Insurance Law Alert

May 2018

In This Issue
Eleventh Circuit Rules That Computer Fraud Provision Does Not Apply To
Fraudulent Debit Card Transactions
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a computer fraud policy does not cover losses caused byfraudulent debit card transactions because the losses did not “result directly” from computer
fraud. Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2018 WL
2149769 (11th Cir. May 10, 2018). (Click here for full article)“They are a very
high-class, strategic
and impressive firm.”– Chambers USA 2018(quoting a client)

Colorado Court Rules That Excess Insurer’s Equitable Subrogation Claim
Against Primary Insurer Fails Absent Allegations Of Bad Faith Refusal To
SettleA Colorado appellate court ruled that an excess insurer must plead and prove that a primary
insurer acted in bad faith in refusing to accept a settlement in order to seek reimbursementof a settlement payment. Preferred Professional Ins. Co. v. The Doctors Company, 2018 WL
1633269 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Applying New York Law, California Appellate Court Rules That Coverage
For Train Collision Losses Is Not Precluded By Expected Or Intended
Exclusion
A California appellate court ruled that claims arising out of a train collision, deemed to havebeen caused in part by the train operator’s cell phone use, were not barred by the policies’
expected or intended exclusions. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Connex R.R. LLC, 2018
WL 1871278 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2018). (Click here for full article)

Wisconsin Supreme Court Says No Coverage For Negligent Supervision
Claim Arising Solely Out Of Employee’s Intentional And Unlawful Act
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a liability policy does not cover negligent supervision
claims that are based solely on an employee’s intentional and unlawful act. Talley v. Mustafa,
911 N.W.2d 55 (Wisc. 2018). (Click here for full article)

Courts Issue Conflicting Decisions Regarding Application Of Assault And
Battery Exclusion
A Kentucky court ruled that an assault and battery exclusion relieved a liability insurer fromthe duty to defend or indemnify its policyholder against personal injury lawsuits, whereasa Florida court deemed an assault and battery exclusion inapplicable. United Specialty Ins.
Co. v. Cole’s Place, Inc., 2018 WL 1914731 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 23, 2018); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Klub Kutter’s Bar & Lounge, LLC, 2018 WL 1933702 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2018). (Click here forfull article)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

1

Federal Court Certifies Question Regarding Scope Of “Collapse” To
Connecticut Supreme Court
Noting the wide-ranging coverage implications for homeowners whose homes wereconstructed with defective concrete, a Connecticut federal district court certified to theConnecticut Supreme Court a question regarding interpretation of “collapse” as used in ahomeowner’s policy. Karas v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 2018 WL 2002480 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2018).
(Click here for full article)

Texas Supreme Court Rules That Dispute With Non-Signatory Was Not
Subject To Arbitration
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that a policyholder was not obligated to arbitrate her disputewith an insurance agent, finding that an arbitration agreement between the policyholder andinsurer did not encompass the policyholder’s claims against the agent, a non-signatory to theagreement. Jody James Farms, JV v. The Altman Group, 2018 WL 2168306 (Tex. May 11,2018). (Click here for full article)

Second Circuit Seeks Connecticut Supreme Court Guidance On Tolling Of
Statute Of Limitations
The Second Circuit asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to address whether a party’s
continuing course of conduct tolled the applicable three-year statute of limitations fornegligence claims involving adjusters. Evanston Insurance Co. v. William Kramer & Assocs.,
LLC, 2018 WL 2142171 (2d Cir. May 10, 2018). (Click here for full article)

New York Department Of Financial Services Offers Guidance On
Cybersecurity Regulations
The Department of Financial Services recently published FAQs that provide guidance as to thescope and application of cybersecurity regulations that were enacted last year.
(Click here for full article)

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Cyber Coverage
Alert:

Eleventh Circuit Rules That
Computer Fraud Provision Does
Not Apply To Fraudulent Debit Card
Transactions
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a computer
fraud policy does not cover losses caused byfraudulent debit card transactions because
the losses did not “result directly” fromcomputer fraud. Interactive Communications
International, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,2018 WL 2149769 (11th Cir. May 10, 2018).
Interactive Communications International(“InComm”) provides a service that allows
the loading of funds onto prepaid debit cards
issued by banks. Cardholders can purchase“chits” from retailers to add prepaid funds
onto the cards. InComm processes telephonicrequests by using an interactive voice
response system. A vulnerability in InComm’s
computer processing center allowed
fraudsters to add credit to their debit cards in
multiples of the amount actually purchased.
Before InComm discovered this flaw,
InComm transmitted more than $11 million
to various debit card issuers. InComm sought
coverage for these losses under a computer
fraud policy issued by Great American, which
the insurer denied.
A Georgia district court ruled that thecomputer fraud policy, which covers losses“resulting directly from the use of any
computer to fraudulently cause a transfer”
of money, securities or other property, did
not encompass the losses at issue. See March2017 Alert. The district court reasoned
that that the underlying transfers were notcaused by “use of a computer” because they
resulted from manipulation of the automatedtelephone system. Although a computer
system processed the telephonic requests, thecourt deemed that involvement insufficient
to constitute use of a computer. Additionally,
the court held that even if a computer wasused, the losses did not “result directly” fromcomputer use because there were intervening
steps between the computer fraud andthe losses.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the
district court as to the “use of a computer”
ruling, finding that the perpetrators’ actions– which involved manipulation of boththe telephone and computer systems –constituted use of a computer. However, theEleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling that the fraud did not “result directly”
from use of a computer. Rejecting InComm’s
assertion that “resulting directly” requires
only proximate causation, the court heldthat under Georgia law, “directly” requires
a consequence that follows “straightaway,
immediately, and without intervention orinterruption.” The court concluded that thisstandard was not met based on the time
lapse and intervening steps between thecomputer fraud and the loss, including thetransfer of funds onto the debit cardholders’accounts and the purchase of goods by a debit
cardholder. InComm argued that the loss was
immediate because it occurred at the moment
the funds were transferred to the debit
cardholders’ accounts. The court disagreed,
noting that InComm retained some control
over the funds at that point and could have
prevented the loss by stopping distribution of
the money from the account to the merchants.
Instead, the court explained, the loss occurred
when funds were actually disbursed to themerchants for purchases made by cardholders
because at that point, InComm could notrecover the funds.

Excess Alert:

Colorado Court Rules That Excess
Insurer’s Equitable Subrogation
Claim Against Primary Insurer
Fails Absent Allegations Of Bad
Faith Refusal To Settle
A Colorado appellate court ruled that an
excess insurer must plead and prove that a
primary insurer acted in bad faith in refusing
to accept a settlement in order to seek
reimbursement of a settlement payment.
Preferred Professional Ins. Co. v. The Doctors
Company, 2018 WL 1633269 (Colo. Ct. App.
Apr. 5, 2018).
A doctor was insured by a $1 million primary
professional liability policy issued by The
Doctors Company (“TDC”) and an excess
policy issued by Preferred Professional
Insurance Company. When the doctor was
sued for malpractice, TDC declined theunderlying claimant’s $1 million settlement
offer. Preferred, concerned that a verdict3

could exceed TDC’s $1 million limit, advised
the doctor to accept the offer and agreed tofund the settlement. Thereafter, Preferred
sued TDC for equitable subrogation, seeking
reimbursement of the payment. A Colorado
trial court granted Preferred’s summary
judgment motion, finding that it had satisfied
the requirements of an equitable subrogation
claim. The appellate court reversed.
The appellate court ruled that in order foran excess insurer to recover under equitable
subrogation, it must prove that the primary
insurer refused to settle in bad faith. The
court held that the only rights Preferred has
against TDC are those that the insured doctor
would have had against TDC, explainingthat under equitable subrogation, Preferred“stands in the shoes” of the original insured.
Thus, because the doctor could not recoversettlement payments against TDC unless
its settlement decisions were deemed
unreasonable, Preferred is subject to thesame requirements. The court rejected
Preferred’s assertion that an “independent
equitable claim” exists under Colorado law,which would allow it to seek reimbursementfrom TDC based on general principles of
equity. The court explained that allowing anequitable claim to proceed in this context,
without a showing of bad faith, would “allow
an excess carrier to nullify the primary
insurer’s contractual right [to settle] merely
because the excess insurer disagrees with theprimary insurer over the risk of exposure.”

Coverage Alerts:

Applying New York Law, California
Appellate Court Rules That
Coverage For Train Collision Losses
Is Not Precluded By Expected Or
Intended Exclusion
A California appellate court ruled that claims
arising out of a train collision, deemed to havebeen caused in part by the train operator’s cell
phone use, were not barred by the policies’
expected or intended exclusions. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Connex R.R.
LLC, 2018 WL 1871278 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2018).
The coverage dispute arose out of a train
collision that resulted in the death of 24
passengers and injuries to dozens of others.
Several insurers interpleaded their policy
limits and then sued for reimbursement anda declaration that coverage was barred bya policy exclusion that applied to injuries“which the Insured intended or expectedor reasonably could have expected.” Theinsurers argued that the underlying injuries
were reasonably expected based on evidence
that the train company knew that personnel
used cell phones while on duty in violationof company policy. A California trial court
disagreed and granted the policyholders’summary judgment motion. The appellate
court affirmed.
The appellate court ruled that under New
York law, the standard for applying an
expected or intended exclusion is whether
the operative occurrence “flowed directly
and immediately from an insured’s alleged
intentional act.” The court explained that thisstandard was not met, even assuming thatthe policyholders knew about employees’
improper cell phone usage while on duty
and failed to impose effective discipline.
In so ruling, the court expressly rejected
the contention that injuries are expected
or intended if the actor “knew or shouldhave known that there was a substantial
probability that a certain result would takeplace.” Although this standard was articulated
in a New York appellate court decision, seeCounty of Broome v. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989), the Connex court deemed that decision
to be an “analytical outlier.”4

Wisconsin Supreme Court Says
No Coverage For Negligent
Supervision Claim Arising Solely
Out Of Employee’s Intentional And
Unlawful Act

known of the employee’s violence or thatMustafa engaged in behavior that led theemployee to punch the customer could serve
as independent acts that might give rise to acovered negligent supervision claim.

Addressing a matter of first impression under
Wisconsin law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
ruled that a liability policy does not covernegligent supervision claims that are based
solely on an employee’s intentional andunlawful act. Talley v. Mustafa, 911 N.W.2d
55 (Wisc. 2018).

Addressing a separate issue, the court ruledthat coverage determinations are madewithout regard to the insured party’s beliefs as
to non-coverage. Mustafa and Auto-Owners
argued that where, as here, the insured andinsurer agree that there is no coverage under
the policy, their agreement controls thecoverage determination. The court rejected
this rule, holding that coverage is determinedby the court’s evaluation of policy language,
the factual record and controlling law.

The coverage dispute arose out of an assault
at a food market owned by Mustafa. Talley,a customer, alleged that Mustafa’s security
guard punched him, causing serious injury.
Talley sued Mustafa, the security guard, andAuto-Owners (Mustafa’s liability insurer).
The complaint alleged, among other things,
that Mustafa failed to properly train andsupervise his employees. Auto-Owners
defended under a reservation of rights
and sought a declaration of no coverage. A
Wisconsin circuit court dismissed the claims
against Auto-Owners, finding that punchingsomeone could not be a covered “occurrence,”
defined in the policy as an accident. An
appellate court reversed, holding that areasonable insured would expect coveragefor the negligent supervision claim and thata disputed issue of fact existed as to whether
Mustafa had a duty to train and supervise thesecurity guard with due care. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that thenegligent supervision claim could qualify as
an occurrence only if Mustafa’s own conduct
accidentally caused Talley’s injuries. Because
the complaint did not allege any specificseparate acts by Mustafa that accidentallycaused Talley’s injuries, the court found nocoverage. The court stated: “We hold thatwhen a negligent supervision claim is based
entirely on an allegation that an employer
should have trained an employee not tointentionally punch a customer in the face, nocoverage exists.”
The court emphasized that it is not thecase that a negligent supervision claim will
never trigger coverage. Rather, when anunderlying plaintiff alleges facts independent
from the intentional act giving rise to theinjury, coverage may exist. For example,
allegations that Mustafa knew or should have

Assault And
Battery Exclusion
Alert:

Courts Issue Conflicting Decisions
Regarding Application Of Assault
And Battery Exclusion
In United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole’s Place,Inc., 2018 WL 1914731 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 23,2018), the court ruled that an assault andbattery exclusion relieved a liability insurer
from the duty to defend or indemnify its
policyholder against personal injury lawsuits.
The underlying suits arose out of a shooting
at a nightclub that injured several patrons.
The nightclub argued that the exclusion
did not apply because the intentions of
the shooter had not been established and
Kentucky state law defines assault and battery
to require intent. The court rejected thisassertion, holding that even assuming intent
is a required element of assault and battery,the underlying complaints alleged facts that
established intent. In particular, the court
noted that the complaints alleged that theincident was an “attack” (with no reference
to the shooting being accidental) and thatthe shooter had been acting aggressively andviolently prior to the incident. Although thenightclub offered several possible scenarios
under which the injuries could have resulted
from inadvertent conduct, the court deemedsuch hypotheticals irrelevant to the insurer’s
duty to defend.
5

In contrast, a Florida court found an
assault and battery exclusion inapplicablein Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Klub Kutter’s Bar& Lounge, LLC, 2018 WL 1933702 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 24, 2018). There, the underlying
complaint alleged that the plaintiff suffered
severe injuries when she was trampled bya stampede of patrons following a fight andshooting at a nightclub. The nightclub argued
that an assault and battery exclusion did not
apply because the underlying complaint did
not allege that the plaintiff’s injuries were theresult of an assault or battery. The insurer
argued that use of the phrase “arising out of”
in the exclusion warranted its application to
the present case, given that the underlying
injuries originated from the shooting. The
court disagreed and granted the nightclub’ssummary judgment motion as to the insurer’s
duty to defend. The court reasoned that
because the underlying complaint madeno mention of the intent of the individuals
involved in the fight and stampede, plaintiff’s
injuries could not be deemed to arise out of anassault or battery. The court declined to ruleon the insurer’s duty to indemnify, findingthat issue premature in light of the procedural
status of the underlying case.

Collapse Alert:

Federal Court Certifies Question
Regarding Scope Of “Collapse” To
Connecticut Supreme Court
Noting the wide-ranging coverage
implications for homeowners whose homes
were constructed with defective concrete, aConnecticut federal district court certified to
the Connecticut Supreme Court a question
regarding interpretation of the term“collapse” in a homeowner’s policy. Karasv. Liberty Ins. Corp., 2018 WL 2002480 (D.
Conn. Apr. 30, 2018).
The plaintiff homeowners, like thousandsof others in Connecticut, discovered cracks
and deterioration of the concrete wallsin the basement of their residence. Theirhomeowner’s insurer denied their claim on
the basis that it was caused by deterioration,
which was not covered under the policy. The
homeowners sued, arguing that the loss was acovered “collapse” under the policy.

The court noted that under Connecticut
precedent, where, as here, collapse isundefined in an insurance policy, it issufficiently ambiguous so as to include
coverage for “any substantial impairment of
the structural integrity of a building.” Thecourt concluded that the question of whether
the concrete-related damage constitutes
a collapse under this standard warrants
certification because it is determinative of
pending litigation within the state and not
addressed by controlling appellate precedent.
Thus, the court asked the state supreme
court to decide “what constitutes ‘substantial
impairment of structural integrity’ forpurposes of applying the ‘collapse’ provisionof this homeowners’ insurance policy?” We
will keep you posted on any developments inthis matter.

Arbitration Alert:

Texas Supreme Court Rules That
Dispute With Non-Signatory Was
Not Subject To Arbitration
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that apolicyholder was not obligated to arbitrate
her dispute with an insurance agent, findingthat an arbitration agreement between thepolicyholder and insurer did not encompass
the policyholder’s claims against the agent, anon-signatory to the agreement. Jody James
Farms, JV v. The Altman Group, 2018 WL
2168306 (Tex. May 11, 2018).
James obtained a crop revenue policy throughthe Altman Group, an insurance agency. The
policy contained an arbitration clause that
required all coverage disputes to be resolved
through arbitration. The Altman Group was
not a signatory to the agreement. When theinsurer denied coverage for a crop loss claim
based on late notice, an arbitration panel
ruled in favor of the insurer. Thereafter,
James sued the Altman Group for breach offiduciary duty and deceptive trade practices
based on the agency’s alleged failure to timely
submit the claim to the insurer. The agency
moved to compel arbitration, which a Texas
district court granted. The arbitration panel
ruled in favor of the agency. The trial court
then affirmed the award, denying James’s
motion to vacate. An appellate court affirmed,
but the Texas Supreme Court reversed.

6

As a preliminary matter, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the question of whether adispute is subject to arbitration is a gateway
issue to be decided by a court, not an
arbitration panel. Although parties may agree
to arbitrate arbitrability, the court found nosuch agreement here. In particular, the court
held that even assuming that incorporationof the American Arbitration Association
rules in an arbitration provision evinces
the contracting parties’ intent to arbitrate
arbitrability, that principle would not govern
the present dispute, which involved a nonsignatory to the agreement. The court stated:“[e]ven when the party resisting arbitration
is a signatory to an arbitration agreement,
questions related to the existence of anarbitration agreement with a non-signatory
are for the court, not the arbitrator.”
Turning to the issue of whether thepolicyholder-agency dispute was subject
to arbitration, the court ruled that it wasnot. The court reasoned that the claims,
based on the agency’s purported failure toprovide timely notice, do not arise froma disagreement between the insurer andpolicyholder. Additionally, the court rejected
theories of agency, third-party beneficiary,
estoppel and “intertwined-claims” as bases tocompel arbitration, finding each unsupportedby the factual record.

Statute Of
Limitations Alert:

Second Circuit Seeks Connecticut
Supreme Court Guidance On
Tolling Of Statute Of Limitations
The Second Circuit asked the Connecticut
Supreme Court to address whether a party’s
continuing course of conduct tolled theapplicable three-year statute of limitations
for negligence claims involving adjusters.
Evanston Insurance Co. v. William Kramer &Assocs., LLC, 2018 WL 2142171 (2d Cir. May
10, 2018).
An insurer sued an adjuster, alleging thatthe adjuster negligently failed to inform theinsurer of a mortgage on damaged property
that he was investigating. The adjuster argued
that the suit was time-barred because morethan three years passed between when theadjuster first failed to inform the insurer ofthe mortgage and the filing of the complaint.
See Conn. Gen. St. § 52-577. A jury found thatthe statute of limitations was tolled based on
the adjuster’s continuing course of conduct
with the insurer for several years following
the adjuster’s initial negligent representation.
However, a Connecticut district court enteredjudgment as a matter of law in the adjuster’sfavor, finding that no reasonable jury could
find the doctrine applicable.

On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that
Connecticut courts have found a continuingcourse of conduct for purposes of tolling thestatute of limitations if “there is evidenceof either a special relationship between
the parties giving rise to such a continuing
duty or some later wrongful conduct of adefendant related to the prior act.” Thecourt rejected the adjuster’s assertion thatongoing communications between the parties,
without more, is insufficient to establish acontinuing course of conduct. In any event,the court noted, the complaint alleged morethan ongoing communications. In particular,
the insurer asserted that following the initial
negligent misrepresentation, the adjuster
billed the insurer, used the insurer’s attorneys
and treated the insurer as its client. The court
stated that “such facts seem to us arguably
sufficient to support a finding that a special
relationship continued between the Adjuster
and the Insurer . . . which would render the
Insurer’s claim timely.” The court further
reasoned that an ongoing special relationshipneed not be based on a continuation of theoriginal duty of care; rather, a continuing duty
may be found where the parties’ relationshiphas evolved. Finally, the court noted thepossibility of tolling based on “later wrongfulconduct . . . related to the prior act.”7

Finding that the parameters of the tolling
requirements have not been clearly addressedby Connecticut precedent, the Second Circuit
certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court
the following question: “Is the trial evidence
legally sufficient to support the jury’s findingthat the statute of limitations was tolled atleast through October 21, 2010, rendering theInsurer’s claim timely?” We will monitor thismatter for future developments.

Regulatory Alert:

New York Department Of Financial
Services Offers Guidance On
Cybersecurity Regulations
In March 2017, the Department of Financial
Services (“DFS”) enacted cybersecurity
regulations applicable to entities subject to
New York banking, insurance and financial
services laws (“Covered Entities”). The
regulations imposed certain minimum
requirements on Covered Entities forcybersecurity practices, including thefollowing: maintenance of a cybersecurity
program and response plan; designation of asenior officer to oversee cybersecurity; routine
risk assessment; notification of a security
incident to DFS; and annual compliancecertification. See NYCRR § 500.
Since the enactment of these regulations,
DFS has provided guidance as to the scope
and application of certain provisions on the
FAQs page of the DFS website. In recent

months, DFS has issued new FAQ guidance
that affects a significant number of entities
operating within the state. Among otherthings, the new FAQs provide the following
information: federally chartered banks that
operate as “exempt mortgage servicers” arenot Covered Entities; not-for-profit mortgage
brokers are Covered Entities; Health
Maintenance Organizations and Continuing
Care Retirement Communities are within thescope of Covered Entities; and companies
that engage in a merger with or acquisitionof a Covered Entity are obligated to conduct
an analysis of how the transaction will affect
the Covered Entity’s compliance obligations.
In addition, the FAQs address applicationof the regulations to the following entities:
New York branches of out-of-state and outof-country banks; subsidiaries and affiliatesof Covered Entities; and entities that havecontractual arrangements with third-party
vendors who are Covered Entities.
With respect to exempt entities, the FAQs
expressly state that “given the ever-increasing
cybersecurity risks that financial institutions
face, DFS strongly encourages all financial
institutions, including exempt Mortgage
Servicers, to adopt cybersecurity protections
consistent with the safeguards andprotections of 23 NYCRR Part 500.”
Notably, although the FAQs are intended
to provide clarity of DFS’s cybersecurity
regulations, they are not binding and are
subject to modification. Thus, both coveredand exempt entities are advised to monitor
any potential changes to Section 500.

8

Simpson Thacher has been an international leader in the practice of insurance and reinsurance law for
more than a quarter of a century. Our insurance litigation team practices worldwide.

Mary Beth Forshaw+1-212-455-2846
mforshaw@stblaw.com

Michael D. Kibler+1-310-407-7515
mkibler@stblaw.com

Craig S. Waldman+1-212-455-2881
cwaldman@stblaw.com

Andrew T. Frankel+1-212-455-3073
afrankel@stblaw.com

Michael J. Garvey+1-212-455-7358
mgarvey@stblaw.com

Susannah S. Geltman+1-212-455-2762
sgeltman@stblaw.com

Lynn K. Neuner+1-212-455-2696
lneuner@stblaw.com

Tyler B. Robinson+44-(0)20-7275-6118
trobinson@stblaw.com

Elisa Alcabes+1-212-455-3133
ealcabes@stblaw.com

Chet A. Kronenberg+1-310-407-7557
ckronenberg@stblaw.com

George S. Wang
+1-212-455-2228
gwang@stblaw.com

Summer Craig+1-212-455-3881
scraig@stblaw.com

Bryce L. Friedman+1-212-455-2235
bfriedman@stblaw.com

Deborah L. Stein+1-310-407-7525
dstein@stblaw.com

This edition of the
Insurance Law Alert was
prepared by Mary Beth Forshaw
mforshaw@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552846 and Bryce L. Friedman
bfriedman@stblaw.com /+1-212-4552235 with contributions
by Karen Cestarikcestari@stblaw.com.

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the
lawyers who authored it are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts
or matters, nor does the distribution of this publication to any person constitute the establishment of an
attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP assumes no liability in connection withthe use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be of assistance regardingthese important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
Please click here to subscribe to the Insurance Law Alert.
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