REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF
ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS AND TERRORISTS
Ahmad Naser Altaharwah＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant
movement in the modern period. They are ʻplaces of vulnerabilityʼ in which radicalization takes place. Yet
they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Much of the current discourse
about prisons and radicalization is negative. But prisons are not just a threat ̶ they can play a positive rolein tackling problems of radicalization and terrorism in society as a whole.
The objectives of the rehabilitation are to change the individualʼs belief system, rejecting the extremist
ideology, and embracing mainstream values, emphasizes that the extremists do not actually care about us,
but callously use them to achieve their own objectives. Also, the prison is to prevent the most ideologicallycommitted individuals from converting more vulnerable persons and offer them alternatives.

II. SUCCESSFUL DERADICALIZATION DEPENDS UPON AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE PATH TO RADICALIZATION
A sound deradicalization programme needs to learn from how individuals become radicalized: indeed,both radicalization and deradicalization lean heavily on family or other social ties, and the Internet isincreasingly playing a large role in both. Indeed, a particularly striking feature of radicalization is that today it
happens primarily over the Internet. As this paper will explore in greater depth later on, an individual needhave had no prior contact with a terrorist group, nor have ever traveled to those countries where the group isactive, to become directly involved with terrorism. This trend of “self-recruitment” has moved many
governments and NGOs to look more closely at the Internetʼs role in both terrorism and counterterrorism.
Researchers described those generally susceptible to radicalization as having a combination of thefollowing characteristics: trusting a person already involved with a radical group; being “spiritually hungry”
and dedicated to their faith, but having limited knowledge of their religion; and being desperate, naïve, or
simply in need of money. Those seeking to recruit such people try to cater to their needs and interests.
During the process of radicalization, as described, the “targetʼs” characteristics are identified to determine
their suitability for terrorism. They are then engaged in dialogue, befriended, and their social, financial, orpsychological needs are addressed as a means of gaining their trust. This part of the process closely
resembles the initial steps taken in many deradicalization programmes. However, throughout therecruitment process, radical groups will often isolate the targeted individual and “educate” them about thecause.
If they refuse to participate in violence, they may then be asked to do something seemingly innocuous, likerenting a car or an apartment to help out the group. This act is then leveraged to elicit continued
participation. For example, they may be told that “the security forces now know about you, and they may
torture you.” The targeted individual is consequently drawn closer to the radical group.

III. THE APPROACH IN JORDAN
The Government of Jordanʼs approach is based on the premise that violent extremism is not a political＊Director, Corrections and Rehabilitation Centre, Public Security Directorate, Jordan.

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issue but rather stems from “misguided youth” taking a “perverse view of Islam.” The state has tackled thisissue with a two-pronged approach that focuses on military measures and an education initiative. Much of thestateʼs action has resulted from its own experiences with terrorism, especially the 2005 Amman hotelbombings, which have led it to take a more comprehensive and aggressive approach to violent extremism.
However, the real blow against radical groups has come not from the stateʼs deradicalization activities but
from the impact of the 2005 bombings, the devastation of which led to a decline in support for extremistgroups.
The security steps taken by the state have led to the infiltration and monitoring of these groups as well as
crackdowns, arrests, and prosecutions. Jordan also introduced an Anti-Terrorism Law and a Fatwa Law in2006, which gives only clerics sanctioned by the state the right to issue fatwas. The Anti-Terrorism Law has
been viewed by critics as being detrimental to civil society because of the freedoms it undermines.
The cultural initiative to tackle the problem began with the Amman Letter of 2004, which confronts
Islamist extremism with its presentation of a wide consensus against its ideology.
The Letter was issued following an accord with 180 prominent Muslim scholars representing a range ofschools of Islamic thought. The aim of the initiative was to refute and delegitimize certain radical
interpretations of Islam and bring back the focus to disseminating a moderate and apolitical Islam. This has
been followed up with conferences as well as media outreach on television and radio. Interestingly, Jordan has
seen a spillover effect from the Saudi deradicalization programme in the form of its prison inmates
demanding a dialogue with the state. The demand of prisoners for dialogue with religious scholars led to a
two-month ad hoc programme, which included debates and lectures. However, a speaker noted that theprogramme was not a success, as many inmates felt that the state had not provided tenable, independentscholars̶a misjudgement that significantly weakened the programme. The need for a credible prison
programme is particularly urgent in Jordan as studies indicate that its jails have proved to be a hothouse forthe growth of extremism.

IV. DEREDICALIZATION IN JORDAN
Jordanian deradicalization is based on the following:
A. Contain a mix of different kinds of programming, typically combining ideological and/or religious reeducation with vocational training
B. Pay attention to facilitating prisonersʼ transition from prison back into mainstream society, typically byproviding them with the means for a new beginning and by establishing (or re-establishing) social
networks away from extremism
C. One of the overriding aims is to reduce opportunities for re-offending and increase the social and material
cost of doing so. Much of the activities in sophisticated programmes are consequently geared towards
locking prisoners into commitments and obligations towards family, community, and the state
D. The programme realized that the structure and instruments must reflect local contexts and conditions, inparticular prisoner population, and their individual and collective needs and motivations;
1. the nature and ideology of the groups to which prisoners used to belong;
2. the society from which they originate, its structure and customs;
3. the dynamics of the wider conflict and other external conditions, which may affect the programmeʼsoutcome.
4.

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The need to consider what the societies in which they take place find politically and ethicallyacceptable.

167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

5. The programme realized that it can be significant when both external conditions and the wider
political environment are conducive. In particular, they can play an important role in facilitating thetransition from conflict to peace when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists and/orconflicts are winding down.
6. Religious Members, the members will directly engage in the prisoner dialogues and the counselling
process. The sheikhs are typically approached on a personal basis and asked whether they would liketo participate in the committee activities and engage in dialogue with detainees. Key in selecting
members is communication style. One member is a formal extremist who has changed his ideas andperceived as good role model.
7. Members trained on psychosocial support (preferably on psychology) and members trained on social
skills, these members focus primarily on evaluating a detaineeʼs social status, diagnosing any
psychological problems and determining the type of support the prisoner and his family may needafter his release.
8. Security Members, security members are to evaluate prisoners for security risks and then makerelease recommendations based on input provided by the Religious, Psychological and Social members.
One of the Security Members serves as the overall Chief of the Advisory Committee.
9. Media Members. Media members produce materials aligned to the agreed Communication Strategy
used for sensitizing the community about the deradicalization project. This will include public
educational materials for use in schools and mosques, focused on outreach and education, primarily
targeting young Somali men using Internet, radio, television, and print media.
10. The Jordanian deradicalization programme shows that prisons are not just about locking people away,
but that they can make a real and positive contribution to tackling problems of radicalization andterrorism in society as a whole.

V. CONCLUSION
Prisons matter. Often ignored by the public and policymakers, they are important vectors in the processof radicalization, and they can be leveraged in the fight against it.
Much of the public debate about prisons and terrorism is about locking people away. This paper has
aimed to focus a more sophisticated understanding of the role prisons can play in radicalizing people ̶ and inreforming them. In doing so, it has analysed the policies. Take, for example, prison regimes for terrorists.
Governments everywhere have had to address a trade-off between wanting to treat terrorists ʻjust like otherprisonersʼ and preventing them from mobilizing outside support, recreating operational command structures,and radicalizing others.
The paper showed that there are no hard and fast rules about whether terrorist prisoners should beconcentrated, separated and/or isolated. In fact, most of the countries that have been looked at practice a
policy of dispersal and (partial) concentration, which distributes terrorists among a small number of highsecurity prisons. Even within such mixed regimes, however, it rarely seems to be a good idea to bring
together leaders with followers and mix ideologues with hangers-on.
The wider, and perhaps even more important, problem is that ̶ in most of the countries that have been
looked at ̶ prison regimes for terrorists are informed by the demand for security before everything else.
While understandable, the ʻsecurity firstʼ approach has resulted in missed opportunities to promote reform.
Many prison services seem to believe that the imperatives of security and reform are incompatible. In reality,
though, reform does not need to come at the expense of security. Prison services should be more ambitious inpromoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches in facilitating prisonersʼ
transition back into mainstream society.
Another issue which this paper has devoted much attention to is that of prison-based radicalization.
Prisons are often said to have become breeding grounds for radicalization. This should come as no surprise.
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Prisons are ʻplaces of vulnerabilityʼ, which produce ʻidentity seekersʼ, ʻprotection seekersʼ and ʻrebelsʼ ingreater numbers than other environments. They provide near-perfect conditions in which radical, religiously
framed ideologies can flourish. While the extent of the problem remains unclear, the potential for prison
radicalization is significant, and the issue clearly needs to be addressed.
Based on the research, it seems obvious that over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions thatlend themselves to radicalization. Badly run prisons also create the physical and ideological space in which
extremist recruiters can operate at free will and monopolize the discourse about religion and politics.
For many prison systems, therefore, the first and most important recommendation is to improve generalconditions, avoid over-crowding, train staff, and provide meaningful programming that allows prisoners todevelop stable inmate identities. Prison imams are important in denying religious space to extremists, butthey are not a panacea.
Not all the findings in this paper are negative. The paper shows that, while certain countries fall short ofeven the most basic good practices, others have recognized the enormous potential for prisons to become net
contributors in the fight against terrorism, and have encouraged ̶ sometimes sponsored ̶ initiatives that
seek to promote disengagement and de-radicalization.
For example, where groups are hierarchical and have strong, authoritative leadership, collective
disengagement and de-radicalization becomes possible. Such processes have to be carefully managed. When
political concessions form part of the ʻdealʼ between the government and the terrorists, collective
disengagement and de-radicalization may, in fact, assume the character of a fully-fledged peace process, andrequires the necessary skills, resources, and ̶ above all ̶ patience.
Individual disengagement and de-radicalization, on the other hand, remains understudied and is often
misunderstood ̶ despite all the publicity that programmes have attracted in recent years.
Looking at six individual disengagement and deradicalization programmes in the Middle East and South
East Asia, the paper has identified key principles, which will help policymakers understand the phenomenon
and identify elements of best practice that can be adopted in their own prison systems.
Whether individual disengagement and deradicalization programmes can make a strategic contribution tobringing a terrorist campaign to an end remains to be proven. The programmes that have been examinedsuggest that they can ̶ as long as the political momentum is no longer with the insurgents and otherexternal conditions are conducive. An over-reliance on individual disengagement and de-radicalization
programmes as the primary means of fighting terrorism should be avoided, therefore ̶ they complement
rather than substitute other instruments in the fight against terrorism.
In bringing together the experiences of 15 countries, the paper has attempted to show the diversity ofpolicy and practice across the world. Not every lesson may be relevant or applicable in every context, but ̶taken together ̶ they demonstrate the enormous possibilities for prisons to make a positive and significant
contribution to countering terrorism.

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