The Relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan:
1950 to 2018
Michael MacArthur Bosack
International University of Japan
Abstract
The United Nations Command is the multinational headquarters that led
the allied forces in the Korean War. The command’s Military ArmisticeCommission supervises the Armistice Agreement. While the United
Nations Command and its activities are common knowledge in the
Republic of Korea, the command’s long-standing organization andfunctions in Japan are less well known. This relationship began in 1950
and is codified in the 1954 United Nations-Japan Status of Forces
Agreement. The command’s rear area headquarters, the aptly named
United Nations Command-Rear Headquarters, has managed thisrelationship since 1957. After decades of few changes, the United Nations
Command and its Sending States broadened traditional roles and missions
from Japan beginning in the early 2000s. This led to expanded activities
within the legal framework and security mandate governing the United
Nations Command’s relationship with Japan, strengthening Japan’s ties
with the command’s member states, and supporting the “maximum
pressure” campaign against North Korea. This paper examines therelationship between the United Nations Command and Japan, beginningwith the institutions and interests underpinning the relationship. Next, it
describes the Status of Forces Agreement and how the relationshipfunctions. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant policy issues,
limitations to greater cooperation, and opportunities for expanded roles
within the framework of the relationship.
Keywords: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United States, United
Nations, Security Council, Sending States, United States Forces Japan,
United Nations Command, United Nations Command-Rear Headquarters
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army,
the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

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Introduction
The United Nations Command (UNC) is a central feature of the
security paradigm vis-à-vis North Korea. The UN Security Council
authorized the command to enable UN-member states to provide militaryand humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Korea. During and after the
Korean War, the UNC was responsible for marshalling forces from UN
member states and directing combat operations of forces from the U.S.
ROK, and 16 UN members known as the “Sending States.”1 The UNC iscurrently responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement. While thecommand’s mission and composition has changed since its establishment
in 1950, one country has played a crucial rear area support role in the
UNC’s mission despite never having formal membership: Japan.
For many years, the relationship between the UNC and Japan wasarcane. The UNC’s relationship with Japan was a seldom discussed subsetof the U.S.-Japan alliance. The relative obscurity of the UNC-Japan
relationship belies its importance. Japan’s strategic position near the
Korean Peninsula, as well as its ready support to UN forces, was criticalto military operations during the Korean War. For decades since, Japan
has maintained its arrangements with the UNC to support the Sending
States in the event of renewed conflict with North Korea. In recent years,
the UNC has found new life in expanded UN resolution-based mission setssuch as sanctions monitoring. The command has also provided a crucial
stepping stone for Japan to increase its military cooperation with othercountries, including Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and theUnited Kingdom (U.K.).
Despite its importance, there is a dearth of public scholarship on therelationship between the UNC and Japan and its interlocutor, the United
Nations Command-Rear (UNC-Rear). The absence of such material leads
to misunderstandings of the function, structure, history, and utility of
UNC-Japan ties. This paper seeks to address this shortfall and clarify
misunderstandings by examining the relationship between the UNC andJapan using a historical approach. The paper begins with a brief overview
on origins of the UNC. It then offers a chronological review of theevolution of the UNC-Japan relationship focused on underlying
institutions and interests. Next, the paper highlights specific details related
to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 2 and how the relationshipfunctions. It concludes with a discussion of relevant policy issues,
limitations, and opportunities within the UNC-Japan relationship.

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Origins of United Nations Command
The UNC is a multinational military organization formed to respondto North Korean aggression. Through a series of resolutions following theNorth Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950, the UN Security
Council called for member states to respond militarily in repelling theattack and formed a unified command under U.S. leadership. 3 This
command included “Sending States” that fought under UN auspices
against North Korea—and Communist China following its entry in thewar—until reaching stalemate. When the shooting stopped, the UNC
remained a core institution of the Armistice Agreement, both in overseeing
the maintenance of armistice conditions and providing a postured
multinational force for deterrence.
The UNC’s primary mission was on the Korean Peninsula. Japan
served as the critical command and control location and rear area base ofoperations during the war, enabling the Sending States to flow forces to
Korea. The UNC Headquarters was collocated with the Far East Command(FECOM) in Tokyo. Forces operated from, and flowed through, bases
across Japan. Although the UNC Headquarters moved to the Korean
Peninsula in the late 1950s, there was a continued requirement for rear areafunctions. The aptly named rear area headquarters, UN Command-Rear(UNC-Rear) is responsible for these functions.
The UNC-Japan Relationship Over the Years
The evolution of the UNC-Japan relationship is predicated on
institutions and interests among three players: the UNC, the Governmentof Japan, and the Sending States. Since UN Security Council resolutions
form the original legal basis for the relationship, UNC interests havenecessarily driven initiatives over time. However, as providers of theforces to carry out those initiatives, the Sending State interests must alignwith the UNC’s priorities. All the while, as the host for UN forces, theJapanese government serves as an advocate or veto player for any potential
initiative. An institutional framework for coordinating those interests andactivities facilitates interaction among the parties. Although robust during
the Korean War, the relationship was static for decades until it was
revitalized in the early 2000s.
In the early years, the UNC and Japan shared a common interest in
restoring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. To that end, theJapan-based UNC Headquarters managed the war effort while themilitaries of the United States (U.S.), Republic of Korea (ROK) andInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XXIII, No. 1

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Sending States executed military operations.4 At the time, Japan had theadded incentive to provide strong support to UN forces. Although someJapanese politicians viewed the Korea conflict as less important thanregaining its sovereignty and rebuilding its economy, when the General
Headquarters5 began directing increases in Japanese defense capabilities
and requesting Japanese support to UN forces, it presented the fledgling
postwar Japanese government an opportunity.6 Supporting the first-everUN-mandated military operation proved an attractive option forhighlighting Japan’s status as a responsible actor, so the country readily
provided support in myriad ways. 7 First, it was home to the UNC
Headquarters and FECOM, the command and control centers for thebroader war effort. Second, the country provided a staging area for troops
flowing to the Korean Peninsula, a rear support base for logistics andmedical functions, and airfields for executing UN air operations in the
Korean Theater. Third, Japan provided logistics support to UN forces
based in, or transiting through, Japan. Finally, the Japanese Maritime
Safety Agency deployed minesweepers and other vessels to support the
war effort directly, though it did so under independent orders from the U.S.
Navy’s 7th Fleet and outside of the direct UNC command and control
structure.8
Indeed, Japan postured itself well and regained its sovereignty, thoughthat change generated additional considerations for the legal basis ofJapan’s support to UNC. Under the occupation, the allies had authorities
that no longer existed once Japan became a sovereign state. To ensure
continuity in the relationship, a separate instrument governing theprovision of logistics support and legal status for UN forces in Japan wasnecessary.
That instrument came in the form of an Exchange-of-Notes between
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Japanese Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida. Accomplished on the sidelines of the San Francisco
meeting on September 8, 1951—where the U.S. and Japan signed theirbilateral Treaty of Peace—the Acheson-Yoshida Exchange-of-Notes
affirmed Japan’s commitment to maintaining rights and obligations for
UN forces in Japan in line with the U.S.-Japan bilateral agreements signed
the same day.9
When the Korean War ended in stalemate, new decisions werenecessary for what would come of UNC presence in Japan. In 1953, the
UNC Headquarters moved about 45 kilometers from its location in
downtown Tokyo to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. The move was

74

International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2019a logical one: the U.S. Army was the executive agent for the UNC andCamp Zama was the largest army garrison in the Kanto Plain. At the sametime, the UNC and the Japanese government entered into negotiations fora Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The negotiated SOFA was largely
the same as the 1951 U.S.-Japan “Administrative Agreement”10 in termsof rights and obligations for forces transiting or based in Japan, thoughsome unique requirements were levied upon UN forces given on themultinational nature of the agreement and the absence of a governing
alliance treaty for the non-American forces. On February 19, 1954, seven
Sending States signed the UNC-Government of Japan SOFA (UNC-GOJ
SOFA); four others acceded to the agreement shortly thereafter.
Changes to the United Nations Command
In 1957, the UNC-Japan relationship experienced its first major
institutional change. The security and political situation in Korea hadstabilized enough to support the move of UNC headquarters to Seoul. In
accordance with the UNC-GOJ SOFA, the UNC had to maintain apresence in Japan to keep the agreement valid. To fulfill this obligation,
the UNC activated a rear area headquarters: United Nations CommandRear (UNC-Rear). The UNC and the Japanese government agreed that fivebases to be designated for use by UN forces, though that number wouldchange over time. At the same time, FECOM was deactivated and the
Headquarters U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) was simultaneously activated at
the Fuchu Air Station. The separation of UNC-Rear and USFJHeadquarters was based on organizational structure rather than function:
the U.S. Army was the executive agent for UNC-Rear; a U.S. Air Forcelieutenant general commanded USFJ. The split of the two commands
influenced the character of the UNC-Rear Headquarters. The organization
focused more on maintaining the UNC-GOJ SOFA than coordinating with
the Government of Japan. The latter mission is the principal function of
USFJ.
After the move, issues related to the UNC-Japan relationship remained
a secondary consideration in major geopolitical events, including the U.S.Chinese rapprochement, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the September
11 attacks that led to the Global War on Terror. Although several
administrations contemplated reducing forces on the Korean Peninsula
and restructuring command elements, North Korea represented enough ofa threat to the U.S. to keep its armistice institutions intact, including UNCRear and the UN-Japan SOFA. 11 Meanwhile, the Japanese government

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was interested in maintaining at least status quo deterrence against a North
Korea that routinely engaged in provocative behavior, including abducting
Japanese nationals12 and developing nuclear and missile capabilities that
directly threatened Japan.13 For the Japanese government, its alliance with
the U.S. was the key feature of its security. The UNC and its rear area
support network remained a passive consideration; a subset of the broader
alliance framework.14 With Washington and Tokyo focused on preserving
the status quo for a multinational deterrent in Northeast Asia, there wasneither the impetus to dissolve nor expand the UNC architecture in Japan.
During this period, significant changes occurred within the U.S.-ROK
security relationship that affected the UNC. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
was created in 1957 as a subordinate unified command within the U.S.
Pacific Command. On November 7, 1978, the Combined Forces
Command (CFC) was established and assumed responsibility for the
defense of the ROK from the UNC.15 Concurrently, the ROK Governmenttransferred Operational Control (OPCON) of South Korean forces to the
CFC. 16 This was a remarkable change for the UNC, which had over
930,000 servicemen and women at the time the Armistice Agreement was
signed. At this time, only five Sending States retained accredited liaisongroups in Korea; seven retained accredited liaison groups in Japan.17
Lacking a dedicated staff, the UNC fulfilled its duties through the
UNC Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), which had been
established by the Armistice Agreement to “supervise the implementationof this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any
violations of this Armistice Agreement.”18 Other UNC-affiliated entities
included the UNCMAC Secretariat, the UNC Honor Guard, the Sending
State Liaison Group, the UNC Security Battalion, as well as the Japanbased UNC-Rear Headquarters.
Over the next three decades, successive UNC Commanders appointed
officers from the CFC and USFK staffs to specific positions within the
UNC Staff. The largest increase occurred in 2004, when 128 members of
the CFC and USFK staffs—including 49 ROK military and civil
servants—were assigned additional duties within the UNC.19 At the sametime, the UNC opened 16 positions in the UNCMAC Secretariat for theSending States and the ROK.20
Changes to the UNC-Rear Headquarters
As the UNC sought to strengthen its staff capability and increaseinternational participation, it opened a window for institutional change in76

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UNC-Rear. The USFJ Headquarters had been at Yokota Air Base fornearly 30 years, having moved when Fuchu Air Station closed in 1976. In
2006, the American and Japanese governments decided to make Yokota ajoint operating base with the Japan Self-Defense Force, accompanied by a
Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC).21 Through these
initiatives, Yokota Air Base became the center of U.S.-Japan alliancecoordination in the time of crisis or contingency.
The timing of this was especially auspicious, given strengthening ties
between UNC and USFJ headquarters.22 The commander of UNC-Rear,
Colonel Floyd Driver, saw an opportunity to maximize his headquarters’
effectiveness in response to a Korean crisis. 23 He petitioned USFJ and
UNC leadership to move the UNC-Rear headquarters to Yokota in order
to collocate it with USFJ.24 Adding to this impetus was the fact that the
principal representative for the UN-Japan “Joint Board” is not a memberof UNC, but the USFJ Deputy Commander. USFJ Commander Lieutenant
General Bruce “Orville” Wright affirmed the decision with UNC
Commander, General B.B. Bell, and Camp Zama’s commander, Major
General Elbert (Nick) Perkins, to gain consensus on the decision and totransfer administrative burden from the Department of the Army to the
Department of the Air Force. By October 2007, UNC-Rear’s move to its
present home was complete.25
There was one last change required before the transition to its current
institutional state. The Commander of the UNC-Rear Headquarters was
still a U.S. Army colonel. Even if the UNC and the Japanese government
wanted to expand their relationship, Sending State support would benecessary. Recognizing a need to “internationalize” the UNC, U.S. Army
General Walter L. “Skip” Sharp, Commander, UNC, sought greater
participation from the Sending States beyond the billets within the
UNCMAC Secretariat. General Sharp wanted to integrate the Sending
States into the operational UNC chain-of-command. As such, he decided
that “the conditions were right” for a Sending State officer to takecommand of the UNC-Rear Headquarters.26 In 2009, General Sharp sent a
letter to Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of the Australian
Defence Force (ADF), requesting Australian support for this proposal. The
Australian Government concurred and agreed to provide a colonel-level
officer to command UNC-Rear Headquarters. Group Captain Tony
McCormack assumed command on February 8, 2010, the first nonAmerican to lead UNC-Rear Headquarters.27

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The arrival of the Australian commander ushered in a new era in the
UNC-Japan relationship. The UNC-Rear Headquarters was no longer justa subset of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Rather, the presence of a nonAmerican commander signaled change to the Japanese government andgave greater weight to Sending State interests within the command’s
decision-making process. Group Captain McCormack later said this of theorganizational change: “[M]y predecessor had done an excellent job ingetting the unit bedded down at Yokota. The staff were keen, energetic
and efficient for their size. What was lacking was the focus on
strengthening relationships with all of UNC-R[ear]'s partners...they
already existed but were not designed around how UNC-R would operate
in a time of crisis.”28 To that end, UNC-Rear Headquarters focused on
fostering stronger ties with the Tokyo-based liaison group, USFJ, and theJapanese government.29
The Great East Japan Earthquake reinforced the decades of effort tosustain the UNC-Rear Headquarters’ operational readiness and the more
recent effort to invigorate coordination relationships in Japan. The March
11, 2011 earthquake caused a tsunami that led to a nuclear accident innortheastern Japan. Several of the Sending States responded following the“triple disaster.” The Australian government dispatched three Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-17 cargo aircraft, an Urban Search andRescue Team, and specialized equipment for cooling nuclear reactors. The
Royal Thai Air Force sent two C-130s. The New Zealand government
deployed its own Urban Search and Rescue team to support disaster relief
efforts. In this situation, the UN-Japan SOFA did not apply; separate
diplomatic clearances were needed. Regardless, arriving forces werefamiliar with the bases in Japan. The relationships that UNC-Rear
Headquarters had with the U.S. military, the UNC liaison group, and theJapanese government enabled the UNC-Rear Headquarters to serve as thede facto “Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC)” to facilitate
successful missions across the board. 30 This event showcased theoperational importance of the UNC-Japan relationship and spurred
additional innovation in ways to use it.
All of this coincided with renewing Sending State interest in the region.
As noted, the Sending States were offered additional positions in the
UNCMAC Secretariat. This push continued with the 2011 Forces
Initiative, in which the Canadian Armed Forces assigned three officers to
the UNC Headquarters staff and one officer to the UNC Rear
Headquarters. 31 At the same time, individual Sending States sought to78

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build bilateral security ties with Japan. In particular, Australia, France, andthe United Kingdom, explicitly publicized their desire for increased
security cooperation with the Japanese government.32 Although none of
the countries initially sought to use the UN-Japan SOFA as a steppingstone to strengthening those bonds, all parties would eventually realize thatthe existing UNC-Japan relationship offered the legal framework andsecurity mandate to underwrite their broader security initiatives.
With new priorities in the UNC-Rear Headquarters and renewedinterest among Sending States, the last requirement was getting theJapanese government interested in advancing of the relationship beyond
status quo. Although the UNC-Rear Headquarters commander does not
require Japanese government approval for UN missions conducted within
the scope of the SOFA, uncoordinated changes to establishedprecedents—namely, the frequency and type of usage of SOFA
privileges—could have led to protest from the Japanese government, or
worse, calls to renegotiate or abrogate the SOFA.
The newly strengthened relationships between the UNC-Rear
Headquarters, USFJ’s Joint Committee Secretary (J03), and the USFJ
Government Relations Branch (J54) were important to gaining support
from the Japanese government. The Joint Committee Secretary is
responsible for managing the U.S.-side of the Joint Committee, theorganization charged with adjudicating U.S.-Japan SOFA matters. The
composition and membership is nearly identical to the UN-Japan Joint
Board, though the Joint Committee is bilateral (U.S. and Japan)
organization. While the Joint Committee has met over a 1000 times, theUN-Japan Joint Board has convened only three. 33 Over time, the Joint
Committee became a de facto avenue for UNC advocacy, and therelationship between the Joint Committee Secretary and UNC-Rear
Headquarters Commander (who also serves as the Joint Board Secretary)
was essential for dissemination of information and coordination ofinterests.
While the relationship with the Joint Committee Secretary was
important for formal coordination, the relationship with the J5 Plans andPolicy Directorate and its Government Relations Branch (J54) was
essential for informal policy formation and coordination. Like the UNCRear Headquarters, the USFJ Government Relations Branch is a small,four member organization that plays an outsize role in intergovernmental
coordination, maintaining counterparts throughout Japan’s governmental
ministries, the Tokyo-based attaché network, the UNC, USFK, the U.S.

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Indo-Pacific Command (the successor to the U.S. Pacific Command), theJoint Staff, State Department, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Members from the USFJ J54 would occasionally attend meetings with the
UNC-Rear Headquarters and the Tokyo Liaison Group, as well as support
the formulation of policy and coordination strategies. The Government
Relations Branch’s combined knowledge and experience working with theJapanese government, as well as its extensive network of contacts, helped
shape “win-win” scenarios for the UNC and Japanese government
officials.
Meanwhile, on the Japanese side, there were three forces supporting amore robust relationship with the UNC: first, Japan’s desire to advanceindividual security relationships with countries that happened to besignatories to the UN-Japan SOFA; second, the “maximum pressure”
campaign in response to North Korean provocations; and third, the newly
created National Security Secretariat.
After regaining the premiership in December 2012, Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe used his resurgent popularity to advance several security
issues. He published Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy inDecember 2013. One of the core tasks the strategy was strengthening
security partnerships beyond the traditional U.S.-Japan alliance; Japan
looked to develop relationships with Australia, South Korea, and theASEAN nations, among others. 34 The Abe government set about
negotiating new instruments of alignment with those countries, including
Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreements and Visiting Forces
Agreements.35 Although the government did not realize it in 2013, theUN-Japan SOFA would offer a stepping stone to greater cooperation thatproved necessary due to unexpected North Korean provocations.
Not long after the Abe government announced its security strategy,
North Korean increased its missile and nuclear activity. During 2013, there
were only six missile launches; the next three years saw 19, 15, and 24,
respectively. 36 Pyongyang also conducted nuclear tests in January and
September 2016. By early 2017, the Japanese government adopted its own“maximum pressure” campaign37 in conjunction with American efforts toisolate North Korea and disrupt access to resources that supported
continued provocative behavior. For Japan, support from the international
community, especially UNC Sending States, was necessary. The
organization in charge of the maximum pressure campaign and garneringinternational support was also the newest in Prime Minister Abe’s foreign
affairs and defense apparatus.

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Among its other defense agenda items, the Abe administration createdthe National Security Council (NSC) to bring greater policy-coordinationand decision-making power to the Prime Minister’s office. Entrusted withcarrying out the NSC’s responsibilities was the National Security
Secretariat (NSS), a small organization launched in January 2014
comprised of 75 defense, foreign affairs, coast guard, and police officials
seconded from their ministries or agencies. 38 The NSS served as theinstitution for advocating Japan’s interests to expand security partnerships
and coordinating the maximum pressure campaign.
In some ways by coincidence and others by design, NSS officials
became well-acquainted with UNC and the potential “win-win”
opportunities it presented. Soon after the creation of the NSS, the Cabinet
Councillor responsible for North Korea 39 (a seconded official from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)) reached out to his counterpart, theDirector of the USFJ J5 40 , who helped arrange a tour of the UNC
Headquarters and related facilities in Korea. The USFJ J54 continued thepractice, ensuring that all new NSS officials received a thoroughintroduction to the UNC organization on the Korean Peninsula. It was
through these interactions that the Japanese government’s interest in
UNC’s institutions and missions became evident, and the opportunity
emerged to secure Japan’s support for expanding the UNC-Japan
relationship.
In April 2017, after 57 North Korean missile launches and two nuclear
tests in the previous three years, the USFJ J54 hosted a group of officials
from across the Japanese government for a briefing by UNC-Rear
Commander, Group Captain Mick Jansen. The participants included
officials from the National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat,
MOFA, Ministry of Defense, and the Japan Joint Staff. The purpose ofthat meeting: explain the role of the UNC-Japan relationship and propose
new initiatives for cooperation between the UNC and the Japanese
government.41 The result was positive, leading to active and tacit Japanesesupport for increased UNC activity in Japan as depicted in Table 1:

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Table 1: UN Sending State Ship and Aircraft Visits to UNDesignated Bases in Japan, 2000 to 2018

Year

Ships

Aircraft
Landings

Personnel

Overflight

2000
8
8
5
2327
2001
2
1
0
614
2002
7
1
0
1629
2003
0
9
2
509
2004
8
7
0
1925
2005
7
6
0
2410
2006
6
8
0
2025
2007
12
14
0
4250
2008
8
8
0
2340
2009
3
9
0
794
2010
4
4
0
976
2011
1
4
0
297
2012
3
9
0
714
2013
5
8
0
2584
2014
1
10
4
555
2015
3
11
4
1616
2016
1
15
7
882
2017
15
20
4
2057
2018
14
38
10
4370
Source: United Nations Command-Rear
Ongoing Initiatives
With a solid institutional foundation and common interest among theUNC, Japan, and the Sending States, the UNC-Rear Headquarters has
shepherded levels of UN forces activity in Japan not seen since the 1950s.
In addition to the normal familiarization visits and orientation tours, newactivities included observation of UNC command post and field training
exercises.42 The command also began initiatives to expand participation in
U.S.-Japan bilateral exercises and incorporate Japanese observers and/or
participants in UNC-led exercises. 43 It has also underwritten bilateral
security cooperation between Japan and individual Sending States.

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While exercises are important, the UNC-Rear Headquarters has also
been crucial in supporting real-world operations since early 2017. One
such use of the UN-Japan SOFA for a real-world scenario was to support
the return of a detainee. In July 2017, the Canadian government negotiatedthe release of Lim Hyeon-soo, a pastor who had been detained in North
Korea for nearly two years. To get him home, the Canadian government
flew him from Pyongyang to the UN-designated base at Yokota en routeto North America.44 Canada was able to exercise this option due to its
membership in the UNC.
The UNC-Japan SOFA has also been used to support the enforcementof new UN Security Council resolutions; i.e., sanctions monitoring. With
the escalation of North Korean provocations from 2014 to 2018, the UN
Security Council issued five new sanctions regimes on top of the four
already in place.45 The Sending States opted to increase their sanctions
monitoring activities, and the UN-designated bases in Japan became astaging point for several of those operations. Since 2017, the U.K. hassent three vessels—HMS Sutherland, HMS Albion, and HMS Argyll—to
support sanctions monitoring activities. All made port calls at Yokosuka
and/or Sasebo Naval Bases during their floats.46 Australia, New Zealand,
and Canada deployed reconnaissance aircraft to Kadena Air Base for the
purpose of conducting sanctions monitoring missions.47
Although renewed diplomatic efforts have slowed some activity
related to North Korea, the conditions are still set for continued
advancement of UNC initiatives with Japan. While not specificallynaming the UNC, Japan’s 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines
called for increased security cooperation with Australia, Canada, France,
New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S., signaling its intent to continue theseon-going efforts. 48 While limitations on integration of the Japan SelfDefense Forces exist, the foundation is set for continuing this new era of
the UNC-Japan relationship.
The UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement
The 1954 UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement provides the legal
basis for UN forces transiting through or operating from Japan. It includes
negotiated rights and obligations, while serving as an instrument ofalignment for Japan and the other signatories vis-á-vis the North Korean
threat. In plain terms, the SOFA is the document that showcases Japan’s
willingness to side with UN forces against North Korea and provides thelegal framework for how it will support the UNC.

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There were seven signatories to the UN-Japan SOFA when theagreement came into force in 1954: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, thePhilippines, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. Italy, France, Thailand,
and Turkey acceded to the SOFA shortly after the original signingceremony. Over time, South Africa and Italy became non-active membersof UNC; when they did, their UN-Japan SOFA privileges lapsed.49 The
nine active SOFA signatories 50 are Australia, Canada, France, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S.51
As with any international agreement, there are both rights andobligations, and UN forces must adhere to five major requirements inorder to maintain their SOFA privileges.
First, the UNC must maintain a presence in Japan. The UNC-Rear
Headquarters fulfills this requirement. If no UNC element physicallyremains in Japan, the legal basis goes away, and UNC-Rear Headquarters
has 90 days to withdraw from the country entirely.
Second, the UNC presence in Japan must be multinational; at least oneof its assigned personnel must be a non-American from one of the othersignatories to the UN-Japan SOFA. For many years, the “Force
Representative” billet fulfilled this requirement; it was the only
multinational position within the UNC Rear Headquarters. As noted, theRAAF provided an officer to command the UNC-Rear headquarters in
2010, so two billets are now multinational.
Third, the U.S. and Japanese governments must mutually designate
U.S. administered bases for co-utilization by the UNC. At the time the
SOFA was negotiated, the Japan Self-Defense Forces did not exist. The
Japanese government had no desire to designate civilian airports andseaports for UNC military use. As a result, the governments fulfilled thisrequirement by agreeing to a list of dual-flagged U.S. bases to hostSending State forces.
Fourth, the UNC designated bases must fly the UN flag. Thus, all UNdesignated bases in Japan fly three flags: the American flag, the Japaneseflag, and the UN flag.
Fifth, the UNC-Rear Headquarters must exercise the use of thosebases for Sending State forces. The SOFA does not mandate the type orscale of usage, meaning aircraft, vessels, or personnel visits are sufficientfor meeting those requirements.

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The Joint Board
The UN-Japan SOFA mandated the creation of a “Joint Board,” which
is an intergovernmental committee intended to negotiate and adjudicate
any matters pertaining to the UN-Japan SOFA. Figure 1 depicts theorganization of the Joint Board:

Figure 1: The United Nations Command-Japan Joint Board
UNC
Japan
Principal Representative:
Deputy Commander, USFJ

Principal Representative:
Director-General, North American
Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Delegated to:
Deputy Director-General North
American Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Secretary:Commander, UNC-Rear

Secretary:
Director, SOFA Division, MOFA

Deputy Representatives:
Political Minister-Counselor, U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo
UN Force Representatives from
UNC Liaison Groups

Deputy Representatives:
Director, Japan-U.S. Treaty Division,
MOFA
Members of the Japanese
Government as required byfunctional area

Source: Created by author from multiple sources.
The Joint Board has only met three times: once to convene the board andtwice to designate UN bases in Japan. Most matters related to UNC havebeen handled within the bilateral U.S.-Japan Joint Committee. The Joint
Committee and Joint Board are nearly identical organizations: both aremandated by SOFAs and chaired by the same principal representatives.
However, instead of meeting three times, the Joint Committee has
convened over 1000 times (nearly every two weeks). As such, the UNCRear Headquarters and Japanese government officials have, at times,
requested the Joint Committee handle UN-Japan SOFA issues on thesidelines of its regular meetings; e.g. the temporary designation of Naval
Air Facility Atsugi as a UN base in 2001.

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United Nations Command-Rear Bases
In order to operate the headquarters and execute UNC functions inJapan, the UN-Japan SOFA provides bases for use by UN forces. Thereare currently seven UN-designated bases in Japan. There were nine when
the UNC Rear Headquarters was established in 1957 and the bases
designated for use by the UN have changed over time. Table 2 shows pastand current UN-designated bases.

Table 2: United Nations-designated Bases in Japan52
Base

From

To

Primary
Function(s)Remarks

Camp
Zama

Oct
1957

——

HQ
RSOI

Former UNC and UNCRear HQ location (19532007)

Fuchu
Air Station
SaseboNaval Base
Tachikawa
Air Base
Yokosuka
Naval BaseCamp
Drake/Asaka

Oct
1957
Oct
1957
July
1957
July
1957
June
1958

Feb
1976

AirfieldBase closed.

Sep
1977

RSOI

KishineBarracks
YokotaAir Base
MCAS
FutenmaKadenaAir Base
Naval BaseWhite Beach
NAF
Atsugi

April
1959
Oct
1969
May
1972
May
1972
May
1972
Oct
2001

Aug
1972

RSOI;
Hospital——

Airfield——

Airfield——

Airfield——Port;
logistics
Airfield

——
Sep
1977
——

July
2002

Port;
MaintenanceAirfieldBase closed.

Port;
MaintenanceTransferred to Japan
Ground Self Defense
Force
Base closed.
Current UNC HQ location(2007-present)
Designated after Okinawa
Reversion
Designated after Okinawa
Reversion
Designated after Okinawa
Reversion
Temporary replacement
while Yokota Airbase wasundergoing airfield
maintenanceSource: Created by the author from multiple sources.

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Since the establishment of the UNC-Rear Headquarters, two baserealignment initiatives have affected UN-designated bases: the Kanto
Plain Consolidation and the Okinawa Reversion. The Kanto Plain
Consolidation was an initiative in the early seventies to close the majorityof U.S. military bases in Tokyo and nearby prefectures. In 1970, the U.S.
military began unilaterally seeking ways to reduce the costs of its bases inthose areas.53 Given the relative stability of the security environment andredundancy of capabilities—there were three air bases within 20
kilometers of one another—the U.S. sought to reduce the number of
personnel in the area and consolidate remaining units on fewer bases. At
the same time, the Japanese government looked to capitalize on the highly
valuable land in the Tokyo metropolitan and surrounding areas. As a result,
the two governments negotiated the full or partial return of six major
facilities, including three that were UN designated bases.54
The Kanto Plain Consolidation had two major effects on the UNC:
first, it created a requirement to seek UN-designated bases elsewhere in
Japan to make up for the facilities it would lose. Second, the consolidationof American bases meant less room for non-U.S. forces. While UNC-Rear
Headquarters does not require additional “Maximum-on-Ground” (MOG)
capacity in peacetime, it would be critical in contingency as U.S. forcestransit through Japan and leave little room for Sending States units.
Around the same time, the UNC was on the verge of losing many otherbases. Beginning in 1969, Washington and Tokyo began the process ofnegotiating the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese sovereignty.
When the Allied Occupation ended in 1952, Okinawa and its surroundingislands remained an American protectorate. As territory under American
administration, the UNC had ready access to any military facility in
Okinawa. Accordingly, part of the reversion negotiations focused on
ensuring that some of those facilities would be retained for UN use under
the UN-Japan SOFA. Thus, on May 15, 1972, Okinawa reverted toJapanese sovereignty, and three bases on the island—Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma, Kadena Air Base, and the White Beach Naval Facility—
raised UN flags for the first time.
UNC-Rear Headquarters: Structure, Function, and Tasks
The UNC-Rear Headquarters has always been a small organization.
There were only four formal position requirements within the headquarters
for the majority the command’s existence. However, the UNC-Rear

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Headquarters would expand in the event of a conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. Figure 2 depicts the current structure of the command:
Figure 2: United Nations Command-Rear, 2019
Chief of Staff

Source: Created by the author from multiple sources.55
The UNC-Rear Headquarters reports directly to the major general who
serves as the Chief of Staff, UNC Headquarters. Communication between
UNC-Rear and UNC is routine, though it has increased with theincorporation of secure video telecommunications (SVTC) allowing
attendance in regular meetings and participation in an increasingly active
UNC agenda.

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The UNC-Rear Headquarters is commanded by a colonel (or anequivalent level officer) who is principally responsible for coordinating
UN operations in Japan and maintaining the UN-Japan SOFA. The
commander concurrently serves as the Secretary to the Joint Board.
Among other tasks, the commander is the approval authority for UN
missions in Japanese territory and is responsible for notifying theGovernment of Japan when Sending State forces intend to exercise their
SOFA privileges.
The Force Representative/Deputy Commander is second-in-commandof the UNC-Rear Headquarters and acts in lieu of the commander. Asidefrom the requirement that the Force Representative be from one of theSending States, there is no specification as to number or rank of personnel
filling this billet. Since 1957, five signatories to the UN-Japan SOFA havefilled the billet with personnel ranging from a British Flight Lieutenant toa Turkish Major to an entire Royal Thai Air Force detachment of 30
personnel and three aircraft.56 Given the breadth of rank and experienceamong the various Force Representatives, commanders have tailoredspecific responsibilities to the individual or individuals serving at UNCRear Headquarters. Those duties included, but were not limited to,coordinating with liaison group personnel; representing the UNC-Rear
Headquarters at official functions; supporting the development of UNC
operational plans; participating in UNC-led exercises; and facilitating the
UNC-Rear Headquarters’ wartime mission. In recent years, the CanadianGovernment has offered consistency in the position by providing a single
Major (O-4) to fill the role, so the Force Representative gained the
additional title of Deputy Commander.
There are two administrative billets within the UNC-Rear
Headquarters: a protocol officer and a Non-Commissioned Officer-inCharge (NCOIC) position. The protocol officer, which used to be a U.S.
Army enlisted billet and is now Department of Defense civilian, is
responsible for supporting distinguished visitors, coordinating ceremonies
and tours, and liaising with other organizations. The NCOIC is a “jack-ofall-trades” position, responsible for handling everything from liaison withbase infrastructure support to managing budget and travel to overseeing
facility and property management. Both the protocol officer and NCOIC
handle other tasks assigned by the Commander or Force Representative.
Finally, the UNC-Rear Headquarters maintains one reserve billet anda plan for headquarters expansion in the event of a contingency on the
Korean Peninsula. The command established this billet to support theInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XXIII, No. 1

89

additional work during exercises and contingencies. The position is billed
for a Captain (O-3) or equivalent officer from one of the Sending States.
Separately, the expansion plan calls for an additional 38 personnel to staff
the UNC-Rear Headquarters in the event of a major contingency.57 Those
personnel would occupy the billets typically associated with headquarters
staff, ranging from U-1 (Personnel) to U-6 (Communications).
Aside from the headquarters positions, there is a formal liaison groupwith representatives from all signatories to the UN-Japan SOFA.
Membership to the group requires accreditation, accomplished by formal
Ambassadorial request to the Commander of UNC-Rear Headquarters. In
practice, this typically results in a group comprised of defense attachésfrom the Sending States’ embassies in Tokyo. UNC-Rear Headquarters
officials have routine contact with the liaison group, especially when theSending States intend to send military forces to or through Japanese
territory. Whereas normal circumstances would require an attachécoordinated diplomatic clearance, under the SOFA, the UNC-Rear
Headquarters is responsible for informing the Japanese government andensuring that any personnel and equipment adhere to SOFA provisions.
Given the small size of the organization, the scope of its functions was
narrow. Foremost, the UNC-Rear Headquarters’ primary function is tomaintain and exercise the UN-Japan SOFA. Maintaining and executing
the SOFA falls under two categories: Armistice and contingency.
Armistice refers to the steady-state conditions on the Korean Peninsula.
Contingency occurs when the Armistice is violated or abrogated andmilitary operations—whether for combat missions or non-combatantevacuations—become necessary.
Armistice Support
During the Armistice, the UNC-Rear Headquarters focuses on
meeting the requirements outlined in the UN-Japan SOFA. The
headquarters ensures it has sufficient organizational representation andliaises with Sending State militaries to exercise of SOFA privileges
annually. This involves the following five tasks:First, UNC-Rear Headquarters personnel coordinate with U.S. andJapanese Government agencies, including the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, and the Sending
State Liaison Group. Actions within the scope of the SOFA requires
frequent coordination among UNC forces, Japanese government officials,
and the U.S. military.

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Second, the UNC-Rear Headquarters coordinates ship and aircraft
visits for familiarization visits or to support operations. Familiarization
visits enable UN forces to gain first-hand experience with ports andairfields in Japan. UNC-Rear Headquarters personnel and the UNC
Liaison Groups work with operational units and the Japanese government
to coordinate the movement of UN forces through and around Japan. The
UNC-Rear Headquarters commander is the approval authority for any
UN-flagged operation within the territory of Japan.
Third, the UNC-Rear Headquarters advocates for the command andconducts orientation tours. These tours are designed for officials in
operational- and policy-level positions and highlight the significance of
the UNC-Japan relationship. These orientations are especially importantfor senior Korean officials. Conducted quarterly, these tours highlight thesignificance of Japanese support in the event of a crisis on the Korean
Peninsula. The UNC-Rear Headquarters annually escorts Tokyo-based
Sending State liaison officers to the ROK to explain the operations andlogistics chain between UN-bases in Japan and UNC facilities in South
Korea.
Fourth, UNC-Rear Headquarters personnel participate in key UNC
exercises. Since the UNC-Rear Headquarters does not have assigned
forces, it provides notional input and supports the White Cell to shape
exercise participants’ expectations on the type of support available fromUN-bases in Japan. 58
Finally, the UNC-Rear Headquarters coordinates Distinguished
Visitor engagements with the Japanese government, supports ceremonies,
and manages day-to-day office functions.
Contingency Support
During crisis or contingencies, the UNC-Rear Headquarters’ functions
expand significantly as the command is responsible for managing UNC
operations throughout Japan. The UNC has developed three categories of
UN forces involved in those operations:
1) UN forces that will stay temporarily in Japan as part of
the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement andIntegration process for deployment to Korea. Examples
include ground combat and combat support units.
2) UN forces that will be based in Japan and move to andfrom the Korean Theater of Operations. Examples include

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91air transport units and intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance assets.
3) UN forces that stay in Japan. These include logistics,
medical, and maintenance units.
To support these operations, the UNC-Rear Headquarters is responsible
for granting entry approval for ships, aircraft, and units. Headquarters
personnel liaise with Japan’s MOFA to meet SOFA obligations. They
coordinate with U.S. bases to ensure there is available space for staging or
beddown of UN forces. The UNC-Rear Headquarters will expand to serveas the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) in Japan, whileworking with Sending State embassy staffs to support non-combatantevacuation operations. Finally, the UNC-Rear Headquarters assists theSending States that are not signatories to the UN-Japan SOFA to receive
the diplomatic clearances needed to conduct UNC operations from Japan.
Japanese Government: UNC Structures, Functions, and Tasks
For most of the existence of the UNC-Japan relationship, the Japanese
government treated UNC matters as a subset of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
There was not much reason to do otherwise; the original Exchange-ofNotes underpinning the UN-Japan relationship was between American
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida; the UN-Japan SOFA ensured that all UN bases would be U.S.administered bases; the UNC is an American-led command, as was UNCRear Headquarters for 53 years; and the principal representative on the
Joint Board is the Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces, Japan.
As such, the organizations principally responsible for managing the
UN-Japan relationship did not intersect with those that normally dealt withindividual Sending States. Instead, the primary interlocutors for managing
the UN-Japan SOFA were, and are, in MOFA’s North American Affairs
Bureau, specifically the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division and the
SOFA Division. Although responsibilities seem split between the twodivisions, they overlap in many areas and the divisions actually share an
office on the sixth floor of the MOFA building. The Treaty Division
Director, SOFA Division Director, and a “Senior Japan-U.S. Alliance
Coordinator” serve as the de facto ‘one-two-three’ for MOFA’s day-today alliance management responsibilities with the U.S. and the UNC-Rear
Headquarters, as required.

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With about 15 personnel,59 the SOFA division is about four-to-fivetimes larger than the entire UNC-Rear Headquarters. However, thedivision’s responsibilities focus on managing SOFA matters for the
103,000 American defense personnel and their dependents present inJapan under the bilateral U.S.-Japan SOFA. These responsibilities include:
1) Working with relevant Japanese ministries and agencies
on SOFA-related concerns. These include jurisdictional
matters, frequency management, and utilities issues,
among others.
2) Negotiating and implementing force realignment
initiatives, including politically contentious items likethose related to the bases in Okinawa. This also includes
negotiating the designation of new UN bases.
3) Preparing, conducting, and recording U.S.-Japan Joint
Committee and UN-Japan Joint Board meetings.
Although the UN-Japan Joint Board has only met threetimes, the Joint Committee has met well over 1000 times,
as it convenes nearly every two weeks.
4) Generating ministerial responses for Diet testimony. If amember of parliament, opposition or ruling party, raises aquestion pertaining to the U.S.-Japan or UN-Japan
SOFAs, SOFA division research and draft appropriate
responses for cabinet ministers.60
5) Liaising with base-hosting populations to explain changes
in conditions. Although the Ministry of Defense’s Bureauof Local Cooperation and regional defense bureaus are theprimary liaisons for base-hosting communities, whenevera matter pertaining to the SOFA arises, a member of
MOFA’s SOFA division typically accompanies defense
officials to provide explanations to local political officials
and community groups.61
This list is by no means exhaustive. The relatively small cadre of MOFA
SOFA Division personnel are often over-stretched. With the massive
amount of issues related to the U.S.-Japan SOFA, it requires strong
political impetus to generate bureaucratic momentum for UNC-Japan
initiatives.

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Another factor is the frequent turnover of civil services personnel. The
Japanese government’s personnel system typically mandates thatbureaucrats change positions about every two years. In some ways, thisdegrades continuity, especially when UN-Japan SOFA issues arise
infrequently. This system also makes addressing long-term UNC-Japan
initiatives difficult. Frequent changes in personnel necessitates educating
new arrivals on the issues and building the relationship between the UNCRear Headquarters staff and MOFA SOFA personnel. However, thissystem occasionally works to the benefit of the UNC if members familiar
with the UNC-Japan relationship move to other influential government
offices or return to positions of leadership within MOFA.62 In those cases,
the UNC can advance progress on initiatives important to the command if
the UNC-Rear Headquarters knows to leverage those relationships.
Because UN forces operate from U.S. bases, there was no requirement
for Japanese Self-Defense Forces to liaise and coordinate with the UNCRear Headquarters. With no functional requirements, the relationshipremained static until recently. With a push to use the UNC-Rear
Headquarters as a bridge between U.S.-Japan exercises and U.S.-Korea
exercises, the Japan Joint Staff (namely, the J3 Operations directorate andJ5 Plans and Policy directorate) has a need to maintain functional
relationships with UNC-Rear Headquarters. However, it often does thisthrough existing relationships with USFJ.
Another major change in the Japanese government’s handling of the
UNC-Japan relationship came with the advent of the National Security
Secretariat. Comprised of approximately 75 staff members seconded from
MOFA, the Ministry of Defense, the National Police Agency, Japan Coast
Guard, and others, the NSS is now the principal policy coordination
authority for foreign affairs and defense.63 The establishment of the NSS
created a situation in which the Japanese interlocutors involved in the
UNC-Japan relationship were no longer just comprised of individuals who
saw UNC as a subset of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Rather, the NSS staffers
had broader responsibilities, including responding to North Korean
provocations, supporting UN sanctions enforcement, and advancing
Japan’s security partnerships with countries other than the U.S. These
countries include South Korea and signatories to the UN-Japan SOFA,
such as Australia, Canada, France, and the U.K. While MOFA continues
to be the primary interlocutor for the UNC-Japan relationship, the NSS
staff serve as interagency coordinators to advance mutually beneficial
security initiatives.

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Limits on Japanese Integration
Aside from the well-documented historical tensions between Japanand South Korea, there are practical and political reasons why Japan has
not sought formal integration with the UNC at any point in its six-decaderelationship with the command. During the Korean War, Japan spent two
years during the fighting as an occupied nation. After regaining its
sovereignty, the government would wait another two years before
establishing the Self Defense Force (SDF). Since 1954, the constitution
served as the primary obstacle to a closer military relationship with the
UNC.
Article IX of Japan’s constitution is known as the anti-war clause andprevents the SDF from integrating in any sort of foreign military commandand control structure.64 The constitutional limitation is known in Japanese
as ittaika. The word literally means “to integrate” or “to become one.” In
the context of the constitution, it refers to a stipulation where the SDF is
prohibited from joining any command structure where a partner military
maintains different rules on “use of force;” i.e., the employment of militarycapabilities in combat. It is why Japan can participate in CTF-151 antipiracy missions,65 but cannot provide a single Foreign Exchange Officer
to Indo-Pacific Command.66 It explains why Japan has necessarily kept its
relationship to the UNC as one of a support capacity with no aim to gain
formal membership in the command itself.
Japanese Political SentimentJapanese domestic politics remain an important consideration for the
UNC-Japan relationship. As discussed, the UNC operated in relative
obscurity as a subset of the U.S.-Japan alliance for much of its existence.
Key members of the Japanese government were aware of UNC-Rear
Headquarters,67 but those officials preferred to minimize public discourseon the command and its accompanying SOFA rather than invite political
scrutiny. Given the limited use of UN bases and other constraints on UN
operations during the Armistice—e.g., requirements to notify the Japanese
government and operate from U.S. bases—there are few practical issues
to deliberate.
Over time, the small size of the UNC-Rear Headquarters, the absenceof major incidents and accidents, and the smooth management of UN
activities in Japan have mitigated politicization of the headquarters and the
UN-Japan SOFA. Since the establishment of the UNC-Rear Headquarters,

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it has only been brought up nine times in the Japanese Diet; “UNC,” which
includes the forces on the Korean Peninsula, has been brought up 31 times;and “UN Forces in Japan” has been brought up only 13 times.
Comparatively, in that same time period, “Headquarters USFJ” has beenbrought up 327 times, and “US Forces in Japan” have been mentioned
4002 times.68
However, there are two legacy issues that may lead to the negative
politicization of UN Forces in Japan. First, the Japanese government
renegotiated the U.S.-Japan “Administrative Agreement” (the predecessor
to the Status of Forces Agreement), but no such renegotiations occurred
for the UN-Japan SOFA. The argument could be made that the remnantsof the 1951 “Unequal Treaty” still exist; i.e., UN forces have the right tostation its armed forces in Japan with no formal obligation to defend Japan.
Second, UN forces and UN-designated facilities contribute to the “basehosting burden.” Certain Japanese interest groups and politicians routinely
call for futan keigen [burden reduction], advocating for limits on military
operations, return of land used by the armed forces, and fewer incidents
and accidents. Thus, the Japanese government is cautious about increased
UNC operations in and from Japan, the addition of signatories to the UNJapan SOFA, or anything else that could be perceived as increasing the“burden” on the Japanese population. This could have negative political
impact on the administration or threaten the long-term sustainability of the
UNC-Japan relationship. Given these circumstances, the Japanese
government will quietly support ongoing initiatives without directly
drawing attention to the long-standing UNC-Japan relationship.69
The Prior Consultation Issue
One issue relevant to public discourse on the relationship between the
UNC and Japan is that of prior consultation. Tokyo, fearing the possibilityof being entrapped in conflict as a result of U.S. operations from Japan,sought to include a consultation requirement when negotiating the second
iteration of its postwar alliance treaty with the Washington. In addition to
Article IV 70 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security andCooperation, the two governments clarified the requirement via an
Exchange of Notes:
Major changes in the deployment into Japan of UnitedStates armed forces, major changes in their equipment,
and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for

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military combat operations to be undertaken from Japanother than those conducted under Article V of the said
Treaty.71
In short, prior consultation is the requirement for the U.S. to consult with
the Japanese government before taking military actions from Japan that
may affect Japanese security.
Certainly, prior consultation is an important consideration in intraalliance decision-making, and it played a significant role in the early
history of the UNC-Japan relationship. There were two agreements known
as the “Kishi (or Korean) minute” and the “Korea clause.” The former
came in 1960 as a concession from the government of Nobusuke Kishi,
asserting that the U.S. military had the administration’s tacit agreement tolaunch immediate military action from Japan in the event of a North
Korean armed attack. The latter was part of the November 1969 joint
communique that, based on verbal affirmation, noted that if the U.S.
military was required to respond to either Taiwan or North Korean crises,
the Japanese government would say “yes” in response to U.S. priorconsultation. Based on those 60s-era Japanese concessions that would
have presumably allowed U.S. forces to launch military operations fromUN-designated bases without prior consultation, the argument exists that
preservation of this legal loophole was a key point in establishment andmaintenance of the UNC-Rear Headquarters.72
While evidence suggests that prior consultation was a notableconsideration in the legal status of UN bases in the 60s and early 70s,73
there are three counterpoints to the claims that it has underwritten longterm sustainment of the UNC-Japan relationship. First, the UN-Japan
SOFA is an agreement about the legal status of military forces and theprovision of logistics support, not an alliance treaty. The UNC-Rear
Headquarters is responsible for managing SOFA issues, notintergovernmental issues related to fears of entrapment and abandonment.
Second, the UNC does not maintain forces in Japan; in other words, itwould be incapable of violating a prior consultation agreement even if it
applied. The only forces that could potentially violate a prior consultationagreement are U.S. forces, which, by legal agreement, operate under the
Mutual Security Treaty and bilateral U.S.-Japan SOFA, not UN authority
or the UN-Japan SOFA. Third, the Kishi Minute is limited in its
applicability. The minute states that prior consultation would not be
required in the event of an armed attack situation and gives no such

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concession for military action absent that. Based on that language, apreemptive strike or any other military action absent a declared North
Korean armed attack would fall outside of the scope of the Japanese
government concession. Fourth, the argument that UNC-Rear
Headquarters continues to be a front for preserving a loophole in priorconsultation is Korea-centric and ignores forty years of alliance evolution.
It presupposes that the assertions of administrations in the sixties still
represent policy positions of governments today. In fact, during aparliamentary committee meeting on July 5, 2014, Prime Minister Abe
addressed this issue, stating that Okinawa-based Marines, which includes
the UN-designated Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, will not be
permitted to deploy to support a Korean contingency without priorconsultation with the Japanese government.74 While that testimony does
not necessarily indicate the formal negotiated position of the two
governments, it at least signals that, regardless of the sixties-era Kishi
Minute and “Korea clause,” the current Japanese government expects tobe consulted before any major military actions from Japanese territory.
In sum, the UNC-Japan relationship is unrelated to the separate
requirement for prior consultation under the U.S.-Japan bilateral security
treaty. U.S. forces will still need to consult the Japanese government prior
to taking any action that might endanger the Japanese population,
regardless of the status of UNC forces in Japan.
Conclusion
The UNC is the multinational headquarters that led the allied forces in
the Korean War. Sixteen UN member states sent combat forces and fiveprovided humanitarian assistance to the UNC. Japan—both as an occupied
country and sovereign nation—was a critical contributor to the UNC,
albeit outside the command’s formal structure. When fighting ended in astalemate, the UNC’s mission and structure shifted to deterring North
Korea and supervising the Armistice Agreement. Japan’s role changed aswell, shifting from active support of operations on the Korean Peninsula
to passive maintenance of a rear area hub that can be employed rapidly
and effectively in the case of resumed conflict in Korea.
When UNC Headquarters moved to Seoul in 1957, the newly formed
UNC-Rear Headquarters took over management of the SOFA andrelationships with relevant governmental offices. For many years, theheadquarters focused on maintaining the status quo. However, changes ininterests and institutions within the UNC, the Japanese government, and98International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2019

the Sending States ushered in new opportunities for expanded activities
under the aegis of the UNC-Japan relationship.
The early 2000s witnessed substantial change in the interests andinstitutions underlying the UNC-Japan relationship. The collocation of the
UNC-Rear Headquarters and USFJ Headquarters, as well as theappointment of an Australian commander at the UNC-Rear Headquarters,
set the foundation for active coordination of UN forces activities in Japan.
The Japanese government desired to expand security partnerships withseveral of the Sending States and execute a maximum pressure campaign
against North Korea. A new National Security Secretariat that exercisedinteragency policy-coordination authority provided the means andmomentum to employ the UNC-Japan framework to pursue theseobjectives.
These initiatives notwithstanding, there are still limitations on what
Japan can do in support of the UNC. Political tensions between South
Korea and Japan aside, the inability of the Japan Self Defense Force tointegrate into command and control structures with foreign militaries willcontinue to keep Japan outside of formal membership with UNC. Further,domestic politics continues to be a consideration, and the government must
balance the long-term viability of the UNC-Japan relationship and its
associated SOFA with near-term initiatives that, although mutually
beneficial, could lead to protest.
Despite these potential obstacles to progress, the UNC has expanded
its activities in Japan to levels not seen since the 1950s. The use of the
SOFA for sanctions monitoring missions and exercise participation
showcases progress under the framework of the long-standing UNC-Japan
relationship, while continuing to provide the institutional foundation forother initiatives. The relative obscurity of the UNC-Japan relationshipbelies its importance. There has been, and will continue to be, a criticalconnection between Japan and the preservation of stability of Northeast
Asia in the face of a North Korean threat.

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Notes:1 The first formal usage of the term “Sending State” was in the United Nations-Japan

Status of Forces Agreement, but it is now the common term of reference for nations
which have committed forces to UN Command.
2 A Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, is an agreement which covers the legal
provisions for a foreign military or militaries operating within another sovereign territory.
Provisions include but are not limited to taxation, basing, entry and exit procedures,
criminal jurisdiction, and host nation support.
3
UN Security Council Resolutions 82 (passed 25 June 1950), 83 (27 June 1950), and 84(7 July 1950).
4 Neither the ROK nor the U.S. are considered Sending States: the former received forces
and latter established the unified command. Shawn P. Creamer, “The United Nations
Command and the Sending States,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Volume
XXI, Number 2 (Fall/Winter 2017), p. 64.
5 The Supreme Commander of the Allied powers was the military government for
occupied Japan. Within Japan, the position was generally referred to as General
Headquarters. In addition to serving as SCAP, General MacArthur was the Commanderin-Chief (CINC) FECOM. In June 1950, FECOM consisted of the General Headquarters(GHQ) staff, the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands, a geographical component(Philippines) and Army, Naval, and Air Force components. Creamer, p. 60.
6 Kijeong Nam, “The Reality of Military Base and the Evolution of Pacifism: Japan’s
Korea War and Peace,” The Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (December 2014),
20.
7 On 8 July 1950, just a day after the passage of UNSCR 84, General Douglas MacArthur(Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers-Pacific) sent a letter to Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida requesting the buildup of the National Police Reserve. A few months
later, on 8 October 1950, a memorandum from the Commander of Naval Forces Far East
was submitted to Japan’s Ministry of Transport (the parent organization of the Maritime
Safety Agency) to assemble minesweepers, a guinea pig, and and other Maritime Safety
Agency vessels in the port of Moji (Kyūshū). In reply, Shigeru Yoshida sent a letter toGeneral MacArthur offering Japan’s full support to the war effort, which not only
supported Japan’s negotiating position in the peace treaty talks but provided a major
economic boost through domestic procurements for the war effort, so much so that
Shigeru Yoshida (in)famously called the Korean War a “gift from the gods.”
8 In total, the Japan Maritime Safety Agency deployed forty-four minesweepers, sevenpatrol boats, and two guinea pigs.
9 “Exchange of Notes Signed at San Francisco,” conclusion date: September 8, 1951,
USARJ PAM 550-1: United States-Japan Treaties, Agreements, and Other Documents,
10 September 1984: 21.
10 The Administrative Agreement was the predecessor to the 1960 Status of Forces
Agreement.
11 In carrying out the Nixon Doctrine which demanded greater defense contributions from
America’s allies, the Nixon administration debated drawing down forces in Korea anddissolving UN Command. The Carter administration also signaled an intent to withdraw

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U.S. forces from Korea. Neither administration carried out their original policy
intentions.
12 There are seventeen confirmed abductees, but missing persons cases along Japan’s
western coast suggest the actual number is much higher; “Headquarters for the Abduction
Issue,” Government of Japan, accessed December 10, 2018,https://www.rachi.go.jp/en/index.html.
13 The 1993-94 North Korean Nuclear Crisis coincided with the most sweeping changes
to Japanese defense capabilities and posture since the creation of the Self-Defense Force.
The Japanese government issued its second-ever National Defense Program Guidelines,
adopted new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation with heavy focus on a
North Korean crisis, and pursued ballistic missile defense technology that put it on theleading edge of those capabilities. Importantly, none of those changes focused on the
UNC-Japan relationship, which was still seen as a subset of the broader U.S.-Japan
alliance.
14 There is a noticeable absence of discourse on the subject of UNC in Japanese sources.
Rather, most archival records, especially in the sixties and seventies, point to the issue ofthe role of UN bases vis-à-vis the prior consultation requirement (see section in thispaper entitled, “The Prior Consultation Issue”).
15 USFK Homepage, Combined Forces Command Tab,
http://www.usfk.mil/About/Combined-Forces-Command/ (accessed April 16, 2018).
16
Shawn P. Creamer, Answering the Korea Question: U.S. Government Policy toward
the Unified Command and the Korea Armistice Agreement, Civilian Research Project(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2017), 18 and 72-74; LtCol
Mel T. S. Han and Maj Dong Hyun Yoon CFC Historical Branch, Headquarters ROK /US Combined Forces Command Historical Summary, November 7, 1978 – December 31,
1979, (Yongsan Garrison, ROK: Command Historian Office), pp. 1-2.
17 Creamer, pp. 69-70.
18 Korean Armistice Agreement, Article II, Paragraph 19.
19 Creamer, p. 73.
20 Creamer, p. 74.
21 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 1,
2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html.
22 At the time, UNC Commander General B.B. Bell and Lieutenant General Bruce“Orville” Wright conducted weekly phone calls and frequently had staff exchanges for
coordination on operational plans and other activities; Author interview with Lt Gen(retired) Wright, December 18, 2018.
23 Colonel Driver had four objectives for moving UNC-Rear headquarters to Yokota Air
Base: one, enabling UNC-Rear to serve as a conduit for Korean and Japanese military-tomilitary engagement; two, fostering closer engagement with the USFJ staff for purposesof exercise support; three, presenting solidarity between UNC and USFJ senior
headquarters in Japan; and four, posturing for contingency response in the event of
renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula; Colonel (retired) Floyd Driver, Former
Commander, United Nations Command-Rear, email exchange with author, January 9,
2018.
24 At the time, UNC-Rear’s primary relationship with USFJ was through the J5 Plans andPolicy Directorate.

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25 USFJ Deputy Commander Major General J.F. Flock, “Memorandum to Joint Board

Representative (Japan),” letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo, Japan,
October 11, 2007.
26 UNC Commander General Walter L. Sharp letter to Australian Chief of the Defence
Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston, Yongsan, Republic of Korea, undated.
27 Australian Chief of the Defence Force Air Chief Marshall Angus Houston response
letter to UNC Commander General Walter L. Sharp, Canberra, Australia, October 29,
2009.
28 Air Commodore (retired) Tony McCormack, Former Commander, United Nations
Command-Rear, email exchange with author, January 4, 2018.
29 In the past, the liaison group traveled to Camp Zama and Yokota for engagements with
UNC-Rear. UNC-Rear changed the policy to increase UNC-Rear engagement at theSending States embassies and Japanese government offices in Tokyo.
30 Tony McCormack, “Air Power in Disaster Relief: The Role of the Royal Australian
Air Force in Australia’s Response to the 2011 Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami,” Royal
Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre, July 31, 2014, 7.
31 Creamer, p. 74.
32 Australia had formally indicated its desire for increased security cooperation withJapan in its 2007 “Joint Declaration” (“Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html) andsubsequent ministerial-level meetings; the 2016 UK-Japan Foreign and Defense
ministerial meeting (“2+2”) produced a joint statement calling for the two countries to“explore possible cooperation between Japan, the UK and other regional partners,
including through joint exercises” (“Second Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial
Meeting Joint Statement,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/gb/page4e_000368.html); theFrench and Japanese governments initiated 2+2 meetings in 2014, with subsequent
ministerial-level foreign affairs and defense meetings in 2015 and 2017, each producing astatement calling for steadily increasing, formalized security cooperation.
33 As of December 2016, the Joint Committee had convened 1030 times.
34 “National Security Strategy,” Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, December 17, 2013, 23.
35 This is a variant of a Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA.
36 “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed 5
December 2018, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-testdatabase/.
37 Known as “saidaigen no atsuryoku” in Japanese, Japan’s maximum pressure campaign
came in conjunction with the newly minted Trump Administration’s North Korea
strategy.
38 Michael Bosack, “Japan’s National Security Secretariat, Four Years On,” Tokyo
Review, 8 February 2018, http://www.tokyoreview.net/2018/02/japans-national-securitysecretariat-four-years/.
39 This position also covers China and Russia.
40 The USFJ J5 Director is billeted to an Army 0-6 (Colonel) Foreign Area Officer(FAO). The particular J5 supporting the Japanese NSS visit to UNC facilities in Korea
was Colonel Mark Hague, a long-time FAO in the Indo-Pacific region with extensive
knowledge of both the government of Japan and the importance of the Japan’s role vis-àvis any Korean contingency.

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41 Email correspondence between USFJ J54 and Japan Joint Staff J5, Subject: “Invitation

for UNC-R & USFJ Orientation,” March 24, 2017.
42 Exercise participation in 2017 included embedded Sending State officers in the 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force and in UNC-Rear headquarters.
43 Given the political tensions that exist between Japan and South Korea, UNC
headquarters and Japan Joint Staff saw UNC’s participation in mostly bilateral U.S.-ROK
exercises like ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and bilateral U.S.-Japan exercises like
KEEN EDGE as a stepping stone for greater multinational inclusion.
44 “Canadian pastor freed by North Korea 'has been flown to Japan',” The Guardian, 10
August 2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/10/canadian-pastor-hyeon-soo-lim-freednorth-korea-flown-japan.
45 “SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TORESOLUTION 1718 (2006): Resolutions,” UN Security Council, accessed December 12,
2018, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/resolutions.
46 “British amphibious assault ship arrives in Tokyo,” Reuters, August 3, 2018,https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-britain-defence/british-amphibious-assault-shiplands-marines-in-tokyo-idUKKBN1KO02P; “HMS Sutherland arrives in Japan in effort
to curb North Korea's evasion of sanctions,” The Telegraph, April 12, 2018,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/12/hms-sutherland-arrives-japan-effort-curbnorth-koreas-evasion/.
47 “Monitoring and surveillance activities by partner countries against illicit maritime
activities including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean flagged vessels prohibitedby UNSCRs,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 6, 2018,https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002210.html.
48 “Heisei sanjyū ichi nendo ikō ni kakaru bōueikeikaku no taikō ni tsuite [“National
Defense Program Guidelines”],” Ministry of Defense of Japan, December 18, 2018, 1415.
49 UN Command reinstated South Africa as a sending state in 2010 and Italy in 2018, butboth countries would have to be reaffirmed by both UNC and the government of Japan as
an active party to the SOFA to enjoy the rights granted under the agreement.
50 It is possible for additional countries to become party to the UN-Japan SOFA. A state
first needs to be a member of the Sending States in Korea. Once an official Sending
State, its government must submit a request to UNC-Rear headquarters to become asignatory to the SOFA, the most direct route being through its embassy in Japan. The
UNC-Rear Commander would then forward the request to the Deputy Commander ofU.S. Forces, Japan and the UNC Commander in Korea to gain their approval. If it is
supported, the UN-Japan Joint Board convenes to approve or deny the request. Any new
signatories would then have to meet the requirements as outlined in the SOFA tomaintain their legal privileges.
51 The United States is also a signatory to the bilateral U.S.-Japan SOFA which takes
precedence over the UN-Japan SOFA.
52 Not listed in this table is Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Although the base served
as a refueling location for the Thai Air Detachment at Tachikawa Air Base from July
1971 to July 1977, it never had formal UN designation.

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53 The service spearheading this initiative was the U.S. Air Force; John G. McKay Jr.,

“Report No. 5692, THE KANTO PLAIN CONSOLIDATION PLAN: A Case Study of
Military Cost Reduction,” Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1975, 3.
54 Takashi Koyama, “‘Kantō Keikaku no naritachi ni tsuite’ [About the Origins of the‘Kantō Plan’],” National Institute for Defense Studies, March 2008, 2.
55 The author compiled organizational charts from UNC-Rear briefings dated 2000, 2004,
2014, and 2017.
56 The following indicates the historical Force Representatives by sending state and years
served: Thailand (1957 to 1976); United Kingdom (1976 to 1978); Philippines (1978 to2002); United Kingdom (2003 to 2005); Australia (2006); United Kingdom (2006 to2007); Thailand (2008); Australia (2009); Turkey (2009 to 2011); Canada (2011 topresent).
57 Compiled from UNC-Rear information pamphlets and briefings dated 2000, 2004,
2014, 2017, and 2018.
58 An Exercise White Cell is the group charged with managing the actual exercise. There
are many White Cell tasks, but overall, the group is responsible for shaping the exercise
scenario for players to ensure that all exercise objectives are met as realistically as
possible.
59 At least one of those personnel is seconded from the Ministry of Finance to handle
fiscal issues related to the SOFA. While the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division has atleast one seconded Self-Defense Force officer, there are no defense personnel in the
SOFA Division.
60 Known as “tōben,” the government treats responses that cabinet ministers offer in Diet
plenary sessions or committee meetings as de facto policy unless retracted in future
testimony. As such, bureaucrats are charged with providing cabinet ministers drafted
responses not just to protect the ministers from embarrassment, but to preserve ministry
initiatives and interests.
61 One example of this related to UNC came when UNC-Rear moved from Camp Zama
to Yokota Air Base. Despite the move only consisting of four personnel, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs published formal justification via press release and website, as well as
providing explanations directly to local communities. For the MOFA publication, see“Relocation of the United Nations Command (Rear) from Camp Zama to Yokota Air
Base,” October 26, 2007,https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/10/1176845_836.html; for the local
community publication, see “Chōsen-Kokurengun-Kōhōshireibu no Kyanpu Zama kara
Yokota hikōjo he no isetsu nit suite (“Regarding the move of UNC-Rear from Camp
Zama to Yokota Air Base”),” Hamura City, November 10, 2010,
http://www.city.hamura.tokyo.jp/0000000086.html.
62 A prominent example of this is Takehiro Funakoshi, who served as the director of theJapan-U.S. Treaty Division before eventually becoming the first NSS Cabinet Counsellor
for North Korean, Chinese, and Russian affairs in 2013. He is currently serving as the
Deputy Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau, meaning he is both theauthority in charge of the Japan-US Security Treaty and SOFA Divisions and the(delegated) Principal Japanese representative on the UN-Japan Joint Board.
63 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s National Security Council: Policy Coordination and Political
Power,” Japanese Studies (2018), 10.

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64 Article IX: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, theJapanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aimof the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
65 Japan has committed two destroyers and two P-3 aircraft to CTF-151, which includes
military personnel from the United States, Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, Denmark,France, the Netherlands, and Australia, among others. Japan commanded CTF-151 from
May to August 2015, March to June 2017, and March to June 2018.
66 In 2016, U.S. Pacific Command offered to incorporate a Japanese Foreign Exchange
Officer (FEO) within its J5 office, which the Japan Self-Defense Force turned down
based on constitutional limitations. The FEO position differs from a Liaison Officer(LNO) in that a FEO works within the command and control structure of a foreign
military organization, while an LNO may be embedded with that same organization but isonly legally obligated to follow orders from his/her home military command.
67 Called the Chōsen Kokuren-gun kōhō-shireibu in Japanese.
68 Data on Diet testimonies gathered from the Japanese government’s Kokkai kaigi-roku
kensaku shisutemu (“National Diet Committee Search System”). Searches wereconducted for both the House of Councillors and House of Representatives from June
1957 to November 2018.
69
For example, in the MOFA press release regarding the dispatch of Australian,Canadian, New Zealand, and other states’ militaries for UNSCR sanctions enforcement,
there is neither mention of the use of the UN-Japan SOFA or the role of United Nations
Command, nor links to other MOFA pages detailing the UNC-Japan relationship;“Multinational efforts against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transferswith North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited by UNSCRs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan, September 23, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002168.html.
70 Article IV states: “The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding theimplementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the securityof Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”
71 “EXCHANGE OF NOTES INCORPORATING AGREED CONSULTATIONFORMULA,” Washington, D.C., conclusion date: January 19, 1960; Article V details theobligation for defense of Japan.
72 Dong-jun Lee, “From the Secret ‘Korean Minute’ to the Open ‘Korea Clause’: The
United States and Japan and the Security of the Republic of Korea,” Asian Perspective,
36 (2012), 137; Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.
Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 164-165.
73 For example, in declassified NSC minutes signed by National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger, a condition for the Nixon administration’s push to dissolve UNC was thenecessity to seek “an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would
extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty following
termination of the UNC”; “National Security Decision Memorandum 251,” National
Security Council, March 29, 1974.
74 “Dai 186 kai kokkai, Yosan iinkai dai 1 go [Number 186 Diet Session, Budget
Committee Number 1 Session],” House of Councillors, July 15, 2014,
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/186/0014/18607150014001a.html.

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