ISSN 1349-9904

Clinical Philosophy

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Formation of Sensibility in Mother-Child Relation: Temporal Dephazing
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   ʾžĠŐ 19 đFormation of Sensibility in Mother- Child Relation: Temporal Dephasing and Traumatic Displacement.
Irina Poleshchuk
Maternity and temporality

Being well known as a philosopher of radical responsibility for theother Levinas develops a model of intersubjective relation and its ethicaltemporality on the example of maternity. The mother-child relation is
described as a prototype of intersubjective relation, it is one-for-the-otherand other-in-the-same, i.e., being already affected by the other.

Maternal

subjectivity is unconditionally responsibility for the other, it is disclosed not
only as a metaphor to portray radicality of responsibility for the other but
also as a modality of ethical becoming.

This ethical becoming has aparticular structure of temporality: subjectivity is the one-for-the-other atthe very moment of the present but also is already for the other in the future,i.e., the futurity of responsibility is penetrating the present.
The ethical becoming is rooted first of all in sensibility, which has,according Levinas’s interpretation, intriguing features: taking various
interchangeable shapes it involves exposure, vulnerability, trauma but also
welcome and care. The maternal sensible embodiment shows that sensibility
has a double structure based on auto-affectivity and hetero-affectivity. The
hetero-affective sensibility is initiated by the other penetrating subjectivity
at the level senses: mother reacts on child’s needs, illness, pain or death. The
address of the other expels subjectivity depriving it from its locus thought asenjoyment and ‘furnishment of needs’, it is “no longer dwelling, not stomping
any ground” (Levinas, 2006, 49).

This is a displacement of the embodied

self, of the self as auto-affectivity and as affectivity of life itself might alsoquestion the validity of intersubjective temporality of mother-child relation.
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I believe that maternity is not only a form and a manifestation of radical
responsibility, but also traumatic bias and temporal dephazing which
describe a transformation of sensibility.
Let me start with developing Levinas’s original view on formation of
ethical temporality. The main focus of Levinas’s work Time and the Other is
how to preserve subjectivity in transcendence and, at the same time, not to
reduce the alterity of the other: “How can the ego that I am remain myself
in a you, without being nonetheless the ego that I am in my present – thatis to say, an ego that inevitably returns to itself? How can the ego become
other to itself?” (Levinas, 1985, 91). This question has a very explicit
temporal dimension. I reformulate it as the following: how to keep the ethicalmeaning of the presence of the future in the present and not reduce it to thesolitary life of subjectivity?

The answer is that subjectivity finds thisparticular modality in maternal relation.
The birth of a child breaks the time of subjectivity as continuity.
Levinas argues that the future of the child is “my own and non-mine, apossibility of myself but also a possibility of the other” (Levinas, 2004, 267).
In fecundity, given as a relation to the future, subjectivity can be saved fromthe endless repetition of oneself and from being attached to oneself. (Levinas,
1985, 92) But also in fecundity I find a birth of the other who is not mine andwho avoids any possession because in a child I go beyond the fulfillment of
all the possibilities of my own ego. The child as a result of the erotic situation
appears to be a specific locus of transcendence, where subjectivity while
preserving itself is given the possibility of not inevitably returning to itself.
The relationship with a child establishes an “absolute future”: a childis not a replication of the identical, because in the case of repetition thealterity of the other is totally neutralized. In fecundity it is preserved.
Because of infinite time, the subject transcends death through thediscontinuity of its transcendence to others. This peculiar modification of65

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temporality is not, however, an attempt to reclaim lost opportunities, it is
not to be in “search of lost time”.

It is rather the only possible actualizationof responsibility. The identical in this case is opposed to the true future —the future that is beyond the limits of its own predetermination.
We do not really encounter the term of the maternal subjectivity
Levinas’s texts, however, in Otherwise than Being of Beyond the Essence hespeaks about maternity as sensibility found inside subjectivity. There iscomplicated logic of alteration between immanence and transcendence
manifested as the other within subjectivity revealed as maternity: “it is being
torn up from oneself, being less than nothing, a rejection into negative,
behind nothingness; it is maternity, gestation of the other in the same”(Levinas, 2006, 75). In other words, starting from discussion of the erotic
relation (where auto-affective sensibility can still hold its strong locus) in

Totality and Infinity Levinas moves to ethical modality of maternal
subjectivity. He writes, “sensibility is being affected by a non-phenomenon,
a being put in question by the alterity of the other, before the intervention ofa cause, before the appearing of the other” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Here theaccent is put on the immediacy of body sensation which exposes one to thesignifying of the other as the-other-in-the-same. The-other-in-the-samemeans that “the subject is affected without the source of the affection
becoming a theme of representation” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Maternity, as
passing between being and transcendence, expresses a being affected by theother without having a source, and it is also structured as the-other-in-thesame. (Levinas, 2006, 78) Let me elaborate this argument.
In maternity female subjectivity acquires its interpretation as atemporalizing body and discovers a pre-ontological past: because the birth ofa child and an appeal of a child break temporal continuity of subjectivity andaffect subjectivity before it is aware of being responsible.
“The subjectivity of flesh and blood in matter – thesignifyingness of the sensible, the-one-for-the-other itself – is66

19the preoriginal signifyingness that gives sense, because it gives.
Not because, as preoriginal, it would be more original than theorigin, but because the diachrony of sensibility, which cannot be
assembled in a representational present, refers to an
irrecuperable pre-ontological past, that is of maternity”(Levinas, 2006, 78)
Subjectivity as one-for-the-other is born only in maternity, meaning
deposing itself, a deposing which, according to Levinas, is the very possibilityof giving. This giving could be described as a gift of my body, my food andclothes to the other before I have been born as a sensible subject, even before
my free will and without the possibility of being together since the other has
already marked me inside.
Thus, maternity means also welcome. I claim that in maternity
subjectivity already anticipates the appeal of the other which has not yet
come. My argument differs form Levinas’s which claims, as in the quotation
above, that maternity bears a sense of a pre-ontological past.

Maternity

gives also a new look on the future. I am welcoming the other by giving food,clothes and my body: “sensible experience as an obsession by the other, or amaternity, is already corporeality. …The corporeality of one’s own bodysignifies, as sensibility itself, a knot or a denouement of being. … one-forthe-other, which signifies in giving, when giving offers not the superfluxionof the superfluous, but the bread taken from one’s mouth. Signification
signifies, consequently, in nourishing, clothing, lodging, in maternal relation,in which matter shows itself for the first time in its materiality” (Levinas,
2006, 77). The gesture of giving signifies here a move towards the future but
the act itself of giving is formed as the present. I am giving my food to theother at the moment of now, but still, the origin of present and future is in
the other.
The mother-child relation is based on the sensible expressed insensibility, but it also goes beyond the sensible. In Levinas’s reading of67

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sensibility in intersubjective relation the sense bestowal is coming fromoutside. The transcendental character of sensibility is structurally
determined by the moment of contact with alterity of the child. The profoundnuance that Levinas is at pains to point out is that the contact itself should
not be read as the consciousness of contact, but rather subjectivity is
subordinated to that with which it is in contact. Thus, Levinas’s innovative
reading of sensibility tends to see sensibility as alterity, which facilitates ouropenness to exteriority. The innovation of Levinas’s analysis of sensibility isrooted in its openness to alterity happening in maternal relation. His goal is
to maintain otherness within the structure of sensibility. However, this
openness involves being vulnerable: sensible being is also simply dependent
being, being vulnerable in its sensibility, because in openness to the world
and together with enjoyment, subjectivity also experiences pain andsuffering, and hence it cares for its own protection in the world. This analysisof sensibility fundamentally problematizes subjectivity. Incarnated sensible
subjectivity also has the possibility of signification in the sense of donation.
However, this ethical gesture takes a radical form of irreversibility of
responsibility. Levinas argues that “the ego in itself like one is in one’s skin,that is to say, cramped, ill at ease in one’s skin, as though the identity ofmatter weighing on itself concealed a dimension allowing a withdrawal thisside of immediate coincidence” (Levinas, 1996, 86). To escape this coincidencewith its ipseity, the subjectivity has to move from the modality of “being-inone’s-skin”

to“having-the-other-under-one’s-skin.”1“Having-the-other-under-one’s-skin” conditions the constitution of ethical sensibility, whichleads directly to the non-coincidence with oneself.

Here, the initialdisplacement of the intentional consciousness is rooted in the embodied
sensibility: “in the form of corporeality, whose movements are fatigue andwhose duration is ageing, the passivity of signification, of the one-for-anotheris not an act, but patience, that is, of itself sensibility or imminence of pain”(Levinas, 2006, 55).
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The category of maternity got a different interpretation than thetemporal one. Furthermore, maternity is described as the archetype ofnourishment, i.e. a synthesis of the mother and the earth as providers of
feeding.2 There is also another crucial question which I would like just to
mention. The metaphor of maternity reveals also the mother-child relation
which is different from the father-child relation. In the father-child relation
subjectivity both remains itself and becomes other than itself: “Paternity is
the relationship with a stranger who, entirely while being Other, is myself,
the relationship of the ego with a myself who is nonetheless a stranger to me”(Levinas, 2004, 91). The male creates something outside of himself,
something “other” that will outline his own mortal body without making an
immediate claim on his autonomy. Yet, in the mother-child relation the childbelongs to the substance of the mother and it is of the mother. There is asharing of substance that finally leads to total substitution: in feeding themother gives herself to the child; it is one-for-the-other without keeping thesame but also torn inside out and displaced in the radicality of substitution.
Here the traumatic modality is more visible than in paternity since the very
core of sensibility as auto-affectivity is involved.
The general structure of the experience of maternity is built up upona tension arising between auto-affectivity, self-awareness and disrupted
temporal continuity grasped in memories and projections. This tension canbe expressed in language emphasizing eventually a meaning of ethicalbecoming of subjectivity. Maternity thus seems to bring subjectivity to thevery limits of rationality, language and self-consciousness. In Otherwise

than Being Levinas makes an interesting turn to the theme of the feminine,maternity and language. Maternity becomes appropriate for the signifyingof the sense - “bearing par excellence” (Levinas, 2006, 75). Here I find aremarkable change in the reading of the feminine – it is revealed as thesignifying par excellence of alterity, of subjectivity and of the saying.
Describing the feminine as the-other-in-the-same Levinas discovers the69

19ethical saying in the core of the said: “But the saying extended toward thesaid received this tension from the other, who forces me to speak before
appearing to me. The saying extended towards the said is a being obsessedby the other, a sensibility which the other by vocation calls upon and where
no escaping is possible” (Levinas, 2006, 77). Before the other appeals to me I
am already forced to answer, because in maternity subjectivity is disclosed
as being obsessed by the other and being a hostage of the other.
Giving, welcoming and deposing oneself are linked to the saying
within the said. Let me also add that maternity as subjectivity in absolute
exposedness to the other (to the child) is described by Levinas as speaking
to/for (Levinas, 2006, 92). It is a form of an ethical language the essence of
which consists in being silent and offering that silence as a gift for the otherand as being-for-the-other. This silent speaking is a fundamental passivity
that again indicates a non-intentional state of consciousness: “this passivity
is the way opposed to the imperialism of consciousness open to the world”(Levinas, 2006, 92).
Maternity, sensibility and dephasing

What we don’t see behind Levinas’s exposition of temporal structureof paternal relation as a radical form of responsibility is phenomenology ofpregnancy and gestation, which reveal the intensity of vulnerability inmaternal embodiment.
What is ‘how’ of subjectivity before it enters into mother-childrelation? Following Levinas’s description subjectivity is perceived as the one
who dwells, enjoys, and builds its life on eating and furnishing, who is ‘livingfrom the world’. In forms of dwelling and in “living from”, but also in such
existential modalities as at enjoying and bathing in the world, self-affectedsubjectivity is already determined as being here and as an embodiment,
which unfolds itself exactly in the present and it is possessing the very
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continuity of the present. In this phenomenological description ofsubjectivity proposed by Levinas I find a particular temporality deploying as
the being here of the body, and sketching its static character: subjectivity
constantly tends to localize itself as a center and as a privileged locus, whichis the way of how the body experiences to be at home (chez soi) and in theworld. Therefore, the self-affecting subject is a pure present, a temporalpunctum and a center in terms of space and time. In holding its locus, theself-affecting subjectivity is heading towards a temporal synchronizationthat soothe its interiorized habitation. The emphasis here is on autoaffection as the continuity of the self ’s inner-time and as a projectiveretentive temporalization of its being-in-the-world. The self-affectedsubjectivity naturally wants to return to the self, to be able to hold the coreof the self and to preserve it as an identity.

To leave its ecstatic andsometimes disturbing existence self-affecting subjectivity needs a refuge, apossibility of withdrawal, or a retreat into the locus. However, this autoaffective sensibility and this comforted embodied dwelling are displaced ingestation, pregnancy and maternity. Maternal subjectivity is foremostdephasing: neither in phase with its own affectivity, nor for the self and by
the self. Dephasing, brought by gestation and pregnancy, can contribute to a
description of a specific form of ethical intersubjective temporality, which hascomplex framework of intertwined “slices” of time invading subjectivity. Let
me examine this thesis in a more detailed way.
The very general structure of women’s experience of pregnancy andmaternity might be described as a transitional process towards the unknown.
The continuity of temporal move is constantly disturbed: the awareness ofthe past and the moment of the present are not necessarily connected andprojected, in an expected way, on the future which is still to come.

This

includes travelling from the past through the present toward the unknown
future. In the modi of gestation, pregnancy and maternity hetero affection isshaped by the alterity of the child, which becomes a primary clue for the71

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constitution of time. Subjectivity is affected not only by representations andimmanent affection (‘affection de soi par soi’) but also by the other
inseparable from maternal subjectivity, i.e. by “the-other-in-the-same”. Thus,
the dialectic relation between continuity and discontinuity, between
synchronized present and diachrony comes into play.
In the context of phenomenology the fascinating side of pregnancy andmaternity shows that subjectivity does not possess the intentioned object
and is not able to manipulate it. In process of gestation the child is not minein a complete comprehensive way and is not available for consciousness.
Being a kind of ‘in-between” phenomenon pregnancy is inwrought between
physical manifestation, cognitive and existential experiences. Here,sensibility of maternal subjectivity takes a different shape. In paternity father-child relation - the future of the child is the future of a stranger or of
the radical other. The danger is that the child still might be conceived as an
object of representation. In father-child relation the singularity of paternal
subjectivity is preserved while inside maternal subjectivity this singularity
is disturbed and shifted. But for maternal subjectivity the condition is rather
different: the child, whom she is expecting, will never be an object forconsciousness but only as the other (because it is also of-the-mother), whose
possibilities exceed what can be grasped in terms of her own.
Following Levinas’s description “the sensible-maternity, vulnerability,
apprehension – binds the mode of incarnation into a plot larger than theapperception of the self”. He argues that in the mode of maternity “I ambound to Others before being tied to my body” (Levinas, 2006, 76). In
pregnancy mother-child relation has a peculiar structure: the child is felt asa stranger, however, for the expecting mother the child is a ‘’familiar
stranger”, who is both of the mother and in oneself. In Totality and Infinity
Levinas develops the metaphor of maternity as an example of radical
responsibility for the other to reformulate a meaning of transcendence.
(Levinas, 2004, 267-269) Being a constant “growing up” maternity is felt as72

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a genesis of “experience” and is determined as a phenomenon that befalls
subjectivity before it is fully aware of it. Sensibility enters into
intersubjective field thanks to the ethical draw of the child. However, thisappeal of the child might also dissociate the sense of self-conformity andchallenges the assumption that subjectivity is always singular. The uniqueexperience of maternity, its vulnerability, is marked by the anarchic, preoriginal touch of the other, which would be otherwise lost in other types ofintersubjective relations. Thus, the relation between sensible subjectivity
and the child arrive at the high level of vitality because in different senses
and in different expressions the structure of embodiment consists at once ofthe mother’s and of the child’s and therefore singularity of subjectivity is
tuned into intersubjective sensibility.
This brings up the further consideration that maternal relation withthe child is going beyond any relation between two equal concepts of two
subjects, rather this relation is rooted inside subjectivity and it aims at theconstitution of ethical becoming of subjectivity. Subjectivity is extending
itself into temporality other than its own continuity. To have a child does not
literally mean to reproduce but to give birth to diachronical temporality, tothe future which is not fully mine but which invades my present. Subjectivity
is in a way split by the future that the child will open and develop. Many
feminists continue to see the pregnancy not only as a “split subjectivity” buta certain mode of sensibility in-between. This split is a diachronical rupture;
it is the future, which is not yet there, however, it establishes a link to ethicaltemporality.
In “Gender and Anonymous Temporality” Silvia Stiller writes, “it isdue to a woman’s awareness of pregnancy that they hold another genderspecific time experience. The pregnant woman experiences carrying
somebody in her body for nine months, waiting for the birth of her child,being patient, continually recognizing the changes in and of her body, thegrowth of her child, living an intense double life for a certain time period.
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(….) Women do indeed have a specific sense of temporality due to theirfemale bodies” (Stiller, 2011, 80). The auto-affective subjectivity is no longer
in continuity of the present, it is no longer dwelling at its locus but it is ahetero-affectivity in a mere transit phase of waiting for. This split of
temporality implies a common ontological ambiguity that is inherent to all
human conditions – alienation and freedom, immanence and transcendence,
singularity and intersubjectivity, the one and the other.
In a more dynamic approach to the problem of maternal subjectivity
Iris Marion Young notes: “The pregnant subject, I suggest, is decentered,split, or doubled, in several ways. She experiences her body as herself andnot herself. Its inner movements belong to another being, yet they are notother, because her bodily boundaries shift and because her bodily selflocation is focused on her trunk in addition to her head. (….) Pregnancy, I
argue, reveals a paradigm of bodily experience in which the transparent
unity of self dissolves” (Young, 2005, 46f).
Young offers the vision of pregnancy as transitional modality of “inbetween”. It is also a new mode of sensible embodiment of “in-between”. The
subject is not just split but rather diachronical and is in the mode ofintersubjective “in-between” happening inside constantly transforming
sensibility.

Julia Kristeva reinforces an image of pregnant subjectivity:“Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes, grow, tissues stretch, an body
fluids change rhythm speeding up or slowing down. Within the body, growing
as a graft, indomitable, there is an other. And no one is present within thatsimultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is going on. “It happens,but I’m not there.” “I cannot realize it but it goes on. Motherhood’s impossible
syllogism” (Kristeva, 1982, 237).3 For Kristeva pregnancy is a continuous
duality where the awareness of being oneself and of being the otherconstantly changes.
As it was described above in giving birth the horizon of perspective of
embodied subjectivity and its constitution of temporality are bound to the74

19modes that are not for subjectivity alone to make a choice. In this context
Beauvoir’s argument comes into play asserting that the birth involves anirreducible element of passivity from female subjectivity: “(She is) a
storehouse of colloids, an incubator, an egg; she scares children who areproud of their young, straight bodies and make young people tittercontemptuously because she is a human being, a conscious and free
individual who has become life’s passive instrument” (Beauvoir, 1956, 477).
This passivity meant that pregnancy and maternity are bound to immanenceof material presence because their biological bodies are becoming confinedboxes where possibility to escape and to free oneself is very little. However,I believe that there is a kind of dynamism present in unfolding maternal
body. The formation of gestation refers to such structure of temporality thatprecedes an origin of time rooted in existence of maternal subjectivity. The
growth of the child’s gestation in the body of a woman comes before anawareness of one’s maternal existence as belonging to oneself. In The Gift of

the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction Lisa Guenther fuses anconcept of pregnancy as extreme vulnerability with modality of ethicalwelcoming: “the expectant mother… bears this other who remains a stranger
despite he bearing, unseen and perhaps even violent: kicking at her ribs,
altering the shape of her body, shifting her bones from within. She bears thisweight of the Other for the sake of the Other in this bearing, she becomes
responsible for the child, for the child’s responsibility, and even for the painthat the child inflicts” (Guenther, 2006, 211).
I still want to articulate a complexity of vulnerability of maternal
embodiment. Before the child exists as the temporal continuum, i.e. as thepresent grasped in the world she or he already addresses maternal
subjectivity with demands. Lisa Guenther describes it in a very physiologicalway – child is kicking, squeezing and pressing against ribs of its mother. The
child is not only depending on maternal subjectivity but it also conquers her
body by creating space for its own existence within her body. By consuming
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and destroying mother’s body the child grows and gradually gains its
independency. Before the child starts to build it existence as a being-in-theworld it affirms itself through dependency, separation, address, response andcommand. One could already see that these types of relations create anarchic
conditions for the child’s future existence and establish a radical form of
responsibility as the one-for-the-other projected into the future.
There is an important point to stress.

For maternal subjectivity theprocess of gestation marks the immemorial irrecuperable lapse of time thatprevents subjectivity from prioritizing or imposing one’s own existence.
Levinas describes it as “a pre-original, not resting on oneself” (Levinas, 2006,
75). Obviously, gestation disrupts in advance the representation of birth as
imagined, fixed, chosen or produced, but also gestation crashes the residueof the self of subjectivity. Being pregnant the woman is exposed to the otherwhom she has never seen or met in the immediacy of modality of the face-toface situation but with whom she finds herself in the ultimate proximity. And
this is one of the most fascinating move in this anarchic form ofintersubjective mother-child relation: the face-to-face embodied encounter of
two, the gestating child and the pregnant woman happens only at the very
moment of birth, even if they have already been in the closest proximity to
one another.
Similar to the function of gestation, in its structure pregnancy refers
to an anarchic time that cannot be made entirely one’s own; it refers tospecific form of temporality as being for the other who is not yet-there but
who is still to come. Temporality of the child precedes temporal continuity ofthe mother, tearing it and creating temporal lapse. Thus, pregnancy isexperienced as already diachronical because subjectivity exceeds and breaks
up any continuity with the present grasped as its own. In other words, thenon-projected future of the child, the future that does not belong to me, but
for which I am nevertheless responsible brings forth the anarchy of ethicallife. This anarchy of responsibility initiates a form of dephasing where76

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maternal subjectivity is not coinciding with herself and is shifted from its
habitual locus. I want to stress here that these disruptions and shifting are
not the same as alientation, because the body that bears the child is still
itself but it does not belong to maternal subjectivity as well as it is not
becoming fully the property of the other. For Levinas being the-one-for-theother in proximity is “pure passivity or susceptibility, passive to the point of
becoming an inspiration, that is, alterity in the same” (Levinas, 2006, 67).
My argument is that brought by gestation and pregnancy the temporaldephasing happening within female embodiment opens up sensibility, which
is not entirely mine but shared.
To conclude I would like to advance an idea that in formation ofmaternal sensibility, ethical becoming is not an innate process of the self, nor
is it a conscious decision to take responsibility for its own actions according
to ethical norms of behavior. The-other-in-the-same is always more thansubjectivity can endure. Responsibility befalls the subject with the demand“bear me”.

When Levinas says that maternity as a metaphor of ethicalresponsibility is the figure of “bearing par excellence”, he articulates thecomplex meaning of receiving, carrying, sharing, donating, and welcoming
which are in the anarchy of gestation and birth. Ethical bearing does notrefer to the present as re-presented but rather to the gift of time. To
paraphrase Derrida to be responsible is to think time of responsibility as
donation of my present and of my future, which are not at my possession.
Even though the donation of time does not belong to the subjectivity in full
sense, this gift of time happens in intersubjective and shared sensibility ofthe mother-child relation.

The advantage of Levinas’s description ofmaternity is that he attempts to get closer to what takes place in theexperience of ethical becoming of subjectivity. He widens conceptual
meaning of temporal structures of sensibility by bringing it from autoaffective state to hetero-affection and to vulnerability of gestation andmaternity, and finally, as I believe, to a shared intersubjective sensibility.
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References-

Beauvoir, Simone de. 1956. The Second Sex. Translated by Parshley H.M. London,
Jonathan Cape.
Guenther, Lisa. 2006. The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Kristeva, Julia. 1982. “Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini” in Desire in Language:
A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Edited by Rouddiez L. S. and Translated
by Gora T. New York: Columbia University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1985. Time and the Other. Translated by Cohen R. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1996. Basic Philosophical Writings. Edited by Peperzak A. T.,
Simon Critchley S., and Bernasconi R. Translated by the editors. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 2004. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Lingis A. Duquesne
University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 2006. Otherwise than Being or Beyond the Essence. Translated by
Lingis, A. Duquesne University Press.
Stiller, Silvia. 2011. “Gender and Anonymous Temporality” in Time in Feminist
Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Young, Iris Marion. 2005. “Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation”, in On
Female Body Experience: Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays, Oxford University
Press.

Notes
1. Levinas does not explicitly use the phrase “having-the-other-under-one’s-skin”; however, in Otherwise
than being or beyond the Essence, he describes a traumatic experience of embodied subjectivity being
marked by and exposed to the other as being turned inside out and as having the other on the other sideof one’s skin (Levinas, 2006, 48-51). I introduce a modality of “having-the-other-under-one’s-skin” toconceptualize the work of affection, which is close to what Levinas uses as the other-in-the-same.
2. I should also mention a biblical reference in the story of Ruth, which links maternity withnourishment and hospitability. This aspect was discussed by Claire Elize Katz in the essay“Reinhabiting the House of Ruth” in Feminist interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas. The author
makes an interesting point in interpreting the feminine: she discloses the woman as formation of
the ethical I, and as the condition of the ethical.
3. Kristeva reveals pregnancy as a mean to question social structures and institutions, opening
horizons to conceptualize varieties of woman’s practices in intersubjective relations.

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On Dis/Ability in Husserl’s Phenomenology
HAMAUZU, Shinji
Introduction

Since publishing my dissertation entitled Husserl’s Phenomenology ofIntersubjectivity in 1995 (Sobunsha, Tokyo), I have been engaged in dealing
with the issues regarding “Caring” as a concrete field of intersubjectivity,
especially after I began to teach the “Clinical Philosophy” seminar at Osaka
University, Japan. From such a background I shall re-read Husserl’s
phenomenology and suggest how we can develop a phenomenology of
Dis/Ability and Ab/Normality based on it. I intend to neither stay rigidly
within the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, nor go far beyond it. I’ll
examine carefully the possibility of Husserl’s phenomenology on these
problems1.
1. “I live”

In his “Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook” of Ideas Vol.1(1912)
Husserl described his idea of “natural attitude” by using the Cartesian word“cogito”, but immediately re-defined it as “the fundamental form of all‘wakeful (actual)’ living”(III, 59) and, instead of “ego sum, ego cogito” hewrote “I am, this life is, I live: cogito”(III, 97) and called it “the flowinglife”(ibid.). However, what does “living” and “life” mean in this context? What
did he mean with these words? Usually we would answer, living means
breathing, eating, drinking, discharging, sitting, walking, etc. These actions
are related to physical sides of living and can’t happen without my body.
Living means further feeling, willing, thinking, remembering, expecting, etc.
These actions are related to mental sides of living. We might also say that79

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living means talking to others, listening to others, discussing with others,playing something with others, etc. These actions have a physical andmental relationship to others.
Whereas bodily actions are performed in space and time, mental
actions are performed mainly only in time. Life has not only spatial aspects
in the expanse, but also temporal aspects in the flawing. Husserl understood
the term “cogito” in a wider sense than Descartes did, and Husserl did not
develop a body-mind dualism from the “cogito” by seeing the “cogito” only asa mental aspect in “cogito”. Rather, Husserl saw the “cogito” as offering a
notion of “life”. When he talked about “intentionality” as the fundamental
idea of phenomenology, he used often the word “consciousness”, as follows:“We understand under intentionality the peculiarity of lived experience(Erlebnis) to be ‘consciousness of something’”(III, 188). However later, e.g. in
his manuscript for To The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity(1920, XIII, 71
et passim) or in his lecture The First Philosophy (1923, VIII, 120 et passim),
he paraphrased it with the coinage “consciousness-life”(Bewußtseinsleben).
Thus he had a tendency to use the word “life” or “living” instead of “thinking”
for “cogito”.
2. “Actuality and potentiality”

What does Husserl’s usage of phrases like “all ‘wakeful (actual)’ living”
instead of “cogito” mean? Husserl thought that “cogito” in a narrow sense isperformed in “actuality”, but “cogito” in a wider sense includes “inactuality(potentiality)” as well. He wrote: “Cogito means ‘I perform an act ofconsciousness.’ In order to keep this fixed concept we reserve the Cartesian
expression of cogito.”(III, 73) Cogito in a narrow sense means for him, only
such a performative act in actuality, but doesn’t cover all lived experience orconsciousness-life in actuality as well as potentiality. So, he wrote: “Theactual lived experiences are surrounded by a ‘garden(Hof)’ of inactual lived
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experiences. The stream of lived experiences can’t composed only of
actuality.”(ibid.) In this context he introduced the important words such as“garden”, “background” and “horizon”.
Husserl wrote: “The actually perceived, the more or less clear present
together, is partly accepted and partly surrounded by a darkly being
conscious horizon of undefined reality. … The undefined surroundings are
infinite. There is necessarily a hazy and never fully defined horizon.”(III, 57)
Or, in other words including an example: “The grasping is a grasping out,
each perceived thing has a background of experience. Around the paper there
are books, pencils, inkpot, etc. in a certain sense of ‘perceived’ there in thefield of intuitions.”(III, 71) The fundamental concept of intentionality is now
understood in a wider sense, and such understanding includes the conceptsof actuality and potentiality as well. Therefore Husserl wrote: “Even if theintentionality is not ‘performed’ in the special modality of actuality, it can bealready ‘stirred’ in the ‘background’ without being performed.”(III, 189) Laterhe called it “horizon-intentionality”(XVII, 207).
From his lecture Thing and Space (1905), seven years earlier than

Ideas Vol.1 (1912), I would like add some passages regarding the theme of“horizon”: “The thing has more than the perceived or appearing front side in
the sense of perception. … Original appearance and unoriginal appearance
are not separated, but united in the appearance in the wider sense.” (XVI,50) “To the appearance it belongs that the visible refers to the invisible.”(XVI,245) However, how is the perception of the “horizon” in potentiality possible?
Take this example: there is a house in front of me. I am looking at the frontof the house and from here I can see neither the side nor the back of it. But
if I can go around, I can see both. This example brings us to the problem of“I as lived body (Ichleib)”(XVI, 10, et passim). There are two relevant andimportant points which he developed in this lecture: On the one hand:“Perception of things is perception of what is grasped out from thebackground.” This is the point I have just mentioned in Ideas Vol.1. On the81

19other hand: “Perception has a relationship to my lived body (Ichleib).” (“EgoBody” in translation by Rojcewicz; but in original German word
“Ichleib”)(XVI, 10). Now I would like to go onto the second point: my lived
body.
3. “My lived body (Ichleib)”

In the lecture Thing and Space, Husserl developed the idea of “my lived body”
as follows: “A perceived thing is not alone for itself, but stands before eyes
midst a certain intuitive circumstance of things. For instance the lamp
stands on the table midst books, papers and other things. The physicalcircumstances are similarly perceived. … My lived body (Ichleib) belongs tothese things which are perceived together.” (XVI, 80) Everything around meis relate to my body. “It [The lived body] stands there as the always staying
point of relationship. … It defines right and left, front and back, above andbelow. It takes a special position in the perceived world of things.”(ibid.)
Husserl emphasized the peculiarity of my lived body among otherthings around me. “On the one hand the lived body is a thing as well, aphysical thing as other things. … It is a thing midst other things. On theother hand this thing is just lived body, bearer of I. … The constitution ofphysical things is intertwined with the constitution of my lived body (Ichleib)in a strange correlation.”(XVI, 162) Because my lived body takes a special
position and is located in a special place (here), a thing lying far away can beseen only as a small thing in a distance and only in one side. If I can approach
to it and go around it, I am able to see it in details and with multiple sides,
and in some case look into it, touch it and analyze it, and then I see what thething originally is. (cf. XVI, 115f.)
In order to see a thing in details, “the thing must be turned or pushed,
or I must move me, my eyes, my lived body, go around it, approach it and gooff.”(XVI, 155) My lived body is not a simple thing among other things, but
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is an “organ” with which I can see, hear, feel, smell, go and move. It is anorgan of my perception. “The eyes can move, the head, the upper body, etc,
as well. … Important is the ‘moving itself ’, which is expressed in thekinesthetical senses.”(XVI, 158) The term “kinesthese” was also an
important coinage composed of “kinesis(movement)” and “aesthesis (sense)”
which Husserl borrowed from the contemporary psychology and changed it
into a phenomenological concept. That is, so to speak, no senses I feel atthings, but senses I feel with my moving my own lived body.
He wrote: “The touching hand ‘seems’ as having sense of touch.
Directed to the touched object smoothness or roughness seems as belonging
to it. I look after the touching hand, it has the sense of smoothness ofroughness, and it has them at the appearing fingertips. … If I touch the righthand with the left hand, the appearance of the left and right hand constitutes
itself alternately with senses of touch and kinesthese, the one moving on
another.”(XVI, 162) He continued: “Here is important that the constitutionof physical things is intertwined with the constitution of my lived body(Ichleib) in the strange way.”(XVI, ibid.)
Husserl developed the idea of “lived body” further about ten years laterin the manuscript of Ideas Vol.2. “The lived body (Leib) is the medium of allperceptions and the organ of perception. It is necessarily present in allperceptions.”(IV, 56) The lived body is no dead body or thing, but the living
body which is functioning in the center of my perception. “The lived body
becomes the bearer of the point of orientation, the zero point, and of here andnow, from which the pure I gets intuitions of the space and the whole worldof sense. Therefore each appearing thing has in itself a relation of orientation
to the lived body, and not only the really appearing thing but also each thingwhich can appear.”(ibid.) “I have all things oppositely, they are ‘there’ - witha sole exception of the lived body which is always ‘here’.”(IV, 159)
My lived body stays in the center of my perception, even if I move with
it. Husserl wrote: “Whereas I have against all other things the freedom to83

19change my stand point to them voluntarily, I have no possibility to removeme from my lived body. Therefore, the variety of possibilities as to how the
lived body may appear is limited. I can see only the certain parts of the bodyin a special shortening of perspective and the other parts (e.g. the head) areunseen at all for me. The same body which serves me as medium of allperceptions stands me on my way of perception and is a strangely
imperfectly constituted thing.”(IV, 159)
Merleau-Ponty, who read Husserl’s manuscript of Ideas Vol.2 at the
Husserl Archive in Leuven, quoted in his Phenomenology of Perception as
follows: “I have appearance of touch by touching the left hand. Namely I don’t
only feel, but perceive and have appearance of a soft and such and suchformed smooth hand. … But by touching the left hand, I find there a seriesof senses of touch which are localized there. … If I speak of physical thing‘left hand‘, I ignore these senses. … If I add them to it, the physical thing
doesn’t get rich, but it becomes a lived body, it senses.”(IV, 145) A lived body
is not only an object as a thing similar to other things in surroundings, butalso a medium with which I can sense and move, further a living body, i.e. a
subject which senses and moves.
4. “I can”

In connection with the idea of “lived body (Leib)”, Husserl often used also theexpression “I can (Ich kann)”. E.g. in Ideas Vol.2: “The subject has‘ability(Vermögen)’(I can) to move the lived body freely and to perceive theouter world through it.”(IV, 152) In the paragraph 59 titled with “The I as
subject of ability(Vermögen)”, Husserl wrote: “The I as unity is a system of ‘I
can’. There it is to distinguish between the physical and the physicalmediated ‘I can’ and the mental ‘I can’. I have an ability on my body, am theone who moves and can move this hand. I can play piano.”(IV, 253f.)
Nevertheless, it doesn’t mean that I can always do so, but sometimes I can’t
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do it. He continued: “But it doesn’t work always. I forgot playing it again andam out of practice. I learn my body. … But if I am ill for long time, I must
learn going and come into it soon. But if I am mentally ill (nervenkrank), I
lost control of parts of my body. ‘I can’t’. In this sense I became another.”(ibid.)
In this context Husserl discussed many issues regarding “ability” also
in relationship to actuality and potentiality, as follows: “The mental I can be
grasped as an organism of ability (Vermögen) with its development in anormal typical style, namely with steps of children, youth, ripeness andelderly. The subject ‘can’ be various and is defined according to its ability
through stimulus and actual motive to do. It is always active according to its
ability and changes, gets rich, strong or weak always through its activity.
The ability is no empty ‘can’, but a positive potentiality which comes into
actuality and is always ready to go to activity.” (IV, 254f.) I am not always
able to do something and I change from potentiality to actuality and viceversa, and change from inability to ability vice versa.
Husserl continued: “At last everything is sent back to primary ability(Urvermögen) of subject and then to acquired ability, sprung from the earlier
actuality of life. The I as a person constitutes itself in the original genesis
not only as impulsively defined personality, from the beginning and always
impulsed by original ‘instincts’ and following them, but also as higher,
autonomous, free active, especially lead by motive of reason.”(IV, 255)
Husserl initiated here the idea of a genetic phenomenology which hedeveloped later.
Husserl characterized “able / capable” as a practical possibility andsaid: “What I can, am able to, am capable for, what stands for me consciously,
is a practical possibility.”(IV, 258) Then he continued: “In the experience the‘I can” and “I can’t” are distinguished according to it’s phenomenologicalcharacter. There is an action without opposition or a consciousness of ability
without opposition, and an action with overcoming of opposition. … There is85

19

a degree of opposition and power of overcoming. The opposition can beirresistible. Then we are pushed to ‘it doesn’t work’, ‘I can’t’, ‘I don’t have thepower’”.(IV, 258f.) Husserl mentioned here my today’s theme of “ability andinability or disability” which I have according to the situation.
5. “Capability” (Vermöglichkeit)

In this context Husserl discussed “can” and “ability” in various passages, e.g.:“All my ‘can’(Können) in the physical sphere is mediated by my ‘bodily
activity (Leibesbetätigung)’ and by my physical ‘can’(leibliches Können) andability(Vermögen).” (IV, 259) However, I’m not always able to do something,or sometimes am unable or disable to do a certain thing, e.g. as follows: “Myhand falls asleep. — now I can’t move it, it is benumbed temporarily. …The
hand puts aside something that stands on the way, ‘it works’. Sometimes it
works ‘with difficulty’, ‘with less difficulty’, ‘without resistance” and it
doesn’t work sometimes. The opposition is unovercoming in spite of allendeavours.”(ibid.) Then he concluded as follows: “It is of importance to bringout the contrast between the possibility in the sense of mere ‘logical’possibility and the practical possibility of ‘can’ (Können) with examples.” (IV,261)
Husserl mentioned later, e.g. in The Crisis of European Sciences (1938)(VI, 164 et passim), this practical possibility of the “can” or possibility basedon ability with his coinage “Vermöglichkeit”. This is a compound word
composed of “be able to (Vermögen) and possibility (Möglichkeit) and I would
like to translate it with the English word “capability”. If I can make a bridge
between the idea of the “lived body”, “horizon”, “potentiality” and “capability”,
I would say, inactuality of horizon means potentiality and possibility, e.g. “I
can go further”. It is no empty logical possibility, but the “capability”(Vermöglichkeit) motivated by “I can go” with my kinesthetic lived body. The
horizon is thus a “playing space” (Spielraum) of the possible and physical86

19experience. It has a relationship to “my lived body (Ichleib)” as the “zeropoint” of orientation and perspective.
It means, however, that the horizon is not only opened by capability,
but also is limited by or depends on my capability of e.g. “I can go”. If I could
add the above mentioned genetic phenomenology to this point, I would saythat this horizon has diversity according to the steps of my development fromchildhood, youth to elderly and my conditions as healthy, sick, fatigue, awake
or asleep. And each of us human beings has a different ability or disability,
a different way of going, seeing, hearing and smelling. We all have different
horizons, and how they differ depends on our own dis/ability.
6. “Normality and abnormality”

In this context, Husserl sometimes mentioned the dichotomy of the“normal / abnormal”, and “normality and abnormality” which he used often
in his posthumous manuscripts To Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity (XIIIXV). We should examine this dichotomy carefully, because he introduced itin order not to discriminate, but to develop his genetic phenomenology. He
wrote: “Abnormality is a modification of normality, stands out from it, andcomes to it. … Each subject has his normality within which abnormality
emerges as a certain style of disturbing”(XV, 154) He continued: “Normality
has various forms and steps which belong to the constitution of humanbeings where he or she ‘becomes” him- or herself and from child to normal
ripe man or woman.”(ibid.) “Child” could be characterized as abnormal onlyin contrast to ripe normal adult. Abnormality is a relative concept which canbe defined in contrast to normality.
Abnormality as well as normality has various steps. Husserl wrote:“The steps of normality and abnormality correspond to the steps ofconstitution of beings. The world constituted in the normality is constituted
as world including the abnormality. … Each normal subject has occasionally87

19

abnormal deviations from his normal experience.”(XV, 155) As examples ofabnormality Husserl sometimes uses the terms “children”, “crazy”, “disease”,“sleep”, “loss of consciousness” and “animals”. He introduced these examples
not in the sense of discrimination, as something apart from normality, but asvarious “modifications”, “steps”, “changes” of normality. We ourselves could
be developed from such abnormality and could fall into such abnormality.
Therefore, Husserl introduced the genetic method which he called“Abbau”(XV, 133) and could be translated with the English word
“deconstruction”. According to this method, by imagining a step where somedimension of the normal constitution which the world lacks, we can imagine
the world of above mentioned abnormality such as “crazy”, “disease”, “sleep”,“loss of consciousness”, etc. This is so to speak, a method to understandabnormality as a modification of normality. Husserl understood thedichotomy of normality and abnormality rather in relativity. He wrote:“Abnormal people are only abnormal regarding to a definite layer ofcharacteristics of normal common world, whereas they have experienceotherwise in total harmony with normal people and are normal in otherpoints.”(XV, 158)
We could understand this relativity of normality and abnormality fromthe point of view of ability and disability. Normality is characterized byability by which someone is able to do something as normal people, whereas
abnormality is characterized by disability by which someone is disabled, andthat disability prevents them from doing something as normal people. If I
fall in the situation of abnormality, I’m not able to do what I was able to do
in my normality. Husserl wrote in a text: “I become somehow sick. From theinner side I have a lived experience as abnormal. Because of continuing of
bad feelings I get consciousness of weakness such as disability for moving ina normal way, performing my familiar ability and gathering my thoughts. I
feel the disappearance of my consciousness.”(XLII, 2) In my abnormal
situation of sickness I lost my ability I have in normal situation.
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My ability could open my horizon and “life-world” as “a horizon ofhorizons”, whereas my lost of ability namely my disability could limit my“life-world”. The extent of my “life-world” depends on my ability anddisability. Husserl mentioned “adult” and “children”, as another example fornormality and abnormality. This should be understood in terms ofdevelopment and the genetic phenomenology. Genetic phenomenology
should cover not only issues of development and genesis, i.e. how we getability and normality, but also issues of ageing and losing them, i.e. how welose ability and normality and fall into disability and abnormality, what we
could call a de-genetic phenomenology or a phenomenology of decline2. And
what is interesting for me is that Husserl introduced the issues of “birth anddeath”(XV, 138 et passim) in this context, namely as an extreme pole ofabnormality. He characterized both extreme cases as “problems of border”(cf.
XLII) with which the phenomenological method can’t cope well.
Husserl asked himself: “Now it is important to set world, birth anddeath seriously in the essential relationship and to show how far they are
not only a fact and how far a world and humans without death isunthinkable.”(XV, 172) I myself am also interested in the issues of “ageing
and death” because Husserl wrote: “AlsoI

myselfwill

die -- likeI

was once born, developed into adulthood and got old. But the question is,what this means.”(XXIX, 332) I myself have been interested in the issues of“birth, ageing, disease and death” in Buddhist ideas. In his latemanuscript(1930/31), Husserl himself used terms “birth, ageing, disease,
death”(XV, 168). However, these themes would go beyond today’s theme andshould be discussed in another chance.
Closing words: Intersubjectivity of dis/ability

In ending this talk I would like to mention the theme of intersubjectivity of
dis/ability in Husserl’s phenomenology. As said previously, he discussed
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normality and abnormality in relativity, namely we can talk about normal
and abnormal only in relationship to each other. Then we should discuss thecontrast between ability and disability in relationship to each other as well.
Dis/ability is not a characteristic which individuals possess by him- or herself
without any relationship to each other. I’ve tried to translate Husserl’scoinage “Vermöglichkeit”, i.e. possibilities based on ability with “capability”.
Also this concept should be understood not as something belonging toindividuals, but something characteristic of relationships or circumstanceswhere individuals are living. Although we can’t find in my opinion so muchpassages leading to this thought in Husserl’s text, it is important andremarkable that he discussed issues of dis/ablity in the context ofphenomenology of intersubjectivity.
Discussion

Q1: You say that each individual develops his own horizon and on someoccasions you also say that each individual develops his own life world. Thissounds strange to me since the life world is precisely the intersubjective,
horizontal meaning structure that serves as background for the lived bodily
focus of my experiences. The life world does not admit of any plural as
Husserl writes in the Krisis. Maybe we can talk about a homeworld of apeople in contrast to a world of foreigners as Husserl did sometimes, orpluralize the life world as “working world”, “family world” ect. as in Schutz,
but surely we cannot talk about one life world for each individual. As I
understand it, what is individual in the experienced ability case is the way
each person makes himself at home in a world that also belong to others, notthe life world itself. What do you intend here?
A1: Thank you so much for your helpful comment to develop my idea! Youare right, that I used the term “lifeworld” in a little deviated way from90

19

Husserl in the Krisis, and that it would be better to use e.g. the term
“homeworld”. But, about 40 years ago Ulrich Claesges pointed out the
ambiguity or double meaning of the term “lifeworld”. However against his
critique I was of the opinion, that almost every phenomenological term could
be ambiguous with double meaning according to natural attitude ortranscendental attitude. Especially if we contrast the lifeworld with naturalscientific world in the transcendental attitude, as in the Krisis, we should
talk one single and intersubjective lifeworld. On the contrary, when Husserl
talks in the natural or personalistic attitude in the Ideas II, he could say
different “lifeworlds” in plural. Moreover about 20 years ago I was engaged
in the relationship between Husserl and Schutz, I got my opinion that thenatural attitude and the transcendental attitude can be interpreted in anreciprocal relationship, and that Husserl’s interpretation of lifeworld in thetranscendental attitude and Schutz’s interpretation of lifeworld in thenatural attitude could be complemented each other. In addition, in last 6
years I was engaged in collaboration with researchers from various empiricalfields such as medicine, sociology, caring science, antholopology and so on.
From this collaboration I am tended to emphasize the term lifeworld in thenatural attitude. Today’s talk had also such tendency.
Q2: Your presentation of normality and abnormality in the talk seems to beabout health and illness issues rather than about social and cultural norms.
What do you think about the possibilities of upholding distinctions between
health norms that mainly concerns lived, bodily capabilities and socialcultural-moral norms that are found in the shared life world? From a
Foucauldian point of view all normality claims could be viewed as repressive
structures that have a cultural rather than biological origin. Could the
Husserlian take on normality preserve some kind of difference between
being unhealthy and being politically repressed when experiencing inability?

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A2: Yes, in my talk today I focused on the personal side of normality andabnormality including health and illness following Husserl’s discussion, andnot on the social and cultural side of them, because Husserl himself in myopinion didn’t develop the social and cultural aspects of the problem deeply,as I touched the lack of intersubjective dimension of normality andabnormality in Husserl’s texts at the closing words of my talk. And as said
there, I think that this idea of normality and abnormality should go beyond
the limitation of Husserl’s ideas, what I could not develop further in today’stalk.
Q3: Another issue that bothers me is if the individualized capabilities of aperson do not presuppose some kind of limits that are provided by the bodyitself on the one hand and our shared ways of making ourselves at home inthe life world on the other. In other words, if health from thephenomenological perspective is an individualized norm and not a biologicalnorm does it not nevertheless presuppose certain limits of each individual
normality provided by the body itself (whatever that means)?
A3: Yes, I did mention some of such limitation, but didn’t mention the limitsof capability or individual normality so much. However, I do think that we
can imagine such limits easily. E.g. I can walk, run and swim, but I cannot
fly without any artificial equipments, neither run in 100 m per one second,nor dive without breathing 1 hour, because of our lack of capability based on
our biological body. According to Husserl’s idea in my today’s talk the norms
of normality and abnormality are understood as an individualized norm, but
not as an social or cultural, therefore intersubjective norm. Limits ofnormality and abnormality could be understood based on individual andbiological dimension on the one hand, based on social and culturaldimensions on the other.

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Q4: Finally, I think your interest in the role of birth and death from theperspective of health and normality are interesting, but I wonder if it iscorrect to call these issues “extreme poles of abnormality”, are they notrather liminal experiences, fundamental border experiences that lend
significance to the streaming life of consciousness as a whole? Birth anddeath are indeed not abnormal, but very normal for us, at least if we havenot become transhumanists and believe in a future life as cyborgs orcomputers who do not have parents and will never die.
A4: Yes, birth and death can be called “extreme poles of abnormality” only if

we talk from my first person perspective and start with normality with which
I am accustomed to live in everyday life. However, if we talk from the third
person perspective about human beings, birth and death are totally normal
just “for us”, but not abnormal, neither liminal. We can observe birth anddeath of second and third person, but never birth and death of myself frommy first person perspective. In this sense phenomenological research on
birth and death is limited, they are talked only as liminal experiences.
Bibliography-

Beauvoir, Simone de (1970). La vieilllesse, Gallimard.
Hamauzu, Shinji (1995). Husserl’s Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, Sobunsha.
--------------- (2013). “Caring und Phänomenologie - aus der Sicht von Husserls
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Soziale Erfahrung, Phänomenologische Forschungen, Im Auftrage der Deutschen
Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung, hrsg. von Karl-Heinz Lembeck, Karl--

Mertens und Ernst Wolfgang Orth, 2013.
--------------- (2014). “Towards a Phenomenological Approach to the Problem of Organ
Transplantation after Brain Death”, Kwok-ying Lau / Chung-Chi Yu (Eds.), BORDERCROSSING - Phenomenology, Interculturality and Interdisciplinary, Orbis
Phaenomenologicus, Königshausen & Neumann, 2014.
Husserl, Edmund: (1973). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge,
Husserliana Bd.I, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1976). Ideen zu reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie,
Erstes Buch, Husserliana Bd.III/1, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1991). Ideen zu reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie,
Zweites Buch, Husserliana Bd.IV, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1976). Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie, Husserlina Bd.VI, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Erstes, Zweites und

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-

Drittes Buch, Husserliana Bd.XIII-XV, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1973). Ding und Raum, Vorlesung 1907, Husserliana Bd.XVI, Den Haag,
Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (1993). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband, Husserliana Bd. XXIX, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
--------------- (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Husserliana Bd. XLII, New York,
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Käll, Lisa Folkmarson (2015). “No Simple Loss: Selfhood in Age Related Dementias”,
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published in the Journal Clinical Philosophy, No.16.

Notes
1. This paper was originally read at first at the PEACE VII Conference “Phenomenology of Dis/Ability”
on 16. December at Tokyo University, then in a minor revised version at the Annual Conference ofNordic Society for Phenomenology, “Phenomenology and the Body – Contemporary Perspectives” on
17. June 2017 at NTNU, Trondheim, Norway. I would like to thank all participants who discussed at
the both conferences. Especially I appreciate Prof. Fredrik Svenaeus who raised some questions ascommentator in the discussion represented at the end of this paper.
2. We can find examples of such a de-genetic phenomenology in the following works:
Beauvoir (1970) and Käll (2015).

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-

Ahmed, S. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.
Cahill, A. Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics. London and New York: Routledge,
2011.
Cohen, D., and C. Eisdorfer, The Loss of Self: A Family Resource for the Care of
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Fontana, A., and R. Smith. “The ‘Unbecoming’ of Self and the Normalization ofCompetence.” Sociological Perspectives 32(1) 1989: 35–46.
Fóti, V. Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Biology, andOntology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013.
Hedman, R. Striving to Be Able and Included: Expressions of Sense of Self in People with
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Hughes, J., S. Louw, and S. Sabat. “Seeing Whole.” In J. Hughes, S. Louw, and S. Sabat(eds.), Dementia: Mind, Meaning and the Person, pp. 1–40. Oxford and New York: Oxford
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Kitwood, T. Dementia Reconsidered: The Person Comes First. New York: Open
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University Series in Gender Research: Crossroads of Knowledge, 2009.
Käll, L.F. “Intercorporeality and the Constitution of Body Schemata: A Case of Pain.” In
R. Fox and Nicole Monteiro (eds.), Perceiving Pain: Global and Cross-Cultural
Understandings, pp. 51–62. Witney, Oxfordshire: Interdisciplinary Press, 2014.
Käll, L. Expressive Selfhood (Unpublished dissertation). Center for Subjectivity
Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007.
Landes, D. Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression, London and New York:
Bloomsbury, 2013.
Marratto, S. The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity, Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 2012.
McLean, A. The Person in Dementia: A Study of Nursing Home Care in the US. New
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Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception. London & New York: Routledge, 1962.
Merleau-Ponty, M. Signs. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
Merleau-Ponty, M. “An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of
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Merleau-Ponty, M. The Visible and the Invisible. Followed by Working Notes, Evanston,
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Merleau-Ponty, M. Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010.
Sabat, S. “Surviving Manifestations of Selfhood in Alzheimer’s Disease: A Case Study.”
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Sabat, S. The Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease. Life rough a Tangled Veil. Oxford &Malden: Blackwell, 2001.
Sabat, S., and R. Harré. “The Construction and Deconstruction of Self in Alzheimer’s
Disease,” Ageing and Society 12 (1992): 443–461.
Stoller, S. “Expressivity and Performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler,” Continental
Philosophy Review 43 (2010): 97–110.
Waldenfels, B. “The Paradox of Expression.” In F. Evans and L. Lawlor, Chiasms:
Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, pp. 89–102. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000.
Weiss, G. “Intertwined Identities: Challenges to Bodily Autonomy,” Perspectives:
International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 2 (2009): 22–37.
Zeiler, K. “A Philosophical Defense of the Idea that We Can Hold Each Other in
Personhood: Intercorporeal Personhood in Dementia Care,” Medicine, Health Care andPhilosophy 17 (2014): 131–141.
Örulv, L. Fragile Identities, Patched-up Worlds: Dementia and Meaning-Making in
Social Interaction. Linköping: Linköping University, 2008.


1. J. Hughes, S. Louw, and S. Sabat, “Seeing Whole,” in Dementia: Mind, Meaning and the Person, J.
Hughes, S. Louw, and S. Sabat (eds.), 1–40 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006),
5.
2. *9L6̚Ȇ:Ⱦ3LʥMPOL76/,D. Cohen and C. Eisdorfer, The Loss of
Self: A Family Resource for the Care of Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders (New York: New
American Library, 1986) ȴ̟4%2:ȾSĖɳA. McLean, The Person in Dementia: A Study196   ˽ƗĲū 19 Ģ

of Nursing Home Care in the US (New York: Broadview Press, 2007)
3.
T. Kitwood, Dementia
Reconsidered: The Person Comes First (New York: Open University Press, 1997); T. Kitwood, Tom
Kitwood on Dementia: A Reader and Critical Commentary, C. Baldwinand A. Capstick (eds.) (NewYork: Open University Press, 2007)
5
R. Hedman, Striving to
Be Able and Included: Expressions of Sense of Self in People with Alzheimer’s Disease (Stockholm:
Karolinska Institutet,2014), J. Hughes, S. Louw and S. Sabat, “Seeing Whole,” J. Hughes, Thinking
Through Dementia (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). L-CHydén, H. Lindemann,
and J. Brockmeier. Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014), P. Kontos, “Ethnographic Reflections on Selfhood, Embodiment andAlzheimer’s Disease,” Ageing and Society 24 (2004): 829–849, P. Kontos, “Embodied Selfhood in
Alzheimer’s Disease: Rethinking Person-centred Care,” Dementia 4 (2005):553–570, S. Sabat,“Surviving Manifestations of Selfhood in Alzheimer’s Disease: A Case Study,” Dementia 1 (2001):
25–36, S. Sabat, The Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease. Life Through a Tangled Veil (Oxford &Malden: Blackwell,2001), S, Sabat and R. Harré, “The Construction and Deconstruction of Selfin
Alzheimer’s Disease,” Ageing and Society 12 (1992): 443–461, L. Örulv, Fragile Identities, Patchedup Worlds: Dementia and Meaning-Making in Social Interaction (Linköping: Linköping University,2008).
4. K. Zeiler, “A Philosophical Defense of the Idea that We Can Hold Each Other in Personhood:
Intercorporeal Personhood in Dementia Care,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2014):
131–141.
5. Zeiler, “A Philosophical Defense,” 137.
6.
v
-

5
9
There is a Bridge
9
http://www.memorybridge.org/videos.php
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CrZXz10FcVM
https://vfvalidation.org
7.
5
95
P. Kontos, “MusicalEmbodiment, Selfhood, and Dementia,” in Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood, L-C. Hydén,
H. Lindemann, and J. Brockmeier (eds.) 107–119 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2014)
8. Zeiler, “A Philosophical Defense,” 136.
9. Zeiler, “A Philosophical Defense,” 138.
10. Zeiler, “A Philosophical Defense,” 139.
11.

197

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.
S. Marratto, The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on
Subjectivity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 144.
12. A. Cahill, Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 2011),
148.
13. M. Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), M. Merleau-Ponty, The
Visible and the Invisible. Followed by Working Notes. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1968)
intercorporeité
50
1
5M. Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception (London & New York, 1962), 354.
M. Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The
Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010).
14. Cahill, Overcoming Objectification, 148.
15. Marratto, The Intercorporeal Self, 146.
16. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 137.
9
“A Being of Two Leaves—On the Founding
Significance of the Lived Body,” in Body Claims, J. Bromseth, L.F. Käll and K. Mattsson (eds.), 110–133. Uppsala University Series in Gender Research: Crossroads of Knowledge, 2009.
17. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 93.
18. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 123. Cf 147f, 254; Phenomenology of Perception, 93.
19. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 9, 147, 260f.
20. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 408. Cf Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible,
254.
21. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 249 (italics in original).
22. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 148; Phenomenology of Perception, 373.
23.

5

5

9

Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 151, 249, 254, 272
24. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 245. Cf M. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 134f.
25. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 137, 245.
26.

Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, 85f, 134f; The Visible and the Invisible, 139, 224; Child
Psychology and Pedagogy, 120.
27. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, 78.
9

198

19

5
5
Merleau-Ponty,
The Visible and the Invisible, p 248.
28. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 98, 99.
29. M. Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work,” in
The Primacy of Perception, J. Edie (ed.), 3–11 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964),
5.
30. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 101, 141.
31. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 106.
32. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 100.
33.
“Intercorporeality and the Constitution of Body Schemata: A Case of Pain,” in Perceiving Pain:
Global and Cross-Cultural Understandings, R. Fox and N. Monteiro (eds), 51–62 (Witney,
Oxfordshire: Interdisciplinary Press, 2014).
34. S. Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (London and New York: Routledge), 24.
35. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xi; The Visible and the Invisible, 136; The Prose of theWorld, 78.
36. Merleau-Ponty, “An Unpublished Text,” 6.
37. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 168, 174.
38. Marratto, The Intercorporeal Self, 181.
39. B. Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,” in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, F. Evansand L. Lawlor (eds.), 89–102 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), 93.
40. V. Fóti, Tracing Expression in Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Biology, and Ontology(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013), R. Kwant, Phenomenology of Expression(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), L. Käll, Expressive Selfhood (Unpublisheddissertation) (Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen: Copenhagen, Denmark,2007), D. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression (London and New York:
Bloomsbury, 2013), Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression.”
41. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 391.
42. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 161.
43. Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy, 449.
44.
59Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology ofPerception, 174.
45. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 18.
46. Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,” 98.
47. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xv.
48. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xiv.
49. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, 82.
50. S. Stoller “Expressivity and Performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler,” Continental Philosophy
Review 43 (2010): 97–110, 98.
51. Stoller, “Expressivity and Performativity,” 109; see also Waldenfels, “The Paradox of Expression,”
92f.
52. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 354.
53. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, 146.
54. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 354.
55. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, 20.
56. A. Fontana and R. Smith, “The ‘Unbecoming’ of Self and the Normalization of Competence,”
Sociological Perspectives 32 (1989): 35–46.

199

19

57. G. Weiss, “Intertwined Identities: Challenges to Bodily Autonomy,” Perspectives: International
Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 2 (2009): 22–37.
58. Weiss, “Intertwined Identities,” 35.

(=abilitycapability
9Vermöglichkeit“On Dis/Ability in Husserl’s Phenomenology”
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Phenomenology of Social Encounters, edited by Luna Dolezal and Danielle
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2016

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The Seminar in Feminist Continental
Philosophy in Stockholm “Feminist Phenomenology: Perspectives fromJapan”(Stockholm University, June 12, 2017)“Body schema and theory of feminist phenomenology”“Some glimpses at Japanese feminist philosophy: In terms of reproduction
and motherhood”
201

19Nordic Society for Phenomenology Annual Conference “Phenomenology andthe Body – Contemporary Perspectives” (NTNU, Trondheim, 15-17 June2017) 7 Ė ÿ %  Nordic-Japanese Panel: “The Phenomenology ofVulnerability – Birth and Ageing”SgZɋέiYZtiuqaŚūήXwgpqaɋέWv g`Śūή4
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Eight years have passed since the first exchange between Japanese andNordic phenomenologists. It has brought us Japanese phenomenologists a
new exchange, one that is different from the one which we had withresearchers from Germany, France and English speaking countries inpreceding years. One of the difference seems to be due to the fact that Nordic
countries are advanced countries with regards to welfare and caring, andthat for this reason there are many researchers and lecturers who are women.
We understand this difference as a phenomenological tendency which
focuses on issues of vulnerability and the limitation of human beings. To
research phenomenologically the wide-ranging problems such as birth, aging,disease, death, disabilities, pains, sex and gender, is an important task for
us phenomenologists. By starting from the point of view of the person
concerned (subjectivity), such a research will be expected to contribute to theclarification of issues in modern society and further issues such as the aging
society and gender equality.
With this interest, in April 2016, we began a collaboration titled“Phenomenological Research on Vulnerability and the Limitation of Human
Beings: A Collaborative project with Nordic Phenomenologists” with thefinancial support from the JSPS (The Japanese Society for Promoting
Sciences). In connection with this project we would like to propose to open a“Nordic/Japanese Scholars Session" at the NOSP conference in 2017. Our
project will focus on the theme of birth in last year and on the theme of aging202   ˽ƗĲū 19 Ģ

in this year.
For the session at the conference we would like to make a bridge
between both themes with the following members:
Minae Inahara (Kobe University, Japan): “Philosophy Café Dialogues as
the Phenomenological Foundation for a Feminist Exploration of the Lived
World of Mothers Who Have RaisedChildren with Disabilities”
Irina

Poleschchuk(Helsinki

University,

Finland):“FormationofSensibility in Mother-Child Relation: Temporal Dephazing and Traumatic
Displacement”
Shojiro Kotegawa (Kokugakuin University, Japan): “To Have a Child andto become a Parent”
Lisa Folkmarson Käll (Stockholm University, Sweden): “Intercorporeal
Expression and Subjectivity of Dementia”
Nordic-Japaneseplenary session
Phenomenology”“On Dis/Ability in Husserl’s
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“Intersubjectivityof Person-centred Care: a phenomenological perspective,” At Centre for
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2017
5
9

5

9
2018

1

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1

29
20

0

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9
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206

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Irina Poleshchuk

Post Doctoral Researcher
CO

Lisa Folkmarson Käll

0

119
2018

560-8532

3

31

1-5

TEL: 06-6850-5099
Mail: rinsho@let.osaka-u.ac.jp

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