THE ＧＬＯＢＡＬＩＺＡＴＩＯＮ ＆ ＧＯVＥＲＮＡＮＣＥ ＰＲＯＪＥCＴ， ＨＯＫＫＡＩＤＯ ＵＮＩＶＥＲＳＩＴＹＷＯＲＫＩＮＧ ＰＡＰＥＲ ＳＥＲＩＥＳThe 2005 Regime
Toward Regime Transition in Japan anda new Agenda for Progressive Governance
Ⅰ－１４

Hiroki Sumizawa, Japan Women’s University＊

Paper for the Symposium, East Asia-Europe-USA Progressive Scholars’ Forum2003 , 11-15 October, 2003.
＊

None of these papers should be cited without the author’s permission.

The 2005 Regime
Toward Regime Transition in Japan anda new Agenda for Progressive Governanceby
Hiroki SUMIZAWA
Japan Women’s University Dep. Household Economics

Paper prepared forEast Asia — Europe — the USA
Progressive Scholars’ Forum, 2003
Sapporo Sessions 1. at Hokkaido University
How has Globalization Changed Social Democracy?

October 14 . 2003

2-8-1 Mejirodai,Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo, 112-8681 JAPAN
Tel:03-5981-3513
Fax:03-5981-3517
E-mail:SUMIZAWA@fc.jwu.ac.jp

Contents
1. Introduction
2. Completion of the 1955 Regime and negative integration of Japanese Social
Democracy
3. Reorganization of the 1955 Regime and renewal of Japanese Social Democracyin the 1980s
4. Globalization and demise of the 1955 Regime: three alternative politics
5. Conception of the 2005 Regime and its opponent
6. To associate with Modern Social Democracy and Progressive Governance
1. Introduction
I have two arguments taken over from the following topics in this paper.
First, this thesis succeeds the theme “Globalization and PoliticalInnovation” in Tokyo Forum in April 2002（Takagi,2003）. It focuses on the result of
the globally discussion, which argued in the concept of “modernization of Social
Democracy” or “Progressive Governance”(Giddens 1998,2000, 2002, Kelly 1999,
Meyer 1998, 2001, Cupers 1998, 2001, Dittke 1998, Progressive Politics 2003, Faux
2001,Sumizawa 2002)

in the forum, in context with Japanese real politics.

Second, this paper follows Yagi’s point in his thesis, “Social Democracy and
Liberalism in the 20th century Japan,” which was presented in second session,“Reflection on Social Democracyin the 20th Century and its Future” in this forum.

But, it also shows the different view from Yagi’s argument.
Yagi’s paper attempts to analyze Japanese socialism

throughout thewhole 20th century, which has never been examined by Japanese scholars. He
explores the 20th Japanese Social Democracy in relation with socialism andliberalism. From “the Declaration of Social Democracy”, which was generated fromthe link between Socialism and “ziyu minken undo”(the Movement for Civil Rights
and Freedom in the 1880s)

caused by Shusui KOTOKU, Toshihiko SAKAI andIsoo ABE in 1901 to the resignation of Murayama Coalition Government of Socialist
Party of Japan(SPJ) and Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) in 1996, Socialism isanalyzed in a consistent way in his paper.
However, this paper tries to make an argument against two strategy
models of future social democracy in Japanthat Yagi suggested, which are social

corporative strategy and civil society Strategy. Although these models had someappeal, they were already appeared and doomed to failure from 1985 to 1996 so thatthey were not for the strategy of 21st century. The reason why they had turned down2

is that Social Democracy did not hold enough power to make them come true.
Further more, it was the time that “the 1955 Regime” was beginning to dismantle,
but not that new one was constructed. Civil society strategy itself even applies tothe plot of the long-term new political culture of citizen, and relates with the idea of
public and social-family life governance.
There are three essential points in this paper.
First, the aim ofpolitical reform in the 1990s war to

positions between government and opposition

form contrary

in regard to basic policies( forexample conservative-market party and welfare state party) and to establish a“democracy with change of government”(the change of government as aim) . But it
was not appropriate. A true problem of political reform should be toestablish a

new political regime ( the change of regime as aim). This paper examines thecharacteristic of the old 1955 Regime, the analysis of the process of its collapse andthe process of reorganization of political parties in “the lost decade” in order tosupport the view of “change of regime”.
Second, “the 2005 Regime” as a new visional regime could beinstitutionalized both by a new catch-all party, the Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ)and the league of several powerful governors, who emphasize the devolution of theJapanese centralized state under the 1955 regime.
regime”1

It is a “cooperative conflicts

between DPJ on the national side and the league of reformconscious

governors on the regional side. It is not discussed now, weather the House ofCouncilors should be reformed to the House of Regional Representative

under thenew regime.
Democratic Party consolidated other parties with different policies overthree periods. The only common position of member of the DPJ is to challenge the1955 regime. Thus it is self-evident, that there are conflicts over the policies onnational security,

deregulation

andwelfare state in it.

Democratic Party

should break through with suggesting a new regime and cooperating with thegovernor league.
Third, it is contingent in many points about the institutions of “the 2005
Regime,” in regard to future of society, the status of Japan in Regional East Asiaand in the world etc.

“The 1955 Regime” is defined not only through predominanceof economic bureaucracy

and interest groups of industry and LDP organization,

about the concept of “cooperative conflicts” see ; Amartya Sen, Gender andCooperative Conflicts, in: Tinker,I (ed.) Persistent Inequality: Women and World
Development , Oxford University Press, 1990, 123-149,

1

3

but also through a national consensus

about “ pacifism” and “belief on economic

growth” as compensation of damaged nationalism.
“The 2005 Regime” will be
modernized civil society.

achieved supposing the matured andUnder this condition, the new regime should create theeconomic and social structure, in which the increasing unequality between regionsin Japan under the open economy
and without infringing on ideas

will be regulated with citizen’s

participationof equality and social justice. Moreover, a regime

is supposed to propose the policies on corporation governance, civil autonomy,
decentralization of power, together-living with environment, the formation of the
global governance etc. These policies are in common with the themesof themodern social democracy or progressive governance. It is the key point toaccomplish “the 2005 Regime” that matches its basic ideas and principles with thevalues und policies of those progressive political parties.
This paper will explain the completion of “the 1955 regime” and thenegative integration of social democracy (in the 1960s and 70s) in the second
chapter. In the third chapter, it will deal with the reconstruction of “the 1955
Regime” and theunsuccessful reception of European social democracy (the late1970s to 1996). In the forth chapter, it will demonstrate the end of the cold war anddismantling of “The 1955 Regime” caused by globalization and burst of bubble
economy , and in fifth chapter, show political strategies to form the new Japanese
2005 regime.
2. Completion of the 1955 Regime and the negative integration of Japanese Social
Democracy(1) The definition of “the 1955 Regime”
In 1955, the era of postwar economic reconstruction ended, and the party
system became stabilized. The conservative parties united into one political power:
the

LDP.

The relative small socialist parties joined also politically: the SPJ.

Therefore, the 1955 system is generally defined as the LDP predominant two party
system(Nihon Seizi Gakkai 1996).
The following shows its characteristics.
(a)There are basic confrontation between the political right around the LDP and thepolitical left around the SPJ and Communists.
The former supports for amendment of the Constitution and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty. The latter advocates protection of the Constitution (especially the
Article 9) and against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In short, the key factor of this4

battle (caused mainly by LDP and SPJ) is ideological differences.
(b)This is a one-party predominant model without the change of political power.
The ratio of the LDP member of Diet to the SPJ member is continuously two
to one. However, since the late 1980s, the 1955 system has been argued as postwar
political and economical system inclusive of centralistic

bureaucracy on the whole.

The postwar system yielded the mutual triangle relations of politics, bureaucracy
and industry, and in fact, the reorganization of only the political system have notresolved the “Japan problems” in later 80s and early 90s. Truly the political reform
since 1993 leads to the emergency of populism after a lapse of ten years (Otake 2003,
Omae 2003). Therefore I define the Japanese postwar political and economicalsystem as “the 1955 Regime” but not as “the 1955 party system” in this paper, andexamines it.
(2) concept of regime in political science
In political science, a regime is defines as(1)

an framework of the international politics such as the regimeof currency (Muramatu 2001),(2) theory of political institutions in comparative politics or democracy theory withsystem transition such as dictatorship, authoritarian andliberal democratic

regimes (Przeworski 2000 ),(3) a classification of liberal democracy

such as pluralism or neo-corporatism

theory, in particular to shape an institutional model in policy-making andpolicy-decision in relation with bureaucratic and industrial organizations(Yamaguchi 1989) .
This thesis will demonstrate “the 2005 Regime” based on the range of definition (3).
However it is also important to analyze a change of regime : politics of regime
transition in liberal democracy, in which the framework of political action andpower is restructured drastically, by showing the Italian case(Magara 1998). This
thesis will

examine Japanese modern politics from the view of the regime

transition(3)two presupposition to the politics of regime transition in Japan
It is necessity of two presuppositions to discuss about the change of regime
in Japan.
First, in the twentieth century, in general, the states intervened economics,
thus liberalism was the social liberalism that differed from the ninetieth century. In
particular, the postwar regime was based on the welfare state or “Keynesian welfare
states” . Ralf Dahrendorf said, “twentieth century was the century of social

5democracy” and the Japanese 1955 regime also took on the aspect of social
democracy in this meaning.
Second, many political scientists pay attention to the varietyof capitalism

regime such as the German Rhein capitalism or the Japanese Lane model（Ronald
Dore 2000）. Esping-Andersen classified regimes of the three welfare capitalism,based on de-commodification and de-familization（ Esping-Andersen,
1999）.Although the Japanese model of the 1955 regime cannot provoke

preciseindicators, it were consist of the specific combination of liberal democratic regime
and the postwar capitalism in Japan.
Tsuyoshi SASAKI, a prominent political scientist who was a member of theCommittee for the Promotion of Political Reform in 1992 and promoted the reformof election system in 1993/94, demonstrates the 1955 regime as the below（Sasaki ,1995 ）.
(a)The twentieth century-liberalism (a redistribution policy for the middle classand a stable democracy)(b)From corporatism and planed economy in the first 5 years after the war by the
Economical Stabilization Board and Reconstruction Finance Cash Office to thedevelopment of market economy by the Dodge line. Labor and economic problems
were regulated through the market mechanism and free enterprise system underthe 1955 regime(c) But the rest of the 1940 system continued under the 1955 regime. That is:wartime economy with National General Mobilization Law, an enterprise union,
controlled bank and finance system, centralistic direct tax system etc,)(d)The by Diet uncontrolled finance resource(fiscal investment and loan troughsaving in post bank) and expansion of bureaucratic control over industry and credit
institute.
(4) Three aspects of social democracy in the 1955 regime
The 1955 regime is the social-liberal regime like many western industrial
countries. But, it was far from Swedish model of

welfare states and not affected by

the English Labor Party or the German Social Democracy. However, social
democracy is “a hidden theme” of the 1955 regime.
(a) integration of liberal socialists: a preceding figure, Hiromi Arisawa(1896-1988)
Now, it will be examined by discussing on the position of a famous
Rono-school Marxist Arisawa’s in the postwar social democracy. He was one of thecentral figures of founding of SPJ.
He organized “the priority production system” that concentrated the6resource on coal and steel in the stage of economic reconstruction. At this time, it
was a plan economy with strong etatism.

However, Japanese market economy

became to stand on its own foot after the boom by Korean War. Now the cost
reduction and improvement of productivity was very important. Arisawa became
then the director of Japan Productivity Center established in 1955. SPJ took acritical attitude to this productivity movement, because it achieved profit forcapitalist, SPJ claimed, and thus it was anti-worker policy(Nakagita 2000).
Arisawa and some members of his school worked after that on the position of
growth of national economy in cooperation with government office. They were
integrated in the 1955 regime. The another groups of Rono-school became moreradical and promoted a class conflict theory against thecapitalism in Japan. The

latter was majority of SPJ and they were negative integrated in the 1955 regime,
becausethey were not able to show the real alternative policies.

(b)functional equivalence with European social democracy
The completed 1955 regime is social democratic without labor

influence

nor social democrats. Its features are follows.
●

Subsidy

and regional tax allocation to local administration increased

continuously in the

postwar government budgets.

The redistribution through tax

was held under the“construction and engineering work state” rather than thewelfare state(Zinno 1998. p.73). Above all, the bureaucracy connected with the
Liberal Democratic Party as a distribution system of state financeto the regional

public investment after high economic growth in the 1960s.
●

Big Enterprises established the corporation welfare system such as corporation

pensionsin cooperation of capital and work in order to advance productivity underagreements with unions.
●

In the beginning 1970s, the progressive big city governments and several urban

prefecture governors, in which a coalition of SPJ and CPJ
strengthened the welfare system

won majority votes,

such as free medical treatment for aged on thelevel of local government. The LDP government and the Ministry of Welfare tried towin back

votes in the urban area

through the promotion of social insurance andwelfare services.
(c)two poles of anti-reformism and anti-communism
The 1955 regime was established during the Cold War, and also Socialists andSocial Democrats inside and outside of SPJ ware strongly affected by Soviet’s andChina’s Communisms in East Asia. The postwar progressive power, SPJ and SOHYO(General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) criticized the western social democracy7because it was Reformism and opportunism (Shinkawa

1999).

On the one hand, the left socialists of Rono-school used to havebeen

theoretically very influential in SPJ and refused the European social democracy(Society for Socialism by Ikurou Sakisaka).

On the other hand, the right socialists left SPJ in 1960 and established Democratic
Socialist

Party (DSP).

Eijiro KAWAI (1891~1944) was prewar social-liberalist and scholar of social
policy .

He participated in the funeral of E. Bernstein in Berlin undreceived the social reform theory of Fabian Society. He was decisively anti-Marxism
and anti-Fascism. But his pupils in postwar understood European social democracy
primary as anti-communism(Society for democratic socialism by Masamiti Inoki
and Yoshihiko Seki).

DSP and DOMEI(Japan Confederation of Labor), stayed

relatively weak in the 1955 regime.
The postwar progressive power of SPJ and SOHYO would have had a chance
to become the dominant party if they would have tried to reform the 1955 regime
toward democratic welfare state through constitutional policy for system transition,
which Hermann Heller in Germany of the Weimar term tried to theorize under theconcept of social constitutional state. However, SPJ gave priority only the protectionof the Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
It is important that both SPJ/SOHYO and DSP/DOMEI

were finallyintegrated in the 1955 regime as a protest party or right of center party andsupported it complementarily.
3. Reorganization of the 1955 Regime and renewal of Japanese Social Democracy inthe 1980s.
(1) Social Democrats, who tried to break through the 1955 regime
I refer to three social democrats , who sought strategy to change the regime:
Saburo EDA, a politician, Keiichi MATSUSHITA, a political scientist, and Shinzou
SHIMIZU, former general secretary of Japan Federation of Steel Worker’s Unionand the author of “Japanese Social Democracy.”(a) Saburo Eda(1907-1977) was a politician committed the prewar farmer
movement. In 1962, he, as a general secretary of JSP ,declared “the Vision ofSocialism” based on the structure reform theory that follows the peaceful reform
strategy of the Italian Communist Party, and aimed to reform SPJ, which fit
economical growth into the mass social age. However, he lost the conflict with the8left wing of SPJ, which made “the road to Socialism in Japan” (1964) in the party.
Eda’s structure reform strategy stemmed from the argument of theEuro-communism, but not from the contemporary western social democracy. As Yagi
points out, Eda advocated the middle road of the coalition of SDJ, DSP and Komei
Party, and in 1978 organized Social-Democratic

Union

KANN conceived a new urban politics for civil society.

, in which young

Naoto“Modern Theory” (Gendai

no Riron) that a famous social democrats Jinbei ANDO edited, started to take up
western social democracy seriously late in the 1970s2. He supported
structure reform strategy

and spread new

Eda’s

trends of western social democracy

throughout Japan(Visions of French Socialist under President Mitterrand andnew social movements with an ecological, gender and alternative agenda ) .
(b)Keiichi MATSUSHITA(1929-)and strategy of local government
Matsushita, a political scientist, emerged in the 1950s with the conceptionof mass and urban society and led a political science as empowerment of citizen overmore than a half century. Meanwhile he planned the civil minimum policy incontrast to national minimum policy, theory and praxis for autonomous local
government and administrative reforms for decentralization of power.
Late in the 1960s, distortions in the result of intensive economic growthand industrialization became clear and candidates recommended by ‘post war
progressive power ‘of SPJ and CPJ were elected to governors and mayors

in large

cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. If SPJ had switched to reform party for urban
middle class and a wide range of labor, the 1955 regime could have changed thegovernment. However, it was not SPJ, but LDP in power, to recognize that thepolitic of the 1955 regime should be modified for urban middle class.
Although such a policy transformation was achieved without change ofgovernment , as Matsushita points out, it prepare to change the 1955 regime in along run. Truly it was April in 2000 that the comprehensive decentralization law
became effective in process of dismantling of the 1955 regime.
(c) Shinzo SHIMIZU(1913-1997) and over-taken of the postwar progressive power
Shimizu theorized the ‘postwar progressive power’, SPJ and SOHYO bloc,
in short the opposition under the 1955 regime as the ‘Japanese model of social
democracy’. He was one of the few intellectuals, who

was active in labor union

Zinbe ANDO(1927-1998) is one of influential social democratic journalists and good
coordinator of various political groups. He edited a monthly critical journal “gendai noriron” from 1965 to 1989, which a treasure house of theories of socialism andsocial democracy in Japan.

2

9

movement and refused the avant-garde role of socialist groups. He emphasized thatJapanese social democracy shouldlabor movement.

be based on the network ofsocial activists inWhile Shimizu agreed with Eda’s reformative line, he criticized

the absence of the movement theory in it. Moreover, He disagreed with dogmaticsocialism on the one hand and a ritual SOHYO’s spring labor offensive on the otherhand.
He thought, that western social democracy came out from the tradition andculture of European labor movement, and Japan also needed to have her own
reformative idea. In the 1980s, he advocated the concept of “social left” and valued
the construction of alternative culture and local movements for quality of life3.
(2) The 1980s: Offensive of Neo-conservatism against

Social democratic welfare

state(a)Reorganization of the 1955 regime and possibility of corporatism
Many leaders of SDJ- and SOHYO bloc were not fallen into the narrowtrade unionism, but

kept a democratic ethos of ‘postwar progressive power’, eventhough they had a lot of defects such as organization egoism and predomination ofideology.

The once effective “Spring Labor Offensive” did no longer work in the

1980s and they confronted with the global offensive of neo-conservatism,
before welfare state was established in Japan.
Under this new condition there

were a lot of important social problems forworking Japanese: price gap between home and abroad, long working hours,
planningof stable pension system, land speculation etc.

When Prime Minister Nakasone decided to privatize public corporationsuch as JNR(railway)and NTT(telephone ), the union was standing in turning point:
from conflict strategy to cooperation model. Nakasone himself

tried toincludelabor unions in his voter. Social corporatism system might have been createdinprocess of reorganization of the 1955 regime. However, it never came true because
Japanese labor union was not strong enough to come out of “ corporatism withoutlabor,” and furthermore SPJ-SOHYO bloc took over the legacy of the postwar
progressive power both in better and‘social corporatism strategy’ could

worse. So Yagi’s

be realistic, if the whole

Two following books are very useful in order to inform the history and politicalstrategy of ‘postwar progressive power’ in Shimizu’s view und activity: Sinzou Shimizu,
sengo-kakushin no han-hikage, memories and dialogs, Tokyo:Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sya,
1995, Ikuo Takagi(ed.), selected works of Sinzou Shimiz, 1948-1996, Tokyo:Nihon
Keizai Hyoron-sya,1999,310social democratic power would be unified; the acceptance of western social
democracy in process of party reform of SDJ andtheunification of labor unions.

(b)Reform of SPJ and campaign to gathering allsocial democratic power
The left wing of SPJ and socialistic intellectual recognizedpolitic andbasic value of the western social democracy about 1980 and published a “newdeclaration of JSP “in 1986. The defects and stagnation of Soviet’s and China’s
communism became clear. Also early in the 1980s, the welfare state regime ofwestern social democracy that was fallen globally in defensive by Thatcherism andReagan’s new conservatism, was recognized by Japanese Socialists

20 years toolate as the achievement of successful labor movements. They thought, the former
Communism-Capitalism struggle in the Cold War switched to the new confrontation
between conservatism and social democracy among advanced industrial countries.
Moreover the social democracy is now understood not as traditional labor movement,
but
a new social democracy dealt with themes such as ecology, gender ,governance of civil society, citizen’s autonomy etc.
The SPJ-SOHYO bloc intended to revive the spread of the postwar
progressive power and democratic legacy even though it was 20 years behind. In
1989, Takako DOI, head of JSP, who opposed to introduction of consumer tax, won
overwhelmingly the election ob House of Councilors. Trade Unions in Japan except
communists had already united in a national centre, RENGO (Japanese Trade
Union Confederation) whose first president was Akira YAMAGISHI. He was one ofinfluence person in SOHYO and social democrats.
Although two-party system for western conservatism and social
democracy was pursued by Yamagishi andUnion leaders, who

advocated ”gathering all social democratic power”, it was not Yagi’s “Social
Corporatism Strategy,” but a mixed form of this and people’s democratic legacy of
postwar progressive power, which had many common ideas with “Civil Society
Strategy”.
Such democratic agenda was consistently applied to “A New Declaration”
in 1986, “Political Strategy for Citizen’ Governance” edited by SOHYO center in1992(Yamaguchi 1992) , and “The Challenge to 21st Century: New Strategy of
RENGO” in 1999. Kimihiro MASAMURA who was one of prominent social
economists in labor movement and social democratic power andpromoted toreform the social economic system of the 1955 regime. But he stood also in the
tradition of postwar democracy and considered that associations and civil

11networking are important for reforms.
Nevertheless, social democratic power could not work as powerful politicalactor in the 1980s and 90s because there were another urgent problems, which
Japan had to tackle on the account of globalization and the end of the Cold War.
4.Globalization and Demise of the 1955 Regime(a)globalization and post Cold War constellation
The several years during the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the end of the Cold
War in 1989/1991 became globally to the turning point of the 20th Century System
and in Japan to collapse stage of the 1955 regime. The 20th century system waschanged through the globalization of economy, information- and communication
technology

and finance system.

globalization during both of

The U.S. played a dominant role in accelerating

neo-conservative Reagan’s era and new democrat

Clinton’s era. American globalization advanced to make not only information andfinancing sectors, but also market oriented social system universal. Thus,
globalization and Americanization are the both sides of coin.
European nation states could adjust to the post Cold War globalization due
to rigionalization-strategy through European Union (EU). Japan was the main
target of the American strategy of promoting globalization because Japan was
following to the U.S. economical great power and also a rival to U.S. It was the
problem that Japan had no preparation for the change brought by globalization andend of the Cold War. But, global change and the collapse of “bubble” economy
attacked Japan simultaneously. The weak dollar policy of the 1985 Plaza agreement
and the domestic easy money brought “bubble” economy. Therefore it became clearthat Japan had to transform the 1955 regime. However, the collapsed 1955 regime
had further considerable supporter such as the state bureaucracy , many regulated
andfrom globalization and competition protected sectors and the interest groups

in and out of LDP. It was uneasy to suit the global changing economical dynamic. In
this point, the problems that Japan had to confront were no longer to choose theconservatism or the social democratic welfare state. The two social democratic
strategies in 1980s reflected no more the new global reality. The real challenge tothe 1955 regime cam from other political groups with following three original ideas
and policy proposals.
(b)Ichiro OZAWA and vision of a‘ normal state’12First, Ichiro OZAWA proposed

a concept of “ Normal State” 4.

Ozawa was one of the leading members in the JDP’s

Ironically,

greatest faction, which

supported not only the 1955 regime but also played a roll as king-maker. As he was
general manager of LDP, a sort of co-determination center of party and government,
the Golf War brokeout. He had recognized through his own experience in

diplomatic negotiation with the U.S, that Japanese government had neither idea
und strategy for the post Cold War world nor leadership, to decide unpopular
policies such as Japanese new international contribution including PKO. Therefore,
Japan needed the statesman’s leadership and the political system led by the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet. That was his vision to a ‘normal state’ and the 1955
regime and its consensus system were the main barrier. Thus he proposed to
introduce the single-member constituency system in Diet election.
(c)Kenichi OHMAE and consumer revolution
Second, the sudden strong yen (dollar-yen exchange rate from 235 yen in1985 to 80 yen in a few years) brought the price gaps between home and abroad in
the regulated sector. Subsequently, Kenichi OHMAE, who was the president of
McKinsey Japan, suggested to abolish the regulations to protect producer’s interest
and carry out a sort of “ consumer revolution” against the 1955 regime oriented forthe producer profits5.

OHMAE emphasized that economic system has developed

into the boarder-less economy in respect of currency, information, enterprises andconsumption since the plaza agreement in 1985. On the other hand, he warned of
the government that the maintain of unproductive sectors through public finance
led Japan into more serious crisis. Therefore He proposed to create several different
economical bloc. Not a national economy, but several small

regional economy could

help Japan to solve the globalization problem and to produce employment inregional economy , although the level of income and living condition were different.
Ichiro Ozawa, nihon kaizou keikaku,( Reorganization Plan of Japan), Tokyo :kodan-sya. 1993, In spite of his anti-democratic mentality, this book is today( ten years
later) unchanged interesting for us, because Ozawa is one of a few statsmans who did
not changed his policies in the last dacade.
5 Keniti OHMAE, Revolution of the Living Citizen: The End of the Etatism, Tokyo:
Japan Broadcasting Publication. 1991) The term of ‘living citizen’ have two4

meanings: a active citizen and consumer. It is not Ohmae’s original concept, but a
popular word in context with critic to “ a major economic power Japan” or “corporationsociety “.

Like OZAWA, Ohmae is one advocator of few economists who point out

the problems consistently in the last decade.

13In contrast to other prominent market economy fundamentalist who
claimed the adjustment of Japanese economic system to American system of market
society but changed their proposals of

economic policy opportunistic, OHMAE kept

his vision and proposals till today.
(d)Hosokawa’s Vision to Devolution6
Third, this paper pays an attention to political reform and devolution
strategy proposed by Morihiro HOSOKAWA who started the Japan New Party andbecame the Prime Minister of 7 parties-coalition against LDP in 1993. From theview of present ten years after, the real confrontation strategy against the 1955
regime is this way to decentralization of the bureaucratic state.
It is important to point out that HOSOKAWA isa symbolical figure ofwide range of different organizations, which aim at the reconstruction of the oldregime. One of the core coordinator was the Committee for the Promotion of
Political Reforms started in April of 1991, and the Committee was composed by veryvarious member: members of Diet (LDP, SPJ, DSP, KOMEITO),leaders of manager
organizations and trade unions, political scientist with various colors andjournalists.
The preparation for the reform seemed to be complete and the structuralreform of political and socio-economic system could be realized in several years.
However, the reality became quite different development. Japan became a failure
model in 1990s from the success model of the postwar era till to 1980s. Thus 1990s
is called now ‘Ten Lost Years’.
5.

Why?

conception of the 2005 Regime and its opponent(1) Change in “Ten Lost Years”
Now, this paper explains the change during these ten years.
First, SPJ, the biggest oppositional party of in the 1955 regime, fell down.
SPJ in government

had to decide in favor of Japanese Self-Defense Force andJapan-U.S. Security Pact. The Strategy of RENGO, “Gathering all social democratic
power”, assumed that SPJ would accept to change her security policy. In the end,
JSP could not adjust to this change and split.
Second, the labor union’s power declined. RENGO could not keep the

The following two books are now historical documents: Hosokawa, Morihiro(ed.),Nihon Sintou: sekinin aru henkaku (Japan New Party,), Touyou Keizai, 1993,
Minkan Seizi Rincho (ed.), Nihon Henkaku no bizyon.(Grand Vision of Political Reform),
Kodansya, 1993

614

political power which trade Union had under the 1955 regimes.

Its members

decreased and Rengo could no longer handle to stop the increase of unemployment.
The union activity

shifted from the national center to industrial unions orenterprise unions. While RENGO failed to gather the social democratic powercompletely, he attempted to establish more wide-ranging democratic and liberal
power. Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ) formed at first in 1996

through theunification of right wing of SPJ and reformative groups of LDP. DPJ grew infollowing years through joining other small parties and at last jointed withOZAWA’s Liberal Party in October 2003. DPJ becomes now to reform and all catchparty.
Third, the largest faction of LDP, the former Tanaka-Takeshita faction,
which has supported the 1955 regime since the 1970s, is about to dissolve under the
Koizumi government in 2003. The purposes for political reform that majority ofJapanese people wanted in the end of 1980s and in the beginning of 1990s, wereneither to establish a new global security policy nor living-citizen’s revolution nor
devolution of nation state, but attacking the money politic of LDP leaders combining
bureaucracy. It took more than ten years to disband this faction’s

force apparently.

The battle against this largest faction is certainly the reason why the Koizumi
government has obtained a high approval rating. But, faction politics is just only apart of the 1955 regime. This is one of relevant reasons why the ninety’s reform wasstagnating.
Forth, the Japanese city banks dominating the world ten big banks in 1990
almost disappeared from the global financial business. The former Ministry of
Finance in the 1955 regime has been losing its great authority through thereorganization of administration. Now, Japanese economics lost credibility of both
Ministry of Finance and financial system as a global playmaker. Even so, economic
rehabilitation

by deregulation or structural reform advocated by neo-classiker

economists is not likely to be achieved. Japan is on the verge of deflationary spiral.
(2) American Global Strategy
The American global strategy in post Cold War seemed to be corresponding
to the result of Japanese economic stagnation in the 1990s.

Therefore, media

understands that Japan have lost the second war against the U.S. in the ninety’s“Ten lost years”. The 1955 regime was constructed along fixating the Cold War
structure of East Asia after armistice of Korean War. The 1955 regime stemmed
from the real confrontation between two totally different regimes: the easternsocialism regime and western capitalism regime, even though some Japanese15

unique systems such as rest of wartime economy and cooperation between LDP,
Bureaucracy and Industry are added. Thus It is no wonder its dissolution andchange is strongly influenced through American global strategy.
(3) Alienation factors to regime transition
The old 1955 regime has tried to survive with curtailing and changing theformer forms of such as party systems and the bureaucratic organizations, eventhough it begins to be dismantled. For example the left and traditional wings of SPJ
remains in a certain regionswith changing its function and LDP’s factions politics

will continue. Even if new DPJ could win the

majority of House of Representatives,

old power could keep on in House of Councilors in following years. Even though themodified single-member constituency system is introduced, Communists and Komei
Party are surviving. While Italian Christian Democrats are dismantled, Japanese
LDP is staying in power without any future visions. This structure applies tovarious fields such as the bureaucracy, industrial sections, and interest groups.
Each organization attempts to survive und that is a rational choice for organization.
As a result, the transition into the new regime will be more complicated.
Therefore on the one hand a public space or open arenas are lacked inJapan, where different organizations or person participate on debate and try tobring a common decision. On the other hand, the labeling of politics seems to be now
relevant. The trend to populism is to see.
(4) conception of the 2005 Regime
It is a time to discuss on the regime transition.

In order to escape fromstagnation of ‘Ten Lost Years’ it is necessary to recognize that any partial regime
reforms or change of political power are not enough to solve problems. To achieve
the regime change successfully, it is necessary to create institutional framework andgather the wide range of supporters. The following table shows the regime
comparison to verify the necessity of the regime change.
While the 1955 regime took over the rest of prewar systems, it successfully
established the postwar system distinguished fromimperialistic Japanese regime

between Russo-Japanese War1904/5 and 1945. The prewar bureaucracy contributed
to the success of the “catch up” economical growth strategies even though there
were many defects in terms of democracy.
The 2005 regime also took over the 1955 regime in many points. Although
Japanese style stakeholder model for lifetime employment and protecting
employee’s profit should transform to keep on, it cannot adjust to the Anglo-Saxon’s
share holder model. The Japanese type management should extend the concept of16

‘stakeholder’ to civil society and market system.
While promotion of privatization and decentralization of national
administrative organizations developed in last years,

newinstitutions for

citizen’s autonomy and local government have been not established. However, newtype governors have been trying to modify such decentralization plan of ministries.
Thus, central ministries have to clarify their position to promote thedecentralization in respect of administration reform.
Table 1 Japanese 1955 regime and 2005 regime

historical age

The 1955 regime

The 2005 regime

the East-West Cold War

mega-competition and multilateraladjustment
between global-regions

security

Bilateral Alliance(regional)collective security(Japan-U.S. Security Pact)
national consensus

Peace and economical growth

The quality of life and cooperation
between regions

state

bureaucratic nation state

decentralized nation state andregional unionpolitical party

conservative Vs. progressive

systemCollaboration between all catchparty and Governor’s Union

economic spacenational economy

global economy + local economy

economyheavy and chemical Industries

information and service business+ mass-consumption

and knowledge capitalism

form of national

collaboration of Politics =collaboration of government = civil

governance

Bureaucracy = Industry

Society = enterprises

corporate

Japanese style stakeholder

universal stakeholder modelsocial insurance and nationalsocial insurance and regional

minimum

welfare governancenational center,

local union

industrial trade union

associated trade union

governancesocial Security
trade union

Currently, the left of the 1955 regime interferes with forming the2005 regime as “resistance power,” and it may be very difficult to get rid of the17resistance power completely in respect of the 1990’s experiences. It is not likely that
expanded DPJ generally take a stand on social democracy, but rather DPJ should
gather various powers and colors

for reform. But, if four or five powerful groups

composed of DPJ follow the policies and principles of modern social democracy andprogressive governance, it should be easier to shift to the 2005 regime .DPJ
announced to support for the policies of decreasing the unemployed rather than thepromise of ambiguous economical growth in “Manifest” of DPJ in September 17th in2003.
6. To associate with Modern Social Democracy and Progressive Governance
There are following merits of the connection with the global progressive
powers.
First, these social and liberal progressive powers lasting more than 100
years through the 20th century have matured theoretically and politically.
Second, social democracy and liberals

have been regularly ingovernment and known of the possibility and limit of political power andadministration. Additionally, its party and government have a long tradition tocooperate globally and thus they are capable tohave the view beyond the national

interests.
Third, the progressive powers have recognized necessity

fortheir own

radical reform and new vision to the 21st century. They have proposedalready tothe planund discussed world wide. They reflect the political history in last 20

years in context withrise of neo-conservatism,

return of social democracy topolitical power by the left-of-middle road, and come backconservatism and rightof the present national

populist . The network of modern social democracy andprogressive governance is one of the results of them.
Forth,

Social Democratic Parties in EU countries and others andAmerican Democratic Party participate on global cooperation and dialog. They aim
at sharing common value and discussing on the actual problems together. In orderto establish the 2005 regime in Japan, it is very important to understand themodern history universally and share the basic value and democratic principles
globally.
But, there are also defects of it.
First, a plentiful history may be restricted by the 20th ideologies such associalism and liberalism, or institutions of a welfare state in expansion age.
Therefore innovation of the 20th century system is pursuit, but also is disturbed by

18

it.
Second, both of modern social democracy and progressive governance powerhas promoted globalization and market economy. Simultaneously, market principles
has been prior in trying to achieve modernization of the welfare state and social
security, as seeing to EU economics and currency union. In addition, globalization
itself has made the regional gap or class gap enlarge.
Third, political innovation for globalization has been stagnating. The 20th
century democracy has legitimated legal rights and justified national ruling, andyielded consensus and national identities. Therefore, a nation state which promotes
globalization but does not care for citizens has caused insecure feeling to people andgiven the power to the extreme right and conservative populism. For example, theconservative populism defeated the Social Democratic Party in Netherlands andDenmark which macroeconomic performance is excellent. Obviously, globalization
has brought nationalism, which is one of central theme in international conferenceof progressive governance in July 2003 in London.
Even if Japanese progressive groups collaborate with global progressive
powers, it is not sure whether Japan can cooperate with the U.S. and othercountries. Moreover the cooperation to promote the regional East Asia with Japan,
Korea and China stay only in first step.

However, the 2005 regime is not broughtby the Japanese isolated politics for only domestic affairs, but can be achieved bypolitical global innovation as the 1955 regime in past.

19

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