Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
The US. Air Service in World War I.
CONTENTS: v. 1. Final report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF.
A tactical history of the Air Service, AEF.-v. 2. Some early
concepts of military aviation.
Includes index.
1. European War, 1914-1 918-Aerial operations, American.
2. United States. Army. A.E.F., 1917-1920. Air Service. 3.
Aeronautics, Military-United States-History. I. Maurer, Maurer.
0606. U54
940.4 4 9 73
75-42296

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 008-070-00362-7

iii

United States Air ForceHistorical Advisory
Committee (As of September 1975)
Dr. 1. 8. Holley, Jr
Duke University

Lt. Gen. James R. Allen
Superintendent, USAF
AcademyDr. Henry F. Graff
Columbia University

Dr. Robert F. Byrnes
Indiana University

Dr. Louis Morton
Dartmouth College

Lt. Gen. Albert P.Clark
USAF (ret.)

Dr. Forest C. Pogue
Director, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Institute for
Historical Research

Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong
Commander, Air University

Mr. Jack Stempler
General Counsel, USAF

Stanley L. Falk
Chief Historian

Carl Berger
Chief, Histories Division

Max Rosenberg
Deputy Chief Historian

Lawrence J. Paszek
Senior Editor

Office of Air ForceHistory
Maj. Gen. John W. Huston
Chief

F O K ~ O K ~There has been a tendency to belittle the work of the U.S. Air
Service in World War I while singing the praises of heroes like
Rickenbacker and Luke. Compared with the bombing of the
U.S. Eighth Air Force in World War II or the B-52's in Southeast
Asia, the 138 tons of bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Service inFrance in 1918 may seem almost too insignificant to mention.
Any such comparison, however, should not lead to a conclusion that World War I was of little importance in the overall
history of the U.S. Air Force.
The U.S. Air Service should be viewed in relationship to its
own age. World War I was fought when aviation was still young.
The first ace of the U.S. Air Service won his victories in a
French plane that had a top speed of about 125 miles per hour
and a tendency to shed the fabric of its upper wing in a dive.
The American-produced DH-4, used by the 1st Day Bombardment Group, usually carried about 220 pounds of bombs for a
mission, which meant a lot of sorties to deliver 138 tons ofbombs.
Aviation technology was not always equal to the tasks to be
performed. A major goal of the U.S. Air Service, one notattained during the war, was the development of a bomber
force capable of hitting strategic objectives in Germany. Targeting for the strategic campaign involved the identification of"a few indispensible targets without which Germany cannot
carry on the war"-an idea that would be used years later
against Hitler and the Third Reich. Interdiction, close air support, and some other types of missions carried out by the U S .
Amy Air Forces in World War II, and by the U.S. Air Force atlater times, had already been tried by the U.S. Air Service.
Some documents illustrating various concepts and ideas forthe employment of the U.S.Air Service in World War I havebeen selected for publication in this volume, one of a series
being published by the Office of Air Force History.
John W. Huston, Maj. Gen., USAF
Chief, Office of Air Force History

VWhen the Great War began in Europe in August 1914,
aviation in the U.S. Army was a function of the Signal Corps. Its
mission was to support infantry and artillery by providing
observation services. There were people in the Army andoutside who could foresee no other military use for aircraft.
Others believed that the airplane should be given a combat
role. Some thought that aviation should be a separate combatarm.
As news of aerial operations in the European war drifted
across the Atlantic, there was more and more talk of buying
fighting planes, battle planes, and bomb-dropping planes for
the U.S. Army. Although some faltering steps were taken, little
progress was made toward building a fighting air force-or
even toward developing observation services for the groundforces-before the United States entered the war in April 1917.
Having joined Great Britain, France, and Italy in war against
Germany and Austria, the United States quickly drew plans foran air service to include fighting and bombing airplanes as well
as observation planes and balloons. The allies, who had beenfighting for two years or more and were much farther advanced
in military aviation, provided valuable information to help theUnited States build up its air service. Allied contributions
included not only technical data on new developments inaircraft and other aeronautical equipment but also information
on how to use aviation in battle.
One thing borrowed from the allies was the classification of
military aviation into three, broad, functional areas labeled“observation,” “pursuit,” and “bombardment.” Another was
the concept that aviation had two separate roles, one “tactical,” the other “strategical.” In addition, the Allies provided
ideas, along with detailed information about tactics, techniques, and procedures, that formed the foundation for theemployment of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces(AEF), in World War I.
The wartime operations of the Air Service, AEF, included
visual and photographic reconnaissance, artillery adjustment,
infantry liaison, counterair operations, bombing and strafing inclose support of ground forces, and interdiction of the enemy’slines of communications. The war ended before US. units wereready for strategic air operations, but thinking on strategic air
warfare had advanced far enough to raise, and tentatively
answer, questions concerning area versus precision bombing
and day versus night operations. Thus, US. military aviation in
November 1918 was far different from what it had been when
the war began four years earlier.

viii

There were wide differences of opinion in the U.S. Army as tohow military aviation should be employed. There were those
who believed that the sole function of aviation was to assist the
ground forces. That point of view was held by Gen. John J.
Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF, and by many otherofficers in command and staff positions in the U.S. Army.
Others thought that aviation could best be used in a strategicrole. While agreeing that some aviation had to be committed tosupporting ground forces, they believed that aviation could
make its greatest contribution toward winning the war byattacking strategic military and industrial targets behind enemy
lines. This was the position taken by Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, the top-ranking air commander in the AEF. Many membersof the Air Service, and some from other branches of the Army,
held views somewhere between these extremes. The general
inclination, even in the Air Service, however, seems to havebeen toward the view held by Pershing.
The fundamental differences between Pershing’s and Mitchell’s thinking on aviation can be seen by comparing their ideas
on air superiority. Both men believed it essential. Both gave it
top priority. But they disagreed on what it was, and how toattain it. Pershing did not want enemy aircraft attacking his
troops or otherwise interfering with his operations. The best
way to prevent such attacks and interference, he thought, wasto keep friendly airplanes over the lines in sufficient strength tocommand the air and thus prohibit the operation of enemy
aircraft in the area. Mitchell, looking to the same goal, believedthat the best way to attain it was to hit the enemy’s air strength
behind the lines, removing the source of the threat by attacking
the enemy’s airfields and shooting his planes out of the air
before they could reach the front.
The principal duty of aviation, in Pershing’s opinion, was tosupport ground forces by protecting them against hostileaircraft and by performing observation services for infantry andartillery. With command of the air over the battle front, his Air
Service then might assist ground forces by attacking theenemy’s artillery and ground troops. Pershing believed that his
Air Service attached too much importance to operations
behind the lines to disrupt lines of communication. He approved plans for organizing units for strategic missions but
balked at the idea of creating an independent air force forstrategic operations.
Mitchell agreed that aviation units should be attached to
ground forces, but he insisted that they be under the control ofan air service commander. This was necessary, he believed, toIXpermit concentration of air strength when needed, as well as
for proper coordination and direction of air operations. Mitchell placed much greater emphasis than Pershing did on close
support and interdiction. He and others of this thinking believed that aviation could be used most effectively against
strategic targets. For such operations, an air force working
independently of ground forces was required.
As indicated earlier, Mitchell did not have a chance to try out
his ideas on strategic air warfare during World War I. The airunits that fought under American command in World War I
were attached to ground forces. Their missions were in more orless direct support of infantry and artillery. Thus the combat
experience of the U.S. Air Service in World War I was exclusively in tactical air operations, a fact that was to have a
profound influence on U.S. military aviation in the 1920’s andlater.’
Some documents reflecting and illustrating various conceptsof the functions of military aviation and ideas concerning theemployment of aircraft as an instrument of warfare have been
selected for publication in this volume. The period represented
is from the creation of the Aviation Section and the beginningof World War I in the summer of 1914 until the end of thefighting in November 1918. The selection of documents forinclusion in this book has been restricted to official materialsof American origin available on paper or microfilm in the Albert
F. Simpson Historical Research Center of the U.S. Air Force orin the Fairchild Library of Air University; both facilities arelocated at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Many documents
identified for possible use have been omitted in an effort toavoid repetition so far as possible; others that appeared more
appropriate to other volumes in this series have been reserved
for later publication. Some items, such as Congressional hearings, Bolling’s report, and Gorrell’s plan for bombing, havealready appeared in print in various places; many are being
published here for the first time.
Responsibility for the selection of documents for this bookrests with the editor, who worked without the assistance of an
Notes
1 The toregoing summary is based on documents In this volume supplemented by various
published works. including the following: John J. Pershing. My Experiences in the World War(New York. 1931); William Milchell, Memoirs of World War l (New York, 1960); Aifred J. Hurley.
Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power (New York, 1964); Thomas H. Greer, USAF HistoricalS t d y 89. The Development 01 Air Doctrine In the Army Air Arm. 1917-1941 (USAF Hist Div.
1955); I. 8 . Holley. Jr.. Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, 1953); and Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas,
Concepts. Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the Unted States Air Force, 1907-1964 (AS.
AU. 1971).

X

associate editor or an editorial committee. He would like toclaim complete objectivity in making the selection and preparing the documents for publication, but he suspects that he may
be no more successful than most other historians in keeping
his work free of any subjective influence. With a policy ofletting the documents speak for themselves, no attempt has
been made to interpret or explain. Nor have efforts been madeto discover the origins or to point out the factors that helped toshape the various concepts and ideas. Background informationand notes have been kept to a minimum.
The original text and, so far as possible, the original format
have been followed in preparing the various documents for
publication. As a result, there is some inconsistency, sometimes within a single document, in such things as spelling,
punctuation, and format. For example, “reconnaissance” also
appears as “reconnoissance,“ and “strafe” often appears as“straff.” The only editorial changes, except for omissions
clearly indicated by ellipsis marks, are those made to correct
confusing punctuation and obvious mistakes, such as slips inspelling and typing.
The editor is grateful for the administrative support and assistance provided by Mr. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., Chief of the Albert F.
Simpson Historical Research Center, Lt. Col. Charles C. Biasi,
Executive, and Mr. Herschel Harvey, Chief of Administration.
Special recognition goes to Mr. Deane J. Allen, Office of Air ForceHistory, for his help in proofreading the original text, and to Mr.
Lawrence J. Paszek, Senior Editor in the Office of Air ForceHistory, for his work in photo editing, preparing artwork for thisvolume, and maintaining a close liaison with the printer to resolve
the numerous difficulties that arise in the various phases of
production. Mr. Jack Harrison, U S . Government Printing Office,deserves credit for the arrangement of typography and design ofthis volume. The editor also wants to express his thanks to Mrs.
Linda Copenhaver, Mrs. Mary F. Hanlin, Mrs. Jane Motley, andespecially, Mrs. Lois Wagner for transcribing the documents and typing the manuscript.
Maurerxi

Cements

Page

Part I The Aviation Section, 1914-1917 . . . . . . . . .
1. Aeronautics in the Army . .
.....................
2. Four-Squadron Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Creation of the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, 18
July 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Field Service Regulations, 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Funds for Aeronautics (Fiscal Year 1916),.
December 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Scriven: The Service of Information, 1915 . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Scriven: Annual Report, 1915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
8. War College Division: A Proper Military Policy, 1915 . .
9. To Increase the Efficiency of the Military
Establishment, 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Preparedness for National Defense, 1916 . . . . . . .
...... . ......
11. National Defense Act of 1916 . . . .
.............
12. Funds for Fiscal Year 1917, April 1
13. Foulois: The 1st Aero Squadron in Mexico, 1916 . . . . .
14. Scriven: Annual Report, 1916 . . . . . . . . . .
...
15. Funds for Fiscal Year 1918, January 1917.. . . . . . . . . .

Part II Air Service Plans and Programs,
April 1917-February 1918 . . . . . .
.... .......
16. 12,000-Plane Program, 29 May 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17. Mitchell: Air Policy, 13 June 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18. Mitchell: Aeronautical Organization,
13 June 1917 . . . .
......................
.
19. Dodd: Aviation Work, 18 June 1917 . . . . . . .
20. Churchill: Liaison with Artillery, 21 June 1917 . . . . . . . .
21. Churchill: Air Superiority, 21 June 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22. Parker: The Role of Aviation, 2 July 1917
23. Board of Officers: Recommendations, 4 Ju
24. Duties of the Chief of Air Service, 5 July 1917 . . . . . . .
25. 59-Squadron Plan, 10 July 1917 . . . . . . . . . .
26. Bolling: Report, 15 August 1917 . . . . . . . .
27. 260-Squadron Plan, 18 September 1917
28. Command in the Zone of Advance, 10 October 1917 .
29. Gorrell: Strategical Bombardment, 28 November 1917
30. Foulois: Recommendations for Air Service, 1
December 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .
31. Foulois: Report on Air Service Problems,..................
23 December 1917 . . .
32. Command of the Air Se
24 December 1917

1
3
19
21
23
27
33
37
41
55

65
67
75
89
91

103
105
107
111
113
115
117
125

139
141
159
161

xii

Page
33 . 100-Squadron Schedule. 1 January 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . 167
34. 120-Squadron Schedule. 6 February 1918 . . . . . . . . . . 171

Part Ill Combat. February-November 1918 . . . . . .

173
175
35. Mitchell: General Principles. 30 April 1918 . . . . .
177
36. Artillery Adjustment. May 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37. Command of the Air Service. AEF. 29 May 1918 . . . . . 187
38. No Independent Air Operations. 29 May 1918 . . . . . . . . 191
39. Restatement of the 260-Squadron Plan.
195
5 June 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
199
40. Infantry Liaison. 15 June 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
205
41. Infantry Liaison in I Corps. June 1918 . . . .
213
42 . The Role of Pursuit. June 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
219
43. 358 Squadrons. July 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44. Liaison-A Costly Business. 4 August 1918 . .
223
45 . Command of the Air Service. First Army.
225
6 August 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46. 202 Squadrons. 16 August 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
47 . Plans for the Initial Phase of the Meuse-Argonne
231
Offensive. September 1918 . . . . . . . .
48. Battle Orders. Air Service. First Army.
247
September-November 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49 . Objectives of Day Bombardment. November 1918 . . . . 251
50. Area vs Precision Bombing. November 1918 . . . . . . . . . 253
51. Observation Balloons. November 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
263
52. A Combat Service. 11 November 1918 . . . . . .

Part IV Postwar Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53. Mitchell: Provisional Manual of Operations.

265

267
23 December 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54. Notes on the Characteristics. Limitations. andEmployment of the Air Service. 1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
55 . Sherman: Tentative Manual for the Employment of Air
313
Service. 1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

411
A . Funds for Military Aviation. 1909-1 918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
6. Squadron Plans and Programs. 1917-1918 . . . . . . . . . . 412

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

413

List OF Illustrzatiolzs

Early U S . military aviators.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

Page
2

..........
.........

.........
who fired a rifle from the aircraft.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Capt. Charles D. Chandler who fired the first machine gun
from an aircraft in flight piloted by Lt. Roy C. Kirtland . . . . .
First serviceman to fly-Lt. Lahm (art by Richard Green)
1st Aero Squadron, Texas City, Texas, 1913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lts. Thomas D. Milling and Wi
the U.S. duration and distance record.. . . . . . . . .
Burgess-Dunne airplane used
Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven
Signal Corps Burgess-Wright
A captive balloon inflated at Ft. Myer, Virginia, summer of1908 . .
.....
Wright Model D Scout purchased by the Signal Corps inFormation of JN-3 aircraft . . . .

Pancho Villa . . . . . .

...............

10
10
17
18

40

56

..................

..............
...........

71

Aircraft #43 landing in Mexi
Mexico . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 74
Officers of the I s
JN-2 Aeroplane #44 (cLt. Herbert A. Dargue posing by his air
Lts. Herbert A. Dargue and Edgar S. G
Lt. Dargue, Capt. Foul0
Lt. Col. George 0. Squier . .
......................
94
Gen. Pershing with his World War I staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
French women assembling A
n-made planes in France 104
Brig. Gen. Edgar Russel . . . .
.......................
106

xiv

Maj. Gen. Sir Hugh Montague Trenchard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Billy Mitchell” . . .
...............
Maj. Townsend F.
...........................
Maj. Marlborough Churchill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maj. Frank Parker . . . . .
...........
Observation balloon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Capt. Joseph E. Carberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chaumont France, site of Pershing’s Headquarters, AEF(sketch by J. Andre Smith) ............................
................
Maj. Raynal C. Bolling . . . . .
................
Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly . .
Gen. Sir D. Henderson decorates Col. Edgar S. Gorrell . . . . .
German Gotha bomber.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
109
110
118
122
124
130
138
140

Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord . . . .

Glenn L Martin #50 airplane equipped with r..........................

197

Ground panels laid out to signal aviators in flight . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Maj. Davenport Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 212Generals Ferdinand F........... 218. . . . . . . . . . . 222
Brig. Gen. Malin Craig. . . . . . . . . . . 224
Brig. Gen. “Billy” Mitc
226
Maj. Gen. Fox Conner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lt. Col. Bert M. Atkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Col. Robert McCleave . .
.................
Col. Joseph C. Morrow; Maj. William K. Thaw and
Lt. Col. Ralph Royce .....................
Lt. Col. Lewis H. Brereton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A loaded bomber awaiting takeoff ........................
238
240
Lt. Col. Frank P. Lahm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commandant Villome, French Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Col. Milling, Gen. Mitchell, and Maj. Paul Armengaud

xv

Page
250
252
254
261

Aerial view of Conflans ..................................
Brequets in formation ...................................
Col. Charles DeF. Chandler .............................
Telephone to a balloon.. ................................
Maj. Harold E. Hartney; Maj. James L. Dunsworth and 1st
Lt. N. McDonald ......................................
262
Four different types and sizes of bombs used in raids . . . . . . 276
Signal Corps radio truck used to receive and transmit
messages...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Panel marker
atio
anes ..
Brig. Gen. Mitchell and his staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lt. Col. William C. Sherman and Lts. V. F. Ludden and C. G.
Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
312
An open-air P.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
339
Observer watching infantry movements below . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344“Take-off’’ in formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
357
Another method of forming ..............................
358
Method of forming fives or multiples; Right angle or crossover turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................
359
Taylor stunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
English vol de group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Camouflage attack. ....................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Lufbery show . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
364
Attack on two-seater by formation of pursuit planes. . . . . . . . . 365
Method of assembling chain formations; Scouring patrol . . . . 366
Pursuit chain of formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
367
Strafing a machine-gun battery.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
369
U.S. airplane attacks captive balloon . . . . . .
Daylight balloon attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Day bombardment operation of one wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395-96
Day bombardment operation of one group.. . .
Chart showing functions of different branches
An observer and pilot demonstrate steering th
objective by reins .............................
Germans fire a captured French AA gun against
Allied balloons.. ....................
DH-4 (art by Masami DaiJogo). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
410

The U S Airz Serzvice inW o d a Warz I

Volume II
Early Conceptsof Military Aviation

PaRc I:
The A u i a t i o n Section
1914-1917

When the Great War began in August 1914, military operations with lighter-than-air craft had a history going back wellover a century. The airplane, however, was a new and as yet
relatively untried instrument of warfare. While European nations had spent considerable sums in recent years in building
up air forces of both lighter- and heavier-than-air craft, theUnited States had lagged far behind.
In the United States, military aviation was under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps, where the balloon section that had
been established in 1892 had been expanded into an Aeronautical Division in 1907 to take in heavier- as well as lighter-thanair activities. In the first part of August 1914 the Army had fewer
than 200 officers, enlisted men, and civilians in its aviation
establishment. Of the 30 airplanes that had been obtained up tothat time, one (the first one, purchased from the Wright
Brothers in 1909) was in the Smithsonian Institution, and 21
had been destroyed in accidents or condemned.
Dissatisfaction with lack of progress and with Signal Corps
jurisdiction over military aviation had brought on a congressional inquiry and “An Act to Increase the Efficiency of theAviation Service.” Passed by Congress, and approved by the
President on 18 July 1914, this act left aviation in the Signal
Corps but created a new section to be responsible for aviation
matters. Among other things, it also authorized as many as 60
officers and 260 enlisted men for aviation duty.
Meantime, the Chief Signal Officer, Brig. Gen. George P.
Scriven, had asked for $1,000,000 for aviation for Fiscal Year
1915, but Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison had reduced
the amount to $300,000, and Congress had cut out another$50,000. Thus the new Aviation Section began business with anannual appropriation of only $250,000, but that was twice asmuch as had been provided for the previous year.

12

Aviation Section

Early U.S. military aviators:(leftto right) Capt. Paul W. Beck. Lt. Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold. Capt.
Charles D. Chandler, Lt. Thomas D. Milling. and Lt. Roy Kirtland

1-A e R o n a u t i c s
in t h e A ~ r n g

3

1913

Hearings on the “Act to In-- not yet learned to fly; 1st Lt.
crease the Efficiency in the H. H. Arnold, Russel’s assistAviation Service” centered ant; Capt. Paul W. Beck, aiilot and the only officer whoon the question of organization. Considerable attention appeared before the commitwas given, however, to the tee in support of a separate
purpose and function of avia- aviation corps; and Riley
tion in the U.S. military estab- Scott, a former Army officer
lishment. The matter of orga- who had been experimenting
nization had been taken up with bomb dropping andearly in 1913 by Congress- who, like Beck, thought thatman James Hay (D., Va.), who the airplane had a great pointroduced a bill to take avia- tential for bombardment. Betion out of the Signal Corps. sides the chairman, the comThe bill ran into so much op- mittee members mentioned
position, however, from the in the extracts below were
War Department and from of- Daniel E. Garrett (D., Tex.), J.
ficers closely associated with C. McKenzie (R. Ill.), Frank T.
aviation that it had to be O’Hair, (D., Ill.), Frank L.
abandoned. But Hay did not Greene (R., Vt.), and Maurice
give up. In May 1913 he intro- Connolly (D., Iowa).
As a result of the hearings
duced another bill to create
an Aviation Corps which of August 1913, the commitwould be directly under the tee struck out everything
Chief of Staff and would be after the enacting clause andequal to other branches of rewrote the bill, which later
was enacted (Doc. 3), to prothe line of the army.
The House Committee on vide for an Aviation Section
Military Affairs, of which Hay in the Signal Corps. Followwas chairman, held hearings ing are extracts from theseon the new bill from 12 to 16 hearings in 1913.’
August 1913. The following............................
were among those who testiGen. Scriven [reading fromfied: General Scriven; Henrya memorandum which he had
Breckinridge, Assistant Secamong his papers]. . . Aeronauretary of War; Lt. Col. Samueltics and aviation in military afReber, a signal officer andfairs are merely an added means
balloon pilot who was slatedof communication, observation,
to become Chief of the Aero- and reconnaissance, and ought
nautical Division; Maj. Edgar
to be coordinated with and subRussel, Chief of the Aeronauordinated to the general service
tical Division; Capt. William
of information, and not be
Mitchell, who then was on erected into an independent andduty as a signal officer on the
uncoordinated service.
General Staff and who had . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Chairman. Will you
state briefly what are the functions of an Aviation Corps intime of war?
Gen. Scriven. Of course it is
all theory. Little has been done
offensively with aeroplanes inwar, but they have done a great
deal in reconnoissance work inmaneuvers and the like, especially in France, a little in Italy,
and they are trying to do something in Mexico. It seems that thething divides itself into two different classes of work to be
done. One is scouting and reconnoissance work by the fast
flying machine, heavier than air.
The Chairman. How doesthat pertain to the Signal Corps?
Gen. Scriven. The results ofreconnoissance work must bereported. The aeroplane is an
adjunct to the Cavalry. It makes
long reconnoissances and performs distance scouting. The
cavalryman outlines his advance
position, the aeroplane detects
and observes him in the distance, and must send the information back instantly to thecommander of the forces, andmust do so by wireless.

1 Hearings before the Cornmlnee on Military
Affairs House of Representatives. Aeronautcs!n the Army, 6% Gong 1st sess (1913)

4

Aviation Section

The Chairman. How about
the scouts sent out by the Cavaly, they have not to send backinformation in the same way?
Gen. Scriven. They also
have the wireless to some extent; but the aviator must have
his wireless man with him, andhis observer must be able tomanage wireless to be of muchuse. The aeroplane has also afighting function, we presume:that is, the bomb dropping. Of
this nobody knows much of anything, but we have theories. As
to the dirigible, its management
is most essentially Signal Corps
work, so far as observation andreconnoissance work can bedone by balloon. The dirigible iscapable of hovering over a city
or a command or whatever you
like, constantly sending inreports.
Mr. Garrett. You say thatboth machines will c a r y wirelessequipment?
Gen. Scdven. Yes, sir. The
aeroplane probably will carryother means of communication,such as the dropping of dispatches and things of that kind.
One of the main services of the
aeroplane is that of reconnoissance and the collection of
information.

............................

Mr. Garrett. In the recent
wars, what has been the successof the flying machine?

Gen. Scriven. Well, there
has been a little reconnoissancework done, but the reports are
not v e y full, and the fact of thematter is, many of the flyers, ofcourse, are not to be classed as
experts, and certainly not as
trained military observers. The
Turk can not handle an aeroplane-I know that-and theother peoples recently at war
probably can not do much withsuch a machine. Some volunteers, of course, from Europe
appeared at the seat of the recent war, but the reports f haveread are not v e y full, not v e ysatisfactoy, but an occasional
reconnoissance has been madethat has proved of value.
Mr. Garrett. The point I havein mind is this: Could any army
contend with its opponents ifthey should have an aviation
service?
Gen. Scriven. I do not believe for a moment an army
could so contend except at a
disadvantage, and the conditionin the Philippines is a good illustration of the fact. Consider theisland of Corregidor. If an enemy should land, say, at Subig
Bay and the defense was provided with aeroplanes, f doubt
very much if the attack could getashore; they must approach with
their transports loaded withtroops, with their horses andguns exposed in going ashore,
and the beach open to anythingthat might come over it, attackfrom overhead-an ideal condition for the dirigible and aeroplane, which by dropping nitro-gelatin might stop the landing or
at least disorganize the enemy’s
troops. Whatever may bethought regarding the danger ofattack to a warship from overhead, there can be no doubt of
the tremendous influence ofoverhead attack upon transports
crowded with troops and uponsmall boats and shore landings.
At best this is a time of confusion, or at all events extra hazardous, and when the enemy
must be to some extent disorganized and not prepared or capable of resisting to the utmost
the approach of aerial war machines, whether dirigibles oraeroplanes.
On the other hand, if the defense had none and the enemy
landed and marched to the hills
that overlook Corregidor with a
few aeroplanes and certainlywith a dirigible, it is difficult tosee how it would be possible tohold the position if conditions
are at all what they may be
expected to be in the attack on
this position.
The Chairman. Do you
mean by that that the science of
aviation has advanced to suchan extent that any county that isgoing to war with some othercounty would be handicapped
and at a great disadvantage unless that county had an aviation
corps sufficiently experienced tocontend with that of the othercounty?

Aeronautics in
the Army

Gen. Scriven. 1 believe so,most distinctly. If you look at
conditions at the Panama
Canal-I have happened to talkwith Mr. Scott, well known
throughout the world as having
conducted some interesting experiments in bomb dropping
Mr. Scott later appeared before
the committee1 who has informed me that he has dropped
100 pounds of nitrogelatin, and 1
believe the record shows that
400 pounds have been dropped
from an aeroplane. In talking of
the Panama Canal, Mr. Scottremarked that he had questioned a flier who the other day

passed over the Isthmus in regard to the canal as a target, andespecially as to the spillway of
Gatun Dam. It appears that thelatter makes a v e y conspicuous
target; so, no doubt, do othervulnerable points. Now, thequestion immediately comes up
as to what would be the result of
dropping 300 or 400 pounds ofnitrogelatin on the lock or spillway. There is probably little difficulty in doing it, and should aforeign fleet anchored beyond
the range of the guns of ourfortifications, some distanceout-say, 15 or 20 miles-aeroplanes may well be sent out andgreat damage to the canal done.
Of course, nobody would expect
to see the aeroplanes again, but
the probability is that some ofthem would be effective. Now, if
we have nothing to resist the aircraft except land guns, it seems
more than probable that somedamage would be done and theworking of the canal interrupted,
especially if we have no air craft
to resist that sort of attack.
Mr. McKenzie. How would
you meet that attack?
Gen. Scriven. By aeroplanes
and dirigibles.
The Chairman. Has theOrdnance Department succeeded in getting a gun that
could be used on aeroplanes?
Gen. Scriven. The Krupp
gun can do it. The Krupps havea gun that can be used against
machines. The Ordnance Department has been experimenting, but I do not know that they
have yet devised a gun.

............................
Mr. Breckinridge. . . . thevast amount of experimental
work that has been done andthe state of continuous development in which this matter of theservice of information has existed during the last 50 years,
and now exists, are such that allof the energy and capacity of aseparate body, such as the Signal Corps, will be required. 1 am
free to believe that the art of war
since the Civil War, if it has
Congrrw-

Jam- Hay. Chairman.
& w e Committee on Mllitw
Affalm.

Aviation Section

6changed at all, has only changedin the service of information, andthat the only thing that would
make the Battle of Gettysburg
different today from what it was
50 years ago would be that thework of each of the armies
would be much better coordinated by the work of the Signal
Corps, of which aviation would
be merely a branch.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may 1 ask what I asked
Gen. %riven, and that is what
function does the Signal Corps
perform,or, rather, what functions will the aviation corps perform that pertains to the Signal
Corps, which is purely a meansof information?
Mr. Breckinridge. This, forinstance: the aeroplane goes out
under orders, perhaps, of thecommander of a screening brigade of cavalry which is protecting the advance of a larger bodyof mixed troops. Now, the aviator goes and gets his information; he is 20 miles away, andhow does he get that information back? You do not transmit
that information in the mannerin which he came for it. He is 20
miles away, and he will send an
instantaneous wireless message.
Now, he will send that instantaneous wireless message and thatmessage will be received by
what? By another wireless outfit
under the command of the Signal Corps, and thus the information reaches the commander ofi7Aeronautics in
the Army

the screening brigade of cavalry.
As I say, that message will besent back by wireless or wire or
through some other agency of
the Signal Corps. The transmission of that information fromthere to the commanding general of the army, who may be
100 miles away, will be throughnothing but agencies of the Signal Corps until it gets there. Of
course, the Cavalry gets information, but the Cavalry is notunder the Signal Corps. The differentiation to be made is theresult of experience. It is not amatter of logic. You could say,as a matter of logic, that because
the Cavalry gets information the
Cavalry should be under the
Signal Corps, or you could say,as a matter of logic, that because
the Cavalry gets information andis not under the Signal Corps,
therefore no branch of the service that gets information should
be under the Signal Corps. It is
not a matter of logic, but a matter of experience.
The Chairman. What otherservice is it contemplated thataeroplanes or an Aviation Corps
would render in time of war except to get information?
Mr. Breckinridge. At thepresent time the only established
use that is proved for aviation isthe expediting of the service of
information and the getting of
information.
The Chairman. But we areproviding legislation not only forthe present time but for the future.

Mr. Breckinridge. I would
go so far as to say that for theimmediate future 99 per cent of
the value of aviation will be in
the service of information. Now,
I do not say that in the development of dirigibles which can
carry 5 tons of lyddite or nitrogelatin or any other high explosive,
they will not be able to perfect a
device which will drop a ton of
explosives in a vulnerable place.
I can not say that the time will
not come when a flock of dirigibles can come to England, if it isunprotected, and may hover in
the air for 40 hours, as a dirigible
can do, and destroy whole cities;
but I do mean to say that, looking at it through the vista of the
future with the largest powers ofimagination with which we canconceive the probable future
growth of aviation, and yet also
looking at it from the viewpointof legislation that is likely to berequired, and taking the averagedevelopment that will be experienced in the next 15 or 20 years
in the Army, as far as we can see
there ought not to be any separation, because this great development in aviation will not comein that length of time, particularlyin this county, because we will
follow rather than lead in its development.
The Chairman. We are far
behindMr. Breckinridge (interposing). We were the pioneers; wedeveloped it. Wright was the first
man to do it, but in the feeling of
security that America has always
had, and in that she may besomewhat justified, we have

lagged behind other nations
which immediately perceived thenecessity of this thing from themilitary standpoint. If the aeroplane is never to be developed
another inch, as Gen. Scriven
has said, the nation that is without aviation will simply be overwhelmed by the nation that isequally as well prepared in otherrespects and is better preparedin the matter of aviation, because the question of victory or
defeat, where the troops areanywhere near equal, will
depend upon the question of
information or the lack of
information. I think that is all 1
care to say.

............................
Mr. O’Hair. What is the true
function of the Aviation Corps?
Col. Reber. It is to receive
and transmit information for thetactical commanders. For instance, the commander of a division desires to know what isgoing on in front of him. He has
certain instrumentalities for gathering that information and certain instrumentalities for thetransmission of that information.
For example, his way of gathering it may be by Cavalry,screened Cavalry patrols, or Infantry patrols. There is a method
for getting that information back.
That information is transmitted
back to the commander and hedistributes it as he sees fit.

............................

Aviation Section

8

The Chairman. . . . Capt
Beck, we will hear you now. I
wish you would state what, if
any, experience you have had asan aviator, and to what arm of
the service you belong.
Capt. Beck. Mr. Chairman
and gentlemen of the committee, I am an Infantry officer andwas detailed to aviation in January, 1911. My first experience
with aviation was in January,1910, when I was sent by the
War Department, as its representative, to a large international
meet which took place at Los
Angeles. During that Los Angeles meet l had occasion to makea number of flights as passenger
with Glenn Curtiss in his machine, which, incidentally, was
not a passenger-carrying machine, but it was modified inorder to carry me up, and withCapt. B. D. Foulois, who was
flying a French Farman machine.
During the course of the aviation
meet it occurred to me that the
aeroplane might be used as anaggressive factor in war, and following that the idea of dropping
various and varying weightsfrom the aeroplane to find out,
first, whether or not the equilibrium would be changed becauseof this dropping, and, second,
whether or not we could reasonably expect to strike an object on
the ground. The largest weightthat I dropped at that time wasCapt. Paul W. Beck,a pllot and the only offlcer to appear
before Hay'. commtttee in support
of a separate avhtlon corps.

not in excess of 15 pounds.
There was no change in theequilibrium of the machine. I
found that the tables which I had
roughly gotten up regarding theangle of dropping were totally
inaccurate, which led me to perform a good deal of experimentation to bring out the proper
tables.
The following November I was
detailed by the commanding
general of the western division toassist in the organization of alarge aero meet at San Francisco. The people behind thatmeet were the most influential
people on the coast, and theywanted to make something exceedingly large on account of
the then fight between San

Francisco and New Orleans for
the Pan American Exposition. I
simply bring that out to show thescope of the meet. I was madesecretary on account of the experience I had had at Los Angeles, which, while small, at thesame time was greater than anyone else on the coast had at thattime. From November until January we worked up the details
and the meet was held in January. During that meet I continued the experiments started before at Los Angeles. Lieut.
Crissy, of the Coast Artillery,
worked with me on the aggressive use of the aeroplane, anddevised a bomb-dropping device
which was worked from theaeroplane, and he also got up aset of tables which enabled him
to determine with considerable
accuracy where they would
strike the ground at varying altitudes. Those experiments weresuccessful to a height of 1,500
feet, showing conclusively that aweight up to 36 pounds could
be dropped within 20 feet froman altitude of 1,500 feet. Understand, we were striving at thattime to work out the basic principles. No one ever held for an
instant that an aeroplane at 1,500 feet would be of any military value. We had to creep before we could walk, and we
wanted to work out these thingsin order to arrive at the greater
things which lay in the higher
altitudes. Since that time exLieut. Scott, of the United States

Aeronautics in
the Army

Army, has devised a bombdropping device which has beensuccessful up to altitudes of 5,000 feet. I can not tell what his
accuracy is offhand, but my
impression now is that hedropped 14 projectiles fromheights vaying from 3,500 to
5,000 feet, and his largest misswas something like 30 feet froma given spot. 1 do not claim thisto be absolutely accurate, butthat is my impression.
The Chairman. Captain, that
leads you to believeCapt. Beck. That leads me
to believe that there is an aggressive use for the aeroplane.

............................

There are four fundamental
uses for the aeroplane in war.
One is for reconnoissance purposes; two, for fire control of
Field Artillery and Coast Artillery; three, the aggressive use,
and four, the occasional transportation use. Those things are
not experimental; they have all
been demonstrated. They havebeen demonstrated abroad, andif they have not been demonstrated here it is because ourpeople have failed to grasp thesituation. We are behind; in five
years we have done nothing. . . .

range of information transmiswhelming advantage of thesion for all practical and general
aeroplane as an instrument of
purposes, does it not?
reconnoissance and report. He
admits that its extensive use in
Maj. Russel. As 1 haveoffensive warfare by bomb drop- stated, there is a possibility ofping and machine-gun fire is as development in the offensive
warfare utilization. It appears
yet a matter of speculation. In
there has not been very muchthese views he is supported bypractically all of the conservative done as yet. No great accomwriters in the foreign services. To plishment has been reported. It
attempt to organize aviation on a has some promise, but there
have been no realizations of it.
basis of what it may'be able to
At present we can rely only on
do some time is vey unwise
the aeroplane for obtaining andand, at any rate, premature.
transmitting information.
............................
Mr. Green. When the aero- ............................
Capt. Mitchell. . . . Thisplane begins to be used foraeroplane business is pretty wellbomb throwing and machineunderstood in its relation to thegun work it becomes then an
instrument offensive and defen- military service; it is well undersive, and that takes it out of the stood by all of the great na-............................
Ma]. Russel. . . .
One of the best articles on the
militay value of the aeroplane
has recently been written by
Jacques Mortane, who as one of
the greatest living authorities frequently advises the French military establishment. He brings out
with a great clearness the over-

Lt. Myron s. Crluy dqvlsed a bombdropping devlce and dropped the firstbomb from a U.S. alrckaft on 15 January 1911 at the Tanforan race tracknear SM Franctaco. Seated wlth Cdsay I s Phillip 0. Pannalee, whopiloted the Wrlsht aircraft for the expedment.

10Charles F. Will@, aCurtiss pilot. flbw theCurtiss PushedBiplanefrom which Maj. Jacob E.
Fickel fired a rlfle from anaircraft. The event took
place during an air meetheld In August 1910, at
Sheepshead Bay, N.Y.
At right,
Capt. Charles D.
Chmndkr fired the f h t
machine gun +om anaircraft In flight on 7 June
1912. Thomas D. Milling
was the pllot of theWrlght Type “B” aircraft,
but Lt. R o y C. Klrtland
substituted for hlm inthe pilot’s seat.

Aviation Sectiontion-thatis, it is well understood what it is good for. Now, if
this thing were not any good atall, if we did not derive any
advantage from it, it would not
be of any use to do what we areattempting to do; but we allknow that there is something in
it, and that from the military
standpoint it is a necessary andimportant adjunct to the militaryorganization. We know absolutely that aeroplanes are valuable for reconnoissance service.
Now, reconnoissance workmeans the getting of informationin regard to the enemy andbringing it back to the person forwhose use the information is intended. Aeroplane reconnoissance means finding out about
the enemy; that is, getting information about large units and notlittle details about small detachments. We have troops for that
purpose, but the aeroplane reconnoissance will be used for the
purpose of securing information
concerning large strategic combination-thelarger tacticalmovements-or the things usefulfor the commanding general toknow. In other words, they will
not be used to secure information respecting small details butof large tactical combinations.
Now, the offensive value of thisthing has not been proved. It isbeing experimented with-bomb
dropping and machines carrying
guns are being experimented
with-but there is nothing to it
so far except in an experimentalway.

Aeronautics in
the Army

Some experimenters in Germany have dropped as much as
300 pounds of explosive froman aeroplane, and all that sort ofthing; but, gentlemen, you
should bear in mind that if you
drop 300 pounds of explosive
on one man, while it may tearthat one man all to pieces, theeffect will be entirely local. On
the other hand, it might be usedagainst bridges and it might beused against dockyards andstorehouses; but at the present
time all that is in the experimental stage. On the other hand, theaeroplane to be safe from fire
directed from the ground must
be over 4,000 feet altitude. That
has been proved in Tripoli andin the Bulgarian war. That is tosay, until that altitude is attained
it is not safe from hostile fire,from the ground. We have got
to be over 4,000 feet to be safe
from that hostile fire. Now,
gentlemen, with these conditions
we know what organization we
ought to have with the units of
the Army we now have. We
know that almost to the extent
that we know what a regimentof Cavalry or a regiment of Field
Artillery or a regiment of Infantry
should be. Reconnoissance withthe troops may be divided into
two kinds-one strategical reconnaissance-that is, reconnaissance at a distance, to findout what the enemy’s plans areaway from the field of battle andthe other is what we call tacticalreconnaissance-that is, reconnaissance on the actual field ofbattle. We know that when an

11

aeroplane is sent out alone on a
mission it is apt not to getback-that is, the chances arethat something is apt to happen
to it-so it is the practice in thisreconnoissance work to send out
two aeroplanes. That would require two for tactical reconnoissance; and then if we have astrategical reconnoissance outfit,
we will need two aeroplanes forthat purpose. Now, for the purposes of tactical reconnoissance,
suppose we are marching in thisdirection, for instance (indicating); we are reconnoitering theenemy’s front for that purposethat is, for tactical reconnoissance purposes-we need two
aeroplanes for that service. At
the same time we wish to get aline on the enemy’s flank movements, and for that purpose weneed two aeroplanes. Obviously,
therefore, they ought to run intwos all the time. Therefore, as I
said, we need two machines atleast for each of these kinds ofreconnoissance. We need two atleast to reconnoiter ahead of theforces and two to reconnoiter inon a flank or other places fortactical purposes, and we needat least two for strategical reconnoissance, with a given forcesay, a division of troops.

French batteries. Consequently it
is very important that they develop their field-artillery fire, andthey have definitely worked out
a system which is better thananything they had before andthat is accomplished by meansof aeroplane. That is a very important function-that is, the fire
control of field artillery by meansof aeroplanes. That is anotherelement of use, and we would
need a unit for that purpose.
The French in their organization
have that. The French, in theirorganization, have provided
aeroplanes for the artillery commander. That is, the commander
who handles that artillery has agiven force of aeroplanes andthey are assigned to each group.
They assign machines for the
purpose of handling the fire of aparticular lot of guns. Theirgroups correspond to battalions
in this county. In starting theorganization in this county it
seems to me that we have pretty
definite things to go on. That
organization ought to consist of
one unit for strategic reconnoissance, consisting of two machines, and two units for tacticalreconnoissance; that is, one unit
for the front and one for thesides, or four machines. Then,we ought to have a unit for the
There is a third use for themfield artillery fire control.
which is very important inNow, in order that we may
not overdo this thing, this orgaFrance on account of her present deficiency, as they believe, in nization ought to be thoroughly
the matter of artillery materiel.
The Germans have recently developed a field howitzer which
can probably get next to the12considered. A certain number ofaeroplanes have been recommended to constitute this unit,
and that number is eight aeroplanes-two for strategical reconnoissance, four for tacticalreconnoissance, two in front of
the force, two on a flank, andtwo for k l d artillery fire control.
Each of these aeroplanes musthave two officets-one observer
and one to do the flying-so thatthe miniium number in eachmachine would be two. Then,
there should be one officer incommand of each one of theseforces and another to look after
the property, making the number of officers necessary about
20,and of enlisted men in roundnumbers, 80 would be requiredfor one of these units. Now theunit of Army organization is thedivision, because that is thesmallest complete army in itselt
it comprises all of the branchesof the service capable of acting
together, and, in round numbers, consists of 20,000men.
With the exception of our Civil
War and with the exception of
the war in the Philippines, where
we had 60,000men, all of our
expeditions have been not toexceed that size, in one place.
So it seems to me, in so far as
our organization in this county
is concerned, that our unit to be
used with troops should bebased on the division, becausethat is a little army in itself. . . .
............................

Aviation Section

The Chairman. Do you thinkin course of time that the militaryby experience will be able todrop bombs with any accuracy?
Capt. Mitchell. Yes, sir;probably with great accuracy,
but the effect would be the sameas a high-explosive shell. We do
not use that against personnel;
we only use it against materielhouses, buildings, etc.,-because the effect is local. Some ofthe people in the Russo-Japanese War had a thousand fragments of high-explosive shelltaken out of their bodies. Its
effect is entirely local. Against
personnel we use shrapnel. Thismay be regarded as a short shotgun that is thrown in the air andexplodes at the proper time andsweeps the ground for about
250 yards by 20 yards with a lotof heavy shot.
The Chairman. How about
the machine gun?
Capt. Mitchell. it will probably never be any good for attacking personnel on the groundfrom aeroplanes; it may from
dirigibles. To operate against
other aeroplanes and dirigibles itwill be used. On the other hand,
it is thought in fighting aeroplanes they will ty to ram eachother as much as they can, andboth get smashed up. That is aproblem.
The Chairman. We would
like to hear what you have to
say about the possibility of the
dirigible, how much they cost,
and whether or not they are so
important as to justify our Government in going into them.

Capt. Mitchell. We should
keep up with modem methods.
The cost of dirigible ballooning istremendous. We have not thesame problems that they have todeal with in Europe, but weshould have a few; that is, one
or two,and keep them up todate, so we will be capable ofdeveloping them if called on to
do it. In Germany their idea isthat they are the battleships ofthe air and will be able to cary agreat amount of explosives andguns and at the same time reconnoiter. On the other hand,
they are very subject to attackfrom these little hornets of the
air-the aeroplanes.

............................

Lieut. Arnold. . . . I would
like, if I may, to add a few
remarks to some of the testimony given by preceding officers. In the first place, I would
like to call attention to what has
been done by aeroplanes anddirigibles in the Balkan war. Of
course the information we receive now is very meager, andmost of the information we havegotten is from consuls and considerable from military attaches,
no official reports having comeover as yet.
However, we do know that
there was a naval lieutenant in ahydro-aero plane-equippedwith the bomb-dropping device
invented by Mr. Scott, who washere yesterday--who located theTurkish cruiser that was creating
so much havoc over in the Dar-

Aeronautics in
the Army

danelles. He made a cross-country flight of 180 miles out and180 miles back and was fired on
numerous times on that trip, but
was not touched. He flew at analtitude of about 6,000 feet. In
the Bulgarian Army, at the
opening of the war, they had noaviation organization at all. They
had four officers in Russia learning to fly and four machines
under orders. Outside of that
their aviation service did notamount to anything. So when
the war broke out they had noexperienced pilots whatsoever.
But in spite of that fact they
determined to organize an aviation corps and hired civilian
aviators to enter the service,
paying them a large bonus. Fouror five of those aviators werecrooks and did not develop at
all; the others they used to train
the officers. Up to about the 1stof December of last year they
did not do anything at all, to
speak of.At that time the aviation equipment was increased sothat they had about 14 aeroplanes in use.
Between December 10 andJanuary 1it was known that
there were a number of reconnoissance flights made and v e yvaluable information turned in to
the commanding generals of thedifferent armies. There was areconnoissance flight of 140 kilometers, at an altitude of between 1,100 and 1,200 meters,
flying about opposing troops
whose position they were able toreveal. They brought back very
valuable information; just what13

the nature of that information
was we do not know yet, but weknow the flight was made andthat they turned in a report tothe commanding general. On
the 11th another aviator flew
over Preveza, with a passenger,
and flew to a place 47 kilometers
away, and brought back very
valuable information as to theTurkish position. A short timelater a flight was made over Janina to a place 75 kilometers
away, at a height of 1,600meters. This aviator threw downbombs, creating a veritable panic
amongst the Turkish troops.
Many hostile bullets tore the fabric, but the machine continued
its flight unaffected. On the 28thof December a Greek army pilot
officer made a flight over the fortof Bisani. He flew at an altitudeof 2,300 meters, reporting observations concerning the garrison and the fortifications, whichwere considered of the highest
importance by the Greek commanding officer. It is also known
that at Adrianople aeroplanes
and dirigibles were both used ingoing over the city.
Of course, their flight for reconnoissance purposes
amounted to practically nothing,but these aeroplanes were
equipped with the Scott bomb
dropper, and dropped bombs on
the city and set fire to it, whichcaused considerable damage.
............................

The Chairman. . . .
Capt. Scott, who has been in
the Army and is now a civilian
operator, is present, and we willhear him.

............................

The Chairman. You were at
one time in the Army?
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did you do
any duty as an aviator while in
the Army?
Mi. Scott. No, sir. I took up
aviation afterwards. I have madea special study of the aeroplane
as an offensive weapon.
The Chairman. We would
like to hear what your experience has been.
Mr. Scott. About 1908,
when Mr. Wright was making his
first flights, I came to the conclusion that the aeroplane would
eventually become very important as an offensive weapon.
The fact that you can get overan object to be destroyed andthat you can see it from anaeroplane better than in any
other way caused me to cometo the conclusion, with proper
application of scientific principles, that bombs or explosives
could be dropped accurately,and I took up that study
specially.

14

In 1911 a gentleman inFrance offered a prize for dropping dummy bombs on a target.
The prize was 150,000 francshalf of that was available in 1912
and the other half in 1913. I
already had an apparatus designed which, through the courtesy of Gen. Allen, I was able totest at College Park. I took theapparatus over to France andwas fortunate enough to win thewhole series of prizes. The
heights from which the projectiles were dropped were 200
meters (about 656 feet) and 800
meters (about half a mile). Fifteen projectiles were dropped oneach flight, the time being 50
minutes. The winning machine
was able to place 12 out of the
15 projectiles within a radius of
10 meters-that is 33 feet, which
would be a little over twice thesize of this room-12 out of 15,
each weighing 25 pounds.
The second test was at 800
meters-we really flew at 850,
over half a mile, and 12 out of
15 projectiles were placed withina radius of 40 meters, 120 feetsquare, which is a v e y small
portion of the side of thisbuilding.

Aviation Section

The various tests made-themeet lasted from March until
September and included
hundreds of flights-and the accuracy attained, convinced methat projectiles could be dropped
with a great deal of accuracy on
any target from, say, a height ofa mile, from 1,000 to 1,500 meters, a mile, or a mile and aquarter. I have been studying
considerably the application ofsuch a device, which I believe tobe sufficiently accurate at thepresent time, and I firmly believethat the aeroplane will become av e y important destructive
weapon, much more so than werealize at the present time. It
could be used, among otherthings, in a siege against a besieged place. There is always
some key point like there was at
Port Arthur and Adrianople,
against which troops are fighting
sometimes for days and w e e kagainst the strongest point-

without any appreciable effort.
In such a case, if I were thecommanding officer, I would
send up as many aeroplanes as
were available, 20 or 30, each
one carrying 500 pounds of highexplosive, and rain that high explosive on this importarit pointthat they were tying to attackand just as soon as that wascompleted, then rush in thetrrmps and storm the fortifications or the strong poinit, and I
believe it would be very effective.
Mr. Connolly. In the eventof using the aeroplane as a destructive means in modern warfare and you are up against another power presumably as wellfortified with air craft as you are,then does not the warfare actually take place in the air, andwould not their air craft protect
their fortifications?

Aeronautics in
the Army

Mi. Scott. When you besiegea place the presumption is they
are in more or less desperatestraits, and in a case like Adrianople the outside force would
have full opportunity to recoup
their air force, and in this particular case I think you could presume that you would have thepreponderance of aeroplanes, orthat the enemy have none at all,but ordinarily the presumption
would be that the two powers
fighting would have equal forces,
in Europe at least.
Another important use, I
should think, would be against
headquarters. Commanding officers can not be made in a day or
a year. From my experience I
think that a mile above the earth
you can pick out with an eyevery readily anything as large asa tent or an automobile, or wagon-anything like that can beseen very clearly on a clear day.
I imagine an important use of
the aeroplane would be picking
out headquarters, the enemy’scommanding general and important encampments like that, andby using shrapnel, a large shellweighing 500 pounds with highexplosives, and being able todrop it within a square of 120
feet, I think you could make itvery uncomfortable for the commanding general. I think thatwould be an important use of
the aeroplanes. Against fortifications-I firmly believe that 500
pounds of nitrogelatin placednear a barbette disappearing gun
carriage would put that completely out of service. If dropped

15

on a mortar battery, 1 think it
would temporarily at least put
that out of order, and especiallythe range-finding system. The
accuracy of these guns depends
entirely on the range-finding system. These systems are screened
as much as possible from the sea
in the seacoast fortifications, butthey can not be screened fromthe air, and 1 think it would bevery readily put out of business,
and when the range-finding system is put out of business thebattety is put out of business, atleast until it is repaired.
We have very elaborate fortifications to protect the large cities,
especially New York. I can imagine an enemy’s fleet of 20 or 30
vessels coming toward New
York-our Navy may be insome other part of the seasthey just come outside of therange of the Sandy Hook guns,
cruise around and send aloft 20
or 30 aeroplanes at a height of amile, I do not see any way ofbringing down an aeroplane except occasionally by accidentprobably by accident one may
occasionally be brought down-

but the fleet would cruise out
there and the aeroplanes would
go over New York with incendiary bombs especially constructed to produce conflagration, probably a few high explosives but mostly incendiarybombs, and drop them over
New York and produce such a
conflagration that no fire department could cope with-in otherwords, make New York like San
Francisco. I do not think Washington is too far off for a thing
like that-Baltimore, Norfolk,Charleston, and Wilmington, thecoast cities, would be vulnerable.
The same way on the Pacificcoast. Those things are in the
future, but military people haveto look into the future, and theones who look far into the future
are the ones who usually win out
in the long run.
My particular hobby, the thing
I have been studying about particularly, is the destruction of the
Panama Canal. It has cost an
immense amount of money. It isa lock canal, and there has beena great deal of discussion as towhether certain parts will holdup. The canal is about 50 miles
across, 1 believe; that is, the center of the canal would be 25
miles from either sea.
Over in Europe, when dropping these bombs in the 800meter contest, you were allowedAviation Section

16

to drop any number, one or allof them, at the same time. In theother contests you had to drop
one at a time, flying around andgoing over the target successively, but in the 800-meter contest several of the aviators, twoof them to be accurate, just put
their eggs all in one basket. One
man, a lieutenant in the French
Army, who had a light Farman
machine, with a 50-horsepower
motor, could not carry a passenger, and he dropped the bombs
himself. He did not have a particularly scientific way; he justput his eggs all in one basket
and dropped them at one time,
believing that if he got in theright place he would win out. He
did this day after day, and hetold me the effect of dropping
the bombs was hardly perceptible; that is, the stability of themachine was not affected. Of
course it jumped forward andbackward and the speed increased after releasing theweight. I have not any doubtthat an aeroplane will be built
heavy enough to drop from 500
to 1,000pounds without any
trouble whatever.
With the machine I used overthere I would not hesitate todrop 500 pounds. I dropped 50
pounds a good many times, andI would have to touch the manon the knee to let him know it.
You can build machines, 1 think,to drop 500 or 1,000 pounds ofnitrogelatin, which is a very
powerful explosive.
In war the object of the foreign nations is to destroy our

greatest strategic point, which
would be the Panama Canal,
and they would put all theirforce against the canal. For somereason our fleet is not there, it
has been defeated or it is protecting some other part of thecoast-any way, they go there.
No matter how strongly thecanal is fortified, they do notcome within range of the guns;
they cruise out 10 or 30 miles.
The distance to Gatun Dam orto the locks would be probably
half an hour's fly. They send out
their aeroplanes loaded withhigh explosives, say 20 or 30 ofthem, as many as they can send,hoping that some of them will
get back; but in warfare we takechances, and if they destroyed
the canal no doubt they would
be willing to lose them all. They
send them up and they are flying
one. after another, placing 500
pounds of nitrogelatin first on
the spill-way and later up theCulebra Cut, causing slides. I
think some of you gentlemenknow the effect of an explosiveon the earth, causing it to slide. I
think the canal would be put outof business, probably in one
hour or two hours, by an enemy
with aeroplanes. That is, ofcourse, my own personal opinion. We do not know the effectof an explosive dropped from anaeroplane, because it has neverbeen done except in a small
way. I firmly believe when theexperiments are carried on inthat direction that it will be foundto be very destructive.

MI. Connolly. Would it not
be difficult to place bclmbs with
precision at an altitude of 5,000
feet on account of the various
currents that intervene between
the air craft and the target?
MI. S c o t t . From my experience, I think the wind does notmake a great deal of difference,
especially after the first bomb, if
it is planed off. In the first place,
you usually fly into the teeth of
the wind, and at a very highaltitude the currents would probably be compensating. I do notbelieve that the wind would
have a great deal of effect if they
were up a half a mile. I am
speaking from experience.
Mr. McKenzie. You havespoken of danger to the Panama
Canal from aeroplanes?
MI. S c o t t . Yes, sir.
MI. McKenzie. What is youridea of the way we shlould protect the canal, with air craft?
MI. Scott. I am not able toanswer that question at the present time. The only way to fight
air craft is with air craft.
MI. McKenzie. If iit is truethat the Panama Canal is in danger of being destroyed by theoperation of air craft, then, in
your judgment, is not the fortification of the Panama Canal aneedless expense?
Mr. Scott. If air cradt were all
the defenders of the Panama
Canal were going to contend

Aeronautics in

17

the Army

with, yes; but the fortifications
are naturally placed there against
the navies at the present time,
primarily. I think the authorities
should consider the air craft as amenace to the canal and not
wait until that menace really develops-take it up now.
Mr. McKenzie. Pardon me,
but according to your theoy, if I
understand you correctly, you
would have a fleet of aeroplanes
stationed at either end of the
Panama Canal, and they would
be of greater service in destroying an enemy’s fleet than thefortifications?
Mr. Scott. 1 believe so; yes,sir. The authorities say that 500
pounds of nitrogelatin dropped
on the deck of a battleshipwould have only a local effect.

Mr. Connolly. Do you reWe do not know; it has nevergard the air craft as a potential
been tried. The proof of theforce in destroying batfleships?
pudding is in the eating and I
From your experiments, it would
think it should be done; thatseem reasonable that you could
some old battleship or monitor
hit a battleship.
should be made a target and
Mr. Scott. 1think so. Fromthat it should be done. A great
the height of a mile, I should say
many authorities say it would
50 per cent of hits. There is ahave a local effect. I do not
great deal of controversy as tobelieve it.
Mr. McKenzie. I understand the effect that a high explosive
would have on the deck of aone of the older battleships isbattleship, whether it would be
about ready to go out of commission and that might be a very local or cause vey serious harm.
That can only be proven bygood experiment.
Mr. Scott. I believe in taking tying.
The Chairman. We are vey
time by the forelock, and at themuch obliged to you, Mr. Scott.
present time I think the aeroplane is of sufficient importance (Thereupon the Committee adto warrant vey serious consider- journed.)............................
ation.

Filrt oaviceman to fly-Lt.

Lahm(art by Richard Green)2- FouR-Squatmon

19

Plan

During t h e hearings of1913 (Doc. l ) , Scriven gave
the committee a paper entitled "Suggested Organization for Aeronautical Work int h e United S t a t e s Army,"'which explained the basis forthe first plan for the organization of units for tactical operations with aircraft. The
first such unit, the 1st Aero
Squadron, had been formed
as a provisional organization
at Texas City, Texas, on 5
March 1 9 1 3 a s U.S. Army
forces on t h e border werebeing strengthened as a result of revolutionary disturbances in Mexico.*

1 Aeronaurics m the Army, pp 120-122
2 Maurer Maurer (ed ) Combat Squadrons of the A s Force, World War II (Washington. 1969).pp 4 4. . . this office has convened
boards of officers to discuss thenecessities which confront us,
and these boards, consisting ofseveral experienced officers of
the Signal Corps associated withpractically all of the aviators on
duty, have reported in effect asfollows: Our military forces havebeen apportioned among six divisional commands. Since these
are tactical units, and it has been
agreed that a large aeronauticalorganization should be assigned
as a part of each main tacticalunit, the boards have reported
that an organization called an
Aeronautical Squadron should
be assigned to each of thesetactical units to serve therewith
as a component part of such
units for peace training or forservice in war.
On account of the present reduced strength of such divisions,
it has been recommended from
economical considerations thatat present we favor the organization of only 4 of the aeronautical squadrons, subdividing 2 ofthose so that distribution may bemade of these subdivisions
among the tactical units requiring them.
The four aero squadrons thus
formed are to be placed at appropriate aeronautical centers,

each commanded by a field officer and serving incidentally as acenter of aeronautical instruction.
The organization and equipment of each of the aeronauticalsquadrons proposed is as follows:
It is customary to assign forthe operation of an aeroplane
two officers, who alternate inlong cross-country flights as observer and aviator or pilot. It has
been found by our experience,
and abroad, that at least fiveenlisted men are required in thecare, repair, and handling of an
aeroplane. This personnel (twoofficers and five men) constitutethe section necessary for the
aeroplane. Two aeroplanes andtheir sections are proposed as
the platoon; two platoons compose the company, and two
companies, commanded by amajor, constitute the aerosquadron, the aero tactical unit
proposed to be assigned to adivision.
............................

3,C K e a t i o n o ~The Aviation Section,
Signal COKPS

21

18July 1914............................
, . . there is hereby created,
an aviation section, which shallbe a part of the Signal Corps of
the Army, and which shall be,
and is hereby, charged with theduty of operating or supervising
the operation of all military aircraft, including balloons andaeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when
installed on said craft. . . .

...........................

22

Shortly after thelet Aem Squadron had been formed as aprodsional quadton. Lte. Thomae D. Milling andWilliam C. Sherman broke the U.S. durationand dietance Ipcord. on 28 March 1913. flying non-etop,
crnee-country. frnm Texae City to San Antonio. On the tetum
flight, on 31 March, they drew the f h t aerial map froman aircraft. Ihe picture w u taken uponlanding a t Towe City.

Aviation Section

23

Regulations
1914............................

The position taken by
Breckenridge and Scriven in
the hearings of 1913 (Doc. 1)
with regard to the function ofaviation was reflected in t h e
War Department’s field Service Regulations of 1914.’
These regulations made infantry t h e principal combat
arm of the U.S. Army, withartillery and cavalry a s theprincipal supporting arms.
Aviation, which was not mentioned in t h e section concerning the use of combinedarms in combat, was given a
reconnaissance mission that
included strategic and tactical reconnaissance and observation of artillery fire. The
only refererice to a fightingrole for aircraft was a single
sentence relating to t h e useof aircraft in preventing aerial
observation by t h e enemy.
Though these regulations
were altered in several instances between t h e timethey were issued in 1914 ,?p
the end of t h e war in 1s b ,statements concerning thestatus and mission of aviation remained unchanged.
Following are some extracts.

1 War Department Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1914. Corrected
to July 31, 1918 (Changes Nos 1 to 1 1 )(Washington 1918) No changes are indicated for the passages printed above

end. As the opposing armies
11. Reconnaissance-Reconnaissance is the military term draw near each other, the cavalry endeavors to secure control
used to designate the work oftroops or individuals when gath- of the ground between andbends every effort to that close
ering information in the field.
Reconnaissance begins as soon and continuous reconnaisance ofas the theater of possible opera- the enemy’s forces that is vital totions is entered and continues
the success of the entire campaign.
throughout the campaign. No
matter what other sources of in- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
formation of the enemy may be
21.During combat the aerosquadron will operate aroundavailable, reconnaissance must
be depended upon to obtain the the flanks and over and to theinformation upon which all tacti- rear of the enemy’s position, forcal movements of troops should the purpose of reporting his dispositions, the approach of reinbe based.
forcements, or the beginning of
12, By Aero Squadron.-In
his withdrawal from action.
forces of the strength of a divi............................
sion, or larger, the aero squad30.Employment of Air
ron will operate in advance of
the independent cavalry in order Craft.-Military air craft of all
to locate the enemy and to keep kinds will be employed under
track of his movements. Contact the direction of the commanderwith the enemy once gained will of the forces to which they are
be maintained thereafter contin- assigned and the immediate
control of the officer commanduously.
ing the aero organization.
13. By the Cavalry.-ReBalloons are classed as free,connaissance in the theater of
captive, and dirigible. Free baloperations is best made by theloons may be used to convey
cavalry, which from the begininformation from besieged placning of the campaign seeks todetermine the enemy’s strength es, the return message being
sent by radiotelegraphy, carrier
and dispositions. It protects its
pigeons or otherwise. Free balown army against surprise,
loons are of little use for any
screens its movements, and inother service, and are not verysures the safety and success ofdependable on account of their
the troops of other arms. The
defeat of the hostile cavalry, and uncertainty of movement. Capits expulsion from the field areusually the best means to thisAviation Section

24

tive balloons may be used fortactical reconnaissance, for observation of artillery fire, and forsignaling. Communication froma captive balloon to the groundshould be by telephone.
Large dirigible balloons are ofpractical value for strategical reconnaissance and to travel great
distances; they are also suitablefor carying a number of observers, radio equipment, machine
guns, and considerable weight of
explosives. Aeroplanes are more
dependable for field service witha mobile army than dirigible balloons, as the latter require substantial shelter from winds whileon the ground.
31. Reconnaissance by aeroplane includes strategical andtactical reconnaissance and theobservation of artillery fire.
Aeroplanes are also used to prevent hostile aerial reconnaissance.
Strategical reconnaissance by
aeroplane is effective within aradius of 150 miles from thestarting point, and is for the purpose of determining the position,
strength, and direction of advance of the large elements ofan enemy’s forces, and also thecharacter of the roads, railroads,
streams, and the general military
topography of the theater of operations.
Tactical reconnaissance by
aeroplane is used both in attackand defense. It is extended innature and does not involve
minute examinations of verysmall localities or detachments. It
is designed to discover turningand enveloping movements, theposition and strength of the enemy’s general reserve, artilley
positions and movements ofcavaly; also, from the movement of combat or fielcl trains
behind an enemy’s position information may be gained as towhether certain parts oif the line
are being weakened or strengthened, or whether a retreat iscontemplated.
For observation of fire of fieldartillery, aeroplanes are usuallyassigned to the artillery commander. They are especially
useful against targets which areinvisible from the position of theartillery officer conducting thefire.
Aeroplanes are safe from hostile fire at altitudes of 4,000 feetor more.
The results of reconnaissanceare reported by radiotel’egraphy,
signals, and the dropping of
messages.

25

Field Service
Regulations

Transmission ofInformation

Use ofthe
Combined Arms

36. Information is transmitted
as follows:
1. By wire (telegraph,buzzer, telephone).
2. By visual signaling (flag,
helio, night lamp).
3. By radio telegraph.
4. By messenger (foot,mounted, cycle, motor car, flying
machine).
............................

123. Infantry.-The infantry
is the principal and most important arm, which is charged withthe main work on the field ofbattle and decides the final issueof combat. The role of the infantry, whether offensive or defensive, is the role of the entire
force, and the utilization of thatarm gives the entire battle its
character. The success of the infantry is essential to the successof the combined arms.
124. Artillery.-The artillery
is the close supporting arm of
the infantry and its duties are
inseparably connected withthose of the infantry. Its targets
are those units of the enemy
which, from the infantry point ofview, are most dangerous to its
infantry or that hinder infantry
success. The greater the difficulties of the infantry the more
powerful must be the artillery
support.

125. Cavalry.-The cavalry,preceding contact of the opposing troops of the other arms, isengaged in reconnaissance ofthe enemy and of the terrain andin accomplishing such mission as
may be assigned it. During combat it directs its activities to the
support of the other arms andparticularly toward insuring the
success of the infantry as soon asthat arm is fully committed toaction.
............................

5, FUDC%FORAeaonautics(FiscaJ YWR 1916)

27

D e c e m b e R 1914

Gen. Scriven. We have six
When it c a m e time tobudget for Fiscal Year 1916, months to run and we have toGeneral Scriven asked for a buy gasoline and oil, and we will
little more than $1,000,000 have a thousand and one little
for aviation. Secretary Garri- expenses. An air machine is very
son again imposed a cut, this much like an automobile. Whentime to $400,000. On 8 De- you buy an automobile, thencember 1914, Chairman Hay your expenses begin.
The Chairman. You expect
and members of the House
Military Affairs Committee (D. to spend that for the upkeep and
R. Anthony, (R-Kan.); William repair of the machines?
Gen. Scriven. For upkeep
S . Howard, (D-Ga.); Julius
Kahn, (R-Calif.); and Kenneth and repairs. Of course, if we
McKellar, (D-Tenn.) q u e s - have any of that appropriation
tioned the Chief Signal Offi- left, and 1 hope we will, we will
cer about how the money for buy some more machines.
The Chairman. You have1 9 1 5 w a s s p e n t , about t h e$400,000 requested for 1916, not a sufficient fund to buy more
a n d , among other things, than the 21 machines you haveabout the use of aviation in already provided for?
the war in Europe. In the end
Gen. Scriven. I have been
Congress cut the amount to thinking it over, Mr. Chairman,$300,000 (see Appendix A). and I am in hopes that we may
Following are extracts from be able to squeeze out two or
three more machines, making a
the hearings.'
total, with the 21 on hand, of 2 3. . ..........................
or 24 machines. If we can create
The Chairman. How many four aero squadrons, like theairships, aeroplanes, or biplanes one represented in that picture,
have you on hand?
of 8 machines each, that will
Gen. Scriven. We have on
give us 32 machines, and withhand just now 11. Col. Reber is that number we are quite well
just placing an order for 8 more, provided for an army of ourand there are 2 training masize-32 machines in first line inchines, so that we will have acommission. Then we should
total of 21 machines, and subadd 50 per cent of spare parts,
tracting the cost of these orders
or what really amounts to otherthat are now placed. . . we
machines, in the warehouses[will] have about $40,000 left for ready to put together, so that we
fiscal year 1915.
will then have 50 machines, and
The Chairman. What do you then we shall be as well off inpropose to do with that $40,this respect as we need to be.
OOO?
The Chairman. You only
want to accumulate 32
machines?

Gen. Scriven. We only wantto accumulate 32 machines in
the first line and a reserve of 50
per cent because we have underthe bill 60 aviator officers and
we are only allowed 12 enlisted
men for instruction in flying. The
limit is therefore 72. If we organize 4 squadrons of 8 machineseach that is 32 machines-eachsquadron is supposed to have
20 pilots and observers-4
squadrons would require 80
men, observers and pilots. Thatwould constitute the necessary
complement of men. Now weare allowed 60 officers. We willprobably get these officers, because they are coming in vey
fast and they appear to appreciate the work. We should thenrequire 20 enlisted men to makeup the full complement of 800
men. If these can not be obtained it will be necessary to cut
off some of the 4 officers comprising the commander and staff
of each squadron, or an observer need not be sent out withevey machine. At all events it
will be possible to put 4 squadrons in the field fairly wellmanned and equipped.
But to the 4 squadrons of 32
machines should be added a reserve of 50 per cent of spare

1 Hearings before the Cornminee on Milltarv Affairs. House of ReDreSentatlVeS Army
Appropriation Bill 1916 (1914)

28

parts, because the machines require this for spare parts all thetime. That would add 16 moremachines to be purchased, as
the spare parts should constitutean entire semblance not put together, so that in case of immediate necessity the spare parts
could be assembled and replacebroken machines in the field at
once.
The Chairman. Of the$400,000 you are asking for,how much do you expect tospend for this purpose?
Gen. Scriven. I think I cangive that exactly. We have 21
machines now and $40,000 left.
The running expenses from now
until July will be, I should say,about $25,000, which will give
us $15,000 free and two moremachines, which will make 23
machines. To make up the 32
machines we will have 9 macines to buy and to make up theresetve for the 32 machines, 50
per cent, 16, making it necessary
to buy in all 25 new machines
during the coming year to put
the aviation squadrons into fairly
good shape.
............................

Aviation Section

Mr. Kahn. Gen. Scriven, youstated to the committee that you
thought if you could build up acorps of 32 flying machines it
would serve your present purpose in proportion to our Army?
Gen. Scriven. I think so.
Mr. Kahn. Can you give thecommittee any data as to thenumber of machines that eachone of the belligerent nations
had at the outbreak of hostilities
in Europe?
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; I can.
I do not know how accurate it is,but it is the most recent thing on
the subject I know of. It comesfrom a publication called theClash of Nations published byThomas Nelson & Sons, of New
York, 1914. They give the number of aeroplanes for France,

500; dirigibles, 11. Russia, aeroplanes, 5 0 0 dirigibles, 4. GreatBritain, aeroplanes, 250; dirigibles, 8. Germany, aeroplanes,
5 0 0 dirigibles, 20. Austria, aeroplanes, 1 0 0 dirigibles, 3. Italy,
aeroplanes, 150; dirigibles, 2.
Mr. Kahn. So that your request is an exceedingly modest
one in comparison with what
they had when war broke out in
Europe?
Gen. Scriven. I think it is avey modest one. I would like to
go on and explain that a little
further. The idea is to have foursquadrons, three of them aeroplanes proper and one a squadron of hydro-aeroplanes. It must
be understood that we irequire
certainly eight machines (onehydro squadron) to be used in
the Philippines, and especiallyfor use in Panama, and also, as I
think, in Hawaii.
............................

Funds for Aeronautics(Fiscal Year 1916)

The Chairman. What is yourinformation as to the effect of
the aeroplane service in the armies of the countries now at
war?
Gen. Scriven. Mr. Chairman, 1 have pretty pronounced
views on that.
The Chairman. I mean, what
is your information about that?
Mr. McKellar. Are they
doing any real service?
Gen. Scriven. They are themost tremendous implement forreconnoissance and for the gathering of information that modern
war has ever seen, 1 think. I
think they have changed, as I
said in my annual report, notstrategy, but the principles ofgrand tactics.
Mr. Anthony. It has not developed that they are of any
practical value for offensive milit a y purposes?
Gen. Scriven. No, sir; I believe not.
A man to make a cruise of
400 miles, across a course 200
miles each way, has to cary, we
will say, 400 pounds of fuel andoil. He can not take an observerwith him because that would
add too much weight, and hegoes alone. The amount of destructive material he can carry in
the way of bombs or guns underthese conditions must be small,as their weight makes any considerable supply of ammunition
prohibitive, but in addition apilot alone without help canhardly do any effective firing
either with bomb or gun; and if
4,000 or 5,000 feet in the air, he29

can do little more than drop his
shots broadcast upon the earth.
We have recently tried bomb
dropping at San Diego withthree types of bombs, one
weighing 25 pounds, one weighing 50 pounds, and one weighing 100 pounds. As a matter offact, we did not use the 100pound bomb. It has been estimated that our aeroplane carries
about 25 to 50 gallons of gasolene for a flight of, say, 350
miles; but this depends uponcurrent winds. At all events, themachine carries enough gasolene to stay in the air about fourhours, and carries also an observer and a pilot, besides oil. So
loaded it is estimated that one of
our aeroplanes has a free lifting
capacity of about 120 pounds.
With a lifting capacity of 120
pounds and with each bomb
weighing not less than 25
pounds-and a 25-pounder is
not good for much, so that thebomb should be as large as 50
pounds to do any damage-f
what value is the aeroplane as
an offensive weapon?

Of course, I do not now refer
to attack of aeroplane against
aeroplane or aeroplane against
dirigible, nor do I wish to beunderstood as saying that in a
few isolated cases bomb dropping may not do harm, but onlythat as a fighting machine theaeroplane has not justified its
existence, except aeroplane
against other air craft.
As an implement for reconnaissance and as the far-seeing
eye of a commander the aeroplane is superb.
Mr. McKellar. You say they
are used for getting information.
How can a man in the air, several hundred or several thousand feet above the county,
running a machine get any information about what is actually
going on down below?

30

Gen. Scriven. Not the man
running the machine, but theobserver.
Mr. McKellar. How does heget any information about what
is going on down below?
Gen. Scriven. We can not
say how he does it, but as amatter of fact we know he doesit, because we know what they
are doing in Europe. He also
gives signals of what he sees.
The Chairman. General, I
apprehend that the greatest useof the aeroplane so far in the
war in Europe has been that theobserver in the aeroplane has
been able to signal to his side
the position of the enemy.
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir.

Aviation Section

Mr. Kahn. And that supplements the work of the cavalry inthat respect?
Gen. Scriven. It supplements
cavalry and it leads cavalry. It
gives the cavalry the point ofobjective to get in touch with theenemy.
The Chairman. And it also
aids the artillery?
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; visualsignaling is done in several ways.
There is a smoke bomb which is
dropped above the point to be
indicated, also fragments of tinsel paper, which fall down fromthe aeroplane and in the sunlight
gives a streak of light. From suchsignals the observer at the guns,
who is constantly following theplane gets his range with theglass. This, if well calculated,
gives him his range and his direction. I believe, too, that othersignals of the wigway type areused. Indeed, the matter is notdifficult-a flag thrown to thewind from the aeroplane, asmoke bomb dropped, a sudden
rise or dip of the machine perhaps might serve the purpose.
Mr. Howard. The observer
ought to be a very competent
military officer.
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; hemust be a trained man.

Mr. Howard. And a strategist?
Gen. Scriven. Yes. ,4t all
events, he should be able tointerpret the movement!; oftroops that he sees. We have
tried, and I think successfully,
the wireless with the aeroplanes,
and by that means, throughground stations, should keep thecommanding general constantly
in touch with the movement of
troops. If he (pointing) is sending
a column over the hills yonder
he can see through the aeroplane how far the column has
gone and just what its position is.
Hence he keeps in touch withthe positions of his own moving
troops and knows where they
actually are, and not merely
where they should be according
to arranged plans.
In regard to the enemy, hisairmen outline the latter’s lines,
see the movement of his troops,
indicate his reinforcements. In
fact, the whole game is open to
a commander; the cards lie on
the table.

31

Funds for Aeronautics(Fiscal Year 1916)

Mr. Kahn. Gen. Scriven, I
have seen it stated in some ofthe papers that the aeroplane islargely responsible for the indecisiveness of the battles thathave been raging in northern
France lately.
Gen. Scriven. I think thatmust be so.
Mr. McKellar. Has not theuse of aeroplanes in the European war now going on been a
distinct disappointment to those
who believed that air craft would
play an important part in
warfare?

Gen. Scriven. Well, I think in
one direction, that of destruction, such is the case; in anotherdirection, that of information,
their usefulness far exceeds the
expectations and hopes of anybody. In reconnoissance work
they have done more than anybody could have dreamed of.
Gen. French's official reports
show that. As far as aggressiven e s and destruction are concerned, they have fallen far shortof what we anticipated at thehearing a year and a half ago.
Mr. McKellar. The only destruction they have accomplished is that of helpless womenand children?
Gen. Scriven. There has
been no destruction of militaryimportance, absolutely none, so
far as 1 have observed. Their
attack has inspired fear, but eventhat seems quickly to pass away.
............................

6, ScRiuen:T h e

In a circular on “The Service of Information” in 1915, Air Craft
General Scriven emphasized
the importance of aviation as
an instrument of reconnaiss a n c e and communication.
At the same time, however,
he recognized that the role ofmilitary aviation w a s expanding as aircraft were used forother kinds of operations in
the war in Europe. Following
is the section of the circularconcerning t h e employmentof aircraft. 1

1 Scriven, The Service of Information,
Circular No 8. Office of the Chief Signal
Otficer (Washington. 1915). pp 21-23

The signal corps is intrustedwith the air service of thearmy-undoubtedly the mostimportant, as it is the most recent, auxiliary in the collection
and transmission of military information. Air craft are now employed for strategical and tacticalreconnaissance and the prevention of reconnaissance by theenemy’s air craft; for the direction and control of fire of the
field artillery; for the destructionof the enemy’s personnel andmateriel by explosive and incendiay missiles and other means;
and for the rapid transportationof superior commanding officers.
The value of air craft and especially of the aeroplane, in thefield of reconnaissance has been
proved beyond the shadow of a
doubt. Whatever may be theopinions of military men as regards the offensive importanceof air craft and the present
standing of the dirigible there is
no longer a question as to thevalue of the aeroplane in rapid

33

and long-range reconnaissancework, and of its power to secureand to transmit by radio, visualsignal or direct-flight informationof the utmost importance to armies in the field. So true is thisthat it seems probable the aeroplane and, to some smaller degree, all air craft have altered not
the principles of strategy, which
are immutable, but the theoy
and application of grand tactics.
It now appears that the actual
game of war is played openly
with cards laid on the table, andopportunity no longer is given
for inference as to concealed
movements or for surprises, perhaps not even for the exercise of
the high military quality of anticipation of the unseen movementsof the adversary. It is now recognized that the possibility of brilliant and unexpected blows andsurprises by enterprising commanders has been largely eliminated from modern operationsof war by the information supplied by the aviators. It is provedthat the modem air craft lays
open to the field of mental view
the whole visible area of theimmediate theater of war andthat the commander’s vision
reaches far beyond the limits of
the actual sight of his marching
troops. The air craft sees andindicates the larger operations of
war and points out to the slowly
moving men on the ground not
only the object to be attacked ordefended, but to reconnaissancetroops, especially the cavalry,Aviation Section

34

the objective to be sought, thelocalities to be searched, and thecharacter of information to beobtained.
By no means does the air craft
supersede, nor can it eversupersede, the work of obtaining
detailed information which canbe acquired only by close observation, by contact, and by development of the enemy’s forces
and positions. This remains theduty of the troops in the field;
but the air craft does indicate toeither commander the character,location, and general dispositionof opposing forces, and of his
own commands. Not only has it
been proved that the aeroplane
is invaluable in locating the position of the enemy, but it has
especial value to a commander
in finding his own troops, in
keeping him informed whenmovements are taking place,and of the position of his flanks
and center, his outposts, hiscavalry, his artillery, of the positions attained by any detachedbody-in short, of keeping him
constantly in touch with the locations and movements of all theunits of his command under thechanging conditions of war.
This much is proved, but it
does not follow that the air craft
curtails the work of reconnaissance of other arms of the service, the infantry, the signal corps,
and, more especially, the cavalry. On the contrary, it extends
the usefulness and power of all,for if the general field of reconnaissance is outlined, it is obvious that the cavalry or infantry
can more readily strike its objective and more quickly and accurately obtain information regarding any particular point than if
obliged unseeingly to search thewhole field of operations for locations and forces regarding

which an intimate knowlledge isdesired or contact expec:ted. In
other words, by aid of air craft,
and more especially of the aeroplane, a reconnaissance bytroops moves less in the dark,
knows better what to look forand search in detail, and loses
less time and effort in acxomplishing the object sought. No
move of concentration fromflank or center, no envelopmentof a wing nor reenforcement of a
weak position should rernain unknown to the adversary in thecase where he possesses a thoroughly efficient flying corps. It
would seem, therefore, ihat not
only has the power of all1 reconnaissance troops been increasedby the air craft, but also that theneed and importance of the cavalry in reconnaissance work
have not been lessened, but, on
the contrary, have been greatly
increased by them.
In addition to the influenceexerted by air craft on grand%riven: The Service
of Information

operations, events now appear
to show that their value in moredetailed operations is great andmay increase in the future toenormous proportions. It is wellestablished that the accuracy,
value, and effect in service offield and siege artillery and, indeed, of the heavy guns afloat
and ashore have been greatly
increased by this agency. It may
almost be said that guns arefought by means of the eyes of
the aviator. So clearly has thisbeen shown that there now appears a noticeable change in artillery practice. Instead of theold-fashioned system of range
finding by trial fire or of observation from the battery or elevations near by, the exact range is
now found with the help of
aeroplanes, by signaling positions and noting the fall or burstof the shrapnel, and there canbe no doubt that artillery-fire direction has been enormously increased in accuracy by the aeroplane, especially when the
shrapnel burst can not be seenfrom below. Infantry fire has
been largely improved in efficiency by the same means.
Besides influence of this character the aeroplane has undoubted use in the finding of

35

concealed positions, in locating
hidden howitzers or mortars, andin pursuit and rear-guard actions. It will be useful in thelocation of ships at sea or atanchor within defenses, possiblyin the detection of submarines
and submarine mines, and certainly in the enormous increased
efficiency given to seacoast gun
fire, and especially to the coast
defense, the coast guard, andmany other details of observation.

But the useful, approved, andmost important work of air craft
is to be found chiefly in reconnaissance and the collection andtransmission of information in
the theater of militay operations. For this reason aviationmust be reckoned as a vastly
important branch of the signal
corps of the army.
The use of the aeroplane as adefense against aeroplane attackand for the rapid transmission ofcommanding officers or important personages to destinations
sought is, of course, obvious.
......................... . . .

7,Scrziuen:
Annual R e p o ~ t

37

FOR 1915

The section on aircraft in
Scriven‘s The Service of Information (Doc. 6) was also
used as an introduction to achapter on aviation in the
Chief Signal Officer’s annual
report for Fiscal Year 1915,
extracts from which are
printed below.’ Reviewing
events of t h e past year andnoting the situation that existed in mid-1915, Scriven
looked toward t h e future toan expansion of the aviation
service to perhaps a s manyas 18 squadrons. At that time
there was only one, t h e 1st
Aero Squadron, which wasmade up of two companies,
each with four airplanes forreconnaissance work. Developments in Europe, however,
had indicated that squadronorganization needed to bechanged.

1 Report o f the Chiet Signal Oliicer
United States Army to the Secretary of War
1915 (Washington 1915)
2 The act which created t h e Aviation
Section (Doc 3)............................
. . . hereafter aeroplanesquadrons should be composedof 3 companies, with a total of
12 machines to the squadron.
Two companies should have 8
reconnoissance machines ( 4 toeach company), and the third
company should be made up of
2 rapid-flying machines for chaseor transport purposes and 2 machines of the bomb-carrying or
offensive type. Such are theconclusions reached from experience abroad.

its use on the old target range at
Fort Sam Houston will havebeen completed. The personnel
for the company designated for
Corregidor is now at the Aviation School and its equipment isbeing purchased. It will leave for
Manila at the close of the typhoon season of the present
year. Steps are being taken to
obtain and train the personnel
for the companies intended for
Hawaii and Canal Zone, andsuch of their equipment as ispracticable to purchase from the............................
The organization and instruc- appropriation for the current fistion of the personnel of the First cal year will be procured. SuffiAero Squadron were completed cient funds have not been produring the year (at North Island) vided for in the current year’s
appropriation to purchase comand the squadron sent to Fort
Sill, Okla., for duty in connection plete equipment for these comwith the problems of fire control panies. It is expected to send aand direction of the field artillery. company to Hawaii by next April
and one to the Canal Zone............................
The War Department has di- when funds are available for theequipment of the organization
rected the maintenance of anaviation school and a squadron destined for that station.
The estimate for the ensuing
for land flying in this country, thestationing of an aero company at fiscal year has been prepared on
the basis of the program preeach of the following places:
scribed by the War Department
Corregidor, P.I.; Fort Kamehameha, Hawaii; Canal Zone, and for utilizing the personnel authorized by the act approved
when this has been accomplished, an increase of the force July 18, 1914.*The total of thisat Corregidor to a squadron.
estimate is $1,358,000.
Under this program the Signal
The recent war in Europe has
Corps Aviation School will con- emphasized the absolute necestinue at North Island, in San
sity for an adequate aviation
Diego Bay, until a permanent
service, has illustrated in a mostsite has been obtained. The First forcefulway the dangers resultSquadron, now at Fort Sill, willing from an inadequate supply
proceed to San Antonio, Tex., in of personnel and materiel, has
the early part of December,when it is expected that thebuildings now being erected forAviation Section

38

shown that aeroplanes are invaluable for reconnoissance purposes, and that their absencefrom a combatant force has resulted in most serious disasters.
Aeroplanes have proved theirvalue in the direction and control
of artillery fire, in preventing theoperation of the aeroplanes ofan enemy, and have been usedwith great effect against both
personnel and materiel. The difficulties surrounding the creationof an adequate aeronauticalservice after the outbreak of hostilities have been vividly illustrated during the past year, andthe great inconveniences anddangers resulting from the lackof adequate aeronautical personnal and materiel have been
so forcibly demonstrated thatcomment is unnecessary.
The greater need at such atime, however, will be for trained
men as pilots and observers. . . .
The inadequacy of facilities forbuilding aeroplanes and the
manufacturing of their accessories has to a large extent been
removed in this county. At thepresent time it is known thatsomething more than 100 flying
machines per month can be produced. While this supply mightmeet the needs of a small army,
it would be totally inadequate ina great war. However, there canbe no doubt that American manufacturers would arise to the occasion with a sufficiently large
output. The training of men,

therefore, is the crying need ofthe present time.
The number of officers andmen now authorized by law isinadequate to the needs of the
Army as it is at present organized. With one aero squadron
per division, the present organization of the Army calls for fiveaero squadrons. The commissioned personnel provided bylaw allows a sufficient number ofofficers for three aero squadrons,
as at present organized, while
the enlisted strength is insufficient; and if the number of officers and men allowed by law
should be organized into three
aero squadrons there would be
no personnel left for the conductof the Aviation School.
The present war in Europe
has developed three separate
types of aeroplanes-the reconnoissance and fire control machines, the combat machine,
and the pursuit machine. The
aviation section possesses a satisfactory type of reconnoissanceand fire-control machine and hastaken up the question of thedevelopment of both the combat
and pursuit types. For this purpose an item of $50,000 has
been included for experimental
machines in this year's estimates.
The organization of the aviation units in the foreign armies
suggests a squadron of 12 machines as the basis for our organization, 8 of these machines tobe of the reconnoissance typeand 2 each of the pursuit andcombat types. Our aero squadron as at present organized has
sufficientcommissioned personnel for this increase in the number of machines, but the enlisted
personnel is deficient by 24 men
to provide crews for the additional machines and drivers forthe additional autotrucks.. In case
the Army remains at its present
authorized strength, the personnel of the aviation section should
be increased by 46 officlers and
410 men to give sufficient personnel to supply five aerosquadrons, one for each of thefive tactical divisions at present
organized in the Army, and tomaintain the Aviation School. It
is to be pointed out that there isneed for at least one squadron
for reconnoissance work in eachof the three Coast Artillery districts in this county, and that asufficient number of aeroplanes
should be provided for fire direction and control for the l-ield
Artillery on the basis of one
aeroplane per battery, with one
in reserve, or, in round numbers,
six aero squadrons for this arm.
This calls for the addition of nineI39

Scriven: Annual Reportfor 1915

squadrons to those above mentioned.
If the plan for the reorganization of the Army by the War
Department, which calls forseven tactical divisions and five
Cavalry brigades, be approved
by Congress, provision should
be made for 1aero squadron for
Corregidor, 1 for Hawaii, 1for
Canal Zone, 1 for each of thethree Coast Artillery districts in
the United States, 1 for each of
the tactical divisions, and 5 for
the Field Artillery, giving in all 18
squadrons, with a total strengthof 368 officers and 2,360 enl i e d men.
The total cost of the equipment necessay for these organizations will be $4,284,000.
.___.

Proposed otgantzatien ofthe aviation section for service dth an Army of 18O.M)O men.

Total

.

.

.

.

. 1~1 ~
19 ~174 ~173~90 ~150~282~ 612~

74 816336

2,360

8.WaRCollege

41

Diuisiorz: A P~operr
Mi l i t a ~y Policy
1915

In March 1915 the Chief ofStaff directed t h e War College Division of the General
Staff to make a full study of“a proper military policy for
the United States.” In the report submitted to the Chief ofStaff on 11 September 1915,
the War College Division recommended a mobile army of
1,000,000 m e n prepared totake the field immediately on
the outbreak of war. Of these,
half should b e fully trained,
and t h e other half shouldhave enough training to enable them to be brought to fullcom bat r e a d i n e s s wit hi nt h r e e months. The 5 0 0 , 0 0 0
fully-trained troops were divided between regular army
and reserve. For the regulararmy, the War College Division recommended 65 infantry regiments, 25 cavalry regiments, 21 field artillery regiments, 2 8 9 c o a s t artillery
companies, a n d , among
other units, 8 aero s q u a d rons. Five of the squadrons
were for duty with five tactic al divisions recommended
for service in t h e UnitedStates; the other three were
to be stationed in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Canal
Zone.’The report of the War College Division w a s supplemented by a series of special
studies which were publisheda little later. One of the studies was on military aviation,
which is printed below.2

Military Aviation
1. Introduction.

1. Relation of Aviation to
The Military Service
In this paper it is proposed toconsider various aeronauticalappliances in regard to theirpractical value in campaign, as
shown by such data as are now
available from the theater of war
in Europe.
In its relation to the military
service, aviation to-day may be
regarded as embracing all aerial
appliances, such as heavierthan-air craft, dirigibles lighterthan-air craft, and nondirigibles
or captive lighter-than-air balloons, together with the personnel necessary for their operationand management.

2. Use of Aircraft on Our
Coast and With Our Mobile Land Forces.
In considering this subject account should be taken, first, ofthe use of aircraft of various
types along and beyond thecoasts and frontiers of the UnitedStates upon the outbreak of war;
second, the use of aircraft in the
Army by the mobile forces; third,
the use of aircraft by our oversea garrisons.
In addition to the battle fleet
and units of the Navy designed
to take the offensive on the highseas, the waters contiguous tothe coast line of the UnitedStates are organized into naval
defense districts. These covercertain sections of the coast line
and contain patrol vessels, both
surface and subsurface, and aircraft for reconnoissance purposes. These are essentially forthe purpose of finding out andlocating hostile vessels which areapproaching the coast and ofdetermining their strength, dispositions, and probable intentions.
Added to the strictly naval formations included in the naval
defense districts, in time of war
the United States Coast Guard(in peace under the Treasury
Department) passes to the control of the Navy.
The Coast Guard, in addition
to its boats and revenue cutterswhich will be utilized as patrol
vessels, embraces the Life-Saving Service. The latter has stations more or less regularly distributed along the coasts which
are connected by telephonelines. They are also equippedwith visual signaling appliances
to communicate from shore toships. The Navy maintains a
chain of radio stations along ourcoasts and over-sea possessions.
The naval defense districts become of great importance incase that the main battle fleetsare defeated or in case they areoperating at a great distance.
Notes
1 War College Division. Statement of a
Proper Military &/icy for the United States(Washington. 1915), p 13
2 War College Division, Mditary Aviation(Washington. 1916)

Aviation Section

42

Therefore, when an enemy expedition breaks through the naval defense and approaches thecoast with a view to forcing alanding the resistance to such an
expedition becomes primarily afunction of the Army.
The defensive formations of
the Army consist of the harbor
defenses and accessories and themobile units. The harbor defenses consist of fixed and mobile
gun defenses and mine defenses; also obstacles both on land
and in the waters. The aircraft
required in connection with the
harbor defenses should consistof machines used for one ormore of the following purposes:(a) For reconnaissance-that
is, to determine the strength, dispositions, and probable inten-

tions of the enemy.
(b) For preventing hostile aerial reconnaissance.
(c) For destroying hostile aircraft and for offensive work
against enemy submarines andother vessels, including the interruption of enemy mining or
countermining operations.
(d) For aiding in spotting thefire of Coast Artillery, bothagainst ships and against any
invading force that may invest
the seacoast fortifications.
The number and character of
the aircraft required depends on
the locality, number of harbor
defenses, their organization,
strength, and positions. Eachharbor-defense area, therefore,
needs to be studied with thisspecific end in view, and should

Wright Model D Scout purchased by the Signal Corps in 1913.
It was a single-seat pusher type aircraft propelled by a 6cylinder, 60 hp. Wright Field engine.

have radio apparatus not only
for communicating with the
Navy but also for communicating with its aircraft and with theunits of our mobile forces.
In addition to the aircraft required with the harbor defenses
themselves, aircraft are requiredwith modem movable coast-defense armament employed as an
auxiliay element of the mobile
forces in defending the intervals
between our fortified harbors
and with units of the mobile
forces.
The use of aircraft with themobile units is a definite matter;each division requires one
squadron of 12 aeroplanes.
These are divided into threecompanies of four aemplanes
each, two companies having re-43

War College Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

connaissance and artillery observation machines and one company having two high-speed machines especially constructed forlong-distance reconnaissanceand for combating the enemy’s
aerial craft; two battle machines
for the purpose of bomb dropping and offensive work against
enemy material of all sorts. This
is in keeping with the best practice that has been developed in
the European war.
3. Use of Aircraft At OverSea Stations
The use of aircraft with theArmy in the over-sea possessions analogous to that mentioned above with the harbor
defenses; and in addition, wherever mobile units of the Army
happen to be, they must be provided with suitable aircraft. The
defense of over-sea possessions
constitutes a problem in itself,
and these garrisons must be
equipped not only with machines capable of reconnaissance over land but also withthose capable of operations overwater, with the power to alight inwater-that is, hydroaeroplanes.
The type of machine to beenhanced the utility of captive
balloons, as it made communication instantaneous from car to
ground instead of by the older
way of raising and lowering written messages by ropes. In clear
weather and on favorable terrain
captive balloons are able to distinguish different branches of theservice at a distance of 16,000
yards or about 9 miles. With thebest glasses at the present time
the field of observation is said toextend to 20,000 yards. In general, captive balloons of the“Sausage” or “Drachen” typeare used by all the armies of thegreat nations. Along the FrenchGerman front in northem France
11. General Types ofthese balloons are used in great
Aircraft.
numbers all along the lines.
Their function is to observe the4. Captive Balloons.
fire of artillery and keep watch of
For over a century captive
all movements of hostile parties
balloons have been used by the within their field of view. They
armies of all the leading militaly are connected with telephone dinations. Their function has been rectly with the batteries whose
one of observation; that is, tofire they are observing and with
see what those on the groundthe headquarters to which they
were unable to see. They haveare attached. In many cases thetherefore proved a useful means captive balloons work in conof observing and reporting thejunction with aeroplanes. The
effects of artillery fire. Electrical
aeroplanes by flying over themeans of communication greatly terrain where the hostile targets
are located find out the exact
position of those which the captive balloons have been unable
to locate by themselves. Whenby means of signals the locationsof the targets have been indicated to the observer in the captive balloon, the aeroplanes proceed to other duty. Aside fromthe use of the captive balloons inconjunction with aeroplanes,

used necessarily depends on thelocality; for instance, in Hawaii
practically all of the military machines would need to be hydroaeroplanes; in the Philippines
and Panama a great proportionof them. To the Coast Artillely
troops in the United States
proper and in the districts
around the Great Lakes thesame considerations apply. It isbelieved that the main principles
enunciated above should be followed, and that an estimate ofactual machines and material,both heavier and lighter than air,should be made for all places.

War Cdlege Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

rigid, which have a framework
for the whole envelope thatmaintains itself continuously. All
have been tried for the last 15
years. The nonrigid types havenot given vey good results, as
they are too much dependent on
the weather, due to distortion of
the envelopes; the semirigid
have given some satisfaction andhave been largely employed.
The advantage of the semirigid
types is that they may be packed
for shipment and reassembled
much more easily than the rigid
types; they can be deflated
quickly and, consequently, arenot so subject to complete destruction as the rigid types whenanchored to the earth. On theother hand, they are not able todevelop the speed that the rigid
types, such as the “Zeppelin,”
are capable of.
Dirigibles and aeroplanes are
frequently compared with eachother as to their utility in general.
5. Dirigibles.
As a matter of fact, they are two
entirely different military accesThe term dirigible, as applied
to aeronautical appliances, signi- sories and are as different infies a lighter-than-air craft, which many ways as is a captive balloon from an aeroplane. Dirigiis equipped with engines andbles are able to stay in the air at
propellers capable of moving it
any height for long periods offrom place to place. Dirigibles
time. They are capable of runmay be roughly divided into
three classes: Non-rigid, or those ning at reduced speed, canwhose envelope can be entirely
packed into a small space when
deflated, and that have no rigid
framework of any kind; semirigid, or those that have a stiffening for a part of their length inorder to enable the envelopes tomaintain their shape to better
advantage than the nonrigid; thetheir duties are practically thesame as they have been formany years or were in our own
Civil War. Free balloons such aswere used from Paris, for instance, in 1870 are now a thingof the past, their place having
been taken by the aeroplane or
the dirigible airship. All militarycaptive balloons are now so constructed that their undersurface
acts like a kite, thereby making
them steady in a strong wind. To
keep the envelope distended
properly in the face of the wind,a wind sail is provided so as totransmit pressure to the rear partof the envelope by means of thewind itself. Captive balloons areused not only with the fieldforces, but also are especially
useful in fortress warfare. The
organizations which handle theseballoons consist ordinarily ofsome 4 officers, 72 men for eachballoon section.

45

hover over localities for minute
observation and to take photographs. They are able to cany
several tons weight in addition totheir passengers and crew. From
the fact that they are able toremain stationary over a given
place they are able to launch
their projectiles with greater accuracy. Dirigibles in present war
have been used both over landand sea. At sea they have carried out reconnaissance, haveacted offensively against hostile
submarines, have accompaniedtransports in order to observe
the approach of hostile craft,have been used in mine laying,
stopping and examining hostile
merchanrvessels at sea, and for
bombarding hostile localities.
The airships which have madethe longest trips and developed
the greatest efficiency thus far
the German “Zeppelin”
rigid-frame type. These have repeatedly flown over England at a
distance of at least 300 miles
from their base, and have nearly
always returned in safety. Somehave been lost, however. Aeroplanes appear to be unable tocope with them at night. Whiledirigibles have not proved themselves to be a determining factor
in combat, either on land or sea,
they are being developed to thegreatest extent possible, especially by the Germans, who havedirigibles of very great size. The
principal features of this type area rigid framework of aluminum,
a number of drum-shaped gas

War College Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

bags, and a thin outer cover.
Although the details of construction are not definitely known up
to date, their length is about 485
feet, their volume about 900,000 cubic feet, their total lift over
20 tons, and their useful lift
about 5 tons. They are driven by
four motors of a total horsepower of about 800, which isapplied to four propellers. Their
speed is from 50 to 60 or more
miles per hour and a full-speed
endurance of over 100 hours, ormore than 4 days. It is therefore
evident that in good weather
these airships have a radius ofaction of from 5,000 to 6,000
miles. Moreover, they are being
constantly improved, and areprobably capable of crossing theAtlantic Ocean. Crews of from10 to 20 men are required fortheir operation; they are armed
with bombs of various sorts, lightguns, and are equipped withsearchlights. They carry very efficient radio apparati, whichhave equipments for determining the directions from whichradio impulses are being sent. In
this way they are able to locate
themselves at night or in foggy
weather when the ground is invisible. They require very large
and expensive hangars, gas
plants, and equipments for theiroperation. When forced to makelandings outside of their hangars,
on account of their bulk, they
are very difficult to handle inhard winds, and are liable todestruction thereby.
The best of the nonrigid andsemirigid airships have a capacity of more than 800,000 cubic

47

feet, a maximum speed of 50
miles per hour or less, and a fullspeed endurance of about 24
hours. As mentioned above,
their great asset is extreme portability and cheapness as compared with the rigid type.

6. Aeroplanes.
Heavier-than-air craft madetheir appearance as militaryagencies in 1908, when the
Wright brothers demonstrated
thoroughly the possibilities in thisrespect. While many of the salient features of heavier-than-air
machines had been worked out
years before, it remained for theinternal-combustion engine toreally make mechanical flightpossible. The military possibilitiesof aircraft of this description
were appreciated immediatelyby the great nations. Large appropriations were made at once,
notably by France and Germany
for their development. At first
England was slow to take up thematter, but in 1912 had gone atit thoroughly and was spendinglarge amounts of money for theirdevelopment. Italy, Russia, Japan, and the smaller nations ofEurope and South America
made liberal appropriations for
obtaining the material and developing the personnel. Aeroplanes were used in a small way
during the Italian campaign inAfrica during the Balkan-Turkish
War, and during the Balkan
War. These nations had very little equipment and very few

trained flyers. Wherever the
aeroplanes were given the opportunity under average conditions they rendered efficient
service in reconnaissance.

7. Types of Aeroplanes.
We now find aeroplanes consisting of three principal classes:(a) Scout or speed machines; (b)reconnaissance aeroplanes; (c)battle machines. The first areused for distant reconnaissanceand combating the enemy’s aircraft, the second for ordinary
reconnaissance and the observation of fire of artillery, and thethird for the destruction of enemy’s material, personnel, or
equipment.
8. Requirements of Various
Types of Machines.
Great advances have been
made since the war began in allthese machines, all the details of
which are not yet available. The
following table, which appearedin the London Times of February 19, 1914, gives the approximate requirements of each typeof machine at the beginning of
the war. These general characteristics are still desired, but theradius of action and the speed
have been considerably increased.

48

9. Aeroplane Engines.
As to material, the most important consideration in aeroplane construction has been theengine. Without excellent engines the best aeroplanes otherwise are of no service; in fact,
may be a source of danger. In
the countries where aeroplanedevelopment has made the mostprogress large prizes have been
given for the development ofsuitable engines. At the sametime, research and experimentation have gone on along this line
at Government plants. Engines
require frequent replacement. In
fact, it is reported that after 100

Aviation Section

hours in the air engines are"scrapped" and new ones installed. The plan found to give
excellent results for the development of material is for the Government to have stations whereexperimentation along all lines iscarried on. On the data furnished by these establishments
specifications are made up forthe construction of aircraft byprivate individuals and civil manufactories. If any parts, such as
the engines mentioned above,
need additional development,
prizes are offered to stimulate
construction and progress.

111. Functions of Aircraft.
10. Height At Which

Aeroplanes Must Fly.
It was soon found olut that toescape the fire of smalll arms, aheight of about 4,000 feet above
the ground had to be maintained. As soon as balloon guns
were created this height had to
be increased to 6,000 feet, atwhich height it is now necessary
to fly in order to be reasonably
safe from being hit by hostile
projectiles sufficient to bring themachine down. At this height,
6,000 feet, small details of theterrain and small detachments oftroops or material are very difficult to distinguish. On the other
hand, large columns of troops,
trains, railways, bridge!;, artillery
firing, and sometimes in position,
defensive positions of large extent, and things of that nature
can be readily distinguiished.
Whenever it becomes necessary
for the aircraft to fly at (3 lower
altitude than 6,000 feet the
chance of destruction by gunfire
must be considered.

11. Strategical Recamnaissance.
Reconnaissance of this kind is
strategical in its nature, the tactical reconnaissance of particular
localities is still carried out bytroops or captive balloons. In
fact, it may be said that all strategical reconnaissance is now
carried on by aircraft. The reconnaissance is carried out by an
officer who requires considerable
experience in order to be able toWar College Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

49

Performances required from nrioua milltary types.
Light scout.

Reconnaissanceaeroplane.

Reconnaissanceaeroplane.
(b1b)
Tankage to give an en- 300 miles
durance of.
Tocany -~.......~.~
Pilotonly......_...
300 miles.

.

Fighting aeroplane.
(a)

200 miles~ ..._.
~.....
~
200 miles~

Fighting aeroplane.
(b 1~
300 miles.

~~~...~~...
R o t and observer plus

Range of speed .~~~~~
50 to 85 miles per hour
5 minutes ..........
Capable of being
started by the pilot
single-handed.

To climb 3,500 feet in

Miscellaneous qualities

distinguish objects on the earth
and assign to them their true
military value. The pilot is either
an officer or noncommissioned
officer. The observer is always atrained tactical officer, because
in reconnaissance of this nature
an untrained person can not interpret the militay significance ofwhat he sees.

12. Photography From
Aeroplanes.
Photography is utilized to thegreatest extent possible in aerial
reconnaissance. The devices are
so arranged that they are capable of taking one or a series ofviews of a particular locality. The
plates or films thus made are
rapidly developed and are

Pilot and observer plus Pilot and gunner plus Pilot and gunner plus
80 pounds for wire300 pounds for gun
100 pounds.
less equipment.
and ammunition.
35 to 60 miles per hour 45 to 65 miles per hour 45 to 75 miles per hour.
~
10 minuts~.
.-..~.... 10~minutes~ ~~~~~~~.
.
.
8 minutes.
..._..............
To land over a 30-foot A clear field of fire in A clear field of fire inevey direction up to
vertical obstacle andevey direction up to
30” from the line ofpull up within a dis30” from the line offlight.
flight.
tance of 100 yards
from that obstacle,
the wind not being
more than 15 miles
per hour. A very
good view essential.

80 pounds for wireless equipment.
45 to 75 miles per hour
7 minutes ~ ~~~thrown on a screen by means ofa stereopticon, when all details
are magnified to any extent desired and details invisible to thenaked eye are brought out
plainly. These details are thenentered on the maps of the officers concerned. As the height at
which an aeroplane is flying canbe taken from the barograph,and as the focal angle of the lensof the camera is known, a scale
can easily be worked out andthe views form good maps of theterrain photographed.

tion to the field artillery, andthen observe the fire of the batteries. By means of prearranged
visual signals or radiotelegraphy
the aeroplanes are able to indicate to the artillery where theirfire is making itself felt. If artillery
is insufficiently provided withaeroplanes, it is well establishedthat an enemy so provided has
an overwhelming advantage.

14. Control of The Air.
For this reason, among others,
attempts to gain “control of theair” are made by belligerents at
13. Aeroplanes and Artillery. the inception of hostilities. ThisIn addition to reconnaissance takes the form of offensive action by aeroplane against aeroin general, aeroplanes havetaken their place as a fixture for plane. For this purpose machines known as “speed scouts”
observing the fire of artillery.
and “battle aeroplanes” have
Due to the degree of concealbeen developed. All the great
ment which artillery is now
European nations are now
given, it is impossible to determine its location from theground. The aeroplanes first pickup the targets, report their loca-~

50

equipped with them. The only
way in which enemy aeroplanes
can be effectively dealt with is by
aeroplanes, because they are
difficult targets for gunfire fromthe ground. To gain control of
the air a great preponderance in
number and efficiency of aircraftis necessary. So far in the European war, unless one side had agreatly preponderating number
and quality of aeroplanes, they
have been unable to obtain andkeep control of the air. An excellent instance of obtaining controlof the air seems to be furnishedby the Austro-Germans when
they initiated the campaign
against the Russians in May,
1915. In this instance complete
control of the air appears tohave been obtained. The results
to the Russians were disastrous
because the Austro-Germans
were able to fly at will wherever
they wanted to, could pick up
the location of the Russian masses, and make their movements
accordingly, entirely unobservedby the Russians. In the fire of
their artillery they had the advantage of being able to locate
the Russian guns and observe
their own fire while the Russians
were powerless to do so.
In an article on “Recent progress in military aeronautics,”
published in the Journal of theAviation Section

Franklin Institute for October,
1915, Lieut. Col. Samuel Reber,Signal Corps, United States
Army, sums up the question ofmachines for control of the air as
follows:

16. Bomb Dropping.
In addition to their functionsof reconnaissance, the observation of the fire of artillery, andthe combat of hostile machines,
both heavier and lighter than air,Experience has developed threemuch time, thought, and ingetypes of aeroplanes for military pur- nuity have been given to theposes. The first, the speed scout, for subject of dropping projectiles.
strategical reconnaissance, a one
Bombs of various sorts weighing
seater, with a speed up to 85 miles
per hour and radius of action of 300 from a couple of pounds to 50
pounds have been tried. The
miles and a fast climber, about 700
feet per minute; the second for gen- most common ones weigh from15 to 35 pounds. At the height
eral reconnaissance purposes withthe same radius of action, carrying
at which aeroplanes are required
both pilot and observer andto fly it is extremely difficult to hit
equipped with radiotelegraphy,
an object with any certainty.
slower in speed, about 70 miles per
Various devices have been used
hour, and climbing a b u t 500 feetand tried for this purpose. The
per minute, and in some cases protected by armor; the third, or fighting factors of height, speecl, andwind, are almost impossible tocraft, armored, and carries in addition to the pilot a rapid fire gun and compensate for entirely, up to
the present time, so that conseammunition and so arranged as tohave a clear field of view and fire in quently bomb dropping in geneither direction up to 30 degrees
eral or the launching of projecfrom the line of flight, the speed totiles of all kinds from aeroplanes
run from 45 to 65 miles per hour,
has not attained great results inand the machine to climb about 350 so far as the actual destruction offeet per minute.
material or personnel is concerned. Advances along this line
15. Surprise Movements.
areconstantly being made, howIt is often said that due to theever, but progress is slow. A
use of aeroplanes surprises are
special type of aeroplane has
no longer possible. Generally
been developed for dropping
speaking, this is so, providing
both sides are equally wellequipped with machines andweather conditions are favorable. If, however, complete“command of the air” is obtained by one side, the chancesof surprising the enemy are
greater than they have everbeen before.

War College Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

51

bombs and battle purposes. For
bomb attacks on any locality
these machines are sent in flotillas of from 30 to 60 machines,
each of which is provided withfrom 5 to 10 bombs. They go to
the locality and circle over it,
dropping their projectiles.
Against railways, roads, bridges,
and hostile parks of various
kinds, this method of attack has
given considerable success.

19. Assignment of Aero18. Development During
planes to Artillery.
European War.
The use of aeroplanes is gradMany are of the opinion thatually being developed from ex- machines with the personnel toperience in the European war.
operate them should be assigned
Organization has been found to permanently to artillery regibe one of the most importantments so that they would beconsiderations; in general the or- immediately available wheneverganization has been into squad- action is required by the artillery.
rons. The squadron is a tactical If they have to be obtained fromand administrative unit. It has a a higher headquarters valuable
time is often lost. It is believed
personnel consisting of pilots,
observers, bomb droppers, me- that before long aeroplanes will
chanicians, chauffeurs, and driv- be assigned permanently to regiers, Flying personnel has to bements of artillery.
developed in the military service.
V. Development of
Unlike chauffeurs, for instance,
there are few in the civil popula- Aeronautic Personnel.
tion who can be drawn on. The
20. General Line of Develfew who fly are demonstrators,
opment in Europe.
exhibition flyers, or sportsmen.
They are very few in number
In the development of theirand scarcely a military asset. In
aeronautical personnel all naFrance the squadrons usuallytions have worked more or lesshave six machines and twoalong similar lines. At first thesespares. They have the same or- detachments were attached toganization of d e p t s of resupply the engineers. All the pilots andthat other units of the armies
observers were officers, while
possess. The squadrons usually the mechanicians and others
consist of complete units of one were enlisted men. As the scikind of machine; that is, speed, ence developed and more andreconnaissance, or fighting.
more machines became necesThese squadrons 2re usually as- sary the importance of thissigned to an army, or more if the branch constantly increased until
machines and personnel areavailable.
In general an aeroplane requires for its operation a personnel of 1 pilot, 1 observer, and 2
enlisted men, mechanicians,chauffeurs, etc.
In England 12 machines ofdifferent classes are assigned toa squadron.

IV. Organization of
Aeroplane Units
17. Tactics of Aeroplanes.
As to tactical use aeroplanes
seem to be approaching methods similar to those used by anavy. That is, first the speed
machines reconnoiter to thefront; they are followed by thebattle machines, which in theirturn clear the way for the reconnaissance aeroplanes; those assigned to the artillery stay rightwith their guns. Fortresses, harbor-defense works, and naval
formations require special organizations of aeroplanes, some or
all of which may be operated
from the water. The organization, kind, and number of themachines and personnel required for this particular service
depend on the special locality
and mission of whatever formation the aircraft are to be
attached to.

Aviation Section

52

eventually it formed a separate
arm of the service.
Instead of officers only being
employed in the flying of themachines noncommissioned officers began to be used as thepilots.

21. Officer-Observers andNoncommissioned Officer Pilots.
The observers were either
trained staff officers or officers ofparticular branches when the reconnaissance being made especially concerned a certain
branch. For instance, in the observation of artillery fire an artil-

WAR DEPARTM

ley officer, for the inspection ofa demolished bridge over a greatriver an engineer officer, or forthe observation of the tactical or
strategical dispositions of an enemy's troops a staff officer. Noncommissioned officers are now
vey generally used as pilots. All
countries now at war have foundthat they have places for all thetrained pilots they can possibly
obtain. In general the units arecommanded by officers and acertain number of the pilots are
officers, but the bulk of the piloting is done by enlisted men
while the officers are carried as
observers.

SHINGTON, D. C

On 27 May 1913 the War Department established the Military
Aviator Certificate. Officers of the Army qualifying under rules
approved by the S.cretary of War received the certificate.
and a lnoignia (at rlght) to wear on their uniforms.

22. Losses to Aero
Personnel in War.
The losses to the flying personnel in war, when equippedwith proper machines, seems tobe less than that of infantry, cavaly, and artillery in tho ordernamed.

23. Development of Aeronautic Personnel in the
United States.
In the United States the development has been along similarlines to those employed in Europe, with the difference that
here a branch of the service existed that did not formerly exist
in European armies. It was adevelopment of the Civil War,i.e., the Signal Corps. This corps
is charged with the transmissionof information between the various units of an army; the captive balloons had formerly been
assigned to it, and when the
aeroplanes made their (appearance they naturally fitted in. In
this way all the agencies for thetransmission of information are
kept under one head, whichshould give not only the maximum amount of efficiency insuch transmission but ~ilsoobviate the necessity of creating a
new arm of the service. The
development of aero units in the
United States has been slow forvarious reasons: First, on account of the fact that very little
money has been appropriatedcompared to the sums appropriated in Europe. Second, the selection of the flying personnel
has been limited to lieutenants of

War College Division:
A Proper Military Policy 1915

the Regular Army, unmarried,and below 30 years of age. This
reduces the number of eligibles
t o a very small compass anddoes not give the results that arenecessary. In the developmentof a flying personnel it is thought
that, in addition to a certain
number of officers obtained fromthe Regular Army as now provided for by law, pilots should
be obtained both from among
the enlisted men and from suitable civilians who enlist for that
purpose. When they have
proved their ability to be efficientpilots they should be placed in a
special grade to be designatedby a suitable name, such as“aero pilot, Signal Corps,” forinstance. This grade should be
analogous to the grade of warrant officer in the Navy. Whensuch men leave the service forany cause which does not interfere with the performance of theduties of pilot, arrangements
should be made to obtain theirservices at once at the outbreakof war. The observers should betactical officers who have received training. The present organization authorized for theaero squadrons in the UnitedStates provides that each one
have 12 aeroplanes-8 of thereconnaissance type, 2 of the
speed type, and 2 of the battle
type. The personnel numbers 20

53

officers, 18 of whom are pilots. It
is intended that staff and Artillery
officers be used as observers.
The United States squadron appears to be a well-balanced unit
for work in this country, judging
by the experiences obtained inEurope. It should be perfected
as soon as possible and every
effort made to give our Army theaircraft of all types needed for its
use. Lieut. Col Reber, in thisconnection, says:
We who in the beginning started
the movement are now at the tail ofthe procession. We have no dirigibles, but very few trained men, andfewer machines. The manufacturingindustry is moribund from the lack ofbusiness, and there is no future for it.
We have no aerodynamical laboratories in which to study the problems, and no engineering courses,
except one, in which to develop ourconstructors. The Government has
not stimulated any advance in thedesign of machines or motors bycompetition for substantial reward.
We have no national league, as inFrance and Germany, to assist theGovernment by private subscription
and by public demand for the development of air power. The interest of

our people in aeronautics at large isdead, and has been perhaps solulled by a sense of false security andthe belief that war will not come tosuch a vast and powerful Nation as
ours; that it will not heed an oftquoted maxim of the Father of ourCounty, “In time of peace prepare
for war.” In no particular is it more
impossible to make up deficiencies
after the outbreak of hostilities thanin aeronautics. What is to be done?

Evidently a strong appeal
should be made to Congress forsuitable legislation.
24. Scope of Needed
Legislation.

What is needed is legislationthat will give means of obtaining
a sufficient personnel of pilots,
enough money to buy suitablemachines including excellent engines, and the training of a suitable number of officer-observers.
Provision should be made forthe creation of captive-balloon
units, and dirigibles of various
types should be developed.

9. T o lncrzecrse t h e
Eggiciency OFT h e MiJiCaey
Establishment

55

1916

On 1 May 1915, during thetime the War College Division
w a s formulating a military
policy (Doc. 8), the American
merchantman Gulflight w a s
torpedoed by a German submarine. A week later, on 7
May, the Lusitania was sunk.
Despite repeated protests
from President Wilson, t h esinkings continued; and as
they continued, the need for
U.S. military p r e p a r e d n e s s
became more and more evident.
On 1 8 January 1 9 1 6 , t h e
Chief Signal Officer, General
Scriven, again appeared before Hay’s Committee on Military Affairs, t h e subject
being another bill “To Inc r e a s e t h e Efficiency of theMilitary Establishment.” Thefollowing extracts from t h ehearings
are concerned
mainly with Scriven’s testimony in behalf of an expansion of the Aviation Section
and his response to a question from Congressman Kahn
about bombing operations in
Europe.’1 Hearings before the Committee on Milttary Affairs, House of Representatives. To
Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, 64th Cong,
1st sess. VOI 1 (1916)..............
control of the Field Artillery on
The Chairman. You are ask- the basis of one aeroplane per
ing for 73 additional aviation of- battery with one in reserve, or,
ficers. I wish you would state the in round numbers, six aeroreason for that.
squadrons for this arm. This calls
Gen. Scriven. In order tofor the addition of nine squadexplain it thoroughly, I think itrons to those above mentioned.
might be well for me to state to
While the above-mentioned
the committee the scope, as I
force will give a personnel for aunderstand it, of the aviation
flying establishment in time ofservice which is needed at thepeace, a much greater number
present time. I will do thatof officers and men will be rebriefly, sir, and give you the fig- quired in time of actual hostiliures in regard to that.
ties. As a step toward getting the
The organization of the avia- flying men necessary to meettion units in the foreign armies
war conditions, an aviation resuggests a squadron of 12 maserve corps should be createdchines as the basis for our orga- including citizen aviators, menization, 8 of these machines to chanics, and constructors of air
be of the reconnaissance typecraft. . . .
and two each of the pursuit and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
combat type. In case the Army
I have said that the organizaremains at its present authorized tion of the aviation units in forstrength the personnel of theeign armies suggests a squadron
aviation section should be inof 12 machines as the basis ofcreased to give the sufficient per- the present organization. We
sonnel to supply seven aero
have heretofore had eight masquadrons, one for each of thechines, which we have called
four tactical divisions organizedsquadrons. They have been
for duty in the United States,
scout machines. It seems desirathree for over-seas garrisons,ble, in accordance with the presand a detachment for duty at the ent practice, to add a third comaviation school.
pany of four machines, two of
It is to be pointed out thatwhich shall be what we call purthere is additional need for atsuit machines, capable of pursuleast one squadron for reconing dirigibles or attacking aeronaissance work in each of theplanes, and two of them heavy
three Coast Artillery districts inthis country, and that a sufficientnumber of aeroplanes should be
provided for fire direction and56

A formation of JN-3 aircraft, which were modified J N - 2 s usedby the l e t Aero Squadron (late 1915 early 1916) at Fort SIU.
Okla., and San Antonio. Tex.

Aviation Section

To Increase theEfficiency of The Military
Establishment 1916

carrying machines, which would
be capable of carrying a considerable amount of ammunition in
the shape of bombs, and which
could be used for combat or
destructive purposes. Thatmakes the squadron as at present proposed 12 instead of 8.
Now, it is also, I think, to be
accepted that an aeroplane is an
expendable article. It is like ammunition used with the gun. It is
subject to destruction, and therefore we must have 12 machines
for replacement, and also a reserve of 12, so that a squadronconsists of 36 machines. . . .

57............................
As I have said, if the reorganization plan of the Army by the
War Department, which calls forseven tactical divisions and fivecavalry brigades, should be approved by Congress, provisions
should be made for one aerosquadron for Corregidor, one for
Hawaii, one for the Canal Zone,
one for each of the three Coast
Artillery districts in the UnitedStates, one for each of the tactical divisions and five for the
Field Artillery, giving in all 18
squadrons, with a total strengthof 368 officers, counting 20 officers to a squadron and 6 officers
for the school, with a total
strength of 368 officers and2,360 enlisted men.
............................

Mr. Kahn. Well, I have in myoffice here in this building d picture that was issued by the British Government calling for volunteers, with a legend on it that
this was the damage done by aGerman dirigible; and according
to that picture the wreckage wassomething terrific. Now, does thebomb dropped by an aeroplane
accomplish the destruction thatthose heavier missiles accomplish? As I understand it, thedirigible can carry much heavier
missiles.
Gen. Scriven. Oh, yes. Of
course, the bomb dropped by
the aeroplane is a very small
matter; that is to say, it has veryslight destructive power, because, so far as we know, they
have not had the power to carry
free weight enough to make itworth while. They can carry abomb or two,but it is not much.
............................
The Chairman. There seemto be no further questions.
Gen. Scriven. May I say justone word before you go? In
regard the first question you
asked me, in connection with the
Signal Corps at large, 1 haveendeavored in this pamphlet
here submitted to point out theneed of a corps of information inmodern armies, and I have endeavored to show how absolutely inadequate the strength of
the Signal Corps is to meet thoserequirements. . . .
.............

10, PRepaR&ness

59

FOR N a t i o n a l Degense
1916

Early in 1916 t h e S e n a t e
Committee on Military Affairs
was holding hearings on bills
for reorganizing t h e Armyand for creating a reserve.
The Chief Signal Officer,
General Scriven, and t h e
Chief of the Aviation Section,
Colonel Reber, testified on 28
January. They were q u e s tioned by Chairman George
E. Chamberlain (D-Ore.), andSen. Thomas Benton Catron( R-N.M.).’............................
Gen. Scriven. In the firstplace, I would like to emphasize,
as far as I can, the growing importance of the service of information. I have endeavored to do
this in a little pamphlet before
me, which I think has come tothe committee room. But theservice of information has become so obviously importantand of such paramount value inmilitary operations, especially inthe light of events abroad, that I
think it is well to emphasize it asstrongly as possible. The general
officer or the commanding general of any force or any expedition who has not a service of
information, as compared withthe man who has, is like a blind
man fighting one who can see,
one who has all the information
on current happenings andchanging events before him
upon which to base his actions.
The service of information is
performed in these days, first,
largely, in broad scope, by the
aeroplane, which gives the general survev of the field. but mustbe supported by the othermeans of transmitting information now employed, such as, ofcourse, the telegraph, telephone,what we call the buzzer, visualapparatus of various kinds, andlargely, as is now pretty wellrecognized, by wireless telegraphy, or radio telegraphy, as it is
now known. . . .

............................
The needs of the aviation section were gone into quite fully inthe hearing before the House
committee, and I understandthat it will not be necessary forme to repeat what appears in thereport of that hearing. I do, however, wish it to be fully understood that the aviation organization which is called for in thepreceding table-that is, sevenaero squadrons and a school detachment, has been reluctantly
offered as absolute minimum incase the Army remains at its
present strength.
The Chairman. You went
into that in the House committee?
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir. I
asked there for 18 aero squadrons.
Senator Catron. What constitutes a squadron?
Gen. Scriven. A squadron as
we had it consisted of two companies of four aeroplanes eachthat is, of eight aeroplanes, all ofwhich were intended for scouting purposes.

Senator Catron. How many
men to a company?
Gen. Scriven. Under the oldplan it was 90 to the squadron,but now it has been proved byevents abroad that to these twocompanies of scout machines forgeneral outlook over the country
must be added a third company
of four aeroplanes, two of whichshall be rapid-pursuit machines
to counterattack any enemy’s aircraft, and two heavy weight-carrying machines, armed with machine or other types of guns
and capable of carrying a considerable weight of ammunition
used for destructive purposes.
So that a squadron properly organized now consists of 12 aeroplanes in the first line, 129 men
and 20 officers.
Senator Catron. You mean
129 men in a squadron, or ineach company?
Gen. Scriven. In the wholesquadron. There are 20 officers
and 129 men to the squadron, 6
officers to each company, whichmake 18, one squadron commander, who should be a major,
and one adjutant and supply officer. But a squadron of 12 machines, in my opinion, is notenough. The organization isgood as a fighting unit, but I
think that for each machine you
should count three-that is, one
machine that is actually in use,

1. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Preparedness for National Defense, 64th Cong, 1stsess. pt 12 (1916).

Aviation Section60

one replacement, so that when
the first is broken up or out ofcommission it can be at once
replaced and a third aeroplane
be kept as a reserve, not necessarily assembled, but ready to be
used. As I see it, we should have
one squadron in the Philippines,
one in Hawaii, one in the Canal
Zone, seven for use with thefield armies-that is, one at theheadquarters of each divisionand three squadrons for the useof the Coast Artillery-that is,
one squadron for the North Atlantic, a squadron for the South
Atlantic, and a squadron for the
Pacific. To these 13squadrons
there should be added one aeroplane, with its replacement, foreach battery of Field Artillery.
The Chairman. How many
would that mean?
Gen. Scriven. That means
18 squadrons.

The Chairman. Of 129 men
each?
Gen. Scriven. Eighteensquadrons of 129 men.
The Chairman. And 20 officers?
Gen. Scriven. Yes. . . .

ter, one squadron and one company, and a school detachment.
The Chairman. You havenot three, then?
Gen. Scriven. No, sir; not of
the approved squadron organization. We have 46 officers and............................
243 men.
The Chairman. How many
The Chairman. How manysquadrons have you now?
machines have you now?
Gen. Scriven. We have toGen. Scriven. Twenty-three,day, I think, 23 aeroplanes. Call and two awaiting acceptanceit two squadrons. As a matter of tests.
fact, we have a squadron at San
The Chairman. How many
Antonio and we have the aviado you need for 18 squadrons?
tion school at San Diego, andGen. Scriven. I think wethen we have a company on its need 36 machines to a squadway to the Philippines.
ron. But, as a matter of fact,
The Chairman. That is three. perhaps we will say 24 machines
Gen. Scriven. I could hardly to a squadron would be wellcall it three.
enough, though each unit in
The Chairman. Not threeservice should have a support ofsquadrons?
two machines, rather than ofGen. Scriven. No. Two
one replacement.
squadrons by number; but bet-

Officers of the U.S. Signal Corps Aviation School, North Island,
San Diego, California, 1916. Thirteen of the 28 officers in thephoto attained a general officer rank in later years.

61

Preparedness for
National Defense
1916

The Chairman. You need
432, and you have 23?
Gen. Scriven. Yes; reckoning 2 4 to the squadron; or if you
reckon 36 machines to thesquadron, the total number ofmachines we should have is 18
by 36, or 648. The machines
should be considered as expendable, for they are easily
placed out of commission.
The Chairman. There must
be a great number in reservewith the European armies?
Gen. Scriven. It is no doubt
tremendous.
The Chairman. What does amachine cost?
Gen. Scriven. I think,roughly, $10,000, with the instruments, and so on.
The Chairman. I should
think it would be almost as perishable as ammunition.
Gen. Scriven. No doubt,
and should be so reckoned.

Abroad they are getting tremendously powerful machines, andwill undoubtedly be able to carryguns and missiles in sufficientquantity to d o a great deal ofdestruction.
The Chairman. What dothese Zeppelins carry?
Gen. Scriven. They carryseveral tons. The new ones I do
not know about, but the oldones had a capacity of something like 4 or 5 tons free weight.
The Chairman. That is what
the Germans are using forbombs?
Gen. Scriven. Yes.
Senator Catron. Can theydrop their bombs with any accuracy?
Gen. Scriven. No, sir; they
can not. They have small chance
to hit what they are aiming at.
They simply drop the bombs
when and where they can.

Senator Catron. And they
have to get up about how highto be at a safe distance?
Gen. Scriven. Now, to be
beyond the range of the powerful anti-aircraft guns, they mustrise to at least 13,000 feet. Thisis probably beyond the ability ofthe dirigible.
Senator Catron. If they dropthem while they are moving andtheir machine is not entirely
steady, they would have allkinds of trouble about where
their shots would go?
Gen. Scriven. They would.
Senator Catron. What are
you doing in regard to improving
your machines, or whatever you
call them? Have you adopted
any machine that is a standard
machine, or are you open togetting better ones?

62.Lieut. Col. Reber. We are
keeping abreast of the practiceas developed at home andabroad, and evey time any improvement is made we endeavor
to put that in our machines. . . .
............................
Senator Catron. What machines are you using?
Lieut. Col Reber. Aeroplanes.
Senator Catron. What kindof aeroplanes are you using?
Lieut. Col. Reber. We areusing a biplane tractor, twoseated scout machine.

Aviation Section

Senator Catron. Any particular make, designated by thename of any particular person?
Lieut. Col. Reber. We havethose machines made both by
the Curtiss Co. and by the Martin Co.
Senator Catron. I suppose
you have in them the advantageof e v e y machine there is in the
county?
Lieut. Col Reber. We t y to
get them.
Senator Catron. What is thegreatest speed you can get outof one of those?

Lieut. Col. Reber. Do you
mean the ones we have?
Senator Catron. Yes.
Lieut. Col Reber. I think
about 80 miles an hour.
Senator Catron. It seems tome that over in Europe they
have gotten more speed thanthat out of them.
Lieut. Col. Reber. But notout of the same type of machine
we have.
Senator Catron. Do weneed another type of machine?
Lieut. Col. Reber. We do,and the only reason we haven’t
it is because we haven’t enoughmoney to buy it.
Senator Catron. That waswhat my first question was addressed to, whether you were
keeping abreast of the times,
getting machines as efficient as
those now being used in Europe,that would be efficient for andbeneficial to the Army in its operations. You now say you havenot got as rapid a flying machineas they have?
Lieut. Col. Reber. I might
say this, that the average scout
machine abroad, of the same
type we have, has approximately
the same speed as ours has.
They have a faster type machine
they have developed that wehave not as yet been able toPreparedness for

63

National Defense
1916buy, as it has not been developed in this county, although
American manufacturers now
are planning to build it, and they
have offered to build some types
which we expect to have tried
out in the next two or threemonths. As a specific case, theCurtiss people are building andwill have for exhibition and trial
within about a month a fast machine, which will probably make
110 miles an hour.
Senator Catron. The paper
stated some machines over there
are making 110 miles an hour.
Lieut. Col Reber. That is afact.
Senator Catron. Is that thegreatest speed any of them hasreached?
Lieut. Col Reber. No, sir. I
think the fastest speed on record
is a little over 126 miles an hour;
but that is not a militay machine. That was a racing machine.
Senator Catron. Where wasthat?
Lieut. Col. Reber. That wasin France. In a Duperdussin
mono-plane, Prevost made aspeed of 126.59 miles per hour.
Senator Catron. As I understand, Gen Scriven, you claim
you ought to have some additional machines, and particularly
these v e y fast machines?
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; I
think it is pretty well developed

flying, by smoke bombs, signalsthat if the aeroplane is actuallyfrom a V e y pistol, and by wireused in war, there must bemeans of counterattack by aero- less apparatus.
Senator Catron. YOU statedplane. An aero attack must bea while ago that they could wire
met by a counterattack, and aout, but they could not receive a
Zeppelin attack should be met
probably by the fast aeroplanes. message.
Gen. Scriven. No; they can
Senator Catron. What is the
not hear. The aeroplane makes
speed of the Zeppelin?
Gen. Scriven. I do not recall so much noise.
anything higher than about 65
The Chairman. How accumiles, whereas the aeroplanes
rate is photography from those
have gotten up as high as about machines?
125 miles an hour.
Gen. Scriven. It has been
Senator Catron. Whatv e y excellent.
would be the particular benefit
The Chairman. At what eleof the exceedingly fast machine vation?
in connection with the others?
Lieut. Col. Reber. They
Gen. Scriven. Like a black- have taken photographs frombird attacking a crow. He can fly 12,000and 13,000 feet.
all around his enemy, get above
Gen. Scriven. It is v e y good
him, fire projectiles at him, andwork. In making signals they
has the advantage of always
have sometimes used little scinbeing able to manuever for posi- tillations of silver paper.
tion. Like a fast ship, he can
The Chairman. They have akeep out of the way of thecode?
other’s guns, and make his own
Gen. Scriven. They have a
attack.
conventional code.
Senator Catron. Have these
The Chairman. Is there anymachines proven a success as
thing else you want to discuss,
scout machines?
General?
Gen. Scriven. Our machines
Gen. Scriven. I have been
are v e y successful as scout ma- thinking of the best means forchines.
obtaining a reserve of men who
Senator Catron. How dowould be required in war forthese machines inform the Army signal work, and also in regard
where a battey that may be
to aviators regarding which I
firing against the troops is lohave made a suggestion, but
cated?
that is in the House hearing. The
Gen. Scriven. They do it by question of a reserve of men andvisual signaling, by dropping or officers is going to be the mostdisplaying objects of various
serious matter we have to face.
shapes and colors, by directional
The Chairman. It all looks
serious to me, General.
. . .Gen.
. . . . . .Scriven.
. . . . . . . . . I. .know.
. . . . . ... .. .

11. N a t i o n a l Degense
A c t OF1916-

The hearings in t h e Houseand Senate early in 1916
(Docs. 9 and 10) were steps
toward the enactment of t h e
National Defense Act of 1916.
With the War College Division's
study on military policy (Doc.
8) in hand, Secretary Garrison
proposed a plan that included
the creation of a Continental
Army of 400,000 volunteers under federal control. The idea
was approved by President
Wilson and found support in
the Senate. The House, however, favored a plan based ona large national guard. The
President changed sides, Garrison resigned, and Newton D.
Baker became Secretary ofWar. With some help from Pancho Villa, who raided Columbus, N.M., in March 1916, t h e
preparedness measure finally
cleared Congress and was approved by the President on 3
June 1916.' It provided for an
increase in the regular army
over a five-year period, quadrupled the national guard, established officer and enlisted
reserve corps, and provided for
a volunteer army to be raisedin time of war. The regulararmy, after expansion over a
period of five years, was toinclude 64 regiments of infantry, 25 regiments of cavalry,and 21 regiments of field artillery, which is what t h e War
College Division had recommended except that the law
provided one less regiment of
infantry.
1 39 Stat 166 (1916)

65

Each infantry regiment was consist of a headquarters, three
to have 12 infantry companies Infantry brigades, one regiment(103 men each) organized into of Cavalry, one Field Artillery
3 battalions, plus 1 machine brigade, one regiment of Engigun company, 1 supply com- neers, one field signal battalion,
pany, and 1 headquarters com- one aero squadron, one ammupany. Organization of brigades, nition train, one supply train,
divisions, and corps was au- one engineer train, and one sanitary train. The typical Cavalry
thorized when needed.
The National Security Act of division shall consist of a head1916 did not specify the num- quarters, three Cavalry brigades,
ber of aero squadrons to be one regiment of Field Artillery
formed or give any indications (horse), one battalion ofas to their organization and mounted Engineers, one field
functions, but it did state that signal battalion (mounted), one
squadrons could be formed as aero squadron, one ammunition
the need arose. Further, it tied train, one supply train, one engit h e aviation establishment to neer train, and one sanitary
the division organization of t h e train. The typical army corps
shall consist of a headquarters,
ground forces.
.........................
two or more Infantry divisions,one or more Cavalry brigades or
SEC. 3. Composition of
Brigades, Divisions, a Cavalry division, one Field Artillery brigade, one telegraphand So Forth.
The mobile troops of the Reg- battalion, and one field signal
battalion, and such ammunition.
ular Army of the United States
supply,engineer, and sanitary
shall be organized, as far aspracticable, into brigades and di- trains as the President may
visions. The President is author- deem necessary. . . .
............................
ized, in time of actual or threatened hostilities, or when in his
SEC. 13. The Signal Corps.
opinion the interests of the public service demand it, to organize............................
the brigades and divisions into
. . . Authority is hereby givensuch army corps or armies as
the President to organize, in his
may be necessary. The typical
Infantry brigade shall consist of a discretion, such part of the commissioned and enlisted personheadquarters and three reginelof the Signal Corps into suchments of Infantry. The typicalCavalry brigade shall consist of a number of companies, battalions, and aero squadrons as theheadquarters and three reginecessities of the service may
ments of Cavalry. The typical
Field Artillery brigade shall con- demand.
............................
sist of a headquarters and three
regiments of Field Artillery. The
typical Infantry division shall66

Pancho Villa.
Mexican bandit andrevolutionary. raided American
territory in March 1916. His actions
led to Penhing’s Punitive
Expedition into Mexico,d d n gwhich US. aviation gained theopportunity for field testing.

Aviation Section

12-F u n a s F o ~Fiscal yea^ 1917

67

Ap~illQl6

In October 1915 General
Scriven requested $3,768,743
for aviation for Fiscal Year
1917. Since the estimate had
been based in part on t h eplan for a Continental Army,
which by April 1916 appeared
to be doomed, Secretary
Baker reduced the amount to$1,222,100. When Baker, accompanied by Capt. Charles
S. Wallace, appeared before
the House Committee on Military Affairs on 8 April 1916
for hearings on t h e 1917
budget, the questioning related more to t h e Punitive
Expedition than to events in
Europe. After Pancho Villa’s
raid on Columbus, N.M., theprevious month, the 1st Aero
Squadron had been sent toColumbus to join the Punitive
Ex p ed it i on h ead ed by Brig.
G e n . John J . Pershing. An
emergency appropriation of$500,000 had been made, at
Baker’s request, on 31 Marchto purchase airplanes andother aeronautical equipment. In the hearings in April
the committee wanted toknow about the 1st Aero
Squadron’s activities andabout the performance of t h e
Curtiss JN-3 planes withwhich the squadron was operating.
Following are some extracts from Secretary Baker’s
testimony under questioningby Chairman Hay and members of his committee.’ Between the time Baker appeared before the committee

and the time the appropria- machine, and they cost $12,500
tion was passed in August, apiece. So that shows there is a
growing concern over t h e somewhat wide variation in thestate of preparedness re- price.
sulted in a huge increase in
The object of the aviation secfunds for aviation. The tion is to continue to develop aamount appropriated for reconnoissance machine until we1917 was $13,881,666.
have an adequate reconnoissance machine, and then to un............................
dertake to add to the equipment
The Chairman. Out of thesome of the so-called war ma$1,222,100 for the Aviation
Section how many machines is it chines, which means slightly armored machines, machines withproposed to purchase?
larger carrying capacity.
Secretary Baker. The inThe intention is to have twotended expenditures include thecost of supplying one and two- squadrons of 12 machines with
50 per cent of spare parts, andthirds squadrons at $233,400
each, to fumish sufficient equip- the machines are estimated atment for the present authorized $12,000 each, including thestrength, making an aggregate of spare parts. Then there is an
estimate to be added, in addi$389,000; then that also intion, for certain trucks, motorcycludes one additional aerosquadron at $233,400, making a cles, supply trucks, tank trucks,
carrier trucks, machine-shop
total for new material for thetrucks, making up the entire
Aviation Section of $622,400.
An aero squadron consists of equipment of an aero squadron,with 12 aeroplanes, and all the
12 machines, and this price isattendant and accessory trucks
arrived at in this way. The 12
and parts, the total cost of one
machines with 50 per cent of
spare parts it is estimated would squadron being $233,400.
The Chairman. What are
cost $144,000. The actual fact
about the price of an aeroplane you going to do with the $800,is that it is pretty widely variant, 000 that remains?
Secretary Baker. Of theof course. It depends a goodamount that remains, Mr. Chairdeal upon the type of machine
and a good deal upon the man- man, $288,500 is made up in
this way: For replacing existing
ufacture.
The machines we have most machines, $75,000 for mainterecently bought for use in Mex- nance, $50,000 for salaries of
ico we are paying about $7,500. the civilian force, $27,500 for
That is just for the machine.
There is one manufacturer who
claims to have the latest type of

68experimental machines, $50,000 that is an experiment item
for developing a better type. It
has been recommended by theaviation section, and I think has
the approval of such members of
the General Staff as have considered it, that we ought to havein War Department a specificsum of $50,000 available for experimenting on aviation matters.
The weak point in American
aviation has been the motor,
and it has been thought that the
War Department could, after acompetition in the developmentof an adequate aviation motor,
perhaps, develop a type thatwould be satisfactory.
The Chairman. Then it is
proposed only to buy 12 machines during the coming fiscal
year?
Secretary Baker. No. The
first figure I gave you was tosupply one and two-thirds
squadrons, which, with thesquadrons on hand now-that
is, one and one-third squadrons-would bring that up to
three squadrons. That figure forsupplying the one and two-thirds
squadrons is $389,000. Thatwould buy the one and twothirds additional squadrons, andan additional squadron besides
that is estimated for at a cost of$233,400, so that the intention
would be to buy 32 machines.
The remainder of the $288,500 to which I was referring amoment ago is to be used in thefollowing way: For experimental
machines, $50,000; for motor
competition, $50,000; for instru-

Aviation Section

ments and incidentals, $10,000; demned in February, 1914, andfor one rescue sea sled, $8,000, the next Curtiss machine wasfor four motor trucks, $16,000; also condemned in February,
1914. The next Wright was deand for maintenance of transportation, $2,000. That makes a stroyed by accident in August,
1913, and the last of the Curtiss
total of $288,500.
The Chairman. How many machines was condemned in
June, 1914.
machines have you on hand?
That was almost the initial
Secretary Baker. 1 have ayear of real experimentation withcomplete history here, Mr.
heavier-than-air machines, andChairman, of all that has happened in the department in the all of the defects that at first
appeared were, of courw, inherway of buying aeroplanes,
ent in our machines, and they
where they are, and what has
were finally condemned and debecome of those that are nolonger anywhere. 1 do not want stroyed.
In 1912 we bought 12 mato take your time to go into
details in regard to that history, chines. All of them have either
sirice been condemned or debut it seems to me to be rather
stroyed by accident. Of the latterinteresting.
The Chairman. We are anx- class 9 were destroyed by acciious to have a full statement indent in 1913 and 1914, of thereference to that matter.
machines bought in 1912. The............................
others were condemned in
Secretary Baker. The first
June, 1914.
machine the Army ever had was
In 1913 we bought eight maan original Wright, which waschines, adhering to the types
acquired in 1908. It is now in the originally purchased, the Curtiss,
Smithsonian Institution.
the Wright, the Burgess, and the
In 1911 we bought seven ma- Burgess-Dunne, and of thoseeight machines one is now inchines, three Curtiss, three
Wrights, and one Burgess. The
commission; one Burgessfirst Curtiss and the first WrightDunne. That was the new typewere condemned for further use of that year. The others havein February, 1914, having lasted either been condemned or arepractically three years. The next out of repair. One of them is
Wright was destroyed by an ac- marked “out of repair,” which
cident in September, 1912, very means probably that it <:anbe
shortly after its purchase. The
put into service with sorne spare
Burgess machine was conparts added.
In 1914 we bought 11 machines. One of them is out of
repair, five of them have beenFunds for Fiscal
Year 1917 [April 19161

condemned, and five are now incommission. That year we hadan experiment in a new type ofmachine, known as the Martin
machine. I comment on that
only to show that new makers
are coming into the art and thedepartment is keeping up withthem by experimenting with
their types.
In 1915 we bought 20 machines-the Burgess, the Curtiss,and the Martin machines. The
preponderating number boughtthat year was the Martin type. Of
those, 2 have been condemned-2 Curtiss machines.
The rest are substantially all incommission, making a total aggregate number purchased fromthe beginning of our experimenting in the art, of 59 machines and they are distributed
as follows: One in the Smithsonian Institution, 32 have been destroyed or condemned, 3 are outof repair, and 23 are now inservice as follows:
Four hydroplanes at Manila, 2flying boats and 9 training machines at San Diego, and 8 machines with the expedition in
Mexico, making a total of 23
machines. That does not account for the 8 machines bought
this year which are now in process of delivey and experimental
trial at Newport News.

............................
Mr. Anthony. What did wepay for the 20 machines we purchased last year?

Capt Wallace. Those machines cost from $7,000 to$10,000 each.

69

The Chairman. Heretofore it
has been stated by the representatives of the Signal Corps thatthey were buying the best typeof machine, and they told us
they cost $10,000 apiece, andwe appropriated in accordancewith what they said they wanted.
In other words, we practicallygave them all they asked for for
their aviation section.
A great deal of criticism has
appeared in the newspapers inregard to the kind of machines
now in use not being machinesthat ought to be used, and wewould like to know whether or
not those machines that werebought in 1915 were the kind ofmachines that ought to havebeen bought for use in the
Army?
Secretary Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have given as much personal attention to that subject as
was possible to give it in thelimited time I have been in contact with the matter, and 1 wantto say 1 am satisfied that the
Army has bought as good machines as were made each time it
has bought, but that in an infantart, undergoing very rapid development, the Army would hardly
have a machine before somenew development would bemade that would antequate its
machines.
Perhaps the best illustration ofthat is what took place with Curtiss machine at the time webought a number of machines
known as the CURTISS J. N. 2.
They turned out to be exceedingly dangerous machines. Nobody knew it beforehand; but
there was some improper calculation of the wing area in thosemachines. Our men experimented with them and unhappily some of them lost their lives,not, probably because of thedefect in the machine so muchas because of the men’s. I do
not like to say lack of skill, butlack of experience of the men
dealing with experimental machines, which increased the possibility of accident.
The net result of that was that
our men very quickly put theirfinger on the defect, increased
the wing area, and made what is
known as the CURTISS J. N. 3,
which, in the hands of competent aviators is regarded as goodreconnaissance machine as there
is. In other words, the makers
have been experimenting, ourAviation Corps have been experimenting, and the combined
experience of both has now
been v e y lately increased by theexperiences in Europe, so that
we are approaching a development of a more stable type andmodel of aeroplane. I think the
Army has always bought as
good machines as there were to
be had.
The Chairman. Mr. Secret a y , are the eight machines inoperation in connection with the
expedition in Mexico being operated successfully?

70

A t the timeof Secretary Baker’s testimony
before the House Committee on Military
Affairs, powered flight itself was scarcely
more than a decade old. In 1900 Wright
brothers were still experimenting with kitegliders (top). In 1902 they were soaring on
the Wright Glider at Kitty Hawk, N.C..
(center), one year before their first succeesful
powered flight. Five years later. the Armypurchased from the Wrights the first military
aircraft, Wright Type A. which Orville Wrightflew in acceptance tests at Ft. Myer. Va.. on
9 September 1908 (bottom).

The Wrights taught others to fly. Orville taught students at
Montgomery, Ma.. in 1910 (top). Army pilots, in turn, learned tofly from Wrights’ students. Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois received
instruction from Phil Parmalee (at the controls) in operating a
new Wright Type B aircraft a t Ft. Sam Houston. Tex., in
February 1911 (center). Lt. Frank M. Kennedy, at the controls of
a Curtiss Trainer a t College Park, Md.. 1911. learned to fly from
Army pilots at the new Army aviation school (bottom).

72

Secretary Baker. They arebeing operated successfully, Mr.
Chairman. That needs a word of
explanation. The first aeroplanes
that were made had the propellers behind the aviator, andwhen any accident took place, inthe way of the machine stallingin going along, so much of thepower would be used to secure
added elevation that the machine would lose its fotward motion and come to a standstill,
except that it would be attempting to rise. The loss of the forward motion deprived it of thesustaining friction with the air,and the machine would stall andplunge head first down to theground.
When that happened the great
weight of the motor and of thepropeller and the gear behind
the aviator crushed him.
That led to the novel suggestion that the motor and propeller
should be put in front. That is
the so-called tractor type. All of
the heavy machinery is in frontof the aviator, and he is protected from the rushing air by amica cage. That seems to have
solved the problem to a great
extent, and since that time there
have been few fatal accidents,
although there have been anumber of falls. Apparently thatmachine is much more stable.
The young men in charge of it
now say they are perfectly willing to take it up and turn over
two or three times as long as
they are 500 feet above theground.

Aviation Section

Mr. McKellar. And 'give us
The Chairman. Is that thetype which is now being used in the information about it?
Secretary Baker. Yes.
Mexico?
Secretary Baker. That is the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mr. Greene. 1 remember at
exclusive type. Those machines
the hearings when they instituted
require a good landing place.
One of the highly desirable qual- the Aviation Section, it was sugities to develop in aeroplanes is gested that the Aviation Sectionthat which will enable a machine has to work also in connection
to slow down very gradually so with the combatants, because
they give back directions for firthat the aviator can pick his
landing place and land in a rela- ing, and all that sort of thing.
Secretary Baker. I think thetively small level field. In Mexico
their landing difficulties are very most serious addition to yourgreat. The county is mountain- discussion is the fact that theyous, and the landing is very diffi- are now devising a battle aeroplane which is in itself an offencult. For that reason when theeight machines went down there sive arm and that places a newthey met with a series of minor phase on the whole thing.
Mr. Greene. That was sugaccidents, and at one time only
two of them were in actual oper- gested at the time.
............................
ation. At the present time six out
Secretary Baker. All theof the eight are in operation.
Mr. McKellar. Mr..Secretary, aeroplanes we now have andare proposing to buy are reconis any real good being accomnoissance machines, and theplished by them?
Secretary Baker. We are re- machines in Mexico are doing
lying on them entirely for comwhat would be done by thewireless telegraph if the staticmunication with the front.
............................
conditions were not so bad.
Mr. McKellar. Would you
Mr. Shallenberger. What is
mind, if you are not prepared to the length of life of an aeroplanein war, the average length ofgive the information about it
now, looking up the question of life?
the separation of the aerial force
Secretary Baker. Ten days, I
am told; certainly a short time.
from the Signal Corps?
Secretary Baker. I would be
Mr. Shallenberger. If themachines in Mexico are now
glad to do that.
doing good service, it shows
what they can do under war
conditions, does it not?
Secretary Baker. They are
hardly under war conditions.
There are no antiaircraft gunsin Mexico.
.............................

75

13,FouJo~: The 1st A ~ R O
SquaCmon in Mexico
1916

When Secretary Baker tes- employment of U.S. militarytified on 8 April 1916 (Doc. aviation just a year before the12), he spoke well of the Cur- United States entered thetiss JN-3, which the 1st Aero war. The major part of the
Squadron was using on the report is printed below.'
Punitive Expedition. There
had been some minor accidents, he said, but six of the Report of Operations
squadron's eight planes were of the First Aeronow in commission. The Sec- Squadron, Signal
retary's information, howCorps,with Punitive
ever, was out of date. Twoplanes had been wrecked on Expedition, U.S.A.
20 March and another on 5 for Period March 15
April. And by the 19th of the to August 15, 1916.
month only two would be left,
In compliance with Par. 1,
and they would not be in
S.O. No. 61, Southern Departserviceable condition.
The story of the difficulties ment, March 12, 1916, the 1st
the 1st Aero Squadron had in Aero Squadron, left Fort Sam
Mexico were recorded by the Houston, Texas, on March 13,
squadron commander, Capt. 1916 en route to Columbus,
Benjamin D. Foulois, in a re- N.M., with the following personport completed at Columbus nel and equipment.
Personnel-Captains B. D.
on 28 August 1916. The report is interesting and signifi- Foulois, T. F. Dodd, Lieuts. C.
cant for what it has to say G. Chapman, J. E. Carbery, H.
about the capabilities and A. Dargue, T. S. Bowen, R. H.

1 The copy used is one beanng Foulois
name stamped in the sgnature block at theend of the repOrl It is a carbon copy that
was acquired by Lt Col Ernest L Jones andis now part of the Jones Collection in theAlbert F Simpson Histoncal Research Center 168 65011-7A The same folder also
contains another version, more in the formof a narrative account than a formal report
This second version. which presumably was
also written by Foulois, was printed. withfive paragraphs (numbers 2-6) deleted, as
Appendix B to Col Frank Tompkins, Chasing W/a (Harrisburg. 1934)

The Squadron arrived at Columbus, N.M., March 15, 1916,
and started immediately to assemble aeroplane equipment. . . .
Aeroplane #44, Capt. Dodd,
pilot, Capt. Foulois, observer,
made the first reconnaissanceflight into Mexico on March 16,
1916.

............................
March 19, 1916
Telegraphic orders were received from the Division Commander at Nuevas Casas
Grandes, Mexico, for the Squadron to proceed at once to Casas
Grandes, Mexico, for immediate
service.

............................

All aeroplanes of the Squadron, eight in number, werestarted in flight, from Columbus,
at 510 p.m. One aeroplane wascompelled to return to Columbus due to motor trouble.
Four aeroplanes landed at Las
Ascencion, Mexico, on accountWillis, W. G. Kilner, E. S. Gorof darkness. The other three berell, A. R. Christie, I. A. Rader,came separated from the Squad82 enlisted men, and 1civilianron, in the darkness. One landedmechanician. 2 Hospital Corps
at Ojo Caliente, Mexico, one atmen, attached.
Janos, Mexico, and another near
Equipment-8 aeroplanes, 10 Pearson, Mexico. This latter matrucks, 1 automobile.
chine was wrecked upon
Upon arrival in El Paso, March landing.
14th, 1st Lieut. S. S. Warren, M.
R. C., and one Hospital Corps
enlisted man joined Squadron.
Two additional trucks were also
received from the Depot Quartermaster, El Paso, giving the
Squadron, about 50% of its necessary motor transportation.

Foulois: The 1st Aero
Squadron in Mexico 1916

March 20, 1916
The four pilots who had
landed at Las Ascencion proceeded south to Casas Grandes
and reported for duty. The pilot,
who had been compelled to return to Columbus, and the one
who had landed at Janos arrived
at Casas Grandes at approximately the Same hour, this date.
The pilot who had landed at Ojo
Caliente reported in to Casas
Grandes, several days later, having incurred slight damage to his
aeroplane, which had to be repaired.
The aeroplane which had
been landed near Pearson, wasso badly damaged that the pilot
abandoned it, and returned toCasas Grandes on foot.
Upon reporting to the Division
Commander at Casas Grandes,
instructions were received, tomake an aero reconnaissancesouth toward Cumbre Pass, inthe heart of the Sierra Madre
Mountains, for the purpose of
locating troops moving southward toward Lake Babicora.
Aeroplane #44, Capt. T. F.
Dodd, pilot, and Capt. B. D.
Foulois, observer, proceeded
south at noon, March 20. Proceeded about twenty-five miles,
from Casas Grandes, but wereunable to rise over the foothillsof the Sierra Madre Mountains,77

due to constantly encountering
whirlwinds and terrific verticalcurrents of air, which, on account of the low power of the
aeroplane, effectually prevented
the aeroplane rising to an altitude sufficiently high to allow ofcrossing the mountains, which atthis particular locality, rise to aheight of over 10,000feet above
sea level.
On this same date aeroplane#48,Lieut. T. S. Bowen, pilot,
while making a landing wascaught in a whirlwind, which
completely wrecked the aeroplane. Lieut. Bowen, escapedwith a broken nose, and minor
injuries.
March 21, 1916
Orders received to locate
troops under Colonel Irwin in
the Galeana Valley. Aeroplane#44, Capt. T. F. Dodd, pilot,
and Capt. B. D. Foulois, observer, located these troops atGalera Lopena, landed, and reported to Colonel Irwin. Retumed to Dublan, with reportfrom Colonel Irwin. As a resultof this reconnaissance and reportfrom Colonel Irwin, six trucks ofthis Squadron, loaded with supplies, were sent to Colonel Irwin’s column.
March 22, 1916
Orders received to communicate with troops moving southon the Mexican North-Western
Railroad, and Colonel G. A.
Dodd’s command in the Galeana Valley.

Aeroplane #42, Lieut. W. G.
Kilner, pilot, Lieut. 1. A. Rader,observer, and aeroplane #45,
Lieut. J. E. Carberry, pilot, flew
to the Galeana Valley, locatedColonel Dodd’s troops, landed
and reported to Colonel Dodd.
Returned to Dublan, with reports
from Colonel Dodd, to Division
Commander. Aeroplane #44,
Capt. T. F. Dodd, pilot, Lieut. A.
R. Christie, observer, and aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. Chapman, pilot, flew south into the
Sierra Madre Mountains, in an
endeavor to locate the troops,
moving south on the Mexican
North-Western Railroad. These
aeroplanes were driven into theheart of the Sierra Madre Mountains, as far as the northern endof the Cumbre Pass tunnel, but
due to terrific vertical air currents
and whirlwinds, which at times
drove the aeroplanes withintwenty feet of the tree tops, thepilots were unable to cross the
Sierra Madre Mountains, andwere compelled to return to
Dublan.
As a result of this failure toaccomplish the reconnaissanceas directed the Squadron Commander submitted the following
memorandum to the Division
Commander:Aviation Section

78

22 Mch. 16.
Memo for the Commanding
General Punitive Expedition,
U.S. Army at Casas Grandes,
Mexico.
1. In view of the fact that thepresent aeroplane equipment of
the First Aero Squadron is notcapable of meeting the present
military service conditions, it isurgently requested that the following number of aeroplanes,
motors, and spare parts be purchased, if they can possibly be
secured in the United States. It isfurther requested that this orderbe placed by telegraph and immediate delivery of all equipment, by express, be specified.
2. Aeroplanes(a) Two (2) Martin aeroplanes, Model S, with army
standard landing gear, Hall-Scott
125 h.p. 6 cyl. motors.
(b) Two (2) Curtiss aeroplanes, Model R2, Curtiss 160
h.p. steel cylinder motors.

On this same date, a detachment was sent to salvage suchparts of aeroplane #41, which
was wrecked near Pearson on
the evening of March 19, as
were serviceable. This detachment returned same date, andreported that it had been fired
upon, by Mexicans, in the vicinity of Pearson.
March 23, 1916
Received orders to communicate with Colonel G. A. Dodds
troops in the Galeana Valley.
Aeroplane #44, Lieut. A. R.
Christie, pilot, aeroplane #45,
Lieut. J. E. Carbeny, pilot, andaeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G.
One set lower wings, complete, Chapman, pilot, flew to El Valle,with fittings and wires.
landed and reported to Colonel
One landing gear complete.
Dodd. These aeroplanes and piOne set tail control surfaces,
lots, were unable to retum tocomplete, with fittings and wires.
Dublan, until March 25, due toThree (3)spare radiators.
high winds, dust storms, andThree (3)spare magnetos.
snow storms. Detachment from
B. D. Foulois Squadron proceeded to PearCaptain, Signal Corps, son, Mexico, this date, and reComdg. First Aero Squadron. turned to Dublan, with suchparts of aeroplane #41, as could
be considerable serviceable.
The Squadron Commander
submitted the following plan to
the Division Commander, which
contemplated the establishmentof aeroplane and fuel bases inadvance of Division Headquarters.

(c) Two Sturtevant aeroplanes, 140 h.p. Sturtevant motors.
(d) Two (2) Thomas aeroplanes, 135 h.p. Thomas motors.
(e)Two (2)Sloane aeroplanes, 125 h.p. Hall-Scott 6 cyl.
motors.
All of the aeroplanes above to
be completely equipped, andready for immediate use.
3. The manufacturer to furnish
one (1)spare motor for eachtwo (2) machines purchased,
and in addition the following
aeroplane and motor spares:
Two (2) spare propellers.

The JN-2(converted to dN-3) inwhich Dodd and Foulois made thefirst reconnaissance flight into
Mexico, 16 March 1916. Pershing’s
staff cars parked in rear.

79

Foulois: The 1st Aero

Squadron .in Mexico 1916

Headquarters, 1st Aero Squadron, Signal Corps, Colonia DubIan, Mexico, Mar 30/16.
Memorandum for Chief of Staff,
Punitive Expedition, US. Amy.

1. Plans are herewith submitted for the most effective use of
the 1st Aero Squadron, with its
present equipment of six low
powered aeroplanes.
Also other data in reference tosame.
Plan 1
Object: To maintain aerocommunication between Columbus, N.M.-Casas Grandes-El
Valle and Namiquipa.
(a) Two aeroplanes, with sufficient commissioned and enlisted
personnel and supplies to takestation at El Valle. One aeroplane to fly from El Valle to
Namiquipa every morning, returning the following morning to
El Valle.
(b) Two aeroplanes to be assigned to maintain aero communication between Casas Grandes
and Columbus, as follows: Oneaeroplane to leave Casas
Grandes every morning, flying toColumbus without stop, and returning the following morning
without stop.
(c) Two aeroplanes to be assigned to maintain aero communication between Casas Grandes
and Namiquipa, as follows: Oneaeroplane to leave Casas
Grandes every morning, flying toNamiquipa without stop, return-Plan 111(a) Upon establishment of effective radio-telegraph communication between Namiquipa
and Casas Grandes, the following is recommended-( 1) Discontinue the use of aeroplanes
between Namiquipa and Casa!:
Grandes except in emergencies-(2) Continue the aerocommunication between Namiquipa and El Valle, if radio-telegraph, motor cycles, or other
Plan I1
means fail-(3) Concentrate all
Object To maintain aeroavailable aeroplanes at Namicommunication between Cams quipa for daily communication
Grandes-El Valle-Namibetween Namiquipa and adquipa-and points south of Na- vanced troops-( 4) If communimiquipa (communication becation between Namiquipa andtween Casas Grandes [and Co- El Valle is of secondary imporlumbus] to be maintained by ra- tance only and can be maindio-telegraph, motorcycles, and tained by radio-telegraph, moroad transportation).
torcycles, or other means of(a) Transfer entire Squadron communication, the use of aeroof six aeroplanes to Namiquipa, planes between these two points
maintaining fuel bases only, atshould also be discontinued, arid
Casas Grandes, El Valle, and an every available aeroplane conadvanced fuel base south of Na- centrated at Namiquipa for themiquipa, to be determined later. purpose of maintaining commu(b) Upon transfer of Squadron nication south of Narniquipa.
to Namiquipa, the following assignment of aeroplanes to be
made-( 1)Two aeroplanes tomaintain daily communication
between Namiquipa and Casas
Grandes-(2) Two aeroplanes tomaintain daily aero comrnunication between Namiquipa and El
Valle-( 3) Two aeroplanes tomaintain daily aero communication between Namiquipa andpoints south, within effective radius of aeroplanes.

ing the following morning without stop.
The foregoing plan contemplates the maximum use of all
auiators and all aeroplanes, formaintaining aero communication
between Columbus-Casas
Grandes-El Valle and Namiq u i p only, and does not contemplate the use of aeroplanes
for communication, south, east,
or west of Namiquipa.

80Plan IV(a) In the event that contact isgained with the enemy, it is recommended that every available
aeroplane be concentrated at thefront for observation and reconnaissance of the enemy, as far aspracticable.
2. In connection with the foregoing plans, for effectiue use of the
aeroplanes of this organization,
the following is furnished.
The six aeroplanes now inuse, have been subjected, fornearly ten months, to severe
weather conditions, in Oklahoma and Texas, exposed torain, high winds, and severe cold
weather conditions.
As a result of these months offield service, all aeroplanes havebeen subjected to severe wear
and tear. With the present extreme field service conditions every machine is liable, at any day,to be placed out of commission
as unfit and too dangerous forfurther field service.
3. Further information is furnished to the effect that these
aeroplanes are not capable ofmeeting the present militaryneeds, incident to this expedition. Their low power motors
and limited climbing ability with
the necessary military load
makes it impossible to safely operate any one of these machines,

Aviation Sectionin the vicinity of the mountains
Plan I11 of the foregoing waswhich cover the present theatre approved and ordered put intoof operations. These same limi- effect, April 1.
tations as to power, climbing
Nine flights were made thisability, and weight carrying abil- date between Dublan, Galera
ity limit these machines to safe
.Lopena, and El Valle, carrying
operations for a few hours each mail and despatches.
day, chiefly on account of the
March 27, 1916
altitude and extremely severe atSeven flights were made thismospheric conditions encoundate between Columbus, N.M.,
tered every day in the present
Dublan, and El Valle, carrying
theatre of operations.
mail and despatches.
4. The entire commissioned
March 28, 1916
and enlisted personnel of thisReconnaissance flights madeorganization are exerting every
effort to maintain all aeroplanes as follows-Aeroplane #43,
in the best possible condition for Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, fromfurther field service, but even the Dublan to Bachineva, Bachineva
united efforts of the entire tech- to Namiquipa, Namiquipa tonical ability in this command can Santa Ana, and return to Naminot make these aeroplanes suita- quipa. Aeroplane #53, Lieut.
ble for to meet the present mili- Chapman, pilot, from El Valle,east and south, for a distance oftary needs.
5. An urgent appeal is there- 110 miles returning to El Valle.
fore made, that this organization March 29, 1916
be supplied, at the earliest possiSix flights made this date byble moment, with at least ten of five aeroplanes, between Cothe highest powered, highest
lumbus, N.M., Dublan, El Valle,climbing and best weight carry- and Namiquipa, carrying mailing aeroplanes that can be seand despatches.
cured and purchased in the
March 30, 1916
United States.
Three flights made this date,With this new equipment, thewiththree aeroplanes, between
present commissioned and enlisted personnel of this organiza- Columbus, N.M., Dublan and El
Valle, carrying mail andtion, will be able, under thepresent service conditions, to in- despatches. . .
crease its effectiveness to thisexpedition at least five hundred
percent.
B. D. Foulois
Captain, Signal Corps,
Commanding
1st Aero Squadron.

Foulois: The 1st Aero
Squadron in Mexico 1916

March 31, 1916
Nine flights were made thisdate by four aeroplanes between
Dublan, El Valle, Namiquipa,
and San Geronimo, carrying
mail and despatches. Severe
rain, hail, and snow storms wereencountered this date, causing
several forced landings, awayfrom the base at Dublan, until
the storms had passed.
April 1,1916
Nineteen flights made thisdate, by six aeroplanes, between
Columbus, N.M., Dublan, Espindeleno, El Valle, Cruces, Namiquipa, San Geronimo, andSanta Ana, carrying mail anddespatches.
Rain, hail, and snow storms
were encountered on this date,causing several forced landings,
until storms had passed.
April 2, 1916
Fourteen flights made thisdate by five aeroplanes, between
Dublan, El Valle, Cruces, Namiquipa, San Geronimo, andBachineva, carrying mail anddespatches.
April 3, 1916
Six flights made this date, byfour aeroplanes, between DubIan, El Valle, Namiquipa, and
San Geronimo, carrying mailand despatches.
April 4. 1916
Four flights made this date by
two aeroplanes, between El
Valle, Namiquipa, and San Geronimo, carrying mail and despatches.

April 5, 1916
Seven flights made this dateby four aeroplanes, between
Dublan, El Valle, Namiquipa,
and San Geronimo, carrying
mail and despatches.
Aero Squadron headquarters
changed to San Geronimo.
Orders received this date tolocate Colonel W. C. Brown’scolumn, reported in the vicinityof San Antonio. Aeroplane #43,
Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, Capt.
B. D. Foulois, observer, left San
Geronimo on this reconnaissance. Flew to San Antonio andlocated a pack train of Colonel
Brown’s column, returning toward San Geronimo. Landed
aeroplane and received information that troops were proceeding
toward Cusihuirachic. Flew to
Cusihuirachic Canyon, and located troops entering Canyon,
Landed and reported to Colonel
Brown. Flew back to San Geronimo, with report from Colonel
Brown to Division Commander.
April 6, 1916
Four flights made this date by
three aeroplanes, between Namiquipa, San Geronimo, andCusihuirachic, carrying despatches to troops. Aeroplane#44, badly damaged on landing
at San Geronimo. All serviceableparts salvaged, remainder ofaeroplane condemned and destroyed.

April 7, 1916
Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A
Dargue, pilot, and Capt. B. D.
Foulois, observer, from San
Geronimo to Chihuahua City
with despatches for Mr. Marion
H. Letcher, American Consul.
Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. Carberry, pilot, and Capt. T. F.
Dodd, observer, from San Geronimo to Chihuahua City, carrying duplicate despatches to
American Consul. Both aeroplanes arrived at Chihuahua Cityat same time, causing considerable excitement. By pre-arrangement aeroplane #43 was landed
on south side of city, aeroplane#45 on the north side. Lieut.
Dargue, in aeroplane #43, wasdirected to fly his machine to thenorth side of town in order tojoin #45. As he started off, four
mounted rurales opened fire on
the machine, at a distance ofabout one half mile. Capt. Foulois, having started into town,
heard the firing, proceeded in
the direction of the rurales andstopped their firing. Capt. Foulois was then arrested by thewrales and taken by them to thecity jail, followed by a mob ofseveral hundred men and boys.
Enroute to the jail Capt. Foulois
succeeded in getting word to an
American bystander, requestingthat he notify the American
Consul of his arrival in the cityand that the Consul take thenecessary steps for the protec

82

Aviation Section

Lt. Herbert A. Dague,
posing by hls alrcmft on 7 April 1916.
The picture was taken just after Dargue and his plane werestoned at Chihuahua City. He kept the photographer posing him
as long as possible to avoid further violence from the mob.

Foulois: The 1st Aero
Squadron in Mexico 1916

tion of all aviators and machinesthat had arrived in the city.
Upon arrival at the city jail andafter considerable delay, Capt.
Foulois succeeded in getting intouch with Colonel Miranda,
Chief of Staff to General Gutierrez, Military Governor of Chihuahua. Colonel Miranda thentook Capt. Foulois to see General Gutierrez, who soon ordered Capt. Foulois’ release.
Capt. Foulois, then requested
that a guard be placed over thetwo aeroplanes, which request
having been granted, Capt. Foulois, in company with Colonel
Miranda, then proceeded to thenorth side of the city to locate
the other three aviators andaeroplanes. Upon arrival at thelanding place, only Lieut. Dargue, with aeroplane #43,wasfound. Lieut. Dargue reported
that he had landed alongside of
aeroplane #45; that Capt. Dodd
had then proceeded into Chihuahua City to locate the American
Consul and deliver his duplicate
despatches; that after Capt.
Dodd had left, a large crowd ofnatives, Carranzista soldiers, andofficers, had collected and proceeded to crowd around the machine, making insulting remarks;
that several natives burned holes
with cigarettes in the wings ofaeroplane #43;that others haveslashed the cloth with knives, inseveral places, and extracted
bolts and nuts on both machines. The two pilots left withthe machines, Lieuts. Dargue
and Carberry, felt that the mob
would ultimately wreck the ma-

83

April 9. 1916
chines and decided to fly theTen flights made this date, blymachines to the smelters of theAmerican Smelter and Refining five aeroplanes, between Namiquipa, San Geronimo and San
Company, located about six
Antonio.
miles from Chihuahua City.
Lieut. Carberry got away safely April 10. 1916
without encountering any further
Orders received this date todifficulties. Lieut. Dargue, in
locate troops in vicinity of San
aeroplane #43, Qot away in the Borja, Mexico.
midst of a shower of stones,
Aeroplane #43,Lieut. H. A.
thrown at him by the mob. He
Dargue, pilot, Capt. B D. Fouhad only flown a short distance lois, observer, reconnoitered thewhen the top section of the fuse- area from San Antonio to Ojolage flew off and damaged theAzules-Ojo Caliente-Sanstabilizer, causing him to makeBorja-Santa Maria-Tres Herimmediate landing which he ac- manos-Satevo-Carretas andcomplished safely. He thenreturn to San Antonio. No
stood off the crowd without fur- troops discovered within thisther damage to the aeroplane or area.
to himself until the arrival of the
Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E.
guard. Captains Foulois andCarberry, pilot, and Capt T. F.
Dodd spent the remainder of the Dodd, observer, reconnoitered,
day with the American Consul in the area from San Antonio-Ojo
arranging for supplies to be sent Azules-Ojo Caliente-Santato the advance troops by railMariaSatevo-San Lucasroad. Lieuts. Dargue and CarSanta Cruz-Manula-Santaberry spent the remainder of the Ysabel and return to San Antoday repairing the damage done nio. No troops discovered withinby the mob on the two aerothis area.
planes.
Orders received this date tomove Aero Squadron base to
April 8.1916
Satevo.
Aeroplane #43, Lieut. Dargue, pilot, Capt. B. D. Foulois,
observer, and aeroplane #45,
Lieut. Carberry, pilot, and Capt.
T. F. Dodd, observer, from Chihuahua City to San Geronimo
with despatches from American
Consul to Division Commander.
Orders received to move Aero
Squadron base to San Antonio,
Mexico.

84

April 11.1916
Ten flightswere made thisdate, by five aeroplanes, between Satevo-Santa RosaliaSan Lucas-San Antonio-Namiquipa-Dublan and Columbus, N.M.
Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A.
Dargue, pilot, and Lieut. E. S.
Gorrell, observer, flew from San
Antonio, Mexico, to Columbus,
N.M., making one stop at Dublan. Total distance 315 miles.
Aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G.
Chapman, pilot, on reconnaissance trip to Santa Rosalia(south of Chihuahua City, on
Mexican Central Railway. Upon
landing at Santa Rosalia, Lieut.
Chapman was taken by Carranza troops, to the Commanding Officer of the Carranza gamson. During his absence from theaeroplane, his field glasses, gaggles, and considerable ammunition were stolen from the aeroplane by Carranza soldiers. . . .
April 12,1916
Six flights made this date, by
three aeroplanes, between Satevo-San Geronimo-Namiquipa and south toward Parral.
Aeroplane #53 Lieut. C. G.
Chapman, pilot on reconnaissance flight south toward Parral,
for the purpose of locating
troops moving in direction of
Parral.

Aviation Section

April 13,1916
Being in a hostile county, 100
miles from the nearest base, andAeroplane #42, Lieut. I. A.
Rader, pilot on reconnaissance unable to make necessay reflight south toward Parral, for the pairs, the aeroplane was abanpurpose of locating troops in di- doned, and the pilot proceeded
rection of Parral. No troops
with Major Howze's column.
located.
Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E.
Four other flights this date, by Carberry, pilot, Capt. B. D. Fouthree aeroplanes, between Salois, observer, from Chihuahua
tevo-Chihuahua City-andCity to Satevo with despatches
San Andreas.
from Mr. Marion H. Letcher,American Consul, and desAeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E.
Carberry, pilot, Capt. B. D. Fou- patches from General Gutierrez,
lois, observer, to Chihuahua City Military Governor of Chihuahua.
with despatches for the AmenCapt. B. D. Foulois and 14
can Consul. Received first infor- enlisted men, 1st Aero Squadmation regarding flight at Parral. ron, from Satevo to Chihuahua
City, in automobile and truck,
April 14,1916
withdespatches for American~~~~~l~~~ #a,
Lieut. H.A.
and General Gutierrez,
Dargue, pilot, Lieut. E. S. G ~ ~Consul,
Governor.
rell, observer, on reconnaissance Militay
Due to intense feeling in Chiflight from Columbus, N.M, toBoca Grande-Pulpit Passhuahua City over the clash beOaxaca Pass-Carretastween the American troops andJano+Ascencion and return to troops at parral, the Detachment
Columbus, N.M. R~
of enlisted~men~ was placed~ in ~
Sance made for the purpose of concealment in the outskirts oflocating a large Carranzista
the city. Capt. Foulois, accomforce, reported to be moving
panied by Cpl. Arthur Westereast toward our line of commu- mark (chauffeur)proceeded tonications. N~ hostile troops were the American Consulate, delivlocated within the area covered. ered the despatches for the
B~~~~~~of flight 315 miles,
American Consul and Militaryp,merican aeroplane record for Governor, and left the city without difficulty.Returned to Diviflight with two men.
sion Headquarters,at Satevo,
Aeroplane #52, Lieut, 1. A.
Rader, on reconnaissance flight Same date.
south from Satevo, toward Parral, to locate troops in vicinity of
Parral. Located Major Robert L.
Howze's command in vicinity of
Ojito, near Durango State line.
Pilot was compelled to land on
vey rough ground, and damaged aeroplane.

Foulois: The 1st Aero
Squadron in Mexico 1916

85

April 15, 1916
Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A.
Dargue, pilot, Lieut. E. S. Gorrell, observer, on reconnaissancefrom Columbus, N.M., to Boca
Grande-Pulpit Pass--Dublanfrom Dublan to Namiquipafrom Namiquipa to Satevo. Total
distance 415 miles, with two
stops.
Three other flights made thisdate, between Satevo-Can Antonio-and Namiquipa, carrying
mail and despatches.
Aeroplane #42,dismantled,
condemned and destroyed.
Lower wings of this aeroplane
placed on aeroplane #45, to replace wings damaged in flight to
Chihuahua City.
April 16, 1916
Two flights made this date, between Satevo, San Antonio andNamiquipa, carrying mail anddespatches. Division Headquarters moved to Namiquipa.
April 17, 1916
Two flights made this datefrom Satevo to San Antonio andNamiquipa. Squadron Headquarters moved to Namiquipa.
April 18, 1916
Two flights this date between
Namiquipa and San Antonio,c a v i n g mail and despatches.

Lts. Herbert A. Dargue and Edgar S. Gorrell pose next to“Aeroplane #43” between reconnaissance flights in
Mexico. 1916.

86

Aviation Section

April 19, 1916
April 20, 1916
Total number of flights madeOrders received for the
Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A.
from March 15, 1916 to August
Dargue, pilot, Capt. R. E. Willis, Squadron to return to Colum15, 1916-540.
observer, on reconnaissancebus, N.M., to secure new aeroTotal number of miles flown,
flight from San Antonio to Chiplanes. Of the eight aeroplanes from March 15, 1916 to Augusttaken into Mexico on March 19, 15, 1916:--19,553.
huahua City, for the purpose of1916, but two were still in comtaking photographs and reconTotal duration of flights, fromnoitering all roads and apmission on this date. These two March 15, 1916 to August 15,
aeroplanes (nos. 45 and 53)
proaches to Chihuahua'City.
1916-345 hours, 43 minutes.
were in such condition as to be
Roads in vicinity of Chihuahua............................
unsafe for further field service.
City were reconnoitered and
The Squadron Commander
They were therefore flown to invites attention to the fact thatseveral photographs were taken.
Columbus, this date, and ultiWhile reconnoitering roads inthe 1st Aero Squadron, S.C., isthe first organization of its kindthe hills west of Chihuahua City, mately condemned and destroyed.
the aeroplane motor failed,that has ever been used in active
causing a forced landing in the
The Squadron personnel and field service in the history of thehills. The aeroplane was comtransportation arrived at Colum- United States Army. This completely wrecked. Lieut. Dargue
mand took the field with aerobus, N.M., April 22, 1916.
escaped uninjured, Capt. Willis
Upon arrival at Columbus, the planes of very low military effiwas pinned under the wreckage, Squadron received four newciency, and with less than 50%
sustained a severe scalp woundof its authorized allowance ofaeroplanes, which had been
and considerably bruised about
truck transportation. Due to lackpurchased from the Curtissthe legs and ankles. As the aero- Aeroplane Company.
of aeroplanes with greater carryplane was completely wrecked, it
From April 23 to April 29, the ing capacity, all flying officers
was burned up, on the spot. The Squadron was employed in test- were continuously called upon
two aviators, with their personal ing these four new aeroplanes.
to take risks in every reconnaisequipment, started to walk to
Practical tests in flight with these sance flight made while on duty
San Antonio, their nearest base, machines demonstrated theirin Mexico. All officers, thoroughly appreciated the fact thata distance of about 65 miles.
unsuitability for Mexican field
After constant suffering andservice, and they were declared the failure of their aeroplane
motors, while flying throughhardship, due to lack of foodunsuitable for such service.
and water, they reached San
On May 1, 1916, two Curtiss mountainous canyons and overAntonio, on April 21st. Stayed at aeroplanes (R-2 type 160 horse- rugged mountains, would invariably result in death. They also
San Antonio until April 23, when power) were received. By May
appreciated the fact that in athey proceeded by automobile
25, twelve of this type had arto Namiquipa, and reported the rived.
forced landing even if safely
results of their reconnaissance tomade, there was every possible
During the months of May,
the Division Commander.
June, and July, constant troubles risk of being taken prisoner by
and difficulties were encountered an enemy, whose ideas of thewith defective propellers, defec- Laws of War are on a par withtive construction in aeroplanes
an uncivilized race of savages.
All officers, pilots, on duty
and defective motor parts.
with command, during its active............................
service in Mexico, were constantly being exposed to per-

87

Foulois: The 1st Aero
Squadron in Mexico 1916

sonal risk and physical suffering.
Due to inadequate weight carrying capacity of all aeroplanes, it
was impossible to even carrysufficient food, water or clothing,on many of the reconnaissanceflights. Pilots, in flight, were frequently caught in snow, rain andhail storms which, due to inadequate clothing, invariably caused
excessive suffering.

In several instances, pilots
were compelled to make forced
landings in desert and hostile
county, fifty to seventy miles
from the nearest troops. In
nearly every case, the aeroplanes were abandoned or destroyed and the pilots, after experiencing all possible suffering
due to lack of food and water,would finally work their way on

foot, through alkali deserts andmountains, to friendly troops,
usually arriving thoroughly exhausted as a result of thesehardships.
The earnest and willing spirit,
shown by every officer in thecommand, in performing thisnew and perilous service, withinadequate equipment, and under very severe conditions, isdeserving of the highest commendation. Foreign Governments have decorated their
flying officers for far less perilous
flying. The officers of this command considered their hardships
and their service with the Punitive Expedition as part of the
day’s work, and simply in line ofduty.
The experience gained by thecommissioned and enlisted personnel of this command whileon active duty with the Punitive
Expedition has been of thegreatest value, and it is believedthat the knowledge gained by allconcerned should result in more
rapid and efficient developmentof the aviation service in the
United States Army.

Lt. Dargue.
Capt. Foulois. and Lt.
G o m l l plan a reconnaissancemission to locate Villa’. troops
during the Punitive
Expcdltion.

14. ScRiuen:
Annual R e p o ~ t

89

1916.

............................
With t h e first increments
It is proposed to organize thisprovided by the National Deforce
into . . . 2 aero squadrons,f e n s e Act of 1916, the Aviation Section had personnel 2 aero companies; and a school
authorizations for 77 officers detachment for duty at the Sigand 1,978 enlisted men effec- nal Corps Aviation School attive 1 July 1916. In his annual San Diego, California. Therereport, dated 3 October 1916, were organized at the end of this
General Scriven outlined fiscal year . . . 1 aero squadron;plans for using t h e s e people 1 aero company: . . . These orto expand the tactical organi- ganizations will be expanded
zation of t h e Aviation Sec- into the units proposed.2............................
tion.’
Two of the aero squadrons
will be organized and stationed
in the Southern Department;
one aero company will be assigned to the Philippine Islands
and one to the Canal Zone.

............................
An aero squadron is required
for service with each division, or
when divisions are operating as
parts of a field army corps thesquadrons may be detachedfrom divisions and grouped under the immediate control of the
field Army commander. The recommendation in my last reportthat aero squadrons of 12 machines be the basis of our organization has been approved, andexisting Tables of Organization

1 Report of the Chiei Signal Officer.
United States Army, to the Secretary oi War,1916 (Washington 1916)
2 The company was the 1st Company. 2d
Aem Squadron. which was organized at San
Diego on 1 December 1915 and sailed for
the Philippines early in January 1916
Maurer. Combat Squadrons. pp 15-16

provide for three companies offour machines each for a squadron. A major will be in commandof the squadron, with a first lieutenant as squadron adjutant ,andquartermaster; 2 master signid
electricians; 2 sergeants, firstclass, 6 corporals; and 2 privates, first class, for duty with theheadquarters and supply detiichments. Each aero company has
an authorized strength of 1 captain; 5 first lieutenants; 1 mastersignal electrician; 2 sergeants,
first class; 5 sergeants; 9 corporals; 2 cooks, 14 privates, firstclass; and 6 privates.

15-Funas FOR
Fiscal Y-R 1918

91

JanuaRy 1917

When General Scriven apWilson, re-elected Presi- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mr. Kahn. Have you been
peared for budget hearings dent on 7 November 1916 on
early in 1917, his days as a peace platform, was having using any aircraft in connection
Chief Signal Officer were no success in bringing the with fire control?
Gen. Scriven. No, Mr. Kahn;
numbered. There had been war to an end. Rather, thedissension within the Avia- nation seemed to be moving I do not think I can say we have.
tion Section between the inevitably toward a war for There has been no general orflyers and the non-flyers. which it was ill prepared. The ganized work in that direction,
There had been charges that performance of the 1st Aero but there has been a little experinon-flying officers had been Squadron in Mexico, when mental work at Fort Sill with thedrawing flight pay. Scriven contrasted with events in Eu- Field Artilley, observations in
had openly accused aviation rope, had helped to reveal the Philippines in connectiorl
officers of insubordination how far the United States had with the coast defenses, and atand disloyalty. In hearings fallen behind in the develop- San Diego some experiments
looking to the detection of subthe previous April (Doc. 12), ment of military aviation.
Baker had informed the comFor Fiscal Year 1918 the marine obstacles.
Mr. Kahn. They are using
mittee that Scriven would be Signal Corps had requested
replaced and the Aviation $16,600,000, which was $2,- aircraft for fire control vey exSection reorganized. To take 300,000 more than it had re- tensively on the European batCot. Samuel Reber’s place as ceived for 1917. When asked tlefields, as I understand it.
Gen. Scriven. It is absolutely
Chief of the Aviation Section, about the cause of the inBaker had brought Lt. Col. crease, Scriven explained essential, and we must come to
George 0. Squier back from that the amount for the “Sig- it as soon as we can.
Mr. Kahn. How does it hapLondon, where he had been nal Corps proper” was only
military attache. Squier had $1,000,000, which was $100 pen we have not done any oftaken charge of the section less than the previous year. that?
Gen. Scriven. It is because
in May 1916, but that was just The remaining $1 5,600,000
we have not had the machines
a temporary arrangement. He was for aviation.
S. Hubert Dent, Jr. (D., Ala.), or the personnel.
was slated to become Chief
Mr. Kahn. When you have
Signal Officer upon Scriven’s had
becomecommittee
retirement in February 1917. chairman following Hay’s the machines, do you expect to
The committee was inter- resignation to accept a judi- operate them in connection ‘withested in what Squier, who ac- cial appointment. Congress- the Coast Artilley, too?
Gen. Scriven. I have justcompanied Scriven to the men Greene, Kahn, McKellar,
hearing, had learned from and McKenzie were still recently submitted a memoranconversations with British of- members of the committee, dum to the General Staff, asking
ficials and from personal ob- which also included William them to decide, in connection
servation of aircraft in action Gordon (D., Ohio) and John with the military policy of theon the battle front in Europe. Tilson (R., Conn.). In addition United States, the locations of
to Scriven and Squier, Maj. various aviation centers, schools,
William Mitchell and Maj. aerodromes, etc., according toCharles S. Wallace were the needs of the service, andpresent at the hearing on 5
I Hearings before the Committee on Milltary Affairs. House of Aepresentatwes. Army
January 1917.1

Appropriation Bill, 1978, 64th Cong. 2d sess
(1917)

92

also the locations of airplane
centers, in connection with the
Coast Artillery defenses.
Of course you know we havejust purchased a very large tractof land near Fort Monroe, costing $290,000, where there is tobe established one of these centers and schools, and the Navy iscoming in on that to some extent, temporarily. That will undoubtedly be an aviation centerfor the defenses of Chesapeake
Bay. What the policy will be inregard to the locations for othersquadrons of aeroplanes, so far
as the Coast Artillery is concerned, I do not know. We plan
the placing of squadrons in thePhilippines, in Hawaii, and in the
Canal Zone. They will be verylargely used in connection with
the Coast Artillery for defense.
Mr. Kahn. Do you expect tooperate those aeroplanes?
Gen.Scriven. We must; yes,sir. The men we are training
must operate them.
Mr. Kahn. You do not intend, as far as you know, to turnover any of your aeroplanes to
the Coast Artilley, to be operated by the Coast Artillery.
Gen.Scriven. That is a question of policy for the future. . . .
............................
Mr. Kahn. How many machines have you purchased withthe appropriation of last year,
and how many have you obligated the department to purchase?
GenScriven. I have the data
in regard to that.

Aviation Section

Mr.Kahn. Will you put thatin the hearings?
Gen. Scriven. The total
number of aeroplanes purchased
or under order is 423. There
have been 21 machines destroyed and condemned, andthere are 27 out of commission.
Of those in service 4 are in Manila, 30 at San Diego, 18 at
Mineola, 7 at San Antonio, and
14 at Columbus and on the border, making a total of 7 3 inservice. There are 302 machines
under order but not delivered.

Mr. Kahn. Of course, thecommittee, 1 take it, is anxious to
let the county know that, while
we are willing to appropriatemoney for this purpose, thecounty ought also to know thatthe life of these machines is exceedingly short.
Gen. Scriven. It is very
short. Take, for instance, theconditions as they exist on theborder. An aeroplane goes up,
meets with some unfavorable
conditions, and comes down
perhaps 30 or 40 miles away............................
from any place where it can get
Mr. Kahn. Have you had any any assistance. That is the end ofoccasion to revise your opinion the machine. On the contrary, if
which you gave last year as tothe machine came down at a
the life of an aeroplane? I think place where repairs could be
you said the life of a machine in made, the broken parts may betime of peace is about 10
replaced without difficulty.
months and in time of war about
Mr. Kahn. What do you
7 days.
mean when you say that is theGen. Scriven. No, sir. I think end of the machine? Do you
the use of an aeroplane is justhave to abandon it?
like the use of so much ammuniGen. Scriven. We may havetion. A machine goes up andto abandon it if you can not get
comes down and may be
any of the parts you need. Thatsmashed. If the machine goes
would be especially true in casealong without an accident, I sup- the machine came down in an
pose anywhere from 6 to 10
enemy's county.
months is about as long as you
Mr. Kahn. How many of ourcan expect it to last. It depends machines have met with such aon the conditions under which it fate recently?
Gen. Scriven. There haveis used or maintained, climate,weather, service, and the like.
been a good many of them
They are very fragile, and it iswhich met such a fate down invery difficult to estimate their life Mexico. All of the first lot weexactly.
sent down there suffered thatfate.
Mr. Kahn. There was somequestion about those machines
being fitted for the work you
expected them to do, wasthere not?

Funds for Fiscal
Year 1918

Gen. Scriven. They were
picked up and taken down there
because they were all we had.
They were taken down from
Fort Sill and San Diego, where
the conditions were different; but
it was abwlutely necessary tosend them out as the days were
those of war. They were lowpower machines-90-horsepower Curtiss machines-andfor that allotment the committee
only gave us $300,000, which,as a matter of fact, extended
over some 14 months.
Mr. Kahn. What is the average price of one of these flying
machines?
Gen. Scriven. The machines
which are proving very satisfactory now with the border troops
at Columbus, communicatingwith Gen. Pershing, are 160horsepower Curtiss machines.
Maj. Mitchell. The average
cost is $12,000, $20,000 withthe spare parts.

............................

Mr. McKenzie. Since wehave done our flying with theaeroplane, what is your judgment about the practicability of
the use of balloons?
Gen. Scriven. I think thecaptive balloon is very valuable.
Of course, we know they havebeen using them on the Belgian
coast and on the coast of France
for observation purposes andvery largely on the fighting
fronts. Of course, they are limited in the altitude which they93

can reach. The free balloon is ofno special value, as its use isexceedingly limited. As to the
dirigible, I have never beenmuch of a believer in it. The
dirigible is six or seven hundred
feet long, of enormous diameter,
has powerful searchlights, guns,
bomb-dropping devices, theability to hover over a certain
selected point, but it is vulnerable to attack from the aeroplaneor from the ground and susceptible to weather conditions, and I
can not see where the dirigible
has ever done anything commensurate with its cost, or fulfilled the expectations of thepeople who believe in them. In
fact, I do not believe in them atall. Of course, there may bet i e s when such a machine as
the dirigible might be of some
service, but those times are so
infrequent, and the chances ofsuccess are so remote, I do notbelieve they are worth having attheir present cost.
Mr. McKenzie. Would you
advise striking out the work“balloon” in the appropriation
bill?
Gen. Scriven. Oh, no. Balloons are very important. Captive and kite balloons are absolutely necessary. The captive
balloon is much more valuable
than most people recognize.
When I was military attache of
the United States in Italy I saw acaptive balloon being carriedalong with the cavalry at a trot. It
makes a very fine observation
station.

Mr. Kahn. Germany is the
only county which uses the
Zeppelin type of dirigible, is it
not?
Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir. I believe the English have tried the
dirigible. Col. Squier is rather
more in favor of the dirigible
than I am. As far as I can see,the longer this war continues,
the less the Zeppelin is proving
its value; but, of course, that is
an individual opinion.

............................

The Chairman. How are theaeroplanes armed?
Gen. Scriven. That is another question that is very difficult of solution. They are catrying now merely the service rifle
and pistol. Some men think thata short riot gun, a shot gun,should be used; others think thata gun of the Lewis type or someother such type may be wellused.
The Chairman. You havenot equipped them with the machine gun at all?
Gen. Scriven. Oh, yes; experimentally, we have tried
some. We have used the Lewis
gun, but they are not mounted.
The Lewis gun weighs only 27
pounds, and can be used fromthe shoulder. It is a very goodgun.
Mr. Kahn. Are they all armed
with Lewis guns?

94

Gen. Scriven. There aresome down there; 14, I think.
Mr. Kahn. Have you everused any other machine gun,except the Lewis gun?
Gen. Scriven. The BenetMercier gun was used. We tried
it out. I think there are somedown there now. We have tried
them all out thoroughly.

............................
Mr. McKellar. The first item

is on page 7 of the bill, “Signal
Service of the Army,” a very
comprehensive item. Will you
explain to the committee, in
general, exactly what you aredoing in carrying out the provisions of that item?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir. Last
year you remember that we had$300,000as the appropriation,and then you gave us an emergency fund of $500,000 in
March or April, on account of
the Mexican situation; and thenit was suddenly increased fromthose small amounts until, on
the 28th of August, the Army
appropriation act was signed,
and we got under that act $13,281,666. In other words, gentlemen, beginning the year with thesmall amount of $300,000,wesuddenly got a large amount ofmoney with which to carry on
the development of the Aviation
Service.
............................
Lt. Col. George 0. Squler,
Officer In Charge of the Avhtlon
Saction. Slgral Corpa (1916-1917). later (1917-1923) In therank of first brigadier and then nulor general.
he served u Chlef Sigml Officer.

Funds for Fiscal
Year 1918

95

Col. Sauier. . . . The- verv much behind Europe,
Col. Squier. The unit of thisservice is <he squadron, which
equipment we are getting now is which, under the spur o> thewar, has gone forward in a mar- consists of three flights of four
as good, 1 am sure, as this counvelous way along these lines.
aeroplanes each, or a total of 12
ty can produce, and it is imThe flying movement abroad is aeroplanes in a unit. It will perproving very rapidly. We arehaving very few accidents, andsimply prodigious; and any
haps clear the atmosphere a bit
if we bear in mind two ideas
questions you may wish to ask
there are very few forced landme about that I will be v e y glad which will help us to make aings. Our troubles are now disto answer, provided my answers proper estimate about this wholeappearing, because we haveare not to go into the record or subject; and I will tell you thebetter equipment. 1 think I may
way it appealed to me from thesay with considerable satisfaction to become public. I have had
unusual opportunities to follow beginning and the method that I
that we have very few accidents
the flying movement abroad, be- used.
of any sort at our schools now.
cause I have been the military
Before leaving England I
The figures with regard to that
attache to London for the pastmade inquiry on two points:
are really astonishing.
four years, and 1 have been priv- Vey generally I made inquiry as
Mr. Kahn. if it is not too
ileged to see a good deal at the to how many aeroplanes shciuld
much trouble, will you put thembe assigned to each mobile unit
front. Naturally, I must be v e yin the record of this hearing?
or division of an army. I considCol. Squier. I will be glad to circumspect in anything that 1
may say here in regard to theered that if I knew that it would
do so. . . .
be a great help. Second, I made............................
present war.
Flying Record, Army Air Service,
The Chairman. Do you
inquiry as to what was the cost
Signal Corps Aviation School,mean that you do not want toof one aeroplane maintained in
San Diego, Cal., Jan. 1 to Dec.
speak of that unless we go into the air per year.
So I made it my business to
26, 1916.
executive session?
inquire of the Government odfic 0 l . Squier. Certainly, beTotal number of flights . ,7,087
cause whatever I have Seen has cials and others and tried to get
Total time in air (hours andan answer to tho= two quesminutes) . . . . . . . . . ..3,356.56 been under diplomatic privitions, because they are fundaDistance tranveledleges.
(miles) . . . . . . . . . . . . .,251,775
The Chairman. All right. . . . mental questions.
Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . .None.
............................
I found that the allowance ofCol. Squier (continuing).
Col.Squier. . . . . we hope
aeroplanes per division of theWe have been confronted by the to have seven squadrons for the mobile army is one squadron offact that there has been no buyRegular Army developed, or
active aeroplanes in the air
ing market for aeroplanes in thisnearly SO, with materiel and per- whenever the commanding officounty, and, of course, withoutmnnel by the end of the year,
cer wants them. That does nota buying market, you can not
Of tho= seven squadrons fourmean that each division of adevelop an engine or an equipwill be for the four departments; large army would have its Own
ment. Consequently, we were
three will be for over-sea sewsquadron, by any means; it
ice-in the Canal Zone, Hawaii, means that the average would
and the Philippines.
be according to that formula. If,
Mr. Kahn. For the sake of therecord, will you state again how
many machines are in a squadron in the aviation service?

96

then, any mobile atmy has six
divisions, we know just how
many squadrons we ought toprovide.
The other important consideration is the price of keeping
aeroplanes in the air for a year. I
found in Europe, or in England,
from separate sources, as nearas they could guess i t - o fcourse, it is more or less guesswork, because you may have aseries of accidents in a day thatwill wipe out whole squadronsthat the figure is about $50,000
a year, or f10,000 a year, tokeep an aeroplane in the air. So
that 12 aeroplanes in a squadron
would cost $600,000 a year for
maintenance.
Mr. McKellar. Have you
given the original cost of the
aeroplanes?
Col. Squier. I am coming tothat. So that the unit squadron,
which will produce 12 flying
aeroplanes in war, wears out anaeroplane, on the average, every
three months; and 4 aeroplanes
are therefore required to keep 1
aeroplane in the air all of thetime; so that you would have 48
aeroplanes in a squadron used
up in war per year. In peace it isless, of course, but not so muchless as you would imagine, because an aeroplane is a fragile
thing, and it wearS out very
quickly. The life of an engine isonly about 300 hours, roughly,

Aviation Section

and you would have to haveseveral engines for each aeroplane, and the engine is an expensive part of the aeroplane,
costing about $50 per honepower.
So that I can say that thebasis we are now working on isthat the original cost of a squadron for a division, with all its
equipment, which includes thisbook (indicating) full of accessories, the number of which would
surprise you, is $800,000,
roughly; and to maintain thatafter you got it is $600,000 per
year, which is $50,000 per machine per year in the air.

............................

before. If you will bear those
figures in mind, it will be easy to
get a general idea of what weare doing. We feel very muchencouraged as to the personnel
also, and have inauguratedMr. Greene (interposing).
$800,000 you say is the original
cost?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir; for theunit, the squadron.
At present the President has
authorized for the aviation section for the present year 1,800
men; he has authority to dothat. . . .

............................

There has been authorized by
the War Department for the next
year no less than 3,200 men; thepersonnel for the squadrons for
the Canal Zone and for Hawaii,
and for the completion of thesquadron at Manila-the officers
to command them have alreadybeen selected, and the supply
officers have already been designated, and the men themselves
who are to go have been selected, very largely, with theview of keeping the two elements of personnel and equipment side by side. There aresomething like 200 of these menat the San Diego School; 50 ofthem will be sent to Panama and
50 to Hawaii.

I have said, then, that with theappropriation you have given us,
we propose to equip, as far as
we can, seven squadrons for the
Regular Army, and we will probably have pretty well under way
six reserve squadrons which will
be used temporarily, at least, inconnection with coast defenses,
in such manner as the War Department may decide. Thesemachines have already been ordered for coast defense, bids
have been called for, and if thecommittee desires to see them,the specifications are here (indicating).
There will be 6 of thesesquadrons, in addition to the 7;............................
for the Regular Army that would
I have given you then, Mr.
be 13 in all. And for the next
Chairman, our hopes for tliis
fiscal year we propose to main- year, namely, seven squadrons
tain those 13,and add 4 more at for the Regular Army, four ofa cost of $800,000 each, maintaining those 13 at $600,000
each. Those figures I gave youFunds for Fiscal
Year 1918

which are to be in this county
and three for the over-sea possessions; and six reserve squadrons for the Coast Defense;
those six squadrons would be,
speaking generally, two near thecity of New York, say, one in
Chesapeake Bay, one near Boston for instance, one near San
Francisco, and one in the Seattle
district.
The machines are all bought,
or under contract; the personnel
is largely in hand for those; andtwo of the new squadrons for
the Regular Army will be formed
at San Antonio; all four of theRegular Army squadrons will bein the Southern Department atpresent, because there is the active border duty. Later some
may be assigned to other departments. But the urgent basefor us now is San Antonio, Tex.;
and as one squadron is completed and ready, it goes out,
and another one is formed.
The Chairman. Let me ask
you this question in that connection: The squadrons that you will
use for the posts will be under
the jurisdiction of the Signal
Corps, will they?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir; it is allunder one head.
The Chairman. And the usethat they may be devoted to in
directing fire will be under the
Signal Corps?

97

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. I may
say, Mr. Chairman, that we regard the air service as being designed and provided for thewhole of the Army; and in myjudgment that is very wise atpresent, because you can look at
the whole problem and spend
the money with the greatest
economy in that way. Theremay come a time afterwards
when you may want to segregate the bookkeeping part of it. I
have an open mind upon thesubject-if there is to be any
question of authority between
committees of Congress.
Mr. Kahn. Is that done
largely in Europe in the belligerent countries? Is it one service?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir; the airservice in Europe is one central
service. It is then assigned to any
service that they may wish; forinstance, to “spot” artillery fire.
The way they use the aeroplaneis that certain aeroplanes will beassigned to certain batteries; andthey do it by numbers, and you
can see them go to those batteries and perform that service forthat day, and then return to theirstations with their squadrons.
Mr. Kahn. They are sent out
by the Signal Corps?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir; by theaviation service.
Mr. Kahn. And they report toa certain battery commander?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir. Of
course, they are all under thegeneral.
Mi. Kahn. Yes; I understand.

Col. .Squier. It is like you
send a doctor to a general, andhe is under the general’s command, but is in a separate service for technical training andequipment.

............................

Mi. McKellar. Here is a subject as to which I think you could
tell us a good many things wewould like to know. As I understand it, when you went downon the border, all the machinesthat you had failed to come up
to what was required of them, inother words, you could not fly
over mountains?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir; that iscorrect.
Mr. McKellar. And you haveto abandon those. Now, in thepurchase of these 306 that arecontracted for, have you securedby these contracts such machines as can fly over mountains, or can fly to almost any
height? Will you just state howthat is?
Col. Squier. My answer isthat the present squadron withthe punitive expedition is fully
equipped with suitable reconnoissance machines, which I $am
satisfied are the best that thiscountry can produce now; andwith every auxiliary part that isneeded for its service, including
automatic Lewis machine guns,
rifles, automatic cameras, inctandiary bombs, demolition bombs,

98

wireless, etc. There is a base atColumbus, N. Mex., capable ofrepairing anything that happens,within reason, and it is self-supporting, so that we do not haveto devote any attention practically to it at this end of the line.
We have a propeller factory rightthere, and they make their own
propellers there to suit the dry
climate and the heat.

............................
Mr. Kahn. These [aerial]
battles are all fought with machine guns?
Col. Squier. Absolutely. On
that point 1 might add the angleof view of the machine gun as it
appears to our Aviation Section.
If you will eliminate the demolitions, for instance, where you
drop bombs, or the incendiarybomb, and take the pure case ofa fight between aeroplane andaeroplane, it would appear thatwhat we want is not a large gun
with a few number of rounds,
but a small-caliber gun with alarge number of rounds, for thefollowing reason: You get theupper berth and come at the
opponent by gravity, shooting
through the propeller, and you
only have a very short time inwhich to shoot. You then go by

Aviation Section

him at the rate of a hundred
miles an hour, and you comeback again, if you are faster than
he is. So that if you had a large
gun with only one shot and did
not hit him at all, your shot
would do no good; but if you
had the same weight of lead in ahundred shot you would be
more apt to hit him; and theaeroplane is so vulnerable atpresent, that he would be disabled as much by that small shot
as by the large one.
Mr. Kahn. And do they ordinarily aim through the propeller?
CoLSquier. They ordinarily
aim right through the propeller
and the pilot sits right back of
the propeller, they aim thewhole machine; they do not aim
the gun; they just pull a string tofire and aim the machine itself.
The point is this, that you can
only have a certain weight oflead on the aeroplane.
Mr. Kahn. Yes; I understand.
Col. Squier. And you canhave that in one big shot, or a
lot of little shots; and you can
not cary an extra man, because
he weighs so much; you must fix
it so that this same man must doit; you can not take up an extra
man just to shoot a machine
gun, because the extra weight
would be so much. And you
would be going by the othermachine at perhaps 120 miles
an hour, and you want to hit
him with one of those shots, andnot to miss him. So you want a
multiple machine gun, or something by which you will not belikely to miss him as you pass;

you do not have much time tofire; then you go by and begin
maneuvering again and repeat
the operation.
So that, as a general thing, weare against larger guns for aeroplanes; but I am speaking now
about a machine that goes up
and fires in the air at anotheraeroplane.
Mr. Kahn. Are there many
American aviators using thosemachines in the various armies
in Europe?
Col. Squier. There are in
France a considerable number,as you know.
Mr. Kahn. Yes.
Col. Squier. They are
known as the “American legion”
or something of the kind.
Mr. McKellar. Are you anaviator yourself?
Col. Squier. No, sir. I haveridden as a passenger frequently,
but I am not a driver. It is not thepolicy; in fact, I am too old todrive. The driver is, in war, a
man under 30 years old, usually;
it is a young man’s job; there isno question about that.
Mr. Kahn. That is true also of
the mobile army, the infantymen?

Funds for Fiscal
Year 1918

Col. Squier. Well, it is particularly true in this. In fact, I cantell you that, in a residence ofseveral months with an army inwar, I have never found a single
actual flier that was over 24
years of age at that time. Well,the only point I want to make isthat it is distinctly a young man’sjob.
The Chairman. How close
do these machines come to eachother in a fight?
Col. Squier. They have actually rammed each other. It is amost thrilling thing to watch
them; in fact, there is no use
reading novels any more; reallife is more interesting; it is simply wonderful to see them.
Mr. Greene. Col. Squier, I
understand that the theory ofthis combat in the air is to gain
control of that territory, for theother purposes for which theaeroplanes are subsequently to
be used in it?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir.
Mr. Greene. The fighting itself has no particular military object?
MI. Gordon. Well, it is to kill
the other man.
MI. Greene. Well, to kill him,
but it is in order to get control of
the air zone?
Col. Squier. Yes, sir.

99

MI. Tilson. Reconnaissanceand fire control is what YOU arelooking for?
Col. Squier, Yes, sir. In fact,
the only way they know now
about the maze of trenches
along that line, which any human being could not 90 over, is
by taking photographs of eachzone from aeroplanes andmatching them together eachday. Without that they could nottell the new pieces of trench dug
during the previous night.

MI. Kahn. Control over the
air is just as important as control
over the sea?
Col. Squier. And after thiswar the armies, in general, will
disband or shrink, but the airservice is going to stay where it isand go on. They realize it is anasset that is going to remain, andnot shrink or disband. All welearn in this war about aerial
navigation will be applied to theuses of civilization in the peace
which follows. It is one point of
permanent gain, at any rate, andthat is why this county is safe inputting money into it.
(Thereupon, at 1:30o’c1oc:kp.m., the committee adjourned. . . .)

100

When Germany resumed
unrestricted submarine warfare at the beginning of February 1917, the United Statesbroke off diplomatic relations. Then came the Zimmermann note, the arming ofAmerican merchantmen, thesinking of American ships, acall for a special session ofCongress, and, finally, on 6
April 1917, the declaration of
war against Germany.
Meanwhile, on 5 February
1917, the Signal Corps was
asked to estimate requirements for an army made upof the regulars, the national
guard, and 500,000 volunteers. The estimate submitted
on 16 February included$48,666,666 for aviation proportioned to the rest of thearmy. On 21 March Secretary
Baker called for another estimate, this time with 1,000,000
volunteers. Using the same

Aviation Section

For several years officials
formula, the Signal Corps
came up with $54,250,000 for of the War Department, theaviation. During this time es- Signal Corps, and the Aviatimates for aircraft produc- tion Section had lamented
tion had mounted to 3,700 a the secrecy that prevented
year. In such exercises, the them from learning about the
major concern apparently latest technical developwas production, with little at- ments in aircraft production
tention being given to how in Europe. There was plenty
the planes were to be used. of information available,
The aircraft industry of the however, to indicate that theUnited States was not then major belligerent powers had
geared up to any such pro- made great progress in deduction, even if the govern- veloping not only aircraft but
ment had known what kinds also doctrine and tactics forof planes it needed for com- the employment of theirbat service.

Funds for Fiscal
Year 1918

growing airpower. Britain,
France, and Germany had
recognized the importance of
air superiority and were using their aircraft for counterair operations, bombardmentof strategic and, more often,
interdiction targets, close
support of ground forces bybombing and strafing, strategic and tactical reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, adjustment of artillery fire, and for informing
infantry commanders of thelocation and movements of
their troops.
Although there was someawareness in the UnitedStates of these developmentsin the use of airpower, aviation in the U.S. Army was still
regarded as being principallya service of reconnaissance,with plans for expansion oftactical strength being basedon the addition of one squadron for each additional Army
division. On 6 April 1917,
however, the Aviation Section was ill prepared to carryout even the limited function
it had been assigned for field
service in time of war.

101

When the United States reservists and retired officers
went to war in April 1917, the on active duty as well as regaviation service of the U.S. ulars) and a little over 1,000
Army consisted of the 1st enlisted men. No one seems
Aero Squadron, which had to know for sure how m.any
been formed in 1913 and had airplanes the Aviation Secserved with Pershing in Mex- tion had (about 200? lessico; the 1st Company, 2d than 300?), but all sources
Aero Squadron, which had seem to agree that not one ofbeen formed in December the planes was suitable for1915 and sent to the Philip- combat service, not even repines the following January; connaissance.
the 7th Aero Squadron,Thus the United States
formed in February 1917 for went to war without an air
duty in the Canal Zone; and the force worthy of the name,
6th Aero Squadron, organized and without any well forrnuin Hawaii in March 1917. Three lated ideas, much less plans,
other squadrons, part of a for building and employing
seven-squadron program, were such a force in battle.'
in various stages of formation in
the United States.
For these units, and for administration, training, andother activities, the Aviation
Section had about 130 officers (flyers and non-flyers,
airplane and balloon pilots,

1. The histoly of the U.S. Army's air service in the period prior to America's entry
into the war is traced in considerable detailin USAF Historical Study 98, The U.7ited
States Army Air Arm. April 1861 to Aprd 1917
(USAF Hist Div, 1958).

PaRt II:

P l a n s arza Przogrzams
A p ~ i l 1 9 1 7 - F e b ~ u a1918~y

In the days immediately following America’s entry into thewar, much effort was devoted to plans for the development of
an air force for wartime service. In Washington the concern
was with production, construction, and training, with little
attention being given to how airpower would be used in battle.
As events developed, planning for the employment of U.S.
airpower in Europe was left largely to General Pershing, his
staff, and his Air Service, which was a separate service and notpart of the Signal Corps of the AEF.

Gen. Pershing with his World War I staff: First row (I. to r.):Brig. Gen. Harold B. Fiske, Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew,
Gen. John J. Pershing, Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, Brig. Gen.
George V. H. Moscley; second row: Brig. Gen. Avery D.
Andrew. Brig. Gen. LeRoy E l t h y . Btig. Gen. Dennis E.
Nolan, and Brig. Gen. Robert C. Davis.

103

1 6 12,000P l a n e

105

PRogRarn
2 9 May 1917

The development of anaviation program in Washington was given a new direction and greater impetus by acable received on 24 May
1917 from Premier Alexandre
Ribot of France. Ribot proposed that the United States
form a flying corps of 4,500
planes, with personnel andmaterial, for service inFrance in 1918. The cable
was based on a French study
for a U.S. air force of 60
groups for strategical operations. Half of the groups were
to be pursuit and half bombardment, with each group
being made up of 6 squadrons of 12 planes each [Docs.
7 and 231. Since the cable did
not specify pursuit and bombardment, officials in Washington assumed that the
number covered all aviationand made plans accordingly.'
The Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board quickly
translated Ribot's proposal
into the following plan.2 With
provisions for replacement
and reserve craft, the plancalled for the production of
12,000 airplanes during thefirst half of 1918 for service inFrance. To this were added

be available for active service inFrance during the spring cainpaign of 1918.
To meet the foregoing r equest, the needs of the UnitedStates Army for service airplanes
and engines, to be used in E.urope, are as indicated [see tablebelow]:In order that the United States
Government may meet the request of the French Government, immediate steps should betaken to start the manufacture,in the United States, of the
Washington, D.C.
above airplanes and engines.
May 29, 1917.
B. D. Foulois
V. E. Clark
From: Joint Army and Navy
Technical Aircraft Board Major, Signal Captain,
Corps, U.S.A.
U.S.A.
To: Secretary of War.
A. K. Atkins
J. G.Hunsaker
Secretary of the Navy.
Lieutenant,Asst. Naval
Subject Report of Board
U.S.N.
Constructor,
U.S.N.
1. The Board met at 1015
J.
H.
TowersE.
S.
Gorrell
A.M. at the call of its president.
Lieutenant,Captain, Signal
2. Present: All the members.
U.S.N.
Corps,
3. The French Government,
U.S.A.
on May 24, 1917, requested theApproved:
United States Government tocooperate with the French Aero- Newton D.
Josephus Daniels
nautics, and form a flying corps Baker
Secretary ofSecretary ofof 4,500 airplanes, personnel
and material; such flying corps to War.
the Navy.

more than 5,000 training
planes. The plan was to concentrate on the production oftraining and reconnaissanceplanes in the United Statesand obtain fighting andbombing planes from the allies. Funding for production
was included in $640,000,000
appropriated by Congress inan act signed by the President on 24 July 1917 for alarge expansion of the Aviation Section.

Service Airplanes and Engines (Latest Types)(To be produced between January 1, 1918, and June 30,1918).
Types

AirplanesFighting line

1 . The statements concerning the R i b 1
cable and 11s interpretation follow I. 8 . Holley, Jr , Ideas and Weapons (New Haven,1958). pp 41-46, supplemented by Ministerede la Guerra. l e s Armees Francaises d a m /aGrande Guerre. Tome V. Vol 2 (Paris, 1937).
pp 48-51
2 In Gorrell's History. A-1, pp 11-12.

Reconnaissance &artilley control ...... 3.000
5.000........
Fighting .....~
1.OOO
Bombing ..__.......
.
Total .-..........
Grand Total ..........

9.000

Engines
Reserve Fighting line

1.000
1,667
333

6.000
10,000
2.000

3.000

18.00012.000

COSl

Reserve

2.000
3,334

666
6.000
24.000106

Bdg. Gen. Edgar R w r l (at the tlme a colonel) was
Chlef S I c d Offker. AEF, and pmldent of a Board of
Offiun appointed In dune 1918 to make rccommendatlons on adatbn
mattem h France. (sketch by Joseph Cummlngs Chus)

Air Service
Plans and Programs

17-Mitch d J :107

A h Poky
13 June1917

Two days after the Ribot
cable, Pershing assumedcommand of the AEF in
Washington. Sailing for Europe on 28 May, he stopped
in England before going on
to France. When he arrived in
Paris on 13 June 1917, one ofthe people on hand to greet
him when he got off the train
at the Gare du Nord was Lt.
Col. William Mitchell, Aviation Section, Signal Corps,
U.S. Army. Mitchell, who had
left Washington on 17 March,
had been sent to Europe as amilitary observer with orders
to investigate the status of
French aeronautics. His firststop in Europe had been
Spain, where he heard thenews that the United States
had declared war. He had set
out immediately for Paris,and during the following
weeks he had talked with
Frenchofficials,
visitedFrench factories and aeronautical schoo Is, toured theFrench front, flown over enemy lines with a French pilot,
visited Royal Flying Corps
units in France, talked with
their commander, Maj. Gen.
Hugh Trenchard, and, among

1 . Exhibit C (Duty Performed by Major
W m Mitchell, Aviation Section, Signal
Corps, dated 13 Jun 17) to Mitchell, Memofor CIS. AEF, subj: Aeronautical Organization in France, 13 June 1917, in Gorrell’sHistory A-23.
2 The proceedings of the board are in
Gorrelvs History, A-23.

other things, had set up an Field Artillery; Maj. Frank
office for the U S . Air Service Parker, Cavalry; and Capt.
at 25 Avenue Montaigne in Joseph E. Carberry, Aviation
Paris. That office, he in- Section,
SignalCorps.
formed Pershing’s Chief of Churchill and Parker were
Staff, Lt. Col. James G. Har- members of a U.S. Militarybord, in a memorandum Mission, headed by Lt. Col.
dated 13 June, was “ready to James A. Logan, that had
go ahead with any project been in France for somedetermined upon by the time. Carberry, who served as
Commanding General.”lrecorder for the board, had
Mitchell also had prepared arrived in France only a shortfor the Chief of Staff two pa- time earlier for flight trainung.
pers dealing with American Mitchell’s papers on policy
air policy and organization. and organization were reHarbord referred them to a ceived by the board at its
Board of Officers appointed third meeting, on 26 Juneon 19 June to make recom- 1917.2
mendations on various aviation matters. The board wasmade up of Col. Edgar Russel, Chief Signal Officer, AEF,
president of the board;
Mitchell, the senior aviation
member; Maj. Townsend F.
Dodd, Aviation Officer, AEF;
Maj . M arlboroug h Ch urchill,

Air Service
Plans and Programs

108

Memorandum for the Chief ofStaff, US. Expeditionary
Forces. From: Major‘ Wm.
Mitchell, Auiation Section, Signal
corps

1. Now that the United States
Militay participation in France isassured, it seems to be an opportune moment to consider
what poky should be adopted
with respect to the aeronauticalservice.
2. The opinion is advanced that,
if a sound policy is adopted to
begin with, results will follow
quickly and surely. If, on theother hand, a halting policy isadopted, the air service will fall
far short of what it is absolutely
required to do in modern war.
The decisive value of this service
is difficult to appreciate at a distance from the field of militay
operations. It should be an independent arm as artilley or infantY.
3. Aeronautical functions divide
themselves into strategical andtactical phases:a) The tactical function, basically, is to insure observation for
the fire and control of our own
artilley. To accomplish this, airplanes and balloons observe thefire while others fight off hostileaircraft which attempt to stop it.

This kind of air work has been
done now for three years and iswell understood. There is attached hereto a copy of the noteof General Trenchard (commanding British aviation in
France) on this subject, which
was written in September 1916,
and is as sound today as it wasthen (Appendix “A’).5b) The strategical phase(which has received a vey limited application, but which is
being seriously considered by all
belligerents and is not dealt with............................

(Signed) Wm. Mitchell.

3 In Gorrell s History. A-23
4 Mitchell had been promoted to Iieuten-

ant colonel effective 15 May 1917
5 This appendix has been omitted The
document was published in Mitchell. Memoirs of World War I (New York. 1960). pp
105-109 An entract appeared in Andrew
Boyle. Jrenchard (London, 1962), pp 186188

in General Trenchards note) applies to the air attack of enemy
material of all kinds behind hislines. To be successful, large
combatant groups of airplanes
must be organized, separate
from those directly attached toarmy units.
It is with this class of aviation(strategical)that the UnitedStates may aid in the greatest
way and which, it is believed if
properly applied will have agreater influence on the ultimate
decision of the war than any
other one arm.
4. There is attached hereto the
French General Staffs request
for what may be termed strategical aviation units (Exhibit B).6
The first thing to be determined
is whether it is to be adopted
or modified.

6 This exhibit, which has been omitted
was dated 6 May 1917 It IS an extract fromthe document on which me R i b t cable wasbased (See Doc 23 for further reference )Mitchell:
Air Policy

MaJ. Gen. Sir Hugh Montague Trenchard. General M c a
Commanding Royal Flying Corps in the Field when the UnitedStates entered World War 1. (from a drawing by Francla Dodd)109

18- Mitchell:
AerzonauticaI Orzganization

111

13 June1917

Memorandum for the Chief ofStaff, U.S. Expeditionay Force.’
From: Major Mitchell, Aviation
Section, Signal Corps.

1. United States aeronauticalparticipation in France naturally
divides itself into two classes:
A. The air squadrons with
the American units themselves,
such as the divisions, army corps
or armies, in accordance withthe manner in which the army isorganized and employed. The
aeronautical units for this service
will be attached directly to thetroops in the same way, for instance, as the field and heavy
artilley are. They always willcomprise divisional air squadrons and balloon companies,
and may consist of pursuit andbombardment squadrons in addition. Their entire object is tofacilitate the work of the division,
corps or army. They should beorganized progressively.

1 In Gorrell s History A-23

B. Based on the theory thatno decision can be reached on
the ground before a decision has
been gained in the air, theFrench General Staff has requested, that in addition to theAviation Units which form a partof the American troops coming
to France, there be organized anumber of large aeronauticalgroups for strategic operations
against enemy aircraft and enemy material, at a distance fromthe actual line. These units
would be bombardment andpursuit formations and would
have an independent mission,v e y much as independent cavalry used to have, as distinguished from divisional cavaly.
They would be used to carry thewar well into the enemy’s
county.

............................
(Signed): W m .Mitchell

L3

113

Maj. Townsend F. Dodd,
who had served with Pershing in Mexico, accompanied
Pershing to Europe a s Aviation Office1 of t h e AEF. Enroute to Paris h e spent several days in London, talking
with the U S . Military Attache,
Cot. William Lassiter, andwith various British officials.
His report on those conversations, submitted to the Chiefof Staff, A E F on 20 June
1917, included a note outlining what needed to be done.'T h e Chief of Staff sent
Dodd's report to the Board of
Officers, where it was received at the first meeting, on
21 June 1917.

Notes

1 In Gorrell's History. A-23

Aviation Work
Necessary for the
Successful
Prosecution of theWararsenals, factories, railways, etc:.
but should also be sufficient to
act as a reprisal agent of such
destructiveness that the Germans would be forced to stop
their raids upon Allied cities.
c) This offensive arm would,
The following is a brief synop- of course, be of great value on
sis of the most important details and immediately behind theof aviation work necessary for
German lines in connection withthe successful prosecution of the land warfare.
war.
............................
I. The first thing to be determined is the results that theAmerican Air Service, in connection with the Allied Air Service
and the Allied Armies, is to accomplish.
The results called for by paragraph I are briefly as follows:a) The unchallenged supremacy of the air on the different
fronts, the major consideration
being given to the Western
Front.
b) The development andmaintenance of an aerial offensive force that will be able tocarry the war two hundred ormore miles behind the Germanlines. This force, when first available might properly be considered for use strictly for the attack
upon military features, such as

2 0 -Churxhill: Liaison
with A ~ t i l l e ~ y
2lJune1917

At t h e first meeting of theBoard of Officers on 21 June
1917, Churchill submitted
two memoranda, one dealing
with liaison with the artillery,
and the other concerned with
air superiority a s it affectedartillery. 1

Aerial Observation in
Liaison with
Artillery.
Informal notes for the Boardof Officers convened by Par. 4,
SO. 11, Hqrs. A.E.F.., June 19,

1917.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
The basic idea in connection
with aerial observation in liaison
with artillery concerns the factthat artillery is today partiallyblind and partially impotent
without efficient aerial observation.
Such being the case, it is evident that connection between
the artillery and the air service
cannot be too close and that
there must be established acomplete professional and moral
liaison between the two arms.
The aerial observer must be an
artillery officer, trained in principles governing the conduct offire, and perfectly familiar withthe capabilities of his own arm;
but he must live and work withhis comrades in the Air Service.
,..............

1. In Gonelvs History, A-23

115

116

Ma). Marlborough Churchill. a Field Artillery
officer, served on the Board of Officers
appointed by Gen. Harbord to advise on
aviation matters.

Air Service
Plans and Programs

117

Notes to Justify theStatement that Military Success Depends
Upon Superiority in
the Air.lb) Be able to adjust its fire upontargets by means of accurate
information furnished by welltrained aerial observers.
4. To follow and direct aninfantry attack, a general must
maintain liaison by means of low
1. If the enemy is master offlying airplanes.
the air, the artillery cannot con5. Without air superiority, thequer the grodnd which the inartillery is both blind and impofantry is to occupy.
tent so far as counter-battery
2. Even though the ground be and destruction fire are conconquered, if the enemy regains cerned.
mastery of the air at the time of
6. The accuracy and efficiency
the attack, the progress of theof artillery fire depend upon
infantry advance cannot beproper identification of targets
known or controlled. In this case and accurate adjustment. In
liaison is lost and success bemodem war both these are imcomes a matter of chance.
possible if the mastery of the air
3. To conquer the ground, the is not assured.
artillery must:
7. If the enemy has the masa) Know, by means of aerial
tery of the air his artillery fire,reconnaissance and photograknown as “counter-battery” and“counter-preparation”, willphy:x) the exact nature and lo- make even the launching of an
cation of the enemy’s batteries
attack impossible.
and works;y) the exact amount of success attained at each period of
the preparation;z) The moment at which theartillery preparation is finished.

i
1. In Gonell’s History. A-23.

119

T h e Role OFA u i a t i o n
2 July 1917

The minutes of the fourth
meeting of the Board of Officers, held on 29 June 1917,
state that “Major Parker was
directed to submit a report on
the tactical role of aviation.”
Born in South Carolina in 1872,
Parker was a graduate of the
U.S. Military Academy in theClass of 1894. He was commissioned in the Infantry but
soon transferred to the Cavalry.
He had served as military attache in Latin America, cavalry
instructor in Cuba, and memberof the U.S. Cavalry Board, andhad attended service schools
in France on three occasions
before being sent to France asa member of the U.S. Military
Mission in 1916. In April 1917
he became U.S. liaison officer
at French General Headquarters. Later he would commanda brigade and then a divisionin battle in France, and eventually he would retire as a major general.
Parker’s wife, Katherine, wasthe daughter of Frank S. Lahm,
the American aviation enthusiast who had resided in Parisfor many years, and the sisterof Frank P. Lahm, a U.S. cavalry officer who had won theJames Gordon Bennett International Balloon Race in 1906,
and had been the first U.S.
1 In Gorrell s History A-23
2 A C A was the abbreviation for Air
Commander Advance3 Primary and secondary sources seen by
the editor do not indicate what contributions if any were made by Mitchell or otters in the preparation of the report assigned
to and Submitted by, Parker

Army officer to fly in a Wright The Role and Tactical
airplane. At the beginning of and Strategical
July 1917, Frank P. Lahm wasa major in charge of the Avia- ployment of Aeronaution Section’s balloon school at tics in an Army.
Omaha, Nebraska.
The proceedings of the ROLE.
Board of Officers state that, “A
Military Aeronautics comprise
report was read by Major Par- all means of aerial activity which
ker on the role and distribution an Army employs to assist it inof tactical units . . .,” at the fifth obtaining victory.
meeting, on 2 July 1917. ParMilitary Aeronautics are diker’s report,’ which became vided into:
Exhibit N to the board’s pro- A. Aviation, or heavier than air
ceedings, and which is printed formations.
below, is interesting not only B.Aerostation, or lighter than air
for its ideas on the role of formations.
airpower but also because its
A. AVIATION.
authorship generally has been
Aviation is divided into two
attributed to another officer.
general classes:
With a new title, “General Principles Underlying the Use of 1. TACTICAL AVIATION, or that
the Air Service in the Zone of acting in the immediate vicinity
Advance, A.E.F.,” and with or directly attached to organizaonly a few minor changes in tions of troops of all arms.
the text, the report submitted 11. STRATEGICAL AVIATICIN,
by Parker was published in a or that acting far from troops of
Bulletin of the Information Sec- other arms and having an indetion, Air Service, A.E. F., with a pendent mission.
preface attributed to “Wm.
Mitchell, Lt. Col., A S . , S.C.,
A.C.A.”* (see Doc. 35). Thus
Parker’s report became Mitchell’s “General Principles.”3

Em,-

120

Air Service

Plans and Programs

I . Tactical Auiation.
The object of tactical auiation
is to assist troops in combat. Allaviation elements themselves
must be ready to fight to accomplish their mission.
Tactical aviation consists of
A. Observation aviation
B. Pursuit aviation
C. Tactical bombardment auiation.
A. OBSERVATION AVIATION is carried on essentially bydivision squadron^.^OBSERVATION AVIATION
consists in:
1. Reconnaissance by eye
and by photograph of the enemy's positions and works of allsorts, and the results of all attacks against them.
2. The adjustment of artill e y fire.
3. Keeping superior command in liaison with the infanty
during attacks by means of wireless, optical signals and
B. PURSUIT AVIATION iscarried out by pursuit squadrons
whose primary object is offensive combat. The mastery of the
air is obtained by air battles.

PURSUIT AVIATION consists in:
1. Destruction of enemy
aeronautical materiel and personnel by combat in the air.
2. Creating diversions by attacking enemy personnel andmaterial on the ground.
These operate to prevent observation on the part of enemy
aeronautical elements, to prevent hostile air incursions into
friendly territory and to create adiversion against hostile elements.
C. TACTICAL BOMBARDMENT AVIATION is carried out
within about 25,000 yards of theline or roughly within the extreme zone of long-range artilley.
Its object is:
1. To assist in the destruction of enemy materiel of allsorts;
2. To attack hostile personnel both during the day andnight, so as to undermine theirmorale.
3. To attack hostile aerodromes so as to force hostile
airplanes to arise and accept
corn bat.

4. The Bulletin (Vol 111. No 132, 30 April
1918) says: ". . . by observation squadrons."
5 Bulletin:by means of electrical andphysical means.
6 . Bulletin: The object of strategical aviaton is to destroy the means of supply of an
enemy army. . . .
7 Bulletin: The organizatons for this purcase . . are: . .

8 Bulletin
accept combat to carryout long-distance reconnaissance and to
attack personnel and material on the
ground by gun-fire
9 In the Bulletin was inserted an additional unnumbered paragraph Bombing I S
carried on in the day-time primarily for reconnaissance It IS carried on at night for
deStNCtiOn

11. Stmtegical Aviation.
The mission of strategicalauiation is independent.
Strategical aviation consists in
attacking enemy elements, whatever their nature, at a distance
usually more than 25,000 yards
from friendly troops.
The object is to attack the
supply of an enemy army,6
thereby preventing it from employing all its means of combat.
This may be accomplished by:
1. Destroying enemy aircrafts, air depots and defensive
air organization.
2. Destroying enemy depots, factories, lines of communications and personnel.
The organization for this purpose whose role is entirely offensive and whose radius of action
extends beyond that of tacticalaviation, should be:'
1. Pursuit squadrons forfighting enemy aircraft.
2. Day-bombardment
squadrons for bombing enemy
aerodromes to make hostile airplanes rise and accept combat,
and to cany out long-distancereconnaissances.s
3. Night-bombardment
squadrons for destroying enemy
elements and lines of communications?

Parker: The Roleof Aviation

121

B. AEROSTATION.
AERONAUTIC UNITS consist
Of:

1. Observation balloons.
2. Dirigible balloons (these

are not being considered at present in connection with U.S. Aeronautics in France).
3. Observation balloons,
from'O an elevated fixed stationfrom which powerful glasses
may be used and constant communication maintained by telephone with the earth.
They are used for:1.Adjustment of fire of artilley.
2. Observation of combats.
3. Observation of elements
in and behind hostile lines.
Airplanes and balloons haveclosely related missions and are
therefore placed under one direction.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT.
The method of operation andtactical handling of air forces
with divisions," army corps, armies and groups of armies isprescribed from time to time inorders,12for instance see Annex
11, Regulations concerning a
General Offensive, dated December 16, 1916 (French).
............................

10 There may have been a typographicalerror in the original or in the copy included
in Gorrelrs History In the Bulletin the word
I S "form "11 In the Bulletin, "divisions" was omitted.
12 In me Bulletin, the remainder of thesentence was omitted

Observation balloon.

122

Capt. Joseph E. Carberry

served M the recorderfor the Board of
Officenu.

Air Service
Plans and Programs

23. B O U R ~OFOFF~C~RS:
Recom m enaations

123

4July1917

A draft of the proceedingsof the Board of Officers w a s

presented at the sixth meeting, on 3 J u l y , for revision.
The following day a revision
was approved, and the board
adjourned, sine die.

Recommendations'
The Board believes that it is
now a cardinal principle in warfare that a decision in the air
must be sought and obtained
before a decision on the groundcan be reached. Absolute andunchallenged superiority in the
air can perhaps never be attained although possibly it may
be attained for short periods oftime; but experience of three
years' war has amply shown thatthe side which can at criticaltimes dominate the enemy in the
air has taken the first, if not thevital, step toward victory.
As a preliminary to the studyof the specific recommendations
which follow, the board recommends most strongly a careful
study of Exhibit N,2 a memorandum outlining the role of aviation in modem war, with specificreference to the problem now
awaiting solution in France.
Proceeding to the specific recommendations required, theBoard was ordered to report on
the following, which it will discuss in order, concluding the entire proceedings with a series of
proposed steps on which action
is most strongly urged, to theend that the recommendations
herein contained may receive
prompt attention:

The board was required tomake recommendations on thefollowing:(a) A complete aviation project for the US. Army in France.
(b) The complete organizationof the air service, including the
manufacture and supply ofequipment.
(c) The establishment of depots, repair shops and parks.
(d) The establishment ofschools.
(el The distribution of tacticalunits and their duties.
An aviation project will embrace two phases of air development, strategical and tactical(See exhibit N).
STRATEGICAL AVIATION.
Based on the letter of theFrench Commander-in-Chief tothe Minister of War, May 6,
1917 (See Exhibit H)3 whichstates that the United Statesshould aim to fumish 30 groupsof 6 squadrons (pursuit), and 30
groups of 6 squadrons (bombardment).
The estimated number of officers and men required for thisproject is 20,000 Officers and
110,000 Men.

TACTICAL AVIATION.
The tactical development will
follow the development of theAmerican land forces in Europe,and the personnel required tocarry out this program can becalculated from the proposed tables of organization (Exhibit
For each Army Corps there
should be 141 officers and 1340
men.
On the basis of 10 Army
Corps, this means
1,410 Officers
13,400Men
The total air personnel wiiu approximate 23,000 Officers and125,000 Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 In Gorrell's History. A-23
2 Exhibit N was Parker s report on therole of aviation (see Doc 22)
3 Omitted
4 Omitted

24- Duties OFthe
C h i q OFA ~ R
SeRuice125

5 July1917

On 30 June Mitchell replaced
Dodd as Aviation Officer. The
duties of the position, whichwere to be changed to Chief of
Air Service, were set forth in a
general order assigning duties
to the various staff officers of
Headquarters AEF. The Headquarters had two major divisions, the General Staff, and
the Administrative and Technical Staff, with the Chief of Air
Service being in the latter.

Table IV.
Technical and Administrative
Seruices

Headquarters, A.E.F.
France, July 5, 1917.
General Orders,No. 8.
The tables hereto attachedshow the present distribution ofstaff duties of the Headquartersof the American Expeditionary
Forces. . . .
The distribution of staff duties
in the headquarters of divisions,army corps and other commands subordinate to theseheadquarters will conform inprinciple to the distribution ofduties shown in these tables.

............................
By command ofMajor General Pershing:
James G. Harbord,
Lieut. Col. Geneml Staff,
Chief of Staff

1 The second fifth. and eighth items
were dropped and a new one-Airplanes
and balloons-was added at the beginningwhen the duties were revised in G 0 31 16
February 1918 at the time Services of Supply was established with jurisdictlon over
the administrative and technical Services Of
the AEF(Air Sewicel
Aviation and aero station
Enlisted and commissioned personnel of ,iviation
units.
Material
Organhation.
Instruction
Aerial reconnaissance obsewation and pt,otography.
Aerial combat and bombing.
Etc.. etc.'

25,59-Squac)~on
Plan

127

loJuly1917

On 10 July 1917 Pershing
forwarded to Washington aplan for the tactical organization of the AEF.' Known a s
t h e General Organization
Project (GOP), this plan had
been developed jointly by the
Operatioiis Section of h i s
headquarters and a board of
officers, headed by Col.
Chauncey Baker, sent toFrance by t h e War Department to look into matters relating to the organization, armament, and equipment of
troops. In the GOP, which
was based on an army ofabout 1,000,000 m e n , aviation units were assigned tothe army and to each of thearmy's corps but not to divisions.* T h e total number ofaero squadrons in t h e GOP
was 59, of which 39 were observation, 15 pursuit, and 5
bombardment (see Appendix
B). Following are extracts
from the GOP.3

1 The transmittal was dated 10 July. but
the memorandum by which Pershing formally approved the project was dated 11
July.
2 In the AEF the infantry was organized
into platoons of 58 men (commanded by alieutenant), with 4 platoons to a company(captain). 4 companies to a battalion (malor). 3 battalions and a machinegun company to a regiment (colonel), and 2 regiments and a machinegun battalion to abrigade (brigadier general), the other arms
being organized in a similar fashion. Twobrigades of infantv and one of field attillery.

Headquarters American Ex- F. C.
peditionary Forces, Office of H. A. D.
A. B. B.4
the Chief of Staff,
Operations Section
A force consisting of about
July 10, 1917. one million men has been taken
as a basis for the following
REPORT ON
reasons:
ORGANIZATION(a) A thorough study of the(Modifications resulting fromsubject of organization could not
general conference included
be made without considering aherein.) 5
balanced force, complete in all
the weapons and services essen1. BASIS OF STUDYtial to modern war.
In preparing the attached ta(b) An Army is the smallest
bles of organizations the Opera- unit fulfilling the conditions intions Section has considered the cluded in -a-.
provisional organization pre(c) The operations of thescribed for the first division orAmerican forces in France must,dered to France, definite projects for many reasons not discussed
presented by the French Army,herein, include offensive action
Headquarters and British Armyon a large scale. To carry thisHeadquarters in France, and hastaken as the basis of the study atotal force of about 1,000,000
men in France. This force includes not only the combat elements, but also those necessary
to main these combat forces.
............................

plus engineer. signal. and other troops. constituted a division (major general). In the
GOP the army was organized into five c o p s(major general), each with four divisions(major general).
3. In Gonell's History. A-23, also A-7.
4. The staff committee on organization
Consisted of Lt. Cot Fox Conner. Maj HughA. Drum, and Ma). Alvin B Barber
5 This was a conference of members of
Headquarters AEF and members of the
Baker Board

128

action out on a front sufficient toproduce results commensuratewith the endeavor, there must
be available 20 combat divisions
for the operations.
(d) With 20 combat divisions
as a basis, the Corps and Army
troops and necessary Line ofCommunications troops were
determined.

Air Service
Plans and Programs

It is evident that a force ofabout one million is the smallest
unit which in modem war will be
a complete, well balanced, andindependent fighting organization. However, it must be
equally clear that the adoption ofthis size force as a basis of study
should not be construed as representing the maximum force
which should be sent to, or
which will be needed in France.
It is taken as the force which
may be expected to reachFrance in time for an offensive in1918 and as a unit and basis oforganization. Plans for the future
should be based, especially inreference to the manufactureetc. of artillery, auiation andother material, on three times
this force, i.e. at least three million men. Such a program of
construction should be completed within two years.
........................

....

59-Squadron Plan

129

Table I11

Table IV.

A Corps (4 Combat a n d 2Army Headquarters and Army Troops.

Replacement Divisions.)

Approximate Strength

Approximate
Strength

Replacement Diusions-44.528

Corps Troops......................
Aviation Troops.
1 Comdr. & Staff

2 Squadrons (Pursuit)
3 Squadrons (Art. Sewice)
1 Section, Photographic
1 Secbon Meteorologic
1 Aviation Park Co
3 Balloon Cos.

...

............................

~

_

_

Aviation

100.000

Combat husions__rlCommander, Staff and Hq. Details to be subject tofuture study

150..........................................................

350

Headquarters

Headquarters

15
350
500

150
150
104

468

1 Commander and Staff
5 Squadrons-pursuit
5 Squadrons-Bombardment
24 Balloon Cos
Service with heayr
24 Squadrons
Artilley of A m y
2 Sections. meteorological

1.600

30Cl

3 Sections. photographic
16 Park companies

1.000..........................................................

2 6 Boiling Repo~f

131

15 A u g u s t 1917

Maj. Raynal C. Bolling, a
New York corporation lawyer
who had organized the firstaero squadron in t h e National Guard, was sent to Europe by the War Department
in June 1917 with a group of
military and civilian engineers and technicians togather information for the
production of airplanes andother aeronautical equipment. His report, like that of
the Board of Officers, advocated an air force of fighting
and bombing planes overand beyond the aviation thatwould be assigned to the various elements of t h e groundforces. In bombardment,
Bol Ii ng d i sting u i sh ed between operations conductedduring the day and those carried out at night, as is indicated in t h e following extractfrom his report.’

1 In Gorrells Hstory. 1-1. Pp 60-88

45, Avenue Montaigne, Paris,
France.
August 15, 1917.
FROM:
Major R. C. Bolling,
S.0.R. C.
TO:
Chief Signal Officerof the Army, Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Report of Aeronautical Commission.
1. The Aeronautical Commission
under my charge left New Yorkon the steamship “Adriatic”
June 17, 1917, landed at Liverpool June 26, 1917, proceeded
to London, remained there
about a week, proceeded toFrance and to Paris, remained
there about two weeks, proceeded thence to Italy, remained
there about ten days, returned toParis and remained there about
ten days. Thereafter the party
was divided according to new
instructions and duties. . . .
............................
C. American Production
Program.
There is general agreement
here in the opinion we haveformed concerning the governing principle for our American
production program. That opinion is as follows:First:-The United States must
provide itself with all airplanes
and engines required for training

purposes in America.
Second. The United States,
must next provide the airplanes
and engines necessary for use
strictly in connection with theoperation of American Force:; inthe field. . . .
Third. After these first two
considerations comes the American program of putting into thefield next year air forces in excess of the tactical requirementsof its Army in France. It is greatly
desired that the United Statesshall do this. Such air forces
should consist of fighting airplanes and bombers. The fighting airplanes are divided into
two classes:(a) Airplanes with fixed engines.
(b) Airplanes with rotary engines.
Both types appear to be essential. We all hold the opinion thatthe rotary engine is much less,reliable and has much less lengthof service than the stationary engine; but for certain purposes it
appears to be indispensable. The
bombing airplanes may be divided into day and night bombers.
Day bombing presents muc hgreater difficulties than nightbombing because it cannot be
conducted successfully by slow

132

machines with great bomb canying capacity, if the enemy havein the air any number of fast
fighting machines or have great
numbers of anti-aircraft guns effective at great altitudes. If it
should be possible to drive fromthe air practically all the enemy
fighting machines, day-bombing
would become much more effective. Night bombing permits
to [?I use large airplanes without
great speeds but with greatbomb-carying capacity. There ispractically no effective means ofpreventing night-bombing.
Therefore, its possibilities appear
to depend almost entirely on thenumber of suitable airplanes
which can be provided. Fromthe militay standpoint these
possibilities are v e y great andextremely important. Could
night bombing be conducted ona sufficiently great scale and kept
up continuously for a sufficienttime, there seems good reason
to believe that it might determine
the whole outcome of military

Air Service
Plans and Programs

Bdling Report
15 August 1917

operations. Up to the present
time, the trouble seems to havebeen that all bombing has been
carried on intermittently andsporadically because of the lackof attention to the subject andprovision for large enough numbers of the right kind of airplanes. In this connection, it may
be well to compare the situation
with artillery bombardment.
While I speak with some diffidence on such a subject, all I
have been able to leam indicatesthat intermittent and sporadic artillery bombardment produces
but small results notwithstanding
the great size and accuracy ofmodem bombardment artillery.
When definite and importantresults are desired, artillery bombardment must be made systematic and continuous and tremendous quantities of high explosives must be used on the selected objectives. This seems to
be exactly the situation which
exists with respect to airplane
bombardment. There seems ev-

133

ery reason to believe that it canbe made of vital importance ifvery great numbers of airplanes
carrying great size and numbersof bombs can be provided andused continuously and systematically.
To determine the proportionof airplanes of different types forUnited States production we
have recommended the following rough method of calculation
which seems to give results thatcheck up pretty well with theviews over here: First deductfrom the total number of airplanes it is considered possible
to produce the number required
for use in direct connection withthe military forces. That number
can only be determined where itis known what will be the sue ofthe military forces at any given
time and that number varies

only in proportion to the size ofthe forces. By this deduction
having obtained the number of
airplanes within your capacity of
production which can be used
independently of United States
military forces, we recommendthat this number be apportioned
as follows: About thirty sevenand a half percent should befighting airplanes divided equally
between fixed and rotary engine
fighters. About twenty five percent should be day bombers andabout thirty seven and a half
percent should be night bombers. Of course, it is impossible toestablish any proportions which
are likely to be entirely correct
because it is impossible to tellwhat will be the air conditions at
any given portion of the front at
any given time. For example, theenemy may have a larger orsmaller number of fast fighting
machines requiring that we havea larger or smaller number ofthese mathines and permitting
our use of a smaller number ofday bombing machines.
............................

27,260-Squaa~or-2
PJan

135

1 ( 3 SeptembeR 1917

Although the GOP (Doc.
25) included troops for t h eService of t h e Rear (later,Line crf Communications, still
later, Services of Supply),’ it
did not indicate what kinds oftroops would be needed or
how they were to be organized. These details were provided in September 1917 by
the Service of the Rear Project (SORP). Headquarters
AEF used the SORP to add
201 aero squadrons for strategic aviation, which had
been omitted from t h e GOP.
This was done to bring A E F
planning more into line withproduction plans made in the
United States following t h ereceipt of the Ribot cable(see Doc. 16). With the addition of 201 squadrons to the
59 in the GOP, the total wentu p to 260: 120 pursuit, 80
observation, and 60 bom-

G.H.Q., and L. of C. troops.
The total estimated strength.of
this force, including service ofthe rear and L. of C. troops, wasgiven in Table 2, G.O.P., as
L,R.E, about 1,100,000 men. It is now
S,H, found that the following modifiA , B , B , ~ cations in this estimate must be
made:(a)The forward services (areto
HeadquartersAmerican Ex- be increased by 55,590 men, of
peditionav Forces*Office Of which 6,560 signal troops are to
the Chief of Staff,
be added to the total strength ofOperations Section
the 30 infantry divisions, 1,038
September
1917. ordnance Dersonnel are to be
added to the army troops and
MEMORANDUM FOR
47,992 aviation personnel are to
Chief of Staff
be added to the Army troops.
Subject: Services of the Rear
The increase in the divisionaland Lines of Communication.
signal troops is necessary on ac1. The Commander in Chiefs count of the adopted signal
letter, dated July 10, 1917,
corps personnel for infantry regitransmitting to the War Depart- ments. The increased ordnancement the A.E.F. General Organi- personnel is due to the inatlezation Project (G.O.P.) states, in quacy in the G.O.P. estimate.
paragraph 3, “RecommendaThe addition to the aviation pertions as to Lines of Communica- sonnel consists of strategicaltion troops will be submitted
units, all of which are not strictly
later.”
necessary for the American
bardment. Extracts from t h e
SORP, approved by Pershingon 18 September 191 7, areprinted below.*

6 9............................

4. The basis of the projects
submitted herewith is identicalwith that of the G.O.P., i.e., aforce of 20 fighting and 10 replacement (base and training)divisions with Corps, Army,

1 TI ese des ynations apparently ate cot
rect altl>obyli dn s o f t e n w a s added toServce n SOR and to Line n LOC andd r o ~ p e clrom Serv ce m SOS
2 in Gottell 5 h s t o r y A 23 also A 12
3 Col Le Foy Elt8nye Lt Col Stuart heln
Lelman and Lt Col Alv n E BarberAir Service
Plans and Programs

136

~~

~

.

forces herein considered but are
to be used on the fronts'occupied by our Allies as well as on
our own. It is necessay. however. to consider them in preparing a project for the senrice ofathe rear and inshipping program. With the

Totals for Aeronautics.
Front.-T acncal

5 corps ............................................................
A~ .Y.............................................................

Total Tactical-aU recommended by A.E.F. organization
Project of July 11, 1917,except
13 Park Cos. of strengthof 1352

Total Personnel
8.255

15.12323.378.

Front-Sbateglcal
41 Observation Squadrons ............................................
105 Pursuit Squadrons ..............................................
55 Bombardment Squadrons ..........................................
15 Balloon Companies ..............................................
73 Park Companies ..................................................

7.093
18.16510.670
3.120
7.592

Total Personnel ......................................................

46.640Rear
Hq . Air Service L. of C........................
Research Finance, Purchase, Inspection and Provision of Personnel ........
Training and Replacement ............................................
Repair and Salvage ..................................................
Housing of Material and Personnel ....................................
Reserve of Mechanics, etc.......................
Supply and Assembly ................................................
3 Port Depots x 104 ................................................
3 Port Balloon Companies x 208 ......................................

50
295
24.06610.4002.600
12.272
5.200
312
624

.

55.819Recapltulatlon
Total Strength-Tactical ..............................................
Total Strength-Strategical ............................................
Total Strength-% rvice of Rear ........................................

Grand Total ........................................................
Total Service Planes-exclusive of Training and Replacement Planes ........
Total Balloons-exclusive of Training and Replacement Balloons ..........

23.37846.64055.819125.8374.680
57 in Eervre
87 spare.

260-Squadron

137

Plan

above additions the total of divisional, corps, army and G.H.Q.
troops, including base and training divisions, amounts to 908,795 men. This figure includes
the noncombatant organizations
pertaining to divisions, corps andarmies.

..............
Kirby Walker
Lt. Col. Cav.,
Acting Chief of Section

28. Cornman6 in
the Zone OFA6uance139

1 0 October2 1917

In August 1917 the activities of the Air Service, AEF
w e r e divided between t h e
Zone of Interior, where Col.
R. C. Bolling w a s placed incharge, and the Zone of Advance, where Col. William
Mitchell w a s placed in command. About the same time,
Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly
was named Chief of Air Service, AEF. Mitchell’s authority
w a s outlined in the following
order.

Strategical Air Units not assigned
to armies and corps but attacheddirectly to these headquarters.
General Orders(a) Formation and equipNo. 46.
ment of units formed in the Zone............................
of the Advance.
(b) Tactical employment.
11. 1. Under the direction of the(c) Technical inspeciion.
Chief of Air Service, all Air Serv(d) Instruction in theice units and personnel serving
Zone of the Advance.
in the Zone of Advance are
Air Depots and Parks in Zone ofplaced under the command of
the Advance.
the Air Commander, Zone of(a) Technical supervision
Advance, who is charged withand inspection.
their proper administration, instruction, discipline and employ- Air Schools in Zone of the fidvance.
ment.
(a) Supervision of injtruc2. Command of the Air
tion.
Service, Zone of the Advance,
Liaison With the Air Services ofincludes:Allied Armies.
Tactical Air Units, assigned toThis liaison is to be mainarmies and corps.
(a) Formation and equip- tained under the direction of thement of units formed in the Zone Chief of Air Service by means ofliaison officers detailed at the reof the Advance.
(b) Technical supervision quest of the Commander iri
Chief.
and inspection.
(c) Supervision of tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
By command of
employment.
General Pershing:(d) Supervision of instruction in the Zone of the AdJames G . Harbord.
vance.
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff.

Headquarters, A.E.F.
France, October 10, 1917.

I‘

On behalf of the British Government. Gen. Sir D. Henderson.
K.C.B.. decorates Col. Edgar S. Gonell with the “Companion of
the Diotinguished Service Order.”29-GorzrzeJJ: StrzategicalB o r n barzarnent

141

2 s NouernbeR 1917

When Maj. Edgar S. Gorrelll b e c a m e Chief of t h e
Technical Section, Air Service, AEF, on 15 August 1917,
he b e c a m e responsible for
initiating p u r c h a s e s for all
kinds of equipment and supplies that t h e Air Service
would need during t h e following year. Investigating
and attempting to anticipate
requirements of materiel forbombing operations, h e
m a d e a study of t h e bombardment situation and fromthat formulated a bombardment plan for the Air Service,
AEF. That plan, printed below,* was to be characterized
many years later by Maj. Gen.
Laurence S. Kuter of the U.S.
Army Air Forces as the “earliest, clearest and least known
statement of t h e American
conception of t h e employment of air power.3
Brig. G e n . Benjamin D.
Foulois, who b e c a m e Chiefof Air Service, AEF on 27 November, not only approvedt h e plan but m a d e Gorrell,
who had b e e n promoted tolieutenant colonel, t h e headof Strategical Aviation, Zoneof Advance, AEF. A s events
developed, however, Gorr el 1’s bombardment plan
could not b e carried out.
Gorrell explained why in the
1 For biographical data see the Introduction
to the first volume in this serles
2 In Gorrell s History. B-6. pp
3 Kuter. Air Power-The American Concept. [c 1943.1 photostat of typewritten copy
In AFSHRC 167 6-50

“Early History of the Strategi(b) Apparently both the Allies
cal Section” which h e wrote and the Germans have begun atin January 1919 as part of the the same time to conceive of the“History of t h e Air Service, immense importance of aerial
AEF.”4 Extracts from the history of t h e section are presented below as a sequel tothe plan.

A. Plan
I. Introduction.
(a) Three and a half years of
War finds us in a position inwhich movement either by landor by sea is rendered vastly difficult and expensive. On the sea
the Allies’ superiority keeps theCentral Power’s above-waterships inactive, while on land,
where Allied and enemy trenchsystems face each other from sea
to boundary on the western
front, movement can only beobtained over short distances byvast concentration of artillery,
without which the infantry cannot advance. The speed withwhich the infanty can advanceis determined by the speed of
movement of the artillery, andeven a minor operation demands a heavy toll of life andmaterial.
If the conduct of the War is tobe seriously affected in the near
future, a new policy of attacking
the enemy must be adopted.

373-390

4 The history of the Strategical Section IS in
Gorrell’s History. 5 6 . pp 371401.

bombing, and we find in all
countries, both Allied and German, the conception of the immensity of such a problem andthe beginning of a preparation
for a bombing campaign. Judging from our own knowledge ofwhat the Allied countries are
doing and from the report ofAllied spies in the German tc!rrit o y , the Allies are far behind theGermans at the present momentin preparation for next year’sbombing campaign. We constantly receive reports from ourspies and agents in the German
territory, indicating an increasein the size of many German factories-to be specific, indicatingthat about 25 German airplanefactories have extended and increased facilities for output andincreased number of employees-and our information evengoes to show that portions of the
Zeppelin Works have been prepared to build bombing airplanes. It is certain that Germany
is concentrating on the manufacture of the Gotha airplane, tl3 beAir Service
Plans and Programs

142

Germany’s Gotha bomber.

supplemented by pursuit airplanes. The recent activities of
the German forces in bombdropping, especially by night,
have been an indication of her
probable use of these bombdropping airplanes next year;
and the bombs which she is now
using have also been an indication of the type of bomb she willattempt to drop upon the Allied
forces.
(c) The German Lines are sosituated that bomb-dropping is avery easy problem for the German forces, compared with
bomb-dropping for the Allied
forces; and judging by the character of the airplanes Germany isbuilding for bomb-dropping, together with the realization bothsides have apparently come tonamely that to affect the armies
in the fields it is necessary toaffect the manufacturing outputof the countries-we can readily
see that next spring and next
summer the Allies will be visitedby bomb-dropping airplanes,
both by day and by night andwill be confronted with the enemy’s superiority in the air andwith a bomb-dropping campaign
against them that will tend to
wreck their commercial centers,
to say nothing of the moral effectof such bomb-dropping against
the inhabitants of the Alliedcountries.
(d) This scheme which Germany is apparently talking of inflicting upon the Allies is thesame as the Allies have recently
been talking of inflicting upon
Germany; but the difference be-

tween the two is simply that theGerman words are being rapidly
turned to deeds, while the wordsof the Allies lack deeds to backthem. Therefore, it becomes ofparamount importance that we
adopt at once a bombing project
to be immediately put into force
and carried out with all vigor at
the quickest possible moment, inorder that we may not only
wreck Germany’s manufacturing
centers but wreck them more
completely than she will wreckours next year.
(e) German shells are being
fired at Allied troops and positions over a large area of the
Front; but the manufacture ofthese shells is dependent upon
the output of a few specific, wellknown factories turning out thechemicals for them, so we canGorrell: Strategical143

Bombardment

such a matter of course that it is 111. German targets to be!
attacked.
not treated in this paper since
the idea of this paper is solely(a)The first question to conthat of strategical bombing
sider in an air offensive against
against commercial centers andGerman industrial towns is thelines of communications, with a question of objectives, and theseview to causing the cessation of can be divided into four main1
supplies to the German Front.
groups, following the general di(c) By strategical bomb-drop- vision made by English experts
ping is meant, in the larger sense on this same subject.
of the word, bomb-dropping(b) The first, or Northerly
against the commercial centersgroup, comprises such towns asof Germany. An army may be
Dusseldorf, Crefeld, Elberfeld.,compared to a drill. The point of Essen, and other German towns
the drill must be strong and must grouped in their vicinity. For
stand up and bear the brunt ofshort this may be called thethe much hard work with which Dusseldorf group.
it comes into contact; but unless(c) The second group is a colthe shank of the drill is strong
lection of objectives, the centerand continually reinforcing theof which may be taken as Copoint, the drill will break. So with logne. This we will call thethe nation in a war of these
Cologne group.
days, the army is like the point(d) The third and most impor11. Division of bomb-dropof the drill and must bear thetant group comprises MannheimPing.
brunt of constant conflict withand Ludwigshafen and also thie(a) Aerial bomb-dropping isforeign obstacles; but unless the manufacturing industries in thedivided essentially into twonation-which represents thevicinity of Frankfurt, such as theclasses, tactical and strategical.
shank of the drill-constantly
Meister-Luciuc Works at(b) Tactical bomb-dropping is stands behind and supplies the
Hoechst, and the Casella Works
becoming better known every
necessary aid to the point, theon the far side of Frankfurt. This
day as the War goes on; and thedrill will break and the nation will we will call the Mannheim
results obtained by the Handley- fall. The object of strategicalgroup.
Page squadrons in the vicinity of bombing is to drop aerial bombs(e)With the forces which theDunkerque, as well as the bomupon the commercial centers
Allies will have available during
bardment against Dunkerque by and the lines of communications the spring and summer of 1918,
the Germans, have more thanin such quantities as will wreck
it is not wise to operate further
indicated that wonderful results
the points aimed at and cut off
south along the Rhine than tho
could be accomplished along
the necessary supplies without
Mannheim group, except totactical lines, should aerial
which the armies in the field
make feints and infrequent raids
bomb-dropping be really carried cannot exist.
against Karlsruhe and Rastadt.
out in a manner which some of(d) When we come to analyze(f) A fourth group of targets
the targets, we find that there are enter as a part of a logical
its ardent advocates have urged
for a long time. The necessity for a few certain indispensable tarscheme for destroying German
tactical bomb-dropping is evigets without which Germany
cannot carry on the war.
dent and will come about asreadily see that if the chemicalfactories can be blown up, theshell output will cease, to agreater or lesser degree dependent upon the damage donethese chemical plants. The sameis true of airplane output; thelarge Mercedes engine plants
and the Bosch magneto factories
are located in the same city, andif bombing airplanes raid this cityof Stuttgart and can inflict damage on one or both of theseplants, the output of German
airplanes will cease in proportion
to the damage done.
(f) Many of these points could
be gone into at length, but it is
not necessay here for the advantages of bombing manufacturing centers is recognized without debate.

145

Gorrell: StrategicalBombardment

ammunition works and thesehave special value for the reason
that on days, such as often occur, when weather conditions
prevent the airplanes fromreaching targets in the Rhine
Valley, bomb-dropping raids cannevertheless be made against
targets in this fourth group; We
will call this fourth group the
Saar Valley group, which comprises the numerous steel worksof this Valley.

IV. Base of operation(a) Having chosen, as generally outlined above, the German
objectives it becomes necessary
to consider from what bases they
are to be attacked. Two large
bases have been used in thepast; one from the Ostende region, the other from the region
in the vicinity of Toul. These two
may be compared as follows:(b) If the Ostende region is tobe taken as a base or center ofour operations, the following disadvantages will have to be considered. These disadvantages are
inherent in the terrain and cannot be removed. Although it istrue that the first two groupsnamely the Dusseldorf and the
Cologne groups-may be attacked from the Ostende basenearly as easily as from the Toulbase, yet the other groups will
be entirely out of the question.
Furthermore, the Germans will
be entirely aware of these facts
and therefore, for the purpose ofdefense, they will know the limitations of the chosen objectivesof each and every one of theraids that we may attempt to

make; whereas in operating fromthe Verdun-Toul base, the Germans will never know for whatparticular objective the raid isintended and hence must be
proportionately extravagent of
airplanes for defensive purposes.
Furthermore, such concentrationof airplanes as Germany effects
for defensive purposes against
our strategical bomb-dropping
raids, means the subtraction ofthis number from her airplanes
in tactical use over our Front.
The following figures roughlyshow the distances involved andthe advantages of choosing abase:(c) There is another disadvantage against the Ostende base,and that is the disadvantage inherent in weather conditions.
Past records show that there are
only a certain number of days,
very far apart, on which it ispossible to raid at the distances
which are involved in reaching

the first three groups of targets
mentioned: British estimatesshow that these good days do
not number more than four otr
five per month and that only
during the summer months.
There will, however, be a large
percentage of days when shortraids can very easily be made.
From the Ostende base there arepractically no targets against
which short raids can be madeto injure Germany's manufacturing centers; while from the Verdun-Toul base, the Saar Valley
with its enormous steel w o koffers exactly the type of target
which the Allies urgently desire
to destroy; and therefore ondays when raiding at long distances on Germany's Rhine Valley targets is impossible, shortraids against the Saar Valley arefeasible and sometimes several
raids per day can easily be
made.

Distance
From
OstendeDistrict

Dusseldorf straight ....... _...........
186
Dusseldorl by Maastrill...-.~.~. ..-... 206
Cologne straight ...... .._....
~.~
..
.....
185
Cologne by Maastritt ... ...._........~.~
192
Mannheim ...~._~...... .__..
...~
...
.
. ~280
~~
~~

~~~

~~~~~

~~~

~~~

~~

From
Souilly

Goand
Return

372
412
370

384
560

Extra mileage
in excess of
shortest
mileage

.:32
:'72
:'70
:134
:3GO

Dusseldorf straight . ...~..._~. .........
170
340
Cologne ...... ....... ._...........
150
300
Mannheim .. ~~~~......~~~._.........~~~..
150
300
:40
Frankfolt ....._~.
.....~~.
.-.
.......... ~. 170
340
20
~~~~

~~

~~~

~~~

~

From

Toul

Dusseldorf.......
...._.........
~~.
..
190
380
:40
Cologne ..~~..._..~~~~~...._.........~~~..
170
340
:'10
Mannheim ......... ......-...
~.~~......
130
260
Frankfolt~.
........~.
~.... ~.... . 160~
. 320
~~

~~~~

~

~~

~~

~

~

~~~

Air Service
Plans and Programs

146(d) It has sometimes been advocated that raiding might bedone across the northern borderof Belgium, in order to permit
pilots who fail because of engine
failure to land in Holland. But
such an agrument is a mythrather than a reality. If the Allies
are constantly performing rsids
from the Ostende base acrossHolland, we might find ourselvesin a rather awkward diplomatic
situation, and therefore any
scheme to deliberately violate
the neutrality of Holland is untenable. If neutrality laws be notviolated, raiding from the Ostende base against German targets becomes extremely difficult
because of the increased lengthof flight necessary.
(el Apparently there is only
one base from which operations
should first be begun, and that isthe base which we may call, forthe purpose of reference, theVerdun-Toul base. It is suggested that we begin operations
against the German targets with
our airplanes operating from thisVerdun-Toul base, and, as thenumber of airplanes in commission increases, that we spreadout from this base as a center oneither side, as conditions may
indicate best, until, as a climax,
airplanes may be used from all
portions of the Allied lines toconcentrate against the German
targets which it is hoped to destroy:-the Rhine Valley targets
being the targets for clear day
operations and those at handbeing attacked on days when it
is impossible to reach the Rhine
Valley.
(f) In this base known as the
Verdun-Toul base, there arereally two bases: one roughly ona quadrilateral bounded by Pont
St. Vincent, Toul, Void, and Vezelise. This for short we will callthe Toul group; and its railheads will be Pont St. Vincent
and Toul, with main depot andpark at Toul. The second groupwill be in the district whose center is Souilly, and the rail-head,park and depot will have to bechosen in accordance with details to be taken up later on.
( 9 ) The first concentration of
airplanes is suggested for the
Toul base, and those to be used
next for the Souilly base. As thenumber airplanes increases, they
can be divided proportionately
between these two bases until
such time as we have a sufficientnumber to extend in either direction from these bases and touse airdromes along other portions of the line. In the locationof airdromes it is to be kept inmind that any German concentration against our airdromes
would deplete our aerial forces,
and, therefore, our aerial squadrons must be scattered about thecountry in the most advantageous manner to prevent theirdepletion by bomb-dropping

raids on the part of the Germans. Furthermore, the existence of numerous airdromes
about the bases hereinbefore indicated will increase the difficulties of German intelligence and,
therefore, will render less difficult
the protection of our airdromes
from German aerial raiding.

V. Choice of systems or
raiding.
(a) There are two large systems of aerial bomb-dropping.
One is what is known as daylightbombing; the other is night-timebombardment. There are manyarguments both in fakor of andagainst each kind of bomb-dropping, but it goes without sayingthat our efforts should be directed against the German objectives both by day and bynight, giving the Germans norest from our aerial activities andno time to repair the damage
inflicted. In this project it is proposed to commence this bombdropping with day-light bombardment solely because of thequestion of availability, since deliveries on our daylight bombardment airplanes will takeplace prior to deliveries on ourlarge night bomb-dropping airplanes of Caproni and HandleyPage types. This will lend itself
readily to our final project ofboth day and night bombardment, since our pilots will bereceiving training in aerial navigation over Germany during theday, while we are waiting for thearrival of our night-time
airplanes.

Gorrell: StrategicalBombardm ent

VI. Difficulties to be encountered which necessitate
immediate preparation.
(a) There will be considerable
difficulty in instructing the pilots
in the art of navigation whengoing very long distances, andcourse of instruction must be immediately established in the
flying schools for obviating thisdifficulty.
(b) The ordinary map of Germany in existence is not sufficient to permit green pilots tofind their way across Germany
and home again in safety, andtherefore the preparation of a
special map of Germany must
be begun at once, following theindications which the Army Air
Service is prepared to submit to
the Topographical Section of theIntelligence Division of the
Army. This special map was that
contemplated in a letter to theChief, Intelligence Division, A. E.
F., dated November 12, 1917,
subject “Aviation Maps for theAmerican Army”, signed by
Brigadier-General Kenly, requesting the preparation of sucha map.
(c) Weather conditions along
the Rhine Valley permit of raiding only during special times ofyear-these being mainly in thelate spring, the summer, and theearly autumn-and therefore ifbomb-dropping against Germancommercial centers is to be fea-

sible during the year 1918,preparations must be begun at oncein order that we may be ready intime to take advantage of theweather.
(d) As indicated above, ouradvices show that Germany isalready preparing a large bombdropping against the Allies. The
existing program of Allied production of airplanes is on too
small a scale to manufacture asufficiently large number in timefor 1918, and therefore a decision should be made immediately to undertake this bombdropping campaign in order thatthe necessary impetus may be
given to the production of airplanes to permit their receipt intime for such a campaign.
(e) Assuming that each effective machine in commission performs four raids per weekwhich, considering the short distance from our chosen bases to
the Saar Valley targets, is not too
optimistic-the total output ofbombs heretofore contemplated
for next year on a basis of pastaviation, when bomb-dropping
was not seriously considered,must be increased to meet thedemands of next year. This increase can be easily effected if adecision is made, and madenow, to consider such a bombdropping campaign. Hence thenecessity of an immediate decision for strategical bomb-dropping next year, in order thatbombs may be ready when
weather conditions permit thecommencement of sucha campaign.

(f) Considering the 50-poundbomb as a standard for calculation purposes, we find that twobombs will pack into a caseabout 2’6” x 1’3 x 2’9”; or,about 120 cases of bombs may
be placed on a railroad truck. In
the quantities contemplated, thebombs will have to be dumped
into ammunition dumps in the
open and provision should bemade as soon as possible toprovide underground bomb
dumps in order that we may ,nothave the regrettable experienceof seeing our bomb dumps
blown up as recently was thecase at Dunkerque, where theGermans instead of attacking
airdromes attacked the bomb
dumps and rendered the bombing airplanes useless because of
having destroyed their bombs.
Furthermore, in this question ofbombs, the technical sections of
the Allies must design water-tightplugs, so that such bombs as are
kept in the open or in underground dumps may be protectedfrom weather conditions, thus
necessitating keeping only thefuses and detonators in cover~dwater-proof magazines. When
handling such a large output ofbombs as will be necessary for
next year, we must consider thatthe following operations will ble
necessary: detonators and fusesmust be put into the bomb, thefins must be screwed on, thebombs must be transported tothe airplanes, and must then he148loaded upon the airplanes.
Working with such large quantities it is clearly necessary tocommence immediately to train
special armament personnel inthe loading and handling ofbombs. This is not a difficult
question, but needs to be undertaken at the earliest moment.
Another point in the bomb question is the transportation of thebombs by rail from the seaboard
to the point desired, and, when
we consider that only about 240
bombs can be transported on an
ordinary, average, flat-car we
see that the transportation of
sufficient bombs for a strategicalcampaign in earnest against theGerman targets becomes a large
problem and one which the railroad authorities must take immediate steps to meet. This
problem is not insurmountablenor difficult if steps are taken
now and without delay.
(9) The next question of difficulty is that of sheltering the
airplanes. During certain parts of
the year, with luck, our airplanes
should last roughly three months
when kept in the open; but during the other portions of theyear, as, for example, the rainyseason, experience in Mexico
shows that airplanes last only
about two weeks; while Frenchadvices received about two
weeks ago show that airplanes
kept in the Toul region in theopen, in the fall, or in other badseasons, last only about 8 days.
It becomes at once apparent,

Air Service
Plans and Programs

therefore, that every attempt
must be made to shelter the
airplanes; otherwise the replacement of airplanes due to lack ofshelter becomes an enormous
problem. For this purpose theUnited States is making provision to ship hangars to Europe
with the various squadrons. Assuming the hangars arrived at
the seaboard, the question oftransporting them to the bases inthe vicinity of Toul (or to wherever else the airplanes may bewhen they are at the Front) in
sufficient numbers becomes
rather difficult. Two thousand
daylight bombarding airplanes of
the DH 4 type would require
about 500 Bessonneau hangars.
Since about 10 railroad trucks
are required to transport four
Bessonneau hangars, we see atonce that for even as small anumber of airplanes as 2,000 weshould require 1,250 railroad
freight cars to transport thesehangars. America is planning to
adopt individual tent hangars,
but the problem of transportation remains roughly the same asin the consideration of the Bessonneau hangars.
( h ) Since the bases are chosen
in the vicinity of Toul and are in
the country where it becomes
rather cold in the winter time, itwill be necessary to provide
shelter for the personnel. This
amount of shelter will depend
upon the size of the force involved. Due to the population of
the country we cannot safely
count upon billeting more thanapproximately one-third of ouraviation personnel, and there-

fore the remaining two-thirds
must be provided for, say, perhaps in standard French barracks which, under conditionsprescribed by regulations, willaccomodate 90 men per barrack. The question of figuring
the housing necessary becomes
one of mathematics, as the force
increases in size, but it is necess a y to commence now, owing
to the scarcity of material forbuilding purposes, in order toobtain sufficient barracks or sufficient housing facilities by thetime that the airplanes are readyfor the bomb-dropping campaign next year.
(i) Having chosen our firstbases from which the airplanes
will commence operation, it isnecessary to choose landing
fields, after the Italian system of
one about evey ten miles, fromthe point of assembly (of American airplanes to our probablepositions at the Front; to indicate
on each landing field the portions where airplanes rnay land
without smashing; and to erectwind-vanes to indicate the direction of the wind. These will beeasy to keep up after they haveonce been established but thelabor of locating these fields andmarking them should be undertaken immediately, since it is oneof the small points which is essential for success next year.
(j) There are very few placesin the vicinity of the entire Verdun-Toul bases where one canGorrell: StrategicalBombardment

land, and therefore details
should be out at the present
moment choosing these landing
places and marking them so thatthey may be used either as airdromes or as landing places formachines in distress.
(k) The weather in the Rhine
Valley does not by any means
follow the weather on the
French side of the Vosges
mountains, and experience has
shown that it is not satisfactoy
to rely upon existing weather
reports as they are today predicted. Meteorological officers
should, therefore, be sent out atonce to study weather conditionsin the Rhine Valley between
now and next spring and summer, and reports should be received from our agents in Germany to assist in the calculationsof probable weather conditions.
(1)Our Intelligence Section of
the Army Air Service will haveconsiderable work to do in the
preparation of the necessary
data for such a strategical bombing campaign as herein contemplated, in order that fully up-todate information may be had on
all targets and in order thatproper maps may be preparedand proper instructions given to
the various commanding officers
and even to the individual pilots
and observers.
(m) Any system of raiding
such as contemplated hereinmeans carefully prepared andtimed plans, and in order thatthey may be carried out without
defects, telephonic communications must be established beWeen the various headquarters1149

of groups and squadrons. This isa matter which must be done assoon as the airdromes are chosen, and work should be commenced thereon immediately.
(n) The question of rail-heads
and transports must be considered, since it will be necessa y to
install at various points railroad
sidings; and, in the case of largenight bombarding airplanes, it
may be found necessary to run
special narrow-gauge railroad
tracks into the airdromes themselves. The difficulty of transporting spares of large night
bombarding airplanes like theHandley-Page must be overcome at once by choosing theroutes which permit of transportation of the spares, since on
account of the large chord of thewings of these airplanes it is notpossible to transport them overeve y road in France, because
they will not pass under all
bridges. This means that special
routes for transportation must be
chosen.
(0)
The question of transportation between the various
groups becomes difficult, since insome places the ground ismarshy and chalky and since
under certain conditions theGermans may command someof the roads by shelling if they
desire; and it will, therefore, benecessa y to choose specificroads for the use of the transportinterconnecting bomb-dropping

routes, in order to supplement
such transportation as takes
place by railroad and the limited
amount which can take place byair.
(p) The question of the actual
choice of position of each individual airdrome is one whichmust be considered immediately;
and it should be rememberedthat these should not be chosen
too close to the German lines, as
has actually been the case todaywith certain of the airdromes inthat vicinity. A proper location of
our airdromes will facilitate theirdefense against enemy raids.
(9)Since bomb-dropping overa distance of 150 to 200 miles
necessitates a special knowledge
on the part of pilots and observers far beyond any instruction
now being given in any of theAllied schools, navigation becomes not the only problem,since a v e y large problem is thatof teaching the pilots to know
the county over which they ,areto fly. This means months oftraining in these particular mapsof Germany, and pilots trained
simply in the art of map-reading
as it is taught today can neverhope to accomplish their missions and return to their own
lines in safety. French relief
maps along existing lines should
be made up of German terrain,
and their formation together with
the natural features of the terrain
should be indelibly impressed on
the minds of pilots and observers
during their scholastic training.

150

Air Service

Plans and Programs

Our own experience in the
United States and in Mexico,and Allied experience in Europe,
has shown that it is very easy for
one or more machines or squadrons to start out to reach a certain point and to return to theirbase, each believing that he hasreached the proper point, when
probably all, or nearly all, havereached unconnected points andnot the target for which they
originally started to fly. Therefore, a knowledge of Germany
must be taught to the pilots andobservers in their instruction period, and provision must be
made at the Front to keep up
this instruction.
(r) From both the morale
point of view arfd also that ofmaterial damage, concentrationof our aerial forces against single
targets on the same day is ofvital importance since it tends tohamper the defense and also tocomplete in a thorough manner
the work which the bombardment is intended to perform.
Therefore, it is suggested that
often all available airdromesshould concentrate upon a single
objective in a single day. For
example, suppose 100 squadrons are available and that it isdesired to attack Mannheim andthe Ludwigshafen Works. Assuming a time-table of threeminutes between squadrons, thismeans a bombardment of about
five continuous hours. If immediately afterwards, on the next
possible day, Frankfurt were at-tacked in a similar way, judging be possible in the future only bytaking the matter in hand immefrom the press reports of what
diately and working at extreme
has already occurred in Gerpressure from now on till operamany, it is quite possible that
Cologne would create such trou- tions are able to commence next
year. Therefore, it becomes imble that the German Government might be forced to suggest mediately essential to ldecide infavor of such an operation forterms if that town were so attacked. Furthermore, after such next year and to take the necessary steps to organize and to put
a bombardment, the manufacturing works would be wrecked into operation such a campaign
and the morale of the workmen as that proposed herein. Neither
would be shattered. It is also to can it be said that an operation
be remembered that in chemical such as this is impossible. All ofworks of this nature a fire once us well remember the huge cry
started will spread and that with of “Impossible!” that went up
when it was proposed to consuch a bombardment going on
throughout such a length of time centrate enormous artillery attacks on the German lines such,the organization of the fire brifor example, as the British havegade and fire protection, in theconcentrated during the months
already undermanned German
villages, would be broken down of August and September
and therefore the results would against the German Front. Every
one of us can now see that what
be out of proportion to the imlooked impossible in the past has
mediate effects of the bombs.
Germany has shown by her at- become a reality accomplishedtempts to wreck havoc with the with ease in the present. So,with this bomb-dropping cammorale of the Allied nations, insuch cases as the bombardment paign, while the difficulties lookof London, that her own human large at present they will become
feasible realities if we only startnature lends itself to having
havoc wrecked with it in a simi- immediately to prepare.
lar manner, and the press reVII. Future Operatnons.
ports taken from German papers(a) After starting the campaign
indicate that this conclusion isas indicated herein, the difficulcorrect.
ties connected with the com(s) It cannot be pointed out
mencement become negligible;that the scheme suggested
but those connected with transherein is possible now; but it will portationand supply of both
personnel and material becomelarger as the campaign increases
in size, and it will therefore benecessary for railroad and materiel facilities to increase proportionately with the increase in size

Gorrell: StrategicalBombardmentof the campaign, until we worku p to a climax where our airplanes are dropping bombs ontargets in the same proportion as
when the artillery shells a target.
Statistics will show very easily
that, given a fixed amount of
explosives to destroy a target,
aerial bomb-dropping will reachand destroy this target with less
explosive, fewer shells, and lessexpenditure of money than isrequired for the artillery and infantry to destroy a target of similar importance to the final issueof the campaign. For practicallythree years the artillery has constantly shelled German positions
and the infantry has sacrificed anenormous number of human
lives, only to gain an insignificant
number of miles along the Front.
With a similar expenditure inaerial bomb-dropping of money,
material, and human beings, thetransportation in the rear of theGerman lines and the supplies ofall sorts of material to the German troops could long ago havebeen cut off.

VIII.

Cooperation of theA1lies.
(a) The targets chosen in thisprogram to be attacked, and thebases from which it is expected
to deliver our attacks, are thesame as those contemplated by
the British in their proposal to
wreck the manufacturing centersof Germany and by the Frenchin such programs as they areproposing. The British are seri-

1ti1

ously considering such a bomb- all the Allied land armies. Therefore, in view of the concentration
dropping campaign, but havementioned herein, as well as
not started in earnest on thenecessary preparation for such a other vital considerations, it issuggested as the proper part ofcampaign. The French production program for both airplanes America, especially in view ofher aerial production, to take theand bombs, as well as for personnel, does not lend itself to an initiative in bringing about such acoordination.
attack on the large scale proposed, during 1918, on the
IX. Necessity for
manufacturing centers of Gerimmediate action.
many. The money appropriated(a) Since a bomb-droppingby the American Congress was
campaign does not mean theappropriated with the idea inmere supplying of airplanes andview of dropping the maximum bombs, and since many othertonnage of bombs on German
features, as hereinbefore indimanufacturing centers andcated, enter into a project suchmeans of transportation, and the as that contemplated herein, it isAmerican public as well assuggested that unless a decision
American industries and financial is made to commence this campurse-string lend themselves topaign and to commence it imthis idea and have so lent them- mediately, we cannot hope toselves since the beginning of the operate during 1918. Therefore,
War. We find America today
it is requested that approval ofbuilding an aerial program withthis project be given immediately
the sole idea of such a campaign and that the necessary authority
against Germany as that outlined to carry it out be granted inherein, and therefore American order that it may be started withbacking of this program is cerout loss of time and in order thattain. British participation in thisit may be under way in the
campaign is also certain. French spring or summer of 1918. If it iswillingness to participate in such not begun at that time, it musta campaign is certain, although
go over until 1919. It is not too
her materiel, especially, and her late yet to commence this campersonnel, to a minor degree, do paign; but the time when its
not lend themselves to such acommencement is possible withlarge scale operation as either
success is drawing to a close,
the Americans or the British are hence the urgency of immediate
prepared to undertake. Thereapproval of this scheme.
fore, since all three nations will
be desirous of participating insuch a campaign as this and toparticipate against the same targets and from, roughly, the samebases, it is suggested that there
be coordination of the .efforts of

Air Service
Plans and F’rograms

152

B. Sequel
After adopting the program for
operations it next became necessary to decide upon the staff for
Officer in Charge of StrategicalAviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. It was
decided that the staff should becomprised of the following officers:(a) Executive Officer.
(b) Adjutant(c) Intelligence Officer.
(d) Meteorological Officer.
(e) Armament Officer.
(f) Engineering Officer.
(9)Supply Officer.
(h) Photographic Officer.
(i) Telephone Officer.
(j) Wireless Officer.
(k) Medical Officer.
(1) Transportation Officer.
(m) Officer In Charge of Pursuit
and Observation Forces,(n) Interpreter.

Steps were taken to obtain a few
of these officers to start the workof this force.
On December 22, 1917, aconference was held at French
G. H.Q., at Compiegne, wherein
the following representatives
participated,British:-Major General Sir
Hugh Trenchard, General Officer Commanding the Royal
Flying Corps, in the Field.
French:-General D ~ v a l l , ~Commanding the French Air
Service, in the Field.
United States:-LieutenantColonel E. S. Gorrell, Officer in
Charge of Strategical Aviation, Z
of A., A. E. F.
5. Maurice Duvall

At this meeting General Trenchard told that he had been ordered by his Government to establish a force of bombardment
aviation in the vicinity of Nancy
for the purpose of bombarding
the industrial centers of Germany, that whether or not the
Allies intended to join with him
in this work did not affectwhether or not he continued
such work, and that he intended
to increase the size of his force
and to push this work to its
maximum extent in compliancewith the orders of his Govemment on this subject. The Frenchsaid that, in their opinion, it did
not pay to heterogeneously
bombard enemy industrial centers and that the Allies must remember bombardment of Allied
towns by the enemy was a mucheasier task than bombardment ofenemy towns by the Allies, andtherefore not only from the pointof view of the fact that the materiel was unavailable for this purpose but also from the point ofview of the fact that the use ofbombardment aviation as contemplated by the British did notagree with French tactical plans
and that the French did not expect to join in this operation.
The American representative
stated that it was the intention of
the United States to also undertake this work along the lines
now being commenced by the
British but that he could notpledge the United States or the
A.E.F. to such a procedure forthe reason that decision on that
subject lay with G.H.Q., A.E. F.

During the Christmas Holidays, 1917, the Chief of Air
Service, accompanied by LieutColonel Gorrell visited I-leadquarters of the Royal Flying
Corps in the Field, for the purpose of discussing this question
with General Trenchard, theGeneral Officer Commanding
the R.F.C., in the Field. At thismeeting General Trenchard proposed that, since he had alreadybegun to operate from theNancy District, and since theAmericans had yet to make theirfirst beginning in this work, that
the Americans profit by such experience as he may have gained
and such installation as he may
have established and place theirfirst few squadrons with hisforces in order to train the Americans and to allow them to profit
by what experience the British
may have already obtained. If
the Americans had one squadron it would be General Trenchard’s intention to place thissquadron in an airdrome withseveral other British squadrons,
the combination of squadrons
being commanded by a British
officer. When the Americans had
several squadrons they would
occupy an airdrome by themselves, being commanded by an
American officer, to report to the
British Commander in that District. When the Americans
placed a larger force in the fieldGorrell: StrategicalBombardment

than the British had there, General Trenchard proposed to turnover the command in that district, at such time as Americans
should thus begin to secure predominance in the combinations,to the Americans and to allow
the British to serve under an
American Commander in that
region. These propositions, because they offered both training
and maintenance facilities to theAmerican Air Service, both ofwhich were lacking and both ofwhich promised to be difficult tobe obtained, were accepted by
the Chief of Air Service. However, it may here be said, thatshortly after this conference
General Trenchard was recalled
to England and General Salmond6 took his place in the field.
Later, approximately the summer of 1918, the British Bombardment Forces in the vicinityof Nancy were separated fromthe Royal Air Force in the Field
and placed under the commandof General Trenchard, who
would honor the orders of noone except the British Air Ministry. General Trenchard received
no orders and would acknowledge no superior in the Field,
not even Marshal Foch, who wesupposed to command the Allied
forces on the Western Front.
This turn of affairs necessitated achange in the American attitude
towards the problems then confronting them. The Americans
had recognized and loyally supported Marshal Foch as the Allied Commander-in-Chief andtherefore could not assist the

1!j3

British Independent Air Force inits efforts. It was therefore decided on June 18, 1918, by the
Chief of Staff, A.E.F., that while
cooperating in every possible
way with air forces of our Allies,
the Air Bombardment Forcemust remain an actual integral
part of the American Expeditionary Forces. The Chief of Staff on
this same date uttered the fundamental principles of the Bombardment Force when he said
every one must be impressedwith the importance of the principle of the concentration of theeffort of each arm, and of allcoordination and all effort to acommon tactical end. He thensaid that all must be warned
against any idea of independence and all must know from the
beginning that every force must
be closely coalescent with thoseof the remainder of the Air Service and with those of the GroundArmy. He further stated that inmaking of arrangements with the
British it must be thoroughly
understood that, when the aerial
forces reached a certain importance, the regions to be bombed
would be designated by G.H.Q.,
A.E.F. and that the selection of
the targets would depend solely
upon their importance with respect to the operation which the
A.E.F. contemplated for its
Ground Army.’
The Office of the StrategicalAviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. wasbeing utilized for duties otherrhan those belonging purely to
6 . John Maitland Salmond.
7 See Doc. 38.

this office and it was proposed toalso place him as Assistant to the
Supply Officer of the Air Service.
With this in mind, this officer
wrote the following memorandum for the Chief of Air Service,
which is quoted herein solely forthe purpose of setting forth someof the problems which presented
themselves as of January 1,
1918.
American Expeditionary Forces
Paris, January 2, 1918.
Memorandum for
Chief of Air Service.
1. It is of the maximum importance possible at the present
time that the officer detailed forcharge of bombing should takeup the reins if he is to bring anefficient, well-trained team to thefront at the speed at which deliveries are to take place. Not onl,ythat this officer take up his own
duties forthwith, but he mustcollect his technical staff aroundhim without delay, and fight thle
thousand and one duties in the
all-too-short time at his disposal.
2. The fact that the UnitedStates is only now entering into
the contest makes it almost impossible to obtain the number of
specialist officers required, andthe men chosen for these duties
must be allocated to the best
centers for their own instruction.

Air Service
Plans and Programs154

The British and French after
three and a half years of experience have decided on the personnel, spares and materiel required for their units, and theclosest liaison is necessary forthe officer commanding American bombing to reap the fulladvantage of their experience. It
is probable that the original
American bombing units will
work under British command,and it is necessary to study the
British organization with a viewto blending in with it efficiently.
The O.C.'s decision is required,after consultation with the British, as to the most important
position from which to operatewith a view to the preparation ofvarious sites, and to determine
the methods of supply of thosesites. He must inspect the bombing units in order to become
himself au fait with work in thefield and to obtain a close understanding of the operations
undertaken. He should inspect
the English training schools forbombing, choose the commanding officers for the orignal units,
and see that they are competent,
efficient and well-trained and organize many other details.

3. Accurate bombing on alarge scale is a new science andrequires the entire time andstudy of the man who is toshoulder the responsibility forsuccess or failure during thecoming year.
4. The following points must
be immediately considered anddecided upon, and time will be
required to do this in accordancewith the estimate set forth hereinafter.
Time
Decision should be madewith regard to having thesame organization of units
as the British have, and thenecessary study is required
to harmonize ourorganization and the British
since not even the British
have yet decided on a partof their organization.
Obtain staff and send
them to learn their duties,
shce strategical aviation is
the most unknown part ofaeronauhcs.
Obtain office rooms andclelks.
Establsh well-informed
intelligence
Lay down detailed
program to be iollowed in
1918 and prepare this toexchange with British andFrench in accordance withagreement Dec. 22.
Work out monthly
tonnage for railroads andgive them estimate ofrequirements. Indicate
where railheads andrailroad installations arenecessary
Obtain accurate list ofdeliveries from every
source. See if sufficient
supples of every kind havebeen ordered for strategicalaviation. Place requisitions
for what has not yet beenordered.

2 weeks

days pick 'Iaff
monthsinstruction forthem.

2 daysmths.
at least 4 rn<

weeks

2 weeks.

week

Decide on commandersof first units; dispatch themfor training.
Obhin necessary
Specialists from England asa loan for two months
during winter inaction
Consult with and learn fromthem principles taught by
their experience.
Choose aerodromes forsquadrons that will be readyby end of June. Chooseparks and depots. Get theseapproved and preparation
under way, even if onlywith a very few workmen
Choose dummy
aerodromes.
Choose concentration
aerodromes.
Choose hopping-off
aerodromes.
Give to Instruction
Department ourrequirements of pilots andobservers shaving number
and date. Follow progress.
Give to Personnel
Department and Instruction
Department list showing
different trades which will
be required m organization.
Have preparedsatisfactory map ofGermany. since none exists
now
Obtain schedule ofbombing training school m
England and follow
progress made in that
school.
Visit English andAmerican bombing schools.
Inspect bombing units inthe field now and learn thework myself.
Inspect aerodromes
allocated for bombing work.
Obtain schedule ofnavigation training in
England get mariners into
U.S.schools; work with
Training Department
tauards perfection ofcourse.

days pickcornmanders7 lo
3 months fortraining.

at least 2 weeks.

2 umeeks search. 2
weeks sulvey; 2 to
3 u'eeks forapproval. Time forwork depends
u w n number ofmen used.
2 ueeks choice, 2weeks connectedwith their
preparation.

2 weeks
2 weeks.
1 day. plus
variable time
following progress.

3 days.

2 woeks work. 2%
moriths
supc!nrision.

1 weekw"eks'
at least 1 month

wt'eks.

1 week.

1!55

Gorrell: StrategicalBombardment

Consultation reorganization meterologicaldays'
serwe as it affects bombing
at long range
Obtain information on
progress of wirelesstelegraph for navigation;days
initiate improvements.
Check petrol
3 daysarrangements.
Personnel force keep
track all our men working
on Strategical Aviation on
British Force.

Continuous after
March.

Contact with Allies
learning from them, keeping
up with them, and1 month.
coordinating our plans withthem.
Laying out equipment
depots. parks, etc.

1 month

5. The above schedule showsthat some 14 months would benecessary in order to be prepared to carry on this work if
one person were to attempt to
do it himself. With an efficient
staff things can be divided intoclasses and separated, and thework can be started by June, but
not before. The person who is tobe responsibile for the success or
failure must be on hand at all
times to handle the staff andmake the necessary decisions.
6. This is the class of work
which we have promised ourCongress, our County and ourAllies that we would do, and it isof utmost importance that weare prepared to carry out wholeheartedly, efficiently and without
delay.
Respectfully submitted,(signed) E.S. Gorrell
Lt-Colonel, A.S.S. C.

1918, was detailed to report toAn effort was made to set
upon an American organization the Chief of Staff, A.E.F., on
February 5, 1918, for this duty
for the Bombardment units ofDuring the first part of Februthe Strategical Aviation of theary 1918, the office of the Chief
A.E.F., similar to the organizaof Air Service was moved fromtion adopted by the British because of the fact that the British G.H.Q. to Tours and Colonel F L
0. Van Horn, Air Service, who
had had experience in this capacity while the Americans had had been detailed by the Chiefof Air Service as Operations 01had no such experience, beficer in the Air Service (whichcause the British were alreadydesignation of Air Service wasengaged upon this work, andbecause it was essential that the later ordered, by the Chief oforganizations be similar in order Staff, A.E.F., to be discontinued,
to allow the commanding officer for the reason that no such office
and any Allied officers engaged existed within the Air Service)
moved to Colombey-les-Belles
upon the work to realize theextent of the striking force under with his office force. The Chiefof Air Service appointed Colonel
his command.
Thus at this date, December, A. Monell," Air Service, in the
Office of Colonel Van Horn and1917, American plans based
to command the Strategicaltheir organization upon the"Group" to be the smallest self- Aviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. Colocontained bombardment tactical nel Monell was assisted by Major
unit. The Americans had no ex- Fowler: Air Service, and Wing
pectation of bombing by squad- Commander Spencer Grey,"rons but to bombard by groups R.N.A.S. The work previously
started was carried on by Coloand perhaps by various combinations of groups whenever the nel Monell for a month or so. In
the meantime Major Fowler weistarget to be attacked should be
relieved from duty with this work
worthy of it.
Just after the middle of Janu- and sent to command the Amerary, 1918, the Chief of Air Serv- ican Air Forces with the B.E.F. in
the Field. Wing Commander
ice was ordered by G.H.Q. to
Spencer Grey, R.N.A.S., bedetail an Air Service officer for
duty in the Operations Section( G 3 ) ,on the General Staff.
Lieut-Colonel Gorrell was re9. Harold Fowler, who had served with ':helieved from duty as Officer inRoyal Flying Corps and had franslerred to I:heCharge of Strategical Aviation, Z U.S. Air Service in 1917.
10. While in charge of the Strategicalof A., A.E.F. and by Par 7, S.O.
Gorrell had arranged for Grey to21, H.A.E.F., dated January, 21, Section.
serve on his staff Grey, he said "was con8 Ambrose Monell, who had resigned thepresidencyof the International Nlckel Company

lo accept a wmmlsslon in the U S Armysidered at that time as the worlds greatest
authority on questions dealing with aerlal
bombardment." (Early History of the Strategical Section. in Gorrell's History. 6-6 p
372).

156

coming discouraged over the
failures of the American Production Program and realizing in detail what would be necessary before America could begin a Strategical Bombardment campaignof any size, left the American Air
Service and returned to the Air
Service of his own Government.
Later on Wing Commander
Grey was attached to the Air
Service of the US. Naval
Forces, operating in Europe forthe purpose of bombarding enemy submarine bases.
Colonel Monell after having
selected an airdrome at Latrecey, several bombardment airdromes on the Toul Sector, andan airdrome near St. Blin, andhaving seen that construction
work was begun on each ofthese, realized that the larger
problems that faced the strategical aviation operations of the Air
Service were industrial. He also
realized that the pursuit operation of strategical aviation would
not and could not become areality for several years, due tothe failure of the Allies to deliver
pursuit planes to the American
Air Service in accordance with
their promises made in the Fallof 1917, and due to the fact thatno pursuit machines, because ofsuch promises, were being constructed in the United States.

Air Service
Plans and Programs

Therefore, there remained only
one possible future for the Strategical Aviation-that was aerial
bombardment. The D.H. airplane was being handled satisfactorily at Romorantin” insofar
as its assembly was concerned.
However the assembly of theHandley-Page airplane presented a more difficult situationand thereafter Colonel Monell
concentrated his attention upon
the question of the night bombardment program.
The use of the words “Strategical Aviation” had led many
persons, in and out of the Air
Service, to believe that this operation of the Air Service wassomething independent from therest of the Air Service and notdependent at all upon the rest of
the Army. In order to eliminate
such an idea and to cause arealization of the fact that theStrategical Air Service was employed as an integral part of the
Air Service, A.E.F. and thereforeof the entire A.E.F. and in orderto force a realization of the factthat American Bombardment
Aviation should and would be
used as a combat arm upon
missions synchronizing with andcoordinated with the missions of
the entire A.E.F., the name Strategical Aviation was changed in
the Summer of 1918 to “G.H.Q.
Air Service Reserve.” Thischange had the desired effectand brought home the realization of the fact that this bom-

1 1 Air Service Production Center No 2

bardment aviation was a combat
portion of the Army designed foruse upon missions coordinatedwith the entire use of the A.E.F.
in Europe.
Plans were made in G 3 ,G.H.Q., A.E.F. for the future useof the Bombardment Aviation
when it should arrive at the size
consistent with its being used as
G.H.Q. Air Service Reserve. It
was contemplated that any bombardment units in existence prior
to the time when this reserve
had reached a growth sufficient
to justify its creation as a G.H.Q.
Air Service Reserve would be
used as a part of the Army Air
Service of the various American
Armies in the Field or in somespecific cases units might probably be placed with the Eiritish
Independent Air Force, later
known as the Inter-Allied Air
Force, for the purpose of receiving training in long distancebombardment. It being understood by the nations concernedthat our bombardment forcesmust remain an actual integral
part of the American Expeditionary Forces.

157

GorrelI: StrategicalBombardment

Looking at this Section previously known as the StrategicalAviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. andgazing upon it with a hind-sightview of one year, in January,
1918, the time when the plans
hereinbefore quoted were originally made, there are two great
faults which are easily seen.
(a) Entirely too much optimism was felt for the American
Production Program.
(b) The Air Service failed tosecure the approval of the General Staff of its plans for the

Assembly of a Handley-Page bomber.

employment of this aviation andconsequently suffered from thefact that its plans for the use of
the Strategical Air Service were
not synchronized properly, especially from a mental point ofview of its employment, with theideas of the G.H.Q.
These of course are hindsight view points.
The second point is inexcusable only upon the grounds ofinexperience but the first point
presents the same facts as affected the entire Air Service,
namely, a program far too large
to be realized in the length oftime allowed for its production.
There is no one to be blamed
for this program for it had theapproval and encouragement of
the highest authorities in Europe
and it was only cold matter offact experience which proved to
the world the fact that money
and men could not make an air
program over night and that thetime to prepare for war was notafter war had been declared but,as quoted from the first President of the United States: “Intime of peace let us prepare
for war.”30- FOU~O~S:

Soon after becoming Chiefof Air Service, Foulois madea number of recommendations t o Pershing's Chief ofStaff. H i s memorandum w a s
devoted mainly t o organizational and logistical problems, but one item had to d owith aerial operations. T h efollowing is an extract froman account written by Foulois
in 1919.'............................
X-26. Under my orders fromthe War Department, I proceeded to General Headquarters
A.E.F. and reported for duty to
the Commander in Chief, on
November 16, 1917.
I was directed to make aninspection and report upon the
Air Service activities as they existed at that time. While uponthis inspection trip, I was assigned to duty as Chief of Air
Service, A.E.F. (November 27,
1917), relieving Brigadier General Kenly.
X-27. Upon completion of myinspection trip, and pursuant to
my assignment as Chief of Air
Service, effective November 27,
1917, the following memoranda
for the Chief of Staff, A.E.F.
were submitted.

1 In AFSHRC 168 68-5

-1 !59

Memorandum for The Chief of
Staff
December 1, 1917
Subject: Recommendations
for Air Service.

The following recommendations for the Air Service are submitted for consideration:............................
8. That a comprehensive planof air operations (including
bombing) be authorized at once,
and that authority for the necessary construction and material
be given, in order that fighting
and bombing operations in cooperation with the French andBritish Flying Corps may be carried on at the earliest practicabledate. (General plans now being
prepared will be submitted assoon as ready.)
B.D. Foulois,
Brigadier General, S.C.

Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois. Chief of Air Service, AEF(November 1917-May 1918).

31, F o u J o ~ : R e p o ~ t

1Eil

2 3 Decernbea 1917

In a memorandum t oPershing's Chief of Staff on
23 December 1 9 1 7 , Foulois
devoted considerable s p a c e
t o what h e had recently
learned about bombing. His
recommendations included
support for Gorrell's bombing plan (Doc. 2 9 ) and forcooperation with t h e British
and French in strategical operations.'

1 In Gorrell's History. A - I , pp 131-136

Memorandum for the Chief ofStaff.
Subject. Report on Air
problems, A.E.F., andrecommendations resame.
The undersigned reported for
dutV at G. H. Q. November
16th 1917, was assigned to
dutV as Chief of Air Service per(3.0. 66 H.A.E.F., November
27, 1917.
From November 16 to November 25, I visited and conferred with Major General Trenchard, Royal Flying Corps,
Commanding the R.F.C., in
France; visited and conferredwith GWVX~~Pet&% and cobriel
in charge of French
aviation on General Petain's
Staff.

mation and data as obtained
from official French and British
Military and Civil sources.

............................
11. Each and every high offi-

cial, military and civilian, withwhom I have conferred has
frankly stated that under the existing conditions of ship tonnage,
the most swift and effective assistance which the United States
can give during the Summer andFall of 1918, is through its airforces,
The war policy of Great Britain for 1918places (1)Tonnav;(2)Air Service; (3) Army personnel, in the foregoing order ofpriori~.This infomation I received officially from one of themost prominent members of the
British War Cabinet.
12. The foregoing opinion of............................
English and French military ancl
h m the date of assignment civil officials as regards the comas C.A.S., November 27, UP to parative effectiveness, during
the present date, 1 have also had 1918,of troops on the grounda conference in Paris with Lord as compared with air troops andNorthcliffe, representative of
airplanes in the air is concurred
Lord Rothermere, the President in or was concurred in, twoof the British Air Board; numer- months ago, by the Congress ofous conferences with our own
the United States, a great porAir Service Officers in Paris, and tion of U.S. Army and by thehave just returned from a four
American public.
days conference in London withThe English, French andthe British Air Ministry andAmerican military and civil offimembers of the British War
cials heretofore mentioned fully
Cabinet.
believe that the air campaign ofAs a result of these confer1918 will be the most severeences and investigations into ourown needs as heretofore tentatively outlined by the Air Service, A.E.F., the following generalsummary of our air problems is
submitted, also general air infor-

162

and critical insofar as its effect on
the morale of the English andFrench civil population is concerned.
The effect, of air raids, on
England during the past few
months, has absolutely reversed
the British war policy which existed four months ago, as rcgards reprisals on Germany. Today the cry is “Bomb theHuns.”
During my visit last week in
London I saw two small air raids
and saw four civilians killed by ashell within one hundred yards
from where I was standing. I also
saw hundreds of poor people
sleeping on the station platformsof the underground railway stations, because they were too
frightened to go to their homes.
So far, the air raids on London
and the coast of England havebeen carried out by Germansquadrons in very small numbers, and on this particular raid
only about 40 bombs were
dropped. The morale effect,
however, on the British people,of this small number of bombs
was very great in proportion to
the physical damage (10 killed,
70 w o u n d e d 4 small fires andseveral houses wrecked).

Air Service
Plans and Programs

Upon investigation, the morning after this raid, I learned thatfrom the time the first warning issent out until the “all clear” signal was given, practically all
work ceases in factories andother industries. This particularraid which I witnessed, kept theanti-aircraft batteries surrounding
London, busy for nearly fourhours, putting up a barrage
about the city.
When one computes the manhours lost, in a city the size of
London, it is readily understood
why the British War policy is
being directed to taking active
offensive measures against the
air menace of the Germans.
There were approximately 20
airplanes estimated to have been
engaged in this raid, and I could
not learn that there had everbeen a larger number engaged
in any single raid on England.
The British Secret Service,
however, have informed us that
Germany is exerting every effort
to produce a great number ofbombing squadrons for offensive
use during 1918.
Such being the case, weshould most seriously and mostpromptly consider the probablemorale effect on the French andEnglish civil populations, in theevent that the Germans attain air
supremacy in night bombing
in 1918.

From a strictly tactical viewpoint, if Germany secures air supremacy in night bombing in
1918, the first military objectiveof the German Air Service willbe the Allies Airdrome:, and theirsquadrons, in order to prevent
counter-offensive on the part of
the Allies.
At the present time there is noeffective method of combatingnight bombing raids, and theonly answer to the prcjblem is tobuild more night bombing
squadrons than the enemy andcarry on a greater offensive
bombing campaign against him.
13. The Air Service, A.E.F.
has collected a great amount of
information, maps and data, on
the most vital military industrial
centers in Germany, where submarine essentials, munitions,chemicals, iron, steel, engines
and airplanes are manufactured
all of which are within bombing
distance of the Verduri-Toul
region.
The British and French authorities have fully appreciatedthe importance of a strategic air
offensive against German industrial centers and lines of communications, but they have neverduring the present war, beenable to provide enough personnel and airplanes to take care of
the tactical air units with troops,
and also provide additional units
for strategical offensive
operations.

Foulois: Reporton Air Service Problems

Our e n t y into the war withlarge resources of personnel andaircraft materials, if promptly
taken advantage of, will allow
the Allies and ourselves to takethe strategical offensive next
Summer, against the German industrial centers, German airdromes and German lines ofcommunications.
14. The British Air Ministy
and the British War Cabinet are
now preparing a communication
to be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F. recommending that the British, Frenchand American Air Services takethe necessay steps toward inaugurating a combined strategic
offensive against German industrial centers without further delay. This communication shouldreach these headquarters withina few days.
Recommendations in Air
Service Policy A.E.F.
15. In view of the foregoingstatement of the needs of the Air
Service, A.E.F. and the trend of
our efforts toward a co-ordinated
air policy with our Allies, it isrecommended:
First: Provide the necess a y air personnel and material
for tactical operations withtroops.
Second: Take immediate
steps in co-operation with the
British and French authorities for
a combined strategical fighting
and bombing campaign in 1918
against German industrial centers, German airdromes, German aero squadrons and German lines of communications.

163

Third: Settle as quickly as
possible, the question as to priority of Aviation personnel andmaterial over other personnel
and material.
Fourth: Determine, as
quickly as possible, the amountof tonnage per month whichshould be set aside for aviation
peronnel and material.
Fifth: Obtain official approval of the air program A.E.F.
with the least possible delay, inorder that the C.A.S. may take
immediate steps to cany it into
effect, without further loss oftime.
Sixth: Designate threemembers of the General Staff towork with the Air Service, indrawing up, in detail, a complete
and co-ordinated air schedule toinclude all questions regarding
instruction, training, organization, transportation and supply.
B. D.Foulois,
Brig. Gen’I S.C.
C.A.S.

w-

Ma!. Gen. Hunter Uggctt (taken as Brig. Gen.). commander of
I Corps. was one of the few air-minded U.S. infantry generals ofWorld War 1.

32. Corrmmna OF
T h e A k S e R u i c e , AEF

165

24 DecembeR 1917

As plans were made in December 1917 to organize anarmy corps in the AEF, orders concerning command of
aviation units were revised.
When I Corps was formed in
January under the commandof Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggetl inJanuary 1918, Mitchell became Chief of Air Service, I
Corps and Corps Air Service
Commander.

Headquarters, A.E.F.
France, December 24, 1917.

General Orders,No. 801. 1. The Chief of the Air
Service will exercise general supervision over all elements of the
Air Service and personnel assigned thereto, and will control
directly all Air Service units andother personnel not assigned totactical commands or to theL. of c.

............................

3. The Air Service units ineach army will be under thegeneral supervision of the Army
Air Commander, who will control directly all air units and other
Air Service personnel on dutywith that army and not assigned
to Army Corps or other subordinate commands. The Air Service
units of each Army Corps will be
under the direct control of theCorps Air Commander.
4. Sec 11, G.O. 46, c. s.,these headquarters, is revoked.

............................
By command ofGeneral Pershing:
James G. Harbord,
Brigadier General,
Chief of Staff.

166

Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) James G. Harbord served as Gen.
P m h w ’ a Chlcf of Staff at Hudquartero. AEF. (Sketch by
Joseph Cummings Chase).

33- 1oo-squu6Ror2
Sch&uJe167

I J a n u a R y 1918

Followingrecommendations made by Foulois on 10
December 1917 and again on
23 December (Docs. 30 and
3 1 ) , a three-man committee
w a s appointed to review Air
Service policies, priorities,
and schedules. Taking into
consideration
production,
construction, and other problems, t h e committee concluded that 60 service squadrons ready for combat by theend of June 1918, and 100 by
the end of the year, would bet h e most that could b e attained. Following are the report of the committee’ and amemorandum
indicating
Pershing’s qualified
approval.2

1

In Gorrell’s History, A - I , pp 136-138

2 AFSHRC 168 68-5

January 1, 1918.
Memorandum for the C. of S.
Subject: Air Service Program.
1. In accordance with memorandum dated December 21stand your subsequent verbal instructions, the following report is
submitted:
2. The committee consulted
British Staff Officers. Their opinion appears to be that infantry
divisions with corresponding
aviation units were most necessary for the immediate futurethat no additional aviation
should be brought over until anarmy (including its aviation) wason hand or the situation considered safe. It was, however, admitted that the total number ofdivisions might be reduced by
one by August, 1918, in order tobring over its equivalent tonnagein extra aviation. The principal
reasons advanced were probable
German superiority on this front,that the British infantry wasmuch worn from fighting anddeficient in strength.
3. The Committee also consulted the French Staff. In a general way their discussion may besummarized as follows: They believe an increase of aviation, especially pursuit and bombardment units, will be the most important reinforcement that the
Allies will need, stating as a reason for this, that to obtain control of the air will go far toward
rendering a German offensive
ineffective.

4. The ability of the U.S. tohelp the Allies this Spring andSummer will not be great either
in trained divisions or in avialion
ilnits. The number of the latter
will be limited also by productionof planes, instruction of pilots,
and other factors.
5. In order to permit the Air
Service to be developed within
its limiting factors such priority
should be given to extra air units
as will not unduly delay the formation of a balanced army (including its aviation). With theforegoing in mind it is believedthat the weight of the extra aviation should be directed toward,
lst, pursuit, and 2nd, bombardment squadrons.
6. Based on the best estimate
obtainable in which allowance
has been made for delays inproduction, preparation ofgrounds, etc., the Committee
believes the following to beabout the probable maximum
attainment. The program for December 31, 1918, is of course,
less accurate and should be considered as subject to later revision, when circumstances warrant it. Program for 1919 to beconsidered as soon as developments this Spring permit it to betaken up:

169

100-Squadron
Schedule

Type of Unit
Servre Squadrons
School Squadrons
Park Squadrons (incl.
supply & repair)
Construction Squadrons
Total Squadrons
Total men

To be inselvice
June 30.
1918.

To be hservice
Decernber 31,
1918.

60
40

100
50

70
20

100
20

190
28,500270
40,500- _ _The above includes personnel
now in England and France.
Balance to amve progressively inEngland and France by April 1st

The plans devised late in 1917
called for a number of Park
Squadrons to assemble and repair
aircraft. Top left photo shows wingassembly in progress; bottom left
shows the interior of an engine
repair shop. Aviation mechanics forthese tasks displayed a badge on theleft breast of the uniform. above
other decorations. It was a l a g e
four-bladed propeller within a whiteembroidered circle (above).

January 5, 1918.
and October lst, respectively.
The probable ratio of service
Memorandum for:squadrons to be: Pursuit 6, ObChief of Air Service
servation 2, Bombardment 1.
Material to be supplied from
Subject:
US. for above service squadAir Service Program.
rons to arrive progressively by
1. The Commander-in-Chief
June 30, 1918, and December
approves the attached report
31, 1918, respectively.
7. The committee recomdated January 1, 1918, subject
mends adoption of the above
Air Service Program, with theunderstanding that it represents
program.
the maximum the Air Service
8. A separate report will be
submitted regarding the balloon can attain. He desires no change
for the present in the schedule
program.
for shipment of aviation troops
Signed: W. B.
Col., Auiation Sec., Sig. Corps but desires that you submit before February loth, a careful esH. A. Drum, timate of Air Service possibilities
Lt. Col., G. S. for the latter part of this year so
A. B. Barber, that the schedule for the period
Lt. Col., G. S., A.E.F. following the 1st of April may be
again considered.
2. There is returned to you,herewith, your report on Air
Service program, A.E.F.; it is liesired that you take up with theproper sections of the General
Staff and supply departments
and various detail questions presented in your report so that theCommander-in-Chief s decision
may be canied out promptly.
Ry direction:
W. D. Connor,
Acting Chief of Staff.

3 Bum was Assistant Chief of kr Service
for Policy, Drum and Barber. who had
worked on the GOP. represented the Operations and Administrative Sections. respectively

171

In giving tentative approvalto the work of the Burtt committee on 5 January 1 9 1 8 ,Pershing asked for a reviewof the schedule for the last
half of 1918. As a result ofthat review, Foulois raised
the number of service squadrons to b e ready by 31 December 1918.'
February 6, 1918.
Memorandum:For Chief of Staff(Administration Section)(Operations Section)
Subject: Estimate Air Service
possibilities latter part 1918.
The following program of the
Air Service is submitted as being
the probable increase in the
project already authorized forthe latter part of 1918.
2. The project for the latterpart of 1918 calls for the following:%ceat the Front
Schools

Service at the Front

Schools
Park (Supply & Repair)
Construction

120
60
120
100

100
50

Park (Repair
SUP& etc 1

100

20

Conshuction

-

TOTAL

3. An agreement entered intowith the British Air Ministry accounts for approximately 100
squadrons to be trained in England. An additional agreement
calls for the training of 30 bombing squadrons in England, of
which about 12 were considered
as included in the 100 squadrons mentioned in the approved
project.
4. The construction of airdromes and other necessary installations we estimate may use
about 100 squadrons of either
Service or Construction type, of
which, 20 are included in theoriginal project. These squadrons can be exchanged for partof the 100 squadrons in England, obtaining trained men for
untrained.
5.The project recommended
for approval for the latter part of1918, would be as follows:

....
~

~

~

~

~.
........ 270

6. The increase of 130 squadrons is accounted for as follows:
In service for the
front
Schools
Park (Repair etc.)
Construction
TOTAL

1. AFSHAC 168.68-5

20 (bombing)
10
20
80 (work)
130

7. Referring now to cable r12quest for squadrons in November, which called for 30
service and 20 park for 7
months, plus those already here
or enroute, a total of 393 was,contemplated. It should be bornein mind that the agreements withEngland contemplate a total of
about 130 squadrons there fortraining, so that the actual increase herein, is to provide forthose agreements, which fumish
a pool, from which we can dralw,
trained men supplying untrained
men from here in exchange forthem.
8. The equipment required
from the United States will not be
increased over that for the original project for 270 squadrons,
because the men in England willneed no squadron or plane
equipment.
B. D. Foulcis
Brigadier General, A. S., S . C .
Chief of Air Service.

173

CombatFebRuaRy-NouembeR1918

The United States had been at war for more than 10 months
before any US. aviation unit began active operations in France.
The first US. aero squadron to enter combat was the 103d, apursuit unit. Manned by pilots who formerly had fought with
the French in the Lafayette Escadrille, the 103d began operations with the French Fourth Army on 18 February 1918. Laterthat same month the 2d Balloon Company joined the 1st
Division in the line in the sector north of Toul. The Toul Sector,
where the Germans were relatively inactive on the ground andin the air, was the area to which U.S. aviation units were sent in
the spring of 1918 for their initial operations.

35- Mitchell:
G enerzaJ P ~ i niplesc175

3 0ApRil1918

In April 1918, after pursuitand observation squadrons
had begun operations in the
Tout Sector, the Information
Section of the Air Service,A E F published Maj. Frank
Parker’s 10-month-old reporton aviation (Doc. 22), towhich was added the following preface by Mitchell, Air
Commander, Advance.’

General Principles
3. The efficiency of an army isUnderlying the Use of the measured by its ability to carry
Air Service in the Zone of destruction to the enemy’s
forces.
the Advance, A.E.F.
These principles will be held inmind by all personnel in thisService in the execution of their
duty.
Wm. Mitchell.
Lt.-Col., A S . , S.C., A.C.A.

PREFACE
1. The issue of war depends
primarily on the destruction ofan enemy’s military forces in thefield. To bring this about all elements of a nation’s military
power are employed to bringabout a decision on the field ofbattle in the shortest time possible.
2. An army is composed ofvarious arms and services whose
complete interdependence andworking together is necessary for
efficiency. No one arm alone canbring about complete victory.

1 Bulletin of the Information Secton, Air
Service, A E F , Vol 111, NO 132. 30 npr 18

4. The efficiency of any arm isdependent on its military training, experience and direction.
5.The Air Service of an army
is one of its offensive arms.
Alone it cannot bring about adecision. It therefore helps theother arms in their appointed
mission. The measure of thishelp is its efficiency in its
mission.

Lts. Follet Bradley and Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold are seated in
the alrcraft equipped with the “wireleu” outfit they rued for
artlllery adjustment from airplanes in t e e s at Ft. Riley.
Kansas, 2 November 1912 (above). Lts. Arnold and Joseph 0.
Mauborgne make adjustments in the radio set during the tests(below).

17'7

36. A ~ t i J J e ~ z gAbjustment
May 1918

Artillery adjustments by observers in airplanes had become part of the work of the

U S . air service after the firstsuch adjustment was madeby Lieutenants H. H. Arnold
and Follett Bradley at Ft. Riley, Kansas, late in 1912.
W h e n U.S. units went into
combat in France in 1918,
however, they followed procedures derived from French"Instructions on t h e Employment of Aerial Observation in
Liaison with Artillery." Following are extracts from revised instructions based on
the French edition of 29 December 1917 and publishedby GHQ AEF in May 1918.'

Aerial Observation
for Artillery.
Chapter 1. When Used
Airplane.
1. Under favorable atmospheric conditions, the airplane
affords rapid, accurate and, if
necessay, vertical observation,even on distant objectives*. It
can determine the sense* andalso the deviation of shots**.

Notes
1 In Gorrell s History. J-3. beginning p
123
2 Position of burst (deflection andlor
range) with reference to the target
3 Undamped waves, requiring more elaborate equipment. give a more stable signal
and are received more easily and clearly
than damped waves

2. The airplane signals to the This device interferes with thecontinuity of observation andground by means of radio (31,projector, dropped messages, or should be used only when necby signal light. The observer can essay.
Certain airplanes (for comthus report his presence, designate objectives, report the results mand and for high power guns),of fire, and transmit information use radio sets with sustained or
undamped waves*. 3
in regard to both friendly andAirplanes should remain
hostile troops. This information
strictly in their own zones. Theyis received by ground stations.
3. The receiving stations can, should not approach closer thanby means of white cloth panels, two kilometers to their receiving
stations, except for ve y imporradio***,o r projectors, answer
tant messages. Messages sent
the observer's questions andgive a certain number of simple from immediately above the receiving station interfere seriously
indications concerning thewith other messages. With
conduct of fire.
4. Radio.-Radio has greatly proper organization in sending,enhanced the importance of ae- five airplanes can operate on a
rial observation for artillery. Be- kilometer of front.
Technical details concerningcause of the delicate construction of the radio apparatus and the use of radio are prescribed ineach army, army corps and divithe large number of airplanes
which of necessity must operate sion by the Signal Officer.
in a restricted zone, careful orga5. Projectors.-When thenization and strict discipline are number of airplanes is too great
essential in order to avoid confu- to permit all to use radio, thesion.
congestion may be relieved by
Airplanes sending simultane- the use of projectors carried byously may be distinguished by: the airplanes. By day, themethod is applicable only up toa) Call signals for receiving
a limited distance from the restations.
ceiving station.
b) Differences in the waveProjectors on neighboring airlength used.
planes can be distinguished byc) Vaying the tone of thepointing the beam of light careemission.
d) The use, in certain cases, of fully, and by the use of callsignals.
watches with colored dials, bywhich neighboring airplanes
send at alternate specified intervals and thus avoid confusion.
*Under particularly favorable conditions,
airplane observation can be used at night.
**The devialionofa shot is its distance from theobjective.
***Sometimes by radio telephone.

*Ordinarilw. aimlanes use darnwd waves
I

.

178

Following theKansu tests. a major
development in transmitting radiotelegraph messages took place at
the Signal Corps Air Station, San
Diego. in the summer-fall of 1916.
when messages were wnt andreceived from ground to planes,
planes to ground, and between
planes, for the first time in aviation
history. The Glenn L. Martin #50(above) was equipped for theexperiments with sending andreceiving sets (below).

Combat

179

The radio sets inthe airplanes w e n powered by a rmall fanddven generator mounted below the leading edge ofthe lower wing (above). An aezial of braided wlre trailed theaircraft. and a reel attached at the left of thefront cockpit war wed
to reel it into theplane (below).

180

Combat

6. Dropped messages.-This
The personnel of a receiving
information is thus collected.
method is useful in transmitting
station consists of the radio andd ) In each army corps, superinformation concerning objecvising receiving stations are espanel operators supervised bytives or firing. The message isthe radio officer. All are special- tablished near the command
placed in a container provided
ists and must be carefully
post of the corps artillery. They
with a streamer. It should be ‘trained. Suitable replacements
receive from all corps airplanes,
dropped from a height not exshould be provided for.
or at least those having general
ceeding 300 meters, and as
11. The functions of receiving functions (general observation,
close to the receiving station as
stations depend on the tacticalinfantry accompaniment, compossible.
unit to which they pertain. Themand). The corresponding com7. Signal lights.-Generally,following general classification
mands are thus in a position tothese are used only for commu- may be made:exploit promptly all information
nication with the infantry. Duringa) The receiving station of areceived.
the artillery preparation, theire ) Each landing field has abattalion or battery acts princiuse with the artillery may bepally as an adjusting station. It
receiving station for testing theauthorized by proper authority.
receives the reports of the airradio equipment of airplanes
A conventional code must be
leaving, for following the work ofplane observing fire.
prearranged, and only a fewb) The receiving station of a
airplanes at the front, and forproviding relief for airplanes
simple messages can be sent.
sub-group acts as a command
8. Receiving stations.-Eachpost. The airplane calls on it for about to land.
regiment, group, or battalion,
12. Listening service.-In
fire on objectives found in theeach division, army corps, andand sometimes each battery, has zone of the sub-group. It transa radio receiving station.
mits the sub-group commander’s army, the artillery commander,
The artillery radio officer
decision in regard to each objec- in cooperation with the Air Servtransmits the message received
tive. In certain cases of this kind, ice and the Signal Corps, decides what portion of the receivto the unit concerned. The stasuch as battalions and batteries
tion must have exclusive anding personnel shall be used forhaving a special mission, andlistening duty.
continuous communication withprearranged adjustments, theeach battery dependent on it.
At times, particularly during anairplane calls directly on the adWithin a regiment, communicaaction or in open warfare, thejusting station.
tion must be arranged so as to
The receiving station of a sub- artillery commander so organizes
provide alternate stations in case group sometimes replaces an
the listening service that one staof damage to particular stations. adjusting station which is out oftion at least in each regiment or
If the airplane is equippedgroup will be in a position toaction.
with receiving apparatus, the rac) The receiving station of areceive calls from all airplanes
calling the regiment or group,
dio officer handles all messages
regiment or group acts as anfrom the ground station.
information station. It follows the without other previous arrangement. Communication between
9. Telephone communication work of the airplanes with theis covered by Liaison for All
battalions or batteries of the regi- such stations and the units to
Arms4
which they pertain must be carement, and also the observation
10. Each receiving station has airplane and that accompanying fully planned. Whatever be thekind of communication used,thean identification panel enabling it the infantry operating in theto be recognized by an airplane. zone of the regiment. All useful
radio officer is responsible for its
proper operation.
4. See Doc. 40

Artillery Adjustment

Balloon.

13. Balloon observation depends on:a) The altitude of the balloon.
b) The range.
c) The atmospheric conditions.
d) The terrain.

14. Altitude.-Altitude is an
essential condition for good observation. A balloon can ascend
to about 1200 meters with two
observers, and to 1600 or 1800
meten with one observer.
15. Range.-The balloon
should be pushed as far foward
as possible while actually observing, but should be withdrawn at once when it ceases toobserve and while descending.
It has been found by experience that, on a well establishedfront, the balloon can be maneuvered up to within about 9
or 10 kilometers of the front line.
Points of ascension can bewithin 6 or 7 kilometers of thefront line. These distances are
determined by the position of
the friendly and hostile artillery.
They can be reduced when, during preparation for an attack, thehostile artillery is clearly dominated.
16. Atmospheric conditions.Fog, strong wind, rain, and low
clouds ordinarily prevent successful balloon observation.

181

For the present balloons, thelimiting wind velocity is about 18
meters, or 20 meters during an
attack.
17. Terrain.-Even when theballoon is at its maximum altitude, there is generally a portionof the terrain hidden from view.
The balloon commander prepares a visibility sketch for eachpoint of ascension, and transmits
it to the command and the artillery commander.
18. Communication.-Telephone.-The telephone assuresconstant and reciprocal communication between the balloon
and the command and the artillery. It is the normal means. It
should be established so as topermit direct communication between the balloon and the battery whose fire is being observed.
Radio.-Balloon companies
are provided with radio equipment for use when telephone
communication fails.
Visual communication.-In
addition the observer has various means of communication
for use with the infantry whichmay, with prearranged signals,
be used in connection with observation of artillery fire.

Chapter 2. Functions.
19. The functions of aerial ohservation for artillery are:a) Information.
b) General observation.
c) Liaison with the other arms.
d) Observation of fire.

20. Information.-This includes the study of the hostile
positions to locate objectives,
such as command posts, machine gun emplacements, battery positions, communication
trenches, etc.
The best means of obtaining
information is by photography
for the interpretation of aerial
photographs affords information
which would not be noted by anobserver during a reconnaissance.
21. All aerial observers, during
flights or ascensions, cooperate
in obtaining information. This information is collected in each airunit by the intelligence officer
attached, who communicates it
at once to the Intelligence Section and the artillery information
officer.
Similarly the intelligence officer attached to an observation
unit is given such informationfrom other sources as will assist
him in his work.
Objectives are designated bycoordinates. An Objective Cardis made out for each objective,
particularly batteries, giving all
available information. . . .

182

Aerial photographs are the basis for rough sketches in the airunit, provisional interpretation in
the army corps, and subsequent
incorporation in the battle maps.
The destruction maps are also
made up from them.
During active periods, therapid distribution of suchsketches and interpretations is ofprime importance, in order tolocate new objectives promptly
and permit destruction fire.
22. General observation.This includes watching for hostilebatteries in action and determining the objectives on which they
are firing, reporting hostile
troops which can be fired upon,and sometimes observing the
movements of our own troops.
23. Constant observation isve y difficult for airplane squadrons. They have no other means
than sight, since all sounds aredrowned by the motor. They
should be used for such observation only for areas hidden toballoon or terrestrial observation.
Such observation is particularly
the function of the balloon, inareas which are visible to it.
24. General observation requires:Of the aerial observer, a
prompt call for fire, when
deemed appropriate.
Of the command, prompt exploitation of the information obtained.
When practicable, the receiving station informs the aerial observer which battey is to fire.

CombatFor oblectives hidden from
25. Liaison with other arms.See Liaison for All Arms.
balloon observation, ihe balloon
26. Observation of fire.-This
can still be used for a roughincludes fire for adjustment, pre- adjustment to be completed bycision fire for effect, and verifica- airplane observation, or for thetion during precision fire for ef- observation of fire for effect begun with airplane observation.
fect, zone fire, and systematicfire.
29. The assignment of the
The observer can determine
available aerial cbsewation is
not only the sense but also thebased on the orders of the comdeviation, if each salvo or volley mand and of the artilley and on
the reports rendered by the Air
is fired at his signal.
In fire for adjustment or verifi- Service.
30. Coordination of balloons
cation and for precision fire forand airplanes-Close coordinaeffect, the method fulfills thiscondition, and airplane observa- tion of balloons and airplanes
and a careful assignment of dution is v e y advantageous. It
saves ammunition and increases ties to each are essential for successful aerial observation. For
the efficacy of the fire.
For zone and systematic fire, this reason both are placed under the Air Service commander
in which the volleys are firedof the army corps or army.
without notifying the observer,
The general assignment of duairplane observation is uncertain
ties is made by the aitilley comand only fairly effective.
27. An airplane can observe
mander as follows:a) To balloons, the general
for but three hours at a time.
Observation may be interrupted observation and observation ofat any time by atmospheric con- fire for objectives which they canditions or incidents of combat.
see, except those for which terThe fire should therefore be de- restrial observation can also be
used;livered as rapidly as possible,
without sacrificing accuracy ofb) To balloons, the rough adlaying.
justment on objectives wherever
28. The balloon can observe possible, to be subsequently
the sense and sometimes the de- completed by airplaneviation of shots with respect toobservation
numerous objectives. It shouldc) To airplanes, the observabe used for the observation of all tion of fire only in cases forfiring on these objectives, includ- which balloon or terrestrial obing precision fire, when terrestrial servation is impossible.
observation is impossible.
The Air Service commander
makes the detailed assignmentof duties to airplanes and balloons, in accordance with thegeneral assignments of the artil-Artillery Adjustmentl e y commander and conditions
at the time. He makes the necessary arrangements for the successive use of the two methods
on the same objective, when thisis appropriate.
31. Division of duties among
airplanes.-When an airplane
can be assigned to each regiment or group of artillery in a
restricted zone where the artillery
preparation is well advanced, theobserver should be given a definite task. He is then charged
with general observation and theobservation of fire.
In order to avoid errors, it isdesirable that the observer who
reports an objective should also
observe the fire upon it.
In some cases however it isbetter to assign one airplane togeneral observation and the verification of fire over a larger
zone, and to others, the observation of fire for adjustment andprecision fire for effect.
32. The relative importance ofthe various aerial functions varies with the phases and characterof an action. This is covered inorders by the command.

In an offensiue against a fortified position, the duties of artill e y airplanes and balloons are
generally as follows:a) lnformation and generalobservation accurately to locate
batteries and other objectives.
b) Observation of fire for adjustment on datum points andthe principal objectives.
c) Observation of precision firefor effect for the destruction ofbatteries and other hostile positions.
d) At the same time, reconnaissance and photography, todetermine the effect produced.
e ) The verification of fire, beginning as early as possible on
the day of the attack.
f) During the action, the observation of neutralizing or destruction fire on the hostile artilley, in the form of fire for effectbased on previous adjustments
and on shifting fire on new objectives. Even, at this time, adjustments on important objectives may be necessary. These
are assigned to special airplanes.
33. During movements, eachlarge unit, generally the division,is assigned a route of march anda zone of action. Airplanes re-connoiter this zone and transmit
information by projectors, signal
lights, dropped messages, or radio, to information centers.
These are established successively along the route so as tosecure continuous reception.
lnformation centers are incommunication with the landing
field of the airplanes by visualsignals, telephone, radio, carrier
pigeons, airplanes, or automobiles. An officer of the Air Service of the army corps or division
reconnoiters if possible a suitalble
landing field near the information center. The necessary seritinels are assigned to it and cornmunications organized,
The division commander generally has his artillery commander with him, and moves
successively from one informaltion center to another as the
movement continues.
The division artillery commander requests of the squadron commander, through thenearest information center, theairplanes which are needed byhim. He states the assignment
intended if possible.
The airplanes designated folr
such duty report at the information center of the division, either
from the air or by landing, inorder to ascertain the battalion
with which they are to work andthe objectives. The battalion puts
out its identification panel near
the receiving station.

Combat184

34. The division artillery commander establishes a radio receiving station with panels at the
information center nearest to
him. Each battalion commander
installs his radio receiving station
as soon as he occupies a position, even if he has good terrestrial observation posts. For thispurpose the radio transportationmust be pushed foxward with thereconnaissance.
35. The designation of objectives and assignment of duties toairplanes is very important. For
this reason, an auxiliary landing
field near the division inforrnation center is desirable, and is
the more so when the communications between the latter andthe regular landing field of thesquadron are not reliable. The
division artillery commander
sends instructions as to the various assignments to the auxiliary
landing field. This is facilitated if
he keeps available several artillery aerial observers, who can begiven instructions in advanceand sent to the landing field tomeet the airplane as it lands.
36. But in no case should thelack of an auxiliary landing fieldor p o d communications be allowed to interrupt the successful
execution of aerial observation.

37. Balloons.-Balloons movewith the unit to which they are
assigned. The functions remainunchanged. They are charged
with general observation and theobservation of fire. Communication is by radio, projector or
folding cylinder. Telephone
communication is established assoon as possible.
A balloon observer is permanently attached to the artillery
staff.
When the advance is rapid,
the balloon is deflated.
As the attack develops, theorganization tends to take theform of that for the attack of anorganized position.

Chapter 4.
Methods of Fire, Field,
Heavy, and High Power
Artillery.
Airplane

49. Airplane observation offire has the following advantages.
a ) The accurate location of
objectives.
b) Determination of deviations.
c) The observation of a salvo
or volley as a whole and thedetermination of the estimatedposition of the center.
It has the following disadvantages:a ) Unreliable communication
between the observer and thebattery commander.

b) Short period of observation
possible.
c) Airplane moving zit highspeed, with difficulties due toclouds, wind, sun, obstruction ofview by the wings of the airplane, limited radius of action of
the radio, and incidents of aerial
combat. These ronder the observation intermittent.
The following points are thus
important:a ) A previous complete understanding between the observer
and the battalion or battery
commander with whom he is towork.
b) Use of simple methods.
carefully prearranged, in order toavoid dialogues.
c) Short, well conducted firing;to save time.
............................
Night Airplane Observation.

91. Night airplane observation
requires the following:a) specially clear nights* without mist over the ground.
b) Airplanes of certain models.
c) Very well-defined objectives.
d) A thorough familiarity withthe ground on the part of theobserver.
e) Strict fire discipline**.

*Airplane observation has been successfully

used on moonless nights**The flashes of the bursts are extremely
fleeting. and the close attentum 3.equired of theobserver IS very tryingArtillery Adjustment

92. Night observation should
be as nearly vertical as possible,
as it is easier to catch the flashes
in this manner.
Communication from theground to the airplane is by radio when the airplane has a receiving apparatus, or by searchlight.
If searchlights are used, two
are needed, pointed in the direction of the objective and elevated to about 15".One fixes
the line of fire, and the other isused for signalling.
............................
94. The sense of shots can be
determined at night, but not thedeviations.
Night observation is safer forthe airplane, which must operate
well inside the enemy lines. The
methods can be used advantageously for harassing and interdiction fire on distant objectives*,
effectively protected in the daytime by the antiaircraft defense,such as depots, railroad stations,camps, or points of obligatory
passage. It is not suitable fordestruction fire on batteries thatare difficult to distinguish atnight.

5 A visible target on which fire is adjusted
immediately after adpstment on a target
that is or may become obscured'In this case. the observer is not confused by
the flashes of the pieces themselvesor by bursts inconnection with other firing,

1 85

Balloon.

c) To lessen the strain on theobserver, he should be warned
as to the departure of shots inthe following manner:
Battery:
to fire!7.

95. Methods Of fire.-The
special signals prescribed in thecase of airplane observation are
not necessary for balloon obserObserver:
Battery:thevation, because of the continuous and reciprocal communicad ) Firing by balloon observabetween the Observer andtion should be followed by firing
the battery by telephone. Balon a witness point. . . .5
loon observation imposes no
special restriction in regard to the
conduct of fire.
The following should be noted
however:a) Only percussion fire can be
accurately observed. Time fireshould be used only to locateIthe approximate point of shots,
which are being lost.
Ib) In firing by salvos, the interval between shots should be 5
1,seconds at least, so as to permit
observation of the individualcr/shots.
II

37. Commana OFthe
A i a Se~uice,
AEF

187

29 M a y 1918

T h e duties of t h e chief
aviation officers at GHQ andat army, corps, and divisionlevels in t h e AEF were restated when Brig. Gen. Mason
M. Patrick (soon promoted tomajor general) replaced Foulois as Chief of Air Service,
AEF. Foulois then b e c a m e
Chief of Air Service, First
Army. Mitchell remained withI Corps.’

1 The Air Servlce and some other elements of First Army were organized before
the army itself was formally organized, andPershing took command, on 10 August
1918 Foulois and Mitchell could not getalong together Alter trying to have Mitchell
sent home, Foulois stepped aside wlth arecommendation that Mitchell be placed incharge of the First Army Air Servlce

training, instruction and assignment.
5. He will prepare and submit
General Headquarters A.E.F. to the Chief of Staff drafts ofFrance, May 29, 1918 such manuals and other literature as may be necessary in the
I. The duties of the Chief of Air training and employment of allService, A.E.F., provided for in air units.
G. 0. No. 31, current series,
Nothing in the foregoing willthese headquarters, are as folbe construed as in any way lirnitlows:ing or prescribing the powers
1. The Chief of Air Service is a and responsibilities of the Geinmember of the staff of the Com- era1 Staff, as defined by G.O.
mander in Chief, and acts as
No. 31, current series, theseadviser on aeronautical matters. headquarters.
2. He is responsible for the
6. General Order No. 31, curorganization, training, materiel
rent series, these headquarters,
and equipment, methods, andis amended in accordance withall other matters affecting thethe provisions of the preceding
efficiency of the Air Service. He paragraph.
will make suitable recommenda- 11. Brigadier General Mason h4.
tions to the Chief of Staff, based Patrick, N.A., is announced as
on inspection and study, investi- Chief of Air Service, A.E.F.
gation and experience.
111. The duties of the Chief of Air
3. He is responsible for theService of an army are as folpreparation of all details conlows:
cerning the instruction and train1. In each army there will be a
ing of air units, in accordance
Chief of Air Service, who willwith the approved training poli- command the army air units andcies, and he is charged with the who will act as adviser to thesupervision of all Army AeroArmy Commander and thenautical Schools.
Army General Staff on all aero4. He will supervise the train- nautical matters.
ing of all air units until they join
2. Under authority of thethe tactical units to which they
Army Commander, the Chief ofare assigned, or until they are
the Air Service of an army, issent to the AS., S.O.S., for final

General Orders
No. 81

Combat188

charged with the instruction andinspection of all air units of thearmy. He will keep the Army
Commander informed at all
times Concerning aeronauticalmatters, and will make such recommendations as he considers
necessaty concerning aeronautical personnel, materiel andmethods.
3. In accordance with the general plan of operations, and in
co-operation with G 3 of thearmy, he prepares the generalplan for the employment of all
air units in the army. He prepares detailed plans for the airunits under his direct orders.
4. He is charged, in accordance with operation orders issued, with the apportionment ofaeronautical materiel and equipment placed at the disposal of
the army.
5. In addition, he is charged
with the instruction and supervision of all Air Service units andpersonnel in the Advance Section, S.O.S., pending their assignment to tactical units.

IV. 1. Brigadier General B. D.
Foulois, S.C., is announced as
Chief of Air Service, 1st Army.
2. The air units now attachedto the 1st Corps are detachedtherefrom and placed under thecommand of the C.A.S., 1st
Army.
V. The duties of the Chief of Air
Service of an army corps are as
follows:
1. In each army corps there
will be a Chief of Air Service,
who will command the corps
aeronautical units.
2. He is the adviser of theCorps Commander and theCorps General Staff in all thatpertains to the Air Service. He
will keep the Corps Commander
informed in regard to aeronautical matters, and will make such
recommendations as he considers necessary Concerning aeronautical personnel, materiel andmethods. In accordance with thegeneral plan of operations, andin co-operation with G-3 of thecorps, he prepares the generalplans of action for all the airunits of the corps. He insures theco-ordination of the aeronauticalplans of divisions and supervises
the employment of all air units
throughout the corps in accordance with the approved plans.
He prepares the detailed plans
for the air units under his directorders.

Command of the
kr Service, AEF

1I39

3. Under the authority of theCorps Commander, the Chief of
Air Service is charged with the
instruction and inspection of all
air units assigned or attached tothe corps; the collection, dissemination and utilization of aeronautical information within thecorps, and the necessary liaison
with the artillery and the Air
Service of the Army and of theneighboring corps.
4. He apportions the aeronautical supplies and materiel placedat the disposal of the corps, andprepares timely requisitions foraeronautical materiel.

VI. Colonel W. A. Mitchell, S.C.,
is announced as Chief of Air
Service 1st Corps.
VII. When aeronautical units areattached to a separate division,
the senior Air Service officer on
duty therewith will bear thesame relation to the Division
Commander and will perform
duties similar to those prescribedabove for the Chief of the Air
Service of an Army Corps.
VIII. The 27th and 147th Aero
Squadrons (pursuit) and the96th Aero Squadron (bombardment) are assigned to the 1st
Army A.E.F. These organizations
will be reported by their commanding officers to the Chief of
Air Service, 1st Army, A.E.F.
for duty.
By Command of General
Pershing:
James W. McAndrew,
Chief of Stcff.

38. No In8epenbent

191

A h Opermtions
29 May 1918

Writing about his plan forstrategic bombardment (Doc.
29B), Gorrell told of conversations with Trenchard late in1917 concerning a cooperative Anglo-American bombing program. With Pershing's
approval, Foulois had concluded an agreement with
British officials on 26 January
1918 for organizing, equipping, and training 30 U.S.
squadrons for night bombardment with Handley Page
aircraft. Approving the plan
and agreement in general,
Pershing informed Trenchard
on 6 February 1918 that he(Pershing) would instruct
Foulois "to take the necessary steps towards insuring
the closest possible co-operation with the British Air
Service."' Gorrell went on tosay, however, that on 18 July
Pershing's Chief of Staff(Maj. Gen. James W. MCAndrew) placed certain restrictions on U.S. bombing
operations, and on U.S. Air
Service cooperation with the
British in such a bombing
program. Following is McAndrew's statement, as wellas an extract from the document, a memorandum from
Patrick, to which McAndrew
was responding.2

1 Ltr, Pershing to Trenchard. 6 Feb 18. in
Gorrdl's History. B-6. p 33
2 In Gorrell's History. 6-6. pp 39-42

2. Approval is requested forAmerican Expeditionary Forces,
the Chief of Air Service to desigServices of Supply, Office ofnate officers charged with theChief of Air Service
May 29, 1918, following duties:(a) Study the development
MEMORANDUM for Chief ofofourorganization, personnel,
Staff, GHQ, American E.F.
and material in conjunction withSUBJECT: Approval of prelimi- the British officers charged withnaries for nightnight bombardment, in orderbombing operations. that our bombing units, whencreated, may properly cooperalte
1. In order to carry out thewith similar British units.
agreement arrived at with the(b) Establish a center for the
British Commander-in-Chief fororganization and instruction of
the joint operation of our bompilots and bombers in night
bardment squadrons, and apflying and bombing operations
proved by the Commander-inChief, A.E.F., February 8, 1918, with required British instructor!:,and make special study of British
and in view of the fact that:(a) Night bombing units op- training in night navigation.
erate independently of otherunits in the Air Service (do not
require the protection of Pursuitunit).
(b)The planes used are radically different from those required by day bombing and day
pursuit squadrons.
(c) The final training of thepersonnel is along entirely different lines from that followed in
the case of observation, pursuit,and day bombardment personnel, it is recommended that thedevelopment and operation of
the Night Bombardment F'rogram should be camed forward
by such officers as may be designated to specialize in this Sectionof the Air Service.

Combat

192

~~

~

~~

~~

~~

(c) Arrange for the trainingof transfer pilots to fly planes
from England to the American
airdromes in France.
(d) Arrange for the required
emergency landing fields between the Channel and theAmerican airdromes.
(e) Arrange with the British
for carrying out the present
agreement of making a new andmore comprehensive agreement,for doing the repair work onnight bombing machines at
Courban.
(f) Arrange with Ordnance
Department to have officers attached to British squadrons tomake study of bombs, bomb
gears, etc., used on British
planes.
(9)Arrange with Intelligence
Department for officer or officers
to make study of bombing targets with British Intelligence Officers attached to British Brigade
Headquarters.

............................
4. It is necessary that theabove points be given close
study in order that our bombing
operation may be properly correlated with the bombing operation of the British when theAmerican bombing planes arereceived at the front.
(Sgd) Mason M.Patrick
Brigadier General, N.A.
C.A.S.

1st Ind.
G.H.Q., A.E.F., June 18, 1918.
To C.A.S., Hq S.O.S.
1. Approved subject to such
limitations as are imposed by thefollowing paragraphs.
2. While cooperating in every
possible way with the Air Forcesof our allies, all of our bombing
forces must remain an actual integral part of the American Expeditionary Forces.
3. It is of special importancethat the higher officers among
our bombing personnel be impressed with the importance ofthe principle of the concentrationof the effort to each arm, and of
the coordination of all efforts, toa common tactical end. It istherefore directed that these officers be warned against any ideaof independence and that they
be taught from the beginningthat their efforts must be closely
coordinated with those of theremainder of the Air Service andwith those of the ground army.
4. In making arrangementswith the British it must be thoroughly understood that when
our forces reach a certain importance the regions to be bombed

will be designated by theseheadquarters and that the selection of targets will depend solely
upon their importance with respect to the operations which we
contemplate for our groundforces.
5. In the establishment oftraining schools the idea of making them purely Amemcan mustgovern.
6. In order to prevent interference with other projects it is necessay that all bombing projects
involving matters of construction, supply or repair be taken
up with the Asst. Chief of Staff,
G.4 at these headquarters.
7. G.2 at these headquarters
has already established the liaison requested in subparagraph(gl, paragmph 2.
B y direction.
(Sgd.) J. W . McAndrew,
Chief of Stajf.

39, Restatement OF
the 2 6 0 - S q ~ a b ~Pol ann

105

5June1918

On 2 May 1918 the War D epartment informed the AEF bycable that production problems
were making it impossible tomeet the schedule for preparing
squadrons for service at thefront.’ On 20 May Pershing replied that developments to date
did not require any change in
the GOP and SORP, which hehad approved. Those projects,
he said, “set forth our needs
and desires to include June
1919.” He then laid out a schedule that would put all 260
squadrons at the front by thattime.2 This new schedule reflected significant changes
made in the 26Gsquadron planin the SORP of 18 September
1917 (Doc. 27). The 60 bombardment squadrons of the
SORP had been designated fornight operab-~s,and the 41 observationsquadrons
firstclassed as strategical aviation
had become day bombardment
units. Because of some confusion that had developed during
the exchange of a series of cables concerning schedules, Patrick restated the schedule in
the following paper? to which isadded a memorandum indicating Pershing’s approval4

1. Cable 1224-R. McCain (Maj. Gen Henry
P. McCain. TAG) to Pershing AMEX Forces,
May 3d. in Gorrell’s History, A-7, pp 89-90,

American Expeditionary Forces
2. As stated in paragraphs 1
5 June 1918. and 1-a of our cable 11564,
the building program given to
From: Chief of Air Service.
the United States conforms exTo: Commander-in-Chief,
actly to the General Organization
American E.F.
Project approved by the ComSubject: Air Service Building
mander-in-Chief on July 11,
Program In United
1917, as amended and comStates
pleted by the Senrice of theRear Project approved by the
1. Cable 1224-R, dated May Commander-in-Chief on Sep3, 1918, requested our recomtember 18, 1917, for an Armymendations for the United States of 20 combat divisions.
Air Plane production program,
3. It is noted that the cable
to include June 1919. Our rec1224-R states that all we needommendations were sent to the tell America is the dates when
United States on May 21, 1918, we wish squadrons ready forin paragraph 1 of cable 11564. service on the front and that
The United States requested fur- America will then make the necther information on May 26,
essary calculations to ascertain
1918, in paragraph 1of Cable
what size building program is1397-R, and we gave them this necessary to permit us to motiiinformation on May 31, 1918, in lize the squadrons on the dates
our cable 1 2 1 S S . The building when we desire. . . .
program given to the United............................
States was based on allowing
6. It is requested that this proSquadrons to be efficiently oper- gram be reviewed and that it beating on the front according toreturned to this office with suc:hthe following tabulation, and theUnited States was informed that,to accomplish this, the squadrons should reach the front 1
month prior to the time when
they were expected to be
operating efficiently.

2. Cable 1156-5. Pershing to AGWAR
Washington, May 21st. in Gorrell’s History,
A-7, pp 65-86.
3. In Gorrell‘s History, A-7, pp 6 5 4 8 . The
day of the month, missing at the top of thecopy of the letter in Gorrell’s History is
supplied by a paper prepared by Gorrell on
29 July 1918, in Gorrelk History. A-7, p 94.

4 . In Gorrell’s History. A-7, p 68. It isinteresting to note that the indorsement
signed by McAndrew was written by Gorrell.
For the date of the indorsement. which was
missing. see the previous note
5. In the table which follows. Observation
and Bombardment have been abbreviated,
and format for Mono- and Biplace Pur!;uit
has been changed to save space.

Combat196

additions, comments, or modifications as may be desired, andthat it then be known as the“AIR SERVICE PROGRAM.” It
is desired to send this paper tothe United States to clarify, if
necessary, the cables alreadysent.

............................

Mason M . Patrick
Brigadier General, N.A.

__

CorpsObs Sq

3

Army Obs Sq

1

5

Monoplace Pursuit Sq

3

2

3

8

8

8

8 4 0

Biplace Purstut Sq

4

3

9

16

16

16

16

1

6
4

2

3

15

4

5

5 24

80

Day Bomb Sq

-

9

8

8

8

8 41

Night Bomb Sq

12

12

12

12

12

60

ation will, from time to time,cause minor variations in thedates when Corps Observation
1st lnd.
and Army Observatiori SquadG.H.Q., American E.F.,
rons are needed, but this fact
France, June 5, 1918.
need not vary the building proTo: Chief of Air Service,gram as already furnished theAmerican E.F.
United States.
Returned.
(signed) J. W . McAndrew
1. The Commander-in-Chiefapproves this program as a basis
Chi,ef of Staff.
for production in the UnitedStates. It constitutes a program
upon which it is desired the Air
Service develop, provided thetonnage is available. It must be
understood that the military situESG(G-3)

Restatement of the
260-Squadron Plan

With emphasis on developing the aviation program. aircraft
factories, such as the Liberty Englne plant (above), worked
feverishly t o meet productlon goals.

19740- I n p l z t R g

Liaison
15June1918

Early in the war, failure oflandline and other communications during battle caused theBritish and French to devise
means for using aircraft to keep
infantry commanders informedon the movements and locations of their various units. Although balloons were used,most operations of this typewere carried out by airplanes.
For such infantry liaison, or infanby contact work the Air Service, AEF, adopted proceduresissued by the French in a pamphlet, “Instruction on Liaison for
Troops of All Arms,” dated 12
December 1916. Following are
extracts f’rom a revised edition,issued by the French on 28 D e
cember 1917 and published intranslation by GHQ AEF on 15
June 1918.1

1 In Gorrell’s History. J-3. beglnnlng p
2 00

Liaison For All Arms
I.

General Considerations.
1. The object of liaison is asfollows:
To keep the commander constantly posted on the situation of
the units under his orders, andto furnish him with a basis for his
decisions.
To insure, between the various echelons of the command,
between adjoining units and between the various arms of theservice, the safe and rapid transmission of orders, questions, reports and information, and in a
general way to insure all communications necessa y to obtaina close co-operation, particularlyb e b e e n the infantry and artillery.
Consequently, to be complete, the liaison must secure thefollowing communications:(1)From the front to therear.
(2) From the rear to thefront.
(3) Laterally between units
co-operating in the same action.
It utilizes:(a) Means of obtaining information (liaison agents, groundobservation, aerial observation,
liaison with airplane, liaison withballoon).
(b) Means of transmission:
Telephone and telegraphy.
Radio telegraphy and earth telegraphy (T.S.F. and T.P.S.)
Visual and acoustic signaling.
Various signaling (by arms, by
panels, by fireworks).
Courier.
Carrier pigeons, etc.
............................

Chapter 1V.
Liaison by Airplanes andBalloons.
1. Airplanes.
A. Work Assigned to Airplanes.

23. In combat, besides thevarious duties of reconnaissancewhich may be assigned to themby the commander, the work of
aerial observers includes:
Watching the enemy in thezone of the combat.
Liaison of the commanderwith subordinate echelons.
Accompanying the infantry.
In an army corps, for instance,these duties may be distributedin the following way:
( 1)One or several airplanes:ofcommand follow the general development of the combat, watch
the enemy within the assigned
zone, give information as to the
distribution of his forces, indications of counter-attacks, etc.
(2)Courier airplanes arecharged with the rapid transmission of orders from the commander and of valuable information about their own situation, that of nearby units andthat of the enemy.
(3)Airplanes for accompanying the infantry (cavalry uses thesame methods as infantry for its
liaison with airplanes and balloons),as a rule‘one perdivision.

Combat

200

They follow the assaulting
troops and reserves, observe signals of the firing line and of thecommand posts and transmit
them to the general commanding the division, and possibly tothe artillery radio stations, to thecommand posts of brigade andregiment.
They transmit to the infantry
the orders of the division commander and, generally speaking,inform the commander of everything going on in the vicinity of
the first line and behind it.
24. The airplane for accompanying the infantry is provided
with distinctive signs (pennants,
rows of lights, etc.), and besides
makes itself known by a soundsignal and a signal cartridge,
both determined by the plan ofliaison.
Its characteristics and the signals which it uses to communicate with the infantry ought tobe familiar to all men of the units
for which it works.
To prevent its appearance
from giving the enemy a sureindication of an impending attack, and to make all concernedfamiliar with their own airplanes,
it is indispensable that the airplanes accompanying the infantry fly frequently over the lines
during the days of artillery preparation. Outside these periods
they should fly from time to timein order to practice liaison with
the infantry.

The airplane for accompany- (The plan of liaison should preing the infantry rises above thescribe, as far as possibba, on
advanced units to a height which what terrain weighted messages
must not exceed 1,200 meters. shall be dropped.)
In certain cases it may be
In the course of the infantry’s
obliged to fly over the lines atadvance, supported by artillery
very low height, but must not
fire of all calibers, it is difficult forcome below 600 meters except an airplane to get through thein case of necessity.
very dense sheet of projectiles.
It must be the constant care of At the moment it can drop mesthe crew to assist the infantry,
sages on a command post lonoting exactly its position and its cated near the line of batteries
needs and conveying rapidly
only by remaining above thatsuch information to the comsheet, hence under bad condimander and the artillery.
tions for carrying out it:; duty.
(b)Radio telegraphy, for urB. Means of Communicagent information (position oftion.
friendly troops, requests for artil(1)Communication From T h elery fire, lengthening of range,
Airplane to T h e Earth.
etc.), to the authorities whose
25. Airplanes communicate
receiving station is likely to hearwith the earth by means ofit, i.e., to commanders of army(a) Weighted messages (1)for corps, divisions, brigades, infanimportant indications, sketches
try regiments, artillery goups
and photographs intended forand battalions.
the command posts of army
Such communications arecorps, divisions, brigades, and in made by using one of 1 he codes
exceptional cases of regiments.
of Appendix VI.* Only such indiTo drop a weighted message cations as are totally useless tothe airplane comes down to a
the enemy may be transmitted in
low height (about 200 meters)
plain language.
above the command post con(c) Visual signaling arid signalcerned, calls the attention of the ing by fireworks (conventional
addressee by one or several
signals of codes in Appendix VI)
sound signals (fixed by the plan after having drawn attention byof liaison), and drops its message a sound signal (fixed by the planso that it falls in open ground.
of liaison) for communications
intended for such elements ashave no radio stations ,at theirdisposal and whose advance position does not permit the dropping of weighted messages.
111The message itself is placed in a metal box
provided with a white or colored pennant which
increases its visibility.

2 This appendix and the othrmrs cited havebeen omitted

Infantry
LiaisonWith the fireworks used nowadays the airplane cannot possibly indicate which element it
wishes to communicate with.
Such signals are consequently
intended for all elements constituting the large unit for whose
benefit the airplane is working.
The use of projectors, on, thecontra y, enables the airplane tochoose its correspondent. It istherefore advisable to try constantly to improve the lattermethod.
To be visible, visual and fireworks signals must not be used
when the airplane is seen by theduties to be carried out,
the better.
Signal cartridges must always
be fired from a height greaterthan 300 meters, and as muchas possible upwards, to avoid
confusion with the signals madeby the infantry.
(2) Watch Posts
26. In order that the airplanesignals and the messages sent bythem may not pass unnoticed, incase the noise of the battle
drowns the sound signals, a permanent watch post service must
be secured by the radio officers,
or by the officers in charge of theliaison near the posts of command of army corps, division,brigade, regiment, artillery groupand battalion, as soon as thepost of command is established.
This service is carried on by ob-

2101

servers within the battalions and view, by hiding them behind ii
screen, at the bottom or on thecompanies. (The distribution of
the personnel should be such as front side of a shell crater, while
to insure simultaneously “obser- taking care that they remain visible to friendly observers.
vation” and “watch.”)
To avoid confusion it is forbid(3) Communication From The
to display positionmarking
den
Earth to The Airplane.
panels or to light Bengal flares
27. The airplane receives
anywhere but on the line. (Thiscommunications from the firing
interdiction applies as well to paline and from the command
trols sent in front of the lines as
posts.
to supporting or reinforcing(a)Firing line: The line indiunits).
cates its location:
In order to distinguish clearly
1.By means ofposition-rnark- the signals made by our infanltry
ing panels, All men cartingfrom those which might be set
panels alternately open and shut by the enemy to impede obsertheir apparatus, taking care tovation it is important to agree
set it facing the airplane with that that panels or Bengal flares willside whose color stands out bet- be placed in groups of 2, 3, etc.
ter on the surrounding ground. It
3. For want of marking pariels
is better to use many panels
and Bengal flares, the line uses
simultaneously during a fairly
all means available to indicate its
short time than a smaller numlocation: signal cartridges of theber of panels during a longer
25 mm pistol or V.B.,3 signal
time; thus, the line is automatiprojectors sending series of altercally traced very quickly andnated dots and dashes, waved
clearly and troubles caused byhandkerchiefs, pocket mirrors,
forgotten panels are avoided.
etc.
To reduce the enemy’s
The marking out of the firing
chances of spotting our line, theairplane observer must endeavor line is carried o u t
Either at an hour set beforeto reduce to a minimum the timerequired to take note of the new hand, or on a prearranged line:
for instance, the final objectiveline.
or one of the successive objecPanels are folded up again astives: or by order of the comsoon as the airplane signals“understood,” and in any case mand transmitted by the airplane by means of the signal
after ten minutes.
“Where are you?’
2. By means of Bengal flares cartridges,
afterhavingdrawn the infantry’sof certain color (fixed by theattention by a sound signal; orplan of liaison). These signals
constitute the surest way of indi- upon the company or platoon
cating one’s position. It is important, however, to conceal them
3. Viven Besaera; a smoke grenade.
as much as possible from hostile202

commander’s initiative, when
their unit cannot advance any
farther; or when, compelled tofall back, it has succeeded insecuring a hold on the ground.
Orders for marking out should
not be too frequent. In principle
the marking out will be done bypanels.
Should the observer not see
the panels, or should he seethem badly, he will request another marking out, which willthen be executed by means of
J3engal flares.
In that case the company orplatoon commanders will also
signal their positions by meansof color signal cartridges firedwith the 25 mm pistol.
The line sends its request to
the airplane by means of thesame fireworks and according to
the same codes as for communications with the rear (see codesof Appendix VI).
The airplane transmits theserequests by radio to the generalcommanding the division.
(b) Command posts. The different command posts indicate
their locations by means of theidentification panels described inAppendix Ill.
Such panels are placed, eithei
upon initiative from the command post to draw the airplane’s
attention, or at a fixed hour, byorder of the higher command

Combat

11. Balloons
transmitted to the command
post by the airplane under the
A. Duties of Ballooas.
same conditions as to the firing
28. The divisional balloon,
line. Hence, as soon as the air- whose work it is to insure liaison
plane sends out the signal,for the infantry, carries (3s a dis“Where are you?” all command tinctive mark one or more penposts noticing the signal should nants attached to the rear or tomark their respective positions.
the cable of the balloon. If a
The panels are removed as soon night ascension is deemed necas the airplane has answered,essary in order to receive signals“Understood.”from the infantry, the balloon
Command posts of generals
indicates its presence by means
commanding army corps and di- of a luminous signal lit i4t regularvisions can communicate by ra- intervals.
dio with such airplanes as have a
Like the airplane for accomreceiving apparatus.
panying the infantry, its duties
All command posts can com- consist in:municate with airplanes either by
Following the progress of asvisual signaling or by means ofsaulting troops and reserves.
their rectangular panels (deObserving the signals from thescribed in Appendix III), using
line of the command posts, andthe conventional signals of Aptransmitting them to the generalpendix VI.
commanding the division.
As a rule, visual signals are
Informing the commander of
repeated and panel signals left in everything going on in ihe vicinplace until the airplane has anity of the firing line, and behindswered, “Understood” (prefera- it.
bly by projector signals).
Sending out, if necessary, tothe advanced elements conventional signals provided for in theplan of liaison.
8. Means of Cornmimica-tion
29. (1)From the balfoon to
the command. The b a b o n is
directly connected by telephonewith the divisional command
post (balloon circuits) arid withthe army system.
It is besides provided with aradio apparatus enabling it totransmit its observations in casetelephone communications
should not work.

203

Infantry
Liaison(2)From the balloon to thejiring line and to the advancecommand posts. The balloon

can communicate with the advance elements.
(a) In daytime by means of acylinder which folds and unfolds
at will, thus making signals corresponding to dots and dashes.
These transmissions are limited
to the two signals, “Understood”
or “Repeat,” preceded by thecall of that particular post which
the balloon addresses.
(b) At night by means of luminous signals, enabling it to sendmore complete messages, which,however, are always likely to beread by the enemy.
( 3 )From the firing line andthe advance command posts tothe balloon. In daytime, the firing line and the advance command posts indicate their positions to the balloon and communicate with it by means of thesame methods as for communicating with the infantry airplane.
However, the following should
be noted:(a)The balloon does not sendout to the firing line the order tomark out the line which it occupies. Consequently it only observes the prearranged making,or that ordered by the airplane.

(b) The balloon does not see
the panels clearly.
(c) It can see the identification
panels and the rectangularpanels of the command posts
only when they are inclined at a
sufficient angle.
(d) Being far away from thelines it can hardly ever receive indaytime the signals made by theadvanced elements with the 24cm. projectors.
At night the balloon indicatesits presence and position by
lighting a luminous signal at regular intervals.
To this end, at an hour settled
in the plan of liaison, the balloon
sends out its call several times insuccession and keeps its light up
for five minutes.
The signalers of the different
command posts take note of thedirection of the balloon, orient
their projector toward it, call up

and then send their particularstation call to the balloon until
the latter sends it back. The balloon then takes them from rightto left successively and receives
their message, which it immediately transmits to the post ofcommand by telephone or radio.
After these liaisons have been
established the balloon observer
watches the battlefield to catchany call which the different postsof command might send to him,and every 15 minutes he indicates his presence by two-minUte calls.
As soon as he notices a callfrom a command post he starts
communications with that postaccording to service regulationsprescribed in Appendix V. Signals must be transmitted at low
speed.

41- Ingantrzg
Liaison in I CORPS

205

June1918

The following instructions'front or most advanced line and11. Mission of the Infantry

for infantry liaison apparently the various P.C. and to transmit Airplane-general principles. It is difficult to fix definite
were written shortly before I them to the Division ComCorps began operations early mander and, when required, to limits to the activity of Infantry
receiving stations of the P.Cs. of
the artilley, Division, Brigade, or
instructions of 28 December Regiment.
3. To transmit to the infanty
1917 (see Doc. 40) had been
received. Much attention is the orders of the Division Comgiven to a variety of ways for mander, and, in general, to keep
aerial observers to communi- the headquarters informed ofcate with infantry troops and eveything that is going on in theheadquarters. With radiote- neighborhood of the advanced
legraphy for air-ground com- line and behind it.
The Infantry Airplane, theremunications still in its infancy, and with radioteleph- fore, has a double mission to
ony e v e n less developed, assure; first, to keep the staff
there really w a s no satisfac- informed of what is taking place,
tory means of communica- secondly, to act as liaison agent
tion, as these instructions in- between the troops in the firstline and Division Headquarters,
dicate.
or, when required, with the
P.Cs. or artilley and infantry briNotes on Liaisongades or regiments. This forms a
Between Aircraft and task of the highest importanceand one which is extremely
Infantry During
complex and v e y delicate. It can
Attackbe said without exaggerationthat liaison with the infantry is
the most difficult mission that
Prepared under direction of Col. can be entrusted to an aerial
W. Mitchell, C.A.S. First Armyobserver. For this reason, it iscorps.
indispensible, both for the infanI. Functions of the Infantry trymen and for the aviator, that
Airplane. During periods of at- exercises should be held frequently and as closely as possitack one infantry airplane is, ingeneral, allotted to each Divible approaching the realities ofsion. The functions of this plane active warfare. The work of liaiare:son with infantry is extremely
1. To follow the advance ofdifficult and arduous, both forthe attacking troops and rethe infantry and for the aviators,
serves.
that the more practice exercises
2. To observe signals from the held to familiarize both with theduties to be camed out,
the better.
1 In Gorrell's History, J-12
in July 1918 and before the
AEF version of t h e French

Airplanes, Artillery Surveillance
Airplanes, and Command Airplanes. It should not be forbidden to the observer in the Infantry Airplanes, to spot enemy beitteries in action and to signal
them to the artillery, or to notify
the Command of points particularly swept by the fire of theenemy; nor should it be forbidden to the artillery observer toobserve and report matters ofinterest in our front lines or
trenches, but the former is solely
responsible for locating the advance of our attacking infantry,
whereas the latter is solely responsible for observing, adjusting and directing the fire of ourartilley. The observer of the Infanty Airplane has about all h'e
can do to see what is occurringin the neighborhood and behindthe foremost lines of the infanhy.
Without entirely ignoring what isgoing on on the enemy's side,
he should, in principle, only interest himself with our o w n infanty. If he fails to confine himself to this, he runs a considerable risk of failing to satisfactorilycany out his mission and obtam
the best possible results. It isessential that the observer
should thoroughly realize this-that what takes place beyond
our foremost lines is not his concern; this latter is the mission of
the Command Airplane.

206

111. Mission of the Infantry
Airplane--execution. The Infantry airplane flies above ourlines, slightly behind our mostadvanced troops at an altitude
generally low, but varying withatmospheric conditions, the nature of the ground, and what theobserver is looking for. This altitude, however, should never bemore than 1,200 meters andonly exceptionally less than 600
meters. Owing to the vulnerability of a low flying observation
airplane, it should not descend
below 600 meters except incases of absolute necessity. It is,furthermore, advisable that theplane should not keep constantly
to the same altitude, as by frequently changing its altitude, it isless likely to be hit by shots fired
from the ground. During thecourse of operation, the surveillance of the battlefield should, inprinciple, begin before dawn andthe infantry airplane should
leave its field while it is stiil darkso as to arrive above the lines at
the first moments of daylight.
This is nearly always the mostinteresting time of day for observation. The results of reconnaissance by infantry airplanes during a light rain are often particularly valuable for the reason thatat such a time the enemy takes
few precautions to conceal himself, generally thinking that he isin complete security from aerial
observation.

CombatAt the beginning of offensive stations should also take any
operations, the Infantry Airplane messages sent to the Division
should not amve over the lines report center. Infantry airplane
until a little after “H’ hour, so as observer should not send by radio any information of which
not to call the attention of theenemy prematurely to the point they are not certain. Observaand moment of attack. When no tions of this nature should be
attack is planned it is sometimes noted on the written message tobe dropped at the report center,of value for an airplane to fly
over the lines at dawn dropping mentioning, of course, the fact
various luminous signals in order that the information is of doubtto deceive and worry the enemy. ful accuracy. All radio messages
should be preceded by the callFire from the ground by the
infantry constitutes the principal letters indicating to whom themessage is addressed. Coordisource of danger for the lownates, etc., must always be given
flying observation plane. The
best method of contending with in code. It is most strictly forbidthis and protecting himself as far den for any messages to be sent
as possible, is for the observer to in clear.
Note: Before leaving thefire with his machine gun as freneighborhood of his airdrome,quently as he can against thethe infantry airplane observer
enemy trenches and positions.
Furthermore, by machine gun- will test the working of his radiowith the receiving station of thening certain suspicious points,
group (squadron) and will not
the observer often succeeds inmaking the enemy disclose him- start off over the line until thelatter has notified him by aself by movements.
IV. Means of communica- prearranged signal (a Special
form of panel, for example) thattion between the airplane
his radio is working properly. For
and the ground.
this reason, the Infanby Airplane
1.By radio. The observer
signals by radio all his observa- must take off from his field earlytions, in general addressing him- enough to make this test and, if
self to the Division report center. necessary, to remedy any fault in
He must pay special attention to his radio and still arrive over thelines at the hour fixed
the rapidity and clearness with
2. By visual signals and sigwhich he sends his messages,
nal lights. The observer carries
and he should not hesitate torepeat his message several times two sorts of luminous signals:
1. The projectcr.
until the receiving station gives
2. Signal lights of various
the signal “understood.” It is advisabk that the artillery receiving kinds.
Up to the present time the former method has been by nomeans perfected, and, although

Infantry Liaison
in I Copsit has many advantages over thelight signals, the infantry is not
yet sufficiently expert in reading
indications sent them from anairplane by projector to allow
this method to be successfully
employed.
Liaison by signal lights presents several disadvantages. In
the first place, such signals do
not indicate the unit with whom
the airplane desires to communicate (for example, they do notshow that the observer wishes tocall the attention of one certain
battalion, rather than any otherbattalion that happens to be in
the neighborhood). The considerable variety of signal lights
which have to be employed necessitate the canying of a large
number of cartridges, with theresult sometimes of overloading
the airplane. The pistol, unless
fixed, is long and inconvenient.
It may occur, by a false movement on the part of the observer, by a violent movementon the part of the plane or by
bad functioning of the pistol, thatthe signal light is shot-inside, oron to the fuselage or wings ofthe machine. To guard against
the last difficulty, it is desirable
that the pistol should be fastened
to the edge of the cockpit. An
aluminum pistol is preferable,
because of the weight, to one inbronze .
Signal lights should not be
fired from an Infantry Airplane at
an altitude of less than 300 meters, in order to avoid confusion
with similar signals fired from theground. The pistol should be

207

held vertically.
Before leaving his field the observer should test the working of
his signal pistol. A second pistol
should always be carried in casefor any reason the first one fails
to work, and, furthermore, inorder to permit of two different
signals lights being fired rapidly
one after the other. The latter isof value when, as often happens, the observer is required tosend successively “I am the infanty airplane of “ X ’ Division”,
and “Where are you?’
3. By sound signals. This is
another method which has not
yet been completely perfected,
although tests with certain instruments have given good results.
Infanty airplane reconnaissanceover the positions held by the
first lines of our attacking troops
being usually made at a predetermined hour, and the Infanty
airplane flying at a lower altitude
than any other plane and bearing distinctive marks and letting
off identifying light signals, there
is little chance that it will fail tobe recognized by the many infantymen who will be looking at
it. It does not, therefore, appear
necessary for a sound signal tobe employed in this case. On theother hand, sound signals arepractically indispensable in thecase of airplanes wishing to inform the P.C.that they intend todrop a weighted message, because, particularly if the P.C.is8
under shell fire, the vigilance ofthe look-outs cannot always be
relied upon. If the plane is not
equipped with a Klaxon horn, orsome other type of sound producing instrument, a peculiarly
timed burst of machine gun fire,several times repeated, if necess a y , will usually have the same
effect.
4. By weighted message.
Weighted messages are especially valuable for the purpose ofconfirming and completing theinformation already dispatchedby radio or by various light signals. Weighted messages are
dropped at the P.Cs.of Army
Corps and Divisions, and but
exceptionally to P.C.of infantry
regiments. Weighted messages
should never be dropped to atlvanced units, for orders or infcamation addressed to the P.C.of
a battalion, for example, run aconsiderable risk of falling into
the enemy hands. It is necessary
for observers to practice dropping weighted messages from aheight of at least 200 meters,
until they are able to drop theinwith the greatest precision.

Combat

208

Written messages, and maps
showing the location of Bengal
fires, P.Cs. &c., should be madein triplicate (one copy to be
dropped at Division P.C. or Report Center, one copy at Army
Corps Report Center, if required
and one copy retained for the
Squadron Commander). Before
leaving the airdrome the threecopies of the map, with newcarbon sheets between, should
be carefully affixed to an aluminum back and kept in place bygummed comers and by surgeons tape around the edges.
The same is done with the message forms. The observer indicates in pencil on the map thelocation of our front line andP.Cs., as shown him by panels,
Bengal fires &c. and any otherobservations of interest, noting
the hour. When he has completed his mission he pulls off
the tape and takes off one sheetof the map, rolls it up, and puts
it in the Div. P.C. The second
sheet is similarly taken off andplaced in the message carrier for
the Army Corps P.C., and thethird is left attached to the board
by means of a clip. The same isdone with any messages that theobserver may have written out.

V. Means of communication between the ground andthe airplane. The Infantry Airplane observer receives signals
both from the most advanced
line and from the Staff (generally
the Staff of the Infantry Division).
1. Communication with themost aduanced line. Units of themost advanced line (excluding
both patrols sent further out andunits in support or reserve further back) signal their locationbya ) Individual panels (one fortwo men).
b) Bengal fires.
c) Projectors.
d ) Signal lights.
e) Various make-shift methods, such as mirrors, pocket
torch lights, handkerchiefs, overcoat linings, etc.
At the demand of the Infantry
Airplane, or at an hour prearranged by the Staff, or at theinitiative of a Company Commander or the Commander of
any other unit, when this unit
can no longer advance, or whenafter having been obliged to retire he has succeeded in holding
his ground-the infantrymen lay
out their individual panels. If the
Infantry Airplane observer fails
to see the panels, or has difficulty in distinguishing them, herepeats his signal of identification“I am the Infantry Airplane of“ X ’ Division”, and the question“Where are you”, and thereupon the signals of the infantry

must be made by Bengal fires.
(a)Panels
In case of individiual panels,
because of their small dimensions, it is indispensable that they
be placed together in groups ofat least three or four, in orderthat the observer may see themclearly. Furthermore, it is necess a y that they should he waved
or moved about at the right moment in order to attract the observer‘s attention-the right moment being when the airplane
has passed slightly beyond apoint directly above the signalers. The observer will do his
utmost to reduce to a strict minimum the time necessary for him
to note the positions shown by
the signals, in order not to keep
the attention of the intwtry for
too long a time and to avoid, as
far as possible, that the enemy
should be able to locale our line.
On the other hand, infantrymen
should wave and moue about
their panels for a time sufficientfor the Infantry Airplane observer to properly locate them. It
is extremely difficult for anyone
on the ground to determine theexact moment at which an airplane passes vertically over him,
and it is certainly better for thepanels to be shown a little toolong than not long enough.
However, if at the end of ten
minutes the Infanty Airplane
has not given the signal “understood’, the panels should berolled up.
It is necessary to insist on thev e y important point that thepanels when laid out must be

Infantry Liaison
in I Corps“living,” that is to say, continually moved about or agitated,and not merely unrolled and leftlying. If this is not done it is likely
to give rise to errors of the greatest importance, for immobile
panels are very apt to give erroneous, or at least uncertain indications to the observer, being
easily confused with other thingsand not informing the observerwhether or not they are the locations of the most advanced line.
Individual panels should beplaced in such a way as not tobe visible to the enemy, i.e.,
inclined on the parados of atrench, hidden in shell holes, or
behind a slight rise of ground,etc. It is strictly forbidden to anyone not in the most advanced
line to signal his presence bymeans of individual panels. This
does not, of course, apply tobattalion P.Cs. whose identification panels should be laid out as
won as the Infantry Airplanesends his signal “Where areyou?” The laying out of the battalion identification panels is
often very useful to the airplane
observer, especially when he has
no clear idea of the approximate
location of the most advanced
line. Similarly, and for the same
reasons, it is desirable that regimental P.Cs. should lay out theiridentification panels when the
Infantry Airplane sends his signal“Where are you?’ (This is formally ordered in the French instructions of the 28th December,

1917.. . .)2109

Care must be taken to preventthe panels from becoming dirty.
It is recommended that theyshould be carried in cloth cases
or sacks to protect them from
mud and dust.
(b). Bengal fires.
The panels have the serious
inconvenience of being invisible,
or nearly so, against light background, such as clay soil broken
up by shell fire, or when they
become soiled and are no longera brilliant white-which is nearly
always the case.
Bengal fires, on the contrary,
are always visible against no
matter what background, andconstitute certainly the most satisfactory method of signalingfrom the ground. It is, however,important that they should beconcealed from the view of theenemy, while, at the same time,
being clearly visible to the observer in the airplane. For thisreason they should be placed
behind a screen, or at the bottom or on the forward slope of ashell hole, etc. The same way asin the case of the panels, theEiengal fires should be placedout in groups of three or four so
as to be more visible to the
airplane observer.
(c)Projectors.
Projectors can hardly beconsidered as a means of signaling the location of the advancedlines, but they can be very usefully employed to attract the attention of the airplane observer.
They possess the advantage ofbeing able to be employed without attracting the attention of theenemy and, furthermore, of
being the more visible the worse
is the visibility. Well handled
they should render excellent
service, but it is essential that thesignalers with the infantry bevery skillful in following the airplane. The present number ofprojectors authorized for a battalion (14)is considered to be
scarcely sufficient and should be
added to. Furthermore, in order
to simplify the handling of a projector to as great an extent as
possible, it is desirable that thesignalers carry spare batteries
and lamps.
(d) Signal lights andsmokes.
Signal lights sent up fromthe ground give only a veryvague indication of the pointfrom which they were sent (notwithin 50 or 100 meters) and,
therefore, are of little value toany one desiring to signal “I amhere.” As for smoke signals,
these are practically useless during battle as it is almost impossible to distinguish them among
the shell-bursts.
(el Make-shift methods.
Handkerchiefs waved in theair, overcoats turned inside out,
so that the lining is exposed, andwaved, pocket electric torches,
mirrors, etc., directed towards
the airplane, etc., etc., are very
ineffective and give very poorCombat21 0

results, but they should not be
forgotten in any special circumstance when other regular methods of signaling are, for any reason, not available.
(f) At present, with the apparatus available for receiving
radio messages by an airplane,
the results are so uncertain that itis hardly worth considering thismethod for signaling from theground to the airplane in connection with liaison with infantry.
For an observer to be encumbered with the radio receiving
helmet and constantly obliged tolook at his lamps and messabout with the handles, would
seriously interfere with the efficient performance of his mission,
which requires concentrated observation of what is going on
below him.
2. Communication with
Staffs and Headquarters.
The various P.Cs. indicate
their locations to the airplane
observer by means of the different identification panels described in Annex 4 of the instructions of 28th December
1917. These panels are laid out
at the discretion of the P.C. inorder to attract the attention of
the airplane, or at a certain hour,arranged beforehand, or by order of the higher command,transmitted to the P.C. by the
airplane in the same manner asto the most advanced line. The
panels should be taken in assoon as the airplane has given
the signal “understood”.
It is, of course, possible for the
P.Cs. of the Corps Commander
or Division Commanders tocommunicate by radio with any
airplanes which have receiving
apparatus on board, but it must
be remembered that this procedure practically results in making
the observer both blind and deafto everything else during a comparatively long time when it
might be more profitable for him
to be employed in observing
what is going on beneath him.
All P.Cs. may communicate with
the infantry airplanes, either bymeans of optical signals or withthe rectangular panels of theP.Cs, as described in Annex 4,
and employing the conventionalsigns used in Annex 8 of the
instructions of December 28,
1917. In general, optical signals
should be repeated and panels
left in position until the airplane
has given the signal “understood’. To avoid enabling theenemy to locate the P.C. it ispreferable, if possible that theobserver should give the signal“understood” by projector.
VI. Preparations for liaison
with infantry.
The missions of Infantry Airplanes and Command Airplanes
can only be carried out effectively when the observers arethoroughly trained and have acomplete knowledge of the planof the operations, or, EIS the casemay be, of the defence. In caseof a necessary retirement of our
troops, the observer should
know our own succesjive positions quite as well as the enemy’s lines. It is, furthermore,indispensable that the observers
should personally visit the Commanders of the various infantry
units, down to, and including,Company Commanders at least,
with whom they will have towork; that these visits should beheld in the trenches; that theobservers should look over the
ground of operation from thefirst line observation posts, andthat they should work out on the
spot with the various Commanders the details of the missions
which they will be called upon to
fulfill. Delicate liaison of this nature can only be efficiently accomplished when each party
thoroughly understands theother, and the only way that thiscan be arrived at is for each one
to thoroughly know the other.
No opportunity shoulcl be lost of
improving the relatiom between
the observers and the infantry
officers, both when the latter arein the trenches and especiallybecause then they are less occupied with other duties-when
they are on rest. The habit ofclose cooperation in working together must be encouraged to
the greatest possible extent.

Infantry Liaison

21 1

in I Corps

VII. Practice Exercises.
The more practice exercises ofaerial liaison with infantry thatcan be carried out, the better. It
is impossible to over do it. In thecourse of these exercises every
one must endeavor to simulate,as far as possible, the conditions
that will be met with during theactual attacks. The airplane
should fly rapidly above the positions and, from time to time, fly
off as if he were driven by hostile
aerial attack, or forced away by
clouds or other climatic conditions. The observer should strive
to observe from the highest altitude possible. The infantrymen
must handle their signaling apparatus exactly as they would do
under the conditions of an attack
and as if they were continuallyharassed by enemy fire, etc.
The men handling the projectors
must strive to follow exactly thecourse of the airplane until theown plane from among a numlatter has given the signal
ber of others. During the exer"understood", or has repeatedcise the observer should precede
his call signal. (With regard to
the training of the projector sig- all his radio calls by the call e
nalers, in addition tc that carried (. . - . .I, or ex (. - . . -). Coordinates sent by radio should beout in exercises in cooperation
given in code, but in an obsoletewith our aircraft. The signalers
code and not the one actively inshould, on all occasions, endeavor to follow with the projec- use. The code signals actually inuse for list No. 2 of the signals
tor any airplane that may passbetween an airplane and the inover them, without, of course,
fantry instructions of 28th Delighting the lamp of the projeccember, 1917, should not be
tor.)
If possible, during the course used for practice exercises.
In order that observers in theof the practice exercises, several
event of an advance should not
airplanes should fly over thefind themselves handicapped bytroops at the same time, only
one of which acts as the Infantry the lack of large scale maps
Airplane and gives signals. This (Plans Directeurs) it is advisabk
that in exercises of liaison with
serves the double purpose of
training several observers at the the infantry they should practiceboth with the Plans Directeur
same time and of accustoming
the infantrymen to pick out their and with the maps of 1/80,000.
VIII. The maximum returnfrom liaison with the infantry will
only be obtained when every
infantryman is thoroughly convinced of the value of the aidthat can be given him by theobserver in the airplane. It is
indispensable to create in theinfantry the spirit of the knowledge of the absolute necessity of
infantry liaison and its undeniable utility.

42. TheRoJe213

OF PURSUit
June191s

Thefollowingnotes,’
which carry no indication as
to d a t e or author, evidently
were written late in June
1918, at the time the 2d Pursuit Group was being organized under t h e command of
Maj. Davenport Johnson. The
group, which began o p e r a tions immediately in the Tout
Sector, was part of the shortlived 1st Brigade Air Service,commanded by Col. William
Mitchell.

Notes on The Tactical
Employment of
Pursuit Aviation
Prepared under the direction ofCol. W. Mitchell. C.A.S. 1stcorps.
The role of Pursuit Aviation is
two-fold:
1. Offensiue
To seek out and attack all
enemy elements in the air, forcing the combat back over enemy
territory, breaking up the enemy’s aerial formation activity,
inflicting the greatest possible
casualties on his air service, andpreventing his observation aviation from functioning;
To co-operate with our Day
Bombardment Aviation in theattack of enemy elements on the
ground, and especially enemy
air elements that are forced by
the bombardment of their airdromes to take to the air.
2. Defensive
To protect our observation
1 In GorrelKs History, C-4. pp 500-503

aviation from interference by en- functioning of our own observalemy aircraft, and to prevent in- tion aviation. This is also very
cursions by enemy aircraft over important when the enemy has
our area.
assumed the offensive and iscorrespondingly difficult to acOffensive.
Ascendency in the air on any complish as the enemy will havemade a concentration of his air
given sector of the front is obtained by the attack, destruction forces for the attack. The attackand destruction, or dispersing, ofor dispersing of the enemy air
elements operating on that sec- the enemy observation eletor, and so completely dominat- ments, as well as other enemy
ing them that they are unable to air elements back of his own
cany out their missions. To ac- lines, is the duty of the second
Group of the Pursuit Wing and iscomplish this it is necessary for
mosteffectively carried out bylarge forces of pursuit aviation to
be concentrated under one com- offensive patrols of five to sevenmand, so that the protection of airplanes each, one of which
may be a fast bi-place machine
our observation aviation may
to cover the rear of the patrol.
first of all be assured, and that
These offensive patrols penetratestrong, purely offensive patrolfar over the enemy’s territory atformidable in numbers, battle
an altitude of 5000 to 6000 meformation and tactical grouping-may be thrown out to clear ters, seeking combat, sweeping
the air of hostile elements, inflict- the air of hostile aircraft; theiring great losses on the enemy’s primary duty being to attack at
air service, breaking up his aerial once any enemy aircraft that
defense against our aircraft and they may sight. The patrols of
our Day Bombardment should
forcing his whole aviation tokeep back of the zone in which it work in close co-operation withthem, striking the enemy’s aerial
is of primary value.
At all periods during the prep- defensive organizations simulta .
aration and conduct of offensive neously with strong attacks by
the Pursuit patrols, taking adoperations by our troops, it isessential to prevent the function- vantage of the breaking up of
the enemy’s formations and theing of the enemy’s observation
aviation as it is to prevent enemy dispersing of his offensive eleaircraft from interfering with the ments by the strong formationsof the Day Bombardment aviation which are then attacked indetail by the pursuit machines (ofthe Offensive Pursuit Patrols.

Combat214

Offensive patrols acting in cooperation with Day Bombardment Patrols should penetrate as
far over enemy territoy as theobjective of the latter, in order totake advantage of opportunities
for attacking the enemy air elements that may attempt to oppose them, and any enemy aircraft forced by the bombardment of their airdromes to taketo the air. This does not meanthat the pursuit planes should
stay with them constantly, butshould work in cooperation withthem.
Day Bombardment patrols are
frequently followed back to theirlines by enemy aircraft afraid toattack the formation but waitinga chance to pick off stragglers,and our Pursuit patrols should
be in readiness to take advantage of the demoralization
caused by the bombing, especially the bombing of camps,
hutments, parks, transport, columns of troops on the march,
etc., and find special opportunities for attack with M. G. fire on
the enemy personnel scatteredand driven into the open by thebombs.
Such attacks at low altitude
should be carried out by special
patrols or special machines andnot by the regular offensive patrots, which ordinarily should not
attempt to descend to very low
altitudes.
The Second Pursuit Group isfurthermore responsible for carying out attacks on enemy observation balloons. These also

balloons ve y rapidly (and an attacking aeroplane is therefore
forced to descend very low andcome under heavy machine gunfire. The results obtained are
rarely in proportion tcs the risk
run, and such isolated attacks
should, therefore, be undertaken
only under especially favorable

are done by mac hines speciallydetailed for the purpose and notby the regular patrols. It should
be bome in mind, however, thatisolated attacks for destruction ofobservation balloons are attended with considerable danger, as the German balloon
winches can bring down their

'I,'

I

I

,

/I

.-

The Role of
Pursuitweather conditions (clouds) or
when it is considered essential
for some particularly annoying
enemy balloon to be destroyedor forced to move further back.
This does not apply to demonstrations against enemy balloons
by airplanes with the object notof destroying the balloon but
merely forcing it to descend temporarily and interrupting thework it is carrying out. Suchdemonstrations are of advantage
in that they interfere with theobservation or adjustment of artillery fire that the balloon observer is engaged upon, while
they are not especially dangerous as the airplane does nothave to descend very low. Attacks for destruction carried out
on a large scale against all balloons along a considerable
length of the front give valuable
results, especially when carriedout at the beginning of, or during, any minor operation, butthese must be organized withgreat caution and precision.
The duties of the Surveillance
Squadrons are to keep the enemy’s back area under constantobservation, for general activity
and important movements, but
especially for the activities of his
air service. These machines will
be bi-place or tri-place, and will
carry out their missions singly or,in special cases, in pairs. They
will be equipped with cameras,
and with radio-by means ofwhich they can sig,ial the location of enemy aircraft, patrols,
activity on airdromes, etc.

21 5them, both about the enemy
The most efficient and ecoand about any proposed operanomical organization of Pursuit
Aviation, it is considered, is for it tions within the Corps.
to be combined with Day BomClose liaison must be mainbardment and Surveillancetained between Pursuit Group
Groups in a Combat Brigade
Commanders and Commanders
composed ofof Anti-aircraft Artillery. Anti-aircraft artillery serves as the sentiThe Brigade Commander andnel of aviation, and the system
Staff
2 Groups of six Pursuit Squad- employed by it to signal to ourrons each, each with a Park pursuit patrols the presence arid
and Meteorological Section; the course of hostile aircraft,
1 Group of six Day Bombard- must be worked out with thement Squadrons; andgreatest care and precision with
1 Group of two Surveillance
the Pursuit Group Commanders.
Squadrons, with a Park,
Pursuit Group Commanders
Photo Section, and Meteoroshould furthermore carry out fielogical Section each.
quent liaison with troops in line
The functions of the three
types require the closest co-op- and at rest, with a view to develeration and inter-dependence. It oping the mutual understandirigof each other’s functions andis therefore essential that theycapabilities and perfecting theshould be grouped under one
co-operation between them arid
tactical command.
the Air Service. In a war of
It is important that close liaimovement all pursuit elements
son be constantly maintained
between the Pursuit Groups and must be ready to move theirObservation Groups, and that all airdromes, parks and all equipinformation of interest be inter- ment at a moment’s notice. Atchanged between them. Obser- such times the liaison systems
are necessarily interrupted andvation Group Commanders
the closest touch by motor vehishould keep Pursuit Groupcle, radio or signaling must be
Commanders constantly informed as to the number of ob- kept with the necessary division,
Corps and Army posts of comservation planes they have in
mand, and with contiguous
operation over the lines, theareas in which they are working, air units.
their altitude and the characterof their missions-photographic
or visual reconnaissance, artillery
adjustment, liaison with infantry,
etc. The Corps Air Service Commander should furthermore
keep the Pursuit Group Commanders in possession of all information likely to be of value toCombat216

Defensive.
The basis of an Air Service is
its Observation Aviation, but thevery existence of this Observation aviation depends upon astrong and well trained Pursuit
Aviation, able to defend it fromenemy attack, and powerfulenough to assure at least a local
superiority in the air in any sector selected for offensive operations. In order that our Observation aviation, carrying out photographic and visual reconnaissances, artillery adjustment, liaison with infantry, etc., may render its maximum service, it isessential that observation squadrons be enabled to accomplish

their missions without interference from the enemy’s aviation.
This is true at all times, but especially so during periods of offensive operations.
To protect individual reconnaissance and artillery missions
by individual pursuit patrols
keeping continually close to theobservation planes is a wastefuland inefficient method of protection, but it is sometimes necessary, especially in the case oflong distance reconnaissancemissions. The protection of theobservation aviation is best assured by a system of defensive
patrols of five airplanes each,forming a protective (lower tier)barrage. These patrols fly backand forth beyond and slightly
above the line of the observation
airplanes, between them and theenemy, approximately over theenemy trench line at an altitude
of about 3500 meters. These
defensive patrols attack any enemy aircraft that approach, butthey should not attempt to penetrate far over enemy territory toseek enemy aircraft, as in sodoing the successful accomplishment of their principal imission isjeopardized, the Observation airplanes behind being left unprotected while the defenswe patrol
is away.
The duty of maintaining theProtective (lower tier) Ekarrage isallotted to one Group of the
Pursuit Wing.
This Group is also responsible
for the defense of our area
against incursions by enemy
long distance photographic reconnaissance planes. A j suchenemy planes usually cross ourlines at a height of 5000 to 6000
meters and maintain this altitude
throughout the course of their
mission, it is rarely successful forour pursuit to start from theground after them after they
have been sighted. A method of
defense against these photographic planes is for high patrolsof three to five airplanes each topatrol back of our line at analtitude of 5500 to 6000 meters
throughout the hours oi’ daylightsuitable for photography. The
sectors covered by such patrols
must be carefully selectcbd withreference to the likely points at
which enemy long distance reconnaissance planes are apt tocross our lines and the courses
which they are believed to follow. The patrols must be on
their beats at their altitudes assoon as or just before the lightbecomes sufficient forphotography.

21 943. 358 Squa6Rons
July 1918

Two days before approving
the schedule submitted byPatrick on 5 June 1918,
Pershing had informed the
Army Chief of Staff and theSecretary of War that the military situation was “verygrave.” A German offensiveon the Aisne had driven backthe French and seemed to bethreatening Paris. The Supreme War Council was depressed. Everyone wanted
more help from America. On
19 June Pershing recommended a buildup of the AEF
to 3,000,000 men (66 divisions) before May 1919. Aftera meeting with General Fochon 23 June, Pershing endorsed a plan that would put
46 divisions in Europe by October 1918, 64 in January
1919, 80 in April 1919, and
100 in July 1919. On 23 July:he War Department informed Pershing that a program for 80 divisions inFrance by 30 June 1919 hadbeen recommended to the
President.’

1 See Cable P-1235-S, 3 June 1918. Cable P-1342-5. 19 June 1918. Cable P-1369S. 25 June 1918, and SWC 316. Cablegram,
2 3 July 1918. and related documents in
Histoncal Division, Department of the Army.
United States Army in the World War, 19177919, Vol 2 (Washington 1948). pp 4 4 9 4 5 0 .
4 7 6 4 7 9 , 482-483. 544. and passim
2. In Gorrell’s History, A-7, pp 94-101.

The job of translating thelatter plan into an Air Service
program fell to Gorrell, Aviation Officer, G-3, General
Headquarters, AEF. Although
Gorrell’s plan called for only
9 add ition al bomb ard m ent
squadrons, he was able toadd 14 to the day bomber
force by reducing the night
bomber program by 5 squadrons. He also provided for an
additional 62 squadrons ofobservation and 27 of pursuit, making a total of 358
squadrons for the Air Service
AEF by June 1919. Following
is a brief extract from thelong and detailed study
which Gorrell produced andwhich was forwarded to Patrick on 29 July 1918.2

ESGG.3EXHIBIT “A”.
July 29, ‘1918.

1. “Problem”
A. Promises:(a) In July, 1918, theUnited States will have 30 Divisions in the American Expoditionary Forces in Europe.
(b) By July 1, 1919, the220

United States will have 80 Divisions in the American Expeditionay Forces in Europe. . . .

............................
B. Required to ascertain:(a) Tt 5 size and rate of formation of tne Air Service program necessay for a balanced
Army of the size indicated inparagraph 1-A. (Answer to thisquestion is found in paragraph[and table] 5).

............................
............................
8. The above program in Table V, even with the help of ourAllies, can not be met in full but
should serve as a goal which the
Air Service should strive toreach.

CombatTable V.
Size and Rate of Formation Desired for the Air Service

Date

Corps Obser- Army Observation Sqd.
vation Sqd.

Day Bornbardment
5 4Night Bombardment

22

8

4

Pursuit Sqd.

biioonCompanies

Sqd

1918
22

12

11

4

4

1

Sept.

3

5

11

4

4

9

July
Aug.

52

Oct.

4

7

12

4

4

8

Nov.

3

5

12

4

4

7

Dec.

2

6

12

4

5

6

Jan.

2

2

9

3

5

6

Feb.

2

3

9

4

5

8

Mar.

3

2

12

5

5

9

Apr

3

3

12

5

5

10

May

3

4

12

5

5

9

1919

June

2

3

12

5

5

8

TOTAL

49

52

147

55

55

133

358

133

GRAND

TOTAL

44, L i a i s o n - A
Costly B u s i n e s s

223

4 A u g u s t 1918

American pilots assigned
to infantry liaison found thework both dangerous andfrustrating. They complainedthat the infantry ignored theirsignals, did not put out markers, and otherwise failed tocooperate. The airman’s attitude is reflected in the following memorandum concerning this aspect of theemployment of airpower.’
The memorandum apparently
was prepared by Maj. Lewis
H. Brereton, who had succeeded Mitchell as Chief of
Air Service, I Corps, or by amember of his staff, for signature by Brig. Gen. Malin
Craig, Chief of Staff to Maj.
Gen. Hunter Liggett, Corps
Commander.
Headquarters, 1st Army Corps,
American E. F.,
August 4, 1918

Suggest Memorandum for
Division Commanders:
Liaison Instructions.
1. The Chief of Air Service will
be notified at the earliest possible moment of the arrival of newunits in the Corps, and the dateof their active operations. The
Chief of Air Service will immediately have air service assigned tothe unit concerned, and will notify such unit and the Corps

1 In Gorrell‘s History, C-12,p 35
2 See Doc 40
3 SeeDcc 36
4 A marking out

Commander regarding dispositions made, and will cause liaison to be established and maintained immediately therewith.
The attention of the unit arriving
should be directed particularly toConfidential Pamphlet., No. 2,“Liaison for all Arms,” dated
H.A.E.F., June, 1918, andConfidential Pamphlet No. 88,
revised, “Aerial Observation for
Artillery,” dated H.A.E.F., May
1918.3 With reference to thecontents of these pamphlets,
which contain the basis for all
liaison and co-ordination between air service and the Corps
Troops, the following should be
impressed strongly upon the
newly-arrived units:(a)Artillery: Adjustment of fire
and artillery surveillance should
not be requested from aerosquadrons when same can be as
efficiently performed by terrestrial observation or balloons.
(b)Infantry: An infantry contact plane (i.e., jalennement)‘
should not be demanded froman aero squadron if desired information regarding the positionof the advance units can possibly
be obtained through any othersource. In this connection, it isdesired to point out that observation balloons can effect efficient liaison between the infantry
P.C. and the advance units under ordinary circumstances.
11. When an infantry contact
plane is called for, it must be
realized thoroughly by the troops
Concerned that the infantry
plane cannot remain at a low

altitude over the lines for morethan a very few minutes without
the certainty of being shot down.
It is, therefore, of the utmost
importance, that watchers be
designated to observe all signals
from the infantry plane, and thatthe personnel have on hand at
all times the required material toindicate the positions of thetroops to the airplane, and thatthe signals be made immediately
upon demand of the plane.
111. The cost to the Goveinment of training a pilot and observer, coupled with the cost ofan observation plane, is approximately $80,000.00. Infantry
contact work is the most hazardous of all air service operatitons.
The present state of organizationof the Air Service renders replacement of planes, pilots andobservers increasingly difficult. It
should be realized that the expense to the Government ensuing from the loss of an observation plane properly equipped
and manned, can be decreasedmaterially by a thorough understanding on the part of the imit
concerned of the necessity of
having the proper material readyfor instant use in indicating thelocation of the lines, and theutilization of such material
promptly, when called upon by
the observer.
Malin Craig
Chief of Staff

45-commana ogthe

225

A k Semite, F k s t A ~ m y
6 A u g u s t 1918

When the First Army wasformally organized in August
1918 with Pershing as Commanding General, Mitchellwas staff advisor on aeronautical matters (Chief of Air

Service, First Army) and commander of the First Army’s
aviation units (Army Air Service Commander) (see Doc.
37). The authority to assign
missions to Air Service units

and the channels used in
making such assignmlents
were outlined in the following memorandum.

Headquarters, 1st Army, A. E. F.

MEMO RANDUM
Number 8

August 61h, 1918.

The following system and routine of assigning missions to the Air Service in the 1st Army is published
for the information and guidance of all concerned
MISSIONSAB

A m y Obseruabon Group
1. Reconnaissancea. visualDayNightb. Photographic
2. Command Reconnaissance
3. A ~ i l e yAdjustment

BY WHOM OFFERED

TO WHOM TRANSMITTED

Army G 2Group Commander through Branch Intelligence
OfficerArmy G-3
Army A d l e y Commander

Army Chief of Air Service
Group Commander

Army G 3

Army Chief of Air Service

Pursuit Group:

1. Patrollinga. Offensiveb. Defensive
2. Protection

Air Service CommanderC

Bombing Group
1 Tactical BombardmenthD

Balloon Group.
1. General Surveillance
2 Artillery adjustment

E

Cops Observation Group
1. Reconnaissancea. VisualDay
Night.
b. Photographic
2. Commander Reconnaissance
3. Artiley Adjustment
4. Liaison
a. Infantry
b. Artilley__
F

Balloon Group.
1. General Surveillance
2 Artilley Adjustment

W

Army Chief of Air Service

h Y G - 3

Army Chief of Air Service
Group commander

Corps G 2Group Commander through Branch lritelligence
Officer

corps G-3
Corps Artillely Commander
Division Commander

Corps Chief of Air Service
Corps Chief of Air Selvice

Division Artillery CommanderGroup Commander

Corps G-3
Corps Artillery Commander

Corps Chief of Air Service
Group Commander

Y

Army Artillery Commander

Lower unit commanders should come into direct communication in arranging for the missions outlined above.
The coUection, collation and dissemination of information of the enemy obtained by the Air senilce is a duty of G 2 and is fully covered by the InteUiince
Regulations.
By command of General Pe.shing46- 2 0 2 Squaarzons

227

16 A u g u s t 1918

Believing that Gorrell's General Headquarters
schedule for 358 squadrons American Expeditionary
could not b e met (Doc. 43), Forces Air Service.
Patrick prepared a different
France, 16 August, 1918.
schedule,' printed below, for
Memorandum
For: CHIEF OF
202 squadrons by June 1919.
STAFF
G-3
The reduction from 358 w a s
made by cutting pursuit and Subject: Air Service Program tobombardment. Patrick's plan 30 June 1919.
w a s approved, a s indicated
1. A careful study has beenby the indorsement' appear- made of the papers entitled "Airing below, this being the last Service Materiel" A.E.F. Estichange in the squadron pro- mate of July 29, 1918, and Exgram before the Armistice.
hibit "A" appended thereto.
2. It was soon evident that it
would be absolutely impossible
to get together sufficient materielor sufficient trained personnel toenable the Air Service to accomplish the program as laid downin Table 5 of Exhibit "A' whichcalled for 358 Squadrons on thefront by the end of June 1919,
and for the same date, 133 Balloon Companies.
3. Further consideration wasgiven to a possible program andat the last meeting of the Interallied Aviation Committee all of
the Allies were asked to submit
to the Committee by Monday,
the 19th, August 1918, programs showing what units they
expected to place at the front by
end of June 1919.
4. Below is given a table inwhich are shown the number of
Notes
Air Units we now have at the
1 In Gorrell's History. A-7, p 104.
front and the number which it is
2 In Gorrell's History. p to3 The initials
indicate that the indorsement was preparedor initiated by Col Fox Connet, AssistantChief of Staff, G-3 Having reviewed thevarious programs. the anonymous author ofa "History of the Various Air Service Programs for the Air Service. A.E.F" (in Gorrell's History, A-7). said, "The above programs serve to illustrate two points: (a) thefact that G.H 0 . . A.E.F., was at all times
willing for the Air Service to expand to its
maximum possible extent, and that G.H.Q.
desired the largest and most efficient Air
Service that could be placed on the Ameri-can front: and (b) the fact that G.H.Q..
A.E.F.. having determined upon a policy for
the Air Service did not vary in this pcilicy but
continued to allow the Air Service to expand
as rapidly as possible."

228

CombatPursuit

Obs.
Corps

Present

12

10

August

4

3

Obs.
Army

Day
Bomb

Night
Bomb

Totals

1

1

0

24

3

2

12

Sep!ernber

4

3

1

1

9

October

4

2

1

1

8

November

4

2

2

1

1

10

December

4

3

4

0

1

12

January

4

3

5

2

2

16

February

4

4

5

1

4

18

March

5

4

5

2
~

4
~

20
~

April

5

4

8

1

5

23

May

5

5

8

2

5

25

M)

49

52

14

27

202

June

TOTALS

hoped may be placed at thefront during each month between now and July 1, 1919. It
is recommended that this be approved as the American E.F. Air
Service Program for the next 11
months, including August 1918.
5. In addition to the above
there are now two Pursuit
Squadrons with the English
which are to be released to us
about the 1st. of Oct. if we sodesire.
6. Also in addition to theabove it is planned to place at
the front by 1st. July 1919 a
total of 133 Balloon Companies.
(Sgd) Mason M. Patrick
Major General, N.A.
C.A.S., A.E.F.

1st. Ind.
FC (G-3)
Chief of Staff, GHQ, AEF
France Aug. 17, 1918.
To Chief of Air Service
1. Returned. The foregoingprogram is approved. This program will replace all previous
projects. It is desired that theChief of Air Service prepare acablegram informing the War
Department of the new program.
(sgd) J. W. McAndrew
Major General231

With the successful com- E Corps was on the left, V inpletion of operations at St. the middle, and Ill on the
Mihiel in mid-September right. To the left of I Corps
1918, the First Army, com- was the French Fourth Army,manded by Pershing, issued which was to work in coordibattle instructions, in the nation with the First Army. To
form of a proposed field or- the right of Ill Corps was theder, for an offensive in the French XVll Corps, French II
area from the Meuse River to Colonial Corps, and U S . IV
the Argonne Forest. The first Corps. For the initial operaobjective was penetration of tions Mitchell had under his
the Hindenburg Line for command 54 squadrons (28about 16 kilometers, and sec- American, 23 French, and 3
ond being a further penetra- Italian), with a total of 963
tion for another 16 kilome- airplanes. In addition, his airservice included 22 balloons
ters.
On 1 6 September, the As- (14 American and 8 French).
sistant Chief of Staff G-3, The British Independent Air
First Army issued instruc- Force was to cooperate.
tions, written by Lt. Col. Mitchell wanted the FrenchFrank P. Lahm, for employ- 1st Air Division, with somement of the Air Service in the 525 bombardment, pursuit,attack. The following day, and observation aircraft, unMitchell, Chief of Air Service, der his command, as it had
First Army, submitted the Air been during the Battle ofService plan, which became St. Mihiel, but the most hean annex to the field order could get was a promise ofthat the First Army issued on assistance in an emergency.
20 September. At midnight
Following are: A. Firston 22 September, Pershing Army instructions for the emassumed command of allied ployment of the Air Service;'
forces that were to take part B. Extracts from the Firstin the offensive. On 23 Sep- Army field order2 and aviatember, Mitchell issued a tion annex;3 C. Supplemensupplementary plan for the tary plan of First Army Air
First Army Air Service, and S e r ~ i c e ;and
~ D. Plan of 1st
on 25 September, Lt. Col. Pursuit Wing.5
Bert M. Atkinson issued aplan for the 1st Pursuit Wing,
which he commanded. Hhour for the attack was 0500
on 26 September.
The First Army moved
three corps into the line on
the front of the main assault;

A. Instructions ofFirst Army
G-3
Headquarters First Army,
A. E. F.
September 16, 1918.
Memorandum, F o t Chief of Air
Service.
Subject: Employment of Aviation in Proposed Attack.
The employment of aviation in
the proposed attack will be divided into four phases:
1. Preparation.
11. During the Artillery Preparation.
111. During the Attack.
IV. Exploitation.

1.Preparation:Absolute secrecy must be maintained prior
to the opening of the artillery
preparation, consequently there
will be no increase in aerial activity at this time. Sufficient patrols will be maintained to prevent the enemy's reconnaissanceplanes penetrating our lines;
bombardment aviation will continue its normal activity (targets
will be furnished from this office); reconnaissance aviation
will secure the maximum information of the enemy without
arousing his suspicions.

1 Historical Division, Department of theArmy, U S . Army in the World War, 19171919, Vol 9 (Washington, 1948). pp 82-88.
2. AFSHRC 248. 211-61K.
3. In Gorrell's History, N-2. pp 350355.
4 . Ibid.. pp 356359.
5. Ibid.. C-7. pp 391392.

Combat2322.Dudng The Artillery
Preparation: Pursuit aviation
will attack concentrations of enemy troops, convoys, enemy
aviation and balloons. Day
Bombardment aviation will attack enemy concentrations, convoys, stations, command posts
and dumps, in a zone between
approximately 10 and 30 kilometers back of the lines. Nightbombardment aviation will attack railroad centers, enemy airdromes, troop concentrations
and dumps. Reconnaissanceaviation will carry out its usual
missions, army squadrons paying particular attention to locating the arrival of reserves.

3.Dudng The Attack: Thesame employment as during theartillery preparation.
4.Exploitation: As dictatedby the progress of the attack andsituation at the time.
5. Four command airplanes
will be held at the disposal of G3 beginning at daylight on the
day of the artillery preparation,these planes to be located asnear as practicable to Army
Headquarters.
6. Missions will be ordered
and results reported as directedin Memo. No. 8, these headquarters, dated August 8, 1918.
7. Bombing objectives will be
indicated by G 3 and detailed
information concerning theseobjectives by (3-2, 1st Army.
R. McCleave
Colonel, General Stajj,
A. C. ofS., G 3 .
FPL-PHeadquarters, Air Service, 1stArmy, American Expeditionary
ForcesFrance, September 17th, 1918.
Annex No. 4,(Field Orders No. 20).
Subject: Plan of Employment
of Air Service Units,
1st American Army.

I. Plan of Employment. This
will consist of four stages as follows:
A. Preparation until day of attack.

B. During the Artillexy preparation.

C. During the Attack.
D. Exploitation.

A. Preparation Until Day of Attack.
1. Surprise, being a iactor in
the success of operations, theutmost secrecy will be observedin movements and concentrationof Air Service Units.
2. Hostile reconnais.,c.ance
aviation will be prevented fromentering our lines and the workof hostile balloons hindered.
This will be insured by placing
an absolute barrage over thefront, from and including the
Meuse on the east, to and including La Hazaree on the west.
3. All information necessary in
the preparation of attack, especially for the Artilley preparation, will be gathered. Particularcare will be taken that the suspicions of the enemy are notaroused. These missions will beaccomplished by:(a) Army ReconnaissancePlans for the Initial
Phase of the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive

233

Aviation-Photographic

and&wd miSsk3ns.

(b) Army Corps and Army
Artilley Aviation-Photographic
ad vi%!a! n i s s h s , ordered by
the Army Corps and Army ArtilIety Commanders.
(3Night R e r o ~ ~ n i h m e
Aviation-Visual reconnaissancecarried out at night to obtain
information of the movemenb
and concentrations of enemy
forces.
4. Bombardment Aviation.
both day and night, will continue
to be mipioyeb fn a nomai
manner.
The above missions will be
carried out so as to &~arigeas
little as possible the usual aspectof the sector.
B. During The Artiltilley&p.nardbn.

1.Pursuit.

1Col. Robert McCleave.

(a) The First Pursuit Wing (4gieiips)w;# isrrre an a h i &barrage of the front and protect
our observation aviation at e v e y
dtit& kx3m ttw Mecs.2 imkisiveon the east and LA HAZAREE
inclusive on the west; prevent
enemy a s a s t i hm. attacking
through the WOEVRE and will
attack concentrations of enemy
trmps, c n q s , enemy ahk&k?nand balloons.
Ib)Pursuit Aviation, French
Aerial Divkiq wi!l he rn dksposed as to protect our rightflank and front in case of
811 idhck.

Combat234

2. Day Bombardment Aviation.
Will attack concentrations ofenemy troops, convoys andaviation, railroad stations, command posts and dumps.
3. Night Bombardment
Aviation.
Will attack railroad stations
and trains, troop concentrfitions,
ammunition dumps, and enemy
airdromes.
4. Reconnaissance Aviation.
(a) Army Reconnaissancewill carry out long distance missions, both photographic andvisual.

d4(b) Army Corps and Army Artillexy-Will carry out the missions, both photographic andvisual, prescribed by the Army
Corps and Army Artillery Commanders, including:
The observation and results ofartillery fire.
Liaison with Infantry.
Information of the enemy ofbenefit to the Higher Command.
(c) Night ReconnaissanceWill cany out visual reconnaissance as prescribed.
C. During The Attack.
The same general employment as prescribed in B. The
offensive will be taken andmaintained at all points and under all conditions.
D. Exploitation.
The offensive will be maintained, based on the progress of
the attack and the situation at
the time, with the particular object in view of destroying theenemy’s air service, attacking his
troops on the ground and protecting our own air and groundtroops.
11. Four Command Airplanes
will be held at the disposal of G3, commencing at daylight on

the day of the beginning of theArtillery preparation. These
planes will be located on the
Souilly airdrome.
111. Appendixes.
Appendix No. 1, shows the
distribution of the air forces.
Appendix No. 2, c;hows theplan of reconnaissance aviation.
Appendix No. 3, shows theplan of Bombardment Aviation.6
The plans for the utilization of
Aeronautical Units with theArmy Artillery and with theArmy Corps conform to the general scheme and are prepared indetail by those units.
By Command of General
Pershing
H. A. Drum
Chief of Stajj.
Official:
William Mitchell
Colonel, A. S., U. S. A.
Chief of Air Service, First Amy.

4b

6. The annex has no appendix on pursuit.

237

CombatAppendix I

Lt. Col. Lewis H. Brereton.

7 This group and the other French and
Italian units listed here, except for the 1st
Air Divison. were attached to the U S First
Army and under Mitchell s command forpera at ion^ The FTW& osgmrzdmai hierarchy was escadrille (flight)-groupe-esc&re :sqacM-3n), which was comparable to
the U S squadron-roup-wingorganizatan
8 These units are not on the chart. butthey are on the station list for the First Amy
Air Service for 26 SeDtember 1918

[The appendix is an organizational
chart labeled “Air Service of theAmerican 1st Army.” Since it is notsuitable for reproduction, it has beenused as the basis for the following
listing of units:]
First Army Air Service (Col. William
Mitchell)
1st Pursuit Wing (Maj. Bert M.
Atkinson)
2d Pursuit Group (Maj. Davenport Johnson)
4 squadrons (13,22, 49,
139)
3d Pursuit Group (Maj. William
K. Thaw)
4 squadrons (28, 93. 103,
213)
1st Day Bombardment Group(Mai. James L. Dunswoih)
4 squadrons (11,20, 96,
166)
1st Pursuit Group (Maj. Harold E.
Hartney)
4 squadrons (27, 94. 95, 147)
Army Observation Group (Maj.
John N. Reynolds)
3 squadrons (9, 24, 91)
Army Artillery Observation Group(Capt. Bloch) (Fr.)’
6 squadrons
4 balloon companies
Night Bombardment Wing (Commandant Viome)
2 groups (1French; 1 Italian)
5 squadrons (2 French;
3 Italian)Corps Observation Wing (Maj.
Lewis H. Brereton)
1st Corps Air Service (Maj. Melvin A. Hall)

9 Although the division appeared on thechart, it was not under Mitchell‘s commandSee the editor’s introductory note to thisdocument

1st Corps Observation Group
4 squadrons: 3 US. (1,12, 50); 1 French
Balloon Wing Co. A
3 companies (1,2, 5)
3d Corps Air Service (Col. Joseph C. Morrow)
3d Corps Observation Group
5 squadrons: 2 U S . (88,90); 3 French
Balloon Wing Co. D
4 companies (3, 4, 9, 42)
4th Corps Air Service (Maj.
Hany B. Anderson)
4th Corps Observation Group
3 squadrons: 2 U S . (8,135);1 French
Balloon Wing Co. C
3 companies (10, 16, 69)
5th Corps Air Service (Lt. Col.
Arthur R. Christie)
5th Corps Observation Group
4 squadrons: 2 US. (99,104);2 French
Balloon Wing Co. B
4 Companies (6, 7, 8, 12)
I1 Colonial Corps Observation
Group (Fr.)
3 squadrons
2 balloon companies
XVll Corps Observation Group(Fr.)
2 squadrons
2 balloon companies
From Second Army Observation
Group (Fr.)*
3 squadrons: Pursuit, night reconnaissance, and day observation
1st Air Division (Fr.)9
Day bombardment brigade
2 bombardment wings
7 bombardment groups
15 bombardment squadrons
2 protection Squadrons
Pursuit brigade
2 wings
6 groups
24 squadrons

Combat238

Appendix I1

September 17th. 1918.
Observation Plan-Under
Inshuctions No. ?..loBattle1. The Enemy can, in addition toreacting on the front attack, do thefollowing:a. On the tight bank of the Meusehe can engage reserves which healways has in the area DamdlenMangiennes in order to attacit either
on the Haute de Meuse or by debouching from the Forest of Spincourt.
b. On the lek bank of the Meuse
attempt an anack as a diversion ortake away reserves from this part of
the front and transport them to theright bank.
c. Bring up resews on both sidesof the r i v n from other parts of thefront.
2. In consideration of tho above thefollaving observations will be carried
OUt:a, On the tight bank there must be
constant observation of the area
north of the Forest of Spincourt.
b. In addition, reconnaissance cartied out over Montmedy-bnguyon-Spincaurt-Audun-le-Roman
would give notice of any amval andunloading of reserves which might
be brought from other parts of thefront.
c. On the leh bank of the Meuse
there must be constant observationof the area Dun-Romagne-sousMantfaucon-Charpenny-Vilosnerin order to watch the possible movement of troops or concenbation.
d. In addition reconnaissance mustbe pushed along the Mouzon-Dun
and Mown-St. Juvin railroads in
10. T h e p r o p ~ e dfield order. This plan.
rubmine5 as Appendix I1 lo Annex 4. bec m e Annex. 9 10 F i M Oder 20
11 Nn m Gorelle HtBory, N-2

order to determine If any unloading
has taken place.
e. Observation of the crossing
over the Meuse are indispensable.
3. To carry out the foregoing plan
the following in5hllctions will govern:a, Observation Squadrons of therespective Corps will be responsible
before operations for a depth ofeight kilometers. Boundaries are indicated on map attached hereto."
During overations Corn units will
not &beyond a depth of five kilometers unless they are provided withpursuit planes for protection.
b. Enemy front lines will be photographed by C o p Machines at evey
opportunity. h n t r of such photos
will be sent to Amy Cropping
Ground by airplane delivey.
c. A m y Observation units will observe the area bounded on anachedmap by single green line. carryingout the missions indicated in paragraph X2 above.
d. The necersay steps will betaken to secure the cooperation of
the observation servke of the 4th
A loaded bomber awaiting takerdf.

and 8th French Anies.
Willey Howell,
Lt. Col, G.S.
A.C. ofS.. G Z

AppmvedWm'
Cdonels Air
Chiefof Air
Appendix 111

September Wth, 1918.
PLAN OF BOMBARDMENTAVIATION
Four phases are to be considered.
1.Prepamtion. Coveting the p-

riod from this date until the time ofa d e y preparation.
2. Dun'ng the Alblleely Prepamtion.
3. Duting the Attack.
4. Egloitation.

1. Prepomtion.
Object: To hinder the arrival of enemy troops and supplies in the sector to be attacked. Destructon ofenemy ahtion on its airdrome
and parks.

23 9Appendices

As absolute secrecy must be observed, there will be no heavy conCentration Of bombing, consequently
with the limited means available, thevarious targets indicated herewith
will be bombed in turn.

2. During The Artillery
Preparation.
Object To harass the enemy byattacking his troop concentrations,convoys,command posts
and dumps; to hinder his movement

Preparation
OBJECTIVESTO BE
BOMBED
BY

By ORDEROF

REPORTS ON
RESULTS, ETC. TO BE
ADDRESSED TO

Rallroad Centen:
Longuyon
StenayMontmedy
Carignan
Mowon
Vouders
Lumes
Airdromes & Park8
Maimy
MouzonC.G.. 1st Amy
C.S.. 1st Army

G2
AmericanDay Bombing
Group of
3 SquadronsCAS
1st Army

2 FrenchNight Bombing
Groups at
Epiez 81Chermisy

C.A.S..
1st Army

G-3
C. of A.
bY
C. A. 5. 1st Army
C.G.. 1st Army
C.S.. 1st Army
G-2,

w.

C. of A
by C.A.S. 1st Army

Durina Artillem PreDaration
To Be Bornbod
ObJecUvem

By OrderOf

By
Troop Concentrations, andconvoys wherever found in azone approximately 10 to 30
kilometers back of the lines.
Dumps. Railheads. Camps& Command Pomt..
I Bneulles
5 Meuse2 Romagne S
Montfaucon
3. Termes
Grand Pie
4 SaintJuwn
5 Briqueney
6. Hanicoult
7 Dun-Doulcon
8 Saulmey
Railroad Centers
StenayVouners
Airdromes and Park
McuzonMalmy

AmericanDay Bombing Groupof 3 Squadrons

C.A.S.
1st Army

Report. On Result..
Etc.. To Be
Addressed To

C.G.. 1st Army
G2w

by C.A.S.. 1st Army

2 FrenchNight Bombing
Group

C.A.S.
1st Armyof troops and to destroy his aviationon the ground.
Such of the following targets will
be selected as are found to be themost important as shown by reconnaissance made at the time.

Combat

24Q

3. During The Attack
Object: (a) To prevent the arrivalof reserves.
(b) To break up counter attacks.
(c) To harass the enemy in the
wh&awid of his troops & material.
(d) To destroy his aviation on thet J m i i . TXgek w# be tire 5am-e as
those during the Artillery Preparation, selecting fhe ones found to be
the most important as shown by
visual and photographic reconnais??axemic!e a! t k time. Orders fcKmissions will be transmitted by G3,
fhrough the C.A.S.,and reports on
results made as in the preceding
phases.

B. Field Order

C. SupplementaryFirst Army, A.E.F. Plan
Ligny-en-Barrois,
September 20, 1918-3 p.m. Headquarters, Air Service, First
Army American Expeditionary
ForcesField Orders
France, September 23, 1918
No. 20............................
3. [Mission assignments, corps
and services.]............................
(K)Air Service:(1)For plan of employment, see Annex No. 4.
(2) It will attack and defeat
the hostile Air Service while
4. Exploitation.
As dictated by the progress of the screening our army front fromhostile observation and attack.
attack and the situation at the time.
(3)The army dropping
F. P. i a h m ,ground for messages from aeroColonel, Air Service
planes will be at the Souilly
Official:
aerodrome. Four command
William Mitcheti.
planes will be held ready to exeColonel, A.S. U.S.A.
cute any mission given at theChief of Air Service, First Army.
army landing field at Souilly.
(4)The Chief of Army Air
Service will designate certain
army balloon companies to accompany the advance. Corps
commanders will designate andregulate roads for these
movements.
............................
By command of General
Pershing
H. A. Drum,

Supplementary Plan of
Employment of Air Service
Units, 1st Army
1. This plan covers fourphases:(1)Preparation until day of
attack.
(2) During Artillery preparation.
(3)During attack, as far as
first combined army objective.
(4) Exploitation of Attack as
far as second combined Armyobjective.
2. (1)Preparation Until Day
of Attack.
(a) Acting vigorously overthe enemy's lines between LA
CHAUSSEE and the MOSELLE
RIVER, on the right flank of thisposition and North and East of
NANCY, so as to hold the enemy's attention in that direction
and lead him to believe that weare to attack METZ.
(b) Stopping all hostile reconnaissance from crossing ourlines and preventing observation
Colonel, from hostile balloons throughout
Chief of Staff. the area mentioned above. In
addition a Pursuit barrage to beplaced between the MEUSE andthe AlSNE to prevent enemy
reconnaissance.

Lt. Col. (later Col.) Frank P. Lahm.

Appendices(c) Gathering all informationnecessary for the preparation of
the Attack throughout the area
as far as, and including the final
objectives.
(d) All missions along the
new front of operations will be
carried out in such a way as not
to alter the usual aspect of the
Sector.
3. Special Missions For Each
Branch of Aviation Under (1).
(a) Night Bombardment.
Independent Royal Air
Force, Night Bombardment
Wing.
VILLOME, French Night
Bombardment Wing.
French Squadrons ofFrench Group of Armies of theCenter.
The objectives have been
pointed out in the original planof employment covering the period of attack and are chosen so
as to shut off the zone of thelast operations from the present
zone of attack.
(b)Pursuit and Day Bombardmentdrench Air Division.
Missions as per "a" paragraph
2, over the front between LA
CHAUSSEE and CHATEAUSALINS by means of
1. Short distance offensive
patrols across the lines, carried out
by combined Bombardment andPursuit forces.

24 1

2. Patrols covering ourlines and attacking balloons.
These missions should be carriedout whenever any reliefs of troops
are being made.
(c)Pursuit and Day Bombardment of 1st US Army
1st Pursuit Wing(Atkinson).-Barrage over front
and attack of balloons between
CHATILLON SOUS LESCOTES-PONT SUR SEILLE.
Offensive Pursuit and Day Bombardment patrols as directed in or
to the East of this area.
1st Pursuit Group(Hartney)-Barrage patrols overthe front between CHATILLON
SOUS LES COTES-AISNE
RIVER at MELZICOURT so as tostop hostile reconnaissance andpatrols.
(d)Army Reconnaissance
Aviation.
1.lstArmy Obseruation
Group. Photographic and visualreconnaissance of area included
between a line from VERDUN to
LONGWON inclusive, West to
the RIVER AISNE, inclusive.
2.2nd French Army Obserution Group. Photographic
and visual reconnaissance of area
between a line drawn from VERDUN to LONGWON inclusive,
East to the RIVER MOSELLE
inclusive.

Night Reconnaissance.
1st Army Observation GroupVILLOME, Night Bambardmerit
Group
2nd French Army Observation
Group.
Visual reconnaissance towatch any movements of concentration or withdrawal of theenemy throughout the areas assigned to each aviation unit.
NOTICE: These missions havebeen allotted by G 2 , l s t Army,in the plan of reconnaissance.
(e)Army Artillery and Anmy
Corps Aviation. Visual and photographic reconnaissanceSpotting Artillery objectives arid
adjustments.
4. (2) and (3)During Artillery
Preparation and During Attackof First Combined Objective.
(a) Destruction of the hostile
air service at all altitudes, attackof his ground troops, and protecting our own air and groundforces.
(b) The benefit of surpriseand the quick progression of 1he
attack will give us an advantalp,
our Aviation therefore will beable to act very boldly. This will
enable our Pursuit Aviation tofight ground troops with machine guns and bombs.
Special Missions of Each Ckiss
of Auiation.
(a) Night Bombardment.
(During the night before D day,and during the night following,
D day).

242

Independent R.A.F. -Will
attack the railway stations of
METZ, SABLONS, THIONVILLE, AUDUN LE ROMAN,
and the most important aviation
grounds in that region. (Samegeneral mission for Day Bombardment on D day).
Villome night Bombardment Wing-Will attack the railway stations of CONFLANS,LONGUYON, MONTMEDY,
and all large gatherings of troops
noticed.
(b) Aerial Diuision. Its mission will be to cover the front,
up to a depth of 10 kilometersin the enemy lines, destroy enemy aircraft and balloons.
It will develop its greatest
offensive power with bombs andmachine guns against all enemy
reserves, reinforcements andconvoys, whether they aremarching to the attack or retreating so as to throw them into
confusion, cause a block in theroad traffic and block cross roads
throughout the enemy backarea.
The central line of action
will be on the plateau along thegeneral axis Montfaucon-Nantillois-Romag ne-Ba yonvilleBuzancy.
(c)Pursuit and Day Bombardment Auiation of First Army.
1st Pursuit Wing (Atkinson)Barrage at medium and high altitude up to 5 kilometers on ourwhole front.
Enemy ground troops will be
attacked by Pursuit Units withmachine guns and bombs whenever ordered.

Combat

1st Day Bombardment
Group, (Dunsworth)-Will attack enemy concentrations along
the valley of the MEUSEROMAGNE-ST. JUVIN- andGRANDPRE.
1st Pursuit Group (Hartney)-Will specialize against enemy low flying airplanes, protect
our infantry liaison and observation planes and attack hostile
balloons on the front Chatillon
Sous Les Cotes-Melzicourt.
(d) Army ReconnaissanceWork.
The 1st Army Observation Group (Reynolds)-Willcover the sector to the West ofa line drawn from Verdun to
Longuyon inclusive with bothday and night reconnaissance.
The 2nd French Army
Obseruation Group (De Vergnette)-Will cover the sector eastof a line drawn from Verdun to
Longuyon, inclusive, with bothday and night Army Reconnaissance.
The missions specified in
the plan of reconnaissance will
be carried out.
Four command airplanes
will be located at Souilly readyto take off at any moment toverify or obtain precise details
concerning any important pieceof information that may be required by the Army Commander.

(e)Army Artillery Auiation
and Army Corps Auiation. Theiremployment will be governedby the plans of employment of
the Army Artillery or of the Armycorps.
These airplanes will have toprotect themselves to some extent from hostile machines whichhave broken through our Pursuit
Aviation.
Army Artillery and Army
Corps airplanes should avail
themselves of every favorable
opportunity to attack enemy
troops on the ground, when it
does not interfere with their general mission.
5.(4) Exploitation of Attack
on Second Combined Army Objective (Second Operattion)
1.General Aims. Theoretically the same as durinlg the preceding period. The missions willbe specified according to the situation after the first attack.
2. Special Missioris of Each
Branch of Auiation.
(a)Pursuit and Bombardment Auiation of The First Army.
Same missions as during preceding period.
(b) French Aerial Diuision. Same missions. Two principal axis along which its action
will be ordered accordling to thesituation.
Buzancy-Stonne
Bridges Over the
Meuse.
(c) Night Bombardment.
Independent Force R.AF.-

Appendices

Commandant Villome. French Air
Force. (Courtesy Attache de I’Air,
French Embassy)

243

Same list of O b j d l V e S . L’LLOME Night Bombardment
Wing. -Diff erent objectives
t h r m g h w t t k httkfiedd, rziL
heads and bridges over the
MEUSE as far as and including
LL’MES.
(d) Army Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of lines
Where the &T!E?miS$JOXgEdZhg
fresh centers of resistance, supply and direction of movementof reinforcement or withdrawal.
(Details of these missions shouldbe specified by G 2 j .
(el Army Corps andArmy Artillery Aviation. Samemissions. Greater impurkmm
will be given to the Infantry
Liaison work:-the airplanes
shodd bring m &Teai n h a tion to the Infantry (to the Divisions, regiments and even battali m s ofi the first lire)-a greater
share, too, should be given to
the attack on land, (rear-guards,
nests of resistance, reififorczments or reserves).
6. Provision For A Movement
Fot-mrd.
Army Attilley a n d Army
Corps Aviation.
Advxxed d r d r m s for
the Army Corps and Army Artillery Aviation will be selected
R e x the pcrst of c o m m n d ofthe larger units, which will beequipped for use at the eadiest
prxtkacshle m m f hl orrler tofacilitate the liaisons. If the attack
progresses normaiiy, the advanced airdromes will become
the permanent ground of thesector.

When the mimewrent forward is sufficientlyimportant,
new advanced ground will again
be sdmtixi and prepared in asimilar manner.
The Equipment Section
wid; make arrangem~ts
xc~rbingly.
Pursuit a n d Bombardment
A>i&im.
These units will movenearer to the front as soon as
terrains are freed by t!he k m y
Corps and Army Artillery.
In Special cases, theseini it^ . ~ S utibizeJadvanced airdromes, auxiliary airdromes or
fhe airdromes of the Army Corps
and Army Artillery.
William Mitchell,
Colonel, A.S., U. S. A.
CMrf ofA h SHiikx

Combat244~

D. Pursuitwing
Plan
Headquarters, First Pursuit Wing,
Air Service, American E. F.
September 25th, 1918.

PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT OF
PURSUIT, AND DAY BOMBARDMENT UNITS FIRSTPURSUIT WING
1. The operations will cover 4
phases:1. Preparation until day of attack.
11. During artillery preparation.
111. During attack, as far as firstcombined army objective.
IV. Exploitation of attack as far
as second combined army
objective.

While the areas and objectives
will be altered from time to time
the plan of employment of pursuit aviation in the last threestages of the attack will follow
the same general principles.
2. (A) Preparation until d a y of
attack: In order that secrecy may
be obtained no airplanes fromthis wing will operate west of
Chatillon-sous-les-Cotesuntil
after H hour.
(B) The normal activity of thesector between Chatillon andPort-sur-Seillewill be maintained
and the Groups will operate overthe sector of the last operations.

3. Pursuit Aviation after H hour: will be paid to the sector be(A) Pursuit aviation at the dis- tween the Meuse and Chatillon.
posal of the First Pursuit Wing
(D)Special Missions of Pursuit
comprises the 2nd and 3rd Pur- Aviation:
suit Groups. The sector of the
By requiring one Group to do its
1st Pursuit Wing is from Portbarrage work in the morning its
sur-Seille on the east to La Har- squadrons will be available forazee on the west. The sector of an offensive operation in theattack is from the Meuse Riverafternoon, and vice-versa. The
on the east to La Harazee on the Group assigned to patrol in thewest.
afternoon will be on the alert in(B) In order to maintain athe morning to carry out an ofproper superiority over the enfensive mission, in which the enemy air service it will be neces- tire Group may be called uponsary for our air service, not only to participate at medium andto maintain protective patrols
high altitudes, penetrating about
within the enemy's lines for the 12 kilometers beyond our addefense of our Army Corps Air vancing lines to clean the air ofService and to attack enemy re- enemy aviation. A similar expeconnaissance planes, but it will
dition may be sent out in thealso be necessary from time toafternoon from the Group thattime to take the offensive with a has done the patrolling in thedisplay of dominating force
morning. The hours at which
sending out powerful expedithese offensive missions are cartions so as to cover intermediate ried out will be constantly varand high altitudes and to sweep ious and an effort will be madethe air clear of enemy aviation
to order offensive misions at
up to a depth, 10 or 12 kilome- hours when intelligence received
ters inside his lines.
from the Anti-Aircraft Artillery in(C) One Group will protect
dicated maximum enemy activthe front, daily, from dawn to 12 ity. The strength and frequency
h 30 and the other from 12 h 30 of attacks on ground objectives'till dark. in the protection of the will depend upon the strength ofenemy aerial activity encounfront, patrols of one Flight will
operate over the sector, Chatil- tered.
Ion-sous-les-Cotes, Port-surIn special circumstances purSeille; Patrols of 2 Flights will be suit reconnaissances will be ordered. While it is not anticipatedmaintained throughout the period assigned over the sector
that such missions will be orChatillon-sous-les-Cotes-La
dered, Group Commanders will
see that their pilots are familiar
Harazee.
with infantry ground panels.
In view of the fact that it isbelieved that most of the enemy
aviation is concentrated in theregion of Metz, especial attention

Appendices

Close protection for Corps
Observation photographic missions, when it is required, will be
provided by the squadron assigned to barrage patrol. The
Corps Observation Wing will be
informed of the hours at which
the different Groups will be responsible for the barrage patrol
the night before. When Observation Squadrons cannot provide their own protection they
will notify the Corps Observation
Wing Commander who is authorized to adjust this protection
directly with the Group that is
responsible, at the hour in question, for the barrage patrol. The
Group Operations Officer will inform the patrol leader of thesquadron going out on barrage

24 5

patrol that its mission has beenaltered from that of barrage patrol to one of close protection
and the patrol leader in question
will get into immediate telephonic liaison with the pilot who
is responsible for the photographic mission.
4. Day Bombardment Aviation
In the First Pursuit Wing comprises the First Day Bombardment Group. In principle thisGroup will be used to attackfrom high altitudes, large objectives such as towns and railroad
stations from which traffic is radiating.
In the first stages of attack itwill operate against enemy concentrations along the valley ofthe Meuse, Romagno, St. Juvin,Grandpre.
Special Missions of Bombardment; In emergencies when intelligence is received that specially favorable targets are presenting themselves within 6 or 8
kilometers of our front lines thisGroup will be ordered to attack
such targets at low altitude inorder to cause confusion andmaterial damage to enemy elements arriving as reinforcementsor retreating.
By order of Lieutenant Colonel
AtkinsonPhilip J. Roosevelt,
Captain, Air Service, U. S. A.
Operations Officer.

247

Battle orders issued daily
by Col. William Mitchell,
Chief of Air Service, First
Army, and by his successor,
Col. Thomas D e w . Milling,from the beginning of the
Meuse-Argonne Campaign
until the Armistice, generally
consisted of five major parts.
These (1) described the situation at the front; (2) indicatedthe actions to be undertakenby the First Army on the following day; (3) provided ageneral statement of the Air
Service mission; (4) made det ai Ied operation al assign
ments t o the various elements of the Air Service; and(5) supplied additional instructions, information, orcomment. The general mission statements for the Air
Service reveal a shifting ofemphasis from time to time,even from day to day, as thebattle progressed. Following
are extracts from some ofthose battle orders.’-

1 In Garrells titstory. N-2. PP 1-96 Passim

Headquarters Air Service,First Army American
Expeditionary Forces

France, September 30, 191.8.

Battle Orders No. 12.

1. The offensive of the Allied
Armies continues with success. . . .
Battle Orders No. 7.
2. The 1st Army will remain in
1. The enemy continues onplace on October lst, continuing
the defensive at all points along its preparations for further adthe front. . . .
vance.
3. Our air service will maintciin
2. The 1st Army attacks bethe offensiveat all points andtween the MEUSE AND THE
AISNE RIVERS at 5-30 H Sep- will thoroughly cover our position from hostile air attack ortember 26th. . . .
3. Our air service will take the reconnaissance.
............................
offensive at all points at daylight
September 26, 1918, with theobject of destroying the enemy’s
France, October 3, 19B.
air service, attacking his troops
on the ground and protecting
Battle Orders No. 14.
our own air and ground troops.
1. The offensive of the Allied
Armies continues with success. . . . Our air service continues to dominate the enemy’s...........................
aviation.
2. The 1st Army attacks on
the front west of the RIVER
France, September 29, 1918. MEUSE on October 4th at 5.25
H....
Battle Orders No. 11.
3. The air service will concen1. The offensive of the Allied
trate its efforts on the battlefieldArmies continues with sucand will take the ojjensiue at (111
cess. . . .
2. The 1st Army continues the points at daylight October 4th,
attack, as do the French, British 1918, with the object of destroying the enemy’s air service, atand Belgian Armies. . . .
3. Our air service will maintain tacking his ground troops, andprotecting our own air andthe offensiveat all points, andground troops.
will assist the infantry and artil............................
lery in their advance in all ways.
France, September 25, 1918.

CombatFrance, October 4, 1918.
Battle Order No. 15.
1. Our Army has made substantial gains all along the line
against a stubborn resistance.
The Allied Armies continue toadvance. The German Air Service confronting ours, after vainly
attempting all day to gain control
over our Air Service, was defeated everywhere.
2. Our Army continues to attack with vigor.
3. The air service will put forward great efforts to assist thetroops on the ground by close
operation with them. The sameorders remain in effect for October 5th.
4. The work of all branches of
the Air Service, both French andAmerican. has been extremely
severe, not only on account of
the presence of the enemy ingreat numbers, but on accountof the weather and poor visibility. In spite of these difficulties,
the Air Service have [sic]showna dash and readiness to meet
every call made upon them, in a
way to excite admiration from all
who have witnessed the work.
............................

France, October 7th, 1918. points on the Front bedween the
Meuse River and Grandpre
Battle Orders No. 17.
1. The offensive of the Allied inclusive.
............................
armies is being maintained. The
front of the 1st Army had advanced in the ARGONNE FORFrance, October 11, 1918.
EST. Our Air service continues
Battle Orders No. 21.
to dominate the German aviation, notwithstanding the fact
1. The offensive of the Allied
Armies continues with sucthat it has been largely reincess. . . .
forced. . . .
2. The 1st Army continues its
2. The 1st Army will seize theattack on October 12th. . . .
heights east of the MEUSERIVER, which are occupied by
Our air seruice will maintainthe offensive at all points, will
about three German divisions. . . .
support the attack from the3. The air service will take the Meuse River to Beaumont, andwill thoroughly protect our posioffensive at all points over thefront of the attack and will main- tions from hostile air attack andtain a protective barrage west of reconnaissance.
............................
the Meuse River to the Argonne
Forest. The enemy’s air service
will be destroyed, his ground will
France, October 13, 1918.
be attacked, and our own air
and ground troops will be
Battle Orders No. 2:3.
1. The Allied Armies to ourprotected.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . left are continuing their advanceand the enemy is giving way
before them. , . ,France, October 10, 1918.
2. The 1st Army continues its
attack on October 14th. . . .
Battle Orders No. 20.
............................
1. The Allied Armies are ad3. The air service will concenvancing everywhere. The enemy
trate its efforts on the battle field
in front of the 1st Army has
thrown his divisions into the line and will take the 0ffen:iive at allby regiments, in his attempts to points at daylight October 14th.
1918, with the object of destroystop our advance. . . .
2. The first Army continues its ing the enemy’s air service. harassing and attacking his groundattack on October 11th. . . .
3. The air service will support troops, and protecting our own
air and ground troops.
the attack and will prevent theenemy from organizing along the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
heights of the Bois de Barricoutt.
The offensive will be taken at allBattle Orders
Air Service, First Army

France, October 18, 1918.
Battle Orders No. 28.
1.The enemy continues to fallback. . . . The 1st Army has captured 20,000 prisoners since thecommencement of Operations
on September 26th. . . . The
German Air service opposing us,
in vain, has attempted all day togain control of the air by employing patrols of 25 to 50 machines, but has been defeated atevery point.
2. The 1st Army will continue
to improve its position for further
attack by local operations on
October 19th. . . .
3. Our air service will maintainthe offensive at all points, willprotect our position from hostile
air attack and reconnaissance,
and will support our groundtroops in their local operations.

..........................
France, October 20, 1918.
Battle Orders No. 30.
1. No change in enemy situation on our front. . . .
2. The 1st Army will continue
to improve its position by local
operations, maintaining contact
with the enemy and developing
his line of resistance.
3. The orders for tomorrowremain the same for all branchesof the Air Service as prescribedin Battle Orders No. 28, Special
effort will be made to give information concerning 'the locationof hostile artillery units.
...........................

24 9

France, November 3, 1918.
Battle Order No. 44.
1. The Allied Armies haveforced the enemy into a precipitate retreat. . . . The aviation of
the enemy has been destroyedor driven back wherever found,
his balloons have been burned,
and our airplanes continually
harry and demoralize his groundtroops with bombs and machineguns.. . .
2. The First American Army
will take up the pursuit of theenemy west of the MEUSE andwill make preparations to extend
it to the east bank of the............................
3. The air service will take theoffensive at all points on themorning of November 6th. The
enemy air service will be destroyed and our own air andground troops will be protected.
Every opportunity will be seized
to harass hostile ground troops
with bombs and machine gullfire.

..........................

France, November 11, 1918.
Battle Orders No. 52.
1. (a) Yesterday the enemy
MEUSE... .
threw into the line opposite our............................
3. The air service will concen- Third Corps his last available ditrate its efforts on the battle field, vision on the western front.
(b) An armistice with Gertaking the offensive at all points
at daylight November 4th, 1918. many has been signed and 2111
It will seize euery opportunity to hostilities ceased at 11:00 H November 11th.
assist our troops, our corps air(c) The Allied Armies hold1
services will be protected, theenemy air service destroyed, and themselves in readiness for further advance.
his ground troops attacked.

............................

............................

3. The Air Service will holditself in readiness to resume opFrance, November 5, 1918. erations at a moment's notice.
No planes will cross the lines.
Battle Orders No. 46.
............................
1. The enemy continues to
6. Attention of all units is cliretreat with his infantry in confusion. His artillery is gradually in- rected to training memoranda
creasing its fire. The Air Service attached ,of the enemy wherever encountered has been destroyed orforced to withdraw by our own
aviation. . . .

49- Objectives of
Day Bornbaaarnent

251

Nouernberz 1918

The interdiction and closesupport functions of d a ybombardment units of t h e
AEF at the end of the war are
seen in the following extractfrom the history that the 2d
D a y Bombardment Groups u b m i t t e d in D e c e m b e r1918.' The group, which was
not organized until t h e beginning of November 191 8,
was part of the Second Army,of which Col. Frank P. Lahmw a s Army Air Service Commander.

Air Service-Second
Army, American Expeditionary Forces,
Headquarters 2nd
Day Bombardment
Group.
Outline of Operations
Tactical:I. Aims of Bombardment
Group.

1. Direct.
(a) Cutting of communications lines; by bombing railroad
centers, thus destroying yards,
warehouses, supplies, munitions,trains, and demoralizing transportation personnel; by bombing
main roads.
(b) Destruction of enemy
works; by bombing ammunition
dumps, concentration camps,

1 In Gorrelrs History, C-8. p 176

airdromes, supply depots, military factories, and military defenses.
(c) Smothering of enemy
attacks; by bombing concentration of troops in reserve areas orin the zone of attack, or bybombing reinforcing troops on
the march.
(d) Demoralizing an enemy
retreat; by bombing retreating
troops, by cutting communications, or by bombing newly established line of defense.
2. Indirect.
(a) Demoralize troops andlower their fighting morale.
(b) By engaging hostile pursuit, draw them away from thezone of attack.
11. Choice of Objectiues.
1. Area; as in most cases thisgroup operated with its army,
2nd American Army, its sector
covering the sector of the 2nd
Army and extending about 40
kilometers back of the front
lines.
2. Nature of objectives; railroad centers, airdromes, andmunition dumps constituted theoriginal objectives. These were
to be bombed continually until
specific and individual objectives
were to be assigned in case of an
attack.

3. Choice of objectives foreach mission; unless specific 'orders were received from
A.A.S.C. this group would selectthe target for each mission, depending upon the following elements:
a. Importance of the target.
b. Number of planes available for mission.
c. Availability of protective
pursuit planes.
d. Presence and aggressiveness of enemy planes.
e. Weather.
For example, if Conflans,
showed unusual activity, and theenemy planes were numerous
and sufficient bombing and pursuit planes were available thetime of bombing would depend
upon the weather.

............................

50, A~ecrus

253

P ~ e c i s i o nBombing
NouembeR 1918

Aerial bombardment became possible with the develqmmt d akcraf!
ofgetting over a target with abomb. Then c a m e the prob-

lem of putting the bomb on
the target. The history of theBomb Unit, Aircraft Armament Section. Ordnance Department, AEF, the organization responsibie fur providing
bomb sights for the Air Service, stated alternatives available then, as ktter, to perms
attempting to solve the problem.'............................
2. h b n g from implanes
may in general be divided into
two types, precision bombinga d area bmbing. In the firstcase a definite target is pickedout upon which the majority ofthe bombs are to drop. In thelatter the frank admission ismade that accuracy is hnited
and a given area is covered in
the hope that enough bombs will

1. In Gonell's History, 1-2, p 77

strike the target proper to accomplish the mission.
2. The French and British
have both tended toward thelatter general scheme of bombing, and the system of "sowing"bombs or releasing them in series or tmii is the uiltgrimth ofthat tendency. The advantage ofthat system lies in the fact thatthe .&Its
wc?d ii-r ihh work . . .
are mounted outboard, obviating any necessity of the observer
g&iilg &*%iF&
the fuselage
to sight, and therefore leaving
him always ready at his guns,
4offering hlm &&!ap*tion. The disadvantage lies in thefact that admitting inaccuracy is
Zp! to led to C a r e a e s ~ s sk theuse of sights; or their being practically ignored.
3 . h h g in general is donein formation, the leading planeof the squadron aione using a
sj&k and the other planes releasing their bombs when they
are at what they judge to be thesame point. The sighting observer is in that case protectedby the &er &Tles m the formation. His business is to sight, andhis attention is not attracted elsew h . Fcif i k e rethe
general policy of the UnitedStates has been toward precisionh b k i g ; and :he Mkf that tlpe
American Aviators would faithfully use their sights has been
Cfirmed.
............................

51, Obswuation

255

Balloons
N o u e r n b e R 1918

The work of the balloon
observers was detailed in thefollowing instructions whichwere issued by Col. Charles
DeF. Chandler, Chief of the
Balloon Section, AEF,' andrepublished in a bulletin of
the Air Service, AEF.2

Instructions For
Balloon Observers

1 Balloon Notes, No 66, 27 Nov 18.
2. Air Service Bulletin. Vol VII. No 317. 7
Dec 1918. In t h e Bulletin the title waschanged to "Observation "fare of movement when very

then a balloon officer assigned toDivision Artillery Headquarters is
expected to inform the balloon
Assignment of Balloons
by courier, if no other means is
possible, of the information de1. When sufficient balloon
companies are available they are sired by Division Headquarters
and upon securing the inforinanormally assigned one to eachtion he should give personal atDivision, one to the artillery oftention that it is, without dehy,
each Army Corps,and others
made available to the officers
distributed to serve Army Artillery. The duties of the observer, who call for it. Likewise, thepersonal liaison with Artillery istherefore, vary somewhat, depending upon the assignment of expected to constantly informthe balloon of the location of
his balloon.
batteries in their vicinity and ar2. For all balloons the obrange for temporary telephoneserver is expected to regulate
Artillery fire and conduct general of some kind from the nearest
surveillance of the enemy terrain battery to the balloon position
for location of fire.
within view. In addition to this,the balloons assigned to Divisions have Infantry liaison which General Surveilianceconsists in the use of precon5. General surveillance concerted visual signals between thesists
in reporting all matters ofballoon and infantry, reportingthese by telephone to the proper military interest within view o f
the observer in the basket. Even
P.C.
3. In addition to the duties in while adjusting fire for Artil1e:ythe observer is expected to conthe basket as indicated in thetinue reporting events which
preceding paragraph, the observer takes his turn (usually by come to his attention.
6. The military information
roster) for ground assignments
mostdesired consists of the folsuch as officer in charge oflowing:chartroom and personal liaison
Fugitive targets (troop andwith Division Headquarters ortransport movements)
Artillery Brigade Headquarters.
Position of enemy batteries
4. When there is little move(usually located by flashes)
ment of troops, giving time forTrain movements, giving posithe construction of sufficient tel- tion of train and direction
ephone lines, the personal liaiThe beginning of barrage fire,
son to Artillery and Infantry
reporting its extent and changes
Headquarters is not required tothe same extent as during warfew telephone lines are possible;

256

CombatRoad transport and troop
movements
Hostile balloons and airplanes
All airplanes brought down,

both enemy and friendly
Fires, lights, smoke and explosions
Entrenchments or emplacements and any changes in these
Bridges of all kinds acrossstreams and canals, particularly theconstruction or destruction of temporary bridges.
7. All of the general military
information phoned from thebasket is recorded in the chartroom log from which place it is
telephoned to the various P. C‘s.
according to the nature of theinformation. These miscellaneous reports are classified under a few general headings forthe daily reports.
8. The reports of train movements are particularly important
for the reason that increased railway activity is an indication thatthe enemy is either augmenting
or reducing the movement of
troops.
9. An enemy intending advance or retreat movements,
usually constructs additional
bridges over streams and canals.
These are frequently visible fromballoons and it is most importantthat any change in bridges, bepromptly reported.
10. The observer should always be careful not to include
his own deductions in reports.
He should simply give facts

briefly and in case of doubt as towhat he sees the report shouldcarefully state that the information is not certain; if the information is of sufficient importancethe Intelligence officers will secure confirmation from othersources such as ground observation posts and airplanes.
11. All reports from the observer should answer the fourquestions of WHAT (definitionof what was seen), WHEN (dayand hour), WHERE (indicating
the place), HOW (troops inmarch or at a halt, Artillery active or silent, etc.).
12. General surveillance byArmy balloons is ordered byArmy G-3 and the informationof this nature when secured istransmitted by the balloon to the
Army Air Service Commander.
13. Balloons forming a part of
the Army Corps Group receive
instructions concerning generalsurveillance from Corps G-3
and transmit the information secured to the Corps Air Service
Commander (Memo No. 8, Hqs.
1st Army, A.E.F. Aug. 6, 1918).

Infantry
14. The observer can easily
see Infantry in column andshould be able to calculate its
strength from the length of thecolumn or time required whilemarching to pass a given
point. . . .
15. If the infantry marches notin column of four’s but by two’s
the corresponding change in the
figures should be allowed. It will
be easy to determine the num-

ber of companies, battalions, etc.
by the intervals between units,
but note that toward the end of
a long march these intervals diminish and may even disappear
by reason of the lengthening inevitable in every column. The
tail of every unit from the battalion up will generally be indicatedby the presence of wagms,
which form its combat train. If it
is impossible to give wiih reasonable accuracy the strength ofmarching organizations it will besatisfactory to report “An Infantry column of such a length andhaving such a time of defilement
is passing along the road between A to B toward e;.”16. When Infantry is in line orin mass, not in motion, the estimate of the strength is much
more difficult than for marchingcolumns and it becomes a matter of experience with the observer. It should be rennembered, however, that a large unit
does not move over a considerable distance in other foimation
than in column and if it deploys,
it is for the purpose of going into
action and then the informationof most interest would be thefront along which the cleployment has been made, together
with a number of the lines andthe density of each line.

Observation

257

Balloons

Artillery

Cavalry

17. Batteries in position arelocated best by the flashes either
early in the morning or twilightin the evening. Particular effort
should be made to determine
the number of guns in each battery position.
18. It has been reported thatdummy battery positions withinview of the balloon are occasionally made more realistic byflashing a little powder in front ofthem. The nature of this flash
and difference in the smoke
should not deceive an experienced observer.

22. During the present war
comparatively little cavalry has
appeared in formation withinview of the balloons but the table for estimating the strength isgiven herewith. . . .3............................
20. There is a serious difficultyin accurately estimating moving
Artillery for the reason that frequently Infantry marches with itfor defence in case of enemy
attacks. At considerable distancethe wagons of the Infantry transport may be confused with Artillery guns mounted.
21. During preparation for an
offensive, practically all Artillery
and much of the Infantry movements are made at night andwithout lights which would otherwise be an indication to theballoon observer, but during
open warfare involving advancesand retreats, there will be plentyof Artillery moving in daytime.

Transport
23. Motor trucks are used extensively for movements oftroops and supplies. Theseshould easily be distinguishedfrom horse-drawn vehicles orArtillery guns by the more rapid
rate of movement along theroads.
24. The railway transport ofrations, forage and ammunition
requires many trains of cars eachday, often amounting to 25
freight cars per day for each
Division when considerable ammunition is being used. Continuous balloon observation willsoon determine the amount of
the normal railway activity fordaily replacements so that any
increase in the number of trains
is a reliable indication that theenemy contemplates increased
activity and troop movements.
25. On French railways tomove a complete Division requires approximately 35 trains
and an Army Corps of two Divisions from 100 to 200 trains,considering each train as transporting one infantry battalion,
one battery or a squadron ofcavalry.

3 Table mined

26. For motor truck transportation, it is assumed that eachtruck carries from ten to fifteen
men, there being approximately
fifteen to eighteen trucks percompany.

Night Observation
27. Information desired andobtainable by night ascensiosns
embraces the following:
To report the beginning oi enemy attacks.
To determine the limits of thefront which is attacked.
To observe and report the signals of Infantry during barrage fire.
To observe and report marker
signals from front lines for enerny
bombing planes.

..........
Infantry Liaison
29. During position warfatre
which may be considered as including the so-called trench warfare, all infantry positions up to
the most advanced outposts areusually connected by a telephone system so complete ,thatvisual signals to and from theballoons are ordinarily not necessary. Open warfare of molvement gives little time for providing telephone circuits to advanced infantry so that the clevelopment of visual communication via balloon observers becomes important. Division headquarters should know at all limes

258

where the advanced infantry line
is located and its changes.
30.Infantry liaison consists ofFollowing the progress of assaulting troops and reserves.
Observing the signals from theline of the command posts andtransmitting them to the Generalcommanding the division.
Informing the command of
everything going on in the vicinity of
the firing line and beyond it.
Signalling out, if prearranged, tothe advanced elements conventionalsignals as provided in the plan ofliaison.

Means of Communication
For Liaison
31. From the balloon to thecommand-The balloon is directly connected by telephonewith the divisional command
post and with the army control
system.
It is, besides, provided with aradio apparatus enabling it totransmit its observations in casetelephone communication
should be broken.
From the balloon to the firing
line and to the advance command posts. -The balloon cancommunicate with the advanceelementsIn daytime by means of a cylinder which folds and unfolds atwill, thus making signals corresponding to dots and dashes.
These transmissions are limited
to the two signals, “Understood”
or “Repeat”, preceded by thecall of that particular post which
the balloon addresses.

Combat259

Observation
Balloons

36. The balloon observers
should know in advance the following:
Coordinates of targets.
Batteries which will fire.
Caliber and number of pieces tofire.
Nature of fire (salvo or one
piece at a time).
Type of projectiles with time offlight and type of fuse.
Interval between shots.

37. After securing information
concerning the targets the observer should then procure thefiring maps and photographs
covering the target area.
38. Adjustments are reported
on the line battery-target. Distances are reported in meters to
the “right” “left” “over” and“short” stating first the deflection
followed by the range, thus “25right” “50 over”.
39. Figures are given by theirdigits, i.e. “two five right” “fivezero over”.
40. The telephone communication between balloon and battery should conform to the following example:
Battery: “Battery ready tofire.”
Observer: “Ready to observe.”
Battery: “No. 1 on the way,etc.”
“No. 2 on the way, etc.”
Observer: “No. 1 two fiveright, etc.”
41. Shots should be reported‘‘lost’’if not seen but reported as“not in position to observe”
when the movement of the basL o t a Dassing cloud, or otherobstacle prevents a proper viewof the target. When a salvo isreported “lost” by an observer
the Artillery fires the next salvo
with data intermediate between
that and the last salvo seen andthe one lost but if the report is“not in a position to observe”
the salvo is repeated with thesame data.
42. In order to observe successfully for several batteries simultaneously it is necessary tohave very efficient fire and telephone discipline also knowing
accurately the batteries which
are to fire.

Registration Points
43. All batteries need registration points for determining theerror of the day thereby taking
gunlaying corrections to accountfor changed atmospheric conditions. Balloon officers should frequently advise the batteries they
serve of various clearly definedplaces in enemy lines which areeasily visible from the balloon
these being indicated on theirartillery firing maps. If this is notdone the battery commanders
might select from their maps registration points not clearly visible
from the balloon.

Army Artillery
44. If sufficient balloons (areavailable the fire of special highpower artillery can be more accurately reported by using IWO
balloons so placed that one observes for deflection and theother for range.

Methods of Fire Affecting
Balloon Observation
45. The balloon observer having continuous telephone communication with the battery firing, no system of signals is necessary such as must be employed for observation by irirplane. It is therefore the fact, asa direct result, that the battery
commander is not restricted in
the conduct of his fire as he mustnecessarily be with observation
by means of airplanes.
46. In the adjustment of artillery fire the balloon observer
should therefore remember that
his function is to OBSERVE thefall of the projectiles from thebattery or batteries with which
he is working. He should not
attempt to prescribe to the battery commander, the methods of260

fire of the battery nor the manner in which this fire is to be
conducted. However, in orderthat the most efficient co-operation may be secured between
the balloon and the battery, thebattery commander should inform the balloon observer as towhat methods are to be employed in making the adjustment. This is for the reascn that,with observation by balloon, themethod of fire adjustment will
depend largely upon the abilityof the observer to accurately determine the positions of thepoints of fall of the projectiles.
47. In general there are two
methods of making this adjustment. If the observer can determine exactly the positions of thepoints of fall and can transpose
these positions to the firing map
or photographic map, the battery commander can then easily
determine the distance of eachpoint of fall from the target. The
balloon observer may himself
make this determination, simply
informing the battery commander that such and such shot
fell so many meters right (or left)
and so many meters over (orshort). The battery commander
will then make the necessary
corrections for each shot until heconsiders the fire adjusted.

Combatnot be necessary for the battery
48. In case communicationcommander to make any deflecbetween the observer and thebattery is not entirely continuous tion corrections.
50. The range adjustrnent in
it may be impractical to send therange and deflection errors after this case is, however more comeach shot. The balloon observer plicated and requires a prelimishould then request the battery nary fire known as Trial Fire, theobject of which is to place thecommander to fire a series ofshots (6 or 8, for example). The zone of dispersion in an area
which contains the target. In obobserver observes the bursts ofserving for Trial Fire, the balloon
all shots of this series before
making any report. After the last observer simply reports, after
shot he calculates the center of
each shot, whether the shot fell
impact of the series, with relation short of, or over, the target. The
to an origin and system of coor- battery commander makes the
dinates known to the battery
range corrections necessary, uncommander. He then informs
til he has bracketed the target by
the latter of the co-ordinates of
two shots, each of which is lessthis center of impact. The battery than four “probable errors”
commander will then make thefrom the target. He then ascorrections necessary to bringsumes his trial elevation, thethe center of impact upon themean range of these two shots,target.
thereby practically assuring him49. Through various causes,
self that a number of shots fired
however, it is often found thatwith this trial elevation, will form
the observer is unable to doa zone of dispersion which wiU
more than determine the apcontain the target.
proximate errors in deflection
51. The next procedure is toand only the general “sense” of place the center of imptactof all
the shots in range (i.e., whether shots, upon the target itself. In
the shot fell short of, or beyond order to do this the battery comthe target). In this case the batmander must resort to what istery commander should adopt a
different method of adjusting his
fire. With the elements of fireproperly calculated, the deflection dispersion of any number ofshots, will be slight and the battery commander will as a rule
correct the deflection as a whole,basing his correction upon the
total number of shots employed
to adjust his fire. In case thedeflection is less than four
“probable errors” it will usually261

Observation
Balloons

known as Improvement Fire. Asa rule this requires that twelve
shots be fired with the elevation
determined from the Trial Fire.
The balloon observer reports thesense of each shot, either (andthis is preferable from the pointof view of the observer) immediately after it has burst, or uponcompletion of the series. If morethan six shots have fallen over,or if more than six have fallen
short, the battery commander
subtracts six from this number
and multiplies the result by ‘/izth
0: 4 probable errors. This operation will give a range correction
which should be added to, or
subtracted from, the trial range,
according as the greater numberof shots were short of, or over
the target. The range as deter-

mined, is known as the Adjusted Control of Fire and the observer
Range. If time or ammunition is need only give the sense of thelacking, the Adjusted Range can shots or he may only give thebe determined with less thansense of a number of shots, as
twelve shots, by the same proc- for example; “Last six shots,ess. The number of shotsover” or: “All shots fallingshould, however, never be less short”.
than six. After the Improvement
53. In the case of fire upon
Fire has been completed andfugitive targets, or other objecthe Adjusted Range determined, tives where the element of time
the fire is considered as adjusted. is most essential the battery
52. When the fire of a battery commander does not attempt toadjust his fire for precision. He
has been adjusted, the battery
commander may either dispense simply attempts to bracket thewith the services of the balloon target by quickly enclosing it beobserver, or he may request the tween two ranges, one of which
gives a majority of shots, over,latter to observe the fire for efand the other a majority offect, in order that the center ofshots, short. The deflection is
impact may be kept continuously on the target. This is called adjusted by adjusting the sheafof fire on a certain portion of thetarget, and then opening thesheaf until the fire is distributed
over the entire objective. The
balloon observer as a rule, sends
only the sense of the shot generally waiting until a salvo is fired
and then communicating to thebattery commander the sense ofthat salvo.
............................

Telephone to a balloon.

5 2 - ACombat

263

senuice
11Nouernbea 1918

During the war many officers in the A E F tended toregard aviation as one of thetechnical services of the U S .
Army. Struggling against thisattitude, members of the Air
Service sought recognition
for aviation as one of thecombatant arms. The position taken by the Air Service
is seen, for example, in thefollowing memorandum dealing with the allocation of
supplies among the various
elements of the AEF.' For another example, see the introductory paragraph of Sherman's Tentative Manual (Doc.
55).

1. In Gorrell's History, A-9, p 201

Headquarters Services ofSupply, American Expeditionary Forces, Office Chief of Air
ServiceNovember 11, 1918.
Office Memorandum No. 82.
1. The Air Service, althoughhighly technical and specializedin character, is organized,
equipped and trained for thesole purpose of taking its placeon the fighting line with theother combatant services.
2. Air Service units, from themoment they arrive in France,
form a part of the Expeditionary
Forces and each Air Service unit
is at all times a part of somedistinct organization of theseforces. In the S.O.S. these organizations are as a rule territorial,at the front they are tactical. At
all times they are composed ofunits of all or several of thecombatants arms as well as thepurely technical services.
3. Whether in the S.O.S. or in
the Armies at the front except for
supplies which are peculiar to

the Air Service, it receives its
share of shelter and other equipment made available for the
Army Organization to which it
belongs and neither asks orwants more.
4. If Air Service Agencies cliscover supplies that are needed
they should at once give noticeto the proper authorities thatsuch supplies may be madeavailable where they are needed
and ask that the Air Service
share accordng to its needs inthe distribution of such supplies.
This is true for all classes ofequipment which is used frorn
the base ports to the fighting
line. The Air Service asks for no
special favors.
By direction:
H.C. Whitehead,
Colonel, A S ,Chief of Staff.

53, Mitchell: Pr2ouisionaJ
ManaaJ ~~Operzations

2 67

2 3 D e c - e m b e R 1918

While commanding the Air
Service of the First Army,
Mitchell pulled together in
one document the routine
procedures of his observation, day bombardment, andpursuit units.’ Later, after hebecame commander of the
Air Service, Army Group,
those procedures were revised and reissued as a seriesof operat ions bul Ieti n s. * The
series contained one additionofconsiderable
significance-a bulletin on the “Organization and Employment
of Attack Squadrons.”
The bulletin on attack aviation evidently was written
during the last days of the
Meuse-Argonne Campaign,in which bombing and strafing of German troops andpositions in the battle area
became an important part of
U.S. Air Service operations.
Those attacks, made by bombardment, pursuit, and, to alesser degree, observation
units, led to plans for organizing units to specialize in attacks of that kind. The plan,
as it appeared in the bulletin,
was incorporated in a “Provisional Manual of Operations

1 Routine Procedure of Air Service
Units Cir No 1 CAS 1st Army 19 Aug 18
republished in Air Service Bulletin Vol VII
No 305 24 Dec 18
2 In Gorrell s History C-2 pp 232-267
3 AFSHRC 248 21141s
4 Ma1 Gen Joseph T Dickrnan assumed commanc of Third Army upon its
organization on 1:) November 1918 at whichtime Mitchell became Chief of Air Service
Third Armyof Air Service Units” which
Mitchell issued on 23 December 1918. A prefatory note
stated that the United States
did not yet have any experience in organizing and emplaying attack units. In fact,
the first such unit was notorganized i n the U.S. Air
Service until th e 3d Attack
Group was formed in 1921.
The routine procedures forobservation, day bombardmerit, and Pursuit which had
been Published in bulletins of
the Air Service, Army Group,
were also incorporated withrevision, i n the ”Provisional
Manual,” which was issued
while Mitchell was with theArmy of OccuPation as Army
Air Service Commander,
Third Army.3

Official:
Wm. Mitchell, Brig. General.
U.S.A., Army Air Service Conimander, Third A m y .

Headquarters Air Service, Third
Army American
Forces.
Coblenz, Germany,
December 23rd, 1918
This manual treats of the activities of various types of unitsof the Air Service of the Amelican Expeditionary Forces, andso far as subjects discussed arc!
concerned, may be taken as E\
brief summary of experience of
the American Squadrons gained
during active operations,
For the most part, the note:jdeal with the routine procedureof groups and squadrons operating in the various fields of aerial
activity.
To these have been
Headquarters, Third Army
American Expeditionary Forces. added articles published from
Coblenz, Germany, time to time by these HeadquarDecember 23rd, 1918. ters as the need developed for acloser coordination of the work
The following Provisionalof the various units, both in their
Manual of Operations for Air
operations over the lines, and in
Service Units is approved andthe arrangement of a training
published for the information
program to satisfy their internaland guidance of all Concerned.
reauirements and also to imBy command of Major-General prove their liaison with otherDickman:4 Anm:~~craig,/i The~ following subjects are clisChief of Staff. cussed:(a) The Routine of a Corps Observation Group,(b) The Routine of an Army Otiservation Group,(c) The Routine of a Day Bombardment Group,(d) The Routine of a Night Reccmnaissance Squadron

Postwair Review

268(e) The Routine of a Pursuit Unit.
(f) Organization and Employment
of Attack Squadrons.
(9)Liaison of the Airplane with the
Infantry.
(h) Instructions for the Improvement of Liaison between the Observation Air Service and Line Troops.
(i) Instruction of Observers andPilots of Observation squadron^.^

The notes on routine procedure are based upon actual
practice of units of the types
mentioned. The article dealing
with the “Organization and Employment of Attack Squadrons”
is based upon the experience ofothers in this field, as this experience has never been tested by
an American attack Squadron.
Active operations were suspended before the organizationof a unit of this type was carried
to completion.
The article on “Liaison of the
Airplane with the Infantry” dealing as it does with a field inwhich the American airplanes
operated with such conspicuous
success, contains a record of theexperience of our squadrons
which is of the most importance.
The pamphlet entitled “lnstructions for the Improvementof Liaison between the Observation Air Service and Line
Troops” was issued as a guide to
Observation Units in the outlining of a course of instruction forother Arms in working with the
Air Service, which instruction
was found to be most necessary

5 . kerns h. and i. have been ornined

the operations of the Group isdelegated by the Group CornBrig. Gen’l.
rnander to a Group Operations
Am!J Air
Commander* Officer, whose selection should
Third Amy9 be based upon his ability as aAmerican Expeditionary Forces.
executive and experierlce as an............................
observer over the lines. This officer should keep in constant
touch with the operations of allof the squadrons of the group,and should advise them as tothe best methods of ca.rrying out
Wm.

U.S.A.y269

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

the operations which the groupis called upon to perform. He is
responsible to the Group Commander for the performance of
duties assigned to the various
squadrons, for the preparationand forwarding of operations reports, and should keep theGroup Commander constantly
informed as to activities of theGroup.
4. The Group Operations Officer is responsible for the proper
equipment and operation of theGroup Operations Room, andwill supervise the training of new
observers assigned to the Group.
In all matters connected with
operations he should act as theadviser of Squadron Operations
Officers.
Assignment of duties to

Squadrons.
5. One squadron of the groupwill normally be assigned to carryout missions of surveillance andadjustmentfor the Corps Artillery,
as well as photographic missions
as ordered from G -2 of theCorps through the office of
the Corps Chief of Air Service.
The Corps Artillery squadron will
make such adjustments of fire of

the Corps Artillery as cannot be
carried out by the Corps Artillery
Balloons, and will have at all
times an airplane of commandat the disposal of the Corps
Chief of Air Service.
6. One squadron will ordinarily be assigned to each divisionin line. The divisional squadrons
will carry out missions of reconnaissance, infantry liaison, andsuch artillery adjustments as cannot be done by the divisional
balloon. In addition, they will
carry out photographic missions
ordered through the office of
the Corps Chief of Air Service.
7. Squadron Commanders in
addition to their administrative
functions will be responsible forthe carrying out of duties assigned to their squadrons by theGroup Commander. The actual
control of operations within the
Squadron will be delegated to
an Operations Officer, selected
for qualifications similar to thoseof the Group Operations Officer.

The Day's Work.
8. In preparing the programof work for the day in eachsquadron the Squadron Commander and Squadron Operations Officer should meet after
flying is finished for the day toframe the schedule of operations
for the succeeding day. They
should be provided with the following data by the officers mentioned:
Engineer Officer: Airplanes avail-able and airplanes equipped for ptiotographic missions listed by number.
Radio Officer: Airplanes equippedwith proper radio installation.

Ordnance Officer Airplanes
equipped with proper armament.

9. This data may be conveniently posted upon a chart in t11e
Squadron Operations Office, oron the Squadron bulletin board
in the Group Operations Room.
In the assignment of missions toobservers and pilots the flying
record of each must be kept
constantly in mind. For this purpose a chart should be kept
posted to date, showing thenumber of flying hours of each,and the character of and date of
missions performed.
10. A typewritten schedule ofwork should be prepared showing the character of each mission, the airplane assigned, thename of the pilot and observer
selected to carry it out, the timeof departure, and in case of aphotographic missiqn, the size' ofthe camera and the number ofplates to be taken.

270

11. One pilot, one observer,
and one airplane should be designated to respond to alert calls,
to be called upon in case additional work is required, or upon
the failure of an airplane to perform its mission.
12. A Pilot should be designated as Officer in charge of theField, whose duty it is to see thatthe airplanes assigned to duty
are properly inspected andequipped, and that the missions
leave the field at the time scheduled. A copy of this scheduleshould go to the Engineer Officer, the Radio Officer, the Ordnance Officer, the Group Photographic officer, and the GroupOperations Officer. One copy
shall be posted on the Squadron
Bulletin Board.
13. The Engineer Officer is
responsible for the proper condition of the airplane, and that it isready for flight at the time specified.
14. The Radio Officer will seethat the airplanes are equippedwith proper reels, and that theradio is in proper condition before the airplane leaves the field.
15. The Ordnance Officer
must see that the machine guns
are mounted upon the airplane,
and that the proper number ofmagazines and other ordnanceequipment is placed in it, andthat the fixed guns are in propercondition and equipped withbelts of cartridges.

Postwar Review

16. It is the duty of the Photographic Officer to see that the
airplanes sent out on photographic missions are equippedwith the proper cameras andplates, and to arrange for the
prompt return to the photographic laboratory of these articles, upon the return of the mission, so that the plates may be
developed at once. The firstprints are then identified by the
Branch Intelligence Officer, assisted by the observer who performed the mission. During an
attack, especially, speed in distribution of the photographs is of
the utmost importance, and delivery of the first urgency prints
should be made by airplane.
17. Just before leaving for thefield the observer should reportat the Observer's Room andbring up to the minute all information which will be of assistance in the performance of his
mission; he should then proceedto his airplane in time to reach it
half an hour before the time ofdeparture. He must then inspect
his equipment. The pilot who isabout to make a flight should
also be at his airplane at least ahalf hodr before the time set for
departure and must inspect his
airplane and armament andwarm up his engine.

18. A daily form should be
prepared and posted in the Operations Office of each squadron, upon which the observer,
before leaving to carry out his
mission, must enter his nameand that of his pilot, the numberof the airplane, charactcer of mission and time of departure.
Upon his return he mu:d proceed without delay to the Operations Office, and enter upon theform the time of landin'g, with ashort record of results obtainedon the flight. He must then fillout a careful report of the mission, in the preparation of which
the pilot can often render valuable assistance.
19. Each pilot will be assigned
an airplane. He is responsible forthe calibration of his own ammunition, must load his own
belt, and load and unload his
gun himself. He is responsible
for the aligning of the sights of
his own gun.
20. Each observer should be
assigned two movable guns,
mounted in pairs, as well as six
magazines. He is responsible forthe calibration of his ammunition, the loading of his inagazines, and the aligning of
his sights.
21. Squadron Commanders
will detail to the headquarters of
the unit to which their squadron
is assigned, an observer to act as
Liaison Officer. That all observers may benefit by this experience, it is suggested that this271

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

detail be made for a period of
one week, except during periodsof intense activity, when one Liaison Officer should act throughout the period to insure continuity of the Liaison.
22. In all squadrons an Assistant Operations Officer will be
appointed to act as assistant to
the Squadron Operations Officer, and will familiarize himself
with all his duties. He will takepersonal charge of the training of
new observers assigned to thesquadron, under the direction of
the Group and Squadron Operations Officers. On account of
the rapid expansion of the service, the constant training of officers who can go to newly
formed squadrons fully acquainted with the duties andpractical workings of an Operations Department is imperative.
Group Operations Room
23. To insure the proper functioning of the squadrons of a
Corps Observation Group it isessential that the personnel befurnished with complete, accurate and up-to-date informationin regard to the disposition, operations and plans of our own
forces and those of the enemy. It
is, therefore, of fundamental importance that each group have aconveniently located Operations

Photo finishing room

Room in which all this information is assembled and placed at
the disposal of the observers andpilots.
24. The Group Operations
Officer is responsible for theproper upkeep of this room. He
is assisted by the Branch Intelligence Officer detailed to thegroup by G 2 . Should a squadron be operating alone, responsibility for the maintenance of an
Operations Room will devolve
upon the Squadron Operations
Officer.
25. The information that must
be available in the operations
room may be classified under
the following subjects:(a) Photography(b) Artillery(c) Infanty(d) Reconnaissance(e) Miscellaneous

Photography
26. One copy of each photograph will be kept on file in theIntelligence Office and two copies placed in the Operations
Room at the disposal of the observers.
27. The Intelligence Officer
will keep a card index of photographs taken, showing the size ofcamera used, coordinates of thecenter, index number of thephotograph, altitude and date on
which taken, together with a record of the character of the photograph, whether good, fair orpoor. These cards are filed according to the coordinates of thecenter of the photograph, eachcard representing a square kilometer and containing a record of
all photographs whose center iswithin this square. Photographs
will also be listed in a book

Postwiar Review

272

under their index number showing the coordinates of the center,the date when taken, the nameof the observer who carried out
the mission.
28. The photographs filed in
the Operations Room are arranged in pigeon holes according to their coordinates, eachpigeon hole representing one
square kilometer on the map
and containing the photographs
whose center is in that square.
The pigeon holes are numberedin the same way as the Plan
Directeur; horizontally, according to the “ X ’ coordinates andvertically according to the “Y”
coordinates. These files are kept
up-to-date and complete by theIntelligence Officer, replacements being made whennecessary.
29. Areas covered by photographic missions will be graphically represented upon a map,
each plate being outlined, theindex number and date attached, and the area covered by
the mission colored. Each map
will show the missions performed during a week, and eachmonth a second map will be
prepared showing graphically inthe same manner the areas photographed during the calendar
month.
30. A panoramic view of thesector is a valuable asset to theoperations room and should beobtained if possible. Assemblages of photographic missions

carried out by observers of thegroup tend to make the operations room attractive, and arevery valuable for study of thesector.
31. A stereoscopic instrument
and magnifying glass must be
available for the study and interpretation of photographs.
Artillery.
32. The most important map
in the Operations Room is thegeneral map of the sector (1to10,000 or 1 to 20,000) showing
the position of all of our artillery
elements and the enemy organization in depth, particularly enemy batteries and battery emplacement locations.
33. Friendly battery positions,
including the name of the unit
and the number and caliber ofguns should be shown by tags ormarkers which can be moved asnecessary. Artillery P.C.’s andpanel stations should be similarlymarked, the markers of the latterincluding information as to radio
call and type of panel used.
34. This map should bechecked daily and all information pertaining to the artillery
should be kept up-to-date andshould be accompanied by achart showing the daily activityof each enemy battery.
35. Fugitive target batteries
should be shown upon a special
map, similar markers being used
to indicate their location and thatof their panel stations with radio
calls and type of panel. Uponthis map the field of fire of eachof these batteries shouldbe
indicated.

36. A general map of artillery
objectives (1/20000) issued byArmy G-2 and showing important objectives, such as road intersections, ammunition dumps,
material depots, bridges, railroads, camps, aviation fields,
and other objectives should also
be posted.
37. A list should a h beposted showing the name andlocation of the various artillery
units with which the command is
to work, the coordinates of the
P.C., the coordinates of thepanel stations, the radio calls,
the type of panels and the wave
lengths.
38. A relief map is of greatvaue in an operations room forthe study of the terrain. It isparticularly valuable in case ofadjustment of fire upon an objective upon the revem slope,as by a study of the contours,
the observer will be able to plan
his method of flying the missionin advance.
39. A map should be provided
showing the position of friendly
balloons and the defiladed areafrom the three general ascension
levels.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

273

Infantry.
40. A map showing the partsof the line held by the different
infantry commands, marking bytags the location of the various
P.C.'s of units both in the line
and in reserve, must be posted.
On this map the successive objectives in case of an attack can
be shown. It must show the outline of our trenches and detail ofthe enemy trenches, strong
points, dug-outs, machine gun
emplacements, etc. This map isof the utmost importance to theinfantry observer in order that hemay familiarize himself completely with the sector overwhich he must work.
Miscellaneous.
41. The Operations Room,
being the information center,must contain all data obtained
from various sources which bear
upon the activities of the group.
In it should always be found alarge scale map showing the entire front line.
42. All orders or letters of interest to the personnel, daily
communiques, the weather forecast and visibility report will be
posted upon a bulletin board ina conspicuous place.
43. Summaries of information
and bulletins from the Air Service and from the Army, Army
Corps and Divisions shall at all
times be available.

44. Under the supervision of THE ROUTINE OF AN
the Intelligence Officer a stock of ARMY OBSERVATION
maps of all scales shall be kept
GROUP
on hand for the use of pilots and
49. The mission of Army Obobservers.
servationis the reconnaissance,
45. Maps showing the position
in depth, both visually and byof all friendly airdromes, and aphotograph, of the Army sector.
map of enemy airdromes and
The Army Observation Group isballoon positions shall be
posted. In addition, illustrations placed at the disposal of theGeneral Staff of the Army andof enemy aircraft are of value.
themissions carried out in conAll possible information in regard
to types and markings of enemy formity to its orders. Orders asairplanes must be at the disposal signing missions are received tiy
the Group Commander whoof the observers and pilots.
transmits them to the Group Op46. The room should beequipped with a blackboard and erations Officer, who is in immelarge tables, chairs and benches, diate control of the operations 'ofand material such as ink, pencils, the group.
drawing pens, paste, glue, elastic The Group Operations
bands, thumb tacks; paints andRoom.
pins, should be provided. Buu50. It is essential to the properers for practice in radio manipu- conduct of operations that bothlation should be mounted.
pilots and observers of a group
Forms for written reports of mis- have a thorough knowledge ofsions and a basket to file them in their sector, and access to allmust be provided.
available information in regard
47. The Operations Room will to enemy activity in it. For army
be well lighted and always be
work, it is especially necessary to
kept clean and in an orderly
condition. Every effort should bemade to make it as comfortable
and attractive a place as possible.
48. Owing to the fact that
information of the most secretnature is constantly displayed, arule barring all persons otherthan authorized personnel fromthe room must be rigidly enforced. Under no circumstances
should other persons be admitted without special permission
from the Group Commander.

274

be familiar with the main lines ofcommunication, dumps, detraining and unloading stations, andairdromes.
51. In order that this information may be conveniently assembled and placed at the disposalof the pilots and observers of thegroup, a Group Operations
Room is maintained, equippedwith large scale maps showing
the location of principal enemy
works, with photographs of all
principal towns, dumps, railroad
centers, airdromes, and anti-aircraft batteries. Bulletins andcharts of special interest are
posted from time to time. The
Group Operations Officer is responsible for the proper upkeepof this room.
52. Pilots and observers are
required to spend as much time
as possible in the Operations
Room, studying the sector. Instruction in reference to the work
is given by means of talks, pointing out the most important features of the sector, suggesting
methods of preparations for missions, and impressing upon the
personnel the importance of
their work, especially during
an attack.

Postwar Review

Method of assignment andexecution of missions.
53. After flying for the day has
ended, the Group Operations
Officer will prepare a schedule
dividing the work assigned forthe following day between thevarious squadrons of the group.
The division of work is based
upon the number and characterof the missions to be performed,
and the airplanes and personnel
available at the close of the day's
flying, as shown by reports furnished by each of thesquadrons.
54. A copy of this schedule isissued to each squadron Operations Officer, with whom a conference is held in order that thework may be clearly understood.
One flight in each group will
always be held on alert to carryout any special mission that may
be called for.
55. The Squadron Operations
Officers will assign the missions
among the flights in their respective squadrons, flight leaders
being given all necessary instructions covering the nature of themission, the routes to be followed and the time of departure.
In case of a photographic mission, objectives, size of camera,
altitude, and number of plates tobe exposed, are specified. The
instruction as to the most advantageous method of carrying out
a mission and the assignment of
the individual pilot and observer
to it is left to the discretion of theflight commanders.

56. In carrying out the various
missions the flights follow accustomed routes over certain portions of the sector. As soon as aflight departs, the Squadron Operations Officer posts a tag or
marker in the Group Operations
Office showing the time of departure, number of airplanes,
area to be covered, a.nd the nature of the mission, this tag being
taken down immediately upon
the return of the mission. The
Group Operations Officer is thus
kept constantly informed as tothe amount and character of thework as it is being carried on.
57. The alert flight remains in
the vicinity of Group Headquarters to carry out special andCommand missions.
58. On landing upon the fieldat the conclusion of 21 mission,
the observers go immediately to
the Squadron Operations Room,and make a complete report of
all information obtained, plates
exposed, weather conditions at
the lines, and the activity of enemy aircraft and anticraft. This
information is handed without
delay to the Branch Intelligence
Officer, who places it at the disposal of the Group Commander
and the Army Intelligence
Officer.
59. All the plates exposed aretaken immediately to the photographic laboratory, developed
and printed. Three proofs ofeach are sent to the Intelligence
Officer. The latter disi:ributes theproofs among the observers
concerned, who identify them byindicating on each different print

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

the coordinates of its center,time of exposure, and the altitude at which taken.
60. All three proofs aremarked, and two are sent immediately to the Army Intelligence
Office, the third being sent backto the laboratory in order thatplate may be permanently
marked. As soon as practicable,
the required number ot prints
are distributed according to a list
on file in the Intelligence Office.
Normal Employment of
the Group.
(a) During an inactive period, or before an attack.
61. During an inactive period,or the period preceding an attack, the group should dispatch
daily visual reconnaissance missions, covering all importantlines of communication in the
sector, to include both the roads
and railroads. At such times, all
movements of size are carriedout at night and it is therefore
necessary to make observationsat break of day, or at dusk inorder to obtain the information.
Missions should be sent out
some fifteen to thirty minutes
before daybreak. They can thenbe over the objective as soon as
there is sufficient light to observe. These observations atdaylight and dusk are supplemented by visual reconnaissancecarried out in conjunction withthe photographic missions during the day.

27'5

63. The general scheme of
62. Photographs should betaken as frequently as possible of visual reconnaissance during an
all enemy works, such as dumps, active period remains the sameas that followed in an inactivelines of defense in rear of thefront lines, concentration points, sector, except that in such a peaviation fields hospitals and rail- riod, enemy movements willroad yards. As most of these will take place in daylight, as well as
be found on or near main roads night. For this reason, enemy
lines of communication must b'e
and railroads, it is advisable to
make photographic assemblages kept under constant observation.
From time to time, the Generalof the lines of communication,and thus insure the discovery of Staff will require confirmation of
information received from othernew works, rather than to takesources, or will want the accuisolated photographs of theracy of certain deductions to beworks themselves. All photoverified. It therefore becomesgraphic missions should be acnecessary to reserve a far larger
companied by at least one airportion of the command for theplane whose duty it is to carryon visual reconnaissance which fulfillment of emergency calls.
64. The photographic work
will often locate something ofcarried out during an active peinterest, to be photographed,riod will be closely supervisedeither on the return trip or atsome future time. During the pe- and directed by the Army, whichriods mentioned, it is not neces- will indicate, as far in advance assary that Army Headquarters as- possible, the objectives to besign in detail the missions to be photographed, together with theperformed by the group, a gen- order of their importance.
65. A schedule is made out
eral indication of what areas in
the sector are considered of the each day, listing the missions,
greatest importance being suffi- both visual and photographic, tobe carried out upon the followcient. Under these circumstaning forenoon. This schedule isces, it is the duty of the Group
Commander to so direct opera- based upon the information retions that the sector is systemati- ceived from the Army and acally covered by both visual and knowledge of the general situation. A sufficient reserve should
photographic reconnaissances,at all times be held for special
special attention being paid towork.
the areas referred to.
(b) During an attack, or inan active sector.

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66. At least one flight (6 teams
with their airplanes) should be
kept on alert so that when aspecial request is received, themission can be dispatched withthe least possible delay. While
the greatest care must be exercised to be ready for an alertcall, equal care should be takenthat too great a portion of thecommand does not remain idle
for lack of requests from theA m y . If emergency calls do notcome in, alert airplanes may be
employed as deemed necessary
by the Group Commander.

THE ROUTINE OF A DAY
BOMBARDMENTGROUP.
67. The missions of Day Bombardment Aviation are the following:(a) To destroy and harass therear areas of the battlefield andto attack military and industrial
objectives within and beyond therange of artillery.
(b) To cause a dispersion ofenemy anti-aircraft defences(pursuit patrols, anti-aircraft batteries, etc.), throughout the zoneof vulnerable bombardment objectives.
(c) To destroy in combat theenemy's air forces.
(d) To obtain information of
military value by surveillance of'enemy activity carried on in thecourse of the bombing expedition.
Four different types and sizes ofbombs used in raids: (I. t o r.) 155mm. 115-mm. 90-mm. and 75-mm.

Preparation of a Bombing
Expedition.
68. Day bombardment objectives are designated by G-3 andtransmitted by the Army Chief of
Air Service to the Commanderof the Day Bombardment
Group. Unless specifically covered in orders from higher authority, the Group Commander
will issue orders specifying:(a) The number of formations
and the number of airplanes ineach.
(b) The types and weight ofprojectiles.
(c) The route, altitude, andorder of departure of eachformation.

69. The method of pursuit cooperation will be explained to
the Commanders of the squadrons forming the Group.
70. Unless the objective must
be kept secret until the momentof departure, detailed orders
should be issued in time to permit each pilot and observer tofamiliarize himself with all available information in regard to themain objective, the route, seconday objectives, and the region to be observed or photographed. A day bombardment
expedition must be able to leave
the field rapidly upon emergency
order. In this case only the formation leader and deputy leaderof each formation need know
the exact route to be followed.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

For the other pilots and observers a sketch of the objective anda general knowledge of the terrain, so that they may return to
our lines in case of accident, will
suffice.
71. Each Squadron Commander will designate the airplanes, pilots, and observers totake part in an expedition, and ischarged with the responsibility
for their proper preparation forthe mission. He will appoint formation leaders and deputy leaders and will assign to each airplane its position in the formation.
Formations.
72. Day Bombardment
Squadrons will invariably workin formation. These formations
should be large, as many aseighteen airplanes being easily
controlled by a leader whenworking at high altitudes. For
low flying formations in bad
weather, eight is the maximumthat can be employed. All formations must have the following
characteristics:(a) Simplicity.
(b) No dead angles.
(c) Concentration of fire to therear.
(d) Concentration of fire below
the center of the formation.

(el Compactness.
(f) Each airplane must be able
to see the leader.

277

73. All formations, whatever
the number, should fly in a "V"formation with the rear of the Vclosed. Formations of more thanten should have one airplane in
the center of the V at the average altitude of the V. Airplanes
in formation should be numbered as follows:ting out of formation. It is fatal
for an airplane to leave the formation, and the formation
should not be broken up even toprotect an airplane which has left
it,

75. Whenever the landing
field is sufficiently large, the formation is made up on the
ground, the pilots having first1
warmed up their engines. If this
3 2
procedure cannot be followed
5 12 4
7
6
for lack of room, for example,
9 11
10 8
when several squadrons are
Number 1 is the leader and flies leaving at about the same time,at the lowest altitude, Numbers 2 the airplanes will take off in theorder of their number in theand 3, 4 and 5, and similarly
formation, each airplane begin placed pairs should fly at thening
to taxi when the wheels ofsame altitude, number 2 and 3
the preceding airplane leave theabout fifty meters higher thannumber 1, and about thirty me- ground. Number 1 throttles
ters to the right and left of num- down when he has attained sufficient altitude to do so withber 1 respectively. Number 4safety, and flies slowly until all
takes the same position relative
the airplanes are in place. He
to number 2 as number 2 withmay then take up his travellingreference to number 1; andfull speed. The
speed-nevernumber 5 takes the same posionly practicable maneuver intion with relation to number 3.
formation flying is an "8" upon
74.' Formations should be as
an extremely wide curve. covercompact as possible, especiallying
at least five kilometers.
when dropping projectiles; andduring a combat, formations
should close up. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the
training of day bombardment
pilots in formation flying. If thepilots maintain a regular echelonment in height, in case of
emergency they can close up
quickly upon the leader, by diving. The guide should neveropen his throttle wide, and observers should always warn theirpilots whenever their own or any
other airplane appears to be get-

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278

Combat.
76. Aerial combat is not
merely an incident of day bombardment, but is one of its integral phases. The normal combatof a day bombardment unit is afight between the formation andenemy pursuit airplanes that attack it. Observers must be on
constant watch for enemy aircraft and upon sighting them,the observer fires an agreed signal of warning, which signal isrepeated by all the other observers. All the observers should
then test their machine guns.
Number 1, upon learning thatenemy aircraft are in sight,
should slow down and the formation should tighten up as
much as possible. The pilots
must make every effort to keepin formation and keep the formation compact. Under no circumstances will they be permitted to attempt an individual
maneuver.
77. In the course of aerial
combat it will sometimes befound that the mass of the enemy pursuit airplanes will attempt to create a demonstration
by maneuvering and shooting atlong range while two or threeclimb and then dive upon theformation, in an effort to separate one or more of the bombing
airplanes from it. Observers must
keep a careful lookout at all

times for such attacks. The majority of attacks, however, will

come from below. If the observer opens fire when the enemy is at least 300 meters distant, in most cases he will notcome to close quarters. If allowed to approach nearer, thesafety of a bombing airplane depends upon putting the enemy
airplane out of action.
78. As there is always the likelihood of an airplane becoming
separated from the formation,
bombing units should be thoroughly trained in single combat
against pursuit patrols. In thecourse of such a combat a pilot
will do little shooting, but will
exert his efforts to keep his observer in a favorable position.
He will avoid maneuvers such as
regular spirals or straight dives,
but should fly an irregular course
and watch his observer so as toplace the latter in a position fromwhich he can shoot to the best
advantage. If the enemy gets
into a position where he canshoot without being shot at, thepilot must do everything possible
to spoil his aim. A climbing turnmade very steeply toward theside upon which the weapons
are carried is the best maneuver,as it will allow the observer touse his guns. While the pilots
ordinarily attempt to place theobserver in shooting position,
experience has shown that attimes the pilot is obliged to turnon his pursuers. The pilot
should, therefore, take every opportunity to perfect his maneuvering ability and gunnery.

Bombing the Target.
79. In passing over the objective the formation will not beallowed to break up, but willtighten up as compactly as possible. Sighting errors thus produced are negligible considering
the dispersion of the projectiles
and the size of the usual day
bombardment targets
80. Greater accuracy is obtained by permitting the leading
observer to sight for the wholeformation. Accurate bombing is
an art in which certain observers
will excell, and these observers
should be used as leaders anddeputy leaders. Excitement adds
to inaccuracy and if but one
observer uses the sights he willknow that all of the other airplanes are acting as his protection. When the leader has adjusted his sights and is approaching the target in line of sight hefires a signal “Prepare to drop
bombs”. When the leader’sbombs start to leave the racks
the other observers in the formation drop their bombs. Excellent
results have been obhined bythis method of bombing, which
was adopted after extensive experience in active service. The
greatest accuracy has been obtained when the formations
reach their altitude before crossing the lines, the leader being
thus given an opportunity tocheck his calculations before theobjective is reached.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

81. When several formations
are directed against the same
objective they should approach
it at thirty second intervals, one
behind the other. Upon leaving
the objective they should all turnin the same direction.
82. In the performance of a
day bombing expedition, it ismost essential that the bombardment formation reaches the objective exactly at the time designated, in order that successful
coordination between the workof the bombardment units andthe pursuit units may be assured,with the object of causing thegreatest possible damage to theenemy and of maintaining ourascendency in the air.
83. A Group Operations Officer will be appointed by theGroup Commander of the Day
Bombardment Group, and to
him will be delegated the immediate supervision over the operations of the group. He will also
act as the representative of G-2.
It is his duty:(a) To compile and keep
available for the Group Commander and the personnel of theGroup, all information of value
in the preparation of a bombing
mission.

(b) To keep an indexed fileof photographs, and a stock ofmaps for use of pilots and observers. He will also post in theoperations room a map (1to80000 or 1 to 50000) of thesector in which the group is operating, as well as a 1 to 200,000 scale map showing the lineof the entire front with its
changes as they occur.
(c) To post upon a bulletinboard all orders and communications of interest to pilots orobservers of the group, and bulletins from the Army or its Corps
or Divisions.
(d) To post a map showing
the location of friendly airdromes
and hospitals.
(e)To file the flight report ofeach crew and to interrogate
personally the pilots and observers to get additional information
if possible, and to transmit the
information obtained to the
Army Intelligence Section.
(f) To supervise the work of
the Photographic Section, thedeveloping of all plates and theprinting and distribution of photographs.
84. The Group Operations
Officer should receive the chartsfrom the Army Chief of Air Service, showing bombing targets
and intelligence in reference tothem. He should keep duplicate

copies of these, marking one ofthem daily with the bombardments effected. It is one of h's
most important functions to keep
up-to-date at all times available
information in reference to thelocations of enemy anti-aircraft
batteries, enemy airdromes, iindthe number and identity of thesquadrons which occupy them.
The photographs taken by theBombing Group itself, will often
assist in establishing the whelreabouts of new airdromes and theoccupation of old ones. A Day
Bombardment Group may furnish information of great value
from visual and photographic reconnaissance conducted during
the course of the bombing expeditions, especially in regard tolocation of enemy airdromes andworks, and the number of erremy troops.
85. The Group Operation!;
Officer is responsible for the liaison of the group with the pursuit
units in addition to the liaison
with the Army Chief of Air Service, G-2, and G-3, and heshould notify the pursuit groupof the bombardment group's
plan of operations and advise
them as far in advance as possible of the hour, the altitude andreturn route of all expeditions.

280

THE ROUTINE OF A
NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON.
86. The mission of Night Reconnaissance is to provide information to the Higher Commandin regard to the trend and extent
of movements behind the enemy’s line made under cover of
darkness. These are usually extensive if operations are impending. It is therefore imperative thatthe routes followed by the enemy in moving troops and material should be reconnoiteredthoroughly and frequently atnight, due to the fact that themost perfect day reconnaissancewill often fail to disclose any
abnormal activity. During active
operations, the battle-field mustbe patrolled consistently by nightreconnaissance airplanes.
87. A night reconnaissanceunit is ordinarily assigned for
duty with an Army, the missicnsof strategic reconnaissance andnight surveillance-being assigned
through the office of the Army
Chief of Air Service.

Postwar Review

Organization.
88. The Commanding Officer
of a Night Reconnaissance
Squadron is responsible for theactivity and efficiency of the unit.
It is his duty to insure the proper
performance of the duties assigned to the subordinate officersof the Squadron.
89. In addition to the pilots
and observers, and the necessary enlisted personnel, the unit
commander will be assisted by
the following officers:
Operations Officer.
90. The duty of the Operations Officer attached to a nightreconnaissance unit will be toadvise the Commanding Officerof all tactical matters connectedwith the field of operations.
Upon receipt by the unit of orders assigning the missions forany given night, under the authority of the Commanding Officer, he will prepare and post aschedule designating the pilots
1

and observers and the hours
during which each of the routesof enemy movements will be reconnoitered. The Opeiations Officer will procure all available information of the enemy’s rearareas, particularly in regard torailheads, routes, of transports,
detraining points, billeting areas,
camps, depots, anti-aircraft, divisions and airdromes. It is his
duty to supervise the preparationof the personnel for the execution of the missions assigned tothem, and he will assure himselfthat all information obtained by
the unit in the course of a mission is passed on without delay
to the Branch lntelligerice Officer. The Operations Officer will
have charge of the landing lights,
searchlights, etc., on the ground.
He will see that these ilre lighted
at the hours specified by the Unit
Commander for airplanes toleave the airdrome or wheneveran airplane overhead gives thecorrect signal for landing. He will
also make a daily report of operations to the Chief of Air Serviceof the Army under which he isoperating, which report will
cover the routes, hours of flight,
and all information obtained. He
must make certain that every
pilot and observer is familiar withthe correct landing sigrial for the
day before leaving the ground.

28 1Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

Branch Intelligence Officer.
91. A Branch Intelligence Officer will be detailed by G 2 of
the Army for duty with every
night reconnaissance unit. This
officer will see that all information obtained is transmitted to
Headquarters without delay. He
will make out routes covering
points of concentration and themain arteries of movement in
the enemy's rear areas, and hewill transmit the orders for reconnaissance missions to theUnit Commander.
Supply Officer.
92. The Supply Officer will
requisition and procure the supplies necessary for the unit.
These will include Quartermasterand commissary supplies forwhich he will establish the necessay liaison with the Chief
Quartermaster of the Army towhich the unit is attached. In
addition, he will establish thenecessary channels for securing
technical, Ordnance and Air
Service supplies. The Supply Officer is also responsible for thesquadron transportation, its
proper upkeep and repair.

should be made to reduce, as far
as possible, the necessity for using a map by acquiring an exact
knowledge of the salient featuresand landmarks.
96. The position of the stars
and moon, (according to thehour and the phase of themoon,) should be utilized for the
purpose of orientation, especiallyfor checking the indications c btained from the compass. 1.n lorder to determine with exactitude
the angle of the course of the
airplane, the indications given by
the stars and compass must be
combined with the effect of thedrift resulting from the action of
the wind at the altitude attained.
Study of Routes and
The latest obtainable meteoroLandmarks.
logical data is essential to the
95. Useful and reliable reports night flying pilot not only to enamay be expected only from ob- ble him to judge the possibility ofservers who are perfectly familiar flying, but to permit him to corwith the terrain, both as a result rectly determine his course while
he is in the air.
of detailed study of all maps
97. Within our own lines,
covering the sector, and fromthere exists an organization ofknowledge acquired from previous fliahts
carried out. both bv signal lights of the front, marking"
day and at night. Constant effort out the aerial routes which furnishes the pilot and observerwith necessary indications anddirection marks to enable themto take the direction of their objective and to find their field on
return. Familiarity with the system of signal lights is of course
essential.
98. In spite of all precautions
taken within both our own andenemy lines, permanent lights
will be found which form excellent landmarks. Groups ofsearchlights placed around iniportant localities and objectives.

Engineer Officer.
93. The Engineer Officer willsupervise the work of the several
aero sections, and the work of
the mechanics assigned thereto.
He will keep on hand at all times
a reserve of spare parts of electrical material, i.e., dynamo
spares, searchlight spares, landing flares, etc., sufficient to meetthe immediate needs of the unit
and will advise the Supply Officer relative to such needs.
Adjutant.
94. The Adjutant is charged
with the administrative work of
the unit.

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282

and generally lit up on the passage of any airplane are visible
from very far away, and can beused as direction points andguides. The star shells fired almost continuously from thetrenches, and flashes of the cannon in an active sector will permit any lost plane to find thelines again.
99. Whenever the enemy iscarrying out night bombardment, their ground signal lights
and direction rockets, the location of which is generally permanent, form indications of thehighest value to our airplanes.

Visibility In General.
100. The closest possible
study must be made of the effectof varying weather conditions
upon visibility. Visibility at nightis extremely variable. It depends
upon two things: the clearness of
the atmosphere, (absence of
mist and fog) and the light afforded by the moon. The visibility of natural landmarks at night
is found in general to take thefollowing order: woods, important towns or other localities;
roads, rivers and other water
courses or bodies of water,(brooks, canals, lakes andponds).
101. On clear moonlit nights
the visibility is very good. At an
average altitude the visibility forpractical purposes of direction
may extend from 10 to 15 kilometers. Woods show up as
clearly defined black (or dark)
blots, easily recognizable by theirshape and outline. Roads appear
white or grey if bordered bytrees or just after rain. Water
courses may be recognized by
the dark strips formed by thevalleys, nearly always borderedby trees or meadows, and by thereflection of the moon in thewater. Canals are still more easy
to identify owing to their rectilinear form.

102. On misty nights the reflections of the light on the mist
interferes with observation. It isthen necessary to place oneself
between the moon and the point
to be observed or the road to befollowed.
103. On dark nights it is quitepossible to see quite well, but
the visibility is generally confinedto the vertical. For this reason, it
is not possible to fly by known
direction points and landmarks,
but it is necessary to follow stepby step the itinerary, paying
ceaseless attention to locating
one’s position accurate1.y on themap. When direction signal
lights are given, they may, ofcourse, be used to fly by. On
dark nights when utilizing woods
as landmarks and direction
points to fly by, it is better, if thewoods be of large dimensions or
extent, to follow along .theiredges than to try to fly sdraightacross them. Large towns andlocalities show up in ths form ofgrey blots with sharply definededges. White roads, not bordered by trees, in dry weather,show up clearly, but should be
followed in all their detours lest
they be lost. The same may besaid for water courses, whichare, however, more difficult tosee and are frequently only visible by the dark line of the trees
and meadows bordering them,or by the bank of mist lying in
the valley.
104. On bad nights when thehygrometric state of the air is
pronounced, and particiilarly if itMitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

is very dark and the sky is covered over, the visibility is extremely restricted. It is then very
difficult to direct oneself otherthan by signal lights, or to findobjectives except those which
are lighted up. Nevertheless, it isalways necessary to pay thestrictest attention to watching the
ground, and an experienced observer rarely fails to pick up sufficient indications to locate himself. Sorties on nights such asthese should be carried out onlyin the event of real necessity andonly over objectives close to thelines.

Visibility of Special
Objectives.
105. (a) Stations: The rails areof dark color and do not show
up well, but the platform, paths,
etc., which practically always exist, make characteristic whitepatches which are easy to recognize. Sometimes red and green
signal lights will be seen andoften, especially when there is agreat deal of activity at the station, various white lights andeven arc lights are shown.
(b) Factories: When lit up
they can be seen as readily as bydaylight. They are usually beneath a luminous halo which canbe seen from a great distance. In
general, all lights are put out assoon as an alert is sounded andfrequently a few will be left inorder to draw the bombardment
to false objectives, such as slag
heaps, etc. Iron castings look likehuge reddish explosions.
(c) Airdromes: From an:283

average altitude the hangars are
only visible on clear nights, but it
is always possible to locate themfrom their relative position fromthe roads that feed them. Airdromes in use at night show only
a very restrained amount oflight-three or four red lights
and occasionally a row of small
searchlights lighted at the instantthat an airplane is landing. Rockets and other signal lights arealso used, and give useful indications as to the location andactivity of the various fields.
(d) Villages: These appear
as a grey blot with roads, paths
and sometimes railways converging into them.
(e) Camps and Bivouacs: In
open ground these are not difficult to find; the numerous paths
around them make it still moreeasy to locate them. In woods
they are rarely visible at night.
(f) Convoys and Columns:
Convoys carrying lights show upthat portion of the road which

they occupy. Motor car headlights give characteristic whitespots on the roads. Columns
without lights are difficult to spot
except on clear nights at a low
altitude.
(g) Trains: On moonlightnights the smoke of a locomotive
can be seen at a great distance,
at low altitude the train itself i j
visible. On dark nights only thetail lights can be seen and occasionally the firebox when it i:,
opened (especially the refleciionof the fire on the smoke overhead). Only exceptionally aretrains lighted up.

Execution of a Mission.
106. The altitude at which areconnaissance is carried out depends on visibility; in order torecognize details by vertical observation, it is necessary to fly
low. Good visibility is attained byflying away from the moon.

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284

107. By allotting clearly defined reconnaissance areas to individual airplanes flying at fixed
times, it will be possible to obtainreports covering practically thewhole night.
108. If it is not possible toreconnoiter railway lines, roads
and watercourses for movement
by repeatedly flying along theirwhole length, one reconnaissance should be carried out between midnight and 300 A.M.,
as the beginning or end of any
important movement will takeplace during that period. The
direction of railway movement
and activity at stations can berecognized by the glare from locomotives and the white smoke
issuing from them. Size and nature of train movements and ofentraining and detraining operations can only be observed byairplanes flying at low altitude.
Increased activity at stations canbe recognized by the unavoidable increase in lights on sidings
and platforms.
109. Troop movements andtraffic on treeless roads and overopen county cannot escape anobserver’s attention. On roads
bordered with trees, in villages,
and in county affording facilities
for cover, however, airplanes will
have to fly low, when, as experience has shown, even the slightest movements can be detected.
110. When ordering reconnaissances for concentrations oftroops, camps, billets and airdromes, individual airplanes
should not be allotted too large
an area, and observers should
be instructed in detail as to roadsof approach of columns and assembly areas, from information
gained by photographic and visual observations by day.
111. Night reconnaissance airplanes will be sent out singly inorder not to attract the enemy’s
attention, which would cause
him to extinguish lights andalarm his defences. It is recommended that Airplanes shouldcross the lines at great heights
and then glide down. It may also
be advisable to fly with the engine throttled down. Machineguns should only be used for self
defense or when there is achance of causing serious losses
to the enemy. A machine which
limits itself to reconnoitering may
sometimes be taken by the enemy for one of his own aeroplanes.
112. Parachutes flares aremost useful for night reconnaissance.

Enemy Defense Against
Night Reconnaissance.
113. As regards the enemy’s
defensive measures against nightreconnaissance airplanes, complaints received are chiefly concerned with the blinding effectof
searchlights, which ma!, render
all reconnaissance impossible;on the other hand anti-aircraft
and machine gun fire have notbeen heavy. It will be foundadvisable to employ night pursuit for the purpose of neutralizing enemy searchlights and antiaircaft defense. Enemy night
pursuit is a growing danger tonight reconnaissance.

THE ROUTINE OF A
PURSUIT UNIT.
Duties.
114. Pursuit aviation has adouble mission to perform:(a) Offensive.
(b) Protective.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

115.Offensive Patrols are dispatched to cross the enemy’slines in sufficient strength tocruise over his rear area, searchout enemy aircraft, and attack
them with the object of causing
maximum casualties and inflicting the greatest possible damage
to his air service and with afurther object of obtaining a definite moral superiority. Offensive
patrols should cover low, intermediate, and high altitudes, andit must always be borne in mind
that pursuit aviation furnishes its
own protection and that the advantage of altitude will frequently outweigh the advantage
of numbers in a combat so that
low or intermediate patrols
should invariably be accompanied by high protection.
116.Protective Patrols, have adouble mission to carry out:(a) To place Corps Observation Aviation in a position
where it will be, and will feel,that it is protected.

(b)To protect our groundtroops from the results of enemy
artillery adjustment, reconnaissance, and photographic airplanes, as well as from attack by
pursuit and attack airplanes.
117. Protective patrols are not
to be regarded as defensive incharacter. All pursuit aviation isoffensive in character, but thelimitation of the area in which
protective patrols are ordered to
fly and to fight and the end
which it is desired to accomplishby the utilization of protective
patrols distinguishes them from
offensive patrols, whose mission
is to attack and destroy enemy
aircraft of every sort wherever
found.
118. The performance of the
double role of protective patrols
cannot be accomplished by the
maintenance of a permanent
barrage of the sector. Such a
procedure is fatiguing for the pilots, expensive in material incomparison with the results obtained and renders it impossible
for us to undertake offensive expeditions in force. Consequently
a permanent barrage will only beresorted to at times of intense
preparation for attack while it isimperative to prevent all reconnaissance of our rear areas on
the part of the enemy air service.
119. It is to be noted thatbarrage patrols can only afford
effective protection to our army
corps air service when active
over a limited breadth of front
which, as a rule, should not exceed 15 kilometers. The size andaltitude of protective patrols will
depend upon the general activityof the sector, and the strengthand degree of aggressiveness ofenemy aviation. On special occasions a triple tier barrage may
be established for short periodsof time. The depth that protective patrols will penetrate into
the enemy rear areas will beprescribed in orders. Patrols
must not exceed this depth except in extraordinary circumsiances; for them to do so leaves ,theArmy Corps aviation unprotected. For a protective patrol toleave this area assigned to it, inorder to attack enemy airplanes
or for any other reason, constitutes a serious offense.
120. In order to protect effectively our Army Corps airplanes,
barrage patrols should operatefrom 5 to 9 kilometers over theenemy lines.
121. For the rigidity of a fixedsystem of protective patrols there
will be substituted a system
which will comprise patrols especially directed against enemy
army corps aviation and in addition a number of airplanes onalert, ready to take off in a few
minutes, to cope with any
marked increase of enemy aviation over a part of the sector of
the enemy aviation in cases
where ground activity makes anincrease of aerial activity
advisable.

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hopes of picking off a straggler.
122. The size of the alert or124. Close Protection ofUnder these circumstances ourmobile reserve will be prescribed Corps Aviation will only be arpursuit airplanes by knowing thein orders. The group command- ranged in special cases wherealtitudes and route whi’ch thethe Corps Aviation has to perers will be responsible for its
day bombardment will follow,
form particularly difficult andproper utilization. It is not incan obtain the advantage of altitended to use the planes on alert delicate missions. The groupcommander of the Corps Obser- tude and surprise, as the enemy
to counter attack every enemy
pursuit will have its attention diairplane reported by our A. A. A. vation Group will request suchprotectioh from the nearest pur- rected to the bombers whom
Observation Post or the Gonio
Stations. The alert will be used
they are pursuing.
suit group commander and theby group commanders as a sortlatter will be the judge as to127. Attacks on Balloons areof “support System” to reinforce whether or not his missions will dangerous and difficult andour aviation in case of increased permit him to furnish the protec- should only be undertaken intion requested. It has beenorder to destroy the work ofenemy aviation or in case ofsome balloon which is particuactivity on the part of infantry or found that by furnishing thedaily schedule of operations tolarly embarrassing to our troops.
artillery.
123. In addition to the routine the Corps Air Service in advance V e y light patrols, of one or two
offensive protective patrols, pur- the Corps Air Service is generairplanes, make the attack with asuit aviation will perform 4 types ally able to arrange its missions patrol overhead to protect theattacking airplanes from being
so that they coincide with theof special missions:surprised.
Demonstrations
time
of
a
routinepursuitpatrol,(a) Close protection of Corps airagainst the entire line of enemy
and this patrol after it has conplanes.
balloons along a considerable
cluded its protection of the(b) Cooperation with Day Bomlength of front often give valuaCorps airplanes is able to conbardment.
ble results by causing aUl the(c) Attacks on balloons.
tinue its patrol of the lines.
(d) Attacks on ground troops.
enemy balloons to be hauled125. Cooperation With Day
down; these results are espeBombardment is valuable, inthat it enables pursuit patrols to cially to be sought during theobtain contact with enemy pur- preparation of an offen.;w e orsuit airplanes. Owing to the long when the attack is in prlcgress.
They must be organized withrange and slow speed of day
bombardment airplanes, a cov- great care and precision in orderthat the attack may take placeering protection should not be
afforded. A day bombing expe- simultaneously along the entire
dition should rely upon its own front. In attacking a balloon, it
strength to defend itself from at- must always be borne in mind
that only the front part is vulnertack of enemy airplanes.
126. By sending out pursuit able. At least the rear third has
nothing in it but air.
patrols to meet day bornbardment units over the objective
and again at the line when returning from their raid it willoften be possible to attack enemy pursuit airplanes which arefollowing the bombers in theMitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

128. Attacks on Ground Objectives often give valuable results during a major operation.
The objectives of attack should,
as a rule, be the enemy reserves,
either in mass formation or on
the march. They should be undertaken in force as the result
desired is the maximum moral
effect. The employment of alarge number of pursl;it airplanes
in attacking ground objectives
increases the safety of the operations by multiplying the targets at
which the enemy must shoot. Ina calm sector, machine gun attacks of objectives on the
ground, trenches, machine gun
emplacements, artillery positions, etc., produce very little effect either moral or material.
They will not be attempted.

Notes on Routine Procedure.
129. The Group Commander
will dispose tactically of hisforces in order to cover the instructions or orders issued by the
Army to which the Group is
attached.

287

130. All Tactical Work in Pursuit Units will be performed information, the size of these formations varying in accordancewith the situation, the mission,and the enemy's dispositions.
131. The Formation of five or
six airplanes, i.e., the flight, willbe the basis of all tactical operations, in order that the tactical
efficiency of the several flights
may reach maximum, it is advisable that the pilots live together
on the ground as much as possible, and in addition, work together in the air at all times.
Formations of five or six airplanes are extremely maneuverable and at the same time canbe controlled to the best advantage by a single patrol leader. It
is probable that of a flight of six
airplanes and pilots, not morethan five will be available forduty on any given day. Where
the mission requires a greaternumber than five or six airplanes, two or more flights acting
independently, but in liaison
with one another, will be employed.
132. Either one of the following methods may be employed
for the formation of flights depending upon the direction of
the wind and the size of thelanding field:(a) Formation on leavinq
the ground-The patrol leader
takes off first, flying at less thanfull speed, and the others follow
him in order. When the patrol
leader has reached the approximate altitude which he has sot
beforehand for formation, hewill make a half circle and return
over the flying field, each pilotthen taking up his appointed
place. Upon passing over the
flying field, the patrol leader candetermine the number of airplanes which have been unable
to take off.
(b) Formation over a selected spot-This method of
forming patrols is especially useful when several patrols are t'3
take off at the same time. In thiscase, the patrol leader is the last
to take off and the deputy patrol
leader the next to last. The altitude of assembly is fixed beforehand and depends upon the
mission, ceiling, etc. It is nevergreater than 2,000 meters. Otherwise, the airplanes are likely to
become dispersed before the patrol is formed. The assembly
point is a few kilometers fromthe flying field, never more thanten, over some striking landmark. Upon arrival at this point,
each pilot makes left-hand turns,
while he is climbing, until he hasreached the designated altitude
which he must maintain precisely. The patrol leader climbs

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Postwar Review

number one. When the patrol is flights guiding on him. In suchto an altitude of 200 meters becomposed of six airplanes, num- cases, it is generally preferable to
low the patrol and describes
right-hand circles. When he con- ber six takes position above, be- attempt to attack the rear man ofthe enemy formation. The inahind, and to the left of number
siders it proper, he turns towardbility to maneuver formations offour, or above, behind and to
the lines flying extremely slowly
more than five airplanes, makes
the right of number five.
and balancing his wings to at134. In formations of several it possible to throw the enemy
tract attention. The other pilots
flights, the same principle is em- into confusion and to attack histhen assume their places. If noairplanes separately. The attack
ployed. The flight leader of the
airplane is seen turning to theentire formation flies at the head by the formation leader uponright below the patrol, the depof the leading flight. One flightthe leader of the enemy‘s formauty patrol leader flies to thebehind, above and to the left of tion should, as a rule, beflying field to ascertain that the
avoided unless the formation
patrol leader has been unable to him and another flight behind,
above and to his right.
leader is confident of possessing
take off. A ground sheet signal135. Single Flight Combat. - superior material. The attack by
gives the indication. If the patrol
The patrol leader determines the the leader of the formation uponleader has been unable to takeadvisibility of combat. He will be the leader of an enemy formaoff,the deputy patrol leader aspermitted a considerable latitude tion invariably leads to a melee
sumes the leadership of thein making his own dispositionin which both formations bepatrol.
when the combat is joined. As a come separated, which is difficult133. AU formations should
rule, airplanes number four and to break off inside the enemy’scomprise a double echelon in
number five of his formation will lines, and which simply becomes
depth and in altitude, the airremain above to afford protecan engagement of individuals.
planes at the rear being highest
137. The Rally-After a comup so that they can take advan- tion from enemy airplanes,
which may in the vicinity. The
bat every effort should be madetage of their altitude to close inon the patrol leader by diving, in patrol leader himself will always to regain the formation as speedily as possible. This is easy tocase of necessity. The usual for- lead the attack. In the attack
teamplay leads to victoy. It is,accomplish inside our lines ifmation is that of an inverted
therefore, essential that all mem- conspicuous landmarks are des“V’, the patrol leader at thehead. Number two and number bers of one flight shall talk over ignated beforehand within fouror five kilometers of the line.
four on his left rear and number on the ground and practice inthe air the evolutions, which the Within the enemy lines, the rally
three and number five on his
Flight Commander will use in
is far more difficult to execute. In
right rear; number two andattacking different types of enthis case, each pilot will fly tonumber three should be aboutward the fixed rally point, within
200 meters apart and about 50 emy aircraft.
136. In case of a combat
our lines, but will watch at all
meters above and to the rear ofwhen several patrols are flying
times to give assistance to any of
number one. Number four andtogether and a large force ofour pilots who appear to be in
number five should be about
trouble. When the rally point has
400 meters apart and about 100 enemy airplanes is sighted, themeters above and to the rear of leader of the forward and lower been reached, patrol reforms inflight will detemine what action
accordance with the principles
to take. the leaders of the other laid down in paragraph 132 (b).
138. In making disposition of
his forces, the Group Commander will endeavor at all times

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

to keep in hand a mobile reserveof airplanes capable of taking off
in a few moments to counterattack any increased enemy
aviation over our front, or toreinforce our patrols on the frontin case ground activity makes
increased aerial activity advisable.
139. In sectors where generalconditions render it safe to install
the pursuit airdrome very close
to the front, i.e., 20 to 25 kilometers, it should be possible toarrange a very close liaison withthe front, the anti-aircraft artillery, the goniometric stations,etc. In such cases a number of
airplanes to be determined bycircumstances, always at least
one flight, will be held on alert,
ready to take off and attack every enemy airplane crossing ourlines and every enemy airplanemaking adjustments close to its
own lines. Under these circumstances, flights will perfect themselves in taking off quickly andgetting into formation immediately. In answering “alert” of thischaracter, speed in leaving theairdrome and taking up formation is of paramount importance.

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140. Group Operations Officer. Alerts of a character requiring instant response shouldcome in to the office of theGroup Operations Officer. He
will decide whether or not thealert is to be answered, bearing
in mind the number of airplanes
instantly available, the number,
type, and probable mission of
the enemy airplanes reported,
their altitude and direction offlight. He will transmit the alert
to the flight or squadron which isstanding by to respond to suchcalls, together with his estimateof the situation. The Flight Commander on duty will, as a rule,decide the number of airplanes
which will actually be used torespond to an alert transmitted
to him, but the group Operations
Officer should be authorized togive orders on the subject in thename of the Group Commander
regarding the number of airplanes to respond if, in his judgment, orders are necessary.

141. After a patrol leader has
left the ground, he is responsible
for carrying out the patrol’s mission. He should be permitted
complete independence of judgment in the leading of his patrol,and in exceptional cases, may
depart from the designated route
if the situation makes it advisable. The Group Operations Officer is responsible that complete
information is given to the
Squadron Operations Officer relative to every mission, and in
exceptional cases he will explain
the objective of the mission to
the patrol leader personally. The
patrol leader will only departfrom the mission assigned to him
in such cases as this appears tobe essential.

290

ORGANIZATION AND
EMPLOYMENT OFATTACK SQUADRONS.

146. The systematic and aggressive participation in the battle of flying formations against
ground targets is of great imporComposition of Attack
tance. During offensives, attack
Squadrons and Attack
squadrons operate over and inGroups.
front of the infantry and neutral142. An Attack squadron willize the fire of the enemy’s infannormally consist of 18 airplanes, try and barrage batteries. On the(either mono-plane or bi-plane), defensive, the appearance of thedivided into three flights.
attack airplanes affords visible
143.An attack group will con- proof to heavily engaged troops
sist of two or more attack squad- that Headquarters is maintainingrons, the normal composition
close touch with the front, and isbeing three squadrons.
employing all possible auxiliaries
144. In addition to the combat to support the fighting troops.
squadrons, there will also be one The morale of the troops andpark squadron assigned to each
their confidence in a successful
battle group. Whenever practica- defense is thereby materiallyble, all squadrons of an attack
strengthened. The object of thegroup will be located on theattack squadrons, in addition tosame airdrome.
the losses inflicted by them, is toshatter the enemy’s morale byMissions and Duties ofcontinuous attacks in formation,
Attack Squadrons.
145. The use of low-flying air- and thus to exert a decisive influence on the result of the batplanes on the battle-field andtle. Confusion to the enemy’s
their cooperation in fighting on
the ground, by open gun fire, or front line troops, dispersion of
his infantry and machine gun fireby attacking with bombs andhand grenades, is particularly ef- from their normal targets, thefective from the point of view of demoralization of traffic, the dispersion and delay of reinforcemorale, both on our own andments, as well as the actual
the enemy’s troops.
losses inflicted upon his forces,
are the means by which the mission of the attack squadrons isaccomplished.

Postwar Review

147. Whenever the situation
warrants, attack squadrons
should operate in conjunction
with bombing squadrons. The
area of attack may thus be extended deeper into the enemy’slines, the bombing squadrons
operating beyond the attack
squadrons, and normally as far
back as the rear areas of theenemy’s corps, and, in somecases, to the rear areas, of
his army.

Mitchell: Provisional Manual,291

of Operations

Employment of Attack
Squadrons.
148. The successful employment of attack squadrons depends upon their concentrated,
continuous, uninterrupted engagement at the decisive timeand place. This condition limits
their use to that particular portion of the battle front uponwhich the entire operations depends, and prohibits their distribution over relatively unimportant portions of the battle line.
149. The proper execution of
the missions of attack squadrons
makes the fullest demands on
the physical and mental capabilities of the personnel. While employed on attack missions, attack
squadrons must devote themselves exclusively to their particular sphere of action. Tasks

forming part of the normal dutiesof the observation, pursuit or
bombardment squadrons mustnot be assigned to attack squadrons simultaneously with their
attack missions. Attack squadrons, however, will report to theproper Headquarters immediately after landing, all observations made during their flights
which may be of value. Theirduties in connection with observation are the same as now
specified for pursuit squadrons.
150. Attack squadrons are tobe employed in DECISIVE infantry actions. At other times(when the military situation issuch that there is no probabilityof attack missions being required), attack squadrons may
be employed as protection forcorps and army observation
units.
151. Attack groups will normally be held under the directcommand of the Chief of Air
Service of an army or, (in extended operations) of the Chiefof Air Service of the Army

Group. Liaison must be maintained so that the entire forces of
the attack units can immediately
be thrown into action at the
point designated. This requiresthat the personnel of the attack
squadrons be constantly in touchwith the progress of the battle
and the exact locations of theleading elements of our own andthe enemy’s troops. It also requires that they be thoroughlyfamiliar with the location of theenemy’s artillery, machine gun
nests, bivouacing centers, hislines of communications androutes or reinforcement immediately in rear of the battle front.
152. The information outlinedin the preceding paragraph will
be obtained through close liaison
with the Chief of Air Service (ofthe Army and Corps, Observation Groups, Balloons, Pursuit
and Bombardment Groups,
Ground Observation Posts andthe General Staffs.
153. During active operations,the attack units will be kept
ready for immediate action, bothduring the day and night. Their
efficient use requires that they
strike at the given point at thedecisive instant, and with theirmaximum force. Their airdromesshould be located as far forward
as communications and the terrain will permit. Advanced airdromes will be reconnoitered,and communications installed
beforehand, and these advanced
airdromes will be utilized as themilitary situation requires.

292(a) Offensive.
154. In the offensive, attack
squadrons will be employed inforce to destroy the enemy’s forward infantry lines and harass
his forward artillery. They will be
used to neutralize infantry andmachine gun fire. They will prevent the organization of supports
and their movement forward to
the main line of resistance. They
will prevent the sending forward
of reinforcements. They will isolate and demoralize enemy concentrations. They will prevent
designated routes of communications from being used. They
will prevent the sending forwardof ammunition, especially byhorse-drawn caissons to thefront lines. The above missions
will be accomplished by the useof bombs, hand grenades, airplane cannon, and machineguns.
155. Accurate knowledge ofthe ground is the first condition
for the successful action of attack
squadrons. The personnel must
be thoroughly familiar with theirown forward battle zone, andthe composition and formationof the ground troops that are to
make the attack, the positionand location of the forward elements of the enemy’s groundtroops, his centers of resistanceand lines of reinforcement andwithdrawal.
156. Attack squadrons mustnot be engaged before the attack
is made by the ground troops.
The proper moment for the

Postwair Review

leading elements of attack
squadrons to pass over our frontline is the moment when theinfantry units advance to the attack. Attack squadrons should
therefore be continuously engaged until a decision on the
ground has been reached. They
should be ready and should
strike again if counter attacks arebeing prepared.
157. In case the advance isbeing successfully accomplished,
the attack squadrons must utilize
every possible means of turning
the enemy’s withdrawal into arout.
158. Light artillery, especiallythat using gas to delay our advancing troops, are one of thenormal targets for attack squadrons. The enemy’s barrage batteries are normal targets for our
attack squadrons. Special flights
should be detailed to attack
these batteries.
159. Special attack squadrons
or flights may be detailed forharassing traffic in certain areas
behind the enemy’s front lines.
Their missions will usually be
best accomplished by rendering
designated traffic centers impassable.
160. Attack airplanes should
not be given missions against
enemy aircraft. Their relation toenemy aircraft is normally a defensive one only.
(bl Defensiue.
161. The use of attack squadrons on the defensive against theenemy’s counter-attacks madeduring our offensive operations

has been indicated above. When
our troops are on the defensive
and the enemy’s preparations
indicate that his infantry attack isimminent, the attack squadrons
must be held in constant readiness both by day and night.
Continuous liaison must be
maintained during this period regarding the enemy’s assembly
points, troop movements andprobable line of advance.
162. The enemy’s leading elements become of secondary importance after the advance is actually started, and the force of
attack squadrons should be concentrated upon his supports andreserves, his barrage batteries,
and possibly upon certain of his
interdiction and harassing batteries. Normally, the enemy’s second and third assault waves will
be targets of prime importancefor attack squadrons after theadvance has begun. If the enemy’s leading elements attack by
the infiltration method, our attack squadrons should concentrate upon the “follow-up”
forces, and except under very
unusual conditions, cannot be
used against the enemy’s leading
elements.
163. If the enemy’s infantry
advance is made in connection
with tanks, the isolation of thetanks from their infantiy supports becomes one of the missions of attack squadrons. The

Signal Corps
radio truck used toreceive and transmit messages.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

attack by airplanes upon tanks
should be made with bombs andairplane cannon.

Transmission of Orders.
164. The commander of theattack squadron o r attack groupwill receive detailed orders fromthe Headquarters to which hisorganization is attached. These
will state the following:(a) Exact location of our own andthe enemy’s front lines.
(b) Objective and sector of theattack.
(c) Nature of the preparatoy
phase.
(d) Method of attack.
(e) “ D ’ Day.
(f) “ H ’ Hour.
(9) Targets especially assigned tothe attack group o r squadrons.

2 93165. Each attack squadron of
the group will be given one
target, one mission, or one area
to cover. If the position of ourfront line is not exactly known,
as, for instance, during rearguard actions, the enemy’s batteries, routes of advance, androad centers, will normally begiven as targets.
166. During active operations,especially when our troops are
acting defensively, every means
for the rapid transmission of information and orders must be
employed. If a division intends
to counter-attack, this information, giving the hour and sector,
must be transmitted to the attack
squadron or group assigned.
Telephones, telegraph, radio, or
visual signals will be used. The

attack squadron or group. will, if
necessary, maintain one or two
airplanes over the Division P.C.,
for the receiving and transmission of information concerning
the time of the proposed counterattack. Upon receipt of this information, the liaison plane will
return to its airdrome and transmit its information by radio,
dropped message, or by landing.
167. Selected men of theleading elements of the infantry
organization should be informedof the time that attack squadrons
are to operate over their sector,
and particular care should betaken that the panels or flares
used to mark the front line areproperly displayed.

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294

Training and Tactics.
168. The lower the altitude atwhich attack airplanes operate,
the greater the morale and material effect. For this reason, attack airplanes will operate as low
as the terrain and their weapons
permit. If machine-gunning
troops in the open, descents as
low as ten meters are advocated.
Then flying at this height, thedirection of attack should beparallel to, or away from ourtroops. Extremely low attack is
especially valuable against columns of troops or convoys,
along a straight road, in cuts,
and against troops massed on
open hill-tops. When usingbombs, the airplane should beflown just high enough to beoutside the danger zone of the
explosion. For the engagementof batteries in action, a height of
two hundred or three hundred
meters is more favorable. If thebatteries are exposed in the
open where the terrain permits
an attack from the flank or rear,at one hundred meters, or less,(depending upon armament of
the airplane), may accomplish
better results.

169. Attack squadrons andgroups must make use of every
opportunity to carry out training
behind the front for their work.
The most important features ofthis training are simulated attacks
in close formation, flight following flight, and the preparation oftime scheaules of departure fromthe airdrome, formation of flight,
attack, expenditure of ammunition, and return to the airdrome,
replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and repetition of attack. Particular attention shouldbe paid to the training of flight
leaders, deputy flight leaders,
and the control and maneuvering of the flight as a unit. Theoretical and practical instruction
and training must be given toeach individual until he hascompletely mastered his airplane
and weapons.

Relation to other Aircraft.
170. Attack squadrons are foruse against the enemy's groundforces. They are not, primarily,
for use against enemy aircraft,
except balloons. Their use
against balloons should be considered as of minor importance,
except in connection a'ith attacks
against enemy artillery.
171. During the preparatory
phase of an operation, they may
efficiently be used as protection
for low-flying infantry m d artillery airplanes. These missions
should be utilized for familiarizing the personnel of the attack
squadrons with the sector.
172. During the operations ofattack squadrons, against theirnormal targets, they should beprotected from enemy aircraft,either by pursuit airplanes, or by
one or more flights of the attack
group operating as protection ata higher altitude. If tho groupdoes not contain a squadronequipped with machin'es of the
pursuit type suitable for engaging enemy aircraft, thereby requiring that protection be furnished by one or more flights ofattack airplanes, the schedule ofoperations should be worked out
so that the protection flights berelieved by other protection
flights before their fuel has been
consumed, and they will thendescend and expend their ammunition against ground targets
before returning to their airdrome.
173. Particular attention andthought should be given by all
attack personnel to thc. means
1295

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

and methods of improving theefficiency of attack squadrons,particular attention being given
to maneuvers and new
weapons.

LIAISON OF THE AIRPLANE WITH THE
INFANTRY.
174. The functions of the infantry airplane in its cooperation
with the infantry is separated
into two distinct categories,
which will be specified hereafter
under the titles of: THE INFANTRY COMMAND AIRPLANE.
THE INFANTRY CONTACTAIRPLANE.

I. The Infanty
Command Airplane.
Function.
175. The Infantry Command
Airplane acts as the liaison agent
under the direction of the division commander, between theattacking infantry and the division P.C., and as an agent ofliaison for the P.C.’s of the infantry itself, of the artillery and ofneighboring troops, as circumstances require and in conformance with instructions fromproper authority.
176. It follows the operationsof the front line troops for the
purpose of obtaining the positionof their lines when desired, andtransmits same to the division
P.C., and gathers such information as possible concerning theenemy and our own troops during the preliminary reconnaissance which is made prior toasking for the position of thefront line from the infantry.
177. It transmits to the infantry the orders of the divisioncommander; transmits to the division commander the communications of the subordinate
P.C.’s made by signals; and ingeneral keeps the division commander informed of the progressof our own front lines and as tothe situation in the immediate
enemy lines.

The Mission.
178. It is not feasible to limit
exactly the duties of the Infantry
Command Airplane where suchduties may temporarily coinci.dewith those of the artillery surveillance or counter-attack airplane.
It is desirable that the Infantry
Command Airplane report all
activity of interest that he may
see during his preliminary recmonnaissance, so that his message
may well include a report ofenemy batteries in action; theactivity of enemy and our own
neighboring troops, and similar
information of importance. He
should always report the activityof enemy aircraft, enemy bal.loons, and anti-aircraft. It must
be borne in mind, however, ]:hat
this airplane has for its specificmission the determination of theinfantry front lines, and that allother considerations are secondary. To keep the command wellinformed as to the situation of
our front line is the first and mostimportant duty of the Infantry
Command Airplane. The difficulties that he will have to overcome to be successful do not
permit those in command to expect him to give other inforrriation regularly or to have him
undertake other missions. However, if, as frequently happensin the war of movement. it is
not immediately possible to obtain the position of the frontline. the observer may render,other services in the interval
which will elapse until the time
when he can obtain its position.

1

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296

179. He may temporarily assume the functions of a counterbattery or surveillance airplane.
He may relay to the commandand to the artillery the signals
made by the infantry such as arequest for a barrage, or for an
increase of artillery range, or arequest for ammunition. In thecase of strong resistance by theenemy, checking our advance atany point, he may inform thecommand by radio or by adropped message on the P.C.,
or may drop a message on agroup of infantry, giving locationand importance of the opposing
forces.
180. The command must realize that an absolutely fixed time
for obtaining the position of theline is impracticable. This is true
both at the beginning of an attack, when an Infantry Command Airplane will invariably beover the lines, and later during
the war of movement when circumstances may easily arise rendering it impossible to obtain theline at a specific time. At the
beginning of an attack the line
should not be demanded until
sufficient time has elapsed forthe infantry to gain some predetermined objective.

181. Infantry commanders
and troops must assist the aviator so far as lies within theirpower. A watch must be maintained for his signals, and aprompt response made to his
request for the position of theline. It must be borne in mind
constantly that the success of themission depends upon a thorough mutual understanding andcooperation between the infantry and the airplane.
The Execution of theMission.
182. An observer, in order torender a comprehensive, valuable report must bring up to thelast moment the information heobtained before leaving the airdrome. This will be done byflying over our artillery line before going to the front; locating
the important P.C.’s and observing the activity of our own andthe enemy’s artillery, the progress of the artillery engagement,
and the aerial activity; then proceeding to the lines he will notethe enemy activity on the
ground; the grenade and bayonet fights, and any other information of importance and interest to the command. When hehas thoroughly grasped the general situation he takes advantage
of a favorable opportunity anddischarges his signal asking that
the Infantry indicate theirposition.

183. The Signal used by the
airplane in identifying himself,
asking for the line to be indicated, sending “understood”
and making other pre-arranged
signals, are made by rockets ofvarious descriptions, discharged
from a Very pistol. The significance of the various rocket signals used is specified in the planof liaison, and may be changed
from time to time, if circumstances demand.
184. The infantry will at all
times have specially detailed
lookouts whose duty it will be toobserve the movements of the
Infantry Command Airplane andreport to the proper officer when
the airplane signals its request
for the line to be shown. The
responsible officer will see thatpanels are promptly displayed. If
the signal “Where are you” isagain displayed by the airplane
after the panels are shown, steps
will be taken to immediately indicate the line by means of Bengal flares. These should be habitually used to mark the line inwooded county, and underMitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

other circumstances where the
11. The Jnjanty Contact
airplane may have difficulty in
Airplane.
locating the lines. If the Infantry
Function.
Command Airplane does not
186. The Infantry Contact Airsend the signal “Understood”
plane takes an active part in theafter ten minutes have elapsed,the panel should be taken in and offensive operations, and acts as
the liaison agent of the front line
no more flares will be lighted.
infanty and the accompanying
185. After having determinedartilley.
the lines the Infanty Command
Airplane will proceed toward the The Mission.
division P.C., sending by radio
187. It attacks the enemy on
the information gathered, andthe ground with machine guns
confirming same by his written
and light bombs, and by suchmessage which will be dropped
maneuvering may easily indicate
at the P.C. Normally the mission the position of enemy strongof the Infantry Command Airpoints and centers of resistance.
plane is completed by this act. If By signals and methods pre-arit is desired to communicate with ranged with the infanty batteries
other P.C.’s, messages should
and accompanying guns, it indibe delivered after completing the cates targets which should be
mission for the division.
taken under fire, and also indicates objectives to the heavymachine guns and mortars. Its
communication with the groundtroops will be entirely by visualsignals and dropped messages.
In order that the results obtainedby this airplane are commensurate with the risks undertaken,
such close liaison must exist between it and the troops on the
ground that prompt and unfailing advantage is taken of e v e ysignal and message given by it.
Success depends upon a liaison
perfected to an extent hitherto
unknown, in our service; a liaison must be founded on mutual
knowledge, confidence, and admiration. The Infanty Contact
Airplane by its signals anddropped messages gives to thesmallest party of infanty information invaluable to them in:297

their advance.
188. Such close liaison anti
cooperation should exist between the infantry and the Infantry Contact Airplane that a message dropped near any group of
infanty, however small, will berecovered by them and carriedat once to a responsible officer
and action taken without delay
according to the contents of themessage. In this way minor units
will have information of their immediate front of greatest value tothem.
189. When the informatiori
gathered warrants it, and upon
the completion of its mission, theInfanty Contact Airplane conimunicates with the desired P.C.,
imparting such information as it
has collected. For subordinate
P.C.’s in particular this is important, as by this means information is received which will not
be obtained by other means fora long period of time.

2 98

I l l . Liaison.
(a)Relations of the Air Service
with Ground Troops.
190. The success of the infantry mission, command or contact, depends entirely upon themaintenance of an intimate liaison between the air service andthe infantry, from the divisioncommanders down to the soldiers in the front lines. In orderto foster the spirit of cooperationnecessary to success, every effort
will be made to have officers of
the air service units visit the infantry in the lines, for the purpose of becoming acquainted
with their work, their difficulties,
and the way they live. Infantry
officerswill also be encouraged
to visit the airdromes, when circumstances warrant, to become
familiar with the operations andwork of an observation squadron. When possible, selected officers will be taken over the sector by airplane. Special efforts
should be made to enable officers of the division and corps
staffs to see the lines fromthe air.

Postwar Review(b)Aitplaneto Ground Communications.
191. Radio and visual signals
fumish the most reliable andgenerally used means of communication between the airplane
and the ground. In the American
Army at the present time thedropped message is employed toa large extent.
192. The observer sends byradip all his observations, confirming his information by adropped message at the P.C.
Rocket signals, discharged froma Very pistol, and other visualsignals are used for communication with the front line troops
and for other special purposes,
as provided in the plan of liaison.
193. The observer tests his
radio set before leaving the vicinity of the airdrome, with theground testing station there, sothat no airplane ever proceeds
to the front without its radio
being adjusted to the stations
with which it may have to communicate.
194. The dropped message isinvariably used to confirm theradio message at the P.C., forwhich primarily intended. This isimportant, as the radio messages
are frequently lost by the receiving station. The dropped message is used by the Infantry
Contact Airplane to communicate with the advancing troops,
and, by special agreement, with
the infantry batteries and accompanying guns.

(c) Ground to Airplane Communications.
195. For the infantry airplane,these signals are all visual. They
comprise panels, Bengal flares,
signal lights, and rockets, andany other improvised means for
attracting attention of the plane.

(d)Panels.
196. Marking panels are usedby the front line infantry to indicate their position to the airplane, either at the demand of
the airplane, at a prearranged
hour, or at the initiative of theinfantry commander when forsome reason he wishes to indicate his position to the InfantryMitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

299

Command Airplane. The Infantry Command Airplane, having
seen the panels displayed without request, will immediately
take the position of the line, givethe signal understood, and proceed as in his regular mission.
Identification panels are used toindicate the location of the
P.C.’s and in case of stations
equipped with radio receiving
sets, the display of a panelmeans specifically “Here is P.C.,
so and so, with radio set erected,
listening in, and ready to receive
messages.” By this means theobserver locates stations withwhich he may wish to communicate, and all stations so adjusted
may intercept his message.

N. Training.
(el Flares and Rockets.
197. The Bengal flare is used to200. The preliminary instrucmark the infantry line in woods, tions of infantry must be thorduring misty weather or fog,
ough and must be continued
when it is difficult for the airconstantly while in repose or beplane to see the panels. If after
hind the front lines, in order thatthe line has been marked by the the principles of close liaison andcooperation with the airplanepanels, the airplane again demands the line, flares should be may be kept constantly in view.
lit. In lighting flares, care must be
201. Instruction must be given
which will impress the importaken to have airplane in a fatance of the work done by thevorable position, going awayfrom the line, as flares remain lit airplane, and the absolute necessity of complying with its deonly about thirty seconds.
mands promptly. This instruction
198. After the airplane has
signalled “Understood,” or after must be aimed at all infantrymen, from the regimental coma period of ten minutes hasmander to the private. It must be
elapsed, the panels should beborne in mind that after the obconcealed and no more flares
server has asked for the line,
lighted.
199. Rockets and other signals both he and the pilot are conare used for special purposes, as centrating their attention on the
ground; that it is very difficult at
indicated in the plan of liaison.
that time to maneuver so as to
avoid machine gun fire from theground or anti-aircraft fire, andthat the airplane during this interval is at the mercy of enemy

Panel markers
for communication
with airplanes.

300

Postwar Review

aircraft, completely without de- V. Exercises.
Furthemore, the longer
202. Exercises will be held at
themust remain Overfrequent intervals for the purthe lines at a low altitude thethe liaison bepose ofheavier becomes the hostile ma- tween the infantryand thechine gun fire. The enemy is
try Command and Contact Airtrained in thisOfplanes. These exercises will befire, and heavy casualties invari- held at concentration pointsinThe
ably
to thethe rear, and with troops in redestruction of the infantry airpose behind the linesor newly
plane not only means the loss of arrived in corps
A course
trained andof instruction will be establishedized officers, difficult to replace, in each corps at the airdrome ofbut itthat a very serious the Corps Observation Group,
delay results in the arrival ofwhich will have for its purpose
infomation to the command at a the instruction of officersand
time when VeY Probably Other
non-commissioned officers in inmeans of communication do not fantry liaison, and to give thoseexist. The success or failure of an
operation may easily depend on
the certainty of receiving the information which it is the missionof the Infantry Command Airplane to transmit promptly.

Mitchell: Provisional Manualof Operations

attending the course such aknowledge of the Air Service
and its operation, possibilities,
and limitations, as will establish afirm,mutual understanding andconfidence. A large part of the
instruction will take the form ofpractical exercises under conditions simulating actual service as
closely as possible. Every effort
will be made to make the course
interesting to the students.

301

203. In the armies on thefront, arrangements will be madewhereby officers of the air setvice, particularly of the observation units, may visit troops in thel i e , for the purpose of gaining
first hand knowledge of the operations of ground troops, which
will aid them in aerial operations,and tend to strengthen the confidence and liaison with groundtroops.

AA guns on French trucks operated by 2nd Balloon Co..
1st Army Corps., Montrieul, France, 8 duly 1918.

204. All commanding officersof troops having control overobservation air service will takesuch steps as are necessay toperfect the cooperation, confidence and liaison between theinfantry and the air service. It
should be borne in mind in thisrespect, that as the most suitable
place to gain a knowledge of theinfantry is in the front lines, so
the most suitable place to gain aknowledge of the air service ison the airdrome and in the air.

Brig. Gen. Mitchell and his staff. Coblenz. Germany, November,
1919: (1. t o r.) Capt. 1. W. Miller, Capt. R. Valois. Lt. Col. L. H.
Brereton. Gen. Mitchell, Ma). I. D. Joralemon, andCapt. 0. E. Manell.

54. Notes OFthe
Cha ~acte~istics,
Limitations, andEmployment OFthe A ~ RS e R u i c e

303

1919

During the war, officers and Employment of the Air
and soldiers of the infantry Service,” and later publishedand artillery often expressed in Washington in an Air Servdissatisfaction with the way ice Information Circular.2 The
aviation was being used. latter version is printed beSuch comments were sum- low.
The original paper conmarized and answered in apaper, “Notes on Employ- tained sections, omitted fromment of the Air Service from the published version, conthe General Staff View cerning principles of comPoint,” prepared in Febru- mand, complaints of aviatorsary 1919 under the direction against the infantry and artilof Colonel Gorrell, Assistant lery, the “temperament” ofChief of Staff, Air Service, fliers, and the status of the
AEF. After being circulated Air Service as a combat arm.
for comments, the paper was These paragraphs seem to berevised in France, given a of sufficient interest to warnew title, “Notes on the rant their being printed as an
Characteristics, Limitations, addendum.

1 In Gorrell s History D-1
2 Vol I, No 72 12 Jun 20
3 The revised Statement is more positive
than the original The Air Service tries tokeep the staff informed The Air Service
helps adjust artillery The Air Service tries todestroy the enemy air service The Air SeN-

ice tries to help declde action on the groundby using machine guns and bombs Only
significant changes in content will bepointed out in these notes

Principles of Air Servicts
Operations.
1. What is the function of an
Air Service? These are its chief
purposes:
The Air Service aids the Infanty, helps adjust Artillery, assis,ts
in keeping the staff informed,
destroys the enemy air service,by using machine guns andbombs, assists in deciding actions on the ground, and prevents the enemy air service fmm
rendering similar assistance tothe hostile forces3
2. The Air Service has difficulty in keeping the staff informed because there are manythings which it is hard or impossible for airmen to see becauseof atmospheric conditions, thespeed at which airplanes travel,
the blind angles on all airplanes,
and the fact that from an airplane the ground appears inplan, without contours. The Air
Service can not take the place ofCavaly, but the Air Service canbring back accurate, cool reports, not warped by the sights
and sounds of the battlefield.

Postwar Review

304

These reports can be of value
only if they are quickly decoded
and transmitted. The airplanesecures and carries reports
quickly. A well-trained staff uses
them quickly.
3. Adjuting Artillery from the
air in a war of movement isdifficult unless all who take partin the adjustment, Artillery andairmen alike, are thoroughly
trained. The first essential is athorough understanding between the ground and air forces
and a well-developed system ofcooperation and of signaling orcommunicating information.
First, the Air Service must know
approximately where the Artillery posts of command are located. Second, the artillery panelcrews must answer signals
promptly and properly. Third,
the radio must work. Fourth, thedetails of the shoot must be carried out smoothly, and this canbe accomplished only when efficient ground communication exists. Fifth, though perhaps it
should be put first, the airplanemust find the target at which theArtillery is to shoot.4
4. Airplanes in fighting in the
air must try to keep clear ofenemy airplanes an area about
10,000yards deep in front of
the line of battle. If they aresuccessful the Infantry see few
air fights and therefore think ourplanes are not operating. Complete success is impossible. The
idea of a submarine barrage bysubmarines against submarines
is ridiculous, but no more ridiculous than the conception of athey do with their bombs andcomplete aerial barrage 2 ' / 2
miles high, 5 miles deep, and as machine guns is to the material
damage as about 20 to 1,but
broad as the front over which
success in battle comes from thethe battle is raging. A perfectdestruction of the enemy's moaerial barrage is impossible berale, and not from the enemy's
cause of the difficulty a planeannihilation. The best relations
has, first, to see another in thebased upon intimate knowledge
air, and second, to attack it.
Therefore, enemy airplanes oc- and personal acquaintance andcasionally get past the most nu- friendship, must exist between
the Air Service and the othermerous and aggressive friendly
arms. Otherwise there will be
pursuit concentrations. They
must be acce ted by our ground misunderstandings and recrimitroops with t e same philosophy nations.6
7. The above points are illusas the enemy's shelling.
5. Low-flying enemy airplanes trated and explained in the sucmust be fought by ground troops ceeding pages.
utilizing their machine guns andFunctions of the Air
rifles. In firing from the groundon low-flying enemy aircraft re- Service.
member that many a machine is
8. Whatever the future develhit, the pilot wounded, and theopment of aviation may be, up
observer killed, when the airto the end of the war in 1918 its
plane does not fall nor appear to most important function had
be damaged. Do not become
proved to be securing and transdiscouraged because the enemy mitting information concerning
plane which is being fired at
the developments in and beyond
does not fall. Many machines of the line of battle. The work of
our Army, disabled by enemy
keeping the command informed
fire from the ground, have come was rendered difficult because
home in crippled condition, with what the Air Service could doobservers dead and pilots
and what it could not do were
wounded. The enemy did not
not sufficiently well known either
have the satisfaction of seeing
to the staffs or to the troops, andthem fall.
6. If proper understanding,cooperation, and communication exist, airplanes can enter
4 . The original contained the additional
effectively into the battle on thestatement: "This is not always easy."g r o ~ n dThe
. ~ moral damage
5. The original began: "If good liaison

K

exists. . . :' Similar changes were made inother places where "liaison" was used in
the original.
6. The original contained an additional
paragraph: "Finally, the Air Service is acombatant arm and not a staff service. It
must be utilized as such."Notes of the Characteristics,
Limitations, and Employmentof the Air Service

305

because the American Army did
not have at its disposal a sufficiently large air force. The purpose of this pamphlet is to set
forth simple statements of thecapabilities and limitations of the
Air Service.
9. As has been pointed out,
the Air Service, in order to assist
the Infanty, besides keeping thecommand informed, adjusts Artilley; fights in the air against theenemy air service; attacks
ground objectives, both tacticaland strategical; and prevents theenemy air service from rendering
similar assistance to the hostileforces.’10. The work of keeping thecommand informed is doneby(a) Visual reconnaissance;(b) Photographic reconnaissance;(c) Thorough mutual understanding and the prompt communication of information.

13. No man, no matter what
Limitations of
his flying experience, can standReconnaissance.
on the ground and estimate the11. Visual reconnaissances by state of visibility in the air. A

daylight and by well-trained observers often furnish informationof great value. These missions
sometimes fail for reasons which
are readily apparent. An airplane
can not stand still to scrutinize astretch of county. A thousand
men hidden in a wood or avillage can not be compelled byan airplane to expose themselves. Therefore, if they wish toremain hidden they can do so.
Hence negative information,
while valuable, is not always accurate. Again, the Air Service
can not replace the Cavaly. If,
however, the presence of concealed hostile troops is suspected, this can often be verified
or disproved by airplanes dispatched on special missions,while circling at a v e y low altitude over the locality concemed.8
12. An airplane passes overthe county so rapidly that
troops on the ground can sometimes deceive the aerial observer; for example, a column
may alter temporarily its direction of march, etc. Hence evenpositive information must be
carefully weighed in order to determine its value.

ground mist frequently reduces
visibility from the air on days
which may appear perfect for
observation purposes to men on
the ground?
14. To the aerial observer certain things show more or lessclearly, due to the fact that backgrounds and shadows affect vsibility. Fields show up from theair like checkerboard squares.
Soldiers standing on the line
where two fields meet are hard
to see, while if they are a few
feet within one field or the otherthey show up clearly. On the line
between two fields, if they areseen at all, it is generally because
they are revealed by their shadows. The best cover from airplane observation is natural
shadow.
15. Wheel tracks and paths
are readily noted by an observerand show clearly on airplane
photographs. Freshly turned
earth is quite conspicuous and,no amount of camouflage canconceal it completely.

7 The lasl clause was added in the revision
8 T h e last sentence was added in therevision
9 T h e original contained an additicnal
sentence The only answef to the questionof what is the visibility on any given dav I S
Take the air and see306

Capabilities ofReconnaissance.
16. As the limitations of aerial
observation are seldom appreciated, so also its capabilities are
seldom comprehended.
17. Any staff officer who has
seen war has heard tales of disaster such as are almost always
brought back by the seriously
wounded and by skulkers. All
reports from ground observers in
the front line have a tendency to
be warped by the excitement,
the sights, and the sounds of thebattle field. It is difficult for a staff
officer to avoid being influenced
by these reports. A properly utilized and properly trained Air
Service can discount many false
reports and can clear up most of
the obscure points on the line ofbattle.
18. To locate troops on broken ground requires flying at altitudes of 700 feet and less, atwhich altitudes airplanes are extremely vulnerable to machinegun fire from the ground." It isdifficult to locate the lines during
an attack, as our own Infantry
are then too busy to show theirpanels; hence, though the enemy does not greatly hinder our
low-flying airplanes at such atime, the airplanes do not bringback the most valuable reports.
The best time for Infantry contact patrols is usually for about
one hour after the capture of an
objective. During enemy counterattacks, a very heavy fire against
our low-flying airplanes must
be expected.

Postwar Review

19. The aerial observer, when
not in action, is generally somewhat removed from the sights
and sounds of the battlefield.
He is not subject to the waves of
emotion that can and do run
through masses of men at thefront.
20. The aerial observer can
not do his work intelligently unless he has had proper training.
To secure reports of the greatest
value, the observer should be ahighly trained General Staff officer. This ideal, for obvious reasons, will rarely be attained. By
the proper training of Air Service
officers it can be approximated.
The pilot should be a youngman, the observer an older man,
who has received several years
on General Staff traininq inschools established for that
purpose.
The Airplane as an Instrument of Communication."
21. Once the deadlock on thewestern front was broken, andmovement-which is the essence of war-began, the staffs
of large units began to experience serious difficulties in transmitting orders and in securing
information. These difficulties
were almost insuperable so far
as ground communication withadvanced elements of groundtroops was concerned; the common methods failed to function
with more than a small part oftheir former efficiency. This was
not true of the Air Service. The
difficulties of communication, inherent in a war movement, arepresent to a much smaller extent

between the staffs and the Air
Service than between groundobservation posts and posts ofcommand. In future wars wemay expect the Air Service to do
more and more of this importantwork.
22. In a war of movement the
Air Service will probably be thechief reliance of the G 2 ' s of
combatant units. The training for
G-2 work should therefore include experience in aerial
observation.
Communication.
23. To keep in touch with thefront line in open warfare, only
one means is reliable-the actual
physical canying of a message.
Runners are slow, horses frequently impracticable, and motor cycles demand roads. Considering time and distance as important factors, the airplane isoften the best carrier. Bettermeans of communicating fromthe ground to the airplanes must
therefore be devised. This is limited at present to a few prearranged signals which, though
they may not contain all a commander desires to know, evennow contain all he need know toform a sound estimate of thesituation. Communication from
airplanes to the ground, on theother hand, for all essential command purposes, is efficientwhere good training exists,l 2
10 Ine opening sentence of the original
was dropped in the revision
Infantry Iiaison flights are dangerous
1 1 The original heading was The Airplane as an Instrument of Liaison See note
5 above1 2 In the original this is followed by asection (one paragraph) on principles ofcommand See addendum

Notes of the Characteristics,
Limitations, and Employmentof the k r Service

Combat.
24. Aerial fighting is difficult.
Its difficulties are not appreciatedby the majority of those who are
not aviators.
25. The greatest difficulty ofthe pursuit pilot is to find theenemy. The difficulty that a manin the air experiences in seeing
another airplane is hard to understand. When an airplane isseen from the ground, it is generally the noise of the engine
which attracts attention to it. In
the air the noise of the pilot’s
own engine drowns all othersounds.
“Vision of the Air.”
26. With no foreground or
background a pilot may look directly at an airplane and not see
it, because his eye is out offocus. This difficulty is hard to
explain. To seafaring men it willappeal as natural. To landsmen,
all that can be said is that it does
exist, and aviators try all sorts ofexpedients in an effort to overcome it, such as looking at struts
which are at different distancesfrom their eyes and then sweeping the horizon.
27. From above it is difficult todistinguish an airplane if the
camouflage on the wings blends
well with the background of theearth against which it is seen.
28. An airplane seen from below can not be attacked unlessthe attacker is justified in accepting a serious disadvantage of position during the combat that is
to follow.

307

29. Two airplanes on thesame approximate level present
to one another very small projected areas as compared withthe same two airplanes as seenfrom the ground, for from theground they are seen in pian.
30. For the foregoing reasons
hostile airplanes often pass one
another in the air without joining
in combat.13Also observation
airplanes, like ground reconnaissance patrols ordinarily avoid
combat unless they are attacked.
Fighting in the Air.
31. Fighting on the ground isin two dimensions; fighting in the
air is in three. When combat isjoined, an airplane moving at a
speed in excess of 120 miles anhour is a gun platform fromwhich to fight a target moving at
a similar speed. The difficulties
involved are sufficiently obvious
to explain the fact that effective
range never exceeds 400 yards
and that 90 percent of the machines shot down are shot downat ranges from 100 yards to 10
feet.
32. To the average soldier at
the front, and to his officers, too,the soie purpose of airplanes
was apt to be regarded as thedriving off of enemy machinesa function which was very poorly
performed in the war, to judge
by the accounts of those unfamiliar with the proper employment of an air service.14

Tactical Employment.
33. The proper employmentof pursuit airplanes includes thedestruction of enemy aircraft, theprotection of our own observation airplanes, and the prevention of enemy aerial attacks on
our ground troops. By our SLICcess in harassing and destroying
hostile two-seaters the enemy isprevented from informing his
c~mmand.’~34. Experience has shownthat maximum casualties can be
inflicted on the enemy air service, and our own observation
airplanes can be better protected, by adopting a vigorous
offensive policy for our pursuit
airplanes. This is the best defense. Maintaining our aerial
front line far beyond the frontline of our Infantry and clearing
the enemy aircraft from the area
in which our observation airplanes work, give better protection to our Infantry and to our

13 In the original the following sen ence
inserted
Probably the Infantry of bothsides curse their respective representmves
as yellow while the truth is that the pilots
have never seen one another at all or else atl e a 3 one of the planes was an obserbation
plane charged with the duty of getting information
14 In the original the sentence erided
to judge by the accounts o f t i o s e
unfamiliar with the proper employment of
an air service The original then contirlued
The function w a s ill-performed because
the Aii Service never attempted it foi thereasons indicated in paragraph 36 l:84 inrevision I
15 The last sentence was added iri therevisionIS308

observation airplanes than attempting to give close protection. The Infantry do not see
combats far within the enemy’sline, and consequently one hears
frequent complaints and demands by the ground troops forthe patrolling of our lines by ourown pursuit airplanes. Such a
disposition of forces would be
analogous to placing all of ourInfantry in the outpost zone andevenly distributing it from one
end of the line to the other,while confining it to a strict defensive. Such tactics would ofcourse inevitably result in
defeat. l6

16 The last sentence was added in therevision
17 The original continued
In addition
if while an airplane is over the lines orduring the ten minutes after it departs
shells fall near any part of the Division as isalmost Certain to occur in all probability theshelling will be attributed l o the direct
agency of the airplane The attribution ofsuch shelling to airplane artillery adjustment
is invariably based upon complete and to
the aviator pathetic ignorance of the functions capabilities and limitations 01 the Air
Service

Postwar Review

Low-Flying Enemy
Airplanes.
35. As a matter of fact, theonly successful way to deal with
low-flying airplanes is for the Infantry to have confidence in theirown weapons-rifles and machine guns-and to use them. It
has been explained that it is difficult to see one airplane fromanother in the air. The lower anairplane is flying the harder it is
to see. Once seen, a low-flying
airplane is hard to attack fromthe air. With no room to dive or
maneuver, the efforts of a pursuit airplane to attack even a
two-seater which is harassins our
Infantry, Artillery, or columns on
the road may be compared to
rts of a hawk to attack among trees. It is the duty
Infantry to drive off theing enemy airplanes.

36. The great moral effect of
low-flying airplanes results froman exaggerated notion of theircapabilities. An airplane that remains over the enemy lines at analtitude of 500 feet for only fiveminutes may safely be assumed
to cover 7 miles. It will probably
be seen by all the troops of one
division who are in the forward
zone, and experience goes toshow that, no matter with what
equanimity the division withstands hostile shelling, a numberof its troops will believe themselves to have been in danger
from such an airplane. (One of
the best American divisions inFrance on one occasion received
3,500 enemy shells in its sector
in one day without being disturbed, and yet personal questioning by General Staff officers
disclosed that almost every man
in the division believed himself
to have been in danger from asingle low-flying enemy airplane
which was over its lines forabout 10 minutes.)
37. All ground troops must be
educated to appreciate that(a ) Airplanes never regulate
Artillery on the front lines.
( b ) Airplanes seldom regulate
Artillery from an altitude of lessthan 2,000 feet.
(c) More or less continuous
observation is essential to theregulation of Artillery fire.
( d ) Rifles and machine guns ofground troops are the best defense, and are a thoroughly efficient defense, against low-flying
airplanes.

309

Notes of the Characteristics,
Limitations, and Employmentof the Air Service

38.Infantrymen are loath tofire upon aircraft, because theyfear to disclose their positions.
Firing on aircraft by infantrymen
does not tend to disclose theposition of the Infantry, butrather by virtue of keeping theenemy at a higher altitude helps
to conceal it. Many pilots andobservers returning from flights
have reported being fired uponby small arms, but if in any casea pilot or observer was able tolocate the point from which thefire came with sufficient accuracy
to demand Artillery fire against
the hostile positions the case wasa very rare one, probably
unique .
39. If Infantry do not fireagainst low-flying hostile airplanes, the enemy’s aviators will
become bolder, descend tolower altitudes, and will remainmuch longer over the lines.
40. It can be stated unhesitatingly that the boldness of theGerman low-flying planes over
the American Army on the western front was due to insufficient
initiative by the Infantry, who
frequently failed to engage hostile aircraft, or engaged them
only in a half-hearted manner.
41. A word of caution in thisregard is imperative. The Infantxy must not engage our own
airplanes. Before firing on any
airplane its hostile intent shouldbe established beyond a doubt.

All combatants on both sides in
the late war received numerous
reports of enemy pilots’ flying
machines captured from theother side. So far as the allied
armies are concerned no German airplanes were ever flown
by the Allies near the lines. No
allied pilot would have dared to
fly any German plane near thelines, for the one reason, if forno other, that it would havebeen impossible to have notified
all allied pilots when and where
he would be in the air, and if all
allied pilots, at least within aradius of 30 miles, had not been
notified, any flier in a German
airplane near the allied lines
would, in all human probability,
have been attacked. If the lowflying airplane has not exhibitedany hostile intent, the Infantry
should wait to see the hostile
insignia before firing upon it. To
fire when it is so far away thatthe insignia can not be distinguished, is not productiveof results.*8

18 The last two sentences were added In
the revision

Bombing and Machine
Gunning.
42. Besides its interest in theactual fighting in the air, the CI-3
staff is interested in these elements of the air service which
enter directly into the battle on
the ground-bombers and airplanes which attack ground objectives.
43. The developments of thelate war in its later months inclicate that future wars will see afurther strengthening of machine-gun nests as a means ofdefense. The airplane gave
hopes, at the end of the war, of
assisting materially in overcoming these obstacles. To be ofassistance in the reduction ofmachine guns, air service units
must know their location andcommunication must be sufficiently good so that the cooperative action between the arms at
the disposal of the Infantry and
Artillery can be assured.
44. The attack of ground objectives in the zone as far back of
the enemy’s front lines as his
divisional posts of commandoften yields important results.
For such attacks to be of maximum effect, good targets, suchas columns on the road or
troops in reserve, marching up
to the line of battle or retreating,must be exactly and positively
located before the “groundstraffers” are dispatched. Under
other circumstances good results
will in all probability not be
achieved.

Postwar Review

31 0

45. Bombing and its results
have heretofore been little
understood. The great mobility
and speed of airplanes make itpossible to utilize day bombardment tactically to influence anaction in progress. It is considered that as compared with thematerial destruction wroughtwhich is frequently considerable-the moral effect of either
bombing or. machine gunningfrom airplanes is as 20 to 1, andvictory in battle results from thedestruction of the enemy’s
morale.

Mutual Understanding and
Personal Visits.
46. The basis of the proper
operation of the combined arms
is mutual understanding and aspirit of camaraderie. This is best
secured by the exchange of personal visits. Infantrymen, artillerymen, and staffs must visit airdromes and watch the air service
work. Aviators must be sent fortours of duty with Infanty and
Artillery units.Ig

ADDENDUM
from Notes on
Employment of The Air
Service From The General
Staff View Point............................
Principles of Commandz0
26. Nevertheless, in no caseshould Squadrons or Groups beunder direct orders of G-2 andthe role of Branch Intelligence
Officer should be turned over toan Air Service Intelligence Officer. Air Seruice units must be
under the direct orders of Air
Seruice officers, held responsiblethat the orders of the Commanding General, expressed (forintelligence) through G -2, areproperly executed. From a G 2
point of view the Air Service is tobe regarded as any other combatant unit. The relationship between staffs of large units (Division, Corps and Armies) and the
Air Service of the units should
be analogous to that between,
for example, G-2 of a Corps
and the Divisions of the Corps.
Each air service unit should haveits own officer who is responsible
for the collection and forwardingof all information of the enemy.
He will cooperate with G-2 andmaintain intimate liaison exactly
as do the G-2s of divisions and

19 There were four additional paragraphs
in the original See the addendum
20 See note 12

Notes of the Characteristics,
Limitations, and Employmentof the Air Service

31 1

corps. But he is under the ordersof the Air Service Officer who
commands the unit.

The Air Service Not A Staff
Aviation Morale
Service
53.Much ridicule has been
54. Finally it is particularly deheaped upon the so-called
sired to impress upon all staff“temperament” of fliers. Fliers
are not per se any more temper- officers that the Air Service is nota staffservice but is a combatantamental than other healthy
arm and it must be consideredyoung men, and are equally
as such to obtain success. It isanxious to live up to the bestsusceptible to the same tacticaltraditions of the profession ofarms. Nevertheless the morale of dispositions, in accordance withthe same underlying tacticalan Air Service is a sensitive
thing, certainly, at least as sensi- principles as are all other arms of
the Service.
tive as that of the Infantry, andsubject to much the same reactions. The giving of ill-advisedorders to fliers such as sendingout a squadron under atmosheric conditions that renderork impossible and increase
the likelihood of casualties will
destroy the confidence of thepilots and observers of thatsquadron in their superiors, withconsequent loss of morale.
These conditions can only be
accurately appreciated by a flier.
Therefore orders to Air Service
units should always proceedfrom Air Service commanders,
held responsible that the ordersof commanding General expressed through their Staffs arecarried out.

.........................

51. All *’the recriminations
between the Air Service and theother line troops have not been
made by the Infantry and Artillery. Aviators who have foughtin the war have expressed themselves quite freely when they
have been called upon byground troops for protection
against enemy aircraft at a timeand a place where the only airplanes in the sky were American.
Frequently American airplanes
have been shot at and a few
have been brought down by themachine guns and rifles of ourown Infantry.
52. But to be shot at by one’s
own friends is one of the unavoidable incidents which occasionally occur to all arms. Recriminations were more bitter whenthe Air Seruice met with definiterefusals to cooperate on the partof the line. When the Chief ofStaff of one Division refusedeven to consider holding Infantry
Liaison exercises with the Air
Service, when day after day Artillery batteries changed their locations and the Air Seruice was
not notified, when the Infantry
took couer and hid instead ofdisplaying their panels when an
airplane signalled asking forthem, when P.C. after P.C. wasfound which was without its distinctive panel, on these occasions it was difficult for the Air
Service to maintain its high spirit
and morale.

e,

21 See note 19

Lt. Col. William C. Sherman (far right) was on hand to examine
a new Vickers machine gun which fired through the propeller.
Lts. V. F. Ludden (far left), C. G. Sellers (in cockpit), andCapt. G. C. Thomas collaborated in the briefing.

55- Sheranan: Tentatiue
ManuaJ g o ~ T h Employmente
OFAirz Serzuice

313

1919

Lt. Cot. William C. Sherman, who was Chief of Staffof the First Army Air Service
in November 1918, and who
produced a “Tactical Historyof the Air Service” at the endof the war,’ also prepared a“Tentative Manual for t h e
Employment of Air Service.”
Written in France in the early
weeks of 1919, the manual reflected the experience gained
during the war. A revised copy,
entitled “Notes on Recent Operations,” was sent to GHQ,AEF for publication, but GHQ
apparently never gave its approval. On 11 April 1919, following a cabled request fromthe United States, a copy wassent to Washington. There it
was mimeographed on 18 June
1919 by the lnformation Group,
Air Service, under t h e title“Notes on Recent Operations.”
The following year it was published under the latter title asan Air Service lnformation Circular. The text printed below
is from a copy of the original in
Gorrell’s History.2

1. Published in the first volume in thisseries.
2. Gorrell’s History. D-1. pp 167-247. See
ibid., C-15. for copy of version sent to GHQ.
A note in D-1, p 1, states that the manual was
prepared by Sherman and corrected by Gorrell.
A copy of the mimeographed version that at
one time was in the library of the Field Officers’
School at Langley Field, is in AFSHRC
248.211-61K. The section on corps aviation
was published in Air Service fnformafion Circular, Vol I, No 74. 12 Jun 20, and the entire
manual in another Circular, Vol I, No 76, 30
Jun 20.

Part I.
Chapter 1.
General Principles
1. The name Air Service is, tosome extent, a misnomer; theemployment of Air Units is not
an automatic thing, functioning
as a service, but is an arm, subject to the same variety of a
combination for differing tacticalsituations as are the other arms,
and governed by the same tactical principles. It is proposed,
therefore, to enumerate theseprinciples, before going into a
more detailed study of Air Service employment.
2. It is a fundamental of human nature for man to fear man
more than the chance action ofsteel and lead. Therefore, in the
future, as in the past, the final
decision in war must be made by
man on the ground, willing tocome hand to hand with theenemy. When the infantry loses,
the Army loses. It is, therefore,

the role of the Air Service, as,well as that of the other arms,, toaid the chief combatant: the Infantry. That the lack of assist.
ance from other arms would
inevitably result in the defeat of
our infantry does not affect thetruth of the axiom. Two important corollaries therefore follow:
the Air Service must know infantry and its assistants; and general
officers and their staffs cannot
hope to produce the most efficient knowledge, tactical cornbinations, unless they have a thorough knowledge, not alone c’f
infantry, but of its assistant arms,
which include the Air Service.
3. In so far as the Army isconcerned, the object of war isthe defeat of the enemy’s armed
forces in the field. This can bedone only by seeking a decisionin battle. It is essential to victory,

314

therefore, to assume the offensive. In war, practically neverdoes victory come as a result of
the material destruction of any
large portion of the enemy’s
forces. Often much material destruction has resulted from victory: it has never been a prerequisite to victory. The final aim
sought, therefore, is not the material destruction of the enemy,
which can never in practice beeven nearly complete, but thedestruction of the enemy’s hopeof victory, of his desire to continue fighting, in a word, of his
morale. This fact must be particularly borne in mind, in considering the Air Service, whose
moral effect on ground troops
is out of all proportion to thematerial destruction wrought. In
the line, the most certain outward sign of that superiority ofmorale which insures victory, isthe possession of the battlefield.
No other factor is so largely destructive of the enemy’s moraleas this. It has been truthfully
said, therefore, that to advanceis to conquer, and one may conquer only by advancing. These
facts, seemingly trite, mustnevertheless be constantly kept
in mind. Whole tactical doctrines
have ignored certain of thesetruths, with consequent disaster.
Nor were there lacking men, in

Postwar Review

5. Before, however, thethe recent war, who believedthat the war would end in com- proper economy of forces canbe determined, knowledge must
plicated systems of trenches: A
failure to appreciate the very na- exist of the enemy’s dispositions.
In former wars, this required nuture itself of war. In the future,
therefore, as in the past, the only merous detachments of troops.
The employment of these constitrue expression of war is thebattle, and the battle implies and tuted the preparatory stage ofthe battle, which frequently abnecessitates movement. The
sorbed a large portion of thelong deadlock on the Western
front must be regarded as exforces available. Great tact andceptional and peculiar, and lescoolness, a careful estimate ofsons drawn from that carefully
facts, still left often no lightening
examined, lest a rule be deof the “fog of war.” It is in thisduced from what was indubitaphase of the battle that the relably an exception.
tive importance of aircraft has
4. It is the battle then that is
steadily grown. Surprise exists
sought for, and, in the battle the now and always will, but air condestruction of the enemy’s motrol can eliminate a very large
rale. It is not necessary, however, proportion of the unknown eleat one and the same time toments, and admit of a solution
attack all portions of the hostilebased on facts.
army. The morale of an army
6. The decisive blow struck, to
may be compared to the human complete the victory requires
body: to destroy it, it is necesthat the fleeing enemy be givensary to destroy only one of sev- no opportunity to reorganize,
eral of its component parts. The and that his loss of morale bebattle then resolves itself into an communicated to the portions ofattempt, by a crushing blow, tohis army still unstruck. The purdestroy but a limited portion ofsuit, then, is at once organized.
an enemy’s army, while holding Too frequently, in past wars, theover the remainder the threat of victor, scarcely less disorganized
impending destruction. This de- than the vanquished, has failed
mands then a certain economy
to gather in the fruits of victory.
of forces: to the portions of the
Very rarely has a thoroughly orfield where the blow is to beganized pursuit been possible.
struck must be brought the suThis will be dealt with in greater
periority of force needed. For all detail in a later chapter, so far asother portions of the field, we
the employment of aircraft is
may regard troops there emconcerned.
ployed as detachments-either
to hold limited portions of the
field or to ascertain the enemy’s
strength.

Sherman: Tentative Manual

315

for The Employment of
Air Service

7. The general principles
briefly outlined above apply to
Air Service units, not alone active cooperation with groundtroops, and their attack of theenemy’s ground troops, butequally in purely aerial warfare.
Before, however, discussing indetail tactical use of aircraft, certain possibilities and limitationsof aircraft must be considered.
8. The extraordinary development of airplanes during thegreat war has brought it aboutthat practically one natural factor
alone can prevent flying today:lack of visibility. A pilot travellingat rates of speed almost always
in excess of one hundred miles
per hour must have a fairly wide
range of vision in order to know
and to maintain his course. Nor
can visibility be determined fromground observations, except inextreme cases. It is highly probable that with time, this handicap
will be overcome to a large extent. It must, however, be accepted as a definite limitation
today. A second limitation to beborne in mind is the duration oftime an airplane may remainover the enemy lines. Due to thequestion of fuel supply, wear
and tear on comparatively delicate engines, and the great
physical and mental strain offlying, where every sense is
keyed up to the highest, only asmall average number of hours

per day per plane available can trench warfare, elaborate methods of liaison were established,
be kept up indefinitely. It is notwhich seldom succeeded when
uncommon among the uninithe war of movement-which istiated to believe that, because
ten planes are available, ten may alone really war-began. Liailjon
from airplane to ground, lessbe kept over the lines all day,modified, by movement becausewith short intervals for refilling
more simple and containing
fuel. Such is far from being acfewer links to be broken, should
tual service conditions.
on the contrary, always be suc9. From the point of view of
the command, the greatest value cessful in open warfare, where
due care is taken. Liaison fromof the Air Service to date has
been in gathering information of the ground to airplane, on theother hand, is still comparatively
the enemy and of our own
undeveloped, and constitutes
troops. In the nature of things,
this source of information should one of the problems of the imbe in future wars both more
mediate future.
nearly complete and more reliaReports from untrained obble. The observer, aloof from the servers, whether on the groundbattle, is less subject to its disor in the air, are generally valueturbing influences. He is reless. Training is essential before
moved from the contagion of
one can describe even the locafear and panic, so easy of trans- tion of the most conspicuous obmission where men are elbow to jects. To know what things areimportant, and what unimporelbow. He hears none of thereports of the wounded, nearlytant; to know exactly what toalways breathing calamity. He
look for, and what negative in8formation is of value; in shorireceives no impressions fromfrom a view to secure such inforskulkers, “the last man left intheir company,” justifying theirmation as will permit an accurate
crime by reports of disaster. In
estimate of the situation, requires
short, he is physically so situated an officer whose knowledge andintelligence fit him to be a genas to be able to see and reportwith an approach to that mathe- eral staff officer. In practice, thisideal will rarely be attained.
matical coolness and accuracy,
Nevertheless it will be striven for,that is so desirable, but so seland thereby make more full m d
dom secured by human beingsin the thick of a fight, subject to reliable the information received
in future from the Air Service.
all its disturbing reactions.
Physically, nothing is defiladed
10. An employment of the Air
from the airplane observer’s
Service, as yet in its infancy, but
view: a situation that is rarely
capable of great results, is that ofmet with in even the best sysactually intervening on the battlefield, not alone by bombing
tems of terrestrial observation.
During the long period ofPostwar Review

316[but also] by direct attack withmachine guns. In estimating thevalue of such attacks, we mustagain bear in mind that an army
is defeated not by destroying it,
but by destroying its morale. It
has been said before that man
fears man more than the chanceof lead or steel. The basis of thegreater fear is the knowledge
that man, having both intent andintelligence, can pursue his design to a fatal conclusion, andhence is more terrible than any
inanimate object, directed from a
distance. Much of this feelingenters into man’s fear of hostile
airplanes. The latter’s commanding position, rendering concealment apparently useless, induces
the instinctive belief in the heartof every man on the ground that
he himself is being watched byhostile eyes and being made thetarget for bomb or bullet; andthat this hostile man can pursue
him intelligently and ultimately
destroy him. To this is added afeeling of utter helplessness, notjustified by facts, but none theless instinctive and not to be
overcome wholly by reason ortraining. That the moral effect of
attacks from the air is, as compared with attacks from theground, out of all proportion

both to the effort expended andthe material damage done, isattested by many incidents. A
division of first class troops, thatreceived with equanimity fourthousand shells p e r day in its
sector, has been known to begreatly disturbed and harassedby the efforts of one persistently
active day bomber. Inquiry
showed that almost every man
in the division believed himself
to have bee0 in danger from thisplane.
11. It is the purpose of thismanual to set forth the principles
governing the use of air units,
and to put on record the resultsof experience in this war. But,
two facts must be held constantly in mind: The Air Service
is a combatant arm, and fulltraining in peace can alone prevent inefficiency in war.

Chapter 11. Security
1. Security in Air Service units
as in all branches of the army
embraces all those measurestaken by a command to protect
itself from observation, annoyance, or surprise by the enemy.
Security of the plane in the air
will be dealt with under theheading of combat, because inreality once the machines haveactually left the airdrome, thegeneral principles of combat go
hand in hand and come under
the province of fighting in the
air. It will only be necessary,
therefore, in discussing the security of Air Service Organizations
to consider those measurestaken by the Commanding Officer at his airdrome, that will protect him from observation, annoyance, or surprise.

317

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

2. It is essential the greatest
care be exercised in selecting anairdrome, not only from thestandpoint of accessibility andother general principles andshelter, but also from the standpoint of security. An airdrome,
therefore, should be selected
bearing these principles in mind.
Airdromes, if possible, should beaway from landmarks which will
be visible at night; they should
be away from streams; if locatedat the edge of a forest theyshould not be near a prominent
portion of the forest. While it iswell in selecting an airdrome totake precautions against enemy
action, it is advisable to look out
for natural obstacles, such as undulating ground, and high obstacles which might endanger machines landing or taking off. Every precaution should be takenthat will eliminate, insofar as
possible, the chances of accidents. In flying, accidents arebound to occur even at the front
where pilots are supposed to becapable of flying under any conditions. After the airdrome has
been located, care should be
used in the location of the hangars. They should never beplaced closer than 100 yards
apart; in practice it has beenfound well to scatter themevenly around the perimeter ofthe field. Where there is dangerof night bombing it is well tocover them with camouflage material which makes them blend
with the ground, not appearing
as landmarks at night. Precaution against fire must always betaken in the case of hangars, andcamouflage material should not
be used where airdromes are notsubject to night attack, as it isalways inflammable and renders
the possibility of complete destruction greater. At times it isbetter to place hangars on good
ground than to religiously distribute them evenly over the airdrome and break a lot of propellers, tail skids and machines inrough ground. After a commanding officer has located his
hangars he should next look to
the security of his personnel.
Under normal war conditions his
enlisted men and officer personnel will be scattered over thewhole airdrome, but great caremust be taken to keep a unit in
its own area, so as to maintainproper disciplinary control. Byscattering the personnel in thisway danger from bombardment
is minimized and protection
given to the hangars and machines located at the airdrome.
Often airdromes are so locatedthat additional precautions by
way of trenches and abris must
be taken. If the airdrome is very

close to the line great care must
be taken against attack in force
by enemy low flying airplanes,machine guns should be
mounted and personnel properlyorganized for the most efficient
handling of same when occasion
arises. Smoke screens, if possible, should be prepared so that adense form of smoke can be
scattered over the airdrome firom
all directions should an attack ofthis nature be attempted and if
under any special circumstances
it is felt that the security of theairdrome is jeopardized. In thisrespect special guards should bemaintained at all times to beready to handle the situation.
3. Complete mobility of allunits insures the safety of miiterial when a general retreat becomes necessary. This mobility
depends principally on suffic,ientinitial transportation equipment,
and its proper upkeep during thecourse of operation and on themaintenance of mobility in theunit at all times. Offices should
be located in trailers ready to bepulled away on a moment’s notice. Spare parts should be kept
in trailers and in spare trucks,
and movement orders should be
extant at all times and revised
and republished at frequentintervals.

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318

Chapter 111. Shelters

Chapter V. Marches andConvoys
7. (a) Wings, or larger units,
will move by groups.
(b) The removal of a Pursuit
Group from one field to anotherhas primarily three phases:
1. Preparation for themove.
2. The move.
3. Arrival at the new airdrome and the preparation until
day of attack.
8. Preparation for the move.
(a)As accuracy is of paramount importance in any move,
the Group Commanders will begiven his new location and allnecessaq information conceming it, with instructions to makeall arrangements to move-but
to cany on his preparations fully
with only the date, hour, andlocation omitted.
(b) He will, therefore, beChapter IV. Orders
fore flying to the new location
6. The principles laid down in immediately call a meeting of
Field Service Regulations for the Squadron Commanders, Parkissuance of orders apply to the
Commanders, Supply, Transissuance of orders for the Air
portation, Radio, Engineering,Service.
and any other officers who in his
opinion are necessary to contribute to the working out of theoperation, which must beplanned with all the forethoughtpossible. In this meeting allquestions of moment will be discussed which will include:

4. The maximum achievements of any Air Service organization can only be achieved
when machines are properly
housed against the weather andthe personnel is comfortably
cared for. Mobility and defense
against bombardment attacks
must be considered.
5. Airdrome sites should beselected on flat well drained highground, free as far as possible
from mud and dust. Good roads
must lead to them and a railroad
should pass in the vicinity. Highgrass will injure many propellers
and must be removed before
flying begins. Sanitation andkindred subjects will be cared foras prescribed in Field Service
Regulations. See also Paragraphs 2 and 3 in Chapter 2,
Part I.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

31 9

I. Transportation.
11. Supplies-ontinuance ofincoming.
111. Rations for at least ten days
from the present railhead.
IV. Material left on the field fortransport to the rear, to beplaced in charge of an officer sent from the rear forthat purpose.
V. Billeting to be properly adjusted with the local authorities before leaving.
VI. Pulling down of existing inter-camp lines of communication that have been installed by the group.
VII. Camp thoroughly policed
before leaving, etc., etc.

10. The advance echelon will
be in charge of a competent
officer and will be light, consisting only of the personnel nec:ess a y to start inter-camp communication by telephone to establish squadron operations, to locate source of supply, fuel,straw, water, etc., and to set up(d) Upon returning to the
kitchens to take care of arrivals
old field he will see that all these until incoming units are settled.
details are passed on to the
In regard to the above, the park
Squadron Commanders and tocommander will immediately get
those affected.
in touch with the Air Depot of
9. The Move.
the Army of its advanced field to(a) Moving orders will be
insure this supply, determining atreceived from the wing or thethe same time the quantity ofArmy Air Service Commander,
planes on hand, spare parts,
depending upon the tactical use etc., that may be called upon for
to be made of the unit and will
be acknowledged by notifying
the Headquarters as soon as theechelons have started or are all
en route.
(b) The move will be madein four echelons, by squadrons,each echelon of each squadronin charge of an officer.

(c) The Group commander
will then make an aerial reconnaissance to the new airdrome
with the object of returning withfurther particulars of importanceto the move in general.
I. He will establish the routeby which pilots will fly, noting the important landmarks, airdromes, gas stations, headquarters to notify
if forced to land one side or
the other of given points“en route.”
11. He will have inspected the
new field and made noteson the landing facilities.
111. The work of the construction squadron engaged in
the preparation of the field
and upon the constructionof barracks, hangars, etc.
IV. The line of communication
to outside headquarters.
V. The disposition of the hangars on the field and whichsquadrons will occupy
them.

VI. The new Group Headquar-ters and the most suitablelocation.
VII. Men’s quarters and messes.
IX. And in general an idea of
the neighboring units and inwhich way they might be ofassistance to his commandin moving.

1. Advance echelon.
11. Main echelon.
111. Flying echelon.
IV. Rear echelon.

Postwar Review

320

immediate use. Also get in touchwith Parks of adjoining Armies
which may be used as an auxiliary supply.
11. The main echelon will
leave if possible the next day
and will consist of all non-flying
personnel of the Group, less thenecessary personnel fromsquadrons and Headquarters
Detachment, required to provide
meals, planes, make minor repairs on those planes which may
be out of commission, attend tobilleting, policing, etc., etc. All
material that can be taken willaccompany this echelon, which
will leave camp at the designatedhour and will follow the routeaccording to itinerary.
12. The following rules andregulations are to be observedon the march.
(a) All stops for meals orother reasons, other than thosecaused by emergency, will be
regulated on schedule order issued when moving order has
been received, designating timeof departure and route.

(b) Speed of truck train will
be between 10 and 12 miles perhour, regulated by Acting First
Sergeant at head of train in sidecar.
(c) In towns and villages,
distances between transportation
will be 30 feet, every place else
200 feet.
(d) The train will never stop
within a radius of one mile ofany town or village.
(el Acting First Sergeant
may grant soldier permission toenter town but only for a goodreason.
(f) No soldier will descendfrom trucks for any reason whatsoever without permission fromthe N.C.O. in charge of truck.
(9) Each junior N.C.O. will
be in close relation with his senior N.C.O. and privates, and isdirectly responsible to his immediate superior for the discipline
and work of his men.
(h) When train is moving, if
certain trucks are lagging, putthem at the head of the train.
(i) Trailers may be shifted atnoon stops or at evening stops,
provided that such changes willassist in maintaining schedule.
(j) Chauffeurs will work indetails to which trucks are assigned and will be held responsible that their trucks have extra
supply of gas each.
(k) N.C.O. in charge ofeach section will be responsible
to the Acting First Sergeant for
the loading and unloading andplacing of equipment assigned tohis section. He will also be responsible for the discipline of themen fssigned to his section
while en route and until thesquadron is settled in its newquarters.
13. The flying echelon willconsist of all serviceable machines, with their pilots. This
party will leave the field after theadvance echelon has reached its
new station to receive theplanes. Flight formations will be
used and each pilot leaving theFund will be given the necessary information for making thetrip. On arrival at the new stationeach pilot will report to the commander of the advance echelon.
14. The rear echelon will consist of the necessary personnel
required to provide meals, start
planes, make minor repairs onthese planes which may be outof commission, attend the billeting, policing material left on thefield for transport to the rear,
empty gas containers, etc., etc.,
but will terminate their work as
quickly as possible, making surethat the camp is thoroughly policed and in the proper shape tobe taken over by the rear units
or a new organization, and leaving a proper guard for the camp,
should the incoming units be de-Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

layed or the local authorities be
20. Arrival at the new field
unable to furnish the proper pro- and preparation until the day of
the attack. As soon as the Grouptection.
15. It is most important thathas arrived and a hurried inspecthese echelons be properly offition has shown that things are
cered to handle any emergencies progressing nicely, the Group
that might arise and that theCommander will
move be conducted according to(a) Report the arrival in person to the Wing or A.A.S.C.
one prescribed route with aschedule of arriving and depart- Headquarters, as the case may
ing times for the main stoppingbe.
points “en route.”(b)Ascertain the locationsof all units with which he will be
16. Officers heading these
expected to keep in liaison.
echelons will be assisted by another officer and side car who(c) Dispatch the radio andwill bring up the rear and notify
searchlight officers to establish
the head of the convoy of any
relations with the radio andsearchlight P.C.’sand to get inbreakdowns. They will also be
posted on all traffic rules for con- touch with their respective liaivoys, see that all rules of theson officers at A.A.S.C. Headroad are observed and in enter- quarters.
ing congested areas will make(d) Dispatch other liaison
sure that no other moving units
officers, calling upon Squadron
have priority of movements.
Commanders, if necessary, to
17. All drivers will be supplied establish relations with anti-airwith maps and an itinerary of the craft batteries, balloon locations,move in case of breakdowns.
headquarters of adjoining army
18. Each echelon will departunits, corps observation groups,
with ten (10) days’ ration.
in short, developing all sourcesof information which will materi19. A medical officer will acally assist in the efficient funccompany each echelon.
tioning of the group as well as
developing relations which will
include the personal touch soessential in cooperation.
(e) See that all lines fromoutside sources as well as theinter-communicatingtelephonesystems are speedily installed,321

including radio and searchlightinstallations.
(f) Make sure that the o p r ations office of the group is establishing itself with all scale
maps necessary, information
about existing line locations ofallied and enemy airdromes,
anti-aircraft batteries, balloon locations, searchlight locations,etc., and the proper housing of
the radio and power equipment.
(9) Make arrangements fsor
an aerial target, preferably asmall lake at which the pilots
may commence at once to test
their guns.
(h) Visit personally the staff
officers of the A.A.S.C. or Wingof the Army to which attached;
Corps observation groups, either
pursuit group with whom patrols
will be made; C.O.’s of units
working with the army operationon the right or left, etc., etc.
21. Separate squadrons will
move as above, except that theaerial reconnaissance of the newstation and other details of the)Group Commander’sduty will
be performed by the Squadron
Commander.
22. A separate flight will generally move in only three echelons: the advanced echelon, theflying echelon, and the rear echelon. The main body of the flicght
may travel with either the advance or rear parties, dependingon circumstances. The Flight
Commander will make the samearrangements as the Group or
Squadron Commander in the
moves discussed above.

322

Part 11. Corps and Army
Observation
Corps Observation

Introduction
1. The purpose of this Manualis to establish, on the basis ofexperience gained in the Warwith Germany, the general linesof tec:hnical procedure governing
the operations of the air service
assigned to Army Corps in the
Field.
Chapter 1. General
Principles
2. The Air Service of any
Army Corps in the Field is an
auxiliary arm. Primarily it is organized for the purpose of observing the dispositions and activities of the enemy during active hostilities. It further assists
the artillery as a means of fire
control. It partakes of the generalnature of combatant arms in thatits mission forces it from time totime into combat with enemy
aerial forces. The Corps Air
Service may accept but will not
ordinarily seek combat.
3. 'The Air Service of an Army
Corps is under the tactical andadministrative control of theGeneral Commanding the Army
Corps. The troops of the Air
Service of a Corps are Corps
Troops. Corps Air Service troops
assigned for tactical duty to Divisions within the Corps retain
their identity as Corps Troops.

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recommendation of the Chief of
4. The basis of organization
Air Service. Thereafter the Corpsfor the Air Service of an Armybeing a part of an Army, he isCorps is the Observation Aero
designated by the Commanding
Service Squadron. The basis ofGeneral of the Army upon thethe Squadron is the two-seater
airplane manned by a pilot and recommendation of the Army
Air Service Commander.
an observer. The Air Service of
7. The Corps Air Service is
the Corps may number one ordependent, for technical supply
several squadrons.
5. When two or more squad- and replacement of personnel,
upon the Air Service Organizarons are operating together intion of the Services of Supply
the same Corps they are orgaoperating through the medium
nized into an Observation
Group. The Observation Group of Air Depots, Air Parks, andReplacement Squadrons of theis under the immediate command of a Group Commander. Air Service in the Zone of Ad6. The tactical and administra- vance.
8. The details of organization,
tive control of the Corps Air
assignment and designation ofService vested in the Corps
personnel, amounts and kinds ofCommander is delegated totransportation and technicalCorps Air Service Commanderequipment are fixed in the Ta(C.A.S.C.).The C.A.S.C. is an
officer of the Air Service. He is a bles of Organization for the Air
member of the Corps Staff.
Service of an Army Corps, Air
Upon the original organization of Service of the United States
Army.
the Corps he is designated byGeneral Headquarters upon the323

Sherman: Tentative Manual

for The Employment of
Air Service

Chapter 11. The Squadron
9. Tactical and administrative
control of the squadron is vested
in the Squadron Commander.
He is responsible for the tactical,
technical, and administrative efficiency of his organization. He is
assisted by a staff of officers in
the discharge of his duties. Hisprime qualification is leadership.
He is the rallying point of his
command. The degree of success attained by the squadron
will depend very largely upon
the example set by the Squadron Commander. The Squadron
Commander may be either apilot or an observer. in eithercase he is conversant with theessential principles of the workof both.
10. A Squadron Commander
in his administrative duties is assisted hy a competent Adjutant.

Routine administration is supervised by the Squadron Commander but is effected by the
Adjutant.
11. Routine details of squadron supply are administered by
the Supply Officer. The Supply
Officer will ordinarily be placedin charge of the transportation of
the Squadron.
12. In the exercise of his tactical functions the Squadron
Commander is assisted by an
Operations Officer. This officer isordinarily the senior observerpresent. A junior observer may
be detailed as Operations Officer
if, in the opinion of the Squadron Commander, his executive
ability, practical experience, andrecord for devotion to duty warrant his preferment. The Operations Officer is responsible, under the Squadron Commander,
for the direction of the tacticaloperations of the squadron. Hecollects, compiles, and transmits
all tactical information. He assigns tactical missions to the individual pilots and observers of thesquadron. He directs the establishment and maintenance of liaison. He renders, nightly, tohigher authority, a detailed account of the tactical operationsof the squadron for the day. He
acts as tactical advisor and instructor to the pilots and observers of the squadron.

13. The Operations Officer is
assisted in the discharge of his
duties by an Assistant Operistions Officer. The Assistant Operations Officer is an observer.
The Assistant Operations Officer
replaces the Operations Officer
during the latter's absence.
14. The squadron is equippedwith Radio Set capable of s'ending and receiving radio messages
to and from all ground staticlns
within a radius of fifty kilometers.
The Squadron Radio Set is further equipped with an artillery
spark set for receiving airplane
messages on short wave-lengths.
The squadron radio equipment
further consists of airplane typesending sets mounted on each
airplane. A detail of Radio mechanics is a part of the personnelof the squadron. The squad.ron
Radio Section is in charge of theRadio Officer. The Radio Officer
is responsible for the installation
and upkeep of all radio equipment. He is further responsible
for the radio liaison of thesquadron. He is in personal
touch with the Corps and P,rmy
Radio Officers. He is conversant
with Corps and Army Radio
Plans and Regulations and .assures compliance with these. He
assigns wave-lengths to outgoing
airplanes. He is responsible forthe coding and decoding of radio messages and of telegrams.
He receives the test calls of airplanes leaving the airdrome unless relieved of this function by
the Radio Officer of a higher
unit. He investigates into thecauses of airplane radio failures

Postwar Review

324

and establishes liaison with radio
stations of artillery and otherunits with which radio failures
have been reported. Wherever
possible he logs the messages of
all airplanes of his squadron operating on the lines, with a view
to determining, in case of failure,
whether the faulty functioning
originated aboard the airplane orelsewhere. He maintains a complete log of all radio messages
received at his station. He is
assisted by one or more trained
radio noncommissioned officers.
15. The armament of the airplanes of the squadrons is installed, aligned, and maintainedat the maximum of efficiency by
the Armament Officer assisted
by a staff of enlisted mechanics.
The Armament Officer is responsible for the supply, calibration,and loading of machine-gun ammunition. He is further responsible for the supply of signal rockets, signal pistols, and message
dropping tubes. During intensive
operations he is charged with theduty of replenishing aboard each
airplane, immediately the planeis announced available for flight,
the stock of equipment above
noted. Immediately upon taking
station at an airdrome the Armament Officer establishes a machine-gun testing butt, an armament work-shop and storeroom,and erects adequate gun-racks.
He assigns rear turret machineguns to observers by number.
He assures the use of rear-turretmachine-guns only by the observer to whom each gun, or set
of guns, is assigned.
16. The care and upkeep of
airplanes and engines is the dutyof the Engineer Officer. The Engineer Officer is in immediatecharge of the airplane and motor
mechanic personnel of thesquadron. He is responsible forthe instruction and efficiency ofthe mechanics. He is assisted bya Chief Mechanic and three
Chiefs of Flight mechanics.
17. For the purpose of distribution of control the squadron isdivided into three Flights. The
Flight is composed of six airplanes together with the indicated proportion of pilots, observers, and mechanics. The
Flight is commanded by a Flight
Commander. The Flight Commander is ordinarily a seniorpilot. The Flight Commander isnever an observer. The Flight
Commander is responsible to
the Squadron Commander formechanical and tactical efficiency of his Flight. He acts as
instructor and advisor to the pilots of the Flight. When an entire
Flight is detailed for a single mission the Flight Commander isthe leader of the formation. The
Flight Commander is ordinarily
Second-in-Command of the
Squadron.
18. The flight is never an administrative unit. In theory it is atactical unit; in reality it is atechnical group, furnishing a
convenient sub-division for distribution of technical control.
During intensive operations theoperative unity of the Flight cannot be preserved. Fluctuation in
the average availability of machines in the different flights, andvarying qualifications of pilots,
will render assignment to dutyby flight roster inexpedient.
Squadron Commanders will assign pilots to duty in the order ofavailability and according to thespecial qualifications of each, not
Flight by Flight. During periodsof comparative inactivity, however, a duty roster by Flight may
be advantageously employedthus:
One Flight, Duty.
One Flight, Reserve.
One Flight, Off duty.

This arrangement is desirable inthat it permits pilots one day inevery three of complete rest andfreedom from responsibility. lt
has the further advantage of permitting a thorough inspection
and overhaul of airplanes every
third day.
19. Where a single squadronis operating separately with adivision in the field the tacticalorganization becomes similar tothat of the observation group.

Sherman: Tentative Manual

325

for The Employment of
Air Service

Chapter Ill. The Corps
Observation Group
20. The Corps Observation
Group consists of a Headquarters, two or more observationsquadrons, and a photo section.
Medical ordnance, artillery, infantry, and Intelligence personnel are attached.
21. Command of the Group isvested in the Group Commander. The administrative
functions of the Group Commander are similar to those of
the Commanding Officer of any
Army Post.
22. The Group Commander
assures the efficient execution oftactical orders received fromhigher authority. He is responsible for the organization and efficiency of the tactical staff assisting him in his functions. In reality
he is the representative, at theairdrome, of the Corps Air Service Commander. Upon his ability
to visualize the specific demandsof the general situation as communicated to him from higher
authority depends the success of
the Group.
23. The Group Commander is
assisted in his administrative
work by a Group Adjutant. The
Adjutant is assisted in his duties
by a Headquarters Detachmentof enlisted clerks and orderlies.

The functions of the Adjutant are
similar to those of the Adjutant
of an Army Post.
24. Supplies are received by
the Group for the Air Park andalso the Air Park attends to certain repair of not sufficient major
importance to warrant their
being done at the Air Depots.
25. In the fulfillment of his
tactical functions the Group
Commander is assisted by an
Operations Officer. The Operations Officer is an able and experienced observer. The Operations Officer is responsible, under the Group Commander, forthe direction of the tactical operations of the Group. He collects,
compiles, and transmits all tactical information proceeding fromoutside sources to the Groupand all information proceedingfrom the Group to outside units
and headquarters. He transmits
orders for the execution of missions to the squadrons concerned. He actively directs andmaintains at a high point of efficiency the liaison of the Group.
He organizes the Group Operations Room. He prepares theschedule of missions for eachday. He renders nightly to hi9,herauthority a detailed account of
the tactical operations of theGroup for the day. He receives
and supervises the reports of allobservers. He acts as tactical advisor and instructor to the flyi~ng
personnel of the Group.
26. The Operations Officer is
assisted in the discharge of his
duties by an Assistant Opera.
tions Officer.
27. The Radio Section of theGroup is exactly similar in organization to that of the squadron.
The Group Radio Officer, in addition to the duties outlined for
the Squadron Radio Officer, supervises the operations of thesquadron Radio Sections. Wherea separate Radio Section is notdetailed to the Group the Group
Commander may designate asquadron Radio Section in lieu
thereof. The Group Radio Ssction maintains operators at thereceivers throughout the day
and night. It constitutes one of
the surest means of liaison
available

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326

28. A complete motorized
photographic laboratory constitutes a part of the technicalequipment of the Group. The
laboratory, together with its staff
of enlisted experts, is commanded by the Group Photographic Officer. Wherever possible the Photographic Officer is
responsible for the installation ofa photographic barrack, withcomplete apparatus for developing, dying, and printing inquantity production. Airplanecameras are a part of the equipment of the Group Photo Section. 'The installation of cameras
aboard airplanes is a function of
the Photo Section.
29. The Branch Intelligence
Officer is a member of theGroup tactical staff. He is especially trained in the subject ofintelligence of the enemy. He is
assisted by a staff of clerks,
draftsmen, and photo interpreters. He is responsible for thecollection, compilation, and distribution of all intelligence of theenemy gathered by the observers of the Group. He provides
the maps for the use of theGroup. He prepares a special
large scale mimeographed map
for use of observers in marking
the location of troops. These
maps are extremely useful additions to dropped messages reporting the results of infantly

contact patrols. He is responsible
for the interpretation, assemblage, map and file record, anddistribution of aerial photographsof enemy territory secured byobservers of the Group. He
maintains close liaison with G 2of the Corps.
30. The Operations Room isthe tactical heart of the Observation Group. It is the center andsource, for the organizations andindividuals of the Group, of all
tactical information. In it areconveniently displayed detailed,large scale situation maps of theorganization of the Army, Corps,
and Divisional areas. Other
maps show enemy situation andorganizations. Charts, diagrams,
tabulations, orders, bulletins, reports, photographs having atechnical or tactical bearing on
operations are available for immediate access. Work tables,
paste-pots, colored crayons forthe use of observers and pilots
are provided. Maps are on filefor distribution to individuals. A
collection of technical works forreference of flying personnel is
kept at hand. The complete Operations Room is the realizationof effective liaison. Before leaving on missions observers are
instructed to post themselves on
the latest developments and receive final instructions from theOperations Officer or his Assistant at the Operations Room.
Upon returning from missions
observers invariably prepare
their reports here. The Operations Room is the Headquartersof their Operations Officer.

Chapter IV. The Corps Air
Service Commander
31. Technical, tactical, andadministrative control of all sections, units, and groupings of the
Air Service of an Army Corps isvested in the Corps Air Service
Commander. The C.A.S.C. is afield officer of the Air Service.
He may be either a pilot or an
observer. He should be thoroughly familiar with the generalprinciples of the procedure governing the operations of theGeneral Staff. He is a memberof the Corps Staff. In addition tohis administration and tacticalduties, as an Air Service Commander he is the immediate advisor to the Commanding General and the Staff in all matterspertaining to the tactical employment and operations of the Air
Service as a whole. He is at allSherman: Tentative Manual

327

for The Employment of
Air Service

times familiar with the tacticalsituation and may make suchdispositions to meet it as thelimitations and possibilities of thearm he directs indicate, provided
that such dispositions in no way
conflict with instructions emanating from superior commands.
He further transmits and assurescompliance with orders governing the employment of the Air
Service emanating from the Staff
and the C.O. He is responsible
for the efficiency of Air Service
liaison. He is responsible for theassurance of maximum operative efficiency of the units andstaffs of his Command. He is
assisted in the discharge of his
duties by a staff of experienced
Air Service Officers. The post of
the C.A.S.C. is with the Corps
Staff. The office of the C.A.S.C.
is a section of Corps Headquarters.
32. The C.A.S.C. is assisted in
his administrative duties by an
Adjutant. The Adjutant is assisted by a Headquarters Detachment of enlisted clerks andorderlies.

33. Adequate transportationand transportation personnel
must be allotted the C.A.S.C.
for the cartying out of all liaison
duties and establishment ofcourier services. SuDervision oftransportation is ordinarily the
duty of the Adjutant.
34. The C.A.S.C. is assigned
an airplane for his personal use.
It is the function of one squadron of his command to assure
the care and upkeep of his airplane.
35. In discharge of his tacticalduties the C.A.S.C. is assisted by
an Operations Officer. The Operations Officer is an Air Service
Observer of wide active experience and considerable executive
ability. The Operations Officer

PPostwar Review

328

replaces the C.A.S.C. in his temporary absence. He is responsible, under the C.A.S.C., for theissuance and transmission of all
tactical orders. He advises with
the C.A.S.C. in all matters pertaining to the establishment ofadequate liaison system by all
sections, units, and groupings of
the Corps Air Service. He collects, compiles, and transmits, inclose liaison with the Corps andDivisional Staffs, all information,
both outgoing and incoming. On
the basis of the tactical situation
as established by the day’s information and orders he prepares,
under the immediate supervisionof the C.A.S.C. the general Operations Order governing the operations of the Groups for thefollowing day.
36.The Operations Officer of
the C.A.S.C. is assisted in the
discharge of his duties by an
Assistant Operations Officer.
37. Such personal liaison for
the Office of the Corps Air Service as cannot be undertaken by
the C.A.S.C. or his Operations
and Assistant Operations Officers
is assured by one or more Liaison Officers. These Officers are
ordinarily Air Service Observersof considerable active experience It is their duty to visit asoften as may be necessary the
Headquarters and Posts ofCommand of Divisions and Divi-

sional troops and there discuss
and, if possible, solve all tacticalproblems and collect all tacticalinformation having a bearing on
the operations of the Air Service
in their relation to the commands visited. Liaison Officers
render verbal and written reportson their activities to the C.A.S.C.
at the close of each day.
38. It is important that all concerned recognize the Office of
the Corps Air Service Commander as the sole controlling
point for activities of the Corps
Air Service. Ordinarily no orders
emanating from Staff or Line
Commanders requiring compliance by the units of the Corps
Air Service will be transmitted
direct to the Group or to the
Squadron immediately concerned. Orders will be transmitted to the C.A.S.C. or his representative and thence will be issued to lower units. In this connection a comparison may be
drawn for the tactical purposes
between the regiment and the
Air Service of the Corps. In thecase of the regiment, orders requiring compliance by battalions
or companies pass through theRegimental Commander. This
practice is established by military
precedent and dictated by practical considerations. In general
the same precedents and considerations apply to the Air Service.
Situations may and frequently
do arise where it is impossible totransmit orders for the Air Service having their source in Divisions through the office of the
C.A.S.C. Communications may
be interrupted or extreme urgency may interfere and dictate
the more direct and rapid
method. In special situations of
this nature it is permissible for
Divisions to transmit orders direct to the Group. The C.A.S.C.
in this case is informed by theGroup Commander of the receipt of the order and the action
taken to comply. In like manner
all relations of the Group andSquadrons entered into withLine Organizations should betaken cognizance of by theSherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

C.A.S.C. Liaison Officers proceeding to Division Headquarters and Divisional units will report in one way or another tothe C.A.S.C. that visits are contemplated or have just takenplace. The result of visits will
likewise be reported. It is of extreme importance that the
C.A.S.C. be informed up to theminute of all tactical activities of
his command. Obviously, unless
he is conversant with the verylatest data regarding the operations of his command he cannot
intelligently direct future operations nor report accurately on
the accomplishment of work. Incomplete exercise of control by
the C.A.S.C. will result either induplication and the issuance ofsuperfluous orders, or in an under estimation of the needs ofthe situation and a consequent
failure to make adequate
disposition.

329

Chapter V. Assignment andFunctions of Squadrons
39. In assigning Squadrons
the C.A.S.C., upon whom thisduty devolves, will consider thetactical needs of the Corps as aunit, and the needs of the Divisions of the Corps in the line.
Excepting for purposes of training, the Division in reserve will
not be considered. The C.A.S.C.
will ordinarily assign one Squadron to perform the missions required by the Corps as a wholeand one squadron each to theDivisions on the Line.
40. The Corps Squadron has
a zone of action bounded on theright and left by the Corps
boundaries. The depth of thezone is ordinarily never morethan ten kilometers from the enemy territory. The depth is determined in each particular caseby the relative strength of enemy
aerial defenses weighed against
the urgency of demand for information. The Corps Squadron ischarged with the duty of securing all photographs of enemy
territory, whether photographs
are requested by the Corps orDivisions. It is charged with suchgeneral surveillance of thecourse of battle across the entire
Corps front as the situation may
demand it. It controls and adjusts the fire of the Corps artillery
and observes any preparations
for enemy counter attack.
41. The Division Squadron ischarged with the duty of surveillance of the Divisional Sector to

the depth of flight of the Corps
Squadron. It is further responsible for establishing liaison between the Divisional Commander and the troops in thefront line by means of low-flying
Contact Patrols. It reports the
position of the enemy’s advanceelements and his dispositions tor
defense and attack. It controls
and adjusts the fire of the Divisional Artilley. Observations
made by Divisional planes andreported to Divisional Headquarters are repeated to Corp5,
Headquarters.
42. All Squadrons report toheadquarters of units to which
they are assigned the locationsof enemy batteries observed inPostwar Review

330~

action and the location and density of friendly and enemy shellobserved. Special reconnaissance for the location of enemy
batteries in action are ordinarily
carried out by airplanes of theCorps Squadrons but may berequested by Divisions of the
Squadron and assigned to them.

Chapter VI. General
Observation and Principles
43. The observation airplane
is not designed for combat. It
is charged not only with securing
information but with the duty ofreporting on its observations.
Observation planes will avoid
combat whenever possible,
thereby increasing their chanceof returning safely to report on
information gained. They will
avoid all danger from enemy
aerial defenses whenever suchaction will not materially interfere with the accomplishment of
the mission. In like manner theCommand will carefully weighthe urgency of need for information against the risk involved in
obtaining it. Where the risk overbalances the need the Air Service will not be called into action.
It must be borne in mind that the
Air Service is a costly, highly
trained arm. Replacements ofpersonnel and equipment are
difficult and effectives must be
husbanded in times of relative
inactivity in order that maximum
service may be counted onwhen greater need arises, Airplanes must never be utilized
when balloons will give the results desired. As a means of liaison between the troops and theCommand the Air Service
should be called upon only
when all other means fail or are
virtually certain to fail. Never use
aerial observation when terrestrial observation is sufficiently efficient. Local actions will never
be deemed sufficient reason forordering the accomplishment ofcontact patrols.

Chapter VII. Information
44. With the Air Service, aswith all other Arms, intelligent
and successful action is based
upon accurate and complete
tactical and technical informationof the military situation. The
Corps Air Service itself is fundamentally organized with the object in view of gathering informa?ion of the enemy for communication to the commands andServices concerned. The Air
Service, on the other hand, isitself dependent upon outside
sources for such information as
will enable it to carry out its

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

functions in the most efficientmanner. Collection and communication of information will constitute a prime preoccupation of
Commanding Officers.
45. Information may be considered under two general
heads, (a) Information of the
Friendly Situation, (b) Information of the Enemy Siiuation. Information of the Friendly Situation includes (a) Situation on the
ground, (b) Situation in the air,(c) Plans for future operations(1)on the ground (2) in the air,(d) Liaison plans. Information of
the enemy ordinarily available
includes, (a) Situation on the
ground, (b) Situation in the air,(c) Plans for future operations.
46. Sources of Information of
the Friendly Situation:
1. On the GroundCorps and Division Staffs,
Commanders of Combat
Units.
Field Orders: G-3, Army
Corps, Division.
Daily Operations Orders: G-3,
Army, Corps, Division.
Liaison Reports: G-3, Corps,
Division.
Station Lists: G-3, Army,
Corps, Division.

Situation Maps:
Artillery Command, Army,
Corps, Division.
G 3 : Army, Corps, Division.
Plans of Employment: Artillery,
Corps, Division.
Observation Post Bulletins: G-3,
Corps, Division.

2. In the AirArmy and Corps Air Service
Commands.
Neighboring Air Service Units.
Station Lists Army Air Service.
Bulletins: Army Air Service.
Operations Reports: Army andCorps Air Service.
Operations Orders, Army Air
Service.

3. Plans for Future OperationsField Orders: G-3, Army,
Corps, Division.
Operations Orders: G 3 , Army,
Corps, Division.
Plans of Employment: Artillery,
Army, Corps, Division.
Maps to Accompany Any
Above: corresponding
sources.
Air Service Plans: Air Service
Command and Units.

4. Liaison Plans and Data-Road Liaison: One-way Road
Maps and Orders, G-I,
Army Corps, Division.
Plans of Liaison to Accompany
Field Orders:
Telephone.
Telegraph.
Visual Signals.
Rockets.
Panels.
Flares.
Projectors.
Radio.
Pigeons.
M.D.S.
Runner.
Airplane Dropping
Grounds.
Fixed Regulations Governing
All Forms Liaison: Confidential Pamphlet No. 2 (Revised) G.H.Q., A.E.F., June
1918, ‘Liaisonfor All
Arms.”

Fixed Regulations Governing
the employment of Aerial
Observation in Liaison With
Artillery: Confidential Pam..
phlet No. 80 (Revised)
G.H.Q.,A.E.F., May 1918,“Aerial Observation for A dley.”

Means of Secret Liaison:
Codes: G-2,Corps.
Airplane Codes: Plan of Liiiison and Fixed Regulations
as Above.
Secret letter map coordinates:
G-3, COWS.
Service Code: Chief Signal Officer, Corps.
Telephone Code Name Dire<:tory: Chief Signal Officer.

Postwar Review

332

47. Sources of Information of
the Enemy Situation:
1. On the Ground-

49. The Field Order embodies
a resume of the friendly andenemy situation and establishes
the strategical and tactical plan
Field Orders: G-3.
of action which will be followed
Operations Orders: G 3 .
by the troops of Army, Corps,
Liaison Reports: G-3.
Observation Post Bulletins:
and Divisions over a consideraG-2.
ble period. It includes annexes
Summaries of Intelligence:
giving information regarding theG-2.
activities of special arms and
G-2.
Interrogation of Prisoners: G-2.
Interrogation of Prisoners: services. The general Plan for
Enemy Order of Battle Maps:
G-2.
the employment of the Corps
G-2.
Interrogation of Captured
Air Service during the period of
Aerial Photographs: G-2 andAviators: Air Service,activity presumed is based upon
Air Service.
G-2.
the tactical provisions of the
Air Service Reports:
Balloon Observation ReA m y Air Service.
Field
Order. The Field Order isports.
Corps on Right.
Friendly Anti-Aircraft Artil- communicated to the entire
Corps on Left.
flying personnel of the Corpslev.
Own Corps.
Air
Service in order that pilots
Observationsof own Air
Balloon Observation Reports.
Service Units.
and observers may have a thor2. In the Airough understanding of, and take
3. Plans for Future OperaEnemy Airdrome Maps: G-2,
anintelligent interest in operationsArmy (Thru A.A.S.C.)
tions in which they are toSummariesofIntelligence.
Bulletins:
participate.
Interrogation of Prisoners.
A m y Air Service.
50.The Daily Operations OrCorps on Right, Air Serv48.
Stress
is
laid
upon
the
der,
G3, embodies a fesumk of
ice of.
Corps on Left, Air Service personal contact element in col- the friendly and enemy situationlecting information of every sort. at the close of the day andof.
Frequent conferences by Air
establishes the tactical plan ofService Officers with other offiaction for the following day. The
cers of the Aerial Army and with activities of the Corps Air Service
Staff and Unit Commanders ofconform to the tactical demands
for aerial cooperation with theCorps and Divisions will often
troops as set forth day by day inelicit special information, not
the Corps Operations Order.
available from other regularsources, which may be advanta- The G3 Operations Order is
not necessarily, however, thegeously acted upon.
sole basis for the planning ofdaily Air Service operations.
51. Liaison Reports, G 3 ,andObservation Post Bulletins, G 2 ,are hurried reports rushed fromthe forward areas by the most
rapid means of liaison available.
They ordinarily demand immeOperations Reports:
Army Air Service.
Air Service, Corps on
Right & Left.
Neighboring Air Service
Units.
Balloon Reports.
Liaison Reports: G-3.
O.P. Bulletins: G-2.
Summaries of Intelligence:Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

diate action, if any, by the Air
Service. They form the basis forthe ordering of specific missions,
not for the formulation of extended plans of action. Theyfrequently warn the Air Serviceof radical changes in the terrestrial or aerial situation requiringa reversal or readjustment of set
plans, an intensification of general activity, or the adopiion of
additional precautionary measures. Their rapid transmission
from the Office of the Corps Air
Service Commander to theGroup is at times of vital importance.
52. Station Lists and Situation
Maps are the basis of personal
liaison. They show the locationof the units with which liaison isrequired.
53. The Plan of Employmentof the Artillery is the basis of theplans for the accomplishment of
Air Service artillery missions.

333

54. Accurate information of
the strength and method of employment of neighboring friendly
Air Service objectives, whenchecked against the reported
aerial strength and aggressiveness of the enemy, permits an
intelligent estimate of the lengths
to which Corps Observation may
be safely carried. Knowledge ofthe offensive and defensive Pursuit patrol schedule in the sector
will permit the accomplishmentof routine Corps Observation
missions at those hours of the
day when aerial support andprotection is present on the lines.
DEsemination of information regarding the operations of neighboring Observation Groups will
promote interest and encourage
emulation in the ranks of theflying and executive personnel.

55. Army Air Service Bulletins, Operations Reports, andOperations Orders contain information of enemy aerial strength,
tactics, and equipment. Army
Operations Orders ordinarily establish, by authority of the Army
Air Service Commander, thebroad tactical principles regulating the direction of Corps Air
Service operations.
56. Personal liaison and courier runs are routed in accordancewith one-way road regulationsof Army, Corps, and Divisions,established in orders emanatingfrom the G
1 Sections of various
Staffs. Illustrative maps ordinarily
accompany these orders.
57. The system of liaison established by the Corps Air Service is governed by the Corps
Plan of Liaison and fixed regulations above noted. Secret messages are encoded and decodedby means of the codes and keys
above noted. Headquarters arecalled by code name in accordance with the Code Telephone
Directory prescribed by the
C.S.O. Map coordinates aretransmitted by a system of secretlettering prescribed by higher
authority.

334

58. Possession of information Chapter VIII. Liaisonof the enemy is a prime requisite
62.Effective Liaison involves
to the intelligent direction of aer- the establishment of mutual unial operations, permitting conderstanding, rapid communication, and effective cooperation
centration of observation on
those points where the reaction between the Air Service of theCorps, Air Services ot otherof our own forces will be mosteffective, or on points whence
Corps, other branches of the Air
Service, and other Branches andenemy a'ctivity is apprehended
and where such activity may be Arms of the Service to which theforestalled by appropriate dispo- Corps Air Service stands in sometactical or technical relation. Insitions based upon information
formation is gathered by means
furnished by the Air Service.
59. Information of our own or of Liaison.
63. Liaison cannot be carried
the enemy situation having its
source in the Air Service is ordi- too far. Its scope is limited only
narily communicated by theby the means possessed.
C.A.S.C. direct to the G 2 Sec64.Liaison is carried out by
the following means:tion of the Corps Staff. G 2 isFrequent personisl visits andresponsible for its transmission
conferences.
by the most rapid means ofPermanent Air Slewice Liailiaison available to those units
son Officers stationed at imporconcerned.
tant tactical centers of informa60.All information collectedby officers of the Corps Air Serv- tion.
Mechanical mearts of longice which has a bearing on theoperations of the Air Services of distance communication:neighboring or higher units is
Telephonetransmitted by the most rapid
TelegraphRadiomeans of liaison available from
Visual Signals
Air Service to Air Service, withMotor Couriers
out reference to G 2 .
Airplane Couriers
61.All tactical and technical
Pigeons
information, whatever its nature,
Mounted Couriers
is of direct or indirect interest toRunners
all flying, technical, and executive commissioned personnel of
65.Liaison by personal conthe Air Service. Its rapid transtact, besides elicting information,
mission and thorough dissemipromoted mutual understanding
nation is of prime importance.
and sympathy between the Air
Service and other Branches of
the Service. It is useful in acquainting other Servic'eswith thepossibilities and limitations ofSherman: Tentative Manual

335

for The Employment of
Air Service

military aviation. It forms the basis for the laying of specificplans, prescribing of methods,
and establishment of means andmethods of rapid communication. Within the Corps, personal
liaison will be frequently affected
to include down to Infantry Brigades and Artillery Batteries.
66. The permanent Liaison
Officer is ordinarily posted with
Division Headquarters andCorps Air Service Headquartersof the Corps on right and left.
The permanent Liaison Officer
at Division Headquarters is therepresentative of the Divisional
Squadron and of the C.A.S.C.
He collects and transmits,through the C.A.S.C., to theGroup and Squadron, all tacticalinformation available. He is inclose touch with the Divisional
Artillery Brigade Commander.
He transmits, through the
C.A.S.C., all requests for missions. He is the immediate advisor on Air Service matters of
the Divisional Command andStaff. He is responsible to the
C.A.S.C. for the establishmentof a suitable airplane message
Dropping Ground at Division
Headquarters. He interprets,
whenever necessary, dropped
message and clears up
obscurities.

67. Establishment of adequate mechnical means of longdistance communication is aduty of the C.A.S.C. He must
always be furnished with a direct-line telephone circuit fromhis office to the office of theGroup Commander. The running of telephone lines is a function of the Corps Signal Officer.
68. A special Air Service Motorcycle Courier connects the office of the C.A.S.C. with theGroup. Orders, reports, bulletins, and routine administrative
papers are transmitted bycourier.
69. Carrier Pigeons, Airplanes,and Mounted Couriers are used
as a means of liaison when othermeans fail. Runners are employed over short distanceswhere road communication by
motor dispatch is impracticable.
70. The Air Service system ofliaison includes the establishments at Corps, Division, Brigade, Regimental, and Battalion
Headquarters of suitable Dropping Grounds for the receipt of
airplane written messages. Signal
Officers are responsible for theestablishment and maintenanceof Dropping Grounds. The location of Dropping Grounds is ordinarily selected by an Air Service Offficer and, wherever possible, the Radio Station is established nearby. A detail of enlisted men is on duty at the

Dropping Ground throughout
the hours of daylight. The
C.A.S.C. prepares a map showing locations of all Dropping
Grounds in the Corps Area for
the information of Pilots and observers of the Group. Distinctive
panels, as prescribed in “Liaison
for All Arms” (see chapter on
Information) denote at the sametime the locations of headquarters and the emplacements ofDropping Grounds. Dropping
Ground panels are displayed by
the detail on duty upon the callof the airplane. Calls are sent bysignal rockets, short bursts ofmachine-gun fire, or radio.
71. Liaison includes the takingof any measures which serve toenlist the interest of troops in thework of the Air Service. Divisional Squadrons may display
special distinctive insignia on thewings and fuselage of airplanes
permitting troops to recognize
planes of their own Division. The
morale of troops in action is appreciably raised by the knowledge that “their own plane” isflying over them and assisting
operations. Where troops constantly observe planes known to
be of their own command inaction a feeling of interest andcamaraderie with the Air Service
is developed. Cooperation of thetroops during infantry contact
patrols is a direct result. The
dropping of newspapers and cigarettes from airplane to the troops
in advance areas is likewise ameans of liaison, promoting, as itPostwar Review

336

does, mutual confidence andsympathy. Visits by pilots andobservers to advance positions
and the front line during battle isa valuable means of promoting
sympathy and understanding
between the troops and the Air
Service. In like manner visitsfrom officers of combatant
troops to the airdrome are encouraged. Line officers visiting
the airdrome gain an intimate
first-hand knowledge of the workand viewpoint of the Air Service
and disseminate the information
obtained upon return to theirunits.
72. The Corps or Division
Commanders may utilize airplanes for communicating totheir troops in advance areas.
Orders and citations calculated
to raise the morale of the forces
engaged in battle may be mimeographed and dropped inquantity along the lines.
73. Airplanes communicate
with the ground by radio androcket signalling and by dropped
message. Conventional rocket
signals are fixed in Planes of
Liaison of Armies, Corps, andDivisions. Secret Radio codes foruse by airplanes are similarlyprescribed. All airplane radio
messages are in code.
74. Ground troops communicate with airplanes by means ofsignal panels, rockets, bengal
flares, and electric projectors.
Regulations governing the use ofground signals are published in
Liaison Plans and the Pamphlet,“Liaison for All Arms.”

Chapter IX. Security
75. The Chapter on Securityof the Airdrome, Part I, applies
in principle and detail to Corps
Observation Stations.
76. During active operations
over the lines, Corps Observation Planes are largely dependent for security upon the protection afforded by the Pursuit Effectives operating on the sector.
Pursuit protection is of two sorts,(a) Extended Barrage, and, (b)Close Protection.
77. Pursuit barrage methods
are prescribed by the Army Air
Service Commander. Ordinarily
formations of pursuit planes patrol the Army and C o w sectors
at scheduled hours and forstated periods during each day.
Certain formations are charged
with the duty of clearing the airof enemy aircraft and protecting
our own aircraft at low and medium altitudes. Other formations
fly at higher altitudes and forbid
the approaching of our lines byenemy aircraft. To assure thesecurity of observation missions
the Corps Air Service Commander prescribes the accomplishments of routine missions at
those hours of the day whenpursuit barrage is scheduled tooperate. Close protection ofCorps Observation Planes

whose mission carries them deep
into enemy territory is secured
by personal arrangement between the Group Commandersof Corps and Pursuit Groups.
78. Where close protection
from Pursuit Units is not available Corps Observation Planes
detailed for deep-flying photographic or visual reconnaissancemissions assure their own security and are dispatched in formations of vaying numericalstrength, the number of planes
depending upon the reported
strength and aggressiveness ofenemy pursuit aviation in the
sector.
79. Security of Corps Observation Planes flying !within thefriendly lines is further assured
by the protection afforded fromenemy pursuit by the Anti-aircraft Defenses of the Sector.
80. Lacking other protection
the Corps Observation Plane isdependent for security upon its
own armament.
81. Security decreases in direct proportion to the increase inaltitude and distance from thefriendly lines. Enemy pursuit

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

337

aviation rarely ventures into thefriendly lines at an altitude of lessthan three thousand feet. Corps
Planes observing from their own
lines at low altitudes are relatively secure both from enemy
aircraft and enemy artilley.
82. In conducting observation
the intelligent Corps Observationteam seek the maximum of security. Missions are carried out
at the lowest altitudes and shortest flight ranges which permit ofaccurate observation. The enemy lines are ordinarily penetrated by the single plane only
for short periods and after careful survey of the air. Repeatedshort sorties over enemy territoy, although they prolong thetotal duration of the flight, decrease the danger of attack andare therefore preferable to a single extended flight at a distancefrom the friendly lines. Observa-

tion of Artillery fire, excepting at to hostile pursuit. Broken cloudbanks are never approached byextreme ranges during hazythe single plane where it is possiweather, can be accomplished
ble to avoid them.
by the experienced observer
without crossing the enemy
Security from surprise attack islines. Observation of artilley fire dependent upon the constantat long range is more easily
vigilance of pilot and observer
accomplished from high thanand upon ability of airplanefrom low altitudes. For purposes teams to distinguish enemy airof security it is preferable to fly
craft from friendly by the silhouhigh within the friendly lines
ette. Pamphlets showing the silthan to fly low in the enemy
houettes of enemy and friendly
lines, for the reason that, though types of planes are published by
the danger of encounter is inthe Air Service Intelligence Section from time to time. These
creased, the plane, if attacked
over its own territory, can resort are made available to all flying
to rapid manoeuvres while losing personnel and are carefully studied and learned.
altitude and thus drop into security under cover of friendly
ground machine-guns andartilley.
83. The use by observers offield-glasses is an added measure of security and is encouraged. The use of field-glasses
permits accurate observationfrom a safe distance within thefriendly lines and the rapid identification of distant airplanes.
Long practice is required for theeffective use of field-glasses. The
ability to employ them is a rareand valuable asset amongobservers.
84. A sky completely overcast
by even cloud strata affords
added security. Sun-glare iseliminated and the area to be
surveyed in watching for hostileaircraft is limited. The silhouettesof aircraft within the range ofvision stand out sharply against
the clouds. Broken cloud groupings decrease security. Scatteredbanks of clouds afford ambush

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86. Security from enemy antiaircraft artilley and machine-gun
fire is afforded by effecting slightchanges in course and altitude atshort intervals. Where artillery
fire is so dense as to assume theaspect of a barrage a long steep
dive is resorted to, the divebeing continued until the lowest
bursts observed have passed
overhead. The plane then climbs
rapidly changing course at thesame time.

Chapter X. Orders andReports

87. The Corps Air Service
Operations Order is based upon
the tactical situation as set forth
in information gathered by the
C.A.S.C., through liaison channels. The Operations Order isissued by the C.A.S.C. at theclose of each day and prescribes
the general and specific lines ofactivity of the Observation
Group for the following day. It
contains:

90. Distribution of the Operations Order:
Group Headquarters.
Army Air Service Commander.
C.A.S.C., Corps on right andleft.

corps c. of s.
Corps G 2 and G3.
Commanding Genlerals, Divisions of own Corps.

91. Operations Reports areprepared for the C.A.S.C.by theGroup Operations Officer under
the supervision of tho Group
Commander. They contain aa. Friendly tactical situation and narrative of the salien,t features
plan.
b. Enemy tactical situation and of each day’s aerial operations.
They contain a statistical tabulapresumed purposes.
tc. General mission of the Corps i n of each day’s operations, by
squadron, showing number andSquadron.
d. General mission of the Divi- kinds of flights accomplished;sional Squadrons.
number of flying hours; number
e. Specific missions.
of photographs secured; number
f. Special information affectingof forced landings; number ofoperations.
planes crashed; numlber of comg. Any admonitions, advice, enbats; number of casualties;
couragement.
planes and personnel available
88. The Operations Order isfor the following days operaforwarded to the Group by
tions. Totals for the entire Group
M.D.S. If there is doubt that it
follow squadron stati:jtics. For
will arrive at Group Headquardistribution see Par. !20.
ters in ample time it is communicated in advance by telephone.
89. In preparing the Operations Order the C.A.S.C. willadvise with the Corps Chief ofStaff and the Assistant Chiefs ofStaff, G 2 and G 3 .

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for The Employment of
Air Service

92. A written report of eachvisual reconnaissance mission
accomplished is furnished byeach observer (a) in a dropped
message to the P.C. of the Division for which the flight is made,and to the Corps P.C. in every
case, and (b) in a carefully detailed narrative, prepared after
landing, under the supervision of
the Group Operations Officer.
93. The dropped message report is complete but concise.
Skeleton phrasing is permitted.
All information secured, both
positive and negative, dealing
with the friendly and enemy situation, is included. The tendency of the inexperienced ob-

An open-air P.C.

server is to omit in the dropped
message minor details of timeand place. All details will be
included, no matter how insignificant they may appear to theobserver. Locations will be accurately described by coordinates or filled in on an attachedmap. The message, if dropped
at the Corps P.C. by a Divisional
Plane, will state in conclusion
whether or not a similar message
has been dropped at the Division, this in order to assure G 2of the Corps that transmissionof the information in the bodyof the message is or is not necessay. In preparing forms forthe writing of dropped messages
observers will duplicate, andthus save time, by the use ofcarbon paper firmly fixed between two or more message
blanks, attached by means ofrubber bands, thumb tacks, ortape, to a stiff backing. Photo-graphic and artiiley missions are
not reported by dropped message. Their results are reported
by telephone liaison from theGroup.
94. The full narrative observer’s report prepared at theGroup tells the entire stoy of themission, including information ofroute followed; visibility; and duration of flight; enemy road andrailway activity observed enemy
aircraft observed; with description of types or silhouettes anddistinctive markings; enemy balloons in ascension, giving location; enemy and friendly artiiley
activity, locations of enemy batteries in action; density and location of friendly and enemy shellobserved; locations and activities
of friendly and enemy troops;
general aspect of enemy sector,
carefully calling attention to any
lack of activity where activity
might have been expected; fires
and explosions in friendly andenemy territory. Where conclusions are drawn they are carefully labelled as such and are notstated as absolute fact. Observers are encouraged to draw conclusions.
95. Inexperienced observers
often omit the following essential
data in reporting on missions:
Negative Information of Enemy
Sector.
Exact time of observations.
Exact locations by coordinates.
Direction taken by Enemy
Troops and Train movements.
Approximate strength of columns observed on roads.
Direction of flight of enemy air-craft.

Postwar Review

340

Careful supervision by Corps
Air Service and Group Commanders and their Operations
Officers is the sole means of
training observers in the carefuland complete preparation ofreports.
96. Report of artillery adjustments is made by the observerat the Group. The usual flightnarrative describing general conditions under which the flight
was accomplished is followed bya report of number of rounds
fired and number of bursts observed and by an estimate of theresult obtained. Failures arecarefully reported, stating
reasons.
97. The photographic reconnaissance report includes theusual narrative with a statementof number of plates exposed andestimate of area covered. Failures and reasons thereof arereported.

98. Report of encounters andcombats with enemy aircraft is
made, by pilot and observer inconference, on a special Combat
Report Form prescribed by the
Army Air Service Commander.
Report includes narrative of theincidents of combat; states theapproximate number of rounds
fired by the pilot and observer;states effect of fire on the enemy
and effect of enemy fire. Time,
locality, and altitude are carefully
noted. Number And type of enemy planes encountered, a description of their characteristic
markings, and comments on thetactics employed are embodied
in the report.
99. The Observer’s Reportis the sum and substance of Air
Service Information. Its contents
are transmitted to all concernedby the most rapid means of liaison available.
100. General principles governing the composition and issuance of Orders and Reports for
the Army promulgated in Field
Service Regulations apply to Orders and Reports of the Air
Service.

Chapter XI. Marches andConvoys101. The principles governing
the conduct and regulation ofMarches and Convoys for all Air
Service units and Groupings aretreated in Chapter V. Part I of
this Manual.
102. The Corps Air Service
Commander and his Staff movewith Corps Headquarters.

Chapter XII. Participationin Combat Observation
103. During the inactive periods in trench or stabilized warfare the Air Service of the Corps
is charged with the following
missions:a. To photograph to adepth of ten kilometers the enemy’s position.
b. To locate by the flash theexact emplacements of enemy
batteries.
c. To adjust the fire of ourown artillery on sensitive points
and calibrate our guns.
d. To maintain surveillanceof the enemy and assure protection of increased activity indicating preparation for hostile attack.
104. During a friendly offensive the Air Service of the Corps
is charged with the fcillowing
missions:
a, b, and c, as in paragraph103.
d. To maintain surveillanceof the enemy at low isltitudes,
reporting on concentrations oftroops for local stands andreactions.

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Air Service

e. To observe enemy roadmovements for indications of thebringing up of extensive reinforcements.
f. To find and report to the
Command and the artillery thelocation of the friendly front lines
by means of low-flying infantry
contact patrols.
g. To control the friendly
barrage.
h. To seek and report on all
indications of a general enemy
retreat.
i. To seek fugitive targets,
i.e. massed enemy troops, convoys on roads, and to adjust
rapid zone fire on such targets.
105. During a general retreatof the enemy and pursuit byfriendly forces the Air Service of
the Corps is charged with thefollowing missions:a. To seek and report on
the location of the enemy’s rearguard, notifying the heads of thefriendly pursuing columns aswell as the Command.
b. To discover the enemy’s
main axes of withdrawal.
c. To report on the positionof the friendly advance elements
at frequent intervals.
d. To report to the heads offriendly pursuing columns any
concentration of enemy troops
for local stands or reactions.

e. To discover the enemy’s
main line of resistance.
f. To photograph the enemy’s main line of resistance.
106. During an enemy offensive met by stubborn friendly
resistance the Air Service of theCorps is charged with the following missions:a, b, c, as in paragraphfollowing missions:a. To report on the positionof the friendly rear guard andthe general road aspect of thefriendly retreat.
b. To report to the friendly
rear guard and to the Command
the position of the advanceguard and main body of the
pursuing hostile forces.
c. To effect liaison between
103.
the Command and the right andd. To maintain constant
low-flying surveillance of the en- left flanks.
107. Under all conditions theemy and report in advance his
Corps Air Service holds one,preparation for each successive
two, or three airplanes at theeffort to break through thedisposal of the Corps Comfriendly lines.
mander for the accomplishment
e. To observe enemy roadmovement for indications of the of special missions demanded
by developments in the tacticalbringing up of extensive reinsituation.
forcements.
108. Photographic missions
f. To locate enemy cantonare requested as need arises byments, camps, dumps, axial
roads, and other suitable targets G-2, G-3, or the Artillery Command. During stable trench warfor the destructive and harrassfare tactical maps are based on
ing fire of the friendly artillery.
g. To find and report to the data furnished by Corps andArmy aerial photographs of the
Command and Artillery the loenemy’s territory. Photographs
cation of the friendly front line
during war of movement are ofduring and after each enemy
little value in studying the enemy
effort to break through.
organization but serve to ach. To control the friendly
quaint the Command with debarrage.
tails of terrain. Oblique photoi. To adjust rapid zone fire
graphs of the enemy’s front-line
on fugitive targets and concentrations of enemy troops prepar- defenses in either stable or open
warfare are extremely useful.
ing for assault on the friendly
They are distributed down topositions.
106.During a general friendly include commanders of infantry
platoons and serve to acquaintretreat and pursuit by hostile
the Command and troops withforces the Air Service of thethe nature of the terrain andCorps is charged with thePostwar Review

342

defenses immediately confronting them. During stable trench
warfare photographic missions
are a matter of daily routine tobe accomplished by the Corps
Air Service upon evey day offavorable weather. During open
warfare photographic missions
are only occasional and are requested to clear up map obscurities or most other specific demands for information. The
preparation of the photographic
mission involves communication
to pilot and observer, by
C.A.S.C., of the limits of territoy
to be covered. The work is carried out by formations. The
usual altitude from which Corps
photographs are secured is 3000
meters. It is sometimes impracticable to send formations ofplanes on photographic missions. In this case the mission iscarried out by a single planeflying at great altitude, 5000 to
5500 meters. The security of theplane is increased by its inconspicuousness at extreme altitudes and the rapidity withwhich it can cover an extended
area from great heights. In thecase of certain types of planes(examples of which are theFrench Salmson and Breguet)
which retain their qualities of
speed, climb, and manoeuverability at extreme altitudes, security is further afforded by theability of the plane, relying on
its qualities of speed and climb,
to out-distance attacking enemy
pursuit. During periods of unsettled weather photographic missions are ready to take the airfrom early morning. Instant advantage is taken of any break inthe clouds. Under these conditions Pursuit protection will not
be counted upon owing to theloss of time involved in meetingthe protection at the rendezvous.
During midsummer, sunlight issufficientfor the securing of photographs between 8 and 16
o’clock. Photographic missions
during the spring and autumn
months are ordinarily executed
between 10 and 14 o’clock. In
winter good photographs are secured only between 11:30and
1230 o’clock.

109. Location of enemy batteries in action by the flash is aroutine mission of Corps Observation Units during all situations
excepting that of general friendly
retreat. Battey flashes are best
observed just after day-breakand just before night-fall. They
are rarely picked up, even by
the vigilant observer, in broad
daylight. Where it is lknown orsuspected that a concentrationof enemy batteries h i a been effected within certain specific limits bounding a ve y restricted
area a single reconnaissanceplane charged with the sole mission of locating exactly the
flashes of batteries in that area
will ordinarily meet with success.
Surveillance planes searching
the sector for miscelhneous information are only moderately
effective in locating batteries.
The plane seeking to locate batteries in action should fly at thelowest altitude permitting observation and should remain as far
behind the friendly lines as thework will permit. Once theplane’s presence is detected by
the enemy, batteries will ordinarily cease fire. Information of enemy batteries in action is communicated to the Divisional andCorps Commands immediately
by radio and later confirmed bydropped message. Enemy batteries in action may be effectively counter-battened by theassistance of the airplane reporting them. For this purpose theartillery assigns suitable counterbatteries. Liaison with these batteries is then effected. When

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

arrangements are completed between the batteries and the Air
Service the counter-batteries areprepared to receive radio callsfrom all planes of the Corps
during the hours of daylight andto adjust fire on targets reported,
without delay. It is a function of
the C.A.S.C. to assure wherever
possible the assignment of suchcounter-batteries and to provide
for adequate liaison in order thatthe minimum of failures may
result. Counter-batteries thus arranged for become, during active periods, fugitive-target batteries. Theoretically, all batteries
are ready to receive airplane
calls and adjust at all times.
Practically, better results are obtained by assigning only a few
batteries for this type of workand carefully perfecting liaison
arrangements. All Corps and Divisional observers are suppliedwith the necessay information
for calling counter-batteries andconducting adjustments, in accordance with the arrangements
effected.

343

110. Detailed instructions foradjustment of artilley fire bymeans of airplane observation
are contained in Confidential
Pamphlet No. 80 (Revised)
G.H.Q., A.E.F., May 1918,“Aerial Observation for Artilley”: Successful adjustment ofartilley is largely dependent
upon carefully accomplished liaison. The best work is achieved
after a visit by the observer tothe battey with which he is toconduct fire. The adjustment
should be arranged by conference between the observer andthe battey commander, detailsof method, time, panel and radio
signaling, being thoroughly discussed and a complete understanding and agreement reached.
Before leaving on the mission
the observer notifies the battey
by telephone or radio that he isabout to start. In preparing themission the observer equips
himself with a large-scale mapbearing coordinates in secret letters and showing the location of
the target. If an aerial photograph of the target is available
this will be attached to the map,
properly oriented and squared
off to scale. The photographrenders exact location of bursts
observed extremely easy. Batteries which do not respond to theradio call of the plane may becalled by dropped message. inlike manner batteries whose calls
are not known to the observer
may be notified that an adjustment is required and all necess a y data for opening fire andestablishing radio liaison may be

included in the written message.
The battey replies by panel signals whether or not the work
requested can be undertaken
and what method of fire will be
used (see “Aerial Observation
for Artilley ” ) . Liaison between
the airplane and artilley is at all
times complex and difficult ofperfection. The conditions governing its effective establishmentchange with the tactical situationand cannot be laid down by
any rule which will cover allcases. Corps Air Service Commanders will be called upon touse great energy and ingenuity
in assuring effective cooperation
between the Air Service and the344

Artillery. This will be particularly
true during active periods in warof movement.
111. Surveillance of the enemy is a routine mission ofCorps and Divisional Squadrons
during all tactical situations. The
Corps Squadron patrols the entire Corps Front reporting on
the general activity of the entire
sector to a depth varying fromfive to ten kilometers. The Divisional Squadron patrols within
the boundaries of the Divisional
Sector reporting in detail on all
activity observed. Effective sector surveillance implies an accurate knowledge of the terrain by
the observer. The observer

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should be familiar with the latest
information on the tactical situation in order to concentrate his
attention on those points which
are of most interest to the Command. Sector reconnaissances
are increased in frequency as
combat activity or preparation
for activity increases. During actual offensive or defensive operations they may overlap, establishing an unbroken watch on
the movements of the enemy.
Surveillance planes are fittedwith radio equipment and areprepared to call the artillery into
action whenever need arises.
112. Control of the friendly
barrage may be advantageously

conducted by airplane. Where
the barrage extends across theentire Corps front and is participated in by both Corps andDivisional Artillery, the Corps
Artillery is observed by a planefrom the Corps Squadron; theDivisional Artillery is observedby planes from the Divisional
Squadrons. Observers controlling barrages are provided inadvance with maps showing thebarrage schedule, minute byminute. Control consists in reporting by radio to the Corpsand Divisional Artillery Brigade
Headquarters any failure of thebarrage to play accurately ando n schedule time, giving approx-

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Air Service

imate location, density, and Caliber of bursts observed to beinaccurately placed or off schedule. Close adjustment of the barrage is not undertaken.
113. The general principles
and specific regulations governing the conduct of infantry contact patrols for the purpose of
staking the friendly front line areestablished in “Liaison for All
Arms.” The contact patrol is a
mission of the Divisional Squadron. The contact patrol is mosteffectively carried out at an altitude ranging between 25 and100 meters. Troops frequently
disregard the call of the plane todisplay panels. From these altitudes troops can be plainly distinguished and identified by thecolor of the uniform. Where
troops do not show panels observers will not report the location of the “front line.” They

Oboerver watching infantry
movement. below.

will report the location of the“most advanced friendly elements observed.” The Infantry
panel is the only guarantee ofthe exact location of the frontline. Where troops are seen but
no panels are displayed upon
the call of the plane, there isroom to suppose the actual frontline is still further advanced.
Even though the observer canlocate no friendly troops beyonda certain point he will not report
the location of the “front line”
until panels are shown. The infantry contact plane will neverproceed directly from the airdrome to the point which theadvance of the friendly troops ispresumed, by schedule, to havereached. It will proceed to thatpoint where the most advanced
elements were last definitely reported. Having reached thispoint the plane will assure itself
by observation of movement of
troops on the ground that theadvance has continued. It willthen gradually extend its observations farther and farther to thefront, working back and forthacross the sector, until the observer can distinguish no friendly
troops beyond. The line is calledat this point. If no panels areshown the plane will carry observations somewhat deeper butwith extreme caution. When satisfied that the limit of the friendly
advance has been reached andnoted the observer will immediately report to Division andCorps Headquarters by dropped
message. The contact patrol observer will bear always in mind

the possibility of enemy counterattacks and will constantly watch
for enemy troop concentrations.
Where counter-attacks appear
imminent the observer will dropa message to that effect to thefront line elements most nearly
concerned. He will then call the
fugitive target battey and adjustneutralizing zone fire over the
terrain where concentration has
been observed. Contact patrols
frequently locate enemy machine-gun nests. Where hostilemachine-guns are observed thefront line troops are notified ofthe danger by dropped message.
Contact patrol planes may assist
the advance of friendly troops
by opening fire on enemy machine-guns, silencing them until
they can be captured.
114. In directing the operations of the Air Service the
C.A.S.C. maintains liaison with
the Corps and Divisional Balloons. He is assisted in this function by the Corps Balloon Group
Commander. The C.A.S.C. willassure himself at all times that

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346

airplane missions do not duplicate the work accomplished, orin course, by the Balloons. He
will establish as a principle thatwork which Balloons can accomplish will not be undertaken
by airplanes. This will usually
apply to the accomplishment ofartilley missions. Certain areas
in enemy temtoy are obscured
to Balloon Observers by inequalities in the'terrain. The areas
not defiladed by the Balloons
decrease in number and extent
with the increase in altitude.
Those areas closed to Balloon
Observation at varying altitudes
will be sketched in on a map forthe use of the Corps Air Service
and Group Commanders in determining what missions properly
fall within the province of the
Balloons during vaying conditions of visibility. A copy of the
Balloon defilade map is posted
for the information of flying personnel in the Group Operations
Room.

Chapter XIII. Shelter
115. The principles governing
shelter of troops in the field,
established in Army Field Service Regulations, apply to thetroops of the Corps Air Service.

Chapter XIV. Information
117. information of ihe en-

emy and our ground forces isessential to the proper tacticaloperation of any observation
unit whether it be an independent squadron, a group, or a
A r m y Observation
larger organization.
118. The collection, preparaIntroductiontion, and circulation to the
116.The Army Observation
smaller units of the command ofunits function as an organ o,f thethis information is the duty of thehigh command. They are placed Army Air Service Commander.
at the disposal of the General
Every Commander of a large
Staff of the Army and their activ- unit, wing, or group will see thatities conform to the orders issued all essential information whichby the General Staff. The Chief
he receives is circulated to thefunction of the Army Observacomponent elements of his comtion units is to keep under conmand. It is the duty of all Comstant surveillance the dispositions manders at all times to act on
and movements of enemy
the principle that the collection
forces. This consists of the reof information without its circulaconnaissance, both visual andtion is useless. Information propphotographic, in depth, of theerly circulated to Observation
entire Army sector. Their prime
Units has an important moral
object being the gathering of in- effect upon the flying personnel.
formation, it is necessary that
It is to be remembered that exthey operate in spite of enemy
cept when actually in the air,
aerial opposition. However, enaviators are removed from thegaging the enemy's air forces in sights and sounds of the battlecombat must be avoided as far
field and only by a thoroughas possible except when the na- information system can the varture of the mission demands and ious possibilities of the military
the chances of gain are comsituation be brought home tomensurate with the risk involved. them. Unless these possibilities
are made clear it is impossible toobtain the maximum efforts fromthe personnel.
119. The Operations Officersof the various units (separate
squadron, group, or wing) areresponsible for the supply of347

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

their respective units with:(a) Maps of 1/20,000
scale covering the entire sector.
This map should be colored sothat the prominent topographicalfeatures are easily referred to.
(b) Maps of 1/50,000
scale covering the entire sector
for use by observers. It is ofparamount importance thatthese maps be colored so as tomake reference easier.
x (c) Maps of 1/20,000
scale covering the entire sector
showing, by means of conventional symbols, all the important
artillery objectives. These maps
are printed at frequent periodic
intervals by the second sectionof the General Staff (G-2).
(d) Maps of 1/200,000
scale covering the entire sector
for use by pilots and observers.
x (e) Maps showing the organization and occupation of thesector by ground troops. Thismap shows the location of thedifferent friendly divisions in line.
(f) Daily enemy Order ofBattle map showing the location,
both known and probable, of all
enemy divisions both in line andreserve.
x (9) A map showing the location of all known enemy airdromes. This map should indicate, by conventional symbol,
whether the airdrome is occupied or unoccupied.

x ( h ) A map showing thelocation of all enemy balloons.
x (i) A map showing the precise location of all the known
enemy antiaircraft batteries andtheir calibre.
(j) A map showing the enemy areas that are defiladed
from the different friendly balloons. This is valuable in that the
Aeroplane observers can pay
particular attention to thoseareas that are protected fromobservation by balloons.
x (k)A map showing enemy’s system of railroads andthe railheads.

x (I) A map showing themain roads over which traffic isheaviest. These are indispensable to observers so as to know
beforehand where to look fortraffic.
(m) A map showing thelocation of all friendly airdromesin the sector of the Army Air
Service Commander. The pilots
and observers should be familiar
with the location of all theseairdromes so that in case of aforced landing if they should become lost the breaking of aplane might be avoided.

348

x (n) Silhouettes, photographs, and tables of performance of all known types ofenemy airplanes will be prepared or secured. These are essentials and must be studied
carefully by the flying personnel.
(0)Charts showing thelighting systems of enemy airdromes and signals for planes atnight.
(p) All photographs available of the enemy airdromes,
dumps, towns, etc. It is well toarrange these in alphabetical order in books so that easy reference can be made to them andwhen new photographs aretaken they can be compared.
Also,it is necessary that these beat all times kept at the disposalof the pilots and observers forstudy, as it enables them to recognize them when flying overenemy temtoy. Stereoscopic
views of all these points should
be prepared and placed at thedisposal of the pilots and observers for study.
Items marked x are preparedand distributed at frequent periodic intervals.
120. Charts, diagrams, andmaps should be supplementedby:(a) Army Summaries of Intelligence, prepared by the second section of the General Staff((3-2). It is of paramount importance that these be supplied tothe squadrons and there be at

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the disposal of the pilots andChapter XV. Liaisan
observers as it is difficult to Pre121. Owing to the absolute
vent these officers fromsuffering necessity for cooperation bea feeling of the other arms of the tween the various Air Service
service unless these summaries
units under the command of theare furnished to them.
Army Air Service Commander,(b)Air Service s.u~~maries and also the various arms of theof Intelligence will be prepared
Service, great importance mustin the Headquarters of the Army be attached to the preparation of
Air Service Commander to sup- means of communication for replement the A m y Summaries of ceiving and transmitting informaIntelligence. These should cover tion and orders. A rapid andall subjects relating to the enemy complete comprehension of the
Air Service and especially deal
entire situation has decided inwith the types of planes and offluence upon the success of theusing them as h m e d from all
operations. For mutual compredifferent sources, such as: rehension of plans, possibilities,
ports from agents, statements of and limitations nothing can be
Prisoners and captured Orders
substituted for personal contact.
and documents of all sorts.
122. The exchange of per(c) The A m y Air Service
sonal visits between pibts andOperations Orders Prepred inobservers and officers of otherarms stationed nearer to thethe Headquarters of the Army
Air Service Commander, show- front will be encouraged as
ing the activities Of all Air %Vke much as possible. All Air Service
Units under his command.
Commanders in the field will ex(4All available documents change personal visits with offiand Pamphlets concerning thecers of corresponding ri3nk andenemy's forces, Paying Particular will see that their subordinates
attention to the information con- of all ranks come into close
cerning the enemy's aerial
personal contact with officers offorces.
corresponding rank in the diviIt is one of the duties of the sions in the line and in reserve.
in the anti-aircraft artillery. both
Operations Officer of all observation units to attend to the de- machinegunners and heavier
tails of the circulation of informa- gunners. in Field and Heavytion within the command. It is
Artillery, with balloon observers
imperative that the observations and all other Air Service units.
and experiences over the lines of both bombardment and pursuit
evey pilot and observer be
as well as observation.
made a ~ e s s i b l eto eveY other123. In order that a maximum
Pilot and observer in the organi- return may be assured from thezation in the most inviting man- observation units, it is necessaryner, without delay.

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that the best possible means ofcommunication be established,
as follows:(a) By direct telephonic installationsto the Headquarters of
the Army Air Service Commander.
(b) By telephonic liaison
with all the Air Service Units
under the command of the Army
Air Service Commander.
(c) By liaison by radio withthe station established at Headquarters, Army Air Service Comman der.
(d) By dropping messages
from aeroplanes on the dropping
ground established near the
Headquarters Army Air Service
Commander.

124. Liaison by aircraft is still
to be developed as a means ofreporting promptly the information obtained concerning the
progress of the battle but withthe development of wireless telephones for communication between planes and between
planes and the ground the utilization of aircraft as a means ofcommunication will be more andmore emphasized.
125. Evely observation groupwill be equipped with sufficient
supply of telephones and wire
to insure the establishment of its
internal liaison, the Group Operations Officer and Headquarters being directly connectedwith the several squadron Headquarters and Operations Offices.
The establishment of telephonicliaison from the Wing Headquarters to the Group Headquarters
and from the Headquarters of
the Army Air Service Commander to the Wings and separate groups of his command is
the duty of the Army Air Service
Commander. He will arrange
with the Chief Signal Officer ofthe Army in the field for the
installation of these telephonelines before ordering those units
to their new stations.

126. In order to insure close
cooperation between pursuit andobservation planes while in the
air it is necessary for the GroupOperations Officer of the Observation Group to inform the Operations Officer of the Pursuit
Groups as to the time of departure of the missions, the numberof planes in the formation, thealtitude at which they are going
to work, the probable time ofcrossing and recrossing the lines
and the route to be covered inorder that the pursuit patrols
separating over the same areaat the same time may be notified
and pay particular attention to
the safety of these formations.
127. The Operations Officersof the various units are responsible for the interrogation of all
pilots and observers immediately
upon their return from missions
and for securing a full, accurate
and intelligible report of all observations of interest to the General Staff. This report should betransmitted by him by telephone, if possible, direct to the
Headquarters of the Army Air
Service Commander.

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3 50

Chapter XVI. Combat
General Principles
128. The object of tactics, as
employed by Army Observation
planes, is to avoid combat withenemy planes, to allow the obsewers to obtain the desired information and return to the airdrome with it. The Army
Observation planes do not accept combat otherwise than as adefensive measure. Definite tactics to be employed by formations of biplace observation
planes have not been adopted.
It depends entirely upon theability and initiative of the Flight
Commander, the pilots comprising the flight and the conditions.
Owing to the fact that the Army
Observation unit operates far
beyond the line of friendly pursuit patrols, it is necessary thatthey depend largely upon theirown means of defense. However, even though formations ofbiplace observation planes are
employed the co-operation between pursuit patrols and observation informations when thelatter are operating within rangeof the pursuit patrols should be
as close as possible. The numerical strength of a formation depends entirely upon the depth
to which it must penetrate theenemy's territory and the known
aggressiveness and numericalstrength of the enemy's airforces. Missions must never be
attempted by individual planes
except when the weather conditions are such that formations
flying is rendered impossible.

Formations
129. During the hours of daylight, the weather conditions permitting, the missions assigned to
the Army Observations Squadrons will invariably be carriedout by formations. These formations should not be too large. A
formation of 4 planes, flying indiamond formation, has beenfound very effective as it is easily
controlled by the leader and it isvery flexible. All formations musthave the following characteristics:(a) Simplicity.
(b) Manoeuverability.
(c) No dead angles.
(d) Concentration of fire to therear.
(e) Compactness.
(f)Each pilot must be able tosee the leader,130. Airplanes in formation
are numbered as follows:
1
2

3
4

3 The copy contains a typographical error, a parenthesis for what evidently was tob e a second digit This perhaps was a zero
but Circular 76, p 29. gives 25, which fitswith the other distances in the formation

Number 1 is the leader andflies at the lowest altitude, numbers 2 and 3 fly at the !same
altitude, about 25 meters higher,
25 meters to the rear, and 25
meters to the right and left, of
number 1, respectively, whilenumber 4 closes the diamond,as it were, flying about 25 [?I
meters3 above numbers 2 and 3
and about 25 meters behind,keeping directly behind number
1.
131, In the event that the formation is attacked, the formationmust be kept as compact as possible. The maximum security will

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment
of Air Service

be maintained by keeping theclosest possible formation-15
to 20 meters between planes. In
this manner the blind angles of
one plane are covered by theother planes of the formation,
thereby preventing the enemy
planes from closing in to shortranges without exposure to concentrations of fire from the different planes. The usual tactics
employed by the enemy pursuit
planes against formations of biplace planes is to remain at longranges and firing short bursts toconfuse the pilots and observers
so that they will break up theformation. It is fatal for any
plane to become detached fromits formation as it will then be
subjected to the concentrated efforts of the enemy pursuit pilots
and will be easy prey for them.

351

132. In order that there be
mutual understanding between
the pilots and observers of theflight it is necessary that theyknow the following:(a) The various signals for communication between planes.
(b) The mission to be accomplished.
(c) The territory to be covered.
(d) The altitude at which they
will fly.
(e) Their relative positions in theformations.

133. The Flight Commander
being responsible for the tactical
employment of the formation
while in the air must take allnecessary precautions to preventthe formation from being surprised by enemy planes. He will
pay particular attention to thesun and to the clouds that are
above the level of the formation,
behind which enemy planes may
be lurking.

Single Planes
134. Missions are carried out
by single planes only when theatmospheric conditions such as
low hanging clouds and mist
prevent the employment of formations, and the early reconnaissance, when darkness forbids the employment of formations. When single planes areoperating under or above theclouds it is an easy matter for theplane to enter the clouds, which
afford excellent protection, in theevent of being attacked by enemy planes. However, operating
at such low altitudes, far beyond
the enemy lines, under and in
the clouds, requires the employment of pilots and observers of
exceptional ability. They mustknow:(a) The terrain, thoroughly.
(b) The direction and speed of
the wind at the different altitudes.
(c) How to navigate, in theclouds, by compass.

352Part 111. Pursuit
Introduction
1. Pursuit Aviation has for its
object the destruction of the enemy air service and the protection of our own observation
aviation. When opportunity offers it will take part in the battleon the ground, inflicting maximum casualties upon and weakening the morale of the enemy’s
ground troops. Whatever later
developments may appear, up
to the present time the basis of
the Air Service has proved to bethat portion devoted to observation. But observation aviation’sv e y existence depends upon a
powerful, well trained and aggressive pursuit aviation. That
our own observation airplanes
and balloons may be [protected]
and may feel and see that they
are protected, while the enemy’sobservation aviation is destroyedand driven back from the line ofbattle, pursuit aviation is
employed.

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Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

353(e) A map showing the location of all airdromes in the
sector of the Army Air Service
Commander, the Corps and Divisional sector boundaries of allunits in line, the location of ourantiaircraft units, balloons andother Air Service organization.
(f) A diagram or chart of
telephonic liaisions within the
Army area.
5. The charts, diagrams andmaps should be supplementedby:(a) Army Summaries of Intelligence, prepared by G 2 . It
is of the utmost importance thatthese be circulated down to include Groups and wheneverpossible should be circulated toinclude squadrons as it is difficult
to prevent the pilots from suffering a feeling of detachment andisolation from the operations of
the other combatant arms unlessthese summaries are furnishedto them.

Chapter 11. Liaison(b) Air Service summaries
of Intelligence will be prepared
6. Owing to the rapidity ofin the Headquarters of the Army movement of pursuit airplanes
Air Service Commander to sup- and the influence that they canplement the Army Summaries of exercise both in the battle forIntelligence. These should cover supremacy of the air and theall subjects relating to the enemy fighting on the ground, great imair service and especially deal
portance must attach to thewith the types and quantities ofpreparation of means of comhis airplanes and his methods of munications for the transmission
using them as learned from pris- of information and orders. A
oners, captured orders and doc- rapid comprehension of the enuments of all sorts.
tire situation has a decided influIt is one of the duties of theence upon the success of the
Operations Officer of all pursuit operations.
units, under the Commanding
7. For mutual comprehension
Officer, to attend to the details of of plans, difficulties and limitathe circulation of information
tions nothing can be substituted
within the command. It is imper- for personal contact. The exative that the observations andchange of personal visits beexperience over the lines of ev- tween Air Service pilots and alle ry patrol leader and every pilot elements stationed closer to thebe made accessible to every
front will be encouraged asother pilot in the organizationmuch as possible. All Air Service
without delay.
Commanders in the field will exchange personal visits and will
see that their subordinates of allranks come into close personal
contact with officers of corresponding ranks in the Headquarters and the Divisions in line
and in reserve, in the antiaircraft
artillery, both machine-gunners
and heavier gunners, with balloon observers and with all air
service units, both bombardment
and observation as well as
pursuit.

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3 54

8. In order that a maximum
return may be secured from our
pursuit aviation, and in orderthat the enemy may not throw
an overmastering force of pursuit
airplanes on the line at certain
hours of the day, it is all important that close liaison be maintained with the front at all times.
This liaison should be perfected
so that every Group Commander can be informed without
delay of the number, type, altitude and direction of flight of all
enemy airplanes and formations
approaching our front lines inthe sector for which his group is
responsible. This liaison may beestablished:(a) By direct telephonic installations to forward observing
posts established at intervals onor near the front lines, in chargeof Air Service officers.
(b) By telephonic liaison
with the anti-aircraft artillery observation posts. Messages relative to enemy aircraft activity
from the anti-aircraft artillery to a

4 . Direction finding.

pursuit group should have priority over the army telephonelines, because Air Service Units
practically alone can be utilized
to influence an action in progress.
(c) By liaison by wire withthe radio-goniometric4stations.
(d) By liaison by radio
either with forward observing
posts established by the Air
Service or with radio equippedforward observing posts of theanti-aircraft artillery.
9. Liaison by aircraft is still tobe developed as a means ofreporting promptly upon the
progress of fighting in the air.
With the prospective development of wireless telephones forcommunication between formations and between airplanes andthe ground the utilization of aircraft as a means of communication will be more and more emphasized.
10. In addition to immediate
reports upon the number, type,
altitude and direction of flight ofenemy airplanes, daily reports
should be made to the Group
Commander upon the size, altitude and methods of operationof all elements of the enemy airservice. These reports must be
prepared by Air Service officers

detailed by their Group Commanders to keep watch from theground upon the enemy airservice from advance observation posts.
11. Every Pursuit Group will
be equipped with a sufficient
supply of telephones and wire to
insure the establishment of its
internal liaisons, the Group Operations office and the several
squadron operations offices
being directly connected. The
establishment of telephonic liaison from the Wing Headquarters
to the Groups and from the
Headquarters of the Army Air
Service Commander to theWings and independent Groupsof his command is the duty of
the Army Air Service Commander. He will arrange with theChief Signal Officer of the Armyin the field for the installation ofthese telephone lines before ordering these several Iieadquarters to new stations.
12. In order that our pursuit
aviation may make safe the workof our observation aviation,
close liaison must be maintainedwith all elements of the observation air service, and the pursuit
group commander should haveat all times as complete a knowledge as possible of the number,
altitude and route of all observation airplanes working in the sector for which his goup is responsible. This liaison will also
be helpful in keeping track of the
movement of our advanced infantry and cavalry elements andin the selection of targets forground straffing.

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355

for The Employment of
Air Service

13. While the prime duty of
pursuit aviation is fighting in theair, pursuit pilots will occasionally be called upon for special
reconnaissances and will makevaluable observations from time
to time in the course of theirpatrols. This will not be allowed
to interfere with their combatant
operations.
14. The squadron operations
officers are responsible for theinterrogation of all pilots upon
their retum from flights and for
securing a full accurate and intelligible report of all observations of interest to the higher
command. This report should besubmitted immediately by telephone, if possible, throughchannels to the Army Air Service
Commander, who will transmit
it to the Second Section, General Staff (G-2).

5. There was an error made In numberlng theseven paragraphs whch follow. The correct
numbering resumes with oaraaranh 23

Chapter 111. Combat
I. General principle^:^5. The guiding principle in
Pursuit Tactics is to seek out
and destroy enemy airplanes.
Contact is made with the enemy
by chains of formations, fotmations and by individual machines. Before passing on to
study the tactics used by each, it
is to be remembered that the
primary object of the aerial force
working with an Army is to keep
the enemy under observation. It
performs what was once thechief function of the Cavalry,and preventing the enemy observing our dispositions and maneuvers, seeks to keep him under surveillance at all times. Theeyes of the Air Service are observation airplanes and balloons.
But the arms and weapons are
the pursuit airplanes and without
the latter two-seaters would beblinded by the enemy air forces
to such an extent that their missions would fail and they would
have to resort to fighting tactics.
6. The pursuit elements of the
Air Service have as their prime
function to keep an area equal
in depth to the distance overthe enemy lines which is allottedto the Corps and Divisional Observation squadrons clear of enemy machines. In other words
the aerial front line must be
maintained, at minimum, asmuch in advance of the line ofbattle on the ground as therange of the Corps Artillery. Pursuit machines, therefore, specialize on the fighting, and of necessity have to adopt certain tactics,
varying with the type of machine
used, with the activity of thesector and with the altitude atwhich they are working, but certain principles are universally
applicable.
7. The flight formation, limited
in size by the number of machines that can be maneuveredby a single leader, at present
five or six, is the tactical unit ofpursuit aviatign. When morethan one flight is to be used forany given purpose, emphasis is
to be laid upon the value, fromthe point of view of esprit, ofusing the flights of a squadronecheloned together in a chainof formations.

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11. Tactics of Single Machine.

(a) The unit of the formation.
8. A great deal of attention
has to be given to the tactics ofthe single machine and it might
be argued that this amounts tonothing more than tactics of theindividual pilot. This is indeed afact except that a great deal depends on the make of the machine in use, but there are many
principles in individual aerial
combat tactics that apply to all
pursuit planes, which mustclosely be followed.
9. The individual pilot in aformation must be a disciplined
subordinate officer with confidence in his leaders. A single
machine must be part of theteam. The team must be the unit
to engage the enemy. It must be
remembered that the pursuitmachine has no defense after asurprise other than its maneuverability and for this reason
only pilots of the longest experience and the greatest ability
should be permitted to engage inindividual patrols and then only
on rare occasions. Up to thepoint where the pursuit machineis attacked its defense consists ofthe eyes of the pilot plus its
speed. It is quite possible for asingle machine to get out of very
awkward predicaments provided
they are seen by the pilot in timeand proper tactics are employed.
When once attacked the pursuit
pilot depends upon his ability toshoot and maneuver for success.
The only safe protection fromattack the single-seater has be-

sides the eyes of the pilot isaltitude, but the higher the pursuit machine gets the less likely
its pilot is to see any enemy
machines below him and thefewer machines will be encountered. The object of the attack of
a formation is to break up theenemy group and resort to single
combat without losing the chainof responsibility, so that throughout the combat the mental unityof the flight is not lost. When thisstage is reached the individual
pilot must close in and at close
range deliver accurate and effective fire. Under no circumstances
must he be drawn away fromthe rest of his flight, no matter
what the results of his fire havebeen. He must carefully avoid
being drifted over by the windfarther into enemy territory, or
pulled away by any ruse whatsoever. If he is separated from his
formation he must fight constantly, relying on being able tofly back home at low altitude if

necessary, remembering that it isfatal to dive straight away. Evenin case of engine failure the aggressive spirit must be maintained until the ground isreached.
(b) When Single Machine
Permissible.
10. At times opportunity presents itself for individual pilots toperform a mission. On days
when the weather is very bad,for instance, it sometimes becomes necessary for individualmachines to cross the lines at
extremely low altitude and penetrate to certain objectives forthe purpose of gaining information of great value. At othertimes the enemy will seize theopportunity afforded by very
bad weather and use especiallydesigned armored machines forstraffing the infanty at a v e y
low altitude. On misty days it issometimes impossible to attack
these enemy airplanes except[by] individual machines, flying
as before, at an extremely low
altitude and in this case all theelements of success called into

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service"Take-off''
in formation.

357

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service by formation leader must
be employed. Surprise being thegreatest asset, the pilot should,
if possible, close in on the enemy machine by flying throughthe clouds a portion of the time,making allowance for speed ofenemy machine and other possibilities so that the surprise will
be complete and the personnel
destroyed by a heavy cone ofwell directed fire at short range.
Another occasion when it is permissible for a single machine to
be sent on a mission is when asingle enemy airplane penetrates
far behind our lines and must
be destroyed at any cost. At
such a time it is well to attack
the enemy with individual machines rather than wait to dispatch a formation and run therisk of the enemy machine getting back home safely with theinformation gained.

Postwar Review

358(c) Single-seater vs Singleseater.
11.When a single-seater attacks a single-seater, his ideal
objective is to get directly behind
his opponent’s tail at very close
range where tanks, engine andpilot are in line and where nocare has to be taken as to deflec-tion in aim. If the element of
surprise has not been effected
the only manner of getting thisadvantageous position is bymaking the enemy dive away. A
good pilot, however, will neverdive away and the fight resolves
itself into a battle to gain thehigher position. A pilot mustnever allow his machine to lose
altitude or fall into a spin. This
calls for perfect flying sq that justthe right moment of rudder isused at the proper time and sothat the fight can be moved atwill toward supports or awayfrom enemy reinforcements, as

the case may be. Above all, apilot’s attack must be vigorous
and if he should be so unfortunate as to be outnumbered
greatly, he must maneuver cooly
but in a very erratic course until
he can damage or destroy oneof the enemy machines without
himself being trapped. He must
do his best to keep all enemy
machines in sight and never permit an enemy pilot to align theaxis of his machine in his direction. It is quite possible for one
good single-seater to engage as
many as three, four or evenmore enemy pursuit machinestII
1-leaders plane with strip of canvas
on ground for identity/ e - --

Another methodof forming.

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1Sherman: Tentative Manual

359

for The Employment of
Air Service

Method of forming
fives or multiples.

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Postwar Review

360

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for 20 minutes and get backsafely to his lines. To a certain
extent the type of airplanes will
govern the particular maneuvers
employed.
(d) Single-seater vs twoseater.
12. Attack by a single-seateron a two-seater machine is, ofcourse, very much more difficult.
It should be made in cooperation with another machine, butwhen this is not possible, thepilot should aim at closing in toshort range, delivering his first
burst before the observer is able
to reply. When two or moremachines attack a single-seater it
is necessary by zigzag courses,
relying on the extra speed, toclose in despite the observers fire
and at close range deliver hot
bursts. When close in under theenemy's tail, make it a practice
to turn opposite to the way hedoes. In this way it is practically
impossible for the enemy observer to train his gun on you.
(e)Decoy work b!y the Single-seater.
23. There is another casewhen individual flying can beresorted to and this is in decoy
tactics. Usually a machine goesout alone but in the sight of alarger formation. Sometimes itmeets at a predetermined point
at a given altitude and time. andthere the formation conforms to
the movements of the decoy.
The best advice for a decoy
machine under these circumstances is to follow an erratic

course. It should never fly
straight at all. The pilots should
be scouring the sky systematically and thoroughly at all times
and use his head to obtain thegreatest results by decoying theenemy down on him or attrading the enemy's attention fromthe higher friendly formation
above. It is essential in decoying
tactics that the utmost co-operation and confidence exist between the leader of the patrol
and the decoy so that there will
be no chance of them gettingout of touch.

English uol de group.

c

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362

Postwar Review

111. The Single Formation(a) General.
24. Good formation flying is
the greatest essential in pursuit
work. The greatest results cannot
be obtained by units that do not
do good formation flying. A unit
with this asset is certain of success and will attain the greatest
point of efficiency. The first essential is to get a good leader;the second, is to maintain therelative positions of the machines; the third, is liaison andcooperation between machinesof the formation and last but notleast is the chain of responsibility
in the flight.

- - 4-b-

Camouflage attack.

25. The normal formation
should comprise a double echelon in depth and in altitude, theplanes at the rear being highest
up so that they can take advantage of their altitude to close inon the patrol leader by diving, incase of necessity. The normal
formation is that of an inverted"V", the patrol leader at thehead, number two and number
four on his left rear, number
three and number five on his
right rear. Number two andDive slowly*--+

Run away apparently scared
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Will climb and make sharp turnto attract enemy planes from rear.

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Enemy planes

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

number three should be between 100 and 200 yards apartand about fifty yards above andbehind number one. Number
four and number five should be
between two and four hundred
yards apart. The shape of theinverted “V’, whether the angle
is to be acute or obtuse, will
depend upon the visibility fromthe particular type of airplane inuse. When several flights areused as a chain the same principle is employed. The guide forthe chain of formations flies at
the head of the leading flight,
one flight behind, above and to
his left, the other behind, above
and to his right. Where chains ofmore than three flights are employed each echelon of threeflights will use a similar formation
and while guiding on the leader
will also maintain its own
formation.
(b) The leader and his responsibilities.
26. A successful patrol leader
must possess the complete confidence of his flight, and all thatthat entails. While the leader isunder definite orders always, agreat deal depends on his ability
to engage the enemy at the mostopportune moment, retaining his
disposition of machines andlaunching his attack or maneuvering his formation as occasion
demands. He will be well advised to allocate certain positions
to pilots and then maintain themon successive patrols insofar as
possible. Communication between machines must be simple
but certain, and he can obtain363

this by signals with his wings orby firing Very Lights. The prospective development of thewireless telephone will be ofgreat assistance in increasing theefficiency of patrol leading. Eachmachine in itself must be in aposition to signal to the leader.
In short there must be a chain of
responsibility running from theleader through the deputy leader
to each successive machine of
the formation to the last man sothat positions and liaison may be
maintained under a competentleader, no matter what circumstances arise or what disaster befalls the unit. After much practice, that state of proficiency will
be reached where a formation
can be worn down to two machines but it still maintains its

unity as a formation with its
leader and the second machine
working in cooperation ready for
combined effort.
(c) Fighting tactics.
27. The actual fighting methods of the formation are muchthe same as for the chain offormations, with the exceptionthat the leader, in attacking andmeeting the attacking line of machines, usually breaks off his individual attack and climbs to
support the rear machines or tohold himself in readiness to get
his formation together again in ahurry. It is essential to demand
this of the leader in spite of thetemptation he will have to closein on his adversary. He will often
be under the necessity of sacrificing a personal victory to thebetter judgment indicated. In an
attack by a formation every effort should be made to obtain
unity to the last. For this purpose
it is well to attack the highest andrearmost enemy machines, if attacking from above, of if frombelow, the straggler should beselected for concentration. Eachman of the formation should be
able to surmise the attentions of
the leader and in this way concentrated effort is more apt to beattained. In order that a perfectunderstanding may prevailPostwar Review

364

Lufbery show.

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among the pilots of every flightthey will live together on the
ground and will be encouraged
to talk over at all times the situation which have been or are
likely to be encountered in the
air. If it is impossible to close inon a formation owing to its superior speed or altitude, the next
best alternative is to wait until
the formation endeavors tomake a turn and then launch theattack with great vigoux. The enemy can be broken up much
more easily at this point than if
he is flying straight away [and]has advantage of the height andspeed. Great care in the attack
must be exercised by all leaders
to see that the formation itself
does not straggle, because on
going down on the attack altitude is lost so quickly by thefront line the supports often getout of touch, with disastrous results, amounting, as it does, to a
split in the attacking formation. It
is found in practice that it iseasier to keep a formation of
pursuit machines intact in acombat than larger two-seatermachines provided the pilots are
sufficiently well trained. This isdue undoubtedly to their superior maneuverability.
(d) On the type of machine.
28. Formation flying depends
so much on the machines in usethat it would be unwise to pass
on without calling attention to
the fact that the tactics must, ofnecessity, alter with the type ofmachine employed. The ideal
machine for this work of course
is one that is maneuverable, andSherman: Tentative Manual

365

for The Employment of
Air Service

that can be throttled down,6 andat the same time made to fly
level at any speed by means ofan adjustable tail or other contrivance.' With a machine of thisnature, formation flying is very
simple, as one can fly slowly
until the actual combat or until
necessity arises when by opening out the throttle the necessary
speed is obtained to launch theattack. Some machines, however, have motors that cannot
be throttled and tails that cannot
be adjusted so formation flying
becomes a greater problem.
IV. Chains of Formations.
(a) The simple chain.
29. Aerial fighting has developed to that stage where it isnecessary to send out formations
and chains of formations for theaccomplishment of missions.
Mutual cooperation and support
is essential. It has become necess a y , therefore, to adopt a unit
formation. The size of this unit
varies and is determined by thesimple fact that a flight leader
cannot control more than a limited number of machines in the
air at one time with the greatest
efficiency. It has become necessary therefore, to send out
chains of formations. Sometimes
this chain consists merely of two
6 The rotary motorsused bn some planes had
no throttles and were controlled mainly by turning the m o m on and off by means of an ignition
switch on the control stck Some degree of regulation. however, was provided by a mixture
valve
7 The reference may be to an adlustablehwizontal stabilizer such as had been incorpe
rated in the Sopmth 1'12 Strutter and some otherplanes. or some similar means for trimming theaircraft in flightformations of three machines asa minimum, working in touchwith one another; the front andlower formation guides and may
be called the front line; the rear
formation conforms its movements to the lower and supports
the lower in its attack according
to the requirements. They maintain their respective positions
throughout the whole of an offensive patrol and are often
given definite patrols when it isnecessary to cover a large
amount of territory with a limited
supply of machines. In suchcases a patrol will be ordered tocover certain points at certain
altitudes and at given times andthe two formations or echelons
perform their mission, retaining
their respective positions and relationship at all times.

30.It is interesting to compare
this simple combination to a patrol on the ground. On the
ground one would find advanceand flank guards, but in the airthese are unnecessary and thework is accomplished by a top
guard. The strength of this top
guard has to be considerable as
this is the most vulnerable pointof the formation, and great carehas to be taken that it does not
get too far in the rear of themain or guiding unit.
(b) Larger chains.
31.This simple chain can beaugmented as circumstances require by increasing the numberof each echelon or by adding

Attack on two-seaterby formation of

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A 8 attack from the left and right respectively.C attacks
from rear, while D remains above for protection.

Postwar Review

366

one or more formations to thechain. The positions of theseadded formations are maintained throughout the operationand they have clearly defined
functions to perform for eachparticular occasion that arises.
For example, if three formations
are patrolling, it is well to havethem proceed in a triangularchain, the right rear formation
serves as a support to the main
body while the left rear remains
above in reserve to give protection during the combat and todeal with enemy machines that
detach themselves and climb
with the intention of counterattacking.
(c) Chains at a distancefrom the airdromes.
32. This simple combinationof formations is not the only kindof chain flying that has beendeveloped. Sometimes individual formations are dispatchedand they maintain their individuality and their independence until a given point is reached at an
appointed time, when they takeup their positions with respect tothe previously designated leading flight and proceed as in thesimple chain. The advantages ofthese tactics for use against balloons or other localities ofknown enemy aerial activity,

Method of assembling
chain formations.

777

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Fight leader of formaticln A takes
off first and picks up B 8 C over
specified points.

Scouring patrol.

"A"=PiVOt formation moves on definite prescribed patrol"8"8 "C'Keep in touch at all times with "A"

.

- -*

Sherman: Tentative Manual

367

for The Employment W
Air Service

such as the rendezvous of a day
bombardment formation, is obvious. It is well to point out inthis particular form of tactics bychains of formations that thegreatest care must be exercisedby each leader of a formation.
He must not give battle to any
enemy aircraft before he reaches
his objective and must sacrifice
everything to being at his objective at the given instant. The
importance of this cannot be
over emphasized, as failure on
the part of even one formation
leader might prove extremely
disastrous.

(d) Chain.

these formations encounter erremy machines, a signal is given
to summon the whole chain to
low work prove especially valua- its support. A chain of this kind isble. These tactics have in mind
not liable to surprise as theat least three formations, one
whole sky is under observation
acting as the pivot. Each forma- practically all the time and ittion leaves the airdrome at a
becomes impossible for enemy
given time and proceeds over a formations to approach without
prescribed route to a rendezbeing seen by someone. On thevous. No time is lost in getting to other hand, enemy aerial activity
the rendezvous but each forma- is almost bound to be observedtion is independent until it conby someone and by signals thenects with its pivot formation at
hostile machines can be encounthat point. On arriving there the tered and destroyed.
leader of the pivotal formation
flies in an erratic course but on adefinite bearing offensive. The
other formations, flying erratically, keep in touch but practically out of sight of the pivot in
the hope that the enemy may be
encountered. Should one of

33. These tactics can be employed at any altitude but for

Pursuit chatn offormation.

DeputyLeader

B
B

A

Plan
A-Leading Echelon

8-Support
C-Reserve

C

Elevation

Postwar Review

368(e) Barrage chain.
34. These three formations ofchain flying are used for offensive purposes. Pursuit aviation,
however, is used a great deal for
protection of reconnaissance andartillery observation machines.
One of the simplest and mosteffective means of accomplishing
this is by means of chains offormations. Each formation
works individually, patrolling agiven beat and connecting up at
the beat with its adjacent patrol.
Each patrol in itself is irregular inthat it does not patrol the wholebeat religiously but proceeds erratically. In this way the aerial
front line is maintained in advance of the line of battle andfriendly observation machines
are permitted to carry out theirimportant work of surveillanceand observation unmolested.
The utilization of permanent barrage chains is wearing on pilots
and is opposed to the principleof economy of forces as it resultsin using up our available resources without permitting us toundertake those strong offensive
expeditions in force which alone
can cause maximum casualties
to the enemy and give us adefinite moral superiority. It
therefore should only be undertaken at times of intense preparation for attack.

(f) Fighting tactics of thedifferent chains.
35. The fighting tactics employed by the chains in actual
combat have certain fundamental principles in common. In theattack the leaders, having done
their utmost to surprise their adversary, sweep down deliberately on their opponent, relying
on the support to lend necessary
assistance. The latter at the sametime acts as a reselve or top
guard to deal with reinforcements which may arrive to assist
the enemy. The primary objectof the attack is to split up theenemy formation and enable thepilots of the patrol, maintaining
superior altitude to destroy theenemy in single combat. SO
much depends on the factor of
surprise that its value cannot be
overestimated. Probably the best
feature of a surprise attack isthat the offensive formation
maintains its unity or at most, if
it does lose it temporarily, regains more quickly to great advantage in the ensuing combat
which is bound to follow. Provision is always made for a rendezvous in case a formation isbroken up. In practice it has
been found that the center ofthe fight and the shortest line toour own side of the lines is thebest rendezvous area. This not
only enables a formation to getback quickly but often insuresmachines supporting one another on their return journey.
(9) Fighting tactic!; continued.
36. Fighting tactics in the
chain depend a great deal on
the machine, on the direction of
the wind, and on the locality,
but certain principles prevail inall combats which mwt be adhered to at all costs. First, theleader controls the situation.
Every machine must conform to
his movement and support him.
Second, attempts must be madeto fight outwards at all times,
the idea being to have yourformation intact at the end of
the fight, with the enemy scattered on the outskirts. Thirdly,
under no circumstances must apilot or formation attempt todive away from a fight. It isbetter for a pilot when his machine is shot to keep fighting
and circling and be forced downin enemy territory than to attempt to break away and divefor home. By staying with thefight he lends support to his
comrades and may cause theenemy to retire and enable himself and comrades to reachsafety after destroying enemy
machines, whereas by diving forhome he is practically #certainto
be shot down himself.
(h) Principles.
37. Certain principles in thefighting tactics must be forgottenin the chain of formations. First,
each formation must lend sup-

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

port to the other. Second, if
given a mission to perform, a
rendezvous or patrol, it must be
camed out at all costs, as the
success of the chain of formation
depends so much on the canying out of the mission by eachindividual formation. Third, eachformation is subservient to theleading formation of the chain.
The successful performance ofthe mission assigned to the chain
is of a great deal more importance than any other that might
be successfully accomplished by
the single formation at the costof the greater mission.

Strafing a machine-gun battery.

369

Chapter Iv. Attacks on

Ground Targets
38. Bombing and machinegunning of ground targets canonly be camed out when air
supremacy is attained. This supremacy does not have to bepermanent but must be temporary at least. Unless this supremacy is held at the time low flying
is to be done there will be agreater loss in machines thandamage done to the enemy.
Ground straffs may be carriedout in force by placing over thelines at a certain period sufficientnumber of pursuit machines toestablish the line of equal safety
for machines as far over as thestraffing is to be done. A single
pilot of experience, however,may go over the enemy linesand ground straffs when the enemy hold air supremacy, but theamount of possible damage hemay do does not equal the risk
for loss taken.
39. The discussion for low
bombing and machine gunningcan be combined because where
it is possible to accomplish one itis, as a rule, possible to accomplish the other. Low bombing,however, is more effective on
troops. Bombing can be done
from a greater height than effective machine gunning. Bombing
is more effective on places ofshelter. However, machines
doing low straffing should be capable of both and in most casesa good target for low bombing isa good target for machine gunning.
40. Low straffing of groundtargets is only used when large
targets are available for attack. A
target must be large enough to
be an easy mark and importantenough for its destruction to370

warrant risking the loss of a machine. Only in time of great activity on the ground by either ofthe combatant forces are groundtargets sufficiently large to warrant their being attacked fromthe air. In the ordinary course of
war when no offensive is being
launched a good target such as astaff car, or a convoy or a battery may very occassionallypresent itself, and the pilot of aseparate machine or a patrol
leader of a formation may use
his judgement as to whether thesituation demands that he makean attack on that target. Although ground straffing is commonly spoken of as trench straffing, the term trench straffing is amisnomer. Targets in trenches

374

Postwar Review

are not large enough to strafffrom a height and are protected
and for a machine to go down towithin 25 or 30 feet from theground where many machineguns can be directed against it,
the chance of that pachine
doing damage is too small tooffset the chance of beingbrought down. When an offensive is under way large bodies oftroops, cavalry and transport are
being brought up to the line.
These targets are large enoughto spot from some distance inthe air. Fire can be directed on
the group and a great amount ofmaterial damage as well as

moral damage to the enemy canbe done. Targets whic:h admit ofattacks from the air are anygroups of men or horses ortransport of the enemy large
enough to be easy of mark, andmaterials or any sort which areof military value and which canbe destroyed by aerial attack.
41. The locality of effective
ground straffing varies. As troops
and transports approach thefront line there is a point wherelarge movement cannot be
made. Back of that point is the
beginning of the effective zoneof ground straffing. The farther
back of the line one goes thelarger are the bodies encountered. But after a certain distancethe frequency of encounter willdiminish. The zone foi, the best
targets for ground straltfing is thatplace where large enough targets
to be easy of mark are foundfrequently. Besides the locationof the target, the factor of comparative safety in distance ofpenetration enters the question.
This factor is determined by the
air superiority held, both permanent and temporary, upon
weather conditions, the type ofmachine used, and the conditionof enemy ground defenses.

Postwar Review

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

371

cooperation, and patrols should tack is just beginning or is in
42. In conducting a groundsteady slow progress. When thestraffe the command has to con- be arranged to take advantageof that fact whenever possible. In attack is in its first stages masider the disposition of its forcescase the number of machines for chines should be sent over inand the method of their dispatch
protection is small it will be nec- great numbers and force should
and orders. The disposition ofessary to concentrate the probe concentrated on that period
forces depends upon the force
tecting force during certain hours when greatest assistance can beavailable and the state of theand send out all ground straffing rendered the ground troops.
attack. The dispatch and orders
machines during those hours. If When the attack has slowed in
depends upon whether the tarthe number of machines availa- progress ground straffing may be
get is predetermined and desigble for protection is large a bar- extended for several days and anated when the straffing marage of machines may be kept
chines leave the ground; orconstant stream of machines
up to serve as a protection at all kept over the enemy to harass
whether the target is to betimes. It is more difficult to sehis reserves coming up. The
found, the area in which targets
cure cooperation between thenumber over the lines at any
are likely to appear being
low flying machines and the pro- time need not however be sodesignated.
tecting machines where the pro- great as when the attack is ad43. The problem of available
tecting barrage of machines isvancing rapidly. The reason f o r
force is one of the number ofused all during the day thanputting a large number of straftmachines for ground straffing
where forces are concentrated
ing machines over when an atand the number for protective
during limited periods. The
tack is in its first stages is more apatrols. Whenever straffing is tonumber of machines available to moral than a destructive reason.
be done there should be suffido ground straffing does not af- The sight of our machines stral'fcient protective force above tofect their disposition so much as ing ground targets strengthens
make the low flying machines
the number of the protecting
the morale of the friendly troops,
safe from attack by enemy airforce. The use of a ground straff- and weakens the morale of thecraft. If the protective force is
ing force, whether large or small, enemy at a psychological moinsufficient a ground straffing
ment. If an attack is slow inmachine will be easy prey for the may be concentrated or extended according to the protec- progress and ground straffing
enemy because a pilot doing
has been carried out day afterground straffing has his attention tive force available and theground conditions.
day, the enemy must cease day
centered on the ground and not
44. The conditions on the
movement of large bodies andin the air. Also formations ofground which effect the dispatch transport must move in small
machines on this mission beof machines are whether the at- groups with some distance become scattered in most cases.
The greater the confidence of
tween groups. If it is found thatthe pilot of the low machine in
insufficient ground targets are
the pilots protecting him, thepresented it is well to concentrate on a certain period, andbetter the job of ground straffing
extend straffing farther back into
will be. Cooperation between
enemy territory where large tarthe protecting machines and thestraffing machines is very imporgets can be found. Also, thetant. The feeling of personal recentral control should know
lationship brings about the bestwhat cities and towns the enemy
is using for concentration points

372

and may designate special straffs
on those centers at an unexpected time.
45. When machines are sentout for the purpose of attacking
ground targets, the target may
have been previously designated, and information concerning its nature and its place given.
Such a target is usually one offleeting opportunity. In such acase it is necessary for the machines which are to make theattack to arrive at the place ofthe target upon very short notice. For the purpose of performing missions of this sort certain
squadrons should be moved towithin the closest possible distance of the line previous to an
attack. A certain number of pi-

Postwar Review

lots and machines must be kept altitude provided air superiority
can be insured at the particularon alert constantly, ready toleave the ground at a moment’s time and place.
47. Machines are also disnotice after information is repatched without particular tarceived concerning a target. The
gets being designated The pilots
machine used must be one
which does not require warming, may only be instructed as to the
locality in which targets are likely
such as a rotary motored machine, in order that it may leave to be found. This is particularly
true during the beginning of an
the ground immediately. Maattack by ground troops on thechines for this work can not goenemy. In such a case the cenover the line farther than theirtral control should know theprotection takes them. If a protective barrage is up the mission hour of attack, the lines of halting, the final objective, and thecan be dispatched without special escort. If there is not protec- zone of exploitation. The pilots
to do ground straffing should betive force on the lines a special
informed of these various lines,
escort must be provided.
46. A definite target, however, and orders should be issued,that up to a certain tirne targets
may be given which is not oneof fleeting opportunity, such as a will be attacked in a given zone;
town where concentration is tak- that after another definite time
ing place, an important railhead, targets will be attacked in a definite zone farther in enemy terrietc. Machines which are to perform the mission need not betoy. Unless this method is folfrom an advanced airdrome.
lowed pilots will not always be
Targets of this nature are often
certain of whether tarsgets are
enemy or their own. E3ut even if
given after a ground attack has
the progress is not so rapid the
been in progress for some time
central control must know theand when few moving targets
worth while present themselves. zone in which targets are likely
to be found and instruct pilots to
However, the central control
look for them in that area. The
should know what centers are
more complete the information
used for concentration points atthe better will be results, for piall times and should direct attacks on them. These centers are lots should not have to spend
usually too far over the line for a much time looking for targets.
low attack from the air to be
carried out unless sufficient force
is sent out as an escort to provide temporary air supremacy
over the target. An enemy aerodrome presents a target of almost the same nature. Any target may be straffed from a low

373

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48. Whether machines aresent out singly, in pairs, or in aformation will depend entirely
upon the situation. A small formation of three or five machines
will bring best results in straffing
most targets because there will
be a leader of some experience
to find the target and to keep alookout for enemy aircraft. Also
the formation will scatter the enemy fire from the ground. The
formation cannot be large because of the danger of collisionin getting at the target. Machinesof a small number can take turns
at attacking a target but the
number cannot be large because
attack must be quick and machines must not have to wait foreach other any length of time, If
the target is surprised fire fromthe ground will not be severe,but if time is given for the preparation the chance of the loss ofmachines will be greater. The
number of machines sent to attack the same target is, therefore, limited.

49. The pilots who are to do
the ground straffing must possess very definite information as
to where enemy troops are located and where friendly troops
are located. Uncertainty, even toa limited extent, will ruin theefficiencyof the work. In casethe push is rapid and the line
uncertain the central control
must inform the pilots of limitsof the zones in which straffing is
to be done. That limit should
not be several miles within theenemy side of the line, for while
attempting to make it safe forfriendly troops, the situation ismade more unsafe than necessary for the pilots. Pilots should
always be informed as to thelatest line reports, and, if theline is a moving one, the pilot
should know the line the infantry
is supposed to hold at the precise moment attack is to bemade from the air. Pilots after
having this information should
know their maps so well thatreference to them is almost unnecessary. It is impracticable forpilots to determine whether
troops are enemy or their own
by uniforms, etc., before theattack from the air is made. To
do this will do away with suddenness of attack, besides, inmost cases, placing the pilot in
unnecessary danger. There will,of course be exceptional cases
where the pilot cannot tell by
position whether troops are enemy, in which case they shouldmake certain by uniforms andobservation of various indicating
facts before making an attack.
50. The method of actually
straffing the target cannot beprescribed. The closer a machineis to the ground, down to 100
feet, the more accurate will be
the bombing and shooting; also
the more accurate the fire fromthe enemy. Effective bombing
and shooting can be done from2000 feet. The height fromwhich work will be done will
depend upon the development
in types of machines, and armament, and in the effectiveness ofthe fire from the enemy.
51. Formations in an attack
usually become very dispersed.
If the nature of the target permits
attack in formation, airplanes ofthe formation should attack one
after the other. In case the formation becomes completely
scattered, pilots of inexperienceshould not remain over enemy
territory a great length of time,
for they are very subject to attack. The leader should, whenever possible, prescribe whenwithdrawal to the line is to bePostwar Review

374

made by signal to other machines. Otherwise, the machines
should not linger over enemy
territory but a few moments. In
case of complete dispersion eachmachine is to make its way backin the shortest line. If dispersion
is only partial it is best to pick up
the formation while withdrawing.
52. Weather conditions effectground straffing fundamentally.
Clouds may prohibit protective
patrols. In this case groundstraffing machines cannot workin formations far over enemy
territory, the distance depending,however, upon height and nature of clouds, and visibility of
atmospheres. A single machine
may do effective ground straffing
when clouds are under 2000
feet, going to or returning fromhis target in the clouds. This isbest accomplished when visibility
is v e y poor, when there can bepractically no enemy machines
about. The most effective
ground straffing done by single
machines can be accomplishedin weather of this sort with very
little danger of loss of the machine. The pilots must, however,be of experience.

Airplane
attacks captive balloon (left).
Minutes latex the balloon becomesengulfed in flames (right).

53. The most difficult situations, however, arise whenclouds exist at altitudes about
2000 feet, not rendering a protective patrol useless, but changing v e y greatly the cooperation
between the protective patrol
and the ground straffers, andrendering the [possibility ofprotection] against attack fromenemy aircraft much more difficult than where there are no
clouds. If it is possible for machines to work above the low
clouds, it is necessary to havepart of the protective patrol
above the clouds and part directly in touch with the groundstraffers beneath the clouds. [If3
it is impossible for machines towork above clouds the protective patrol cannot penetrate far
into enemy territory, the distancedepending upon the height ofthe clouds. The ground straffing
machines, being lower, can work
a little farther into enemy territoy than the protective patrol
is working.

54. Machines used in groundstraffing can be combatted fromthe ground and from the air. The
greatest source of destruction,
however, comes from theground because of the greater
possibilities of fire from thatsource, both with respect to accuracy, and as to amount andkind. Also the sources of fire on
the ground are difficult to observe, and cannot easily be combatted by the low flying machine. It is necessay to perfectdevices for fire from the groundand to provide machines, which
are to do low flying, with ameans of protection from enemy
ground fire. When ground straffing is being done it must also be
combatted from the air by low
flying machines with overheadprotection.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

55. The type of machine
which is best adapted to groundstraffing is necessarily an armoured machine. As weight isincreased maneuverability,
speed and climb will be decreased. The best machine willbe the one with adequate armouring and with least decreasein maneuverability, speed andclimb, and with greatest reliability of engine. The reliability ofthe engine is more important ina ground straffing machine thanin other types, because that machine usually works in a place
where a forced landing means
the loss of a machine and pilot
The least vulnerable engine tobullets is an air cooled engine.
Rotary motors can be shot
through and still run. It is atpresent considered that the best
type of machine for groundstraffing is a single seater, rotary
motored, armoured machinewith two fields of fire-one infront and one below.

375

Chapter V. Balloon Attacks
56. Balloon attacks may be
divided into two general headings, one the individual unpremeditated attack made merely
because the pilot finds himself in
position for such an attack afteran engagement or some special
mission, and secondly the scientific attacks made with cooperation in various forms.
57. The first type is usually
made with the utmost danger tothe pilot as he is open to attackby enemy aircraft from above
and has no efficient method of
stopping attack from the grounddefenses. These attacks should
be discouraged save in very exceptional circumstances when
they should consist only of asingle dive, a long burst of machine gun fire continuing to an
extremely short range, and thenan immediate but cautious return to the lines. Organized balloon attacks often yield important results. They will almost always be undertaken just before
or during an assault. In all balloon attacks it is most essentialthat the gas bag be perforated. inorder that the gas may mix withthe atmosphere and the incendiary ammunition ignite the resulting combustible mixture. It has
been found satisfactory to use
ordinary ammunition for the
perforation of the bag while ashort burst of the incendiary
fired at extremely short range,
25 to 50 yards, will in the majority of cases ignite the gas.

58. There are several methodsof attacking a balloon. It should
be kept clear in the mind of all
pilots making such attacks that
only approximately thefront 213rdsof the bag has gas init, the back ?hbeing filled largely
with air. Because of this, a vertical dive is not recommended.
On the other hand the pilot’s
machine should be gotten intosuch position that he will be firing parallel to the fore and aftaxis of the balloon. This guarantees that the bullets will puncture
the bag where the gas is located.

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59. In a premeditated attack
one of the elemental principles is
to silence ground defenses in the
shape of machine guns, “flaming
onions” batteries (incendiaryanti-aircraft) and anti-aircraft
guns of greater caliber. This mayeither be done by our batteries
or by aircraft accompanying thepilot who is to destroy the balloon. Both of these methods
have proven very satisfactory inpractice.. In the first case the battery commander makes arrangements for his barrage to be directed at the winch and for aconsiderable radius surrounding
the balloon. This barrage is usually laid down two or three minutes before the attack by ouraircraft.
60. In the second case themachine which is to destroy theballoon is accompanied by fouror five other pursuit machines,
fitted with bomb racks carrying

Daylight balloon

attack.

light bombs. These bombs are
dropped on the emplacementsof the anti-aircraft defenses andas close as possible to the winch.
Immediately after this and at thesame time that the single machine attacks the balloon, machine gun fire is also directed atthese ground defenses and it has
been found that the enemy in aconsiderable number of cases
leaves his balloon up and takes
cover.
61. Attacks on balldons
should have as much of the element of surprise in their favor as
conditions permit in order toprevent the enemy from drawing
his balloons to the ground before the attack is made. In casethere are clouds in the sky suchcover as they afford should be
utilized. On clear days great skill
in maneuvering is necessay tomake the balloon companies believe that the patrol has someother mission than destruction of
the balloon. Very often a long,
gentle glide to the enemy side of
the balloon and considerably

I

Attack at 0 hour. Formation A, B 8 C rendezvous
over balloon at 0 hour+ 1 mi. to protect attacking plane

above it, followed by a steep,
rapid dive and attack, will be
successful. At other times it becomes necessary to follow theballoon as it is drawn to within av e y short distance of theground.
62. When more thain one balloon is to be destroyed it is much
more satisfactory, wheneverpossible, to assign separate patrols for the destructiori of eachtarget. In this way the element of
surprise is maintained .to a considerable degree. It is perfectly
apparent that in the caw of attacking by one patrol of a number of balloons, that thc successful destruction of one will warn
those to be attacked later of theirdanger, and will give them an
opportunity to draw dawn theballoon and prepare for an intensive defense.
63. The element of surprise
may be v e y valuably increasedby making balloon attacks just atdawn or very late in the evening.
Attack at this time also removes
to a v e y large extent thle dangerof interference by hostile aircraft.
The effect of an evening attack
on a balloon line has really very
little tactical or strategical value
as each balloon destroyed will
be replaced in time for ascension
the following morning, but there
is undoubtedly a consiclerable
effect on morale, particiilarly insofar as observers areconcerned.
JSherman: Tentative Manualflor The Employment of
Air Service

64. It is exceedingly importantthat observers making successful
descents in parachutes should beaitacked as they are extremely
dangerous to our troops on the
ground because of their training.s Here again the question ofrriorale arises and if observers
are attacked as they are descending in their parachutes it isbelieved a considerable increase
u'ill be noted in the number of
unnecessary descents made.
65. It has been found much
more satisfactory to utilize the 11
millimeter balloon gun than theordinary caliber machine gun.
Something on the order of the
one-pounder, firing a very delicately fused contact shell, would
be even more successful for thedestruction of enemy balloons.
The use of bombs containing
sulphur or other incendiary material did not prove satisfactory.
66. Whenever possible balloon attacks should be madeuith an escort of considerable
sirength, in order to allow thea ?acking machines to performtheir mission without interruption
bg enemy aircraft. This protectirsn should be flying in the close
vicinity of the balloon at the timeof the attack, but at a higher
altitude, and should be very
careful not to communicate to
the enemy by its actions prior to
the attack information that the
a3ack is to be made.

377

67. A considerable proportionof the balloon attacks made by
the Allies during the recent war
failed in the destruction of theballoon because the pilot did nothave a true appreciation of his
distance from the balloon. This
realization of distance may begained by practice with balloons
behind our lines during thecourse of which pilots will become familiar with the appearance of the bag in the sight andwill then be able to deliver theirburst of incendiary ammunition
at a range short enough to beefficient .
68. It should be the attempt of
pursuit squadrons on any front
to keep the enemy balloons intheir sector down as much of thetime as possible. Balloon observation is extremely valuable forthe regulation of artillery fire andfor reconnaissance of backareas. It is even suggested that in
the future night pursuit will beequipped with searchlights orother means for locating and destroying enemy balloons during
darkness.

8. The shooting of parachutists abandoning
disabled ercran was then. and is yet, a difficultand controversial area of international law.

Chapter VI. Night Pursuii:
69. With the development of
the Air Service, the problem ofnight flying and more particularlynight pursuit has to be faced andsolved.
70. At first sight, it might appear the limitations of night pursuit are so great that a squadronof this kind would not justify its
existence, but on more careful
study one finds that the potentialities are great and the possibilities almost unlimited.
71. The main function of night
pursuit at present is, of course,
the defensive patrols for the purpose of destroying night bombers. The British have alreadydemonstrated that this is quite
practical.
72. As the Air Service develops, the night pursuit will be
used in conjunction with patrolling for the purpose of surveillance and reconnaissance. All
big movements of troops now
take place by night and in time
pursuit pilots will be required under certain circumstances to gci
out to predetermined objectives
for the purpose of dropping aflare at a given important crossroad to ascertain movements oftroops or for the purpose of coinfirming a suspected withdrawal
or concentration. At first, nightreconnaissance by pursuit machines will probably be done in
the late evening or in the earlymorning, but as time goes on
and the number of squadrons of
this kind increase, this kind of

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work will be done in all favorable weather at night. Concentrations will be located and bombs
will be carried, enabling the pursuit machines to descend andharrass same from very low altitudes with extremely great accuracy. Balloon straffing at dawn
and in the dusk of evening willbe almost entirely the functionsof the night pursuit machine andthis practice may in time blindthe enemy insofar as balloons
are concerned. Straffing enemy
troops by machine gun fire, owing to the case with which asurprise and get away can beeffected at night, will be a v e ysafe and effective work of thenight pursuit, and its possibilities
are limited only by the weather
conditions.
73. There are many difficult
problems in connection withnight pursuit that have to be
faced and attempts made tosolve before a squadron canhope to meet with any success.
The pilots must be speciallytrained in navigation by night
although this can be learned in av e y short time by one of ordinary intelligence and can behelped greatly by increasing thenumber of lighthouses, mortar
signals, and cooperation between the units of the Air Service, day and night forces combined. Forced landings at night

discourage pilots more than any
other feature of this work, butwith proper landing flares andemergency airdrome lighting setson all fields, and cooperation of
searchlights in the defendedarea, the dangers from thissource can be reduced practically to the same as day flying.
74. Pilots find that one of thegreatest problems of night pursuit is locating the enemy. They
claim it is impossible to see him
even with the aid of searchlights.
It is difficult but it is not impossible. On moonlight nights the enemy is visible at 500 to 600
yards even when he is not in the
beam of the light, and on brightstarlight nights he appears as adark shadow at a distance of
200 yards. If he happens to bepicked up by a searchlight, hisplanes show up for a v e y great
distance, and experience provesthat sometimes machines can beheld in the beam ten minutes.
Sometimes he can be seen, notin the beam itself, but in thetwilight formed in the air by thesearchlights and fights havetaken place without the beam
picking him up or without theknowledge of the operators of
the light.

75. As for the actual combat it
is safe to say that the enemy canbe engaged and brought downwith slight danger of his retaliation, provided he is seen first by
the pursuit pilot.
76. One of the great problemsof night flying is equipiment.
These necessities include firstclass searchlights, airplanes, airdrome lighting plants, llighthouses, motors and signals.
77. For night flying to be a
success in the operations of anarmy it is absolutely essentialthat it have the proper cooperation and liaison with the neighboring arms. The searchlights
are operated by the Engineers
Corps. A liaison officer must beplaced on the staff of the Chiefof night flying who can1 advise
and insure the proper location of
searchlights and the cooperationof their personnel with the pilots.
The v e y closest liaison must be
maintained with the anti-aircraft
artillery. The Chief of Air Service
must have a liaison officer from

Sherman: Tentative.Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

this branch on his staff, and theguns must be located and operi3ted on his advice and with hiscooperation. In addition, official
observation posts are to be established in all units on the lines,
each in touch with a Post ofCommand where there will belocated a wireless transmitting
station, in order that the Chief of
all wireless stations in the rear
will be kept familiar with indications and locations of enemy
aerial activity and likewise advised of its cessation, so that hecan most efficiently make histactical decisions.
78. Defended areas-that is
territory over which it is forbidden to fly at night-should be
reduced to a minimum if notdispensed with entirely. Arrangements can be made whereby all
machines crossing the lines
could be challenged by the forward observation posts and theidentity of the machine fixed at
this point.
79. It is v e y essential to obtain the proper kind of machinefor night work. In the first place
the engine must be reliable, simple, and if possible, one that379

starts up easily and instantly.
Any reliable rotary or radial motor seems best adapted for night
pursuit. The machine itself mustbe light, maneuverable and possess great flexibility of speed,
owing to the tactical necessity
after overtaking a twin-engine
machine for a pilot to reduce thespeed to the same or less thanthat of the bomber. It is essentialthat it climb and dive rapidly andat the Same time should land
very slowly so that it can besafely landed in a very smallarea, a feature that will always
be essential in night forced landing. It is well to strengthen thecenter section struts and takesimilar precautions so that incase of a turn over the pilot canbe sure of getting out and it isadvisable to have a machinesensitive laterally rather than fore
and aft. If a machine is too sensitive fore and aft, one is apt todive into the ground or stall on
coming into the airdrome when
one's attention is often diverted
to landing light instruments or
ground lights. With regard tofuel, it is advisable to have as
much gasoline as possible. Although a patrol should not be
for more than 1%hours, pilots
frequently get lost returning andhave to fly around a long time
before they get their bearings.
80. Armament is an importantfeature. Machines should beequipped with two guns, one
balloon and one ordinary. Sights
should be illuminated and ordin a y ammunition used with thisexception, that v e y few tracers

should be used (1in 15).Bombracks are essential and it is wellto have a rack that can be bodily
taken off with bombs and replaced on short notice as normally its employment will nolt be
the duty of night machines.
81. The instrument board is
an important feature. All instruments must be lighted and in
addition luminous in themselves,
and two movable [flash-lights,
must be provided, the whole
electrical equipment being runI9
from two separate storage baiteries which, in themselves,
should be very accessible, yet
substantially fixed. A good air
speed indicator and a good altimeter are even more essential innight flying than in day, and thecompass, too, must be of thevery best. A machine will carrywing tip flares. A navigation lighton the outer struts, and a signalling light on the bottom of thefuselage with at least one emergency parachute landing flare.

9. The words in brackets, inserted to fill an
obvious omission, are from Circular 76, p. 44.

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Normally the dangerous wing tip
flares will not be used but in thecase of forced landings these will
be lighted, sufficiently highabove the ground to insure their
being bumed out by the time theground is reached. These must
be examined very frequently
and under no circumstances
should they be used later thanthe date stamped thereon. Thereis no such word as economy inconnection with the use of flares.
They must not be opened until
they are actually going to beplaced on the machine. Firstclass parachute flares should be
the only parachute flares carried.
The signal-light beneath the fuselage must be operated by atapper key and a permanentswitch be opened interchangeably, at will and instantly.
82. Two kinds of airdrome
equipment must be recognizedand provided. First, that invogue on the fields of the othernight squadrons operating whichmust be most reliable and if necessary elaborate; secondly, theemergency landing set, whichshould be at hand on these fields
but in addition should be placedon every airdrome in the army
area so that a pilot lost in a fog
may with safety call and land at
any field. The arrangements ofthe main fields must be worked
out as circumstances require, but
it is essential that a good generating unit be at hand and thatthe bounds of the field be clearly
defined. For an emergency lighting outfit, three small concentrated beam throwing lights, withpower furnished by a fifteen volt
storage battery placed on a trolley are recommended. These arequite inexpensive and will on
every field justify their existence
many times over.
83. The army area as a wholemust [be] lit up with Mortars andLighthouses, and a 36”Spenylight at the main airdrome forpurpose of defense as well as forthe purpose of directing machines home is essential.
84. Certain rules must be inaugurated for landing at an airdrome at night. These must be
formulated not forgetting thepossibility of the enemy bombing and must consist of a signal
for recognition and on the main
field the use of a dummy airdrome as an adjunct. All pilots
will be called upon to make circuits to the left and glide inparallel to the main lince of lights.
Each pilot must flash the proper
code letter before landing. If acrash blocks the field, :proper signals or a beam of light must be
flashed to him. In this connection it will be essential to instruct
and hold responsible one man atleast on every field in the best
methods of placing the lights, sothat a pilot will never be required
to come in over obstacles and sothat he will be able to make alanding even if he is unfamiliar
with the airdrome.
85.Probably the greatest difficulty to be encountered is ths
selection of pilots for this work. It
is absolutely imperative thatnight pilots master the science offlying. It is quite possible to be apilot in the day time and yet
know v e y little about flying, but
he who hopes to succeed atnight must be capable of flying
any kind of a machine intuitively
and in addition must hlave mastered the peculiarities of the particular machine that ha is to use.
It is essential that he be keen
about his work and the responsibility for this rests primarily withthe squadron commander directly through the flight commander. He must be imbued
with the spirit of determination
first of all to develop this branchof aviation. He should lbe steady,sober, keen and industrious andso fond of flying that he sees
every opportunity to get up in
the air, day and night.

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for The Employment of
Air Service.
86. In flying a pursuit machineat night a pilot who has mastered his machine thoroughly
should have no difficulty in mastering the art, whether pursuit orbomber, but it is useless for him
to attempt the work until this is
the case. In all armies there havebeen regretable accidents in thisconnection which have tended
to bring night flying into disfavorwith the pilots. It is a fact thatany good day pilot will make agood night pilot provided his vision is normal. In addition to
being a good pilot, the nightflyer must have a thoroughknowledge of the country, particularly of the landmarks. He
must be skilled in the location of
possible fields, airdromes, forests, rivers, bad ground, etc.,
and when he has first enlisted
into the service of a night squadron, he should utilize e v e y opportunity that presents itself inmastering the situation, neverfeeling satisfied until he knows
the country thoroughly. He must
be instructed in cloud flying but
should be warned never to attempt it unless compelled to do
so. If overtaken by a mist or
clouds he must never let the
ground get out of sight. If necessaty he should make a forced
landing rather than attempt toget home at night by flying
through the mist, unless ofcourse he is flying high and issure of the weather.
87. After a pilot becomescompetent he will practice forced
landing on his own airdromes on
moonlight nights, and practicecombat fighting with two-seaters
at night cooperating with thesearchlights. Rehearsals of
forced landings by means of parachute flares are practicable, thepilot using the engine if he discovers that the field sought isliable to cause him to tum over.
88. The location of instruments and the method of using
them in the dark must become amatter of second nature to thenight pilot, so that this will in noway distract his attention from
more important things. Patrols
will often be monotonous because they will cover short beats
over important points. Enemy
night bombers are certain to follow permanent land marks, suchas rivers or forests. This meansthat a pilot on patrol must stayover this spot patiently and await
his opportunity. He will do wellto have patience and not to be
distracted by neighboring lightsfrom his particular mission. Prlots
must never attempt to fly under
200 meters at night as the risk

involved is too great, and on his
first flights he must arise over his
airdrome at a height of at least
1000 meters and take his timecoming in. The morale of pilots
in all branches of the Air Service
must be carefully preserved, but
this is even more marked in thecase of night pilots. Day flying
should be performed and should
only be permitted between certain definite flying hours of dalylight. Otherwise pilots will neverfeel that they are off duty and ina few weeks will become tired
and disgusted with their work,and lose a11 their keenness.
89. The main duties in theoperations of night pursuit is thedefensive barrage. Patrols will
be carefully planned with theobject of intercepting hostilebombers at the point where thleyare picked up by the searchlights. Patrols will, therefore, be
carried out slightly in the rear oflines and more particularly overpermanent land marks. They will
not last more than one and one

Postwar Review

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fourth hours and va y in altitude
from 2000 to 4000 meters, according to the situation. It is
inadvisable to send patrols up
until enemy activity has beenreported by the advanced posts
and it is quite possible to determine with great accuracy whenthe enemy is operating by observing his mortars, lighthouses,
airdromes, and so on. Balloons
may be utilized for this purposeas they can render valuableassistance.
90. When a pilot is on patrol
he will have his attention called
to enemy aircraft by the firing of
the Archie guns, by observationof the explosion of bombs on
the ground and by the direction
and concentration of searchlights
beams. He will “cut” his motor
frequently and glide as long as
possible with a dead motor sothat the light operators and gunners can listen for the enemy
ships. In times it will be possible
to institute a system of rockets
and flares which will enable apilot on patrol to follow thecourse of an enemy bomber and
it is within the range of possibility
that before long wireless telephones will come to assistanceof a pilot on patrol and solve
many of his difficulties.

91. When a pilot sights anenemy machine, his simple tactics will be to get under his tail,closing in to a very close range
and opening up fire after throttling down, making use of theelement of surprise to the utmost, for, if the enemy begins
to slide-slip and maneuver, hewill probably get away. Shoulda pilot be so unfortunate as tobe seen by the enemy machine
before he has effected a complete surprise, he must endeavor
to keep his eye on the enemy
by observing his instrument
board, his exhaust or the explosive tracers from his machineguns. After a short time theenemy will steady down andprobably attempt to dive for
home, when it will be safe forthe pursuit machine to close on
him again. It is easier on a clear
night to see machines above
silhouetted against the sky but
should he dive and get below
the attacker, it is quite possible
to pick up his outline once moreagainst the lights on the groundprobably in time special illuminating lights will be provided forthis purpose.

92. In addition to defensive
patrols, night pursuit will be utilized in time for reconnaissanceand surveillance and Especialmachines will be dispatched to intersections and cross roads, railway stations, rivers, etc., for the
purpose of locating and confirming enemy movements. In somecases parachute flares will be
used and in time it will be possible to take photographs at night.
The same machines will be able
to carry light bombs and shutting
off their motors, glide down to ave y low altitude and !with great
precision and accuracy dropthem, insuring good results.
93. Other duties, however,besides these will be sequired ofnight pursuit squadrons. They
will be required to attack balloons suspended in th’e air orlying on their beds late in the
dusk of evening after all theSherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

enemy airplanes have landed,enabling the pilot to come backunmolested and in safety to his
own lines, landing after dark. In
the early dawn the same work
can be accomplished and it is
not without the range of possibility that the efficiency of balloons will in this way be
reduced.
94. Airdrome straffing in thelate evening and in the early
dawn is one of the chief functions of night pursuit and airdromes may be so far back thatthe whole situation will bechanged. Hangars probably will
have to be underground andmechanics will have to live in
dug-outs. On fine nights single
machines will harrass enemy airdromes many times over andon [some] nights large offensive
operations will be able to put
machines out of action. Before
and during an offensive enemy

concentrations will be straffed
and machine-gunned at nightfrom a low altitude. The Commanding Officer of a Night Pursuit unit must be ready to develop the possibilities of his
command to the utmost.
95. A great deal of the successof night pursuit will depend on
the location of the airdrome.
The ideal place is in the centerof the line of searchlights. This
enables pilots to stand on theirairdromes ready to take off andreduce the duration of their patrols. With an airdrome in thislocation, pilots are able to go up
and take short flights, making
many sorties per night if necess a y . Many devices, such as
dummy airdromes, must be used
to enable the location of thisadvanced field to be kept secret
and to prevent its being bombed.
Machines will not be brought up
until the night of an anticipatedraid, the actual location of thesquadron being well in the rear.
As a matter of general princiipal,
it is ve y much better, however,to have squadron work from thefield where its headquarters,
hangars, machine shop, etc., arelocated, as advanced fields arenever entirely satisfactoy, and if
at all practicable this should be
the case. The location of thisfield near the searchlights, inaddition to the usual advantages,
keeps a possible landing groundwithin gliding distance of thepilot at all times and greatly
increases his confidence andefficiency.
96. While it is important tohave the airdrome located ccmtrally, the proper location of thesearchlights is more essential andtwo methods prevail. First, theconcentration of searchlights
around important bombing objectives from the enemy standpoint of view and, second, thelocation of a continuous line oflights along the whole front.
There are many points in favorof both, the ideal, of course,
being the adoption of both. Certainly, it is best to have as manylights as possible and in this thequestion of economy does not
figure. Searchlights will be placedin units of three lights in triangular formation, the sides of thetriangle being roughly [300yards].10All the lights will be

10. The bracketed phrase, supplying a
number that was omitted, and correcting a word
mat was misspelled, IS from Circular 76, 6146.

384

under the control of one P.C.
and where possible this will belocated on the airdrome and in
direct touch with the operations
officer of the squadron. Anothervery important feature about thelocation of the lights and one
which will go a long way to thesuccess of the operations is thatof possible “forced-landing’’
field. Every search light, where
possible, will be placed on a
possible emergency landing field
and instructions given to the operators that upon a distress signal from the plane all lights solocated will concentrate on theirrespective emergency field. In
locating these searchlights andinstructing the operators, care
will be taken that operators understand that a plane lands bestup hill and into the wind, notforgetting to point out that it isPostwar Review

Part IV. Day
next to impossible at night toland over high obstacles.
Bombardment
97. Anti-aircraft guns should
be located so as to fire in zones Introduction
Object of Day Bombardment
and the best rule is to havethem fire only towards enemy
1. The primary object ofterritory and over the enemy
bombing operations is the delines. In this way they serve as a struction of the material, personsignal for a pilot who may be in nel and morale of the enemy.
the air and at the same time
The secondary object iic reconthere is less likelihood of anaissance of enemy movements
friendly pilot being hit. Enemyin the air and on the ground.
bombers prefer to penetrate an
The effect of destroying the enanti-aircraft barrage than search- emy’s materiel and personnel islights where there are pursuit
not commensurate with the efmachines about. With this infect gained by day bombardview tactical distribution of thement in weakening the morale ofguns will be made to suit occatroops and civilians in thesions and special circumstances. bombed areas. The ratio of theeffect and lowering the enemy’s
morale over that of destruction isestimated as about twenty
to one.
Chapter I. Information
2. Information of the enemy
and our own ground forces isessential to the proper tacticaloperations of a day bornbardment unit. The collection andpreparation of this information
for distribution to the smaller
units of his command is the dutyof the Air Service commander.
Information properly circulated
to bombardment units has animportant effect upon the moraleof the personnel. This is the only
method by which units far fromthe battlefield can have brought
to them the actual situations at
the front. Unless the possibilities
of day bombardment are made

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

clear it is impossible to get the
maximum efficiency from thepilots and observers.
3. Every unit headquarters will
be supplied by the Army Air
Service Commander with(a) A map showing the location of all enemy airdromes.
This map will indicate whether
or not the airdromes are occupied, and will show the quantityand kind of air forces present.
(b) A map showing the location and kind of all enemy
antiaircraft artillery, which will be
kept as near up to date as
possible.
(c) A map showing the existing and probably locations of
all enemy divisions, both in thel i e and reserve. The map will
be prepared from information
furnished by the second sectionof the General Staff ((3-2).
(d) A map showing the location of all airdromes in the
sector of the Army Air Service
Commander, the corps and divisional sector boundaries of allunits in line, the location of ourantiaircraft artillery units, balloons and other air service units.
(el Silhouettes and photographs of all known types ofenemy airplanes. These should
be posted in the operations
rooms, and in the mess hall andquarters of the flying personnel.
(f) A diagram of telephonicliaison in the army area.

385(9)A map showing the location of heavy and railroad artillery units and their targets.
5. The charts, diagrams, andmaps will be supplemented with(a) Army summaries of intelligence prepared by G-2.
These will be circulated to beaccessible to every pilot andobserver.
(b) Air Service summaries
of intelligence prepared in theheadquarters of the A.S.C.
These will cover all subjects relating to the enemy air service,especially the quantities andtypes of his airplanes, and his
methods of employing them inaerial warfare. It is the duty of
every operations officer to makeknown to his flying personnel all
the experiences that other pilots
and observers have had overthe lines.

Chapter 11. Liaison
5. Success of day bombardment depends in a large measure, upon a system of well established liaison. The liaisonmust be such that it guarantees arapid transmission of informationand orders. A comprehension of
the entire situation at the moment has a decided effect upon

the success of bombardment operations. In order that bombing
raids may be made most effective, and with a minimum oflosses, a close Liaison with tho
front must be maintained. Ac'curate knowledge of the enemy's
aerial activity at the time is themost important factor in decidlingupon the tactics to be employed
in executing the raids, the route
to be followed, and the altitude
from which the objective will bebombed. The Liaison should beso perfected that each groupcommander can be informed
without delay of the location,
number, altitude, direction offlight and types of enemy airplanes approaching our front
lines. This liaison will be established(a) By direct telephoniccommunications with anti-aircraft artillery observation posts.
(b) By wire with the radiogoniometric stations.
(c) By wire with the line ofobservation balloons.

Postwar Review

306

6. The telephone communications from group to wing, and to
the Army Air Service should bedirect. The internal liaison fromgroup headquarters to the several squadrons should be perfect. The group operations officer should be able to communicate without delay with allsquadrons operations officers
and with the flying field and alert
tents.
7. Too much emphasis cannot
be placed upon the importanceof the exchange of visits between the commanding officersof the air service units. This applies especially to the day bombardment and pursuit aviation.
Without these exchanges of visits
it is impossible to arrive at thatclose cooperation so necessary
between these two branches.
Personal visits between officersof all branches of aviation andthe officers of infantry, artil!ery,
anti-aircraft artillery, and balloon
sections are the best means ofestablishing a feeling of understanding and sympathy between
the various arms of the service.
This understanding is necessary
to perfect an efficient system ofliaison upon the battle field.

Chapter 111. Security
8. Security embraces all measures taken by a command toprotect itself from annoyance,
observation, surprise and attackby the enemy. The protection of
day bombardment naturally falls
under combat, and will betreated under that head. Under
security will be discussed only
those measures taken by thecommanding officer for the protection of his airdrome.
9. The selection of an airdrome depends upon several
circumstances, such as accessability, distance from the front,
size, security and shelter. In day
bombardment it is essential toselect a large field. Airplanes
loaded with bombs require along runway to take off. As they
climb slowly they must haveconsiderable distance in which toattain sufficient altitude to clear
the natural obstacles which generally surround a field. The necessity, especially during an offensive, to take off on short notice, and to take up formation
quickly, requires the squadrons
to leave the ground together.
Therefore, a large airdrome isabsolutely essential for the efficiency of the group.
10. Day bombardment airdromes as a general rule aresituated at 35 kilometers fromthe front lines that the airplanes
may attain their bombing altitude without making unnecessary detours before crossing thelines. Working within the limits

above laid down the selection ofan airdrome, as regards security,
should be made with a consideration of the following principles:
It should be away frlom all
landmarks which are visible atnight, such as streams, intersecting highways, and large cities.
An airdrome situated alongside aforest affords great security, as
the hangars and buildings can beconcealed among the trees. Careshould be taken to place thehangars on a well defended
edge of the forest. The day
bombardment fields at Amanty
and Maulan were good examples of forest security. On manyoccasions enemy night bombers
could be heard circling the forest, but the airdromes were
never hit by even stray bombs.
These airdromes were also good
examples of camouflaging material. The colors of the hangars,
and buildings, blended so wellwith the colors of the forests that
it was difficult to locate either
airdrome even in daylight, especially if the clouds were low andthe known landmarks in the vicinity hidden. The hangars
should be spaced at least 100
meters apart so that thle maximum effect of one bomb would
be one hangar. All hangars andbuildings should be camouflaged
to blend with the surroundingcolor. As most night rabders carry
incendiary bombs great care

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

must be taken in choosing camouflage material and in the disposition of inflamables. The gasoline stores must be placed asafe distance from the hangars
or other likely targets.
12. The distance of day bombardment airdromes from thefront usually is a sufficient safeguard against daylight raids. But
it is always well to organize asystem of defense against low
flying enemy airplanes. This defense usually consists of machine
gun emplacements around theairdrome so placed that the enemy airplanes will have to passthrough a barrage before reaching a bombing position over the
hangars. At times the exigenciesof the service make it necessary
for day bombardment airdromes
to be placed close to the front,
as for example, when operating
in a constricted area. When airdromes are close to the front,
earthworks and bombproof shelters must be erected aroundquarters as protection for the
personnel against air raids andshell fire.

387

Chapter VI." Group13. Each group should be
mobile, and should have ample Organizationtransportation facilities to move
16. Group Commander.
all its material in case of a genGroup Operations offic:er.
eral advance or retreat. Lack ofGroup Adjutant.
transportation has occasioned
Group Armament Officer.
great losses in material. UnitsGroup Supply Officer.
operating near the lines shouldGroup Instrument officer.
have their supplies or spare parts
Group Radio officer.
packed in boxes with hingedGroup Photographic Offidoors, to be loaded on trucks atcer.
the first alarm. The offices
Group Officer in charge
should be in trailers so that allof flying field.
the records can be carried away.
Group Police officer.
Orders covering emergencies
Group Surgeon.
should be prepared in advanceGroup Transportation
and understood by those reofficer.
sponsible for carrying them
17. The efficiency of a group
into effect.
depends primarily upon the organization of its commissioned
personnel. The principal dutiesof the group officers are here
designated in order of importance.

11. The index in Gorrell's History. D-1. p 165.
lists Chapter IV, Orders, and Chapter V,
Marches and Convoys, which are omitted fromthe text. D-1, p 236. Those two chapters areincluded in Circular 76 by reference to the portinent chapters of Part I.

Postwar Review

388Group Commander
18. The group commander
has all the administrative duties
of a post commander. He is also
responsible for the operations of
his group, the orders for which
he receives from the G3 Armythrough the Army Air Service
Commander. In compliance withthese operation orders he issues
orders to his squadron commanders for the execution of thedesignated missions. Unless specifically covered in orders fromhigher authority the group commander’s orders cover the following essentials:(a)The number of formations and the number of airplanes in each.
(b) The types and weights
of projectiles to be used.
(c) The time of departure,
the order of departure of eachformation, the route, altitude,
and time of arrival at objective.
The duties of the group commander should be so coordinated that the minimum amountof time will be spent in the office.

It is essential for him to keep in
personal touch with all his
squadron commanders, and tocreate a feeling of sympathy withall his flying personnel. Flightcommanders and leading observers should feel at liberty tomake suggestions to him regarding changes in the execution ofraids, which is possible only if headopts an attitude of sympathy
toward the elements pf his command. He must make frequent
visits to group commanders of
the other branches of aviation,
especially those of pursuit
groups, as such conferences are
the surest means of acquiring
cooperation in aviation as awhole, and of putting into effectin his group the best methods
used by all the others. It is his
duty to instruct his squadroncommanders fully regarding theparts their respective squadrons
will take in the raids. He must bea flying officer, and should participate in such raids as his duties
will permit. It is absolutely essential for him to participate inenough over-the-lines duty to
become familiar with the actual
execution of raids. With the development of the wireless telephone he will be able to direct
the execution of a bombing raid
from a point of vantage impossible to a formation leader.

Operations Officer
19. The operations officer willcany out the will of the groupcommander much the Same as
an adjutant does that of a postcommander. He should be chosen for his executive ability, preferably a leading observer who
has had considerable experience
over the lines. He will have immediate supervision of group
operations. It is his duty:(a) To compile and keep
available for the group cornmander and flying personnel all
information of value in the preparation of bombing raids.
(b) To keep an indexed fileof photographs, and a supply ofmaps for the pilots and observers. He will post in the operations room a map of tho sector(1to 80,000, or 1to 50,000
scales) in which the group isoperating, also a map (1to200,000) showing the lines ofthe entire front with the changes
as they occur. For the instructionof the flying personnel he will
post maps upon which are indicated the location of all antiaircraft batteries, airdromes, artill e y positions, hospitals and balloons, both our own and thoseof the enemy.
(c) To post on a bulletinboard all orders and communications, and all bulletins of theArmy, Army corps and divisions,which may be of interest to pilots
and observers of the group.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service(d) To transmit all information obtained from squadron operations officers to the Army Air
Service Commander, and to file
the raid reports of each squadron with the records of thegroup.
(e) To supervise the workof the group photographic officer, to see that all possible photographs of the raids are taken
and proper distribution of theprints made.
(f) To supervise the work ofgroup pilot and observer detailed to instruct new pilots andobservers in the theory andpractice of bombing.
( g ) To instruct selected officers in the duties of the operations office, to supply operations
officers to new squadrons.
(h) To post silhouettes of
all types of our own and enemy
airplanes in places where they
can be studied by all pilots andobservers.
(i) To keep in touch withthe meteorological station, andto post at least twice daily thereports of weather and air conditions.
The group operations officer
should keep intelligence charts
showing all the bombing objectives, and mark daily on duplicate copies the bombardments
effected. He should keep up todate all information of the number and types of enemy aircraftin the sector, their air tactics,
and the best methods to combat
them. He is responsible for thecorrect interpretations of thephotographs taken by the group,389

and for utilizing the information
thus obtained. He is further responsible for the establishingand maintenance of internal liaison, liaison with G 2 Army,
A.A.S.C., and all the pursuit
wings and other groups.
Armament Officer.
20. The duties of the grouparmament officer are:(a) To exercise general supervision over the entire armament of the group.
(b) To advise the groupcommander on the best types ofbombs available for a particularpurpose.
(c) To maintain a close liaison with the ordnance department that the squadrons may
obtain, at the earliest date, any
improvements in bombs, ammunition, guns or armor.

(d) To maintain a personal
liaison with the armament officers of all aviation units, and to
take advantage of the improvements evolved by them.
(e) To advise the supply
officer of the needs of the groupin armament, and see that requisitions are made out to supply them.
The duties of the armament
officer are very important in thegroup. He is responsible for thestoring and care of explosives,and for the protection of the
airplanes against incendiary budlets in combat. He should be an
officer of great initiative as mojt
of the improvements in armament will be developed fromsuggestions made by him to theordnance department. Nearly all
real and effective improvements
result from experience gained at
the front.
Supply Officer
21. The main duty of thegroup supply officer is to keepon hand an adequate but not
an over supply of spare parts.
Enough spare parts is necessaiy
to permit the group to operate
at maximum efficiency; an oversupply decreases the mobility of
the unit when ordered to move.
It requires a constant study ofthe spare parts used by thegroup to estimate the amountnecessary. To prevent an overaccumulation of spare parts th4agroup supply officer must supervise the work of the squadron
officers and issue spare parts toPostwair Review390

the squadron only when actuallyneeded for particular repairs. By
personal visits to the parks one
can leam what supplies are on
hand, and what expected, andthus avoid submitting many useless requisitions.
Instrument Officer.
22. The duties of the instrument officer are:(a) To keep in adjustment
all delicate instruments used inbombing.
(b) To keep up to date
information on the manufacture
and improvement of such instruments.
(c) To recommend improvements in the instruments
and requisition new and improved types.

Radio Officer.
23. The duties of the GroupRadio officer are:(a) To supervise the installation and testing of all radio
equipment.
(b) To install and test all
wireless telephones.
(c) To operate the radio
station.
(d) To carry out orders fromthe group operations officer inestablishing liaison with all otherradio stations at the front.
Photographic Officer
24. The duties of the group
photographic officer are:(a) To command the photographic section.
(b) To supervise the careand installation in the airplanesof all the cameras.
(c) To see that all plates areproperly developed and prints
made.
(d) To see that all prints areproperly marked.
(e) To make the correctinterpretations of the photographs.
(f) To see that the observers
are efficient in the manipulationof the camera.
(9) To collect all the cameras after a raid, and to assume
responsibility for the plates exposed by the observers.
Officer in Charge of Flying Field.
25. The officer in charge ofthe flying field is responsible fordiscipline on the field. His duties
include the following:(a) That pilots comply
strictly with the rules for taking
off and landing, and for piloting
while in the air.
(b) That the sleeves areproperly placed and working all
the time.
(c) That the landling T isalways out in the day time toindicate exactly the direction of
the wind.
(d) That flares and landing
flights are ready and properly
placed to aid airplanes landing
after night has fallen.
(e) That all wrecked airplanes are removed from theairdrome without delay.
(f) To superintend themaintenance of the terrain of
the airdrome that the field be in
the best possible condition for
airplanes to take off and land.
(9) To see that airplanes
parked outside the hangars areproperly aligned.
The officer in charge of theflying field has a very important
bearing on the proper functioning of the group. His (discipline
must be very strict. M.any infractions of the field rules are madeby pilots returning from a raid inwhich the airplanes have suffered from anti-aircraft or enemy

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

airplane attacks. The officer incharge of the flying field must
report every breach of discipline
to the group commander. Thereis a tendency for the group commander to overlook breaches of
discipline when there has been
a severe combat, but the field
officer must enforce the flying
rules to safeguard against accidents. The officer in charge ofthe flying field also assumescommand of the ground targets
for aerial gunners. He should
see that the targets are properly
placed, and danger flags sent up
during practice.
Police OfFcers.
26. The police officer can begiven the odd jobs which do notseem important, but which must
be done for the proper maintenance of the group, when operating against the enemy. It is his
duty:(a)To see that the camp is
kept clean.
(b) To see that all oil, gasoline drums and other material
which cannot be sheltered areproperly placed and neatly
arranged.

391(c) To see that necessary
walks are laid out and maintained.
(d) To take proper precautions to protect the camp against
fire, and to see that fire fighting
facilities are maintained.
(e) To see that the enlisted
personnel use the latrines ordered by the surgeon, and whena group occupies an airdrome
temporarily it is difficult to makethe enlisted personnel observe
the above regulation.
(f) To see that an airdrome
when evacuated is left in propercondition.
Surgeon.
27. The surgeon cares for thehealth and sanitation of thegroup. Close supervision of thegroup surgeon by the groupcommander is necessary. He
should have a comfortablebuilding as a hospital in whichto treat flying personnel sufferingfrom only temporary ailments.
There is a tendency on the partof most group surgeons to evacuate pilots and observers for amonth or more for slight indispositions which could be curledin three days at the group hospital.
The group surgeon will seethat a medical officer is on duty
during flying hours, and an ambulance with a driver on thefield.
Group Transportation Officer.
28. The principal duty of thegroup transportation officer isthe care of all transportation.
(a) He will make requisitionon the group supply officer for- --Postwar Review

392

all transportation and spare partsneeded.
(b) He will supervise theemployment of the transportation in all marches and convoys.
(c) He will see that hischauffeurs are properly instructed in all traffic regulations.
(d) He will see that his enlisted personnel is properly instructed in the care and upkeepof all motor vehicles.
(e) He will see that notransportation is driven from thepark that is not in proper condition.
(f) He will be directly under
the supervision of the groupcommander, and will assign notransportation without his
consent.
Group Adjutant.
29. The group adjutant will
carry out the administrative duties of the group, and will bear
the same relation to the groupcommander that the adjutant ofa post does to the post commander.

Chapter VII. The Squadron

Adjutant.

32. To the adjutant fall theadministrative duties of the
Adjutant.
squadron.
Operations officer.
Ordnance officer.
Operations Officer.
Engineer officer.
33. The duties of the operaSupply officer.
tions officer include:
31. The squadron commander(a) To compile anti keep
is responsible for the operations available for the squadron comof his squadron. He should be a mander and flying personnel all
natural leader of men. His
information of value in the prepsquadron will have no more ini- aration of bombing raids.
tiative than he personally shows,(b) To keep an indexed filenor will the morale of his comof photographs, and a :;upply ofmand be higher than his own.
maps for the pilots and observHe must be a flying officer anders. He will post in the operamust so perfect his organization tions room a map of the sector
as to have time to lead frequent (1to 8O,OOO, or 1 to 50,000)inraids. His adjutant must be capa- which the squadron is operating,ble of looking after the prepara- also a map (1 to 200,000)showtion of raids. Squadron coming the lines of the entire front
manders should be chosen from with the changes as they occur.
the best flight leaders gifted with For the instruction of the flying
executive ability. His more spe- personnel he will post maps
cific duties are:upon which are indicated the(a) To issue orders neceslocation of all anti-aircraft battersary for the execution ofies, airdromes, artillery positions,
missions.
hospitals and balloons, both our(b) To give special instruc- own and those of the ernemy.
tion to his flight leaders on points(c) To post on a bulletin
not covered by the Operations
board all orders and coimmuniofficer.
cations, and all bulletins of the(c) To give personal instruc- Army, army corps or divisions,tion to his flying personnel on
which may be of interest to pilots
the tactics employed in the exe- and observers of the squadron.
cution of missions.
(d) To acquire sufficient intimacy with his flying officers toenable him to judiciously selectpilots and observers for special
missions.

30. Squadron commander.

3 93

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service(d) To post silhouettes of all
types of our own and enemy
airplanes in places where they
can be studied by pilots andobservers.
(e) To instruct selected officers in the duties of the squadron operations officer.
(f) To make proper preparations for all the raids.
(9) To compile all information submitted by pilots and observers returning from a raid andmake written report of same togroup operations officer.
(h) To see that the orders of
the squadron commander aretransmitted to the flying personnel.
(i) To maintain an operations room similar to that of thegroup operations officer.
Ordnance Officer.
34. The ordnance officer isunder the supervision of thegroup armament officer, and is
responsible for the armament of
the squadron. His duties are:(a) To test and calibrate all
ammunition.
(b) To supervise the care of
all machine guns.

(c) To synchronize all machine guns mounted to shootthrough the propeller, and toadjust all sights.
(d) To supervise placing thebombs on all airplanes scheduled for raids.
(e) To see that all bombsights and bomb racks function
properly.
(f) To test all pyrotechnics.
(9) To care for all the explosives in the squadron.
(h) To see that all machineguns mounted for a raid function
properly.
Engineer Officer.
35. The engineer officer has
supervision of all the airplanes,
spare parts and the E. & R.
shops. His duties are:(a)To supervise the overhauling of all motors and thealigning of all airplanes, and to
make all necessary repairs.
Supply Officer
36. The duties of the squadron supply officer are:(a) To take charge ofsquadron stores and supplies.
(b) To make necessary requisitions to the group supply officer for supplies needed in theoperations of the squadron.

Chapter VIII. Reliminary
Training at the Front
37. No matter how thoroughthe course of training given ait
the instruction centers, no bombardment unit is prepared to
begin actual operations against
the enemy when it arrives at thefront. The knowledge that theenemy is but twenty minutes
away brings home to the pilots
and observers the realities ofwar. Hying behind the lines, anda short review of the things they
have learned at training schools,
soon impress them with these
realities, and lead to rapid andreal preparation for work overthe lines.
38. The pilots and observers
will be given a review of their
theoretical course of instruction
to ascertain their fitness for further service. If their previous
training is found to be sufficientthey will be taught from maps,
the exact location of the lines,
and all the topographical features of the sector. Special attention will be directed to prominent landmarks. They will acquaint themselves with the position of all our troops, anti-aircraft batteries, as well as thoseof the enemy. They must learn
the location of all bombing objectives and be able to identify
them from photographs. Thep
must be able to identify at a
glance silhouettes of all our own
and enemy airplanes. They will
be given instruction in the enemy methods of attack and ourPostwar Review

394

tactics for defense. Formationflights will be made e v e y day,approaching nearer to the lines.
Pilots and observers who are
paired off in teams will always
fly together when possible. They
should live together in the samequarters, and know each otherintimately. On the practice flights
the pilots will be given an objective, and the time will be fixed
for leaving the ground andbombing the target. The formation will pass over the flying field
at a given altitude for inspection
by the commanding officer.
39. When the flight returns to
the airdrome the signal to breakformation will be given by theleading observer. The pilots will
obey the rules of the flying field,
landing with the T, and in rotation. This practice will be continued until the pilots and observers know the sector perfectly andcan adhere to the time schedule
while flying tight formation witha full load of bombs. The observers will make observations,practice signals with Vey pistols,
take photographs, and submit
raid reports to the operations
officer immediately after landing.

During this period the pilots andobservers will be given instruction in aerial gunnery withshooting practice at ground targets. The Observers must become expert machine gunners tobe successful in combat withhostile aircraft. This training will
give the squadron commander
an opportunity to select his flight
leaders, and the observers who
are to specialize in photography,
reconnaissance and protection.
40. Leading observers will bechosen from those making thebest records at the bombing
schools. After operations havebegun other observers will begiven an opportunity to qualify
in leading. Some observers
make excellent records in training centers, but fail in duty overthe lines, and vice versa. After
this training the squadron will beready to begin real operations.
Large targets which are close to
the lines and easy to hit should
be chosen as objectives for the
first raids.

Chapter IX. Preparation
for a Raid
41. Day bombardment objectives will be designated by G 3of the Army, and transmitted
through the Army Air Service
Commander to the commanderof the group. Upon receipt of
those orders he will delcide upon
the following:(a) The number of formations and the number of airplanes in each.
(b) The types and weights
of projectiles to be carried.
(c) The route, altitude, andtime of departure and oarrival
over objective of each formation.
(d) The method of pursuit
cooperation.
The pilots and observers mustbe allowed ample time to acquaint themselves with all available information regarding theobjective, both primary and seconday, the route, and the region to be observed arid photographed. The squadron commanders will designate the pilots
and observers who are to participate in the raid, and are responsible for their preparation for the
execution of the mission. They
will designate their flight leaders,and deputy flight leaders, andwill assign positions in the formation to the rest of the teams
scheduled for the raid. The
squadron operations officers willthen prepare the operalion order, a copy of which will be sent
to the group operations officer.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

The Formations
42. Day bombardment squadrons will invariably work in formation. The formation should belarge, as many as eighteen airplanes being easily controlled bya leader when working at highaltitude. For low flying formations in bad weather, eight is the
maximum that can be employed. All formations must havethe following characteristics:(a) Simplicity.
(b) No dead angles.
(c) Concentration of fire to therear.
(d) Concentration of fire below
the center of the formation.
(e) Compactness.
(f) Each airplane must be able
to see the leader.

Day bombardment
operation of one wing.

*

Triplacena

Day Bombard- P u r hmen1 Biplace monoplace

3'95

All formations, whatever thenumber, should fly in a "V'formation with the rear of the Vclosed. Formations of more thanten should have one airplane in
the center of the V at the average altitude of the V. Airplanes
in formation should be numbered as follows:1
3 2

5 12 47
6
9 11 10 8
Number 1 is the leader and fliesat the lowest altitude, Numbers
2, and 3, 4 and 5, and similarly
placed pairs should fly at thesame altitude, numbers 2 and 3
about fifty meters higher thannumber 1, and about thirty meters to the right and left of nutnber 1, respectively. Number 4
takes the same position relative
to number 2 and number 2 withreference to number 1;and
number 6 takes the same position with relation to number 3.
Formations should be as compact as possible, especially when
dropping projectiles; during acombat. formations should close

3 96

up. Too much emphasis cannot
be laid upon the training of day
bombardment pilots in formation
flying. If the pilots maintain aregular echelonrnent in height, incase of emergency they canclose up quickly upon the leader
by diving. The leader should
never open his throttle wide, andObservers should always warn
their pilots whenever their own
or any other airplane appears tobe getting out of formation. It isfatal for an airplane to leave theformation, and the formation
should not be broken up to protect an airplane which has
dropped out.

Day bombardmant
operation of one wrlng.

The Take Off
43. The pilots and observers
should be in readiness on thefield at least thirty minutes before the formation is scheduled
to leave the ground, reporting to
the respective operations officers. This will give the operations
officers time to place any unavailable pilots or observers. The
pilots will utilize this time tomake a thorough inspection of
their airplanes and test their motors, and the observers to arrange their maps, Very pistols,
ammunition drums and to inspect their machine guns. If theflying field is sufficientlylarge theformation will be assembled on
the ground. The flight leader andpilots 2 and 3 leave the groundsimultaneously; 4 and 5 will start

as soon as the wheels of 2 and 3
are in the air, and so on until thewhole formation is in flight. The
leader will throttle down as soon
as he has attained sufficient altitude to do so with safety. When
all the airplanes are in position
the flight leader may make up
traveling speed in climbing, butnever full speed. The only practicable formation maneuver is afigure 8 on a wide circuit ofabout five kilometers.

f
Tri-place+

DayBombardmend BlplmezPUrSUlt

MonoplaceSherman: Tentative Manual

397

for The Employment of

Air Service

make the calculations necessary
for the adjustments of his sightwithout being molested by antiaircraft fire or enemy airplanes.
The target may be approachedeither up or down wind. The
formation should be tight uponcrossing the lines. Any airplane
which cannot hold its position in
the formation must return to theairdrome.

Flight to the Objectiue
44. The formation will attainan altitude of about 1000 metersin the vicinity of the airdrome,
and then upon the signal of one
white star from the leading airplane, follow the prescribedcourse to the lines. The bombing
altitude, generally 4,000 meters
or higher, must be attained before the formation is within fivekilometers of the lines, in orderthat the leading observer may

Bombing the Objectioe
45. When nearing the objective the leading observer willsteer his pilots by means of reinsattached to the pilot’s arms. Thisis necessary because the pilot
has a limited visibility of objects
directly under his airplane. The
leading observer should recheckhis calculations, and then fire the“Prepare to Bomb” signal of six
green stars. When the image ofthe target appears at the blackline in the bomb sight he will pull1
the bomb dropping lever. Allother observers, or pilots as thecase may be, will release theirDay bombardmentttt

operation of one group.

t
T

tr

t

t

5 Spads

t
t t

* *

Tri-place

3 Spadst’t.f. t tt

5Spads*** *10 Breguet

SSpads

*

t

tf
t
t
5 Spads

t
t t

*f *

Tri-place

3Photographic Plane

3 Spads

a
t

t

tt tt
5 Spads
Tri-place

t

-I=

t t

*

t
10 Breguet

*

*
*

tTT
t t
5 Spads

*

tfr
t T

*

5 Spads
Tri-place* *10 Breguett

3 Spads

3 Tri-placeI‘f
Day Bombardment Biplace

Tri-place

f

t
t f

-I=

3 Spadst*- I = *f
T Photographic Planer r

Tri-placei-

Photographic Plane

3 Spads

Pursuitmonoplace

f

tt ‘
t
5 Spads**

Tri-Qlacs**

Pursuit at 1300-1400 meters
Bomber at 12W meters
Triplace at 1200 metersr? t
3 Stlads

Postwar Review

398

bombs the moment those of theleading airplane are seen toleave the racks. Great accuracy
has been obtained by using thismethod of bombing. Precisionbombing over the lines is an art
in which only a few observers
excel. Such observers should bechosen for leading or deputy positions. Bomb sighting requires
cool judgment and intensive observation of the target. Excitement causes inaccuracies. If but
one observer does the sighting
he knows that all the others are
acting as protection, and his excitement is thus lessened.
46. When several formations
are sent to bomb the same objective they should bomb at
thirty second intervals. Upon
leaving the objective they should
all turn in the same direction. In
the performance of a day bombardment mission it is essentialthat the formations reach the objectives exactly on time in orderthat successful cooperation withthe pursuit units designated may
be assured. With successful pursuit cooperation great damage
can be inflicted upon the enemy
with the minimum losses to bothday bombardment and pursuit.

Chart Showing
Functions of Different
Branches of Air Service.
Meters0pn:iy- p."I"yi! 1-0 p!P-tb of -5 -m!ks-yn.e~iy!o-n---- ............................
Day Bombardment of rear areas...............---Army Reconnaissance of rear areas
5000 _-_...........................................
..--- -- .............................
Corps Observation to depth 01 5 miles-5,500

~

~

__-

Enemy
BalloonBalloontoo0

Low flying pursuit-

Low flying Battleplanes(1nfantryStarting)

No Mans LandAn observer and pilot demonstrate steering
the pilot to the objective by reins.

I

3'99

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

During the Argonne-Meuse offensive the cooperation between
day bombardment and pursuit
was responsible for seventy-five
per cent of the enemy airplanes
brought down by the 1st Pursuit
Wing.
The Return Route
47. To spend the minimum
amount of time over hostile territory is the aim of every formation leader. The route from theobjective back to the lines must
be chosen with consideration of
the direction of the wind, theposition of the sun, the locationof cloud banks, the most accurate enemy anti-aircraft batteries,
and the probable direction of
attack by enemy aircraft. If thepresence of hostile aircraft does
not make it inadvisable the formation leader should always
take the advantage of the wind
to regain the lines. It is sometimes advisable to fly toward thesun, and thus put the enemy
under the disadvantage of facing
the strong light. The leader
should avoid passing underclouds which offer concealment
to hostile airplanes. Clouds under the formation or at the samelevel, may be utilized for protection. Frequent changes of direction should be made, but theyshould be made slowly. Rapidchanges of direction may causea rear airplane to lag, which USUally results in its destruction.
Speed does not enter very muchinto the safe return of the formation. The formation should beformed to afford no vulnerable
point of attack, as its safety depends upon its fire superiority.

Breaking Formation andLanding
48. Having recrossed thelines, beyond which enemy pursuit airplanes seldom venture,
the formation leader begins along glide toward the airdrome.
When nearing the landing field
the leading observer fires agreen rocket as a signal to breakformation. The airplanes circle
the airdrome and land accordiing
to number in formation, Number
1 first, followed by Number 2,
and so on. All airplanes land into
the wind, as indicated by the 'T.
The landing rules must be strictly
observed. The observers and pilots report immediately to theirrespective operations officers on
the field, and submit written raid
reports, which include results (ofthe bombardment, observationsof enemy movements on the
ground and in the air, the nurnber of enemy airplanes brought
down, and our own losses.
Low Bombing Raids
49.At the beginning of anadvance, or during an offensive,by either friendly or hostile
troops, there are occasions when
day bombardment must resort tolow bombing. Such conditions
arise when the weather conditions are such that altitude cannot be attained to cany out theimperative bombardments.
Other occasions are when certain bridges must be destroyed,
but the topographical features
around the objective make it impossible for artilley fire to accomplish that destruction. Day

400

bombardment must be used at
low altitudes against suchobjectives.
50. The time element often
prevents the accomplishment ofsuch missions. The day bombardment airdromes are at considerable distance from the front
lines, and time is required fortransmitting the information, andfor warming up the high powered engines. Often the conditions have changed before thebombers amve at the objective.
A heavily loaded bombing airplane is slow in climbing andmaneuvers, and therefore unsuited for this kind of work. The
best type of airplane for low
bombing is one that can climb
and maneuver quickly. The rot a y engine, which is air cooled,
and can be started v e y readily,
and which continues to run after
being hit by enemy bullets,
would, therefore be better than
the fiied motor for low bombing. The accuracy and volume ofground fire causes so many
losses that low bombing is extremely costly, even if our forces
have supremacy of the air.

Postwar Review

51. When orders are received Chapter X. Combiat
for a low bombing mission the
52.General Principles. The
group commander decides thethree general tactical principles
number of airplanes to be sent in in order of their importance are:formation, never more than six.
(a) The effective bombing of theGreat care should be taken in
objective.
selecting the leader. He should(b) The reduction of our losses
be daring and know the terrain
to a minimum.
perfectly, and the exact location(c) The inflicting of the greatest
k m e s to enemy aviation. Tactics ofof our own troops. The pilots
day bombardment in combat are,should be chosen for their skill
therefore, defensive,and daring, as there is always
danger of collisions when,the53. Due to the size of a bombbombers operate at v e y low al- ing formation, and the slow matitudes. When descending toneuvers necessary, quick changes
bomb the pilots should “strafe”
of direction and steep dives are
the objective, to demoralize theimpracticable. The bombers mustenemy and prevent accurate fire depend upon the nature of theirfrom the ground. The observers formation, which should be such
use their machine guns before
as to give them fire suiperiority.
and after they have released
The formation should have symthe bombs.
metry, simplicity and compactness, with no dead angles, andshould permit a concentration offire to the rear and below thecenter. Each pilot must be able
to see the leader. A formation
so formed, with well trained pilots and observers, can defend
itself against superior riumbersof the enemy.
54. The formation is limited to
the number of airplanes which
can be maneuvered b!y a formation leader. The importance ofthe objective determinces thenumber of airplanes to be employed in a particular raid. Whenthe number required is greaterthan can be used in one formation the mission passes fromsquadron size to that clf the401

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

group. The plan of group bombing is analogous to the chain
formation employed by pursuit
aviation. The several flight leaders are subordinate to the leaderof the leading formation, andmust make their tactics correspond to his. It is a governing
principle that the chain of responsibility must never be broken, from airplane to airplane in
the squadron, and from formation to formation in the group.
This leads to the question offormation leaders, upon whom
the success or failure of operations very largely depends.

Formation Leader
55. A formation leader to be
successful must have the absolute confidence of his pilots andobservers. Under definite orders
at all times, much depends upon
his quick decisions and accurate
estimates of tactical situations.
The tactical situation oftenchanges his plans. The appearance of cloud banks, a change inthe direction of the wind, a sudden burst of sunlight, or new
methods of attack by the enemy,
make it imperative for him tothink and act quickly to carry out
his mission in the face of alteredconditions. He must know justwhat reliance can be placed oneach pilot. He must so arrange
his pilots, and the chain of responsibility in the formation, thatno matter how great the losses
incurred the formation will preserve its units. He must be amodel of discipline, and enforce
the same from his pilots. Thoughtempting aircraft targets often
appear he must remember thatthe safety of the formation depends upon its unity, and neither
he nor any other pilot should
break formation to attack individually. He must sacrificechances for personal glory incombat to the object of his mission, which is to reach andbomb the objective and return
without loss.

Enemy Methods of Attack
56. The deciding element inaerial combat is usually surprise.
The enemy will employ allmeans at his disposal to conceal
his approach. His most usual
methods are to climb into thesun, and approach from that direction with the advantage oflight and altitude. When the enemy gets between a formationand the sun he often escapes
detection until he actually opens
fire. He will also take advantage
of cloud banks to screen his approach. Sometimes when operating as a chain one flight ofenemy pursuit airplanes will follow the bombers to attract theirattention, while other flights approach unnoticed. His aim is tobreak up the formation, or atleast isolate several of the bombers, and then by concentration
to destroy them. Sometimes asingle enemy pursuit airplane
will fly below and in front of theformation in an attempt to enticea bombing pilot to dive at him.
Other enemy airplanes, atgreater altitudes, will immediately dive on the bomber thus
separated from the formation.
57. Having decided to attack,several of the enemy usually approach from the rear, and open
fire at about 200 meters. While
the observers are engaged withthose at the rear other attacking
airplanes will dive under the formation and attack from the deadangle under the tail. This attack
is usually directed at the airplanes at the rear of the formation. Other airplanes will dive

402

rapidly at either side of the formation and rake the whole armof the V with deflection fire.
One, or perhaps two,will try toshoot down the leader, and thus
break up the formation. Occasionally when the enemy has
vastly superior numbers, he will
make a determined rush at theformation. This attack, when
made by experienced flights, isvery hard to combat, especially if
the bombers are inexperienced.
An enemy formation sometimes
flies parallel to the bombing formation at slightly greater altitude. In an attack of this kind theindividual pilots make sudden
dives at the flank of the bombers, deliver their bursts, and thensideslip to safety before regaining their positions alongside andabove the formation.

Methods of Defense
58. The observer first to sight
enemy airplanes fires a rocket ofsix red stars. The formationtightens up, and the observers
fire at the nearest enemy airplanes. Fire is concentrated
upon the leading airplanes until
they turn back, or are brought
down. When this is accomplished fire is brought to bear on
the enemy airplanes which venture closest to the formation.
During a combat the pilots watch
the progress of the fighting bymeans of mirrors, and endeavor
to maneuver their airplanes into
the best firing positions for theobservers, and at the same time
keep their places in formation.
The formation leader maneuvers
to take advantage of the wind,clouds and sunlight. He should
never increase the formation
speed beyond that possible tothe slowest airplane in the formation. In a group operation hewill lead his formation so theguns of the other formations canbe brought to bear on the enemy. The leaders of the otherformations will maneuver toconform to the necessities ofgroup protection. If an observer
has his guns completely
jammed, or if he is too badly
wounded to operate his guns,
the pilot will fly directly below
the leader for protection. If a
motor is put out of commission
the pilot will attempt to regain
the lines. The leader can sometimes maneuver a formation toprotect a pilot who has been
forced to drop out, but no pilot

will leave the formation for that
purpose. The leader rnust always
bear in mind the prearranged
cooperation with the pursuit,and try to lead the enemy toward the rendezvous. The pursuit airplanes can inflict great
losses by attacking when the enemy is engaged with thebombers.

Tactics of a Single Two-Seater
59. When a bombing airplane
becomes separated from the formation the pilot and observer
generally have to fight their way
back to the lines. A large bombing formation attracts enemy
pursuit airplanes from over awide area. Pilots with motor
trouble, or forced to drop behindbecause of broken control wires,are attacked by enemy airplanes
from the main combat as well as
those which were too late toattack the formation proper.
When thus attacked the pilot
must fly an irregular course. He
must give his observer every
chance to fire bursts at favorable
targets, and try to reach the lines
as quickly as possible. If the attacking airplanes are riumerous,
and the pilot, consideling thedisability of his airplane, sees nochance to cut his way through, it
is well to make a tight spiral indescending. Often a pilot canrisk the accuracy of ground fire if
such a maneuver would throw
off the attacking airplanes.

Sherman: Tentative Manual

403

for T h e Employment of
Air Service

Part V. Balloons

Chapter 11. Information

Chapter I. Organization

1. That which is collected intime of peace. This consists of astudy of maps, of types of balloons and airplanes of our own
and other nations, and of suchother information as is available.
2. That which is gathered intime of hostilities. This consists of
all information gathered duringhostilities by balloon companies
at the front. In general this information is only that which is seenfrom the basket, relative to troop
movements, destructions, enemy

1. The Mobile Army. There
should be a balloon company
for each division, one for eachcorps, and three companies as
reserve balloons for each army.
These companies should becompletely motorized in order toassure efficient functioning withthe elements of the army withwhich they are working.
2. Tables of Organization. The
details of organization, theamounts and kinds of transportation, and the factors on which
the allowance of transportation isbased are fixed in the Tables ofOrganization, Air Service, US.
Army.
Within a corps, a balloon
company should be assigned toeach division and one to thecorps. These assignments shouldbe permanent or at least continue while the divisions are withthe corps, so that perfect liaison
can be established.

batteries, infantry actions, information on our own artillery fire,
flares, explosions, fires, etc. This
information is transmitted to the
Information and Operation Sections of the General Staff of theunit with which the balloon is
working. The means of communication is usually the telephone,but in the event of the failure ofthis means, recourse is had toradio-telegraphy, radio-telephony, visual signalling, or runner.
3. The only other reconnaissance which balloon personnel iscalled upon to make is that byballoon observers in airplanes tomake themselves more familiar

404with the immediate field of operations.
4. Reports. In addition to routine administrative reports, thefollowing reports are submitted.
(a) By balloon companies toGroup Headquarters.
(1)Daily balloon company report.
(2) Observers’ ascension
report.
(3)Report on enemy balloons.
(4) Daily hydrogen report.
(b) By Balloon Group to
Balloon Wing, and to General
Staff of unit with which employed.
(1)Daily Balloon Group
Report.
(c) By Balloon Wing toArmy Air Service Operation Section.
(1)Daily Balloon Wing
Report.

Chapter 111. Security
Security embraces all thosemeasures taken by a balloon
company to protect itself fromobservation, annoyance, or surprise by the enemy.
(a) From observation. Thisconsists of all the ordinary precautions taken by troops in thefield to prevent observation by
the enemy. It further consists ofall possible efforts to conceal the
position of the balloon bed. Thisis effected by choosing defiladed
positions which are also concealed by overhead Screens suchas trees, vines, etc. It is further
effected by the use of vari-colored camouflage balloon fabric.
When the balloon is out of itsbed, great care should always betaken to leave nothing in thevicinity of the bed which would
disclose its position. All machine
gun and automatic cannon positions should be screened fromobservation. When the balloon isin the air, screening should be
provided for the winch, tenderand personnel from aerial observation. These points cannot be
too highly emphasized as they
are vitally essential to uninterrupted functioning.

(b) From annoyance. Thisconsists of an equipment of machine guns and automatic cannon on anti-aircraft mounts
manned by experienced personnel. As the chief sourl:e of annoyance by the enemy is their
airplanes, specialists are trainedin balloon companies whose
only duties are to study continuously types of airplanes and to
watch the sky for thern. Theselookouts and the anti-aircraft armament personnel miist be
highly trained. Furthermore, balloon company commiinders
must always arrange to have atleast one anti-aircraft (artillery
battery within protective radius.
(c) From surprise. This consists of the usual precautions
against surprise as well as theproper training and functioningof lookouts.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment of
Air Service

Chapter IV. Marches
A successful march, whetherin peace or war, is one thatplaces the company at its destination at the proper moment
and in the best possible condition.
In war, marches are of frequent occurrence, and successdepends in a great measure
upon the skill with which they
are conducted.
Balloon companies, being
completely motorized, move always as a motor train.
There are two types ofmarches undertaken by balloon
companies: those with the balloon inflated, and those with theballoon packed.

12 The maneuvering spider consisted Of
several ropes-usually 4 in number, at least 1
inch in diameter to permit firm hand grasp, andusually about 25 feet ol&-spciledinto a common eye which was fastened to Me maneuvering block (pulley) through which passed thecable to the balloon The winch to which thecable was attached was sltuated some distance
Iran the block, the latter being weighted withsand bags so as to keep it down near. but nottouching, the ground The purposa of the spider
was to provide a means of applying manpower
to the block By pulling on the ropes. men could
haul down the balloon when the winch was outof order, or they could maneuver the block so as
to bring the balloon around an obstacle

405

Marches with the balloon
packed follow the rules and regulations prescribed for motor
trains.
The rate and length ofmarches with the balloon inflated depend on the tactical situation entirely. The rate is dependent only on the rate oftravel of the winch transporting
the balloon.
The most common forms of
obstacles encountered during amarch with balloon inflated arewires crossing the road, camouflaging crossing the road, trees
bordering the road, and tallbuildings on narrow streets invillages. Wires may be either insulated or high tension, and radio antennae are sometimes
found stretching across roads.
These latter are usually on v e yhigh poles or from the tops oftall trees. It is usually consideredadvisable in crossing wires topull the wires down and when
the winch has crossed them, tofasten them up immediately.
This is far better than cutting thewires and splicing them together

afterwards. Sometimes, however, wires must be cut and ifthey are, they should be immediately repaired. Often, it will benecessa y to maneuver the balloon over wires rather than to
cut them or let them down, but
the first two methods are better if
the number of wires is not too
great. In maneuvering the balloon over wires, use can bemade of the tender in conjunction with the winch, or by throwing the maneuvering ropes over
the obstacles one by one andslowly working the balloon overin that manner.
With reference to maneuvering around trees, the height of
the trees must be considered,their proximity to the road, extent to which branches reachover road, and the velocity anddirection of the wind. The maneuvering spider1*can usually
be used to v e y good advantage
in passing trees, and they may
often be maneuvered around by
what is known as “jockeying.”
This consists of taking the opportunity, when the balloon
swings back and forth in thewind, of catching it at the rightangle and driving quickly past
the tree. Most trees, however,can be passed by running thewinch on the windward side of
the road and by the use of the
maneuvering spider. Occasionally the balloon can be put up
100 meters higher than it is usually transported and then hauleddown rapidly. This straightens
out the cable and to some extent
overcomes the action of thePostwar Review

406wind on the balloon by the rapid
descent. If at the same time thewinch moves, the obstacle canbe passed.
In passing through villages
practically the same means canbe used as in traveling alongroads bordered with trees.
The usual maneuvering heightof a balloon is about 100 meters.
This, of course, varies with thewind.
Roads should be reconnoitered before the march so thatthe best roads can be picked.
In maneuvering with the balloon inflated, the train should bemade up as follows:(a) Light truck ahead carrying telephone material and personnel.
(b) Winch, with winch crew,
maneuvering officer, and theballoon.
(c) The tender, transporting
men of the maneuvering squad,and machine guns.
(d) The remainder of thetrucks, in whatever order isdeemed best by the company
commander.
It is always more desirable tomove by day than by night, but
often, due to exigencies of theservice, it becomes necessary to
make night marches. If this becomes necessary a reconnaissance of the road by daylight isimperative. If it is possible tochoose the time of marching, theearly morning or the early evening are usually best as there isoften a lull in the wind at
those times.

Chapter V. Combat
1. Combat Principles.
(a) Duties of Company
Commander. In addition to his
regular administrative duties, thecompany commander must be
responsible for the proper use of
the balloon, its defence, its
marches, choosing of new sites,reconnaissance of roads, liaison
with units which he is working,communications, and supplies.
He is assisted in the ex‘ecution ofthese duties by the various officers within the company, but hehimself is responsible for theirproper accomplishment.
(b) Duties of Maneuvering
Officer. The Maneuvering Officer
has, under the supervision of thecompany commander, completecharge of the balloon and its
accessories, the protection squadand the winch. He is responsible
for the proper safeguarding of
the balloon against attack, forthe proper posting of his means.of defense, for the safety of theobservers, and for the housing
and precautions against observations for his balloon.
(c) Protection against attack.
Machine guns and automaticcannon should be so placednear the point of ascension as togive the best barrage against an
attacking plane. Lookouts
should be posted at most advantageous points from which they

can scan the sky. Thsey should
be close enough to the ascension point, however, to permit ofa clear transmission of warning
by word of mouth.
(d) Liaison. Group Commanders and Company Commanders should strive at all
times to be in perfect liaison withthe heavier-than-air units in theirsector, the commanding officers
of units with which the companies are working and the various
section of the General Staff ofCorps and Divisions. This is ofutmost importance.
(e) Combat Ord,ers should
be issued by Group Commanders to their balloons. ’Those orders should conform to the combat orders of the corps and divisions. They should asign duties,
and prescribe routes of movement either forward or rearward.
(f) Army Balloon Wing
Commanders are responsible forthe reconnaissance of all roadsin their sector. Maps should be
published showing all roads
passable for balloons. We should
confer with Signal Officers ofunits in the Army and arrange sothat no overhead wire crosses
roads marked on the map “Balloon Roads.” He should see tothe placing of signs, such as“Balloon Road-No Overhead
Wires,” on all roads i n the army
sector which balloons may
have to pass.

Sherman: Tentative Manual
for The Employment
of Air Service

Offensive Combat
1. During offensive combat,
companies assigned to divisions
move with the troops of the division. The liaison officer at thedivisional P.C.transmits information and orders to the company commander relative to
movements. In order to assure aplace in the line of march inadvance, the balloon company
should be attached to a neighboring artillery unit, and movewith it. The details of routes andpositions are, of course, decided
upon before the advance takes
place.
2. Eking in a position, withliability to move forward, in addition to the regular net of telephone lines, a forward line
should be run and a forward
telephone central established.
The line should be run as far
forward as possible, and the advance central placed so that it
will be convenient to the next
contemplated stop. This facilitates uninterrupted telephone
communication with units withwhich the balloon is working.
Defensiue Combat
1. In a defensive sector, allroads to the rear should be reconnoitered and routes established by each company commander. On days when the balloon cannot ascend, the person-407

nel of the company should be
utilized to construct balloon beds
and positions at intervals along
the line of retirement as far to
the rear as time permits.
2. As in a advance, telephonelines should be run to the rear, arear central established, and as
many telephone preparations as
possible made for successive
rearward positions.
Night Combat
1. Balloons cannot do a great
deal of work at night. They areable to see flares, signals, etc.,
but locations cannot ordinarilybe accurately determined. Bymeans of an electric signallingdevice, messages can be sentfrom balloons to front line positions and to the rear. Balloons
can also be used as a receiving
point for messages.

Chapter VI. Artillery Adjustments
1. To insure efficient cooperation with Artillery for the regulation of fire, balloon officers
should meet with the artillery
officers each evening for the
purpose of securing detailed information concerning the batteries which will fire the following
day and the targets which they
will engage. It is a general rulethat the evening conference
should arrange to divide the observation so that balloons willobserve fire for all targets which
can be seen from balloons. Allother targets will have the fire
regulated by the airplanes of anobservation squadron. Whenpersonal liaison of this kind is
impossible the information fromthe artillery should be obtainedby telephone.
2. The balloon observers
should know in advance the following:
Coordinates of targets.
Batteries which will fire.
Caliber and number of pieces tofire.
Nature of fire (salvo or one pieceat a time).
Type of projectiles with time offlight and type of fuse.
Interval between shots.

Postwar Review

408

3. After securing information
concerning the targets the observer should then procure thefiring maps and photographs
covering the target area.
4. Adjustments are reported
on the line battery target. Distances are reported in meters to
the “right,” “left,” “over,” and“short,” stating first the deflection followed by the range, thus,“25 right,” “50 over.”5. Figures are given by theirdigits, i.e., “two five right,” “fivezero over.”6. The telephone communication between balloon and battery should conform to the following example:
Battery: “Battery ready to fire.”
Observer: “Ready to observe.”
Battery: “No. 1 on the way,etc.”
“No.2 on the way,etc.”
Observer: “No. 1 two five right,
etc.”

7. Shots should be reported“lost” if not seen, but reported
as “not in position to observe”
when the movement of the basket, a passing cloud, or otherobstacle prevents a proper viewof the target. When a salvo isreported “lost” by an observer
the artillery fires the next salvo
with data intermediate between
that and the last salvo seen andthe one lost, but if the report is“not in a position to observe,”
the salvo is repeated with thesame data.
8. In order to observe successfully for several batteries simultaneously, it is necessary to havevery efficient fire and telephone
discipline; also knowing accurately the batteries which are
to fire.

Appenaices

41 1

A. Funds For Military Aviation' 1 9 0 ~ 1 9 1 8
1 Oct 1908
4 Nov 1909
3 Mar 1911
24 Aug 1912
2 Mar 1913
27 Apr 1914
4 Mar 1915
31 Mar 1916
29 Aug 1916
14 Feb 1917
12 May 1917
12 Jun 1917
15 Jun 1917
24 Jul 1917
6 Oct 1917
8 Jul 1918
9 Jul 1918
4 Nov 1918

Allotted by Board of Ordnanceand Fortifications
Allotted by Board of Ordnanceand Fortifications
Appropriated by Congress, FY
1912
Appropriation for FY 1913
Appropriation for FY 1914
Appropriation for FY 1915
Appropriation for FY 1916
Emergency Appropriation
Appropriation for FY 1917
Aviation Seacoast Defenses
Appropriation for FY 1918
Seacoast Defense, Panama
Canal
Emergency Appropriation
Emergency Appropriation
Urgent Deficiency Act
Aviation Stations, Seacoast Defenses
Emergency Appropriation
Appropriation-

25.00025,0002125,0003
100,00125,000
250,OOO4
300,000
500,000
13,881,6665
4,800,000
10,800,000

750,000
43,450,000
640,000,000
8,300,0006
8,000,000
884,304,758
60,000,000

1. Adapted from chart prepared by Historical Section. Information Group, Air Service, 23
May 1919. in History of the Bureau of Aircrafl Production (reproduced by Hist. O f t , AMC.
1951).Vol I. p 104.
2. For purchase 01 the Wright plane.
3. $25.000 available immediately.
4. $50.000 available immedialely.
5. Includes $600.000 for purchasing land for aviation sites.
6. Allocation from $40.000.000 lor Signal Service.

Postwar Review

41 2

B. Squadron Plans and Programs
1917-1918

Document Date of Plan Observationor Proaram

5; g;

- -m
s

t .F
z

:

n

I'

Date lor
Comoletion 01
Plan or
Project;

I-

1OJul 17

15 24

39

15"

5

59

Dec 18

15 24

80"

120

60'

260

Dec 18

1 Jan 18

(Ratio of 2 Obs to 6 Pur to 1 Bomb)100

Dec 18

6 Feb 18(100 squadrons of 1 Jan 18 plus 20
bomb)

120

Dec 185 J u n 18

15 24

260

Jun 19

3b

120

41 60

101

29Jul 18

49 52

101

147

55 55

110

358

Jun 1916Aug 18

49 52

101

60

14 27

41

202

Jun 19_ _ _ _ ~Ten for corps and 5 for army aviation
In addition to corps and army, 41 for strategical aviation' In addition to corps (10) and army (5),105 for strategical aviation%

Total
Sauadrons

18Sep17_____"

Pursuit Bombardment

In addition l o army aviation (5). 55 for strategical aviation
Divided between 40 monoplace and 80 biplacehaex*

Adjutants, duties of: 281, 323, 325, 327, 392
Administration, responsibility for: 268, 281, 323, 325, 327
Adrianople: 13-1 5
Accidents. See Aircraft, losses
Aerial photography. See Photography, aerial: Reconnaissance andobservation
Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps: 1
Air defenses. See Antiaircraft defenses and Weapons
Air operations
Bombing operations. See Bombing operations
Communications in. See by type
Escort and patrol missions. See Escort and patrol missions
fighter operations. See Pursuit operations
first by United States: 86, 173
formations. See Formations and maneuvers, combat
limitations: 303-304
maneuvers, combat. See Formations and maneuvers, combat
in Meuse-Argonne offensive: 23145
mission assignments. See Mission assignments
orders, typical: 247-49
patrols. See Escort and patrol missions
pursuit operations. See Pursuit operations
responsibility for: 187-89
support missions. See Escort and patrol missions
tactics. See Tactics
three-dimensional factor in: 307
Air Service (see also air units by type); Aviation Section, Signal
Corps
appropriations for: 1, 3739, 55, 57, 67-73, 91, 101-1 05
autonomy proposed: 3, 72, 97, 103, 108, 153, 192
Aviation Section created: 21
chief, duties of: 125
as combat arm: 192, 263, 311, 313, 316, 322
command and control: 187-89
flight pay, dissension over: 91
morale status. 311
relation to other arms: 41
reserve components: 55, 63, 101* Photo captions indicated by italic

413

414

staff appointments and shifts: 155-56
of armies: 187-88
of corps: 188-89, 326-27
Air Service Information Circular: 303, 313
Air Service Production Center: 197
Air speeds: 62-63
Air superiority, importance and attainment: 49-50, 99, 101, 113,
117, 120, 123, 213, 216, 244, 247-49, 307408, 314, 369
Air units. See b y type
Aircraft (see also Balloons; Dirigibles)
air speeds: 62-63
allotments to squadrons: 19, 55-57, 59-61, 95
altitudes, operational: 24, 29, 48, 63, 80, 87, 200, 206
armament and equipment: 39, 59, 67, 75, 93, 95, 97-98, 123,
378-80balloons, cooperation with: 43
bombing missions. See Bombing operations
capabilities and limitations: 303-306, 315
characteristics and requirements: 47-48, 50
in coast defense support: 35, 39, 42-43, 55, 57, 60, 91-92, 9697
combat capability: 101
command use of: 199-200, 205-1 1, 232, 234, 240, 242, 269,
295, 327, 336, 341
commercial uses foreseen: 99
costs of purchase and maintenance: 61, 67, 69, 93, 96, 223
courier service by: 334-36
in defense against air attack. See Pursuit operations
development, production and procurement: 1, 7, 38, 62-63, 6769, 78, 86, 92, 95, 100, 105, 131-33, 147, 156-57, 195-96
equipment for. See Armament and equipment
in fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction
first purchase: 68, 70
foreign development: 47, 63, 101, 141-43, 151, 162
fueling and refueling: 78
ground units, assignment to: 18, 51, 55, 57, 60, 65, 89, 95-97,
111, 123, 127-29, 136, 156, 165, 167, 182-83, 189, 196,
205-11, 223, 269, 295-98
hangars, location and security: 148, 317, 319, 386-87
identification, friend or foe: 273, 309, 311, 335, 337, 348, 352,
385, 389, 393

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. II4.1 5

Index

instruments, flight control by: 68,379,381
liaison role. See Liaison operations and systems
longevity estimates: 72,92,148
losses and condemnations: 1, 68-69,75-77,81,84-87, 92,95
maintenance, repair and replacement: 27,57,60-62,67-69, 78,

80,92,96-98,123,148,169, 192,223,327
nonstop flight records: 84
number in service and required: 1, 27-28,42,60,6849,92,

101,135
performancestatistics: 95
radio communications among: 349,354,363,382
in reconnaissance and observation. See Reconnaissance andobservation
reserve inventories: 61
safety features development: 72
salvage operations: 78,81,85
as surprise deterrent: 33,50
transportation role: 33-35
transporting: 149
types. See Aircraft types
vulnerability: 98,306
Aircraft types
bombers, development and procurement: 50-51, 55-57, 67,

103,133,135,167
Breguet: 252, 342
Burgess: 68-69
Burgess-Dunne: 26, 68
Burgess-Wright36
Caproni: 146classification: 4243,47,50
combat types development: 38
Curtiss: 10,56, 62-63,67-69,71,73, 75,78,86,93
De Havilland: 148,156,410
Duperdussin: 63
experimental: 68-69,72
Farman: 8,16
fire-control types development: 38
Gotha: 141
Handley-Paige: 143,144, 146,149,156,157, 191
JN. See Curtiss above
Martin: 54, 62,69, 78,178
pursuit types, production and procurement: 105,133,135,156,

167
reconnaissance types development: 38,67,72,105,135
Salmson: 342

416

US. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. II

Sloane: 78
Sturtevant: 78
Thomas: 78
trainers: 69,105
Wright: 10,39, 68,70-71
Airfields
construction and repair: 156,171
enemy strikes against: 146,162,387
identifying: 283
landing rules: 380
officer in charge, duties of: 390-91
railroads, access to: 31 8
road systems, access to: 318
safety equipment at: 380,384
site selection and security: 92,14849,156,184,192,243,291,

317-18,383,386-87
strikes against enemy: 120,163,232,234,23840,251,383
Aisne-Marne offensive: 219
Aisne River: 24041,247
Alerted flights: 276,285-86,289,292,372
Allen, James: 14
Altitudes, operational
aircraft, general: 24,29,48,63,80,87,200,206
balloons: 93,181,406
in bombing operations: 397
in fire control and direction: 308,337
in liaison operations: 223,345
in pursuit operations: 213-14,216,285,287,294,336-37,370,

373,381-82
in reconnaissance and observation: 21 1 , 283-84,306,337,342
Amanty: 386
American Expeditionary Forces
expansion program: 219-20
organization: 127-29
personnel, numbers and required: 127-29,135-37
squadrons as elements of: 192,263

staff structure: 125
American Smelter & Refining Co.: 83

41 7

Index

Ammunition
against balloons: 375,377,379
dumps. See Supply depots
incendiaries: 375
supply. See Supply operations and systems
tracers: 379
Ammunition train: 65
Anderson, Harry B.: 237
Andrews, Avery A.: 103
Anthony, Daniel R.,Jr.: 27,29,69
Antiaircraft defenses and weapons (see also Ground forces)
British: 162
enemy: 206,284,330,338,374,376
in ground units: 304,308-309,317-18,336,384
liaison with: 215
prewar concepts: 5,72
Appropriations, Air Service: 1-3,17,27-31,37-39,53,55-57,59-

63,65,67-73,91-101,105
Argonne Forest: 248
Armament and equipment
aircraft: 39,59,67,75,93,95,97-98, 123,378-80
development, production and procurement: 141,171
dirigibles: 47,93
responsibility for: 187-88,270
transportation of: 31 9
Armament officers, duties of: 324,389
Armengaud, Paul: 246
ArmiesFirst: 188-89,225,23145,24749
Second: 251
air service chiefs, duties of: 187-88
air service command and control: 225,322,325-28
air service organization: 65,96,128-29, 165,234-37, 322,325
Armistice signed: 249
Army Group, Center: 241
Army War College: 41-53,55,65

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

418

Arnold, Henry H.: 2,3,12-13,776,177
Artillery fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction
Artillery units. See Field Artillery; Ground forces
Atkins, A. K.: 105
Atkinson, Bert M. 230,231,237,241-42,245
Audun-le-Roman: 238,242
Austria-Hungary, aircraft in inventory: 28
Automobiles. See Motor vehicles; Transportation
Autonomy, proposed and actual: 3,72,97,103,108,153,192
Aviation school: 37-39,55,57,59-60, 71,89,96
Aviation Section, Signal Corps: 21. See also under Air Service
Bachineva, Mexico: 80
Baker, Chauncey B.: 127
Baker, Newton D.:65,67-72,75,91,100,105,219
Balkan Wars: 11-12,47
Balloon companies
2d: 173
combat practices: 406-407
command and control: 406-407
convoys and marches: 405-407
ground forces, assignment to: 255,403,407
liaison by: 406
mission assignments: 43-45, 225,240
number in service and required: 227-28
orders, issuance and transmission: 406
organization: 45,403
Balloon school: 1 19
Balloons
altitudes for: 93,181,406
ammunition against: 375,377,379
attacks on: 214-15, 232-33,241-42,249,286,294,374,375-

77,382-83
Caquot: 44
construction features: 45

419

Index

cooperation with: 43
in fire control and direction: 24,108,121,181-85,255,258-59,

346,377,407-408
Italian development: 93
in liaison: 202-203,223,255,345-46
in Meuse - Argonne offensive: 231
in night operations: 407
operational area: 181
in reconnaissance and observation: 23-24,43-45,93,121,

181-85,202-203,255-61,330,377,403-404
security of: 404
types in use: 43
Baltimore, Md.: 15
Barber, Alvin B.: 127,135,169
Bayonville: 242
Beaumont: 248
Beck, Paul W.: 2, 3,8Belgium: 93
Bengal flare: 201-202,208-209,258,296,298-99,336
Bennett, James Gordon: 119
Billeting. See Housing
Bisani: 13
Bloch, Captain: 237
Boca Grande, Mexico: 84-85
Bois de Barricourt: 248
Bolling, Raynal C.: 730, 131-33
Bomb sights: 253
Bombardiers, training program: 191
Bomber - observation - pursuit ratio: 169
Bombing operations: 47,50-51, 55-57, 101,108,1 1 1-1 3,120,

131-32,195,376,384
accuracy in: 61,154,253,278
aircraft efficiency in: 400
altitudes for: 397

US. Air' Service

420

in World War I
Vol. II

area versus precision bombing: 253
as Army function: 156bases for: 145-46, 151
British cooperation in: 151-53,159,161-63,191-92,241-42,

248
British doctrine: 253
command and control: 151
critique of: 157
defense against enemy fighters: 278
definition and object: 143
by dirigibles: 45,57,61
effectiveness: 57,161-62
enemy plans and practices: 141-42,147
enemy tactics against: 401-402
first drop: 9
first target: 250
formations and maneuvers: 51,253,277-79,395-403
French cooperation in: 151-53,159,161-63,191-92,231-45,

247
French doctrine: 253
by Germany: 1 1 , 61
ground forces, attacks on: 234,249,251,369-75
international law considerations: 145
landings after: 399
leaders, responsibilities during: 401
low-altitude raids: 399-400
in Meuse - Argonne offensive: 397
mission assignments: 225,231-34,236-45,247-49,251,276
Mitchell views on: 12
morale, effect on: 142,150,162,251,304,310,314,316,335
night operations: 120,131-32,142,146,156,162,191,195,232-34,241-42
number of aircraft engaged: 162
operational areas: 251
operational routines: 276-77
orders, issuance and transmission: 31 1, 318,327-28,338-40,

388,392,394
organization for: 155
policies, priorities and plans in: 141-57,159,161-63
prewar concepts, tests and experience: 4-5,7-9,12-17,33-35
pursuit operations, cooperation with: 213-14,279,286,290,

379,382,398,402
return routes: 399
security measures in: 401-402
staff organization for: 152,155

421

Index

tactics: 277-79, 400-403
takeoff system: 396
target selection and assignment: 117, 143-45, 149, 151, 153,
i92,23i-32,238-45,25i,253,279,309-i 0,394
techniques in: 397-99
three-dimensional factor in: 307
time and distance factors in: 146, 149-50, 315
training programs: 393-94
visibility and weather factors in: 307, 315, 389, 397, 401
Bombs
components, assembling: 147-48
development and procurement: 147, 192
French development and production: 151
incendiaries: 15
load and weight capacities: 8, 11, 15-16, 29, 50,57, 61, 132,
142, 147, 162
nitrogelatin types: 4-5, 15-1 7
smoke-bomb signals: 30, 63
varied types: 276
Bosch magneto: 143
Boston, Mass.: 97
Bowen, Thomas S.:75, 76, 77
Bradley, Follett: 7 76, 177
Breckinridge, Henry: 3, 5-7, 23
Brereton, Lewis H.: 223, 237, 302
Bridges
identifying: 256
strikes against: 243
Brieulles-sur-Meuse:239
Brigade, 1st: 213
Briqueney: 239
British antiaircraft defenses and weapons: 162
British government agencies. See under United Kingdom
Brown, William C.: 81
Bulgarian army: 13
Burtt, Wilson B.: 169, 171422

Buzancy: 242
Cameras: 326
Camouflage measures: 305, 307, 317, 386-87
Camps, identifying: 283
Canal Zone: 28, 37, 39, 41, 43, 57, 60, 89, 92, 95-96, 101. See
also Panama Canal
Canals, identifying: 282
Carberry, Joseph E.: 75, 76, 77-78, 81-84, 107, 722
Carignan: 239
Carranza forces: 83-84
Carretas, Mexico: 83-84
Cases Grandes, Mexico: 75-79
Casella Works: 143
Casualties
civilian: 162
in squadrons: 52
Catron, Thomas B.: 59-63
Cavalry (see also Ground forces)
air units as adjunct to: 4, 6-7
organization: 65
regiments, number expanded: 65
reconnaissance and observation by: 23, 25, 34
roles and missions: 23, 25
Chain of formations: 365-69
Chamberlain, George E.: 58, 59-63
Chandler, Charles D.: 2 , 7 0 , 2 5 4 , 255-61
Chapman, Carleton G.: 75, 76, 77-78, 80, 84
Charleston, S.C.: 15
Charpentry: 238
Chase, Joseph Cummings: 106, 166, 229
Chateau-Salins: 241

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

423

Index

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes:241 -42,244
Chauffeurs, duties of: 320
Chaumont-en-Bassigny: 124
Chesapeake Bay: 92,97
Chief Signal Officer. See Scriven, George P.
Chief of Staff, A.E.F. See Harbord, James G .
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See March, Peyton C.; Scott, Hugh L.
Chihuahua City, Mexico: 81-86
Christie, Arthur R.:75-78,237
Churchill, Marlborough: 107,115,716,117
Civilian casualties: 162
Civilian employees: 67
Clark, V. E.: 105
Clash of Nations, quoted: 28

Clear transmissions: 200,206
Close-support missions. See Bombing operations; Pursuit
operations; Tactical air support
Coast defenses
air assaults on: 15
aircraft in support of: 35, 39,42-43,55,57,60,91-92,96-97
Codes: 63,200,202,21 1, 323,333,336
College Park, Md.: 14,71
Cologne bombing target group: 143-45,150
Colombey-les-Belles:155
Columbus, N.M.: 65,67,75-80,84-86,92-93,98
Command aircraft: 199-200,205-1 1, 232,234,240,242,269,

295,327,336
Command and control
Air Service, A.E.F.: 187-89
army and corps air service: 225,322,325-28
balloon companies: 406-407

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. II

424

British proposals and practice: 152-54
in fire control and direction: 183flights: 324
groups: 268,325,388
by pilots: 270in pursuit operations: 213,215,287,291
in Royal Flying Corps: 151
squadrons: 19,23-24,52,89,97,121,139,152-54,165,192,
225,232,239,268,310-1 1, 323,392-93
Command postsof .enemy, strikes against: 232,234,239
liaison with: 202-203,205,209-10,255-56,258,273,293,295-97,304,378-79
Commercial aircraft, prediction of: 99
Communications systems and installations: 334.See also by rype ;Signalling systems
air to ground: 24-25,30,33-35,43,63,72,79-83,120-21,

177,183-85,199-203,205-1 1, 215,255,258,290,296,298,
304,336
among air units: 349,354,363,385-86
altitudes for: 207
discipline in: 177,259
dismantling and reinstalling: 31 9of enemy, strikes against: 251
ground to air: 201-202,208-10,223,258,293,296,298-301,
306,336
among ground units: 306
listening service: 180
makeshift methods: 208-209
by motor vehicles: 79,84, 193,334
night signals: 202-203
receiving stations: 180, 182,184
responsibility for: 270,335
shore to ship: 42
with staffs and headquarters: 210
testing: 206-207
time and distance factors in: 306
transmission methods. See by typewatch posts for: 201
Compass: 379
Compiegne: 152
Conflans: 242,250,251

425

Index

Congress, appropriations by: 1-3, 17, 27-31, 53, 55-57, 59-63,
65, 67-72, 91-101
Conner, Fox: 103, 127,226
Connolly, Maurice: 3, 14, 16-17
Connor, William D.: 169
Construction projects: 192, 319
Construction squadrons: 169, 171
Contact patrols. See Ground forces, contacts with; Liaison
operations; Reconnaissance and observation
Continental army plan: 65, 67
Connvoys and marches
balloon companies: 405-407
discipline in: 320-21
reconnaissance and observation in: 319
squadrons: 318-21, 340
Corps
I: 165, 188-89, 205-1 1, 231, 237
Ill: 231, 237, 249
IV and V: 231, 237
air service chiefs, duties of: 188-89, 326-27
air service command and control: 225, 322, 325-28
air service organization: 65, 128-29, 165, 322, 325-29
Corregidor Island: 4, 36, 37, 39, 57
Courban: 192
Courier service. See Messenger service
Craig, Malin: 222, 223, 267
Crefeld: 143
Crissy, Myron S.: 8, 9Culebra Cut: 16
Cumbre Pass, Mexico: 77
Curtiss, Glenn: 8
Cusihuirachic, Mexico: 81
Cusihuirachic Canyon: 81

426

DaiJogo, Masami : 410
Damvillers: 238
Daniels, Josephus: 105
Dardannelles Strait: 12-1 3
Dargue, Herbert A.: 36, 75, 80-81,82, 83-84, 85,86, 87
Davis, Robert C.: 703
De Vergnette: 242
Deception. See Ruses
Decorations and awards: 336
Decoys: 360-61, 401
Dent, S. Hubert: 91-101
Dirigibles
air speeds and operational areas: 47, 63
armament and equipment: 47, 93
assets and weaknesses: 47,93
Baldwin Airship No. 1: 46
bomb capacities: 61
bombing operations by: 45, 57, 61
British development: 93
classes defined: 45
construction features: 45-47, 93
crews required: 47
defense against: 63
engines in: 47
German development: 93
lift capabilities: 47, 61
mission assignments: 4-5, 7, 12, 45-47
Mitchell views on: 12
reconnaissance and observation by: 24,45
Zeppelins: 45, 61, 63
Discipline
in communications: 177, 259
in convoys and marches: 320-21
Distance records: 22

U.S. Air Service'in World War I
Vol. II

,427

Index

Divisions
1st: 173
number expanded: 39, 219
number in service and required: 167, 195
organization: 65, 127-28, 135
Dodd, Francis: 109
Dodd, George A.: 77-78, 81-83
Dodd, Townsend F.: 75-77, 83, 107, 722
Doulcon: 239
Drum, Hugh A.: 127, 169, 234, 240
Dublan, Mexico: 77-81, 84-85
Dun: 238-39
Dunkerque: 143, 147
Dunsworth, James L.: 237, 242,262
Duration records: 22
Dusseldorf bombing target group: 143-45
Duvall, Maurice: 152, 116

Economy of force, principle of: 314
El Paso, Tex.: 75

El Valle, Mexico: 78-81
Elberfeld: 143
Eltinge, LeRoy: 703,135
Engineer officers, duties of: 269-70, 281, 324, 393
Engineer units: 65
Engines
Baldwin: 46
characteristics and requirements: 48
costs of purchase and maintenance: 96
Curtiss: 78
development and procurement: 68, 105,131-33
in dirigibles: 47
fixed verssus rotary: 131, 133, 375, 400

420

U.S. Air Service
in Wo'rld War 1
VOl. IIHall-Scott: 78
Liberty: 104,797
maintenance, repair and replacement: 96
Mercedes: 143
Salmson: 26
Sturtevant: 78
Thomas: 78
Wright Field: 39
England. See Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom
Equipment. See Armament and equipment
Escort and patrol missions: 21 3 - 1 6,231,241,244-45, 285-86,
307-308,374,377,381-82.See also Pursuit operations
Escort and patrol missions, enemy: 249
Essen: 143
Exchange tours: 348
Exercises. See Training programs

Ferry pilots, training: 192
Fickel, Jacob E.: 70
Field artillery (see also Ground forces)
bombardment by: 133,150-51,232-33
bombardment by enemy: 249,308
fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction
organization: 65
regiments, number expanded: 65
roles and missions: 23,25
Field glasses, use of: 337
Field Service Regulations: 23-25
Fighter operations. See Pursuit operations; Tactics
Fire (conflagration),safeguards against: 31 7
Fire control and direction
advantages and limitations: 182, 184
aircraft role in: 9,24,30,33-35,37-39,42-43,47,49,52,55,
91,99, 101,108,115,117,120,776, 177-85,205-206,223,

234,241-42,247-49,296,304308,322,329-30,333,34041,344

429

Index

altitudes for: 308,337
assignments to: 182-84
by balloons: 24,108,121,181-85,255,258-59,346,377,407-

408
command and control in: 183
by enemy: 215
essentials and limitations: 304
functions and purposes: 181-84
liaison, interarm: 182,343
maps, use in: 272,343-44,346
methods in: 259-61,343-44,408
mission assignments and execution: 269
Mitchell views on: 11-12
operational areas: 337
registration techniques: 259
reports of: 340
security during: 216
visibility and weather factors in: 307,315,346
First aerial map: 22
First aircraft purchase: 68,70
First bomb drop: 9First bomb target: 250
First machine-gun firing: 70
First military pilot: 17
First squadron in combat: 86,173
Fiske, Harold B.: 703
Fixed versus rotary engines: 131,133,375,400
Flare signals: 63,199-202,258,282,293,296,298-99,336,363,

380,382
Flash spotting: 184-85,257,282,340,342
Flashlight signals: 208-209
Flight pay, dissension over: 91
Flightscommand and organization: 324
as tactical units: 324,355
Foch, Ferdinand: 153,218,219

430

Formations and maneuvers
in bombing operations: 51, 253, 277-79, 395-403
in pursuit operations: 287-89, 336, 338-69, 373
in reconnaissance and observation: 350-51
tactics in. See tactics, combat
Fort Kamehameha:37
Fort Monroe: 92
Fort Myer: 40,46, 70
Fort Riley: 176-77
Fort Sam Houston: 37, 71, 75
Fort Sill: 37, 56, 91, 93
Foulois, Benjamin D.: 8, 77,76, 87, 760
on 120-squadron plan: 171
on aircraft production and procurement: 105arrested in Mexico: 81-83
on bombing doctrine: 161-63
as chief of Air Service, A.E.F.: 141, 159, 161, 187
as chief of First Army air service: 187-88
on organization and logistics: 159
Punitive Expedition report: 75-87
Fowler, Harold: 155
France: 93
Second Army: 234, 241-42
Fourth Army: 173, 231, 238
Eighth Army: 238
II Colonial Corps: 231, 237
XVll Corps: 231, 237
1st Air Division: 231, 233-34
aircraft development and production: 47, 63, 101, 151
aircraft in inventory: 28
bomb development and production: 151
bombing doctrine: 253
bombing operations, cooperation in: 151-53, 159, 161-63, 19192, 231-45, 247
bombing prize offered: 14
pilots in service of: 98
squadron organization: 51
Frankfurt-am-Main: 143, 150
French, 'Sir John: 31

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

431

Index

Fuel capacities and storage: 29, 78, 379, 387

Galeana Valley, Mexico: 77-78
Galera Lopena, Mexico: 77, 80
Garrett, Daniel E.: 3-4
Garrison, Lindley M.: 1, 27, 65
Gatun Dam: 5, 16
General Headquarters Air Service Reserve: 156
General Organization Project, A.E.F.: 127-29, 195
General Staff, G.H.Q.: 41-53, 68, 91, 157, 163, 169, 187
Germany
air superiority, use by: 50
aircraft development and production: 47, 101, 141-43, 162
aircraft in inventory: 28
bombing operations by: 11, 61
dirigibles development: 93
submarine warfare by: 55, 100
war declared against: 100
Gettysburg, battle of: 6
Gliders: 70
Gordon, William: 91
Gorrell, Edgar S.:75, 84, 85,87,105, 740,141-57, 191, 219, 227,303-1 1
Grandpre: 239, 242, 245, 248
Great Britain. See Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom
Great Lakes region: 43
Greek army: 13
Green, Richard: 17
Greene, Frank L.: 3, 9, 72, 91, 96, 99
Grenade assaults, identifying: 258
Grey, Spencer: 155-56
Ground crews. See Maintenance, supply and support forces

432

US. Air Service

in World War I
Vol. II

Ground forces (see also by arm)
aircraft assignments to: 18,51,55,57,60,65,89,96-97,1 1 1,

123,127-29,136,156,165,167,182-83,189,196,205-11,
223,269,295-98
antiaircraft defenses and weapons: 304,308-309,31 7-1 8,336,
384
attacks on: 369-76,378,400
balloon companies, assignment to: 255,403,407
bombing operations against: 234,249,251,369-75
contacts with: 210,255,298,301,310,332,33436,343,348,
353-54,385
estimates of: 256-57
identifying: 283-84
infantry as chief combat element: 313
liaison with: 1 1 7,120,184,199-203,205-1 1, 21 5,223,234,
243,255,257-58,269,293,295-99,301,31 1, 341-42,345,
353,378,385-86,407
mobility of: 141,306
reconnaissance and observation by: 34
relations with: 41,296,298,304,310,321
strikes against enemy: 120,232-33,241-43,247-49,287,292,
294Groups
1st Bombardment: 237,242,245
1st Pursuit: 237,241-42
2d Bombardment: 251
2d Pursuit: 213-14,237,244
3d Attack: 267
3d Pursuit: 237,244
command and control: 268,325,388
observation units: 322,325-26
operational procedures: 268-79
organization: 155,387-92
staffs and staff officers: 325-26,387-92
Gulfhght, SS:55

Gunnery training: 394
Gutierrez, General: 83-84

Hall, Melvin A.: 237
Handkerchief signals: 208-209

433

Index

Hangars
Bessonneau: 148
location and security: 148,31 7,31 9,386-87
Harbord, James G.:707, 113,116,139,165,766
Harricourt: 239
Hartney, Harold E.: 237,241-42,262
Haute de Meuse: 238
Hawaii: 28,37,41,43,57,60,92,95-96,101
Hay, James: 3-1 7,27-31,55-57,67-72,91
Heintzelman, Stuart: 135
Heliograph signals: 25
Henderson, Sir D.:740
Hindenburg Line: 231
Hoechst: 143
Holland: 145
Horn signals: 120
Housing, provision for: 148,31 8-1 9
Howard, William S.:27,30
Howell, Willey: 238
Howze, Robert L.: 84
Hunsaker, J. G.: 105
Hydroplanes. See Seaplanes

Identification, friend or foe: 273,309,31 1, 335,337,348,352,

385,389,393
Incendiary ammunition and bombs: 15,375
Industrial centers
identifying: 283
strikes against: 120,142-45, 147,151-53, 162-63,251,276
Infantry (see also Ground forces)
as chief combat element: 31 3

434

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

organization: 65
roles and missions: 23,25
regiments, number expanded: 65
Infantry contact patrols. See Ground forces, contacts with; Liaison
operations; Reconnaissance and observation
Information. See Intelligence operations and reports
Insignia
aircraft identification: 273,309,31 1, 335
mechanics: 132,169
military aviator: 52
Inspections, responsibility for: 189,270,319
Instrument officers, duties of: 390
Instruments, flight control by: 68,379,381
Intelligence officers, duties of: 181,270-71,273-75,281,31 0,326
Intelligence operations and reports (see also Reconnaissance andobservation)
British: 162collection and dissemination: 1 17,149,181-82,234,241,347-

48,352-53,384-85
purpose: 314,346
responsibility for: 189,256,268,279,323,325-26,346,352-53,

384,389,392
transmission: 334
Inter-AlliedAir Force: 156
Inter-Allied Aviation Committee: 227
International law considerations: 145
Interrogations, of pilots and observers: 349,355
Irwin, George L.: 77
Italyaircraft development: 47
aircraft in inventory: 28
balloon development: 93

Janina: 13
Janos, Mexico: 75-77,84

435

Index

Japan, aircraft development: 47
Johnson, Davenport: 272, 237
Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board: 105
Joralemon, I.D.: 302
Journal of the Franklin institute : 50,53

Kahn, Julius: 27-28,30-31,55-56,91-99
Karlsruhe: 143
Kenly, William L.: 7 38, 139,147,159
Kennedy, Frank M.: 77
Kilner, Walter G.: 75-77
Kirtland, Roy C.: 2, 70
Kitty Hawk, N.C.: 70
Klaxon horn signals: 207
Krupp guns: 5
Kuter, Laurence S.:141

La Chaussee: 240-41
La Harazee: 232-33,244
Lafayette Escadrille: 98,173
Lahm, Frank P.: 77, 119,231,240,251
Lake Babicora, Mexico: 77
Landing fields. See Airfields
Landings
after bombing runs: 399
emergency: 378-81,304
rules for: 380
Las Ascencion, Mexico: 75-77,04
Lassiter, William: 113

436

U.S.Air Service

in World War I
VOl. II

Leaders, responsibilities of: 36364,373-74,400-401
Letcher, Marion H.: 81-84
Liaison officers, duties of: 199,271,321,328,335,378
Liaison operations
with air units: 348-49,378-79
aircraft role in: 199-203,31 5with Allies: 139,151-54,156,161,167,171
altitudes for: 223,345
with antiaircraft defenses: 215
balloons role in: 202-203,223,255,345-46,406
with command posts: 202-203,205,209-10,255-56,258,273,

293,295-97,304,378-79
enemy attacks against: 242
failures in: 223with ground forces: 1 17,120,184,199-203,205-1 1, 21 5,223,

234,243,255,257-58,269,293,295-301,311,341-42,345,
353,378,385-86,407
ground forces contacts with: 298,310,332,334-36,343,348,
353-54,385
importance: 21 1
information, disseminating: 33336
methods and measures: 215,33336
Mitchell views on: 205-1 1
in night operations: 378-79
in pursuit operations: 215,291-92,354
reports, uses of: 332-33
responsibility for: 189,323,325,327-29,335
among squadrons: 321
training programs: 21 1, 299-301,301
transportation for: 327
Liggett, Hunter: 764, 165
Lighting systems: 380,383-84
Lights, signals by: 25,177,180,183,206-209,258,281,298
Line of Communications, A.E.F.: 135
Lines of communication
reconnaissance and observation of: 275
strikes against: 120,143,162-63,251,292
Listening service: 180
Logan, James A. : 107

437

Index

Logging procedures: 256, 324
Logistical support. See Supply operations and systems
London, air raids on: 150, 162
London Tlmes: 47

Longuyon: 238-39, 241-42
Los Angeles, Calif.: 8
Low-altitude raids: 399-400
Ludden, V. F.: 312
Ludwigshafen: 143, 150
Lufbery show: 364
Lumes: 239, 243
Lusltanm, SS:55

Machine guns
aircraft role in overcoming: 309
Benet-Mercier: 94
firing as signal: 207
first fired from aircraft: 10
Lewis: 93-94, 97
Mitchell views on: 12
proposals for use: 9, 12
synchronized firing system: 98
testing: 321, 324
Vickers: 372
Magneto, Bosch: 143
Maintenance, repair and replacement
aircraft: 27, 57, 60-62, 67-69, 78, 80, 92, 96-98, 123, 148, 169,
192, 223, 327
engines: 96
motor vehicles: 68
responsibility for: 324
Maintenance, supply and support forces: 19
Malmy: 239
Maneuvering officers, duties of: 406

U.S. Air Service
in Wo'rld War I
VOl. II

438

Maneuvers, combat. See Formations and maneuvers, combat;
Tactics
Mangiennes: 238
Manila, PA.: 37,69,92,96
Mannheim bombing target group: 143,150
Manula, Mexico: 83
Mapscompilation and distribution: 147,149,208,259,272-74,279,

321,326,341,347,352,385,
388,392
in fire control and direction: 272,343-44,346
first aerial: 22
reading and use, training in: 149-50,21 1
in reconnaissance and observation: 272-73
Marches. See Convoys and marches; Mobility; Transportation
Marrell, 0. E.: 302
Materiel. See Armament and equipment
Mauborgne, Joseph 0.: 176
Maulan: 386
McAndrew, James W.: 703,189,192,196,228,229
McCleave, Robert: 232,233
McDonald, N.: 262
McKellar,'-KennethD.: 27,29-31,72,91,94-97
McKenzie, John C.: 3,5, 16-17,91-93
Mechanics: 169,324
Medical services: 321,391
Meister - Luciuc Works: 143
Melzicourt: 241-42
Mess operations: 31 9-21
Messages, by air drop: 4,24,17580,183-84,200,206-207,240,

296-98,335-36,339,343,345,349
Messenger service: 25,199,255,306,334-35
Metz: 240,242,244

439

Index

Meuse - Argonne offensive: 231-45,247-49,267,397
Meuse River: 231-33,238,240,242-45,247-49
Mexican Central Railroad: 84
Mexican North-Western Railroad: 77
Mexican Punitive Expedition: 19,66-67,69,72-73,75-87, 91,93-

94,101,148
Mikkelson, Linda: 174
Military Affairs Committees. See Congress
Military aviator, certificate and insignia: 52
Military policy, U.S. formulation: 41-53,55-57,59-63, 65,91
Miller, I. W.: 302
Milling, Thomas D.: 2, 70,22,76,246,247-49
Mineola, N.Y.: 92
Mining operations: 45
Mining operations, enemy: 42
Miranda, Colonel: 83
Mirror signals: 208
Mission assignments
air operations: 225
arms and services: 23-25
balloon companies: 43-45,225,240
bombing operations: 225,231-34,238-45,247-49,251,276
Coast Guard: 41-42
dirigibles: 4-5,7,12,45-47
fire control and direction: 269
pursuit operations: 225,232-38,240-45,247-49,251,284-87,

292-93, 352,355
reconnaissance and observation: 182-83,225,232-34,238,

255-56,258,269,273-75,280,284,295-98,332-33,340-46
Mitchell, William: 3,91,93,174,224,246,302
as A.E.F. air service chief: 125
on air-ground liaison: 205-1 1
bombing operations, views on: 12
as developments observer: 107
on dirigibles: 12

440

US. Air Service

in World War I
VOl. IIon fire control and direction: 11-12
as First Army air service chief: 225, 231, 237, 243, 247-49, 267
as 1st Brigade air service chief: 213
as I Corps air service chief: 165, 187, 223
machine gun, views on: 12
operations manual, provisional: 267-301
organization, views on: 12, 107-108
on reconnaissance and observation: 9, 12
on roles and missions: 175
as Third Army air service chief: 267
as Zone of Advance air service chief: 139
Mobile units. See Ground forces
Mobilityground forces: 141, 306
squadrons: 215, 243, 317-21, 387. See also Convoys andmarches; Transportation
Monell, Ambrose: 155-56
Montfaucon: 242
Montgomery, Ala.: 77Montmedy: 238-39, 242
Moralein Air Service: 31 1
British: 167
effect of bombing operations on: 142, 150, 162, 251, 304, 310,
314, 316, 335
effect of pursuit operations on: 290, 294, 304, 308, 310, 314,
316, 335, 371, 376-77
of enemy, destroying: 314, 316
night pilots, preserving: 381
of observers and pilots: 311
Morrow, Joseph C.: 236, 237
Mortane, Jacques: 9
Moseley, George V. H.: 103
Moselle River: 240-41
Motor vehicles
communications by: 79, 84, 183, 334
development and procurement: 68
estimates of needs: 257

441

Index

maintenance, repair and replacement: 68
speed and interval regulation: 320
Motorcycle messengers: 79, 335
Mouzon: 238-39

Namiquipa, Mexico: 79-86
Nancy: 152-53, 240
Nantillois: 242
National Defense Act of 1916: 65, 89
National Guard: 65
National Security Act of 1916: 65
Naval forces
air assaults by and against: 15-1 7
air reconnaissance in detecting: 35, 45
roles and missions: 41
Navigation systems: 146-47, 149, 281, 378
Netherlands: 145
New Orleans, La.: 8
New York City: 15, 97
Newport News, Va.: 69
Night operations
balloons in: 407
bombing operations: 120, 131-32, 142, 146, 156, 162, 191, 195,232-34, 241-42
liaison in: 378-79
pursuit operations: 37744
reconnaissance and observation: 18445,233-34, 241-42, 257,
28044,382
Night signals: 202-203
Nitrogelatin bombs: 4-5, 15-17
Nolan, Dennis E.: 703
Noncommissioned officers, duties of: 320

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

442

Nonstop flight records: 84
Norfolk, Va.: 15
North Island, Calif. See San Diego, Calif.
Northcliff e, Lord: 161
Northerly bombing target group: 143
Nuevas Casas Grandes, Mexico: 75
Oaxaca Pass, Mexico: 84
Observation, aerial. See Fire control and direction; Liaison
operations; Reconnaissance and observation
Observation groups: 322,325-26
Observation-pursuit-bomber

ratio: 1 69

Observers (see also Fire control and direction; Pilots;
Reconnaissance and observation)
assignments and duties: 4,19,30,49,52-53,181-83,199,

205-1 1, 223,255,259
battle atmosphere, detachment from: 31 5
exchange tours: 348
ground forces, contacts with: 210,255,301
interrogating: 349
morale: 31 1
qualifications, training and efficiency: 30,38,51-52,115,149-

50,210,223,269,
271,273,306,315,340,351,
389,39394,407
reports by: 270,274,281432,295436,298,315,
325,329,33840,349,399
Offensive, principle of: 314
Officers. See by assignment
OHair, Frank T.: 3,7
Ojito, Mexico: 84

Ojo Caliente, Mexico: 75-77,83
Omaha, Neb.: 119
Open transmission. See Clear transmissions
Operational areas
balloons: 181
bombing operations: 251

4.43

Index

dirigibles: 47,63
fire control and direction: 337
pursuit operations: 285,304,371,374-75,379
reconnaissance and observation: 308,337,342,344
squadrons: 329
Operations officers, duties of: 71,268-71,274,279-81, 289,321,

323,325,327-28,346-49,
353,355,388-89,392-93
Operations rooms: 271 -74,326
Orders, issuance and transmission
balloon companies: 406
bombing operations: 31 1, 318,327-28,338-40,388,392,394
pursuit operations: 293,31 1 , 318,325,327-28,33840,388,

392
reconnaissance and observation: 325,327-28,33840,388,392
types and scope: 24749,332
Ordnance Department: 5,253.See also Armament and equipment
Ordnance officers, duties of: 269-70,393
Ordnance units and troops: 135,148
Orqanization
air units: 3, 19-20,27-28,51,55-57,59,65,89,105,1 1 1 , 120,

123. 191
American Expeditionary Forces: 127-29
armies: 65,96,129
Army, US.: 42,57,59,65
army and corps air service: 65,128-29,165,322,325
balloon companies: 45,403
bomber units: 155
cavalry: 65
divisions: 65,127-28,135
field artillery: 65
flights: 324
foreign squadrons: 39
groups: 155,387-92
infantry: 65
Mitchell views on: 12,107-108
pursuit operations: 215,290
responsibility for: 187
signal units: 65
squadrons: 19,37-39,42,51,53,55,59,67,79,324,392-93

444

Ostend: 145
Overcoat lining, signals by: 208-209
Pacific coast region: 15
Pan American Exposition: 8
Panama Canal: 5, 15-17. See also Canal Zone
Panel signals: 177, 180, 183, 199,201-203,204,208-10,244,
258,293,290,298-99,304,311,336,343,345
Parachute descents, attacks on: 377
Parachute flares: 284
Paris, German drive on: 219
Park squadrons: 169, 171
Parker, Frank: 107, 178, 119-21, 175
Parker, Katherine: 1 19
Parks, aircraft: 123, 139, 238-39. See also Airfields
Parmalee, Phillip 0.:9, 71
Parral, Mexico: 84
Patrol operations, aerial. See Escort and patrol missions
Patrol operations, ground: 201
Patrick, Mason M.: 786
and 202-squadron plan: 227-28
as A.E.F. air service chief: 187
on aircraft production and procurement: 195-96. 219
on combined bomber offensive: 191-92
Pearson, Mexico: 75-78
Pershing, John J.: 74, 78,218
and 260-squadron plan: 195
as A.E.F. commander: 107,127, 135
on A.E.F. expansion: 219
on Air Service autonomy: 103
on Air Service program: 169,171, 195
on bombing operations: 191
as First Army commander: 225,231
in Punitive Expedition: 6667, 93

U.S. Air Service
in Woirld War I
VOl. II

445

Index

Personnel
assignment and replacement: 163,322
number in service and required: 1, 39,55, 57,59-60,89,96,

101,123,135,169
safety measures for: 31 7
strength in A.E.F.: 127-29,135-37
strength in Army: 27,38-39,41,51,53,57,65
Petain, Henri Philippe: 161
Philippine Islands: 4,28,41,43,60,89,91-92,95,101.See also
Corregidor Island; Manila
Photographic officers, duties of: 270,326,389-90
Photography, aerial: 49,63,86,99,101,117,120,181-63,215,

234,238,240-41, 245,268-72,274-75,279,326,329,340-43,
346,382,388,392
Photography, aerial, by enemy: 216
Pigeon messages: 183,199,33445
Pilotsassignments and replacements: 19,52-53,223,324
battle atmosphere, detachment from: 315,352
command and control by: 270
from enlisted grades: 27,52-53
exchange tours: 348
first military pilot: 17
in French service: 98,173
interrogating: 349,355
morale: 31 1, 381
number, expansion of: 55
numbers required: 27
qualifications, training and efficiency: 37-38,51-52,71, 86-67,

98-99,146-47, 149-50,191,223,273,
277,294,306,351,
356,373,36041,
389,393-94,400
reports by: 399
Police officers, duties of: 391
Policing procedures: 31 9-21
Pont St. Vincent: 146
Port Arthur: 14
Port-sur-Seille: 241,244
Posts of command. See Command posts

US. Air Service
in Wolrld War I

446

VOl. I1

President of United States. See Wilson, Woodrow
Press reports: 150
Preveza: 13
Priorities, British: 161-62
Prisoners of war, enemy: 249
Projector signals: 177,183-84,201,203,206-1 1 , 258,336
Pulpit Pass, Mexico: 84-85
Punitive Expedition. See Mexican Punitive Expedition
Pursuit-observation-bomber
ratio: 169
Pursuit operations: 35,38,42,47,49,55,59,63,101,108,1 1 1 ,120. 156
aircraft efficiency in: 364-65,372,375,379
alerted flights: 285-86,289,292,372
altitudes for: 213-14,216,285,287,294,336-37,370,373,

381 -82
balloons, attacks on. See under Balloons
bombing operations, coordination with: 21 3-14,279,286,290,

379,382,398,402
by British: 377
combat kill range: 307
combat maneuvers. See formations and maneuvers, combat,
below
command and control: 213,215,287,291
decoys in: 360-61,401
enemy ground forces, strikes against: 120,232-33,241 -43,

247-49,287,292,294
escort and patrol missions. See Escort and patrol missions
formations and maneuvers, combat: 287-89,336,355-69
ground forces support. See Tactical air support
ground targets, attacks on: 369-76,378,400
importance: 314-16
leaders, responsibilities of: 363-64,373-74,400
liaison in: 215,291-92,354
limitations: 304,307,309
mission assignments: 225,232-38,240-45,247-49,251,284-

87,292-93,352,355
morale, effect on: 290,294,304,308,310,314,316,335,371,

376-77night operations: 377-84
number of aircraft for: 371 -73,400

447

Index

observation functions: 291
offensive character: 285
operational areas: 285,304,371,374-75,379
operational routines: 284-89
orders, issuance and transmission: 293,31 1, 318,325,327-28,

338-40,388,392
organization: 215,290
in reconnaissance and observation security: 336
roles and missions: 213-16,294,307
romantic appeal: 99
security in: 294,371,377
single aircraft in: 356-57,360-61
special missions: 355
strafing. See Ground targets, above
tactics: 28839,291-94,307-309,355-84
tanks, strikes against: 292-93
target assignment and identification: 233,292-93,309-10,372-

73
teamwork in: 356,363,371
three-dimensional factor: 307
time of day for: 376-78
time and distance factors: 315
training programs: 294
visibility and weather factors: 307,315,356-57,374,378,381-

82,389Quarters. See Housing
Rader, Ira A.: 75,76,77,84
Radio communications and installations: 334
air to ground: 3-4, 6-7,24-25,30,33-35, 47,49,59,63,72,

79,120,176,177,181,183-85,200,202-203,206,215,258,
292,293,296-98,304,323,325,336,343-44
with air staffs: 349
among aircraft: 349,354,363,382
dismantling and reinstalling: 321
ground to air: 210,323,325
Navy, by and with: 42
testing: 206,298,324
Radio officers, duties of: 201,269-70,323-25,390
Railwaysin air equipment transportation: 148-49
identifying: 283-84
reconnaissance and observation of: 256-57,275
strikes against: 232,234,238-39,242-43, 245,251

448

Rastadt: 143
Rations. See Mess operations
Reber, Samuel: 3,7,27,50,53,59,62-63,91
Reconnaissance and observation (see also Fire control anddirection; Liaison operations; Photography, aerial
by aircraft: 23-24,30-31,33-35,38,47-49,55,63,99,101,

117,120,177-85,199,205-11,215,231-45,322,329
alert flights: 276
altitudes for: 21 1, 283-84,306,337,342
by balloons: 23-24,43-45,93,121,181 -85,202-203,255-61,

330,377,403-404
of bridges: 256
capabilities and limitations: 182,184,303-306
by cavalry: 23,25,34
combat, avoiding: 330,346,350
in convoys and marches: 319
cover and concealment from: 305 (see also Camouflage)
cooperation with Allies: 238
coordination among aircraft: 182
crew, number in: 270
defined: 23
by dirigibles: 24,45
enemy attacks against: 242
by enemy, preventing: 213,231-32,240,244,247-49
of enemy elements: 341 -44
facts reported: 256,340-41
false reports: 306
formations: 350-51
of friendly elements: 341,345
grenade assaults, identifying: 258
by ground forces: 34
ground forces, estimates of: 256-57
ground forces, support of: 35
importance stressed: 57,59,21 6,31 5,330-31,334
information, scope and sources of: 331 -32
of lines of communication: 275
logging procedures: 256,324
maps, value in: 272-73
Mitchell views on: 9-12
mission assignments and execution: 182-83,225,232-34,238,

255-56,258,269,273-75,280,284,295-98,332-33,340-46
Motor vehicles, estimates of: 257
of naval forces: 35,45

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

449

Index

-.

navigation systems: 281
night missions: 184-85,233-34, 24142,257,280-84,382
number of aircraft for: 350
operational areas: 308,337,342,344
operational routines: 269-71,274-77,283-84
orders, issuance and transmission: 325,327-28,33840,388,

392
prewar concepts: 3-4,6-7,9-10,12-13
in Punitive Expedition: 75,87
purpose: 42
pursuit operations functions in: 291
of railways: 256-57,275
reports. See Observers, reports byof road systems: 275,341,406-407
security measures in: 216,285-86, 291,336-38,342,351-52,404
by signal troops: 34
tactics in: 338,350-51
time of day for: 206,275,342
visibility and weather factors: 282-83,305,31 5,337,342,351
Record, flight: 22
Registration techniques: 259
Regular Army. See United States Army
Reorganization. See Organization
Repair. See Maintenance, repair and replacement; Spare parts
Reports
in fire control and direction: 340
in liaison: 332-33
by observers: 270,274,281-82,295-96, 298,315,325,329,

338-40,349,399
by pilots: 399
Rescue operations and equipment: 68
Reserve components: 55,63,65,101
Reynolds, John N.: 237,242
Rhine River and Valley: 14347,149
Ribot, Alexandre: 105-107,135

Railroads
airfields, access to: 318
reconnaissance and observation: 256-57,275

450Road systems
airfields, access to: 31 8
identifying: 282,284
reconnaissance and observation: 275,341,406407
strikes against: 292
Rocket signals: 296,298-99,336,382
Roles and missions (see also Mission assignments)
in air operations: 303-305
cavalry: 23,25
field artillery: 23,25
infantry: 23,25
Mitchell views on: 175
naval forces: 41
in pursuit operations: 213-16,294,307
of squadrons: 3-17,21,23,29-31,33-35,38,43,48-53,61,
65,67,107-108,1 1 1, 1 1 9-21,157,161,199-203,205-1 1,

231 -45
Romagne-sous-Montfaucon:238-39,242,245

Romorantin: 156,197
Roosevelt, Philip J.: 245
Rothermere, Lord: 161
Royal Flying Corps (Air Force)
aircraft development and production: 101
bombing doctrine: 253
bombing operations, cooperation in: 151-53,159,161-63,191-

92,241-42,248
command and control, proposals and practice: 152-54
dirigible development: 93
Independent Air Force: 231,241 -43
intelligence operations: 162
morale: 167
pursuit operations: 377
squadron organization: 51
squadrons serving with: 228
training programs: 171,191-92
Royce, Ralph: 236
Runners. See Messenger service
Ruses, application of: 206,240,360-61,401
Russel, Edgar: 3,9,706, 107

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

451

Index

Russiaaircraft development: 47
aircraft in inventory: 28
Russo-JapaneseWar: 12
Ryan, John J.: 74
Saar Valley bombing target group: 145, 147
Sablons: 242
Safety measuresat airfields: 380, 384
for personnel: 317
St. Blin: 156

St. Juvin: 238-39, 242, 245
St. Mihiel offensive: 231

Salmond, John Maitland: 153
Salvage operations: 78, 81, 85
San Andreas, Mexico: 84
San Antonio, Mexico: 81-86
San Antonio, Texas: 22, 37, 56, 60, 92
San Borja, Mexico: 83
San Diego, Calif.: 29, 37, 54, 60, 69, 89, 91-93, 178
San Diego Bay: 37
San Francisco, Calif.: 8-9, 97
San Geronimo, Mexico: 81-84
San Lucas, Mexico: 83-84
Sandy Hook, N.J.: 15
Sanitary train: 65
Sanitation measures: 318

Santa Ana, Mexico: 80
Santa Cruz, Mexico: 83
Santa Maria, Mexico: 83452

Santa Rosalia, Mexico: 84
Santa Ysabel, Mexico: 83
Satevo, Mexico: 83-85
Saulmey: 239
School squadrons: 169,171
Schools
aviation school: 37-39,55, 57,59,60,71,89,96
balloon school: 119
establishment and operation: 123
navigation courses: 147,191
supervision: 187
in Zone of Advance: 139
Scott, Hugh L.: 41
Scott, Riley: 3,5, 8-9,12-17
Scriven, George P.: 3-17,19,23-25,27-31,32,33-35,37-39,

55-57,59-63,67,89,91-94
Sea, command of: 141
Seaplanes, number required and procured: 28,43,69
Searchlights
against aircraft: 377-78,381
signals by: 185,282,321
Seattle, Wash.: 97
Secretary of War. See Baker, Newton D.: Garrison, Lindley M.
Security measures and operations: 146,200-201,207,209-10,

231-32,239,244,273,316,318,386-87
at airfields: 92,148-49, 156,184,192,243,291,317-18,383,
386-87for balloons: 404
in bombing operations: 401-402
in fire control and direction: 216
in reconnaissance and ObSeNatiOn: 21 6,285-86,291,336-38,
342,351-52,404
Sellers, C. G.: 372
Semaphore (wigwag) signals: 30,59,199
Senate. See Congress

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

453

Index

Service of the Rear Project: 135,195
Service squadrons: 169,171.See also by typeServices of Supply: 135,263
Shallenberger, Ashton C.:72
Sheepshead Bay: 10
Sherman, William C.: 22, 372,313-408
Shore-to-ship communications: 42
Sierra Madre range: 77
Sightsbombing: 253
machine gun: 379
Signal Corps
Aeronautical Division: 1
aviation, control of: 1, 3,33,52
Aviation Section. See Air Service
Signal units: 34,65,135
Signalling systems: 24-25,30,33-35,49,59,63,120,177,18081,183-85,199-203,205-1 1 , 25758,281,296-98,306,334,
363,380.See also by type
Smith, J. Andre: 124,357
Smithsonian Institution: 68-69
Smoke
signals by: 30,63,201,209
tactical use: 317
Smoke-bomb signals: 30,63,201, 209
Souilly: 146,234,240,242
South American aircraft development: 47
Soviet Union. See Russia
Spare parts (see also Maintenance, repair and replacement)
procurement: 27-28,67,78
storage: 317
Specialists. See Technicians
Spies, reports from: 141,149

4 54

Spincourt: 238
Spincourt Forest: 238
Squadrons (see also Aircraft; also by type)1st: 19, 37, 56, 67, 75-87, 101
2d, 6th and 7th: 101
27th and 96th: 189
103d: 173
147th: 189
4-squadron plan: 19-20, 27-28, 195-96
100-squadron plan: 167-69
120-squadronplan: 171
202-squadron plan: 227-28
260-squadron plan: 135-37
368-squadron plan: 219-20, 227
as A.E.F. elements: 192, 263
aircraft allotments to: 19, 55-57, 59-61, 95
assignments and transfers of: 37, 41, 57, 60, 89, 92, 329
with British: 228
casualties in: 52
as combat elements: 192, 263, 311
combat readiness: 41
command and control: 19,23-24, 52, 89, 97, 121, 139, 152-54,
165, 192,225,232, 239, 268, 310-1 1, 323,392-93
convoys and marches: 318-21, 340
costs of maintaining: 96
dedication of personnel: 248
development: 52-53
enemy’s destroyed: 249
equipment. See Armament and equipment
expansion programs: 39, 65, 103-105, 127, 131-33, 135-37,
167-69, 171, 219-20,227-28
first in combat: 86, 173
flights as tactical units: 324, 355
French organization: 51
ground forces, support of. See Tactical air support
headquarters, establishing: 319
housing for personnel: 148
liaison among: 321
in Meuse-Argonne offensive: 231
mobility of: 215, 243, 317-21, 387
number in service and required: 60, 95, 101, 123-27, 135-37,
167-71, 195436, 219, 228
operational areas: 329
organization: 19, 37-38, 42, 51, 53, 55, 59, 67, 89, 324, 392-93

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. It

Indexpark squadrons: 169,171
personnel, assignment and replacement: 163,322
personnel, number and required: 1, 39,55, 57,59-60,89,96,

101,123,135,169
personnel, safety of: 317
personnel strength: 27,38-39,51, 53
policies, priorities and plans: 103,167-69, 192
pursuit-observation-bomber
ratio: 1 69
roles and missions: 3-17,21, 23,29-31,33-35,38,43,48-53,

61,65,67,107-108,1 1 1 , 119-21,157,161,199-203,2051 1 , 231-45
school squadrons: 169,171
staffs and staff officers: 323,392-93
tactics. See Tactics
Squier, George 0.:91,93-99
Staffs and staff officers
Air Service appointments and shifts: 15-56
American Expeditionary Forces: 125
air service chiefs: 187-89
army and corps air service: 325-27
for bombing operations: 152, 155
communications with: 21 0
coordination with air operations: 163
groups: 325-26,387-92
relations with: 310-1 1
squadrons: 323,392-93
Stenay: 239
Stonne: 242
Strafing. See Ground forces, attacks on
Strategic air support. See Bombing operations
Strategic Aviation, Zone of Advance: 156-57
Stuttgart: 143
Subig Bay: 4
Submarine warfare, German: 55, 100
Submarines, detection of: 91
Supply depots
establishment and operation: 123,139
strikes against: 120,232,239,251

US. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

456

Supply forces. See Maintenance, supply and support forces
Supply officers, duties of: 281,323,389-90,393
Supply operations and systems: 163,169,263
responsibility for: 187-88,192,319,322-25,346-47
strikes against: 120,143,151,232-34,239,242-43,292
Supply train: 65
Support missions. See Escort and patrol missions
Supreme War Council: 219
Surgeons, duties of: 391
Surpriseaircraft as deterrent: 33,50
application of: 232,241,314,357,376,382
security from: 337,351,371,404.See also Security measuresand operations
Surveillance. See Reconnaissance and observation
Synchronized firing systems: 98
Tactical air support: 4243,72,101,117,119-21,139,163,199-

203,205-11, 231-45,24749,251,285,292,313
Tactical units. See by type
Tactics
in bombing operations: 277-79,400403
general: 51
in pursuit operations: 99,288-89,291-94,307-309,355-84
in reconnaissance and observation: 338,350-51
Takeoff systems: 396
Tanforan race track: 9Tanks, strikes against: 292-93
Target selection and assignment
in bombing operations: 117,14345,149,151,153,192,231-

32,238-45,251,253,279,309-10,394
in pursuit operations: 233,292-93,309-10,372-73
Taylor stunt: 360
Teamwork in pursuit operations: 356,363,371
Technicians, training and efficiency: 153

457

Index

Telegraph battalion: 65
Telegraph communications and installations: 25, 59, 199, 293, 334
Telephone communications and installations: 24-25, 43, 59, 149,
321,334-35,
180-81, 183-85, 199,202,255,257-59,293,319,
349,354, 38546,407
Termes: 239
Terrain, effect on operations: 181
Texas City, Texas: 19,22
Thaw, William K.:236, 237
Thionville: 242
Thomas, G. C.:372
Three-dimensional factor in flight: 307
Tilson, John Q.:91
Time and distance factors
in bombing operations: 146, 149-50, 315
in communications operations: 306
in pursuit operations: 315
Tinsel-paper signals: 30, 63
Toul bombing targets group: 146
Toul sector: 145-46, 148, 156, 173, 175, 213
Tours: 155
Towers, John ti.: 105
Towns, identifying: 282-83
Tracer ammunition: 379
Trailers. See Motor vehicles
Trainer aircraft: 69, 105
Training aids and literature: 187-88, 192
Training programs: 37. See also Schools
Army in general: 41
bombardiers: 191
for bombing operations: 393-94
by British: 171, 191-92

458

U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. II

ferry pilots: 192
in liaison operations: 21 1, 299-301,31 1
in map reading and use: 149-50,21 1
mechanics: 324
in navigation: 147,191
observers: 30,38,51-52,115,149-50,210,223,269,271,273,

306,315,340,351,
389,393-94,407
pilots: 37-38,51-52,77,86-87,98-99,14647,149-50,191,

223,273,277,294,306,351,356,373,380-81,388,393-94,400
responsibility for: 187-88
technicians: 153
Transportation (see also Convoys and marches; Mobility)
air units equipment and personnel: 148,150-51
by aircraft: 33-35
of aircraft: 149of armament and equipment: 319
for liaison operations: 327
Transportation officers, duties of: 391 -92
Trenchard, Hugh M.: 107-108,709,152-53,161,191
Tres Hermanos, Mexico: 83
Tripoli, war in: 1 1 , 47
Troop units. See Ground forces
Trucks. See Motor vehicles; Transportation
Turkish army: 13
United Kingdom (see also Royal Flying Corps)
Air Board: 161
Air Ministry: 161,163
air raids on: 162
aircraft in service: 28
war aims, policies and priorities: 161 -62
War Cabinet: 161,163
United States Army (see also American Expeditionary Forces)
combat mission: 31 3-14
organization: 42,57,59,65
personnel strength expansion: 41,57,65
training program: 41
United States Coast Guard: 4142

459

Index

United States Navy: 41 -42,92.See also Naval forces
Valois, R.: 302
Van Horn, Robert 0.: 155
Verdun: 241 -42
Verdun-Tout

base: 145-46, 148

Very pistol signals: 63,798,296,298
Vezelise: 146
Villa, Pancho: 65,66, 67
Villome, Commandant: 237,241 -43
Vilosnes: 238
Visibility factor
in bombing operations: 307,315,389,399,401
in fire control and direction: 307,315,346
in pursuit operations: 307,315,356-57,374,378,381-82,389
in reconnaissance and observation: 282-83, 305,315,337,342,

351
Visual signals. See by type
Viven Bessiere: 201
Void: 146
Volunteer forces: 65
Vosges sector: 149
Vouziers: 239
Walker, Kirby: 137
Wallace, Charles S.:67,69,91
War aims, British: 161 -62
War Department: 3,145,228
Warren, S.S.:75
Washington, George, quoted: 53,157
Watercourses, identifying: 282
Weapon systems, aircraft. See Armament and equipment

460

U.S. Ail: Service
in Wclrld War I
VOl. II

Weather factor in operations: 50, 77-78, 80, 92, 14547, 149,

181-182,206,215,248,251,277,38143
Westermark, Arthur: 84
Whitehead, Henry C.: 263
Wigwag (semaphore) signals: 30
Willard, Charles F.: 70
Willis, R. H.:75, 86
Wilmington, Del.: 15
Wilson, Woodrow: 55,64,65,91
Winds
direction, indicating: 148
effect on operations: 181
Wing, 1st Pursuit: 231, 233, 237, 2414 5
Wireless. See Radio communications and installations
Woevre sector: 233
Wooded areas, identifying: 282
Wright brothers: 1, 7, 13, 47, 70,77
Zeppelins: 45, 61, 63
Zimmermann note: 100
Zone of Advance, A.E.S.: 139
Zone of Interior, A.E.F.: 139

Q U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1978 0 3 8 - 7 9 5