The Role and Responsibilities of the United Statesin the Korean War: Critical Foreign Policy Decisions
by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations
Doug Bandow
Cato Institute

ABSTRACTThe Korean War was not inevitable. Neither was its scope and impact.
Decisions by the U.S. government, and particularly the administration ofHarry S Truman, made both division and war likely on the Korean
peninsula. Had the U.S. reacted differently during the conflict, combat
would have ended much earlier or expanded more widely. As always,
hindsight clarifies. Some adverse consequences were more predictable
than others.
Policymakers operating in real time with limited
information will always face a difficult challenge. However, several
decisions surrounding the Korean War were based on a deeply flawed
understanding of the facts or an equally flawed prediction of theconsequences of particular actions. This article considers the merits often of the most consequential decisions made by U.S. policymakers
affecting the onset and course of the Korean War.

Keywords: Korean War, Truman Administration, Syngman Rhee, Mao
Zedong, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung, Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower,
Douglas MacArthur, Harry Truman, U.S. Foreign Policy, China, Soviet
Union, United States, Taiwan, John Muccio, armistice, Chiang Kai-shek,
Panmunjon, 38th Parallel, atomic bomb, Cold War, military budget,
Mutual Defense Treaty, prisoner repatriation, NSC 68

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Introduction
The responsibility for starting the Korean War remains most directlythat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) under Kim
Il-sung. The Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China (PRC) werecomplicit, having backed Kim’s offensive.
The South Korean
government of Syngman Rhee also played a role, having provoked
conflict and threatened war.1
Washington’s decisions helped create the volatile geopoliticalenvironment, determine the nature of the ensuing conflict, and define
American involvement. Had the Truman administration acted differently,
there would have been no divided peninsula and no war. Tragically, theU.S. “played a key role in the establishment of two separate governmentsin the Korean peninsula and ignored the potential for violence as well as
the threat of an imminent war.”2
The Korean War was small compared to the global conflagration
which preceded it by barely five years. But the former’s consequences
still were enormous. The human costs were high. The division between
the two Koreas deepened. The war drew the United States into apermanent role as the guarantor of East Asian security. The conflictcreated enduring hostility between Washington and the newly-created
PRC. And the war militarized U.S. foreign policy.
None of these consequences was inevitable. Rather, they were theresult of a series of decisions taken by policymakers looking through a
glass darkly. Had Washington made different decisions at a number ofkey points, the futures of both the American and Korean peoples would
have varied dramatically. This article considers ten decisions ofparticular import.
Decision 1: Disposing of the Korean Peninsula at the End of WorldWar II
Despite the efforts of émigrés like Syngman Rhee, who traveled toAmerica for schooling and remained to organize politically, Washington
paid little attention to the plight of Korea as a Japanese colony. Thencame the Second World War. As Japan’s collapse approachedpolicymakers in Washington finally became concerned about thedisposition of Korea—though, in one famous story, Secretary of State
Edward Stettinius, Jr. had to request a map to locate the nation.
At Yalta in February 1945 Washington and Moscow agreed to afour-power trusteeship for the peninsula, but left the details undecided.

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The U.S. was not prepared for Stalin's declaration of war against Japan,
and, with Soviet troops racing for the peninsula, the U.S. requested that
Moscow halt at the arbitrarily chosen 38th parallel. The two war-timeallies agreed to establish a provisional government under a five-year
trusteeship, with independence to follow.
The U.S.-Soviet partnership quickly broke down in Korea as well as
Europe. After all, “the Americans and Soviets had mutually exclusive
definitions of an acceptable political profile for a Korean government.”3
Plans for peninsula-wide administration and elections went unfulfilled asboth superpowers proceeded to create client states in their own image.4
The USSR promoted communist and anti-Japanese guerrilla Kim Il Sung,
while the U.S. relied on conservative nationalists, like Rhee (though he
was not initially America's preferred candidate), to the exclusion of local
leftish leaders.
Observed historian Richard Whelan: “The United States was notwrong in wanting to prevent Korea from becoming a Soviet satellite.
But if that aim was really so important, then the Americans were foolishindeed to postpone action until the very last minute and to approach theissue in such a confused and haphazard manner—a manner that could
hardly have more effectively antagonized both the Koreans and theRussians if it had been explicitly designed to do so.”5 Tragically, theresult was two Koreas, a bitter conflict, and a more intense Cold War.
The U.S. and its allies were bound to require Japan to surrender any
lands conquered as a result of Japanese aggression, starting from the war
against China. However, the Korean peninsula had a different status.
Since Korea had not been acquired as the result of recent aggression,
the Truman administration could have formally left Korea underJapanese administration even as the U.S. occupied Japan. The reasonsfor not doing so were obvious. It would have been morally offensive tokeep people subjugated by a discredited empire guilty of wartime
brutality. Japanese control could only have been maintained bypreserving a Japanese military presence or enforcing Japanese rulethrough an American occupation.
Washington instead pressed the Soviets to divide the peninsula
despite possessing little knowledge of Korea, having no plans for the
territory, and being unwilling to adequately see to either the land’spolitical development or its military security. There were at least threealternatives.

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One would have been to leave the peninsula to the USSR. In fact,
Washington may have only narrowly avoided this outcome. Had Japannot surrendered in early August, Soviet involvement in the Asia-Pacific
war would have been both more substantial and long-lived. Moscow
then might have insisted on occupying the entire Korean peninsula,
especially if the Truman administration had refused to provide theSoviets with an occupation zone in Japan.
Had the U.S. eschewed involvement on the peninsula, Washington
would have reduced both a manpower and financial burden at a time of a
rapidly shrinking military. The U.S. also would have avoided its central
role in a civil war that turned into an enduring regional conflict, leading
to three years of a very hot war and decades of policing a cold peace that
endured even after the end of the Cold War. Equally important, there
would have been no trigger—in June 1950, at least—for the virulent
hostility between Beijing and Washington (later promoted by Stalin) andthe militarization of the Cold War. Finally, the U.S. would have lost no
credibility since none was at stake in Korea until Washington chose to
get involved.
On the negative side, the U.S. would have suffered a slightgeopolitical disadvantage, losing this foothold on the Asian mainland.
However, until June 1950 the Truman administration treated South
Korea as at most a marginal security interest.
In September 1947, as the Cold War was deepening, the Joint Chiefsof Staff declared that the Korean peninsula was strategically unimportant.
They advocated a withdrawal of U.S. forces, carried out in 1949, since“from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little
strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.”6
Prior to the invasion Gen. Douglas MacArthur maintained that the U.S.
needn't defend the ROK. 7 The Pentagon acknowledged that such adrawdown meant that Soviet domination of the South would "have to be
accepted as a probability."8 In his famous speech to the National Press
Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded theROK, along with the rest of the Asian mainland, from America's
strategic "defense perimeter," though he later denied that he had meantthat Korea would not be defended.9 And the Joint Chiefs considered a
withdrawal from Korea after China’s entry into the war since “they still
considered the peninsula a strategic backwater and thought it more
important to preserve American ground forces for the defense of Japanand Western Europe.”1074International Journal of Korean Studies  Fall 2010

Moreover, the U.S. could have sought a geopolitical trade with
Moscow elsewhere in Asia or even in Europe. Leave the Korean
peninsula under Soviet control in return for concessions elsewhere. Suchan approach looks unduly cynical today, but the post-war era was awash
in similar deal-making.
The principal losers would have been the residents of the South, who
would have ended up under a Stalinist tyranny for decades. Yet evenhere the balance is complicated: no division would have meant brutal
repression but at least no conflict, saving millions of lives and sparing
Koreans south and north the horrors of three years of war.
An alternative to Soviet control would have been to have turned
Korea over to the oversight by the Chinese Nationalist government.
History and geography offered some support for this choice. However,this disposition would not likely have been accepted by the Soviets or
satisfied Korean independence activists.
And the incompetent,
authoritarian Chinese Nationalists, soon to be ousted in their own civil
war, could not have been trusted to establish an effective government or
defend the peninsula. Moreover, we now know that such a decision
would have soon left Korea under Communist occupation, only by the
PRC rather than the Soviet Union.
Lastly, the Truman administration could have proposed immediate
independence as desired by most Koreans, perhaps overseen by someform of United Nations trusteeship. In principle, this would have been
the best option. However, it would have been difficult for the Koreans tocreate a new state out of the old Japanese colonial structure. A civil war
likely would have started almost immediately, with Communists battling
nationalists: Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee would simply have staged
an intra- rather than inter-state conflict. Nor is there much reason toassume that the Soviet Union and China (whether under Nationalists or
Communists) would have eschewed the temptation to meddle in Koreanpolitics. On the other hand, even under U.S. direction and protection
democracy took more than four decades to fully develop in the South.
Washington’s decision to push for an occupation zone ultimately
redounded to the benefit of Koreans, at least those living in the Republicof Korea today. But the costs of division, a very hot conflict, and theensuing Cold War were, and remain, high for all parties. The U.S.
should not have taken on responsibility for the peninsula at the end ofWorld War II if it was not willing to invest the resources necessary tocreate and protect an effective government under its control.

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Decision 2: Establishing a Government in the Occupation Zone
Having established a presence on the Korean peninsula on a largely
ad hoc basis, the Truman administration found itself ill-prepared fornation building in a place and at a time when even the most sophisticatedstrategy would have had no guarantee of success. Unfortunately, thegovernment created under American control contributed to the comingwar.
The U.S. came to back Syngman Rhee, who returned to Korea on an
American aircraft with Washington’s somewhat mixed blessing.11 His
denunciations of the Soviets caused the occupation officials to lookelsewhere for leadership. However, Rhee triumphed in the convoluted
political process.
Historians disagree over Washington’s exact
responsibility for his success, but tolerating him was in some sense thepath of least resistance.
James Irving Matray argued that
“Administration officials, at least in Washington, honestly attempted toprevent a political triumph for Rhee during the first two years of theoccupation.”12 Still, the resistance probably was not as firm as it was
towards politicians of the left. After all, during this period Washington
accepted the necessity of underwriting authoritarian regimes throughout
the Third World.
Accepting Rhee, however reluctantly, had several notable downsides.
No small matter was the moral repugnance of backing in the name of
democracy someone prone to jail his opponents. Wrote Fred Inglis:“Ruthless is a word we tend to reserve for the enemy. In Korea it appliedeven-handedly.”13 Rhee’s government proved to be a poor partner for the
U.S. Of limited legitimacy, it generated substantial domestic opposition,
increasing its vulnerability to subversion and war. Worse, Rhee could
not be trusted with a military. His leadership was marked by aggressive
rhetoric and action. U.S. Ambassador John Muccio admitted: “if wegave Rhee and his cohorts what they wanted, they could have started tomove north the same as the north moved south.”14 Seoul could not evenbe provided with the weapons necessary to defend itself from the Sovietbacked North. In this way the Truman administration set up thecircumstances leading to the North Korean invasion.15
Nor was Rhee a cooperative wartime partner. He steadfastly resisted
ending the war on any terms other than allied victory, meaning a united
Korea under his leadership, even attempting to sabotage the armisticenegotiations. Rhee required the promise of extended security aid before
he acquiesced to ending hostilities.

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None of this is to diminish Rhee’s accomplishments. He was more
successful than other Third World despots reliant on Western support increating a new state. South Vietnam’s disastrous revolving door
government comes to mind. Nevertheless, the outcome was less thansatisfactory for the U.S.
Washington should have considered alternative occupation strategies.
One would have been to anoint someone else as America’s preferredleader. Alas, it is easier to imagine a liberal, popular, competent,cooperative, and decisive strongman than to find one. 16 Washington
might have lucked out, but maybe not. More attractive in principle
would have been to promote a freer and more open political transition.
Still, the results would not necessarily have been different, since Rhee
was not without popular support. Anyway, American military officers
were ill-equipped to govern a distant land with an ancient history about
which they knew very little, especially given the “confusion, controversy,
factional rivalry, personal opportunism, and out-and-out hatred”
confronting them. 17 And Matray warned against the tendency to“overestimate the power of the United States to determine events in
Korea.”18
However, with slightly enhanced ruthlessness, American officials
might have defenestrated Rhee when his failings clearly undermined
American policy. In fact, U.S. officials discussed not returning him to
power after American forces pushed the North Korean forces
northward.19 The Eisenhower administration was equally serious about
staging a coup against him (“Operation Everready”) if he refused toaccept an armistice.20 Much conflict might have been avoided had the
U.S. acted against Rhee even earlier.
All of these alternatives had their own problems, but they probably
would not have turned out worse than accepting Rhee. Tolerating an
incipient dictator who could not be trusted with his own nation’s defense
had tragic consequences for the people of South Korea and America.
Decision 3: Defending the Republic of Korea
Setting up a new nation in a bad neighborhood is one thing.
Defending it is another. Unfortunately, the Truman administration did
the former but not the latter.

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The evolution of administration security policy on the peninsula
further reflected the same lack of foresight as when Washington
proposed to share in occupation duties. Perhaps the U.S. government
could be forgiven for initially hoping for speedy reunification achieved
with Soviet cooperation. But that prospect quickly disappeared. Insteadof promoting stability, "The ultimate result of great power rivalry,
therefore, was to institutionalize the civil war in two contending states,
both committed to the cause of unification.”21
The two countries
settled into a near war, with frequent cross-border raids and military
clashes. Yet despite a North Korean military build-up, the Pentagon
resisted proposals to increase military assistance to Rhee. In particular,
Washington refused to equip the ROK's military with aircraft (either
bombers or fighters), tanks, and other heavy equipment, and to limit
ammunition stocks. Some in Washington simply overestimated the
ROK's military readiness. More important was the certitude that Rheewould, if able, make good on his repeated threat to retake the "lostterritories" in the North. Observed James Matray: "Once Rhee had
sufficient military power, there could be little doubt that he would
attempt forcible reunification."22
Still, the Truman administration went even further than this rationale
would suggest.
Noted Richard Thornton, who believes theadministration deliberately set up Rhee: “of course, anti-tank guns, antitank mines, anti-aircraft guns, and coastal patrol craft could not provide
the basis for an invasion of the North. They could only be employed indefense. Yet they were pointedly not provided.”23 Thus, when war came
the North possessed a decided military edge. One need not believe
Thornton’s conspiratorial theory to agree that the administration did little“to deter an attack. Indeed, from its actions and inaction in 1950,
Washington invited one.”24
Nevertheless, the U.S. withdrew its last military forces from theSouth in July 1949. Although Pentagon defense planners recognized that
there was a risk of the North invading the South, they did not intend tounilaterally commit U.S. troops in the event of war.25 Washington both
doubted Korea's importance and the Rhee regime’s longevity; theadministration preferred not to waste resources on the South's military.
Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the South was "of little
strategic value to the United States" and that any commitment "ofmilitary force in Korea would be ill-advised."2678International Journal of Korean Studies  Fall 2010

Acheson’s famous speech communicated this message to thecommunist states, whatever his intent. Even after the U.S. entered thewar, the Joint Chiefs advocated minimizing America’s commitment
should a broader war with the Soviet Union occur, since “it would be
militarily unsound for the United States to commit large forces against
the USSR in an area of slight strategic importance.”27
James Matray put the best face possible on Truman administration
policy, contending that “Truman did not intend to shirk American
responsibilities in Korea. His strategy envisioned instead the emergenceof an economically strong and politically stable South Korea that would
permit the United States to withdraw safely and without surrendering theentire peninsula to Soviet domination.”28 But even if true, this strategy
manifestly failed. And the administration had no alternative policy toprevent precisely that domination. It made no sense to invest resources
to create the Republic of Korea without adopting policies to ensure its
survival, whether by building up its own military, offering a U.S.
security guarantee, maintaining an American garrison, or somecombination of the three.
For good reason Kim Il-sung believed military victory was likely andJoseph Stalin and Mao Zedong believed Washington was unlikely tointervene. Of course, Kim might have chosen to attack anyway.
However, what we know of the decision-making process leading to thewar—unfortunately, North Korea’s archives remain closed—suggeststhat had Stalin and Mao thought the U.S. likely to intervene Kim would
not have attacked, and especially with Soviet and Chinese backing, atleast in June 1950. 29 So obvious was the deleterious impact of U.S.
policy that some American officials actually predicted that the Northwould invade and when.30
Once Washington committed itself to occupation duty in Korea, it
should have committed itself to ensure the security of the state that it
established. If the Truman administration was not willing to do the latter,it should not have entered Korea in the first place.
Decision 4: Going to War to Stop North Korea
The North Korean invasion and South Korean collapse left Truman
administration policy in Asia in tatters. However, Washington faced
more political embarrassment than the nation faced a security threat.
The invasion did not directly threaten the U.S. As noted earlier, theDepartment of Defense and military commanders including Gen.

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MacArthur viewed the Korean peninsula as of only modest strategic
value.
The North’s invasion was unlikely to significantly impact other,more important, regional concerns. China already had been “lost” andno amount of wishing in Washington was going to restore Chiang Kaishek to power. The Nationalists were only tenuously clinging to Taiwan
even before Kim’s invasion and the administration had effectively
written them off.
Japan was far more critical than Korea and remained safe under
American occupation—the San Francisco peace treaty would not besigned for more than a year. No “domino” effect seemed likely
elsewhere in East Asia: the Philippines and allied colonial possessions
all were distant from the conflict. The intangible morale of America’s
allies might have fallen, but the U.S. had not promised to defend theROK, so Washington’s credibility was not directly at stake. Thus, its
failure to defend Korea was no predictor of America’s willingness to act
if other nations were threatened.
However, an administration under attack for losing China andotherwise failing to confront Communism could not easily ignore thecrisis on the Korean peninsula. While no popular groundswell for war
was likely, the “loss” of South Korea would become one more
Republican talking point against President Truman and the Democrats.
Moreover, the administration committed a basic error. As historian
Glenn Paige explained, "the President and his advisers had no doubt
whatever that the North Korean invasion had been inspired andcontrolled by the Soviet Union." 31 Beatrice Heuser similarly said:“Suspicions about Soviet intentions were among the reasons preventing
the Western Powers from seeing the Korean War as a civil war. They
saw it as a war ordered by Stalin, and fitting in with the expansionist
masterplan of the Kremlin.”32
Thus, Washington policymakers worried about an expanded war ifthey failed to act. John Foster Dulles said that “to sit by while Korea isoverrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of
events leading most probably to world war.” 33 Truman was explicit
about his reasoning: “Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years
earlier.…. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third
world war.”34

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However, the invasion was not a Soviet project. The attack was Kim
Il-sung's idea and he initiated the war, though he acted with the supportof the USSR and China. There is no evidence that Joseph Stalin, acautious predator wary of confrontation with the U.S., was prepared toinaugurate global war as a follow-up to a successful invasion of Korea.
It was one thing to encourage an ally to grab a weak American client
state seemingly abandoned by Washington. It was quite another thing tocontemplate war over lands that the U.S. had recently fought to protectfrom German or Japanese tyranny. Omar Bradley, who joined theconsensus at the time and said it was necessary to “draw the line
somewhere,” recanted this view later in life, admitting that many
officials incorrectly presumed the Soviets were behind every adverse
Communist move internationally.35
With no overriding security interest at stake, Washington might have
tried alternatives short of full-scale participation in the war. Some top
military officials proposed relying on air and naval support. At least one
analyst believes that provision of previously denied anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons could have halted the North Korean attack. 36 Other
ideas included bringing the matter to the United Nations, a U.S. blockadeof the DPRK, UN-approved economic sanctions, and the rescue andretrofit of South Korean military units in Japan. Unfortunately, none ofthese steps seem likely to have halted Kim’s offensive once begun orotherwise prevented the North’s conquest of the peninsula.
The strongest argument for acting was perception. Richard Whelan
explained: “American intervention in Korea was primarily symbolic in
intention; it was meant to demonstrate to the world America’s
willingness and ability aid friends and allies in their struggle to resist
Soviet domination. It was a matter of credibility and prestige.”37 Yet the
U.S., having withdrawn, left no combat troops, and provided no security
guarantee, had limited its commitment to Korea. As noted earlier, failingto act there had little implications for Europe or Japan. Credibility is atgreatest risk when directly engaged. The Truman administration had
consciously limited its potential loss in this regard.
Perhaps
Washington’s willingness to expend so much effort on a peripheral (or“slight,” according to the JCS) strategic interest without any treaty
commitment acted to deter Soviet adventurism elsewhere. 38 But
evidence of a Soviet intent to attack other Western nations remains inshort supply.

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Thus, having earlier decided that the Republic of Korea was not
worth arming or garrisoning, the Truman administration should haveconcluded that the ROK was not worth defending in June 1950. On a
strategic basis, the Korean War was a costly mistake. Having refused todefend the South when it would have been easy to do so, it made nosense to act when it was difficult to do so.
The best case for American intervention was Washington’s own
culpability in setting the circumstances that led to conflict. This
provided a moral rather than security rationale for entering the war. The
Truman administration arguably had a responsibility to retrieve thesituation—for the South Korean people if not their government.
Whether the American people were obliged to pay the resulting price isless obvious.
Decision 5: Liberating the North
Had the war concluded on October 1, 1950, when the allied forces
regained the 38th parallel, the most long-lasting consequences of theconflict—including the extraordinary destruction wrought throughout thepeninsula, horrific casualties among all combatants, enduring enmity
between Beijing and Washington, and deepening of the Cold War acrossthe globe—would have been mitigated to varying degrees. The war
would have lasted a little more than three months rather than a little morethan three years.
The conflict likely would have effectively ended at this point had theallies merely restored the status quo ante. Kim Il-sung would havelacked the capacity to renew the war, especially against South Korean
forces augmented by America. The Chinese likely would not haveintervened.
In short, the march north was a disastrous mistake. Today a critic
calls the vision of liberation after North Korea’s military collapse
quixotic. 39 Still, there was a reason for the apparent blindness of
Washington policymakers. The opportunity to liberate the North
appeared to be a God-send. The many benefits of reunifying thepeninsula and “rolling back” communism were obvious.
Still, there were voices in Washington warning of the dangers ofChinese and Soviet intervention.40 Even the National Security Council
recognized the risk of triggering a world war if the U.S. attempted toforcibly reunify the peninsula: “If the present United Nations action in
Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of82

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general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in
our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to thisconclusion.”41
And China provided a number of signs that it would not countenance
American forces on its border. For instance, Premier Chou En-lai
summoned Indian Ambassador Kavalam Panikkar (without diplomatic
relations, Washington and Beijing had no means of direct contact) to a
famous midnight interview to issue a warning. American intelligence
officers also were aware of an ongoing Chinese military build-up in
nearby Manchuria.
Unfortunately, the Truman administration treated the PRC threats asa bluff. Washington publicly offered Beijing assurances of its good will
and officials had trouble imagining that the Chinese would see any threat
against the PRC where none existed. The American military’s actions
spoke louder than any words, however. 42 U.S. officials assumed that
China’s leaders would be focused on domestic problems, but an
American military triumph on the PRC’s border could create domestic
political problems for Beijing.43
The allies could have stopped at the 38th parallel. Still, Washington
had three legitimate objectives beyond simply restoring the ROK:
punish the aggressor, reduce the aggressor’s opportunity for futuremischief, and liberate as many people as possible from the aggressor’s
control.
Thus, the administration should have considered two alternatives.
The first would have been to only use South Korean troops north of the
38th parallel, along with a promise to withdraw American forces from thepeninsula once peace was restored. Zhou’s warning to Panikkar
indicated that the PRC would not intervene if only the ROK military
moved north. 44 Whether the PRC viewed this position as a final
resolution or the opening bid in a future negotiation, such a strategy
offered the possibility of a peaceful settlement. Second, the allied forces
could have halted on a line drawn across the peninsula’s narrow necknorth of the 38th parallel, perhaps between Pyongyang and Wonsan. Max
Hastings argues, “The Chinese undoubtedly went into Korea with thelimited objective of driving back the Americans to a respectable distancefrom the Yalu.”45 In fact, it appears that Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai,
the commander of the “Chinese People’s Volunteers,” originally“devised a plan to hold a line north of Pyongyang, rather than trying topush the Americans completely out of North Korea,” to be followed byInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XIV, No. 2

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negotiations over a final border settlement.46 Moreover, after the Soviet
Union withdrew its offer of direct air support, the Chinese leadershipdiscussed establishing defensive lines north of Pyongyang and Wonsan,
which could be used as a base for future offensive operations.47
A voluntary halt north of the 38th parallel would have mimicked
these plans, addressing, though perhaps not fully satisfying, the PRC’s
major security concerns. Relying on only South Korean soldiers in the
North could have further eased Chinese concerns.48
Finally, Washington could have added assurances that the U.S. had
no intention of opening hostilities against the new regime in Beijing andreaffirmed the administration’s earlier decision not to intervene on
Chiang Kai-shek’s behalf.
The latter assurance would have been
particularly important. The Truman administration had for a time
pursued a strategy designed to woo the PRC away from the Soviet
Union.49 When President Truman reversed himself to insert the Seventh
Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, he acted “without paying much attention to
how the Chinese Communists might react.”50 Yet the Chinese leadershiptied together American policies throughout East Asia as evidence of“aggressive” and “predatory” behavior.51
Beijing might still have viewed the allied position as unduly
threatening. Mao in particular might have been reluctant to back down.
Historian Shu Guang Zhang writes: “it now seems arguable that
Beijing’s decision to intervene, though catalyzed by the breach of the
38th parallel, was no less significantly shaped by Mao’s optimistic
willingness to confront the U.S. in Korea.”52 Obviously, the PRC was anindependent actor that could have maintained the same course
irrespective of Washington’s actions.
Nevertheless, had the allies halted short of the Yalu, Mao and hiscolleagues, many of whom were uneasy about confronting America,
would have been forced to rethink their decision. In fact, Stalin’s
retraction of his offer of Soviet air support caused Mao to suspend troop
movements until the Politburo could reconsider its decision.53 An allied
military halt would have been an even greater change in circumstances.
Nor did Beijing rush events on the battlefield. Pyongyang fell to U.S.
forces on October 19th, but China did not actually launch its first, limited
offensive until late in the month against allied forces which had
advanced much closer to the Chinese border. Even then, the PRC backed
away, seemingly giving the allies time to retreat.

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Certainly the march to the Yalu was a mistake. But there werealternatives to stopping at the 38th parallel. The latter strategy would nothave been without risk, but the benefits of even partial liberation of
North Korea would have been worth the risk.
Decision 6: Fighting a Limited War Over Korea
In Korea the U.S. consciously fought a limited war. Most obvious
was the refusal to take the conflict into China even after the PRC became
America’s primary adversary. Washington also eschewed use of atomic
weapons, in contrast to World War II. Moreover, as the battle line acrossthe peninsula stabilized in mid-1950 Washington changed its objectivefrom victory to a draw.
Limiting both objectives and means was controversial at the time.
General MacArthur was perhaps the most important advocate of taking
the war to China, which ultimately led to his firing. But MacArthur’sviews were not uncommon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a naval
blockade, lifting restrictions on Nationalist Chinese operations against
the mainland, and covert assistance to guerrillas on the mainland. Other
proposals included attacking air bases, mining rivers, and destroying
ports and railways, all in China.54 General Mark Clark even proposed a
massive escalation, including the use of Chinese Nationalist troops andatomic bombs, to break the deadlocked negotiations over an armistice.
Many Truman administration officials contemplated a more limited
escalation for the same purpose. So did incoming President Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
This was what Washington policymakers believed was necessary toforce a draw. Presumably more would have been necessary to “win.”
MacArthur advocated a sustained nuclear assault on Manchuria andcreation of a “belt of radioactive cobalt” to interdict reinforcement andresupply of Chinese forces in Korea.55 A blockade of the Chinese coastand strategic bombing of Chinese targets, including with atomic weapons,would have been other options.
The armistice disappointed almost everyone. After three years of
horrific conflict, significant casualties, and enormous destruction, theparties all ended up roughly where they began. The Korean War settled
nothing.
Should the U.S. have tried for more? Washington almost certainly
would have lost its allies on the way to a fiercer and bigger war. When
President Truman suggested his willingness to use nuclear weapons,

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tremors shook Europe.56 British Prime Minister Clement Atlee hurried to
Washington “principally to dissuade any use of the atomic bomb in
Korea without ‘formal agreement’ with the U.K., to discourage othermeasures leading to general war with Red China, and to urge that
Washington accept a negotiated cease-fire in Korea even if Peking’s
price included a seat in the UN and withdrawal of UN forces from Korea,
Formosa, and Indochina.”57
The U.S. also would have risked a clash with the Soviet Union,
which had signed an alliance with China. Moscow so far had proved
reluctant to formally enter the war. For a time Stalin rejected Kim’s
proposed invasion out of fear of a confrontation with America. 58 He
refused to send troops when asked by Kim Il-sung.59 The USSR also
would not openly enter the conflict alongside Beijing.60 U.S. officials
considered the possibility of Soviet entry into the war, but generally
dismissed the likelihood, though their assessment varied some overtime.61
However, Moscow’s caution would have been increasingly tested themore America escalated. When the newly-inaugurated Eisenhoweradministration considered using nuclear weapons and attempting todestroy the Chinese air force, even the Joint Chiefs “thought it necessary
to stress that expansion might involve the United States in a larger,
longer, and more costly war with the PRC and could lead to an Asian
war with the Soviet Union or, worse still, spark the outbreak of WorldWar III.”62
Although it is impossible to know what Stalin would have done in
response to a wide array of possible U.S. attacks on China, he could haveincreased military aid and covert military support. Moreover, Moscow
would have had a powerful incentive to accelerate its own armament
program. Perhaps Stalin would have applied increased military pressurein Europe—another move on Berlin, an assault on Yugoslavia, increased
destabilization of Greece. Moscow might have considered transferring
atomic technology or weapons to the PRC. At some point, perhaps if
Stalin perceived the survival of Chinese Communism at stake, the USSR
might have more directly confronted America.
Assume Washington was able to hold together its alliance and theSoviet Union refrained from turning the Korean War into a global
conflagration. Would China then have yielded?
In the abstract, China would not seem to profit enough frompreserving North Korea to risk all-out war with nuclear-armed America.

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However, Beijing entered the war for what were defensive reasons in its
view. The more extensive the force deployed by Washington, the moredangerous China likely would perceive the threat from America. Afterall, why would Washington go to such trouble to merely unify the
Korean nation?
Thus, Beijing likely would have responded to escalation withescalation. The Chinese Communist Party demonstrated a high “painthreshold” during its years of struggle with the Nationalists. High
Chinese casualties after Beijing’s initial military successes against allied
forces did not dissuade Beijing from reinforcing its forces and launching
new offensives. At some point the PRC leadership presumably would
have yielded. But no one, especially in Washington, had any idea atwhat point.
In any case, the U.S. had too little to gain even if it won to warrant
this course. The war was never going to be over large geopolitical issues.
As mentioned earlier, the Joint Chiefs considered withdrawal from Korea
after the Chinese invasion. They were not certain that the stakes were
worth confronting China, given real world resource constraints.
Had Washington achieved “victory” in the sense of ending the war
on the Yalu, the war would have only marginally advanced Americaninterests. (The outcome obviously mattered much more to the Korean
people.) Eliminating North Korea would have done little to reduce
America’s Cold War defensive burden in East Asia, since the U.S.
almost certainly would have needed to maintain a troop presence toprotect a united ROK from China. The latter could have been expected
to host a government-in-exile claiming to speak for the Korean people,
underwrite a continuing campaign of subversion against a still unpopular
Rhee government, and prepare to reverse the war’s outcome if possible.
Moreover, victory in Korea would not have changed the perceived
threat to America posed by the Soviet Union or PRC. To the contrary,escalating war to the Chinese homeland likely would have frightened
both Communist powers, further militarizing the Cold War. The bond
between to two Communist behemoths probably would have beenstrengthened. A large-scale conflict with substantial U.S. bombing of themainland would have made the 1970s rapprochement between
Washington and Beijing and ongoing liberalization in the PRC far lesslikely.

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Decision 7: Fighting the War Only Over Korea
Although the struggle between President Truman and General
MacArthur was formally over strategy in the Korean War, the subtext
was a battle over whether the war should morph into the Chinese War.
After all, Gen. MacArthur’s proposal to “unleash” Chiang Kai-shek—
which presumed levels of military competence and popular appeal that
the Nationalist government did not exhibit—made little sense in thecontext of the Korean peninsula. The real issue was reclaiming themainland from the Communists.
Overthrowing the PRC offered a much better argument for escalation
than did eliminating Kim Il-sung’s small if aggressive Korean state. The
benefits of success would have been significant—liberating the world’s
most populous nation and reversing a dangerous advance of an assertive
totalitarian ideology. However, making the war over China rather than
Korea would substantially raise the stakes for both the PRC and Soviet
Union. For the Chinese leadership, which would equate its survival withnational survival, the means would become unlimited. The PRC was
economically backward, but likely would have launched a total
mobilization effort.
Moreover, Stalin certainly would have done much more to defend
China had he perceived Washington’s objective to be the overthrow of
the PRC rather than of the DPRK. Indeed, the one consistent “but”
articulated by American policymakers who concluded that Moscow
would not risk war with the U.S. was that “it understood clearly that we
had no intention of attempting to overthrow the Chinese Communist
regime by force.”63 Take away that condition, and all bets would be off.
Even if the Soviets stayed out, America’s chances of success looked
dim. The incoming Eisenhower administration could rattle sabers—
talking about using nuclear weapons and removing restrictions on
nationalist Chinese military operations—in order to push Beijing to
finalize an armistice that both sides appeared to desire. 64 To actually
have initiated such actions and more in pursuit of victory would havebeen quite different.
Chiang’s forces could do little even if backed by Washington; there
was little reason to believe they would be dramatically more effective in1950 than they had been the year before, when the Nationalists were
ousted. But the U.S. did not have the military manpower necessary toconquer China; any attempt to do so would require a massive
mobilization and would have left Europe vulnerable to possible Soviet

88International Journal of Korean Studies  Fall 2010

attack.
To escalate and fail would have disastrous consequences. And thecost in blood and money of just the attempt would have been far greaterthan in the actual conflict. Such a campaign would have dramaticallyintensified the Cold War. As alluring was the possibility of reversing theCommunist revolution might have seemed, it almost certainly would
have been the wrong war at the wrong time.
Decision 8: Fighting Over the Repatriation of Prisoners
The entire Korean War was a tragedy. Begun by Kim Il-sung withthe worst motives, it resulted in only mass death and destruction.
The most tragic fighting occurred between mid-1951 and mid-1953.
The battle front had stabilized and it soon became evident that neitherside was able or willing to deploy the resources necessary to achieve adecisive breakthrough. Everyone who died during the course of thearmistice negotiations truly died in vain.
Many issues delayed a settlement.
The most contentious
undoubtedly was the repatriation of prisoners. Normally countries swap
all-for-all. But the U.S. demanded that repatriation be voluntary. Wrotehistorian Clay Blair: “for propaganda and humanitarian reasons
Washington introduced several unprecedented and complicatedconditions for the exchange of prisoners.”65 For the same propaganda
reasons neither North Korea nor China could easily agree with anything
short of full repatriation.
Assessing exactly when the armistice might otherwise have beenarranged involves substantial conjecture, especially since evidence existsthat the Chinese leadership as well as Stalin saw advantages incontinuing the war and might not otherwise have been quick to settle.66
Still, the controversy appears to have lengthened the war. Blaircontended that the allied demands “ultimately prolonged the Korean War
for another year and a half, during which time United States forces
suffered 37,000 more battlefield casualties.”67
The issue was controversial even within the U.S. military andgovernment at the time but President Truman was steadfast.68 Blair put
the question bluntly: “Should American (and UN) soldiers fight and dieor suffer wounds and injuries in order to give their former enemies, manyof them traitors, freedom of choice over repatriation?”69
The issue may be one of the most vexing of the war. The American
government’s highest duty was to its own citizens, military personnelInternational Journal of Korean Studies  Vol. XIV, No. 289included. There was no obligation for Washington to promote theprinciple of voluntary repatriation.
Yet forced repatriation would
make the allies complicit in repression. The U.S. and Great Britain
already had turned over millions of Soviets, as well as a number ofRussians, such as post-revolutionary émigrés, who were not Soviet
citizens, to Moscow at the conclusion of World War II. Known as
Operation Keelhaul, the result was mass execution and imprisonment.
In the end, the allies won the point in Korea, and roughly 48,000
prisoners, mostly North Koreans, refused to return home. Roughly 350
allied prisoners remained in the North. Along the way, the allies together
incurred more casualties than the number of POWs who were freed.
Moreover, by deadlocking negotiations this issue brought both the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations close to massive escalation toforce a military decision. In effect, then, Washington contemplated
risking World War III to enforce its demand for choice in prisoner
exchange.
The Truman administration’s decision was difficult. It also wasincorrect. The extension and potential expansion of the war was too higha cost to pay for making voluntary repatriation a requirement foragreement. It was worth proposing that prisoners be allowed to choose
whether or not to return. However, the administration should haveconceded the issue when it became clear that the question would unduly
delay a settlement.
Decision 9: Providing a Post-War Security Guarantee
America’s military involvement on the peninsula persisted after the
war ended. Without a peace treaty—or, more accurately, conditions thatwould guarantee the preservation of peace—the ROK remained acutely
vulnerable to any resumption of hostilities.
As a cold peace descended on the peninsula, Washington negotiateda defense treaty with South Korea. Or as Youngnok Koo of the
University of Michigan put it, Rhee "extracted" the agreement ascompensation for the war's indecisive outcome.70 The Mutual Defense
Treaty, ratified in January 1954, did not explicitly guarantee U.S.
military assistance to the ROK. However, the continued presence of U.S.
soldiers in the ROK acted as a tripwire that would make American
participation in combat automatic.
Again abandoning the South would have been inconceivable. The
Eisenhower administration threatened to walk away if Rhee did not

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accept the armistice. However, it was a giant bluff. A coup was a more
likely option had Rhee remained a barrier to halting the war.71
Having suffered more than 150,000 casualties to prevent South
Korea’s defeat, Washington had no choice but to create a security
structure to preserve the South’s independence. The U.S. would not
repeat its mistake of 1949, when it withdrew without adequately
preparing the ROK. The resulting defense treaty and troop commitment
still endure today.
The alliance made sense in 1953. However, the relationship shouldhave been structured to discourage permanent South Korea dependency.
The principal flaw in original U.S. occupation policy was failing topromote ROK self-sufficiency. America’s post-war alliance policy
repeated the same mistake in a different way. At regular intervals both
American and South Korean officials talked about the ROK matching theNorth militarily, but what followed always were more promises rather
than actions. 72 Even today the South faces quantitative deficiencies,
though it enjoys a qualitative and technological edge. Yet by the 1980s
and certainly the 1990s South Korea was more than able to defend itself
against an adversary with a decrepit economy that faced international
isolation and had lost military support from its two great war-timeallies.73 The United States should have steadily drawn down its troop
levels as Seoul’s ability to provide for its own defense improved.
As in 1949, Washington today is overstretched and over-budget.74 It
should not leave troops deployed where they are no longer needed.
Decision 10: Militarizing the Cold War through NSC 68
At the end of World War II there was strong popular pressure todemobilize. The number of men in uniform fell from 12.4 million toroughly 1.5 million by June 1950 and conscription was allowed to expire
for a time. Military budgets dropped rapidly. But the Cold War
developed equally quickly. President Harry Truman’s speech in March
1947, pledging American support for peoples resisting subjugation “byarmed minorities or by outside pressure” often is seen as the onset of theCold War. However, historian James L. Gormly suggested that “theTruman Doctrine speech is, more precisely, a part of the breakdown of
the Grand Alliance” which began even as World War II was ending.75
Nevertheless, a highly militarized conflict was not inevitable. Key tochanging U.S. policy was NSC-68, which was presented to the president
in April 1950. The document set the path for a more confrontational U.S.

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91

policy towards the Soviet Union, with Washington “strengthening its
allies and warning its adversaries.” 76 However, absent a serious
international threat there remained little domestic political support for amajor military build-up. The Korean War provided that threat.
Of course, the conflict did not occur in an international vacuum.
Explained William Stueck: “The North Korean attack came at a time ofincreasing alarm in Washington over recently international developments
and growing pressure on the Truman administration to act decisively in
Asia.”77 However, these factors alone were not enough to intensify theCold War to such a degree, particularly at that moment. Robert Jervis
wrote:
American policy during the height of the cold war was
distinguished by the following features: (1) a high degree ofconflict with the USSR; (2) a significant perceived threat of war;(3) high defense budgets; (4) large armies in Europe; (5) theperception of a united Sino-Soviet bloc; (6) the belief that
limited wars were a major danger; and, following from the latter
two beliefs (7) anti-Communist commitments all over the globe.
While the first and perhaps the second characteristics were
present form 1946 to 1947, the other five came only after
Korea.78
One of the most important aspects was budgetary. Concluded Fred
Inglis: “From that moment, NSC 68 became the foundation of American
foreign policy, and there were few limits to what budget the president
could ask from Congress for the next thirty-odd years.” 79 Military
outlays remained high even after the Cold War ended.
Also dramatic “was the militarization of NATO; the transforming ofa paper organization built on a symbolic American commitment to aforce capable of resisting Soviet attack.”80 This obviously meant more
U.S. troops and weapons. There also came more security commitments,
like that to Korea. NATO expanded to Greece and Turkey; Washington
created SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, and the mutual defense treaty withJapan. America “would extend commitments to threatened areas, stake
its reputation on meeting force with force, and thereby deter
adventurism.”81
Another event conceivably could have sparked a similartransformation of U.S. policy, but none look likely to have had the same
effect. 82 So effective was the Korean War in transforming American

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foreign policy that Richard Thornton argued the administration provoked
the war in order to implement its larger policy: “A protracted conflictwith China would provide the lengthy political stimulus for the
rearmament that would thrust the United States into a position ofhegemony.”83
Advocates of NSC-68 were not without reason in fearing for the
future.
While Stalin’s predation always appeared cautious andopportunistic, there were no certainties, and it is impossible to knowwhat he would have done had he not died in early 1953.84
Nevertheless, the implementation of NSC-68, both in degree andtiming, appears to have been a significant error. Hindsight is wonderful,of course, but to claim, as did one U.S. official, that at that time America
was “in a war worse than any we have ever experienced” was simply nottrue.85 Despite defending the authors of NSC-68, even Beatrice Heuserargued that “the enormous re-armament programme which sprang from
NSC 68 was probably excessive in any case” and that “NSC 68’s
provisions for the increase of ‘roll-back’ operations” were negative.86
Moreover, Washington’s rapid and radical mobilization sparked adangerous reaction that arguably lessened American security. John
Lewis Gaddis contended that:
NSC 68 was, then, a deeply flawed document, in the sense thatthe measures it recommended undercut the goals it was trying toachieve. A military buildup might enhance American security if
American interests remained stable, but NSC 68 expanded
interests. Fragmentation of the communist world might be adesirable objective, but treating communists everywhere as
equally dangerous was not the way to achieve it. A more
moderate Soviet attitude towards the outside world was certainly
to be welcomed, but a negotiating posture that required Soviet
capitulation could hardly hasten it.87
Although the Cold War ended without a global conflict, this may
have reflected luck as much as policy. Moreover, later major power
conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan and proxy wars in numerous Third
World states were costly in terms of life and money. The diversion of
resources to the military was enormous; the persistent international
tensions may have delayed liberalization and ultimately collapse ofCommunist states.

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Had the Truman administration made different decisions—not gotten
involved in the Korean peninsula, adequately provided for the defense of
its weak client state, not joined the war once it erupted, or halted short of
the Yalu—there would have been much less pressure to militarize theCold War. Even while fighting in Korea the Truman administration
could have moved more slowly elsewhere, carefully monitoring Soviet
reactions. Of course, once Washington was involved in a shooting war
with China backed by the USSR, the relationship among former WorldWar II allies was bound to significantly worsen around the globe. Still,
the military competition could have been more constrained.
Conclusion
Few wars easily survive the harsh glare of history. President Trumanand his aides had to make many difficult decisions under difficult
circumstances. Nevertheless, administration mistakes did much totrigger the Korea War, expand the conflict to China, and militarize theCold War around the world. The conflict’s malign impact is still being
felt on the Korean peninsula and beyond.
Notes:
1
See, e.g., John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1989), p. 136. Depending on where they aretaken, the various competing explanations often complement and sometimes
compete with one another. Merrill, pp. 19-54. One of the most innovative isthat from Richard C. Thornton, who contends that Joseph Stalin and Mao
Zedong were in a race, with the former promoting war on the Korean peninsula
to preempt the latter from invading Taiwan. Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out:
Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 2000), pp. 101-18.
2

D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command
and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 133.

3

Kathryn Weathersby, “North Korean Foreign Relations: Historical Roots ofPresent Patterns,” the ICAS Lectures, Institute for Corean-American Studies,
February 22, 2006, p. 3.
4The saga of the stillborn trusteeship is described in James Irving Matray, The
Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 52-124.

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5

Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1990), p. 28.

6

Whelan, p. 44.

7

Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: Free Press,
1986), pp. 13, 30, 35.
8Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-Hill,1982), p. 28.

9The actual impact of his words occasioned much comment, though it remains
unclear to what extent they affected policy in any of the Communist states. See,e.g., Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department(New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 358, 691; Goulden, pp. 30-31; Chen Jian, “TheSino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War international History Project,
Working Paper No. 1, June 1992, p. 23.

10

Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 224.

11

Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and theEmergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1981), p. 188.
12

Matray, p. 161.

13

Fred Inglis, The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life and the Cold War (New York:
Basic Books, 1991), p. 71.

14James with Wells, p. 133.

15

So incomprehensible was U.S. policy that one is tempted to give credence tothe contention of Richard C. Thornton, a professor at George Washington
University, that the administration “proceeded to treat the Rhee government in amanner designed to leave South Korea vulnerable to invasion.” Thornton, pp.
147-48.

16

In fact, U.S. officials brought in other Korean exiles and found them evenharder to work with. See, e.g., Cumings, pp. 192-93.
17

Whelan, p. 32.

18

Matray, p. 161.

19

Edwin P. Hoyt, On to the Yalu (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 179.

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95

20

Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York:Times Books, 1987), p. 974.

21

MacDonald, p. 15.

22

Matray, p. 233.

23

Thornton, p. 149.

24

Thornton, p. 149.

25

Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 23, 1949, JCS 1483/74.

26
Quoted in Kim Chull Baum, "U.S. Policy on the Eve of the Korean War:
Abandonment or Safeguard?", in Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction,
and Disarmament, ed. Kim Chull Baum and James Matray (Claremont, Ca.:Regina Books, 1993), p. 90.
27

National Security Council, “A Report to the National Security Council by the
Secretary of Defense on U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet ForcesEnter Korean Hostilities, NSC 76, July 21, 1950, pp. 1-2.

28

Matray, p. 151.

29

See, e.g., Whelan, p. 52.

30

Ibid., p. 90.

31

Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950 (New York: Free Press,
1968), p. 132. Paige's book provides a detailed study of the decision to intervene.

32

Beatrice Heuser, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on
Western Threat Perception and Policy Making,” Review of International Studies,Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991), p. 27.

33

John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1053 (New York: William
Morrow, 1991), p. 34.
34

Toland, p. 37.

35

Whelan, p. 140; Schaller, p. 186.

36

Thornton, p. 178.

37

Whelan, p. 52.

38

For an argument that the war in Korea may have helped deter a Sovietsponsored attacks on Yugoslavia or Greece, see Heuser, pp. 37-38.

39

James, p. 179.

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40

See, e.g., Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and theDimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1963 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1985), pp. 73-74.

41

National Security Council, “A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,
NSC 81, September 1, 1950, p. 2.

42John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War(New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 120-21. See also Robert Jervis, “The Impact of
the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24,
No. 4 (December 1980), p. 583.

43
Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 160.
44

William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 99.

45

Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.
341.

46

Schaller, p. 202.

47

Chen Jian, Working Paper, p. 33.

48

The NSC surmised: “While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist
intervention might not be lessened if only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces
conducted the operation north of the parallel, the risk of general hostilities as aresult of such intervention would be reduced.” NSC 81, p. 4.

49

Thornton, pp. 51-77; Whelan, p. 87.

50

Jervis, p. 582.

51

Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War,1950-1953 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 56; Sergei
N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao,and the Korean War (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 159,
181.

52

Zhang, p. 85.

53

Chen Jian, Working Paper, p. 32.

54

Foot, pp. 141, 154.

55

Schaller, p. 231.

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56

Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, andCommand (New York: Knopf), p. 1986, p. 111.

57

Blair, p. 533.

58

Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, p. 139; Weathersby, p. 4.

59

Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, pp. 197-98; Weathersby, pp. 7-8.

60

Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, p. 189.

61

See, e.g., Foot, pp. 124, 163, 165, 168-69, 195-96, 228.

62

Foot, pp. 225-26.

63

Bombing close to sensitive Soviet territory also was considered to be risky.
Foot, pp. 198, 224.

64

Blair, p. 971.

65

Blair, p. 962.

66

Stalin’s malign role long has been known. See, e.g., Natalia Bajanova,"Assessing the Conclusion and Outcome of the Korean War," paper presented at
Korea Society conference, "The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical
Record," July 24 & 25, 1995. But Beijing appeared to agree, at least in 1952.
Weathersby, p. 9. Notably, the Chinese leadership appeared to move quickly toreach an agreement after Stalin’s death. Weathersby, p. 10.
67

Blair, p. 962.

68

Blair, p. 963.

69

Blair, p. 964.

70

Youngnok Koo, "The First Hundred Years and Beyond," in Youngnok Koo and
Dae-Sook Suh, ed.'s, Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), p. 359.

71

Blair, p. 974.

72

Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed
World (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1996), pp. 71-73.

73

Bandow, Tripwire; Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean
Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (NewYork: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004).

74
Doug Bandow, “Bankrupt Empire,” National Interest online, April 19, 2010,www.nationalinterest.org.

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75

James L. Gormly, The Collapse of the Grand Alliance: 1945-1948 (Baton
Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), p. ix.

76

Thornton, p. 133.

77

Stueck, p. 41.

78

Jervis, p. 564.

79

Inglis, p. 76.

80

Jervis, p. 580.

81

Jervis, p. 581.

82

Jervis, pp. 586-88.

83

Thornton, p. 353.

84

Heuser, p. 39.

85

Heuser, p. 23.

86

Heuser, p. 40.

87

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of
Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), p. 106.

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