IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

Research article
erd

Factors Influencing Equity in Farmer-managed Irrigation
Distribution in Sindh, Pakistan
JUNAID ALAM MEMON*
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan
Email: memon@gmx.us

FATEH MUHAMMAD MARI
Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project, Karachi, Pakistan
Received 24 December 2012

Accepted 10 June 2013(*Corresponding author)

Abstract Equitable distribution of irrigation has been one of the most compelling
justification for irrigation management reforms in many countries. Policy response to suchneed in Pakistan had been the introduction of farmer-management of tertiary level
irrigation affairs. This study presents an empirical analysis of the effect of reforms onequitable irrigation distribution in Farmer Organizations (FO) of three Area Water Boards(AWBs) in Sindh, Pakistan. Cross-sectional quantitative information obtained fromsecondary sources included the official datasets on irrigation discharge measurements, FOmaturity indexes and FO profiles prepared by Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority(SIDA) and Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP-I). A multinomial logistic
regression model, having Equity between Head and Tail watercourses as the regressand
and Institutional maturity index, Culturable command area, and Membership size of FO as
the regressors were used to model the determinants of Equity in Farmer-managed
Irrigation Distribution. The study identified institutional maturity as one of the influential
factors explaining variation in the irrigation delivery performance of FOs. With somecaveats, findings have useful policy implications for the success of irrigation reforms forsustainable agriculture in Sindh Province of Pakistan.
Keywords farmer-managed irrigation, irrigation equity, delivery performance ratio,
Pakistan

INTRODUCTION
Irrigation is the lifeline for millions of poor who eke out their livelihood from agricultural activities
carried out in the developing regions of the world. As a key component of the green revolution
package, developing countries have invested heavily in building irrigation infrastructure like dams,
diversion structures and irrigation networks. The benefits of such investments can be observed
from the fact that the total area under irrigation has more than doubled during 1961-2003 (Gleick etal., 2011). Probably it would not be exaggerating to say that human civilization avoided theMalthusian pessimism of food shortages and hunger (Malthus, 1806) partly because of theadvances in irrigation engineering and technology. Today, agriculture consumes 60 percent offreshwater withdrawal worldwide, 69 percent in Africa and 75 percent in Asia, whereas in somecountries, this figure could be as high as 99 percent (Gleick et al., 2011). Since 1950s, the irrigation
policies in various developing countries had largely been an artifact of international donors(Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012).The importance of irrigation development on donor agenda canbe understood from the fact that irrigation could secure more than seven percent of the total lendingby the World Bank since 1950s (Plusquellec, 1999 cited in Bassi and Kumar, 2011). The extent towhich the donor intervention in irrigation issues and policies in developing countries is qualified issomething external to the scope of this paper. However, it worth reading the illuminating article bySuhardiman and Mollinga (2012) nicely describing the way in which the international donors
authored, suggested and pushed national irrigation policies in developing countries in general andIndonesia in particular.
Ⓒ ISERD

26

IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

Over the years, the donor prescription of irrigation policy for developing countries has largely
shifted from the infrastructure expansion to institutional development. The new narrative described
the hydraulic bureaucracy as incapable of making full cost recovery of irrigation service, adequate
operation and management of infrastructure and equitable irrigation distribution; while assumingthat if organized, farmers could efficiently manage the irrigation affairs (Bandaragoda, 2006;
Memon, 2012; Mustafa, 2002; Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012). The donors may have some
empirical or systematic understanding of the inefficiency of hydraulic bureaucracy irrigation affairs,
but it is highly tempting (see for example Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012) to relate this shift to theascendancy of participatory approaches promoted by Ostrom (1990), Chambers (1983, 1989, 1997)
during the same period. Regardless of the label, the underline theme of reforms in most of thecountries was full or partial involvement of farmers in different aspect of irrigation management(Bassi and Kumar, 2011; Poddar et al., 2011; Samad, 2002). Garces-Restrepo et al., (2007 cited in
Bassi and Kumar, 2011) reported that 60 countries covering about 80 percent of the irrigated area
worldwide have already implemented some form of institutional reforms in irrigation management.
South Asian countries such as India (Arun et al., 2012; Poddar et al., 2011), Pakistan (Memon,
2012; Memon, 2006) and Sri-Lanka (Bandaragoda, 2006) were also not an exception of the donor
driven reforms. All of these countries have initiated some form of Participatory Irrigation andManagement (PIM) on secondary and tertiary level channels.
Institutional reforms in Pakistan are particularly important since the country features the Indus
River, which houses a gigantic irrigation system unparalleled in the world. The system developed
through substantial assistance of international donors. Consistent with donor narrative elsewhere in
the world (see for example, Bandaragoda, 2006; Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012), the external
push for reforms triggered the policy shift for PIM, assuming that it will facilitate full cost recovery,
adequate operation and management and equitable irrigation distribution (Memon, 2006). Memon(2012) reported that despite more than 15 years of implementation, the reforms were still in theirinfancy. Advocates often report Sindh province for its relatively better performance in theimplementing the reforms, but actual implementation could hardly be seen beyond the canalcommand areas of three Area Water Boards (AWBs) against the targeted 14 canals (Memon, 2012).
Call for speedy implementation of reforms in the remaining canal commands in Sindh Province
might be reasonable, but there are virtually no empirical evidences suggesting the policymakers
about the efficacy of the farmer-managed irrigation system in terms of full cost recovery, adequate
operation and management of infrastructure and equitable irrigation distribution.
OBJECTIVE
Thus, the objective of this study was to carry out an empirical analysis of the extent to which theinstitutional reforms in the irrigation sector of Sindh Province in Pakistan could achieve its
equitable irrigation distribution objectives hoping that findings will guide appropriate policymaking.
In order to achieve this objective, the next section describes the materials and methods followed bya section on results and discussion. The final section concludes the study and draws policy
implication besides highlighting the areas for future research.
METHODOLOGY
Selection of Study Area and Sample FOs
The study covered all three canal commands of Area Water Boards (AWBs) namely, Nara CanalAWB (NCAWB), Ghotki Feeder Canal AWB (GFCAWB) and Left Bank Canal AWB (LBCAWB)
where the institutional reforms were implemented (Fig. 1). Farmer Organization (FO) served as themain unit of analysis. Selection of FOs was arbitrary based on the availability of required
information across all data sources explained in the Table 1. This means that any FO, for which therequired information was available, qualified the selection process. This process provided 34 FO(27 from NCAWB, four from GFCAWB and three from LBCAWB).
Ⓒ ISERD

27

IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

Ghotki Feeder
AWB

Nara Canal AWB

Providencial Boundary
The Indus River System
Ghotki Feeder AWB
Left Bank Canal AWB
Nara Canal AWB

Left Bank Canal
AWB

100

0

100 Kirometers

Fig. 1 Location of study area, main canals and three AWBs
Table 1 Description of data and indicators
Data set/Source
1. Delivery Performance
Ratio (DPR)(WSIP-I, 2012a)1

Description
 DPR3 calculated separately for any watercourse (WC):𝐷𝑃𝑅 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒⁄𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒(1=getting designed share; <1= getting less than design share; and >1
getting more than the designed share) Head to Tail equity4 at the tertiary level channel was determined by:
𝐻𝑇𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = (𝐷𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑊𝐶)/(𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑊𝐶)(1= Equity between Head and Tail WCs of a FO; <1= Head WCs getting lessthan Tail WCs; and >1= Head getting more than Tail)

2. Institutional Maturity

 The institutional maturity index was the sum of four constituting indexes:
1. Organizational management
2. Financial Management
3. Conflict Resolution
4. O&M and Irrigation Service Delivery(Since both of the sources were different in terms of weights assigned to eachof the above parameters, standardization was obtained by converting theoriginal scores into percentages)

Index (2 Datasets)(SIDA,2012)2(WSIP-I, 2011)

 CCA is Culturable Command Area in hectares irrigated on a tertiary channel(SIDA,2009) Size of FO (Membership)(WSIP-I, 2012b)
1.
2.
Notes:
Water Sector Improvement Project
Sindh Irrigation & Drainage Authority
3.
4.
DPR calculated at Water Course level
HT Equity calculated at FO level

3. Profile Indicators

Materials and Methods
The study utilized secondary information obtained from two government agencies, namely: Sindh
Water Sector Improvement Project (WSIP-I) and Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA)(Table 1). Since the information was the part of official reports and publically inaccessible, theauthors wrote emails and visited the concerned offices to get access. Some of the selected FO waspresent in both SIDA (2012) and WSIP-I (2011) maturity index datasets. In those cases, theinformation was extracted from the dataset provided by SIDA (2012) due to the consideration thatit required no processing which could somehow affect the overall quality of the information.
Model SpecificationⒸ ISERD

28

IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

Institutional reforms in the irrigation sector came out of a belief that organized and capable famers
could take over the management responsibility of tertiary level irrigation affairs. This encouraged
the policymakers to implant FOs and invest in building their institutional capacity until they
become mature enough to assume the complete responsibility of tertiary level irrigation affairs. If
such an assumption was reasonable, any increase in the maturity level of a FO could result in more
equitable irrigation distribution. However, some other factors such as the membership size of FO
and the agricultural area it served could also affect the equitable distribution of irrigation. With thispremise, equity between head and tail watercourses (HT Equity) as dependent variable wasregressed with three independent variables namely, the institutional maturity index of FO (IMI), themembership size of FO (Mem) and the culturable command area of FO (CCA). The dependent
variable was re-coded into three categories (values < 0.90 = 1, head WCs drawing less water thantail WCs (HDL); values between 0.90 - 1.10 = 2, head and tail WCs drawing equal water (HTDE)
by allowing ± 0.10 margin to 1:00 to account for technical and flow change reasons; and, >1.10 =3,
head WCs drawing more water than tail WCs (HDM)). Thus, the dependent variable wascategorical while all of the independent variables were continuous. Since ‘HT Equity’ as adependent variable had three categories, Multinomial Logistic Regression was an appropriate
modelling choice. The model specifications were:log

𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 𝐻𝐷𝐿)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐶𝐴
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 𝐻𝑇𝐷𝐸)(1)

𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 𝐻𝐷𝑀)log
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐶𝐴
𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 𝐻𝑇𝐷𝐸)
Where:- Y was dependent variable: HT Equity having three categories (HDL, HTDE, &HDM)- HTDE was the reference category- IMI, Mem and CCA were independent variables- α was a constant (the state of HT Equity without any effect of independent variables)- β1, β2 and, β3were coefficient of independent variables
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
An average FO in Sindh Province could be a sufficiently large entity all in terms of its social,
geographic and operational attributes (Table 2). Serving thousands of hectares within the range ofvarious kilometers and satisfying hundreds of farmers must be a complex task if purely seen from a
micro lens of collective action problems. These complexities could multiply if one takes in toaccount the power structure in the agrarian society where landholding size symbolizes social status,
power and prestige. The difference in land holdings of the largest and smallest farmer and in FOs
indicates that not all of the members were equally advantageous in the local power structure (Table2). Within this context of the complexities, shall one expect that a FO could achieve its objective ofequitable irrigation distribution?
Based on the analysis of a small sample of arbitrarily selected FOs, the answer to the above
question appears to be a cautious ‘yes’ (Table 3). Taking equity between head and tail watercourses
as a base category of the dependent variable, the results of multinomial logistic regression revealed
that with one percent increase in institutional maturity index score, while keeping all otherindependent variable constant, there is relative risk that the inequity will decrease for about 10
percent (Table 3). This seems to be valid in both cases of inequality, i.e. if head was drawing less
irrigation than tail or head was drawing more irrigation than tail (Table 3). Relative risk that
inequity of irrigation will decrease essentially implies that equity will increase. None of the otherindependent variable had any significant impact on equity except that membership size hadsignificant impact on equity in the case of head watercourses drawing more irrigation than tailwatercourses. With an increase of 10 members, a FO would probably move five percent towards
equity (Table 3). If one looks at the effect of membership size with a “small is beautiful” lens, theⒸ ISERD

29

IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

contribution of membership size towards equitable irrigation distribution seems a paradox. This isbecause the complexities of irrigation management will perhaps increase with larger groups.
Nevertheless, a valid explanation may come from the “mass effect” suggesting that increase inshareholders, will reduce the space for individual to demand more irrigation than their due shareand thus compel FO management to ensure equitable irrigation distribution.
Table 2 Management context of an average FO in Sindh Province (N=354 FOs)
NCAWB
x̄
SD
CCA (Ha)
3280
3057
Design Discharge (Cusec)
35
32
Length of Channel (km)10
13Membership (Person)
280
231
Largest Landholder (Ha)98
85
Smallest landholder (Ha)3
2
Source: Prepared based on SIDA (2009)
Salient Features (Unit)

GFCAWB
x̄
SD
2659
2682
59
57
12
11
347
401
84
106
2
3

LBCAWB
x̄
SD
3457
2645
112
102
11
6
348
383
176
230
5
22

Other AWB
x̄
SD
2414
2012
68
91
9
3
280
138
197
172
2
2

Table 3 Results of multinomial logistic regression (irrigation equity as dependent variable)
EquityRRR
Std. errz
Head drawing less than tail.91991.01055–1.94
 Institutional Maturity.98486.01303–1.15
 Membership size
1.00125.008940.14
 CCA
Head drawing more than tail.89550.01097–2.45
 Institutional Maturity.95216.02717–1.72
 Membership size
1.00987.011130.89
 CCA
Notes:
1. ‘Head and Tail are drawing equal’ is the base outcome
2. * & ** denotes significance at 90 & 95 percent, respectively.
3. Supplementary statistics
Number of observations
=
34
LR χ²
=
14.91
Prob. > χ²=
0.0210Pseudo R2=
0.2154Log likelihood=–27.15064

P> | z |[95% confidence Interval]

0.053*
0.249
0.889.845374.959645.983883

1.001016
1.010748
1.018921

0.014**
0.086*
0.373.819720.900374.988291.9782891.006927
1.031931

CONCLUSION
Donors-pushed and demand-driven reforms in the irrigation sector posit various questions on theefficacy of FOs in achieving the intended objectives of PIM. One of the key questions raised in thisstudy asked whether the implanted FOs could ensure equitable irrigation distribution. Drawing on
the case of institutional reforms in Sindh Province of Pakistan, this paper concludes that it isplausible to expect that upon maturity FOs would deliver equitable irrigation distribution.
Nevertheless, there are various caveats in accepting this conclusion. Surprisingly, when regressedindividually none of the constituting indexes of IMI (Table 1) showed any significant impact onequity between head and tail watercourses. The impact came out only with the summation of theconstituting indexes as IMI (Table 1). One may conclude that farmer organizations need an overall
capacity building support in order to achieve its intended objectives. Nevertheless, given that the
study was data constrained and carried out with a very small sample of arbitrarily selected FOs, thiswould be an imprudent jump into the conclusion. In order to serve as a real policy input, the study
needs extension over adequate and representative sample of FOs. Such study should also include
all constituting indexes as separate variables. This will not only confirm the tentative conclusions
emerged out of this study but will inform policymakers about the specific areas of intervention forthe success of institutional reforms in irrigation sector of Sindh Province.

Ⓒ ISERD

30

IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2014) 5-1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are extremely thankful to institutions – Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority, Sindh
Water Sector Improvement Project – and officials Mr. Nazeer Ahmed Essani, General Manager
Transition for providing access to the departmental datasets used in this study.
REFERENCES
Arun, G., Singh, D.J., Kumar, S. and Kumar, K., 2012. Canal irrigation management through water users
associations and its impact on efficiency, equity and reliability in water use in Tamil Nadu. Agricultural
Economics Research Review, 25, 409-419.
Bandaragoda, D.J. 2006. Limits to donor-driven water sector reforms: insight and evidence from Pakistan
and Sri Lanka. Water Policy, 8, 51-67.
Bassi, N. and Kumar, M.D. 2011. Can sector reforms improve efficiency?: Insight from trrigation
management transfer in central India. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 27, 709721.
Chambers, R. 1983. Rural development: Putting the last first. Longman London.
Chambers, R. 1989. Managing canal irrigation: Practical analysis from South Asia. Cambridge University
Press. USA.
Chambers, R. 1997. Whose reality counts?: putting the first last. Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd(ITP).
Gleick, P.H., Allen, L., Choen, M.J., Cooley, H., Christian-Smith, J., Heberger, M., Morrison, J.,
Palaniappan, M. and Schutle, P., 2011. The world's water Volume 7: The biennial report on freshwater
resources (Data Tables). Island Press, Washington, Covelo, Landon. UK.
Malthus, T.R. 1806. An essay on the principle of population: or, A view of its past and present effects onhuman happiness. Reeves and Turner, London. UK.
Memon, J.A. 2012. Emerging issues in the implementation of Irrigation and Drainage sector reforms in
Sindh Province of Pakistan. 28th AGM & Conference of PSDE Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics. Islamabad, Pakistan.
Memon, N.A. 2006. Participatory irrigation management and institutionalizing irrigation service in Sindh, in:
Hussain, I., Gill, Z.A., Naseer, Z. and Sarwar, S. (Eds.), INPIM’s 9th International Seminar Participatory
Irrigation Management. INPIM, Lahore, Pakistan, 78-93.
Mustafa, D. 2002. Theory versus practice: The bureaucratic ethos of water resource management andadministration in Pakistan. Contemporary South Asia, 11, 39-56.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge
University Press, New York, USA.
Poddar, R., Qureshi, M.E. and Syme, G. 2011. Comparing irrigation management reforms in Australia andIndia - a special reference to participatory irrigation management. Irrigation and Drainage, 60, 139-150.
Samad, M. 2002. Impact of irrigation management transfer on the performance of irrigation systems: A
review of selected Asian experiences, in: Brennan, D. (Ed.), Water Policy Reform: Lessons from Asia
and Australia. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, Bangkok, Thailand, 161-170.
SIDA. 2009. Profile of Farmers Organizations - 354 registered FOs up to April 2009. Social Development
Cell of Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority, Hyderabad, Pakistan, 364.
SIDA. 2012. Institutional maturity index (IMI) of FOs. in: Transition Wing of Social Development Cell SOFWMP (Ed.). Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority, Hyderabad, Pakistan, 20+Excel datashet.
Suhardiman, D. and Mollinga, P.P. 2012. Correlations,causes and the logic of obscuration: Donor shaping of
dominant narratives in Indonesia's irrigation development. The Journal of Development Studies, 48, 923938.
WSIP-I. 2011. FO Performance Quarterly Report (July - September, 2011). in: NESPAK (Ed.), Monitoringand Evaluation Consultants. Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project (ID:P084302), Karachi, Pakistan,54.
WSIP-I. 2012a. Draft report on equity in water distribution based on Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR)
during low flow season. in: NESPAK (Ed.), Monitoring and Evaluation Consultants. Sindh Water Sector
Improvement Project (ID:P084302), Karachi, Pakistan, 48.
WSIP-I. 2012b. General assessment and profile of project farmer organizations. in: NESPAK (Ed.),
Monitoring and Evaluation Consultants. Sindh Water Sector Improvement Project (ID:P084302),
Karachi, Pakistan, 289.

Ⓒ ISERD

31