Philosophica 34,1984 (2), pp. 85-102.

85

WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS INTRINSICALLY WRONG WITH
CAPITALISM ?*Philippe Van Parijs

Unlike most of the other contributions to this volume, mypaper is not concerned with exegetical issues. True, the question I
address is directly inspired by the Marxist tradition and several of
the answers I am about to consider are recognizably Marxist. But I
will make no claim to discovering nor reconstructing Marx's answer
to that question. The latter is a question which I have long asked
myself and which I find of the utmost importance, for reasons which
go far beyond sheer academic interest. What I want to know about
it is not what Marx said about it. Nor what he would have said aboutit, had he said all he thought and only what he thought. Nor what
he would have thought about it, had he been fully consistent. What I
want to know about this question is, simply, the right answer to it.
Unlike most of the other contributions to this volume again,
this paper bluntly takes it for granted that it does make sense to
ask normative, ethical questions about capitalism. As some of theother contributors to this volume have neatly shown, the generalissue of whether normative discourse makes sense is an interesting
and complicated issue as far as the interpretation of Marx's thought
is concerned 1 • But as a point of substance, not of Marxology, there
is not the slightest doubt in my mind that it does make sense toraise normative questions and to take normative stances - inparticular about capitalism. And I will now proceed to do so without
further apology.

1. The question and the strategy.what, then, is wrong with capitalism, i.e. with a social systemorganized on the basis of the private ownership of the means of

86

Ph. V AN P ARIJS

production and a "free" labour market? Somewhat more precisely,
what is intrinsically wrong with capitalisnl ? In other words, is it
possible to identify a feature(i) which is necessarily present" in capitalism (it is impossible toconceive of a capitalist society without it) and(ii) of which it can cogently be argued that it is ethically inacceptable?
For the answer to this question to have any bite for the purposes ofsocial criticism, we must add a further desideratum. We can only besatisfied with a feature(iii) which is not necessarily present in all other conceivable social
systems, in particular in (ideal) socialism - presumably themost relevant alternative to capitalism in this context.
There are several features of capitalism which may be worth
trying on this threefold filter, for example inefficiency or irrationality, domination or alienation. But there is one which looks more
promising than any other. Exploitation does not only appear mostfrequently in ethical condemnations of capitalism. It has also been
defined as precisely as one may wish and,' it would seem, in a way
which makes it plain(i) that it is intrinsic to capitalism,(ii) that it is ethically inacceptable, and(iii') that it is necessarily absent from socialism, which entails(iii) that it is not necessarily present in all conceivable societies.
It is therefore on exploitation that I will concentrate in this paper.
The strategy I propose following consists in two steps. I first
define unambiguously, with regard to a simple reference situation,
what I will call "standard exploitation", which corresponds
approximately (in such a situation) to what is generally called"exploitation" in the Marxist tradition and which uncontroversially fulfils (i) and (iii') above. I then ask what is wrong with exploitation thus defined,
in an attempt to identify a further feature(which we may, but need not, be able to label "exploitation" insome broader sense) which would simultaneously be(i') intrinsic to standard exploitation, and(ii) ethically inacceptable.
If such a feature can be found, the intrinsic wrongness of capitalism
will have been demonstrated - since any feature which fulfils (i')
also fulfils (i) -, but not necessarily in a "biting" way - since what
is instrinsically wrong with an exploitative system can also be present(and to the same extent) in a non-exploitative system. On the otherWHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

87

hand, if no such feature can be found, then there is nothing wrong
with exploitation as such, and what seemed the most promisingcourse in our quest for a clean ethical condemnation of capitalism
will have proved misguided.

2. Standard exploitation
For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict our attention to a
fictional society in which there are two non-overlapping categories
of people, workers and non-workers. The workers produce all the
goods available in this society. One part of these goods simply
serves to replace the means of production used up in production.
The remainder will be called the net product. Within this very
simple context, what does it mean to say that the workers (as awhole) are exploited by the non-workers (as a whole). In otherwords, can we work out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
which would capture adequately the standard intuitive notion of
exploitation, as applied to this simple reference situation?
I submit that the workers can be said to be exploited in thestandard sense if and only if part of the net product is appropriatedby the non-workers. Let us call surplus product this part of the
net product, and let us call surplus labour the part of the workers'
labour which produces the surplus product. Therefore, my proposal
can equivalently be formulated more compactly: standard exploitation consists in the extraction of surplus labour. But what does itmean that the non-workers "appropriate". the surplus product or"extract" surplus labour? Does it mean that they consume thecorresponding goods ?
.
As it is here understood, appropriation does not imply
consumption any more than consumption implies appropriation.
Part of the net product may be appropriated by the non-workers
without being consumed, for example if they use it as net investment, i.e. to expand future production. And non-workers may also
consume part of the net product without appropriating it in therequired sense, for example if they happen to be disabled, children.
Theravada Buddhist monks or members of a beloved royal family.
If the workers unanimously and freely choose to allocate part of the
product to such non-workers, without expecting anything in exchange, there will be consumption by non-workers, but not appropriation or extraction in the sense required to characterize standard
exploitation. (In real-life situations, there may of course be consider-88

Ph. VAN PARIJS

able uncertainty as to whether the choice is genuinely free -:- is notlove for the rulers subtly instilled by the rulers? - and genuinely
altruistic - won't the monk who receives my aIm help improve
prospects for my next life? But this does not invalidate thedistinction. )Does standard exploitation thus defined fulfil the three criteria
set out in the previous section? It definitely meets criterion (i):by earning profits, capitalists necessarily appropriate part of the net
product. Even if they accumulate all the profits they earn, theystandardly exploit the workers, since we did not stipulate that theyshould consume the surplus product, only that they should
appropriate it. And despite the fact that they do not coerce theworkers into working for them (unlike slaveowners and feudal lords),
they do extract their surplus labour, they do appropriate their surplus product. For the workers would not be willing to let thecapitalists have part of what they produce if it were not in exchange
for access to the means .of production which, by definition, thecapitalists own. Standard exploitation, therefore, is intrinsic tocapitalism. One cannot conceive of the latter without the former.
Under (ideal) socialism, on the other hand, the means of production are collectively owned by the workers, who decide howmuch of the social product should be allocated to accumulation andcommon needs and how the rest should be distributed among thecitizens 2 . Of course some non-workers may get part of the productthe young, the old, the sick, perhaps even the housewives and thetramps (if any is left) -, but only by virtue of the workers' benevolence, not because they have anything to offer in exchange. They
may consume~ but' could not appropriate. Standard exploitation,consequently, is ruled out under (ideal) socialism. And criterion(iii) is met.
The real problem is with criterion (ii). What is it exactly thatmakes standard exploitation ethically inacceptable? Whichdefensible ethical principle does it unavoidably violate? Quite a few
distinct answers have been proposed.

3. Expropriation
The most obvious answer appeals to a "creator-keeper" principle. The workers produce the whole product and are therefore
entitled to it. They are entitled, as the Gotha Programme (criticizedby Marx) put it, to the "undiminished proceeds" of their labour.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

If such a principle

89

is valid, clearly, standard exploitation isillegitimate, since appropriation of the surplus product by nonworkers would necessarily violate the workers' right over the whole
product. It would expropriate what is legitimately theirs. This
"Ricardian-socialist", conception of what is wrong with exploitation3
can be challenged in two ways. One may question the truth of thestatement that (a) workers are the sole creators of the product. And
granted that they alone create the product, one may still challenge
the claim that (b) whoever is the sole creator of something is entitledto the whole of it. In other words, one may question the underlying
ethical principle (b) or its relevance to this case (a).
To the claim that workers, and only workers, create theproduct, one may object that capitalists also contribute to it4.
Current production would not be possible without the current stockof capital. And capitalists, by definition, are those who provide thiscapital. One may argue, of course, that capital is just past labour,congealed labour, and hence that workers, taken as an intergenerational whole, produce the lot and are therefore entitled to
the lot 5 . But this will not do. For there is a difference between living
labour and capital, namely that the latter presupposes a certain
amount of "waiting", of "abstinence", of "saving" and possiblyof "risk". And this is precisely what the capitalists' specific contribution consists in.
Alternatively, one may attempt to argue that there is a crucial
distinction between contributing to the creation of something andparticipating in its creation or, as Cohen puts it, between a "productive act" and an "act of producing,,6. Even if capitalists
contribute to production, they do not participate in it. Even if
capital is productive, only workers produce. The causal role they_play in bringing the product about may be equally important. Whatmatters is the form this contribution takes: only labour involves'
active participation, which implies at the very least physical presence
and some expenditure of energy.
Let us suppose that this distinction does the trick 7 , and hence
that (a), if carefully formulated, is correct. It follows that whenever
there is standard exploitation, people who do not participate in thecreation of the product appropriate part of it. This only implies that
there is something intrinsically wrong with standard exploitation if
those who do participate in the creation of the product are entitled'
to keep the whole of it, i.e. if (b) can be s'Ustained. But can it ?
Imagine two worker-controlled, autarcic societies, one of which

90

Ph. VAN PARIJS

enjoys a much higher standard of living than the other (with thesame quantity of labour performed), due to the fact that it happens
to have easy access to energy (plenty of oil in its soil). Is it so
obvious that its workers are fully entitled to tbe whole product, ofwhich they are the sole creators ? Do~s not the fact that their productivity is heavily influenced by natural conditions shatter the
ethical plausibility of such a principle? I believe that it does and thatso does the fact that productivity is also heavily affected by thecurrent level of capital accumulation or by inherited technology.
To put it differently: having shown that standard exploiters
take part of the social product away from its sole creators does notamount to showing that they are doing wrong, because the "creatorkeeper"principle is inacceptable. No one in his right mind (i.e. inreflexive equilibrium) would endorse it. Since there is (therefore)
nothing intrinsically wrong with not letting those who created something keep it, this cannot possibly constitute what we are looking
for, namely a feature which would make standard exploitation, andhence capitalism, intrinsically wrong.

4. Unequal exchange
A second possibility is that standard exploitation may be wrong
because it necessarily involves some sort of unequal or unfair exchange. Let us look at an economy as a complex form of cooperation
or exchange, to which individuals make contributions and from
Which they draw benefits. Assuming that contributions and benefits
are measured in such a way that the sum of all contributions is equal
to the sum of all benefits, a principle of equal exchange can statethat each should contribute exactly as much as he receives. One wayof measuring both contributions and benefits is in terms of labour
value or of socially necessary labour. We then get the usual surplus
value definition of exploitation. A victim of unequal exchange issomeone who contributes more socially necessary labour than hegets back, for example embodied in the goods he purchases with
his income. And a beneficiary of unequal exchange is someone who
contributes less socially necessary labour than is embodied in thepart of the net product which he is allotted B •Because of the numeraire chosen to measure contributions, it
is obvious at once that only workers can make strictly positive
contributions and that non-workers, therefore, necessarily benefit
from unequal exchange as soon as they get any part, however small,WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

91

of the net product. Standard exploitation, therefore, entails unequal
exchange in the sense specified. And if such unequal exchange is
ethically wrong, so is standard exploitation, and hence capitalism 9 .
Equal exchange of labour value, unfortunately, does not make sense
as an ethical principle of income distribution.
To start with, as soon as equilibrium prices (or exchange values)
cease to be strictly determined by amounts of socially necessary
labour (or labour values), there is no justification for sticking tolabour values as the measuring rod for each individual's benefits.
For one thing, how much labour value is embodied in the goods a .
worker buys with the wage he earns will then depend' on what choice
he happens to make. If he purchases goods whose relatIve exchange
values are far smaller than their relative labour values (due to thefact that they require a much smaller amount of capital and natural
resources than the average commodity), they may well end up
beneficiaries rather than victims of unequal exchange 1 o. In order to'remove this unwelcome sensitivity of the concept of unequal
exchange to subjective consumer preferences, one could redefine itin modal terms: a victim of unequal exchange would not be someone who buys goods embodying less labour value than he has contributed, but rather someone who could not possibly buy (with his
income) goods which embody as much labour value as he has contributed 1 1. ,By smuggling in an essential reference to (equilibrium)
exchange values, and not just to labour values, this move implicitly
concedes that where the "law of value" fails to apply, (equilibrium)
exchange values provide the appropriate standard. As soon as living
labour is no longer, the sole scarce productive resource, competitive
prices are far better than labour values at telling us how precious"£.
given part of the social.product is, and hence at measuring thebenefits drawn by each agent from economic cooperation.
As far as the measurement of contributions is concerned, labour
values are no less inappropriate _.- though for quite different reasons.
First of all, assessing how much labour value each worker contributes
to production is a very tricky business. Not only because skilled
labour should create more value than; unskilled labour and hence
because an adequate reduction procedure of complex to simple
labour is being presupposed. But even more because how much value
a worker contributes in a given time depends on how productive heis compared to other workers producing the same goods. And while
this productivity can in principle be assessed in the case of workers
who independently produce identifiable products, it cannot, even inPh. VANPARIJS

principle, in the general case in which goods are the joint products ofa large number of operations by a large number of workers. Consequently, it is in most cases impossible to say whether the sociallynecessary labour performed by a' particular worker (or group of
workers) was smaller or larger than the number of hours he actually
worked, or than the value embodied in the goods he consumes 1 2.
Secondly and more fundamentally, choosing socially necessary
labour, rather than actual labour, as an ethical principle of distribution, is highly questionable. Why should someone who happens
to be less skilfull than average, or to work on particularly poor land,
or in a firm using obsolete machinery, be morally entitled for thatreason to a smaller part of the social product? Surely, if work is
relevant at all to the determination of how much a particular worker
is entitled to, it should be the work he has actually performed andnot the work which would have been necessary to someone withaverage skill to produce the same goods under average technicalconditions.

5. Disproportionality
Unequal exchange (of labour value), it thus turns out, neatly
fulfils criterion (i'), but badly fails with criterion (ii). In the processof showing this, however, an alternative suggestion has emerged.
I have argued above that actual labour was more suitable thansocially necessary labour as a basis for entitlement to the social
product. And I have also argued that equilibrium prices were moresuitable than socially necessary labour as a standard for assessing
how much any part of the social product is worth. So, why not
replace the requirement that each should get back just as muchsocially necessary labour as he has contributed, by the demand thateach should receive a part of the social product (measured in priceterms) proportional to the labour he has contributed? In otherwords, why not discard the notion of equal exchange and adopt
instead (as Marx does, for the lower stage of communism, in his
critique of the Gotha Programme) a principle of proportionality
between income and labour contribution? Standard exploitation is
as obviously an instance of disproportionality in this sense as it i$an instance of unequal exchange, and criterion (i'), therefore, iseasily fulfilled.
As far as criterion (ii) is concerned, proportionality between
labour contribution and income is definitely more satisfactory than

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

93

equal exchange. But not quite satisfactory yet. Just think of a situation in which there are widely different kinds of labour: some labouris pleasant, interesting and safe, while some other labour is unattractive, boring and dangerous. Would it not be deeply unfair toreward both sorts of labour at the same rate? Surely, some way ofweighting different kinds of labour must be found if "To eachaccording to his labour" is going to be at all plausible as an ethicalprinciple. And what criterion could be found for this purpose otherthan the average disutility associated with each kind of labour?
The proceeds of production, so the underlying principle should go,
are to be distributed according to desert, and desert is determinedby how much disutility each contributor to production has had tosuffer 1 3.
In the process of trying to meet (ii), however, we have now
ended up violating (i'). For if disutility is the standard by which one
must assess how much different labour contributions deserve, it ishard to see why non-labour contributions, providing they involve
any amount of disutility, should not be treated in the same way.
Saving, "abstinence", taking risks, may involve incomparably lessdisutility than most kinds of labour. And the fact that not everyone
can save (just like the fact that not everyone can provide certain
sorts of labour) may often mean that those who can, manage to cash
incomes which far exceed what would reflect the disutility they
underwent. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that non-workers receivea strictly positive income without receiving more than what they
deserve. In such a situation, standard exploitation would be present.
But according to the very principle to which we have been led, there
would be nothing wrong with such exploitation. Even though there
may be something wrong with all its observed instances, therefore,
there would be nothing intrinsically wrong with standard exploitation.

6. Endowment-based inequality
John Roemer's (1982a) "game-theoretical" definition of exploitation provides an alternative way of trying to meet the criteria ofadequacy we have set ourselves. He defines a group as capitalistically
exploited, roughly, if and only if it would be better off, and its
complement worse off, if it withdrew with its per capita share of themeans of production (abstracting from incentive effects and economies of scale). And he shows that under some conditions - basical-

94

Ph. VAN P ARIJSly, perfect competition, equilibrium, identical preferences -, thisdefinition is equivalent to some version of the unequal-exchange
definition discussed above 1 4. Under those conditions, therefore,
standard exploitation entails capitalist exploitation in Roemer's
sense. Under those conditions, in other words, non-workers who
appropriate part of the net product would necessarily be worse off(and their complement better off) if they withdrew with their per
capita share of the means of production. Or again, it is only possible
for non-workers to appropriate part of the product, under thoseconditions, because they own more than their per capita share ofsociety's wealth. Our criterion (1 ') is met: if Roemer's capitalist
exploitation is demonstrably wrong, so is standard exploitation.
As soon as any of the conditions mentioned above is not met,
however, this no longer holds. When free competition is dropped,
for example, non-workers may be able to appropriate part of the net
product through coercion, rather than by providing means of production. In order to cover this case, Roemer introduces. the conceptof feudal exploitation: a group is feudally' exploited if and only if
it would be better off (and its complement worse off) if it withdrew
with its initial endowment of means of production (abstracting again
from incentive effects and economies of scale) 1 5. In order to meet(i') beyond the case of free competition, we could then weaken
capitalist exploitation into capitalist-or-feudal exploitation. If theformer is not intrinsic to standard exploitation, the latter may stillbe.
But it is not, at least as soon as disequilibrium situations aretaken into account. For instead of assuming the form of interest
on capital advanced, standard exploitation might take the form of
purely entrepreneurial profits. Some of these may only be available
to individuals owning a sufficient ~mount of wealth. Hence, withdrawal witb per capita share would make these individuals worse off,
and for this reason, they can only be capitalist exploiters in Roemer's
sense. But take the case of a man who sees that it is more effective
to gather fifty men to raise an obelisk than to use scaffoldings tobuild it vertically. Just for having this idea, and without needing any
capital, he may earn huge entrepreneurial profits (by producing at
much lower cost than traditional obelisk builders). Of course, suchprofits will not last forever (the new technology will spread, or theworkers employed by the innovator will realize they no longer needhis services), and at equilibrium they will be completely eroded
away. Nonetheless, as the Austrian School has been at pains toWHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

95emphasize, they are central to the working of a capitalist economy,
while being irreducible to the performance of skilled labour 1 6 •When the appropriation of the surplus product by non-workers
is based. on the perception of opportunities, rather than on wealthownership or coercion, Roemer's withdrawal games are unable tocapture it as a special case. If one allows for disequilibrium
situations, therefore, standard exploitation may be present in theabsence of feudal-or-capitalist exploitation. The latter is not intrinsic
to the former.
.
Furthermore, even under equilibrium conditions, standard
exploitation need not derive from wealth ownership or coercion.
For suppose wealth is equally distributed, but preferences for leisurevary across individuals. Some members of the society concerned may
be lazy, or disabled, or scornful of worldly goods. And they may
therefore be content to earn a modest living out of the interest they
get from lending their share of wealth to others. Despite the fact that
all are equally endowed (and hence that no one can take advantage
of his superior wealth position), the latter are standardly exploitedby the former. Indeed, such a situation could even arise if the' nonworkers had less than average wealth. They would be standard
exploiters, and still withdrawing with their per capita share ofsocial wealth would make them better off, i.e. they would becapitalistically exploited in Roemer's sense 1 7. This shows that(equilibrium) standard exploitation may derive from differences in
preferences as well as from differences in wealth or from coercion.
Even at equilibrium, therefore, standard exploitation may be present
while capitalist-or-feudal' exploitation is not. And even if it can beshown that there is something wrong with the latter, it would not
ipso facto show that there is something intrinsically wrong with theformer.
.

7. Inequality of opportunities
There is worse still, for our current purposes. Even if it had
been the case that capitalist exploitation in Roemer's sense (or any
disjunction including it as an essential element) was entailed bystandard exploitation, it would not follow that the latter is inacceptable. For there is, as Roemer puts it, a "clean path" to capitalist
exploitation. Suppose the initial distribution of wealth (as well asof skills in the widest sense) is absolutely egalitarian. But somepeople are harder-working and/or thriftier than average, while others

96

Ph. VANPARIJS

are lazier and/or more extravagant. At the start of the next period,
wealth will be unequally distributed, and some will earn less thanothers for this reason (whether or not they regret having worked
so little or consumed so much in the previous period). Assuming thedifferences in time preferences and in preferences for leisure are not
the result of any perverse process, what could possibly be wrong
with such capitalist exploitation, i.e. with an inequality of income
which derives from an inequality of wealth,- but from one which
is itself generated by fully free choices starting from equal endowments?18
Of course, one can attempt to tackle this difficulty, as Roemer
does, by redifining (unjust) capitalist exploitation as an inequality
stemming from an unequal distribution of INITIAL wealth (or,more generally, of initial endowments, whether of an alienable orinalienable nature) 1 9 . But, first of all, it is by no means certain that
this leads us to an ethical principle that is any more defensible 2 0 •And in any case, this would further widen the gap between standard
exploitation and what is supposed to be wrong with it. Standard
exploitation by someone who "started" with less than average
wealth, for example, could never be capitalist exploitation in thismodified (and narrower) sense, even if the standard exploiter now
extracts an immense amount of surplus labour, due to the fantastic
amount of wealth he happens to have ("cleanly") accumulated.

8. Nothing wrong with exploitation?
What, then, is intrinsically wrong with exploitation, with theextraction of surplus labour, with the fact that .som~ people manage
to appropriate part of the net product without doing any work?
We have seen that it cannot be the fact that such people expropriate
what truly belongs to the workers as its sole creators (§ 3). Nor thefact that they contribute less labour value than they receive. ( § 4)
or that their income is larger than what they deserve (§ 5). Nor thefact that they owe this income to their ownership of the means of
production or to coercion (§6), nor to superior opportunities "atthe start" (§7). For of each of the named features it can be said
either that it need not be present when standard exploitation is(disproportionality, unequal opportunities), or that there need not
be anything objectionable about it (expropriation, unequal exchange), or both (endowment-based inequality)21 .
So, if the features examined are the most serious candidates

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

97

for the job of pinpointing what is intrinsically wrong with exploitation, we must face squarely the possibility that there may nothing
wrong with exploitation as such. This would of course not rule outthat some instances of exploitation might be ethically inacceptable,
nor even that all actual instances of exploitation might be so. But
they would not be ethically inacceptable because they are instancesof exploitation, but for some other reason. And if we are not to be
misled onto the wrong target, it is important that we should beaware of this.
Moreover, if exploitation is the most serious candidate forpinpointing what is intrinsically wrong with capitalism, we mustalso face the possibility that there may be nothing wrong withcapitalism as such. Agam, this would not rule out that actuallyexisting capitalism might be ethically inacceptable. But if it is, itwould then not be so because of its capitalist nature. This too, if
true, would be important to know. And for reasons which go far. beyond sheer academic interest.

Universite Catholique de Louvain
Departement de Philosophie et de Sciences Economiques
NOTES*The author is a Research Fellow of the Belgian National Fund for
Scientific Research. His paper sketches some of the arguments
presented more fully in a forthcoming book on "What is wrong with
Capitalism ?". An earlier version of it was presented at the Conference on "The problem of justice. An emancipatory approach froma Marxian perspective", Ghent, 23-24 March 1984. Warm thanks
are du€ to S.M. Balu, Norman Geras, Koen Raes, Robert van derVeen, Allen Wood and other participants, for the stimulation of(sometimes highly) critical comments.
1 See esp. Wood (1981) and the papers by Geras, Raes, van der Veen
and Wood in this volume.

2 If

a bureaucratic elite took all these decisions, instead of theworkers as a whole (or their democratically elected representatives),
standard exploitation could of course be present. Suppose, however, that the decisions are taken by the workers but that a minorityof them disagrees, for example, with the decision to give part of the
net product to some category of non-workers. Do the latter exploit

98

Ph. VAN PARIJS

the minority workers, given that these workers also disagreed withthe constitutional decision which laid down the procedure fortaking such decisions? (This case is in part analogous to that of acapitalist who earns profits which he neither consumes nor accumulates but donates to his old mother (herself rather wealthy). Who
exploits the workers? The old mother or her son? The son, presumably. But does this commit us to maintaining that, in a workers'
democracy, the majority exploits the minority?)
3S ee , for example, D6bb (1973: 137-138) on Hodgskin and Thompson.
4Indeed, Marx (1880: 359) himself seems to hold such a view:"I present the capitalist as a necessary functionary of capitalist
production, and show at length that he does not only "deduct"or "rob" but forces the production of surplus value, and thus"helps
create what is to be deducted."
5 This line of argument is suggested by Elster (1978: 10-11).

6See Cohen (1979: 151-152 and 1983: 314), who defends claim(a) above as a necessary, though not sufficient, ingredient in thedemonstration that the capitalists' appropriation of part of the social
product is unjust. What (a) needs to be supplemented with (according to Cohen 1983: 316-317, who explicitly disagrees on this pointwith Cohen 1979: 140-154) is an argument to the effect that theprivate ownership of the means of production is illegitimate. However, Cohen also sometimes suggests (even though he asserts the
opposite elsewhere) that (a) may, after all, be dispensable.(See esp.
Cohen 1983: 316 : "When apologists for capitalism deny that capitalists are exploiters on the ground that they contribute to thecreation of the product by providing means of production, theappropriate Marxist reply is ( ..... ) that the said 'contribution'
Does not establish absence of exploitation, since capitalist property in means of production is theft, and the capitalist is therefore'providing' only what morally ought not to be his to provide.";also ibid. 329 fn 12: "Capitalists may well qualify as productive incertain ways, but ( ... ) nevertheless exploit, UNLESS owning capitalis morally defensibl~."). In other words, why should it matter toshow that capitalists do not help create the product, since even if
they did help create it, their appropriation of part of it would remain illegitjrnate ? The first shot does not kill if not followed by thesecond one (Cohen's recognition of insufficiency). But the second
one kills wHether or not the first one has been fired (Cohen's two

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

99

sentences quoted above). Why waste a bullet?
7 It may well be enough to discriminate. between coupon-clipping
capitalists and workers (including managers). But what about thepurely entrepreneurial function a la Kirzner (see e.g. 1973) ? The
opportunity for performing that function is (generally) restricted tocapital owners. But through their "alertness", through their perception of (profitable) opportunities, don't they participate in (andnot just contribute to) the creation of, the product? If they do and I think they do -, one may try to assimilate them to workers(though strange ones: opportunity perception is quite different frommanagerial or organizational work). But whether one' does or not,one ends up with the embar.ra.ssing conclusion that there is nothing
wrong with entrepreneurial profits (which reward participants in the
production process), only with the interests earned by savers (whocontribute without participating). Indeed, it is precisely by reference
to a "finders keepers ethic" that Kirzner (1978: 394-400) attempts
to justify the entrepreneurs' profits.

8See e.g. Roemer (1982a: part 1) for a systematic exploration ofthis concept.
9 I here abstract from the fact that, strictly speaking, the concept oflabour value, or of socially necessary labour, is only supposed toapply in . market economies (whereas standard exploitation is not).
I assume, in other words, that it is possible, for normative purposes,
to define a concept of labour value which applies even in the absenceof markets.
1 ON ote that this could not happen for the workers as a whole (ina closed economy) - and hence that this does not conflict with theclaim made above to the effect that standard exploitation entails
unequal exchange of labour value. In the case of a particular worker(or group of workers) whose optimal choice is to be a pure waged
worker (no work in his own shop), this situation can only arise underless than perfect competition. (See e.g. Roemer 1982a: 78-84
and 1982b: 22-30 for a rigorous discussion of the limits of the classexploitation correspondence principle.)
11 See Roemer (1982a: 121-123).

1 2 Here again, the problem does not arise for the workers as a whole(in a closed economy), whose total working time is necessarily equal
to the amount of socially necessary labour performed (if understoodas labour required in the average), and the claim.made above to the

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effect that standard exploitation entails unequal exchange of labour
value remains meaningful.
1 3 For an attempt to point out what is wrong with expl~itation byappealing to a principle of desert, see Arneson (1981').

14 See Roemer (1982a: 202-205).
1 5See ibid., 199-202.
1 6 Roemer (ibid. 205-207) proposes to construe entrepreneurial
profits as returns to scarce skills, which coulc;I then be captured asa special case of his socialist exploitation, i.e .. as skills-based'inequality. However, there is an important difference between entrepreneurial "alertness'" and managerial work (for example, the latter
appears in equilibrium input-output tables, not the former). Is it
really plausible to say that (ephemeral) returns to alertness cannot
constitute appropriation of part of the social product by
non-workers, because perceiving opportunities (and making use ofthis perception) is working? (Perhaps it is, but then we need a neat
definition of work, and one which would not turn a coupon-clipper
too into a worker.) See also footnote 7 above.
1 7 This point is made by Roemer (1983b:

26-32) himself.

1 BSeeRoemer's (1983a: 381-383) recognition of the possibilityof "clean" capitalist exploitation in thi~ sense.

1 9 See Roemer (1984) for further discussion, and van der Veen &Van Parijs (1985) for an attempt to put the underlying theories ofjustice into a broader perspective.

2 0Equal endowments means equality of what one is given (whether

at some initial point or later in life). Implementing this is only
possible if all (particularistic) altruistic acts are banned (or, which ishardly better, detected, recorded and somehow neutralized). Is
this an attractive future? (See Van Parijs 1983: 358-360 for further
discussion. )21 Since even the minimal criteria (i')-'(ii) are not fulfilled, there islittle point in asking whether the features examined are necessarily,
or at least conceivably, absent from, say, socialism. Even if can weshown that feature F fulfills (i'), the fact that exploitation fulfils(iii) does not guarantee that this is the case. In other words: suppose
F is present wheneverE is present (F is intrinsic to exploitation),while E is absent .whenever S is present (socialism excludes exploitation); this does not rule out that' F may be present when S is

WHAT IS WRONG WITH CAPITALISM?

101

present (socialism may not exclude F), nor even that F is always
present when S is (F may even be intrinsic to socialism). To derive
F's incompatibility with socialism, we would need the further
premise that F is ONLY present if E is present. And defending sucha premise for an F which fulfils (ii) is even more formidable a task
than defending that F is present whenever E is.

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