The Nautilus Institutefor Security and Sustainability

FOUNDATIONS OF ENERGY SECURITY
FOR THE DPRK:
1990-2009 ENERGY BALANCES,ENGAGEMENT OPTIONS, AND FUTURE
PATHS FOR ENERGY AND ECONOMIC
REDEVELOPMENT

ATTACHMENTS
WORKPAPERS, BACKGROUND DATA,AND DETAILED RESULTS
Prepared byDavid Von Hippel and Peter Hayes
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in Collaboration
with the Korea Energy Economics Institute
DRAFT, September 13, 2012
Nautilus Institute
United States:
2421 Fourth Street
Berkeley, CA 94710

Copyright Nautilus Institute, 2003, 2007, and 2012 ©

D. Von Hippel e-maildvonhip@igc.org;
P. Hayes e-mail:phayes@nautilus.org

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2
WORKPAPERS, BACKGROUND DATA, AND
DETAILED RESULTS:
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGYSUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESFOR THEDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)AND RELATED ENERGY SECTOR AND POLLUTANTEMISSIONS ANALYSESCONTENTS:ATTACHMENT 1
DETAILED, PETROLEUM PRODUCT, AND SUMMARY ENERGYBALANCES ............................................................................................................. A1 - 1
WORKPAPERS—ENERGY SUPPLY SECTORS .......................................... A1 - 32
WORKPAPERS—ENERGY DEMAND SECTORS ........................................ A1 - 95
ADDITIONAL SUMMARY FIGURES AND TABLES ................................. A1 - 140
ESTIMATES OF COST AND SAVINGS OF SELECTED ENERGYEFFICIENCY MEASURES............................................................................... A1 - 172
ESTIMATES OF ACID GAS AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS..... A1 - 181
ATTACHMENT 2
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE
MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRK: UPDATE THROUGH THE YEAR 2009................................................................................................................................... A2 - 1
DRAFT—Please do not quote or cite without permission from authors

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Detailed, Petroleum Product, and Summary Energy Balances
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 1990
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

6/9/2011
COAL &
COKE
1,325,571

CRUDE
OIL
110,742

REFINED
PROD.
26,622

HYDRO/NUCLEAR78,075WOOD/
BIOMASS
161,944

1,301,288
68,392
44,108110,742

26,622

78,075

149,944
12,000(377,571)(110,742)

82,762(78,075)(76,641)(110,742)(21,947)
110,742(9,920)Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses(294,926)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

948,000-

109,384-

152,024

ENERGY DEMAND

948,006-

109,384-

152,021671,661
324,615
68,13923,994
11,203
4,026
23,72029,38561,980124,600-

28,483-

5,626

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

189,274
129,155
60,119-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

9,750

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/OtherINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL
-

2,976

HEAT
-

(3,417)

(73)

-

9,251

120,464(360,855)

7,884

165,600(593)(8,544)(1,549)(12,408)(23,592)(220,030)(593)(71,636)(6,944)(2,008)(18,368)(41,277)

2,976

9,251

120,464

1,342,099

2,973

9,251

120,467

1,342,103--

70,242
17,3884,356
18,891
6,616
932
4,126
396
2,497
189
14,850776,013342,003
80,06547,45817,8198,985
27,846
12,99631,882
62,169144,790--

11,470600

51,03934,243
12,819
1,253
1,123
1,600

2,976

(1,433)

2,916(5,960)(16,136)

7,571
4,573
4,026
12,600

3,740

1,600

37,89632,571
1,949
1,253
1,123
1,000

-

6,600
6,256
344

-

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

-

1,132
1,132

-

3,137
2,681
456

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

29,825-

16,444
6,585
263
2,648
6,847

-

887
28,938100

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

32,646

98

-

9,750

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

1,672
1,672

10,87086,140

6,134
6,134

86,140

2,973
1,814
1,159

10,7187,420
3,298

301,840
150,780
151,060

44,950

-

-

2,572
907
1,664

62,2773,526
58,750

-

-

524

4,794
2,681
2,112

44,950
-

524
-

1,632

5,950

NON-ENERGY USE

13,7185,771

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

23.43

1.28

A1- 1

-

-

2,644
473

12,00021.29

TOTAL
1,702,954
1,529,306
217,755
44,108-(63,092)(9,920)ELECTRICITY-

14,00848
13,96060,277
6,585
263
2,648
6,847
935
42,998

10,932

47,952
6,423
31,48846.00

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 1996
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

12/13/2011
COAL &
COKE
684,227

CRUDE
OIL
39,874

684,608
11,614
11,99439,874REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
32,211
19,160167,345
19,16039,100443

155,348
12,0004(251,361)(39,874)

11,979(19,160)(25,467)
39,874(19,160)(39,874)(7,916)(207,738)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

432,866-

44,190-159,429

ENERGY DEMAND

432,867-

44,190-250,538
124,977
29,981
6,515
3,697
1,329
7,828
832
9,697
20,45345,230

-

8,685

-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

121,735
92,74728,988AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

5,155

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
-

2,375

859,116
102,588
12,441
6,446

5,128

50,757(248,074)

4,543

82,238(213)(4,438)(1,126)(10,186)(16,644)(165,584)(213)(37,211)(5,541)(921)(12,452)(26,151)

2,375

5,128

50,757694,744

159,428

2,374

5,128

50,757694,743

1,909

-

-

24,001
6,694
1,917
5,130
2,183
308
1,362
131
824
62
5,391

285,133
131,671
35,22912,774
5,880
2,965
9,189
4,289
10,521
20,51652,100

-

-

4,804

-

22,157
15,174
5,583
501
899
-

(32,773)(7,916)(2,468)

2,375

(163)

1,710

(2,266)(8,382)

3,331
1,129
1,329
3,326

899

581

16,525
14,345
779
501
899
-

-

-

1,785
1,649
136

-

117,606
15,135
102,471

2,374
1,455
919

3,572
3,572

6,145
4,562
1,583

253,219
119,120
134,098

-

1,502
786
716

-

23,767

-

-

1,697
816
880

32,121
1,602
30,518

998
804
193

-

-

-

236

1,743
804
939

-

-

5,155
509
509

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

25,363-621
24,742

13,123
5,734
211
1,886
5,198
95

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

26,180131

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

TOTAL
942,817-6,446Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

829
829

4,804

23,767
-

236
5,498

-

5,498
2,618

-

NON-ENERGY USE

3,386

1,442

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)*

16.61

0.91

1,555
-

7,200
5.32

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 2

-

7,711

33
7,678

51,695
5,734
211
1,886
5,198
654
38,013

6,163

36,646
12,02822.84

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2000
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE
337,701

CRUDE
OIL
17,857

336,565
10,454
9,318

1,278
16,579REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
40,01137,705
165,746
37,705
41,777
3,010

153,735
12,012
1(52,526)(17,857)(156)(37,705)(16,555)
17,857(37,705)(17,857)(6,061)(31,316)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

285,175-

39,855-

159,685

ENERGY DEMAND

285,169-

39,852-

147,882
67,382
19,067
2,070
2,325
836
4,924
869
6,100
21,38322,926-

11,792-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

95,05573,24621,808AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

3,845

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
(82)

1,818

82

2,645

30,848(78,993)

2,451

47,746(105)(2,182)(661)(1,903)(12,708)(35,379)(105)(18,294)(4,243)(524)(2,959)(17,490)

1,818

2,645

30,767519,946

159,683

1,818

2,645

30,768519,936

1,130-

12,618
3,609
1,503
1,629
1,373
194
857
137
518
65
2,732

173,42270,991
27,623
4,042
3,699
1,865
5,780
4,484
6,618
21,44826,873

3,237-

12,405
7,299
3,821
476
809
-

(16,112)(6,061)
(978)

1,818

(402)

855

(1,056)(4,121)

7,052
343
836
3,478

920

294

8,665
6,795
585
476
809
-

-

-

2,207
2,058
149

-

121,601
19,021
102,580

1,818
1,117
701

1,826
1,826

2,744
2,421
323

225,251
99,690125,561

-

1,251
655
596

-

19,943

-

-

1,296
680
615

26,335
1,335
25,000

828
668
161

-

-

-

196

1,447
668
779

-

-

3,845
423
423

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

21,307-399
20,908

10,908
4,187
148
1,367
5,122
85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

15,62978

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

TOTAL
598,939529,283
80,822
12,411(1,245)-(1,245)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

504
504

-

3,237

19,943
-

196
7,379

-

1,029

4,121

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)*

2.64

0.15

3,126

820
-

6,000
10.47

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 3

-

7,379

-

NON-ENERGY USE

-

7,420

21
7,399

47,015
4,187
148
1,367
5,122
421
35,771

3,258

22,911
11,15013.26

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2005
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE
391,355

CRUDE
OIL
23,547435,749
35,536
79,931

1,278
22,270

REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
23,42744,008
185,798
44,00823,405
186

173,816
12,001
19(111,976)(23,547)

13,353(44,008)(8,736)23,547(42,575)(23,547)(6,121)(83,890)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

279,378-

36,779-179,677

ENERGY DEMAND

279,377-

36,780-150,534
52,71723,878
3,010
2,265
814
15,9403,528
6,582
20,825
20,975

-

8,329

-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

84,88667,806
17,079AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

4,931

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
(60)

265
325

(207)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

1,836

37,657(128,531)

3,719

59,592(139)(2,825)(1,137)(3,508)(15,463)(71,891)(139)(23,685)(4,284)(1,709)(4,888)(21,935)

1,836

4,276

37,597539,544

179,677

1,836

4,276

37,596

539,543

1,083-

14,660
2,824
1,561
2,370
1,338
188
2,773
222
559
64
2,762

174,607
55,541
28,695
5,892
3,602
1,816
18,713
7,278
7,142
20,88925,0393,587-

16,332
10,529
4,484
526
793
-

(6,121)
(79)

1,836

(1,433)

1,695(1,380)(5,335)

3,256
512
814
3,528

1,033

269

11,869
9,653
896
526
793
-

-

-

2,221
2,075
146

-

134,550
24,739109,810

1,836
1,132
704

2,439
2,439

3,887
3,399
488

229,819
101,591
128,228

-

1,351
707
644

-

24,070

-

-

1,431
590
842

31,784
1,297
30,487

924
751
173

-

-

-

210

1,586
751
836

-

-

4,931
453
453

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

19,614-399
19,215

11,221
3,641
129
2,039
5,326
85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

17,423174

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

654,851
93,47780,461
(207)

4,276

(20,860)(1,892)

TOTAL
668,074

876
876

-

3,587

24,070
-

210
7,871

-

1,536

690

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)*

5.15

0.17

5,227

1,364
473

6,000
11.15

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 4

-

7,871

-

NON-ENERGY USE

-

8,746

21
8,725

47,453
3,641
129
2,039
5,326
421
35,896

5,074

29,262
473
8,226
16.47

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2008
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE
370,238

CRUDE
OIL
23,792REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
28,86842,575
205,678-

424,584
11,53365,8791,278
22,514(102,860)(23,792)

6,686(42,575)(15,471)
23,792(42,575)(23,792)

42,575
29,136267

193,678
12,000(5,873)(75,804)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

267,378-

35,554-

199,806

ENERGY DEMAND

267,374-

35,553-

147,751
51,77623,452
2,872
2,095
753
16,177
4,108
6,465
20,453
19,600

-

7,494

-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

74,302
61,212
13,090AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

5,147

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
1,058

1,575
517

-

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

1,762

39,119(123,201)

4,383

61,617(140)(2,753)(1,151)(3,493)(16,112)(67,850)(140)(23,078)(4,111)(674)(4,887)(22,461)

1,762

4,331

40,177549,008

199,806

1,762

4,331

40,177549,003

1,005-

15,478
2,773
1,533
2,261
1,237
174
2,814
227
549
62
3,846

171,727
54,54928,183
5,632
3,332
1,680
18,991
7,434
7,014
20,516
24,396

4,185-

17,674
11,706
4,702
414
853
-

(5,873)

1,762

(241)

1,100

(1,394)(5,198)

3,198
498
753
3,099

699

662,11576,757
66,663-

4,331(20,325)(1,533)

TOTAL
672,209252

12,59010,807
516
414
853
-

-

-

2,086
1,902
184

-

153,322
34,093
119,228

1,762
1,089
673

2,824
2,824

4,670
4,058
613

238,965
105,178
133,787

-

1,251
655
596

-

25,126

-

-

1,355
476
879

32,8791,131
31,748

921
751
171

-

-

-

210

1,584
751
833

-

-

5,147
453
453

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

19,614-399
19,215

10,257
3,338
101
2,144
4,589
85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

18,614

289

899
899

-

-

4,185

25,126
-

210
7,871

-

-

7,871
5,584

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

1,508
-

NON-ENERGY USE

1,493

666

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

5.12

0.21

6,000
11.83

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 5

8,886

21
8,865

46,628
3,338
101
2,144
4,589
421
36,036

5,392

31,386
8,159
17.15

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2009
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE
356,087

CRUDE
OIL
23,418445,808
3,718
93,4401,278
22,140

REFINED HYDRO/PROD. NUCLEAR
11,551
42,719WOOD/
BIOMASS
207,034

42,719195,034
12,00011,674
123(91,081)(23,418)

17,198(42,719)(42,719)(23,418)(4,807)
23,418(5,972)(62,549)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

265,005-

28,749-201,062

ENERGY DEMAND

265,002-28,749-201,060

144,468
51,77624,216
1,903
1,972
709
16,177
4,843
5,818
19,772
17,283

-

4,882

-

931

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

75,642
62,34913,292

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

4,956

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/OtherHEAT-ELECTRICITY
1,101

1,565
464

-

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL-

1,792(1,733)36,138(104,065)

3,961

56,784(138)(2,890)(1,063)(2,598)(15,020)(49,330)(138)(24,231)(4,180)(674)(3,970)(21,541)

1,792

3,998

37,239537,845

1,791

3,998

37,239537,840

14,281
2,773
1,485
1,498
1,164
164
2,814
227
494
60
3,600

164,562
54,54927,302
3,730
3,136
1,581
18,991
7,434
6,313
19,832
21,693

4,240-

14,557
8,725
4,688
351
793
-

1,792

(41)

1,100

(1,372)(5,458)

-

1,601
330
709
2,364

588

222

9,690
8,098
448
351
793
-

-

-

1,718
1,571
146

-

155,758
34,685
121,072

1,791
1,108
683

2,635
2,635

4,401
3,826
575

241,943
106,174
135,769

-

1,153
629
525

-

24,193

-

-

1,300
454
846

31,602
1,082
30,520
1,400
670
730

-

4,956

627
627

684,839
51,09894,027-

3,998(21,341)(5,972)TOTAL
641,910

-

-

4,240

24,193

396
396

-

820
670
150

-

-

-

-

183

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

19,614

-

-

7,871

-

-

8,007

399
19,215

9,265
3,338
101
1,807
3,934
85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

18,937

362

183

7,871
5,681

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

1,363
-

NON-ENERGY USE

989

859

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

3.73

0.20

6,000
11.87

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 6

21
7,985

44,756
3,338
101
1,807
3,934
421
35,156

4,828

31,171
7,847
15.80

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 1990:
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
110,742GASOLINE
5,275

DIESEL
12,962HEAVY KEROSENE
LPG, REF.
OIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
6,224
2,160
-

AVIATION
GAS

110,742

5,275

12,962

6,224

2,160

(110,742)

25,332

19,357

16,583

8,849

11,5601,080(110,742)

25,332

19,357(21,947)
38,603

8,849

17,521

1,080

TOTAL
137,364
137,364-(73)(5,960)(27,980)(21,947)
0(73)(5,960)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION-

30,60732,31922,807

11,00911,5601,080

109,384

ENERGY DEMAND-

30,60632,31722,807

11,008

11,566

1,080

109,384

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

3,050

21,775

-

3,658

-

28,483
7,571
4,573
12,600-TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

4,473
4,129
344

2,127
2,127

-

6,600
6,256
344

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

-

-

-

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

2,777
2,547
230

360
134
226

-

-

-

3,137
2,681
456

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

7,386
6,476
45
494
371

6,859
109
218

45

1,798

-

356

6,432

45

16,444
6,585
263
2,648
6,847
100

7,571
915

12,60023,22023,2203,050

690

12,926
9,351
1,949
627

627

3,740
399

-

724

627
399

724

1,000

1,798

356

100

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORSNON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

3,658

88
-

1,700

NON-ENERGY USE

10

4,250

98
5,950

5,771

A1- 7

37,89632,571
1,949
1,253
1,123
1,000

5,771

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS: PETROLEUM REFINING BY PRODUCT1990 Production Data from Jang, 1994

Product
Gasoline
DieselHeavy Oil
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
Other Products
TOTAL

1990 Production from Balance (Note 2)
Oil for Magnesite as(Note 1)
Oil for Magnesite as Heavy
Crude
Production Conversion Production Fraction Production
Fraction
Production Fraction
kte/yrte/toektoe/yrof Totalktoe/yrof Totalktoe/yrof Total
950
1.07
1,017
33%
605
23%
605
26%
1000
1.035
1,035
34%
463
17%
463
20%
650
0.96
624
20%
923
35%
621
26%
210
1.045
219
7%
211
8%
211
9%
165
0.96
158
5%
445
17%
445
19%
3,053

100%

2,647

100%

2,346

100%

Notes:
1 Young Sik Jang, North Korean Energy Economics, Korea Development Institute, 1994 (pp. 54, 64)
2 The "Oil for Magnesite as Heavy" columns in this table present production as estimated in the refined products balance, which assumes
that oil used in magnesite production is heavy or residual oil. It is possible that crude oil is input to the magnesite (and/or fertilizer)
production process without previous refining. If this is the case (for magnesite), the refined products balance would be as shown inthe second pair of columns.

A1- 8

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 1996:
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
GASOLINE
39,874
8,545

DIESEL
5,185

HEAVY
OIL
18,388

8,545

5,185

24,834

-

-

6,446

(39,874)

8,183

8,090

(39,874)

8,183

8,090

39,874

KEROSENE
LPG, REF. AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
518
(426)
-

TOTAL
72,08578,974
443
6,446

518

17
443

(10,852)

1,618

4,070

871

(25,450)
14,760

1,618

(17)
6,352

871

(163)
(2,266)(27,895)(25,467)0(163)(2,266)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION-

16,72813,275

7,536

2,136

3,644

871

44,190ENERGY DEMAND-

16,72813,276

7,536

2,137

3,643

871

44,190

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

671

7,111

-

903

-

8,685
3,331
1,129
3,326
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

553
430
123

1,232
1,218
14

-

1,785
1,649
136

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,502
786
716

-

-

-

-

1,502
786
716

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

856
764
92

142
40
102

-

-

-

998
804
193

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

6,352
5,639
36
395
281

5,248
95
174

32

1,199

-

292

4,884

32

3,331
226

903

3,326

10,376
10,376

671

228

4,999
3,969
779
251

251

899
320

-

579

251
320

579

-

1,199

292

95

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

65

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS-NON-ENERGY USE

65-

13,123
5,734
211
1,886
5,198
95
131
-

1,442

A1- 9

16,525
14,345
779
501
899
-

1,442

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2000
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
GASOLINE DIESEL
17,857
4,791
8,221
1,278
16,579

4,791

8,221

-

HEAVY
OIL
20,809KEROSENE
LPG, REF. AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
951
5,240
-

22,391
2,827

951(1,245)-TOTAL
57,868
1,278
58,356
3,010(1,245)5,424
183(17,857)

3,401

3,630

(9,534)

734

946

667

(17,857)

3,401

3,630

(15,783)
6,651

734

(771)
2,774

667

(402)
(1,056)(18,013)(16,555)
0(402)(1,056)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

8,193

11,851

11,274

1,685

6,186

667

39,855ENERGY DEMAND

-

8,193

11,852

11,271

1,685

6,185

667

39,852

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

633

10,885-274-

11,792
7,052
343
3,478
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

458
373
85

1,750
1,686
64

-

2,207
2,058
149

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,251
655
596

-

-

-

-

1,251
655
596

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

710
634
76

118
33
85

-

-

-

828
668
161

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,742
4,118
25
321
277

5,091
69
122

30

824

-

222

4,815

30

7,052
69

3,478

3,452
3,452

633

286

4,166
3,344
585
238

238

920
364

-

445

238
364

445

-

824

222

85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORSNON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

274

39

78
-

4,121

A1- 1010,908
4,187
148
1,367
5,122
85

39

-

NON-ENERGY USE

8,665
6,795
585
476
809
-

4,121

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2005
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
GASOLINE
23,5472,238
1,278
22,2702,238

DIESEL
12,741

12,741

HEAVY
OIL
5,302

5,094
-

KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
2,031
1,115
-

2,031

1,301
186

TOTAL
46,974
1,278
45,675
186
(207)

(207)
(23,547)

4,899

3,423

2,195

965

1,409

461

(23,547)

4,899(1,362)
4,785(6,483)
8,757

965

(891)
3,680

461

(79)
(1,380)(10,195)(8,736)(0)(79)(1,380)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

7,137

16,164

7,497

2,996

2,524

461

36,779ENERGY DEMAND

-

7,137

16,163

7,498

2,997

2,524

461

36,780

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

844

7,076

-

410

-

8,329
3,256
512
3,528
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

927
828
100

1,294
1,247
47

-

2,221
2,075
146

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

1,351
707
644

-

-

-

-

1,351
707
644

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Processing/Other

-

-

796
713
82

128
38
91

-

-

-

924
751
173

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,238
3,581
22
346
288

5,259
60
107

31

1,423

-

270

5,007

31

3,256
102

410

3,528

2,900
2,900

844

189

7,913
6,754
896
263

263

1,033
602

-

191

263
602

191

-

1,423

270

85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

44

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS131-

NON-ENERGY USE

11,221
3,641
129
2,039
5,326
85
174
-

690

A1- 11

11,869
9,653
896
526
793
-

690

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2008
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
23,792GASOLINE
5,109

DIESEL
8,236

HEAVY
OIL
13,220KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
2,050
254
-

1,278
22,514

5,109

8,236

13,220
0

2,184
133

387
133

(23,792)

4,956

4,235

(6,265)

975

2,325

460

(23,792)

4,956

(599)
4,834

(14,872)
8,848

975

3,719

460

TOTAL
52,6601,278
51,649267-(241)(1,394)(17,106)(15,471)0(241)(1,394)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION-

10,064

12,471

6,955

3,025

2,579

460

35,554ENERGY DEMAND-

10,064

12,470

6,954

3,026

2,580

460

35,553

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

503

6,592

-

398

-

7,494
3,198
498
3,099
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

797
697
100

1,289
1,205
84

-

2,086
1,902
184

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,251
655
596

-

-

-

-

1,251
655
596

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

793
713
80

128
38
91

-

-

-

921
751
171

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

3,919
3,283
17
371
248

4,537
55
84

27

1,498

-

275

4,314

27

3,198
100

398

3,099

6,145
6,145

503

196

5,384
4,661
516
207

207

699
668

-

185

207
668

185

-

1,498

275

85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS62

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS226-

NON-ENERGY USE

10,257
3,338
101
2,144
4,589
85
289
-

666

A1- 12

12,59010,807
516
414
853
-

666

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED ENERGY BALANCE FOR THE YEAR 2009
REFINED PRODUCTS BY PRODUCT TYPE
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

1/18/2012
CRUDE
OIL
23,418HEAVY KEROSENE
LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
281
1,522
196
-

GASOLINE
3,585

DIESEL
5,966

3,585
-

5,966
-

281
-

1,522

319
123

(23,418)

4,864

4,377

4,243

960

2,287

466

(23,418)

4,864

(381)
4,759

(4,426)
8,709

960

3,660

466

1,278
22,140TOTAL
34,9691,278
33,814123-(41)(1,372)(6,220)(4,807)(0)(41)(1,372)-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

8,449

10,343

4,524

2,482

2,483

466

28,749ENERGY DEMAND

-

8,449

10,342

4,526

2,482

2,483

466

28,749INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

403

4,216

-

264

-

4,882
1,601
330
2,364
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

655
576
79

1,062
996
67

-

1,718
1,571
146

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,153
629
525

-

-

-

-

1,153
629
525

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

708
637
71

113
33
79

-

-

-

820
670
150

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

3,884
3,283
17
371
213

3,922
55
84

22

1,161

-

275

3,698

22

9,265
3,338
101
1,807
3,934
85

1,601
66

264

2,364

4,566
4,566

403

185

4,156
3,532
448
175

175

588
602

-

191

175
602

191

-

1,161

275

85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

63

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

298-

NON-ENERGY USE

362
-

859

A1- 13

9,690
8,098
448
351
793
-

859

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 1990
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
11/28/2011

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/NUCL.

WOOD/BIOMASS

1,326

111

27

78

162

1,301
68
44

111

78
27

150
12

(384)

(111)

95

(77)

(16)
111

(77)

(111)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses(301)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

942

-

122

ENERGY DEMAND

948

-

109

672
189
10
1
30
33

-

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYElect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)

CHARCOAL-(10)HEAT ELEC.

-

3

1,703

-

1,529
218
44

9

132

(342)

8

166
(1)
(9)

(2)

(12)
(12)

(220)
(1)
(72)
(7)
(1)
(12)
(29)

(63)
(10)
(3)

3

(0)

3

(16)
1

TOTAL

-

152

3

9

132

1,361

-

152

3

9

120

1,342

-

6
2
86
45
2

70
11
11
3
1
14
11

14

28
38
7
5
3
16
0
6
6

776
51
302
62
5
60
48
6
31

23.43

1.28

21.29

12

A1- 14

-

3

-

6
3

46.00

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 1990

CRUDE OIL
6%
REF. PROD
2%

COAL & COKE
78%

HYDRO/NUCL.
5%WOOD/
BIOMASS
9%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1990
0%
0%

2%

4%
4%

INDUSTRIAL

5%

TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIES23%

MILITARY

58%

PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY
4%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1990
NON-ENERGY

31

NON-SPECIFIED

6

PUBLIC/COMML

48

MILITARY60

FISHERIES

5AGRICULTURAL

62

RESIDENTIAL

302

TRANSPORT

51

INDUSTRIAL

776

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 15

700

800

900

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY FUEL,
1990
REF. PROD
8%
COAL & COKE
71%

WOOD/ BIOMASS
11%
CHARCOAL
0%
HEAT
ELEC.
1%
9%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1990

RESID.

AGRIC.
INDUSTRIALMILITARY
PUB/COMML
NON-ENERGY

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD. DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990
RESIDENTIALAGRICULT.
FISHERIESTRANSPORT.
MILITARYNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

INDUSTRY

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1990
PUBLIC/COMMLMILITARYFISHERIESAGRICULTURAL

INDUSTRIALRESIDENTIAL

TRANSPORT

A1- 16

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 1996
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

684

40

32

19

167

-

685
12
12
-

40
-

39
0
6

19
-

155
12
0
-

-

(251)

(40)

12

(19)

(8)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(208)
(33)
(2)
(8)

(40)
-

(19)
-

-

-

(25)
40
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

433

-

44

-

159

ENERGY DEMAND

433

-

44

-

159

251
122
5
1
25
26

-

9
17
2
2
1
13
0
1

-

2
1
118
24
5
3

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY3HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASSCHARCOALHEAT ELEC.

-

2
-

(8)

TOTAL

-

943

-

859
103
12
6

5

51

(248)

5

82
(0)
(4)
-

(1)

(10)
(17)

(166)
(0)
(37)
(6)
(1)
(12)
(26)

2

5

51

695

2

5

51

695

24
5
6
2
0
8
6

285
22
253
32
2
52
37
12
22.84

2
2
-

-

2

-

4
2

7

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)*
16.61
0.91
5.32
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 17Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 1996

CRUDE OIL
4%
REF. PROD
3%

HYDRO/NUCL.
2%
COAL & COKE
73%

WOOD/
BIOMASS
18%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1996
0%

41%

2%

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORT

5%RESIDENTIAL

7%AGRICULTURAL0%FISHERIESMILITARY

5%

3%
37%

PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1996
NON-ENERGY

12NON-SPECIFIED-

PUBLIC/COMML

37

MILITARY

52

FISHERIES

2AGRICULTURAL

32

RESIDENTIAL

253

TRANSPORT22

INDUSTRIAL

285

-

50

100

150

200

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 18250

300

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY FUEL,
1996
REF. PROD
7%WOOD/
BIOMASS
23%
COAL & COKE
62%

CHARCOAL
0%

ELEC.
7%

HEAT
1%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1996
RESIDENTIALAGRICULT.
MILITARY

PUB/COMML
NON-ENERGY
INDUSTRIAL

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD. DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1996
FISHERIESAGRICULT.

MILITARY

NON-ENERGYRESIDENTIAL
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT.

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1996
MILITARY
15%

PUBLIC/COMML
12%FISHERIES
1%AGRICULTURAL
3%

RESIDENTIAL
12%

TRANSPORT
10%INDUSTRIAL
47%

A1- 19

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 2000
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

338

18

40

38

337
10
9
-

1
17
-

42
3
(1)

(53)

(18)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(31)
(16)
(1)
(4)

(18)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMANDUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYCHARCOAL

HEAT

166

-

-

38
-

154
12
0
-

-

(0)

(38)

(6)

(38)
-

-

-

(17)
18
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

285

-

40

-

160

285

-

40

-

160

148
95
4
0
21
16

-

12
9
2
1
1
11
0
4

-

1
1
122
20
7
3

1

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

(0)

599

-

529
81
12
(1)

3

31

(79)

2

48
(0)
(2)
-

0
2

(6)

ELEC.

(1)

(2)
(13)

(35)
(0)
(18)
(4)
(1)
(3)
(17)

2

3

31

520

2

3

31

520

13
3
3
1
0
7
3

173
12
225
26
1
47
23
11

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)*
2.64
0.15
10.47
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 2013.26

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2000
CRUDE OIL
3%
REF. PROD
7%
COAL & COKE
56%

HYDRO/NUCL.
6%

WOOD/
BIOMASS
28%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2000
INDUSTRIAL

2%
0%

TRANSPORT33%

RESIDENTIAL

5%3%

AGRICULTURALFISHERIES

9%MILITARY
0%

PUBLIC/COMML

43%

5%

NON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2000
NON-ENERGY

11

NON-SPECIFIED-

PUBLIC/COMML

23

MILITARY

47

FISHERIES

1AGRICULTURAL

26

RESIDENTIAL

225

TRANSPORT

12INDUSTRIAL

173

0

50

100

150

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 21

200

250

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY
FUEL, 2000
REF. PROD
8%CHARCOAL0%WOOD/
BIOMASS
31%

HEAT
0%
ELEC.
6%

COAL & COKE
55%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2000
TRANSPORT0%

AGRICULTURAL
1%

RESIDENTIAL
33%

FISHERIES0%MILITARY
8%
PUBLIC/COMML
6%

INDUSTRIAL
52%

NON-ENERGY
0%NON-SPECIFIED
0%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PRODUCTDEMAND BY SECTOR: 2000
INDUSTRIAL
30%
TRANSPORT
22%

NON-ENERGY10%RESIDENTIAL
6%NON-SPECIFIED0%MILITARY
27%

AGRICULTURALFISHERIES
2%

PUBLIC/COMML
0%

3%

ESTIMATED DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2000

MILITARY
24%

FISHERIES
1%AGRICULTURAL
4%
RESIDENTIAL
9%INDUSTRIAL
41%
TRANSPORT
10%

A1- 22

PUBLIC/COMML
11%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 2005
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

391

24

23

44

436
36
80
-

1
22
-

23
0
(0)

(112)

(24)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(84)
(21)
(2)
(5)

(24)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMANDUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYCHARCOAL

HEAT

186

-

-

44
-

174
12
0
-

-

13

(43)

(6)

(43)
-

-

-

(9)
24
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

279

-

37

1

279

-

37

151
85
5
0
20
17

-

8
12
2
1
1
11
0
1

2

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

(0)

668

0
0
-

655
93
80
(0)

4

38

(127)

4

60
(0)
(3)
-

-

2
-

(6)

ELEC.

(1)

(4)
(15)

(72)
(0)
(24)
(4)
(0)
(5)
(22)

2
2
-

180

2

4

38

541

-

180

2

4

38

539

-

1
1
135
24
8
5

15
4
4
1
0
9
5

175
16
230
32
2
47
29
8
16.47

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.15
0.17
11.15
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 23Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2005
WOOD/
BIOMASS
28%

HYDRO/NUCL.
7%

COAL &COKE
59%

REF. PROD
3%CRUDE OIL
3%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY
SECTOR 2005
43%

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORT
6%RESIDENTIAL

0%AGRICULTURALFISHERIES

3%9%MILITARY
PUBLIC/COMML

5%
2%

0%

NON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

32%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2005
8

NON-ENERGY-NON-SPECIFIED

29

PUBLIC/COMML

47

MILITARY

2

FISHERIES

32

AGRICULTURAL230

RESIDENTIAL

16

TRANSPORT175

INDUSTRIAL

-

50

100
150
PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 24200

250

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND
BY FUEL: 2005
CHARCOAL0%WOOD/
BIOMASS
33%

HEAT
1%

ELEC.
7%

REF. PROD
7%
COAL &
COKE
52%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2005
AGRICULTUR
AL

TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL30%
MILITARY
7%

FISHERIES
0%

PUB/COMML

INDUSTRIAL54%

NONSPECIFIED
0%NONENERGY
1%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PRODUCTDEMAND BY SECTOR: 2005

INDUSTRIAL
23%
NON-ENERGY
2%NONSPECIFIED
0%

TRANSPORT
32%

RESIDENTIAL
6%MILITARY30%

AGRICULTURAL
4%

PUBLIC/COMML
0%FISHERIES
3%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2005

INDUSTRIAL
39%

TRANSPORT
10%RESIDENTIAL
10%

PUBLIC/COMML
13%

MILITARY23%

AGRICULTURAL
4%FISHERIES
1%

A1- 25Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 2008
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/28/2011
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

370

24

29

43

425
12
66
-

1
23
-

29
0
-

(103)

(24)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(76)
(20)
(2)
(5)

(24)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMANDUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYCHARCOAL

HEAT

206

-

-

43
-

194
12
-

-

7

(43)

(6)

(43)
-

-

-

(15)
24
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

267

-

36

-

200

267

-

36

-

200

148
74
5
0
20
19

-

7
13
2
1
1
10
0
1

-

1
1
153
25
8
6

1

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

1

672

2
1
-

662
77
67
-

4

39

(123)

4

62
(0)
(3)
-

-

2
-

(6)

ELEC.

(1)

(3)
(16)

(68)
(0)
(23)
(4)
(1)
(5)
(22)

2

4

40

549

2

4

40

549

15
4
5
1
0
9
5

172
18
239
33
2
47
31
8
17.15

2
1
-

-

2

-

3
2

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.12
0.21
11.83
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

A1- 26

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2008

WOOD/
BIOMASS
31%

COAL & COKE
55%
HYDRO/NUCL.
6%

REF. PROD
4%CRUDE OIL
4%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2008
6%0%

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORT

9%RESIDENTIAL

44%

AGRICULTURAL

6%0%FISHERIESMILITARY

1%

PUBLIC/COMML

31%

NON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

3%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2008
NON-ENERGY

8NON-SPECIFIED-

PUBLIC/COMML

31

MILITARY

47

FISHERIES

2AGRICULTURAL

33

RESIDENTIAL

239

TRANSPORT18

INDUSTRIAL

172
-

50

100

150

200

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 27250

300

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND
BY FUEL, 2008
REF. PROD
7%WOOD/
BIOMASS36%

CHARCOAL
0%
HEAT
1%

COAL &
COKE
49%

ELEC.
7%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2008
AGRICULTURAL
2%

TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
28%FISHERIES0%MILITARY
7%
PUBLIC/COMML
7%
NON-ENERGY
1%

INDUSTRIAL
55%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD. DEMANDBY SECTOR: 2008

TRANSPORT35%
INDUSTRIAL
21%

RESIDENTIAL
6%

NON-ENERGY
2%
NON-SPECIFIED0%MILITARY
29%

AGRICULTURAL
3%
FISHERIES
3%

PUBLIC/COMML
1%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2008
TRANSPORT
10%INDUSTRIAL
39%

RESIDENTIAL
12%AGRICULTURAL
3%
FISHERIES
1%

PUBLIC/COMML
13%

MILITARY22%

A1- 28Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NAUTILUS INSTITUTE

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED SUMMARY ENERGY BALANCE FOR 2009
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
12/19/2011

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

356

23

12

43

207

-

446
4
93
-

1
22
-

12
0
-

43
-

195
12
-

-

(91)

(23)

17

(43)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(63)
(21)
(2)
(5)

(23)
-

(43)
-

-

-

(5)
23
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

265

-

29

-

201

ENERGY DEMAND

265

-

29

-

201

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMML
NON-ENERGY

144
76
5
0
20
19
1

-

5
10
2
1
1
9
0
1

-

1
1
156
24
8
6
6

CHARCOAL

(6)

HEAT

ELEC.

-

TOTAL

1

642

2
0
-

685
51
94
-

4

36

(104)

4

57
(0)
(3)
-

-

2

(1)

(3)
(15)

(49)
(0)
(24)
(4)
(1)
(4)
(22)

4

37

538

4

37

538

14
4
4
1
0
8
5

165
15
242
32
1
45
31
- 8

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
3.73
0.20
11.87
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

15.80

A1- 29

(6)

2
1
2
2
-

2

-

3
1

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2009
COAL & COKE
55%

CRUDE OIL
4%
REF. PROD
2%. HYDRO/NUCL
7%

WOOD/
BIOMASS
32%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2009
1%
6%

8%

INDUSTRIAL

0%
TRANSPORT

6%31%

RESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
3%45%

PUBLIC/COMML
NON-ENERGYESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2009
NON-ENERGY

8

PUBLIC/COMML

31

MILITARY

45

FISHERIES

1AGRICULTURAL

32

RESIDENTIAL

242

TRANSPORT

15

INDUSTRIAL

165
-

50

100

150

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

A1- 30

200

250

300

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND
BY FUEL, 2009
CHARCOAL0%WOOD/
BIOMASS
38%

REF. PROD
5%

HEAT
1%
ELEC.
7%

COAL &
COKE
49%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2009
TRANSPORT0%
AGRICULTURAL
2%

RESIDENTIAL
29%FISHERIES0%

INDUSTRIAL
55%

MILITARY
7%
PUBLIC/COMML
7%

NON-ENERGY
0%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD. DEMANDBY SECTOR: 2009FISHERIES3%MILITARY
32%

AGRICULTURAL
4%

PUBLIC/COMML
1%

RESIDENTIAL
6%
NON-ENERGY
3%

TRANSPORT34%

INDUSTRIAL
17%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2009
MILITARY
22%

PUBLIC/COMML
13%

FISHERIES
1%AGRICULTURAL
3%

RESIDENTIAL
12%INDUSTRIAL
38%

TRANSPORT
11%

A1- 31Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Workpapers—Energy Supply Sectors
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:COAL EXTRACTION AND PROCESSING, IMPORTS
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

8/9/2012

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Source/Note:
Domestic Coal Production (official)
Anthracite Coal
Brown CoalHeat Content, Anthracite
Heat Content, Brown Coal
Weighted Ave Heat Content
Official Ave. Heat Content
Conversion Factor
Total Coal Production (official)
True-up factor to reduce coal supply to meet demand
Total Coal Production (revised)
Coal and Coke Imports
Total Coal Imports
Average Heat Content
Coal Imports
Coke Imports
Average Heat Content
Coke Imports
Total Coal and Coke Imports
Coal Exports
Total Coal Exports (Anthracite)
Heat Content, Anthracite
Conversion Factor
Total Coal Exports (Anthracite)
Coal Use in Coal Mining
Per-unit coal use in mining
Weighted Ave Heat Content
Conversion Factor
Coal Use in Mining Industry
Coal Transport Losses
Coal Loss Rate
Mass of Coal Lost
Energy content of Coal Lost
Electricity Use in Coal Mining
Electricity intensity of mining
Conversion Factor
Electricity Used in Coal Mining

4.90E+07 te
2.10E+07 te
6150 kcal/kg
4250 kcal/kg
5580 kcal/kg
4500 kcal/kg
4.184 kJ/kcal
1317960000 GJ
98.7%
1301287806 GJ
2.38E+06 te
26.2 GJ/te
6.24E+07 GJ
2.09E+05 te
28.47 GJ/te
5.95E+06 GJ, or
6.84E+07 GJ
1,700,329 te
6200 kcal/kg
4.184 kJ/kcal
4.41E+07 GJ

1, 21
1, 21
2
2
10

Assumption

38342.0308E+05 Tce(to China and Japan)

5, 16
8

39.1 kg/te
5580 kcal/kg
4.184 kJ/kcal
6.31E+07 GJ

71.0% of mined
6.91E+05 te
1.61E+07 GJ

Guess, see Note 24

34.34 kWh/te
0.0036 GJ/kWh
8.54E+06 GJ, or

60.006901 GJ/GJ net coal output

COAL SUPPLY ESTIMATE
Coal Imports to the DPRK (China)
Coke Imports from FSU
Coal Exports to China

1.75E+06 te
2.09E+05 te
1.55E+05 te

Coal Imports to the DPRK relative to 1993
Coke Imports to the DPRK relative to 1990
Total Estimated Coal+Coke Imports (GJ)
Coal Exp. from DPRK rel. to 1993 Exp. to China
Total Estimated Coal Exports (GJ)
Domestic Coal Production relative to 1990
Total Estimated Domestic Coal Production (GJ)
Estimated Coal Use in Coal Mining (GJ)
Estimated Coal Losses (GJ)
Estimated Electricity Use in Coal Mining (GJ)

1996
18%
52.7%
1.16E+07
298.49%1.20E+07
52.61%
6.85E+08
3.28E+07
8.38E+06
4.44E+06(In 1993)(In 1990)(In 1993)
2000
19%
26%
1.05E+07
231.9%
9.32E+06
25.86%
3.37E+08
1.61E+07
4.12E+06
2.18E+06

A1- 32

2005
75.3%
17%
3.55E+07
1989.2%
7.99E+07
33.49%
4.36E+08
2.09E+07
5.33E+06
2.82E+06

2008
24.2%
7.1%
1.15E+071640%
6.59E+07
32.63%
4.25E+08
2.03E+07
5.20E+06
2.75E+06

11
3
11
2009
7.3%
6.1%
3.72E+06
2325%
9.34E+07
34.26%
4.46E+08
2.13E+07
5.46E+06
2.89E+06

2010--Dec.
THIS
SECTION80%
OF THIS47%
WORKSHE
3.95E+07
ET NOT
200%
USED FOR
8.04E+06
THIS
ANALYSIS
59.8%
7.78E+08
3.72E+07
9.52E+06
5.04E+06

17, 2212, 22
Calculated
18, 19Calculated
13
Calculated
Calculated
Calculated
CalculatedNautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Data on Coal Imports from and Exports to Other Countries, 2000
Data on Coal Exports from China to the DPRK and Imports to China from the DPRK (Source 15)

Mer. ID
Name
Unit
27011100 Blend coalkg
27011100 anthracite coalkg
27011210 agglomerating(cindery) coalkg
27011290 other bituminous/soft coalkg
27011900 other coalkg
27040010 coking coal and semi-coking coalkg
27060000 coke tar; oil tar from distilling minerals
kg

ExportAmountUS $1,024,000$

40,9601,024,000$

40,960100,489,900$ 3,616,390 -

17,406,100$

53,646,410$ 2,018,696 -53,166,100$ 3,001,260 -

154,500$

ImportAmount8,142,700
8,142,700

US $
$
$

90,33290,332-519,652 -

37,600 -225,887,010

Data on Coal Exports to Japan from the DPRK (Source 16)
Mer. ID
Name
27011100 anthracite coal
351,069 tonnes
Data on Coal Imports from Australia to the DPRK
Total estimated coal imports from Australia (see Notes 14, 23)

31,194 tonnes

Data on Coal Imports from and Exports to Other Countries, through 2008/2009
Coal and coal products imports to the DPRK from China, as indicated in data collected as in Source 19 ,(China Customs Statistics, except for 1992 through 1994, which are from UN Comtrade Units: metric tonnes

Year

Anthracite Coal
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

2,700
1,024
200
969
4,867
19,011
4,858
1,579
3,343
5,674

Other NonBituminous Agglomerated
Coal
Coal

429,574
117,956
267,697234,810367,315
241,040
142,419
205,249
227,250
228,116
84,234

2,488
53,646
151,954
26,68432,969
4,271
195
345
483

Total
Coals (HS2701)

Coke; Retort
Carbon (HS2704)

1,369,165
1,668,080
1,552,365
1,105,746
323,772
268,440
98,918434,762
172,627
419,851
262,463405,152
264,322
147,471
206,828
227,250
231,804
90,390242,121

123,444
83,33545,16496,222100,053

Pitch, Cokefrom Mineral
Tars (HS2708)

48,875
84,127
72,97053,166
125,497
155,91487,141
22,21325,87817,644
7,534
7,592
3,948
2,000

2,033
2,671
5,403
23,873
6,152
2,877
3,104
5,635
4,243
4,306
4,959
6,179
4,488
5,721
5,561
6,186
5,901
7,635

Mineral Tars,
Oils from Coal
Tars (HS 2707)

190
1,388
40
100
5

185
155
99
380
592
125
7
29
25
97
52

Coal and coal products exports from the DPRK to China, as indicated in data collected as in Source 19 ,(China Customs Statistics, except for 1992 through 1994 and 2010, which are from UN
Comtrade database) are as follows for selected years:

Year

Anthracite Coal
(HS 270111)

Briquettes,
Lignite,ovoids, andw hether orsimilar solidnot
Bituminous Other NonTotal
fuels
agglomerated Pitch, Coke from Mineral Tars, Oils
Coal (HS Agglomerated manufactured Coals (HS (excl. Jet) (HS Mineral Tars (HS from Coal Tars
270112)
Coalfrom coal
2701)
2702)
2708)
(HS 2707)

1991
1992
711,150
1993
154,926
1994
64,317
1995
28,836
1996
33,777
1997
42,704
1998
27,344
1999
12,211
2000
8,143
2001
86,361
2002
406,534
2003
745,339
2004
1,571,348
2005
2,804,239
2006
2,484,991
494
2,485,486
2007
3,741,267
2,177
3,743,444
2008
2,537,274
2,322
2,539,596
2009
3,598,951
3,083
3,602,034
2010
4,603,099
1,898
6,346
29,771 4,644,859
2005 "total coals" figure inclues 21 tonnes of lignite coal. 2010 total includes HS 2702.

A1- 33

52
184

229

100
318
50

920
219

208
5
3,746

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Coal and coal products exports from the DPRK to Japan as indicated in data collected as in Source 16 ,(Japan Customs Statistics) are as follows for 1990 through 2008:
Mer. ID
Name
27011100 anthracite coalYear

Tonnes
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

528,329
498,307366,700
459,585409,931403,566
428,772
397,370
349,611
251,844
351,069
411,178
354,491
333,545
255,945
277,017
110,418-

Average
Cost, 1000 Value, 1000
Yen/tonne
Yen
6.73
3,558,217
6.40
3,187,789
5.88
2,156,175
4.82
2,216,519
4.15
1,702,676
3.89
1,570,310
4.89
2,094,622
5.48
2,177,716
5.49
1,918,955
4.23
1,065,360
3.61
1,266,121
4.06
1,668,661
4.15
1,470,955
3.75
1,250,831
4.47
1,144,447
6.95
1,924,606
8.42
929,947
No imports at all to Japan from DPRK listed for 2007
No imports at all to Japan from DPRK listed for 2008
Import statistics for 2009 not yet available as of 9/2010, but value assumed to be zeroNotes:
1 1989 value from document in authors' files [HT1]. Other estimates are as high as 87
total Mte, and as low as 43 (both for 1990), and more recent outside ROK estimates are even lower(For example, the ROK's MOCIE and the Korean National Statistical Office estimate 1990 output of
33.15 million tonnes, declining to 21 million tonnes in 1996. Based on other information we have received, andon our analysis of DPRK energy demand in 1990 and 1996, these estimates appear too low.
2 Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea , RINU, 1993. P. 14.
3 Imports to NK. Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea , RINU,
1993. P. 23. Based on various statistics, including UN
4 J. Sinton, Editor, China Energy Databook , 1992 (Revised 1993). LBL. Page xii. Coal import figure
assumes washed Chinese coal.
5 Exports to China. Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea , RINU,
1993. P. 25. Based on various statistics, including UN
6 Raw coal production electricity use, China, 1980, from "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial
Products" Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL
7 Coal use in coal mining from [Chinese language spreadsheet dated 12-Feb-93 provided by J. Sinton],
8 Young Sik Jang, North Korean Energy Economics , Korea Development Institute, 1994 (p. 179).
Value in this source for import coal to NK is within 1% of value for washed Chinese coal from reference 4.
10 Official 1989 value from document in authors' files [EE1].
11 J. Sinton, Editor, China Energy Databook (Revised 1996). Lawrence Berk eley National Laboratory (LBNL).
Value is for the year 1993. Page VII-8.
12 Virtually all cok e imported to the DPRK in 1996, 2005, 2008, and 2009 is assumed to come from China.
Cok e imports in these yeara are therefore assumed to be equal to imports from China as reflected incustoms statistics, plus
10% to reflect additional imports from China not reported incustoms statistics, plus small-volume, non-reported imports from other countries, such as Russia.

A1- 34

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
13 Set so as to balance demand+exports-imports. For 1996, value is consistent with the notes of someobservers suggesting that coal output in that year was about half what it was in 1990, though estimates ofof DPRK coal output over the years vary significantly. For 2005, the value shown is reasonably consistent
with the "24.6 million tonnes of anthracite" figure provide in the State of the Environment DPR Korea 2003
report prepared with UNDP, and published by the United Nations Environment Programme, although the comparison
depends on the conversion factor used. Of course, thevalue in the "SOE" report would have been a projection at the time that the report was written, but it is quite close
to the value of 24 million tonnes cited by ROK sources (MOCIE, the National Statistical Service) for DPRK coal
output in 2005. By comparison, the implied domestic coal output estimated here for 2000 is on the order of
25 to 35 percent lower than the 22.5 million tonnes that ROK sources (same as above) estimate for the DPRK.
Values estimated above for 2008 and 2009 coal output are similarly somewhat lower than those estimated by ROK sources(25.06 and 25.50 million tonnes, respectively), though again the comparison depends on the coal heat content
used by the ROK analysts, which is not immediately clear from our reading of the source material.
14 "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fact Sheet", from the Australian Department of Foreign Trade(www.dfat.gov.au/geo/dprk , visited 5/17/2002), lists Australian exports of coal to the DPRK during "2000-2001"
with a value of
1.70 million $AU. Data from http://www.australiancoal.com/exports.htm(visited 5/23/02) show that
104.4 million tonnes of "Metallurgical coal" and89 million tonnesof "thermal" coal were exported overall by Australia in 2000-2001, with values, respectively, of6367.7 and4194.9 million $AU. This suggest that the average value per ton of coal shipped was$
54.62 AU per tonne,
so that if coal exports to the DPRK were of the same proportions of metallurgical and thermal coals as overall exports,
a total of approximately
31,127 tonnes of coal would have been exported from Australia to the DPRK
in 2000-2001. This estimate is very similar to the value reported by UN Comtrade, see Note 23 below.
The 2009 version of the above fact sheet (http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/dprk .pdf, accessed 9/17/10)
shows total recorded Australian exports to the DPRK to be zero for the period 2005 thorugh 2009, so by definition
Australian coal exports to the DPRK over that period (at lest official exports) were0 as well.
15 Data from China Customs Report 2000 , pp. 1483-1495 (in Chinese).
16 From/derived from Japan customs statistics, http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/info/index_e.htm, andhttp://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/download/index_d012_e.htm (the latter last visited 4/2010).
17 Year 2000 value includes reported coal imports from China and Australia.
18 Year 2000 value includes reported coal exports to China and Japan.
19 China Customs Statistics reported coal exports from China to the DPRK of
147,471 tonnes
in 2005. As compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006, 2008, and 2010. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's 2006 paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
20 Following data on coal products imports and exports from source as noted above.
Imports to the DPRK from China
Commodity
Code

2708
2701
270111270112270119270120

Product/Product GroupPITCH,COKE FM MN TARSSOLID FUELS FROM COAL
ANTHRACIT COAL,N AG
BITUMNOUS COAL,N AG
OTHER COAL,NT AGGLM
OTHER 2701

Exports from the DPRK to China
Commodity
Code

2701
2706
2702

Product/Product GroupSOLID FUELS FROM COAL
MINERAL TARSLIGNITE,EXCLUDING JET

Units: Metric Tonnes
2000
4,243.2
172,627
1,024
117,956
53,646-

2001
4,306.3
419,851200
267,697
151,954-

2002
4,959.2
262,523969
234,810
26,68460

2003
6,179.5
405,152
4,867
367,315
32,969-2004
4,488.2
264,357
19,011
241,040
4,271
35

2005
5,720.6
147,471
4,858
142,419
195
-

2006

2007

2008

2009

206,828
1,579
205,249

227,250
227,250

231,804
3,343
228,116
345-

90,3905,674
84,234483

2002
406,534

2003
745,339

2004
1,571,348

2005
2,804,260
920
21

2006
2,484,991
229
494

2007
3,741,267
208
2,177

2008
2,537,274
5
2,322

2009
3,598,951

Units: Metric Tonnes
2000
8,143

2001
86,361A1- 353083

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
21 The report DPR KOREA : STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2003 , published by the United Nations Environment Programme,
lists (tables 3.15 and 3.16) anthracite coal "primary consumption" of
45,409 thousand tonnes, "bitumimous coal"primary consumption of
11,934 thousand tonnes, and total coal consumption of
60,000 thousand
tonnes. Given that the DPRK is said to have very limited reserves of bituminous coal, and lignite coal
is not listed in the tables referenced, we consider 21 million tonnes of lignite to be more believable.
A set of figures in the authors' files [NKES-01], dated 2001 and citing a DPRK source, lists 1991 output figures that are similar to
the above--45.4 million tonnes anthracite, 14.3 million tonnes of lignite, and 365,000 tonnes of "raphaelite". This appears roughly
consistent with an estimate of 70 million tonnes for 1990, given that production declined after 1990. The same source provided thefollowing coal production estimates for other years.
Yearly coal production rates
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Million*
60
59
58
52.8
37.8
Tonnes
Year
1998
1999
2000
Million*
22
22.1
22.3
Tonnes* Stated by the source as "k ilo-tonnes", which seems clearly to have been a units error.

1996
27.2

1997
27

22 The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 10/19/10) includes the following statistics on exports from
Russia to the DPRK of coal products:
HS2701 = Coal
Period
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Trade Value$3,859,085$6,043,451$3,028,770$898,866$3,947,190$5,041,736$11,634,797$53,522,090$101,085,805$3,274,753$15,198,654$4,937,349

HS2702 = Lignite
HS2704 = Coke
Implied
NetWeight
Implied
NetWeight
Implied
NetWeight (kg) Cost/tonne Trade Value(kg)
Cost/tonne Trade Value(kg)
Cost/tonne
86,743,500 $
44.49
161,737,000 $
37.37
82,094,700 $
36.89$136,340
2,005,000 $68.00
23,059,100 $38.98
158,158,020 $
24.96
214,629,750 $
23.49
301,159,810 $
38.63
1,170,252,170 $45.74$28,039 1,263,000 $
22.20
2,277,528,770 $44.38$24,331 1,142,300 $21.30
65,668,900 $
49.87
192,388,250 $
79.00
37,719,950 $ 130.89

23 The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 3/11/11) includes the following statistics on exports from
Australia to the DPRK of coal products:
HS2707 = Coal tar distillation products
HS2702 = Lignite
including oils
Implied
NetWeight
Implied
NetWeight
Implied
Trade Value
NetWeight (kg) Cost/tonne Trade Value(kg)
Cost/tonne Trade Value(kg)
Cost/tonne$1,488,759
35,000,000 $42.54$160,309
2,000,000 $
80.15$967,029
31,194,000 $
31.00
HS2701 = Coal

Period
1991
1993
2000

24 Though this is the roughest of estimates, it is of the same order of magnitude as the 0.5% implied for coal transport in the western US in
Exporting Powder River Basin Coal: Risk s and Costs , by the Western Organization of Resource Councils, dated January, 2011,
available as http://www.worc.org/userfiles/file/Coal/Exporting_Powder_River_Basin_Coal_Risk s_and_Cost.pdf.
Of course, the transport distance for this US example, is much further than the average in the DPRK, but loading, unloading, andother coal transport infrastructure is lik ely better in the US. As another example, a 2006 calculation of fuel costs adjustments forelectricity generation in the Indian state of Punjab used a coal loss factor of 0.8%, also in the same range as the assumed value (seehttp://pserc.nic.in/pages/7_2006.html). Yet another example from India is "Case Study Of The Damodar Valley Region", a chapter in an industrial
ecology book , probably dated late 1990s, and available as http://www.roionline.org/book s/Industrial%20ecology_chapter09_Damodar_Coal.pdf.
This example suggests about 4 percent losses during transport, with an additional 6 percent losses during storage, though these estimates
may also include pilferage.

A1- 36

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:OIL IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND REFINING
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

2/27/2012

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Source/Note:
Domestic Crude Oil Production
Crude Oil Imports, Total
Conversion Factor
Crude Oil Imports, Total
Refined Products Imports
FUEL
Gasoline
Kerosene
DieselHeavy Oil
TOTAL
Conversion Factor
Total Refined Products Imports
Total Oil Imports

0 te
2.60E+06 te
4.26E+01 GJ/te
1.11E+08 GJ
teEnergy Use in Refining--West Coast Refinery
Energy Use in Refining-East Coast Refinery
Conversion Factor
Total Refining Losses
Production of Refined Products, Total
LPG Consumption
Conversion Factor
LPG Consumption, Total

toe/te
1.20E+05
5.00E+04
3.00E+05
1.50E+05

Toe
1.26E+05
5.16E+04
3.10E+05
1.49E+05
6.36E+05 toe
4.1868E+01 GJ/toe
2.66E+07 GJ
1.37E+08 GJ

1

1.05E+00
1.03E+00
1.03E+00
9.91E-01

0.0578 toe/te of input
0.0523 toe/te of input
4.1868E+01 GJ/toe
6.29E+06 GJ
1.04E+08 GJ
2.55E+03 te
4.24E+01 GJ/te
1.08E+05 GJ

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CRUDE OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS SUPPLY
Input Data for the Year 1996
Crude Oil Imports from China, 1st through 3rd Quarters, 1996
7.48E+05 tonnes
Recorded Crude Oil Imports from China, all of 1996
936,170 tonnes
Estimate of other crude oil imports, 1996
0.00E+00 tonnes
Conversion Factor
4.26E+01 GJ/te
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports to DPRK, 1996
3.99E+07 GJ
Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 1st - 3rd Q., 1996
42,744 tonnes
Recorded Refined Products Imports from China, all of 1996
68,378 tonnes
Conversion Factor
1.050 toe/te
HFO Supplied by KEDO, 1996 (11/1/95 to 10/31/96)
500,000 tonnes
Est. Conversion Factor, KEDO Oil
1.00 toe/teOther Imports of Refined Products, 1996
tonnestoe/teGJ
Gasoline
1.26E+05
1.050
5.54E+06
Kerosene
1.20E+04
1.032
5.18E+05
Diesel
1.20E+05
1.032
5.18E+06
HFO
9.40E+04
0.991
3.90E+06
Total Estimated Refined Product Imports to DPRK, 1996
3.91E+07 GJ
Estimated Refined Product Exports from DPRK, 2000 (to China)
HFO
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
Total of above
Estimated HFO placed in storage, 1996

A1- 37

tonnes
GJ
0.00E+00
10,4504.43E+05
10,4504.43E+05
155,360 tonnes
6.45E+06 GJ

3
3
3
3

2
17

4

5
30
13

5,6
30
7

14
14
14
14

8
8

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Input Data for the Year 2000
DPRK Crude Oil Production
30,000 tonnes
27
Reported Crude Oil Imports from China, 2000
3.89E+05 tonnes
18
Other Imports of Crude Oil from China not Reported to Customs
0.00E+00 tonnes
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports from China, 2000
3.89E+05 tonnes
Estimate of other crude oil imports, 2000 (unknown source)
0.00E+00 tonnes
See below
Conversion Factor
4.26E+01 GJ/te
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports to DPRK, 2000
1.66E+07 GJ
Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2000
1.17E+05 tonnes
18
Extrapolated Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2000
1.17E+05 tonnes
Conversion Factor
1.050 toe/te
HFO Supplied by KEDO, 2000 (1/1/2000 to 12/31/2000)
394,722 tonnes
19
Est. Conversion Factor, KEDO Oil
1.00 toe/te
Total Imports of Refined Products, 2000
tonnestoe/teGJ
Gasoline
1.09E+05
1.050
4.79E+06 Sum of
Kerosene
2.20E+04
1.032
9.51E+05 Imports fromDiesel
1.90E+05
1.032
8.22E+06 all nations
HFO
5.40E+05
0.991
2.24E+07 (see below,
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
6.43E+04
1.012
2.72E+06 and note 15)
Total Estimated Refined Product Imports to DPRK, 2000
3.91E+07 GJ
Estimated Refined Product Exports from DPRK, 2000 (to China)
tonnesGJ
HFO
68,135
2.83E+06
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
4,329
1.83E+05
Total of above
72,464
3.01E+06
Estimated Net HFO placed in storage, 2000
(30,000) tonnes
26-1.245E+06 GJ
26
Input Data for the Year 2005
DPRK Crude Oil Production
30,000 tonnes
27
Reported Crude Oil Imports from China, 2005
522,844 tonnes
30
Other Imports of Crude Oil from China not Reported to Customs
tonnesTotal Estimated Crude Oil Imports from China, 2005
522,844 tonnes
Estimate of other crude oil imports, 2005 (unknown source)
tonnesSee below
Conversion Factor
42.59 GJ/te
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports to DPRK, 2005
2.23E+07 GJ
Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2005
148,963 tonnes
31
Extrapolated Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2005
1.49E+05 tonnes
Conversion Factor
1.050 toe/te
HFO Supplied by KEDO, 2005
0 tonnes
31
Est. Conversion Factor, KEDO Oil
1.00 toe/te
Total Imports of Refined Products, 2005
tonnestoe/teGJ
Gasoline
50,9091.050
2.24E+06 Sum of
Kerosene
46,994
1.032
2.03E+06 Imports fromDiesel
2.95E+05
1.032
1.27E+07 all nations
HFO
1.228E+05
0.991
5.09E+06 (see below,
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
9.67E+03
1.012
4.10E+05 and note 36)
Total Estimated Refined Product Imports to DPRK, 2005
2.25E+07 GJ
Estimated Refined Product Exports from DPRK, 2005 (to China)
tonnesGJ
HFO
0.00E+00
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
4,393
1.86E+05
Total of above
4,393
1.86E+05
Estimated Net HFO placed in storage, 2005
(5,000) tonnes
26-2.07E+05 GJ
26
Implied total 2005 crude oil, oil products into the DPRK:
4.48E+07 GJ/yr, which implies annual use of(at a conversion rate of
7.33 bbl oil equivalent per tonne oil equivalent)
7.84E+06 bbl/yr or
an average of
21,481 bbl per day, which is somewhat higher than totals estimated by source in Note 37 .

A1- 38Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Input Data for the Year 2008
DPRK Crude Oil Production
30,000 tonnes
27
Reported Crude Oil Imports from China, 2008
528,577 tonnes
30
Other Imports of Crude Oil from China not Reported to Customs
tonnesTotal Estimated Crude Oil Imports from China, 2008
528,577 tonnes
Estimate of other crude oil imports, 2008 (unknown source)
tonnesSee below
Conversion Factor
42.59 GJ/te
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports to DPRK, 2008
2.25E+07 GJ
Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2008
117,743 tonnes
31
Extrapolated Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2008
1.18E+05 tonnes
Conversion Factor
1.050 toe/te
HFO Supplied by Six-Party Talks Parties, 2008
304,000 tonnes
41, 42
Est. Conversion Factor, KEDO Oil
1.00 toe/te
Total Imports of Refined Products, 2008
tonnestoe/teGJ
Gasoline
1.16E+05
1.050
5.11E+06 Sum of
Kerosene
50,542
1.032
2.18E+06 Imports fromDiesel
1.91E+05
1.032
8.24E+06 all nations
HFO
3.19E+05
0.991
1.32E+07 (see below,
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
9.13E+03
1.012
3.87E+05 and note 36)
Total Estimated Refined Product Imports to DPRK, 2008
2.91E+07 GJ
Estimated Refined Product Exports from DPRK, 2008 (to China and RF)
tonnesGJ
HFO
5.50
2.28E+02 (See notes 32
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
3,148
1.33E+05 and 44)
Total of above
3,153
1.34E+05
Estimated Net HFO placed in storage, 2008
tonnes26
0.00E+00 GJ
26
Implied total 2008 crude oil, oil products into the DPRK:
5.16E+07 GJ/yr, which implies annual imports of(at a conversion rate of
7.33 bbl oil equivalent per tonne oil equivalent)
9.04E+06 bbl/yr or
an average of
24,774 bbl per day.
Input Data for the Year 2009DPRK Crude Oil Production
30,000 tonnes
27
Reported Crude Oil Imports from China, 2009
519,814 tonnes
30
Other Imports of Crude Oil from China not Reported to Customs
tonnesTotal Estimated Crude Oil Imports from China, 2009
519,814 tonnes
Estimate of other crude oil imports, 2009 (unknown source)
tonnesSee below
Conversion Factor
42.59 GJ/te
Total Estimated Crude Oil Imports to DPRK, 2009
2.21E+07 GJ
Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2009
126,741 tonnes
31
Extrapolated Official Refined Prod. Imports from China, 2009
1.27E+05 tonnes
Conversion Factor
1.050 toe/te
HFO Supplied by Six-Party Talks Parties, 2009
0 tonnes
41, 42
Est. Conversion Factor, KEDO Oil
1.00 toe/te
Total Imports of Refined Products, 2009
tonnestoe/teGJ
Gasoline
81,5491.050
3.59E+06 Sum of
Kerosene
35,2301.032
1.52E+06 Imports fromDiesel
1.38E+05
1.032
5.97E+06 all nations
HFO
6.78E+03
0.991
2.81E+05 (see below,
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
7.53E+03
1.012
3.19E+05 and note 36)
Total Estimated Refined Product Imports to DPRK, 2009
1.17E+07 GJ
Estimated Refined Product Exports from DPRK, 2009 (to China)
tonnesGJ
HFO
0.00E+00
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
2,908
1.23E+05
Total of above
2,908
1.23E+05
Estimated Net HFO placed in storage, 2009
tonnes26
0.00E+00 GJ
26
Implied total 2009 crude oil, oil products into the DPRK:
3.38E+07 GJ/yr, which implies annual imports of(at a conversion rate of
7.33 bbl oil equivalent per tonne oil equivalent)
5.92E+06 bbl/yr or
an average of
16,219 bbl per day.

A1- 39

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Crude Oil Imports from China relative to 1996 (rel to 2000 for 2005-on)
Other Crude Oil Imports (tonnes)
Domestic DPRK Crude Oil Production (tonnes)
Official Refined Products Imports from China relative to 1996 (rel to 2000
for 2005 through 2009)
HFO Supplied by KEDO or through 6-Party Talks (tonnes)
Total Imports of Refined Products (tonnes)
Gasoline
Kerosene
Diesel
HFO
LPG/Refinery
Gas/NonEnergy

2000
42%
0.00E+00
30,0002005
134%
30,0002008
136%
30,0002009
134%
30,000172%
3.95E+05
1.09E+05
2.20E+04
1.90E+05
5.40E+05

127%
0.00E+00
5.09E+04
4.70E+04
2.95E+05
1.23E+05

100%
3.04E+05
1.16E+05
50,542
1.91E+05
3.19E+05

108%
0.00E+00
81,54935,2301.38E+05
6.78E+03

6.43E+04

9.67E+03

9.13E+03

7.53E+03

Estimated Refinery Statistics--1990
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 1990 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 1990 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1990 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1990 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1990 (TOE)
Refinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 1990 Refinery use of electricity

West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
4.20E+04
1.446E+06 2.095E+06
38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
1.16E+06

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
1.44E+06

440,800
255,200
232,000
46,400139,200
67,048489,600
345,600
216,000
158,400
158,400
75,312

1.83E+07
1.12E+07
1.00E+07
2.00E+06
5.06E+06
4.66E+07
1,093,869
1,113,042

2.03E+07
1.52E+07
9.33E+06
6.84E+06
6.50E+06
5.82E+07
1,362,884
1,389,628

12

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17

Toe/Te67.04
165 GWh or

Estimated Net Output of East Coast Refinery based roughly on scaling the figure above
using non-Chinese oil import estimates from Reference 3 .
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1991 (TOE)773,103
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1992 (TOE)
411,017

A1- 40

0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012
% of Net
36.84%
25.21%
18.47%
8.45%
11.03%
100.00%2,456,753
2,502,670

10

28
5.93E+05 GJ

15, 3615, 3615, 3615, 36

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated Refinery Statistics--1996
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 1996 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 1996 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1996 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1996 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 1996 (TOE)West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
4.20E+04
1.446E+06 2.095E+06
38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
9.36E+05

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
0

355,745
205,957
187,234
37,447112,340
54,111-

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17

1.48E+07
9.05E+06
8.09E+06
1.62E+06
4.09E+06
3.76E+07
882,799
898,273

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00% of Net
39.25%
24.07%
21.51%
4.30%
10.87%
100.00%-898,273

Toe/TeRefinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 1996 Refinery use of electricity

Estimated Refinery Statistics--2000(See below for smaller W. Coast Refinery)
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 2000 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 2000 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2000 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2000 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2000 (TOE)

12

67.04
59 GWh or

0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012

10

28
2.13E+05 GJ

West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
4.20E+04
1.45E+06
2.09E+06

12

38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
3.95E+05

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
0.00E+00

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17150,185
86,94979,04515,80947,427
22,844-

6.23E+06
3.82E+06
3.42E+06
6.83E+05
1.73E+06
1.59E+07
372,693379,226

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00% of Net
39.25%
24.07%
21.51%
4.30%
10.87%
100.00%-379,226

Toe/TeRefinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 2000 Refinery use of electricity(Includes small West Coast refinery)

0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012

73.74 10% higher than in 1996
29.21 GWh or
1.05E+05 GJ

A1- 41

1028

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated Refinery Statistics--2005(See below for smaller W. Coast Refinery)
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 2005 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 2005 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2005 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2005 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2005 (TOE)West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
4.20E+04
1.45E+06
2.09E+06

12

38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
5.29E+05

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
0.00E+00

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17200,957
116,343
105,767
21,15363,46030,567-

8.34E+06
5.11E+06
4.57E+06
9.14E+05
2.31E+06
2.12E+07
498,684
507,425

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00% of Net
39.25%
24.07%
21.51%
4.30%
10.87%
100.0%

0507,425

Toe/Te
0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012

Input to/Output of Smaller Western Refinery relative to 2000 Estimate:
Refinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 2000 Refinery use of electricity(Includes small West Coast refinery)

Estimated Refinery Statistics--2008(See below for smaller W. Coast Refinery)
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 2008 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 2008 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2008 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2008 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2008 (TOE)

100%

10

Assumption

73.74 10% higher than in 1996
38.50 GWh or
1.39E+05 GJ

West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
4.20E+04
1.45E+06
2.09E+06

28

12

38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
5.35E+05

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
0.00E+00

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17203,135
117,604
106,913
21,38364,14830,898-8.43E+06
5.17E+06
4.62E+06
9.24E+05
2.33E+06
2.15E+07
504,090
512,926

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00% of Net
39.25%
24.07%
21.51%
4.30%
10.87%
100.00%0512,926

Toe/TeInput to/Output of Smaller Western Refinery relative to 2000 Estimate:
Refinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 2000 Refinery use of electricity(Includes small West Coast refinery)

0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012

100%

10

Assumption

73.74 10% higher than in 1996
38.90 GWh or
1.40E+05 GJ

A1- 4228

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated Refinery Statistics--2009
Capacity, barrels of crude/day
Capacity, tonnes of crude per year
Output (Weight fraction of input)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Refinery Input, 2009 (tonnes)
Estimated Refinery Output, 2009 (tonnes)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-energy (gross)
Estimated Refinery Fuel Use (toe)Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2009 (GJ)
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
TOTAL
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2009 (tonnes)
Estimated Net Refinery Output, 2009 (TOE)West Coast
East Coast
2.90E+04
1.05E+05
1.45E+06
5.24E+06
38%
22%
20%
4%
12%
96%
5.26E+05

34%
24%
15%
11%
11%
95%
0.00E+00

199,805
115,677
105,160
21,03263,09630,391-

8.29E+06
5.09E+06
4.54E+06
9.09E+05
2.30E+06
2.11E+07
495,827
504,518

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00% of Net
39.25%
24.07%
21.51%
4.30%
10.87%
100.00%0504,518

Input to/Output of Smaller Western Refinery relative to 2000 Estimate:
Refinery use of electricity, kWh/tonne output
Estimated 2000 Refinery use of electricity(Includes small West Coast refinery)12, 16

11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17
11, 17

Toe/Te
0.991
1.050
1.032
1.032
1.012

100%

10

Assumption

73.74 10% higher than in 1996
38.29 GWh or
1.38E+05 GJ

A1- 4328

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Crude Oil and Refined Products Imports from and Exports to China, 2000 (kilograms: See Note 18)
Commodityasphaltasphalt coke
crude petroleum and crude oil from asphalt
vehicle use gasoline and aviation gasoline
rubber solvent oil, oil paint solvent
Jet fuellight diesel oilother diesel oil and fuel oil
lubricant greaselubricant oil
lubricant oil basic oilother heavy oilliquefied butane for lighter, volume > 300 cuomother liquefied butane
other unlisted liquefied petroleum gas and other aromatic gas
vaselineparaffin wax, content less than 0.75% in terms of weightmicrocystal wax
unburnt petroleum coke
petroleum asphalt
other petroleum or residuals from asphalt smelting
emulsified asphalt
Total refined products (above less crude oil)

Imports
4,203,170
40,000389,236,142
22,091,731
87,621
46,853,114
29,108,167
3,589,984
168,652
7,781,450
1,789,195

Exports

14,016
19,920,914

16,00030,4004,314,996
75,735
10,0002,200
843,000
211,289563,217
10,450117,475,375

Summary of Above in Refined Products Balance Reporting Categories (tonnes)
Commodity
Imports
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline/Aviation Gasoline
22,092
Diesel Oil
32,698
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
46,853
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
15,832
Total of Above
117,475

24,249,926

Exports
19,921

4,329
24,250Refined Products Imports from and Exports to China, 2005 (tonnes: See Note 30)
Commodity
Light diesel oil
Aviation kerosene
Basic oils for lubricating oils
Lubricating oils
Fuel oils No. 5 ~ No. 7
Other diesel oils and other fuel oils
Lubricating grease
Liquid paraffin and heavy liquid paraffin
Other lubricating oils, greases and other heavy oil
Motor gasoline, aviation gasoline
Rubber solvent, paint solvent, extractive solvent
Other light oils and preparations
PETROLEUM,OTHER GASESPETROLEUM JELLY;WAXESPETROLEUM COKE,RESIDUESBITMN,ASPHLT;TAR SAND
BITUMEN,TAR RELATED

Imports
46,66846,994
3,629
2,320
3,573
1,187
168
0
4
40,893
3.3
51
497
109
2,865
1.5

Total refined products (above less crude oil)

148,963

Summary of Above in Refined Products Balance Reporting Categories (tonnes)
Commodity
Imports
Heavy Fuel Oil
3,573
Gasoline/Aviation Gasoline
40,893
Diesel Oil
47,855
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
46,994
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
9,646
Total of Above
148,963

A1- 44

Exports

4,393

4,393

Exports
-

4,393
4,393

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Refined Products Imports from and Exports to China, 2008 and 2009 (tonnes: See Note 30)
2008
Commodity
Imports
Exports
Light diesel oil
14,047Aviation kerosene
50,542
Basic oils for lubricating oils
1,681
Lubricating oils
3,370
Fuel oils No. 5 ~ No. 7
3,982
Other diesel oils and other fuel oils
0
1.805
Lubricating grease939
Liquid paraffin and heavy liquid paraffin0
Other lubricating oils, greases and other heavy oil
8Motor gasoline, aviation gasoline
43,166
Rubber solvent, paint solvent, extractive solvent
8
Other light oils and preparations
0.00
PETROLEUM,OTHER GASES
480
3,148
PETROLEUM JELLY;WAXES
252
PETROLEUM COKE,RESIDUES
2,330
BITMN,ASPHLT;TAR SAND
43
BITUMEN,TAR RELATED
18
Total refined products (above less crude oil)

120,865

3,150

2009
Imports
Exports
10,46035,230
1,686
1,290
2,576
0
142
0
306
38,738
20
0.00
543
2,908
117
3,284
34
111
94,536

2,908

Summary of Above in Refined Products Balance Reporting Categories (tonnes)
2008
Imports
Exports
3,982
43,166
14,04750,5429,129
3,148
120,865
3,148

Commodity
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline/Aviation Gasoline
Diesel Oil
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
Total of Above2009
Imports
Exports
2,576
38,738
10,46035,2307,533
2,908
94,536
2,908

Estimates of HFO Stock Build-up and Draw-down Related to HFO Imports from KEDO and 6-PT Agreements
Additions to/depletions
Implied HFO in Storage (yearfrom stocks
end)
See Note 26
Year
GJ
TonnesGJ
Tonnes1996 6.446E+06
155,360
6.45E+06
1.55E+05
1997 -1.245E+06(30,000)
5.20E+06
1.25E+05
1998 -1.245E+06(30,000)
3.96E+06
9.54E+04
1999 -1.245E+06(30,000)
2.71E+06
6.54E+04
2000 -1.245E+06(30,000)
1.47E+06
3.54E+04
2001 -2.075E+05(5,000)1.26E+06
3.04E+04
2002 -2.075E+05(5,000)1.05E+06
2.54E+04
2003 -2.075E+05(5,000)8.45E+05
2.04E+04
2004 -2.075E+05(5,000)6.37E+05
1.54E+04
2005 -2.075E+05(5,000)4.30E+05
1.04E+04
2006 -2.075E+05(5,000)2.22E+05
5.36E+03
2007 0.000E+00
2.22E+05
5.36E+03
2008 0.000E+00
2.22E+05
5.36E+03
2009 0.000E+00
2.22E+05
5.36E+03

A1- 45Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009 Imports of Petroleum Products from Russia
Total Imports in 2000 were estimated at:
1.5 kbbl/day
Source 20
at an estimated
7.24 bbl/tonne(assumes average product density of .87 kg/l)
implies an annual level of imports of
7.56E+04 tonnes
The UN Comtrade statistics database for that year lists total export from the RF to the DPRK (see Note 41 ) of
6.86E+03 tonnes, quite a bit lower than the estimate.
Assume that
60% of these imports were diesel/gas oil, and
35% were gasoline
5% were heavy oil or the equivalent, then total
imports from Russia (tonnes) were
4.12E+03 of diesel,
2.40E+03 gasoline, and3.43E+02 heavy oil.
Imports in 2005 are estimated at
7 kbbl/day on average. This is a rough estimate, pending
receipt of better data, but yields an approximate value for oil exports from Russia to the DPRK, if one
assumes an average price of$70 per bbl, of$
174.26 million, which is about
the level of 2005 oil products trade suggested by Petrov (see Note 41 ).
Implied annual level of imports,
3.53E+05 tonnes
The UN Comtrade statistics database for that year lists total export from the RF to the DPRK (see Note 41 ) of
338,919 tonnes oil products.
Assume that
65% of these imports are diesel/gas oil, and
3% are gasoline (based on trade statistics), and
32% are heavy oil or the equivalent, then total
import from Russia were
2.29E+05 of diesel and9.06E+03 of gasoline
1.14E+05 of heavy oil.
Imports in 2008 are estimated at
1 kbbl/day on average. This is a rough estimate, pending
receipt of better data, but yields an approximate value for oil exports from Russia to the DPRK, if one
assumes an average price of$90 per bbl, of$
27.15 million, which is about
the level of 2008 petroleum products trade suggested by combining data on "mineral products" trade in Note 40
with petroleum products trade from data from Note 41 . This implies
5.04E+04 tonnes total imports.
The UN Comtrade statistics database for that year lists total export from the RF to the DPRK (see Note 41 ) of
42,126 tonnes oil products.
Assume that
80% of these imports are diesel/gas oil, and
1% are gasoline, and
19% are heavy oil or the equivalent, then total
imports from Russia were
3.37E+04 of diesel and4.61E+02 of gasoline
7.96E+03 of heavy oil.
The UN Comtrade statistics database for 2009 lists total export from the RF to the DPRK (see Note 41 ) of
4,318 tonnes oil products.
Assume that
40% of these imports are diesel/gas oil, and
56% are gasoline (based on trade statistics), and
4% are heavy oil or the equivalent, then total
1.73E+03 of diesel and2.42E+03 of gasoline
1.71E+02 of heavy oil.

A1- 46

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Year 2000 Oil products imports from other countries
Oil products imports from Japan
4.43E+04 tonnes
Fraction as heavy fuel oil:
99.51%
Fraction as non-energy (solvents and lubricants):
0.49%
Total imports of heavy fuel oil from Japan
4.41E+04 tonnes
Total imports of non-energy petrol. products from Japan
2.15E+02 tonnes

See Note 21

Oil products from Singapore:

Value:
Volume:Implying an average price ofYear 2000 average price per gallon:$9,986,108
See Note 22
56,649.85 tonnes$
176.28 per tonne$
0.78 gasoline
See Note 23$
0.77 gasoil
at an average density of
0.74 kg/liter for gasoline andand
0.87 kg/liter for diesel andat
3.78 liters per gallon
implies year 2000 average prices per tonne:$
277.45 for gasoline
235.99 for diesel
Since the average price paid in 2000 by the DPRK was lower than the diesel (gasoil) pricecalculated above, we assume that imports are
15% gasoline and85% diesel, and thus total
implied oil imports are

8.50E+03 tonnes of gasoline and4.82E+04 tonnes of diesel.

Oil Products from the ROK:
Rough estimate of maximum rate of imports from ROK:
10,000 Bbl/day for
See Note 24
10% of the year, or an average of1000 Bbl/day.
Assume that these oil products are (or can be used as)
70% diesel
and30% heavy fuel oil at an assumed density of
0.95 kg/liter.
This implies imports from the ROK of
16,515 tonnes of heavy fuel oil and
35,290 of diesel.
Imports and Exports Associated with Asphalt Use for Road (see worksheet "Oil_Asphalt")
Middle of estimated asphalt requirements for Nampo-Pyongyang Road built in 2000
48,214 tonnes
Assumed mass of heavy oil traded (probably to China) per tonne asphalt received:
1.00 , which implies heavy fuel oil exports of:
48,214 tonnes

A1- 47Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of Output of Smaller West Coast Refinery (see Note 25)
We know little about the small refinery on the West Coast of the DPRK, except that it is thought to be
dedicated all or in part to the military, and is a relatively crude fractionation or "topper"-type refinery.
It is not know where the oil for this refinery comes from--it could be some of the Russian oil described above,or could be oil supplied in barter from China (and thus not part of trade statistics), or could be purchasedon the spot market. It operates in a batch mode, and reportedly had an capacity factor of
about
20% in 2000. We do not know the capacity of this refinery, but estimate it below basedon what is known about the capacity of the oil-fired power plant that is near the refinery site, and on thefollowing rough estimates of refinery outputs and related assumptions.
Fraction of heavy fuel oil produced by the refinery used in the nearby power plant:
95% Assumption
Gross efficiency of power plant (assumes relatively poor condition and operation in a cogeneration
mode to provide steam for the refinery).
19%
Implied heavy oil input to power plant:
1,991,747 GJ, or
47,572 toe when the
powerplant and refinery operate at full capacity. Assuming that the refinery and power plant operate at thecapacity level indicated above, the output of the refinery is roughly:
Implied Output
Output (Energy fraction of input)
Assumptions
toe
GJ
Heavy Fuel Oil
41%
10,015
4.19E+05
Gasoline
24%
5,863
2.45E+05
Diesel Oil
21%
5,130
2.15E+05
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
5%1,221
5.11E+04
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy
5%1,221
5.11E+04
TOTAL
96%
23,4509.82E+05
Implied required crude oil input to refinery

24,427 toe or
1.02E+06 GJ
The refinery would produce
1.17E+05 toe operating at full capacity, with
crude oil input of
1.22E+05 toe.
Consider
0% of these inputs to be crude oil imports not accounted for elsewhere. For 2000 and2005 it is assumed that the DPRK has produced roughly 30,000 tonnes per year of crude oil from domestic
sources (see Note 27). The reported site of the oil production is close enough to the reported site of thesmall West Coast refinery, and the estimated volume of crude oil required by that refinery is close enough tothe assumed output, that we assume that either the 30,000 tonnes of domestic production goes to the small
West Coast refinery, or, if there is in fact no significant domestic crude oil production in the DPRK, the crude
oil used as feedstock from that refinery is imported from elsewhere (that is, is not captured in China Customs
Statistics).
Input of refinery fuel to refinery (own use) atabove, for a total of
1,412 toe orplus the "shrinkage" indicated above at
For a total of

0.0578 toe/te of input at
5.91E+04 GJ
977 toe or
4.09E+04 GJ
2,389 toe or
1.00E+05 GJ

Refinery Net Output (for LEAP) is

22,038 toe

A1- 48Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Year 2008 and 2009 Oil products imports from other countries
Oil products imports from Japan, 2008
53.89 tonnes
Fraction as heavy fuel oil:
90.42%
Fraction as non-energy (solvents and lubricants):
9.58%
Total imports of heavy fuel oil from Japan
48.73 tonnes
Total imports of non-energy petrol. products from Japan
Oil products imports from Japan, 2009
Assumed imports from Japan in 2009 relative to 2008
0%
Total imports of heavy fuel oil from JapantonnesTotal imports of non-energy petrol. products from Japan
Oil products from Singapore (2008/2009):
Reported value:
Reported quantity:
Implied average price:
Assume that imports were
2008
0%
100%
2008
0.00E+00
1.13E+05

2008$42,004,340 $
112,733.46$
372.60 $See Note 38

5.16 tonnes-

tonnes2009
100,937 See Note 35
43.12 tonnes
2,340.84 per tonne

2009
100% gasoline and
0% diesel, thus annual estimated imports were:2009
0.00E+00 tonnes of gasoline and4.31E+01 tonnes of diesel.

Oil products from Malaysia (2009):
Reported value:
Reported quantity:
Implied average price:

$
$

2009
1,427,390 See Note 45
3,718.48 tonnes
383.86 per tonne

Assume that imports were2009
0% gasoline and100% diesel, thus annual estimated imports were:2009
0.00E+00 tonnes of gasoline and3.72E+03 tonnes of diesel.
Oil products from India:
Indian customs statistics (see Note 43 ) include huge, and in all likelihood impossibly huge, exports ofoil products from India to the DPRK in 2008 and 2009. The categories of these recorded
exports (largely napthas and other products that may be inputs for the chemical industry),
their volumes, and the volumes (typically of the same order of magnitude or larger for the same
products) of products that India reports were exported from India to the ROK, suggest that the large
volumes exported to the DPRK probably mostly, if not totally, represent mis-reporting by India,
as has been suggested by other analysts. Moreover, the value of HS 27 (fuel products) tradereported by the ROK as coming from India (the vast bulk of which is in petroleum products),
several billion dollars worth per year in recent years, issignificantly greater in both of these years than the volume of exports to the ROK reported byIndia. We are inclined, pending further research into this issue, to conclude that the export ofof petroleum products from India to the DPRK in 2008 and 2009 was probably non-zero, but small.
As placeholder assumptions, we assume that the following volumes of fuel were exported to
the DPRK from India:
2008
2009
2.00E+04
4.00E+04 tonnes of gasoline and0.00E+00
6.44E+04 tonnes of diesel.
Values above for gasoline are guesses. Significant exports to DPRK from India are reported in a
category that would include gasoline (possibly "off-spec"?) and other light oil products, but
the volumes reported, as noted above, are sufficiently high as to be not credible.
2009 diesel imports are are reported in the Indian statistics. This may well be an over-estimate,given that the ROK also imported large quantities of diesel (or rather, non-specified diesel-like fuels)in the same year, but it would seem consistent with the much lower volumes of diesel imported fromSingapore in 2009 relative to 2008--that is, maybe the DPRK got their supplies from India instead.
An interesting, but hardly definitive, additional note about reported Indian petroleum products
exports to the DPRK is that significant quantities of HS 27101190, of which at least one transformer
oil is an example, were recorded. Perhaps the DPRK imported transformer oil in an attempt
to improve the performance of their electrical tranformers? This is probably not likely, but intriguing.

A1- 49.

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Oil Products from the ROK (2008/2009):
Rough estimate of rate of imports from ROK:
12,000 Bbl/day for
See Note 24
5% of the year, or an average of
600 Bbl/day.
Assume that these oil products are (or can be used as)
80% diesel
at0.87 kg/liter for diesel andand
20% heavy fuel oil at an assumed density of
0.95 kg/liter.
Conversion:
3.78 liters per gallon,
This implies imports from the ROK of
6,606 tonnes of heavy fuel oil and24,199 of diesel.
Oil Products from Other Countries (2008/2009):
UN Comtrade data lists oil exports from a number of other countries, besides the ones identified
individually above, for 2008 and 2009. These are mostly quite small quantities.
Most of the quantity under HS 271019 imported in 2008 seems to come from the Netherlands(see Note 46 ). The totals for
HS 271019 (assumed to be diesel or similar) and HS 271011 (assumed to be gasoline or similar)
are provided below. It is possible that some of these could be specialty oils or lubricants.
2008
2009
Implied price
Implied price
Value
Quantity (te)($/te)
Value
Quantity (te)($/te)HS 271019$ 3,237,684
5,927.89 $546.18 $1,638,241
3,947.21 $415.04HS 271011$ 49,673,911
52,588.23 $944.58 $16,574,700
28,669.55 $578.13
Even including all recorded (and in the case of ROK, guessed at) oil products imports, 2009 was an unusually low
year for supplies of diesel fuel. We assume that an additional
26,000 tonnes of diesel fuelwas available for use in the DPRK in 2009, though the source could have been unrecorded (smuggled)
imports, withdrawls from stocks, or possibly (but less likely) refinery output from crude oil imports that were
not recorded otherwise. This amount of oil is equivalent to about one cargo delivery by a small to medium-sizedtanker ship.

A1- 50Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimates of HFO and "Other Petroleum" (mostly Non-Energy) Imports in Other Years (for LEAP database), tonnes
In Non-KEDO column, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 values from above, others are interpolated.
Heavy Fuel Oil
KEDO/6Year
Non-KEDO Party Talks
Total
Other Petrol.
1990
150,0000
150,000
16,047
1991
141,423
0
141,423
16,047
1992
132,8470132,847
16,047
1993
124,2700124,270
16,047
1994
115,694
0
115,694
16,047
1995
107,117150,000
257,117
16,047
1996
98,541500,000
598,541
16,047
1997
110,138
500,000
610,138
16,047
1998
121,735
500,000
621,735
16,047
1999
133,333
500,000
633,333
16,047
2000
144,930
394,722539,652
64,261
2001
140,500
559,613700,113
14,772
2002
136,071456,893592,964
13,497
2003
131,642
0
131,642
12,222
2004
127,2130127,213
10,947
2005
122,7830122,783
9,671
2006
0
2007
146,000
See Notes 41 and 42 for 6-PT totals
2008
304,000
See Notes 41 and 42 for 6-PT totals
2009
0
See Notes 41 and 42 for 6-PT totals

Calculation of Net Refining Output Shares by Year, for LEAP Input, based on Balance figures and data above
Fuel Category

Gasoline
Aviation Gas
Kero/Jet
DieselResidual Oil
LPG
Other
TOTAL

1990
24.2%
1.03%
8.45%
18.5%
36.8%
2.0%
9.0%
100.0%

1996
21.8%
2.32%
4.30%
21.5%
39.2%
4.7%
6.1%
100.0%

2000
20.2%
3.97%
4.37%
21.6%
39.6%
4.1%
6.1%
100.0%

2005
22.1%
2.08%
4.35%
21.6%
39.50%
7.14%
3.24%
100.0%

2008
22.1%
2.05%
4.35%
21.6%
39.5%
7.14%
3.2%
100.0%

2009
22.1%
2.12%
4.35%
21.6%
39.5%
6.81%
3.6%
100.0%

Refined product balances in this workbook do not separately estimate LPG and "other" oil products. At present, we assume thefollowing fractions by year of the aggregate category "LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy" is composed of LPG.
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
12%
28%
25%
43%
43%
41%
These fractions will vary by year and be different for different refineries.

Sources/Notes:
1 Reference 3 reports 2.8 Mte. Note that the Korea Foreign Trade Association, in "Major Economic Indicators
for North Korea", 1993. P. 33, lists a total of 2.43 million te oil, which
includes imports from the former USSR, China, and Iran, but apparently does not include oil purchased
On the spot mark et. 1990 figures. Other sources suggest that 2.8 Mte in 1990 is an over-estimate, thus
we have assumed crude oil imports of 2.6 Mte in 1990.
2 Based on figures in: "Progress of Energy Saving in China's Petrochemical Industry", W.B. Shen, in
Energy Mark ets and the Future of Energy Demand , LBL, 1988, p. 24-2.
3 Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea , RINU, 1993. P. 40
4 Young Sik Jang, North Korean Energy Economics , Korea Development Institute, 1994 (p. 62)
5 Exports to the DPRK from China. Source: China Customs Statistics.
6 Probably mostly gasoline (David Fridley, Lawrence Berk eley National Laboratory, Personal Communication).
7 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO, 1996), Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization, Annual Report, 1995 . KEDO, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1996

A1- 51Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
8 Calculated estimate based on difference between estimated demand and estimated supply for heavy oil in 1996.
9 Note that 110% of estimated 1996 imports approximates the level of refined products imported from
China (at least officially) as of 1993 (Sinton, J. (1996), China Energy Databook ).
10 Net of refinery gas used in-plant, and calculated as LPG/Refinery gas-(input-other products output-refining loss)
11 Data for Western refinery estimates based on similar Chinese plants from David Fridley, Lawrence Berk eley
National Laboratory (personal communication, 12/96). Data for Eastern (Russian-built) refinery from Source 17.
Estimate from Fridley was modified by reducing heavy oil total by 7% to account for probable productionof heavy non-energy products (bitumens/asphalts, petroleum cok e, wax, lubricants), based very roughly
on Chinese petroleum output statistics for 1990 (from Sinton, J. ( China Energy Databook ), p. II-55).
12 From International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1996. Confirmed by other sources. East coast refinery has
7,300 barrels per day fluid crack ing capacity.
13 Several sources have suggested that little, if any, crude oil beyond that imported from China has come into
the DPRK in the two years prior to 1997--possibly one cargo at most (which would have been refined at Sonbong)--and almost certainly not in 1996.
14 Includes petroleum product imports reported to be "one-half of the output" of a 750,000 te (output)
Chinese refinery located north of the Tumen River. This refinery is assumed to operate at a maximumof 80 percent of capacity (David Fridley, personal communication), yielding total output of 600,000 tonnes.
Output shares of that refinery are assumed to be the same as in the West Coast DPRK refinery, but
it is assumed that the products exported to the DPRK are weighted slightly toward diesel and gasoline
and away from HFO, based on the higher need for motor fuels in the DPRK and the need for HFO to fuelpower plants in adjacent areas of China. Our assumption is that 10,000 tonnes more of gasoline and ofdiesel are exported to the DPRK, and 20,000 tonnes less of HFO, relative to simply splitting the productslate of the refinery evenly between the two countries. For 1996, product imports also include 50,000 te eachof gasoline and diesel reported to be provided by ship and rail from Russia.
[Industry source--should be confirmed independently]
15 For 2000, includes quantities reported separately from the ROK, Russia, Singapore, and Japan, plus
amounts of products similar to those received in 1996 from the Chinese refinery near the border (note 14).
16 [Not used]
17 Personal communication [QR 9/97].
18 Exports to the DPRK from China from China Customs Report 2000 , pp. 1483-1495 (in Chinese).
19 From "Appendix 1: HFO Deliveries" of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
Annual Report 2001 , obtained from www.k edo.org, 5/31/2002. Note that this figure is for oil actually
delivered during the calendar year 2000, as two of the shipments of the "HFO Year 2000" occurred in 2001.
Other annual reports from the same website (as of 2/2008) yield the following data for other years
Yeartonnes HFO delivered by calendar year
1995
150,000 estimate based on stated plans
1996
500,000 estimate based on stated plans
1997
500,000 estimate based on stated plans
1998
500,000 estimate based on stated plans
1999
500,000 estimate based on stated plans
2000
394,722
2001
559,613
2002
456,893
2003-onnone
Sum of above
3,561,228
Sum of all deliveries as reported in 2002 KEDO Annual Report
3,520,000
Since these two figures are very close, we use the unadjusted estimates for 1995 through 1999 as estimatesof KEDO HFO deliveries in those years.
20 Industry source reports probable barter imports of oil products ("gas oil and light crude") from Russia at "lessthan 1.5 k bbl/day". We have assumed an average of 1500 bbl/day.
21 From Japan customs statistics, http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/info/index_e.htm. Composed of
a combination of products, but 99 percent by mass are in the class designated "HS# 271000400".
The designation of this code appears to be Heavy Fuel Oil of some k ind, which is consistent with its
specific gravity of near one.

A1- 52Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
22 Based on text in "Singapore" section of "Current Status and Features of North Korean Foreign Tradeof the First Half of 2001", from www.k otra.or.k r/main/common_bbs which suggests that the maximum
value of oil exports to the DPRK in the first half of 2000 would have been about $8.5 million (but could
have been considerably less). The actual data on sales of oil products from Singapore to the DPRK in 2000 are
as follows (from UN Comtrade statistics) for HS 271000 (oil products):
Trade value:$9,986,108 volume (kg)56,649,852 implied cost:$

176.28 $/tonne

23 Data from the US DOE Energy Information Administration (table http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum(downloaded from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/prices.html#Motor)
suggests that spot prices for diesel fuel and gasoline in Singapore averaged$
0.7761 and$ 0.7735 per gallon, respectively, in 2000.
These figures are used to roughly calculate oil product quantities purchased from Singapore.
24 An industry source suggests that the ROK sent to the DPRK in 2000 a maximum of "8 - 10 k bbl/day of off-spec
HSFO for brief periods". "Off-spec" fuels do not meet ROK specifications for quality. We assume
a rate of shipment of about 10 k bbl/day for about 10 percent of 2000. Lack ing additional information, we
assume a lower rate of exports from the ROK to the DPRK in 2005, 2008. and 2009.
25 Information on this refinery from industry sources. Fuel output shares of refinery are very roughNautilus estimates.
26 Assumes, based on industry sources, that relatively little KEDO HFO remained in storage at the end of 2000.
We assume that stock s accrued in 1996 were drawn down at
30,000 tonnes per year through 2002,
when KEDO deliveries ceased, then were drawn down more slowly, at
5000 tonnes per year, through 2006.
27 There have been reports that the DPRK "began to produce crude oil in a sea well off Suk chon
County, South Pyongan Province" in 1998 (Lee Kyo Kwan, writing on www.chosun.com, "North Korea
Exports Petroleum", probably sometime in 2001). This article suggests, without citing any figuresthat DPRK production was significant enough to allow the reduction of petroleum imports. Though ourconversations with some experts in the industry have suggested that any production from DPRK wells was minimal,
other sources in the literature suggest that DPRK oil production has indeed been enough to supply a significant
fraction of DPRK needs. For example, Selig Harrison writes in Toward Oil and Gas Cooperationin Northeast Asia: New Opportunities for Reducing Dependence on the Middle East (published as
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars Asia Program Special Report No. 106 , dated December
2002, and available as http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asiarpt_106.pdf), that"an oil well [in Suk chon] began producing 2.2 million barrels annually in 1999". This is similar to a figure of
300,000
tonnes crude oil per year quoted in several publications by Keun-Wook Paik , including
Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula , published by Chatham House, January 2005, andavailable as http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk /pdf/research/sdp/KPJan05.pdf.
In the Chatham House report, Paik writes (p. 37) "Even though the scale of annual crude oil production fromthe Sook -Cheong County’s Anju Basin is very small (0.3 mt/y), to the North Korean authorities it is a significant volume."
In personal correspondence with Dr. Paik , he indicates that the information for this estimate came from an article
in the ROK press in approximately 2001, and that while he has not seen the quantity of oil production confirmed, hehe believes that some oil production is ongoing. Dr. Harrison indicates that his figure for DPRK oil
production was lik ely tak en from the work of Dr. Paik , or from the same original source. Other experts in the field
consulted on this question have expressed sk epticism that DPRK domestic oil production to date, if any, hasbeen even close to as significant as the quantity reported.
Accordingly, we assume that a more reasonable figure for ongoing DPRK domestic oil production is10%of the reported value (which might also have been misreported due to an error in reporting units, as happens
occasionally in the DPRK and elsewhere).
It is assumed that the oil from this oil goes to the small western refinery, thus the output of the well isadjusted based on the output of the refinery (which is currently assumed not to change from 2000 through 2009).
Another reference to the chronology of oil exploration in the DPRK includes the statement "The DPRK obtained 450 barrels of
petroleum in the offshore areas of Nampo" ("Interview with DPRK's Oil Project Planner" [Mr. Choi Dong Ryong],
The People's Korea , 1998, available as http://www1.k orea-np.co.jp/pk /073rd_issue/98120902.htm). Given that Nampo iswell south of Suk chon county.it seems unlik ely, though not impossible, that this production and the 1998 production describedabove are from the same offshore oilfield.
An alternative estimate of DPRK oil production, from index mundi (http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=k n&v=88), based ondata from the CIA World Factbook , which suggests that DPRK oil production in 2004 to 2007 was about 140 bbl per day, declining
to 118 bbl per day in 2009 (and 2010, according to the CIA World Factbook ). See that graph below. At
140 bbly/day, oil
production would have been about
51,100 bbl/yr, which, at
7.3 bbl/tonne, would be
7,000
tonnes/yr. This is lower than the estimate we are using, though approximately on the same order of magnitude.
Both estimates are lik ely to be quite speculative.

A1- 53Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
28 Calculated based on 1990 data for China from J.E. Sinton, ed (1992). China Energy Databook .
Lawrence Berk eley National Laboratory, Berk eley, CA, USA. (Revised 1996).
29 The website http://www.answers.com/topic/north-k orea, visited 1/15/07, listed oil pipelines in the
DPRK of total length 154 k m as of 2004.
30 China Customs Statistics reported crude oil exports from China to the DPRK of
522,844.40 tonnes
in 2005. As compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006, 2008, and 2010. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's 2006 paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
Crude oil and oil products imports to DPRK from China, as indicated by the same source, are as follows for other years:(Values for 2010 from UN Comtrade database.)

1,000,000
900,000"PETROLEUM
OTHER GASES"

Year
Crude Oil Oil "(Not Crude)"1996
936,170
66,533
1,845
1999
317,241
122,966.47
1,791.57
11.13 Units: metric tonnes
2000
389,236
111,501.04
1,617.51
46.40
2001
579,278
109,311.22
2,065.68
149.80
2002
472,167
82,471.55
6,547.86
215.85
2003
573,558
124,726.96
4,369.66
232.34
2004
531,785
127,968.58
5,283.75
354.37
2005
522,844
145,506.35
2,864.52
496.802006
524,040
122,303.02
1,532.99
755.77
2007
523,160
147,678.87
3,083.45
770.05
2008
528,577
117,742.86
2,330.22
479.73
2009
519,814
126,741.40
3,283.52
543.002010
528,315
145,015.29
5,638.29
663.70All crude oil shipped to the DPRK from China was recorded as coming from the Dalian district from 1999-2005.

Crude Oil

800,000
700,000

Tonnes per Year

"PETROLEUM
COKE,RESIDU"

600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000-

Units: Kilograms
Commodity
Code

Product/Product Group
2710 OIL (NOT CRUDE)
271019 OIL (NOT CRUDE) FROM PETROL
27101921
Light diesel oil
27101911
Aviation kerosene
27101993
Basic oils for lubricating oils
27101991
Lubricating oils
27101922
Fuel oils No. 5 ~ No. 7
27101929
Other diesel oils and other fuel oils
27101992
Lubricating grease
27101994
Liquid paraffin and heavy liquid paraffin
27101999
Other lubricating oils, greases and other heavy oil

2002

2003

2004

2005

2008

2009

82,471,546

124,726,964

127,968,583

145,506,346

147,678,866

117,742,858

90,447,291

63,900,162

78,280,544

89,821,556

104,543,577

2006

122,963,762

2007

74,568,855

51,689,392

3,647,230

20,871,299

34,458,192

46,668,386

12,496,241

14,046,689

10,460,146

46,649,237

46,307,578

46,572,203

46,994,450

51,205,986

50,542,083

35,229,535

2,722,165

3,435,866

2,524,002

3,628,783

1,958,658

1,680,951

1,686,362

6,366,340

4,170,232

2,705,837

2,320,426

1,942,129

3,370,020

1,289,901

2,569,560

2,600,000

3,573,156

9,422,740

3,981,836

2,575,871

4,268,282

490,000-

1,186,911

45,789,974--

246,908

254,890

183,135

167,665

141,577-990-

180,129

139,217

938,921

-

170

-

-

-

778,187

3,630

8,817

8,355

306,000

Units: Kilograms
Commodity
Code

Product/Product Group
2710 OIL (NOT CRUDE)
271011 LIGHT OILS & PREP (NOT CRUDE)
27101110
Motor gasoline, aviation gasoline
27101130
Rubber solvent, paint solvent, extractive solvent
27101190
Other light oils and preparations
27101199
Other light oils and preparations

2002

2003

2004

2005

2008

2009

82,471,546

124,726,964

127,968,583

145,506,346

147,678,866

117,742,858

90,447,291

18,571,384

46,446,418

38,147,027

40,947,469

2006

2007
24,715,104

43,174,003

38,757,899

18,328,384

46,199,539

38,144,787

40,893,374

24,574,734

43,165,743

38,737,609

143,000

188,179

2,240

3,300

140,370

8,260

20,290100,000

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

58,700-50,795---

Units: Metric Tonnes
Commodity
Code

2708
2711
2712
2713
2714
2715

Product/Product GroupPITCH,COKE FM MN TARSPETROLEUM,OTHER GASESPETROLEUM JELLY;WAXESPETROLEUM COKE,RESIDUESBITMN,ASPHLT;TAR SAND
BITUMEN,TAR RELATED

2000
4,243.2
46.4
87.9
1,617.5
10.5
-

2001
4,306.3
149.8
59.0
2,065.7
2.0
8.0

2002
4,959.2
215.9
187.0
6,547.9-

2003
6,179.5
232.3
157.8
4,369.7
26.1
29.0

2004
4,488.2354.4
149.0
5,283.8
0.5
1.6

2005
5,720.6
496.8
108.9
2,864.5
1.5

2006
5,560.9755.8
133.2
1,533.0
0.5-

2007
6,186.5
770.1
111.2
3,083.5
9.8-

Note that the highlighted values for "oil, not crude" in the first table in this note does not match the value for the same quantity in the second and third tables. The reason for thisis that in its 2009 customs statistics, China placed four months ( August-November 2009) of its exports to the DPRK under the category "Asia, NES".
The total in the first table above includes exports from China to "NES", while the totals in the second and third tables do not. As a consequence, we have attempted to categorize theindividual fuels in the additional "Asia NES"-designated imports (about 37,000 tonnes total) by fuel type in the calculations in the "Refined Products Imports
from and Exports to China, 2008 and 2009" table above. Relevant data from the UN Comtrade database for 2009 and 2010 are as follows:2009
Commodity
Code

Product/Product Group
2710 OIL (NOT CRUDE)
271011 LIGHT OILS & PREP (NOT CRUDE)
271019 OIL (NOT CRUDE) FROM PETROL

2010

Value (USD)
Volume (kg) Value (USD)$ 69,252,199 126,741,402 $ 104,886,571$26,288,119
50,621,296$40,629,283$42,964,080
76,120,106$64,257,288

Volume (kg)
145,015,288
55,501,253
89,514,035

A1- 54

2008
5,901.5479.7
251.8
2,330.2
42.8
17.6

2009
7,635.3
543.0
117.1
3,283.5
34.0
111.2

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
31 Assumes no KEDO oil remained in storage as of end-2005. KEDO suspended shipments of heavy oil
to the DPRK as of December, 2002 (see, for example, http://www.k edo.org/).
32 Source cited in note 30 lists no imports of oil products from the DPRK into China in the categories below
for the years 1995 to 2005 with the exception of 2002, as shown.
27101919
Other kerosene distillages
1,098 tonnes
27101999
Other lubricating oils, greases and other heavy oil
8,593 tonnes
and for the following years in a more aggregate categories "OIL (NOT CRUDE)" and "OIL (NOT CRUDE) FROM PETROL &BITUM MINERAL ETC" (used in 2002), as shown.
(Category 271019 in 2007-2009)
1997
236,478

1998
7,175

1999
19,1802000
19,935

2002
11,704

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007
0

2008
1.805

2009
tonnesExports to China from the DPRK of gaseous petroleum products were recorded as:Units: tonnes
Commodity
Code2711192711

2711192711142711

Product/Product GroupOTHER,LIQUEFIEDPETROLEUM,OTHERGASESOTHER,LIQUEFIEDVARIOUS,LIQUEFIEDPETROLEUM,OTHER
GASES

1995
11,703

1996
10,450

1997
5,874

1998
4,100

1999
4,534

2000
4,315

11,703

10,490

5,874

4,100

4,534

4,315

2001
8,747
-

2002
8,558
-

2003
4,679
-

2004
6,598
0

2005
3,844
549

2006

2007

2008

2009

8,747

8,558

4,679

6,598

4,393

4,118

5,230

3,148

2,908

33 Source cited in note 30 lists the following detail on imports of gaseous oil products into the DPRK from
China in the categories below
Units: Kilograms
Commodity
Code

Product/Product GroupPETROLEUM,OTHER
2711 GASES
271119OTHER,LIQUEFIED
271113
BUTANES, LIQUEFIED
271111
NATURAL,LIQUEFIED
271112
PROPANE, LIQUEFIED
271129OTHER GASES,GASEOUS

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

11,130
11,130-46,40046,400-149,800
17,400132,400-

215,850
13,850202,000-

23233521550
210755003035436555707
2986580004967971252943618269677
0075577077005247972754300134 Data from files downloaded from http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/download/index_d012_e.htm
yields the following summary of oil products exports from Japan to the DPRK in 2005:
Commodity
Code'271019520''271019590''271019600'

Product/Product Group(Probable)"SOLID OR SEMI-SOLID
LUBRICANT PREPN""Other Heavy Oils andPreparations"

OTHER LUBRICATING'271019900' OILS, OTH. HEAVY OILSSum of Petroleum Products Above

Quantity, kl

Quantity, kg

Value-Year(1000 Yen)

Implied value,
1000 yen/unit

16

14397

4484

0.311

78
0

74605
1328

19174
839

0.257
0.632

9

9131
99,461

1951

0.214

Total petroleum products exports from Japan to the DPRK in 2005 were a tiny fraction of those in 2000.
35 Singapore oil trade statistics for 2005, 2008, and 2009 are as provided below (from United Nations "Comtrade" database, as
downloaded and provided by Jennifer Lee of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 10/2010). In 2005, an industry source
suggested that there may have been approximately 25,000 tonnes of petroleum products shipped periodically,
perhaps every six week s or so, from Singapore to the DPRK. The product shipped was reported to belik ely "gas oil" for use in power generation, industry, and marine diesel engines. We assume that the imports fromSingapore listed below are diesel oil or similar fuels.
Commodity Code271019"Petroleum oils & oils obt. from bituminous mins. (excl. crude) & preps. oth …"
Value ($
Quantity
Implied priceYear
thousand)(tonnes)($/ton)2005
905
952.04 $950.37
2008
42,004 112,733.46 $372.602009
101
43.12 $
2,340.84
36 For 2005 and beyond, includes quantities reported/estimated separately from China, the ROK, Russia, and Japan, but
without those estimated to have been received in 1996 from the Chinese
refinery near the border (note 14), as those exports, if they continue today, are thought to now be reflected in official
Chinese customs statistics (Nate Aden, personal communication).
37 A source familiar with the oil industry estimates that the DPRK in 2005 used "no more than 18 - 19 thousandbarrels [of crude oil and oil products] per day" on average. Given the considerable uncertainties in some of
the reported oil products imports to the DPRK (and a small portion of the DPRK's crude oil inputs), we havetak en the middle of this range as a target total for the overall oil supply to the DPRK.

A1- 55Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
38. Data from files downloaded from http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/download/index_d012_e.htm
yields the following summary of oil products exports from Japan to the DPRK in 2008 and 2007:
Product/Product Group
Value-Year
Implied value,
Commodity
Code(Probable)
Quantity, kl
Quantity, kg(1000 Yen) 1000 yen/unit"SOLID OR SEMI-SOLID'271019520' LUBRICANT PREPN"
5
5000
1734
0.347
"Other Heavy Oils and'271019590' Preparations"
47
48727
17322
0.355
'271019600'
0
160
216
1.350
'271019900' OTHER LUBRICATING000Sum of Petroleum Products Above
53,887'271019520' "SOLID OR SEMI-SOLID
1
1000
600
0.600
"Other Heavy Oils and'271019590' Preparations"
712
23145
7064
0.305
'271019600'
000'271019900' OTHER LUBRICATING
0
480
213
0.444
Sum of Petroleum Products Above
24,625

Year
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

39. Based on data from GlobalSecurity.org, "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Six-Party Talk s" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk /6-party.htm)
The DPRK received
150,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil under the 6-Party Talk s agreement in 2007.
40

Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, "North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis" , US Congressional Research Service,
dated January 22, 2010, and available as http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32493.pdf, includes the following passage regarding Russian fuels trade with the DPRK:
Major Russian exports to the DPRK include mineral fuels, wood pulp, machinery, non-rail vehicles, iron and steel, and wood. Russian
exports of mineral fuels have been declining from a peak of $224.4 million in 2005 to $73.5 million in 2007 and $41.6 million in 2008.

41 In "Russian ‘Power Politics’, North Korea and the Future of Northeast Asia" (In The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus), Leonid Petrov
dated on July 29, 2008, and available as http://www.japanfocus.org/-Leonid-Petrov/2835, includes the following passages:"...During 2004–2005, petroleum [products] trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million."and"The Maritime Province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in the
Russian Maritime Province and oil has to be obtained through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil -rich areas of Eastern Siberia.
Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labour of North Korean workers."
and"This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tons of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the Six-Party Talks, will deliver another 100,000 tons by October 2008."
and"Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong the Russian auto plant
KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specialising in the production of medium -size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks
were assembled in 2007 this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate
United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled theheavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products. "The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 10/19/10) includes the following statistics on exports from
Russia to the DPRK of oil products:

HS2710: 'Petroleum oils and oils obtained
HS271019: 'Petroleum oils & oils obtained from from bituminous minerals, other than crude;
bituminous minerals (other than crude) &preparations not elsewhere specified or
preparations not elsewhere specified…"
included....", aggregate category for
HS271011: Light oils and preparations
probably diesel and heavy oils
petroleum products
NetWeight
NetWeight
NetWeight
PeriodTrade Value(kg)
Trade Quantity
Trade Value(kg)
Trade Quantity Trade Value(kg)
Trade Quantity
2000$1,621,861
6,862,811
6,862,811
2005 $3,867,434
8,704,467
8,704,467$140,877,871 330,214,190
330,214,190 $144,745,305 338,918,657
338,918,657
2006 $1,779,745
2,879,099
2,879,099$67,031,085 116,715,130
116,715,130 $68,810,830 119,594,229
119,594,229
2007$837,987
1,101,248
1,101,248$69,340,553 133,045,608
133,045,608 $70,178,540 134,146,856
134,146,856
2008$644,830
460,593
460,593$25,770,853 41,665,420
41,665,420 $26,415,683
42,126,013
42,126,013
2009 $1,373,927
2,419,666
2,419,666$1,513,772
1,898,396
1,898,396$2,887,699
4,318,062
4,318,062

A1- 56

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
42 In CRS Report to Congress, U.S. Assistance to North Korea , by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nik itin, available as
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21834.pdf, and dated July 31, 2008,
included the statement:"North Korea has received a total of 330,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and 60,000 tons of fuel equivalent (i.e., steel products to renovate
aging power plants)."
Ambassador Chris Hill's testimony on July 31, 2008 described delivery of a total of
420,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, out of a
total promised volume of 950,000 tonnes, as of that date (see http://www.ncnk .org/resources/publications/Amb_Hill_Testimony_SASC_July_08.pdf)
A further delivery of
50,000 tonnes was shipped from the US in late 2008(see http://www.nautilus.org/mailing-lists/napsnet/dr/2008/20081113.html).
Following from http://www.ick s.org/publication/pdf/2009-SPRING-SUMMER/5.pdf, "U.S. Assistance to North Korea", by Mark E. Manyin
and Mary Beth Nik itin, of the US Congressional Research Service, International Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XIII, No. 1, pp. 85-105.
Table 2. Delivery of Heavy Fuel Oil to the DPRK,
July 2007 – December 2008

Shipment
Date
Donor Country
Jul-07
ROK
Sep-07China
Nov-07USA
Jan-08RussiaMar-08USA
May-08RussiaJul-08USA
Aug-08USA
Nov-08USA
Dec-08RussiaTOTAL
Source: Compiled by the Congressional Research Service

Amount HFODelivered(MT)
50,00050,00046,00050,00054,00050,00034,00016,00050,00050,000450,000

43 Indian trade statistics record substantial flows of oil products to the DPRK in recent years. In some cases, these flows appear to be
hundreds of thousands of tonnes per year, with values in the hundreds of millions, and in one year on the order of a billion, dollars.
Given that some of these volumes are A) sufficiently large as to be on the same order as all k nown (or strongly suspected) oil andoil products imports from elsewhere, and B) placed overwhelmingly in product categories such as naptha (mostly used as an input
to chemicals manufacture and other (unspecified) light oil products, that it, categories that do not necessarily correspond with major
DPRK oil requirements, it is clear that the data cannot be accepted on face value. Some analysts (Jennifer Lee, Petersen Institute,personal communications, 10/2010) suggest that it is possible that Indian statistics have inadvertently mis-categorized oil products
exported to the ROK as oil products exported to the DPRK. A summary of statistics related to oil exports from India to the DPRK
and ROK follows.
Reported Oil Exports to DPRK from India, Quantity in Tonnes
Year
HS Code2003-2004 2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-20092009-2010
27074000
4.3
240,000.00
63,000.00
27082000
60
2710111927101190
75234063313037150027100094
22500
35060
55000
26845027101920
10
40000
20
20
27101930
22500
27101950
27101960
27101990
30000
64400
27122090
1227109900
29700
27129090
10
1.67
5

A1- 57Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Reported Oil Exports to ROK from India, Quantity in Tonnes
Year
HS Code2003-2004 2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
27074000
38,750.00
27079900
0.42
141427090000
29700
2710111985000
56484025920027101190
15750
88540
17063027082000
27100094
19482021943054000
11000027101111
17404027101920
30
50
50
30
27101930
5500
27101950
17500
1027101980
10
200
27101990
80000
63276055310013162027109900
38000
20296027111400
12,253.00
27111900
27121010
15
1427121090
889.66
1427122010
165927122090
2.727129010
27129090
10
7.07
73
271311000.08
27131200
0.04
27149090
12
0.3

2008-2009
108,000.00

2009-2010
29,700.00

9706806574706189901,377,060

3127401,345,710

990
15000
96280
50
18299015000

80000
52696013,280.00
129.3
19.6

76.55
80.2

0.29
103.38

83.86

Data above (and first two rows of table below) from http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/ecntcomq.asp
Total value of HS 27 Imports to ROK or DPRK from India, $$ thousand
Year
Reported by
2003-2004 2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-20092009-2010
India to
DPRK$
5,610 $
30,800 $$65,400 $ 777,850 $
844,930 $
330,120
India to ROK $ 41,050 $ 103,610 $
496,190 $
869,070 $ 733,430 $ 2,170,610 $ 1,526,960
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
ROK from
India (UN)$281,159$434,860$835,148$1,754,345 $2,592,060$3,944,862$2,289,798
ROK from
India (KITA)$ 281,159 $ 434,860 $
835,148 $1,754,345 $ 2,592,060 $ 3,944,862 $ 2,289,798 $2010

2,115,057"UN" data from United Nations Comtrade System for Exports from India to the ROK, as reported by the ROK.
"KITA" data from Korea International Trade Association, http://global.kita.net/.
Note that in each year, the value of HS 27 products reported exported by India to both Koreas combined is much less thanthe value of HS 27 products reported imported from India by the ROK alone.
44 The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 10/19/10) includes thefollowing statistics on exports from the DPRK to Russia of oil products:

Period
2006
2008

Code
Trade Value NetWeight (kg) Trade Quantity
271019$7,646
10,645
10,645271019$9,4333,697
3,697

45 The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 2/10/11) includes the following
statistics on exports to the DPRK from Malaysia of oil products in 2009:
Period2009

Code271019Trade Value NetWeight (kg) Trade Quantity$1,427,390

3,718,477

3,718,477

46 The United Nations "Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed 2/10/11) includes the following
statistics on exports to the DPRK from the Netherlands of oil products in recent years:
Period
2005
2007
2008
2007

Code
271019271019271019340319Code
Definition
394 Light petroleum distillates nes
11,350 Light petroleum distillates nes
5,245,516 Light petroleum distillates nes
2 Lubricating oil etc containing <70% petroleum oil nes

Trade Value NetWeight (kg) Trade Quantity$9,949$46,676$2,478,562$5,491394
11,3505,245,516
2

A1- 58Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEADDITIONAL BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:OIL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
ESTIMATE OF THE MATERIALS REQUIREMENT FOR SURFACINGNEW SUPERHIGHWAY BETWEEN PYONGYANG AND NAMPO, DPRK
Prepared By David Von Hippel, 10/19/00, Modified 6/8/02: DRAFT

ASSUMPTIONS:Asphalt paving is:
5% to
8% by weight Asphalt Cement (see Note 1) .
Paving on the Pyongyang--Nampo road will ultimately be:
15 cm thick (see Note 2)
Length of the Pyongyang--Nampo road recently constructed:
43 km (Note 3)
Pavement Width of the Pyongyang--Nampo road
50 meters (DVH on-site estimate)Specific gravity of pavement mixture (asphalt cement plus aggregate):
2.3 (Note 4)
RESULTS:
Estimated volume of asphalt mixture used on road:322,500 cubic meters, andEstimated mass of asphalt mixture used on road:741,750 tonnes
Estimated quantity of asphalt cement needed to make above quantity of asphalt mixture:
37,088to59,340 tonnes, or, by comparison, about
10%
to
16%
of our estimate that 1996 DPRK refinery output of heavy oil was about:
379,000 tonnes.

NOTES AND SOURCES:
1 The National Asphalt Pavement Association (NAPA), on its web site, defines Asphalt Cement (AC) as follows:"This is the black , stick y stuff produced by petroleum refineries. It is the "glue" that holds the pavement together.
Generally, it mak es up about less than 8%, by weight, of the total pavement mixture." Another asphalt-relatedsite provided an estimate that AC was 5% of the weight of asphalt paving (a mixture of AC and aggregate).
Information on the "FAQ" page of the Asphalt Institute WWW site(http://www.asphaltinstitute.org/faq/apcfaqs.htm#temp) suggests an intermediate concentration of
400 lbs of asphalt cement to 6000 lbs of asphalt paving (or about 6.7%).
2 Another asphalt www site visited suggested that 8 to 12 inches of asphalt paving (applied in at least
two layers) was standard for roads used by heavy duty truck s. Where paving was observed being applied to the
Pyongyang--Nampo road, the paving seemed to be thinner (perhaps 2-3 inches, or 5 to 7.5 cm), so it is assumed
both A) that a second layer would be applied, and B) that the ultimate thick ness will be somewhat less thanwould be recommended in the US for a highway of similar size.
3 In DPRK YOUTH BUILD PYONGYANG-NAMPO SUPERHIGHWAY
by Jang Yong Chol, First Secretary, Pyongyang City Committee, Kim Il Sung
Socialist Youth League, for the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, 28 August, 2000, reference ismade to the Pyongyang-Nampo having a "40-odd k m-long roadbed, scores of metres wide.."43 k m is a guess, based on the assumption that longer than 45 k m would lik ely be referred to as "nearly 50".
4 Density and specific gravity of asphalt will depend on the air void volume in the mix (typically 5 to 8 percent,as based on documents reviewed) and the density and shape of the aggregate used. An example given in adocument on the Asphalt Institute's WWW site has a specific gravity of 2.363.
http://www.infratech.com/technical_corner/tables_calculators/metric/density_asphalt_materials.htm
provides a table entitled "DENSITY AND SPECIFIC GRAVITY FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF COMPACTEDASPHALT PAVEMENTS", which gives a specific gravity range of 2.1 to 2.5 for (combined) several
types of asphalt pavements. The estimate of 2.3 for DPRK asphalt is a rough guess based on this range.

A1- 59

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:BIOMASS AND WOOD PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/18/2012

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Fuelwood Consumption (Residential and Industrial)
Residential Fuelwood
Industrial Fuelwood
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Total Fuelwood Production
Charcoal Production
Wood Input
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Process Efficiency
Total Wood used for Charcoal
Total Charcoal Production
Wood for Non-Energy Products
Building Materials
Pulp and Paper
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Total Wood, Non-Energy Products
Wood Imports
Imports of wood from Russia
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Wood Imports, Total
Total Domestic Wood Production
Other Biomass/Crop Wastes Production for Fuel
Crop Wastes Used in Agriculture:
Crop Wastes for Other Uses
Conversion Factor
Total Biomass/Crop Wastes Production
TOTAL WOOD/BIOMASS PRODUCTION

6.00E+06 cu.m.
1.50E+05 cu.m.
1.69 cu.m./te
16.00 GJ/te
5.82E+07 GJ

1
1
9
2

9.30E+05 cu.m.
1.50 cu.m./te
16.00 GJ/te
30%
9.92E+06 GJ
2.98E+06 GJ

1
10
2
Rough Estimate

1.00E+06 cu.m.
5.00E+05 cu.m.
2.00 cu.m./te
16.00 GJ/te
1.20E+07 GJ

13
1Assumed to be mostly softwood
2

1.50E+06 cu.m.
2.00 cu.m./te
16.00 GJ/te
1.20E+07 GJ
6.81E+07 GJ

3Assumed to be mostly softwood

3.10E+06 te
2.54E+06 te
14.5 GJ/te
8.18E+07 GJ, or
1.50E+08 GJ

4
Est. based on needs
2
5.64E+06 tonnes

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE WOOD/BIOMASS SUPPLY
Category
Domestic wood production relative to 1990
Domestic wood production (GJ)
Wood used to make charcoal relative to 1990
Wood Used to make charcoal (GJ)
Charcoal production (GJ)
Wood imports relative to 1990
Wood imports (GJ)
Biomass/crop wastes production relative to 1990
Biomass/crop wastes production (GJ)
Pulp and Paper Imports from China (tonnes)
Pulp and Paper Imports from China (GJ)
Pulp and Paper Exports to China (tonnes)
Pulp and Paper Exports to China (GJ)

1996
135.58%
9.23E+07
79.8%
7.92E+06
2.37E+06
100%
1.20E+07
77.0%
6.30E+07
4.8
7.68E+01
225.2
3.60E+03

2000
145.83%
9.93E+07
61.1%
6.06E+06
1.82E+06
100%
1.20E+07
66.5%
5.44E+07
772.7
1.24E+04
49.2
7.87E+02

2005
166.43%
1.13E+08
61.7%
6.12E+06
1.84E+06
100%
1.20E+07
73.9%
6.05E+07
43.9
7.02E+02
1,211.6
1.94E+04

2008
194.27%
1.32E+08
59.2%
5.87E+06
1.76E+06
100%
1.20E+07
75.0%
6.14E+07

2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
196.26% SECTIO
111%
1.34E+08
7.52E+07
N OF
60.2%
THIS88%WORK
5.97E+06
8.73E+06
SHEET
1.79E+06
2.62E+06
NOT
100%
120%
USED
1.20E+07
1.44E+07
FOR
75.0%
111%
THIS
6.14E+07
9.08E+07
ANALY
SIS

1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
Total Implied Domestic Wood Harvest, tonnes
4.26E+06 5.77E+06 6.21E+06 7.08E+06 8.27E+06
Total Implied Domestic Wood Harvest, cu. meters
7.20E+06 9.76E+06 1.05E+07 1.20E+07 1.40E+07
Note: Totals above not adjusted for pulp and paper imports and exports (which are minor)

A1- 60

6
6

5
6
7
7

2009
8.35E+06 Calculated from above
1.41E+07 Calculated from above

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Summary of Information on Wood Stocks and Productivity in the DPRKFor 1996, Prof. Lee Seung-ho (see Note 8, below) estimates from remote sensing and other data that the growing stockof trees--including all above-ground biomass, was in the range of
251 to293 million
tonnes. The lower of these two estimates uses an average specific gravity for Korean hardwoods (0.65 versus0.80) that appears to be more realistic for typical Korean hardwood species. This lower estimate implies
average specific gravity of
1.37 cubic meters stem biomass per tonne above-ground biomass.
Based on growth rates for forests in areasof the ROK that have forests similar to the types of forests found in the DPRK, and using data from three sources,
Prof. Lee calculates a weighted-average annual growth rate of
3.06% , which implies an annual production fromgrowing tree stocks in the DPRK of
7.68E+06 tonnes per year. Note that this figure includes all
above-ground biomass, some of which (small twigs and leaves, for example) would likely not be used as fuel, andlikely some of which would be lost during harvesting. Prof. Lee cites ratios of total above-ground biomass to tree stem
volume ranging from 1.22 (for hardwoods) to 1.29 (for conifers). This implies that leaf and twig biomass might
be on the order of 5 to 15 percent of total above-ground biomass. The table below, originally from the UNEP
document cited in Note 11 , below, is included in Prof. Lee's presentation, and appears to paint a rosier picture of
DPRK forest stocks (Table 3.1 from UNEP document--shaded row and column are values calculated
from data in table), at least as of 1990.

Classification
TOTAL Forested land
Forest of timber industry
Economic forest
Firewood forest
Protected forest
Non-timber forest land
Unforested area
Grass field
Total of Above

Area (1000hectares)

8,201
5,440
1,436
196
1,129
436
383
170
9,190

Biomassstock(ton/hectare)

Implied stock(million
tonnes)

62.3
74.55
48.3
40.95
66.15
3.15
18
61.16

510.92405.55
69.36
8.03
74.68
1.37
3.06
562

Professor Lee cites several different sources for surveys of the DPRK's forest area, as follows:
Estimate(Mha)
Date
Source
9.77
1970
DPRK
8.97
1987
FAO
8.45
1994
KFRI: Satellite Image Analysis
7.53
1997
DPRK: UNDP Round Table Meeting
7.53
1999
KFRI: Satellite Image Analysis
In addition, the UN FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (see note 12 , below) offers the following
estimated timeline of assessments of forest area
Estimate
(Mha)
8.20
6.82
6.19

Date
1990
2000
2005

A June, 2011 report by KFRI includes the following estimate of forest area in the DPRK, based on an English-language summary(see Note 15 ):Estimate
Date
8.20
1990
6.99
2000
6.29
2005
5.66
2010
From the data above, the implied rates of change in forest lands in the DPRK were:-1.45% per year, 1987 to 1999, using the multi-survey timeline cited by Prof. Lee,
-1.83% per year, 1990 to 2000, and-1.93% per year, 2000 to 2005, using the FRA estimates, and-1.59% per year, 1990 to 2000, and-2.09% per year, 2000 to 2005, and-2.09% per year, 2005 to 2010, based on data in the summary of the 2011 KFRI report.
Based roughly on the information above, we make the following estimate of forest area, wood stocks, and wood production
over time.
Key Assumptions:
Estimate of forest area in 1990:
8.20 Million ha (DPRK State of Environment Report, 2003, and UN FAO FRA)
Change in extent of forest lands, 1990 to 2000:-1.64% per year (average of rates estimated above).
Change in extent of forest lands, 2000 to 2005:-2.01% per year (average of FRA and KFRI estimates).
Change in extent of forest lands, 2005 to 2010:-2.09% per year (from KFRI estimates).
Growing wood stocks on forest lands, 1996:
251
million tonnes (estimate above by Prof. Lee)
Average annual growth on stocked forest lands:
3.06%
per year (estimate above by Prof. Lee)
Average growth per ha on forest lands
0.94
te/ha-yr, based on estimates above.
Total degraded forest lands as of about 1997:
1.6317 Million ha (from Prof. Lee presentation, slide 34; includes"denuded forest", "unstocked forest", and "converted farmland", of which the latter is
59% of the total.
Average fraction of annual stocked-forest growth per hectare in degraded forests:
20% (placeholder
estimate).

A1- 61Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Mha Forest
Lands

Year

Im plied
AnnualBiom ass
Available
from
Reduction
in Forest
Area (Mte)

Im plied
AnnualGrow th inGrow ing
Stocks (Mte)Grow ing
Stocks(m illion te)

Im plied
AnnualWoody
Biom ass
Availablefrom Forest
Lands and
Clearing(Mte)

Estim ated
Degraded
ForestLands(Mha)

Im plied
AnnualBiom ass
Availablefrom
Degraded
ForestAreas(Mte)

Im plied
AnnualWoody
Biom ass
Availablefrom all
Stocked andDegraded
Forests
(Mte)

1990
8.20
277
8.48
4.61
13.09
0.74
0.14
13.23
1991
8.07
273
8.34
4.54
12.88
0.87
0.16
13.04
1992
7.93
268
8.20
4.46
12.67
1.00
0.19
12.85
1993
7.80
264
8.07
4.39
12.46
1.13
0.21
12.67
1994
7.68
259
7.94
4.32
12.25
1.26
0.24
12.49
1995
7.55
255
7.81
4.25
12.05
1.39
0.26
12.31
1996
7.43
251
7.68
4.18
11.86
1.51
0.28
12.14
1997
7.31
247
7.55
4.11
11.66
1.6317
0.31
11.97
1998
7.19
243
7.43
4.04
11.47
1.75
0.33
11.80
1999
7.07
239
7.31
3.97
11.28
1.87
0.35
11.63
2000
6.95
235
7.19
3.91
11.10
1.98
0.37
11.47
2001
6.81
230
7.05
4.72
11.77
2.12
0.40
12.17
2002
6.68
226
6.90
4.63
11.53
2.26
0.42
11.96
2003
6.54
221
6.77
4.54
11.30
2.40
0.45
11.75
2004
6.41
217
6.63
4.44
11.07
2.53
0.47
11.55
2005
6.28
212
6.50
4.35
10.85
2.66
0.50
11.35
2006
6.15
208
6.36
4.43
10.79
2.79
0.52
11.32
2007
6.02
204
6.23
4.34
10.57
2.92
0.55
11.11
2008
5.90
199
6.10
4.25
10.35
3.04
0.57
10.92
2009
5.77
195
5.97
4.16
10.13
3.16
0.59
10.72
2010
5.65
191
5.85
4.07
9.92
3.29
0.62
10.54
Values in non-shaded cells are estimates from sources as indicated above. Values in shaded cells are estimatesthat are calculated based on estimates from literature sources and other inputs.

14

10
8
6
Implied Annual Biomass Available from Degraded Forest Areas (Mte)4Implied Annual Biomass Available from Reduction in Forest Area (Mte)
Implied Annual Growth in Growing Stocks (Mte)2

A1- 62

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

-

1990

Million Tonnes Tree Biomass

12

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes:
1 Documents in authors' files provide estimates that cover a wide range. One source [FC1, p. 11] cites
production of 8 - 10 million cubic meters of fuelwood, while other sources suggest total wood productionof 4.7 to 7 million cubic meters. Professor Lee Seung-ho (see Note 8, below) provides an estimate ofsomewhat less than 4 million cubic meters of fuelwood in 1990, rising to 4 million by 1996, and increasing
steeply to 5.5 million cubic meters by 1999. Lee cites UN FAO statistics as the source for these data.
The UN FAO (2005, see Note 12, below) cites a fuelwood production figure of just over 5 million cubic meters.
We use a figure roughly in the middle of this overall range for fuelwood. Most other quantities link ed tothis note are from the document that provided the higher-range estimate for fuelwood use.
Wood input for charcoal falls within a range quoted by a document in the authors files, but was adjusted toroughly match UN FAO production estimate for 1990 shown in Note 7.
2 From document in authors' files [FC1, p. 7].
3 Annual imports from Russia. Document in authors' files lists imports of 2.5 million cubic meters [TP1, p. 4].
Note: other sources list these imports at 230 k cu.m./yr, and also list the number of DPRK work ers
sent to Russian forests at 16-20,000 annually. An abstract from a 1990s report on the Russian
Far East forestry sector (C I N T R A F O R Work ing Paper Abstract, "The Forest Sector in the Russian
Far East: Status and Near-Term Development", by Ek aterina Gataulina and Thomas R. Waggener, 1998,
available as http://www.cintrafor.org/research_tab/link s/WP/WP63.htm) suggests that the average productivityof Russian forest work ers as of 1994 was "360 m 3 per work er (roundwood equivalent)", presumably per annum.
This suggests, if the productivity of DPRK work crews were similar, that the DPRK crews might harvest up to
about 7 million cubic meters per year, assuming the same rate of production (and the same access toharvesting equipment--which may well not be a given) as Russian crews. If, as has been reported, DPRK
harvesting crews brought home approximately a quarter or a third of their harvest (the rest remaining in
Russia), annual imports of wood back to the DPRK would be in the range from 1.9 to 2.4 million cubic meters.
We assume that 1990 imports of wood to the DPRK from the RFE was somewhat below the lower end of this range,
based on an assumption of lower productivity.
4 Use of straw and bran in Agriculture from document in authors' files [HT1, p. 10].
5 Assumption
6 Adjusted to meet demand.
7 China Customs Statistics reported exports "woodpulp, etc" from the DPRK to China
in 2005 of (HS #47) of
1,098 tonnes. No shipments in this category were reported in 2000,
and 1996 shipment were
80 tonnes.
China also imported 726 and 145 tonnes of "paper and paperboard" (HS # 48) from the DPRK in 2003 and 2004 (noDPRK paper and paperboard exports to China were recorded in 2005). In 1996, exports from the DPRK were145.35tonnes in this category, and exports in 2000 were49.215 tonnes.
An additional
114 tonnes of paper and paperboard were recorded, however, as exported to Hong Kongfrom the DPRK in 2005, down from 566 tonnes in 2003 and 136 tonnes in 2004.
China exported modest amounts of paper and paperboard to the DPRK: about 9.9, and 11.4
tonnes in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and12.9 tonnes in 2005,
6.7 tonnes in 2000, and
4.8 tonnes in 1996, along with a tonne or less of wood pulp in each of those years.
Hong Kong also exported modest amounts of paper and paperboard to the DPRK: about 42, 38, and31
tonnes in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively, plus
766 tonnes of wood pulp (but no paper) in in 2000.
Import/export data as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates for DPRK wood and wood products imports and exports areavailable from http://faostat.fao.org/site/381/Desk topDefault.aspx?PageID=381, and suggest imports andexports of wood and wood products from thousands to tens of thousands of cubic meters (or tonnes) per year overthe period from 2000 to 2005. These data have not yet been directly used in the estimates prepared as above because
A) in some cases, the use of a value for several consecutive years suggests primary data have not been used, andB) these quantitities have little effect on the overall wood supply/demand balance estimated above. Sample FAO datatables (from the FAOSTAT site) are provided below (for "Korea, Dem People's Rep").

A1- 63Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Item
Sawlogs+Veneer Logs (C)Chips and Particles
Wood Residues
Wood Charcoal
Sawnwood (C)Sawnwood (NC)
Veneer Sheets
Plywood
Particle Board
Hardboard
MDF
Fibreboard, Compressed
Insulating Board
Ind Rwd Wir (C)Mechanical Wood Pulp
Semi-Chemical Wood Pulp
Chemical Wood Pulp
Ind Rwd Wir (NC) Tropica
Dissolving Wood Pulp
Other Fibre Pulp
Recovered Paper
Ind Rwd Wir (NC) Other
Newsprint
Printing+Writing Paper
Other Paper+Paperboard

Element
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty
Imports - Qty

Unit
Cum
Cum
Cum
Mt
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Cum
Mt
Mt
Mt
Cum
Mt
Mt
Mt
Cum
Mt
Mt
Mt

2000
0
950
0
0
1000
200
100
1100
200
0
0
0
0
10100
0
0
11500
0
0
0
800
1100
400
2900
1300

2001
0
0
600
700
200
300
300
3000
200
100
5500
0
0
0
100
0
44700
0
0
200
2000
0
5400
16900
2200

2002
0
0
600
700
200
300
300
3000
200
100
5500
0
0
0
100
0
44700
0
0
200
2000
0
5400
16900
2200

2003
0
0
600
700
200
300
300
3000
200
100
5500
0
0
0
100
0
44700
0
0
200
2000
0
5400
16900
2200

2004
0
0
600
700
200
300
300
3000
200
100
5500
0
0
0
100
0
44700
0
0
200
2000
0
5400
16900
2200

Item
Chemical Wood Pulp
Mechanical Wood Pulp
Other Fibre Pulp
Other Paper+Paperboard
Wood Charcoal
Other Indust Roundwd(C)Sawlogs+Veneer Logs (C)Sawlogs+Veneer Logs (NC)
Sawnwood (C)Sawnwood (NC)Element
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production

Unittonnestonnestonnestonnestonnes
CUM
CUM
CUM
CUM
CUM

1990
43000
13000
50000
80000
102729300000400000200000185000
95000

1996
43000
13000
50000
80000
131226300000450000250000185000
95000

2000
43000
13000
50000
80000
141339500000600000400000185000
95000

2005
43000
13000
50000
80000
149939500000600000400000185000
95000

2006
43000
13000
50000
80000
15125850000060000040000018500095000

8 Data from presentation entitled "Forest and Other Biomass Production in the DPRK: Current Situation andRecent Trends as Indicated by Remote Sensing Data - Status of Forest Resources, Degradation &Biomass in North Korea using Remote Sensing Data" by Professor Lee Seung-ho of theRemote Sensing Laboratory, KOREA FOREST RESEARCH INSTITUTE.
as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Prof. Lee's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/papers/Lee.ppt.
9 Calculated from data in Source 8 (slide 59) as weighted average:

1.69

10 Input to charcoal production assumed to be largely hardwood.
11 The report DPR KOREA : STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2003 , published by the United Nations Environment
Programme, lists (table 3.2) oak as the dominant hardwood tree species in the DPRK (52.4 percent in deciduous forests).

A1- 64

2007
43000
13000
50000
80000
152600500000600000400000185000
95000

2008
43000
13000
50000
80000
15390050000060000040000018500095000

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
12 The UN FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FRA) provides forest extent, forest stock , and other data overtime for most nations, including the DPRK. DPRK data are available from www.fao.org/forestry/site/32086/en/prk .
Key tables from this source are reproduced below.
Extent of forest and other wooded land
Area (1000 hectares)
FRA 2005 categories
1990
2000
2005
Forest
8,201
6,821
6,187
Other wooded land
Forest and other wooded land
8,201
6,821
6,187
Other land
3,840
5,220
5,854
...of which with tree cover
Total land area
12,041
12,041
12,041Inland water bodies
13
13
13
Total area of country
12,054
12,054
12,054
Data source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.

Note--Table above only part of that provided in source, but the remainder of the table includes no data.

FRA 2005
categories
Grow ing
stock inforest andotherw oodedland
Commercial
grow ing
stock-

Growing stock in forest and other wooded land
Volume (million cubic meters over bark)
ForestOther wooded land
1990
2000
2005
1990
2000
2005

-

-

Data source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.

-

FRA 2005
categories
Abovegroundbiomass
Below groundbiomass
Total living
biomass

504

429

395 -

Biomass stock in forest and other wooded land
Biomass (million metric tonnes oven-dry weight)
ForestOther wooded land
1990
2000
2005
1990
2000
2005

434

369

340 -

-

-

159

136

125 -

-

-

593
505
464 8774
68 Total
680
579
532 Data source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.

-

Dead w ood

FRA 2005
categories
Carbon inabovegroundbiomass
Carbon in
below groundbiomass
Carbon inlivingbiomass
Carbon indead w ood
Carbon inlitterCarbon indead w ood
and litter

Carbon stock in forest and other wooded land
Carbon (million metric tonnes)
ForestOther wooded land
1990
2000
2005
1990
2000
2005

217

185

170

-

-

-

80

68

62

-

-

-

297

252

232

-

-

-

34

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

43

37
-

Total
340
289
266
Data source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.
Soil carbon -

43

-

37

-

34

-

A1- 65Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
FRA 2005
categories

1990

Removals of wood products
Volume (1000 cubic meters over bark)
ForestOther wooded land
2000
2005
1990
2000
2005

Industrial
roundw ood

690
1,725
1,725 5,055
6,318
6,967 Total
5,745
8,043
8,692 Data source: FAO, Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005.
Woodfuel-This document also lists the area of forest lands affected by forest fires in the DPRK at

46 kha/yr.

13 A document in the authors' file lists "building materials" (assumed to be similar to "industrial roundwood",
though the latter may also include wood for pulp)
consumption at "3 to 5 million cubic meters/yr". By way of comparison, at this level, the DPRK would beusing approximately twice as much roundwood per capita as China in 1990. We assume that therange above is an over-estimate, and that the UN FAO FRA value (see above) is more reasonable,
though possibly still a bit of an under-estimate. We therefore use 1 million cubic meters for building
materials as an estimate for 1990.
14 The following is a rough calculation of the annual availablity of livestock manures in 2005:
Animal Type Number
kg VS/dayte VS/yr
Cattle5780002.2
464,134
Pigs
3200000
0.3
350,400
Chickens
21000000
0.01
76,650Ducks
5500000
0.024
48,180Goats
2750000
Sheep
172000TOTAL
939,364
Note: VS = "volatile solids", essentially a measure of the amount of dry organic matter in the manure.
Animal numbers from UN Food and Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT, available as http://faostat.fao.org/site/568/default.aspx.
Estimates of manure production per animal are derived from data in Rural Energy Production: Biogas Plant, a Sustainable Source ofEnergy for Cooperative Farms, by Arthur Wellinger, dated December 12, 2003, and published by ADRA (Adventist Development
and Relief Agency International) and Nova Energie. The Wellinger report provides case studies of the application ofmanure-fed biogas digesters in the DPRK.
15 The following is a summary of a Korea Foreast Research Institute Report, copied fromhttp://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=100007194&docId=l:1438898309&start=8:

Asia Pulse, June 17, 2011 Friday 11:09 AM EST, NATIONWIDE INTERNATIONAL NEWSN. KOREA'S DEFORESTATION PROCEEDING RAPIDLY: REPORTSEOUL June 17
Deforestation in North Korea is tak ing place at a rapid pace as people cut down trees for fuel and turn forest into farmland, a report by a state think tank here said Friday.
An average of 127,000 hectares of forest in North Korea have been destroyed on average every year for the past two decades, the Korea Forest Research Institute(KFRI) said in the report based on data by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
Total forest area in North Korea stood at 5.66 million hectares as of 2010, which was less than the 6.22 million hectares tallied for South Korea.
The institute under the farm ministry said that the pace of deforestation is even faster than that of rainforests around the world.
"The size of forest lost every year is equal to 150 times the land area of Yeouido in Seoul," the KFRI said. Yeouido in central Seoul, an
island-turned-business district, is home to many South Korean securities firms, the stock exchange and the National Assembly.
The report said North Korean forests are probably being destroyed to provide wood for heating and cook ing and to mak e new farmland to grow more food.
The report, meanwhile, showed that North Korea's forest size decreased from slightly over 8.20 million hectares in 1990 to 6.99 million
hectares 10 years later and 6.29 million in 2005.

A1- 66

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 1990
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
3/1/2007
DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Electricity Generation: Output by Fuel Type:
Total Gross Generation
4.60E+04 GWhe
1
Fraction in Hydro Plants
46.3%
2
Fraction in Thermal Plants
53.7%
2
Generation in largest Oil-fired plant
1.28E+03 GWhe
3
Fraction of Oil Generation in Largest Plant
100%
4Gross Generation, Hydro Plants
2.13E+04 GWhe
Gross Generation, Oil Plants
1.28E+03 GWhe
Gross Generation, Coal Plants
2.34E+04 GWhe
Conversion Factor
3.60E+03 GJ/GWhe
Gross Generation, Hydro Plants
7.66E+07 GJ
Gross Generation, Oil Plants
4.61E+06 GJ
Gross Generation, Coal Plants
8.44E+07 GJ
Own Use Rate, Hydro Plants
0.3%
5
Own Use Rate, Oil Plants
8.00%
5
Own Use Rate, Coal Plants
9.00%
5
Own Use, Hydro Plants
6.39E+01 GWhe
Own Use, Oil Plants
1.02E+02 GWhe
Own Use, Coal Plants
2.11E+03 GWhe
Own Use, Hydro Plants
2.30E+05 GJ
Own Use, Oil Plants
3.69E+05 GJ
Own Use, Coal Plants
7.59E+06 GJ
Net Generation, Hydro Plants
2.123E+04 GWheNet Generation, Oil Plants
1.178E+03 GWheNet Generation, Coal Plants
2.132E+04 GWheNet Generation, Hydro Plants
7.64E+07 GJ
Net Generation, Oil Plants
4.24E+06 GJ
Net Generation, Coal Plants
7.68E+07 GJ
MW of hydro capacity in shared dams used by China
700 MW
11
Fraction of 1990 DPRK hydro generation represented
by Chinese border hydro plants
Exports of electricity to China (does not count sharedborder dams)
Exports of electricity to China"Emergency Losses" Rate, Coal Plants"Emergency Losses", Coal Plants"Emergency Losses", Coal Plants
Total Net Generation factoring in emergency losses,
Coal Plants
Total Net Generation factoring in emergency losses,
All Plants
Total Net Generation, All Plants
Transmission and Distribution Losses
Transmission Losses
Distribution Losses
Delivered Electricity
Delivered Electricity
Fuel Requirements for Electricity Generation"Heat Rate" (Efficiency) Hydro Plants
Gross Generation Efficiency, Oil-Fired Plants
Gross Generation Efficiency, Coal-Fired Plants
Input Energy, Hydro Plants
Input Energy, Oil Plants
Input Energy, Coal Plants
Fraction of energy input to Coal plants as residual oil
Oil input to coal plants
Total Input Energy, Electricity Generation

A1- 6716%
0.00E+00 GWhe
1.19E+07 GJ
5.0%
1.17E+03 GWhe
4.22E+06 GJ

12

14
6

7.25E+07 GJ
4.26E+04 GWhe
1.53E+08 GJ
10%6%
3.60E+04 GWhe
1.30E+08 GJ

7
7100.00%29.5%
28.0%
7.66E+07 GJ
1.56E+07 GJ
3.01E+08 GJ
2.1%
6.33E+06 GJ
3.94E+08 GJ

8
9
10Assumption

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 Somewhat lower than value cited by Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea ,P. 49 (55.5 TWh) as "Official NK Figures", compiled by RINU. Other estimates, published and otherwise
place 1990 DPRK electricity output between about 28 TWh (RINU estimate) and 60 TWh.
2 Figures from document in authors' files [EE1, p. 15].
3 For Oung gi plant, one of (possibly) 2 grid-connected oil-fired plants. From document in authors' files [EE1, p. I-2].
4 The Oung gi plant is 200 MW. The second oil-fired plant listed by some sources must be quite small,
if indeed it exists. Other sources claim that there is only one oil-fired plant in the DPRK, which we have assumed.
5 ROK rates in 1970. From p. 129,E-W.Kim et al, "The Electric Future of Korea" East-West Center,
September, 1983. Own use rates for Chinese coal-fired plants are very slightly higher.
6 Rough estimate. A note in document in authors' files [EE1, p. 26]
put the loss from "frequent emergencies" at Pyongyang power
station at 7%. It is not clear whether this value is typical for the DPRK system as a whole.
7 Official Estimates. From document in authors' files [EP1, p. 3].
This source notes that these estimates may be optimistic.
8 As used in United Nations Energy Statistics Yearbook .
9 Author's estimate. Official rate of approximately 35% (as presented in UNDP (1994), Studies in Supportof Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for the UNDP, July, 1994)
seems somewhat high given the reported condition of the power plant at Sonbong.
10 This rate is somewhat lower than that given for the Chongjin plant in source 9, and similar to the heatrates in Chinese coal plants in the late 1970's.
11 See "Energy Generation Facilities" sheet.
12 Assumes that exported electric energy is proportional to the fraction of capacity earmark ed for Chinese use.
13 The DPRK's Yongbyon nuclear plant, though frequently described as having a capacity of "5 MWe", 5 MW
electrical output) is not configured to produce electricity (see, for example, North Korea's Nuclear
Weapons Programme, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategicdossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-w eapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas-nuclear-w eapons-programme#w eapons

The Yongbyon reactor does, however, provide some heat to buildings in the area. The reactor is said to have a
rated output of about
25 MWth (a range of 20 - 30 MWth is often cited). Capacity factors of about
80 percent for this reactor have been cited, but other observers suggest that a capacity factor of60%
is "more realistic". For 1990, and pending the addition of "heat" as a separate balance category, weplace the heat produced by the Yongbyon reactor, estimated at
4.73E+05 GJ. In the "Hydro/Nuclear"and the "non-specified" row of the energy balance, as well as in the "domestic production" row under supplies.
See "Yongbyon 5-MW(e) Reactor" from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk /yongbyon-5.htm
for estimates of Yongbyon capacity factor.
14 Not counted as exports in energy balances because these plants are owned and operated by China.

A1- 68Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ELECTRICITY GENERATION FACILITIESMAJOR THERMAL GENERATING FACILITIESCapacity
#
Name
(MW)
Fuel
1 Pyongyang
500 Coal
2 Bukchang
1600 Coal
3 Chongjin
150 Coal
4 Chonchonang
200 Coal
5 Oungi
200 Oil
6 Sunchon
200 Coal
7 East Pyongyang
50 CoalTOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Year
Completed
1968
1985
1984
1979
1973
1988
1992

Sources/Notes:
1
1,2,7
1,2
1,2
2
1
3, 18

2900

THERMAL GENERATING FACILITIES REPORTEDLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION
OR RECENTLY COMPLETED AS OF 1996#

Name
1 Pyunghung(?)
2 Suncheon(?)
3 Dongpyungyang
4 Kimchaek
5 Hamhyng central
6 12wol
7 Haeju
8 Ahnju
9 Hamheung

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Capacity(MW)
Fuel
200 Coal
200 Coal
600 Coal
150 Coal
100 Coal
150 Coal
Unknown Coal
1200 Coal
150 CoalYear
StartedYear
Completed Sources/Notes:
8
8,121993 - 1996
13
1988
2
1994
2
1993
13
1990
13
1989
13
1989
13, 142,750

MAJOR HYDRO GENERATING FACILITIESCapacity
Year
Year
#
Name
(MW)
Completed Refurbished Sources/Notes:
1 Supung
400
1,2,4
2 Kymgansang cascade
13.5
1930
1958 2
3 Puren cascade
28.5
1932
2
4 Puch’on-gang
260
1932
1956 2,11
5 Chanjin-gang
390
1936
1958 2
6 Hoch’on-gang
394
1942
1958 2
7 Tonno-gang
90
1959
2
8 Kangae
246
1965
2
9 Ounbong
200
1970
2,5
10 Sodusu-1
180
1974
2,9
11 Sodusu-2
230
1978
2,9
12 Sodusu-3
45
1982
2,9
13 Taedong-gang
200
1982
2
14 Mirim
32
1980
2
15 Ponhwa
321983
2
16 Hwan-gang
20
198?
2
17 Tonhwa
20198?
2
18 T’aep’enmang
90
1989
2,6
19 Weewong
200
1989
2,10
20 Nam-gang
200
1994
2
21 Dokro river
36
2,8
TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

3,307

A1- 69

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
HYDRO GENERATING FACILITIES REPORTEDLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION
OR RECENTLY COMPLETED AS OF 1996#

Name
1 Taechun
2 Kumgang Mountain
3 Sodusu-4
4 Namkang
5 Youngwon
6 Ehrangcheon
7 Jabgjakang
8 P’och’on
9 Oranch’on
10 Heech’on
11 Kymyan-gang

Capacity
(MW)
750
800
200
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
240
820
180
Unknown
Unknown

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Year
Year
StartedCompleted
1983
1985 1996 (1st Phase)
1990
1983
1986
1986

1989

2,990

PARTIAL LISTING OF SUBSTATIONS IN THE DPRKCapacity
#
Name
MVA
Units
1 Changjingang
48 1x28, 1x20
2 Chongjin
165 1x100, 1x5, 1x60
3 Pyongyang No. 2
100 2x50
4 Vynalon
200 2x50, 1x100
5 Pyongyang No. 1
6 Undok
7 Munsan
8 Kilju
9 Hamhung
10 Songchon
11 Sepo12 Nampo
13 Kusong
14 Sinuiju
15 Pyongsong
16 Sin-Anju

Sources/Notes:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

LISTING OF PROVINCIAL CONTROL CENTERS FOR THE DPRK T&D GRID
Source 1#

Name
Location (city)
1 North Kamgyong Chongzin
2 Ryanggang
Hyesan3 Chagang
Kanggye
4 South Hamgyong Hamhung
5 South Pyongan Pyongsong
6 Kangwon
Wonsan7 North Hwanghae Sariwon
8 NampoNampo
9 South Hwanghae Haeju
10 Kaesong
Kaesong
11 North Pyongan
SinijuA1- 70Sources/Notes:
2, 8, 15
2,8,13,16
2
13
13
13
13
2
2
2
2

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Annual Load Curve for 1989
(Source 1)
MonthLoad (MW)
0
9900
1
9950
2
10000
3
9100
4
9900
5
10100
6
10250
7
10500
8
10000
9
9900
10
10000
11
10200
12
10200

Daily Load Curve for August, 1990
(Source 1)
Time
Load (MW)
0:00
8000
1:00
8000
2:00
8500
3:00
8500
4:00
9000
5:00
9550
6:00
9900
7:00
10200
8:00
9500
9:00
9750
10:00
10000
11:00
10000
12:00
8750
13:00
9900
14:00
10100
15:00
10200
16:00
10500
17:00
10250
18:00
10250
19:00
10500
20:00
10600
21:00
10500
22:00
9900
23:00
8200
0:00
8000

Annual Peak Load Curve for the DPRK: 1989

Peak Load (MW)

10500
10000
9500
9000

8500
8000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Months

8

9

10

11

Hourly Load Curve for the DPRK: August, 1990
12000
10000
Load (MW)

8000

6000
4000
2000
0

A1- 71

12

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 Documents in authors' files [EP1, EE1]
2 Moiseyev, V. (1996), The Electric Energy Sector of the DPRK .
Paper presented at the work shop on "Security on the Korean Peninsula," November 21, 1996,
Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey
Institute of International Studies (with funding from the Rock efeller Foundation).
3 Source 1 reports 50 MW of East Pyongyang plant completed in 1992. Source 2 suggeststhat the ultimate capacity of the plant will be (or was to have been) 400 MW
4 Source 2 lists the "Supun" plant as having a total capacity of 735 MW, with 210 MW of that capacity
used to produce power for China.
5 Source 2 lists this plant as having a total capacity of 400 MW, with 200 MW going to China.
6 Source 2 lists this plant as having a total capacity of 190 MW, with 100 MW going to China.
7 Source 1 lists the in-service date of the Buk chang station as 1973. This may be the in-service
date for the first of the units. (Plant name may also be translated as "Puk chang".)
8 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for
National Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
9 Source 8 lists the total capacity of the three phases of the Sodusu plant at 510 MW. Source 17 lists theplant capacity as 420 MW.
10 Source 2 lists this plant as having a total capacity of 390 MW, with 190 MW going to China.
11 Capacity listed by source 8 as 226 MW
12 Source 8 seems to indicate that this plant will be associated with an industrial facility mak ing vinalon.
13 Dongseok Roh, Electricity Policy Division, Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI). PersonalCommunication, 1996.
14 This plant may well be the same as the project listed by source 2 as "Hamhyng central".
15 Source 8 lists the total capacity of this project at 800 MW. Source 13 describes the "first phase"as having a capacity of 660 MW.
16 Source 2 lists the capacity of this project at 810 MW. The first phase of the project, reportedly in therange of 100 to 200 MW, was reportedly brought on line in late 1996.
17 UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP,
Seoul, ROK for the UNDP, July, 1994.
18 According to one report, the East Pyongyang power plant was built to use lignite coal of relatively low
heating value (2000 - 3000 k cal/k g).

A1- 72Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND FUEL REQUIREMENTS IN 1996 THROUGH 2009
Prepared by David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

12/29/2011

ESTIMATE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 1996

Electricity Generating Capacity as of 1990 (MW)
Estimated Gross Generation in 1990 (GWHe)
Implied Capacity Factor, 1990
Changes in Capacity, 1990 to 1996 (MW):Average 1996 Capacity Factor Relative to 1990 Est.
Estimated Gross Generation in 1996 (GWHe)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1990 (GJ)
Fraction of 1990 Exports to China in 1996
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1996 (GJ)
Gross Generation Efficiency, 1996
Fuel Input to generation, 1996 (GJ)
Fraction of fuel input as HFOHFO Input to generation, 1996 (GJ)
Other Petrol Products (tires) input to gen., 1996 (GJ)
Own Use Fractions, 1996
Own Use of Electricity (GJ)
"Emergency Loss" Fractions, 1996
Emergency Losses, 1996 (GJ)
Implied Net Electricity Output (GWhe)
Transmission and Distribution Loss rate (overall), 1996
Transmission and Distribution Losses, 1996 (GJ)

Sources/Notes:
Hydro Plants Coal Plants HFO Plants
4,500
3,200
200
4
2.129E+04
2.34E+04
1.28E+03 Based on 1990 est.
54.0%
83.6%
73.1%
-3250
50
0
5
90%
69.80%
71.2%
3
5.322E+03 1.661E+04
9.11E+02
0.00E+00
Does not include output of0%
Supung hydro plants
0.00E+00
controlled by China
100%
27.0%
28.00%
2
1.92E+07
2.21E+08
1.17E+07
N/A
6.20%
100%
1
N/A
1.37E+07
1.17E+07
N/A
1.69E+04
0.30%
9.00%
8.00% Based on 1990 est.
5.75E+04
5.38E+06
2.62E+05
0%7.5%
0% 50% higher than 1990
0
4.48E+06
05.306E+03 1.387E+04 8.385E+02 for use in LEAP
23.10%
50% higher than 1990
1.66E+07

ESTIMATE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2000

Changes in Capacity, 1990 to 2000 (MW):Average 2000 Capacity Factor Relative to 1990 Est.
Estimated Gross Generation in 2000 (GWHe)
Gross Generation Efficiency, 2000
Fuel Input to generation, 2000 (GJ)
Fraction of fuel input as HFOHFO Input to generation, 2000 (GJ)
Other Petrol Products (tires) input to gen., 2000 (GJ)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1990 (GJ)
2000 Exports to China (GWh)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 2000 (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from China (GJ)
Own Use Fractions, 2000
Own Use of Electricity (GJ)
"Emergency Loss" Fractions, 2000
Emergency Losses, 2000 (GJ)
Implied Net Electricity Output (GWhe)
Transmission and Distribution Loss rate (overall), 2000
Transmission and Distribution Losses, 2000 (GJ)

Hydro Plants Coal Plants HFO Plants
-1400
150
69.8 Total capacity, not just operable
71%
10.8%
8.57% CF based on total capacity
1.05E+04 2.641E+03
1.48E+02100%
21.0%
20.54%
3.77E+07
4.53E+07
2.59E+06
N/A
29.13%
100%
N/A
1.32E+07
2.59E+06
N/A
7.71E+05
0.00E+00
Excluding Chinese-controlled
22.66
Based on reported exports
8.16E+04
0.00E+00
0.30%
9.00%
8.00% Same as in 1990
1.13E+05
8.56E+05
4.26E+04
0%9.4%
0% 30% higher than in 1996
08.91E+05
0
1.044E+04 2.156E+03 1.362E+02 for use in LEAP
27.72%
20% higher than 1996
1.27E+07

A1- 73Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2005

Changes in Capacity, 1990 to 2005 (MW):Average 2005 Capacity Factor Relative to 1990 Est.
Estimated Gross Generation in 2005 (GWHe)
Gross Generation Efficiency, 2005
Fuel Input to generation, 2005 (GJ)
Fraction of fuel input as HFOHFO Input to generation, 2005 (GJ)
Other Petrol Products (tires) input to gen., 2005 (GJ)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1990 (GJ)
2005 Exports to China (GWh)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 2005 (GJ)
Own Use Fractions, 2005
Own Use of Electricity (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from China (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from Russia (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from ROK (GJ)
Total Electricity Imports (GJ)
"Emergency Loss" Fractions, 2005
Emergency Losses, 2005 (GJ)
Implied Net Electricity Output (GWhe)
Transmission and Distribution Loss rate (overall), 2005
Transmission and Distribution Losses, 2005 (GJ)

On-site generation with Diesel Fuel

Hydro Plants Coal Plants HFO Plants-383.6150
69.8
57.24%
21.00%
10% See Note 12
1.1146E+04 5.1511E+03 1.727E+02
100%
21.0%
21.00%
4.01E+07
8.83E+07
2.96E+06
N/A
3.99%
100%
N/A
3.52E+06
2.96E+06
N/A
8.91E+05
0.00E+00
Excluding Chinese-controlled
Based on reported exports.
90.15
See Note 11
3.25E+05
0.30%
9.00%
8.00% Same as in 1990
1.20E+05
1.67E+06
4.97E+04
2.37E+03
See Note 10
Discussions, but no0.00E+00
evidence of transfers as yet
2.62E+05
For Kaesong; See Note 82.65E+05
0%9%0% 25% higher than in 1996
01.67E+06
0
1.111E+04 4.224E+03 1.589E+02 for use in LEAP
20% higher than in 1996;
27.72%
See Note 91.55E+07
Average
Capacity
Average
Capacity (MW)FactorEfficiency
38.00
25%
22% All rough assumptions
Implied (Net)
ImpliedImpliedGeneration
Generation Diesel Fuel
(MWh)
(GJ)
Use (GJ)
8.32E+04
3.00E+05
1.36E+06

ESTIMATE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2008

Changes in Capacity, 1990 to 2008 (MW):Average 2008 Capacity Factor Relative to 1990 Est.
Estimated Gross Generation in 2008 (GWHe)
Gross Generation Efficiency, 2008
Fuel Input to generation, 2008 (GJ)
Fraction of fuel input as HFOHFO Input to generation, 2008 (GJ)
Other Petrol Products (tires) input to gen., 2008 (GJ)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1990 (GJ)
GWhe Electricity Exports to China in 2008
Estimated Power Exports to China, 2008 (GJ)
Own Use Fractions, 2008
Own Use of Electricity (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from China (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from Russia (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from ROK (GJ)
Total Electricity Imports (GJ)
"Emergency Loss" Fractions, 2008
Emergency Losses, 2008 (GJ)
Implied Net Electricity Output (GWhe)
Transmission and Distribution Loss rate (overall), 2008
Transmission and Distribution Losses, 2008 (GJ)

On-site generation with Diesel Fuel

Hydro Plants Coal Plants HFO Plants-255.46150
69.8
58.89%
20.86%
10% See Note 14
1.18E+04 5.117E+03
1.73E+02
1.7116E+04
100%
21.0%
21.00%
4.26E+07
8.77E+07
2.96E+06
N/A
13.58%
100%
N/A
1.19E+07
2.96E+06
N/A
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
Excluding Chinese-controlled
Based on reported exports.
143.54
See Note 11
5.17E+05
0.30%
9.00%
8.00%
1.28E+05
1.66E+06
4.97E+04
6.46E+04
See Note 10
Discussions, but no0.00E+00
evidence of transfers as yet
1.51E+06
For Kaesong; See Note 8
1.57E+060%9%
0%0
1.66E+06
0
1.179E+04 4.196E+03 1.589E+02 for use in LEAP
27.72%
Based on 1990 est.
1.61E+07
Average
Capacity
Average
Capacity (MW)FactorEfficiency
38.00
11%
22% All rough assumptions
Implied (Net)
ImpliedImpliedGeneration
Generation Diesel Fuel
(MWh)
(GJ)
Use (GJ)
3.66E+04
1.32E+05
5.99E+05

A1- 74

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2009

Changes in Capacity, 1990 to 2009 (MW):Average 2009 Capacity Factor Relative to 1990 Est.
Estimated Gross Generation in 2009 (GWHe)
Gross Generation Efficiency, 2009
Fuel Input to generation, 2009 (GJ)
Fraction of fuel input as HFOHFO Input to generation, 2009 (GJ)
Other Petrol Products (tires) input to gen., 2009 (GJ)
Estimated Power Exports to China, 1990 (GJ)
GWhe Electricity Exports to China in 2009
Estimated Power Exports to China, 2009 (GJ)
Own Use Fractions, 2009
Own Use of Electricity (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from China (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from Russia (GJ)
Imports of Electricity from ROK (GJ)
Total Electricity Imports (GJ)
"Emergency Loss" Fractions, 2009
Emergency Losses, 2009 (GJ)
Implied Net Electricity Output (GWhe)
Transmission and Distribution Loss rate (overall), 2009
Transmission and Distribution Losses, 2009 (GJ)
Nuclear Generating Capacity as of 2009 (MWe)Ave. Capacity Fact., Nuclear Plants (Gross Generation)
Own Use of Electricity at Nuclear Plants
Net Nuclear Generation Exported
Transmission and Distribution Losses, Exports
Net Nuclear Generation Used DomesticallyOn-site generation with Diesel FuelSources/Notes:
Hydro Plants Coal Plants HFO Plants-217.28
150
69.8
58.6%
15.2%
10%
1.187E+04 3.734E+03
1.73E+02 See Notes 13, 15
100%
21.0%
21.00%
4.27E+07
6.40E+07
2.96E+06
N/A
2.290%
100%
N/A
1.47E+06
2.96E+06
N/A
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
Excluding Chinese-controlled
Based on reported exports.
128.89See Note 11
4.64E+05
0.30%
9.00%
8.00%
1.28E+05
1.21E+06
4.97E+04
2.48E+04
See Note 10
Discussions, but no0.00E+00
evidence of transfers as yet
1.54E+06
For Kaesong; See Note 8
1.57E+060%9%
0%01.21E+06
01.183E+04 3.062E+03 1.589E+02 for use in LEAP
27.72%
6
1.50E+07
0
75%
7%
90%
5%
10%

GWHe
GJ
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
Average
Capacity
Average
Capacity (MW)FactorEfficiency
38.00
7%22% All rough assumptions
Implied (Net)
ImpliedImpliedGeneration
Generation Diesel Fuel
(MWh)
(GJ)
Use (GJ)
2.33E+04
8.39E+04
3.81E+05

A1- 75Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Conversion Factor:
Conversion Factor:

1.000 toe/te
41.87 GJ/toe
Sources/Notes:

Plant
Pyongyang
as start-up fuelas supplement
Ch'ongjin
Pukchang
SunchonEast-Pyongyang
TOTAL

Rating (MWe)
500
500
150
1600
200
150
2600

Assumed Gross
Implied Max. Max. Listed
Max.
Generation Eff. fuel use (GJ/mo.)HFO (te/mo.) Fract. HFO
27.0%
27.0%
27.0%
27.0%
27.0%
30%

4.87E+06
4.87E+06
1.46E+06
1.56E+07
1.95E+06
1.31E+06
2.52E+07

2,500
17,00010,00020,0002,000
3,000
52,0002.15%
14.63%
28.68%
5.38%
4.30%
9.56%
8.65%

1
1
1
1
1
1
2

Back-up Calculation: Actual KEDO Fuel Input to Power Facilities in 1996 (11/95 through 10/96)
Chongjin
3,755 tePyongyang
44,842 te
Pukchang
20,065 te
Estimated KEDO HFO used, nominally coal-fired plants:
68,662 te
Estimated KEDO HFO used, nominally coal-fired plants:
2.87E+06 GJ
Sonbong279,891 te
Estimated KEDO HFO used, Sonbong oil-fired plant:
1.17E+07 GJ
Implied average capacity factor at Sonbong plant, 1996:
52.0%
Sources/Notes:
1 Assumes start-up and fuel supplement use of HFO in coal plants at over 6 percent of total thermal input.
2 Hydro set at 100 percent for accounting purposes. Coal and oil as described in estimates made for 1990,
except efficiency reduced to reflect deterioration of infrastructure.
3 Figures of 75 percent and 100 percent of 1990 capacity factors for oil-fired plants and hydroelectric plants are assumptions.
Factor for coal-fired stations is used to balance demand with net generation.
4 Assumes UN estimate of 4500 MW hydro and 5000 MW thermal. For reference, the sum of the capacitiesof the seven largest thermal plants was reported to be 2900 MW. There is by at least one report of one other oil-fired,grid-connected plant in addition to Sonbong, but other reports state that the plant at Sonbong is the
only active oil-fired plant of any size in the DPRK--which has been our work ing assumption.
5 Information from one source is that "one or two" "small to medium" (less than 10 MW) hydro plants were damaged in
the floods of 1995 and 1996. Another source states that there has without doubt been substantial flood damage, including
reservoir siltation and other problems. We assume that the net impact of flood damage and opening of a newhydro facility at Kumgang Mountain has been the effective reduction in hydro capacity shown.
For thermal facilities, we assume (and have been told) that the addition of one 50 MW unit of the
150 MW plant under construction at East Pyongyang is the only recent major change.
6 Assumes a slight improvement as a result, for example, of lessons learned in ongoing UNDP program.
7 Year 2000 losses assumed to be an additional 5 percent higher than in 1996, due to continuing deterioration ofelectricity transmission and distribution system. Year 2005 losses assumed to be about the same as in2000, as improvement of grids in some areas with improving economies is balanced by continued deterioration inother areas.

A1- 763
3
3

3
4

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
8 Electricity exports from the ROK to the Kaesong (Gaesung) industrial region of the DPRK started from about mid-March, 2005,
over a line with a capacity of
15 MW. Assuming an average capacity factor of
70% (rough estimate, based on consideration of baseload power needs of industry, and seconded by ROK
experts) for the supplies to this industrial area, and that supplies were available for 9 months of 2005, implied
exports of power from the ROK to the DPRK during 2005 were about
72.82 GWh.
Capacity of line from ROK from several sources, including KERI ("Analysis of Present Status and Future
Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System", by J.Y. Yoon, presented at the DPRK Energy
Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Yoon's
presentation is avaialble as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Yoon.ppt.
We assume that the power line to Kaesong operated at the same capacity factor estimated above for thefull 12 months of 2006, implying energy provision of
97.09 GWh.
A sample of the news reports on the initiation of power flows from the ROK to the DPRK is
Agence France-Presse (AFP), dated: 16 Mar 2005, "South Korea supplies power to North for first time in five decades".
Accessed at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6AJ9J5?OpenDocument.
In mid-2007, a second, larger power connection to the Kaesong area was completed. This line, capableof carrying
100 MW, would, at the same
70% capacity factor assumed above,
have potential output on the order of613.2 GWh/yr.
(Data on line capacity and date from Congressional Research Serice, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex ,by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, dated June 1, 2010,
and available as www.opencrs.com/document/RL34093/2010-06-01/download/1013/.
The total value of goods from the Kaesong complex was
251.4 million USD in 2008, and
256.5 million USD in 2009, up from
14.9 million USD in 2005 (source, Nanto and Manyin).
More than half of this output value was from textile/apparel firms. In the ROK in 2007, the approximate electricity intensityof the textile industry was
1.379 k cal per ROK Won, or about
1.67 k Wh per USD
This would imply electricity consumption at Kaesong of about
419.44 GWh in 2008, and427.95 GWh in 2009. These figures are rough estimates, but close enough to the capacity of the line to be plausible.
In 2007, we assume that total electricity provision over the 15 and then 100 MW lines were mid-way between the totals
estimated to be provided in 2006 and 2008, or
258.26 GWh.
9 The presentation by Dr. Yoon referenced in Note 9, above, estimates DPRK transmission and distribution losses
at "about 20%" and "above 20%". Other, anecdotal estimates of losses, particularly in areas away from large cities,
suggest that losses could be considerably higher. The value used for this analysis for 2000 and 2005 is
intended as a rough weighted average.
10 China Customs Statistics from World Trade Atlas lists 2005 exports of electricity from China to the DPRK as
657,068 k Wh. As compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
Electricity exports from the DPRK to China, as indicated by the same source and updates in 2008 and 2010, are as follows for otheryears:
Year
kWh
1999
115,200
2000
2001
63,250
2002
8,845,890
2003
11,107,121
2004
8,568,657
2005
657,0682006
1,178,774
2007
1,710,409
2008
17,937,327
2009
6,896,090
2010
3,345,000
Average from 2002:
6,694,037
2010 value from UN Comtrade Database
11 From China Customs Statistics; see "ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2005" Work sheet in this work book , Note 2.
12 Output from hydroelectric plants based on data and assumptions presented in "ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2005 AND BEYOND"Work sheet. Output of oil-fired power plants assumes little change since 2000, and output of (mostly) coal-fired
power plants is adjusted to reach total DPRK-wide output as reported in "ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2005 AND BEYOND"
work sheet by adjusting capacity factor.

A1- 77Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
13 For 2009, we assume that there was a decrease in overall gross generation approximately equal to that estimated by J.Y. Yoon in
his presentation for the 2010 Energy and Minerals Experts Work ing Group Meeting in Beijing, September 2010, "Analysis on
DPRK Power Industry & Interconnection Options". In the presentation, Yoon quotes ROK analysts as estimating that the
DPRK's generation in 2008 was
25.5 TWh, and generation in 2009 was
23.5 TWh. We do not use these absolute generation estimates, because we believe that they are
too high (Mr. Yoon agrees that a "minimum" value could be closer to 16 TWh for 2007, for which ROK analysts estimate output of
23.7 TWh), but we use the ratio of these 2009 and 2008 estimates,
92.2% , to estimate a target value for 2009 output.
The target value for overall generation is assumed to be composed of the hydroelectric output estimated for 2009 in the work sheet"Electric--2005_2008" in this work book , the oil-fired capacity estimated for 2009 as above, and the coal-fired capacity, which isestimated by difference from the target value less the output of hydroelectric and oil plants.
14 As an alternative perspective on the capacity factor assumed for coal-fired thermal generation, dprk guidebook .org (probably c. 2006/7),"III - MAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS & BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES", available as http://dprk guidebook .org/contents_3.htm, contains thethe assertion "Around 23% of the country’s thermal ( Coal-fired ) power generation facilities are operational [and] [a]round 80% of thecountry’s hydro-electric (water-generated) power generation facilities are operational". No specific source is provided for these data, but comparing
our assumed capacity factor for coal-fired generation for 2009 (about 12 percent) with the 23 percent operable value cited by dprk guidebook
suggests a capacity factor of about 50 percent for the fraction of thermal capacity that remains operable, which seems plausible.
15 Several sources suggest that the 200 MW oil-fired power plant associated with the oil refinery at Sonbong has operated relatively little since
the oil refinery has been off-line due to lack of crude to process (possibly compounded with maintenance issues). The oil-fired power plant
generated power when heavy fuel oil was available from KEDO and, we assume proably when HFO was shipped to the DPRK as a partof the Six-Party Talk s agreements, but absent those inputs, has probably operated little, if at all. The website NK Economy Watch, in a posting
dated November 7, 2011, under "Choson Exchange October trip findings" (available as part of http://www.nk econwatch.com/category/energy/oil/)includes the following text:"Sonbong PowerThis power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feedback to Victory. Since the refinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with fueloil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, the economics of running the plant do notwork leaving the 800 workers employed here largely idle."

A1- 78Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2000
Prepared by David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

2/24/2011

Estimate of Status of Electricity Generating Plants as of 2000 (see Note 1)

Plant Name/Group
Thermal Power Plants
Oungi (Sonbong refinery)

DesignFuel

Original
Capacity
(MW)

HFO

200

(Plant associated with small W
Coast Refinery)
HFO

Estimated
Capacity
Operable
FactorEstimated
Capacity (fraction of
2000
as of
operable
output2000
capacity)(GWh) Notes-(Note 3)
0%

60

60

20%

Pukchang
Pyongyang
East Pyongyang
Taechon

Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal

1,600
500
100
200

180
190
40
50

45%
45%
45%
45%

Songlim (internal combustion)
SonglimSariwonSunchonTotal of Above

HFO/diesel
Coal
Coal
Coal

9.8
100
100
100
2,970

9.8
530

50%
0%
0%
0%

Thermal Capacity included in
1996 estimate but not in theabove:
Total of Large Thermal

Coal

Design
Fuel

350
3,320

Original
Capacity
(MW)

210
740

45%
43%

-

Not in operation since 1999

Operable capacity not from Source 1-estimate assuming full capacity
available, but plant may have heatexchanger problems. Much of output
105 may be dedicated to nearby refinery.
3x100 MW units in operation, further
40% reduction in capacity due to710 heat exchanger problems.
749 See also Note 16
158 See also Note 16
197
43 Capacity factor rough estimate
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
1,961
Operable capacity not from Source 1-estimate assuming full capacity
available, but down-rated by 40%
because plants likely have heat828 exchanger problems.
2,789

Estimated
Capacity
Operable
FactorEstimated
Capacity (fraction of
2000
as of
operable
output2000
capacity)(GWh) Notes

Plant Location/Category
Hydro Power Plants
Plants on Chinese Border

Hydro

700

700

17.5%

Other Hydro Plants as of 1996

Hydro

3,925

2,944

36%

1,073 See Note 2
Assumes about 75% of non-borderregion capacity is operable (or thatthe average available capacity is 75%
of nameplate), and capacity factor is9,401 75% of 1996 estimate.

33%

Excludes portion of capacity at
Chinese border used exclusively by
10,474 China.

Total Estimated Operable
Hydro Capacity

4,625

3,644

TOTAL IMPLIED DPRKELECTRICITY OUTPUT, 2000
Recorded Electricity Exports to China
Recorded Electricity Imports from China
Input of used tires as fuel for electricity generation

13,263 GWH (see Note 4)
22.66 GWh (see Note 5)
0.00 GWh (see Note 5)
7.71E+05 GJ(See Notes 6 and 7)

Sources/Notes:
1 Information on status of electricity generating facilities from an industry source, except as noted below.
2 An industry source with k nowledge of operating procedures for the hydroelectric power plants along
the China/DPRK border estimates that there are approximately 700 MW of capacity providing power
to the DPRK from the 4 hydroelectric cascades on the rivers that form the border between the
DPRK and China. Further, this capacity, if it was damaged in the floods of the mid-1990s, is now operational.
Standard procedures for operating the shared hydro capacity on the DPRK/China border is to
run the plants on a peak ing basis (low capacity factor) except for August, when rivers are full andthe plants are run at full capacity. Availability of water thus limits output. As 2000 was reportedly arelatively low water year (perhaps 70% of normal), we assume that the average capacity factor for these plants
was10% for all months except August, and thus the overall annual averagecapacity factor was approximately
17.5% .
3 An estimated 50% capacity factor for the operable thermal units is roughly consistent with the level of
output we assumed for 1996, with some reduction to account for difficulties in obtaining coal supplies. Still,
50 percent may be a generous estimate. By way of comparison, the KEEI data set provided to Nautilus(work book titled "DPRK Energy Data", based on information from the ROK National Statistics Office)suggests total (probably not all operable) thermal capacity of 2960 MW, and output of 9200 GWh, foran average capacity factor of 35 percent. The average hydroelectric capacity factor from the same sourcefor 2000 is 25%.

A1- 79

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
4 This total is lower than the 19.3 TWh quoted by The Wall Street Journal (Jay Solomon, "EUROPE ENGINEERS WAIT
FOR U.S. MOVE TO OFFER ENERGY HELP TO NORTH KOREA," Seoul, 03/21/01) as having been
estimated by Siemens AG, and is also lower than the 19.4 TWh estimated production in 2000 asprovided in the KEEI data set described in Note 3. The total, however, does not seem unreasonablegiven the difficult status of the power generation and fuel supply infrastructure in the DPRK described byrecent visitors. The total calculated also is similar to the value (apparently) attributed to "ROK Officials"
by the Associated Press in a 1998 article focusing on potential South-North Power Transfers("KOREA ELECTRIC POWER CHIEF OFFERS SURPLUS POWER TO N. KOREA," Seoul, 06/08/98)
as "most of the DPRK's power plants are fossil-fired and only produce about 1.5 million k ilowatts daily,
about one- fifth of their total capacity, because of fuel shortages". If the reference here, which is not entirely clear, isinterpreted to mean that the average output of DPRK electricity plants was 1500 MW as of mid-1998, the implied
total annual generation would be about 13 TWh.
5 Exports from the DPRK to China from China Customs Report 2000 , pp. 1483-1495 (in Chinese).
6 Source from the industry reports that the DPRK lik ely received a total of 25,000 tonnes of used auto
tires from Japan and Taiwan in 2000 for use as a supplemental boiler fuel. The DPRK has reportedly beenrequesting similar cargoes from Europe. This estimate corresponds well with data from Japan
Customs Statistics (data from files downloaded from http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/download/index_d012_e.htm)
that lists year 2000 exports from Japan to the DPRK in a category (HS # 400400000) that is definedas "Waste, parings and scrap of rubber (other than hard rubber) and powders and granules obtained therefrom"at a total level of
22,156 tonnes. We use this value as the estimated input of waste tires toelectricity generation in the DPRK in 2000. For 2005, exports from Japan to the DPRK in the same category
were recorded as
25,599 tonnes. The reported value of cargoes of this product averaged about
3600 Yen/tonne in 2000, and was about 3000 Yen per tonne from 2003 through 2005. By way of comparison
these per-tonne value were less, sometimes significantly less, than the amount paid by Japan for coalexported from the DPRK to Japan in those years. Exports of this waste-rubber product werehigher in all of the other years between 2000 and 2005, peak ing at over 110,000 tonnes in 2003.
UN Comtrade data available for exports of this product from Japan to the DPRK are as follows:
Trade
Value

Period1988$102,675

1989$80,735

Net Weight(kg)

Im plied
Cost pertonne

920,312 $ 111.57
631,125 $ 127.92
189,910 $ 116.73
926,937 $ 397.87

1990$22,169

1991$368,796

1992$16,346

1993$2,693

1995$6,3241996$5,117

1997$20,383

328,875 $ 61.98

1998$37,169

1999$185,892

1,385,812 $ 26.82
6,047,750 $ 30.74

88,050 $ 185.64
14,000 $ 192.36
237,359 $ 26.64
486,250 $ 10.52

22,156,316 $ 33.09
78,881,812 $ 20.28

2000$733,051

2001$1,600,014

2002$2,207,715 112,927,562 $ 19.55$1,633,181 63,311,953 $ 25.80

2003
2003

$7,736

100,500 $ 76.98

2004$1,781,644

62,972,308 $ 28.29
50,000 $ 86.76

2004$4,338

2005$692,654

2006$221,617

25,599,116 $ 27.06
8,557,974 $ 25.90

A1- 80Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
7 Oxford Recycling Inc. (http://www.oxfordrecycling.com/product.html#5, visited 6/8/02) lists a fuel energy
content of
15,000 Btu/lb, or
34.82 GJ/tonne, for fuel from shredded tires.
the same source lists a sulfur content of
1.30% for the same fuel.
8 An article entitled "Defector from Pyonyang: 'Thirty thousand constructing soldires were died (sic) in Guemgangsan Plant'",
by Han Yo'ng-chin, published 14 Feb, 2006, in The Daily NK WWW (Seoul), includes a reference to theAnbyun Youth Power Plant, near Mount Guemgang (Kumgang) as having a second step of construction completed
in 2000, with final construction completed in 2003, and having a capacity of 200 MW.
9 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 14 December, 2004, and entitled "Leader Gives Field
Guidance to Construction of Power Station", refers to the under-construction Orangch'on (hydro) Power Plant
in North Hamgyong Province. The generating room of "Power Station No. 1" is described as "entering the construction stage".
10 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 26 May, 2005, and entitled "Kim Jong Il Visits
Wo'nsan Power Station", refers to the under-construction Wo'nsan Youth Power Station (hydro)
in Kangwo'n Province. This plant seems to be in the construction phase, with the dam at least partiallycompleted. No figures on capacity are given.
11 An article in KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 19 September, 2005, and entitled "DPRK Leader Visits
Moranbong Theater Under Reconstruction", includes a reference to the construction of a series of "10 small- and medium-sized
power plants in tiers along [the] To'k chi River", with the implication that construction of the dam and related elements
are complete or nearly so. The article also references the completion and starting of the To'k chinggang No.9
power plant, and refers to an under-construction No. 4 power plant. No information on plant capacity is provided.
12 An broadcast by KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 20 December, 2005, and on the subject "DPRK TV on Leader'sInspiring People to Build New Power Plants on 'Large Scale'", includes reference to the Naep'yo'ng No. 2 Kunmin Power
Plant and the Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant, and notes that "Kim Jong Il visited all the power plant construction sites in the
country for the last 10 years." The transcript of the broadcast also refers to the volume of the dam at the
Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant as 1.7 million cubic meters, with 16 k m of aqueducts, and refers to assembly ofgenerators No. 2 through 5. There is also a reference to the Ku'mjingang Hu'ngbong Youth Power Plant inSouth Kamgyo'ng Province on the Ku'mjin River, to "large scale hydraulic power plants" such as theOrangch'o'n Power Plant and the Paek tusan So'ngun Youth Power Plant, plus "scores of" small and medium-scale power
plants including the "(Word Indistinct) No. 2 Railway Youth Power Plants, the Naso'n Youth Power Plant, the Singye Kunmin
power plant, the (Word Indistinct) Mine No. 2 Power plant, [and the] (? Taegak ) Youth Power Plant."
There is a reference to a photo of "one or a power plant of the Susongch'o'n Second-stage Five Powr Plants".
13 An article in Korea Today (Pyongyang, via Naenara Internet, in English), dated 12 January, 2006, includes aninterview with Kim Su Nam, "Bureau Director of the Ministry of Electric and Coal Industries". In the interview, Kim states,in part, "A large number of hydroelectric power stations have been built, including the Taedonggang, Namgang,
Anbynon Youth, Thaechon, and Kanggye Youth Power Stations. Hydroelectric generating capacity
has steadily grown with the builiding of many minor hydropower stations on the principle of combining large, medium,and small power plants. Along with this, thermal power plants have been erected in Pyongyang, Puk chang, Sunchon, andother parts of the country to meet the growing demand for electricity." The interview also refers to the completed
construction of a dam of the Nyongwon Power Station, and to medium and (smaller) power stations in Jagang, South
Haymgyyong, Ryanggang, and other provinces. Kim also refers to efforts to increase capacity at existing hydro andthermal power stations.
14 The article in Nodong Sinmun (Pyongyang, in Korean), dated 29 December, 2002, page 1, by Chong Yong-ch'ol,"At North Hwanghae Province: Power Plants Wherever the Water Flows", refers to power plants including
the Yosonggang Power Plant in North Hwanghae Province, power plants in Yont'an and Unp'a County, a power plantin P'yongsan County, a power plant in Kok san County (on the stream of the same name), a plant at Taech'on-ri
in Insan County, plants under construction in Singye and Yonsan Counties (Singye Power Plant No. 1, and Hwangdaech'on
Power Plant, respectively, with the latter apparently in early construction phases, and the former more advanced).
There is a reference to "power plant constructed at Holdong Mine".
15 From China Customs Statistics. See Note 10 in "Electric--96-on" Work sheet in this work book .

A1- 81Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
16 A set of figures from a 2001 document in the authors' files [NKES-01], citing a DPRK source, provided the following
information about the Pyongyang Thermal Power plant. The coal consumption figure shown corresponds to a
relatively high efficiency if it is interpreted as referring to average heat-content coal, and an efficiency
of about
26% when converted from grams of coal equivalent per kWh. The same source also
includes the following information: "The Pyongyang area has 600MW of thermal power plants (Pyongyang Thermal Plant 500MW,
East Pyongyang Thermal Plant 100 MW), which receive coal supplies from the Chik dong Mine and the Chonsong Mine.
Electric power production these days is only 1,700,000 MWh (Pyongyang Thermal Plant 1,225,000 MWh,
East Pyongyang Thermal Plant 475,000 MWh)." The latter figures, if true, suggest that year 2000 electricity output
was somewhat higher than estimated above, at least for these plants. It should be noted that the Pyongyang and in particular,
East Pyongyang plants are among the most recent additions to the DPRK fleet of thermal power plants.
Pyongyang Thermal Power Facilities*
Thermal Condensing Turbine
50 MW x 7 (USSR)
Extraction Steam Condensing
TurbineSteam Condensing Turbine
Steam Boiler
Heating Boiler (210t) 100Gcal/h
Total Operating Hours
Consumption of Anthracite

50 MW x 1 (German)
100 MW x 1 (German)
12 Unit2 Unit300,000
470g/kwh(approximately)

Based on a very rough calculation, 2 boilers of this size could supply
space heat and hot water for tens of thousands of households(perhaps 25,000 to 100,000)* This table has been edited slightly for clarity.

A1- 82Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 2005 AND BEYOND
Prepared by David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

8/9/2012

Estimate of Status of Electricity Generating Plants as of 2005-2009 (see Note 1)

Plant Name/Group

Design Fuel

Estimated
Capacity
FactorOriginal
Operable(fraction of EstimatedCapacity Capacity as of operable 2005 output
(MW)
2005
capacity)
(GWh)
Notes

Thermal Power Plants

Oungi (Sonbong refinery)(Note 3)
Reportedly not in operation since1999 as of 2000. Assumed not tohave operated since 2000, as
associated refinery remains inactive.

HFO

200

-

0%

-

(Plant associated with small W
Coast Refinery)
HFO

60

60

20%

105 Assumed same as 2000
Recent news articles suggest that
this plant is a mainstay of the current
DPRK electricity system, and has
been upgraded recently, but an
estimate of currently operable
capacity is not available. See also
Note 13 .

Pukchang
Pyongyang
East Pyongyang
Taechon

Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal

1,600
500
100
200

??
??
??
??

Songlim (internal combustion)
SonglimSariwonSunchonTotal of Above
Thermal Capacity included in
1996 estimate but not in theabove:

HFO/diesel
Coal
Coal
Coal

9.8
100
100
100
2,970

??
??
??

350

??

Coal

Total of Large Thermal

Plant Location/Category
Hydro Power Plants

Plants on Chinese Border

Other Hydro Plants as of 1996

3,320

Design Fuel

Hydro

Hydro

Total Estimated Operable Hydro
Capacity as of end-2004
Hydro

New large hydro capacity added
in 2005

New medium hydro capacity
added in 2005

Hydro

??
??
??
??
9.8

50%
??
??
??

70

43 Assumed same as 2000
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
148

??

2,040

30.2%

Operable capacity and output fromdata reported by KERI (for 2004)--seesource in Note 1 . Total capacity
roughly consistent with data in Note
5,400 12.

Estimated
Capacity
FactorOriginal
Operable(fraction of EstimatedCapacity Capacity as of operable 2005 output
(MW)
2005
capacity)
(GWh)
Notes

700

3,925

4,625

864

3,066

37%

Estimated based on 2004 figures forplants shared with China as provided
2,800 in source listed in Note 1 .

30%

Estimated based on 2004 figures forplants other than those shared with
China as provided in source listed in
8,100 Note 1 .

3,930

32%

100

15%

Excludes portion of capacity at
Chinese border used exclusively by
China. Total capacity roughly
10,900 consistent with data in Notes 12, 16 .
Rough estimate. New reports in thelast few years such as thosedescribed in Notes 6 - 11 list several
new large hydro facilities in different
stages of construction, but few
132 quantitative details are available.

15%

See Note 14 . Capacity factor for
medium and large hydro plants
added in 2005 assumed half of
average for existing plants not sharedwith China (to roughly account for
operation starting at different times of
114 the year).

86.4

TOTAL IMPLIED DPRKELECTRICITY OUTPUT, 2005

16,546 GWh (See Note 15 )A1- 83Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of Status of Electricity Generating Plants as of 2008 (see Note 1)

Plant Name/Group
Thermal Power Plants

Design Fuel

Oungi (Sonbong refinery)
HFO(Plant associated with small W
Coast Refinery)
HFO

Pukchang
Pyongyang
East Pyongyang
TaechonSonglim (internal combustion)
SonglimSariwonSunchonTotal of Above
Thermal Capacity included in
1996 estimate but not in theabove:

Coal
Coal
Coal
Coal
HFO/diesel
Coal
Coal
Coal

Coal

Total of Large Thermal

Plant Location/Category
Hydro Power Plants

Estimated
Capacity
Estimated
FactorOriginal
Operable(fraction of EstimatedCapacity Capacity as of operable 2008 output
(MW)
2008
capacity)
(GWh)
Notes
(Note 3)

200

-

0%

-

60

60

20%

105 Assumed same as 2000
Recent information from visitors to
the DPRK indicate that updates tothis plant are planned, but have notyeat been carried out. See also
Note 13 .

1,600
500
100
200
9.8
100
100
100
2,970

??
??
??
??

350

??

3,320

Design Fuel

9.8
??
??
??

??
??
??
??
50%
??
??
??

70

2,040

30.2%

700

864

37%

Other Hydro Plants as of 1996

Hydro

3,925

3,066

31%

New medium hydro capacity
added between 2006 and 2008

New medium hydro capacity
added during 2009

Hydro

Hydro

Operable capacity and output fromdata reported by KERI (for 2006)--seesource in Note 1 . Total capacity
roughly consistent with data in Note
5,400 12.

Estimated
Capacity
FactorOriginal
Operable(fraction of EstimatedCapacity Capacity as of operable 2008 output
(MW)
2008
capacity)
(GWh)
Notes

Hydro

New large hydro capacity addedfrom 2005 through 2008

43 Assumed same as 2000
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
Plant reportedly not operating
148??

Plants on Chinese BorderTotal Estimated Operable Hydro
Capacity as of end-2004
Hydro

Reportedly not in operation since1999 as of 2000. Assumed not tohave operated since 2000, as
associated refinery remains inactive.

4,625

Estimated based on 2004 figures forplants shared with China as provided
2,800 in source listed in Note 1 .
Slightly higher than 2004 figures forplants other than those shared with
China as provided in source listed in
8,300 Note 1 .

3,930

32%

200

30%

Excludes portion of capacity at
Chinese border used exclusively by
China. Total capacity roughly
11,100 consistent with data in Notes 12, 16 .
Rough estimate. News reports in thelast few years such as thosedescribed in Notes 6 - 11, 19, and 22
list several new large hydro facilities
in different stages of construction,
but few quantitative details are
526 available.

20.0%

See Note 14 . Capacity factor for
medium-sized hydro plants addedfrom 2006 through 2008 assumed
somewhat lower than capacity factor
for larger hydro plants, and also
reduced somewhat because plants
completed in 2008 are assumed toaverage only half of a full year's
output during that year. Capacity
total for 2006-2008 extrapolates trendof capacity additions from 2000-2005
through 2008, and thus is a very
201 rough estimate.

12%

See Note 14 . Capacity factor for
medium-sized hydro plants added
during 2008 assumed somewhat
lower than capacity factor for largerhydro plants, and also reduced
somewhat because plants completed
in 2009 are assumed to average only
half of a full year's output during thatyear. Capacity total for 2009
extrapolates trend of annual capacity
additions from 2000-2005, and thus
40 is a very rough estimate.

114.5438.18

TOTAL IMPLIED DPRKELECTRICITY OUTPUT, 2008

17,226 GWh (See Note 15 )TOTAL IMPLIED DPRKHYDRO OUTPUT FOR 2009

11,866 GWh (See Note 21 )A1- 84

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Recorded 2005 Electricity Exports to China
Recorded 2008 Electricity Exports to China
Recorded 2009 Electricity Exports to China
Input of used tires as fuel for electricity generation, 2005
Input of used tires as fuel for electricity generation, 2008
Input of used tires as fuel for electricity generation, 200990.15 GWh (see Note 2)
143.54 GWh (see Note 2)
128.89 GWh (see Note 2)
8.91E+05 GJ
0.00E+00 GJ
0.00E+00 GJ(See Notes 3 and 4)
Assumption--2009 data not yet available.

Sources/Notes:
1 For 2005, we do not yet have the same estimates of plant-by-plant operational status that we had in
2000. We therefore use as a rough guide the overall estimates of capacity and capacity factor for thermal and hydroelectric power
plants as reportedly provided by DPRK engineers to KERI (Korea Electrotechnical Research Institute) staff(and as cited in "Analysis of Present Status and Future
Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System", by J.Y. Yoon, presented at the DPRK Energy
Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Yoon's
presentation is available as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Yoon.ppt.
A similar table also appear in the presentation "Analysis on DPRK Power Industry & Interconnection Options",by the same author, dated September 21, 2010, prepared for the DPRK Energy and Minerals Experts Work ing Group
Meeting, Beijing, China, September, 2010, and available as
http://www.nautilus.org/projects/dprk -energy/dprk -energy-and-minerals-work ing-group-2010/01.%20Yoon.ppt.
Note, however, that the estimates presented here are slightly different than those derived for 2005 in the "Electic--96-on" work sheet
in this work book , and the latter are used in the 2005 energy balance.
2 Exports from the DPRK to China from China Customs World Trade Atlas
As compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends
and Implications as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
Electricity imports to China from the DPRK, as indicated by the same source and 2008 and 2010 updates,
are as follows for other years:
Year
MWh
2000
22,665
2001
36,289
2002
9,979
2003
31,838
2004
83,3502005
90,146
2006 141,129
2007 168,502
2008 143,535
2009 128,886
2010 151.710
Average, 2006-2010 116,441
2010 value from UN COMTRADE data for 2010, HS Code 271600.
No data for electricity exports from the DPRK to China are available for 1990 - 1999.

A1- 85Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
3 Source from the industry reports that the DPRK lik ely received a total of 25,000 tonnes of used auto
tires from Japan and Taiwan in 2000 for use as a supplemental boiler fuel. The DPRK has reportedly beenrequesting similar cargoes from Europe. This estimate corresponds well with data from Japan
Customs Statistics (data from files downloaded from http://www.customs.go.jp/touk ei/download/index_d012_e.htm)
that lists year 2000 exports from Japan to the DPRK in a category (HS # 400400000) that is definedas "Waste, parings and scrap of rubber (other than hard rubber) and powders and granules obtained therefrom"at a total level of
22,156 tonnes. We use this value as the estimated input of waste tires toelectricity generation in the DPRK in 2000. For 2005, exports from Japan to the DPRK in the same category
were recorded as
25,599 tonnes. The reported value of cargoes of this product averaged about
3600 Yen/tonne in 2000, and was about 3000 Yen per tonne from 2003 through 2005. By way of comparison
these per-tonne value were less, sometimes significantly less, than the amount paid by Japan for coalexported from the DPRK to Japan in those years. Exports of this waste-rubber product werehigher in all of the other years between 2000 and 2005, peak ing at over 110,000 tonnes in 2003.
GJ fuelinput to
Impliedcoal-fired
fraction
power
input asYear
tonnes
GJ implied
plantstires
Reported Exports by Year are:1990
190
6.61E+03
3.01E+08
0.002%(metric tonnes)
1991
927
3.23E+04
2.88E+08
0.011%
1992
88
3.07E+03
2.75E+08
0.001%
1993
14
4.87E+02
2.61E+08
0.000%
none
1994 reported
0.00E+00
2.48E+08
0.000%
1995
237
8.26E+03
2.35E+08
0.004%
1996
486
1.69E+04
2.21E+08
0.008%
1997
329
1.14E+04
1.77E+08
0.006%
1998
1,386
4.82E+04
1.33E+08
0.036%
1999
6,048
2.11E+05
8.93E+07
0.236%
2000
22,156
7.71E+05
4.53E+07
1.704%
2001
78,8822.75E+06
5.39E+07
5.097%
2002 112,928
3.93E+06
6.25E+07
6.292%
2003
63,312
2.20E+06
7.11E+07
3.100%
2004
62,972
2.19E+06
7.97E+07
2.751%
2005
25,5998.91E+05
8.83E+07
1.009%
2006
8,558
2.98E+05
8.83E+07
0.337%
none
2007 reported
0.00E+00
8.83E+07
0.000%
none
2008 reported
0.00E+00
8.83E+07
0.000%
4 Oxford Recycling Inc. (http://www.oxfordrecycling.com/product.html#5, visited 6/8/02) lists a fuel energy
content of
15,000 Btu/lb, or
34.82 GJ/tonne, for fuel from shredded tires.
the same source lists a sulfur content of
1.30% for the same fuel.
5 An article entitled "Defector from Pyonyang: 'Thirty thousand constructing soldires were died (sic) in Guemgangsan Plant'",
by Han Yo'ng-chin, published 14 Feb, 2006, in The Daily NK WWW (Seoul), includes a reference to theAnbyun Youth Power Plant, near Mount Guemgang (Kumgang) as having a second step of construction completed
in 2000, with final construction completed in 2003, and having a capacity of 200 MW.
6 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 14 December, 2004, and entitled "Leader Gives Field
Guidance to Construction of Power Station", refers to the under-construction Orangch'on (hydro) Power Plant
in North Hamgyong Province. The generating room of "Power Station No. 1" is described as "entering the construction stage".
7 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 26 May, 2005, and entitled "Kim Jong Il Visits
Wo'nsan Power Station", refers to the under-construction Wo'nsan Youth Power Station (hydro)
in Kangwo'n Province. This plant seems to be in the construction phase, with the dam at least partiallycompleted. No figures on capacity are given.
8 An article in KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 19 September, 2005, and entitled "DPRK Leader Visits
Moranbong Theater Under Reconstruction", includes a reference to the construction of a series of "10 small- and medium-sized
power plants in tiers along [the] To'k chi River", with the implication that construction of the dam and related elements
are complete or nearly so. The article also references the completion and starting of the To'k chinggang No.9
power plant, and refers to an under-construction No. 4 power plant. No information on plant capacity is provided.
9 An broadcast by KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 20 December, 2005, and on the subject "DPRK TV on Leader'sInspiring People to Build New Power Plants on 'Large Scale'", includes reference to the Naep'yo'ng No. 2 Kunmin Power
Plant and the Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant, and notes that "Kim Jong Il visited all the power plant construction sites in the
country for the last 10 years." The transcript of the broadcast also refers to the volume of the dam at the
Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant as 1.7 million cubic meters, with 16 k m of aqueducts, and refers to assembly ofgenerators No. 2 through 5. There is also a reference to the Ku'mjingang Hu'ngbong Youth Power Plant inSouth Kamgyo'ng Province on the Ku'mjin River, to "large scale hydraulic power plants" such as theOrangch'o'n Power Plant and the Paek tusan So'ngun Youth Power Plant, plus "scores of" small and medium-scale power
plants including the "(Word Indistinct) No. 2 Railway Youth Power Plants, the Naso'n Youth Power Plant, the Singye Kunmin
power plant, the (Word Indistinct) Mine No. 2 Power plant, [and the] (? Taegak ) Youth Power Plant."
There is a reference to a photo of "one or a power plant of the Susongch'o'n Second-stage Five Powr Plants".

A1- 86

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
10 An article in Korea Today (Pyongyang, via Naenara Internet, in English), dated 12 January, 2006, includes aninterview with Kim Su Nam, "Bureau Director of the Ministry of Electric and Coal Industries". In the interview, Kim states,in part, "A large number of hydroelectric power stations have been built, including the Taedonggang, Namgang,
Anbynon Youth, Thaechon, and Kanggye Youth Power Stations. Hydroelectric generating capacity
has steadily grown with the builiding of many minor hydropower stations on the principle of combining large, medium,and small power plants. Along with this, thermal power plants have been erected in Pyongyang, Puk chang, Sunchon, andother parts of the country to meet the growing demand for electricity." The interview also refers to the completed
construction of a dam of the Nyongwon Power Station, and to medium and (smaller) power stations in Jagang, South
Haymgyyong, Ryanggang, and other provinces. Kim also refers to efforts to increase capacity at existinghydro and thermal power stations.
11 The article in Nodong Sinmun (Pyongyang, in Korean), dated 29 December, 2002, page 1, by Chong Yong-ch'ol,"At North Hwanghae Province: Power Plants Wherever the Water Flows", refers to power plants including
the Yosonggang Power Plant in North Hwanghae Province, power plants in Yont'an and Unp'a County, a power plantin P'yongsan County, a power plant in Kok san County (on the stream of the same name), a plant at Taech'on-ri
in Insan County, plants under construction in Singye and Yonsan Counties (Singye Power Plant No. 1, and Hwangdaech'on
Power Plant, respectively, with the latter apparently in early construction phases, and the former more advanced).
There is a reference to "power plant constructed at Holdong Mine".
12 The table below is from http://www.asiatradehub.com/n.k orea/power.asp., "Asia Trade Hub: North Korea, Energy (Power)"
The year to which these data apply was not recorded, but seems lik ely to be 2000 or shortly thereafter.
The ultimate source of these data is unk nown.
Hydraulic Power Plants

Eastern Region

Western Region

Name

Location

Soedusoo

North
Hamkyung

The Huhchon River

39.4

The Changjin River

South
Hamkyung"

A valleyremodeling
type
"

38.1

"

The Pujon River

"

26.2

"

Anbyon Youth

Kangw on10

A dam-type

Soopung

70"

TaechonNorth
Pyongan"40

Woonbong

Jagang40

A valleyremodelingtype and a
dam type
A dam-type

Wiw on"39"

Kanggye Youth

"

24.6

The Daedong River

South
PyonganNorth
PyonganJagang20

A valleyremodelingtype
A dam type19"

Taepyongman
The Jangja River

Capacity (Unit:
10,000 kw )51

9Remarks"

TOTAL of Above

426.3

Therm al Pow er Plants

Eastern Region

Name

Location

Seonbong

North
Hamkyung
ChongjinChongjinWestern Region

Bukchang

Capacity(Unit: Remarks
10,000 kw )
20
15

South
PyonganPyongyang

169

20
20

"

East Pyongyang

South
PyonganSouth
PyonganPyongyang

A condensed
w ater type
A combined
heat type"5"

DecemberNampo

5

Pyongyang
The Chongchon River
Soonchon

50"

TOTAL of Above304

13 Note from presentation by DPRK Delegation, "THE PROSPECT OF ELECTRICAL ENERGYDEVELOPMENT IN DPRK AND REGIONAL CO OPERATION IN NORTH EAST ASIA," September 31, 2003.
From Nautilus Institute 3rd Work shop on Grid Interconnection in Vladivostok , Russia, September 31, 2003.
"Puk Chang thermal power plant at center of electrical system of DPRK has capacity of 1,600,000 k W.
All hydro plants connected to Puk Chang through 220k W network ."14 The table below (which has been edited slightly for clarity) was provided in the KERI presentations referenced in
Note 1. It lists capacity in small and medium power plants, but notes that "effect of small power plant was not high".
A trend toward construction of larger-capacity "medium" hydro plants is noted.
Units: kW
Category

A s o f 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Planned (number)
Number Cons tructed (undercons truction)

6,840

370

250

?

100

43

6,615

98

40

30

10

48(18)

6,841(18)

Capacity (kW )292,000

24,50030,00030,00020,00086,400470900*kW /unit

31

250

750

1,000

800

1,800

*Total as s hown in pres entations appears to be incorrect. Actual total of v alues through 2005 is

A1- 87

Total

482,900 kW

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
15 Source in Note 1 cites estimates of total DPRK generation in 2004 ranging from 16.3 TWh (KERI estimate, based ondata provided by DPRK) to 20.4 (ROK government estimate). We feel that the former is lik ely closer to actual
DPRK generation.
16 A source familiar with the DPRK energy sector suggests that about 3.9 GW of hydroelectric capacity was operable
as of 2004, which is consistent with the estimate provided here.
17 Table below is from Some Thoughts on DPRK’s Natural Geological Conditions and Their Evaluation - On the Distribution andDevelopment of Hydropower Resources and the Electric Industry , by Professor Sagong Jun, Korea University in Japan, Available as
http://www1.k orea-np.co.jp/pk /112th_issue/99091601.htm
Hydraulic Resources in DPRK (II)
Name
GWh
(%)
Amrok River
39,635.00
47.9
Tumen River
8,134.61
9.5
Taedon River
7,508.17
9.1
Chongchon River
4,407.00
5.3
Rimjin River (north)
2,806.10
3.4
Pukhang River (north)
3,422.10
4.1
Resong River
701.340.8
Songchon River
1,675.00
2.0
Kumya River
1,617.17
2.0
Tanchonnam River
1,692.40
2.0
Orangchon River
1,451.80
1.8
Kiljunam River
7,670.80
0.9
TOTAL OF ABOVE
80,721.49
88.8
Units in original source given as "1,000,000 k w/h", but apparently GWh is the intended unit.
Above corresponds to9.21 average GW of power.
18 Li Dunqiu, in his presentation "DRPK’s Reform & Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation", as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts
Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available as
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Li.ppt, notes the following power exchange project between China and the DPRK,
presumably starting in 2005 or 2006:"Jilin Province has reached “barter” agreement with DPRK, transmitting electricity to DPRK in exchange of exploitation rights of its
Youth Copper Mine. The project has a total investment of 0.22 billion RMB and represents DPRK’s typical experiment inexchanging electricity with mineral [resources]."A1- 88Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
19 NK Economy Watch, in a compilation of recent news and other information releases describing recently completed or underconstruction hydroelectric power plants in the DPRK, lists the following plants and units.
Summarized from a search of hydroelectric plant articles, the most recent of which (3/23/2011), is entitled "DPRK to sell carbon credits",
and derived from http://www.nk econwatch.com/2011/03/23/dprk -to-sell-carbon-credits/.
Eight power plants were included in a February, 2011 listing provided to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
as DPRK projects that might qualify for credits. No additional Information on size or other parameters were provided to the UNFCCC by the DPRK, though
an earlier post quoted Bernhard Seliger, "the [Hanns Seidel] foundation’s representative in South Korea, [as saying that] North Korea is initiallylook ing at trying to get approval for three hydro power plants of 7-8 megawatts (MW)." We assume this means 7-8 MW each.
Selinger was also quoted as saying “We are talk ing about eight power plants, with the smallest size about 7.5 megawatts. These are not big projects
but small or medium-sized projects,” and that none of the projects had been completed.

Location/Google
Earth Image

Name/Location

Notes

Stations on UNFCCC List of 2011
Hamhung Hydropower Plant No.1
Hamhung 20MW Hydropower Plant No. 2
39.574232°, 127.104736°;
http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nk-uploads/KumyaDam-Construction.jpg
Under construction as of 2008

Kumya Hydropower Plant

See "Paektusan…"
stations below

Paekdusan Songun Youth 14MW Hydropower Project No.2
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 3
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 4
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 5
Wonsangunmin 20MW Hydropower Project No. 1

Presumably Project #1 of the 4 Wonsan units below.

Other Stations Described in NK Economy Watch (reference above)
http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nk-uploads/KumjinRiver-Power-Stations.jpg Started in 2000, complete as of 2011
DPRK Economy Watch describes as under construction as of2011, but "Korea is one" website (http://www.korea-isHamju County, South
one.org/spip.php?mot111), based on a KCNA report, describes
Hamgyong Province
plant as completed in April, 2005.
Complete as of 2011

Kumjingang Power Station

Kumjingang Hungbong Youth Power Station
Kumjingang Kuchang Youth Power Station

Started construction in 2009. "These projects required theconstruction of both the Kuryong Reservoir and an appx 8.5
http://www.nkeconwatch. mile (13.69km) tunnel to link the hydro power stations with
com/nk-uploads/wonsan- their power source". At least one unit ("Chungnyun") describedyouth-powerstations-3as being complete in early 2009 (NK Today 298, 10/2009, No.
2011.jpg.
293, 8/2009)http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nkuploads/OrangchonBegun by 2007, completed by 201138.954400°, 127.538912°,
http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nkFed by 45 km tunnel from Imnam
uploads/OrangchonReservoir.

Wonsan Youth Power Stations No’s. 1-4

Orangchon Power Station No. 1

Anbyon Youth Power Stations No’s 1 & 2

38.367696°, 126.781096°,
http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nkuploads/RyesonggangPower station 1 completed 2007, #2 and #6 also complete,
Power-1-6Stations.jpg
others presumaby under construction.
41.716931°, 128.786163°,
http://www.nkeconwatch. Also probably called "Mt. Baekdu Military First Power Plant",
com/nkmentioned as completed (at least one unit) in NK Today, 375,
uploads/PaektusanNovember 2010.

Ryesonggang Youth Power Stations 1-6

Paektusan Songun Youth Power Stations (1 and 2)

39.596238°, 126.266478°,
http://www.nkeconwatch.
com/nkuploads/PukchangRyongsan-Powerstation.jpg
Construction began 2002, apparently continuing as of 2011
Completion of units 1 and 2 apparently scheduled for 2012,
with units 3 - 5 scheduled for 2015 (NK Today #297, 9/2009).
Armed forces units are heavily involved in construction, andlocals residents, North Korean businesses, and Chinese
trading companies operating in the DPRK have been asked to
Jagang Province, upperprovide funds toward its construction (see, for example, NKpart of Chung-chun river Today, No. 291, 8/2009).

Pukchang Ryongsan Power Station

Huichon (also "Heecheon") Youth Power Stations (1 - 5). Capacity 300 MW(probably for units 1 or 1 and 2, but not clear)
Other Stations Mentioned in 2007 - July 2011 Issues of North Korea TodayUrang River Hydroelectric Dam

Dae-Ryeng-Gang No. 2 Power plant

Unit 1 apparently complete at 60 MW as of 2007, Units 2-5(total capacity 23 MW apparently started in 1988, restarted in
North Hamgyong Province 2008, and under construction as of 2011
Power output down 40% from previous year due to problems
with turbine and maintenance. Plant is apparently relatively
Taechun County
small (NK Today No 285, 7.2009).

Stations Under Construction on Yalu River mentioned in NK Economy Watch, 4/4/2010, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2010/04/04/dprk-prc-plan-two-moreyalu-river-dams
Each dam reportedly 40 MW, with planned
annual output of 154 GWh (implying a capacity
factor of about 44%), total cost of $160 M,
Wangjianglou or Lintu
Yalu River near Jian, Jilin
apparently paid by China. How the output is toProvince, China
be shared is unclear. Construction apparently
began in Spring of 2010, with completion
Wenyue or Changchuanplanned for 2013.

A1- 89

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
4 Oxford Recycling Inc. (http://www.oxfordrecycling.com/product.html#5, visited 6/8/02) lists a fuel energy
content of
15,000 Btu/lb, or
34.82 GJ/tonne, for fuel from shredded tires.
the same source lists a sulfur content of
1.30% for the same fuel.
5 An article entitled "Defector from Pyonyang: 'Thirty thousand constructing soldires were died (sic) in Guemgangsan Plant'",
by Han Yo'ng-chin, published 14 Feb, 2006, in The Daily NK WWW (Seoul), includes a reference to theAnbyun Youth Power Plant, near Mount Guemgang (Kumgang) as having a second step of construction completed
in 2000, with final construction completed in 2003, and having a capacity of 200 MW.
6 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 14 December, 2004, and entitled "Leader Gives Field
Guidance to Construction of Power Station", refers to the under-construction Orangch'on (hydro) Power Plant
in North Hamgyong Province. The generating room of "Power Station No. 1" is described as "entering the construction stage".
7 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 26 May, 2005, and entitled "Kim Jong Il Visits
Wo'nsan Power Station", refers to the under-construction Wo'nsan Youth Power Station (hydro)
in Kangwo'n Province. This plant seems to be in the construction phase, with the dam at least partiallycompleted. No figures on capacity are given.
8 An article in KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 19 September, 2005, and entitled "DPRK Leader Visits
Moranbong Theater Under Reconstruction", includes a reference to the construction of a series of "10 small- and medium-sized
power plants in tiers along [the] To'kchi River", with the implication that construction of the dam and related elements
are complete or nearly so. The article also references the completion and starting of the To'kchinggang No.9
power plant, and refers to an under-construction No. 4 power plant. No information on plant capacity is provided.
9 An broadcast by KCNA in Korean (Pyongyang), dated 20 December, 2005, and on the subject "DPRK TV on Leader'sInspiring People to Build New Power Plants on 'Large Scale'", includes reference to the Naep'yo'ng No. 2 Kunmin Power
Plant and the Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant, and notes that "Kim Jong Il visited all the power plant construction sites in the
country for the last 10 years." The transcript of the broadcast also refers to the volume of the dam at the
Wo'nsan Youth Power Plant as 1.7 million cubic meters, with 16 km of aqueducts, and refers to assembly ofgenerators No. 2 through 5. There is also a reference to the Ku'mjingang Hu'ngbong Youth Power Plant inSouth Kamgyo'ng Province on the Ku'mjin River, to "large scale hydraulic power plants" such as theOrangch'o'n Power Plant and the Paektusan So'ngun Youth Power Plant, plus "scores of" small and medium-scale power
plants including the "(Word Indistinct) No. 2 Railway Youth Power Plants, the Naso'n Youth Power Plant, the Singye Kunmin
power plant, the (Word Indistinct) Mine No. 2 Power plant, [and the] (? Taegak) Youth Power Plant."
There is a reference to a photo of "one or a power plant of the Susongch'o'n Second-stage Five Powr Plants".
10 An article in Korea Today (Pyongyang, via Naenara Internet, in English), dated 12 January, 2006, includes aninterview with Kim Su Nam, "Bureau Director of the Ministry of Electric and Coal Industries". In the interview, Kim states,in part, "A large number of hydroelectric power stations have been built, including the Taedonggang, Namgang,
Anbynon Youth, Thaechon, and Kanggye Youth Power Stations. Hydroelectric generating capacity
has steadily grown with the builiding of many minor hydropower stations on the principle of combining large, medium,and small power plants. Along with this, thermal power plants have been erected in Pyongyang, Pukchang, Sunchon, andother parts of the country to meet the growing demand for electricity." The interview also refers to the completed
construction of a dam of the Nyongwon Power Station, and to medium and (smaller) power stations in Jagang, South
Haymgyyong, Ryanggang, and other provinces. Kim also refers to efforts to increase capacity at existinghydro and thermal power stations.
11 The article in Nodong Sinmun (Pyongyang, in Korean), dated 29 December, 2002, page 1, by Chong Yong-ch'ol,"At North Hwanghae Province: Power Plants Wherever the Water Flows", refers to power plants including
the Yosonggang Power Plant in North Hwanghae Province, power plants in Yont'an and Unp'a County, a power plantin P'yongsan County, a power plant in Koksan County (on the stream of the same name), a plant at Taech'on-ri
in Insan County, plants under construction in Singye and Yonsan Counties (Singye Power Plant No. 1, and Hwangdaech'on
Power Plant, respectively, with the latter apparently in early construction phases, and the former more advanced).
There is a reference to "power plant constructed at Holdong Mine".

A1- 90Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
20 The following, from North Korea Today No.267 February 2009, describes coal supply to the Pyongyang power plant.
Ryongdae Coalmine in Sungchun City Fails to Supply the Pyongyang Thermoelectric Power Plant
Ryongdae Coal Mine, located in the Workers District, new Sungchun, in Sungchun County of South Pyongan Province, has been
supplying its partial production to the Pyongyang Thermoelectric Power Plant. However, there has been a recent failure in sup ply,
due to low productivity volume. The production level has dropped to about 27,000 MT a month. This coal mine had produced over
100,000 MT a month and about 1,000,000 MT a year.
At

500 MW, and a capacity factor of
75% and with coal averaging
23.35 GJ/tonne, and an efficiency of
21% (all starting assumptions), the impliedannual use of coal at the Pyongyang power plant would be
2,412,086 If the Ryongdae mine was the main supplier ofcoal to the Pyongyang plant, the information above implies that the average capacity factor was about
31% formerly, and now is about
8.4% . As it is unclear that this mine isthe only source of coal for the Pyongyang plant, and as some of the coal for the plant goes to heat-only boilers, this calculation
is incomplete, but it suggests that there is reason to show a decrease in power output for thermal plants through 2009.
21 This calculation assumes that the average capacity factor for DPRK hydroelectric capacity in 2009 was similar to that in 2008.
In fact, it is clear that hydro output in the DPRK differs, at least in different areas of the DPRK, with the timing and amount of
rainfall received (based on anecdotal information from a number of sources), but we have no specific information that would allow
us to estimate how the relative hydroelectric output differed in the two years.
22 Several sources in Korean (including NODONG SINMUN, DPRK, 28 OCTOBER 2000, 3 and 8 NOVEMBER 2005,
and 22 MAY 2006, and MINJU CHOSON, DPRK, 15 NOVEMBER 2005) refer to a 11 MW power plant called"THE NAEP'YONG NO. 2 ARMY-CIVILIAN HYDROELECTRIC POWERPLANT", in Sep'o County, Kwangwon Province.
This plant appears to have begun operation in 2005 or so. It produces power for the Korean People's Army.
Information from the photo below includes the following:
RIVER BASIN -- 1,021 SQUARE KILOMETERS (SQ KM), MAXIMUM WATER LEVEL -- 177.5 M, EFFECTIVE FALL (hydraulic head) -- 28 m,
MAXIMUM WATER CONSUMPTION -- 51.30 CUBIC M PER SECOND, DAM HEIGHT -- 31.30 M, LENGTH OF LEVEE, 41.58 m,
LENGTH OF IRON PIPE CONDUIT -- 83.00 m. Rainfall data from nearby counties suggest that rainfall in the area is 1.2 to 1.5 meters/yr,
based on data from county observation stations.

A1- 91Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
23 The table below is from Enipedia, http://enipedia.tudelft.nl/wik i/North_Korea/Powerplants_Without_Power_Conversion_Units,"North Korea/Powerplants Without Power Conversion Units"
The year to which these data apply was not recorded, but the website lists "date last modified" as 2011.
The ultimate source of these data is unk nown.
OutputPowerplant
Owner
Fuel type(MWh)
Pukchang Powerplant

Pukchang Thermal Plant
ComplexSupung Dam Dprk Powerplant

Korea-china Hydroelec Power

Pyongyang Powerplant

Pyongyang Power Plant

Kyosenko Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Unbong Powerplant

Korea-china Hydroelec Power

Hydro

920,535

Taechon Hydro Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Hydro

920,535

Hochon River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Laohushao B Powerplant

Korea-china Hydroelec PowerHydro

897,522

Wiwon Powerplant

Korea-china Hydroelec PowerHydro

897,522

Changjin River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

5,017,987
Hydro

1,449,843
1,167,045
961,959

906,727

880,262

Taechon Metal Works Powerplant Taechon Metal Works

669,489

Pujon River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Taepeungman Powerplant

Korea-china Hydroelec Power598,348

Chonchon River Powerplant

Chonchongang Power Plant

530,121

East Pyongyang Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

516,762

Daedong River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

460,268

Kanggye Youth Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

434,953

Sodusu (march 17)-1 Powerplant Ministry Of Power Industry

414,241

Chongjin River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

390,449

Sodusu (march 17)-2 Powerplant Ministry Of Power Industry

373,664

Sodusu (march 17)-3 Powerplant Ministry Of Power Industry

345,201

Shoko Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

331,393

Anbyon Youth Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

230,134

Kokai Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

220,928

Donro-gang Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

207,120

Jangja River Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

207,120

Fusenko Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

180,931

Taechon Youth Hydro-3
Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Hydro

138,080

Taechon Youth Hydro-4
Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

Hydro

138,080

December (nampo) Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

127,642

Sonbong (unggi) Powerplant

Sonbong (unggi) Power Plant

121,512

Oranchon Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

103,560

Bu-dzan-gan Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

80,547

Mirimkapmun Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

73,643Pu-ryong Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

59,605

Sunchon Vinalon Powerplant

Sunchon Vinalon Complex

51,080Bongwhaskapum Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

46,027

Hongnam Fertilizer Powerplant

Hongnam Fertilizer Plant

45,757

Anju Youth Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

34,520Eogidon Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

34,520Tongchun Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

32,219Kumgansan Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

31,068Heungman Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

30,481

Dprk West Coast Refinery
Powerplant

Dprk West Coast Refinery

27,816

Chunma (bui) Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

27,616

Najungri Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

27,616

Kilju Pulp Mill Powerplant

Kilju Pulp Mill

22,851Chongjin Chemical Powerplant

Chongjin Chemical Fiber Plant

15,228Songlim Powerplant

Ministry Of Power Industry

2,222

Unhi-ra Powerplant

Korea Peace Committee

Hydro

575,334

27

21,978,110

SUM OF ABOVE

A1- 92Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:
ESTiMATE OF DISTRICT HEATING USE
Prepared by David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

2/20/2011

District heating is used in several DPRK cities, but very little information is available with which to estimate theextent of district heating. The following estimate should therefore be regarded as very rough.
Size of existing heat-only boilers at Pyongyang Power Plant(see Note 16 in "Electric--2000" worksheet in this workbook).
Or the equivalent of

2 units at
100 Gcal/hr rating (assumedly, heat output).
7,330,368 GJ/yr (at full capacity for the entire year).

Total MWe of major thermal power plants described as "combined type"(see Note 12 in "Electric--2005_2008" worksheet in this workbook).
Total full-time equivalent months of heat production by both types of plants
Average ratio of heat output to electricity output in combine-type plants

1000 (rated capacity)
4 months/yr (Assumption)
1 Assumption

Implied heat output (as of 1990) in Pyongyang Heat-only boilers

2,443,456 GJ/yr.

Assuming a capacity factor of
75% for combined heat and power plants over the heating months above, usefulheat output produced by these plants in 1990 would be
7,884,000 GJ/yr.
This is the equivalent of
2.62% of the total heat input to coal-fired power plants in 1990.
Our estimate for the annual 1990 use of coal per urban household is
52.74 GJ/yr
Assuming that
90% of that is for space and water heat, and an average boiler efficiency of
55% , the implied heat delivered per household is
26.11 GJ/yr
Assuming an average rate of losses in district heating systems of
15% , the actual delivery of heatfrom district heating boilers and combined heat and power systems would be
8,778,338 GJ/yr
This would be sufficient to supply
336,254 households, or approximately
13%
of Urban households in 1990.
District heat is also used in the Public/Commercial sector. In 1990, our estimate is that coal use for the pubic/commercial sector was
0.82 GJ per square meter, which, assuming that
90% of coal use
was for heating and water heating, and an average boiler efficiency of
60% , the implied heat delivered per
square meter of floorspace would be
0.44 . At this rate, the output of the district heating and combined heat andpower plants would be enough to provide heat for
16,812,680 square meters of floorspace, or about
42% of the total estimated Public/Commercial floorspace in the DPRK, if all heat from these systems
were used in the Public/Commercial sectors.
We make the assumption that Public/Commercial space is somewhat more likely than residential space to be served by district heat,since such space is more likely to be centrally located in a city. We therefore assume that
15% ofPublic/Commercial heat demand was met by central heat-only boilers or district heating systems in 1990. This means that theamount of heat used in the Public/Commercial sector was
2,644,289 GJ/yr of delivered heat, or
3,110,928 GJ/yr of heat at the generator, or
30.1% of heat produced for district heating systems would
be used in the Public/Commercial sector, meaning that
6,134,049 GJ/yr of heat was used in 1990 by the residential sector, or
enough for
234,964 households, or
8.755% of urban households.
We assume that the average efficiency of heat-only district heat boilers was
70% in 1990, and that those boilers were fueledwith
97.9% coal and
2.1% heavy fuel oil (used as a starter fuel) in that year.
These assumptions imply usage of
3,417,348 GJ of coal, and73,304 GJ of heavy oil in 1990.
Data on District Heat Use from 2008 DPRK Census
The 2008 DPRK Census (D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report, Central Bureau of Statistics Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, available as
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_PHC/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf),
includes a table (52) on heating energy use in the DPRK. This table suggests that in 2008, a total of
263,809 households
used (presumably primarily) "Central or local heating system[s]". Over 99 percent of these were in urban areas, about 97 percent were in apartment buildings,
and99.2% were in Pyongyang. This suggests that as of 2008, about
7.37% , which
seems consistent with both the assumptions above and a supposition that few themal central heating and/or power plants were built after 1990
(the construction of the East Pyongyang plant in the 1990s being a notable exception).

A1- 93Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Assumptions for post-1990 District Heat (DH) Production Parameters
We assume generally that district heat production matches district heat usage, which is assumed similar to electricity availabilty in the
Urban Residential and Public/Commercial sectors. Beyond that, assumptions related to district heat production are as follows. Theseassumptions follow the premise that infrastructure related to district heating, similar to electricity generation and T&D infrastructure,
has continued to degrade in the years since 1990, but at a decreasing rate since about 2000.
Parameter
District Heat distribution losses
Efficiency of heat-only boilers for DH
Fraction of fuel as HFO for heat-onlyboilers (assumes same as coal-fired
electricity generation)
Capacity Factor of heat-only DH boilers
relative to 1990 estimate
Implied gross heat output of heat-only
DH boilers (GJ/yr)
Implied Coal input to heat-only DH
boilers (GJ/yr)
Implied HFO input to heat-only DH
boilers (GJ/yr)
Implied DH used from electricity
generation boilers as a fraction of total
fuel input
1990 -->
2.62%

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

18%
65%

20%
62%

21%
62%

21%
62%

21%
62%

6.20%

29.13%

3.99%

13.58%

2.3%

70%

35%

50%

45%

45%

1,710,419

855,210

1,221,728

1,099,555

1,099,555

2,468,266

977,560

1,891,905

1,532,638

1,732,864

163,148

401,81178,624

240,838

40,613

2.05%

5.41%

4.21%

5.00%

6.19%

A1- 94

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Workpapers—Energy Demand Sectors
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCEDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified: 12/14/2011
DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
GENERAL ASSUMPTION:DPRK Industrial processes assumed to bewhen Chinese intensities are used, andCoal Consumption, All Industries
All Coal Consumption: Iron and Steel
Annual Steel Production:
Coal Use intensity:
Total Coal Use:
Coking Coal Consumption: Iron and Steel
Coking Coal Use intensity:
Conversion Factor:
Total Coking Coal Use:
Other Coal Consumption: Iron and Steel
Coal Use intensity:
Conversion Factor:
Total Other Coal Use:
Coal Consumption: Cement
Annual Cement Production:
Coal/Oil Use intensity:
Fraction of fuel needs by coal
Total Coal Use:
Coal Consumption: Fertilizers
Annual Fertilizer Consumption:
Annual Fertilizer Imports
Annual Ammonia prod capacity
Annual Urea Production capacity
Ratio of Ammonia Mass to N
Ratio of Urea Mass to N
Capacity Utilization Factor
Estimated Ammonia Production
Estimated Urea Production
Total coal use/te NH3
Fraction coal used as feedstock:
Conversion factor:
Coal Use, Ammonia Production
Coal and Oil Use, Ammonia Production
Annual Superphosphate product.
Fract. Phosphorus in Superphos.
Energy int., phosphorous prodn.
Conversion Factor:
Total Coal Use, Superphos prodn.
Total Coal and Oil Use, fertilizer prodn.
Total Coal Use, Fertilizer Prod.
Coal Consumption: Other Chemicals
Annual Carbide production:
Coal Use, carbide production:
Conversion factor:
Total Coal Use, Carbide Prod:
Caustic Soda Production:
Therm. En. Int., caustic soda prod.:
Boiler efficiency
Total Coal Use, caustic soda prod.:
Total Coal Use, Unspec. Chem:
Total Coal Use, Other Chem.:

10% more energy intensive than in China
15% more energy intensive than in Russia
when Russian intensities are used
Notes/Sources:
6.72E+08
6.00E+06 Te
1.64 tce/Te Steel
3.25E+08 GJ coal

4, 49
6

0.79 tce/Te Steel
29.3 GJ/tce
1.5277E+08 GJ coal50.85 tce/Te Steel
29.3 GJ/tce
1.72E+08 GJ coal45

1.10E+07 Te
6.88 GJ/te clinker
90%
6.81E+07 GJ/yr

1, 48
2
46

6.00E+05 Te Nitrogen
1.00E+05 Te Nitrogen
5.80E+05 te/yr
1.35E+06 te/yr
1.214
2.50
49%
2.853E+05 te/yr
6.626E+05 te/yr
2 te/te50%
25.1 GJ/te
1.83E+07 GJ/yr for energy
1.83E+07 GJ/yr as feedstock2.466E+05 te
44%
8.83 tce/te
29.3 GJ/tce
5.70E+06 GJ/yr (net of elect. use)
1.83E+07 GJ/yr--non-energy feedstock
2.40E+07 GJ/yr--as fuel

12
43
30
30

29
29
29
35
36
36

3.50E+05 te (from coal, Hamhung)31
0.96 te/te Ca Carbide
25.1 GJ/te coal29
8.43E+06 GJ/yr
9.86E+04
33
14.64 th GJ/te caustic soda
44
60% thermal GJ/tce
Assumption
2.77E+06 GJ/yr
1.12E+07 GJ/yr

A1- 95Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Coal Consumption: Pulp and Paper
Paper production:
1.82E+05 Te
Wood Pulp/Unit Paper
0.85 Te/Te
Fraction of fuel needs by coal50%
Ratio of fuel use to electr. use:
0.00106115 tce/kWh
Conversion factor:
29.3 GJ/tce
Total Coal Use:
4.03E+06 GJ/yr
Coal Consumption: Other Metals
Zinc Production
1.70E+05 Te
Copper Production
2.90E+04 Te
Aluminum Production
2.10E+04 Te
Lead Production
8.40E+04 Te
Zinc Coal Use intensity:
2.47 tce/te
Copper Coal Use intensity:
1.705 tce/te
Aluminum Coal Use intensity:
1.916 tce/te
Lead Coal Use intensity:
2.693 tce/te
Coal Use, Zinc Production
4.20E+05 tce
Coal Use, Copper Production
4.94E+04 tce
Coal Use, Aluminum Production
4.02E+04 tce
Coal Use, Lead Production
2.26E+05 tce
Conversion factor:
29.3 GJ/tce
Total Coal Use: Other Metals
2.37E+07 GJ
Coal Consumption: Other Minerals
Magnesia Production
1.00E+06 Te
Magnesia Production assumed Oil-based in 1990
Coal Use, Other Minerals
0.00E+00

7
8
10
11

15
15
15
15
27
17
16
20

40

Coal Consumption: Textiles
Textile Production
Average textile weight
Coal use, printing and dyeing
Coal Use per unit "vinalon" fiber
Conversion factor:
Conversion factor:
Total Coal Use: Textiles

5.20E+08 running meters
2.47E-04 te/running meter
4.39E-04 tce/running meter7.04 te coal/te
25.104 GJ/te coal29.3 GJ/tce
2.94E+07 GJ

7
21
22
31
29

Coal Consumption: Building Materials
Glass production in China, 1990
Population of China, 1990
Per Capita Glass prod., China
DPRK Population, 1990
Est. Glass production, DPRK
Coal Consumption Intensity/Case
Conversion factor:
Total Coal Use: Glass Production
Brick Production in China, 1990
Per Capita Brick product., China
Est. Brick production, DPRK
Coal Consumption Intensity
Total Coal Use:Brick Production

8.07E+07 Cases
1.14E+09 People
7.06E-02 Cases/Person
2.20E+07 People
1.55E+06 Cases
30.85 kgce/case
29.3 GJ/tce
1.40E+06 GJ/yr
4.49E+11 Pieces
392 Pieces/Person
8630473192 Pieces
2390 kgce/10,000 pieces
6.04E+07 GJ/yr

37
37

Total Coal Cons., Bldg Materials.
Coal Consumption: Non-specified Industry

38
20

37

39

6.20E+07 GJ/yr
1.25E+08 GJ/yr

26

Oil Consumption, Cement:
Fraction of heat input provided by oil
10%46
Heavy Fuel oil use, cement product.
7.57E+06 GJ/yr
Oil Consumption, Fertilizers:
See "Industry--96-on" and "Non-energy" work sheets for oil products use as
Fertizer Feedstock s
Oil Consumption, Other Minerals:
Magnesia Production
1.00E+06 Te
40
Magnesia Fuel Use intensity:
12.6 GJ/te
41
Hvy Fuel Oil Use, Magnesia Prod.
1.26E+07 GJ
Oil Consumption: Non-specified Ind. (Diesel):
3.05E+06 GJ
Placeholder value
Oil Consumption: Non-specified Ind. (Hvy Oil):
6.90E+05 GJ
Placeholder value
Oil Consumption, All Industries
2.39E+07 GJ
Wood/Biomass Consumption: Pulp and Paper
4.03E+06 GJ Complements coal consumption
noted above

A1- 96

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Wood Consumption: Non-specified Industry
Fuelwood consumption
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Total Fuelwood Consumption
Electricity Consumption, All Industries
Electricity Consumption: Iron and SteelElectricity Use intensity:
Conversion Factor
Total Electricity Use:
Electricity Consumption: Cement
Electricity Use intensity:
Conversion Factor
Total Electricity Use:
Electricity Consumption: Fertilizers
Electricity Use intensity:
Conversion Factor
Electricity Use, Ammonium Prod.
Electricity Use intensity:
Electricity Use, Superphos. Prod.
Total Electricity Use:
Electricity Consumption: Other Chemicals
Elect. Use, Carbide production:
Conversion factor:
Total Elect. Use, Carbide Prod:
Elect. Use, Caustic Soda prod.:
Total Elect., Caustic Soda Prod:
Total Elect. Use, Unspec. Chem:
Total Elect. Use, Other Chem.:
Electricity Consumption: Pulp and Paper
Electricity Use intensity:
Conversion Factor
Total Electricity Use:
Electricity Consumption: Other Metals
Zinc Elect. Use intensity:
Copper Elect. Use intensity:
Aluminum Elect. Use intensity:
Lead Elect. Use intensity:
Elect. Use, Zinc Production
Elect. Use, Copper Production
Elect. Use, Aluminum Production
Elect. Use, Lead Production
Conversion factor:
Total Elect. Use: Other Metals
Electricity Consumption: Other Minerals
Magnesia Elect. Use intensity:
Conversion Factor
Elect. Use, Magnesia Production
Electricity Consumption: Textiles
Elect. Use, Vinalon production
Conversion factor:
Total Electricity Use: Textiles
Electricity Consumption: Building Materials
Electricity Int., Glass Production
Conversion factor:
Electricity Use: Glassmaking
Total Elect. Use: Bldg. Materials
Electricity Consumption: Non-specified Industry

1.50E+05 cu.m.
1.50E+00 cu.m./te
1.60E+01 GJ/te
1.60E+06 GJ
7.02E+07
700.0 kWh/te crude steel
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
1.74E+07 GJ/yr

23
24
24

47, 5

100.0 kWh/te cement
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
4.36E+06 GJ/yr

35.76 MWh/te Ammonium
3.60E+00 GJ/MWh
1.26E+07 GJ/yr
16.258 MWh/te phosphorous
6.30E+06 GJ/yr
1.89E+07 GJ/yr

294571 kWh/te Ca Carbide
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
5.76E+06
2413 kWh/te
8.57E+05

31

36

32

6.62E+06

A1- 971522 kWh/te pulp
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
9.32E+05 GJ/yr

93844 kWh/te
1240 kWh/te
16050 kWh/te
184.92 kWh/te
6.53E+08 kWh
3.60E+07 kWh
3.37E+08 kWh
1.55E+07 kWh
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
4.13E+06 GJ/yr

28
17
18
28

100.0 kWh/te Magnesia
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
3.96E+05 GJ/yr

425400 kWh/te
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
2.50E+06 GJ/yr

31

30.81 kWh/case
3.60E-03 GJ/kWh
1.72E+05 GJ/yr
1.89E+05 GJ/yr
1.4850E+07 GJ

20

25

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 The National Report of DPRK to UNCED, 1992, lists 13.9 million tonnes cement output for 1990. See also note 48.
2 Based on document in authors' files [CE1]. which cites
1645 kcal/kg "clinker". This is somewhat higher than a figure given for the Chinese cement industry, b ut
only ab out 5% higher than the 1980 average for Russian cement plants.
3 Approx 1981 fig., China "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products" Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL
4 Document in authors' files [IF1] lists a figure of 7 million tonne figure (as of 1989) for crude steel output.
5 1987 fig. for "Key, Medium, and Small" plants in China is 890 kWhe/te. Source: "The Energy Efficiency of the Steel
Industry in China", M. Ross and L. Feng, Energy, 1991. Also see note 6.
6 Note that this figure is ab out 30% higher than 1987 Average Chinese energy intensities.
7 Economist Intelligence Unit, "China, North Korea Country Profile 1992-93", p.72
(Original Source, "Industry of the DPRK" b y M. Trigub enko).
8 Approximation b ased on author's experience. Remainder of paper weight is chemicals and b inders, such as clay.
9 Chinese 1985 value: "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products" Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL
V. Kalashnikov (personal communication, 9/97) suggests that the Russian historical average for electricity use inpapermaking is somewhat lower--671 kWh/te paper (not pulp) as of 1965. We use the Chinese value here.
10 Working assumption, no data. Rest of fuel would prob ab ly b e wood-derived.
11 For Chinese plants, 1980. Sum of non-electric fuel use (mostly coal) per kWh electricity used. Source:
China Energy Datab ook, 1992 Edition, page IV-30
12 Based on document in authors' files [HA1]. Figure is prob ab ly from 1989 or 1990, and is generally consistent
with other estimates and official figures for fertilizer production and consumption.
13 Ammonia, med. plants, tot. energy use; and elect. gen. eff. From "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products"
Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL. Figures are for 1981 Chinese plants.
14 Assumes all non-electric energy use is coal. Sub tracts coal input to electric power plants from total energy use.
15 Economist Intelligence Unit, "China, North Korea Country Profile 1992-93", p.72
(Original Source, "Industry of the DPRK" b y M. Trigub enko). Data for 1990.
16 For aluminum oxide production (not clear if per te AlOx or Al), China, 1990.
[Chinese data compendium provided b y J. Sinton], p. 2.
17 Coal use in copper refining, China, 1990, from [Chinese data compendium provided b y J. Sinton], p. 2.
1980 Russian figure for electric intensity of copper production (V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).
Value is sub stantially higher (3-fold) than estimates for electricity use in copper production in China.
18 1980 Russian figure for electric intensity of aluminum production (V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).
1981 China figure for electrolytic aluminum, DC use, (from "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products"
Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL) is very similar.
19 Document in authors' files [HT1, p. 10].
Reference to oil use is assumed to b e all use of refined products in nation.
20 Chinese language spreadsheet of energy intensities ob tained from J.Sinton, dated Feb 12, 1993. 1980 data
21 Ratio of textile length to weight as implied b y figures in Korea Foreign Trade Association,"Major Economic Indicators for North Korea, 1993". (Page 9).
22 1990 (?) figures for China. P. 23: Energy of China, 1993 (Chinese-lang. compendium provided b y J. Sinton, LBL)
23 Industrial Fuelwood, from document in authors' files [TO1, p. 22]. Upper end of range (100 - 150 kte/yr).
24 From document in authors' files [FC1, p. 7]

25 Placeholder value to bring total industrial demand up to approximately 60% of total electricity consumption
as estimated in document in authors' files [EP1].

A1- 98Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
26 Placeholder estimate to bring total industrial/electric generation coal consumption up to (approximately) 75% ofcoal available, as estimated in document in authors' files [EE1]
27 1980 figures for China, section 8-37 of Chinese language document (1991) provided by J. Sinton, LBL.
28 For zinc, uses Russian electric intensity value from 1980 (V. Kalashnik ov, personal communication, 9/97).
Zinc figure is about 30% higher than 1990's figures for China, page 369 of Chinese language document("China Energy ____") (1994) provided by J. Sinton, LBL. Lead intensity figure is from the latter document.
Includes electricity used in ore milling (c. 1/3 of total for lead).
29 Based on flow diagram for Hamhung Fertilizer Complex as presented in
document in authors' files [HT1, Annex 8].
Assumes that all nitrogen fertilizer starts with ammonia production. Coal is assumed to have acalorific value of 6000 k cal/k g (as specified for Anthracite in Annex 7 of the same document).
Electricity consumption is also based on the flow diagram, which shows a total of 200 MW of power
input to the process that produces 250 k te/yr ammonia. 7200 operating hours per year assumed,
as stated in Annex 7 for the vinalon plant in the same complex. Electricity use is assumed (basedon the flow diagram) to also account for conversion of ammonia into other fertilizer products, such as urea.
30 Based on values in Annex 7 of document described in 29. Note that theseproduction capacities are the sum of data provided for specific large complexes in DPRK, andthus probably represent most, but not all, of the productive capacity in the country.
31 Based on values for carbide and vinalon production from flow diagrams presented in Annex 7 of the
document described in 29.
32 Chinese 1980 value: "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products" Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL

33 from document in authors' files [TX1: Annexure 1].
34 Electricity use in caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) production refining, China, 1990, from
[Chinese data compendium provided b y J. Sinton].

35 Based on values for superphosphate production from flow diagrams presented in Annex 7 of the
document described in 29. Assumes productive capacity of 400 k te/yr at full capacity
and actual operation 7200 hours/yr.
36 Assumes that superphosphate is produced from phosphorous, and that the energy/electricity intensities ofphosphorous production is as noted in "Chinese Energy Conservation" (1993), a Chinese-language compendium
provided b y J. Sinton of LBL. This assumption prob ab ly overstates the energy use in manufacturing superphosphate.
37 Data on production of glass and b ricks in China contained in spreadsheet provided b y J.Sinton of LBL.
38 As in "Residential" spreadsheet in this Workb ook.
39 Russian value for b ricks for 1965 ob tained from V. Kalashnikov (personal communication, 9/97). Used without inflator.
1980 value from China (Chinese language spreadsheet of energy intensities ob tained from J.Sinton, dated Feb 12, 1993)
gives an energy intensity slightly more than half of the 1965 Russian value. We do not know whether the Russian andChinese b ricks are the same size, b ut assume that DPRK b ricks will more closely resemb le Russian models.
40 Economist Intelligence Unit, "China, North Korea Country Profile 1992-93", p.72 (Original Source,
Industry of the DPRK b y M. Trigub enko). Magnesia is MgO, or magnesium oxide.
41 Rough of intensity from US Bureau of Mines pub lication as relayed b y Ms. Deb orah A. Kramer of the U.S. Geological
Survey is 10 MMBtu/short ton. This estimate is on the same order of magnitude as the energy required
to produce chemically similar calcium oxide from calcium carb onate. A separate estimate of DPRK magnesite
fuel use intensity (personal communication [QR 9/97]) was slightly higher: 300 kg fuel oil/te. The latter figure was used.
42 Estimated to b e similar to electricity requirements for production of cement "clinker" from limestone.
43 Estimated imports of nitrogen fertilizer in 1990. Assumed mostly from the (former) Soviet Union.
44 1980 Russian figure for thermal energy use (assumed to b e as heat) in caustic soda production(V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).
45 Rough estimate b ased on 1965 and 1980 Russian figures for coal use in iron making plus steelmaking.
(V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).

A1- 99

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
46 It has b een reported that some fuel oil is used in cement production. The figure shown here is a guess on our part.
47 Based on 1965 and 1980 Russian figures for electric energy use in steelmaking(V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).
48 Data from the Korean National Statistical Office and the Korea Cement Industrial Association suggest a considerab ly lower
figure for DPRK cement output in 1990--6.13 million tonnes. Other sources place DPRK cement production at
10.1 million tonnes in 1986, 10 million tonnes in 1988 (the latter from the Economist Intelligence Unit,"China, North Korea Country Profile, 1992-93", p.79, Original Source, Mining Journal, Mining Annual Review, 1991),
4.75 million tonnes in 1992, 7.5 million tonnes in 1993, and 12 million tonnes in 1993. Of these, our sub jective
judgement is that the 7.5 million tonnes in 1993 figure may well b e the b est-informed of the group, and given the
sub stantial decline in all industrial output in the DPRK b etween 1990 and 1993, we b elieve that a 1990 figure of ab out
11 million tonnes is a reasonab le estimate.
49 Data from the Korea Iron & Steel Association suggests a considerab ly lower
figure for DPRK steel output in 1990--3.36 million tonnes. Other sources place DPRK steel production at
5.8 million tonnes in 1993, 4.2 million tonnes in 1990, 5.1 million tonnes in 1990 (the latter from the Economist Intelligence Unit,"China, North Korea Country Profile, 1992-93", p.79, Original Source, Mining Journal, Mining Annual Review, 1991),
1.79 million tonnes in 1992, and 5.98 million tonnes in 1993. Of these, our sub jective
judgement is that a 1990 figure b elow the 7 million tonne figure cited in Note 4 (for 1989) is likely for 1990 (mostob servers suggest that 1989 was a peak year for industrial output in many sub sectors), b ut that the Korea Iron and Steel Association
figure is prob ab ly too low (or represents an incomplete count of output). We therefore adopt an estimate of 6.0 million tonnesof steel output in 1990 for the DPRK.

A1- 100

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND IN 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

8/9/2012

ASSUMPTIONS FOR CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL ENERGY USE, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009

Subsector
Iron and Steel (See Notes 1, 17)
Cement (See Note 2)---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
Fertilizers (See Note 3)
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals (See Note 19)
Other Minerals (See Note 18)---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-Specified Industry--non-oil fuels(See Note 20)
Non-Specified Industry--diesel oil
Non-Specified Industry--heavy oil

1996
35%
40%
10%
24.68%
30%
30%
30%
30%
80%
30%
30%

Production Relative to 1990
2000
2005
2008
18.05%
14.50%
14.5%
30%
32%
32%
27.0%
12.0%
12%
7.5%
11.2%
10.9%
18.05%
18.05%
17.0%
18%
18%
17%
18%
60%
62%
30.0%
50%
52%
80%
50%
43.0%
18%
20%
20%
30%
30%
30%

16.00%
15.03%
18.1%
24.7%
36.1%
24.5%
(See Note 4)[Below is same as and linked to table above, but fomatted for reporting]Subsector
Iron and Steel
Cement---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
Fertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-Specified Industry--non-oil fuels
Non-Specified Industry--diesel oil
Non-Specified Industry--heavy oil

33.00%
20.0%
30.0%

2009
2010--Dec.
14.5% THIS
47%
31% SECTI
44%
6% ON OF
9%7.2% THIS
65%
WORK
16% SHEE
33.0%
16% T NOT
33%
62% USED
33%
FOR
52%
33%
THIS
32.8%
ANAL
18% YSIS
33%
29%
33%

14.30%
15.0%
25.8%

12.61%
12.0%
24.4%

1996
Production
Relative to
1990

2000
Production
Relative to
1990

2005
Production
Relative to
1990

2008
Production
Relative to
1990

2009
Production
Relative to
1990

35%
40%
10%
25%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
33%
20%
30%

18%
30%
27%
8%
18%
18%
18%
30%
18%
30%
16%
18%
36%

15%
32%
12%
11%
18%
18%
60%
50%
20%
30%
15%
20%
25%

15%
32%
12%
11%
17%
17%
62%
52%
20%
30%
14%
12%
26%

15%
31%
6%
7%
16%
16%
62%
52%
18%
29%
13%
12%
24%

2.62E+05

1.51E+06

Non-Specified Industry--Electricity for Kaesong

1.54E+06 GJ

33%
13%
33%

1996
110%
110%
110%
110%
110%
110%
110%

115%
115%
115%
115%
115%

112%
112%
112%
112%
112%

110%
110%
110%
110%
110%

110%
110%
110%
110%
110%

110%
110%

115%
115%

112%
112%

110%
110%

110%
110%

110%
110%
110%

115%
115%
115%

112%
112%
112%

110%
110%
110%

110%
110%
110%

See Note 8 in "Electric-96-on" work sheet

Notes/Sources:
1 www.koreascope.com, in "Production of Major Industrial Items and World Ranking" (visited 6/3/02),

lists the ROK production of steel in 1999 as 41 million tonnes. In "Economic and Social Comparison
between the Two Koreas", on the same WWW site, the ROK's steel production is listed as being
33 times that of the DPRK, implying an annual production of about 1.24 million tonnes. This figure, about
18 percent of 1990 production levels, seems plausible (though possibly high). A figure that is probably from the same
ultimate source, the Korea Iron & Steel Association, suggests a value of 1.086 million tonnes in 2000,
along with 1.208 million tonnes in 1996, and 1.168 million tonnes in 2005. It is unclear how these figures
were derived. Based on consideration of existing estimates, observations of the overall DPRK economy,
and trends in iron and steel products trade with China (see notes 13 through 17, below), we adopt iron andsteel production estimates of 2.1 million tonnes in 1996, 1.08 million tonnes in 2000, and 0.87 million
tonnes in 2005, describing a slow decline, in more recent years, in primary iron and steel production in the DPRK.

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Energy Intensity Relative to 1990
2000
2005
2008
2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
115%
112%
110%
110% SECTI
110%
115%
112%
110%
110% ON 110%
OF
THIS
WORK
110%
SHEE
110%
T NOT
110%
USED
FOR
110%
THIS
110%
ANAL
YSIS

110%
110%
110%
110%
110%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
2 The source noted above, in the "Economic and Social…" page, lists a DPRK cement production of
4.1 million tonnes, or about 41 percent of year 1990 production, in 1999, which seems plausible.
Data that are probably from the same ultimate source, the Korean National Statistical Officeand the Korea Cement Industrial Association, suggest that year 2000 cement output was 4.6 million tonnes,
output in 1996 was 3.79 million tonnes, and output in 2005 was 5.93 million tonnes. It is unclear how thesenumbers were derived, and though one would expect the cement industry to decline somewhat less thanother industries, as it is/was not largely an export industry, the observed lack of recent construction activity
in the DPRK would suggest that the level of 1996 to 2005 increase that the latter source shows is
not what one would expect. We assume cement output of 4.4 million tonnes in 1996, 3.3 million tonnes in 2000, and3.52 million tonnes in 2005, showing a trend of slightly increased construction-sector demand for cement (for example,
for hydroelectric dams) in recent years in the DPRK.
3 www.nis.go.k r/english/democratic/industry07.html, dated 2001, by the ROK National Intelligence Service,suggests that current supplies of fertilizer cover only 40 percent of fertilizer needs in the DPRK.
Causes and Lessons of the "North Korean Food Crisis", by Tony Boys of Ibarak i Christian University
Junior College (2000), lists total fertilizer supply in the DPRK in 1999 of 200 k tonnes of "NPK", of which
32% was produced domestically, 10% imported, and the remainder provided in aid. This would imply thatabout
11% of 1990 levels of fertilizer production were achieved in 1999.
This document is available as "dprk e.pdf" on the WWW. The same document shows total fertilizer
availability of about
170 k tonnes in 1996. Assuming fertilizer aid at that time wasminimal, and assuming fertilizer imports were approximately as in 1999, domestic fertilizer productionin 1996 can be estimated at
25% of 1990 levels.
As an alternative source, the presentation "Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea", by R.V. Misra,available as http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from theInternational Fertilizer Industry Association), presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006
Conference 'Growing mark ets, nurturing success'", Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006, includes thegraph at right. This suggests that 1999 productionof fertilizer in the DPRK was
63 thousand
tonnes of nitrogen, which is roughly consistent with thelevel suggested in the article by Tony Boys that is quoted
above. Assuming this figure is correct, we adopt Misra's
2000 fertilizer production figure of
37.5 thousand
tonnes or nitrogen, or
7.5% of 1990
production levels. The analogous figure for 2005 is
56 thousand
tonnes or nitrogen, or
11.2% of 1990
production levels. A companion paper by Misra available fromthe same source notes that of the362.8 thousand
tonnes of annual nitrogen fertilizer production capacity listed(see reproduction of Table 5 from that paper, below),
27 k te ofcapacity use a fuel-oil based fertilizer process, electrolysis
is the basis for61
k te of capacity and239
k te of N fertilzer capacity use "coal and naptha"
as feedstock s. No information is provided on therelative proportions of these inputs, or on therelative capacity factors typical for the different
production complexes. The same paper quotes
an estimated energy intensity of fertilzer output of
50 GJ/te N to produce ammonia, and an additional
25 GJ/te N to produce urea. Which fuels these estimates include
are not specified, but these estimates seem reasonably consistent with the estimates we have used for 1990 energy
consumption in the fertilizer subsector.
On the basis of these data, and largely as placeholder values, we assume that
5% of (non-energy)
fertilizer feedstock s are heavy oil (in 1990 and beyond), and
20% are naptha, relative to the reported
coal used as feedstock (at 1 te per tonne ammonia produced). Consumption of these feedstock s isreported in the "non-energy" sheet in this work book . At this level, the naptha use in the fertilizer sector
is still less than half of the 220,000 tonnes of naptha reportedly used in the industrial
sector as a whole in 1990 in the report State of the Environment DPR Korea 2003 (Table 3.14)
prepared by the DPRK with UNDP, and published by the United Nations Environment Programme. Other figuresin the same table, however, appear somewhat overstated relative, at least, to our estimates for 1990.

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2 The source noted above, in the "Economic and Social…" page, lists a DPRK cement production of
4.1 million tonnes, or about 41 percent of year 1990 production, in 1999, which seems plausible.
Data that are probably from the same ultimate source, the Korean National Statistical Officeand the Korea Cement Industrial Association, suggest that year 2000 cement output was 4.6 million tonnes,
output in 1996 was 3.79 million tonnes, and output in 2005 was 5.93 million tonnes. It is unclear how thesenumbers were derived, and though one would expect the cement industry to decline somewhat less thanother industries, as it is/was not largely an export industry, the observed lack of recent construction activity
in the DPRK would suggest that the level of 1996 to 2005 increase that the latter source shows is
not what one would expect. We assume cement output of 4.4 million tonnes in 1996, 3.3 million tonnes in 2000, and3.52 million tonnes in 2005, showing a trend of slightly increased construction-sector demand for cement (for example,
for hydroelectric dams) in recent years in the DPRK.
3 www.nis.go.kr/english/democratic/industry07.html, dated 2001, by the ROK National Intelligence Service,suggests that current supplies of fertilizer cover only 40 percent of fertilizer needs in the DPRK.
Causes and Lessons of the "North Korean Food Crisis", by Tony Boys of Ibaraki Christian University
Junior College (2000), lists total fertilizer supply in the DPRK in 1999 of 200 ktonnes of "NPK", of which
32% was produced domestically, 10% imported, and the remainder provided in aid. This would imply thatabout
11% of 1990 levels of fertilizer production were achieved in 1999.
This document is available as "dprke.pdf" on the WWW. The same document shows total fertilizer
availability of about
170 ktonnes in 1996. Assuming fertilizer aid at that time wasminimal, and assuming fertilizer imports were approximately as in 1999, domestic fertilizer productionin 1996 can be estimated at
25% of 1990 levels.
As an alternative source, the presentation "Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea", by R.V. Misra,available as http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from theInternational Fertilizer Industry Association), presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006
Conference 'Growing markets, nurturing success'", Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006, includes thegraph at right. This suggests that 1999 productionof fertilizer in the DPRK was
63 thousand
tonnes of nitrogen, which is roughly consistent with thelevel suggested in the article by Tony Boys that is quoted
above. Assuming this figure is correct, we adopt Misra's
2000 fertilizer production figure of
37.5 thousand
tonnes or nitrogen, or
7.5% of 1990
production levels. The analogous figure for 2005 is
56 thousand
tonnes or nitrogen, or
11.2% of 1990
production levels. A companion paper by Misra available fromthe same source notes that of the362.8 thousand
tonnes of annual nitrogen fertilizer production capacity listed(see reproduction of Table 5 from that paper, below),
27 kte ofcapacity use a fuel-oil based fertilizer process, electrolysis
is the basis for61
kte of capacity and239
kte of N fertilzer capacity use "coal and naptha"
as feedstocks. No information is provided on therelative proportions of these inputs, or on therelative capacity factors typical for the different
production complexes. The same paper quotes
an estimated energy intensity of fertilzer output of
50 GJ/te N to produce ammonia, and an additional
25 GJ/te N to produce urea. Which fuels these estimates include
are not specified, but these estimates seem reasonably consistent with the estimates we have used for 1990 energy
consumption in the fertilizer subsector.
On the basis of these data, and largely as placeholder values, we assume that
5% of (non-energy)
fertilizer feedstocks are heavy oil (in 1990 and beyond), and
20% are naptha, relative to the reported
coal used as feedstock (at 1 te per tonne ammonia produced). Consumption of these feedstocks isreported in the "non-energy" sheet in this workbook. At this level, the naptha use in the fertilizer sector
is still less than half of the 220,000 tonnes of naptha reportedly used in the industrial
sector as a whole in 1990 in the report State of the Environment DPR Korea 2003 (Table 3.14)
prepared by the DPRK with UNDP, and published by the United Nations Environment Programme. Other figuresin the same table, however, appear somewhat overstated relative, at least, to our estimates for 1990.

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For 2008 and 2009 (and 2010), estimates of fertilizer production were obtained from
UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program (2010), SPECIAL REPORT: FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY
ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA , dated 16 November 2010, and available as
URL http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.pdf. The estimate is derived from data in Table 2 of that document (see below).

The quantities of nitrogen fertilizer shown imply the following (quantities in thousand tonnes):
Year
2008
2009
2010
Nitrogen fertilizer as Ammonium Sulphate
256.8
170.09174.35
Nitrogen fertilizer as N
54.42
36.04
36.94
Fraction of 1990 Production
10.9%
7.2%
7.4%

Fraction of (NH4)2SO4 as N
21.2%

4 With the exception of "Other Minerals" and "Building Materials", we assume that the level of activity in otherindustries relative to 1990 in the year 2000 is approximately the same as in the iron and steel sector.
The building materials and other minerals subsectors are assumed to have activities relative to 1990 similar tothe cement industry. The other minerals subsector includes magnesite (or, when processed lik e lime forcement, magnesia), which is a valuable export product. An industry source indicates that an 8000 tonne
shipment of magnesia (although it may have been magnesite) arrived in Europe in early 2001. Japan imported$3.5 million worth of magnesia in the first half of 2000 (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency
data from http://www.k otra.or.k r/main/common_bbs, visited 6/3/02, "Trade Tendencies of the Major
Countries"), which, if annualized and assuming a sales price of $US 100 to $200 per tonne (within
the range suggested in Queensland Department of Minerals and Energy Mineral Information Leaflet No 5:
MAGNESITE, dated January 1998, suggests exports of 35 to 70 thousand tonnes to Japan alone, which
in turn suggests relatively active production of the mineral. On our trip to the DPRK in October of 2000 wesaw work ing brick or tile production facilities, some of the very few active industrial facilities wesaw during our time in the DPRK. For 2005, with the exception of the subsectors treated explicitly
in other notes, we assume that the generally-percieved modest upturn in the DPRK economy has translated in
into a small increase, relative to 2000, in activity and energy use in industry, for example, in the cement,
building materials, and textiles subsectors, though the upturn in the latter may be mostly due to garment
assembly on commission, rather than the much more energy-intensive manufacturing of cloth.
We increase non-oil fuels in "unspecified industry" more than other categories to reflect the probable increasein demand for electricity, and also some coal, from development of export-oriented light industry.
A Bank of Korea estimate placed the production of cement in the DPRK at 5.6 million tonnes in 2004,
which is considerably higher than the 4.1 million tonnes we use for 2000. We assume, in part reflecting
information in Note 5, below, that the Bank of Korea figure is probably an over-estimate for 2005.
5 The document Seoul T'ongil Kyongje , dated August 2000, pages 39-48, article by Hong Sun-chik entitled"North Korean Industry (Part II): Cement Industry", suggests that cement output in 1998 was 3.15 million tonnes, butgrew substantially in 1999. The capacity factor of DPRK factories was 26.2 percent in 1998, compared with
51 percent in 1990. The article lists a year-2000 capacity of
12.01 million tonnes, of which 96.3 percent
was in the 10 largest factories. The DPRK had 49 k ilns, and the average capacity of 0.25 million tonnes each was lessthan one quarter the average capacity of k ilns in the ROK. The article cite DPRK limestone reserves ofabout 100 billion tonnes. The article references a year-2000 source listing the Ch'onnae-ri Cement plant with
"Annual production of 1.1 Million tonnes, the largest on the East Coast". In a discussion of cement quality, the article
says that cement made in the DPRK is lower in quality (due to poorer quality control, k iln break down due to oil
shortages, and lack of input supplies) than ROK cement, but that DPRK cement is similar in quality and price to Chinese
cement. Problems in the Cement industry listed in the article include outdated production facilities,
with automated facilities in use for only about one sixth of k ilns, poor cement quality (due in part to lack of fuels,
which prevent k ilns from being operated normally), lack of paper for pack aging of cement products (leading
to difficulties in exporting cement), the presence of wastes in the cement, and "an inefficient usethat causes environmental pollution".

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
6 The document Seoul T'ongil Kyongje , dated December 2000, pages 36-44, is an article by Hong Sun-chik entitled"North Korean Industries (Part V): Automobile Industry". This article notes a new plant in Nampo, opening 9/2000,
to "modif[y] imported secondhand automobiles", with a planned second phase to assemble Fiats. In the 1970s, theDPRK developed production lines for 2.5-, 10-, and 25-tonne truck s. The article states that "most of the k ey parts
that require elector-circuit systems and precision processing such as cylinder heads and starter motors are imported"due to problems with the quality of domestically-produced parts. Although a 90 percent "self-sufficieny rate"
is claimed by the DPRK, the author estimates a rate under 60% is more lik ely. 1999 auto production capacity in the
DPRK was estimated at 33,000 units, with production of 7,300 that year. The Sungni Motor General Plant accounts
for 80 percent of the DPRK's output of cars and truck s. Starting in 1995, this factory began producing a diesel-fueled
passenger car to try and shift transport fuel consumption to lower-cost diesel oil (and away from gasoline). This transitionis also (as of 2000) being undertak en for new 2.5-tonne truck s (gasoline-to-diesel). The article contains anestimate that 70 to 90 percent of cars being used in Pyongyang are imported. The article estimates that the DPRK's
domestic automobile demand is 20,000 to 30,000 units per year, of which passenger cars account for 30-40 percent.
Engines have been imported from Japan, the Czech Republic, and other countries since 1988.
7 China Customs Statistics reported imports of television sets to the DPRK from China
increased approximately five-fold, on average, between 1998-2000 and 2003-2005. Televisions (HS #8528)
were the number one import in the "electrical equipment" category for the DPRK during the latter years, at
an average of about 400,000 sets per year. At the same time, imports to the DPRK from China of
the rare earth metal Yttrium (HS # 2846) , which is used in mak ing phosphors for televisions, declined from about
55 tonnes in the mid-1990s to zero by 2000 and 2005. China was (as of the mid-1990s) by far the world leader
in production of Yttrium (see http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/741397.pdf).
The increase in television imports from China, and the decrease in Yttrium imports, is circumstantial
evidence of (though, admittedly, hardly proof of) a decline in the DPRK appliance sector since the mid-1990s.
Import data as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and
Implications as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
8 Many of the top imports to the DPRK from China, by value, in 2005 in the Machinery (HS # 84) category appear to
be tools related to mines, mining, or the mineral industry. These include minerals sorting devices,compressors and pumps (air and liquid), bulldozers and related self-propelled equipment, furnaces,
derrick s, and cranes. These purchases would appear to point to an upturn in the DPRK metals and minerals
subsector (or perhaps an upturn to come in the next few years). In most of these categories, purchases
increased significantly in recent years. In the "machinery" category overall, the DPRK's imports from China
nearly doubled (in reported value) between 2004 and 2005. Source same as cited in note 7, above.
9 Imports of plastics and plastic goods to the DPRK from China, by weight, in 2005 in the Plastics (HS # 39) category
were over 45,000 tonnes, which was an increase of more than 50 percent over year 2004 imports, and aboutfour-fold higher than plastics imports in the mid-1990s. This may indicate a combination of a decline in the
DPRK's capacity to produce plastics domestically, plus an increase in the demand for plastic goods, particularly
as the non-state economy began to develop. Source same as cited in note 7, above.
10 Imports of iron and steel products (for example, rolled steel and steel bar, not finished goods--"Iron and Steel", HS # 72
category) to the DPRK from China, by weight, averaged about 57,000 tonnes per year from 2003 through 2005.
This was an increase of more than 4-fold over 1995-1997 imports, and may indicate a combination of a decline in the
DPRK's capacity to produce such products domestically. Source same as cited in note 7, above
A similar pattern exists for finished iron and steel goods ("Iron and Steel Products", HS #73), where year 2005 imports
from China (at about 25,000 tonnes) were significantly higher than in previous years, and about five-fold higher than theapproximately 4000 - 6000 tonnes level of imports of these goods that prevailed from 1995 through 1999.
Among these products, the DPRK imported over 24,000 tonnes of railway track (HS# 7302) in both 2001 and 2005,
far more than imports in other years. Lik ewise, imports of inorganic chemicals (HS # 28), at about
50,000 tonnes in 2005, were over 50% higher than in 2003 and 2004, and about 3 times imports in the mid-1990s.
Aluminum oxides and carbonates (HS# 2818 and 2836, respectively) made up almost 40,000 of the total
imports by the DPRK from China in this category in 2005.
11 Similar to the pattern noted in 10, above, Imports of aluminum and aluminum products (HS # 76
category) to the DPRK from China, by weight, averaged about 57,000 tonnes per year from 2003 through 2005
(see data below). This was an increase of about 5-fold over 1995-1997 imports, and, similar to the iron and steel sector,
may indicate a combination of a decline in the DPRK's capacity to produce such products domestically.
The most commonly imported products in this category, by weight, were "bar, rod, profiles", "other structures","plate, sheet, strip > 0.2 mm thick ", "household articles", and "foil =< 0.22 mm thick (except back ing)" (?).
Imports of aluminum "tubes and pipes" (HS # 7608) were just under 19 tonnes in 2005.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
2003
2004
2005
76 ALUMINUM
1,655
2,286
4,285 Quantity: tonnes

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12 In 2005, the DPRK exported to China somewhat under 4700 tonnes of lead (HS # 78) and over 9300
tonnes of Zinc and zinc products (HS # 79). Lead exports from the DPRK to China were recorded aszero in 2003 and 2004 (or, possibly, not recorded), but varied from about 1200 to 4200 tonnes per year
from 1995 through 2002. Zinc/zinc products exports were much higher in 2004--about 35,000 tonnes,
and also higher--about 15,500 tonnes--in 2003.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
13 In 2003 - 2005, the DPRK exported to China the quantities of ores (HS # 26) noted below.
Only selected ore exports are shown (largely, top exports by volume). Many ore exports to China
showed large increases in 2005, and also between the late 1990s and 2005.
Exports from the DPRK to China of 90.54 tonnes of "Uranium, Thorium Ore and Concentrate" was listed forthe year 2004, but Uranium exports from the DPRK to China are not listed for other years between 1995 and 2005.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
Description
IRON ORES+CONCENTRATE
ZINC ORES+CONCENTRATE
PRECIOUS METAL ORES+C
MOLYBDENUM ORE+CONCEN
LEAD ORES+CONCENTRATE
COPPER ORES+CONCENTRATUNGSTEN ORE+CONCEN
OT WASTE MANU IRN/STL
OTHER ORES AND CONCENTRATES

HS #
2601
2608
2616
2613
2607
2603
2611
2619
2617

2003
270,854
5,242
55,788230
20,608
7,298
398
-

2004
2005
937,159 1,320,458 Units: Tonnes
16,10930,38960,007384
619
14,301
14,090
6,987
7,856
542
1,252
568
7,169
2
2,962

14 In 2003 - 2005, the DPRK exported to China the quantities of iron and steel products (HS # 72) noted below.
Only selected exports are shown (largely, top exports by volume). Exports to China in this categoryalso, overall, showed large increases between the late 1990s and 2005, particularly in scap exports.
In addition to the quantities noted above, smaller amounts of iron and steel products (about 1100 tonnes
in 2003, but only 82 and 87 tonnes in 2004 and 2005, respectively) were imported to Hong Kong from the DPRK.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
Description
FERROUS WASTE,SCRAP;OPIG IRON,SPIEGELEISENSEMIFINSH IRON,NONAST
FERROALLOYSPRIMARY FORMS,NT 7203
BAR,ROD,H ROLLD,I/NAS

HS #
7204
7201
7207
7202
7206
7214

2003
221,719
118,874
69,183
3,318
8,084
738

2004
275,687
155,377
47,767
6,139
4,677
2,485

2005
358,293 Units: Tonnes
98,06047,538
9,843
2,042
798

15 From 1995 - 2005, the DPRK exported to China small quantities of finished iron and steel products (HS # 73)
in quantities ranging, by year, from near zero to about 800 tonnes. The largest single year's export ofa single product was 707 tonnes of railway track in 2004.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
16 Since 1998, the DPRK has exported to China less than a million USD per year of goods in "machinery" category (HS # 84.)
Exports for 1998 and for several other years in the late 1990s were higher, by value.
Source same as cited in note 7, above.
17 The data on trade in iron ore and iron and steel goods between China and the DPRK, as described in notes 10, 13, and14 above, suggest a pattern whereby the DPRK (and/or Chinese businesses operating in the DPRK) are focusing onexporting increasing amounts of raw materials (ore, scrap) from the DPRK to China, and increasing imports offinished and semi-finished iron and steel products into the DPRK from China. Based on this pattern and on reports(and our own observations) of the continued decline of DPRK heavy industry, we assume a continued reduction in output
of iron and steel and iron and steel products in the DPRK between 2000 and 2005.
18 Dr. Chung Woo-jin, in his presentation entitled "Mineral Resources in DPRK",
as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA), and available as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Chung.ppt.
lists 2004 DPRK output of Magnesite of 1 million tonnes, the same as in 1990. What is not k nown iswhat fraction of that output might have been simply exported as a raw ore (and thus not processed toMagnesia), and what fraction might of ore processing was fueled with heavy oil versus coal. We mak e theassumption, for the year 2005, that about
50% of magnesite was processed to Magnesia, andabout
50% of the fuel input for that processing was provided by heavy
fuel oil (the rest being provided by coal).

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
19 In the presentation referenced above, Dr. Chung provides estimates of the production of lead andzinc metal (ingots) in 2004 in the DPRK at levels of
60 and100 k te,respectively, or about
71% and
59% of 1990 output. Copper ingot
production was estimated by Dr. Chung at
13 kte, or
45% of 1990 output as
estimated. The heavy imports of aluminum products (at levels well beyond even the reported output ofaluminum in 1990) from China into the DPRK, as reported in Note 11, above, suggest that domestic DPRK
production of aluminum in 2005 could have been low (which would also be consistent with electricity shortage,as aluminum manufacture is quite electricity-intensive). Based on these data, we estimate a roughaverage activity for the overall "other metals" subsector for 2005 at
60% of 1990 levels.
20 Anecdotal and fragmented evidence of activity in industrial installations include: The Wonsan shipyard has
not built a new ship since 1985, and struggles in even repair work due to deteriorated equipment, with only 1/6th of theoriginal work force even reporting. The "6.4 Wonsan Vehicle Factory" has ceased manufacturing trains due to a shortageof raw materials and electricity, and now occasionally repairs trains, but also mak es doors for buildings its
reporting work force about 1/6th of 1990 levels (North Korea Today, No. 298, 10/2009).
NK Today No. 291 (8/2009) report "[p]roduction Rate below Thirty Percent at Lanam Mine Machinery Factory in Chungjin",
despite the pressure of a "150-day battle campaign" (national productivity push).
Low output (due to lack of electricity and food) at the Duk sa Coal Mine (producing "low heat anthracite coal") of Soodong District
idled clothing, shoe, and "mark et" factories in Hamheung, which used to receive 1000 te/month from the mine.
NK Today, No.268 March 2009.
21 A piece in North Korea Today (No.263 January 2009) suggests that DPRK fertilizer output was on the order of
300,000 te, though the units (tonnes of N or of fertilizer in total, for example) of fertilizer output were not specified.
Assuming this is a figure for total fertilizer output, it is reasonably consistent with the 2008 value shown in Note 3, above.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:TRANSPORTATION SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

2/25/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
GENERAL ASSUMPTION:DPRK transport assumed to be

20% more energy intensive than in China or Russia
Notes/Sources:

Oil Use: Road Vehicles
Freight Transported:
Average Distance of transport
Energy Intensity, Diesel Trucks
Fract Freight on Diesel Trucks
Diesel Use, Road Freight
Energy Intensity, Gasoline Trucks
Fract Freight on Gasoline Trucks
Gasoline Use, Road Freight
Total Road Freight Oil Use
Number of Civilian Autos in Use
Average km traveled/yr
Efficiency, Civilian Autos
Conversion factor
Gasoline Use, Civilian Autos
Economically Active Population
Per capita Trips/yr
Average Trip Distance
Fract. Trips by Motor Transport
Fraction of Trips by Road
Fraction of km in Diesel Veh.
Energy Intensity, Diesel Oil Transport
Conversion Factor
Total Passenger Road Diesel Use
Fraction of km in Gasoline Veh.
Energy Intensity, Gasoline Transport
Total Passenger Road Gas Use
Total Oil Use, Pass Vehicles
Total Oil Use, Road Vehicles
Biomass Use, Road Vehicles
Fract Freight on Biomass-fueled Trucks
Efficiency of biomass trucks relative to gasoline
Biomass use, road freight

4.20E+07 te
75 km
3.08 MJ/te-km
23.93%
2.32E+06 GJ
5.77 MJ/te-km
71.5%
1.30E+07 GJ
1.84E+07 GJ
15,5008,500
1.10E+01 km/liter gasoline
0.0325 GJ/liter
3.90E+05 GJ
1.38E+07
300
16 km
25%
30%
50%
75 kgce/kpass-km
0.0293 GJ/kgce
5.47E+06 GJ
50%
98.2 kgce/kpass-km
7.16E+06 GJ
1.42E+07 GJ
3.26E+07 GJ

1
Guess
19
Guess
19
Guess

11
Guess
11

3
Guess
Guess
Guess
10
Guess
4

Guess
4

4.60%

14
13

50%
1.67E+06 GJ

Oil Use: Rail Transport
Freight Transported:
Fraction of Freight on Diesel Rail
Average Distance of transport
Energy Intensity, Diesel Rail
Conversion Factor
Total Rail Freight Oil Use

1.69E+08 te
12.5%
250 km10.5 kgce/kte-km
0.0293 GJ/kgce
1.95E+06 GJ

Oil Use: Water Transport
Freight Transported:
Average Distance of transport
Energy Intensity, Diesel/Heavy Fuel Oil Ships
Conversion Factor
Total Ship Oil Use
Fraction of Ship Oil Use as Heavy Fuel Oil
Total Diesel Oil Use in Ships
Total Heavy Oil Use in Ships

1.80E+07 te
200 km
9.9 kgce/kte-km
0.0293 GJ/kgce
1.25E+06 GJ
50%
6.27E+05
6.27E+05

A1- 110

1
10
Guess
18

1
Guess
5

Guess

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Oil Use: Air Transport
Number of Planes (Total)
Number of Planes that are Tu-154 jets
Average Number of Seats/Plane (non-jets)
Average Airspeed During Operation (non-jets)
Average Number of Seats/Plane (jets)
Average Airspeed During Operation (jets)
Annual Operating Hrs/plane-yr--non-jets
Annual Operating Hrs/plane-yr--jets
Implied total seat-km per year
Average Fraction of Seats Occupied
Implied Air Passenger-km
Fuel use per hour (An-24s)
Fuel use per hour (Tu-154s)
Conversion factor
Conversion factor
Total Domestic Air Aviation Gasoline Use
Total Domestic Air Jet Fuel Use
Total Domestic Oil Products Use
Implied Intensity, all planes
International Aviat. Fuel Supplied by DPRK
Total Air Transport Oil Use
Oil Use: Non-Specified Transport
Electricity Use: Rail Transport
Fraction of Freight on Electr. Rail
Average Distance of transport
Energy Intensity, Electric Rail
Conversion Factor
Total Rail Freight Elect Use
Fract. pass. Transp on Elect Rail
Energy Intensity, Electric Rail
Conversion Factor
Total Pass. Rail Elect Use
Total Electricity Use, Rail Transp.
Coal Use: Rail Transport
Coal Use: Water Transport
Electricity Use, Non-specified Transport

24
8
3
16
50
15, 16500 km/hr
15166
15
900 km/hr
15
300
Guess
750
Guess
4.94E+08
75%
Guess
3.70E+08
3582 liters/hr
125073 liters/hr
170.0321 GJ/liter gasoline
0.0350 GJ/liter jet fuel7.24E+05 GJ
3.99E+05 GJ
1.12E+06 GJ
3.03E-03 GJ/passenger-km
0 GJ
Guess
1.12E+06 GJ
1.00E+06 GJ
Placeholder value
87.5%
300 km28.6 kWh/kte-km
0.0036 GJ/kWh
5.48E+06 GJ
70%
13.2 kgce/kpass-km
0.0293 GJ/kgce
5.39E+06 GJ
1.09E+07 GJ
0 GJ
0 GJ
6.00E+05 GJ

Guess
18

7

Placeholder value

Notes:
1 Estimated Freight transported. Korea Foreign Trade Association, "Major Economic Indicators
for North Korea, 1993". Page 34.
2 Chinese 4-ton truck , "CA-10B", c. 1985, from [Chinese data compendium provided by J. Sinton], p.2.
3 Korea Foreign Trade Association, "Major Economic Indicators for North Korea", page 9.
4 For Pass. Vehicles. From: "Energy and Transport in China" in " Energy Mark ets and the Future of
Energy Demand ", LBL, 1988. Chinese data for 1985. Probably high for DPRK.
5 Per 1000 net te-k m. From: "Energy and Transport in China" in " Energy Mark ets and the Future of
Energy Demand ", LBL, 1988. Chinese data for 1985. Probably a bit low for DPRK.
Russian (1970s) energy intensities for ships fueled with heavy oil are very similar to the Chinese value used.
Russian intensities for marine diesel-fueled ships are lower (about 7 k gce/k te) than the value used, but Russian
intensities for inland waterways shipping are higher, about 13 k gce/k te. Russian intensities from V. Kalashnik ov(personal communication, 9/97).
6 Electric generation efficiency, China, 1981. From "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products"
Spreadsheet printout from J. Sinton, LBL.
7 Very rough estimate based on US value for 1989 for commuter rail. From D. Gordon, Steering a New
Course: Transportation, Energy, and the Environment , 1991, p.33. NK fuel efficiency is probably
lower than US but passenger-k m per seat is probably much higher.
8 Korea Foreign Trade Association, "Major Economic Indicators for North Korea", page 37.

A1- 111

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
9 Rough estimate: DPRK planes assumed to be twice as energy intensive per seat mile as US commercial
commuter airlines in 1989 (US data from reference 7).
10 Economist Intelligence Unit, "China, North Korea Country Profile 1992-93"
11 Estimate by recent visitors of cars in Pyongyang, including 4000 Volvo sedans (of which 3000 are operable),and assuming five years worth of imports of approximately 2500 vehicles per year (used, from Japan,
also from former East Bloc). Fuel economy assumed to average 25 miles/gallon.
Other observers estimate less than 10,000 autos total as of approximately 1990.
12 Fuel use and airspeed is as estimated cor An-24 in Aircraft spreadsheet of Military Energy Use work book .
13 Assumes that efficiency of gasification of biomass for use as motor fuel is about 50 percent.
14 One observer reports that "most truck s outside Pyongyang are fueled with biomass".
Other observers, on the other hand, report few or no biomass truck s in use. We assume 5 percent for 1990.
15 Assumes (based on source 16) that planes that are not jets are An-24s. These are reported to carry 48
to 52 passengers (World-wide Web site "Turk ish World Russian Aircraft", http://www.rz.uni.franfurt.de/~puersuen/tac.htm).
16 Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress (1993), North Korea, A Country Study ,edited by Andrea M. Savada.
17 Assumes Tu-154s, with a range of 5500 k m (source 15) have a fuel capacity similar to that of
the Boeing 727 (31,000 liters--data from World-wide Web site http://boeing.com/bck _html/Boe727.html),
an aircraft similar in size (the 727 is a few percent lighter) and configuration to the Tu-154.
18 Based on energy intensity of Russian rail freight in the 1970s (V. Kalashnik ov, personal communication, 9/97).
19 Based on energy intensity of Russian road freight in the 1970s (V. Kalashnik ov, personal communication, 9/97).
Note that these values are substantially higher (in the case of gasoline truck s, by a factor of 2) than published
Chinese values (for example, see note 2).

A1- 112Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEASSUMPTIONS, BACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:TRANSPORT SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND IN 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

2/19/2012

ASSUMPTIONS FOR CHANGES IN TRANSPORT ENERGY USE, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
Sources/Notes:(See Note 5 for Assumptions for 2000)
Population Growth Rate through 2000: 0.08% /yr (See Note 20 in "Residential" worksheet)
Econ. Active. Population Growth Rate 2000-2008:
1.02% /yr
Econ. Active. Population Growth Rate after 2008:
0.54% /yr
1996
2000
2005
Economically Active population relative to 1990:
100.5%
100.5%
105.7%

Total Road Freight rel. to 1990
Fraction Road Freight, biomass truck
Fraction Road Freight, diesel truck
Fraction Road Freight, gasoline truck

1996
30.0%
7.60%
20.20%
72.20%

Subsector--End Use
Road--Freight--Gasoline
Road--Freight--Diesel
Road--Freight--Biomass
Road--Civilian Auto Pass-km
Road--Passenger Bus, Diesel
Road--Passenger Bus, Gasoline
Rail--Freight, Diesel
Rail--Freight, Electric
Rail--Passenger, Electric
Water--Freight, Diesel and HFOAir--Passenger: Activity levels (fuel)Air--Passenger: Fraction as Jet Fuel
Non-Specified Transport (Oil/Elect.)

1996
30.3%
25.3%
49.6%
100.0%
44.2%
59.5%
40.0%
40.0%
44.21%
40.0%
80.0%
35.5%
0.0%

2000
14.0%
9.90%
34.35%
55.75%

2005
25.0%
9.64%
66.24%
24.12%

2008
25.5%
9.70%
48.51%
41.79%

Activity Relative to 1990
2000
2005
2008
10.9%
8.4%
14.9%
20.1%
69.2%
51.7%
30.1%
52.4%
53.8%
75.0%
90.0%
120.0%
40.0%
70.0%
48.1%
17.0%
14.7%
45.1%
30.0%
46.0%
26.5%
33.0%
33.0%
39.0%
26.5%
33.0%
38.0%
38.0%
42.0%
33.0%
72.0%
80.0%
85.0%
45.0%
67.0%
70.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

(See Note 22 in "Residential" work sheet)2008
109.0%

2009
109.6%

2009
2010--Dec.
18.0%
THIS 40%
9.58% SECTION
69%
8
OF THIS
47.31% WORKSHE
4.3%
9
43.11% ET NOT27% Calculated

Energy Intensity Relative to 1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
110%
110.0%
110.0%
105%2
110%
100.0%
100.0%
100%
2
100%
100%
100%
100%
105%
103.0%
95.0%
96.0%
10, 11110%106.0%
105.0%
102%3
110%
100.0%
100.0%
98%
3
100%
100%
100%
100%
2
105%
100%
100%
100%
2
105%
100%
100%
100%
3
100%
100%
100%
100%
2
100%
100%
100%
100% Assumption
4
100%
100%
100%
100%

Activity Relative to 1990
Energy Intensity Relative to 1990
Subsector--End Use
1996
2009
2010--Dec.
1996
2009
2010--Dec.
Road--Freight--Gasoline
30.3%
10.9%
15%
110%
103%
104%
2
THIS
THIS
Road--Freight--Diesel
25.3%
35.6% SECTION
7%110%
98% SECTION
104%
2
OF THIS
Road--Freight--Biomass
49.6%
37.5% OF THIS
600%
100%
100%
100%
WORKSHEWORKSHE
Road--Civilian Auto Pass-km
100.0%
109.0% ET NOT
110%
105%
95%
100% Assumption
ET NOT
FOR
Road--Passenger Bus, Diesel
44.2%
39.0% USED FOR
45%
110%
100% USED 104%
3
THIS
THIS50%Road--Passenger Bus, Gasoline
59.5%
34.0%
110%
96%
104%
3
ANALYSISANALYSIS
Rail--Freight, Diesel
40.0%
23.0%
50%
100%
100%
100%
2
Rail--Freight, Electric
40.0%
40.0%
50%
105%
100%
100%
2
Rail--Passenger, Electric
44.2%
38.0%
45%
105%
100%
100%
3
Water--Freight, Diesel and HFO
40.0%
28.0%
50%
100%
100%
100%
2
Air--Passenger: Activity levels (fuel)
75.0%
80.0%
80%
100%
100%
100% Assumption
Air--Passenger: Fraction as Jet Fuel
35.5%
67.0%
36%
3
Non-Specified Transport (Oil/Elect.)
0.0%
0.0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
Sources/Notes:
1 US Central Intelligence Agency, "Korea, North". CIA Factbook , 1995 (World Wide Web Version).
USCIA, Washington, D.C., USA. 1996.
2 Consistent with general decrease in industrial production

A1- 1132010
110.2% CalculatedNautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
3 Assumes that per-capita passenger transport use decreased to 44 to 60 percent of 1990 by 1996 due to austerity
measures, with the decrease continuing through 2000 before increasing slightly in 2005 (based on
the anecdotal observations of visitors to the DPRK), varying thereafter to roughly follow the estimatedavailability of refined fuels.
4 Based on general observations of a decline in air travel through 2000, increasing somewhat in 2001 and 2002,
as more international visitors came to Pyongyang in those years, but declining somewhat thereafter to a current
level that is similar to that in 1990. It is assumed that a larger fraction of travelers are carried on jet aircraft
as opposed to the older propellor-driven DPRK planes.
5 No specific data were available for the transport sector for 2000, so estimates of the parameters in these tables arerough figures based on the experiences of Nautilus staff and others in the DPRK. It is assumed that the use of producergas-fueled truck s would increase somewhat as a fraction of overall freight transport, but that the increase would be modest.
Visitors to the DPRK have generally noted a modest increase in the use of small "private" cars and mini-vans in thelast several years. The use of other vehicles, however, seems to have stayed the same or decreased slightly, thus
the slight decrease in vehicle use between 1996 and 2000 relative to 1990. No change in the efficiency of vehicles
was assumed between 1996 and 2000, as any efficiency gains through the introduction of a few new vehicles seems
lik ely to be counterbalanced by continuing problems with the availability of spare parts. We saw many disabled truck salong the road in areas not far from Pyongyang.
6 The website http://www.answers.com/topic/north-k orea, visited 1/15/07, listed the following as the ships in the
DPRK merchant marine as of 2005: "total: 238 ships (1,000 GRT or over) 985,108 GRT/1,389,389 DWT by type:bulk carrier 13, cargo 191, container 2, livestock carrier 4, passenger/cargo 5, petroleum tank er 13,
refrigerated cargo 5, roll on/roll off 5 foreign-owned: 52 (China 1, Denmark 2, France 1, Greece 4, Italy 1, Lebanon 4,
Lithuania 1, Netherlands 1, Pak istan 2, Romania 10, Russia 2, Singapore 2, South Korea 2, Syria 9,
Turk ey 6, Uk raine 1, UAE 3).
7 China Customs Statistics reported transport vehicles exports from China to the DPRK as follows for 2000 through2005. As compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
ROAD VEHICLES IMPORTS TO DPRK FROM CHINA
Units: Number of Vehicles
Description
HS (code)
2000
MOTOR TRUCKS
8704
770
PASSENGER MOTOR
8703
1529
OT SPEC PURPOSE M VEH
8705
75
MOTORCYCLES
8711
1354
TRACTORS,NOT IN 8709
8701
28
PUB TRANS MV>10PERS
8702
337
PART/ACCESS 8701-8705
8708
0PART,ACCESS 8711-8713
8714
0BICYCLES+OTHER CYCLES
8712
12400
TRAIL,ET,NT MEC PROPL
8716
0
M VHCL CHASSIS W/ENGN
8706
10
MOTOR VEHICL BODIES
8707
3
CARRIAGES FOR DISABLEDPERSONS,MOTORIZED OR NOT
8713
200

RAIL EQUIPMENT IMPORTS TO DPRK FROM CHINA
Units: Number of Vehicles except as noted
Description
HS (code)
2000
N-S-P RLWAY FRGHT CAR
8606
0
LOCOMOTV/R STOCK PRTS
8607
0
OT N-EL LCMTV;TENDERS
8602
5RAIL LOCOMOTIVE,ELECT
8601
0
RLWAY FXTUR; MECH EQP
8608
83000
OT S-PRPL RLWAY COACH
8603
0
CONTNR (1+TRANS MODE)
8609
1
RLWAY MAINT/SERV VHCL
8604
0
N-S-P RWAY PASS COACH
8605
0

2001
677
629
40
62
47
233
0
0
4066
0
4
2

2002
955
0
9
30
86
14
0
0
53601
0
16
6

2003
1409
65
10
1
65
38
0
0
1020
0
2
7

2004
2108
145
26
701
234
82
0
0
7745
0
2
15

2005
2444
244
29
3433
401
89
0
0
12,958
0
24
38

0

387

132

548

552

2001
0
0
5
0
83000
0
1
0
0

2002
53
0
13
3
83400
35
14
0
1

2003
36
0
8
1
61300
5
21
2
5

2004
12
0
6
3
80000
47
4
0
0

A1- 114

2005
176
0
7
12
57472 Units: KG
20
1
2
0

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
SHIPS AND BOATS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT IMPORTS TO DPRK FROM CHINA
Units: Number of Vessels except as noted
Description
HS (code)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
SHIPS AND BOATS
89
23
0
18
183
1295
FISH VESSEL;OTH SHIPS
8902
0
0
1
0
5
YCHT & OT PLEAS VESSL
8903
20
38
0
19
51
TRANSPORT PERSON/GOOD
8901
1
0
4
0
0
TUGS AND PUSHER CRAFT
8904
1
0
0
0
0
LGT-VESS,FL DOCKS ETC
8905
0
0
0
0
0
OT VESSEL,N ROW BOATS
8906
1
0
13
4
9
OT FLT STRUCT,RFT,ETC
8907
0
0
0
160
1230
Note: Based on their reported value of $1.45 million US, the four "transport person/goods" vessels imported by the
DPRK in 2005 seem likely to be fairly large vessels.

2005
59
11
30
4
0
0
7
7

8 Anecdotal reports indicate that the use of biomass-fueled (gasifier-using) truck s remain very common in some areasof the DPRK, even in the years 2000 - 2005. We have assumed values of about 10 percent after 1996, withslight adjustments to balance fuel supply and demand.
9 Visitors to the DPRK, including the authors, have noted an increase in the number of imported, mostly diesel, truck s
in use in the DPRK. Increasing imports of truck s from China from 2001 through 2005 reinforce these observations.
Values shown are rough assumptions, adjusted slightly to balance fuel supply and demand.
10 Visitors to the DPRK, including the authors, have noted an increase in the number of imported automobiles inrecent years. This observation is reinforced by the import statistics above. We assume that these vehicles are more
efficient, on average, than the older vehicles (a declining percentage of them DPRK-made) in the DPRK automobile
fleet, thus the improvement in energy intensity that is assumed over time. The increase in the number ofimports of motorcycles noted above also supports this trend in efficiency improvement (gasoline use by private
motorcycles is reported in the same row as gasoline use in private autos).

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
11 Another point of reference on the DPRK road vehicle sector is provided by the following from dprk guidebook .org (undated, but
probably 2006 or 2007), in "III - MAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTORS & BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES" available as
http://dprk guidebook .org/contents_3.htm. Though this source claims that only 3000 passenger cars were on the roads of the DPRK
as of 2005, that figure seems somewhat at odds with (too low relative to) the anecdotal reports and official import statistics
described above. The text quoted below appears in the source under the headings "Automotive Industry" and "Passenger Cars".

"DPRK’s automotive industry was born in November 1950 with the construction of the 600.000 m2 Tokchon Motor Plant inTokchon City, South Pyongan Province, The factory name was changed to Sungri ( Victory ) Motor Plant in 1975 andproduced a number of DPRK “classics” still to be seen on the country’s roads. The "Sungri -58" truck debuted in November
1958 and was followed by the "Sungri 4.25" truck, the "Jaju" 5-seat passenger car, the "Konsol" ( Construction ) passenger
car, the "Kumsusan" 40-ton truck, the "Paekdusan" ( Mount Paekdu ) passenger car and the "Kwangbok" jeep. The
production of the "Mount Kumsusan" truck is said to have been discontinued because of excessive fuel consumption,
among other reasons.like the WWII vintage “Jaju” ( independence ), “Sungri” trucks, the rickety “Kaengsaeng” Jeep as wellas buses and trolleybuses assembled with imported parts.. Production facilities are concentrated at the foot of Mount
Sungri in Tokchon City. Some of the facilities were built by the Chinese as a logistical base during the Korean War ( 1950-53).
Car assembly and parts manufacturing are done on the ground, and most vehicle parts except glass and tires are produced
there. The Sungri Motor Works further received Czechoslovakian assistance to build improved trucks. The country’s vehicle
production capacity has grown to 33.000 units per annum as of 1997 through continuous expansion and diversification of
the types of vehicle produced. When China and Russia, major suppliers of parts and fuel, demanded cash instead of barter
starting from 1993, the domestic vehicle industry was severely affected. The decline went on until actual production
bottomed to 1.300 vehicles in 1999. In 2004, domestic production climbed to 4.500 units and total number of vehicles on
DPRK roads was estimated at around 250.000, 3.000 of them being passenger cars. Since all High-tech parts such as
carburetors, filters and fuel injection pumps are imported in large quantities, the localization rate of the industry is
estimated well below 60 %. The low quality of locally produced parts has a direct impact on overall quality of domestically
produced vehicle and breakdowns are very frequent.""DPRK has never given any priority to the production of passenger cars given its ideological choice in favor of public
transportation, the long ban on private ownership of a car and the absolute control exerted on the population’s mobility.
Passenger cars in DPRK represent nowadays around 3.000 units : they are either imported second-hand cars from Japan,
Russian cars ( VOLGA ) or sometimes Romanian cars ( DACIA ) but the biggest fleet is still made by ageing MERCEDES-BENZ
190, 230 and others makes imported from Germany through the Trade Office of the DPRK Embassy in Vienna for the
exclusive use of Party Central Committee members ( mostly blue Mercedes 230 and newer types ) as well as official foreigndelegations ( Bordeaux red 190 models ). Since 2005 however, Pyongyang has decided for budgetary reasons to importhundreds of VOLKSWAGEN directly from Germany to gradually replace their fleet of MERCEDES which are costly tomaintain.""In 2002, South-Korea’s Unification Church through its automobile business arm Pyeonghwa Motorsinvested U$ 55 millions
together with DPRK’s Korea Ryongbong Corporation to build the first ever foreign automotive Joint -Venture factory
between Nampo and Pyongyang and started assembling FIAT SIENA ( under the Korean name “Hwiparam”) and a small
SUV, the FIAT DOBLO ( under the Korean name “Pokkugi”) in association with a Chinese local maker, Dandong Shuguang
Automobile. The venture targets the burgeoning middle-class in Pyongyang as well as the foreign community and elite. Cars
typically sell around U$ 10.000 and the venture foresees to produce 20.000 units annually from 2006 and later even export
its products to China, Russia and South-Korea. Pyeonghwa Motors also imports second-hand Japanese and foreign cars andis said to have secured the exclusivity to conduct all second-hand car business in DPRK. It was also Pyeonghwa Motors who
paid for the first ever outdoor advertising in DPRK in 6 locations of Pyongyang for its Hwiparam car."Pyeonghwa Motors Factory in Nampo (source as above)A1- 116

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/28/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Estimate of Rural and Urban Households
Total DPRK Population
2.20E+07
1
Military Personnel
1.20E+06
Population in Households
2.08E+07
Urban HH pop. fract
60%
1
Rural HH pop. fract
40%1
Persons/HH, Urban
4.65
4
Persons/HH, Rural
4.65
3
Number of Urban HH
2,683,871
Number of Rural HH
1,789,247
Coal Use: Urban Households
Fraction Using Coal:
91.2%
5
Average HH Dwelling Size
50 sq. meters
19
Te coal per HH/yr
2.20
19
GJ/Te Coal24
GJ Coal Use/HH
52.74
Total Coal Use, Urban HH
1.29E+08 GJ/yr
District Heat Use: Urban Households
Fraction Using District Heat:
8.755%
See "District_heat" work sheet
Estimated delivered heat use per household
26.106 GJ/yr
in this work book
Implied district heat use, Urban HH
7.01E+07 GJ/yr
Coal Use: Rural Households
Fraction Using Coal:50%
6
Te coal per HH/yr
2.8
2, 26
GJ/Te Coal
24
7
GJ Coal Use/HH
67.2
Total Coal Use, Rural HH
6.01E+07 GJ/yr
Electricity Use: Urban Households
Fraction Electrified HH:100%
8
MWh per HH/yr
0.768
9
GJ/MWh
3.6
10
GJ Electricity Use/HH
2.7648
Total Electricity Use, Urban HH
7.42E+06 GJ/yr
Electricity Use: Rural Households
Fraction Electrified HH:100%
8
MWh per HH/yr
0.512
9, 24
GJ/MWh
3.6
10
GJ Electricity Use/HH
1.8432
Total Electricity Use, Rural HH
3.30E+06 GJ/yr
Oil Use: Urban Households
Fraction using LPG/Kero:
25% (for Cooking)11
te per HH/yr
0.21
12
GJ/te
44.4
13
GJ LPG/Kero Use/HH
9.324
Fraction of Kero/LPG use as Kero
66.0%
Assumption to balance supply and demand
Total LPG/Kero Use, Urban HH
6.26E+06 GJ/yr
Oil Use: Rural Households
Fraction using Kerosene/LPG:
2% (for Cooking)30
te per HH/yr
0.22
GJ/te
44.4
GJ Kerosene/LPG Use/HH
9.60
Total Kerosene/LPG Use, Rural HH
3.44E+05 GJ/yr
Charcoal Use: Urban Households
Fraction Using Charcoal:
16% (for Cooking--specialty foods)
16
Te Charcoal per HH/yr
0.15
17, 27
GJ/Te Charcoal
28.8
18
GJ Charcoal Use/HH
4.224
Total Charcoal Use, Urban HH
1.81E+06 GJ/yr

A1- 117

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Charcoal Use: Rural Households
Fraction Using Charcoal:
Te Charcoal per HH/yr
GJ/Te Charcoal
GJ Charcoal Use/HH
Total Charcoal Use, Rural HH
Wood/Biomass Use: Rural Households
Fraction Using Wood/Biomass:
Te Wood/Biomass per HH/yr
GJ/Te Wood/Biomass
GJ Wood/Biomass Use/HH
Total Wood/Biomass Use, Rural HH

15% (for Cooking--specialty foods)
0.15
28.8
4.32
1.16E+06 GJ/yr
48.00% (all End Uses)
6.6 (Dry basis)
15.25
100.3
8.61E+07 GJ/yr

16
29
18

6
14, 2815

Heating and Cooking Fuel Use Data from 2008 DPRK Census
The 2008 DPRK Census (D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report, Central Bureau of Statistics,
Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, available as
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_PHC/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf),
includes two tables (52 and 53) on heating and cooking energy use in the DPRK (respectively). This tables suggests that in2008, the fractions of households that used various heating and cooking fuels were as follows:
Type of Dwelling Unit
SingleDetached
Apartment
Urban-Rural and Type of Heating System
Total
House
Row House Building
All Areas--Number of Dwellings
5,887,471 1,988,415 2,584,435 1,261,709
Central or local heating system
263,809
1,315
1,894
258,942
Electronic heating system
40,624
3,018
7,415
29,495
Electronic heating system with others
55,712
1,841
4,575
49,115
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
2,773,238
600,671 1,399,295
757,398
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
2,656,866 1,328,122 1,142,644
157,912
Others97,22253,44828,6128,847
All Areas--Fraction of Total by Heating Type100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%Central or local heating system
4.48%
0.07%
0.07%
20.52%
Electronic heating system*
0.69%
0.15%
0.29%
2.34%
Electronic heating system with others*
0.95%
0.09%
0.18%
3.89%
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
47.10%
30.21%
54.14%
60.03%
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
45.13%
66.79%
44.21%
12.52%
Others
1.65%
2.69%
1.11%
0.70%
Urban--Number of Dwellings
3,579,626
616,955 1,773,414 1,164,767
Central or local heating system
263,055
998
1,632
258,769
Electronic heating system*
35,6301,860
5,354
27,823
Electronic heating system with others*
45,343898
3,781
40,523
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
2,300,395
352,867 1,205,421
729,042
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
918,583
256,117549,999
104,366
Others
16,620
4,215
7,227
4,244
Urban--Fraction of Total by Heating Type100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%Central or local heating system
7.35%
0.16%
0.09%
22.22%
Electronic heating system*
1.00%
0.30%
0.30%
2.39%
Electronic heating system with others*
1.27%
0.15%
0.21%
3.48%
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
64.26%
57.19%
67.97%
62.59%
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
25.66%
41.51%
31.01%
8.96%
Others
0.46%
0.68%
0.41%
0.36%
Rural--Number of Dwellings
2,307,845 1,371,460
811,02196,942Central or local heating system
754
317
262
173
Electronic heating system*
4,994
1,158
2,061
1,672
Electronic heating system with others*
10,369
943
794
8,592
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
472,843
247,804
193,874
28,356
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
1,738,283 1,072,005
592,645
53,546
Others80,602
49,233
21,385
4,603
Rural--Fraction of Total by Heating Type100.00%100.00%100.00%100.00%Central or local heating system
0.03%
0.02%
0.03%
0.18%
Electronic heating system*
0.22%
0.08%
0.25%
1.72%
Electronic heating system with others*
0.45%
0.07%
0.10%
8.86%
Coal boiler or Briquette hole in the dwelling unit
20.49%
18.07%
23.90%
29.25%
Wood hole in the dwelling unit
75.32%
78.17%
73.07%
55.24%
Others
3.49%
3.59%
2.64%
4.75%
*Note: "Electronic" probably means "Electrical", likely mostly portable or fixed resistance heating devices.

A1- 118

Others52,912
1,658
696
181
15,87428,1886,315
100.00%
3.13%
1.32%
0.34%
30.00%
53.27%
11.93%
24,490
1,656
593
141
13,0658,101934
100.00%
6.76%
2.42%
0.58%
53.35%
33.08%
3.81%
28,422
2
103
40
2,809
20,0875,381
100.00%
0.01%
0.36%
0.14%
9.88%
70.67%
18.93%Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Type of Cooking Fuel
Total
Urban
Rural
Total (all of DPRK)
5,887,471 3,579,626 2,307,845
Electricity
79,05765,814
13,243Gas [likely almost all LPG]
167,462
157,228
10,234
Petroleum
103,091
90,927
12,164
Coal
2,714,511 2,271,128
443,383
Wood
2,758,400
984,407 1,773,993
Others64,95010,122
54,828Fraction of Cooking Fuel by Types
Total (all of DPRK)
100.00%100.00%100.00%Electricity
1.34%
1.84%
0.57%
Gas [likely almost all LPG]
2.84%
4.39%
0.44%
Petroleum
1.75%
2.54%
0.53%
Coal
46.11%
63.45%
19.21%
Wood
46.85%
27.50%
76.87%
Others
1.10%
0.28%
2.38%
Type of Cooking Fuel
Total for Pyongyang only
813,769
703,910
109,859
Electricity
52,47046,592
5,878
Gas [likely almost all LPG]
160,873
153,605
7,268
Petroleum
99,646
88,832
10,814
Coal
458,212397,766
60,446Wood
38,312
16,936
21,376
Others
4,256
179
4,077
Fraction of DPRK Households using Cooking Fuel that are in Pyongyang
Total for Pyongyang only
13.82%
19.66%
4.76%
Electricity
66.37%
70.79%
44.39%Gas [likely almost all LPG]
96.07%
97.70%
71.02%Petroleum
96.66%
97.70%
88.90%
Coal
16.88%
17.51%
13.63%
Wood
1.39%
1.72%
1.20%
Others
6.55%
1.77%
7.44%

A1- 119

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 AND 2009 ENERGY USE IN RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Growth in total number of households

Implied population (million)
Estimated population not in households
Estimated Persons per Household
Urban
Rural
Fraction of Households as:
Urban
Rural
Number of Households
Urban
Rural
TOTAL
Fraction of Households using Coal Cooking/Heat
Urban(See Note 37)
Rural(See Note 37)
Coal Use per Household relative to 1990:
Urban(See Note 38)
Rural(See Note 38)

0.079% /yr (1990 to 2000 Estimate)1.021% /yr 2000-2008 (average based on 2008 Census
0.536% /yr after 2008
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
2.210E+07 2.218E+07 2.333E+07 2.405E+07 2.418E+07
SECTI
1.106E+06 1.044E+06 9.655E+05 9.186E+05 9.030E+05

ON
OF
THIS
60.27%
60.44%
60.67%
60.80%
60.85% WOR
60%
39.73%
39.56%
39.33%
39.20%
39.15% KSHE40%
ET2,869,730 3,005,533 3,350,571 3,579,626 3,641,784 3,012,384
NOT
1,891,971 1,966,822 2,172,292 2,307,845 2,343,540 2,008,256
4,761,701 4,972,355 5,522,864 5,887,471 5,985,324 USED
FOR
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
81.7%
77.0%
72.4%
64.8%
64.9%
66.2%
38.00%
33.00%
26.00%
18.76%
18.76% ANAL
23%
YSIS
4.400
4.425

4.234
4.274

4.026
4.086

3.901
3.974

3.859
3.936

1996
75%
60%

2000
60%
50%

2005
53%
45%

2008
50%
45%

2009
2010--Dec.
50%
70%
45%
70%

1996
8.29%

2000
7.99%

2005
7.60%

2008
7.37%

2009
7.29%

57.50%
45.4%

29.14%
8.9%

36.69%
12.2%

41.00%
14.4%

38.00%
13.3%

Fraction of Households using Wood/Biomass Heat
Urban
(See Note 34)
Rural(See Note 34)

1996
10%
60%

2000
15%
65%

2005
20%
72%

2008
27.78%
79.244%2009
2010--Dec.
27.78%
25%
79.24%
75%

Wood/Biomass Use per Household rel. to 1990:
Urban(See Note 35)
Rural(See Note 36)

1996
100%
90%

2000
80%
80%

2005
70%
70%

2008
65%
65%

2009
2010--Dec.
65%
110%
65%
110%

Charcoal Use per Household rel. to 1990:
Urban
Rural

1996
75%
75%

2000
55%
55%

2005
50%
50%

2008
45%
45%

2009
2010--Dec.
45%
75%
45%
75%

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

13.0%
1.5%

12.0%
1.4%

9.0%
1.2%

6.93%
0.971%

6.93%
0.971%

Fraction of Urban Households Using District Heating
Electricity and Heat Use per HH relative to 1990:
Urban(See Notes 23, 31, 32)
Rural(See Notes 24, 31)

Fraction of Households using Kero/LPG for cooking
Urban
Rural
Kero/LPG Use per Household rel. to 1990:
Urban---fraction of Urban use as Kero
Rural
(See Note 25)---fraction of Rural use as Kero

47.4%
26.1%
50.0%
90.0%

61.2%
18.1%
57%
57%

73.8%
39.9%
58.5%
68.0%

82.2%
36.6%
85.5%
54.3%

66.8%
36.6%
67.0%
54.3%

Sources/Notes:
1 from document in authors' files [HT1].
2 A document in authors' files [FC1] gives figures for coal use of 8 and 9.2 tonnes of coal per rural
household in two areas of the DPRK. Based on other documents and the observations of visitor to the DPRK,
these figures either represent very high-use areas, or are inaccurate, but do not seem to be consistent withaverage figures for rural coal consumption.
3 Value for Ongjin area (southern DPRK) from document in authors' files [FC1].
Value is similar to estimates given for rural areas in the central and northern
regions of DPRK.

A1- 120

20
22
22

21
21
21
21

2010--Dec.

65%
65%

2010--Dec.
33
33
34.0%
33
25.0%
25.0%

33

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
4 Assumed same as rural value.
5 Assumes all urban households, most in multi-unit concrete buildings, use coal for space heating,
except for those that use district heat for space and water heating. See "District_heat" work sheet.
Urban households also, except in Pyongyang, use coal for cook ing.
From document in authors' files [R1]. This assumes that wood and biomass use in urban households in 1990,
with the exception of charcoal, was negligible, as coal supplies were generally sufficient in urban areas.
6 Fractions cited for three different areas of DPRK, from document in authors' files, vary from 8 to 50% coal use.
Other observers of the DPRK situation suggest that the fraction of coal use in rural households as of 1990
or so was higher, perhaps 60%. We use 50% as an estimated national average.
7 From document in authors' files [FC1]. This value may be somewhat high.
8 Document in authors' files [HT1, p. 14], says "government reportsthat 100 percent of homes and industry are electrified".
9 Estimated based on 1.6X (rural) and 2.4X (urban) 1975 value for per household consumption of electricity in
the Republic of Korea, as derived from pp. 121, 90, and 102 of "The Electric Future of Korea" East-WestCenter, September, 1983. At these levels, total sectoral energy use is approximately 10%
of total national electricity consumption, as suggested in UNDP "Project of the Government of DPRK:Electric Power Management System".
10 Unit conversion (3600 k J/k Wh), no generation losses included.
11 From document in authors' files [FA1]. This sourcenotes that cook ing in (apparently Pyongyang) is by LPG or Kerosene stoves. Figure shown assumes thatthat petroleum-based fuels are rarely used outside Pyongyang, and that the 1990 population of Pyongyang
is approximately 3.2 million (Microsoft Encarta lists a 1984 estimate of 2.64 million,
Korea Foreign Trade Association lists 3.288 million for 1990)).
12 Estimated assuming petroleum product stoves have on average 50 percent of the energy intensity of wood stoves,and that wood use for cook ing is approximately 19.2 GJ/HH-yr (estimate from Kumgang area, as given infrom document in authors' files [FC1].
13 Rough ave. assuming fuel is 50% LPG (at approx. 45.5 GJ/te) and 50% Kerosene (at approx. 43.3 GJ/te)
14 Original value (earlier versions of analysis) based on est. (13.7 te/HH-yr) from Kumgang area, as given
in document in authors' files [FC1].
15 Based on average of values for wood (16 MJ/dry k g) and crop residues (14.5 MJ/k g), source as in 14)
16 Rough estimates to yield 1990 charcoal consumtion approximately equal to wood charcoal produciton as described in
UN FAO statistics (see Note 7 in "Biomass" work sheet in this work book ). Post-1990 UN FAO estimatesof charcoal production were not used to estimate charcoal use after 1990 because the UN FAO estimates appear
to just apply a constant growth rate every year, and thus may not reflect actual DPRK conditions.
17 Originally assumed heat energy requirements as for wood-fired rural cook ing, but assumed fuel input per unit heat
supplied to the cook ing vessel was two-thirds that for wood stoves (original value 0.44 tonnes/HH-yr).
Assumption has changed based on input from observers--see note 27.
18 Based on value used in LEAP (SEI-B) default data set (which is based on international sources)
19 Based on Chinese figure of 30 k gce/sq.m.-yr for centrally-heated residential buildings, and a rough averagedwelling size of 50 sq. meters (from in-country observations by visitors to DPRK).
An alternative "typical" dwelling size estimate of 120 sq. meters (from document in authors' files [FA1].
would seem to be large based on Chinese figures, which showless than 10 square meters/person ("Energy Use and Conservation in
China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects", by Feng Liu, LBL,
March, 1993.). Per-unit floor area figure from China increased by 20 percent to account for
more severe weather, on average, in DPRK.

A1- 121

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
20 US Central Intelligence Agency, "Korea, North". CIA Factbook , 2001 (World Wide Web Version).
USCIA, Washington, D.C., USA. 2001, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook /geos/k n.html
listed a 2001 estimated growth rate of 1.22 %/yr and a total population of just under 22 million. The USDOE
Energy Information Administration lists a year 2000 population of 21.7 million in its North Korea Country Analysis Brief(www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nk orea.html, visited 5/2002). A file of "DPRK Energy Data" provided to
Nautilus by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI, 2002) suggested a year-2000 population of
22.175 million and a growth rate of 0.4 percent annually (with the growth rate decreasing substantially between
1990 and 2000), but uses a year-2000 base population of 20.221 million for the DPRK. While recognizing
the extreme difficulty in estimating DPRK population, we continue to assume that year 1990 population was
22 million (as official estimates suggest) and adopt the figure provided by KEEI as the year 2000 population.
This suggests a very modest increase in population over the decade, which is certainly consistent with food shortages andanecdotal but fairly widespread evidence of lack of proper food rations, as well as medical care, for the DPRK populace,offsetting the impacts of a national government program to increase the population.
21 Based on data in 2008 DPRK Census (see source in Note 22, Table 3), by 2008 there were3,579,626 urban households,
and2,307,845 rural households in the DPRK. This implies an urban population fraction of
60.8% ,
which is slightly higher than the 60 percent reported in 1990. We assume linear growth in the urban household fraction from1990 through 2009. Based on figures for 2008 populations in households of
13,962,973 in urban households, and9,170,719 in rural households, this implies average persons per household in 2008 of
3.90 in urban areas, and3.97 in rural areas. In both urban and rural areas, about two-thirds of households
are categorized as extended households (including relatives other than a nuclear family). Note that populations in households do
not include individuals in institutions (that is, includes private households only), which are largely soldiers (mostly male) in the military.
We assume linear trends in household size from 1990 through 2009.
There have been reports of forced migration from the cities to the rural areas, but none have been
confirmed. World Bank projections suggested continued rural-to-urban migration. The overall pattern of migration
remains undocumented. There is anecdotal evidence that residents of cities in the North of the DPRK, for example,
are leaving for the countryside where they can forage, rather than remain in cities where food distribution is sporadic at best.
We assume that there has been at least a modest net migration from urban to rural areas in some places, but that thistrend has been offset by a slow migration to the cities (which in any case has been much slower than in the Republic of Korea).
22 This population growth assumption represents an attempt on our part to tak e into account the effects ofthe food shortages of the 1990s on future population growth in the DPRK, but also assumes that the results of the UN-directed 2008 DPRK Census
are accurate, at a total population of
24,052,231 ( D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report , Central Bureau of
Statistics Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, available as
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_PHC/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf).
Historical (pre-1990) population growth rates had been near 2 percent annually.
The 2008 Census document lists total births in the 12 months prior to the census as345,630 (Table 16), andtotal deaths in the same period as
216,616 . These figures imply a rate of population increase as of 2008 of
0.536% annually.
23 Visitors to the DPRK in 2000 described electricity in Pyongyang as being generally available, but electricity in at least
major portions of other cities being largely unavailable. Based on Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency(KOTRA) data (from http://www.k otra.or.k r/main/info/nk /eng/main.php3, visited 6/3/02) that lists the
population of Pyongyang as
3.4 million, assuming, based roughly on a record ofof electrical outlet voltage collected in Pyongyang and covering most of 2000, that Pyongyang suffered fromblack outs for about
30% of 2000, and further assuming that residents of cities other than Pyongyang
had power only
14% of the time, we estimate that the average consumption of power per
household was about
29% of that in 1990.
24 Nautilus Institute's rural energy survey in the village of Unhari, (as reported on in "A RURAL ENERGYSURVEY IN UNHARI VILLAGE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK):METHODS, RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS", Asian Perspectives special issue, 2002. ), suggested
an annual average usage of 390 k Wh per household per year, fairly close to the 1990 value estimated above.
During our mission to Unhari in 2000, we determined that householders virtually never had electric power
available in their homes during the day, especially in the winter months. As Unhari is relatively close to
Pyongyang, it is our expectation that the situation there is lik ely, if anything, to be better than that in otherrural areas. We therefore assume that the lack of availability of power limited rural residents to
10% of 1990 levels of electricity consumption in the year 2000.
25 Oil use in rural households increased for 2000 relative to 1996 to reflect more use of k erosene and diesel oil for
lighting during the bulk of the year, when electricity for lighting is unavailable. On a national basis, theper-household rural oil consumption estimate shown here is approximately the same as that estimated for
Unhari village (see reference in Note 24) based on a survey done in 1998. Other areas probably had less accessto fuel supplies than Unhari, on average, but rural electricity availability in 2000 was worse than in 1998.

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26 In earlier versions of this analysis, a much higher estimate of coal use per household (9 tonnes) was used. The
results of the Nautilus Unhari survey, and input from recent DPRK visitors, have suggested that a substantial
revision to this assumption is in order. Therefore, an average of 2.8 tonnes coal/HH year is assumed for households
in rural areas in 1990 using coal (exclusively or nearly so) for cook ing and heating. This is consistent with estimatesfrom other documents in the authors files, and is consistent with the 2 tonnes/yr finding in (relatively temperate) Unhari, giventhat the Unhari survey was tak en in 1998/2000, when supplies were not as adequate as in 1990 (by residents' estimation).
27 Initial assumption (in previous versions of analysis) for charcoal use in urban households reduced based on input
from residents and recent visitors to the DPRK that charcoal use in urban households is not routine.
28 Initial assumption (in previous versions of analysis) for wood/biomass use in rural households reduced based on input
from recent visitors and consideration of results of Unhari survey suggesting that coal use per household is lower thanpreviously thought (see note 26 in this work sheet). The revised figure shown is calculated assuming that wood/biomassburns approximately
67% as efficiently as coal, and tak es into account the difference between theenergy contents of coal and biomass fuels. By way of comparison, annual estimates of per-household woood/biomass
fuel use in rural households vary from 9 to 13 or so tonnes per HH year, but in many cases the mass basis(wet or dry) of the biomass input was not specified (document in author's files).
29 Assumed approximately the same as in urban households.
30 Assumed, based on input from observers, to be quite low, even in 1990.
31 Observers suggest that electricity supplies to residences and public/commercial buildings in the DPRK have improved
somewhat by 2005, relative to 2000, though improvements, and the number of hours per day that residents can
expect to have electricity services, varied substantially by region of the country, by proximity to power plants, andby time of year (allocation of electricity varies in seasons when agricultural uses have priority, and availability ofelectricity varies seasonally as water flows affect hydroelectric output). Observers have reported levelsof electricity availability ranging from an hour or two per day (intermittently) to nearly 24 hours per day.
32 Availability of heat is assumed to be link ed to availability of electricity for urban homes. Although some heat is generated
in central district-heat-only boilers, we assume that those plants would be subject to most of the same fuel availability
and maintenance issues affecting electricity generation (including combined heat and power) plants.
33 2008 and 2009 values based on data in 2008 DPRK Census (see tables from census above). We assume that households
who had typically used liquid petroleum fuels (k erosene or diesel fuel) or LPG for cook ing were forced to either cut back on
their usage due to lowered oil products availability after 1990, or switch to other cook ing fuels (coal or wood) altogether. Thistransition is modeled as a reduction to near 2008 fractions of households using these fuels by 2000. Over time, moreof the total petroleum products used for cook ing are assumed to be LPG, converging on 2008 Census figures by 2008.
34 2008 and 2009 values based on data in 2008 DPRK Census (see tables from census above). We assume that urban households
used very little wood fuel as of 1990, but that as coal became more scarce, more household started using it, thus values shownfor 1996 through 2005 are rough interpolations to the 2008 census value. For rural households, we assume based on literaturesources that 48 percent of rural households used wood or other forms of biomass for cook ing and heating as of 1990, andthat value increased toward 2008 values over time as coal scarcity increased (and or coal became unaffordable).
For 2008, we have used census-derived values for the fraction of wood and "other" (assumed to be crop waste or other biomass)used for cook ing, but the fraction of heating reported by the 2008 Census as being done with wood and other fuels is within a
few percent of the cook ing fractions in both the urban and rural subsectors.
35 As we assume that there was little use of wood and biomass fuels for cook ing and heating in urban households in 1990, thefractions of household usage shown here are the equivalent of the 1990 per-household use of coal per urban household,measured on an energy content basis, and roughly factoring in the lower efficiency of biomass fuel use relative to coal.
36 We assume that the usage of wood fuel per rural household has decresased somewhat over time due to a combination of
scarcity of fuel, and possibly a reduction, on average, in the amount of food to be cook ed.
37 Fraction of urban and rural households using coal for cook ing and heating is adjusted downward over time to account for theincreased in wood use, though in practice (though not directly reflected in Census statistics), many households probably usedboth fuels depending on availability and cost.
38 The amount of coal used for cook ing and heating per household primarily using is assume to have trended downward over time
due to lower availability.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/21/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Oil Use in Agricultural Sector
Total Area of Field Crops:
Average Diesel use
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Annual Oil Use: Agric. Machinery
Electricity Use in Agricultural Fields
Total Area of All Crops:
Average electricity use
Conversion Factor
Annual Electricity Use: Agric./Fields
Coal Use: Processing/Other
Area of Rice Cultivation
Total Agr. Coal Use
Annual Processing/Other Coal Use
Oil Use: Processing/Other
Total Agr. Oil Use
Annual Oil Use in Agric. Machinery
Annual Net Oil Use, Processing/Other
Electricity Use: Processing/Other
Total Agr. Electricity Use
Conversion Factor
Conversion Factor
Annual Electricity Use: Agric./Fields
Annual Net Elect Use, Processing/Other
Wood/Biomass Use: Processing/Other
Grain straws used in Crop drying
Conversion Factor
Grain brans used in crop drying
Conversion Factor
Wood used in Agricultural Sector
Conversion Factor
Total Annual Wood/Biomass Use:

1.70E+06 ha
41 l/ha-yr
1149 l/te
43.17888 GJ/te
2.62E+06 GJ

12

2.00E+06 ha
126 kWh/ha-yr
0.0036 GJ/kWh
9.07E+05 GJ

3,42

6.50E+05
1.50E+01 GJ/ha rice
9.75E+06 GJ

477.70E+00 GJ/ha rice-yr
2.62E+06 GJ
2.39E+06 GJ

7

4.44E+02 kgce/ha rice-yr
4.04E+02 kgce/MWhe
3.60E+00 GJ/MWHe
9.07E+05 GJ
1.66E+06 GJ

7

3.00E+06 te/yr
14.5 GJ/te
1.00E+05 te/yr
14.5 GJ/te
0
16 GJ/te
4.495E+07 GJ

5
6
5
6

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY USE IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR(Notes 10, 15)
1996
2000
2005
2008
Area Cropped Relative to 1990:
100%
100%
100%
100%
Use of Tractors, etc. Relative to 1990:
30%
25%
27%
25%
Use of Electricity in Fields Relative to 1990:
90%
75%
65%
52.5%
Coal Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
52.88%
39.44%
50.574%52.79%
Oil Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
30.0%
25.0%
27.0%
25%
Elect. Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
52.9%
37.0%
50.6%
52.8%
Biomass Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990: 52.88%
44.37%
53.55%
55.90%

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9

No data
6

2009
100%
24%
50%
50.83%
22%
50.8%
53.82%

2010--Dec.
THIS
95%
Assumption
SECTION
8
OF35%
THIS
90%
11
WORKSH
EET
NOT
90%
8
USED
35%
8
FOR
THIS
90%
8
ANALYSI90%
8

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 Total reported cropped area less fruit orchards (300,000 ha), which are assumed to be relatively lessenergy intensive to operate. From document in authors' files [KJ1, p. 7].
2 P.81: F Liu et al, "An Overview of Energy Supply and Demand in China", LBL, May 1992.
3 Assumption is that most electricity use will be for irrigation.
4 Crop area. From document in authors' files [KJ1, p. 7].
5 From document in authors' files [HT1, p. 10].
6 From document in authors' files [FC1, p. 7]. Air dried wood.
7 Based on 1987 Chinese values. Agricultural coal use from J. Sinton, Ed, "China Energy Databook1992" (Revised June 1993), LBL, page IV-56. Rice area in China from FAO.
8 Intensity of fuels use relative to 1990 values (for example, use of field machinery per hectare).
9 On a per hectare of rice basis, the sum of the "field" and "other" electricity consumption estimates shown here arevery similar to the approximately 3.6 GJ per ha of rice estimated during Nautilus' 1998 and 2000 rural energy
survey in Unhari village, the DPRK, as (as reported in "A RURAL ENERGYSURVEY IN UNHARI VILLAGE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK):METHODS, RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS", Asian Perspectives special issue, 2002.).
10 Estimates of fuel use in 2005 and 2000 relative to 1990 are subjective, and are based on observations by Nautilus andothers who have visited farms in the DPRK. Typically, supplies of electricity and coal seem to be provided tofarms at a priority to other sectors during the growing and harvest seasons, so supplies of those fuels arebarely sufficient to accomplish the necessary threshing and milling, but motor fuel supplies are considerably
less than in 1990, so that tractors are used only for essential purposes, and much more labor is done by hand.
This is probably even more the case in more remote areas of the country. The lack of spare parts for tractors andtruck s also diminishes demand for motor fuels. Electricity use for agriculture is assumed to be slightly
higher in 2000 than in 1996 because, though availability of electricity for agricultural requirements are similar,
intensity per unit of output is assumed to be higher due to a lack of access to spare parts and a lack of otherfuels for support vehicles (thus decreasing overall efficiency). One observer of DPRK energy use has suggested
that mechanized inputs to agriculture may have fallen by over 85 percent from 1990 to 2005. Other observers reportincreased use of manual and animal labor in the fields, including the transfer of office and factor work ers, students,
others from the cities in 2005 in larger numbers than in previous years to help bring in the harvest. We have looselyinterpreted this anecdotal information to point to a continued decline in diesel fuel for tractors and other farm
implements, with the result being that oil use in agriculture was 20 percent of 1990 levels by 2005.
For related analysis, see also Hugh Bentley, "Trends in the DPRK Agricultural Sector & Implications
for Energy Use",
as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). This presentation is available as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/papers/Bentley.ppt.
11 An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 14 March, 2005, and entitled "Kaechon-Lak e Thaesong
Waterway Pays Off", suggests that the waterway carried 100 million cubic meters of water over two
years, and displaced more than 500 water pumps that "had to consume more than 60,000 k W of electricity a year to
supply needed water to [the areas served]. Assuming that this note referred to the power input to the displaced
pumps as60 MW, and assuming an annual average capacity factor for those pumps of about
20%
this implies a displacement of
105.12 GWhrs, or
3.78E+05 GJ of electricity, about
42%of estimated field use of electricity in 1990. On this basis we decrease estimated use of electricity in 2005, but
by somewhat less than this estimate, assuming that there may still be additional pumping from the
new aqueduct into the fields, and assuming that the KCNA article may present a somewhat optimistic account of the
impacts of the waterway.
12 China Customs Statistics reported imports of meat to the DPRK from China (meat imports were 90% pork
by 2005) had increased more than 20-fold (by weight), on average, between 1995-1997 and 2003-2005.
This may be indicative of continued decline in DPRK agricultural production.
Import data as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/0679Aden1.ppt.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
13 China Customs Statistics reported imports of fertilizers to the DPRK from China were
92,494 te in 2003
60,804 te in 2004, and67,838 te in 2005.
95 percent or more of these imports were in the "nitrogeneous fertilizer" category (HS # 3102).
DPRK fertilzer imports from China appear to vary considerably by year, but the average imports for 2003 - 2005
was about five times the average imports in 1995 - 1997. Source as in Note 12, above.
14 China Customs Statistics include reports of the following agricultural exports from the DPRK to China in 2005:
HS # Description
Tonnes12 MISC GRAIN,SEED,FRUIT
20,94808 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS
5,479
78 LEAD
4,666
14 OTHER VEGETABLE
3,903
07 VEGETABLES
1,912
The same compendium also notes exports from the DPRK to China of about 35 million live animals (types not
specfied), up from about 21 million in 2004 and 7.8 million in 2003.
Source as in Note 12, above.
15 Coal and biomass use in crop drying, and electricity used in crop processing, are assumed to be roughly proportional to annual cerealequivalent harvests, based on the following output statistics:
Year
Million tonnes cereal Equivalent production
1990
6.940
1996
4.077
2000
3.421
2005
4.129
2008
4.31
2009
4.15
Value for 1990 is estimated based on data from Chart 2 (shown below) in FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE and WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, SPECIAL REPORT FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENTMISSION TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, dated 16 November 2000. The ratios of 1990 and 1996 total paddy andmaize production were used with the 1996 value for cereal equivalent production below to create an estimated value for 1990 consistent
with the other values in the time series shown in the table.
Values for 1996 and 2000 are from page 17 of UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme,
SPECIAL REPORT, FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE DEMOCRATICPEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA , dated 30 October 2003, and available as
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook /agriculture/fao-dprk -30oct.pdf
Value for 2005 is from Randall Ireson, Food Security in North Korea: Designing Realistic Possibilities , dated February 2006, published by the
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and available as
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21046/Ireson_FoodSecurity_2006.pdf. Table 2.

Figure for cereals production in 2008 is as quoted in several sources, including S. Haggard and M. Nolan, "The North Korean Food Situation,
Too Early to Break Out the Champagne", Asia Pacific Bulletin , Number 27, February 5, 2009,
available as www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb027.pdf.
Figure is roughly consistent with UN FAO statistics shown in Note 16, below, for DPRK agricultural production in 2008.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Figure for cereals production in 2009 is estimated from UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program (2010),
SPECIAL REPORT: FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY
ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA , dated 16 November 2010, and available as
URL http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.pdf. The estimate is derived from data in Figure 1 (see below).

In addition, coal, electricity, and biomass use in processing per unit crop harvested were assumed to have decreased somewhat relative to 1990,
due to lack of availability of fuel and other factors, as follows:
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Coal Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
90%
80%
85%
85%
85%
Elect. Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
90%
75%
85%
85%
85%
Biomass Use, Processing/Other, Rel. to 1990:
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
16 Data from FAOSTAT on agricultural production in the DPRK for 2000, 2005, and 2008 (from http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx)
is as follows:2000 Data
Rank

*:
[ ]:
F:
Fc:

Commodity
1 Vegetables fresh nes
2 Rice, paddy
3 Potatoes
4 Apples
5 Indigenous Pigmeat
6 Tobacco, unmanufactured
7 Beans, dry
8 Maize
9 Hen eggs, in shell
10 Cabbages and other brassicas
11 Indigenous Rabbit Meat
12 Fruit Fresh Nes
13 Soybeans
14 Garlic
15 Indigenous Cattle Meat
16 Peaches and nectarines
17 Pears
18 Indigenous Chicken Meat
19 Sweet potatoes
20 Cow milk, whole, fresh
Sum of Rice and Maize
Unofficial figure
Official data
FAO estimate
Calculated data

Production(Int $1000)

450360315459211506
186693141771114862114142105894
93947
87919
82938
73374
71032
61745
41417
39268
37018
31306
25645
23934

Flag

Production(MT)*
2400000*
1690000*
1870000*
650000*140000*63000*
290000*1041000*
110000*630000*53690*
460000*350000
*
80000
*
20025
*
110000*130000*26840*
290000*90000
2731000

A1- 127

Flag
F

F
Fc
F
F
F
F
Fc
F
*
F
Fc
F
F
Fc
*
F

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
2005 Data
Rank

Commodity
1 Rice, paddy
2 Vegetables fresh nes
3 Potatoes
4 Apples
5 Indigenous Pigmeat
6 Maize
7 Indigenous Rabbit Meat
8 Hen eggs, in shell
9 Tobacco, unmanufactured
10 Beans, dry
11 Cabbages and other brassicas
12 Fruit Fresh Nes
13 Garlic
14 Soybeans
15 Indigenous Cattle Meat
16 Peaches and nectarines
17 Indigenous Chicken Meat
18 Pears
19 Sweet potatoes
20 Wheat
Sum of Rice, Maize, and Wheat
Unofficial figure
Official data
FAO estimate
Calculated data

*:
[ ]:
F:
Fc:

Production(Int $1000)

Flag

486562459742234117
191862170125151455143385119475119238118499
96292
78159
73322
68853
44364
44266
41699
38442
31835
26166

Production(MT)*2583400*
2450000*
2070000*
668000*168000*1630000*
92820*
140000*65400*
300000*690000*490000*95000*
340000*21450*
124000*35750*
135000*360000*1930004406400

Flag
F
F
F
Fc
*
Fc
F
F
F
F
F
F
*
Fc
F
Fc
F
F
*

2008 Data
Rank

Commodity

1 Rice, paddy
2 Vegetables fresh nes
3 Apples
4 Indigenous Pigmeat
5 Potatoes
6 Indigenous Rabbit Meat
7 Maize
8 Hen eggs, in shell
9 Beans, dry
10 Tobacco, unmanufactured
11 Cabbages and other brassicas
12 Fruit Fresh Nes
13 Garlic
14 Soybeans
15 Indigenous Cattle Meat
16 Peaches and nectarines
17 Indigenous Chicken Meat
18 Pears
19 Sweet potatoes
20 Cow milk, whole, fresh
Sum of Rice and Maize* : Unofficial figure[ ]:Official data
F : FAO estimate
Fc: Calculated data

Production(Int $1000)

540166422212
182384182277171981140574137195121125118499114862
97688
78159
73322
69942
44985
42838
37208
35595
33610
25530

A1- 128

Flag

Production(MT)*
2862000*
2250000*
635000*180000*1520280*
91000*
1411390*142000*300000*63000*
700000*490000*95000*
345000*21750*
120000*31900*
125000*380070*96000
4273390

Flag
*
F
F
Fc
Fc
F
F
F
F
F
F
*
Fc
F
Fc
F
F

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:FISHERIES SECTOR ENERGY DEMAND
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

8/3/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Oil Use: Large Ships
Estimated Inventory of DPRK Larger Fishing Vessels (~1990s)
Average
Displacement(tonnes)

Average
Horsepow er

10,000485
60
200
438,250

2,250
400
100
200
360,200

NumberComposite estimate based on sources 1, 4, and 6

Description

8 Large Factory Ships
554 "Multi-purpose"
776 "Trap-fishing"
215 Others (estimate)
1,553 Total

Total Engine horsepower of Larger Ships
360,200
See above
Average days at sea
200
Estimate, consistent with data in 1 for collectives
Operating hours/day
12
Estimate
Fraction of Ships in operation (as of 1990)
85%
Estimate
Average fraction of full power while operating
50%
Estimate
Total fishing fleet power use
3.674E+08 hp-hours
Fuel consumption rate
0.18 kg/hp-hr
7
Conversion Factor
1.032 kg Diesel/kgoe
From "Oil" Work sheet in this Work book
Conversion Factor
0.04184 GJ/kgce
Total Oil Use, Larger Ships
2.68E+06 GJ
0.0072977
Fraction of Oil Use as Diesel
95%
Calculated
Fraction of Oil Use as Heavy Fuel Oil
5%
Assumes only large factory ships use Heavy Fuel Oil
Diesel Oil Use in Large Ships
2.55E+06 GJ
Heavy Fuel Oil Use in Large Ships
1.34E+05 GJ
Oil Use: Fishing Collectives
Placeholder estimate
Number of fishing collectives284
5
HP of motors on boats per collective
76
8
Average days at sea
200
Estimate, consistent with data in 1 for collectives
Operating hours/day
12
Estimate
Fraction of boats in operation (as of 1990)
75%
Estimate
Average fraction of full power while operating
25%
Estimate
Total collectives fishing fleet power use
9.71E+06 hp-hours
Calculated
Fuel consumption rate
0.2 kg/hp-hr
Assumed somewhat higher than for larger boats
Diesel Oil Use in Fishing Collectives
7.88E+04 GJ
Oil Use: Processing/Otherno dataFisheries product output, total
2.20E+06 tonnes
1990 value from Table 2 from FAO source in note 6
Fraction of product processed
60% Rough Estimate, assumes some not processed or minimally processsed
Fuels consumption per unit output
1.14 GJ/tonne
9
Fraction of fuels consumption as heavy oil
15%
Rough Estimate
Fraction of fuels consumption as diesel oil
10%
Rough Estimate
Fraction of fuels consumption as coal
75%
Rough Estimate
Electricity Consumption per Unit output
110.32 kWh/tonne
9or
0.40 GJ/tonne
9
Heavy Oil Use, Processing/Other
2.26E+05 GJ
CalculatedDiesel Oil Use, Processing/Other
1.51E+05 GJ
Calculated
Total Oil Use, Fisheries Sector
3.14E+06 GJ
Calculated
Coal Use: Ships
0.00E+00 GJ
no data
Coal Use: Processing/Other
1.13E+06 GJ
Calculated
Total Coal Use, Fisheries Sector
1.13E+06 GJ
CalculatedElectricity Use: Processing/Other
5.24E+05 GJ
Calculated
Total Electricity Use, Fisheries Sector
5.24E+05 GJ
Calculated
ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY USE IN FISHERIES SECTOR(See Note 3)
1996
2000
2005
Large Ships Fishing Effort Relative to 1990:
30%
25%
28%
Fishing Collectives Fishing Effort Relative to 1990:
30%
25%
28%
Oil/Coal Use, Processing/Other Relative to 1990:
45%
37%
40%
Elect. Use, Processing/Other Relative to 1990:
45%
37%
40%

A1- 129

2008
28%
25%
40%
40%

2009
25%
23%
35%
35%

2010--Dec.
THIS
55%
Assumption
SECTIONOF
THIS Assumption
55%
WORKS
55%
Assumption
HEET
55%
Assumption

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Sources/Notes:
1 From document in authors' files [IF1].
2 Chinese data, c. 1990. From p. 23: "Energy of China, 1993" [provided by J. Sinton of LBL--Chinese language].
3 The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) suggests that DPRK marine products catchdecreased substantially between 1996 and 1997, but increased somewhat between then and 2000. KOTRA data(from "Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine Products industries", available through http://www.k otra.or.k r/main/,visited 6/3/02) lists 1996 output of .876 million tonnes, and 1999 output of .664 million tonnes. A web page on"North Korea's Foreign Trade in 2000" from the same site listes the value of marine exports as having increased 9.4 %between 1999 and 2000. If all fisheries production track ed export earnings (which is not necessarily the case,but assumed for the sak e of argument here), the implied ratio of fisheries output between 1996 and 2000 is
83% . We further assume that fisheries effort (as reflected in fuel use) is proportional to fisheries output.
Alternatively, end of 1999 data based on the Economic and Social Comparison between the Two Koreas ,published by the National Statistics Administration (December 2000) and provided on
http://www.k oreascope.org/english/sub/1/index3-h.htm, suggest that the DPRK fish catch in 1999 was
45.70% of the catch in 1990. This figure is very close to the 42 percent figure shown above.
Further, data from source 6, below, shows 1996 total marine products production as45%
of 1990 production, but also shows a mark ed shift in production, with 68 percent of output from "marine capture"in 1989, to only 32 percent in 1996 (with the remainder being from aquaculture, 99% of which was marine
aquaculture. Since marine aquaculture seems lik ely to require significantly less energy for boats and ships than"marine capture", we estimate that 1996 energy use for fishing was 30% of 1990 energy use, and that
1996 energy use for processing and other fisheries sector energy use was reduced by the same amount asfisheries output was reported to decrease between 1990 and 1996. For 2000, the ratio shown above between
2000 and 1996 marine products output was used to scale energy use. The ROK Ministry of Unification site
http://www.unik orea.go.k r/en/index.jsp includes a listing of fisheries output suggesting that total marine products
production in the DPRK had increased to 1.16 million tonnes by 2004, a significant jump from2002 and 2003 (0.81 and 0.84 million tonnes). 2005 information on DPRK fisheries from the UN FAO "Fishstat"database shows a very slight reduction in output between 2000 and 2005, but as the same values are used for several
years in a row, our assumption is that no reliable data on total fisheries output in the DPRK have been made available to the UN.
4 The document Seoul T'ongil Kyongje , dated January 2002, pages 38-50, is an article by Hong Mi-ri entitled"North Korean Industries (Part IX): Fisheries Industry". This article includes the following information about
the DPRK fishing fleet: As of 1988, 30,600 boats, of which 21,000 were motorized. Of about 1540 primaryfishing boats, 766 were 30 to 100-ton "trap-fishing boats", 554 were "multipurpose" vessels of 450-485 tons, and8 large vessels in the 10,000-ton class (80 meters or more long, 2250 horsepower). The percentages of the fleet
in various categories as given in the article (trap fishing boats 60.0 % of total) do not quite match the totals provided,
but are close. The article states that "recent, unofficial information" suggests that only 400 of 1400
"relatively large motorized fishing boats" were operable due to "fuel shortages, faulty equipment, supply difficulties,
engine problems, and such things."
5 The document cited in Note 4 describes DPRK fisheries production in 1984 as 1.65 million tons, and1.78 million tons in 1993, but falling to 0.698 million tonnes by 2000.
The document describes 284 fisheries cooperatives of 70 - 100 households, owning 20 to 70 boats each.
The document also estimates that no more than 10 percent of the West Coast production potential is being used,and "the operation rate of fishing and processing facilities on the east coast is only at about 30 percent".
Cooperatives in 1998 are described as having 1500 motorized fishing boats, and 4000 non-motorized vessels,
which is roughly consistent with information in Reference 1, above.
6 The document WORKING PAPER 6, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA REPORT OF
THE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING MISSION, prepared for the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, dated November 1998, and available as
http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/383547.htm#P108-15868 (and http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/383547.htm as of 3/2012), includes larger(as Table 1) a listing of the fishing boats in the DPRK fleet. This table is reproduced below. Some figures in this table correspondgenerally with the data from source 4, above, though there are some discrepencies (in particular, the 8 largest
ships in the DPRK fleet are reported in various sources as 3750, 10,000, and 10,000 - 14,000 tonnes displacement)
the reference in the table below to 1545 boats probably is meant to be a total number for all of thecategories except the first.
Number of mechanized fishing boats classified by length and size of engine
Displacement
Tonnage

Gross tons

Length(Metres)

HP of theEngineNumber

3 750
2 759
83
2 250
8
485
267
39
400
1 545
270
150
33
400
140
77
23-25
200
84
44
20-23
200
30
18
16-18
30
Original source for table cited:Ministry of Fisheries (DPRK)

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7 Fuel consumption rate for diesels is assumed to average 0.18 k g/hp-hr, which is slightly higher than the(approximately) 1985 value for diesel-fueled boats in China cited on p. 18-6 in the chapter "Energy and Transport
in China" in the document Energy Mark ets and the Future of Energy Demand , by Lawrence Berk eley National
Laboratory (LBNL, USA), 1988. This figure is also similar to the fuel consumption estimate used for military
ships elsewhere in this analysis.
8 Source 1 lists small collectives as having 150 member, and 2 boats with 28 hp engines plus 5 boats with 4 hp
engines per collective. This is consistent with the lower end of the "20 - 70" boats per collective estimate provided
in note 5, above, assuming that many boats counted in the total are not motorized.
9 In the document Improving Energy Use and Productivity in West Coast and Alask an
Seafood Processing Plants , by Greg Kelleher, Edward Kolbe, and Greg Wheeler (2001), the authors
provide estimates of fuel consumption and output for five Alask an seafood processing plants. The document
is available as http://seagrant.oregonstate.edu/sgpubs/onlinepubs/t01004.pdf. Based on data in tables 1 and
2 of this document, per-unit output consumption of electricity and fuel oil can be calculated as follows:
Electricity Use
Fuels Use (oil, LPG)
Output average

3.41 GWh (5 plants)
33502 Million Btu (5 plants)
13.6 million lbs/yr per plant, or
0.031 Million Te total
Implied electricity use per te output:
110.32 kWh.
Implied oil use per te output:
1,143,502 kJ.
The application of these intensities to the DPRK situation is admittedly inexact at best. Although Alask an
seafood processors certainly handle some of the same types of seafood as were and are handled in DPRK
facilities, the compositions of the product lines will certainly be different (in fact, probably change year-to-year).
Moreover, Alask an seafood processing facilities are doubtless more efficient than DPRK facilities, but are also
lik ely to be much more highly mechanized. As a result, these figures for electricity and thermal energy use, asapplied to the DPRK situation, should be considered as initial estimates only, to be confirmed with better estimateswhen available.
10 China Customs Statistics report that the DPRK imported 5 fishing boats in 2004, and 11 in 2005.
Based on the value of these shipments, however (and assuming that both the quantities and values reported
in the China Customs Statistics are complete), these vessels, with average costs of $600 (2005) to $6000(in 2004) US dollars each, would lik ely have been small in size (or, possibly, poor in quality and/or very old).
Import/export data as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
11 Anecdotal information about the status of North Korean Fisheries includes the following from North Korea Today , No. 298 (10/2009):
Wonsan Fishery Enterprise Reduced to a Fraction of Former Output
The Wonsan Fishery Enterprise has 2,500 laborers on its payroll and is not considered a large enterprise along the east coast.
The Enterprise is one of three major companies in Wonsan. In the past the Enterprise was doing relatively well because oflarge catches of flounder. However, since the navy took over the fishery farm, the fishery enterprise has reached the point
where it had to cease operations.
The reason for the end of the Fishery Enterprise lies in the method of the naval headquarters’ management. After enlarging
operations to catch any and all fish without limitation, flounder numbers have been critically depleted. Additionally, theDaeheung Trade Company allowed Japan fishery rights in the area, causing severe competition with Japanese fishermen.
Overseas Fishery was attempted, but failed because of difficulties in facilities investments. Currently, only the No. 9 work unit isin operation, which sends caught fish to Pyongyang. Virtually all the fishing activities of the Fishery Enterprise have come to an
end.
The City of Wonsan currently has around 250 ships of different sizes in operation. Mostly of the ships belong to the military,
trading companies earning foreign currency, and some wealthy people. Only those organizations or individuals capable ofproviding fuel can operate fisheries. Throughout Kangwon Province, small vessels with capacities of 8-HP (horse power) and28-HP are concentrated in the Counties of Tongchun and Gosung. These small vessels are operated by individuals mainly
because they require much less fuel to run.

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ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

4/7/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Coal Use: Public/Commercial Sectors
Urban Residential Floor Space:
1.34E+08 sq.m.
Ratio of Res. Urban to Pub/Comml Space29.60%
Commercial Floor Space
3.972E+07 sq.m.
Coal Use intensity
33 kgce/sq.m.-yr
Conversion Factor
0.0293 GJ/kgce
Fraction of Buildings Heated with Coal
85%
Total Coal Use, Public/Commercial Sectors
3.26E+07 GJ/yr
District Heat Use: Public/Commercial Sectors
Fraction of Public/Commercial Floorspace with District Heating
15.00%
District Heat Use
2.64E+06 GJ/yr
Oil Use: Public/Commercial Sectors
9.79E+04 GJ/yr
Electricity Use: Public/Commercial Sectors
Electricity Use intensity, Buildings
27.5 kWh/sq.m.
Conversion Factor
0.0036 GJ/kWh
Electricity Use in Buildings
3.93E+06 GJ/yr
Other Electricity Use, Public/Commercial
7.00E+06 GJ/yr
Total Elect. Use, Public/Commercial Sectors
1.09E+07 GJ/yr
Wood/Biomass Use: Public/Commercial Sectors
1.63E+06 GJ/yr

1
42

See "District_heat" work sheet

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY USE IN PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS(See Note 8)
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
SECTION
Public/Commercial Floor space per unit
OF THIS
residential floor space relative to 1990:
100%
95.0%
95.0%
95%
95%
100%
WORKSHE
Public/Commercial Floor space (sq.m.)
4.247E+07 4.226E+07 4.711E+07 5.033E+07 5.120E+07 4.46E+07
ET NOT
Implied floorspace relative to 1990
106.93%106.39%118.60%126.71%128.91% USED FOR
THISCoal use per square meter relative to 1990:
75%
45%
45%
45%
45%
100%
ANALYSIS
Elect. and Heat use per square meter relative to 1990:
55%
29.14%
43.5%
45%
40%
90%
Other Public/Comm'l elect use rel to 1990.
55.0%
29.14%
43.5%
45%
40%
90%
Wood/Biomass Use as a fraction of coal use:
10%
20%
30%
30%
30%
20%
Oil use as a fraction of coal use:
0.5%
0.5%
1.0%
1.55%
1.91%
1.0%
Fraction of Oil Use as Kerosene (remainder assumed LPG) 50.0%
50.0%
25.0%
21.5%
17.5%
15.00%

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3

5
10

7

12
13
13
10
11

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 Ratio of all commercial to urban resid. floor area, heating zone of China, 1989. From "Energy Use andConservation in China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects",
by Feng Liu, LBL, March, 1993, p.26.)
2 For centrally heated buildings. 10% higher than Chinese value from source as in 1, page 41.
3 Derived based on data in 1, pages 26 and 63.
4 Note that this is about twice current Chinese levels, but less than half of 1985 USSR levels.
5 Placeholder estimate to bring total Agric/Services/Military power demand up to 25% of electricity use
as estimated in document in authors' files [EP1].
6 [Not Used]
7 Lower value in 2000 assumes the closure of some buildings no longer used.
8 Based on visits to the DPRK in 1998 and 2000, commercial/public space does not seem to be under construction
at an unusual rate (when there is construction at all), so the ratio of residential to commercial/public space remains
as in 1990. The reduction in electricity use relative to 1990 is a function of the same assumed
average urban electricity outage rate used for the residential sector, namely that power outages in cities outside the
Pyongyang area as of 2000 were by far the rule rather than the exception. The fraction of 1990 coal use
per unit area assumed for 2000, 65%, reflects the assumption that coal availability is poor in many areas of thecountry.
9 China Customs Statistics reported imports of computers and computer components to the DPRK from China
more than doubled, in both number and value, between 2004 and 2005. This increase in computer (HS #8471)
imports may indicate or be a indicator of somewhat of an increase in public/commercial activity,
including, possibly, in the information technology sector.
Import data as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also
N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implicationsas prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0679Aden.pdf.
10 We have no direct data on use of wood and biomass as a heating and cook ing fuel in the public/commercial sector
in the DPRK as of 1990, but anecdotal evidence of widespread use of biomass fuels in at least some types ofcommon public institutions in recent years suggests that at least some use of biomass fuels for heating and cook ing
occurred in at least rural areas as of 1990. Accordingly, we assume that public/commercial/institutionaluse of biomass was approximately
5% of coal use, in terms of energy content in 1990.
Given the lower heating efficiency of biomass relative to coal in most applications, this implies thatbiomass accounted for only a few percent of heating provided in 1990. Some observers note that theuse of wood and other biomass fuels for heating (when used) and cook ing in several types of public sector
buildings has increased substantially since the mid-1990s, with wood often providing the bulk of fuel use.
11 We have no direct data on oil use in the public/commercial sectors, but it seems clear that some oil (in the form ofk erosene and LPG for cook ing) was and is used in the sector. We mak e the nominal assumption that oil use in1990 was 0.3 percent of coal use in the sector, rose to 0.5 percent in 1996, increased in 2000 to 1% of coal use, andto a level equal to 1.5 percent of coal use in 2005 and on as a result of the growth in the number of restaurants, primarily
in Pyongyang, but also elsewhere in the country. Oil use is assumed to be
90.0%
k erosene andand
10% LPG in 1990 but ramping up to higher fractions of LPG in 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009.
12 Coal use is assume to decline substantially, particularly in 2000 and 2005, relative to 1990, based on observers reportsthat many public buildings, including most office buildings, have remained unheated in winter in recent years.
13 For 2000, public/commercial electricity use relative to 1990 is assumed similar to that for the residential sector.
For 2005, some observers report a modest increase in the availability of electricity to public/commercial buildings, though
the change in electricity availability varied substantially by area of the DPRK, including in relation to proximity to new orexisting power plants, or to priority users of power. From 2005 on, electricity use in the sector is assumed to roughly
follow estimated availability of electricity. Heat use in the sector is assumed to follow electricity use, as most of the distribution,
fuel availability, and plant maintenance problems that pertain to the electricity sector are lik ely to be shared with the heat production
sector, particularly as most heat production is from combined heat and power plants (or district heat boiler co-located with power plants).

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ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:ENERGY USED IN MILITARY BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIESPrepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

11/21/2011

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Coal Use: Military Sector
Military Installation Floor Space:
2.00E+07 sq.m.
1
Coal Use intensity
33 kgce/sq.m.-yr2
Conversion Factor
0.0293 GJ/kgce
Total Coal Use, Military Buildings
1.93E+07 GJ/yr
Coal Use, Military Manufacturing
8.87E+05 GJ/yr
5, 8
Other Coal Use: Military Sector
9.60E+06 GJ/yr
1
Total Coal Use, Buildings and Other
2.98E+07 GJ/yr
Oil Use: Military Sector
Oil Use, Military Transport Vehicles
6.58E+06 GJ/yr
5
Oil Use, Heavy Armaments
2.63E+05 GJ/yr
5
Oil Use in Air Force
2.65E+06 GJ/yr
5
Oil Use in Navy
6.85E+06 GJ/yr
5
Oil Use, Buildings and Other
1.00E+05 GJ/yr
1
Total Oil Use, Military Sector
1.64E+07 GJ/yr
Electricity Use: Military Buildings and Other
Electricity Use intensity, Buildings
55 kWh/sq.m.-yr
4
Conversion Factor
0.0036 GJ/kWh
Other Electricity Use
1.00E+07
1
Total Electricity Use, Buildings and Other:
1.40E+07 GJ/yr
Electricity Use, Military Manufacturing
4.75E+04 GJ/yr
5
Total Electricity Use, Military:
1.40E+07 GJ/yr
Wood Use: Military Sector
Intensity of wood/biomass fuel use relative to coal use
200%
10Energy Use in 1996, 2000 and 2005 Relative to 1990 for Subsectors/End-Uses Not Covered in Military Workbook
1996 Coal/Wood Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
95%
Assumption
2000 Coal/Wood Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
85%
Assumption
2005 Coal/Wood Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
80%
Assumption
2008 Coal/Wood Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
80%
Assumption
2009 Coal/Wood Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
80%
Assumption
1996 Oil Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
95%
Assumption
2000 Oil Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
85%
Assumption
2005 Oil Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
85%
Assumption
2008 Oil Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
85%
Assumption
2009 Oil Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
85%
Assumption
1996 Fraction of Coal and Wood Use as Wood
10%92000 Fraction of Coal and Wood Use as Wood
15%
92005 Fraction of Coal and Wood Use as Wood
17%
9, 11
2008 Fraction of Coal and Wood Use as Wood
17%
2009 Fraction of Coal and Wood Use as Wood
17%
1996 Elect. Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
55%
Assumption
2000 Elect. Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990 (See Note 6)
53%
Assumption
2005 Elect. Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990 (See Note 7)
62.5%
Assumption
2008 Elect. Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
63.5%
Assumption
2009 Elect. Use, Buildings and Other, relative to 1990
57.2%
Assumption

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Sources/Notes:
1 Placeholder Estimate, but electricity comparable to estimates by KERI ("Analysis of Present Status and Future
Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System", by J.Y. Yoon, presented at the DPRK Energy
Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA) that military sector
electricity demand in the DPRK would be about 4.9 TWh/yr if unconstrained. Since electricity demand in1990 in the DPRK was already somewhat constrained by supply, we assume that total military electricity
use in that year was about 80% of the KERI (Korea Electrotechnical Research Institute) figure. Dr. Yoon's
presentation is avaialble as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Yoon.ppt.
2 Assumed to be 10% higher than value for centrally heated Commercial/Public buildings from " Energy Use andConservation in China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects",
by Feng Liu, LBL, March, 1993, p.41.)
3 Derived based on data in 1, pages 26 and 63.
4 Assumed to be 100% higher than the level in (other) public and commercial buildings due to use of
specialized electrical equipment.
5 As estimated in other Military Energy Consumption sections.
6 Rough assumption, but as the electricity situation in the country had continued to worsen, it.seems unlik ely
that electricity use in military buildings in the DPRK was larger in 2000 than in 1996, evenconsidering the importance of the military sector in the DPRK
7 Rough assumption, tak ing into account that as the overall electricity situation in the country has
improved slightly from 2000 to 2005, military sector electricity use should rise somewhat.
8 The journal Seoul T'ongil Kyongje , dated July 2002, contains an article (pages 28-36) by So Chu-sok entitled"North Korean Industries (Part X): Munitions Industry". Among the information in this article is the following:"…North Korean military power has not changed greatly since….the mid 1990s", apart from some missile developmentand "expanded forward deployment of long-range artillery". The article estimates the size of the military at
1.7 million people, consuming much more than 5% of food in the country, and more than 15 percent of fuel oil usedin the DPRK. Military stock piles of food and fuel are "100 to 120 days worth", but it is not stated whether.
this refers to days under typical non-combat or combat conditions. The article states that there are about
180 munitions factories in the DPRK, including about 40 gun factories, 10 armored vehicle factories, 50 ammunitions
factories, and 10 naval shipyards, producing a total of 25 percent of GNP. Exports of SCUD-C missiles
in the early 1990s are estimated at 100 to 150 per year. Factories, largely based on Soviet/East Bloc
technology, have become "technologically obsolete and their facilities are run down", resulting in "extremely low"efficiency and high rates of consumption of energy and materials that, coupled with fuel and materials shortages, have"caused production setback s" in some factories. These trends are tak en into account in the analysisof energy demand in the military manufacting sector (see military sector analysis work papers).
9 The publication Seoul Wolgan Choson published an article by Kim Yon-k wang and Yi Sang-hun, dated 1 October, 2003
(pages 168-181), entitled "Kim Chong-il's Military is Hoarding All Rice Aid as Military Provision", which is based on
an interview with a DPRK soldier named Chin Yon-k yu, who had defected to the ROK, but who was (or claimed to be)a driver for a high-rank ing officer. This article contains one of a number of anecdotal reports, including reports
by observers of and recent visitors to the DPRK, that suggest that soldiers, lik e many DPRK residents
have in recent years, in many locales, been obliged to forage, in both the broad and specific senses of the word,for both food and fuel. Although no quantitative data are available to assist in estimating the impact of
the need for military units to use wood fuel, we have assumed that the fraction of fuel for cook ing and heating madeup by wood has risen, starting at (near) zero, we assume, in 1990, rising substantially in 1996 and through 2000,
and rising only slightly between 2000 and 2005 as the DPRK economy improved somewhat. After 2005, the fraction ofof wood fuel use is assumed to be constant.
10 Rough assumption, but considering that much biomass is probably burned in open fireplaces, and much of thebiomass/wood fuel used is probably green (wet and unseasoned), it seems reasonable to assume the the efficiencyof biomass fuel use might be half that (twice the intensity) of coal use for cook ing and heating end-uses.
11 By way of comparison, the assumptions above for 2005 suggests military wood/biomass fuel use of approximately
4.06E+06 GJ is approximately the amount of wood fuel energy needed to cook
1.27E+08
k ilograms of rice, assuming the use of
2 k g of (dry) wood fuel per k g of rice.
(Note that this is a highly variable quantity, depending on cook ing methods and the type of fireplace/stove and pots
used, but the figure cited is within the range of values provided in, for example,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/AB780E/AB780E03.htm
http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/rural/energy_use_in_rural_areas/2_3.asp, andhttp://www.fao.org/docrep/x5400e/x5400e04.htm.)
At an average daily ration of
0.5 k g per soldier (various accounts put soldiers rations
at about 500 grams per day, sometimes somewhat lower or higher, depending on the soldier's task s, duty station,and food availability), this implies that wood equivalent to the amount needed to cook rice for about
694,565 soldiers is used. Given that some wood will in fact be used for heating, or for cook ing
other foods this figure--the equivalent of about 70 percent of the number of people the DPRK was estimated toin uniform as of about 2005, seems generally plausible.

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ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:OTHER/NON-SPECIFIED SECTOR
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
10/27/2010

DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Sources/Notes:
Coal Use: Other/Non-Specified Sectors
Diesel Oil Use: Other/Non-Specified Sectors
Kerosene/Jet Fuel Use: Other/Non-Specified Sect.
Electricity Use: Other/Non-Specified Sectors
Wood/Biomass Use: Other/Non-Specified Sectors
Heat from Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor used locally

1.70E+06 GJ/yr
4.25E+06 GJ/yr

1
1

4.73E+05 GJ/yr

2

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE ENERGY USE IN NON-SPECIFIED SECTORS
Values Relative to 1990
Oil used in unspecified/other sectors
Heat from Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor

1996
0%
0%

2000
0%
0%

2005
0%
100%

2008
0%
0%

2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
0% SECTION
0% Assumption
OF THIS0%0%3

Sources/Notes:
1 Included to account for remainder of refined products production in balance sheet, 1990.
2 See Note 13 in "ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN 1990" work sheet.
3 Yongbyon reactor not operating in 1996 or 2000. Capacity factor in 2005 assumed to be similar to that in1990 (about 60 percent).

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:NON-ENERGY RESOURCE USES
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
3/3/2011
DERIVATION OF INFORMATION PASSED TO ENERGY BALANCE SHEET, 1990
Coal and Oil Use as feedstock: Fertilizer (Ammonia) production
Total Coal Use: Non-Energy Applications:
Oil Use: Non-Energy Products excluding:-- heavy oil for fertilizer production-- naptha for fertilizer production
Wood/Biomass Use: Roundwood for Wood Products:
Wood/Biomass Use: Non-Energy Applications

Sources/Notes:
1

1.83E+07 GJ/yr
1.37E+07 GJ/yr
5.771E+06 GJ/yr
9.15E+05 GJ/yr
3.66E+06 GJ/yr
1.20E+07 GJ/yr
1.20E+07 GJ/yr

4
5
5
2

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE NON-ENERGY USE OF FUELS
Values Relative to 1990
Coal, Oil feedstock for ammonia production
Oil Use: Other Non-Energy Products
Wood/biomass used as roundwood:

1996
24.7%
24.70%
60%

2000
8%
38.00%
50%

2005
11%
11.95%
50%

2008
11%
11.54%
50%

2009
2010--Dec.
THIS
OF
7% SECTION65%
3
THIS
14.88% WORKSHEET
30%
650% NOT USED
50% Assumption

Sources/Notes:
1 Imported from Industry sheet.
2 Imported from Biomass sheet.
3 Assumed same as production relative to 1990 for the fertilizer subsector; imported from "Industry--96-on" sheet.
4 Estimate based on estimated output of bitumen, petroleum cok e, lubricants, and waxes in 1990.
Some of these products were probably exported (to Russia and possibly China).
5 For Nitrogen fertilizer manufacture. See "Industry-96-on" work sheet in this work book , note 3.
6 Adjusted to mak e production plus imports minus exports of "LPG/Refinery Fuel/Non-Energy Products" balance demand.

A1- 139

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Additional Summary Figures and Tables
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEADDITIONAL GRAPHS AND FIGURESHFO Supply Summary: Thousand tonnes
SOURCE
KEDO/6-PARTY TALKSIMPORTSDOMESTIC
TOTAL
KEDO/6-PARTY TALKSIMPORTSDOMESTIC
TOTAL

1996
500
94
356
950
53%
10%
37%
100%

YEAR
2000
2005
395
145
123
160
211
700
334
56%
0%
21%
37%
23%
63%
100%
100%

2008
304
319
203
826
37%
39%
25%
100%

2009
-

1990
15.6
6.3
21.8
1.0
44.8
35%
14%
49%
2%
0%
100%

1996
11.7
13.7
7.1
0.4
6.4
39.4
30%
35%
18%
1%
16%
100%

YEAR
2000
2005
2.6
3.0
13.2
3.5
10.9
7.1
0.4
0.4
(0.03)(0.01)
27.0
14.0
10%
21%
49%
25%
40%
51%
1%
3%
0%
0%
100%
100%

2008
3.0
11.9
6.6
0.36
21.8
14%
55%
30%
2%
0%
100%

2009
3.0
1.5
4.2
0.31
9.0
33%
16%
47%
3%
0%
100%

6.2
38.6
44.8

20.7
4.1
14.8
39.6

12.6
0.6
8.8
22.1

0.3
8.7
9.0

1990
0
150
930.4
1,080
0%
14%
86%
100%

7
200
207
0%
3%
97%
100%

HFO Demand Summary: Petajoules (PJ)
CONSUMEROIL-ELECT.
COAL-ELECT
INDUSTRYSHIPSSTORAGETOTAL
OIL-ELECT.
COAL-ELECT
INDUSTRYSHIPSSTORAGETOTALHFO Supply Summary
KEDO/Six Party Talks
Net Non-KEDO Imports
Domestic Refining
TOTAL

A1- 140

16.4
3.2
6.7
26.2

5.1
8.8
13.9

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

HFO Supply Summary by Year
Thousand Metric Tonnes

1200
DOMESTIC
IMPORTS
KEDO/6-PARTY TALKS

1000
800
600
400

200
0
1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

Estimated Disposition of Heavy Fuel Oil by Year

50
45

STORAGE

40

SHIPS

Petajoules (PJ)

INDUSTRY

35

COAL-ELECT

30

OIL-ELECT.

25
20
15
10

5
(5.0)

1990

1996

2000

A1- 141

2005

2008

2009

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Demand Summary for Other Refined Products: Terajoules
DIESEL OIL
SECTOR
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
INDUSTRIAL
3,050
671
633
844
503
TRANSPORT
12,926
4,999
4,166
7,913
5,384
RESIDENTIALAGRICULTURAL
5,005
1,502
1,251
1,351
1,251
FISHERIES
2,777
856
710
796
793
MILITARY
6,859
5,248
5,091
5,259
4,537
NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER
1,700
TOTAL
32,607
13,276 11,852
16,163 12,470
INDUSTRIAL
9%
5%
5%
5%
4%
TRANSPORT
40%
38%
35%
49%
43%
RESIDENTIAL
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
AGRICULTURAL
15%
11%
11%
8%
10%
FISHERIES
9%
6%
6%
5%
6%
MILITARY
21%
40%
43%
33%
36%
NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER
5%
0%
0%
0%
0%
TOTAL
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
101%

2009
403
4,156
1,153
708
3,922
10,342
4%
40%
0%
11%
7%
38%
0%
100%

1990
23,2207,386
30,606
76%
0%
0%
0%
24%
100%

1996
10,376
6,352
16,728
62%
0%
0%
0%
38%
100%

GASOLINE
2000
2005
2008
3,452
2,900
6,145
4,742
4,238
3,919
8,193
7,137 10,064
42%
41%
61%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
58%
59%
39%
100%
100%
100%

2009
4,566
3,884
8,449
54%
0%
0%
0%
46%
100%

1990
399
4,473
1,798
6,670
6%
67%
0%
0%
27%
100%

KEROSENE/JET FUEL
1996
2000
2005
2008
320
364
602
668
553
458
927
797
1,199
824
1,423
1,498
2,071
1,646
2,953
2,963
15%
22%
20%
23%
27%
28%
31%
27%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
58%
50%
48%
51%
100%
100%
100%
100%

2009
602
655
1,161
2,419
25%
27%
0%
0%
48%
100%

SECTOR
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARYTOTAL
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARYTOTAL
SECTOR
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARYTOTAL
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
TOTAL

A1- 142Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Supply Summary for Electricity: Terawatt-hours
of Gross Generation
GENERATION
HYDRO
HFO-FIRED
COAL-FIRED
TOTAL
HYDRO
HFO-FIRED
COAL-FIRED
TOTAL

1990
21.3
1.8
22.9
46
46%
4%
50%
100%

1996
5.3
1.9
15.6
22.8
23%
8%
68%
100%

YEAR
2000
2005
10.5
11.1
0.9
0.4
1.9
4.9
13.3
16.5
79%
68%
7%
2%
14%
30%
100%
100%

2008
11.8
0.9
4.4
17.2
69%
5%
26%
100%

2009
11.9
0.3
3.6
15.8
75%
2%
23%
100%

Terawatt-hours

Gross Generation in the DPRK, 1990, 1996, 2000,
2005, 2008, and 2009
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
-

COAL-FIRED
HFO-FIRED
HYDRO

1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

Demand Summary for Electricity: Petajoules
SECTOR
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMERCIALTOTAL
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL
TOTAL

1990
70
11
11
3
1
14
11
120
58%
10%
9%
2%
0%
12%
9%
100%

1996
24
5
6
2
0
8
6
51
47%
9%
12%
3%
0%
15%
12%
100%

A1- 143

ELECTRICITY
2000
2005
13
15
3
4
3
4
1
1
0
0
7
9
3
5
31
38
41%
39%
11%
10%
9%
10%
4%
4%
1%
1%
24%
23%
11%
13%
100% 100%

2008
15
4
5
1
0
9
5
40
39%
10%
12%
3%
1%
22%
13%
100%

2009
14
4
4
1
0
8
5
37
38%
11%
12%
3%
0%
22%
13%
100%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Estimated Electricity Use by Sector and Year
140
120

PUBLIC/COMMERCIALFISHERIESRESIDENTIAL
INDUSTRIAL

Petajoules

100
80

MILITARY
AGRICULTURAL
TRANSPORT

60
40
20
1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

SUMMARY TABLE OF ELECTRICTY SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Units: TWh
YEARGENERATION
1990
1996
2000
2005
HYDRO
21.3
5.3
10.5
11.1
HFO-FIRED
1.8
1.9
0.9
0.4
COAL-FIRED
22.9
15.6
1.9
4.9
NUCLEAR
TOTAL
46.0
22.8
17.2
15.8
EXPORTS(0.0)(0.1)
COAL PROD.
(2.4)
(1.2)
(0.6)
(0.8)
OWN USE
(3.4)
(2.8)
(0.5)
(1.0)
LOSSES
(6.6)
(4.6)
(3.5)
(4.3)
TOTAL DEMAND
33.5
14.1
8.5
10.4
INDUSTRIAL
19.5
6.7
3.5
4.1
TRANSPORT
3.2
1.3
0.9
1.0
RESIDENTIAL
3.0
1.7
0.8
1.1
AGRICULTURAL
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.4
FISHERIES
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
MILITARY
3.9
2.1
2.1
2.4
PUBLIC/COMM'L
3.0
1.7
0.9
1.4

A1- 144

2008
11.8
0.9
4.4
16.5
(0.1)
(0.8)
(1.0)
(4.5)
11.2
4.3
1.2
1.3
0.4
0.1
2.5
1.5

2009

2009
11.9
0.3
3.6
15.8
(0.1)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(4.2)
10.3
4.0
1.2
1.2
0.4
0.1
2.2
1.3

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Industrial Energy Demand By Subsector: 1990 and 1996
Units: Terajoules (TJ)
1990
Subsector
Coal Petr. Prod.
Wood
Electricity
Iron and Steel
324,615
17,388
Cement68,1397,571
4,356
Fertilizers
23,994
4,573
18,891Other Chemicals
11,203
6,616
Pulp and Paper
4,026
4,026
932
Other Metals
23,7204,126
Other Minerals
12,600396
Textiles
29,385
2,497
Building Materials
61,980189
Non-specified Industry
124,600
3,740
1,600
14,850TOTAL
671,661
28,483
5,626
70,242

1996
Coal Petr. Prod. Wood Electricity
124,977
6,694
29,981
3,331
1,917
6,515
1,129
5,130
3,697
2,183
1,329
1,329
308
7,828
1,362
832
3,326
131
9,697
824
20,4536245,230
899
581
5,391
250,538
8,685
1,909
24,001DPRK Industrial Energy Demand By Subsector: 2000 and 2005
Units: Terajoules (TJ)
2000
Subsector
Coal Petr. Prod.
Wood
Electricity
Iron and Steel
67,382
3,609
Cement19,067
7,052
1,503
Fertilizers
2,070
343
1,629
Other Chemicals
2,325
1,373
Pulp and Paper
836
836
194
Other Metals
4,924
857
Other Minerals
869
3,478
137
Textiles
6,100
518
Building Materials
21,38365
Non-specified Industry
22,926
920
294
2,732
TOTAL
147,882
11,792
1,130
12,618

2005
Coal Petr. Prod. Wood Electricity
52,717
2,824
23,878
3,256
1,561
3,010
512
2,370
2,265
1,338
814
814
188
15,940
2,773
3,528
3,528
222
6,582
559
20,82564
20,975
1,033
269
2,762
150,534
8,329
1,083
14,660DPRK Industrial Energy Demand By Subsector: 2008 and 2009
Units: Terajoules (TJ)
2008
Subsector
Coal Petr. Prod.
Wood
Electricity
Iron and Steel
51,776
2,773
Cement23,452
3,198
1,533
Fertilizers
2,872
498
2,261
Other Chemicals
2,095
1,237
Pulp and Paper
753
753
174
Other Metals
16,177
2,814
Other Minerals
4,108
3,099
227
Textiles
6,465
549
Building Materials
20,45362
Non-specified Industry
19,600
699
252
3,846
TOTAL
147,751
7,494
1,005
15,4782009
Coal Petr. Prod. Wood Electricity
51,776
2,773
24,216
1,601
1,485
1,903
330
1,498
1,972
1,164
709
709
164
16,177
2,814
4,843
2,364
227
5,818
494
19,77260
17,283
588
222
3,600
144,468
4,882
931
14,281A1- 145

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
1990
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

50,000100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000

Energy Demand (TJ)DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
1996
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers

CementIron and Steel-

20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000 120,000 140,000

Energy Demand (TJ)

A1- 146

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
2000
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals

Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000

Energy Demand (TJ)DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
2005
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

10,00020,00030,00040,000

Energy Demand (TJ)

A1- 147

50,00060,000Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
2008
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals

Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,000

Energy Demand (TJ)DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
2009
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

10,00020,00030,00040,000

Energy Demand (TJ)

A1- 148

50,00060,000Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1990
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Building
Materials
9%
Textiles4%

Other Minerals
0%

Other Metals
3%Non-specified
Industry
19%

Pulp and Paper
1%
Other Chemicals
2%
Fertilizers
4%

Iron and Steel48%

Cement10%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1990
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Non-specified
Industry
21%
Building
Materials
0%

Iron and Steel
25%
Cement6%

Textiles4%

Other Minerals
1%
Other Metals

Fertilizers
27%

6%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Other
Chemicals
9%

A1- 149

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1996
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Building
Materials
8%

Textiles4%

Non-specified
Industry18%

Other Minerals
0%
Other Metals
3%

Pulp and Paper
1%
Other
Chemicals
1%

Cement12%

Iron and Steel
50%

Fertilizers
3%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1996
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Non-specified
Industry
23%
Building
Materials
0%
Textiles3%
Other Minerals
1%

Iron and Steel
28%

Cement8%

Other Metals
6%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Fertilizers
21%

Other
Chemicals
9%

A1- 150

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2000
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Cement13%

Fertilizers
Other Chemicals
1%
2%

Pulp and Paper
1%

Iron and Steel46%

Other Metals
3%
Other Minerals
1%
Textiles4%

Building
Materials
14%

Non-specified
Industry
15%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2000
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Non-specified
Industry
22%

Iron and Steel
29%

Building Materials
0%

Textiles4%
Other Minerals
1%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Cement12%
Fertilizers
13%
Other Metals
7% Other Chemicals
11%

A1- 151

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2005
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Cement16%

Fertilizers Other Chemicals
2%
1%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Iron and Steel35%

Other Metals
11%
Other Minerals
2%
Textiles4%

Non-specified
Industry
14%

Building
Materials
14%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2005
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Cement11%

Non-specified
Industry
19%

Iron and Steel
19%

Fertilizers
16%

Building Materials
0.4%

Textiles4%
Other Minerals
2%

Other Metals
19%

Other Chemicals
9%
Pulp and Paper
1%

A1- 152

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2008
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Fertilizers
2%

Other Chemicals
1%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Cement16%

Other Metals
11%

Iron and Steel35%

Other Minerals
3%

Building
Materials
14%

Non-specified
Industry
13%

Textiles4%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2008
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Iron and Steel18%

Building Materials
0.4%

Non-specified
Industry
25%

Textiles4%

Cement10%

Other Minerals
1%
Fertilizers
15%

Other Metals
18%
Pulp and Paper
1%

A1- 153

Other Chemicals
8%Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2009
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Fertilizers
1%

Other Chemicals
1%

Cement17%

Pulp and Paper
1%

Other Metals
11%

Iron and Steel36%

Other Minerals
3%
Textiles4%

Non-specified
Industry
12%

Building
Materials
14%

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 2009
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector

Non-specified
Industry
25%

Cement10%

Iron and Steel
19%

Fertilizers
11%
Other Chemicals
8%

Building Materials
0.4%
Textiles4%
Other Minerals
2%

Other Metals
20%

Pulp and Paper
1%

DPRK Transport Energy Demand By Subsector: 1990, 1996, 2000, annd 2005
Units: Terajoules (TJ)
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Subsector
Petr. Prod. Electricity Petr. Prod. Electricity Petr. Prod. Electricity Petr. Prod. Electricity Petr. Prod. Electricity Petr. Prod. Electricity
Road32,571
14,345
6,795
9,653
10,807
8,098
Rail
1,949
10,870
779
4,804
585
3,237
896
3,587
516
4,185
448
4,240
Water
1,253
501
476
526
414
351
Air
1,123
899
809
793
853
793
Non-Specified
1,000
600
-

A1- 154

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
1990

DPRK Transport Petroleum Demandby Subsector: 1990
NonSpecified
3%

Non-Specified
Petr. Prod.

Air

Air
3%

Electricity

Water

Road
86%

Water
3%

Rail

Rail
5%

Road
-

5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
1996
Non-Specified

Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity

DPRK Transport Petroleum
Demand by Subsector: 1996
NonSpecified
0%
Air
5%

Water
Rail

Water
3%

Road

Rail
5%

-

5,000

10,000Road
87%

15,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
2000
Non-Specified
Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity

Water
Rail

Road
-

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

Terajoules (TJ)

A1- 155

5,000

6,000

7,000

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector: 2005

Non-Specified

Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity

Water
Rail
Road
-

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
2008
Non-Specified
Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity

Water
Rail
Road

-

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

Terajoules (TJ)

A1- 156

10,00012,000Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
2009
Non-Specified
Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity

Water
Rail
Road
-

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009
Units: Terajoules (TJ)
1990
1996
Subsector
Coal Petr. Prod. Electricity
Coal
Wood Petr. Prod. Electricity
Trucks and other Transport
6,585
5,734
Armaments
263
211
Air Force
2,648
1,886
Naval Forces
6,847
5,198
Military Manufacturing
887
48
621
33
Buildings and Other
28,938100
13,96024,742
5,498
95
7,678

Subsector
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

Coal
399
19,215

2005
Wood Petr. Prod. Electricity
3,641
129
2,039
5,326
21
7,871
85
8,725

Coal
399
19,215

Coal
399
20,9082008
Wood Petr. Prod. Electricity
3,338
101
2,144
4,589
21
7,871
85
8,865

A1- 157

2000
Wood Petr. Prod. Electricity
4,187
148
1,367
5,122
21
7,379
85
7,399

Coal
399
19,2152009
Wood Petr. Prod. Electricity
3,338
101
1,807
3,934
21
7,871
85
7,985

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 1990

Buildings and Other
Military Manufacturing
Coal

Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.

Air Force

Electricity

Armaments
Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 1996

Buildings and Other
Coal

Military Manufacturing
Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.

Air Force

Electricity

Armaments

Wood

Trucks and other Transport
-

5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)

A1- 158

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 2000

Buildings and Other
Military Manufacturing

Coal
Petr. Prod.

Naval Forces

Electricity

Air Force

Wood
Armaments

Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 2005

Buildings and Other
Military Manufacturing

Coal

Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.

Electricity

Air Force

Wood
Armaments
Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)

A1- 159

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 2008

Buildings and Other
Military Manufacturing

Coal

Naval Forces

Wood

Petr. Prod.

Air Force

Electricity
Armaments
Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 2009

Buildings and Other

Coal

Military Manufacturing

Wood
Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.
Electricity

Air ForceArmaments
Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)

A1- 160

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY
TYPE: 1990
WOOD/
BIOMASS
9%

HYDRO
11%

REFINED
PROD
1%

COAL &COKE
78%

CRUDE OIL
6%

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990
INDUSTRIAL
58%

NON-ENERGY
2%NONSPECIFIED
0%
PUBLIC/COMM
L
4%MILITARY
4%

FISHERIES0%RESIDENTIAL
23%

AGRICULTURAL
5%

TRANSPORT
4%

A1- 161Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990
NON-ENERGY

31
6

PUBLIC/COMML

48
60

FISHERIES

562

RESIDENTIAL

302
51

INDUSTRIAL

776

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY
DEMAND BY FUEL: 1990
REF. PROD
8%WOOD/
BIOMASS
11%
CHARCOAL
0%
COAL &
COKE
71%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990

ELEC.
9%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1990

TRANSPORT
0%
PUBLIC/COM
0%

RESIDENTIAL
20%

INDUSTRIAL
71%

HEAT
1%

NONSPECIFIED
5%NONENERGY5%
INDUSTRIAL
26%

MILITARY
15%

AGRICULT.
1%MILITARY
3%

FISHERIES
3%

PUBLIC/COMM
4%

AGRICULT.
4%

NON-ENERGY
2%RESIDENTIAL
6%

A1- 162

TRANSPORT
35%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1996

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1996
TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
28%

INDUSTRIAL
20%

AGRICULTURENONENERGY
3%

1%
MILITARY
6%

NONSPECIFIED
0%

PUBLIC/COMM
4%
NON-ENERGY
1%

INDUSTRIAL58%

FISHERIES
2%

4%AGRICULT.
4%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2000
PUBLIC/COM
0%

FISHERIES
2%AGRICULT.

AGRICULTURAL
1%
RESIDENTIAL
33%

RESIDENTIALMILITARY
30%

PUBLIC/COM
0%

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2000

TRANSPORT
0%

TRANSPORT37%

NONSPECIFIED
0%4%FISHERIES0%RESIDENTIALMILITARY
27%

6%
MILITARY8%

INDUSTRIAL
52%

NONENERGY
10%

TRANSPORT

PUBLIC/COMML
6%

INDUSTRIAL
30%

22%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%
NON-ENERGY
0%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2005

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2005
AGRICULTURA
L
3%

TRANSPORT0%FISHERIES
0% MILITARYRESIDENTIAL
30%

INDUSTRIAL
23%

7%

32%

NONENERGY
2%

PUBLIC/COMML
6%

INDUSTRIAL
54%

TRANSPORTNONSPECIFIED0%NONSPECIFIED
0%

PUBLIC/COM
0%

NON-ENERGY
1%MILITARY
30%

RESIDENTIA
L
6%
AGRICULT.
4%FISHERIES
3%

A1- 163

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2008

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM
PRODICTS DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2008

AGRICULTURAL
3%

TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
28%FISHERIES0%MILITARY7%

INDUSTRIAL
21%

PUBLIC/COMML
7%

INDUSTRIAL
55%

6%
AGRICULT.
4%FISHERIES
3%

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS DEMAND BY SECTOR:
2009

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2009
AGRICULTURAL
3%

RESIDENTIAL
29%

RESIDENTIALMILITARY
29%

PUBLIC/COM
0%

NON-ENERGY
1%

TRANSPORT
0%35%

NONENERGY2%
NONSPECIFIED0%NONSPECIFIED
0%

TRANSPORTFISHERIES0%MILITARY7%

INDUSTRIAL
23%
TRANSPORT

PUBLIC/COMML
7%

NON-ENERGY
0%

INDUSTRIAL
55%

NONENERGY2%32%

NONSPECIFIED
0%RESIDENTIAL
6%MILITARY30%

AGRICULT.
4%

PUBLIC/COM
0%

FISHERIES
3%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 1990

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 1996
TRANSPORT

PUBLIC/COM
5%

10%

MILITARY
12%

RESIDENTIAL
13%

INDUSTRIAL
47%
INDUSTRIAL58%

FISHERIES
0%AGRICULT.
2%

AGRICULT.
2%
RESIDENTIAL
9%FISHERIES
1%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2000

INDUSTRIAL
41%

MILITARY
15%

PUBLIC/COM
5%

TRANSPORT
10%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 2005

TRANSPORT
10%INDUSTRIAL
39%

TRANSPORT
10%RESIDENTIAL
10%RESIDENTIAL
9%AGRICULTURAL
6%

PUBLIC/COMML
11%

MILITARY
24%

FISHERIES
1%AGRICULTURAL
5%
PUBLIC/COMML
13%

A1- 164MILITARY
23%

FISHERIES
1%Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 2008

INDUSTRIAL
39%

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 2009

TRANSPORT
10%INDUSTRIAL
38%

RESIDENTIAL
12%

PUBLIC/COMM
L
13%

MILITARY
22%

AGRICULTURA
L
5%

FISHERIES
1%

TRANSPORT
11%

RESIDENTIAL
12%

PUBLIC/COMML
13%

A1- 165

MILITARY
22%

AGRICULTURAL
5%FISHERIES
1%Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 1990
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production
1,301
78
Imports
68
111
27
Exports
(44)
-

Wood
150
12
-

DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 1996
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production
685
19
Imports
12
40
39
Exports
(12)
(0)
-

Wood
155
12
(0)

DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 2000
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production
337
1
38
Imports
10
17
42
Exports
(9)
(3)
-

Wood
154
12
(0)

DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 2005
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production
436
1
44Imports
36
22
23
Exports
(80)
(0)
-

Wood
174
12
(0)

DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 2008
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production425
1
43Imports
12
23
29
Exports
(66)
(0)
-

Wood
194
12
-

DPRK Energy Supply By Fuel and Source: 2009
Units:Petajoules (PJ)
SourceCoal
Crude Oil Ref. Prod. Hydro
Domestic Production
446
1
43Imports
4
22
12
Exports
(93)
(0)
-

Wood
195
12
-

A1- 166

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
1990
Wood

DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
1996

Domestic Production

Wood

Domestic Production

Hydro

Imports

Hydro

Imports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Crude Oil

Crude Oil

Coal

Coal

(500)

-

500

1,000

1,500

(200)

-

200

Petajoules (PJ)

400

600

800

Petajoules (PJ)DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
2000

DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
2005

Wood

Domestic Production

Wood

Domestic Production

Hydro

Imports

Hydro

Imports

Exports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Ref. Prod.

Crude Oil

Crude Oil

Coal

Coal

(100)

-

100

200

300

400

(100)

-

100

Petajoules (PJ)

300

400

500

Petajoules (PJ)DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:2009

DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
2008

Wood

Wood

Hydro

Imports

Imports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Exports

Crude Oil

Domestic Production

Hydro

Domestic Production

Ref. Prod.

Crude Oil
Coal

Coal

(100)

200

-

100

200

300

400

(100)

500

-

100

200

300

400

500

Petajoules (PJ)

Petajoules (PJ)DPRK Residential Sector Energy Demand By Fuel and Subsector: 1990 and 1996
Units:Terajoules (TJ)
1990
SourceCoal
Ref. Prod.
Wood
Charcoal
Heat
Electricity
Urban
129,155
6,256
1,814
6,134
7,420
Rural
60,119344
86,140
1,159
3,298

Coal
Ref. Prod.
92,747
1,649
28,988136

1996
Wood Charcoal
15,135
1,455
102,471
919

Heat
Electricity
3,572
4,562
1,583

DPRK Residential Sector Energy Demand By Fuel and Subsector: 2000 and 2005
Units:Terajoules (TJ)
2000
SourceCoal
Ref. Prod.
Wood
Charcoal
Heat
Electricity
Urban
73,246
2,058
19,021
1,117
1,826
2,421
Rural
21,808
149
102,580
701
323

Coal
Ref. Prod.
67,806
2,075
17,079146

2005
Wood Charcoal
24,7391,132
109,810704

Heat
Electricity
2,439
3,399
488

DPRK Residential Sector Energy Demand By Fuel and Subsector: 2008 and 2009
Units:Terajoules (TJ)2008
SourceCoal
Ref. Prod.
Wood
Charcoal
Heat
Electricity
Urban
61,212
1,902
34,093
1,089
2,824
4,058
Rural
13,090184
119,228
673
613

Coal
Ref. Prod.
62,3491,571
13,292
146

2009
Wood Charcoal
34,685
1,108
121,072
683

Heat
Electricity
2,635
3,826
575

A1- 167

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 1990
Electricity

Electricity

Urban
Rural

Heat

DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 1996
Urban
Rural

Heat
Charcoal

Charcoal
Wood

Wood

Ref. Prod.

Ref. Prod.

Coal

Coal
-

50,000100,000

150,000

200,000-

20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 2000

DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 2005

Electricity

Urban

Electricity

Urban

Heat

Rural

Heat

Rural

Charcoal

Charcoal

Wood

Wood

Ref. Prod.

Ref. Prod.

Coal

Coal
-

20,00040,00060,00080,000 100,000 120,000 140,000-

20,00040,00060,00080,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 2008

DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 2009

Electricity

Urban

Electricity

Urban

Heat

Rural

Heat

Rural

Charcoal

Charcoal
Wood

Wood

Ref. Prod.

Ref. Prod.
Coal

Coal

-

50,000100,000

150,000-

200,000

50,000100,000

150,000

200,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Terajoules (TJ)DPRK Energy Demand By Sector: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
Units: Petajoules (PJ)
SECTOR
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
Industrial
776
285
173
175
172
Transport
51
22
12
16
18
Residential
302
253
225
230
239
Agricultural
62
32
26
32
33
Fisheries
52
1
2
2
Military
60
52
47
47
47
Public/Commercial
48
37
23
29
31
Nonspecified/Other
6
Nonenergy
31
12
11
8
8
TOTAL
1,342
695
520
539
549

A1- 168

2009
165
15
242
32
1
45
31
8
538

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Energy Demand By Fuel Category: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
Units: Petajoules (PJ)
SECTOR
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Coal and Coke
948
433
285
279
267
265
Refined Products
109
44
40
37
36
29
Wood/Biomass
152
159
160
180
200
201
Charcoal
3
2
2
2
2
2
Heat
9
5
3
4
4
4
Electricity
120
51
31
38
40
37
TOTAL
1,342
695
520
539
549
538

A1- 169

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Petajoules Energy Use

1,400

DPRK Energy Demand by Sector: 1990, 1996, 2000,
2005, 2008, and 2009
Nonenergy
Public/Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

1,200
1,000

800

Nonspecified/Other
Military
Agricultural
Transport

600
400
200
-

1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

Petajoules Energy Use

DPRK Energy Demand by Fuel Category: 1990, 1996,
2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
1,600
Heat

1,400

Electricity

1,200

Charcoal

1,000

Wood/Biomass
Refined Products

800

Coal and Coke

600
400
200
-

1990

1996

2000

A1- 170

2005

2008

2009

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Estimated DPRK Energy Demand by Sector: 1990,
1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009

800

600
500
400
300

200
100

A1- 171

Nonenergy

Nonspecified/Other

Public/Commercial

Military

Fisheries

Agricultural

Residential

Transport

Industrial

2009

2008

2005

2000

1990
1996

-

Petajoules

700

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Estimates of Cost and Savings of Selected Energy Efficiency Measures

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:POTENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS: END-USERSBASED ON YEAR 2009 CONSUMPTION

Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:
1/4/2012

Sources/Notes:
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS/CONVERSION FACTORS
Currency Conversion: 1990 Yuan to 1990 $US:
Fraction of total investment represented by annualized CCE:
Inflator to convert 1990 costs to 2009 costs:
Energy Conversion Factor:
Energy Conversion Factor:

4.755
15%
151%
29.3 GJ/tce
0.0036 GJ/kWh

Note 3Note 4Note 18

Sources/Notes:
Efficiency Improvements in Coal Fired Boilers: Industrial
Coal Use (Fuel) by Industrial Subsector

Subsector

Total
TJ/yr

Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesNon-specified Industry
Agricultural Processing
Military Manufacturing

51,77624,216
1,903
1,972
709
16,177
4,843
5,818
17,283
4,956
399

Fraction in
Boilers &Furnaces
Note 5
60%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

TOTAL EST COAL USE IN BOILERS AND FURNACES
Fractional Savings Potential, Boilers and Furnaces:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COAL SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers and Furnaces
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers and Furnaces
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT

Total TJ/yr
Boilers &Furnaces
31,06624,216
1,903
1,972
709
16,177
4,843
5,818
17,283
4,956
399

$
$

A1- 172

109,342 TJ/yr
37.5%
41,003 TJ/yr
537 Yuan/(tce/yr)
5.82 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
238,792,210

1

6, 19
7

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Coal Use in Small/Medium Boilers and Furnaces:(Assumes that essentially all coal use is in boilers and furnaces)

Sector/Subsector

Total
TJ/yr

Residential/Urban
Public/Commercial
Military Buildings

62,34919,21518,937

Fraction in
Boilers &Furnaces
Note 5
90%
100%
100%

TOTAL EST COAL USE IN BOILERS AND FURNACES
Fractional Savings Potential, Boilers and Furnaces:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COAL SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers and Furnaces
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers and Furnaces
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT

TJ/yr inBoilers &Furnaces
56,114
19,21518,937

2$$

94,266 TJ/yr
23.0%
21,681 TJ/yr
300 Yuan/(tce/yr)
3.25 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
70,495,862

Fract. Savings Potent., Building Envelope Improvements:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COAL SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Building Envelope Improvements:
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Building Envelope Improvements: $TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT$

20%
14,517 TJ/yr
275 Yuan/(tce/yr)
2.98 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
43,268,112

8, 19
8

12
12

Coal Savings through Solar Water Heat
(Assumes that essentially all coal use is in boilers, furnaces, and rural heating stoves)
Fraction in
TJ/yr inBoilers, Stoves, Boilers, Stoves,
Sector/Subsector
and Furnaces
and Furnaces
Note 5Residential/Urban
62,34990%56,114
Residential/Rural
13,292
90%
11,963Public/Commercial
19,215100%
19,215
Military Buildings
18,937100%
18,937
Estimated fraction of residential energy used for water heeating
Water heat use per urban household, 1990, (delivered electricity equivalent)
Water heat use per rural household, 1990, (delivered electricity equivalent)
Average efficiency of coal use for water heating, all households
Implied GJ/yr coal use for water heat, urban households
Implied GJ/yr coal use for water heat, rural households
Implied fraction of coal use for water heating, urban households
Implied fraction of coal use for water heating, urban households
Fraction of coal use for water heating in non-residential buildings
Ultimate potential fraction of urban residential units using solar HW
Ultimate potential fraction of rural residential units using solar HW
Ultimate potential fraction of non-residential buildings using solar HW
Total
TJ/yr

1500 kWh2000 kWh55%
9.82 per household
13.09 per household
18.6%
19.5%
10%
35%
50%
50%

Assumption
Assumption
Assumption

Assumption
Assumption
Assumption
Assumption

Fraction of water heating coal use displaced in households and non-residential buildings using solar water heaters
80%
Assumption
Potential coal savings from solar water heat, residential/urban
2,925 TJ/yr
Potential coal savings from solar water heat, residential/rural
932 TJ/yr
Potential coal savings from solar water heat, public/commercial
769 TJ/yr
Potential coal savings from solar water heat, military buildings
2,651 TJ/yr
TOTAL of above
7,277 TJ/yr
Estimated cost per household of solar water heater$400 per unit
(Based roughly on 2010 costs of solar water heaters in China)
Implied capital cost per unit energy savings, residential units (urban)$51 per GJ/yr ($2009)
Assume capital costs for non-residential installations are
75%
of residential costs per unit output, based on generally larger system size and associated economies of scale.
Then capital cost per unit energy savings for non-residential units implied is$38.19 per GJ/yr ($2009)
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT$ 130,813,077

A1- 173

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Coal Use in Household cooking and heating stoves:
Residential/Rural Coal Use (TJ)
Residential/Urban Cooking Coal Use

13,292 TJ/yr
6,235 TJ/yr

TOTAL EST COAL USE IN DOMESTIC STOVESFractional Savings Potential, Domestic Stoves:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COAL SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Domestic Stoves
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Domestic Stoves
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT$$

19,527 TJ/yr
25.0%
4,882 TJ/yr
100 Yuan/(tce/yr)
1.08 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
5,291,033

99Electricity Use by Industrial Subsector: Motors and Drives

Subsector

Total
TJ/yr

Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesNon-specified Industry
Agricultural Processing
Military Manufacturing

2,773
1,485
1,498
1,164
164
2,814
227
494
3,600
846
21

Fraction in
Motors &Drives
Note 10
50%
95%
50%
50%
95%
20%
95%
95%
80%
95%
80%

TOTAL EST ELECT USE, IND. MOTORS & DRIVES
Fractional Savings Potential, Motor Improvements
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Electric Motors
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Electric Motors
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT

Total TJ/yr
Motors &Drives
1,387
1,411
749
582
156
563
215
470
2,880
677
20

$
$

9,110 TJ/yr
15.0%
1,367 TJ/yr
0.10 Yuan/kWh58.81 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
80,361,607

11, 19
11

Electricity Use in Other Sectors: Motors and Drives

Sector/Subsector

Total
TJ/yr

Residential/Urban
Public/Commercial
Military Buildings

3,826
7,985
4,828

Fraction in
Motors &Drives
Note 10
10%
30%
30%

TOTAL EST ELECT USE, IND. MOTORS & DRIVES
Fractional Savings Potential, Motor Improvements
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Electric Motors
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Electric Motors
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT

Total TJ/yr
Motors &Drives
383
2,396
1,448

$
$

A1- 174

4,226 TJ/yr
15.0%
634 TJ/yr
0.10 Yuan/kWh58.81 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
37,282,021

11
11

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Electricity Use: Lighting
Sector/Subsector

Total
TJ/yr

Industrial (All)
Residential/Rural
Residential/Urban
Public/Commercial
Military Buildings

14,281
575
3,826
7,985
4,828

Fraction inLighting
Note 13

Total TJ/yr
Lighting

5%
50%
50%
50%
50%

TOTAL EST ELECT USE, RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING
Fractional Savings Potential, Lighting Improvements
Fraction of households lamps already CFLs
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Costs: CFL Replacement of Incandescent
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Residential Lighting
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTTOTAL EST ELECT USE, NON-RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING
Fractional Savings Potential, Lighting Improvements
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Costs: CFL Replacement of Incandescent
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Non-Residential Lighting
TOTAL EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT

714
287
1,913
3,993
2,414

$
$

2,200 TJ/yr
30.0%
20.0%
528 TJ/yr
0.10 Yuan/kWh58.81 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
31,054,972$$

7,120 TJ/yr
50.0%
3,560 TJ/yr
0.015 Yuan/kWh41.94 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
149,331,643$$

1,743 TJ/yr
2.44E+08 te-km
15,000 te-km
16,2963,737 TJ/yr
38,02254,31766%90%
43%2,140 TJ/yr
20,000716,988,248

14

14

15
15

Petroleum Fuel Use: Medium-Sized Trucks
Fuel Use: Civilian Transport/Freight (gasoline trucks only)
Freight transported by gasoline trucks
Average tonne-km per vehicle/yr
Implied number of 2.5 tonne trucks in use (civilian):
Fuel Use: Military Trucks (2 1/2 tonne only)
Total number 2 1/2 tonne military trucks in active service
Total number of 2.5 tonne trucks in service:
Fraction of trucks to be replaced
Fraction of energy use represented by trucks replaced
Fractional energy savings by replacing trucks
TOTAL ENERGY SAVED
Cost per truck to replace
TOTAL COST OF NEW TRUCKS

A1- 175

Rough Est.

Rough Est.
Rough Est.
16
17

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 Total coal use shown here does not include coal used as a non-energy feedstock in carbide production.
2 Assumes 10 percent or less of urban coal use is burned in individual cook ing stoves
3 1990 Value from Microsoft Encarta, 1994.
4 Assumes 12 percent discount rate and average 15 year lifetime for energy efficiency investments.
J. Sathaye (1992), "Economics of Improving Efficiency of China's Electricity Supply and Use: Are Efficiency
Investments Cost-effective?" (LBL--In draft form as of May 1992).
5 End-use fractions are rough assumptions
6 Assumes the following measures: Microcomputer control (8% increase in efficiency), insulation of piping(responsible for heat loss equal to 10% of energy use), and rennovation of boilers & furnaces (10 -15% increasein efficiency). Overall, assumes increase in average boiler energy efficiency from 50% to 65 or 70%, plus additionalsavings from other measures. 50% initial (existing boiler) efficiency estimate from document in authors' files [R1].
Savings fractions and costs for measures tak en from China studies:
M.Levine, L.Xueyi, "Energy Conservation Programs in the PRC", Aug, 1990, LBL-29211;
D. Yande, "An Analysis of the Potential in Investment-Cum-Energy Conservation in Chemical Industry in China";
and Levine et al, "China's Energy System: Historical Evolution, Current Issues, and Prospects", Ann. Rev
Energy Environ., 1992, 17:405-435.
Note that the savings potential assumed here, 37.5%, comports with the estimate (UN document) that theconservation potential in DPRK is 30 to 50% (and further, up to 20% can be saved at "little or no cost").
7 Assumes (based on sources in 6) 8% increase in efficiency from microprocessor controls at investment of1200 Y/tce-yr, 10% increase for insulation of piping (and similar furnace improvements) at 412 Y/tce-yr,
and 12% increase for boiler and furnace rennovation at 200 Y/tce-yr.
8 Assumes (based roughly on sources in 6) that a 15% efficiency increase with general boiler rennovations, startingfrom an average efficiency of 50%, is available for an investment of 250 Y/(tce/yr) (20 percent higher than value
estimated for industrial boilers in Levine et al).
9 Various estimates place the efficiency of chinese coal stoves/heaters at anywhere from 20 to 50 percent.
We have assumed that efficiency measures can increase the thermal efficiency of individual rural stove/heaters
and urban stoves from ave. of 30% to 40%, for a 25% reduction in coal use. Doc. in authors' files [R1] cites
an estimated DPRK residential coal-fired heating stove efficiency of 30%, and cook ing stove efficiency of 20%.
Efficiency investment of 100 Y/tce for domestic coal burning improvements from Levine et al (1992--see note 6).
It is not clear exactly which measures these improvements include; lik ely candidates include coal briquetting
and stove technology improvements.
10 Values are rough estimates. By way of comparison, 65 percent of the electricity used in the entire Chinese
economy has been estimated to be consumed in electric motors (Sathaye, 1992).
11 Assumes (based on Chinese experience) that motors can be upgraded from an average efficiency of 75% toan efficiency of 88% (the latter is close to standard US motors) at a (per unit) cost of 0.1 Y/k Wh.
Costs and efficiency improvements from Sathaye, 1992. Note that other improvements such as variable speed
electronic drives, improved valving and gearing, piping retrofits represent substantial additional savings potential.
12 Based on Chinese studies, assumes a 20% increase in thermal performance through two measures:a 30mm perlite cement mortar coat on inside of walls plus double glazing. Costs based on estimated
Payback of 2-3 years and mark et coal price of 110Y/tce. Source: S. Lang et al, "Energy Conservation
Standards for Spare Heating in Chinese Residential Buildings", 1992, LBL. Note that these two simple
measures do not begin to exhaust the cost effective measures available for building shell improvements. Other
estimates based on the Chinese situation show that 30 percent improvements in building energy efficiency are
possible for a modest 5% increase in building costs. (Source: "An Overview of Energy Demand andSupply in China", F. Liu et al, 1992 (LBL).)
13 Rough estimates. For comparison, lighting comprises about 28% of household electricity use in
Thailand, and 33% in the FSU, but in both cases use of household appliances, including cooling, refrigeration,and electric water and space heating, probably account for a larger fraction of energy use than in DPRK homes.
Nautilus' 1998 rural energy survey suggested that lighting comprised over 50 percent of total electricity use in thehouseholds in one rural village.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
14 Assumes that 50% of residential lighting energy is currently used in incandescent bulbs, that compact fluorescent (CFL)
bulbs save 75% of the energy of incandescent bulbs, and that CFLs can be used to replace incandescent bulbs
for roughly 80 percent of residential incandescent bulb lighting use. Costs based on Sathaye, 1992, andare based on setting up CFL factory in China at an investment cost of $5M to produces 3 million CFLs
per year at roughly 6.9Y/unit. Note that extensive use of CFLs will require that DPRK power grid be upgraded
to reduce voltage fluctuations and improve power factors. An addendum to this estimate is that the
DPRK apparently has placed CFLs, reportedly made in the DPRK, in virtually all DPRK households
during approximately 2005 - 2006. The DPRK reportedly deployed both imported bulbs, including
bulbs made by Phillips, but over time have developed DPRK-based manufacturing. News of this program isbased on a report provided by the DPRK delegation attending the 2006 "Asian Energy Security" work shop
organized by Nautilus with EETC of Tsinghua University, Beijing (November, 2006).
15 Assumption based primarily on industrialized-country costs (as in Von Hippel and Verzola, 1994).
16 Estimated based on our estimates for the fuel economy of 2 1/2 tonne truck s in the DPRK military and quoted
estimate from US Isuzu truck vendor for average fuel economy of new 2 1/2 tonne Isuzu (diesel) truck (11miles per gallon). Adjustment has been made for higher fuel energy content of diesel (vs. gasoline).
17 Cost of 2 1/2 tonne Isuzu truck in US was approximately $30,000 in the mid-1990s, but is lik ely at least
double that as of 2005. Assuming that a large portion of the price is profit for the vendor, import duties,
and profit for Isuzu, and further, that the cost of producing similar truck s in the DPRK (for example, underlicense to Isuzu) will be lower than in Japan due to lower wage rates and factor prices, we have estimated a cost
per truck of $20,000 US (2005 dollars). This may still be too high, as the average value of truck s imported
to the DPRK from China in 2005 was under $10,000 (though some or many of these units may have been used).
18 See, for example, "Inflation Calculator" on http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
19 The savings figures shown here may well be conservative (low) for DPRK conditions. In his presentation"Energy Efficiency Activities in the DPRK and Opportunities for Rationalization of Energy Use", prepared
as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Work ing Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Prof. Jan Jasiewicz notes the results of energy audits in industrial installations in the
DPRK where potential savings were found to be between 15 and 60 percent, with payback times (presumably undermark et prices for energy commodities) of less than three years.

A1- 177

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:POTENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS: ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

BASED ON YEAR 2009 ACTIVITIES
1/4/2012

GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS/CONVERSION FACTORS
Currency Conversion: 1990 Yuan to 1990 $US:
Fraction of total investment represented by annualized CCE:
Inflator to convert 1990 costs to 2009 costs:
Energy Conversion Factor:
Energy Conversion Factor:

4.755
15%
164%
29.3 GJ/tce
0.0036 GJ/kWh

Note 1
Note 2
Note 10Sources/Notes:
Electricity Supply Improvements:
Coal and HFO Consumption in Electricity Generation Boilers
Fractional Savings Potential, Boilers:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL COAL/HFO SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Boilers
ESTIMATED ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT: Boilers

67,357 TJ/yr
30.0%
20,207 TJ/yr
537 Yuan/(tce/yr)$
6.33 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)$ 127,811,722

Own Use of electricity in Coal and HFO-Fired Power Plants
Potential reduction in "Own Use" in Coal/HFO-Fired Plants:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Plant Self-Use
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Plant Self-Use
ESTIMATED ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT: Self Use

1,260 TJ/yr
50.0%
630 TJ/yr
0.12 Yuan/kWh$76.64 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)$ 79,164,953

Emergency Losses of electricity in Coal/HFO-Fired Power Plants
1,210 TJ/yr
Potential red. in Emergency Losses in Coal-Fired Plants:
90%
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGS
1,089 TJ/yr
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Reduction in Emergency Losses
0.075 Yuan/kWh
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Reduction in Emergency Losses$
47.90 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)
EST. ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT: Emer. Losses$ 52,161,262
Transmission and Distribution Losses of Electricity
Potential reduction in Transmission and Distribution Losses:
ESTIMATED POTENTIAL ELECTRICITY SAVINGSPer Unit Upgrade Costs, Electricity T&D
Per Unit Upgrade Costs, Electricity T&D
ESTIMATED ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT: T&D
DPRK Wind Power Resource
Total Wind Power Generation Implemented, 2012 to 2020
Capacity factor of Wind generators
Energy Produced by Wind Generators (year 10)
Energy Produced by Wind Generators (year 10)
Installed Capital Cost of Wind Generators (per unit capacity)
Variable Operations and Maintenance Costs
Total Capital Costs of installed Wind Generators
Capital Costs, Wind Power, per unit output
Total of Other Generation Costs (year 10)

A1- 178

15,020 TJ/yr
37.5%
5,633 TJ/yr
0.075 Yuan/kWh$47.90 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)$ 269,820,015
MW
500 MW
25%
1,095 GWhe/yr
3,942 TJ/yr$
1,500 per kW$
0.016 per KWhe
$ 750,000,000$
190 /(GJ/yr) ($2009)$ 17,958,000 per yr ($2009)

3
3

4

6
6

7
5
5

???

7

8
9

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sources/Notes:
1 1990 Value from Microsoft Encarta, 1994.
2 Assumes 12 percent discount rate and average 15 year lifetime for energy efficiency investments.
J. Sathaye (1992), "Economics of Improving Efficiency of China's Electricity Supply and Use: Are Efficiency
Investments Cost-effective?" (LBL--In draft form as of May 1992).
3 Assumes the following measures: Microcomputer control (8% increase in efficiency), insulation of piping(responsible for heat loss equal to 10% of energy use), and rennovation of boilers (10 -15% increasein efficiency). Overall, assumes increase in average boiler energy efficiency from 55-60% to 75-80%.
Savings fractions and costs for measures tak en from China studies on industrial boilers; we assume similarsavings will be available for DPRK utility boilers (probably at a lower price, due to economies of scale).
Sources: M.Levine, L.Xueyi, "Energy Conservation Programs in the PRC", Aug, 1990, LBL-29211;
D. Yande, "An Analysis of the Potential in Investment-Cum-Energy Conservation in Chemical Industry in China";
and Levine et al, "China's Energy System: Historical Evolution, Current Issues, and Prospects", Ann. Rev
Energy Environ., 1992, 17:405-435.
Note that the savings potential assumed here, 30%, comports with the estimate (UN document) that theconservation potential in DPRK is 30 to 50% (and further, up to 20% can be saved at "little or no cost").
4 Assumes Own use can be reduced from current (estimated) 9.0% to 4.5% of gross generation. Savings
fraction range and cost range from Sathaye, 1992.
5 Assumes Transmission and Distribution losses can be reduced from current (reported) 16% to 10% of net
generation. Savings fraction range and cost range from Sathaye, 1992.
6 Assumes that emergency losses can be nearly eliminated by plant and T&D improvements, and thatmeasures to reduce emergency losses will be available at a cost per k Wh saved similar to that fortransmission and distribution improvements. In fact, reduction in emergency losses may occur as a result of
boiler and T&D improvements even without any additional outlay.
7 Rough estimate. By way of comparison, Cavallo, Hock and Smith ("Wind Energy: Technology and Economics",
in Renewable Energy, Sources for Fuels and Electricity, T.B. Johansson et al, 1993. Island Press, Washington, DC)
cite capacity figures of 25 and 26.7 percent for California and Denmark , respectively.
8 Assumes that wind machines can be produced in DPRK under license to an existing manufacturer, and/or
can be imported from manufacturers in China (for example), at least as the program matures. For comparison,
US installed wind power capacity costs in the 2009-2011 time frame was about $2000 per k W, withprice quotes for equipment (uninstalled capacity) ranging from $900 to $1600 per k W. As most US wind powerpurchases were probably larger-capacity machines in recent years, and North Korean wind machines, for various
reasons (including logistics of installation and grid-compatibility issues, among others) migth be smaller, thisestimate could be either a bit high or low for the wind devices actually deployed in the DPRK. For figures on the
US wind mark et, see, for example, 2010 Wind Technologies Mark et Report , primary authors Ryan Wiser and Mark Bolinger,
Lawrence Berk eley National Laboratory, LBNL Report Number 4820e, dated June, 2011, and available as
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/51783.pdf.
9 Rough estimate. Source above shows recent O&M costs in the US of about $10/MWhe, but for larger windturbines than would lik ely be installed in the US. Still, though O&M costs are labor-intensive as opposed to material-intensive,these costs may well be less in the DPRK.
10 See, for example, "Inflation Calculator" on http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.

A1- 179

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEBACK-UP CALCULATIONS AND DATA:POTENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS: SUMMARY
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

BASED ON YEAR 2009 ACTIVITIES

1/4/2012

Inflator for 2009 to 2009 (Note 1 ):1.000

MEASURES TO SAVE COAL:

MeasureIndustrial Boiler and Furnace Improvements
Residential and Public/Commercial/Military Boiler Impr.
Building Envelope Improvements
Solar Water Heating
Domestic Stove/Heater Improvements
Electric Utility Boiler Improvements
TOTALS
Avoided Losses of Coal During Transport:
TOTAL COAL SUPPLY SAVINGS
Fraction of 2009 Total Coal Supply
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of Coal Supply Savings
Investment required, $ per tce/yr of Coal Supply Savings

Estimated Energy
Total EstimatedEnergy Savings
Investment
Potential, TJ/yr
Cost, $US 2009
41,003$ 238,792,210
21,681$70,495,862
14,517$43,268,112
7,277$ 130,813,077
4,882$
5,291,033
20,207$ 127,811,722
109,567 TJ/yr $ 616,472,016
1,096 TJ/yr
110,663 TJ/yr
31.1%
$
5.57
$
163

MEASURES TO SAVE/GENERATE ELECTRICITY:
Estimated Energy
Total EstimatedEnergy Savings
Investment
MeasurePotential, TJ/yr
Cost, $US 2009
Industrial Motors and Drives
1,367$
80,361,607
Motors and Drives in other Sectors
634$
37,282,021
Residential Lighting
528$
31,054,972
Non-residential Lighting
3,560$ 149,331,643
Own Use reduction in Power Plants
630$
79,164,953
Reduction of Emergency Use in Power Plants
1,089$
52,161,262
Transmission and Distribution Improvements
5,633$ 269,820,015
Wind-powered Electricity Generation
3,942$ 750,000,000
TOTALS
17,382 TJ/yr $ 1,449,176,474
Additional Avoided T&D Losses (based on 2009 Rates)
1,688 TJ/yr
TOTAL ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SAVINGS/GENERATION
19,070 TJ/yr
Fraction of 2005 Total Electricity Generation
33.6%
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of Electricity Supply Savings/Generation$
75.99
Investment required, $ per MWh/yr of Electricity Supply Savings/Generation$
274

MEASURE TO SAVE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS:
Estimated Energy
Energy Savings
Potential, TJ/yr
2,140
7.4%
26.4%

MeasureImprovements in 2 1/2 tonne truck fleet
Fraction of 2009 Total Refined Products Use
Fract. of 2009 Total Refined Prod. Use in Road Transport
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of refined products Savings
Investment required, $ per toe/yr of petroleum products Savings$$

ESTIMATED EMISSIONS REDUCTION (Rough Calculations)SulfurOxides(tonnes)
MEASURES TO SAVE COAL
MEASURES TO SAVE ELECTRICITY

50,41013,257

Nitrogen
Oxides(tonnes)

31,403
8,379

A1- 180

Total EstimatedInvestment
Cost, $US 2009
716,988,248

Carbon Dioxide(tonnes)

7,890,272
2,120,241335.1014,021Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Estimates of Acid Gas and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 1990
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED WOOD/
PROD. BIOMASS

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

73.08
0.01
0
0.00350.299
0.24

CHARCOAL

000.016 0.001867
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel1990
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED WOOD/
PROD. BIOMASSCHARCOAL

1.25E+08
2.20E+03
7.18E+05
5.83E+03
7.91E+05
4.93E+05

1.00E+07
1.32E+03
0.00E+00
4.61E+02
3.94E+04
3.15E+04

0.00E+00
5.55E+00
2.50E+02
6.94E+01
0.00E+00
1.20E+03

0.00E+00
2.18E+03
0.00E+00
9.52E+02
0.00E+00
1.65E+04

TOTAL
1.35E+08
5.70E+03
7.18E+05
7.31E+03
8.31E+05
5.42E+05

Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category

TOTAL

CARBONDIOXIDE
1.35E+08

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00 7.18E+05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00 6.95E+05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 2.35E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

3.65E+07 1.14E+03 1.77E+03 2.29E+05

1.45E+05

2.97E+07
6.01E+06
0.00E+00
3.31E+05
4.36E+05
0.00E+00

1.87E+05
3.85E+04
0.00E+00
2.11E+03
1.78E+03
0.00E+00

1.17E+05
2.40E+04
8.40E+02
1.32E+03
1.42E+03
0.00E+00

9.84E+07 4.81E+03 5.54E+03 6.02E+05

3.97E+05

6.61E+07
2.77E+06
1.85E+07
1.30E+06
3.37E+05
4.05E+06
3.12E+06
4.35E+05
1.73E+06

2.63E+05
9.26E+03
8.44E+04
1.03E+04
1.18E+03
1.53E+04
1.26E+04
1.42E+03
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLossesENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYNITROUS SULFURMETHANE OXIDEOXIDES
7.24E+05 7.31E+03 8.31E+05

7.21E+02
1.07E+02
2.50E+02
6.54E+00
5.96E+01
0.00E+00

1.45E+03
4.06E+02
1.77E+03
7.86E+02
3.33E+01
2.15E+02
8.26E+01
5.95E+01
0.00E+00

A1- 181

1.40E+03
2.84E+02
4.86E+01
1.56E+01
2.09E+01
0.00E+00

3.13E+03
1.44E+02
1.50E+03
3.76E+02
1.61E+01
1.92E+02
1.59E+02
2.08E+01
0.00E+00

4.19E+05
1.13E+04
1.18E+05
7.45E+03
1.63E+03
2.31E+04
2.00E+04
1.78E+03
0.00E+00

NITROGENOXIDES
5.42E+05

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO 2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SO x , CO 2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SO x emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SO x emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SO x .
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (SO x , NO x , and CO 2 ) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NO x emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NO x
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NO x factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NO x emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NO x emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NO x from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF AGGREGATE SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
731
Diesel772
Heavy Oil
1,069
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
263
LPG
276
Aviation Gasoline
26
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ
Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x
Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 182

kTE
782
799
1026
275
312
28

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.150
100%
2
0.299

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 1996
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

73.90
0.01
0
0.0035
0.379
0.24

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

000.016 0.001867
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel
1996
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

6.44E+07
1.14E+03
3.72E+05
3.03E+03
4.11E+05
2.56E+05

5.29E+06
7.06E+02
0.00E+00
2.47E+02
2.32E+04
1.69E+04

0.00E+00
2.41E+03
0.00E+00
1.06E+03
0.00E+00
1.83E+04

0.00E+00
4.43E+00
1.99E+02
5.54E+01
0.00E+00
9.58E+02

TOTAL
6.97E+07
4.27E+03
3.72E+05
4.39E+03
4.34E+05
2.92E+05

METHANE
3.76E+05

NITROUS
OXIDE
4.39E+03

SULFUROXIDES
4.34E+05

NITROGENOXIDES
2.92E+05

Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category

TOTAL

CARBONDIOXIDE
6.97E+07

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00 3.72E+05

0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00 3.65E+05
0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 6.40E+03

0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

2.52E+07 8.92E+02

1.23E+03 1.59E+05

9.98E+04

2.17E+07
3.12E+06
0.00E+00
2.47E+05
1.66E+05
0.00E+00

6.08E+02
5.57E+01
1.99E+02
5.83E+00
2.27E+01
0.00E+00

1.02E+03 1.37E+05
1.47E+02 2.00E+04
3.88E+01 0.00E+00
1.17E+01 1.57E+03
7.93E+00 6.78E+02
0.00E+00 0.00E+00

8.51E+04
1.25E+04
6.70E+02
9.78E+02
5.41E+02
0.00E+00

4.45E+07 3.58E+03

3.16E+03 2.75E+05

1.92E+05

2.45E+07
1.21E+06
1.17E+07
6.01E+05
1.21E+05
3.38E+06
2.51E+06
0.00E+00
4.27E+05

1.16E+03 1.56E+05
6.36E+01 4.94E+03
1.39E+03 7.49E+04
1.95E+02 3.60E+03
5.78E+00 6.10E+02
1.99E+02 1.94E+04
1.37E+02 1.60E+04
0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00

9.75E+04
4.05E+03
6.13E+04
5.20E+03
4.32E+02
1.35E+04
1.03E+04
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production

Own UseLossesENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

A1- 183

5.22E+02
1.79E+02
2.11E+03
4.04E+02
1.08E+01
2.62E+02
8.77E+01
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SOx, CO2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SOx emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SOx emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SOx.
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (COx, NOx, and CO2) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NOx emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NOx
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NOx factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NOx emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NOx emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NOx from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
400
Diesel317
Heavy Oil
788
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
51
LPG
87
Aviation Gasoline
21
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x

kTE
428
328
756
53
98
22

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.190
100%

Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

2

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 184

0.379

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 2000
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &
COKE

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

REFINED
PROD.

73.69
0.01
0
0.0035
0.387
0.24

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

000.016 0.0018667
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel2000
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

3.18E+07
5.65E+02
1.85E+05
1.50E+03
2.03E+05
1.27E+05

4.00E+06
5.37E+02
0.00E+00
1.88E+02
1.76E+04
1.28E+04

0.00E+00
2.45E+03
0.00E+00
1.07E+03
0.00E+00
1.85E+04

0.00E+00
3.39E+00
1.53E+02
4.24E+01
0.00E+00
7.33E+02

TOTAL
3.58E+07
3.55E+03
1.85E+05
2.80E+03
2.21E+05
1.59E+05

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category
CARBONDIOXIDEMETHANENITROUSOXIDESULFUROXIDESNITROGENOXIDES

TOTAL

3.58E+07

1.88E+05

2.80E+03

2.21E+05

1.59E+05

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00 1.85E+05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00 1.80E+05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
0.00E+00 4.97E+03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

5.94E+06 4.15E+02 3.11E+02 3.64E+04

2.32E+04

4.21E+06
1.54E+06
0.00E+00
1.23E+05
7.72E+04
0.00E+00

2.55E+04
9.84E+03
0.00E+00
7.52E+02
3.16E+02
0.00E+00

1.59E+04
6.13E+03
5.13E+02
4.68E+02
2.52E+02
0.00E+00

2.99E+07 3.29E+03 2.49E+03 1.84E+05

1.35E+05

1.50E+07
6.33E+05
9.22E+06
4.58E+05
1.01E+05
2.83E+06
1.50E+06
0.00E+00
1.56E+05

5.91E+04
2.13E+03
5.16E+04
4.18E+03
3.59E+02
1.16E+04
6.34E+03
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production

Own UseLossesENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

A1- 185

2.19E+02
2.74E+01
1.53E+02
5.68E+00
1.06E+01
0.00E+00
3.74E+02
9.47E+01
2.13E+03
3.38E+02
9.00E+00
2.63E+02
7.74E+01
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

1.99E+02
7.25E+01
2.97E+01
5.81E+00
3.70E+00
0.00E+00
7.09E+02
3.39E+01
1.30E+03
1.61E+02
4.80E+00
1.86E+02
9.25E+01
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

9.39E+04
2.59E+03
5.87E+04
2.72E+03
5.06E+02
1.63E+04
9.57E+03
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SOx, CO2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SOx emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SOx emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SOx.
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (COx, NOx, and CO2) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NOx emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NOx
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NOx factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NOx emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NOx emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NOx from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
196
Diesel
283
Heavy Oil
646
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
40
LPG
148
Aviation Gasoline
16
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x

kTE
209
293
620
42
167
17

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.193
100%

Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

2

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 186

0.387

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

A1- 187

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 2005
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

73.62
0.01
0
0.0035
0.308
0.24

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

000.016 0.0018667
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel2005
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

3.68E+07
6.54E+02
2.75E+05
1.73E+03
2.35E+05
1.46E+05

3.44E+06
4.63E+02
0.00E+00
1.62E+02
1.39E+04
1.11E+04

0.00E+00
2.77E+03
0.00E+00
1.21E+03
0.00E+00
2.09E+04

0.00E+00
3.43E+00
1.54E+02
4.28E+01
0.00E+00
7.41E+02

TOTAL
4.02E+07
3.89E+03
2.75E+05
3.15E+03
2.49E+05
1.79E+05

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category

TOTAL

CARBONDIOXIDE
4.02E+07

METHANE
2.79E+05

NITROUS
OXIDE
3.15E+03

SULFUROXIDES
2.49E+05

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00

2.75E+05

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

2.33E+05
0.00E+00
4.27E+04

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

1.09E+07

4.37E+02

5.46E+02

6.83E+04

4.35E+04

8.64E+06
1.99E+06
0.00E+00
1.86E+05
1.01E+05
0.00E+00

2.30E+02
3.55E+01
1.54E+02
4.00E+00
1.38E+01
0.00E+00

4.08E+02
9.39E+01
3.00E+01
8.79E+00
4.83E+00
0.00E+00

5.39E+04
1.27E+04
0.00E+00
1.18E+03
4.13E+02
0.00E+00

3.40E+04
7.94E+03
5.18E+02
7.39E+02
3.30E+02
0.00E+00

ENERGY DEMAND

2.93E+07

3.60E+03

2.60E+03

1.80E+05

1.35E+05

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

1.50E+07
8.67E+05
8.25E+06
5.69E+05
1.11E+05
2.69E+06
1.67E+06
0.00E+00
1.94E+05

3.44E+02
1.33E+02
2.32E+03
4.07E+02
1.00E+01
2.71E+02
1.15E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

7.08E+02
4.77E+01
1.34E+03
1.95E+02
5.27E+00
1.83E+02
1.16E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

9.44E+04
3.55E+03
5.25E+04
3.42E+03
5.53E+02
1.53E+04
1.07E+04
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

5.93E+04
2.94E+03
4.93E+04
5.11E+03
3.93E+02
1.11E+04
7.30E+03
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production

Own UseLosses

A1- 188

NITROGENOXIDES
1.79E+05

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SOx, CO2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SOx emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SOx emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SOx.
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (COx, NOx, and CO2) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NOx emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NOx
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NOx factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NOx emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NOx emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NOx from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
170
Diesel386
Heavy Oil
334
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
72
LPG
60
Aviation Gasoline
11
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x

kTE
182
400
321
75
68
12

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.154
100%

Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

2

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 189

0.308

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 2008
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

73.62
0.01
0
0.0035
0.308
0.24

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

000.016 0.0018667
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel2008
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

3.48E+07
6.18E+02
2.62E+05
1.64E+03
2.22E+05
1.38E+05

3.85E+06
5.20E+02
0.00E+00
1.82E+02
1.57E+04
1.24E+04

0.00E+00
3.09E+03
0.00E+00
1.35E+03
0.00E+00
2.34E+04

0.00E+00
3.29E+00
1.48E+02
4.11E+01
0.00E+00
7.11E+02

TOTAL
3.87E+07
4.23E+03
2.62E+05
3.21E+03
2.38E+05
1.75E+05

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category

TOTAL

CARBONDIOXIDE
3.87E+07

METHANE
2.66E+05

NITROUS
OXIDE
3.21E+03

SULFUROXIDES
2.38E+05

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00

2.62E+05

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

2.27E+05
0.00E+00
3.52E+04

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

1.06E+07

4.85E+02

5.28E+02

6.49E+04

4.17E+04

8.37E+06
1.94E+06
0.00E+00
1.64E+05
1.02E+05
0.00E+00

2.84E+02
3.46E+01
1.48E+02
5.01E+00
1.39E+01
0.00E+00

3.95E+02
9.15E+01
2.88E+01
7.74E+00
4.88E+00
0.00E+00

5.11E+04
1.24E+04
0.00E+00
1.01E+03
4.17E+02
0.00E+00

3.25E+04
7.73E+03
4.97E+02
6.41E+02
3.33E+02
0.00E+00

ENERGY DEMAND

2.81E+07

3.89E+03

2.68E+03

1.73E+05

1.33E+05

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

1.46E+07
9.20E+05
7.24E+06
5.82E+05
1.11E+05
2.62E+06
1.80E+06
0.00E+00
1.89E+05

3.30E+02
1.40E+02
2.60E+03
4.23E+02
9.98E+00
2.62E+02
1.24E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

6.93E+02
5.04E+01
1.43E+03
2.03E+02
5.26E+00
1.79E+02
1.24E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

9.25E+04
3.77E+03
4.60E+04
3.52E+03
5.52E+02
1.50E+04
1.15E+04
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

5.80E+04
3.12E+03
4.75E+04
5.30E+03
3.93E+02
1.09E+04
7.83E+03
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production

Own UseLosses

A1- 190

NITROGENOXIDES
1.75E+05

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SOx, CO2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SOx emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SOx emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SOx.
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (COx, NOx, and CO2) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NOx emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NOx
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NOx factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NOx emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NOx emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NOx from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
170
Diesel386
Heavy Oil
334
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
72
LPG
60
Aviation Gasoline
11
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x

kTE
182
400
321
75
68
12

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.154
100%

Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

2

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 191

0.308

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATEESTIMATED GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEAR 2009
Prepared By David Von Hippel
Date Last Modified:

1/20/2012EMISSION FACTORS: kg/GJ fuel combustion/production
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &COKE

REFINED
PROD.

95.3
0.00170.534
0.0045
0.611
0.38

72.87
0.01
0
0.0035
0.265
0.24

WOOD/
BIOMASSCHARCOAL

000.016 0.0018667
0
0.084
0.007
0.007
0
0
0.121
0.121

Notes
1,4,7
1,2
1,3
1,2
4,5
1,2,6

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Fuel2009
GHG/POLLUTANTCarbon Dioxide from Combustion
Methane from Combustion
Methane from Production
Nitrous Oxide from Combustion
Sulfur Oxides from Combustion
Nitrogen Oxides from Combustion

COAL &
COKE
3.34E+07
5.94E+02
2.88E+05
1.57E+03
2.14E+05
1.33E+05

REFINED
PROD.
2.53E+06
3.41E+02
0.00E+00
1.19E+02
1.00E+04
8.15E+03

WOOD/
BIOMASS
0.00E+00
3.11E+03
0.00E+00
1.36E+03
0.00E+00
2.35E+04

CHARCOAL
0.00E+00
3.34E+00
1.50E+02
4.18E+01
0.00E+00
7.23E+02

TOTAL
3.60E+07
4.05E+03
2.88E+05
3.10E+03
2.24E+05
1.65E+05

SUMMARY EMISSIONS RESULTS: Tonnes of Emissions by Balance Category
CARBONDIOXIDEMETHANENITROUSOXIDESULFUROXIDESNITROGENOXIDES

TOTAL

3.60E+07

2.92E+05

3.10E+03

2.24E+05

1.65E+05

ENERGY SUPPLY

0.00E+00

2.88E+05

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

2.38E+05
0.00E+00
4.99E+04

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

0.00E+00
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

8.62E+06

3.58E+02

4.36E+02

5.40E+04

3.46E+04

6.31E+06
2.03E+06
0.00E+00
1.68E+05
1.00E+05
0.00E+00

1.54E+02
3.63E+01
1.50E+02
3.35E+00
1.37E+01
0.00E+00

2.98E+02
9.60E+01
2.93E+01
7.94E+00
4.80E+00
0.00E+00

3.95E+04
1.30E+04
0.00E+00
1.07E+03
4.10E+02
0.00E+00

2.49E+04
8.12E+03
5.06E+02
6.69E+02
3.28E+02
0.00E+00

2.73E+07

3.84E+03

2.66E+03

1.70E+05

1.31E+05

1.41E+07
7.08E+05
7.34E+06
5.57E+05
9.77E+04
2.55E+06
1.83E+06
0.00E+00
1.31E+05

2.98E+02
1.07E+02
2.64E+03
4.07E+02
8.88E+00
2.52E+02
1.27E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

6.69E+02
3.83E+01
1.45E+03
1.96E+02
4.65E+00
1.76E+02
1.26E+02
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

8.97E+04
2.90E+03
4.67E+04
3.37E+03
4.87E+02
1.48E+04
1.17E+04
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

5.62E+04
2.39E+03
4.83E+04
5.09E+03
3.47E+02
1.06E+04
7.98E+03
0.00E+00
0.00E+00

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSF.
Electricity Generation
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production

Own UseLossesENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

A1- 192

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes/Sources:
1 Carbon dioxide emission factors for coal and refined products, and all wood and charcoal factors
From Greenhouse Gas Inventory Work book : IPCC Draft Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories, Volume 2 . IPCC/OCED Joint Programme, published by UNEP/WMO. "Final Draft" Version
2 Most non-CO2 emission factors derived from a variety of sources used by the authors in earlier work .
3 Production of methane from coal mining assumes a mid range estimate (from source 1) for production
and post-mining emissions of 14 cubic meters methane per tonne of coal.
4 SOx, CO2 emission factors for wood/biomass and charcoal considered to be zero on the assumption thatbiomass fuels are used sustainably in the DPRK and have negligible sulfur contents.
5 SOx emission factor for petroleum products estimated as shown below. SOx emission factor for coal
combustion assumes that lignite coal is 0.5% sulfur, anthracite is 0.75% sulfur by weight. Analyses ofcoal from the Anju field (lignite) show sulfur contents ranging from 0.2 to 1.2 %S (Document in authors' files[HA1-VO1]). All of the sulfur in both oil-based and coal fuels is assumed to be emitted as SOx.
Sulfur contents for petroleum products are generally tak en from Kato, et al (1991) Analysis of the Structureof Energy Consumption and the Dynamics of Emissions of Atmospheric Species Related to the Global
Environmental Change (COx, NOx, and CO2) in Asia . NISTEP Report No. 21, page 37.
6 NOx emission factors for coal are derived from Kato et al, 1991 (reference as in 5, p. 39) assuming NOx
factors of 7.5 k g/te for anthracite, 6.38 k g/te for brown coal. These are listed as factors for industry, andare assumed to be representative. NOx factors for coal-fired utility boilers are shown in the source
document as somewhat higher than these figures, and factors for residential coal consumption are lower.
NOx emission factors for petroleum products were assumed to be 10 k g/te. NOx emission factors varyconsiderably by fuel type and usage (NOx from transport fuels is an order of magnitude higher thanfrom residential fuels, for example); the figure used here is a central estimate of factors listed in
Kato et al, 1991, page 41.
7 Use of coal and oil for fertilizer production, accounted for in the energy balances under "non-energy" products,
emit CO 2 to the atmosphere either during fertilizer production or (in the case of Urea), shortly after application.
As a consequence, CO 2 from non-energy consumption of fuels for fertilizer use is accoiunted for by using
the coal and petroleum emission factors above. See, for example,
A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production , Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
Research and Development Division, State Forests of New South Wales, Cooperative Research Centre
for Greenhouse Accounting, dated June 2004, and available as
http://www.ieabioenergy-task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer%20Production_July2004.pdf.
Other non-energy uses of oil were assumed to be mainly lubricants, with a carbon content
that is20% oxidized to CO 2 . This is not quite accurate, assome non-energy uses or oil are for asphalt, and those uses emit relatively little CO 2 directly, but
produce NMVOCs (non-methane volatile organic compounds) that oxidize to carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
We thus use the 20% factor, from "Chapter 5: Non-Energy Products from Fuels and Solvent Use", of 2006 IPCC
The 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Volume 3, Industrial Processes andProduct Use , available as
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/3_Volume3/V3_5_Ch5_Non_Energy_Products.pdf.
It is recognized that there will lik ely be some non-CO 2 emissions related to the use of non-energy products,
perhaps especially sulfur oxide emissions from coal use in fertilizer production, but providing an estimate ofthose emissions depends on k nowledge of how the sulfur component of coal is managed in coal-based
fertilizer production--for example, is it captured for use in products such as sulfuric acid, or emitted?--thatis currently unavailable to us, so these non-CO 2 emissions are set at zero for now.

ESTIMATE OF SOx EMISSION FACTOR FOR REFINED PRODUCTS
ProductkTOE
Gasoline
202
Diesel
247
Heavy Oil214
Kerosene/Jet Fuel
59
LPG
59
Aviation Gasoline
11
Weighted Average: Sulfur content in kg/GJ

TE/TOE
1.07
1.035
0.96
1.045
1.13
1.07

Fraction of Sulfur emitted as SO x

kTE
216
256
205
62
67
12

%S
0.12
0.4
1.5
0.032
0.00016
0.04
0.132
100%

Mass ratio of SOx (as SO2) to S

2

Weighted Average SOx emission factor: kg/GJ

A1- 1930.265

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAUTILUS INSTITUTE
ESTIMATED/PROJECTED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCESDEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
2010/2011 UPDATESUMMARY GHG AND ACID GAS EMISSIONS FROM FUELSPRODUCTION AND COMBUSTION FOR THE YEARS 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
Estimate of Sulfur Oxide Emissions, Thousand Tonnes of Sulfur Dioxide
YEAR
Source of Emissions

1990*

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

Electricity Generation

186.7

136.5

25.5

53.9

51.1

District Heat Production

2.1

1.6

0.8

1.2

1.0

1.1

Coal Production/Preparation

38.5

20.0

9.8

12.7

12.4

13.0

Own UseIndustrial Sector

39.5

1.8

0.7

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.4

418.8

155.6

93.9

94.4

92.5

89.7

Transport Sector

11.3

4.9

2.6

3.5

3.8

2.9

Residential Sector

117.6

74.9

58.7

52.5

46.0

46.7

Agricultural Sector

7.5

3.6

2.7

3.4

3.5

3.4

Fisheries Sector

1.6

0.6

0.5

0.6

0.6

0.5

Military Sector

23.1

19.4

16.3

15.3

15.0

14.8

Public/Commercial

20.0

16.0

9.6

10.7

11.5

11.7

TOTAL*

830.8

433.9

220.7

248.8

237.7

223.6

* Total for 1990 includes emissions from non-specified consumption at 1.8 thousand tonnes.

Estimate of Nitrogen Oxide Emissions, Thousand Tonnes
YEAR
Source of Emissions
1990*
1996
2000
2005
2008
Electricity Generation
117.5
85.1
15.9
34.0
32.5
District Heat Production
1.3
1.0
0.5
0.7
0.6
Coal Production/Preparation
24.0
12.5
6.1
7.9
7.7
Own Use
1.4
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.3
Charcoal Production
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
Industrial Sector
262.6
97.5
59.1
59.3
58.0
Transport Sector
9.3
4.0
2.1
2.9
3.1
Residential Sector
84.4
61.3
51.6
49.3
47.5
Agricultural Sector
10.3
5.2
4.2
5.1
5.3
Fisheries Sector
1.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
Military Sector
15.3
13.5
11.6
11.1
10.9
Public/Commercial
12.6
10.3
6.3
7.3
7.8
TOTAL*
542.1
292.0
158.6
179.0
174.8
* Value for 1990 includes emissions from non-specified consumption at 1.4 thousand tonnes.

2009
24.9
0.7
8.1
0.3
0.5
56.2
2.4
48.3
5.1
0.3
10.6
8.0
165.4

Estimate of Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Million Tonnes
YEAR
Source of Emissions
1990*
1996
2000
2005
2008
Electricity Generation
29.7
21.7
4.2
8.6
8.4
District Heat Production
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
Coal Production/Preparation
6.0
3.1
1.5
2.0
1.9
Own Use
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
Industrial Sector
66.1
24.5
15.0
15.0
14.6
Transport Sector
2.8
1.2
0.6
0.9
0.9
Residential Sector
18.5
11.7
9.2
8.3
7.2
Agricultural Sector
1.3
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.6
Fisheries Sector
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Military Sector
4.0
3.4
2.8
2.7
2.6
Public/Commercial
3.1
2.5
1.5
1.7
1.8
Non-Energy
1.7
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
TOTAL*
134.9
69.7
35.8
40.2
38.7
* Value for 1990 includes emissions from non-specified consumption at 0.4 million tonnes.

A1- 194

2009
6.3
0.2
2.0
0.1
14.1
0.7
7.3
0.6
0.1
2.5
1.8
0.1
36.0

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of Methane Emissions, Thousand Tonnes
YEAR
Source of Emissions
1990*
1996
2000
2005
2008
Electricity Generation
0.7
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.3
District Heat Production
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Coal Production/Preparation
718.3
371.9
184.7
275.3
261.8
Own Use
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Charcoal Production
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
Industrial Sector
1.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
Transport Sector
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
Residential Sector
1.8
2.1
2.1
2.3
2.6
Agricultural Sector
0.8
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.4
Fisheries Sector
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Military Sector
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
Public/Commercial
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
TOTAL*
724.1
376.3
188.3
279.3
266.2
* Value for 1990 includes emissions from non-specified consumption at 0.06 thousand tonnes.

2009
0.2
0.0
287.9
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.1
2.6
0.4
0.0
0.3
0.1
292.0

Estimate of Nitrous Oxide Emissions, Thousand Tonnes
YEAR
Source of Emissions
1990*
1996
2000
2005
2008
Electricity Generation
1.40
1.02
0.20
0.41
0.40
District Heat Production
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
Coal Production/Preparation
0.28
0.15
0.07
0.09
0.09
Own Use
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
Charcoal Production
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
Industrial Sector
3.13
1.16
0.71
0.71
0.69
Transport Sector
0.14
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.05
Residential Sector
1.50
1.39
1.30
1.34
1.43
Agricultural Sector
0.38
0.19
0.16
0.20
0.20
Fisheries Sector
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
Military Sector
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.18
0.18
Public/Commercial
0.16
0.14
0.09
0.12
0.12
TOTAL*
7.31
4.39
2.80
3.15
3.21
* Value for 1990 includes emissions from non-specified consumption at 0.02 thousand tonnes.

2009
0.30
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.03
0.67
0.04
1.45
0.20
0.00
0.18
0.13
3.10

Estimate of Coal Ash Production, Thousand Tonnes
Assumes that coal is on average

20% ashSource of Emissions
1990
1996
Electricity Generation
3,200
2,207
District Heat Production
36
26
Coal Production/Preparation
670
348
Industrial Sector
7,135
2,661
Residential Sector
2,011
1,293
Agricultural Sector
104
55
Military Sector
317
269
Public/Commercial
347
278
Non-Energy
146
36
TOTAL
13,965
7,174
Solid Wastes from SOx controls (dry weight CaSO4)

YEAR
2000
2005
333
891
10
20
171
222
1,571
1,599
1,010
902
41
52
226
208
166
185
11
16
3,539
4,096

A1- 195

2008
805
16
216
1,569
789
55
208
198
16
3,873

2009
664
18
227
1,535
804
53
208
201
11
3,720
-

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Sensitivity Analysis: Total Coal Ash (Thousand Tonnes) vs. Ash Fraction Assumed
YEAR
Ash Fraction
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
13,965
7,174
3,539
4,096
3,873
10%
6,982
3,587
1,769
2,048
1,936
15%
10,474
5,380
2,654
3,072
2,905
20%
13,965
7,174
3,539
4,096
3,873
25%
17,456
8,967
4,424
5,120
4,841
30%
20,947
10,761
5,308
6,143
5,809
35%
24,43812,554
6,193
7,167
6,777

2009
3,720
1,860
2,790
3,720
4,650
5,580
6,511

Thousand Tonnes Ash

30,00025,000

1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

20,00015,00010,000

5,000

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Ash Fraction in Coal
SUMMARY OF ACID GAS AND CO2 EMISSIONS
SulfurNitrogen
OxidesOxides(thousand (thousand
tonnes)tonnes)
831
542
434
292
221
159
249
179
238
175
224
165

YEAR
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009

A1- 196

CarbonDioxide(million
tonnes)
135
70
36
40
39
36

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
SUMMARY OF SOx and NOx Emissions, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
Units: Thousand Tonnes

SULFUR OXIDES
2000
2005
220.7
248.8
36.4
68.3
-

TOTAL
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION

1990
830.8
229.1
-

1996
433.9
158.8
-

Electricity Generation
District Heat Production
Coal Production/Preparation
Own UseCharcoal Production

186.7
2.1
38.5
1.8
-

136.5
1.6
20.0
0.7
-

25.5
0.8
9.8
0.3
-

ENERGY DEMAND

601.6

275.1

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIED

418.8
11.3
117.6
7.5
1.6
23.1
20.0
1.8

155.6
4.9
74.9
3.6
0.6
19.4
16.0
-

NITROGEN OXIDES
2000
2005
158.6
179.0
23.2
43.5
-

2008
237.7
64.9

2009
223.6
54.0

1990
542.1
145.1
-

1996
292.0
99.8
-

53.9
1.2
12.7
0.4
-

51.1
1.0
12.4
0.4
-

39.5
1.1
13.0
0.4
-

117.5
1.3
24.0
1.4
0.8

85.1
1.0
12.5
0.5
0.7

15.9
0.5
6.1
0.3
0.5

184.2

180.5

172.8

169.6

397.1

192.2

135.4

-

-

-

93.9
2.6
58.7
2.7
0.5
16.3
9.6
-

94.4
3.5
52.5
3.4
0.6
15.3
10.7
-

92.5
3.8
46.0
3.5
0.6
15.0
11.5
-

89.7
2.9
46.7
3.4
0.5
14.8
11.7
-

262.6
9.3
84.4
10.3
1.2
15.3
12.6
1.4

97.5
4.0
61.3
5.2
0.4
13.5
10.3
-

59.1
2.1
51.6
4.2
0.4
11.6
6.3
-

59.3
2.9
49.3
5.1
0.4
11.1
7.3
-

58.0
3.1
47.5
5.3
0.4
10.9
7.8
-

56.2
2.4
48.3
5.1
0.3
10.6
8.0
-

CARBON DIOXIDE
2000
2005
35,79640,236-

2008
38,655-

2009
35,955-1990
724.09-1996
376.30-METHANE
2000
2005
188.33279.30-2008
266.18-2009
292.04
-

34.0
0.7
7.9
0.3
0.5

2008
174.8
41.7

2009
165.4
34.6

32.5
0.6
7.7
0.3
0.5

24.9
0.7
8.1
0.3
0.5

SUMMARY OF GHG Emissions, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009
Units: Thousand Tonnes
TOTAL
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
District Heat Production
Coal Production/Preparation
Own UseCharcoal Production
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIED

1990
134,869-

1996
69,719-36,502
29,720
331
6,015
436
-

25,223
21,686
247
3,124
166
-

5,941
4,205
123
1,536
77
-

10,916
8,641
186
1,989
101
-

10,569
8,366
164
1,938
102
-

8,616
6,313
168
2,035
100
-

1.14
0.72
0.01
718.25
0.06
0.25

0.89
0.61
0.01
371.89
0.02
0.20

0.42
0.22
0.01
184.65
0.01
0.15

0.44
0.23
0.00
275.29
0.01
0.15

0.49
0.28
0.01
261.83
0.01
0.15

0.36
0.15
0.00
287.880.01
0.15

98,367
66,1132,770
18,526
1,295
337
4,045
3,119
435

44,49524,5191,208
11,736
601
121
3,377
2,505
-

29,855
14,960
633
9,223
458
101
2,828
1,496
-

29,31914,960
867
8,255
569
111
2,690
1,674
-

28,086
14,633
920
7,236
582
111
2,619
1,796
-

27,33814,129
708
7,337
557
98
2,547
1,832
-

4.81
1.45
0.41
1.77
0.79
0.03
0.22
0.08
0.06

3.58
0.52
0.18
2.11
0.40
0.01
0.26
0.09
-

3.29
0.37
0.09
2.13
0.34
0.01
0.26
0.08
-

3.60
0.34
0.13
2.32
0.41
0.01
0.27
0.11
-

3.89
0.33
0.14
2.60
0.42
0.01
0.26
0.12
-

3.84
0.30
0.11
2.64
0.41
0.01
0.25
0.13
-

1990
7.31
-

1996
4.39
-

NITROUS OXIDE
2000
2005
2.80
3.15
-

2008
3.21
-

2009
3.10
-

1.77
1.40
0.02
0.28
0.02
0.05

1.23
1.02
0.01
0.15
0.01
0.04

0.31
0.20
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.03

0.55
0.41
0.01
0.09
0.00
0.03

0.53
0.40
0.01
0.09
0.00
0.03

0.44
0.30
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.03

5.54
3.13
0.14
1.50
0.38
0.02
0.19
0.16
0.02

3.16
1.16
0.06
1.39
0.19
0.01
0.20
0.14
-

2.49
0.71
0.03
1.30
0.16
0.00
0.19
0.09
-

2.60
0.71
0.05
1.34
0.20
0.01
0.18
0.12
-

2.68
0.69
0.05
1.43
0.20
0.01
0.18
0.12
-

2.66
0.67
0.04
1.45
0.20
0.00
0.18
0.13
-

Units: Thousand Tonnes
TOTAL
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
District Heat Production
Coal Production/Preparation
Own UseCharcoal Production
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIED

A1- 197

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimates of DPRK Air Pollutant Emissions in 2009, Thousand Tonnes
Source of Emissions
Electricity Generation
District Heat Production
Coal Production/Preparation
Own UseCharcoal Production
Industrial Sector
Transport Sector
Residential Sector
Agricultural Sector
Fisheries Sector
Military Sector
Public/Commercial
TOTAL

SulfurNitrogenDioxideOxides
39.5
24.9
1.1
0.7
13.0
8.1
0.4
0.3
0.5
89.7
56.2
2.9
2.4
46.7
48.3
3.4
5.1
0.5
0.3
14.8
10.6
11.7
8.0
223.6
165.4

A1- 198

CarbonMethaneDioxide
6,313
0.15
168
0.00
2,035
287.88100
0.01
0.2
14,129
0.3
708
0.1
7,337
2.6
557
0.4
98
0.0
2,547
0.3
1,832
0.1
35,824292.0

Nitrous
Oxide
0.30
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.03
0.67
0.04
1.45
0.20
0.00
0.18
0.13
3.10

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ATTACHMENT 2
WORKPAPERS AND DETAILED RESULTS:
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE
MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRK: UPDATE THROUGH THE YEAR 2009

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF ANNUAL FUEL USE
BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRKUPDATE 2010
SUMMARY: FUEL USE IN EQUIPMENT AND
MILITARY MANUFACTURING, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
MILITARY BRANCH
Equipment
GROUND FORCES
Tanks
Amphibious Vehicles
Armored Fighting Vehicles
Truck/Tank-Mounted Guns, Missiles
Jeeps and Motorcycles
2 1/2 Ton Trucks
Other Trucks and Utility Equipment
TOTAL: Ground Forces

1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Fraction Fraction Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Fuel Consof Branch of Total
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ

Est. Number Fuel Consin Service
GJ
5,832
900
4,015
516
9,045
72,403
1,632
94,343

2.05E+05
1.04E+04
4.50E+04
2.64E+03
2.15E+05
6.23E+06
1.44E+05
6.85E+06

3.0%
0.2%
0.7%
0.0%
3.1%
90.9%
2.1%
100.0%

1.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.0%
1.2%
36.0%
0.8%
39.6%

1.64E+05
8.35E+03
3.60E+04
2.12E+03
1.87E+05
5.42E+06
1.30E+05
5.94E+06

1.15E+05
5.85E+03
2.52E+04
1.49E+03
1.37E+05
3.96E+06
9.47E+04
4.33E+06

1.01E+05
5.11E+03
2.21E+04
1.30E+03
1.19E+05
3.44E+06
8.24E+04
3.77E+06

7.87E+04
4.00E+03
1.73E+04
1.02E+03
1.09E+05
3.15E+06
7.55E+04
3.44E+06

7.87E+04
4.00E+03
1.73E+04
1.02E+03
1.09E+05
3.15E+06
7.55E+04
3.44E+06

AIR FORCE
Fighters
Bombers
Transport
Helicopters
TOTAL: Aircraft
Service (Ground) Vehicles
TOTAL: Air Force

748
82
308
275
1,413
6,235

1.76E+06
3.96E+04
2.76E+05
8.03E+04
2.15E+06
4.94E+05
2.65E+06

66.4%
1.5%
10.4%
3.0%
81.3%
18.7%
100.0%

10.2%
0.2%
1.6%
0.5%
12.5%
2.9%
15.3%

1.17E+06
2.64E+04
2.32E+05
6.02E+04
1.49E+06
3.95E+05
1.89E+06

8.06E+05
1.81E+04
1.76E+05
4.52E+04
1.05E+06
3.21E+05
1.37E+06

1.39E+06
3.13E+04
2.10E+05
6.02E+04
1.69E+06
3.46E+05
2.04E+06

1.47E+06
3.30E+04
2.15E+05
6.02E+04
1.77E+06
3.71E+05
2.14E+06

1.14E+06
2.56E+04
2.15E+05
6.02E+04
1.44E+06
3.71E+05
1.81E+06

NAVY
Frigates
Corvettes
Missile Attack Boats
Patrol and Mine Craft
Amphibious Craft
Submarines
TOTAL: Naval Vessels
Service (Land) Vehicles
TOTAL: Naval Forces

1
2
39
351
324
84
801
4,077

4.48E+04
1.79E+04
1.07E+06
5.05E+06
2.31E+05
5.56E+04
6.48E+06
3.71E+05
6.85E+06

0.7%
0.3%
15.7%
73.8%
3.4%
0.8%
94.6%
5.4%
100.0%

0.3%
0.1%
6.2%
29.2%
1.3%
0.3%
37.5%
2.1%
39.6%

3.19E+04
1.28E+04
7.66E+05
3.60E+06
4.53E+05
5.56E+04
4.92E+06
2.81E+05
5.20E+06

2.99E+04
1.20E+04
7.19E+05
3.38E+06
6.57E+05
5.00E+04
4.84E+06
2.77E+05
5.12E+06

3.13E+04
1.25E+04
7.52E+05
3.54E+06
6.57E+05
5.00E+04
5.04E+06
2.88E+05
5.33E+06

2.69E+04
1.07E+04
6.45E+05
3.03E+06
5.84E+05
4.45E+04
4.34E+06
2.48E+05
4.59E+06

2.24E+04
8.95E+03
5.37E+05
2.52E+06
5.84E+05
4.45E+04
3.72E+06
2.13E+05
3.93E+06

5.1%
0.3%

6.21E+05 3.99E+05
3.33E+04 2.14E+04

3.99E+05
2.14E+04

3.99E+05 3.99E+05
2.14E+04 2.14E+04

MILITARY MANUFACTURING: Coal Use
MILITARY MANUFACTURING: Electricity Use

TOTAL, ALL MILITARY ENERGY USES ABOVE

8.87E+05 GJ/yr
4.75E+04 GJ/yr

1.73E+07 GJ/yr

A2 - 1

100% 1.37E+07 1.12E+07 1.16E+07 1.06E+07 9.60E+06

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN DPRKSUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITY LEVEL ASSUMPTIONS FOR 1990,
AND ESTIMATES FOR 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
Detailed Data and Results
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:David Von Hippel
3/3/2011

UPDATE 2010/2011
GROUND FORCES
Tanks,Am ph.
Trucks andVeh.,General
Arm ored
Use
Veh., Other
VehiclesArm s

Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1990:
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1996:
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2000:
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2005
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2008
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2009

1000
870
680
620
660
660

100
80
60
55
50
50

AIRCRAFT
Mission Hours Per Year:
Fighters/Bombers
Transport Aircraft
Helicopters
Ave. airspeed--Fract. of Maximum

1990
24
50
32
80%

1996
16
42
24
80%

2000
11
32
18
80%

2005
19
38
24
80%

2008
20
39
24
80%

MILITARY SHIPS AND BOATS
Active Hours Per Year in:
Amphibious
Submarines
Other Vessels
Ave. power use--Fract. of Maximum

1990
50
100
800
50%

1996
50
100
570
50%

2000
45
90
535
50%

2005
45
90
560
50%

2008
40
80
480
50%

PROJECTION OF ENERGY REQUIRMENTS FOR MILITARY PRODUCT MANUFACTURING
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 1996 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2000 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2005 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2008 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2009) versus 1990:

A2 - 2

0.7
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45

2009

2010--D
THIS
16 SECT16
39 ION4224
OF 28
80% THIS
80%
WOR
KSHE
ET
NOT
USED
2009
2010--DFOR
40 THIS50
80 ANAL100
400 YSIS
600
50%
50%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN DPRKSUMMARY: FUEL USE IN EQUIPMENT, ALL MILITARY BRANCHES--1990,
1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, AND 2009
Summary Graphics
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:David Von Hippel
11/18/2011

UPDATE 2010/2011

MILITARY BRANCH
Equipment
GROUND FORCES
Tanks/Heavy Arms
2 1/2 Ton Trucks
Oth Trucks/Utility
TOTAL: Ground Forces
AIR FORCE
Fighters/Bombers
Transport/Helic.
Service (Grnd) Veh.
TOTAL: Air Force

Fuel Cons
GJ

1990
Fraction Fractionof Branch of Total

Fuel Cons
GJ

1996
Fraction Fractionof Branch of Total

Fuel Cons
GJ

2000
Fractionof Branch

Fractionof Total

2.63E+05
6.23E+06
3.59E+05
6.85E+06

3.8%
90.9%
5.2%
100.0%

1.6%
38.1%
2.2%
41.9%

2.11E+05
5.42E+06
3.17E+05
5.94E+06

3.5%
91.1%
5.3%
100.0%

1.6%
41.6%
2.4%
45.6%

1.48E+05
3.96E+06
2.31E+05
4.33E+06

3.4%
91.3%
5.3%
100.0%

1.4%
36.5%
2.1%
40.0%

1.80E+06
3.56E+05
4.94E+05
2.65E+06

67.9%
13.4%
18.7%
100.0%

11.0%
2.2%
3.0%
16.2%

1.20E+06
2.92E+05
3.95E+05
1.89E+06

63.6%
15.5%
21.0%
100.0%

9.2%
2.2%
3.0%
14.5%

8.24E+05
2.22E+05
3.21E+05
1.37E+06

60.3%
16.2%
23.5%
100.0%

7.6%
2.0%
3.0%
12.6%

5.05E+06
1.42E+06
3.71E+05
6.85E+06

73.8%
20.8%
5.4%
100.0%

30.9%
8.7%
2.3%
41.9%

3.60E+06
1.32E+06
2.81E+05
5.20E+06

69.2%
25.4%
5.4%
100.0%

27.6%
10.1%
2.2%
39.9%

3.38E+06
1.47E+06
2.77E+05
5.12E+06

65.9%
28.6%
5.4%
100.0%

31.2%
13.6%
2.6%
47.3%

NAVY
Patrol Craft
Other Vessels
Service (Land) Veh.
TOTAL: Naval Forces

TOTAL MILITARY EQUIP ENERGY USE

1.63E+07 GJ/yr

100% 1.30E+07 GJ/yr

A2 - 3100%

1.08E+07 GJ/yr

100%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

MILITARY BRANCH
Equipment
GROUND FORCES
Tanks/Heavy Arms
2 1/2 Ton Trucks
Oth Trucks/Utility
TOTAL: Ground Forces
AIR FORCE
Fighters/Bombers
Transport/Helic.
Service (Grnd) Veh.
TOTAL: Air Force

Fuel Cons
GJ

2005
Fraction Fractionof Branch of Total

Fuel Cons
GJ

2008
Fraction Fractionof Branch of Total

Fuel Cons
GJ

2009
Fractionof Branch

Fractionof Total

1.29E+05
3.44E+06
2.01E+05
3.77E+06

3.4%
91.2%
5.3%
100.0%

1.2%
30.9%
1.8%
33.9%

1.01E+05
3.15E+06
1.84E+05
3.44E+06

2.9%
91.7%
5.4%
100.0%

1.0%
31.0%
1.8%
33.8%

1.01E+05
3.15E+06
1.84E+05
3.44E+06

2.9%
91.7%
5.4%
100.0%

1.1%
34.4%
2.0%
37.5%

1.42E+06
2.70E+05
3.46E+05
2.04E+06

69.8%
13.2%
17.0%
100.0%

12.8%
2.4%
3.1%
18.3%

1.50E+06
2.75E+05
3.71E+05
2.14E+06

69.9%
12.8%
17.3%
100.0%

14.7%
2.7%
3.6%
21.1%

1.16E+06
2.75E+05
3.71E+05
1.81E+06

64.3%
15.2%
20.5%
100.0%

12.6%
3.0%
4.0%
19.7%

3.54E+06
1.50E+06
2.88E+05
5.33E+06

66.4%
28.2%
5.4%
100.0%

31.7%
13.5%
2.6%
47.8%

3.03E+06
1.31E+06
2.48E+05
4.59E+06

66.0%
28.6%
5.4%
100.0%

29.8%
12.9%
2.4%
45.1%

2.52E+06
1.20E+06
2.13E+05
3.93E+06

64.2%
30.4%
5.4%
100.0%

27.5%
13.0%
2.3%
42.9%

100%

1.02E+07 GJ/yr

100%

9.18E+06 GJ/yr

NAVY
Patrol Craft
Other Vessels
Service (Land) Veh.
TOTAL: Naval Forces

TOTAL MILITARY EQUIP ENERGY USE

1.11E+07 GJ/yr

A2 - 4100%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 1990
Other
Trucks/Utility
2%

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
38%Fighters/Bombers
9%. Transport/Helic
2%

Tanks/Heavy Arms
2%
Service Veh./Navy2%
Other Vessels
9%

Patrol Craft
31%

Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 1996

Other
Trucks/Utility
2%

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
42%Fighters/Bombers
9%

Tanks/Heavy Arms
2%

Transport/Helic.
2%

Service Veh./Navy2%
Other Vessels
10%

Patrol Craft
28%

Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 2000

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
36%

Other
Trucks/Utility
2%Fighters/Bombers
9%Transport/Helic.
2%
Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

Tanks/Heavy Arms
1%
Service Veh./Navy2%

Patrol Craft
31%

Other Vessels
14%

A2 - 5Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 2005

Tanks/Heavy Arms
1%

Service Veh./Navy2%

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
31%

Other
Trucks/Utility
2%Fighters/Bombers
9%Transport/Helic
2%

Other Vessels
13%

Patrol Craft
32%

Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 2008

Tanks/Heavy Arms
1%

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
31%Service Veh./Navy
2%

Other
Trucks/Utility
2%Fighters/Bombers
15%

Other Vessels
13%. Transport/Helic3%

Patrol Craft
30%

Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 2009

Tanks/Heavy Arms
1%
Service Veh./Navy2%

Ton Trucks 1/2 2
34%

Other
Trucks/Utility
2%Fighters/Bombers
13%

Other Vessels
13%
Patrol Craft
28%

A2 - 6

Transport/Helic2%
Service Veh/Air
Force
3%

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRK:MILITARY GROUND VEHICLES AND ARMAMENTS
UPDATE 2010/2011
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:David Von Hippel
11/18/2011

Summary Input Data and Results
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 1990:
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 1996:
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 2000:
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 2005:
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 2008:
Hours of Ground Maneuvers Per Year, 2009:

Tanks,Am ph. Veh.,
Trucks andArm oredGeneral Use Veh., Other
Vehicles
Arm s

1000
870
680
620
660
660

100
80
60
55
50
50

1990
1996
2000
Est.
Fuel Economy Range
Fract. of Ave. Speed Annual Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Fraction
Annual Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Annual Fuel Cons Fuel Cons
Vehicle Types
Number(km per Gallon)
Time in Use when in Use Hrs Use(liters)
GJ
of Total Hrs Use(liters)
GJ
Hrs Use(liters)
GJ
Notes
1
2
Tanks
5,832
1.97
2.08
50%
25
50 5.46E+06 2.05E+05
3.0%
40 4.36E+06 1.64E+05
30 3.06E+06 1.15E+05
Amphibious Vehicles
900
1.04
26.50
50%
20
50 2.78E+05 1.04E+04
0.2%
40 2.22E+05 8.35E+03
30 1.56E+05 5.85E+03
Armored Fighting Vehicles
4,015
6.53
7.50
50%
30
50 1.38E+06 4.50E+04
0.7%
40 1.11E+06 3.60E+04
30 7.76E+05 2.52E+04
Truck/Tank-Mounted Guns, Missiles
516
1.97
6.44
25%
20
25 7.06E+04 2.64E+03
0.0%
20 5.65E+04 2.12E+03
15 3.96E+04 1.49E+03
Jeeps and Motorcycles
9,045
26.50
50
50%
30
500 6.61E+06 2.15E+05
3.1%
435 5.75E+06 1.87E+05
340 4.20E+06 1.37E+05
2 1/2 Ton Trucks
72,4038.63
50%
30
500 1.91E+08 6.23E+06
90.9%
435 1.67E+08 5.42E+06
340 1.22E+08 3.96E+06
Other Trucks and Utility Equipment
1,632
3.85
8.63
50%
25
500 3.97E+06 1.44E+05
2.1%
435 3.45E+06 1.30E+05
340 2.52E+06 9.47E+04
TOTALS
94,343
2.09E+08 6.85E+06
100.0%
1.81E+08 5.94E+06
1.32E+08 4.33E+06
Diesel Consumption
8.69E+06 3.27E+05
4.8%
7.16E+06 2.69E+05
5.09E+06 1.91E+05
Gasoline Consumption
2.00E+08 6.52E+06
95.2%
1.74E+08 5.68E+06
1.27E+08 4.14E+06

A2 - 7Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Vehicle Types
Notes
Tanks
Amphibious Vehicles
Armored Fighting Vehicles
Truck/Tank-Mounted Guns, Missiles
Jeeps and Motorcycles
2 1/2 Ton Trucks
Other Trucks and Utility Equipment
TOTALS
Diesel Consumption
Gasoline Consumption

2005
Annual Fuel Cons Fuel Cons
Hrs Use(liters)
GJ
27.5
27.5
27.5
13.75
310
310
310

2.67E+06
1.36E+05
6.79E+05
3.46E+04
3.65E+06
1.06E+08
2.19E+06
1.15E+08
4.44E+06
1.11E+08

AnnualHrs Use

1.01E+05
5.11E+03
2.21E+04
1.30E+03
1.19E+05
3.44E+06
8.24E+04
3.77E+06
1.67E+05
3.60E+06

25
25
25
12.5
330
330
330

2008
2009
Fuel Cons Fuel Cons Annual Fuel Cons Fuel Cons
(liters)
GJ
Hrs Use(liters)
GJ
2.09E+06
1.07E+05
5.31E+05
2.71E+04
3.35E+06
9.69E+07
2.01E+06
1.05E+08
3.69E+06
1.01E+08

7.87E+04
4.00E+03
1.73E+04
1.02E+03
1.09E+05
3.15E+06
7.55E+04
3.44E+06
1.39E+05
3.30E+06

Notes:
1 This fraction is assumed to be 25% for vehicles used primarily in engineering operations, 50% for most others.
2 Average speed applies to most, but not necessarily all, vehicles in class.

A2 - 825 2.09E+06 7.87E+04
25 1.07E+05 4.00E+03
25 5.31E+05 1.73E+04
12.5 2.71E+04 1.02E+03
330 3.35E+06 1.09E+05
330 9.69E+07 3.15E+06
330 2.01E+06 7.55E+04
1.05E+08 3.44E+06
3.69E+06 1.39E+05
1.01E+08 3.30E+06

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRKMILITARY GROUND VEHICLES AND ARMAMENTS
UPDATE 2010/2011
Detailed Data and Results

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS
Tanks,Am ph.
TrucksVeh.,and
Arm oredGeneral
Veh.,
Use
Other
VehiclesArm s

Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:

GROUND FORCES
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1990:
1000
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 1996:
870
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2000:
680
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2005:
620
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2008:
660
Hours of Maneuvers Per Year, 2009:
660
Fraction of Stock Unuseable:
20%
Conversion Factor:
3.8 liters/gal
Diesel Energy Content:
0.037584 GJ/liter
Gasoline Energy Content:
0.03253 GJ/literDavid Von Hippel
11/18/2011

Estimate of Number of Vehicles In Military Fleet

Branch or Unit of Ground Forces

Reserve Infantry Divisions
Reserve-Infantry Brigades
Infantry Divisions
Truck Mobile Divisions
Infantry Brigades
Truck Mobile Brigades
Armored Brigades
Special Operations Brigades
Elite Training Regiments
Engineering River Regiments
SAM Regiments
AAA Regiments
FROG Battalions
Command and Support
Artillery Regiments
MRL Regiment
AAA Regiments
Engineering Regiment
Signal Battalion
Decon Battalion
ATGM Company
Field Hospital

Number

26
18
30
1
4
20
15
22
5
5
5
5
10
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

100 Note 25
80
60 Note 24
55 Note 2750
50
Note 21

MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT

Personnel TOTAL
per Unit Personnel Notes

10,3598,296
10,359
8,194
8,296
4,781
2,481

269,334
149,328
310,770
8,194
33,184
95,62037,215

1,490
1,660
1,112
529
173
338
735
751
529
1,206
299
315
81
435

7,450
8,300
5,560
2,645
1,730
338
2,205
751
1,058
1,206
299
315
81
435

TOTAL INDICATED LAND FORCES
Reported Ground Personnel (as of 1990)
TRUED-UP LAND FORCES
True-Up Factor, '90/96:
Equipment Totals by Category

936,018

TANKS
Medium
T-54/55

Med: T62/
63/PT-76

31

2

31
93

2

1
2
1
5
2
4
3
6

6

ASLT

GUNS, MISSILES (ContGUNS, MISSILES

PT-76
PTS
K-61
AMPHI
Tank
AAG
BM-21
Lt Amph Trk Amph Trk Amph GAZ-46 FERRY Retriever BTR-60 BRDM ZSU-57 (URAL-375)
1

16
31
133

1
8

330

7

99
58

5

95

10

18
15
3

6

6

6
60

7

12
30

30

1,919

2,727

2,185

3,106

1.07E+06 7, 23, 26

1.14

ARMORED
FTG. VEHICLESAMPHIBIOUS VEH. AND TANK RTVR

10

20

475
5,121

166

10

320

35

60

199
790

3,180

541

189

11

364

40

68

227

3,622

5,832

A2 - 9

900

345
3,525

240

138

393

273

157

4,015

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of Number of Vehicles In Military Fleet

Branch or Unit of Ground Forces

NumberMOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT

Personnel TOTAL
per Unit Personnel Notes GUNS, MISSILES (Cont.)
BM-20,24 FROG 3/5 FROG 7(ZIL-151,7) (PT-76) (ZIL-135)

Reserve Infantry Divisions
Reserve-Infantry Brigades
Infantry Divisions
Truck Mobile Divisions
Infantry Brigades
Truck Mobile Brigades
Armored Brigades
Special Operations Brigades
Elite Training Regiments
Engineering River Regiments
SAM Regiments
AAA Regiments
FROG Battalions
Command and Support
Artillery Regiments
MRL Regiment
AAA Regiments
Engineering Regiment
Signal Battalion
Decon Battalion
ATGM Company
Field Hospital

26
18
30
1
4
20
15
22
5
5
5
5
10
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

10,3598,296
10,359
8,194
8,296
4,781
2,481

269,334
149,328
310,770
8,194
33,184
95,62037,215

1,490
1,660
1,112
529
173
338
735
751
529
1,206
299
315
81
435

7,450
8,300
5,560
2,645
1,730
338
2,205
751
1,058
1,206
299
315
81
435

TOTAL INDICATED LAND FORCES
Reported Ground Personnel (as of 1990)
TRUED-UP LAND FORCES
True-Up Factor, '90/96:
Equipment Totals by Category

936,018

1
2
1
5
2
4
3
6

3

15

30

1.14

17

34

JEEPS
57
39
57
56
39
28
26

MotorCycles
29
29
29
29
8

14
10
8
14

14

44
4
10
14
9
5
1
1
4

30

5,400

2,542
7,942
2,895
9,045

3

15

1.07E+06 7, 23, 26

LIGHT VEH.

30
453
34
516

A2 - 106,150

20

TRUCKS AND UTILITY VEHICLES
2.5 T
Truck

Power Oth Hvy
Dump Zil-135 Zil-151 KRAZ-214 GAZ-63 Zil-157V Boats Equip.

692
503
692
255
503
376
162
133
148
60
104
54
68
75
48
104
103
37
30
5
63
63,57563,57572,40372,403

96

18

72

24

15

12

33

108
1,433
123
1,632

36
3

3

23

23

30

480

90

360

210

132

26

34

547

102

410

239

150

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Estimate of Number of Vehicles In Military Fleet

Branch or Unit of Ground Forces

NumberMOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT

Personnel TOTAL
per Unit Personnel Notes

Reserve Infantry Divisions
Reserve-Infantry Brigades
Infantry Divisions
Truck Mobile Divisions
Infantry Brigades
Truck Mobile Brigades
Armored Brigades
Special Operations Brigades
Elite Training Regiments
Engineering River Regiments
SAM Regiments
AAA Regiments
FROG Battalions
Command and Support
Artillery Regiments
MRL Regiment
AAA Regiments
Engineering Regiment
Signal Battalion
Decon Battalion
ATGM Company
Field Hospital

26
18
30
1
4
20
15
22
5
5
5
5
10
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1

10,3598,296
10,359
8,194
8,296
4,781
2,481

269,334
149,328
310,770
8,194
33,184
95,62037,215

1,490
1,660
1,112
529
173
338
735
751
529
1,206
299
315
81
435

7,450
8,300
5,560
2,645
1,730
338
2,205
751
1,058
1,206
299
315
81
435

TOTAL INDICATED LAND FORCES
Reported Ground Personnel (as of 1990)
TRUED-UP LAND FORCES
True-Up Factor, '90/96:
Equipment Totals by Category

936,018

FROG 3/5(PT-76)FROG 7(ZIL-135)

1
2
1
5
2
4
3
6

3

15

30

17

34

JEEPS
57
39
57
56
39
28
26

MotorCycles
29
29
29
29
8

14
10
8
14

14

44
4
10
14
9
5
1
1
4

30

5,400

2,542
7,942
2,895
9,045

3

15

1.07E+06 7, 23, 26

1.14

LIGHT VEH.

GUNS, MISSILES (Cont.)
BM-20,24(ZIL-151,7)

30
453
34
516

A2 - 11

6,150

20

TRUCKS AND UTILITY VEHICLES
2.5 T
Truck

Dump

Zil-135 Zil-151 KRAZ-214 GAZ-63 Zil-157V

Power Oth Hvy
Boats Equip.

692
503
692
255
503
376
162
133
148
60
104
54
68
75
48
104
103
37
30
5
63
63,57563,57572,40372,403

96

18

72

24

15

12

33

108
1,433
123
1,632

36
3

3

23

23

30

480

90

360

210

132

26

34

547

102

410

239

150

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT
TANKS
Fuel Use Effic. Calculations

Units
km
gal
hp
ton

Reported Range
Reported Fuel Capacity (Est )Reported Horsepower
PayloadFuel Used
Fuel Use Efficiency

MediumMed: T62/

Notes T-54/55

63/PT-76

500
254

500
240

ARMOREDFTG.
VEHICLESAMPHIBIOUS VEH. AND TANK RTVR
PT-76
ASLT

PTS

K-61

AMPHI

Tank

GUNS, MISSILES
AAG

BM-21

Lt Amph Trk Amph Trk Amph GAZ-46 FERRY Retriever BTR-60 BRDM ZSU-57 (URAL-375)

650
110
180
5.5
3.3
11
4.9
DieselDieselDieselDieselDieselDieselGas
Diesel Diesel
Gas?? Gas
DieselDiesel??
1.97
2.08
2.00
3.88
2.08
3.88
26.50
1.04
2.03
6.53
7.50
1.97
5.91

km/gal

Notes

300
150

260
67

8

8, 9

8

8

50%
25
50
40

50%
25
50
40

50%
25
50
40

50%
20
50
40

500
240

260
67

530
20
55
0.4

500
480

12

13

14

15

300
148

500
76.6

750
100

8

8

16

25%
15
25
20

50%
30
50
40

50%
30
50
40

500
254

11

Operating Assumptions
Fract. Time In-Use During Maneuvers
Average Speed During Maneuvers
Hours of Operation, 1990
Hours of Operation, 1996
Hours of Operation, 2000
Hours of Operation, 2005
Hours of Operation, 2008
Hours of Operation, 2009
Hours of Operation, 2010--Decline Scenario

km/hr
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs

50%
20
50
40

50%
20
50
40

50%
20
50
40

25%
15
25
20

25%
20
25
20

25%
20
25
20

30

30

30

30

30

30

30

15

15

30

30

15

15

27.5
25

27.5
25

27.5
25

27.5
25

27.5
25

27.5
25

27.5
25

13.75
12.5

13.75
12.5

27.5
25

27.5
25

13.75
12.5

13.75
12.5

25

25

25

25

25

25

25

12.5

12.5

25

25

12.5

12.5

435

435

435

435

435

435

435

217.5

217.5

435

435

217.5

217.5

22 5.55E+05
22

7.45E+05

1.35E+05

1.95E+04

2.19E+03 3.76E+04 6.02E+02 4.92E+03 8.39E+03 3.3E+05 3.1E+04 1.39E+04

2.66E+03

2.11E+06

2.83E+06

Fuel Consumption Results, 1990
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.

5.50E+07

All Veh.

2.09E+08

All Veh.

6.85E+06

All Veh.

4.78E+07

All Veh.

1.81E+08

All Veh.

5.94E+06

All Veh.

3.48E+07

All Veh.

1.32E+08

All Veh.

4.33E+06

1.44E+06
5.14E+05

7.31E+04
7.41E+04

5.46E+06
7.93E+04

1.06E+05

1.93E+04

8.31E+03 1.43E+05 2.29E+03 1.87E+04 3.19E+04 1.3E+06 1.2E+05 5.28E+04
2.78E+05

2.78E+03

2.05E+05

3.6E+05

3.12E+02 5.37E+03 7.44E+01 7.03E+02 1.20E+03 4.1E+04 3.9E+03 1.98E+03
1.04E+04

1.01E+04

1.4E+06
3.80E+02

4.5E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 1996
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

22 4.44E+05
22

5.96E+05

1.69E+06

2.27E+06

1.08E+05

1.56E+04

1.15E+06
4.11E+05

5.85E+04
5.92E+04

4.36E+06
6.34E+04

8.52E+04

1.55E+04

1.75E+03 3.01E+04 4.81E+02 3.94E+03 6.71E+03 2.7E+05 2.5E+04 1.11E+04
6.65E+03 1.14E+05 1.83E+03 1.50E+04 2.55E+04 1.0E+06 9.6E+04 4.22E+04
2.22E+05

2.23E+03

1.64E+05

8.09E+03

1.1E+06

2.50E+02 4.29E+03 5.95E+01 5.62E+02 9.58E+02 3.3E+04 3.1E+03 1.59E+03
8.35E+03

2.13E+03

2.9E+05

3.04E+02

3.6E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 2000
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

22 3.11E+05
22

4.18E+05

1.18E+06

1.59E+06

7.58E+04

1.09E+04

8.05E+05
2.88E+05

4.10E+04
4.15E+04

3.06E+06
4.44E+04

5.97E+04

1.08E+04
1.15E+05

A2 - 12

1.23E+03 2.11E+04 3.37E+02 2.76E+03 4.70E+03 1.9E+05 1.8E+04 7.78E+03
4.66E+03 8.00E+04 1.28E+03 1.05E+04 1.79E+04 7.1E+05 6.7E+04 2.96E+04
1.56E+05

1.56E+03

5.67E+03

7.8E+05

1.75E+02 3.01E+03 4.17E+01 3.94E+02 6.71E+02 2.3E+04 2.2E+03 1.11E+03
5.85E+03

1.49E+03

2.0E+05

2.5E+04

2.13E+02

GUNS, MISSINautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT
TANKS
MediumMed: T62/

22 2.72E+05
22

3.65E+05

1.03E+06

1.39E+06

AMPHIBIOUS VEH. AND TANK RTVR
PT-76

PTS

K-61

AMPHI

ARMOREDFTG.
VEHICLES

Tank

GUNS, MISSILES
AAG

BM-21

Fuel Consumption Results, 2005
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.

3.03E+07

All Veh.

1.15E+08

All Veh.

3.77E+06

All Veh.

2.76E+07

All Veh.

1.05E+08

All Veh.

3.44E+06

All Veh.

2.76E+07

All Veh.

1.05E+08

All Veh.

3.44E+06

6.63E+04

9.55E+03

7.04E+05
2.52E+05

3.59E+04
3.63E+04

2.67E+06
3.89E+04

5.22E+04

9.47E+03

1.07E+03 1.84E+04 2.95E+02 2.41E+03 4.11E+03 1.6E+05 1.5E+04 6.81E+03
4.07E+03 7.00E+04 1.12E+03 9.16E+03 1.56E+04 6.2E+05 5.9E+04 2.59E+04
1.36E+05

1.36E+03

1.01E+05

4.95E+03

6.8E+05

1.53E+02 2.63E+03 3.65E+01 3.44E+02 5.87E+02 2.0E+04 1.9E+03 9.72E+02
5.11E+03

1.30E+03

1.8E+05

1.86E+02

2.2E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 2008
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

22 2.13E+05
22

2.86E+05

8.09E+05

1.09E+06

5.19E+04

7.48E+03

5.51E+05
1.97E+05

2.81E+04
2.84E+04

2.09E+06
3.04E+04

4.08E+04

7.41E+03

8.39E+02 1.44E+04 2.31E+02 1.89E+03 3.22E+03 1.3E+05 1.2E+04 5.33E+03
3.19E+03 5.48E+04 8.77E+02 7.17E+03 1.22E+04 4.9E+05 4.6E+04 2.02E+04
1.07E+05

1.07E+03

7.87E+04

3.88E+03

5.3E+05

1.20E+02 2.06E+03 2.85E+01 2.70E+02 4.59E+02 1.6E+04 1.5E+03 7.61E+02
4.00E+03

1.02E+03

1.4E+05

1.46E+02

1.7E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 2009
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

22 2.13E+05
22

2.86E+05

8.09E+05

1.09E+06

5.19E+04

7.48E+03

5.51E+05
1.97E+05

2.81E+04
2.84E+04

2.09E+06
3.04E+04

4.08E+04

7.41E+03
7.87E+04

A2 - 13

8.39E+02 1.44E+04 2.31E+02 1.89E+03 3.22E+03 1.3E+05 1.2E+04 5.33E+03
3.19E+03 5.48E+04 8.77E+02 7.17E+03 1.22E+04 4.9E+05 4.6E+04 2.02E+04
1.07E+05

1.07E+03

3.88E+03

5.3E+05

1.20E+02 2.06E+03 2.85E+01 2.70E+02 4.59E+02 1.6E+04 1.5E+03 7.61E+02
4.00E+03

1.02E+03

1.4E+05

1.7E+04

1.46E+02

GUNS, MISSINautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT
GUNS, MISSILES (Cont.)

Fuel Use Effic. Calculations

Units
km
gal
hp
ton

Reported Range
Reported Fuel Capacity (Est )Reported Horsepower
PayloadFuel Used
Fuel Use Efficiency

LIGHT VEH.

BM-20,24

FROG 3/5

FROG 7

Notes (ZIL-151,7)(PT-76)(ZIL-135)

JEEPS

500
130
180
11

530
20
54

600, 430

260
67

92, 109

2.5 T

Cycles

Truck
345
40
70
2.2

Diesel??
Diesel
Gas
Gas
Gas
6.4375
3.88
3.85
26.50

km/gal

Notes

11

17

TRUCKS AND UTILITY VEHICLES

Motor-

Gas

Power Oth Hvy
Dump Zil-135 Zil-151 Kraz-214 GAZ-63 Zil-157V Boats
530
130
205
7.7
Diesel

500
130
180
11
Gas

600
80
92
2.7

530
130
205
7.7

Diesel?? Diesel

345
40
55
2.2
Gas

430
80
109

Equip.

28

Diesel?? Diesel?? Diesel??

50

8.63

4.08

3.85

7.50

4.08

8.63

19

10

17

17

11

11

10

5.38

0.195
l/hp-hr
11
20

5.38
18

Operating Assumptions
Fract. Time In-Use During Maneuvers
Average Speed During Maneuvers
Hours of Operation, 1990
Hours of Operation, 1996
Hours of Operation, 2000
Hours of Operation, 2005
Hours of Operation, 2008
Hours of Operation, 2009

25%

km/hr
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs
hrs

25%

25

25

25%
20
25

250

25%
15
250

20
15

20
15

20
15

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

435
340

217.5
170

217.5
170

13.75

13.75

13.75

310

310

310

310

310

310

310

310

310

155

155

12.5
12.5

12.5
12.5

12.5
12.5

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

330
330

165
165

165
165

2.65E+02

8.80E+02

8.88E+02

1.39E+06

20

20

50%
30
500

50%
30
500

50%
30
500

50%
25
500

50%
25
500

50%
25
500

50%
25
500

50%
25
500

50%
25
500

25%

Fuel Consumption Results, 1990
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.
All Veh.

5.50E+07

22
22

1.86E+04
1.01E+03

3.35E+03

3.79E+01

1.26E+02

2.09E+08

All Veh.

6.85E+06

All Veh.

4.78E+07

3.38E+03

1.74E+06 5.04E+07
5.29E+06

7.06E+04
1.10E+02

3.47E+05 5.04E+07 3.2E+04 4.4E+04 3.6E+05 1.3E+05
1.32E+06 1.91E+08 1.2E+05 1.7E+05 1.4E+06 4.8E+05
6.61E+06 1.91E+08

1.72E+05

2.64E+03

4.29E+04 6.23E+06 4.6E+03 5.5E+03 5.2E+04 1.8E+04
2.15E+05 6.23E+06

2.4E+05 2.2E+05 0.0E+00 1.7E+04
1.0E+06
9.0E+05 8.5E+05 0.0E+00 6.5E+04
4.0E+06
2.9E+04 3.2E+04 0.0E+00 2.5E+03
1.4E+05

Fuel Consumption Results, 1996
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.

22
22

2.12E+02

7.04E+02

5.94E+06

All Veh.

3.48E+07

1.21E+06

1.49E+04
8.07E+02

2.68E+03

3.03E+01

1.01E+02

1.81E+08

All Veh.

7.11E+02
2.70E+03

1.51E+06 4.38E+07
4.60E+06

5.65E+04
1.01E+02

3.02E+05 4.38E+07 2.8E+04 3.9E+04 3.2E+05 1.1E+05
1.15E+06 1.67E+08 1.1E+05 1.5E+05 1.2E+06 4.2E+05
5.75E+06 1.67E+08

1.50E+05

2.12E+03

3.74E+04 5.42E+06 4.0E+03 5.5E+03 4.5E+04 1.6E+04
1.87E+05 5.42E+06

2.1E+05 1.9E+05 0.0E+00 1.5E+04
9.1E+05
7.9E+05 7.4E+05 0.0E+00 5.7E+04
3.5E+06
3.0E+04 2.8E+04 0.0E+00 2.1E+03
1.3E+05

Fuel Consumption Results, 2000
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.
All Veh.

22
22

1.49E+02

4.94E+02

8.85E+05

1.04E+04
5.65E+02

1.88E+03

2.12E+01

7.05E+01

1.32E+08
4.33E+06

4.98E+02
1.89E+03

1.11E+06 3.20E+07
3.36E+06

3.96E+04
7.11E+01
1.49E+03

A2 - 14

2.21E+05 3.20E+07 2.0E+04 2.8E+04 2.3E+05 8.0E+04
8.39E+05 1.22E+08 7.8E+04 1.1E+05 8.8E+05 3.0E+05
4.20E+06 1.22E+08

1.09E+05

2.73E+04 3.96E+06 2.9E+03 4.0E+03 3.3E+04 1.1E+04
1.37E+05 3.96E+06

1.5E+05 1.4E+05 0.0E+00 1.1E+04
6.6E+05
5.7E+05 5.4E+05 0.0E+00 4.1E+04
2.5E+06
2.2E+04 2.0E+04 0.0E+00 1.6E+03
9.5E+04

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT, BY TYPE, PER UNIT
GUNS, MISSILES (Cont.) LIGHT VEH.
TRUCKS AND UTILITY VEHICLES
Fuel Consumption Results, 2005
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.
All Veh.

3.03E+07

22
22

1.30E+02

4.32E+02

3.77E+06

All Veh.

2.76E+07

7.69E+05

9.11E+03
4.94E+02

1.64E+03

1.86E+01

6.16E+01

1.15E+08

All Veh.

4.35E+02
1.65E+03

9.61E+05 2.78E+07
2.92E+06

3.46E+04
6.22E+01

1.92E+05 2.78E+07 1.8E+04 2.5E+04 2.0E+05 6.9E+04
7.29E+05 1.06E+08 6.7E+04 9.3E+04 7.7E+05 2.6E+05
3.65E+06 1.06E+08

9.51E+04

1.30E+03

2.37E+04 3.44E+06 2.5E+03 3.5E+03 2.9E+04 9.9E+03
1.19E+05 3.44E+06

1.3E+05 1.2E+05 0.0E+00 9.5E+03
5.8E+05
5.0E+05 4.7E+05 0.0E+00 3.6E+04
2.2E+06
1.9E+04 1.8E+04 0.0E+00 1.4E+03
8.2E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 2008
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.

22
22

1.02E+02

3.38E+02

3.44E+06

All Veh.

2.76E+07

7.05E+05

7.13E+03
3.87E+02

1.28E+03

1.45E+01

4.82E+01

1.05E+08

All Veh.

3.41E+02
1.30E+03

8.81E+05 2.55E+07
2.68E+06

2.71E+04
4.87E+01

1.76E+05 2.55E+07 1.6E+04 2.2E+04 1.8E+05 6.4E+04
6.69E+05 9.69E+07 6.2E+04 8.5E+04 7.0E+05 2.4E+05
3.35E+06 9.69E+07

8.72E+04

1.02E+03

2.17E+04 3.15E+06 2.3E+03 3.2E+03 2.6E+04 9.1E+03
1.09E+05 3.15E+06

1.2E+05 1.1E+05 0.0E+00 8.7E+03
5.3E+05
4.6E+05 4.3E+05 0.0E+00 3.3E+04
2.0E+06
1.7E+04 1.6E+04 0.0E+00 1.2E+03
7.6E+04

Fuel Consumption Results, 2009
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Category
TOTAL FUEL USED
By Vehicle Categorygal
gal
literslitersGJ
GJ

All Veh.
All Veh.

22
22

1.02E+02

3.38E+02

7.05E+05

7.13E+03
3.87E+02

1.28E+03

1.45E+01

4.82E+01

1.05E+08
3.44E+06

3.41E+02
1.30E+03

8.81E+05 2.55E+07
2.68E+06

2.71E+04
4.87E+01
1.02E+03

A2 - 15

1.76E+05 2.55E+07 1.6E+04 2.2E+04 1.8E+05 6.4E+04
6.69E+05 9.69E+07 6.2E+04 8.5E+04 7.0E+05 2.4E+05
3.35E+06 9.69E+07

8.72E+04

2.17E+04 3.15E+06 2.3E+03 3.2E+03 2.6E+04 9.1E+03
1.09E+05 3.15E+06

1.2E+05 1.1E+05 0.0E+00 8.7E+03
5.3E+05
4.6E+05 4.3E+05 0.0E+00 3.3E+04
2.0E+06
1.7E+04 1.6E+04 0.0E+00 1.2E+03
7.6E+04

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

NOTES:
1 "Infantry Division" from North Korea Handbook , page 5-5
2 "Basic Corps Independent Infantry Brigade" from Opposing Force Training Module , p. 11-13
3 "Tank Brigade" from North Korea Handbook , page 5-31
4 "Mechanized Infantry Brigade" from North Korea Handbook , page 5-37
5 "Mechanized Infantry Division--Strategic Forces Command" from Opposing Force Training Module, p. 11-3
6 "Special Operations Brigades" are assumed to be those units listed in the Opposing Force Training Module
as being under either the Strategic Forces Command or the Basic Army Corps, but which are
not obviously included in the force units accounted for separately here.
7 From "Military Balance: North vs. South" Unclassified DOD document, September 27, 1993.
8 From Opposing Force Training Module, pp. 13-16 - 13-22.
9 For T-62. Pt-76 is a lighter, amphibious tank with a range of 260 k m and a fuel load of 67 gal,but the ratio of the two types is not k nown.
10 Engine size and range are as listed for the older but similar Sungni-58, which is reported to be very fuel-inefficient.
Fuel tank capacity is a guess. Data from reference 8, page 13-29.
11 Estimates based on measurements of drawings in reference 8.
12 Carriage, size seem similar to T-62 tank .
13 Carriage, size seem similar to PT-76 tank .
14 Built on Jeep chassis--assumed to have similar performance
15 Ferry consists of two track ed vehicles, each of which is assumed to have performance lik e T-62 tank .
16 Carriage seems similar to GAZ-66 2.2 ton truck . Fuel capacity for latter estimated based on measurement of drawings in reference 8.

A2 - 16

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
17 Assumed similar to KRAZ-214.
18 Assumed similar to Zil-157V on average. Reference 8 lists the lighter Zil-151 as one of the prime movers used for cranes.
19 Rough Estimate
20 Assumes boats will have similar engines to tractors, with similar fuel consumption.
21 Unusable equipment includes equipment rendered unusable by age, rust, or lack of spare parts.
22 Energy use as calculated here excludes fuel that would have been used by equipment considered unusable.
23 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service, "North Korea Military. The KPA: Troops & Equipment", fromhttp://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok /nis-docs/defense08.htm, visited 5/21/02, lists the total ground forces for the DPRK
at a total of
996,000 troops in 20 corps units. Assuming that this estimate holds forthe year 2000, a "true-up factor" for the equipment estimates above of
1.06408 is implied.
24 It has not been possible to obtain unclassified information that provides any specific information on recent fuel use
by the DPRK military. Analysts contacted regarding the "tempo" of recent DPRK military exercises,
and reports in the media (for example, "NK Ground Exercises Up as Navy and Air Force Decline",
Yoo Yong-won, www.chosun.com, 2001- 9-10) suggest that the DPRK military exercise tempo forground forces has increased somewhat in recent years, but not substantially, and that some of the apparent increasein exercises may be an increase in the number of soldiers involved, but not necessarily the number of fuel-using vehicles
and armaments. Accordingly, we assume that the average hours of annual use by ground vehicles in 2000 was
slightly lower than in 1996 by 2000, and somewhat lower still, in part due to fuel supply restrictions, in 2005.
25 Observers of DPRK and other countries' military activity suggest that the active (mobile) hours fortank s, mobile armaments, armoured vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and similar equipment are typically, underroutine (non-wartime) use, lik ely to be quite limited. Truck s and other utility vehicles that are used bothfor training/exercise use and also (especially in the DPRK) for other goods and human transport uses, are assumed
lik ely to be used significantly more than tank s and other armaments. See also Note 27.
26 There are a range of different estimates for the number of ground troops in the DPRK military in the years since
2000, though the range of estimates is not great. The document The Asian Military Balance: An
Analytic Overview--A Comparative Summary of Military Expenditures; Manpower; Land, Air, and Naval,
Forces; and Arms Sales , by Anthony H. Cordesman and G. Ryan Faith of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C., (available as http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/asia_ro_asian_mb_comp%5B1%5D.pdf),
published May, 2003, lists the manpower of DPRK ground forces in 2003 at
950,000 troops.
Assuming that this estimate holds for 2005 and beyond, a "true-up factor" for the equipment estimates above of
1.0149 is implied.

A2 - 17

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
27 The publication Seoul Wolgan Choson published an article by Kim Yon-k wang and Yi Sang-hun, dated 1 October, 2003
(pages 168-181), entitled "Kim Chong-il's Military is Hoarding All Rice Aid as Military Provision", and is based on
an interview with a DPRK soldier named Chin Yon-k yu, who had defected to the ROK, but who was (or claimed to be)a driver for a high-rank ing officer. This article includes a quote from Chin that suggests typical training for heavy equipment
was minimal: "Due to the fuel shortage, the North Korean Army's training exercises for heavily armed vehicles such astank s is said to involve 'an annual travel distance of 30 k ilometers'". This quote would appear to pertain to the time periodaround 2000, and the interviewee claims to have been based near Wonsan, in the "rear area".
If this information can be tak en at face value, it would imply that a true estimate for training use for tank s (and other heavyarmaments) might be just a few tens of k m, as opposed to the 200 - 700 k m/yr we estimate. Although it seems
lik ely that training with heavy armaments is limited, and has been decreasing over the years, we will, until additional information
becomes available, stay with our higher estimates of average usage. In so doing, we discount somewhat
Chin Yon-k yu's account, in part because A) Chin appears to have been stationed well North of the DMZ, wheretraining (and concentration of operable equipment, as well as fuel supplies) would be expected to be far less than inareas closer to the DMZ, and B) because it is only one, anecdotal account. Additional information on this topic
would, however, be very welcome.
In the same interview, the interviewee reported that starting in "…1992, the North Korean Army has begun to gradually use
fuel oil (incluidng benzene, gasoline, and diesel) stored for combat emergencies. Fuel oil tank s for use in combat are all
empty."
28 Several recent estimates based on the 2008 DPRK Census, including "[North Korea Census 2008] Korean People’s Army estimatedto number 700 thousand troops" ( The Hank yoreh , dated 3/19/2010, and available as
http://english.hani.co.k r/arti/english_edition/e_northk orea/411106.html)
have estimated that the current number of people in the DPRK military is approximately
700,000 As this reduction of troops
from previous estimates may not necessarily mean a proportionate reduction in movements by energy-using vehicles, we adopt a
true-up factor for 2008 and 2009 that assumes a reduction in energy use equal to about half of the proportional reduction introop levels from previous years, or
0.874

A2 - 18

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRKMILITARY AIRCRAFTUPDATE 2010/2011
Detailed Data and Results
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:Type of Aircraft

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS--AIRCRAFT USEDavid Von Hippel
Mission Hours Per Year:
Fighters/Bombers (Note 13 )Transport Aircraft
Helicopters
Ave. airspeed--Fract. of Maximum
Use of Service Vehicles Relative to 1990
Kerosene/Jet Fuel Energy Cont. (GJ/ltr)
Aviation Gasoline Energy Cont. (GJ/ltr)

3/2/2011

Number in Air Force
Number in
Fuel
Estimates from Sources
Air Force Range Capacity
1
2
3
4
17
18 Assumed km
liters
19
14
14

Class

Notes:
Fixed Wing
F-5 (MIG-17) Fresco
FighterF-6 (MIG-19) Farmer
Fighter/Bomber
MIG-21 Fishbed D/F/JFighter
F-7 (Fishbed C)Fighter
MIG-23 Flogger B/C/E/G/K Fighter
MIG-29 Fulcrum A/BFighter
MIG-15 Fagot
Fighter5SU-7B Fitter AFighter
SU-25 Frogfoot AFighter
9IL-28 Beagle
BomberY-5 (AN-2 Colt)
Transport
20
AN-24 (Coke)Transport
IL-18 Coot
Transport
IL-12 Coach (Civil)
Transport
6,10,11LI-2 Cab (Civil)
Transport
6,10,11
IL-14 Crate (Civil)
Transport
6, 10Fighters (All)
Bombers (All)Transport (All)
Helicopters
MI-2 Hoplite
7MI-4 Hound8, 12
MI-8 Hip8
MI-17 Hip
Hughes 500 D/E
All1990 1996
24
16
50
42
32
24
80% 80%100% 80%
0.035 Note 15
0.0321 Note 15

130
160
160
160
120
40
46
10 "2 reg"20
20
35 >2080
82
270 >250
6
10
2

601
80
278

ALL AIRCRAFT
Air Force Personnel
80,0003, 21Service Vehicles
6,235
16
TOTAL: AIRCRAFT PLUS GROUND SUPPORT VEHICLES

140
120110 >100 160
130 120 160
46

13
180
20
36
85
205

45
15
190
20 20
36 35
82 80
270 >30010

748 748 580
82 82 85
310 310 205"Most"

188
75

87
>75
275 275

87

130
160
160
40
46
13
144
20
35
82
270
6
2
10
10
10
748
82
308

1270
1390
971
1203
1800
2100
1368
1450
1250
2180
900
600
6500
1500
1500
1500

113
45
30

715
325
475
475
480

87
275

1413

2365
2170
2340
2340
5750
4365
2365
5275
4568
1740
1200
5550
30000
6500
6500
6500

2000
11
32
18
80%
65%

2005
19
38
24
80%
70%

(See Notes 22 and 23)
2008
2009
2010--D
THIS
20
15.5 SECTIO16
N OF 42
39
39
THIS
24
24 WORKS28
HEET
80%
80%
80%
NOT
75%
75%
100%

1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Max. Cruise Ave. Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel Total Fuel
Speed Speed Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt Consumpt
km/hr km/hr
l/hr
liters
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
GJ
14
14
1145
1590
2230
2230
2440
2440
1017
1696
848
900
220
484
675
675
675
675

850

625
625
625
625

1706
1986
4299
3470
6236
4057
1407
4936
2479
575
235
3582
2885
2708
2708
2708

5.32E+06
7.63E+06
1.65E+07
3.33E+06
6.88E+06
1.27E+06
4.86E+06
2.37E+06
2.08E+06
1.13E+06
3.17E+06
1.07E+06
2.88E+05
1.35E+06
1.35E+06
1.35E+06

1.86E+05
2.67E+05
5.78E+05
1.17E+05
2.41E+05
4.43E+04
1.70E+05
8.29E+04
7.29E+04
3.96E+04
1.02E+05
3.45E+04
9.26E+03
4.35E+04
4.35E+04
4.35E+04

1.24E+05
1.78E+05
3.85E+05
7.77E+04
1.61E+05
2.95E+04
1.13E+05
5.53E+04
4.86E+04
2.64E+04
8.54E+04
2.90E+04
7.78E+03
3.65E+04
3.65E+04
3.65E+04

8.54E+04
1.22E+05
2.65E+05
5.34E+04
1.10E+05
2.03E+04
7.80E+04
3.80E+04
3.34E+04
1.81E+04
6.51E+04
2.21E+04
5.92E+03
2.78E+04
2.78E+04
2.78E+04

1.47E+05
2.11E+05
4.57E+05
9.23E+04
1.91E+05
3.51E+04
1.35E+05
6.56E+04
5.77E+04
3.13E+04
7.73E+04
2.62E+04
7.04E+03
3.30E+04
3.30E+04
3.30E+04

1.55E+05
2.22E+05
4.81E+05
9.71E+04
2.01E+05
3.69E+04
1.42E+05
6.91E+04
6.07E+04
3.30E+04
7.93E+04
2.69E+04
7.22E+03
3.39E+04
3.39E+04
3.39E+04

1.20E+05
1.72E+05
3.73E+05
7.53E+04
1.56E+05
2.86E+04
1.10E+05
5.35E+04
4.71E+04
2.56E+04
7.93E+04
2.69E+04
7.22E+03
3.39E+04
3.39E+04
3.39E+04

5.03E+07 1.76E+06 1.17E+06 8.06E+05 1.39E+06 1.47E+06 1.14E+06
1.13E+06 3.96E+04 2.64E+04 1.81E+04 3.13E+04 3.30E+04 2.56E+04
8.59E+06 2.76E+05 2.32E+05 1.76E+05 2.10E+05 2.15E+05 2.15E+05

846
846
1870
1870
240

210
210
250
250
250

Kerosene/Jet Fuel
Aviation Gasoline
TOTAL ALL FUELS

160
225
240
240

199
416
886
945
120

7.19E+05 2.31E+04 1.73E+04 1.30E+04 1.73E+04 1.73E+04 1.73E+04
6.00E+05 1.92E+04 1.44E+04 1.08E+04 1.44E+04 1.44E+04 1.44E+04
8.50E+05 2.73E+04 2.05E+04 1.53E+04 2.05E+04 2.05E+04 2.05E+04
3.34E+05 1.07E+04 8.04E+03 6.03E+03 8.04E+03 8.04E+03 8.04E+03
2.50E+06 8.03E+04 6.02E+04 4.52E+04 6.02E+04 6.02E+04 6.02E+04
5.14E+07 1.80E+06 1.20E+06 8.24E+05 1.42E+06 1.50E+06 1.16E+06
1.11E+07 3.56E+05 2.92E+05 2.22E+05 2.70E+05 2.75E+05 2.75E+05
6.25E+07 2.15E+06 1.49E+06 1.05E+06 1.69E+06 1.77E+06 1.44E+06
1.52E+07 4.94E+05 3.95E+05 3.21E+05 3.46E+05 3.71E+05 3.71E+05

TOTAL ALL FUELS

A2 - 19

7.76E+07 2.65E+06 1.89E+06 1.37E+06 2.04E+06 2.14E+06 1.81E+06

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Notes:
1 North Korea Handbook , US Department of Defense, 1994. (PC-2600-6421-94). Pages 6-165 - 6-178.
2 North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength . US Defense Intelligence Agency (1990?). Pp. 47-48.
3 Point Paper, Republic of Korea/North Korea: Military Capabilities (with Military Balance). JICPAC (ONK), Sept. 1993.
4 From Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces. Field Manual No. 34-21 .
Headquarters Department of the Army (US). February, 1982. Chapter 14.
5 Not given in source 1. Number assumed brings total of fighters up to that listed in sources 2 and 3.
6 Not given in source 1. Numbers assumed are guesses to bring total of transports to figures listed in sources 2 and 3.
7 Not given in source 1. Number assumed brings total of helicopters up to that listed in sources 2 and 3.
8 No break down between MI-4 and MI-8 available. Break down assumed is a guess. MI-8 and MI-17 are similar aircraft.
9 Fuel capacity estimated based on (max weight - empty weight - weapons weight).
10 No information available (1940's vintage aircraft). Range and fuel capacity assumed similar to IL-14.
11 Speed assumed similar to IL-18.
12 Fuel capacity assumed similar to the MI-2.
13 Translates to approximately two 1-hr missions per month per aircraft.
14 Fuel Capacity data are from the following sources: A) Jane's All the World's Aircraft , 1990/91, 1981/82, 1972/73, and1968/69 editions. Jane's Publishing Co., N.Y., NY; B) Air Forces of the World , C.Chant, Brian
Trodd Publishing House, Ltd (1990); C) Military Aircraft of the World , J.W.R. Taylor and G/ Swanborough,Ian Allen Ltd., UK (1979). Range and airspeed data are from a mixture of these sources and sources 1 and 4, above.
15 All jet aircraft are assumed to use Kerosene/Jet Fuel, while all propeller-driven craft and helicopters are assumed touse Aviation Gasoline.

A2 - 20

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
16 Ground support vehicles for Air Force assumed to include light vehicles, 2 1/2 ton truck s, and larger truck s
and utility vehicles in the same proportions as are used in the ground forces. The number of these vehicles perperson in the Air Force is assumed to be the same as in the DPRK Army.
17 North Korea Country Handbook ,Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 1997. (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97). File Nk or.pdf,
obtained from Federation of American Scientists WWW site, 5/21/02, and dated May, 1997.
Data on aircraft are mostly from pages 36 to 38 of this document.
18 North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength -- Update 1995 . US Defense Intelligence Agency (1995).
Obtained from Federation of American Scientists WWW site, 5/21/02, and dated December, 1995.
19 As estimates of the numbers of aircraft from newer information sources (17 and 18) are not significantly different
from those in earlier documents, we will continue to use the composite estimates of total aircraft shown here for1996 and 2000 aircraft fuel use estimates.
20 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service (1999), North Korea Military. The KPA: Troops & Equipment
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok /nis-docs/defense08.htm, visited 5/21/02. This cource lists the
DPRK Air Force as having "a whopping 820 support aircraft and helicopters", but does not indicate
of what types are the approximately 200-plus aircraft beyond those listed in other sources (that is, apart fromthe AN-2 units and helicopters, the totals of which are similar to the listings above).
21 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service, "North Korea Military. The KPA: Troops & Equipment", fromhttp://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok /nis-docs/defense08.htm, visited 5/21/02, lists the total air force personnel for the DPRK
at a total of 103,000, somewhat above the figure used here, but as the personnel totals do not directly affectfuel use estimates for this branch of the service, the figure from source 3 is used.
22 Unclassified informaiton on fuel use in the DPRK military was not available, but the informal opinion or analysts familiar
with the DPRK military situation suggests that air force activity in the DPRK is, if anything, declining slowly, perhaps
due to lack of fuel, probably due to lack of spare parts, and probably due to a recognition on the part of the DPRK
military command that in a real conflict, the DPRK Air Force is unlik ely, given the age and condition of its equipment,
to play a substantial role. Accordingly, we have assumed that DPRK Air Force training exercises have continued todecrease slowly since 1996, as reflected in the flight-hours estimates shown.
23 The article "Korean People's Army Air Force" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk /airforce.htm)
on the Global Security website includes the following passage on the topic of training time for DPRK flight crews:"Pilot proficiency is difficult to evaluate because it is crudely proportionate to hours and quality offlight time. Although the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense's Defense White Paper,1990 states that flight training levels are 60 percent of South Korea's, other sources believe thefigure is closer to 20 to 30 percent. Lower flight times are attributed to fuel shortages, a moreconservative training philosophy, and perhaps a concern for older airframe life expectancies ormaintenance infrastructure capacity. The training of pilots on the NKAF's most modern aircraft ismuch more significant than "seven flying hours per year" sometimes claimed in the West. But aircrew are being trained in accordance with outdated procedures and, with lack of fuel, have very little
experience."
Although this article does not provide definitive information on aircraft use in training, it would seem to be consistent
with the assumptions of limited, and slowly decreasing, training levels made in this analysis.
The same article also inicates that "Kazak hstan had transferred lethal military equipment, specifically
about 40 MiG-21 fighter aircraft, to North Korea" in the late 1990s. We assume that this transfer has
had little impact on overall usable stock s of that aircraft, or on training levels (and thus energy use).

A2 - 21

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRKMILITARY SHIPS AND BOATSUPDATE 2010/2011
Detailed Data and Results
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:

10/26/2010

True-Up Factors (see Note 14 )Missile Attack Boats:
Amphibious:
Other Sm. Surface Vessels:

Type of Vessel

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS--NAVAL ENERGY USEDavid Von Hippel

1.50
1.46
1.04

Class

Notes:Nanjin Class
Frigate21
T (Tral) Class
Lg Patrol
Sariwon Class
Lg Patrol
SO 1 Class
Lg Patrol
Artillerist Class
Lg Patrol
17
Hainan Class
Lg Patrol
Taechong Class
Lg Patrol
OSA 1 Class
Missile Att.
Komar Class
Missile Att.
Shanghi Class--Gun
Fast Att.
Swatow Class--Gun
Fast Att.
Chodo Class--Gun
Fast Att.
K-48 Class--Gun
Fast Att.
MO IV Class--Gun
Fast Att.
13
Chongjin Class--Gun
Fast Att.
7
P 6--Torpedo
Fast Att.
26
P 4--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Iwon--Torpedo
Fast Att.
10
An Ju--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Chaho Class--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Sin Hung/Kosong--Torp.
Fast Att.
8
Shersen Class--Torpedo
Fast Att.
KM 4--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Torpedo Boats
PatrolLight Patrol
Patrol19
HantaeLanding
12, 18Nampo
Landing
HanchonLanding
9, 18Kong Bang (Hovercraft)
Landing
24,27
Whiskey
Submarine
Romeo, Chinese
Submarine
Romeo, NK
Submarine
YUGO mini-sub
Submarine25
Sang-O coastal infiltration Submarine
29
Frigates
Corvettes
Missile Attack Boats
Coastal Patrol Craft
Mine Warfare Craft
11
Amphibious Craft
Submarines
Trawlers
TOTAL, ALL VESSELS
Those Using Heavy Fuel Oil
Naval Personnel
60,000 3, 28
Service Vehicles
4,077
20
TOTAL: VESSELS PLUS SERVICE VEHICLESActive Hours Per Year in:
Amphibious
Submarines
Other Vessels
Ave. power use--Fract. of Max.
Marine Diesel Fuel Cons. (15 )Sub Diesel Fuel Cons. (16 )

1990
1996
50
50
100
100
800
570
50%
50%
0.38 lb/hp-hr
0.5 lb/hp-hr

Diesel Energy Content:
Conversion Factor
Diesel Fuel Density

0.04 GJ/liter
2.2 lb/kg
0.87 kg/liter

1

Number in DPRK Navy
Estimates from Sources
3
4
5
22

2

>60

150

4
2
3
15
2
4
2
8
10
8
8
4
4
20
30
62
12
15
6
60
60
4
10
229
20

8
>100

70
5

4
4
16

4

1
1
2
2
39 39
388 38823 23
194 19424 24
671 671

2

23
2

4
15
6
7
16
8
12
8
4
4

12
39?

45 31
60
15
6
66
72
3
10

62

2000
45
90
535
50%

(Note 30)
2005
2008
2009 2010--D
THIS
45
40
40 SECTI50
ON100
90
80
80
OF
560
480
400 THIS600
50%
50%
50%
50%

Liters per gallon

3.78

NumberEnginein Navy Displcmt Range Speed Power
Assumed Tons
n.miles knots (b/s/hp)
6
5
2
1
1800
4000
14
15000
2
475
18
3000
4
4
450
21
3000
18
16
250
1100
13
7500
2
240
25
7500
6
6
400
1000
10
8800
13
7
400
7500
26
24
200
800
25
12000
6
15
80
400
30
4800
14
13
155
800
17
4800
8
80
500
28
3000
4
130
2000
10
6000
4
100
24
5000
21
56
25
3000
51
47
80
40
4800
30
65
75
450
30
4800
13
25
50
4800
16
40
3600
6
35
1300
20
4800
52
69
80
40
4800
98
75
35
2400
4
160
41
12000
10
10
146

24

200 32088100 100 13025
125 130
15

11

10
95
7
135
4

26
22
48+ 40+
3
22
1
2

18
42
75
15
105
568

A2 - 22

23

21
12
146
36
130
4
4
16
48
12
1
2
39

2
150
82
150

1030 13,000
1100 16,000
1100 16,000
25
277

56
324
84
801
1

375

89,216
1,800

40
10
52
8
10
10
4
8.8

146
5000
4800
5000
8000
4000
4000
4000
160
800

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
FUEL CONSUMPTION RESULTS: MILITARY VESSELS

Type of Vessel

Class

Nanjin Class
FrigateT (Tral) Class
Lg Patrol
Sariwon Class
Lg Patrol
SO 1 Class
Lg Patrol
Artillerist Class
Lg Patrol
Hainan Class
Lg Patrol
Taechong Class
Lg Patrol
OSA 1 Class
Missile Att.
Komar Class
Missile Att.
Shanghi Class--Gun
Fast Att.
Swatow Class--Gun
Fast Att.
Chodo Class--Gun
Fast Att.
K-48 Class--Gun
Fast Att.
MO IV Class--Gun
Fast Att.
Chongjin Class--Gun
Fast Att.
P 6--Torpedo
Fast Att.
P 4--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Iwon--Torpedo
Fast Att.
An Ju--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Chaho Class--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Sin Hung/Kosong--Torp. Fast Att.
Shersen Class--Torpedo Fast Att.
KM 4--Torpedo
Fast Att.
Torpedo Boats
PatrolLight Patrol
PatrolHantaeLanding
Nampo
Landing
HanchonLandingKong Bang (Hovercraft) Landing
Whiskey
Submarine
Romeo, Chinese
Submarine
Romeo, NK
Submarine
YUGO mini-sub
Submarine
Sang-O coastal infiltrationSubmarine
Frigates
Corvettes
Missile Attack Boats
Coastal Patrol Craft
Mine Warfare Craft
Amphibious Craft
Submarines
Trawlers
TOTAL, VESSELS
Those Using Heavy Fuel Oil

1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
Per Vessel Per Class Per Class Per Vessel Per Class Per Class Per Vessel Per Class Per Class Per Vessel Per Class Per Class Per Vessel Per Class Per Class Per Vessel Per Class Per Class
Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons.Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons. Fuel Cons.
liters/year liters/year GJ/year
liters/year liters/year GJ/year liters/year liters/year GJ/year liters/year liters/year GJ/year liters/year liters/year GJ/year liters/year liters/year GJ/year
1,191,223
238,245
238,245595,611595,611
698,851595,611
952,978
381,191
381,191
238,245476,489
397,074
238,245
381,191
381,191
381,191
285,893381,191
381,191
190,596
952,978
11,595

1.19E+06
4.76E+05
9.53E+05
9.53E+06
1.19E+06
4.19E+06
4.17E+06
2.29E+07
5.72E+06
4.96E+06
1.91E+06
1.91E+06
1.59E+06
5.00E+06
1.79E+07
2.48E+07
4.96E+06
4.57E+06
2.29E+06
2.63E+07
1.43E+07
3.81E+06
1.16E+05

4.48E+04
1.79E+04
3.58E+04
3.58E+05
4.48E+04
1.58E+05
1.57E+05
8.60E+05
2.15E+05
1.86E+05
7.16E+04
7.16E+04
5.97E+04
1.88E+05
6.73E+05
9.31E+05
1.86E+05
1.72E+05
8.60E+04
9.89E+05
5.37E+05
1.43E+05
4.36E+03

848,746
169,749
169,749
424,373424,373
497,931424,373
678,997
271,599
271,599
169,749
339,498
282,915
169,749
271,599
271,599
271,599
203,699
271,599
271,599
135,799
678,997
8,261

8.49E+05
3.39E+05
6.79E+05
6.79E+06
8.49E+05
2.99E+06
2.97E+06
1.63E+07
4.07E+06
3.53E+06
1.36E+06
1.36E+06
1.13E+06
3.56E+06
1.28E+07
1.77E+07
3.53E+06
3.26E+06
1.63E+06
1.87E+07
1.02E+07
2.72E+06
8.26E+04

3.19E+04
1.28E+04
2.55E+04
2.55E+05
3.19E+04
1.12E+05
1.12E+05
6.12E+05
1.53E+05
1.33E+05
5.10E+04
5.10E+04
4.25E+04
1.34E+05
4.80E+05
6.64E+05
1.33E+05
1.22E+05
6.12E+04
7.04E+05
3.83E+05
1.02E+05
3.10E+03

796,630
159,326
159,326
398,315
398,315467,356
398,315
637,304
254,922
254,922
159,326
318,652
265,543
159,326
254,922
254,922
254,922
191,191
254,922
254,922
127,461
637,304
7,754

7.97E+05 2.99E+04
3.19E+05 1.20E+04
6.37E+05 2.40E+04
6.37E+06 2.40E+05
7.97E+05 2.99E+04
2.80E+06 1.05E+05
2.79E+06 1.05E+05
1.53E+07 5.75E+05
3.82E+06 1.44E+05
3.31E+06 1.25E+05
1.27E+06 4.79E+04
1.27E+06 4.79E+04
1.06E+06 3.99E+04
3.35E+06 1.26E+05
1.20E+07 4.50E+05
1.66E+07 6.23E+05
3.31E+06 1.25E+05
3.06E+06 1.15E+05
1.53E+06 5.75E+04
1.76E+07 6.61E+05
9.56E+06 3.59E+05
2.55E+06 9.58E+04
7.75E+04 2.91E+03

833,856
166,771
166,771416,928
416,928
489,195
416,928
667,085
266,834
266,834
166,771
333,542
277,952
166,771
266,834
266,834
266,834
200,125
266,834
266,834
133,417667,085
8,116

8.34E+05
31,340333,542
12,536
6.67E+05 2.51E+04
6.67E+06 2.51E+05
8.34E+05 3.13E+04
2.94E+06 1.10E+05
2.92E+06 1.10E+05
1.60E+07 601,721
4.00E+06 150,430
3.47E+06 1.30E+05
1.33E+06 5.01E+04
1.33E+06 5.01E+04
1.11E+06 4.18E+04
3.50E+06 1.32E+05
1.25E+07 4.71E+05
1.73E+07 6.52E+05
3.47E+06 1.30E+05
3.20E+06 1.20E+05
1.60E+06 6.02E+04
1.84E+07 6.92E+05
1.00E+07 3.76E+05
2.67E+06 1.00E+05
8.12E+04 3.05E+03

714,734
142,947
142,947
357,367
357,367
419,310357,367
571,787
228,715
228,715
142,947
285,893
238,245
142,947
228,715
228,715
228,715
171,536
228,715
228,715
114,357
571,787
6,957

7.15E+05
2.86E+05
5.72E+05
5.72E+06
7.15E+05
2.52E+06
2.50E+06
1.37E+07
3.43E+06
2.97E+06
1.14E+06
1.14E+06
9.53E+05
3.00E+06
1.07E+07
1.49E+07
2.97E+06
2.74E+06
1.37E+06
1.58E+07
8.58E+06
2.29E+06
6.96E+04

2.69E+04
1.07E+04
2.15E+04
2.15E+05
2.69E+04
9.46E+04
9.40E+04
5.16E+05
1.29E+05
1.12E+05
4.30E+04
4.30E+04
3.58E+04
1.13E+05
4.04E+05
5.59E+05
1.12E+05
1.03E+05
5.16E+04
5.93E+05
3.22E+05
8.60E+04
2.61E+03

595,611
119,122
119,122
297,806
297,806
349,425
297,806
476,489
190,596
190,596
119,122238,245
198,537
119,122
190,596
190,596
190,596
142,947
190,596
190,596
95,298476,489
5,797

5.96E+05 2.24E+04
2.38E+05 8.95E+03
4.76E+05 1.79E+04
4.76E+06 1.79E+05
5.96E+05 2.24E+04
2.10E+06 7.88E+04
2.08E+06 7.83E+04
1.14E+07 4.30E+05
2.86E+06 1.07E+05
2.48E+06 9.31E+04
9.53E+05 3.58E+04
9.53E+05 3.58E+04
7.94E+05 2.98E+04
2.50E+06 9.40E+04
8.96E+06 3.37E+05
1.24E+07 4.66E+05
2.48E+06 9.31E+04
2.29E+06 8.60E+04
1.14E+06 4.30E+04
1.32E+07 4.94E+05
7.15E+06 2.69E+05
1.91E+06 7.16E+04
5.80E+04 2.18E+03

11,595
24,817
23,824
24,817
113,400
52,24752,24752,2472,090
10,449

2.43E+05
2.98E+05
3.48E+06
8.93E+05
1.47E+06
2.09E+05
2.09E+05
8.36E+05
1.00E+05
1.25E+05
1.19E+06
4.76E+05
2.86E+07

9.15E+03
1.12E+04
1.31E+05
3.36E+04
5.54E+04
7.85E+03
7.85E+03
3.14E+04
3.77E+03
4.71E+03
4.48E+04
1.79E+04
1.07E+06

8,261
24,817
23,824
24,817
113,400
52,24752,24752,2472,090
10,449

1.73E+05
2.98E+05
3.48E+06
8.93E+05
7.37E+06
2.09E+05
2.09E+05
8.36E+05
1.00E+05
1.25E+05
8.49E+05
3.39E+05
2.04E+07

6.52E+03
1.12E+04
1.31E+05
3.36E+04
2.77E+05
7.85E+03
7.85E+03
3.14E+04
3.77E+03
4.71E+03
3.19E+04
1.28E+04
7.66E+05

7,754
22,33521,442
22,335102,060
47,02247,02247,022
1,881
9,404

1.63E+05 6.12E+03
2.68E+05 1.01E+04
3.13E+06 1.18E+05
8.04E+05 3.02E+04
1.33E+07 4.99E+05
1.88E+05 7.07E+03
1.88E+05 7.07E+03
7.52E+05 2.83E+04
9.03E+04 3.39E+03
1.13E+05 4.24E+03
7.97E+05 2.99E+04
3.19E+05 1.20E+04
1.91E+07 7.19E+05

8,116
22,33521,442
22,335102,060
47,02247,02247,022
1,881
9,404

1.70E+05 6.41E+03
2.68E+05 1.01E+04
3.13E+06 1.18E+05
8.04E+05 3.02E+04
1.33E+07 4.99E+05
1.88E+05 7.07E+03
1.88E+05 7.07E+03
7.52E+05 2.83E+04
9.03E+04 3.39E+03
1.13E+05 4.24E+03
8.34E+05 3.13E+04
3.34E+05 1.25E+04
2.00E+07 7.52E+05

6,957
19,85419,06019,85490,72041,797
41,797
41,7971,672
8,359

1.46E+05
2.38E+05
2.78E+06
7.15E+05
1.18E+07
1.67E+05
1.67E+05
6.69E+05
8.03E+04
1.00E+05
7.15E+05
2.86E+05
1.72E+07

5.49E+03
8.95E+03
1.05E+05
2.69E+04
4.43E+05
6.28E+03
6.28E+03
2.51E+04
3.02E+03
3.77E+03
2.69E+04
1.07E+04
6.45E+05

5,797
19,85419,06019,85490,72041,797
41,797
41,7971,672
8,359

1.22E+05 4.58E+03
2.38E+05 8.95E+03
2.78E+06 1.05E+05
7.15E+05 2.69E+04
1.18E+07 4.43E+05
1.67E+05 6.28E+03
1.67E+05 6.28E+03
6.69E+05 2.51E+04
8.03E+04 3.02E+03
1.00E+05 3.77E+03
5.96E+05 2.24E+04
2.38E+05 8.95E+03
1.43E+07 5.37E+05

6.14E+06
1.48E+06

2.31E+05
5.56E+04

1.20E+07
1.48E+06

4.53E+05
5.56E+04

1.75E+07 6.57E+05
1.33E+06 5.00E+04

1.75E+07 6.57E+05
1.33E+06 5.00E+04

1.55E+07 5.84E+05
1.18E+06 4.45E+04

1.55E+07 5.84E+05
1.18E+06 4.45E+04

1.72E+08
1.19E+06

6.48E+06
4.48E+04

1.31E+08
8.49E+05

4.92E+06
3.19E+04

1.29E+08 4.84E+06
7.97E+05 2.99E+04

1.34E+08 5.04E+06
8.34E+05 3.13E+04

1.15E+08 4.34E+06
7.15E+05 2.69E+04

9.90E+07 3.72E+06
5.96E+05 2.24E+04

1.14E+07
1.84E+08

3.71E+05
6.85E+06

8.63E+06
1.39E+08

2.81E+05
5.20E+06

8.50E+06 2.77E+05
1.37E+08 5.12E+06

8.84E+06 2.88E+05
1.43E+08 5.33E+06

7.62E+06 2.48E+05
1.23E+08 4.59E+06

6.53E+06 2.13E+05
1.06E+08 3.93E+06

Service Vehicles
TOTAL: VESSELS PLUS SERVICE VEHICLES

A2 - 23

2010--Decline Sc

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

Notes:
1 North Korea Handbook , US Department of Defense, 1994. (PC-2600-6421-94). Pages 6-165 - 6-178.
2 North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength . US Defense Intelligence Agency (1990?). Pp. 44-46.
3 Point Paper, Republic of Korea/North Korea: Military Capabilities (with Military Balance). JICPAC (ONK), Sept. 1993.
4 From Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces. Field Manual No. 34-21 .
Headquarters Department of the Army (US). February, 1982. Chapter 15.
5 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-88 . Edited by J. Moore, Jane's Publishing Co., NY, NY. P. 329-222.
6 Speed shown is that given with the range of the vessel, if specified.
7 Assumed similar to Chaho Class based on information in source 4.
8 Similar to Soviet "D3" class.
9 Source 4 shows this vessel as approximately twice as long and 10% wider than the Nampo.
10 Similar to Soviet "P 2" class.
11 Total shown for source 4 are vessels listed in source 1 as mine-capable.
12 Source 1 shows this vessel to be about 30% longer, 10% narrower than the Hanchon
13 Assumed similar to Swatow class (engine size)
14 "True-up" factors are used to inflate numbers of vessels by individual class (from 4 and 5) to the aggregate
values presented in sources 2 and 3. True-up factors are not applied to Kong Bang hovercraft or mini-subs.
15 Generic value for fuel consumption by marine diesel engines from The Marine Power Plant, L.B.Chapman
McGraw-Hill, 1942. This figure may (or may not) be slightly high for the DPRK Navy. Figure judged tobe reasonable by a representative of a US distributor of marine diesel engines, who gave a range of
0.32 lb/hp-hr for best modern diesels, to 0.40+ for older diesels, with 20 hp-hr/gallon (0.364 lb/hp-hr) as amodern rule of thumb. Same representative also indicated that a range of 0.4 to 0.6 of maximum power use
was a reasonable range for a ship cruising at sea.

A2 - 24

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
16 Generic value for fuel consumption by submarine diesel engines from Submarine Design and Development ,N.Freedman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1984. P. 131.
17 Assumed similar to SO 1 class (engine size)
18 Assumed similar to K-48 class (engine size)
19 Assumed similar to KM-4 torpedo class (engine size)
20 Service vehicles for Navy assumed to include light vehicles, 2 1/2 ton truck s, and larger truck s
and utility vehicles in the same proportions as are used in the ground forces. The number of these vehicles perperson in the Navy is assumed to be the same as in the DPRK Army.
21 Frigate is assumed to be fueled with heavy oil. All other vessels are assumed to be diesel-fueled.
22 North Korea Country Handbook ,Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 1997. (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97). File Nk or.pdf,
obtained from Federation of American Scientists WWW site, 5/21/02, and dated May, 1997.
Data on naval vessels are mostly from pages 39 and 40 of this document.
23 North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength -- Update 1995 . US Defense Intelligence Agency (1995).
Obtained from Federation of American Scientists WWW site, 5/21/02, and dated December, 1995.
24 World Navies Today: North Korea , from www.hazegray.org/worldnav/ (visited 5/22/02) suggests that the DPRK
has "135 Kongbang class assault hovercraft, carrying 35-55 troops". Source 22 lists three types of thesecraft, with sizes ranging from 23 x 60.7 feet to 29.5 x 75.5 feet. Source 22 lists the speed of these vessels as
52 k nots. No specific information on the propulsion systems used in these craft was included in either of thesesources, but a somewhat larger troop landing hovercraft (47 x 88 feet) used by the US Navy, and with a slightly
lower speed, is listed as having 16,000 hp (total?) in four turbine engines.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lcac.htm (visited 5/22/02) lists the US "LCAC" as having 12,280 bhp, and"Fuel capacity is 5000 gallons. The LCAC uses an average of 1000 gallons per hour."Assume that the somewhat smaller DPRK vessels would have lower fuel consumption and power ratings
perhaps
600 gallons per hour.
According to source 23, production of the Kong Bang type II and III craft began in 1988, suggesting that the
major portion of the Kong Bang fleet was produced after 1990. Assume that 10% of the fleet shown was in service
by 1990, and
50% was in service by 1996.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
25 Source 23 suggests that there are "over 48" YUGO submarines and 3 SANGO coastal submarines in the DPRK fleet.
26 Source 24 lists 18 "Sinpo class" small patrol boats, with 66.5 tons full load displacement, and 4800 hp diesels,
and "up to 12" P-6 class small torpedo boats.
27 Estimate of 8000 bhp shown here for the Kong Bang hovercraft is a rough figure based on the specifications for thelarger US vessel described in note 24. Fuel consumption, however, is based on the estimate given
in note 24, not on the horsepower estimate. See also notes 31 and 32.
28 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service, "North Korea Military. The KPA: Troops & Equipment", fromhttp://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok /nis-docs/defense08.htm, visited 5/21/02, lists the total naval force personnel for the DPRK
at a total of 48,000, somewhat above the figure used here, but as the personnel totals do not directly affectfuel use estimates for this branch of the service, the figure from source 3 is used.
29 Engine size for the Sang-O submarines is a rough estimate based on reported engine size for other DPRK subs and therelative size of the different submarine models.
30 There does not appear to be any available definitive intormation of an unclassified nature that could be used toeven quailitatively estimate the level of activity in the DPRK naval forces as of 2000 or 2005. Analysts contacted inresearching this update, however, indicate that the DPRK Navy did not, as of about 2002 seem to be operating under
any particular fuel restrictions, and that the level of incursions (from DPRK vessels) experienced in ROK waters
seems to be fairly consistent with prior years. As a result, we have assumed that DPRK naval activity was about thesame (in terms of activity per vessel) as in 1996 for vessels other than submarines and amphibious craft. We haveassumed that submarine and amphibious craft activity in the DPRK navy declined slightly in the period after 1996, in part,in the case of amphibious craft, in k eeping with our assumption of reduced training levels for ground forces,
as well as tak ing into account reported restrictions on fuel availability in the general economy.
31 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk /navy.htm states "[t]he North Korean navy has built over 140 hovercraft
capable of carrying platoon-size units ashore…" which is on the same order as the estimates of the number of these craft
provided in other sources, but slightly higher.
32 Two recent ROK media reports--"North Korea Deploys Air Cushion Warships", Seoul, The Korea Times(Internet Version-WWW) in English, by Cho'ng Su'ng-k i, dated April 1, 2007 (and quoting the 2006 ROK Defense
White Paper); and "N.Korea Develops High-Speed Military Hovercraft", Seoul. Chosun Ilbo WWW-Text
in English, dated April 2, 2007--report the development of DPRK hovercraft, but these appear to be the sameas the Kong Bang hovercraft developed deployed during the 1990s, with no apparent change in the number of such
vessels (both of the 2007 articles give a number of 130 hovercraft) since about 2000.

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Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL FUEL USE BY THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRKENERGY USE IN MANUFACTURING MILITARY EQUIPMENT UPDATE 2010/2011
Detailed Data and Results
Prepared By:
Date Last Modified:David Von Hippel
2/28/2011

COMMON ASSUMPTIONS & PARAMETERS, MILITARY MANUFACTURING
Lifetime of Ground Forces Equipment (yrs):
Lifetime of Small Armaments (yrs):
Lifetime of Naval Vessels (yrs):
Fract. of Weight of Equipment as Iron & Steel

20
10
30
90%
Estimated Average
Number
Weightin Service Each (t)GROUND FORCES: VEHICLES
Notes:

Made in
DPRK?

Equip.
Lifetime(years)

Total
Weight(t)

Estimated
Iron&Steel
Needed (t)

1

Tanks
T-54/55
T62/63/PT-76
Assault

2,185
3,106
541

36
36.4
30

Yes?
Yes?
Yes?

20 7.87E+04
20 1.13E+05
20 1.62E+04

3.54E+03
5.09E+03
7.30E+02

PT-76
PTS
K-61
GAZ-46
Amphibious Ferry
Tank Retriever
Armored Fighting Vehicles
BTR-60
BRDM
Truck/Tank Mtd Guns & Missiles
AAG
BM-21
BM-20,24
FROG 3/5
FROG 7
Light Vehicles
Jeeps
Motorcycles
2 1/2 T Trucks
Trucks and Utility Vehicles
Dump
Zil-135
Zil-151
KRAZ-214GAZ-63
Zil-157VPower Boats
Other Heavy Equipment

189
11
364
40
68
227

14
20
15
2
50
29

Yes?
Yes?
Yes?
Yes
Yes?
Yes?

20
20
20
20
20
20

2.65E+03
2.28E+02
5.47E+03
7.97E+01
3.42E+03
6.57E+03

1.19E+02
1.02E+01
2.46E+02
3.59E+00
1.54E+02
2.96E+02

3,622
393

10
5

Yes?
Yes?

20 3.62E+04
20 1.96E+03

1.63E+03
8.84E+01

273
157
17
34
34

31
13
9
16
20

Yes?
Yes?
Yes?
Yes?
Yes?

20
20
20
20
20

8.47E+03
2.04E+03
1.54E+02
5.47E+02
6.83E+02

3.81E+02
9.19E+01
6.92E+00
2.46E+01
3.07E+01

6,150
2,895
72,403

1.5
0.2
2.9

Yes
Yes
Yes

9.22E+03
5.79E+02
2.10E+05

4.15E+02
2.61E+01
9.45E+03

26
34
547
102
410
239
150
123

13.5
12.4
6.1
13.5
2.9
6.6
1
6.6

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

3.54E+02
4.24E+02
3.33E+03
1.38E+03
1.19E+03
1.58E+03
1.50E+02
8.12E+02

1.59E+01
0.00E+00
0.00E+00
6.23E+01
5.35E+01
0.00E+00
6.76E+00
3.65E+01

5.05E+05
Total
Weight(t)

2.25E+04
Estimated
Iron&Steel
Needed (t)20 6.00E+04
1042,6401.03E+05

2.70E+03
3.84E+03
6.54E+03

Amphibious Vehicles +2

TOTAL--GROUND FORCES VEHICLES

94,343
Estimated Average
Number
WeightMade inin Service Each (t) DPRK?
Notes:
1

Equip.
Lifetime(years)GROUND FORCES: OTHER ARMAMENTS
Towed Guns and Missile Launchers
Light Arms, Various
TOTAL--GROUND FORCES OTHER

3
4

10,0006

A2 - 27

Yes?
Yes?

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
NAVAL FORCES
Total Tonnage of Naval Vessels
Service Vehicles
TOTAL--NAVAL FORCES

5
7

4,077

Yes
(varies)

6
7

6,235

No
(varies)

30 8.92E+04
20 1.29E+04
1.02E+05

2.68E+03
5.66E+02
3.24E+03

20 1.72E+04
1.72E+04

0
7.55E+02
7.55E+02

AIR FORCESAIRCRAFT
Service Vehicles
TOTAL--AIR FORCESTOTAL IRON&STEEL REQUIRED/YR FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

3.30E+04

CALCULATION OF ENERGY REQUIRMENTS FOR MILITARY PRODUCT MANUFACTURING, 1990
Energy Required to melt iron for steel
250 kgce/te crude steel
Note 8Average number of melts to produce military products
2
Note 9DPRK Steelmaking processes assumed to be
10% more energy intensive than in China
Conversion Factor:
29.3 GJ/tce
ESTIMATED COAL TO MANUFACTURE IRON AND STEEL MILITARY EQUIPMENT
5.32E+05 GJ
Fract. Energy Use in Production of Military Equipment Represented by Iron and Steel

60% Note 98.87E+05 GJ

ESTIMATED TOTAL COAL USED IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURE
Ratio of Electricity Use to Coal Use in DPRK (Non-Military) Iron and Steel Industry

0.054 Note 10

4.75E+04 GJ

ESTIMATED TOTAL ELECTRICITY USED IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURE

PROJECTION OF ENERGY REQUIRMENTS FOR MILITARY PRODUCT MANUFACTURING
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 1996 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2000 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2005 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2008 versus 1990:
Ratio of Military Equipment Output in 2009 versus 1990:

Projection of Coal Use in Military Manufacturing (GJ)
Projection of Electricity Use in Military Manufacturing (GJ)
Projection of Coal Use in Military Manufacturing (GJ)
Projection of Electricity Use in Military Manufacturing (GJ)A2 - 280.7
0.45 (See Notes 11 - 13)
0.45 (See Notes 11 - 13)
0.45
0.45
1996
2000
6.21E+05 3.99E+05
3.33E+04 2.14E+04
2008
2009
3.99E+05 3.99E+05
2.14E+04 2.14E+04

2005
3.99E+05
2.14E+04
2010--D
7.54E+05
4.04E+04

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12
Notes:
1 From Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces . Field Manual No. 34-21. Figures initalics are guesses--no data available.
2 Weight of launcher only--prime mover assumed to be imported..
3 Point Paper, Republic of Korea/North Korea: Military Capabilities (with Military Balance). JICPAC (ONK),
Sept. 1993. This source reports roughly 10,800 artillery pieces and rock et launchers. Figure shown nets out
roughly guns and missiles included in the accounting of ground forces vehicles. Weight per unit is a roughestimate, and is probably more lik ely to be high than low.
4 Assumes an average of 40 k g of light arms per person in the Army.
5 Sum of displacement of Naval vessels. Actual weight of vessels may be different.
6 All aircraft assumed to be imported.
7 Based on service/ground support vehicle totals calculated in the Aircraft and Navy sheets, and the vehicle
tonnages shown in the Ground Forces section of this sheet.
8 "The Energy Efficiency of the Steel Industry of China", M.Ross and L.Feng. Energy, Volume 16, no. 5(1991), pp. 833-848.
9 Peter Zimmerman, personal communication.
10 Assumes that the ratio of electricity to coal use in military manufacturing will be similar to that in the ironand steel subsector of the DPRK's (assumed) non-military industries. Ratio calculated from figures in
estimated energy balance for DPRK.
11 There has been little direct or quantitative information available on the intensity of military manufacturing in
the DPRK in recent years. There have been some reports of missile exports from the DPRK.
The Seoul T'ongil Kyongje article referenced below (13) suggests that exports of SCUD-C missles in the "early 1990s"
were on the order of 100-150 per year. The same article also suggests that "weapons exports at the 15 to 20 percent[presumably of total national exports] in the Cold War…dropped to less than 5 percent after the mid 1990s".
It seems unlik ely that such exports of relatively high-value armaments would have a substantial effect onoverall military sector manufacturing. We assume that the level of military manufacturing is approximately thesame as in 1996, though even that level may be difficult for the DPRK to sustain given the reported difficulties inthe DPRK coal sector.
12 A description of SCUD missles ("Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): R-11 / SS-1B SCUD-A
R-300 9K72 Elbrus / SS-1C SCUD-B") from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r-11.htm
suggests that the typical weight of a SCUD missile is about 6.5 tonnes, of which"3,500 k ilograms (7,700 pounds) of IRFNA [inhibited red fuming nitric acid, a fuel oxidant] and about 1,000
k ilograms (2,200 pounds) of fuel".
An article in Janes.com , "SS-1 `Scud' (R-11/8K11, R-11FM (SS-N-1B) and R-17/8K14)", dated April 26, 2001,
lists the SCUD-C as having a launch weight of 6.4 tonnes and a warhead weight of 600 k g(http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/sws_scud010426.shtml).
these figures together suggest that the weight of the missile hardware itself is about 1.3 tonnes. Assuming thatmost or all of this mass is steel, exports of SCUD-C missiles in the early-1990s imply a use of iron/steel of about130-200 tonnes--which amounts to on the order of half of 1 percent of the iron/steel needed for routine replacementof DPRK equipment (as of 1990), as calculated above. Thus, exports of these missiles, at least, would seem tohave little impact on overall DPRK Military manufacturing energy use.
13 The journal Seoul T'ongil Kyongje , dated July 2002, contains an article (pages 28-36) by So Chu-sok entitled"North Korean Industries (Part X): Munitions Industry". Among the information in this article is the following:"…North Korean military power has not changed greatly since….the mid 1990s", apart from some missile developmentand "expanded forward deployment of long-range artillery". The article estimates the size of the military at
1.7 million people, consuming much more than 5% of food in the country, and more than 15 percent of fuel oil usedin the DPRK. Military stock piles of food and fuel are "100 to 120 days worth", but it is not stated whether.
this refers to days under typical non-combat or combat conditions. The article states that there are about
180 munitions factories in the DPRK, including about 40 gun factories, 10 armored vehicle factories, 50 ammunitions
factories, and 10 naval shipyards, producing a total of 25 percent of GNP. Exports of SCUD-C missiles
in the early 1990s are estimated at 100 to 150 per year. Factories, largely based on Soviet/East Bloc
technology, have become "technologically obsolete and their facilities are run down", resulting in "extremely low"efficiency and high rates of consumption of energy and materials that, coupled with fuel and materials shortages, have"caused production setback s" in some factories. This general description, together with the information innotes 11 and 12, leads us to believe that military manufacturing has fallen fairly substantially since 1996, in partdue to further loss of exports since then, but also due to fuels, material, and parts shortages. We assume thatmilitary manufacturing activity was 45 percent of (estimated) 1990 levels in 2005. This would mean that miltary-sector
manufacturing, while substantially less than in 1990, has not fallen by as much as average industrial sector output
in the DPRK.

A2 - 29

Nautilus Institute, Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK, Attachments, 8/20/12

ESTIMATES OIL FUEL USE IN A CONFLICT BY
THE MILITARY SECTOR IN THE DPRK
Prepared by:

D. Von Hippel, 6/3/04(Updated 4/12/07, 10/16/2011, and 8/22/12)

Based on our estimates of 1990 Fuel Use (from this workbook), total use of fuel per hour of exercise-level
activity are as follows:
Conversions from GJ to tonnes assume

43 GJ/tonne fuelService
GJ/hr
Tonnes/hr Notes
Ground Forces
7,638
178 Per hour overall ground forces activity*
Air Forces
110,3422,566 Per hour fighter/bomber activity
Naval Forces
8,559
199 Per hour "other vessels" activity*Assumes armaments (including tanks) move
4 times as much as during routine exercises.
Assuming a

30 -day conflict in which:
50% of ground forces are destroyed/rendered inoperable by the end of the period,and ground forces are moving about
50% of the time,
100% of air forces are destroyed/rendered inoperable or placed in deep storage within
24 hours of the start of the conflict, and
90% of naval forces are destroyed/rendered inoperable/placed in deep storage within
120 hours of the start of the conflict.

Total fuel use during a 30-day conflict would be:

129,387 tonnes

Based on our preliminary estimates of year 2009 diesel plus gasoline production plus imports in the DPRK,
it would take on the order of
3.6 months to replenish the stocks consumed in theconflict, even if A) all domestic production and imports were diverted to the war effort, and B) all supply
lines remained intact.
Running the two operating refineries at full capacity (only possible if sufficient imported crude oil
supplies are available) would increase the total output of gasoline plus diesel by about
3.70E+04 tonnes per month, meaning that the stocks consumed could be replenished inabout
1.8 months
The rate of fuel use by the forces remaining after a 30-day war as above would be
108.71 tonnes/hr
This is about
215% of the total average year 2009 rate of diesel plus gasoline production and imports, or
about
107% of the total rate of diesel plus gasoline production and imports with refineries running to full capacity.

A2 - 30