Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

NATIONAL INTEREST AND JAPAN`S FOREIGN AID POLICY
Purnendra Jain
Professor of University of Adelaide
INTRODUCTION
Official foreign aid relates closely to pursuit of national interests. That is why it isarranged by and through national governments across the world and is the subject ofnational policy. In giving foreign aid, national governments are spending from thepublic purse; they need to justify their actions in ‘giving’ public monies abroad whencompeting needs at home already have heavy pull on the national budget. The terms‘aid’ and ‘assistance’ suggest that care for the wellbeing of others is the motivating
force. Aid/assistance is to help, support, provide relief to others who are in need, and it
bespeaks the generosity of the donor. But a considered look at the geopolitical context
of where and when national governments spend foreign aid monies, upon whom and for
what, reveals a defining characteristic. Altruism is not the exclusive motivation ofnational governments’ foreign aid programs. They are always intended to serve national
interests, alongside or even irrespective of the needs and interests met at the receivingend.
In this article we consider Japan’s foreign aid policy. We turn to examples of
the who, what, when, where and why of this ‘giving’ abroad in the context ofinternational and domestic politics to understand how Japan’s foreign aid is put to workin pursuit of Japan’s national interests, to also ‘give’ to the Japanese nation. As this
discussion illustrates, over time foreign aid has been used to serve more complex
national interests for Japan as domestic and foreign policy needs require. Limits upon
how Japan can engage as an international actor while upholding its ‘pacifist constitution’designed to restrict Japan’s involvement in international military actions, have helped
propel foreign aid as a versatile policy tool to deliver symbolic and practical outcomesat both donor and recipient ends of the aid process.
We first clarify the ambiguous concepts of ‘national interest’ and ‘foreign aid’
and then briefly overview Japan’s foreign aid program as a useful backdrop. We thenconsider what the types, timing and recipient destinations of this program indicate about
Japan’s foreign aid policy motivations. Overall, we see how foreign aid has been
deployed as an ever more valuable policy tool for Japan, in pursuit of economic,
diplomatic and strategic objectives for Japan’s comprehensive national security.

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

UNDERSTANDINGS OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN AID
Political leaders in donor countries speak loosely of ‘serving our national interests’ tojustify spending from the public purse on overseas aid programs. Using foreign aid in
pursuit of national interests has been acknowledged widely in the foreign aid discourse(e.g., USAID 2002, Hook 1995, Donald 1983), to the point where Hook’s cross-country
study of foreign aid describes the linkage as ‘virtually axiomatic’ (Hook 1995: xi). Yet
the notion of national interest is still conceptually rubbery. In the international relations
literature the concept is explored rigorously using paradigm-consistent theoreticalframeworks. State-centric realist studies validate foreign aid as a move by the stateessentially to protect national territory, while liberal traditions see the public or national
interest served by government programs such as foreign aid to be ‘some summation ofprivate interests’ (Krasner 1978: 28).
In this article we accept Krasner’s understanding of the national interest
associated with national foreign aid policies as the objectives sought by the state(Krasner 1978: 5-6). We therefore take national interest to refer to the policy objectives
set by Japanese aid policy decision makers. In the Japanese case, high-ranking national
bureaucrats have been the main state actors who plan and process objectives in aid
policymaking. In more recent years, however, political leaders have begun to play amuch greater role in determining and shaping ODA policy directions. As true of allnational policies, policymakers’ perceptions of shift in domestic and external
circumstances may urge them to shift what they recognise as national interests andpolicy objectives and priorities to best serve these interests. Thus we observe shifts overtime in destination, type and scale of Japan’s aid programs and in the national interests
these programs are deployed to serve.
For many years Japan’s aid discourse has tended to skirt around the ‘axiomatic
relationship’ between Japan’s foreign aid and pursuit of national interests. Japanesepolitical leaders – like leaders of many donor nations – have preferred to downplay thatthe nation’s foreign aid programs are motivated primarily by pursuit of national
interests while also serving the interests and needs of recipient nations. But in recent
years while the Japanese economy remains under stress, some Japanese leaders havepublicly acknowledged the primarily self-serving purpose of Japan’s foreign aid giving.
For example, in 2002 an LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) report indicated theruling party’s position that in the revised 2003 ODA charter, ODA ‘should be
redefined based on the national interest’(Sunaga 2004:5). But the final document
reflected aversion to this term mainly from NGOs, and instead cast Japan’s ODA as toensure ‘Japan’s own security and prosperity’ while also ‘contributing to the peace andPurnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

development of the international community’ (GOJ 2003: 2), i.e., altruism alongsidenational interests. A more recent example is a 2010 report in English by the Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA) titled ‘Enhancing Enlightened National Interest’ Even though
the meaning of ‘enhancing’, ‘enlightened’ and ‘national interest’ remains unclear in the
document (MOFA 2010), what is clear is the government’s recognition that withnational budget cutbacks domestically, it now needs to validate this expenditure to
Japanese constituents whose taxes fund these expensive programs abroad. Six years
earlier, Sunaga (2004: 4) identified how public knowledge of misappropriation of funds
and other scandals associated with ODA weakened the necessary public support inside
Japan for the nation’s ODA programs.
The growing Japanese scholarship on this important aspect of Japan’sinternational activities suggests a similar tendency to avoid rigorous analysis of Japan’s
ODA in relation to the national interest. Exceptions include the work of Hirano (2012)
arguing the case for explicit linkage, and Matsumoto (2014) positioning the objectivesof Japanese aid between national self-interest and altruism. This survey article
contributes to the scholarship by arguing that Japan’s foreign aid is driven primarily by
Japan’s own broad national interest, through what is explicitly national policy plannedand directed by representatives of the state. As Rix (1980) observed in a seminal study
that drew Japanese aid into fuller scholarly appreciation, a decentralized approach to aid
policy meant that none of the multiple ministries involved fully represented ‘thenational interest’; a ‘government’ view of national objectives was lacking (1980:
35).Yet as Tsunekawa (2014: 5) argues, even with policy decentralization and lack of
coordination, the full bulk of ministry contributions to aid policy moved in the same
direction in serving national interests. Over 20 years of efforts to streamline aid policy
administration and implementation, particularly impelled by prolonged national
economic downturn since the early 1990s, now show some success in consolidating theoverall thrust of policy and its pursuit of national interests. The 2014 official report‘OECD Peers Review: Japan’ suggests a whole-of-government approach on a numberof aid programs (OECD 2014), which is an important outcome given the mounting
strategic policy imperatives.
JAPAN’S FOREIGN AID PROGRAM: A BRIEF OVERVIEWJapan’s aid program has operated for 60 years, its origins tracing to the San Francisco
Treaty of 1951 that obliged Japan to pay war reparations. Japan began its modest
foreign aid program through the Colombo Plan in 1954, while still a recipient of WorldBank aid. Growth of the national economy paralleled growth of the aid budget, with

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

expansion of programs, objectives and geographical reach. Japan connected itself withthe western camp of industrialized donor nations by joining the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961 and the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in 1964. Yet it maintained a distinctive aid profile byfocusing on loan programs rather than grants. In the 1990s Japan emerged as theworld’s largest aid donor and stayed in this position for about a decade. It has sinceslipped alongside national economic downturn – to number four/five on the DAC donor
table in 2013 (OECD 2014:16) – but is likely to remain a significant donor for many
years to come, with a commitment of USD11.8 billion in 2013 .
Aid remains a key diplomatic tool in Tokyo’s foreign policy kit. Aid policy
objectives can be divided into several areas that serve Japan’s national interest. These
focused initially on commercial and other economic interests, but along the way
strategic objectives have been firmly embedded into the aid program. Tokyo has also
used its aid as a diplomatic tool to earn not just goodwill but also kudos (though at times
has drawn opprobrium) regionally and globally – as a player of great significance and asan ‘aid great power’. It weaved a narrative of national security in the broader sense into
the aid programs, which in more recent years have included pursuit of ‘human security’.
Support for defense-related activities was a taboo in Japan’s aid discourse hitherto. Now,
however, space has been made within aid policy, and security and defense-related aid
projects may well be given firmer roots through the revised ODA charter due for release
towards the end of 2014. Here we consider the main types of national interest thatJapanese aid policies have served, are serving and are likely to serve into the future:
economic and commercial; diplomatic and strategic; security and defense; and otherinterests.

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
Japan began its aid program directed primarily to Japanese commercial objectives,
focussing on Asian recipient nations. Programs were initially tied to supply of goods
and services from Japan, over time particularly through tied yen-loan programs. Rix
rightly observed that aid was not only integral to Japan’s available repertoire of foreign
economic policies, it was also ‘the only diplomatic weapon Japan could use in her
relations with the developing countries’ (1980: 11). Japanese terminology signals thiseconomic focus. Rather than ‘enjo’ (aid), official documents used the term keizai
kyoryoku (economic cooperation) referring to reparations, technical cooperation andgovernment assistance to private business abroad (Rix 1980: 24).

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

The understanding was rooted in reciprocity. Programs would not only supply
much needed raw materials such as mining and energy resources to develop Japaneseindustries, but also as Asian nations developed economically they would provide
markets for Japanese products and destinations for private Japanese investment in thesemarkets. The first yen loans to India in 1958 were provided with the clear aim ofdeveloping iron ore in Goa for Japan’s fledgling steel industry. As Lancaster observed,
commerce played a major role in determining country allocation and use, and ‘theJapanese business community – especially construction, engineering, and consulting
firms – implemented much of Japanese aid (Lancaster 2007: 110-11). Emphasis on‘request-based’ policy encouraged Japanese companies to prepare projects attractive tothe aid ministries in Tokyo on behalf of the recipient countries and once approved thesecompanies carried out the project that delivered them direct commercial opportunities.
Japan’s success in meeting economic policy objectives of foreign aid is demonstrated in
the literature (for example, Arase 1995 and Arase ed. 2005).
Japanese policymakers neither denied nor acknowledged the commercial
motivations of their bilateral aid. Their flagship policy of ‘self-help’ has been based on
the premise that economic growth in recipient nations through large infrastructure
projects would have a trickle-down effect to help with poverty reduction in the recipient
nation. But as the aid budget grew, alongside overseas concern that Japan’s tied projects
returned much of their commercial benefit to Japan, Tokyo adjusted its aid policy. A
primary way was by slowly untying Japan-funded large ODA projects from exclusively
Japanese suppliers to allow local and international companies (mainly US and European
but often in collaboration with Japanese contractors) to be part of the bidding process.
By the early 1970s Japan had become an economic success story, evident when
Japan became the world’s second largest economy in 1968. Japan’s global economic
strength through the 1980s brought changes in domestic and international circumstancesthat shifted Japan’s foreign policy needs. With the majority of Japan’s ODA projects
untied by the late 1980s, some of the large Japanese companies lost interest in ODArelated projects. And international status took on a different hue for Japan, now asregional economic giant. In the wake of criticisms from outside and inside Japan that its
foreign aid policy flagrantly pursued its own commercial interests, Tokyo began toconsider how aid programs could satisfy other national interests as discussed below.
The commercial objective of Japan’s bilateral aid programs lost some significance in theearlier years of the 1990s but was never abandoned, and national economic interests
through yen loan programs are still the mainstay of Japan’s ODA. Indeed, these
programs have regained significance in the new century while the Japanese economy

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014struggles for regrowth and China’s economic momentum positions this powerfulneighbour of Japan in an ever more strategically influential position regionally andglobally.
In more recent years, Japan’s continuing recession has inspired calls inside
Japan to relink ODA projects with Japanese business interests. The Japanese business
community tried to pressure the government to tie its one-off $5 billion in government
credit for the Asian financial crisis to purchases in Japan (Lancaster 2007: 120). The
government tried from the late nineties to promote Japan’s cutting-edge technologies
through a new scheme of tying called ‘Special Terms for Economic Partnership’(STEP), which improved Japanese firms’ procurement inside the government’s ODA
projects from 29 per cent in 1999 to 38 per cent in 2001. Japanese business people haveargued that the government should better integrate ODA into Japan's economic andtrade policy in line with growing economic integration in East Asia, and should use
ODA more actively ‘to ensure the interests and prosperity of Japan, based on clear-cut
strategies and priorities’ (Sunaga 2004: 7). Matsumoto has examined the linkage
between ODA and Japan’s commercial interests through a recent project in Myanmar,
exposing a pattern again widespread in Japan’s ODA projects (Matsumoto 2014).
Commercial interest is being returned to its original salience in aid policy objectives, in
response to Japan’s long-term economic downturn while Japanese companies areseeking profitable business opportunities overseas. ODA projects have always offeredthat attraction to Japanese businesses.
Large ODA commitments in recent years to countries like Vietnam, Indonesia
and India present significant business opportunities for Japanese companies throughlarge projects. The top three recipients of Japan`s gross aid in 2012–2013, these nations
accounted for close to one third of the total ODA budget (OECD 2014). As in the earlyyears of Japan’s aid program, large aid projects offer Japanese companies an entry tothese emerging markets where prospects for economic growth are immense. But thesenations have more than just economic appeal to Japan; they are also significant
strategically.
DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS
Above we noted that in response to criticisms from the late 1970s that Japan was using
foreign aid to serve explicitly economic self-interests, Tokyo began to consider how aid
programs could satisfy other national interests. These were diplomatic and strategic, andrecognition of the utility of foreign aid to serve these interests was surely opportune. In
terms of diplomacy, aid has also been clearly used as an instrument to build friendship,

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

cultivate goodwill, and signal support (or otherwise) for nations regionally andinternationally, consistent with Japan’s diplomatic needs. Yasutomo argued in the 1980s
that Japan used aid to enhance its national prestige, seeking to maximize ‘public
relations effect’ through prime ministers announcing large aid packages at regional andglobal summits (Yasutomo 1989-90: 501). The practice continues. For example, Prime
Minister Abe announced during his visit to Myanmar in May 2013 that Japan would not
only waive a 190 billion yen debt but also give Myanmar a new 91 billion yen aid
package. Tokyo has come to recognize Myanmar’s strategic significance for Japan, notjust in Myanmar’s noteworthy progress with democratisation and its status as animportant supplier of natural resources to Japan, but also for its potential to help balance
China’s powerful presence in the region.
Japan’s use of aid in this way as a tool of international diplomacy has often
drawn the label ‘gift diplomacy’ (omiyage gaiko). In attempts to repair Japan’s damaged
image abroad, for example, Japanese prime ministers have announced huge aid
packages to their counterparts while on official visits. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, forinstance, announced a massive ODA package of more than one billion dollars forSoutheast Asian nations as part of the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ during his regional tour in
1977, after massive anti-Japanese protests and riots in some Southeast Asian capitals
when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited in 1974. The Fukuda doctrine with its huge
aid package was deployed in Southeast Asian nations to cultivate goodwill towards
Japan, to try to convince Southeast Asian nations that Japan was their true friend andpartner in development and economic growth (Lam 2013). Katada sees as part ofJapan’s customary omiyage gaiko the special dispensations it gave to China while arecipient of Japan’s aid, for example working on a five-year commitment basis for aid
projects rather than the usual annual commitment (Katada 2010: 56).
Foreign aid is offered by the Japanese government as a way to meet various
diplomatic needs. Currently, for example, Japan is seeking a non-permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2016–17. Japan was set to run against
Bangladesh in an election at the United Nations due in October 2015 to elect one
member from the Asia-Pacific group for a two-year term. Japan was embarrassed to be
defeated by Bangladesh for a seat on the UNSC in 1978 and certainly wanted to preventa repeat of that outcome. To this end, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida visited
Bangladesh in March 2014, and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina toured
Tokyo in May to meet with the prime minister and senior leaders in search of new ODA
commitments and other economic assistance. Japan agreed to provide some 600 billion
yen in economic aid for infrastructure development over 4-5 years (Miyasaka 2014). As

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

expected (Rashid 2014), during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Bangladesh in early
September 2014, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced Dhaka’s
withdrawal from the race in favour of Tokyo’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the
UNSC. This allows Japan to take the seat uncontested.
Some diplomatic uses of Japanese aid have a clearly strategic edge in procuring
Japan’s national security. This became evident especially from around the end of the
1970s when Tokyo used aid to secure resources essential for Japan’s economic
wellbeing. The understanding that securing essential resources is part of Japan’snational security is articulated in the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ (sogo anzen).
Greater assistance to the resource-rich Middle East and the nations of Central and SouthAmerica when Japan was desperate for continued energy resources exemplifies well.
But beyond resource security, Japan’s ODA has also been aligned to thestrategic needs of Cold War dynamics. In the name of ‘burden sharing’, Japan has
directed aid for security/military purposes to frontline states such as Pakistan, Thailand
and Turkey, as identified by its principal security partner, the United States. WhenJapan came under intense criticism from its key ally as a ‘free rider’ and ‘unfair trader’,with severe diplomatic and economic consequences, the Japanese government turned its
aid to purposes that would serve US strategic interests. This also served Japan’s national
interest by enabling Japan to adroitly manage its most important strategic partnership
through ODA.
These imperatives changed considerably, however, with the end of the Cold War.
Here was space for Japan to articulate fresh thinking on its aid objectives, which it did
through its 1992 ODA Charter. Nevertheless, what Japan has identified as its strategicinterest in serving its US ally through ODA policy has not waned in the post-Cold War
period. Japan’s huge aid to Afghanistan (fourth largest recipient in 2011) and Iraq (tenthlargest), is a case in point.1 Rankings of these two nations in Japan’s aid table havefluctuated year by year, but both have received sizeable amounts of ODA in recent
years even though they have not been traditional recipients of Japan foreign aid. Their
strategic significance in the context of the US ‘war on terror’ campaign makes themworthy recipients of Japanese aid. Japan supports US strategy in this way, often under
US pressure, because it is unable to provide military support as other US allies do, given
its anti-military constitution. But in the present geostrategic climate aid is deployed notjust for diplomatic and strategic purposes. Japan now also uses its foreign aid in the
pursuit of security and defence interests.

1

http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/JPN.JPG

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

SECURITY AND DEFENSE INTERESTS
Article 9 of its constitution prohibits Japan from maintaining a military. It is therefore
reasonable to expect that in the spirit of the constitution, Japan’s ODA will have little to
do with traditional security and defense associated with military activity. Yasutomo
argued in the late 1980s that with Japan’s international status as ‘aid great power’ rather
than military great power, nonmilitary statecraft substituted for military diplomacy. Aid
as a form of statecraft thus inherited Japan’s pacifist spirit of the postwar era, ‘which
has molded aid into a concrete, activist, global foreign policy tool for a “heiwa kokka,” apeace-loving Japan’ (Yasutomo 1989-90: 502). Indeed Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter
explicitly prohibits Japan from giving aid for military purposes or to countries
experimenting with weapons of mass destruction and instead directs aid towards
promotion of democracy and human rights.
The charter’s intent is worthy, but Japan has implemented only selectively
from this charter to suit its national interest. Japan froze aid to Myanmar in June 2003
following the arrest and detention of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to signal
policy alignment with its US and European partners and to demonstrate that Tokyo does
follow the ODA Charter. But that same year it did not apply this yardstick to Indonesia
following military actions against demonstrators in Aceh province. The strategic
understanding that Indonesia is too big and too important for Japan to apply the samemeasures as it applied to Myanmar prevailed. Similarly, Tokyo handled Beijing withkid gloves after the Tiananmen Square military operation against pro-democracy
demonstrators in 1989 and after China’s nuclear testing in 1995, but it came downheavily on India in 1998 when New Delhi conducted nuclear testing. China wascertainly of great economic and diplomatic interest to Japan while India at that time wasnot. Aid was the tool to punish.
Now Japan is explicitly supporting its strategic partners with ODA budgets for
projects that are directly linked to their security and defense needs. The Japanese
government announced in an April 2012 Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security
Consultative Committee that it will make strategic use of its ODA to promote safety inthe region, including through providing patrol boats to coastal states. 2 This ‘safety’
assistance was announced for Vietnam and the Philippines in 2012, but Japan has
already been using its ODA explicitly for maritime security purposes for some years. In
June 2006, for example, Japan allocated Indonesia 1.92 billion yen in aid towards
construction of patrol vessels for preventing piracy, maritime terrorism and proliferation2

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/js20120427.html

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

of weapons. This project committed to providing three high-speed patrol ships fittedwith bullet proof glass that were classified as ‘military vessels’ and defined as ‘arms’.3
In the wake of a China–Philippines stand-off in the South China Sea, in July 2013
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to provide the Philippines with 10 new coastguard
patrol ships as part of Japan's ODA, sending a clear message to all players, especiallyChina, about Japan’s commitment to the Philippines (Sato 2013) and to protecting its
territorial integrity against China.
Japan’s recent focus on Vietnam is especially notable, partly through theattraction of Vietnam’s growing economy but more importantly through its historicallyand currently vexed relationship with China. In the last five years the bilateralrelationship has accelerated to the point where in August 2014, Japan announced its
intention to provide six used vessels for conversion into patrol boats to support thecountry’s maritime defense activities in the South China Sea. This will be offeredthrough Japan’s ODA program to Vietnam’s Coast Guard, which is part of Vietnam’s
military establishment. The Asahi Shinbun reported ‘Vietnam had to separate its
coastguard from its military’ because Japan is not permitted to provide ODA for
military purposes. 4 Japan began to strengthen relations with Vietnam, including a
military edge, in 2006 signing a strategic partnership agreement that included a defense
clause. In 2014 the agreement has been elevated to an ‘extensive strategic partnership,’which includes cooperation between the Vietnam People’s Army and the Japan SelfDefense Forces. Abe made clear Japan’s strategic priority to Vietnam, making his firstport of call a visit to Vietnam in January 2013 after taking office in December 2012.
Vietnam’s interest in a strategic partnership with Japan to counterbalance China is also
clear. Following the Chinese ban on supplying rare earth to Japan after a 2010 territorial
episode in the East China Sea, Vietnam offered to partner with Japan to develop rareearth elements. In 2012 Vietnam received the largest Japanese ODA loan that year.
Similarly, resumption of aid to Myanmar for a new airport project in its
relatively new national capital Naypyidaw was partly a result of Tokyo’s concern about
China’s rising influence there (Oishi and Furuoka 2003: 900). Tokyo will likely firm its
focus on Myanmar as democratization appears to be taking strong hold. Since Beijing
now has a stronger presence than Japan in this resource rich nation, Tokyo feels
compelled to gain lost ground which it can do most effectively through ODA and its
business networks built over several years (Slodkowski 2012).

3

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html

4

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201408020031

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

These examples indicate that Japan is using its ODA and other programs to try
to keep a strong foothold in Southeast Asia, and especially to cultivate strategic linkages
with countries strategically concerned about China. Japan’s projects such as those in the
Greater Mekong subregion are also to act as a balancer to China’s aid projects (Shiraishi
and Hau 2012: 18-22). The Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting in 2012 where Tokyo for
the first time proposed ODA to support defense ties with Pacific Island nations also
signals Japan’s national defense approach to ODA, in response to its concerns about astrong Chinese presence (Watanabe 2012).
The rise in loan aid programs for strategic purposes in countries like India,
Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines, and growing linkages through aid in Africa, thePacific Islands and other places strategically important to Japan signal that national
security interests are now of paramount importance in Japan’s aid objectives. Sato andAsano (2008: 124-25) argue that a realist perspective now drives Japanese aid,
explaining decline of both mercantilist aims and pursuit of liberal norms such as
promoting democracy, civil rights and poverty reduction, despite the importanceattributed to these aims in the ODA charter. Yet even while the realist perspective gains
ground in shaping Japan’s ODA, commercial and humanitarian programs both remain
important as components of ‘international cooperation’, which itself now has an explicit
and more confident strategic edge.
OTHER INTERESTS
Apart from the key national interests discussed above, over time other aspects ofJapan’s foreign aid pursuits have also been associated with serving national interests.
These include involvement in multilateral frameworks and contributing to global
humanitarian concerns. Aligning with the international aid regime such as the DAC
norms and recommendations, and participating in World Bank programs towards
poverty alleviation and meeting basic human needs are clear examples. Japan has
participated enthusiastically in working to achieve the UN Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) through health and development initiatives, and has allocated funds formany humanitarian programs to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; promote
education; supply water and sanitation; and contribute to food security.
Japan has substantially increased its aid to Africa since it started the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993, with the latest
TICAD V held in Yokohama in 2013. The stated purpose of TICAD is to deal with
Africa’s poverty and social development, through programs related to health, womenand children. Yet one Japanese observer claims Japan’s aims in Africa have changed

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

significantly, so it is now focusing TICAD on Japan’s ‘own economic interests rather
than as a consultative forum on development cooperation (Hirano 2012: 183). In Africa
Japan now pursues at least two clear national interests beyond, or to some extent partand parcel with, its contribution to humanitarian concerns. One is economic interest, as
the continent has huge natural resource supplies including much sought-after rare metals.
The other is strategic; China has a rapidly growing presence in Africa and similar
economic and geostrategic motivations (Hirano 193-197). As Hirano observes critically,
Japan’s aid policy towards Africa is now going to be formulated on the basis of Japan’snational interest’ (emphasis added) (Hirano 2012: 198).
What can be regarded as a truly altruistic goal – human security – was added toJapan’ ODA agenda after the appointment of Sadako Ogata as JICA’s first non-MOFA
President in 2003. The ‘human security’ aspect of Japan’s aid policy had been pushed
by Keizo Obuchi in his capacity first as foreign minister (1997–98) and later as prime
minister (1998–2000). But when Ogata became JICA President she pursued humansecurity as her signature policy; she was previously the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees and had co-chaired the Commission on Human Security
with the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. She pushed for a prominent place for humansecurity in the 2003 revised ODA Charter. It should be noted, however, that while thecharter includes humanitarian goals, it also makes clear their purpose: to ensure‘Japan’s own security and prosperity’ (emphasis added). Japan’s aid policy is thus tofollow goals at two levels, both of them strategically oriented. The international goals
are to promote human security and democracy and to discourage militarization; thenational goals are to promote Japan’s prosperity and its security. Japan’s foreign aid
monies serve national and international interests.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that although not articulated clearly in Japan’s aid policy,
Japan’s foreign aid is essentially oriented towards serving its national interests, as istrue for all nations’ foreign aid programs. Only recently do we find someacknowledgement of national interest incorporated in official documents and ministerial
statements. A true debate about policy intent – what mix of altruism and national selfinterest and how the mix should work – is yet to take place in public. Surely a sensitive
discussion, perhaps it will always be kept behind closed doors. Since foreign aid isadministered through bureaucratic mechanisms with no central command, each ministry
pursues its own narrow interest but the sum of these interests certainly serves Japan’snational interests, as discussion above of what, where, when and why of Japan’s aid

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014delivery reveals. Altruistic and moral goals are part of foreign aid policy and Japan’s
broader national interest but they are not, and cannot be, its central objectives.
Economic goals and commercial aspects still dominate Japan’s foreign aid landscape,alongside strategic and diplomatic interests. In more recent years, Japan is orienting its
aid towards defense purposes including maritime security, with the stated aim ofregional peace, maritime safety and the rule of law. National interest has without doubt
played a dominant role in Japan’s aid policy. A national discourse acknowledging thishas just begun and is certain to develop further. One document worth watching will be
the revised ODA charter to be issued by the end of 2014, a declaration of the ideal andhopefully the real motivations of the foreign aid policy that for the past 60 years has
served the Japanese nation – and other nations – very well.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank Keiichi Tsunekawa for reading the draft paper and for his usefulcomments. The usual caveat applies and responsibility for any error or misinterpretation
rests with the author.

REFERENCES
Arase, David. 1995. Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid, Boulder Co.: Lynne
Rienner.
Arase, David (ed.). 2005. Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, London: Routledge.
Donald, Gordon. 1983. U.S. Foreign Aid and the National Interest Washington, D.C.: National Planning
Association.
GOJ (Government of Japan). 2003. Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, August, Ministryof Foreign Affairs.
Hirano Katsumi. 2012. ‘TICAD and the National Interest of Japan’, Japanese Studies, 32:2, September,
183-99.

Hook, Steven W. 1995. National Interest and Foreign Aid, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

Katada, Saori N. 2010. ‘Old visions and new actors in foreign aid politics Explaining changes in Japanese
ODA policy to China’, in David Leheny and Kay Warren, Japanese Aid and the Construction of Global
Development: Inescapable Solutions. London: Routledge, 54-74.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign
Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lam Peng Er (ed.). 2013. Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond,London: Routledge.

Lancaster, Carol. 2007. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Matsumoto, Satoru. 2014. ‘Dare no tameno ODA ka? rita to riko no aida de’ (ODA in whose interest?
between altruism and self-interest), Sekai, August.
MOFA(Ministryof

Foreign

Affairs).

2010.

‘Enhancing

Enlightened

National

Interest’,

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/pdfs/review1006_report.pdf
Miyasaka Shotaro. 2014. ‘Abe Pushes Japanese Interests in Bangladesh’, http://asia.nikkei.com/PoliticsEconomy/International-Relations/Abe-pushes-Japanese-interests-in-BangladeshOECD. 2014. OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014, OECD Publishing.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218161-en
Oishi Mikio and Fumitaka Furuoka. 2003. ‘Can Japanese aid be an effective tool of influence? Case
Studies of Cambodia and Burma’, Asian Survey, 43:6 (November/December), . 890-907.

Rashid,

Harun

ur.

2014.’Look

East

PolicyforPartnership’,

Daily

Star,

http://www.thedailystar.net/print_post/look-east-policy-for-partnership-25761
Rix, Alan. 1980. Japan’s Economic Aid: Policy-making and Politics. London: Croom Helm.
Sato, Yoichiro. 2013. ‘Japan aid to the Philippines a warning to China’, East Asia Forum,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/29/japan-aid-to-the-philippines-a-warning-to-china/.

Purnendra Jain, National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy, Kokusai Mondai (International
Affairs), No.637, December 2014

Sato Yoichiro and Masahiko Asano. 2008. ‘Humanitarian and Democratic Norms in Japan’s ODA
Distributions’, in Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (eds), Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign
Policy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shiraishi Takashi and Caroline Hau. 2012. Chugoku wa Higashi Ajia o do kaeru ka (How China willtransform East Asia) Tokyo: Chuko shinsho.
Slodkowski, Antoni. 2012. ‘How Japan Inc stole a march on competitors to enter Myanmar’, Myanmar
Times, 8 October.
Sunaga, Kazuo. 2004. The Reshaping of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter,
FASID Discussion Paper on Development Assistance, No.3, November. Download available fromhttp://www.fasid.or.jp/e_publication_discussion/index.shtml
Tsunekawa Keiichi. 2014. ‘Objectives and Institutions for Japan’s Official Development Assistance(ODA): Evolution and Challenges’, JICA-RI Working Paper, 66, Tokyo: JICA Research Institute.
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development). 2002. Foreign Aid in the National Interest ：Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity, Washington: DC.
Watanabe, John. 2012. ‘Japan’s South Pacific Summit directed against China’, World Socialist Website,
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/06/japa-j11.html (accessed 4 November 2013).
Yasutomo, Dennis T. 1989-1990. ‘Why Aid? Japan as an "Aid Great Power", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 62, No.
4 Winter, . 490-503.