Insurance Law Alert

October 2014

This Alert addresses recent decisions relating to late notice, pre-notice
expenses, and whether a non-signatory may be equitably bound by anarbitration clause. In addition, we report on two recent pollution exclusion
rulings and interpretation of an “insured v. insured” exclusion. Finally, we
discuss decisions relating to voluntary payments, broker liability and unsettled
questions of policy interpretation under Georgia law.
“Clients award‘high marks’ to Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP’s
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Third Circuit Rules That Non-Signatory Is Not Equitably Bound to
Arbitrate Insurance Dispute
The Third Circuit ruled that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement was not equitably
estopped from refusing to arbitrate. Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 2014 WL 5033218 (3d Cir. Oct.
9, 2014). (click here for full article)

Costs Are “Incurred” at Time of Settlement, Not When Approved by aRegulatory Agency, Says Indiana Court of Appeals
The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that Travelers is not liable for expenses arising from a
pre-notice settlement, even though regulators approved of the settlement after notice had
been given to Travelers. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc., 2014 WL
4851663 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014). (click here for full article)

Second Circuit Court Declines to Extend Reach of Statutory NoticePrejudice Requirement
The Second Circuit ruled that an insurer has no duty to indemnify pollution-related claims dueto the policyholder’s late notice, regardless of prejudice to the insurer. Indian Harbor Ins. Co.
v. City of San Diego, 2014 WL 4922143 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014) (Summary Order).
(click here for full article)

Nebraska Supreme Court Rules That Pollution Exclusion Encompasses
Lead Paint Claims
The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that lead paint claims are barred by a pollution exclusion
as a matter of law, regardless of the manner of exposure to the underlying claimant. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dantzler, 289 Neb. 1, 852 N.W.2d 918 (2014).
(click here for full article)

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Tenth Circuit Rejects Argument That Absolute Pollution Exclusions Are
Ambiguous As Overbroad
Applying Utah law, the Tenth Circuit ruled that several variations of absolute pollution
exclusions in general liability policies were unambiguous and barred coverage for damage andinjury allegedly caused by fly ash contamination. Headwaters Resources, Inc. v. Illinois Union
Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5315090 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014). (click here for full article)

California Court Deems “Insured v. Insured” Exclusion Ambiguous inContext of FDIC Receivership Claims
A California federal district court ruled that an insured v. insured exclusion was ambiguous as
to whether it applied to claims brought by the FDIC in a receiver capacity. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co. v. Hahn, 2014 WL 5369400 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2014). (click here for full article)

Policyholder’s Payment Is Not “Voluntary” If Mandated by Statute, Says
Pennsylvania Court
A Pennsylvania federal district court ruled that a policyholder did not violate a voluntary
payments provision by making payments that were required by statute. First CommonwealthBank v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4978383 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2014).
(click here for full article)

Eleventh Circuit Certifies Coverage Questions to Georgia Supreme Court
The Eleventh Circuit asked the Georgia Supreme Court to address important coverage issues
relating to interpretation of a “consent-to-settle” provision and interpretation of the policy
phrase “legally obligated to pay.” Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co.,2014 WL 5334551 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). (click here for full article)

Sixth Circuit Rules That Broker Had No Duty to Provide Coverage Advice
to Policyholder
The Sixth Circuit concluded as a matter of law that a broker had no duty to recommend
particular insurance to its client. Hardy Oil Co., Inc. v. Nationwide Fargo Ins.-Indiana, 2014
WL 4693816 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2014). (click here for full article)

STB News
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Arbitration Alert:

Third Circuit Rules That NonSignatory Is Not Equitably Bound to
Arbitrate Insurance Dispute
Reversing a Delaware federal district court
decision, the Third Circuit ruled that a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement was not
equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate.
Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 2014 WL 5033218(3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2014).
In 1985, Flintkote, an asbestos supplier,reached a settlement of asbestos-related
claims with several London insurers via
the Wellington Agreement, which required
disputes to be resolved through mediation
and arbitration. One insurer, Aviva, did notparticipate in the Wellington Agreement andinstead entered into a separate agreementwith Flintkote, which reserved each party’s
right to litigate disputes. In 2006, after filingfor bankruptcy, Flintkote initiated mediation
with its London insurers. Aviva participatedin the mediation proceedings, sharing joint
representation with the other insurers. The
mediation agreement did not reference theWellington Agreement. In 2012, Aviva moved
in Delaware bankruptcy court to lift the
automatic stay that had been imposed underfederal bankruptcy law in order to pursue a
declaratory judgment action against Flintkote.
Flintkote, in turn, moved to compel Aviva toarbitrate. A Delaware district court granted
Flintkote’s motion, ruling that although
Aviva was not a signatory to the Wellington
Agreement, it was equitably estopped fromavoiding arbitration by virtue of its ongoingparticipation in the mediation process. The
Third Circuit reversed.
The Third Circuit ruled that Flintkote had notestablished equitable estoppel by clear andconvincing evidence, as required by Delaware
law. The Third Circuit rejected the two bases
upon which the district court had foundequitable estoppel: (1) that Aviva knowingly“embraced” the Wellington Agreement
to obtain benefits to which it otherwise
would not have been entitled, and (2) that
Flintkote detrimentally relied on Aviva’s
participation in mediation. The Third Circuit
explained that Aviva had never signed the
Wellington Agreement or otherwise forfeited
its litigation rights. Furthermore, the court
held that a single reference to the Wellington
Agreement in a letter sent by the insurers’

counsel during mediation did not establishthat Aviva “embraced” or directly benefitted
from the Wellington Agreement. Rather, thecourt noted that a “single invocation” of the
Wellington Agreement over the course of
several years “falls well short of ‘consistently’
seeking the benefit of ‘other provisions of thesame contract.’” Similarly, the Third Circuit
ruled that Flintkote could not have reasonably
relied on Aviva’s participation in mediation
as an assurance that Aviva had consented
to arbitration. Any such reliance was notreasonable, the court explained, in light of
the litigation provision in the Flintkote-Aviva
settlement agreement and the absence of any
references to the Wellington Agreement in the
mediation agreement.
As discussed in prior Simpson Thacher
Insurance Alerts (e.g., July/August 2014
and July/August 2013), other courts have
similarly denied petitions to compel nonsignatories to arbitrate where the factual
record does not sufficiently establish
equitable estoppel or other doctrines thatwould warrant enforcement of an arbitration
clause (e.g., assumption, assignment orincorporation by reference).

Voluntary
Payments Alert:

Costs Are “Incurred” at Time of
Settlement, Not When Approved by
a Regulatory Agency, Says Indiana
Court of Appeals
The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that
Travelers is not liable for expenses arisingfrom a pre-notice settlement, even though
regulators approved of the settlement after
notice had been given to Travelers and despite
the fact that certain costs were incurred after
the notice. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.
v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc., 2014 WL 4851663(Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014).
The coverage dispute arose out ofcontamination at a dairy farm owned by
Maplehurst. In 2002, the Indiana Departmentof Environmental Management (“IDEM”)
advised Maplehurst to provide a remediation
plan. Maplehurst submitted a corrective
action plan (“CAP”) to IDEM and reached asettlement agreement with the subsequent3

owner of the dairy farm under which it
assumed full responsibility for remediation.
Thereafter, Maplehurst discovered insurance
policies for the relevant time period and in
2003, provided notice of the claim to theinsurers, including Travelers. The insurers
denied coverage for Maplehurst’s pre-noticecosts. In ensuing litigation, the Indiana
Court of Appeals ruled that Travelers was
not responsible for Maplehurst’s pre-notice
expenses, reasoning that an insurer’s duties
do not arise until an insurer is provided with
notice of the claim. However, the appellate
court noted that “Travelers remains liable forthe costs and expenses … that Maplehurst
incurred after it notified Travelers of theclaim.” On remand, Maplehurst sought
recoupment of its costs, arguing that as final
approval of a revised CAP was not given by
the IDEM until 2004, related costs should beconsidered to have been incurred after notice
was given to Travelers. The trial court agreed.
The appellate court reversed.

notice to Travelers, explaining that all of
the post-notice costs flowed from the prenotice settlement.

The appellate court concluded that
Maplehurst had incurred the expenses
in question in 2002, when it submitted
the original CAP to IDEM and reached asettlement with the subsequent property
owner—both of which occurred prior togiving notice to Travelers. The court reasoned
that expenses are deemed “incurred” when
Maplehurst obligated itself to remediate
the property, not when IDEM approved thefinal CAP. “The final CAP merely described
how Maplehurst would be required to
remediate the property; Maplehurst agreed
in the [settlement] to remediate to IDEM’s
standards long before Travelers was
notified of the claim.” The court reachedthis conclusion notwithstanding thatsome of the remediation occurred after

denying coverage on policies “issued ordelivered” in New York after January 17, 2009
on the basis of late notice absent a showing of
prejudice. N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(a)(5). Prior to
the amendment, New York common law did
not require a showing of prejudice.

Late Notice Alert:

Second Circuit Court Declines toExtend Reach of Statutory NoticePrejudice Requirement
Affirming a New York federal district court
decision, the Second Circuit ruled that aninsurer has no duty to indemnify pollutionrelated claims due to the policyholder’s late
notice, regardless of whether the insurer
was prejudiced by the late notice. Indian
Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of San Diego,
2014 WL 4922143 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014)(Summary Order).
In 2009, New York statutory law wasamended to prevent liability insurers from

Indian Harbor argued that it had no duty
to indemnify pollution claims because thepolicyholder had waited 58 days before
providing notice and because the policy was
not “issued or delivered” in New York. The
district court agreed and granted Indian
Harbor’s summary judgment motion. The
Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that Section
3420 was inapplicable and that notice wasuntimely as a matter of law.

4In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit
concluded that the policy was not “issued”
in New York. The policyholder argued
that because Indian Harbor’s president,
whose signature was on the policy, had
his office in New York, the policy should
be deemed issued in New York. The court
explained that the president’s signature
was a pre-existing electronic signature andwas, in any event, affixed to the policy inPennsylvania. Additionally, the policy wascreated in and mailed from Pennsylvania andall correspondence bore the Pennsylvania
office’s letterhead.
The court also rejected the notion that
Section 3240 created a new public policy
and thus abrogated New York’s common
law no-prejudice rule, noting that had the“legislature intended to change the common
law for all policies, it could have done so.” As
discussed in our June 2014 Alert, other courts
have similarly declined to apply Section 3240
where the criteria set forth therein are notmet. See KeySpan Gas East Corp. v. Munich
Reinsurance American, Inc., 2014 WL
2573382 (N.Y. June 10, 2014) (heightened
standard for late notice disclaimer set forth in
Section 3420 does not apply to environmental
property damage claims). Finally, the court
ruled that the 58 day delay was unreasonable
as a matter of law, noting that similar length
delays are routinely deemed unreasonable
under New York law.

Pollution
Exclusion Alerts:

Nebraska Supreme Court
Rules That Pollution Exclusion
Encompasses Lead Paint Claims
Reversing an intermediate appellate court, theNebraska Supreme Court ruled that lead paintclaims are barred by a pollution exclusion asa matter of law, regardless of the manner of
exposure to the underlying claimant. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dantzler, 289
Neb. 1, 852 N.W.2d 918 (2014).
State Farm sought a declaration that apollution exclusion precluded coverage for
injuries allegedly sustained by a tenant as aresult of exposure to lead paint. A Nebraska
trial court granted State Farm’s summary
judgment motion, but the intermediateappellate court reversed. The appellate court
agreed with the trial court that lead paintconstituted a pollutant, but ruled that amaterial question of fact existed as to whether
the exposure occurred through a “discharge,
dispersal, spill, release or escape,” as specified
in the exclusion. The Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that the pollution
exclusion barred coverage as a matter of law
because the terms “discharge, dispersal, spill,
release or escape” encompass all possible
movements by which exposure to lead
could occur.
This Dantzler case broadly holds that under
Nebraska law, a pollution exclusion bars
coverage for lead paint claims regardless of(1) whether exposure occurred via inhalation
or ingestion, (2) whether the claimant was
exposed to paint chips, flakes, dust or fumes,or (3) whether the lead paint separated
from the painted surface by flaking over thepassage of time or by intentional chewing on
an intact painted surface. The court reasoned
that the terms “discharge, dispersal, spill,
release or escape” encompass the separationof lead-based paint that is inherent in every
case of lead paint poisoning. Therefore,“a determination of the specific process of
exposure in any particular case is not material
to application of the exclusion.” In so ruling,
the court expressly distinguished and rejected
Connecticut case law (see Danbury Ins. Co.
v. Novella, 727 A.2d 279 (Conn. 1998)), on
which the appellate court had relied. Instead,the court found persuasive the reasoning5

of numerous other courts that have applied
pollution exclusions to preclude coverage forlead paint claims, including a Delaware trial
court decision discussed in our November
2013 Alert (see Farm Family Casualty Co. v.
Cumberland Ins. Co., Inc., 2013 WL 5496780(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2013)).

Tenth Circuit Rejects Argument
That Absolute Pollution Exclusions
Are Ambiguous As Overbroad
Applying Utah law, the Tenth Circuit ruledthat several variations of absolute pollution
exclusions in general liability policies wereunambiguous and barred coverage fordamage and injury allegedly caused by fly ash
contamination. Headwaters Resources, Inc.
v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5315090(10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014).

The policyholder sought coverage forcosts arising from two suits alleging thatits construction of a golf course resulted
in personal injury and property damage
caused by the dispersal of fly ash. The
liability insurers denied coverage on thebasis of the policies’ pollution exclusions.
The insurers moved for summary judgment,
which a Utah district court granted. The
district court ruled that for some policies(which excluded coverage for “actual,
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of‘pollutants’” when combined with oneof five enumerated circumstances), thepollution exclusion unambiguously barred

coverage. On other policies with similar, but
not identical, pollution exclusion language(which excluded coverage for “any injury,
damage, expense, cost, loss, claims, liabilityor legal obligation arising out of or in any
way related to pollution, however caused”),
the district court declined to rule onwhether the exclusions were ambiguous andinstead held that regardless of any potential
ambiguity, the exclusions applied to theclaims in the underlying complaints. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that all
pollution exclusions were unambiguous as amatter of law and clearly encompassed theunderlying claims.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the policyholder’sargument that “the comprehensiveness ofthe pollution exclusions reveals ambiguity
within the policies because literal applicationof the exclusions abolishes coverage.”
Acknowledging that the pollution exclusions

were “far-reaching,” the court nonethelessheld that they were unambiguous andenforceable. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit
rejected an argument frequently asserted bypolicyholders in this context—that a pollution
exclusion is overbroad where it bars coveragefor events arising from the policyholder’sregular business activities.
The court expressly noted that there is somedisagreement between courts nationwide inthis area. While a few courts, including a Utahfederal district court, have ruled that a broad
exclusion that encompasses “normal businessactivities” creates ambiguity, the Tenth
Circuit disagreed.
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D&O Alert:

California Court Deems “Insured
v. Insured” Exclusion Ambiguousin Context of FDIC Receivership
ClaimsOur April 2014 Alert discussed a First Circuit
decision requiring an insurer to advancedefense costs under a directors and officers
policy due to uncertainty as to whether
an “insured v. insured” exclusion barred
coverage for claims brought by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). In aruling issued this month, a California federal
district court reached the same conclusion,
finding that the exclusion was ambiguous as
to whether it applied to claims brought by the
FDIC in a receiver capacity. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co. v. Hahn, 2014 WL 5369400 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 8, 2014).
The FDIC, acting as appointed receiver
for a defunct bank, sued the bank’s former
directors and officers for negligence andbreach of fiduciary duty. Travelers, the bank’s
D&O insurer, filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a ruling that its policy did notcover the underlying claims. In particular,
Travelers relied on the “insured v. insured”
exclusion, which barred coverage for any
claim “brought or maintained by or on behalfof any Insured or Company [including theBank] in any capacity.” Travelers argued that
because the FDIC “stands in the shoes” ofthe bank and brought claims “on behalf of”
the bank, the exclusion applied. The court
disagreed and granted the FDIC’s summary
judgment motion.

The court held that the phrase “on behalfof” is ambiguous when applied to the
FDIC. Rather than basing ambiguity on
the policy language, the court reasoned
that the presence of conflicting case law
across jurisdictions on this issue renders
the exclusion ambiguous. Having deemed
the exclusion ambiguous, the court resolved
the issue against the insurer. Noting thatthe policy could have expressly specified
that the exclusion applied to claims broughtby the FDIC, the court emphasized aninsurer’s obligation to “phrase exceptions
and exclusions in clear and unmistakablelanguage.”

Voluntary
Payments Alert:

Policyholder’s Payment Is Not“Voluntary” If Mandated by Statute,
Says Pennsylvania Court
A Pennsylvania federal district court denied
an insurer’s motion to dismiss a breach ofcontract action, ruling that the policyholder
did not violate a voluntary payments
provision by making payments that wererequired by statute. First CommonwealthBank v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2014 WL
4978383 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2014).
As a result of computer malware, funds froma client’s bank account were transferred tounauthorized parties. In response to theclient’s demands, the bank agreed to refund

7the transferred amounts. Thereafter, thebank notified its insurer of the loss andsought to recover its payments. The insurer
denied coverage, arguing that it had no duty
to indemnify because the bank breached
the voluntary payments provision, whichstated that the “Insurer shall not be liable
for any settlement, Defense Costs, assumed
obligation, admitted liability, voluntary
payment, or confessed or agreed Damages or
judgment to which it has not consented.” Thecourt disagreed.
The court denied the insurer’s motion todismiss, finding that the bank had a valid
breach of contract claim against its insurer.
The court reasoned that the bank’s payments
were not “voluntary” because they wererequired by state statutory law (relating torefunds of unauthorized wire transfers). The
court held that a payment is not voluntarywhen it is “compelled by law or other outside
influences.” The court rejected the insurer’s
argument that the payment was voluntarybecause the bank could have refused to pay
and tendered the claim to the insurer.

PolicyInterpretation
Alert:

Eleventh Circuit Certifies Coverage
Questions to Georgia Supreme
Court
Citing to a lack of state law precedent, theEleventh Circuit asked the Georgia Supreme
Court to address two issues: (1) whether aninsured is “legally obligated to pay” a claim
if it voluntarily settles an underlying suit butthat settlement is approved and authorized
by a final court order, and (2) whether a court
may bar coverage based on a policyholder’sviolation of a “consent-to-settle” clause
without first deciding whether the insurer
unreasonably withheld consent. Piedmont
Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty
Ins. Co., 2014 WL 5334551 (11th Cir. Oct.
21, 2014).

Policyholders may seek to rely on First
Commonwealth Bank more broadly, such as
in contamination cases in which payments
are made pursuant to local or federal

Piedmont Office Realty Trust purchaseda primary policy that provided up to $10
million in coverage and an excess policythat provided an additional $10 million
in coverage. Piedmont was named as aenvironmental statutes without insurer
consent, particularly given the court’s relianceon Federal Ins. Co. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 972
F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1997), which held that amandatory payment under the Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act did not violate avoluntary payments provision. In this context,
First Commonwealth Bank may give rise
to disputes relating to whether a statutory
payment should be deemed voluntaryor mandatory.

defendant in a class action securities suitseeking $150 million in damages. After
protracted litigation of the securities claims,
a court dismissed the action. The class action
plaintiffs appealed. Piedmont had alreadyexhausted its primary policy limit and had
used $4 million of its excess coverage. While
the appeal was pending, Piedmont engaged
in mediation with the class. Piedmont sought
the excess insurer’s consent to settle the suitfor up to the remaining limits of the excess8policy. The excess insurer agreed only tocontribute an addition $1 million. Despite theexcess insurer’s position (and without further
notice to the excess insurer), Piedmont settled
the underlying suit for $4.9 million. A court
approved the settlement and entered a final
judgment and order implementing the termsof the agreement. Thereafter, Piedmont sued
the excess insurer.
A Georgia district court granted the insurer’s
motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned
that because Piedmont had voluntarily
settled the underlying case, it was not “legallyobligated to pay” the securities claim as
required by the excess policy. The district
court also ruled that Piedmont violated
the policy’s “consent-to-settle” provisionby settling the underlying case with theinsurer’s consent.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that“substantial doubt” existed as to whether,under Georgia law, the “legally obligatedto pay” requirement may be satisfied by avoluntary settlement if a final court order
exists that directs implementation of thesettlement. The Eleventh Circuit also sought
guidance from the Georgia Supreme Court asto whether a court can deny coverage basedon a policyholder’s violation of a “consentto-settle” clause (which provides that theinsurer’s consent “shall not be unreasonably
withheld”) without first determining whether
the insurer’s withholding of consent was
unreasonable. We will keep you updated on
developments in this matter.

Broker Alert:

Sixth Circuit Rules That Broker Had
No Duty to Provide Coverage Advice
to Policyholder
Our March 2014 Alert discussed a New
York Court of Appeals decision holding thata question of fact existed as to whether aninsurance broker owed a duty to provide
coverage advice to its client. See Voss v.
Netherlands Ins. Co., 2014 WL 804129 (N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2014). There, the court held that
although a broker is generally not obligatedto provide coverage advice, a duty may becreated by the parties’ course of dealing overan extended period of time—an issue that the
court held required factual resolution. The

Sixth Circuit recently addressed the same
issue and applied the same legal standard for
broker liability, but concluded as a matter oflaw that a broker had no duty to recommend
particular insurance to its client. Hardy Oil
Co., Inc. v. Nationwide Fargo Ins.-Indiana,
2014 WL 4693816 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2014).
In Hardy Oil, the court held that a broker’s
duty to provide coverage advice arises under
three circumstances: (1) when the client
pays consideration beyond the premium; (2)when the parties’ extended course of dealing
would put an objectively reasonable broker on
notice that his advice is being relied upon; or(3) when the client makes a specific request
for advice. The client argued that the second
circumstance—his long-term relationshipwith the broker and the broker’s knowledgeof his petroleum business—gave rise to thebroker’s special duties. The court rejected thisargument, finding that the parties’ extended
relationship was not based on reliance on thebroker’s expertise, but rather on the favorable
price of the broker’s services. Therefore,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court
decision granting the broker’s summary
judgment motion.

STB News Alert
Simpson Thacher’s Insurance Practice was
ranked as Tier 1 by Euromoney’s Benchmark
Litigation 2015. The publication described
Simpson Thacher as “revered by peers andclients for [its] all-around litigation practice… and its oft-heralded insurance practice.”
Partners Barry Ostrager, Mary Kay Vyskocil,
Andrew Amer, Mary Beth Forshaw andBryce Friedman were named Local Litigation
Stars (New York) and Litigation Stars U.S., Insurance.
Last month, Thomson Reuters announced
the publication of the Third Edition ofModern Reinsurance Law and Practice,authored by Barry R. Ostrager and Mary Kay
Vyskocil. The treatise discusses thousands ofreinsurance-related decisions and provides acomprehensive analysis of numerous issues
central to reinsurance litigation.

9

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.
Barry R. Ostrager+212-455-2655
bostrager@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Mary Kay Vyskocil+212-455-3093
mvyskocil@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang+212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Andrew S. Amer
+212-455-2953
aamer@stblaw.com

Linda H. Martin+212-455-7722
lmartin@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

David J. Woll
+212-455-3136
dwoll@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Mary Beth Forshaw+212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Deborah L. Stein(dstein@stblaw.com/310-407-7525)
and Craig S. Waldman (cwaldman@stblaw.com/212-455-2881) with
contributions by Karen Cestari(kcestari@stblaw.com).

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
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