ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003

JAPAN-ASEAN
Security Symposium 2003

Tokyo, Japan October 9–10, 2003

Co-organized by: The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), andInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore (IDSS)
Hosted by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JapanThe Japan Institute of International Affairs

Printed in Japan

Foreword

This report was compiled from the conference proceedings of the “ASEAN-Japan ExchangeYear 2003 Project: Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003” (9–10 October 2003, Tokyo). The
symposium was held by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and commissioned by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in FY2003. Co-organizers were the JIIA and the Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies of Singapore (IDSS). Participants consisted of government-related
security affairs officials from Japan and the ten ASEAN countries, as well as university and thinktank researchers participating in their private capacities.
The year 2003 commemorates the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the ASEAN Culture Fund,to which great contributions were made by former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda upon its establishment.
An agreement was formally made at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting held in November 2002 to
designate the year 2003 as “ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003.” To that end, Japan and ASEAN exchange
projects in a wide range of areas including politics, the economy, society, education, and arts and culture
have been conducted during FY2003 in order to strengthen further a sincere and open partnership with
ASEAN, with whom Japan will “act together and advance together.” Security-related exchange projects
between Japan and ASEAN countries have yet to be implemented. In this regard, it could therefore benoted that the “Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003” carried a very significant value in strengthening further dialogue and cooperative relations on security issues between Japan and ASEAN countries.
The symposium had the following three purposes: 1) realizing free and lively discussions
through Track II with the objective of strengthening Japan-ASEAN security cooperation; 2) strengthening ties among government-related officials and researchers from Japan and ASEAN countries,
thereby constructing a network of experts specialized in security; and 3) as a mid- to long-term goal,
establishing a new framework for discussions among government-related officials, which extends
beyond the currently existing frameworks for dialogue on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.
The results from this symposium have been compiled as the Co-Chairmen’s Report. It is
expected that its content will be referred to at the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit, whichis scheduled to be held in Tokyo in December 2003.
Finally, the JIIA would like to extend its deepest appreciation to each and every individual in
the Regional Policy Division, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan, who have made this symposium possible.
Japan Institute of International Affairs
December 2003

Contents

Co-Chairmen’s Report ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
List of Participants ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Program ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Presentation Papers
Security Challenges in East Asia: An ASEAN Perspective
Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees and Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta ........... 11

Security Challenges to Japan
Prof. Koichi Kawakami, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies ..................................................................................................................... 12

Japan-ASEAN Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism Measures
Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Director General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia) ................................................... 14

Export Control and Transnational Crime
Ichiro Ogasawara, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ................................................ 17

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in East Asia—
A Singaporean Perspective of the North Korean Problem
Fook Weng Loo, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)........................................................................................................ 20

Maritime Security Measures of the Japan Coast Guard
Satoshi Nakajima, Head of Office, Security Division, Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ........................................................................................................................... 24

Peacekeeping Operations and Intra-State Conflicts
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ...................................................................................... 31

The Roles of Regional Security Institutions: Beyond “Talk Shops”?
Tsutomu Kikuchi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University,
Adjunct Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) ................................................................................................................................... 37

Reference
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD II (BALI CONCORD II), 7–8 October 2003 ...................................................................... 43
Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi
ASEAN Business and Investment Summit....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 50

ASEAN-Japan Summit Phnom Penh 5 November 2002
Joint Declaration of the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership ................. 53
Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi
Japan and ASEAN in East Asia—A Sincere and Open Partnership— ................................................................................................................................ 57

Co-Chairmen’s Report

In celebration of 2003 as the Year of Japan-ASEAN Exchange, the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (JIIA) and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore,convened a Symposium in Tokyo on 9–10 October to review the progress of, and prospects for,Japan-ASEAN security cooperation. The Symposium brought together senior officials and analysts
from the leading institutes of strategic and international studies in ASEAN and their Japanesecounterparts. A list of the participants in the Symposium is attached.
Japan-ASEAN security dialogue stands at a critical juncture at the beginning of the 21st century.
In the 25 years following the establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Fund, a process in which
former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda played a key role, Japan and ASEAN established a broad andsubstantive range of economic and socio-cultural relations within the political and security framework of the Cold War period. The Asia-Pacific region now confronts a new geopolitical environment in the post-Cold War and post-September 11 th period. There is a need to review theincreasingly multi-faceted interfaces between Japan-ASEAN relations and the new and complex
geopolitical environment.
Symposium participants highlighted significant shifts in US and Chinese policies towards the
Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Japan, ASEAN as well as their relations with eachother. Furthermore, the region needs to address a new set of non-traditional security challenges.
These changes in the geopolitical environment provide an impetus for Japan and ASEAN to review
their political relations and plan how they can more effectively interface their economic and sociocultural relations with the new political and security realities.
The Symposium identified a number of critical political and security challenges for JapanASEAN cooperation. These include:a. Counter-terrorism measures;
b. Export control and transnational crime;c. Military modernization and WMD;
d. Maritime security;
e. PKOs (including joint training and exercises); andf. Regional security frameworks.
The above list of issues, symposium participants stressed, is not exhaustive, as there may beother critical issues that deserve attention, such as aviation security.
These are complex issues that require more studies to be conducted by senior officials fromboth ASEAN and Japan. Symposium participants therefore recommended that the Japan-ASEAN–4–

Co-Chairmen’s Report

Commemorative Summit in December 2003 designate a Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) to study
more systematically how these changes in the region’s geopolitical environment impact JapanASEAN relations and to recommend proposals on how Japan and ASEAN can more effectively
cooperate in order to meet these new geopolitical challenges.
Symposium participants also recommended that a Track II network of officials (acting in theirprivate capacities) and representatives of strategic and international studies institutions be established to support the SOM in their deliberations. The Symposium nominated the JIIA and the IDSS
to offer their services to their governments, and to convene in 2004 a team of experts from Japanand ASEAN to further study and recommend measures to be adopted by Japan and ASEAN so as
to better manage the new political realities and security challenges of the 21st century. Symposium
participants recommended that their ministers consider drawing funds from existing JapanASEAN funds to support the JIIA and IDSS in convening two Workshops (one in Tokyo and theother in Singapore), leading to a second Symposium in Singapore that will draw up a report and aseries of recommendations for consideration by the heads of government when they meet again.
Yukio SatohPresident
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Barry Desker
Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
October 10, 2003

–5–

List of Participants

CHAIRS:
Ambassador Yukio SATOH
President, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

Ambassador Barry DESKER
Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Brunei Darussalam
Mr. Jaini ABDULLAH
Director, Department of Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. Izzah Daraina BADARUDDIN
Diplomatic Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cambodia
Mr. SISOWATH Chanto Doung
Deputy Executive Director and Senior Research Fellow, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace

Indonesia
Ambassador Wiryono SASTROHANDOYO
Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); former Ambassador to Austria, France andAustralia

Mr. Jusuf WANANDI
Member, Board of Trustees, and Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Lao PDR
Mr. Bounsom PHOMMAVIHANE
Deputy Director General, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. Sengchanh SOUKHASEUM
Director-General, the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Malaysia
Ms. NAZIRAH Hussain
Under-Secretary, Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dato’ Dr. Mohamed JAWHAR bin Hassan
Director-General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia

MyanmarProf. Khin Maung Nyunt
Professor, Historical Research Commission, University of Yangon

Dr. Maung Aung Myoe
Department of International Relations, University of Mandalay–6–

List of Participants

Philippines
Dr. Noel Mañago MORADA
Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS)

Singapore
Mr. CHUA Thai KeongDirector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Evelyn GOH
Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Mr. KWA Chong Guan
Head of External Programmes, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Dr. Fook Weng LOO
Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

ThailandAmbassador Nitya PIBULSONGGRAM
Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Kusuma SNITWONGSE
Chairperson, Advisory Board, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS)

Viet Nam
Dr. DO Son Hai
Head of Department of International Politics and Vietnamese Diplomacy, Hanoi Institute for International
RelationsDr. Tuan Anh HOANG
Assistant- Director-General, Director of Research, Institute for International Relations (IIR)

Japan
Prof. Koichi KAWAKAMI
Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Prof. Tsutomu KIKUCHI
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University; Adjunct Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

Mr. Kuninori MATSUDA
Director of Research Coordination, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

Dr. Makio MIYAGAWA
Director of Regional Policy Division, Asian & Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Satoshi NAKAJIMA
Head of Office, Security Division, Guard and Rescue Department, Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

Mr. Ichiro OGASAWARA
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Captain Katsuyuki TERAYAMA
Chief of Arms Control Section, Joint Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency

Prof. Susumu YAMAKAGE
Professor, the University of Tokyo; Adjunct Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

Ms. Haruka MATSUMOTO
Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

Mr. Masahito YAJIMA
Major of JASDF & Assistant Director, Regional Policy Division, Asian & Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs–7–

Program

October 9, Thursday
9:00–9:45

Opening Remarks:
Moderator: Mr. Kuninori MATSUDA, Director of Research Coordination, JIIA

“Changes in the Security Environment of Japan and ASEAN since the 9-11 Attacks”
From ASEAN’s perspective: Ambassador Barry DESKER, Director, IDSS
From Japan’s perspective: Ambassador Yukio SATOH, President, JIIA
10:00–13:00

Session 1: Security Perceptions
Moderator: Mr. KWA Chong Guan, Head of External Programmes, IDSS
A. Security Challenges to ASEAN
Mr. Jusuf WANANDI, Member, Board of Trustees, and Senior Fellow, CSIS
B. Security Challenges to Japan
Professor Koichi KAWAKAMI, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Discussion

14:30–17:30

Session 2: Security Challenges and Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN
Moderator: Professor Susumu YAMAKAGE, the University of Tokyo
Part 1
C. Counter-terrorism Measures
Dato’ Dr. Mohamed JAWHAR bin Hassan, Director-General, ISIS-Malaysia
D. Export Control and Transnational Crime
Mr. Ichiro OGASAWARA, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Division, MOFA, Japan
E. WMD (Including Military Modernization)
Dr. Fook Weng LOO, Assistant Professor, IDSS
Discussion–8–

Program

October 10, Friday
9:00–12:00

Session 2: Security Challenges and Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN
Moderator: Dr. Fook Weng LOO, Assistant Professor, IDSS
Part 2F. Maritime Security
Mr. Satoshi NAKAJIMA, Head of Office, Security Division, JCG
G. PKOs (Including Joint Training and Exercises)
Ambassador Wiryono SASTROHANDOYO, Senior Fellow, CSIS
H. Regional Security Frameworks (ARF, ASEAN+3)
Professor Tsutomu KIKUCHI, Aoyama Gakuin University
Discussion

13:30–16:00

Session 3: Wrap-up Session
Moderator: Mr. Kuninori MATSUDA, Director of Research Coordination, JIIA
Drafting of a co-chairmen’s report for the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting at Tokyoin December 2003
Discussion–9–

Presentation Papers

Security Challenges in East Asia:
An ASEAN Perspective
Jusuf Wanandi
Member, Board of Trustees and Senior Fellow,
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

1. There are several layers of security concerns andHere, it is the countries concerned that are mainly

challenges in East Asia that are intertwined and as

responsible for responding to the challenges, butsuch have to be dealt with simultaneously.

assistance and support from the region and the international community could be critical. As has been

2. The first layer is “classical” security issues, involving

said above, the three layers of security challenges are

historical and traditional issues:intertwined, and could not be separated. In this

- The problems and challenges of the Koreansense, the one challenge will influence the other two,

Peninsula. The divide is a relic of the Cold War

and by solving one issue, others could be assisted inthat has again become acute due to the prolifera-

finding their solution.

tion threat.
- Then there is the problem of the Taiwan Straits

5. In looking for solutions, first, it has to be recognized

between China and Taiwan, a relic of China’s civilthat the role and presence of the US are dominant,war in the 1930s and 1940s.

and her role in keeping peace and stability is critical- There are other problems, such as the overlapping

for the region. However, regional institutions, espe-

claims in the South China Sea by China, Taiwan,

cially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Brunei.

(ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), could be- Another problem is the increase in military

supporting instruments to make that critical role ofspending, especially in Northeast Asia. All these

the US more acceptable and effective. But at the sameproblems are “hard” security issues, where the roletime, there is a serious need to improve the ARF andof the United States (US) is critically important andits objectives, programs, institutions and leadership.

very dominant in keeping the problems more or lessunder control.

6. Japan-ASEAN’s role in making the ARF effective
again is important in addition to ASEAN’s own

3. The second layer involves the new threats and chal-

effort to get its act together. But more important islenges of global and regional terrorism as well as thetheir cooperation to face the new challenges of global

problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-and regional terrorism and the proliferation of WMDtion (WMD). Here again the US has a dominant rolein the region. This also includes efforts to cooperate

to play, in both the traditional challenges above andwith the US in a more pro-active way in the future.

these new challenges. Others in the region also have

In so doing, they will assist the US in a positive way

a role to play.

and make the US more successful in exercising her
leadership. This will make her more acceptable to the

4. The third layer is domestic and internal challenges,

public in the region. ASEAN’s support for Japan toresulting also from globalization, especially thegradually become a “normal” country in the context

impacts of the 1997/98 financial crisis in East Asia.

of the US alliance is also important for the region.

– 11 –

Security Challenges to Japan
Koichi Kawakami
Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

1. Traditional Challenges

It must be reminded that Japan has territorial issues
with major players in the region, including the Northern
Territories, Takeshima Island and Senkaku Archipelago.

General Strategic Situation
This year marks the 14th year since the announce-

The Korean Peninsula

ment of the end of the Cold War by the leaders of theOn the Korean Peninsula, there exists only theUnited States (US) and the Soviet Union in Malta.
In Western Europe, the risk of an armed conflictarmistice agreement of 1953 and no peace treaty. One

between states is as low as ever. Viewed from France, forand a half million soldiers stand face-to-face around theinstance, the traditional threat that used to exist at the

Demilitarized Zone.

border between East and West Germany now seems

North Korea has shown sporadic terrorist attacks,

distant. Nowadays, terrorism is considered to be theguerrilla warfare and invasions by special forces both

most imminent threat for France.

inside and outside the Korean Peninsula. Back in 1983,
there was an attempt to assassinate the then SouthIn Asia, the situation is different. Of course, the end

Korean President in Burma (Rangoon incident). One ofof the Cold War brought about certain changes in Asia.
In Southeast Asia, the risk of an armed conflictthe most recent examples is the exchange of fire between

between states caused by the difference in ideology has

a suspicious North Korean boat (which later sank) andbecome extremely low. Moreover, Association of

the Japan Coast Guard in 2001. In addition to the recent

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems to represent

doubts about North Korea’s nuclear development

the beginning of the future Asian regional integration. In

program and the issue of abduction of JapaneseSoutheast Asia, as in Western Europe, terrorism isnationals, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-considered to be the most urgent threat at present.

tion (WMD) and missiles is also a concern of the international community.

There were certain changes in Northeast Asia as

The intention of North Korea is unclear. Is it inten-

well.
The main challenge for Japan during the Cold War

tionally increasing tensions to obtain concessions fromperiod was to prevent the potential landing and invasion

the other parties? Or does it really intend to possessby the Soviet forces in northern Japan. After the end of

nuclear weapons? It seems that the ultimate goal for

the Cold War, the Russian military presence in the Far

North Korea is to ensure the survival of its regime. If

East was dramatically diminished from 500,000 soldiersthat is the case, there is room for a negotiated settlement.

and 40 divisions to 110,000 soldiers and less than 10 divi-

The Taiwan Straits

sions. For the time being, the Russian military presence

Although there have developments in the economic

in the Far East will be low-profile.
But in Northeast Asia, there are still legacies of the

field such as the rapid increase of direct investment from

Cold War. The situation of potential military confronta-

Taiwan to mainland China, political dialogue is yet totion on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits

begin.
The strategic significance of Taiwan cannot beremains unchanged.
The important US military presence in the Far East

underestimated. From Japan’s point of view, the South-

contributes to the stability of the region. The US main-

west sea lane passes through the area. In addition,

tains some 36,000 soldiers in South Korea and 38,000 in

Taiwan is an excellent location for submarine bases. Any

Japan.

changes in the area will also affect the opinions of ethnic– 12 –

Presentation Papers

Chinese minorities in the Southeast Asian countries.

attacked by Peruvian terrorists in 1996.

China has an overwhelming superiority overJapan has been actively cooperating in the fightTaiwan on quantitative basis, but not on qualitative

against terrorism in Afghanistan, but so far there havebasis. But the Taiwan authority feels that the qualitative

been no cases of terrorism against Japanese interests.

military competition will soon start.

Traditional deterrence does not work against

The situation on the Korean Peninsula and in theterrorism. The highly sophisticated infrastructure of

Taiwan Straits shows that traditional deterrence is func-

Japan, including its bullet trains and nuclear power

tioning well for the maintenance of peace and stability inplants, makes Japan vulnerable against such attacks. We

this region.

also have to take into account the existence of US military bases in Japan.

2. Rise of China and its future strategic
implications

Utmost efforts should be made so that people
clearly understand that the fight against terrorism is nota fight against Islam. The Japanese government has been

China has introduced a market-oriented economy

making efforts to this effect, such as promoting dialogue

while maintaining its communist one-party system andbetween civilizations and networking between intellec-

is realizing astonishingly rapid economic growth. The

tuals.

rise of China has often been described as a “business

Piracychance,” but in view of the recent drastic shift of thedirection of foreign direct investment from Southeast

Japan imports almost 90% of its energy and over

Asia to China, we will have to make sure that it is really

60% of its food from abroad. Most of these items area “win-win” situation.

transported by ship. Therefore, the frequent acts of

The recent efforts by China to modernize its armed

piracy in Southeast Asia, especially in the Malacca

forces, combined with the rapid economic growth, might

Straits, are of great concern to Japan. The Japaneselead to future modification of the military balance in thegovernment is strengthening its bilateral and multilat-

region. According to the Annual Report by the Pentagon

eral efforts to combat piracy.

dated 28 July 2003, Chinese annual military spending

Cyber Warfare

might be between US$45 and 65 billion instead of 20

Without the Internet, the September 11 attacks

billion as announced by the Chinese authorities. This

would not have been possible.

Pentagon report was immediately criticized by China asbaseless. However, we may expect more transparency

The sophisticated information technology (IT) infra-

from the Chinese side concerning its military modern-structure of Japan, both of the public and private sector,

ization efforts.

is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks by terrorists.

3. Asymmetric Challenges

4. Conclusion

There are various types of asymmetric threats. Three

Traditional threats that exist in Northeast Asia,

typical asymmetric threats will be described below.

which are the remnants of the Cold War, are dealt withby the traditional deterrence. To further strengthen the

Terrorismstability of the region, more efforts should be made to

In the past, there have been examples of acts ofenhance the bilateral ties between the major players ofterrorism by Japanese terrorists or targeting Japanese

the region, which include the US, Russia, China andinterests. The Japanese Red Army was responsible forJapan.

the Tel Aviv Airport incident in 1972 and Kuala Lumpur

As for non-traditional or asymmetric threats, tradi-incident in 1975. The religious sect Aum attacked thetional deterrence does not work. Therefore, efforts

subway of Tokyo using sarin gas in 1995. Furthermore,should be made to further strengthen international and

the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Peru wasregional cooperation.

– 13 –

Japan-ASEAN Cooperation
on Counter-Terrorism Measures
Mohamed Jawhar Hassan
Director General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia)

Introduction

perceived oppression; ethnic, linguistic or religious
discrimination, etc.) or socio-economic (poverty, extremesocial inequities, corruption, etc.).

Terrorism is not a new problem in the region.
Neither Japan nor the states of the Association of

Measures to eliminate terrorism include surveillanceSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are strangers toand intelligence exchange, denial of supplies and funds,

terrorism. The terrorist threat in the region is also muchcontrol of arms and explosives, protective security meas-

less extensive than it was decades ago. In Japan, there isures, arrest and detention operations, search and destroy

no known terrorist organization today. In Southeast

operations, etc.
Counter-terrorism operations also include ideolog-

Asia, terrorism, which prevailed in many countries, has

ical measures, that is, measures to counter extremist andlargely dissipated except in the Philippines.
A major concern in the region, however, is themilitant terrorist ideology, and to condition popular

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Not much credibility is given to

perceptions and attitudes, such as measures to counterits purported aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate inabuse of religious teachings.

a polity binding Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore,Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Involving
ASEAN Countries

Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. The JI has
sprung to prominence since September 11, 2001 and theattacks led by the United States (US) on Afghanistan and
Iraq. However, when it was discovered that it was

There has been long-standing bilateral cooperation

targeting the interests in the region of the US, the United

between the governments and security agencies of Thailand/

Kingdom (UK), Australia and Israel, resulting among

Malaysia, Malaysia/Indonesia and Malaysia/Singapore inothers in the Bali and J.W. Marriott Jakarta bombings in

the fight against communist terrorism that has stoodIndonesia.

these countries in good stead in the current campaign

The global campaign against international terrorism

against international terrorism. The cooperation between

launched after September 11, 2001 and the existence ofSingapore and Malaysia especially has been truly

international terrorist elements in the region such as theremarkable.
Since the launching of the global campaign against

JI provide an opportunity for Japan-ASEAN cooperationinternational terrorism following September 11, 2001 theto combat this threat.

ASEAN countries have issued declarations and entered

Counter-Terrorism Measures

into agreements with one another and with the rest of theinternational community to cooperate to combat

Measures to counter terrorism cover an enormous

terrorism. The most important of these are the 2001

area, depending on the nature and severity of the threat

ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism

posed. They are of two broad categories: measures todated 5 November 2001; the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

address root causes that are also preventive in nature,on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), Kuala Lumpur, 20-21

and measures to eliminate the terrorist organization and

May 2002; the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for

its infrastructure.

Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, Bandar

Measures to address root causes are based on an

Seri Begawan, 1 August 2002; the ASEAN Regional

assessment of the factors that are driving the terrorist

Forum (ARF) Statement on Measures Against Terrorist

activity. These factors can be political (occupation;

Financing, Bandar Seri Begawan, 30 July 2002; the– 14 –

Presentation Papers

Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit,

tions and treaties.
9. Establishment of ASEAN focal points on counter-

Phnom Penh, 3 November 2002; and the Joint Declaration
on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, 14 th ASEAN-

terrorism.
10. Establishment of an anti-terrorism task force in each

European Union (EU) Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 27

ASEAN country to strengthen cooperation on

January 2003.
In addition, the ASEAN countries are party to a

counter-terrorism in the country and facilitate collab-

number of declarations and agreements on transnational

oration with neighboring countries following acrime that contribute to the combating of terrorism. A

terrorist attack. Assistance required of a neighboring

Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan ofcountry could include identifying, pursuing andAction to Combat Transnational Crime was adopted inapprehending suspects, examination of witnesses,

May 2002.

search and seizure of evidence, etc.
11. Freezing of terrorist assets.

In the same month, Malaysia, Indonesia and thePhilippines signed the Agreement on Information

Malaysia has also established the Southeast Asia

Exchange and Establishment of Communication

Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). The

Procedures to combat transnational crime. Thailand andCenter focuses on training and capacity building, both

Cambodia acceded later.

for Malaysians as well as foreigners.

Beyond this, some of the ASEAN countries as well

Problems Affecting Counter-Terrorism
Efforts in Southeast Asia

as Japan are also party to some of the 12 international
conventions and protocols related to terrorism such as
the International Convention for the Suppression of the

Despite these efforts to intensify operations against

Financing of Terrorism.
Besides working together within the framework ofterrorist organizations in the region in the wake of thethe ARF, ASEAN and Japan are also cooperating in the

global “war” on international terrorism, there has only

context of ASEAN+3 to combat transnational crime andbeen limited success. More than 180 JI suspects havecounter terrorism. The ASEAN Ministers of

been arrested and detained by the end of July 2003

Transnational Crime will hold joint consultations with(about 80 in Malaysia, 32 in Singapore, about 50 intheir counterparts from Japan, China and South Korea

Indonesia, approximately 12 in the Philippines, and 8 inlater this year.

Thailand and Cambodia). Prominent figures that have

The ASEAN countries have agreed to focus on

been brought to trial in Indonesia include Abu Bakar

several key areas in their joint efforts to counterBa’asyir, the suspected head of JI, and Mukhlas (Aliterrorism. These include:

Ghofron), the leader of the group responsible for the Bali

1. Establishing a regional database on national andattack. Hambali, the suspected head of operations of theinternational laws, regulations, treaties and agree-

JI, was arrested in Thailand. Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi

ments pertaining to counter-terrorism.

was arrested in the Philippines, but managed to escapein July under the most embarrassing circumstances.

2. Strengthening of national counter-terrorism mecha-

These are generally not insignificant achievements,

nisms.
3. Deepening cooperation among law enforcement

but it is assessed that the JI continues to have about 300

agencies and sharing experiences and “best prac-

members still at large, with a capacity (though signifi-

tices.”

cantly reduced) to carry out terrorist attacks.

4. Improving information and intelligence exchange on

The main factors inhibiting success in countering

the terrorist organizations, terrorist movements andterrorism in Southeast Asia appear to include thefunding.

following:

5. Enhancing regional capacity building programmes to

1. Limited intelligence capacity among national agen-strengthen the capabilities of institutions to investi-cies, in particular in Indonesia and the Philippines.

gate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist activi-

Inadequacies include manpower, training, technicalequipment and funds.

ties.

2. Professional jealousies among domestic intelligence

6. Cooperation in legal matters.
7. Training.

and security agencies, which inhibits operational

8. Early accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conven-cooperation and information exchange. This is not a– 15 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

problem peculiar to the region.

to counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Assistance

3. Problems with regard to the sharing of intelligence

may be particularly useful for Indonesia, thePhilippines and to a lesser extent Malaysia.

caused among others by lack of confidence andsuspicion regarding the efficiency and integrity of

2. The newly established SEARCCT in Malaysia canneighboring intelligence services. The US is perhaps

benefit substantively from Japanese assistance inthe most guilty in its reluctance to share information.

three areas: training instructors and speakers; equip-

4. Political sensitivities in Indonesia particularly

ment such as masks for use in training; and building

regarding action against suspected terrorist

up the intelligence database.

elements, for fear of losing political support from the

The SEARCCT plans to conduct courses, seminars,

people. These sensitivities have declined after theworkshops and conferences on the following

Bali bombing, and the Indonesian government andsubjects:

authorities are more determined in their apprehen-- Causes and Origins of Terrorism.

sion of suspected terrorist elements, but reluctance to- Modus Operandi of Terrorist Groups.

act fully against them remains, as evidenced for- Combating Terrorism.

instance in the unwillingness of Indonesia to declare- Cyber Terrorism.

the JI as a terrorist organization until October 2002.

- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist

5. Poorly developed banking institutions and regula-Financing.

tions in some countries, which make it difficult to- Training Courses on Identification of Chemical

enforce efficient ways of freezing and seizing

Substances that Could be Used as Explosives.

terrorist funding.

- Criminalization of Terrorist Acts.

6. US policies which feed anti-American sentiment and- Harmonization of Regional Anti-Terrorism Laws.

help increase support for international terrorism- International Legal Cooperation in Combating

directed at the US and its allies (the UK, Australia

Terrorism through Extradition and Mutualand Israel) are making it difficult for regional

Assistance in Criminal Matters.

governments to neutralize the environment for- Public Awareness Campaign/Education Programmeterrorism. The Palestinian problem and the US-led

Related to Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism.

attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq are major factors- Aviation Security Course.

contributing to support and sympathy for militancy- Sea-Surveillance Techniques.

and terrorism directed at the US and allied interests- Security Intelligence.

in the region.

- Border Control/Security, Immigration Matters andManagement – Border Integrity.

Potential Areas for Japan-ASEAN
Cooperation- Disaster Scene Management.
3. Japan can assist the regional and global community
in impressing upon the US the need to address theJapan can enter into discussions with individualroot causes of international terrorism, namely US

ASEAN members as well as ASEAN collectively to iden-policies towards the Middle East, in particular thetify areas in which she can help in the campaign against

Palestinian problem and Iraq. The terrorist threat ininternational terrorism in the region.

the region cannot be overcome by merely imple-

Some of the areas that deserve attention are thementing punitive measures.

following:

4. In the larger scheme of things, Japan can contribute

1. Capacity-building in intelligence gathering andto a terrorism-free environment in Southeast Asia by

analysis. This is a primary area where Japanese

undertaking various discreet initiatives that help

resources and technical expertise can help

promote good governance and standards of living inenhance capabilities and significantly contributethe region.

– 16 –

Export Control and Transnational Crime
Ichiro Ogasawara
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

1. Emerging threats: proliferation of WMD
and the danger of WMD falling into thehands of terrorists

them. ”
Under the present rubric of “export control andtransnational crime,” I could touch upon various issues
ranging from money laundering to counter-terrorism

It is my great pleasure to have the opportunity tomeasures. However, today, I would like to focus on the

talk about one of the most imminent security issues ofmost acute aspect of the issue, that is, proliferation of

today, that is, “Export control and transnational crime.”

WMD with special reference to the danger of WMD

Today, export control is regarded as a key element

falling into the hands of terrorists. Thus, I believe, myof our non-proliferation policy. The proliferation ofpresentation can better serve as a bridge between theweapons of mass destruction (WMD) is widely recog-

presentations given by the speakers before and after me.

nized as the most serious threat to regional and interna-

2. International frameworks to deal withproliferation problems

tional security. With the end of the Cold War, thepossibility of global nuclear war between superpowers
has grown slim. Yet we are not immune to the menace of
nuclear, biological or chemical attacks. We are aware ofNow, let us examine what instruments are available

and concerned about the fact that, today, in addition tofor us to deal with such problems. In this regard, ourcountries of concern, various non-state actors are trying

efforts can be divided into two categories, that is to say,to develop or acquire such heinous weapons. Theinternational efforts and domestic ones.

terrorist attacks of September 11 brought about a sea(a) International frameworks

change in our “threat awareness.” Since then, WMD

Our concerted non-proliferation efforts are under-

falling into the hands of terrorists has been the highest

taken mainly through diverse multilateral internationalon the scale of threat evaluation.
Such a recognition, I believe, is also widely sharedframeworks. These frameworks may also be divided intoby the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

two groups. To the first group belong universal disarma-countries. At the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN

ment treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Regional Forum (ARF) in June this year, the partici-

Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention

pating ministers “recognized the growing danger posed(CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

These three treaties are themselves great achievements

their means of delivery, and reaffirmed their commit-of almost half a century of strenuous diplomatic efforts,

ment to make further joint efforts to tackle the problem.”and now cover all of the three types of WMD. These

Again, in July this year, the Asia-Europe Meeting

three multilateral frameworks are legally binding and(ASEM) foreign ministers emphasized “the importance

open to any countries for membership. Today, they areof continuing efforts on disarmament and prevention ofadhered to by an overwhelming majority of countries.

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological

These treaties not only prohibit the use, development,

weapons; and related materials, equipment, and tech-acquisition or stock of WMD, but also proscribe that

nologies in accordance with relevant international

parties to those treaties shall not transfer goods or tech-

conventions in the interest of maintaining international

nologies that might contribute to the development ofpeace and security.” They also stressed “the importanceWMD to other countries unless certain conditions areof preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing

met. These universal treaties are indispensable in our– 17 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

non-proliferation efforts since they lay down the

more sophisticated by means of such elusive measures

inhibitive norms against WMD by which all responsible

as transshipment, transit or paper companies, the risk ofnations are expected to abide. To effectively deter thethe unintentional diversion of sensitive goods and tech-illicit procurement of WMD by terrorists, it is critical tonologies into the hands of terrorists is increasing.

further enhance the functioning of these treaties and to

Therefore, the enhancement of the export control

further universalize their membership.

system in Asian nations is an urgent task. Japan has

The second group of multilateral frameworks

actively conducted various regional cooperation activi-

comprises export control regimes. So far, we have estab-ties to raise awareness among ASEAN policy makers

lished a multilateral export control regime for each cate-and experts in this field. Furthermore, at the end of thisgory of WMD and its delivery means. Now, we have themonth, Japan will hold an Asian Export Control Seminar

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for nuclear weapons,in Tokyo. For the past 10 years, this seminar has served

the Australia Group (AG) for chemical and biologicalas a valuable occasion for Asian countries to upgrade

weapons, and the Missile Technology Control Regime

their export control skills and knowledge. In this

(MTCR) for delivery means. These export control

context, we highly appreciate the remarkable strength-

regimes provide suppliers of sensitive goods and tech-ening efforts that have been made recently by some of

nologies with cooperative frameworks that enable

ASEAN countries. We are particularly impressed by theparticipating countries to share threat awareness in

improvements that have been made to the Singaporean

terms of destination and sensitivities of goods and tech-system.

nologies as well as to share relevant information among(c) New initiatives

themselves. These export control regimes have proveneffective in preventing the illicit procurement of sensi-

Although the export control mechanisms describedtive items through concerted action among capable

above continue to play a central role in the current non-nations. As one of the most competent and responsible

proliferation system, they are not panacea to all prolifer-

exporters, Japan actively participates in all of theseation concerns. No matter how strictly export control

regimes. Japan also conducts intense outreach activities

measures may be applied, no system can be perfect intowards ASEAN countries to harmonize their efforts

preventing illegal procurement. Porous border control

with those undertaken under the multilateral regimes

could still allow illicit cross-border transactions. Thus,

mentioned above.

additional measures have been sought to enhance ourability to thwart proliferation attempts, even in such(b) Domestic efforts

cases where sensitive items cannot be interrupted effec-

These international frameworks regulating thetively and in a timely manner by the export control

transfer of sensitive goods and technologies cannot

authorities.

make any tangible contribution if the participating states

Here, I am referring to the Proliferation Security

are not equipped with effective domestic export control

Initiative (PSI) as a strengthened non-proliferation

systems. Stringent export control undertaken by themeasure. The PSI is a response to the growing challenge

supplying countries is also essential to fulfill obligations

posed by the proliferation of WMD, and their delivery

under these international treaties.

systems to and from states and non-state actors of prolif-

Many ASEAN countries are now competitiveeration concern. US President Bush announced theexporters, even for sensitive items. Consequently, thelaunch of PSI in Poland in May this year. Eleven coun-risk of proliferation through these countries istries now associate their efforts with this initiative. So

increasing. The more competitive a country becomes as afar, in the framework of this initiative, the participating

provider of goods and technologies, the more stringent

countries have made the following commitments:

an export control legislation is required. Furthermore,• To confirm their political will to promote the PSI;WMD procurers are always looking for the weakest link

• To implement, in principle, measures to preventin a chain. If export control is insufficient in one of theproliferation within the existing legal frameworks;

countries in a region, countries or groups of concern will

• To agree, in principle, to the concept of interdiction

probably be tempted to undertake procurement activi-

training and to conduct the training as soon asties in that country, taking advantage of the loophole. As

possible; andrecent procurement activities are becoming more and• To undertake effective measures, either alone or in– 18 –

Presentation Papers

concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer

indispensable to form a impermeable front. In order toor transport of WMD, and their delivery systems toeliminate the cloud of uncertainty hanging over ourand from states and non-state actors of proliferation

security environment, Japan is driven to vigorously

concern.

promote multilateral non-proliferation regimes and to

Japan supports the PSI since it is in line with Japan’s

actively weave more intense cooperative relations withefforts to promote non-proliferation. Japan participatedlike-minded Asian nations.

in the first joint maritime interdiction training PacificAt the same time, as one of the biggest exporters ofProtector which took place in offshore Australia from 12-

advanced goods and technologies, Japan is always

14 September. Japan, as the only Asian country among

exposed to the risk of being an unwitting proliferator.

the original members of the PSI, has embarked on

Therefore, we are keen to assume a responsibility

approaching like-minded Asian countries for seeking

commensurate with our ability to export. That is why

their cooperation to the PSI.

Japan has adopted one of the most stringent export
control policies in the world. Also, Southeast Asia is one

3. Japan’s stance and the importance ofregional cooperationof the fastest developing regions in the world. It is,therefore, critical not to inadvertently and unknowinglyoffer attractive opportunities to clandestine procurers.

Japan has actively committed itself to a non-prolifer-

It is hard to imagine that one day the problem ofation policy as one of the pillars of its diplomatic efforts

proliferation may be resolved once for all. New tech-to ensure its peace and security. Today, the issue of

nology might provide terrorists with new methods ofproliferation of WMD is particularly relevant to thedestruction, which might, in turn, induce them to seek

security conditions in East Asia. As clandestine

access to goods and technologies other than those listed.

procurers are always in search of the weakest link in a

Therefore, we have to make continuous efforts to fillchain and geographical vicinity is still one of the key

every loophole wherever and whenever it is found, andfactors determining a procurer’s activities, concerted andensure that our multilateral instruments of non-prolifer-harmonized efforts among neighboring countries areation effectively deter new challenges.

– 19 –

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in East Asia
—A Singaporean Perspective of the North Korean Problem
Fook Weng LOO
Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Ever since a French weather satellite provided thefurther concern is the possibility that the North Koreans

first images of an unusual building in Yongbyon in 1985,

have already in place a programme to develop highly

the problem of a nuclear-capable North Korea has comeenriched uranium (HEU), which is much more difficult

to be seen by other states in East Asia and elsewhere as

to detect. According to US intelligence agencies, North

one of the most potentially destabilizing developments

Korea attempted to acquire centrifuge-related equip-

in the strategic environment of East Asia. The subject ofment for its HEU programme.

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in

The key to the uncertainty about the extent of North

East Asia suddenly became an important topic for

Korea’s NW programme revolves around the 70-day

discussion amongst academic, strategic and policy

shutdown of the 5 MW reactor in 1989, which US intelli-circles. It is ironic because WMD proliferation in East

gence agencies believe allowed North Korea to remove

Asia was already in place long before the Yongbyon

spent fuel rods for reprocessing into weapons-grade

nuclear plant was first detected.

plutonium.4 In addition, in 1990 and 1991, North Korea

This paper examines this issue of WMD prolifera-

could have extracted more spent fuel rods during

tion in East Asia, by looking at the various WMDreactor slowdowns in both years. If North Korea

programmes currently known in North Korea. The

extracted the maximum number of spent fuel rods

paper will argue that there are causes for concern, butduring the 1989 shutdown and the 1990 and 1991 slow-that the academic, strategic and policy communities

downs, then it can process that into weapons-grade

should not overreact; that, in other words, these causes

plutonium; however, it is not entirely certain that thefor concern may be manageable.

North Koreans actually removed the spent fuel rods
from the storage tanks that the IAEA had been moni-

Assessing the Evidence

toring until the devices were disabled, and the inspectors expelled. The point, therefore, is that North Korea

The case of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is clear-

has an undisputed capacity for acquiring plutonium, but

cut. These concerns began to emerge after the discovery

it remains unclear that it has actually processed thein 1985 of a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. Some estimates

spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Recent

suggest North Korea may already have one to two

pronouncements by Pyongyang, such as the declaration

existing nuclear warheads. 1 Another key concern

in July 2003 that they had finished producing enoughrevolves around 8000 spent fuel rods, and the fact that

plutonium to make half a dozen nuclear warheads, 5International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoringcertainly do not help to assuage security concerns

devices for these fuel rods have been either disabled or

revolving around this nuclear proliferation issue.

removed. What is fairly clear is the capacity of the 5 MW

Furthermore, there remains uncertainty over the extent

Yongbyon reactor to generate between 5 to 7 kg of pluto-

of weaponization of this weapons-grade plutonium,

nium each year, which is sufficient for one bomb.2 North

assuming that there is weapons-grade plutonium.

Korea is planning to construct another two nuclear

Having a nuclear device is not the same as having aplants, a 50 MW reactor at Yongbyon-kun and a 200 MW

nuclear warhead, and there are significant technologicalreactor at T’aech’on-kun, which could become opera-

steps to be made in transforming a nuclear device into ational in as early as two years. Both reactors, combined,

deployable weapon. It is not entirely clear that North

could possibly generate up to 200 kg of plutonium annu-

Korea has this capability.

ally, enough for almost 30 nuclear weapons (NW).3 A

The case of North Korea’s alleged chemical weapons– 20 –

Presentation Papers

extracting fresh concessions and aid programmes.

(CW) and biological weapons (BW) programmes israther more ambiguous. There is evidence that suggests

The case of North Korean linkages to terrorism isthat North Korea has established programmes designed

rather more clearly established. Bermudez, probably theto produce both BW and CW capabilities.6 There areleading expert on this issue, argues that North Korea’s

allegations that North Korea has been pursuing researchlinkages to terrorist organizations around the world areinto BW pathogens such as anthrax. However, the statepart of its grand strategy of gaining recognition as theis a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention

sole legitimate Korean government, as and when these(BWC). In any case, these limited sources suggest thatterrorist organizations achieve their political aims inwhatever BW capabilities exist in North Korea, these are

their respective countries.8 North Korea has provided

likely to be fairly primitive. North Korea’s CW

training facilities for a wide range of terrorist organiza-

programmes are rather better developed. The sources

tions from around the world, and has also maintained aused here suggest that the state has stocks of nerve,

number of training facilities in Africa and South

blister, choking and blood chemical agents. Unlike theAmerica. What is particularly worrying is that the North

BWC, however, North Korea has not signed the

Korean policy of identifying and supporting revolu-

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and so thistionary or terrorist organizations around the world coin-remains a source of concern.

cided with the emergence of Kim Jong Il as the de facto
controller of North Korea’s international revolution

Assessing the Impact

activities. As the leader of North Korea now, and given
his past record, it is not implausible to conclude that

The case of North Korean intentions to use WMD

North Korea will continue to indulge in the sponsorshipagainst states in Northeast Asia or against other USof terrorist activities and organizations around theinterests worldwide is similarly ambiguous. There has

world. The conjunction between a WMD-capable North

been a cottage industry concerning the apparently irra-

Korea and its sponsorship of terrorist activities presents

tional or unpredictable tendencies of North Korean

terrifying possibilities for not just the US or the UK but

leaders, first Kim Il Sung and now Kim Jong Il. If thisjust about every state in the world.

perspective is correct that North Korean leaders have

Furthermore, North Korea has a history of arms

demonstrated a propensity for unpredictable behavior,

exports to just about any actor—state or non-state—who

then it would seem that a WMD-capable North Korea

seeks its armaments. The recent sale of North Korean

represents a more urgent threat to regional and interna-

Scud-derived ballistic missiles to Yemen, intercepted bytional security. This paper suggests that at least in somea Spanish warship and subsequently released to its final

instances, a more careful reading of North Korean

destination by the US, is merely the tip of what is likely

external behavior shows that it is neither unpredictablea very large iceberg of North Korean arms and military

nor irrational, but rather fits into a broader pattern oftechnology sales to the outside world. Of course, the saleinstability in international politics. In other words, theof ballistic missiles is not on the same level as the sale ofNorth Korean leadership has adopted a very rational

WMD technologies, but in the latter, it seems likely thatand predictable approach that seeks to exploit moments

the North Koreans have been equally culpable. There isof uncertainty or instability in international politics tostrong evidence to suggest that North Korea wasadvance North Korean interests. 7 Since then, North

involved in an exchange with Pakistan, involving the

Korean behavior continues to fit the pattern of exploitingexchange of North Korean missiles for Pakistani-

uncertainty in the wider strategic environment as andsupplied HEU. 9 Thus far, the North Koreans havewhen possible. Its recent decision to restart the nuclear

largely concentrated on the sale of ballistic missiles.

reactor at Yongbyon can be seen in this light. It can be

However, given the fact that the North Korean economy

seen as partly a reaction to the sanctions imposed by theis virtually collapsed, and that arms and military tech-current US administration, and the exploitation of

nology sales have been its sole source of foreign

perceived opportunities created as a result of the crisis

exchange for some time now, it is not implausible toover Iraq. A plausible explanation is that it saw the

hypothesize a situation where Pyongyang could becrisis—and the fact that US attention was directed

tempted to provide another state or non-state actor withtowards Iraq—as an opportunity to ‘blackmail’ the US

such NW or materials, if the price is right.

and other states into either lifting the sanctions or– 21 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

Southeast Asian Concerns

knowledge of chemistry, are all that is needed foranyone or any organization to manufacture CW. Of

The primary concern of Southeast Asia with regards

course, CW agents tend to revolve around 4 types—

to the WMD proliferation in Northeast Asia has tradi-

nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and bloodtionally focused on the impact of a nuclear North Korea.

agents—and the chemical recipes of these agents are

There are concerns that a nuclear North Korea might justknown. Sufficient monitoring of the possession, utiliza-

prove to be the catalyst to wider nuclear proliferation

tion and movement of the base chemicals for these CW

throughout the region. Implicit in these concerns is thatagents should suffice in preventing them from falling

this case might be sufficient for Japan to overcome its

into terrorist organizations’ hands. As for BW agents,

long-standing nuclear aversion. Such fears have beenthese tend to revolve around bacterial or viral infections

shown to be misplaced, of course.

or the use of toxins. The major problem with BW agents

But given the current obsession over the so-called

is, however, their storage, which requires strict environ-new terrorism, surely a greater concern would now bemental conditions for the BW agents to remain potent.

the CW and BW programmes in North Korea. Consider

The same is true of CW, but to a lesser extent.

the evidence—North Korea has a history of selling justFurthermore, a detailed analysis of previous terrorist

about any military technology or weapon to anyone

employment of either BW or CW attacks shows very

willing to buy them, North Korea has history of relation-

limited fatalities, albeit with a disproportionately large

ships with various terrorist organizations. Do the math,

psychological impact.

and it seems inevitable that North Korea may at someConclusion

point in time—if it has not already—do business withsuch terrorist organizations as al Qaeda and Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), at least in CW and BW capabilities.

The point this paper makes is that while there are

Interestingly, however, North Korea has tended to favorcauses for concern from North Korea, it is not yet time toterrorist organizations that seek to overthrow an existingpress the panic button. We know there are fissile mate-political authority in a state—so-called traditionalrials in North Korea, and we know how many nuclear

terrorist organizations. New terrorist organizations likewarheads these fissile materials will likely yield. We

al Qaeda do not fall into this pattern. This is not to say

know the North Koreans have existing CW programmes.

that any relationship or transaction between al Qaeda or

We know the North Koreans are willing to sell anythingsimilar terrorist groups and North Korea is automati-

to anyone willing to buy it. We know that Pyongyang

cally precluded, but Pyongyang would have to weighhas in the past cultivated relations with some terrorist

this concern carefully. Its terrorist support policies haveorganizations. We know the North Koreans had a BW

been linked to wider political and diplomatic interests—

programme, but have since become signatories to thegaining recognition as the sole legitimate political

BWC, for however much that is worth. We know, there-

authority in Korea at the expense of Seoul.

fore, that the possibility exists that North Korea might be

It is important not to be too sanguine about such

willing to sell CW or BW agents to terrorist organizations

things, but it is also important that a sense of reality

in the region, who can then use these agents to wreak

should continue to inform our assessments. Yes, thehavoc in Southeast Asia. These are disturbing facts andabove scenario is correct, but there is no evidence as yet

scenarios that trouble all of us in East Asia, and continueof such linkages between Pyongyang and the JI, at least

to make North Korea a continuing security concern not

in information that is openly available. The tranship-

just for Northeast Asia but Southeast Asia as well.

ment of BW or CW remains a fairly complicated process,But there is a lot we do not know about. We do notand movements out of North Korea are likely being

know if the fissile material has been weaponized. We do

monitored closely by the intelligence agencies of Japannot know, in the first place, if the North Koreans have aand the US. It would be difficult—although not impos-

nuclear device to begin with. And even if they have asible—for North Korea to move any CW or BW capabili-

nuclear device, we do not know if they have the capacity

ties it had to another part of the world undetected.

to weaponize this device. More importantly, we do not

Furthermore, production of CW, and to a lesser extent

know what strategic value a nuclear capability has toBW, is a fairly simple process. A simple laboratory,

Pyongyang. What is the strategic purpose behind nuclear

access to the right chemical elements, and rudimentary

weapons for Pyongyang? This is a question that has never– 22 –

Presentation Papers

NOTES

been satisfactorily answered. Is it offensive or defensive?
Are the North Koreans planning to obliterate Seoul? Or
1Tokyo? Or is it defensive? Are they trying to deter external
aggression? From which direction would this external
aggression emanate? These are difficult questions that2need to be examined and thought through carefully.
We do not know the full extent of Pyongyang’s CW

3programmes. We do not know the stocks of CW agents
4
5

they might currently possess, or the delivery systems
they have. We do not know if they have continued
research of BW agents, in contravention then of theirmembership of the BWC. We do not know what rela-

6

tionship Pyongyang might have with such terrorist
organizations as al Qaeda or the JI. We do not know if
there are transactions between these parties. Simply put,
we do not know if Pyongyang has sold CW or BW
agents to terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. What weknow is that a postulated link between Pyongyang and7

al Qaeda or the JI might not fit the historical pattern ofPyongyang’s links with other ‘traditional’ terroristgroups. But, of course, it does not automatically
preclude such a linkage being developed or indeed
already being in place. What we do know is that it is noteasy for transshipments out of North Korea going undetected, and that if such terrorist organizations as the JI
wanted to acquire CW agents, it is probably easier forthem to acquire the production facilities themselves.
So in the event that there is much that we do not
know, it remains important that we do not panic. For
sure, a WMD-capable North Korea is not the mostpleasant thing to have, but it is not necessarily lifethreatening either. What we should maintain is awatchful eye on this difficult and emotive issue.

89– 23 –

Nancy Soderburgh, “Escaping North Korea’s Nuclear Trap”,
in The New York Times, 12 February 2003 (http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/02/12/opinion/12SODE.html).
Daniel A. Pinkston and Stephanie Liegg, “North Korea’s
Nuclear Program: Key Concerns” (http://www.cns.miis.
edu/research/korea/keycon.htm).
Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program”, Issue
Brief for Congress, 7 January 2003, CRS-5.
Ibid., pp.CRS-5-7.
See David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel
For Atom Bombs”, in The New York Times, 14 July 2003
(http://www/nytimes.com/2003/07/15/international/asi
a/15KORE.html).
For North Korea’s ambitions for BW capabilities, see
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html;
and http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/bio/ie/
NKB_EoGO_bg.html. For North Korea’s CW ambitions, see
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html;
and http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/chem/ie/
NKC_EoGO_bg.html.
The crises on the Korean peninsula between 1968 and 1977,
for instance, all took place against the backdrop of apparently declining US interests in the wider East Asian, andmore specifically Northeast Asian region, evidenced by thewithdrawal of US military forces from the Vietnam War
and the downsizing of US forces in Japan and Korea. There
was the additional complication for North Korea in theform of a growing South Korean economy that was threatening even then to outstrip the economic capacity of North
Korea. In other words, these incidents of North Korean‘irrationality’ and ‘unpredictability’ occurred against a
backdrop where the North Korean leadership was facing an
increasingly powerful South Korea and an apparently
disinterested US. For a brief discussion of these crises, seeCho, Soon Sung Cho, “North and South Korea: Stepped-Up
Aggression and the Search for New Security,” in Asian
Survey, January 1969, Vol. 9, No.1, p.30; Joseph S.
Bermudez, Jr., Terrorism: The North Korean Connection (NewYork, Bristol, Washington, London: Crane Russak, 1990),
p.39; Dan Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary
History (Reading, MASS: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.56-8;
and Sung-Hack Kang, “Strategic Metamorphosis from
Sisyphus to Chameleon? North Korean Security Policy and
Military Strategy,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Spring 1995, Vol. 7, No. 1, p.204.
Bermudez, op. cit., pp.1-3.
Daniel A. Pinkston, When Did WMD Deals between
Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin? (Monterey, California:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002).

Maritime Security Measures of the Japan Coast Guard
Satoshi Nakajima
Head of Office, Security Division, Japan Coast Guard– 24 –

Presentation Papers– 25 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

– 26 –

Presentation Papers– 27 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

– 28 –

Presentation Papers– 29 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

– 30 –

Peacekeeping Operations and Intra-State Conflicts
Wiryono Sastrohandoyo
Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

One of the facts of life of the post-Cold War period isof intra-state conflicts and civil wars that were held once

that there are more intra-state conflicts than inter-statein check and masked by the Cold War rivalry of two

conflicts. A study by Wallensteen and Sollenberg showedsuperpowers that were themselves held in check by thethat of the 96 violent conflicts that had occurred between

principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in the1989 and 1995, all but five of them were intra-state.

event of a nuclear war. Intra-state conflicts were swept

A proliferation of intra-state conflicts translates into

under the carpet or turned into international conflicts

a greater demand for peacekeeping operations (PKOs)

fought by proxy.

by the United Nations (UN). This is clearly discernible inSome of these proxy wars became susceptible tothe pattern of UN expenditures for peacekeeping. In thepeaceful settlement with the end of the Cold War. Thus,

first 45 years of its existence, the UN spent 23 percent of

the conflict in Angola came to an end with the Angola

its annual budget (US$3.6 billion) for peacekeeping.

Accords of 1988 and the two-decade-long conflict in

From 1990 to 2000, however, the allocation for peace-

Cambodia was settled by the Paris Agreements of 1991.

keeping rose to 77 percent of the annual budget or

These were among the notable exceptions. In

roughly to US$12.1 billion.

general, simmering disputes within Third World coun-

The number of PKOs carried out over the years tells

tries became more pronounced and erupted into massive

the same story: between 1945 and 1989, there were only

armed conflicts. Today, inter-ethnic, inter-religious,

13 PKOs; between 1989 and 1998, there were 36 suchinter-communal, horizontal and vertical conflicts

operations, a disproportionate increase in just a decade.

abound among countries of the Third World. Although

The same story is told by the proportion of civilian

these conflicts have international and regional ramifica-

casualties to casualties who were combatants. Before

tions and consequences, they are basically domestic andand during the Cold War, only 10 percent of casualties

often the result of diversity and inequality among

were civilians. After the Cold War, 90 percent of casual-national components.

ties were civilians.

With the proliferation of such internal conflicts,
various forms of transnational crime have also flour-

New threats to security

ished as these are resorted to or encouraged by the
belligerents. These include the smuggling of small arms,

As a result, the world today is in the grip of adrugs and people, and money laundering. Often, thedifferent sense of insecurity. It is no longer so much

belligerents have created links between themselves andabout external threats of aggression but about internaltransnational criminal syndicates and even international

threats like rebellions, social upheavals and separatism

terrorists, with the result that it has become difficult tothat are the consequence of policies perceived as

distinguish between freedom fighters and separatists on

lopsided and unjust, or of a struggle for the country’s

the one hand and terrorists with a regional or global

resources. At the same time, there are crime syndicates

agenda on the other.

at work within a country that may be receiving help and

The UN response: peacekeeping

funds from outside but are so formidable, not so muchbecause of that external help but because of their ability

As the organization established to address theto merge with the peaceful and law-abiding populationcollective security concerns of the internationalof the country.

community, the UN must have a response to the insid-

The post-Cold War world inherited a great number– 31 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

Principles and practiceious threat of intra-state conflicts. By and large, theresponse has been, over the years, in the form of PKOs.
That is why the UN maintains a Department of

Traditionally, three principles conceptualized by

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to plan, prepare,

UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld have guided

manage and direct such operations. Peacekeeping

UN PKOs: (1) the consent of the parties involved; (2)missions may be aimed at deploying personnel andimpartiality, which that the peacekeeping contingent

troops under UN command to prevent the outbreak ofshould treat all sides even-handedly and not merely

conflict or the spillover of conflicts across borders, toremain neutral to the point of inaction; and (3) the use ofstabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to help

force, only as a last resort, in self-defense.

implement peace agreements, to lead states or territories

In practice, it is becoming increasingly difficult forthrough a transition to a stable democratic government,

peacekeeping forces to operate strictly in accordanceor to carry out any combination of these tasks.

with these principles, which have become inadequate in

The legal basis for PKOs has always been thought tothe face of complex realities in the field. These situations

be Chapter VI of the UN Charter, on the Pacificinclude when parties are uncooperative; when there are

Settlement of Disputes, particularly Article 33, which

intractable factions within the parties; or when the roots

stipulates that parties to any dispute “shall, first of all,of the conflict itself are pervasive and deep-seated, suchseek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation … oras in the Middle East, the Congo, Somalia, and theother peaceful means of their own choice.” This is inter-

former Yugoslavia.

preted as implying the need for PKOs to give negotia-

Since the UN has no army, each peacekeeping

tions a chance to take place.

mission is organized on an ad-hoc basis and configured

As a term, “peacekeeping” is not mentioned, let

to fit its specific mandate. When a crisis arises, a party toalone described, in the Charter. It has been developed in

the conflict or a member of the Security Council or thesituations where there are no formal determinants of

UN Secretary-General can request that the Security

aggression, or no clear “enemies.” Its goal is to promote

Council hold a meeting in which the formation of aand win time for peaceful settlement of the conflict andpeacekeeping force may be proposed.

its effectiveness depends on consent and cooperation of

The Security Council may then authorize thethe parties involved.

deployment of such a force and define its mandate. SuchRegarded as the very first PKO of the UN was thea decision can be reached only through an affirmative

UN Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) in 1948.

vote by at least nine of 15 Council members, without any

Little known outside Indonesia is the fact that in Augustof the permanent members giving a negative vote,of the previous year, the UN Security Council formed awhich would be an effective veto. The Secretary-General

consular commission to monitor the implementation ofrecommends how the mission will operate and thethe ceasefire between the Dutch forces and the forces of

DPKO provides political and executive direction in thethe fledgling Indonesian Republic. Soon after that, thefield.

Security Council sent a Good Offices Committee to

A mixed record

mediate the conflict in Indonesia. Composed ofAustralia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the
Netherlands) and chaired by the US (chosen by bothDuring the Cold War, the Security Council was not

Australia and Belgium), the Committee arrived inalways effective because of the abuse by the permanentIndonesia on 27 October 1947. Although it had neither

members of their veto power. There were major security

military nor police component, the Committee success-issues that were resolved without the involvement offully promoted negotiations that led to peace and to

the UN, such as the Berlin Crisis, the Soviet interven-international recognition of Indonesian independence.

tions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the conflicts in

The UNTSO was a small operation to supervise theNorthern Ireland and in the Falklands, and in thetruce between the warring parties in Palestine. Since

Vietnam War. The UN failed in Somalia because it wasthen, there have been many more. In 1956, during the

not perceived as impartial. In Rwanda, it failed toSuez Canal crisis, the UN Emergency Force was a muchprevent a massive tragedy of genocide. Moreover, itbigger operation designed to maintain a buffer zone

failed to coax Milosevic to negotiate on Bosnia-

between the combatants.

Herzegovina.

– 32 –

Presentation Papers

On the other hand, UN peacekeeping was not“Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed

without its successes. These include the resolution of theduring the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping

Iran-Iraq war; the peace processes that led to the inde-

today requires not only rethinking the means but also thependence of Namibia, Mozambique and in later times,

methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security

East Timor; as well as the Cambodia peace process.

Council.”

In addressing such problems, PKOs have become

The rethinking process has to take into account thebroader and multi-dimensional, as it often assumes the

now generally accepted concept of human security. It isrole of a transitional administrator, attending to various

an idealistic concept, but there is no denying that in thepolitical concerns and exercises, dealing with humanface of increasingly frequent and flagrant violation ofrights issues, administering humanitarian assistance andhuman rights in the course of intra-state conflicts, thereeven rehabilitating the natural environment devastatedis need for concrete action. In that same process ofby conflict. These demands on the capacity of peace-

rethinking, therefore, a dilemma has to be confronted: is

keeping forces have made them exceedingly costly.

it justified to uphold human security at the expense of

Because the UN does not have its own troops andthe sovereignty of a member of the UN?

much depends on the will of the contributing countries

On this, Secretary-General Kofi Annan says, “Ifas well as the availability of logistical support, it has

humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault

sometimes happened that UN troops and otheron sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to apersonnel arrive on the scene after a costly delay of

Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of humanseveral months. The issue of financial support for PKOs

rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?

remains to this day a source of friction among members…Armed intervention must always remain the option of lastof the General Assembly and the Security Council.

resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that

In recent times, PKOs have been more and morecannot be relinquished.”

based not only on Chapter VI of the Charter, theThe issue of sovereignty

peaceful settlement of disputes, but also on Chapter VII,
actions with respect to “threats to peace,” “breaches ofthe peace” and “acts of aggression,” all of which have

While the Secretary-General has a strong view on

not been clearly defined. What has made it difficult tothis real need to resolve real problems, and many

carry out peace enforcement through military action, ineminent minds agree with him, there are provisions

spite of the enabling provision of Article 42 of Chapter

within the UN Charter that do not support that view:

VII, and regardless of whether the problem be intra-state

Article 2 (1): “The UN is based on sovereign equality.”

or inter-state conflict, is the fact that the UN does not

Article 2 (4): “Members shall refrain from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-

have a standing military force to rely on.

pendence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the

The need for rethinking

purposes of the UN.”
Article 2 (7): “Nothing in this present Charter shallWith more and more intra-state conflicts taking

authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are ... withinplace all over the world, there is a need to be forward-

domestic jurisdiction …”

looking. The situation clearly calls for UN capability to

Article 51: refers to “the inherent right of individual or

quickly muster at any time a military or police force,collective self-defense ... until the Security Council has taken

equipped according to the situation that is to bemeasures …”

addressed, to deploy that force to maintain law and

There is also Resolution 2625 of the UN Generalorder, to protect civil liberties and win the hearts andAssembly (UNGA): “Principles of Friendly Relations

minds—and the confidence—of the people of the

between States,” which provides that “No state has any

disputing parties, and to reestablish peace. It may meanright whatsoever to intervene in any way whatsoever in thepeace enforcement that requires heavy armaments, oraffairs of other states …”

humanitarian intervention in the face of genocide or

Moreover, the view from Third World countries iswidespread violation of human rights, which createsthat sovereignty, which they have gained after a long,another kind of problem.

hard, and often bloody struggle, is the last defense.

On this, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said,

Without this principle, Third World countries would– 33 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

easily fall prey to the more powerful nations.

prevailing views today:

Third World countries like to point out that ina) The UN has failed, as evidenced by the debacles inreality humanitarian intervention is always applied

the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia. The

selectively. When human rights violations occur in athree guiding principles were either proven inade-powerful country, intervention is not possible. But whenquate or violated. There is also “donor fatigue” andthese occur in a country that is not so powerful, humani-

reluctance of member countries to share the burden

tarian intervention is often carried out swiftly.

of the cost of PKOs.

It is true that the West, generally speaking, hasb) The UN has been able to do its job of peacemaking,become the bastion of democracy and human rights, butpeacekeeping and peace-building. Not perfectly, but

only after centuries of both positive and negative devel-

successfully enough under the most difficult circum-

opments, including numerous wars that brought about

stances and in the face of the increasing number ofenormous human suffering (such as the Napoleonicconflicts around the world. After all, it was for its

wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War).

PKOs that the UN received the Nobel Prize for Peace

The West also had to go through, or live with, all kinds

in 1988. The Secretary-General’s report, An Agendaof disastrous systems (for example, colonialism, fascism,for Peace, shows that most members continue to pin

Nazism, and communism).

their hopes for world peace on the UN.

In the present globalizing world, which has been

One of the most urgent needs of our time is for the

reduced to a global village and then to a global neigh-establishment

borhood, countries normally scrutinize each other’s

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Force,

society. However, it is mostly the developed countries ofwhich is well trained, equipped with adequate logistics

the West that scrutinize the countries of the Third Worldand ready to be deployed under UN command to meetas intra-state conflicts mostly occur in the Third World.

security threats, including and especially intra-state

Thus, the objects of scrutiny and humanitarian interven-conflicts in addition to other kinds of disasters.

tion are, most of the time, countries of the Third World.

ofastanding

permanentUN

In establishing such a force, a good starting point is

Besides, governments of the Third World are mostly

to consider the insights and recommendations contained

too busy with their own problems to scrutinize thein the report of the Brahimi Panel on UN peacekeeping

developed countries.

operations. The report covers a wide range of subjects,

What is bound to happen is that there is a lot of

including (1) the need for change, (2) doctrine, strategy

perception of lecturing and hectoring by the developed

and decision-making for peace operations, (3) UNworld on democracy, human rights, rule of law andcapacity to deploy operations rapidly and effectively, (4)similar issues, which create resentment in the Third World

HQ resources and structure for planning and supporting

countries. This increases the divide between the West andpeace operations, (5) peace operations and the informa-

the rest and results in a new global polarization.

tion age, and (6) changes to implementation.

Indispensability of the UN

The role of regional organizations

Whatever may be the failings and deficiencies of the

A new trend has developed in PKOs: cooperation

UN, it is still the best instrument that the internationalwith regional organizations. The guiding principles arecommunity has crafted for its own collective security. As

contained in Chapter VIII, which provides that:the only forum in which each nation in the world, no

1. The Charter does not prohibit regional arrangements

matter how small and insignificant, has a voice, the UN

as long as these are consistent with the principles

is indispensable. Even the US, the only superpower inand purposes of the UN;

the world today, must return to the UN to seek “burden

2. Regional efforts should first be attempted before

sharing” in its troubled adventure in Iraq. A recent

taking the problem to the UN Security Council; andsurvey of American public opinion shows that 63

3. The UN Security Council, whenever necessary, canpercent of respondents favor the UN to take a leading

apply enforcement under regional arrangements.

role in maintaining international peace and security. We

For example, in Africa, the UN worked with the

all need to work within the UN system.

Economic Community of West African States

As for the UN’s role in peacekeeping, there are two(ECOWAS) in Liberia between 1993 and 1997. After the– 34 –

Presentation Papers

successful efforts of the ECOWAS to bring about a peacetraining center and conduct joint exercises on peace-agreement between the disputing parties, the ECOWAS

keeping. At this time, only Malaysia has a peace-

Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a military observer

keeping training center.

group under ECOWAS, was formed. The UN Observer

3. To persuade the developed country members of theMission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was then established in

ARF and ASEAN dialogue partner countries to1993 to observe the implementation of the agreement.

provide assistance and cooperation that will makeIn the Balkans, the UN Mission to Bosnia-

possible greater ASEAN participation in UN peace-

Herzegovina worked together with the Highkeeping.

Representative of the European Union (EU), the North

A choice has to be madeAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and theCommission on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE).

If there has been no effort to translate the notion of a

In Georgia, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia

partnership between the UN and ASEAN in achieving(UNOMIG) worked together with the CSCE and theand sustaining regional security, this can only bepeacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of

because of the tenacious adherence of the ASEAN

Independent States (CIS).

members to the principle of state sovereignty. In its 1967
founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN

A UN-ASEAN partnershipexpressed determination “to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation.”

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The fact is that even the effort of ASEAN to become(ASEAN) already has a number of documents

a security community may be stymied by this strict

containing principles on maintaining regional peace andadherence to the principle of state sovereignty. An

security such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

essential element of the ASEAN Security Community(TAC) in Southeast Asia, and on cooperation with the(ASC) is the activation of the High Council envisioned in

UN in the Singapore Declaration of 1992, the Bangkok

the TAC in Southeast Asia. This Council cannot possibly

Declaration of 1995, ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Hanoi

assume its function of settling internal disputes among

Plan of Action.

ASEAN countries unless the members involved in the

It would seem only natural that ASEAN starts estab-dispute yield to its authority. However, they cannot

lishing cooperation with the UN on matters of security.

yield to the authority of the High Council without

In 1999, at the 54th UNGA, on the item of peacekeeping

diminishing their own sovereignty, so they will have toand after the disastrous East Timor implosion, ASEAN

face that dilemma.

made a joint statement reaffirming its commitment to

Formulated in 16th century Europe at a time when

the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

nation-states were still being formed in that continent,

and its wish to cooperate with the UN. Within thethe principle of sovereignty was defined as “a state’s

framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), there

absolute authority over its citizens and subjects and terri-have been seminars and workshops on the possibility of

tory.” It is this absoluteness that makes sovereignty suchsetting up a peacekeeping center.

a difficult issue to deal with. On the other hand, if it is
not absolute, sovereignty may be thought to have lost

Within the UN system of peacekeeping, ASEAN ismuch of its value.

now in the category that contributes the least to thepeacekeeping activities of the UN, in comparison with

Under the present international circumstances, inother regions. This, in spite of the fact that one ASEAN

which there are so many intra-state conflicts, there

member, Indonesia, has contributed to about 20 peace-

seems to be a need to strike a balance between main-

keeping forces. To improve ASEAN’s standing andtaining sovereignty and accepting cooperation on theparticipation in peacekeeping, there are several ideas

basis of humanitarian concern and protecting humanthat can be pursued:

rights. Moreover, in a world where states violate the

1. To start a consultative forum among ASEAN coun-rights of their own citizens, practice murder and geno-

tries’ foreign and defense officials/military authori-cide, and also fail to attend to human hunger, health andties on peacekeeping activities.

other human needs, it has become difficult to defend theabsoluteness of state sovereignty. Various sets of criteria

2. To establish and operate together a peacekeeping– 35 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

have been proposed and are being discussed within thein which the gap between individual human rights andUN on when humanitarian intervention may be

the rights of states can be bridged because neither is

imposed upon a state unwilling to accept it.

regarded as absolute.

It may take a very long time, but eventually theIt will take a long time, but a choice will have to beinternational community will have to choose between a

made.

world in which the authority of states is absolute, or one– 36 –

The Roles of Regional Security Institutions: Beyond “Talk Shops”?
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
Adjunct Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

1. Introduction

Although they have been searching for a multi-polarworld since the end of the Cold War, they are now

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the roles ofcoming to terms with a unipolar world underlined by

the multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific,

the US power. This creates the possibility of establishingespecially those of the Association of Southeast Asiana new form of “Concert of Powers” in the Asia-Pacific,

Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF). There areeven if tentatively.

many critical views on the regional institutions, espe-

Third, a war against terrorism creates new coalitions

cially the ARF and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperationof the willing, not directly related to the regional institu-(APEC). The ARF, together with ASEAN and APEC, hastions. Coalitions of the willing are becoming a distinct

also been criticized for its “talk shop” quality. Sometrend of security management. The Proliferation Security

critics observe that the ARF’s use of concepts like “grad-Initiative (PSI) is one example.

ualism” and “evolutionally” may be convenient

Fourth, we are witnessing a new development ineuphemisms for inaction. They argue that consensus-

Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries that have faced

decision has obstructed the regional institutions fromvarious difficulties in enhancing cooperation and unity

developing a tightly-regulated mechanism for security

among the member countries, finally started to reacti-

cooperation.

vate the regional institution. New ASEAN initiatives

Given these criticisms, it is important for us to havesuch as an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) anda clear recognition of what the ARF can do and what theASEAN Security Community (ASC) demonstrate the

ARF cannot do. Demanding too much from the ARF is

possibility of introducing a new vigor for regional coop-premature and inappropriate.

eration in Southeast Asia.

The roles of regional multilateral security institu-

2. Security Issues in the Asia-Pacifictions such as the ARF have to be analyzed taking thechanges of the geopolitical and economic environments

There are a lot of security issues in the region. Some

into account. What changes?
First, the political, economic and security gravity isof them cannot be handled by the ARF, leaving them toshifting towards North of the Asia-Pacific. Northeast

other mechanisms and instruments. There are three

Asia is now becoming a region where the new economic,“big” security issues that may ignite military confronta-

political and security dynamisms are emerging. Thesetion in the region: the Korean Peninsula, the cross-strait

dynamisms will largely affect the future regional orderrelations and the South China Sea disputes. Militaryof the entire Asia-Pacific.

measures such as deterrence are still quite important indealing with these issues.

Second, among the newly emerging dynamisms,
the defining one is that among the major powers. The

There are additional important security issues: mili-major powers are now searching for an appropriate

tary modernization (offensive military strategy/

regional order bilaterally and/or multilaterally. The

doctrine), the spread of the weapons of mass destruction

future shape of the regional order will be more and(WMD), transnational issues such as piracy, drug-traf-

more defined by the relationships among the major

ficking, illegal transfer of weapons and so forth. These

powers. In this regard, it is to be noted that China andare mostly inter-state security issues.

Russia have gradually accepted the reality that theWe have additional security issues if we pay atten-

United States (US) is the sole superpower in the world.

tion to domestic areas. Intra-state conflicts (ethnic and– 37 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

(1) Security Cooperation under Competitive
Security Relations (Collective Defense)

religious conflicts and independence movements) arebecoming tense. These conflicts have increasing regional
security implications.

In spite of the end of the Cold War, there are tense

Furthermore, if we define security in a comprehen-relations among countries, especially among the major

sive way, economic difficulties, huge income gaps

powers and a competitive security mode (such as

among the people and degradation of socio-economic

balance of powers, deterrence, etc.) prevails among

conditions in certain countries are also becoming secu-

them. Reflecting the competitive security system, werity issues. The concept of “human security” emphasizes

have collective defense arrangements.

these aspects. In fact, one of the most serious security

After the end of the Cold War, collective security

issues lies in both domestic politics (domestic politicalarrangements centered on the US were “redefined,”

instability) and effects of the rapidly changing global

making the alliances respond to strategic uncertainties,

political economy on domestic socio-economic condi-

not against any specific countries. In addition, after thetions. Economic globalization has posed serious chal-

September 11 tragedy, the alliances have been further

lenges to these countries. The countries in the region

enhanced. Japan, for the first time, sent the Self-Defense

have to carry out the difficult task of strengthening state

Forces to the Indian Ocean to support the US mission to

structures, while simultaneously making them compat-

fight terrorism. Furthermore, bilateral alliances haveible with the rest of the world in rapidly changing

been connected to each other recently. Japan, the US andnational, regional and international environments. This

Australia started a trilateral security consultation at aputs the countries of the region in a serious policy

vice-minister level. Trilateral security cooperation

dilemma.

between Japan, the US and South Korea has also beendeveloping.

3. Security Mechanisms/Instruments in
the Asia-Pacific

The alliance networks centered on Washington stillserve as a basic security linchpin in dealing with “bigissues” such as the Korean Peninsula and the cross-strait

Reflecting various security relations, there are

relations. The alliance networks also provide the entire

different modes of security management in the Asia-

region with a stable security environment (alliance as

Pacific. The region has a competitive security system, a“regional public goods”).

common security system and some cooperative security

These “big” issues will continue to be handled bysystems. Put differently, there exist “balance of powers,”

the logic of power politics (power balancing and“concert of powers” and “security via multilateralism”“concert of powers”) among the major powers. As such,in Asia. The logic of balance of powers is distinct among

the role of the ARF has continued to be limited.

the major powers. But the logic of balance of powers also(2) Cooperative Security: Asia-Pacific Cooperation
under the Global Institutions

exists among the smaller countries. Military modernization among the ASEAN countries follows this pattern,although in a lesser degree, compared with it among the

The global collective security system underlined bymajor powers.

the United Nations (UN) covers the entire Asia-Pacific.

It is still uncertain which mode of security manage-

Although most Asia-Pacific nations have not been active

ment will become dominant in the region. It will be mostparticipants in sustaining the UN collective security

probable that various security modes co-exist together insystem, these attitudes have been changing for the last

the foreseeable future.

decade. This took place not in the field of collective secu-

As I mentioned above, we are witnessing various

rity efforts such as providing military forces as a part oftypes of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific today.

UN sanctioned military activities against aggressors, but

Responding to security issues facing the region, there

in the field of peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The

have emerged different modes of security management.

Cambodia peace settlement was a first example. East

The roles of regional institutions such as the ARF have toTimor is another example. The recognition of further

be reviewed in the context of multiple mechanisms ofenhancing cooperation under the UN PKO system issecurity management now existing in the region.

commonly shared among the countries in the region. In
fact, the ARF took PKOs as one of the important areas ofcooperation among the members.

– 38 –

Presentation Papers

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

Korea’s nuclear development have just started. In order(UNCLOS) has served as a focal point to moderate theto realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, there aretension over the South China Sea territorial disputes.

many difficult questions such as “security assurance” byThis issue has been mainly dealt with by ASEAN andthe US, an economic rehabilitation program for North

China on a bilateral basis. Discussions of establishing

Korea, the transformation of an armistice regime to“Codes of Conduct” have been underway. Global insti-

peaceful one and so forth. However, as a result of

tutions such as UNCLOS have provided a basic frame-

solving North Korean nuclear problems, some form ofwork to dealing with the issue. However, China’s

regional security architecture underlined by a “Concert

opposition to “internationalize” the dispute haveof Powers” may be emerging. In fact, Japan, the US,

prevented regional institutions (except ASEAN) from

China and Russia, together with South Korea, strongly

being involved in the issue.

commit to the basic principle that the Korean Peninsula

Asian countries have been committing themselves

must be nuclear free. If some concert emerges, it will

to various global regulatory institutions such as thealso have an enormous impact on the entire region

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)/International

including Southeast Asia.

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a maritime safety

4. The Record of the ARF: What Has the
ARF Done?

regime and so forth. The ARF has played a stimulatingrole for the member countries to comply with the global
rules.

I have mentioned various security cooperation activ-(3) Coalitions of the Willing: Cooperation amongthe “like-minded”

ities that have been taking place in the region. What
have the regional institutions (especially the ARF) done

The September 11 tragedy has been encouraging

so far?

security cooperation among like-minded countries on(1) Institutionalized Dialogue Channel andSocialization (Mutual Learning)both a bilateral and multilateral basis. New forms ofcooperative arrangements are now emerging. The PSI
has been gaining momentum to consolidate security

The ARF is the first multilateral security dialogue

cooperation among 11 like-minded countries. The 11

mechanism that spans the whole of the Asia-Pacificnations have strongly committed to prevent the prolifer-region. The ARF has provided member countries with aation of WMD and other illegal activities across thevenue to exchange views and concerns relating to secu-

world. Joint exercises among the member countries haverity interests through the ASEAN process of consultation

already started. This security framework will have aand consensus. The ARF also provides a venue for thehuge impact on both security and economic relations

member countries to explain the developments that haveamong Asian countries.

grave regional security implications. Explanations of“redefining” the US-Japan alliance at the ARF meeting

The US enhanced its joint exercises with someare a good example.

Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Singapore
and the Philippines. No regional institutions have been

The ARF has played an important role in providing

involved in these exercises. In the bilateral context, thesocializing mechanisms. Regional institutions such as

US has been strengthening security cooperation with

the ARF could encourage states and societies to imagine

some ASEAN countries. Intelligence and other security

themselves as part of a region. The ARF has served as arelated cooperation have been strengthened. Although“generative” institution that highlighted new ways of

the ARF, APEC and ASEAN+3 have announced theirthinking about the problems facing the region.

collective intention to enhance cooperation to fight(2) Transparency

against terrorism, practical cooperative activities have

One of the first priorities of the ARF was to increase

been mostly taken on a bilateral or minilateral basis.

transparency: security concerns, defense strategy and so(4) New developments among the major powers

forth. This goal has been to some extent accomplishedA new multilateral security framework may emerge

through presenting the so-called “defense policy state-in Northeast Asia, based upon the on-going processes ofments.” At the same time, it should be noted that stan-

the Six Party Talks. The Six Party Talks over Northdards of releasing defense-related information are quite– 39 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

lax; not enough for the regional countries to understandUN, the ARF promoted cooperation in the field of thethe “real” picture of the respective military forces and

UN PKOs, maritime safety operations to fight piracy anddefense strategies.

drug-trafficking and other transnational crime.

(3) Basic Principles Regulating Interactions among
the Member Countries

tackle regional arms modernization. But, the ARF

There have been a lot of discussions of the principles

tion processes underlined by the NPT/IAEA. The

and rules regulating interchanges among the member

member countries have been strongly urged to comply

countries at the ARF. The Concept Paper prepared bywith global non-proliferation regimes such as thethe ASEAN countries provided the basic ideas. Because

NPT/IAEA.

As for arms control, the ARF has never tried totackled non-proliferation as part of global non-prolifera-of this, the principles and norms of the ARF were(6) Institutional Linkages

employed from those of ASEAN. This made a smooth
start to dialogue at the beginning, but it faced a lot ofMany criticisms have been directed to this “weak-difficulties later. Disputes over the principles of preven-ness” of the regional institutions in Asia. However, insti-

tive diplomacy demonstrated this difficulty.

tutions do not function alone. They interact with eachother. In fact, the Asia-Pacific has tried to enhance a(4) Functional Cooperation

regional governance mechanism through connecting

Like other Asia-Pacific regional institutions such as

various bilateral, regional and global institutions, even if

APEC, the ARF has taken a step-by-step approach,

the overall structure is still weak.

taking specific issue areas where the member countries

A series of informal South China Sea workshops

come to some agreement, rather than talking about thewere linked to the ASEAN and ASEAN-China

future blueprint of regional security order. Most of theprocesses. The principles developed and agreed at the

ARF’s activities focused on several functional areas

workshop were supported by ASEAN Ministerial meet-where the member countries had common interests. The

ings, thereby constraining countries from breaching

ARF Working Groups are the main instruments toregionally-endorsed norms, rules and codes of conduct,

promote these functional cooperation activities. The ARF

although this may not be strong enough to fully prevent

working groups on maritime search and rescue, andconflicts from taking place. The basic principles, rules of

PKOs have produced tangible results.

conduct and activities of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) have received(5) Commitments to the Global Rules and Norms

strong support from such other regional institutions as

Asia-Pacific trans-regional institutions such as

ASEAN, the ARF, the G8 and so forth.

APEC and the ARF were devised from the beginning to

In this way, the regional institutions, by strength-

reconcile with global institutions such as the UN, World

ening their linkages with other institutions, have solidi-

Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary

fied and expanded their rules and norms, and throughFund (IMF) and NPT/IAEA. The ARF also has madecollaboration among various institutions, they havestrenuous efforts to link itself with the existing global

promoted compliance with agreements and rules,

institutions such as the UN, NPT, Comprehensive

thereby providing certain constraints on the conduct of

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Missile Technology

the countries involved.

Control Regime (MTCR) and UNCLOS, to mention only

The power of the regional institutions of the Asia-a few. In turn, these global institutions have provided

Pacific lies in this sort of linkage, which we may call

the ARF with various norms and rules to strengthen“institutional networking.”

regional politico-security cooperation.

In terms of institutional linkages, it is interesting to

Global institutions could provide “focal points” asnote that conflict-ridden state-to-state relations are rela-

the basis for consensus building among the countries of

tively stable, when the relationships are enmeshed

the region. The UN Arms Registry is one of the exam-

within the dense institutional networks. For example,

ples. The ARF has been constantly trying for its member

tensions over various territorial disputes such as thecountries to respect for the UN Arms Registry. However,Japan-China dispute over a small island has been effec-

the ARF tried to develop a regional arms registry, but

tively been diffused within a larger context of dense

failed to obtain the consent of the members. As for the

networks of bilateral, regional and global institutions.

– 40 –

Presentation Papers

On the other hand, some tensions are not necessarily

agreed to pick up certain issues that the existing global

diffused because of the lack of institutional linkages.

institutions have provided as “focal points.”

Synergistic effects originating from the dense linkages of(2) ASEAN’s Centrality

various institutions are not created in these cases. The
Korean issue is one of them. The problems in the Korean

ASEAN’s centrality is quite paradoxical. On the one

peninsula are not necessarily due to the lack of institu-

hand, ASEAN’s centrality made it possible for thetions regulating inter-state relations, but in the lack ofregional countries to agree to establish the Asia-Pacificlinkages among various institutions. North-South rela-region-wide security dialogue forum. On the other hand,tionships are not fully linked with other institutions such

because of ASEAN’s centrality, ASEAN’s norms andas the US-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

rules regulating inter-state relations were introduced(DPRK), Japan-DPRK, China-DPRK, Russia-DPRK, theinto the ARF processes.

six-party talks and so forth.

Today, most security issues touch upon internalaffairs. But ASEAN’s norms of managing inter-state rela-

5. ARF: From Dialogue to Problem-Solving?

tions have prevented the ARF from directly dealing withsecurity issues with domestic implications. In addition,

The ARF’s activities have been mainly focused onrather than directly dealing with particular security

the creation of principles for security cooperation in theissues, ASEAN has focused upon developing norms, prin-

Asia-Pacific. The ARF has never dealt with particular

ciples and rules regulating inter-state relations among thesecurity issues. The only exception is in the field ofmembers. ASEAN has had few experiences in directly

maritime safety. The ARF has been taking various

dealing with “hot” security issues. In fact, there has been

concrete measures to enhance maritime safety in thelittle opportunity for ASEAN to present concrete

region. Can the ARF focus on particular themes andproposals to deal with particular security themes andissues?

issues at the ARF. ASEAN’s practices and power depend

There have been various proposals presented to re-upon the belief that collectively developed rules andactivate the ARF, such as the establishment of the ARF

norms would put diplomatic constraints on the behaviors

Secretariat, enhancing the role of the ARF’s Chair,of the others. This has been useful in some areas but has

holding the meeting of senior defense officials concur-

not worked in politically sensitive areas.

rently with the meeting of foreign ministers, and so

Of course, this does not mean that the ARF becomes

forth. Probably the introduction of these new measuresmore effective if ASEAN steps down from the “driver’s

into the ARF processes will, to some extent, contribute toseat” of the ARF. The composition of membership andactivating the ARF processes. However, they will not

the difference of security interests among the members

solve the fundamental problems facing the ARF.

have prevented the ARF from touching upon politicallysensitive issues.

(1) ARF’s Membership(3) Rehabilitating the ARF

The ARF is a forum reflecting a cooperative security
concept, the essence of which is “inclusiveness” in its

Given the current modalities of the ARF, it will still

membership. In fact, the ARF has expanded its member-be difficult for the ARF to directly deal with particular

ship and now has all Asia-Pacific countries as its

security issues in the coming years. However, there aremembers. In a sense, the ARF is a mini-UN in the Asia-

several ways for the ARF to reactivate its activities.

Pacific that includes all major powers (UN Permanent 5

First, we wait for the changes of intra-ASEAN rela-plus Japan). This serves as a quite useful venue fortions. ASEAN has a huge responsibility for how the ARF

dialogue and consultation and confidence-building.

evolves in the coming years, given its claim that ASEAN

However, when the ARF tries to tackle particular secu-

sits in the driver’s seat. Most of the security issues in therity issues, the composition of the forum becomes a

region have grave domestic implications. Discussions

stumbling block. As far as the ARF maintains the prin-

will be touching upon domestic affairs/politics. If

ciple of consensus decisions, it is impossible for the ARF

ASEAN countries succeed in developing norms, princi-

to deal with politically sensitive issues for the members.

ples and rules to engage in the internal affairs of other

The ARF can tackle only the issues where a consensus

members, the modalities of the ARF will be modified

emerges among the members. So far, the members haveaccordingly and the ARF will be able to touch upon

– 41 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

more sensitive security issues with internal implications

Fourth, the ARF should further enhance functionalsuch as arms modernization. In this regard, it is quite

cooperation. In the foreseeable future, it may be difficultinteresting how the currently discussed new concept offor the ARF to evolve into a tightly organized regulatory

the ASC will develop in the coming years.

institution that creates mutually binding rules andSecond, one of the reasons for the slow pacing of

behavioral prescriptions. However, it could serve as a

ARF processes (and Asia-Pacific regional cooperation in“programmatic” forum leading to some joint or collabo-

general) is found in domestic politics, namely the insecu-

rative projects among the Asia-Pacific countries. Thererity of domestic political regimes in terms of the legiti-

are many functional areas such as law enforcement,

macy of political leadership. Many Asian countries areborder control, maritime safety and so forth where thefacing the challenge of a great transformation of political

ARF could enhance its collective activities.

regimes, from authoritarian to democratic ones.

6. Tentative Conclusion

The extent to which regional cooperation candevelop is likely to depend very heavily on the coherence and viability of the states and state structures

Existing alliances and the newly formed coalitions

within a given region. The absence of viable states (bothof the willing will continue to play important roles forin terms of effective state apparatus and mutually

security management in the region. At the same time,

accepted territorial boundaries) makes the process of

we need security institutions where all the countries inregion building difficult, if not impossible. States remain

the region participate on an equal footing. This is vitalthe essential building blocks on which regional coopera-

for us to enhance mutual confidence-building, especiallytive exercises are built.

given the rapidly changing political, economic and secu-

Furthermore, achieving common rules of conduct

rity outlooks. The role of the ARF as a regional security

and entering into reciprocal commitments and obliga-

institution is quite important in this regard.

tions need some degree of “like-mindedness” on the part

However, this does not mean that the ARF will beof the participating states concerned. Homogeneity ofable to act as one of the key regional institutions in thesocial organizations and values, and convergence ofcoming years without “reforms.” The basic foundations

political interests all make it easier to accept necessaryof the ARF are constantly being eroded. New develop-

levels of intrusive management, in terms of both stan-ments in the Asia-Pacific region will continue to castdard setting and regulation, as well as effective imple-

serious doubts on the viability of the ARF. If the ARF

mentation.

continues to maintain the existing modalities, the ARF

Again, in this regard, ASEAN’s introduction of the prin-

will be further marginalized.

ciple of democratic governance into the “ASEAN Concord

Of particular importance, as I mentioned above, theII” (to be reportedly adopted at the ASEAN Summit, Bali,

major powers’ relations have been constantly changing.

shortly) demonstrates a remarkable development.

A new security mechanism in Northeast Asia that

Third, in the meantime, the ARF should think about

includes all major powers may emerge after the settle-

the introduction of the principle of “coalitions of thement of the North Korean nuclear issue. If this happens,willing.” Asia-Pacific cooperation has to move towards

security gravity of the Asia-Pacific region will further

establishing regional arrangements that entail the impo-

shift towards Northeast Asia. Southeast Asia will form

sition of common rules of conduct and a set of legally

just a part of the expanded Northeast Asia’s security

binding reciprocal commitments and obligations.

system. In addition, fighting against terrorism has been

Achieving common rules of conduct and entering intocreating various security arrangements based upon thereciprocal commitments and obligations need someprinciple of the coalitions of the willing. Now is the timedegree of “like-mindedness” among the participating

for Japan and the ASEAN countries to enhance coopera-

governments.

tion to reactivate the ARF processes.

– 42 –

Reference

DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD II(BALI CONCORD II), 7–8 October 2003

The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Presidentof the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, thePrime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister ofthe Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam;
RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia
in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction
with the overall progress made in the region;
NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepeningof regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia;
CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as adynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member states andpeople as well as the need to further strengthen the Association’s guidelines in achieving a more
coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them;
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration(Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971),
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN
Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok,
1995);COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN cooperation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, theHanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN
Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA);CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive
national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security fromexternal interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;– 43 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference andconsensus in ASEAN cooperation;
REITERATING that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an effectivecode of conduct for relations among governments and peoples;
RECOGNIZING that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment
based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation and politicalsolidarity;
COGNIZANT of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member
countries to adopt “Prosper Thy Neighbour” policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy
and prosperity of the ASEAN region;
REITERATING the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable andthat contributes towards the pursuit of development;
REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding
cultural diversity and social harmony;

DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT:
1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political andsecurity cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closelyintertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability andshared prosperity in the region;
2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its
member states and among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security,
development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open,
dynamic and resilient;
3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member Countries
and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in anenvironment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony;
4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues
and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation
among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve tosettle long-standing disputes through peaceful means;– 44 –

Reference

5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of conduct
governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace andstability in the region;
6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political andsecurity cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace andstability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region;
7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy to realize an ASEAN Economic Community through a bold,
pragmatic and unified strategy;
8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process so as tofurther draw synergies through broader and deeper cooperation in various areas;
9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration arisingfrom its existing initiatives and those with partners, through enhanced trade and investment
links as well as through IAI process and the RIA;
10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common
regional identity;

DO HEREBY ADOPT:The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community:
A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC)
1. The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another andwith the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN
Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of
intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another andbound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.
2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries topursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account thestrong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects
in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a
joint foreign policy.

– 45 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member Countries shall
exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in theirinternal affairs.
4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decisionmaking, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of
the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.
5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressedregionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between
and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security
Community.
6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and theSEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution.
7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security
Community since it reflects ASEAN’s commitment to resolve all differences, disputes andconflicts peacefully.
8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and security inthe wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN’s determination to move forward at a pace
comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security
dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force.
9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively engaging
ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the region, and shallbuild on the ARF to facilitate consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and its friends andPartners on regional security matters.
10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms
within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter
terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shallwork to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the
primary driving force of the ARF.
11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the United Nations
as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peaceand security.

– 46 –

Reference

12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the
ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting,conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.
B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)
1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal of economic integration as
outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive
ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer
flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic
disparities in year 2020.
2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN
members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines.
3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production
base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply
chain. ASEAN’s strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and enhancing ASEAN’s
economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN
shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of
its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerateregional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled
labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including theimprovement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious andlegally binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of
the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall implement the recommendations of the HighLevel Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed.
4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening integration of
ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development cooperation in order to address
the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar and Viet Nam through IAI and RIA so that the benefits of ASEAN integration areshared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move forward in a unified manner.
5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity
building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic andfinancial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications
connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries– 47 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.
C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC)
1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020,
envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies.
2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, theCommunity shall foster cooperation in social development aimed at raising the standard ofliving of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the active involvementof all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities.
3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The development and enhancement of
human resources is a key strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socioeconomic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue
existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials,
talents, and skills development.
4. ASEAN shall further intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and support joint regional
actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the Community is enhanced
when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of ASEAN are assured ofadequate health care.
5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers,
artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN’s diverse cultural
heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people’s awareness of ASEAN.
6. The Community shall intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with population
growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary pollution as well as
disaster management in the region to enable individual members to fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit.
We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN Community
into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement this Declaration.
Done in Bali, Indonesia, on the Seventh Day of October in the Year Two Thousand and Three.
For Brunei Darussalam
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam– 48 –

Reference

For the Kingdom of Cambodia
SAMDECH HUN SEN
Prime Minister
For the Republic of Indonesia
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI
President
For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
BOUNNHANG VORACHITH
Prime Minister
For Malaysia
DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Prime Minister
For the Union of Myanmar
GENERAL KHIN NYUNT
Prime Minister
For the Republic of the Philippines
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President
For the Republic of Singapore
GOH CHOK TONG
Prime Minister
For the Kingdom of Thailand
DR. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA
Prime Minister
For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
PHAN VAN KHAI
Prime Minister– 49 –

Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi
ASEAN Business and Investment Summit

October 7, 2003
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:
Good morning!
Almost exactly one year ago, many lives were taken in a terrorist bomb attack here in Bali. I
would like once again to extend my condolences to the victims and their families. We must not bedaunted by terrorism, and it is of symbolic importance that many of the region’s heads of state andgovernment as well as business leaders have gathered here today to discuss the creation of our
future.
Last year, I proposed “act together and advance together” and “sincere and open partnership”
in the relationship between Japan and ASEAN. This statement is based on my conviction that weare at a stage where we should advance toward an even greater goal, building upon the ties which
Japan and ASEAN have enjoyed over the past 30 years or so.
This year has been designated ASEAN-Japan Exchange Year 2003, celebrating our long historyof friendship. Over 600 commemorative events and programs will have been held in Japan and
ASEAN countries. As the crowning event of this year of exchange, the Japan-ASEAN
Commemorative Summit will be held for the first time in the history of ASEAN. It will be held inTokyo at the end of the year. I hope that the Commemorative Summit will give broad guidelines
for the partnership between Japan and ASEAN in the 21st century.
I firmly believe that the aim of the Japan-ASEAN partnership is to transform the East Asian
region into an open community that “acts together and advances together” and shares greater
prosperity, peace, and trust. Japan and ASEAN should strengthen their cooperation as the engine
behind not just their own mutual prosperity but also the prosperity of the entire East Asian region.
East Asia is the world’s most promising growth center. ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea
are home to approximately one third of the world’s population and account for about one fifth ofboth the world’s nominal GDP and total trade volume. Nonetheless, compared to the dynamism inNorth America through NAFTA and Europe via the EU, the Asia region lags behind in terms ofregional cooperation and is not fully exercising its potential as a region.
In recent years, however, we have seen impressive developments in East Asian region,
including not only cooperation between Japan-ASEAN but also collaboration among ASEAN+3
and among Asian and Oceanian nations related to transnational issues, including piracy and illicit
drugs. In the financial world, institutional arrangements for the Chiang Mai Initiative and thedevelopment of Asian bond markets are being promoted to prevent recurrence of an Asian financial crisis. ASEAN itself is making efforts to enhance its integration and heighten its– 50 –

Referencecompetitiveness. Today as regional cooperation has started to develop, it is expected that all measures taken by this region will be promoted keeping in mind the overriding aim of creating an open
community that “acts together and advances together.”
What tasks should Japan and ASEAN address in order to achieve mutual prosperity and create
an East Asian community?
First, partnership on the economic front should be fortified. If the exchange of ideas and the
movement of people, goods, and funds are enhanced within the East Asian region with its great
potential, economic activities will be further stimulated, and the economy of scale will also takeeffect. Japan and ASEAN are becoming increasingly interdependent in terms of their economies.
Alongside the EU, ASEAN is Japan’s second largest trade partner, sharing over $110 billion intrade annually. Moreover, accumulated amount of direct investment from Japan to ASEAN exceeds$100 billion. As the nucleus of economic cooperation in the East Asian region, the economic partnership shared by Japan and ASEAN should serve as a model.
Based upon this idea, I proposed “The Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Partnership” last year. This initiative promotes not only the liberalization of investment and tradein goods and services, but also encourages advanced cooperation in a wide range of fields fromtourism to human resources development and small and medium-sized corporations. We strive not
only to achieve economic profit, but also to deepen our political and human ties and to increase thestrength of the entire region through friendly competition. The Japan-Singapore Economic
Partnership Agreement has already entered into force, and consultations are underway withThailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia with a goal toward creating similar bilateral
economic partnerships. Moreover, a basic agreement has been reached on the Japan-Viet Nam
Investment Agreement. Japan is working to create an economic partnership with ASEAN as awhole in fields for trade facilitation and cooperation as well as in areas for liberalization.
Secondly, the economic crisis made us keenly aware that East Asia needs strong economic
systems which would enjoy confidence of investors and consumers in the world. This means
enhancing the legal systems in the area of anti-monopoly issues so that rival companies cancompete on an equal footing. The protection of intellectual property rights must also be ensured sothat inventors whose profits are protected would have an increased desire to develop new technology. The transparency of the public procurement system also has to be secured in order toprevent corruption. The kinds of reforms required will differ from country to country; however,every country will need the determination to change systems if ill-suited to the current situation
though they used to function well. I am promoting reform in Japan in the belief that “without
structural reform there can be no rebirth for Japan.” At the same time, I am calling upon theJapanese people not to fear change but to take up the challenges presented by the new age. Bydeveloping its economic systems, ASEAN can continue to be an attractive investment destination
for foreign corporations. Japan and ASEAN can further prosper, I believe, sharing their experiences
and lessons.
The third issue is promoting economic development and rectifying the disparities in the
ASEAN region. Japan recognizes the importance of ASEAN’s maintaining its unity and developing
together. Japan has placed special emphasis on ASEAN countries in providing ODA to developing
countries in the world. Over the past decade, Japan has extended bilateral ODA to ASEAN countries in the amount of approximately $24 billion or about 30 percent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA.

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Japan will continue to emphasize ASEAN countries in its ODA activities.
At the same time, foreign direct investment assumes increasing importance for the economic
development of the ASEAN countries. Investment plays a significant role for developing countries
to achieve self-reliant prosperity. Thus, it is of utmost importance to improve investment environment. For example, the Mekong subregion development requires a new strategy that combines
various elements, including not only ODA, but also market integration, trade, and investment.
Moreover, following the good tradition of East Asia where countries that are at different levels of
economic development help and complement each other, Japan intends to support new membersof the ASEAN through its partnership with its more advanced members.
I would like to make one final remark. A sound political environment is indispensable to overcome the various issues I have just mentioned and expand trade and investment. The countries ofthis region should offer each other advice and assistance to resolve any difficulties they face in thepolitical realm. In this area as well, Japan will “act together and advance together” as a “sincere
and open partner.”
The world is changing and growing day after day. I am confident that future generations willview the various kinds of regional cooperation we are undertaking today as a history-making
endeavor to raise East Asia to a new stage. I am proud that Japan and ASEAN can play an activerole in these historic times. Japan is always prepared to provide cooperation and support for thefurther development of ASEAN countries. This basic stance of ours is unshakable. I strongly hopethat Japan and ASEAN will further deepen heart-to-heart understanding and continue to be truefriends who help with each other at any time, not only in fair weather, but in adverse circumstances as well.
Thank you for your kind attention.

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ASEAN-Japan Summit
Phnom Penh
5 November 2002

Joint Declaration of the Leaders of ASEAN and Japanon the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
WE, Heads of State/Government of Brunei Darussalam, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic ofIndonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Union of Myanmar, Republic of thePhilippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, andJapan, gathered today for the ASEAN-Japan Summit,
Recalling the Initiative proposed by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in January this year forJapan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership to strengthen broad-ranging economic partnership between Japan and ASEAN;
Inspired by the significant progress made in ASEAN-Japan relations which would be highlighted by
the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in 2003 to mark 30 years of ASEAN-Japan relations;Acknowledging that the economic partnership between ASEAN and Japan has been expanding
and cover a wide range of areas;
Recognizing that the rapid progress of regional economic integration in other parts of the world,
particularly in Europe and in North America, has been contributing to promote liberalization ofworld trade and stimulate dynamism in the region;

HEREBY DECLARE:
1. We underlined the desirability for this region to seek such economic integration through thecreation of economic partnerships and linkages.
2. We shared the view that such partnerships and linkages should be of a comparable nature toones achieved in other regions and completed as soon as possible.
3. We viewed that a comprehensive economic partnership between ASEAN and Japan would
provide greater market opportunities to their economies, through the creation of larger andnew markets and enabling the industries to enjoy bigger economies of scale, and that such partnership would bring about greater stability and prosperity to this region, nurturing a sense ofcommunity between ASEAN and Japan.
4. We recognized that, for the creation of economic partnerships and linkages of a leading nature– 53 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

between ASEAN and Japan, ASEAN and Japan should seek broad-based economic partnershipcovering not only liberalization of trade and investment but also trade and investment promotion and facilitation measures, including, but not limited to customs procedures, standards andconformance, non-tariff measures, and co-operation in other areas, such as financial services,
information and communications technology, science and technology, human resource development, small and medium enterprises, tourism, transport, energy and food security.
5. We endorsed the approach that, while considering a framework for the realization of aComprehensive Economic Partnership between Japan and ASEAN as a whole, any ASEAN
member country and Japan could initiate works to build up a bilateral economic partnership. We
welcomed the efforts made by our foreign and economic ministers on the ASEAN-Japan comprehensive economic partnership and commended the Expert Group on ASEAN-Japan Closer
Economic Partnership for their report. We also welcomed and encouraged initiatives by ministersof other portfolios, such as transport, to promote co-operation for such economic partnerships.
6. From the viewpoint of promoting the aforementioned approach, we expressed satisfaction withthe progress of consultations between ASEAN countries and Japan to explore bilateral
economic partnerships and agreed that such bilateral economic partnerships should seek todevelop and enhance the comprehensive economic partnership between ASEAN and Japan.
7. We recognized that the goal of such block building should be to strengthen current economic
partnership between Japan and ASEAN as a whole and, with this as a basis, to explore andbroaden such economic partnerships for the whole of East Asia.
8. We noted that the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership would expand tradeand boost growth between the two regions. By the year 2020, the export value from ASEAN to
Japan would increase by US$ 20,630 million, which would be equivalent to 44.2% of that in thebase year, 1997. The export value from Japan to ASEAN would increase by US$ 20,022 million,
which would be equivalent to 27.5%of that in the base year.
9. Based on these understandings, we decided that ASEAN and Japan develop a framework thatwould provide a basis for concrete plans and elements towards realising an ASEAN-Japan
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in accordance with such guiding principles as comprehensiveness of countries and sectors, reciprocity and mutual benefits.
10. We affirmed that special and differential treatment could be provided to developing countriesof ASEAN in accordance with WTO Agreements. Additional flexibility should also be accorded
to the new members of ASEAN.
11. We also decided that the implementation of measures for the realization of the partnership,including elements of a possible free trade area, should be completed as soon as possible within
10 years, taking into account the economic levels and sensitive sectors in each country.

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12. We confirmed that the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership should be consistent with the rules and disciplines of the WTO.
13. We recognized the feasibility and effectiveness of the building block approach. Therefore, theComprehensive Economic Partnership should begin in areas where implementation is feasible;
it could address areas that could be implemented on an accelerated basis to provide immediate
benefits to the parties, without leaving the liberalization aspect behind, such as:• Technical assistance and capacity building to ASEAN, particularly for the new members, so
as to improve their competitiveness to meaningfully participate in the partnership• Trade and investment promotion and facilitation measures• Trade policy dialogue• Business sector dialogue• Facilitation of mobility for business people• Any other measures delivering immediate mutual benefits.
14. Finally, we also decided on the establishment of a Committee, consisting of relevant senior officials of ASEAN and Japan responsible for sectors and scopes of comprehensive economic partnership and tasked this committee to consider and draft a framework for the realization of theComprehensive Economic Partnership and present its report to the Leaders Meeting in 2003.
We also instructed that the progress of the creation of bilateral economic partnerships should bereported to this Committee.
DONE in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on the 5th day of November, Two Thousand and Two, in two
copies in the English language.
For Brunei Darussalam
HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH
Sultan of Brunei Darussalam
For the Kingdom of Cambodia
HUN SEN
Prime Minister
For the Republic of Indonesia
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI
President
For Japan
JUNICHIRO KOIZUMIPrime Minister– 55 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
BOUNNHANG VORACHITH
Prime Minister
For Malaysia
MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD
Prime Minister
For the Union of Myanmar
SENIOR GENERAL THAN SHWE
Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council andPrime Minister
For the Republic of the Philippines
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President
For the Republic of Singapore
GOH CHOK TONG
Prime Minister
For the Kingdom of Thailand
LT. POL. COL. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA
Prime Minister
For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
PHAN VAN KHAI
Prime Minister– 56 –

Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi
Japan and ASEAN in East Asia
—A Sincere and Open Partnership—

January 14, 2002
SingaporeYour Excellency, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong,Your Excellency, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Defence Tony Tan,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am greatly honored to give this speech here in Singapore, the final stop on my schedule ofvisits to the countries of ASEAN.
Singapore is a remarkable nation with remarkable people. Bursting through the constraints ofsize and resources, Singapore through sheer energy and willpower has created a tremendous place
for itself in the world. Through its economic and diplomatic vitality, it contributes to the international community far in excess of what size alone would warrant. And so to the government andpeople of Singapore, let me express my admiration and respect for your achievements.
I am told that Singapore is called the “Lion City.” Maybe it has something to do with my hairstyle, but in Japan I am known as the “Lion Prime Minister.” Perhaps that is why I am so delighted
to be here in the Lion City.
Today I would like to speak about cooperation between Japan and ASEAN and my concept of
how this cooperation can contribute to all of East Asia.
Let me begin by defining what cooperation truly is. Cooperation is working in common
purpose with others in order to accomplish more. In the simplest terms, this is what I would like to
see Japan and ASEAN accomplish—more prosperity, more peace, more understanding, more trust.
This cooperation requires an exchange of ideas, opinions and people.
Exchanges between Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia have a long history. As early as
the 14th century, the Kingdom of the Ryukyu, which ruled the islands of Okinawa, traded withThailand. In the 16th century, the sea-borne trade in vermilion seals was active in the waters thatconnect East Asia, and a thousand Japanese lived in Ayuthaya, the Thai capital of the period.
One recent anecdote in particular demonstrates to me how fate has destined exchange between
Japan and Southeast Asia. In 1989, a child living on the southern Japanese island of Tanegashimaplaced a “letter of friendship” in a bottle and set it adrift in the sea. That very same bottle traversed
the seas that our ancestors had themselves traveled in trade—and ten years later in 1999 it washed
up on the shores of Malaysia. The Malaysian citizen who found the message invited the Japanese– 57 –JAPAN-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003

child to come to Malaysia, which resulted in both a real and a symbolic exchange.
Today, many kinds of bottles travel between Japan and Singapore—economic, political, diplomatic and cultural. At present, Japan’s pop culture has become a part of Singapore’s pop culture,and the young people of Singapore are teaching English to young Japanese people. In such ways
and many others, our mutual exchanges are passed to the younger generation.
The exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asia, of course, also include more formal and diplomatic exchanges. Twenty-five years ago in 1977, then-Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda made a speech in
Manila, citing “equal partnership” and “heart-to-heart understanding” between Japan and ASEAN.
Based on the fundamental concepts of the “Fukuda Speech,” Japan’s ASEAN policies have been
passed on from that time to each subsequent Cabinet. I, too, am eager to promote such policies.
In the quarter-century since the “Fukuda Speech,” the global situation has undergone tremendous change. In Southeast Asia, peace has progressed with the resolution of conflicts in Indochina,
resulting in the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries. Democratization and a market economy arealso progressing in Asia. The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan have joined the WTO.
Furthermore, as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States, we’ve seen a paradigm shift insecurity concepts, making patently clear the importance of working together for the sake of peaceand stability.
In the 21st century, the changes confronting Japan and ASEAN will be even more swift andmomentous. We must face such changes with unflinching resolve and courage. And we must facethem together.
Despite enduring difficult trials in the midst of economic globalization, despite living in different
stages of economic development, despite a diversity of backgrounds, all of the ASEAN countries
increasingly share the basic values of democracy and market economy. Efforts to harmonize theregion’s diverse histories, societies, cultures and religions have reaped a greater good for all.
I believe that Japan has made a contribution in strengthening the countries of ASEAN. True tothe old adage, “A friend in need is a friend indeed,” Japan at the time of Asia’s financial crisis
played a role in easing that crisis. We viewed the situation not just as your challenge but as ourown. I believe that Japan-ASEAN relations have reached a new level of maturity and understanding. In the 21st century, as sincere and open partners, Japan and ASEAN should strengthen
their cooperation under the basic concept of “acting together—advancing together.”So, what are the areas where we should focus our cooperation as we “act together—advance
together?”First, by undertaking reforms in our respective countries, we will advance individually andjointly toward increased prosperity.
During the mid-19th century, Japan underwent major reforms for modernization known as the
Meiji Restoration. At the end of World War II, Japan conducted major reforms based on democracy.
Now, in order to adapt to radical changes in the international community of the 21st century, I am
convinced that Japan must undergo a “third major reform.” Since my appointment as Prime
Minister, I have been tackling such reform under the banner of “structural reform without sanctuaries.” I know that no great reform is accomplished without pain and resistance. I also know thatthe countries of ASEAN are awaiting Japan’s structural reform and the subsequent return of a

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dynamic Japanese economy. I realize that when it comes to the global economy, rain does not fallon one roof alone.
The reason that the Japanese economy stagnated for such a long period in the 1990s is clear.
Japan’s previous success had made us complacent. Despite the significant changes taking place inthe global economy, Japan failed to respond by reforming its political and economic structures.
Information and communications technologies have rapidly created a single, unified global
market. Competition has become much more severe. To succeed under such conditions, a country
needs a free and efficient market that can be trusted by global investors and consumers alike. It
needs a strong and healthy financial market.
These challenges are as important for the countries of ASEAN as they are for Japan. The Asianfinancial crisis showed us that the ASEAN countries also required new economic structures.
Change is not easy for individuals or for countries. Someone once said that courage is the power tolet go of the familiar—and that is what we must do. As I mentioned a moment ago, reform will
inevitably be accompanied by pain, which eventually will be succeeded by sustainable prosperity.
Japan is ready to support ASEAN’s serious efforts of reform. Specifically, Japan offers its cooperation to improve legislation, administrative capabilities and nation-building measures. We offer
our help to improve the capabilities of each country to compete economically and to participate ina multilateral trading system based on the WTO. We also offer our cooperation in developing ahealthy financial system, which is to a country what the circulatory system is to the human body.
Japan will continue to cooperate in such areas as Mekong Subregion Development so that
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam may accelerate their economic development. It is also
important that we continue to cooperate in information and communications technology, which
contributes to the integration of ASEAN. Through the swift realization of an ASEAN Free Trade
Area and an ASEAN Investment Area, ASEAN should continue to be an attractive place of investment for Japanese companies. To this end, the promotion of supporting industries is also an important part of our cooperation.
The second point is to continue and strengthen our cooperation for the sake of stability.
Instability is not always elsewhere. Sometimes it is at home. Factors for instability are also in
the region. Japan for many years now has been the largest contributor of foreign aid in the world.
In Southeast Asia, Japan would like to actively cooperate in reducing poverty and preventing
conflicts, in such cases as Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor. In particular, by the spring of this year
Japan will dispatch a Self Defense Force Engineer Unit to Peace-Keeping Operations in East Timor.
In recent years, Japan has begun to fulfill its international obligations, such as peace-keeping
missions. We have dispatched Self Defence Forces to help in Cambodia, Mozambique, Zaire and
the Golan Heights. And, in cooperation with the countries of ASEAN, we intend to make an evenmore active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Regional
Forum has made steady progress in building confidence and trust on security matters. Now is thetime to aim for a higher degree of cooperation. Japan is eager to consider how together we candevelop this forum for the future.
Efforts towards democratization in Myanmar must also be accelerated, and this is an endeavorthat we fully support.
Together, Japan and ASEAN must also tackle a variety of transnational issues such as terrorism,
piracy, energy security, infectious diseases, the environment, narcotics and trafficking in people.

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These ancient and modern ills represent a major challenge to us all.
Japan-ASEAN cooperation must extend its reach globally. I believe we should increase ourcooperation on such issues as peace and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, measures fordisarmament and non-proliferation and reform of the United Nations. We have a role to play in theworld, and we should play it. In particular, I hope to see active participation on the part of thecountries of ASEAN at the Ministerial Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan tobe held in Tokyo on 21 and 22 January. In the recent past, the people of Southeast Asia havesuffered from war and violence; so they well understand the hardship that the people ofAfghanistan have endured for so many years.
A third area of cooperation between Japan and the countries of ASEAN relates to the future. I
would like to propose initiatives in five areas.
One, we must focus on education and human resources development, which form the foundation for national development. I would like to dispatch a governmental mission to ASEAN countries to promote exchange and cooperation between universities. Some Japanese universities havealready opened courses in English as well as Japanese language courses for students in ASEAN by
utilizing the Internet. Through such efforts I expect that university exchanges will develop. I
would also like to continue the training of information and communications technology engineers
in both Japan and ASEAN in order to enhance practical opportunities in the region. In addition, I
emphasize the importance of the institution building and capacity building in governance, as wellas the promotion of supporting industries.
Two, I propose that 2003 be designated as the Year of Japan-ASEAN Exchange. We shouldpresent a number of ideas to stimulate exchanges in all areas, including intellectual and cultural. I
also believe it would be useful to strengthen the network that links research institutions in Japanand ASEAN countries.
Three, I would like to propose an Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Partnership. Of course, we will cooperate in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations
under the WTO. At the same time, we must strengthen broad ranged economic partnership bystretching further than trade and investment—to such areas as science and technology, humanresource development and tourism. The Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age
Partnership, which was signed yesterday, is an example of such economic partnership. I would liketo see us generate concrete proposals for endorsement at the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting.
Four, in order to pursue development in a new era, I propose the convening of an Initiative forDevelopment in East Asia meeting. Based on East Asia’s development experiences to date, myhope is that such a meeting would provide an opportunity for us to reexamine where we are andto consider together future models for development—thus raising the standard of living for thepeoples of the region.
Five, I propose that Japan and ASEAN security cooperation, including transnational issues
such as terrorism, be drastically intensified. Now, more than ever, we realize that one’s own security is at stake when a neighbor’s wall is ablaze. I believe we need an agreement for regional cooperation on piracy, and I will promote consultation to achieve that end. We must band together toeradicate the plague of piracy. In addition, I would like to strengthen cooperation between the
Coast Guard of Japan and ASEAN counterparts. I also wish to promote regional cooperation in– 60 –

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strengthening energy security, in light of the gap between rapid increase of energy demand andlagging energy supply within Asia.
Finally, let me turn to how cooperation between Japan and ASEAN should be linked to cooperation with all of East Asia. I believe that East Asia’s whole can be greater than the sum of its parts.
Ladies and gentlemen, if you took a poll of the world’s economists and asked them what regionof the world they believe to have the greatest potential in the immediate future, I have no doubt of
their answer. They would say East Asia. By cooperating, I believe we can gain the critical mass toadvance this potential.
Our goal should be the creation of a “community that acts together and advances together.”
And we should achieve this through expanding East Asia cooperation founded upon the JapanASEAN relationship. While recognizing our historical, cultural, ethnic and traditional diversity, I
would like to see countries in the region become a group that works together in harmony. Our
pasts may be varied and divergent, but our futures can be united and supportive of each other. The
realization of such a group needs strategic considerations in order to produce positive consequences. And in order to contribute to global challenges, we must play a role in linking our region
to the world.
Certainly, such an objective cannot be achieved overnight.
The first step is to make the best use of the framework of ASEAN+3. We should promote cooperation on the broad range of areas that I have been discussing today, in order to secure prosperity
and stability in our region.
The deepening of Japan’s cooperation with China and the Republic of Korea will also be asignificant force in propelling this community. The Trilateral Meeting of the leaders of Japan, China
and the Republic of Korea set some wonderful precedents. I would like to highly praise the activerole China is willing to play in regional cooperation. With its wealth of human resources and hugeeconomic potential, China will surely make an enormous contribution to regional development. In
addition, I would like to express my respect for the Republic of Korea’s dynamic initiatives inpromoting regional cooperation. I can confirm that the three leaders of Japan, China and theRepublic of Korea are resolved to cooperate with each other; because we all know that our trilateral cooperation will make great contribution to prosperity of the region.
An important challenge is strengthening economic partnership in the region. The Initiativefor Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership that I mentioned earlier will be an
important platform for this purpose. I expect that the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and moves
toward economic partnership between ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand will makesimilar contributions.
If one considers the specific challenges to be tackled in the region, it is only natural that thesecountries will deepen their partnerships with each other.
Through this cooperation, I expect that the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic ofKorea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.
The community I am proposing should be by no means an exclusive entity. Indeed, practicalcooperation in the region would be founded on close partnership with those outside the region. In
particular, the role to be played by the United States is indispensable because of its contribution toregional security and the scale of its economic interdependence with the region. Japan will

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continue to enhance its alliance with the United States. Cooperation with Southwest Asia,
including India, is also of importance, as is cooperation with the Pacific nations through APEC, theAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group, and with Europe through ASEM, the Asia-Europe
Meeting. APEC and ASEM are important tools to link our region to other regions.
Through such efforts, the community I have described can take meaningful actions for regional
cooperation. I believe that this in turn will benefit global stability and prosperity.
Let me summarize by using an analogy. I am a great fan of opera. To me, the appeal of opera
lies in the fact that a myriad of singers and instruments, each possessed of different qualities ofvoice and sound, against the backdrop of a grand stage and beautiful costumes, come together in
one complete and impressive drama. The community that I have outlined today is exactly such acreation. As we “act together and advance together,” let us in concert compose a harmonious
community of many voices raised for the greater good.
As was the case with the “letter of friendship” sent in a bottle by the child from Tanegashima, I
sincerely hope that my words today will reach each of your hearts and prompt you to join me increating such a community in this region.
Thank you for inviting me, and thank you for your kind hospitality.

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