Insurance Law Alert

July/August 2019

In This Issue
Ninth Circuit Asks Nevada Supreme Court Whether Insurer Is Entitled To
Reimbursement Of Defense Costs After No Duty To Defend Ruling
The Ninth Circuit asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether an insurer that defends
under a reservation of rights is entitled to reimbursement of defense costs following a rulingthat the insurer had no duty to defend. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Access Medical, LLC, 2019 WL
2812407 (9th Cir. July 2, 2019). (Click here for full article)“[Simpson Thacher]is one of the preeminentand most sophisticatedcoverage litigation firms.”– Chambers USA 2019(quoting a client)

Washington Court Rules That Policy Exclusion Bars Coverage For
Fraudulent Wire Transfer
A Washington federal district court ruled that a Fraudulent Transfer Request exclusion barred
coverage for losses stemming from a wire transfer initiated by a fraudulent email, rejecting
arguments that the exclusion was ambiguous. Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2326818 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2019). (Click here for full article)

D.C. Circuit Court Reverses Dismissal Of Data Breach Privacy Claims,
Finding That Plaintiffs Had Standing And Alleged Actual Damages
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed in part and affirmed in parta district court’s dismissal of claims arising out of a cyberattack, finding that certain plaintiffs
had standing and that the complaint sufficiently alleged actual damages. In re: U.S. Office of
Personnel Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2019 WL 2552955 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2019).
(Click here for full article)

Supreme Court Of Washington Rules That Insurer Must Fully Reimburse
Policyholder For Deductible Before Recovering Its Own Payments
The Supreme Court of Washington ruled that under the made-whole doctrine, state statutory
law and applicable policy language, an insurer is obligated to reimburse a policyholder the full
deductible amount before retaining any funds for its own payments. Daniels v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2909308 (Wash. July 3, 2019). (Click here for full article)

Third Circuit Rules That Assault And Battery Exclusion Bars Coverage For
Negligence Claims Against Hotel In Sex Trafficking Suit
The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a coverage suit by a hotel against its insurer, findingthat the allegations of negligence in the underlying complaint were encompassed by an assault
and battery exclusion. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 3283221 (3d Cir.
July 22, 2019). (Click here for full article)



Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

First Circuit Rules That Specific Litigation Exclusion Bars Coverage For
All Claims Against UBS
The First Circuit ruled that primary and excess insurers had no duty to provide coverage forsuits brought against UBS Trust Company, finding that a specific litigation exclusion applied to
all claims. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2019).
(Click here for full article)

Insurer’s Refusal To Pay Policy Limits Settlement Demand Not Bad Faith,
Says Georgia Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that an insurer’s failure to pay a policy limits settlement
demand was not bad faith, notwithstanding a subsequent jury award in excess of policy limits.
Taylor v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2559482 (Ct. App. Ga. June 21, 2019). (Click here
for full article)

Reversing District Court, Sixth Circuit Rules That Coverage Limit For
Flood Applies To All Losses, Not Just Property Damage
The Sixth Circuit ruled that a flood-specific coverage limitation is not limited to property
damage but rather applies to all loss or damage arising out of a flood. Federal-Mogul LLC v.
Ins. Co. of Pa., 2019 WL 2928961 (6th Cir. July 8, 2019). (Click here for full article)

Louisiana Court Questions Application Of Pollution Exclusion To Oil Spill
A Louisiana federal district court ruled that issues of fact exist as to whether a pollution
exclusion bars coverage for losses stemming from an oil spill, notwithstanding state precedentholding that oil spills are recognized as “pollution” under such exclusions. Cent. Crude, Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 3227580 (W.D. La. July 16, 2019). (Click here for full article)

2Defense Costs
Alert:

Ninth Circuit Asks Nevada Supreme
Court Whether Insurer Is Entitled
To Reimbursement Of Defense
Costs After No Duty To Defend
RulingThe Ninth Circuit asked the Nevada Supreme
Court to decide whether an insurer that
defends under a reservation of rights isentitled to reimbursement of defense costs
following a ruling that the insurer had no
duty to defend. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Access
Medical, LLC, 2019 WL 2812407 (9th Cir.
July 2, 2019).
Nautilus defended its insured under areservation of rights that expressly referenced
its right to seek reimbursement of defense
costs. While the underlying litigation was
pending, Nautilus sought a declarationthat it had no duty to defend. Neither
the pleading nor a subsequent summary
judgment motion referenced defense cost
reimbursement. A Nevada federal district
court ruled in Nautilus’ favor and closed thecase. Thereafter, Nautilus moved for further
relief seeking reimbursement of defense
costs. The court denied the motion basedon the insurer’s failure to include a claim
for reimbursement in its complaint andthe absence of Nevada law requiring such
reimbursement.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted a split
across other jurisdictions regarding an
insurer’s right to reimbursement of defense
costs following a no-duty-to-defend ruling.
The Nevada Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue and while some Nevada
courts have held that insurers have a right toreimbursement if there is an “understanding”

between the parties as to reimbursement,
Nevada law is unclear as to whether andunder what circumstances an insurer’s
reservation of rights establishes such
understanding. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
certified the following question of law to the
Nevada Supreme Court:
Is an insurer entitled to reimbursementof costs already expended in defenseof its insureds where a determination
has been made that the insurer owed
no duty to defend and the insurer
expressly reserved its right to seek
reimbursement in writing after
defense has been tendered but where
the insurance policy contains noreservation of rights?
We will keep you apprised of further
developments in this matter.

Cyber Alerts:

Washington Court Rules That
Policy Exclusion Bars Coverage For
Fraudulent Wire Transfer
A Washington federal district court ruledthat a Fraudulent Transfer Request exclusion
barred coverage for losses stemming from awire transfer initiated by a fraudulent email,rejecting arguments that the exclusion was
ambiguous. Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2326818(W.D. Wash. May 31, 2019).
A Tidewater accounts payable clerk altered
payment details for a contractor after
receiving an email from an imposter directing
him to do so. As a result, Tidewater issued
four payments to the imposter’s bankaccount totaling approximately $568,000.
Tidewater sought coverage from Westchester
Fire Insurance Company under a Computer
Fraud provision in its corporate indemnity
package policy. Instead, the insurer offeredcoverage under a Supplemental Funds
Transfer provision, which covered loss
“resulting directly from the Company havingtransferred . . . any Money or Securities as
the direct result of a Fraudulent Transfer
Request committed by a person purporting to
be an Employee, customer, client, or vendor.”
Because this provision limited Tidewater’srecovery to virtually nil, Tidewater deemed3this offer to effectively constitute a denial ofcoverage, rejected payment, and brought suit.
The court assumed, without deciding,that Tidewater’s loss was covered by theComputer Fraud provision, which applied toloss “resulting directly from the use of any
computer to fraudulently cause a transferof that property.” However, the court heldthat coverage was nonetheless barred by
an exclusion that stated that “the Insurer
shall not be liable for any loss resulting fromany Fraudulent Transfer Request.” Thecourt rejected Tidewater’s assertion thatthe exclusion was ambiguous, noting thatit expressly applied to “every clause thatprovides coverage.”
Notably, the court rejected Westchester’s
assertion that Ninth Circuit precedentestablishes that computer fraud provisions
do not encompass wire transfers initiated byfraudulent emails. See Taylor & Lieberman
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir.
2017) (discussed in March 2017 Alert) andAqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. &Sur. Co. of Am., 719 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir.
2018) (discussed in April 2018 Alert). The
court explained that the coverage denials in
those matters was based on interpretationof specific policy language not at issue in thepresent case.

D.C. Circuit Court Reverses
Dismissal Of Data Breach Privacy
Claims, Finding That Plaintiffs
Had Standing And Alleged Actual
Damages
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Districtof Columbia reversed in part and affirmedin part a district court’s dismissal of claims
arising out of a cyberattack, finding thatcertain plaintiffs had standing and that thecomplaint sufficiently alleged actual damages.

In re: U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt. Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 2019 WL 2552955 (D.C.
Cir. June 21, 2019).
A cyberattack on the database of the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)
affected the personal information of morethan 21 million government employees. The
compromised information included social
security numbers, names and addresses andin some cases, fingerprint records. Numerous
lawsuits were brought against OPM andits security firm, which were ultimately
consolidated into two complaints alleging
willful failure to implement appropriate
safeguards to ensure the security of plaintiffs’
private information. One action—the Arnold
action—was brought by a putative class ofbreach victims seeking monetary damages
based on alleged violations of the Privacy
Act of 1974 and various other statutory andcommon law claims. The second action was
brought by the National Treasury Employees
Union (“NTEU”), a putative class seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief based onalleged violation of a “constitutional right toinformational privacy.”
The district court dismissed both complaints
based on lack of standing. The court reasoned
that allegations of a heightened risk ofidentity theft were insufficient to allege asubstantial risk of future injury, and thateven for plaintiffs that had alleged actual past
injury, the complaint failed to allege that themisuse of their information was caused by
the OPM cyberattack. The district court also
held that the Arnold plaintiffs failed to plead
actual damages. Finally, the district court
concluded that NTEU plaintiffs failed to statea constitutional claim.
The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed in partand affirmed in part. The court ruled thatboth putative classes alleged facts sufficient
to satisfy Article III standing, finding bothcomplaints alleged a substantial risk of
future identity theft given the highly sensitive
nature of the compromised information. The
court further held that the Arnold plaintiffs
stated a claim for damages under the Privacy
Act, concluding that in addition to unlawful
charges on plaintiffs’ accounts, plaintiffs
incurred “actual damages” in the form ofcosts incurred for credit monitoring, legal feesand delayed tax refunds. The court affirmed
the dismissal of the NTEU action, stating:“assuming (without deciding) the existence4

of a constitutional right to informational
privacy, it affords relief only for intentional
disclosures or their functional equivalent—
which NTEU Plaintiffs do not allege.”
Notably, the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a
dismissal of data breach privacy claims basedon lack of standing, finding that plaintiffs had
failed to allege a prospective injury because
the likelihood of future identity theft was“purely speculative.” See June 2019 Alert.

from a third-party. The Supreme Courtof Washington rejected the argumentthat the doctrine was inapplicable underappellate precedent, declaring such case law
unpersuasive and counter to the doctrine’s
principles. The court also rejected State
Farm’s argument that allowing an insured torecover the full deductible alters the termsof the insurance contract and results in awindfall payment to the insured.

Subrogation Alert:
Supreme Court Of Washington
Rules That Insurer Must Fully
Reimburse Policyholder For
Deductible Before Recovering Its
Own Payments

The Supreme Court of Washington ruledthat under the made-whole doctrine, statestatutory law and applicable policy language,
an insurer is obligated to reimburse a
policyholder the full deductible amount
before retaining any funds for its own
payments. Daniels v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2909308 (Wash. July
3, 2019).
Daniels was involved in a three-car collision.
State Farm, Daniels’ insurer, paid therepair costs that exceeded the policy’s$500 deductible. State Farm then sought
recovery of its payment from GEICO, which
had insured another driver involved in theaccident. GEICO conceded that its insured
was 70% at fault and reimbursed State Farmfor that portion of the total cost of repairs.
From those proceeds, State Farm reimbursed
Daniels for 70% of her deductible.
Daniels brought a putative class action suitagainst State Farm, alleging that State Farmis not entitled to recoup its own costs unless
its policyholder has been fully compensated,
including the full deductible amount. A
Washington trial court granted State Farm’s
motion to dismiss and an appellate court
affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington
reversed, ruling that Daniels stated a claim
for relief for the entirety of the deductible
payment under three legal theories:
The Made-Whole Doctrine: Under thiscommon law doctrine, an insured party
is generally entitled to full compensation
before an insurer can recoup its own costs

State Statutory Law: Washington regulations
provide that an insurer “must include theinsured’s deductible, if any, in its subrogation
demands. Any recoveries must be allocatedfirst to the insured for any deductible(s)incurred in the loss, less applicable
comparative fault.” WAS 284-30-393. The
parties disputed the meaning of the phrase“less applicable comparative fault.” The court
sided with Daniels’ interpretation, findingthat because there was no assertion or findingthat Daniels was at fault in the accident(the record was silent as to whom GEICO
attributed the remaining 30% of fault), a valid
claim existed that State Farm violated thestatute by withholding 30% of the deductible.
Policy Language: State Farm’s policy
includes a provision that allows the insurer
to pursue subrogation claims on behalf of thepolicyholder. This provision states that“[o]ur right to recover our payments
applies only after the insured has been fullycompensated for the bodily injury, property
damage or loss.” The trial and appellate
courts concluded that State Farm did not
violate this provision by refusing to reimburse
the deductible payment, because Daniels had
already been fully compensated for her “loss”
when she accepted payment from State Farm.
The Supreme Court of Washington disagreed,ruling that “loss” includes full reimbursementof the deductible.
5Coverage Alerts:
Third Circuit Rules That
Assault And Battery Exclusion
Bars Coverage For Negligence
Claims Against Hotel In Sex
Trafficking Suit

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of acoverage suit by a hotel against its insurer,
finding that the allegations of negligence inthe underlying complaint were encompassedby an assault and battery exclusion. Nautilus
Ins. Co. v. Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2019 WL
3283221 (3d Cir. July 22, 2019).
A minor female sued Motel Management
Services (“MMS”), alleging that it failed toreport that traffickers had enticed her toengage in commercial sex acts at its motel.
According to the complaint, MMS facilitatedthe minor’s exploitation by knowingly renting
rooms to traffickers and failing to intervenein the illegal conduct. The complaint asserted
claims for negligence as well as intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Nautilus
brought a declaratory judgment action,seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend
the underlying suit based on an assault andbattery exclusion that provided Nautilus “willhave no duty to defend or indemnify any
insured in any action or proceeding alleging
damages arising out of any assault or battery,”“regardless of the culpability or intent of any
person.”A Pennsylvania federal district court granted
Nautilus’s motion for judgment on thepleadings and the Third Circuit affirmed. The
Third Circuit ruled that “arising out of” inthe exclusion indicates a “but for” causation
standard and explained that “if an assault or
battery was a ‘but for’ cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries, the assault and battery exclusion
will apply to allegations that the insured’s

negligence contributed to the injuries.”
Applying this standard to the underlying
allegations, the Third Circuit concluded thatthe exclusion barred coverage for all claims,
including the negligent failure to preventor report, because all injuries alleged in thecomplaint were the result of the exploitation
and assault by the traffickers and customers.
In so ruling, the court noted the absence of
any allegations that MMS’s negligence directly
caused the plaintiff’s injuries or resulted in
independent harms.

First Circuit Rules That Specific
Litigation Exclusion Bars Coverage
For All Claims Against UBS
The First Circuit ruled that primary andexcess insurers had no duty to provide
coverage for suits brought against UBS Trust
Company, finding that a specific litigation
exclusion applied to all claims. UBS Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d
11 (1st Cir. 2019).
From 2009 to 2012, UBS was the subjectof various proceedings related to its saleof shares in closed-end funds to brokeragecustomers in Puerto Rico. Two suchproceedings were a 2009 Securities andExchange Commission (“SEC”) investigation
and a 2010 lawsuit brought by fund investors.
In 2011, UBS secured primary and excess
insurance coverage. The policies contained
a specific litigation exclusion that precluded
coverage for “any Claim in connection with[the 2009 SEC investigation and the 2010
fund investor lawsuit], or in connection with
any Claim based on, arising out of, directly or
indirectly resulting from, in consequence of,or in any way involving any such proceedingor any fact, circumstance or situation
underlying or alleged therein.”
UBS was the target of additional litigationand investigations during and after 2012 (the“Disputed Matters”). The insurers denied
coverage for those claims on the basis of
the specific litigation exclusion. A Puerto
Rico federal district court, applying Puerto
Rico law, granted summary judgment to theinsurers, finding that the Disputed Matterswere excluded from coverage because they
were related to the prior litigation referenced
in the exclusion. The First Circuit affirmed.
The First Circuit rejected UBS’s assertion
that the exclusion applies only when there6

is a “substantial overlap” of relevant facts
between the prior litigation and Disputed
Matters, explaining that the broadly-worded
exclusion included no such requirement.
In so ruling, the court noted that UBS had
sought to narrow the exclusionary language
during contract negotiations but ultimately
agreed to the stated verbiage. The court also
rejected UBS’s contention that the exclusion
rendered coverage illusory because any claim
connected to the closed-end funds, which area “core business” of UBS, would be excluded.
The court reasoned that the exclusion,“although expansive,” does not bar coverage
for all claims. Finally, the court rejected UBS’s
argument that the specific litigation exclusion
bars coverage for only those portions ofclaims with the requisite nexus to the
Disputed Matter.

could not establish that GEICO’s refusal to
pay was frivolous or unfounded. The courtemphasized that an experienced claim
examiner conducted a thorough investigation
and analysis of the claim. The court further
noted that Taylor failed to identify any steps
or measures that GEICO should have taken,
aside from alleging that the insurer shouldhave agreed to a policy limits settlement.
In addition, the court rejected the assertion
that the $120,000 jury award established (oreven created a triable issue of fact regarding)
GEICO’s bad faith refusal to settle forpolicy limits.

Bad Faith Alert:

Insurer’s Refusal To Pay Policy
Limits Settlement Demand Not Bad
Faith, Says Georgia Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled thatan insurer’s failure to pay a policy limits
settlement demand was not bad faith,
notwithstanding a subsequent jury award
in excess of policy limits. Taylor v. Gov’t
Employees Ins. Co., 2019 WL 2559482 (Ct.
App. Ga. June 21, 2019).
Following a car accident involving Taylor
and Edwards, Taylor received $25,000 from
Edward’s automobile insurer. Taylor also senta demand letter to GEICO, her uninsured
motorist carrier, seeking $25,000 (the fullamount of benefits under the policy) basedon medical expenses and lost wages. Afterinvestigating the claim, GEICO offered
Taylor $750, which she rejected. Thereafter,
Taylor sued Edwards and a jury awarded
her more than $120,000 in damages. Afterthe jury verdict, GEICO paid Taylor the$25,000 policy limit. Taylor sued GEICO,
alleging that the insurer’s failure to pay her$25,000 within 60 days of her demand letter
constituted bad faith under Georgia statutory
law. A Georgia trial court granted GEICO’s
summary judgment motion and the appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court ruled that the bad faithclaim failed as a matter of law because Taylor

Property Policy
Alert:

Reversing District Court, Sixth
Circuit Rules That Coverage Limit
For Flood Applies To All Losses, Not
Just Property Damage
The Sixth Circuit ruled that a flood-specificcoverage limitation is not limited to property
damage but rather applies to all loss ordamage arising out of a flood. Federal-Mogul
LLC v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 2019 WL 2928961 (6thCir. July 8, 2019).
Federal-Mogul’s factory was damaged in aflood, resulting in $39 million in property
damage and $25 million in economic losses.
The company’s insurer refused to pay morethan $30 million on the basis of a Flood forHigh Hazard Zone limitation (the “Flood
Sublimit”). Although the policy provided up to$200 million for all covered loss or damage,
the Flood Sublimit capped coverage at $30
million if the flooding occurred in a “highhazard zone.” The parties disputed whether
7the Flood Sublimit applied only to physicalproperty damage caused by the flood, or to allloss, including economic loss, that resulted
from the flood.
A Michigan district court concluded that
the Flood Sublimit applied only to property
damage and did not limit coverage for “TimeElement” losses, defined by the policy as
various economic losses resulting directlyfrom a flood. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that there was no policy provision
limiting the Flood Sublimit to property
damage. The court explained that “when thepolicy limits the Insurance Company’s liability
for ‘Flood,’ it limits the insurer’s liability forlosses from a particular type of peril rather
than a particular type of coverage.”

Pollution Exclusion
Alert:Louisiana Court Questions
Application Of Pollution Exclusion
To Oil Spill
A Louisiana federal district court ruledthat issues of fact exist as to whether apollution exclusion bars coverage for losses
stemming from an oil spill, notwithstanding
state precedent holding that oil spills
are recognized as “pollution” under suchexclusions. Cent. Crude, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 2019 WL 3227580 (W.D. La. July16, 2019).

under a primary policy, which expressly
encompasses property damage and cleanup
costs arising from the discharge or release ofpollutants at any premises owned or occupied
by Central Crude. The court further noted thata Premises Operations Liability Endorsementin Great American’s policy excludes liability
arising out of Central Crude’s premises oroperations, “unless such liability is covered byvalid and collectible Underlying Insurance.”
The court acknowledged that explicit
exclusions in umbrella policies are notnullified by follow form clauses, but
concluded that application of Great
American’s pollution exclusion raisedquestions of fact. The court stated:
Given Central Crude’s line ofbusiness—the transport of oil—it
could yield absurd results to interpretthe [premises operations liability]
endorsement in a way that gave
it any independent effect while
simultaneously barring any coverage foroil spills under the Pollution Exclusion.
In other words, such a reading would
require the court to find that Central
Crude purchased an umbrella policythat provided no coverage for one of
the major risks of its line of business.
While this may ultimately be thecase, Louisiana law still permits
further interpretation in light of thepotential absurdity.
We will keep you apprised of further
developments in this matter.

Central Crude, an oil transport company,sought coverage for property damage
and remediation costs stemming from an
oil pipeline leak. Great American argued
that a pollution exclusion in its umbrella
policy barred coverage for the loss. The
court acknowledged that under Louisianalaw, oil spills are recognized as “pollution”
for the purposes of pollution exclusions,but nonetheless declined to grant Great
American’s summary judgment motion on
this issue.
The court reasoned that in the context of thiscase, the exclusion is ambiguous or potentiallyinvalidated based on Following Form
Endorsements in the Great American policy.
Those endorsements indicate that excess
coverage mirrors the coverage provided
8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Daniel J. Stujenske+1-212-455-2419
dstujenske@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 and Elisa Alcabes
ealcabes@stblaw.com /+1-212-455-3133
with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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