Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Brown-Watson Case 15-06

An Investigation Into Nestle’s Efforts
To Establish Credibility In Its Global
Cocoa Supply Chain

By: Madeleine Wood

WATSON INSTITUTE, BROWN UNIVERSITY
Prepared for Professor Peter Gourevitch
Course on Corporate Accountability
Fall 2015

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Introduction
Nestle is one of the largest nutrition, health, and wellness companies in the world,
producing products in over 86 countries.1 Accordingly, Nestle’s actions have an enormous
impact on many people around the world. As a consultant for Human Rights Watch’s (HRW)Business and Human Rights division, this case study seeks to analyze the effectiveness of Nestle
Inc. USA’s (Nestle) efforts to establish credibility in its Corporate Social Responsibility policies
in the cocoa industry, in order to advise HRW on how to best respond. This paper will argue that
although Nestle has made improvements in its efforts to eliminate the Worst Forms of Child
Labor (WFCL) 2 from its global cocoa supply chain, Nestle’s efforts are not credible because it isinsufficiently transparent in the steps that it has taken to remedy this problem. Specifically, thispaper will evaluate transparency in terms of the quantity, quality, accessibility, availability, andtraceability of information to the public, information from third-parties, and Nestle’s willingness
to incur penalties if the information it provides is inaccurate. Further, this paper will focus on
Nestle’s efforts to eliminate the WFCL in its Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farms where approximately 40
percent of the world’s cocoa is produced.
To do so, this paper will begin by outlining why HRW should be suspicious of Nestle’s
efforts to self-monitor, pointing to examples of Nestle’s resistance to legal and government
regulations and incentives to disregard its suppliers’ use of the WFCL in its global supply chain.
Understanding Nestle’s incentives to either obey or disobey the International Labour
Organization’s (ILO) convention on the WFCL will prove essential to deciding the best forms ofpressure that HRW, as an international activist NGO, can apply to enhance Nestle’s transparency
and credibility. The body of the paper will critically analyze the ways Nestle has tried toestablish credibility. For instance, Part 1 will focus on what Nestle is ‘saying’. It will draw onCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Nestle’s official policies like Nestle’s Supplier Code of Conduct, Corporate Business Principles,and official statements to analyze Nestle’s efforts to establish credibility by investing in its
reputation. Official statements and policies represent the image Nestle wants consumers,
investors, shareholders, employees, government officials, NGOs, and the general public to see.
Accordingly, it is important to examine official statements and policies to decipher if Nestle isfollowing through with what it is saying or if it is just ‘cheap talk’. To determine the validity of
Nestle’s statements and policies and to see if Nestle has followed through with what it says, thiscase study will compare Nestle’s statements against its actions and the reality on the ground in
Côte d’Ivoire. Part 2, the largest section, will focus on what Nestle is ‘doing’ to eliminate the
WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain. It will examine the Nestle Cocoa Plan, an example of
Nestle’s efforts to establish credibility by pursuing ancillary activities and utilizing recognizedindependent third party certification schemes namely, UTZ Certified and Fairtrade International.
This section will criticize Nestle’s selective certification approach because it makes it difficult
for consumers to know which products are certified and which ones are not and which product iscertified by which organization. Additionally, Part 2 will draw on a current class action lawsuit
against Nestle; to present a possible mechanism a HRW could support to ensure Nestle
systematically eliminates the WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain. Part 3 will focus on who
Nestle is turning to in order to verify Nestle’s actions to combat the WFCL. Specifically, Part 3
will analyze Nestle’s efforts to recover from its ‘Nike problem’ and rebuild credibility by turning
to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), comparing Nestle’s actions to Apple who also turned to the
FLA to help rebuild Apple’s credibility after its 2014 Foxconn scandal. Part 3 will note that
Nestle chose to work with the FLA instead of the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC), an
organization that professes to be more of an independent third-party verifier than the FLA.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Ultimately, the paper will conclude by suggesting that HRW advocate for improved standards
and monitoring and greater government regulation in the cocoa industry’s global supply chain.
For the past 15 years, Nestle and its partners in the Cocoa Industry have been intensely
resisting government regulation regarding eliminating WFCL in their global cocoa supply chain.
The general public first became aware of child labour in West African cocoa farming in 2000
when True Vision released the 80 minute documentary “Slavery: A Global Investigation,” which
provides a graphic account of slavery and hazardous working conditions in cocoa production in
Côte d’Ivoire.3 Immediately following pressure and outrage from civil society groups and media
outlets,4 large chocolate and cocoa corporations –– including Nestlé –– responded by claimingthat they did not know about the situation and, like the public, were concerned.5 United States
government officials were also under pressure from civil society organizations, media outlets,
and the general public. Accordingly, United States Representative Eliot Engel sponsoredlegislation that would obligate the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to indicate which
products were produced using slave labour and which ones are not. Enough U.S. Senators
supported Engel’s legislation for it to pass through the Senate; however, at the last minute andafter intense lobbying from the Cocoa Industry, Nestlé, Hershey, and eight other large chocolate
and cocoa corporations signed the Engel-Harkin Protocol –– or Cocoa Protocol –– in September
2001.6 The Protocol was a non-binding and completely voluntary agreement to self-regulate andoutlined a series of targets to be achieved on specific dates. The purpose of the Protocol was toeradicate child labour in its worst forms by 2005, in accordance with the ILO.7 But, when 2005
arrived and child labour in its worst forms had not been eradicated, the corporations extended
their target to 2008. Then, in 2010, the corporations proposed The Declaration of Joint Action to
Support Implementation of the Harkin-Engel Protocol, calling on its signatories to help reduceCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
child labour by 70 percent by 2020. 8 Therefore, not only has the cocoa industry resisted
government regulation, but also the fact that the cocoa industry members have repeatedly missed
self-set deadlines to eliminate the WFCL indicates that the industry members are not taking theircommitments seriously.
Furthermore, HRW should be suspicious of Nestle’s efforts to eliminate the WFCL
because of the very nature of the self-monitoring system. The self-monitoring system is notcredible as there is too much self-interest involved. For instance, in Nestle’s case, if its
competitors are also not complying with international norms like the ILO conventions andhuman rights, Nestle will likely be less motivated to properly monitor and enforce the standards
throughout its supply chain. The pressure to earn profits is so high that companies look to makecuts on matters that are not ‘essential’ and the fact is that monitoring (especially by a third party)
and enforcing norms are often seen as supplementary costs, especially when considering thatcompanies have to answer to their shareholders. According to Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, Nestle’s
Chairman, “you shouldn’t do good with money which doesn’t belong to you. What you do withyour own money, this is absolutely fine.”9 As such, self-monitoring is not an effective systembecause the extent of monitoring and efforts are left to the company’s discretion and, even more,companies can censor the information the public receives.
Part 1: Nestle’s Official Statements vs. Its Actions
Part 1 of the case study will analyze Nestle’s efforts to establish credibility by investing
in its reputation. This section will argue that there is a significant discrepancy between Nestle’s
grandiose official policies and statements prohibiting the use of the WFCL, and the marginalactions Nestle has taken to eliminate the WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain. To do so,Part 1 will explore Nestle’s Supplier Code, Nestle’s official statements about its progress, and its

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
level of commitment towards sourcing sustainable cocoa compared to its competitor, Mars Inc..
Throughout Part 1, this case study will also explore whether Nestle’s statements contain
substance and promise, or if they are just examples of ‘cheap talk’.
Interestingly, reporters and the media have been the main leaders in questioning Nestle
and the Cocoa Industry’s business practices. For instance, CNN released a documentary in 2012
called “Chocolate’s Child Slaves” in which CNN sent a team of reporters to investigate childlabour in the cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire. CNN also created the CNN Freedom Project,which works to expose issues of slavery, human trafficking, and the humanitarian issues in thecocoa industry through its ‘Cocoa-nomics’ section.10 The fact that the CNN has criticized Nestle
and the cocoa industry’s practices demonstrates that establishing credibility is a ‘two way street’.
Simply put, Nestle tries to portray that it is socially responsible and reporters question Nestle’s
practices.
According to Nestle’s official policies, Nestle appears to be both adhering to andenforcing human rights standards and ILO Conventions (like the prohibition of the WFCL)
throughout Nestle’s global cocoa supply chain. For instance, Nestle describes its Supplier Codeas a set of “non-negotiable standards.”11 The first pillar in Nestle’s Supplier Code is the humanrights pillar. Nestle states that, “the use of child labour by the Supplier is strictly prohibited, inline with ILO Convention 138, on the Minimum Age, and Convention 182 on the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour.”12 However, the fact that Nestle states that respecting ILO
conventions on child labour and the WFCL are non-negotiable terms between Nestle and its
suppliers does not follow with the fact that Nestle officially acknowledges that child labour isprevalent in its global cocoa supply chain.13 In other words, if using the WFCL really were aCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
non-negotiable term, Nestle would not stand for its presence in Nestle’s global cocoa supply
chain.
Nestle’s official statements explain that Nestle has “made important progress with thisaction plan”14 to eradicate child labour from Nestle’s cocoa supply chain.15 However, a recent
study by Tulane University16 indicates that the situation is actually worsening. The study foundthat in 2013/14 there were approximately 260,700 more children between the ages of 5 and 14
years who were working in hazardous working conditions in Côte d’Ivoire than in 2008/09.17
Thus, the situation that Nestle describes in its official statements does not coincide with thereality on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire.
Furthermore, Nestle has yet to produce a concrete plan outlining when it will source
entirely sustainable cocoa. Nestle states that it seeks to increase the quantity of cocoa sourced
sustainably (100,000 tonnes by 2015; 120,000 tonnes by 2016; 150,000 tonnes by 2017), but
Nestle’s timeline for this project stops at 2017.18 Conversely, Nestle’s competitor, Mars, “haspledged to certify 100% of its cocoa as sustainably produced by 2020.”19 Though ‘sustainability’is a vague term that has different meanings depending on who uses it, the fact is that Mars has
supported its grandiose official statements with tangible and time-specific action, while Nestle
has not.
As such, Nestle fails to establish credibility in its official statements and policies because
Nestle does not support its statements with reciprocal actions. This is not to completely denounce
all of Nestle’s statements, but rather, to provide a framework within which to better understandthe extent of Nestle’s commitment to eliminating the WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Part 2: The Nestle Cocoa Plan
The Nestle Cocoa Plan represents Nestle’s effort to establish credibility by pursuingancillary activities and through self-certification that is backed by recognized independent third
parties. This section of the case study will begin by presenting the Nestle Cocoa Plan’sachievements and examining its transparency, based on the information Nestle provides those
who seek it out by conducting independent research on the Internet. Second, Part 2 will analyze
the certification schemes that Nestle has chosen to partner with for the Nestle Cocoa Plan
namely, UTZ Certified and Fairtrade, and consider the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s transparency andcredibility within this context. Third, Part 2 will present a class-action case filed in California
against Nestle USA to explore a possible path to enhance Nestle’s transparency in both the
Nestle Cocoa Plan and its global cocoa supply chain. In doing so, Part 2 will grapple with thequestion of whether it is consumers’ responsibility to investigate if the WFCL were used in the
production of the product –– by looking online or doing independent research –– or if it is thecompany’s responsibility to provide the information to consumers directly.
As part of Nestle’s efforts to demonstrate it is working towards eliminating the WFCL in
its global cocoa supply chain, Nestle invested approximately $110 million to establish the Nestle
Cocoa Plan in 2009.20 The Nestle Cocoa Plan “aims to improve the lives of cocoa farming
communities and the quality of cocoa [Nestle] purchase[s].”21 Specifically, the Nestle Cocoa
Plan has enabled Nestle to establish Farmer Field Schools in which Nestlé supports its farmers
by partnering with Anader, an NGO in Côte d’Ivoire, that goes into cocoa growing communities
to teach best farming practices.22 Additionally, the Nestle Cocoa Plan improves social conditions
by working to remove the barriers children face to attend school. Even more, through the Nestle
Cocoa Plan, Nestle collaborates with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red CrescentCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Societies to improve access to water in rural communities in Côte d’Ivoire.23 The Nestle Cocoa
Plan exemplifies Nestle’s attempt to establish credibility by pursuing ancillary activities.
Although Nestle should be commended for the positive attributes of the Nestle Cocoa Plan, it
fails to enhance Nestle’s credibility because Nestle is not transparent in its actions. Specifically,
Nestle provides incomplete and insufficient information regarding the details of the Nestle Cocoa
Plan and its certification schemes.
At fist glance, the Nestle Cocoa Plan appears to be transparent because Nestle provides
many statistics and figures to indicate the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s progress to eliminate the WFCLin Nestle’s global cocoa supply chain, in a manner that is accessible and readily available on
both the Nestle Cocoa Plan and Nestles’ official websites. However, upon closer examination, it
becomes clear that Nestle has materially omitted –– or made it difficult to find –– information
regarding the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s progress in relation to Nestle’s actions in the rest of its global
cocoa supply chain. For instance, in highlighting its efforts to combat the WFCL in its global
cocoa supply chain, Nestle asserts that it has implemented Child Labour Monitoring andRemediation Systems –– a Nestle Cocoa Plan program to train community liaison members to
identify instances of the WFCL in cocoa farms –– in 22 of its Côte d’Ivoire co-ops. Interestingly,
it is very difficult to find information on how many co-ops Nestle has in Côte d’Ivoire and how
many farms are in a co-op. Nestle states that the Nestle Cocoa Plan is active in Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Indonesia, but Nestle does not provide any
information regarding how the Nestle Cocoa Plan is distributed across the countries.24 It is left tothe researcher to make sense of this information. Since the Child Labour Monitoring andRemediation system is part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan and there are 67 co-ops in the Nestle Cocoa
Plan, the researcher can infer that approximately 32 percent of the co-ops involved in the Nestle

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Cocoa Plan have Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation systems.25 Further, Nestle states that
25 percent of its total cocoa production is produced through the Nestle Cocoa Plan.26 However,
because Nestle does not specify how much cocoa each co-op or even each country produces inrelation to the rest of Nestle’s global cocoa supply chain, the researcher is unable to decipher
what proportion of Nestle’s co-ops have Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation Systems.
This is problematic because it serves as a barrier to criticizing Nestle for not taking enoughaction. It is as if Nestle is providing enough information for a sceptical public to see that it isdoing something, but not enough information for critics to actually do anything with. Critics are
simply supposed to trust that because UTZ Certified and Fairtrade International –– two publicly
recognized independent third-party verifiers –– certify the Nestle Cocoa Plan, it must be acredible self-certification sustainable sourcing program.
UTZ Certified is in and of itself a credible independent third-party verifier. At theorganization’s core, it focuses on sustainable farming, improving the lives of farmers, andenhancing traceability in the cocoa, coffee, and tea industries. UTZ Certified ensures that thefarms and cooperatives have good working conditions, strictly prohibits the use of child labour inaccordance with Conventions 138 and 182 of the International Labour Organization,27 and it
trains farmers to produce higher volumes at a lower cost and in a manner that is environmentallyfriendly.28 To monitor compliance with UTZ Certified’s values, it works with independent third
parties to annually inspect cooperatives, farms, and producer groups. 29 Additionally, UTZ
Certified created the Good Inside Portal specifically to enhance traceability of products
throughout supply chains. The Good Inside Portal enables end manufacturers like Nestle to log
into a portal to see which suppliers were involved in its supply chain and, thus, ensure that the
product derives from a credible source.30 Interestingly, those who wish to register for the Good

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Inside Portal must provide the name of their organization. Therefore, while producers, exporters,
traders, grinders, processors, manufacturers, and retailers can all join the portal, it is not available
to the general public.31
Even though, once again, consumers are put in a situation where they do not have access to
sufficient information about Nestle’s global cocoa supply chain, when Nestle certifies its supply
chain using UTZ Certified, consumers can be confident that the WFCL were not used in the
production of the product. As an independent third party, UTZ Certified provides Nestle withcredibility. However, only fourteen out of Nestle’s 114 national branches globally are UTZ
Certified for the cocoa industry.32 Put slightly differently, Nestle cocoa products are not certified
by UTZ in 88 percent of the countries in which Nestle operates.
Fairtrade International is also a credible independent third-party certification system in thecocoa industry. Like UTZ Certified, Fairtrade strictly prohibits the use of child labour. Fairtradeprides itself in working to ensure that farmers in developing countries are paid a ‘fair’ price forgoods by instituting a price floor for the products farmers produce. The price floors serve as theminimum price a farmer will receive, but it is possible for better quality goods to receive a higher
premium payment.33 Furthermore, producers that are members of Fairtrade are audited two times
in a three-year certification cycle.34 Thus, Fairtrade helps Nestle establish credibility for the
Nestle Cocoa Plan; consumers can have confidence in the fact that Fairtrade has strict
requirements and policies for its members and Fairtrade does not turn a blind eye to the WFCL
in the global cocoa supply chain.
On December 8, 2015, Nestle UK and Ireland announced that as of January 1, 2015, allof Nestle UK and Ireland’s cocoa would be certified sustainable through the Nestle Cocoa Plan.35
It seems logical that Nestle UK and Ireland is the first Nestle national branch to source only

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
sustainable cocoa, because the UK has the highest awareness of Fairtrade and the highest
Fairtrade sales. In 2013, shoppers in the UK spent over 2 billion Euros on Fairtrade. To put thisfigure in context, in 2013, shoppers around the world spent 5.5 billion Euros on Fairtrade.36 The
fact that Fairtrade is popular in the UK and Nestle UK and Ireland has decided to source only
sustainable cocoa indicates that consumer pressure in the UK has forced Nestle to act and change
its sourcing practices. Furthermore, in the self-monitoring system, Nestle is able to selectively
certify products based on consumer demand, rather than truly investing in sustainability and safe
working conditions at all levels of the supply chain as a corporation.
Given the information presented above, in theory, the Nestle Cocoa Plan should be
credible. UTZ Certified and Fairtrade International are both recognized independent third-party
verifiers who strictly prohibit any use of the WFCL in the global cocoa supply chain and bothcertification schemes have monitoring systems in place to ensure compliance at all levels. In fact,
having both UTZ Certified and Fairtrade International should mean that the Nestle Cocoa Plan isespecially credible. However, according to Nestle’s Creating Shared Value and Meeting Our
Commitments 2013 report, “This year, [Nestle] purchased 62, 299 tonnes (about 14.5% of[Nestle’s] cocoa) through the Nestle Cocoa Plan, of which 75% was certified UTZ or
Fairtrade.”37 Nestle does not provide information about what portion of the Nestle Cocoa Plans iscertified by UTZ and what portion is certified by Fairtrade. This is an important distinction to
make, because they are two different certification schemes. For instance, Fairtrade provides
farmers with a price premium regulated by a price floor, which helps to protect farmers in case of
price fluctuation. On the other hand, though UTZ Certified also provides farmers with a pricepremium, the price is negotiated between the buyer and seller and is not monitored by UTZ.38 It

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
is very difficult –– if not impossible –– for a consumer to decipher which product was certified
by which organization and in which country the certified version of the product is available.
Even more, Nestle’s statement indicates that no independent third-party certifies 25
percent of the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s products. Setting aside 25 percent of the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s
products as non-independently certified provides Nestle with flexibility in case Nestle is accusedof using the WFCL –– which, as previously mentioned, is strictly prohibited by both UTZ and
Fairtrade ––in the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s global supply chain. Perhaps this is Nestle’s mechanism
to establish credibility through two reputable independent third-party certifiers –– and, in theprocess, expand its consumer base –– without having to incur potential costs to the reputationand legitimacy of the Nestle Cocoa Plan if its practices do not coincide with its policies. As such,
the Nestle Cocoa Plan has such a shallow level of transparency (because it is not completely
verified by third parties and Nestle does not appear to be willing to incur a penalty if it is wrong)that Nestle fails to establish credibility in its efforts in the Nestle Cocoa Plan.
In hopes of introducing product-labelling standards to enhance Nestle’s transparency inits global cocoa supply chain, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP –– representing Plaintiff
Elaine Mccoy –– filed a class-action lawsuit against Nestle on September 28, 2015.39 Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP describes itself as “a national class-action and complex litigation law
firm that takes on the world’s largest corporations and entities, fighting for the rights ofconsumers, investors, whistleblowers, employees, and others.”40 Interestingly, the firm operates
on a contingency basis, meaning that the Plaintiff only pays for the firm’s services if the casedoes well. Among the firm’s major successes, it filed a class-action case against Toyota
automobile’s sudden unintended acceleration, representing twenty million class members. The
firm settled the case for $1.6 billion. 41

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Accordingly, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP is in an excellent position to represent
the Plaintiff in the class action case against Nestle. The Firm accuses Nestle U.S.A. and Nestle
Mexico S.A. of violating California’s Business & Professions Code (The Unfair Competition
Law), California Civil Code (the Consumers Legal Remedies Act), and the False Advertising
Law.42 The Complaint criticizes Nestle for its “hollow public relations statements [that] mask the
tragic truth that millions of African children are engaged in the Worst Forms of Child Labor.”43 It
is wise for the Firm to attack Nestle for unfair competition and false advertising, rather than forviolating international law or build a case specifically around Nestle’s use of the WFCL in its
global cocoa supply chain. While human rights and respecting ILO Conventions are obviously
incredibly important, the very nature of human rights is that they are international norms, a set of
guidelines that are extremely difficult for a court to enforce. Also, it does not seem logical for the
Firm to file a case against Nestle’s actions in its African cocoa farms in California because thestate of California does not have legal jurisdiction in African countries and so the court would be
confined in its possible actions. The Complaint argues that “even were the Ivorian human rights
abuses a problem that Nestle was powerless to solve (it is not), Nestle would still be obligated todisclose to consumers at the point of sale the existence of child and slave labor in its supply
chain for Chocolate Products.”44 In forming this argument, the Firm draws on the basis ofRepresentative Engel’s legislation that almost passed in 2001 that would have obligatedchocolate manufacturers to label if products were used using slave labour.
The fact that almost fifteen years later, the same dialogue about chocolate companies
labeling whether or not slave labour was used to produce the product is taking placedemonstrates that the current system of self-monitoring is not working. In the current system,
Nestle provides partial or incomplete information and has the power to selectively certify its

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
products. In doing so, Nestle leaves consumers confused or falsely confident in the ‘goodness’ of
Nestle’s products. It should not be the consumers’ responsibility to research whether or not the
WFCL were used in the production of the product, because, in such a situation, companies work
hard to make sure that such information is either not available, incomplete, or difficult to find.
Since companies have strong incentives to withhold this information from consumers,
government regulation is important. Government regulation could necessitate companies
providing information to consumers, especially information that companies would rather notdisclose. Chocolate manufacturers do not want to remind consumers of the fact that slave labour
was likely used to produce the product. If they did so, consumers would be faced with an intense
moral dilemma each time they went to purchase a chocolate bar. Thinking about the humansuffering that went into the production of the chocolate bar would certainly make many
consumers reconsider their desire to purchase it. Accordingly, if chocolate manufacturers werelegally required to disclose at the point of purchase whether or not the WFCL were used in its
global supply chain, chocolate manufacturers like Nestle would have strong incentives toeliminate the WFCL at all levels of production.
Part 3: Rebuilding Credibility Through the Fair Labor Association
Part 3 of the case study will analyze Nestle’s efforts to recover from its’ ‘Nike Problem’
and rebuild credibility by turning to the Fair Labor Association (FLA), a third-party monitoringorganization. First, Part 3 will explore why Nestle might have chosen to work with the FLA as
opposed to another third-party monitoring organization like the WRC. Second, Part 2 will argue
that although it is good Nestle has sought out a third-party monitoring organization, the fact that
Nestle has chosen to work with the FLA –– a monitoring organization that is criticized for being‘sensitive’ to companies’ situations and so not entirely independent –– and that the FLA only

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
investigated Nestle’s farms that are part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan, demonstrates that Nestle is not
being sufficiently transparent in its global cocoa supply chain. To further explore the process of
re-establishing credibility after a scandal by working with the FLA, Part 3 will also compare
Nestle and Apples’ experiences.
It is important to emphasize that Nestle has chosen to work with the FLA instead of theWRC. The FLA prides itself in being a forum where members of civil society organizations,
university representatives, and companies can gather to discuss issues of Corporate Social
Responsibility and, specifically, working conditions at all levels of production.45 On the one
hand, in can be seen as good that the FLA includes companies in the conversation, because, atthe end of the day, companies know the ‘ins and outs’ of their global supply chains andunderstand the pressures in the industries best. Understanding the pressures to ignore Corporate
Social Responsibility issues like workers’ rights and the WFCL are essential prerequisites tounderstanding how to pressure companies to take action and improve their behaviour. On theother hand, the WRC criticizes the FLA for not being independent because company
representatives are on the FLA’s board. Contrarily, the WRC does not include companies its
board. The WRC is composed of representatives from American universities, labor rights
organizations, and representatives from the United Students Against Sweatshops. 46 As aconsensus-based organization, 47 companies on the board of the FLA have the power toessentially define the FLA’s rules so that the FLA’s rules and policies take into accountcompanies’ perspectives and can ensure that the FLA does not institute policies that would behighly unfavourable to companies. Accordingly, it seems logical that Nestle has chosen to workwith the FLA instead of the WRC because companies have more influence in the FLA’s
processes than the WRC.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Although it is good that Nestle has chosen to seek out a third-party monitor to enhance
Nestle’s credibility in its efforts to eliminate the WFCL in its global cocoa supply chain, Nestle’s
efforts to work with the FLA do not sufficiently enhance Nestle’s transparency because the FLA
only investigated Nestle’s Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farms that are part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan.
Approximately 25 percent of Nestle’s cocoa farms are part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan, meaningthat 75 percent of Nestle’s cocoa farms are not under the Nestle Cocoa Plan. 48 Thus, the FLA
investigation presents an incomplete picture of the situation on Nestle’s cocoa farms. The FLA
conducted thirteen unannounced visits on four of the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s co-ops. In the FLA’s
report, the FLA notes that it “selected these four cooperatives through a stratified random
sampling taking into account criteria such as location, tier-1 suppliers sourcing from thecooperative, certification status, and involvement in Nestle’s Child Labor Remediatation andMonitoring Systems.”49 Given that the FLA essentially selected the ‘best’ co-ops to monitor ––the co-ops that are part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan and have Child Labor Remediation andMonitoring Systems –– it is particularly concerning that the FLA found numerous violations of
Nestle’s Supplier Code of Conduct. For instance, the FLA investigation found that workers on
the cocoa farms were typically not aware of Nestle’s corporate policies. The FLA investigationeven found an instance of forced labour on Nestle’s cocoa farms. In response to theinvestigation, Nestle said it would re-negotiate its contract with the supplier and ensure that theworker got paid.50 But, why has Nestle chosen to renegotiate its contract with the supplier insteadof terminating the contract? Nestle is not being transparent in its actions, because ‘renegotiating’is a vague term and Nestle’s renegotiations with its suppliers happen privately. It is difficult toconfirm whether or not the renegotiations happened or what conditions were put in place oraltered during the renegotiations. Additionally, the FLA found 25 child workers (children underCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
the age of 15) on the farms they visited and 31 young workers, some of the children were
working in hazardous conditions like operating machetes and transporting heavy loads.
Interestingly, three of the four farms where the FLA found instances of child labor and the
WFCL had Child Labor Monitoring and Remediation Systems.51 As such, the fact that the FLA
visited cocoa farms that are part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan, have Nestle’s Child Labor Monitoring
and Remediation Systems in place, and the FLA still found instances of forced labor and the
WFCL in Nestle Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farms raises concerns about conditions in the 75 percent of
Nestle cocoa farms that do not have such programs to eliminate the WFCL. Nestle’s partnershipwith the FLA does not adequately enhance Nestle’s transparency or credibility because theinvestigation was not an accurate representation of Nestle’s global cocoa supply chain.
Similarly, Apple turned to the FLA to recover from its ‘Nike Problem’ after consumers
learned of the poor working conditions in Apple’s Foxconn factories and the “wave of suicide
workers.”52 Foxconn is a supplier in China that manufactures Apple’s iPads and iPhones. The
major issues in the Foxconn factories were long working hours, crowded working conditions,child labor, and improper disposal of waste.53 The FLA investigation (which was funded byApple)54 confirmed that Apple was taking steps to improve working conditions in the Foxconn
factories.55 However, according to a New York Times article, critics of the FLA, “said the mostrecent audit played down problems found by other investigators, such as unpaid overtime andFoxconn’s use of unpaid interns.”56 Thus, further demonstrating that companies like Apple and
Nestle who are looking to rebuild credibility and recover from a ‘Nike Problem’ –– in terms ofboth issues with the companies’ poor credibility and negative public images –– may turn to the
FLA because its investigations and reports are more likely than the WRC to frame companies’
efforts in a relatively decent light.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
Even though it is true that a third party monitor can enhance companies’ transparency andcredibility in its efforts to improve adherence to international norms like the ILO’s Convention
on the WFCL, Nestle’s partnership with the FLA does not increase Nestle’s credibility because
the FLA only investigated Nestle’s ‘best’ cocoa farms. The FLA investigation was surely not an
accurate representation of the conditions on Nestle’s cocoa farms because a majority (75 percent)of Nestle’s cocoa farms are not part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan. Accordingly, should Nestle choose
to continue working with the FLA as a third-party monitoring organization to increase its
transparency –– especially since the FLA is criticized for not being independent –– Nestle should
ensure that future investigations include farms that are not part of the Nestle Cocoa Plan. Better
yet, Nestle should expand the Nestle Cocoa Plan’s coverage across its global cocoa supply chain.
Conclusion
This case study has explored Nestle’s efforts to establish credibility in the self-monitoring
system. It has acknowledged that Nestle has enhanced its efforts to address human rights abuses.
However, this case study has argued that Nestle is not sufficiently transparent in its efforts (bothstatements and actions) to eliminate the WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain. Part 1 of thecase study has discussed the discrepancy between Nestle’s official statements professing Nestle’s
solidarity with the importance of human rights and the ILO conventions and Nestle’s actions toeliminate the WFCL from its global cocoa supply chain. Then, Part 2 has reasoned that Nestle
fails to establish credibility through the Nestle Cocoa Plan, even though independent third parties
certify it, because the Nestle Cocoa Plan utilizes an unclear selective certification process. Part 3
has contended that Nestle did not increase its transparency or credibility by working with the
FLA because the FLA only investigated Nestle’s Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farms that are part of the
Nestle Cocoa Plan and, thus, the results are not an accurate representation of Nestle’s globalCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
cocoa supply chain. In addition, the fact that the FLA’s investigations found violations of
Nestle’s Supplier Code even on the farms that receive extra attention through the Nestle Cocoa
Plan suggests that there are more severe violations on Nestle’s Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farms thathave not been investigated by an independent third-party.
Given the information presented in the case study, it is advisable that HRW take action topressure Nestle to enhance its transparency and improve Nestle’s credibility. As an international
activist NGO, HRW can use its reputation to hold countries and businesses accountable to their
responsibility to both protect and respect human rights. First and foremost, HRW should conduct
its own independent investigation on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire to investigate the WFCL andworking conditions more broadly on Nestle’s cocoa farms. Although boycotts and targetingshareholders’ interests are two of Nestle’s possible pressure points, it is not advisable for HRW
to pursue either of those rout. Even if either a boycott or convincing shareholders of theimportance of respecting human rights and the WFCL were to work, the results continue toprovide Nestle with the ability to offer partial, incomplete, inaccessible, or confusing
information. In this situation, consumers would still be left to trust that the information Nestle isproviding is accurate, even though Nestle has incentives to disobey ILO conventions and humanrights standards.
Instead, HRW should write press releases and use social media to officially support
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP’s class actions to enact product-labelling standards in which
chocolate manufacturers would be obligated to state whether or not slave labour was used to
produce the product. In doing so, HRW could utilize its strong reputation to enhance awarenessof the issues and encourage public support. Chocolate manufactures will be eager to avoid
labeling their product as having used slave labor, so they will have high incentives to improveCopyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
working conditions at all levels of its global supply chain. It is advisable to pursue government
regulation, because doing so would bring about a sustainable systematic change to the entire
cocoa industry.

Endnotes
1“Facts & Figures,” Http://www.nestle.com, accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.nestle.com/media/facts-figures.
According to the International Labour Organization, the Worst Forms of Child Labour are “all forms of slavery orpractices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced orcompulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; the use,
procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic
performances; the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production andtrafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; and work which, by its nature or thecircumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.” International
Labour Organization (ILO), Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour, C182, 17 June 1999, available at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/com-chic.htm [accessed 10 October 2015]3
Abby Haglage, “Lawsuit: Your Candy Bar Was Made By Child Slaves,” The Daily Beast, September 30, 2015,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/30/lawsuit-your-candy-bar-was-made-by-child-slaves.html.
4“Case Studies in Multi-Stakeholder and Multi-Brand Engagement,” Verite, accessed December 1, 2015,
http://www.verite.org/helpwanted/toolkit/brands/multistakeholder-multibrand-engagement/tool-2.
5Haglage, “Lawsuit.”
6“Child Slavery and Chocolate: All Too Easy to Find,” accessed November 16, 2015,
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/19/child-slavery-and-chocolate-all-too-easy-to-find/.
7
Verena Bitzer, Pieter Glasbergen, and Pieter Leroy, “Partnerships of a Feather Flock Together? An Analysis of theEmergence of Networks of Partnerships in the Global Cocoa Sector,” Global Networks 12, no. 3 (July 1, 2012):
355–74, doi:10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00359.x.
8
Haglage, “Lawsuit.”
9
Tom Mulier and Judith Bogner, “Nestle Chairman Opposes Company Philanthropy as Misuse of Funds,”
Bloomberg.com, accessed December 12, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-07/nestle-schairman-opposes-corporate-philanthropy-as-the-misuse-of-funds.
10“The CNN Freedom Project,” Http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com, n.d.,
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com.
11“Suppliers,” Http://www.nestle.com, accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.nestle.com/aboutus/suppliers.
12“The Nestlé Supplier Code” (Nestle Ltd., December 2013), 2, http://www.nestle.com/assetlibrary/documents/library/documents/suppliers/supplier-code-english.pdf.
13“Does Nestlé Have Child Labour in Its Cocoa Supply Chain?,” Http://www.nestle.com, accessed December 17,
2015, http://www.nestle.com/ask-nestle/human-rights/answers/nestle-child-labour-supply-chains.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
The objective of the study was to “assess the prevalence of, and measures changes in, estimates of working
children, children in child labor, and children in hazardous working in West African cocoa sector between 2008/09
and the 2013/14 cocoa harvest seasons.” ““Final Report: 2013/14 Survey Research on Child Labor in West African
Cocoa Growing Areas” (Tulane University, July 30, 2015).
17
Ibid., 50.
2

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
18“Nestlé Cocoa Plan - Our Commitment,” Http://www.nestle.com, accessed December 10, 2015,
http://www.nestle.com/csv/rural-development-responsible-sourcing/nestle-cocoa-plan.
19“Cocoa Supply Chain,” Mars, n.d., http://www.mars.com/global/brands/cocoa-sustainability/supplychain.aspx#certification.
20“Nestlé Becomes First Food Company to Partner with the Fair Labor Association,” Http://www.nestle.com,
accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.nestle.com/media/newsandfeatures/fair_labour_association.; “Does Nestlé
Have Child Labour in Its Cocoa Supply Chain?”
21“Nestlé Cocoa Plan - Our Commitment,” Http://www.nestle.com, accessed December 10, 2015,
http://www.nestle.com/csv/rural-development-responsible-sourcing/nestle-cocoa-plan.
22“About the Nestlé Cocoa Plan” (Nestle Inc.), accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.nestlecocoaplan.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/ABOUT-THE-NESTLE-COCOA-PLAN.pdf.
23“Nestl&#233; in Society Full Report 2014,” 105–106, accessed December 4, 2015,
http://storage.nestle.com/nestle-society-full-2014/index.html#106/z.
24“Nestlé Cocoa Plan - Our Commitment.”
25
Ibid.
26
“2014 Assessments of Nestlé Cocoa Supply Chain in Ivory Coast,” Fair Labor Association, n.d.,
http://www.fairlabor.org/report/2014-assessments-nestl%C3%A9-cocoa-supply-chain-ivory-coast.
27“Our Approach: Tackling Child Labor” (UTZ Certified, n.d.), 3,
https://utzcertified.org/attachments/article/2174/Tackling-child-labor-nutshell-UTZ-LR.pdf.
28“What Is UTZ Certified,” UTZ Certified, n.d., https://www.utzcertified.org/aboututzcertified.
29“Mars, Nestlé, and ECOM Join Good Inside Program” (UTZ Certified, February 7, 2008),
https://www.utzcertified.org/attachments/article/429/press_release_7_feb_2008__mars,_nestle,_ecom_join_good_inside_cocoa_program.pdf.
30“Introducing the Good Inside Portal for Coffee,” UTZ Certified, n.d.,
https://www.utzcertified.org/fr/sallederedaction/actualite/2477-introducing-the-good-inside-portal-for-coffee.
31“Registration Form-Cocoa,” UTZ Good Inside Portal, accessed December 1, 2015,
https://www.goodinsideportal.org/Octopus/Registration.action?tapAccountId=2&coreProductId=4.
32“UTZ Certified Cocoa Members: Supply Chain Actors” (UTZ Certified), accessed December 6, 2015,
https://www.utzcertified.org/images/stories/site/pdf/downloads/cocoa/12-062015%20UTZ%20Certified%20Cocoa%20Members%20-%20Supply%20Chain%20Actors.pdf.
33“Cocoa,” Fairtrade International, n.d., http://www.fairtrade.net/products/cocoa.html.
34“Certifying Fairtrade,” Fairtrade International, n.d., http://www.fairtrade.net/about-fairtrade/certifyingfairtrade.html.
35“100pc Sustainable Cocoa,” Http://www.nestle.co.uk, accessed December 18, 2015,
http://www.nestle.co.uk/media/pressreleases/100pc-sustainable-cocoa.
36“Annual Report 2013-2014” (Fairtrade International, n.d.), 18–19,
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/resources/201314_AnnualReport_FairtradeIntl_web.pdf.
37“Nestlé in Society –– Creating Shared Value and Meeting Our Commitments 2013” (Nestle, n.d.), 160,
http://storage.nestle.com/Interactive_CSV_Full_2013/files/assets/common/downloads/Creating%20Shared%20Valu
e%20Full%20Report%202013.pdf.
38“UTZ Certified Good Inside,” International Institute for Environment and Development: Shaping Sustainable
Markets, n.d., http://shapingsustainablemarkets.iied.org/utz-certified-good-inside.
39
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP filed three separate class-action lawsuits against Nestle USA Inc., Marc Inc.,and The Hershey Co.“Nestle Chocolate Child Labor,” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d.,
https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/nestle-chocolate---child-labor.
40“About,” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d., https://www.hbsslaw.com/about-us.
41“Landmark Cases,” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d., https://www.hbsslaw.com/successrecord/landmark-cases.
42
Ibid., 5.
43
Ibid., 23.
44
Ibid.,16.
45“About Us,” Fair Labor Association, n.d., http://www.fairlabor.org/about-us-0.
46“Governance,” Worker Rights Consortium, n.d., http://www.workersrights.org/about/govern.asp.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
47“2013 Annual Report” (Washington, D.C.: Fair Labor Association, n.d.), 6,
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2013_fla_apr_low.pdf.
48“2014 Assessments of Nestlé Cocoa Supply Chain in Ivory Coast.”
49
Ibid.
50
“Independent External Monitoring of Nestlé’s Cocoa Supply Chain in Ivory Coast: 2014-2015: Executive
Summary” (Fair Labor Association, n.d.), 3.
51
Ibid., 4.
52
Vindu Goel, “Foxconn Audit Reveals Workweek Still Too Long,” The New York Times, May 16, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/business/foxconn-audit-reveals-workweek-still-too-long.html.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
“Fair Labor Association Completes Verification At Apple Supplier Foxconn” (Fair Labor Association, n.d.),
http://www.fairlabor.org/press-release/final_foxconn_verification_report.
56
Goel, “Foxconn Audit Reveals Workweek Still Too Long.”

References“100pc Sustainable Cocoa.” Http://www.nestle.co.uk. Accessed December 18, 2015.
http://www.nestle.co.uk/media/pressreleases/100pc-sustainable-cocoa.
“2013 Annual Report.” Washington, D.C.: Fair Labor Association, n.d.
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2013_fla_apr_low.pdf.
“2014 Assessments of Nestlé Cocoa Supply Chian in Ivory Coast.” Fair Labor Association, n.d.
http://www.fairlabor.org/report/2014-assessments-nestl%C3%A9-cocoa-supply-chainivory-coast.
“About.” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d. https://www.hbsslaw.com/about-us.
“About the Nestlé Cocoa Plan.” Nestle Inc. Accessed December 1, 2015.
http://www.nestlecocoaplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ABOUT-THE-NESTLECOCOA-PLAN.pdf.
“About Us.” Fair Labor Association, n.d. http://www.fairlabor.org/about-us-0.
“Annual Report 2013-2014.” Fairtrade International, n.d.
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/resources/201314_AnnualReport_FairtradeIntl_web.pdf.
Bitzer, Verena, Pieter Glasbergen, and Pieter Leroy. “Partnerships of a Feather Flock Together?
An Analysis of the Emergence of Networks of Partnerships in the Global Cocoa Sector.”
Global Networks 12, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 355–74. doi:10.1111/j.14710374.2011.00359.x.
“Case Studies in Multi-Stakeholder and Multi-Brand Engagement.” Verite. Accessed December
1, 2015. http://www.verite.org/helpwanted/toolkit/brands/multistakeholder-multibrandengagement/tool-2.
“Certifying Fairtrade.” Fairtrade International, n.d. http://www.fairtrade.net/aboutfairtrade/certifying-fairtrade.html.
“Child Slavery and Chocolate: All Too Easy to Find.” Accessed November 16, 2015.
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/19/child-slavery-and-chocolate-alltoo-easy-to-find/.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
“Cocoa.” Fairtrade International, n.d. http://www.fairtrade.net/products/cocoa.html.
“Cocoa Supply Chain.” Mars, n.d. http://www.mars.com/global/brands/cocoasustainability/supply-chain.aspx#certification.
“Does Nestlé Have Child Labour in Its Cocoa Supply Chain?” Http://www.nestle.com. Accessed
December 17, 2015. http://www.nestle.com/ask-nestle/human-rights/answers/nestlechild-labour-supply-chains.
“Facts & Figures.” Http://www.nestle.com. Accessed October 16, 2015.
http://www.nestle.com/media/facts-figures.
“Fair Labor Association Completes Verification At Apple Supplier Foxconn.” Fair Labor
Association, n.d. http://www.fairlabor.org/pressrelease/final_foxconn_verification_report.
“Final Report: 2013/14 Survey Research on Child Labor in West African Cocoa Growing
Areas.” Tulane University, July 30, 2015.
Goel, Vindu. “Foxconn Audit Reveals Workweek Still Too Long.” The New York Times, May
16, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/business/foxconn-audit-revealsworkweek-still-too-long.html.
“Governance.” Worker Rights Consortium, n.d. http://www.workersrights.org/about/govern.asp.
Haglage, Abby. “Lawsuit: Your Candy Bar Was Made By Child Slaves.” The Daily Beast,
September 30, 2015. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/30/lawsuit-yourcandy-bar-was-made-by-child-slaves.html.
“Independent External Monitoring of Nestlé’s Cocoa Supply Chain in Ivory Coast: 2014-2015:
Executive Summary.” Fair Labor Association, n.d.
“Introducing the Good Inside Portal for Coffee.” UTZ Certified, n.d.
https://www.utzcertified.org/fr/sallederedaction/actualite/2477-introducing-the-goodinside-portal-for-coffee.
“Landmark Cases.” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d. https://www.hbsslaw.com/successrecord/landmark-cases.
“Mars, Nestlé, and ECOM Join Good Inside Program.” UTZ Certified, February 7, 2008.
https://www.utzcertified.org/attachments/article/429/press_release_7_feb_2008__mars,_nestle,_ecom_join_good_inside_cocoa_program.pdf.
Mccoy v. Nestle USA, INC., Nestle Mexico, S.A., (n.d.).
Mulier, Tom, and Judith Bogner. “Nestle Chairman Opposes Company Philanthropy as Misuseof Funds.” Bloomberg.com. Accessed December 12, 2015.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-07/nestle-s-chairman-opposescorporate-philanthropy-as-the-misuse-of-funds.
“Nestl&#233; in Society Full Report 2014.” Accessed December 4, 2015.
http://storage.nestle.com/nestle-society-full-2014/index.html#106/z.
“Nestlé Becomes First Food Company to Partner with the Fair Labor Association.”
Http://www.nestle.com. Accessed December 16, 2015.
http://www.nestle.com/media/newsandfeatures/fair_labour_association.
“Nestle Chocolate Child Labor.” Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP., n.d.
https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/nestle-chocolate---child-labor.
“Nestlé Cocoa Plan - Our Commitment.” Http://www.nestle.com. Accessed December 10, 2015.
http://www.nestle.com/csv/rural-development-responsible-sourcing/nestle-cocoa-plan.

Copyright 2015. No quotation or citation without attribution.
“Nestlé in Society –– Creating Shared Value and Meeting Our Commitments 2013.” Nestle, n.d.
http://storage.nestle.com/Interactive_CSV_Full_2013/files/assets/common/downloads/Cr
eating%20Shared%20Value%20Full%20Report%202013.pdf.
“Our Approach: Tackling Child Labor.” UTZ Certified, n.d.
https://utzcertified.org/attachments/article/2174/Tackling-child-labor-nutshell-UTZLR.pdf.
“Registration Form-Cocoa.” UTZ Good Inside Portal. Accessed December 1, 2015.
https://www.goodinsideportal.org/Octopus/Registration.action?tapAccountId=2&corePro
ductId=4.
“Suppliers.” Http://www.nestle.com. Accessed December 1, 2015.
http://www.nestle.com/aboutus/suppliers.
“The CNN Freedom Project.” Http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com, n.d.
http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com.
“The Nestlé Supplier Code.” Nestle Ltd., December 2013. http://www.nestle.com/assetlibrary/documents/library/documents/suppliers/supplier-code-english.pdf.
“UTZ Certified Cocoa Members: Supply Chain Actors.” UTZ Certified. Accessed December 6,
2015. https://www.utzcertified.org/images/stories/site/pdf/downloads/cocoa/12-062015%20UTZ%20Certified%20Cocoa%20Members%20%20Supply%20Chain%20Actors.pdf.
“UTZ Certified Good Inside.” International Institute for Environment and Development:
Shaping Sustainable Markets, n.d. http://shapingsustainablemarkets.iied.org/utz-certifiedgood-inside.
“What Is UTZ Certified.” UTZ Certified, n.d. https://www.utzcertified.org/aboututzcertified.