1

Helsinki Court of Appeal

22.6.2024

via: helsinki_muutoksenhaku.ko@oikeus.fi

Applicants for authorisation to proceed:
Mika Vauhkala
For

Aki

Nummel,Aki

Nummelin(Aki

Nummelin

Law

Office)Process

address:

aki.nummelin@gmail.com
Tel. 0400432428
Postal address: Viimatie 14, 28190 PoriRespondents:
1) The Finnish State
2) Fazer Restaurants Oy

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORISATION FOR FURTHERPROCESSING
Asia:
Application for leave to continue proceedings concerning the judgment of Helsinki District Court incase L706/2022/1504 (31.5.2024, decision number 1017 5944)

Grounds for applying for leave to continue proceedings under the Code of Judicial Procedure:
We respectfully request the Helsinki Court of Appeal to grant the applicants leave to appeal theentire judgment, as there is reason to doubt the correctness of the final result of the district court's
decision, and it is not possible to assess the correctness of the final result of the district court's
decision without granting leave to appeal.
Furthermore, this is an exceptional case in which the constitutionality of the Communicable
Diseases Act, the obligation of Fazer Ravintolat Oy to comply with all the articles of theCommunicable Diseases Act in the same case at the same time, the European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are assessed.

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the binding nature and applicability of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights to theapplication of the Communicable Diseases Act, fundamental procedural issues and theinterpretation of the Equality Act. In this respect, the Court of Appeal should most respectfully
grant further leave to apply the law to other similar cases. We consider that the Helsinki District
Court has completely failed to assess the relevance of the above-mentioned laws and case-law inthe case brought by the applicant.

Subject-matter and pleas in law
The applicant Mika Vauhkala (hereinafter either the applicant, Vauhkala or the applicant) has been
prevented from entering Fazer Cafe (Kluuvikatu 3, Helsinki) on 10 December 2021 at 9 a.m. The
applicant has been required to show a so-called coupon pass as a condition for entry to therestaurant. The applicant did not have such a passport, so he was turned away from the café. The
applicant considers that, in his case, the requirement to show a passport was unjustified andunlawful, inter alia becausea) he has been in perfect health when he went to the caféb) he or she is not a member of a "risk group" and, knowing at the time that coronary
vaccines cause harmful side effects, could not have been forced to take a potentiallyharmful coronary vaccinec) According to the statements made in the district court by Hanna Nohynek, Chief Physicianof the THL, and Asko Järvinen, Infectious Diseases Physician at HUS, the coronary
vaccines were only intended to protect the persons who had received them, and Vauhkala
could not have protected any person at Fazer Cafe from coronary heart disease by taking thecoronary vaccine himself. This is also confirmed by our written evidence, where theEuropean Medicines Agency confirms the information given by Nohynek and Järvinen: thecoronary vaccine only protected those who had taken the coronary vaccine.
d) the applicant considers that the requirement of vaccination as a condition for access to acafé (Article 1 of Protocol No 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights requires
the State to ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily prevented, inter alia, from eating in a
restaurant) is contrary to his convictions and religion, since believers constitute the bodyof Jesus on earth and the body of Jesus must not be contaminated with harmful substances.
e) as early as December 2021, it was known to the medical community that the coronary
vaccines used to qualify for the coronary passport did not prevent the spread of coronary
heart disease at that time. This was confirmed in the district court proceedings by, inter alia,
the THL Chief Physician

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Hanna Nohynek and Asko Järvinen, HUS infectious diseases physician. In addition, we
have presented extensive medical evidence to the district court that coronary vaccines havenot prevented the spread of coronary heart disease. Nohynek and Järvinen have testified
that they have already communicated this information to the Council of State in thesummer of 2021.
f) the Constitutional Committee has approved coronary passport legislation on the basis that
medical evidence showed that coronary vaccines prevent the spread of coronary heartdisease. At the same time, the Constitutional Committee has required the Government tomonitor developments in medical knowledge of coronary heart disease. Since Nohynek andJärvinen have stated at the district court hearing that they have passed on information about
the ineffectiveness of coronary vaccines to the Government, and the Government has not
obtained information about the actual effectiveness of coronary vaccines even from publicly
available information sources (of which we have submitted numerous examples as written
evidence at the district court hearing), the Government has clearly not followed thedevelopment of medical knowledge about vaccines. We would have liked to have heard
former Prime Minister Sanna Marin, who was in charge of the Council of State at the time
the legislation on the interest rate passport was drafted, specifically on this issue, but the
district court has refused to allow us to call her as a witness. Since the Government has notcomplied with the requirement of the Constitutional Committee to monitor the progress of
medical knowledge, the Coronary Passport legislation has not been drafted in accordancewith the Constitution, and it has certainly not been applied in the way required by theConstitution. Similarly, the Council of State has not followed the development of medical
knowledge as to whether the corona tests, known as PCR tests, have been valid inestablishing with sufficient certainty that a person has covid-19g) the applicant has been able to have breakfast at Hotel Kämpp on the same day (10.12.2021)
and in the coming days also at other locations, even at other Fazer Restaurants Oy
locations. As the Equality Act states that "discrimination is direct if someone is treated lessfavourably on a personal ground than someone else would have been, is or would betreated in a comparable situation", this comparable situation has arisen from that, when
Vauhkala has been able to enter other cafés/restaurants at approximately the same time andunder the same interest rate pass legislation as he has not been able to enter Fazer Cafe
(Kluuvikatu, Helsinki). The discrimination was based on the presumption of Vauhkala's
state of health when he did not have to present a coupon pass. However, Mr Vauhkala wasin perfect health when he went to the café, and he was not covered by the health insurance
scheme in force at the time (10.12.2021).

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on the basis of medical knowledge, caused any health risk to others in the café by his presence
thereh) Fazer Ravintolat Oy has, in the applicant's view, infringed the Equality Act, because thecompany has directly discriminated against Vauhkala, as Fazer Ravintolat Oy's actions havenot been based on law. Fazer Ravintolat Oy has failed to comply with Articles 58h and 58iof the Communicable Diseases Act.
§ 58j concerning the company's failure to draw up a written plan on how it will implement
the obligations and restrictions imposed by the decision of the Regional Administrative
Board of Southern Finland, and § 58j concerning the company's failure to inform Vauhkala
about the processing of personal data contained in the interest-bearing passport. In addition,
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has decided to start requiring customers of its cafeteria to present a
coupon card throughout the day, whereas normally the coupon card is required in catering
establishments only from 5 p.m. onwards. This has been based on the fact that it has
allowed Fazer Restaurants Ltd to attract customers to its premises without the need tocomply with any restrictions on its premises, thereby maximising its profits. The refusal ofaccess to the restaurant infringed the constitutional right to equal treatment and protection ofprivate life with regard to the disclosure of health information, the right to respect for
private life, freedom of religion or belief and freedom of conscience and the right to nondiscrimination guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, and the right tofreedom of religion or belief guaranteed by Article 12 of the ECHR. the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary denial of access to a restaurant, Fazer Ravintolat Oy has failed tocomply with its human rights obligations to respect the dignity, privacy and fundamental
rights of individuals and not to tolerate discrimination of any kindi) the State's interest rate passport legislation has also been unconstitutional because it has
allowed for a significant transfer of public power to a private company, in this case Fazer
Ravintolat Oy. The legislation has allowed a private company to decide for itself when torequire a passport as a condition of entry to a restaurant. Fazer Ravintolat Oy has required
a card as a condition of entry throughout its opening hours, usually only after 5 p.m. inother restaurants.
According to Article 124 of the Constitution, "a public administrative task may be entrusted toa person other than.
to a public authority only by or under a law, if it is necessary for the proper performance of
its task and does not undermine fundamental rights, legal certainty or other requirements ofgood administration. However, tasks involving the exercise of significant public authority may
be entrusted only to a public authority." Barring access to a restaurant for the whole day as an
exception to the others

5of companies in the same sector has implied a significant exercise of public authority,
which may only be entrusted to a public authority. The applicant further submits that thefact that an ordinary restaurant worker is entitled to check the interest rate passport throughwhich that restaurant worker obtained access to Vauhkala's personal medical data also
constituted a significant exercise of official authority.
j) other criteria for obtaining a coronary passport, other than just taking coronary vaccines,
have also violated Vauhkala's fundamental and human rights. Vauhkala could not have beenrequired to contract a communicable disease of general interest every six months. Mr
Vauhkala, in good health and in good condition, has never contracted coronavirus. Matti
Muukkonen, a doctor of law, has testified at the district court hearing - also on the basis of
his only peer-reviewed legal article on the coronary passport legislation - that in order forthe coronary passport legislation to ensure that the fundamental rights of healthy individuals
who had not received coronary vaccinations for ideological reasons were also guaranteed,
the State should have paid for free coronary testing for all, so that individuals could enjoy
the fundamental and human rights to which they are entitled. In order to obtain a coronary
passport and enjoy the fundamental rights of all, in accordance with Article 6 of the Patients
Act, Article 5 of the Oviedo International Convention and point IV of the Code of Medical
Ethics, those who refused the medical procedure would have had to undergo a PCR test
every three days and pay between EUR 100 and EUR 200 each time. This would havemeant that, in order to fully enjoy their fundamental and human rights, those who refused
the coronary vaccine would have had to pay between EUR 1000 and EUR 2000 per monthout of their own resources, which would have been totally unreasonable in financial terms.
Fundamental and human rights must be enjoyed by everyone, regardless of their wealth

Serious procedural errors that occurred during the district court proceedings and prevented a fairhearing of the case
It is necessary to obtain leave to continue the proceedings because of a number of serious procedural
errors in the district court proceedings, which have prevented a fair hearing of the case andjeopardised the applicant's legal protection.
These serious errors include:
1) Judge Markku Saarikoski, the judge hearing the case, was unable to hear the case2) Judge Marko Lepistö, the judge hearing the case, was unable to hear the case63) The refusal to hear Sanna Marin, a witness called by the applicant, was not based on law
4) The refusal to hear Satu Koskela, a witness called by the applicant, was not based on law
5) The oral hearing at the main hearing of Janne Salminen, the legal expert appointed by
the defendant, was contrary to the prevailing case-law
6) The hearing of Hanna Nohynek as an expert was unlawful7) The admission of the preparatory documents submitted by the defendants as
written evidence in the case is contrary to the principle of jura novit curia8) The applicant's request for a preliminary ruling on the award of contracts for the supply ofcoronary vaccines in Finland by the State to the applicant was rejected, even though theapplicant's main plea in law was the ineffectiveness of the coronary vaccines against the
spread of covid-19.
Here are more detailed breakdowns of the serious errors mentioned above, with reasons.

Judge Markku Saarikoski's disqualification
According to Chapter 13, Section 6(2) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (OC, 4/1734) (441/2001), a
judge is disqualified if he or she has a relationship with a party, whether by reason of employment orotherwise, which, particularly in view of the nature of the case before him or her, gives rise toreasonable doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the matter. According to paragraph 2 of the same
Article, the mere fact that a party is a State, a municipality or another public body does not constitutea bar under paragraph 1. According to Article 7.3 of Chapter 13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge is also disqualified if any other circumstance comparable to those referred to in this Chapter
gives rise to reasonable doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the matter.
On 9.11.2023, we learned that Markku Saarikoski, who was the District Judge and presiding
judge in our case, will, in addition to his judicial work, work as a mediator at the Office of
the National Mediator. On 16 September 2021, he was appointed for a three-year term ofoffice, starting on 20 September 2021 (news on this: https://valtioneuvosto.fi//1410877/markku-saarikoski- mediator-for-the-office-of-appointed-mediator).
The other defendant in our action is the Finnish State. In practice, the defendant is the Finnish
Government, which is the same body that appointed Saarikoski as a mediator for the Office of the
National Mediator. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, acting as part of the Council of Stateand on its behalf in the present case, has been assigned to handle the action on behalf of the State.
In addition, the Office of the National Mediator operates administratively under the Ministry of
Employment and the Economy. The said Ministry played a key role in the preparation of thelegislation on the interest rate passport which is the subject of the dispute in the present action.

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The information about Saarikoski's secondary function as a mediator appointed by the Government
in the Office of the National Mediator came as a complete surprise to us, as there was no mentionof this secondary function in the register of judges' affiliations and secondary functions maintainedby the judicial administration (the so-called Sisi register, https://asiointi.oikeus.fi/sidonnaisuus-jasivutoimirekisteri/ilmoitus/search). According to the entries in the register, Mr Saarikoski has beena judge at the Helsinki District Court since 1 September 2007 and has been a part-time deputy
member of the expert and expert members of the Labour Court from 1 January 2019 to 31
December 2023. The Sisi register should also have mentioned Mr Saarikoski's three-year post as amediator at the Office of the National Mediator. However, this post was only added to the Sisi
register after our allegations of obstruction were brought to Saarikoski's attention. In his
explanation, Mr Saarikoski said that the information had been 'inadvertently omitted' from the Sisi
register.
In our application, we alleged that the Finnish state, in practice the Finnish Government in office in
2021, had violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The same government that we
allege committed a serious violation of human rights has appointed Mr Saarikoski as its mediator.
These facts, together with the fact that Saarikoski's position as mediator was not mentioned in theregister of judges' affiliations and secondary functions as required by law, in our opinion, give rise
to reasonable doubt as to Saarikoski's impartiality in the case within the meaning of § 13:6(2) and§ 13:7.3 of the Code of Conduct.
On the basis of the above, we made an objection under § 13:8 of the Rules of Procedure that Judge
Saarikoski was unfit to sit.
The District Court rejected Saarikoske's objection of obstruction by decision of 22 January 2024
(decision number 1015 0438). The District Court justified its decision, inter alia, by stating that"[t]he fact that District Judge Saarikoski's secondary position had not been entered in the registerof affiliations is irrelevant for the assessment [of the disqualification]". However, this fact was oneof our main grounds for doubting Mr Saarikoski's disqualification; the statutory declaration of that
office in the Sisi register had been neglected by Mr Saarikoski for more than two years.
The failure to make the statutory declaration and the fact that he was acting under the authority of theCouncil of State, which is a co-defendant in the Vauhkala case, give rise to reasonable grounds foralleging that Saarikoski was disqualified from presiding over the jury in the Vauhkala case.
In addition, the district court states the following in its decision:
In the present case, it is justified to draw attention to the fact that the Office of the
National Mediator has allegedly played no part in the proceedings referred to in theapplication.

8in the preparation of the decision. Similarly, the outcome of the action will have noeffect on the functioning of the Office of the National Mediator or its staff. The
connection between the Ministry and Mr Saarikoski must be regarded as rather
distant.
However, we did not even argue that the Office of the National Mediator played a role in the
preparation of the decisions referred to in the complaint, but the Ministry of Employment and theEconomy, which is part of the Council of State. Nor did we argue that the outcome of the action
should have had any effect on the Office of the National Mediator or its staff. We argued that the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy is the paymaster of Mr Saarikoski and that he wasappointed to his post by the same Government which was preparing the contested interest rate
passport legislation.
The district court thus completely failed to address or ignored the core grounds of our estoppel
argument. The decision is therefore not sufficiently reasoned in the way required by the case-law:according to KHO 2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must
be considered from the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned to obtain areasoned decision and to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
The applicant's right to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it is now denied, as thereasoning does not respond to the arguments put forward by the applicant in substance or at all.
The decision is therefore unlawful in the light of the legal guidance given in the abovementioned
judgment of the Court of First Instance.

Judge Marko Lepistö's disqualification
Pursuant to Chapter 13, Section 7(2) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (1.6.2001/441), a judge isdisqualified from hearing the same case or part of it again before the same court if there arereasonable grounds for suspecting that he or she has a prejudiced view of the case because of aprevious decision or other special reason.Pursuant to Section 13(3), a judge is also disqualified if
any other circumstance comparable to those referred to in this Chapter gives rise to reasonable
doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the case.
According to Antti Tapanila's doctoral thesis "Judge's disqualification" (Publications of the Finnish
Lawyers' Association: A series 2007), a judge's disqualification may be affected by apreconception of a legal issue, which may have arisen, for example, in connection with a previous
trial.
A judge's preconception of a point of law is revealed by the decisions he has given in similar cases inrelation to the case at hand (pp. 307-308). According to Tapanila.

9the expression of exceptionally unconditional opinions in isolation from the legal sources may giverise to suspicions of bias that could undermine the judge's impartiality (p. 309, footnote 269).
District Judge Marko Lepistö has acted as District Judge in case L 706/2021/2416 (judgment of 10
September 2021, decision number 165570/2021). The case concerned compensation claimed by theapplicants for a violation of the Equal Treatment Act when HUS/Helsinki Women's Clinic did not
admit the applicants because they did not use face masks. At the time, the Women's Clinic had a mask
recommendation in force. Lepistö dismissed the action without issuing a summons on the grounds,
inter alia, that:"[The plaintiffs'] claim was based on a denial of the seriousness of the Corona
pandemic, based on denialism. In the district court's view, however, the alleged
conduct against [the plaintiffs] was based on what was, at the time of the incident, agenerally perceived necessary and indispensable means of protecting the healthsafety of others in the hospital environment.
The Equality Act cannot protect an individual's opinion that is or may be likely toendanger the health or public safety of other people."
The judgment further states that "[the applicants] were a married couple who had been prevented
from having an amniocentesis because of the opinion expressed. The plaintiffs had stated that they
did not believe in the seriousness of the Covid-19 pandemic and that, at the very least, the masks
were not helping against the disease. The use of masks and visors caused both of them to have apanic attack."
Judge Marko Lepistö therefore refused to serve the summons on HUS on the ground that hehimself had argued that the applicants' claim was based on a denial of the seriousness of theinterest rate pandemic, based on "denialism". However, no such allegation of 'denialism' wasmade in the application for a writ of summons. Moreover, the procedure against the applicants(requiring them to wear a mask) was, in the judge's view, based on a necessary and indispensablemeans of protecting health and safety.
Chapter 5, Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure provides for the inadmissibility of an action
and the settlement of the case without requesting a reply:
The court shall dismiss the action as inadmissible if the plaintiff fails to comply with
the invitation referred to in Article 5 and the application is so incomplete, unclear or
confused that it cannot form the basis of the proceedings, or if the court is otherwise
unable to admit the case.

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The court must dismiss the action by judgment to the extent that it is manifestly
unfounded.
In the preamble to Article 6(2) and in the case-law, it has been held that a manifest lack offoundation for an action means a deficiency in the substantive basis of the action which cannot be
remedied even later in the proceedings. Such a situation arises where the factual grounds put
forward by the plaintiff (the facts put forward as elements of the case) do not allow the plaintiff toestablish what he claims in his application for a writ of summons (so-called 'legal unfoundedness').
Judge Lepistö has therefore already decided, before issuing the summons, that the application for asummons was manifestly unfounded, pursuant to Article 5:6.2 of the Rules of Procedure.
According to Mr Lepistö, the applicants had not even alleged that they had been treated lessfavourably than other clients of the hospital and that, as a result of this failure to meet the burdenof proof, the facts set out in the application could not give rise to the result they sought, for which
reason the application had to be dismissed. However, that argument is absurd: the applicants
expressly stated as a matter of fact that the condition for their admission to the amniocentesis on 23
March 2021 was the wearing of a mask or visor and that they could not wear a mask or visor for
health reasons, that is to say, that they were treated less favourably than hospital customers
wearing a mask or visor who were admitted to the hospital for treatment, on the basis of aprohibited ground of discrimination. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiffs did not expressly"underline" that they were treated differently from clients who wore a mask is very difficult to see
as a sufficient ground for a "manifest" lack of legal basis for the action within the meaning of
Article 5:6.2 of the Code.
The purposeful application of the law
Lepistö's bias and the fact that he refers in his reasoning to Article 11(2) of the Non-Discrimination
Act by apparently deliberately omitting to quote the rest of the provision also indicates that his
reasoning is biased. He states that a difference in treatment is nevertheless justified even in theabsence of a provision laying down the grounds on which the treatment is justified, provided thatthe treatment has an objective which is acceptable from the point of view of fundamental andhuman rights and that the means of achieving that objective are proportionate. The provisioncontinues, however, that this provision does not apply, inter alia, to the exercise of official
authority or the exercise of a public administrative function. Mr Lepistö knew or ought to have
known that amniocentesis falls within the scope of the provision of counselling services under
Article 15 of the Health Care Act (1326/2010), which falls within the scope of the exercise of apublic administrative function within the meaning of Article 11.2(1) of the Equal Treatment Act.
Thus

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says for example Eeva Nykänen in her article "Private service providers as providers of public socialand health services" (Lakimies magazine 3-4/2020 p. 8):"... social and health services, which are the responsibility of the public authorities,
fall within the scope of public administration. Public service tasks which areconsidered to be public administrative tasks may be similar in content to services
provided by the private sector. The decisive factor in defining the nature of the task iswhether the public sector is responsible for organising and financing the services. ...
For example, services provided by an undertaking providing health services or
housing for the elderly do not therefore fall within the scope of the public service
remit, unless the provision of the service is based on a statutory obligation on the partof the - - - municipality to organise the service. If the provision of the service inquestion is based on such an arrangement, it is a public administrative task which theprivate service provider is carrying out in this case."
Based on Nykänen's article, it is clear that the provision of child health services - including
amniocentesis - is a public administrative task, as it is based on the statutory obligation of themunicipality to provide them under Section 15 of the Health Care Act. Thus, the provision ofamniocentesis is subject to the requirement of different treatment under the law pursuant to Article
11.1 of the Equality Act, and Article 11.2, as applied by Lepistö, does not apply to amniocentesis.
Consequently, the mask claim made by the amniocentesis clinic would have had to be based on alaw enacted by Parliament as required by section 11.1 of the Equality Act in order for the claim tomeet the equality requirement and thus be lawful. However, at no time was the use of masks mademandatory by law in Finland, and although the Government proposed such a law in the spring of
2021, it withdrew its proposal on 31 March 2021 and never returned to the issue.
Lepistö's attitudinal use of language
The word "denialism" (a word that was never used by the plaintiffs themselves) used by theplaintiffs in the Lepstein claim is generally associated with phenomena that are particularly sociallyobjectionable, such as climate denialism, Holocaust denialism and vaccine denialism. See, forexample, Osmo Pekonen's article of 27 April 2022 "Denialists of many kinds"(https://www.tiedetoimittajat.fi/tiedekeskiviikko/monen-sortin-denialisteja/), which states that"denialism is the disease of our time". See also e.g. Syksy Räsäsäsen and Kari Enqvist's article of
5.5.2014 "Denialism, a collateral damage of scientific progress?"(https://journal.fi/tt/article/view/41570), where already in the title the word "denialism" is linked to"damage"12

a negative, undesirable phenomenon. In both writings, the word 'denialism' has been associated forat least ten years with a strong sense of disapproval and avoidance in common parlance.
The applicant considers that Lepistö's use of the word denialism in relation to the applicant's claimin the case must be regarded as the expression of an exceptionally unconditional position, detachedfrom the legal sources, which gives rise to suspicion of a bias that compromises the impartiality of
the judge (see above and Tapanila 2007 p. 309, footnote 269).
Based on the above, the applicant considers it clear that the strong language used by Lepistö in the
judgment of 10 September 2021 gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality in the handlingof cases challenging coronary measures involving similar legal issues, as in the present case of
Vauhkala v. State of Finland and Fazer, within the meaning of OC 13:7.2.
Since Marko Lepistö has applied the Equal Treatment Act in case L 706/2021/2416 in the abovementioned manner in a manifestly purposive manner, has used strongly accusatory language in
relation to the applicant's claims and has dismissed the action in question without issuing asummons on manifestly frivolous and/or questionable grounds, this gives rise to a well-foundedsuspicion that he is subject to OC 13:7.2 of the Law on interest rate pandemics in general and on
cases challenging interest rate measures in particular. The applicant considers that Mr Lepistö's bias
is such that he is unable to act objectively and impartially in Vauhkala v State of Finland and Fazer.
The district court rejected Lepistö's claim of obstruction by decision of 19 March 2024 (decision
number 1016 1641). The district court justified its decision, inter alia, as follows:
Vauhkala's view that District Judge Lepistö had made an exceptionally absolutestatement, unconnected with the legal sources, was based mainly on the fact that
District Judge Lepistö had used the term "denialism" as part of his reasoning.
In this respect, the District Court finds that the mere use of the said expression cannot
be regarded as a statement that is detached from the legal sources, let alone as an
exceptionally absolute one.
The decisive point is that the cases L 706/2021/2416 and L 706/2022/1504 involve
different legal issues. In the first case, Judge Lepistö did not express a legal opinion
which might lead to a finding of incompetence in a subsequent case.

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matter. There is no justification for a different assessment of that conclusion on thebasis of a single expression used by District Judge Lepistö.
In summary, the district court states that the party's own perception of the judge's
disqualification is not decisive, but the doubt must be objectively justified. Mr
Vauhkala has not put forward any evidence in support of his allegation of lack ofcompetence which, viewed objectively, would give rise to a reasonable doubt as to theimpartiality of District Judge Lepistö in the case.
The claim that District Judge Lepistö was not disqualified must therefore be rejected.
The district court's assessment that Lepistö's use of the term "denialism" could not be regarded as astatement unconnected with the legal sources, let alone an exceptionally absolute one, is incorrect.
The district court's finding that the applicant had not put forward any evidence in support of his
plea of lack of competence which, objectively speaking, would give rise to a reasonable doubt as tothe impartiality of District Judge Lepistö in the case is also incorrect. The use of the word
'denialism', together with the deliberate application of the law and the dismissal of the action
without issuing a summons without sufficient reason, gave rise to objectively well-founded doubts
as to Mr Lepistö's impartiality in other cases criticising the corona measures.

Refusal to hear the witness Sanna MarinWe demanded an oral hearing in the district court of Sanna Marin, who was Prime Minister at thetime the interest rate passport legislation was drafted, on the subject of "what the Government has
based its view of the necessity of interest rate passport legislation on and how the Government hasmonitored the necessity of regulating interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of
fundamental rights".
The district court refused to hear Marin as a witness in the case, justifying its decision on 27 February
2024, among other things, as follows:
The district court considers that the case involves constitutional and procedural
questions of law. The views or opinions of an individual politician, albeit a person
who was Prime Minister at the time the legislation in question was enacted, areirrelevant when considering such questions of law.
Frankly, we don't even understand what the district court means by this. There are undoubtedly atleast constitutional issues involved. We also agree with the district court's14that the personal views or opinions of Mr Marin, who was Prime Minister, are irrelevant when
considering the legal issues involved - the necessity of the interest rate passport legislation and thefulfilment of the government's duty to monitor it. Instead, what is relevant are the concrete actions
that the Government did or did not take under the leadership of Prime Minister Marin, and it isSanna Marin, who was in charge of the Government, who is best placed to speak on these matters.
In particular, since the defendants have not adduced any evidence to shed light on these legal
issues, there is no basis in law for refusing to hear Ms Marin, and thus the hearing of Ms Marinwould have been essential to the success of the applicant's action.
According to the view expressed in the case law, the court should apply the limitation provision in
OC 17:8 with a certain degree of caution and target limitation decisions to clear-cut cases. It isdifficult for a judge to limit the number of witnesses against the will of the party, because the judge
cannot draw conclusions about the credibility of the witnesses in advance, unless there are clearly
too many witnesses (Vuorenpää et al. 2021, Prosessioikeus, Alma Talent 2021 p. 609; see also HE
46/2014 p. 56 and LaVM 19/2014 p. 8).
According to the preamble to OC 17:8, before the court proceeds to reject evidence under thissection, it would normally be justified to discuss the extent of the evidence with the parties. As amatter of priority, agreement should be sought, if possible, so that the parties voluntarily give up
evidence that is unnecessary or otherwise objectionable (HE 46/2014 vp p. 57; see also Rautio etal., Evidence: a commentary on Chapter 17 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, Edita lakitieto 2020
p. 85).
However, in the present case, the district court did not even attempt to discuss with the parties thenecessity or otherwise of hearing Marin, but only unilaterally and without any practicaljustification stated that his hearing would not be relevant to the case.
It may even be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights if the decision to restrict
evidence is not properly justified (e.g. Suominen v. Finland 1.7.2003; see also Rautio et al. 2020 p.
85).
The district court has thus apparently misinterpreted our evidence in relation to the Marin hearing;
we did not find any answer to the question of our evidence as to how the government had
monitored the necessity of the regulation of interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of
fundamental rights. Thus, there was no legal basis for refusing to hear Mr Marin.
The district court further justified its refusal to hear Marin as follows:

15

According to Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the court must
exclude evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary.
The hearing of the witness Sanna Marin is not relevant in this case, so it is unnecessary
to hear her in this case. The Court must therefore refuse to hear her in this case.
In addition, the District Court stated in its decision of 28 March regarding the hearing of Sanna
Marini and Satu Koskela that case law has consistently refused to hear ministers and heads ofdepartment of ministries as witnesses in similar or similar cases.
However, the district court did not make any further reference to such established case law, nor did
it give any reasoning as to why the Marin hearing would not be relevant in this case. The parties
are therefore unable to assess the legal reasoning on which that case law is based. The decision istherefore not sufficiently reasoned in the manner required by the case-law: according to KHO
2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must be consideredfrom the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned to obtain a reasoned decisionand to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision on the refusal to hear Marin is noteffectively protected, as the district court gave virtually no concrete reasons for the refusal; more
precisely, the district court did not provide any concrete reasons why Marin's hearing would not be
relevant to the issue of evidence we have raised.
The district court responded only to the evidence he had invented for which he would have been
heard in court: his perception or opinion on the matter. However, as we have already stated, Mr.
Marin's perceptions and views are, in our view, irrelevant to the case.
In fact, the district court did not even give any reasons for refusing to hear Marin. For this reason
alone, the refusal was unlawful.

Refusal to hear the witness Satu Koskela
We demanded to hear oral evidence from Satu Koskela, Head of Department of the Ministry ofSocial Affairs and Health at the time of the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation, on
the issue of "what kind of medical research or legal assessment was the basis for the guidance
given by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to the Regional State Administrative Agencies".
The District Court refused to hear Koskela as a witness in the case, justifying its decision on 27
February 2024, among other things, as follows:16

Moreover, the views or opinions of the official who participated in the preparation of
the provision in question are, according to the district court, irrelevant when
considering questions of law such as those referred to above. Moreover, according to
the district court, the evidence in question is always presented in written form in thelegislative project in the form of a draft government bill and its preparatory documents,
so that the evidence must be replaced by documentary evidence as provided for in
Articles 3 to 4 of that provision.
... According to Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the court must
exclude evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary.
... The hearing of witness Satu Koskela is irrelevant in this case and the evidence
must be replaced by documentary evidence, so the hearing of the witness is
unnecessary in this case. The court must therefore refuse to hear her in this case.
In Koskela's case, our evidence was based on what kind of medical research or legal assessment the
STM's guidance to the regional administrative agencies was based on. We agree with the district
court that, like Marin, Koskela's personal views or opinions are irrelevant in considering the legal
issues involved. However, the issue on which we would have liked to hear Koskela (the STM's
guidance to the regional administrative agencies) was not presented in any written material at any
stage of the proceedings or their preparation; the district court's reference to "such evidence in thelegislative project, always in the government bill and its preparatory documents" has nothing to dowith the STM's administrative guidance to the regional administrative agencies, but only with the
preparation of the legislation.
Thus, Koskela's hearing could not be replaced by substantially less costly or time-consuming andsubstantially more reliable evidence, and there was no legal basis for refusing to hear Koskela. In
any event, the above-mentioned statement in the case law literature that the court should apply thelimitation rule in OC 17:8 with a certain degree of caution and only target limitation decisions toclear-cut cases applies.
In addition, the District Court stated in its decision of 28 March regarding the hearing of Sanna
Marini and Satu Koskela that case law has consistently refused to hear ministers and heads ofdepartment of ministries as witnesses in similar or similar cases.
However, the district court did not make any further reference to such established case law, nor did it
in any way explain why the Koskela hearing would not be relevant in this case. The parties are
therefore not in a position to assess the legal reasoning on which

17

this case law is based on. The decision is therefore not sufficiently reasoned in the way required by
the case-law: according to KHO 2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrativedecision must be considered from the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned toobtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision on the refusal to hear Koskela
is not effectively safeguarded, as the district court gave practically no concrete reasons for therefusal; more precisely, the district court did not provide any concrete reasons why the hearing of
Koskela would not be relevant in the case in relation to the evidence we have submitted.
In fact, the district court did not even give any reasons for refusing to hear Koskela. For this reason
alone, the refusal was unlawful.

Oral hearing of legal expert Janne Salminen
The State presented its legal expert Janne Salmi for a written and oral hearing in the proceedings,
in addition to giving a written expert opinion for the trial. However, according to establishedFinnish case-law, legal experts are not heard orally in court proceedings. Even the defendant, theFinnish State itself, through its agent, stated the following in its reply of 31 August 2022 to theDistrict Court:
117. The (oral) hearing of legal experts is not part of the Finnish procedure. The key
principle is that the court knows the law (jura novit curia). The parties (typicallythrough their agents/attorneys) can of course present their legal arguments in theirpleadings, and in particular in the final report, and may refer to and present legal
sources and expert opinions to the court if they wish.
We agree with the view expressed in the State's 31.8.2022 reply that legal experts should not, inprinciple, be heard orally as experts in Finnish court proceedings. We therefore wonder why the State,in complete contradiction to its earlier statement, has nevertheless summoned Salminen to be heardorally, and why the District Court has accepted this.
For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the district court should have denied
Salminen an oral hearing under Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, as it may
be replaced by.

18

with substantially less cost or effort and substantially more reliable evidence (Salminen's written
expert testimony), and because his oral hearing is unnecessary anyway from the point of view ofthe prevailing Finnish judicial culture. That view was confirmed during the oral hearing of Mr
Salminen at the main hearing, since he did not say anything orally at the main hearing that had notalready been read in his written expert report; rather, he appeared to be merely reading out extracts
from his written report.
The district court should have taken into account the above-mentioned unnecessary oral hearing ofSalminen as a matter of course, especially since it refused to hear the applicant's main witnesses,
Sanna Marini and Satu Koskela. The mere equality of the parties before the law and the adversarial
principle require that the district court should have taken the initiative to consider suchfundamental issues of procedural management properly and with respect for the rights of theparties.

Oral hearing of Hanna Nohynek as an expert
The State obtained a written expert report from Hanna Nohynek, the Chief Medical Officer of the
THL, and also presented her orally to the district court as an expert, which the district court
accepted. In our view, however, Hanna Nohynek could not have been heard as an expert in court,
since she was the Chief Medical Officer of the National Institute for Health and Welfare at the time
the coronary passport legislation was drafted and came into force, and repeatedly made strong
public statements on coronary vaccines and coronary passports. Moreover, as the State has stated in
its response to our request for edits, "the State has relied on the THL throughout the coronary
passport legislation, with the THL having issued numerous statements on the matter that areavailable from public sources" (see, e.g., Summary of 6 November 2023, p. 43). Since theGovernment has always relied on the THL in the preparation of the interest rate passportlegislation, it is obvious that Nohynek has also been involved in the preparation of the interest rate
passport legislation. For these reasons, Mr Nohynek's involvement in the case is such that his
impartiality is compromised. For the same reasons, in our view, Mr Nohynek cannot act as anexpert for the Finnish State, either in writing or orally. He should therefore have been heard
expressly as a witness in the case.
Thus, the written expert opinion given by Nohynek should also have been disregarded.
In its decision of 27 February 2024, the district court stated the following in its decision on the
hearing of Nohynek as an expert:

19

The district court finds that the ... Noheneki's status is not covered by Chapter 17,
Section 35 of the Code of Judicial Procedure§in the sense of Article 5(1), that they are so related to the case or the party
concerned that their impartiality would be compromised or that there is any otherobjective reason to believe that their impartiality would be compromised.
The matters relied on by the applicant concern the normal assessment of the evidence
to be taken into account in expert reports. Thus, they may be heard as experts or, in
the absence of a written expert report or in the opinion of the appointing party,
alternatively as witnesses.
However, the district court does not give any reasons for this view. The decision is therefore notsufficiently reasoned in the way required by the case-law: according to KHO 2019:110, the adequacyof the reasons given for an administrative decision must be considered from the point of view ofwhether the right of the party concerned to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can beeffectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision to hear Nohynek as an expert is
not effectively protected, as the district court did not provide any concrete reasons for its decision.
For this reason alone, the decision is unlawful.
Furthermore, we understand that it is impossible in the eyes of the law for the same person to beheard at the same time as an expert (the State's witness) and as a witness (the plaintiff's witness).
However, this is what happened at the trial. This is a question which, in our view, deserves apreliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal.

Legislative material in the form of written evidence
The State and Fazer submitted as written evidence the legislative documents V1 and V6, i.e.
Government Bill 131/2021 vp and the opinion of the Constitutional Committee PeVL 35/2021 vp.
In our view, however, they cannot be written evidence to be examined during the evidence phaseof the main hearing, as they are legislative documents and part of the legislation, which the court
must know ex officio. This is a question which, in our view, deserves a preliminary ruling from the
Court of Appeal.

Ignoring and ignoring the screen
The district court completely ignored, inter alia, the testimony of the plaintiff's witness Matti
Muukkonen and the legal analysis of the contested interest rate passport legislation

20

the equal treatment approach. The district court merely stated, in the exact wording used by thestate's attorney in the main hearing, that "Muukkonen makes no mention of the right to life andhealth, which has been the main justification for the state and PeVK's interest rate passportlegislation." However, Muukkonen's article - like Vauhkala's complaint - was not a comprehensive
critique of the fundamental rights analysis of the interest rate passport legislation, but primarily acritique of the equality analysis of the interest rate passport legislation. In any case, even if
Muukkonen had mentioned something about the right to life and health in his article, this would
not have refuted the main jurisprudential finding of Muukkonen's article, which was completely
ignored by the district court - from the perspective of the fundamental rights system, it would havebeen a less intrusive interference with the rights of the unvaccinated (including the plaintiff) if they
had been offered free testing (Muukkonen article p. 13), and therefore the interest rate passportlegislation did not meet the proportionality requirement of the fundamental rights restrictions.

The district court ignored Article 106 of the Constitution
The decision of the Helsinki District Court proceeds in such a way that firstly, the District Court
ignores Vauhkala's main grounds for his action, stating that the District Court is not competent toassess the constitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation. In so doing, the district court
effectively disregards the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 106 of the Constitution to assess theconstitutionality of the interest-rate passport legislation and its implementation in the present case.
For that reason, and in order that the application for leave to proceed to a further hearing may
logically proceed in parallel with the decision of the district court, the applicant also seeks leave toproceed to a further hearing on the ground that it is important, for the application of the law in othersimilar cases, to assess in which cases the court may assess the constitutionality of a parliamentarylaw. The Helsinki District Court has completely disregarded Article 106 of the Constitution, statingthat the court cannot assess the constitutionality of the Eduskunta Act because the assessment has
already been made by the Constitutional Committee.
The applicant's main plea in law is that the State's interest rate passport legislation has led to theabrogation of his fundamental and human rights and that the interest rate passport legislation has
been unconstitutional. According to Article 106 of the Constitution, "[W]here the application of aprovision of law in a case before the court would be manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution,
the court shall give preference to the provision of the Constitution."
In its judgment, the district court states that "in this case, where the Constitutional Committee has
assessed the constitutionality of the interest passport legislation, i.e. Section 58i of the Communicable
Diseases Act, and held that

21

such that the law can be enacted by ordinary legislative procedure, the district court does not havejurisdiction in principle to assess its alleged unconstitutionality. The constitutionality of theprovision has been assessed by the Constitutional Committee and neither the Committee nor any
constitutional expert consulted during the Committee's deliberations has expressed the view thatthe provision is unconstitutional'.
However, the district court also states that "the constitutional review practice has taken as a starting
point that the priority provision of Article 106 PL can only be applied in situations of statutory
interpretation that have not been subject to review by the Constitutional Committee".
In the present case, the Constitutional Committee has left a pre-condition on how the government
should deal with the coronary passport legislation in the light of evolving medical knowledge.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Committee has not assessed the coronary passport legislation in
relation to Article 124 of the Constitution, on which we will provide legal assessment and evidence
later.
As stated in the judgment of the District Court, "the applicant has argued that the objective ofpreventing the spread of the disease, which was the basis of the interest rate passport legislation, was
not based on up-to-date scientific knowledge, even though the Constitutional Committee had on
several occasions stressed the obligation of the Government to closely monitor the need to maintainthe regulation on interest rate restrictions and any problems that might arise in its application".
All the expert opinions submitted to the Constitutional Committee concluded that the interest
rate passport legislation was proportionate and necessary in the light of the medical andepidemiological data explicitly presented. The Constitutional Committee, for its part, statedthat "[w]hile the proposal places individuals in a different position, the proposed regulation
cannot bein the view of the Constitutional Committee, in the light of the medical grounds on which it isbased, arbitrary". With regard to written exhibit 8 submitted by the applicant in the district court,
it is noted that the Equal Opportunities Commissioner, Mr Stenman, stated that the use of theinterest rate passport was, according to Mr Stenman, acceptable if it could alleviate the medical
condition.
The pre-condition for coronary passport legislation has therefore been clear: coronary passportlegislation has been proportionate and necessary only and only in the light of the medical evidence
presented. The logical legal conclusion is that if medical knowledge changes, the legislation and its
implementation must change. This is a matter of legal importance in the light of the generalconditions of limitation of fundamental rights. According to the doctrine of the limitation of
fundamental rights, fundamental rights can only be limited by a lower level of regulation than theConstitution under certain well-defined conditions. These conditions include, inter alia, that the

22ground for limitation must be based on

23

in the Parliament Act, the restriction must be acceptable and required by a pressing social need,and that the restrictions must comply with the proportionality requirement. The proportionality
requirement can be considered to consist of both a requirement of appropriateness and arequirement of necessity; the restriction must be suitable in general to achieve the objective
pursued and, in addition, the objective cannot be achieved by means less intrusive thanfundamental rights.

The obligation for the Council of State to monitor the effects of regulation and take remedial action
The Government's obligation to monitor the effects of legislation is clear, for example, from thestatements of the Constitutional Committee on the interest rate passport legislation:
PeVL 35/2021 vp (regulation on the use of interest certificates) p. 4, point 10:(10) The Government must closely monitor the effects of the regulation and, if
necessary, take steps to correct it.
PeVL 26/2021 vp (border testing and inter alia TTL 16a-16f §) p. 4, point 9:(9) The Committee also stresses the need to closely monitor the impact of theregulation and to introduce legislative changes where necessary.
PeVL 14/2020 vp (temporary restriction on the operation of restaurants, TTL 58a §) p. 6:
The Constitutional Committee stresses that the proposed regulation must also be
limited in time to what is necessary. The Government must closely monitor the needfor the regulation to remain in force and any problems that may arise in its
application and take measures to remedy them.
In its opinion on the regulation of the use of the jewellery certificate, the Constitutional Committee
has made it a condition that the Government must closely monitor the effects of the regulation and, if
necessary, take steps to correct it. Thus, if medical knowledge had changed, the regulation (theintroduction of the interest certificate and the requirement to obtain it on the basis of decisions byregional administrative offices) would have had to be amended. According to the applicant, theCouncil of State failed to do so, which resulted in his being required to obtain a passport at the Fazer
Kluuvi café at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021, unnecessarily and in breach of his fundamental rights.

Former Prime Minister Marini's testimony blocked by district court

24

Since the Constitutional Committee had held that the Government was obliged to monitor the effectsof the regulation and, if necessary, to take steps to correct it, and since the Prime Minister was
responsible for the functioning of the Government, the applicant had decided to call the former
Finnish Prime Minister, Sanna Marin, as a witness before the District Court. It was during her timethat the Government submitted the interest rate passport legislation to Parliament for approval. Ms
Marin's testimony was entitled: 'on what the Government has based its view of the necessity of theinterest rate passport legislation and how the Government has monitored the necessity of theregulation of interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of fundamental rights'.
A key aim of the coronary passport has been to prevent the transmission of coronary heart disease
from one person to another. On the basis of the written evidence submitted by the applicant to the
district court and the oral testimony of witnesses, in particular the statements of Hanna Nohynek, asenior physician at the THL, and Asko Järvinen, an infectious diseases physician at the HUS, aswell as the statements of cardiologist Aseem Malhotra, it was known by the summer of 2021 that
coronary vaccines do not prevent the transmission of coronary heart disease from one person toanother in more than half of the cases. However, the key information has been that a vaccinatedperson could also have transmitted coronary heart disease to another vaccinated person. Thus, acoronary passport may have resulted in a vaccinated person who had access to a facility with agreen coronary passport being able to infect unsuspecting persons with coronary heart disease.
However, as described above, the district court refused to call Sanna Marin as a witness and the court
thus had no first-hand knowledge of how the Government implemented the precondition set by theConstitutional Committee for the adoption of the interest rate passport legislation.

Medical testimonies and medical examinations as written evidence
The witnesses Järvinen and Nohynek - Nohynek also acting as an expert - who were heard in the
district court have confirmed the views of the plaintiff that the coronary vaccines have notprevented the spread of covid 19. According to Järvinen, already in late 2020, when the firstcoronary vaccines were introduced, it was known to the medical community that they provided
only 50% protection against coronavirus infection and that the effect lasted 2-3 months. Each timea new variant of the virus appears, the efficacy and duration of action of the vaccines has
decreased. This has meant that by early December 2021, the effectiveness of the coronavirus
vaccines will have been significantly reduced.
According to Nohynek's testimony, by 6 months after the coronary vaccine was administered, theprotection it provided had dropped to zero.

25

At trial, the plaintiff has presented both Järvise and Nohynek with Exhibit 13, which was a study
conducted in the US state of Wisconsin in July 2021 on how the SARS-CoV-2 virus has spread
despite the vaccine at a time when the delta variant was in general use. The study measured similar
viral loads in people living in Wisconsin, USA, regardless of vaccination status, during a period
when the prevalence of the delta variant was high and rising.
The study data confirmed the notion that vaccinated individuals who contracted Delta variant
infection were able to spread the SARS-CoV-2 virus to other people in the same way as unvaccinatedindividuals. Both witnesses have admitted in court that they were familiar with the results of thestudy. According to Nohynek, the results of the study have been known for several months before
August 2021, when the study was published.
Both Nohynek and Järvinen have said that they have informed the Ministry and, through the
Ministry, the Government, that the coronary vaccines have not prevented the transmission ofcovid-19, even from one vaccinee to another. This information has been passed on since at least
the summer of 2021. Both say the vaccines have only been effective in preventing hospital
admissions and that this, according to Nohynek's statement, has only been the case for frail people,
such as the particularly elderly.
Both Nohynek and Järvinen have said in interviews that the entry of a single vaccinee into a roomwith a large number of vaccinated people has not posed a risk to those vaccinated, who have beenprotected from hospitalisation by the vaccine. On the other hand, the entry of an unvaccinatedperson into a room with vaccinated persons has, in the opinion of both parties, not differedsignificantly from the entry of a previously vaccinated person into a room, because also
the vaccinated person may have carried a coronavirus load and may have passed it on to others who,
despite vaccination, may well have contracted coronavirus disease.
With regard to the applicant's written evidence, we highlight the following points, which we
consider to show that taking the corona mRNA vaccine, which was a condition for obtaining thecorona passport, has not fulfilled its intended function of preventing the spread of covid-19, evenfrom one vaccinee to another, nor has it protected against covid-19.
As for Exhibit 14, the survey data suggest that the disease has spread between fully vaccinatedindividuals. As regards evidence 15, it is concluded that individuals with a breakthrough infection
have similar viral loads to unvaccinated individuals and are able to effectively spread the infection
under domestic conditions, including to fully vaccinated contacts. With respect to Exhibit 16, manydecision makers assumed that vaccinated individuals could be excluded as a source of potential
infection. It appears to be grossly negligent to neglect vaccinated26

the population as a potential and essential source of infection when deciding on public healthmeasures. The above evidence also shows that the admission of vaccinated persons to public
premises under the coronavirus passport has in fact created a situation where individuals who,
despite vaccination, have contracted covid-19 have been able to and have spread coronavirus toother - unsuspecting - fellow human beings. In order to respect equality and at the same time - as
the government has stated it wanted to do - to protect people from coronavirus, all customers
who tried to enter the Fazer Kluuvi café should have been tested for coronavirus.
As for documentary evidence 17, coronavirus vaccines have not prevented the disease, withcoronavirus infections being found in Israel (which was at the forefront of the distribution ofcoronavirus vaccines) in those who received a third dose of the vaccine. Documentary evidence 18
continues the trend in Israel, showing that almost all adults in Israel have been vaccinated, but that
coronavirus has only spread.
Vaccination has not prevented the spread of the disease, nor the transmission of the disease among
those vaccinated. Exhibit 19 states that a full vaccine series has resulted in coronavirus infections
among nurses in Ostrobothnia, Exhibit 20 states that in Pirkanmaa, an increase in vaccination
coverage correlates with an increase in the incidence of covid-19 disease, and Exhibit 21 states thatin Kainuu Central Hospital, coronavirus infections have occurred among patients and staff who
have received coronavirus vaccination. Thus, according to this evidence, the vaccine has notprevented the spread of coronavirus disease; on the contrary, there are indications that it has evenaccelerated the spread of the disease.
According to Exhibit 31, Nohynek, a senior physician at the THL, says that the studies found thatthe vaccine only slightly reduced forward transmission, and that the idea of the benefits of thevaccine was too black and white and did not even reflect the scientific knowledge at the time. "Thevaccine protected against infection, but only moderately and for a short time". According to Exhibit
32, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) stated that the covid-19 vaccine was not intended toprevent the transmission of disease from one person to another and that the vaccine was only
intended to protect those vaccinated. The EMEA's statement indicates that even if Vauhkala hadtaken the vaccine, it would not have protected anyone else from the disease. Thus, the refusal toallow Vauhkala access to the Fazer café has not protected anyone, has not protected legal interests,
but has instead infringed Vauhkala's right to equal treatment and the right of access to the restaurant
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. According to Exhibit 34, the national
expert group on vaccination, KRAR, considered, according to THL Kontio, that since vaccination
does not completely prevent infections, vaccination would not be the primary means of preventing
infections. Further, according to Kontio, herd immunity could not be discussed because it was notachieved.
The district court merely acknowledges the medical assessment of the case by stating the following:

27"The district court assessed the medical evidence presented as showing that theprevailing medical opinion was that the coronavirus vaccines were effective inprotecting the vaccinees from serious forms of disease and that the vaccines also
helped to prevent the spread of coronavirus. In addition, the coronavirus passportalso protected other fundamental rights of citizens and reduced the burden on thehealth care system in the face of a challenging disease situation. The purpose of thecoronavirus passport legislation was to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of
citizens' fundamental rights and to prevent the harm to society caused by apandemic."
In light of the evidence presented in the case, we find highly questionable the district court's assertion
that coronary vaccines would have helped prevent the spread of coronavirus in the fall and Decemberof 2021.
In any event, limiting fundamental rights solely on the basis of "helpful" utility does not satisfy the
proportionality and necessity requirement of the conditions for limiting fundamental rights; here, thedistrict court fails to make this proportionality assessment entirely.

Corona testing performed with an unreliable test
According to the State, Vauhkala was also not discriminated against on the grounds that he could
have obtained a negative PCR test result every 72 hours. However, this would have cost between€100 and €200 per session, which would have meant an extra €1000 to €2000 per month just to
enable Mr Vauhkala to enjoy his rights under the Constitution and the ECHR. This would of course
have been considered a violation of fundamental rights in principle.
However, the plaintiff also questions the effectiveness of PCR tests. On the basis of the opinion of
the expert Astrid Stuckelberger, it must be concluded that the PCR tests used by the Finnish
authorities give 97 % false positive results. Consequently, restrictions of fundamental rights basedon PCR tests cannot meet the general conditions for restrictions of fundamental rights. It should
also be noted that the Constitutional Committee - despite relying on medical knowledge - has notassessed the conditions for the use of PCR tests, even though they have played a key role inassessing the incidence of coronary heart disease. It must be held that the Constitutional Committee
did not carry out an adequate assessment of the legislation on the coronary passport by failing toassess the possible unreliability of the PCR test. In practice, the spread and extent of Covid-19 has
been assessed solely on the basis of the results of PCR tests. It is to be feared that this28

the test format has resulted in a very high number of false positive results, leading to unnecessary
restrictions on the fundamental and human rights of the persons concerned.
On this basis alone, the Helsinki Court of Appeal should grant Vauhkala leave for further
proceedings in order to assess the constitutionality of the coronary passport legislation in relation
to the detection of covid-19 almost exclusively by PCR testing.
Stückelberger's expert testimony indicates that the PCR test results have not reliably predicted thehealth status or infectivity of the person being tested for coronavirus. A coronavirus passport could
be obtained with a negative coronavirus test result, in addition to the so-called green coronavirus
vaccination and coronavirus disease, even though the coronavirus test did not meet the expectationsof the coronavirus passport legislation.
It is undisputed that the infection by Covid-19 is established on the basis of the PCR test result andto this end the applicant has submitted a number of written proofs. It is clear from Mr
Stückelberger's statement that the PCR test is not a diagnostic tool and that in any event it cannot be
said with certainty whether a positive test indicates the presence of residual antibodies to the virus
or to an old infection in the sample. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
also stated in its guidelines for the use of PCR that "the detection of viral RNA does not necessarily
indicate the presence of an infectious virus or that 2019-nCoV is the cause of clinical symptoms".
These facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate that PCR test results, and hence corona statistics, areunreliable.
In relation to a domestic sample study in the HUS region, the State argued that in this sample study
positive PCR test results would have been achieved with relatively low Ct values, which would
make the test results reliable. However, our evidence 31 - the HUS diagnostic centre's HUSLAB
study document - shows that the HUS diagnostic centre itself claims that the Ct value does notallow reliable conclusions to be drawn about the viral load of the sampled person and thus his or her
infectivity, and that there are large uncertainties in the clinical interpretation of the samples ingeneral. Because of this high uncertainty, PCR test results therefore do not reliably indicate
anything about a subject's morbidity or infectivity to coronavirus.
The high level of uncertainty in the PCR test results highlighted by the HUS diagnostic centre is
explained by the scientific facts presented in Stückelberger's statement. PCR technology canidentify the genetic material of a virus, but not the whole virus: although PCR technology is goodat correctly identifying the genetic material of a virus, it does not detect whether it comes from a
whole

29

about the virus. Therefore, the PCR test cannot diagnose any viral infection and is not a valid test for
demonstrating infectivity.
COVID patients are infectious for 7-8 days, but an infected person can test positive for PCR even
if they are no longer sick or infectious. People with a history of COVID can have a positive PCR
test result for 80 days or more, even if they are no longer sick, infected or infectious. Patients
who are immune and have never had symptoms can test positive.
In his expert and witness testimony, THL Chief Medical Officer Nohynek has said that PCR tests arevery sensitive and do not give the full picture of infectivity. PCR test results can remain positive longafter the end of infectivity. A person may excrete traces of the virus but not necessarily be infectious.
In fact, in a statement to the Helsinki District Court, Mr Nohynek confirmed Mr Stückelberger's
statement.
The district court acknowledges the above evidence as follows (pp. 47 and 51 of the operative part of
the judgment):
The district court also notes that the interest rate vaccine was not the only condition
for obtaining the interest rate passport. If a person has not wanted/has not been able
to take a coronary vaccine, such a person has also been able to obtain a coronary
passport by obtaining a negative coronary test, or if the person had a coronary
disease within the last six months. If Mr Vauhkala did not want to take the coronary
vaccines because he considered it against his religious convictions to do so, he wasnever forced to do so. This must be taken into account when assessing thecompatibility of the interest rate passport legislation with Article 9 of the EIS,
specifically from the perspective of the principle of proportionality. And in any case,the interest passport legislation was only in force for operators who do not provide a
so-called 'necessity service'. Thus, for example, pharmacies or grocery stores were
not required to have a passport, which is an important consideration when examining
whether the proportionality condition of the passport legislation is fulfilled.
The district court thus does not in any way consider the evidence presented in the case regarding
the reliability of the corona tests or the fact that the tests were paid for, but merely states that
Vauhkala would have had the opportunity to take the tests if he so wished. The district court thus
completely ignores and disregards the relevant evidence. This omission of factual reasoning alone
renders the judgment unlawful.

30

Interest rate passport legislation loses Constitutional Committee approval
In the applicant's view, the oral testimonies and the written evidence show that the Council of State
did not take medical information into account at the time when the interest rate passport legislation
was drafted, that distorted or at least outdated medical information on the benefits of vaccines wasmost probably communicated to the Constitutional Committee and that the interest rate passportlegislation could not have been based on up-to-date medical information.
By 10.12.2021 at the latest, the interest rate passport legislation did not meet the criteria for general
restrictions of fundamental rights, because the restriction, i.e. the requirement of an interest rate
passport as a condition for access to a catering establishment, was not suitable to achieve the statedobjective. That was because the condition for obtaining a coronary passport, namely the taking of acoronary vaccine, did not result in the coronary disease not spreading and the coronary vaccine
could only protect at most the person who had taken the coronary vaccine himself. If Mr Vauhkala
had taken the coronary vaccine and had obtained a green coronary pass which would have enabled
him to enter the Fazer Kluuvi café, the situation with regard to the transmission of coronary heartdisease would not have changed in any way for those who had already been in the café and who had
not yet been vaccinated.
for any new customers that may come to the site.
In this way, the Constitutional Committee cannot be considered to have assessed theconstitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation when the constitutionality of the legislation
has changed in the light of changing medical knowledge. The Government should have followed theevolution of medical knowledge. This is not what the Council of State has done. Further, the Councilof State should have taken corrective measures to the regulation, as the Constitutional Committee
has required. Since the Government has not taken corrective measures, the interest rate passportlegislation has lost the constitutional approval given to it by the Constitutional Committee.

Violations of Article 124 of the Constitution
The state's interest rate passport legislation has also been unconstitutional because it has enabled asignificant transfer of public power to a private company, in this case Fazer Restaurants Ltd. The
legislation has allowed a private company to decide for itself when to require a passport as acondition of entry to a restaurant.
Fazer Restaurants Ltd has demanded a coupon pass as a condition for access to its premises
throughout its opening hours, usually only from 5pm onwards in other restaurants. Article 124 of theConstitution"A public administrative task may be entrusted to a person other than a public authority only by law
or statute.

31

if it is necessary for the proper performance of the task and does not undermine fundamental
rights, legal certainty or other requirements of good administration. However, tasks involving theexercise of significant public authority may be entrusted only to a public authority." Barring accessto a restaurant for the whole day, as an exception to other businesses in the same sector, involved asignificant exercise of official authority which can only be entrusted to a public authority. The
purpose of the Communicable Diseases Act is to prevent communicable diseases and their spreadand the harm they cause to people and society, not to regulate the opening hours of businesses. The
closure of shops is aimed at preventing the spread of covid-19 and, while the closure of shops has
an effect on the protection of the public from the spread of covid-19, the closure of shops has aneffect on the protection of the public from the spread of covid-19.
§, the right to freedom of trade and industry cannot be transferred to a private undertaking, butsuch a task involving the exercise of significant public authority could only have been entrusted toa public authority.
The applicant further submits that the fact that an ordinary restaurant employee is entitled to checkthe interest rate passport through which the restaurant employee has access to Vauhkala's personal
health information also constitutes a significant exercise of official authority.
The obvious unconstitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation is evident from the factthat the legislation, namely Section 58i of the Communicable Diseases Act, has not been precise,but has left it to the private operator, in this case Fazer Ravintolat Oy, to choose whether or not
to infringe fundamental rights. The representatives of the Fazer group had the option of choosing
either to act in a non-discriminatory manner towards the applicant
which would have resulted in financial losses for Fazer, or discriminatory behaviour towards theapplicant. The defence of a breach of fundamental rights on the basis of financial loss is not inaccordance with the law. According to Mr Kostilainen, the defendant's managing director, 'thematerial you refer to elsewhere (on the website of the Regional Administrative Office) states that "itis up to the catering trade to determine the dates on which it adopts the interest rate pass".
When the legislation is not specific, i.e. it allows a private company to decide whether or not toprevent an individual from entering its premises based on presumed health information at a certain
time of day, the legislation does not comply with the doctrine of restriction of fundamental rights.
As the defendant's CEO himself explains in his letter to the applicant, it has exercised the "right"
mentioned on the Regional Administrative Office's website to determine for itself the times atwhich the company has introduced the interest rate pass.
The district court stated the following in response to our arguments above concerning Article 124of the Constitution (p. 56 of the judgment):

32"The district court finds that this issue was also clarified in accordance withestablished practice when the coronet certificate legislation was introduced and that
there is no significant exercise of public authority when a cafeteria worker merely
checks whether a person has a coronet certificate or not."However, it is not clear from the district court's decision what this "established practice" is, and how
the matter was resolved accordingly. Indeed, this particular question was not addressed in the
Parliamentary Papers (HE 131/2021 vp), apart from Mr Hidén's attempt to raise the issue in his
opinion. The district court thus simply ignores and disregards the applicant's legal arguments by'holding' that the case is not as the applicant claims, without giving any reasoning. The parties arethus unable to assess the legal reasoning on which the decision is based. The decision is therefore
not sufficiently reasoned in the way required by the case-law: according to KHO 2019:110, theadequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must be considered from theperspective of whether the party's right to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can beeffectively safeguarded.
The importance of the matter is also reflected in the fact that the Constitutional Committee has nottaken any position on this issue in its opinions, which shows that this is a genuinely open issue on
which the Court should take a position on the basis of the Constitution, based on legislation, legal
principles and case law. In an ambiguous situation, and especially where the issue has not been
properly addressed at the drafting stage, the issue should be interpreted in favour of the applicant.
In order to legally assess the definition of a function exercising significant public authority andwhether the communicable disease law and the measures taken by the authorities have transferredsignificant public authority to a non-public authority, we respectfully request the Helsinki Court ofAppeal to grant Vauhkala leave to proceed in the case.

Preparation of interest rate passport legislation unconstitutional
Furthermore, the district court has not assessed in any way the apparent unconstitutionality in thecontext of the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation that, when the plaintiff requested
the State to provide the preparatory documents for the interest rate passport legislation, the State hasstated during the litigation process that it does not have such preparatory documents, but the State
has relied only on the statements made by the THL. This is contrary to the position taken by theConstitutional Committee, which in its opinion PeVL 11/2016 vp - HE 13/2016 vp (in relation to theGovernment's

33

on the proposal to Parliament for a law on communicable diseases and certain related laws), it isstated that, according to the general explanatory memorandum of the Government proposal, thebasic draft of the Government proposal was prepared by a consultant commissioned by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Legislative drafting is one of the main tasks of the ministries.
It is clear that it cannot be outsourced. In practice, however, it has been held that this does notprevent external studies or expert advice from being obtained.
In the present case, however, it is undisputed that, according to the State's statement, the preparationof the interest rate passport legislation was entirely based on the statements and preparation of the
THL, not the ministries. We respectfully request the Helsinki Court of Appeal to grant leave forfurther proceedings in the case also so that the State's statement that it relied solely on statements
made by the THL in the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation can be examined and it
can be determined whether the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation violated the viewof the Constitutional Committee that the preparation of legislation is one of the most important tasksof the ministries.
When the State relies in its evidence, inter alia, on the THL's weekly bulletins, it is clear that what
is at issue is not the opinions of an impartial expert body, but an organisation directly andobviously centrally involved in the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation, whosebulletins have supported the legislation prepared by the organisation. Consequently, the State's
evidence in this respect cannot be considered credible.

Application of Section 28 of the Non-Discrimination Act to the case
Vauhkala also considers that the Helsinki District Court did not assess the meaning of Section 28
of the Equality Act in the case. For this reason, too, leave to continue the proceedings should be
granted.
When Vauhkala has provided sufficient grounds in the course of the proceedings for his claim that hehas been discriminated against by both Fazer and the State, it is for the respondents to prove that there
has been no breach of the prohibition, pursuant to Section 28 of the Equality Act.
However, the State has done everything in its power during the legal process to prevent the casefrom being resolved. Vauhkala has not succeeded, despite his representations, in getting the State's
representatives, former Prime Minister Sanna Marini and the head of department of the Ministry ofJustice, Koskela, to testify in court.
Despite the request for a preliminary ruling, the State has not handed over the above-mentioned
preparatory documents for the coronavirus passport legislation, nor the contracts for the supply ofcoronavirus mRNA vaccines in so far as they concern the coronavirus vaccines supplied to Finland.

34

The importance of the supply contracts would be35

was to see whether the vaccines had been guaranteed by the manufacturer to work and whether
they had been tested to ensure that they did work.

Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights
Vauhkala is also seeking leave to continue the proceedings on the grounds that the Court of Appeal
should assess whether the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights apply to
Vauhkala's case. The Helsinki District Court has held, with very brief reasoning, that in the
Vauhkala case there is no reason to consider that the State has committed a human rights violation
against Vauhkala.
The district court's view is based solely on the opinion of Salminen, who gave an expert opinion on
behalf of the State, that the jewellery certificate has been assessed in the opinions of theConstitutional Committee as meeting the requirements of admissibility and proportionality for
fundamental rights restrictions and further that "the assessment is in line with the requirements ofthe EIS for corresponding fundamental rights restrictions and that therefore the fundamental
rights restrictions do not violate the obligations of the EIS either". According to the district court's
statement, "Salminen has stated that it is well established that bills under review by theConstitutional Committee also undergo a similar test of compatibility with human rights
conventions, and that this has been held to be the correct interpretation of the EIS". In its
judgment, the District Court further relies on Salminen, stating that "Salminen has also stated that,in addition to the factors mentioned in the PeVL's opinion, and in view of the very short time-limits
for the legislation to come into force, he considered it to be clear that the regulation of the coronet
certificate fulfilled the proportionality requirements of legislation restricting a fundamental right."
Further, in the judgment, the district court states that "the district court will assess the relevance ofthe report of the plaintiff's witness Muukkonen below, but already states here that Muukkonen has
not provided any relevant information in this regard that would affect this assessment."
For the reasons set out below, Vauhkala's case has a very similar relationship to the ECHR, and the
district court's disregard of the ECHR on the basis of Salminen's statement alone also disregards
Vauhkala's right to a fair trial. In this regard, we conclude that obtaining leave to proceed isessential to the realisation of Vauhkala's right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.

36

As the district court refused to assess the case for violations of the ECHR and relied in its
reasoning only on Salminen's statement, we recall that already at the beginning of the application
for leave to continue the proceedings we stated that the oral hearing of the legal expert appointed
by the defendant, Janne Salminen, at the main hearing was contrary to the prevailing case-law for
the following reasons:According to established Finnish case law, legal experts are not heard orally in court proceedings.
Even the Finnish State itself, through its agent, stated the following in its reply to the District Court
on 31 August 2022:
117. The (oral) hearing of legal experts is not part of the Finnish procedure. The key
principle is that the court knows the law (jura novit curia). The parties (typicallythrough their agents/attorneys) can of course present their legal arguments in theirpleadings, and in particular in the final report, and may refer to and present legal
sources and expert opinions to the court if they wish.
We agree with the view expressed in the State's 31.8.2022 reply that legal experts should not, inprinciple, be heard orally as experts in Finnish court proceedings. We therefore wonder why the State,in complete contradiction to its earlier statement, has nevertheless summoned Salminen to be heardorally, and why the District Court has accepted this.
For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the district court should have refused
Salminen's oral hearing under Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, as it can be
replaced by substantially less costly or time-consuming and substantially more reliable evidence(Salminen's written expert testimony), and as his oral hearing is unnecessary in any event from thepoint of view of the prevailing Finnish judicial culture. That view was confirmed during the oral
hearing of Mr Salminen at the main hearing, since he did not say anything orally at the main
hearing that had not already been read in his written expert report; rather, he appeared to be merely
reading out extracts from his written report.
The district court should have taken into account the above-mentioned unnecessary oral hearing ofSalminen as a matter of course, especially since it refused to hear the applicant's main witnesses,
Sanna Marini and Satu Koskela. The mere equality of the parties before the law and the adversarial
principle require that the district court should have taken into account of its own motion such a

37fundamental issues of procedural management in an appropriate manner and with respect for therights of the parties.
Muukkonen is a doctor of law by training and, as he told the district court, he has offered to write anassessment of the implementation of unvaccinated fundamental rights in relation to the interest rate
passport legislation for the Constitutional Committee, an offer that the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health and the Ministry of Education and Culture have not taken up. He is also the author of the only
peer-reviewed legal article on the passport and fundamental rights, which is included in the written
evidence submitted to the Vauhkala District Court.

Ignoring Muukkonen's opinion without a valid reason
The district court has effectively completely ignored the significance of Muukkonen's testimony andthe peer-reviewed legal article he wrote, on the sole basis that Muukkonen would not have assessed
the right to life in any way. However, there are many fundamental rights, and no single one of themcan be elevated to a level of importance vastly superior to others. Muukkonen has also pointed thisout in his witness statement to the district court, stating that fundamental rights form a coherent
whole, from which it is not possible to separate the pieces and place them in an unequal position.
According to him, fundamental rights are assessed on a case-by-case basis. For example, according to
the WHO definition, health is not only the absence of disease-causing elements, such as a virus, but isabove all the totality of a meaningful life. If a person is unable to live a full life, for example becauseof forced medical interventions and restrictions, this in fact and according to research shortens lifeand negatively affects the quality of life.
In any case, even if Muukkonen had mentioned something about the right to life and health in his
article, it would not have refuted the main legal observation of Muukkonen's article, which wascompletely ignored by the district court - from the perspective of the fundamental rights system, it
would have been a less intrusive interference with the rights of the unvaccinated (including theplaintiff) if they had been offered free testing (Muukkonen's article p. 13), and therefore the interest
rate passport legislation did not meet the proportionality requirement of the fundamental rights
restrictions.
In order to address these issues as well, we respectfully request the Helsinki Court of Appeal to
grant leave to proceed.

38

Vauhkala's own view has been left aside
According to Vauhkala, the central problem with the district court's judgment in relation to the fairtrial process is that his own views are in practice completely omitted from the judgment. The
district court has acknowledged that Vauhkala has religious beliefs, but nothing else is actuallyapparent from what Vauhkala himself has said about this in court. However, also according to thecase-law of the Supreme Court (KKO:2016:20), the assessment of the offence experienced by anindividual is based on the feeling of offence experienced by the individual himself, and this cannot
be brought out except by hearing the individual and assessing his account. In practice, the district
court has not done this at all. The case is also important in the sense that the district court has,throughout the judgment, referred to the case law of the Supreme Court in relation to the conditions
for the State to be liable for damages for human rights violations. These are: (i) the violation ofhuman rights has occurred; (ii) the violation can be considered sufficiently serious; (iii) the
violation has caused causal damage.
The severity of the injury and the causal damage should therefore be assessed on the basis of the
injury and the depth of the injury experienced by Vauhkala himself.
Vauhkala has actively sought to find outa) whether he or she belongs to a coronary heart disease risk group to which he or she does notbelongb) what the consequences of taking a coronary vaccine might be for him or her. Through her
own research, she has concluded that her risk of becoming seriously ill from the coronary
was minimal, and she did not want to take the risk that she, in turn, could suffer serious
health damage from the vaccine.
Vauhkala has told the court that his religious beliefs have been at odds with the fact that a potentiallyharmful vaccine could harm the body of Christ, which is made up of believers together. Vauhkalaalso knew that the coronary vaccine and the medical procedure in general were voluntary and that
refusal of a voluntary procedure should not lead to the annulment of fundamental rights.
At Fazer Kluuvi café, Vauhkala has been prevented from entering the café after a short argument
because he did not have his interest rate pass. Mr Vauhkala said that customers at the Fazer café
had been watching the discussion between him and the employees. Mr Vauhkala felt that he did
not belong and that he was an inferior citizen. During the hearing, he said that he had also been
prevented from accessing services on several occasions at a later stage. Vauhkala was39

was subjected to many public attacks on the group of people he considered himself to represent,
namely people who deliberately - either for so-called ideological or religious or other reasons refused coronary vaccines. That group of people considered that they had the right to bodily
integrity and the right to refuse medical interventions. According to Vauhkala, those attacks
included the April 2021 writing by Ilta-Sanomie journalist Manninen about unvaccinated people askulkus and the October 2021 declaration by Bishop Laajasalo that the unvaccinated are responsible
for the death of their fellow human beings. In November, Lasse Lehtonen had called for marketingand propaganda to force people to get coronary vaccinations. Vauhkala saw this action by public
figures and decision-makers as demonising and stigmatising her.
Vauhkala told the hearing that public pressure and repeated refusals to serve him made him feel likehe was living in an open prison, where he would only be allowed to go to the convenience store, but
not much else. He has felt that he was put in this situation through no fault of his own. He said that hehad started to plan to move away from Helsinki to find a place where he would not feel that he wasliving in open prison conditions. What was particularly painful for Vauhkala was that she did notknow how long the situation would last and even formed an association to fight for the constitutionalrights of people like her.
Vauhkala has made the decision not to have coronary heart transplants out of an informed inquiry
and religious conviction. He has told the hearing that he had heard in the spring of 2021 about Jari,
who had been blinded in one eye due to a Pfizer coronary vaccine and had also received medical
compensation for this. Vauhkala had later met this Jari. He had earlier seen a video statement by
Kary Mullis, the developer of the PCR test, in which Mullis said that the test had not been developed
to detect the disease. Vauhkala knew that international pharmaceutical companies had been
repeatedly fined billions of dollars for dishonest practices in the marketing of medicines.
As he continues to investigate the corona issue, he has uncovered a wealth of other information
about how coronary vaccines have harmed people. He has also heard from a client who came to his
firm's office about a young person whose health had been completely ruined by a so-called "pigshot". In his research, he has discovered that coronary vaccines have been recommended for highrisk groups, which Vauhkala, as an active, healthy person, does not belong to.
Vauhkala went on to say that he had been a Christian since 1994. His faith includes the view that
believers are the body of Christ on earth and that this temple of God must be cared for. Having
been aware of the above-mentioned disadvantages, which

40

and the fact that he cannot be at risk from coronavirus when he is healthy and fit, he has decided
not to take the vaccines. He also knew that by taking the coronavirus vaccine he could not protect
others, but that people at risk had to protect themselves by taking the coronavirus vaccine
themselves.
Vauhkala has belonged to two different groups whose rights have been violated by the statethrough the constitutional and ECHR interest rate passport legislation and its practicalimplementation. On the one hand, Mr Vauhkala was a healthy individual who, for ideologicalreasons, did not wish to take the corona mRNA vaccine and, on the other hand, his religious
convictions prohibited him from taking the vaccine, which he considered, on the basis of his own
knowledge, based, inter alia, on information from acquaintances and knowledge acquired during
his studies, could damage his body, which, on the basis of his faith, is part of the body of Christ,
which believers must take the best possible care of. The ideological view of those who do nothave a coronary vaccination is also protected by law, since Article 6 of the Patients' Act, Article 5of the Oviedo Convention and point IV of the Code of Medical Ethics guarantee that no one is
obliged to consent to a medical procedure against his or her will.

The case law of the ECtHR in relation to national law
The European Court of Human Rights is above the Finnish court system in human rights matters,
and Finnish courts must follow the case law of the ECtHR in their own decisions. In the District
Court's view, Salminen's statement that the Constitutional Committee has already assessed thecompatibility of the interest rate passport legislation with the ECHR is sufficient to ensure that thestate has complied with the ECHR in the Vauhkala case. This is not supported by the case law of theEuropean Court of Human Rights, as it is the task of the ECtHR to assess the compliance of statesthat have signed up to the EIS with the ECHR. The case law of the ECtHR has shown that evennational legislation has directly allowed for a violation of an individual's human rights. In Norris v.
Ireland (1988), the ECtHR held that Irish legislation has allowed for a persistent interference with anapplicant's right to respect for his private life, which the Court has held to be a violation of the
ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights case I.B. v. Greece (2013) is directly linked to the Vauhkalacase and serves as a precedent for the case. The case of I.B. v. Greece concerned an HIV-positive
patient.

41

dismissal of a positive complainant shortly after diagnosis. The appellant's claims for compensation
were partially successful in the lower courts, but the country's highest court dismissed the claims on
narrow grounds and using a manifestly incorrect premise about the infectious nature of the disease.
According to the ECtHR, the procedure amounted to discrimination under Article 14 of theEuropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in relation to the protection of private life
guaranteed by Article 8. The present case is very similar to the ECtHR case, in that the introductionof the interest rate passport was also based on a manifestly false premise about the infectiousness ofcovid-19: at the time of the dismissal in the ECtHR case, it was widely known that HIV:HIV carrier
does not transmit HIV in normal human-to-human contact, and similarly it was already widely
known at the time of the preparation of the coronavirus legislation that non-coronavirus persons do
not transmit SARS-CoV-2 in normal human-to-human contact in a different way from coronavirus
persons.
The case law of the ECtHR attaches considerable importance to the resolutions of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. PACE Resolution 2361 (2021): in paragraph 7.3.2, the Assembly
requires its Member States, including the European Parliament, to. In Article 7.3.2, the PACE statesthat no one should be discriminated against on the grounds of non-vaccination, whether this is due topotential health risks or simply to a lack of willingness to be vaccinated. For this reason, too, nonvaccination - and indirectly non-immunisation - must be seen in the light of Articles 14 and 14 of theECHR.
as "other status-based grounds" within the meaning of the 12th Additional Protocol. Of particularnote is paragraph 13.3.8 of Resolution 2383 (2021) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Councilof Europe, which states that, in order to avoid discrimination in the use of the passport, due
attention should be paid to situations where people refuse to be vaccinated for reasons of personal
opinion or belief, and that, in particular for this group of people, Member States should ensure thatany passport system would not in practice lead to pressure or make compulsory the use of thepassport.
The District Court correctly states that the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe are not directly legally binding, but in fact the European Court of Human Rights
gives them considerable importance in its case law, and since Finnish courts should also apply thecase law of the ECtHR in their judgments, the Helsinki District Court should have done the same.
The following extract from the grounds of the judgment is particularly noteworthy (p. 52):
The district court notes that both of the sections of the PACE Resolution cited by theplaintiff (7.3.1 and 7.3.2), however, mention that, while ensuring that,

42

that no one is pressured or discriminated against for not being vaccinated, but also toensure high vaccination coverage. The statements also show that the epidemiologicalsituation and estimates within a country are best assessed by local authorities.
Furthermore, the PACE resolution is not legally binding on an EU Member State.
The district court considers that the applicant has also failed to show that the PACE
Decision was breached by the State in this case.
The applicant has already shown that the interest rate passport legislation was oppressive and/or
discriminatory towards non-interest rate borrowers. The PACE resolution states that in addition toensuring that no one is pressured or discriminated against for not being vaccinated, a high level ofvaccination coverage must be ensured. In other words, vaccination coverage should not have been
ensured by pressuring or discriminating against the unvaccinated, as was done in Finland. In
addition, the objective of increasing vaccination coverage was not officially raised in Finland at any
stage of the preparation of the Interest Rate Passport Act. Despite this, however, the district court
ultimately held, contrary to the logical conclusion of its reasoning, that the applicant had not shownthat the resolution had been breached by the State. The district court's reasoning does not follow therules of logical syllogism, and is thus internally inconsistent with itself.

The ECtHR case of Vavricka and others v. Czech Republic
The State argued that the case of Vavricka v. Czech Republic (2021) would have been applicable asa preliminary ruling also in the present case. The case concerned compulsory polio vaccinations
for children and the discretionary power of the State to impose such obligations on its
administrative subjects. However, the applicant gave full and detailed reasons in the Helsinki
District Court why that case was inapplicable to the case as a matter of law in any respect:
1) The case concerned traditional vaccines that had been in use for decades and whose safety
profile and potential short- and long-term adverse effects had become very clear to thescientific community and the public (see, for example, paragraph 290 of the Vavricka
judgment: 'The vaccination duty concerns nine diseases against which vaccination isconsidered effective and safe by the scientific community'). In contrast, most of thecoronavirus vaccines used in Finland were new-technology mRNA vaccines that had neverbeen used in humans before the coronavirus era, and whose mechanism of action iscompletely different from that of conventional vaccines, as our Exhibits 23-26 show.
Moreover, there was no consensus in the scientific community on the safety and efficacy ofmRNA vaccines.

432) The Vavricka case was largely based on the fact that sufficiently high vaccination coverage(polio and other traditional vaccines) creates a so-called "herd protection" or "herdimmunity" effect, which is in the public interest of the Member States and may justify some
restriction of the privacy of individual citizens (cf. See paragraph 276 of the ECtHR
judgment, and e.g. the opinion of the Czech State General Health Authority in paragraph
153 of the Vavřička judgment; the French intervention, in particular paragraphs 213 and215, and the Polish intervention, in particular paragraph 223). However, as is clear from ourevidence, the coronary vaccines did not cause such a herd immunity effect, i.e. the coronary
vaccines did not prevent the spread of the disease, or even the contracting of the disease,and this was already known in the autumn of 2021 (see, for example, the applicant's written
Exhibit 34, in which Mia Kontio, a leading expert at the THL, stated in November 2021
that there could be no question of herd immunity in the case of coronary vaccines).
3) A key finding of the ECtHR was also that Czech law allowed for a derogation from thevaccination requirement without the threat of sanction if the party concerned presented a"permanent contraindication" to vaccinating his child (paragraph 291 of the judgment, "apermanent contraindication to vaccination"). A contraindication is a reason or obstacle tothe use of a medicine or other treatment (source: https://www.terveyskirjasto.fi/ltt03681). In
Finland, in order to avoid the strong vaccination pressure imposed by the coronavirus
passport, the applicant Vauhkala had practically no alternative but to contract thecoronavirus disease or to pay 100-200 euros every three days.
4) The applicant further submitted that the Vavřička case's legal ruling that compulsory
vaccination interferes with the right under Article 8(1) ECHR must be interpreted, inparticular in the light of the aforementioned PACE resolution, as meaning that strong
political and social pressure, in particular to take mRNA vaccines previously unused inhumans, which were available under conditional marketing authorisations, also interfereswith the right under Article 8(1) ECHR.
The district court rebutted all of the above arguments in the Vavricka case as follows (judgment
pp. 47-48):
The District Court also considers that the case of Vavricka v Czech Republic,
decided by the ECtHR, leads to the conclusion, as interpreted by the respondent, that
the State has a wide discretion to protect the sustainability of health and health careat the population level and a strong right to protect and introduce appropriate
measures for the protection of the health and health of persons.

44

to protect life and health, and that it is proportionate to require those for whom
vaccination represents a remote health risk to accept this universal safeguard in thename of social solidarity for the benefit of those who, for health reasons, are unable
to obtain vaccines.
The district court thus once again completely ignored and disregarded the arguments put forward by
the plaintiff; even the concept of social solidarity used by the district court was based on the herd
protection effect of traditional vaccines, which, according to Mia Kontio, a leading expert at the THL,
could not be mentioned in the case of coronary vaccines. In fact, the rest of the district court's
reasoning is a direct quotation from the State's statement of objections of 31 August 2023 (paragraph47, p. 16):Furthermore, the ECtHR stated that it cannot be considered disproportionate torequire those for whom vaccination represents a remote health risk to accept thisgenerally applicable safeguard in the name of social solidarity for the benefit ofthose who, for health reasons, are unable to obtain vaccines.
The district court thus completely ignores the extensive arguments put forward by the plaintiff, andmerely copies directly the defendant's old written statement (which was not even presented at themain hearing, and on which the judgment should therefore not even be based), which is not,however, applicable as a legal guide in the present case, since the coronary vaccinations were noteven capable of producing a herd protection effect, and could therefore not be demanded fromanyone "in the name of social solidarity". The reasoning of the district court therefore does not in
any way respond to the arguments put forward by the applicant and the judgment is, for that reason
alone, inadequately reasoned and therefore unlawful.

The position of healthy unvaccinated people in relation to the interest rate passport legislation has notbeen assessed at all
We also ask the Helsinki Court of Appeal for leave to continue the proceedings so that the Court ofAppeal can assess to what extent the State should have guaranteed the right of healthy unvaccinatedpersons and persons who refused coronary vaccines on religious grounds to the exercise of theirfundamental and human rights.
Vauhkala called Matti Muukkonen, PhD, who has published the only peer-reviewed legal article on
the implementation of fundamental rights in the context of interest rate passport legislation, to testify
at the main hearing of the district court.
Muukkonen's legal article and his oral hearing considered the question of the circumstances in whicha restriction of fundamental rights should be considered a 'basket case'.

45

the restrictions associated with. According to Mr Muukkonen, the starting point should be thenormal situation, i.e. a situation where there are no restrictions, because if the starting point werethe existing factual situation, this would in practice mean accepting the idea that one could first
restrict fundamental rights on certain grounds and then impose new restrictions by comparing themwith the existing restrictions. However, the government had chosen to do otherwise, i.e. tocompare the situation created by the interest rate passport legislation with an already restrictedsociety.
According to Muukkonen, no equality assessment of healthy unvaccinated persons was carried out
in the Constitutional Committee. The result was that the access of the two healthy persons to theenjoyment of their rights depended entirely on whether or not they had a valid interest rate passport.
Mr Muukkonen pointed out that the comparative situation was wrong because vaccination was
voluntary and it could not be right that the enjoyment of fundamental rights should be based onconsent to a voluntary medical procedure. In fact, even a person who has contracted coronavirus
but has obtained a green coronavirus passport would be in a better position than a healthy person
who has not obtained a coronavirus passport to enjoy his rights. Nor would this be the correct
perspective from the point of view of the fundamental right to life, since a sick person who has
obtained a card would most likely spread his disease elsewhere in the space to which he could gain
access with a card. According to Muukkonen, the undeclared but de facto aim of the passportlegislation has been to increase vaccination coverage, which may be considered highly questionable
in the light of the 'overriding social need' criterion of the doctrine of restriction of fundamental
rights.

Interest rate testing should have been free of charge to ensure equality
According to Muukkonen, the proportionality principle would have been best fulfilled if the corona
test had been free of charge also for persons who did not take coronary vaccines for ideological orother non-health reasons. Article 6.2 of the Constitution requires an acceptable reason for unequal
treatment: whether it was acceptable that two healthy people should be placed in an unequal position
because one had taken a voluntary action, i.e. had taken the coronary vaccine, and the other had not;on the other hand, a sick and infectious person who had taken the action was placed in a better
position versus a healthy and uninfectious person who had not taken the action. And this inequalityof treatment in a situation where vaccination was justified precisely on the grounds of preventing
infection and reducing the burden of disease. And as we have seen in Muukkonen, Järvinen,
Nohynek and Malhotra

46

expert testimony, it was not necessary or even possible, at least not in principle, to protect thevaccinated group by avoiding the presence of the unvaccinated.
According to Muukkonen, healthy unvaccinated people were also under political and socialpressure to get vaccinated: the logic was that you either give up your equal right to services, or you
take a full series of vaccinations to validate your passport, or you get sick, or you pay €100-200
every 72 hours for a PCR test. However, PACE Resolution 2361 of 2021, paragraph 7.3.1 of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) prohibited any political or socialpressure on people who refuse coronary vaccination for any reason. In addition, the second PACE
Resolution of 2021, number 2383, states in paragraph 13.3.8 that, in order to avoid discriminationin the use of the passport, due attention should be paid to situations where people refuse to be
vaccinated for reasons of personal opinion or conviction, and that, in particular for this category ofpeople, Member States should ensure that any passport system would not in practice lead topressure or effectively make vaccination compulsory.
In his oral hearing, Mr Muukkonen said that he had approached the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health on his own initiative, offering the possibility of "acid testing" the interest rate passportlegislation. The STM directed Muukkonen to contact the Ministry of Education and Culture, butthere, too, Muukkonen's offer was not taken up. Mr Muukkonen therefore offered to provide alegal assessment of the equal treatment provisions of the passport legislation to the ministries, butthey were not interested in this offer. This lack of interest on the part of the ministries has
contributed to the fact that Vauhkala, as a healthy unvaccinated person, has been subjected tounequal treatment for no acceptable reason. If the ministries had exercised the duty of care
imposed on them by the Constitutional Committee by accepting Mr Muukkonen's legal
assessment, the discrimination against Mr Vauhkala would probably not have occurred.
Mr Muukkonen could not explain the reasons for this lack of interest and enthusiasm in theministries to receive top-quality legal evaluation. On the other hand, Asko Järvinen said in his oral
hearing that the interest rate pandemic was "the first political pandemic". By this, Mr Järvinen
meant, among other things, that infectious disease doctors, for example, have disagreed with theministries on measures relating to interest rate restrictions. On the other hand, increasing
vaccination coverage was apparently an unspoken goal of the ministries and authorities at large, andperhaps the lack of enthusiasm for Muukkonen's assessment was due to the fact that an objective
assessment would have led to it,47that the chosen pressure procedure, which would have led to the desired increase in vaccination
coverage, could not have been justified in a transparent and legally sustainable way.
Nor has the position of those who have refused coronary vaccines for religious reasons been assessedin any way during the preparation of the coronary passport legislation.

The enjoyment of fundamental rights cannot depend on wealth
The coronary passport legislation meant that if you refused a voluntary coronary vaccination, youeither had to contract a common infectious disease or undergo a coronary test every 72 hours, whichcost €100-200 each time, or around €1000-2000 per month. However, the enjoyment of basic andhuman rights cannot depend on wealth.
We respectfully request the Helsinki Court of Appeal to grant leave for further proceedings also inthis case. For the future interpretation of the law, it is necessary to clarify whether, on afundamental and human rights basis, it is legitimate for the State to require people to pay to enjoy
their fundamental and human rights.

The judgment of the district court is also unfounded in its assessment of the individual provisions
The logic of the Helsinki District Court's decision has thus been to first prevent the applicant fromcalling its key witnesses to the main hearing, not to grant the applicant's requests for redaction,even though these were essential documents of evidence, and then to declare, on very light legal
grounds, that the Court has no jurisdiction to assess the constitutionality of the interest rate
passport legislation and that the Court does not consider that the State has breached its obligations
under the ECHR.
Even if one accepts - and the plaintiff does not accept - the above premises of the court, the district
court's assessment still leaves a considerable number of legally essential elements missing.

The district court unlawfully refused to call the applicant to give evidence against the Head of the
Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Mr Koskela
The most important of these is that the interest rate passport legislation did not directly lead to thesubmission of an interest rate passport claim in the Fazer Kluuvi café on 10.12.2021, but it stillrequired a separate application in the South of Finland.

48

A decision by the Finnish Regional Administrative Board that Fazer Ravintolat Oy could haverequired its customers to present a coupon pass as a condition of admission to the Fazer Kluuvi café
at 9 a.m. The applicant's Exhibit 7 is linked to this case. It states that in October the Regional State
Administrative Agencies sent a questionnaire to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the
grounds on which restrictions should be imposed. In a reply signed by the Head of Department, Mr
Koskela, the STM stated that restrictions should be set at a low threshold.
According to the written evidence, the Regional State Administrative Agencies have requested
clarification of the guidance issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the setting ofrestrictions using the risk potential assessment table of the National Institute for Health andWelfare, given thata) According to THL, the table is indicative andb) according to information from local and regional experts, infections do notcurrently originate from events that are particularly high risk.
The Regional Administrative Agencies asked:
1. In the event of an epidemic situation where no infections have been estimated tocome specifically from public events, will the STM advise to consider imposing
restrictions on public events or the use of premises more generally and in spite of theabove?
2. If the STM directs that restrictions should be considered more generally, does theSTM consider that they should be set at.
• all public events of significant risk mentioned in the THL risk potential
assessment table (taking into account that the table is only indicative)?
• for all public events and general meetings?
• all premises covered by § 58d (including premises where low-risk
activities according to the THL risk potential assessment table arecarried out), if the conditions for the application of § 58d TTL are met?
• in some other way?
3. How can decisions in the above-mentioned situations be justified in alegally sound way?

49

It is therefore clear from the Regional State Administrative Agencies' questionnaire to the STM thatthe restrictions are based on an indicative assessment table provided by the THL, which has notbeen exact, and most obviously not based on medical knowledge, as we will see in the future.
Furthermore, the regional administrative agencies were aware at the time (the letter was dated 1
November 2021, less than 1.5 months before the discrimination against Vauhkala) that, according
to information from local and regional experts, infections do not currently emanate from high-risk
events in particular.
As is clear from the reply signed by Mr Koskela, the letter does not answer any of the questions
raised by the regional administrative agencies. The letter is full of generalities, leaving the Regional
Administrative Agencies in the dark as to how to react to the fact that the infections did not
originate from high-risk events at the time, and how the AVI's decisions should be legally justified.
Based on this unanswered letter, the Southern Finland AVI imposed a restriction in early
December for the Helsinki region, among others, on the basis of which the interest rate passport
has been requested from the applicant Vauhkala on 10 December 2021 at 9.00 a.m. at Fazer Cafe
(Kluuvikatu 3, Helsinki).
According to Article 107 of the Constitution, "If a provision of a decree or other subordinate
legislation is contrary to the Constitution or other law, it may not be applied by a court or otherauthority." The whole episode of Vauhkala's discrimination has started from a restriction decision by
ESAVI, based on STM guidelines, which were not based on legal, nor medical grounds. ESAVI's
restriction decision was in itself manifestly contrary to the Constitution or other law and should not
be applied in court. Thus, the state authority's action was already discriminatory from the outset,
even before Vauhkala sought to enter the cafeteria on 10 December 2021 at 9 a.m.
The applicant would have liked to call the STM's Head of Department Koskela to testify in court on
the following topic: 'on what medical research or legal assessment has the STM's guidance to theregional administrative agencies been based'. The district court refused to allow Vauhkala to call
Mr Koskela, even though no written or oral evidence on the subject was otherwise available.
According to Vauhkala, the reply given by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Consumer Protection
to the Regional State Administrative Agencies was not based on a medical or legal assessment of
the need to require a coupon pass in catering establishments such as Fazer Kluuvi, but it
nevertheless led the Regional State Administrative Agency for Southern Finland to issue a
restriction decision which discriminated against Vauhkala.

50

10.12.2021 at 9 am. Thus, the decision of the Regional Administrative Office was not necessary
from the point of view of interest rate passport legislation and did not lead to the desired result ofpreventing the spread of covid-19. Furthermore, the objective would have been achieved by lessrestrictive means, such as asking people to wash their hands thoroughly before entering a café.
It is clear that the decision of the Regional State Administrative Board of Southern Finland to allow
the application for an interest rate passport was contrary to the Constitution and the generalconditions for limitation of fundamental rights, and therefore cannot be applied before a court orother authority. Further, the decision of the Regional Administrative Agency was contrary to Article
124 of the Constitution in that it allowed the catering establishment, Fazer Kluuvi café, to decide atwhat time of day it would begin to require its customers to obtain an interest rate pass.
This decision of the Regional State Administrative Agencies, based on an unsubstantiated letterfrom the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment alone is sufficient for the Helsinki Court ofAppeal to grant Vauhkala leave to continue the proceedings. The fact that the District Court has notallowed Koskela, who signed the STM letter, to be summoned to appear before the court shows thatthe District Court acted unlawfully in procedural terms and that, for that reason too, leave tocontinue the proceedings should be granted.

The district court's assessment of the significance of the OKV's report was manifestly erroneous
The defendant State of Finland submitted as written evidence the decision of the Chancellor of Justice
V4 of 12 April 2023 concerning a complaint about coronary vaccinations of health care personnel.
The applicant submits that this decision has no connection with the case at issue. The District Court
states the following (p. 48 of the judgment):"... on 2 December 2022, the Chancellor of Justice's Office (hereinafter referred to as
the "OCA") requested a report from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health(hereinafter referred to as the "MOH") on how the Ministry has monitored thefulfilment of the constitutional requirements of Section 48a of the Communicable
Diseases Act (which concerned the coronary vaccination of nurses) and ascertained
the existence of those requirements.
... On the basis of its subsequent investigation, the OCR has come to the conclusionthat it has not found any unlawful conduct or breach of duty on the part of the STM
with regard to the monitoring and assessment of the constitutional or medicalepidemiological conditions for the validity of the provision in question.

51

The District Court considers that the decision of the OKV shows that the STM's
procedure for ensuring the constitutionality of the measures taken during the interest
rate pandemic was fully acceptable and sufficient."
The district court's interpretation is completely untenable and, in the plaintiff's view, an obvious
sign of bias and/or unprofessionalism on the part of the judges.
First of all, from the OKV's analysis of Article 48a of the MLO, no conclusions or interpretations
can be drawn (at least not by means of traditional logical syllogism) that the STM's conduct inensuring the constitutionality of measures other than the interest rate passport legislation during theinterest rate pandemic was also acceptable and sufficient, let alone "fully" acceptable andsufficient, as the district court put it. The argument is logically equivalent to the following
syllogism:"The building inspector inspected the plumbing in the house and found nowrongdoing or neglect of duty."➔ "According to thebuilding inspector, the measures taken by thedeveloper to ensure the safety and compliance of the building's structures
were otherwise fully acceptable and adequate."
Such a "conclusion" is a clear indication of bias and/or unprofessionalism on the part of the judges,
which renders them either unqualified within the meaning of Chapter 13 of the Code of Judicial
Procedure or otherwise unfit to perform their duties.
Secondly, the OMC practically never gives decisions, but mainly solutions. This is another obvious
sign of incompetence and/or indifference on the part of the author of the judgment.

Role of the district court in the caseAccording to the decision of the District Court (p. 45), "[t]he District Court's task is to decide
whether the interest rate passport legislation, in the light of the information available to thelegislators at the time of its entry into force, was a justified and acceptable measure to achieve thebenefits it sought to achieve, i.e. whether the interest rate passport legislation was, inter alia, incompliance with the EIS binding Finland."However, it was not for the district court to decide whether the interest rate passport legislation was,in the light of the information available to the legislators at the time of its enactment, a justified andacceptable measure to achieve the benefits it sought. It was for the district court to determine whether

52interest rate passport legislation is a justified and acceptable measure to achieve the benefits it
seeks in the light of the information that careful legislators had or should have known.
The applicant has repeatedly and consistently stressed this point of view: according to the opinionsof the Constitutional Committee, the Council of State should have carefully assessed the necessity
for the regulation to remain in force and, even if that necessity ceased to exist, the Council of Stateshould have amended or repealed the regulation in that respect. Now, in setting and describing its
task, the district court completely ignores this position, which has been repeatedly reiterated by theConstitutional Committee. In the applicant's view, this is further evidence of the apparent bias
and/or unprofessionalism of the judges.

Decision of the district court on the request for a preliminary ruling
The applicant asked the District Court to order the Finnish State to produce the following documents:
1) copies of contracts between the EU and/or the Finnish state and the various coronary
vaccine manufacturers for the procurement of coronary vaccines. From these documents, weseek information on whether the EU and/or the Finnish state has any specific requirements
for the functionality or usefulness of the coronary vaccines, e.g. in preventing thecontracting or spreading of covid 19, or whether the EU and/or the Finnish state has anyother quality requirements for the ordered coronary vaccines. Alternatively, otherdocuments that provide the above information
2) the medical reports on which the so-called "coronary passport" legislation, which was
temporarily in force from 2021 to 2022, was based. In particular, the precise details of
the medical and other scientific data and studies on which the claim and assumption thatthe use of the coronary passport would have prevented the spread of covid-19 was based.
The applicant considered that the information requested is relevant as evidence, since the trial ispartly about whether the State authorities should have been aware in December 2021 of thescientific knowledge, widely held in the scientific community at the time, that the use of the corona
passport did not prevent the spread of covid-19 to a significant extent or even at all. During theparliamentary debate, several expert opinions considered the interest rate passport legislation to beconstitutional if its introduction would be beneficial in preventing the spread of covid-19.
The question in this respect is whether the Government has fulfilled its obligation, as emphasised by
the Constitutional Committee, to monitor the necessity of the interest rate passport legislation andwhether

53

The Government should have taken steps to correct the regulation before the events at issue on 10
December 2021.
Since the case also concerned coronary vaccines and their role in preventing the spread of coronavirus
and the harm they cause as part of the effects of the coronary passport legislation, these agreements
may have been relevant as evidence in the case.
In its decision of 27 February 2024, the District Court responded to our request for a preliminary
ruling as follows:
In the interpretation of Chapter 17, Section 40 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, caselaw has considered it sufficient that the documents requested may have evidentiary
value for some relevant matter requiring evidence (e.g. KKO 2019:7).
With regard to the documents required from the Finnish State in paragraph 1, theDistrict Court considers that these contractual documents or other documents
referred to and relied on cannot be relevant as evidence in the case. The issue in thecase is not the effectiveness or efficiency of the interest rate subsidies, but whether
there was a legal basis for the interest rate pass legislation and whether thatlegislation complied with the EIS and the Equal Treatment Act. Therefore, whether
the contractual documents stipulate any requirements for the effectiveness orefficiency of the coronary injections is irrelevant for the resolution of the case. Nor
could anything have been inferred from them or from the other documents relied on
as to the legality of the Government's actions in relation to the obligation to monitor
the necessity of the regulation relied on by the applicant in the autumn of 2021
before 10 December 2021.
With regard to the documents required from the Finnish State in paragraph 2, theDistrict Court considers that the medical reports on which the Corona Passlegislation was based are, on the other hand, in the public domain, i.e. no further
order is required. These reports are listed in the references to the Government Bill on
the Coronary Passport Legislation (131/2021 vp) and can still be found online at thelinks provided by the defendant
The reasoning of the district court's decision is absurd and does not stand up to scrutiny: the interest
rate passport legislation was based, to a large extent, on the legal question of whether interest ratevaccines were effective or efficient in achieving the objectives of the legislation - preventing the
spread of the coronavirus and reducing the burden of disease - and whether the interest rate passportlegislation thus met the proportionality and necessity requirements for the restriction of
fundamental rights. The applicant has expressly demonstrated by its evidence that the coronary
vaccines could not even achieve those objectives, and that this was already known by autumn 2021

54

at the latest.

55

Infringement of the Equality Act by Fazer Ravintolat Oy
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has, in the applicant's view, infringed the Non-Discrimination Act. For theapplication of the law in other similar cases, it is important to grant leave for further proceedings in
the case, because the issue is the interpretation of whether Fazer Ravintolat Oy's conduct was basedon a law which - even if, from the applicant's point of view, it was unconstitutional and contrary to
the European Convention on Human Rights - Fazer Ravintolat Oy was obliged to comply with.
According to the applicant, the company discriminated against Vauhkala by directly preventing
her from entering the Fazer Kluuvi café at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021, and Fazer Ravintolat
Oy's conduct was not based on law. According to Section 11 of the Non-Discrimination Act,different treatment does not constitute discrimination if it is based on law.
It is also important to grant leave to continue the proceedings in order to assess whether Fazer
Ravintolat Oy should have complied with the whole of the Communicable Diseases Act inrelation to the interest rate capsule.
In the judgment of the District Court (p. 56), it is stated, inter alia, that "the District Court also
considers that the violation of these provisions (§ 58 j and h of the TTL) could not in any way
constitute a compensatory sanction under § 13 of the Non-Discrimination Act, but that they aremainly procedural provisions assessed as administrative sanctions".
The applicant considers that, especially in a situation where the interest rate passport legislation
undeniably violates Vauhkala's fundamental and human rights, the entire legislation must be strictly
observed. The core of the passport legislation arises from Articles 58h, 58i and 58j of theCommunicable Diseases Act and they form a whole which the caterers who requested the passport
had to comply with strictly in order to ensure that the fundamental rights of the caterers' clientswere not violated.
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has failed to comply with Sections 58 h and i of the Communicable Diseases
Act in that it has not drawn up a written plan on how it will implement the obligations andrestrictions imposed by the AVI's decision, and with Section 58 j in that it has not informed
Vauhkala regarding the processing of personal data in the interest rate bag. In accordance with
Article 58 h.3 of the Communicable Diseases Act, the Fazer café should have made the planrequired by that section available to customers and other participants in its activities, and inaccordance with Article 58 i.4 of the TTC, that plan should have included a statement that Fazer
requires customers and participants in its activities to present a passport. Furthermore, Article 58hof the TTL provides that a business requiring a passport must have a written plan on how it will
implement the obligations and restrictions laid down in the decision referred to in Article 58d(1) of
the TTL.

56

The plaintiff Mika Vauhkala and his friend Mika Jantus, who accompanied Vauhkala to the Fazer
Kluuvi café on 10 December 2021 at 9 a.m., were heard in the district court hearing, and according
to them, the written plan on how the café would implement the obligations and restrictions imposedby the AVI decision was not available, although the law requires it. Neither were they informed by
the café's employees about the processing of personal data in the coupon bag. The district court did
not give any consideration to Vauhkala's and Jantunen's account of the matter, but relied solely on
the witness Tuominen of Fazer Ravintolat Oy, who at the time of the incident was the manager incharge of the Fazer Kluuvi café. Mr Tuominen confirmed that a self-monitoring plan had beendrawn up. He also said that he had not been able to find such a plan.
When asked what he thought was in the plan, Tuominen did not recall putting information in it that
Fazer required customers to show an interest rate passport, nor how Fazer Kluuvi would
implement the obligations and restrictions imposed on it. According to the district court's
judgment, "the witness (Tuominen) had drawn up a self-monitoring plan for Fazer Kluuvi's café
and it had been duly updated. Unfortunately, after the witness had moved on to other tasks, it was
not later found for documentation, but it had certainly been drawn up and was also visible on thewall of the café at the time'.
It remains unclear on what the district court's certainty about the self-monitoring plan and its actual
updated content is based. The district court should act impartially and assess the legal dispute
impartially. This has not happened in the present case, but the district court has assessed the caseone-sidedly from the defendant's point of view, relying without any apparent basis on what thedefendant's witness has said, without taking into account the fact that the witness is employed by
the defendant and thus dependent on the defendant, and without taking into account what thedefendant has actually said. He has not even been able to explain what the plan says about therequirement for an interest rate passport, even though the law is clear: the written plan should havecontained information on how the café/Fazer Ravintolat Oy would implement the obligations andrestrictions imposed by the decision of the AVI.
The applicant has made every effort to clarify the matter by requesting to see the written plan inquestion, but the plan has not been sent to the applicant. The District Court merely notes that,
unfortunately, since the witness had moved on to other tasks, the written plan was not subsequently
found for documentation, but it was certainly drawn up and was also visible on the wall of the caféat the time.
In the applicant's view, the fact that no plan has been found indicates only that there was no plan.
The Court has not explained why it has unilaterally believed

57

the affidavit of the defendant's witness without any further explanation being given. Moreover, thedistrict court's use of the phrase "it was drafted with certainty" above is, in the plaintiff's view,
another glaring example of the judges' apparent bias and/or unprofessionalism.

Customers have not been informed in accordance with the Communicable Diseases Act
Vauhkala and Jantunen, who have been heard in the case, have said that they have not been
informed at Fazer Kluuvi cafeteria about how the personal data in the coupon bag will beprocessed. The witness for Fazer Ravintolat Oy, Tuominen, has also been unable to say how hewould have informed Vauhkala and Jantunen at the café about the processing of the personal dataon the coupon bag.
What does the information referred to in the law include? Government Bill 226/2021 clarifies thatthe content of Section 58j will be clarified in Government Bill 131/2021, which states theGovernment's position that the processing of personal data would require informing the customer.
Fazer's argument that Vauhkala's dealings would not have progressed to the level of the information
obligation under Article 58j(1) of the TTL because he did not have an interest rate passport is, in our
opinion, incorrect. According to the provision:... The processing of the personal data included in the certificate also requires the client
and the participant to be informed. ...
According to the preamble of the provision (HE 131/2021 vp, p. 52):... the processing of personal data on the certificate would also require informing thecustomer and the participant in the activity, in accordance with the GDPR, that thepersonal data would only be processed to verify the validity of the certificate, tocheck the name of the person and to check whether the conditions for accessing thefacility are met. In addition, it should be informed that the data on the certificate
should not be registered or stored under this Act, as set out in paragraph 3 above, or
processed for any other purpose. Pursuant to Section 58j(3) TTL, the data on thecertificate may not be registered or stored or processed for any other purpose.
We argue that it is not even possible to apply the GDPR or to provide information under the GDPR.
Information within the meaning of the GDPR means specifically informing the data subject. On theother hand, according to Article 58j(3) of the TTL, no registration of data at all was allowed. Since
no one can be registered under Section 58j(3)58

become a "data subject", it is not possible to provide the information required by the GDPR at all.
Thus, the reference to information "in accordance with the GDPR" seems to have been mistakenly
or inadvertently included in the Government Bill. Thus, the legal text and its preamble, which refers
to information to 'the customer and the participant', must be applied.
Vauhkala was a customer of Fazer or a participant in Fazer's activities within the meaning of
Article 58j(1) TTL when he tried to buy breakfast from Fazer Cafe Kluuv. According to thepreamble to the provision, he should have been informed, as a precondition for claiming the coupon
pass, that his personal data would be processed only for the purposes of checking the validity of thecertificate, verifying the person's name and checking whether the conditions for access to thepremises were met. This information should have been provided in advance, before the passport
was even required to be shown, because if the information had been provided afterwards, thecustomer would not have been able to be sure, for example, that the data collected from him would
not be registered or stored in any way within the meaning of Article 58j(3) of the TTL.
When questioned, witness Tuomis said that he and another café employee had only informed
Vauhkala and his friend that they had to present their interest rate passport as a condition of entry
to the café. Thus, the customer was not informed in the manner required by law.
Since the preamble to the provision states that the customer or participant must be informed that"personal data would only be processed for the purposes of checking the validity of the certificate,verifying the name of the person and checking whether the conditions for access to the facility aremet", and since this has not been done, Fazer has therefore, in our view, directly infringed Article
58j(1) of the TTL.
The applicant submits that Fazer should have complied with the legislation in its entirety and thatthe lack of a written plan and the lack of information caused Fazer to act in breach of theCommunicable Diseases Act by refusing Vauhkala access to the café, thus not discriminating on
the basis of the law.

Unequal treatment of Vauhkala
The core of the district court's judgment with regard to Fazer Ravintolat Oy's obligation to pay
compensation has thus been dealt with. Fazer Ravintolat Oy's conduct, as we have interpreted andtestified, was not based on law, so that discrimination was not justified. Next

59

we go through how Vauhkala has been treated differently from how other people would have beentreated in a comparable situation.
Fazer Ravintolat Oy, a traditional, financially strong and wealthy company, part of the Fazer
Group, is committed to respecting human rights, as shown in the applicant's Exhibit 10: Fazer does
not tolerate restrictions on movement and Fazer respects the dignity, privacy and fundamental
rights of individuals and does not tolerate discrimination of any kind.
Despite this statement, Miika Kostilainen, the defendant's managing director, has replied to theapplicant's letter, in which the applicant has demanded that the company compensate him for his
infringement, as follows:Also on the website of the Council of State to which you refer, it is veryclearly stated that "if a restaurant requires its customers to have a coupon pass, it does not have tocomply with the stricter than usual restrictions imposed on the area in terms of opening and serving
hours, the number of customers allowed or the requirement that each customer be seated indoors."
The material you refer to elsewhere (on the website of the Regional Administrative Office) statesthat "it is up to the catering establishment to determine the times at which it adopts the pass."
In Fazer's case, it was therefore a method by which it managed to avoid the restrictions on customer
admission that would otherwise have been imposed on it. It is a question of obtaining a higher
profit by limiting Vauhkala's fundamental right to privacy. In several other cafés, there was no suchpractice restricting the fundamental right, nor in some other Fazer cafés. Fazer has notdemonstrated any justification, other than the increase in financial profit, for restricting Vauhkala's
access to the restaurant on the morning of 10 December 2021 in relation to Fazer's own policy of
respecting the dignity, privacy and fundamental rights of individuals.
Fazer Restaurants Ltd has decided to start requiring its café customers to show a coupon passthroughout the day, although normally the coupon pass is not required in food outlets until after
5pm. This has been done on the basis that it has allowed Fazer Restaurants Ltd to attract customers
to its premises without the need to comply with any restrictions on its premises, thereby
maximising its profits.
The denial of access to the restaurant violated the constitutional right to equal treatment andprotection of private life with regard to the disclosure of health information, the right to respect for
private life, freedom of religion or belief and the right to non-discrimination guaranteed by theEuropean Convention on Human Rights, and the right not to be arbitrarily denied access to therestaurant guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. Fazer Ravintolat Oy has
thus failed to fulfil its obligations under60

its human rights commitments to zero tolerance of restrictions on movement and Fazer's
respect for the dignity, privacy and fundamental rights of individuals, and its refusal to tolerate
discrimination of any kind.
As can be seen from the written evidence 9, 11 and 12 submitted by the applicant, the applicant
had the opportunity to eat at Hotel Kämp immediately after the Fazer Kluuvi episode and, on
subsequent days, at other restaurants and even at other Fazer cafés. There was therefore nothing toprevent the Fazer café from actually allowing Vauhkala to have breakfast on 10 December 2021.
The situation on the other days and in other places was comparable under the Equal Treatment Act.
Section 10 of the Equality Act provides:
Discrimination is direct if someone is treated less favourably on a personal ground thansomeone else has been, is or would be treated in a comparable situation.
Dining in other places under the same legislation and the same ESAVI restriction decision has been
a comparable situation as defined by law. In other words, in the applicant's view, he has beentreated in a comparable situation in Fazer Kluuvi at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021 in a
discriminatory manner in relation to other cafés/restaurants both outside Fazer Ravintolat Oy and in
the company's other establishments. The discrimination has been based on the presumption of
Vauhkala's medical condition, as he has not been able to present a passport for interest. However,
Vauhkala was in perfect health when he went to the café.

On the obligation to reimburse costs
Vauhkala considers that the district court's decision to order him to pay the State's costs is notbased on a legally valid assessment of the case. Also for this reason, Mr Vauhkala considers that it
is important for the application of the law in other similar cases to grant leave for further
proceedings.
The main legal errors in the assessment of the liability for legal costs are as follows:
1) At the main hearing, all parties were informed that the bill of costs was to be submitted on
Monday 15 April 2024. Only after this date did the State submit a claim for reimbursement of the
VAT element. Although the State's claim was late, the district court accepted that the State could
have effectively claimed the VAT element as well.

612) The time taken by the State to bring the case was excessive, not least because the State hadstated from the outset that there was no basis for the action. The almost double number of hours
compared with the time spent by the applicant's lawyer shows that the State has deliberatelysought to increase its legal claim, thereby imposing additional costs on the applicant. This can beinterpreted as chicanery
3) The hourly rate of the State agent has been too high in relation to the legal skills demonstrated.
The State lawyer has no knowledge of human rights treaties and has focused mainly on smearing
the opponent, which is contrary to the Code of Good Lawyers' Conduct.
4) Salminen's fee for providing the state expert opinion should not have been accepted because, in
accordance with the principle of jura novit curia, the legal expert should not even have beensummoned to appear in court5) Contrary to its initial declaration, the State has used more than one assistant and Vauhkala has
declared that he accepts the use of only one assistant - as Vauhkala himself has done.

Application for leave to continue proceedings in respect of Mr Nummelin
Annul the judgment of the Helsinki District Court that 'Nummelin must be ordered to contributejointly and severally with Vauhkala to the claim for costs in the amount of EUR 20 000'.
a) contrary to the Code of Judicial Procedureb) as contrary to the State's grounds for the claimant's claim.
Leave for further proceedings should therefore be granted because there is reason to doubt thecorrectness of the outcome of the district court's decision, and it is not possible to assess thecorrectness of the outcome of the district court's decision without granting leave for further
proceedings.
As stated on page 59 of the judgment, "Pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a representative, agent or assistant of a party who, intentionally or negligently, within
the meaning of Article 4 or 5, has caused another party to incur the costs referred to in this
Chapter may, after having been given an opportunity to be heard, be ordered to bear those costs
jointly and severally with the party concerned."
The judgment further states: 'The District Court notes that in the case law and literature the liabilityof an assistant or agent has been considered exceptional, and62a high threshold for personal responsibility. A lawyer's liability for expenses is a sanction for his
conduct in violation of the rules of procedure (Jokela 1995, p 162). Unlike normal liability, theliability of a lawyer requires a subjective basis, i.e. he must have acted intentionally or negligently inbreach of the rules of procedure (reference to § 21:6 of the Code of Conduct 21:4 and 21:5§). The types of conduct referred to in Article 5 of Chapter 21 OC include, inter alia, making an
objection which the person making it knew or ought to have known to be unfounded, or failing tocomply with a court order, or otherwise breaching a duty to prolong the proceedings. The conductreferred to in Article 4 of Chapter 21 of the OC is, for example, the commencement of unnecessary
legal proceedings."
On page 60, the district court states, "The district court finds that the attorney's actions describedabove were in themselves lawful means to protect the client's position and interests and to secure afair trial, but that the making of statements in violation of and in excess of the requests forstatements was a breach of duty that prolonged the trial."
According to the district court itself, therefore, the actions of the agent were legal means of acting
on behalf of the client. According to the Bar Association's Guidelines on Good Lawyer Conduct:a) Paragraph 5.8. defines the obligation to resign. This obligation arises if, after
accepting the post, a circumstance arises which makes the lawyer incompetent or
disqualified. The lawyer is also obliged to resign if: 1. a legal impediment or acomparable compelling reason prevents the performance of the task; or 2. the client
requests the lawyer to act contrary to the law or good professional conduct and,despite being warned, does not withdraw the request.
b) point 3.1 requires a lawyer to be loyal to his clientc) 3.2 requires that, in the performance of his duties, a lawyer must be free from any
outside influence which might impair his ability to control fully the interests of his
client. The lawyer must not allow embarrassing circumstances or other such factors to
influence the performance of his duties. The lawyer shall maintain his independence in
his activities, even if this requires actions or solutions which are not to the liking of his
client, his opponent, the authorities or others.
d) point 2.2 states that the defence of fundamental and human rights and themaintenance of the rule of law require the independence of the legal profession
from the public authorities.

63

These guidelines define the scope of the agent's duty to act as Nummelin. According to the district
court itself, Nummelin acted precisely in accordance with these instructions. Consequently, thedistrict court's decision to order Mr Nummelin to contribute jointly and severally to the costs of theState for the sum of EUR 20 000 must be regarded as contrary to the Code of Procedure and theCode of Good Legal Practice.
Further, the district court found that some unspecified portion of the liability was incurred as a result,that "the action, in its original and amended form as described above, in so far as it has beenabandoned, is based on a manifest error of law and shows clear negligence on the part of theagent, in so far as the applicant knew or ought to have known that the action was unfounded."
Chapter 14 of the Code of Judicial Procedure lays down the procedure in court as follows:2 § (22.7.1991/1052)
You may not amend the statement of claim in the course of the proceedings.
However, the plaintiff has the right to...
3) claim interest or make any other secondary claim or even a new claim, provided
that it is based on essentially the same grounds.
If the application referred to in paragraph 1(2) or (3) is made only at the main hearing,
the application shall be inadmissible if its examination would delay the proceedings.
Such a claim cannot be made in a higher court.
The submission of new facts in support of an action shall not be deemed to be an
amendment of the action, unless it changes the case.
According to the Code of Procedure, the plaintiff is therefore entitled to make another, or even a new,side claim, provided that it is based on essentially the same plea.
In the present case, it is a question of making new claims, supported by a supplementary statement
and by the abandonment of some of the grounds of the old claims. Therefore, since the applicant
has exercised the rights conferred on him by the Code of Procedure and the applicant's lawyer has
assisted him in the present case in accordance with his obligations, the applicant's legal adviser
cannot be penalised.

64

The decision is not based on a claim by the StateThe court cannot take up the legal responsibility of a legal adviser under Chapter 21, Articles 4-6of the Code of Judicial Procedure on its own initiative, but only at the request of a party to theproceedings. The grounds on which the State claimed that Mr Nummelin should be liable for costs
are described in the judgment as follows:"The State has considered that when it has become clear that the State cannot be obliged to pay
compensation to Vauhkala for the violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, andwhen the applicant and his agents have nevertheless continued to pursue the case and to inflate thecase by presenting yet another argument relating to freedom of religion, this has been negligent
and careless conduct of the case. In this respect, the proceedings are unnecessary. Accordingly,
Mr Nummelin, the applicant's agent, must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the State,
together with his client, in the event of the applicant's defeat.'
The State's application therefore seeks an order that Agent Nummelin pay the costs incurred by theState, because:a) it should have become clear to the Ombudsman that the State cannot be ordered to
pay compensation to Vauhkala for the violation of the European Convention on
Human Rightsb) the applicant and his agents have continued to pursue the case and to inflate it
further, putting forward a new argument relating to freedom of religion.
c) for the reasons set out above, Mr Nummelin's conduct of his case wasnegligent and careless.
The question of the attorney's liability should be based on the claim made by the party, but the
district court's decision is not based on the claims made by the state. Thus, the district court's
finding that Mr Nummelin should be jointly and severally liable for the State's claim for EUR 20
000 is not in accordance with the law.
In any case, we will also respond to the arguments put forward by the State:
The State's view that the action would be manifestly unfounded has been based from the outset on
the State's desire to prevent an embarrassing action from coming to trial. We discuss the merits of
the action at length in the application for leave to proceed and in our appeal, so it is unnecessary torevisit those merits here other than to state that our action was based on a strong legal assessment,a large body of evidence consisting of pharmaceutical and legal experts, and a substantial body ofevidence.

65

experts, numerous medical studies, and irrefutable evidence of the events at the Fazer Kluuvi caféon 10 December 2021 at 9 am.
In order to accept the State's view that the action is completely unfounded, the Ombudsman would
have to reject the legal reasoning in the case in its entirety, to consider that Vauhkala would nothave had the right to eat in the restaurant in principle, even though Article 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not apply. Additional Protocol 1 to the ECHR
expressly requires the State to prevent arbitrary denial of access to a restaurant, consider thesignificant medical studies and the views of the medical representatives who gave oral testimony
on the matter to be wrong, and reject as nonsense the article by Dr Muukkonen, the only Finnish
legal expert to have written an article on the subject. However, it is absolutely impossible to reachsuch a conclusion - from the point of view of common sense and legal perception. Nohynek, thechief physician of the THL, and Järvisen, the infectious disease specialist of the HUS, havetestified in the district court that the vaccines have not prevented the spread of corona except to asmall extent, and that the vaccines did not protect anyone except the person who took them, so that
Vauhkala could not have posed any danger to anyone at the Fazer Kluuvi café on 10 December
2021 at 9 o'clock in the morning. As this is what medical experts have told us, there is no way thatthe agent, with his totally inadequate medical training, could have refuted their views - let alonethat the agent could have refuted the results of numerous medical studies.
We further recall that the State has already in September 2022 exercised its right to request the district
court to dismiss the case as unfounded, and the district court has not agreed. Accordingly, the district
court also found that the action was sufficiently meritorious to proceed.
The district court's ruling also leads to difficulties for citizens pursuing claims against the state,especially on human rights grounds, to find an agent. An agent would have to consider the
possibility that, in having to specify the grounds of the action and in facing the State's argumentsthat "the State cannot violate human rights", the agent would run the risk of having to bear part ofthe costs of the proceedings himself.
In order to be independent of the public authorities, in line with the Good Lawyers' Code of
Conduct, a lawyer must be able to work without fear of having to pay his or her client's legal costs.
The decision of the Helsinki District Court is a serious breach of the protection traditionallyafforded to lawyers, which has enabled citizens to have access to professional legal assistance inactions against the State.

1

COMPLAINT

Asia:
Appeal against the judgment of Helsinki District Court in case L706/2022/1504 (31.5.2024, decision
number 1017 5944)

Requirements:
1) Vauhkala's primary claim is that the case be referred back to the Helsinki District Court
for serious procedural irregularities. In addition, the State is ordered to pay the costs
incurred by the parties to the proceedings to date, plus default interest pursuant to
Section 4(1) of the Interest Act for one month from the date of the District Court's
judgment.
2) In the alternative, Vauhkala requests that the Helsinki Court of Appeal decide to hold anoral hearing in the case, at which the plaintiff will be granted the right to call former Prime
Minister Marin and Head of Department Koskela of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health as witnesses, and that the State be ordered to provide the plaintiff with both thecoronary vaccine procurement contracts concerning Finland and the preparatory documents
for the coronary passport legislation from the Government. We further request that, at themain hearing, the State be ordered to comply with the procedural law and case-law in force,according to which legislative documents may not be designated as written evidence and nolegal expert may be called to give oral evidence in court. Similarly, we require that the main
hearing of the Court of Appeal be accompanied by the correction of other procedural errorsthat occurred in the district court.
In the present main oral hearing, the applicant requests that the defendants be orderedjointly and severally to pay to the applicant
1. compensation of EUR 10 000 on the basis of Section 23 of the NonDiscrimination Act for discrimination on the grounds of presumed state of health
2. The Finnish State/Valtiokonttori is ordered to pay compensation of EUR 10 000 on
the basis of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

2violation of Article 1, Article 8, Article 9, Article 13, Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No
12 to the ECHR
3. The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay the costs of the defendant inboth the District Court and the Court of Appeal, together with default interest at the rate
provided for in § 4(1) of the Interest Act for one month from the date of the judgment.
3) Mr Nummelin requests that the decision of the Helsinki District Court ordering him to sharejointly and severally with Mr Vauhkala the sum of EUR 20,000 in the claim for costs be annulled
as contrary to the Code of Procedure and the Guidelines on Good Lawyers' Conduct. The district
court's decision is also procedurally incorrect, since the grounds put forward by the district court
are not based on those put forward by the claimant.

Short description of the caseOn 10.12.2021 at 9 in the morning, Vauhkala tried to get into a Fazer Kluuvi café in Helsinki. He
has been required to show a coupon pass as a condition of entry. Vauhkala did not have such a
passport and was not ill in any way. Vauhkala has been refused entry, after which he has been
allowed to eat breakfast at the nearby Kämppi.
The case is based on the assumption that if Vauhkala does not have a green card, he is potentially
infected with covid-19 and on this basis his access to the restaurant is blocked. Article 8 of the NonDiscrimination Act (prohibition of discrimination), which states that no one may be discriminatedagainston the basis of, inter alia, health status, is directly applicable to the case at hand. Discrimination isprohibited whether it is based on a fact or presumption concerning the person or someone else. The
emphasis in this case is therefore on the presumption. This is the basis of our claim for compensation
under the Equality Act, because Mr Vauhkala was not ill when he went to the Fazer café, but was
discriminated against on the basis of an assumption about his state of health.
We have also claimed compensation from the State for the violation of the rights guaranteed to
Vauhkala under Articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR, read through Article 14, and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights.Article 8 states that everyone has the right torespect for his private life, Article 9 states that everyone has the right to respect for his private life,and Article 12 states that everyone has the right to respect for his private life. Article 8 states thateveryone has the right to respect for his private life, Article 9 states that everyone has the right tofreedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 14 prohibits all forms of discrimination in thatthe rights and freedoms recognised in the ECHR may be enjoyed without discrimination on grounds
such as opinion or religion.

3(including under Finnish law) to enjoy without discrimination on grounds of, for example, opinion or
religion. These rights have also been held to include the State taking measures to prevent arbitraryrefusal of access to a restaurant.
The mere fact that a person has been subjected to an act preventing him from enjoying a right towhich he is entitled (Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR prohibits arbitrary refusal of access toa restaurant) must be considered a violation of a fundamental right and a human right guaranteed by
the ECHR. In the case-law of the courts of appeal, the amount of compensation for discrimination on
grounds of ethnic origin has been set at EUR 800 (Helsinki Court of Appeal 18.6.2020, caseR20/707, after a service station employee refused to open a fuel dispenser for Roma; Helsinki Courtof Appeal 23.Helsinki Court of Appeal of 6 March 2015 in case R14/409 after the defendants
refused to open a fuel dispenser for a Roma). According to the recommendations of the Advisory
Board for Personal Injury, the recommended compensation for refusal to serve on the grounds ofoffended ethnic origin is EUR 300-1500, so the compensation practice of the courts of appeal inthese cases has favoured the so-called middle way.
The fact that Vauhkala has not been allowed to come to dinner is at least comparable to not being
able to fill up your car or get service at a restaurant. In Vauhkala's case, however, it must be bornein mind that her discrimination has taken place in a social context in which it is backed by theauthority of the government and the rest of the political decision-making apparatus and by the verystrong media coverage of the corona mRNA vaccine. Public opinion has been heavily influenced bythese forces, for example against Vauhkala, who has deliberately refused to take the corona mRNA
vaccine. Thus, under constant public pressure, the humiliation and suffering experienced by
Vauhkala has been substantially greater than that experienced by the Roma who have been denied
services. The intensity of the public pressure is evident, for example, in an interview with Prime
Minister Marin published shortly after the entry into force of the interest rate passport legislation on
24 October 2021:
Marin had no sympathy for the unvaccinated.
- I find it hard to relate to people who are critical of vaccination," Marin said.
(Exhibit 28)
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the Finnish state must pay compensation of
more than 10 000 euros. In the case of Hokkanen v. Finland (1994), 200 000

4compensation for non-material damage in the amount of DM. In its 1994 judgment, the ECtHR
accepted that a mere finding of infringement, i.e. lack of enforcement of visiting rights, would not
be sufficient in the circumstances of the case, but reduced the compensation - with reference toequitable grounds - to FIM 100 000 (approximately EUR 16 800). In Z v. Finland (1997), theappellant's privacy had been infringed (primarily) by the disclosure of his sensitive medical data ina judgment of the Court of Appeal concerning offences committed by his spouse. Compensation for
non-material damage was claimed in the amount of two million marks. The government argued thatany compensation should not exceed the maximum of DEM 70 000 for victims of the sexual
violence offences in question. The ECtHR stated that it is not bound by national compensation
practices, although it may seek guidance from them. In this case, too, the compensation was set at
100,000 marks, or 16,800 euros.
In any case, based on the KKO's decision 2016:20, the key issue is how the injured party perceives
the violation.
In the case of Mr Nummelin, the district court found that Mr Nummelin had negligently prolonged
the proceedings unnecessarily by making statements which were in themselves lawful and which,according to the district court, were intended to protect the position and interests of the client andto ensure a fair trial. The district court's decision goes strongly against the foundations of the legal
profession, since, in principle, the protection afforded to legal counsel must be particularly high inorder to ensure that the client has access to adequate legal assistance in pursuing his case. If
lawyers have to constantly consider whether they can be held jointly and severally liable with theirclients, this will erode the protection traditionally enjoyed by the legal profession and will prevent
clients from obtaining legal assistance.

Key legal weaknesses in the Helsinki District Court judgment
The District Court of Helsinki constructs a judgment which, from the plaintiff's point of view, isclearly biased due to the obvious incompetence of the two judges of the District Court and otherserious procedural errors during the trial process, and based on very weak legal reasoning, as
follows:a) first, the District Court declares that it has no jurisdiction - notwithstanding Article 106of the Constitution - to assess the constitutionality of the interest rate passportlegislation, since the Constitutional Committee has already assessed theconstitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation in the parliamentary debate.

5b) according to Mr Salminen, the State expert witness, the interest rate passport legislation isconstructed in a manner which respects the European Convention on Human Rights andthe Court therefore considers that the interest rate passport legislation does not breach the
obligations imposed by the European Convention on Human Rightsc) the individual claims of the applicant against the State are dismissed by the district court byignoring and disregarding the applicant's key evidence and argumentsd) Fazer Ravintolat Oy has complied - although there is no evidence of this - with all theprovisions of the communicable disease legislation, so the refusal to allow Vauhkala accessto the Fazer Kluuvi café was not discriminatory because the action against Vauhkala wasbased on the law. In any event, the Court considers that the alleged infringements ofArticles 58h, i and j of the Law on communicable diseases were at most infringements ofthe procedural provisions and therefore do not affect the substance of the case.
Vauhkala has responded to this as follows:a) in the present case, the question is not whether the interest rate passport legislation is
unconstitutional in principle, but whether the interest rate passport legislation and its
implementation were unconstitutional in the Vauhkala case. According to the generalconditions for the restriction of fundamental rights, the restriction of fundamental rights
must be suitable in general for achieving the objective pursued and, in addition, theobjective cannot be achieved by means that are less intrusive. In Vauhkala's case, therestriction that Vauhkala had obtained a 'green interest rate pass' would not have resulted inany of the customers in the Fazer Kluuvi café being safer if Vauhkala had stayed awayfrom the café than if he had been able to enter the café to have breakfast. Thus, therestriction of Vauhkala's fundamental right was not appropriate to achieve the objective
pursued, namely the prevention of the spread of covid-19. Moreover, the objective could
have been achieved by less intrusive means, such as, for example, by insisting that
customers of the café wash their hands thoroughly before entering the café. Moreover,Vauhkala was not himself at risk of covid-19 and had acquired information throughreading and observation, which had led him to suspect that a person vaccinated with thecoronavirus vaccine might suffer adverse health side-effects. No one can be forced - at therisk of losing their fundamental and human rights - to put their health at risk.
The Constitutional Committee has set a presumption for interest rate passport legislationthat it is constitutional because the Constitutional Committee.

6based on the medical knowledge available, the coronary passport legislation has been able
to prevent the spread of covid-19 and the harm it causes. However, Vauhkala has testified in
the district court, supported by oral and written evidence, that the coronary vaccines, whichhave been a key method of obtaining the so-called green card, have not been able to preventthe spread of covid-19 and that this was already known in the autumn of 2021. It has beenfurther proven that the requirement to undergo a corona test every 72 hours and to pay EUR
100-200 each time in order to fully enjoy the basic and human rights of each of us has
violated the applicant's right to non-discrimination. Mr Vauhkala also proved that thecommonly used corona test, the so-called PCR test, gave too many false positive results toallow the determination of who is entitled to the enjoyment of fundamental and humanrights. The third way to obtain a coronet pass for the 'green' has been to contract covid-19,
classified as a public health communicable disease, every six months. However, this could
not be required of Vauhkalab) The European Convention on Human Rights imposes certain obligations on each statethat has signed up to it, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights defines
the implementation of the European Convention. The case law of the ECtHR has
established that national legislation can also directly infringe the ECHR. Thus, it is not
for the national actor to determine whether national legislation violates the ECHR, but
for the court to assess the issue. The Helsinki District Court has effectively refused tomake this assessment.
c) the district court's assessment of individual points of law is no longer valid after the district
court has not carried out an assessment of the compatibility of the interest rate passportlegislation with the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rightsd) the evidence shows that Fazer Ravintolat Oy has even breached the obligations imposedon it by the interest rate passport legislation, so that the direct discrimination against
Vauhkala by the company is not based on law. Fazer Ravintolat Oy has therefore in any
event committed an infringement of the Equality Act.

Criteria for a priority claim:

Judge Markku Saarikoski's disqualification

7

According to Chapter 13, Section 6(2) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (OC, 4/1734) (441/2001), a
judge is disqualified if he or she has a relationship with a party, whether by reason of employment orotherwise, which, particularly in view of the nature of the case before him or her, gives rise toreasonable doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the matter. According to paragraph 2 of the same
Article, the mere fact that a party is a State, a municipality or another public body does not constitutea bar under paragraph 1. According to Article 7.3 of Chapter 13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge is also disqualified if any other circumstance comparable to those referred to in this Chapter
gives rise to reasonable doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the matter.
On 9.11.2023, we learned that Markku Saarikoski, who was the District Judge and presiding
judge in our case, will, in addition to his judicial work, work as a mediator at the Office of
the National Mediator. On 16 September 2021, he was appointed for a three-year term ofoffice, starting on 20 September 2021 (news on this: https://valtioneuvosto.fi//1410877/markku-saarikoski- mediator-for-the-office-of-appointed-mediator).
The other defendant in our action is the Finnish State. In practice, the defendant is the Finnish
Government, which is the same body that appointed Saarikoski as a mediator for the Office of the
National Mediator. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, acting as part of the Council of Stateand on its behalf in the present case, has been assigned to handle the action on behalf of the State.
In addition, the Office of the National Mediator operates administratively under the Ministry of
Employment and the Economy. The said Ministry played a key role in the preparation of thelegislation on the interest rate passport which is the subject of the dispute in the present action.
The information about Saarikoski's secondary function as a mediator appointed by the Government
in the Office of the National Mediator came as a complete surprise to us, as there was no mentionof this secondary function in the register of judges' affiliations and secondary functions maintainedby the judicial administration (the so-called Sisi register, https://asiointi.oikeus.fi/sidonnaisuus-jasivutoimirekisteri/ilmoitus/search). According to the entries in the register, Mr Saarikoski has beena judge at the Helsinki District Court since 1 September 2007 and has been a part-time deputy
member of the expert and expert members of the Labour Court from 1 January 2019 to 31
December 2023. The Sisi register should also have mentioned Mr Saarikoski's three-year post as amediator at the Office of the National Mediator. However, this post was only added to the Sisi
register after our allegations of obstruction were brought to Saarikoski's attention. In his
explanation, Mr Saarikoski said that the information had been 'inadvertently omitted' from the Sisi
register.
In our application, we alleged that the Finnish state, in practice the Finnish Government in office in
2021, had violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The same8

the Council of State, which we allege has committed a serious violation of human rights, has
appointed Saarikoski as mediator.
These facts, together with the fact that Saarikoski's position as a mediator was not mentioned in theregister of judges' affiliations and secondary functions as required by law, give in our opinion
reasonable grounds to doubt Saarikoski's impartiality in the case within the meaning of § 13:6(2)and § 13:7.3 of the OC.
On the basis of the above, we made an objection under § 13:8 of the Rules of Procedure that Judge
Saarikoski was unfit to sit.
The District Court rejected Saarikoske's objection of obstruction by decision of 22 January 2024
(decision number 1015 0438). The District Court justified its decision, inter alia, by stating that"[t]he fact that District Judge Saarikoski's secondary position had not been entered in the registerof affiliations is irrelevant for the assessment [of the disqualification]". However, this fact was oneof our main grounds for doubting Mr Saarikoski's disqualification; the statutory declaration of that
office in the Sisi register had been neglected by Mr Saarikoski for more than two years.
The failure to make the statutory declaration and the fact that he was acting under the authority of theCouncil of State, which is a co-defendant in the Vauhkala case, give rise to reasonable grounds foralleging that Saarikoski was disqualified from presiding over the jury in the Vauhkala case.
In addition, the district court states the following in its decision:
In the present case, it is justified to draw attention to the fact that the Office of the
National Mediator is not known to have played any role in the preparation of thedecision referred to in the application. Accordingly, the outcome of the action will
have no effect on the functioning of the Office of the National Mediator or on its staff.
The link between the Ministry and District Judge Saarikoski must be regarded asrather distant.
However, we did not even argue that the Office of the National Mediator played a role in the
preparation of the decisions referred to in the complaint, but the Ministry of Employment and theEconomy, which is part of the Council of State. Nor did we argue that the outcome of the action
should have had any effect on the Office of the National Mediator or its staff. We argued that the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy is the paymaster of Mr Saarikoski and that he wasappointed to his post by the same Government which was preparing the contested interest rate
passport legislation.
The district court thus completely failed to address or ignored the core grounds of our estoppel
argument. The decision is therefore not sufficiently reasoned in the way that the case-law has

9required: according to KHO 2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrativedecision must be considered from the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned toobtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
The applicant's right to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it is now denied, as thereasoning does not respond to the arguments put forward by the applicant in substance or at all.
The decision is therefore unlawful in the light of the legal guidance given in the abovementioned
judgment of the Court of First Instance.

Judge Marko Lepistö's disqualification
Pursuant to Chapter 13, Section 7(2) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (1.6.2001/441), a judge isdisqualified from hearing the same case or part of it again before the same court if there arereasonable grounds for suspecting that he or she has a prejudiced view of the case because of aprevious decision or other special reason.Pursuant to Section 13(3), a judge is also disqualified if
any other circumstance comparable to those referred to in this Chapter gives rise to reasonable
doubt as to the judge's impartiality in the case.
According to Antti Tapanila's doctoral thesis "Judge's disqualification" (Publications of the Finnish
Lawyers' Association: A series 2007), a judge's disqualification may be affected by apreconception of a legal issue, which may have arisen, for example, in connection with a previous
trial.
A judge's preconception of a point of law is revealed by the decisions he has given in similar cases inrelation to the case at hand (pp. 307-308). According to Tapanila, the expression of exceptionallyunconditional opinions detached from the sources of law may give rise to suspicion of a bias thatcompromises the judge's impartiality (p. 309, footnote 269).
District Judge Marko Lepistö has acted as District Judge in case L 706/2021/2416 (judgment of 10
September 2021, decision number 165570/2021). The case concerned compensation claimed by theapplicants for a violation of the Equal Treatment Act when HUS/Helsinki Women's Clinic did not
admit the applicants because they did not use face masks. At the time, the Women's Clinic had a mask
recommendation in force. Lepistö dismissed the action without issuing a summons on the grounds,
inter alia, that:"[The plaintiffs'] claim was based on a denial of the seriousness of the Corona
pandemic, based on denialism. In the district court's view, however, the alleged
conduct against [the plaintiffs] was based on what was, at the time of the incident, agenerally perceived necessary and indispensable means of protecting the healthsafety of others in the hospital environment.

10

The Equality Act cannot protect an individual's opinion that is or may be likely toendanger the health or public safety of other people."
The judgment further states that "[the applicants] were a married couple who had been prevented
from having an amniocentesis because of the opinion expressed. The plaintiffs had stated that they
did not believe in the seriousness of the Covid-19 pandemic and that, at the very least, the masks
were not helping against the disease. The use of masks and visors caused both of them to have apanic attack."
Judge Marko Lepistö therefore refused to serve the summons on HUS on the ground that hehimself had argued that the applicants' claim was based on a denial of the seriousness of theinterest rate pandemic, based on "denialism". However, no such allegation of 'denialism' wasmade in the application for a writ of summons. Moreover, the procedure against the applicants(requiring them to wear a mask) was, in the judge's view, based on a necessary and indispensablemeans of protecting health and safety.
Chapter 5, Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure provides for the inadmissibility of an action
and the settlement of the case without requesting a reply:
The court shall dismiss the action as inadmissible if the plaintiff fails to comply with
the invitation referred to in Article 5 and the application is so incomplete, unclear or
confused that it cannot form the basis of the proceedings, or if the court is otherwise
unable to admit the case.
The court must dismiss the action by judgment to the extent that it is manifestly
unfounded.
In the preamble to Article 6(2) and in the case-law, it has been held that a manifest lack offoundation for an action means a deficiency in the substantive basis of the action which cannot be
remedied even later in the proceedings. Such a situation arises where the factual grounds put
forward by the plaintiff (the facts put forward as elements of the case) do not allow the plaintiff toestablish what he claims in his application for a writ of summons (so-called 'legal unfoundedness').
Judge Lepistö has therefore already decided, before issuing the summons, that the application for asummons was manifestly unfounded, pursuant to Article 5:6.2 of the Rules of Procedure.
According to Mr Lepistö, the applicants had not even alleged that they had been treated lessfavourably than other clients of the hospital and that, as a result of this failure to meet the burdenof proof, the facts set out in the application could not give rise to the result they sought, for which
reason the application had to be dismissed. However, this argument is absurd: the applicants
expressly stated as a matter of fact that the condition for their admission to the amniocentesis on 23
March 2021 was the wearing of a mask or visor and that they did not, inter alia, have to wear a

10mask or visor.

11

were unable to wear a mask or visor for health reasons, i.e. that they were treated less favourablyon the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination than hospital clients wearing a mask or visor
who were admitted to hospital for treatment. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiffs did not
expressly "underline" that they were treated differently from clients who wore a mask is very
difficult to see as a sufficient ground for a "manifest" lack of legal basis for the action within themeaning of Article 5:6.2 of the Code.
The purposeful application of the law
Lepistö's bias and the fact that he refers in his reasoning to Article 11(2) of the Non-Discrimination
Act by apparently deliberately omitting to quote the rest of the provision also indicates that his
reasoning is biased. He states that a difference in treatment is nevertheless justified even in theabsence of a provision laying down the grounds on which the treatment is justified, provided thatthe treatment has an objective which is acceptable from the point of view of fundamental andhuman rights and that the means of achieving that objective are proportionate. The provisioncontinues, however, that this provision does not apply, inter alia, to the exercise of official
authority or the exercise of a public administrative function. Mr Lepistö knew or ought to have
known that amniocentesis falls within the scope of the provision of counselling services under
Article 15 of the Health Care Act (1326/2010), which falls within the scope of the exercise of apublic administrative function within the meaning of Article 11.2(1) of the Equal Treatment Act.
This is stated, for example, by Eeva Nykänen in her article "Private service providers as providersof public social and health services" (Lakimies magazine 3-4/2020 p. 8):"... social and health services, which are the responsibility of the public authorities, fallwithin the scope of public administration. Public service tasks which are considered to be
public administrative tasks may be similar in content to services provided by the private
sector. The decisive factor in defining the nature of the task is whether the public sector is
responsible for organising and financing the services. ... For example, services provided byan undertaking providing health services or housing for the elderly do not therefore fallwithin the scope of the public service remit, unless the provision of the service is based on a
statutory obligation on the part of the - - - municipality to organise the service. If theprovision of the service in question is based on such an arrangement, it is a public
administrative task which the private service provider is carrying out in this case."
Based on Nykänen's article, it is clear that the provision of child health services - including
amniocentesis - is a public administrative task, as it is based on the statutory obligation of themunicipality to provide them under Section 15 of the Health Care Act. Thus, the provision ofamniocentesis is subject to the principle of equal treatment under Article 11.1 of the Equality Act.

12

requirement, and § 11.2, as applied by Lepistö, does not apply to amniocentesis. Consequently, themask claim made by the amniotic fluid clinic would have had to be based on an Act of Parliament
as required by section 11.1 of the Equality Act in order for the claim to comply with the Equality
Act and thus be lawful. However, at no time was the use of masks made mandatory by law in
Finland, and although the Government proposed such a law in the spring of 2021, it withdrew its
proposal on 31 March 2021 and never returned to the issue.
Lepistö's attitudinal use of language
The word "denialism" (a word that was never used by the plaintiffs themselves) used by theplaintiffs in the Lepstein claim is generally associated with phenomena that are particularly sociallyobjectionable, such as climate denialism, Holocaust denialism and vaccine denialism. See, forexample, Osmo Pekonen's article of 27 April 2022 "Denialists of many kinds"(https://www.tiedetoimittajat.fi/tiedekeskiviikko/monen-sortin-denialisteja/), which states that"denialism is the disease of our time". See also e.g. Syksy Räsäsäsen and Kari Enqvist's article of
5.5.2014 "Denialism, a collateral damage of scientific progress?"(https://journal.fi/tt/article/view/41570), where already in the title the word "denialism" isassociated with "damage", i.e. a negative, undesirable phenomenon. In both articles, the word
'denialism' is associated with a strong sense of disapproval and avoidance, which has been incommon parlance for at least ten years.
The applicant considers that Lepistö's use of the word denialism in relation to the applicant's claimin the case must be regarded as the expression of an exceptionally unconditional position, detachedfrom the legal sources, which gives rise to suspicion of a bias that compromises the impartiality of
the judge (see above and Tapanila 2007 p. 309, footnote 269).
Based on the above, the applicant considers it clear that the strong language used by Lepistö in the
judgment of 10 September 2021 gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality in the handlingof cases challenging coronary measures involving similar legal issues, as in the present case of
Vauhkala v. State of Finland and Fazer, within the meaning of OC 13:7.2.
Since Marko Lepistö has applied the Equal Treatment Act in the aforementioned manner in case L
706/2021/2416 in a manifestly purposive manner, has used strong attitudinal language in relation to
the applicant's claims and has dismissed the action in question without issuing a summons on
manifestly frivolous and/or questionable grounds, this gives rise to a well-founded suspicion that heis not in breach of Article 13:7.2 of the OC.

13in the sense of a bias towards more general cases relating to the interest rate pandemic andquestioning interest rate measures. The applicant considers that Lepistö's bias is such that he is unable
to act objectively and impartially in Vauhkala v The Finnish State and Fazer.
The district court rejected Lepistö's claim of obstruction by decision of 19 March 2024 (decision
number 1016 1641). The district court justified its decision, inter alia, as follows:
Vauhkala's view that District Judge Lepistö had made an exceptionally absolutestatement, unconnected with the legal sources, was based mainly on the fact that
District Judge Lepistö had used the term "denialism" as part of his reasoning.
In this respect, the District Court finds that the mere use of the said expression cannot
be regarded as a statement that is detached from the legal sources, let alone as an
exceptionally absolute one.
The decisive point is that the cases L 706/2021/2416 and L 706/2022/1504 involve
different legal issues. In the first case, Judge Lepistö did not express a legal opinion
which could lead to a finding of incompetence in the second case. There is no
justification for a different assessment of that conclusion on the basis of a single
expression used by Mr Lepistö.
In summary, the district court states that the party's own perception of the judge's
disqualification is not decisive, but the doubt must be objectively justified. Mr
Vauhkala has not put forward any evidence in support of his allegation of lack ofcompetence which, viewed objectively, would give rise to a reasonable doubt as to theimpartiality of District Judge Lepistö in the case.
The claim that District Judge Lepistö was not disqualified must therefore be rejected.
The district court's assessment that Lepistö's use of the term "denialism" could not be regarded as astatement unconnected with the legal sources, let alone an exceptionally absolute one, is incorrect.
The district court's finding that the applicant had not put forward any evidence in support of his
plea of lack of competence which, objectively speaking, would give rise to a reasonable doubt as tothe impartiality of District Judge Lepistö in the case is also incorrect. The use of the word
'denialism', together with the deliberate application of the law and the dismissal of the action
without issuing a summons without sufficient reason, gave rise to objectively well-founded doubts
as to Mr Lepistö's impartiality in other cases criticising the corona measures.

14

Refusal to hear the witness Sanna MarinWe demanded an oral hearing in the district court of Sanna Marin, who was Prime Minister at thetime the interest rate passport legislation was drafted, on the subject of "what the Government has
based its view of the necessity of interest rate passport legislation on and how the Government hasmonitored the necessity of regulating interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of
fundamental rights".
The district court refused to hear Marin as a witness in the case, justifying its decision on 27 February
2024, among other things, as follows:
The district court considers that the case involves constitutional and procedural questionsof law. The views or opinions of an individual politician, albeit a person who was Prime
Minister at the time the legislation in question was enacted, are irrelevant when
considering such questions of law.
Frankly, we don't even understand what the district court means by this. There are undoubtedly atleast constitutional issues involved. We also agree with the district court that Mr Marin's personalviews or opinions as Prime Minister are irrelevant when considering the legal issues involved - thenecessity of the interest rate passport legislation and the fulfilment of the Government's duty tomonitor it. Instead, what is relevant are the concrete actions that the Government did or did not takeunder the leadership of Prime Minister Marin, and it is Sanna Marin, who was in charge of theGovernment, who is best placed to speak on these matters. In particular, since the defendants havenot adduced any evidence to shed light on these legal issues, there is no basis in law for refusing tohear Ms Marin, and thus the hearing of Ms Marin would have been essential to the success of theapplicant's action.
According to the view expressed in the case law, the court should apply the limitation provision in
OC 17:8 with a certain degree of caution and target limitation decisions to clear-cut cases. It isdifficult for a judge to limit the number of witnesses against the will of the party, because the judge
cannot draw conclusions about the credibility of the witnesses in advance, unless there are clearly
too many witnesses (Vuorenpää et al. 2021, Prosessioikeus, Alma Talent 2021 p. 609; see also HE
46/2014 p. 56 and LaVM 19/2014 p. 8).
According to the preamble to OC 17:8, before the court proceeds to reject evidence under thissection, it would normally be justified to discuss the extent of the evidence with the parties. As amatter of priority, agreement should be sought, where possible, so that the parties voluntarily

15

would dispense with unnecessary or otherwise objectionable evidence (HE 46/2014 vp p. 57; see also
Rautio et al, Todistelu: Kommentarari 17 peatükkun oikeudenkäymiskaari, Edita lakitieto 2020 p.
85).
However, in the present case, the district court did not even attempt to discuss with the parties thenecessity or otherwise of hearing Marin, but only unilaterally and without any practicaljustification stated that his hearing would not be relevant to the case.
It may even be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights if the decision to restrict
evidence is not properly justified (e.g. Suominen v. Finland 1.7.2003; see also Rautio et al. 2020 p.
85).
The district court has thus apparently misinterpreted our evidence in relation to the Marin hearing;
we did not find any answer to the question of our evidence as to how the government had
monitored the necessity of the regulation of interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of
fundamental rights. Thus, there was no legal basis for refusing to hear Mr Marin.
The district court further justified its refusal to hear Marin as follows:
According to Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the court must
exclude evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary.
The hearing of the witness Sanna Marin is not relevant in this case, so it is unnecessary
to hear her in this case. The Court must therefore refuse to hear her in this case.
In addition, the District Court stated in its decision of 28 March regarding the hearing of Sanna
Marini and Satu Koskela that case law has consistently refused to hear ministers and heads ofdepartment of ministries as witnesses in similar or similar cases.
However, the district court did not make any further reference to such established case law, nor did
it give any reasoning as to why the Marin hearing would not be relevant in this case. The parties
are therefore unable to assess the legal reasoning on which that case law is based. The decision istherefore not sufficiently reasoned in the manner required by the case-law: according to KHO
2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must be consideredfrom the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned to obtain a reasoned decisionand to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision on the refusal to hear Marin is noteffectively protected, as the district court gave virtually no concrete reasons for the refusal; more
precisely, the district court did not provide any concrete reasons for the fact that

16

why Marin's hearing would not be relevant to the issue we have raised. The district court only
responded to the evidence it had invented for which he would have been heard in court: his perception
or opinion on the matter. However, as we have already stated, Mr. Marin's perceptions and views are,in our view, irrelevant to the case.
In fact, the district court did not even give any reasons for refusing to hear Marin. For this reason
alone, the refusal was unlawful.

Refusal to hear the witness Satu Koskela
We demanded to hear oral evidence from Satu Koskela, Head of Department of the Ministry ofSocial Affairs and Health at the time of the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation, on
the issue of "what kind of medical research or legal assessment was the basis for the guidance
given by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to the Regional State Administrative Agencies".
The District Court refused to hear Koskela as a witness in the case, justifying its decision on 27
February 2024, among other things, as follows:Moreover, the views or opinions of the official who participated in the preparation of
the provision in question are, according to the district court, irrelevant when
considering questions of law such as those referred to above. Moreover, according to
the district court, the evidence in question is always presented in written form in thelegislative project in the form of a draft government bill and its preparatory documents,
so that the evidence must be replaced by documentary evidence as provided for in
Articles 3 to 4 of that provision.
... According to Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the court must
exclude evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary.
... The hearing of witness Satu Koskela is irrelevant in this case and the evidence
must be replaced by documentary evidence, so the hearing of the witness is
unnecessary in this case. The court must therefore refuse to hear her in this case.
In Koskela's case, our evidence was based on what kind of medical research or legal assessment the
STM's guidance to the regional administrative agencies was based on. We agree with the district
court that, like Marin, Koskela's personal views or opinions are irrelevant in considering the legal
issues involved. However, the issue on which we would have liked to have heard Koskela (theSTM's direction to the regional administrative agencies) was not presented in any written material
at any stage of the litigation or its preparation; the district court's reference to "such evidence in thelegislative project, always in the government bill and its preparatory documents" is not

17

has nothing to do with the administrative guidance given by the STM to the regional administrative
agencies, but only with the preparation of legislation.
Thus, Koskela's hearing could not be replaced by substantially less costly or time-consuming andsubstantially more reliable evidence, and there was no legal basis for refusing to hear Koskela. In
any event, the above-mentioned statement in the case law literature that the court should apply thelimitation rule in OC 17:8 with a certain degree of caution and only target limitation decisions toclear-cut cases applies.
In addition, the District Court stated in its decision of 28 March regarding the hearing of Sanna
Marini and Satu Koskela that case law has consistently refused to hear ministers and heads ofdepartment of ministries as witnesses in similar or similar cases.
However, the district court did not make any further reference to such established case law, nor did
it in any way explain why the Koskela hearing was irrelevant in this case. The parties are therefore
not in a position to assess the legal reasoning on which that case law is based. The decision istherefore not sufficiently reasoned in the manner required by the case-law: according to KHO
2019:110, the adequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must be consideredfrom the point of view of whether the right of the party concerned to obtain a reasoned decisionand to appeal against it can be effectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision on the refusal to hear Koskela
is not effectively safeguarded, as the district court gave practically no concrete reasons for therefusal; more precisely, the district court did not provide any concrete reasons why the hearing of
Koskela would not be relevant in the case in relation to the evidence we have submitted.
In fact, the district court did not even give any reasons for refusing to hear Koskela. For this reason
alone, the refusal was unlawful.

Oral hearing of legal expert Janne Salminen
The State presented its legal expert Janne Salmi for a written and oral hearing in the proceedings,
in addition to giving a written expert opinion for the trial. However, according to establishedFinnish case-law, legal experts are not heard orally in court proceedings. Even the defendant, theFinnish State itself, through its agent, stated the following in its reply of 31 August 2022 to theDistrict Court:

18

117. The (oral) hearing of legal experts is not part of the Finnish procedure. The key principle
is that the court knows the law (jura novit curia). The parties (typically through theiragents/attorneys) can of course present their legal arguments in their pleadings, and inparticular in the final report, and may refer to and present legal sources and expert legal
opinions to the court if they wish.
We agree with the view expressed in the State's 31.8.2022 reply that legal experts should not, inprinciple, be heard orally as experts in Finnish court proceedings. We therefore wonder why the State,in complete contradiction to its earlier statement, has nevertheless summoned Salminen to be heardorally, and why the District Court has accepted this.
For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the district court should have refused
Salminen's oral hearing under Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, as it can be
replaced by substantially less costly or time-consuming and substantially more reliable evidence(Salminen's written expert testimony), and as his oral hearing is unnecessary in any event from thepoint of view of the prevailing Finnish judicial culture. That view was confirmed during the oral
hearing of Mr Salminen at the main hearing, since he did not say anything orally at the main
hearing that had not already been read in his written expert report; rather, he appeared to be merely
reading out extracts from his written report.
The district court should have taken into account the above-mentioned unnecessary oral hearing ofSalminen as a matter of course, especially since it refused to hear the applicant's main witnesses,
Sanna Marini and Satu Koskela. The mere equality of the parties before the law and the adversarial
principle require that the district court should have taken the initiative to consider suchfundamental issues of procedural management properly and with respect for the rights of theparties.

Oral hearing of Hanna Nohynek as an expert
The State obtained a written expert report from Hanna Nohynek, the Chief Medical Officer of the
THL, and also presented her orally to the district court as an expert, which the district court accepted.
In our view, however, Hanna Nohynek could not have been heard as an expert in court, as she wasinvolved in the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation

19

and, when it came into force, as Chief Medical Officer of the National Institute for Health andWelfare, repeatedly making strong public statements on coronary vaccines and the coronary
passport. Moreover, as the State has stated in its response to our request for editing, "the State hasrelied on the THL throughout the coronary passport legislation, of which the THL has issued
numerous statements on the matter that are available from public sources" (see, for example,
summary of 6 November 2023, p. 43). Since the Government has always relied on the THL in the
preparation of the interest rate passport legislation, it is obvious that Nohynek has also been
involved in the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation. For these reasons, Mr Nohynek's
involvement in the case is such that his impartiality is compromised. For the same reasons, in ourview, Mr Nohynek cannot act as an expert for the Finnish State, either in writing or orally. He
should therefore have been heard expressly as a witness in the case.
Thus, the written expert opinion given by Nohynek should also have been disregarded.
In its decision of 27 February 2024, the district court stated the following in its decision on the
hearing of Nohynek as an expert:
The district court finds that the ... Noheneki's status is not covered by Chapter 17,
Section 35 of the Code of Judicial Procedure§in the sense of Article 5(1), that they are so related to the case or the party
concerned that their impartiality would be compromised or that there is any otherobjective reason to believe that their impartiality would be compromised.
The matters relied on by the applicant concern the normal assessment of the evidence
to be taken into account in expert reports. Thus, they may be heard as experts or, in
the absence of a written expert report or in the opinion of the appointing party,
alternatively as witnesses.
However, the district court does not give any reasons for this view. The decision is therefore notsufficiently reasoned in the way required by the case-law: according to KHO 2019:110, the adequacyof the reasons given for an administrative decision must be considered from the point of view ofwhether the right of the party concerned to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can beeffectively safeguarded.
Now, the plaintiff's right to appeal or to obtain a reasoned decision to hear Nohynek as an expert is
not effectively protected, as the district court did not provide any concrete reasons for its decision.
For this reason alone, the decision is unlawful.
In addition, it is in our view impossible in the eyes of the law for the same person to be heard in court
as both an expert (state witness) and a witness at the same time.

20(in the plaintiff's hearing). However, this is what happened at the trial. This is a question which, in
our view, deserves a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal.

Legislative material in the form of written evidence
The State and Fazer submitted as written evidence the legislative documents V1 and V6, i.e.
Government Bill 131/2021 vp and the opinion of the Constitutional Committee PeVL 35/2021 vp.
In our view, however, they cannot be written evidence to be examined during the evidence phaseof the main hearing, as they are legislative documents and part of the legislation, which the court
must know ex officio. This is a question which, in our view, deserves a preliminary ruling from the
Court of Appeal.

Ignoring and ignoring the screen
The district court completely ignored, among other things, the testimony of the plaintiff's witness
Matti Muukkonen and the legal analysis of the equal treatment approach of the contested interest
rate passport legislation. The District Court merely stated, in the exact wording used by the State's
lawyer in the main hearing, that "Muukkonen makes no mention of the right to life and health,which has been the main justification for the interest rate passport legislation by the State and thePeVK." However, Muukkonen's article - like Vauhkala's complaint - was not a comprehensive
critique of the fundamental rights analysis of the interest rate passport legislation, but primarily acritique of the equality analysis of the interest rate passport legislation. In any case, even if
Muukkonen had mentioned something about the right to life and health in his article, this would
not have refuted the main jurisprudential finding of Muukkonen's article, which was completely
ignored by the district court - from the perspective of the fundamental rights system, it would havebeen a less intrusive interference with the rights of the unvaccinated (including the plaintiff) if they
had been offered free testing (Muukkonen article p. 13), and therefore the interest rate passportlegislation did not meet the proportionality requirement of the fundamental rights restrictions.

Grounds for an alternative claim:

The district court ignored Article 106 of the Constitution

21

The decision of the Helsinki District Court proceeds in such a way that, first, the District Court
effectively ignores Vauhkala's main grounds for his action and, second, declares that the District
Court is not competent to assess the constitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation. In sodoing, the district court effectively ignores the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 106 of theConstitution to assess the constitutionality of the interest-rate passport legislation and its
implementation in the present case.
The Helsinki District Court has completely ignored section 106 of the Constitution, stating that the
court cannot assess the constitutionality of the Parliament Act because the assessment has alreadybeen made by the Constitutional Committee.
The applicant's main plea in law is that the State's interest rate passport legislation has led to theabrogation of his fundamental and human rights and that the interest rate passport legislation has
been unconstitutional. According to Article 106 of the Constitution, "[W]here the application of aprovision of law in a case before the court would be manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution,
the court shall give precedence to the provision of the Constitution."
In its judgment, the district court states that "in the present case, where the Constitutional
Committee has assessed the constitutionality of the interest passport legislation, i.e. Section 58i of
the Communicable Diseases Act, and thus held that the Act can be enacted by ordinary legislative
procedure, the district court does not in principle have jurisdiction to assess its alleged
unconstitutionality. The constitutionality of the provision has been assessed in the proceedings
before the Constitutional Committee, and neither the Constitutional Committee nor any
constitutional expert consulted in the proceedings before the Constitutional Committee has
expressed the opinion that the provision is unconstitutional'.
However, the district court also states that "the constitutional review practice has taken as a starting
point that the priority provision of Article 106 PL can only be applied in situations of statutory
interpretation that have not been subject to review by the Constitutional Committee".
In the present case, the Constitutional Committee has left a pre-condition on how the government
should deal with the coronary passport legislation in the light of evolving medical knowledge.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Committee has not assessed the coronary passport legislation in
relation to Article 124 of the Constitution, on which we will provide legal assessment and evidence
later.
As stated in the judgment of the District Court, "the applicant has argued that the objective ofpreventing the spread of the disease, which was the basis of the interest rate passport legislation, was
not based on up-to-date scientific knowledge, even though the Constitutional Committee had on
several occasions stressed the obligation of the Government to closely monitor the need to maintainthe regulation on interest rate restrictions and any problems that might arise in its application".

22

All the expert opinions submitted to the Constitutional Committee concluded that the interest
rate passport legislation was proportionate and necessary in the light of the medical andepidemiological data explicitly presented. The Constitutional Committee, for its part, statedthat "[w]hile the proposal places individuals in a different position, the proposed regulation
cannot bein the view of the Constitutional Committee, in the light of the medical grounds on which it isbased, arbitrary". With regard to written exhibit 8 submitted by the applicant in the district court,
it is noted that the Equal Opportunities Commissioner, Mr Stenman, stated that the use of theinterest rate passport was, according to Mr Stenman, acceptable if it could alleviate the medical
condition.
The pre-condition for coronary passport legislation has therefore been clear: coronary passportlegislation has been proportionate and necessary only and only in the light of the medical evidence
presented. The logical legal conclusion is that if medical knowledge changes, the legislation and its
implementation must change. This is a matter of legal importance in the light of the generalconditions of limitation of fundamental rights. According to the doctrine of the limitation of
fundamental rights, fundamental rights can only be limited by a lower level of regulation than theConstitution under certain well-defined conditions. These conditions include, inter alia, that the
grounds for the restriction must be based on an Act of Parliament, that the restriction must be
justifiable and required by an overriding social need, and that the restrictions must comply with theproportionality requirement. The proportionality requirement can be considered to consist of both arequirement of appropriateness and a requirement of necessity; the restriction must be suitable ingeneral to achieve the objective pursued and, in addition, the objective cannot be achieved bymeans less intrusive to fundamental rights.

The obligation for the Council of State to monitor the effects of regulation and take remedial action
The Government's obligation to monitor the effects of legislation is clear, for example, from thestatements of the Constitutional Committee on the interest rate passport legislation:
PeVL 35/2021 vp (regulation on the use of interest certificates) p. 4, point 10:(10) The Government must closely monitor the effects of the regulation and, if
necessary, take steps to correct it.
PeVL 26/2021 vp (border testing and inter alia TTL 16a-16f §) p. 4, point 9:(9) The Committee also stresses the need to closely monitor the impact of theregulation and to introduce legislative changes where necessary.

23

PeVL 14/2020 vp (temporary restriction on the operation of restaurants, TTL 58a §) p. 6:
The Constitutional Committee stresses that the proposed regulation must also be
limited in time to what is necessary. The Government must closely monitor the needfor the regulation to remain in force and any problems that may arise in its
application and take measures to remedy them.
In its opinion on the regulation of the use of a jewellery certificate, the Constitutional Committee has
made it a condition that the Government must closely monitor the effects of the regulation and, if
necessary, take steps to correct it. Thus, if medical knowledge had changed, the regulation (theintroduction of the interest certificate and the requirement to obtain it on the basis of decisions by theregional administrative offices) would have had to be amended. According to the applicant, theCouncil of State failed to do so, which resulted in his being required to obtain a passport at the Fazer
Kluuvi café at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021, unnecessarily and in breach of his fundamental rights.

Former Prime Minister Marini's testimony blocked by district court
Since the Constitutional Committee had held that the Government was obliged to monitor the effectsof the regulation and, if necessary, to take steps to correct it, and since the Prime Minister was
responsible for the functioning of the Government, the applicant had decided to call the former
Finnish Prime Minister, Sanna Marin, as a witness before the District Court. It was during her timethat the Government submitted the interest rate passport legislation to Parliament for approval. Ms
Marin's testimony was entitled: 'on what the Government has based its view of the necessity of theinterest rate passport legislation and how the Government has monitored the necessity of theregulation of interest rate restrictions in relation to the realisation of fundamental rights'.
A key aim of the coronary passport has been to prevent the transmission of coronary heart disease
from one person to another. On the basis of the written evidence submitted by the applicant to the
district court and the oral testimony of witnesses, in particular the statements of Hanna Nohynek, asenior physician at the THL, and Asko Järvinen, an infectious diseases physician at HUS, as wellas the statements of cardiologist Aseem Malhotra, it was known by the summer of 2021 that
coronary vaccines do not prevent the transmission of coronary heart disease from one person toanother in more than half of the cases. However, the key information has been that a vaccinatedperson could also have transmitted coronary heart disease to another vaccinated person. Thus, acoronary passport may have resulted in a vaccinated person who had access to a facility with agreen coronary passport being able to infect unsuspecting persons with coronary heart disease.

24

However, as described above, the district court refused to call Sanna Marin as a witness and the court
thus had no first-hand knowledge of how the Government implemented the precondition set by theConstitutional Committee for the adoption of the interest rate passport legislation.

Medical testimonies and medical examinations as written evidence
The witnesses Järvinen and Nohynek - Nohynek also acting as an expert - who were heard in the
district court have confirmed the views of the applicant that the coronary vaccines have notprevented the spread of covid 19. According to Järvinen, already in late 2020, when the firstcoronary vaccines were introduced, it was known to the medical community that they provided
only 50% protection against coronavirus infection and that the effect lasted 2-3 months. Each timea new variant of the virus appears, the efficacy and duration of action of the vaccines has
decreased. This has meant that by early December 2021, the effectiveness of the coronavirus
vaccines will have been significantly reduced.
According to Nohynek's testimony, by 6 months after the coronary vaccine was administered, theprotection it provided had dropped to zero.
At trial, the plaintiff has presented both Järvise and Nohynek with Exhibit 13, which was a study
conducted in the US state of Wisconsin in July 2021 on how the SARS-CoV-2 virus has spread
despite the vaccine at a time when the delta variant was in general use. The study measured similar
viral loads in people living in Wisconsin, USA, regardless of vaccination status, during a period
when the prevalence of the delta variant was high and rising.
The study data confirmed the notion that vaccinated individuals who contracted Delta variant
infection were able to spread the SARS-CoV-2 virus to other people in the same way as unvaccinatedindividuals. Both witnesses have admitted in court that they were familiar with the results of thestudy. According to Nohynek, the results of the study have been known for several months before
August 2021, when the study was published.
Both Nohynek and Järvinen have said that they have informed the Ministry and, through the
Ministry, the Government, that the coronary vaccines have not prevented the transmission ofcovid-19, even from one vaccinee to another. This information has been passed on since at least
the summer of 2021. Both say that the vaccines have only been effective in preventing hospital
admissions, and that this, according to Nohynek's statement, has only been the case for frail
people, such as the particularly elderly.
Both Nohynek and Järvinen have told us, when questioned, that a single vaccinee entering a roomwith a large group of vaccinated people has not posed a risk to those vaccinated who are25

have been protected from hospitalisation thanks to vaccination. In contrast, the entry of anunvaccinated person into a room with vaccinated persons was not significantly different from theentry of a person who had already been vaccinated, as both thethe vaccinated person may have carried a coronavirus load and may have passed it on to others who,
despite vaccination, may well have contracted coronavirus disease.
With regard to the applicant's written evidence, we highlight the following points, which we
consider to show that taking the corona mRNA vaccine, which was a condition for obtaining thecorona passport, has not fulfilled its intended function of preventing the spread of covid-19, evenfrom one vaccinee to another, nor has it protected against covid-19.
As for Exhibit 14, the survey data suggest that the disease has spread between fully vaccinatedindividuals. As regards evidence 15, it is concluded that individuals with a breakthrough infection
have similar viral loads to unvaccinated individuals and are able to effectively spread the infection
under domestic conditions, including to fully vaccinated contacts. With respect to Exhibit 16, manydecision makers assumed that vaccinated individuals could be excluded as a source of potential
infection. It appears to be grossly negligent to neglect the vaccinated population as a potential andessential source of infection when deciding on public health measures.
The above evidence also shows that by allowing vaccinated individuals into public places with acoronavirus passport, a situation has in fact arisen where individuals who, despite vaccination,
have contracted covid-19 have been able to and have spread coronavirus to other - unsuspecting fellow human beings. In order to respect equality and at the same time - as the government has
stated it wanted to do - to protect people from coronavirus, all customers who tried to enter the
Fazer Kluuvi café should have been tested for coronavirus.
As for documentary evidence 17, coronavirus vaccines have not prevented the disease, withcoronavirus infections being found in Israel (which was at the forefront of the distribution ofcoronavirus vaccines) in those who received a third dose of the vaccine. Documentary evidence 18
continues the trend in Israel, showing that almost all adults in Israel have been vaccinated, but that
coronavirus has only spread.
Vaccination has not prevented the spread of the disease, nor the transmission of the disease among
those vaccinated. Exhibit 19 states that a full vaccine series has resulted in coronavirus infections
among nurses in Ostrobothnia, Exhibit 20 states that in Pirkanmaa, an increase in vaccination
coverage correlates with an increase in the incidence of covid-19 disease, and Exhibit 21 states thatin Kainuu Central Hospital, coronavirus infections have occurred among patients and staff who
have received coronavirus vaccination. Thus, according to this evidence, the vaccine has notprevented the spread of coronavirus disease; on the contrary, there are indications that it has evenaccelerated the spread of the disease.

26

According to Exhibit 31, Nohynek, a senior physician at the THL, says that the studies found thatthe vaccine only slightly reduced forward transmission, and that the idea behind the solution of thebenefits of the vaccine was too black and white and did not even reflect the scientific knowledge at
the time. "The vaccine protected against infection, but only moderately and for a short time".
According to Exhibit 32, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) stated that the covid-19 vaccine
was not intended to prevent the transmission of disease from one person to another and that thevaccine was only intended to protect those vaccinated. The EMEA's statement indicates that even if
Vauhkala had taken the vaccine, it would not have protected anyone else from the disease.
Therefore, the refusal to allow Vauhkala access to the Fazer café has not protected anyone, has notprotected legal interests, but has instead infringed Vauhkala's right to equal treatment and the rightof access to the restaurant guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. According to
Exhibit 34, the national expert group on vaccination, KRAR, considered, according to THL Kontio,that since vaccination does not completely prevent infections, vaccination would not be the primarymeans of preventing infections. Further, according to Kontio, herd immunity could not be discussed
because it was not achieved.
The district court merely acknowledges the medical assessment of the case by stating the following:"The district court assessed the medical evidence presented as showing that theprevailing medical opinion was that the coronavirus vaccines were effective inprotecting the vaccinees from serious forms of disease and that the vaccines also
helped to prevent the spread of coronavirus. In addition, the coronavirus passportalso protected other fundamental rights of citizens and reduced the burden on thehealth care system in the face of a challenging disease situation. The purpose of thecoronavirus passport legislation was to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of
citizens' fundamental rights and to prevent the harm to society caused by apandemic."
In light of the evidence presented in the case, we find highly questionable the district court's assertion
that coronary vaccines would have helped prevent the spread of coronavirus in the fall and Decemberof 2021.
In any event, limiting fundamental rights solely on the basis of "helpful" utility does not satisfy the
proportionality and necessity requirement of the conditions for limiting fundamental rights; here, thedistrict court fails to make this proportionality assessment entirely.

Corona testing performed with an unreliable test
According to the State, Vauhkala was also not discriminated against on the grounds that he could
have obtained a negative PCR test result every 72 hours. However, this would have cost 100-200

27

times, which would have meant an extra €1000-2000 per month just to enable Vauhkala to enjoy
his rights under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. Of course, thiswould have been considered a violation of fundamental rights in itself.
However, the plaintiff also questions the effectiveness of PCR tests. On the basis of the expert
opinion of Astrid Stuckelberger, it must be concluded that the PCR tests used by the Finnish
authorities give 97 % false positive results. Consequently, restrictions of fundamental rights basedon PCR tests cannot fulfil the general conditions for restrictions of fundamental rights. It should
also be noted that the Constitutional Committee - despite relying on medical knowledge - has notassessed the conditions for the use of PCR tests, even though they have played a key role inassessing the incidence of coronary heart disease. It must be held that the Constitutional Committee
did not carry out an adequate assessment of the legislation on the coronary passport by failing toassess the possible unreliability of the PCR test. In practice, the spread and extent of Covid-19 has
been assessed solely on the basis of the results of PCR tests. It is to be feared that this form of
testing has resulted in a very high number of false positives, leading to unnecessary restrictions on
the fundamental and human rights of the persons concerned.
The Helsinki Court of Appeal should assess whether the coronary passport legislation isconstitutional in relation to the detection of covid-19 almost exclusively by PCR testing.
Stückelberger's expert testimony indicates that the PCR test results have not reliably predicted thehealth status or infectivity of the person being tested for coronavirus. A coronavirus passport could
be obtained with a negative coronavirus test result, in addition to the so-called green coronavirus
vaccination and coronavirus disease, even though the coronavirus test did not meet the expectationsof the coronavirus passport legislation.
It is undisputed that the infection by Covid-19 is established on the basis of the PCR test result andto this end the applicant has submitted a number of written proofs. It is clear from Mr
Stückelberger's statement that the PCR test is not a diagnostic tool and that in any event it cannot be
said with certainty whether a positive test indicates the presence of residual antibodies to the virus
or to an old infection in the sample. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
also stated in its guidelines for the use of PCR that "the detection of viral RNA does not necessarily
indicate the presence of an infectious virus or that 2019-nCoV is the cause of clinical symptoms".
These facts alone are sufficient to demonstrate that PCR test results, and hence corona statistics, areunreliable.

28

In the above statement, the State argues, in relation to a domestic sample study in the HUS region,that in that sample study positive PCR test results would have been achieved with relatively low Ct
values, which would make the test results reliable. However, our evidence 31 - the HUS diagnostic
centre's HUSLAB study document - shows that, according to the HUS diagnostic centre itself, the Ct
value does not allow reliable conclusions to be drawn about the viral load of the sampled person andthus his infectivity, and that there are large uncertainties in the clinical interpretation of the samples
in general. Because of this high uncertainty, PCR test results therefore do not reliably indicate
anything about a subject's morbidity or infectivity to coronavirus.
The high level of uncertainty in the PCR test results highlighted by the HUS diagnostic centre is
explained by the scientific facts presented in Stückelberger's statement. PCR technology canidentify the genetic material of a virus, but not the whole virus: although PCR technology is goodat correctly identifying the genetic material of a virus, it cannot detect whether it is from the wholevirus. Therefore, PCR cannot diagnose any viral infection and is not a valid test for detecting
infectivity.
COVID patients are infectious for 7-8 days, but an infected person can test positive for PCR even
if they are no longer sick or infectious. People with a history of COVID can have a positive PCR
test result for 80 days or more, even if they are no longer sick, infected or infectious. Patients
who are immune and have never had symptoms can test positive.
In his expert and witness testimony, THL Chief Medical Officer Nohynek has said that PCR tests arevery sensitive and do not give the full picture of infectivity. PCR test results can remain positive longafter the end of infectivity. A person may excrete traces of the virus but not necessarily be infectious.
In fact, in a statement to the Helsinki District Court, Mr Nohynek confirmed Mr Stückelberger's
statement.
The district court acknowledges the above evidence as follows (pp. 47 and 51 of the operative part of
the judgment):
The district court also notes that the interest rate vaccine was not the only condition
for obtaining the interest rate passport. If a person has not wanted/has not been able
to take a coronary vaccine, such a person has also been able to obtain a coronary
passport by obtaining a negative coronary test, or if the person had a coronary
disease within the last six months. If Mr Vauhkala did not want to take the coronary
vaccines because he considered it against his religious convictions to take thevaccines, he was not29forced to do so at any time. This must be taken into account when assessing thecompatibility of the interest rate passport legislation with Article 9 of the EIS,
explicitly from the perspective of the proportionality principle. And in any case, theinterest rate passport legislation was only in force for operators that do not provide a
so-called 'necessity service'. Thus, for example, pharmacies or grocery stores were
not required to have a passport, which is an important consideration when examining
whether the proportionality condition of the passport legislation is fulfilled.
The district court thus does not in any way consider the evidence presented in the case regarding
the reliability of the corona tests or the fact that the tests were paid for, but merely states that
Vauhkala would have had the opportunity to take the tests if he so wished. The district court thus
completely ignores and disregards the relevant evidence. This omission of factual reasoning alone
renders the judgment unlawful.

Interest rate passport legislation loses Constitutional Committee approval
In the applicant's view, the oral testimonies and the written evidence show that the Council of State
did not take medical information into account at the time when the interest rate passport legislation
was drafted, that distorted or at least outdated medical information on the benefits of vaccines wasmost probably communicated to the Constitutional Committee and that the interest rate passportlegislation could not have been based on up-to-date medical information.
By 10.12.2021 at the latest, the interest rate passport legislation did not meet the criteria for general
restrictions of fundamental rights, because the restriction, i.e. the requirement of an interest rate
passport as a condition for access to a catering establishment, was not suitable to achieve the statedobjective. That was because the condition for obtaining a coronary passport, namely the taking of acoronary vaccine, did not result in the coronary disease not spreading and the coronary vaccine
could only protect at most the person who had taken the coronary vaccine himself. If Mr Vauhkala
had taken the coronary vaccine and had obtained a green coronary pass which would have enabled
him to enter the Fazer Kluuvi café, the situation with regard to the transmission of coronary heartdisease would not have changed in any way for those who had already been in the café and who had
not yet been vaccinated.
for any new customers that may come to the site.
Thus, the Constitutional Committee cannot be considered to have assessed the constitutionality of
the interest rate passport legislation when the constitutionality of the legislation has changed in thelight of changing medical knowledge. The Government should have followed the evolution of
medical knowledge. This is not what the Council of State has done. Further, the Council of Stateshould have30

take corrective measures to the regulation, as the Constitutional Committee has requested. Since theGovernment has not taken corrective measures, the interest rate passport legislation has lost theconstitutional approval given to it by the Constitutional Committee.

Violations of Article 124 of the Constitution
The state's interest rate passport legislation has also been unconstitutional because it has enabled asignificant transfer of public power to a private company, in this case Fazer Restaurants Ltd. The
legislation has allowed a private company to decide for itself when to require a passport as acondition of entry to a restaurant.
Fazer Restaurants Ltd has demanded a coupon pass as a condition for access to its premises
throughout its opening hours, usually only from 5pm onwards in other restaurants. Article 124 of theConstitution"A public administrative task may be entrusted to a person other than a public authority only by
law or by virtue of law if it is necessary for the proper performance of the task and does notjeopardise fundamental rights, legal certainty or other requirements of good administration.
However, tasks involving the exercise of significant public authority may be entrusted only to a
public authority." Barring access to a restaurant for the whole day, as an exception to otherbusinesses in the same sector, involved a significant exercise of official authority, which can only
be entrusted to a public authority. The purpose of the Communicable Diseases Act is to prevent
communicable diseases and their spread and the harm they cause to people and society, not toregulate the opening hours of businesses. The closure of shops is aimed at preventing the spread ofcovid-19 and, while the closure of shops has an effect on the protection of the health of the
population, the closure of shops is not in line with the provisions of Article 18 of the Constitution.
§, the right to freedom of trade and industry cannot be transferred to a private undertaking, butsuch a task involving the exercise of significant public authority could only have been entrusted toa public authority.
The applicant further submits that the fact that an ordinary restaurant employee is entitled to checkthe interest rate passport through which the restaurant employee has access to Vauhkala's personal
health information also constitutes a significant exercise of official authority.
The obvious unconstitutionality of the interest rate passport legislation is evident from the factthat the legislation, namely Section 58i of the Communicable Diseases Act, has not been precise,but has left it to the private operator, in this case Fazer Ravintolat Oy, to choose whether or not
to infringe fundamental rights. The representatives of the Fazer group had the option of choosing
either to act in a non-discriminatory manner towards the applicant
which would have resulted in financial losses for Fazer, or discriminatory conduct towards the

30applicant. The defence of a breach of fundamental rights on the basis of financial loss is not inaccordance with the law.

31

According to Kostilainen, the defendant's CEO, "the material you refer to elsewhere (on thewebsite of the Regional Administrative Office) states that 'it is up to the catering business todetermine the times when it will introduce the interest rate pass'.
When the legislation is not precise, i.e. it allows a private company to decide whether or not toprevent an individual from entering its premises based on presumed health information at a certain
time of day, the legislation does not comply with the doctrine of restriction of fundamental rights.
As the defendant's CEO himself explains in his letter to the applicant, it has exercised the "right"
mentioned on the Regional Administrative Office's website to determine for itself the times atwhich the company has introduced the interest rate pass.
The district court stated the following in response to our arguments above concerning Article 124of the Constitution (p. 56 of the judgment):"The district court finds that this issue was also clarified in accordance withestablished practice when the coronet certificate legislation was introduced and that
there is no significant exercise of public authority when a cafeteria worker merely
checks whether a person has a coronet certificate or not."However, it is not clear from the district court's decision what this "established practice" is, and how
the case was resolved accordingly. Indeed, this particular question was not addressed in the
Parliamentary Papers (HE 131/2021 vp), apart from Mr Hidén's attempt to raise the issue in his
opinion. The district court thus simply ignores and disregards the applicant's legal arguments by'holding' that the case is not as the applicant claims, without giving any reasoning. The parties arethus unable to assess the legal reasoning on which the decision is based. The decision is therefore
not sufficiently reasoned in the way required by the case-law: according to KHO 2019:110, theadequacy of the reasons given for an administrative decision must be considered from the point ofview of whether the party's right to obtain a reasoned decision and to appeal against it can beeffectively safeguarded.

The importance of the matter is also reflected in the fact that the Constitutional Committee has nottaken any position on this issue in its opinions, which shows that this is a genuinely open issue on
which the Court should take a position on the basis of the Constitution, based on legislation, legal
principles and case law. In an ambiguous situation, and especially where the issue has not been
properly addressed at the drafting stage, the issue should be interpreted in favour of the applicant.

32

Preparation of interest rate passport legislation unconstitutional
Furthermore, the district court has not assessed in any way the apparent unconstitutionality in thecontext of the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation that, when the plaintiff requested
the State to provide the preparatory documents for the interest rate passport legislation, the State hasstated during the litigation process that it does not have such preparatory documents, but the State
has relied only on the statements made by the THL. This is contrary to the position taken by theConstitutional Committee, as the opinion of the Constitutional Committee PeVL 11/2016 vp - HE
13/2016 vp (in relation to the Government Bill to Parliament on the Communicable Diseases Act
and certain related Acts) states that, according to the general explanatory memorandum to theGovernment Bill, the basic draft of the Government Bill was prepared by a consultant
commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Legislative drafting is one of the maintasks of the ministries. It is clear that it cannot be outsourced. In practice, however, it has been heldthat this does not prevent external studies or expert advice from being obtained.
In the present case, however, it is undisputed that, according to the State's statement, thepreparation of the interest rate passport legislation was entirely based on the statements andpreparation of the THL, not the ministries. We ask the Helsinki Court of Appeal to investigate anddetermine whether the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation violated the view of theConstitutional Committee that the preparation of legislation is one of the most important tasks of theministries.
When the State relies in its evidence, inter alia, on the THL's weekly bulletins, it is clear that what
is at issue is not the opinions of an impartial expert body, but an organisation directly andobviously centrally involved in the preparation of the interest rate passport legislation, whosebulletins have supported the legislation prepared by the organisation. Consequently, the State's
evidence in this respect cannot be considered credible.

Application of Section 28 of the Non-Discrimination Act to the case
Vauhkala also considers that the Helsinki District Court did not assess the meaning of Section 28
of the Equality Act in the case.
When Vauhkala has provided sufficient grounds in the course of the proceedings for his claim that hehas been discriminated against by both Fazer and the State, it is for the respondents to prove that there
has been no breach of the prohibition, pursuant to Section 28 of the Equality Act.
However, the State has done everything in its power during the legal process to prevent the casefrom being resolved. Vauhkala, despite his representations, has not succeeded in getting the court
to prove33

representatives of the state, i.e. ex-Prime Minister Sanna Marini, and not STM department head
Koskela. Despite the request for a preliminary ruling, the State has not handed over the abovementioned preparatory documents for the coronavirus passport legislation, nor the contracts for the
supply of coronavirus mRNA vaccines in so far as they concerned the coronavirus vaccines
supplied to Finland. The importance of the supply contracts would have been to show whether thevaccines had been guaranteed by the manufacturer to work and whether the vaccines had beentested to ensure that they did work.

Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights
According to Vauhkala, the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of theEuropean Court of Human Rights apply in the case. The Helsinki District Court has held, with very
brief reasoning, that in the Vauhkala case there is no reason to consider that the State hascommitted a human rights violation in relation to Vauhkala.
The district court's view is based solely on the opinion of Salminen, who gave an expert opinion on
behalf of the State, that the jewellery certificate has been assessed in the opinions of theConstitutional Committee as meeting the requirements of admissibility and proportionality for
fundamental rights restrictions and further that "the assessment is in line with the requirements ofthe EIS for corresponding fundamental rights restrictions and that therefore the fundamental
rights restrictions do not violate the obligations of the EIS either". According to the district court's
statement, "Salminen has stated that it is well established that the bills under review by theConstitutional Committee are also subject to a similar test of compatibility with human rights
conventions, and that this has been held to be the correct interpretation of the EIS". In its
judgment, the District Court further relies on Salminen, stating that "Salminen has also stated that,in addition to the factors mentioned in the PeVL's opinion, and in view of the very short time-limits
for the legislation to come into force, he considered it to be clear that the regulation of the coronet
certificate fulfilled the proportionality requirements of legislation restricting a fundamental right."
Further, in the judgment, the district court states that "the district court will assess the relevance ofthe report of the plaintiff's witness Muukkonen below, but already states here that Muukkonen has
not provided any relevant information in this regard that would affect this assessment."
For the reasons set out below, Vauhkala's case has a very similar relationship to the ECHR, and the
district court's disregard of the ECHR on the basis of Salminen's statement alone also disregards
Vauhkala's right to a fair trial. In this regard, we find that the warrant for further proceedings

34

is essential to ensure that Vauhkala's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights is respected.
As the district court refused to assess the case for violations of the ECHR and relied in its
reasoning only on Salminen's statement, we recall that already at the beginning of the application
for leave to continue the proceedings we stated that the oral hearing of the legal expert appointed
by the defendant, Janne Salminen, at the main hearing was contrary to the prevailing case-law for
the following reasons:According to established Finnish case law, legal experts are not heard orally in court proceedings.
Even the Finnish State itself, through its agent, stated the following in its reply to the District Court
on 31 August 2022:
117. The (oral) hearing of legal experts does not form part of the Finnish procedure.
The key principle is that the court knows the law (jura novit curia). The parties(typically through their agents/attorneys) can of course present their legal argumentsin their pleadings, and in particular in the final report, and may refer to and present
legal sources and expert legal opinions to the court if they wish.
We agree with the view expressed in the State's 31.8.2022 reply that legal experts should not, inprinciple, be heard orally as experts in Finnish court proceedings. We therefore wonder why the State,in complete contradiction to its earlier statement, has nevertheless summoned Salminen to be heardorally, and why the District Court has accepted this.
For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the district court should have refused
Salminen's oral hearing under Chapter 17, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, as it can be
replaced by substantially less costly or time-consuming and substantially more reliable evidence(Salminen's written expert testimony), and as his oral hearing is unnecessary in any event from thepoint of view of the prevailing Finnish judicial culture. That view was confirmed during the oral
hearing of Mr Salminen at the main hearing, since he did not say anything orally at the main
hearing that had not already been read in his written expert report; rather, he appeared to be merely
reading out extracts from his written report.
The district court should have taken into account the above-mentioned unnecessary oral hearing ofSalminen as a matter of course, in particular because it refused to hear the applicant's main witnesses,
Sanna

35

Marin and Satu Koskela, hearings. The mere equality of the parties before the law and theadversarial principle require that the district court should have taken the initiative to consider suchfundamental issues of procedural management properly and with respect for the rights of theparties.
Muukkonen is a doctor of law by training and, as he told the district court, he has offered to write anassessment of the implementation of unvaccinated fundamental rights in relation to the interest rate
passport legislation for the Constitutional Committee, an offer that the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health and the Ministry of Education and Culture have not taken up. He is also the author of the only
peer-reviewed legal article on the passport and fundamental rights, which is included in the written
evidence submitted to the Vauhkala District Court.

Ignoring Muukkonen's opinion without a valid reason
The district court has effectively completely ignored the significance of Muukkonen's testimony andthe peer-reviewed legal article he wrote, on the sole basis that Muukkonen would not have assessed
the right to life in any way. However, there are many fundamental rights, and no single one of themcan be elevated to a level of importance vastly superior to others. Muukkonen has also pointed thisout in his witness statement to the district court, stating that fundamental rights form a coherent
whole, from which it is not possible to separate the pieces and place them in an unequal position.
According to him, fundamental rights are assessed on a case-by-case basis. For example, according to
the WHO definition, health is not only the absence of disease-causing elements, such as a virus, but isabove all the totality of a meaningful life. If a person is unable to live a full life, for example becauseof forced medical interventions and restrictions, this in fact and according to research shortens lifeand negatively affects the quality of life.
In any case, even if Muukkonen had mentioned something about the right to life and health in his
article, it would not have refuted the main legal observation of Muukkonen's article, which wascompletely ignored by the district court - from the perspective of the fundamental rights system, it
would have been a less intrusive interference with the rights of the unvaccinated (including theplaintiff) if they had been offered free testing (Muukkonen's article p. 13), and therefore the interest
rate passport legislation did not meet the proportionality requirement of the fundamental rights
restrictions.

Vauhkala's own view has been left aside

36

According to Vauhkala, the central problem with the district court's judgment in relation to the fairtrial process is that his own views are in practice completely omitted from the judgment. The
district court has acknowledged that Vauhkala has religious beliefs, but nothing else is actuallyapparent from what Vauhkala himself has said about this in court. However, also according to thecase-law of the Supreme Court (KKO:2016:20), the assessment of the offence experienced by anindividual is based on the feeling of offence experienced by the individual himself, and this cannot
be brought out except by hearing the individual and assessing his account. In practice, the district
court has not done this at all. The case is also important in the sense that the district court has,throughout the judgment, referred to the case law of the Supreme Court in relation to the conditions
for the State to be liable for damages for human rights violations. These are: (i) the violation ofhuman rights has occurred; (ii) the violation can be considered sufficiently serious; (iii) the
violation has caused causal damage.
The severity of the injury and the causal damage should therefore be assessed on the basis of the
injury and the depth of the injury experienced by Vauhkala himself.
Vauhkala has actively sought to find outa) whether he or she belongs to a coronary heart disease risk group to which he or she does notbelongb) what the consequences of taking a coronary vaccine might be for him or her. Through her
own research, she has concluded that her risk of becoming seriously ill from the coronary
was minimal, and she did not want to take the risk that she, in turn, could suffer serious
health damage from the vaccine.
Vauhkala has told the court that his religious beliefs have been at odds with the fact that a potentiallyharmful vaccine could harm the body of Christ, which is made up of believers together. Vauhkalaalso knew that the coronary vaccine and the medical procedure in general were voluntary and that
refusal of a voluntary procedure should not lead to the annulment of fundamental rights.
At Fazer Kluuvi café, Vauhkala has been prevented from entering the café after a short argument
because he did not have his interest rate pass. Mr Vauhkala said that customers at the Fazer café
had been watching the discussion between him and the employees. Mr Vauhkala felt that he did
not belong and that he was an inferior citizen. During the hearing, he said that he had also been
prevented from accessing services on several occasions at a later stage. Mr Vauhkala had been
subjected to numerous public attacks on the group of people he considered to be the mostvulnerable.

37

represent people who have deliberately - either for ideological or religious or other reasons - refusedcoronary vaccines. That group of people considered that they had the right to bodily integrity andthe right to refuse medical interventions. According to Vauhkala, those attacks included the April
2021 writing by Ilta-Sanomie journalist Manninen about unvaccinated people as kulkus and theOctober 2021 declaration by Bishop Laajasalo that the unvaccinated are responsible for the death oftheir fellow human beings. In November, Lasse Lehtonen had called for marketing and propaganda
to force people to get coronary vaccinations. Vauhkala saw this action by public figures anddecision-makers as demonising and stigmatising her.
Vauhkala told the hearing that public pressure and repeated refusals to serve him made him feel likehe was living in an open prison, where he would only be allowed to go to the convenience store, but
not much else. He has felt that he was put in this situation through no fault of his own. He said that hehad started planning to move away from Helsinki to find a place where he would not feel he wasliving in open prison conditions. what was particularly painful for Vauhkala was that he did not know
how long this situation would last and he even formed an association to fight for the constitutionalrights of people like him.
Vauhkala has made the decision not to have coronary heart transplants out of an informed inquiry
and religious conviction. He has told the hearing that he had heard in the spring of 2021 about Jari,
who had been blinded in one eye due to a Pfizer coronary vaccination and had also received medical
compensation for this. Vauhkala had later met this Jari. He had earlier seen a video statement by
Kary Mullis, the developer of the PCR test, in which Mullis said that the test had not been developed
to detect the disease. Vauhkala knew that international pharmaceutical companies had been
repeatedly fined billions of dollars for dishonest practices in the marketing of medicines.
As he continues to investigate the corona issue, he has uncovered a wealth of other information
about how coronary vaccines have harmed people. He has also heard from a client who came to his
firm's office about a young person whose health had been completely ruined by a so-called "pigshot". In his research, he has discovered that coronary vaccines have been recommended for highrisk groups, which Vauhkala, as an active, healthy person, does not belong to.
Vauhkala went on to say that he had been a Christian since 1994. His faith includes the view that
believers are the body of Christ on earth and that this temple of God must be cared for. As Mr
Vauhkala was aware of the above-mentioned disadvantages caused by the coronary vaccines andthe fact that, in good health and good condition, he could not be given the coronary

38

risk, he has decided not to take the vaccines. He has also known that by taking the coronary
vaccine he could not protect others, but that people at risk had to protect themselves by taking thecoronary vaccine themselves.
Vauhkala has belonged to two different groups whose rights have been violated by the statethrough the constitutional and ECHR interest rate passport legislation and its practicalimplementation. On the one hand, Mr Vauhkala was a healthy individual who, for ideologicalreasons, did not wish to take the corona mRNA vaccine and, on the other hand, his religious
convictions prohibited him from taking the vaccine, which he considered, on the basis of his own
knowledge, based, inter alia, on information from acquaintances and knowledge acquired during
his studies, could damage his body, which, on the basis of his faith, is part of the body of Christ,
which believers must take the best possible care of. The ideological view of those who do nothave a coronary vaccination is also protected by law, since Article 6 of the Patients' Act, Article 5of the Oviedo Convention and point IV of the Code of Medical Ethics guarantee that no one is
obliged to consent to a medical procedure against his or her will.

The case law of the ECtHR in relation to national law
The European Court of Human Rights is above the Finnish court system in human rights matters,
and Finnish courts must follow the case law of the ECtHR in their own decisions. In the District
Court's view, Salminen's statement that the Constitutional Committee has already assessed thecompatibility of the interest rate passport legislation with the ECHR is sufficient to ensure that thestate has complied with the ECHR in the Vauhkala case. This is not supported by the case law of theEuropean Court of Human Rights, as it is the task of the ECtHR to assess the compliance of statesthat have signed up to the EIS with the ECHR. The case law of the ECtHR has shown that evennational legislation has directly allowed for a violation of an individual's human rights. In Norris v.
Ireland (1988), the ECtHR held that Irish legislation has allowed for a persistent interference with anapplicant's right to respect for his private life, which the Court has held to be a violation of the
ECHR.
The European Court of Human Rights case I.B. v. Greece (2013) is directly linked to the Vauhkalacase and serves as a precedent for the case. The case of I.B. v. Greece concerned the dismissal of an
HIV-positive complainant shortly after diagnosis. The appellant's claims for compensation

39

were partially successful in the lower courts, but the country's highest court rejected the claims on
narrow grounds and using a patently false premise about the contagious nature of the disease.
According to the ECtHR, the procedure amounted to discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR in
relation to the protection of private life guaranteed by Article 8. The present case is very similar to
the ECtHR case, in that the introduction of the interest rate passport was also based on a manifestly
false premise about the infectiousness of covid-19: at the time of the dismissal in the ECtHR case, it
was widely known that HIV:HIV carrier does not transmit HIV in normal human-to-human contact,and similarly it was already widely known at the time of the preparation of the coronavirus
legislation that non-coronavirus persons do not transmit SARS-CoV-2 in normal human-to-humancontact in a different way from coronavirus persons.
The case law of the ECtHR attaches considerable importance to the resolutions of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. PACE Resolution 2361 (2021): in paragraph 7.3.2, the Assembly
requires its Member States, including the European Parliament, to. In Article 7.3.1, the PACE statesthat no one should be discriminated against on the grounds of non-vaccination, whether this is due topotential health risks or simply to a lack of willingness to be vaccinated. For this reason, too, nonvaccination - and indirectly non-immunisation - must be seen in the light of Articles 14 and 14 of theECHR.
as "other status-based grounds" within the meaning of the 12th Additional Protocol. Of particularnote is paragraph 13.3.8 of Resolution 2383 (2021) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Councilof Europe, which states that, in order to avoid discrimination in the use of the passport, due
attention should be paid to situations where people refuse to be vaccinated for reasons of personal
opinion or belief, and that, in particular for this group of people, Member States should ensure thatany passport system would not in practice lead to pressure or make compulsory the use of thepassport.
The District Court correctly states that the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe are not directly legally binding, but in fact the European Court of Human Rights
gives them considerable importance in its case law, and since Finnish courts should also apply thecase law of the ECtHR in their judgments, the Helsinki District Court should have done the same.
The following extract from the grounds of the judgment is particularly noteworthy (p. 52):
The district court notes, however, that both of the sections of the PACE Resolution
cited by the plaintiff (7.3.1 and 7.3.2) mention that while ensuring that no one ispressured or discriminated against for not being vaccinated, it is neverthelessnecessary to40also ensure high vaccination coverage. The statements also show that the
epidemiological situation and estimates within a country are best assessed by local
authorities. Furthermore, the PACE resolution is not legally binding on an EU
Member State.
The district court considers that the applicant has also failed to show that the PACE
Decision was breached by the State in this case.
The applicant has already shown that the interest rate passport legislation was oppressive and/or
discriminatory towards non-interest rate borrowers. The PACE resolution states that in addition toensuring that no one is pressured or discriminated against for not being vaccinated, high vaccination
coverage must be ensured. In other words, vaccination coverage should not have been ensured bypressuring or discriminating against the unvaccinated, as was done in Finland. In addition, theobjective of increasing vaccination coverage was not formally raised in Finland at any stage of the
preparation of the interest rate passport law. Despite this, however, the district court ultimately held,
contrary to the logical conclusion of its reasoning, that the applicant had not shown that theresolution had been breached by the State. The district court's reasoning does not follow the rules oflogical syllogism, and is thus internally inconsistent with itself.

The ECtHR case of Vavricka and others v. Czech Republic
The State argued that the case of Vavricka v. Czech Republic (2021) would have been applicable asa preliminary ruling also in the present case. The case concerned compulsory polio vaccinations
for children and the discretionary power of the State to impose such obligations on its
administrative subjects. However, the applicant gave full and detailed reasons in the Helsinki
District Court why that case was inapplicable to the case as a matter of law in any respect:
1) The case concerned traditional vaccines that had been in use for decades and whose safety
profile and potential short- and long-term adverse effects had become very clear to thescientific community and the public (see, for example, paragraph 290 of the Vavricka
judgment: 'The vaccination duty concerns nine diseases against which vaccination isconsidered effective and safe by the scientific community'). In contrast, most of thecoronavirus vaccines used in Finland were new-technology mRNA vaccines that had neverbeen used in humans before the coronavirus era, and whose mechanism of action iscompletely different from that of conventional vaccines, as our Exhibits 23-26 show.
Moreover, there was no consensus in the scientific community on the safety and efficacy ofmRNA vaccines.

412) The Vavricka case was largely based on the fact that sufficiently high vaccination coverage(polio and other traditional vaccines) creates a so-called "herd protection" or "herdimmunity" effect, which is in the public interest of the Member States and may justify some
restriction of the privacy of individual citizens (cf. See paragraph 276 of the ECtHR
judgment, and e.g. the opinion of the Czech State General Health Authority in paragraph
153 of the Vavřička judgment; the French intervention, in particular paragraphs 213 and215, and the Polish intervention, in particular paragraph 223). However, as is clear from ourevidence, the coronary vaccines did not cause such a herd immunity effect, i.e. the coronary
vaccines did not prevent the spread of the disease, or even the contracting of the disease,and this was already known in the autumn of 2021 (see, for example, the applicant's written
Exhibit 34, in which Mia Kontio, a leading expert at the THL, stated in November 2021
that there could be no question of herd immunity in the case of coronary vaccines).
3) A key finding of the ECtHR was also that Czech law allowed for a derogation from thevaccination requirement without the threat of sanction if the party concerned presented a"permanent contraindication" to vaccinating his child (paragraph 291 of the judgment, "apermanent contraindication to vaccination"). A contraindication is a reason or obstacle tothe use of a medicine or other treatment (source: https://www.terveyskirjasto.fi/ltt03681). In
Finland, in order to avoid the strong pressure to vaccinate imposed by the coronavirus
passport, the applicant Vauhkala had practically no alternative but to contract coronavirus
disease or to pay between €100 and €200 every three days.
4) The applicant further submitted that the Vavřička case's legal ruling that compulsory
vaccination interferes with the right under Article 8(1) ECHR must be interpreted, inparticular in the light of the aforementioned PACE resolution, as meaning that strong
political and social pressure, in particular to take mRNA vaccines previously unused inhumans, which were available under conditional marketing authorisations, also interfereswith the right under Article 8(1) ECHR.
The district court rebutted all of the above arguments in the Vavricka case as follows (judgment
pp. 47-48):
The District Court also considers that the case of Vavricka v Czech Republic, decided
by the ECtHR, leads to the conclusion, as interpreted by the respondent, that the State
has a wide discretion to protect the sustainability of health and health care at the
population level and42a strong right to protect and adopt appropriate measures to protect the life andhealth of persons and that it is proportionate to require those for whom vaccination
represents a remote health risk to accept this universal safeguard in the name ofsocial solidarity for the benefit of those who for health reasons are unable to obtain
vaccines.
The district court thus once again completely ignored and disregarded the arguments put forward by
the plaintiff; even the concept of social solidarity used by the district court was based on the herd
protection effect of traditional vaccines, which, according to Mia Kontio, a leading expert at the THL,
could not be mentioned in the case of coronary vaccines. In fact, the rest of the district court's
reasoning is a direct quotation from the State's statement of objections of 31 August 2023 (paragraph47, p. 16):Furthermore, the ECtHR stated that it cannot be considered disproportionate torequire those for whom vaccination represents a remote health risk to accept thisgenerally applicable safeguard in the name of social solidarity for the benefit ofthose who, for health reasons, are unable to obtain vaccines.
The district court thus completely ignores the extensive arguments put forward by the plaintiff, andmerely copies directly the defendant's old written statement (which was not even presented at themain hearing, and on which the judgment should therefore not even be based), which is not,however, applicable as a legal guide in the present case, since the coronary vaccinations were noteven capable of producing a herd protection effect, and could therefore not be demanded fromanyone "in the name of social solidarity". The reasoning of the district court therefore does not in
any way respond to the arguments put forward by the applicant and the judgment is, for that reason
alone, inadequately reasoned and therefore unlawful.

The position of healthy unvaccinated people in relation to the interest rate passport legislation has notbeen assessed at all
We ask the Helsinki Court of Appeal to assess to what extent the state should have guaranteed theright of healthy unvaccinated persons and persons who refused coronary vaccines on religious
grounds to the exercise of their fundamental and human rights.
Vauhkala called Matti Muukkonen, PhD, who has published the only peer-reviewed legal article on
the implementation of fundamental rights in the context of interest rate passport legislation, to testify
at the main hearing of the district court.
Muukkonen's legal article and his oral hearing considered the question of the circumstances in whicha restriction of fundamental rights should be considered a 'basket case'.

43

the restrictions associated with. According to Mr Muukkonen, the starting point should be thenormal situation, i.e. a situation where there are no restrictions, because if the starting point werethe existing factual situation, this would in practice mean accepting the idea that one could first
restrict fundamental rights on certain grounds and then impose new restrictions by comparing themwith the existing restrictions. However, the government had chosen to do otherwise, i.e. tocompare the situation created by the interest rate passport legislation with an already restrictedsociety.
According to Muukkonen, no equality assessment of healthy unvaccinated persons was carried out
in the Constitutional Committee. The result was that the access of the two healthy persons to theenjoyment of their rights depended entirely on whether or not they had a valid interest rate passport.
Mr Muukkonen pointed out that the comparative situation was wrong because vaccination was
voluntary and it could not be right that the enjoyment of fundamental rights should be based onconsent to a voluntary medical procedure. In fact, even a person who has contracted coronavirus
but has obtained a green coronavirus passport would be in a better position than a healthy person
who has not obtained a coronavirus passport to enjoy his rights. Nor would this be the correct
perspective from the point of view of the fundamental right to life, since a sick person who has
obtained a card would most likely spread his disease elsewhere in the space to which he could gain
access with a card. According to Muukkonen, the undeclared but de facto aim of the passportlegislation has been to increase vaccination coverage, which may be considered highly questionable
in the light of the 'overriding social need' criterion of the doctrine of restriction of fundamental
rights.

Interest rate testing should have been free of charge to ensure equality
According to Muukkonen, the proportionality principle would have been best fulfilled if the corona
test had been free of charge also for persons who did not take coronary vaccines for ideological orother non-health reasons. Article 6.2 of the Constitution requires an acceptable reason for unequal
treatment: whether it was acceptable that two healthy people should be placed in an unequal position
because one had taken a voluntary action, i.e. had taken the coronary vaccine, and the other had not;on the other hand, a sick and infectious person who had taken the action was placed in a better
position versus a healthy and uninfectious person who had not taken the action. And this inequalityof treatment in a situation where vaccination was justified precisely on the grounds of preventing
infection and reducing the burden of disease. And as we have seen in Muukkonen, Järvinen,
Nohynek and Malhotra

44

expert testimony, it was not necessary or even possible, at least not in principle, to protect thevaccinated group by avoiding the presence of the unvaccinated.
According to Muukkonen, healthy unvaccinated people were also under political and socialpressure to get vaccinated: the logic was that you either give up your equal right to services, or you
take a full series of vaccinations to validate your passport, or you get sick, or you pay €100-200
every 72 hours for a PCR test. However, PACE Resolution 2361 of 2021, paragraph 7.3.1 of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) prohibited any political or socialpressure on people who refuse coronary vaccination for any reason. In addition, the second PACE
Resolution of 2021, number 2383, states in paragraph 13.3.8 that, in order to avoid discriminationin the use of the passport, due attention should be paid to situations where people refuse to be
vaccinated for reasons of personal opinion or conviction, and that, in particular for this category ofpeople, Member States should ensure that any passport system would not in practice lead topressure or effectively make vaccination compulsory.
In his oral hearing, Mr Muukkonen said that he had approached the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health on his own initiative, offering the possibility of "acid testing" the interest rate passportlegislation. The STM directed Muukkonen to contact the Ministry of Education and Culture, butthere, too, Muukkonen's offer was not taken up. Mr Muukkonen therefore offered to provide alegal assessment of the equal treatment provisions of the passport legislation to the ministries, butthey were not interested in this offer. This lack of interest on the part of the ministries has
contributed to the fact that Vauhkala, as a healthy unvaccinated person, has been subjected tounequal treatment for no acceptable reason. If the ministries had exercised the duty of care
imposed on them by the Constitutional Committee by accepting Mr Muukkonen's legal
assessment, the discrimination against Mr Vauhkala would probably not have occurred.
Mr Muukkonen could not explain the reasons for this lack of interest and enthusiasm in theministries to receive top-quality legal evaluation. On the other hand, Asko Järvinen said in his oral
hearing that the interest rate pandemic was "the first political pandemic". By this, Mr Järvinen
meant, among other things, that infectious disease doctors, for example, have disagreed with theministries on measures relating to interest rate restrictions. On the other hand, increasing
vaccination coverage was apparently an unspoken goal of the ministries and authorities at large, andperhaps the lack of enthusiasm for Muukkonen's assessment was due to the fact that an objective
assessment would have led to it,45that the chosen pressure procedure, which would have led to the desired increase in vaccination
coverage, could not have been justified in a transparent and legally sustainable way.
Nor has the position of those who have refused coronary vaccines for religious reasons been assessedin any way during the preparation of the coronary passport legislation.

The enjoyment of fundamental rights cannot depend on wealth
The coronary passport legislation meant that if you refused to take a voluntary coronary vaccine, youeither had to contract a common infectious disease or undergo a corona test every 72 hours, whichcost €100-200 each time, or around €1000-2000 per month. However, the enjoyment of basic andhuman rights cannot depend on wealth.
We respectfully ask the Helsinki Court of Appeal to assess this case as well. For the futureinterpretation of the law, it must be made clear whether, on a fundamental and human rights basis,
it is legitimate for the state to require people to pay in order to enjoy their fundamental and humanrights.

The judgment of the district court is also unfounded in its assessment of the individual provisions
The logic of the Helsinki District Court's decision has thus been to first prevent the applicant fromcalling its key witnesses to the main hearing, not to grant the applicant's requests for redaction,even though these were essential documents of evidence, and then to declare, on very light legal
grounds, that the Court has no jurisdiction to assess the constitutionality of the interest rate
passport legislation and that the Court does not consider that the State has breached its obligations
under the ECHR.
Even if one accepts - and the plaintiff does not accept - the above premises of the court, the district
court's assessment still leaves a considerable number of legally essential elements missing.

The district court unlawfully refused to call the applicant to give evidence against the Head of the
Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Mr Koskela
The most important of these is that the interest rate passport legislation did not directly lead to thesubmission of an interest rate passport claim in the Fazer Kluuvi café on 10.12.2021, but it stillrequired a separate application in the South of Finland.

46

A decision by the Finnish Regional Administrative Board that Fazer Ravintolat Oy could haverequired its customers to present a coupon pass as a condition of admission to the Fazer Kluuvi café
at 9 a.m. The applicant's Exhibit 7 is linked to this case. It states that in October the Regional State
Administrative Agencies sent a questionnaire to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the
grounds on which restrictions should be imposed. In a reply signed by the Head of Department, Mr
Koskela, the STM stated that restrictions should be set at a low threshold.
According to the written evidence, the Regional State Administrative Agencies have requested
clarification of the guidance issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on the setting ofrestrictions using the risk potential assessment table of the National Institute for Health andWelfare, given thata) According to THL, the table is indicative andb) according to information from local and regional experts, infections do notcurrently originate from events that are particularly high risk.
The Regional Administrative Agencies asked:
1. In the event of an epidemic situation where no infections have been estimated tocome specifically from public events, will the STM advise to consider imposing
restrictions on public events or the use of premises more generally and in spite of theabove?
2. If the STM directs that restrictions should be considered more generally, does theSTM consider that they should be set at.
• all public events of significant risk mentioned in the THL risk potential
assessment table (taking into account that the table is only indicative)?
• for all public events and general meetings?
• all premises covered by § 58d (including premises where low-risk
activities according to the THL risk potential assessment table arecarried out), if the conditions for the application of § 58d TTL are met?
• in some other way?
3. How can decisions in the above-mentioned situations be justified in alegally sound way?

47

It is therefore clear from the Regional State Administrative Agencies' question to the STM that the
restrictions have been based on an indicative assessment table provided by the THL, which has notbeen exact, and most obviously not based on medical knowledge, as we will see in the future.
Moreover, the regional administrative agencies were aware at the time (the letter was dated 1
November 2021, less than 1.5 months before the discrimination against Vauhkala) that, according
to information from local and regional experts, infections do not currently originate from high-risk
events in particular.
As is clear from the reply signed by Mr Koskela, the letter does not answer any of the questions
raised by the regional administrative agencies. The letter is full of generalities, leaving the Regional
Administrative Agencies in the dark as to how to react to the fact that the infections did not
originate from high-risk events at the time, and how the AVI's decisions should be legally justified.
Based on this unanswered letter, the Southern Finland AVI imposed a restriction in early
December for the Helsinki region, among others, on the basis of which the interest rate passport
has been requested from the applicant Vauhkala on 10 December 2021 at 9.00 a.m. at Fazer Cafe
(Kluuvikatu 3, Helsinki).
According to Article 107 of the Constitution, "If a provision of a decree or other subordinate
legislation is contrary to the Constitution or other law, it may not be applied by a court or otherauthority." The whole episode of Vauhkala's discrimination has started from a restriction decision by
ESAVI, based on STM guidelines, which were not based on legal, nor medical grounds. ESAVI's
restriction decision was in itself manifestly contrary to the Constitution or other law and should not
be applied in court. Thus, the state authority's action was already discriminatory from the outset,
even before Vauhkala sought to enter the cafeteria on 10 December 2021 at 9 a.m.
The applicant would have liked to call the STM's Head of Department Koskela to testify in court on
the following topic: 'on what medical research or legal assessment has the STM's guidance to theregional administrative agencies been based'. The district court refused to allow Vauhkala to call
Mr Koskela, even though no written or oral evidence on the subject was otherwise available.
According to Vauhkala, the reply given by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Consumer Protection
to the Regional State Administrative Agencies was not based on a medical or legal assessment of
the need to require a coupon pass in catering establishments such as Fazer Kluuvi, but it
nevertheless led the Regional State Administrative Agency for Southern Finland to issue a
restriction decision which discriminated against Vauhkala.

48

10.12.2021 at 9 am. Thus, the decision of the Regional Administrative Office was not necessary
from the point of view of interest rate passport legislation and did not lead to the desired result ofpreventing the spread of covid-19. Furthermore, the objective would have been achieved by lessrestrictive means, such as asking people to wash their hands thoroughly before entering a café.
It is clear that the decision of the Regional State Administrative Board of Southern Finland to allow
the application for an interest rate passport was contrary to the Constitution and the generalconditions for limitation of fundamental rights, and therefore cannot be applied before a court orother authority. Further, the decision of the Regional Administrative Agency was contrary to Article
124 of the Constitution in that it allowed the catering establishment, Fazer Kluuvi café, to decide atwhat time of day it would begin to require its customers to obtain an interest rate pass.

The district court's assessment of the significance of the OKV's report was manifestly erroneous
The defendant State of Finland submitted as written evidence the decision of the Chancellor of Justice
V4 of 12 April 2023 concerning a complaint about coronary vaccinations of health care personnel.
The applicant submits that this decision has no connection with the case at issue. The District Court
states the following (p. 48 of the judgment):"... on 2 December 2022, the Chancellor of Justice's Office (hereinafter referred to as
the "OCA") requested a report from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health(hereinafter referred to as the "MOH") on how the Ministry has monitored thefulfilment of the constitutional requirements of Section 48a of the Communicable
Diseases Act (which concerned the coronary vaccination of nurses) and ascertained
the existence of those requirements.
... On the basis of its subsequent investigation, the OCR has come to the conclusionthat it has not found any unlawful conduct or breach of duty on the part of the STM
with regard to the monitoring and assessment of the constitutional or medicalepidemiological conditions for the validity of the provision in question.
The District Court considers that the decision of the OKV shows that the STM's
procedure for ensuring the constitutionality of the measures taken during the interest
rate pandemic was fully acceptable and sufficient."
The district court's interpretation is completely untenable and, in the plaintiff's view, an obvious
sign of bias and/or unprofessionalism on the part of the judges.

49First of all, from the OKV's analysis of Article 48a of the MLO, no conclusions or interpretations
can be drawn (at least not by means of traditional logical syllogism) that the STM's conduct inensuring the constitutionality of measures other than the interest rate passport legislation during theinterest rate pandemic was also acceptable and sufficient, let alone "fully" acceptable andsufficient, as the district court put it. The argument is logically equivalent to the following
syllogism:"The building inspector inspected the plumbing in the house and found nowrongdoing or neglect of duty."➔ "According to thebuilding inspector, the measures taken by thedeveloper to ensure the safety and compliance of the building's structures
were otherwise fully acceptable and adequate."
Such a "conclusion" is a clear indication of bias and/or unprofessionalism on the part of the judges,
which renders them either unqualified within the meaning of Chapter 13 of the Code of Judicial
Procedure or otherwise unfit to perform their duties.
Secondly, the OMC practically never gives decisions, but mainly solutions. This is another obvious
sign of incompetence and/or indifference on the part of the author of the judgment.

Role of the district court in the caseAccording to the decision of the District Court (p. 45), "[t]he District Court's task is to decide
whether the interest rate passport legislation, in the light of the information available to thelegislators at the time of its entry into force, was a justified and acceptable measure to achieve thebenefits it sought to achieve, i.e. whether the interest rate passport legislation was, inter alia, incompliance with the EIS binding Finland."However, it was not for the district court to decide whether the interest rate passport legislation
was, in the light of the information available to the legislators at the time of its enactment, ajustified and acceptable measure to achieve the benefits it sought. It was for the district court todetermine whether the interest-rate passport legislation was a justified and acceptable means ofachieving the benefits it sought in the light of the information that was or should have been known
to the diligent legislators.
The applicant has repeatedly and consistently stressed this point of view: according to the opinionsof the Constitutional Committee, the Council of State must have carefully assessed the necessity
for the regulation to remain in force and, even if that necessity ceased to exist, it should have

50

the Council of State should have amended or repealed the regulation to that extent. Now, in setting
and describing its task, the district court completely ignores this position, which has been repeatedseveral times by the Constitutional Committee. In the applicant's view, this is further evidence of theapparent bias and/or unprofessionalism of the judges.

Decision of the district court on the request for a preliminary ruling
The applicant asked the District Court to order the Finnish State to produce the following documents:
1) copies of contracts between the EU and/or the Finnish state and the various coronary
vaccine manufacturers for the procurement of coronary vaccines. From these documents, weseek information on whether the EU and/or the Finnish state has any specific requirements
for the functionality or usefulness of the coronary vaccines, e.g. in preventing thecontracting or spreading of covid 19, or whether the EU and/or the Finnish state has anyother quality requirements for the ordered coronary vaccines. Alternatively, otherdocuments that provide the above information
2) the medical reports on which the so-called "coronary passport" legislation, which was
temporarily in force from 2021 to 2022, was based. In particular, the precise details of
the medical and other scientific data and studies on which the claim and assumption thatthe use of the coronary passport would have prevented the spread of covid-19 was based.
The applicant considered that the information requested is relevant as evidence, since the trial ispartly about whether the State authorities should have been aware in December 2021 of thescientific knowledge, widely held in the scientific community at the time, that the use of the corona
passport did not prevent the spread of covid-19 to a significant extent or even at all. During theparliamentary debate, several expert opinions considered the interest rate passport legislation to beconstitutional if its introduction would be beneficial in preventing the spread of covid-19.
The issue in this case is whether the Government has fulfilled its obligation, as emphasised by theConstitutional Committee, to monitor the necessity of the interest rate passport legislation andwhether the Government should have taken steps to remedy the regulation before the events at issue
in this action on 10 December 2021.
Since the case also concerned coronary vaccines and their role in preventing the spread of coronavirus
and the harm they cause as part of the effects of the coronary passport legislation, these agreements
may have been relevant as evidence in the case.

51

In its decision of 27 February 2024, the District Court responded to our request for a preliminary
ruling as follows:
In the interpretation of Chapter 17, Section 40 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, caselaw has considered it sufficient that the documents requested may have evidentiary
value for some relevant matter requiring evidence (e.g. KKO 2019:7).
With regard to the documents required from the Finnish State in paragraph 1, theDistrict Court considers that these contractual documents or other documents
referred to and relied on cannot be relevant as evidence in the case. The issue in thecase is not the effectiveness or efficiency of the interest rate subsidies, but whether
there was a legal basis for the interest rate pass legislation and whether thatlegislation complied with the EIS and the Equal Treatment Act. Therefore, whether
the contractual documents stipulate any requirements for the effectiveness orefficiency of the coronary injections is irrelevant for the resolution of the case. Nor
could anything have been inferred from them or from the other documents relied on
as to the legality of the Government's actions in relation to the obligation to monitor
the necessity of the regulation relied on by the applicant in the autumn of 2021
before 10 December 2021.
With regard to the documents required from the Finnish State in paragraph 2, theDistrict Court considers that the medical reports on which the Corona Passlegislation was based are, on the other hand, in the public domain, i.e. a preliminary
injunction is not required. These reports are listed in the references to theGovernment Bill on the Coronary Passport Legislation (131/2021 vp) and can still befound online at the links provided by the defendant
The reasoning of the district court's decision is absurd and does not stand up to scrutiny: the interest
rate passport legislation was based, to a large extent, on the legal question of whether interest ratevaccines were effective or efficient in achieving the objectives of the legislation - preventing the
spread of the coronavirus and reducing the burden of disease - and whether the interest rate passportlegislation thus met the proportionality and necessity requirements for the restriction of
fundamental rights. The applicant has expressly demonstrated by its evidence that the coronary
vaccines could not even achieve those objectives, and that this was already known by autumn 2021
at the latest.
The applicant further requests the State to provide the following documents:
1) copies of contracts between the EU and/or the Finnish state and the various coronary
vaccine manufacturers for the procurement of coronary vaccines. From these documents, weseek information on whether the EU and/or the Finnish government have any specific52

requirements for the functionality or usefulness of the coronary vaccines, e.g. in preventing thecontracting or spreading of covid 19, or whether the EU and/or the Finnish government haveany specific requirements for the functionality or usefulness of the coronary vaccines, e.g. inpreventing the contracting or spreading of covid 19.

53

or the Finnish government has some other quality requirements for the coronary vaccinesordered. Alternatively, other documents which provide the above information
2) the medical reports on which the so-called "coronary passport" legislation, which was
temporarily in force from 2021 to 2022, was based. In particular, the precise details of the
medical and other scientific data and studies on which the claim and assumption that the useof the coronary passport would have prevented the spread of covid-19 was based.

Infringement of the Equality Act by Fazer Ravintolat Oy
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has, in the applicant's view, infringed the Non-Discrimination Act. For theapplication of the law in other similar cases, it is important to grant leave for further proceedings in
the case, because the issue is the interpretation of whether Fazer Ravintolat Oy's conduct was basedon a law which - even if, from the applicant's point of view, it was unconstitutional and contrary to
the European Convention on Human Rights - Fazer Ravintolat Oy was obliged to comply with.
According to the applicant, the company discriminated against Vauhkala by directly preventing
her from entering the Fazer Kluuvi café at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021, and Fazer Ravintolat
Oy's conduct was not based on law. According to Section 11 of the Non-Discrimination Act,different treatment does not constitute discrimination if it is based on law.
According to the applicant, the Court of Appeal should assess whether Fazer Ravintolat Oy shouldhave complied with the law on communicable diseases in its entirety. The judgment of the District
Court (p. 56) states, inter alia, that 'the District Court also considers that the infringement of those
provisions (Sections 58j and h of the TTL) could not in any event give rise to a compensatory
sanction under Section 13 of the Equality Act, but that they are essentially procedural provisions
assessed by means of administrative sanctions'.
The applicant considers that, especially in a situation where the interest rate passport legislation
undeniably violates Vauhkala's fundamental and human rights, the entire legislation must be strictly
observed. The core of the passport legislation arises from Articles 58h, 58i and 58j of theCommunicable Diseases Act and they form a whole which the caterers who requested the passport
had to comply with strictly in order to ensure that the fundamental rights of the caterers' clientswere not violated.
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has failed to comply with Sections 58 h and i of the Communicable Diseases
Act in that it has not drawn up a written plan on how it will implement the obligations andrestrictions imposed by the AVI's decision, and Section 58 j in that it has not informed Vauhkala
regarding the processing of personal data in the interest rate bag. Pursuant to Article 58 h.3 of theCommunicable Diseases Act, the Fazer café should have made the plan required by that article

54

available to customers and other participants in its activities, and that plan should have included, in
accordance with Article 58 i.4 TTL, the following information

55

that Fazer requires customers and participants to present an interest rate pass. Furthermore, Article
58h of the TTL stipulates that a business requiring a passport must have a written plan on how it will
implement the obligations and restrictions laid down in the decision referred to in Article 58d(1) of
the TTL.
The plaintiff Mika Vauhkala and his friend Mika Jantus, who accompanied Vauhkala to the Fazer
Kluuvi café on 10 December 2021 at 9 a.m., were heard in the district court hearing, and according
to them, the written plan on how the café would implement the obligations and restrictions imposedby the AVI decision was not available, although the law requires it. Neither had been informed by
the café's employees about the processing of personal data on the coupon bag. The district court did
not give any consideration to Vauhkala's and Jantunen's account of the matter, but relied solely on
the witness Tuominen of Fazer Ravintolat Oy, who at the time of the incident was the manager incharge of the Fazer Kluuvi café. Mr Tuominen confirmed that a self-monitoring plan had beendrawn up. He also said that he had not been able to find such a plan.
When asked what he thought was in the plan, Mr Tuominen did not recall putting information in
the plan that Fazer would require customers to show an interest rate passport, nor how Fazer
Kluuvi would implement the obligations and restrictions imposed on it. According to the district
court's judgment, "the witness (Tuominen) had drawn up a self-monitoring plan for Fazer Kluuvi'scafé and it had been duly updated. Unfortunately, after the witness had moved on to other tasks, it
was not later found for documentation, but it had certainly been drawn up and was also visible on
the wall of the café at the time'.
It remains unclear on what the district court's certainty about the self-monitoring plan and its actual
updated content is based. The district court should act impartially and assess the legal dispute
impartially. This has not happened in the present case, but the district court has assessed the caseone-sidedly from the defendant's point of view, relying without any apparent basis on what thedefendant's witness has said, without taking into account the fact that the witness is employed by
the defendant and thus dependent on the defendant, and without taking into account what thedefendant has actually said. He has not even been able to explain what the plan says about therequirement for an interest rate passport, even though the law is clear: the written plan should havecontained information on how the café/Fazer Ravintolat Oy would implement the obligations andrestrictions imposed by the AVI decision.
The applicant has made every effort to clarify the matter by requesting to see the written plan inquestion, but the plan has not been sent to the applicant. The district court merely notes that,
unfortunately, since the witness has moved on to other tasks, the written

56

The plan was never found to be documented, but it was certainly drawn up and was on display on thewall of the café at the time.
In the applicant's view, the fact that no plan has been found indicates only that there was no plan.
The court has not explained why it unilaterally believed the defendant's witness's affidavit without
any further explanation. Moreover, the district court's use of the phrase "it was drafted withcertainty" above is, in plaintiff's view, another blatant example of the judges' apparent bias and/or
unprofessionalism.

Customers have not been informed in accordance with the Communicable Diseases Act
Vauhkala and Jantunen, who have been heard in the case, have said that they have not been
informed at Fazer Kluuvi cafeteria about how the personal data in the coupon bag will beprocessed. The witness for Fazer Ravintolat Oy, Tuominen, has also been unable to say how hewould have informed Vauhkala and Jantunen at the café about the processing of the personal dataon the coupon bag.
What does the information referred to in the law include? Government Bill 226/2021 clarifies thatthe content of Section 58j will be clarified in Government Bill 131/2021, which states theGovernment's position that the processing of personal data would require informing the customer.
Fazer's argument that Vauhkala's dealings would not have progressed to the level of the information
obligation under Article 58j(1) of the TTL because he did not have an interest rate passport is, in our
opinion, incorrect. According to the provision:... The processing of the personal data included in the certificate also requires the client
and the participant to be informed. ...
According to the preamble of the provision (HE 131/2021 vp, p. 52):... the processing of personal data on the certificate would also require informing thecustomer and the participant in the activity, in accordance with the GDPR, that thepersonal data would only be processed to verify the validity of the certificate, tocheck the name of the person and to check whether the conditions for accessing thefacility are met. In addition, it should be informed that the data on the certificate
should not be registered or stored under this Act, as set out in paragraph 3 above, or
processed for any other purpose. Pursuant to Section 58j(3) TTL, the data on thecertificate may not be registered or stored or processed for any other purpose.

57

We argue that it is not even possible to apply the GDPR or to provide information under the
GDPR. Information within the meaning of the GDPR means specifically informing the data
subject. On the other hand, according to Article 58j(3) of the TTL, no registration of data at all
was allowed. Since no one can become a 'data subject' within the meaning of Article 58j(3), it is
not possible to provide information within the meaning of the GDPR in the first place. Thus, thereference to information 'in accordance with the GDPR' is obviously
mistakenly or inadvertently ended up in a government bill. Thus, the legal text and its preamble,
which refers to the provision of information to "the customer and the participant", must be applied.
Vauhkala was a customer of Fazer or a participant in Fazer's activities within the meaning of
Article 58j(1) TTL when he tried to buy breakfast from Fazer Cafe Kluuv. According to thepreamble to the provision, he should have been informed, as a precondition for claiming the coupon
pass, that his personal data would be processed only for the purposes of checking the validity of thecertificate, verifying the person's name and checking whether the conditions for access to thepremises were met. This information should have been provided in advance, before the passport
was even required to be shown, because if the information had been provided afterwards, thecustomer would not have been able to be sure, for example, that the data collected from him would
not be registered or stored in any way within the meaning of Article 58j(3) of the TTL.
When questioned, witness Tuomis said that he and another café employee had only informed
Vauhkala and his friend that they had to present their interest rate passport as a condition of entry
to the café. Thus, the customer was not informed in the manner required by law.
Since the preamble to the provision states that the customer or participant must be informed that"personal data would only be processed for the purposes of checking the validity of the certificate,verifying the name of the person and checking whether the conditions for access to the facility aremet", and since this has not been done, Fazer has therefore, in our view, directly infringed Article
58j(1) of the TTL.
The applicant submits that Fazer should have complied with the legislation in its entirety and thatthe lack of a written plan and the lack of information caused Fazer to act in breach of theCommunicable Diseases Act by refusing Vauhkala access to the café, thus not discriminating on
the basis of the law.

Unequal treatment of Vauhkala

58

The core of the district court's judgment with regard to Fazer Ravintolat Oy's obligation to pay
compensation has thus been dealt with. Fazer Ravintolat Oy's conduct, as we have interpreted andtestified, was not based on law, so that discrimination was not justified. Next, we discuss how
Vauhkala has been treated differently from how other persons would have been treated in acomparable situation.
Fazer Ravintolat Oy, a traditional, financially strong and wealthy company, part of the Fazer
Group, is committed to respecting human rights, as shown in the applicant's Exhibit 10: Fazer does
not tolerate restrictions on movement and Fazer respects the dignity, privacy and fundamental
rights of individuals and does not tolerate discrimination of any kind.
Despite this statement, Miika Kostilainen, the defendant's managing director, has replied to theapplicant's letter, in which the applicant has demanded that the company compensate him for his
infringement, as follows:Also on the website of the Council of State to which you refer, it is veryclearly stated that "if a restaurant requires its customers to have a coupon pass, it does not have tocomply with the stricter than usual restrictions imposed on the area in terms of opening and serving
hours, the number of customers allowed or the requirement that each customer be seated indoors."
The material you refer to elsewhere (on the website of the Regional Administrative Office) statesthat "it is up to the catering establishment to determine the times at which it adopts the pass."
In Fazer's case, it was therefore a method by which it managed to avoid the restrictions on theadmission of customers that would otherwise have been imposed on it. It is a question of obtaininga higher profit by restricting Vauhkala's fundamental right to privacy. In several other cafés, there
was no such practice restricting the fundamental right, nor in some other Fazer cafés. Fazer has notdemonstrated any justification, other than the increase in financial profit, for restricting Vauhkala's
access to the restaurant on the morning of 10 December 2021 in relation to Fazer's own policy of
respecting the dignity, privacy and fundamental rights of individuals.
Fazer Restaurants Ltd has decided to start requiring its café customers to show a coupon passthroughout the day, although normally the coupon pass is not required in food outlets until after
5pm. This has been done on the basis that it has allowed Fazer Restaurants Ltd to attract customers
to its premises without the need to comply with any restrictions on its premises, thereby
maximising its profits.
The denial of access to the restaurant violated the constitutional right to equal treatment andprotection of private life with regard to the disclosure of health information, as well as the right torespect for private life and freedom of religion or belief, as guaranteed by the European Convention
on Human Rights.

59

freedom of conscience and the right to non-discrimination, and the right not to be arbitrarily
prevented from entering a restaurant, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR.
Fazer Ravintolat Oy has thus failed to comply with its human rights obligations, according towhich it does not tolerate restrictions on movement and Fazer respects the dignity, privacy andfundamental rights of individuals and does not tolerate any form of discrimination.
As can be seen from the written evidence 9, 11 and 12 submitted by the applicant, the applicant
had the opportunity to eat at Hotel Kämp immediately after the Fazer Kluuvi episode and, on
subsequent days, at other restaurants and even at other Fazer cafés. There was therefore nothing toprevent the Fazer café from actually allowing Vauhkala to have breakfast on 10 December 2021.
The situation on the other days and in other places was comparable under the Equal Treatment Act.
Section 10 of the Equality Act provides:
Discrimination is direct if someone is treated less favourably on a personal ground thansomeone else has been, is or would be treated in a comparable situation.
Dining in other places under the same legislation and the same ESAVI restriction decision has been
a comparable situation as defined by law. In other words, in the applicant's view, he was treated in acomparable situation in Fazer Kluuvi at 9 a.m. on 10 December 2021 in a discriminatory manner in
relation to other cafés/restaurants both outside Fazer Ravintolat Oy and in the company's otherestablishments. The discrimination has been based on the presumption of Vauhkala's medical
condition, as he has not been able to present a passport for interest. However, Vauhkala was inperfect health when he went to the café.

On the obligation to reimburse costs
The applicant considers, in principle, that the time-limit for lodging a precise statement of claim, as
announced by the Court on Friday 12 April 2024, expired at 23.59 on Monday 15 April 2024, andthat claims lodged after that date cannot even be taken into consideration. The State is not entitled
to separate treatment, particularly in view of the fact that the other parties to the proceedings havecomplied with the time-limit set by the court.
In support of its application, the State has submitted the following pleas in law:
The State of Finland's claim for costs (EUR 121 284,82) consists of the work done by the lawyers
and other legal professionals of Merilampi Attorneys-at-Law Oy in the case, as set out in theattached document.

51
0

in accordance with the fee breakdown (total fees EUR 113.960) and the costs of the mandate (EUR
7.324,82). The responsible partner for the mandate was Teemu Taxell until 2022 and Jussi Ikonen
from February 2023. The assistant lawyer, Iiris Paavola, OTM, has been involved in the casethroughout. The costs of the assignment consist of the fees of the expert Janne Salminen and the taxi
costs of the agents.
For this we accept taxi fares.
Using several different lawyers and officials
The State has stated at the preparatory hearing that it will charge exclusively for the use of one
assistant, as will the applicant.
However, the bill for legal costs includes the use of two different lawyers, plus the use of STM
officials.
The court must only approve the use of one legal adviser for the State.

The number of hours used is totally unreasonable
In its invoice, the State has indicated that it spent 382 hours on the case. This is an exceptionallyhigh number for the following reasons:a) the State has stated, in its own opinion, that the action is, in principle, without foundation in
fact. However, the State has spent considerably more hours on the case than the applicant,which is at the very least strange in view of the State's view that the action is completely
unfounded. It is obvious that the State has stretched the number of hours completely
unnecessarily and solely in order to harm the applicant with its claims.
b) the applicant's claim for costs is 216,85 hours and it is quite exceptional that thedefendant's hours are almost double that amount. Furthermore, the applicant has also
spent time on the action against Fazer Ravintolat Oy. We consider that a reasonableamount for the State would be approximately 70% of the hours spent by the claimant.
This would be a realistic number of hours for the State to spend on the action.
c) we will go into more detail on the number of hours we have agreed to later.

The level of hourly billing by the State is disproportionate taking into account the following:

51
1a) the State's agent has focused heavily on defaming the opponent in the proceedings bymaking disparaging and even derogatory remarks about the applicant and his agent, ourlegal expert Muukkose and our medical expert Malhotra. This is contrary to the Finnish Bar
Association's Guidelines on Good Lawyers' Conduct:
Section 8.4: A lawyer shall not make statements which are likely to bring the witness into
contempt, unless such statements are necessary for the conduct of the case or otherwise in
the best interests of the client. The above provisions on witnesses also apply to experts andother witnesses.
Clause 9.1: A lawyer shall, without prejudice to the client's interests, show courtesy andrespect to other members of his profession and shall not make inappropriate criticism of them.
Disputes between lawyers in connection with their professional activities shall be settled
amicably as a matter of priorityb) The State's Agent has focused his opening statement on the information provided by theapplicant in relation to the ongoing litigation. At the same time, the State Counsel has
explained that they have collected a large number of posts from the applicant on social
media. This is obviously not part of the litigation process and shows poor professionalism.
c) during the judicial process, the State agent has shown poor expertiseinternational human rights treaties and their history, the role of witnesses and experts (e.g.
former Prime Minister Marin has been considered as an expert witness).
For these reasons in particular, we consider that the Court can accept the State's hourly rate for its
claim for costs up to the amount claimed by the applicant and Fazer Ravintolat Oy, namely EUR 200
per hour (excluding VAT, which the State had not claimed by the deadline).

From the expert opinion of Janne Salminen
We reject in its entirety the State's claim for compensation for the expert opinion of Janne Salminen.
First, we rely on our assessment, already made before the main hearing, that, in accordance with theprinciple of jura novit curia, the court must, in principle, know the law, and that there was no
reason to call a legal expert to give his opinion on the matter.

60

Secondly, we consider that Janne Salminen's expert opinion is based solely on a statement he has
already made to the Constitutional Committee, so that his hearing could have been replaced by a fulldocumentary evidence.
Thirdly, we consider that Janne Salminen, when questioned in court, merely read the written
statement he had already submitted to the court, so that his summoning to the main hearing was
unnecessary and the State should have been aware of this.

The Finnish State's application to intervene
We reject in its entirety the claim for costs made by the Finnish State on the sole ground that theapplicant had only one agent to be charged and that the State has alleged that our action iscompletely unfounded. If the action had been completely unfounded, it would not have beennecessary to use the services of STM officials in particular, let alone two legal advisers.
In addition, these are monthly paid officials of the Ministry of Justice who are not specificallyrecruited to deal with a case against the State. The State cannot require the applicant to pay thesalaries of the STM officials.

Detailed treatment
Although the State has stated in the preparatory meeting that there will be no invoice for thesecond legal adviser, Iiris Paavola's work will be invoiced from 8 May 2023. The State has
indicated that its counsel is Jussi Ikonen, not Iiris Paavola, who nevertheless seems to have done
the key work in the case.
In principle, the State is not entitled to charge for the use of more than one assistant, unless the
purpose of the charging is to deliberately harm the applicant by creating additional costs throughexcessive work, despite the State's claim that the action is completely unfounded.
With respect to the first 33.75 billable hours of attorney work submitted by the State, we find thateither the State hasa) by working hard, has in fact acknowledged the relevance of the claim in
principleor61b) deliberately created additional costs for the claimant by working excessively, which must be
regarded as chicanery.
We accept up to 15 hours of the State's claim for legal aid until 14 March 2023.
For the above reasons (in principle, the State could have used only one assistant in the presentcase), we do not accept the use of Iiris Paavola's work as a basis for invoicing. As regards the workof Iiris Paavola, the State has submitted a claim for expenses totalling 188,75 hours, which we
therefore request to be excluded from the assessment of the claim for costs.
Furthermore, the State agent did not take into account the meal breaks during the main hearings,
which together lasted 3 hours, which we therefore do not accept in the application.
Sylvia Laulaja's use of 2.5 hours to clarify case law on interest rate restrictions is not related to thepresent case, so we do not accept this part of the legal claim.

Our acceptance of the State's share of the legal claim
We accept the amount, but obviously not the basis, of the State's claim for costs as follows:
382 hours must be deducted from the original requirement:a) Iiris Paavola's contribution 188,75 hoursb) Sylvia Singer's work 2,5 hoursc) until 14.3.2023, 18,75 hours to be deducted from the legal claimd) 3 hours to be deducted from the billing of the main hearing's
meal hours Total deductions: 213 hours
The total number of eligible hours is 169 hours.
Considering that, on the basis of the above, the hourly rate cannot exceed EUR 200 and that the VAT
rate cannot be accepted because the claim is out of time, we accept the amount of the legal costs as
169 hours x EUR 200 = EUR 33800.

Grounds of appeal against Agent Nummelin

62

Annul the judgment of the Helsinki District Court, according to which 'Mr Nummelin must beordered to share jointly and severally with Mr Vauhkala in the claim for costs in the amount of
EUR 20 000'.
a) contrary to the Code of Judicial Procedure and the Code of Good Practice for Lawyersb) as not being based on the claimant's, i.e. the State's, grounds.
As stated on page 59 of the judgment, "Pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a representative, agent or assistant of a party who, intentionally or negligently, within
the meaning of Article 4 or 5, has caused another party to incur the costs referred to in this
Chapter may, after having been given an opportunity to be heard, be ordered to bear those costs
jointly and severally with the party concerned."
The judgment further states: 'The District Court notes that in case law and literature the liability ofan assistant or agent has been considered exceptional and the threshold for personal liability has
been considered high. An attorney's liability for expenses is a sanction for his conduct in violation of
the rules of procedure (Jokela 1995, p. 162). In contrast to normal liability for expenses, the liabilityof a lawyer requires a subjective basis, i.e. he must have acted intentionally or negligently in breachof the rules of procedure (reference to § 21:6 of the Code of Conduct 21:4 and 21:5§). The types of conduct referred to in Article 5 of Chapter 21 OC include, inter alia, making an
objection which the person making it knew or ought to have known to be unfounded, or failing tocomply with a court order, or otherwise breaching a duty to prolong the proceedings. The conductreferred to in Article 4 of Chapter 21 of the OC is, for example, the commencement of unnecessary
legal proceedings."
On page 60, the district court states, "The district court finds that the attorney's actions describedabove were in themselves lawful means to protect the client's position and interests and to secure afair trial, but that the making of statements in violation of and in excess of the requests forstatements was a breach of duty that prolonged the trial."
According to the district court itself, therefore, the agent's actions were lawful means of acting on
behalf of the client. According to the Bar Association's Guidelines on Good Lawyer Conduct:a) Paragraph 5.8. defines the obligation to resign. This obligation arises if, after
accepting the post, a circumstance arises which makes the lawyer incompetent or
disqualified. The lawyer is also obliged to resign if: 1. a legal impediment or acomparable compelling reason prevents the lawyer from performing the task

63

2. the client requires the lawyer to act in a manner contrary to law or good legal practice
and, despite being warned, does not waive the requirement.
b) point 3.1 requires a lawyer to be loyal to his clientc) 3.2 requires that, in the performance of his duties, a lawyer must be free from any
outside influence which might impair his ability to control fully the interests of his
client. A lawyer shall not allow embarrassing circumstances or other such factors to
influence the performance of his duties. The lawyer shall maintain his independence in
his activities, even if this requires actions or solutions which are not to the liking of his
client, his opponent, the authorities or others.
d) point 2.2 states that the defence of fundamental and human rights and themaintenance of the rule of law require the independence of the legal profession
from the public authorities.
These guidelines define the scope of the agent's duty to act as Nummelin. According to the district
court itself, Nummelin acted precisely in accordance with these instructions. Consequently, thedistrict court's decision to order Mr Nummelin to contribute jointly and severally to the costs of theState for the sum of EUR 20 000 must be regarded as contrary to the Code of Procedure and theCode of Good Legal Practice.
Further, the district court found that some unspecified portion of the liability was incurred as a result,that "the action, in its original and amended form as described above, in so far as it has beenabandoned, is based on a manifest error of law and shows clear negligence on the part of theagent, in so far as the applicant knew or ought to have known that the action was unfounded."
Chapter 14 of the Code of Judicial Procedure lays down the procedure in court as follows:2 § (22.7.1991/1052)
You may not amend the statement of claim in the course of the proceedings.
However, the plaintiff has the right to...
3) claim interest or make any other secondary claim or even a new claim, if it isbased on essentially the same grounds.

64

If the application referred to in paragraph 1(2) or (3) is made only at the main hearing,
the application shall be inadmissible if its examination would delay the proceedings.
Such a claim cannot be made in a higher court.
The submission of new facts in support of an action shall not be deemed to be an
amendment of the action, unless it changes the case.
According to the Code of Procedure, the plaintiff is therefore entitled to make another, or even a new,side claim, provided that it is based on essentially the same plea.
In the present case, it is a question of making new claims, supported by a supplementary statement
and by the abandonment of some of the grounds of the old claims. Therefore, since the applicant
has exercised the rights conferred on him by the Code of Procedure and the applicant's lawyer has
assisted him in this case in accordance with his obligations, the applicant's legal adviser cannot be
penalised.

Negligence is not a sufficient ground for extending liability to the agent
The district court bases its decision to extend liability to the agent on the agent's alleged negligence.
Protecting lawyers from outside influence is a time-honoured tradition and has been seen as a wayof ensuring that those who come before the courts have access to expert legal support to make theircase. If a lawyer had to think all the time about whether to take on a case or to fear having to pay
his client's costs, at some point it would become too difficult to obtain justice.
Thus - as the district court rightly points out - in case law and in the literature, the liability of anassistant or agent has been considered exceptional and the threshold for personal liability has been
considered high. In decision No 1699 of the Helsinki Court of Appeal of 22 December 2021, an
agent was held liable, along with his client, for costs in connection with the pursuit of a claim forprotective measures based on a manifestly unfounded and manifestly erroneous legal assessment.
The action was therefore manifestly wrongful, i.e., in legal terms, intentional.
The Helsinki District Court has based its decision on the agent's liability for costs on the agent's
alleged negligence, not on intent. The District Court itself states that "the measures taken by the agent
described above were in themselves lawful means of protecting the position and interests of the clientand of ensuring a fair trial". Thus, when the agent has used lawful means

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to promote his client's position, interests and right to a fair trial, then where is the intent other than in
the attorney's efforts to promote his client's interests in accordance with the standards of good legal
conduct?

The decision is not based on a claim by the StateThe court cannot take up the legal responsibility of a legal adviser under Chapter 21, Articles 4-6of the Code of Judicial Procedure on its own initiative, but only at the request of a party to theproceedings. The grounds on which the State claimed that Mr Nummelin should be liable for costs
are described in the judgment as follows:"The State has considered that when it has become clear that the State cannot be obliged to pay
compensation to Vauhkala for the violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, andwhen the applicant and his agents have nevertheless continued to pursue the case and to inflate thecase by presenting yet another argument relating to freedom of religion, this has been negligent
and careless conduct of the case. In this respect, the proceedings are unnecessary. Accordingly,
Mr Nummelin, the applicant's agent, must be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the State,
together with his client, in the event of the applicant's defeat.'
The State's application therefore seeks an order that Agent Nummelin pay the costs incurred by theState, because:a) it should have become clear to the Ombudsman that the State cannot be required
to pay compensation to Vauhkala for the violation of the European Convention on
Human Rightsb) the applicant and his agents have continued to pursue the case and to inflate it
further, putting forward a new argument relating to freedom of religion.
c) for the reasons set out above, Mr Nummelin's conduct of his case wasnegligent and careless.
The question of the attorney's liability should be based on the claim made by the party, but the
district court's decision is not based on the claims made by the state. Thus, the district court's
finding that Mr Nummelin should be jointly and severally liable for the State's claim for EUR 20
000 is not in accordance with the law.
In any case, we will also respond to the arguments put forward by the State:

66

The State's view that the action would be manifestly unfounded has been based from the outset on
the State's desire to prevent an embarrassing action from coming to trial. We discuss the groundsof the action at length in the application for leave to proceed and in our appeal, so it is unnecessary
to revisit those grounds here other than to state that our action was based on a strong legal
assessment, a large number of witnesses consisting of medical and forensic experts, a large numberof medical examinations, and undisputed evidence of the events at the Fazer Kluuvi café on 10
December 2021 at 9 a.m.
In order to accept the State's view that the action was completely unfounded, the Ombudsman
would have to reject the legal reasoning in the case in its entirety, to consider that Vauhkala would
not have had the right to eat in the restaurant in principle, even though Article 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not apply. Additional Protocol 1 to the ECHR
expressly requires the State to prevent arbitrary denial of access to a restaurant, consider thesignificant medical studies and the views of the medical representatives who gave oral testimony
on the matter to be wrong, and reject as nonsense the article by Dr Muukkonen, the only Finnish
legal expert to have written an article on the subject. However, it is absolutely impossible to reachsuch a conclusion - from the point of view of common sense and legal perception. Nohynek, asenior physician at the THL, and Järvinen, an infectious disease specialist at the HUS, havetestified in the district court that the vaccines did not prevent the spread of coronavirus except in asmall way, and that the vaccines did not protect anyone except the person who took them, so that
Vauhkala could not have posed any danger to anyone at the Fazer Kluuvi café on 10 December
2021 at 9 o'clock in the morning. As this is what medical experts have told us, there is no way thatthe agent, with his totally inadequate medical training, could have refuted their views - let alonethat the agent could have refuted the results of numerous medical studies.
We further recall that the State has already in September 2022 exercised its right to request the district
court to dismiss the case as unfounded, and the district court has not agreed. Accordingly, the district
court also found that the action was sufficiently meritorious to proceed.
The district court's ruling also leads to difficulties for citizens pursuing claims against the state,especially on human rights grounds, to find an agent. An agent would have to consider the
possibility that, in having to specify the grounds of the action and in facing the State's argumentsthat "the State cannot violate human rights", the agent would run the risk of having to bear part ofthe costs of the proceedings himself.

67

In order to be independent of the public authorities, in line with the Good Lawyers' Code of
Conduct, a lawyer must be able to work without fear of having to pay his or her client's legal costs.
The decision of the Helsinki District Court is a serious breach of the protection traditionallyafforded to lawyers, which has enabled citizens to have access to professional legal assistance inactions against the State.

Evidence:
Oral evidence:
1) Mika Vauhkala
subject: treatment and suffering at Fazer Cafe Kluuvi

2) Matti Muukkonen, Doctor of Administrative Sciences
topic: basic rights of the unvaccinated not protected

3) Satu Koskela, Head of Department, STM
topic: on what medical research or legal assessment has the STM's guidance to the Regional
Administrative Agencies been based?

4) Mika Jantunen, who was with the applicant at the Fazer café
subject: the treatment of the applicant in the Fazer café on 10 December 2021, the information
provided to the customer by the Fazer café staff and the documents on file. Events after theturn away from the Fazer Café5) Miika Kostilainen, Managing Director of Fazer Retail Finlandsubject: grounds for the treatment of the applicant. Fazer Group's commitment to human rights

6) Asko Järvinen, HUS Infectious Diseases Physician

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topic: what the international medical community knew about the role of vaccines in thefight against covid 19 before December 2021

7) Hanna Nohynek, Senior Physician, THL
topic: what the international medical community knew about the role of vaccines in thefight against covid 19 before December 2021

8) 10.1.2021 Prime Minister Sanna Marin at the head of the Government
Theme 2: on what the government has based its view on the need for interest rate passportlegislation and how the government has monitored the need for interest rate regulation in
relation to the realisation of fundamental rights.

Written evidence:
1) Fazer Retail Finland's reply
Subject: Defendant's justification for the infringement of the applicant's rights
2) National preparedness plan for pandemic influenza (Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön julkaisuja
2012:9)Subject: Coronavirus does not even meet the STM's definition of a mild pandemic...
6) Peer-reviewed article The Corona Pass, the Constitution and a critique of the equality
approach
Subject: Interest rate passport in breach of equality
7) Ministry of Social Affairs and Health's response to the request for clarification from theRegional State Administrative Agencies regarding guidance on the imposition of
restrictions under the Communicable Diseases Act
Subject: STM's guidance to regional administrative agencies not based on medical studies orlegal assessment8) Yle news 19.11.2021

69

Theme: the Equality Commissioner says that the use of the interest rate passport is
acceptable if it can alleviate the situation of illness

9) Dinner receipts from Fazer
Subject: inconsistent treatment of the applicant in the Fazer Group's cafés, leading to apresumption of 10.12.2021 discrimination

10) Fazer's human rights commitment
Subject: Fazer has declared its commitment to opposing movement restrictions and respecting
privacy and fundamental rights

11) Hotel Kämp restaurant receipt
Theme: Hotel Kämp has allowed the plaintiff to eat breakfast after she was turned away fromthe Fazer café. Fazer cannot claim that it had no choice but to prevent the plaintiff fromentering its restaurant12) Dining in three other cafés
Subject: Fazer cannot claim that it had no choice but to prevent the plaintiff from entering its
restaurant13) US study on the impact of coronary vaccines on the spread of coronavirus (August
2021)
Theme: people who received the full coronavirus vaccine series had similar coronavirus loads
as unvaccinated people & vaccinated people also spread coronavirus

14) Vietnamese study on the impact of coronavirus vaccines on the spread of coronavirus (October
2021)
Subject: care workers who received the full vaccine series contracted pervasive coronavirus
infections in June 2021

7015) British study on the impact of coronary vaccines on the spread of coronavirus (October
2021)
Theme: fully coronavirus-vaccinated individuals infected fully vaccinated contacts, and a fullcoronavirus vaccination series did not reduce coronavirus transmission within households16) German study on the impact of coronary vaccines on the spread of coronavirus (November
2021)
Subject: coronavirus spread by coronavirus vaccinated as well as unvaccinated17) News from Ilta-Sanomien 12.8.2021
Theme: coronary vaccines do not prevent the disease from developing or spreading18) News from Iltalehti 27.8.2021
Subject: Full coronary vaccination series does not prevent covid-19 and the spread of thedisease19) News from Ilkka-Pohilainen 22.9.2021
Subject: Finnish nurses who received a full series of coronary vaccines contracted covid-1920) News from Ilta-Sanomien 9.9.2021
Subject: Increase in coronary vaccination coverage did not reduce the incidence of the disease
in Tampere in September 2021, but on the contrary, the number of infections increased as
vaccination coverage increased21) Kaleva news 31.10.2021
Subject: Coronary vaccination did not protect carers or patients from coronavirus infection or
spread23) The Frequently Asked Questions section of the Rokote.fi website, subsection "How do
vaccines work?". Available at: https://rokote.fi/tietoa-rokotteista/usein-kysyttya/ (accessed
20.9.2023).

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Theme: difference between traditional vaccines and mRNA vaccines24) Glossary on the vaccine-protection.fi website. Available: https://www.rokotesuoja.fi/sanasto(accessed 20.9.2023)
Theme: difference between traditional vaccines and mRNA vaccines

25) Pfizer website, section Vaccines - a medical success story. Available:
https://www.pfizer.fi/tutkimus/terveytesi-tahdet/rokotteet-laaketieteen-menestystarina(accessed 20.9.2023)
Theme: difference between traditional vaccines and mRNA vaccines

26) National Institute for Health and Welfare website, Frequently asked questions aboutmRNA vaccines. Available: https://thl.fi/fi/web/infektiotaudit-jarokotukset/ajankohtaista/ajankohtaista- coronavirus-covid-19/vaccines-andcoronavirus/mrna-vaccines (accessed 20.9.2023)
Theme: difference between traditional vaccines and mRNA vaccines

27) THL website (archived version 10.10.2021). Available at:https://web.archive.org/web/20211010193639/https://thl.fi/fi/web/infektiotaudit-javaccines/diseases-and-prevention/diseases-and-pathogens-a-o/coronavirus-covid-19
Theme: corona infection can only be detected by PCR or antigen test.

28) Ilta-Sanomien news 24.10.2021, "Marin Yle: "It is very possible that the entire population will
be vaccinated with the third vaccine dose". Available at: https://www.is.fi/politiikka/art2000008355719.html
Theme: strong public pressure on unvaccinated people...
31) Helsingin Sanomat article "Korona's after-wipe", published on 1 April 2023, pdf-file, in particulars. 10.
Subject: according to Hanna Nohynek, Chief Medical Officer of the THL:a) the exclusion of the unvaccinated from many events and restaurant meals by means of
the passport legislation was not based on the scientific evidence available at the time;

72b) The ability of coronary vaccines to prevent the spread of infection was not studied initially,and subsequent studies found little such effect.

32) Opinion of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) of 18.11.2023
Subject: According to the EMA, the only approved use of coronary vaccines that have beenon conditional marketing authorisation is to protect the vaccinated individual, and not, forexample, to prevent the spread of infection.

33) HUS research note "Interpretative challenges of Ct values in virological nucleic acidimmunoassays of respiratory specimens"
Theme: the Ct value does not allow reliable quantitative conclusions to be drawn about theamount of virus in the sample or the patient's body.

34) Uuden Suomen Nachrichten 25.11.2021, "THL's Mia Kontio: "We have leaking vaccines",
there can be no talk of herd immunity".
Theme: Coronary vaccines did not prevent coronavirus infections, nor did they build up herd
immunity in the population, and this was known by the THL by 25 November 2021.

Expert opinions:1) Astrid Stückelberger
Theme: The invalidity of corona tests; social and individual consequences

2) Aseem Malhotra
Theme: the scientific community knew by December 2021 that:a) coronavirus vaccines did not prevent the development of severe coronavirus diseaseor the transmission of coronavirus to other people;b) coronary injections can cause severe disability or even death;

73c) the risk of serious adverse events from the vaccine was higher than the risk of
hospitalisation for coronary heart disease.

Sincerely, Aki
Nummelin OTM