The Dialogue with the World“Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy”

Conference Papers

October 29‐30, 2013
At the International House of JapanTokyo, Japan
Co‐sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Washington College International Studies Program
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Table of Contents
1．Program………………………………………………………………………………………………1
2．Biographies of the Panelists……………………………………………………………………2
3．Presentation Papers…………...……………………………………………………………………5
Session I : “Value Diplomacy” and Today…………………………...…………………………………….……….5
Andrew L. OROS.....................................................................................................................................5
OKAGAKI Tomoko.....................................................................................................................................6
SHI Yinhong................................................................................................................................7
MIYAOKA Isao.....................................................................................................................................8
Wei LIANG.....................................................................................................................................10

Session II: Universalism and Uniqueness in “Value Diplomacy”………………………………….…..............11
SATO Yoichiro.............................................................................................................................11David WALTON.............................................................................................................................13
ANNO Tadashi.............................................................................................................................14
Lindsay BLACK.............................................................................................................................16
ITO Go............................................................................................................................. 17
Kim Beng PHAR (A view from ASEAN)..................................................................................................18

4．An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)……………...…….…………19
5．An Introduction to Washington College International Studies Program……………...20
6．An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)……………...21

1. Program
世界との対話The Dialogue with the World「価値観外交」の可能性
Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy
２０１３年１０月３０日（水）／Wednesday. October, 30th, 2013
東京、日本／Tokyo, Japan
共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム ／ The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
ワシントン・カレッジ国際研究所／Washington College International Studies Program（公財）日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)2013 年 10 月 29 日（火）／ Tuesday, 29th October, 2013
国際文化会館「 SAKURA 」／ International House of Japan "SAKURA"
開幕夕食会 *特別招待者のみ ／ Working Dinner *Invitation Only

19:00-21:00

石川薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長主催ワーキングディナー

Working Dinner hosted by ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR2013 年 10 月 30 日（水）／ Wednesday, 30th October, 2013
【公開セッション／ Open Session 】 国際文化会館「講堂」 ／ International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"
開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks

13:30-13:40
開会挨拶（5分間）
Opening Remarks(5min.)

石川 薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長
ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR

セッションⅠ／Session I「価値観外交」の今日的意義“Value Diplomacy” and Today

13:40-15:20
議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員・明治大学教授
ITO Go, Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR, Professor, Meiji University

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)アンドリュー・オロス ワシントン・カレッジ国際研究所所長
Andrew L. OROS, Director, Washington College International Studies Program

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)岡垣 知子 獨協大学教授
OKAGAKI Tomoko, Professor, Dokkyo University

報告C（10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)

時 殷弘 中国人民大学米国研究所所長
SHI Yinhong, Director, Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学教授
MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University

報告E （10分間）
Presenter E (10 min.)梁
微 米国モントレー国際研究所准教授
Wei LIANG, Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

自由討議（45分）
Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

15：20-15:30

休憩 ／ BreakセッションⅡ／SessionⅡ

15：30-17：30

各国による「価値観外交」―普遍性と独自性
Universalism and Uniqueness in “Value Diplomacy”

議長 （5分間）
Chairperson (5 min.)

石川 薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長
ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR

報告A （10分間）
Presenter A (10 min.)佐藤 洋一郎 立命館アジア太平洋大学教授
SATO Yoichiro, Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

報告B （10分間）
Presenter B (10 min.)

ディビット・ワルトン 西シドニー大学上級准教授
David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

報告C（10分間）
Presenter C (10 min.)安野 正士 上智大学准教授
ANNO Tadashi, Associate Professor, Sophia University

報告D （10分間）
Presenter D (10 min.)リンゼイ・ブラック オランダ/ライデン大学地域研究所講師
Lindsay BLACK, Lecturer, Leiden Univesity Institute for Area Studies, Leiden Univesity, the Netherlands

報告E （10分間）
Presenter E (10 min.)伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員・明治大学教授
ITO Go, Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR, Professor, Meiji University

自由討議（45分）
出席者全員
All Participants
Free Discussions (45 min.)[NOTE ］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2．Biographies of the Panelists【Foreign Panelists】
Andrew L. OROS
Director, Washington College International Studies Program
Received Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 2002. Served as Editor of "Millennium: Journalof International Studies" (1992-1993), Japanese government graduate Mombusho fellow (1997-1999), Visiting
Northeast Asia Fellow, East-West Center(2005-2006), Visiting Scholar, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George
Washington University (2006), Invited Visiting Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studie (2009), Visiting
Scholar, School of International Studies, Peking University, China (2010) and Visiting Associate Professor, Facultyof Law, Keio University (2010-2011).

SHI Yinhong
Director, Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China
Received Ph.D. in International History from Nanjing University in 1988. Served as Visiting fellow at
Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University (1983-1984), Professor of International History at Nanjing
University (1993-1998), Professor of International Relations at International Relations Academy, Nanjing(1998-2001), President of American Historical Research Association of China (1996-2002), Fulbright research
visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1995-1996) and Visiting Professor of Modern
China Studies at Aichi University in Nagoya (2004). Concurrently serves as Chairman of Academic Committee of
the School of International Studies, and Director of the Center on American Studies at Renmin University of China
in Beijing and Counsellor of the State Council of People's Republic of China.

Wei LIANG
Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Wei Liang is associate professor in the School of International Policy and Management at the Monterrey
Institute of International Studies. Her research interests include international political economy of East Asia,
Asian regionalism, international trade negotiation and global governance. She is the coauthor of China andEast Asia’s Post-Crises Community: A Region in Flux? (Lexington, 2012), co-editor of China and Global Trade
Governance (Routledge, forthcoming), a number of journal articles and book chapters. A graduate of thePeking University, People’s Republic of China, she received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the
University of Southern California.

David WALTON
Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney
He holds a BA from Griffith University and a MA and PhD from the University of Queensland. His researchinterests are in diplomatic history, foreign policy and Australia - Japan post-war relations. He has taught at
the University of Western Sydney since 1995 and prior to that at Griffith University and the University of
Tasmania. His most recent publications are " New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia Pacific: China,
Japan and Australia" William.T.Tow, David Walton and Rikki Kersten (eds.) (Ashgate; london, 2013) and"Australia, Japan and the Region, 1952 to 1965: Early Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy" (New York; Nova,2012).

Lindsay BLACK
Lecturer, Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University
Received Ph.D. in Sheffield University in 2006. Received Monbusho Scholarship, MEARC and LIAS researchsubsidy and JSPS-NWO Joint Seminar Grant. He concurrently serves as Leiden University Institute for Area
Studies (LIAS), Advisory Council, MA International Studies (MAIS), Coordinator, MA International Studies(MAIS), Board of Admissions, Opleidings Commissie (OLC), MA International Studies and China Committee,
Department of Chinese Studies.
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【Japanese Panelists】
ISHIKAWA Kaoru Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Graduated from University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l’Ecole
Nationale d’Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic Studies(IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa (1999-2001 and 2005-07),
Director General of Global Affairs Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs Bureau (2005-07),
Ambassador to Egypt and then to Canada. Also served as Part time lecturer at Waseda University and Visiting
Professor at the University of Tokyo. In addition to serving as Senior Executive Director of JFIR, he concurrently
serves as Opinion Leader Member of Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), and Executive Vice-President of Council on
East Asian Community (CEAC).

ITO GoProfessor, Meiji University / Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University ofDenver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006.
Also served as Visiting professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica(Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain),
Austrailian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at
Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipientsof the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as
Councilor of JFIR.

OKAGAKI Tomoko
Professor, Dokyo University
She holds a doctoral degree in political science from the University of Michigan and conducts research oninternational politics with particular emphasis on International Relations theory. Her recent research interests
include, inter alia, state socialization, Asian regionalism, and institutionalization of the post-Cold War Japanese
security policy. She recently completed her monograph, The Logic of Conformity: Japan’s Entry in International
Society (University of Toronto Press, 2013) and her co-translation of Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War(Keiso Shobo, 2013). She held an Abe Fellowship (2008-2010), spending a total of two years as a visiting scholar at
Harvard University.

MIYAOKA Isao
Professor, Keio University
Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired fromoffice in 1995. Received his MA from the University of Canterbury in 1994 and his D.Phil. in politics from the
University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001 and as Associate Professor at
Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 to 2007, at Osaka University from 2007 to 2010, and then at Keio
University from 2010 to 2012. Held the current position since 2012. His research interests include international
relations theory and Japanese and American security policy.

Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University/
Hennebach Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor, Colorado School of Mines
Graduated from Keio University. Received Ph.D (Political Science) from University of Hawaii. Currently resides inGolden, Colorado. Previously taught at the U.S. Department of Defense’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Auckland University (New Zealand), Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College, and University of Hawaii. His major works
include Japan in A Dynamic Asia (co-edited with Satu Limaye, Lexington Books, 2006), Norms, Interests, andPower in Japanese Foreign Policy (co-edited with Keiko Hirata, Palgrave, 2008), The Rise of China andInternational Security (co-edited with Kevin Cooney, Routledge, 2008), and The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance:
Regional Multilateralism (co-edited with Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, Palgrave, 2001). Professor Sato
has commented on strategic and security affairs in East Asia on such media as Time Magazine, National PublicRadio, and Voice of America.
SATO Yoichiro

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ANNO Tadashi
Associate Professor, Sophia University
He holds a B.A. from the University of Tokyo (1989), and an M.A. (1990) and a Ph.D. (1999) from the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. His research interest is in nationalism and international politics of Northeast Asia, including
Russo-Japanese relations, Japan’s foreign and security policy, and the political theology of nationalism. He hastaught at Sophia University since 2000, and he assumed his current position since 2007. He is currently a visiting
scholar at the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at UC Berkeley.

(In order of appearance)

43. Presentation Papers
Session I : “Value Diplomacy” and Today

Andrew L. OROS
Director, Washington College International Studies Program“Value Diplomacy” and Today: A View from Washington•

The idea of “value diplomacy” is not a topic of much discussion in Washington from what I hear.
o This is a big contrast to the popularity of the concept under the first Abe administrationin 2006-07 – as set out by then Foreign Minister Taro Aso in November 2006.
o Still, elements of the “value diplomacy” approach have long been successful hallmarksof Japanese foreign policy and should be embraced.
o Moreover, the confidence that underlies an explicit “values diplomacy” approach is awelcome sign for Japan in the region – a very important regional actor that has been“punching below its weight” in recent years.
o But, Japan must be careful not to alienate potential partners from a range ofperspectives, and to focus on what’s most important for Japan’s national interest in its
near-term policies.

•

Why the shift away from interest in “value diplomacy” outside of Tokyo?
o In Washington, a new President (Mr. Obama) and new foreign policy challenges
globally.
 A move to more realist-based crisis management diplomacy after largely failed
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq – two conflicts justified in part through acall to values – and new US struggles with “Arab Spring” states – Egypt, Syria,etc US-Japan alliance discussions continue to stress common values – but not as
actively framed in a global dimension.
 There also has been concern that “soft” ideas like “values” also links to the very
problematic “history” issues that are actively discussed in Washington today.
o In the Asia-Pacific region, values diplomacy was seen by many as needlessly
confrontational – especially since much of the underlying content was not new.
 The notion of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” created an overt visual image
that excluded China, for example.

•

Yet Mr. Abe is back!

(and so is Japan – as he has stressed!)

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o
o

•

Much of Mr. Abe’s largely unfulfilled agenda from his last term as Prime Minister has
reappeared in his new administration – not just the “values diplomacy” idea.
Where does values diplomacy fit into Japan’s new foreign policy agenda, 7 years after
the term first gained popularity?

Value diplomacy and Japan’s near-term foreign policy agenda – a good match?
o The Trans-Pacific Partnership and broader focus on economic revitalizationo Territorial disputes: China, Russia, South Korea
o Crafting a deeper set of regional partnerships
 Common values as one part of the picture – as it long has been for Japan.

•

But as with the United States, Japan must manage the challenges it
faces and actors it must work with – not a foreign policy of “dreams”.

OKAGAKI Tomoko
Professor, Dokkyo University

Japan’s “Value-oriented Diplomacy”: Evaluating Its Utility and Effectiveness
Advocating “values” in a country’s foreign policy serves the following functions: 1) to demonstrate thecountry’s commitment to international society and highlight its raison d’être; 2) to rationalize a policythat the country intends to pursue or has already pursued; 3) to make a policy recommendation to theinternational community; 4) to send a message to the domestic audience and explain the government’s
stance; 5) to form a network within the international community by supporting or containing a certain
country or group of countries; 6) to provide a long-term perspective in forming policies; and 7) to“varnish” diplomacy that is actually based on national interests.
Up until the mid-1990s, Japan remained low-keyed in advocating its values to the international
community. What changed in Japanese diplomatic style at that time was an increased awareness ofthe necessity to project its values in conducting foreign policy. Among the values that the Japanesepolitical leaders have advocated since then are: “the arc of freedom and prosperity,” democracy, liberty,
and fraternity. What might explain this change in the style of Japanese foreign policy? How
effectively have those values been projected in promoting Japan’s national interests?
Two factors stand out in explaining Japan’s increased advocacy of values in foreign policy. The first is
the end of the Cold War and the concomitant redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which has beenclosely tied to Japan’s national interests. With the disappearance of the common threat to the alliance,
the Soviet Union, Japan started to search for its new role in global security in cooperation with the U.S.
The second factor lies in the increased national confidence that Japan gradually gained in the processof its post-war efforts to return to and contribute to the international community as a pacifist economic
power. The international reputation of Japan as a country of cleanliness, hospitality, technologicaldevelopment, environmental concern, and refined cuisine, for example, confirmed to the Japanese that
it was time for the country to grow out of its post-war, subservient mentality and become more
“normal” and proactive in its foreign policy behavior, in keeping with its role as a mature democracy
and an advanced industrial power.

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If “value-oriented diplomacy” is to remain one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy for the coming
decades, the values that its political leaders advocate need to meet two conditions in order to beeffective. First, the values must originate from Japan’s own historical experiences and diplomatic
practices, shared among all the political elite and with the public. A faithful compliance withinternational law and a pluralist understanding of the nature of international society embodied in its
modern diplomatic history would be more appropriate and persuasive values for Japan to advocate
than liberty or democracy which are of Western origin. Second, values must be universal and should
not be asserted in a way that can be taken as encouraging containment of a certain country or countries.
As such, the values to advocate in foreign policy necessarily remain those that bind the international
community only loosely. What we can expect then is civility: a minimal degree of compliance with themost basic principles of international relations. That is, not the kinds of values that presuppose a highdegree of convergence in specific foreign policy behaviors among countries.

SHI Yinhong
Director,
Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China
Guard against Excessive Universalism, While Not Go Excessively
There are already too many "universal values or norms". If one want universal norms to be truly
universal, one should decide to listen to different nations and peoples. Of course, there aredevelopments of some important principle in this era, but still some values or norms are not really"universal". Importantly, in order to become universal, they must be sufficiently generalized.
Otherwise, if one want to make very concrete laws or rules, the different nations and peoples will haveconsiderable hesitations. Values or norms have to leave space for accommodating different
understandings and requirements. In international society, "practice" is so important in the making ofprinciples and norms. Practice can make some values or norms more universal, while make someothers more particularistic.

On the other hand, the world leaders in 1945 and 1946 did a great job. From lessons learned, mainly
after the experience of Nazism, fascism, and militarism, they emphasized the need for universal values
and norms. But, one should not have so many universal ones--it diminishes the value and possible
impact of them all.

China, before Mao Zedong in the 1930s, was a nation that very much liked to teach others. In fact,
Confucianism is universalism--this means that what is best for the Chinese is best for everyone else.
This was the Chinese mainstream ideology before Mao Zedong over two-thousand years. Maochanged this, and despite his many mistakes, and despite that he inflicted in his latter years so muchsufferings for millions of the Chinese, he made a wonderful contribution to China, and the world. He
battled against Western universalism in the 1930s, and whether issued against London, Washington, or
Moscow, Mao felt that every people should decide by their own practice, according to their own

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situations, in their own countries. What is best for Washington or Moscow or elsewhere is definitely
not necessary best for China, or other peoples. There is no ready answer from west or east, but one
should learn lessons and answer vital questions in one's own practice.

This is the particularistic perspective at its best. China has contributed by this to world history,
fundamentally. Of course, maybe China in the future would forget it, or China would become too
proud and would launch its own universalism. But there is no ready universal answer that can beapplied to every situation. There is something like independent practice and it is more effective insolving its own problems and learning from other people's experience. These are universal values andnorms, from local experience.

Having said all the above in guarding against excessive universalism, a balanced point of view andpolicy standing is still very much required, for avoiding the excessive particularism. This speaker
would like to talk about it in terms as “international responsibility: The new key words in the issue ofChina's foreign policy and even grand strategy".

It is right for China to refuse and resist some quite unreasonable demands and pressure from the West.
At the same time, it is also right for her to increase substantially the commitment and bearing ofinternational responsibility in the common enterprise to address the global challenges. These twothings are not at all mutually exclusive. To increase commitment and responsibility bearing are first of
all bound closely to China’s healthy development within and strategic security without.

MIYAOKA Isao
Professor, Keio University

Japan’s Value Oriented Diplomacy toward the United States“Value Oriented Diplomacy”: Australia, India, and the member states of the EU and NATO
“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”: emerging democracies around the Eurasian Continent
Ⅰ．U.S.-Led Liberal International Order
１．Liberal Character of the Current International Ordera. “Liberal Hegemonic Order”（Ikenberry 2011）
BalanceCommandState sovereignty
Material power
Sources
Preservation of autonomy
Interests of dominant states
PurposeNo / great power co-equals
Yes / rulers and subjects
Hierarchy
Present

Westphalia system

Consent
Rule of Law
Creation of public goods
Sometimes / leaders andfollowers

U.S. hegemonyb．Liberal International Order: “order that is open and loosely rule-based”

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U.S.: Liberalism as an ideology of domestic regime / political and economic values“people from different backgrounds can be united through their commitment to sharedvalues”
２．Issues of the Current International Ordera．Emergence of Unipolarity: + Liberal international order ⇒ revisionist state
U.S. hegemony (exceptionalism) ⇔ Liberal international order (rule of law)b．Eroding of State Sovereignty: Westphalia system⇔Liberal international order (human rights)
c．Ideology of “Universal” Values: “transparent disguises of selfish vested interests” (E.H. Carr)d．Universality of Values: self-evident truth for U.S. / threat to illiberal states (Walt)
e．Promotion of Conflicts：intolerance “struggle between good and evil” self-fulfilling prophecies
democracy promotion ⇒ instability abroad / illiberal democracies are bellicose (Layne)
３．Japan’s Strategic Response
a．Target of Value Oriented Policy：states that have embraced universal values“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity:” emerging democracies
b．“Friendly Advisor”: going too far (forceful democratization) / hypocrisy (exceptionalism)
The U.S. is the most influential to liberal international order both positively and negatively.
state with strong liberal beliefs / state that is the most open to liberal discourse
It is necessary to pay attention to tension among the different logics of order.
Ⅱ．Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
１．Liberal Character of the Japan-U.S. Alliancea. “Liberal Hegemonic Alliance”: one institution for U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order
1) balance of power, 2) constraints of subjects, 3) provision of public goods
b．Role of Liberalism in Alliances: shift to a security community
1) democracy/interdependence/institutions ⇒ peaceful resolution of conflicts (trust)2) institutional cooperation, self-restraint by hegemons, consent ⇒ mutual aid (credibility)c．We-Feeling (Collective Identity): collective-self defense1) type identity: common regime type such as liberal democracies
2) role identity: friendly states that have internalized norms of non-violence and mutual aid
d．U.S. Perception of Other States: domestic regime type and values are important.
“our steady support for universal values . . . sets us apart from our enemies, adversarial
governments, and many potential competitors for influence.” (NSS 2010)
２．American Variable Views of Japan
a．Japan was an Enemy in WWII: the origin of the current international order
Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender)
justice to war criminals / strengthening of democratic tendencies
b. Japan as an Ally during the Cold War
Security Treaty: “to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”
There is no reference to common values in Mutual Defense Treaties with Philippines and ROK.
North Atlantic Treaty: “common heritage and civilisation”
c．Decline in a Sense of Common Values around the End of the Cold War1) capitalism vs. communism ⇒ a focus on different types of capitalism “revisionism”
2) In 1990, 63 % of the surveyed leaders viewed the economic power of Japan as a critical threat.
3) differentiation along trivial dimensions in a “narcissism of small differences”
３．Japan’s Strategic Response
a．Sharing of values with the U.S. is one of the best national security assets for Japan.
b．Practice of Liberal Values at Home and Abroad91) open economy: promotion of TPP2) human rights: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012
Japan: “The leading human rights problems included lack of due process for pretrial
detainees; exploitation of children; and societal discrimination against women in
employment, children born out of wedlock, ethnic minority group members, persons withdisabilities, and foreigners, including permanent residents.”
c．Issue of Constitutional Amendment: to maintain the provisions related to universal values
similarity to the U.S. Constitution is a national security asset for Japan.
to focus on universal values rather than the history, tradition, and culture of Japan
d．Historical Issues: Historical revisionism weakens a sense of common values.
prewar militaristic Japan ⇔ postwar democratic Japansocially constructed symbol/myth, perception rather than fact
political responsibility as a defeated nation ⇔ historical verification

Wei LIANG
Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Visiting Professor, Peking University
Japan’s Value-Oriented Diplomacy and Its Policy Implications for China andEast Asian Regional Integration
Prime Minister Abe’s focus on value-orientated diplomacy represents Japan’s efforts to retain andexpand its regional influences and counterbalance Chinese ascendancy. It regards identity as a key
variable shaping Japan’s policy choices in Asian regional integration. How will this self-identity ofJapan as a democratic nation and a mature market economy play a role in its strategic move toward
Japan-U.S.-China trilateral economic relationship in Asia-Pacific?
China now has served as a de-facto hub of regional production network and the US continues toprovide the security umbrella in the region. China is the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea
and most of the ASEAN member countries. In the meantime, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership (TPP) is a major breakthrough of US commitment to East Asia. Japan’s recent decision tojoin the TPP negotiation has a fundamental impact on the future outlook of Asian regionalism. It entails
that China may need to reconsider its role in regional integration, especially its subtle regional
leadership competition with Japan.
Japan hesitated to join the TPP negotiation due to the strong political pressure from its domestic
agricultural sector. In fact, most ASEAN countries would prefer a more relaxed and incremental
approach to trade liberalization. Looking back to the APEC history, it clearly shows that the regional
preference of Asian countries on regionalism was voluntary, pragmatic and incremental. The same
principle has been embedded in most of the existing ASEAN agreements, China-ASEAN FTAs andJapan-ASEAN FTAs. Moving to the US approach and US-dominated TPP negotiation represents amajor policy shift for Japan.
The recent dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 has reminded many Japanese the10

importance of US-Japan military alliance, after the United States publicly asserted that the disputed
islands were covered by the terms of US-Japan bilateral security treaty. the decision made by Japan will
suggest the direction of its foreign policy toward Asian regionalism—to reinforce its role as Asian
powers or to reconnect with US politically and economically. As China now is excluded from the TPP
negotiation, the non-member anxiety has entailed more willingness for China to participate theJapan-initiated ASEAN+6 scheme (RCEP). It may provide a unique opportunity for Japan and help
gain more leverage in the following TPP and RCEP negotiations if Japan can effectively manage andmaneuver its strategic and economic ties with US and China.

Session II : Universalism and Uniqueness in “Value Diplomacy”

SATO Yoichiro
Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University
Hennebach Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor, Colorado School of Mines

Industrial Policy, the East Asian Miracle, and Regional Integration after the Lehman ShockJapan’s industrialization since the Meiji period, which “followed the Western countries,” demonstrated
strong characteristics of “state capitalism” under bureaucratic guidance. The later economic growth,
growth of the private capital, diversification of the industries, and political democratization gradually
weakened the state control of the industries, but the start of the Japan-China War in the 1930s led to
re-strengthening of state control over the economy. The cooperative approach between the state andthe private sector in developing a blueprint of regional economic integration during construction of theGreat East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was succeeded in Japan’s post-WW2 economic reconstruction
and the process of regional economic integration in East Asia. The cooperative model, which wasfeatured in the World Bank report on The East Asian Miracle (1995), attracted the attention of scholars
and policymakers in and out of Japan as an alternative paradigm of development to the U.S.-styleliberal capitalism. Developing countries praised the role of the state in limiting the “exploitative” sideof globalizing capitalism, while the United States criticized the “unfair” advantages of the“Japanese-style” capitalism in global competitions.
The 1997-98 Asian Economic Crisis and the responses of the affected countries posed a major challenge
to the “East Asian model.” South Korea, which had graduated from being a recipient of the Japanese
overseas development assistance (ODA), adopted drastic economic deregulation and liberalization,with the aid of the conditionalities under the IMF emergency loan. The reform exposed the Korean
firms to global competition, and differentiation of the “winners” from the “losers” was carried out
ahead of Japan, which had to await the “Koizumi reforms.” However, in China and other East Asian
countries, close coordination between the ODA plans and the overseas investment, production transfer,and component trade by the Japanese firms continued, although the “tied aid” of the past (in which theaid money was used directly for capital goods imports from Japan) had largely been abolished.

11

The appreciation of yen triggered by the Plaza Accord of 1987 and the resulting large-scale transfer ofmanufacturing productions from Japan to Asia kept pace with the Japanese economy’s shift into theservice sector. The Japanese economy now earns more in financial services and intellectual properties.
Japan, on one hand, shares interests with the western nations in deregulation in entering the services
market and improved protection of the intellectual property rights in developing countries. The
proportion of trade surplus in Japan’s overall balance of payments has shrunk, and Japan in recent
years even runs a trade deficit. Meanwhile, the proportion of the investment revenues has risen, whichmakes Japan’s economic structure similar to the western countries. Japan’s identity has therefore
become similar to that of the mature developed countries and investors on the issue of establishing acommon set of investment rules.
The Lehman Shock in 2008 exposed the lack of U.S. government supervision over the U.S. firms, which
played the central role in globalization of the financial business. The event offered an opportune
moment to revise the U.S.-style liberal capitalism, which almost reached the status of the global
standard. Even earlier, liberalization of global trade through multilateral negotiations at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) stalled, leading to the accelerated shift to bilateral and regional free trade
agreements (FTAs). Making of investment rules has also failed to multilateralize and is limited toconclusion of bilateral agreements. Japan has joined the negotiations for a Trans Pacific Partnership(TPP), but both removal of the trade barriers in the U.S. automobile sector and liberalization of theJapanese agriculture sector face political resistance.
Meanwhile, the development model of China, which surpassed Japan to occupy a greater part of theEast Asian economy, is the very mercantilist model Japan once adopted. China makes a large trade
surplus in trade with developed countries, receives their investments but restricts activities of theinvestors, promotes inward technology transfer, protects and promotes indigenous enterprises,
restricts free movement of capital, tolerates stealing of IPRs by the indigenous enterprises, and resists
opening of the services markets. China signs FTAs with only smaller developed countries, with which
it forces many exemptions. In signing FTAs with developing countries, China focuses on procurementof natural resources and food and export of its own manufactured goods, neglecting “development” ofits economic partners. This neglect is also common in the U.S.-style liberal capitalism. (Some technicalassistance in China’s third world diplomacy is welcomed in the remote areas, and China’s diplomaticcompetition with Taiwan seeks political gains over economic ones. However, as China’s entry intodevelopment of the oil fields and purchase of agricultural lands in Africa indicate, the country’s
economic relations with developing countries are becoming more exploitative.)
In this circumstance, can Japan offer a development paradigm like the “Japanese model” or the “EastAsian Miracle” of the past and shoulder a central role in the regional economic integration process?
While the old model was centered on regionalization of the production network in the manufacturingsector, can Japan offer a new comprehensive model inclusive of the services and agriculture sectors?
Under what conditions, can a model Japan proposes be accepted in East Asia and broader Asia Pacific?
There are no short answers to all these questions. A combination of social and political stability without
strong coercion by the state in Japan during the period of high economic growth was a remarkableaccomplishment, which had a strong appeal to other countries. But, today’s economic stagnation in
Japan, at least partly, is attributed to the legacies of this old paradigm, and the country today isunderstandably going through a major political realignment. Japan does not lead the world in many
areas, and a rare exception is found in terms of graying of the national population. Polarization of theincome-generating generation and the pensioners is a challenge that encompasses all economic, social,
and political dynamics. Japan must first reach a domestic consensus about how to cope with thischallenge. The current splits along three dimensions are the sharpest. Nationalist vs. Globalist—Will
the economy open up? Will the opening include the labor market (which is a social question as well)?

12Liberal Capitalist vs. Welfare State—Will Japan retain a high degree of social welfare support for the“weak”? Materialist vs. Post-Materialist—Will the Japanese continue to measure their happiness interms of material values over intangible values? These questions will not likely to yield a clear-cut
answer. However, a strong national consensus on where the balancing points might be has to beachieved, if the nation is to have a coherent direction. Only then, the model can be armed with Japan’s
pivotal strength in various related areas—be it environmentally friendly technology, labor-saving
robotics, spiritual and cultural sophistication, and/or communal bonds.

David WALTON
Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

Universalism and Uniqueness in 'Value Diplomacy"– Australia and Japan as natural partners
1.

Australia and Japan - collaboration in foreign policy endeavours•

Key allies of the United States and supporters of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of
Law•

Regional architecture such APEC and East Asia Summit•

UN Peace Keeping missions – Cambodia and East Timor• 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation
The 2007 Joint Declaration for Security Co-operation offers a framework for dealing with potential
failed states and natural disasters in the Pacific region. Japan and Australian can play a positive role inaddressing these issues in Asia and the Pacific through bilateral cooperation and through regionalarchitecture such the East Asian Summit approach to natural disasters.
2.
Collaboration in Human Security: a new dimension in bilateral relations
Most primary and secondary sources on Japan’s human security policy, including governmental
documents, tend to focus on the analysis of Japan’s financial contribution to human security (freedom
from want). On the contrary, as this presentation argues that Japan has contributed to freedom fromfear in its human security cooperation with Australia. Japan and Australia, for example, havecollaborated in the field of post-conflict peace operations, which are preconditions for freedom fromfear. Moreover, both countries contribute to nuclear disarmament, such as co-chairing the United
Nations International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 20082009, which is a significant agenda in combating freedom from fear.
Recommendation

13

Both governments should continue making contributions to these two fields from a perspective ofhuman security. In other words, international peace operations and nuclear disarmament should be
explicitly demarcated by Australian and Japanese officials as prioritized agendas in human security
collaboration. In this context, the two countries’ bilateral cooperation yields a basis for merging the two
key frameworks of human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want – and to foster greaterlevels of collaboration to ensure enhanced levels of regional peace and

ANNO Tadashi
Associate Professor, Sophia University

The term “value diplomacy” was introduced to Japanese diplomatic parlance fairly recently, only in a
November 2006 policy speech by the then Foreign Minister ASO Taro. But more broadly, “value
diplomacy” may be defined as a state’s orientation toward values, principles, and norms that are
advanced in international relations – orientations that are assumed either for the sake of advancing (orfighting against) those values, or for the sake of some extraneous goals. In this second, broader sense,“value diplomacy” is almost inevitable for any state. The traditional realist notion that diplomacy canbe (and should be) conducted without (even ostensible) regard for “values” or ideologies made sense
only insofar as major participants of IR shared common rules and cultures in the form of internationallaw and diplomatic protocols. When this underlying cultural unity was broken through the global
expansion of the states system and through the great ideological rivalries of the 20C, values andideologies became unavoidable elements of IR.
Values that exert major influence on today’s IR may be classified into four categories or “layers.”
1) Layer I (Sovereignty values) Values upon which European states system of the 17-19th centuries
was built. These include state sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, sovereign
immunity, renunciation of distinction between just and unjust wars, etc. These also include “codeof honor” in laws of war (such as humane treatment of POWs, distinction between combatants andcivilians, etc.).
2) Layer II (Non-aggression values) Values which were adopted as a result of WWI and WWII,
having to do mostly with de-legitimation of use of force except for self-defense or international
policing action. These values include injunctions against use of force, for instance, for the purposeof gaining new territory. These are values codified in the UN Charter, and it was at least ostensibly
accepted by both sides of the Cold War.
3) Layer III (“Western” values) These include individual liberty, democracy, free market, and basic
human rights. These values go beyond traditional international law regulating relations amonginternally autonomous sovereign states. Some of these values are codified in documents such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These values are “universal” in their potential reach,but they are sometimes called “Western” because their lineage can be most directly traced toWestern intellectual tradition, and because during the Cold War, states in the Western camp tended
to adhere to these values more than the rest of the world.
4) Layer IV (Postmodern values): These are values that have gained prominence on the international
scene in the relatively recent past. They include environmental protection, as well as a host of newindividual and group rights (gay rights, women’s reproductive rights, etc.) some of which remain
controversial even in Western states.

14

Japan since the Meiji period absorbed “sovereignty values,” and transformed itself into an empire, but
this ultimately ended in defeat in WWII. In the postwar era, Japan has shifted emphasis toward“non-aggression values” and “Western values.” Although “Western values” are regarded as at least
potentially “universal,” during the Cold War, the actual extent of these values was limited to theWestern camp. For this reason, during the Cold War era, few expected “Western values” to actually
become universal. Instead, these values served to strengthen the solidarity within the Western camp(solidarist universalism). While emphasizing its commitment to peace (non-aggression values),
postwar Japan also committed itself to the solidarity of the Western camp. To the extent that solidarist
universalism was directed primarily against the Soviet camp, it was permissive of cultural and evenpolitical diversity within the “Western” camp, as long as member-states maintained a pro-Americanorientation.
With the end of the Cold War, the expectation arose that “Western” values may actually become
universal. As a result, the “solidarist universalism” of the Cold War era was replaced by what may becalled “comprehensive universalism,” which sought to actually extend “Western” values worldwide,
and which cast more critical eyes toward cultural and political diversities that existed among
pro-American states (cf. the debate on “Asian values”). The influence of “postmodern” values also
grew. In this new environment, Japan reoriented its diplomatic rhetoric from one of solidarist
universalism to comprehensive universalism, carefully skirting the issue of “Asian values,” andadvancing new “universal values” such as “human security.”
The 9.11 Incident of 2001 once again infused IR with “friend-enemy” distinctions, and the policy ofBush administration revived the ideas of solidarist universalism. Also, the resurgence of historicalgreat powers like China created new security worries in East Asia, underscoring Japan’s need forreliable allies. These circumstances prepared the background for the emergence of solidarist
universalism in Japanese foreign policy in the form of “value diplomacy.”“Value diplomacy” is sometimes criticized as unnecessarily ideological, and Japan’s recent value
diplomacy is often characterized as a throwback to “Cold-War thinking.” Such criticisms are only
partially valid. If pushed to the extreme, value diplomacy can become ideological and un-pragmatic,
but the idea of purely pragmatic, value-less diplomacy is an illusion in the first place. Japan’s recent“value diplomacy” does reflect Japan’s search for reliable allies in the context of a deteriorating security
environment. But this is only a logical response to the behavior of some states in the region that seemto point to backtracking on “non-aggression” values.
Besides, Japan’s “value diplomacy” is inspired not only by the realist attempt to seek allies andcountering potential threats. Another component of value diplomacy is the effort to contribute to amore stable international order that could serve the interests of all states in the region. This is evident
in a speech that Prime Minister Abe was to deliver in Jakarta in January 2013. There, the theme of
spreading democracy or liberty took a back seat behind the key theme of building a stable international
environment, particularly with respect to rule of law and freedom of navigation. Further, despite its
barking rhetoric, Japan’s “value diplomacy” does not really bite. There is little evidence that Japan is
attempting to use “value diplomacy” to undermine the stability of those states that do not conform to
those “universal” values. While Japan does advocate “universal values” as ultimate goals, Japan is
likely to remain flexible and modest in its attempts to advance those values. It is natural that states
sometimes have disagreements with other states. But states that are committed to the basic value of
non-aggression should have no reason to quarrel with Japan or its “value diplomacy.”15

Lindsay BLACK
Lecturer, Leiden University Institute for Area Studies,
Leiden University
Japan’s Kakehashi Diplomacy
This presentation draws on a recent publication: Black, Lindsay. 2013. Bridging between Myanmar andinternational society – Japan’s self-identity and kakehashi policy, The Pacific Review Volume 26, Number
4, 337-360. This article considers how Japanese foreign policymakers have articulated a specific identity
for Japan, namely that of a kakehashi diplomat, based upon their perception of Japan’s experience
within the context of international society. This self-identity guides the decision-making processes ofthese foreign policymakers.
The concept of kakehashi is inadequately explained in the literature on Japan’s IR and deserves attention.
Japan’s self-identity as a kakehashi diplomat frames the country’s historical experience as firstindustrialized East Asian state able to bridge between East and West and speaks to long-standing
debates about whether Japan is in Asia, in the West, or able to deftly maneuver between both.
Japan’s kakehashi strategy constructs Japan’s self-identity as a state able to reenter the internationalsociety after WWII through focusing on economic development rather than military and coercive
action. For proponents of the kakehashi approach, Japan provides both a model of successful
democratization through development which ‘rogue states’ can learn from, as well as the means
through ODA to ‘bridge’ the divide between ‘rogue’ status and liberal democratic capitalism. The
concept of kakehashi therefore speaks directly to the question of Japan’s ‘unique’ experience and sharingof ‘universal’ values.
This paper argues that the four core norms of asianism, developmentalism, reassurance anddemocracy combine to shape Japan’s distinctive kakehashi approach. This kakehashi approach comprises
two key tenets, namely ‘democratization as process’ and ‘positive linkage’.
The concept of ‘democratization as process’ refers to the Japanese government’s commitment tomaintain constant bilateral dialogue that seeks to encourage democratization over time.
The notion of ‘positive linkage’ refers to the financial incentives in the form of ODA granted by theJapanese government in response to political developments that may foster democratization.
Japan’s kakehashi policy is explored in Japan’s response to anti-government protests in Myanmar,
Cyclone Nargis, and the democratization process. Japan’s response contrasts with US and European
approaches that rely on coercive pressure to democratize and impose economic sanctions, or negative
linkage, on states categorized as ‘rogues’.
Japan’s kakehashi policy provides a convincing counter narrative to the assertion of existing paradigms
that Japan’s foreign policy relies on external pressure and merely mimics the policies of the US. Instead,Japan’s kakehashi approach signals a proactive policy of continued engagement that is value-laden(democracy, human rights, economic development…), but is firmly rooted in the construction ofJapan’s self-identity.

16

ITO Go
Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR, Professor,
Meiji University
Just and Unjust “Value Diplomacy”?
Value with/without PowerIt can be argued that “value” is added to foreign policy when a country becomes powerfulenough to project its power to other countries. The same logic, however, can also be applicable when adeclining power seeks to justify its international presence vis-à-vis other countries. To implement one’s
value, the country should maintain a certain level of capabilities in both security and economic terms.
A weaker country, while facing other countries’ projections of values, should be puzzled with adilemma between its own value and the others’ projected values.
Value with/without Willing Partners
The weaker countries, if they could go with other countries sharing the same/similar values,
can project their values to other countries. The partnership can present itself as coalitions, alliances, ad
hoc cooperation, institutions, and so forth. If the institutionalization could be progressed, they can
become international organizations with a certain level of bureaucracy. The more values
institutionalized, more legitimacy they can have to project their ideas globally.
Value with/without attention to international stability
Projection of values to the international arena often invites nationalistic chauvinism. One
country’s ideas about “justness” can be seen as “unjust” in other countries, and if various countries
seek to project their own “values” to the international arena with nationalistic sentiments, it will justlead to chaotic confusion in world politics. In the anarchical nature of international relations, values
which have no foundations of power, or which cannot be supported by other willing partners, will
only invite relentless projections of one’s value to the others. Even if one country regards the value as“just,” any other country cannot follow the projected value.
Lessons from Taiwan’s Failure and Japan’s “Value Diplomacy”
The value projection by President Chen Shuibian and Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party
was a typical example of failure in “value diplomacy.” He once thought that Taiwan’s democracy
should be internationally protected, and must be strongly supported by the United States. Chenthought that various confrontations would be indispensable to widen Taiwan’s space for diplomacy.
However, his emphasis on Taiwan’s democracy was gradually regarded as a breach of the
Taiwan-China status quo, and the US altered its perspectives toward President Chan from the symbolof Taiwan’s democracy to the breaker of the cross-strait stability.
Japan should learn from Taiwan’s failure. “Value projection” without any of the above
elements will lead Japan not to a democracy seeker but to a stability breaker. Foundations of“international order” are not necessarily the same as those of “domestic order.”17Kim Beng PHAR
CEO, Foundation of Research on Transformation, Malaysia

Universalism and Universal Values of Diplomacy: ASEAN Values and UN Values
Introduction:
Diplomacy suggests tact, cordiality and grace, and all things refined, especially in language,
mannerism and etiquette.But the very reason of their existence is also due to the very real possibility ofviolence, which can strike at any moment's notice, according to conventional theories of IR due to thesystemic anarchy of the world.

Diplomacy, therefore, is there to give peace a chance, especially when war is always a plausibility. Even
if one is a proponent in the English School of Thought, or, the Chinese concept of "tien-xia" (all underheaven) as purveyed through the current idea of "peaceful development," diplomacy has to exist as abuffer against the very real prospect of violence suddenly erupting between and within countries.

As a minimum, the universalism and universal values of diplomacy are based on war prevention andpre-emption, especially enshrined and circumscribed by the United Nations Charter (Chapter 7).

Only after having achieved these basic functions, in attenuating the 'high politics' of inter state nations(i.e. arms control, nuclear disarmament, military verification) can diplomacy proceed to deal withother aspects of the relations, such as trade, inter cultural development and religious exchanges.

The diplomatic niceties of diplomacy, in other words, is meant to reduce the tensions and suspicions ofcontentious neighbours, or, even distant powers, that are out to impose their will-----lawful orotherwise----on a country.

The values practised in ASEAN diplomacy are in the main driven by 1. consensus, 2. compromise, 3.
joint cooperation 4. conviviality and 5. sustainable collaboration.

Decisions cannot merely be made through consensus, but based on volitional compromise andcooperation that are in turn shaped by a convivial spirit of win-win collaboration. These are the 5 Cs
that have served ASEAN well, and in allowing the region to go close and closer to being an integral
part of the United Nations (UN).
The issue of values is therefore one of geography versus institutional demand. Do we encourage aregion to get it right first, before we expect it to don greater responsibilities in the United Nations ? Of
course the two can co exist and occur simultaneously. Allowing the two to conjoin----without any
contradiction----should be the cardinal value of diplomacy.

18

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization andregionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the
Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental levels, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On thebasis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests andissues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet
members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global andregional arenas.
【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there wereexpressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within
this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to
be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade
Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as
representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in
September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for
The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The
Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum
was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out toopen its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Overthe years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic
and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the Americancomponent ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter
act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws
accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line withthe principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.
【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in
Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While thesecretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The
Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of
HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as
Chairman, ITO Kenichi as President and HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Leader
Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 19 Diet Members including the three Governors, ASAO
Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 89 Opinion Leader Members including the two Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, and
WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters’ Club of the Global Forum ofJapan.
【Activities】Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangularcountries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including
the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening
mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international
exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called “Dialogue.” In order to secure a
substantial number of Japanese participants in the “Dialogue,” GFJ in principle holds these “Dialogues” in Tokyo. A listing of topics of“Dialogues” and its overseas co-sponsors in the last five years is given below.
Year

2013

2012

Month

March

Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy andEconomic Development
How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation
Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China RelationshipFebruary
January

September Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International
Public Goodss
March
The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's RoleMarch
The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global GovernanceOctoberJuly
February
February
September
May
2010

2009

Co-sponsor

Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy

February

2011

Topic

October

February
January
September
June
April

The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China
Relations
The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on
Disaster Management
The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power
East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional
Cooperation
East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan-India Relations
Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security:
the Case of Counter Piracy
Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues ofthe 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society
Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan
Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis
Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World
US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration

19

Washington College International Studies Program
Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University
World Resources InstituteCollege of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
International Studies Department, Vietnam National University(Vietnam)
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
ASEAN-ISIS
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)5. An Introduction to Washington College International Studies Program
Washington College is the tenth oldest college in the United States, and the first college
chartered in the new nation – in 1782. General George Washington contributed the largest
donation for the establishment of the College, gave us permission to use his name, and served on
the Board of Visitors and Governors for five years until 1789, when he became the first Presidentof the United States.

Today, over 230 years later, approximately 1,400 undergraduate students from 35 states and 40
nations attend Washington College to study in over 40 different academic majors and programs.
Although we are set in a rural location in historic Chestertown, Maryland, we are 90 minutes
from Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, D.C. and take full advantage of the many
cultural, political and business resources these cities have to offer.

The International Studies Program at Washington College – established in 1988 – draws
together faculty and students from across academic disciplines to study, research, discuss, andtravel to countries and regions around the world. The College’s Goldstein Program in Public
Affairs and Institute for Religion, Politics, and Culture work together with the International
Studies program to bring to campus nationally and internationally renowned speakers, support
student and faculty participation in national and international conferences, and contribute to ourvibrant Model United Nations program. Our Global Education Office works with 28 academic
institutions world-wide – including Meiji Gakuin University in Japan – to promote student andfaculty exchanges. After graduation, our majors go on to apply their education and skills in awide range of careers, including business, journalism, teaching, politics, and international andpublic service.

20

6. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishingresearch reports and policy recommendations, etc.
[History]
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on theprivate initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens
from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in
the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1,
2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Ministerin recognition of its achievements.
[Purpose]
The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved
understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on
issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on mattersof foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public
policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution andthe responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign themalone.
[Organization]
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate,(3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is thehighest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of
JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day
operations of JFIR.
Board of Trustees
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
KOIKE Yuriko
INOUE Akiyoshi
KURODA Makoto
NOGAMI Yoshiji
OHYA EikoTANAKA Tatsuo
UTADA Katsuhiro
YOSHIDA Haruki

Directors
ChairmanPresident
Vice President
Executive Director
Director
Director

IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
TAKUBO Tadae

Auditors
HASHIMOTO Hiroshi
ICHIKAWA Isao

[Activities]
In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another importantpillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as aninteractive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent
through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers inJapan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English
website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mailmagazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/