The Changing Geopolitics of Extractivism(s) and the Clean Energy
Transition
Jewellord T. Nem Singh
International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
nemsingh@iss.nlContext
Though it failed to resolve several contentious issues, the COP26 meeting in Glasgow solidified
a consensus around the need for a global transition towards clean energy. Implicated in thistransition is the widescale adoption of renewables̶we must build larger wind turbines, produce
more electric vehicles, and phase down coal factories in electrifying rapidly urbanizing cities.
Climate negotiations often refer to “common but differentiated responsibilities” among countries
in dealing with the coming planetary crisis (UN FCCC 2013). In this narrative, the climate crisis isframed as a global challenge for both developed and developing countries, and in so doing, thereis shared responsibility for the energy transition. The other side of this narrative is unspoken: theprotagonists of such a transformation are European governments and high-tech manufacturing
companies involved in spearheading the green project, which consists of expanding productionof wind turbines, scaling up the usage of hybrid and electric vehicles, fuel cells, and Li-ion
batteries, and decarbonizing steel, power, and other carbon-intensive industries for the greentransition. And their policies have a cost̶if the world meets the targets of the Paris Agreement,
demand is likely to increase by 40% for copper and rare earth elements (REES), 60-70% for cobalt
and nickel, and almost 90% for lithium in the next two decades (International Energy Agency 2021,5).
As the clean energy transition accelerates in this decade, mineral states in Latin America andAfrica̶but also Australia̶are increasingly positioned to become the new sources of critical raw
materials needed for the worldwide shift towards green capitalism. Lithium, graphite, and niobium
are key inputs for batteries powering electric vehicle cars and for storage systems for photovoltaic
panels and wind generators. Beyond new demands for rare metals to power the energy transition,
demand for copper, nickel, manganese, aluminum, and other base metals are increasing inresponse to the need for new infrastructures for clean energy. However, the global politics ofmining has an intrinsically complex and historically problematic record with only a few exceptional
cases of success. For instance, primary commodities served to insert Latin America in the global
international economy. Between 1500s and 1800s, the region was relegated in the periphery partly
a function of the colonial project but also due to the immutable force of extractivist institutions
after independence. It was only during the 20th century when import substitution industrialization(ISI) models were implemented that concerted efforts to change the position of Latin America inthe international political economy.

The China Question ‒ Dominant Narratives in response to Chinaʼs Economic Ascent

1

The clean energy transition is a historically significant moment for resource producers. It involves
the intensive and extensive extraction of “rare metals”̶metal minerals produced in low quantities
and utilized as intermediate inputs in the manufacturing of digital, renewable, and energy
technologies. These have also been identified by the U.S. and EU as “critical raw materials”(CRMs), which are simultaneously important for industrial competitiveness and generate serious
concern due to supply vulnerabilities. The United States lists 35 critical minerals in order of theirimportance for national security and wider supply chain vulnerabilities (U.S. White House, 2017).
The EU Commission report identifies 30 critical raw materials, found in Table 1 (EuropeanCommission, 2020b; European Commission, 2020a). In this ordering, critical minerals are grouped
into three major categories: heavy rare earths (HREEs), light rare earths (LREEs), platinum groupmetals (PGMS). The list also includes various ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

Table 1 Current Global Share of Production and Processing of Critical Minerals

123456789101112131415161718

Material

Stage

Antimony
BaryteEE

Main
globalsupplier
China
China

Share
74%
38%

Material
2324

Magnesium
Naturalgraphite
Natural rubber
Neodymium
Niobium
Palladium
Phosphate rock
Phosphorus
Platinum
Praseodymium
Rhodium
Ruthenium
Samarium
Scandium
Silicon metal
Tantalum
Terbium
Titanium

Stage
PE

Main
globalsupplier
China
China

Shar
e
89%
69%

BauxiteE
Australia
28% 25
E
Thailand33%
Beryllium
EUSA
88% 26
E
China
86%
BismuthP
China
80% 27P
Brazil92%
BorateE
Turkey42% 28P
Russia40%
CeriumE
China
86% 29E
China48%
CobaltECongo,DR
59% 30P
China
74%
Coking coalE
China
55% 31P
S. Africa
71%
Dysprosium
E
China
86% 32E
China
86%ErbiumE
China
86% 33P
S. Africa
80%EuropiumE
China
86% 34P
S. Africa
93%
Fluorspar
E
China
65% 35E
China
86%
Gadolinium
E
China
86% 36
P
China
66%
Gallium
P
China
80% 37
P
China
66%
GermaniumP
China
80% 38
E
Congo,DR 33%
Hafnium
PFrance
49% 39
E
China
86%
E
China
86% 40P
China
45%
Ho,Tm,Lu,Yb
19 IndiumP
China
48% 41 Tungsten
P
China
69%
20 Iridium
PS. Africa
92% 42 Vanadium
E
China
39%
21 LanthanumE
China
86% 43 Yttrium
E
China
86%
22 Lithium
PChile44% 44 Strontium
ESpain31%
Source: European Commission (2020b, 5)
LegendStageE = Extraction stage P = Processing stage
Dysprosium, erbium, europium, gadolinium, holmium, lutetium, terbium,
HREEs
thulium,ytterbium, yttrium
LREEs
Cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium and samarium
PGMs
Iridium, palladium, platinum, rhodium, ruthenium

2Apart from rare metals, the expansion of renewable energy will require significant investments inclean energy infrastructure, which also adds pressure towards primary mineral production of basemetals like nickel, iron, and copper. Drawing from recent data on raw materials and assembly ofcomponents (Figures 1 & 2) collected by the European Commission, it is patently clear thatdeveloping countries are being repositioned̶or more accurately, re-embedded̶in theinternational division of labour as sources of primary raw materials not only to supply current
needs for high-tech manufacturing but also to fuel the green energy transition. If there is one
major difference between the past centuries, it is the fact that China has now joined Latin Americaand Africa as the sources of critical minerals.

Figure 1 Regional Shares in Raw Materials Stages in High Technology Sectors

Figure 2 Regional Shares in Assemblies Stages of High-Tech Manufacturing

Source: European Commission (adapted) (2020a, 82).
In this context, Chinaʼs rise as the second largest economy in the world combined with its
ambitious grand strategy to place itself at the centre of global trade, finance, and investments hascaused concerns and reactions from the West. Two dominant narratives became consolidated
around critical minerals discourses. On one hand, there appears to be no issues about Africa andLatin America retaining themselves as producers of raw materials. In fact, in the European Raw
Materials Conference held in Brussels, the Commission set a special session on Europe-Africa
relations, emphasizing the significance of the region as a source of minerals for renewable energy

3technologies.1 This announcement took place at the backdrop of the publication of EUʼs CriticalRaw Materials Plan2, which emphasises secured access to minerals as a security question, andthus, charts the regional strategy on how access and sustainability are envisaged by the EuropeanUnion (EU). In this roadmap, critical minerals are framed as commodities that ought to be tradedand sold in world markets as if they are ʻnormal commoditiesʼ in which markets set the prices,
and as a consequence, should be readily available for consumers.
On other hand, and as a contrast to these two regions, Chinaʼs strategic control over minerals has
been framed as a security problem for the EU. In this instance, Chinaʼs large-scale acquisition ofnatural resources, strategic ports and infrastructure projects, and even technological and firmlevel mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been perceived as a “security threat” for Europe. Ina high-profile case in Greece, the sale of the centuries-old port of Piraeus has been heavily
politicized as an issue of European security and a test of transatlantic alliances. When the Greek
state was bankrupt and was compelled to privatize important state assets, including the Port ofPiraeus, to finance the IMF bailout, European companies failed to offer a competitive bid againstChinese company COSCO. Since 2016, the sales of the port, then, became subject to intense
geopolitical tensions between the EU, US, and China with Greek politicians being required tonavigate an increasingly complex political terrain. 3 In other words, state assets and natural
resources are perceived as geopolitical tools, which are utilized by mercantilist states andhegemonic powers ‒ i.e. China and Russia ‒ as weapons for security.
Yet, these competing narratives are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. Critical minerals are
simultaneously commodities produced, traded, and sold in world markets; yet minerals should not
be treated simply as ordinary commodities. Natural resources, in particular, are non-renewable,
are geographically concentrated, and have been historically subject to claims of state sovereignty(Nem Singh 2012; 2018; 2019). That China has claimed the right to limit resource exports for its
own developmental needs is, of course, paramount to similar claims of Latin America in the 19thand 20th century over their right to development, and therefore, was often used to justify resource
nationalization for industrialization. Perhaps more controversially, the discourse on green
transition as a public good seems to mirror historical claims over how the West had practically
exercised sovereignty over their right to extract natural resources in the colonial world, especiallyin Africa. The historical scholarship is plentiful in showing the consequences of colonization interms of institution-building, but also its deleterious effects over how resources were transferred
for centuries (Mahoney 2010; Reno 1996). What is, of course, new is that the energy transition isframed as a collective action problem, whereby burden sharing is increasingly expected towards
developing countries even if historical carbon emissions are disproportionately caused by theindustrialization of the West in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Emerging Supply Chains on Clean Energy
Author participation, EU Raw Materials Week, Brussels, November 15-19, 2021.
See https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/42849.
3
Author interview with Former Senior Official, Ministry of Economy, xxx.
124Mineral extraction for renewable energy has already generated new patterns of trade in the energy
sector. In the absence of domestic mineral reserves, resource-poor, industrialized East Asiancountries̶Japan, Korea, and Taiwan̶compete directly with Western capital in various high-end
manufacturing sectors notably automobile, digital and ICT, but also in producing intermediate
inputs like permanent magnets and semi-conductors, which are important components inadvanced manufacturing and clean energy technologies. To secure access to minerals, East Asia
remains committed to engage with China in very pragmatic ways, for example through regional
forums and with the global South through bilateral investment agreements aimed at facilitating
trade, investment, and production. In the absence of strategic diplomatic ties, interconnectedness
between Asia and Latin America is often conducted at the firm-to-firm level. For example, newlithium projects in Brazil are financed through agreements for secured markets in Asia, whereby
Chinese and Japanese firms buy concentrated lithium to be processed in refining facilities in East
Asia.4 By contrast, growing concerns of the EU and US governments over the fact that nondemocratic regimes like China and Russia hold excessive market power in controlling CRMreserves and production have led to newer initiatives, such as the building a new supply chain
linking critical minerals with battery components and final product assembly. The success of an
ambitious strategy to decouple from Chinese-led supply chain of minerals and clean energy,
however, remains entirely dependent on the capacities of the West to secure access to criticalminerals elsewhere. As Figure 3 shows, Latin America and Africa are the primary sources for raw
materials, with East Asian countries and the West dominating the higher value-added activities inthe supply chain.

Figure 3 Indicative Supply Chain of Clean Energy Technologies

Source: International Energy Agency (2021, 29) (adapted).

45Author interview with Manager, Sigma Lithium Resources, Online interview, March 18, 2022.

Notes: DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; EU = European Union; US = United States;
Russia = Russian Federation; China = Peopleʼs Republic of China. Largest producers andconsumers are noted in each case to provide an indication, rather than a complete account.

What the Future Might Look Like
The tide is shifting away from fossil fuel dependency in favour of clean technologies. However,an uncritical embrace of clean technology may also lead to greater inequalities and unevendevelopment. Latin America and Africa will be the new battlefield for resource extraction between
China and the West. But these regions can also become a source of new political ideas on how
to strike a balance between our insatiable demands for critical minerals and a new resource
governance model.
To deal with the complex challenges associated with the transition to green technology, growing
demands for critical minerals, and unequal burdens placed on the developing world, we need toincorporate a social justice perspective. To some, blame goes to the industrialized world whichowes an ecological debt, thereby justifying carbon-based growth in middle and low-income
countries. Other radical calls seek for degrowth, a reversal of humanityʼs pursuit of unfetteredconsumption and production (Kallis, 2018; Kallis et al., 2020). A nuanced position demands
common but differentiated responsibilities. The basic principle is that because industrializedcountries had decades to develop with unrestrained carbon emissions, they are now obligated toreduce emissions and contribute more financial assistance for developing nations to support theirenergy growth and transition to clean technologies (Gallagher and Xiaowei, 2018, 6).
These debates on how to deal with the uneven costs and burdens of the green transition posedifficult but fundamental questions. Are industrialized countries now more willing to accept thecosts of climate change and do more on behalf of the developing world? To what extent can therapid deployment of clean technologies achieve global targets, given how Chinaʼs economic
development model is based on high energy consumption, much of it with coal (Lewis, 2013, 10‒11)? If China does move towards a renewable energy strategy, will the country merely shift thecosts and externalities of the transition from the national government and urban China to rural
China, Latin America, and other resource-rich regions, making them even more vulnerable to thenegative effects of mineral extraction?
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̶̶̶. 2020b. ʻStudy on the EUʼs List of Critical Raw Materials ‒ Final Reportʼ. Luxembourg:European Commission.
Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Xuan Xiaowei. 2018. Titans of the Climate: Explaining Policy Process in theUnited States and China. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Biographical Note:Jewellord T. Nem Singh is an Assistant Professor in International Development at theInternational Institute of Social Studies, The Hague and an Affiliate Research Fellow at theInternational Institute of Asian Studies, Leiden. This paper has received funding from theEuropean Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant No. 950056 and is part of a five-year
research programme Green Industrial Policy in the Age of Rare Metals: A Trans-regional
Comparison of Growth Strategies in Rare Earths Mining (GRIP-ARM). Details of the project
can be found at @GRIP_ARM and @JNemSingh. Nem Singh is the author of Business of theState: Why State Ownership Matters for Resource Governance (Forthcoming, Oxford
University Press) and editor of a new special issue entitled The Politics of Designing andNegotiating Industrial Policy in the 21st Century (Forthcoming, Third World Quarterly).

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