tourism industry in Hokkaido Prefecture in order to bring about a happier and stronger Hokkaido
2. Support Measure than before the disaster.

(1) Support Measures for the Swift Recovery of Affected Areas Designation as a Disaster of Extreme Severity (Cabinet approval on the 28th)[National] Projects for the restoration of public civil engineering works, farmlands, etc. from the disaster[Regional: Atsuma-cho, Abira-cho, Mukawa-cho] Measures for disaster-related indemnity for SMEs

 Acceleration of disaster recovery projects for public civil engineering works, etc.
Cutting down on the tasks and time required for disaster assessments, support by the TEC-FORCE, etc.

 Emergency response measures for large hillside collapses, etc.
Establishing a monitoring system for locations where the river is blocked; implementing emergency
response measures in a prompt manner
The fallen tree in the spillway of Atsuma Dam has been removed. A disaster recovery project is being
promoted.

 Disposal of waste, debris, and sediment
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Ministry of the Environment(MOE) are jointly running a support system for the removal of waste, debris, and sediment.

(3) Reconstruction from Damage to Industry Due to Tight Power Supply
 Full recovery of electricity and reinforcement of energy supply
A technical review by a third party committee will be conducted.
Development of winter power supply-demand measures and a package based on emergency inspectionsof power infrastructure by November

 Support for SMEs
Financing using grants to support the business continuity of small enterprises, grants for shopping
districts, disaster recovery loans, etc.

(2) Support for the Rehabilitation of Livelihoods
 Smooth implementation of affected people support
Emergency disaster relief activities, including the establishment of shelters and providing drinking water;
provision of disaster condolence grants and affected people support loans

 Support concerning affected houses and emergency temporary housing
Provision of emergency temporary housing; first aid measures, including emergency repair of houses anddevelopment of post-disaster public housing
For areas affected by soil liquefaction, permanent reinforcement measures will be taken as soon as possible
after the investigation of the causes and emergency recovery work, in addition to the above measures.



Other support measures for the reconstruction of affected people’s lives

Provision of support grants for reconstructing livelihoods of affected people (for all areas in Hokkaido
Prefecture; approved on the 26th); expansion of the scope of life welfare loans and relaxation of thecriteria; promotion of debt consolidation based on the guidelines

 Regional employment measures
Relaxation of the qualification standards for employment support grants

 Support for the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries
Support concerning the reopening of agricultural business, forestry-related damage, early recovery ofagriculture, forestry, and fisheries-related facilities (such as farmlands and farming facilities), and earlyrecovery of demand in the tourism industry
As measures for dairy and livestock farmers, financial support to cover expenses of the treatment andcontrol of mastitis in dairy cows
Financial support for expenses of securing emergency power source during power outages(4) Support for the Recovery of Tourism and the Distribution of Products from Hokkaido Prefecture
Provision of multi-lingual services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year at the JNTO Call Center Support for the dissemination of accurate information on affected areas and support
for the promotion of travel packages

 Introduction of the “Hokkaido Fukkouwari” special discountCommunication using social and other media; promotion of products related to affected areas

 Fundamental reinforcement of the emergency communication system for foreign tourists[Scope] Expenses of travel packages bound for Hokkaido and accommodation[Coverage] Up to 70% (50%-70%) or 20,000 yen per night The “Welcome! HOKKAIDO, Japan” Campaign
Launching discount packages from airline companies, railway companies, and travel agencies
Discount campaigns and events at tourism facilities in Hokkaido

Source: Cabinet Office
Overview of the Supplementary Budget for FY2018
1. Recovery/reconstruction support for disasters: 727.5 billion yen(1) Measures for the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018: 503.4 billion yen① Livelihood rehabilitation: 36.7 billion yen○ Disposal of disaster waste/recovery of waste disposal facilities [29.2 billion yen]
○ Support grants for reconstructing livelihoods of affected people [3.2 billion yen]
○ Development of post-disaster public housing [1.6 billion yen]
② Reviving business: 198.5 billion yen○ Group grants [31.4 billion yen]
○ JFC’s financing support for affected SMEs [92.4 billion yen]
○ Support for the reconstruction of agricultural greenhouses and farming
facilities; support for transplanting of mandarin trees [3 billion yen]
○ Support for the recovery of farmlands and irrigation facilities [61.8 billion yen]
③ Emergency recovery measures for disasters: 231.9 billion yen○ Recovery of public civil engineering works from the disaster [192.1 billion yen]
○ Recovery of school facilities from the disaster [10.1 billion yen]
○ Recovery of water facilities, medical facilities, and social welfare facilities [14.4billion yen]
④ Disaster relief: 36.3 billion yen○ Disaster relief operation by the SDF [34.7 billion yen]

(2) Measures for the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake: 118.8 billion yen○ Disposal of disaster waste [0.5 billion yen]
○ Support for the group purchase of materials for agricultural greenhouses [0.5billion yen]
○ Measures for large hillside collapses, etc. [12.8 billion yen]
○ Recovery of public civil engineering works from the disaster [76.6 billion yen(partly aforementioned)]○ Disaster relief operation by the SDF [18.6 billion yen](3) Measures for Typhoon Jebi, the Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake, etc.:
105.3 billion yen○ Support grants for reconstructing livelihoods of affected people [6.7 billion yen]
○ Support for group purchase of materials for agricultural greenhouses [1 billion
yen]○ Recovery of public civil engineering works from the disaster [43.3 billion yen]
○ Support for the restoration of the connecting bridge of the Kansai International
Airport [5 billion yen]
○ Recovery of school facilities from the disaster [13.9 billion yen]
○ Disaster assistance expenses [4.8 billion yen]

2. Urgent and prioritized safety assurance measures in schools: 108.1
billion yen(1) Installation of air conditioners as a measure against heat stroke: 82.2 billion yen(2) Measures for concrete block walls with a risk of collapse: 25.9 billion yen

3. Additional contingency reserves: 100 billion yen○ Increasing contingency reserves taking into account future disaster response
measures, etc.

■ Additional expenditures: 935.6 billion yen

Overview of the Second Supplementary Budget for FY2018
1. Disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and building national resilience (urgent
measures specified in the Three-Year Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience): 1,072.3
billion yen○ Disaster prevention and mitigation of rivers, erosion control facilities, roads, etc. [618.3 billion yen]
○ Seismic retrofitting of school facilities [61.1 billion yen]
○ Improvement of police equipment and communication infrastructure for disasters [54.5 billion
yen]○ Improvement of fire department vehicles and equipment for disasters [4.4 billion yen]
○ Improving the resilience of refinery plants and tank facilities [8.4 billion yen]
○ Seismic retrofitting of SDF facilities [13.1 billion yen]
○ Support for the introduction of power‐regeneration and storage equipment in shelters [21 billion
yen]

2. Measures to strengthen the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries in
preparation for the early effectuation of the TPP Agreement: 325.6 billion yen○ Further enlargement of farmland blocks [90.2 billion yen]
○ Assistance for capital investment for improving productivity in agriculture [40 billion yen]
○ Support for capital investment for strengthening profitability in dairy and livestock farming [56billion yen]
○ Improvement of timer processing facilities to strengthen the industry’s competitiveness [39.2billion yen]
○ Support for the introduction of fishing vessels to strengthen the competitiveness of the fisheries
industry [20.1 billion yen]

3. Support for SMEs 206.8 billion yen○ Subsidies for manufacturers, IT introduction, and business sustainability [110 billion yen]
○ Support for business succession [5 billion yen]
○ Support for the introduction of cashiers capable of handling reduced tax rates [56.1 billion yen]

4. Measures for other urgent issues: 1,430.4 billion yen(1) Ensuring security and safety of people’s lives: 751.2 billion yen○ Ensuring the preparedness of the SDF; improving the environment of the SDF by upgrading housing
facilities [386.7 billion yen]
○ Development of day-care centers [42 billion yen]
○ Support for expenses of launching free preschool education and day-care services [31.6 billion yen]
○ Establishment of a strategic coast guard system [28.2 billion yen]
○ Development of information-gathering satellites [16.7 billion yen]

(2) Recovery from disasters, etc.: 213.6 billion yen○ Disaster recovery projects for public civil engineering works [137.4 billion yen]
○ Reconstruction of agricultural greenhouses, equipment, and facilities [21.6 billion yen]
○ Recovery of school facilities from disasters [13.3 billion yen]
○ Post-disaster public housing development projects [4.1 billion yen]

(3) Others: 465.6 billion yen○ Contributions and donations to international organizations [131.9 billion yen]
○ Impulsing Paradigm Change through Disruptive Technologies Program (ImPACT) [100 billion yen]
○ Establishment of bases for regional revitalization [60 billion yen]
○ Research and development of pharmaceuticals, etc. [25 billion yen]
○ Transition to the production phase of the Post-K computer [20.9 billion yen]

■ Additional expenditures: 3,035.1 billion yen

Source: Cabinet Office35

[Column]
Economic Impact of Consecutive Disasters
Non-life insurance claims for Typhoon Jebi (1821) were the largest among those paid for disasters in 2018.
The total claim was about 747.8 billion yen (the largest claims ever in fire insurance). In the earthquake
insurance sector, claims for the Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake were the third largest ever, and thosefor the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake were the fifth largest ever.
Insurance claims paid for each disaster that occurred during 2018
Northern Osaka
Prefecture
Earthquake

Western Japan
Torrential Rains(Heavy Rain Event ofJuly 2018)

Typhoon Jebi (1821)(mainly in the Kansai
region)Date ofoccurrence

June 18

July 6

Scale

Maximum seismic
intensity: 6 Lower

Total precipitation:
Chugoku – 500 mm
Shikoku – 1,800 mm

Maximum windvelocity: 55 m/s

Approx. 179,000
Approx. 103.3
billion yen

Approx. 65,000

Approx. 881,000

Approx. 190.2
billion yen

Approx. 747.8
billion yen

Number of cases
Insurance claims
paid(third largest ever in(seventh largest ever
earthquakein fire insurance)
insurance)[Reference] Past major natural disasters and insurance claims paid
(Earthquake insurance)

Earthquake2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake2016 Kumamoto
Earthquake

September 4(date of landfall)(largest ever in fire
insurance)

Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi
Earthquake
September 6
Maximumseismic
intensity: 7
Approx. 60,000
Approx. 33.8
billion yen(fifth largest everin earthquake
insurance)

Typhoon Trami(1824)(nation-wide)

September 30(date of landfall)

Maximum windvelocity: 55 m/s
Approx. 429,000
Approx. 237.8
billion yen(sixth largest ever infire insurance)(Fire insurance)

1,279.5 billion yen(largest ever)382.4 billion yen (second
largest ever)TyphoonTyphoon Mireille(9119) (nation-wide)
Typhoon Songda(0418) (nation-wide)

568 billion yen (second
largest ever)387.4 billion yen (thirdlargest ever)Note) The number of cases and insurance claims paid are based on the estimations by the General Insurance Association ofJapan and are subject to change (as of December 11, 2018). “Fire insurance” includes automobile insurance and casualty
and surety insurance (including accident insurance).
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the website of the General Insurance Association of Japan(Reference: http://www.sonpo.or.jp/news/release/2018/1812_06.html)

1-6 Introduction of Scientific Disaster Response Measures in 2018
(1) Establishment of the Information Support Team (ISUT)
Experiences such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Kumamoto Earthquake have revealed that it isdifficult for the affected local governments to grasp the damage extent and scope and/or share information
with other administrative organizations, due to damages to local government offices and equipment among
other reasons. In order to ensure smooth and effective disaster response activities carried out by different
organizations, including the affected local governments, utilities and other private companies, the Self Defense
Force and other relief units, medical institutions, supporting local governments, and government ministries andagencies, it is essential that each of such organizations grasps various information in an organized manner, forexample, the extent of damage in each affected zone, locations of facilities that need to be recovered, necessary
recovery operation, and ongoing activities of each organization.
In order to tackle this challenge, the Cabinet Office set up the Disaster Information Hub, an information
sharing mechanism to streamline information-gathering routes of the national government, local governments,
and private companies. The government has promoted this project since FY2017 and conducted demonstration
experiments.
It had been pointed out that it would be useful if information or data held by each organization could be
expressed on a single map. In order to do this, the National and Local Government Public-Private Disaster36

Information Hub Promotion Team decided in April 2018 to establish the ISUT (Information Support Team) as a
new joint team of the Cabinet Office, the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience(NIED), and private companies. The ISUT collects, organizes, and maps information in the affected areas using
disaster information sharing system SIP4D in order to help response organizations to grasp the situation. It wasagreed that the ISUT would first operate on a trial basis.
Vision for the Disaster Information Hub
Disasterinformation

Lifeline utilities

Transporters*It is necessary to define:・information to be shared, and・information sharing process[Approved by the Disaster Information Hub Promotion Team on October 2, 2018]

Disasterinformation

Disasterinformation

Ministries andagencies

Disasterinformation

Disaster
Infrastructure
information
management companies

Collecting and sharing disaster information*

Information sharing*

Information sharing*(Including system linkage)(Automation by system linkage)・Cabinet
Office・NIED・Others

Municipalities(Disaster Prevention Information
System)RetailersCommunication
Socialmedia, etc.

(Disseminate information to the
public in an easy-to-understandmanner)Prefectures

ISUT(Disaster Risk Reduction
Information System)(Information Support Team)
Collect disaster information
Show the information on a map

Mass media

Information sharing*(Including system linkage)

Information sharing*(Including system linkage)

PublicMunicipalities(Disaster Risk Reduction
Information System)

Municipalities(Disaster Risk Reduction
Information System)

Browse on the internet or
disaster prevention apps

Source: Cabinet Office website(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/saigaijyouhouhub/index.html)(2) Activities of the ISUT
The ISUT was engaged in three disaster response operations in FY2018. For the Northern Osaka Prefecture
Earthquake in June 2018, the ISUT worked in the Osaka Prefectural Government Office to collect, map andshare information on the status of roads, shelters, and gas supply (operated from June 18 to 21). During the
Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the ISUT worked in the Hiroshima Prefectural Government Office to gather andshare aerial images as well as information including water outages and hospitals. (operated from July 7 toAugust 9). Finally, during the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, the ISUT worked in the Hokkaido Prefectural
Government Office to gather information on the status of mobile communication and helped responseorganizations to grasp the situation (operated from September 6 to 28). Based on the experiences in these
affected areas, the ISUT is scheduled to start its full-scale nationwide operation in FY2019.

37

[Column]
Future Challenges for the ISUT
The following is an example of a map created by the ISUT in the Hiroshima Prefectural Government Officeduring the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018. The Shelter Support Map shows the critical information forgrasping the overall situation of the affected areas, such as the locations of shelters, traffic regulation points,
and water supply bases. A single map showing both shelters and road information is useful in selecting theroute from a relief supply distribution center to a shelter. The Emergency Management Division of theHiroshima Prefectural Government, which was in charge of relief supplies, used this map and verified its
practicality during the disaster. The map was also useful for support staff from across the country who were
not familiar with the area in selecting patrol routes.
Through the trials, some issues were identified. For example, while the mapping of traffic regulation points
went smoothly as the data was automatically obtained from Hiroshima Prefecture’s system, the mapping ofshelters required significant time and efforts as the information obtained from the system of Hiroshima
Prefecture and local government staff had to be manually input into the mapping system.
In the future, it will be necessary to introduce a system to automate data acquisition and input as muchas possible, for the quick creation and provision of maps. The Cabinet Office will review the challenges
identified through the trials in FY2018 and strive to formulate the solutions in order to achieve effective
operation of the ISUT.
Shelter Support Map (Hiroshima Prefecture) (Created on July 11, 2018)

Number of evacuees

Traffic regulation point
ClosureOne-lane only, etc.

Water supply base
Water supply base

Source: Cabinet Office38

1-7 Support Activities by Volunteers and NPOs
(1) The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
①Support by individual volunteers through disaster volunteer centers
Many volunteers from all over the country came to disaster volunteer centers (“disaster VCs”) established by
the Social Welfare Councils in affected areas. Disaster VCs were established in 60 municipalities in 12
prefectures in western Japan, while permanent VCs run by the Social Welfare Council of 13 municipalities also
accepted volunteers. In municipalities where large areas need to be covered, satellite bases were set up near
the operation areas. A total of approximately 260,000 volunteers mainly worked on mud removal from houses
and tidying up rooms and furniture (as of February 5, 2019). After these activities, the focus of volunteer
activities shifted to community support coordinated by life support coordinators (e.g. dealing with various
issues including, for example, watching over the elderly and disabled, holding social events, opening a children's
playground). As of March 7, 2019, the disaster VC in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture is still accepting
volunteers.
The Number of Volunteer Activities
Currently operating disaster VCs (as of March 7)
Kurashiki City

263,574 volunteers by February 5(Reference) NPOs and other private/civil entities that participated in information sharing meetings and volunteer activities: Approx. 230
Three-dayweekendTyphoonJongdari
Some VCs were
temporarily closed
during the Bon
festival of the lunar
calendar (August 9
to 19)

TyphoonCimaronTyphoonJebi

Three-dayweekendThree-dayweekend

Hiroshima

Okayama

Ehime

Gifu

Kyoto

Kochi

Yamaguchi

ShimaneFukuoka

Hyogo

TottoriSaga

TyphoonTrami

TyphoonKong-rey

Source: Cabinet OfficeVolunteer activities following the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

Support through disaster VCs follows processes from identifying the needs of the affected, receiving
volunteers, matching the activities of volunteers with the needs of the affected, providing necessary materials
39and equipment to volunteers, transporting volunteers to the operation site, and providing work orientation.
Local municipality governments and Social Welfare Councils as well as many companies and NPOs, with theirexperience, expertise and skills, worked together to support disaster VCs in the abovementioned processes.
More than 9,000 support staff were dispatched from Social Welfare Councils from across the country to theaffected areas. They mainly supported the establishment and management of disaster VCs, the identificationof needs, the recovery and reconstruction of affected Social Welfare Councils, and consultation regarding life
and welfare fund loans.
Following the review on disaster VCs for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, the Disaster Volunteer Activity
Support Project Council (“Shien-P”) was established under the Central Community Chest of Japan in January2005 as a joint council of private companies, NPOs, Social Welfare Councils, and community chest committees.
Shipen-P supports disaster VCs in such aspects as human resources, materials and supplies, and funds. For the
Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, Shien-P dispatched human resources to support the operation of disaster VCs.
Also, in cooperation with the Keidanren 1% Club, which is a member of Shien-P, Shien-P procured equipment
and vehicles for disaster VCs as donations from private companies, while also raising contributions fromcompanies and the employees. Such support helped the operation of disaster VCs.
While many people participated in volunteer activities in the affected areas, some issues were identified,such as the proper dissemination of volunteer needs information to prevent the concentration of volunteer
resources in areas covered by mass media, measures to prevent heat stroke and other safety measures forvolunteers, volunteer insurance subscription, and the smooth operation of disaster VCs. Solutions for thesechallenges were discussed at information sharing meetings (described later) and other opportunities.
② Support by specialist NPOs
Specialist NPOs and other organizations carried out a wide range of support activities, including technicalsupport for the affected housings such as removal of sediment and debris, the shelter management, support
for the affected living in each house, support for temporary housing, and support for rebuilding livelihoods.
For example, in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture, the government and NPOs had several meetings tocoordinate NPO support in shelter management. In addition, NPOs and disaster VCs worked together to provide
technical support for house maintenance and sediment removal from the floors of houses. In Okayama City,
Okayama Prefecture and Saka-cho, Hiroshima Prefecture, NPOs conducted surveys to grasp the needs of theaffected living in each house so that they could provide relevant support. In Uwajima City, Ehime Prefecture,
NPOs supported mandarin farmers. Through these activities, NPOs provided meticulous support in the areas
where public support tends to be difficult.
Local NPOs actively supported the affected areas. Uwajima Grandma in Uwajima City, Ehime Prefecture,
secured and distributed drinking water to the areas affected by water outages due to the destruction of thewater purification plant in Yoshida-cho, Uwajima City. They also gathered and shared information on soup
kitchen spots, held events for the mental care of the affected and community rehabilitation, such as children's
festivals and three-generation social events, and supported the disabled and mandarin farmers.

40

Uwajima Grandma staff working to support the affected areas

In order to support the activities of such volunteers and NPOs, the Central Community Chest of Japan raised
a Disaster Volunteers/NPOs Activity Support Fund for each disaster. Volunteer and NPO activities for the Heavy
Rain Event of July 2018 were supported by this fund. As of the end of March 2019, the fund has been used tosupport a total of 158 activities.
③ Tripartite collaboration among the government, volunteers, and NPOs through information sharing
meetings
In order to coordinate support activities among the government, volunteers, and NPOs, information sharing
meetings were held on a regular basis among local governments, social welfare corporations, and NPOs in
Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures. The information sharing meeting was launched with the supportof the Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (JVOAD) and local NPOs that provided intermediarysupport in the affected areas. This meeting was aimed at providing a platform for supporters to share
information and ensuring seamless and smooth support activities.
For example, in Ehime Prefecture, information sharing meetings were held from soon after the disaster,tapping into the already established relationship among the prefectural government, the Prefectural Social
Welfare Council and NPOs. On July 10, the Ehime Prefectural Social Welfare Council started a “core meeting”
for information sharing and discussion with the Ehime Prefectural Government and Shien-P. On the 23rd, theEhime Resources Center, a local coordinating organization, and the JVOAD jointly established the Support
Information Sharing Meeting for the Ehime Torrential Rains as a meeting among NPOs and other support
organizations operating in the prefecture. About 30 organizations from various fields joined this meeting toshare information on the status of volunteer resources, support for home evacuees, and support for shelters,
while coordinating their support activities with each other.

41

Cooperation network in each prefecture for the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
OkayamaPrefecture

Hiroshima
Prefecture

Ehime
Prefecture

Disaster Support Network
Okayama・Regular meetings since July 9・Participated in by approx. 160
organizations and 120
individuals
・Established as a permanent
network on October 18
Prefectural conference: once amonth
Kurashiki conference: twice a
month

Hiroshima Disaster Support Network
Conference for the Heavy Rain Eventof July 2018
・Regular meetings since July 11
・Participated in by approx. 100
organizations

Support Information Sharing Meeting for the Ehime Torrential Rains
・Regular meetings since first held in Ozu City on July 23 (17 meetings)
・Participated in by approx. 30 organizations

Organizer: Disaster Support Network
OkayamaSecretariat: Okayama Prefectural Council ofSocial Welfare and Okayama
NPO Center

Organizer: Hiroshima NPO Center and JVOAD
Secretariat: Hiroshima NPO Center<Uwajima District>
Ushi-oni Meeting・Regularly held since August 20 (20meetings)
The Core Member Meeting for the
Establishment of the Uwajima NPO Center(temporary name) was formed in order todevelop an institution to support
intermediary support organizations.

<Seiyo District>Seiyo City Coordination Meeting・Regularly held since August 15(20 meetings)
The Seiyo Tsunagaru Network
Meeting was established as a new
network meeting to prepare for
future disasters.

Organizer: Ehime Prefectural Council of Social Welfare
Secretariat: NPO Ehime Resources Center

Coordination

Information sharing meeting (Councils of Social
Welfare Core Meeting)・Since July 10 (50 meetings were held)
Participants: Ehime Prefectural Government, Prefectural
Council of Social Welfare, Shien-P, Ehime
Resources Center

Source: Cabinet Office

The second Support Information Sharing Meeting for the Ehime Torrential RainsThe swift establishment of these information sharing meetings was possible because of the lessons learned
from the Hinokuni Meeting for Kumamoto Earthquake Support Organizations established in 2016 and theInformation Sharing Meeting for Supporters of the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Torrential Rains.
In addition, since the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 affected a wide area across Japan, the National
Information Sharing Meeting for the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 was established on July 17, 2018 as ameeting that coordinates with prefectural information sharing meetings. The national information sharing
meeting was regularly held by the Cabinet Office, JVOAD and Shien-P, with the participation of relevant
ministries and agencies, JVOAD-related organizations and Shien-P member organizations. At this meeting,participants mainly discussed challenges common to prefectures (for example, role sharing among
administration, NPOs, and volunteers in the removal of sediment from houses), matters that required resources
procurement on a national basis (e.g. management of disaster VCs), and messages that needed to becommunicated to the public across the nation (e.g. the concentration of volunteer resources in certain areas,
safety management). Based on the discussion in the meetings, the following activities were carried out.
・ Display the volunteer recruitment status of each disaster VC on the website of the Japan National Social
Welfare Council
42

・ Call for donations to support the affected
・ Issue messages about the recruitment of volunteers and safety measures via leaflets (three issues (July 13
and 27, September 20)
Leaflet (issued on September 20)

H.E. Mr. OKONOGI, Then Minister of State for Disaster Management speaking
at the second National Information Sharing Meeting (July 24)(2) Other Response Measures Taken in the Affected Areas in a Series of Disasters in 2018
Volunteer activities through disaster VCs, and information sharing meetings were also conducted in theaffected areas by the Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake and the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in thesame manner as the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018.
Northern Osaka Prefecture
Earthquake

Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake

Number of disaster VCs

7

3

Number of volunteers

5,670 (as of July 31, 2018)12,857 (as of March 24, 2019)

Name of the information
sharing meeting(secretariat)

Osaka Disaster Support Network (9organizations, including Osaka
Prefectural Social Welfare Council)

NPO Information Sharing Meeting for
the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake (Hokkaido NPO Support
Center)43

Meeting in northern Osaka Prefecture

Meeting for the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake

Section 2 Future Challenges Concerning Evacuation
After the torrential rains in July 1983, there had been no major heavy rain disaster that caused more than
100 deaths until the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, which caused more than 200 people to die or go. The directcause of this major disaster was the record-breaking rainfalls that hit over a wide area from western Japan to
the Tokai region, leading to river floods and sediment disasters in many areas, especially in Okayama, Hiroshima,
and Ehime Prefectures. It was reported that the damage was further extended because appropriate evacuation
actions were not taken in spite of the announcement urging residents to evacuate.
Section 2 reflects evacuation during the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 and discusses challenges for the futureand how the government tackles these challenges.
2-1 Review of Government’s Evacuation Measures after the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
Before the start of the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the government proactively disseminated forecasts forthe upcoming weather event through mass media, by holding emergency press conferences and announcing
the possibility of the issuance of an emergency heavy rain warning. The JMA issued an emergency heavy rain
warning for 11 prefectures (Gifu, Kyoto, Hyogo, Okayama, Tottori, Hiroshima, Ehime, Kochi, Fukuoka, Saga, andNagasaki Prefectures) for the period from July 6 to 8, calling for maximum alert. An emergency warning is themost serious warning when there is a risk of a serious disaster that happens only once in a few decades. 11
prefectures was the largest number ever for which an emergency heavy rain warning was issued.
The local governments in Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures, which was severely affected from therainfalls, also issued evacuation recommendations before the disaster as the weather condition became worse,
urging local residents to evacuate from the area.

44

Criteria for Meteorological Emergency Warnings

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website
Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/kishou/know/tokubetsu-keiho/kizyun.html<Refer to Fig. A-59 Emergency Warning Issuance Criteria (A-88)>

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/kishou/know/tokubetsu-keiho/index.html)

Evacuation include moving to shelters or safe places nearby and assuring indoor safety. While it is difficult toknow the number of people who evacuated, the local government has confirmed that the proportion of people
who evacuated to shelters was about 0.5% of those who lived in the areas for which evacuation
recommendations were issued.
Based on the lessons learned from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, on August 31, 2018, the government
established the Working Group on the Review of Evacuation from Flood and Sediment Disasters Caused by the
Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 under the Disaster Management Implementation Committee (a committee
established under the National Disaster Management Council to promote the implementation of various DRR
45

measures of ministries and agencies), in order to strengthen evacuation measures given the recent climate andsocial conditions. At the Director-General-Level Meeting held in September, it was agreed that “the Cabinet
Office serves as the secretariat, while ministries and agencies work together on matters to be referred to theWorking Group” and that “ministries and agencies cooperate with each other to carry out measures for the
next flood season.” The Working Group started discussion on these matters in September (Reference:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/fusuigai/suigai_dosyaworking/index.html). The Working Group held three meetings
by December 2018. It worked together with an expert panel and relevant ministries and agencies to identify
issues that needed a review based on the on-site investigations concerning the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018.
The Working Group submitted a report describing the challenges and measures to implement in the future.
2-2 Report (Proposal) by the Working Group on the Review of Evacuation from Flood and Sediment Disasters
Caused by the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018
(1) Overview of the Report
Based on the discussion of the Working Group, on December 26, 2018, the Cabinet Office published theReport on Evacuation from Flood and Sediment Disasters Reflecting the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, which
described challenges and measures to implement in the future.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/fusuigai/suigai_dosyaworking/index.html
Concerning future measures, the Report pointed out the need for DRR education and evacuation drills at allelementary and junior high schools that are at the risk of flood or sediment disasters as well as the capacity
building of local DRR leaders across Japan. The government also classified warning levels into five levels toclearly define the timing of evacuation and actions that local residents need to take in each stage.

Evacuation Strategy: Practical Examples
Foster an awareness that only residents themselves can protect
their own lives and promote education on regional disaster risks
and required evacuation actions

Continuously conduct disaster prevention educationand evacuation drills for residents of all generations
living in areas with disaster risksChildren Conduct disaster prevention education and evacuation drills every
year before the rainy and typhoon seasons come at all elementaryand junior high schools* with flood and sediment disaster risks.
 Foster an awareness to protect one’s own life by learning practicalactions to protect life (evacuation)*Schools located in a flood hazard area or sediment disaster alert area, which are included in
the regional disaster management plan and which have an evacuation
operation/implementation plan (target year for formulating an evacuation
operation/implementation plan: FY2021)

Region Foster “regional disaster prevention leaders” with basic
knowledge in disaster prevention across Japan
 Continuously conduct proper self-help and mutual-help
initiatives in various areas
Older people Promote understanding of evacuation actions for the elderly undercoordination between disaster prevention and mitigation
organizations [the disaster prevention sector] and Community
Comprehensive Support Centers and care managers [the welfare
sector]Expert support for the above measures
 Develop a system to provide support by experts specialized inflood and sediment disasters in individual regions across Japan

Provision of disaster prevention information to
support residents’ evacuation
Provide information in an easy-to-understand manner so that
residents can quickly take evacuation actions
 Divide actions residents should take into five stages and clarify the
relationship between announced information and actions to be taken
 Make the relationship between announced information and actions to betaken intuitive and easy to understand in order to support residents’voluntary evacuation[Clarifying the timing of evacuation]
Level 3: The elderly should evacuate

Level 4: All residents must evacuate

Warning level

Required Action

Information to callfor actions

Information forsevere weather
preparedness

Warning
Level 5

Survive yourself

Disaster occurrence(announced as much as possible)

Warning
Level 4

Flood Warnings
and Advisories
for designatedriver

Evacuation now!

(for flood and sedimentdisasters)

Warning
Level 3

Evacuation now if you need time

Warning
Level 2Check where to evacuate

Warning
Level 1

Stay alert

・Evacuation advisory
・Evacuation warning(emergency)
Prepared for evacuation/
Evacuation advisory for the elderly
and those needing special care

Advisory

Sediment
disaster alert
information
Warning
Real-time risk
map
OthersPossibility of a warning Review, clarify and announce the relationship between information for severe weather
preparedness (including emergency warnings) and each warning level

Source: Material provided at the 13th meeting of the Disaster Management Implementation Committee, National
Disaster Management Council(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/chuobou/jikkoukaigi/13/index.html)

46Based on the above Report and the lessons learned from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the government
published the Guidelines on Evacuation Advisory (Revised Version) on March 29, 2019. It describes a new fivelevel warning evacuation system that supports voluntary evacuation by ensuring that residents can intuitively
understand required actions.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/oukyu/hinankankoku/h30_hinankankoku_guideline/index.html
In the future, the government intends to disseminate the Guidelines to local governments and the public,
promote their understanding, and ensure the provision of DRR information in an easy-to-understand mannerusing the five-level evacuation warning system.

(March 2019) Major changes to the Guidelines on Evacuation Recommendations
 During the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, residents were not able to utilize announced DRR information
due to various kinds of difficult-to-understand information.
 Based on this lesson, DRR information will be provided to the public in five stages so that residents canintuitively understand the meaning of information and take appropriate evacuation actions.

Communication of DRR information using warning levels(1) Classify actions that residents need to take into five stages according to the level of the risk of adisaster, and clarify the relationship between information and required actions.

 Clarify the timing of evacuation ([Warning Level 3] Evacuation of the elderly; [Warning Level 4]
Evacuation of all residents)• Warning Level 3 is issued to urge the elderly to evacuate and other residents to prepare for evacuation.
• Warning Level 4 is issued when all residents must evacuate.
• An evacuation waring (emergency) is not always issued. It is used when there is an extremely high risk of a disaster and there is aneed to urgently or repeatedly urge residents to evacuate. This is a Level 4 warning that urges all residents to evacuate.

 Warning Level 5 is the announcement of the occurrence of a disaster. It urges all residents to take thebest possible actions to protect their lives.
• Information on the occurrence of a disaster is extremely useful in urging actions to protect life. When the occurrence of a disasteris confirmed, the government will issue Warning Level 5 as much as possible to communicate the fact that a disaster has occurred
and urge residents to take best possible actions to protect their lives.

(2) When issuing an evacuation advisory, the government clarifies the corresponding warning level in a way that
residents of each category can understand required evacuation actions according to the warning level.

(3) Support residents’ voluntary evacuation by clarifying corresponding relationships between various
information for severe weather preparedness and the five-level evacuation warnings.
Information to urge residents totake actions

Warning
Level 5A disaster has occurred. Take the best possible actions to protect
life

Warning
Level 4・Evacuation to designated shelters
・If the resident him/herself determines that it is more risky to go
outside and evacuate to the designated shelter as there is anextremely high risk of a disaster, he/she must urgently evacuate toa safer place nearby or a safer room in the building.
People who need special care, such as the elderly who need moretime to evacuate, should start to evacuate to shelters. Other people
should prepare for evacuation or start evacuation voluntarily.

Evacuation advisory
Evacuation warning (emergency)*

Review evacuation processes, i.e. check disaster risks using thehazard map, locations of shelters and routes, and the timing of
evacuation, review means to obtain evacuation information, andstay alert
Stay alert for a possible disaster and pay attention to updates on
disaster prevention and meteorological information.

Advisory

Warning
Level 3Warning
Level 2
Warning
Level 1

Information on the occurrence of adisaster**Issued as far as possible when theoccurrence of a disaster is confirmed.

*Issued when there is a need to urgently or
repeatedly urge residents to evacuate.

Prepared for evacuation/
Evacuation advisory for the elderly andthose needing special care

Possibility of a warning

Source: Cabinet Office website (Revision of the Guidelines on Evacuation Advisories (FY2018))
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/oukyu/hinankankoku/h30_hinankankoku_guideline/index.html

Issued by municipalities

Actions residents should takeAnnounced by the JMA

Warning level

47Chapter 2 Measures for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
and National Resilience Reflecting Disasters in 2018
1-1 Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure
Reflecting the impact of natural disasters in 2018 (e.g., Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake, the Heavy
Rain Event of July 2018, Typhoon JEBI (1821), Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake) on people’s lives, economic
livelihoods and lives, the government held the Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical
Infrastructure on September 21, 2018 with an aim to discuss over continuous functionality of electricity,transportation and other critical infrastructure. At the meeting, it was agreed that the government would
formulate measures to this end by the end of November (Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
jyuyouinfura/index.html). Under this project, 12 ministries and agencies carried out emergency inspections on
132 items concerning (1) critical infrastructure for securing power in the event of a disaster, and (2) criticalinfrastructure for protecting people’s lives.
Example of an Emergency Inspection Item
Electricity

Emergency Inspection of Electricity Infrastructure

Overview
Overview: Learning from the major blackout affecting the entire Hokkaido Prefecture caused by the2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, overall inspection of electricity infrastructure will
be conducted across Japan, bearing in mind the inspection work for the major blackout
conducted by the third party committee established under the Organization for Crossregional Coordination of Transmission Operators (OCCTO).
Scope: Overall inspection of electricity infrastructure will be conducted across Japan, bearing in mind
the aforementioned inspection work.
Ministry/agency in charge: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

Issues Identified Following the Recent Disaster
A massive blackout occurred during the
Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in
September 2018 due to multiple factors,
including the shutdown of a major thermal
power plant, electric line failures, anddisruptions to renewable energy power
generation (hydropower and wind power).

<The status of the electricity system (power transmission network) from the earthquake to the major
blackout in the Hokkaido area>

Source: Prime Minister's Office of Japan website (Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical
Infrastructure)(Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html)

48

At the second Ministerial Meeting on November 27, 2018, the government reviewed inspection results andformulated measures, which were grouped into the following two categories: (1) the maintenance of thefunctionality of critical infrastructure for disaster prevention (those that protect people’s lives and property
from floods, sediment disasters and other disasters and those related to rescue and relief activities and medical
activities); and (2) the maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure to support people’s economic
livelihoods and lives (e.g., electricity, food supply and transportation infrastructure).
1-2 Approval of the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, andBuilding National Resilience
At the third Ministerial Meeting (jointly held with the National Resilience Promotion Office) on December
14, 2018, the Prime Minister said, “We will create a country that possesses strength and resilience, not giving
in to disasters. We must continue on this path of national resilience as Japan’s grand plan for the long-term
future. In particular, in recent years, since disasters have grown in intensity, disaster prevention, disastermitigation, and building national resilience for the protection of the lives and property of the people havebecome important and urgent issues, and we must continue to advance these efforts swiftly.” With this view inmind, the members of the meeting formulated measures for critical infrastructure based on the results ofemergency inspections, as well as those for concrete block walls and farm ponds reflecting the results of past
inspections. At the meeting, the Cabinet approved the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster
Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience, which described urgent measures that
required immediate action, such as the below.
Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html.
Example of Emergency Inspection Results and Response Measures
RiversEmergency Inspection
Concerning the Risk of Levee Breach in Rivers

Overview: Learning from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, emergency inspections were carried out toexamine the inundation depth during a flood caused by a backwater phenomenon, etc. As a result, it
was found that some of the inspected rivers had sections with a risk of causing enormous casualties.
To mitigate such risks, levee reinforcement and elevation and other response measures will be taken.
Ministry/agency in charge: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)

Class A rivers: Approx. 14,000; Class B rivers: Approx. 7,000
Inspections were conducted.
Sections with a risk of reaching a large inundation depth andcausing enormous casualties

Many houses were flooded due to levee breaches in
multiple tributaries and overtopping on the right bank.

・It was found that important facilities were located in some of the areas witha risk of reaching a considerable inundation depth and causing damage tohouses exceeding a certain number.

[Response measures]
Levee reinforcement and elevation to prevent or delay
breaches49

Hospitals

Emergency Inspection of On-Site Power Generators
at Disaster Base Hospitals

Overview: In light of the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, emergency inspections were conductedon emergency on-site power generation facilities at disaster base hospitals across Japan. While allof the inspected hospitals had emergency on-site power generators, it was found that some ofthem needed additional facilities in order to maintain medical functions for three days.
The government needs to formulate measures to support private hospitals that need additional
emergency on-site power generation facilities (such as installing additional fuel tanks).
Ministry/agency in charge: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)
Disaster base hospitals, emergency medical care centers, and perinatal medical centers: 822 hospitals in total

Inspections were conducted.
Hospitals that needed additional emergency on-site power generation facilities
・Some hospitals might not be able to secure necessary power to maintain medical functions in the event of a longterm power outage (for about three days).

(Emergency on-site power generation facility)[Response measures]Support for installing additional emergency on-site power
generation facilities (such as additional fuel tanks)

Source: Prime Minister's Office of Japan website (Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical
Infrastructure)
Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html

1-3 Implementation of the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation,
and Building National Resilience
The Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National
Resilience describes the goals, contents, expenditures and other information of 160 tangible and intangible
measures to be urgently implemented over the three years from FY2018 to FY2020 from the perspectives of(1) the maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure for disaster prevention and (2) themaintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure to support people’s economic livelihoods and lives.
These emergency measures will be carried out with a fund of approximately 7 trillion yen utilizing the fiscal
investment and loan program and contributions from the private sector with a view to achieving completion orsignificant advancement by the end of the period. In order to ensure the functionality of critical infrastructure,
which protects people’s lives and property from natural disasters and is essential for people’s lives andeconomic livelihoods, the national government will promote these measures in cooperation with various
entities, including local governments, private hospitals, airport terminal companies, communications
companies, and railway companies.
Among these measures, expenditures for those to be commenced in the first fiscal year were covered by the
FY2018 secondary supplementary budget. Additional funds will be allocated from the FY2019 and FY2020
budgets for temporary and special measures.
The government will conduct periodical follow-up assessments on the progress of these emergency
measures to ensure steadily progress and attainment of the defined goals in three years.

50

Overview of the Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster
Mitigation, and Building National Resilience
1. Basic Principles〇Based on the Results of the Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure and Response Measures (report from the Ministerial Meeting on
Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure on November 27, 2018) and the results of past inspections on concrete block walls and farm ponds,
emergency measures were formulated for the following two purposes:
・the maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure for disaster prevention; and・the maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure to support people’s economic livelihoods and lives.
These emergency measures are tangible and intangible measures falling under 20 priority and other programs included in the 45 programs of the
National Resilience Basic Plan. They will be promoted intensively over the next three years.

2. Categories of Measures and Estimated Budgets〇Emergency measures: 160 items〇Implemented with a fund of approximately 7 trillion yen (also utilizing the fiscal investment and loan program) *1, *2
I. Maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure for disaster prevention: Approx. 3.5 trillion yen(1) Prevention and minimization of damage of major floods, sediment disasters, earthquakes, tsunamis, and other disasters: Approx. 2.8
trillion yen(2) Securing disaster response capabilities, including those for rescue and relief activities and medical activities: Approx. 0.5 trillion yen(3) Securing information necessary for evacuation: Approx. 0.2 trillion yen

II. Maintenance of the functionality of critical infrastructure to support people’s economic livelihoods and lives:
Approx. 3.5 trillion yen(1) Securing electricity and energy supply: Approx. 0.3 trillion yen(2) Securing food supply, lifeline utilities, supply chains, etc.: Approx. 1.1 trillion yen(3) Securing land, sea, and air transportation networks: Approx. 2 trillion yen(4) Securing information, communications, and information services necessary in daily life: Approx. 0.02 trillion yen(*1) Includes 0.6 trillion yen
from the fiscal investment
and loan program and 0.4
trillion yen of contributions
from the private sector.
Includes 0.3 trillion yen in
FY2018 1st supplementarybudget.
(*2) Totals may not add up
due to rounding.

3. Period and Goals〇Period: Three years from FY2018 to FY2020〇Goals: Complete or significantly advance emergency measures that require immediate action from the viewpoint of promoting disaster prevention and disaster mitigation
and building national resilience

Source: Prime Minister's Office of Japan website (Ministerial Meeting on Emergency Inspection of Critical Infrastructure)
Reference: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jyuyouinfura/index.html

51

Chapter 3 Preparedness for Nankai Trough Major
Earthquakes: Research on Disaster Risk
Management for Anomalous Phenomena
1-1 Research on Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai TroughIn March 2018, the Cabinet Office established the “Working Group on Disaster Risk Management for
Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai Trough” under the National Disaster Management Council’s Disaster
Management Implementation Committee. The purpose of the establishment of the working group is to study
desirable disaster risk management for anomalous phenomena observed along the Nankai Trough and social
mechanisms to conduct disaster risk management. The study was based on the basic policy of disaster risk
management for such phenomena that has been indicated in “Implementation of Disaster Management Basedon the Observation and Evaluation of Earthquakes along the Nankai Trough (Report),” which was released in
September 2017. The working group started its research in FY2018.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html
The working group held seven meetings in FY2018 while coordinating its study with the discussion at the
Chubu Study Group on New Corporate Disaster Risk Management based on Earthquake Observation along the
Nankai Trough, which has held a meeting every month in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture, since FY2017. At its
meetings, the working group reviewed example cases of disaster management activities conducted by Shizuoka
and Kochi Prefectures and the Chubu economic community in their model areas. The group then discussed andstudied assumed cases of anomalous phenomena (three cases: a partial area rupture, a limited area rupture,
and a slow slip) and the disaster management to be implemented in the event of each case of phenomenon.
On December 25, 2018, “Regarding Desirable Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the
Nankai Trough (Report),” a report summarizing the working group’s discussion and study, was released on the
Cabinet Office’s website.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html

52

Example of Anomalous Phenomena That Might Occur along the Nankai TroughA large-scale (M8 class) earthquake occurs
on the eastern side of the Nankai Trough.

Earthquakes may betriggered on thewestern side.
What kind of disaster risk management measures should be taken when such anomalous
phenomena are observed?
Source: Implementation of Disaster Management Based on the Observation and Evaluation of Earthquakes along the
Nankai Trough (Report) (Summary)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html)

The report describes specifically how the national and local governments, companies and other organizations
as well as residents should respond to each of the assumed three cases when the probability of the occurrenceof an earthquake is assessed to have become relatively high. This is intended to mitigate damage by making
use of information collected through the observation of anomalous phenomena in consideration of such factors
as the severity of the estimated damage that could be caused by a large-scale earthquake along the Nankai
Trough and the past earthquakes in the region. As it is impossible at present to precisely forecast when, whereor on what scale an earthquake may occur, it has been decided to prescribe specifically how disastermanagement should be implemented and in which period in each case utmost caution is required.

53

Systems for implementation of disaster management○ Planning of disaster management
In order to smoothly and appropriately implement disaster management, it is necessary for the national and local governments
and other relevant organizations to formulate in advance plans for disaster management that should be implemented.
○ Specifics of earthquake information concerning the observation of anomalous phenomena
With respect to earthquake information, it is necessary to conduct studies on labeling of information and alert level assessment sothat disaster management suited to each case of phenomenon and the alert level can be implemented.
○ A system for universal start of disaster management
It is necessary to make clear that it is essential for relevant organizations and residents to universally start implementing disastermanagement in accordance with the level of the required disaster management.

Matters of consideration for the study and disaster management by residents and companies○ Promoting measures to deal with earthquakes that may occur without warning signs
Further promoting measures that should be implemented in preparation for earthquakes that may occur without warning signs
would be most effective for dealing with a Nankai Trough Earthquake, which may take any of a great variety of forms.
○ Preventing social chaos and providing appropriate information
It is necessary to carefully disseminate information related to the Nankai Trough Earthquake so that the people can have an
accurate understanding.
○ Guidelines for promoting the study of disaster management by residents and companies (tentative name)
The national government needs to compile guidelines that indicate the basic approach to disaster management, items that should
be studied, procedures for the study, and points of attention, among other matters.
○ Matters of consideration for the study of disaster management in specific sectors
Following consultations with relevant ministries and agencies, it is necessary to make clear the principles for disaster managementthat should be implemented by organizations in specific sectors, including schools and hospitals, as well as by designated pu blic
organizations in such sectors as communication and logistics while taking into consideration the principles of disaster management
by residents and companies.

Source: Implementation of Disaster Management Based on the Observation and Evaluation of Earthquakes along the Nankai
Trough (Report) (Summary)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html)

1-2 Disaster Risk Management for the Case of a Partial Area Rupture
In the case of a partial area rupture (large-scale earthquake) causing serious damage (hereinafter referred toas the “partial area rupture case”), a large-scale earthquake occurs in a part of the expected epicentral area
along the Nankai Trough, while the risk of multiple large-scale earthquakes occurring in the remaining area
increases.

54

A partial area rupture (a large-scale earthquake with a magnitude of 8.0 or
higher) causing serious damage<Criteria>
・An earthquake with a magnitude of 8.0 occurs at a plate boundary in the epicentral
area of the Nankai TroughA large-scale (M8 class) earthquake occurs on the easternside of the Nankai Trough.

Does it cause an earthquake on
the western side?

Ratio to the number of initial earthquakes

Number of aftershocks in partial area rupture cases*Cases where an aftershock with a magnitude of 8 or more occurred in theadjacent area following the main magnitude 8-class earthquake (103 cases)

6 cases

Cases where an aftershock with a magnitude within the ±1.0 rangeof the main earthquake occurred in the adjacent area
Cases where an aftershock with a magnitude of 7.8 or higher
occurred in the adjacent area
Fitted curve using the Omori-Uzu formula indicating the decay ofaftershocks

Out of 103 cases:
6 cases within 3 days
7 cases within 7 days
17 cases within 3 years
1 case1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
Days elapsed from the first earthquake

The frequency of occurrence of anaftershock within seven days is oncein 10 + cases.
(7 cases out of 103 cases)
The probability is nearly a hundred
times the normal.
*Normal probability
The probability of 70% to 80% in 30
years means that the probability ofoccurrence of an earthquake within 7days is once in 1,000 times.

Source: Implementation of Disaster Management Based on the Observation and Evaluation ofEarthquakes along the Nankai Trough (Report) (Summary)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html)

The frequency of occurrence of this case is once in 100 to 150 years. The scenario of this case was developed
based on the most recent two cases where major earthquakes occurred in a row: one was the 1944 Tonankai
Earthquake (Mw 8.2) and the 1946 Nankai Earthquake (Mw 8.4), and the other was the 1854 Tokai Earthquake(Mw 8.6) and the earthquake that occurred about 32 hours later, the 1854 Nankai Earthquake (Mw 8.6).
Note) The momentum magnitudes (Mw) are based on the Report of the Working Group on the Criteria of
Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai Trough for Disaster Risk Management (December 2018).
If a magnitude 8-class earthquake occurs along the Nankai Trough in this case, the following disaster risk
management measures will be implemented over the following week to prepare for a subsequent earthquakethat might occur in the area struck by the earthquake as well as in remaining areas.
The maximum alert will be maintained for a week in principle. In the following week, disaster management measures for the partial area rupture case will
be carried out.
<Residents> ・Residents must evacuate if it is obvious that they would not be able to evacuate should an aftershock occur.
・Residents who need special care must evacuate if they might not have enough time for evacuation should an aftershock occur. Other
residents should prepare for evacuation or voluntarily evacuate depending on the situation.
・Residents in other areas should stay alert and review earthquake preparedness<Companies> ・Facilities used by many and unspecified people and facilities handling hazardous materials must make sure to carry out facility inspections
and check fire control measures, etc.
・If there is an obvious risk of endangering employees’ lives in the case of a large-scale earthquake, companies should take appropriate
preventive measures.
・Other companies should also stay alert and review earthquake preparedness.
・Companies are encouraged to have a business continuity plan that would mitigate overall damage and allow them to recover as early as
possible, even if it means that business activities would be temporarily limited and diminished.

Source: Implementation of Disaster Management Based on the Observation and Evaluation of Earthquakes along the
Nankai Trough (Report) (Summary)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html)

55

Disaster Response Process When a Major Earthquake Warning Is Issued○ The JMA reports to the government as early as two hours after the main earthquake when it judges that the risk of asubsequent earthquake is high.
○ The government gives instructions to local governments on disaster risk management measures over the next week.
○ If one week passes without a subsequent large earthquake, the government lifts evacuation recommendations, while
encouraging residents to continue to stay alert

JMA

Prefectures andmunicipalities

Government

Residents andcompanies

A magnitude 8-class earthquake along the Nankai TroughA few to 5
minutes later(earliest)
5 to 30
minutes later
1 to 2 hours
later
2 hours later(earliest)

1 week later

Major tsunami warning, etc.
・Start investigation on
possibility of aftershock**Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra
Information (under Investigation)

Prepare for establishing Emergency
Headquarters

Start first response
Press conference on initialearthquake
Establish Emergency
Headquarters

・Prepare for evacuation, etc.
・Start evacuation dependingon situation

・Announce commencementof investigation

Hold Assessment Committee
meetingNankai Trough Earthquake Extra
Information (Major Earthquake
Warning)・Relative increase of risk ofearthquake

Emergency Headquarters

Prepare Emergency Headquarters,
etc.

Call for rescue activities and proactive
disaster prevention measures (including
evacuation)*Dissemination of instructions for defineddisaster management period (1 week)

Emergency Headquarters
・Lift evacuation recommendation(excluding affected areas)・Call for continued alert

Implement disastermanagement measures
・Evacuation of relevant residents
・Inspection of infrastructure, etc.

Maintain Emergency Headquarters,
etc.

Review earthquake
preparedness

Source: Cited from the summary of the Guidelines for Formulating Disaster Risk Management Measures Based on Various
Nankai Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1st Edition)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/index.html)

1-3 Disaster Risk Management for the Case of a Limited Area Rupture or a Slow Slip
In the case of a limited area rupture causing limited damage (hereinafter referred to as the “limited area
rupture case”), an earthquake that is one scale smaller than a major earthquake (i.e. a magnitude 7-class
earthquake) occurs along the Nankai Trough.
The frequency of this case is once in 15 years. In the last seven cases, no major aftershock was observed (ona global level, the frequency that a magnitude 8-class earthquake occurs in the same area within a week
following an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 or more is once in a few hundred times).
The slow slip case causing no damage (hereinafter referred to as the “slow slip case”) refers to the case wherean anomalous slow slip is observed. A significant change is observed with a strainmeter and the state of fixationof plate boundaries obviously changes over a short period.
This case has never been observed before. While there is a way to conduct a qualitative assessment to see if
the risk of a large-scale earthquake has increased, there is no established method or criteria to quantitatively
assess the likeliness of occurrence of a large-scale earthquake.
Disaster risk management for these two cases will be centered on the review of earthquake preparedness.

56

The case of a limited area rupture causing limited damage(possible foreshock with a magnitude between 7.0 and 8.0)

The case of a slow slip causing no damage

An earthquake (M7 class) occurs
along the Nankai Trough.

Change in strain

Observation (ofcharge) withstrainmeters

Sprung up(earthquake)

Overriding plate

Strongly attachedboundary

Slow slip
Dragging in

Subduction of thePhilippine Sea Plate

Is it a foreshock of the large-scale Nankai TroughEarthquake?

 Some residents start evacuation.
 No major damage has yet occurred in most regions.

 No shock or tsunami. Transportation infrastructure operates asnormal Attracting higher interest from the public as an unprecedented case

Review earthquake preparedness, raising the alert level, etc.
(Limited area rupture case) Disaster management measures are implemented over a week of maximum alert period in principle(Slow slip case) Disaster management measures will be continued until it is confirmed that no new change has occurred after the same amount of time as the period in which the change in the slip was observed.

Example of items to review for earthquake preparedness

Example of disaster management measures taken according
to the situation[Residents][Residents]

・Check if the furniture is securely fixed・Check means for confirming family members’ safety ・Evacuation centers
・Evacuation routes ・Check the inventory of household emergency supplies[Companies]
・Check means for confirming employees’ safety
・Check evacuation instructions for facility users and evacuation routes for
employees
・Inspection of facilities and equipment
・Check if the furniture and equipment are securely fixed.

・Be ready for evacuation (prepare emergency bags, etc.)
・Voluntary evacuation to houses of relatives or acquaintances
・Stay in a safe room with no objects with a risk of collapse or fall[Companies]
・Traffic control along the coasts ・Increase parts inventory
・Restrict the use of rooms whose ceilings have objects that may fall・Backup and storage of electronic data and important documents

Source: Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai Trough (Report) (Summary)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/taio_wg/taio_wg_02.html)

Disaster Response Process
Earthquake with a magnitude of 8 or
higher at a plate boundary*1
Immediately after theearthquake(Only when deemed necessary
in the case of a slow slip)(Earliest)
About 2 hours later

1 week later2 weeks later*4
Until it is confirmed thatthe slip has stopped

Earthquake with a magnitudeof 7 or higher*2

 Prepare for or start disaster management measures (such as evacuation)
depending on the situation
Major earthquake warning Review earthquake preparedness, etc.
 Residents who need special care mustevacuate if they might not have enoughtime for evacuation should an aftershock
occur. Other residents should prepare
for evacuation or voluntarily evacuate
depending on the situation.
 Residents must evacuate if it is obviousthat they would not be able to evacuateshould an aftershock occur.
Major earthquake advisory
 Review earthquake preparedness, etc.
(voluntary evacuation as needed) Return to normal life while staying alert
for aftershocks and being aware that therisk of a large-scale earthquake has notbeen eliminatedMajor earthquake advisory
 Review earthquake
preparedness, etc.
(voluntary evacuation asneeded) Return to normal life whilestaying alert for aftershocks
and being aware that therisk of a large-scale
earthquake has not been
eliminatedUntil the occurrence ofa large-scale
earthquake*1 When an earthquake with a magnitude of 8.0 or higher has occurred on a plate boundary in the expected
epicentral area of the Nankai Trough (the partial area rupture case)*2 When an earthquake with a magnitude between 7.0 and 8.0 has occurred on a plate boundary in the
expected epicentral area of the Nankai Trough or when an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 or higher has
occurred in a spot other than plate boundaries in the expected epicentral area of the Nankai Trough or within
the 50 km radius of the trench axis of the expected epicentral area (the partial area rupture case)*3 When an anomalous slow slip has been observed, during which a significant change was observed with astrainmeter and the state of fixation of plate boundaries has obviously changed over a short period (the slow
slip case)*4 The two weeks comprise of one week of the aftershock warning period and one week of aftershock advisory
period.

Slow slip*3
 Prepare for or start disastermanagement measuresdepending on the situation
Major earthquake advisory
 Review earthquake
preparedness, etc.

 Return to normal life whilestaying alert for aftershocks
and being aware that the riskof a large-scale earthquake has
not been eliminated
The measures in the above table
are mere guidelines. Actual
response measures would varydepending on the situation.

Source: Cited from the summary of the Guidelines for Formulating Disaster Risk Management Measures Based on Various Nankai
Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1st Edition)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/index.html)

57

1-4 Announcement of Information
The JMA started to release Nankai Trough Earthquake-related Information in November 2017 as a transitional
means until a new disaster risk management scheme is established. Based on the report of the Working Groupon Disaster Risk Management for Anomalous Phenomena along the Nankai Trough published in December
2018, the JMA decided to release observation and analysis results of anomalous phenomena that occurredalong the Nankai Trough under the titles of “Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information” and “Nankai TroughEarthquake Information”.
Reference: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1903/29a/20190329_nankaijoho_name.html
Titles and Conditions of Announcement of Nankai Trough Earthquake-Related Information
Information issued by JMA

Conditions of announcement○ When an anomalous phenomenon is observed along the Nankai
Trough and investigation is started or continued to check the
Nankai Trough Earthquake
correlation of the phenomenon with large-scale earthquakes inthis region.
Extra Information○ When announcing investigation results on observed anomalous
phenomena○ When announcing information on the situation after theannouncement of investigation results on observed anomalous
phenomena
Nankai Trough Earthquake○ When announcing investigation results shared at a regular
Information
meeting of the Nankai Trough Earthquake Assessment
Committee (except when a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra
Information is to be made)Source: Japan Meteorological Agency website(Reference: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/press/1903/29a/20190329_nankaijoho_name.html)

In the partial area rupture case, the JMA will make a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information (Major
Earthquake Warning), while the government calls for alert and evacuation, when the occurrence of thefollowing phenomenon is confirmed:
・An earthquake of Mw 8.0 or higher has occurred at a plate boundary in the expected epicentral area of the
Nankai TroughIn the limited area rupture case or the slow slip case, the JMA will make a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra
Information (Major Earthquake Advisory), while the government calls for caution and the review of earthquake
preparedness, when the occurrence of one of the following phenomena is confirmed:
・An earthquake of Mw 7.0-8.0 has occurred at a plate boundary in the expected epicentral area of the Nankai
Trough・An earthquake of Mw7.0 or higher has occurred in a spot other than plate boundaries in the expected
epicentral area of the Nankai Trough or within the 50 km radius of the trench axis in the expected epicentral
area・ An anomalous slow slip has been observed, during which a significant change was observed with astrainmeter and the state of fixation of plate boundaries has obviously changed over a short period

58

Announcement of Information on Observed Anomalous Phenomena
Observed anomalous
phenomenon

An earthquake with a magnitude of
6.8 or higher has occurred

An anomalous slow slip has
possibly occurredin the expected epicentral area of the
Nankai Trough or its surroundings

at a plate boundary in the expected
epicentral area of the Nankai TroughAssessment on anomalous
phenomena(Approx. 30 minutes laterat earliest)

The JMA makes a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information (under Investigation)

The Nankai Trough Earthquake Assessment Committee consisting of experts holdsa meeting to evaluate the phenomenon

Earthquake with amagnitude of 8 or
higher at a plateboundary (*1)
Information to beannounced after
assessment(Approx. 2 hours laterat earliest)

Nankai Trough Earthquake
Extra Information(Major Earthquake Warning)

Earthquake with amagnitude of 7 orhigher (*2)

Slow slip (*3)

Nankai Trough Earthquake
Extra Information(Major Earthquake Advisory)

When theconditions on
the left are notmet

Nankai Trough Earthquake
Extra Information(Completion of Investigation)*1 When an earthquake with a magnitude of 8.0 or higher has occurred on a plate boundary in the epicentral area along the
Nankai Trough (the partial area rupture case)*2 When an earthquake with a magnitude between 7.0 and 8.0 has occurred on a plate boundary in the expected epicentral areaof the Nankai Trough or when an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 or higher has occurred in a spot other than plateboundaries in the expected epicentral area of the Nankai Trough or within the 50 km radius of the trench axis of the expected
epicentral area (the partial area rupture case)*3 When an anomalous slow slip has been observed, during which a significant change was observed with a strainmeter and thestate of fixation of plate boundaries has obviously changed over a short period (the slow slip case)

Source: Cited from the summary of the Guidelines for Formulating Disaster Risk Management Measures
Based on Various Nankai Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1st Edition)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/index.html)

1-5 Guidelines and Future Steps
The abovementioned disaster risk management processes for the three cases are basic guidelines. Residents,
communities, and companies need to take the best disaster risk management measures possible according to
the situation.
The Cabinet Office and relevant ministries and agencies examined disaster risk management policies for eachsector and published the Guidelines for Formulating Disaster Risk Management Measures Based on Various
Nankai Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1st Edition) on March 29, 2019.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/index.html
The above Guidelines are intended to help local governments, designated public corporations, andcompanies with examining and formulating disaster risk management plans for cases in which the risk of a
Nankai Trough large-scale earthquake is increasing. The Guidelines consist of three sections titled “General,”“Residents,” and “Companies” respectively. These are intended for use by local governments, designated public
corporations, facilities used by many and unspecified people, and facilities handling hazardous materials thatare located in the Nankai Trough earthquake measures promotion area. The Guidelines show the planning
process for these entities based on the following basic ideas:
・It is important to choose safer disaster prevention actions, keeping in mind (1) the balance between the riskof an earthquake and the impact of disaster risk management measures on day-to-day life and businessactivities, and (2) the fact that it is difficult to accurately predict the timing of an earthquake and it ispractically impossible to completely guarantee safety with disaster risk management measures.
・It is important to implement preparedness measures for a sudden earthquake in order to mitigate its impact
on day-to-day life and enhance safety.
59

Residents (Planning Process for Local Governments, Etc.)

Develop a plan for the case of a major earthquake warning〇Review earthquake preparedness●Disaster management centered on the review of earthquake preparedness〇Evacuees and proactive evacuation areas●Define the evacuation speed of different groups of evacuees (normal evacuees and evacuees who need special care)●Define the expected arrival time of tsunami●Define the areas where evacuation is possible●Define proactive evacuation areas〇Sediment disasters●Develop evacuation plans according to theregional situation〇Collapsing houses and earthquake fires● Residents living in houses that fall short of the antiseismic standards should evacuate froman early stage.
●Prevent earthquake fires by refraining from using equipment〇Selection of evacuation centers and transportation means●Grasp the capacity of each evacuation center●Create a list of potential evacuation centers●Select evacuation centers●Measures for when evacuation centers are in short supply●Examine means of transportation to evacuation centers〇Management of evacuation centers●Examine the management system and roleassignment

Develop a plan for the case of amajor earthquake advisory〇Review earthquake preparedness●Disaster management centered on the review of earthquake preparedness○Review prerequisites for disaster management planning

Companies (Planning Process for Designated Public Corporations,
Specified Companies, Etc.)●Check proactive evacuation areas designated by municipalities and the estimated status of lifeline utilities when a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra
Information has been made. Estimate the impact on business activities○Planning specific disaster management measures●Based on the prerequisites, plan specific disaster management measures to be implemented when a Nankai Trough Earthquake Extra Information has been made, withreference to existing BCPs

Develop a plan for the case of a major earthquake warning〇Review earthquake preparedness●Disaster management centered on the review of earthquake preparedness〇Inspection of facilities and equipment●Inspection of facilities that may suffer damage in the event of anearthquake and facilities needed in emergencies〇Securing safety of employees●Plan hazard avoidance measures concerning activities that would obviously
endanger employees’ lives at companies located in the proactive evacuation areas.
〇Measures to be taken depending on the situation●Measures to be taken with an increased alert in preparation for an earthquake, such as changing
delivery routes●Activities to contribute to local communities, such as providing necessities and supplies toevacuation centers

Develop a plan for the case of amajor earthquake advisory〇Review earthquake preparedness●Disaster management centered on the review of earthquake
preparedness

Source: Cited from the summary of the Guidelines for Formulating Disaster Risk Management Measures Based on Various
Nankai Trough Earthquake Scenarios (1st Edition)
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/nankai/index.html

Preparedness for a sudden earthquake is still important because anomalous phenomena are not necessarily
always observed before a large-scale earthquake in the Nankai Trough. Since appropriate disaster risk
management varies among regions, each community needs to find what kind of disaster risk management
policies and solutions would work for it, while referring to the Guidelines and coordinating disaster risk
management measures for individuals, households, communities, and organizations on a regional or districtlevel. The disaster risk reduction capabilities of communities and companies can be improved by continuing topromote preparedness for a sudden earthquake and proactively formulating disaster risk reduction measures
based on the Guidelines for the time at which the risk of a large-scale earthquake increases. The Guidelines are
based on the current best knowledge and will be revised as needed to incorporate new insights.

60

Part I Current Disaster Risk Management Measures
in JapanJapan is prone to various natural disasters due to its natural conditions. In 2018, Japan was struck by various
kinds of disasters, including the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (western Japan torrential rains). Part I looks at
Japan’s recent disaster risk management policies with a special focus on measures intensely promoted in
FY2018.

Chapter 1 Current Disaster Risk Management Policies
Section 1: Reducing Disaster Risk in Advance through Self-help and Mutual
Support and Promotion of Disaster Risk Reduction Activities in Cooperation with
Various Stakeholders
1-1 Raising Awareness of Disaster Risk Reduction among the Public
As Japan is a disaster prone country, the government has constantly promoted initiatives that constitute“public support,” including the development of embankments and other hard infrastructure, as well as nonstructural measures such as preparation of hazard maps before disaster occurs. In the event of a disaster,
public support extends to emergency rescue operations, support for human resources by dispatchingsupporting officials to affected areas, push-mode support (i.e. emergency delivery of necessities and relief
supplies to evacuees at shelters, initiated without waiting for a request from affected communities), andfinancial support through the designation of a Disaster of Extreme Severity and pursuant to the Act on Support
for Reconstructing Livelihoods of affected people.
However, there are concerns about the limits of public support in the event of a major disaster such as the
Nankai Trough Earthquake, which is anticipated to occur in due course. A study showed that when an
earthquake hit Southern Hyogo Prefecture in 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake”), about 80% of people were rescued through self-help (including help from their families) ormutual support (such as assistance of their neighbors), while only about 20% were rescued by public support
such as public rescue squads (Fig. 1-1-1). Amid population decline, resulting in the depopulation of towns andvillages and declining membership of voluntary disaster management organizations and volunteer fire corps, it
is vital to foster communities with a strong disaster management awareness, which means that each
community member takes specific disaster mitigation actions with a recognition that it is no one but themselves
who can protect their life.

61

Fig. 1-1-1

Types of Rescuers and Number of People Rescued at the Time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake

Fire department,
police, SDF
Approx. 8,000(Approx. 22.9%)

Neighbors, etc.
Approx. 27,000(Approx. 77.1%)

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on Prediction of Loss of Human Lives Due to Catastrophic Earthquake Disaster(Yoshiaki Kawada; 1997; Natural Disaster Sciences Vol. 16, No.1

Specific activities to mitigate disaster may include preparedness against disasters by understanding thedisaster risk in communities, fixing furniture to the walls, stockpiling food and participating in evacuation drills.
Once disaster occurs, self-help and mutual support with neighbors are essential for mitigating disaster anddamage.
People are becoming more aware of the importance of self-help efforts and are taking specific measures
after having experienced major disasters, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami (hereinafter the “Great East Japan Earthquake”) (Fig. 1-1-2). The importance of mutual
support has also been recognized in recent years. For example, during the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018,residents of Miyoshi District, Ozu City, Ehime Prefecture were able to evacuate effectively because they had
been promoting mutual support initiatives before the disaster, such as preparing evacuation plans andconducting evacuation drills under the direction of local disaster risk management leaders.
Fig. 1-1-2

Progress of Self-Help Initiatives
The Great
Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake

Stocking food and water, 45.7%
Fixing furniture to the walls, 40.6%

Check locations ofevacuation sites, 38.8%
Check communicationmeans with family
members, 22.5%

The Great
East Japan
Earthquake

No specific action
taken, 10.4%

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on “Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the
Cabinet Public Relations Office62

Discussions with families and neighbors are important for self-help and mutual support approaches. In the2017 survey, the proportion of people who had discussed with their families and surrounding people in thepast couple of years over what to do in the event of a disaster was 50.4% for males and 64.1% for females (Fig.
1-1-3).
The most common topic of such discussion was “evacuation method, timing and location” (68.2%), followedby “communication means with family and relatives” (57.8%), “food and drinking water” (55.3%), and “contentsof emergency bag” (41.7%).
Looking at responses by age, the proportion of respondents who had never had a discussion about disaster
response was highest at 50.6% in the age bracket of 70 years old or older. Only about 30% of respondents ofthis age group answered that they had discussed the evacuation method, timing and location (Fig. 1-1-4).
Fig. 1-1-3

Discussions about Disaster with Families and Neighbors (by gender)

Male

FemaleYes

No

Don’t know

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on “Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the
Cabinet Public Relations Office in (November 2017; valid responses: 1,839)

63

Fig. 1-1-4

Top 5 Topics of Discussion about Disaster with Families and Neighbors (by Age)

18 - 29

30 - 39

Evacuation method, timing
and location
Content of emergency bag

40 - 49

50 - 59

Communication means
with family and relatives
Never had such discussion

60 - 69Over 70s

Food and drinking water

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on “Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the
Cabinet Public Relations Office in (November 2017; valid responses: 1,839)

In order to ensure that each individual can take disaster risk management actions through self-help andmutual support, it is important that they have access to necessary information for taking such actions. In a
survey conducted in 2017 that asked respondents what type of disaster risk management information theywould like to have more, the most common answer was “location of evacuation sites and evacuation routes”(47.5%), followed by “a hazard map showing disaster risks in my neighborhood” (36.4%), “meanings of disaster
information (such as evacuation advisory and evacuation warning) and how it is announced” (30.4%),“earthquake resistance of schools, medical institutions, and other public facilities” (28.1%), and “a map showing
past disasters in my neighborhood” (27.0%). Looking at responses by age, the percentage of people seeking
more disaster information (such as those who responded “location of evacuation sites and evacuation routes”
and “meanings of disaster information (such as evacuation advisory and evacuation warning) and how it isannounced”) was lower in older age brackets (Fig. 1-1-5).

64

Fig. 1-1-5

Disaster Information That Should Be Provided More Extensively (Top 5 Items) (by Age)

18 - 29

30 - 39

40 - 49

Location of evacuation sites and evacuation routes
Meanings of disaster information (such as evacuation
advisory and evacuation warning) and how it is announced
A map showing past disasters in my neighborhood

50 - 59

60 - 69Over 70s

A hazard map showing disaster risks in my neighborhood
Earthquake resistance of schools, medical institutions,and other public facilities

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on “Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the
Cabinet Public Relations Office in (November 2017; valid responses: 1,839)

Although the government intends to spare no effort in enhancing public support, it is becoming more andmore difficult to contain sudden severe disasters solely with existing disaster risk management facilities, otherhard infrastructure or government-led non-structural means, for various reasons including the intensifying
climate conditions accompanying global warming, the increasing number of older people who need support,
and the increasing number of foreign nationals living in Japan due to globalization. It is important for Japanesepeople to shift away from solely depending on government-led disaster risk management and start to focus
more on self-help and mutual support with a shared understanding. Today, there is a significant gap in disaster
resilience among regions. It is vital to disseminate good practices from communities with strong disaster risk
management awareness to other communities all across the country in order to build a society that caneffectively manage disasters.
The Cabinet Office and relevant ministries and agencies need to enhance awareness raising campaigns andmeasures which may connect “awareness” to “preparedness” (specific actions) in the future based on thesurvey results. This section introduces various measures carried out in collaboration with different stakeholders,with a special focus on “disaster precautions” as self-help and mutual support efforts.

65

Column:
Disaster Management Coordinators: Fostering Female Leadership
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) is working on the fostering of female disaster management
leaders in communities and companies, aiming at bringing the number of such talents to about 3,000 by
2020.
To this effect, the TMG has held the Women’s Seminar for Disaster Management from FY2017, which
covers basic knowledge on disaster management. In addition, the TMG started the Disaster Management
Coordinator Seminar in FY2018. Through these efforts, the government aims at fostering a total of 300
female disaster management leaders in three years in order to ensure that diverse perspectives (including
women’s) are to be reflected in preparedness measures for major disasters including a Tokyo inland
earthquake, which is predicted to occur in the future. The Coordinator Seminar is intended for women living,working or going to college in Tokyo to have the basic knowledge equivalent to the content of Textbook for
Female Disaster Management Leaders prepared by the TMG. Participants choose one from two courses;
Community Life Course or Workplace Course. The Community Life Course mainly covers how to deal withvarious situations that may occur during evacuation and in the course of rebuilding life, and how toeffectively communicate in order to solve various problems that may occur after a disaster. The Workplace
Course focuses on how to deal with situations that may arise when a disaster occurs while working, how to
respond to various needs that may arise at workplace, and how to effectively communicate in order to solve
various problems that may occur after a disaster. In FY2018, both courses were held over two days for one
time, respectively.

Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government Disaster Prevention website(Reference: https://www.bousai.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/kyojyo/1005416/index.html)

1-2 National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction and the National Conference on Promoting
Disaster Risk Reduction
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), adopted at the Third UN World
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015, prescribed that all stakeholders (including
companies, academia, volunteers, community groups and media) should be encouraged to take disaster risk
reduction (DRR) initiatives. In response, the National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction (NCPDRR),
66

comprising leaders of 39 groups working on disaster risk management, was set up in September 2015 under
the leadership of Prime Minister ABE, who chairs the National Disaster Management Council. The mission of
NCPDRR is to work in cooperation with the National Disaster Management Council and promote information
sharing, opinion exchange and coordination across a wide range of sectors, in order to promote disaster risk
reduction awareness among the public.
The NCPDRR and other organizations have promoted activities to enhance community preparedness forlarge-scale disasters, built on a combination of public support by the government, self-help by each memberof the public, and mutual support among communities, companies, schools, and volunteers.
(1) The 3rd National Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction (2018 National Conference on
Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction)
With the NCPDRR and the Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction, which is mainly comprised ofdisaster risk management-related industrial groups, the Cabinet Office held the 2018 National Conference on
Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction in Tokyo Big Sight and the Tokyo Rinkai Disaster Prevention Park (Sona Area)
on October 13 and 14, 2018. Under the event theme, “Preparing for Large-scale Disasters: Enhancing
Collaboration in Communities,” the event was held with an aim to promote self-help and mutual support efforts,
voluntary collaboration among people, and disaster risk management awareness.
H.E. Mr. YAMAMOTO, Minister of State for Disaster Management, delivered the opening declaration, in which
he stressed the importance of self-help and mutual support, the need for collaboration among all stakeholders
and the importance of sharing these ideas in and out of Japan. Then, Governor of Tokyo Ms. Koike gave awelcome speech as a representative of the host city, stating the TMG’s intention to make Tokyo a safe andsecure city. In the organizer’s speech, Vice-chairman of the NCPDRR Mr. Akimoto mentioned the importance of
coordination among self-help, mutual support and public support and his expectation for enhanced disasterrisk management awareness as a nation as a whole. At the subsequent High-Level Panel Discussion, opinions
were exchanged on the importance of support for vulnerable people, fostering of disaster risk management
leaders in companies, and collaboration with regional disaster risk management organizations to prepare forlarge-scale disasters.
During the event, a total of 35 sessions were held over two days in Tokyo Big Sight and Sona Area. In thesesessions, hosted by the Cabinet Office and various other groups working on disaster risk management, panelists
discussed specific self-help and mutual support efforts that need to be promoted in the fields such as disasterrisk management activities, community disaster management planning, collaboration between academia andthe public, disaster risk management industry, international cooperation. In particular, there were many
sessions that focused on Tokyo inland earthquakes and large-scale floods, which are predicted to occur in Tokyo.
Also, taking the opportunity of the International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction (October 13), internationalsessions were held to promote the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). There were various other programs held by different groups, such as a booth forexperiencing a disaster, 63 presentation booths, poster sessions and exhibition of large vehicles (e.g. fireengine).
In the closing session, Ms. Mikiko Ikegami, Executive at Shimin Bosai Kenkyujo, mentioned in her presentationthat (1) the importance of taking specific actions that involve all members of society has been confirmed, (2)non-structural measures are the key driver of preparedness for Tokyo inland earthquakes and large-scale
floods; and (3) young generations are promoting disaster risk management for the future.
Joined by 12,000 visitors and covered by TV programs and newspapers, the event successfully communicatedto many people the importance of self-help, mutual support and collaboration among diverse stakeholders.
According to the results of the questionnaire with visitors, 98% responded that the conference helped them67

improve their disaster risk management awareness. The Conference highlighted the importance of accurately
understanding disaster risks and taking specific actions with participation of all members of society form theperspective of self-help (i.e. protecting one’s own life) and mutual support among residents, communities, andcompanies.

H.E. Mr. YAMAMOTO, Minister of State for Disaster
Management, giving opening remarks

Mr. Akimoto, Vice-chairman of the National Council for
Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction (President of the Japan
Firefighters Association), giving organizer’s speech“Enhancing Regional Disaster Resilience ,” a program by
the Fire and Disaster Management Agency”Rescue Workshop,” a program by the Japanese Red Cross
Society68

Panel discussion in the closing session(2) The 4th National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction
The 4th National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction was held at the Large Hall of the Prime
Minister’s Office on December 25, 2018. In his opening remarks, Prime Minister ABE thanked the participatinggroups as the host of this convention and expressed his hope for this Council, mentioning the importance of“coordinating public support, self-help, and mutual support efforts, enhancing disaster risk managementawareness in communities, and building a ‘disaster conscious society’ to prepare for all kinds of natural
disasters.”
Next, the Cabinet Office reported on activities centering on the previously mentioned 2018 National
Conference on Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction. Lastly, the Japan Medical Association and the Japan Disability
Forum reported measures taken to enhance disaster risk management awareness from the viewpoint of selfhelp and mutual support.

The 4th National Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction(Prime Minister ABE)

1-3 Initiatives for Disaster Drills
In the event of a natural disaster, national government institutions, local governments, designated public
corporations, and other institutions involved in disaster risk management must work as a unity in cooperation
with local residents to respond appropriately to that disaster. Accordingly, it is vital to implement disaster risk
reduction initiatives before disaster occurs, such as drills involving collaboration between relevant organizations.
For this reason, institutions involved in disaster risk management implement disaster risk management drills
69

based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management, Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, and other regulations
to check and confirm the emergency measures to be taken when a natural disaster occurs and to enhance
residents’ awareness of disasters.
In FY2018, the following drills were conducted in accordance with the 2018 Comprehensive Disaster Risk
Management Drill Framework, which prescribed the basic policy on conducting disaster risk management drills
and details of the government’s comprehensive disaster risk management drills.
(1) Comprehensive disaster risk management drills on “Disaster Preparedness Day”
On September 1, 2018, which is Disaster Preparedness Day in Japan, a drill was conducted based on the
scenario of operating government disaster headquarters. First, Prime Minister ABE and the rest of the Cabinet
Office gathered at the Prime Minister’s Office and conducted an operational drill of an Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters (a Disaster Response Headquarters set up in the event of an especially unusual andcatastrophic major disaster, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake). This included video-conferences with
Governor KONO of Miyazaki Prefecture to ascertain the extent of the damage and the support requested, as
well as reports by members of the Cabinet Office about the damage and the response to the disaster.
Participants worked with local governments and other bodies to confirm response guidelines that assigned thehighest priority to saving human lives, dispatch a governmental investigation team, and establish an On-site
Disaster Management Headquarters. Throughout this process, they sought to ensure that the systems requiredfor implementing emergency measures in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake were in place, along withchecking the procedures. In addition, part of the meeting was opened up to the media. Afterwards, Prime
Minister ABE held a press conference and made a televised appeal to the public via NHK to request theircooperation, self-help and mutual support in the event of a disaster and informed them of the government’s
initial response measures.
The same day, a joint emergency drill involving nine prefectures and cities was held in a number of locations(primarily Kawasaki City of Kanagawa Prefecture). Prime Minister ABE moved by helicopter from the Prime
Minister’s Office to the drill venue, where he saw a water-discharge exercise using fireboats and large watercannons based on a scenario of a fire at a refinery. Then, he joined local elementary and junior high school
students for a drill in which participants hung yellow towels on house doors to let rescue units know that theresidents have evacuated from the house safely, and a drill to make a makeshift stretcher using a blanket andlaundry poles. Lastly, he joined rescue and relief drills participated by convoys dispatched from fire stations,police stations, SDF, and neighboring prefectures and cities.

Video conference to determine damage in drills to operate
the government headquarters

70

Prime Minister ABE joining in an exercise to make amakeshift stretcher(Prime Minister’s Official Residence website)(2) Government Tabletop Exercises
The government conducted a tabletop exercise for a Nankai Trough Earthquake in November 2018 andanother exercise for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake in February 2019 to improve the knowledge and proficiency ofofficials from relevant ministries and agencies and enhance collaboration with relevant organizations. Using
simulations that replicated near real life disaster situations, participants tackled practical exercises without
having been informed of the drill scenarios in advance. The drills were followed by a review of the effectivenessof emergency measures prescribed in plans and manuals.

Section leader meeting at the secretariat of the extreme
disaster management headquarters(Drill based on a Nankai Trough Earthquake scenario)

Work instruction from section leaders(Drill based on a Tokyo Inland Earthquake scenario)

The government held regional drills for running on-site extreme disaster management headquarters in theevent of the Nankai Trough Earthquake in collaboration with prefectures anticipated to be exposed to hazard,
specifically in the Kyushu region (Kumamoto Prefecture) in July 2018, Chubu region (Aichi Prefecture) in
November 2018 and Shikoku region (Kagawa Prefecture) in January 2019. It also held a drill for the operationof the on-site extreme disaster management headquarters in Tokyo in February 2019 based on a Tokyo Inland
Earthquake scenario.

Drills of the operations of an on-site extreme disastermanagement headquarters(Aichi Prefecture)

State Minister of the Cabinet Office H.E. Mr. Nakane takescommand as Chief of the Tokyo Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters

1-4 Tsunami Preparedness Initiatives
Loss of life in the event of a tsunami can be reduced to some extent if people take swift, appropriate actions.
On November 5, which is the Tsunami Preparedness Day in Japan and the World Tsunami Awareness Day, the71Cabinet Office, relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and private companies, among others,
conducted nationwide initiatives to raise awareness of tsunami preparedness.
(1) Tsunami Evacuation Drills
Around the Tsunami Preparedness Day (November 5) in FY2018, the national government (12 ministries andagencies), local governments (180 government bodies) and private companies (74 organizations) held
earthquake and tsunami preparedness drills nationwide, in which approximately 900,000 people took part.
These included drills for residents held by the Cabinet Office in partnership with local governments in 10
locations nationwide (Wakkanai City in Hokkaido, Takahama Town in Fukui Prefecture, Izu City in Shizuoka
Prefecture, Yuasa Town in Wakayama Prefecture, Yanai City in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Matsumae Town in Ehime
Prefecture, Shimanto City in Kochi Prefecture, Amakusa City in Kumamoto Prefecture, Nobeoka City in Miyazaki
Prefecture and Naha City in Okinawa Prefecture). Approximately 13,000 citizens participated; learning how toprotect themselves if an earthquake were to hit the area (ShakeOut drill) and evacuate to the nearest
evacuation site once tremors subsided (evacuation drill). Various other drills were also held according toregional disaster management plans in order to practice skills such as setting up a shelter, installing disastermanagement headquarters, preparing and serving food to evacuees and first aid.

ShakeOut drill(Takahama Town, Fukui Prefecture)

Tsunami evacuation drill for primary schoolchildren(Shimanto City, Kochi Prefecture)

Evacuation drill for persons requiring special care
(Amakusa City, Kumamoto Prefecture)

Opening of shelter(Wakkanai City, Hokkaido Prefecture)(2) Public Awareness Campaigns Conducted by the Cabinet Office(i) Public Awareness Campaign for Tsunami Preparedness

72The campaign was deployed nationwide to boost public awareness of appropriate emergency evacuation in
the event of a tsunami. The FY2018 campaign included displaying public awareness posters at various locations,
including company and local government buildings and customer-facing cash registers at major convenience
stores and supermarkets nationwide.

FY2018 public awareness poster(ii) FY2018 public awareness event on Tsunami Preparedness Day
Every year on November 5, the Tsunami Preparedness Day, the Cabinet Office, National Council for
Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction and Council for Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction jointly hold an event topromote awareness of tsunami preparedness. In FY2018, the Special Tsunami Preparedness Day Event “Latest
Science × Tsunami × Regional Disaster Risk Management” was held at the Kawasaki Chamber of Commerce andIndustry KCCI Hall in Kawasaki City, Kanagawa Prefecture, in which companies, administrative bodies, andvoluntary disaster risk management organizations participated.
The event programs included a special seminar presenting the latest scientific discoveries on tsunami andactivities carried out according to community disaster management plans from across Japan, as well as a small
workshop on tsunami disaster management education tools, which can be used in schools and by communities.
At the opening ceremony, Mr. MAITACHI, Parliamentary Secretary of Cabinet Office and Mr. FUKUDA, Mayor of
Kawasaki City gave speeches. Mr. MAITACHI said Japan should strive to develop effective tsunami preparedness
measures by combining the latest scientific knowledge and community disaster management plans, pointing
out that community disaster management plans and efforts made under such plans, which support self-help
and mutual support, are highly effective in improving Japan’s total disaster resilience in his speech.
In the special seminar, Mr. IMAMURA Fumihiko, Director of the International Research Institute of Disaster
Science (IRIDeS), led the on-site investigation on the damage of the earthquake and tsunami that hit Sulawesi,
Indonesia on September 28, 2018, reported in his presentation that it took only six minutes after theearthquake for the tsunami to reach Palu, a city that suffered great damage from the disaster, while landslides,
ground subsidence, and liquefaction also occurred concurrently. He pointed out that Japan needed to provide
reconstruction support that also encompasses regional development.

73Moreover, communities working on community disaster risk management plans made presentations to givean interim report on specific activities carried out in FY2018. The Mori District, Tabe City, Wakayama Prefecturerevised evacuation rules, including those for people who need special support in evacuation, while the
Nakajima District, Matsuyama City, Ehime Prefecture examined evacuation sites and routes for tsunami using
an evacuation simulator. In the panel discussion, panelists shared various opinions based on their experience.
One of the panelists pointed out that it is important to deepen collaboration among various community
members by securing opportunities for them to share honest opinions, as different people often have different
opinions on tsunami preparedness. On the closing note, the panelists pointed out the importance of translating
insights gained through this event into specific actions in communities and companies.

H.E. Mr. MAITACHI, Parliamentary Secretary of Cabinet Office, delivering opening remarks

Special Tsunami Preparedness Day Event: Latest Science × Tsunami × Regional Disaster Risk Management

The survey conducted with the event participants (203 valid responses) showed their great interest incommunity disaster risk management plans. According to the survey results, the most common topic people
hoped to learn about in the event (multiple answers allowed) was “community disaster risk management plan”(117), followed by “community tsunami preparedness measures” (100). Also, the most common action thatparticipants hoped to take based on what they learned through the event was “to learn more about community
disaster risk management plans” (105), followed by “to participate in initiatives undertaken under thecommunity disaster risk management plan in my neighborhood” (61).

74

Q. What did you want to learn in this event?
(Multiple answers allowed)

Q. What action would you like to take based on what
you learned through this event? (Multiple answers
allowed)Community disaster management
plan

Learn more community disastermanagement plans

Community tsunami preparedness
measures

Participate in initiatives undertaken
under the community disastermanagement plan in my area

Latest scientific knowledge on
tsunamiStock food and daily necessities

Corporate tsunami preparedness
measures

Participate in tsunami
evacuation drills

Government tsunami preparedness
measures

Launch an initiative according to thecommunity disaster management plan

School tsunami preparedness
measures

OthersOthersNothing in particular

Source: Cabinet Office

Column:Major Tsunami That Hit Indonesia
The overseas natural disaster that caused the most extensive damage in 2018 was the tsunami that hit
Indonesia. The magnitude 7.5 earthquake that struck Sulawesi, Indonesia on September 28 caused morethan 2,000 fatalities (as of October 2018). The bay of Palu, situated in the middle part of the island, sufferedespecially severe damage, including the liquefaction and ground failure at nine locations along the coast,
which caused tsunamis. The landslides that occurred in these nine spots were caused by a phenomenon
called “liquefied gravity flow.” This phenomenon caused a tsunami that reaches the shore in an extremely
short time.
As a result of an on-site investigation by an expert team, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
found that the tsunami was caused by liquefaction in the coastal areas where the ground foundation wasloose, such as the area near the river mouth. It assumes that the tsunami occurred when the sea leveltemporarily lowered due to landslides in the seabed. Liquefaction also occurred on the island as well, whichcaused mud flows that killed many people.
On December 22, 2018, there was another tsunami in the Sunda Strait in western Indonesia, which caused
more than 400 fatalities. According to the analysis by the Earthquake Research Institute, the University ofTokyo, this major tsunami was not caused by an earthquake, but rather by a massive amount of mountainsediment (200 times the capacity of Tokyo Dome), which collapsed into the sea following a volcanic eruption
in Anak Krakatoa. According to a satellite image analysis by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan,
nearly half of the island was lost in this disaster.
A similar catastrophic event happened in Japan, too. In 1972, a tremendous amount of sediment fell into
the Ariake Sea as a result of the collapse of the Mayuyama Dome in front of Mt. Unzen in Shimabara City,
Nagasaki Prefecture, which caused a massive tsunami toward Amakusa, Kumamoto Prefecture located on
the opposite side of the sea. This major disaster, which is said to have killed about 15,000 people, is called“Shimabara Taihen Higo Meiwaku” in Japanese (meaning Shimabara suffers, Higo annoyed”). It is worthy ofnote that tsunamis caused by a factor other than earthquake, such as a collapse of a mountain, can happen
not only overseas, but also in Japan.

75Topographic Change Due to an Eruption of Krakatoa, Indonesia

Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan website(Reference: https://www.gsi.go.jp/cais/topic181225-index-e.html)

1-5 Citizen-led Initiatives (Promoting Community Disaster Risk Management Plans)
The community disaster risk management planning system was established following the amendment of the
Basic Act on Disaster Management in 2014 with an aim to enhance regional disaster resilience through thepromotion of self-help and mutual support initiatives based on cooperation among residents (including
companies operating in the area). This system allows community residents (including business operators with
offices there) to draft a community disaster risk management plan and present it in the municipal council fordisaster management to be reflected in the municipal disaster risk management plan.
According to a survey by the Cabinet Office, 3,206 communities have worked on developing community
disaster risk management plans, of which those from 248 communities have been reflected in municipal
disaster risk management plans as of April 1, 2018. Five years after the establishment of the system, formulating
a community disaster management plan is becoming more and more common.
(1) Trends Concerning Community Disaster Risk Management Plans
The Cabinet Office analyzed 166 community disaster risk management plans that have been reflected inmunicipal disaster risk management plans. It was found that they have the following common characteristics.
①Activities for preparing a community disaster risk management plan were started at the initiative of the local(municipal) government in 69% of the communities. It is important to ensure the appropriateness ofgovernment-initiated activities for developing community disaster risk management plans, in order toencourage residents to engage in such activities, keeping in mind that a community disaster risk management
plan should be prepared at the initiative of the residents in principle.
②In some communities, residents investigated disaster risks, hazard areas, and social characteristics of thearea (such as the ratio of older people and day-time and night-time populations). For example, residents
examined past disasters in the area (e.g. Ando District, Ozuchi Town, Iwate Prefecture; Taira Shiroyama
District, Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture), checked hazard areas by laying a disaster map provided by thegovernment over a detailed map of the area (e.g. Todoroki District, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo), mapped hazard
spots and issues identified in field studies (e.g. Senju Motomachi District, Adachi-ku, Tokyo), and analyzed

76the constitution, history, natural and social environment of the community (e.g. Shuzenji New Town, Izu City,
Shizuoka Prefecture).

LegendSeismic
intensity
6.5 or higher of 7

Seismic intensity

6 Upper

6 Lower

Distribution of seismic intensity

Distribution of liquefaction risks

Source: Todoroki District Community Disaster Risk Management Plan (Earthquake) (prepared in 2017)③Most plans cover items the community considers necessary in each phase of a disaster, from pre-disaster toinitial response immediately after the disaster, evacuation (actions to take and establishment of shelters),
and a stay at an evacuation shelter (Fig. 1-5-1).

Fig. 1-5-1

Example of Items Included in Community Disaster Risk Management Plans

Preventive initiatives
Initial response (immediately after
earthquake, wind, or flood disaster)
Evacuation, establishment of shelters
Stay at shelters, management (rules,
etc.)

101
134

Drills (based on the plan)134
Awareness campaigns, education on
97
disaster prevention (flyers, seminars, etc.)
105
Stock
62
70
Evacuation sites and routes
56
Measures for people who need special care
55
(support for evacuation, making a list, etc.)(n = 166)
Map (inclusion in the plan/revision)
48*Items may be referred to in multiple phases.
Establishing organizations
27
Checklist (measures for households,
26
checking contact information, etc.)
Management of shelters (making a manual,
19
consultation with schools, etc.)(n = 166; items may fall under multiple categories)

Source: Survey by the Cabinet Office (analysis of community disaster risk management plans that have been reflected inmunicipal disaster management plans; as of April 2018)④Many community disaster risk management plans define neighborhood and community associations,
voluntary disaster management organizations, and the like as implementing bodies of the plan. Some plans
involved collaboration among neighborhood and community associations and volunteer organizations for
elderly support (e.g. Uchigo Takasaka District, Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture), while others involved
collaboration among PTAs, children’s associations, social workers and children’s social workers, and regional
security organizations from the viewpoint that a disaster should be tackled by the entire community rather
than by a voluntary disaster management organization alone (e.g. Fuji-eki Minami District, Fuji City, Shizuoka
77Prefecture). There were also plans that included corporations located in the area. In some communities,
residents started activities for developing a community disaster risk management plan for each apartment
and housing complex (e.g. UR Oyamadai Housing Complex (Kamio City, Saitama Prefecture); Yonemoto
Housing Complex (Yachiyo City, Chiba Prefecture)).
⑤Some communities conducted workshops by residents, disaster prevention drills, seminars, and surveys in
the planning process in order to identify local challenges. From the viewpoint of enhancing the effectivenessof the plan, it is important to involve various local organizations (e.g. schools, welfare facilities, community
development NPOs) in the planning process and share among various entities residing or operating in thearea issues that may arise in the event of a disaster as well as what kind of support each member can offerto the community. It is vital to follow a careful preparation process and take as much time as it requires,
rather than rushing to complete the plan.
⑥Community disaster risk management plans should be regularly revised and updated as necessary.
According to the survey results, 63% of the communities revises the plan on a regular basis, and 13% on a
non-regular basis.

(1) Monitoring, review, and updating are conducted on a regular basis.
(2) Monitoring, review, and updating are conducted, but not on a regularbasis.
(3) No monitoring, review, or updating has been conducted, but we areplanning to do it in the future.
(4) No monitoring, review, or updating has been conducted, and we do nothave any plan to do it in the future.

Also, some communities held meetings, panel exhibitions, and disaster management programs at local
events in order to raise residents’ awareness on the community disaster risk management plan (e.g. Miyoshi
District, Ozu City, Ehime Prefecture).
(2) Initiatives by the Cabinet Office①Community Disaster Risk Management Plan ForumIn order to share examples and experience related to community disaster risk management plans andpromote their formulation, the Cabinet Office held “the 2019 Community Disaster Risk Management Plan
Forum: Various Approaches to Community Disaster Risk Management Planning” in Osaka City on March 16,
2019. In this forum, with the attendance of H.E. Mr. YAMAMOTO, Minister of State for Disaster Management,
various participants shared case studies from their areas. Osaka City shared the example of the community
disaster risk management plan of Miyoshi District, Ozu City, which proved to be remarkably effective during adisaster in 2018. Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture shared its intention to develop a community disaster risk
management plan based on the lessons learned from disasters in 2018. The Urban Renaissance Agency, officebuildings, and fire fighters also shared community disaster risk management plans they had been working on.

78

H.E. Mr. YAMAMOTO, Minister of State for Disaster
Management, delivering opening remarks

Community Disaster Risk Management Plan Forum②Establishment of Chikubo’z, a Network of Local Government Officials Working on Community Disaster
Risk Management Plans
During the closing ceremony of the above forum, a network of local government officials working on
community disaster risk management plans, named Chikubo’z, was officially established. Chikubo’z is intended
to help local government officials share with each other information, opinion, and experience concerning
community disaster risk management plans more easily on a daily basis. As of the end of March 2019, 253
officials have joined the network. Full-fledged opinion exchange will be promoted from FY2019 onward.

Local government officials that participated in the forum (members of Chikubo’z)③Establishment of the Community Disaster Risk Management Plan Library
In April 2019, the Cabinet Office opened an online library of community disaster risk management plans thathave been reflected in municipal disaster risk management plans. The uploaded plans can be browsed on the
Cabinet Office website and can be searched by index attached according to the content of the plan (e.g. issues
covered, countermeasures, implementing body, etc.). This library is intended to help planners clearly
understand what they should aim for in a community disaster risk management plan by providing an easy way
to search plans across Japan.

79

LearnAs a first step, please click a region on the map that you are interested in.

Search by Start by choosing a category (issues,countermeasures, or implementing
topicsbodies) to search by topics

IssuesCountermeasures
Implementing bodies

Search byprefecture

You can choose from nine
prefectures.

Hokkaido
Tohoku
Kanto
Hokuriku
Chubu
Kinki
Chugoku
Shikoku
Kyushu/Okinawa

Source: Cabinet Office website(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/chikubousai/chikubo/chikubo/index.html)

1-6 Development of an Enabling Environment for Volunteer Activities
The year 1995, in which the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurred, is known as the beginning year ofvolunteerism, since which time volunteer activities in affected areas have played an increasingly vital role.
Individual volunteers, NPOs, and other organizations that gathered in the affected areas have provided support
for affected people in the fields that are difficult for public support to reach. The Cabinet Office has strived tomake an environment that facilitates volunteers’ support for the affected people. As a result, it has become
more common to address disasters under tripartite collaboration among the government, volunteers, andNPOs, as seen in the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain, and Heavy Rain Eventof July 2018.
For the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the government, volunteers, and NPOs held regular information
sharing meetings to coordinate operation areas and support activities for the affected people in the affectedareas, including Okayama, Hiroshima, and Ehime Prefectures. Moreover, national information sharing meetings
were held to share with other prefectures issues that a prefecture cannot solve on its own and to seek effective
solutions through inter-regional collaboration. With the attendance of the Cabinet Office and organizations
which support the affected people, various active discussions were held on such topics as the recruitment ofvolunteers and procurement of necessary materials and equipment according to the situation of the affected
area. In order to prepare for major disasters, which are predicted to occur in the future, it is important for eachregion to have established a collaborative network among the government, volunteers, and NPOs before adisaster occurs.

80Recent Trends Concerning DRR Volunteer Activities<Major disasters and volunteer activities>(Year)(Disaster)

1995

The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake

Approx. 1,377,000

1997

The marine accident involving
the M.V. Nakhodka

Approx. 270,000

2004
2004
2007
2007
2009
2011
2014
2015
2016

Typhoon Tokage (0423)
The Mid Niigata Prefecture
Earthquake
Noto Hanto Earthquake
The Niigataken Chuetsu-oki
Earthquake
Typhoon Etau (0909)
The Great East Japan
Earthquake(Total number ofvolunteers)

Approx. 56,000
Approx. 95,000<Trends concerning volunteerism>☆Volunteerism for affected people support became
more active (beginning year of volunteerism).
★The situation became chaotic as many volunteers
rushed to disaster affected areas.

☆It became common that Councils of Social Welfare
establish and manage disaster volunteer centers (VCs).

Approx. 15,000<Measures taken by thegovernment>■Amendment of the Basic Act on
Disaster Management (1995)
Stipulated that the government would
strive to establish an environment fordisaster volunteerism■Investigative Committee on Volunteer
Activities
Launched by the Cabinet Office in 2004

Approx. 15,000
Approx. 22,000
Approx. 1,500,000

Hiroshima Torrential Rain
Torrential Rain in the Kanto andTohoku Regions

Approx. 43,000

The Kumamoto Earthquake

Approx. 118,000

Approx. 47,000

2017

Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain

Approx. 60,000

2018

Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

Approx. 263,000

2018

Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake

Approx. 11,000☆Volunteer activities by NPOs, NGOs, companies, etc.
(approx. 4 million volunteers worked outside themanagement of disaster VCs)
☆Various needs were fulfilled by expert volunteers.
★Building a network became a challenge.
★The need for intermediaries to coordinate NPO
volunteer activities was noted.
☆Information sharing meetings were held under
tripartite collaboration among the government, NPOs,
and volunteers (Hinokuni Meeting)☆The JVOAD was established as an intermediary.
☆Information meetings were held in the affectedareas.
☆Information meetings were held on prefectural andnational levels.

■Amendment of the Basic Act on
Disaster Management (2013)
Stipulated that the government would
strive for effective collaboration withvolunteers
The Basic Plan for Disaster Risk
Reduction was also revised.

■Guidebook for tripartite collaboration(April 2018)■Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster
Risk Reduction (2018)
Stipulated that the government would
strive to establish a collaborative
network incorporating intermediaries

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials provided by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, anddocuments and reports by the Japan National Council of Social Welfare(1) Coordination and Collaboration of DRR Volunteer Activities
The Cabinet Office held a Study Group on Promoting Volunteer Activities Contributing Generally to Disaster
Risk Reduction from FY2015 to FY2016, and summarized the issues in promoting volunteer activities andproposals on these issues, upon which the Study Group on Developing an Environment for DRR Volunteer
Activities was held in 2017. The study group issued in April 2018 the Guidebook for the Government in
Collaboration and Coordination with NPOs and Volunteers, which mainly covered tasks assigned toadministrative officers before and after a disaster, with a view to promoting collaboration and coordination
with NPOs and volunteers. It deals with basic government policies to collaborate with NPOs and volunteers andspecific initiatives for promoting collaboration, under both normal times and disasters accordingly (Reference:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/kentokai/bousai_volunteer_kankyoseibi/index.html).
With a view to further promoting collaboration and coordination among the government, NPOs, andvolunteers, a meeting of the Study Group on Collaboration and Coordination of DRR Volunteer Activities washeld in FY2018. Based on what was discussed in this meeting, the government held Seminars for Collaboration
and Coordination among the Government, NPOs, and Volunteers in the Event of a Disaster in six locations. Eachseminar had approximately 100 participants from the government, Councils of Social Welfare, and NPOs. The
seminars revealed the importance of building a face-to-face relationship among the government, volunteers,and NPOs from before a disaster in order to ensure that they can smoothly work in coordination to support
affected people in the event of a disaster. There was also a workshop aimed at building a collaborative networkwith various support entities, which helped participants gain clearer understanding on such collaboration.
<Seminar Venues>
・Gifu Prefecture (November 30, 2018): 103 participants (34 from the government, 27 from Councils ofSocial Welfare, and 42 from NPOs)
81

・Miyazaki Prefecture (December 17, 2018): 114 participants (41 from the government, 31 from Councils ofSocial Welfare, and 42 from NPOs)
・Yamaguchi Prefecture (December 21, 2018): 68 participants (24 from the government, 17 from Councils
of Social Welfare, and 27 from NPOs)
・Oita Prefecture (February 4, 2019): 126 participants (26 from the government, 30 from Councils of Social
Welfare, and 70 from NPOs)
・Chiba Prefecture (February 11, 2019): 75 participants (20 from the government, 24 from Councils of Social
Welfare, and 31 from NPOs)
・Hokkaido Prefecture (March 9, 2019): 46 participants (17 from the government, 16 from Councils of Social
Welfare, and 13 from NPOs)

Seminars for Collaboration and Coordination among the Government, NPOs, and Volunteers in the Event of a DisasterThe government also conducted a survey with prefectures on the establishment of a council or network
incorporating NPOs, Social Welfare Council and various other entities. 60% of the prefectures responded thatthey had such a network, while 31% did not. It is important to further promote the establishment of such DRR
network, while clarifying the functions and roles of existing networks and expanding the circle of collaboration.
Has a prefectural DRR network with various entities been established? (As of April 1, 2018)

Yes

Still working
on it

No

Source: Cabinet Office (2 prefectures did not respond)(2) Drills in collaboration with government and volunteers
In order to ensure smooth collaboration and coordination among the government, NPOs, and volunteers in
the event of a disaster, it is important to promote mutual interaction and understanding before the disasterthrough drills and workshops. The Cabinet Office holds such events in order to provide opportunities for thegovernment, NPOs, and volunteers to meet face-to-face and gain deeper mutual understanding on various
82challenges concerning collaboration and coordination.
For FY2018, a drill was conducted in Fukuoka Prefecture in March 2019. During the July 2017 Northern
Kyushu Heavy Rain, information sharing meetings were launched in the affected areas, including Asakura City,
Fukuoka Prefecture, under tripartite collaboration among the government, volunteers, and NPOs. In the drill, apractical exercise simulating the establishment of an information sharing meeting was conducted with theattendance of the member of the information sharing meeting for the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain,with a view to reviewing the disaster and ensuring the swift setup of a meeting for future disasters.
The drill effectively promoted participants’ understanding of tripartite collaboration. One of the participantssaid, “I would like to start with what I can do to solve various issues identified in the drill. I think it is importantto build a network with local companies and various other entities before a disaster.”<Drill Venue>
・Fukuoka Prefecture (March 5, 2019): 52 participants (16 from the government, 11 from Councils of Social
Welfare, and 25 from NPOs)

Drill on collaboration among the government, NPOs and volunteers(Fukuoka Prefecture)

1-7 Development of Business Continuity Systems(1) Development of Business Continuity Systems by National Government’s Ministries and Agencies
The national government’s ministries and agencies have reviewed their business continuity plans (BCPs) as
required according to the Business Continuity Plan of the National Government (Measures for the Tokyo Inland
Earthquake) formulated by the Cabinet in March 2014. Based on the Plan, the Cabinet Office conducts annual
assessment on its BCP with experts. It also held a training session to prepare for and install disastermanagement headquarters of the national government’s ministries and agencies in the vicinity of theTachikawa Regional Disaster Management Base in December 2018. The government service continuity system
will be implemented in the event of a potential Metropolitan Inland Earthquake through these initiatives tosmoothly continue administrative operations.
(2) Development of Business Continuity Systems by Local Governments
Local governments need to maintain their administrative function and continue to work even when a disasteroccurs. Therefore, it is extremely important for them to have their own BCP in place and establish its
implementation system before a disaster occurs. The BCP preparation rate of local governments had reached83

100% by the end of FY2016. In terms of municipalities (including special zones), this ratio increased from theprevious survey by 17 points to 81% in June 2018 (Fig. 1-7-1).
The Cabinet Office published the Business Continuity Plan Formulation Guidelines for Municipalities in
FY2015, aiming to make BCP planning easier for all municipalities, including small municipalities and special
zones. In addition, the Cabinet Office amended the Business Continuity Manual for Local Governments During
Earthquake Disasters to take account of past disasters, published the revised version in February 2016 under
the title Business Continuity Manual for Local Governments During Major Disasters, and distributed it to local
governments.
Should a major disaster occur, it will be difficult for the affected municipalities to carry out an extensive rangeof disaster response operations singlehandedly. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office published the Guidelines on
Local Government Aid Acceptance Systems in Case of Disaster in FY2016, based on an understanding that local
governments should have a BCP in place and establish a system to smoothly and effectively receive assistancefrom the national government, other local governments, private companies, volunteer organizations and others.
Moreover, since FY2015, the Cabinet Office has held workshops (co-organized by the Cabinet Office and theFire and Disaster Management Agency) to train relevant municipal employees in order to support theestablishment of a system for business continuity in local governments.
Together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and the Fire and Disaster
Management Agency, the Cabinet Office will continue to promote through the above initiatives theestablishment of business continuity systems in local governments, which involves the formulation of BCPs,
enhancement of the Six Critical Factors* in formulated BCPs, and the establishment of a structure to receive
support.
Note) Six Critical Factors: (1) clearly defined leadership structure in the case of absence of the mayor, and asystem to gather employees; (2) specification of an alternative building to use when the local
government’s main building has become unavailable; (3) procurement of electricity, water, food, etc.
(which are necessary for employees to perform their duties); (4) various communication means that tend
to be available even in the event of a disaster; (5) backup of important administrative data; and (6) priority
duties in the event of a disaster.
Reference: Guidelines for Business Continuity of Local Governments in the Event of a Major Disaster;Cabinet Office; http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/chihogyoumukeizoku/index.html

84

Fig. 1-7-1

BCP Preparation Rate in Local Governments

The BCP preparation rate reached 100% in prefectures and 81% in municipalities as of June 1, 2018.

Prefectures

November 2009
April 2011
August 2013
December 2015
April 2016
June 2017
June 2018

Municipalities

November 2009
April 2011
August 2013
December 2015
April 2016
June 2017
June 2018

Source: November 2009 Survey of Business Continuity Plans Based on an Earthquake Disaster (Cabinet Office and Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)
April 2011
Local Government Information Management Report (March 2012) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Local Administration Bureau Regional Information Policy Office Survey
August 2013
BCP Preparation Rate for Large-Scale Earthquakes and Other Natural Disasters (preliminary figures) (Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)
December 2015 Survey of the Preparation of Business Continuity Plans and the Formulation of Specific Criteria for the Issuance of
Evacuation Advisories by Local Governments (Fire and Disaster Management Agency Survey)
April 2016
Survey of the Current Status of the Preparation of Business Continuity Plans by Local Governments (Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)
June 2017
Survey of the Current Status of the Preparation of Business Continuity Plans by Local Governments (Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)
June 2018
Survey of the Current Status of the Preparation of Business Continuity Plans by Local Governments (Fire and Disaster
Management Agency Survey)(3) Development of Business Continuity Systems by private sector companies
The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 clearly highlighted the importance of incorporating business
continuity management (BCM) into the routine management strategy of companies. As such, in 2013, theCabinet Office revised the guidelines to incorporate the concept of BCM and published them under the title“Business Continuity Guidelines (Third Edition) - Strategies and Responses for Surviving Critical Incidents –“.
Companies are encouraged to build a business continuity system in accordance with these Guidelines.
In terms of specific government targets, the Action Plan for National Resilience 2018 sets a goal of ensuringthat 100% (nationwide) of large companies and 50% (nationwide) of medium-sized companies have prepared
BCPs by 2020. The Cabinet Office conducts a survey every second fiscal year, to ascertain what proportion ofprivate sector companies have prepared a BCP and investigate their disaster preparedness initiatives. The
results of the FY2017 Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster Preparedness Initiatives, which was
conducted in March 2018, showed that formulation of BCPs was on the rise, with 64.0% of large companies(60.4% in the previous survey) and 31.8% of medium-sized companies (29.9% in the previous survey). When
companies currently in the process of formulating a BCP are also included, these figures rise to approximately
80% and just under 50%, respectively (Fig. 1-7-2).

85

Fig. 1-7-2

Preparation of BCPs by Large and Medium-sized Companies (No. of companies: 1,985)[Large companies]

FY2007
FY2009FY2011FY2013
FY2015FY2017[Medium-sized companies]

FY2007
FY2009FY2011FY2013
FY2015FY2017

Already prepared

Preparation underway

Due to be prepared(including those under discussion)

No plans to prepare

No idea what the BCP was

Other/no answer

Source: Cabinet Office website (Release of the Results of the Fact-Finding Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster
Preparedness Initiatives; June 2018)(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kigyou/topics/index.html)

The Cabinet Office conducted “the Survey on Corporate Response Measures to Prepare for Natural
Disasters“ targeting companies located in the areas that suffered significant damage from major disasters in
FY2018 in order to grasp their status of BCP formulation and the implementation or development of
preparedness measures and post-disaster response measures (Fig. 1-7-3).

86

Fig. 1-7-3

Collection Rate of Questionnaires in FY2018 Company Survey (No. of companies: 1,613)

Industry

Number of
respondents

Number of
respondents

Industry

MiningConstruction
Food manufacturing
TextilePulp and paper

11
1
174
50
23
15

Chemicals

70 Other manufacturing industry

44

Pharmaceuticals
Oil and coal
Rubber product manufacturing
Glass, soil and stone

20
11
10
23

24 Insurance
86 Other financial business
8 Others
2

Iron and steel

14 business

Fisheries, agriculture, and forestry

Non-ferrous metals
Metals
Machine manufacturing
Electrical equipment manufacturing

8
35
80
66
51
19

Number of
respondents

Industry

Transportation equipment manufacturing

Precision equipment manufacturing

Electricity and gas
Land transportation
Marine transportation
Air transportation
Warehouse/transportation-related

Number of employees of
the respondent company
Item
Number of respondents
Number of respondents that have formulated a BCP
Proportion of companies that have formulated a BCP*

Total

1,613
699
43.3%

Information and communications

Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Real estate
ServiceBanking
Securities, commodity futures
trading

21 Total

301 or
more

678
489
30.3%

51-300

557
177
11.0%

82
157
149
50
202
45
7
8
8
39
1,613

50 or less

329
33
2.0%

No
response

49-*The divisor is 1,613, which also includes non-respondents.
Note) The number of respondents by area struck by natural disasters in FY2018 is as follows:・Area affected by the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake: 198 (Hokkaido Prefecture)
・Area affected by the Northern Osaka Earthquake: 216 (Osaka Prefecture)
・Areas affected by the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (western Japan torrential rains), Typhoons Jebi (1821) and Trami (1824): 173(Okayama Prefecture), 199 (Hiroshima Prefecture), 153 (Ehime Prefecture)・Business clusters (area that was free of disasters): 383 (Tokyo)
・Other prefectures: 291
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on Corporate Response Measures to Prepare for Natural Disasters

The survey results showed that the proportion of companies that had formulated a BCP was higher amonglarger companies, which was also observed in the FY2017 Survey on Company Business Continuity and Disaster
Preparedness Initiatives. For the question of what kind of direct damage respondents suffered from the disaster,
the most common answer was that “employees were unable to come to work” in both affected areas, namely
Hokkaido and western Japan (Ehime, Okayama, and Shimane Prefectures). Therefore, existing BCPs should be
revised to see if they include a scenario where not all of the employees can come to work (Fig. 1-7-4).

87

Direct Damage Companies Suffered from Natural Disasters That Occurred in FY2018(Multiple Answers Allowed)

Fig. 1-7-4(Hokkaido)
Loss of life or injury of employees
Employees were unable to come to work
Damage to buildings
Damage to machinery and equipment
Damage to product inventory
Suspension of business as the company wasaffected by the disaster
Partial suspension of business as the company
was affected by the disaster
Reduction in sales as the company was affectedby the disaster
Closing down the business (including thoseplanning to do so)

OthersNo direct damage(Western Japan)
Loss of life or injury of employees
Employees were unable to come to work
Damage to buildings
Damage to machinery and equipment
Damage to product inventory

Okayama

Suspension of business as the company
was affected by the disaster
Partial suspension of business as thecompany was affected by the disaster
Reduction in sales as the company wasaffected by the disaster
Closing down the business (including
those planning to do so)

Hiroshima
Ehime

OthersNo direct damage

Note) The number of respondents by prefecture is as follows: Hokkaido Prefecture - 318 in total; Okayama Prefecture – 174 in total; Hiroshima
Prefecture – 260 in total; Ehime Prefecture – 157 in total.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on Corporate Response Measures to Prepare for Natural Disasters

When asked about indirect damage from disasters, the most common answer was that they were “unable
to receive or ship out products due to disruptions to logistics after the disaster,” followed by the second mostcommon response that they were “affected by suppliers and distributors that were affected by the disaster”(Fig. 1-7-5). Therefore, companies should be prepared for the case in which they themselves are not directly
affected by a disaster, and incorporate such a scenario in the BCP (such as including measures to prevent
indirect damage).

88

Fig. 1-7-5

Indirect Damage Companies Suffered from Natural Disasters That Occurred in FY2018(Multiple Answers Allowed)(Hokkaido)

Unable to receive or ship out products due to disruptions to logistics after the disaster
Suspension of business as the supplier was affected by the disaster
Partial suspension of business as the supplier was affected by the disaster
Unable to find an alternative supplier
Reduction in sales as the distributor was affected by the disaster (we found analternative distributor, but the sales fell short of expectations)
Reduction in sales as the distributor was affected by the disaster (we were unable
to find an alternative distributor)

Reduction in sales due to decrease in the number of tourists
Difficulty in collecting payments after sales (accounts receivable)
Closing down the business due to chain bankruptcy (including those planning to do so)
Others(Western Japan)
Unable to receive or ship out products due to disruptions to logistics after the disaster
Suspension of business as the supplier was affected by the disaster
Partial suspension of business as the supplier was affected by the disaster
Unable to find an alternative supplier
Reduction in sales as the distributor was affected by the disaster (wefound an alternative distributor, but the sales fell short of expectations)
Reduction in sales as the distributor was affected by the disaster (wewere unable to find an alternative distributor)

Okayama
Hiroshima
Ehime

Reduction in sales due to decrease in the number of tourists
Difficulty in collecting payments after sales (accounts receivable)
Closing down the business due to chain bankruptcy (including those planning to do so)
OthersNote) The number of respondents by prefecture is as follows: Hokkaido Prefecture - 142 in total; Okayama Prefecture – 96 in total; Hiroshima
Prefecture – 165 in total; Ehime Prefecture – 60 in total.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on Corporate Response Measures to Prepare for Natural Disasters

As seen above, a BCP solely focused on the company itself would not be able to mitigate direct and indirect
damage sufficiently in the event of a disaster. When asked about inter-company collaboration (meaning thatdifferent companies share the BCP in part or in whole or that the BCP includes measures to be carried out undercollaboration of different companies), 309 respondents answered that they were working on a BCP involving
group companies and partners. Among these respondents, 290 companies were developing a BCP
encompassing the entire company group. The number of companies involved in a BCP was mostly a few, whilesome BCPs included more than a few companies.
The Cabinet Office will continue to undertake initiatives to popularize and raise awareness of BCP preparation
based on the outcomes of surveys, with the aim of encouraging companies to formulate a BCP and engage in
BCM.
1-8 Partnerships with Private Sector
To improve the capability of disaster risk management in the entire society, private business operators mustalso improve their preparations for large scale natural disasters. In this context, the Disaster Risk Management
Economic Consortium was launched by 13 economic groups on March 23, 2018 to provide a venue forexchanging opinions and communicating with each other (Fig. 1-8-1).
The Cabinet Office promotes such private initiatives by sharing information under the framework of publicprivate collaboration. In FY2018, the Cabinet Office published a simulation of earthquake damage (losses
estimation tool) on its website for corporate use.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/consortium/index.html

89Fig. 1-8-1

Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium

Image of initiatives by the Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium
Japan Economic Federation/Japan Association of Corporate Executives/Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry/Central Federation ofSocieties of Commerce and Industry, Japan/National Federation of Small Business Associations/Junior Chamber International Japan
Affiliated operators/Subsidiaryorganizations, etc. of
consortium members

 Japanese Bankers
Association
 National Associationof Shinkin Banks National Central
Society of Credit
Cooperatives
 Regional Banks
Association of Japan The Second
Association ofRegional Banks

Consortium members
Subsidiaryorganizations

Urged

Financial
institution

Business
operators

Insurancecompany,

・ Independent
Insurance Agents ofJapan, Inc.
・ General Insurance
Association of Japan・ Japan Insurance
Brokers Association
・ Foreign Non-Life
Insurance
Association of Japanetc.
UrgingGraphical representation of
urging initiatives and urgedorganizations

Tax accountant,
Small and Medium
Enterprise Management
Consultant

Japan Federation of Certified Public Tax Accountants' Associations/Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Management Consultant Association

Source: Cabinet OfficeSoon after its launch, the Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium issued the Principles of Disaster
Risk Management Economic Action on March 23 as the common concept of business operators on preparations
for disasters (Fig. 1-8-2).
In FY2018, the members of the 13 economic groups carried out awareness raising activities to ensure that
the Principles are known and understood by their subordinate groups. Through activities to promote thePrinciples, various entities developed a structure to thoroughly and continuously promote corporate disasterrisk management. Also, four secretariat meetings were held for information sharing and interaction among theconsortium members. Each member shared its disaster preparedness and response measures, while
government organizations shared information on disaster risk management. Four new organizations plan tojoin the Consortium in FY2019. The Cabinet Office intends to promote the total disaster resilience of society
using an SME-based approach, working in collaboration with the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency on the
SME Resilience Enhancement Measures (support measures concerning the formulation of business continuity
capacity enhancement plans and support measures for companies whose plans were approved).

90

Fig. 1-8-2

Principles of Disaster Risk Management Economic Action

Principles of Disaster Risk Management Economic Action
March 23, 2018
Disaster Management Economic Consortium[Preface]
Since Japan is prone to natural disasters, it is important for business operators to makedecisions aware that disaster risk management is what underpins business management. For
large scale disasters in particular, it is critical for business operators to make preparations as
described in (1) to (4) below based on self-help and mutual support approaches because of
the limitations of public support.
(1) Business operators adequately recognize and determine disaster risks on their own.
(2) Business operators take measures against disasters using effective disaster risk
management by combining risk control (seismic retrofitting, BCP measures, etc.) and risk
finance (purchase of insurance, loans, cash holding, etc.) depending on the recognizeddisaster risks.
(3) Business operators raise awareness among their executives and employees on disastermanagement through disaster management education to make proactive activities
possible.
(4) Business operators ensure collaboration and communication with their business partners
essential for their business management such as financial institutions, employers’
associations and other related organizations, and take self-help and mutual support-based
disaster management measures.
The Principles of Disaster Risk Management Economic Action must be respected in theactivities of consortium members to boost disaster risk management capability across society
by making self-help and mutual support-based preparations.

[Principles of Disaster Risk Management Economic Action]
1. The members of the Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium must strive toachieve the preparations (1) to (4) as described in the Preface.
2. The members of the Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium must strive to theimprove disaster risk management capability across the entire society by sharing as muchinsight as possible and distributing information to business operators.
3. The members of the Disaster Risk Management Economic Consortium must strive topromote public awareness and education to improve the disaster risk management
capability of business operators by employing ingenuity, according to the characteristics of
the industries to which the members belong.
End.
Source: Cabinet Office website(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/consortium/index.html)

1-9 Initiatives by Academic Communities
A wide range of research is being conducted in Japan on the subject of disaster risk management, including
hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, and meteorological phenomena; civil engineering;buildings; seismic proof structures; emergency medical care; environmental health and other medical care andhygiene issues; geography; history and other aspects of human life; information; and energy. The Great East
Japan Earthquake led to an awareness that disaster risk management and mitigation research from acomprehensive perspective that integrated all these fields is essential, giving rise to a need for interdisciplinary

91

collaboration through information sharing and interaction with other fields across the boundaries of different
specialisms. Accordingly, following discussions with the Science Council of Japan and various other relevant
academic societies, the Japan Academic Network for Disaster Reduction (JANDR) was established to serve as a
network of academic societies involved in disaster risk management, mitigation, and reconstruction. The
network comprised 47 academic societies among its membership at the time of its launch in January 2016, but
this figure had grown to 57 by the end of March 2019.
With an aim to strengthen pre-disaster and emergency collaboration between academia and the government,
the JANDR held the first Liaison Conference on Disaster Risk Management among the Science Council of Japan,
Academic Societies, and Government Ministries and Agencies on June 5, 2018, which was participated by 56
member academic societies, the JANDR, Science Council of Japan (SCJ), and the representatives of ministries
and agencies engaged in DRR. In the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 (western Japan torrential rains), the JANDR
issued the Emergency Message to People in Japan Regarding the Western Japan Torrential Rains on July 22,
2018. It also co-hosted the Emergency Reporting Session on the Western Japan Torrential Rains with the SCJ on
September 10, 2018. Lastly, on March 12, 2018, the JANDR held the Conference for Academic Studies onConsecutive Natural Disasters That Occurred in the Summer of 2018.

First Liaison Conference on Disaster Risk Management among the Science Council of Japan, Academic Societies, andGovernment Ministries and Agencies

1-10 Initiatives from the Perspective of Gender Equality
In the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality (approved by the Cabinet on December 25, 2015) and the Basic
Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (approved by the National Disaster Management Council on February 16, 2016),
the Cabinet Office has specified that consideration must be given to the differing needs of men and women in
all aspects of disaster risk management, including pre-disaster prevention, emergency response, and recovery
and reconstruction. Moreover, these plans require efforts to be made to promote women’s participation indecision-making forums relating to both disaster risk management and reconstruction (Figs. 1-10-1 to 1-10-3).
In addition, the Cabinet Office consolidated the Guidelines for Disaster Planning, Response, andReconstruction from a Gender-Equality Perspective (2013), based on lessons from the Great East Japan
Earthquake and responses to other past disasters. Serving as a basic set of guidelines for local governmentsfrom a gender equality perspective when implementing the necessary measures and responses, these havebeen shared with local governments, as well as relevant groups and organizations. Various problems emergedin the Great East Japan Earthquake due to failure to sufficiently consider the stockpiling and provision of
supplies and the shelter operation. Among the issues raised were the lack of specific supplies for women and92

a failure to provide breastfeeding or changing places.
Using these guidelines, the Cabinet Office has sought to encourage local governments to take action before
disaster occurs, for example, by increasing the number of female representatives in the Local Disaster
Management Council and undertaking initiatives aiming to reflect gender equality perspectives when preparing
and revising the Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction. Following the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake and the
Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the Cabinet Office made a request to affected local governments for adopting agender equality perspective based on these guidelines, especially in the shelter operation.
Fig. 1-10-1

Female Member in Local Disaster Management Councils(No.)

Number of Prefectural Councils for Disaster
Management with no female members
Prefectures
Municipalities

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Note: Following its revision in June 2012, the Basic Act on Disaster Management specified that members of voluntary disaster management
organizations and/or individuals with a relevant academic background should be added to the membership of the Local Disaster
Management Council in addition to the staff of disaster management organizations who are already ex officio members, to reflect the viewsof a more diverse range of bodies in preparing the Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and similar.
Notes: 1. Figures for April 1 each year, in principle.
2. Due to the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake, figures for 2011 do not include parts of Iwate Prefect ure (Hanamaki City,
Rikuzentakata City, Kamaishi City, Otsuchi Town), Miyagi Prefecture (Onagawa Town, Minamisanriku Town) and Fukushima Prefecture(Minamisoma City, Shimogo Town, Hirono Town, Naraha Town, Tomioka Town, Okuma Town, Futaba Town, Namie Town, Iitate Village),while figures for 2012 do not include parts of Fukushima Prefecture (Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village and Iitate Village).

Source: Compiled from Cabinet Office, Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a
Gender-Equal Society

93

Fig. 1-10-2

Female Member in Prefectural Councils for Disaster Management

Prefecture

Total No. of
members

Tokushima
ShimaneTottori

81
73
65

39
35
28

Percentage
of female
(%)
48.1
47.9
43.1

Saga
Niigata
Kyoto
Kanagawa

68
71
66
57

19
19
14
12

27.9
26.8
21.2
21.1

20% - 30%,
4 councils

Gifu
Shiga
Aomori
Miyagi
Tochigi
Yamagata
KagawaNagasakiOkayamaToyamaNagano
Chiba
Iwate
Nara
Okinawa
Gunma
Hyogo
Tokyo
Kochi
Saitama
Ibaraki
Fukushima
Wakayama
Kagoshima
Kumamoto
Osaka
Oita
Ishikawa
Yamaguchi

61
58
60
56
53
60
60
68
57
66
67
61
74
60
54
47
55
66
58
69
52
54
54
63
56
58
58
70
60

12
11
11
10
9
10
10
11
9
10
10
9
10
8
7
6
7
8
7
8
6
6
6
7
6
6
6
7
6

19.7
19.0
18.3
17.9
17.0
16.7
16.7
16.2
15.8
15.2
14.9
14.8
13.5
13.3
13.0
12.8
12.7
12.1
12.1
11.6
11.5
11.1
11.1
11.1
10.7
10.3
10.3
10.0
10.0

10% - 20%,29 councils

Hokkaido
Shizuoka
Mie
Ehime
Yamanashi
Miyazaki
Aichi
Akita
Fukuoka
Fukui

68
59
59
61
62
53
68
60
61
56

6
5
5
5
5
4
5
4
4
3

8.8
8.5
8.5
8.2
8.1
7.5
7.4
6.7
6.6
5.4

5% - 10%,10 councils

Hiroshima

59

2

3.4

5% or less,10 councils

2,882

453

15.7

Total

No. of female
members

40% ormore,
3 councils(Note) 1. Formulated based on the Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society (FY2018) (Cabinet Office).
2. The data is as of April 1, 2018, in principle. However, the date may vary depending on the situation of each local government.
3. The percentage of females is rounded to the nearest tenth.
4. Some islands are omitted for editorial reasons.

Source: Formulated from the Progress of Local Government Measures Focused on Women or the Promotion of a Gender-Equal
Society (2018) by the Cabinet Office<Refer to Fig. A-44 Female Representation in Local Disaster Management Councils (by Prefecture, 2018) (A-67) >Fig. 1-10-3

Targets for Prefectural Councils for Disaster Management and Municipal Councils for
Disaster Management in the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality
Item

Current

Target (Deadline)

FemaleRepresentation in
Prefectural Councils
for Disaster
Management

13.2%(2015)

30%(2020)

FemaleRepresentation in
Municipal Councils for
Disaster Management

・Number of bodies with nofemale as members: 515 (2014)
・Female as a proportion of themembership: 7.7% (2015)

・Number of bodies with no female asmembers: 0 (2020)
・Female as a proportion of themembership: 10% (ASAP),
aiming for 30% in due course (2020)

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office from the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality

94Column:
Empowerment of Female Fire Corps Volunteers
The Momoishi 10th Fire Corps in Oirase Town, Aomori Prefecture is a rare all-women fire corps in Japan,
consisting of 12 female volunteers. The predecessor of the 10th Fire Corps was the Hitokawame Female Fire
Corps formed in 1923. The women-only fire corps was formed as many men were working away from homein those days. The records show that these women have kept operating manual fire water pumps for threehours to extinguish fires.
The number of female fire corps volunteers has been increasing year by year. Today, there areapproximately 26,000 female fire corps volunteers (approximately 500 are in Aomori Prefecture). The
National Conference of Female Fire Corps Volunteers, which started in 1994, will hold its 25th round in
September 2019. Female fire corps volunteers across the country will gather in Aomori City to interact andshare opinions with each other.

Source: Fire and Disaster Management Agency website(Reference: https://www.fdma.go.jp/relocation/syobodan/ladies/index.html)

95Section 2: Disaster Management Frameworks, Disaster Response, andPreparation
2-1 Revision of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
The Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction is decided by the National Disaster Management Council inaccordance with Article 34 of the Basic Act on Disaster Management. It is reviewed annually and revised when
deemed necessary, to take account of the findings from scientific research concerning disasters and theirprevention, as well as disasters that have occurred and the effects of emergency disaster management
measures implemented in response. Local governments are required to develop Local Plans for Disaster Risk
Reduction, while Designated Administrative Organizations and Designated Public Corporations are required todevelop Disaster Management Operations Plans, which must be based on the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk
Reduction.
In FY2018, the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction was revised in June 2018 (Fig. 2-1-1). The revision
included (1) change to systems in relation to the amendment of the Disaster Relief Act and other relevant laws
and regulations, and (2) the addition of countermeasures for challenges identified in the July 2017 Northern
Kyushu Heavy Rain and heavy snows from January to February 2018. More specifically, the revised version of
the Basic Plan refers to disaster relief activities by cities and liaison and coordination by prefectures, which are
to be conducted based on the amended Disaster Relief Act.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/keikaku/kihon.html
The revised Basic Plan describes measures based on the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain, including
the installation of permeable check dams in small and medium rivers and sediment control dams to capture
driftwood, as well as measures based on the lessons learned from the heavy snowfalls from January to February
2018, including a measure to minimize the overall impact of snow on the functionality of the road network.
Fig. 2-1-1

Overview of Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (June 2018)
Overview of Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (June 2018)
Basic Plan for Disaster
Risk Reduction

BackgroundA plan that describes the basic principles for disaster management measures deemed necessary in Japan.
Formulated by the National Disaster Management Council pursuant to Article 34 of the Basic Act on Disaster
Management.

(1) Revision based on the amendment of related laws and regulations (the Disaster Relief Act, the Road Traffic Act, the Flood Control Act, and the Port and Harbor Act)
(2) Revision based on the lessons learned from recent disasters (the July 2017 Kyushu Heavy Rain and heavy snowfalls from January to February 2018)

Major Revisions(1) Revision based on the amendment of related laws and regulations(i) Implementation of swift rescue and relief operation (the Disaster Relief Act) (iii) Bringing the number of trapped people to zero (the Flood Control Act)
○Rescue and relief operation by designated cities and liaison and coordination by prefectures(ii) Minimizing damage and enhancing support (the Road Traffic Act, the FloodControl Act, and the Port and Harbor Act)
○Designation of critical logistics roads and establishment of the disaster recovery work undertaking system○Enhancement of the system in which the national government, etc. undertake construction projects forprefecture-administered rivers○The government undertakes the administration of port and harbor facilities in the event of a disaster.

Implementation of road clearance○Establishment of the Megaflood Management Committees under the government○The preparation of evacuation operation/implementation plans and implementation of evacuation drills
has become part of the obligations of the managers of facilities used by persons who need special care

Preparation of evacuation
operation/implementation plans

Evacuation drills in facilities for persons
who need special care(2) Revision based on the lessons learned from recent disasters(ii) Revision based on heavy snows from January to February 2018

○Establishment of criteria for issuing a municipal evacuation advisory concerning rivers otherthan rivers subject to flood warning and rivers subject to water level announcement○Enhanced measures, including the installation of permeable check dams in small andmedium rivers, which are prone to damage caused by sediment and driftwood, andinstallation of sediment control dams to capture driftwood in forests prone to damage
caused by driftwood.

○The importance of effectiveness of inter-local government partnership agreements
is clearly stipulated as a basic principle.
○Specific measures to minimize the overall impact of snow on the functionality of
the road network.

Upgrade(i) Revision based on the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain

Upgrading permeable check dams
Installation of sediment control dams tocapture driftwood

Source: Cabinet Office

96

Installation of sediment control dams to capture
driftwood

Collaboration among relevant entities

Early opening by preventive traffic regulationand intense snow removal operation

2-2 Establishment of the System for Designating Cities Conducting Relief Operations Pursuant to theAmended Disaster Relief Act
The Disaster Relief Act provides that the governor of a prefecture is responsible for commanding relief
operations pursuant to the Act, such as setting up shelters and supplying temporary housing, on behalf of themayor of municipality (including the mayor of special zone) in the event of disaster on a certain scale. The Act
also provides that expenses for such relief operations are to be partly aided by the national government.
Regarding this relief operation system, the report from the Working Group for Studying Emergency
Responses and Livelihood Support Measures (an organization established with the aim of discussing tactics to
improve responses to earthquake nationwide based on the lessons learned from the Kumamoto Earthquake in
April 2016) stated, “a practical system of implementing rescue operations under the current laws and an
effective approach to regional coordination must be developed from the viewpoint of ensuing faster and moreaccurate rescue operations and smoother execution of disaster rescue-related administrative work”(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/h280414jishin/h28kumamoto/okyuseikatu_wg.html).
In readiness for upcoming large-scale disasters, the Cabinet Office has held meetings of the Task Force on
Practical Procedures for Rescue Operation since December 2016 to study a practical system of implementing
rescue operation and the suitability of regional coordination from the perspective of smooth public rescue
operation. Following a number of discussions, the Task Force issued the final report in December 2017
suggesting that “in preparation for large-scale, widespread disasters, a designated city capable of coordinatingwith the prefecture to which it belong may be assigned as the new main body of relief operation, alongside thecurrent commissioning system, to expedite and streamline administrative work,” and “to settle various
concerns of prefectures, adequate functioning of the right of each prefecture to regional coordination must be
clearly described in the law.” It also suggested that suitable measures must be taken in future to bring thedesignation criteria into shape (Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/saigaikyujo/index.html).
For further discussions, the Cabinet Office launched a meeting involving representatives from Miyagi, Aichi,
Hyogo and other prefectures in February 2018 with a view to strengthening collaboration in disaster relief
administrative work in the event of a large-scale and widespread disaster. The members of the meeting
discussed a system to facilitate the procurement and distribution of disaster relief supplies based on wide-areacoordination on a prefectural level, as well as measures for collaboration with relief supplies-related industries(Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/kyuujorenkei/index.html).
Based on what was discussed in the above meetings, the government amended the Disaster Relief Act in2018 (entered into force on April 1, 2019) to create a system for disaster relief operations conducted by city
mayors designated by the Prime Minister and thereby ensure smooth and swift implementation of relief
operations in the event of a sudden disaster. (Fig. 2-2-1)

97

Fig. 2-2-1

Act Partially Amending the Disaster Relief Act (Entered into Force on April 1, 2019)

Overview of the Act Partially Amending the Disaster Relief Act
Promulgated on June 15, 2018

Disaster Relief Act

Provides that the governor of a prefecture is responsible for commanding relief operations pursuant to the Act, suchas setting up shelters and supplying temporary housing, on behalf of the mayor of municipality in the event ofdisaster on a certain scale and that expenses for such relief operations are to be partly aided by the state

Outline of the amended Act
The amended Act established a system, which allowed cities to carry out relief operations on their own
discretion, with an aim to ensure smooth and swift implementation of relief operations.
1. Designation of cities conducting relief operations
The Prime Minister shall designate cities conducting relief operations* when requested, taking into
account each city’s disaster preparedness and financial capabilities. The Prime Minister shall hear
opinions of the governor of the relevant prefecture prior to such designation.
*Designated cities. The criteria for the designation of a city conducting relief operations are to beprovided in a Cabinet Office Order.
2. Coordination by Prefectures
The governor of the prefecture encompassing the city conducting relief operations shall be responsible
for liaison and coordination with the city mayor, relief supply manufacturers, and other relevant parties
in order to ensure the appropriate and smooth delivery of relief supplies (food, materials for housing,etc.)
3. Disaster relief fundA city conducting relief operations shall reserve a disaster relief fund to aid relief operations, in the samemanner as a prefecture.
* The right of the prefectural governor to give instructions, etc., stipulated in Article 72 (1) of the Basic Act
on Disaster Management, remains unchanged.
<After revision>
Prefectures

Coordination by
prefectural
governor

Municipalities

The state andprefecture shoulder
the financial burden.

City conducting
reliefoperations(assigned fromdesignatedcities)

Setup of shelters
Supply of temporary housing,etc.

* The prefecture canconcentrate its relief
operation onmunicipalities other thanthe city conducting relief
operations (assigned fromdesignated cities)

The state and the city conducting
relief operations should shoulder
the financial burden (assigned
from designated cities).

Impact of the amendment
The amended Act will promote swift and smooth relief operations for 270 million people (the total populationof 20 designated cities across Japan), while also ensuring faster rescue for other municipalities.
Date of entry
into force

April 1, 2019

Source: Cabinet Office

The amended Act stipulates that cities that fulfill the criteria provided in the Cabinet Office Order and aredesignated by the Prime Minister are to conduct relief operations for affected people who need rescue in theirjurisdiction. If a disaster occurs in a designated city conducting relief operations or other areas in the same
prefecture, the governor of the prefecture is responsible for liaison and coordination with the city mayor, relief98supply manufacturers, and other relevant parties in order to ensure the appropriate and smooth delivery ofrelief supplies.
Moreover, when the total expenses of relief operations conducted by a designated city exceed 1 million yen,part of such expenses is covered by the national treasury under the amended Act. In addition, a city conducting
relief operations has an obligation to reserve a disaster relief fund to aid expenses of relief operations. The
minimum amount a city needs to reserve is calculated based on the closing accounts of general tax income asprovided under the Local Tax Act applicable to the prefecture encompassing the designated city conducting
relief operations. When the disaster relief fund has not yet reached the required minimum amount, the cityneeds to reserve an amount as provided in a Cabinet Order.
In August 2018, the Cabinet Office established the Review Meeting on the Criteria for Designating Cities
Conducting Relief Operations as a platform for prefectures, designated cities, the Japanese Red Cross Society,and other relevant entities to discuss the criteria for designating cities conducting relief operations, a system
for smooth procurement and distribution of relief supplies based on wide-area coordination on a prefecturelevel, and collaborative measures with relevant entities. In October 2018, after the members reached a broad
agreement on the designation criteria, the Report of the Review Meeting on the Criteria for Designating Cities
Conducting Relief Operations was published.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/shishiteikijun/index.html
Based on the above Report, the Cabinet Office issued on December 28, 2018 the Order on Cities Conducting
Relief Operations under the Disaster Relief Act, which provided for the criteria for the designation of cities
conducting relief operations.
As the designation criteria, the Cabinet Office Order provides that a city conducting relief operations must
be an ordinance-designated city (as provided under the Local Autonomy Act) that fulfills the following four
requirements:
・ The city that intends to become a city operating relief operations (ordinance-designated city) has anestablished collaborative system with the prefecture encompassing it.
・The city has organizational structures required of a city conducting relief operations
・The city has a financial foundation required of a city conducting relief operations
・Coordination with related administrative and other organizations has been done.
To be more specific, the first requirement refers to the following matters, for example:
・Clearly defined liaison and coordination channels between the city and the prefecture
・A communication system that allows the city to share information with the prefecture on the special
standards applied to it
・Developing a draft resource distribution plan of the prefecture encompassing the city
As the amended Disaster Relief Act entered into force on April 1, 2019, nine cities (Sendai, Yokohama,
Kawasaki, Sagamihara, Kobe, Okayama, Kita-Kyushu, Fukuoka, and Kumamoto Cities) were designated as cities
conducting relief operations (as of April 1, 2019).
2-3 Publication of the Case Studies on the Formulation of Evacuation Plans for Volcanic Eruptions, Etc.
Following the amendment of the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes in 2015, the Cabinet Officerevised the Guide to Develop Concrete and Practical Evacuation Plans for Volcanic Eruption (hereinafterreferred to as the “Guide”) in 2016 with a view to supporting local governments with the formulation ofevacuation plans. Also, the Cabinet Office has worked with local governments composing Volcanic Disaster99

Management Councils on reviewing evacuation plans since FY2016.
In order to provide reference materials to refer to when formulating or revising evacuation plans based on
the Guide, the Cabinet Office released in October 2018 the Case Study on the Formulation of Evacuation Plans
for Volcanic Eruptions (Fig. 2-3-1), which summarized the insights and results of the abovementioned reviews
for the following three categories:(1) The process of formulation of a practical evacuation plan (explanation on specific steps that should be taken)(2) Examples of the descriptions of standard evacuation plans (explanation on how to translate what has been
discussed into an evacuation plan)(3) Forward-looking case studies (explanation on the points that should be addressed in relation to uniquechallenges for volcanic areas).
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kazan/tebikisakusei/jireisyu/index.html
Fig. 2-3-1

Overview of the Case Studies on the Formulation of Evacuation Plans

Guide to Developing Concrete and Practical Evacuation Plans for Volcanic Eruption
This Guide is reference material intended to help Volcanic Disaster Management Councils (which are established for each volcano) with formulating
an evacuation plan. It explains important matters and key points regarding each item to be included in an evacuation plan, as well as matters that
require special attention depending on the characteristics of the volcano or volcanic area.

Case Studies on the Formulation of
Evacuation Plans

Updated based on
the challenges informulating
evacuation plans<Challenges in formulating evacuation plans>
・How should necessary basic data be collected and compiled? What
are the specific steps that a Council should take when determining safe
evacuation methods for each district based on the hazard map?
・How should the results of discussion be translated into an evacuation
plan?

This document explains specific matters that should be studied and discussed when preparing an evacuation plan in accordance with the Guide, how to translate
the results of such study and discussion into an evacuation plan, and the key points to be covered, by showing examples of evacuation plans that had beendeveloped under cooperation between the Cabinet Office and local governments composing Volcanic Disaster Management Councils.

If you would like to learn the specific steps to follow to define the “who,”“where (starting point and destination),” “when,” and “how” of evacuation...

The process of formulation of a practical evacuation plan
Specific steps to take when discussing the main items of the evacuation plan,i.e. the scope, evacuation routes, evacuation sites and shelters, etc.
Evacuation when the volcanic alert
Evacuation when the volcanic alertlevel is 2 or 3
level is 4 or 5
Specific steps for studying anddiscussing a concrete evacuation
plan for the near-crater areas
Specific steps for studying and discussing
an evacuation plan for hikers and tourists
in the near-crater areas

Specific steps for studying anddiscussing a concrete evacuation
plan for residential areas
Specific steps for studying and discussing anevacuation plan for residents and tourists at the baseof the mountain and in residential areas

If you would like to learn the specific steps to follow totranslate the results of the study and discussion into an
evacuation plan...
Examples of the descriptions of standard
evacuation plans
Key points and examples of descriptions for eachvolcanic area concerning each item included in the
Planning chapter of the Guide
If you would like to learn the key points and basic
principles of solutions for challenges concerning othervolcanoes...
Forward-looking case studies
Forward-looking case studies for each volcanic area

Source: Cabinet Office website
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kazan/tebikisakusei/jireisyu/index.html

1002-4 Enhancement of the Training Contents for Local Government Heads and Officials
The ability to respond swiftly and accurately to a disaster largely relies on the knowledge and experience ofthe head of a local government and officials in charge of disaster management. Accordingly, in FY2013, theCabinet Office began offering Disaster Management Specialist Training Courses for national and local
government employees, to build capacity to respond swiftly and accurately to crises and to develop networksof national and local government organizations.
With a view to promoting the fostering of disaster management human resources among local government
officers, the content of one of the above courses, the Training Course at the Ariake-no-Oka Core Wide-area
Disaster Prevention Base, was greatly enhanced in FY2018, such as introducing lectures incorporating the latest
insights on disaster risk reduction based on the experience of the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 and an elearning program that helped participants prepare for the lectures and effectively learn the knowledge.
The Cabinet Office and Fire and Disaster Management Agency jointly held a National Seminar on Disaster
Prevention and Crisis Management for Heads of Local Government to improve the capacity of mayors who
would spearhead the municipality in the event of a disaster to make decisions faster and more accurately. In
the seminar held in FY2018, which specifically encouraged those newly in office, 221 new mayors joined andlearned about the proper initial responses as the head of a municipality and actual examples of initial responses
taken by the disaster-affected local governments.
In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office and Fire and Disaster Management Agency co-sponsoreda Special Training Course on Disaster Prevention and Crisis Management for persons overseeing disaster andcrisis management at related ministries and agencies, prefectural governments and ordinance-designated cities
over two days in April 2019 at the Local Autonomy College.
These training courses and seminars should be further enhanced to improve the national capability ofdisaster management and response now and in future.

The Training Course at the Ariake no Oka Core Wide-area Disaster Prevention Base in FY2018

101

The National Seminar on Disaster Prevention and Crisis Management for Heads of Local Government in FY2018

2-5 Securing Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites and Designated Shelters
Designated emergency evacuation sites are positioned as facilities or places to which local citizens and others
should evacuate urgently to safeguard their lives in the event of imminent danger from a tsunami, flood, orother such hazard. Designated shelters are facilities for accommodating people who have evacuated until thedanger posed by a disaster has passed or for accommodating them temporarily when a disaster prevents theirreturning home.
The distinction between evacuation sites and shelters was not entirely clear at the time of the Great East
Japan Earthquake, which was a factor that increased the harm. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office revised the Basic
Act on Disaster Management in 2013 to require mayors of municipalities to designate both kinds of evacuation
facility in advance, making a distinction between designated emergency evacuation sites and designatedshelters, and issue a public notice to notify citizens of details of these facilities. Fig. 2-5-1 shows the designation
status of designated emergency evacuation sites as of April 1, 2018.
Fig. 2-5-1

Designated Emergency Evacuation Sites
Number of designated emergency evacuation sites by type of anomalous phenomenon
Flood

Sediment
disaster

Storm
surge

Earthquake

TsunamiNumber ofdesignatedevacuation sites(sites)

65,18560,20918,37577,60935,15536,349

Expected capacity(10,000 people)

12,12912,205

5,139

21,535

8,059

14,490Volcanic
phenomena

Total

35,1909,688

106,956

6,934

2,185

Widespread
Rain
fire
inundation

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration” (multiple responses permitted for each category)
Reference: https://www.fdma.go.jp/publication/bousai/

Along with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Cabinet Office is encouraging local governments
to specify their designated emergency evacuation sites without delay. As local governments are required to
specify designated emergency evacuation sites for each type of disaster, the Cabinet Office is calling on local
governments nationwide to lose no time in starting to install signs that comply with the Hazard SpecificEvacuation Guidance Sign System (JIS Z 9098), which was instituted in March 2016 to enable evacuees to clearly
identify such facilities (Fig. 2-5-2).
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/zukigo/index.html

102

・Symbol indicating an evacuation site (required)
・General disaster symbols (required)・Marks indicating compatibility (“○” for compatible
disaster types; “×” for non-compatible disaster types)
・Indicate that it is an evacuation site (indicate the nameof the site)
・Multiple languages are preferred (the example uses
English)Example of a sign compliant with the Hazard Specific Evacuation Guidance Sign System

Fig. 2-5-2Standardization of graphic symbols for evacuation sites, etc.
Evacuation sites need to be specified for each disaster type by therevised Basic Act on Disaster Management.
Related ministries and agencies decided to launch a liaison
conference to standardize graphic symbols for evacuation sites, etc.
The JIS Drafting Committee creates draft symbols, which are thenreported to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
→The graphic symbols were standardized by JIS on March 22, 2016.
Discussion for international standardization is ongoing based on the
proposal from Japan to the ISO.

Source: Cabinet Office

The number of shelters designated pursuant to Article 49-7 of the Basic Act on Disaster Management
increased from 48,014 as of October 1, 2014 to 75,895 as of October 1, 2018, as a result of the government’s
effort to urge municipalities (including special zones) to swiftly complete designation, which had been
continued since the establishment of the designation system in April 2014. As of October 1, 2018, the numberof designated welfare shelters was 8,064, but the number of available welfare shelters, including facilities withwhich a partnership agreement has been concluded, was 22,579.
Following situations that have arisen in recent disasters, various problems have been pointed out in relation
to efforts to provide an appropriate living environment at shelters, including the need to improve toilet facilities
there. Even in the event of a disaster, when evacuees are compelled to lead their lives amid the inconvenientconditions of a shelter, it is important to improve the quality of life in shelters and seek to ensure a good living
environment. Accordingly, since July 2015, the Cabinet Office has been holding meetings of the Study Groupon Securing Shelters and Improving their Quality, to consider and take the necessary steps to deal with a wide
range of issues, including encouraging municipalities to designate shelters and welfare shelters, improving toilet
facilities at shelters, and developing support and consultation systems for persons requiring special care.
Based on discussions by this committee, the Guidelines for Ensuring Satisfactory Living Conditions at Shelters(published by the Cabinet Office in August 2013) were partially revised in April 2016. At the same time, based103

on these revised guidelines, the Cabinet Office published three other sets of guidelines: the shelter
Management Guidelines; the Guidelines for Securing and Managing Toilets at shelters; and the Guidelines for
Securing and Managing Welfare Shelters (Fig. 2-5-3).
In addition, the FY2016 Report on Case Examples of Support for Affected People at shelters was compiled
and published in FY2017. The Report on the Study on Measures for Ensuring Satisfactory Living Conditions at
Designated Shelters was published in FY2018 as supplementary documents to the Shelter Management
Guidelines (Fig. 2-5-3) (Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hinanjo/index.html).

Fig. 2-5-3

Guidelines on Shelters

Evacuation Shelter Management Guidelines (April 2016)
The guidelines emphasize the establishment of systems for internal and external partnership andcooperation before disaster occurs, as well as attaching importance to maintaining the health of evacuees.
In addition, they provide a specific checklist of 19 tasks that should be carried out at each stage of disaster
response (preparation, initial response, emergency response, and recovery), specifying detailed tasks that
tend to be overlooked, such as arrangements for toilets, beds, baths, and pets.
Guidelines for Securing and Managing Toilets at Evacuation Shelters (April 2016)
The guidelines stress the importance of securing and managing toilets. This is because a growing number
of affected people experience discomfort due to the unhygienic state of toilets in times of disaster, whichleads them to refrain from using the toilet by restricting food and/or water intake to reduce the need to use
the toilet, running the risk of adverse impacts on their health or even their lives in a worst-case scenario.
Guidelines for Securing and Managing Welfare Evacuation Shelters (April 2016)
These guidelines are the updated version of the Guidelines on the Establishment and Management of
Welfare Shelters (June 2008) revised based on the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.
Based on an understanding that preparedness efforts are essential in bringing about effective response
operations in the event of a disaster, these Guidelines stress the importance of promoting welfare sheltersrelated initiatives under the initiative of municipalities (including special zones) before a disaster occurs.
FY2016 Report on Case Examples of Support for Affected People at shelters (April, 2017)
This report is based on the results of surveys with local governments, social welfare facilities, persons
with disabilities, and evacuees from the Kumamoto Earthquake, as well as interviews with NPOs, disabled
people’s groups, persons with disabilities, and local government employees who were in charge of managing
shelters. Based on the results of these surveys, the Report summarized facts and challenges concerning
support for the affected people at shelters, as well as advanced examples of countermeasures promoted invarious areas.
Report on the Study on Measures for Ensuring Satisfactory Living Conditions at Designated Shelters(August 2018)
Based on the experience of the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain and opinions from local
governments, the government carried out a survey concerning the needs of affected people, interviews withexperts, a survey and interviews with local governments. The Report summarizes measures to ensure goodliving conditions in designated shelters based on the results of the above surveys.

Source: Cabinet Office website
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hinanjo/index.html

104

2-6 Use of ICT in Disaster Risk Management
As seen at the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, many of affected people would stay in their cars or elsewhere
but not in shelters. This may hinder efforts to integrate information, including understanding the action of thesepeople, the needs of evacuees at shelters and the distribution of supplies. In response, the national government,
local governments and private companies and organizations must share information through public-private
partnership at ordinal times and respond to disasters promptly.
For this reason, the Cabinet Office organized the National and Local Government Public-Private Disaster
Information Hub Promotion Team under the Working Group for the Promotion of Standardization of Disaster
Measures of the Disaster Management Implementation Committee, the National Disaster Management
Council to utilize information and communication technology (ICT), which may be an effective means of sharing
information, and promote rules for the methods and periods of sharing information between related agencies
and the distribution of information according to these rules (“disaster information hub” (Fig. 2-6-1)).
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kaigirep/saigaijyouhouhub/index.html

Fig. 2-6-1

Image of a Disaster Information Hub

Image of a Disaster Information Hub

Disruptions to mobile communications

Damage to infrastructure
Damage to sewage
treatment facility

Debris flows, etc.
Damage topark
Damage toroad

In service
Out of service

Shelter information
Vehicle traffic records

Gas outage

Road traffic
records

Collect various disaster information and share it on a map for use in disaster management

Source: Cabinet Office

In FY2018, the Cabinet Office continued the previous year’s effort to expand the scope of information to beshared among the national and local governments and private companies responding to disasters, while also
discussing the use of big data to grasp the evacuation activities of affected people and the use of satellite datafor disaster management. The government also deployed the ISUT (Information Support Team) to Disaster
Management Headquarters in affected prefectures. During these deployments, the Shared Information
Platform for Disaster Management (SIP4D) was used on a pilot basis to determine the situation of the local
governments, private entities, and other organizations responding to the disasters.
In post-disaster settings, certain types of information (such as the damage and shelters) change from hour
to hour (dynamic information) and thus are hard to share in an organized manner. In order to ensure relevant
decision making by disaster response organizations, it is very important to indicate such dynamic informationon the map and make sure that these organizations can grasp the overall situation of the disaster. If the ISUT
could collect, organize and map such information and share it with disaster response organizations, it would
greatly help their swift and relevant decision making.
105

The ISUT have engaged in relief operations for three disasters to date, namely, the earthquake that hit thenorthern part of Osaka Prefecture on June 18, 2018 (Fig. 2-6-2), the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, and the2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake. Especially, for the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, the ISUT operated
in the building of the Hiroshima Prefectural Government from July 7 (the day following the day of issuance ofthe emergency warning) to August 9, using the SIP4D for information gathering and organization and explaining
the situation using the formulated map to the senior prefectural government officials, response organizations,and supported government employees deployed from other prefectures. This operation proved theeffectiveness of the ISUT to a certain level.
On the other hand, there were also some challenges, such as the time-consuming manual data input,
information gathering and organization processes, which delayed the sharing of map information with local
government and other relevant organizations. To address this issue, the government held orientations on the
ISUT for prefectures and ordinance-designated cities across Japan to explain the types of information the ISUT
can provide, the types of information the ISUT needs, and the importance of compiling a database before adisaster.
The ISUT will start its full-fledged operation across Japan in FY2019. The government intends to work toward
more effective operation of the ISUT and swift preparation and sharing of map information. Specifically, it plans
to develop a system to automate as much data input work as possible, while also working with relevantorganizations toward the expansion of the scope of information to be shared among disaster responseorganizations.
Fig. 2-6-2

Example of a Map Made by the ISUT for the Earthquake Centered in Northern Osaka
Prefecture (Map for Bathing Assistance Planning)

Gas outage (Osaka Gas)

Bathing assistance base (SDF) Number of evacuees (Osaka Prefecture)

Completed
Working on gas equipment inspection at customers’
houses or recommencement of gas supply

Under gas pump repair in road
Under gas pump inspection in roadGas outage (closed)

Source: Cabinet Office106Section 3 Responding to Disasters Anticipated to Occur
3-1 Development of Countermeasures against Wide-Area Ash Falls from Major Volcanic Eruptions
A major volcanic eruption may cause considerable disruptions to the life and social and economic activitiesof people living around the base of the mountain and those living afar alike, as volcanic ashes fall over an
extensive area. In this view, the Working Group on Countermeasures for Wide-Area Ash Falls from Major
Volcanic Eruptions (established in August 2018 under the Disaster Management Implementation Committee,
National Disaster Management Council) has discussed approaches to emergency response measures for major
volcanic eruptions affecting an extensive area encompassing urban areas, in which city functions areconcentrated.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/kazan/kouikikouhaiworking/index.html
As a first step to developing effective countermeasures for wide-area ash falls, the Working Group studied
the conditions of ash falls that can cause disruptions to road and railway traffic, electricity and other lifeline
utilities, and buildings and facilities. In the future, it intends to discuss emergency response measures for widearea ash falls from major eruptions with a focus on the impact on urban areas, using model cases. Specifically,
the distribution of ash falls from major eruptions of Mt. Fuji and their damage will be studied using the data of
the 1707 Hoei Eruption (Fig. 3-1-1) and a model simulating the chronological change of ash fall distribution
until the end of the eruption event. Then, based on the simulated damage situation, the Working Group will
study measures each entity (i.e. facility managers, residents, etc.) should take and basic principles for
emergency response measures, including the ash removal process and securing of ash disposal sites (Fig. 3-12).
Fig. 3-1-1

Ash Fall Distribution during the 1707 Hoei Eruption of Mt. Fuji (Records)

Source: Cabinet Office107

Fig. 3-1-2

Discussion Process

1. Understand the overall situation of the damage (what kind of event happens in each region?)(i) Define the conditions of ash falls based on which countermeasures should be discussed
 As a first step, study the distribution of ash falls during the Hoei Eruption of Mt. Fuji
 Then, study other cases with different conditions as necessary(ii) Define the conditions of ash falls that would cause disruptions to road and railway traffic, electricity, and other infrastructureStudy the damage directly caused by volcanic ashes, as well as ripple effects from the damage to infrastructure, such as traffic andlifeline utility outage(iii) Define the extent and duration of the impact of the ash fall event using (i) and (ii) above. Describe the overall picture of the damage.

2. Establish basic principles for emergency response measures(i) Develop mitigation measures based on the simulated damage
 Study emergency response measures each entity (facility managers, residents, etc.) should take in order to sustain their social andeconomic life Study relevant approaches to the ash removal process and securing of ash disposal sites(ii) Develop basic principles for countermeasures for ash falls from major eruptions

Discussion and formulation of a report (FY2018 to FY2019)
Each entity (facility manager, etc.) reflects the content of the report in their disaster management plans and BCPs.

Source: Cabinet Office

3-2 Deliberations on Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation from Flooding or Storm Surge Inundation in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Area
Experts predict that there will be risks of major flood disasters that would require large-scale, extensive
evacuation, as typhoons may increase their intensity into the future with global warming. Extensive portionsof Japan’s three major metropolitan areas are located below sea level (Fig. 3-2-1). As such, large-scale flooding
caused by the collapse of river embankments is expected to result in huge crowds as large numbers of residents
seek to evacuate, as well as many people being left stranded after failing to escape in time.
Accordingly, approaches to large-scale, extensive evacuation from flooding or storm surge inundation were
examined in Japan’s three major metropolitan areas at the Working Group for Studying Large-scale, Extensive
Evacuation from Flooding or Storm Surge Inundation established under the National Disaster Management
Council’s Disaster Management Implementation Committee in June 2016. The working group submitted areport titled “Basic Approaches for Large-scale, Extensive Evacuation from Flooding or Storm Surge Inundation”
in March 2018.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/fusuigai/kozuiworking/ index.html
Fig. 3-2-1

Areas below Sea Level in the Three Major Metropolitan Areas

Area below sea level:
124km2
Population: 1.38
millionArea below sea level:
336km2
Population: 0.9 million

Area below sea level:116km2
Population: 1.76
millionSource: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI)

In order to identify initiatives that administrative and other organizations should promote for large-scale,108

extensive evacuation from major floods and discuss collaboration and role sharing among these organizations
based on the above report, the Cabinet Office has hosted three sessions of the Study Group on Extensive
Evacuation from Large-Scale Flood Disasters in Urban Areas from June 2018 to March 2019 in cooperation with
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The main topics of the meetings were the securing of extensive
evacuation sites, evacuation means and guidance.
Reference: http://www.bousai.go.jp/fusuigai/suigaiworking/suigaiworking.html
As for the first topic (i.e. securing of extensive evacuation sites), the meeting members will work to identify
challenges by the end of FY2019 concerning the matching of evacuee communities and accepting communities
using the regional block system, which groups multiple communities into one block. As for the second topic (i.e.
securing of evacuation means and guidance), the evacuation means and destinations will be discussed basedon the estimated transportation capacity of railway companies. Also, as common measures that would serveboth topics ((1) securing extensive evacuation sites and (2) securing evacuation means and guidance), themembers will work on developing measures to mitigate the number of region-wide evacuees, a model thatshows how related organizations should share their roles, and a timeline for inter-organizational collaborationin normal times and in times when the risk of a disaster is heightening.

109Section 4: International Cooperation for Disaster Risk Reduction
Japan has accumulated a great deal of experience and knowledge concerning disasters, along with numerous
policies on disaster risk reduction. By sharing these with other countries, it is driving global discussions in thefield of disaster risk reduction and contributing to initiatives in this field in countries worldwide. In particular,
the international communities expect Japan to play a leading role in the implementation of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which was concluded at the Third UN World
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, hosted by Japan in Sendai City in March 2015. Accordingly, the Cabinet
Office is proactively promoting cooperation in disaster risk reduction through the UN and other internationalorganizations, as well as bilateral disaster risk reduction cooperation.
4-1 Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the UN and Other International Organizations(1) Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction(UNDRR)The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) is undertaking intensive activities focused on
the following three strategic objectives, to promote the SFDRR.
Strategic objective 1: Strengthen global monitoring, analysis and coordination of Sendai Framework
implementation
Strategic objective 2: Support to regional and national Sendai Framework implementation
Strategic objective 3: Catalyze action through Member States and Partners
As well as playing a leading role in the activities of UNDRR, Japan provides financial support for those
activities, contributing a total of approximately $5.12 million (approximately ¥563.37 million) through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office in FY2018.
The establishment of an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group (OEIWG) to formulate
indicators to measure progress toward the global targets and relevant terminology was approved by the UN
General Assembly in June 2015 and the OEIWG began its deliberations that September. In this process, Japan
made a substantial contribution to the OEIWG’s discussions, conducting a prior survey to ascertain whether
countries held any data concerning indicators that were tabled for consideration. As a result of thesedeliberations, the Recommendations of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Global
Indicators for the Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and on the
Follow-up to and Operationalization of the Indicators were adopted at the UN General Assembly in February
2017. Accordingly, various countries have submitted their indicators to date. The UNISDR plans to conduct
follow-ups on these indicators.
Ms. MIZUTORI Mami, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Disaster Risk Reduction ,visited the Cabinet Office on May 17, 2018 and had a discussion with H.E. Mr. OKONOGI, then Minister of State
for Disaster Management. The SRSG expressed her gratitude to Japan for its international contribution andleadership in disaster risk management and established a shared understanding of closer collaboration
between the Government of Japan (Cabinet Office) and UNDRR in promoting the SFDRR.
(2) 8th Asia Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR)
The 8th Asia Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) hosted by the Mongolian
government and the UNDRR was held in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia from July 3 to 5, 2018. Once in every two years
since 2005, Ministers in charge of disaster risk reduction from Asia gather to report the progress of each110

country’s initiatives under the Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks, exchange opinions on measures to promote suchinitiatives, share the results and challenges of DRR efforts, and discuss preparedness measures for disasters
that may occur in the future. The 8th Conference was attended by approximately 3,000 people from about 50
countries and regions.
From Japan, H.E. Mr. AKAMA, State Minister of Cabinet Office, attended the Conference and delivered aspeech in the Ministerial Session, in which he expressed Japan’s support for the Sendai Framework andpresented Japan’s efforts for implementing initiatives under the Sendai Framework. He also chaired theTechnical Session regarding “disaster governance” to enhance DRR management measures.

H.E. Mr. AKAMA, State Minister of Cabinet Office, giving a speech in the Ministerial Session(3) International Recovery Platform (IRP)The Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted in 2005 at the Second UN World Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction, which was held in the city of Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture. In response to this, the IRP was established in
the Kobe city the same year, to enhance networks and frameworks for supporting smoother post-disasterreconstruction, disseminate lessons concerning reconstruction and develop common techniques andmechanisms to facilitate reconstruction and provide advice and support to those formulating reconstructionplans and visions following a disaster. The IRP’s activities include holding the International Recovery Forum,
preparing guidance notes on recovery and organizing workshops for human resource development. The SFDRR
advocates that the IRP should be enhanced, as an international mechanism for promoting the “Build Back
Better” approach, which is positioned in the SFDRR as the fourth priority area for action. The Government ofJapan (Cabinet Office) supports the activities of the IRP, as well as contributing to enhancing the infrastructure
for its development, as Co-Chair of the IRP Steering Committee.
The International Recovery Forum in FY2018 was held in Kobe on January 18, 2019 focusing on the theme“Attaining the Build Back Better Dividend.” It was attended by 168 people from 32 countries, including the
Deputy Director General for Disaster Management of Cabinet Office, Mr. KANAZAWA Kazuo, Vice Governor of
Hyogo Prefecture, and Mr. HAYASHI Haruo, President of the National Research Institute for Earth Science andDisaster Resilience (NIED). At the forum, the participants shared case studies of recovery from past disasters
and the lessons learned, and discussed strategies to extend the benefits of “Build Back Better.”

111

The International Recovery Forum(4) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Disaster Management Officials ForumThe 12th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Disaster Management Officials Forum (SDMOF)
was held in Papua New Guinea (Kokopo) on September 25-26, 2018. The Chairman of the Asian Disaster
Reduction Center (ADRC) attended the forum from Japan and presented recent Japanese initiatives for thedevelopment of an early warning platform in the session about warning communication, using the quasi-zenithsatellite technology.
(5) Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation through the Activities of the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ARRC)
The Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) was established in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture in July 1998 toshare the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in January 1995 and other disasters in Japan with therest of Asia. FY2018 marked its 20th anniversary. With Turkey joining in October 2018, the number of members
became 31 (Fig. 4-1-1). The ADRC’s activities center on four key areas: sharing information about disasters,
human resource development in member countries, improving the disaster resilience of communities andpromoting partnerships with member countries, international organizations, local organizations and NGOs. It
also hosts visiting researchers from member countries each year: as of March 2019, the ADRC had hosted a
total of 111 such researchers, thereby helping to foster personnel who contribute to policymaking in the fieldof disaster risk reduction in member countries. The ADRC also gathers information about disaster risk
management systems and the latest disasters in each country and publishes this on its website, as well as
providing information obtained from satellite observation of the extent of the damage when a disaster occurs.
Reference: https://www.adrc.asia/

112

Fig. 4-1-1

Asian Disaster Reduction Center member countries and advisory countries

Source: Asian Disaster Reduction Center

The ADRC convenes the Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction (ACDR) jointly by the Cabinet Office every
year and invited persons in charge of disaster risk management from member countries and internationalorganizations to share information on disaster risk management and mitigation, exchange opinions andstrengthen collaboration in Asia, which is prone to frequent disasters. Celebrating the 20th anniversary of theADRC, the 14th round of the ACDR was held on Awaji Island, Hyogo Prefecture from October 30 to November
1, 2018, based on the themes of “cross-border collaboration to tackle disasters” and “enhancement of a global
disaster database.” More than 110 people attended the conference from member countries (25 out of 31
countries) and international organizations such as the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistanceon Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and JICA. Disaster management representatives shared information on
strategies and systems for reducing the disaster risk in individual countries as well as the progress of initiatives
concerning SFDRR.

Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction

4-2 Bilateral Disaster Risk Reduction Cooperation
Alongside the initiatives through international organization, the Cabinet Office also strengthened its
113

collaboration with disaster management agencies in the governments of various countries by sharing
experiences of disaster management policies through various opportunities such as visits from ministerial level
personnel overseeing disaster management from abroad.
(1) Partnership between the Cabinet Office and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
The Cabinet Office enters into an action plan every year based on the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC)
concluded with the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in December 2014 for sharing
information in mutual interaction and international meetings. In FY2018, the Cabinet Office visited the U.S. to
see a drill held in May, conducted an investigation on areas affected by Hurricane Harvey, and held a Japan-U.S.
Video Conference on Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction in December 2018.
(2) Partnership between the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Home Affairs in India
In September 2017, the Cabinet Office concluded an MOC with the Ministry of Home Affairs in India, aiming
to develop and extend bilateral cooperation and relationships in disaster risk management. Based on this MOC,
the Cabinet Office and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs jointly held the 2nd Japan-India Conference on
Cooperation for Disaster Risk Reduction in Tokyo on October 15, 2018. At the Conference which was attended
by about 70 people including H.E. Mr. YAMAMOTO, Minister of State for Disaster Management, H.E. Mr. P. K.
Mishra, Additional Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India, officers from government agencies,
experts and private companies in both countries, efforts for strengthening bilateral cooperation were discussed
in the sessions concerning disaster preparedness drills, flood measures, and the early warning systemtechnology.
On March 18, 2019, the 3rd Japan-India Conference on Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction was held in
New Delhi, the capital city of India. Japan led by the Vice-Minister for Policy Coordination and India led by H.E.
Mr. P. K. Mishra, Additional Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India, discussed mutual exchange among
research institutions including the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience (NIED)and the International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management under the auspices of UNESCO (ICHARM),
cities including Nagoya and Kumamoto Cities, and twenty private companies including the members of theJapan Bosai Platform (JBP).

2nd Japan-India Conference on Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction(3) Partnership between the Cabinet Office and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency ofTurkey (AFAD)
Through the Japan-Turkey Summit in September 2017 and the visit to Japan by H.E. Mr. Akdag, Deputy Prime
Minister of the Republic of Turkey in April 2018, the two countries agreed to promote cooperation in disastermanagement. In October 2018, Turkey joined the ADRC as its 31st member.
114

H.E. Mr. OKONOGI, Minister of State for Disaster Management, and H.E. Mr. Akdag, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of
Turkey(4) DRR Exchange with Chile and Peru
From February 27 to March 1, 2018, the Japan-Peru Public-Private Disaster Risk Reduction Seminar and theJapan-Chile Public-Private Disaster Risk Reduction Seminar were held in Peru (APEC Chair in 2017) and in Chile(APEC Chair in 2019), respectively. From Japan, the representatives of the Cabinet Office, Senior Research
Fellow at Tohoku University, and Japanese private companies (25 companies in Peru, and 18 companies in Chile)attended the seminars. The bilateral public-private exchange was promoted through sessions in which theparticipants shared Japan’s DRR policies, BCPs, and DRR technologies and know-how of Japanese companies.
Bilateral meetings were also held with Mr. Carranza, General Secretary of the National Institute of Civil Defense(INDECI), and Mr. TORO, National Director of the Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior(ONEMI), to exchange opinions on bilateral cooperation in disaster risk management.
(5) DRR Exchange with the Western Balkans
In the Western Balkans Cooperation Initiative announced by Prime Minister ABE in January 2018, DRR isdefined as the core of cooperation between Japan and the Western Balkans. In February 2019, the JapanWestern Balkans Conference on Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Sofia, the capital of the
Republic of Bulgaria. The Conference was attended by the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Kosovo, Republic of North Macedonia, and Republic ofAlbania. The discussion was focused on flood disasters, which happen especially frequently in the Western
Balkans.
4-3 Development of the Overseas Expansion Strategy in Disaster Risk Management
In the 40th Meeting on the Infrastructure Export and Economic Cooperation Strategy (chaired by H.E. Mr.
SUGA, Chief Cabinet Secretary) held in the Prime Minister’s Official Residence on December 17, 2018, themembers discussed the strategy and direction of overseas expansion in disaster risk management. The strategy
was developed based on the Infrastructure System Export Strategy (revised in FY2018).
The government ministries will collaborate with each other in promoting initiatives to ensure that Japan’s
technologies and know-how on infrastructure planning, development, and renovation and mitigation will bewell-understood and utilized across the globe for disaster prevention and mitigation.

115

Column:
USNS Mercy Visits the Port of Tokyo
In June 2018, the Cabinet Office invited hospital ship USNS Mercy, which conducts humanitarian assistanceand disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, to make a call at the Port of Tokyo. During the port call, various eventswere held, including a ship tour, bilateral HA/DR exercises for medical transportation, and a seminar and a
symposium for people involved in disaster medicine and disaster management, in order to makeopportunities for a wide range of people to learn from the response capability of Mercy against large-scaledisasters and widely disseminate information to Japanese citizens.
About 5,000 people applied for the ship tour on June 16, of which about 400 were able to join the tour.
On the following day, bilateral HA/DR exercises for medical transportation and a seminar were held on Mercy,
which were attended by about 100 Japanese people working in the fields of disaster medicine and disastermanagement. The exercises included the transportation of patients by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) helicopters and Japanese medical team to Mercy, as well as demonstrations by medical staff
on Mercy. Then, the Japanese participants and Mercy staff exchanged their opinions. These events weregreat opportunities to learn Mercy’s capability to respond to injured persons in large-scale disasters.
On June 19, a commemorative symposium was held with Japanese and U.S. participants. In this
symposium, the results of the foregoing seminar on the 17th were presented to the public and discussion
was held to gain insights into disaster medicine for large-scale disasters in Japan.
The above seminar and symposium were a great learning experience for Japanese participants working in
the disaster medicine and disaster management as they could directly see the scale of Mercy as a hospital,
the rich medical human resources, the patient transportation process, the clearly defined instruction order
structure for ship operation and medical activities, the relief supplies procurement process, and othervarious know-how specific to hospital ships.

116

USNS Mercy calling at the Port of Tokyo

Bilateral disaster medical transportation exercise

On-board surgical operation

Commemorative symposium

Section 5: Initiatives to Promote National Resilience
5-1 Approval of the Action Plan for National Resilience 2018
On June 5, 2018, the Action Plan for National Resilience 2018 (hereinafter “Action Plan 2018”) was approvedby the National Resilience Promotion Office. The Action Plan 2018 sought to enhance existing measures basedon the lessons learned from the July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain and subsequent typhoons, the eruptionof Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane (Mt. Motoshirane) in January 2018, and heavy snowfalls from January to February 2018.
It also sought to boost initiatives to broaden the base of national resilience by encouraging local governments
and the private sector to implement initiatives and raising awareness both within Japan and overseas.
The Action Plan also provides that the government would review the progress of the measures under theFundamental Plan for National Resilience when four years have passed since its establishment. The results of
the review will be reflected in the updated version of the Fundamental Plan in the fifth year.
5-2 Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience
The Fundamental Plan for National Resilience is unhindered by time based on the concept of “a far-sighted
national policy with an eye on the distant future (Chapter 1 of the Fundamental Plan),” but at the same time,
stipulates that the government is “reviewing the content once around every five years in consideration of thechanges in social and economic circumstances and the progress of the respective measures” (Chapter 4). The
Fundamental Plan was formulated in June 2014 and revised in FY2018, taking the opportunity of the fifth
anniversary of the Fundamental Plan.
In revising the Fundamental Plan, the government conducted a vulnerability assessment to determine thecurrent status and progress of the measures (programs) aimed at avoiding the worst-case scenarios, while also
determining and analyzing necessary improvement measures for each program and field using the flowchart
analysis method. In December 2018, the Cabinet approved the revised Fundamental Plan based on the resultsof the vulnerability assessment and lessons learned from the disasters that occurred after the assessment.
The key changes to the Fundamental Plan included the reflection of the insights gained through past disasters(such as maintaining a hygiene environment at shelters, a lesson learned from the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake,
during which the deterioration of the health condition of long-term evacuees was observed), revisions basedon the changes to the social situation (such as the promotion of innovations for national resilience using ICT),
prioritizing measures and programs (revising the 15 priority programs and selecting five new programs that areclosely related to the existing priority programs), and the formulation of the Three-Year Emergency Response
Plan, which describes goals, steps to be taken, and expenses of DRR measures (Fig. 5-2-1).

117

Fig. 5-2-1

Overview of the Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (December 2018)
Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (Overview)

Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (June 2014)
What is the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience?
・Provides the guiding principles for the planning of national resilience measures
・Prioritization of measures; effective promotion of both tangible and intangible measures; relevant combination of self-help, mutual support, and public support; utilization ofprivate funds
・Promotion of measures tailored to the characteristics of each region; use in pre-disaster times and in emergencies; implementation of the PDCA cycle

Five years have passed since the formulation.
1. Results of the vulnerability assessment (August 2018)〇Assess challenges (vulnerability) based on the changes in thesocial situation and the insights gained through the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake and other disasters〇Clarify the causal relationships leading to the worst-casescenario, using the flowchart analysis method

The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018, Typhoon Jebi (1821), and the
Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake had a great impact on people’s
lives and economic activities.

Emergency inspection of critical infrastructure (November 2018)(Flowchart analysis)〇Emergency inspections were conducted in relation to 132 items in order
to secure the functionality of critical infrastructure. The inspection
results and response measures were compiled and released.

2. Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (December 2018)(i) Revision based on the insights gained through past disasters
New principles were added based on the insights gained through past disasters, suchas:•Securing of good health and life conditions for evacuees•Flood control measures taking into account the influence of climate change•Diversification and risk dispersion of energy and information and communication
infrastructure(ii) Revision based on the changes in the social situation
Added new content based on the changes in the social situation, such as:•Promotion of the use of new technologies and innovations for national resilience•Fostering regional leaders and enhancement of disaster management education(iii) Especially important disaster measures will be continued, such as
infrastructure development, anti-seismic retrofitting and measures for aging
facilities, and promotion of BCPs.

(iv) Selection of 20 priority programs〇Re-organizing the 15 priority programs
Examples of added programs: [Poor living conditions in shelters; deterioration ofhealth condition of evacuees][Long-term water outages]〇Five new programs that were closely related to the existing priority programs
were added.
(v) Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention,
Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience〇In order to promote the priority programs referred to in (iv) above, the ThreeYear Emergency Response Plan specified goals, steps to be taken, and expenses
of especially urgent measures.

Source: Cabinet Secretariat website
Reference: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/kihon.html

5-3 Support for the Formulation of Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience
Local governments are in the process of formulating their relevant Fundamental Plan for Regional Resilience(hereinafter “Regional Plan”). As of April 1, 2019, 47 prefectures and 94 municipalities had already formulated
the Regional Plan while 92 municipalities were in the process of doing so (Fig. 5-3-1). Government officials held
briefings to support local governments in formulating the Regional Plan. In addition, 30 grants and subsidies
under the jurisdiction of relevant ministries and agencies are made available to help fund initiatives undertaken
by local governments based on their Regional Plan. Follow-up surveys are also conducted to ascertain theimplementation status of support provided via these ministries and agencies, and the results are informed to
local governments.

118

Fig. 5-3-1

The Formulation of the Fundamental Plan for Regional Resilience (Nationwide)
The Formulation of the Fundamental Plan for Regional Resilience in Prefectures
As of April 1, 2019

Prefectures
Hokkaido
Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Akita
Yamagata
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
Gunma
Saitama
Chiba
Tokyo
Kanagawa
NiigataToyamaIshikawa
Fukui
Yamanashi
NaganoGifu
Shizuoka
Aichi
Mie

Status of formulation of regional plan
Month and year
Month and year ofof formulation
most recent revision
Mar. 2015
Mar. 2018
Mar. 2017
Feb. 2016
Jun. 2017
Apr. 2017
Mar. 2017
Mar. 2016
May 2018
Jan. 2018
Feb. 2017
Feb. 2016
Mar. 2017
Mar. 2019
Mar. 2017
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2016
Mar. 2017
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2018
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2016
Oct. 2018
Dec. 2015
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2018
Mar. 2015
Apr. 2015
Aug. 2015
Mar. 2016
Jul. 2015

Prefectures
Shiga
Kyoto
Osaka
Hyogo
Nara
Wakayama
Tottori
Shimane
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Tokushima
KagawaEhime
Kochi
Fukuoka
Saga
Nagasaki
Kumamoto
Oita
MiyazakiKagoshima
Okinawa

Status of formulation of regional plan
Month and year
Month and year ofof formulation
most recent revisionDec. 2016
Nov. 2016
Mar. 2016
Jan. 2016
May 2016
Sep. 2015
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2019
Mar. 2016
Feb. 2016
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2015
Mar. 2018
Dec. 2015
Mar. 2016
Aug. 2015
Mar. 2016
Nov. 2015
Feb. 2019
Dec. 2015
Dec. 2017
Oct. 2017
Nov. 2015
Dec. 2016
Mar. 2016
Mar. 2019*All prefectures have formulated a Fundamental Plan for Regional Resilience.

Source: National Resilience Promotion Office, Cabinet Secretariat

5-4 Promotion of Private Sector Initiatives Contributing to National Resilience
Since FY2016, there has been a system under which companies and organizations actively implementing
business continuity initiatives are certified by third parties as an Organization Contributing to National
Resilience. The objective is to encourage private sector initiatives contributing to national resilience.
Meanwhile, in order to address a large-scale disaster, it is important to maximize the functionality of mutual
support in society as a whole, rather than focusing solely on the self-help efforts by individual companies. In
this view, a new system was established in July 2018 to certify Organizations Contributing to National Resiliencethat have made outstanding social contribution as Organizations Contributing to National Resilience (+ Mutual
Support). By the end of March 2019, a total of 162 organizations received the certification (of which 40
organizations have been certified as Organizations Contributing to National Resilience (+ Mutual Support)).

119

Chapter 2 Progress of Measures for Nuclear Disasters
Section 1: Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems
1-1 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System under Non-Emergency Conditions
In the case of a nuclear emergency, the resultant damage would be immense and extensive, so the whole
government must work together cohesively to develop and promote nuclear emergency response measures.
Accordingly, the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council has been established within the Cabinet Office topromote nuclear emergency preparedness measures by the government as a whole under non-emergency
conditions. The main role of this Council is to take national responsibility for verifying based on the Nuclear
Emergency Response Guidelines the concreteness and practicality of the emergency response plans drawn by
each Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, which is comprised of representatives of the Cabinet Officeand other related ministries and agencies and local governments. The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council
is chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, Cabinet Office
Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and the Chairman of the NRA as Vice Chairpersons,and all Ministers of State and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and others, serving
as Council Members (Fig. 1-1-1).
1-2 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System in an Emergency
In the event of a nuclear emergency involving the release of a large quantity of radioactive material, a Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters will be established. The main role of this headquarters will be to ascertain
the actual situation on the field and the extent of the damage and to take overall charge of coordinating related
national government organizations and local government bodies to ensure that emergency response measures
suited to the situation are implemented swiftly and accurately. The Prime Minister will serve as DirectorGeneral of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of theEnvironment, Cabinet Office Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and the Chairman of
the NRA as deputy directors-general, and all Ministers of State and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis
Management, among others, serving as regular members (Fig. 1-1-1).
In the Headquarters, the NRA holds primary responsibility for decisions on technical and specialized matters(urgent area), while matters relating to the procurement of equipment and supplies required to deal with thenuclear facilities and all matters associated with the response outside the facilities (off-site) are handled by the
related ministries and agencies, based on the directions of the director-general (the Prime Minister). The
organization headed by the Cabinet Office Director-General for Nuclear Disaster Management that was
launched on October 14, 2014, will serve as the Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.
Moreover, the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction was revised in July 2015 to enhance the system for
dealing with a complex disaster. This revision put in place a cooperation framework that will, in the event of acomplex disaster, enable the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters (which deals with natural disasters)
and the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (which deals with nuclear emergencies) to undertake
integrated information gathering, decision-making, and direction and coordination (Figs. 1-2-1 and 1-2-2).
In addition, the 2018 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, which was held on August 25
and 26, 2018, was based on the scenario of a complex disaster involving a combination of a natural disasterand a nuclear disaster. The exercise included decision making concerning the evacuation of residents according120

to the development of the situation as well as field drills (see Section 4).

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems under Emergency and Non-emergency Conditions

Fig. 1-1-1

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems under Emergency and Non-emergency Conditions
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council
Normalcircumstances* Permanent(Article 3-3 of the Atomic Energy Basic Act)○ Comprehensive, everyday coordination of nuclear DRR, such as promoting the implementation of policies based on the Nuclear
Emergency Response Guidelines○ Comprehensive coordination of long-term initiatives after an accident[Council Composition]
Chairperson: Prime Minister
Vice Chairperson: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
Nuclear Regulation Authority Chairman, etc.
Council Members: All Ministers of State, Cabinet Office State Ministers & Parliamentary Vice-Ministers,
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management[Secretariat Structure]
Secretariat Director: Minister of the Environment
Secretariat Deputy Director: Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Environmental Management Bureau Director General

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters(Article 16 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness)

Emergency
situation* To be temporarily established when a Declaration of a Nuclear
Emergency Situation has been issued.

○ Comprehensive coordination of emergency situation and response measures related to nuclear emergencies, and nuclear
emergency post-incident measures[Council Composition]
Director-General: Prime Minister
Deputy Director-General: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
Nuclear Regulation Authority Chairman, etc.
Members: All Ministers of State, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management,
Others appointed by the Prime Minister: Cabinet Office State Ministers & Parliamentary Vice-Ministers, etc.
[Secretariat Structure]
Secretariat Director: Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Secretariat Director Alternate: Deputy Secretary-General of the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA),
Cabinet Office Deputy Director General for Nuclear Emergency
Secretariat Deputy Director: Cabinet Secretariat Councilor for Crisis Management, Cabinet Office Deputy Director General for Disaster Management(Note 1) The Cabinet Office State Minister or Parliamentary Vice-Minister (concurrently nominated as the State Minister/Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Environment)
will be the Director of On-site Headquarters for Emergency Response(Note 2) Ministry of the Environment State Ministers & Parliamentary Vice-Ministers other than those responsible for dealing with nuclear emergency preparedness will
also be appointed, if necessary

Source: Cabinet Office

Fig. 1-2-1

Crisis Management System in Nuclear Emergencies

Crisis Management System in Nuclear Emergencies[National<<Prime Minister’s
Government]
Office>>Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters* Report on situations
as required.

Director-General:
Prime Minister
Deputy Director-General: Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment,

Minister of State for the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
Nuclear Regulation Authority Chairman, etc.
Members: All Ministers of State, Cabinet Office State Ministers/Parliamentary ViceMinisters, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, etc.

Prime Minister’s Office Team at the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters Secretariat

Cabinet Office Director General for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Secretariat
Director), key personnel of the Cabinet Office and Secretariat of the NRA<< Secretariat of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority’s ERC>>

Director-General of the NRA
Key personnel of the Cabinet Office and Secretariat of the NRA[Urgent area]

Relatedministries andagencies<<Off-site responses>><<On-side responses>>
Coordination

Disastermanagement
Collaboration
support base at thenuclear site

Rapid response center at nuclear
facilities(Main office of the nuclear operator)
Officers of the Secretariat of the NRA(Example: J-VILLAGE)
SDF, etc.

Coordination andcollaboration

Nuclear Regulation
Authority

ERC Team at the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters Secretariat

Specialized/
technologicalknowledge

Supervision and support of
the nuclear operator

Nuclear operator(Restoration from the accident at theplant)

On-site disastermanagement headquarters(Off-site center)
Director-general: Cabinet OfficeState Minister (or ParliamentaryVice-Minister),
Deputy Director General for
Nuclear Emergency, etc.

Coordination

Collaboration

Local
government<<Joint Disaster Management Council>>
Evacuation instruction and support
for residents

Outside the nuclear plant(Protection of residents)

Source: Cabinet Office121

Fig. 1-2-2

Illustration of Responses by Both Headquarters in the Event of a Major Complex
Disaster

Source: Cabinet OfficeSection 2: Bolstering Nuclear Disaster Management and Radiation Monitoring
Under the NRA
It is absolutely vital to implement ongoing initiatives to ensure trust in the administration of nuclear energy
regulation, taking into account the lessons from the accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is tackling various policy challenges,
based on its guiding principles of independent decision making, effective actions, open and transparent
organization, improvement and commitment, and emergency response, in order to fulfill its mission ofprotecting the general public and the environment through rigorous and reliable regulation for nuclear power.
2-1 Initiatives in Nuclear Disaster Management
The NRA strives to enhance the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines by actively incorporating the latest
international knowledge, in order to ensure that the optimal judgment criteria are used in formulating disastermanagement plans at all times. On July 25, 2018, the NRA revised the Guidelines to add a provision on theestablishment of the Core Advanced Radiation Emergency Medical Support Center, with the objective of
nuclear emergency response consistent with the international standards. In addition, the Facility Requirements
to Medical Institutions for Nuclear Emergency were also revised on the same day. In March 2019, the National
Institutes for Quantum and Radiological Science and Technology was designated as a Core Advanced Radiation
Emergency Medical Support Center (Reference: https://www.qst.go.jp/).
In October 2018, the NRA published the Reference dose to be referred in formulating proactive nuclear
emergency response program (Reference: http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/bousai/measure/index.html).
Steady progress is being made in developing a medical care system for nuclear emergency, and support for
designation of Nuclear Emergency Core Hospitals.

1222-2 Emergency Response Initiatives
The NRA established the “Rules on Nomination of Staff to be Engaged in Emergency Response Operations”
on October 1, 2018, in order to facilitate smooth implementation of emergency response operations based on
nuclear emergency response manuals. With that, the NRA clarified the duties of emergency response staff at
normal times and in emergencies and nominated staff members to carry out clearly defined emergency
response duties.
The NRA also participated in the Emergency Drills by Nuclear Operators, as in FY2017, seeking further
improvement of emergency preparedness and response such as a smoother approach to sharing information
with the plant team of the NRA’s Emergency Response Center (ERC) and immediate situational response centers
for nuclear facilities.
In addition, at the Debriefing Session of Emergency Drills by Nuclear Operators in FY2018, the NRA reported
the evaluation results for the Emergency Drills by Nuclear Operators in commercial power reactor facilities. For
nuclear fuel facilities, the NRA decided to apply evaluation similar to that for commercial power reactors on a
trial basis, to develop performance indicators for nuclear fuel facilities taking into account the results of thetrial operation, and to start full implementation when the Emergency Drills by Nuclear Operators in FY2018 are
conducted. Furthermore, on the basis of the results of the Emergency Drills in FY2017, the Training Scenario
Development Working Group set up under the Debriefing Session of Emergency Drills by Nuclear Operators
examined the implementation plan for FY2018 and developed scenarios, conducted these Drills, and evaluatedthe results. In FY2018, the Nuclear Operators conducted this implementation plan for commanders judging theability at three nuclear operators and courses for response capabilities at two nuclear operators.
2-3 Emergency Radiation Monitoring Initiatives
To conduct effective emergency monitoring in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines,
the NRA established emergency monitoring centers in all areas in which nuclear power reactor facilities arelocated. The NRA has maintained necessary equipment and materials at each emergency monitoring center inorder to secure their functionality in the event of a nuclear disaster. It also intends to enforce and reinforce theemergency monitoring systems by deploying personnel in charge of radiation monitoring at the NRA office.
Following the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, there were disruptions to the operation of monitoring
posts and signal transmission, which were necessary for emergency protective measures against nuclear
disasters. These disruptions were caused by a power outage. Therefore, the NRA conducted inspections on the
power sources of prefecture-owned monitoring posts, the composition of the communication equipment
system, and the status of installation of alternative monitoring posts that can be used in the case of a long-term
power outage. The NRA decided to improve monitoring posts with problems, using measures for securingmultiple power sources and communication means, such as installing emergency power generators or portable
monitoring posts and introducing various communication means, in order to maintain the monitoring functionin the event of a disaster (Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation,
and Building National Resilience (Cabinet decision on December 14, 2018)).
2-4 Accidents and Failures
The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material, and Reactors requires nuclear
licensees, etc. to report accidents and failures that occur at nuclear power facilities to the NRA, while the Act
on Prevention of Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc. requires permission or notification users, etc. toreport accidents and failures that occur at radio isotope facilities. Of the reports received in FY2018, five camefrom nuclear licensees, etc. and seven from permission or notification users, etc.
123Section 3: Enhancing and Strengthening Local Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Systems
3-1 Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction / Evacuation Plans
Under the Basic Act on Disaster Management, local governments must prepare Local Plans for Disaster Risk
Reduction with Nuclear Emergency Response Measures (hereinafter “Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction”)
that set out the basic response to be adopted by prefectures and municipalities in dealing with a nuclear
emergency.
Currently, related local governments within a radius of around 30km of a nuclear power plant are preparing
Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction based on the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Nuclear
Emergency Response Guidelines (Fig. 3-1-1). Ensuring that the content of Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction
is highly specific and effective is crucial, so the government provides proactive support regarding measures totackle issues that are difficult for local governments alone to resolve in developing more specific Evacuation
Plans and measures to assist persons requiring special care.
Fig. 3-1-1

Status of Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction / Evacuation Plans (as of March 31, 2019)

Tomari region
Higashidori region
Onagawa region

13
5
7

Number of Local Plans
for Disaster Risk
Reduction Formulated
13
5
7

Fukushima region*

13

11

9

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
region999Tokai region

14

13

3

Hamaoka region

11

11

7

Shika region
Fukui area
Shimane region
Ikata region
Genkai region
Sendai region
Total for the 13
regions

9
23
6
8
8
9

9
23
6
8
8
9

9
23
6
8
8
9

135

132

116

Municipalities
Concerned

Number of
Evacuation Plans
Formulated
13
57Remarks

In December 2016, Fukushima Prefecture revised the
Fukushima Prefecture Region-wide Evacuation Plan inCase of Nuclear Emergency.

In March 2015, Ibaraki Prefecture formulated the Plan
for Region-wide Evacuation in Ibaraki Prefecture inCase of a Nuclear Emergency.
In March 2017, Shizuoka Prefecture revised the Plan
for Region-wide Evacuation in Case of a Nuclear
Emergency in the Hamaoka region.

Note: * Readers should be aware that Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which is a Specified Nuclear Facility,
is located in the Fukushima region and that the area around it is an evacuation instruction area.

Source: Cabinet Office

In March 2015, the Cabinet Office established Local Nuclear Disaster Management Councils (hereinafter“Management Councils”) to serve as working teams for resolving issues in areas where nuclear power plants
are located. Its aim in doing so was to support efforts to flesh out and enhance the content of the Local Plans
for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans formulated by prefectures and municipalities in accordancewith “Future Responses to Enhancing Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction” (approved by the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Council in September 2013). The Cabinet Office also established working groups
reporting to these Management Councils. The working groups in each region are considering support andregion-wide coordination in the formulation of Evacuation Plans, and the assistance provided by national
frontline response organizations, while the national government and related local governments are working
124

together to develop more specific, enhanced Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans (Fig.
3-1-2).
Areas where more specific, enhanced Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans have beendeveloped must summarize their emergency response including evacuation plans and have it confirmed by theManagement Councils, to ensure that it is specific and rational. The Cabinet Office then reports the councils’
findings to the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council, to seek the Council’s approval. A PDCA review cycle
is introduced for regions whose emergency response has been confirmed: in addition to support for enhancing
the emergency response and making it more specific, followed by confirmed of the emergency response (Plan),a drill is carried out by the Management Council based on the confirmed emergency response (Do), areas for
improvement are identified from the outcomes of the drill (Confirm), and the emergency response of the region
in question is improved on the basis of those areas for improvement (Action). Thus, the local nuclear emergency
preparedness system goes through an ongoing process of enhancement and strengthening.
Fig. 3-1-2

Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans
Formulating and Supporting Local Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans<National Government>
National Disaster
Prevention Council
Basic Plan for Disaster
Risk Reduction
Prescribes things to be done by
the central government, local
governments, and nuclear
operators, etc.
*Basic Act on Disaster Management

Nuclear Regulation
Authority
Nuclear Emergency
Response Guidelines
Prescribes specialist/technicalmatters concerning nuclear
emergency response measures* Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness<Prefectures &Municipalities>
Prefectural & Municipal
Disaster Management
Councils
Local Plan for Disaster Risk
Reduction & Evacuation Plan
Prepared by related local
governments well-acquainted withthe local situation, in accordancewith the Nuclear Emergency
Response Guidelines and the Basic
Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction*Basic Act on Disaster Management* Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness

Local Nuclear Disaster Management
Council

Nuclear Emergency

Preparedness Council
 Established by the Cabinet Office for* Atomic Energy Basic Act
each of the 13 areas where nuclear
power stations are located• Members include theReported whole Cabinet and the Members include the Cabinet&
Office, NRA Secretariat, and all
Chairman of the NRA
other relevant national ministries & Approved (Chairman: Prime
agencies, and relevant local
Minister)governments that draw up plans• Grants government
 Collates the emergency responses
approval for emergency
drawn up by each region, including
responses, including
the Evacuation Plans of each local
regional Evacuation Plans,
government, and then checks
confirming that they are
whether they are sufficiently
sufficiently specific andspecific and rational in light of therational in light of the
Nuclear Emergency Response
Nuclear Emergency
Guidelines, etc.
Response Guidelines, etc.
* Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction based on the
Basic Act on Disaster Management

SupportSupportCabinet Office(departments responsible for nuclear emergency preparedness)

Secretariat

Central government support for local governments
Financial support for protective equipment and other materials and equipment<Specifics of central government support for local governments>• The central government is closely involved from the outset of plan formulation and takes the lead in providing local governments with full
support, working with them to resolve local issues such as finding evacuation sites, securing means of evacuation, and establishingevacuation routes, including for persons requiring special care
• Government grants help to support the procurement of the materials and equipment required in an emergency• The government also provides support at the national level in such areas as requesting the cooperation of relevant nongovernmentalorganizations• The government provides ongoing support and checks of the formulated plans, to ensure a process of continuous improvement that also
takes into account the outcomes of drills and the like

Source: Cabinet Office

In FY2018, the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council amended the Genkai Region Emergency
Response in its 2nd meeting, while the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council amended the Ikata
Region Emergency Response in its 3rd meeting (Fig. 3-1-3).

125

Fig. 3-1-3

Status of Collated Emergency Response

Status of Collated Emergency Responses

The Local Nuclear Disaster Management Councils formulated the emergency responses in each region, including Sendai,
Ikata, Takahama, Tomari, Genkai and Ohi (six regions). Lessons from the outcomes of nuclear disaster drills in various
regions will be collected and used to further reinforce the emergency responses in the future.
The NRA will work closely with local governments in other regions to finalize their emergency responses.

Tomari region…Regions whose emergency response was finalized. September 2016
(October 2016)
Red letter…Date of the Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council Revised in(Blue letter)…Date of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council
December 2017

Higashidori region

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa region
Fukui area
Takahama
regionOhi
regionDecember 2015
(December 2015)
Revised in October
2017

October 2017
(October 2017)

MihamaregionOnagawa region

Shiga region
TsurugaregionFukushima region

Shimane region

Tokai region

Genkai region

November 2016 (December 2016)
Revised in January 2019

Sendai region
September 2014 (September 2014)
Revised in March 2018

Hamaoka region
Ikata region
August 2015 (October 2015)
Revised in July 2016
Revised in February 2019

Source: Cabinet Office

A subcommittee will be set up in each of the Tsuruga, Mihama, Ohi and Takahama regions in the Fukui area
to discuss how best to solve issues specific to each region.
(1) Genkai region
The Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council reviewed the Genkai Region Emergency Response
in November 2018, and reported the results of the review and approved said Emergency Response in December
2018. In September 2017, a National Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise was held in orderto verify the effectiveness of the above Emergency Response. Subsequently, in order to further concretize andenhance the Emergency Response based on the lessons learned from the exercise pointed out in the Report on
the Report on the Findings from the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise that came out inMarch 2018, the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council amended the Genkai Region Emergency
Response in its second meeting on January 9, 2019.
Reference: https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/keikaku/02_genkai.html
The key changes to the Genkai Region Emergency Response are as follows:(i) Clarification of the bus evacuation routes for people who need special care in the event of a site area
emergency;(ii) Designation of multiple transfer airports for the emergency delivery of personnel and relief supplies by thenational government;(iii) Concretization of the ideas of response measures in a scenario where indoor evacuation becomes
impossible due to a complex disaster involving an earthquake, etc.; and(iv) Enhancement of evacuation monitoring measures and traffic congestion measures using the video
transmission system of helicopters.
Other changes included: (1) clarification of response measures for tourists and temporary visitors; (2)enhancement of the medical system in the case of a nuclear disaster; (3) increasing the stock of stable iodine
126

agents; and (4) clarification of response measures for Unit 1 of the Genkai Nuclear Power Plant, for which a
decommissioning plan pursuant to the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors has been approved and which is subject to the scope of the public notice on fuel cooling (thosespecified by the NRA in the public notice as nuclear power generation facilities in which irradiated fuelassemblies have been cooled for a sufficient period of time).
At the second meeting of the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, Saga, Nagasaki, andFukuoka Prefectures shared a view that there would be neither end to nuclear disaster preparedness efforts
nor such thing as a perfect nuclear disaster preparedness plan, while other participants pointed out the needfor establishing a collaborative system to ensure smooth evacuation in the event of a complex disaster. The
Local Council also announced its intention to continue the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear
disaster preparedness measures by conducting exercises based on the amended Emergency Response, while
also striving to promote the public understanding for nuclear disaster preparedness through drills anddistribution of booklets. The national government announced its intention to continue to conduct exercises
under cooperation with the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, while also working with therelevant local governments in further concretizing and enhancing the Genkai Region Emergency Response,
keeping in mind the results of the drills. Through the above process, the Genkai Local Nuclear Disaster
Management Council confirmed in its meeting that the above amendment was aimed at the further
concretization and enhancement of the Emergency Response based on the lessons learned through theComprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercises in FY2017.
(2) Ikata region
In the Ikata region, the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council finalized the Ikata Region
Emergency Response in August 2015; the report confirming the final outcome was submitted to and approvedby the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council in October that year. In November the same year, a National
Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise was held to verify the effectiveness of the Emergency
Response. In July 2016, the Ikata Region Emergency Response was amended based on the lessons learned
through the exercise. Subsequently, in order to further enhance the effectiveness of the Emergency Response,
Ehime Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercises were held in September and November 2016,
November 2017, and October 2018. The Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council amended the Ikata
Region Emergency Response in its third meeting held on February 12, 2019 in order to further concretize andenhance the Emergency Response based on the lessons learned through the above exercises.
Reference: https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/keikaku/02_ikata.html
The key changes to the Ikata Region Emergency Response are as follows:(i) Enhancement of the system to collect information on evacuation routes using drones in the PAZ(Precautionary Action Zones: Areas where precautionary measures are in place; within a radius ofapproximately 5 km from the nuclear power generation facility) and PEA (Precautionary Evacuation Areas:
Areas in which evacuation and other protective measures similar to those for PAZ are in place);(ii) Development of an information sharing system with Oita Prefecture, which is a potential marine evacuation
destination for the residents of the PEAs;(iii) Clarification of marine and air evacuation routes, destinations, and means for when land evacuation fromthe PEAs is difficult; and(iv) Clarification of protective measures in the event of a complex disaster involving a typhoon, earthquake, etc.
127

Other changes included: (1) enhancement of the capability of temporary disaster information broadcastingstations for communicating information to the residents; (2) enhancement of the medical system in the case of
a nuclear disaster; (3) increasing the stock of stable iodine agents; and (4) clarification response measures for
Unit 1 of the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant, for which a decommissioning plan pursuant to the Act on the Regulationof Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors has been approved and which is subject to thescope of the public notice on fuel cooling.
At the third meeting of the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, the members shared anunderstanding that there would be no end to nuclear disaster preparedness efforts. Ehime Prefectureannounced that it would create an educational DVD on region-wide evacuation for use in seminars andstreaming to promote the understanding of the residents, while also promoting more practical exercises andthe use of drones. In addition, Ehime, Yamaguchi, and Oita Prefectures expressed their intention to work with
relevant municipalities and disaster prevention organizations in enhancing and strengthening nuclear disaster
preparedness measures. The national government announced its intention to continue to conduct exercises
under cooperation with the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council, while also working with therelevant local governments in further concretizing and enhancing the Ikata Region Emergency Response,
keeping in mind the results of the drills.
Through the above process, the Ikata Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council confirmed in its meetingthat the above amendment was aimed at the further concretization and enhancement of the Emergency
Response based on the lessons learned through the Ehime Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercises.

128

3-2 Support and Initiatives for Other Prefectures(1) Stockpiling and Distribution of a Stable Iodine Agent in Jelly Form
Stable iodine agents in pill form are not suitable for infants and young children (aged under three) because
their swallowing ability is not fully developed by that stage. In an emergency, a pharmacist or other trained
person has to administer a powdered stable iodine agent dissolved in syrup. For this reason, agents suitable forsuch children could not be distributed in advance, which had been a major issue.
In March 2016, the manufacturer of the pills developed a prepackaged product consisting of the active
ingredient (potassium iodide) dissolved in a jelly. Accordingly, local governments in the PAZ and UPZ (Urgent
Protective Action Planning Zone: Areas in which urgent protective measures are in place; within a radius ofapproximately 5 to 30 km from the nuclear power generation facility) stockpiled stable iodine agents in jelly
form and distributed them to residents in advance with financial support by the national government. The
necessary amount had been stocked by the end of FY2018 (Fig. 3-2-1).
In addition, the manufacturer announced that the expiration of potassium iodide pills (50 mg) shipped from
April 1, 2019 onward would be extended from three years to five years.
Fig. 3-2-1

Stable iodine agent in jelly form
Potassium Iodine Oral Jelly 16.3mg, Nichi-Iko

Potassium Iodine Oral Jelly 32.5mg, Nichi-Iko[Usage and dosage]
Potassium iodine should be administered orally. The usual dosage is
100 mg/time for individuals aged 13 or over; 50 mg/time for children
aged at least 3 but under 13; 32.5 g/time for infants aged at least 1
month but under 3; and 16.3 mg for newborn infants.
Source: Provided by the pharmaceutical manufacturer(2) Designation of Off-site Centers
Under Article 12 (1) of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Prime
Minister is required to designate an emergency response base facility (known as “an off-site center”) for eachnuclear site, for the coordination of emergency response measures (Fig. 3-2-2).
The requirements that off-site centers must satisfy are prescribed in the Cabinet Office Ordinance on Offsite Centers Pursuant to the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Based on129the lessons from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the siting requirements for the offsite centers of commercial power reactors were revised in September 2012 to be within a radius of 5 - 30 km
from the power station in principle (i.e. within the UPZ).
Since the former Onagawa Off-site Center had been damaged by tsunamis in the Great East Japan Earthquake,a Fire Academy in Sendai City had been designated as a temporary off-site center for the Onagawa region, but
a new site was decided in Onagawa Town and construction of a new off-site center started in FY2017.

Fig. 3-2-2

Off-site Centers across Japan (as of March 31, 2019)

Fukui

Source: Cabinet Office(3) Enhancing Nuclear Emergency Response Measures
At a meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Council for Nuclear Power in March 2016, a document concerning
nuclear energy policy, entitled the “Stance on Enhancing Nuclear Emergency Response Measures,” was put
together at the request of the National Governors’ Association, in response to calls from local governments incharge of local resilience. The Committee of Related Ministries and Agencies on Nuclear Emergency Response
Measures was convened in April 2016 to facilitate a government-wide effort to enhance nuclear emergency
response measures in light of this stance. At this meeting, committee members decided to establish
subcommittees focused on three themes: cooperation between front-line response units (No. 1 Subcommittee),cooperation between private sector business operators (No. 2 Subcommittee), and approaches to the provisionof information, including diffusion calculations (No. 3 Subcommittee). Each subcommittee was engaged inprofessional and practical deliberations that take into account the views of local governments while cooperatingwith related ministries and agencies. The outcomes were reported at the Inter-Ministerial Council for Nuclear
Power, etc. (Fig. 3-2-3)

130

Fig. 3-2-3

Key Points of Study Results at the Subcommittee for Enhancing Nuclear Emergency
Response Measures(1) If the risk of fatalities directly caused
by natural disasters (earthquakes,
tsunamis, heavy snowfall) is extremely
high, evacuation actions for natural
disasters will be prioritized over thatfor nuclear disasters.

Source: Cabinet Office

3-3 Training and Seminars on Regional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness(1) Support for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Drills Conducted by Local Governments
Under the Basic Act on Disaster Management, etc., local governments are required to hold a nuclear
emergency preparedness drill on a regular basis. Drills organized by related prefectural governments are carriedout with the participation of prefectural governors and local governments, as well as national and regional
front-line response organizations, namely the police, firefighters, the Japan Coast Guard, and the Self-Defense
Forces. They include exercises in evacuating local citizens and conducting inspections when evacuating each131

area (Fig. 3-3-1).
In regions where the Local Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plan have been enhanced andmade more specific, each Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council provides the necessary support in suchareas as planning and implementing the drills, promoting the widespread use of evaluation methods, andoperating the PDCA cycle via the drills, with the goal of verifying the specificity and effectiveness of the Local
Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plan.
The Cabinet Office formulated the Guidance for Planning, Implementing and Evaluating Emergency
Preparedness Drills in March 2018 as basic guidance for the prefectures which operate the entire drills fromplanning, implementation to evaluation.
Reference: https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/kunren/kunren.html
Fig. 3-3-1

Nuclear Emergency Response Exercises Held by Local Governments in FY2018

RegionTomari
Higashidori
Onagawa
Fukushima
Shika

Fukui

Hamaoka
Shimane
Ikata
GenkaiSendaiName of Drill
Hokkaido Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Aomori Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Miyagi Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Fukushima Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Ishikawa Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Toyama Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(i) Fukui Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(ii) Kyoto Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise(iii) Shiga Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise((i) to (iii) are conducted as part of the National Comprehensive
Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise)(iv) Gifu Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Shizuoka Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Shimane Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Tottori Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Ehime Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Yamaguchi Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Saga Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Nagasaki Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Fukuoka Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
Kagoshima Prefecture Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise

Date
October 22, 2018 and February 4, 2019
November 10 and 11, 2018
January 24, 2019
January 21 and 26, 2019
November 11, 2018(i) - (iii) August 25 and 26, 2018(iv) November 25, 2018

February 5 and 6, 2019
October 26 and 30, 2018
October 12, 2018
February 2, 2019
February 9, 2019

Source: Cabinet Office(2) Training for Staff of the National and Local Governments and Front-line Response Organizations(Training Programs by the National Government)
The Cabinet Office has organized training of key nuclear emergency response personnel and tabletop
exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. The objective of these initiatives was to provide local
governments and other disaster response personnel with an understanding of approaches to protection
measures in the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines and to improve their ability to respond in the eventof a nuclear emergency.
The new programs that started in FY2018 included the Core Personnel Training aimed at promoting theunderstanding of the core roles among the nuclear emergency response personnel concerning themanagement of the national headquarters according to the development of the situation of a nuclear disaster,and the Practical Capacity Building Training aimed at improving various skills that are necessary for smoothly
conducting resident evacuation in the event of a nuclear disaster, such as skills for formulating implementationplans.
(i) Training of key nuclear emergency response personnel
Training is provided to key disaster response personnel at local governments who deal with nuclear
132

emergency preparedness, to teach them basic knowledge required for nuclear emergency management. The
course covers legislation concerning nuclear emergency preparedness, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Guidelines, and lessons from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. These training sessions
were held on 36 occasions in FY2018. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
∙ Overview of legislation concerning nuclear emergency preparedness (classroom learning)∙ Approaches to radiation protection in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Response Guidelines(classroom learning)∙ Lessons from the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (classroom learning), etc.
(ii) Tabletop Exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Tabletop Exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters are organized for key disaster response
personnel at the national and local governments who deal with nuclear emergency preparedness, to provide
them with the ability to respond in the event of an emergency and also to review and improve the Local Plans
for Disaster Risk Reduction and Evacuation Plans formulated by local governments. These exercises were heldon 10 occasions in FY2018. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
∙ Activities at off-site centers (classroom learning)∙ Exercises focused on challenges specific to each functional team
∙ Tabletop exercise based on scenarios, etc.
(iii) Core Personnel Training
The Core Personnel Training is conducted for those who play leading roles among key disaster response
personnel at the national and local governments, with an aim to equip them with necessary knowledge andskills. The training was conducted on a pilot basis in FY2018. After that, two rounds of the training were held,
bearing in mind the opinions and requests heard after the pilot training program. The main topics covered in
the training are as follows.
・Emergency situation concerning power generation reactors (lecture)・Nuclear emergency and health hazards (lecture)・Protective measures against nuclear emergencies (lecture)
・Tabletop exercise(iv) Practical Capacity Building Traininga. Inspection of evacuation and relocation areas, etc.
The Practical Capacity Building Training was conducted for local government employees in charge ofdeveloping plans for temporary decontamination and inspection of evacuation and relocation areas, in orderto strengthen their skills to formulate specific plans, manuals, etc. This training was held seven times in FY2018.
The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
・Basic principles for the inspection of evacuation and relocation areas (lecture)
・Exercise concerning the planning of the inspection of evacuation and relocation areas
b. Evacuation by bus
The Practical Capacity Building Training was conducted for local government employees in charge of planningevacuation by bus, in order to strengthen their skills to formulate specific bus evacuation plans, manuals, etc.
This training was held twice on a trial basis in FY2018. The main topics covered in the training are as follows.
・Challenges concerning bus resident evacuation following the Fukushima nuclear disaster; planning skills
required to solve the challenges (lecture)133

・Status of preparation of a bus evacuation plan in each prefecture(Training Programs by Local Governments)
From FY2018, each prefecture took initiative in planning and implementing the training for disaster response
personnel and basic training in nuclear emergency preparedness, with support from the Cabinet Office asnecessary.
(i) Training for disaster response personnel
Training was provided for disaster response personnel including the employees of private business operators
who carry out activities to protect local citizens from radiation in the event of a nuclear emergency. As well as
providing them with the basic knowledge required for radiation protection, this course teaches them about thebasic approach to protecting citizens from radiation and the sequence of protective activities.
(ii) Basic training in nuclear emergency preparedness
Basic training in nuclear emergency preparedness was provided to key disaster response personnel at local
governments who deal with nuclear emergency preparedness, to teach them the basic knowledge required forradiation protection.

Lecture(Training of key nuclear emergency response personnel)

Exercise(Tabletop Exercises for Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters)

Exercise(Core Personnel Training)

Exercise(Practical Capacity Building Training: Inspection ofevacuation and relocation areas, etc.)1343-4 Strengthening International Partnerships
International organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various countries
undertake initiatives concerning off-site nuclear emergency preparedness. Such advanced knowledge isrequired to raise the standard of Japan’s own nuclear emergency preparedness.
Accordingly, the government has sought to share its knowledge and experience of nuclear emergency
preparedness with other countries by such means as strengthening cooperative frameworks with authorities
responsible for nuclear emergency preparedness in other countries, conducting regular exchanges of opinionswith them, and mutual invitation to exercises. In addition, Japan conducts surveys of the IAEA’s standards
regarding off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and the systems/management of major countries engaging
in nuclear power generation.
(1) Cooperation Focused on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Systems(i) Cooperation with the U.S.
Japan is deepening its partnership with the U.S. in the area of nuclear emergency management systems via
reciprocal invitations to exercises and regular exchanges of opinions with such bodies as the Department ofEnergy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC), based on the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation framework established in2012 under the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG).
Specifically, Japan participated in the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference held in
Washington, the United States in April 2018 to make a presentation on Japan’s Comprehensive Nuclear
Emergency Response Exercises and join the panel discussion. In August 2018, Japan shared the EMWG’s
initiatives and the roadmap for the future at the fifth meeting of the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil
Nuclear Cooperation. In the same month, Japan invited officials from the U.S. to observe the Comprehensive
Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise held to verify systems for responding to a nuclear emergency at Kansai
Electric Power Company’s Ohi and Takahama Nuclear Power Stations. After the exercise, representatives of thetwo countries held an exchange of views.
(ii) Cooperation with France
The Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Cabinet Office of Japanand the Director-General for Civil Security and Crisis Management, Ministry of the Interior of France on
Emergency Management related to Nuclear Accidents was signed in 2015. Based on this memorandum, theCabinet Office is pursuing closer collaboration with the French Ministry of the Interior and other relevant Frenchorganizations in the area of nuclear disaster preparedness through regular opinion exchange and reciprocal
invitations to exercises. Specifically, Mr. ITO, then State-Minister of Cabinet Office, visited the Ministry of theInterior of France in May 2018 to exchange views on the efforts for the enhancement of emergency responseplans in the two countries based on the lessons learned from the nuclear disaster at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant.
(iii) Other international cooperation
Japan has also engaged in exchanges of opinions with and issued reciprocal invitations to observe exercises
to international organizations such as the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA), as well as countries including Germany, China, and Lithuania.
Specifically, then State-Minister of Cabinet Office Ito visited the OECD/NEA in May 2018 to exchange opinions
on the enhancement and strengthening of nuclear disaster preparedness in Japan.
135

Opinion exchange with the IAEA

In addition, Japan invited 18 representatives of international organizations and nuclear emergency
preparedness organizations in various countries to observe the Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response
Exercise held at Ohi and Takahama Nuclear Power Stations. Members of the delegations spent three days in
the area, where they observed the evacuation of residents and the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency
Situation from the Prime Minister.
(2) Surveys of International Standards, etc.
December 2015 saw the first meeting of the IAEA’s new Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards
Committee (EPReSC), which has been held on a regular basis since then to examine the IAEA’s standards
regarding off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and the systems/management of major countries engaging
in nuclear power generation. The Cabinet Office attended the meeting (the 6th meeting from June 12 to 14,
2018 and the 7th meeting from October 30 to November 1, 2018), and participated in discussions with experts
from the IAEA and other member countries.

Section 4: 2018 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
4-1 Overview of Exercise(1) Positioning and Objectives
The Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise is a joint exercise involving the national
government, local governments, and nuclear operators, in accordance with the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Based on the scenario of a nuclear emergency, it aims to verify
systems for responding to such an emergency. The 2018 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise
was held at the Ohi and Takahama Nuclear Power Stations with the objectives as listed below (Reference:https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/kunren/h30sg.html).
∙ To confirm the effectiveness of the disaster preparedness systems of the national government, local
governments, and nuclear operators, and the cooperative frameworks of related organizations∙ To confirm national and local systems and procedures specified in manuals for responding to a nuclear
Emergency∙ To verify the Evacuation Plan based on the Ohi Region Emergency Response and the Takahama Region
Emergency Response (Fig. 4-1-1)
136

∙ To identify lessons from the outcomes of the exercise and improve emergency responses∙ To enhance the skills of key personnel involved in nuclear emergency response measures and promote public
understanding of nuclear emergency preparedness

Fig. 4-1-1

Priority Zones for Nuclear Emergency Response in the Ohi and Takahama Regions
Enlarged PAZ map
Areas in which evacuation is conductedin the same manner as the PAZ

UPZ (Ohi)

UPZ (Takahama)

Ine
Town
MiyazuCity

Takahama
Power Station

Ohi Power
StationTsurugaCity

PAZ (Ohi)
MihamaTown

PAZ (Takahama)

WakasaTown

MiyazuCity

Fukuchiyama
City

MaizuruCity

Takahama
Town
Ayabe
City

Obama
City
Ohi
Town

Takashima
City

NantanCity
Kyotamba
Town

Kyoto
City

Note) PAZ: Precautionary Action Zone
Note) UPZ: Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone
<Some residents living in Oura Peninsula in Maizuru City must evacuate in the same manner as the PAZ, as their evacuation routes
are located near the PAZ borders.>
Source: Cabinet Office(2) Subject Power Plants and Dates
The exercise was held on August 25 and 26, 2018 at Ohi Power Station and Takahama Power Station.
(3) Participants, etc.
(Number of participating organizations: 191; number of participants, including local citizens: approximately
21,200)∙ Governmental organizations: Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, NRA, and other related ministries andagencies∙ Local governments: Fukui Prefecture, Kyoto Prefecture, Shiga Prefecture, Ohi Town, Takahama Town, Maizuru
City, 10 cities and towns within the UPZ and related cities and towns∙ Nuclear operator: Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
∙ Related organizations: National Institutes for Quantum and Radiological Science and Technology, Japan
Atomic Energy Agency, etc.
(4) Accident Scenario
After the external power source is shut down following an earthquake centered on northern Kyoto Prefecture,reactor coolant leaks from Unit 3 of the Ohi Nuclear Power Station. In addition, water injection to the reactor
137becomes impossible due to the failure of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), leading to the state ofGeneral Emergency.
Meanwhile, the Takahama Nuclear Power Station suffered no direct damage from the earthquake. However,water supply to the vapor generator of Unit 4 is shut down following the loss of external power source due toan electric line failure, while water injection to the rector becomes impossible due to the failure of the ECCS,
leading to the state of General Emergency.
(5) Content of Exercise
This exercise was held with the aim of further improving the effectiveness of the Evacuation Plan based on
the Ohi Region Emergency Response and Takahama Region Emergency Response. It involved decision-making
and operational drills relating to the evacuation of residents, tailored to the escalation of the situation in acomplex disaster scenario, which involved a combination of a natural disaster and a nuclear emergency.
4-2 Overview of Performance(1) Exercise in Rapid Establishment of an Initial Response System
The national government, local governments, and nuclear operator mobilized key personnel to set up an
initial response system at their respective operational bases following an earthquake and gathered information
about the status of the natural disaster and the power station. In addition, they used teleconferencing andother systems to strengthen communication between related organizations and prepare for an escalation of
the situation.

Key personnel gather information(Ohi Off-site Center)(2) Exercise in Making Decisions Concerning the Evacuation Policies, etc. Based on Collaboration between
National and Local Bodies
Following an escalation of the situation, the Prime Minister’s Office and the other bases worked together toformulate and decide on protection measures, including the evacuation of local citizens. In addition, according
to the escalation of the situation, the functions of the local headquarters were unified at the central
headquarters for integrated management. At the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, Prime Minister Abe
carried out a Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation in response to the General Emergency, and held themeeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters with the participation of relevant ministers. During
this meeting, the members of the meeting confirmed initiatives relating to protection measures, including theevacuation of local citizens, and approved the government’s basic guidelines on emergency response measures.

138Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (drill) participated in by Prime Minister Abe and relevant ministers(3) Field training exercise on inter-prefectural evacuation, indoor evacuation, etc.
Following the site area emergency and general emergency, evacuation sites were arranged andtransportation means were provided for residents in the PAZ and in the areas where protection measuressimilar to the PAZ are taken, based on the extent of the damage caused by the natural disaster. The residents
were evacuated within or to outside the prefecture after having taken stable iodine agents. In addition, indoor
evacuation was conducted to promote the understanding of the residents concerning the meaning of such
evacuation. Also, the scenario assuming that radioactive materials had been released involved the urgent
distribution of stable iodine agents, temporary relocation, and inspections of evacuation areas. For each
evacuation, video footage transmitted by Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces and Fukui Prefectural Police
helicopters was used to gain an understanding of the situation on the ground.

Evacuation exercise for persons who need special assistance (persons suffering acute disease)(Ohi Town, Fukui Prefecture)139

Video explaining the meaning of indoor evacuation(Ine Town, Kyoto Prefecture)

4-3 Post-exercise Initiatives
Following the 2018 Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise, the Cabinet Office identified
areas for improvement based on views expressed by experts and responses to a questionnaire distributed to
local citizens who participated in the drill. These are summarized in the Report on the Findings from the 2018
Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise in March 2019.
Reference: https://www8.cao.go.jp/genshiryoku_bousai/kunren/h30sg.html
Going forward, the Fukui Local Nuclear Disaster Management Council will make improvements to the Ohi
Region Emergency Response and Takahama Region Emergency Response and various manuals, following
deliberations informed by the lessons and response guidelines described in this report. Moreover, thegovernment will seek to further enhance the methods used for conducting the Comprehensive Nuclear
Emergency Response Exercise, as well as the menu of scenarios and exercises, constantly reviewing the exercise
to make it more realistic.

140

APPENDIXTABLE OF CONTENTS: APPENDIX
1. Overview of Japan’s National Land
Fig. A-1 Worldwide Hypocenter Distribution (for Magnitude 6 and Higher Earthquakes)
and Plate Boundaries .............................................................................................. A-1
Fig. A-2 Distribution of Volcanoes Worldwide ...................................................................... A-1
Fig. A-3 Subduction Zone Earthquake Areas and Major Active Faults in Japan ..................... A-2
Fig. A-4 Distribution of Active Volcanoes in Japan ................................................................ A-4

2. Disasters in Japan
Fig. A-5 Major Earthquake Damage in Japan (Since the Meiji Period) ................................... A-5
Fig. A-6 Major Natural Disasters in Japan Since 1945 ........................................................... A-6
Fig. A-7 Number of Fatalities and Missing Persons Due to Natural Disasters ........................ A-8
Fig. A-8 Fatalities and Missing Persons by Hazard ................................................................ A-9
Fig. A-9 Recent Major Natural Disasters (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake) ........ A-10
Fig. A-10 Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major
Disaster Management Headquarters ..................................................................... A-19
Fig. A-11 Dispatchment of Government Investigation Teams (Since the Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake) ................................................................................................. A-20
Fig. A-12 Application of the Disaster Relief Act (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake) .......................................................................................................... A-22
Fig. A-13 Designations of Extremely Severe Disasters in the Past Five Years ....................... A-26
Fig. A-14 Response of Government Ministries and Agencies to Major Disasters Since 2018............................................................................................................................. A-28
Fig. A-15 Trends in Facility Damage and the Amount and as a Percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) ....................................................................................... A-38
Fig. A-16 Facility Damage Due to Disasters in 2017, by Hazard ........................................... A-38
Fig. A-17 Comparison of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan
Earthquake, and the Sumatra Earthquake ............................................................. A-39
Fig. A-18 Damage Estimate for the Great East Japan Earthquake ....................................... A-40
Fig. A-19 Main Volcanic Eruptions and Volcanic Disasters in Japan ..................................... A-41
Fig. A-20 Number of Sediment Disasters ............................................................................ A-42
Fig. A-21 Increase in the frequency of short-duration downpours...................................... A-42
Fig. A-22 Number of Tornados ........................................................................................... A-43
Fig. A-23 Major Natural Disasters in the World Since 1900 ................................................ A-44
Fig. A-24 Top 10 Largest Earthquakes Since 1900 ............................................................... A-47
Fig. A-25 Major Natural Disasters Since 2018 ..................................................................... A-47

3. Laws and Systems
Fig. A-26 Evolution of Disaster Management Laws and Systems Since 1945 ....................... A-50
Fig. A-27 Major Disaster Management Laws by Type of Disaster ........................................ A-51
Fig. A-28 Structure of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction........................................ A-52
Fig. A-29 Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction........................................ A-53

4. Organizations
Fig. A-30 Organization of the National Disaster Management Council................................ A-55
Fig. A-31 Recent Meetings of the National Disaster Management Council (Since 2010) ..... A-56
Fig. A-32 Status of the Establishment of National Disaster Management Council
Committees for Technical Investigation ................................................................. A-57
Fig. A-33 Disaster Risk Management Budgets by Year ........................................................ A-58
Fig. A-34 Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans ............................................ A-60
Fig. A-35 Estimated Budgets of Five-Year Plans for Emergency Earthquake Disaster
Management Project ............................................................................................ A-61

6. Disaster Management Facilities and Equipment
Fig. A-36 Number of Red Cross Hospitals, Emergency Medical Centers, and Disaster Base
Hospitals ............................................................................................................... A-62
Fig. A-37 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Infrastructure ................................................... A-63
Fig. A-38 Trends in the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities That Serve as
Disaster Management Bases ................................................................................. A-64
Fig. A-39 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Elementary and Junior High Schools ................. A-64

7. Trends in Numbers of Workers in Disaster Management
Fig. A-40 Numbers of Fire Corps Volunteers ....................................................................... A-65
Fig. A-41 Age Composition Ratios among Fire Corps Volunteers ........................................ A-65
Fig. A-42 Numbers of Flood Fighting Corps Personnel ........................................................ A-66
Fig. A-43 Numbers of Voluntary Disaster Management Organizations ............................... A-66
Fig. A-44 Female Representation in Local Disaster Management Councils (by Prefecture,2018) .................................................................................................................... A-67

8. Various Policies and Measures
Fig. A-45 Hazard Map Development .................................................................................. A-68
Fig. A-46 Formulation of Official Announcement Criteria for Evacuation
Recommendations in Municipalities ..................................................................... A-68
Fig. A-47 Communication Method of Evacuation Instructions in Municipalities ................. A-69
Fig. A-48 Assistance based on Mutual Support Agreements between Prefectures andSupport Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions ............................................ A-70
Fig. A-49 Mutual Support Agreements in Municipalities .................................................... A-71
Fig. A-50 Municipalities’ Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions .................. A-72
Fig. A-51 Disaster Management Drill Implementation ........................................................ A-73
Fig. A-52 Earthquake Disaster Management Drill Implementation ..................................... A-74
Fig. A-53 Implementation of Tsunami Countermeasures .................................................... A-75

9. Japan's International Cooperation
Fig. A-54 List of Cooperation Projects Conducted by Ministries and Agencies .................... A-76
Fig. A-55 Technical Cooperation Projects in Disaster Risk Reduction (FY2018) .................... A-80

10. Others
Fig. A-56 Number of Earthquake Insurance Contracts ........................................................ A-83
Fig. A-57 Awareness of Self-Help, Mutual Support, and Public Support Measures ............. A-83
Fig. A-58 Tables Explaining the Japan Meteorological Agency Seismic Intensity Scale ........ A-84
Fig. A-59 Emergency Warning Issuance Criteria ................................................................. A-88

List of Acronyms ................................................................................................ A-89

1. Overview of Japan’s National Land
Fig.
Fig.A-1
A-1 Worldwide Hypocenter Distribution (for Magnitude 6 and Higher Earthquakes) and Plate
Boundaries

North American Plate

Eurasian Plate

Philippine Sea Plate
African Plate
Pacific Plate
Indo-Australian Plate

South American Plate
Antarctic Plate

Note: 2009–2018
Source: Formulated by the Japan Meteorological Agency based on earthquake data from the U.S. Geological Survey

Fig.
Fig.A-2A-2 Distribution of Volcanoes Worldwide

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

A-1

Fig.
Fig.A-3A-3 Subduction Zone Earthquake Areas and Major Active Faults in Japan

Subduction Zone Earthquake Areas

Kuril Trench
Nansei-shoto
TrenchEastern Edge ofJapan Sea Trench

Suruga TroughHyuga-nada
SeaJapan Trench

Major Active Faults

Enlarged

Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

A-2

NumberHokkaido region
Tohoku region
Kanto region
Chubu region
Kinki region
Chugoku region
Shikoku region
Kyushu region
Okinawa region

101~
201~
301~
401~
501~
601~
701~
801~
901~

101

No.

Sarobetsu fault zone

424

102
103
104

425
426
427
428

Noubi fault zone

429
430
431
432
433
501
502
503
504
505

Yanagase Sekigahara fault zone
Nosaka Shufukuji fault zone
Kohoku-sanchi fault zone
Yoro-Kuwana-Yokkaichi
Isewan fault zone
Suzuka-toen fault zone
Nunobiki-sanchi-toen fault zone
Suzuka-seien fault zone
Tongu fault
Kizugawa fault zone

506

Biwako-seigan fault zone

208

Shibetsu fault zone
Tokachi-heiya fault zone
Furano fault zone
Mashike-sanchi-toen fault zone · Numata-Sunagawa
fault zone
Toubetsu fault
Ishikari-teichi-toen fault zone
Kuromatsunai-teichi fault zone
Hakodate-teiya-seien fault zone
Aomori-wan-seigan fault zone
Tsugaru-sanchi-seien fault zone
Oritsume fault
Hanawa-higashi fault zone
Noshiro fault zone
Kitakami-teichi-seien fault zone
Shizukuishi-bonchi-seien - Mahiru-sanchi-toen fault
zone
Yokote-bonchi-toen fault zone

Name of Fault
Byoubuyama Enasan fault zone & Sanageyama fault
zone
Shokawa fault zone
Nagaragawa-joryu fault zone
Fukui-heiya-toen fault zone

507

209

Kitayuri fault

508

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
301
302

509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
601
602
603

Chojagahara-Yoshii fault

604
605

Yasaka fault
Jifuku fault

606

Tsutsuga fault

307
308
401
402
403
404
405

Shinjo-bonchi fault zone
Yamagata-bonchi fault zone
Shonai-heiya-toen fault zone
Nagai-bonchi-seien fault zone
Nagamachi-Rifu Line fault zone
Fukushima-bonchi-seien fault zone
Futaba fault
Aizu-bonchi-seien-toen fault zone
Sekiya fault
Okubo fault
Fukaya Fault Zone and the Ayasegawa Fault (Kantoheiya hokuseien fault zone and Motoarakawa fault
zone)
Tachikawa fault zone
Isehara fault
Shiozawa fault zone, Hirayama-Matsuda-kita fault
zone and Kouzu-Matsuda fault zone (Kannawa
Kouzu-Matsuda fault zone)
Miura-hanto fault group
Kamogawa-teichi fault zone
Kitaizu fault zone
Fujikawa-kako fault zone
Minobu fault
Sone-kyuryo fault zone
Kushigata-sanmyaku fault zone

Mikata Hanaore fault zone
Sourthern fault zone of Kyoto-bonchi-Nara-bonchi(Nara-bonchi-toen fault zone)
Yamada fault zone
Mitoke Kyoto Nishiyama fault zone
Ikoma fault zone
Uemachi fault zone
Arima-Takatsuki fault zone
Rokko Awajishima fault zone
Osaka-wan fault zone
Yamasaki fault zone
Shikano-Yoshioka fault
Shinji (Kashima) fault

607
608
609
610
611
612
613

406

Tsukioka fault zone

701

407
408
409
410

Nagaoka-heiya-seien fault zone
Muikamachi fault zone
Tokamachi fault zone
Takada-heiya fault zone
Nagano-bonchi-seien fault zone (Shinanogawa fault
zone)
Itoigawa-Shizuoka-kozosen fault zone
Sakaitoge Kamiya fault zone
Inadani fault zone
Kiso-sanmyaku-seien fault zone
Uozu fault zone
Tonami-heiya fault zone · Kurehayama fault zone
Ouchigata fault zone
Morimoto Togashi fault zone
Ushikubi fault zone
Atotsugawa fault zone
Takayama Oppara fault zone
Atera fault zone

702
801
802
803

Hiroshima-wan-Iwakuni-oki fault zone
Akinada fault zone
Iwakuni-Itsukaichi fault zone
Oharako fault
Ogori fault
Suounada fault zone
Kikugawa fault zone
Chuo-kozosen fault zone (Kongo-sanchi-toen –Iyonada)Nagao fault zone
Fukuchiyama fault zone
Nishiyama fault zone
Umi fault

804

Kego fault zone

805
806
807
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
901

Hinata-toge-Okasagi-toge fault zone
Minoh fault zone
Saga-heiya-hokuen fault zone
Unzen fault group
Futagawa-Hinagu fault zone
Midorikawa fault zone
Hitoyoshi-bonchi-nanen fault
Izumi fault zone
Koshiki fault zone
Hijiu fault zone
Haneyama－Kuenohirayama fault zone
Miyakojima fault zone

105
106
107
108
109
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

303
304
305
306

411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423

Name of Fault

No.

Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

A-3

Fig.
Fig.A-4A-4 Distribution of Active Volcanoes in Japan
Rishirizan Atosanupuri

Shiretoko-Iozan

Tenchozan

Nansei Islands

Io-Torishima

Yoteizan
UsuzanTaisetsuzan
NisekoHokkaido-Komagatake
Tokachidake
Esan
Oshima-Oshima
IwakisanSubmarine Volcano
NNE of Iriomotejima

SanbesanAbu Volcanoes

MyokosanKusatsu-Shiranesan
Niigata-Yakeyama
Midagahara
Yakedake
Akandanayama
Norikuradake
Hakusan
Ontakesan

Akita-Yakeyama
Akita-Komagatake
Chokaisan
Hijiori
Zaozan(Zaosan)
Hiuchigatake
Numazawa

Unzendake
Fukue Volcanoes
Yonemaru and Sumiyoshiike
Ikeda and Yamagawa
Kaimondake
Satsuma-Iojima
Kuchinoerabujima
Kuchinoshima
Nakanoshima
Suwanosejima

Yokodake
Tsurumidake
and Garandake
Kozushima
FujisanYufudake
Mikurajima
AsosanHakoneyama
Kujusan
Kirishimayama
Izu-Tobu Volcanoes
Wakamiko
Sakurajima

Izu-Oshima
ToshimaNiijimaMiyakejima
Hachijojima
Aogashima

Ruruidake
Rausudake

Chirippusan
Moyorodake

Sashiusudake
Odamoisan
Etorofu-Yakeyama
Berutarubesan
Chachadake
Mashu
Maruyama Oakandake
RaususanTomariyama
Eniwadake Meakandake
Tarumaesan
Osorezan
KuttaraHakkodasan
TowadaHachimantai
E140°
E144°
Iwatesan
N32°
Kurikomayama
Beyonesu (Bayonnaise) Rocks
NarukoSumisujima(SmithRocks)
Azumayama
Izu-Torishima
Adatarayama
SofuganBandaisan
Nasudake
N28°
Takaharayama
Nishinoshima
Nantaisan
Kaikata Seamount
Nikko-Shiranesan
Kaitoku Seamount
AkagisanFunka Asane
Ioto
Harunasan
Kita-Fukutokutai
Asamayama
Fukutoku-Oka-no-Ba
N24°

Minami-Hiyoshi Seamount
Nikko Seamount: Continuously monitored volcanoes (50): Active volcanoes (111)

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office from the Japan Meteorological Agency website (As of March 2018)

A-4

Etorofu- Atosanupuri

2. Disasters in Japan
Fig.
Fig.A-5A-5 Major Earthquake Damage in Japan (Since the Meiji Period)
Disaster

Date

Number of
Fatalities andMissing Persons

Nobi Earthquake
Meiji Sanriku Earthquake and Tsunami
Great Kanto Earthquake
1927 Kita Tango Earthquake
Showa Sanriku Earthquake Tsunami
1943 Tottori Earthquake
Tonankai Earthquake
Mikawa Earthquake
Nankai Earthquake
Fukui Earthquake
Tokachi‐oki Earthquake
1960 Chile Earthquake and Tsunami
1964 Niigata Earthquake
1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake
1974 Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake
1978 Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake
1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake
Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake
Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake(M8.0)(M8.25)(M7.9)(M7.3)(M8.1)(M7.2)(M7.9)(M6.8)(M8.0)(M7.1)(M8.2)(Mw9.5)(M7.5)(M7.9)(M6.9)(M7.0)(M7.4)(M7.7)(M6.8)

October 28, 1891
June 15, 1896
September 1, 1923
March 7, 1927
March 3, 1933
September 10, 1943
December 7, 1944
January 13, 1945
December 21, 1946
June 28, 1948
March 4, 1952
May 23, 1960
June 16, 1964
May 16, 1968
May 9, 1974
January 14, 1978
June 12, 1978
May 26, 1983
September 14, 1984

7,273
Approx. 22,000
Approx. 105,000
2,925
3,064
1,083
1,251
2,306
1,443
3,769
33
142
26
52
30
25
28
104
29

Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
Great East Japan Earthquake
The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake(M7.8)(M7.3)(M6.8)(M7.2)(Mw9.0)(M6.5)(M7.3)(M6.7)

July 12, 1993
January 17, 1995
October 23, 2004
June 14, 2008
March 11, 2011
April 14, 2016
April 16
September 6, 2018

230
6,437
68
23
22,252
273

The 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake*

42*Mw: Moment magnitude
Notes:
1. The earthquakes listed before World War II are those with more than 1,000 fatalities and missing persons, while theearthquakes listed after World War II are those with more than 20 fatalities and missing persons.
2. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Great Kanto Earthquake are based on the revised Chronological
Scientific Table (2006), which changed the number from approximately 142,000 to approximately 105,000.
3. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake) is the current figure as of May 19, 2006. The number of fatalities directly caused by structures collapsing, fire,and other factors caused by seismic shaking on the day of the earthquake, excluding so-called “related deaths,” is 5,515.
4. The number of fatalities (including disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake andTsunami (Great East Japan Earthquake) is the current figure as of March 1, 2019.
5. The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake is the current figure as of April 12, 2019 (including disaster-related
fatalities).
Source: Chronological Scientific Tables, Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, National Police Agency materials,
Comprehensive List of Destructive Earthquakes in Japan, Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters materials, Major
Disaster Management Headquarters materials

A-5

Fig.
Fig.A-6A-6 Major Natural Disasters in Japan Since 1945
Date

Disaster

Main Affected Areas

January 13, 1945
September 17-18, 1945
December 21, 1946
August 14, 1947
September 14-15, 1947
June 28, 1948
September 15-17, 1948
September 2-4, 1950
October 13-15, 1951
March 4, 1952
June 25-29, 1953
July 16-24, 1953
May 8-12, 1954
September 25-27, 1954
July 25-28, 1957
June 24, 1958
September 26-28, 1958
September 26-27, 1959

Mikawa Earthquake (M6.8)
Typhoon Makurazaki
Nankai Earthquake (M8.0)
Mt. Asama Eruption
Typhoon Kathleen
Fukui Earthquake (M7.1)
Typhoon Ione
Typhoon Jane
Typhoon RUTH (5115)
Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M8.2)
Heavy Rains
Torrential Rains
Storm Disaster
Typhoon MARIE (5415)
Torrential Rains
Mt. Aso Eruption
Typhoon IDA (5822)
Typhoon VERA (5915)

May 23, 1960

Chile Earthquake Tsunami

January 1963
June 16, 1964

Heavy snowfall
Niigata Earthquake (M7.5)
Typhoons SHIRLEY (6523), TRIX (6524),
VIRGINIA (6525)

September 10-18, 1965
September 23-25, 1966

Typhoons HELEN (6624), IDA (6626)

July to August 1967

Torrential Rains

May 16, 1968

Tokachi-oki Earthquake (M7.9)

July 3-15, 1972
May 9, 1974
September 8-14, 1976
January 1977
August 7, 1977- October 1978
January 14, 1978
June 12, 1978
October 17-20, 1979
December 1980 - March 1981

Typhoons PHYLLIS (7206), RITA (7207),
TESS (7209) and Torrential Rains
Izu-hanto-oki Earthquake (M6.9)
Typhoon FRAN (7617) and Torrential
Rains
Snow Disasters
Mt. Usu Eruption
Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake (M7.0)
Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake (M7.4)
Typhoon TIP (7920)
Snow Disasters

Southern Aichi
Western Japan (Especially in Hiroshima)
Various Places in West of Chubu
Around Mt. Asama
North of Tokai
Around the Fukui Plains
From Shikoku into Tohoku (Especially in Iwate)
North of Shikoku (Especially in Osaka)
Nationwide (Especially in Yamaguchi)Southern Hokkaido, Northern Tohoku
Kyushu, Shikoku, Chugoku (Especially Kitakyushu)
West of Tohoku (Especially in Wakayama)
Northern Japan, Kinki
Nationwide (Especially in Hokkaido and Shikoku)
Kyushu (Especially around Isahaya)Around Mt. Aso
East of Kinki (Especially in Shizuoka)
Nationwide (Except for Kyushu, especially in Aichi)
Southern Coast of Hokkaido, Sanriku Coast, Shima
Coast
Hokuriku, Sanin, Yamagata, Shiga, Gifu
Niigata, Akita, Yamagata
Nationwide (Especially in Tokushima, Hyogo,
Fukui)
Chubu, Kanto, Tohoku (Especially in Shizuoka,
Yamanashi)West of Chubu, Southern Tohoku
Southern Hokkaido and Tohoku Area centering
around Aomori
Nationwide (Especially in Kitakyushu, Shimane,
Hiroshima)
Southern Tip of Izu-hanto
Nationwide (Especially in Kagawa, Okayama)

Tohoku, Northern Kinki, Hokuriku
Hokkaido
Izu-hanto
MiyagiNationwide (Especially Tokai, Kanto, Tohoku)
Tohoku, Hokuriku
Nationwide (Especially in Nagasaki, Kumamoto,
July to August 1982
Torrential Rains and Typhoon BESS (8210)
Mie)
May 26, 1983
Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake (M7.7)
Akita, Aomori
July 20-29, 1983
Torrential Rains
East of Sanin (Especially in Shimane)
October 3, 1983
Miyake Is. Eruption
Around Miyake-jima Island
December 1983 - March 1984
Snow Disasters
Tohoku, Hokuriku (Especially in Niigata, Toyama)
September 14, 1984
Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake (M6.8)
Western Nagano
November 15 - December 18, 1986 Izu-Oshima Eruption
Izu Oshima Island
November 17, 1990 – June 3, 1995 Mr. Unzen Eruption
Nagasaki
July 12, 1993
Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake (M7.8)
Hokkaido
July 31 - August7, 1993
Torrential Rains
Nationwide
1995 Southern Hyogo Prefecture
January 17, 1995
Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Hyogo
Earthquake) (M7.3)
March 31, 2000 - June 28, 2001
Mt. Usu Eruption
Hokkaido
Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima andJune 25, 2001 - March 31, 2005
Tokyo
Kozushima Is. Earthquake (M6.5)
October 20-21, 2004
Typhoon TOKAGE (0423)
Nationwide
October 23, 2004
Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake (M6.8) Niigata
December 2005 - March 2006
Heavy Snowfall
Japan Sea Coast centering around Hokuriku Area
Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
July 16, 2007
Niigata(M6.8)
June 14, 2008
Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake (M7.2)
Tohoku (Especially in Miyagi, Iwate)
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on
December 2010 - March 2011
Snow disaster
the Japan Sea Coast2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
Eastern Japan (Especially in Miyagi, Iwate,
March 11, 2011
(Great East Japan Earthquake) (Mw9.0)
Fukushima)
August 30 - September 5, 2011
Typhoon TALAS (1112)
Kinki, Shikoku

A-6

Number of
Fatalities andMissing
2,306
3,756
1,443
11
1,930
3,769
838
539
943
33
1,013
1,124
670
1,761
722
12
1,269
5,098
142
231
26
181
317
256
52
447
30
171
101
3
25
28
115
152
439
104
117
－
131
29
－
44
230
79
6,437
－
1
98
68
152
15
23
131
22,25298

Date

DisasterNovember 2011 - March 2012

Heavy Snow in 2011

November 2012 - March 2013

Heavy Snow in 2012

November 2013 - May 2014

Heavy Snow in 2013

Main Affected Areas
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on
the Japan Sea Coast
From Northern Japan through into West Japan on
the Japan Sea Coast
From Northern Japan through into KantoKoshinetsu Area (Especially in Yamanashi)

September 27, 2014
April 14 and 16, 2014

Torrential Rains of August 2014
(Hiroshima Sediment Disaster)
2014 Eruption of Mt. Ontake
The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (M7.3)

June 28 - July 8, 2018

The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

September 6, 2018

The 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Earthquake (M6.7)

August 20, 2014

Number of
Fatalities andMissing

104
95

Hiroshima

77

Nagano, Gifu
Kyushu Area (Especially in Kumamoto)
Nationwide (Especially in Hiroshima, Okayama,
Ehime)

63
273

Hokkaido

42

Notes:
1. The disasters listed resulted in fatalities and missing persons as follows: 500 or more for storm and flood disasters, 100 or more for snow
disasters, and 10 or more for earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. It also includes disasters for which governmental Major Disaster
Management Headquarters were established based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
2. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake) is thecurrent figure as of May 19, 2006. The number of fatalities directly caused by structures collapsing, fire, and other factors caused by seismic
shaking on the day of the earthquake, excluding so-called “related deaths,” is 5,515.
3. The numbers of fatalities from the Miyake Is. Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake are from the earthquake of July 1, 2000.
4. The number of fatalities (including disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons resulting from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami(Great East Japan Earthquake) is the current figure as of March 1, 2019 (including disaster-related fatalities).
5. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake is the current figure as of April 12, 2018.
6. The number of fatalities and missing persons from the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018 is the current figure as of January 9, 2019.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the meteorological almanac of Japan, Chronological Scientific Tables, National Police Agency
materials, Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters materials, Major Disaster
Management Headquarters materials, and Hyogo Prefecture materials

A-7

133

245

Fig.
Fig.A-7A-7 Number of Fatalities and Missing Persons Due to Natural Disasters(People)Major disaster: Great East Japan Earthquake(22,252) (as of March 1, 2019)

20,00015,000Main disasters: Mikawa Earthquake (2,306), TyphoonMakurazaki (3,756)

Main disaster: Nankai Earthquake (1,443)
Main disaster: Typhoon Kathleen (1,930)
Major disaster:Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (6,437)

10,000Main disaster: Fukui Earthquake (3,769)
Main disaster: Nanki torrential rains (1,124)
Main disaster: Typhoon Touyamaru (1,761)

Main disaster: Typhoon Isewan (5,098)

5,000

0

1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

(Year)
Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

People
6,062
1,504
1,950
4,897
975
1,210
1,291
449
3,212
2,926
727
765
1,515
2,120
5,868
528
902

Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

People
381
575
307
367
578
607
259
183
163
350
587
85
324
213
273
174
153

Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

People
208
148
232
524
301
199
199
148
69
93
96
123
190
19
438
39
6,482

Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

People
84
71
109
141
78
90
48
62
327
148
177
39
101
115
89
22,515
190

Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

People
173
283
77
344
129
337

A-8

Note: Of the fatalities in 1995, the deaths from the Southern
Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake) include 919 so-called "related deaths"(Hyogo Prefecture).
The fatalities and missing persons in 2018 are based on
flash bulletins from the Cabinet Office.
Source: Fatalities and missing persons for the year 1945 came
only from major disasters (source: Chronological
Scientific Table). Years 1946–1952 use the Japanese
Meteorological Disasters Annual Report; years 1953–
1962 use National Police Agency documents; years
1963 and after formulated by the Cabinet Office basedon Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials.

Fig. A-8
A-8 Fatalities and Missing Persons by Hazard
Fig.
(Unit: persons)
Earthquake/
Volcano
Snow
Other
Total
Tsunami
1993
183
234
1
9
11
438
1994
8
3
0
21
7
39
1995
19
6,437
4
14
8
6,482
1996
21
0
0
28
35
84
1997
51
0
0
16
4
71
1998
80
0
0
28
1
109
1999
109
0
0
29
3
141
2000
19
1
0
52
6
78
2001
27
2
0
59
2
90
2002
20
0
0
26
2
48
2003
48
2
0
12
0
62
2004
240
68
0
16
3
327
2005
43
1
0
98
6
148
2006
87
0
0
88
2
177
2007
14
16
0
5
4
39
2008
22
24
0
48
7
101
2009
76
1
0
35
3
115
2010
31
0
0
57
1
89
2011
136
22,2520125
222,515
2012
52
0
0
138
0
190
2013
75
0
0
92
6
173
2014
112
0
63
108
0
283
2015
22
0
0
49
0
77
2016
38
228
0
6
0
344
2017
60
0
0
68
1
129
2018
261
46
1
23
6
337
Notes: This table shows the number of fatalities and missing persons between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31.
Fatalities and missing persons in 2018 are based on flash bulletins from the Cabinet Office.
(The earthquake/tsunami disaster figures for 2011 include 22,252 fatalities (including disaster-related fatalities) and missing persons
from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Great East Japan Earthquake) (March 1, 2019).)
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report "Status of Regional Disaster Management
Administration"Year

Storm/Flood

A-9

Fig.
Fig.A-9A-9 Recent Major Natural Disasters (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)(Total: As of April 12, 2019)
Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)

Name of Disaster

Major Events

The Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake(January 17, 1995)

Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
Unprecedented major disaster inWestern Japan. Became a turning
point in DRR measures for national
and local governments, with various
DRR measures developed andstrengthened.

6,437

43,792 104,906 144,274

Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
The Great East Japan Tsunami caused extreme damage
Earthquake
mainly along the coast of Eastern(March 11, 2011)
Japan, including Iwate, Miyagi, andFukushima Prefectures.

22,2526,233 121,995 282,939

2000 Eruption of Mt. The Japan Meteorological Agency
announced emergency volcano
Usu
information and residents evacuated(March 31, 2000 before the eruption began, resulting in
June 28, 2001)
no human casualties.

－

Completely
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

－

119

355

A caldera was formed along with thesummit eruption. Large amounts of
volcanic gases were emitted over an
extended period, and evacuation
instructions were issued to all
residents of the town of Miyake, which
forced all residents to evacuate andlive off the island.
Very large number of humancasualties due to rising river levels,
sediment disasters, and high waves
nationally, but concentrated in the
Kinki and Shikoku regions. The
Maruyama River, Izushi River, andother Maruyama River system rivers
overflowed their banks and flooded.
Maximum seismic intensity of 7.
Homes were destroyed, landslides andother disasters caused many humancasualties, communities were isolated,people were forced to evacuate, andthere was massive damage to homes,
lifelines, transportation, andagricultural land.

98

68

4,805

3,175

13,810Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Homes were destroyed on Genkai
Island and elsewhere, and window
glass fell from buildings in Fukuoka
City.

1

1,204

144

353

Record-breaking rains fell, mainly in
Typhoon NABI (0514)
the Kyushu region, and sediment(September 4-8,
disasters caused many human2005)
casualties.

29

177

1,217

3,896

Following 1963, the second-largest
number of fatalities and missing
persons since WW II (on par with
1981.)

152

2,145

18

28

2006 Torrential Rains
Due to Seasonal Rain Many fatalities due to sediment
Front
disasters in Nagano and Kagoshima(June 10–July 29,
Prefectures.
2006)

33

64

313

1,457

Typhoon SHANSHAN(0613)(September 15–20,
2006)

Damage due to strong winds from the
Okinawa region to the Kyushu region,
and a tornado in Nobeoka City,
Miyazaki Prefecture.

10

446

121

518

Tornado in Saroma
Hokkaido Prefecture Highest number of fatalities on record(November 7, 2006) attributed to a tornado.

9

31

7

7

2000 Miyake Is.
Eruption and Niijima
and Kozushima Is.
Earthquake(June 25, 2000 March 31, 2005)

Typhoon TOKAGE(0423)(October 18-21,
2004)

2004 Mid Niigata
Prefecture
Earthquake(October 23, 2004)

Fukuoka-kenSeihouoki
Earthquake(March 20, 2005)

2006 Heavy Snows(December 2005 March 2006)

1

15

555

A-10

15

909

Abovefloor
Flooding

Remarks

・Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters*1
・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
inspection by Prime Minister－ ・Site・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teaminspection by Minister of State for Disaster
1,628 ・Site
Management
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
inspection by Prime Minister－ ・Site・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster20

・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister－ ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

7,776

・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Dispatchment of government investigation team
14,323 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Ministerof government investigation team
－ ・Dispatchment
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Invocation of Remote Islands Development Act
・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
3,551 ・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster12 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
1,971 ・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster
・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
251 ・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to DisasterName of Disaster

Major Events

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Completely
Half
Destroyed Destroyed2007 Noto Hanto
Earthquake(March 25, 2007)

Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Disaster in mountainous regions with ahigh percentage of aging population
and advancing depopulation.

1

356

686

1,740

2007 Heavy Rainsfrom Typhoon MANYI (0704) andSeasonal Rain Front(July 5-31, 2007)

The typhoon made landfall in Japan in
July with the strongest intensity in 57
years from 1951 to 2007. Record
rainfalls in various regions.

7

75

33

33

2007 Niigataken
Chuetsu-oki
Earthquake(July 16, 2007)

Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Many human causalities due to homes
collapsing. Damage to homes, lifelines,
transportation, and nuclear power
plants.

2008 Iwate-Miyagi
Nairiku Earthquake(June 14, 2008)
Earthquake
epicentered on
Northern Coast of
Iwate Prefecture(July 24, 2008)
Heavy Rains from
July 28(July 28-29, 2008)

Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 6.
Many human causalities due tolandslides and other sediment disasters.
Many river channels became blocked(natural dams) in rivers in mountainous
areas.
Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Earthquake with a deep hypocenteroccurring inside a plate. Seismic
intensity of Lower 5 and higher
recorded in affected areas of inland
Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures.
Localized heavy rains in the Hokuriku
and Kinki regions.
Human casualties along the Toga River
in Kobe City.

Torrential Rains at
Record heavy rains in various regions,
the End of August
especially extensive flood damage in2008(August 26-31, 2008) Aichi Prefecture.
Record heavy rains in Yamaguchi andJuly 2009 Torrential Fukuoka Prefectures due to seasonal
Rains in Chugoku and rain front.
Northern Kyushu
Numerous fatalities from sediment(July 19-26, 2009)
disasters in Yamaguchi Prefecture andother prefectures.

Remarks

Abovefloor
Flooding

・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster
・Dispatchment of government investigation team

434 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
of Act on Support for Reconstructing－ ・Invocation
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Invocation of Special Measures Act for Specified
Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

15

2,346

1,331

5,710

23

426

30

146

1

210

1

0

－ ・Dispatchment of government investigation team

6

13

6

16

of Act on Support for Reconstructing
585 ・Invocation
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Designation as an extremely severe disaster
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act
3,106 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act
2,139 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation teamof Disaster Relief Act
974 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

2

7

6

7

36

59

52

102

Heavy rains from the Chugoku andTyphoon ETAU (0909) Shikoku regions to the Tohoku region(August 8-11, 2009) due to the effects of the typhoon.
Human casualties and homes damaged
due to flooding in Hyogo Prefecture.

27

23

183

1,130

Earthquake
epicentered in
Suruga Bay(August 11, 2009)

1

319

0

6

－

5

139

9

86

571 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

0

0

0

0

6 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

91

・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Site inspection by Minister of State for Disaster
Management
1,844 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disasterMaximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Tomei Expressway closed due to slope
collapse.

Destructive storm and heavy rains overa wide area from the Okinawa region to
Hokkaido Prefecture due to the effectsof the typhoon.
Winds and rains in Aichi Prefecturecaused partial damage and flood
damage to many homes.
An earthquake struck the central coast
Tsunami fromof Chile just after noon on Feb. 27. A
Earthquake
tsunami was approaching Japan theepicentered innext day on the 28th, and a major
Central Chilean Coast tsunami warning and tsunami warning(February 27-28,
were issued at 9:33 a.m. on the 28th.
2010)
Extensive fishery damage toaquaculture facilities.
The seasonal rain front stalled over theregion from Kyushu to Honshu from2010 Heavy Rains
mid-June, with intermittent bursts ofDue to Seasonal Rain activity. Southern Kyushu received moreFrontthan twice its average annual rainfall.
(June 11 - July 19,
There were large-scale landslides in2010)
Kagoshima Prefecture, and fatalities andmissing persons mainly in Hiroshima
and Gifu Prefectures.
The rain front stalled over the Amami
region, with moist air flowing in from
Heavy Rains inthe south toward this rain front,
Amami Region ofcreating unstable atmospheric
Kagoshima
conditions.
Prefecture
The Amami region received intense(October 18-25,
rainfall of more than 120 mm per hour,
2010)with more than 800 mm of rainfall since
the rains began.
Record snows fell from the end of theyear to the beginning of the following
Heavy Snow in 2010 year in some areas of the Japan Sea side
(November 2010 of Western Japan.
March 2011)
Fishing boats overturned and sankalong with other damage in Tottori and
Shimane Prefectures.
Typhoon MELOR(0918)(October 6-8, 2009)

22

21

43

3

2

10

443

・Site inspection by Minister of State for Disaster
Managementof Disaster Relief Act
116 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

131

1,537

9

14

inspection by Minister of State for Disaster6 ・SiteManagement

・Cabinet meeting

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

A-11

Name of Disaster

Major Events

Following a small eruption on January 19, a
medium-sized eruption occurred at
Shinmoedake on January 26 and the volcanic
Mt. Kirishima
alert level was raised to 3 (Do not approach the(Shinmoedake)
volcano). Eruptions continued repeatedly
Eruption
thereafter until early September, with air waves(January 26 and cinders breaking windows and causing other
September 7,
damage. In addition, falling ash from the2011)
eruptions was recorded over a wide area mainly
to the southeast of the mountain, including
Kirishima City, Kagoshima Prefecture, andMiyakonojo City, Miyazaki Prefecture.
The typhoon made landfall on the southern partof Tokushima Prefecture around 11:00 p.m. on
July 19, maintaining its strong intensity, with
Typhoon MA-ON
maximum winds of 40m/s, and its large scale.
(1106)(July 12-24, 2011) Record heavy rains were recorded in WesternJapan, with rainfall of more than 1,000 mm
recorded in some parts of the Shikoku region
since the rains began.

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

0

52

0

0

・Cabinet meeting (twice)・Site inspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management- ・Designation as an area requiring the
emergency development of evacuation
facilities and an ash prevention area
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

3

54

0

1

28 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

Rain began falling in Niigata Prefecture and Aizu,
Fukushima Prefecture, from around noon on theJuly 2011 Niigata 27th. Intermittent intense rains of more than 80
and Fukushima
mm per hour fell starting on the 28th.
Torrential Rains(July 27-30, 2011) In Niigata and Fukushima Prefectures, record
heavy rains exceeding the July 2004 Niigata andFukushima Torrential Rains were recorded.

6

13

74

1,000

Record rains were recorded across a wide areafrom Western Japan to Northern Japan.
Especially on the Kii Peninsula, the highest
amount of rainfall since the rains began at 5:00
p.m. on August 30 exceeded 1,800 mm, andmany river channels became blocked.

98

113

379

3,159

20

425

34

1,524

133

1,990

13

12

Typhoon TALAS(1112)(August 30 September 5,
2011)

Strong winds and record rains were recorded
across a wide area from Western Japan to
Typhoon ROKE
Northern Japan.
(1115)
Total rainfall from 12:00 a.m., September 15 to(September 15-22, 9:00 a.m., September 22 exceeded 1,000 mm in2011)
some parts of Kyushu and Shikoku, with many
points recording rainfall of more than double theaverage rainfall for September.
Record snows fell mainly on the Japan Sea side,
Heavy Snow inwith cumulative snowfall of more than 28%
2011higher than the average for the past 5 years. In(November 2011 - addition, in some regions the depth of the
March 2012)
snowfall was more than double the average forthe past 30 years.
Lightning strikes, wind gusts, and hail wererecorded from the Tokai region to the Tohoku
region. From Joso City to Tsukuba City, Ibaraki
Prefecture, a tornado formed that wasWind Gusts in May estimated to be one of the strongest (F3)2012
recorded in Japan. Multiple tornadoes were
(May 6, 2012)
recorded in the region from Mooka City, Tochigi
Prefecture, to Hitachi-Omiya City, Ibaraki
Prefecture, including a destructive tornado of
approx. 32 km, the second longest recorded
since statistics have been kept.
Heavy rains fell across a wide area from the
Okinawa region to the Tohoku region due to the
Typhoon GUCHOL typhoon and seasonal rain front. Following the(1204)
track of the typhoon, strong winds, high waves,(June 18-20, 2012) and a storm surge were recorded across a wide
area from the Okinawa region to the Tohoku
region.

・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)・Site inspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management
1,082 ・Invocationof Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)inspection by Minister of State for
5,500 ・Site
Disaster Management
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster(national)

2,270

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Cabinet meeting (twice)inspection by Minister of State for
3 ・SiteDisaster Management (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

3

61

103

234

・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Site inspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management－ ・Invocationof Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster

1

85

1

3

49 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

Heavy Rains from
June 21 to July 7,
2012(June 21 - July 7,
2012)

Due to the effects of the seasonal rain front anda low-pressure system in the Yellow Sea forming
above the seasonal rain front, from June 21 toJuly 7, rains were recorded from Western toEastern Japan, and Northern Japan, with heavy
rains in parts of Kyushu and other locations.

2

7

36

180

July 2012
Northern Kyushu
Torrential Rains(July 11-14, 2012)

From July 11 to 14, moist air from the south
flowed in toward the seasonal rain front thatwas stalled near Honshu, and heavy rains wererecorded across a wide area from Western toEastern Japan. Extremely heavy rains fellintermittently with thunder especially in thenorthern region of Kyushu.

33

34

276

2,306

104

1,517

5

7

Due to the cold, there was a long stretch of lowtemperature days in Northern Japan, with a
Heavy Snow from large amount of snow falling mainly on the Japan
November2012
Sea side. This resulted in record snowfall(November 2012 - recorded mainly on the Japan Sea side ofMarch 2013)
Northern Japan, including snowfall with a depthof 566 cm recorded at Sukayu, Aomori
Prefecture.

Remarks

Abovefloor
Flooding

(*2)

(*3)

(*2)

(*3)

・Dispatchment of government investigation
teamof Disaster Relief Act
1,131 ・Invocation(*2) ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)
2,574 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act(*3) ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Cabinet meeting heldof government investigation
2 ・Dispatchment
team・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

A-12

Name of Disaster
Earthquake
epicentered Near
Awajishima Island(April 13, 2013)

Major Events

Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.

・From June 8 to August 9, the seasonalrain front stalled from Kyushu to thevicinity of Honshu with intermittent
bursts of activity. In addition, warm andvery moist air surrounding a highpressure ridge flowed in even after the
rainy season ended. During this time,
Typhoons LEEPI (1304) and SOULIK (1307)
approached Japan, causing heavy rains invarious regions.
Warm, moist air flowed in toward the rain
front, creating extremely unstable
atmospheric conditions and heavy rains
mainly on the Japan Sea side of Eastern
Heavy Rains fromJapan, and Western Japan. On August 24,
August 23, 2013
record heavy rains on par with the torrential(August 23-28, 2013) rains of July 28 were recorded, especially in
Shimane Prefecture. Some areas of
Hokkaido Prefecture also received heavy
rains.
・On September 2, F2 tornadoes wererecorded in Saitama City, Koshigaya City,and Matsubushi Town, Saitama
Prefecture, Noda City, Chiba Prefecture,
and Bando City, Ibaraki Prefecture.
・On September 4, an F0 tornado was
Tornadoes onrecorded in Sukumo City, Kochi
September 2 and 4,
Prefecture, an F0 tornado in Aki City,
2013
Kochi Prefecture, F1 tornadoes(September 2, 4, & 7, respectively from Kanuma City to2013)
Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture, andfrom Shioya Town, Shioya District to Yaita
City, and F0 tornadoes from Ise City to
Obata Town, Mie Prefecture.
・On September 7, F0 wind gusts wererecorded in Komaki City, Hokkaido
Prefecture.
On September 15, localized intense rains fell
Heavy Rains fromin Eastern Japan and Northern Japan. On
Typhoon MAN-YI
the 16th, heavy rains fell across a wide area
(1318)
from Shikoku to Hokkaido. Record heavy(September 15-16,
rains fell especially in Fukui, Shiga, and Kyoto
2013)
Prefectures. A total of ten F0–F1 tornadoes
also occurred.
Heavy Rains in 2013
Seasonal Rain Front(Disaster due totorrential rains anddestructive storms
between June 8 andAugust 9, 2013)

Typhoons WIPHA(1326) & FRANCISCO(1327)(October 14-16,
2013)(October 24-26,
2013)

Heavy rains fell mainly on the Pacific Oceanside of Eastern Japan and Northern Japan.
Driving rains of more than 100 mm per hourfell especially in Oshima-machi, Tokyo
Prefecture, with record rainfall of 824 mmrecorded in 24 hours.

・Record heavy snowfall was recorded
across a wide area from Northern Japanto Kanto-Koshinetsu.
・Especially from February 14 to 16, record
Heavy Snow fromheavy snows fell, substantially surpassing
2013
past snowfall depths mainly in the Kanto(November 2013 Koshinetsu region, including Kofu
March 2014)(Yamanashi Prefecture) with 114 cm,
Chichibu (Saitama Prefecture) with 98 cm,
and Maebashi (Gunma Prefecture) with73 cm of snowfall.
・Record heavy rains were recorded on
Okinawa Island.
Typhoon NEOGURI・Due to the effects of the moist southerly(1408)
wind surrounding the typhoon and the(July 6-11, 2014)
seasonal rain front, some regions even far
from the typhoon received localized
driving rains.
Torrential Rains of August 2014
<Typhoon NAKRI (1412)>
・From the night of the 5th, heavy rains
were recorded in the Chugoku andTohoku regions. Especially in Yamaguchi
Prefecture, localized driving rains of morethan 100 mm per hour were recorded insome places.
Typhoons NAKRI <Typhoon HALONG (1411)>(1412) & HALONG Heavy rains fell across a wide area from(1411)
Western Japan to Northern Japan. Especially(July 30 - August in Kochi Prefecture, total rainfall from the11, 2014)
7th to the 11th, when the heaviest rains fell,
was more than 1,000 mm. Total rainfall fromthe Shikoku region to the Tokai region was
more than 600 mm.
Atmospheric conditions were extremely
unstable, with extremely strong winds
including tornadoes in Tochigi Prefecture
and other areas.

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons0Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

34

8

97

17

50

73

222

2

4

9

53

0

67

13

38

6

136

40

967

45

140

65

63

95

3

5

1,770

70

93

A-13

28

14

22

Abovefloor
Flooding－

Remarks－

・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (seven times)of Disaster Relief Act
1,845 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

243

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)of Disaster Relief Act
0 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster

・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (five times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,453 ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation
teamof Disaster Relief Act
2,011 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster40

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
3 ・Siteinspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (five times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

12・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (three times)of Disaster Relief Act
409 ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster374

・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
1,529 ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disasterName of Disaster

Major Events

Heavy Rains from ・Extremely intense localized rains with
August 15, 2014
thunder. The amount of rainfall that
(August 15-26,
fell during the 2 days of the 16th and2014)
17th set new records in places such as*Excludes
Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture,
Hiroshima
and Takayama City, Gifu Prefecture,
Sediment Disasterwith heavy rains mainly in the Kinki,
on August 20
Hokuriku, and Tokai regions.
・ Warm, moist air flowed in toward theHiroshima
rain front, and extremely unstable
Sediment Disasteratmospheric conditions were recordedon August 20,
mainly in the Chugoku region and2014
northern Kyushu region.
(Disaster in・At 3:30 a.m. on the 20th, driving rains
Hiroshimaof approx. 120 mm per hour werePrefecture due torecorded in Hiroshima Prefecture, andheavy rains fromheavy rains, including a new record set
August 19, 2014)
for the highest recorded rainfall in a
24-hour period, were recorded.

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

8

77

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

7

68

38

179

Abovefloor
Flooding

Remarks

332

・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,240 ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

217

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation
1,086 team (three times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster0・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster0 Management Headquarters
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Volcanic tremors started at 11:41 a.m.
on September 27, with an eruption on
the same day around 11:52 a.m.
・Volcanic smoke descended the2014 Eruption of Mt.
southern slope and was recorded for
Ontakemore than 3 km. Therefore, a level 3(September 27,
volcano warning (Do not approach the2014)
volcano) was issued.
・Entry within 4 km of the crater was
restricted.
・Many mountain climbers sufferedcasualties due to this eruption.

63

Earthquake with a
Seismic Source inNorthern Nagano
Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6.
Prefecture(November 22, 2014)

0

46

81

133

・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)of Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

83

1,029

9

12

5

Due to the effects of a strong winter airpressure pattern as well as a lowHeavy Snow in 2014 pressure system and cold air, heavy(November 2014 snows fell on the mountainous areas ofMarch 2015)
the Japan Sea side from Northern Japanto Eastern Japan.
・An explosive eruption occurred at
Shindake at 9:59 am on May 29. Thiseruption triggered a volcanic cloud of
black-gray smoke that rose 9,000m
above the crater rim and a pyroclastic
Kuchinoerabu-jimaflow that reached the northwestern
Eruptioncoast (Mukaehama district).
[Volcanic Alert Level ・At 10:07 am, the JMA raised the5]Volcanic Alert Level from 3 to 5
(May 29, 2015)(evacuate).
・The municipal ferry, Ferry-Taiyo, andother vessels were used to evacuate
all those on the island at the time ofthe eruption to Yakushima (allindividuals were confirmed to be safe)
・A very small amount of volcanic ash
was observed inside the crater, which
was thought to have been the result ofa very small eruption, so the JMA
raised the volcanic alert level from 2 toEruption of Mt.
3 (Do not approach the volcano) at
Hakone12:30 on June 30[Volcanic Alert Level ・At the same time, Hakone-machi
3]
imposed a ban on entering the area
(June 30, 2015)
within around 1km of the crater andissued an evacuation instruction forparts of the Ubako, Kamiyuba,
Shimoyuba, and Hakone Sounkyo
Bessochi areas, as well as evacuating
residents, etc. from those areas
・The typhoon and warm, moist air
heading toward the typhoon caused
increased rainfall, primarily over Westand East Japan. The Kinki region inparticular saw the highest rainfall in 24
Typhoon NANGKA
hours since records began, with heavy(1511)
rain in excess of the usual rainfall for(July 16-18, 2015)
the entire month of July in an ordinary
year.
・This caused river flooding, damage to
public civil engineering works, andsuspension of transport services,
mainly in West Japan.

690・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office (Yakushima Town,
Kagoshima)
・Site inspection by Prime Minister
・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

0

1

To be confirmed

0

0

0

0

of a Cabinet Office advance
0 ・Deployment
information-gathering team

2

57

5

10

to the public by the Minister of
85 ・Appeal
State for Disaster Management

A-14

Name of Disaster

Major Events

・At around 07:00 on August 15, a seriesof volcanic earthquakes centered on
the island occurred. Rapid crustal
movement indicative of inflation of
the volcanic edifice was also observed.
・At 10:15 that day, the JMA raised thevolcanic alert level from 3 to 4
(Prepare to evacuate) (caution
required in Arimura-cho and FurusatoVolcanic activity atcho, within 3km of the Showa crater
Sakurajima
and the Minamidake summit crater).
[Volcanic Alert Level・At 16:50 that day, Kagoshima City
4]
issued evacuation advisories to the(August 15, 2015)
residents of the Arimura district ofArimura-cho, the Furusato district ofFurusato-cho (areas within 3km of thecrater), and the Shioyagamoto districtof Kurokami-cho.
・At 18:10 that day, evacuation of allresidents (77 people from 51
households) in the areas subject toevacuation was completed.
・The typhoon that made landfall near
Arao City in Kumamoto Prefecture
after 06:00 on the 25th moved
northward to northern Kyushu,
maintaining its strong intensity, andreached the Sea of Japan during thedaylight hours of the 25th.
Typhoon GONI
・A maximum instantaneous wind speed(1515)of 71.0m was observed at 21:16 on(August 22-26, 2015)
the 23rd on Ishigaki Island, Okinawa
Prefecture. In addition, the typhoon
and warm, moist air flowing in fromthe south resulted in heavy rain overthe Ryukyu Islands, West Japan, andthe Tokai region, with more than
500mm of rain falling on Mie
Prefecture in a single day on the 25th.
・After making landfall near Nishio City,
Aichi Prefecture at around 09:30 on
September 9, 2015 Typhoon ETAU
(1518) moved on to the Sea of Japanand transformed into an extra-tropical
cyclone at 15:00 that day.
・As a result of Typhoon ETAU (1518)
and weather fronts, heavy rain fell
Torrential Rain ofover a wide area from western toSeptember 2015 innorthern Japan. In particular, between
the Kanto andthe 9th and the 11th, a southerly windTohoku Regions
flowing into the extra-tropical cyclone[Including Typhoon
into which Typhoon ETAU (1518)
ETAU (1518)]
transformed and, subsequently, a(September 9-11,
southeasterly wind from the vicinity of2015)
Typhoon KILO (1517) supplied flows ofmoist air that triggered a succession ofline-shaped precipitation systems,
causing record-breaking rainfall in the
Kanto and Tohoku regions andprompting the issue of emergency
heavy rain warnings for Tochigi,
Ibaraki, and Miyagi prefectures.
・Typhoon DUJUAN (1521) approached
the Ishigaki and Yonaguni island areas
with violent intensity during the dayon the 28th.
・On Yonaguni Island, a maximum
Typhoon DUJUAN
instantaneous wind speed of 81.1m(1521)
was observed at 15:41 on the 28th,(September 27-28,
the highest figure since statistics
2015)
began to be compiled. A severe galebuffeted Yaeyama and the surroundingarea, while the Sakishima Islands saw
stormy seas with high swells and the
Okinawa Island area was also batteredby rough seas.

The 2016 Kumamoto ・At 09:26 p.m. on April 14, 2016
Earthquake
Maximum seismic intensity of 7
(April 14 and 16,
・At 01:25 a.m. on April 16, 2016
2016)
Maximum seismic intensity of 7

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

Remarks

Abovefloor
Flooding

・Site inspection by Parliamentary Vice

0

0

0

0

Minister
0 ・Deploymentof a Cabinet Office liaison
team

1

147

12

138

53 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster・Minister of State for Disaster Management
issues a list of requests to relevant
ministries and agencies
・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information-gathering team・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
meeting (twice)2,523 ・Cabinet
・Site inspection by Prime Minister (once)
・Site inspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

20

82

81

7,090

0

0

5

23

273

2,809

A-15

8,667

34,7190・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Establishment of On-site Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Site inspection by Prime Minister (threetimes)
・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
0 ・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Invocation of Special Measures Act forSpecified Disaster・Partial invocation of the Act on
Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters
・Designation as an extremely severe disasterName of
Disaster

Major Events

・Warm, moist air flowed in toward theseasonal rain front having stalled overWestern to Eastern Japan and a lowHeavy Rainspressure system above the seasonal rainfrom Seasonalfront, creating extremely unstable
Rain Front
atmospheric conditions.
Starting June
・Rainfall from 00:00 on 19 onward exceeded
20, 2016
300 mm over a wide area of Kyushu, as well(June 20-25,
as Chugoku, Shikoku and part of the Izu
2016)
Islands, while rain in some parts ofKumamoto, Oita and Miyazaki Prefectures
exceeded 500 mm.
・Typhoon CHANTHU (1607) moved
northward along the Pacific coast of the
Kanto and Tohoku regions, making landfall
near Cape Erimo at around 17:30 on August
17. It then continued up through Hokkaido
and transformed into an extra-tropical
cyclone near Sakhalin island at 03:00 on the
Typhoon18th.
CHANTHU
・The passage of the cold front of the extra(1607)
tropical cyclone that was formerly Typhoon(August 16-18,
CHANTHU (1607) caused localized driving2016)
rains in the Kanto region, with 83 mm perhour of rain recorded in Utsunomiya City,
Tochigi Prefecture up to 03:14 on the 18th.
・The total rainfall between 00:00 on August
16 and 06:00 on August 18 exceeded 100
mm over an extensive area in the Kanto,
Tohoku, and Hokkaido regions.
・Typhoon KOMPASU (1611) formed as atropical storm over the sea east of Japan at
09:00 on August 20 and approached the
Tohoku region before making landfall near
Kushiro City, Hokkaido after 23:00 on the
21st. It then continued up through
Hokkaido and transformed into an extratropical cyclone over the Sea of Okhotsk at
03:00 on the 22nd.
・Typhoon MINDULLE (1609) made landfall
near Tateyama City, Chiba Prefecture ataround 12:30 on August 22 and continued
Typhoons
up through the Kanto and Tohoku regions,
KOMPASUmaking landfall once more on the central(1611) &part of Hidaka District of Hokkaido
MINDULLE
Prefercture before 06:00 on the 23rd. It(1609)
then continued up through Hokkaido(August 20-23,
before transforming into an extra-tropical
2016)
cyclone over the Sea of Okhotsk at 12:00 on
the 23rd.
・These typhoons and weather fronts caused
heavy rain in eastern and northern Japan.
Between 00:00 on August 20 and 24:00 on
the 23rd, there was 448.5 mm of rainfall at
Mt. Amagi in Izu City, Shizuoka Prefecture;
297.5 mm at Ome in Ome City, Tokyo; and296.0 mm at Itokushibetsu in Shibetsu
Town, Hokkaido. Hokkaido experienced
particularly heavy rain, receiving double theaverage rainfall for August.
・Typhoon LIONROCK (1610) approached the
Kanto region in the morning of August 30
and made landfall near Ofunato City, Iwate
Prefecture around 17:30 on the 30th,
accompanied by a storm area. It thenTyphoonaccelerated on a peculiar course that saw it
LIONROCK
pass through the Tohoku region and enter(1610)
the Sea of Japan, and it transformed into an(August 26-31,
extra-tropical cyclone on the 31st.
2016)
・This was the first time that a typhoon had
made landfall on the Pacific coast of the
Tohoku region since the Japan
Meteorological Agency began recording
statistics in 1951.
・With strong intensity, Typhoon MALAKAS(1616) made landfall on the Osumi
Peninsula, Kagoshima Prefecture after
00:00 on September 20 and then headed
Typhoonnortheast across the waters off the coast of
MALAKAS
Shikoku before making landfall once more
(1616)
near Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture(September 16around 13:30 the same day. After making
20, 2016)
landfall yet again after 17:00 that day near
Tokoname City, Aichi Prefecture, ittransformed into an extra-tropical cyclone
at 21:00 the same day off the coast of theTokai region.
2016
Earthquake
centered in thecentral Tottori Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6
Prefecture(October 21,
2016)

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

Abovefloor
Flooding

Remarks

7

12

37

165

520 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

0

5

0

9

67 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

2

76

6

19

665

・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

29

14

518

2,281

・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office・Appeal to the public by the Minister ofState for Disaster Management
・Site inspection by Prime Minister (twice)・Dispatchment of government investigation
279 team (twice)・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

1

47

8

65

509 ・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

312

・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act－ ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

0

32

A-16

18

Name of
Disaster

Major Events

Earthquake
centered in thenorthern Ibaraki Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6
Prefecture(December 28,
2016)
March 27,
2017Avalanche An avalanche hit the Nasu Onsen Family Ski
in Nasu, Tochigi Resort, affecting high-school students werePrefecture on
involved during a mountain climbing(March 27,
workshop.
2017)
Heavy rainsfrom Seasonal
Rain Front
starting June
Localized intense rain caused by a seasonal30, 2017andrain front and Typhoon NANMADOL (1703)
Typhoonfell mainly in northern Kyushu. Especially
NANMADOL
from July 5 to 6, record heavy rain hit(1703)
northern Kyushu due to warm and very moist(including
air flowing in toward the rain front stalling inNorthern
Kyushu Heavy the vicinity of the Tsushima Straits.
Rain)(June 30 - July
10, 2017)
Heavy Rainsfrom Seasonal
Warm and moist air flowed in towards theRain Front
Starting July 22, rain front stalling over Tohoku and Hokuriku
regions; stimulating it and causing heavy rain,
2017
concentrated in these regions, from July 22.
(July 22 - 26,
2017)
Typhoon TALIM (1718), heading north near
Miyako Island from September 13 to 14,
crossed the Satsuma Peninsula, Kagoshima
Prefecture around 11:30 on 17 th and madeTyphoon TALIM landfall on Tarumizu City, Kagoshima(1718)
Prefercture around 12:00 the same day. It(September 13 - continued to move north along the Japanese
18, 2017)
islands with a storm area and transformed
into an extra-tropical cyclone at 03:00 on 18th
around Sado Island. The typhoon and active
rain front caused driving rains from Western
to Northern Japan.
Typhoon LAN (1721) moved northward overthe sea south of Japan during October 21-22
and made landfall around Kakegawa City in
Shizuoka Prefecture around 03:00 on the 23rd
with its strong intensity and its very large
Typhoon LAN
scale. After crossing the Kanto region with a(1721)
storm area. It transformed into an extra(October 21 tropical cyclone around the sea east of Japan
23, 2017)
at 09:00 on 23rd. This brought heavy rain overmuch of Western and Eastern Japan and the
Tohoku region; due to well-developed rain
clouds surrounding the typhoon and the rain
front stalling near Honshu.
Due to the effects of a strong winter airpressure pattern, heavy snowfalls wereobserved in some areas on the Japan Sea side.
Heavy Snow
Especially large amounts of well-developed
from 2017snow clouds flowed in from the Japan Sea(Novemberside from early to mid-February. In Fukui,2017 - March
Fukui Prefecture, the daily maximum snow
2018)
depth exceeded 140 cm for the first time in
37 years. The Hokuriku region observed heavy
snowfalls overall, with some areas recordingsnow exceeding six times the average.
・An eruption occurred at 10:02 a.m.,January 23. Volcanic rocks travelled farther
than 1 km from the crater near Kagami-ike,
Eruption ofMotoshiranesan.
Kusatsu・At 11:05 a.m., the volcanic alert level was
Shiranesan
raised from 1 to 2 (Do not approach the(January 23,
crater).
2018)
・At 11:50 a.m., the volcanic alert level was
raised from 2 to 3 (Do not approach thevolcano) (caution required within a 2 km
radius from the crater near Kagami-ike).
Earthquake
centered in thewestern
Maximum seismic intensity of Upper 5
ShimanePrefecture(April 9, 2018)
Sediment
Disaster in
Nakatsu, Oita
A landslide in Yabakeimachi, Nakatsu City
Prefecture(April 14, 2018)

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

Abovefloor
Flooding

0

2

0

1

－

8

40

－

－

－

Remarks

・Cabinet meeting (three times)
・Site inspection by Prime Minister (once)・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information gathering team・Dispatchment of government investigationteam (twice)
223 ・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

44

39

338

1,101

0

0

3

44

618

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

5

73

5

615

1,553

・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
2,794 ・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

8

245

13

485

116

1,539

9

18

13

1

11

0

0

0

0

9

17

58

0

6

0

4

0

0

A-17

・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act

・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to DisasterName of
Disaster

Major Events

Earthquake
centered in thenorthern Osaka Maximum seismic intensity of Lower 6
Prefecture(June 18, 2018)

Due to the effects of the rain front andTyphoon PRAPIROON (1807), warm and highly
humid air was continuously supplied into thevicinity of Japan, resulting in record rainfalls in
The Heavy Rainwestern Japan and other areas. The rains
Events of Julycaused some serious disasters, including river2018
overflows, floods, and landslides, leaving(June 28 – July more than 200 people dead or missing. The
8, 2018)
lifelines were also affected, with water andelectricity outages occurring in various areas
across Japan, while rail and roadtransportation was also disrupted.

From around August 8, many volcanic
Volcanic activity earthquakes and large amounts of volcanic
atgases were observed. From around midnight
Kuchinoerabu- on August 15, an increasing number of
jima
volcanic earthquakes were observed at[Volcanic Alert deeper spots. In the small hours of the same
Level 4]day, an earthquake with a maximum(August 15,
magnitude of 1.9 (preliminary) was observed.
2018)
At 10:30 a.m., the volcanic alert level was
raised to 4 (prepare to evacuate).
With very strong intensity, Typhoon JEBI(1821) made landfall on the southern part ofTokushima Prefecture before noon on
September 4. It then made landfall again
around Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture before 2
p.m. and continued up through the Kinki
Typhoon JEBI
region while accelerating. At 9 a.m. on the(1821)
5th, it transformed into an extra-tropical(September 3 cyclone off the coast of the Russian Primorsky
5, 2018)
Krai. During the approach and passage of thetyphoon, very intense winds and rains hit
western to northern Japan. The Shikoku andKinki regions experienced particularly strong
winds and rains, with some areas observing
record high waves.

The 2018
Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi
Earthquake(September 6,
2018)

Maximum seismic intensity of 7
A major power outage occurred across theprefecture.

From September 28 to dawn on the 30th,
Typhoon TRAMI (1824) approached the
Typhoon TRAMI Okinawa region with very strong intensity. It(1824)
made landfall near Tanabe City, Wakayama(September 28 Prefecture around 8 p.m. on the 30th while– October 1,
rapidly accelerating. After crossing eastern
2018)
and northern Japan, it transformed into an
extra-tropical cyclone over the sea east ofJapan at 9 a.m. on October 1.

Human Casualties(persons)
Fatalities/
Missing
Injured
Persons

Houses Damaged (houses)
Half
Destroyed Destroyed

Completely

Remarks

Abovefloor
Flooding

・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information gathering team・Cabinet meeting (once)・Siteinspection by Prime Minister (once)
0 ・Invocationof Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Establishment of Major Disaster
Management Headquarters
・Cabinet meeting (once)・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information gathering team・Dispatchment of government investigation
team
・Site inspection by Prime Minister (fourtimes)
7,173 ・Siteinspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management (three times)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Invocation of Special Measures Act forSpecified Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

6

462

21

454

245

433

6,767

11,243

－

－

－

－

－

14

1,011

59

627

of government investigation
64 ・Dispatchment
team・Cabinet meeting (once)

・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

42

762

462

1,570

・Deployment of a Cabinet Office advance
information gathering team・Cabinet meeting (nine times)
・Installation of government on-sitecommunications office・Dispatchment of government investigationteam－ ・Site inspection by Prime Minister (once)
・Site inspection by Minister of State forDisaster Management (once)
・Invocation of Disaster Relief Act
・Invocation of Act on Support for
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected
due to Disaster・Designation as an extremely severe disaster

4

227

53

384

of Act on Support for
316 ・Invocation
Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected

・Designation as an extremely severe disasterdue to Disaster

Notes: *1 Established by a Cabinet meeting decision, and therefore not based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
*2 The number of damaged houses in the July 2012 Northern Kyushu Torrential Rains contains some duplications.
*3 The number of damaged houses due to heavy rains from June 21 to July 7, 2012 contains some duplications.
*4 The details given for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake show the toll as of April 12, 2019.
Source: Cabinet Office, Fire and Disaster Management Agency Materials, Major Disaster Management Headquarters materials

A-18

Fig.
Fig.A-10
A-10 Establishment of Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
As of March 31, 2019

Period of Establishment
Jan. 29 - May 31, 1963
Jun. 16 - Oct. 31, 1964

Manager of Headquarters
Minister of State
Minister of State

Sep. 17 - Dec. 17, 1965

Minister of State

Sep. 26 - Dec. 27, 1966

Minister of State

Jul. 9 - Dec. 26, 1967

Minister of State

6
7

Name of Headquarters
Heavy Snowfall Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Niigata Earthquake Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Typhoons SHIRLEY (6523), TRIX (6524), and VIRGINIA (6525) Major
Disaster Management Headquarters
Typhoons HELEN (6624) and IDA (6626) Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1967 July and August Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1968 Tokachi-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management Headquarters
July 1972 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters

May 16, 1968 - May 2, 1969
Jul. 8 - Dec. 19, 1972

8

Typhoon FRAN (7617) Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Sep. 13 - Dec. 10, 1976

91977 Mt. Usu Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1978 Izu-Oshima-kinkai Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1978 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
Typhoon TIP (7920) Major Disaster Management Headquarters
July and August 1982 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1983 Nihon-kai-chubu Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
July 1983 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1983 Miyake Island Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1984 Nagano-ken-seibu Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
1991 Mt. Unzen Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
1993 Hokkaido-nansei-oki Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
August 1993 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters

Aug. 11, 1977 - Dec. 4, 1979

Minister of State
Minister of State
Director General of National
Land Agency (NLA)
Director General of NLA

Jan. 15 - Aug. 4, 1978

Director General of NLA

Jun. 13 - Nov. 28, 1978

Director General of NLA

Oct. 20 - Dec. 4, 1979

Director General of NLA

Jul. 24 - Dec. 24, 1982

Director General of NLA

May 26 - Dec. 23, 1983

Director General of NLA

Jul. 23 - Dec. 23, 1983
Oct. 4, 1983 - Jun. 5, 1984

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA

Sep. 16, 1984 - Feb. 19, 1985

Director General of NLA

Jun. 4, 1991 - Jun. 4, 1996

Director General of NLA

Jul. 13, 1993 - Mar. 31, 1996

Director General of NLA

Aug. 9, 1993 - Mar. 15, 1994

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake Measures↓
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management

1
2
3
4
5

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21

1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Extreme Disaster Management
Headquarters*1
1997 Diamond Grace Oil Spill Major Disaster Management
22
Headquarters
23 2000 Mt. Usu Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
2000 Miyake Island Eruption and Niijima and Kozushima Island
Earthquake Emergency Management Headquarters
24
2000 Miyake Island Eruption Major Disaster Management
Headquarters*3

Jan. 17, 1995 - Apr. 21, 2002

Jan. 19 - Apr. 28, 1995

Prime Minister

Jul. 2-11, 1997

Minister of Transport

Mar. 31, 2000 - Jun. 28, 2001
*2
Aug. 29, 2000 - May 15, 2002
May 16, 2002 - Mar. 31, 2005

25 Typhoon TOKAGE (0423) Major Disaster Management Headquarters
2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake Major Disaster Management
Headquarters
2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Extreme Disaster Management
27
Headquarters
26

Oct. 21, 2004 - Mar. 31, 2007
Oct. 24, 2004 - Mar. 31, 2008
Mar. 11, 2011 -Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Director General of NLA↓
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Prime Minister

Minister of State for Disaster
Management
Minister of State for Disaster29 2014 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Feb. 18 - May 30, 2014
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
30 August 2014 Torrential Rains Major Disaster Management Headquarters Aug. 22, 2014 - Jan. 9, 2015
Management
Minister of State for Disaster
31 2014 Mt. Ontake Eruption Major Disaster Management Headquarters
Sep. 28, 2014 - Nov. 9, 2015
Management
2016 Emergency Response Headquarters for the Earthquake Centered
Minister of State for Disaster
32
Apr. 14, 2016 - Nov. 30, 2018
in the Kumamoto Region of Kumamoto PrefectureManagement
Minister of State for Disaster
33 Emergency Response Headquarters for the Heavy Rain in July 2018
Jul. 8 - Nov. 30, 2018
Management
Notes: The above are Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters and Major Disaster Management Headquarters based on the Basic Act on
Disaster Management (Act No. 223 of 1961).
*1 Established within the Cabinet Office based on a Cabinet meeting resolution, not based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management.
*2 Based on reports that the eruption had subsided. Upon dissolution of the Headquarters, the Mt. Usu Eruption Disaster Restoration andRecovery Measures Council was established.
*3 The names of Niijima Island and Kozushima Island were changed with the conclusion of response measures.
Source: Cabinet Office
28 Typhoon TALAS (1112) Major Disaster Management Headquarters

A-19

Sep. 4, 2011 - Dec. 26, 2014

Fig.
Fig.A-11
A-11 Dispatchment of Government Investigation Teams (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
As of March 31, 2019Year

Name of Disaster1995 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nanbu Earthquake(Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
1997 July 1997 Torrential Rains from Seasonal
Rain Front1998 End of August 1998 Torrential Rains
1999 Heavy Rains Starting June 23, 1999
Heavy Rains from Typhoon BART (9918)
and Rain Front
2000 2000 Eruption of Mt. Usu
2000 Tottori-seibu Earthquake
2001 2001 Geiyo Earthquake
2003
July Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
Northern Miyagi Earthquake
2003Tokachi-oki Earthquake
2004 July 2004 Niigata and Fukushima
Torrential Rains
July 2004 Fukui Torrential Rains
Typhoon MEARI (0421)
Typhoon MA-ON (0422)
Typhoon TOKAGE (0423)
2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
2005 Fukuoka-ken-Seihou-oki Earthquake
Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake
Typhoon NABI (0514)
2006 Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front
Starting July 4
Typhoon SHANSHAN (0613)
Tornado in Saroma, Hokkaido
2007 2007 Noto-hanto Earthquake
Heavy Rains from Typhoon MAN-YI(0704) and Seasonal Rain Front2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
2008 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake
Earthquake Epicentered Along Northern
Coast of Iwate Prefecture
End of August 2008 Torrential Rains2009 July 2009 Torrential Rains in Chubu andNorthern Kyushu
Typhoon ETAU (0909)
2011
2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami(Great East Japan Earthquake)
July 2011 Niigata and Fukushima
Torrential Rains

Deployment
Dates
Jan. 17-18
Jul. 11-12
Aug. 28
Jun. 30 - Jul. 1
Sep. 25

Team Leader
Director General of National Land Agency(NLA)

Kagoshima,
Director General of NLA
Kumamoto
Tochigi, Fukushima Parliamentary Vice-Minister of National Land
Hiroshima
Director General of NLA

Mar. 31 - Apr. 1 Hokkaido
Oct. 7
TottoriMar. 29
Hiroshima, Ehime
Kumamoto,
Jul. 22
Kagoshima
Jul. 27
MiyagiSep. 26-27
HokkaidoJul. 14
NiigataJul. 15
Fukushima
Jul. 20
Fukui
Oct. 1Mie
Oct. 14
Shizuoka
Oct. 22
Hyogo, Kyoto
Oct. 22
Kagawa, Okayama
Oct. 24
NiigataMar. 20-21
Fukuoka
Aug. 16-17
MiyagiSep. 9MiyazakiJul. 21
NaganoJul. 25
Kagoshima
Sep. 19
MiyazakiNov. 7-8
HokkaidoMar. 25-26
Ishikawa

Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA
Director General of NLA
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Jul. 13

KumamotoState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Jul. 16
Jun. 14-15

Niigata
Iwate, Miyagi

Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Jul. 24

Iwate, Aomori

Minister of State for Disaster Management

Aug. 29
Jul. 22
Jul. 27
Aug. 11Mar. 11Mar. 12Mar. 12
Jul. 31
Aug. 2

Aichi
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Hyogo, Okayama
Miyagi
Iwate
Fukushima
Niigata, Fukushima
Fukushima
Wakayama, Nara,
Mie

Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Finance
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Sep. 4-7
Sep. 6

July 2012 Torrential Rains in Northern
Kyushu

Hyogo

Kumamoto

Typhoon TALAS (1112)
2012 May 2012 Gust

Prefecture
Surveyed

Nara

May 7
Jul. 13-14
Jul. 21-22

Ibaraki, Tochigi
Kumamoto, Oita
Fukuoka, Oita,
Kagoshima

A-20

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Year
2013

Name of Disaster
Heavy Snow in2012

Deployment
Dates
Mar. 4-5
Jul. 29-30

Aug. 3

NiigataAug. 9Aug. 13
Aug. 13
Sep. 3
Sep. 4
Sep. 17
Sep. 18

Heavy Rains from Typhoon MAN-YI (1318)

Sep. 18
Sep. 19
Sep. 19-20

Typhoon WIPHA (1326)
2014
Heavy Snow in 2013

Typhoon NEOGURI (1408) and Seasonal
Rain Front
Typhoons NAKRI (1412) & HALONG (1411)
Heavy Rains Starting August 15
Heavy Rains in Hiroshima Prefecture
Starting August 19
Mt. Ontake Eruption

2015

2016

Earthquake Epicentered in Northern
Nagano Prefecture
Heavy Snow in 2014
Eruption of Kuchinoerabu-jima
Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the
Kanto and Tohoku Regions
Typhoon DUJUAN (1521)
The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake
Typhoons KOMPASU (1611) & MINDULLE(1609)
Typhoon LIONROCK (1610)
Earthquake centered in the central Tottori
Prefecture

2017

2018

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet
Office, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister
Shimane, Yamaguchi State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Yamagata,
Fukushima

Aug. 3Oct. 19
Feb. 6
Feb. 17

Team Leader

Hokkaido

Aug. 3Heavy Rains with Seasonal Rain Front

Tornadoes on September 2 and 4

Prefecture
Surveyed

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Land,
Iwate, Miyagi
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Shimane, Yamaguchi Minister of State for Disaster Management
Akita
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Iwate, Akita
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
SaitamaParliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Chiba
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
SaitamaParliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeActing Minister of State for Disaster
Kyoto
Management
Shiga, Fukui
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
MieParliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Aomori, Iwate,
Akita
Oshimacho (Tokyo)

Special Advisor to the Prime MinisterMar. 7

Tokyo, Yamanashi

Mar. 10
Mar. 15
Jul. 11
Jul. 12
Jul. 14-15
Aug. 11-13
Aug. 11
Aug. 18-19
Aug. 19
Aug. 20-21
Sep. 6
Sep. 17
Sep. 28
Oct. 11
Nov. 23
Dec. 2
Dec. 9
May 29-30

Saitama
Nagano, Gunma
NaganoYamagata
Okinawa
Tokushima, Kochi
Tochigi
Hyogo, Kyoto
Gifu
Hiroshima
Hiroshima
Hiroshima
NaganoNaganoNaganoNaganoTokushima
Kagoshima

Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office, StateMinister of the EnvironmentState-Minister of the Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
State-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Sep. 11

Ibaraki, TochigiState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Akita
Yamanashi

Sep. 30-Oct. 1 Okinawa
Apr. 15
Kumamoto

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Aug. 28-29

Hokkaido

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office

Aug. 31-Sep. 1 Iwate
Sep. 5
Hokkaido

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Oct. 29

TottoriState-Minister of the Cabinet Office

Typhoon LAN (1721)
Heavy Snow in 2017

Jul. 7
Jul. 9Oct. 27
Feb. 24

FukuokaOita, Fukuoka
Osaka, Wakayama
Fukui

State-Minister of the Cabinet Office
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

Jul. 9Okayama,
Hiroshima

Minister of State for Disaster Management

Typhoon JEBI (1821)

Sep. 11
Sep. 19

Hyogo Osaka
Hokkaido

Minister of State for Disaster Management
Minister of State for Disaster Management

Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front Starting
June 30, 2017 and Typhoon NANMADOL (1703)

The 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
Source: Cabinet Office

A-21

Fig.
Fig.A-12
A-12 Application of the Disaster Relief Act (Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake)
As of March 31, 2019Year

Name of Disaster1995 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nanbu Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake)
Niigata-ken-Hokubu Earthquake
Heavy Rain Starting on July 3
July 1995 Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
Heavy Rain Starting on August 10
1996

Typhoon VIOLET (9617)

1997 July 1997 Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains
Typhoon OLIWA (9719)

Jul. 31

Tokushima

2

Typhoon VICKI (9807)

Sep. 22

Heavy Rains of September 23–25, 1998
Typhoon ZEB (9810)

Sep. 25
Oct. 17

Heavy Rains Starting June 23, 1999

Jun. 29

Torrential Rains in Tsushima Region on August 27–28, 1999

Aug. 27

Heavy Rains from Typhoon BART (9918) and Rain Front

Sep. 24

Tokaimura Criticality Accident

Sep. 3Heavy Rains Starting October 27, 1999

Oct. 28
Mar. 29
Jun. 26
Jul. 1, Jul. 15
Jul. 8Sep. 112000 Tottori-ken-Seibu Earthquake

Oct. 6

2001 Geiyo Earthquake

Mar. 24

Heavy Rains of September 6, 2001
Typhoon NARI (0116)

2003

Apr. 1
Jul. 5
Jul. 11
Jul. 11, Jul. 12
Aug. 10
Sep. 22
Sep. 22
Jul. 10

Typhoon STELLA (9805)

2000 2000 Eruption of Mt. Usu
2000 Miyake Is. Eruption
2000 Niijima and Kozushima Is. Earthquake
Typhoon KIROGI (0003)
Heavy Rains from 2000 Autumn Rain Front and Typhoon
SAOMAI (0014)

2002

Sep. 6
Sep. 8, Sep. 11
Jul. 10
Jul. 11
Jul. 19
Jul. 20
Jul. 26
Aug. 9Jul. 13
Jul. 18

20
5
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
4
1
3
3
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
4
2
1
1
9
1
9
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
21
1
6
2
13
1
2
2
1
1
5
1
5
3
7
5

Aug. 4
Aug. 27
Aug. 28
Aug. 27, Aug. 30
Aug. 28
Aug. 3
Sep. 16

End of August 1998 Torrential Rains

2001

Hyogo
Osaka
Niigata
Ehime
Niigata
NaganoNiigata
Saitama
Chiba
Kagoshima
Oita
MiyazakiKagoshima
Niigata
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
SaitamaShizuoka
Saitama
Fukui
Hyogo
Nara
Kochi
Okayama
Hiroshima
Fukuoka
Nagasaki
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Kumamoto
Ibaraki
Aomori
Iwate
Hokkaido
Tokyo
Tokyo
SaitamaAichi
Gifu
Tottori
ShimaneHiroshima
Ehime
Kochi
Okinawa
Iwate
Gifu
Fukuoka
Kumamoto
Miyagi
Hokkaido
NiigataFukui

Jan. 17

Sep. 16

1998 Early August 1998 Torrential Rains

1999

Prefecture

No. ofMunicipalities towhich the Act wasappliedDate of
Invocation

Typhoon CHATAAN (026)
July Seasonal Rain Front Torrential Rains

Northern Miyagi Earthquake
Typhoon ETAU (0310)
2004 July 2004 Niigata and Fukushima Torrential Rains
July 2004 Fukui Torrential Rains
Typhoon NAMTHEUN (0410), Typhoon MALOU (0411), andRelated Heavy Rains

A-22

Year
2004

Name of Disaster

Ehime
Kochi
Okayama
KagawaEhime
Miyazaki
Hiroshima
Mie
Ehime
Hyogo
Shizuoka
Miyazaki
Tokushima
Kagawa
Hyogo
Gifu
Kyoto
Niigata
FukuokaTokyo
Yamaguchi
Kochi
MiyazakiKagoshima

1
1
9
13
1
2
2
5
4
2
1
1
4
9
18
1
7
54
1
2
2
1
13
1

Niigata

11

Sep. 17
Nov. 7Mar. 25

NaganoOkinawa
NaganoKagoshima
MiyazakiMiyazaki
Hokkaido
Ishikawa

8
2
3
6
1
1
1
7

Jul. 6

Kumamoto

1Jul. 16
Aug. 2
Sep. 17
Feb. 24

NiigataMiyazaki
Akita
ToyamaIwate
MiyagiToyamaIshikawa
Aichi
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Hyogo
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Hiroshima
Kagoshima
Niigata
Niigata
NiigataMiyazakiMiyazaki

10
1
2
1
5
2
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
3
4
2
3
1
1

Typhoon MEGI (0415) and Heavy Rains from Rain Front

Aug. 17

Typhoon CHABA (0416)

Aug. 30

Typhoon SONGDA (0418)

Sep. 7

Typhoon MEARI (0421)

Sep. 29

Typhoon MA-ON (0422)

Oct. 9Typhoon TOKAGE (0423)

Oct. 2

2004 Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
2005 2005 Fukuoka-ken-Seihou-oki Earthquake

Oct. 23
Mar. 20
Sep. 4

Typhoon NABI (0514)

Sep. 6
Sep. 4Jan. 6, Jan. 8,
Jan. 11, Jan. 13
Jan. 7, Jan. 12
Jun. 15
Jul. 192006 Heavy Snowfall
2006 June 2006 Extended Rain Landslide Disaster
Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front Starting July 4

Jul. 22

Typhoon SHANSHAN (0613)
Tornado in Saroma, Hokkaido
2007 2007 Noto-hanto Earthquake
Heavy Rains from Typhoon MAN-YI (0704) and Seasonal
Rain Front2007 Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
Typhoon USAGI (0705)
2007 Heavy Rains from Typhoon NARI (0711) and Rain Front
2008 Low-Pressure System from February 23 to 24

2009

Prefecture

No. ofMunicipalities towhich the Act wasappliedDate of
Invocation

2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake

Jun. 14

Heavy Rains Starting July 28

Jul. 28

End of August 2008 Torrential Rains

Aug. 28
Jul. 21
Jul. 24

July 2009 Torrential Rains in Chubu and Northern Kyushu
Typhoon ETAU (0909)

Aug. 92010

Jul. 14
Jul. 15
Jul. 16
Oct. 20
Jan. 27
Jan. 30
Jan. 31
Jan. 30
Feb. 102010 Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front
Heavy Rains in Amami Region, Kagoshima Prefecture
2011
Heavy Snow Starting November 2010
Mt. Kirishima (Shinmoedake) Eruption

A-23

Year

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster2011

2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

Mar. 11

July 2011 Niigata and Fukushima Torrential Rains

Jul. 29

Sep. 2Typhoon TALAS (1112)

Sep. 3Typhoon ROKE (1115)

Sep. 212012

Jan. 14Jan. 28
Jan.31
Heavy Winter Snowfall

Feb. 1Feb. 3Feb. 4

May 2012 Gust

May 6

Heavy Rains Starting July 3

Jul. 3Heavy Rains from Seasonal Rain Front Starting July 11

Jul. 12

Snow Melt Landslide
Heavy Rains Starting July 22

Jul. 13
Aug. 14
Sep. 15
Nov. 27
Feb. 22
Feb. 25
Feb. 26
Feb. 28
May 1
Jul. 22

Heavy Rains Starting July 28

Jul. 28

Heavy Rains Starting August 9Aug. 9Heavy Rains Starting August 23
September 2 Gust

Aug. 23
Sep. 2Typhoon MAN-YI (1318)

Sep. 16

Typhoon WIPHA (1326)

Oct. 16

Heavy Rains Starting August 13
Typhoon SANBA (1216)
November 27 Destructive Snow Storm
2013
Heavy Winter Snowfall

2014
Feb. 15
Heavy Winter Snowfall

Feb. 17
Feb. 18
Feb. 21

A-24

Prefecture

No. ofMunicipalities towhich the Act wasapplied

Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
Chiba
Tokyo
Niigata
Fukushima
Mie
Nara
Wakayama
Okayama
Tottori
Aomori
Fukushima
Niigata
Niigata
Niigata
Aomori
NaganoNiigata
Niigata
IbarakiTochigi
Fukuoka
Oita
Kumamoto
Oita
Fukuoka
Kyoto
Kagoshima
Hokkaido
Niigata
Niigata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamagata
Yamaguchi
ShimaneAkita
Iwate
Shimane
Saitama
Saitama
Kyoto
Tokyo
Chiba
NaganoGunma
Yamanashi
Gunma
Saitama
Gunma
Yamanashi
Yamanashi

2
34
35
59
37
15
8
47
15
9
3
10
5
1
2
1
1
2
4
1
2
5
4
1
4
3
1
2
5
1
7
1
1
7
8
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
4
1
16
7
7
1
3
2

Year
2014

Date of
Invocation

Name of Disaster
Heavy Rains from Typhoon NEOGURI (1408)

Jul. 9Typhoon NAKRI (1412)

Aug. 3Typhoon HALONG (1411)

Aug. 9Heavy Rains Starting August 15, 2014

Aug. 17

Heavy Rains Starting August 19, 2014
Damage Related to Mt. Ontake Eruption
Nagano Prefecture Kamishiro Fault Earthquake
Heavy Snow Starting December 52015 Eruption of Kuchinoerabu-jima

Aug. 20
Sep. 27
Nov. 22
Dec. 8May 29Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku
Regions
Typhoon DUJUAN (1521)
2016 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake

2017

Sep. 10
Sep. 28
Apr. 14

Typhoon LIONROCK (1610)

Aug. 30

2016 Earthquake centered in the central Tottori Prefecture2016 Conflagration in Itoigawa City, Niigata Prefecture

Oct. 21
Dec. 22
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 22
Sep. 17
Oct. 22
Oct. 22
Oct. 21Feb. 6
Feb. 13
Feb. 14
Jun. 18
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 5
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 6
Jul. 7
Jul. 7
Jul. 8Jul. 8Aug. 31
Sep. 6

July 2017 Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain
Heavy Rain Starting on July 22, 2017
Typhoon TALIM (1718)
Typhoon LAN (1721)

2018

Sep. 9Heavy Snow Starting February 4, 2018
Heavy Snowfall in FY20172018 Earthquake centered in the northern Osaka Prefecture

The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

Heavy Rain Starting on August 30, 2018
The 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
Source: Cabinet Office

A-25

Prefecture

No. ofMunicipalities towhich the Act wasappliedNaganoYamagata
Kochi
Kochi
Tokushima
Kyoto
Hyogo
Hiroshima
NaganoNaganoTokushima
Kagoshima
IbarakiTochigi
Miyagi
Okinawa
Kumamoto
Hokkaido
Iwate
Tottori
Niigata
Fukuoka
Oita
Akita
Oita
Mie
Kyoto
Wakayama
Fukui
Fukui
Niigata
Osaka
Kyoto
Hyogo
Okayama
Hiroshima
Ehime
Fukuoka
Gifu
Hyogo
Tottori
Shimane
Okayama
Yamaguchi
Kochi
Hyogo
Kochi
Gifu
Kochi
Yamagata
Hokkaido

1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
1
10
8
8
1
45
20
12
4
1
3
2
1
2
2
1
1
8
1
5
13
9
6
19
15
7
2
17
5
10
2
2
1
3
4
1
4
3
7
179

Fig.
Fig.A-13
A-13 Designations of Extremely Severe Disasters in the Past Five Years
Title of Legislation

Disaster Name

Main Affected
Areas

Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Seasonal Rain
Measures for the Districts of Nagiso-machi, Kiso-gun,
Nagano andFront/Typhoon
Nagano Prefecture, and Shiiba-son, Higashi UsukiMiyazaki Pref.
NEOGURI (1408)
gun, Miyazaki Prefecture Due to Rainstorms andTorrential Rains on July 9 and 10, 2014
Torrential Rains
Hokkaido, Kyoto,
Caused by
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Hyogo, Osaka,
TyphoonDesignation and Identification of Essential Response
Nara, Hiroshima,
HALONG (1411)/
Measures for Rainstorms and Heavy Rains from July
Tokushima,
Typhoon NAKRI
30 to August 25, 2014
Ehime, and Kochi(1412)/ Seasonal
Pref.
Rain Front
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon
Measures for the Districts of Sumoto City and Awaji VONGFONG
Hyogo Pref.
City, Hyogo Prefecture Due to Rainstorms on(1419)
October 13 and 14, 2014
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Earthquake of
Measures for the Districts of Ikeda-cho and OtariNagano Pref.
Nov. 22, 2014
mura, Kitaazumi-gun, Nagano Prefecture Due to the
Earthquake of November 22, 2014
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2014
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Regional―
Measures for Specified Regions in 2014
Disasters
Seasonal Rain
Front/Typhoon
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
CHAN-HOM
Designation and Identification of Essential Response(1509)/ Typhoon Kumamoto Pref.
Measures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms fromANGKA (1511)/
June 2 to July 26, 2015
Typhoon
HALOLA (1512)
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Typhoon GONI
Measures for the Districts of Odai Town, Taki-gun
Mie Pref.
(1515)and Kihoku Town, Kitamuro-gun, Mie Prefecture
Due to Rainstorms on August 24 and 26, 2015
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Miyagi,
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon ETAU Fukushima,
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from (1518), etc.
Ibaraki, andSeptember 7 to 11, 2015
Tochigi Pref.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2015 Regional
Designation and Identification of Essential Response―
Disasters
Measures for Specified Regions in 2015
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
The 2016
Kumamoto Pref.,Designation and Identification of Essential Response Kumamoto
etc.
Measures for the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake
Earthquake
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Seasonal Rain
Kumamoto andMeasures for Torrential Rains from June 6 to July 15, Front
Miyazaki Pref.
2016
Typhoon
CHANTHU(1607)/ Typhoon
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
MINDULLE
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Hokkaido and(1609)/ Typhoon
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from
Iwate Pref.
LIONROCK
August 16 to September 1, 2016
(1610)/ Typhoon
KOMPASU(1611), etc.
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon
Miyazaki and
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains from MALAKAS (1616) Kagoshima Pref.
September 17 to 21, 2016
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2016
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Regional―
Measures for Specified Regions in 2016
Disasters
Seasonal Rain
Front (Northern
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Kyushu Heavy
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Fukuoka and Oita
Rain, etc.)/
Measures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms on
Pref.
TyphoonJune 7 - July 27, 2017
NANMADOL(1703)

A-26

Main Applicable Measures
Other
Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Applicable
3, 4 56
7
12 16 17 19 24 Measures

●

○

○

●

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●

●

●

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*1

●

●

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●

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*1

●

●
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*1

○
*2

●

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*1
●

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*1

○

Title of Legislation
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for Rainstorms and Torrential Rains on
September 15 - 19, 2017
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for Rainstorms on October 21 - 23, 2017
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response
Measures for Specified Regions in 2017

Disaster Name

Main Applicable Measures
Other
Main DisasterArt. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Applicable
Affected Regions
3, 4 56
7
12 16 17 19 24 Measures

Typhoon TALIM(1718)

Kyoto, Ehime,
and Oita Pref.

●○

Typhoon LAN(1721)

Niigata and Mie
Pref., Kinki region

●

○

●

●

○

○

○

●

●

●

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○

●

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○

○
*1

●

●

●

●

2017
Regional―
Disasters
Seasonal Rain
Front (The Heavy
Rain Event ofJuly 2018, etc.)/
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
TyphoonOkayama,Designation and Identification of Essential Response
MALIKSI (1805)/ Hiroshima andMeasures for Torrential Rains and Rainstorms from
Typhoon GAEMI Ehime Pref.
May 20 to July 10, 2018
(1806)/ Typhoon
PRAPIROON(1807)/ Typhoon
MARIA (1808)
A series of
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disasterdisasters caused
Designation and Identification of Essential Response by 2018
Wakayama,
Measures for the Districts of Awashimaura Village, Typhoons
Nara, Osaka,
Iwafune-gun, Niigata Prefecture Due to Rainstorms SOULIK (1819), Nagano andand Torrential Rains from August 20 to September 5, CIMARON
Niigata Pref.
2018(1820), and JEBI(1821)
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
The 2018
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Hokkaido
Hokkaido
Measures for the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi
Eastern Iburi
Earthquake
Earthquake
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Tottori, Miyazaki
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Typhoon TRAMI
and Kagoshima
Measures for Rainstorms from September 28 to(1824)
Pref.
October 1, 2018
Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster2018
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Regional―
Measures for Specified Regions in 2018
Disasters

○
*1
○
*1

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●

*1 Public works facilities were considered as regional disaster*2 Limited to portions concerning item 3[Legend]○: Indicates a national disaster (Region is not specified, the disaster itself is specified).
●: Indicates a regional disaster (Disaster is specified at the municipal level.).
The applicable measures are the measures listed below prescribed in the Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters.
[Main applicable measures][Other applicable measures]Art. 3, 4: Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for public Art. 8: Application of interim measures related to financing for agricultural,works facilities
forestry, and fishery operators who are victims of natural disasters
Art. 5: Special measures on subsidies for disaster recovery projects forArt. 9: Subsidies for projects to remove deposited earth and sandagricultural land
conducted by forestry associations
Art. 6: Special cases of subsidies for disaster recovery projects forArt. 10: Subsidies for projects to remove floodwater conducted by land
agricultural, forestry, and fisheries shared-used facilities
improvement districts
Art. 7 (iii): Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for plant Art. 11: Subsidies for construction expenses for shared-use small fishing
and animal aquaculture facilities
boats
Art. 12: Special provision concerning disaster-related credit guarantees
Art. 11-2: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for forests
under the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act
Art. 14: Subsidies for disaster reconstruction projects for facilities including
Art 16: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for public social andbusiness cooperatives
educational facilities
Art. 20: Special cases of government loans based on the Act for the Welfare
Art. 17: Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for private school facilities
of Fatherless Families, motherless families and Widows
Art. 19: Special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented byArt. 22: Special cases of subsidies for public housing construction projects
municipalities to prevent infectious diseases
for victims
Art. 24: Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest
Art. 25: Special cases of paying job seeker benefits based on therelated to small disaster bonds in the standard budget request
Employment Insurance Act

Source: Cabinet Office

A-27

Fig.
Fig.A-14
A-14 Response of Government Ministries and Agencies to Major Disasters Since 2018

14-1

Heavy Snow Starting February 4, 2018

(1) Damage
From February 3 to 8, a strong winter pressure pattern prevailed, resulting in a continuous supply of extremely
cold air and intermittent snowfall over the Japan Sea side of northern to western Japan. In the Hokuriku region,
heavy snow fell on the mountains and mountainous areas as well as in the plains. In particular, in Fukui City, Fukui
Prefecture, the maximum snow depth reached 147 cm (3:00 p.m. on the 7th), which was the largest snowfall in
37 years since the heavy snow of 1961 (maximum snow depth: 196 cm).
Casualties due to falling and accidents during snow removal amounted to 22 fatalities and 102 seriously injured
as of February 16, 2018, with many houses completely or half destroyed. The heavy snows also caused traffic
hazards, such as road closures and railroad outages. In particular, a maximum of 1,500 vehicles were trapped near
the Fukui-Ishikawa prefectural border on National Route 8. It took three days for the road to reopen. The traffic
disruptions caused school and company closures and shortages of kerosene and gasoline and other daily
necessities, disturbing lives and economic activities of local residents.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
On February 2, an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting was held in order to prepare for upcoming heavy snows.
On February 6, the government held another Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting, which was attended by thenMinister of State for Disaster Management Okonogi, then State-Minister of the Cabinet Office Akama, and thenParliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office Yamashita, and gave instructions to relevant ministries and agencies
to take necessary response measures.
On February 24, a government investigation team led by then Minister of State for Disaster Management
Okonogi was sent to Fukui Prefecture to identify the situation of trapped traffic on National Route 8, damage to
agricultural fields, and the status of snow disposal sites. The investigation team also met the Governor of Fukui
Prefecture and leaders of 10 municipalities to exchange opinions. Based on the facts and issues identified throughthese direct investigations, the government took emergency disaster control measures and promoted recovery
support.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to requests
from the Governor of Fukui Prefecture.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・On Tuesday, February 6, numerous vehicles were trapped on National Route 8 in Awara City, Fukui
Prefecture, due to heavy snow. In response, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Governor of Fukui Prefecture
contacted the Commander of the GSDF 14th Infantry Regiment to request a disaster relief deployment
for the purpose of saving lives (request for withdrawal: 10:49 on Saturday, February 10).
B. Scale of Deployment
・Personnel: Approx. 4,925 people in total; vehicles: Approx. 805 in total
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・Although Fukui Prefecture had established more than 100 snow disposal sites, more of such sites wereneeded in order to contain record snow accumulation from intermittent snowfall starting Tuesday,
February 6. At 4:47 p.m. on Thursday, February 15, the Governor of Fukui Prefecture contacted theCommander of the GSDF 14th Infantry Regiment to request a disaster relief deployment for the
purpose of removing snow (request for withdrawal: 17:32 on Sunday, February 18).
B. Scale of Deployment
・Personnel: Approx. 35 people in total; vehicles: Approx. 15 in total
Due to the heavy snowfalls in FY2017, including one that started on February 4, the Disaster Relief Act was
invoked in respect of five municipalities in Niigata Prefecture and nine municipalities in Fukui Prefecture.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act (Heavy Snowfall in FY2017, Heavy Snow Starting February 4, 2018)]
Niigata Prefecture: Nagaoka City, Ojiya City, Tokamachi City, Uonuma City, Aga Town in Higashikanbara-gun(Date of invocation: February 14)
Fukui Prefecture: Fukui City, Ono City, Katsuyama City, Sabae City, Awara City, Sakai City, Eiheiji Town in
Yoshida-gun, Echizen Town in Nyu-gun (Date of invocation: February 6)
Echizen City (Date of invocation: February 13)

A-28

14-2

Earthquake centered in the northern Osaka Prefecture [Maximum
seismic intensity of Lower 6](1) Damage
At 7:58 a.m. on June 18, 2018, the Kinki region was struck by a 6.1-magnitude earthquake centered in thenorthern part of Osaka Prefecture. Strong intensities were recorded across the region, with five municipalities in
Osaka Prefecture (Kita-ku, Takatsuki City, Hirakata City, Ibaraki City, and Minoh City) registering a lower 6.
Casualties of the earthquake included 6 fatalities and 462 injured as well as damage to houses, including 21
completely destroyed, 454 half-destroyed, and 56,873 partially damaged as of February 12, 2019. The impact on
the lives of local residents was enormous. Damage relating to lifeline infrastructure encompassed blackouts
affecting a maximum of approximately 170,000 households, disruptions to gas supply affecting a maximum of
approximately 110,000 households, and water outages affecting approximately 94,000 households, as well as
disruptions to train services during commuting hours.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
Following the earthquake, at 8:03 a.m. on June 18, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions to therelated ministries and agencies:
1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking
emergency disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected people.
3. Ensure timely and accurate provision of information to the public regarding evacuation and the extent of
the damage
Under the direction of Prime Minister Abe, the government immediately took various emergency disaster
control measures, including convening an Emergency Meeting Team and holding a Cabinet meeting and an InterAgency Disaster Management Meeting. It also sent a Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team to the
Osaka Prefectural Government and supported the governments of the affected municipalities in carrying out
emergency disaster control measures. SDF units, which received a deployment request from the Governor of
Osaka Prefecture, supported emergency water supply, bathing, and the sealing of damaged houses using blue
tarps. In particular, the government strived hard together with the Japan Gas Association and other entities forrestoration from gas outages, which had affected vast areas.
On June 21, Prime Minister Abe and then Minister of State for Disaster Management Okonogi visited a school
in Osaka Prefecture to mourn children whose lives were taken by collapsing concrete-block walls. They also visited
evacuation sites and SDF’s bathing support facilities and shared opinions with the Governor of Osaka Prefecture
and the Mayors of Takatsuki City and Ibaraki City.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to requests fromthe governor of Osaka Prefecture.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・A water outage occurred at the National Cerebral and Cardiovascular Center (NCVC) in Suita City, Osaka
Prefecture. At 12:00 p.m. on Monday, June 18, the Governor of Osaka Prefecture contacted theCommander of the GSDF 3rd Division to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose of
securing water supply at the NCVC. The GSDF then received additional deployment requests for the
purpose of securing water supply in Minoh City and Takatsuki City and for the purpose of bathing
support in Ibaraki City. After that, the GSDF received additional deployment requests for the purposeof bathing support in Takatsuki City and emergency response support (sealing damaged houses withblue tarps) in Takatsuki City and Ibaraki City. (Request for withdrawal: 21:30 on Tuesday, June 26)
B. Scale of Deployment
・Personnel: Approx. 1,145 people in total; vehicles: Approx. 280 in total; aircraft: approx. 12 in total
Due to the earthquake disaster, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked in respect of twelve cities and one town,
while the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster was invoked in respect of
one city in Osaka Prefecture.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act]

A-29

[Osaka Prefecture] Osaka City, Toyonaka City, Suita City, Takatsuki City, Moriguchi City, Hirakata City, Ibaraki
City, Neyagawa City, Minoh City, Settsu City, Shijonawate City, Katano City, Shimamoto Town in Mishimagun (Date of invocation: June 18)[Invocation of the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster][Osaka Prefecture] Takatsuki City (Date of occurrence: June 18)

14-3

The Heavy Rain Event of July 2018

(1) Damage
Due to the effects of the rain front and Typhoon PRAPIROON (1807), warm and very moist air continued to flow
into the vicinity of Japan from June 28, which caused record-breaking rainfalls in western Japan and other areas
across the country. The total precipitation from June 28 to July 8 was over 1,800 mm in the Shikoku region andover 1,200 mm in the Tokai region, two to four times the average monthly rainfall in July.
The heavy rains caused river flooding and sediment disasters in Okayama Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, andEhime Prefecture. Human casualties amounted to 237 fatalities and 8 missing persons, while damage to houses
encompassed 6,767 completely destroyed, 11,243 half-destroyed, 3,991 partially damaged, 7,173 with abovefloor flooding, and 21,296 with below-floor flooding as of January 9, 2019. There were also significant disruptions
to the lifeline utilities, including electricity outages affecting a maximum of about 80,000 households and water
outages affecting a maximum of about 263,000 households. Traffic hazards included the suspension of 115 linesof 32 railway operators and the closure of 24 expressways as of 5 a.m. on July 7.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
On July 2, prior to the heavy rains, the government held an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting to share
information about the weather outlook and the steps being taken by ministers and agencies in response,
confirming that they would take appropriate response measures. On July 5, another Inter-Agency Disaster Alert
Meeting was held where the Minister of State for Disaster Management made an appeal to all members of the
public to take active initiatives for ensuring the safety of their lives.
At the Cabinet meeting held on July 7, the Prime Minister issued the following instructions, making sure thatthe government would spare no effort in responding to the disaster.
1. The utmost priority is human lives. Deploy rescue units with no delay and spare no effort in the rescue andrelief of affected people.
2. Proactively take all possible preventive measures to minimize the damage.
3. Work closely with affected prefectures and municipalities to evacuate local residents, support the lives ofaffected people, and restore lifeline utilities.
In the following days, the government sent Cabinet Office advance information-gathering teams to Okayama
Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, and Aichi Prefecture, in order to set up a system to coordinate with local
governments in the affected areas.
On July 8, the Emergency Response Headquarters for the Heavy Rain in July 2018 was established in accordancewith the Basic Act on Disaster Management. On the same day, its first meeting was held (a total of 23 meetings
were held after that). The Headquarters worked on the determination of the extent of the damage, total
coordination of emergency disaster control measures, and development of prevention measures for secondary
disasters. In addition, ministries and agencies sent a total of 79 senior officials (officials with titles equivalent tostatutory designated official or division or office manager) to affected local governments in order to facilitate
prompt decision-making, cross-departmental support, and coordination between ministries and agencies and theleaders and managers of the local governments.
Immediately after the disaster, the police, the fire department, the SDF, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism (MLIT) deployed response units from across the country to the disaster area to carry out
rescue and relief activities, secondary disaster prevention activities, and life support. The total number of rescue
workers deployed was about 19,400 from the Police, about 15,300 from the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency, and about 858,800 from the SDF, and about 10,800 from TEC-FORCE.
On July 9, the government established the Team to Support the Daily Lives of Affected People of the Heavy Rain
Event of July 2018 consisting of administrative vice-minister-level officials, headed by the Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary, in order to provide life support to solve the issues and needs in the affected areas determined basedon information from deployed government officials.

A-30

The disaster forced many people to live in shelters, while also causing significant disruptions to logistics due todamage to roads and railways. On July 8, the government decided to implement the “push-mode support,” whichmeans the government proactively procure and deliver relief supplies without waiting for requests from affectedareas. In order to robustly promote push-mode support, the government established in Central Government
Building No. 8 the Emergency Supplies Procurement and Delivery Team consisting of the Disaster Management
under the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI), MLIT, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and designated public corporations. Using reserve funds,
the Team procured and sent necessities that would affect human life, such as water, food, and air conditioners,in order to improve the environment of the shelters. The push-mode support was carried out until July 26. A totalof about 2.57 million items were supplied.
At the eleventh meeting of the Emergency Response Headquarters held on July 22, Prime Minister Abe issued
an instruction to formulate a package for the recovery of affected people’s lives and livelihoods. Following this
instruction, the government identified necessary measures to help affected local governments smoothly carry out
disaster recovery activities, disposal of disaster debris, and restoration of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, andlocal small and medium-sized businesses. To support these activities, the Cabinet approved the contribution of
the approximately 105.8 billion yen from reserve funds on August 3 and an additional contribution of 61.6 billion
yen on September 7. Moreover, from the FY2018 supplementary budget under the general account approved on
November 7, approximately 503.4 billion yen was allocated to recovery and restoration from the torrential raindisaster.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to requests fromthe governors of Kyoto, Kochi, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Okayama, Ehime, Yamaguchi and Hyogo Prefectures.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・A river in Kyoto Prefecture rose to a dangerous level on Thursday, July 5. At 1:10 a.m. on Friday, July 6,
the Governor of Kyoto Prefecture contacted the Commander of the GSDF 7th Infantry Regiment torequest a disaster deployment for the purpose of flood control activities (sandbagging to reinforce thelevees). (Request for withdrawal: 7:05 on Friday, July 6)
・On Friday, July 6, a river in Kochi Prefecture breached the levees, isolating some residents in Aki City,
Kochi Prefecture. At 3:30 a.m. that day, the Governor of Kochi Prefecture contacted the Commander of
the GSDF 50th Infantry Regiment to request a disaster deployment for the purpose of rescuing theisolated residents. (Request for withdrawal: 9:07 on Monday, July 16)
・On Friday, July 6, a landslide occurred in Kita-Kyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture. Sediment flowed into
houses, leaving two persons missing. At 9:56 a.m. that day, the Governor of Fukuoka Prefecture
contacted the Commander of the GSDF 4th Division to request a disaster deployment for the purposeof saving lives. Later, the Governor made additional disaster deployment requests for the purpose of
rescuing isolated residents in Iizuka City and Chikuzen Town. (Request for withdrawal: 8:24 on Monday,
July 9)・As a river in Kyoto Prefecture rose to a dangerous level, the Governor of Kyoto Prefecture contacted
the Commander of the GSDF 7th Infantry Regiment to request a disaster deployment for the purposeof flood control activities (sandbagging to reinforce the levees) on Friday, July 6. After the completionof the activities, due to the release of a dam upstream, additional flood control activities became
necessary. For this reason, at 6:35 p.m. on the same day, the Governor of Kyoto Prefecture contacted
the Commander of the GSDF 7th Infantry Regiment to request another disaster deployment for the
purpose of flood control activities. (Request for withdrawal: 23:30 on Friday, July 6)
・On Friday, July 6, a landslide occurred in Hiroshima Prefecture. Sediment flowed into houses, leaving
several persons missing. At 9:00 p.m. that day, the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture contacted theCommander of the GSDF 13th Division to request a disaster deployment for the purpose of saving lives.
(Request for withdrawal: 10:30 on Tuesday, August 14)
・On Friday, July 6, residents in Takahashi City, Okayama Prefecture became isolated. At 11:11 p.m. thatday, the Governor of Okayama Prefecture contacted the Commander of the GSDF 13th Artillery Unit torequest a disaster deployment for the purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 12:00 on
Saturday, August 18)
・On Saturday, July 7, a landslide occurred in Uesugi-cho, Ayabe City, Kyoto Prefecture. Sediment flowed
into houses, leaving several persons missing. In response, at 6:10 a.m. that day, the Governor of Kyoto
Prefecture contacted the Commander of the GSDF 7th Infantry Regiment to request another disaster
deployment for the purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 17:05 on Sunday, July 8)・On Saturday, July 7, a landslide occurred in Joya, Maizuru City, Kyoto Prefecture. Sediment flowed into
houses, leaving several persons missing. In response, at 9:42 a.m. that day, the Governor of Kyoto

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Prefecture contacted the Commander of the MSDF Maizuru District Fleet to request a disaster
deployment for the purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 10:02 on Thursday, July 12)・On Saturday, July 7, a landslide occurred in Uwajima, Ehime Prefecture. Sediment flowed into houses,
leaving several persons missing. In response, at 6:10 a.m. that day, the Governor of Ehime Prefecture
contacted the Commander of the GSDF Middle Army Artillery Unit to request a disaster deployment
for the purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 21:00 on Wednesday, August 15)
・On Saturday, July 7, a landslide occurred in Osogoe, Shuto-cho, Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture.
Sediment flowed into houses, leaving several persons missing. In response, at 7:35 a.m. that day, theGovernor of Yamaguchi Prefecture contacted the Commander of the GSDF 13th Brigade to request adisaster deployment for the purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 14:55 on Saturday, July
7)
・On Sunday, July 8, a landslide occurred in Shiso City, Hyogo Prefecture. Sediment flowed into houses,
leaving several persons missing. In response, at 5:00 a.m. that day, the Governor of Hyogo Prefecture
contacted the Commander of the GSDF 3rd Artillery Unit to request a disaster deployment for the
purpose of saving lives. (Request for withdrawal: 17:45 on Sunday, July 8)
B. Scale of Deployment
・Personnel: A maximum of approx. 33,100; Ships: A maximum of 28 (including private ship Hakuo);
Aircraft: A maximum of 38; LO: A maximum of approx. 300 LOs to 74 locations
Due to the torrential rains-related disasters, the Disaster Relief Act was invoked in respect of 110 municipalitiesin 11 prefectures, while the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster was
invoked in respect of 88 municipalities in 12 prefectures.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act]
[Kochi Prefecture] Aki City, Konan City, Motoyama Town in Nagaoka-gun (Date of invocation: July 6)
Sukumo City (Date of invocation: July 7)
Tosashimizu City, Otsuki Town in Hata-gun, Mihara Town in Hata-gun (Date of invocation: July 8)[Tottori Prefecture] Tottori City, Wakasa Town in Yazu-gun, Chizu Town in Yazu-gun, Yazu Town in Yazu-gun,Misasa Town in Tohaku-gun, Nanbu Town in Seihaku-gun, Houki Town in Seihaku-gun, Nichinan
Town in Hino-gun, Hino Town in Hino-gun, Kofu Town in Hino-gun (Date of invocation: July 6)[Hiroshima Prefecture] Hiroshima City, Kure City, Takehara City, Mihara City, Onomichi City, Fukuyama City,
Fuchu City, Miyoshi City, Shobara City, Higashihiroshima City, Etajima City, Fuchu Town in Akigun, Kaita Town in Aki-gun, Kumano Town in Aki-gun, Saka Town in Aki-gun (Date of invocation:
July 5)[Okayama Prefecture] Okayama City, Kurashiki City, Tamano City, Kasaoka City, Ibara City, Soja City,
Takahashi City, Niimi City, Setouchi City, Akaiwa City, Maniwa City, Asakuchi City, Hayashima
Town in Tsukubo-gun, Satosho Town in Asakuchi-gun, Kagamino Town in Tomata-gun,
Nishiawakura Village in Aida-gun, Kibichuo Town in Kaga-gun (Date of invocation: July 5)[Kyoto Prefecture] Fukuchiyama City, Maizuru City, Ayabe City, Miyazu City, Kyotango City, Nantan City,
Kyotamba Town in Funai-gun, Ine Town in Yosa-gun, Yosano Town in Yosa-gun (Date of
invocation: July 5)[Hyogo Prefecture] Toyooka City, Sasayama City, Asago City, Shiso City, Kamigori Town in Ako-gun, Kami
Town in Mikata-gun (Date of invocation: July 5)
Himeji City, Nishiwaki City, Tamba City, Taka Town in Taka-gun, Sayo Town in Sayo-gun (Date of
invocation: July 6)
Yabu City, Tatsuno City, Ichikawa Town in Kanzaki-gun, Kamikawa Town in Kanzaki-gun (Date of
invocation: July 7)[Ehime Prefecture] Imabari City, Uwajima City, Yawatahama City, Ozu City, Seiyo City, Matsuno Town in
Kitauwa-gun, Kihoku Town in Kitauwa-gun (Date of invocation: July 5)[Gifu Prefecture] Takayama City, Seki City, Nakatsugawa City, Ena City, Minokamo City, Kani City, Yamagata
City, Hida City, Motosu City, Gujo City, Gero City, Sakahogi Town in Kamo-gun, Hichiso Town in
Kamo-gun, Yaotsu Town in Kamo-gun, Shirakawa Town in Kamo–gun, Higashishirakawa Village in
Kamo-gun, Shirakawa Village in Ono-gun (Date of invocation: July 6)
Gifu City, Mino City, Tomika Town in Kamo-gun, Kawabe Town in Kamo-gun (Date of invocation:
July 8)[Okayama Prefecture] Tsuyama City, Mimasaka City (Date of invocation: July 5)
Yakage Town in Oda-gun, Wake Town in Wake-gun (Date of invocation: July 6)[Fukuoka Prefecture] Iizuka City, Kurume City (Date of invocation: July 5)

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[Shimane Prefecture] Gotsu City, Kawamoto Town in Ohchi-gun (Date of invocation: July 6)[Yamaguchi Prefecture] Iwakuni City (Date of invocation: July 6)[Invocation of the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster][Gifu Prefecture] Seki City (Date of occurrence: July 8)[Kyoto Prefecture] Fukuchiyama City, Ayabe City (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Hyogo Prefecture] Kobe City, Shiso City (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Shimane Prefecture] Gotsu City, Kawamoto Town in Ohchi-gun (Date of occurrence: July 6)[Okayama Prefecture] All areas (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Hiroshima Prefecture] All areas (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Yamaguchi Prefecture] Iwakuni City, Hikari City (Date of occurrence: July 6)[Tokushima Prefecture] Miyoshi City (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Ehime Prefecture] All areas (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Kochi Prefecture] Konan City (Date of occurrence: July 6)
Sukumo City, Otsuki Town in Hata-gun (Date of occurrence: July 8)[Fukuoka Prefecture] Kitakyushu City, Kurume City, Iizuka City, Kama City (Date of occurrence: July 5)[Saga Prefecture] Kiyama Town in Miyaki-gun (Date of occurrence: July 6)
In addition, in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Preservation of Rights and Interests of theAffected of Specified Disasters (Act No. 85 of 1996), the Heavy Rain Events of July 2018-related disasters were
designated as specified disasters in the Cabinet Order on the Designation of the Heavy Rain Event of July 2018Related Disasters as Specified Extraordinary Disasters and Measures to Be Applied. The applied special measures
included the extension of expirations of administrative rights and interests, exemption from obligations that were
not fulfilled in the designated periods, a special measure on orders to commence corporate bankruptcy
proceedings due to insolvency, a special measure on the period for the acceptance or renunciation of inheritance,
and a special measure on fees for filing a petition for conciliation under the Civil Conciliation Act (approved by the
Cabinet, promulgated and enforced on July 14).
The status of the extremely severe disaster designation for this disaster is as follows:
Disasters due to torrential rains and destructive storms between May 20 and July 10, 2018
(A series of disasters due to Typhoons MALIKSI (1805), GAEMI (1806), PRAPIROON (1807), and MARIA (1808), theHeavy Rain Events of July 2018, and the seasonal rain front)
Announcement of potential designation on July 15, approved by the Cabinet on July 24
Partial revisions of the Cabinet Order approved by the Cabinet on January 25, 2019 (*1)
AreaApplicable Measures
Nationwide
Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for public works
facilities
Special measures on subsidies for disaster recovery projects for agricultural
land
Special cases of subsidies for disaster recovery projects for agricultural,
forestry, and fisheries shared-used facilities
Special provision concerning disaster-related credit guarantees under the
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act(* The period of applying the special provision was prolonged by the Cabinet
Order for partial revisions (*1))
Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for public social and educational
facilities
Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for private school facilities
Special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented by municipalities toprevent infectious diseases
Special cases of government loans based on the Act for the Welfare ofFatherless Families, motherless families and Widows
Special cases of subsidies for public housing construction projects for victims
Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest related to small
disaster bonds in the standard budget request
Special cases of paying job seeker benefits based on the Employment
Insurance Act
Note) “LO” stands for Liaison Officer. In military terms, they are referred to as “renraku shoko” or “renraku-in.”

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14-4

Typhoon JEBI (1821)(1) Damage
Before noon on September 4, Typhoon JEBI (1821) made landfall on southern Tokushima Prefecture with verystrong intensity and crossed the Kinki region while accelerating. It moved northward over the Japan Sea andtransformed into an extra-tropical cyclone off the coast of the Russian Primorsky Krai at 9:00 a.m. on September 5.
During the approach and passage of the typhoon, very intense winds and rains hit western to northern Japan. The
Shikoku and Kinki regions experienced particularly strong winds and rains, with some areas observing record highstorm surges.
Casualties of the typhoon included 14 fatalities, 46 seriously injured, 965 lightly injured and damage to houses,
including 59 completely destroyed, 627 half-destroyed, 85,715 partially damaged, 64 with above-floor flooding, and452 with below-floor flooding as of February 12, 2019. The typhoon also severely affected local residents’ lives andeconomic activities of SMEs and the agriculture, forestry, and fishery industry and the tourism industry. There wasan electricity outage affecting approximately 1.7 million households in the area served by the Kansai Electric Power
due to power pole collapses from strong winds and landslides. It took about two weeks to recover from it. Also,
Kansai International Airport had to suspend its service due to inundation from record-breaking storm surges.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
On September 3, an Inter-Agency Disaster Alert Meeting attended by then Minister of State for Disaster
Management Okonogi was held to share information about the weather outlook and the steps being taken byministers and agencies in response. On September 5, after the passage of the typhoon, an Inter-Agency Disaster
Management Meeting was held to share information about the transition of weather, weather outlook, and the steps
being taken by ministers and agencies in response, and discussed measures for an early recovery from power outage,
which was an urgent issue in the heat.
On September 11, a government investigation team led by then Minister of State for Disaster Management
Okonogi was sent to Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures to ascertain the extent of the damage to Kobe Port from storm
surges and the damage to the connecting bridge at Kansai International Airport. The investigation team also met theleaders of the affected local governments. Through these efforts, the government strived to directly grasp the extent
of the damage. On September 28, the Cabinet held a meeting and formulated support measures for recovery andreconstruction from damage from the typhoon and strong winds. On the same day, the Cabinet approved the use of
15.3 billion yen from the reserves in order to support recovery from the typhoon and the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern
Iburi Earthquake. In addition, from the FY2018 supplementary budget under the general account approved on
November 7, approximately 105.3 billion yen was allocated to recovery and restoration from the typhoon (includes
funds for recovery from the 2018 Osaka Earthquake).
The status of the extremely severe disaster designation for this disaster is as follows:
Disasters in Awashimaura Village, Iwafune County, Niigata Prefecture due to destructive storms and torrential rains
between August 20 to September 5, 2018 (A series of disasters due to Typhoons SOULIK (1819), CIMARON (1820),
and JEBI (1821))
Announcement of potential designation on September 21, approved by the Cabinet on September 28
Additional announcement of potential designation on November 15
Partial revisions of the Cabinet Order approved by the Cabinet on November 30, 2018 (*1) and March 15,2019 (*2)
AreaApplicable Measures
Awashimaura Village, Niigata Prefecture
Special financial support for disaster recovery
Toshima Village, Kagoshima Prefecture
projects for public works facilities
Ooshika Village, Nagano Prefecture
Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal
Kozagawa Town, Wakayama Prefecture
and interest related to small disaster bonds in thestandard budget request
Ooshika Village, Nagano Prefecture
Special measures on subsidies for disaster recovery
Kozagawa Town, Wakayama Prefecture
projects for agricultural land
Sakegawa Village, Yamagata Prefecture
Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal
Nanao City, Hodatsushimizu Town and Nakanoto
and interest related to small disaster bonds in the
Town, Ishikawa Prefecture
standard budget request
Neba Village, Shimojo Village, Urugi Village andYasuoka Village, Nagano Prefecture

A-34

Toyone Village, Aichi Prefecture
Toyono Town, Osaka Prefecture
Tenkawa Village, Nosegawa Village, Totsukawa
Village and Kamikitayama Village, Nara Prefecture
Shingu City, Koya Town and Shirahama Town,
Wakayama Prefecture
Kamiyama Town, Tokushima Prefecture
Shiiba Village, Miyazaki Prefecture
Shirahama Town, Wakayama Prefecture

Special cases of subsidies for disaster recovery
projects for agricultural, forestry, and fisheries
shared-used facilities
Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for forests

Takatsuki City, Osaka Prefecture (Addition of
applicable measures and areas by the Cabinet
Order for partial revisions (*1))(*The underlined municipalities were added in accordance with the Cabinet Order on the Extremely Severe Disaster
Designation and Identification of Essential Response Measures for Specified Regions in 2018(*2).)

14-5

The 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake [Maximum seismic
intensity of 7](1) Damage
At 3:07 a.m. on September 6, 2018, a magnitude 6.7 earthquake occurred at 37 km deep in Eastern Iburi,
Hokkaido Prefecture (42.7 degrees north latitude and 142.0 degrees east longitude). The earthquake registered aseismic intensity of 7 in Atsuma Town, of 6 Upper in Abira Town and Mukawa Town, and of 6 Lower in Higashi-ku,
Sapporo City.
Casualties of this earthquake amounted to 42 fatalities and 762 injured and damage to houses, including 462
completely destroyed, 1,570 half-destroyed, and 12,600 partially damaged as of January 28, 2019.
At 3:25 a.m., approximately 20 minutes after the earthquake, a major blackout occurred due to faults at power
stations, including the Tomatoh-Atsuma Thermal Power Station, the largest power plant operating in the Hokkaido
Prefecture which is located near the epicenter. This was the first power outage in Japan in which power supply
was disrupted across the entire servicing area. The earthquake greatly affected local residents’ lives and economic
activities in the prefecture, including logistics and other activities of companies, the agriculture, forestry, andfisheries industry, and the tourism industry.
(2) Response from Government Ministries and Agencies
At 3:10 a.m. on September 6, 2018, immediately after the earthquake, the Prime Minister issued the following
instructions to relevant ministries and agencies.
1. Ascertain the extent of the damage without delay.
2. Work closely with local governments as an integrated government team, sparing no effort in taking emergency
disaster control measures, including the rescue and relief of affected people.
3. Fully implement measures to prevent further harm.
Immediately after the earthquake, the government summoned a meeting of an emergency team at the Cabinet
Intensive Information Center. Following the Prime Minister’s instructions, at 6:10 a.m., the government deployeda Cabinet Office advance information-gathering team to Hokkaido in order to ascertain the extent of the damage.
From this day onward, a series of Cabinet meetings and Inter-Agency Disaster Management Meetings were held
to ascertain the extent of the damage and share and confirm steps to be taken by the government. On the day ofthe earthquake, a local liaison and coordination office was established in order to facilitate close coordination
among relevant ministries and agencies and local governments in tackling various issues that occurred in Hokkaido
Prefecture due to a major blackout.
On September 7, a Push-Mode Support Coordination Meeting was held by the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), Ministry of Defense(MOD), and the Japan Trucking Association. At this meeting, the members formulated and agreed on a plan forrelief supplies support using contingency reserves (approximately 540 million yen; approved by the Cabinet on
September 10). In accordance with this plan, the government carried out push-mode support to procure anddeliver daily necessities to save affected people’s lives, such as foods, water, and blankets, tapping into theA-35transportation power of the SDF. Until the push-mode support was closed on September 21 (delivery date), a totalof approximately 330,000 items were procured and delivered.
On September 9, Prime Minister Abe visited Hokkaido Prefecture to examine the extent of the damage fromsoil liquefaction and sediment disasters, as well as the status of evacuation. He also met the leaders of affected
local governments to share opinions. On September 19, a government investigation team led by then Minister ofState for Disaster Management Okonogi was sent to Hokkaido Prefecture to ascertain the extent of the damage
and identify the issues faced by the affected areas in order to develop emergency disaster control measures.
On September 28, a Cabinet meeting was held. The Cabinet decided support measures for the 2018 Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi Earthquake and approved the use of contingency reserves. From the FY2018 supplementary budget
under the general account approved on November 7, approximately 118.8 billion yen was allocated to recovery
and restoration from the earthquake.
The SDF carried out the following disaster relief operations in the areas concerned, in response to a requestfrom the Governor of Hokkaido Prefecture.
A. Overview of Disaster Relief Operations
・At 6:00 a.m. on Thursday, September 6, the Governor of Hokkaido Prefecture contacted theCommander of the GSDF 7th Division to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose ofsaving life and securing water supply. At 9:00 a.m. the same day, the Governor also contacted theCommander of the GSDF 11th Division to request a disaster relief deployment for the purpose of
securing water supply. (Request for withdrawal: 23:00 on Sunday, October 14)
B. Scale of Deployment
Personnel: A maximum of approx. 25,100; Aircraft: 46; Ships: A maximum of 9 (including private ships
Hakuo and Natchan World); LO deployment: A maximum of 29 locations
Due to the earthquake disaster, the Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoodsof the Affected due to Disaster were invoked in respect of 179 municipalities in Hokkaido Prefecture.
[Invocation of the Disaster Relief Act]
[Hokkaido Prefecture] Sapporo City, Hakodate City, Otaru City, Asahikawa City, Muroran City, Kushiro City,
Obihiro City, Kitami City, Yubari City, Iwamizawa City, Abashiri City, Rumoi City, Tomakomai City,
Wakkanai City, Bibai City, Ashibetsu City, Ebetsu City, Akabira City, Mombetsu City, Shibetsu City,
Nayoro City, Mikasa City, Nemuro City, Chitose City, Takikawa City, Sunagawa City, Utashinai City,
Fukagawa City, Furano City, Noboribetsu City, Eniwa City, Date City, Kitahiroshima City, Ishikari
City, Hokuto City, Tobetsu Town in Ishikari-gun, Shinshinotsu Village in Ishikari-gun, Matsumae
Town in Matsumae-gun, Fukushima Town in Matsumae-gun, Shiriuchi Town in Kamiiso-gun,
Kikonai Town in Kamiiso-gun, Nanae Town in Kameda-gun, Shikabe Town in Kayabe-gun, Mori
Town in Kayabe-gun, Yakumo Town in Futami-gun, Oshamambe Town in Yamakoshi-gun, Esashi
Town in Hiyama-gun, Kaminokuni Town in Hiyama-gun, Assabu Town in Hiyama-gun, Otobe
Town in Nishi-gun, Okushiri Town in Okushiri-gun, Imakane Town in Setana-gun, Setana Town in
Kudo-gun, Shimamaki Town in Shimamaki-gun, Suttsu Town in Suttsu-gun, Kuromatsunai Town
in Suttsu-gun, Rankoshi Town in Isoya-gun, Niseko Town in Abuta-gun, Makkari Village in Abutagun, Rusutsu Village in Abuta-gun, Kimobetsu Town in Abuta-gun, Kyogoku Town in Abuta-gun,Kutchan Town in Abuta-gun, Kyowa Town in Iwanai-gun, Iwanai Town in Iwanai-gun, Tomari
Village in Furu-gun, Kamoenai Village in Furu-gun, Shakotan Town in Shakotan-gun, Furubira
Town in Furubira-gun, Niki Town in Yoichi-gun, Yoichi Town in Yoichi-gun, Akaigawa Village in
Yoichi-gun, Nanporo Town in Sorachi-gun, Naie Town in Sorachi-gun, Kamisunagawa Town in
Sorachi-gun, Yuni Town in Yubari-gun, Naganuma Town in Yubari-gun, Kuriyama Town in Yubarigun, Tsukigata Town in Kabato-gun, Urausu Town in Kabato-gun, Shintotsukawa Town in Kabatogun, Moseushi Town in Uryu-gun, Chippubetsu Town in Uryu-gun, Uryu Town in Uryu-gun,
Hokuryu Town in Uryu-gun, Numata Town in Uryu-gun, Takasu Town in Kamikawa-gun,Higashikagura Town in Kamikawa-gun, Tohma Town in Kamikawa-gun, Pippu Town in Kamikawagun, Aibetsu Town in Kamikawa-gun, Kamikawa Town in Kamikawa-gun, Higashikawa Town in
Kamikawa-gun, Biei Town in Kamikawa-gun, Kamifurano Town in Sorachi-gun, Nakafurano Town
in Sorachi-gun, Minamifurano Town in Sorachi-gun, Shimukappu Village in Yufutsu-gun,
Wassamu Town in Kamikawa-gun, Kembuchi Town in Kamikawa-gun, Shimokawa Town in
Kamikawa-gun, Bifuka Town in Nakagawa-gun, Otoineppu Village in Nakagawa-gun, Nakagawa
Town in Nakagawa-gun, Horokanai Town in Uryu-gun, Mashike Town in Mashike-gun, ObiraTown in Rumoi-gun, Tomamae Town in Tomamae-gun, Haboro Town in Tomamae-gun,
Shosanbetsu Village in Tomamae-gun, Embetsu Town in Teshio-gun, Teshio Town in Teshio-gun,
Sarufutsu Village in Soya-gun, Hamatonbetsu Town in Esashi-gun, Nakatonbetsu Town in Esashi-

A-36

gun, Esashi Town in Esashi-gun, Toyotomi Town in Teshio-gun, Rebun Town in Rebun-gun, Rishiri
Town in Rishiri-gun, Rishirifuji Town in Rishiri-gun, Horonobe Town in Teshio-gun, Bihoro Town in
Abashiri-gun, Tsubetsu Town in Abashiri-gun, Shari Town in Shari-gun, Kiyosato Town in Sharigun, Koshimizu Town in Shari-gun, Kuneppu Town in Tokoro-gun, Oketo Town in Tokoro-gun,Saroma Town in Tokoro-gun, Engaru Town in Mombetsu-gun, Yubetsu Town in Mombetsu-gun,Takinoue Town in Mombetsu-gun, Okoppe Town in Mombetsu-gun, Nishiokoppe Village in
Mombetsu-gun, Oumu Town in Mombetsu-gun, Ozora Town in Abashiri-gun, Toyoura Town in
Abuta-gun, Sobetsu Town in Usu-gun, Shiraoi Town in Shiraoi-gun, Atsuma Town in Yufutsu-gun,Toyako Town in Abuta-gun, Abira Town in Yufutsu-gun, Mukawa Town in Yufutsu-gun, Hidaka
Town in Saru-gun, Biratori Town in Saru-gun, Niikappu Town in Niikappu-gun, Urakawa Town in
Urakawa-gun, Samani Town in Samani-gun, Erimo Town in Horoizumi-gun, Shinhidaka Town in
Hidaka-gun, Otofuke Town in Kato-gun, Shihoro Town in Kato-gun, Kamishihoro Town in Katogun, Shikaoi Town in Kato-gun, Shintoku Town in Kamikawa-gun, Shimizu Town in Kamikawagun, Memuro Town in Kasai-gun, Nakasatsunai Village in Kasai-gun, Sarabetsu Village in Kasaigun, Taiki Town in Hiroo-gun, Hiroo Town in Hiroo-gun, Makubetsu Town in Nakagawa-gun,
Ikeda Town in Nakagawa-gun, Toyokoro Town in Nakagawa-gun, Honbetsu Town in Nakagawagun, Ashoro Town in Ashoro-gun, Rikubetsu Town in Ashoro-gun, Urahoro Town in Tokachi-gun,Kushiro Town in Kushiro-gun, Akkeshi Town in Akkeshi-gun, Hamanaka Town in Akkeshi-gun,Shibecha Town in Kawakami-gun, Teshikaga Town in Kawakami-gun, Tsurui Village in Akan-gun,Shiranuka Town in Shiranuka-gun, Betsukai Town in Notsuke-gun, Nakashibetsu Town in
Shibetsu-gun, Shibetsu Town in Shibetsu-gun, Rausu Town in Menashi-gun (Date of invocation:
September 6)[Invocation of the Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of the Affected due to Disaster][Hokkaido Prefecture] All areas (Date of occurrence: September 6)
The status of the extremely severe disaster designation for this disaster is as follows:
Disasters due to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake
Announcement of potential designation on September 13 and 21, approved by the Cabinet on September
28
Partial revisions of the Cabinet Order approved by the Cabinet on March 22, 2019 (*1)
AreaApplicable Measures
Nationwide
Special financial support for disaster recovery projects for public works
facilities
Special measures on subsidies for disaster recovery projects for agricultural
land
Special cases of subsidies for disaster recovery projects for agricultural,
forestry, and fisheries shared-used facilities
Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for public social and educational
facilities
Subsidies for disaster recovery projects for private school facilities
Special cases of cost coverage for projects implemented by municipalities
to prevent infectious diseases
Special cases of government loans based on the Act for the Welfare ofFatherless Families, motherless families and Widows
Inclusion of funds for the redemption of principal and interest related tosmall disaster bonds in the standard budget request
Atsuma Town, Abira Town Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit Insurance Act
and Mukawa Town,(* The period of applying the special provision was prolonged by the
Hokkaido Prefecture
Cabinet Order for partial revisions (*1))
Note) “LO” stands for Liaison Officer. In military terms, they are referred to as “renraku shoko” or “renrakuin.”

A-37

Fig.
Fig.A-15
A-15 Trends in Facility Damage and the Amount and as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
6,000

3.0%

Facility-Related Damage (JPY 1 billion)

5,000

2.5%

4,000

2.0%

3,000

1.5%

2,000

1.0%

1,000

0.5%

0

1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Percentage of GDP (%)

Facility-Related Damage (JPY 1 billion)% of GDP (%)

0.0%

Note: Gross domestic product (GDP) figures up to 1993 are based on the 2000 standard (SNA 1993), while those for 1994 onward are
based on the 2011 standard (SNA 2008)

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from various ministries and agencies

Fig.
Fig.A-16
A-16 Facility Damage Due to Disasters in 2017, by Hazard(Unit: JPY 1 million)
Facility type

Public works

Typhoon

Torrential
rain

Earthquake

Heavy
snowfall

119,525

167,966

6

0

Other

Total

Notes

16,198Rivers, forestry
303,695 conservation facilities,
ports, etc.
Farmland, agricultural
facilities, forestry
184,245roads, fishing facilities,
etc.

Agriculture, forest,and fisheries
industry

66,528108,314

134

310

8,959

Educational facilities

1,376

459

216

23

123

Public welfare
facilities

1,433

5,251

0

0

9

Social welfare
6,693 facilities, waterworks
facilities, etc.

Other facilities

2,564

5,856

601

1

0

Nature parks,
9,023 telegraph/telephone,urban facilities, etc.

191,426

287,846958

334

25,290

Total

2,197

505,854

Note: Totals may not agree due to rounding.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from various ministries and agencies

A-38

School facilities,
cultural heritages, etc.

Fig.
Fig.A-17
A-17 Comparison of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and theSumatra Earthquake
Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake (Japan)

Great East Japan Earthquake(Japan)Sumatra Earthquake(Indonesia)

Date & time

5:46 a.m., Jan. 17, 1995

2:46 p.m., March 11, 20119:58 a.m., Dec. 26, 2004

Magnitude

M7.3*Mw9.0*Mw9.1

Earthquake typeInlandOceanic trench

Oceanic trench

Affected area

City center

Mainly agricultural, forestry,
and fishery regions

Mainly agricultural, forestry,
and fishery regions

No. of prefectures withseismic intensity ofLower 6 or higher

1 (Hyogo)

8 (Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki,
Tochigi, Iwate, Gunma,
Saitama, Chiba)―

TsunamiReports of tsunami measuringtens of centimeters, nodamageLarge tsunami observed invarious regions (max. wave
height of more than 9.3 m inSoma, more than 8.5 m in
Miyako, more than 8.0 m in
Ofunato)Large tsunami observed inIndonesia as well as othercountries with coastline along
the Indian Ocean

Damage characteristics

Structures destroyed, large
fires erupted mainly in Nagataku

Large tsunami caused massive
damage in coastal areas,
destruction across many
districts

Large tsunami caused damage
to countries with coastline
along the Indian Ocean, withIndonesia suffering particularly
massive damage

Fatalities
Missing persons

Fatalities: 6,437
Missing persons: 3(May 19, 2006)

Fatalities: 19,689
Missing persons: 2,563(as of March 1, 2019)

Fatalities: 126,732
Missing persons: 93,662(as of March 30, 2005)

Homes damaged(totally destroyed)

104,906

121,995(as of March 1, 2019)

Unknown*

25 municipalities(2 prefectures)

241 municipalities(10 prefectures)*Including 4 municipalities (2prefectures) that invoked the
Act for an earthquake centeredin northern Nagano prefecturein2011―

Invocation of theDisaster Relief Act

Seismic intensity
distribution map(showing seismic
intensity of 4 and above)

―
震度階級

７
６
５
４

* Mw: Moment magnitude
Note: The seismic intensity levels were revised in 1996 to newly add Lower 5, Upper 5, Lower 6, and Upper 6.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office from Cabinet Office materials, Fire and Disaster Management Agency materials, andUNOCHA materials.

A-39

Fig.
Fig.A-18
A-18 Damage Estimate for the Great East Japan Earthquake
June 24, 2011
Category

Damage (Approx. Value)

Structures(Homes/housing sites, stores/offices, factories, machines, etc.)

JPY 10.4 trillion

Lifeline facilities(Water, gas, electricity, communications/broadcasting facilities)

JPY 1.3 trillion

Infrastructure facilities(Rivers, roads, ports, sewers, airports, etc.)

JPY 2.2 trillion

Agriculture, forest, and fisheries-related facilities(Farmland/agricultural facilities, forests and fields, fisheries-related
facilities, etc.)

JPY 1.9 trillion

Other(Educational facilities, healthcare/social welfare facilities, waste treatment
facilities, other public facilities)

JPY 1.1 trillion

Total

JPY 16.9 trillion

Note: This information has been compiled by Disaster Management Bureau of the Cabinet Office based on information provided
by individual prefectures and relevant ministries and agencies regarding damage to property (including buildings, lifeline
facilities, and infrastructure facilities). Information is subject to change as the details become clear.
Source: Cabinet Office

A-40

Fig.
Fig.A-19
A-19 Main Volcanic Eruptions and Volcanic Disasters in Japan
Year of
Eruption

Name of Volcano

No. ofVictims

1640

Hokkaido-Komagatake*At least 700

1663
1664
1667

Usuzan*Unzendake
Tarumaesan*5
At least 30

1694

Hokkaido-Komagatake

1707

Fujisan *

1721
1739

Asamayama
Tarumaesan *

15

1741

Oshima-Oshima

1,467

1769
1777
1779
1781

UsuzanIzu-Oshima
Sakurajima*
Sakurajima

At least 150
15

1783

Asamayama

1,151

1785

Aogashima

130–140

1792

Unzendake

15,0001822

Usuzan50–1031853

Usuzan1856

Hokkaido-Komagatake

1888

Bandaisan*

1900
1902

Adatarayama
Izu-Torishima

72
125

1914

Sakurajima*

58

1926

Tokachidake

144

1929

Hokkaido-Komagatake

2

1940

Miyakejima
Beyonesu (Bayonnaise)
Rocks (Myojin-sho)

11

1952
1943–45
1958
1991
2014

UsuzanAsosanUnzendake
Ontakesan

Eruption and Damage Characteristics

21–29
461–477

Sector collapse, debris flow, tsunami, large amount offalling ash, pyroclastic flow
Nearby homes disappeared or were buried
Lava flow, flood of water from crater
Pyroclastic flow, large amount of falling ash/pumice
Eruption with earthquake/volcanic thunder, falling pumicestone, pyroclastic flow
"Great Hoei eruption," large amount of falling ash,landslide disaster after eruption
Cinders
Pyroclastic flow, large amount of falling ash/pumice
Sector collapse, large tsunami occurred due to debris
avalanche
Large amount of falling ash/pumice, pyroclastic flow
"Great Anei eruption," lava flow, scoria fall
"Great Anei eruption," cinders, lava flow
Eruption on an island off of Komen, tsunami"Great Tenmei eruption," pyroclastic flow, lava flow,
flooding of Agatsuma River and Tone River
Cinders, mud, more than one-third of islanders became
victims. Uninhabited island for more than 50 years
thereafter"Shimabara taihen, Higo meiwaku," tsunami on opposing
shore due to collapse of Mt. Mayuyama
Pyroclastic flow, former Abuta village totally destroyed
Large amount of volcanic ash/pumice, formation of lava
dome, pyroclastic flow
Falling pumice, pyroclastic flow
5 towns and 11 villages buried in debris avalanche, debris
flow (volcanic mud flow)
Cinders, sulfur mine at crater totally destroyed
All islanders became victims"Great Taisho eruption," volcanic thunder, lava flow,earthquake, air wave, villages buried, large amount offalling ash
Larger mudflow, towns of Kamifurano and Biei buried
Large amount of falling ash/pumice, pyroclastic flow,
volcanic gas damage
Large amount of volcanic ash/volcanic bombs, lava flow

31 Pyroclastic surge
Large amount of volcanic ash, cinders, formation ofShowa-shinzan (new mountain)
12 Cinders
43 Pyroclastic flow, debris flow
58 Cinders
1*Indicates eruptions with apparent volume of ejecta of more than 1 km3
Note: Lists "Eruption disasters with 10 or more fatalities and/or missing persons" and "Large eruptions with an apparent volume
of ejecta of 0.1 km3 or more"
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the National Catalogue of the Active Volcanoes in Japan (4th Edition) (editedby the Japan Meteorological Agency, 2013).

A-41

Fig.
Fig.A-20
A-20 Number of Sediment Disasters
As of December 31, 2018

(Number of Sediment
Disasters)

Debrisflow
土石流等

Landslide
地すべり

Slope
failure
がけ崩れ

3,459

3500

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000

2008-2017 Average
1,106
1,058

966

1,492 1,514

1,422
1,184

1,128

941

837

695

788

500
0

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (Year)
Number of fatalities/
20
missing persons

22

11

85

24

53

81*

2

18

24

161

*In addition, there were 3 disaster-related deaths due to the Hiroshima Sediment Disaster
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Fig.
Fig.A-21
A-21 Increase in the frequency of short-duration downpours

Annual Number of Events (per 1,000 points) (Times)[AMeDAS] Annual Number of Events with Precipitation ≥ 50 mm/hour
Trend = 27.5 Times/DecadeYear
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (website)

A-42

Fig.
Fig.A-22
A-22 Number of Tornados

Tornado Distribution Map
Whole of Japan: 1961–2017

Source: Japan Meteorological Agency.

A-43

Fig.
Fig.A-23
A-23 Major Natural Disasters in the World Since 1900
Year
1900
1902
1902
1905
1906
1906
1906
1906
1907
1907
1908
1911
1911
1912
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

Disaster Type

1927
1927
1928
1930

Hurricane Galveston
Volcanic Eruption
Volcanic Eruption
Earthquake
Earthquake (Chiayi earthquake)
Earthquake/Fire
Earthquake
TyphoonEarthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake (Messina earthquake)
Flood
Volcanic Eruption
TyphoonEarthquake
Landslide
Earthquake
Earthquake
Volcanic Eruption
Earthquake/Landslide (Haiyuan
earthquake)
TyphoonEarthquake/Fire (Great Kanto
earthquake)
Earthquake (Kitatango earthquake)
Earthquake
Hurricane/Flood
Volcanic Eruption

1931

Flood

1932
1933
1933
1933
1935
1935
1939
1939
1939
1942
1942
1943

Earthquake (Gansu earthquake)
Flood
Tsunami (Showa Sanriku Tsunami)
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake (Quetta Earthquake)
Earthquake/Tsunami
Flood
Earthquake
CycloneCycloneEarthquake
Earthquake (Showa Tonankai
Earthquake)
Earthquake
Earthquake (Mikawa Earthquake)
Typhoon (Typhoon Makurazaki)
Earthquake/Tsunami (Showa Nankai
Earthquake)
Typhoon (Typhoon Kathleen)
Earthquake (Fukui Earthquake)
Earthquake (Ashgabat Earthquake)
Earthquake/Landslide
Flood
Flood
Volcanic Eruption
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Typhoon (Typhoon MARIE (5415))
Flood
Typhoon (Typhoon VERA (5915))
Flood
Earthquake
Earthquake/Tsunami

1920
1922
1923

1944
1944
1945
1945
1946
1947
1948
1948
1949
1949
1949
1951
1953
1953
1953
1954
1954
1959
1959
1960
1960
1960

GLIDE number

Country (Areas)
Texas, USA
Martinique (West Indies, Mt. Pelée)Santa Maria Volcano, Guatemala
Northern India
TaiwanSan Francisco, USA
Chile
Hong Kong
Tianshan, China
Uzbekistan (former Soviet Union)
Sicily, Italy
China
Taal Volcano, Philippines
Wenzhou, China
Central Italy
Italy, Austria
Bali, Indonesia
Guangdong, China
Kelut Volcano, Indonesia
Gansu, China

180,000

Shantou, China

100,000

Southeast Kanto region, Japan

143,000

Northern Kyoto, Japan
Nanchang, China
Florida, USA
Merapi volcano, Indonesia
Coastal areas of the Yangtze River andother rivers in China
Gansu, China
Henan, China
Sanriku, Japan
China
China
Baltistan, Pakistan
Chile
Hunan, China
Eastern Turkey
Bangladesh
Orissa, India
Tottori, Japan

2,930
200,000
2,000
1,400
3,700,000
70,00018,0003,000
10,000142,000
60,00030,000500,000
32,96261,00040,0001,083

Tonankai, Japan

1,200

Midwestern Argentina
Aichi, Japan
Western Japan

10,0002,300
3,700

Nankai, Japan

1,400

North of Tohoku, Japan
Fukui, Japan
Turkmenistan (former Soviet Union)
Tajikistan (former Soviet Union)
China
Guatemala
Mt. Lamington, Papua New Guinea
Coastal areas of the North Sea
Kyushu, Japan
Honshu, Japan
China
Japan
China
Japan
Bangladesh
Southwestern Morocco
Chile

A-44

Fatalities/Missing
Persons (approx.)
6,000
29,0006,000
20,0006,000
1,500
20,00010,00012,00012,00075,000100,000
1,300
50,00030,00010,00015,00010,000
5,200

1,900
3,900
110,000
12,00057,00040,000
2,900
1,800
1,000
1,100
40,0001,700
2,000,000
5,100
10,00012,000
6,000

Year

Disaster Type

1961
1962
1963
1965
1965
1968
1970
1970
1970
1971
1972
1974
1974
1975
1976
1976
1977
1978
1982
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994

1995
1995

CycloneEarthquake
CycloneCycloneCycloneEarthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake/Landslide
Cyclone Bhola
CycloneEarthquake (Managua earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake
Earthquake (Guatemala earthquake)
Earthquake (Tangshan earthquake)
CycloneEarthquake
Volcanic Eruption
CycloneEarthquake
Volcanic Eruption
Toxic gas
Earthquake
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake
Flood
Earthquake (Spitak Earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood
Flood/Landslide
Earthquake (Manjil Earthquake)
Earthquake
Cyclone/Storm Surge
Flood
Typhoon THELMA (9125)
Flood
Earthquake/Tsunami
Flood
Earthquake (Maharashtra Earthquake)
Flood
Torrential Rain, Flood
Typhoon, Flood
Tropical Storm
Earthquake (Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake)
Earthquake
Flood

1996

Flood/Typhoon

1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

Typhoon/Flood
Earthquake
Flood
Flood
Typhoon LINDA (9726)
Earthquake
Earthquake
Flood/Landslide
Cyclone
Flood

1998

Flood

FL-1998-000165-CHN

1998
1998

Tsunami (Aitape Tsunami)
Hurricane Mitch

TS-1998-000220-PNG
TC-1998-000012-HND

1995

GLIDE number

Country (Areas)
Bangladesh
Northwestern Iran
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Southern Pakistan
Northwestern IranYunnan, China
Northern Peru
Bangladesh
Orissa, India
Nicaragua
Yunnan and Sichuan, China
Bangladesh
Liaoning, China
GuatemalaTianjin, China
Andhra Pradesh, India
Northeastern IranEl Chichon Volcano, Mexico
Bangladesh
Mexico City, Mexico
Nevado del Ruiz Volcano, Colombia
Lake Nyos, Western Cameroon
San Salvador, El Salvador
Northwestern Ecuador
Bangladesh
India, Nepal
Bangladesh
Armenia (former Soviet Union)
Yunnan, China
India
Sichuan, China
Northern IranPhilippines
Chittagong, Bangladesh
Jiangsu, China
Philippines
PakistanIndonesia
Nepal
India
India
India
Six Southern Provinces of China
Haiti

EQ-1997-000095-IRN
FL-1997-000260-IND
FL-1997-000265-SOM
TC-1997-000007-VNM
EQ-1998-000026-AFG
EQ-1998-000152-AFG
FL-1998-000392-IND
FL-1998-000203-BGD

A-45

Fatalities/Missing
Persons (approx.)
11,00012,00022,00036,00010,00012,00010,00070,000300,000
10,00010,00020,00028,70010,00024,000242,000
20,00025,00017,00010,00010,00022,000
1,700
1,000
5,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
25,000
1,000
1,000
2,000
41,0002,000
137,000
1,900
6,000
1,300
2,100
1,800
9,800
1,200
2,000
1,000
1,100

Japan

6,300

RussiaChina
Seven southern and five northern andnorthwestern provinces of China
Viet Nam
Eastern Iran
India
Southern SomaliaSouthern Viet Nam
Northern Afghanistan
Northern Afghanistan
Assam state, India
India
Bangladesh
Coastal areas of the Yangtze River andother rivers in China
Papua New Guinea
Honduras, Nicaragua

1,800
1,200
2,800
1,000
1,600
1,400
2,000
3,700
2,300
4,700
3,000
2,900
1,000
3,700
2,600
17,000Year

Disaster Type

1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
2003
2003
2004
2004

Earthquake (Quindio Earthquake)
Earthquake (Izmit Earthquake)
Earthquake (Chi-Chi earthquake)
CycloneFlood
Earthquake (Gujarat earthquake)
Earthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake (Bam earthquake)
Flood
Hurricane

2004

Earthquake, Tsunami (2004 Indian
Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami)

2005
2005

Flood/Landslide
Hurricane Katrina

2005

Rainstorm

2005

Hurricane Stan/Flood

2005

Earthquake (Pakistan earthquake)

2006
2006
2006
2007
2007

Landslide
Earthquake/Volcanic Eruption
Typhoon XANGSANE (0615)
Heavy Rain, Flood
Cyclone Sidr
Earthquake (Great Sichuan
Earthquake)
Cyclone Nargis
Flood
Earthquake (2009 Sumatra
Earthquake)
Flood
Earthquake (Haiti Earthquake)
Earthquake (Yushu Earthquake)
Flood
Torrential Rain, Debris Flow
Earthquake, Tsunami (Great East Japan
Earthquake)
Typhoon WASHI (1121)
Typhoon BOPHA (1224)
Flood
Typhoon HAIYAN (1330)
Earthquake (Nepal Earthquake)
Earthquake, Tsunami

2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2012
2013
2013
2015
2018

GLIDE number
EQ-1999-000007-COL
EQ-1999-000008-TUR
EQ-1999-000321-TWN
ST-1999-000425-IND
EQ-2001-000033-IND
EQ-2001-000013-SLV
EQ-2003-000074-DZA
EQ-2003-000630-IRN
FL-2004-000028-HTI
TC-2004-000089-JAM
TS-2004-000147-LKA
TS-2004-000147-IDN
TS-2004-000147-MDV
TS-2004-000147-IND
TS-2004-000147-THA
TS-2004-000147-MYS
TS-2004-000147-MMR
TS-2004-000147-SOM
TS-2004-000147-BGD
FL-2005-000125-IND
TC-2005-000144-USA
ST-2005-000162-IND
ST-2005-000162-BGD
TC-2005-000171-GTM
FL-2005-000171-SLV
EQ-2005-000174-PAK
EQ-2005-000174-IND
LS-2006-000024-PHL
VO-2006-000048-IDN
TC-2006-000144-PHL
FL-2007-000096-IND
TC-2007-000208-BGD

Country (Areas)
Mid-western Colombia
Western Turkey
TaiwanIndia
Venezuela
India
El Salvador
Northern Algeria
Iran
Haiti
USA, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Haiti

Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives, India,
Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania,
Bangladesh, Kenya

Fatalities/Missing
Persons (approx.)
1,200
15,5002,300
9,500
30,00020,0001,200
2,300
26,8002,700
3,000Over 226,000

India
USA

1,200
1,800

India, Bangladesh

1,300

Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico

1,500

Pakistan and northern India

75,000Philippines
Merapi volcano, Indonesia
Luzon, Philippines
India
Bangladesh

1,100
5,800
1,400
1,100
4,200

EQ-2008-000062-CHN

China

87,500

TC-2008-000057-MMR
FL-2008-000089-IND

Myanmar
North-eastern India

138,400
1,100

EQ-2009-000273-IDN

Indonesia

FL-2009-000217-IND
EQ-2010-000009-HTI
EQ-2010-000073-CHN
FL-2010-000141-PA
LS-2010-000156-CHN

Southern India
Haiti
Qinghai, China
North-western Pakistan
Yangtze River Basin, China

1,200
222,600
3,000
2,000
1,800

EQ-2011-000028-JPN

Tohoku and Kanto regions, Japan

19,000

TC-2011-000189-PH
TC-2012-000197-PHL
FL-2013-000070-IND
TC-2013-000139-PHL
EQ-2015-000048-NPL
EQ-2018-000156-IDN

Mindanao, Philippines
Mindanao, Philippines
Northern India
Leyte, Philippines
Nepal
Sulawesi, Indonesia,

1,400
1,900
1,500
6,200
9,000
3,400

1,200

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) (www.emdat.be),
Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium), and Chronological Scientific Tables
Note) GLIDE number (GLobal unique disaster IDEntifier number) was proposed by the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC)
in 2001 to share disaster information between different databases by allocating a common and unique disaster number
to each of various disasters in the world, and operated jointly by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA, ReliefWeb) for use of numerous disaster-related organizations. The number does not cover all kinds of disasters
because it is allocated for a disaster when the relevant organization decides to allocate as required according torespective criteria. If the use of GLIDE is more common in disaster-related organizations in the future, more information
on disasters can be shared.

A-46

Fig.A-24
A-24 Top 10 Largest Earthquakes Since 1900
Fig.
(As of March 1, 2019)

Ranking

Date (Japan Time)

1
2
3
4

May 23, 1960
March 28, 1964
December 26, 2004

6
8
9

March 11, 2011
November 5, 1952
February 27, 2010
February 1, 1906
February 4, 1965
April 11, 2012
March 29, 2005
March 10, 1957
August 16, 1950
April 1, 1946

Location
Chile
Gulf of Alaska
Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Off the Sanriku Coast, Japan(2011 Great East Japan Earthquake)
Kamchatka Peninsula
Offshore Maule, Chile
Offshore Ecuador
Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Aleutian Islands, Alaska
Tibet, Assam
Aleutian Islands, Alaska

Magnitude
(Mw)
9.5
9.2
9.1
9.0
9.0
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.6
8.6
8.6
8.6
8.6

*Mw: Moment magnitude*The magnitude (Mw) of 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake is based on materials from JMA.
Source: US Geological Survey

Fig.
Fig.A-25
A-25 Major Natural Disasters Since 2018
Date
Jan. 2018
Jan.-Feb. 2018
Jan.-Mar. 2018
Jan. 2-5, 2018
Jan. 5-8, 2018
Jan. 13-17, 2018
Feb. 12, 2018
Feb. 26, 2018
Mar. 1-3, 2018
Mar.-Aug. 2018
Mar. 3-5, 2018
Mar. 3, 2018
Mar. 14-Apr. 30, 2018
Apr. 1-30, 2018
Apr.-Dec. 2018
May 1-10, 2018
May 3-30, 2018
May 7-30, 2018
May 18-22, 2018
May 19-26, 2018
May 21, 2018
Jun.-Aug. 2018
Jun.-Aug. 31, 2018
Jun.-Aug. 2018
Jun.-Aug. 2018
Jun.-Aug. 2018
Jun. 3, 2018
Jun. 29-Jul. 8, 2018
Jul. 1-15, 2018
Jul. 5-7, 2018

Country

Disaster TypePakistan
Mongolia
Argentina
China
Madagascar
Philippines
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
USA
Mauritania
RwandaChina
Kenya
Somalia
Madagascar
India
USA
China
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Somalia
Guatemala
Niger
Nicaragua
Honduras
El Salvador
Guatemala
Japan
Japan
China

Drought
Cold wave
Drought
Rainstorms
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Earthquake
Rainstorms
Drought
Flood
Rainstorms
FloodRiver flooding
Drought
Rainstorms
Volcanic eruption
Flood
Heat wave
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Drought
Flood
Drought
Drought
Drought
Volcanic eruption
Flood
Heat wave
Flood

A-47

Fatalities
0
0
0
21
73
11
0
145
9
0
116
14
72
0
0
143
0
77
180
20
53
0
36
0
0
0
425
230
119
108

Affected Direct Damages
People(USD 1,000)
2,807,3500264,000003,400,000
2,503,700
854,000
161,3180
180,000
0
254,859
3,070
544,300
61,00002,250,000
350,600
0
26,0510
177,000
147,000
211,188
350,000
700,00001,260,000
0200
24,0002,500
0225,000
373,000
00
153,7120
228,00001,500,000
44,669130,4680
300,0000
360,000
0386,61037,0001,714,414
01,500,102
9,500,000
49,0000450,000
1,300,000

Date
Jul. 7, 2018
Jul. 10-11, 2018
Jul. 13-16, 2018
Jul. 15-Aug. 10, 2018
Jul. 17-21, 2018
Jul. 18-19, 2018
Jul. 23, 2018
Jul. 23-24, 2018
Jul. 27-Aug. 31, 2018
Jul. 29, 2018
Aug. 2018
Aug.-Oct. 2018
Aug. 1-Nov. 24, 2018
Aug. 5, 2018
Aug. 7-20, 2018
Aug. 13-16, 2018
Aug. 15-17, 2018
Aug. 24-Sep.6, 2018
Aug. 31-Oct. 2, 2018
Sep. 4-5, 2018
Sep. 12-18, 2018
Sep. 16, 2018
Sep. 20-Oct.2, 2018
Sep. 28, 2018
Sep. 28-Oct. 1, 2018
Oct. 2-11, 2018
Oct. 10-11, 2018
Oct. 11-12, 2018
Oct. 19-23, 2018
Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 2018
Oct. 30, 2018
Nov. 8-16, 2018
Nov. 8, 2018
Nov. 16, 2018
Dec. 2018
Dec. 22, 2018
Dec. 28-31, 2018
Jan. 4, 2019

Country

Disaster Type

China
China
Nigeria
MyanmarPhilippines
Laos
Laos
GreeceUSA
Indonesia
Australia
Afghanistan
Congo
Indonesia
India
Laos
China
North Korea
Ghana
Japan
USA
Philippines
Nigeria

Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Forest fire
Forest fire
Earthquake
Drought
Drought
PlagueEarthquake
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Flood
Tropical cyclone
Tropical cyclone
Tropical cyclone
Flood
Earthquake/Indonesia
TsunamiJapan
Tropical cyclone
Costa Rica
Flood
USA
Tropical cyclone
India
Tropical cyclone
Trinidad and Tobago
Flood
Italy
Rainstorms
Philippines
Tropical cyclone
USA
Forest fire
USA
Forest fireIndia
Tropical cyclone
Nigeria
Flood
Indonesia
Volcanic eruption
Philippines
Tropical cyclone
Thailand
Tropical cyclone

Fatalities
3
16
101
16
0
0
136
126
14
14
0
0
236
564
504
0
53
146
34
17
53
84
199

Affected Direct Damages
People(USD 1,000)
1,381,000
781,283
1,519,000
530,689
15,872
0109,65001,677,993
25,944
120,000
0
13,100069
03,237
1,000,000
102,852
23,00001,200,000
2,200,000
0412
0516,927
509,000
23,220,000
2,852,480
660,000
039,6005,360,000
581,2680
100,000
0
3,900
12,500,000
1,500,000
14,000,000
3,800,138
32,033
1,922,332
275,000

3,400

210,894

1,000,000

4
1
45
85
0
12
12
85
2
45
0
453
182
7

18,200125,190
5,000
300,200
150,000
2,200
253,300
250,000
3
249,000
2,000,000
47,778926,690
720,885

1,000,000
0
16,000,000
920,000
3,700
1,100,000
2,402
16,500,000
5,200,000
000169,9140

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from EM-DAT: The International Disaster Database (Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain).

(1) India: Floods (FL-2018-000134-IND)
Heavy rains during the monsoon season in June 2018 and torrential rains from August 1 to 19, which exceeded
758 mm, caused massive floods and landslides in Kerala, India. The intense rains that hit a wide area across thenation caused floods in eight states, including Kerala. The number of fatalities and missing persons exceeded
500 and the number of affected people exceeded 23 million people.
The National Disaster Response Team, national disaster WATSAN response teams, state disaster response teams,
and the Indian Red Cross Society provided emergency medical services and carried out hygiene control
measures. The safety of well water was also checked, as almost a half of residents in Kerala use it as drinking
water. The Japanese Red Cross Society also supported disaster control measures and reconstruction andrecovery from the disaster through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

A-48

(2) Indonesia: Earthquake, Tsunami (EQ-2018-000156-IDN)
Around 5:02 p.m. on September 28, 2018 (around 7:02 p.m. on the 28th Japan time), a magnitude 7.5
earthquake occurred with the epicenter located 78 km north of Palu, Donggala Regency, Central Sulawesi
Province on Sulawesi Island, Indonesia. The earthquake left approximately 3,400 people dead or missing, while
also causing massive damage to approximately 68,000 houses and 45 medical facilities in Palu, the provincial
capital, Donggala, Donggala Regency, and other areas.
It was pointed out that one of the causes that expanded the extent of the damage was landslides caused byinland and coastal soil liquefaction and tsunamis generated by it. The Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA) carried out detailed analyses of the tsunami and liquefaction phenomena and created an elaborate
hazard map. JICA is providing ongoing support for formulating a reconstruction basic plan based on the hazard
map.
(3) United States: Wildfire (WF-2018-000421-USA)
On November 8, 2018, the wildfire that occurred in northern Butte County, California (the Camp Fire) left 85
people dead and approximately 14,000 houses damaged and burned approximately 62,000 hectares. It wasreported that there were some people caught in fire while evacuating in cars, as the fire extended at a highspeed while the main roads were jammed.
There were other wildfires in California on the same day. Together with the Hill in southern California andWoolsey in the suburbs of Los Angeles, the total insured losses were estimated to be more than 9 billion dollars,record-high losses from wildfires in the history of the United States. California often has extremely hot and dryweather conditions that can cause wildfires. It has had many wildfires in recent years.

A-49

3. Laws and Systems
Fig.
Fig.A-26
A-26 Evolution of Disaster Management Laws and Systems Since 1945
Disasters that triggered law/system introduction

1940s

Disaster Management Law

Explanation

1945 Typhoon Ida (Makurazaki)
1946 The Nankai Earthquake
1947 Typhoon Kathleen
1948 The Fukui Earthquake

1950s
1960s

49 The Flood Control Act

1959 Typhoon Vera (Isewan)

50 The Building Standards Act

1961 Heavy Snows

60 Soil Conservation and Flood Control Urgent Measures Act
61 Basic Act on Disaster Management
62 National Disaster Management Council established
63 Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
62 Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with
Extremely Severe Disasters
Act on Special Measures for Heavy Snowfall Areas
66 Act on Earthquake Insurance

1964 The 1964 Niigata Earthquake
1967 Torrential Rains in Uetsu
1970s

47 The Disaster Relief Act

1973 Mt. Sakurajima Eruption
Mt. Asama Eruption
1976 The Seismological Society ofJapan publishes reports on a
possible Tokai Earthquake

1978 The 1978 Miyagi Earthquake

Establishment of fundamental disaster prevention laws
・ Clear assignment of federal responsibilities
・ Development of cumulative and organized disaster prevention
structures etc.

73 Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence Grant
Act on Development of Evacuation Facilities in Areas
Surrounding Active Volcanoes (Act on Special
Measures for Active Volcanoes (1978))78 Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures forLarge-Scale Earthquakes

80 Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent Earthquake

1980s

Countermeasure Improvement Projects in Areas for Intensified
Measures

81 Partial amendment of Order for Enforcement of the Building

・Induction of current earthquake engineering laws, etc.

Standard Law

1990s

1995 The Southern Hyogo
Earthquake(The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake)
1999 Torrential Rains in Hiroshima
Tokaimura Nuclear Accident(The JCO Nuclear Accident)

2000s2000 Torrential Rains in the
Tokai Region

2004 Torrential Rains in Niigata,
Fukushima
The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu
Earthquake

95 Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures
Act on Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings
Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
96 Act on Special Measures for the Preservation of Rights andInterests of the Victims of Specified Disasters
97 Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience Improvement inDensely Inhabited Areas
98 Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
99 Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness

00 Act on the Promotion of Sediment Disaster Countermeasuresfor Sediment Disaster Hazard Areas

01 Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act
02 Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Tohnankai andNankai Earthquake Disaster Management
03 Specified Urban River Inundation Countermeasures Act
04 Act on Special Measures for Promotion of Disaster
Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinityof the Japan and Chishima Trenches

05 Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act

Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of Sediment
Disaster Countermeasures in Sediment Disaster Hazard Areas
Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of the Seismic
Reinforcement and Retrofitting of Buildings
06 Partial amendment of the Act on the Regulation of
Residential Land Development

2011 The 2011 Tohoku Region
Pacific Coast Earthquake(The Great East Japan
Earthquake)

11 Act on the Promotion of Measures for Tsunami
Act on Development of Areas Resilient to Tsunami Disasters

12 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

13 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Act on Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters
Partial amendment of the Act on the Promotion of the
Seismic Reinforcement and Retrofitting of Buildings
Partial amendment of the Flood Control Act and River Act
Act on Special Measures for Land and Building Leases in Areas
Affected by Large-scale Disasters
Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Nankai TroughEarthquake Disaster Management (Partial amendment of the
Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Tonankai andNankai Earthquake Disaster Management)

Act on Special Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake2014 Heavy Snow
Hiroshima Sediment Disaster
Mt. Ontake Eruption

14 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
Partial amendment of Act on the Promotion of Sediment
Disaster Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Hazard Areas

15 Partial amendment of Act on Special Measures for Active
2016 The 2016 Kumamoto
Earthquake
2018

Volcanoes
Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management
16 Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster Management

18 Partial amendment of the Disaster Relief Act
Partial amendment of Basic Act on Disaster
Management

Source: Cabinet Office

A-50

・ Establishment of disaster management mechanisms based on volunteer
groups and private organizations, loosening of requirements for theestablishment of a National Disaster Management Council led by thePrime Minister, the codification of disaster relief requests for the JSDF,
etc.

・ More rivers were added to flood alert lists, announcement of expected inundation areas.

・ Expansion of list of designated rivers in expected inundation area.
・ Increased efforts in public education through use of Sediment Disaster Hazard Maps.
・ Establishment of basic national directives and regional earthquake - proof retrofit plans, andpromotion of organized earthquake - proofing.
First Amendment (2012)
・ Regional response for large - scale disasters.
・ Incorporated lessons from the disaster, improvements to disaster management education, andimprovements to regional disaster management capabilities through participation of diverse entities
in implementation.
Second Amendment (2013)
・ Improvement of support for affected people.
・ Improvements to rapid response capabilities in the event of a large - scale and regional disaster.
・ Smooth and safe evacuation of residents.
・ Improvements in disaster countermeasures in daily life.

・ Establishment of obligatory earthquake - proofing examinations and publication of test
results for large buildings in need of emergency safety checks.
・ Participation of diverse entities including river management organizations in flood control
activities, acquisition of appropriate maintenance and management needs in rivermanagement facilities, etc.
・ Designation of Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster Countermeasure Promotion Areas,
promotion of earthquake disaster management for the Nankai Trough Earthquake throughthe creation of a Basic Plan.
・ Designation of Areas for Urgent Implementation of Measures against a Tokyo Inland
Earthquake and promotion of earthquake management through the creation of a Basic Plan.

・ Establishment of laws regarding abandoned vehicles in opening up transportationroutes for emergency vehicles in large - scale disasters, etc. (Responsibleorganization: road managers)
・ Clear definitions of sediment disaster - prone areas (publication of basic
investigations), provision of information necessary for issuing evacuation alerts.
・ Formulation of basic guidelines by the government; designation of volcanic eruption
hazard zones; establishment of Volcanic Disaster Management Councils in designated zones;
imposition of mandatory preparation of evacuation implementation plans, etc.

・ Matters concerning the disposal of waste generated by a specific major disaster:
formulation of disaster waste management guidelines by the Minister of theEnvironment; central government takeover of the disposal of disaster waste, etc.
・ Establishment of laws regarding abandoned vehicles in opening up transportationroutes for emergency vehicles in large-scale disasters. (Port management bodies andfishing port management bodies added as responsible organizations)・Establishment of a system to allow rescue implementing cities to carry out rescue
operations as their own administrative tasks.
・Clearly stipulating that prefectures receiving a support request from an affected
prefecture can order municipalities in their jurisdictions to support affectedmunicipalities.

Fig.
Fig.A-27
A-27 Major Disaster Management Laws by Type of Disaster
Type

Prevention

Emergency
Response

Recovery/Reconstruction

Basic Act on Disaster Management
・Act on Special Measures Concerning
・Disaster Relief
Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Act
・Fire Service Act
・Act on the Promotion of Measures for・Police Act
Tsunami・Self-Defense
・Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent
Forces Act

Earthquakes,
Tsunamis

Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement
Projects in Areas for Intensified Measures
・Act on Special Measures for Earthquake
Disaster Countermeasures
・Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of
Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster
Management
・Act on Special Measures against Tokyo Inland
Earthquake
・Act on Special Measures for Promotion ofDisaster Management for Trench-type
Earthquakes in the Vicinity of the Japan andChishima Trenches・Act on Promotion of the Earthquake-proof
Retrofit of Buildings
・Act on Promotion of Disaster Resilience
Improvement in Densely Inhabited Areas
・Act on Development of Areas Resilient to
Tsunami Disasters

Volcanic
eruptions・Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes

Windstorms,
flooding

・River Act

Landslides,
rockfalls,
debris flow

・Erosion Control Act
・Forest Act
・Landslide Prevention Act
・Act on Prevention of Disasters Caused by
Steep Slope Failure・Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster
Countermeasures in Sediment Disaster
Hazard Areas

Nuclearpower<General Relief and Support Measures>
・Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Credit
Insurance Act
・Act on Financial Support of Farmers, Forestry
Workers and Fishery Workers Suffering fromNatural Disaster・Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence Grant
・Employment Insurance Act
・Act on Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods ofDisaster Victims
・Japan Finance Corporation Act<Disposal of Disaster Waste>・Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act

・FloodControlAct<Disaster Recovery Work>・Act on Temporary Measures for Subsidies from
National Treasury for Expenses for Project to
Recover Facilities for Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries Damaged by Disaster・Act on National Treasury's Sharing of Expenses for
Project to Recover Public Civil Engineering Works
Damaged by Disaster・Act on National Treasury's Sharing of Expenses for
Recovery of Public School Facilities Damaged by
Disaster・Act on Special Measures concerning Reconstructionof Urban Districts Damaged by Disaster・Act on Special Measures concerning Reconstructionof Condominiums Destroyed by Disaster<Insurance and Mutual Aid System>
・Act on Earthquake Insurance
・Agricultural Insurance Act・Government Managed Forest Insurance Act<Acts relating to Disaster Taxation>
・Act on Reduction or Release, Deferment ofCollection and Other Measures Related to Tax
Imposed on Disaster Victims<Other>・Act on Special Measures for the Preservation of
Rights and Interests of the Victims of Specified
Disasters
・Act on Special Financial Support for Promoting
Group Relocation for Disaster Mitigation
・Act on Special Measures for Land and Building
Leases in Areas Affected by Large-scale Disaster・Act on Special Measures for Heavy
Snowfall Areas
Heavysnowfall<General Relief and Assistance Measures>・Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with
Extremely Severe Disasters

・Act on Special Measures concerning
Maintenance of Road Traffic in Specified
Snow Coverage and Cold Districts

・Act on Reconstruction from LargeScale Disasters

・Act on Special Measures Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

Source: Cabinet Office

A-51

Fig.
Fig.A-28
A-28 Structure of the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

Source: Cabinet Office

A-52

Fig.
Fig.A-29
A-29 Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction
Revision
Date

Outline of Revision

Background‐ The Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction formulated based on the Basic Act on DisasterSep. 26, 1959: Typhoon VERA (5915)
Management
Nov. 15, 1961: Enactment of the Basic‐ Stipulations regarding various measures to prevent natural disasters, mitigate damage, andAct on Disaster Management
promote disaster reconstruction
Partial revisionSep. 6, 1967 Recommendation‐ Enhancement of earthquake countermeasures (facilities for earthquake prediction,May
concerning Disaster Prevention
preparation of fire fighting helicopters)
1971
Measures (recommending revisions in‐ Renewed positioning of countermeasures to tackle hazardous materials, petrochemical
response to a modern socioeconomy)complexes, and wildfires
Complete revision‐ Structured this version by disaster type, and included stipulations in the following order:
prevention, emergency response, recovery/reconstruction
Jan. 17, 1995: Southern Hyogo
July‐ Clearly defined the stakeholders, such as national governments, public agencies, local
Prefecture Earthquake (Great Hanshin1995
governments, and businesses, and specified countermeasures
Awaji Earthquake)‐ Stipulated that changes in social structure such as the aging of society should be taken into
account
Partial revision
June‐ Addition of section on countermeasures to address disasters caused by accidents (structural
Jan. 2, 1997: Nakhodka Oil Spill Accident
1997
improvements such as the establishment of an emergency countermeasures headquarters)‐ Addition of a section on snowstorm countermeasures
Partial revisionSep. 30, 1999: Criticality accident at
May‐ Revision of the section on countermeasures to tackle nuclear power disasters, following the uranium fabrication plant in Tokai-mura,
2000
enactment of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Ibaraki prefecture
December Partial revision
National government reformation
2000‐ Revisions resulting from the national government reformation
Partial revisionJun. 29, 1999: Torrential rain disaster in
April‐ Enhancement of descriptions relating to information transmission to residents and evacuation Hiroshima Prefecture
2002
measures regarding countermeasures against flooding, sediment disasters, and storm surges Sep. 24, 1999: Storm surge disaster in‐ New positioning of nuclear power disasters related to nuclear vessels
Kumamoto Prefecture
Partial revision‐ Revisions based on the creation of the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Tonankai and Nankai
Mar. 31, 2004: Creation of a Basic Plan
March
Earthquake Countermeasures (seismic retrofitting of public buildings, etc.)
for the Promotion of Tohnankai and2004‐ Revisions based on the development of policies such as the development of an earthquake
Nankai Earthquake Countermeasures
early warning system
Partial revision‐ Revisions based on developments in policy, such as the promotion of a nationwide movement July 28, 2004: Creation of an Earthquake
July
to practice disaster preparedness, the promotion of corporate disaster risk reduction efforts, Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy
2005
the formulation and implementation of an earthquake DRR strategy, tsunami DRR measures Dec. 26, 2004: Indian Ocean Tsunami
such as the development of tsunami evacuation buildings, information transmission during(Sumatra/Andaman Earthquake)torrential rains, evacuation support for the elderly, etc.
March
Partial revision
Transition from Defense Agency to
2007‐ Revisions resulting from the transition from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Partial revision‐ Implementation of follow-up actions on key issues regarding the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk
February
Reduction, development of strategic national movements, establishment of conditions for the July 16, 2007:The Niigataken Chuetsu2008
promotion of corporate disaster risk reduction, full-scale introduction of earthquake earlyoki Earthquake
warning system, strengthening of nuclear power disaster countermeasures in light of lessons
learned from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake
Partial revision
Mar. 11, 2011 Tohoku Earthquake andDecember‐ Radical strengthening of earthquake/tsunami countermeasures in light of the Great East
Tsunami (The Great East Japan
2011
Japan Earthquake (addition of tsunami disaster countermeasure section)
Earthquake)
Partial revision‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against large-scale regional disasters in light of revisions to Mar. 11, 2011 The Great East Japanthe Basic Act on Disaster Management (First Revision), and the final report of the National
Earthquake
September Disaster Management Council's Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management (each Jun. 27, 2012 Partial Amendment of the2012
section)Basic Act on Disaster Management‐ Strengthening of nuclear power disaster countermeasures in light of the enactment of the Act Sep. 19, 2012 Inauguration of thefor Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (nuclear power disaster
Nuclear Regulatory Authority
countermeasures section)
Partial revision
Mar. 11, 2011 The Great East Japan‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against large-scale disasters in light of revisions to the
Earthquake
January
Basic Act on Disaster Management (Second Revision) and the enactment of the Act on
Jun. 21, 2013 Partial Amendment of the2014
Reconstruction from Large-Scale Disasters (each section)
Basic Act on Disaster Management,‐ Strengthening of nuclear disaster countermeasures in light of investigations by the Nuclear
enactment of the Act on Reconstruction
Regulation Authority
from Large-Scale Disasters
June
1963

A-53

Revision
Date

Outline of Revision

Background

Partial revision‐ Strengthening of countermeasures against abandoned and stranded vehicles following
Feb. 2014: Heavy snowfall
November revision of the Basic Act on Disaster Management
Nov. 21, 2014: Partial Amendment of2014‐ Addition of descriptions in light of lessons learned from heavy snowfall of February 2014,
the Basic Act on Disaster Management
such as the diversification of information transmission methods such as warnings of heavy
snowPartial revision
Mar. 5, 2015: Cabinet Secretariat Three‐ Improvement and strengthening of nuclear disaster risk reduction systems e.g., through the Year Revision and Investigation TeamMarch
establishment of local nuclear disaster management committees and national support for the "Improvement and Strengthening of the2015
enhancement of local plans for disaster risk reduction/evacuation plans (nuclear disaster
Nuclear Disaster Management Systemcountermeasures section)(Second Report)"
Jan. 18, 2015: Partial Amendment of the
Act on the Promotion of Sediment
Disaster Countermeasures in Sediment
Disaster Hazard Areas
Partial revision
Mar. 26, 2015: Working Group for the
July-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from thePromotion of Volcano Disaster
2015
Hiroshima Sediment Disaster and the Mt. Ontake Eruption (each section)
Prevention report
Jun. 4, 2015: Working Group forStudying Comprehensive
Countermeasures against Sediment
Disasters report
Partial revision-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of the revision of laws,
Dec. 10, 2015: Partial Amendment of
February
including the Act on Special Measures for Active Volcanoes, the Flood Control Act, thethe Act on Special Measures for Active
2016
Sewerage Act, the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Act, and the Basic Act on Disaster Volcanoes
Management (each section)
Partial revision
Mar. 31, 2016: Working Group on StudyMay-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from theon Evacuation and Emergency Response
2016
Torrential Rain of September 2015 in the Kanto and Tohoku Regions (each section)
Measures for Flood Disasters report
Dec. 20, 2016: Report of the Working
Group for Studying Emergency
Response and Livelihood Support
Measures in Light of the 2016
Partial revision
April
Kumamoto Earthquake-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from the2017
Dec. 26, 2016: Report of the Study
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake and Typhoon LIONROCK (1610) disaster (each section)
Group on Guidelines for Producing a
Handbook on Decision and
Dissemination for Evacuation
Recommendations
Dec. 8, 2017: Report of the Study Group
Partial revision
on Evacuation from the 2017 July
-Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of the revision of laws,
Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain
June
including the Disaster Relief Act, the Road Act, and the Flood Control Act, etc. (each section) May 16, 2018: Interim Report on
2018- Revisions resulting from the strengthening of measures in light of lessons learned from the
Measures to Secure Road Traffic in
2017 July Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain and the heavy snow from January to February 2018
Heavy Snow(each section)
June 15, 2018: Partial Amendment of
the Disaster Relief Act
Source: Cabinet Office

A-54

4. Organizations
Fig.
Fig.A-30
A-30 Organization of the National Disaster Management Council
Inquiry(all appointed byPrime Minister)

University of Tokyo

Naoshi Hirata

Governor of the Bankof JapanHaruhiko Kuroda Professor of Tokyo International University
Hisako Komuro
President of Japanese
Red Cross Society

Chairman, Special Committee for Risk

Tadateru Konoe Management/Disaster Control, National
President of Japan
Broadcasting
Corporation (NHK)Governors’ Association (Mie Prefecture
Governor)

Eikei Suzuki

Ryoichi Ueda Vice President of the Japan Firefighters
Association
President of Nippon
Telegraph andTelephone
Corporation

Kazuo Ueda

ReportOffer
OpinionPrime Minister, Minister of State for Disaster Management

National Disaster Management Council (Section I, Chapter II of the Basic Act on Disaster Management)
Chair
Prime Minister
Members
Minister of State
for Disaster
Heads of
Experts(appointed by Prime Minister)Management
Designated Public
Corporations
Director, Earthquake Prediction Research
Other ministers (appointed by Prime
Center, Earthquake Research Institute, The
Minister)of state

Chairman of the Disaster Victims HealthSupport Liaison Council

Hiroo Unoura
Committees for Technical Investigation

Yoshitake Yokokuta●Disaster Management Implementation Committee (established March 26, 2013)

Officers' Meeting
Chair: Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet OfficeVice Chair: Director General for Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, and Deputy Manager of the Fire andDisaster Management Agency
Advisor: Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management
Secretary: Relevant directors-general of each ministry and agency[Role]○ Formulate a Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Earthquake Disaster Management Plan and promote
their implementation○ Discuss important issues related to disaster management in response to inquiries from the Prime Minister orthe Minister of State for Disaster Management (e.g. basic approaches to disaster management,
comprehensive coordination of disaster management policies, and the declaration of states of emergency)○ Offer opinions on important issues related to disaster management to the Prime Minister or the Minister ofState for Disaster Management
Source: Cabinet Office

A-55

Fig.
Fig.A-31
A-31 Recent Meetings of the National Disaster Management Council (Since 2010)
FY2010
Apr. 21, 2010

• FY2010 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Establishment of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster Evacuation• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Large-Scale Flood Measures• Tsunamis caused by earthquakes centered along the coast of Chile• Tokyo Metropolitan Area Flooding: Measures Needed for Damage Mitigation

FY2011
Apr. 27, 2011
Oct. 11, 2011

Dec. 27, 2011

Mar. 29, 2012

• Great East Japan Earthquake: Characteristics and Challenges• Conventional earthquake and tsunami policies• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Earthquake and Tsunami Measures Based on Lessons
Learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake• Government ministry and agency efforts related to future DRR efforts• Establishment of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Revisions to the National Disaster Management Council Operation Guidelines• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of the Dissemination of Lessons Learned from Disasters• Status of the investigations by the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Interim Report of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Current efforts aimed at bolstering and reinforcing DRR measures• FY2012 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2012
Sep. 6, 2012

Mar. 26, 2013

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Framework for Large-Scale Flood Measures in the Capital Region• New Promotion of Earthquake Research• Final Report of the Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Best Practices for Earthquake Disaster Managementin Regional Cities• Report of the Committee for the Technical Investigation of Disaster Evacuation• Report on Tsunami Heights and Inundation Areas Resulting from Nankai Trough Megaquake (Secondary Report)
and Damage Estimates (Primary Report)• Review of the legal systems for disaster management; status of investigations into Nankai Trough Megaquake
Measures and Tokyo Inland Earthquake Measures• Establishment of the Disaster Management Implementation Committee• FY2013 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2013Jan. 17, 2014

Mar. 28, 2014

• Designation of Areas for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake DRR Measures and Areas for the Special
Reinforcement of Nankai Trough Earthquake Tsunami Evacuation Measures• Designation of Tokyo Inland Earthquake Emergency Management Zones• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Final Report of the Working Group to Investigate Tokyo Inland Earthquake Measures and a National Government
Business Continuity Plan Proposal• Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster Management• Act on Special Measures against Tokyo Inland Earthquake• Framework for Large-Scale Earthquake Disaster Management and Reduction• FY2014 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2014
Nov. 28, 2014
Mar. 31, 2015

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• FY2015 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Earthquake Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for a Tokyo Inland Earthquake

FY2015
Jul. 7, 2015
Feb. 16, 2016

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Basic Guidelines on the Comprehensive Promotion of Measures for Active Volcanoes• Designation of volcanic eruption hazard areas• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

FY2016
May 31, 2016

• FY2016 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction

FY2017
Apr. 11, 2017

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• FY2017 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework

FY2018Jun. 29, 2018

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Partial amendment of the Disaster Relief Act

FY2019May 31, 2019

• Revisions to the Basic Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction• Revisions to the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster Risk Reduction
Countermeasures• FY2019 Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework• Promotion of Earthquake Research (third period)

Source: Cabinet Office

A-56

FY2001

FY2002

Jun. 26, '02

FY2003

FY2004

Jun. 28, '02

May 12, '03

Oct. 3, '02

Source: Cabinet Office

Fig. A-33

A-57
Oct. 27, '03

Sep. 18, '03

Sep. 12, '03

Jul. 31, '03

Jul. 16, '03

Sep. 25, '02 May 13, '03

Mar. 4, '02

Oct. 11, '01

FY2006

FY2007

Dec. 9, '05

Dec. 13, '06

Aug. 29, '06

Aug. 16, '06

Jan. 23, '06

Oct. 14, '05

Jul. 22, '05

FY2009Oct. 21, '08

Dec. 2, '08

FY2008

Chubu and Kinki Inland Earthquake
Measures (meetings 17-36)

FY2005Oct. 3, '01 Tohnankai and Nankai Earthquake Nov. 26, '04
Measures (meetings 1-16)

Sep. 17, '01

Mar. 14, '01 Dec. 11, '01

FY2000

Reform of Ministries and Agencies

Name of Committee for Technical Investigation

Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Tokai Earthquakes (total 11 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Future Earthquake Measure Effective
Practices (total 11 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Tonankai and Nankai Earthquakes(total 36 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Basic Plans for Disaster Risk Reduction(total 9 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Tokai Earthquake Measures(total 10 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
the Cultivation of Disaster Management
Human Resources (total 5 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofDisaster Management Information Sharing(total 12 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
the Dissemination of Lessons Learned from
Disasters (total 15 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofTokyo Inland Earthquake Measures(total 20 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Improving Disaster Resilience Using thePower of the Markets and Private Sector(total 5 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofTrench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of theJapan and Chishima Trenches(total 17 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
the Promotion of Citizen Campaigns to
Reduce Disaster Damage (total 14 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofTokyo Inland Earthquake Evacuation
Measures (total 14 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Large-Scale Flood Measures(total 20 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation of
Effective Practices for Earthquake Disaster
Management in Regional Cities(total 10 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofDisaster Evacuation (total 8 meetings)
Committee for the Technical Investigation ofEarthquake and Tsunami Measures Based on
Lessons Learned from the Great East Japan
Earthquake (total 12 meetings)
Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster
Management (total 13 meetings)
Disaster Management Implementation
Committee

FY2011Mar. 22, '12Mar. 12, '12

FY2012

Oct. 28, '11

FY2014

Jun. 14, '13

FY2013

Jul. 31, '12

May 28, '11 Sep. 28, '11

Aug. 26, '10

Apr. 26, '10

Mar. 18, '10

Dec. 22, '10

FY2010FY2015FY2016FY2017FY2018Fig.
Fig.A-32
A-32 Status of the Establishment of National Disaster Management Council Committees for Technical
Investigation

Fig. A-33 Disaster Risk Management Budgets by Year
Fiscal
Year
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Science andDisasterDisaster Prevention Land Conservation
Total
Technology Research
Reconstruction
Share
Share
Share
Share
(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
751
0.4
8,864
4.3
97,92947.1
100,64248.3
208,006
1,021
0.4
8,906
3.7
116,13147.7
117,47348.2
243,522
1,776
0.7
13,724
5.4
122,40948.3
115,39345.6
253,302
1,605
0.5
17,143
5.6
147,85848.3
139,42445.6
306,030
1,773
0.5
20,436
5.9
170,65049.0
155,71544.7
348,574
2,115
0.6
23,152
6.1
197,833
52.3
154,855
41.0
377,955
2,730
0.7
25,5146.8
207,600
55.4
138,81537.1
374,659
2,747
0.7
30,1777.5
236,20959.0
131,27032.8
400,403
2,756
0.6
36,0278.2
269,15960.9
133,99830.3
441,940
3,078
0.5
50,4648.6
352,68660.3
178,20930.5
584,4373,700
0.4
93,425
10.3
488,81854.1
316,895
35.1
902,8386,287
0.7
111,32112.4
493,58054.9
287,082
32.0
898,270
14,5691.5
118,59612.1
505,208
51.5
342,55634.9
980,929
17,795
1.5
159,595
13.3
615,457
51.3
405,77133.9
1,198,618
21,143
1.3
186,297
11.5
711,15943.9
700,68843.3
1,619,287
22,836
1.4
234,409
13.9
904,30253.6
525,88631.2
1,687,433
29,642
1.7
307,17017.3
1,093,847
61.6
345,603
19.5
1,776,262
35,145
1.6
435,963
20.4
1,229,401
57.6
432,759
20.3
2,133,268
29,9291.2
456,575
18.9
1,229,615
50.8
705,16829.1
2,421,287
29,621
1.2
474,92618.9
1,240,788
49.5
761,95030.4
2,507,285
28,945
1.1
469,44317.2
1,261,326
46.3
963,98435.4
2,723,698
29,825
1.1
489,918
18.4
1,268,712
47.6
875,85132.9
2,664,306
28,215
1.2
485,21920.7
1,350,592
57.7
475,878
20.3
2,339,904
27,6801.1
512,83720.2
1,355,917
53.5
640,22525.2
2,536,659
28,646
1.2
482,88919.7
1,354,397
55.3
581,46223.8
2,447,394
38,296
1.4
612,50521.9
1,603,599
57.2
548,33719.6
2,802,737
31,051
1.1
587,07320.8
1,550,132
54.9
657,68123.3
2,825,937
34,542
1.2
588,35420.7
1,638,104
57.5
587,81920.6
2,848,819
35,382
1.1
625,239
20.0
1,669,336
53.4
796,23125.5
3,126,188
35,791
1.1
628,596
19.8
1,729,332
54.3
788,60324.8
3,182,322
36,302
1.1
745,40522.8
2,017,898
61.6
475,41114.5
3,275,015
43,152
0.9
866,17018.6
2,462,800
52.9
1,280,569
27.5
4,652,691
40,460
1.0
747,22318.9
1,945,295
49.1
1,230,072
31.0
3,963,050
105,845
1.4
1,208,134
16.0
2,529,386
33.5
3,696,010
49.0
7,539,375
52,3851.2
1,029,658
24.5
2,156,714
51.3
968,182
23.0
4,206,938
49,1281.2
1,147,102
28.2
2,014,695
49.4
864,370
21.2
4,075,295
62,4351.1
1,228,539
22.3
2,905,921
52.8
1,310,515
23.8
5,507,411
78,134
1.7
1,142,199
25.0
2,400,534
52.6
941,886
20.6
4,562,752
73,5021.8
1,011,535
24.4
2,376,083
57.3
689,225
16.6
4,150,346
49,3101.2
1,060,445
26.7
2,238,816
56.4
618,427
15.6
3,966,998
48,1641.3
1,202,984
31.9
1,981,686
52.5
543,949
14.4
3,776,783
35,1331.1
814,101
25.7
1,625,670
51.4
689,25521.8
3,164,159
30,4780.7
815,059
19.3
1,753,418
41.5
1,622,112
38.4
4,221,067
11,0970.4
866,29028.6
1,426,745
47.0
728,606
24.0
3,032,738
11,627
0.4
689,50525.1
1,439,12952.3
610,30222.2
2,750,563

A-58

Fiscal
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

Science andDisasterDisaster Prevention Land Conservation
Total
Technology Research
Reconstruction
Share
Share
Share
Share
(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)(JPY million)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
9,687
0.4
706,853
29.0
1,332,222
54.6
391,63716.0
2,440,399
8,921
0.4
819,35933.2
1,275,135
51.7
363,47114.7
2,466,886
8,761
0.4
498,39723.0
1,383,254
63.7
279,78912.9
2,170,201
7,695
0.6
224,841
16.9
813,35961.1
285,03821.4
1,330,933
28,072
0.6
376,169
8.0
743,93615.9
3,536,475
75.5
4,684,652
29,4220.6
561,02112.0
790,42217.0
3,129,561
67.2
4,656,656
15,3390.3
788,576
14.1
879,93215.8
3,883,911
69.6
5,578,036
16,688
0.4
639,966
13.9
836,580
18.2
3,101,555
67.5
4,594,789
14,961
0.4
713,477
18.6
155,475
4.1
2,954,355
77.0
3,838,268
14,023
0.3
696,39914.3
318,3206.5
3,855,516
78.9
4,884,258
10,1230.3
790,36122.1
267,6297.5
2,515,384
70.2
3,583,497
22,781
0.8
737,42916.3
482,711
4.0
2,834,284
78.8
4,077,205
11,233
0.4
602,574
23.4
114,907
4.5
1,842,652
71.7
2,571,366

Notes:
1. These are adjusted budget (national expenditures) amounts. However, the FY2019 figures are preliminary figures reflecting
the initial budget.
2. The reduced amount allocated to science and technology research in FY2007 is largely due to the structural conversion ofnational lab and research institutions into independent administrative agencies (the budgets of independent administrative
agencies are not included in this table).
3. The amount allocated to disaster prevention in FY2009 is reduced because a portion of the revenue sources set aside for road
construction were converted to general fund sources making it impossible to allocate certain portions to the disastermanagement budget.
4. The reduced amount allocated to disaster prevention and land conservation in FY2010 is due to the fact that, following thecreation of the General Grant for Social Capital Development, some disaster prevention policies and many subsidy programsin land conservation were established using those grants.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from various ministries and agencies

8,000,000

12
Disaster management budjet (adjusted amounts)

Budget (JPY million)

106,000,000
8
5,000,000

4,000,000

6

3,000,000
42,000,000
2
1,000,000

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from various ministries and agencies

A-59

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

1976

1974

1972

1970

1968

1966

1964

0
1962

0

Percentage of the General Fund Budget (%)(FY2018 figures are initial amounts)

Disaster management budjet proportion of thegeneral fund7,000,000

Fig.
Fig.A-34
A-34 Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans(As of the end of FY2017; Unit: JPY million)

FY1980 - FY2019

Category

Planned Amount(a)

Implemented
Amount(b)Rate of Progress(b)/(a)1 Evacuation sites

177,539

167,775

94.5%

2 Evacuation roads

93,98384,986

90.4%

3 Firefighting facilities

141,230

128,583

91.0%

4 Emergency transport routes

951,838

860,516

90.4%

4-1 Emergency transport routes

840,671

757,891

90.2%

4-2 Emergency transport ports

59,63156,78495.2%

4-3 Emergency transport fishing ports

51,53645,84188.9%

5 Telecommunications facilities

17,514

16,545

94.5%

6 Public medical institutions

54,01250,90094.2%

7 Social welfare facilities

55,58655,586100.0%

8 Public elementary and junior high schools

446,226

428,96296.1%

9 Tsunami countermeasures

272,080

188,655

69.3%

9-1 River management facilities

104,233

61,95259.4%

9-2 Coastal preservation facilities

167,847

126,703

75.5%

540,827

513,556

95.0%

10-1 Erosion control facilities

103,265

99,53696.4%

10-2 Security facilities

171,243

161,232

94.2%

10-3 Landslide facilities

84,622

79,363

93.8%

10-4 Steep slope facilities

160,067

156,748

97.9%

10-5 Ponds

21,63016,67777.1%

2,750,835

2,496,064

90.7%

10 Landslide prevention

Total

Notes:
1. The content of Earthquake Emergency Development Project Plans (FY1980-2019) is as of the end of FY2017.
2. Project expenses include expenses for projects that may not be solely designed for earthquake disaster management, butthat, while having other policy objectives, also are intended to have an overall effect on earthquake disaster management.
Project expenses are not comprised solely of expenses used entirely for disaster management.
Source: Cabinet Office

A-60

(n)

7,009
154,432
17,9255,939

46,75524,393256 facilities
267 schools

78.2%
49.9%

98,772
27,203

126,275
54,480681 facilities
1,159 schools

49.1%
20.1%

56,4007,074

114,756
35,198521 facilities
995 schools

63.0%
-

176,408-

280,028-

857 facilities

45.5%

-

219,490-482,317-

A-61

126,423
379,222
121,170
60,244

910,589
285,307
165,823

8,931 sites
1,823 sites
2,728 sites

93.0%
85.0%
118.7%

786,324
257,665
173,261

845,288
303,286
146,012

9,327 sites
2,063 sites
2,683 sites

91.3%
91.8%
95.9%

976,742
325,910202,299

1,069,686
354,972
210,861

10,504 sites
2,033 sites
3,673 sites

82.6%
93.8%
79.8%

1,339,438
409,636
263,907

1,622,048
436,635
330,719

14,332 sites
2,278 sites
5,583 sites

98.4%

92.1%

114.6%

1,702,042

247,050

469,126

1,729,574

268,151

409,216

359,433

522,261

13-3. Landslide prevention facilities

13-4. Steep slope failure prevention facilities

Source: Cabinet Office materials.

3. Public special education schools include schools known as schools for the blind, schools for the deaf, and schools for the physically or mentally/physically handicapped prior to FY 2006.

2. The expenses for each project are not limited to projects aimed at achieving earthquake DRR; they include expenses for projects that have other policy purposes, such as those related to urban infrastructure development, but that also are effective in termsof earthquake DRR.

1. The content of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY2016-2020) is current as of the end of FY2017.

Notes:

2,871,313
7,868,573
75.7%
8,386,758
11,080,537
68.5%
8,359,916
12,197,074

70.8%

10,018,773

14,157,285

76.3%

32
87,970429,416

14,117,470

ha

18,503,368

12,64567.8%
340,080ha

501,836
12,15666.6%
563,811846,19753.1%

916,981

1,725,532

50.9%

1,431,714

2,814,605

ha

29 groups
18.0%
161
891
304 groups
83.4%
262
314

515 groups

60.6%

687

1,133

610 groups

18.3%

659

3,595
7,839

2,395
10,261451 sites
56.3%
3,968
7,053
650 sites
20.5%
838
4,081

296 sites

51.2%

5,292

10,338437 sites

45.2%

8,028

17,763
ha

50,678
119,572443 sites
76.8%
93,437
121,728517 sites
50.5%
72,142
142,958

405 sites

61.9%

55,59989,822444 sites

57.0%

126,320

221,622

17. Storage warehouses
18. Response and relief systems
6,960

42,147
164,585
8,953 sites
55.3%
105,334
190,6128,777 sites
32.6%
78,112

239,525

5,844 sites

30.5%

38,693

126,944

1,702 sites

56.3%

126,236

224,276

16. Potable water facilities/power generation systems

19. Downtown areas with high density dilapidated housing

40,98893,033121 sites
75.6%
68,591
90,683161 sites
56.3%
34,27760,90578 sites

49.4%

40,34281,642121 sites

63.4%

102,857

162,319

15. Disaster management radio communications system

150

56,428
176,559
1,814 sites

94,821

46,55972.9%187,322

95,57860,5391,849 sites

717 sites
83,029

95.8%

91.7%
1,103 sites

185,729

109,130
66.3%

193,935

119,025

66,8702,629 sites

849 sites

100,91390.3%

101.5%

1,147 sites

220,779

160,88367.8%

244,461

158,479

90,1652,500 sites

1,151 sites

133,038

79.9%

79.5%

1,252 sites

356,530

219,200

77.2%

446,098

275,558

131,6453,568 sites

1,651 sites

170,513

95.3%

99.2%

13-5. Reservoirs
14. Community DRR base facilities

497,690356,531

118,841

245,264
292,975

351,724

644,699
231 sites

570 sites

801 sites
80.4%

87.5%
101.7%
117,594

184,601

302,195
115,601

229,583

345,184
162 sites

525 sites

687 sites

73.2%

77.9%

76.9%

36,867

146,044

182,91150,380187,407237,787

68 sites

423 sites

491 sites

74.7%

82.7%
103.5%

78,899146,699

225,598

76,24894,821

196,496

272,744119 sites

82.1%

77,809140,865

12-2. River management facilities
13. Erosion control facilities, etc.
13-1. Erosion control facilities
13-2. Security facilities

215 sites

334 sites

79.5%

187,310

235,68612-1. Coastal preservation facilities

77.7%

56.6%

38.8%

24,42962,975109,501

2,452
94,755

5,293
238,055

6 schools
719 facilities

69.4%
29,955
209,134

43,173
369,417

199 schools
1,737 facilities

40.9%

23,262

56,834670 facilities

151,809

264 schools

371,97745.0%

987 schools

37.6%

70.3%

1,199

1,631,920

12,0702,322,751

2,662

13,612 schools

32,09445.5%

29 facilities

1,399,624

114 schools

3,077,544

21.8%

16,256 schools

35.1%

55.1%

5,267

594,777

29,685

1,078,849

24,1695,840 schools

84,57756.3%

10. Public special education schools
11. Public buildings
12. Coast and river facilities

765,344

1,359,672

9. Public elementary and jr. high schools-

104,235

20,868239,81270 facilities

265,416

26 sites
463 km
73.4%

81.6%

84.7%
17,652506,681

208,175

20,843689,917

255,017

26 sites
219 facilities

471 km

63.0%

67.7%

87.3%

41,558150,877

175,571

47,594239,424

93 facilities

259,42043 sites
591 km

71.0%

65.3%

65.9%

46,387
277,721257,890

70,423391,016

394,948

73 sites
115 facilities

67.1%

844 km85.0%

784,899105.6%

526,548

261,385

7. Medical institutions
8. Social welfare facilities
8-2. Public kindergartens

275,928

103,481

121,734

6. Multipurpose underground utility conduits

024,62575,43246 sites
87.4%
133,801

153,101

06,543
0 sites

77 sites

66.7%

68.9%

78

136,895

117

198,676

2 sites

100 sites

－

66.0%

0

21,856
6,458 sites

119,869

0991,640
2,625,220
2,180 km181,5030 sites

79.0%
12,214

15,464

4,837 sites

113 sites

70.4%

88.2%

2,279,595

2,584,039

2,191 km

66.2%

387

74.0%

6,844

9,242

2,439 facilities

237,940

550

87.3%

3,106,165

3,557,657

2,552 km6,854
1,029,817

24,0952,743,376

359,671

1 site

50.3%

8,473

16,855

3,448 facilities

88.1%

5-5. Emergency transport fishing port facilities

33.1%

81.4%

4,067,023

4,998,577

3,920 km85.1%

19,9982,443,339

23,506
2,773,563

5-4. Emergency transport port facilities

2,094

87.9%

21,017

23,900

86.3%

6,327

96.4%

5,355,365

5,555,626

105.2%

49,136
3,291,461

46,7193,813,169

29 km

80.5%

56 km

77.9%

92,9584,242,139

119,329
5,267,908

102 km94.3%

161 km76.1%

128,1635,719,897

431,517
18,239 sites
69.8%

472,644677,209

20,052 sites

55.0%

246,745448,460

21,039 sites

55.0%

297,301

540,784

28,153 sites

76.0%

697,067

917,213

168,387

127,582

830,575
58.5%

781,62865.7%

625,957

952,865

1,405 km75.8%

900,446

2,601 km74.6%

1,481,509

6,067,258

92,501
234,317275,005ha
597 km84.2%

257,218

305,490
1,336,465ha

897 km82.0%

400,283

488,257

ha

2,515

58.3%

543,233

931,413
1,188,051

ha

3,168

65.6%

959,276

1,105,639

1,462,542

1,043

(m)
(l)

(k)/(j)

(k)

(j)

(i)

(h)/(g)

(h)

(g)

(f)

(e)/(d)

(e)

(d)

(c)

(b)/(a)

(b)

(a)
1,456

Actual Amt.
Planned Amt.

Project Scope (Unit)% Complete

Actual Amt.

Planned Amt.

Project Scope (Unit)% Complete

Actual Amt.

Planned Amt.

Project Scope (Unit)% Complete

Actual Amt.

Planned Amt.

Project Scope (Unit)

Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY 2016-2020)(All prefectures, as of FY2017. Unit: JPY 1,000,000)% Complete

Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY 2011-2015)

Actual Amt.

Third Five-Year Plan (FY 2006-2010)

Planned Amt.

Second Five-Year Plan (FY 2001-2005)

5-3. Emergency transport heliports

5-2. Emergency transport/traffic control facilities

1. Evacuation sites
2. Evacuation routes
3. Firefighting facilities
4. Roads for firefighting activities
5. Emergency transport roads, etc.
5-1. Emergency transport roads

Category

First Five-Year Plan (FY 1996-2000)

Project budgets for these plans over fifth terms are shown in the table below.

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures was enacted in July 1995 to protect citizens' lives, heath, and assets from earthquake-related damage. This law allows prefectural governors to create a Five-Year Plan for Emergency
Earthquake Disaster Management Projects for communities where there are concerns about the occurrence of a severe earthquake disaster and a portion of the projects to be implemented based on this plan are eligible for an increased rate of financial support from the national government.
These plans are five-year plans created for 29 facilities that need to be urgently developed from the perspective of achieving earthquake disaster reduction. When a prefecture wants to create a plan, hearings are held to listen to the opinions of the municipalities involved, and the consent of the Prime Minister must be obtained. Thus far,these plans have been created by the prefectural governors over fifth terms, and earthquake disaster projects have begun to be implemented.

Fig.
Fig.A-35
A-35 Estimated Budgets of Five-Year Plans for Emergency Earthquake Disaster Management Project6. Disaster Management Facilities and Equipment
Fig.
Fig.A-36
A-36 Number of Red Cross Hospitals, Emergency Medical Centers, and Disaster Base Hospitals
Red Cross
Hospital

Emergency
MedicalCenterDisaster
Base
Hospital

Red Cross
Hospital

Emergency
MedicalCenterDisaster
Base
Hospital

Hokkaido

10

12

34

Shiga

3

4

10

Aomori

1

3

9

Kyoto

3

6

13

Iwate

1

3

11

Osaka

2

16

19

Miyagi

2

6

16

Hyogo

4

10

18

Akita

2

1

13

Nara

0

3

7

Yamagata

03

7

Wakayama

1

3

10

Fukushima

1

4

8

Tottori

1

2

4

Ibaraki2

6

15

Shimane2

4

10

Tochigi

3

5

11

Okayama

2

5

10

Gunma

2

4

17

Hiroshima

3

7

18

Saitama3

8

18

Yamaguchi

2

5

13

Chiba

1

13

25

Tokushima

1

3

11

Tokyo

4

26

80

Kagawa1

3

9Kanagawa

6

21

33

Ehime

1

3

8

Niigata

1

6

14

Kochi

1

3

12

Toyama1

2

8

Fukuoka3

1030

Ishikawa

1

2

10

Saga

1

4

8

Fukui

1

2

9

Nagasaki

2

3

13

Yamanashi

1

1

9Kumamoto2

3

14

Nagano

6

7

10

Oita

1

4

14

Gifu

2

6

12

Miyazaki

0

3

12

Shizuoka

5

11

22

Kagoshima

1

3

14

Aichi

2

23

35

Okinawa

1

3

13

Mie

1

4

15

Total

97

289

731

Prefectures

Prefectures

Source: Red Cross Hospital information was formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the website of the Japanese Red Cross
Society (as of March 2019).
Information on emergency medical centers and disaster base hospitals was formulated by the Cabinet Office based onmaterials from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (as of April 1, 2018).

A-62

Fig.
Fig.A-37
A-37 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Infrastructure
100

100％

80％

100
91

75

97
81

78
60

60％

61
55

50
38

40％

20％

0％

Roads

Railways(Shinkansen)

Railways(Conventional)

Airports

FY2012FY2018

Ports andHarbors

Sewerage
Facilities

Notes
Roads: The rate of bridges not in danger of being damaged related to all bridges along emergency transport roads (importantroads that have to be secured for evacuation and rescue as well as ensuring the passage of emergency vehicles
immediately after the earthquake, including national expressways, national highways and the arterial roads that connect
them.) (As of end of FY2017)
Railway (Shinkansen): Elevated bridges.
Railway (Conventional): Elevated bridges of major railway lines in regions where a seismic intensity of 6 Upper or greater would
be expected to occur in the case of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake or Nankai Trough Earthquake. (Left: As of end of FY2012.
Right: As of end of FY2017.)
Airports: Percentage of population in a 100 km area around an airport that could be used for emergency transport.
Ports and Harbors: Seismically reinforced piers (number completed as a proportion of those detailed in plans for seismic retrofitof piers to facilitate the transportation of emergency supplies (those classed as major ports or higher)). (Left: As of end
of FY2012. Right: As of end of FY2017.)
Sewerage Facilities: Important main lines (pipes that can accommodate drainage from river basin lines, DRR bases, andevacuation sites, main pipes connected to pump stations and disposal stations, pipes buried beneath emergency
transport roads and railroad tracks. (Left: As of end of FY2012. Right: As of end of FY2017.)
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office using materials from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(MLIT)A-63

Fig.
Fig.A-38
A-38 Trends in the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities That Serve as Disaster Management
Bases
100%

93.1%

88.3%

79.3%

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

FY2011FY2014FY2017Note) Of all the public facilities owned or managed by local governments (buildings for public or public-private use: non-wooden structures built
two stories or taller or buildings with a floor area of 200 m 2 or more), the facilities that could serve as disaster management bases for
implementing disaster response measures are identified, consolidated and analyzed based on the criteria below.

<Classification criteria of public facilities that serve as disaster management bases>(1) Social welfare facilities(2) Education facilities (classrooms, gymnasiums)(3) Government buildings(4) Prefectural civic halls, civic centers(5) Gymnasiums(6) Health care facilities(7) Police headquarters and police stations

All facilities
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated shelter, etc.
Facilities that will be used for the implementation of disaster response measures
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated shelter, etc.
Facilities designated as designated emergency evacuation site or designated shelter, etc.
Facilities positioned in local plans for disaster risk reduction as medical care facilities
All facilities

Source: “Results of the Survey on the Seismic Reinforcement Rate of Public Facilities That Serve as Disaster Management Bases,”
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (November 2018)

Fig.
Fig.A-39
A-39 Seismic Reinforcement of Public Elementary and Junior High Schools
98.5%
96.2% 97.6%

No. of remaining buildings

93.3%

60,00090.0%

73,16670,16767,068
63,10159,295

92.5%
88.9%

99.1%

99.2%

95.6%

84.8%

84.6%
80.3%
53,636
73.3%

Rate of seismic reinforcement
Implementation rate

40,00062.8%

80%

No. of remaining buildings

47,94941,206
70.2%

33,134
67.0%

58.6%
62.3%

54.7%

20,00051.8%

60%

22,911
18,508

57.5%

49.1%
44.5%

100%

98.1% 98.8%

13,412

46.6%

Rate of seismic reinforcement &implementation rate

80,000

8,956
5,212

0

2,228 1,399

978

40%

20022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018

Source: “Results of a Follow-up Investigation on the Progress of the Seismic Retrofitting of Public School Facilities,” Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (August 2018)

A-64

7. Trends in Numbers of Workers in Disaster Management
Fig.
Fig.A-40
A-40 Numbers of Fire Corps Volunteers
1,200

30,000No. of Fire Corps Volunteers
Female Fire Corps Volunteers

1,000

983

25,00023,899963
928

Fire Corps Volunteers (thousands)

25,981

24,947889

22,747
874
869
880
864
860
884
21,684
20,785
19,577
20,10919,043

885

800

856

850

844
20,00017,87916,699600

15,00012,440400

10,0008,485

200

Female Fire Corps Volunteers (individuals)

1,002

5,000
4,150

00

0
1989

1993

1998

2003

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Note: As a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the figure for 2012 for Onagawa-cho, Meshika-gun, Miyagi prefecture is
the figure from 2010 (as of April 1, 2010)
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster
Management Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

Fig.
Fig.A-41
A-41 Age Composition Ratios among Fire Corps Volunteers
100%

1.8%
7.8%

3.1%
15.9%

0.9%
6.1%

1.9%

2.2%

7.4%

10.4%

15.7%

80%

24.2%

4.5%
13.4%

15.1%

24.6%
27.1%

45.0%

31.6%

39.2%

60%

6.0%

10s-30s
90.4%

47.3%
40.2%

38.6%

40%

38.5%
33.7%

20%

45.4%

41.8%
30.0%

26.2%

24.2%

16.5%

13.5%

2013

2018

0%
1965

1975

1985

10s-20s

1998

30s

40s

2003

50s

60s and older

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster
Management Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

A-65

Fig.
Fig.A-42
A-42 Numbers of Flood Fighting Corps Personnel
2220

No. of flood flghting corps (thousand)18

19.76019.17319.100
18.87718.99219.02218.98318.873
18.45418.12917.87617.73017.724
16.99516.801
16.26015.99215.867
15.70215.599
15.43915.406

16

14.92114.55914.383
14.31914.105
13.98813.711

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

YearNote) Number of full-time flood fighting corps personnel
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)

Fig.
Fig.A-43
A-43 Numbers of Voluntary Disaster Management Organizations
200,000
73.5%

69.9%
61.3%

146,396

No. of organizations

127,824
109,016

77.9%
153,600

81.7%

82.7%

83.2%

159,967

161,847

164,195

165,42990%70%

139,316

115,81450%

100,000

30%
50,000
10%

0

-10%
2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

2016

2017

2018

No. of organizations
Activities Coverage Rate (no, of community households that fall within thescioe of activities ofvoluntary disaster management organizations)

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Survey on the Current Status of Fire and Earthquake Disaster
Management Measures of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency. Figures as of April 1 each year.

A-66

Activities Coverage Rate

150,000

64.5%

75.8%

81.0%

Fig.
Fig.A-44
A-44 Female Representation in Local Disaster Management Councils (by Prefecture, 2018)

Hokkaido
Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Akita
Yamagata
Fukushima
IbarakiTochigi
Gunma
Saitama
Chiba
Tokyo
Kanagawa
NiigataToyamaIshikawa
Fukui
Yamanashi
NaganoGifu
Shizuoka
Aichi
Mie
Shiga
Kyoto
Osaka
Hyogo
Nara
Wakayama
Tottori
Shimane
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Tokushima
KagawaEhime
Kochi
Fukuoka
Saga
Nagasaki
Kumamoto
Oita
MiyazakiKagoshima
Okinawa
Total

Prefectural Disaster Management Council
Of which,
Proportion of
Total
Female
Women
Members
Members
(%)
68
6
8.8
60
11
18.3
74
10
13.5
56
10
17.9
60
4
6.7
60
10
16.7
54
6
11.1
52
6
11.5
53
9
17.0
47
6
12.8
69
8
11.6
61
9
14.8
66
8
12.1
57
12
21.1
71
19
26.8
66
10
15.2
70
7
10.0
56
3
5.4
62
5
8.1
67
10
14.9
61
12
19.7
59
5
8.5
68
5
7.4
59
5
8.5
58
11
19.0
66
14
21.2
58
6
10.3
55
7
12.7
60
8
13.3
54
6
11.1
65
28
43.1
73
35
47.9
57
9
15.8
59
2
3.4
60
6
10.0
81
39
48.1
60
10
16.7
61
5
8.2
58
7
12.1
61
4
6.6
68
19
27.9
68
11
16.2
56
6
10.7
58
6
10.3
53
4
7.5
63
7
11.1
54
7
13.0
2,882
453
15.7

Municipal Disaster Management Council
Of which,
Proportion of
Total
Female
Women
Members
Members
(%)
3,836
120
3.1
762
36
4.7
1,133
93
8.2
856
62
7.2
716
77
10.8
1,002
58
5.8
947
40
4.2
1,254
102
8.1
635
66
10.4
901
70
7.8
2,148
214
10.0
1,420
140
9.9
2,160
243
11.3
966
113
11.7
878
52
5.9
499
26
5.2
431
28
6.5
500
50
10.0
584
50
8.6
1,897
150
7.9
969
86
8.9
1,060
95
9.0
1,470
146
9.9
899
89
9.9
537
51
9.5
758
59
7.8
1,406
156
11.1
1,315
129
9.8
882
80
9.1
611
39
6.4
375
55
14.7
616
46
7.5
477
79
16.6
826
60
7.3
606
63
10.4
581
44
7.6
430
45
10.5
485
31
6.4
743
73
9.8
1,297
187
14.4
396
39
9.8
665
47
7.1
1,629
108
6.6
534
47
8.8
729
54
7.4
1,115
73
6.5
579
51
8.8
45,515
3,822
8.4

Notes)
1. Formulated by the Cabinet Office from its material titled the “Implementation Status of Measures for Promoting theFormation of a Gender-equal Society or Policy Considerations for Gender in Local Government” (FY2018)
2. Figures for April 1, in principle.

A-67

8. Various Policies and Measures
Fig.
Fig.A-45
A-45 Hazard Map Development
Flood Hazard
Map
Published : 1,316
municipalities(*1)(as of end of September 2018)
Sample:1,340
municipalities

100%

Inland Flood
Hazard Map

Published : 268
Published : 358
municipalities(*2)
municipalities(*3)(as of end of September 2018) (as of end of September 2018)
Sample:1,340
municipalities

TsunamiHazard Map

Storm Surge
Hazard Map

Sediment Disaster
Hazard Map

Published : 617
Published : 0
Published : 1,280
Published : 47
municipalities(*4)
municipalities(*5)
municipalities(*6)
volcanoes(*7)(as of end of September 2018) (as of end of September 2018) (as of end of September 2018) (as of end of September 2018)

Sample:484
municipalities

Sample:673
municipalities

2%

Sample:1,535
municipalities

Sample:16
municipalities

Sample:49
volcanoes

6%

8%

90%

VolcanoHazard Map

17%

26%

80%
70%
60%
50%

80%
98%

100%

92%

40%

94%
83%

74%

30%
20%
10%

20%

0%

0%

Published

UnpublishedSource: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (v olcano hazard
maps are materials owned by the Cabinet Office)*1 Municipalities (including special wards) with designated flood and inundation hazard areas based on Article 14 of the Flood Control Act,
which have published a hazard map pursuant to Article 15, paragraph (3) of the Flood Control Act*2 Municipalities (including special wards) that have published a hazard map covering the estimated maximum precipitation*3 Municipalities that need to promptly develop a hazard map as they suffered significant damage from past floods, which have alreadypublished a hazard map.
*4 Municipalities located in coastal areas or the tsunami hazard areas under Article 8 of the Act on Regional Development for Tsunami Disaster
Prevention, which have already published a tsunami hazard map*5 Since hazard coastal areas were first designated in FY2018, municipalities which were designated as storm surge and inundation hazard
areas under Article 14-3 of the Flood Control Act and have already published a hazard map pursuant to Article 15, paragraph (3) of the FloodControl Act are tallied.
*6 Municipalities (including special wards) designated as sediment disaster hazard areas that have already published a hazard map pursuant to
Article 8, paragraph (3) of the Sediment Disasters Prevention Act*7 Volcanoes for which Volcanic Disaster Management Councils were established in accordance with Article 4 of the Act on Special Measures
for Active Volcanoes, which have already published a volcano hazard map (one of the tasks of a Volcanic Disaster Management C ouncil)

Fig.
Fig.A-46
A-46 Formulation of Official Announcement Criteria for Evacuation Recommendations in Municipalities
88.9

(%)

78.2

Formulation rate

80

92.3

88.7

77.4

74.0

80.1

2013

63.3

2015

60
40

20
0
Flood

Sedoment
Disasters

Storm Surges

Tsunamis

Note) The disasters anticipated vary from one municipality to another, so the formulation rate is calculated using different denominators,
according to the type of disaster.
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the "Results of a Survey into the Formulation Status of Specific Official Announcement
Criteria for Evacuation Recommendations" from the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

A-68

Fig.
Fig.A-47
A-47 Communication Method of Evacuation Instructions in Municipalities
Disaster management
radio communications
systemYear

Communication facilities ofagricultural/
Patrols byfishery
loudspeaker
Individual
Simultaneous cooperatives
vans
Home
Broadcasting(including
Receivers
Systemwired systems)
SystemSiren

Bellringing

News
media

Throughvoluntary
disastermanagement
organizations

email

Other

2003

1,748
54%

2,126
66%

591
18%

2,942
92%

2,537
79%

698
22%

675
21%

1,065
33%

-

1,106
34%

2004

1,731
55%

2,095
67%

559
18%

2,864
92%

2,463
79%

659
21%

663
21%

1,064
34%

-

1,106
35%

2005

1,365
56%

1,670
69%

449
19%

2,254
93%

1,927
80%

525
22%

642
27%

942
39%

-

925
38%

2006

1,118
61%

1,349
73%

362
20%

1,739
94%

1,487
81%

414
22%

666
36%

887
48%

-

781
42%

2007

1,125
62%

1,350
74%

343
19%

1,722
94%

1,462
80%

383
21%

718
39%

939
51%

-

800
44%

2008

1,117
62%

1,348
74%

323
18%

1,713
95%

1,455
80%

358
20%

750
41%

987
55%

-

829
46%

2009

1,118
62%

1,361
76%

311
17%

1,702
95%

1,440
80%

345
19%

782
43%

1,015
56%

-

830
46%

2010

1,096
63%

1,333
76%

289
17%

1,647
94%

1,383
79%

324
19%

811
46%

1,033
59%

-

830
47%

2011

1,006
62%

1,240
77%

248
15%

1,530
95%

1,271
79%

270
17%

787
49%

1,002
62%

-

806
50%

2012

1,086
62%

1,340
77%

245
14%

1,644
94%

1,357
78%

285
16%

848
49%

1,129
65%

-

955
55%

2013

1,097
63%

1,377
79%

219
13%

1,648
95%

1,347
77%

276
16%

878
50%

1,154
66%

-

998
57%

2014

1,112
64%

1,398
80%

206
12%

1,651
95%

1,334
77%

256
15%

925
50%

1,169
67%

-

1,049
60%

2015

1,128
65%

1,412
81%

192
11%

1,659
95%

1,317
76%

238
14%

975
56%

1,193
69%

-

1,093
63%

2016

1,145
66%

1,426
82%

178
10%

1,654
95%

1,282
74%

219
13%

993
57%

1,204
69%

-

1,078
62%

2017

1,157
66%

1,443
83%

169
10%

1,651
95%

1,277
73%

208
12%

1,028
59%

1,212
70%

-

1,081
62%

1,170
1,450
155
1,651 1,256
195
1,046
1,203
883
67%
83%
9%
95%
72%
11%
60%
69%
51%
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

972
56%

2018

A-69

Fig.
Fig.A-48
A-48 Assistance based on Mutual Support Agreements between Prefectures and Support Agreementswith Private-Sector Institutions
SupportBased onMutualSupportAgreements
BetweenYear
Prefectures

Total
no.

Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions

Broadcasting
Agreements(agmts.)Reporting
Agreements

Emergency
ReliefAgreements

Transportation
Agreements

Disaster
Recovery
Agreements

Resources
Agreements

Other

Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
Total no.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
concluded
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.
agmts.

2003

23

6

288

47

347

31

191

37

148

39

400

37

711

34

124

19

2004

4

2

288

47

359

33

218

39

165

41

474

39

828

36

134

23

2005

13

8

304

47

362

32

221

43

178

42

504

40

873

40

182

31

2006

5

2

301

46

370

33

241

44

201

40

587

43

992

42

212

37

2007

0

0

304

46

337

34

272

43

211

41

778

43

1,196

44

317

36

2008

12

1

306

46

400

36

316

45

239

43

818

45

1,294

46

461

39

2009

5

1

314

46

399

36

339

44

247

43

857

45

1,364

46

546

41

2010

24

5

329

47

393

36

420

45

254

43

1,590

46

1,431

45

676

42

2011

18

4

318

44

373

33

472

43

235

41

1,568

43

1,357

44

676

39

2012

25

6

334

47

395

36

495

46

291

44

1,825

46

1,461

47

931

46

2013

29

8

360

47

419

38

575

47

317

46

1,913

47

1,558

47

1,178

46

2014

28

6

351

47

445

40

703

47

374

46

2,360

47

1,672

47

1,299

46

2015

24

6

343

47

454

39

893

47

382

46

2,397

47

1,694

47

1,515

46

2016

19

5

352

47

461

40

970

47

438

46

2,626

47

1,795

47

1,751

47

2017

16

5

351

47

438

40

1,065

47

477

47

2,648

47

1,754

47

1,898

47

2018

10

5

349

47

457

41

1,272

47

514

47

3,392

47

1,850

47

2,384

47

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-70

Fig.
Fig.A-49
A-49 Mutual Support Agreements in Municipalities

Year

No. of Municipalities

No. of mutual support
agreements concluded
between municipalities inthe same the prefecture

No. of municipalities thathave concluded mutual
support agreements withother municipalities

2003

3,213

1,459

2,363
74%

2004

3,123

1,527

2,306
74%

2005

2,418

1,502

1,771
73%

2006

1,843

1,408

1,457
79%

2007

1,827

1,512

1,471
81%

2008

1,811

1,625

1,656
91%

2009

1,800

1,725

1,646
91%

2010

1,750

1,778

1,571
90%

2011

1,619

1,738

1,476
91%

2012

1,742

2,254

1,645
94%

2013

1,742

2,920

1,650
95%

2014

1,742

3,419

1,697
97%

2015

1,741

3,642

1,705
98%

2016

1,741

4,013

1,699
98%

2017

1,741

4,280

1,698
98%

2018

1,741

―

1,701
98%

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-71

Fig.
Fig.A-50
A-50 Municipalities’ Support Agreements with Private-Sector Institutions
BroadcastAgreements
Year
No. oforgs.

Reporting
Agreements

Emergency Relief
Agreements

Transportation
Agreement

Disaster Recovery
Agreements

Resources
Agreements

Other

No. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofNo. ofsupportsupportsupportsupportsupportsupportsupport
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
orgs.
instancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstancesinstances

2003

150

10

22

2

726

4

253

2

392

21

562

7

334

6

2004

171

20

20

2

713

4

260

2

445

18

589

5

361

5

2005

191

50

27

2

647

6

271

15

445

39

583

17

376

9

2006

225

38

18

2

574

10

267

3

451

24

619

8

401

2

2007

275

35

24

596

7

292

2

662

23

794

6

484

9

2008

315

62

33

619

2

319

5

813

35

936

17

510

5

2009

362

48

33

658

3

355

2

979

35 1,060

33

559

11

2010

378

35

35

683

6

376

3 1,052

42 1,125

22

580

8

2011

376

107

36

2

645

17

386

109 1,066

548 1,118

226

579

57

2012

437

59

41

3

719

19

462

48 1,242

167 1,309

123

684

54

2013

495

81

58

778

3

519

9 1,318

42 1,412

20

743

6

2014

554

59

66

827

2

602

3 1,360

131 1,466

40

800

17

2015

609

50

83

1

869

34

719

3 1,40862 1,500

31

809

15

2016

636

48

101

1

921

43

811

6 1,451

41 1,526

44

810

25

2017

676

108

116

1

948

2

870

14 1,454

49 1,543

40

821

11

2018

708

140

117

981

31

925

10 1,478

213 1,561

56

826

276

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-72

Fig.
Fig.A-51
A-51 Disaster Management Drill Implementation

Number of Prefectures Conducting Disaster Management
Drills and the Number of Drills Conducted
856
No. of prefectures conducting drills
No. of drills conducted50

47 47 4747

47 47 47 47 43 43

47 47

800

709
47 47

47
45

40

288
20

235 232 218

464 463

347 341

700
600

593
30

900

500

506
400

361 396 360

300
291

No. of drills conducted

No. of prefectures conducting drills

60

200

10
100
0

0

Number of Municipalities Conducting Disaster Management
Drills and the Number of Drills Conducted2,500

10,000

2,000

1,500

7,889
7,457
7,408

9,000

8,000
6,989
6,5306,307
7,000
6,2686,1636,450
1,5441,5261,543
5,9465,8096,014
5,9325,755
1,4611,4851,512
5,420
1,377
6,000
5,000

1,000

4,000
3,000

500

No. of drills conducted

No. of municipalities conducting drills

8,814

2,000

1,000

0

0

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-73

Fig.
Fig.A-52
A-52 Earthquake Disaster Management Drill Implementation

Number of Prefectures Conducting Earthquake Disaster Management Drills, Number of Drills
Conducted, and the Number of Participants (Comprehensive Drills)
No. of organizations
No. of drills conducted
No. of participants
81

82

80

74

76

74
67

60

94

91
79

86

82

160

140
66

63

120

60

55
47

44

47

49

46

42

40

43

180

42

100
46

40

40

43

45

43

40

44

80

35

60
40

20

No. of participants (10,000)

No. of prefectures conducting earthquake
drills amid no. of drills conducted

100

20

0

0

Number of Prefectures Conducting Earthquake Disaster Management Drills, Number of Drills
Conducted, and the Number of Participants (Including Region-Wide Drills)
80

No. of organizations
No. of drills conducted70

No. of participants

80

60

52
43

40

50

57

60
44

37
33

47

45
34

40

42

40

34 32
28

50

33 31
29

36

37
27

36
25

28 29
22

39
33

33

32
27

29

30
20

20

No. of participants (10,000)

No. of prefectures conducting earthquake
drills amid no. of drills conducted

100

10
0

0

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-74

Fig.
Fig.A-53
A-53 Implementation of Tsunami Countermeasures
Designated Measures
Evacuation Routes Evacuation Sites
asincorporated
hazardous
into local
tsunami disaster risk No. of
No. ofNo. ofNo. ofAbsent inundation reduction
routesgovts. facilities govts.
areas
plan

Coastlines
Year

No. ofgovts.

Present

TsunamiBreakwaters
Extendeddistance(km)

No. ofgovts.

2003

3,213

1,014

2,199

401

812

1,700

108

5,355

311

1,631

204

2004

3,123

984

2,139

420

799

1,817

104

5,609

306

1,535

204

2005

2,418

806

1,612

374

465

2,099

111

6,442

316

1,472

180

2006

1,843

666

1,177

367

299

3,066

107

6,830

286

1,233

149

2007

1,827

667

1,160

374

384

2,297

108

7,307

292

1,231

143

2008

1,811

659

1,152

417

393

2,593

118

7,647

297

1,105

133

2009

1,800

655

1,145

424

353

2,674

118

7,919

307

1,042

125

2010

1,750

648

1,102

439

385

2,757

118

8,396

304

1,025

123

2011

1,619

609

1,010

425

357

2,448

106

7,448

276

787

93

2012

1,742

646

1,096

492

379

4,058

130

12,110

323

886

107

2013

1,742

646

1,096

539

383

5,054

139

16,238

361

905

104

2014

1,742

646

1,096

576

403

5,591

155

19,405

380

848

96

2015

1,741

646

1,095

603

431

6,176

166

22,589

410

841

97

2016

1,741

646

1,095

612

444

6,086

174

23,263

418

913

93

2017

1,741

645

1,096

623

483

9,414

179

23,481

425

959

98

2018

1,741

645

1,096

626

500

10,058184

23,285

414

967

101

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on the Fire and Disaster Management Agency report “Status of Regional
Disaster Management Administration”

A-75

9. Japan's International Cooperation
Fig.
Fig.A-54
A-54 List of Cooperation Projects Conducted by Ministries and Agencies
Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Partnership between the
US
Cabinet Office and FEMA

Partnership between the
Cabinet Office and Indian India
Ministry of Home Affairs

Partnership between the
Cabinet Office andTurkeyRepublic of Turkey
Ministry of the Interior

Cabinet Office(CAO)

Partnership between the
Cabinet Office and South
Peru,
American governments’Chileministries in charge ofdisaster prevention

Japan-U.S. Emergency
Management Working
Group

US

Cooperation between
the Cabinet Office ofJapan and the Ministryof the Interior of France Franceon emergency
management related tonuclear accidents

Description

Based on the Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the
Cabinet Office and FEMA in December 2014, a videoconference was held concerning Japan-U.S. disastermanagement cooperation in December 2018.
Based on the Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the
Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Home Affairs in India in
September 2017; aiming to develop a disaster management
partnership and strengthen the relationship between the twocounties, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Home Affairs
held the 2nd round of the Japan-India Disaster Management
Cooperation Meeting in October 2018 and the 3rd round of thesame meeting in Delhi, India in March 2019.
Based on the Japan-Turkey Summit in 2017, the Cabinet Officeand the Ministry of the Interior have promoted bilateral
cooperation in the disaster management field. At the Asian
Conference on Disaster Reduction 2018 held in Hyogo
Prefecture in October 2018, Turkey announced its accession to
the Asian Disaster Reduction Center.
In light of the fact that Chile is the APEC host country for 2019,
the Cabinet Office and the South American governments’ministries in charge of disaster prevention held the Japan-Peru
Public-Private Disaster Management Seminar in Lima, Peru in
February 2019, and Japan-Chile Public-Private Disaster
Management Seminar in Santiago, Chile in March 2019.
Partnerships in the field of nuclear emergency prevention
systems were deepened through regular exchanges of
opinions and information, and reciprocal invitations toexercises, which took place within the framework of theEmergency Management Working Group (EMWG) under the
U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation.
Along with regular exchanges of opinions and information
between the relevant bodies in both countries, reciprocal
invitations to exercises were issued within the framework of
the memorandum of cooperation on nuclear emergency
preparedness signed in May 2015.

With the objective of sharing information and exchanging
views concerning nuclear emergency preparedness in each
Hosting observers of a
IAEA, OECD/NEA. US, country, Japan invited international organizations such as IAEA,
comprehensive nuclear
France, Canada,
as well as the US, France and Canada as observers at the
emergency response
Germany, Indonesia Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise held at
exercise
Ohi and Takahama Nuclear Power Station in August 2018 andexchanged views with them.

Ministry of Internal
Affairs andCommunications(MIC)

Promotion ofInternational
Cooperation of ICT
Systems for Disaster
Management

Budget for
FY2018(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Department Responsible－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Disaster Preparedness,
Public Relations andInternational Cooperation
Division, Disaster
Management Bureau, CAO－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO－

Director General for
Nuclear Disaster
Management, CAO/
International Affairs Office,
Policy Planning and
Coordination Division,
Secretary-General’s
Secretariat, the Secretariatof the Nuclear Regulation
Authority

In order to promote the overseas development of Japan’s ICT
systems for disaster management, which have been cultivated
ASEAN, Latin America based on Japan's many years of experience and expertise, MIC
and Caribbean and will propose the systems for adopting them by the countries
othersthat are prone to natural disasters, while taking advantage ofbeing able to propose solutions that can respond finely to thecircumstances and needs of each country.

Included as a partof packaged
assistanceprojects forInternational Cooperation
strengthening
Division, Global Strategy
international
Bureau, MIC
competitivenessin the field of ICT,FY2018 (JPY641m)

ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) to support the AHA Center,
which is the disaster management information hub for the
ASEAN region. The center not only shares disaster information
with the ASEAN nations and coordinates emergency responses
in the event of a natural disaster or emergency, but also
monitors the ASEAN region, supports disaster drills in theregion and holds workshops to consolidate the partnershipwith disaster response organizations in normal times.

International Cooperation
Division, Global Strategy
Bureau, MIC
Regional Policy Division,
Asian and Oceanian Affairs
Bureau, MOFA

Support to AHA Center(ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian AHA Center (ASEAN)
Assistance on disastermanagement)

A-76

－

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Budget for
FY2018(in JPY million; if
applicable)

The International Forum on Fire and Disaster Management has
been held since 2007 to enable the countries of Asia, first andforemost, to enhance their firefighting and disaster3
management capacity, and to introduce Japan's firefighting
technologies and systems.
During the Year of Japan-Republic of Korea National Exchange,
which was held to coincide with the joint hosting of the 2002
FIFA World Cup by Japan and the Republic of Korea, a JapanJapan-Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea Firefighting Administration Seminar was held
Fire and Disaster Firefighting
Republic of Korea
1in both countries to promote Japanese-Republic of Korean
Management Administration Seminarexchange, partnership, and cooperation, through the sharing ofAgency (FDMA)
information and the exchange of ideas regarding firefighting
and disaster management in both countries.
Cooperation in the fire
Based on the Memorandum of Cooperation in the fire control
control field between
field signed in October 2018, the Fire and Disasterthe Fire and Disaster
Management Agency will exchange opinions with relevantManagement Agency
VietnamVietnamese agencies and provide them with support in6
and the Ministry of
improving fire control and safety, including the standardization
Public Security ofof fire control equipment and the establishment of aVietnamcertification system.
In response to the establishment of World Tsunami AwarenessDay, Japan carried out some promotional activities, such as
Financial Contributions
holding the World Tsunami Awareness Day Symposium in
to International
UNISDR,various areas around the world. It also provided tsunami control
Organizations in
UNDP,
training in low-income countries, which are vulnerable to782
Response to the
UNITAR,
natural disasters, as well as leadership seminars for female
Establishment of World OCHA
government officials concerning tsunami control. Japan also
Tsunami Awareness Day
supported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) which runs ReliefWeb to provide global
disaster information in real time.
In the event of a large-scale disaster overseas, MOFA decides
providing emergency relief goods to support the immediateneeds of affected people, upon request of the government of Included in JICA
Provision of Emergency Countries affected by
the affected country through Japan International Cooperation Management
Relief Goods
natural disasters
Agency (JICA). In FY2018, 11 cases of such assistance wereExpenses Grant
carried out. One example is the provision of electric generators
in response to the flood damage in Djibouti in May.
In the event of a large-scale disaster overseas, MOFA deploys
Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) teams upon request of thegovernment of the affected country. In FY2018, Japan sent a
Deployment of Japan
Included in JICA
Countries affected by Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) team (Infection Team) in response
Disaster Relief (JDR)
Management
natural disasters
to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
teams
Expenses Grant
in June and a Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) team and the SDF in
response to the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia in
October. *As of February 2019.
This program is jointly implemented by MOFA, the Japan
Ministry of Foreign
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), MEXT, the Japan(MOFA)
Affairs (MOFA)
Science and Technology Agency (JST), and the Japan Agency for Included in JICA
Science and Technology
Medical Research and Development (AMED). It aims toManagement
Research Partnership for 130 countries that are promote joint international research on solutions to global
Expenses Grant
Sustainable
the object of ODA
issues that occur in developing countries, tapping into the(MEXT)Development (SATREPS)
power of leading science and technology and Official
Included in JST
Development Assistance (ODA). Disaster prevention is one of Management
the research fields under this program; in FY2018, 23 projects Expenses Grant
were carried out in 19 countries.
The IAEA RANET Capacity Building Centre (CBC), where IAEA
staff are permanently stationed, was designated in Fukushima
Prefecture in May 2013, based on the "Practical Arrangements
Between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency on Cooperation in the
Operation of IAEA
IAEA member
Area of Emergency Preparedness and Response" signed
RANET Capacity Building
50
countries (IAEA)
between MOFA and the IAEA in December 2012. Materials andCentre (CBC)equipment stored for emergence response in the CBC are usedin an emergency involving radiation. In addition, the CBC serves
as the venue for training courses for officials from foreign andJapanese governments and local government officials held
several times a year.
Based on the Japan-Turkey Summits in 2017 and 2018, the twocountries signed a Memorandum on Cooperation in disasterJapan-Turkey Disasterprevention in December 2018 with a view to strengthen
Management
Turkey－comprehensive disaster management cooperation in the
Cooperationbilateral context as well as in a third country and in theinternational community.
International Forum on
Fire and Disaster
Management

Mainly Asian
countries

A-77

Department Responsible(Counselor of) Civil
Protection and Disaster
Management Department,
FDMA(Counselor of) Civil
Protection and Disaster
Management Department,
FDMA

Fire Prevention Division,
FDMA

Global Issues Cooperation
Division, International
Cooperation Bureau,
MOFA
Humanitarian Assistanceand Emergency Relief
Division

Humanitarian Assistanceand Emergency Relief
Division International
Cooperation Bureau,
MOFA

Humanitarian Assistanceand Emergency Relief
Division International
Cooperation Bureau,
MOFA

Development
Administration Division,
International Cooperation
Bureau, MOFA
International Science andTechnology Affairs Division,
Science and Technology
Policy Bureau, MEXTInternational Nuclear
Energy Cooperation
Division, Disarmament,
Non-proliferation andScience Department,
MOFAFirst Middle East Division,
Middle Eastern and African
Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Budget for
FY2018(in JPY million; if
applicable)

Promotion of "Sentinel 28 countries andAsia" Project to Shareregions of the Asia
Information on Natural Pacific Region/ 16
Disasters Between Asia - international
Pacific Countries
organizations

This project is led and implemented by Japan to contribute todisaster management efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region. It uses Included in JAXA
satellites to share information relating to natural disasters.
Management
Participants consist of 28 countries and regions, 92 institutions, Expenses Grant
and 16 international institutions (as of February 2019).

Initiatives on Tsunami
Preparedness inPartnership with Chile

On the assumption that a tsunami caused by an earthquake inChile propagated the Pacific Ocean, water gate closure drills,
etc. were conducted in Japan on November 9, 2018 in accord
with tsunami evacuation drills in Chile.

Ministry of
Education, Culture,
This program is jointly implemented by MEXT, JST, AMED,(MEXT)
Sports, Science and
MOFA, and JICA. It aims to promote joint international research Included in JST
Science and Technology
Technology (MEXT)
on solutions to global issues that occur in developing countries, Management
Research Partnership for
134 countries that are tapping into the power of Japan’s leading science andExpenses Grant
Sustainable
the object of ODA
technology and Official Development Assistance (ODA).
(MOFA)Development (SATREPS)
Disaster prevention is one of the research fields under thisIncluded in JICA
Programprogram; in FY2018, 23 projects were carried out in 19
Management
countries.
Expenses Grant

Chile

Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by theestablishment of World Tsunami Awareness Day, Japan
founded the Hamaguchi Award (presented by the Minister ofLand, Infrastructure and Transport and Tourism) in FY2016 for
Raising Awareness of
individuals and/or organizations within Japan or overseas that
World Tsunami
have made significant contributions in the field of technologies
All relevant countries
Awareness Day
for coastal disaster risk reduction, especially tsunami(Hamaguchi Award)
preparedness. At the ceremony held on November 7, 2018,
awards were given to two people and one organization(Hajime Mase, emeritus professor and specially appointed
professor at Kyoto University, Professor Harry Yeh from Oregon
State University and the DONET developer team).
This dialogue has been held since 2013 with the attendance ofrepresentatives from the industry, academia, and government
Disaster Management Vietnam, Myanmar, sectors in order to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the
Collaboration Dialogues Indonesia, Turkey,
disaster control field and support emerging countries that haveproblems in this field, while also disseminating Japan’s disasterprevention technologies overseas.
In accordance with the cooperation framework concluded in
Discussion with India on
September 2014, the 5th meeting of the Japan–India Joint
Ministry of RoadDRR Technology
Working Group on Roads and Road Transport was held in India.
Transport andMinistry of Land, Through a Bilateral
At the meeting, the Japanese side presented slope protection
Highways in India
Infrastructure Conference
measures and the disaster recovery measures implemented inTransport and
FY2018.
Tourism (MLIT)
Water Hazard and Risk Management (ICHARM) actively
undertook research, training, and information networking
activities aimed at mitigating damage due to water hazards
worldwide. Specifically, it developed the Integrated Flood
International Centre forAnalysis System and the Rainfall-Runoff-Inundation model, andWater Hazard and Risk UNESCO, etc.
put them into practice in the field; conducted research andManagement (ICHARM)
development on risk management; and offered master’s anddoctoral courses in disaster mitigation studies. In addition, it
undertook technical assistance and international support
initiatives funded by organizations including UNESCO and the
Asian Development Bank.
With a view to contributing to the establishment of earthquake
disaster reduction technologies, researchers from public
US-Japan Natural
seismic research institutions in Japan and the U.S. met to
Resources Panel on
USpresent the latest research outcomes and exchange opinions.
Earthquake Research
The event was held in Kumamoto Prefecture in October 2018(UJNR)(the event will be held every two years in Japan and the U.S.
alternately).
UN-GGIM-AP discusses institutional arrangement, policy,
Cooperation through thetechnological trends and capacity building, etc. concerning
National Geospatial
Regional Committee ofgeospatial information management in the region. Japan has
Information
United Nations Global
contributed to the Working Group on Disaster Risk
Authorities of 56
Geospatial Information
Management. The Working Group surveyed best practices ofMember States of UN
Management for Asia
the use of geospatial information in disaster response inin the Asia-Pacificand the Pacificvarious countries and published the Guidelines for Disaster Risk
region(UNGGIM-AP)
Management Using Geospatial Information and Services in
November 2018.

A-78

－

Department Responsible
Office for Space Utilization
Promotion, Space
Development andUtilization Division,
Research and Development
Bureau, MEXTInternational Science andTechnology Affairs Division,
Science and Technology
Policy Bureau, MEXT
Development
Administration Division,
International Cooperation
Bureau, MOFA
Risk Management Office,Coastal Administration andDisaster Management
Division, Ports and Harbors
Bureau, MLIT－

Port and Airport ResearchInstitute, National Instituteof Maritime, Port andAviation Technology

22River Planning Division,
Water and Disaster
Management Bureau/
Overseas Projects Division,
Policy Bureau,
MLIT－

International Affairs Office,Planning Division, Road
Bureau, MLIT－

Public Works ResearchInstitute

7

Research Management
Division, Geography andCrustal Dynamics ResearchCenter,Geospatial Information
Authority of Japan, MLIT－

International Affairs
Division, Planning
Department, Geospatial
Information Authority ofJapan, MLIT

Ministry/ Agency

Project

Partner/ Target
Country(Target Institution)

Description

Budget for
FY2018(in JPY million; if
applicable)

The JMA, as a constituent member of the WMO (one of thespecialized institutions of the UN to facilitate harmonious
development of meteorological services around the world),
sends experts to international conferences and is responsiblefor international centers.
Under the framework of the UNESCO Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the JMA collects, analyzes,
International
UNESCO member
and provides data on oceans and maritime meteorology for the
Cooperation throughcountries, etc.
northeast Asian region. It also provides information on tsunamis
UNESCO
caused by earthquakes that occur in the northwest Pacificregion.
International
The JMA participates in meetings organized by the ICAO, as
Cooperation throughwell as investigations into adopting and improving standard
Japan Metrological
ICAO member
International Civil
international criteria for aviation weather services. It has also
Agency (JMA)
countries
Aviation Organization
been appointed by the ICAO to operate international centers,(ICAO)
thus contributing to the safe operation of global aircraft.
The JMA promotes various international research projects in
Collaboration oncooperation with other countries. On climate change, it has
International Research All relevant countries been involved in writing evaluation reports on the activities of
Plans
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since
the panel was established in 1988.
Together with the Japan International Cooperation Agency
Human Resource(JICA), the JMA conducts training for developing countries toDevelopment Aid andimprove their meteorological services. Also, in response to
Technological
All relevant countries
requests from developing countries, the JMA dispatches expert
Cooperation tostaff and accepts trainees from national meteorological
Developing Countries
institutions.
The JCG participates in the projects of the NOWPAP MERRAC,
Participation in thewhich is a center responsible for preparing for and responding
projects of theto marine environmental emergencies. As well as undertaking a
Northwest Pacific Action
marine environmental conservation initiative focused on thePlan (NOWPAP) Marine
Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, etc. in partnership withJapan Coast Guard Environmental
Republic of Korea,
neighboring countries, the JCG takes part in joint oil spill(JCG)
Emergency
China, Russia
cleanup drills organized by relevant organizations and attends
Preparedness andmeetings held each year. Through these activities, it promotes
Response Regional
international cooperation by striving to build systems that will
Activity Centre
enable relevant countries to work together in the event of an(MERRAC)
accident.
International
Cooperation through
WMO

Ministry ofEnvironment(MOE)

WMO member
countries

Support for the
The MOE provides Japan’s know-how on disaster waste
Countries in the AsiaEnhancement of Disastermeasures, while also working on the development of support
Pacific Region andWaste Measures in theschemes for affected countries in coordination with relevant
othersAsia-Pacific Region
institutions.

Komodo 2018
Indonesia, US,
A multilateral joint training hosted by the Indonesian Navy.
Multilateral Joint
Australia, India, UK, Japan joined the drills related to disaster relief andTraining Exercise Hosted
and others
humanitarian aid activities.
by the Indonesian Navy
Multi-National Joint
US, Australia, Brazil, A multilateral joint training hosted by the U.S. Navy. Japan
Training Exercise,
Brunei, Canada, and joined the drills related to disaster relief and humanitarian aid
RIMPAC 2018
othersactivities.
US-Philippines Joint
A joint training hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines. Japan
Training Exercise
US, Philippines
joined the drills related to humanitarian aid and disaster relief
Kamandag 2018activities as part of international disaster relief activities.
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint
Training for
Ministry of Defense Humanitarian Assistance
A trilateral training among Japan, the U.S., and Australia. Japan(MOD)
and Disaster Relief in the Australia and US
joined the drills related to humanitarian aid and disaster relief
Federated States ofactivities.
Micronesia and otherCountries
Thailand, US,
Indonesia, Singapore, A multilateral joint training hosted by the U.S. and Thailand.
Exercise Cobra Gold
Malaysia, Republic of Japan joined the drills related to humanitarian aid and civilian
2019
Korea, Malaysia, India assistance activities.
and China
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint
A joint training among Japan, the U.S., and Australia. Japan
Training forAustralia and US
joined the drills related to humanitarian aid and disaster relief
Humanitarian Assistanceactivities.
and Disaster Relief

Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from various ministries and agencies.

A-79

Department Responsible－

Office of Disaster
Mitigation, Planning
Division, Administration
Department, JMA－

Office of Disaster
Mitigation, Planning
Division, Administration
Department, JMA－

Office of Disaster
Mitigation, Planning
Division, Administration
Department, JMA－

Office of Disaster
Mitigation, Planning
Division, Administration
Department, JMA－

Office of Disaster
Mitigation, Planning
Division, Administration
Department, JMA

3Protection of Marine
Environment Division,
Guard & Rescue
Department, JCG

17

Office of Disaster Waste
Management, Office of
Director for Environmental
Regeneration,
Environmental
Regeneration and Material
Cycles Bureau, MOE
Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD
Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD
Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD

Training Division, Bureau of
Defense Policy, MOD

Fig.
Fig.A-55
A-55 Technical Cooperation Projects in Disaster Risk Reduction (FY2018)
Cooperation
PeriodProject Name

Description

Indonesia

2013-2019

Project for Assessing and Integrating
Climate Change Impacts into the Water
Resources Management Plans for Brantas
and Musi River Basins

Indonesia

2013-2018

Project for Integrated Study on the
Mitigation of Multimodal Disasters Causedby the Ejection of Volcanic Products(SATREPS)

Indonesia

2014-2018

Project on Capacity Development for River
Basin Organizations (RBOs) in Integrated
Water Resources Management in the
Republic of Indonesia (Phase II)

Philippines

2016-2019

Project for Strengthening Capacity ofIntegrated Data Management of Flood
Forecasting and Warning

Philippines

2017-2021

Development of an Extreme Weather
Observation and Information Sharing
System (SATREPS)

Philippines

2018-2020

Project for Developing a Flood Control
Master Plan for Davao

Thailand2016-2019

Project for Strengthening the ASEAN
Regional Capacity on Disaster HealthManagement (ARCH Project)

Thailand2018-2022

The project on regional resilienceenhancement through establishment of
Area-BCM at industry complexes inThailand

Vietnam

2018-2021

The project for strengthening capacity inweather forecasting and flood early
warning system

Myanmar2015-2020

Project for Development of aComprehensive Disaster Resilience System
and Collaboration Platform in Myanmar(SATREPS)

Myanmar2018-2022

Project for Enhancing Capacity of Weather
Observation and Forecasting in Myanmar

China

2015-2018

The Project for Promotion and Capacity
Development of Disaster Mitigation
Education in Sichuan Province

Mongolia

2016-2019

Project for Strengthening the National
Capacity of Earthquake Disaster Protection
and Prevention in Mongolia

Supports the implementation by Indonesia of water resources management that takes into
account the effects of climate change, by providing advice on the formulation of water resource
management plans in Indonesia's Brantas and Musi River Basins that take such effects into
consideration, and by drafting guidelines that can also be applied to other river basins.
Aims to comprehensively reduce disaster risks caused by the ejection of volcanic products
through the development of a "Multimodal Sediment Disaster Countermeasures DecisionMaking Support System" composed of a "Volcanic Eruption Early Warning System", an"Integrated GIS Multimodal Sediment Disaster Simulator", and a "Floating Volcanic Ash Warning
System", all addressing the six volcanoes within Indonesia (Merapi, Semeru, Kelud, Galunggung,
Guntur and Sinabung), and through the practical use of such system by the institutions related to
DRR.
In the field of integrated water resources management in Indonesia (operation and maintenanceof river facilities, coordination of water use and allocation, preservation of aquatic environments,
flood management, etc.), supports the improvement of the structure and capacity of the RBOs,
by means of (1) site confirmations using field practice, (2) development and management oforganizational structures and systems for strengthening the capacity of the RBOs, and (3)improving access to reliable guidelines and manuals.
This project aims to enhance the capacity of PAGASA (Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical andAstronomical Service Administration) on integrated data management and utilization for riverflood forecasting and warning. The project gives focus on the operation in Cagayan de
Oro/Tagoloan River Flood Forecasting and Waning Center.
This includes establishing a lightning, weather and 3D cloud structure monitoring system,
developing technologies for short-term weather forecasts of extreme weather and the intensityof cyclones in Metropolitan Manila using an extrapolation method and developing software to
distribute information to disaster management organizations.
This project aims to support the preparation of a comprehensive flood control master plan forthree river basins (Davao river, Matina river, Talomo river) in Davao city and carry out feasibility
studies on priority plans.
Thailand’s National Institute for Emergency Medicine (NIEM) serves as the implementing agency
for this project, which aims to strengthen collaborative frameworks for disaster healthmanagement in the ASEAN region through collaborative intraregional disaster healthmanagement drills, the development of collaboration tools, and training courses, thereby
enhancing disaster response capabilities within the region. ASEAN has endorsed this project as
an official ASEAN project.
This project aims to establish a method to introduce and use Area-BCM in clusters in Thailand
through the development of a method to analyze and assess flood risks, development of amethod for business impact analysis concerning natural disasters, establishment of systems to
manage Area-BCM in specific clusters, and development of training programs for the domestic
and international introduction of Area-BCM.
This project aims to provide disaster management institutions and residents with more accurate
meteorological information in a prompt manner by improving maintenance, inspection, andcalibration skills for meteorological observation equipment, improving abilities to analyze dataobtained from two weather radars introduced under the Grand Aid program and quality control
skills, improving monitoring and forecasting skills concerning heavy rains and typhoons, andimproving communication skills.
Yangon Technological University, which falls under the jurisdiction of Myanmar’s Ministry of
Education, is planning to develop and build a scenario analysis system that forecasts changes indisaster vulnerability as needed, and an integrated disaster response system based on this toenhance disaster resilience. In addition, it is planning to establish an industry-academiagovernment collaborative platform to disseminate these systems in governmental organizations
and industry. Japan will provide support for R&D of these systems, human resource
development required for this R&D, and the establishment of a platform, thereby helping toenhance disaster resilience in Myanmar.
This program aims to improve the Myanmar Department of Meteorology and Hydrology’s
capacity for the maintenance of meteorological observation equipment and weather data
analysis and processing skills. By ensuring more effective forecasting, Myanmar aims to reduce
damage from disasters. This program is intended to create a synergy effect with support related
to meteorological observation equipment, such as the introduction of three weather radars
under the Grand Aid program.
As part of this project, which encompasses 100 or so model schools for disaster mitigation
education, model schools in the city of Ya’an will carry out model lessons, to facilitate research
into drills and activities that involve teaching materials, curricula, and communities, as well as
research into the development of government policy. The objective of this initiative is to build
models for ongoing disaster mitigation education and to improve awareness of disaster
preparedness and disaster response capabilities at every level, including boards of education,school managers, teachers, and the students themselves.
This project seeks to strengthen capacity at the Mongolian national government’s disasterprevention body (National Emergency Management Agency: NEMA) by strengthening
preventive measures in respect of earthquake-related disaster preparedness. In addition toincreasing NEMA’s capacity to formulate its own disaster prevention plans, this project will
improve NEMA’s capacity through the engagement in the initiatives such as the formulation andupdating of disaster prevention plans by regional governments and earthquake-resistantconstruction and disaster preparedness education by other ministries and agencies.

Country

A-80

Country

Cooperation
PeriodKyrgyz2016-2019

Turkmenistan

2017-2020

Armenia

2019-2021

Bangladesh

2014-2018

Bangladesh

2015-2019

Bangladesh

2016-2021

Nepal

2016-2021

Pakistan

2016-2021

Sri Lanka

2014-2018

Sri Lanka

2018-2021

Sri Lanka

2018-2020

Fiji

2014-2018

Vanuatu2018-2021

CentralAmerica

2015-2020

Mexico2016-2021

Project Name

Description

This road disaster prevention project involving Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Transport and Roads
seeks to (1) summarize the roles of relevant departments; (2) improve road disaster prevention
inspection and analysis capabilities; (3) build and operate a road disaster prevention database
Project for Capacity Development for Road management system; and (4) promote cooperation in improving capabilities in the area ofDisaster Prevention Management
preparing road disaster prevention management plans. Through this, it aims to develop capacity
for road disaster prevention management within the Ministry of Transport and Roads, andthereby increase the safety of road traffic against slope or snow disasters in the area under thejurisdiction of the road maintenance management office targeted by the project.
The purpose of this project is to improve the capacity of the nation in earthquake observation andearthquake hazard assessment of earthquake risk using earthquake observation data and the result
Project for Improvement of theof earthquake hazard assessment and formulate earthquake disaster management plans by
Earthquake Monitoring System in anddeveloping an earthquake observation and strong motion observation system to establish a system
around the Ashgabat City
for early decision-making on seismic intensity, epicenter and earthquake size and prediction ofseismic intensity in pilot districts of the Ashgabat Area.
This program aims to improve the crisis communication capabilities of the Ministry of Emergency
The Project for the Improvement of Crisis
Situations (Armenia) and domestic media by developing crisis communication guidelines,
Communication and Public Awareness for
conducting drills based on the guidelines, developing training materials and plans, and conducting
Disaster Risk Reduction
training, with a view to ensuring accurate and timely emergency communication.
This project proposes prevention and mitigation measures for storm surge and flood damage
Research Project on Disasterincluding the creation of flood risk maps and storm surge risk maps, measures to address river bank
Prevention/Mitigation Measures against
erosion and river levee collapse, and measures to prevent toxic substance diffusion at times ofFloods and Storm Surges (SATREPS)
flooding, and experimentally conducts such measures.
Primarily targeting staff at the Public Works Department under the Ministry of Housing and Public
Works, this project seeks to increase the safety of buildings in Bangladesh and reduce the risk of
Building Safety Promotion Project fordisaster in urban areas by supporting efforts to strengthen human resource development systems
Disaster Risk Reduction (BSPP)
aimed at increasing building safety and making use of manuals to enhance the capability of the staff
for evaluating seismic capacity, undertaking seismic design and supervising construction at the endof the project.
Focusing on buildings in Dhaka that are primarily built from reinforced concrete, this project involves
Technical Development to Upgrade
research into diagnostic techniques and reinforcement methods suitable to local components andStructural Integrity of Buildings in Densely
structural styles, and the presentation of recommendations for strategies for applying them. ThroughPopulated Urban Areas and its Strategic
this, it aims to increase the structural resilience of buildings, and encourage technology development
Implementation towards Resilient Cities
and its effective implementation, thereby contributing to reducing the structural vulnerability of(SATREPS)
buildings in Bangladesh, and increasing safety against urban earthquakes.
The goal of this project is to strengthen remote monitoring systems and develop human resources
The project for Integrated Research onin the earthquake field by estimating future earthquakes that could occur in the Himalayan seismic
Great Earthquakes and Disaster Mitigation
gap, thoroughly examining the ground properties of the Kathmandu basin, and enhancing thein Nepal Himalaya (SATREPS)
seismographic network.
Via the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), a public training institution established in2007 to develop capacity at the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), this project will
Project for Capacity Development of
support efforts to strengthen human resource development implementation systems in the field ofDisaster Management
disaster management and contribute to increasing the knowledge concerning disaster management
held by personnel belonging to the country’s disaster management administration bodies.
This project supports the enhancement of sediment disaster management capacity in Sri Lanka
through conducting surveys and assessments of sediment disaster countermeasures, development
Technical Cooperation for Landslideof designs to prevent landslide, slope failures and rocks fall, design and construction supervision and
Mitigation Projectmonitoring, and accumulation of knowledge and know-how on sediment disasters mitigation
measures.
Project for capacity strengthening
This program aims to improve Sri Lanka’s capabilities concerning intangible measures by establishing
regarding non-structural measures foran early sediment disaster alert system using risk assessment, and introducing the concept of land
landslide risk reduction
use planning.
Project for Storm Water Drainage Plan inThis project aims to plan urban drainage and inland flood control measures in Colombo and its
selected areas in Colombo Metropolitan
surrounding areas, while also selecting priority programs and conducting investigations.
RegionThe Project Purpose is to enhance comprehensively and effectively the capability of weather andflood forecasting and warning services. Through the project, all National Meteorological Services
Project for Reinforcing Meteorological(NMS) in the South Pacific are effectively enhanced, maintenance and operations of equipment andTraining Function of FMS
systems are enhanced in all NMSs, quality control of data is improved in all NMSs, and disseminationof weather information is improved in all NMSs.
This project aims to develop a system for the timely and accurate communication of earthquake,tsunami, and storm surge information from the Vanuatu Meteorology and Geohazards Department
Project for Enhancing the Capacity ofand the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) to relevant institutions and residents, byIssuing Earthquake, Tsunami and Storm
strengthening earthquake and tide monitoring networks (including the observation networks
Surge Information
developed under the Grand Aid program), improving data analysis capabilities, and enhancing
disaster information communication and alert issuing capabilities.
The Project on Capacity Development for Disaster Risk Management in Central America wasconducted to build disaster-resilient societies by improving the disaster risk reduction capabilities ofsix countries in Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, andPanama), which face similar risks in terms of natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, andProject on Capacity Development forvolcanic disasters. Based on the results of that project, Phase 2 supports the strengthening ofDisaster Risk Management in Central
capacity among administrative organizations with a view to nationwide rollout, and theAmerica, Phase 2
strengthening of frameworks for sustained efforts to popularize systematic community disaster
preparedness, as well as supporting the construction of frameworks for sharing each country’s
experiences with others in Central America, with the aim of developing disaster risk management
capacity throughout the region.
This project involves installing measuring instruments on the earth’s surface and sea floor in the
coastal region of Guerrero state in southern Mexico, and gathering and analyzing earthquake data.
Hazard Assessment of Large Earthquakes
This will be used to develop scenarios for major earthquake and tsunami disasters that could occur
and Tsunamis in the Mexican Pacific Coastin future and to prepare a hazard map and evacuation signs. In addition, the project will develop andfor Disaster Mitigation (SATREPS)
disseminate a disaster mitigation education program that takes local sociocultural attributes into
account.

A-81

Country

Cooperation
PeriodProject Name

Nicaragua

2016-2019

Project for Strengthening of Capacity of theCentral American Tsunami Advisory Center(CATAC)

Honduras

2018-2022

Project for Control and Mitigation ofLandslide in Tegucigalpa Metropolitan
Area

Chile

2014-2019

Disaster Risk Reduction Training Programfor Latin America and the Caribbean

Chile

2018-2021

Institutional Strengthening of ONEMI for
Capacity Development in Disaster Risk
Reduction Project

Colombia

2015-2018

Project for Strengthening Flood Risk
Management Capacity

Colombia

2015-2020

Project for Application of State of the Art
Technologies to Strengthen Research andResponse to Seismic, Volcanic and Tsunami
Events, and Enhance Risk Management(SATREPS)

Ecuador2017-2021

Project for Safe and Resilient Cities for
Earthquake and Tsunami DisasterMozambique

2014-2018

Project for the Capacity Enhancement ofMeteorological Observations, Weather
Forecasting and Warnings

Mauritius

2018-2022

Project for Enhancing MeteorologicalObservation, Weather Forecasting andWarning Capabilities

Afghanistan

2012-2018

Project for Capacity Enhancement on
Hydro-Meteorological Information
Management in the Ministry of Energy and
Water

Turkey2013-2018

Project on Earthquake and Tsunami
Disaster Mitigation in the Marmara Region
and Disaster Education in Turkey(SATREPS)

Description
Focusing on the Instituto Nicaraguense de Estudios Territoriales (INETER) (Nicaraguan Institute of
Territorial Studies) which implemented a 24-hour earthquake and tsunami monitoring system forthe first time in the Central America and the Central American Tsunami Advisory Center (CATAC) in
Nicaragua, the goal of this project is to improve the quantitative tsunami forecasting capabilities
required for CATAC’s tsunami advisory information so that the information can be used in thetsunami warnings of Central American countries. It will involve increasing CATAC’s ability to analyze
earthquake parameters and forecast tsunami using observation data from Central Americancountries; putting in place facilities and infrastructure for conducting human resource development
in Central American countries; and conducting human resource development among corepersonnel.
This project aims to improve landslide management capabilities by strengthening the following skills:(1) detailed investigation and analysis to understand landslide phenomenon; (2) design,
construction, construction management, and maintenance skills concerning small and mediumscale landslide control measure; (3) formulation of landslide hazard maps and risk maps; and (4) land
use regulation related to landslide disasters.
With a view to contributing to the improvement of disaster risk reduction measures in Latin America
and the Caribbean, this project will support the development of mechanisms to establish Chile as abase for human resource development in the field of disaster risk reduction, focusing primarily onearthquakes and tsunami. These mechanisms will cover such matters as cooperation policy, budget
planning, needs surveys in countries receiving assistance, and the coordination and investment ofcooperation resources appropriate to those needs.
Under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, this project aims to contribute to disasterprevention measures taken by ONEMI (Chile’s national disaster control institution) by improving
capabilities and fostering talents for the promotion of disaster prevention and reduction measures,development of a disaster knowledge management system, and formulation of regional disastermanagement plans.
This project will seek to strengthen flood risk management capabilities among relevantorganizations in Colombia by strengthening capacity in the areas of flood risk assessment, flood
forecast and warning, and the communication of forecasts and warnings, as well as by clarifying
the roles and responsibilities of national and local governments, and enhancing flood risk
management planning capabilities.
Colombia experiences frequent disasters due to earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions.
This project involves promoting partnerships between research institutes and relevant disastermanagement organizations, along with research and practical activities aimed at strengthening
measures to mitigate the damage due to disaster through capacity building in such areas asearthquake, tsunami, and volcanic activity monitoring, modeling, damage forecasting, and thetransmission of information. In addition, it will contribute to advances in disaster research inSouth America through collaboration with neighboring countries.
Initiatives for developing “disaster resilient cities” will be deployed nationwide to mitigate
damage caused by earthquakes and tsunamis by formulating tsunami evacuation plans,
updating the disaster management agenda and strengthening the operational structure ofbuilding system in three pilot cities (Atacames, Portoviejo and Salinas).
This project, which targets the staff of the Mozambique Meteorological Office and regional
observation stations, aims to improve the capacity for responding to water-related disasters in
Mozambique, a country which is vulnerable to natural disasters and is exposed to cyclones andflooding every year. The project works towards the improvement of forecasts and warnings thatuse quality controlled weather data by aiming to improve meteorological observation capacity
and weather forecasting and warning capacity.
This project aims to ensure the timely provision of accurate meteorological information to
Mauritian disaster management institutions and residents through technological cooperation
aimed at improving the Mauritius Meteorological Services’ forecasting and alert issuingcapabilities, while also utilizing weather radars introduced under the Grand Aid program.
This project supports a cooperative relationship between the Ministry of Energy and Water(MEW) and other hydro/meteorological information management institutions (Ministry ofAgriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), National Meteorological Service (NMS), etc.), andthen to enable the mutual exchange of Afghanistan's hydro/meteorological data andinformation and its application in the appropriate development of irrigation and agriculture, sothat it will be used by the general public.
In the Marmara Region, with its high earthquake risk, this project conducts research on
earthquake observations and on earthquake and tsunami disaster simulations. By maintaining
the results of this research in the form of visual resources (such as images and pamphlets), thisproject works to improve the general public's awareness and knowledge of DRR.

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

A-82

10. Others
Fig.
Fig.A-56
A-56 Number of Earthquake Insurance Contracts

No. of Insurance Contracts (thousands)

Household Insurance Coverage Rate (%)
Rate of Rider Attachment to Fire Insurance (%)

18,00016,00053.7

17,713 18,258

60.0

50.0

45.0

11,841
40.3
10,247

12,00010,000
7,326

8,000
5,975

13.1

15.4

40.0

33.3
28.8

8,079

29.5

30.5

31.2

30.0

26.0

20.1

4,000

2,000

16,48916,941

63.0

14,08914,000

6,000

60.2
59.3

62.1

22.4

16.4

20.0

0

Rate of Household Coverage/Rider Attachment

No. of Insurance Contracts

20,000

10.0
1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2015

2016

2017

End of Fiscal Year
Source: Formulated by the Cabinet Office based on materials from the General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan

Fig.
Fig.A-57
A-57 Awareness of Self-Help, Mutual Support, and Public Support Measures
Public support measures
should be of primary
importance

Mutual supportshould be of primary
importanceSelf-help should be ofprimary importanceIntegration of public support
measures, mutual support and selfI don’t know
help is important
Others

September2002 Survey

December
2013 Survey

November2017 Survey

Source: Formulated by Cabinet Office on basis of "Public Opinion Poll regarding Disaster Risk Reduction” conducted by the
Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office

A-83

Fig.
Fig.A-58
A-58 Tables Explaining the Japan Meteorological Agency Seismic Intensity Scale
Notes:(1) As a rule, seismic intensities announced by JMA are values observed using seismic intensity meters
installed on the ground or on the first floor of low-rise buildings. This document describes the phenomena
and damage that may be observed for individual seismic intensity levels. Seismic intensities are notdetermined from the observed phenomena described here.
(2) Seismic ground motion is significantly influenced by underground conditions and topography. Seismic
intensity is the value observed at a site where a seismic intensity meter is installed, and may vary even
within the same city. In addition, the amplitude of seismic motion generally differs by floor and location
within the same building, as shaking on upper floors of middle-to-high-rise buildings may be considerably
amplified.
(3) Sites with the same level of seismic intensity will not necessarily suffer the same degree of damage, as theeffect of tremors depends on the nature of the seismic motion (such as amplitude, period and duration),
the type of construction and underground conditions.
(4) This document describes typical phenomena that may be seen at individual seismic intensity levels. In
some cases, the level of damage may be greater or less than specified. Not all phenomena described foreach intensity level may necessarily occur.
(5) The information outlined here is made by experiences of recent earthquake disasters and regularly
checked at intervals of about five years. This information will be updated in line with actual phenomena
observed in new cases or improvements in the earthquake resistance of buildings and structures.
(6) In the case that the extent of damage cannot be shown in round numbers, the following adverbs andadjectives have been used as a tentative guide.
Term
RarelyA few/little
Majority
Almost all
There are (also),
there may be
Increases

Definition
Extremely limited. Hardly ever.
Number/extent is extremely small. Just a little bit.
Half or more. Less than “almost all.”
Not all but close to all.
Used to express something that typically starts to appear at this seismic intensity
level, where the quantity is not great, but it is hard to quantify the number/extent.

Increases further

Same meaning as “increases” above. Used in relation to lower levels of intensity, justlike “increases” above.

It is difficult to specify the quantity, but it is more than would be the case for a lower
level of intensity.

* The JMA sometimes publishes earthquake intensities obtained from questionnaire surveys, but these areexpressed as “corresponding to seismic intensity xx” and are distinguished from seismic intensity levels
observed by seismic intensity meters.

A-84

●Human perception and reaction, indoor situation, outdoor situation
Seismic
intensity0123

Human perception and reaction
Imperceptible to people, but
recorded by seismometers.
Felt slightly by some people
keeping quiet in buildings.
Felt by many people keeping
quiet in buildings. Some people
may be awoken.
Felt by most people inbuildings. Felt by some people
walking. Many people areawoken.

4

Most people are startled. Feltby most people walking. Most
people are awoken.

5 Lower

Many people are frightened
and feel the need to hold onto
something stable.

5 Upper

6 Lower

6 Upper7

Indoor situation

Outdoor situation

－

－

－

－

Hanging objects such as lamps
swing slightly.

－

Dishes in cupboards may rattle.
Hanging objects such as lamps
swing significantly, and dishes
in cupboards rattle. Unstable
ornaments may fall.
Hanging objects such as lamps
swing violently. Dishes incupboards and items on
bookshelves may fall. Many
unstable ornaments fall.
Unsecured furniture may move,and unstable furniture may
topple over.

Electric wires swing slightly.

Electric wires swing
significantly. Those driving
vehicles may notice the tremor.

In some cases, windows may
break and fall. People noticeelectricity poles moving. Roads
may sustain damaged.

Many people find it hard to
move; walking is difficult
without holding onto
something stable.

Dishes in cupboards and items
on bookshelves are more likely
to fall. TVs may fall from theirstands, and unsecured
furniture may topple over.

Windows may break and fall,
unreinforced concrete-block
walls may collapse, poorly
installed vending machines may
topple over, automobiles may
stop due to the difficulty ofcontinued movement.

It is difficult to remain standing.

Many unsecured furniture
moves and may topple over.
Doors may become wedged
shut.

Wall tiles and windows may
sustain damage and fall.

It is impossible to remain
standing or move without
crawling. People may bethrown through the air.

Most unsecured furniture
moves, and is more likely totopple over.
Most unsecured furniture
moves and topples over, or
may even be thrown throughthe air.

A-85

Wall tiles and windows are
more likely to break and fall.
Most unreinforced concreteblock walls collapse.
Wall tiles and windows areeven more likely to break andfall. Reinforced concrete-block
walls may collapse.

●Wooden houses
Seismic
intensity

Wooden houses
High earthquake resistance

Low earthquake resistance

5 Lower－

Slight cracks may form in walls.

5 Upper－

Cracks may form in walls.

6 Lower

Slight cracks may form in walls.

Cracks are more likely to form in walls.
Large cracks may form in walls.
Tiles may fall, and buildings may lean orcollapse.

6 Upper

Crazing or cracks may be seen in walls.

Large cracks are more likely to form in walls.
Buildings are more likely to lean or collapse.

7

Cracks are more likely to form in walls.
Buildings may lean in some cases.

Buildings are even more likely to lean orcollapse.

Notes:(1) Wooden houses are classified into two categories according to their earthquake resistance, which tends to be higher for newer
foundations. Earthquake resistance tends to be low for structures built up to 1981, and high for those built since 1982. However,
to maintain a certain range of earthquake resistance according to differences in structure and wall arrangement, resistance is
not necessarily determined only by foundation age. The earthquake resistance of existing buildings can be ascertained throughquakeproofing diagnosis.
(2) The walls in this table are assumed to be made of mud and/or mortar. Mortar in a wall with a weak base can easily break off
and fall, even under conditions of low deformation.
(3) Damage to wooden houses depends on the period and duration of seismic waves. In some cases (such as the Iwate-Miyagi
Nairiku Earthquake of 2008), few buildings sustain damage in relation to the level of seismic intensity observed.

●Reinforced-concrete buildings
Seismic
intensity
5 Upper

Reinforced-concrete buildings
High earthquake resistance

Low earthquake resistance
Cracks may form in walls, crossbeams andpillars.

－

6 Lower

Cracks may form in walls, crossbeams andpillars.

Cracks are more likely to form in walls,
crossbeams and pillars.

6 Upper

Cracks are more likely to form in walls,
crossbeams and pillars.

Slippage and X-shaped cracks may be seen inwalls, crossbeams and pillars.
Pillars at ground level or intermediate floors may
disintegrate, and buildings may collapse.

Cracks are even more likely to form in walls,
crossbeams and pillars.
Ground level or intermediate floors may sustain
significant damage. Buildings may lean in somecases.

Slippage and X-shaped cracks are more likely to
be seen in walls, crossbeams and pillars.
Pillars at ground level or on intermediate floors
crumble are more likely to disintegrate, andbuildings are more likely to collapse.

7

Notes:(1) Earthquake resistance tends to be higher for newer foundations. The value tends to be low for structures built up to 1981,
and high for those built since 1982. However, to maintain a certain range of earthquake resistance according to differences instructure and 2D/3D arrangement of reinforced walls, resistance is not necessarily determined only by foundation age. The
earthquake resistance of existing buildings can be ascertained through quakeproofing diagnosis.
(2) Slight cracks may form in reinforced-concrete buildings without their core structure being affected.

A-86

●Situation of ground and slopes, etc.
Seismic
intensity
5 Lower

Situation of ground

Situation of slopes, etc.

5 Upper

Small cracks*1 may form and liquefaction*2 may
occur.

Rock falls and landslips may occur.

6 Lower

Cracks may form.

Landslips and landslides may occur.

Large cracks may form.

Landslips are more likely to occur; large
landslides and massif collapses may be seen.*3

6 Upper7

Notes:*1 A crack is the same phenomenon as a fissure, but the expression is used here to refer to a small fissure or opening in the
ground.
*2 Liquefaction may be seen in areas with a high groundwater level and loose sand deposits. Damage observed as a result ofliquefaction includes spouts of muddy water from the ground, outbreaks of subsidence in riverbanks and quays, elevation of
sewage pipes and manholes, and leaning or destruction of building foundations.
*3 When large landslides and massif collapse occurs, dams may form depending on geographical features, and debris flow may
occur due to the large quantities of sediment produced.

●Influence on utilities and infrastructure, etc.
Suspension of gas supply

In the event of shaking with a seismic intensity of about 5 Lower or more, gas
meters with safety devices are tripped, stopping the supply of gas.
In the event of stronger shaking, the gas may stop for entire local blocks.*

Suspension of watersupply, electrical
blackouts

Suspension of water supply and electrical blackouts may occur in regions
experiencing shaking with a seismic intensity of about 5 Lower or more.*

Suspension of railroad
services, regulation of
highways, etc.

In the event of shaking with a seismic intensity of about 4 or more, services onrailroads or highways may be stopped for safety confirmation. Speed control andtraffic regulations are performed according the judgment of the relevant bodies.
(Standards for safety confirmation differ by organization and area).

Disruption to lines ofcommunication such as
telephones

In the event of an earthquake, communication network congestion may occur due
to increased calls related to safety confirmation and inquiries around regions
experiencing strong shaking.
To combat this, telecommunications providers offer Disaster Emergency Message
Dial and Message Board services if a disaster such as an earthquake with a seismic
intensity of about 6 Lower or greater occurs.

Suspension of elevator
service

In the event of shaking with a seismic intensity of about 5 Lower or more, elevatorswith earthquake control devices will stop automatically for safety reasons.
Resumption of service may be delayed until safety is confirmed.

*In the event of shaking with a seismic intensity of 6 Upper or more, gas, water, and electric supplies may stop over wide areas.

●Effect on large-scale structures
Shaking of skyscrapers
from long-period groundmotion*Due to their longer characteristic period, skyscrapers react less to earthquakes
than general reinforced-concrete buildings, which have a shorter characteristic
period. However, they exhibit slow shaking over a long time in response to longperiod ground motion. If motion is strong, poorly fixed office appliances may movesignificantly, and people may have to hold onto stable objects to maintain theirposition.

Sloshing of oil tanks

Sloshing of oil tanks occurs in response to long-period ground motion. As a result,oil outflows or fires may occur.

Damage or collapse ofceilings etc. at institutions
covering large spaces

In institutions covering large spaces such as gymnasiums or indoor pools, ceilings
may shake significantly and sustain damage or collapse, even in cases where
ground motion is not severe enough to cause other structural damage.

*Occasionally, when a large earthquake occurs, long-period seismic waves reach locations far from the hypocenter; such waves
may be amplified over plains depending on the characteristic period of the ground, thus extending their duration.
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

A-87

Fig.
Fig.A-59
A-59 Emergency Warning Issuance Criteria■Criteria for Meteorological Emergency Warnings
Phenomenon
Criteria
Heavy rainfall with a level of intensity observed only once every few decades ispredicted in association with a typhoon or similar.
Or:
Heavy rain
Heavy rainfall is predicted in association with a typhoon expected to have a level ofintensity observed only once every few decades or an extratropical cyclone withcomparable intensity.
Storm

A storm is predicted…

Storm surge

A storm surge is predicted…

High waves

High waves are predicted…

Snowstorm
Heavy snow

…in association with a typhoon expected
to have a level of intensity observed only
once every few decades or an extratropical
cyclone with comparable intensity.

A snowstorm is predicted in association with an extratropical cyclone expected tohave a level of intensity observed only once every few decades.
Heavy snowfall with a level of intensity observed only once every few decades ispredicted.

■Emergency Warning Criteria for Tsunami, Volcanic eruptions, and Earthquake
Phenomenon
Criteria
Tsunami height is expected to be greater than 3 meters. (Major Tsunami Warnings
Tsunamiare issued in the classification of Emergency Warnings.)
Eruption or possibility of eruption that may cause serious damage in residential
areas and non-residential areas nearer the crater. (Volcanic Warning (Level 4 and 5)
Volcanic eruption
and Volcanic Warning (residential areas)* are issued in the classification of
Emergency Warnings.)
Seismic intensity of 6-lower or more is expected. (Earthquake Early Warnings
Earthquake
incorporating prediction of tremors measuring 6-lower or more on JMA’s seismic
intensity scale are issued in the classification of Emergency Warnings.)
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency

A-88

List of Acronyms
ACDR
ADRC
AMCDRR
APEC
ASAP
BCM
BCP
DOE
DRR
ECCS
EMWG
EPReSC
ERC
FEMA
HA/DR
IAEA
ICHARM
ICT
IRP
ISO
ISUT
JANDR
JBP
JICA
JIS
JMA
JVOAD
MAFF
MEXT
MHLW
MIC
MLIT
MOC
NIED
NPO
NRA
NRC
OECD/NEA
OEIWG
PAZ
SCJ
SDF
SDGs
SDMOF
SFDRR
SIP4D
SMEs
SRSG
TEC-FORCETMG
UNISDRUPZ
VC

Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction
Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Asia Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
as soon as possible
Business Continuity Management
Business Continuity Plan
Department of Energy
Disaster Risk Reduction
emergency core cooling system
Emergency Management Working Group
Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee
Emergency Response Center
Federal Emergency Management Agency
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management
information and communication technology
International Recovery Platform
International Organization for Standardization
Information Support TeamJapan Academic Network for Disaster Reduction
Japan Bosai Platform
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japanese Industrial Standards
Japan Meteorological Agency
Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Memorandum of Cooperation
National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience
Non-Profit Organization
Nuclear Regulation Authority
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group
Precautionary Action Zone
Science Council of Japan
Self-Defense Forces
Sustainable Development Goals
Senior Disaster Management Officials Forum
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030
Shared Information Platform for Disaster Management
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
Technical Emergency Control FORCETokyo Metropolitan Government
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone
volunteer center
A-89

2019

2019

The Warning Level is used tocommunicate the timing of evacuation.

Warning Level
土砂災害から身を守るには

The government has been using the
土砂災害は主に台風や長雨、
集中豪雨などの大雨により、地盤がゆるむことによって発生します。
four-level warning system
to provide
多発する土砂災害から避難するタイ
ミングや被害を最小限に抑えるポイントを知っておきましょう。
evacuation information
since the flood
season (around June) of 2019.

Warning Level

土砂災害の多くは雨が原因で起こります。
雨量をチェックして十分な注意を払いましょう。

・大雨注意報の雨量基準(松山市) ‥‥平坦地で1時間雨量30ｍｍ、平坦地以外で3時間雨量70ｍｍ
・大雨警報の雨量基準(松山市) ‥‥平坦地で1時間雨量45ｍｍ、平坦地以外で3時間雨量100ｍｍ※松山市の年間雨量（平年値）は1,300mmほど。

Evacuate
now!

Start evacuation immediately if
１.松山市内には1,652ヵ所の危険箇所
Warning Level 3 or 4 is issued in

White Paper
3.避難のポイント
Disaster Management
雨 量
in JapanWhite Paper on Disaster Management in Japan

サバイバルへの道

第2章

your 現在、
municipality.
松山市には、
土砂災害の発生のおそれのある「土砂災害危避難のポイント

Evacuate
now if you
need time!

険箇所（土石流危険渓流・急傾斜地崩壊危険箇所、
地すべり危険箇
Warning Level所）」
は、
1,280ヵ所あります。土砂災害危険箇所のうち、
現地調査を
行い、
土砂災害防止法に基づき区域指定されたものが、「土砂災害
警戒区域・土砂災害特別警戒区域」
です。
現在松山市内の危険箇所
Warning
Level
でも、
愛媛県により順次指定作業が進められています。
さぼう
土石流による被害を防ぐために砂防 土石流危険渓流の看板
土砂災害は、
被害規模が大きく、人命や財産などを奪う危険性がえんてい堰堤を整備した（松山市の畑寺谷川）あります。
危険箇所はＰ39〜の地図ページのほか、国交省砂防部のホームページなどでも確認できますので、自分の家や近所が危険箇所、警戒区域等に指定されていないか、確認しておきましょう。
また、松山市には、372ヵ所の山地災害危険地（山腹崩壊危険地・崩壊土砂流出危険地、
地すべり危険地）があります。
これは山地災害防止の観点から都道府県により整理されたもので、土砂災害危険箇所と同様に人命に対する危険がありますので注意が必要です。

1
その がけのそばにいる場合は、がけの高さの2倍の距離 の所まで離れましょう。土石流の場合
は、流れから直角方向に向かって、高い所に逃げてください。

Check where toThose who need time
Stay
alert
Evacuate to a safe place「防災マップ」で危険箇所や避難場所・避難経路を確認しておきましょう。
日頃の心得(Announced by theevacuateshould evacuate(Issued by municipalities)
避難所でなくても、周囲に山のない広い駐車場など、逃げられそうな場所を事前に想定しておきましょう。
(Announced
by the(Issuedby municipalities)
JMA)
JMA)

2. 土砂災害の前兆現象
（サイン）

土石流の
速度は時速30〜40km
発生してから避難
Various signs are often observed before a sediment disaster. Payもあるので、extra attention during
heavy rainfall
土砂災害には前兆現象がよく見られます。
次のような
and watch for大雨の時はとりわけ注意し、
signs such as those listed below.
If you are seeingしても間に合いません。
any of the following phenomena,
前兆現象
Signs
of
Sediment
contact the fire department and other relevant authorities and evacuate from the area immediately.
現象を見つけたら、消防などに連絡してすみやかに避難しましょう。
に注意しましょう。
You should also evacuate voluntarily if you are concerned about your safety
during rainfall, even if you■Signs of Debris Flow1

The river water is muddy and somedriftwood is observed.

2

The water level drops while it is still raining or
stays the same when the rain has alreadybecome lighter. (The river flow may be being
blocked upstream by collapsed land.)

3

市民の声
20

1

2

3

Pebbles
continuously
falling.

The slope iscracked or looks“swollen.”
You hear
unusual or
rumbling sounds
from the slope.

Water is gushingout from the cliff.
(Also be warned
when you see
muddy waterflowing out fromthe cliff.)■Signs of Landslide

1

2

You see a dramatic change in the quality
or quantity of underground or springwater. (This is a phenomenon that occurs
when a new water passage
is created underground orwhen an existingwater passage
has been
expanded due toincreased water
flow.)● 高野町で発生した土石流災害

2
その 「土砂災害警戒情報」が発表された

場合は、危険度があがっている状態なので、気象情報や防災情報に注意。
「避難準備情報」（P96）が発令される前でも、身の危険を感じた時は自主的に避難しましょう。
また、夜間に大雨が予想される時には、
暗くなる前に避難する の が
安全です。

ゆる

こうばい

樹園で土石流が発生し、1人の方が犠牲になりました。斜面勾配は20゜
〜25゜
と緩く、普

段は全く水のない谷でした。このあたり一帯は果樹園が広がっており、多くの斜面で崩壊や土石流が発生しました。

この時 の土石流の 流 下 距 離 は 約300m 。地質は土石流発生域の上半分1★島のため、
孤立してしまうことの不安が大きい。
子供と離れて生活しているため、連絡の取り方を早急に話し合いたいと思います。
(50歳・女性）

避難

山で土砂災害が発生し、愚陀佛庵が倒壊しました。崩壊源は登山道脇の斜面で、そこから70m程度の距離を流れ下っています。地質は和泉層群で、風化土層と比較的新鮮な砂岩層の境界部がすべり面になっています。

かこう

城山は花崗岩と和泉層群の境界部に位が砂質のホルンフェルス、下半分が花崗置しています。城山の大半が史跡ですからやすい性質を有しています。松山の南部

め、表層土は根茎によりしっかりと保護さ岩です。何れの地質も豪雨時に崩壊し一帯には和泉層群が広く分布しています
が、これも崩壊しやすい性質の土です。

3

Water is gushing out from the slope.
(Trees are inclined or collapsed.)

数以上は、お年寄りなどの避難
行動要支援者です。
避難所までの移動に時間がかかるので、早めに避難をさせましょう。

平成22年（2010） 7月12日の早朝に城かこう

The ground is cracked. (You see cracks
in farmland, a road, a house, etc.)

3
その 土砂災害の犠牲者の半● 城山で発生した土砂災害

平成13年（2001） 6月19日からの豪雨により、松山市高野町の緩やかな勾配の果

Cabinet Office

You hear a rumbling sound from or in themountains. (Also be warned when you hearsounds of trees splitting or boulders rolling in
the river.)■Signs of Slope Failure

松山市高野町で発生した土石流。普段は水のないみかん山を、土石流が流れくだった。

土砂災害の多くは、木造1階で被災しています。雨が激しくて避難所への避難が困難な場合は、次善の策として近くにある頑丈な建物の2階以上に避難しましょう。さらに外に出るのも危険な時には、家の中のより安
全な場所（がけから離れた部屋や2階など）に避難しましょう。

DisasterPrecursors do not降雨に不安を感じる時は自主避難をしましょう。
これらの前兆現象がない場合でも、
see any of these signs.

土砂災害

立派な雑木林が広がっています。そのたれています。しかし、近年の異常豪雨が崩壊を引き起こしているようです。

★ニュースで見て、おそろしいと思うけれど、
いざ、
自分のところとなると、パニックになってしまって、
本当に冷静に行動できるか心配です。
(61歳・女性)

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