Insurance Law Alert

March 2018

In This Issue
Ninth Circuit Predicts That California Supreme Court Would HoldThat Intentional Acts Cannot Be “Accidents” Regardless Of Insured’s
Reasonable Subjective Beliefs
The Ninth Circuit predicted that the California Supreme Court would rule that a policyholder’sintentional act cannot be considered an “accident” for coverage purposes, regardless of thepolicyholder’s subjective reasonable beliefs. Crown Tree Serv. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 2018
WL 1042673 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018). (Click here for full article)“Simpson Thacher
has many litigators
who are very experienced
in handling complex,
multi-faceted litigation
involving novel issues.”– Benchmark Litigation 2018(quoting a client)North Carolina Court Rules That Claims Arising Out Of Two Bridge
Collapses Are “Related” And Thus Subject To Single Claim Limit
A North Carolina federal district court ruled that an insurer was obligated to pay only asingle claim limit under a liability policy with respect to multiple claims arising from two
bridge collapses because claims arising out of the collapses were “related claims.” Stewart
Engineering, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 2018 WL 1403612 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2018).
(Click here for full article)

Finding Ambiguity, Nevada Court Rules That Per-Occurrence Limit Does
Not Apply To Policy Endorsement
A Nevada federal district court ruled that a policy was ambiguous as to whether a coverageendorsement was subject to the policy’s per-occurrence limit and thus construed the ambiguity
against the insurer. AIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1245488(D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2018). (Click here for full article)

California Court Refuses To Dismiss Suit Against Insurer Based On
Appointed Counsel’s Alleged Inadequacies
A California federal district court declined to dismiss a breach of contract claim against an
insurer based on the allegedly inadequate defense provided by appointed counsel. DiMuccio v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1382048 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018). (Click here forfull article)

Colorado District Court Rules That Failed Software Installation Is Not
Property Damage
A Colorado federal district court ruled that liability insurers had no duty to defend orindemnify claims arising out of the botched installation of a software system, finding no
physical injury to or loss of use of tangible property. Ciber, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2018 WL
1203157 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

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California Appellate Court Rules That Property Policy Does Not Cover
Losses Arising From Purchase Of Counterfeit Wine
A California appellate court ruled that a policyholder was not entitled to coverage under avaluable possessions policy for losses incurred as a result of the purchase of counterfeit wine,
finding no loss to property. Doyle v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1177929 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 7, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Tenth Circuit Rules That TCPA Damages and Injunctive Relief Are
Uninsurable Penalties, Not Covered Damages
The Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado federal district court decision holding that an insurer
had no duty to defend or indemnify claims that DISH Network violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act because relief under the statute is an uninsurable penalty rather thancovered damages. Ace American Ins. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2018).
(Click here for full article)

Trial Court Erred In Denying Insurer’s Fee Request Based On Nominal
Settlement Offer, Says Florida Appellate Court
A Florida appellate court ruled that a trial court erred in denying an insurer’s attorneys’ feerequest on the basis that the insurer’s nominal settlement offer was made in bad faith. Mount
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. New Moon Mgmt., 2018 WL 844131 (Fla. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2018).
(Click here for full article)

Tenth Circuit Rules That Equitable Contribution Claim Is Governed By
Statute Of Limitations For Contract, Not Equity, Claims
The Tenth Circuit ruled that an insurer’s complaint against another insurer, alleging equitable
contribution, was governed by Utah’s six-year statute of limitations for claims based on written
instruments, rather than the four-year statute of limitations for claims sounding in equity.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2018 WL 1388515 (10th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018).
(Click here for full article)

Texas Appellate Court Rules That Insurer Need Not Produce Engineering
Reports From Other Claims
A Texas appellate court ruled that an insurer was not obligated to produce engineering reports
used in evaluating other property damage claims, notwithstanding that the coverage dispute
before the court involved a report issued by the same engineering firm. In re Hanover Lloyds
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1127436 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Simpson Thacher News Alerts:
Click here to learn about Simpson Thacher’s recent insurance-related honors and publications.

2

Coverage Alert:

Ninth Circuit Predicts That
California Supreme Court Would
Hold That Intentional Acts Cannot
Be “Accidents” Regardless Of
Insured’s Reasonable Subjective
Beliefs
The Ninth Circuit predicted that the
California Supreme Court would rule thata policyholder’s intentional act cannot
be considered an “accident” for coveragepurposes, regardless of the policyholder’ssubjective reasonable beliefs. Crown TreeServ. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 2018 WL
1042673 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018).
The coverage dispute arose when apolicyholder was sued for removing treesthat he mistakenly believed were on his
property. A California federal district court
had ruled that his insurer need not defend
the suit because the policyholder’s conduct
was intentional and thus did not give rise to
an insured “occurrence.” The Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Acknowledging the inconsistencyof California appellate case law in thiscontext, the Ninth Circuit predicted that “theCalifornia Supreme Court would hold that aninsured’s subjective belief – no matter how
reasonable – cannot transform an intentional
act into accidental conduct.” The court further
held that the unclear status of case law on
this issue did not give rise to a “potential forcoverage” obligating the insurer to defend.

Policy Limit
Alerts:North Carolina Court Rules That
Claims Arising Out Of Two Bridge
Collapses Are “Related” And Thus
Subject To Single Claim Limit
A North Carolina federal district court ruledthat an insurer was obligated to pay only asingle claim limit under a liability policy withrespect to multiple claims arising from two
bridge collapses because claims arising out of
the collapses were “related claims.” Stewart
Engineering, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co.,2018 WL 1403612 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2018).

Stewart, an engineering company, wasretained to provide structural design
services for two pedestrian bridges. During
construction, both bridges collapsed,killing one worker and injuring several
others. Numerous individuals thereafter
sued Stewart. Stewart sought defense
and indemnity from Continental up to
the aggregate policy limit of $5 million.
Continental argued that its obligation was
limited to the $3 million per-claim limit.
The court agreed and granted Continental’ssummary judgment motion.

The court ruled that claims arising out of bothbridge collapses constituted “related claims,”
defined by the policy as “all claims . . . arisingout of: (1) a single wrongful act; (2) multiple
wrongful acts that are logically or causallyconnected by any common fact, situation,
event, transaction, advice, or decision.” Thecourt explained that even if the design failures
were considered separate wrongful acts, thoseacts were logically and causally connectedbased on common circumstances, events anddecisions. In particular, there was a single
contract for Stewart’s design services for bothbridges, and the same engineer of record andproject manager supervised both bridges.
The court noted that “[a]lthough there may
have been some different actors and decisions
involved in the design and construction of
Bridge 1 and Bridge 2, such differences do not
defeat a finding of relatedness.” In so ruling,
the court rejected Stewart’s assertion that therelated claim provision was ambiguous.

Finding Ambiguity, Nevada
Court Rules That Per-Occurrence
Limit Does Not Apply To Policy
Endorsement
A Nevada federal district court ruled thata policy was ambiguous as to whether acoverage endorsement was subject to the3policy’s per-occurrence limit and thus
construed the ambiguity against the insurer.
AIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1245488 (D. Nev. Mar.
9, 2018).

subject to the per occurrence limit,” but heldthat the ambiguity must be construed against
Liberty, as the drafter of the policy.

A hotel owner sued its contractors forproperty damage caused by construction
defects. The contractors were insured undera primary policy issued by Liberty and an
excess policy issued by AIG. Liberty tendered
its $2 million per-occurrence limit, arguingthat the property damage was caused by asingle occurrence. AIG sought a declarationthat there were multiple occurrences, andthus that its policy was not implicated until
Liberty paid its $4 million aggregate limit.
AIG additionally argued that a contractor’s
rework endorsement in the Liberty policy,
which provided coverage for the underlying
claims, was not subject to the per-occurrence
limit. The court agreed with this assertion andgranted AIG’s summary judgment motion.

Defense Alert:

The court concluded that Liberty’s policy was
ambiguous as to whether the contractor’s
rework endorsement was a separate insuringagreement that is not subject to the peroccurrence limit, or alternatively whether it
was a modification to the coverage set forthin Coverage A (which relates to coverage for“property damage”), and thus subject to the
per-occurrence limit. In finding ambiguity,
the court noted that the endorsement did notrefer to “occurrence” and did not indicatethat it was replacing any provision within
Coverage A. Further, the endorsement
contained its own insuring agreement that
did not define coverage with reference
to “property damage” and had its own
exclusions. The court acknowledged that“it may be a reasonable construction of thepolicy to conclude that the endorsement isjust another form of ‘property damage’ that is

California Court Refuses To
Dismiss Suit Against Insurer Based
On Appointed Counsel’s Alleged
Inadequacies
Last month’s Alert discussed an Eleventh
Circuit decision that held that even assuming
appointed counsel was negligent in defendinga policyholder, the insurer could not be held
liable, so long as counsel was competent andqualified. See Kapral v. Geico Indem. Co.,2018 WL 509308 (11th Cir. Jan. 23, 2018).
This month, a California federal district court
declined to dismiss a breach of contract claim
against an insurer based on the allegedly
inadequate defense provided by appointed
counsel. DiMuccio v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1382048 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
19, 2018).
Sherita Wicks was sued for her involvement
in an automobile accident. Geico initiallyrefused to defend but thereafter provided
a defense without a reservation of rights.
Geico appointed counsel who was identified
in various communications as a salaried
employee of GEICO and as “GEICO Staff
Counsel.” Once assigned, counsel failed to
oppose a pending summary judgment motion
or seek a continuance. When judgment was
ultimately entered against Wicks, counsel
failed to appeal or move to set the judgment
aside. Plaintiffs, as assignees of Wicks’
claims against Geico, sued the insurer for
failure to provide an adequate defense.
The court refused to dismiss the suit onsummary judgment.
The court explained that because counsel
represented himself as a Geico employee,
he could “hardly argue” that he was in thesame position as independent counsel, freefrom the control and direction of Geico.
The court found that issues of fact existed
as to whether Geico was responsible for its
counsel’s conduct in providing a defense. In
so ruling, the court highlighted the distinction
between independent counsel retained by aninsurer, and in-house staff counsel. Notably,
the Kapral court deemed that distinction
4

immaterial, explaining that “under Florida
law, an insurer has no more right to exercise
control over staff counsel’s professional
conduct and independent judgment thanit does over outside counsel’s conduct
and judgment.”

Property
Damage Alerts:

Colorado District Court Rules That
Failed Software Installation Is Not
Property Damage
A Colorado federal district court ruled thatliability insurers had no duty to defend orindemnify claims arising out of the botchedinstallation of a software system, finding no
physical injury to or loss of use of tangible
property. Ciber, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2018
WL 1203157 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2018).
The Hawaii Department of Transportation(“HDOT”) hired Ciber to install a new
financial management system on its
computers. The contract was terminatedwhen Ciber failed to complete the projectsuccessfully. In ensuing litigation, HDOT
asserted breach of contract and fraud claims
against Ciber. Ciber’s primary and umbrella
insurers refused to defend on several bases,
including the lack of property damage.
The court agreed and granted the insurers’
summary judgment motion.
The court held that allegations relating to thefailed software system did not allege a loss ofuse of tangible property. The court reasoned
that the claims were based on the software’s
inadequacies, not the loss of use of HDOT’s
computer system. The court distinguishedEyeblaster, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 613
F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2010), in which the court
concluded that software failure claims alleged
covered property damage. Unlike the present
case, the allegations in Eyeblaster included
claims relating to the loss of use of the entire
computer system as a result of failed software.
In addition, the court held that the underlying
claims did not allege physical injury to
the computer system. The court reasoned
that the loss of “programming and custom
configurations” does not constitute physicalinjury. Likewise, although HDOT claimed

damages for “infrastructure costs,” thecourt held that “there is no indication that
[infrastructure] refers to anything otherthan software.”

California Appellate Court Rules
That Property Policy Does Not
Cover Losses Arising From
Purchase Of Counterfeit Wine
A California appellate court ruled that apolicyholder was not entitled to coverage
under a valuable possessions policy forlosses incurred as a result of the purchase ofcounterfeit wine, finding no loss to property.
Doyle v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2018 WL
1177929 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018).
Doyle purchased consecutive valuable
possessions policies from Fireman’s Fund toinsure his rare wine collection. During thepolicy period, Doyle purchased nearly $18
million worth of purportedly vintage winethat he later discovered to be counterfeit.
When Doyle sought reimbursement for losses
arising from the counterfeit wine purchaseunder the policies, Fireman’s Fund denied
the claim on the ground that it did notpresent a covered loss under the policies. A
California trial court agreed and sustained
Fireman’s Fund’s demurrer. The appellate
court affirmed.
The policy covered “direct and accidental
loss or damage to covered property.” Thecourt concluded that there was no damage
to covered property because there was no
physical or other harm to the wine. The
court explained: “When Doyle purchased
the wine . . . it was counterfeit. The wine
remained counterfeit (and essentiallyworthless) throughout the entire coverage
period of the policy.” The court concluded
that the only loss was to Doyle’s finances andinvestment, which is not a covered peril undera property policy.
The court rejected Doyle’s assertion that his
losses were covered because the policy (1) was
not expressly limited to “physical” damages;and (2) did not list fraud as an exclusion. The
court explained that the fundamental natureof property insurance is to protect against
harm to property, not financial loss, and thatthe absence of a fraud exclusion is irrelevant
because Doyle failed to establish an initial
grant of coverage in the first place.

5

TCPA Alert:

Tenth Circuit Rules That TCPA
Damages and Injunctive Relief Are
Uninsurable Penalties, Not Covered
Damages
The Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado federal
district court decision holding that an insurer
had no duty to defend or indemnify claims
that DISH Network violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) because
relief under the statute is an uninsurable
penalty rather than covered damages. Ace
American Ins. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 883
F.3d 881 (10th Cir. 2018).
The United States and several states sued
DISH, alleging that it had violated the TCPA
and related state laws by making solicitation
calls to phone numbers on the Do Not Call
Registry. Plaintiffs sought statutory damages,
civil penalties and an injunction preventing
future TCPA violations. Ace filed a declaratory
judgment action, seeking a ruling that it
had no duty to defend or indemnify theclaims. A Colorado district court agreed andgranted Ace’s summary judgment motion.
Ace American Ins. Co. v. Dish Network,
LLC, 2016 WL 1182744 (D. Colo. Mar. 28,
2016) (see April 2016 Alert). The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that TCPA statutory
damages are penal in nature and thus
uninsurable under Colorado public policy.
The court rejected DISH’s argument that
portions of the TCPA were remedial (rather
than punitive) because they allowed fordamages representing “actual monetary loss.”
The court explained that even assumingthat the TCPA has both remedial and penal
components and that the remedial portions
could fall within insurance coverage, theunderlying complaint did not seek any
remedial actual damages. Additionally,
the court rejected DISH’s contention that
Colorado’s public policy against insuring
punitive damages was inapplicable because
at least some of DISH’s alleged conduct
was unintentional. The court explained:“If a distinction is to be drawn between
penal statutes that involve willful conduct
and penal statutes merely designed todeter, as DISH argues, ‘that decision is [theColorado Supreme Court’s] decision to make,not ours.’”

Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected DISH’s
assertion that injunctive relief under the
TCPA falls within the scope of insurable
damages. The court acknowledged that the
Colorado Supreme Court “has refused to
draw a bright line between legal remedies
and equitable remedies” in the context ofenvironmental remediation, but deemed
precedent in that context inapposite. The
court explained that equitable relief in thepollution context addresses already existingdamage (e.g., pollution), whereas here, theequitable relief sought against DISH aimed toprevent potential future damages.
The question of whether TCPA claims arecovered under a general liability policy
under Florida law is likely to arise in light ofa recent class action settlement in Horn v.
iCan Benefit Grp., LLC, No. 9:17-cv-81027(S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2018). A Florida federal
district court issued preliminary approvalof the settlement this month, setting thestage for coverage litigation between Liberty
International Underwriters, Inc., thecompany’s insurer, and the plaintiff class,assignees of the insurance benefits under
the policy. We will keep you posted on any
developments in this matter.
As discussed in previous Alerts, the Supreme
Courts of Illinois and Missouri have ruledthat TCPA damages were not uninsurable
punitive damages. See Standard Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Lay, 989 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. 2013) (June2013 Alert); Columbia Casualty Co. v. HIAR
Holding, L.L.C., 411 S.W.3d 258 (Mo. 2013)(Sept. 2013 Alert).

Attorneys’ Fee
Alert:

Trial Court Erred In Denying
Insurer’s Fee Request Based On
Nominal Settlement Offer, Says
Florida Appellate Court
A Florida appellate court ruled that a trial
court erred in denying an insurer’s attorneys’
fee request on the basis that the insurer’s
nominal settlement offer was made in bad
faith. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. New
Moon Mgmt., 2018 WL 844131 (Fla. Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 2018).

6

New Moon sought coverage from Mount
Vernon for water-related damage. Afterobtaining an engineering report, Mount
Vernon denied the claim based on policy
exclusions. New Moon sued the insurer,
alleging breach of contract and bad faith.
After nearly two years of discovery, Mount
Vernon made a nominal settlement offer of$1,000 and moved for summary judgment
as to coverage under the policy. A trial court
granted the motion. Thereafter, Mount
Vernon sought attorneys’ fees and costs under
Florida statutory law based on New Moon’s
failure to accept its settlement. The trial
court denied Mount Vernon’s motion for fees
and costs, finding that its settlement offer
was not made in good faith. The appellate
court reversed.
The appellate court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by ruling that thenominal settlement offer was not madein good faith. The court explained that
because the offer was made after two yearsof extensive discovery and was based onengineering and investigative damage reports,
Mount Vernon had a “reasonable basis” toconclude that its exposure was nominal.

Statute Of
Limitations Alert:

Tenth Circuit Rules That Equitable
Contribution Claim Is Governed By
Statute Of Limitations For Contract,
Not Equity, Claims
The Tenth Circuit ruled that an insurer’s
complaint against another insurer, alleging
equitable contribution, was governed by
Utah’s six-year statute of limitations forclaims based on written instruments, rather
than the four-year statute of limitations forclaims sounding in equity. Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2018 WL 1388515(10th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018).
When Red Point was sued for defective
design and construction of a condominium,
it sought general liability coverage from
Maryland Casualty and Mid-Continental.
Maryland Casualty defended Red Point,
while Mid-Continent refused on the basisof several policy exclusions. The underlying
suit was ultimately settled and Red Point

assigned to Maryland Casualty any claims
it had against Mid-Continent. Thereafter,
Maryland Casualty sued Mid-Continent
seeking a declaratory judgment as to coverage
and alleging claims for equitable contribution
and breach of contract. A Utah federal district
court granted Maryland Casualty’s summary
judgment motion, finding that Mid-Continent
had a duty to defend the underlying action
and that Maryland Casualty’s claims weretimely. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

The Tenth Circuit ruled that Maryland
Casualty’s complaint, including its equitable
contribution claim, was governed by(and timely under) the six-year statute oflimitations for written instruments. Rejecting
the argument that the four-year statute oflimitations for equity claims applied, thecourt held that all of Maryland Casualty’s
claims were “founded upon an instrument inwriting.” The court stated:
Were it not for Red Point’s policies with
Mid-Continent, Mid-Continent would
not potentially have a duty to defend
Red Point in the underlying action,
and Red Point would not potentiallyhave a claim against Mid-Continent
for failure to defend. . . . Further,were it not for Red Point’s policy
with Maryland, which contained thetransfer of rights provision, Maryland
would not potentially have the right torecover from Mid-Continent . . . . Thus,
Mid-Continent’s potential liability to
Maryland in this action grows directly
out of both policies.
The court distinguished Utah precedentholding that an insurer’s contribution claim
against another insurer sounds in equity,
explaining that such case law establishes
equity as an alternative avenue of recourse
against a fellow insurer in the absence of a7

contractual right to recovery, but does notstand for the proposition that equitable
contribution claims cannot be derived fromand founded upon written contracts.
The court also ruled that Mid-Continent’s
duty to defend was not negated by “YourWork” or “Impaired Property” exclusions.
The court held that even assuming that theYour Work exclusion barred liability for all
allegations relating to property damage to
Red Point’s own work or its subcontractors’
work, Mid-Continent still had a duty to
defend because the complaint also allegeddamage to other real and personal property.
The court further held that the Impaired
Property exclusion – which applies to claims
alleging loss of use of property – did not
eliminate coverage because the underlying
complaint included allegations of actual
damage, not just loss of use.

Discovery Alert:

Texas Appellate Court Rules
That Insurer Need Not Produce
Engineering Reports From Other
ClaimsA Texas appellate court ruled that an insurer
was not obligated to produce engineering
reports used in evaluating other property
damage claims, notwithstanding that thecoverage dispute before the court involved areport issued by the same engineering firm. In
re Hanover Lloyds Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1127436(Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2018).
Indoor Sports made a claim for property
damage to Markel Insurance, who retained
HAAG Engineering to investigate the claim.
HAAG concluded that a hail storm during thepolicy period was not large enough to havecaused the damage but that a storm during aprevious policy period (covered by Hanover)produced hail large enough to have caused
the damage. Indoor Sports then filed a claim
with Hanover, which also denied the claim on
the basis that a date of damage could not be
determined.

previous storm damage-related HAAGEngineering reports filed with Hanover.
Hanover refused to produce the documents.
A Texas trial court granted Indoor Sports’motion to compel and denied Hanover’s
motion to reconsider. A Texas appellate court
granted Hanover’s writ of mandamus.
The appellate court ruled that the trial
court abused its discretion by compelling
production of the HAAG Engineering reports
used by Hanover in deciding other claims.
The court concluded that the reports were notreasonably calculated to lead to the discoveryof relevant evidence, stating that “we fail tosee how Hanover’s use of HAAG Engineering
reports on claims of unrelated third parties
is probative of Hanover’s conduct withrespect to its handling of this claim.” Thecourt rejected Indoor Sports’ assertion thatthe reports established Hanover’s previous
reliance on HAAG Engineering in approving
claims and was thus probative as to thealleged unreasonableness of the investigationand denial in the present case.

Simpson Thacher
News Alerts:
Simpson Thacher’s Insurance Litigation
Practice received the National PracticeGroup of the Year Award at Euromoney’s
Benchmark Litigation 2018 Awards Dinner.
This is the sixth consecutive year that the
Firm was named the Insurance Firm of theYear. In addition, Mary Beth Forshaw was
shortlisted for the Insurance Lawyer of theYear, which she won in 2016.
Mary Beth Forshaw and Elisa Alcabes arecontributing co-editors of the recentlypublished Getting the Deal Through:Insurance Litigation (5th edition 2018),
which provides expert advice and insight into
contentious insurance issues in a variety ofinternational jurisdictions.

In ensuing litigation, Indoor Sports allegedthat Hanover’s denial was in bad faithbecause Hanover routinely relies on HAAGEngineering reports in evaluating claims.
Indoor Sports sought production of 50
8Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212455-2846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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