Insurance Law Alert

April 2018

In This Issue
New York Court Of Appeals Rejects Unavailability Exception To Pro Rata
Allocation
New York’s highest court rejected an “unavailability” exception to pro rata allocation, holdingthat policyholders, not insurers, are responsible for damages that occurred during periods inwhich applicable insurance coverage was unavailable in the marketplace. Keyspan Gas East
Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., 2018 WL 1472635 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).
(Click here for full article)“Simpson Thacher
is a premier firm in thisspace. The lawyers there
continue to do good workand they are commerciallyrespected.”– Chambers USA 2017(quoting a client)

Applying New York Law, Virginia Court Follows Viking Pump To Apply“All Sums” Allocation And Vertical Exhaustion To Excess Policies In
Asbestos Coverage Dispute
A Virginia federal district court ruled that a policyholder’s asbestos-related liabilities undercertain excess policies were subject to “all sums” allocation and vertical exhaustion under New
York law. Hopeman Bros., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 2018 WL 1726272 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2,2018). (Click here for full article)

Ninth Circuit Rules That Exhaustion Provision Requires Underlying
Limits To Be Paid By Insurers
Applying New York law, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an excess policy unambiguously required
exhaustion of underlying limits through payment by underlying insurers, rather than by the
insured. Cooper v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2018 WL 1548208 (9th Cir. Mar.
30, 2018). (Click here for full article)

New York Court Of Appeals Rules That Policy Requires Contractual Privity
For Additional Insured Coverage
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that an insurer was not obligated to provide additional
insured coverage where there was no contractual privity between the named insured and theparty seeking additional insured coverage. Gilbane Building Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1473553 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Ninth Circuit Rules That Fraudulent Wire Transfers Are Excluded From
Crime Policy’s Coverage
The Ninth Circuit ruled that an exclusion in a crime policy barred coverage for losses arisingfrom a wire transfer of funds initiated by a fraudulent email. Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v.
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America, 2018 WL 1804338 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2018).
(Click here for full article)
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Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

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Kansas Court Predicts That Texas Supreme Court Would Apply NoticePrejudice Rule Notwithstanding Time-Specific Reporting Requirement
A Kansas federal district court predicted that the Texas Supreme Court would require an
insurer to establish prejudice in order to deny coverage based on the policyholder’s violation ofa time-specific notice provision. PetroSantander (USA), Inc. v. HDI Global Ins. Co., 2018 WL
1706516 (D. Kan. Apr. 9, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Idaho Supreme Court Rules That Intentional Act By Third Party Is Not An“Occurrence” Even If Unexpected From Standpoint Of Insured
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an intentional act by a non-insured third party is not acovered occurrence even if the incident was unexpected from the policyholder’s perspective.
Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cook, 2018 WL 1547109 (Idaho Mar. 30, 2018). (Click here forfull article)

Connecticut Court Rules That Madoff Losses Are Not Covered Under“Wrongful Entry” Provision In Property Policy
A Connecticut federal district court ruled that Pacific Indemnity had no duty to defend orindemnify its insured under a homeowner’s policy for losses incurred in connection with
Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, finding that Madoff’s fraudulent conduct did not constitute a“wrongful entry” into the homeowner’s investment accounts. Kostin v. Pacific Indemnity Co.,2018 WL 1747047 (D. Conn. Apr. 10, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Florida Appellate Court Rules That Favorable Resolution Of Underlying
Coverage Action Is Not Prerequisite To Bad Faith Claim Against Insurer
A Florida appellate court ruled that homeowners could pursue a bad faith claim against theirproperty insurer even absent a favorable coverage ruling because the insurer’s tender of policy
limits constituted a determination as to liability and damages. Demase v. State Farm Florida
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1525851 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Fifth Circuit Seeks Mississippi Supreme Court Guidance Regarding
Insurer’s Right To Reimbursement Of Settlement Payments
The Fifth Circuit has certified two questions to the Mississippi Supreme Court relating towhether the voluntary payment doctrine precludes an insurer from recovering settlement
payments made on behalf of an additional insured where the insurer disputed coverage as tothe additional insured. Colony Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1804670 (5th Cir.
Apr. 16, 2018). (Click here for full article)2

Allocation Alerts:

New York Court Of Appeals Rejects
Unavailability Exception To Pro
Rata Allocation
New York’s highest court rejected an“unavailability” exception to pro rata
allocation, holding that policyholders, notinsurers, are responsible for damages that
occurred during periods in which applicableinsurance coverage was unavailable in themarketplace. Keyspan Gas East Corp. v.
Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., 2018 WL
1472635 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).
The coverage dispute arose out ofenvironmental contamination that took
place over several decades. Keyspan soughta declaration that it was not responsiblefor damage that occurred during policy
periods in which it was uninsured dueto the unavailability of insurance in themarketplace. A New York trial court ruledthat Keyspan was liable for years in which
it elected to self-insure, but not for periods
in which relevant coverage was unavailable.
An intermediate appellate court reversedin part, holding that Continental was not
obligated to indemnify Keyspan for losses
attributable to periods in which insurance wasunavailable. See Sept. 2016 Alert. Answeringa certified question, the New York Court ofAppeals affirmed, rejecting application of anunavailability exception.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that policy
language limiting the insurer’s liability
to losses “during the policy period” wasinconsistent with an unavailability exception,
stating that “it would be incongruous
to include harm attributable to years of
non-coverage within the policy periods.”
Additionally, the court explained that theunavailability exception “would effectively
provide insurance coverage to policyholders
for years in which no premiums were paid
and in which insurers made the calculated
choice not to assume or accept premiums forthe risk in question.”As the court noted, some jurisdictions haveadopted an unavailability exception basedlargely on public policy concerns, whereas
others have deemed such an exception
inconsistent with policy language. Two casesthat implicate the unavailability exception are
currently pending in the supreme courts of

New Jersey and Connecticut. See Continental
Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Internat’l Inc., 2016 WL
7665452 (N.J. Dec. 12, 2016); R.T. Vanderbilt
Co., Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 156
A.3d 538 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017), cert. granted,
171 A.3d 63 (Conn. 2017). We will keep you
posted on any developments in those matters.

Applying New York Law, Virginia
Court Follows Viking Pump To
Apply “All Sums” Allocation And
Vertical Exhaustion To Excess
Policies In Asbestos Coverage
DisputeA Virginia federal district court ruled thata policyholder’s asbestos-related liabilities
under certain excess policies were subject to“all sums” allocation and vertical exhaustion
under New York law. Hopeman Bros., Inc. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 2018 WL 1726272 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 2, 2018).
Hopeman, a manufacturer of asbestoscontaining materials, was sued in thousandsof personal injury suits. During the relevanttime frame, Hopeman maintained multi-layer
insurance coverage provided by numerous
primary and excess insurers. Hopeman
received payments from or otherwise resolved
coverage disputes with all insurers covering
the 1971-77 time period, except Continental
and Lexington, both of which participated ina quota-share excess layer of coverage. In thepresent matter, the parties disputed, among
other things, the appropriate method of
allocation and exhaustion.
The court ruled that “all sums” (rather than
pro rata) allocation was mandated by In re
Viking Pump, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 244 (2016)(discussed in our May 2016 Alert). There,
the New York Court of Appeals held that allsums allocation applies to excess policies
containing non-cumulation clauses. Because
the policies at issue included non-cumulation
clauses identical to those at issue in Viking
Pump, or followed form to policies that
included such clauses, the court deemed thedecision binding precedent. In addition, thecourt rejected the insurers’ contention that
Hopeman was bound by pro rata allocation
based on its previous participation in pro rata
allocation settlements. The court also rejected
the argument that Hopeman must allege asingle loss or occurrence to obtain all sums
allocation under its excess policies, noting3

that no such requirement exists under thepolicy language or New York law.
The court further ruled that the policies
required vertical exhaustion of directly
underlying insurance, rather than horizontal
exhaustion by layers, rejecting the insurers’
assertion that triggered policy periods must
be exhausted in chronological order.
The court also addressed whether Hopeman
could exhaust underlying policies issued by aninsolvent insurer by “filling the gap” with its
own payments. With respect to a Lexington
policy, the court held that applicable language(“only after the Underlying Umbrella Insurers
have paid or have been held liable to pay”)
required either actual payment by or liability
attributable to the insurer and did not permit
exhaustion via payments by the insured.
Because material issues of fact existed as
to whether the insolvent insurer was “heldliable” to pay its policy limit, the court
declined to grant summary judgment on thisissue. With respect to a Continental policy,
the court ruled that policy language indicatingthat Continental will “indemnify the insured
for the amount of loss which is in excess of theapplicable limits of liability of the underlying
insurance” allowed for exhaustion by payment
by the insured.

Excess Coverage
Alert:

Ninth Circuit Rules That
Exhaustion Provision Requires
Underlying Limits To Be Paid By
Insurers
Applying New York law, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that an excess policy unambiguously
required exhaustion of underlying limits
through payment by underlying insurers,
rather than by the insured. Cooper v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2018 WL
1548208 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2018).
The dispute arose from the settlement ofseveral lawsuits following the bankruptcy of
Quality Home Loans, Inc. Plaintiffs sought
to recover under a second-tier excess policy
issued by Lloyd’s. Lloyd’s denied coverage,
citing a provision that defines exhaustion
as “by reason of the payment of any claims

or losses or costs and expenses . . . . by the
insurers of the Underlying Policies.” Lloyd’s
argued that there had been no exhaustion
because, pursuant to the settlementagreement, the underlying insurer paid only
$3.47 million of the $5 million policy limit,with additional amounts paid by the insured.
The court agreed, stating that the exhaustion
provision “forecloses the possibility of
exhaustion through payment by parties otherthan the underlying insurers.”

Additional Insured
Alert:New York Court Of Appeals Rules
That Policy Requires Contractual
Privity For Additional Insured
Coverage

The New York Court of Appeals ruled thatan insurer was not obligated to provide
additional insured coverage to a construction
manager where there was no contractual
privity between the manager and the named
insured. Gilbane Building Co. v. St. Paul Fireand Marine Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1473553 (N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2018).
The Dormitory Authority of the State
of New York (“DASNY”) engaged with
Samson Construction to build a forensic
laboratory. Samson, in turn, contracted with
Gilbane to serve as construction manager.
DASNY’s contract with Samson required
Samson to obtain liability insurance listing
Gilbane as an additional insured. Samson’scontract with Gilbane, however, included
no additional insured requirement. Samson
secured coverage with Liberty under a policy
containing the following additional insured
provision: “WHO IS AN INSURED (SectionII) is amended to include as an insured any
person or organization with whom you haveagreed to add as an additional insured by
written contract.” A “Sample Certificate ofInsurance” listed Gilbane as an additional
insured. When negligent construction
litigation arose, Gilbane sought coverage
from Liberty as an additional insured, which
the insurer denied. A New York trial court
ruled that Gilbane was entitled to coverageas an additional insured under the policy.
An appellate court reversed and the New
4

York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate
court ruling.
The Court of Appeals held that the phrase“with whom you have agreed to add” wasunambiguous and required a written contract
between Samson and Gilbane denominating
Gilbane as an additional insured. Because nosuch contract existed, the court concluded
that Gilbane was not entitled to additional
insured coverage.
As the dissent noted, a contrary result wasreached in Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 452157(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016), which involved
similar policy language. There, the court
declined to “add a requirement of directcontractual privity between the named
insured and the purported additional insured
that [did] not exist in the policy language.” AnOklahoma appellate court similarly rejected acontractual privity requirement for additional
insured coverage in JP Energy Marketing,
LLC v. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co., 412
P.3d 121 (Okla. Ct. App. 2017).

Cyber Coverage
Alert:

Ninth Circuit Rules That Fraudulent
Wire Transfers Are Excluded From
Crime Policy’s Coverage
The Ninth Circuit ruled that an exclusion in acrime policy barred coverage for losses arisingfrom a wire transfer of funds initiated by afraudulent email. Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v.
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America,
2018 WL 1804338 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2018).
Aqua Star, a seafood importer, purchased
shrimp from Zhanjiang Longwei Aquatic
Products Industry Co. Ltd. (“Longwei”).
Longwei’s computer system was hacked,
allowing individuals to send fraudulent
emails to Aqua Star about invoice payments.
In certain emails, the hackers directed Aqua
Star employees to transfer funds to theirown bank accounts. After the fraud was
discovered, Aqua Star sought coverage undera crime policy, which covered loss caused bycomputer fraud. The insurer denied coverage,
arguing that the loss was not directly causedby computer fraud and that several exclusions

applied. In ensuing litigation, a Washington
federal district court granted the insurer’ssummary judgment motion. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that even assumingthat Aqua Star’s losses were covered by thecomputer fraud provision, coverage wasbarred by an exclusion that applied to “lossor damages resulting directly or indirectlyfrom the input of Electronic Data by a natural
person having the authority to enter the
Insured’s Computer System.” The court foundthat the exclusion squarely applied because
Aqua Star’s losses resulted from authorized
entry into its computer system by employees
who changed the bank wiring information andsent payment to the hackers’ account.

Notice Alert:

Kansas Court Predicts That
Texas Supreme Court Would
Apply Notice-Prejudice Rule
Notwithstanding Time-Specific
Reporting Requirement
A Kansas federal district court predictedthat the Texas Supreme Court would require
an insurer to establish prejudice in order todeny coverage based on the policyholder’sviolation of a time-specific notice provision.
PetroSantander (USA), Inc. v. HDI Global
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1706516 (D. Kan. Apr.
9, 2018).
PetroSantander sought coverage from HDI fordamage caused by a saltwater spill. Although
the relevant HDI policy contained a pollution
exclusion, it also included a pollution
endorsement that extended coverage forpollution-related losses if certain conditions
were met, including that PetroSantander
report any pollution incident within 120 days.
HDI argued that coverage was barred under
the policy because it did not receive notice
until 141 days after discovery of the spill.
In ensuing litigation, both parties moved
for summary judgment on whether HDI
must demonstrate prejudice as a result of
the late notice. Ruling on this matter of first
impression under Texas law, the court ruledthat prejudice was required.
The court predicted that the Texas Supreme
Court would require prejudice in this context
5

based on Texas State Board of Insurance
Order 23080, which obligates all generalliability policies to include an endorsement
requiring insurers to establish prejudicein order to deny coverage based on late
notice. Although Texas courts have notaddressed whether Order 23080 applies toa time-specific notice requirement, the court
reasoned that the mandatory nature of theOrder, and its application to “as soon aspracticable” notice requirements in claimsmade policies, mitigated in favor of its
application here.
The court acknowledged that two Fifth Circuit
decisions have held that prejudice is not
required in the context of time-specific noticerequirements in pollution endorsements,
but deemed those cases inapposite andunpersuasive. In particular, the court notedthat those decisions did not specificallyaddress Order 23080 and that one caseinvolved a surplus lines carrier, rather than ageneral liability insurer.

Coverage Alerts:

Idaho Supreme Court Rules That
Intentional Act By Third Party
Is Not An “Occurrence” Even If
Unexpected From Standpoint Of
InsuredLast month’s Alert reported on a Ninth
Circuit decision holding that an intentional
act cannot be considered an accident for
insurance coverage purposes, regardlessof the policyholder’s reasonable subjective
beliefs. See Crown Tree Serv. v. Atain
Specialty Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1042673 (9th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2018). In a recent decision, the Idaho
Supreme Court followed suit, ruling that an
intentional act by a non-insured third party is
not a covered occurrence even if the incident

was unexpected from the policyholder’s
perspective. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Cook, 2018 WL 1547109 (Idaho Mar.
30, 2018).
The Cooks owned a cabin situated on 200
acres of property in Idaho. They allowed
Michael Chisholm to stay in the cabin in
exchange for maintaining the property. While
residing at the cabin, Chisholm shot a visitor
to the property. The victim sued Chisholm,
the Cooks and Farm Bureau, the Cooks’
property insurer. Farm Bureau argued that it
had no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks
for the shooting because it was not a covered
occurrence under the policy. An Idaho district
court agreed and granted Farm Bureau’ssummary judgment motion. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled thatthe shooting could not be considered an
occurrence because it was an intentionalact, rejecting the Cooks’ contention thatfrom their perspective, it was an unexpected
event. The court explained that for purposesof an occurrence determination, the focus
is on the injury-causing event (here, theshooting) rather than the insureds’ alleged
negligence. The court noted that althoughsome jurisdictions employ a “standpointof the insured” analysis, Idaho follows a“nature of the event” test under which an
intentional shooting cannot be consideredan accident, regardless of the insureds’
subjective expectations.

Connecticut Court Rules That
Madoff Losses Are Not Covered
Under “Wrongful Entry” Provision
In Property Policy
A Connecticut federal district court ruled that
Pacific Indemnity had no duty to defend orindemnify its insured under a homeowner’s
policy for losses incurred in connection with
Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. The court
found that Madoff’s fraudulent conduct did
not constitute a “wrongful entry” into thehomeowner’s investment accounts under thepolicy. Kostin v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 2018
WL 1747047 (D. Conn. Apr. 10, 2018).
Susan Kostin’s family company had aninvestment account with Madoff. Before
Madoff’s fraud was discovered, Kostin
withdrew $3.75 million from her account.
After discovery of the Madoff scheme, the6bankruptcy trustee brought an adversary
proceeding against Kostin, seeking recovery of
the withdrawn funds. Kostin sought coverage
under her homeowner’s and excess policies.
When Pacific Indemnity denied coverage,
Kostin retained counsel at her own expense
and ultimately settled with the trustee. In thepresent suit, Kostin sought reimbursementof defense and settlement costs from
Pacific Indemnity.
The court dismissed Kostin’s suit, findingthat the policies did not cover the Madoffrelated losses. In particular, the court rejected
Kostin’s argument that her losses werecaused by Madoff’s “wrongful entries” into
her family’s investment account. The court
explained that even assuming that “wrongfulentry” could be interpreted to include avariety of unauthorized intrusions into
personal property or electronic accounts, it
could not be construed to include fraudulent
ledger book entries. Further, the court notedthat Madoff’s access and “entry” to Kostin’s
account was authorized, notwithstanding thefact that he engaged in fraudulent accounting
within that account.

Bad Faith Alert:

Florida Appellate Court Rules That
Favorable Resolution Of Underlying
Coverage Action Is Not Prerequisite
To Bad Faith Claim Against Insurer
A Florida appellate court ruled that
homeowners could pursue a bad faith claim
against their property insurer even absent
a favorable coverage ruling because theinsurer’s tender of policy limits constituted
a determination as to liability and damages.
Demase v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co.,2018 WL 1525851 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. Mar.
29, 2018).
The Demases sought coverage fromState Farm for sinkhole-related property
damage. Over the course of several years,
State Farm investigated the damage, maderecommendations and demanded additional
documentation. The Demases complied withall of State Farm’s requests and after receiving
no payment, served a civil remedy noticepursuant to state statutory law, alleging that
State Farm engaged in bad faith insurance
practices by failing to investigate and resolve

the claim promptly. Under the relevant
statute, § 624.155(a), Fla. Stat. (2014), State
Farm had a 60 day period in which to cure its
alleged wrongful conduct. State Farm took no
action during that period, but tendered thelimits of its policy several months later. The
Demases thereafter sued State Farm for badfaith.

A Florida trial court dismissed the suit,reasoning that the bad faith claim could notproceed absent “a favorable resolution of anunderlying civil action for insurance benefits
against the insurer—whether in the form of ajudgment, arbitration, appraisal, or action on
the contract.” The appellate court reversed,
holding that:an underlying action on the insurance
contract is not required for there to
be a determination of the insurer’s
liability and the extent of the damages
as a prerequisite to filing a statutory
bad faith action. Instead, an insurer’s
payment of an insurance claim after
the sixty-day cure period provided
by section 624.155(3) constitutes adetermination of an insurer’s liability
for coverage and extent of damages
under section 624.155(1)(b) even when
there is no underlying action.

Settlement Alert:

Fifth Circuit Seeks Mississippi
Supreme Court Guidance Regarding
Insurer’s Right To Reimbursement
Of Settlement Payments
The Fifth Circuit has certified two questions
to the Mississippi Supreme Court relating
to whether the voluntary payment doctrineprecludes an insurer from recovering
settlement payments made on behalf of an7

additional insured where the insurer disputed
coverage as to the additional insured. Colony
Ins. Co. v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 2018 WL
1804670 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2018).
An employee of Accu-Fab was killed in an
explosion at Omega Protein Corporation’s
facility. Accu-Fab was insured under a liability
policy issued by Colony Insurance. Omegasought coverage as an additional insured
under the Colony policy for the claims arisingout of the accident. Colony defended under areservation of rights and filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a ruling as tocoverage under its policy. The underlying
suit ultimately settled, with Colony agreeing
to pay its $1 million policy limit. Thereafter,
Colony demanded reimbursement of its $1
million from one of Omega’s liability insurers,
First Specialty, on the basis that the Colony
policy did not cover the underlying claims.
When First Specialty refused to pay, Colony
filed suit, asserting claims for equitable
subrogation and implied indemnity.
A Mississippi district court granted First
Specialty’s summary judgment motion,
relying on Mississippi’s voluntary payment
doctrine. The court reasoned that Colony
acted as a “voluntary payor” by making
payments it believed it was not obligatedto make, and thus could not recover thesettlement payments. On appeal, theFifth Circuit noted that the Mississippi
Supreme Court has not addressed whether
the voluntary payment doctrine precludes
recovery by an insurer that contests coverage
but nonetheless contributes to a settlement
on behalf of a purported insured. The Fifth
Circuit certified to the Mississippi Supreme
Court the following questions of law:
1. Does an insurer act under“compulsion” if it takes the legal
position that an entity purporting
to be its insured is not covered byits policy, but nonetheless pays asettlement demand in good faith to
avoid potentially greater liability
that could arise from a future
coverage determination?
2. Does an insurer satisfy the “legal duty”
standard if it makes a settlement
payment on behalf of a purported
insured whose defense it has
assumed in good faith, but whose
coverage under the policy has notbeen definitely resolved, even if theinsurer maintains that the purported
insured is not actually insured under
the policy?
We will keep you posted on any developmentsin this matter.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552846 and Elisa Alcabes
ealcabes@stblaw.com /+1-212-455-3133
with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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