Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol.51（2017）1-16

ArticleWhitney and Saussure
Naoki ARAKI ＊（Received Nov. 1, 2016）

Abstract
We treat W. D. Whitney’s and Ferdinand de Saussure’s views of language and discuss their similarities and differences. The two linguists have similar ideas on the following points: 1) social character of language, 2) arbitrariness of language, 3) conception of zero sign, 4) acquisition of
language, and 5) relation between linguistics and psychology. On the other hand, they disagree withthe following points: 1) relation between signifiés and signifiants and 2) relation between synchrony
and diachrony.
Key Words: social, arbitrary, zero sign, acquisition of language, psychology, signifié, signifiant, syn-chrony, diachrony.

the work of the collective intelligence. Everythingthat is the language [langue] is implicitly collective.
[...] To say that a word has come into the language[langue] is to say that it has received collective approval.
(Saussure 1993: 91a)

Introduction
Saussure often referred to Whitney, for example,
in“Notes for an article on Whitney (Saussure 2006:
14₀-₁56)”and Course in General Linguistics (1983). He
admired Whitney’s concept of language as a social
institution expressed in Language and the Study of Language ( 1867 ) and The Life and Growth of Language(1875). E. F. Koerner discusses the two linguists in
his Ferdinand de Saussure (1973) and John E. Joseph
also refers to them in his From Whitney to Chomsky(2002).
In this paper, we compare the two linguists ’views of language and focus on their similarities anddifferences.

How, then, does langue exist in a society? Saussure answers this question as follows:
In the form of a deposit existing in brain of eachof the persons making up the crowd like a dictionaryof which all the copies were distributed to these persons.
(Saussure 1993: 91a)
According to Saussure, langue, which is a deposit existing in brain of each of the persons making up
the crowd like a dictionary, is something collective
outside the will of the individual:

1. Language is social
1.1. Langue is complete in a society

After saying that langue (a system of signs) is
necessary for parole (individual utterances) to be executed, Saussure insists that langue is collective:

This thing [langue], although internal to each individual, is at the same time collective, lying beyond
the will of the individual. 1 + 1 + 1... = 1 (collectivemodel)(Saussure 1993: 91a)

Developing and fixing this product [langue] is＊＊＊

Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology, Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: n.araki.gm@it-hiroshima.ac.jp―1―

Naoki ARAKI

Why is langue, which exists in the individual’s
brain like a dictionary, something collective or social
outside the individual’s will? This is not only because
the individual cannot modify langue but also because
langue imposes external restrictions on the individual. Miura (1967: 14₉-₁99) interprets that Saussure’s
langue is the norm of language in the form of“conceptually objectiﬁed will.”From this point of view,
it is understood that langue exists outside the individual’s will and constrains the individual from outside.
Moreover, langue is collective or social in the sensethat it is shared among the members of a society.
What is individual, which is not shared by the members of a society, cannot be langue. Thus langue, for
Saussure, is a social fact as E. Durkheim says:

That would have no right to be called a language
which only one person understood and could use;
and there is not, nor has ever been, any such in existence.
(Whitney 1875: 149)
In other words, language serves the purpose ofcommunication among the members of a society
even though its acceptance is limited:
Acceptance by some community, though but alimited one, is absolutely necessary in order to convert any one’s utterances into speech.
(Whitney 1875: 149)
So personal alterations and additions to language disappear and are never to reappear if they are
not accepted by others and maintained in tradition:

A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed ornot, capable of exerting over the individual an external
constraint;(Durkheim 1982: 59)[...], an individual’s alterations and additions, if
not adopted by others and kept up in their tradition,
die with him, and never come to light at all.
(Whitney 1875: 149)

Furthermore, langue is, for Saussure, social because it is not complete in any individual:[...] doubtless this hoard [langue], in any individual case, will never turn out to be absolutely complete. [...] The language [langue], in turn, is quite
independent of the individual; it cannot be a creationof the individual; it is essentially social; it presupposes the collectivity.
(Saussure 1993: 7a-8a)Thus, Whitney insists that language is a social
belonging because its purpose is communication andfor a successful communication we need more than
one person, that is, a society as a required conditionand communication is realized in more than one person, or a society. In other words, for language, a society is a condition for communication, or the
purpose of language to be successfully realized. On
the other hand, for a society, language is nothing but
what makes communication possible. In this sense
mentioned above, Whitney argues that language is asocial belonging. His thought that language is social,is also based on the idea that language is what is accepted and used by the members of a society:1.2. Speech is a social possession

According to Whitney, above all, language exists for the purpose of communication:
It [language] exists [...], not only partly, but primarily, for the purpose of communication; its otheruses come after and in the train of this. To the greatmass of its speakers, it [language] exists consciously
for communication alone; this is the use that exhibits
and commends itself to every mind.
(Whitney 1875: 149)

Speech is not a personal possession, but a social;
it belongs, not to the individual, but to the memberof a society. No item of existing language is the workof an individual; for what we may severally choose
to say is not language until it be accepted and employed by our fellows.
(Whitney 1867: 404)

Therefore, it is not language that is understoodand used by only one person. There does not exist or
has never existed such a language:

Saussure thinks that langue is social from the―2―

Whitney and Saussure

point of view that it is shared by the members of asociety while Whitney claims that language (speech)
is social from the point of view that it is used forcommunication among the members of a society.
Both Saussure’s and Whitney’s thoughts are based on
the idea that only one individual cannot make language possible. But Saussure’s idea that langue constrains an individual from outside him or her is very
close to Durkheim’s social fact. It is not found in
Whitney ’s writings, moreover, Saussure says that
langue is different from other social institutions although he accepts Whitney’s idea that language is asocial institution:

2. Arbitrariness of signs
2. 1. Signs are arbitrary

Saussure insists that arbitrary is the relation of asigne’s concept (signifié) to its sound (signifiant):
The sign [signe] is arbitrary, that is to say thatthe concept‘ sister[sœur]＇, for example, is not connected by any internal relation to the sound sequences s + ӧ + r which forms the corresponding acoustic
image. This concept could just as well be represented
by any other sequence of sounds. You have only tothink of the different languages. Passing from one
language to another, you see that the concept‘ ox[bœuf]＇ is also represented by the sound sequencebos.
(Saussure 1993: 76a)[...] the other institutions [than language] are tovarious degrees all based on NATURAL relationships, [...] For instance, a nation’s laws, or politicalsystem, or even fashion, even its whimsical sartorial
fashions, which can never ignore the given [proportions] of the human body. [...] But language andwriting are NOT BASED on a natural relationshipbetween things. There is never in any way a link between a certain sibilant sound and the shape of theletter S, and similarly it is no harder for the [French]
word vache than the [Latin] word vacca to refer to acow.
(Saussure 2006: 147)

If we take another example, in French‘ table’
can be replaced by‘ sable＇ or reversely‘ sable＇ canby‘ table,＇ too:[...] in relation to the idea [signifié] it represents,
the signifying element sign [signifiant], whatever it
may be, is arbitrary, appears to be freely chosen, is
replaceable by another (table might be called sable orvice versa).
(Saussure 1993: 94a)
Then, how can“onomatopœias”be explained?
In“onomatopœias,”there is something that enables
us to associate sounds (signifiants) with concepts (signifiés). Saussure says about“onomatopœias”as follows:

It leads to the arbitrariness of signs, which weshall discuss next, that language is not based on anatural relationship between things.
By the way, Saussure divides langage (a linguistic activity) into langue (a system of value) and parole(actual utterances) and says that langue is social but
parole is individual (Saussure 1983: 1₃-₁4). On theother hand, when Whitney says that language is social, it is thought that he means Saussure’s parole by
the word“language.”If this is true, then the two linguists’ view of language will not be the same as wehave seen. But Whitney does not define the word“language”as clearly as Saussure. For example, heinterchangeably uses two words“ language ”and“speech.”The latter may be equivalent to Saussure’s
parole. Therefore, we put this matter aside here now.
Of course, Saussure, Whitney, and Durkheim
sharply disagree with Noam Chomsky, who insiststhat language is biological.

In connexion with this there is the question of
onomatopœias (words of which the sound has something that evokes the actual concept they are called
on to represent). The choice, it is said, is not arbitrary here. Here there would indeed be an internal
connexion. In general people greatly exaggerate thenumber of onomatopœias. It is sometimes said forexample that pluit represents the sound of the rain,
but if you go a little way further back, it becomes
clear this is not the case (earlier plovit, etc.).
(Saussure 1993: 77a)
It may be a little difﬁcult to understand this pas―3―

Naoki ARAKIsage cited above, but what Saussure wants to say is
this: although may not be arbitrary the relation ofsounds to concepts in“onomatopœias,”but it is exaggerated too much and, for example, pluit is said torepresent the sound of rain, but pluit was once plovit,
which has not any connexion with the sound of rain.
Furthermore, Saussure insists that“onomatopœias”
are not the counterexamples of arbitrariness of signes,
quoting other examples:

were originally words with very speciﬁc meanings.
In conclusion, Saussure insists that neither onomatopœias nor exclamations deny the arbitrarinessof relation between sounds (signifiants) and concepts(signifiés). In other words, onomatopœias and exclamations are not counterexamples of the arbitrarinessof signs.
2.2. Words are arbitrary and conventional

Whitney insists that we learn language as follows:

Nonetheless we have: the tick-tock [tic-tac] of aclock, the glug-glug [glou-glou] of a bottle. Thesewords in fact behave like ordinary words, being lostin the linguistic mass. People can often make themistake of seeing an imitation in cases where it does
not exist at all.
(Saussure 1993: 77a)

The learner grasps the conception, at least in ameasure, and then associates his own word with it bya purely external tie, having been able, if so guided,
to form the same association with any other existingor possible word, and not less easily and surely.
(Whitney 1875: 18)

Again, this passage may be hard to understand,but what Saussure has in mind is this: the tick-tock of
a clock or the glug-glug of a bottle is the same as ordinary words, that is to say, in both cases, the relation of the sounds ( signifiants ) to the concepts(signifiés) is arbitrary. Actually, we often mistake ordinary words for imitated ones. Finally, Saussure
says about“exclamations,”which are, like“onomatopœias,”believed to have a connexion between
sounds (signifiants) and concepts (signifiés), but that is
not the case:First of all, a concept is grasped and it is linked
to a sound. Then, what is the relation between a concept and a sound? Whitney answers this question as
follows:
An internal and necessary tie between word andidea is absolutely non-existent for him [the learner];and whatever historical reason there may be is also
non-existent to his [the learner ’s] sense. He may
sometimes ask“what for?”about a word, as he does,in his childish curiosity, about everything else; but it
makes no difference with the young etymologist (anymore than with the older one) what answer he gets,or whether he gets an answer; to him, the sole andsufficient reason why he should use this particularsign is that it is used by those about him.
(Whitney 1875: 1₈-₁9)

The extent of this part of the vocabulary is very
limited, as is that of exclamations. In an exclamation
it may be said that there is something that is dictatedby nature, and that there is a connexion there between the sound and the concept. But for the majority of exclamations, this can be rejected, on theevidence of other languages. Aïe, for example, is notfound in German, English, for example. Swearwords
that have become exclamations and it is known thatthey originated in words with a very speciﬁc sense.
So very marginal and controversial, these cases of
onomatopœia and exclamation. (Saussure 1993: 77a)

It is interesting that Whitney thinks that thelearner is not conscious of a historical reason why aword is tied with an idea. Because Saussure also saysthat a speaker uses his or her language without
knowing its history. Now, let’s get back to the main
subject. According to Whitney, for a learner of language, there is nothing like a necessary and internal
connexion between a word and a concept. The association is arbitrary. Therefore, the only reason why a

Saussure claims that most of exclamations are
not free from arbitrariness. Neither German nor English has aïe , which is an exclamation in French.
Swearwords which have become exclamations now,―4―

Whitney and Saussure

particular word is used is not because it is not arbitrary, that is, it is connected with something for somereason, but because it is only just conventional, thatis, it is used by people around the learner. In otherwords, Whitney insists that words are arbitrary andconventional. Arbitrariness and conventionality ofwords are inseparable like a recto and a verso of asheet of paper. Whitney sums up the idea that words
are arbitrary and conventional as follows:

and concepts are natural, internal, and necessary,changes of sounds should lead to those of concepts
and changes of concepts to those of sounds. But thisis not the case:In this fundamental fact, that the uttered sign
was a conventional one, bound to the conception signified by it only by a tie of mental association, lay
the possibility both of its change of meaning and ofits change of form. If the tie were a natural, an internal and necessary one, it would seem to follow thatany change in either would have to be accompanied
by a change in the other.
(Whitney 1875: 48)

In the true and proper meaning of the terms,
then, every word handed down in every human language is an arbitrary and conventional sign: arbitrary,
because any one of the thousand other words current
among men, or of the tens of thousands which might
be fabricated, could have been equally well learned
and applied to this particular purpose; conventional,
because the reason for the use of this rather than another lies solely in the fact that it is already used in
the community to which the speaker belongs.
(Whitney 1875: 19)

Actually, words may change their sound withoutchanging their meaning or may gain their quite newmeaning without changing their sound. After all,sounds or concepts change because relations between
sounds and concepts are arbitrary or conventional, inother words, they are not natural, internal or necessary:Words are arbitrary in the sense that in order torepresent something, not a particular word but another will do. This is self-evident as Saussure says thatevery language has its own word [signifiant]. Alsowords are conventional in the sense that the reason
why a particular word is used for expressing something, is based on the fact that it is already employed
in a community. Thus, for Whitney, arbitrariness isalso conventionality. Whitney also says about arbitrariness and conventionality of words, referring to
Plato’s Cratylus:

A word may change its form, to any extent,
without change of meaning; it may take on an entirely new meaning without change of form.
(Whitney 1875: 49)

The word exists θέσει [thesei],‘ by attribution,’and not φύσει [phusei],‘ by nature,’ in the sense that
there is, either in the nature of things in general, or in
the nature of the individual speaker who uses it, any
reason that prescribes and determines it.
(Whitney 1875: 19)

The essential difference, which separates man’smeans of communication in kind as well as degreefrom that of the other animals, is that, while the latteris instinctive, the former is, in all its parts, arbitrary
and conventional.
(Whitney 1875: 282)

Moreover, Whitney discusses the difference ofmeans of communication between human beings andthe other animals and says that in the case of humanbeings, the means of communication is arbitrary andconventional while in the case of the other animals,
it is instinctive:

This passage reminds us of Chomsky’s insistence that recursion is found in human language but
not in other animals’ communication. Human language is instinctive for Chomsky while it is arbitrary
and conventional for Whitney. Furthermore, Whitney
also explains the arbitrariness of words as follows:

Words are arbitrary in relation to things theysignify and not natural in that human beings use
them in a conventional way. Sounds or concepts canchange because relations between sounds and concepts are conventional. If relations between sounds―5―

Naoki ARAKI

It is fully proved by the single circumstance thatfor each object, or act, or quality, there are as many
names as there are languages in the world, each answering as good a purpose as any other, and capableof being substituted for another in the usage of any
individual.
(Whitney 1875: 282)

were not arbitrary, then all animals and noises would
be expressed by“onomatopœias”and all languages
would use one and the same“onomatopœia.”But actually this is not the case. All animals and noises are
not expressed by“onomatopœias”and all languages
do not use one and the same“onomatopœia”for thesame animal and noise:

In the world, there are as many words, whichsignify the same thing, as the number of languages.
Furthermore, a word of one language can be replacedby that of another. This means that relation of a word
to the thing it signiﬁes, is not necessary but arbitrary.
In any language, there is not a single word, which isreally thought to be something natural. Every word
exists as what is accepted by convention:

Even where the onomatopœic or imitative element is most conspicuous—as in cuckoo and pewee,in crack and whiz—there is no tie of necessity, but
only of convenience: if there were a necessity, it
would extend equally to other animals and othernoises; and also to all tongues; while in fact theseconceptions have elsewhere wholly other names.
(Whitney 1875: 282)

There is not in a known language a single item
which can be truly claimed to exist φύσει [phusei],‘ bynature;＇ each stands in its accepted use θέσει [thesei],‘ by an act of attribution, ’ in which men ’s circumstances, habits, preferences, will, are the determining
force.
(Whitney 1875: 282)

Furthermore, Whitney mentions onomatopœias
as the origin of language while Saussure says thatthe problem of the origin of language is meaningless:
Onomatopœia, in all its varieties of application,
thus came in at the outset [of language], aided andsupplemented by tone and gesture, to help the language-makers to ﬁnd intelligible signs, but ceased tocontrol the history of each sign when once this had
become understood and conventionally accepted;
while the productive efﬁciency of the principle gradually diminished and died out as a stock of signs was
accumulated sufficient to serve as the germs ofspeech, and to increase by combination and differentiation.
(Whitney 1867: 437)

If Whitney is right, how can“onomatopœias”beexplained? Whitney says about them:More frequent than such words as this, which
only by a lucky hit gain life and a career, are those inwhich the attempt has been made in a rude way toimitate the sounds of nature: as when the cuckoo andthe pewee and the toucan were named from theirnotes; or as in some of the descriptive words likecrack and crash, hiss and buzz, which are by no means
all old, but have been made, or shaped over into a
pictorial form, within no long time. We call suchwords onomatopœias, literally‘ name-makings,’ because the Greeks did so: they could conceive of noway in which absolutely new language-material
should be produced except by such imitation.
(Whitney 1875: 120)

Looking at language [langue] and wondering at
what precise moment such a thing‘ started＇ is as intelligent as looking at the mountain stream and believing that by following it upstream you will reachthe exact location of its spring. Countless things willshow that at any moment the STREAM exists when
one says that it comes into being, (Saussure 2006: 63)

Whitney accepts the idea that“onomatopœias”
are made by imitating natural sounds. Then, how does
he explain“onomatopœias”? Whitney denies the necessary connexion between an onomatopœia’s soundand its concept. The reason is that if“onomatopœias”―6―

Whitney thinks that“onomatopœias”played apart at the beginning of language while Saussure insists that the origin of language depends on what we
consider language as. In other words, if we do notdecide what language is, the origin of language will

Whitney and Saussure

go into infinite regression. If Saussure is right,
Chomsky’s idea that mutation in brain is the origin of
language is also meaningless.
In any case, Saussure and Whitney insist thatwords are arbitrary. That is self-evident if we compare various languages in the world. Furthermore,
Whitney understands that the arbitrariness of words
means their conventionality. Does Saussure think of
the arbitrariness the same way as Whitney? Saussure
says that the (absolute) arbitrariness of signs is only
a part of any language although insisting that signs
are arbitrary:

No need always to have acoustic form corresponding to idea. A contrast is enough and x / zero
will do.
(Saussure 1993: 113a)
To illustrate this idea, an example of Czech istaken up:
Strictly speaking there are no signs [signes] but
differences between signs [ signes ]. Example inCzech: žena‘, woman＇; genitive plural, žen. [...] Žena,žen functions as well as žena, gen. pl. ženŭ which existed previously.
(Saussure 1993: 141a)

I have taken it as an obvious truth that the link
between the sign and the idea represented is radically
arbitrary. In every language, we must distinguish between what remains radically arbitrary and what canbe called relative arbitrariness. Only some of thesigns in any language will be radically arbitrary. In
the case of other signs, we encounter a phenomenon
which makes it possible to distinguish degrees. Instead of arbitrary we can say unmotivated. There arecases where the link between the sign and the soundis relatively motivated. For example, vingt, dix-neuf[ twenty＇,‘ nineteen＇]. In vingt, it is absolutely un‘motivated. Dix-neuf is not completely unmotivated,
you can see in what sense vingt in fact relates to no
coexisting term in the language. Dix-neuf relates tocoexisting terms in the language (dix ‘[ ten＇] and neuf
[ nine＇]). Well, it is trying to be motivated. What is‘in dix and what is in neuf is just as arbitrary. With dixneuf we are into relative motivation.
(Saussure 1993: 85a)

The relation of žena to ženŭ has changed into thatof žena to žen:žena ←→ ženŭ (genitive plural)
↓
žena

↓
←→

žen □ (genitive plural).

Here, ženŭ has changed into žen, but žen □ signifies the concept of‘ genitive plural’ although it has
lost –ŭ in ženŭ, which has become zero □ . Although–ŭ in ženŭ has been lost or has become zero □ , ženfunctions as genitive plural of žena by the fact thatžen is different from or in opposition to žena:This example shows that only the difference between signs [signes] is operative.
Ženŭ works because it is different from žena.
Žen works because it is different from žena.
There are only differences; no positive term at all.
(Saussure 1993: 141a)

By the way, Whitney’s word“idea”is equivalent
to Saussure’s signifié, but his word“word”signifies
both Saussure’s signifiant and his signe, depending on
situations. In any case, it is safe to say that Whitney
and Saussure almost agree on the arbitrariness ofwords.

Thus, Saussure insists that a signe can express a
concept as far as it is in opposition to or different
from another signe, even if the concept is not realized
in the external form, that is to say, the external form
is zero □.
3.2. Absence of signs

3. The notion of zero sign

According to Whitney, the s of brooks modiﬁes
the concept of brook and means that there are morethan one brook , namely changes a singular form
(brook) into a plural form (brooks):

3.1. Opposition between signs

According to Saussure, we do not always need
any external form in order to express a concept:―7―

Naoki ARAKI

brook □ (singular) ←→ brooks (plural)[∅][s]man (singular) ←→ men (plural).
[æ][e]

The s of brooks, for example, is formal in relation to brook as material; the added letter [s] indicatessomething subordinate, a modiﬁcation of the conception of brook, the existence of it in more than one individual: it turns a singular into a plural.
(Whitney 1875: 214)

It is certainly thought, as Whitney insists, thatbrook □ expresses singularity by the fact that the s ofbrooks is absent in brook or □ is a zero sign. But inthe case of man, its singularity can be explained by
the fact that a vowel of men is different from that of aman from a physical point of view. If this is true, inthe case of man a zero sign will not signify singularity. But this can lead to an interpretation that brookalso expresses singularity because its pronunciation
is different from that of brooks. This means that brook
is not an example of a zero sign, either. After all, azero sign is applied when there is not any physicalform for any concept. In English, for example, past
forms of verbs are usually accompanied by someform of the word-ending, but sometimes they arenot. This illustrates an example of a zero sign:

Similarly, men functions in relation to man aswell as the s of brooks does in relation to brook. But
unlike the s of brooks, men brings about an internalchange (from a [æ] to e [e]) instead of an external
one (from □ [∅] to s [s]):Men has the like value as regards man, the meansof making the same formal distinction having cometo be of a different kind from the other, an internalchange instead of an external.
(Whitney 1875: 214)
Brooks and men are‘ formed＇ signs for concepts

to which the characteristic of number is added:

visit

Brooks and men are not mere material; they are←→

visited (past form)[id]
spread ←→ spread □ (past form).
[∅]“formed”material, signs for conceptions with one

important characteristic, number, added.
(Whitney 1875: 214)

In any case, Whitney ’s idea that a concept
emerges with one sign in opposition to another, without a physical form, may be thought to be similar to
Saussure’s. If Saussure’s zero sign had been derived
from Whitney’s writings, Whitney’s idea might havebeen a hint of Saussure’s thesis that“There are only
differences; no positive term at all (Saussure 1993:
141a)”:

It can be thought that brook and man are also
‘ formed＇ by contrast with brooks and men respectively. In other words, brook and man mean singularity not by a sign but by the absence of a sign denoting
singularity, that is, by a zero sign:
But then, by simple contrast with them, brookand man are also“formed;”each implies, not by asign, but by the absence of an otherwise necessary
sign to the contrary, restriction to a single article ofthe kind named.
(Whitney 1875: 214)[...] in the language [langue] (that is, a language
state) there are only differences. Difference implies
to our mind two positive terms between which thedifference is established. [...] In the language, there
are only differences, without positive terms. [...]
When you come to the terms themselves, resulting
from relations between signifying and signiﬁed elements [signifiants and signifiés] you can speak of oppositions. Strictly speaking there are no signs but
differences between signs. [...] There are only differ-

If, as Whitney insists, brook and man signify singularity by a zero sign, or zero in the form, Whitney’s
idea is thought to be similar to Saussure’s. The use of
the word‘ contrast＇ also reminds us of the similarity
to Saussure’s idea:―8―Whitney and Saussureences; no positive term at all. [...] So the whole language system can be envisaged as sound differences
combined with differences between ideas. There areno positive ideas given, and there are no determinate
acoustic signs that are independent of ideas. Thanks
to the fact that the differences are mutually dependent, we shall get something looking like positive
terms through the matching of a certain difference ofideas with a certain difference in signs. We shall thenbe able to speak of the opposition of terms and so
not claim that there are only differences because ofthis positive element in the combination. In the end,
the principle it comes down to is the fundamental
principle of the arbitrariness of the sign. It is only
through the differences between signs that it will bepossible to give them a function, a value. If the sign
were not arbitrary, one would not be able to say thatin the language [langue] there are only differences.
(Saussure 1993: 141a-142a)

It is sufficient to observe how children arebrought up. If one views the facts as they are and indeed as they have always been, it is patently obviousthat all education consists of a continual effort to impose upon the child ways of seeing, thinking and acting which he himself would not have arrived atspontaneously. From his earliest years we oblige him
to eat, drink and sleep at regular hours, and to observe cleanliness, calm and obedience; later we force
him to learn how to be mindful of others, to respectcustoms and conventions, and to work, etc.
(Durkheim 1982: 5₃-₅4)
For Saussure, langue is learned not a natural instinct.
4.2. Learning of the ﬁrst and the second languages

Learning of a second language is, according to
Whitney, the same as that of the ﬁrst language, or amother tongue:

4. Acquisition of language
4.1. Langue is learned

But in all other respects, the learning of a second language is precisely the same process as thelearning of a ﬁrst, of one’s own“mother-tongue.”(Whitney 1875: 24)

According to Saussure, langue is not a natural
instinct but what is learned:
The language [langage] faculty, it will be said,
appears to us as a faculty given to us by nature,
whereas the language [langue], on the contrary, issomething that is acquired and conventional. It cannot take precedence over natural phenomena, natural
instincts.
(Saussure 1993: 66a)

So learning of a second language is, like that ofa mother tongue, to memorize words, which do nothave a natural and necessary relation to concepts
they signify, that is, words, which are arbitrary andconventional:

So learning is needed to acquire langue:
Again, inquiring whether the language [langue]
really is separable from the rest, we see that a wholeapprenticeship is necessary in order to learn the language [langue]. The organs are there, but the humanbeing has to assimilate it by learning it.
(Saussure 1993: 70a)

It [the learning of a second language] is thememorizing of a certain body of signs for conceptions and their relations, used in a certain community, existing or extinct—signs which have no morenatural and necessary connection with the conceptions they indicate than our own have, but are equally arbitrary and conventional with the latter; [...](Whitney 1875: 24)

Thus, langue, for Saussure, is not a natural instinct but what is learned or acquired through learning, that is, experience. Durkheim also says that asocial fact, as which Saussure thinks of langue, iswhat is learned:

Since learning of a second language is, for
Whitney, the same as that of a first language, or amother tongue, what is mentioned about the former
is true of the latter. After all, whether a first language, or a mother tongue or a second language,―9―

Naoki ARAKI

learning of language is to memorize words, whose
connection with concepts is arbitrary and conventional. Therefore, we acquire a second language
through various factors. Sometimes a second language becomes even dominant over a mother tongue:

German, Chinese, and Choctaw are for them:
There are, probably, only a few hundred suchsigns, all told; and outside their circle, the English is
as much an unknown language to the child as is German, or Chinese, or Choctaw.
(Whitney 1875: 25)[...]; and of which [a second language] we makeourselves masters to a degree dependent only on ouropportunities, our capacity, our industry, and thelength of time devoted to the work; even coming tosubstitute, if circumstances favor, the second language in our constant and ready use, and to become
unfamiliar with and forget its predecessor [a first
language].
(Whitney 1875: 2₄-₂5)

As time goes by, children gradually acquire
more and more words:
As he grows older, as his powers develop andhis knowledge increases, he acquires more and more;
and in different departments, according to circumstances.
(Whitney 1875: 25)

Moreover, the process of language learning isnever-ending because language is learned:

Thus, a ﬁrst language, or a mother tongue is acquired through listening, reading, and learning. Thisis generally true of acquiring a foreign language:

We realize better in the case of a second or“foreign,”than in that of a ﬁrst or“native”language, thatthe process of acquisition is a never-ending one; but
it is not more true of the one than of the other.
(Whitney 1875: 25)

Nowhere more clearly than here does it appear
that one gets his language by a process of learning,and only thus; for all this gradual increase of one’s
linguistic resources goes on in the most openly external fashion, by dint of hearing and reading andstudy; and it is obviously only a continuation, undersomewhat changed circumstances, of the process ofacquisition of the first nucleus; while the whole isparallel to the beginning and growth of one’s command of a“foreign”tongue.
(Whitney 1875: 26)

It is because children’s acquisition of language
just means that they learn a limited number of words:
We say, to be sure, of a child who has reached acertain grade that he“has learned to speak;”but wemean by this only that he has acquired a limited
number of signs, sufﬁcient for the ordinary purposesof the childish life, together with the power, by muchpractice, of wielding them with adroitness and general correctness.
(Whitney 1875: 25)

For both Saussure and Whitney, children acquire
language through learning.
5. Linguistics and psychology
5.1. Signs are not the object of psychology

As we have seen, language acquisition means,
for Whitney, learning of words. In this respect, his
idea is similar to Saussure ’s but different from
Chomsky’s, which assumes that language learning is
acquisition of syntax and it ends after parameter-settings of Universal Grammar while language learning
is endless for Whitney. Since the number of children’s
vocabulary, at most, is limited to about hundreds or
so, outside the community to which they belong, thechildren’s target language, for example, English isthought to be unknown for them to the extent that

Signifiés separated from signifiants, Saussure in-sists, are no longer the object of linguistics but thatof psychology:
If you consider the various concepts (love, see,house) in themselves, apart from their representation,a representing sign, they are a series of psychological objects. In the psychological domain, you can saythat it is a complex unit. The concept must be only
the value of an acoustic image if it is to belong to the
linguistic domain. Or else, if you bring it [the con― 10 ―

Whitney and Saussurecept] into the linguistic domain, it is an abstraction.
(Saussure 1993: 79a)

consciousness is externized, turned up to the light forourselves and others to see and study.
(Whitney 1875: 304)

The object of linguistics is, Saussure explains,an entity in which a signifié and a signifiant are combined together, using H2O, which is a compound ofhydrogen and oxygen:

Therefore, Whitney insists that language is not
the object of psychology because language itself is
not the human mind or soul. Both Saussure andWhitney claim that linguistics is not psychology orpart of it although their reasons for their claims aredifferent from each other.

You could compare the linguistic entity to acomposite chemical substance, such as water, where
there is Hydrogen and Oxygen (H2O). Clearly, if in
chemistry the elements Hydrogen and Oxygen are
separated, you still remain within the domain ofchemistry. But, on the contrary, if you decompose
linguistic water [signe] by removing the Hydrogen[signifié or signifiant] or the Oxygen [signifié or signifiant] you are no longer within the linguistic domain(there is no longer a linguistic entity). Only as longas the association remains are we dealing with a concrete linguistic object.
(Saussure 1993: 80a)

6. Relation between signifiants and signifiés
6.1. Signifiants and signifiés emerge simultaneously

According to Saussure, if we did not have ourlangue, our ideas would not exist except in the indeﬁnite form, or we could not clearly distinguish two
ideas:
Psychologically, what are our ideas, apart fromour language [langue]? They probably do not exist.
Or in a form that may be described as amorphous.
We should probably be unable according to philosophers and linguists to distinguish two ideas clearly
without the help of a language [langue] (internal language [langue] naturally).
(Saussure 1993: 137a-138a)5.2. Linguistics is not a part of psychology

It is wrong, Whitney insists, to think that linguistics is a part of psychology and to put the former
in a framework of the latter and to study the former
in a method of the latter:
And this is most of all the case with regard tolanguage; for language is in an especial manner theincorporation and revelation of the acts of the soul.
Out of this relation has grown the error of those wholook upon linguistic science as a branch of psychology, would force it into a psychologic mould and conduct it by psychologic methods: an error which is so
refuted by the whole view we have taken of language
and its history, that we do not need to spend any
more words upon it here. (Whitney 1875: 30₃-₃04)

Therefore, there are no various ideas in advanceand there is nothing distinct in our thought prior to
linguistic signs, either:
Consequently, in itself, the purely conceptual
mass of our ideas, the mass separated from the language [langue], is like a kind of shapeless nebula, inwhich it is impossible to distinguish anything initially. The same goes, then, for the language [langue]:the different ideas represent nothing pre-existing.
There are no: a) ideas already established and quitedistinct from one another, b) signs for these ideas.
But there is nothing at all distinct in thought before
the linguistic sign. This is the main thing.
(Saussure 1993: 138a)

In other words, language is a tool for producing
internal force and what is produced as a result. By
language, internal consciousness is externalized:
Language is merely that product and instrumentality of the inner powers which exhibits them mostdirectly and most fully in their various modes of action; by which, so far as the case admits, our innerThus, ideas would not have any distinct unit
without a langue. On the other hand, neither would
sounds which are linked to ideas:― 11 ―Naoki ARAKIOn the other hand, it is also worth asking if, beside this entirely indistinct realm of ideas, the realmof sound offers in advance quite distinct ideas (taken
in itself apart from the idea). There are no distinct
units of sound either, delimited in advance.
(Saussure 1993: 138a)

between thought and sound, and the union of thetwo, is like that.
(Saussure 1983: 11₀-₁11)
If Saussure is right, it does not follow that an
idea exists ﬁrst and then a sound, which corresponds
to it, is combined with the idea.

If both ideas and sounds, as Saussure insists, do
not exist without a langue, then how will linguistic
signs come into being? Linguistic signs emerge as arelation between ideas and sounds after a langue divides both a mass of idea and a mass of sound at thesame time:

6.2. Ideas come ﬁrst, then words follow them

Whitney insists that ideas come first and thennames for them follow:
First, there is always and everywhere an antecedency of the conception to the expression. In common phrase, we first have our idea, and then get aname for it.
(Whitney 1875: 137)

But the signifying and signiﬁed elements [signifians and signifiés] contract a bond in virtue of the determinate values that are engendered by the combinationof such and such acoustic signs with such and suchcuts that can be made in the mass.
(Saussure 1993: 139a)

For example, when a certain kind of colour, red
is produced, a word magenta is coined through acompletely conscious process:
When a certain new shade of red had been produced by the creative ingenuity of modern chemistry,
the next thing was to give it a name; and magenta
was matched upon, by a perfectly conscious process,(Whitney 1875: 138)

If Saussure is right, it does not follow that ﬁrstof all, ideas exist and then sounds, which correspondto ideas, are combined with ideas. Linguistic signs
appear when ideas and sounds emerge and combine
together at the same time. This process is described
as being“mysterious”and compared to the waves as
the contact of air with water:

The denial of this idea leads to a paradox thatplanets, plants, and animals do not exist until they
are named and that babies are not born until they arebaptized, either:

The characteristic role of a language in relation
to thought is not to supply the material phonetic
means by which ideas may be expressed. It is to act
as intermediary between thought and sound, in sucha way that the combination of both necessarily produces a mutually complementary delimitation ofunits. Thought, chaotic by nature, is made precise bythis process of segmentation. But what happens isneither a transformation of thoughts into matter, nora transformation of sounds into ideas. What takes
place, is a somewhat mysterious process by which‘ thought-sound＇ evolves divisions, and a language
takes shape with its linguistic units in between those
two amorphous masses. One might think of it as being like air in contact with water: changes in atmospheric pressure break up the surface of the water
into series of divisions, i.e. waves. The correlation

This is so palpably true of all the more reﬂective
processes that no one would think of denying it; todo so would be to maintain that the planet, or plant,
or animal, could not be found and recognized as
something yet unnamed until a title had been selected and made ready for clapping upon it; that thechild could not be born until the christening bowl
was ready.
(Whitney 1875: 137)
Moreover, the thought that ideas cannot exist
without words which represent them, is an indefensible paradox except that it is based on misunderstanding or false arguments:
The doctrine that a conception is impossible― 12 ―

Whitney and Saussure

without a word to express it is an indefensible paradox—indefensible, that is to say, except by misapprehensions and false arguments.
(Whitney 1875: 139)

pear first and then words for them follow. This iscompletely different from Saussure ’s thought thatideas and sounds emerge at the same time. According to Saussure, if an idea existed before a sign, thenevery language would have the same idea for thesign. But this is not the case:

Whitney thinks that it is ridiculous for names toexist before things they express or to insist that ideas
do not exist if words for them are not present:

If ideas were predetermined in the human mind
before being linguistic values, one thing that would
necessarily happen is that terms would correspondexactly as between one language and another.
FrenchGermancher ‘
lieb, teuer (also moral)[ dear＇]There is no exact correspondence.
juger, estimer
urteilen, erachten‘[ judge, estimate＇] have a set of meanings
only partly coinciding with
French juger, estimer

Every idea had its distinct existence before it received its distinctive sign; the thought is anterior to
the language by which it is represented. To maintainthe opposite, to hold that the sign exists before thething signiﬁed, or that a conception cannot be entertained without the support of a word, would be thesheerest folly;(Whitney 1867: 125)
For Whitney, it is impossible to claim that ideas
and words for them emerge at the same time:

We see that in advance of the language [ langue ]there is nothing which is the notion‘cher’ in itself.
(Saussure 1993: 139a)

We always make a new word, or bestow uponan old word a new meaning, because we have an
idea that wants a sign. To maintain that the idea waits
for its generation until the sign is ready, or that thegeneration of the idea and of the sign is a simple andindivisible process, is much the same thing as tohold, since infants cannot thrive in this climate without clothing and shelter, that no child is or can beborn until a layette and a nursery are ready for its use,or that along with each child are born its swaddlingclothes and a cradle!
(Whitney 1876: 412)

Here, it may be thought that Saussure denies
Chomsky’s and Descartes’s idea that children areborn with a list of ideas. Phonemes do not exist inadvance of concepts. Saussure also denies an ideathat phonemes are universal across languages. Therefore, every language has its own concepts and phonemes, which vary from language to language.
7. Relation between synchrony and diachrony

According to Whitney, an idea for a word is
floating as something ambiguous in a community.
Then, someone clearly grasps the idea and names it.
Eventually the idea also takes some kind of form in
the minds of other members in the community although it is delusive:

7.1. Synchrony takes priority over diachrony

Saussure explains the difference between a synchronic point of view and a diachronic point of view,using mountain climbing:
The observer [the mountain climber] placed at aﬁxed, determinate point is the speaker, or the linguist
taking his place. If you imagine a moving observer,going the whole way from Reculet to Chasseral the
movement of the drawing the changing relations of
the mountains will represent historical change, evolution. But it is clear that in order to draw this panorama you must focus on a certain state. You cannot
make use of the language except in a state.

[...]; it [an idea] ﬂoats obscurely in the mind of
the community until some one grasps it clearlyenough to give it a name; and it at once takes shape(perhaps only a delusive shape), after his example, inthe minds of others.
(Whitney 1875: 139)
As we have seen, Whitney insists that ideas ap― 13 ―

Naoki ARAKI(Saussure 1993: 107a)over diachrony, because actual speech is carried out
only in synchrony. Diachrony is nothing but an object only for linguists. As we have seen so far, synchrony and diachrony are totally different from eachother and they do not have anything in common:

A diachronic point of view is like a viewpoint ofa mountain climber who is moving from one mountain to the other, for example, from Mt. Reculet to
Mt. Chasseral. So the changing landscapes or thechanging relations of the mountains correspond tohistorical changes of a language. In order to describe
the whole scenes or historical changes of the language, the mountain climber or a linguist must place
himself or herself at a certain ﬁxed point or a certain
state of the language. Moreover, the difference between synchrony and diachrony is also illustrated asthat between a horizontal section and a vertical section of plants:

No synchronic phenomenon has anything incommon with any diachronic phenomenon. One is arelationship between simultaneous elements, and theother a substitution of one element for another intime, that is to say an event. We shall also see thatdiachronic identities and synchronic identities are
two very different things.
(Saussure 1983: 90)
Synchrony is a system of relationship between
signes, or a system of valeur. Diachrony is a changeof one signe into the other in time. As an example toshow the difference of two points of view, synchrony
and diachrony, Saussure takes up the word pas inmodern French. Pas is both the negative particle pas(not) and a noun pas (pace or step):

If we take a horizontal section of certain plants,
we discover a more or less complex pattern. Thispattern is nothing other than a certain perspective, acertain view of the vertical ﬁbres to be seen by taking another section, the vertical section. The two areinterdependent. The horizontal section is determinedby what there is in the vertical direction, but thisview is a fact which is independent of the one givenby the vertical development through the fact thathorizontal section already creates unity of relations
between what is on the left and what is on the right.
These [relations] alone, apart from anything else,
confer unity. The two things are independent. Thesesections may be called: synchronic section and diachronic section.
(Saussure 1993: 124a)

Historically, the French negative particle pas is
the same as the noun pas ‘( pace＇), whereas in modern French these two units are entirely separate. Realising these facts should be sufﬁcient to bring homethe necessity of not confusing the two points of view
[synchrony and diachrony].
(Saussure 1983: 90)
The negative particle pas in Je n’irai pas (I will
not go) is originally derived from a noun pas in Je ne
ferai un pas (I will not take a step). Saussure says thatthe negative particle pas and a noun pas is one andthe same word from a diachronic point of view. In
modern French, however, the negative particle pas
and a noun pas are quite different words. In otherwords, these two words are not the same as each other from a synchronic point of view or for speakers ofmodern French. Thus, for Saussure, it is absolutely
crucial not to confuse the two points of view, synchrony and diachrony.

A horizontal section of plants corresponds tosynchrony and a vertical section to diachrony. Then,
which one of the two takes precedence over the other, synchrony or diachrony?
Which is the more important, which may beconsidered as taking priority? Carrying the image
over into linguistics, it is the horizontal slice whichtakes priority because one speaks in the horizontal
slice. Every horizontal slice is a state which is used
for speech. The vertical section will be considered
only by the linguist.
(Saussure 1993: 124a-125a)

7.2. Linguistics is a historical science

Whitney insists that we must date back to thepast in order to understand the present state of a language:

According to Saussure, synchrony takes priority― 14 ―

Whitney and Saussure

If we would understand anything which has become what it is, a knowledge of its present constitution is not enough: we must follow it backward fromstage to stage, tracing out the phases it has assumed,
and the causes which have determined the transitionof one into the other.
(Whitney 1867:54)

ent. Rather, Whitney insists that a diachronic pointof view is the subject matter of linguistic science,
which is not compatible with Saussure’s thought thata synchronic point of view is nothing but a theme of
linguistics. As is well known, Saussure starts his research as an Indo-European philologist who is concerned with comparative and historical studies. Latein life, however, he declares that synchronic linguistics, which studies a language system at a given time,is what linguistics tries to seek, but that diachronic
linguistics, which historically studies a language, isnot, in the lecture“Course in General Linguistics”
given at University of Geneva. Considering the historical background above, we can clearly realize that
Whitney’s thought that the study of language is concerned with historical studies of language and thatgrammar is not linguistics, corresponds to the methodology of linguistic enquiry which Saussure criticizes more than once in “ Course in General
Linguistics.”

This corresponds to the diachronic point of view
explained by Saussure. Then, what does Whitney
think of a synchronic point of view?
Merely to classify, arrange, and set forth in order the phenomena of a spoken tongue, its signiﬁcantmaterial, usages and modes of expression, is grammar and lexicography, not linguistic science. The
former state and prescribe only; the latter seeks to
explain.
(Whitney 1867: 54)
Whitney insists that grammar, which corresponds to Saussure’s synchrony, is not linguistic science. By contrast, Saussure is sure that historicalstudies of language, which correspond to Whitney’s
linguistic science, are not linguistics. Saussure andWhitney are totally opposed to each other in this respect. Moreover, as we have seen, Saussure claims
that a synchronic point of view takes priority over adiachronic point of view, but on the contrary, Whitney argues that for linguistics as a historical science,
historical studies of language are more important
than grammar, or the study of language in the present state:

Conclusion
So far we have considered both Whitney’s andSaussure’s similarities and differences, comparing
and contrasting their views of language. There are
not only a lot of common ideas of language but also
completely different ones between the two linguists.
Some researchers (for example, Geoffrey Sampson)
insist that Durkheim has considerable inﬂuence upon
Saussure’s idea of language. However, Whitney’s inﬂuence on Saussure is much wider than Durkheim’s.
On the other hand, other researchers (for example,
Koerner) say that it is Saussure’s achievements that
he has systematized Whitney’s view of language. But
is it Saussure’s creativity that he has formulated his
own ideas of language which are different from
Whitney’s? Of course, it cannot be denied that Durkheim has some inﬂuence on Saussure’s idea of language.

[...] to declare that the true and fruitful ﬁeld for
linguistic research is the living and spoken dialectsof the present day, is not less narrow and erroneous.
It overlooks the character of linguistics as a historical science; it forgets that the explanation of thepresent is by the past, and that the record of by-gone
conditions casts on existing conditions a light that
nothing else could yield.
(Whitney 1875: 190)

References
Durkheim, Emile. Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique (The Rules of Sociological Method,translated by W.D. Halls). The Free Press. 1982.
Joseph, John E. From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays
in the History of American Linguistics. John

For Whitney, a synchronic point of view is notenough. Because it misses the nature of linguistics as
a historical science and it does not understand thatthe past explains the present state of language andthat considering the past enables us to grasp the pres― 15 ―

Naoki ARAKI

Benjamins Publishing Company. 2002.
Koerner, E. F. Ferdinand de Saussure (translated by
Keiichi Yamanaka). Taisyukanshoten. 1982. (inJapanese)
Miura, Tsutomu. Theory of Cognition and Language:
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Roy Harris. Pergamon Press. 1993.

Saussure, F. de. Écrits de Linguistique Générale
(Writings in General Linguistics, translated by
Carlos Sanders and Matthew Pires). Oxford
University Press. 2006.
Whitney, William Dwight. Language and the Studyof Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principlesof Linguistic Science. Charles Scribner’s Sons.
1867.
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Appleton and Company. 1875.
*This paper is based on an oral presentation given on
October 24, 2015 at Hiroshima Shudo University on
the 68th Conference of the Regional Branch of the
Chugoku and Shikoku District of the English Literary Society of Japan.

― 16 ―