Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 52 (2018) 15– 21

ArticleSaussure’s Legacy

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Oct. 31, 2017)

Abstract
Ferdinand de Saussure divides langage into langue and parole. Then he makes langue the subject
matter of linguistics. On the other hand, Noam Chomsky claims that linguistics should deal with
I-language, contrasting it with E-language. It seems that langue and I-language are very different concepts. But if we closely examine them, it turns out that they have a lot of things in common although
there are a few differences between them.
Key Words: langue, parole, I-language, E-language

source of manifestations observed in linguistic activi-

Introduction

ties (langage). This means that linguistic expressions,

Chomsky thinks that his I-language as the subject

whether they are spoken or written, are realized frommatter of linguistics is different from Saussure’s

langue. As we shall see later, Chomsky’s I-language

langue. He criticizes Saussure’s social concept ofhas the same characteristic as Saussure’s langue inlangue, questioning what “social” means. But his ideathat it generates E-language.

of I-language has some similarities to Saussure’s
notion of langue. It may be said that Chomsky uncon-

Next, Saussure asks what langue is and answers
this question:sciously inherits Saussure’s idea of langue as a legacy.
What, then, is linguistic structure [langue]? It is

1. Saussure’s langue

not, in our opinion, simply the same thing as language

Saussure states that linguistic structure (langue)[langage]. Linguistic structure is only one part of lan-is the subject matter of linguistics after pointing out

guage, even though it is an essential part. […] At the

how difficult it is to define the object of linguistic

same time, it is also a body of necessary conventions

study:[…] to enable members of society to use their language faculty.

(Saussure 1983: 9-10)

The linguist must take the study of linguistic
structure [langue] as his primary concern, and relate
all other manifestations of language [langage] to it.

According to Saussure, langue is not langage (linguistic activities) but an essential part of it. From

(Saussure 1983: 9)

another point of view, langue is a body of necessary
conventions so that members of society can employ

Here, “linguistic structure” is an English translation of langue. Saussure thinks that langue is thelanguage. Also for Chomsky, I-language makes it possible that humans can generate E-language.

* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 15 ─Naoki ARAKI

Chomsky (1986: 31) claims the same idea as thisThen, where is langue located? Saussure explains:

by saying that I-language is like a code, rules of chessIt [langue] is […] a grammatical system existing
potentially in every brain,(Saussure 1983: 13)

or Articles of the Constitution. A code generates messages, rules of chess do moves of chess pieces, andArticles of the Constitution do a variety of laws. But

Here, Saussure’s langue overlaps Chomsky’s I-language because both linguists locate their object ofwhat generates them is not affected at all by what is
generated.

study (langue and I-language) in the human brain. For

On the other hand, however, Saussure insists that

Chomsky, I-language is not what humans can change

there is an interdependence between langue andbecause it is determined by parameter-settings of Uni-

parole:versal Grammar, which is a biological endowment. In
These two objects [langue and parole] of study are

the same way, langue, for Saussure, is not what we candoubtless closely linked and each presupposes thecreate or modify:

other. A language [langue] is necessary in order that[…] the individual, who by himself is powerlessspeech [parole] should be intelligible and produce allits effects. But speech [parole] also is necessary ineither to create it [langue] or to modify it.
(Saussure 1983: 14)

order that a language [langue] may be established.
Historically speech [parole] always takes precedence

For Chomsky, I-language exists as a perfect form

[over language [langue]]. How would we ever come toin each individual, but for Saussure, langue exists per-associate an idea with a verbal sound pattern, if we did

fectly in the brains of a group of individuals:

not first of all grasp this association in an act of speech[parole]? Furthermore, it is by listening to others that

It [langue] is a fund accumulated by the members

we learn our native language [langue]. A languageof the community through the practice of speech, a[langue] accumulates in our brain only as the result ofgrammatical system existing potentially in every brain,

countless experiences. Finally, it is speech [parole]or more exactly in the brains of a group of individuals;

which causes a language [langue] to evolve. The

for the language is never complete in any single indi-

impressions received from listening to others modify

vidual, but exists perfectly only in the collectivity.

our own linguistic habits. Thus there is an interdepen-(Saussure 1983: 13)dence between the language [langue] itself and speech[parole]. The former is at the same time the instru-

Moreover, Saussure insists that phonation is irrel-ment and the product of the latter. But none of thisevant to langue itself just as performance of a sym-compromises the absolute nature of the distinction

phony to a symphony itself:

between the two.

What Saussure insists above can be translated inTake, for example, the production of sounds necessary to speech. The vocal organs are as external to(Saussure 1983: 19)

Chomsky’s terminology as follows:

the language system [langue] as the electrical apparatus which is used to tap out the Morse code is external

I-language and E-language are doubtless closely

to that code. Phonation, that is to say the execution oflinked and each presupposes the other. I-language issound patterns, in no way affects the system itself. In

necessary in order that E-language should be intelli-this respect one may compare a language [langue] togible and produce all its effects. But E-language also is

a symphony. The symphony has a reality of its own,

necessary in order that I-language may be established.

which is independent of the way in which it is per-Historically, E-language always takes precedence [overformed. The mistakes which musicians may make inI-language]. How would we ever come to associate an

performance in no way compromise that reality.

idea with a verbal sound pattern, if we did not first of(Saussure 1983: 18)

all grasp this association in an act of E-language? Fur-

─ 16 ─

Saussure’s Legacy

thermore, it is by listening to others that we learn our

No society, in fact, knows or has ever known lan-native language [I-language]. I-language accumulates

guage other than as a product inherited from preced-in our brain only as the result of countless experi-

ing generations, and one to be accepted as such. That

ences. Finally, it is E-language which causes I-language

is why the question of the origin of speech is not so

to evolve. The impressions received from listening toimportant as it is generally assumed to be. The ques-

others modify our own linguistic habits. Thus there istion is not even worth asking; (Saussure 1959: 71-72)

an interdependence between I-language itself andE-language. The former is at the same time the instru-

For Saussure the origin of language does not exist

ment and the product of the latter. But none of thisand this means that language has nothing to do withcompromises the absolute nature of the distinction

beginning and end:

between the two.
If language, “which was not spoken the day
According to Chomsky, we understand E-lan-before,” does not exist, we have only one conclusion

guage by I-language but also I-language is acquired by

that—“the origin of language” does not exist. A pas-

E-language. We are born with a list of ideas and thensage from a student’s lecture notebook, which we havefind which sound pattern is associated with an idea,

seen at the outset—“The question of the origin of

only listening to E-language. The parameters of Uni-

language does not have the importance we give. The

versal Grammar (UG), Chomsky insists, are set onequestion does not even exist. (Saussure 1997:

way or another by listening to E-language of others. So

11-12)”—means the same thing as this. The statement

it is thought that I-language changes because thethat “the origin of language” does not exist means thatparameters of UG are reset by listening to changes oflanguage has nothing to do with “birth” and “death,”

E-language. In short, I-language generates E-languagethat is to say, it has nothing to do with “beginning” andand in turn E-language sets the parameters of UG and“end.” (My translation)(Tagai 2014: 376-377)

determines I-language. But I-language and E-language
Saussure insists that language cannot be delim-

are quite distinct from each other.
Also Saussure insists that a linguistic sign does
not refer to a thing in the world but consists of two

ited in time. Saussure explains his idea using Latin andFrench:elements, a sound pattern (signifiant) and a concept
It follows that on no given day could one have(signifié):drawn up the death certificate of the Latin language,
For some people a language, reduced to its essen-and similarly on no day could one have registered thetials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding

birth of the French language. The people of France

to a list of things. […] This conception is open to ahave never woken up and said bonjour in French,

number of objections. […], it leads one to assume that

where they went to bed the previous evening saying

the link between a name and a thing is something‘good night’ in Latin.

(Saussure 2006: 100)

quite unproblematic, which is far from being the case.
[…] A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing andAfter all, Saussure thinks that the origin of lan-a name, but between a concept (signifié) and a soundguage is an infinite regress because it depends on

pattern (signifiant).

when language came into being:(Saussure 1983: 65-66)

Looking at language and wondering at what pre-Here Saussure denies what is called nomenclatur-cise moment such a thing ‘started’ is as intelligent asism.
Also, for Saussure langue is something perfectlooking at the mountain stream and believing that byfrom the outset. Saussure does not think that the ori-

following it upstream you will reach the exact location

gin of language is worth discussing:of its spring. Countless things will show that at any
moment the STREAM exists when one says that it─ 17 ─Naoki ARAKI

comes into being,

I-language refers to “an individual phenomenon, a(Saussure 2006: 63)

system represented in the mind/brain of a particular
So, for Saussure, language does not have begin-individual.” E-language is “some kind of social phenomenon, a shared property of a community.”

ning. It exists from the outset as it is now.

(Chomsky 1988: 36-37)

2. Chomsky’s I-language
Chomsky points out that what has been studied

Also, Chomsky refers to I-language as “whatby structural and descriptive linguistics, is understoodmakes sound and meaning relate to one another in a

independently of the properties of the mind/brain andspecific way”:

names it externalized language (E-language):
But it seems that when we speak of a person as
Let us refer to such technical concepts as instances

knowing a language, we do not mean that he or sheof “externalized language” (E-language), in the sense

knows an infinite set of sentences, or a set of acts orthat the construct is understood independently of the

behaviors; rather, what we mean is that the person

properties of the mind/brain.

knows what makes sound and meaning relate to one(Chomsky 1986: 20)

another in a specific way, what makes them “hangSaussure thinks that langue is an entity located in
the brain. So his langue cannot be E-language, thetogether,” a particular characterization of a function,
perhaps.

(Chomsky 1986: 27)

actual or potential speech events, as Chomsky calls it.
This is similar to Saussure’s idea that sound pat-

Then Chomsky proposes I-language in contrast to

terns (signifiants) and concepts (signifiés) are associ-E-language:ated with each other in langue.
Otto Jespersen, who held that there is some

Moreover, Chomsky does not think that words“notion of structure” in the mind of the speaker […]refer to things in the world just as Saussure denies

Let us refer to this “notion of structure” as an “inter-

nomenclaturism:

nalized language” (I-language). The I-language, then,is some element of the mind of the person who knows[…] a lexical item provides us with a certain

the language, acquired by the learner, and used by therange of perspectives for viewing what we take to be

speaker-hearer.

the things in the world, or what we conceive in other(Chomsky 1986: 21-22)

ways; these items are like filters or lenses, providing
Saussure’s langue can be found in the brain, andways of looking at things and thinking about the prod-

for Chomsky, the brain is synonymous with the mind.

ucts of our minds. The terms themselves do not refer,So, in this point langue can be interpreted as I-lan-at least if the term refer is used in its natural-language

guage. Chomsky definitely insists that I-language issense; but people can use them to refer to things, view-attained and internally represented in the mind/brain,

ing them from particular points of view—which arecontrasting it with E-language:

remote from the standpoint of the natural sciences, as
noted.

(Chomsky 2000: 36)

The shift in focus was from the study of E-language to the study of I-language, from the study ofHere Chomsky also denies nomenclaturism as

language regarded as an externalized object to the

Saussure does. The same thing as this is repeated as

study of the system of knowledge of language attained

follows:

and internally represented in the mind/brain.
Referring is an action, and the internal symbols(Chomsky 1986: 24)

that are used to refer do not pick out mind-indepenChomsky repeatedly says the same thing as this,contrasting I-language with E-language:

dent objects. On investigation, it turns out that what
we understand to be a house, a river, a person, a tree,─ 18 ─

Saussure’s Legacy

water, and so on, is not a physical construct of somescope of the study of language structure, of Saussure’skind. Rather, these are creations of what seventeenth

langue.

(Chomsky 1986: 32)

century investigators called our “cognoscitive powFinally Newmeyer denies that Chomsky’s I-lan-ers,” which provide us with rich means to interpretand refer to the outside world from certain perspectives.

guage is the same thing as Saussure’s langue:(Chomsky 2010: 57)
In my view, Chomsky on page 31 of Knowledge of

Furthermore, Chomsky interprets Saussure’s

language does not attribute to Saussure the view that

langue as appropriate, saying that familiar character-langue was an I-language-based system of rules. The

izations of language as a code or a game point cor-

key word in the quotation is ‘interpreted’. The overall

rectly toward I-language as we have seen before:

context of the citation, as well as Chomsky’s priorrhetorical practice (see below, §5), indicates that what

It should be noted that familiar characterizations

Chomsky really means is ‘reinterpreted’. In otherof ‘language’ as a code or a game point correctly

words, he is saying (in effect), ‘Saussure’s grammar

toward I-language, not the artificial construct E-lan-

was a version of E-language. However, if we want to beguage. A code is not a set of representations but rather

charitable, we can think of it as a model of I-language

a specific system of rules that assigns coded represen-

and take off from there’.

(Newmeyer 2016: 277)

tations to message-representations. […] Similarly, aOn the other hand, John E. Joseph interprets

game is not a set of moves but rather the rule systemthat underlies them. The Saussurian concept of langue,

Chomsky (1986: 31) as follows:

although far too narrow in conception, might be interHere [Chomsky 1986: 31], it is specifically thepreted as appropriate in this respect.
(Chomsky 1986: 31)

concern of langue not with a ‘set’ of elements but with‘the rule system that underlies them’ that Chomsky

But Frederick J. Newmeyer points out the following two passages and says that “[…] it would appear,

appreciates, while lamenting the failure to include
syntax within this system.

(Joseph 1990: 64)

superficially at least, that Chomsky sandwiched apositive appraisal of Saussure [Chomsky 1986: 31] in

Unlike Newmeyer, Joseph finds a close affinity

between two negative appraisals [Chomsky 1986: 19,

between Saussure’s langue and Chomsky’s I-language:32] (with respect to the same issue) in the same chapIf Saussure functions as a minor precursor for theter of the same book.” (Newmeyer 2016: 273):

I-language concept, the major precursor is ‘Otto
In Saussurean structuralism, a language (langue)
was taken to be a system of sounds and an associatedJespersen, […] In sum, Chomsky appears to accept
one feature of Sassurean linguistics—(1) the characterization of langue as an underlying

system of concepts; the notion of sentence was left ina kind of limbo, perhaps to be accommodated within

system rather than as a set of elements(Chomsky 1986: 19)(Joseph 1990: 64-65)

Perhaps the clearest account is Jespersen’s in

So Joseph insists that langue and I-language areterms of the “notion of structure” that guides thesimilar to each other although admitting that they are

speaker “in framing sentences of his own…,” thesedifferent in some respects. I agree with Joseph but I

being “free expressions.” As we have seen, these ideas

do not know if I agree with Newmeyer.

the study of language use.

became the focus of attention in the study of genera-

Similarly, according to Chomsky, “the rules of thetive grammar, although not without controversy.

language are rules that form or constitute the lan-

Saussurean structuralism had placed Jespersen’sguage”:

observation about “free expressions” outside of the─ 19 ─Naoki ARAKIThe rules of the language are not rules of someants) in langue are realized into sounds in parole. In

infinite set of formal objects or potential actions but

this respect, the two linguists’ ideas concerning soundare rules that form or constitute the language, likestructure are quite the same as each other.

Articles of the Constitution or rules of chess (not a setof moves, but a game, a particular rule system).

Furthermore, for Chomsky, I-language is a perfect system that emerged abruptly, not what can be(Chomsky 1986: 28)

explained by Charles Darwin’s natural selection:

Another example, which shows that Saussure’s

Human language faculty has not evolved sincelangue and Chomsky’s I-language are similar to eachhumans went out of eastern Africa about fifty or eighty

other, is the study of sound structure illustrated bythousand years ago. About fifty or a hundred thousand

Chomsky himself. Chomsky says:

years before that time, there was no evidence of language at all, which means, from the archeological

Focusing on the I-language, however, the problem

point of view, that an extremely abrupt event [emerg-[of the study of sound structure] is a rather different

ing of human language] happened to humans between

one: to find the mental representations that underlie

fifty and eighty thousand years ago. These things

the production and perception of speech and the rules

implies that a perfect or almost perfect system [humanthat relate these representations to the physical events

language] emerged abruptly. (My translation)of speech.

(Chomsky 1986: 41)(Chomsky 2015: 129)

Here, “the mental representations that underlie

The same thing as this is repeated as follows:

the production and perception of speech (and therules that relate these representations to the physical[…] there is very strong evidence that there has

events of speech)” can be interpreted to exist in Sau-

been no relevant evolution of the language facultyssure’s langue. Chomsky goes on to say:since dispersal from Africa some 50,000 years ago,
though undoubtedly there has been a great deal of

The representations of column II [phonologicalrepresentation] are essentially the mental representa-change, even invention of modes of externalization (asin sign language).

(Chomsky 2010: 61)

tions of the lexicon, […] The phonetic representationsof column III derive from these by straightforward

So Chomsky thinks that Universal Grammar has

rules, […] Applying these rules, we derive the pho-

not evolved since its emergence in the human brain.

netic forms (III) from lexical-phonological representa-

Also, for Saussure, langue exists as a perfect formtions (II). The latter representations are not derived

from the outset as we have seen before.

from the speech sounds by analytic procedures ofsegmentation, classification, extraction of physical fea-

Conclusiontures, and so forth, but are established and justified as

It is generally thought that Saussure’s andpart of the best theory for accounting ultimately for

Chomsky’s ideas on language are quite different fromthe general relation between sound and meaning ofeach other. But in a sense, their thoughts are surpris-the I-language. […] The I-language, incorporating the

ingly similar in some respects although the differ-

rules that form the representations (II) and the rules

ences cannot be denied. So it can be said thatthat relate them to (III), is acquired by the child byChomsky’s fundamental ideas on language, whether

applying the principles incorporated in the initial state

consciously or unconsciously, are inherited from

S0 to the presented facts;

Saussure’s.

(Chomsky 1986: 42-43)

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Origin, and Use. Praeger. 1986.

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