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  	  Dolphin-safe Tuna Label by Earth Island Institute
Introduction
The Earth Island Institute (EII) was founded in 1982 by environmentalist David Brower as an organization
dedicated to nurturing environmental entrepreneurs. EII provided a variety of such vital services as administrative
support, advising individuals and small groups, facilitating professional networks and personal connections, andassisting with grant applications. The International Marine Mammal Project (IMMP) was begun in 1986 andremains one of the signature EII campaigns. A core element of the IMMP was the call for a consumer boycott of
non-“dolphin safe” tuna as a means of pressuring tuna companies in the U.S. to change their fishing practices, inparticular the end of the intentional chasing and netting of dolphins (so called “dolphin sets”). A labeling system toidentify “dolphin safe” tuna was initiated by the IMMP and became a highly effective scheme with the 1990
cooperation of the world’s three largest tuna companies: StarKist, Bumblebee, and Chicken of the Sea. By 1997,
only 2.9% of the global tuna harvest was caught by dolphin unsafe methods. Today, over 90% of canned tunacompanies have pledged to only purchase or distribute tuna that is certified “dolphin safe” according to the EII
standard. Currently, the mortality rate for all dolphin stocks is lower than 0.1% which is significantly less thanestimated 2% net recruitment rate (Hall et al, 2003). The incidental mortalities of dolphins in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific (ETP) due to commercial tuna fishing have declined from about 133,000 in 1986 to less than 2,000 since1998 according to the estimation by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
The case of the IMMP clearly illustrates how an NGO can be helpful in setting standards that are endorsedby both government and industry. Government regulation was essential because it enforced firms to comply withminimal standards and norms. However, regulation by itself would have been insufficient for the positive changes
by tuna fishers and processors beyond what is required by laws. Although government regulation can conflict with
WTO prohibition of non-tariff barriers to trade (including environmental protections), the IMMP has still beensuccessful in reducing dolphin mortality due to industry compliance with the EII standards and the ongoing supportof the “dolphin safe” labeling scheme by fishers, canners, distributors and ultimately consumers.
As the first and oldest “eco-label” for fisheries products, the “dolphin-safe” tuna labeling scheme has
evolved over a thirty year span. This provide us a unique opportunity to see its evolution as an outcome of struggles
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  over standards and definition of “dolphin-safe” between concerned actors: environmental groups, multinational tunacanneries , tuna exporting states and intergovernmental organizations such as WTO (Constance, 1999). Tuna
exporting nations in Central America eventually filed complaints in WTO, arguing that U.S. regulations regarding
government labeling scheme are too restrictive in support of their purpose of protecting dolphins. This competing
industry lobby successfully weakened the legal definition of dolphin safe tuna in 1998, making it legal to sell nondolphin safe tuna (though it could not bear the EII’s trademarked “dolphin safe” label). However the U.S. court
upheld the original definitions of the dolphin-safe tuna label. Although tuna products bearing a dolphin-safe labelwith the lower industry standards preferred by Mexico are still barred from the U.S. market, if allowed, they may
cause consumer confusion and ultimately undercut the higher non-encirclement standards advocated by the EII andrepresented by its label.
I will first look at the history of dolphin conservation efforts that led to the dolphin-safe labeling system in
U.S. and then follow with an examination of the global tuna industry’s response to the U.S. legislation with specificfocus on tuna-exporting nations in Central America. We will study the credibility of the Earth Island Institute’s
labeling system by looking at transparency and autonomy of the organization and various aspects of its certification,
monitoring and sanctioning process. Reasons for success of the dolphin-safe labeling system will be evaluated withthe main focus on the criteria of NGO credibility, factors affecting firms, and consumer compliance. Lastly, thechallenges from the industry and subsequent weakening of the regulation will be considered.
History of Dolphin-safe Tuna Certification System
In response to NGO and public pressure, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).
But enforcement by the government agency tasked with overseeing compliance was lenient and failed to address theissues of ongoing dolphin mortality. The second round of the NGO-led public campaign resulted in more strict
regulation and private labeling system to fill the gap left out by the government’s regulation. Industry respondedwith various tactics to weaken the standard and enforcement with some success. A coalition of environmentalgroups and its sympathizers in Congress pursued abolition of encirclement/purse-seine fishing, particularly on
dolphin sets, though this stance was strongly opposed by the tuna industry and its own allies. Tuna fishers wanted to

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  	  maintain the legality of purse-seine fishing though they signaled their acceptance of some regulatory constraints(Bonanno & Constance, 1999).
Dolphin Bycatch Problem in Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP)
The incidental mortality of dolphins in the purse-seine fishery for tunas in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean (ETP) is one of the longest and most controversial by-catch problems (Hall, 1998). Bycatch can be defined as
the incidental capture of non-target animals when harvesting a species. Bycatch is made up mostly of non-target
species though it also includes juvenile and immature animals from the target species. The primary source of theincidental mortality of dolphins began in the 1950s when the commercial tuna fishery developed the ability to use
the purse-seine technique of fishing on entire schools of tuna. For unknown reasons, dolphins are frequently foundabove schools of tuna in ETP. The ETP covers approximately 7 million square miles of ocean, ranging from thewaters around San Diego down to Chile and extending several hundred miles westward into the Pacific. During the
deployment of purse-seine nets on dolphin-associated schools of tuna (also known as “dolphin sets”), many dolphinswere frequently either caught in the net or separated from their pod (family) members during the chase. According
to a 2001 Marine Mammal Commission’s Annual Report to Congress, before 1972, an estimated 500,000 dolphinsdied annually as a result of fishing techniques used by tuna vessels (Ramach, 1997). Since 1959, as many as 6 or 7
million dolphins have drowned in the purse-seine nets (Bonanno & Constance, 1996).
Domestic Law and Voluntary Agreement
Beginning in the 1960s, environmental NGOs successfully mobilized public support and lobbied U.S.
Congress to address the ETP dolphin bycatch problem, resulting in the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act(MMPA). Under the 1972 MMPA, the allowable dolphin kill for U.S.-based tuna boats was drastically reduced,
funding was provided to develop new and alternative technologies that increase the likely safety of dolphins during atuna fishing expedition, an observer program was established to gather hard data on dolphin mortality on tuna boats,
and a trade embargo restricting the import of non-dolphin safe tuna became mandatory (Boreman, 1992).
However, conflicting language in the MMPA over the mortality goal produced confusion and future
grounds for contention between environmental groups and the tuna industry. For example, one part of the billdescribed the necessity for maintaining certain species of dolphins at or above the optimum sustainable population(OSP). Another part, however, stated that the purpose of the entire MMPA was to decrease the number of incidental3	  CSR-­‐2_Winter	
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  dolphin mortality cases from tuna fishing to “insignificant levels approaching zero” (Bonanno & Constance, 1999).
Although the act also did not ban any specific technique, it made almost it impossible for U.S.-based large purse
seine vessels in the ETP to continue using purse-seine netting intentionally targeted at dolphins.
An ongoing challenge was implementation of the MMPA since its unilateral regulatory approach only
applies to the U.S. territorial waters. Meanwhile, although the U.S. tuna industry was being forced to reduce dolphinmortality, tuna boats from Latin American countries in particular were responsible for a drastic increase in thenumber of dolphin deaths during the 1970s. In the year 1986 alone, more than 100,000 dolphins were killed in nets,
almost all of which had been set by non-U.S. boats, thus off-setting the progress in dolphin conservation that had
been made by the U.S. fleet (Stweart, 2008). Amendments made in 1984 to the MMPA required foreign exporters ofyellowfin tuna to apply a program designed to reduce dolphin mortality to rates comparable to those of the U.S.
These protective measures included a provision for placing import restrictions on countries that attempted to export
tuna to the U.S. without adhering to a comparable standard of dolphin safe fishing practices (Hall, 2003).
The International Marine Mammal Project began in 1986 as part of a concerted effort to mobilize the public
in favor of the dolphin safety issues advocated by EII. One of the IMMP’s most effective public awarenesscampaigns came as a result of covert footage filmed in 1988 by an employee on a Panamanian tuna boat. The
graphic depiction of drowning dolphins caught in the nets triggered massive outrage among consumers who
expressed their sentiment on multiple fronts. Canned tuna was blocked from school lunchrooms, people wrote theirlegislators, environmental and community groups organized protests outside tuna companies and advocated broad
public boycotts as well (Stewart, 2008).
A major breakthrough for the IMMP came in April 1990 when StarKist, Bumblebee, and Chicken of the
Sea – the world’s three largest tuna companies – committed to ending their purchase of tuna that was not caught inline with the standards endorsed by EII. The other U.S. tuna companies quickly followed suit, and Congress
furthered the momentum toward dolphin safety generated by the lead of this voluntary agreement between an NGO
and industry, approving new legislation: the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA). Evenstronger than the MMPA, it establishes a penalty of up to $100,000 for each instance of noncompliance withlabeling rules for tuna exported from or sold in the U.S. It also established the minimum legal standard for tuna toqualify for the “dolphin safe” label in line with the EII position on non-encirclement of dolphins (Electric Code of4	  CSR-­‐2_Winter	
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  	  Federal Regulations). To monitor compliance, the IMMP maintains a global network of staff tasked with observing
operations at all stages of tuna production, from onboard fishing boats at sea and in the harbor to offloading ports
and transshipment sites, cold storage facilities, processing plants, and canneries.
In 1989, Earth Island Institute led a lawsuit against Department of Commerce for failing to impose strict
enforcement of the MMPA. As a result of this lawsuit, U.S. Courts ordered embargoes on yellowfin tuna andyellowfin tuna products from Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. In 1990, it led the formation of
the Marine Mammal Protection Act Reauthorization Coalition, an environmentalist organization comprised oftwenty-eight national environmental organizations, including Earth Island Institute, Greenpeace, the Marine
Mammal Fund, Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the U.S., the Whale Center, and the National Audubon Society.
They together with some members of Congress accused the National Marine Fisher Services (NMFS) of failing in
its duty (Bonanno & Constance, 1999).
Since the United States still provides a major market for tuna (importer of 40% of world traded tuna), thetrade embargo under MMPA had some effect on global tuna fishing practices (Labor Department). A significant
obstacle, however, is the fact that other countries and non-U.S. markets are not directly subject to U.S. laws
(Boreman, 1992), leaving relative market pressure as the primary tool for compelling compliance with the IMMP’s
definition of a true dolphin safe standard. Moreover U.S. consumption of ETP yellowfin tuna continued to decline
annually from approximately 85 percent of total harvested tuna in 1985 to only 10 percent in 1992. This createdmarket opportunities in other areas of the world, mainly in Europe but also in Latin America, though the flood oftuna was also responsible for a depression in prices (Ramach, 1997).
Tuna Industry Response
An influential industry group, the American Tunaboat Association (ATA), successfully lobbied the Reagan
Administration and obtained a reinterpretation of the MMPA away from the stated goal of zero mortality. Instead,“acceptable” annual dolphin death limits of 20,500 animals were established. They were able to exploit a legal
loophole in the MMPA under which the Secretary of Commerce has authority to issue permits allowing a specified
number of annual dolphin mortalities. In 1987, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Commerce reported
that enforcement of the MMPA was quite lenient, making the law ultimately ineffective to promote dolphin safety.
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  	  Businesses found it less expensive to simply pay the fine for exceeding their limits of dolphins killed during a tuna
harvest than to change their fleets and fishing practices. It became an unpopular addition to the cost of doing
business but was not a steep enough penalty to incentivize tuna companies to shift to more dolphin-safe alternatives.
As a consequence of the ATA lobby, 1986 saw the highest number of dolphin deaths in a decade in the ETP(Bonanno & Constance, 1999).
The purse-seine industry of the tuna exporting nations in Latin America also had employed various
strategies to counter U.S. regulation and labeling system including their own voluntary program aiming to reduce
dolphin bycatch, lobbying U.S. agencies (including the Department of Commerce), and filing complaints with the
GATT and the WTO about the regulations forming non-tariff barriers to trade. The industry-preferred body for tunafishing standards is the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). First established in 1949 andcomposed of tuna fishing nations in the ETP, its main responsibility is to manage ETP tuna stocks to sustain
maximum yields. The IATTC is primarily friendly to free-market forces over environmental considerations in its
decisions, being more concerned with maintaining viable fishing stock than with bycatch.
After an initial resistance to the MMPA in 1984 – 85, with the financial support from the U.S. government,
the IATTC slowly adopted programs that include a very modest shipboard observation program for large purse seine
vessel of greater than 400 short tons (362.8 mt) carrying capacity, technological and performance standards, anddolphin mortality quotas to improve dolphin protection in the ETP (Stweart, 2008). Due to the increased expenses ofdolphin safety, the U.S. tuna fleet diminished in size over time. Although each individual vessel also attempted toreduce dolphin bycatch, a portion of the decline in dolphin mortality for U.S. tuna boats can also be attributed to the
reduced size of the fleet. The 40 vessels remaining in the U.S. tuna fleet in 1989 were collectively responsible forapproximately 19,712 dolphin deaths that year. Other tuna fishing countries took advantage of the opening toincrease the size of their own fleets; in 1989, the ninety-two non-U.S. tuna boats were responsible for 61,881
dolphin deaths. Shipboard observers monitored roughly half the U.S. tuna expeditions, while only 35% percent of
non-U.S. vessels were covered, meaning that the actual numbers of dolphins killed may have been even higher thanwhat was officially reported (Ramach, 1997).
Although the MMPA allowed trade restrictions to be placed against the nations not in compliance with U.S.
standards, the Department of Commerce did not issue any embargo until 1990. In September of 1990, as a result of6	  CSR-­‐2_Winter	
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  the Earth Island Institute’s lawsuit against Department of Commerce in a federal court, U.S. Customs banned tuna
imports from Mexico, Panama, and Ecuador. These countries promptly filed a complaint against the U.S. under the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that the MMPA was unfair trade protectionism. The GATT panel
ruled for the allies, finding against the U.S. and its unilateral regulations for environmental conservation. Concerned
about any negative effect the GATT decision would have on the ongoing North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) negotiations, the Bush Administration engaged in extensive diplomacy with Mexico, promising to try toresolve the disagreements by getting U.S. laws changed. The Mexican government ultimately suspended any action
on the panel report (Bonanno & Constance, 1999). Prior to NAFTA ratification, however, an agreement was reachedamong ETP tuna fishing nations to address issues or contentious points by international consensus. They alsoestablished a voluntary program that formalized on-board observers and technical and performance standards in the
IATTC-sponsored La Jolla Agreement of 1992.
Government Compromise
In 1995, the governments of the ETP tuna fishing nations signed the Panama Declaration, which
established an annually diminishing cap on dolphin mortality for each tuna stock. It seemed that opponents of thedolphin safe standard as defined by the EII and codified in U.S. law by the MMPA were attempting a new strategy.
A competing standard was proposed and would have allowed a product to be labeled “dolphin safe” so long as anobserver on a tuna boat did not actually see any dolphins killed during the fishing process. This was the standard
agreed upon in the 1992 La Jolla Declaration (Bonanno & Constance, 1999). The EII was immediately concerned
because the alternative standard permits intentional chasing and netting of dolphins which is strictly prohibited
under its own definition of “dolphin safe.” The Panama Declaration also called for the signatories to establish abinding legal agreement by 1996 that utilized the La Jolla Declaration’s relaxed interpretation of dolphin safety,
overturning any more protective domestic laws. The U.S. would have had to amend the MMPA to lift any
embargoes on tuna caught in accordance with the La Jolla Declaration and access to the U.S. market would have tobe granted to IATTC members (Felando, 1995).
A bill was introduced to the U.S. Congress in 1996 in accordance with the more lenient Panama
Declaration standard that was supported by a majority of Republicans in the House of Representatives and also
found support within the Clinton Administration, the ATA, and five prominent environmental organizations7	
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  including the Center for Marine Conservation, the Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, the National Wildlife
Federation, and the World Wildlife Fund (Felando 1995). The bill’s sponsors and supporters contended that the La
Jolla Agreement had already made significant progress toward reducing dolphin mortality on an international level
comfortable for IATTC member states. They noted the severity of the threat that countries could withdraw from the
La Jolla Agreement, further eroding dolphin protections, particularly in light of the fact that data showed U.S.
embargoes were having little effect on reducing the number of dolphin sets in the ETP. Advocates of the bills also
argued that aborting the practice of using purse seine nets on dolphins, though reducing dolphin mortality, wereincreasing bycatch of other species and non-target specimens (juvenile tuna), thus threatening the long-term viabilityof tuna stocks as well as the marine ecosystem more broadly (Stewart, 2008). Dolphin sets have the lowest incidents
of bycatch for all non-target fish (except dolphins themselves). If some measures to fully separate the dolphins fromthe tuna schools before capture can be devised, dolphin sets would be the most ecologically sound way of harvestingtuna.
EII has remained steadily opposed to the La Jolla Agreement, the Panama Declaration, and any attempts
to weaken the zero dolphin mortality standards embedded in the MMPA. It has found support for this position frommany prominent environmental NGOs including the Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the U.S., EARTHTRUST,
Cetacean Society International, the ASPCA, Sea Shepherd, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, the Fund forAnimals, Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen, the Human Dolphin Foundation, and the Cousteau Society (Bonanno &Constance, 1999). These organizations claimed the other members of the IATTC were only seeking access to thehighly profitable U.S. tuna market and not concerned with the trauma to dolphins associated with the entire processof a dolphin set, including the hours of chasing, herding, and encirclement. Marine mammal scientists conductedstudies of dolphins and argued that the animals finding themselves in a dolphin set were exposed to extreme stresson top of the fatality risk which prevents individuals, pods, and the general dolphin population in the ETP fromrecovering to historic level. The NGOs further argued that harvesting tuna by using dolphin sets would not reduce
numbers of non-dolphin bycatch (juvenile fish, sharks, sea turtles) but would only result in many additional dolphin
deaths (EII 1996). Finally, they claim, the voluntary IATTC on-board observer program is not as effective as the
mandatory U.S. observation program. Unlike the U.S. NMFS mandatory observer program, IATTC observers on

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  	  tuna boats lack enforcement authority and a process to report violations of dolphin safety procedures (Boreman
1992).
In August 1997, President Clinton signed the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA)
into law. However, the Senate adopted amendment requiring three year-research to determine the impacts of chasing
and encirclement of dolphin on dolphin stock before the final change to standard can be made. The National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) was put in charge of conducting the research and delivering a final judgment at the end of
2002. In December 2002, the Secretary of Commerce determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove thatchasing and encirclement of dolphins harmed dolphin stocks in the ETP (Bonanno & Constance, 1999).
However, in response to a complaint filed by environmental groups against the final finding, the U.S.
court issued an order that stayed the final finding’s implementation in January 2003 upholding the original definitionof dolphin-safe label under the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA). In 2007, EII filed alaw suit against the Secretary of Commerce and Assistant Administrator for the National Marine Fisheries Service(NMFS). The Court of Appeals confirmed the 2004 lower court's decision that the final finding by the Secretary was“arbitrary and was influenced by foreign policy considerations rather than scientific evidence alone (Earth Island
Institute v. Hogarth).
	
  Evaluation of the EII’s Monitoring Mechanism
The Earth Island Institute is a nonprofit, non-governmental conservation organization headquartered in San
Francisco, C.A., and supporting diverse projects around the world. Among the primary reasons for its foundation in1982 is the promotion of biodiversity and conservation of natural resources. Today, it is best understood as anumbrella organization that provides sponsorship and support for a variety of eco-entrepreneurs. Approved
applications are designated official EII projects and must identify themselves as such in all publications. It uses thewide range of its projects to facilitate a variety of services. One of EII’s oldest and most successful projects is theInternational Marine Mammal Project (IMMP). It was founded with the goal of dramatically improving the safety ofdolphins, seals, sea otters, and other marine mammals both by directly advocating for extremely low (if not zero)levels of permittable bycatch associated with tuna fishing. (EII website). Interestingly, EII and the IMMP do not
restrict the scope of their activities to only the government/public or the private sectors. Instead, the project seeks to9	  CSR-­‐2_Winter	
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  direct both legislation and industry practices in a direction that reduces marine mammal mortality. A criticalbreakthrough for the IMMP came in 1990 when the world’s three largest tuna companies (Bumblebee, Chicken of
the Sea, and StarKist) announced that they would no longer purchase, process, or sell any tuna that was dolphin
unsafe according to the IMMP’s strict standards. This industry buy-in made it easier for the IMMP understanding of“dolphin safe” tuna to become the exclusive one used for the official Dolphin Safe label in the U.S.
EII’s Dolphin Safe Tuna Standards
Quoted by the EII, in order for tuna to be considered "Dolphin Safe", it must meet the following standards:
1.

No intentional chasing, netting or encirclement of dolphins during an entire tuna fishing trip;

2.

No use of drift gill nets to catch tuna;3.

No accidental killing or serious injury to any dolphins during net sets;

4.

No mixing of dolphin-safe and dolphin-deadly tuna in individual boat wells (foraccidental kill of dolphins), or in processing or storage facilities; and5.

Each trip in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) by vessels 400 gross tons and above must have an
independent observer on board attesting to the compliance with points (1) through (4) above.

By agreement between Earth Island Institute and the participants in "Dolphin Safe" fishing operations:•

All processing, storage, and transshipment facilities and procurement records related to the purchase,processing, storage, transport, and sale of tuna must be made available for independent monitoring.

•Companies listed as "Dolphin Safe" must maintain "Dolphin Safe" policies approved by Earth Island
Institute and apply them to all international aspects of their operations and related subsidiaries.

Further, “Earth Island Institute and the 85-member Dolphin Safe/Fair Trade Campaign strongly encourage tuna
fishermen and tuna companies to work to reduce bycatch of non-target species and to release alive, to the maximum
extent feasible, any non-target species caught in purse seine nets” (EII website).
Certification Process
The IMMP website is dominated by actionable items and background about its various campaigns related
to the conservation and protection of dolphins, whales, and orcas. The dolphin safe tuna campaign is notably linked
to its QMS Global ISO 9001 registration. Information on their website are comprehensive and transparent indescribing the standardized process by which a tuna fisher, processor, or canner can become a certified “dolphin
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  safe” facility. First the company should request a copy of the relevant policy template from the IMMP which willthen send the appropriate documents. Upon receipt and review, if the tuna-related company elects to pursue IMMP
certification, it must complete a copy of the template on the company’s letterhead and include the CEO or
President’s signature in the designated place(s). The documents should be properly signed, dated, and then returned
to EII. The next step in the certification process is for EII and the IMMP to have an international monitor conduct aninspection of the company’s operations, “including all procurement and production documents, vessels, ports,
storage, processing and canning facilities, as per the policy provisions” (EII website).
Any deficient areas preventing approval of an application will be noted and the company is given theopportunity to rectify any outstanding or additional issues that might hinder adherence to the dolphin safe standard.
Once this step is complete, EII will notify the company of its “provisionally approved” status and the company namewill appear on the IMMP list of companies that are in compliance with the dolphin safe policy. Provisional statuswill last for six months during which time the companies are subject to regular monitoring by EII. At the end of thisperiod, if all goes well, the provisional status will be lifted and the company will be declared fully part of thedolphin safe group with which other dolphin safe tuna companies may do business. Companies are even advised by
EII to plan for this lengthy approvals process.
I. Autonomy from Target of Monitoring
EII’s dolphin safe tuna certification system fits the third-party certification model. While standard setting
was done by representatives from the tuna industry and the EII in 1990, compliance is evaluated using several
methods including monitoring. Sanctioning is verified by its own staff but not independent outside organizations.
The U.S. government has provided legal enforcement to EII’s dolphin-safe labeling standard and fined companies asmuch as $100,000 upon verification of violations. EII also holds an effective threat of sanction in that violators ofthe dolphin safe standard lose access to the EII network of compliant tuna fishers, processors, and canners. Together,
these firms represent 90% of the world’s market for tuna, including the highly lucrative U.S. and E.U. markets.
Based on the information provided on the website, Earth Island Institute appears to be completely
autonomous from the tuna industry it monitors. For its dolphin-safe labeling program, there is no requirement forcertification or inspection fee. Since the IMMP is an integral part of one of the original EII’s conservation programs,
EII provides all the funding. An FAQ section on the dolphin safe tuna program does mention that reimbursement is
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  requested from participating organizations but does not provide details about the amounts received and it is difficult
to distinguish the exact amounts from the required financial filings made public on the website. It is easier to learn
that EII’s funding predominantly comes from donations by individuals and philanthropic foundations. Its Form 990
verifies its claim that the vast majority of its financial support comes by way of the public contribution (roughly90%). On the board of directors for EII (and also on the IMMP staff), there are no representatives from target
industry, tuna canned industry in particular for its tuna labeling program. The Board of Directors has ten members
who are responsible for general oversight of EII, including all projects like the IMMP. The Board is composed ofvarious professionals including: writers, professors, activists, business officers, and a lawyer.
II. Organizational Strength:
Earth Island Institute now maintains 12 international monitoring staff around the world, including offices in
San Francisco and Hawaii, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, Thailand, Italy, Spain, Mauritius, and the Philippines.
Based on information provided in a telephone interview with Mark Berman, the director of EII’s Dolphin Safe Tunamonitoring program, all the staff are experienced monitors who also receive additional training from IMMP. Someof the monitors are scientists, some are environmental activists. Many of them have been with EII more than 18
years, since the beginning of the labeling scheme.
The history of the Earth Island Institute is briefly presented on the company website. It is possible to see
how it has grown and evolved over time, as well as the numerous current projects it coordinates or sponsors. Somebasic information about sponsors and the board of directors is provided along with names of influential individuals
who have either been affiliated with or supported EII in the past. In this way, the organizational strength can beobserved. The Dolphin Safe Tuna program site similarly lists the companies and countries that adhere to the Dolphin
Safe standards, alluding to the strength of the monitoring regime.
Table 1. 2010 Complete Organizational Report with Financial Information

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The chart above shows a breakdown of EII’s income categories for 2010 based on the Form 990 that has been madepublicly available on the EII website. It is clear that public support from a variety of sources accounted for 90% of
EII’s $10 million in revenue for the year 2010.
III. Monitoring Practice
These monitors regularly travel to inspect many other countries with important tuna canneries and fleets.
As part of the "Dolphin Safe" agreement with companies, Earth Island's international monitors have access tofishing vessels, canneries, ports, storage facilities, and transport vessels to inspect tuna catches. Earth Island Institutemonitors also works with fish processors and individual boat owners to establish "Dolphin Safe" fisheries andpolicies. Monitoring may take place at any time and for any reason. According to Mark Berman, EII staff will
follow up on credible complaints but also conduct regular spot checks to ensure compliance. Industry has financial
incentives to police itself using a combination of “police patrol” and “fire alarm” mechanisms against individual
tuna suppliers, brokers, or processors cheating on their obligations, thus transferring a portion of the monitoring cost
away from the IMMP. EII has established a type of insurance system in which companies may return tuna shipments
to their original source without any liability if it can be proved that the fish was not caught in a manner in keepingwith the dolphin safe standard. Any questionable shipments should be reported and will be examined by EII for
compliance. The IMMP website, in its FAQ section, draws the comparison with monitoring for compliance withhealth and safety standards for tuna products, and Mark Berman reiterated that it is simply good business for thesecompanies to make sure that cheating does not take place.
No announcement by EII is necessary for monitoring in the field to take place and all parts of a facility
should be open upon request to an EII inspector. Any attempt by a company to prevent or obstruct an inspection istaken quite seriously and the IMMP response is swift. As stated the Dolphin Safe Tuna Program annual report, 471
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  tuna-related companies in 67 countries were verified dolphin-safe by the EII in 2011. Globally, 493 inspections in
total were carried out in 2011.
VI. Evaluations & Sanctions
EII staffs can withhold resources and the "dolphin safe" label to violators of standards; the organization has
solicited agreements from countries as well as producers and canners to only purchase tuna that is EII compliant. It
also maintains a list of these companies and provides information about companies that are not in compliance with
its standards. These regularly-updated lists are available to participating "Dolphin Safe" companies and posted on its
website.
Furthermore, working with import associations around the world, Earth Island Institute has succeeded inclosing more than 90% of the world's canned tuna markets to dolphin-deadly tuna. More than thirty countries andmore than 300 companies have made progress in adopting dolphin-safe fishing policies with the support and help ofEarth Island Institute. In the event of a violation, EII does not immediately announce non-conformance reports to theentire network unless there is a direct impact on the next company in the production chain. For example, MarkBerman described a recent case where a tuna processor in Thailand had purchased non-dolphin safe tuna from abroker. EII worked with the Thai company to return the shipment and also could have notified any company with acontract to purchase tuna from the Thai firm; however, it would not necessarily have sent out a broad alert on its
website for a narrow violation of this nature. The site visit was triggered by a credible complaint from other tunacompanies.
V. Transparency of Monitoring Organization
The following information was made available on their website: 1) money - financial statements and audit
reports are available online, 2) board control - readily available online, 3) process - processes are largely available
online with direct contact information provided for further inquiries, 4) staff, etc. - staff information (names,
positions, phone numbers, email) is available online. With a little more effort, an interested party could find the2010 budget abstract in a report, though specific details are not readily apparent and require some knowledge ofaccounting and tax forms for nonprofits. The names of the EII Board of Directors, 15 years of required IRS tax
filings and their corresponding auditors' reports (1996-2010), and 10 years of annual organizational reports with

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  rudimentary financial information (1999-2009) are also made publicly available on the website. More prominent on
the site are the current list of projects and an overview of benefits/responsibilities of program sponsorship.
Earth Island Institute appears to be mostly transparent in the information it provides online. Names andtitles of staff and leadership, contact information, financial details, and major reports are all publicly available.
Financial support received from industry is a major exception - it is not easy to find how much the organization
receives each year from this source. The relative autonomy of each of EII's programs is also not readily apparent.
Some projects seem to rely little on EII whereas others, such as the Dolphin Safe Tuna labeling scheme, seem tohave no independent existence apart from EII. The website states that the projects are independent of EII andbasically pay EII an annual fee for the benefits it can lend to each project (expertise, name recognition, access to
professional networks). However, this is not the case with the Dolphin Safe Tuna program; information provided
over the phone by Mark Berman indicates that no independent tax documents are filed with the IRS and that all
financial information pertaining to the IMMP is contained within the EII documents.
Names of the international monitoring program staff (including titles for US staff) are only provided by
IMMP in the International Tuna Monitoring Program annual report. Direct contact information for the EII assistantdirector for the International Marine Mammal Project (the program behind the Dolphin Safe monitoring) is available
in multiple places. One major exception to the general transparency of EII is project-level financials (revenue,
expenses). It is difficult to find the financials of the IMMP (as opposed to EII’s other projects). This is partly due tothe semi-autonomous nature of each project, but EII could take significant steps to improve its information
disclosure in this area. In 2001, EII received a fifth consecutive 4-star rating from Charity Navigator which madethem one of 4% of the charities rated by Charity Navigator who have received 5 consecutive 4-star evaluations. In
2010, it received 4-star rating for 4 consecutive year.

VI. Shadow of the StateThe dolphin-safe labeling system constitutes an industry-based CSR mechanism and traditional public
regulation in which private voluntary standards and enforcement coexist with governments' command-and-control
regulation. The entire arrangement relies on a form of government endorsement of voluntary standards, minimal
recordkeeping requirements for verification, and penalties for false claims. After the EII’s dolphin-safe labeling
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  program met with great consumer acceptance in the U.S., many tuna canneries got on board, sourcing certified
dolphin-safe tuna in international markets and labeling their tuna products “dolphin-safe.” To support the integrityof the labeling scheme, the U.S. government imposed legal requirements for the “dolphin-safe” label such that it
may appear exclusively on tuna that is complaint with the strictest EII’s dolphin-safe definition of no intentional
chasing and encirclement of dolphin in tuna purse-seine nets. In this way, government helped EII establish thenascent niche market for dolphin-safe tuna by providing strict standards and penalty for fraudulent claims.
Confusion among consumers could have undermined consumer confidence in the newly developed labeling system.
However, government-initiated provisions of a verification system were minimal, mostly relying on
documents and statements of on-board observers leaving the credibility of the verification in doubt (The Libarary ofCongress, TOMAS). Moreover, under pressure from the IATTC, the GATT decision, domestic advocates of
deregulation, and a WTO lawsuit, the government attempted to change the original definition of “dolphin-safe” toallow for dolphin sets and created its own “dolphin safe” label that is used by the Department of Commerce.
Success Factors
It would be hard to say labeling alone affected industry to change its behavior since incidental dolphinmortality showed significant decline after the U.S. regulations were passed by Congress. Furthermore, voluntary
efforts to reduce the problem by requiring use of specific technology, special fishing practices, an on-board observerand dolphin mortality limits had been embraced (to varying degrees) by industry long before the labeling systembegan. Although voluntary efforts alone may be insufficient to achieve industrial transformation, the labelingprogram was effective when U.S. domestic regulation is weakened or challenged by industry lobby and international
trade disputes (Mitchell). The NGO-led voluntary labeling program successfully developed a profitable market for
dolphin-safe tuna highlighting the important role of environmental and consumer groups in providing initial
incentives to firms to change their behavior through successful public education campaign and consumer boycott.
However, not all NGO-led campaigns and certification systems become sustainable over the long term. Most
attempts to introduce labels suffered challenges in the early stages of their development and failed to transform theindustry. Next, I will examine some factors behind the earlier success and long-term sustainability of the EII’s
dolphin-safe tuna label.

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  	  Credibility of Monitoring NGOs
The relative decline in the public’s trust of other institutions not due to the NGO’s efforts in combination
with these organizations’ commitment to issues of broad concern are reasons for the default credibility enjoyed bymany NGOs (Conroy 2007). However, the virtue of a cause is not sufficient to build unshakable credibility that is
critical to their long-run success. If we think of the role played by NGOs, monitoring NGOs in particular, similar to
reputational intermediaries, serious credibility challenges by stakeholders can lead not only to temporary damage toan individual organization but also to the collapse of the NGO-led certification system. When monitoring NGOspursues industry participation too aggressively, criticism from fellow NGOs could lead to the credibility crisis asevidenced in the case of Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in 2004 (Conroy 2007).
Credibility also matters when there is competition from an alternative labeling program. The Department ofCommerce will label tuna as being dolphin-safe based on an evaluation standard that is less stringent than the one
established by EII. For now, however, most tuna processors, retailers, and consumers have pledged to stay with the
EII label because of the well-established public trust. Many NGOs such as Humane Society also maintained theirrecommended lists of processors and retailers who are compliant to the older standard. I will attempt to analyze thecredibility of the EII’s labeling system drawing on the four external conditions for credibility laid out by Gourevitchand Lake – common interests of the audience and the NGO, costly effort by the NGO, external verification, andpenalties for misrepresentation (Gourevitch and Lake 2012).
Promoting Bond with the Audience
Audience reception of an NGO’s credibility increases when they promote a bond with audiences aroundshared common interest as well as values (Gourevitch and Lake 2012). In addition to very costly multiyear court
battles against various government agencies to strengthen their regulatory enforcement, EII has been highly visible
in organizing public protests and consumer boycotts as well as sending experts to public hearings. EII also actively
communicates its values through a variety of methods: public outreach and media campaigns, advertisements,
publication of a journal magazine, periodic updates to members, recruiting programs targeting activists and students
from elementary school through college, and organizing special events and lectures featuring their project directors
and leading environmental activists. The organization’s high level of transparency with its provision of documents
and reporting also communicates well with external verifiers including government, media, and other NGOs. This
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  can give ample opportunities for the global public to volunteer and participate according to their own interest andinitiative, further increasing ties to individuals who can make future donations, and eases the recruiting of members
and volunteers.
EII and the target industry share interest in building consumer confidence in dolphin-safe tuna products andprotecting the market for these goods. It has an excellent track record of obtaining industry cooperation as reflectedby the endorsements it has received from large tuna companies and association in the U.S., Thailand, the Philippines,
Canada, Australia, and Europe. However, EII’s effort to bring more companies on board did not stop at the large,
high-visibility branded companies. As of 2011, Earth Island Institute currently has "Dolphin Safe" tuna agreementswith more than 471 companies in 67 countries worldwide (Dolphin safe tuna labeling program annual report, 2011).
So far, it seems that there is no problem or tension among the demands of the different audiences. Although sometuna exporters and retailers in a few nations, primarily in Latin America, have signaled their preference for adolphin-safe standard that permits chasing, encircling, and even limited dolphin mortality, the vast majority of
producers, consumers and NGOs show more confidence in EII’s strict standards.
Costly Effort
Credibility of NGOs also increases when their claims are backed by observable costly effort (Gourevitchand Lake 2012). Moreover, high-quality NGOs have incentives to create credible signals to differentiate themselvesfrom low-quality NGOs or competing organizations. EII’s long track record as leader at the forefront of organizing
demand protest and filing costly multiple litigations against powerful opponents in the U.S. government and aroundthe world definitely signals its long-term commitment to its stated mission. Many early EII projects were small,issue-oriented, and staffed by volunteers. Now, EII serves as a large incubator for numerous eco-projects byobtaining large amounts of grant funding. As a result, it has had to increase its efforts to send often costly signals ofcommitment to its donors and the public in ever more diverse manners.
Other than autonomous governance structure, professional staff and standardization of operatingprocedures, and high level of transparency discussed above, networking with other NGOs was critical for EII’s
strategy. EII has a history of leading the broad-based coalition called the Marine Mammal Protection Act
Reauthorization Coalition comprised of twenty-eight national environmental organizations, to seek stricter
enforcement of government regulation on marine mammal protection. Moreover, over 80 non-governmental
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  environmental, animal welfare, and trade organizations support the Earth Island Institute’s stance and its dolphinsafe tuna standards, including Greenpeace, the Humane Society of the U.S., Defenders of Wildlife, Sierra Club,
American Association for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), Friends of the Earth, Animal Welfare
Institute, and Ralph Nader's Citizen Trade Campaign (EII website).
Penalties for Misrepresentation
If the NGO faces a potential penalty in terms of reputational damage, veto by other NGOs, and ultimately
threat of deselection by donors, the incentive to misrepresent information or engage in wrongdoing will be
substantially lowered. Since EII is mostly a fund-driven incubator for various projects, donor would potentially havepower to fire the organization if they find misrepresentation of information.

External Verification
NGOs are more likely to be credible if their claims are subject to the scrutiny of external verifiers(Gourevitch and Lake 2012). EII, headquartered and operating in San Francisco, where environmental activism ishighly present in addition to free press and active civil society, all of which are typical features of a fully functioning
democratic society, provides the most general level of external verification. Moreover, an increasing number of third
party verifiers such as Charity Navigator and social auditing agencies will also discipline these NGOs. EII’s higher
level of transparency about its budget and procedures also enables easier access to outsiders to verify the NGO’s
claim increasing its credibility.
Advocacy Group-led Campaign
The marketing campaign targeting industry leaders not only gave firms initial incentive to change but also
was cost-effective since the entire industry followed suit. Additionally, it created an opportunity to activate existing
members, to recruit future members and talents, to raise more funds, and ultimately to mobilize large latent public
into becoming involved. With large numbers of public and members behind their back, environmental groups wereable to exert considerable political pressure on vote-maximizing politicians and budget- or political supportmaximizing regulators (Oliver& Marwell 1992).

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  Factors Affecting Consumer Choice
Since canned tuna product is largely undifferentiated commodity, consumer is usually indifferent to brandname or country of origin of canned tuna they purchase. Price rather than brand is often key factor. However, there
was consumers’ willingness to pay premiums for the dolphin-safe tuna products and consumers confidence in theolder standard versus the U.S. Department of Commerce certifies-new standard. Although the direct consumer
benefit (such as health) associated with consumption of dolphin-safe tuna was low, the social benefit such as status
and influence from the socially responsible consumption was high. According to a study by Teisl et al, consumers
did respond to the dolphin-safe tuna label and helped grow the market for certified dolphin-safe tuna (Teisl et al,2001).
Factors Affecting Firms’ Compliance
The canned tuna industry targeting U.S. market has fragmented industry actors. They are composed ofmultiple actors: fishing companies, processing companies, importers, distributors, brokers, retailers in addition totheir different country of origin. Upstream and downstream producers are heterogeneous in their preferences andindustrial structure making it hard for them to present concerted resistance to an NGO-led campaign.
U.S.-based downstream producers that own major canned tuna brands such as StarKist, Bumble Bee and
Van Kamp Seafood Company were quick to adopt the EII-led dolphin safe standards. High reputation costs,
relatively lower compliance costs, expected price premium, high market concentration by industry leaders explains
their incentives to participate in and stay with stricter labeling and regulation.
First, existence of tangible benefits relative to compliance costs is important to the initial adoption of CSR
by firms. Firms’ compliance cost should be offset either by price premium or other financial benefits such as lower
employee turnout, lower insurance cost, and lower reputational risks (Reinhardt, 2000). In this case, branding
benefits existed in the form of an improved reputation with consumers, investors, business partners, and government
officials. The anti-dolphin-deadly tuna campaigns were highly effective in inflicting reputation costs on the tunacompanies. Therefore they had priority to restore consumer confidence in their products and shared interest with
NGOs in reducing consumer concerns.

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  	  Second, part of compliance cost was offset by price premium. The price premium backed by consumers’
willingness to pay for the dolphin-safe tuna products was measured at $400 per ton. This was enough to make up for
additional cost of production relocation (Vogel, 1997).
Third, compliance costs for downstream producers were also relatively lower. The operation of U.S.-based
tuna cannery was vertically integrated in 1970s: they procured tuna either through long term contracts withfishermen or by operating their own fleets (Bonanno & Constance, 1999). They faced two options: either comply
with the dolphin safety regulations by switching to costly dolphin-safe techniques such as hook-and-line fishing andpurse-seine netting on dolphin-free schools of tuna in ETP or to continue using purse-seine nets by relocating theirfleet to the Western Tropical Pacific (WTP) and changing their harvest target species to Skipjack tuna which, unlike
Yellowfin tuna, do not swim with dolphins (Bonanno & Constance, 1999). Many of them either moved their fleet toAmerican Samoa or sourced dolphin-safe tuna in international market outside the ETP. Despite additional costs
incurred due to moving their off-loading locations closer to Asia, the StarKist's revenue and profit improved over the
two-year consumer boycott of non-dolphin-safe tuna (Ramach, 1997).
Fourth, market concentration in the canned tuna industry was rather high. The three largest canned tunaproducers such as StarKist, Bumble Bee and Van Kamp Seafood Company together produced about 84 percent of
the canned tuna sold in the United States (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine andFisheries, 1990). Once they changed, the whole industry followed.
Lastly, once they are established in the premium niche environmental market, they further have incentives
to use government regulation and private regulatory bodies or codes of conduct to deter market entry by firms,
foreign competitors in particular, with higher compliance costs (Reinhardt, 2000). The existence of economic rent
seeking was reason why the producer group failed to form a cohesive alliance against stricter standards.
In contrast, upstream producers, fisheries of the ETP in particular, have suffered significant loss in profits
due to increased costs of compliance to the stringent U.S. standards banning dolphin set. Most fishermen could notafford to relocate their entire purse-seine fleet to the WTP. Another burden was the cost of switching target species
since skipjack tuna in the WTP had lower market value due to its lower overall quality compared with the relative
high quality mature tuna in ETP. To continue fishing Yellowfin tuna, they had to either switch to alternative fishingmethods such as the hook-and-long line fishing and Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) which are less efficient to
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  fishermen relative to large scale purse-seine netting on dolphin. Fishermen in the ETP also had to develop new ways
to detect dolphin-free tuna schools. Moreover, the alternative purse-seine school set on juvenile tuna that do not
associate with dolphins or log set pose a threat to deplete tuna stocks in the future (Ramtch 1997). 	
  Challenges
Competing Standards
The Dolphin-safe label developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce was first establishedin 1990 as a result of Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA). Despite several
attempts by industry lobbyists to change the legal definition of dolphin-safe, the original
standards remained intact thanks to lawsuits filed by the environmental groups. Standards forthe Department of Commerce label are similar to those of EII in that it does not allow
intentional chasing and netting of any dolphins and no dolphin mortality may be recorded. Its monitoringmechanism rely on the tuna tracking and verification system containing on-board observer verification anddocument review by representatives of the National Marine Fisheries Service (Electric Code of Federal Regulations).
The system also allows audits and spot checks but upon request of administrator from NMFS.
Despite the government enforcement and extensive tracking and verification system, this alternate labelingsystem faces serious credibility challenges. First, its standard allows for individual vessel to catch dolphin-deadly
tuna and store them separately from dolphin-safe tuna in their vessel wells while EII’s standard does not allow any
mixing of tuna during the entire fishing trip. In addition, their audit is triggered only by the government
representatives; the system is lacking complaint-based inspections. Non-U.S. vessels catching tuna in the ETP canalso be labeled as dolphin-safe as long as they are complaint with all the requirements of the Agreement on theInternational Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) Tuna Tracking and Verification Plan (Electric Code ofFederal Regulations). Lastly, the Commerce department has a policy of “confidentiality of proprietary information”
which means all the reports are not subject to public access.
A government as an interest-aggregating institution by nature has to make compromise between various
stakeholders’ demand and may sometimes be captured by rent-seeking business interests. This inherent limitation
tends to lead to a less-than-desirable standard from the activists’ and concerned consumers’ point of view, making it
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  hard to promote bonds between these various groups based on shared values and interests. It is also difficult toinclude the most important audience of eco-label, namely, consumers. The government’s inconsistent position on theencirclement of dolphins also added further confusion and lowered confidence in its label. The U.S. Consumers
Union has raised doubts about the government’s veracity, classifying its dolphin-safe label to be a “partiallycertified general claim” (Consumer Reports, Green Choices). EII has put a significant amount of information about
the Department of Commerce label on its consumer alert website, titling it as “a death certificate” for dolphins.
By-catch of Other Species
As a result of dolphin protection measures, fisheries looking for alternative methods increased the use of
Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) which now are creating more adverse impacts on the overall ecosystem since
many more species than dolphins and tuna are drawn to FADs. As a result of the switch from dolphin sets to log sets,
there was a significant reduction of dolphin bycatch and mortality at the expense of other species and small,nonmarketable tuna. In addition, fishing activities can cause many other negative ecological impacts ranging fromhabitat loss, pollution, and generation of marine debris, among other undesirable consequences (Hall, 1998). While
reduction of dolphin bycatch through the single-issue eco-label clearly made a significant progress in limiting
dolphin mortality, a holistic approach is needed to address these concerns (Hall 2003). In addition, some marine
biologists worried that the current dolphin mortality rate is not sufficient to recover the original dolphin populationin ETP unless the goal of zero mortality rate is reinstated (Ward 2008).
Trade Dispute
The U.S. dolphin-safe label is currently under legal challenge from Mexico for being used as technicalbarrier against Mexican tuna producers. In 2008, Mexico filed complaint to the WTO panel that U.S. regulations
including Department of Commerce official dolphin-safe label and section of Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act (DPCIA) were discriminatory against Mexican tuna producers in compliance with a relevantinternational standard that minimize the incidental dolphin mortality in commercial tuna fishing. The panel foundthat while the U.S. dolphin-safe labeling provisions do not constitute technical barrier, they are “more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill the legitimate objectives” of providing information to consumers and protecting
dolphins. Moreover, although the regulations do not require tuna companies to use the labels in order for the
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  products to be sold in the U.S. market, the label is based on the standard adopted unilaterally by the U.S. and not on
relevant international standards (WTO, 2011. Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS381).
The U.S. government appealed the WTO ruling and argued the complaint should be brought to disputesettlement proceedings of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), rather than to the WTO. Losing theappeal may mean another amendment of the 1990 DPCIA and relevant regulations regarding dolphin-safe labelingor threat of Mexican trade sanctions (Reuters, 2012). One of the important policy implications of the future rulingagainst the U.S. government’s mandatory labeling scheme would be that private labeling scheme such as the EII
eco-label would be the best alternative under international trade constraints.
Conclusion
Due to the combination of government regulation and voluntary programs of industry and NGO-ledlabeling program, conservation of dolphins in the ETP has made a significant progress although more can be done toachieve zero dolphin bycatch rates. However, in the presence of the threat of international trade dispute with thenations not in compliance with more stringent U.S. standards, voluntary labeling scheme can use market pressure to
influence trading partners while remaining in compliance with international trade agreements. Although multilateralvoluntary or binding agreements have played another important role in reducing dolphin bycatch, the multilateralnature of international agreements imposes compromise of higher standards sought by particular groups in order toappease members with lower standard. With this external constraint, voluntary labeling system would be much more
viable option for a country to pursue higher dolphin safety fishing standards. However, a voluntary program is only
sustained under certain conditions that enable long-term commitment by consumer and industry to the cause. Such
conditions include an NGO-led consumer boycott, the establishment of independent third-party certification system
run by credible monitoring NGOs, and various contributing factors affecting firm and consumer compliance. The
low consumer and producer acceptance of the new labeling program by Department of Commerce warns of thepotential pitfalls of government attempts to establish a standard when its decision making process can be influenced
by industry interest (Mitchell 2000). Given the low credibility consumers and civic groups often associate withgovernment-led labeling scheme, the government role should be not the creation of its own label but a supporting
advocate for a private labeling scheme, especially in threat of potential trade dispute under WTO system. Further
research would require new role of government in promoting private labeling scheme.
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  References
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Bonanno, Alessandro & Constance, Douglas. 1999. “Contested Terrain of the Global Fisheries: “Dolphin-Safe”
Tuna, The Panama Declaration, and the Marine Stewardship Council”. Department of Sociology, Sam Houston
State Uniuersity, Rural Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 597-623 December 1999

Boreman, Stephen M. 1992. “Dolphin-Safe Tuna: What's in a Label? The Killing of Dolphins in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific and the Case for an International Legal Solution”, J.D. University of California, Davis, is aconsultant on natural resources with the California State Legislature.1992

Conroy, Michael. 2007. Branded: How the Certification Revolution is Transforming Global Corporations, New
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Consumer Reports. Green Choices. Eco-label center http://www.greenerchoices.org/ecolabels/label.cfm?LabelID=98

Labor Department (of United States). Wage and Hour Division (WHD) . VII. Economic Factors for Considerationthat May Weigh Against Minimum Wage Increases-Slow U.S. Market Growth.
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Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth. 2007 United States. 484 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2007)

Electric Code of Federal Regulations. Title 50: Wildlife and Fisheries. PART 216—REGULATIONSGOVERNING THE TAKING AND IMPORTING OF MARINE MAMMALS.
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xt&node=50:9.0.1.3.1.8&idno=50

Felando, August 1995. Declaration Of Panama Signed:Twelve-nation, five-environmental-group accord could bringsense to "dolphin-safe" labelling. The Fisherman's News, November 1995.
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Gelfand, Josh. 2011. “Dolphin-Safe” Tuna Label in Jeopardy". http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/09/dolphin-safetuna-label-jeopardy/. September 22nd, 2011.
Gourevitch, Peter and Lake, David “Beyond Virtue: evaluating and enhancing the credibility of non governmentalorganizations, “ in Gourevitch, Lake and Stein,eds The Credibility of Transnational NGOs - When Virtue Is Not
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Hall, Martin A. 1998. “An ecological view of the tuna-dolphin problem: impacts and trade-offs.” Review in Fish
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Hall, Martin A.. 2003. Campa, Marcela and Gómez, Martha, 2003. “Solving the Tuna-Dolphin Problem in the
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Hirschland. 2006. Global Governance Gap: B/t rising demand for addressing negative impact of globalized market
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  	  Kaiser Michel J. & Edwards-Jones, Gareth. 2006. “The Role of Eco-labeling in Fisheries Management andConservation”. Conservation Biology, Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 392–398, April 2006

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