FULL REPORTThe Use of Uncrewed
Aerial Systems by
Non-State Armed Groups
Exploring Trends in AfricaBÁRBARA MORAIS FIGUEIREDO

Acknowledgments
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This researchis supported by the Government of Germany. The author wishes to thank the experts who participated in the interviews and provided other valuable contributions during the course of the research. The
author is also grateful to the experts who reviewed and provided useful inputs to the report, namely
Dr. Kerry Chávez, Rueben Dass, Wim Zwijnenburg, Dr. Paul Holtom, Sarah Grand-Clément and TheòBajon. Special thanks are due to Joshua Bata and Yoshiharu Wakabayashi for their invaluable researchsupport, and to Matthew Currie for his assistance in preparing this publication

About UNIDIRUNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy
institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue
and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community
to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

About the SeriesThis report is part of a UNIDIR series titled “The Use of Uncrewed Systems by Non-State Armed
Groups” intended to explore trends in the use of uncrewed systems – aerial, ground and maritime– by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in different geographical regions and to assess the implications for regional and international peace and security. Specifically, the series seeks to identify andexamine trends in relation to the purpose for which the systems are used; the types of NSAG using
the systems; and the ways in which NSAGs are modifying or weaponizing these systems for use. The
series is intended to contribute to relevant multilateral processes as well as inform the development
and adoption of prevention and response strategies and measures at national and regional levels.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning thelegal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its
staff members or sponsors.

Citation
Bárbara Morais Figueiredo, “The use of uncrewed aerial systems by non-State armed groups: Exploring
trends in Africa”. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024.

Cover Image: Ogossagou, Mali, 2022. Credit: © UN Photo/Harandane Dicko.

T H E U S E O F U N C R E W E D A E R I A L SYS T E M S B Y N O N - S TAT E A R M E D G R O U P S

2AuthorBárbara Morais Figueiredo
Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme
Bárbara Morais Figueiredo is an Associate Researcher in the Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme of UNIDIR, supporting the Preventing Armed Conflict and Armed Violence research pillar.
Prior to joining UNIDIR, Bárbara worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in Geneva and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, UnitedStates. She is a Brazilian-qualified lawyer and holds a master’s degree in international affairs from the
Geneva Graduate Institute.

T H E U S E O F U N C R E W E D A E R I A L SYS T E M S B Y N O N - S TAT E A R M E D G R O U P S

3Acronyms & Abbreviations
ADF

Allied Democratic Forces

AQAP

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

ASWJ

Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a (Companions of the Prophet)

CA R

Central African Republic

CJTF

Civilian Joint Task Force

CPC

Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (Coalition of Patriots for Change)

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

FACA

Forces armées centrafricaines (Armed Forces of the Central African Republic)

FADM

Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defence Armed Forces)

IED

Improvised explosive device

ISGS

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

ISWAP

Islamic State West Africa Province

ISRIntelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JNIM

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (Group for Support of Islam and Muslims)

MINUSCA

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic

MINUSMA

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MNJTF

Multinational Joint Task Force

MONUSCO

United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

NSAG

Non-State armed group

PMSC

Private military and security company

T H E U S E O F U N C R E W E D A E R I A L SYS T E M S B Y N O N - S TAT E A R M E D G R O U P S

4Contents
Summary

6

1.

Introduction

8

2.

Overview of NSAG use of UASs in Africa and their Areas of Operation

11

2.1

Types of Groups Using UASs and Geographical Location ofRecorded Incidents

11

2.2

NSAGs Using UASs in Africa: Spotlights

17

2.2.1 Somalia: Al-Shabaab

17

2.2.2 Mozambique: Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a (ASWJ,
Companions of the Prophet)

172.2.3 Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin: Islamic State
West Africa Province (ISWAP)

192.2.4 Democratic Republic of the Congo: Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF)20

2.2.5 Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: Group for Support ofIslam and Muslims (JNIM)

21

3.

4.

5.

The Purposes, Targets and Impacts of NSAG Use of UASs in Africa

22

3.1

The Purposes of NSAG Use of UASs in Africa

22

3.2

The Main Targets and Impacts of UAS Operations by
NSAGs in Africa

25

3.3

Types of UAS Used by NSAGs in Africa and Potential
Future Trends

27

Enabling Factors and Salient Trends Influencing NSAG Use of
UASs in Africa

29

4.1

The Role of Network Affiliations in Influencing NSAGs’
Acquisition and Use of UASs in Africa

29

4.2

Use of UASs in Counter-Terrorism Operations andSelf-Reinforcing Proliferation Dynamics

34

Conclusion

37

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5Summary
This report examines current and emerging trends in the use of uncrewed aerial systems (UASs) by
non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in Africa. It provides an overview of the different NSAGs using UASs
and their main areas of operation across the subregions of Africa, describing the most prevalent types
of use, as well as the most common targets of UAS operations by NSAGs and their impacts. It thenidentifies and assesses some of the enabling factors and salient trends influencing how these groups
currently deploy or could deploy these systems in the future.
This report is intended to provide policymakers and practitioners with an overview of current andemerging trends in NSAGs’ use of UAS in Africa, and their implications for national and regional security
and stability.

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6Mopti, Mali, 2019. Credit: © MINUSMA.

Key Findings▶ While the use of uncrewed aerial systems by non-State armed groups operating in Africa
is still at an early stage, it is increasing in both frequency and geographical scope. Acrossthe continent, NSAGs primarily deploy UASs to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions – including to identify targets and coordinate attacks. The
other prominent way in which African NSAGs use UASs is to record footage for communication and propaganda materials.While these groups have not yet used weaponized
UASs for strike operations, groups operating in both West and East Africa are reportedly
seeking to develop capabilities for offensive UAS operations.
▶ NSAGs in Africa tend to employ UASs mostly in an ad hoc and opportunistic manner.
None of the groups using UASs on the continent appears to have developed well-resourced capabilities allowing for more consistent and sophisticated uses of the technology. However, there are indications that some of the conditions that motivated andenabled NSAGs to develop UAS programmes in other regions could potentially be replicated by some groups in Africa.
▶ Across the continent, UASs are primarily used by terrorist groups, especially those thathave ties to groups known for using these systems in other regions, such as IslamicState and Al-Qaida affiliates. Such network affiliations seem to play an important role infacilitating the transfer of knowledge and expertise in the acquisition and deployment of
UASs among NSAGs in Africa. Given the fluid nature of many of these groups, as well as
cross-border flows of fighters, the sharing of knowledge and expertise among different
NSAGs is likely to grow, contributing to the further diffusion of the technology.
▶ Most of the reported incidents of UAS use by NSAGs in Africa have taken place in armed
conflict settings, particularly in border regions in West Africa such as the Liptako–Gourma
region and the Lake Chad Basin. Somalia and Mozambique in East Africa and the Central
African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Central Africa represent
other important “hotspots” for UAS-related incidents involving NSAGs on the continent.
▶ Although publicly available information on the types of UAS used by NSAGs in Africa
is limited, evidence suggests that these systems are mainly commercially available
models, particularly quadcopters. Relevant information on how NSAGs acquire andoperate UASs has been obtained primarily through interviews with former combatants
and former abductees of groups that operated these systems.
▶ As unarmed and armed UASs become more accessible and advanced, and as thesesystems are deployed by an increasingly diverse set of actors across Africa, the risks
posed by NSAGs’ use of UASs to national and regional security could become moreacute and should be monitored closely.

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71. Introduction
Across Africa, many States are facing a myriad

and security companies (PMSCs) to operateof security challenges that undermine politicalalongside State security and defence forces,

stability, good governance and sustainable

while the number of self-defence militias anddevelopment.

security

vigilante groups engaged in the fight against

landscape is characterized by a proliferationthese groups has continued to rise across theof non-State armed groups (NSAGs), which

continent, especially at the local level.4 Africa

both fuel and exacerbate the threats asso-

is also host to a number of foreign militaryciated with armed conflicts, terrorism andbases and operations.5

1

The

deterioratingorganized crime across the continent.2 Given
the rapid growth and geographical expansionof many NSAGs – particularly terrorist groups– in recent years, Africa has been describedas the global epicenter of terrorism in 2023,
and fatalities linked to the activities of thesegroups reached unprecedented levels.3 To
counter these threats, African governments
are increasingly engaging private military

Within this congested security landscape,uncrewed

aerialsystems(UASs)

have

become a ubiquitous presence in the skies
above Africa.6 These systems – defined as
vehicles that can be piloted either remotelyorsemi-autonomously7

–

were

initially

deployed primarily by foreign States to facilitate or execute targeted strikes in the context

1See, for instance, General Assembly and Security Council, A/78/234-S/2023/553, paras 8–12; and UNDP, Journey toExtremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, 2023, https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement.
2

Ibid.

3

Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index 2022, 2023, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “African Militant Islamist Group-Linked Fatalities at All-Time High”, 31 July 2023,
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-militant-islamist-group-linked-fatalities-at-all-time-high/.

4

See, for instance, UNDP, Understanding and Managing Vigilante Groups in the Lake Chad Basin Region, 2022, https://www.
undp.org/africa/publications/understanding-and-managing-vigilante-groups-lake-chad-basin-region; M. Pellerin, Self-Defense Groups: Pyromanic Firefighters in the Sahel, Ifri, 2022, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/self-defense-groups-pyromaniac-firefighters-sahel; K. de Bruijne, Self-defence Groups, Politics, and the Sahelian State, Clingendale, 2022, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/self-defence-groups-politics-and-sahelian-state.

5

A. Attah-Asamoah, “Proceed with Caution: Africa’s Growing Foreign Military Presence”, ISS, 2019, https://issafrica.org/
iss-today/proceed-with-caution-africas-growing-foreign-military-presence; D. Goxho, “Remote Warfare in the Sahel and aRole for the European Union”, E-International Relations, 2021, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/89076.
6

In October 2023, the second Africa Air Force forum, which brought together Air Force Chiefs of Staff, aerospace industry representatives and government officials in Senegal, discussed the use of UASs by States on the continent under the theme “Adapting
air force capabilities and drone deployment to combat modern conflicts”, reflecting the increasing role and attention paid to therole of UASs in Africa. See https://airforceafrica.com/. On the use of UASs by African States, see also E.S. Loumtouang, “Laguerre vue du ciel : l’usage des drones en terrain africain” [War seen from above: The use of drones on African soil], A contrario,
2019, https://www.cairn.info/revue-a-contrario-2019-2-page-99.htm?ref=doi; R. Kurpershoek, A. Muñoz Valdez & Zwijnenburg, Remote Horizons: Expanding Use and Proliferation of Military Drones in Africa, PAX, 2021, https://paxforpeace.nl/
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/import/2021-05/PAX_remote_horizons_FIN_lowres.pdf; P. Melly (2022), “Turkey’s Bayraktar
TB2 Drone: Why African States are Buying Them”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62485325; J. Moody,“Drones Aren’t the Sahel’s Silver Bullet”, Foreign Policy, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/14/sahel-western-africa-drones-jihad-ethiopia-mali-burkina-faso-niger/.

7

See S. Grand-Clément and T. Bajon, “Uncrewed Aerial Systems: A Primer”, UNIDIR, 2022, https://unidir.org/publication/uncrewed-aerial-systems-primer.

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8of counter-terrorism operations.8 However,by criminal groups, issuing a communiquéa growing number of African States havethat called on African Union member Statesacquired armed and unarmed military-grade

to introduce legislation to regulate UAS acqui-

UASs during the past decade for use in armed

sition and use in order to prevent access by

conflicts, counter-terrorism operations andarmed groups.14 Despite this call for action, as

domestic law enforcement activities.9 For

well as the growing frequency and expanding

instance, UASs have been extensively usedgeographical scope of UAS-related incidents

in the armed conflicts in Libya and, more

involving NSAGs in Africa, there is a limited

recently, Ethiopia and Sudan, and they are in-understanding of how these groups are using

creasingly being deployed by African States in

UASs across the continent, as well as of thethe Sahel in the context of counter-terrorism

broader security implications of such develop-

operations. In parallel, the African market forments.

10commercial unarmed UASs has grown considerably over recent years, with these systems
being used across several sectors, including
to support agriculture, humanitarian aid,disaster relief, public safety and peacekeeping

This report attempts to fill this gap byexamining current and emerging trends in
NSAGs’ use of UASs in Africa. Section 2
provides an overview of the use of UASs

operations.11

by NSAGs across the subregions of Africa.

These developments have been accompaniedof use of UASs by African NSAGs, as well as

by a gradual but steady increase in the numberof the most common targets of UAS opera-of NSAGs employing UASs for a variety oftions by NSAGs and their impacts. Section 4

purposes across the continent.12 Several

then identifies and assesses some of thegroups in Africa reportedly have access toenabling factors and salient trends influencing

UASs and deploy these systems in ways that

how African NSAGs currently deploy or could

can challenge national and regional security

deploy these systems in the future. Section 5

and stability.13 In the light of these trends,

concludes the report, summarizing the key

in May 2022 the African Union Peace andfindings. The analysis is based on a data set of

Security Council expressed “serious concern”

incidents of UAS use by NSAGs in Africa in theat the threats posed by the illegal use of UASs

period January 2018–June 2023 (see Box 1).

Section 3 describes the most prevalent types

8

Loumtouang (2019); Kurpershoek et al. (2021); Melly (2022); A. Muñoz, A.M. Pol and W. Zwijnenburg, “Drone Dialogues
Geneva: Outcome Report of the Geneva Informal Roundtable Meeting on Military Drones in Africa”, PAX, 2022, https://paxforpeace.nl/news/dawn-of-the-drones-over-africa/. On the concerns raised by

9

Ibid.

Ibid. See also OHCHR, “UN Experts Warn of Potential for Further Atrocities Amid Resumption of Conflict in Ethiopia”, 19
September 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/un-experts-warn-potential-further-atrocities-amid-resumption-conflict; “Sudanese Army Kills at Least 40 People in a Drone Attack on Khartoum”, Al Jazeera, 10 September 2023,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/10/sudanese-army-kills-at-least-40-people-in-a-drone-attack-on-khartoum.
10

11

K. Allen, “Weaponised Drones: The Latest Tech Threat to Reach Africa”, ISS, 2022, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/weaponised-drones-the-latest-tech-threat-to-reach-africa.

12

Moody (2023); R. Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa”, Lawfare, 1 May 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa; H. Haugstvedt, “A Flying Threat Coming to Sahel and East
Africa? A Brief Review”, Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 14, no. 1, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999979.
13

Ibid.

14

African Union Peace and Security Council, PR/COMM.1085, 2022.

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9Box 1. Methodology
The methodology for the data set used to prepare this study involved primarily desk research.
First, a literature review encompassing both grey and academic literature on non-State armed groups’
use of uncrewed aerials systems in Africa helped to develop the structure for a data set used for collecting information on UAS-related incidents involving these groups, as well as to assess regional specificities and contextualize the research findings into the broader African security landscape. The data set
was structured around the types of system potentially used by NSAGs; the types of NSAG using thesesystems; the purpose of use, as well as the primary targets and potential impact; the incident location;and the incident date.
Second, a collection and systematic review of publicly reported data on UAS-related incidents involving
African NSAGs that took place between January 2018 and June 2023 was undertaken. It reliedprimarily on publicly available information drawn from existing data sets, such as the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as from reports by United Nations entities,15 studies
from relevant think tanks and specialized non-governmental organizations, and international and local
media reporting in English, French and Portuguese.
The purpose of the data set is not to provide a comprehensive overview of UAS-related incidents
involving NSAGs in Africa. Rather, it seeks to identify and offer insights into the most salient trends
across the region. Moreover, it is expected that many UAS-related incidents that are not linked to
specific attacks might to go unnoticed or unreported, while other incidents reported in public sources
may be difficult to verify. Where available, the data set also includes information on the means andmethods used by NSAGs to acquire UASs or their components. As demonstrated by this research,however, the open sources consulted contained very limited information on acquisitions, and some of
the most useful insights have been obtained through interviews conducted with former combatants orformer abductees of the groups by United Nations Panel of Experts or specialized research entities.

15

The reports reviewed include those of Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Resolutions 1526 (2004)
and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; Reports of the Panelof Experts on Somalia, and the Security Council Committee pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia; Reports of
the Panel of Experts on Mali pursuant to Resolution 2374 (2017); and Reports of the Panel of Experts on Libya pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011); Reports of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to Resolution 2360
(2017); Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic pursuant to Resolution 2399 (2018), as well as otherthematic and annual reports by United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in Africa, notably the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUSCO).

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102. Overview of NSAG use of UASs in
Africa and their Areas of Operation
This section provides an overview of NSAG

by terrorist groups, especially in conflict-af-

use of UASs across the subregions of Africa.

fected environments in West, East and Central

16

It shows that UASs appear to be primarily used

Africa.

2.1 Types of Groups Using UASs and Geographical Locationof Recorded Incidents
In Africa, UASs have primarily been used

use of these systems by organized criminal

in armed conflict settings in West and Eastgroups appears to be much less prevalent

Africa by groups designated as terrorist orga-

in Africa, especially in comparison to othernizations,particularly those affiliated with

regions.18 For many of the reported incidents

the Islamic State group and Al-Qaida (seeof suspected UAS use by NSAGs, the precise

Figure 1). In some contexts, rebel groups

user of the system remains nonethelessand PMSCs also seem to use UASs. The

unknown or unidentified.

17

Menaka, Mali, 2018. Credit: © MINUSMA/Marco Dormino.

16

For the categorization and assignment of countries to the geographical regions of Central, East, North, Southern and West
Africa, the United Nations Statistical Division classification of Middle, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western Africa was used:https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49.
17
In the context of this research, “terrorist groups” are considered as those listed as such by the United Nations Security
Council. See, for instance: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries. On different
types of terrorist designations or listings and related challenges, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),“Counter-Terrorism in the International Law Context”, Vienna, 2021; and United Nations Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
OROLSI and Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), “The Evolving Nature of DDR: Study on Engaging Armed Groups
across the Peace Continuum” July 9, 2021, pp. 24-27.
18See, for instance, G. Krame, V. Vivoda and A. Davies, “Narco Drones: Tracing the Evolution of Cartel Aerial Tactics in
Mexico’s Low-Intensity Conflicts”, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2226382. See also https://thewire.in/south-asia/drones-give-new-dimensions-to-narcoterrorism-at-the-india-pakistan-border; https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2023/dec/27/wave-of-drug-carrying-drones-flying-into-india-from-pakistan-officials-say.

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11Figure 1. Number of Recorded Incidents of UASs’ Use Attributed to Types of
NSAGs in Africa, January 2018–June 2023
RE B EL G RO UPS

1 2%

P R I V A T E S E C U R I T Y AN D
M ILIT A R Y C O MP AN I E S ( P MS C )9%TE RRO RIS T G RO UPS53%UNKNOWN

26%

In terms of geographical spread, most of the

Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in the Central

incidents occurred in Central Africa, East

African Republic (CAR). Some incidents ofAfrica and West Africa (see Figures 2 and 3).

UAS use by NSAGs have also been reported

In West Africa the incidents occurred especial-in North Africa, primarily by Islamic State-affili-

ly in porous border regions where State control

ated groups (e.g., in Egypt, Algeria and Libya),

is weak and where territorial disputes between

while Southern Africa appears to be the least

States and NSAGs or among NSAGs them-affected subregion. As NSAGs, particular-

selves are common (e.g., the Lake Chad Basinly terrorist groups, continue to proliferate andand the Liptako–Gourma region). In East Africa

expand to West African coastal States (e.g.,

the incidents occurred in Somalia, Kenya,

Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and, to a lesser extent,

and Mozambique, while in Central Africa

Ghana, Togo, Senegal and Guinea) this will

they occurred in the east of the Democratic

also remain a space to watch.19

19

On the expansion of the terrorist threat to West African coastal States see, for instance, M. Pellerin, “Les pays côtiersd’Afrique de l’Ouest: Nouvelle terre d’expansion des groupes djihadistes sahéliens?”, Ifri, 2022, https://www.ifri.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/pellerin_afrique_ouest_djihadisme_sahel_2022_0.pdf; and L. Brottem, “The Growing Threat ofViolent Extremism in Coastal West Africa”, ACSS, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-growing-threat-of-violent-extremism-in-coastal-west-africa/. In the beginning of 2024, it has been reported that the US is seeking to establish military UAS
bases in West African coastal States, see M. M. Phillips (2024), “U.S. Seeks Drone Bases in Coastal West Africa to Stem Islamist
Advance”, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-seeks-drone-bases-in-coastal-west-africa-to-stem-islamist-advance-21282861?mod=e2tw.

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12Figure 2. Recorded Incidents of Use of UASs by NSAGs in Africa, by State, January
2018–June 2023

2

1

15

3

1

2
9
1

15
1

7

4

10

In addition, the United Nations peacekeep-

premises, including before attacks by armed

ing operations deployed in the DRC, CAR

groups against the mission.20 Likewise, on

and Mali, as well as the African Union-man-several occasions the United Nations Sta-

dated mission in Somalia, have frequently

bilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

reported on sightings of UASs suspected tohas detected unidentified UASs over its

be used by NSAGs, especially near militarybases and flying along the provincial borderbases or camps. For instance, the United

between North Kivu and Ituri in eastern DRC,

Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabili-

where different NSAGs operate.21 The African

zation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has often

Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)

reported unidentified UASs hovering over its

has similarly reported on sightings of small

20

Security Council, S/2023/21, para. 63.

21

Security Council, S/2021/987, para. 14.

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13UASs over its military bases in Somalia.22 In
such hostile and high-risk operational environments, where mission camps, convoys
or personnel are often targeted in attacks
conducted by NSAGs, the difficulties in determining the identity of the individual orgroup operating the UAS and hence distinguishing between malicious and legitimate
uses of these systems add to the security
concerns confronting the missions, withnegative repercussions for their operations(see Box 2).23 In an assessment released in
March 2022, the United Nations Departmentof Peace Operations (DPO) recognized that,while most threats from the use of UASs by
NSAGs stemmed from their use for ISR, they
could evolve towards being used for attacks,
including through the delivery of explosive
payloads.24

Ber, Mali, 2018. Credit: © MINUSMA/Marco Dormino.

22

Security Council, S/2023/95, para.101.

23

Security Council, S/2023/21, para. 63; Security Council, S/2021/1117, para. 68.

24

In the light of these risks, the need for monitoring UAS-related threats features prominently in the United Nations Strategy
for the Digital Transformation of Peacekeeping, launched by the United Nations DPO in September 2021. Many missions havealso introduced counter-UAS training for their personnel. See UN Peacekeeping, “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN
Peacekeeping”, 2021, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping. See also DPO,
“Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping”, 2022, https://pcrs.un.org/Lists/
Resources/03- Uniformed Capability Requirements for UN Peacekeeping/2022/Uniformed Capability Requirements for
UN Peacekeeping_Mar 22_Final.pdf.

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14Figure 3. Recorded Incidents of UASs’ Use by NSAGs in Africa, by State and Year,2018–2023

M ALI

2

CAR

M OZAM BIQU E

N IGERIA

2

SOM ALIA

1

10

1

6

8

1

1

6

2

1

1

4

1

1

4

1

2

1

1

DRC

EGYPT

3

2

1

LIBYA

2

BURKIN A FASO

2

N IGER1

KEN YA

1

GAM BIA1

CAM EROON

1

ALGERIA

1

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Note: Figures for 2023 cover only the first 6 months of the year.

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15Box 2. UAS Flight Restrictions in the Central African Republic Affecting
MINUSCA’s Operations Following an Incident of Alleged UAS Use by a Rebel
Group
In early 2023, the Minister of National Defence and Army Reconstruction of the Central African Republic
issued a communiqué suspending all flights by UASs in CAR except for those owned by the CAR Armed
Forces (Forces armées centrafricaines, FACA).25 The suspension, which also affected the operationsof the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic(MINUSCA), was reportedly linked to an incident that took place in January 2023, where a rebel group
allegedly used a UAS to attack the position of “other security personnel”, in a possible allusion to the
Wagner Group, a PMSC. The attack was reportedly directed against the Wagner Group’s base in thenorth-eastern town of Ndélé. In a February 2023 report, the United Nations Panel of Experts on CAR
noted the use of UASs by armed groups in the country for the first time during 2022–2023. However, it
underscored that the January incident was likely to have been a “one-off” following the capture of the
UAS by the FACA or “other international security presences”.26
While the UAS flight restrictions were eventually lifted by the CAR authorities and new notification requirements were stipulated for UAS operations by MINUSCA, the restrictions had a negative repercussions for the mission’s activities.27 Moreover, MINUSCA was targeted by a disinformation campaign inconnection with the incident, as some local media reports and social media posts alleged that the UAS
used in the January 2023 attack in Ndélé had taken off from a MINUSCA airbase.28

25

Security Council, S/2023/108, para. 18.

26

Security Council, S/2023/87, paras 30, 37; Security Council, S/2022/527, para. 36.

27

Security Council, S/2023/442, para. 91

28

Following a series of allegations regarding the use of UASs in CAR, MINUSCA issued a statement denouncing an online disinformation campaign “aimed at tarnishing the image of its force”, https://minusca.unmissions.org/la-minusca-contribue-à-labaisse-des-crimes-et-délits-enregistrés-sur-le-territoire-centrafricain. Disinformation campaigns targeting United Nations
peacekeeping operations, particularly MINUSCA, MONUSCO and MINUSMA, became a more frequent occurrence in recent
years. See A. Tritthart, “Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations”, IPI, 2022, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/11/2212_Disinformation-against-UN-Peacekeeping-Ops.pdf.

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2.2 NSAGs Using UASs in Africa: Spotlights
2.2.1 Somalia: Al-Shabaab
Since at least 2018, Al-Shabaab has been using commercially available UASs – both rotary wing and small fixedwing systems – for ISR and propaganda in Somalia andneighbouring countries, such as Kenya.29 The group significantly increased its use of UASs to conduct reconnaissance missions and monitor the activities of security forcesin 2021.30 Sightings of mini and micro UASs allegedly usedby the group have also been reported on different occasions
near military camps and facilities.31 Although Al-Shabaabhas not yet employed UASs to conduct strike operations, its
use of these systems has reportedly facilitated high-profile
attacks carried out by the group against Somali, Kenyan andforeign military personnel.32
Concerns have been raised regarding Al-Shabaab’s ability and intent to weaponize UASs for attacks
against civil aviation infrastructure; more recently, the group appears to have initiated experimental
trials of the use of UASs for strike operations. The group’s connections to Al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), which operates in Yemen, has compounded the latter concerns (see Section
4.1).33 Al-Shabaab’s use of UASs to plan and coordinate the complex attacks in Somalia on which it
increasingly relies also remains an issue of concern.34

2.2.2 Mozambique: Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a(ASWJ, Companions of the Prophet)
In Cabo Delgado province, northern Mozambique, ASWJ
(which pledged its allegiance to Islamic State in 2019)
has deployed commercially available UASs to gather intelligence and coordinate attacks against Mozambican and regional defence and security forces on several
occasions since at least 2020.35 The group notably used29

In the same year, the group allegedly seized a military UAS used by USforces that was reportedly used in an attack against the group.

30

Security Council, S/2021/655, para. 22.

31

Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 101.

32

Haugstvedt (2020).

33

Security Council, S/2021/655, para. 22.

34

Security Council, S/2021/655, para. 22; S/2023/539, para. 105; and Security Council, S/2023/724, paras 21, 22.

35

https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-attacks-government-says-armed-groups-wear-army-uniforms-anduse-drones-161507/.

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17UASs to identify targets in the Mocímboa da Praia offensive in 2020, as well as for its attack on Palmain 2021.36 In early 2022, the Mozambican Defence Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa deMoçambique, FADM) reported on the interception and neutralization of several formations of UASs
that were reportedly being used by ASWJ to gather intelligence on the positions these forces.37
In the same year, the Mozambican police shot down two UASs suspected of being deployed by thegroup that were flying over the barracks of the police’s special reserve forces near Nampula International Airport.38 There have been other reports of UAS sightings near the Mozambican Navy baseat Pemba harbour, which raised concerns regarding a possible armed attack by the group.39 In early
2023, ASWJ reportedly captured a surveillance UAS among other military equipment following
an attack on the FADM, according to a statement published in an Islamic State newspaper which
included a photo of the UAS.40
In parallel, ASWJ has been intensifying its reliance on IED attacks, which have grown in sophistication over recent years. As the group is likely to have benefited from the involvement of outsidetrainers for the manufacturing of IEDs, the possibility that knowledge and expertise relating to the development and use of UASs have also been transferred cannot be dismissed.41

36

Dass (May 2023); K. Allen, “Drones and Violent Non-State Actors in Africa”, ACSS, 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/
drones-and-violent-nonstate-actors-in-africa/.

37

Security Council, S/2022/547, para. 103.

38

Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 103. See also https://opais.co.mz/prm-diz-que-abateu-drones-suspeitos-em-nampula/.

39

https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/using-drones-and-disguises-terrorists-target-northern-mozambique-48690955;
https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/CaboLigado-99.pdf.

40

https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-9-15-january-2023.

41

Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 99.

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2.2.3 Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin: Islamic State West Africa Province(ISWAP)ISWAP was one of the earliest adopters and is one of themost prolific users of UASs in Africa.42 Since 2014, the group(which emerged as a splinter faction of Boko Haram in2016)43 has reportedly been employing UASs to conduct
ISR and to record propaganda materials.44 Since its
emergence, the group has significantly expanded its areasof activity in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin,enhancing its operational capabilities and deploying increasingly sophisticated tactics to fight armed forces.45
Despite the setbacks suffered by the group following counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Nigerian armed
forces, ISWAP has continued to attract attention for its technological and media savviness, including its use of UASs.46
In particular, the group is now reportedly seeking to develop
UAS capabilities for carrying out attacks.47

ISWAP uses UASs to direct fire in attack against the Nigerian
Army's positions. Credit: X (formerly Twitter) / @SimNasr.

42

Security Council, S/2019/50, para. 103; Security Council, S/2020/50, para. 41; Soufan Center, “Intel-Brief: The Islamic Statein West Africa Province is Growing in Strength and Sophistication”, 2019, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-islamicstate-in-west-africa-province-is-growing-in-strength-and-sophistication/.
43

Security Council, S/2017/467, para. 23. Boko Haram, which pledged its allegiance to Islamic State in 2015, was one of thefirst African-based terrorist groups to resort to UASs. See Soufan Center (2019); https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/
africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html.
44

Security Council, S/2019/50, para. 103; Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 101.

45

Vision of Humanity (2023), p. 28; Soufan Center (2019); C. Anna (2018), “Nigerian leader: Islamic State is now using drones”,
AP News, https://apnews.com/article/766b4d71c21f43d496550a2eb16e64a9.

46

M. Samuel, “ISWAP’s use of Tech Could Prolong the Lake Chad Basin Violence”, ISS, 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/
iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence.

47

Ibid. Security Council, S/2019/50, para. 103.

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2.2.4 Democratic Republic of the Congo: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
In the DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have reportedly used UASs for surveillance on different occasions
since early 2021.48 According to information obtained by theUnited Nations Panel of Experts on the DRC, the ADF has
allegedly operated UASs from their headquarters, although
the exact purposes of the use could not be confirmed.
Based on accounts of former combatants as well as former
abductees interviewed by the Panel, the group used UASs
to monitor the camp’s surroundings when foodstuffs,
medicine, weaponry or IED components were being brought
by ADF collaborators. Others also said that the ADF used
UASs to record videos and take pictures of its camps for propaganda, as well as of camps of the DRC armed forces forintelligence purposes, especially when preparing attacks onthese camps.49
Most testimonies pointed at a specific individual – Meddie Nkalubo (known as “Punisher”) – as the
person responsible for operating UASs in the group’s headquarters.50 He is also believed to havebeen involved in the manufacturing of IEDs and to have been responsible for directing several lethal
IED attacks carried out by the group.51 The ADF has been increasingly relying on IED attacks,52 andallegedly discussed operational strategy and tactics with representatives of the core Islamic Stateor ASWJ in meetings held in South Kivu. Islamic State has claimed responsibility for several of theattacks perpetrated by the ADF.53 Other reports also point at individuals with Islamic State links who
were involved in helping the ADF to improve its technological capacity, including in deploying UASs.54
They also highlight attempts by Islamic State operatives based in South Africa to transfer commercially available UASs to the ADF.55

48

Security Council, S/2021/560, para. 23; Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 101.

49

Security Council, S/2021/560, Annex 14, p. 73. In the same area where the use of UASs was reported between February andMarch 2021, the ADF carried out consecutive attacks.
50International Crisis Group, “The Kampala Attacks and their Regional Implications”, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/
africa/great-lakes/uganda/kampala-attacks-and-their-regional-implications.
51

Security Council, S/2021/560, para. 23 and Annex 14; Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 16.

52

Security Council, S/2023/549, paras. 15 and 16.

53

Security Council, S/2023/431, para. 14 and annex 3.

54

T. Candland et al., “The Rising Threat to Central Africa: The 2021 Transformation of the Islamic State Congolese Branch”
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch/.

55

Security Council, S/2023/431, para. 37 and Annex 12.

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Photographs of the UASs and cameras seized during the arrest of a SouthAfrican-based Islamic State operative with links to ADF, Final report of the United
Nations Group of Experts on the DRC (Security Council, S/2023/431, Annex 13).

2.2.5 Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger: Group for Support of Islam and Muslims(Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, JNIM)JNIM (Al-Qaida’s branch in West Africa and the Sahel) has
used UASs to record propaganda videos as well as tomonitor and coordinate attacks on several occasions sinceat least 2018.56 The group has relied in particular on UASs
for ISR, including to gather intelligence and plan offensive
operations against national and international forces andrival NSAGs (notably ISGS).57 Since JNIM and ISGS operate
in the same area in north-eastern Mali, they often clash forcontrol, with JNIM deploying UASs to coordinate their operations in some of these incidents.58 The group has also
captured UASs used by different actors in the areas in which
it operates,59 and recently started deploying these systems
to film their attacks on security and defence forces.60

56

In 2018, for instance, the group has recorded a propaganda video showcasing multiple training camps and military raids withcameras and a commercially available UAS. See C. Weiss, “Al Qaeda group JNIM releases high-level production video”, Long
War Journal, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/03/al-qaeda-group-jnim-releases-high-level-production-video.php.
57

In 2018, the group allegedly resorted to UAS to collect intelligence prior to an attack against the MINUSMA camp in Timbuktu.

58

On JNIM’s areas of operation, see also N. Holger Anders, “Peacekeeping in Hostile Environments: The Impact of Illicit Arms
on MINUSMA”, UNIDIR, 2023, p. 13, https://unidir.org/publication/peacekeeping-in-hostile-environments-the-impact-of-illicit-arms-on-minusma-2/.
59

ACLED data. See also Wassim Nasr, “JNIM claims two attacks against the (Burkinabé) army between Dédougou andNouna, ‘32 death, 4 vehicles and one drone captured’”, X (formerly Twitter), 31 May 2023, https://twitter.com/simnasr/status/1663880396256231425?s=12&t=Z0Kxk7JyShVShIJDH1DMRw.
60

Wassim Nasr, “Mali: the start of the attack on the Niafounké FAMa base with the JNIM kamikaze attack filmed by drone”,

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3. The Purposes, Targets and Impacts of
NSAG Use of UASs in Africa
This section provides an overview of thefor ISR, including to coordinate and facilitate

different ways in which NSAGs deploy UASs in

attacks directed primarily against military andAfrica, highlighting the most common targets

security personnel. In contrast to some groups

of UAS operations by NSAGs and their actual

operating UASs in other regions,61 however,or potential impacts. Although NSAGs’ de-none of the NSAGs using UASs in Africa

ployment of UASs in Africa is not widespread

appear to have developed systematic or com-and the number of groups with access to theseprehensive UAS programmes. Instead, theysystems remains limited across the continent,

seem to use these systems in a more sporadic

the research has revealed a relative increase

and opportunistic manner. However, the con-in both the frequency and geographical scope

ditions that motivated and enabled groups toof such uses in recent years (see Figuresdevelop such programmes could nonetheless2–3). African NSAGs deploy UASs mainly

emerge for African NSAGs.

3.1 The Purposes of NSAG Use of UASs in Africa
Across Africa, NSAGs appear to use UASs

the deployment of other weapon systems. For

primarily for intelligence, surveillance andinstance, in early 2022, Islamic State West

reconnaissance activities (see Figure 4).

Africa Province (ISWAP) reportedly used aThis includes the monitoring of their areas

UAS to support an attack by a mortar squadof operation for security reasons, as wellagainst a joint military base of the Multination-

as reconnaissance and surveillance prioral Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in north-east-

to or during offensive operations, including

ern Nigeria.62 The use of the UAS allegedly

to identify targets and coordinate armed orserved both surveillance and target-correc-

explosive attacks (e.g. in Nigeria, Somalia,

tion functions to increase the precision ofMali and Mozambique). In some cases, thethe mortar bombs.63 Other groups in West

employment of UASs for ISR by NSAGs has

and East Africa, such as Al-Shabaab, Ahlu

proven highly effective, enabling groups toSunna wal-Jama’a (ASWJ, Companions ofcarry out complex attacks with a higher degree

the Prophet), Islamic State in the Greaterof accuracy and impact, including by guiding

Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa

X (formerly Twitter), 25 November 2023, https://x.com/simnasr/status/1728366718794260793?s=12&t=Z0Kxk7JyShVShIJDH1DMRw
61

A UAS programme is typically characterized by the presence of “more structured, integrated and resourced” capabilities. See
D. Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology”, Combating Terrorism Center, 2016,
https://ctc.usma.edu/remotely-piloted-innovation-terrorism-drones-andsupportive-technology/; Y. Veilleux-Lepage and E.
Archambault, “A Comparative Study of Non-State Violent Drone Use in the Middle East”, ICCT, 2022, https://www.icct.nl/publication/comparative-study-non-state-violent-drone-use-middle-east.
62

https://africacenter.org/daily-media-review/africa-media-review-for-february-24-2022/.

63

Ibid.

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al-Muslimin (JNIM, Group for Support of Islam

trials of the use of commercially available mini

and Muslims), have used UASs for similar

and micro UASs for offensive operations.69 In

purposes.64 It also appears that criminal

addition to both ISWAP and Al-Shabaab, manygroups in South Africa could be using UASs

of the groups known to have deployed UASs

to monitor the activities of law enforcementin Africa have extensive expertise in manu-

personnel in Cape Town, while PMSCs suchfacturing and deploying improvised explosiveas the Wagner Group rely on these systems fordevices (IEDs) to carry out large-scale attacks

surveillance and possibly attacks in CAR andagainst defence and security personnel and ci-

Mali. While most of the incidents observed

vilians.70 The potential weaponization of com-involved the use of only one system, there

mercially available UASs by NSAGs throughhave also been cases of multi-system deploy-the inclusion of conventional munitions or im-

ment – when more than one UAS is used atprovised explosive payloads therefore remains

one time – such as in Mozambique. However,a credible threat in the foreseeable future, es-such cases appear to be limited and isolated

pecially as these groups seek to diversify their

to date.

tactical arsenals.

Although African NSAGs have reportedly not

The other prominent way in which African

yet successfully weaponized UASs to carry

NSAGs use UASs is to record footage for pro-out strike operations, there are indications

paganda activities. Many NSAGs, partic-

that this could change soon. In 2022, African

ularly terrorist groups, rely on commercial-

States confiscated Islamic State manuals on

ly available systems to capture videos andthe use of UASs for targeted attacks.67 Recent

imagery of attacks and other engagements toresearch by the Institute for Strategic Studies

feed into their propaganda and communica-(ISS) has revealed that ISWAP is testing UASs

tion materials. This is particularly prominent

to carry and deliver explosives in offensive op-

among affiliates of Islamic State and Al-Qaida,erations, with the group reportedly assessing

such as ISWAP, JNIM and Al-Shabaab. In

the payload capacity, endurance and range ofsome cases, these groups have also recorded

the systems at their disposal.68 Similar devel-

videos showing them seizing UASs and otheropments have also been observed in the ac-

remote surveillance devices. Al-Shabaabtivities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, with indica-claimed to have used a UAS to film its attack

tions that the group has initiated experimental

against positions of United States and Kenyan

65

66

64

ACLED data.

65

Daily Maverick, “Are our numbers up? Cape Town’s 26, 27 and 28s gangs up the ante by becoming tech-savvy”, 11 September
2022,https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-09-11-are-our-numbers-up-cape-towns-26-27-and-28s-gangsup-the-ante-by-becoming-tech-savvy/. On the use of UASs by law enforcement against criminal groups in South Africa, see
https://businesstech.co.za/news/technology/597928/south-africas-police-to-start-using-drones-across-the-country/.
66

Mozambican authorities intercepted several formations of UAS used by ASWJ to gather intelligence on the positions of local
and regional forces. See Security Council, S/2022/547, para. 103.

67

Ibid.

68

Samuel (2023).

69

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 105.

70

On the use of IEDs by NSAGs in West Africa, see Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive
Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa”, 2023, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/highlight/new-report-improvised-explosive-devices-west-africa.

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23

soldiers inside the Manda Bay airfield in Kenya

prospective supporters by demonstratingin early 2020. The attack was carried out withtechnological superiority and capability.73

indirect fire and small arms and resulted in thedeaths of three US personnel and the destruction of several military aircraft and vehicles.71
In Nigeria, ISWAP has used cameras andcommercially available UASs to record avideo showing its activities across the region,
including multiple training camps as well as
military raids carried out by the group.72 In
addition to potentially helping recruitment andfundraising efforts, the use of UASs by thesegroups increases the psychological impactsof their operations and may boost their image
among adversaries as well as current and

There is limited evidence to suggest that
African NSAGs are using UASs for smuggling
activities, including to transport weapons or
drugs across borders, as has been seen inother regions.74 Furthermore, for many of theallegedly suspicious UAS sightings reported
by national, regional or multinational forcesin Africa, the exact purposes for which thesystems are used remain difficult to ascertain.
Many incidents, including ISR uses, are also
likely to be underreported if not carried out in
connection with an attack.

Figure 4. Types of Use of UAS by NSAGs in Africa, January 2018–June 2023
DIR ECT S T R IK E O P ER AT IO N

6%INDIREC T STRIKEOPERATION

5%

UNKN O W N

26%

INTELLIG ENC E, SURVEILLANC E
AND REC ONNAISSANC E (ISR)P R O P A G A ND A

4%

4 3%

NO T A PP LICABLE

16%

71

E. Lionel (2022), “Al-Shabaab drones, and the African conundrum”, Military Africa, https://www.military.africa/2022/09/alshabaab-drones-and-the-african-conundrum/; https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/attack-on-manda-bay-airfield-kenya/.
72

Dass (April 2023)

73

Dass (May 2023).

74

See, for instance, Krame et al. (2023).

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3.2 The Main Targets and Impacts of UAS Operations by
NSAGs in Africa
African NSAGs have deployed UASs primarily

used these systems in proximity to critical in-to support operations against members offrastructure and other vulnerable targets andnational defence and security forces, as

may have planned attacks against them.77 In

well as contingents from regional or multi-

Mozambique, for instance, ASWJ has usednational forces and peacekeeping opera-

UASs for surveillance prior to attacks ontions – including United Nations and African

military targets located near ports and airports

Union-mandated peacekeeping operations

in Cabo Delgado province in the north of the(see Figure 5). For instance, in August 2022,

country. In Somalia, concerns have been

ISGS reportedly used UASs to collect intel-

raised about Al-Shabaab’s potential plansligence and guide the deployment of otherto weaponize UASs to carry out attacks on

weapon systems during a complex attack on

aircraft and civil aviation infrastructure along

a military base of the Malian armed forces inSomalia’s border with Kenya, a crucial corridor

central Mali, which killed 42 soldiers and left afor humanitarian and commercial flights.78 In

further 22 injured.75 NSAGs have used UASs

early 2023, Libyan security services disman-near bases and other military premises, as wastled an Islamic State-affiliated cell that was

found to be the case in the DRC, Mali, Nigeria,

reportedly planning an operation using an

Somalia and Mozambique. In Mali, the DRC

armed UAS to target gas supply pipelines.79

and CAR, NSAGs have used UASs near the

Among the items seized was a handbook withpremises of United Nations peacekeeping op-

instructions for manufacturing toxins and bi-

erations. In 2018, for instance, JNIM allegedly

ological materials, which raised additional

used UASs to gather intelligence prior to an

concerns regarding the group’s intentions to

attack on a MINUSMA camp in Timbuktu.

use UASs as a delivery platform for biologi-

76

While it appears that African NSAGs have notsuccessfully employed UASs to coordinate
or execute attacks on critical infrastructure,
there are indications that some groups havecal agents.80 Islamic State’s activities in Libya
are considered an integral part of the group’s
overall strategic objectives in Africa, as thecountry represents an important outreach post
between Islamic State and its affiliated groups75

In a communiqué issued by the FAMA General Staff , the incident was described as “a complex and coordinated attack by anarmed group with UAS and artillery support, using explosives and booby-trapped vehicles”, see https://fr.apanews.net/news/
afrique-le-drone-civil-future-arme-des-jihadistes/; https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20220810-mali-l-attaque-jihadiste-de-tessit-a-tué-42-soldats-la-plus-meurtrière-contre-l-armée-depuis-2019. See also Security Council, S/2022/731,
para. 30.
76

Ibid. See also: Security Council, S/2018/541, para. 26

77

See the Thematic Module 5 on Protecting Vulnerable Targets from Terrorist Attacks involving Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
from the CTED-UNOCT-INTERPOL publication “The protection of critical infrastructures against terrorist attacks: Compendiumof good practices”, 2022. Vulnerable (“soft”) targets include critical infrastructure and public places. See General Assembly, A/
RES/75/291.
78

Security Council, S/2021/655, para. 22.

79

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 41.

80

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 41.

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elsewhere on the continent.81 In the past,

operations and coordinate attacks against

Islamic State in Libya declared that it regards

ISGS.85 This is possibly the first instance ofoil facilities and foreign companies in Libya as

UASs being used by an NSAG to support oper-

legitimate targets, and it has conducted armed

ations against another NSAG – but is unlikely

attacks against the Libyan National Oil Cor-to be the last, with further claims that JNIM

poration headquarters in Tripoli and oil fields

may have also attempted to weaponize UASs

in the country. Currently, Islamic State is re-for attacks against ISGS in Mali in 2023,86 in

portedly seeking to strengthen its ranks in the

addition to allegedly using UASs to monitor

Sahel and West Africa through training activ-

the Wagner Group’s operations in the region.

82

ities and logistical support, which could raise
additional concerns about the possibility ofother groups in the region adopting similar
tactics.83 Moreover, criminal groups andnetworks operating in southern Libya remainfacilitators of weapon trafficking for groups in

Moreover, African NSAGs appear to have
employed UASs to support their operations
against self-defence militias and othervigilante groups.87 For instance, in July 2022,
ISWAP used UASs for surveillance before

West Africa and the Sahel.84

an armed attack against members of the

Although African NSAGs have deployedment-backed militia in north-eastern Nigeria,

UASs primarily against State actors, someleading to the deaths of five members of thegroups may also have relied on these systems

CJTF.88 In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has report-

for planning and coordinating offensive op-

edly used UASs to gather intelligence prior toerations against other NSAGs, especially in

an attack against a base of the Hawadle clanborder areas where State presence is weakmilitia in the Shabelle region.89 In Burkina

and disputes over territorial control among

Faso, members of the vigilante group Volun-

NSAGs themselves are not uncommon. For

teers for the Defence of the Homeland (Volo-

instance, during armed clashes with ISGS inntaires pour la défense de la patrie, VDP) shot

central Mali in December 2022, JNIM (Al-Qa-

down a UAS allegedly operated by JNIM in

ida’s branch in West Africa and the Sahel)early 2023.90

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a govern-

allegedly used UASs to monitor its offensive

81

Security Council, S/2020/717, para. 26; Security Council, S/2022/547, para. 36.

82

Security Council, S/2019/50, para. 30. On Islamic State in Libya, see also https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-libya; https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X19300288.

83

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 40.

84

Security Council, S/2023/539, para. 106.

85

ACLED data.

86

Unverified reports indicate that JNIM may have conducted their first two (rudimentary) failed attempts using UAS to deliver
explosives in September 2023.

87

UNDP (2022).

88

ACLED data.

89

ACLED data. In Somalia, clan militias often fight alongside the Somali armed forces in operation against NSAGs, particularly terrorist groups. See, for instance, V. Velbab-Brown, “The problem with militias in Somalia: almost everyone wants them
despite their dangers”, Brookings Institution, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-problem-with-militias-in-somalia-almost-everyone-wants-them-despite-their-dangers/.

90

ACLED data. On VDP’s role supporting counter-terrorism efforts in Burkina Faso, see M. Demuynck, “Civilians on the Front

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26

It appears that African NSAGs have notand actors supporting them.91 However, withused UASs in operations against civilians or

the growing proliferation and use of theseresulting in civilian casualties, notwithstand-systems by a multitude of actors in Africa, as

ing potential outlier incidents. Such patterns

well as these groups’ constantly shifting oper-of use seem to reflect broader trends in theational priorities, the potential use of UASs to

offensive operations carried out by NSAGs

facilitate or execute complex attacks targetingin armed conflict settings, which have been

the civilian population cannot be dismissed.

primarily directed against state security forces

Figure 5. Targets of UASs Operations by NSAGs in Africa, January 2018–June
2023
PRIVATE PROPERTYNO N- S T A T E ARMED GRO U P S

10%3%MILITARY AND/OR SEC URITY PERSONNE L(MULTILATERAL AND REG IONAL OPERATIONS)

23%

CRITICALI NF R A S T R UC TU R E

3%MILITARY AND/OR SEC URITYPERSONNEL (STATE)U NK NO W N

15%

33%

SOFT TARG ETS

3%N O T AP P LICABLE

10%

3.3 Types of UAS Used by NSAGs in Africa and Potential
Future Trends
In most of the incidents observed in Africa,

the most commonly used systems by African

the types and models of UAS used by NSAGs

NSAGs. In some countries (e.g., Nigeria, CAR

are either unclear or unreported. Available

and the DRC) the use of systems manufac-

evidence, primarily from propaganda materials

tured by DJI, a Chinese company, has been

produced by the groups themselves, suggests

reported.92

that commercially available quadcopters are

Lines of Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland in Burkina Faso”, ICCT, 2021, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Civilians-on-the-Front-Lines-of-Counter-Terrorism-1.pdf.
91

Vision of Humanity (2023).

92

Dass (May 2023). ISWAP reported on social media that it had captured a “Phantom” (likely a DJI Phantom commercial UAS)T H E U S E O F U N C R E W E D A E R I A L SYS T E M S B Y N O N - S TAT E A R M E D G R O U P S

27Cameras and sensors appear to be the mostchemical or biological weapons and theircommon type of payloads added to a UAS,

means of delivery, particularly to NSAGs. To

if not already integrated in the system. Whilethe extent that UASs constitute such a means

there is limited evidence to date to suggest thatof delivery, the proliferation of these systems

African NSAGs have successfully modified

should be monitored closely by States in con-these

nection with the implementation of the resolu-

systemstoincludeconventional

munitions or improvised explosives for use in
offensive strike operations, there are increasing indications that some groups are attempting to develop such capabilities (see Section
3.1). Moreover, many of the groups that are
known to have deployed UASs in Africa arealso prolific IED users, often relying on them tocarry out large-scale attacks on both defence
and security personnel and civilians. The
possibility of UASs being modified to include
spraying or other dispersal mechanisms
capable of serving as a delivery platform forchemical, biological, radiological and nuclear(CBRN) agents in limited-scale attacks cannot
be dismissed either (see Section 3.1 and Box
3). United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) requires States to enforce
effective measures to establish domestic

tion.93
Another possible trend that warrants monitoring is the potential acquisition, development
and use of loitering munitions – also referred
to as “kamikaze” UASs – by African NSAGs,
especially small or improvised systems.94
These systems are increasingly being usedin conflict theatres globally, including in Africa
as seen more recently in Sudan.95 Moreover,rapid developments in UAS technology, suchas advances in speed, endurance, payload
capacity and sensor technology, could expand
their possible uses by NSAGs, as well as
lower the threshold for these groups to accessdifferent types of UASs.96 As such, potential
threats associated with such developments
should be followed closely.97

controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,

during an attack on Nigerian forces in September 2020.
93

See United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). See also R. Dass, “Militant and Drones: A Trend That is Hereto Stay”, RUSI, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/militants-and-drones-trendhere-stay; Global Counterterrorism Forum, Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices for Countering Terrorist Use of Unmanned
Aerial Systems, 2019, https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework Documents/2019/Berlin Memorandum
EN.pdf?ver=2020-01-13-143548-187.

94

In particular, “miniature” loitering munitions, such as the Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost, are a specific type of UASs to watch
given their small size and weight. See Dass (2022). Similarly, with the rapid spread of FPV UASs and the expertise in convertingthem into improvised loitering munitions, this is another trend to be monitored.
95
Sudan is reportedly an important transit point of foreign terrorist fighters within Africa, with North African fighters in particularusing the country as a hub for arrival and onward transfer to southern Libya, Mali and other countries in West Africa. See Security
Council, S/2023/549, para. 28. On the use of improvised “kamikaze” UASs in the conflict in Sudan in 2023 and risks of increased
proliferation of FPV technology since its widespread use in 2022 in the conflict in Ukraine, see D. Hambling (2023), “Kamikaze
Drone Videos from Sudan Conflict Signal Rapid Proliferation (Updated)”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/09/15/kamikaze-drone-videos-from-sudan-conflict-signal-rapid-proliferation/?sh=459d995b2926.
96

For an overview of areas of technological developments related to UASs and their implications for international security more
broadly, see Grand-Clément and Bajon (2023). See also Dass (2022).

97

See Global Counterterrorism Forum (2019), Good Practice 1, and CTED, UNOCT-UNCCT, and UNIDIR (2022), “Technical
Guidelines to Facilitate the Implementation of Security Council 2370 (2017) and Related International Standards and Good
Practices on Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons, Submodule II, section 3.8., https://unidir.org/publication/technical-guidelines-to-facilitate-the-implementation-of-security-council-resolution-2370-2017-and-related-international-standards-and-good-practices-on-preventing-terrorists-from-acquiring-weapons/.

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4. Enabling Factors and Salient Trends
Influencing NSAG Use of UASs in Africa
This section examines some of the enabling

acquisition, development and deployment offactors and salient trends that are influenc-

UASs, as well as the role of the broader social

ing the ways in which NSAGs currently deploy

and strategic environment in which these

UASs across Africa or may deploy them ingroups operate in enabling the diffusion of thethe future. It highlights the prominent role

technology to and among NSAGs, especiallyplayed by network affiliations in facilitating thein the context of counter-terrorism and law en-transfer of knowledge and expertise in NSAGs’

forcement operations.

4.1 The Role of Network Affiliations in Influencing NSAGs’
Acquisition and Use of UASs in Africa
For many NSAGs operating UASs in Africa,

In recent years, African States have confiscat-

it appears that network affiliations have had

ed manuals providing instructions on how to

an important influence on their decision

use these systems to launch attacks.101 Suchand capacity to acquire and deploy thesedevelopments mirror similar trends in the

Many of the groups known tosharing of expertise in the manufacturing andhave used UASs in Africa have ties to groups

deployment of IEDs. This is notably seen withknown for using them in other regions, espe-

groups operating in Mozambique and the DRC,

cially in the Middle East. This is particularly thewhich benefited from training and guidancecase for groups affiliated to Islamic State andrelated to IEDs from Islamic State operatives

Al-Qaida, which have seen a rapid expansion(see Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 on ASWJ andon the continent in recent years.

ADF respectively). For instance, it has beensystems.

98

99

Islamic State affiliates in Africa seem to havebenefited from the transfer of technology
and training on the use of UASs – including
through online and social media channels.100

suggested that ISWAP’s use of UASs could
indicate knowledge transfers between thegroup and Islamic State.102 While there is noevidence of the direct supply of material from
Islamic State to ISWAP, the former reportedly98

On the role of networks in influencing the adoption of UAS technology by NSAGs in general, see K. Chávez and O. Swed, “TheEmpirical Determinants of Violent Non-State Actor Drone Adoption”, Armed Forces & Society, 2023, https://journals.sagepub.
com/doi/full/10.1177/0095327X231164570.

99

While these affiliated groups have contributed to advancing the strategic goals of Islamic State and Al-Qaida in Africa, they
have also retained an important degree of autonomy, especially in the context of local agendas. See Security Council, S/2023/549;
CTED, “Civil Society Perspectives: ISIL in Africa – Key Trends and Developments”, 2022, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
ctc/content/civil-society-perspectives-isil-africa-key-trends-and-developments.
100

Security Council, S/2023/539, para. 105. On use of the Internet by terrorist groups in Africa, see https://www.thecommonwealthilibrary.org/index.php/comsec/catalog/book/1068.

101

Security Council, S/2022/547, para. 103; Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 99.

102

J. Warner et al., “The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront”, 2021.

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29

transferred money on an irregular basis to theMoreover, since late 2021, the ADF haslatter, including to procure materiel.

Com-

allegedly held several meetings with represen-munications between the groups, including

tatives of ASWJ to discuss operational strategy

over social media channels, are also likely toand tactics, which could include use of UASs.

have facilitated the diffusion of expertise on

As there are reports that Islamic State has

the use of UASs. For instance, ISWAP report-

recently established an “Industry Committee”

edly shared a photo of a crashed UAS usedwithin its structures to explore new avenues toby the Cameroonian armed forces in 2014

advance weapon technology (e.g., IEDs andwith Islamic State and in return received in-increased payloads for UASs), it is possible

structions on how to assemble and use thethat such knowledge transfers could increase

UAS.

In the DRC, the links between the ADF

in the near future,107 especially with strength-

and Islamic State cells and operatives based

ened coordination among different affiliates

in South Africa may have also facilitated theon the continent (see Box 3). Beyond transfers

diffusion of UASs to the group.

In 2017, aof knowledge and expertise through estab-suspected operative arrested by South African

lished networks, Islamic State’s prominentauthorities was carrying at least two commer-use of UASs in the Middle East is also likely

cially available UASs and a camera, which

to have influenced the decision of its affiliates

were reportedly intended for delivery to theand other like-minded groups in Africa to adopt

ADF.

these systems in their own operations.108

104

105

103

106

103

DPO, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) & Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Weapons and Ammunition Dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin, United Nations, 2022​, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/weapons-and-ammunition-dynamics-lake-chad-basin.
104

International Crisis Group (2020), “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/islamic-state-franchises-africa-lessons-lake-chad.

105

Security Council, S/2023/431, para. 14 and annex 3.

106

Ibid.

107

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 103; Security Council, S/2023/568, para. 15.

108

Security Council, S/2019/50, para. 103.

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30Box 3. The Expansion of Islamic State Affiliates in the Sahel and Potential
UAS-Related Threats
In the Liptako–Gourma region bordering Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in the central Sahel, ISGS has
been gradually expanding its presence and influence over recent years amidst armed confrontations
with the Malian defence and security forces – sometimes supported by the Wagner Group – as well as
rival NSAGs, including JNIM.109 As reported in July 2023 by the United Nations Panel of Experts on
Mali, ISGS almost doubled the territory it controls in Mali in less than a year.110 Although the situationon the ground remains volatile, the group is said to control important areas in central Mali,111 and has
also managed to revamp its supply routes from Nigeria through Niger and Libya, which represents animportant route for the smuggling of weapons.112
In the light of these developments, concerns have been raised that a potential greater collaboration
between ISGS and ISWAP could help create the conditions for the establishment of a new “territorial caliphate” in the region.113 Although ISGS’s use of UASs appears to have been limited to isolated
incidents, the group has notably relied on these systems to collect intelligence and guide the deployment of other weapon systems during complex attacks against Malian armed forces (see Section 3.2).114
In this context, an enhanced collaboration between ISGS and ISWAP – the latter a more prolific UAS
user – coupled with the control of larger portions of territory and trafficking routes,115 could potentiallyhelp create the conditions for the development and deployment of more advanced UAS capabilities bythese groups.

Likewise, it is possible that Al-Qaida affiliates

systems that have the capacity to deliver larger

in Africa – such as JNIM and Al-Shabaab –explosive payloads,116 which could have an

have benefited from the sharing of knowledge

impact on the activities of its affiliates acrossand expertise on the use of UASs. Al Qaida

the globe. In particular, Al-Shabaab’s connec-

is reportedly actively attempting to develop

tions with AQAP in Yemen have compounded

109

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 30.

110

Security Council, S/2023/578, para. 63.

111

As of September 2023.

112

Security Council, S/2023/578, para. 63.

113

Security Council, S/2023, 549, para. 36.

114

In a communiqué issued by the General Staff of the Malian Armed Forces, the incident was described as “a complex and coordinated attack by an armed group with UAS and artillery support, using explosives and booby-trapped vehicles”. https://fr.apanews.net/news/afrique-le-drone-civil-future-arme-des-jihadistes/; https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20220810-malil-attaque-jihadiste-de-tessit-a-tué-42-soldats-la-plus-meurtrière-contre-l-armée-depuis-2019. See also Security Council,
S/2022/731, para. 30.
115
Across the globe, the control of territory can be an important factor enabling NSAGs to develop and deploy advanced UAS
capabilities. Primarily, it provides security for the development of such capabilities. Beyond that, holding territory enables accessto trafficking routes that can facilitate the acquisition of different types of UAS or their components. See Veilleux-Lepage and Archambault (2022) and Dass (2022).
116

Security Council, S/2022/547, para. 102. As the report highlights, Al-Qaida has attempted to develop systems with anincreased capacity for the delivery of explosive payloads. According to information provided to the Monitoring Team, the firsttime an Al-Qaida affiliate used a UAS was in 2012. See Security Council, S/2017/573, para. 97, footnote 87.

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31

concerns about the group’s intentions toMoreover, foreign fighters may have contrib-

weaponize commercially available UASs foruted to bolstering the operational capacity

carrying out strike operations in Somalia.

of terrorist groups in Africa, including by

AQAP – which conducted several attacks instrengthening coordination between different

southern Yemen using weaponized UASs inaffiliates of Islamic State and Al-Qaida

the first half of 2023

– has allegedly hosted

operating on the continent and beyond.121 As

fighters from Al-Shabaab for training on thethe African branches of these groups continueuse of heavy weapons, with additional inves-to grow and achieve greater tactical and oper-

tigations examining possible attempts by theational successes, the region’s attractivenessgroup to supply anti-tank guided missiles to Al-

as a destination for foreign fighters is likely

Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab is also part of a weap-

to increase even more.122 This refers both toon-trafficking network in Yemen and has trans-

fighters from African States who travelled

ported IED components, ammunition and arms

to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq to fightfrom there to Somalia via boats, according toalongside Islamic State and are now returning

information obtained by the United Nations

to Africa, as well as to potential new recruits

Panel of Experts on Somalia.

While there

from Africa and beyond who may be attracted

has been no evidence of UASs being trans-by the group’s propaganda and appeal.123

ported via this network, or of AQAP providing

Such developments aggravate concerns thatspecific UAS-related training to Al-Shabaab,returning fighters may enhance the capabili-

the recent incidents, along with reports of Al-

ties of groups operating in Africa, particularly

Shabaab’s attempts at weaponizing UASs forin West Africa and the Sahel.124 Movements ofuse in offensive operations, could increase theforeign fighters are also recognized as a factor

likelihood of such occurrences in the foresee-that increases the probability of cross-bor-able future.

der flows of weapons and ammunition, while

118

117

119

120

117

Security Council, S/2023/549, para. 104; R. Dass, “Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula Drone Attacks Signal Strategic Shift”,
Lawfare, 20 August 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-s-drone-attacks-indicate-a-strategic-shift;

118

Security Council, S/2022/754, para. 82 and 83.

119

Security Council, S/2023/95, para. 58 and para. 102.

120

Dass (August 2023).

121

In the context of this research, a foreign fighter is understood as “an individual who leaves his or her country of origin or habitualresidence to join a non-State armed group in an armed conflict abroad and who is primarily motivated by ideology, religion, and/or kinship”. See S. Krähenmann, Foreign Fighters under International Law, Academy Briefing No. 7, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014. On threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters in the Sahel-Sahara region of
Africa, see F. Edu-Afful., F. Kofi Aubyn and A. Banunle, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Sahel-Sahara Region of Africa: Recommendations for Stemming a Long-Lasting Threat”, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, 2022, https://www.
peaceau.org/uploads/policy-paper-ftfs200522-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-the-sahel-sahara-rigion-of-africa.pdf.

122

In several communiqués over recent years, the African Union Peace and Security Council has expressed a “deep concern
over the worsening scourge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, including the influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), as
well as the growing linkages between terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organized crime, and the attendant social,economic and humanitarian impact”. See for instance PSC/MIN/COMM.1040(2021); PSC/PR/COMM (DCCCXII) (2020). See
also Edu-Afful et al. (2022).
123
On the difficulties of defining “foreign fighters” in the African context, where ethnic groups often traverse state borders, see
A. Oloyo, U. Yenwong-Fai, A. Ngari and W. Elsand, “How Foreign are Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Africa?”, ISS, 2018, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-foreign-are-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-africa.
124

Security Council, S/2023/539, para. 105. On risks posed by returning foreign fighters in relation to the manufacture, use andweaponization of UASs, see also Global Counterterrorism Forum (2019), Good Practice 1.

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32returning fighters often bring with them battlefield experience and expertise in the manufacturing and deployment of different weapon
systems.125 Although there is no evidence
to date of UASs being successfully transferred by foreign fighters travelling to Africa,
there are indications that this may have been
attempted, as demonstrated by a case thatcame to court in the United Kingdom in 2023
(see Box 4). The potential for the dissemination of knowledge and skills related to the development of UASs by these fighters, particularly Islamic State’s expertise in weaponizing
commercially available systems, is recognized

as an important threat to the entire region.126
Given the fluid nature of many of the NSAGs
operating in Africa and the blurred lines
between them, especially within conflictand post-conflict settings, the transfer ofknowledge and technical expertise relating to
the development UAS capabilities could also
occur among different types of groups.127
Many terrorist groups, including Islamic State
and Al-Qaida affiliates, are known to have established links with organized criminal networks,
and collaborations between these groups are
not uncommon, especially at the local level.128

Box 4. Student in the United Kingdom used a 3D printer to build a UAS that heintended to take to Islamic State affiliates in Africa
In the United Kingdom, a doctoral student in mechanical engineering at the University of Birmingham was convicted in 2023 for “preparing acts of terrorism”, after investigations revealed that he had
designed a “single use” UAS to deliver chemical or explosive payloads and attempted to build it using a
3D printer.129 According to the prosecutor of the case, evidence from encrypted online chats and otherdigital materials revealed that the student allegedly supported Islamic State and intended to transport
the UAS for use by Islamic State affiliates in Africa, travelling to the region via Turkey.130 The counter-terrorism police of the West Midlands region of England, where the case was filed, noted that the student
was also exploring options for travelling with the UAS without raising suspicions and being stoppedby authorities, and had set up a fake company so that he could pretend to be travelling on business.131

125

United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 (2014); Security Council, S/2018/1177; Security Council, S/2018/705, para.
92, Security Council, S/2021/839. See also S. Woldemichael, “Africa needs a continental strategy on foreign terrorist fighters”,
ISS, 2019, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-needs-a-continental-strategy-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters.

126

Security Council, S/2018/705, para. 52. See also Global Counterterrorism Forum (2019).

127

Indeed, many States in Africa have turned into “virtual laboratories” for the complex and diverse forms of interaction between
organized criminal and terrorist groups. See L. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism, 2014, p. 116; and
L. Pinson, “Addressing the Linkages between Illicit Arms, Organized Crime and Armed Conflict”, UNIDIR, 2022, https://www.
unidir.org/publication/addressing-linkages-betweenillicit-arms-organized-crime-and-armed-conflict.
128

Security Council, S/2023/76, para. 12 and Security Council, S/2023/823, para. 53.

129

https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/man-found-guilty-of-terror-charge-after-building-drone-to-give-to-isis/;
www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-coventry-warwickshire-66947311.

https://

130 Ibid. For images of the system built by the student, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nyKMIR-O1xs; https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/sep/28/birmingham-phd-student-mohamad-al-bared-guilty-using-3d-printer-to-buildkamikaze-drone?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Other.
131

Ibid.

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33In Nigeria, for instance, there are consistentorganized criminal groups due to the allure ofreports of individuals engaged in banditry andeconomic gain.132 This could potentially con-criminal activities operating alongside groups

tribute to the further diffusion of UAS technolo-such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, as well as ofgy between these different groups.

fighters from these groups joining bandit and4.2 Use of UASs in Counter-Terrorism Operations and SelfReinforcing Proliferation Dynamics
As UASs proliferate across Africa, they areunarmed UASs for counter-terrorism and law

being used by more and more of the actors

enforcement operations135 against them.

with which African NSAGs interact – whether
allies or adversaries. This factor is further
enabling the diffusion of the technology to
NSAGs in the region.133 African NSAGs,
including some of the earliest groups to adopt
UASs on the continent, seem to deploy thesesystems primarily in areas where States – both
African and non-African134 – deploy armed andIn Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been consistently
targeted by US-led or supported counter-terrorism operations, which have relied on UASs
and crewed aircraft for strikes against thegroup.136 Similarly, groups affiliated to IslamicState and Al-Qaida that are operating in thecentral Sahel, such as ISGS and JNIM, were
often targeted by military UASs by the former

132

On banditry in Nigeria, see T. Osasona, “The Question of Definition: Armed Banditry in Nigeria’s North-West in the Context
of International Humanitarian Law”, IRRC, 2023, https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/the-question-of-definition-armed-banditry-in-nigeria-923; and M. Samuel, “Boko Haram Teams Up with Bandits in Nigeria”, ISS, 2021, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/boko-haram-teams-up-with-bandits-in-nigeria.
133

On the different determinants of UAS adoption by NSAGs, including the role of network-based determinants, see Chávez
and Swed (2023).
134

In a resolution adopted in August 2019, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights expressed deep concerns

at the increased use of foreign operated UASs to address instability in parts of Africa, including the deployment of armed
and reconnaissance UASs in Somalia and the Sahel region. It urged governments of States Parties to the Africa Charter “toensure that the expansion of the use of foreign armed forces, in particular armed drones in countering terrorism, is subject torigorous regulation and control, and that all measures are put in place to prevent civilian casualties resulting from such use”,
see ACHPR/Res.422(EXT.OS/XXVI), 21 August 2019, https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/422-resolution-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law-violations-resulting-forei.
135

Globally, the use of UASs by law enforcement agencies has expanded significantly in recent years. While these systems
were initially primarily employed for the monitoring of criminal and other suspicious activities, including as part of border management and early-warning activities, they are increasingly being used for offensive operations and embedded with non-lethal
weapons. For instance, a South African UAS manufacturer, Desert Wolf, has developed a UAS with high-capacity paint-ballbarrels capable of firing solid pellets, paint balls or pepper spray. In Nigeria, the police have also been using UASs to support theiractivities against both criminal and terrorist groups. See, for instance, OHCHR, “Position Paper of the Special Rapporteur on theProtection and Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism on the Use of Armed Dronesin Counter-Terrorism Context”, 2023, para. 66, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/terrorism/sr/activities/20230103-Position-Paper-Use-Armed-Drones.pdf

136

On United States’ airstrikes and UAS operations in Somalia, see https://airwars.org/conflict/us-forces-in-somalia/;
https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/; United States
African Command (AFRICOM), https://www.africom.mil/search?query=somalia. See also Watson, Gupta, Goxho andOliveira Martins, “Why Al-Shabaab’s Attack on US Drone Base Shouldn’t be Ignored”, Open Democracy, 22 October 2019;and United States Congressional Research Service, Al-Shabaab (2023), version 9; https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/controversy-over-us-strikes-somalia

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34French-led Operation Barkhane.137 They arelaw enforcement operations has led to serious

also increasingly being targeted by African

concerns over disproportionate civilian casu-

States that have acquired these systems inalties and lack of transparency and account-recent years, including Burkina Faso, Mali, andability.141 In addition, their deployment by a

Niger.138 In Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin,

greater number of States across Africa could

both Boko Haram and ISWAP have been

increase the likelihood of these systems being

targeted in military UAS operations carriedacquired and used by the very groups theyout primarily by the Nigerian armed forces, asare being used against.142 Indeed, the broader

well as by other members of the MNJTF and,strategic environments in which NSAGs

formerly, Operation Barkhane.

operate can influence their decisions to use

139

At the same time, the growth and expansion ofterrorist groups across the continent seems to
be one of the main factors driving African Statesto acquire armed and unarmed UAS technolo-

UASs in their own operations, as these groups
learn and adapt their tactics not only throughengagement with allies, but also “through observation and emulation of enemies”.143

gy for use in offensive operations. This is the

In addition, there have been incidents in whichcase both for States that have been grappling

UASs used by both African and non-Africanwith terrorist-related threats for many years,

States, as well as by other armed security

such as the Burkina Faso, DRC, Mali, Mozam-

actors engaged in the fight against NSAGs,bique, and Niger, as well as for States in whichhave been shot down or seized by these

these groups have been expanding in recent

groups upon crashing or landing. There

years, such as West African coastal States.140

have also been alleged incidents of NSAGs

The increased reliance of States on armed

capturing these systems following attacks on

UASs in the context of counter-terrorism andnational and international security forces in137

On Operation Barkhane, see https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane.

138

In August 2021, France used a military-grade UAS to kill Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, the head of ISGS in northern Mali.
See https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210916-the-assassinated-abou-walid-al-sahrawi-france-s-major-enemy-inthe-sahel.
139

On the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), see https://mnjtffmm.org/about/. Nigeria has acquired UASs for bothcounter-terrorism and law enforcement operations. See https://humanglemedia.com/armed-drones-making-a-strong-entrance-in-nigerias-anti-terror-campaign/.
140

Phillips (2024); Moody (2023); Melly (2022); Kurpershoek et al. (2021). https://humanglemedia.com/niger-receives-6-turkish-armed-drones-to-boost-war-against-terror-groups/;
https://www.military.africa/2023/09/mozambique-seeks-combat-drones-for-cabo-delgado-counter-insurgency/;
https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/02/21/kinshasa-calls-on-armed-chinese-drones-and-foreign-legion-vet-to-take-on-m23-rebels,109915644-eve;
https://www.
military.africa/2023/11/nigerian-air-force-to-acquire-indigenous-tsaigumi-drone/. On allegations of a potential delivery of
Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 UAS to Somalia without notifications to the Panel, see Security Council, S/2021/849, paras 126, 127.

141

Ibid. See also African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), “The African Commission expresses deepshock about the death of more than 80 civilians in Northern Kaduna, Nigeria from a drone strike”, 6 December 2023, https://
achpr.au.int/en/news/press-releases/2023-12-09/african-commission-expresses-deep-shock-death; M. Le Cam (2023),“Malian army drones strike Kidal, northern rebel stronghold”, Le Monde Afrique, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/11/09/malian-army-drones-strike-kidal-northern-rebel-stronghold_6240473_124.html; T. Ndiaga (2022),“Burkina Faso army admits killing civilians in counter-terrorist strike”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-army-admits-killing-civilians-counter-terrorist-strike-2022-08-03/; see also see ACHPR/Res.422 (EXT.OS/XXVI).
142

Dass (May 2023); and Moody (2023).

143

Chávez and Swed (2023), p. 9.
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35

Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Somalia.144

While there is limited available evidence

In September 2020, for instance, ISWAP

on whether the UASs or their components

claimed to have ambushed a convoy from thehave been repurposed for use following

Nigerian armed forces in Borno state, killingsuch incidents, this might have occurred

10 soldiers and seizing weapons and ammu-

on some occasions. In CAR, it is possible

nition, including a UAS.

In early 2023, ASWJ

that the members of the Coalition of Patriots

reportedly captured an unarmed UAS used forfor Change (CPC) attempted to use a UAS

surveillance among other military equipment

captured from a neutralized soldier of thefollowing an attack against the Mozambi-

FACA. According to video footage obtained by

can armed forces, according to a statement

the United Nations Panel of Experts on CAR,

published in an Islamic State newspaper which

CPC fighters were using a UAS (a “DJI Mavic

included a photo of the UAS.

2”) allegedly recovered from the backpack of a

145

146

neutralized FACA soldier following confrontations in May 2022.147

CPC combatants unpacking and showing DJI MAVIC II UAV from a military bag, video obtained from a confidential source,
Midterm report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on CAR, February 2023 (Security Council, S/2023/87, Annex 14).

144

ACLED data. Violent captures represent an important way through which different NSAGs acquire weapons in Africa. See,for instance, Security Council, S/2023/76, para. 13; DPO, ODA and LCBC (2022); Conflict Armament Research (2022).
145

ACLED data.

146

https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-9-15-january-2023.

147

Security Council, S/2022/527, para. 36 and Security Council, S/2023/87, para. 37 and Annex 14. According to a report of
the Panel of Experts on CAR, no import of UAS had ever been notified to or exempted by the CAR Sanctions Committee, andthe FACA denied the possession of the UAS. The Panel considered that, while armed groups may not have purchased the UAS,
with all necessary accessories, they could, within four months between the Nzako attack and the flyovers, have acquired thesebatteries as well as the necessary expertise to operate the UAS. The fact that no flyovers were reported afterwards may imply that
the UASs were already dysfunctional.

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36A UAS suspected to be of the same model was

and it began using UASs for ISR shortly after-

later spotted by MINUSCA near the mission

wards (see Section 3.2).149 As more States

premises in September 2022 (see Box 2).148

acquire and deploy these systems acrossIn the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP allegedly

Africa, and if proper safeguards are not put

received video instructions from Islamic Statein place, the incidence of seizures or violent

on how to assemble and deploy an unarmed

captures could increase significantly in the

UAS that it had captured from the Cameroo-

coming years.

nian military during an attack in October 2014,

5. Conclusion
Over recent years, the use of uncrewed aerialof fighters. Moreover, given the fluid naturesystems by non-State armed groups in Africa

of many NSAGs operating in Africa and thehas increased in both frequency and geo-

frequent interactions between them, suchgraphical scope. A growing number of groups

transfers of knowledge and expertise could

have access to UASs – particularly commer-

also occur among different types of groups.

cially available models – and deploy thesesystems to support their operations on thecontinent. African NSAGs have used UASs
primarily for ISR missions in conflict-affected areas in West, East and Central Africa.
Although it appears that none of the groups
deploying these systems has successfully
weaponized them to conduct offensive strike
operations, some groups have effectively used
UASs to plan and facilitate attacks directedagainst members of national and international

The strategic environment in which African
NSAGs operate is another factor which could
influence the adoption of UASs by thesegroups. Many of the NSAGs deploying UASs
in Africa, including the first groups to have reportedly used the technology on the continent,
have been consistently targeted by both
non-African and African States with armed
UASs, especially in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The increasing affordabili-

defence and security forces.

ty and accessibility of both civilian and military

For African NSAGs, particularly terrorist

use by a wide range of actors in Africa, isgroups, network affiliations seem to havelikely to contribute to the further diffusion ofplayed an important role in contributing to thethese systems to and among African NSAGs.

transfer of knowledge and expertise on the

Moreover, technological developments andacquisition and deployment of UASs. Suchglobal trends in the use of UASs could similarlytransfers appear to be primarily facilitatedhave an impact on their acquisition and de-through online and social media channels,

ployment by NSAGs in Africa.

UAS technology, coupled with its growing

as well as through additional guidance andtraining enabled by the cross-border flows

148

Security Council, S/2023/87, para. 37.

149

International Crisis Group, “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad”, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/islamic-state-franchises-africa-lessons-lake-chad.

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37

Overall, the research for this report high-former combatants and former abductees oflights the importance of strengthening efforts

these groups. Enhanced knowledge of theseto map and monitor trends in NSAGs’ acqui-

trends and continuous monitoring of evolving

sition and use of UASs in Africa. Crucially,

patterns of use are essential to inform the de-increased efforts are needed to identify andvelopment of appropriate strategies, policies

investigate the different strategies utilized

and countermeasures at both domestic andby African NSAGs to acquire UASs and theirregional levels. As UAS technology becomescomponents. Within the African context, somemore advanced and affordable and the skiesof the most useful insights on acquisition

above Africa become increasingly congested,patterns have been obtained through inter-the challenges associated with the use ofviews conducted by United Nations Panels of

UASs by NSAGs will only grow more acute,Experts and specialized research entities withand should be monitored closely.

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38Gedo Region, Somalia, 2022. Credit: © IOM/TransLieu/Zubeyr.

@unidir/unidir/un_disarmresearch/unidirgeneva/unidir

Palais des Nations 1211 Geneva, Switzerland© UNIDIR, 2024
W W W. U N I D I R . O R G

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39