専修大学社会科学研究所月報

ISSN0286-312X
No. 624

The Monthly Bulletin of Social Science2015. 6. 20

習近平と文化大革命――現代に落とす文革の影 ················· 矢吹

晋 ····· 1

Ⅰ．習近平の下放・文革体験 ··············································· 1
Ⅱ．「プチ毛沢東」としての習近平 ·········································· 3
Ⅲ．習近平虎退治をどう読むか ············································· 11
終わりに――「プチ鄧小平」としての習近平および全方位外交 ················· 16

Civicness in Question: The Case of Women’s Activities in Rural Vietnam···························· Takeko Iinuma ····· 19
1. Introduction ····························································· 19
2. Civicness in Post-Doi Moi Vietnam ··········································· 20
3. Cases of the Two Delta Communes ··········································· 23
4. Women’s Microfinance Activities and Civicness in the Communes ·················· 29
5. Conclusions ····························································· 34

Social Safety Net (SSN) in Vietnam: Comparative analysis of two villages in the north andsouth in terms of community-based SSN and the market economy wave·····························Juichi INADA ····· 38
1. Objectives of research and focus of analysis ···································· 38
2. Overview of two communities in the north and the south of Vietnam················· 42
3. Mutual help system of a community, and the market economy wave ················· 47
4. Conclusions ····························································· 53

編集後記 ··································································· 56

doi.org/10.34360/00009317

習近平と文化大革命――現代に落とす文革の影矢吹晋（横浜市立大学名誉教授）

Ⅰ．習近平の下放・文革体験

習近平の経歴は、2012 年 11 月に第 18 回党大会が開かれ、トップ指導者に選出された際に発表されたものと、その後、中国当局の書籍1 で解説されたものを合わせて描くと、以下のごとくである。
――1953 年 6 月生、陕西富平人、1966 年に文化大革命が始まった時は 13 歳、北京「八一初（日本の中学 3 年級）の時、北京 25 中学という中」2 の 1 年生であった。1968 年「初中 3 年」
普通校に転校させられ、それから陜西省延川県に下放した。15～16 歳であった。1969～1975
年、16～22 歳を「下放青年、知識青年」として陕西省延川県文安駅公社梁家河大隊の「知識青年、党支部書記」として生活した3。1975～1979 年（22～26 歳）、推薦により、清華大学に合格し、化学工業系基本有機合成を専攻した。
――まだ幼かった習氏は、1962 年（9 歳）から、中国共産党元老のひとりだった父親・習仲勲
氏の冤罪事件（補注１）に巻き込まれ差別された。
「文化大革命」中に、吊るし上げられ、飢えを経験し、あちこちをさまよい、拘禁されたことさえあった。1969 年の初頭、16 歳にも満たなかった習氏は陜西省北部農村の生産隊への下放を自ら志願して、延川県の文安駅人民公社梁
家何生産大隊にやって来た4。山の崖に掘った洞穴式住居（窑洞）には、特にノミが多く、刺されて全身が水泡だらけになり、オンドルに敷いたアンペラの下に農薬を撒きノミを退治するしかなかった。この数年間、ほとんど休まずに野良仕事をし、石炭を運び、土嚢を積み堰を作り、肥え桶を担ぐなど、どんな仕事もし、どんな苦労もいとわなかった。
――村人たちは、50 キロ、100 キロの麦を片方の肩で担いで 5 キロの山道を何時間も歩く習氏
を見て、「苦労にもつらさにもよく耐えるいい若者だ」と感じた。
「力を惜しまず働く」「知識が有り、アイデアに富む」。習氏は次第に農民たちに信用され、中国共産主義青年団と中国共産党に相次いで加入し、生産大隊党支部の書記にも選ばれた。陜北の黄土高原の生活は苦難に満ち1

習近平『国政運営を語る』北京、外文出版社、2014 年、付録「人民大衆はわれわれの力の源泉である」
この学校は 1947 年設立、聂荣臻が創始者でその弟子が発展させた名門校である。現在の生徒数は約 4200
名、教職員は 422 あまり。http://www.bayims.cn/column-10.html
3 延川県文安駅公社梁家河大隊の北京知識青年は 15 人で、習近平のほか、王翠玉・徐晶・赵华安・雷平生・佟达宁・杨京生・王燕生・戴明・梁万生・慕丰安・慕爱平・齐丽梅・李京鲜・张春富だったという。
4 習近平の下放中について新華社は『中共高层新阵容』で解説している。2013-05-06 来源：大公网
http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/zgzq/2013-05/1590913_2.html
2

－ 1 －

ていたが、自らを鍛え、才能を発揮する初舞台となった。耕地を増やすため、寒い冬の農閑期に、習氏は村民を率いて土留めのダムを修築したが、率先して裸足で氷の中に立って氷に穴を開け、ダムの基盤をきちんと整理した。また、村の鍛冶屋に声を掛け、鉄業社を設立し、農機具を自給自足できるようにしたばかりか、付近の村へ売ることで村全体の収入を増やした。
――新聞で四川省ではメタンガスを利用していることを知ると、経験を聞くために駆け付け、村に戻ると、陜北初のメタンガス備蓄池を作り、村民を率いて陜西省初のメタンガス利用村として、村民たちの炊事、照明の困難を解決した。また、村に下放されていた知識青年に分け与えられた白い小麦粉のマントウを村民に譲り、自分はヌカ（糠）などを混ぜてつくった粗末なものを食べていた。習氏は先進的知識青年として、北京から荷台付きのオート三輪車を奨励品として支給された。当時、地元では非常に珍しいものだったが、習氏はこれを手動トラクターや製粉機、もみがら吹き上げ機、吸い上げポンプなどの農機具と取り換え、村人に使ってもらった。学業は中断されたが、習氏はずっと知識を渇望し、本を読み独学を続けた。梁家河村に下放された時、重たい一箱の本を運んできた。昼間は働き、休憩時間に本を読み、羊を放牧する
時も、黄土高原の坂の上で本を読んだ。夜になると、暗い灯油の灯りの下で、深夜まで本を読み続けた。村人たちの記憶によると、習氏は食事の時も食べながら「レンガのような厚さの本」を読んでいたそうだ。
――43 年前、習氏は知識青年として陜北農村の生産隊に下放され、そこで 7 年働いたが、最初の「公務」は中国共産党組織体系の「細胞」である生産大隊（行政村）の党支部書記だった。
陜西省から北京市へ、河北省から福建省へ、浙江省から上海市へ、西部の貧困地区から国家の
政治・文化中心地へ、東部の立ち後れた地区から沿海の先進地区へ、その政治経歴は村、県、市（地区）、省（直轄市）と中央の党・政府・軍隊の主要ポストすべてに及んでいる。7 年間にわたる農村生活、7 年間にわたって共にした苦楽――黄土高原の純朴な村人たちとつらい仕事の苦労を分かち合い、いっしょに食べ、いっしょに住み、いっしょに働いた歳月は、習氏にとって、現地の民衆と深い友情を結んだばかりでなく、何が中国の農村なのか、何が一般大衆の喜怒哀楽なのか、何が中国の基本的な国情なのか、理解するよい機会だった。習氏は人民に対する深い愛、足元の担当地区に対する責任感を習氏の人生の目標の中に深く刻み込んだ。習氏は自分の人生で最も力になってくれたのは「革命の大先輩と陜北のあの村人たちだ」と率直に話したことがある。16 歳足らずで黄土高原に来た当時は、途方に暮れ、いろいろな迷いがあった。
22 歳でここを離れた時、習氏は揺るぎない人生の目標を持った――「人民のために地道に働く」
がそれだった――。
以上の経歴紹介は、習近平が中国共産党のトップ指導者に選ばれた 2012 年前後に、本人が語った回顧談を中心に当局が「民に親しまれる指導者イメージ」を作るために描かれたもので－ 2 －あり、多かれ少なかれ、若干の修飾語が正確さを欠くことは免れないであろう。たとえば「50
キロ、100 キロの麦を片方の肩で担いで 5 キロの山道を何時間も歩く習氏」の原文は、「能挑一二百斤麦子走 10 里山路长时间不换肩的习近平」であり、これは「刻苦に耐える若者」（是个吃
苦耐劳的好后生）を示す形容句であり、必ずしも、「100 キロの麦を片方の肩で担いで 5 キロの山道を何時間も歩いた」という事実の描写ではあるまい。都会育ちの若者にそのような体力があるとは想定しにくい。
とはいえ、（1）基本的には事実を踏まえて、（2）そして、「有名歌手彭麗媛の夫」程度にしか認識されていなかった習近平像を浮かび上がらせるために描かれたことは確かとみてよい。
（3）さらにより重要なことだが、父親・習仲勲が文革前夜の 62 年 10 月の 8 期 10 中全会から、反党集団の一味と認定され、国務院副総理の職務を事実上停止されていたので、66 年初夏に文革が始まった時期にも、習近平が紅衛兵運動に参加して「加害者」になることはなかったはずだ。文革期の若者たちは紅衛兵運動としての「加害者」5 の立場、その後、下放させられ貧しい農村生活を体験する「被害者」の立場が交錯するために、文革の評価においてアンビバレントな立場に置かれるが、習近平の場合、紅衛兵としての「加害者」体験を欠くことは、注目すべきであろう。

Ⅱ．「プチ毛沢東」としての習近平

Ⅱ-1．習近平記者会見
今から 2 年半前のこと、2012 年 11 月 14 日、私は党大会を終えて中国共産党のトップに選ばれたばかりの習近平記者会見をインターネットで凝視していた。数十分の記者会見を聞いているうちに、私は一昔前にタイムスリップした錯覚に陥った。習近平の口から次から次へとナツメロのように毛沢東語録が飛び出したからだ。曰く、大衆路線、曰く、人民のために奉仕する、等々。
私はテレビ画面に釘付けになりながら、習近平とはどんな男か、あれこれ考えた。清華大学を出て、最初にやった仕事は、職業軍人ではなく、文民の立場で初めて国防部長を務めた耿飈
国防部長の秘書であった。これはおそらく父親・習仲勲が旧知の耿飈に息子を預けたものか。
彼が軍事委員会の周辺を知っていることは重要かもしれない。前述の経歴に「中央军委办公厅
秘书（现役）」の一句が見える。彼は国防部長耿飈の秘書を務めた後、耿飈が中央軍事委員会弁公庁主任となったときに、その秘書を務めたが、これは軍籍のない者は就任できない重要ポス
5 極端な場合は、殺人の加害者であった。たとえば土屋昌明「中国の「民間ドキュメンタリー」とはなにか ― 胡傑監督へのインタビュー」『専修大学社会科学研究所月報』2013 年 4 月号、57～58 ページ。

－ 3 －

トだ。それゆえ、この時期に習近平は「軍籍」に登録されたわけだ。大学卒業直後の若い時期に彼が軍事委員会の弁公庁という枢要な部門に一時属したことは、のちに軍事委員会の虎退治を断行するうえで、一つの重要な要素とみてよい。
1997 年 9 月の第 15 回党大会で習近平は中央候補委員に選ばれ、中央幹部としての歩みを始めたが、その印象は強烈であった。得票順からして序列は 151 名中のビリなのだ。中央委員 193
名は筆画順に並べるので、得票数は分からない。しかし候補委員は得票順を明らかにしておく必要がある。中央委員に欠員が生じた場合に繰り上げ当選させるためだ。このとき習近平は、辛うじて候補委員に当選はしたものの、序列ビリ。これは何を意味するのか。
ちなみにビリから二番目が鄧小平の長男鄧樸方であり、いま習近平の片腕として虎退治を進めている王岐山はビリから七番目であった。3 人の太子党はなぜかくも評判が悪いのか。それはおそらくは 3 人の「個性や能力のため」ではない。当時は鄧小平の没後まだ半年、「太子党を政治権力の中枢に加えるなかれ」という鄧小平ら革命第一世代の良識、自制が働いていた。
文革期には実権派子弟は肩身が狭かった。その後名誉回復は行われたが、「文革の遺風」はまだ残り、習近平ら太子党は小さくなっていた。長老陳雲の長男陳元に至っては、習近平より 8 歳
年上だが、習近平より 5 年遅れて 2002 年にようやく候補委員になった。そしてその序列はビリから 6 番目であった。薄一波の息子薄煕来は、1997 年には候補委員にさえ選ばれず、2002
年に候補委員を飛び越えて直接中央委員に選ばれた。年下の習近平に追い越された薄煕来の敵
愾心がやがて身を滅ぼす。いずれにせよ、15 回大会（1997 年）、16 回大会（2002 年）当時は、
まだ中国共産党が自らの権力乱用を自制する良識が働いていた。この自制心を次第々々に解いて、ついには誰憚ることなく権力を乱用したのが江沢民と江沢民人脈だ。軍のトップや政法委員会書記が処分される現代とは大違いではないか。私はテレビを見ながら習近平＝「プチ毛沢東」のあだ名をつけた。

Ⅱ-2．習近平の虎退治と権力固め作戦
2015 年 3 月、習近平は名実ともに「プチ毛沢東」ぶりを発揮する。一連の全人代がらみの報道について「ピラミッド型の権力モデル」と呼ぶ評論も現れた6。習近平はどう変身したのか。
2012 年秋、党大会でトップに就任した直後の記者会見の写真では 7 名の常務委員の真ん中に並ぶ一人であったが、それから 2 年を経て、テレビカメラの焦点は、習近平の「標準写真」像にズームインされ、他の 6 名がどんどん後景に退いた。このイメージの変化を象徴するニュースが 1 月 16 日に報じられた。この日、トップセブンからなる中央政治局常務委員会議は終日会議を開いた。
6

たとえば牟伝珩の論評「中南海で〝集団指導制〟を覆す」香港『爭鳴』2015 年 3 月号。

－ 4 －日本の国会に当たる全人大常委会（委員長＝張徳江）、内閣に当たる国務院（総理＝李克強）、
参議院に擬せられる全国政協（主席＝兪正声）、最高裁に当たる最高人民法院（院長＝周強）、最高検に当たる最高人民検察院（院長＝曹建明）の五大国家機関における「共産党フラクショ
ンの代表」すなわち「党組書記」の参加を求めて、それぞれの代表から当該部門の「活動報告」を行わせた。報告を聞くのは総書記習近平だ。
ここで張徳江、李克強、兪正声はもともと常務委員会のメンバーだから、一見特に問題はなさそうに見える。周強と曹建明とは、ヒラの政治局委員でさえなく、中央委員級にすぎないから、この政治局常務委員級の会議に対しては、呼び出しを受けた際にのみ「列席」できる。周強と曹建明とは、召喚を受けて報告した形だ。これがこの会議の性質になる。ここから張徳江、
李克強、兪正声ら正規の常務委員もまた「それぞれの分担をもつ常務委員としての出席」というよりは、事実上、周強と曹建明の例のように、習近平の呼び出しを受けて出席した形にならざるをえない。これは巧みに計算された習近平格上げのイメージ作りに見える。
江沢民時代（1992～2002 年）、胡錦濤時代（2002～2012 年）の常務委員会議は、メンバー9
名がそれぞれの担当分野に全責任を負い、他の分野の担当者は、他部門について口出しをする権限が事実上なかった。これは「九龍による治水」などとも呼ばれる分業責任制であった。江沢民や胡錦濤は、自らを除く 8 名からそれぞれの担当分野の報告や提案を受ける形で議事が進み、総書記はいわば会議の「単なる司会役」にすぎなかったと評しても言い過ぎではない。
江沢民の場合は、基本的に自らの腹心を配置できたので、思惑通りに処理できたが、問題は胡錦濤のケースだ。胡錦濤時代の人事は江沢民が自らの影響力を極力残すように仕組まれた人
事体制のゆえに、胡錦濤カラーを打ち出すことはほとんどできなかった。このような江沢民リ
モコン体制のもとで、空前の腐敗現象が現れた。

Ⅱ-3．トップセブンという枠組み――周永康子飼いを阻む2014 年 7 月末に処分された周永康は、政法委員会書記として、警察・検察・裁判等司法部
門の全権力を握っていた。ここで胡錦濤は周永康の腐敗問題に気づいたとしても、それに「口出しできない慣例」に縛られていた。これが「江沢民執政 10 年、院政を含めて 20 年」の間に次第に劣化を加速した「集団指導制」の内実であった。この制度・慣行という縛りに悩まされてきた胡錦濤は、政法委員会書記の地位を常務委員会レベルからヒラの政治局委員レベルに格下げすることを習近平への「置き土産」とした。すなわち常務委員数を 9 名から 7 名に減員して、前任政法委員会書記周永康が「子飼いの代理人」を常務委員会に残す道を塞いだ。これが胡錦濤の習近平への置き土産であった。

－ 5 －Ⅱ-4．王岐山紀律検査委書記の辣腕
さて大会以後に形成された新たなトップセブンの分担体制において、それまでは副総理として国際国内金融を統括していた王岐山に、畑違いの紀律検査委員会書記のポストを担当させた。
この措置は、その後の経過が明らかに示すように、敏腕王岐山にしか前任者周永康の腐敗問題を処理できないことを的確に把握した上での人事であった（この人事内定を受けて、王岐山自身は、自らの後継者を周小川に決定し、周小川を全国政協委員の副主席の一人に据えた。これによって閣僚級の周小川の定年は 65 歳から副総理級の 67 歳に延びた。腐敗摘発は金融面にも波及するが、周小川に実務レベルの最高意思決定を委ねる措置にほかならない）。新たに紀律検査委員会書記を担当した王岐山は、前任者周永康の直接の後継者が常務委員会にはいないことを奇貨として、存分に辣腕を振るうことができた。

Ⅱ-5．徐才厚処分の伏線――胡錦濤の軍事委員会完全引退
胡錦濤と習近平の「事前の合意」でもう一つ決定的な事柄がある。それは胡錦濤が党大会を機として、軍事委員会の「主席ポスト」を習近平に譲ったことだ。江沢民から胡錦濤への権力
引き継ぎの際には、2002 年の党大会の 2 年後の 4 中全会まで、江沢民が軍事委員会主席のポストにしがみついたので、胡錦濤の軍権掌握は著しく妨害を受けた。この苦い体験に照らして、胡錦濤は習近平に大会直後に主席ポストを譲る決断をしたが、これはたいへんな英断であったことが徐才厚処分の際に明らかになる。
というのは、軍事委員会は 2 人の副主席と 4 総部の司令官あるいは部長（総参謀部、総政治部、総装備部、総後勤部）および陸海空軍、ミサイル部隊の司令官等からなり、これらはすべて実働部隊を指揮する「制服組のポスト」である。文民の習近平がただ一人主席として会議を主宰し、軍事委員会主席としての意思決定を行うことができる仕組みだ。これは「主席責任制」と呼ぶ中国流の文民統制メカニズムだ。制服組の司令官たちは、みずからの指揮する実働部隊の責任者としての判断を求められ、意見を述べることはできるが、軍事委員会としての意思決
定権は、習近平の一手に残されている。この「主席責任制」に支えられて習近平は、自らの昇格とともに引退した前任副主席徐才厚を共産党から除名する大英断が可能であった。もし、多数決の評議ならば、この処分決断は葬られたであろう。
こうして江沢民の「執政 10 年、院政 10 年」期に異常増殖した腐敗問題を果敢に処理することによって、習近平は一挙にトップセブンの「集団指導制」の内実を習近平「個人独裁制」に転化した。いまやあたかも毛沢東のような個人独裁権を掌握し、他の 6 名のメンバーがすでに従属的地位に転落したことを象徴的に示すセレモニーこそが 2015 年 1 月 16 日会議の「報告」
スタイルにほかならないと私は解する。これは 6 名の常務委員は、担当分野について「報告す－ 6 －る側」であり、習近平ただ一人がこれを「聞きおく側」の立場に、事実上昇格していることを見せつけるセレモニーなのだ。まさに習近平が「プチ毛沢東」に大化けした瞬間というべきだ。
日本の少なからぬメディアが、習近平の実力について、「共産党史上最も弱い総書記」と軽視しているうちに、本人は大変身した。日本のメディアは、なぜ事態を見誤ったか。取材源が基本的に習近平に敵対する江沢民人脈に限られていたことで致命的弱点をさらけだしたように見える。習近平を見くびり、傀儡化を図る旧勢力が「弱い習近平イメージ」を世論工作のために拡散し、これにひっかかった。これは特派員というニュースの送り手側の問題だ。その背景にあるのは、安倍内閣の中国敵視姿勢であろう。中国敵視・中国脅威・中国封じ込めといった極度に時代後れの戦略に籠絡されて日本世論は、中国問題にほとんど関心を失い、無関心になった。そして「著しく大気の汚染された国、腐敗した肉を売る国」といった類のネガティブ・キャ
ンペーンのみが横行した。これにメディア側自身が幻惑されて、習近平の中国の現実を冷静に観察する意欲と能力を失ったものと私は解している。これは 2012 年の尖閣国有化以来の大きな潮流だ。こうして習近平の就任以来の中国の新しい動向に、日本世論は目を塞ぐか、あるいはネガティブな側面にしか興味を示さなかったために事態を読み違えたのではないか。

Ⅱ-6．毛沢東の「小組治国」に倣う
習近平が一挙に権力を掌握したのは、腐敗の象徴としての徐才厚と周永康とを処分したことによるが、その具体的な方法を見ると、毛沢東が文革で用いた「文革小組方式」に酷似している。すなわち「小組治国」である。3 中全会（2004 年 11 月）以後、習近平は①中央全面深化
改革、②中央国安委、③中央財経、④中央網信等々、11 個の「領導小組」を新設して、党政軍、立法、行政、司法、経済、文化等国家的一切の権力を習近平個人の手に集中した。
中国は 13 億の人口からなり、共産党員だけでも 8000 万人を超える。党とは、いわば「国の中の独立国」であり、党組織自体が極度の官僚主義体制だ。膨大な官僚機構は、どのように機能するか。
「習近平の打ち出す新政策」は、ほとんどの場合、官僚機構のルートを通じてねじ曲
げられ、各段階の各対策によって、シロはクロに変化してしまう。習近平の指示は、官僚主義と敵対勢力によって、ほとんど正反対のものにねじ曲げられる。こうした官僚機構の各段階で生ずる歪曲を防ぎ、習近平個人の意向を誰の目にも明らかにするためにこそ「小組方式」が必須なのだ。これを新たに設けて、この小組によって伝えられる内容だけが「習近平の肉声」であり、これ以外はすべて「ニセの習近平指示」であることを明示するものが、毛沢東のひそみに習う「小組治国」システムなのだ。習近平がわずか 2 年で、毛沢東方式を活用して、権力を一手に掌握した手腕は刮目に値する。毛沢東からその作風を深く学んだ太子党・習近平にしかできない芸当と見てよいと思われる。
－ 7 －習近平を突出させる措置は、たとえば 2014 年国慶節において、李克強が国務院総理として開いた新中国成立 65 周年慶祝レセプションでも見られた。中国共産党は長らく建国祝賀の会
は、周恩来等歴代の国務院総理が講話を発表する伝統が守られてきた。ところが慣例を破り習近平自身がここで主役を演じた。総理李克強は「主役の地位」から単なる「司会者役」に格下げされた形だ。とはいえ、これをもって「李克強の地位に変化が生じた」と見るのは短絡だ。
総理としての李克強の地位、すなわち実務を通じて「党務の習近平を支える伝統的な党政構造」に由来する地位にはいささかの変化もないと見てよい。李克強の地位が下がったのではなく、習近平の地位が格段に強められたのだ。両者はそもそも対等ではない。毛沢東に仕える周恩来の姿を「党高政低」というパターンで見れば分かりやすいであろう。
国務院の主催すべき会議でさえもこのありさまであるから、党の 3 中全会（2003 年 11 月）、
4 中全会（2004 年 10 月）等、党レベルの会議において習近平の「領袖としての地位」が格上げされていることはいうまでもない。たとえば習近平は 2014 年 10 月 15 日に文芸座談会を開き、周小平（著名な若手ブロガー）、花千芳（ネット作家、撫順市作家協会副主席）らに発言の場を与えて周囲を驚かせた。さらに福建省古田で「新古田会議」（10 月 30 日～11 月 2 日）を開き、軍に対する党＝習近平の指導を強調するセレモニーを行った。古田会議は由来毛沢東がゲリラ軍に対する党の指揮を制度としてビルトインした会議として知られている。

Ⅱ-7．習近平語録、その 1
習近平はすでに著作集を 4 冊書いているので、その政治思想を捉えやすい。すなわち➊習近平『擺脱貧困』福建人民出版社 1992 年（1988～1990 年の演説等）➋習近平『之江新語』浙江人民出版社 2007 年（2000～2007 年の演説等）➌習近平『幹在実処走在前列』中央党校出版社 2006 年（2002～2006 年の演説等）➍『習近平談治国理政』外文出版社 2014 年（2012～2014.6 年の演説等）、の 4 冊である。
まず、習近平の地位が確立しつつある姿を➍『習近平談治国理政』7 で確認してみよう。この習近平講演集は、2012 年の発言 12 篇、2013 年の発言 45 篇、2014 年 1～6 月の発言 23 篇、計 80 篇からなる。索引を開くと、毛沢東は 18 回、鄧小平は 29 回、江沢民は 7 回、胡錦濤は8 回登場する。毛沢東思想は 6 回、鄧小平理論は 17 回、江沢民の「三つの代表」は 17 回である。
「プチ毛沢東」としての習近平の面目は、たとえば「大衆路線」を 13 回語るところに現れる。鄧小平時代、江沢民時代、胡錦濤時代にはこのキーワードはほとんど死語扱いで、代わって知識分子の英語力、数学力やＩＴ技術者の先進的知識に光が当てられていた。科学技術を重7

邦訳『習近平、国政運営を語る』2014 年 10 月、北京、外文出版社。

－ 8 －視する点では、清華大学卒・習近平も前任の総書記たちと同じだが、彼が「反腐敗」のスローガンで虎退治に邁進するとき、その支えは大衆の支持であり、これを大衆路線と呼びながら推
進し、大衆の喝采を得ている。
「反腐敗」や「虎・ハエ」のキーワードで習近平講話を調べて見ると、初出は、2013 年 1
月 22 日「中央紀律検査委の第 2 次全体会議の講話」である。そのタイトルは「権力を制度の、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、、
オリに閉じ込める」と題され、「たとえ誰であろうと、職務がどれだけ高かろうと、党の紀律と国の法律を犯しさえすれば、必ず厳しく取り調べ処罰される」と語った。
「これが決してただの空談ではないことを私［＝習近平］は、全党、全社会に表明している。厳しく党を治めるため、処罰は決して緩めてはいけない。
『虎』（大物）も『ハエ』（小物）も一緒にたたき、指導幹部の紀律違反・法律違反案件を断固として厳しく取り締まるだけでなく、大衆の身の回りの不正の風潮や腐敗行為も着実に取り除かなければならない。党の紀律、国の法律の前に例外はないことを堅持し、それが誰の身に及ぼうとも、徹底的に調べ、決して見逃してはならない」8 と強調した。
傍点を付した「職務がどれだけ高かろうと」の一句がキーワードになる。これまでは政治局常務委員級以上の高官は「刑ハ大夫ニ上ラズ」の慣行からして訴追されることはないと広く見られてきたことを踏まえて、高位高官でも「党の紀律、国の法律の前に例外はない」と宣言した。これは習近平が党大会でトップに昇格して 2 カ月後のことであり、虎退治の盟友・王岐山
は、この習近平指示に基づいて、調査に着手していた。
習近平の虎退治 2 回目の発言は、2013 年 4 月 19 日「政治局第 5 回グループ学習会の談話」
である。習近平はここで戦国時代中後期の商鞅と法家学派の学説をまとめた『商君書・修権』から「商鞅の変法」の必要性を説いたキーワードを引用した。
習近平の 3 回目の発言は、2014 年 1 月 14 日、中央紀律検査委の第 3 次全体会議の講話である。
「腐敗分子に対しては、見つけ次第断固取り調べ、処分する。早い段階、軽い段階で押さえ、病気なら早急に治療し、問題を見つけたら直ちに処理する。腫れ物をそのまま放置して、命にかかわる重病になってはいけない」と語った後で、習近平は解放後に初代上海市長を務めた陳毅［元外相］の言葉を引用する。
「「［金銭に］手を伸ばしてはならず、手を伸ばせば必ず捕まる」という道理を幹部一人一人に銘記させなければならない」。これは『陳毅詩詞選集』9 からの引用だ。習近平も一時期上海市書記を務めたが、上海市を解放して初代市長を務めた陳毅元帥の言葉を引用しているのは、太子党の面目躍如だ。
もう一つの引用は、「善を見ては及ばざるが如くし、不善を見ては湯を探るが如くす」という
8
9

邦訳 432 ページ。
北京、人民文学出版社、1977 年。

－ 9 －『論語・季氏篇』の言葉である。
「善を見れば、とても達成できないかもしれぬと謙虚に努力するとともに、不善を見れば、あたかも熱湯に触れたかのように、即座に離れる」態度をもって「不善を憎むべし」の意である。習近平はこのような言葉で中央紀律検査委員たちを激励し、腐敗摘発を呼びかけた。これらの一連の行動は、大衆からの支持を狙うものであるとともに、習近平の敵陣営を破壊し、直ちに自らの政治的基盤を強化する役割をもつ。

Ⅱ-8．習近平語録、その 2
次に➌習近平『幹在実処走在前列』というタイトルは、「現場で実務をこなし、大衆の前に立って歩く」の意である。この本は、習近平の浙江省書記時代（2002 年、副書記、2003-07 年、書記）の演説等からなる。この本から文革期のキーワードを拾うと、次のごとくである。

50 回

目次、見出し等を含む、「腐敗」という二文字の総数

（腐敗現象

（9 回

以下は「腐敗」の内訳。

（予防腐敗システム

（8 回

（腐敗分子

（6 回

（腐敗問題

（2 回

（反腐敗闘争（2 回

腐敗

人民に奉仕する

19 回

毛沢東同志

13 回

大衆路線

8回

毛沢東思想

8回

文化大革命

3回

10 年動乱

2回

大民主

1回

これらの 3 語は、ネガティブな文脈で文革をとらえたもの。

これらの語彙調べから、「人民に奉仕する」「大衆路線」の立場から、「腐敗現象」や「腐敗分子」を批判する習近平のスタンスを読み取ることができよう。反腐敗のスローガンで、政敵を打倒することは、そのまま習近平政権を固めることになるのは明らかだ。

－ 10 －

Ⅲ．習近平虎退治をどう読むかⅢ-1．「慶親王＝曽慶紅批判」
江沢民の「執政 10 年、院政 10 年」期に中国では、途方もない汚職が蔓延し、習近平は「虎もハエもたたく」汚職追放作戦に就任直後から取り組んだ。その皮切りに選ばれた教材が、なんとフランス革命前夜のエピソードであった。19 世紀フランスの政治学者トクヴィルが『旧体制と大革命』という著書で、革命前夜のフランスを描いた一文を示す。 「この政府がこれだけ侵略的であり専制的であったにもかかわらず、最も微小な犯行や軽微な批判でも極度な不安に陥ってしまう」「人々の拝金的な欲望を刺激してはそれを挫折させ、恰も相反する二つの方向か
ら自らの破滅を促している」。
この本は習近平指導部のキーパーソンである李克強首相と汚職追放に取り組む紀律検査委員会書記王岐山が愛読し、周辺に薦めていると報じられたとき、現代中国の独裁権力の腐敗ぶりは承知していたから、やはり「革命前夜のフランス」か、腐敗退治を怠るならば、中国の独裁政権が危ういとする警告と理解した。同時に、愛読書推薦の担い手がナンバー2 の李克強とナンバー6 の王岐山である事実に私は特に着目していた。それはマスコミでは、太子党と共青団との権力闘争が語られすぎて、「李克強首相の地位が王岐山によって奪われる」と見るような軽薄ウォッチャーの間違いを修正する動きと解したからだ。
その後、2 年余、現在に至るも、「太子党が共青団を脅かす」、「李克強の地位を習近平が脅かす」、「王岐山が脅かす」と見る誤解を繰り返す自称専門家が後を絶たない。習近平はあたかも「プチ毛沢東」のように権力を固め、独裁権力をもつに至ったが、それによって「李克強や王岐山の地位が弱くなった」のではない。習近平を支える「助手としての李克強や王岐山の地位」には何ら変化がない。この「党高政低」という構図は、前述のように、毛沢東対周恩来、江沢民対朱鎔基、胡錦濤対温家宝、すべてに共通する「党務優先システム」にほかならない。ちな
みに王岐山は党務として紀律検査委員会書記を務め、政務として国務院監察部を指揮しているが、その任務は習近平の指揮のもとで、虎退治作戦を「実行する任務」であり、実践面で、監察部の行政機構を駆使して、摘発チームを派遣し、汚職調査を展開している。これは基本的に紀律検査委という党機構を通じて行う「政務」レベルへの橋渡し活動なのだ。
江沢民の指導体制は、1989 年の天安門事件を契機としてスタートしつつ、一切の政治改革を封印して市場経済への道を歩み、「世界第 2 の経済大国」（購買力平価ベース）になったことは誰もが知る。その裏面は「汚職と腐敗」の高度成長期でもあった。日本の列島改造期にも似た不動産開発ブームと証券市場の急速な発展が不公正取引の温床と化した（たとえば「原始株」
操作等々）。開発の許認可に関わる贈収賄の弊害が解放軍所有の不動産を管理する兵站部門にお－ 11 －よび、ひいては大将・中将・少将のポストまで「買官売官」の対象となる始末だ。一説では将官級の買官疑惑者は 200 名にのぼるというからすさまじい。
政治改革を封印したまま「荒っぽい資本主義」（ワイルド・キャピタリズム）を加速した結果
が「汚職の高度成長」という苦い結果をもたらしたことになる。極め付きは軍の制服組のトップ徐才厚副主席が「買官売官」の嫌疑で党から除名され、徐才厚の情実人事提案に「副署」してきたもう一人の副主席郭伯雄の責任も追及されるに至ったことだ。長男郭正鋼少将（浙江省
軍区副政治委員）が全人代の開会前夜の 2015 年 3 月 2 日北京に護送され取り調べ中だ。江沢民によって 47 軍軍長から副主席のトップまで引き上げられた父親・郭伯雄の罪状固めの一環とみられる。江沢民軍事委員会主席を支えた二人の副主席が揃って「買官売官」がらみで失脚とは、空前の事態ではないか。江沢民の提起した「三つの代表」を薄めるために「四つの全面」
を前面に押し出す必要性はここにある。
現状を放置するならば、民心は中国共産党や党の指揮する軍から離れ、党による統治の崩壊は必至である。すなわちフランス大革命に類似した中国大革命の再到来だ。習近平の虎退治はそのような危機意識に基づいて着手された。習近平が否応なしに、虎退治に乗り出した直接的
契機は、2012 年の党大会前夜の人事抗争にあると見てよい。
習近平は、胡錦濤、温家宝の力を借りて、まず自らの政治的ライバルと目されていた薄煕来（重慶市書記、政治局委員）の処分に成功した。ついで 2014 年 7 月初めに徐才厚（2007～12
年軍事委員会副主席、政治局委員）を処分し、7 月末に周永康（2007～12 年政治局常務委員）を処分した。10 そして昨年 12 月には令計画（2007～12 年中共中央弁公庁主任）を「組織調査」
処分に付した。ここで「組織調査」とは、政法委員会が犯罪の嫌疑で「処分含みの調査」を決定した意である。薄煕来事件が摘発された当時、一部の中国メディアは、「新四人組」として、「薄煕来、徐才厚、周永康、令計画の結託」を指摘していたが、結果的にはその見通しを裏付けた形になる。
「新四人組」とは、習近平が中国共産党のトップ指導者に就任する際に、これを妨害し、あるいは「棚上げ」を図った勢力を指す。
江沢民時代に、「経済改革優先、政治改革停止」の政経股裂け戦略を強行した結果、市場経済への移行過程の間隙に乗じた腐敗が生まれ、全面的な腐敗に発展した。ここで鄧小平時代と江沢民時代との大きな違いを一つ挙げておく。鄧小平時代には、太子党の子女は中央委員レベル止まりであり、経済活動のみしか許されなかった。しかし江沢民時代には、この制約が解かれ、太子党の政治局入りを容認した。これによって政治権力と経済権力、そして軍事権力との癒着、結託の構造が定着し、中国版の産軍複合体（ミリタリー・インダストリーコンプレックス）がビルトインされた。
102015 年 6 月 11 日に天津市第一中級法院は周永康被告に対して、無期懲役、財産没収を言い渡した。

－ 12 －

では、誰が大泥棒周永康を権力の座に引き入れたのか。曽慶紅前常務委員兼国家副主席である。
「第 15～18 期中国共産党中央常務委員会委員一覧」（図）を見ると、一目瞭然である。2002
年秋、引退する江沢民は後継者として曽慶紅を常務委員に昇格させるとともに、常務委員ポス
トを二つ増やした。7 名から 9 名に増やすことによって、江沢民派を 5 名（曽慶紅、呉邦国、
賈慶林、黄菊、李長春）に増やした。常務委員会の多数派をつくるために恣意的な配置を行った。5 年後の 2007 年秋、引退する曽慶紅が自らの後継者として常務委員に選んだのは周永康である。しかもその担当分野としては、汚職摘発を握りつぶす権能をもつ紀律検査委書記であった。汚職を摘発すべき機能をもつ党務の系統が汚職もみ消しを旨とする腐敗官僚に牛耳られた－ 13 －

結果、汚職は摘発を免れ、汚職が汚職を呼ぶ構造となる。こうして空前の腐敗が横行した。
さてこのような体制を放置したならば、フランス大革命の二の舞、すなわち中国共産党の支配体制の崩壊だ。どこから手をつけるか。核心は、周永康の子分たちからなる紀律政法委を解体し、再編することだ。手順としては、常務委員を 2 名減員して 7 名体制とし、紀律政法委を常務委員級からひとまずヒラの政治局レベルに格下げする。そのうえで、新たな 18 期常務委員のなかから王岐山を抜擢して、紀律検査委の再建を任命する。この特別な措置を通じて王岐山はようやく周永康の妨害を排して紀律検査委の再編と虎退治を進めることができた。
全人代前夜の 2 月 25 日紀律検査委のホームページに登場した「影射史学」エッセイは、歴史に借りた時評として、波乱を呼んだ。筆者は中央紀律検査委の幹部・習驊である。エッセイのタイトルは「大清“裸官”慶親王的作風問題」（2015 年 02 月 25 日）である。周知のように、裸官とは、中国には資産や家族を置かず、すぐに海外逃亡可能にしている状態の高官を指す
えききょう

慶親王 奕 劻 （1838～1917）は、西太后（慈禧）のもとで、首席軍機大臣や内閣総理大臣を務めた政治家だが、「宴会大好き、麻雀大好き」人間であった。「中級幹部の段芝貴が銀 10 万両を贈呈したところ、ただちに黒竜江代理巡撫のポストを与えた」。英国『タイムズ』の有名記
者モリソンによると、「慶親王の預金は 712.5 万ポンドの巨額に上る。ちなみに作家ジェイン・
エアが家庭教師で得た年収は 30 ポンドにすぎず、ダーウィンが購入した豪邸も 2000 ポンドだから、慶親王の預金の大きさが分かる」。慶親王はとりわけ英国系の香港上海銀行が好みで、国内の民族金融期間には一銭も預けなかった。もし百年後に生まれていたならば、慶親王は「裸官」といわれたであろう。モリソンは少しも気兼ねなくこう書いた。
「慶親王のやることは、まるで国家を生き埋めにするようなものだ。ナベの湯が沸騰しているのに、魚自身はそれに気づかない」（まさに日本流なら「茹で蛙」の図柄か）。それゆえ「慶親王のケースは、平和時にリスクを思う（居安思危）格好の教訓ではないか」。
影射史学とは、古に仮託して現代の政治を風刺し、人物を揶揄するものだ。文化大革命期の有名な例としては「批林批孔」がある。
「批林」が林彪批判であることは誰にも分かる。
「批孔」
は孔子を批判する意だが、ここでは「周恩来を孔子になぞらえて」批判したもので、これは江青夫人ら四人組が行ったキャンペーンの一つである。この種の影射史学は、鄧小平時代になると文化大革命の忌まわしい記憶とともに忘れられた。そのような、文化大革命期を思わせるあてこすりが、王岐山の率いるホームページに掲げられたので、大騒ぎになった。
「慶親王」とは
誰をあてこするものか。
「慶」の文字から、賈慶林、曽慶紅説が現れ、いなこれは裸官批判の一般論にすぎまいといった論評が続いた。

－ 14 －

Ⅲ-2．「裸官慶親王」ショック
これは、明らかに曽慶紅を風刺したものと読むべきだ。キーワードは外資銀行への巨額の預金である。モリソンは英『タイムズ』の特派員として北京に駐在したが、国籍はオーストラリ
ア人である。外国銀行に預けた巨額の預金とオーストラリアから、曽慶紅が息子曽偉をキャン
ベラに移住させたポイントを容易に想起させる。曽慶紅は 1939 年生まれだから、「もし 1838
年の百年後に生まれたら」という年齢もほぼ重なる。
このあたりが巷間で語られている最中に、米国紙『ウォールストリートジャーナル』が D.
シャンボー（ジョージワシントン大学教授）の「中国絶縁声明」を発表した11。曰く、①中国のエリートは片足を中国から出して、外国への逃亡を準備している。②「九号文件」に端的に示されるような政治的引き締めが習近平の統治下で深まっているが、これは政権崩壊に対処するためだ。③体制に忠誠心をもつ者でさえも、党活動はやるふりをするのみ。④腐敗が蔓延している。⑤経済発展が減速し、行き詰まっている。これらの 5 カ条を挙げて、かつて旧ソ連が解体したように、中国共産党の支配も崩壊が近づいているとみる。
これらの条件を指摘して「明日にも中国が崩壊する」と語りつづけるオオカミ少年は、枚挙にいとまのないほど大勢いるから、この種の理由づけ自体は珍しくない。ただし、彼のエッセ
イには大きな特徴が一つある。それは曽慶紅のリーダーシップに対して最高度の評価を行う。
その「曽慶紅が処分され、影響力を失うとすれば、もはや中国に希望はない」と分析した。元祖太子党として既得権益を擁護する人々の利益代表を中国発展の担い手とする評価は、どうみ

文革期の太子党
氏名

生年 1966 年当時の年齢と高校、大学

曽慶紅 1939 27 歳北京 101 中学、北京工業学院

父親

父の地位

曽山

内務部長

鄧樸方 1944 22 歳、北京第 13 中学、北京大学物理鄧小平 副総理兪正声 1945 21 歳、北京八一中学、ハルピン軍事工程学院

黄敬

第一機械工業部長

陳雲

党副主席

陳元

1945 21 歳、北京四中、清華大学

18 歳、北京 35 中学高中 2 年の時、すなわち 69 年 1 月に延安王岐山 1948 県康坪生産大隊に下放し、姚依林の娘姚明珊と知り合う。西 姚依林 副総理（岳父）
北大学 73-76 年。子女なし。
薄煕来 1949 17 歳北京四中高中 1 年级、北京大学

薄一波 副総理李源潮 1950 16 歳、上海、華東師範大学

李幹成 上海副市長

劉源

1951 15 歳北京四中初中 2 年级、北京師範大学

習近平 1953

11

13 歳、1968 年北京八一初中 3 年、25 中学に転校後に延川県に下放、清華大学

The Coming Chinese Crackup, WSJ, 2015.3.6－ 15 －

劉少奇 国家主席
習仲勲 副総理

ても唐突な内容であり、人々を驚かせるに十分であった。
シャンボーの宗旨替えは何を意味するのか。近年しばしば訪中し、中国の要人や研究者等と交流し、彼らのいう Responsible Stake-hoder-ism 作りのために努力してきたシャンボーに何が起こったのか。それが「裸官慶親王」ショックにほかならない。私自身は腐敗の根源が江沢民にあることをだいぶ前から見抜いていた12 ので、江沢民の大番頭役・曽慶紅の失脚に驚くことはなく、むしろ拍手を送りたい気分だ。ところがシャンボーは、曽慶紅一派に望みをつなぎ、米中対話のカウンターパートの黒幕と認識していたという事実には、少なからず驚いた。シャンボーと曽慶紅との交流がどのようなものであったかは知らないが、「米中戦略・経済対話」は数年続いており、しかも対話を止められない事情が双方にあるから、曽慶紅失脚に接して、あわてるのは政治分析家としては、未熟といわざるをえない。いわんや曽慶紅とのパイプ断絶をもって、中国全体の未来を語るのは、軽率と評するほかはない。とはいえ、シャンボーの絶縁
声明は反響が大きく、その後まもなく『ニーヨーク・タイムズ』（2015 年 3 月 15 日号）がバッ
クリーによるインタビューを掲げた13。
ここで重要なことは、ワシントンという政治都市では、政策作り優先ですべてが動いている事実だ。近年の米中対話の中心にあったシャンボーの変心がワシントンの対中政策にどのような影響を与えるのか、ポスト・シャンボーの政策プランナーは誰なのか、注視しておく必要がある。曽慶紅処分はなるほど権力闘争には違いないが、権力を得た習近平が何をやるか、それが問題だ。習近平の反腐敗闘争は、権力を固めるための手段の側面をもつことは当然だが、権力闘争のための反腐敗ではない。浙江省書記時代から彼はこれに取り組もうとしていた。
ここで習近平と王岐山の年齢を見ると（表「文革期の太子党」）、習近平と比べて王岐山は 5歳年上だ。処分された薄煕来は習近平より 4 歳年上、処分を待つ曽慶紅は、習近平よりも 14
歳年上である。習近平・王岐山 vs.薄煕来、曽慶紅らの闘争は、太子党のいわば内ゲバである。
習近平と軍の劉源、紀律検査委の王岐山らは、太子党のいわば正統派を自任しているように見える。この立場から太子党内の既得権益擁護層に対して、果敢な権力闘争を挑んで、これに勝利しつつあるのが現状と見てよいであろう。（補注 2）

終わりに――「プチ鄧小平」としての習近平および全方位外交

さて、習近平の内政活動の基調を毛沢東に似せて描いたが、毛沢東時代と現代は、中国内外

たとえば『激辛書評で知る中国の政治・経済の虚実』日経ＢＰ社、2007 年第 2 章および『中共政権の爛
熟腐敗』蒼蒼社、2014 年、142～145 ページ。
13 Shambaugh on the Risks to Chinese Communist Rule, NYT
By Chris Buckley March 15, 2015.
12－ 16 －

の環境は著しく異なる。中国の政治経済はグローバル経済のなかに深くビルトインされている。
それゆえ市場経済の発展を基軸として政策を進めることにならざるをえない。この文脈では、
習近平は「プチ鄧小平」の役割を演じて、文革期のような鎖国政策にはもはや戻れない。私は
旧著『チャイメリカ』（花伝社、2012 年）で詳論したが、米国の国債を保有する最大の債権国が中国であり、2015 年現在 1 兆 2391 億ドルだ。ちなみに親米派の日本は 1 兆 2386 億ドルで、わずかに少ない。1 年前には中国が日本より 600 億ドルも多かった。米中貿易は日米貿易の約3 倍であり、米国から見た「日本の地位」に昔日の面影はない。中国国内の社会情勢も高度成
長を経て大きく変わりつつある。内外の情勢が激変するなかで、習近平が毛沢東の作風を真似するだけでは、マンガになってしまう。とりわけグローバル経済の潮流は、中国経済を深く包摂している。そこで鄧小平流の沿海地区発展戦略をグローバルに発展させた構想こそが「一帯一路」という海陸シルクロード構想にほかならないのである14。

補注
小説『劉士丹』事件は、劉志丹を題材とした小説『劉志丹』が陰謀家康生（1898～1975、没後の 1980 年 10 月 16 日林彪江青集団の一員として党から除名された）によって反党文書だとされた事件。劉志丹は 1920 年代から活躍した軍人で、長征の先頭に立ち高崗らと共に陝西省
北部の陝北ソビエトの確立に尽力。1936 年 2 月 21 日、毛沢東の「北上抗日」という指示で東征を行い、山西省に入ったところで同地を支配していた国民党の閻錫山軍に敗北し、4 月 14日に退却の途中に射殺。この一件で彼の故郷である保安県は志丹県と名を変え、追悼大会が盛大に行われた。1954 年、中央宣伝部の指示で、小説『劉志丹』が弟劉景范の妻李建彤によって執筆された。その後、習仲勲の助言を得て、1962 年までに完成。だが既に失脚していた高崗や1930 年代に共産党で極左偏向路線を主導した王明に関わる内容であったことから、陝北地域の党責任者だった賈拓夫は中央宣伝部の審査を仰ぎ、周揚副部長は問題なく出版は可能と結論。
出版にこぎつけた。ところが光明日報、工人日報、中国青年報などに連載されると閻紅彦（雲南省委第一書記）が、内容は党中央の評価が必要だと発表に反対し、その報告を受けた康生によって「政治問題であり、処理を求める」と楊尚昆に命じた。62 年 8 月、第 8 期中央委員会第10 回全体会議予備会議で、小説『劉志丹』は高崗の名誉を回復し、党を攻撃する文書だと指摘、
9 月 24 日に開催された第 8 期 10 中全会で毛沢東は「小説を書いて反党反人民をするとは、これは一大発明だ」と批判した。これを口実に習仲勲、賈拓夫、劉景范らが反党集団と認定され、14「中国経済が米国を抜いて世界一になる時、中国封じ込めに失敗した安倍ドンキホーテ政権に未来はあるか――AIIB 問題で世界の孤児となった日本」ちきゅう座 2015 年 4 月 6 日、http://chikyuza.net/archives/
52164－ 17 －

習仲勲は党内外の職務からすべて解任された上に下放され、賈拓夫は北京鉄鋼公司の副経理に降格された。1966 年に文革が始まると、康生、江青、林彪らは小説『劉志丹』に関わった人間に対して手を伸ばし始める。1967 年、人民日報で出版許可を出した周揚について、「反革命両面派周揚を評す」と題された文章を発表して党と国家を簒奪する陰謀を進めていたと批判し拘束した。李建彤は 1970 年に党から除名され、労働改造処分となるなど、西北反党集団として 6万人が被害を受けたとされる。またかつて毛沢東に英雄と評された劉志丹自身もその手からは逃れられず、記念碑が紅衛兵によって破壊された。1978 年の第 11 期 3 中全会以降、冤罪事件の再評価が始まり、翌 1979 年には「小説劉志丹の名誉回復に関する報告」で、この小説はすばらしい革命文化作品であり、高崗の再評価問題など存在しないと評価され、10 月には再出版された。しかし一部の古参幹部が事実と異なると指摘したため、1986 年に習仲勲が調査した結果、「党の歴史的人物の描写は歪曲してはならない」と決定され、胡耀邦の指示で再度発禁となった。高崗はスターリンに内通していた事実が『フルシチョフ回想録』（タイムライフ社、1972年）等で明らかになっており、毛沢東はスターリンの死を待って高崗を処分した。高崗事件は
建国初期の中国共産党を揺るがす大事件であった。習近平の父習仲勲はこの事件に巻き込まれ、辛酸をなめた。その父の運命を習近平は幼少の時から身近に観察して成長した。
http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%8F%8D%E5%85%9A%E5%B0%8F%E8%AA%AC%E5%8A%89%E5%BF%97%E4%B8%B9%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6
補注２
曽慶紅について校正の機会に補足しておきたい。本論を発表した研究会が行われたのは 5 月末であった。それから数カ月を経たが、引退後の曽慶紅の地位については、特に目立つ変化はなく、紀律検査委ホームページに掲げられた影射史学の読み方を私は少し間違えたようだ。このエッセイは、曽慶紅あるいはその黒幕としての江沢民を担いで習近平の虎退治に抵抗する勢力への単なる警告に留まるものであり、それ以上の意味を持つものではなかった。9 月 3 日の抗日戦争勝利 70 周年記念軍事パレード報道における習近平の突出ぶりは、際立っており、これは江沢民や胡錦濤の閲兵とは異なり、建国 35 周年の鄧小平閲兵に似ていた。

付記
本論は、2015 年 5 月 28 日、専修大学社会科学研究所特別研究助成（土屋グループ）が「中国六十年代と世界」研究会と共催した研究会において発表した「習近平と文革」にもとづく。
本論の一部は『情況』2015 年 6 月号に「全人代のテーマ「新常態」と隠しテーマ「慶親王＝曽慶紅批判」」にも述べたので、参照されたい。

－ 18 －

doi.org/10.34360/00009318

Civicness in Question:
The Case of Women’s Activities in Rural Vietnam
Takeko Iinuma
1.

Introduction
Since the 1980s, there has been growing interest in the roles that civil society and civic activities

play in social and economic endeavor across the world.

Studies with a greater focus on citizens andtheir initiatives came to cover a wide range of practical and theoretical themes, such as participatory
approaches, social/community networks, community involvement and social capital. In the 1990s,
such perspectives were extended to the studies of the post-Soviet societies with much attention to how
the civic sphere would take shape after the democratization of the one-party regimes.

Althoughdemocratization is yet to be seen, Vietnam was not an exception in attracting such scholarly interest at
the time of these dynamic changes of the former Eastern Bloc. In the period after the introduction of
Doi Moi (Renovation) in 1986, as a result of the shift from a centrally-planned economy to amarket-oriented economy, Vietnam experienced a rapid economic growth with the growth rate of 5.1-7.1
percent between 1990 and 2015 (World Bank Development Indicators). While the economic opening
has been the central purpose of Doi Moi, new attention has been directed to understanding how and towhat extent opportunities for civic activities would emerge in post-Doi Moi Vietnam.1
How much civic space has opened up as a result of the new political environment after the
introduction of the Doi Moi policy, and to what degree does the Vietnamese society embrace civicness?
The existing work on this theme in Vietnam includes aspects on the state-society relations manifested invarious new forms (Kerkvliet, 2001; Thomas, 2001) and on the characteristics of its civil society insocial and political spheres (Thayer, 2009). To define what is civic is a difficult task, but in the context
of pre-Doi Moi Vietnam, what was NOT civic was more evident.

The political system of Vietnam istypically characterized as composed of three institutions: the party, the government, and the massorganizations (Gray, 1999). If they represent the state all together, what is civic would be the rest of
the societal components. In the post-Doi Moi period, however, the empirical observations do notnecessarily indicate such a clear distinction as there are seemingly mixed actors over mixed boundariesof the civic space and the state. This is especially salient in women’s activities in rural Vietnam, wherea mass organization as the state actor intersects with the typically civic domain.
In an effort to understand the characteristics of civicness, or the degree in which civil society
emerges in Vietnam, this paper attempts to delineate the characteristics of the grassroots activities of thewomen’s mass organization in rural communities and to explore the civic quality of such activities.
The female leaders at the community level have taken up microfinance activities, which are often
1
The term, “post-Doi Moi,” employed in this paper refers to the period after the launch of the Doi Moi policy in
1986.

－ 19 －

associated with active civic or NGO engagement, and provide assistance to other women, especiallyfrom poor households, in a wide range of activities.

This paper is based on an interpretation of thefindings from a preliminary study of a comparison of rural communities in the two major delta regionsof the north and the south of Vietnam in order to understand the level of civicness of women’s activities.
Due to the historically different paths they followed in the twentieth century, the communities in thenorth and the south have different levels of socialist legacy. The community in the north is expected toshow closer ties to the state and the party, and the southern community is expected to show greater
civicness.

The following section reviews the existing discussions on civic arenas in Vietnam, with anemphasis on mass organizations.

The third section portrays the situations of the two communes, Hai

Van Commune in the Red River Delta, and Than Cuu Nghia Commune in the Mekong River Delta, andof the women’s organizations in these communities. In the fourth section, empirical cases relating to
women’s activities in microfinance are examined. The analyses were conducted based on interviews
carried out in the studied communes in collaboration with the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academyof Social Sciences, and also based on commune-level data from 2008 to 2013 collected by the Instituteof Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences.
2.

Civicness in Post-Doi Moi Vietnam
What makes activities civic in the context of post-Doi Moi Vietnam?

The existing discussions

on civil society in Vietnam provide diverse views on how to understand civicness in this rapidlytransforming society.
Certain scholars consider the proliferation of organizations as a sign of a widening civil society in
Vietnam.

Kerkvliet (2003: 16) points to “mutual assistance associations among farming households

and organizations among fellow religious devotees to renovate temples and hold particular ceremonies”
as representing certain aspects of civil society. The criteria for civil society here is to be “voluntary,”
working to contribute to certain public deliberations, and also to have “reciprocity,” building mutual
help and feedback to each other.
There are two possible arenas where civicness could emerge on a voluntary basis: civil society inthe private sector, and civil society as citizens’ activities.
has grown as civil society is not substantial.

First, the extent to which the private sector

In describing the nature and extent of activities that could

be recognized as civil society in Vietnam, Dixon (2004: 22) points out that, despite the emergence of a
new economic elite after Doi Moi, the extent to which they could form the basis of an “economic civilsociety” was seriously limited because they were either within or closely allied to the party-state system
instead of residing in the domestic private sector.

Second, after Doi Moi, the number of citizen’s

associations increased rapidly; an estimation reports that in 2005 there were 140,000 community-basedorganizations and 3,000 cooperatives, and 1,000 locally registered NGOs and 200 charities (Thayer,
2009: 5).

Also as many foreign donors rushed to assist Vietnam, they emphasized the important rolethat NGOs play in ensuring a bottom-up approach in the authoritarian political system (Ibid.: 4). Thismay have influenced the government’s attitude towards civicness.

Due to the great interest in

development policy to promote civic engagement in wide activities of the public domain, top-down－ 20 －

institutions can find it useful to foster a certain range of civic bottom-up activities that could serve forpolicy agenda.
One perplexing aspect is that the mass organizations function in both top-down and bottom-up
manners.

As any activities of citizens in the pre-Doi Moi period in Vietnam took place within state-ledorganizations,2 mass organizations are intrinsically categorized as the state domain instead of the civic
domain.

In reality, state-led organizations are of great importance in examining the society in Vietnam.

Despite its mobilizing nature, they were at the core of the construction of the independent country before
and after the reunification in 1975.

Even after Doi Moi, however, they have remained intact andcontinued to grow as organizations, which is a stark difference from other state pillars such as
state-owned companies and cooperatives that have been dismantled.

It indicates the clear aim of Doi

Moi to open up strictly the economy and not the society.
The views on mass organizations in relation to civil society are mainly split in two: someconsider mass organizations as part of civil society while others do not consider them so.

The former isa minority view while most observations and analyses support the latter view. As an example of theformer view, Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2011) considers mass organizations as part of civilsociety by looking at their public benefits and points out that mass organizations have very strong
grassroots links and large memberships, and that they have become increasingly independent since Doi
Moi, especially in the cases of the Farmers’ Association, Women’s Union, and Youth Union. Yet, how
one can assess the degree of independence is not specified here, and the mere fact of having a large
membership is not sufficient to make it civil society.

A report edited by Norlund describes that massorganizations “accepted as an integrated part of society,” while local NGOs and community-basedorganizations are “new types of organizations that developed in the 1990s but not fully recognized bysociety” (Norlund, ed., 2006: 10). The degree of acceptance is a vague criterion unless furnished withcertain opinion survey, and what counts is the context of acceptance, for instance, whether perceived aspart of the state or as the people’s voluntary sphere. The same report points out that, for grassroots
organizations in the rural communities or in local areas, central control is much weaker, and many of themass organizations operate with substantial autonomy (Ibid.: 20). This implies that mass organizations
at the local level have more possibilities to gain civic characteristics regardless of its statal origin.
The view that mass organizations do not represent civil society seems to be widely shared amongscholars. The organizational structure positions mass organizations under the party, thereby bound to
the state control. The mass organizations have a dual function: to implement party and state policies,
and to “act as a transmission belt channeling information to the party without which it could notformulate policies to meet changing conditions” (Beresford, 1988).

The 2003 Decree on Associations

3(Decree 88) sets forth the rules for the registration of “associations,” which seems to be the closest
term to civil society. This Decree marks a shift in government’s relations with citizens’ organizations
by allowing them greater freedom in organizing and financing their own activities.
2

Although thisIn the Vietnamese context, “state-led” means “led by the state institutions/organizations including the party” as theparty and the government comprise identical authorities.
3“Decree No. 88/2003/ND-CP, July 30, 2003, Providing for the Organization, Operation and Management of
Associations.”－ 21 －

Decree does not mention the term “mass organization,” it includes a statement that clearly excludes defacto mass organizations from “associations,” thereby exempting mass organizations from the control of
the Decree. Those exempted from the stipulations of the Decree are (in the order listed in the Decree):“the Vietnam Fatherland Front, Labor Confederation, Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Vietnam
Peasants Association, Vietnam War Veterans Association and the Vietnam Women’s Union.” On theother hand, the Decree considers “associations” as primarily voluntary and for mutual support.4

Even

if the voluntary and supportive nature is emphasized, these associations are after all managed by theministries, and the 2003 Decree retains the “dual management” (Sidel: 2009, 143) of associations,
namely, the uniform management of associations nationwide on the one hand, and the management ofassociations by line ministries on the other.
A perspective of civil society discourse in Vietnam indicates that civil society is equated with
developmental and environmental NGOs, which can be both local and international, resulting inmisunderstandings between concepts such as civil society and participation (Salemink, 2006: 121-122).
There is a tendency that the form of participation, instead of its process, determines whether it isconsidered civil society.

Hirsch points out that many of local NGOs in Thailand shifted from

community development work to policy advocacy work especially drawing on social and environmental
issues of development, such as dams and forestry, but as far as NGO advocacy is concerned, their roles
are significantly circumscribed in Vietnam as well as Laos and China (Hirsch, 2007: 198).

Even

though the Women’s Union may perform as an NGO and it may advise the authorities in the higher
strata on the local situations, it would not hold any advocacy role.

Also, certain discussions on NGOsin the context of civil society call attention to a possible problem in promoting service delivery byNGOs or civic groups, instead of by the state, as it might weaken their capacity to maintain a watchdog
function and to hold governments accountable (Kabeer and Simeen, 2010: 50).
Apart from the above viewpoints on civic activities, it is important to pay attention to what would
be civic in the context of rural areas.

Rural areas faced particularly rapid changes after Doi Moi. The

agricultural sector of Vietnam became increasingly integrated into the regional and global economies,
exposing Vietnamese farmers to international competition.

At the same time, the reduction ingovernment spending left the rural poor with few resources of alternative protection (Bach and Duong,2010: 117).
Another issue for civicness in rural Vietnam is migration from rural areas to urban areas.

The

1990s marked the beginning of a rapid decline in rural population, and this decline was further
accelerated in the 2000s.

In 1975, the percentage of the rural population in Vietnam was 81.2 percent;this had declined to 69.6 percent by 2010 (Table 1).

The main income earners, often men, work incities while women remain in the rural area to look after household and community responsibilities.
4
The Decree stipulates that “Associations prescribed in this Decree are understood as voluntary organizations ofcitizens, organizations of the Vietnamese of the same professions, the same hobbies, the same genders for thecommon purposes of gathering and uniting members, regular activities, non-self-seeking, aiming to protect members'
legitimate rights and interests, to support one another for efficient activities, contribute to the country'ssocio-economic development, which are organized and operate according to this Decree and other relevant legal
documents.” (Article 2.1.)－ 22 －

Table 1: Rural Population in Vietnam (Thousand Persons) (% of Total Population)
Year
Rural population% of total population

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

39,93944,33149,59754,95259,154

61,172

61,773

61,983

81.2

80.8

80.4

79.7

77.8

75.6

72.7

69.6

Source: Based on World Bank World Development Indicators.

In addition, most of the civil society associations are formed mainly in urban areas, and there are lessspaces for civil society associations to be formed in the rural areas.

For this reason, the roles women

and women’s organizations play are relatively significant in the rural areas, and it is important toexamine the way in which they engage in civic or non-civic activities within the communities.
3.

Cases of the Two Delta Communes

3-1.

Social and Economic Situations of the Study Areas
This study is based on empirical observations of two communes: Hai Van Commune, Hai Hau

District, Nam Dịnh Province, and Than Cuu Nghia Commune, Chau Thanh District, Tien Giang
Province.

Hai Van is in the Red River Delta, approximately 100 km southeast of Hanoi. Than Cuu

Nghia Commune is in the Mekong River Delta almost 50 km southwest of Ho Chi Minh City. The
selection of a study site in Vietnam depends largely on theauthorization of the government, thus the cases presented here
are not free from a selection bias.

They are not necessarily

typical or average communities that represent each region.
The government usually approves researchers to study
communities that are on good terms with the government andthat do not have possible sources of conflict.

Hai VanCommune has especially close relations with the government
over years, which might influence its social and politicalcharacteristics.
Nevertheless, the communities in the north and thesouth do have distinctive differences in terms of the historicalbackground and experiences of the communist rule.

Thenorth has a longer period of engagement in the communist
institutions while the south has been exposed to them for amuch shorter time.

The economic basis of production in thenorth was under the influence of the collectivization since thelate 1950s whereas the south was affected only after thereunification in 1975 and until the late 1980s. In theory, thiswould lead to the stronger influence of the state on the society
in the north as opposed to the less influence in the south.
－ 23 －

Map 1: Vietnam andthe Study Areas

The following section describes the social and economic situations of the two communes.

Hai

Van Commune has a population of 9,464 persons and 2,688 households (as of October 2014).

The

population of the Than Cuu Nghia Commune is twice as large as that of Hai Van, with 21,035 persons
and 5,149 households (as of January-June 2013).5 According to the commune data of 2008-2013,
collected by the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, certain commonalities anddifferences exist in the social and economic conditions of the two communes.

The livelihood of theboth communes is based on agriculture and is supplemented by livestock and craft-making.

In general,

Vietnam has relatively good nationwide infrastructure, and its poverty rate is low in comparison to thatof its neighbors in the region. Such national characteristics apply to both of the communes.
Hai Van’s electrification rate was 95.2%, and that of Than Cuu Nghia was 100%.

In 2013,

Both have

all-weather roads connected to other communes. In Than Cuu Nghia, the province provided 9 billion
VND for inter-hamlet road construction, and the population in the district and communes contributed
approximately an equal amount.
With regard to the differences between the Hai Van and Than Cuu Nghia communes, theircharacteristics are distinct from each other in the aspects of religion and economy. Hai Van is unique inthe sense that about 80 percent of the Commune population is Catholic as a result of its early French
influence.
Economic differences between the two communes are fairly large.

With regard to the income

level, Hai Van’s annual per capita income increased from 20 million VND in 2008 to 29 million VND in
2013.

On the other hand, Than Cuu Nghia’s annual per capita income is substantially lower, 25.5

million VND in 2014 although it increased from 15.5 million VND in 2010. Hai Van’s relatively highper capita income is due to labor out-migration and to furniture/wood industry as well as handicraft
production.

Concerning labor migration, according to their village committee, the income increased

since around 2010, which was facilitated mainly by the road network as the National Route 21 connects
Hai Van to the provincial capital, Nam Dinh.

Hai Van has construction labor teams that are regularly

dispatched to Hanoi and its proximity.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the household income quintiles in the both communes. Regarding
income poverty at the household level, none of these communes have population classified as “verypoor,” and both communes have a fairly small proportion of population classified as “poor.”6The

poverty rate in 2011 for Hai Van was 7.75 percent and that for Than Cuu Nghia was 8.16 percent; theformer slightly less than the national average poverty rate, and the latter higher than the national
average.7

Although Than Cuu Nghia seems to face a more severe problem of poverty, there is muchstronger economic equality among households in Than Cuu Nghia, as households classified as “Average”
5
Than Cuu Nghia is considered a middle-size commune. It was created through the merger of three villages, ThanNhou, Cuu Dieu and Nghia Thanh, which were composed of seven hamlets.
6
The communes in Vietnam monitor poverty information at the household level, which is compiled by the MOLISA,
to be incorporated into the values for poverty lines and poverty rates (Demombynes and Vu, 2015). Although
identification of the “poor” was carried out by Commune authorities using different criteria in different communes
and over time, after 2005, the MOLISA implemented a National Census on Poverty (NCP) to produce a complete listof poor households (Ibid.).
7
The national average poverty rate in 2013 was 7.8 percent (MOLISA).

－ 24 －

and “Above Average” account for 82.2 percent of the total while those of Hai Van account for 64.7
percent in 2013.
Figure 1: Household Income Quintiles in Hai Van, 2008-2013 (Number of Households)
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Very Poor

Poor

AverageAbove Average

2013
Wealthy

Source: Based on village information collected by the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences.
N.B.

The data for 2013 is for the period from January to June 2013. (The same

applies for the data hereafter.)Figure 2: Household Income Quintiles in Than Cuu Nghia, 2008-2013 (Number of Households)
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2008

2009

2010

Very Poor

Poor

Average

2011

2012

Above Average

2013
Wealthy

Source: Based on village information collected by the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences.

With regard to the industrial structure, there are distinctive differences between the two
communes (Figure 3 and Figure 4).

First of all, the proportion of labor engaged in the primary sector issubstantially lower in Hai Van, accounting for 26-35 percent in 2008-2013.
sector of Hai Van is distinctively large.

In contrast, the secondary

Many male workers from this commune go to Hanoi and otherprovinces, and women take up the responsibility of agricultural work in the commune.
－ 25 －

Mostimportantly, this commune also has a strong furniture and wood industry as mentioned earlier as one of
the reasons for its higher per capita income.

According to Houtart and Lemercinier (1984: 32-34), therestructuring of the workforce and the reversing of the primary and secondary sectors occurred between
1973 and 1978 as a result of the policy for co-operatives.8
Figure 3: Labor Force by Occupation in Hai Van, 2008-2013 (%)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
0%

20%

40%

Primary

60%

Secondary

80%

100%

Tertiary

Source: Based on village information collected by the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences.

Than Cuu Nghia Commune, on the contrary, has a large primary sector.

Income sources for the

population of Than Cuu Nghia are: 1) vegetable and fruit farming, 2) rice cultivation, and 3) handicraft.
Its agricultural production is integrated into the market economy, and is also managed in a large scale:the agricultural land area per capita in 2013 was 221 m2 in Hai Van and 474 m2 in Than Cuu Nghia.
Figure 4: Labor Force by Occupation in Than Cuu Nghia, 2008-2013 (%)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
0%

20%

40%

Primary

Secondary

60%

80%

100%

Tertiary

Source: Based on village information collected by the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences.

8

The furniture and would industry is made up of small-scale enterprises with less than 30 employees. These
companies have been established through loans from the Agricultural Policy Bank and the Social Policy Bank. The
timber is imported from Laos, and the products are sold to both the foreign and domestic markets. The commune
authority mentions that this industry has prospered as a result of the good road networks reaching Nam Dinh City.

－ 26 －

One of the reasons for Hai Van to reduce the number of agricultural labor was because
agriculture alone could not absorb the young workforce, especially after they come out of the secondary
education (Ibid.).

Despite its larger agricultural land area, it does not mean that the Than Cuu Nghia

Commune does not have any problem regarding job opportunities for young people.

Besides,

agriculture is mechanized and does not require additional labor. In 2009, a new industrial zone openedin Kon Tan Huong, approximately four kilometers away from this commune,9 and young people moved
there to seek income.

According to the commune authority, this was a welcomed development as

young people do not have to leave for distant cities, such as Ho Chi Minh, to look for jobs.
Women are an important labor force in the agricultural sector in both communes.

Althoughthere is no gender-disaggregated data for agricultural labor, narratives show that Hai Van’s agricultural
responsibility depends largely on women, and that both men and women are in charge of agricultural
production in Than Cuu Nghia. Historically, women predominantly worked in agriculture due to theexodus of men to the army in times of war, and, traditionally, women had also taken up heavy labor in
the fields (Beresford, 1988: 74).

In the cases of the two communes, despite significant differences in

the industrial structures, both of their agricultural sectors rely very much on women.
In these transitional processes of the Vietnamese society and economy, differences between thetwo communes is discernible at the level of the influence of the state.

Hai Van has been in a close

relation with the state since early on. The state introduced industrial co-operatives into Hai Van in the
mid-1970s.

According to the Central Committee of Hai Van Commune, the government introduced therural program to this commune in the 1980s one of the earliest in the country. Moreover, Hai Van was
one of the early communes in which the government set forth the cultural titling.

For instance, if ahousehold meets the cultural criteria, it receives titling of “Cultural Family.” The same type of titling
applies to the commune, district and province, but the communes are the important bases of such titling.
In this sense, Hai Van has served as a model commune for the government policy and plans.
3-2.

Women’s Status and their Organization in Rural Areas
Vietnam has made striking achievements in the advancement of women’s status in the publicsphere.

Reforms were launched to promote greater participation of women in political and economic

activities.

Government policies, laws for gender development, and programs to protect women fromharassment, as well as to protect mother and children, have been enacted and enforced.
Traditionally, women have had a lower status in the family, and had very few decision-making
opportunities. After the revolution, socialist ideology propounded the principle of equality between
men and women.

However, the inquiries carried out in Hai Van by Houtart and Lemercinier (1984:

119) in the pre-Doi Moi period indicated that, at the household level, male domination indecision-making in family finance and management has remained persistent, especially among theyounger generation.

With regard to the social and cultural activities of the family members, both

9
The industrial zone has garment factories from Taiwan, Korea and China. The total number of workers isapproximately 40,000 persons, and 70 percent of them are women. In 2014, the average salary of the workers in theindustrial zone was 4.5 million VND per month.

－ 27 －

women and men partake in decision-making, which seemingly reflects the social changes in the socialist
period.10
The Vietnam Women’s Union, founded in 1930, is the oldest mass organization in Vietnam.
The main activities of the Women’s Union are carried out in accordance with the National Five-Year
Plans and the National Women’s Union Congress, which take place every five years.

It operates

nationwide under the Party’s guidance, hence the organizational structure and management are inprinciple the same in both communes.

Although the overall organizational framework is the same forthe both communes, the Women’s Union in Hai Van has a much higher unionization rate (Table 2).
According to the Women’s Unions of the both communes, there are six main areas of work (Table 3).
In Hai Van Commune, activity 4) is not limited to informing the higher strata about the administration ofcommune affairs, but also includes giving feedback on social policies from the viewpoint of theTable 2: Women’s Unions in Hai Van Commune and in Than Cuu Nghia Commune
Number of members (persons)
Unionization rate (% of the total number of adult women)
Membership age

Hai VanThan Cuu Nghia

1,558

998

73.9%

18.9% *

18-60 years old

18-60 years old

Source: Based on interviews, November 2014.
* Estimation based on the commune population data, 2013.

Table 3: Main Activities of the Women’s Unions,
Hai Van Commune and Than Cuu Nghia Commune
Hai VanThan Cuu Nghia

Training (child care, family knowledge,

Training (livestock, agriculture such as

business management)

vegetable growing)

2“Happy Family Movement”“Happy Family Movement”

3

MicrofinanceMicrofinance4

Providing recommendations to the district

Providing advice to local authority about

and the province regarding conditions in theissues pertaining to people’s lives

1

commune5

Expansion of the Women’s Union

Capacity building of the Women’s Union

6

Support for women in poverty

External relations and cooperation formembers

collaboration with other organizations andforeign organizations
Source: Based on interviews, November 2014.

10

For instance, the authors point to equal decision-making on the type of newspapers to read, and to female
initiatives in going to visit friends or attending women’s meetings (Ibid.: 121).

－ 28 －

commune.

For instance, the Women’s Union could suggest support for people with special needs suchas handicapped children.

Even in cases where certain measures taken by the government is not

appropriate for the commune, the Women’s Union of the commune can still make recommendations tobureaus at a higher level of decision-making. Their contact is not limited to the public bureaus, as they
can also demand enterprises to provide appropriate salaries and health insurance.
In Than Cuu Nghia Commune, under activity 3), women are mobilized in environment andsanitation issues.

For instance, every household is required to build a new toilet. If someone needs toprolong his or her credit terms, the Women’s Union brings this request to the local authority. Under
activity 4), the Women’s Union follows up on community health conditions; for instance, it verifies ifchildren under the age of six have received free medical cards. There is great need for activity 5),
capacity building of new members, because approximately one hundred women take up membership in
the Women’s Union every year.
The types of technical training are different in the two communes, reflecting the need of the two
local areas: family care and business management in Hai Van, and agriculture and livestock skills inThan Cuu Nghia.

The rest of the activities are generally the same for the both communes, except theone activity in Hai Van to support women in poverty and the one in Than Cuu Nghia for external
relations and cooperation, directly dealing with outside organizations and foreign organizations, inparticular, the provider of the microfinance assistance. In both communes, the Women’s Union plays acrucial role connecting between the communities and the authorities.

In the sense that its service

delivery is substituting for the local authority’s work in many administrative themes in the communities,
it is a very statal organization.
In sum, the organizational aspect of the Women’s Union indicates that of Hai Van being highly
unionized, which is understandable from the historical background of northern Vietnam.

In terms of

their activities, most of their main work areas overlap with each other while they reflect certain specificcharacteristics and concerns of the local areas.
4.

Women’s Microfinance Activities and Civicness in the Communes
Microfinance has become a widespread development tool in the developing world.

These

activities are often carried out by community development groups and self-help groups. They arehighly appreciated because they can reach out to the poor, and especially poor women, who are often
excluded from credit opportunities.

Microfinance is also believed to be cost-effective as it handles

small amounts of loans, and because the repayment rate is very high.

In Vietnam, microfinance wasquickly adopted in the 1990s at the time of the full reduction of the state sector. Rankin (2008: 1217)
claims that the introduction of microfinance into Vietnam took place through ad hoc negotiations
between individual donors, provincial and district governments and the mass organizations, rather than
through regulatory reform and institutional diversification.

At the same time, behind the introduction

and further promotion of microfinance activities in Vietnam, there were policies to emphasize ruraldevelopment. The National Target Program on New Rural Development (hereafter NTP-NRD) is themain rural policy framework started in 2010 for improving income, livelihood, and living standards－ 29 －

through the development of modern infrastructure, an improved economic structure, and production
bases for agriculture, industry and services.11
Nghiem (2012: 621) categorized microfinance in Vietnam into two types: formal andsemi-formal.

The providers of formal microfinance are the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural

Development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) and the People’s Credit Fund(PCF). The semi-formal providers of microfinance are non-bank institutions of NGO microfinanceactivities.

In the two communes in this study, both types are present: the VBARD, the VBSP, and the

Women’s Union as a non-bank institution although it is not an NGO.

The former PCF, which used to

be a government-owned bank, had a higher interest rate (11%) than the VBARD (10%).

In the case ofThan Cuu Nghia, the VBSP provides credit for the poor with an interest rate of 0.65%.

Borrowers

invest in agricultural activities such as fruit planting, livestock such as poultry, and fishery, or small
businesses and other forms of commerce. The poor may repair houses using this loan, and the limit of
the loan was raised from 5 million VND to 10 million VND in 2010.

A household that wishes to start afamily business would be eligible to apply, and a typical loan would be provided in the areas of fish
farming and coconut tree growing in Than Cuu Nghia. The VBSP also provides loans to organizations
such as the Women’s Union, the Farmers’ Union, the Youth Union, and the Vietnam War Veterans
Association.12
One of the main semi-formal operators of microfinance is the Women’s Union although, as
Nghiem described, their finance providers are usually NGOs.

Microfinance, especially the one

operated by women, has been classified into two groups of approaches: the “financial systems” approachand the “poverty lending” approach. The former offers a commercially-oriented, minimalist packageof financial services for the economically-active poor, while the latter offers loans to the poorer,
subsidized by donors, and often coupled with training, as well as social and other support services(Kabeer, 2005: 261).

To examine the cases in these two communes, it is not so much whom

microfinance is targeted at because “very poor” people do not exist according to the commune data.
More of importance is the second point, whether micro finance comes with or without schemes.
Kabeer draws attention to: 1) the philosophy that governs their delivery, 2) the extent to which they are
tailored to the needs and interest of those they are intended to reach, 3) the nature of the relationships
which govern their delivery, and 4) the caliber and commitment of the people who are responsible fordelivery (Ibid.).
For the purpose of this study, I modify these parameters to portray the characteristics of civicness
11
This policy replaced the earlier Poverty Reduction Policy (PRP). The main difference between the PRP and the
NTP-NRD are the target areas. The PRP focused on credit for the poor to improve only the economic aspect
whereas the NTP-NRD has 19 criteria and encourages cooperation with other organizations, for example,
collaboration with the Vietnam Fatherland Front for the building of cement houses to replace poor simple houses.
To promote livestock and vegetables or health programs, it is considered necessary to cooperate with all these relatedorganizations.
12
As of November 2014, the total number of borrowers of small loans from the VBSP in Than Cuu Nghia was 488
persons. These loans were issued for the following purposes: 1) for building houses, 2) to extend work activities (20households utilized this scheme in November 2014), 3) a poor family with a university student can receive 10-11
million VND per year per person, 4) a household near the poverty line can receive a loan for economic developmentin the range of 5-20 million VND a year, and 5) for installation of clean water facilities, new toilets, and sanitation
measures.

－ 30 －

manifested in microfinance activities: 1) the civic philosophy of microfinance delivery, 2) the civic need
responsiveness of the operation, 3) the civic nature of relationships in microfinance delivery, and 4) the
civic caliber and commitment of those involved. Using this as the frame of analysis, the following
section explores the microfinance activities carried out by state-led organizations at the commune level.
It is assumed to show the different levels of civicness in the two communities in accordance with thedifferent influence of the state.
The following are cases of similar microfinance activities in the Hai Van and Than Cuu Nghia
Communes.

Both have received foreign assistance to initiate microfinance projects.

Hai Vanreceived aid through a Belgian scholar team that was visiting the Commune, and Than Cuu Nghia
received aid from a Norwegian NGO. Such direct contact and cooperation, although reported to andauthorized by the authorities, would not have been possible in the pre-Doi Moi period.
With regard to microfinance in Hai Van, the reasons why the Women’s Union manages the fund,according to them, are: most agricultural workers are women; and the husbands have moved to large
cities for work. Approximately, 80 percent of the Women’s Union members have husbands working inlarge cities and who return home six to seven times a year. Due to these reasons, the providers of the
microfinance fund decided to leave the management responsibility with the Women’s Union. A fundcommittee was established, in which the committee president supervises overall management, and atreasurer serves regularly.

The president of the Women’s Union also partakes in the management.

In

the first two years, three to four Vietnamese experts were brought in to train the staff of the Women’s
Union in management skills.

As Table 4 shows, each loan is 2 million VND, and the loan is issued infour installations of 500,000 VND every six months.

The repayment is also made in four installationsof 500,000 VND every six months. Only Women’s Union members can vote on whom to assist
through the microfinance system, and the Women’s Union submits a report on the fund capital annuallyto the Commune president, who then submits it to the cooperation office in Hanoi to be sent on to
Belgium.
In the case of Than Cuu Nghia Commune, a Norwegian NGO, the Norwegian Mission Alliance(NMA),13 has been in cooperation with the Tien Giang Province’s Women’s Union since 2002.

In

2010, the project’s status was changed to the “Tien Giang Capital Aid Fund for Women’s Economic
Development (Tien Giang CWED),” a non-profit organization for poverty eradication, job creation, andassistance to poor women in remote areas.

The credit is used only for production and businessactivities because its aim is to increase income for the poor.
CWED requires borrowers to make mandatory and voluntary savings monthly and to complete a
training program on business management, followed up by local consultants throughout the process.14
13
The NMA provides small-scale credit assistance with the aim of improving the lives of the poor so that they canestablish their own businesses, develop existing production, or improve their living conditions.
http://www.misjonsalliansen.no/english/a46553 (Viewed on May 21, 2015). In 2005, the fund’s accounting, which
took place at the commune level, became integrated with the accounting system of the province. See Mekong
Organization of Microfinance. http://mom.com.vn/ (Viewed on May 21, 2015).
14
The program eventually changed its status to be a licensed microfinance institution (MFI).
http://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/ngo-evaluations/2011/evaluation-of-capital-aid-fund-for-womens-econo
mic-development/－ 31 －

In the case of Vietnam, the program provided assistance to 12 communes out of the total 22 communesof Chau Thanh District.

The borrowers enroll in technical courses mainly in the areas of agriculture

and fishery, and staff from the Women’s Union follow up on all borrowers and their activities.

The

funds of CWED are managed by the province, and the province pays the Women’s Union 1.5 million
VND quarterly per year as administration and management fees.
NMA started operating in Than Cuu Nghia Commune in 2009, providing 1.2 billion VND (Table
4).

An eligible woman can borrow 5 million VDN for 12 months with a monthly repayment of 50,000

VND.

For the second loan, a person can borrow 6-7 million VND.

In November 2014, 378 members

had utilized this credit scheme for the purposes of rearing chickens/pigs/cows, vegetable farming, or
fishery.

At the time of the credit issuance, their activities are examined, and two or three months later,

the credit staff visit each borrower to see if they are actually engaged in the activities.

For the loanborrowers, the Women’s Union organizes training courses two or three times a year on rearing chicken,
fishery and other activities.

These training courses receive budgetary and technical support from theprovince’s extension office.
In these two communities, although the institutional arrangements are the same, in other words,
both based on collaboration between the Women’s Union and a foreign donor, their funding scales anddelivery details are quite different.

The interest rate of Than Cuu Nghia microfinance is as high as thatof the commercial institutions. As the total fund is larger in Than Cuu Nghia, the first credit amount isTable 4: Comparison of Microfinance Activities in Hai Van and Than Cuu Nghia
Hai VanThan Cuu Nghia

2008

2009

Original fund sources

Foreign aid

Foreign aid

PurposeFor the poor

For the poor

Rate (%)

0.5% per year

1.2% per month

Terms

N.A.

12 months

Total amount of funds (VND) (original)

100 million

1.26 billion

Total amount of funds (VND) (current)

110 million

1.2 billion

Borrowers (persons)

49

378

Cumulative number of borrowers (persons)400

19,959First loan (VND)

2 million

5 million

Repayment (VND)

500,000 per 6 months

50,000 per month

Repayment Rate (%)

100%

More than 99%

Year established

Second loan (VND)

N.A.

6-7 million

Types of activities

Poultry, pig husbandry,

Poultry, pig husbandry,

vegetable farming, andvegetable farming, fishery.

retailing.
Source: Based on interviews, November 2014.

－ 32 －

more than twice of that in Hai Van, and Than Cuu Nghia microfinance provides a second loan.
With regard to the four aspects of microfinance, the following observations were made, which
did not necessarily correspond to the original assumptions.

First, the philosophy of microfinance inboth communes is to provide assistance to poor women. According to the Hai Van Women’s Union,
the provision of a small amount such as 2 million VND is extremely important to a poor woman,because she could purchase 10 chickens or one pig with this amount of money.

They can breed as

many as 100 chickens, and above all, there has not been any delay in repayment in Hai Van.

However,

the actual loan policies are fairly different between the two communes, and for Than Cuu Nghia
microfinance, it is doubtful whether reaching for the poor was actually possible with such a high interest
rate.

Their loans are also restricted for income-generating activities such as cash crop production,

livestock and business, which would not anticipate the needs of the landless or the very poor.
Furthermore, the mutual support is institutionalized in its operation, as seen in the case of Than Cuu
Nghia in the form of the mandatory savings, but there is no reciprocal mechanism in placing themembers’ feedback or evolving this program for further activities beyond individual delivery.
Second, whether microfinance in the two communes has responded to the needs of the people, it
is an advantage that the Women’s Union staff serve as the managers of microfinance activities because
they are very much aware and informed of the issues of the locality.

Identification of the project’s

targets was also made in consultation with the donors, followed by technical training of the managers aswell as of the borrowers in both cases.

Moreover, in the case of Hai Van, the absence of men due totheir labor migration leaves much responsibility for women in securing livelihood.

In this sense, thefemale managers of microfinance are the best fit for dealing with the female borrowers.
The third question on the nature of the relationships in microfinance delivery is closely related to
civicness. As those who are involved in its management are doing so as part of their duties in the
Women’s Union, it is not of voluntary civic engagement.

Yet, their remunerations are rather symbolic,and one needs to acknowledge that these female managers are working, especially so dutifully, out ofcertain voluntarism and dedication.

While the characteristics of microfinance activities are often

associated with civic relations, the operation of microfinance is very administrative, which could bedone either in a public bureau or a private financial institution.

In the case of microfinance in Hai Van,a female manager of the Women’s Union took part in a training course in Thailand, visiting model farms
and exchanging views in a conference with Thai farmers.

The entire operation and management, as

well as building of staff capacity in the Women’s Union, strongly resemble that of a development project.
After all, microfinance operated by the Women’s Union leads to the reduction of the administrative cost,and it utilizes peer pressure for repayment (Rankin, 2002).

In its multiple capacities, the Women’s

Union has grown to act as an administratively inexpensive implementer of a financial development
project at the community level, which can be easily misinterpreted as the representation of civic
activities.

Another path could have been to build upon the essence of civicness in microfinance a“practical basis” for women to meet regularly and to promote new ideas eventually leading to address
their interests (Kabeer, 2005).
This point overlaps with the question on the caliber and commitment of those involved in－ 33 －

microfinance. The female managers and staff of microfinance have much experience in dealing with thesocial and economic issues of the communes.
fund, as well as supervision and reporting.

They have been well trained in the management of the

Nevertheless, the privilege that members of the Women’s

Union have in the form of sole decision-making rights for the selection of the borrowers may create
room for unequal opportunities if the managers turned out to be less committed to social justice andequality.
5.

Conclusions
This study explored the situations of civicness by comparing women’s activities in the north andthe south of Vietnam.

Against the assumption that the state intervention, by the form of the more

firmly organized mass organization, would be stronger in the north, there were no significant differencesof the work frame in the north and south with regard to the civicness of women’s activities, regardless of
the longer and deeper state control in the north and the less state-influence in the south.

Certaindifferences exist with regard to the organizational aspect; Hai Van’s Women’s Union in the north has amuch higher unionization rate, and that of Than Cuu Nghia is low but rapidly growing.

Also, in termsof actual activities, a more institutionalized and more strictly organized microfinance program wasfound in the south.

According to the microfinance typology made by Kabeer, the north had the“poverty lending” approach while the south had the “financial systems” approach.

This does not imply

any inherent nature of the north or the south, yet it suggests that the actual characteristics of the
microfinance program could be differently experienced by the borrowers, and the implication for the
civic spaces in the communities is large as the spread of the “financial systems” approach could be
misunderstood as the enhancement of civic engagement.

This awaits further studies with a greater

sample size, but the re-examination of what seems and claims to be civic would be instrumental for the
analyses of the transitional societies.
In the pre-Doi Moi period, social protection in the forms of secure employment (albeit
remuneration in kind instead of salaries) and the provision of health and education services was animportant part of the socialist state operation. After Doi Moi, the diminished state sector meant that
there was no stable provision of employment or subsidies.

The emphasis on civic activities came about

at a convenient time and provided an opportunity for the state to reduce the statal responsibilities byleaving them for citizens’ self-help or mutual help.

In addition, the poverty reduction policies werebeing implemented and becoming the overarching framework in social engineering. There was agreater need to make a difference at the commune level, and in particular to target at the poor
households, which was expected to be more effective and efficient in reducing poverty.

In the pre-Doi

Moi period, the party mobilized mass organizations for political outputs, whereas in the post-Doi Moi
period there were less needs for socialist ideological dissemination and greater needs for incorporation
into the national development strategies.

Mass organizations came to serve increasingly as

development partners operating poverty reduction activities, with their leaders and members working(with voluntary dedication) as if they were development workers.
Despite the call for reaching out to the poor women, the actual operation and management of－ 34 －

microfinance do not correspond fully to the civic principles of voluntariness or reciprocity.
Voluntariness has been always a part of women’s activities traditionally and historically, which obscuresthe discussions of civicness. Although the mass organization’s remunerations are very humble andtheir staff are usually very dedicated and hard-working, it is difficult to consider them as a form ofvoluntary contribution on the side of the women leaders of the Women’s Union and of the fundcommittee.

Reciprocity in terms of finance is somewhat embedded into the system of microfinance.

As a revolving loan, the mere usage of the fund and the repayment would automatically reciprocate thebenefits to other users.

However, the “services” that female leaders and staff provide in microfinanceactivities are delivered unidirectionally, and there is no space for the reciprocal feedback from theborrowers on how to manage the program.
The philosophy, needs identification, the types of relations created, and the quality of thepersonnel involved in the microfinance activities, all contribute to creating a new role and image ofwomen’s activities in development.

Regardless of its civicness or non-civicness, development work

can take place in both the private and public fields. Examining the case of civic relations in Laos, acountry with a very similar political structure as in Vietnam, Iinuma (2013: 138) points out that in thecontext of a one-party state, the boundary between “voluntary” and “being mobilized” is blurred, and thetwo areas can even overlap with each other, and that under such a regime, it is important to look at whatsocial relations are tolerated or promoted by the government.

In the case of rural Vietnam,

development activities provide an arena for such an overlap to take place.

The Women’s Union has

become a well-trained and well-experienced institution to operate most of such grassroots activities that
could contribute to reducing poverty and to supporting the livelihood of women who are in a more
precarious position in the post-Doi Moi period.

The state-led organization is acquiring multiple

characteristics in a flexible manner to function as both a civic and statal organization. The risk ofincorporating the mass organization into these major development activities may include legitimatizationof its roles in both of the civic domain and the state domain.
Acknowledgements
This research is funded by the Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology
Development (NAFOSTED) under Grant Number I3.3-2012-01. The author is deeply grateful for thesponsorship of the Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, under the research
project “A Study on Civil Linkages and Their Roles in Rural Area Development (the Red River Delta in
Comparison with the Mekong Delta).”
References
Adan, Ahmed, et al.
Policy.”2002.

“Who is Listening? The Impact of Participatory Poverty Research on

In Knowing Poverty: Critical Reflections on Participatory Research and Policy, ed.

Karen Brock and Rosemary McGee. London: Earthscan. Pp. 99-134.
－ 35 －

Asian Development Bank (ADB).

2011.

“Civil Society Brief: Vietnam.”

September.

http://www.adb.org/publications/civil-society-briefs-viet-nam (Accessed on May15, 2015.)
Bach, Robert L. and Le Bach Duong. 2010. “Social Protection and Market Reforms in Vietnam.”
In Social Protection as Development Policy: Asian Perspectives, ed. Sarah Cook and Naila Kabeer.
London: Routledge.
Beresford, Melanie.

Pp. 114-141.

1988. Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society.

Dixon, Chris. 2004.

London: Pinter Publishers.

“Politics: State, party and political change in Vietnam.

ed. Duncan McCargo.
Government of Vietnam.

New York: Routledge Curzon.

In Rethinking Vietnam,

Pp. 15-26.

“Decree No. 88/2003/ND-CP, July 30, 2003, Providing for the Organization,

Operation and Management of Associations.”
Gray, Michael L.

1999.

“Creating Civil Society? The Emergence of NGOs in Vietnam.”Development and Change. Volume 30, Issue 4, pp. 693–713.
Hirsch, Philip. 2007.

“Advocacy, Civil Society and the State in the Mekong Region.” In NGOs as

Advocates for Development in a Globalizing World, edited by Barbara Rugendyke, (London:
Routledge), pp. 185-199.
Houtart, Francois and Genevieve Lemercinier.

1984.

Hai Van: Life in a Vietnamese Commune.

London: Zed Books.
Iinuma, Takeko. 2013. “Government-Initiated Social Capital in Urban and Rural Areas of Laos.” The
Senshu Social Capital Review. No. 4, pp. 111-142.
Kabeer, Naila. 2005.

“Is Microfinance a ‘Magic Bullet’ for Women’s Empowerment?: Analysis ofFindings from South Asia.” Economic and Political Weekly, October 29, pp. 4709-4718.
Kabeer, Naila and Mahmud Simeen.

2010.

“Microfinance and Social Mobilisation: Alternative

Pathways to Grassroots Democracy?” In Vera Schatten Coelho and Bettina Von Lieres, eds.
Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public Participation.

London: Zed

Books, pp. 48-71.
Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria.

2001.

“An Approach for Analysing State-Society Relations in Vietnam.”

Sojourn, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 238-278.
__________.

2003.

“Introduction: Grappling with Organizations and the State in Contemporary

Vietnam,” in Getting Organized in Vietnam: Moving in and around the Socialist State, ed. Benedict
J. Tria Kerkvliet, Russell H.K. Heng, and David W.H. Koh. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies. Pp. 1-24.
Nghiem, Son, Tim Coelli and Prasada Rao.

2012. “Assessing the Welfare Effects of Microfinance inVietnam: Empirical Results from a Quasi-Experimental Survey.” Journal of Development Studies.
Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 619-632.
Norlund, Irene, ed.
Vietnam.”

2006.

Vietnam Institute of Development Studies (VIDS), March.

Rankin, Katharine N.

2002.

Feminist Economics.
__________.

“The Emerging Civil Society: An Initial Assessment of Civil Society in

2008.

“Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development.”Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1–24.

“The Politics of Subversion in Development Practice: An Exploration of－ 36 －

Microfinance in Nepal and Vietnam.” Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 44, No. 8, pp.
1214-1235.
Salemink, Oscar.

2006.

“Translating, Interpreting, and Practicing Civil Society in Vietnam: A Taleof Calculated Misunderstandings.”

In Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of

Aid and Agencies, ed. David Lewis and David Mosse.

Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

pp. 101-126.
Sidel, Mark.

2009. The Constitution of Vietnam: A Contextual Analysis.

Thayer, Carlyle, A.

2009.

Oxford: Hart Publishing.

“Vietnam and the Challenge of Political Civil Society.” Contemporary

Southeast Asia. Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1-27.
Thomas, Mandy.
Vietnam.”

2001.

Sojourn.

“Public Spaces/Public Disgraces: Crowds and the State in Contemporary
Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 306-330.

－ 37 －

doi.org/10.34360/00009319

Social Safety Net (SSN) in Vietnam:
Comparative analysis of two villages in the north and south
in terms of community-based SSN and the market economy wave
Juichi INADA, Professor of Senshu University of Japan
1. Objectives of research and focus of analysis1(1) Improvement of social safety net (SSN) in East Asia
Most East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have been trying to improve their social security
systems in recent years. Their increasing efforts to move toward “welfare states” had been brought about
by the economic reforms and democratization movement in the 1990s, an awareness of the importanceof social safety net gained through lessons drawn from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the rapid
shift toward becoming aging societies.
The SSN serves three purposes. The first purpose is to minimize damage in the event of its occurrence.
The second purpose is to prepare the system in advance to compensate for the damage. The third is tooffer a sense of safety through the existence of SSN2.
SSN can be defined widely as welfare policies, including health insurance, unemployment insurance,and pension system etc. On the other hand, SSN can be defined more narrowly as support for the poor or
low-income households3. In short, SSN is defined as a social system or program that helps to diminish
the risk of illness, unemployment, and poverty, and to offer protection from such risks.
Table 1. Major Types of SSN
Sectors

Official SSN offered through governmental
Informal SSN
programs and/or systems
Social Insurance
Other official programs
SystemHealth insurance
Provision of health service to the poor Mutual aid from relatives and/or
Healthcommunities, aid from NGOs
and religious groups
Introduction of jobs, vocational
Job creation in the agricultural
Labor/employment Unemployment
insurance, labor
training, job creation through public sector
incident insurance
works, local job creation program
Mutual aid from relatives and/or
Pension for the old, Livelihood protection (public
Incomeinsurance for the old benefits), social benefits such as child communities
benefits, food benefits, fuel benefits
Social service provision to
Mutual aid from relatives and/or
Social welfare
handicapped persons, elderly, etc.
communities, aid from NGOs
and religious groups(Source) JICA Institute, Basic Survey on Social Safety Net: Toward establishment of SSN in developing countries,
2003, Chapter 2, p.5.

1This research is conducted as a part of the Research Project of the Institute of Sociology of the Vietnamese
Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), funded by Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology
Development (NAFOSTED) under grant number I3.1-2012-07.
2Toshiaki Tachibanaki (2000), Economics of Safety Net (Seifutii Netto no Keizaigaku, Nihon Keizai Shinnbunsha,
p.1, pp.19–20.
3
Ibid.,（2000）p.22.

－ 38 －

The major types of SSN include a wide variety of support provided in the form of pension, healthinsurance, unemployment insurance, assistance to handicapped persons, elderly persons, children,
provision of food to the poor, and public works and vocational training to create jobs. These programs
reduce risks in the event of illness, unemployment, and poverty. These SSN programs are offered boththrough the official system by the government, as well as through informal mutual assistance systems of
relatives, communities, and/or non-governmental organizations including religious groups.
Table 1 shows the major types of SSN. SSN is provided through formal systems such as government
programs, and through informal networks such as mutual help systems of relatives and communities orassistance from religious groups.
Generally speaking, SSN is formulated to secure a minimal standard of living for households orindividuals, corresponding to changes in industrial structure, labor structure, urbanization, family styles,
population structure, and other factors. In fact, informal mutual help among relatives in the communities
is considered to be diminishing in tandem with economic development, while formal SSN systems havebeen developed to supplement such informal traditional systems4.
To what extent does this official SSN respond to traditional risks such as poverty, hunger, economic
stagnation, and to new emerging risks such as unemployment and inequality? What kind of roles are
local communities, NGOs, and relatives, as well as the official SSN offered by the government, expected
to fulfill? The primary focus of this article is to examine these issues using the case of Vietnam, andpicks up on two local communities in the north and south of Vietnam.
(2) Situations of social safety net (SSN) in Vietnam
Categorization and detailed studies of “Asian Welfare States” have been carried out in the area ofsociology and Asian Studies since the 1990s. For instance, Suehiro (Tokyo University) drew up acategorization of three SSN systems in Asia, based on the differences in the stages of economic
development, trend of population, situations of social security systems, and other factors5. He also wrote
about the necessity of “mutual help” in grasping the reality of SSN in Asia. The JICA report, “Basic
Study of Social Safety Net,” classifies the situation of SSN in Asia into some categories based on thestages of economic development and socio-cultural diversity6.
Vietnam was categorized as one of the “states in which social security system is limited to public
servants and the military, and healthcare is offered as a public health service, in the primary stage ofindustrialization.” Countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are included in this group.
Countries such as China, Vietnam, and Laos fall into a different category of “states of socialist orcommunist system (and in the process of transition to market economy).”The aforementioned JICA report examined the situation in the three countries of Thailand, thePhilippines, and Indonesia, using these as detailed case studies. However, no studies were conducted for
4

JICA Institute, Basic Survey on Social Safety Net: Toward establishment of SSN in developing countries, 2003,
Chapter 3, p.13.
5
Akira Suehiro, ed. (2014), Employment, Safety Net & Responses to New Social Risks in East Asia, Institute ofSocial Sciences (Tokyo University) Research Series, No.56.
6
Op. cit., JICA Institute (2003), Chapter 3, p.12.

－ 39 －

Vietnam. Therefore, the study that we conducted in 2014 would be meaningful to fill the gap in research
conducted on SSN in Asia.
Table 2 shows a provisional summary of the situation of SSN in Vietnam.
Table 2. Outline of SSN in Vietnam
Sectors

Official SSN offered through governmental
programs and/or systems
Social Insurance
Other official programs
SystemNo health insurance Provision of health service to all
people by the state

Informal SSN

Mutual aid from relatives and/or
communities, aid from NGOs
and religious groups, are limited
Job absorption in agricultural
Labor/employment No unemployment Large public sector, all farmers are
insurance, no labor members of the Farmers’ Union, many sector, aid from relatives andincident insurance
semi-official unions such as Farmers’ communities (neighbors)
Union, Women’s Union, Youth Union,
etc.
Pension for the
Several forms of public benefits for
Mutual aid from relatives, aid
Incomeelderly (public
the poor, households with students,from communities, are included
servants and military persons unable to work, etc.
in the official benefits system
personnel only), no(officially classified as “poor”)
insurance for theelderly
Several forms of public benefits for
Mutual aid from relatives and/or
Social welfare
the poor, households with students,
communities, aid from NGOspersons unable to work, etc.
and religious groups, are limited
Health(Note) Drawn up by the author, based on Table 1.

Informal SSN is mainly offered through mutual help from relatives and communities instead of NGOs
and religious groups, which have a restricted activity scope in Vietnam. Such mutual help systems
among relatives and communities were examined in the study conducted by Senshu University in theearlier project of “Social Capital in Asia,” and a questionnaire survey was conducted in the Giao Tancommune in the north of Vietnam. One of the conclusions of the study was as follows;“Social capital of agricultural communities exists to some extent. The credibility, mutual affection
within communities create contact networks of internal consensus. However, in the context of the shift
in labor and jobs in localities as well as that of the whole area and the whole country, current forms ofcontact have yet to result in important changes in community life. Social capital in fact remains weakand easy to collapse, for the members in the network of contact themselves are still in the conditions ofearning their living. Forms of mutual support do exist, but they are still limited to the support of people
within the family or the closest ones.”77Institute of Sociology (Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences), Social Capital and Sustainable Development in
VIETNAM: The case of Giao Tan commune Hanoi, August 2011 (a part of the “Conclusions”)－ 40 －

(3) The similarities and differences between the north and the south in Vietnamese society, and the
explanation for these based on the “path dependence”
One of the useful analytical tools used to analyze socio-economic factors is the concept propoundedby D.C. North, a new institution school8. He divided social systems into two categories: the first isformal legal and official policies, and the second is informal system such as culture, social customs, andbeliefs. He claimed that the formal system, established based on the informal system, affects the
distribution of resources of the socio-economic system. This idea comes into play in the “comparative
institutional analysis” and “historical system analysis” that follow. Another popular argument employedin historical system analysis is the theory of “dependent path,” which asserts that systems and social
frameworks are restricted by historical background, and that the characteristics of a system can be
explained by the differences in the historical socio-political experiences. This argument is very effective
in explaining the similarities and differences between the north and the south of Vietnam, through thedifferences in experiences of socialism and market economy.
The Vietnamese government launched the Doi Moi (reform) policy in 1986. Initially, it partiallyliberalized individual agricultural production and sales, then moved on to promote reforms ofstate-owned companies, liberalization of private business and activities, as well as liberalization of tradeand foreign investment. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, a state-led economic system wasintroduced, establishing agricultural cooperatives as the core of agriculture in rural areas in the north ofVietnam. On the other hand, although the capitalist market economy spread across the south of Vietnam
up till 1975, the socialist system was introduced after that and free market economy became severely
restricted after 1975. Nevertheless, after the Doi Moi policy was introduced in 1986, the market
economic system was restarted and spread rapidly in the south. The Doi Moi policy introduced in 1986
represented the first stage of reform, while the 9th General Assembly of the communist party held in2001 can be regarded as the second stage of further reform. It was at this point when the focus wasplaced on the concepts of “rule of law” and “civil society.”
In short, the north and south of Vietnam took different historical paths. In the north, governmentalorganizations and systems have been dominant under the long-lasting reign of the socialist system. The
south experienced a market economy system, and political liberties prevailed during the era of thecapitalist system. Furthermore, there are differences in the climate of Vietnam; the north has four
seasons and has a temperate climate, while the south, is warm throughout a year and has a subtropicalclimate. The differences in climate affect the different patterns of agriculture between the north and thesouth. On the other hand, the Red River Delta and Mekong Delta are both famous as typical riceproduction areas, and the same socialist system prevails in both areas. Therefore, the two areas also
share similarities.

8
D. C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press. D.
C. North (2005), Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press.

－ 41 －

2. Overview of two communities in the north and the south of Vietnam(1) Location of the communities
As mentioned in the previous section, the focus of this survey was to compare the rural community inthe north, where people have been living under a socialist system for a long time, and the ruralcommunity in the south, where people have experienced the history of an open capitalist society. Twotypical communities have to be selected to elucidate the differences between them.
The Hai Van commune in Nang Dinh Province in the north, located in a typical rural area of the Red
River Delta and a few hours’ drive from Hanoi, and the Thân Cửu Nghĩa commune in Tien Jiang
Province, located in a typical rural area of the Mekong Delta and nearly two hours’ drive from Ho Chi
Minh City, were selected as target communities for our study.
Chart 1 shows the location of the two communities on the map of Vietnam.
Chart 1. The locations of the two target communities

Hai Van commune in Nang Dinh Prov.

Thân Cửu Nghĩa commune in Tien Jiang Prov.

－ 42 －

(2) Overview of two communes in the north and the south
The Institute of Sociology of the Vietnam Academy of Social Science (VASS) has collected basic
socio-economic data of the target communes, which was shared with the author.
The population of the Hai Van (HV) commune in Nang Dinh Province was 9,807 (2,789 households),
and that of the Thân Cửu Nghĩa (TCN) commune in Tien Jiang Province was 21,035 (5,149 households)
in 2013. The percentage of the population employed in each sector in the HV commune was as follows:
agriculture 29.5%, industry & construction 53%, and trade and services 17.5%. On the other hand, thepercentage of the population employed in each sector in the TCN commune was as follows: agriculture
59.7%, industry and construction 12.2%, and trade and services 28.1%. The reason behind the large
percentage employed in industry and construction in the HV commune was because the woodprocessing industry had been a traditionally dominant industry in the area.
The percentage of population employed in agriculture was large in the TCN commune, but the patternof agriculture in the area was different from that in the north. Rice was the main produce of the HV
commune, while vegetable cultivation was popular in the TCN commune as the TCN commune was
located in an extremely market-oriented area near Ho Chi Minh City, which has a huge consumer
market.
The original assumption was that the comparison of the two communes would lead to a comparison
between the traditional (socialist) social capital influenced by the formal socialist system and the modern(capitalist) social capital of the market-oriented area. In reality, based on our interviews with residents,
unions, and People’s Committees, many similarities could be found between the two communes in termsof their prevailing socialistic social safety net systems.
However, the rural community that has experienced a long history of the socialist system in the north,and the rural community that has been developing as a market-oriented area in the south, especially after
the launch of the Doi Moi policy and despite the introduction of the socialist system after the integrationof 1975, are considered to be different from each other, and evidence of these differences could be foundin our interviews with the local communities. In other words, I would like to clarify the differences in
the characteristics between modernization from the top (initiated by the state) in a socialist system with a
traditional society at the bottom, and modernization derived from external trends (impact of the global
market economy) in the last 20 years. I will also explain the similarities and differences of social capitalin Vietnam.
(3) Comparison between two communes: Photos taken in our field study
The research team visited two communes in the south and north of Vietnam from late October to earlyNovember in 2014, and conducted several interviews with local residents and relevant organizations.
The following photos are examples showing the differences between the two communities.

－ 43 －

A. HV commune in the north: agriculture and distribution based on rice production

Photo 1: HV commune(1)Photo 2: HV commune(2)Photo 3: HV commune(3)Photo 4: HV commune(4)Photo 5: HV commune(5)Photo 6: HV commune(6)－ 44 －

B. TCN commune in the south: agriculture and distribution based on vegetable production

Photo 7: TCN commune(1)Photo 8: TCN commune(2)Photo 9:TCN commune(3)Photo 10: TCN commune(4)Photo 11: TCN commune(5)Photo 12: TCN commune(6)－ 45 －

(4) Comparison of figures related to living conditions in the two targeted communities
Table 3 shows the comparison of basic socio-economic data of the two targeted communities.
Table 3: Basic socio-economic data of the two targeted communities (as of June 2013)

Total population (Total no. of households)
Population of adults (Population below 15 years ofage)
Percentage of population employed each sector(agriculture, industry/construction, trade/services）
Classification of living standards of households(HHs): wealthy, above average, average, poor
(No. of poor HHs－No. of HHs receiving poverty
allowance)
Electrification rate
Percentage of HHs with TV
Percentage of mobile phone ownership

CPC: Hai Van
District: Hai Hau,
Province: Nam Dinh (north)
9,807（2,789 households）
6,987（2,820）

CPC: Thân Cửu Nghĩa
District: Châu Thành,Province: Tiền Giang (south)
21,035（5,149 households）
16,228（4,807）

29.5%, 53%, 17.5%

59.7%, 12.2%, 28.1%

30.0%, 35.0%, 29.9%, 5.2%

12.1%, 40.0%, 43.3%, 5.5%

（145 HH－145 HH）（285 HH－4 HH）

95.2%

100%

76.2%
43.4%

98.7%
42.7%

Percentage of HHs that own a computer (Percentage 4.4% (3.8%)of HHs that have access to Internet)

50.0% (40.0%)

No. of students (kindergarten, primary school,
625, 778, 630
385, 1274, 626
secondary school)
No. of students (kindergarten, primary school,24, 30, 32
13, 73, 40
secondary school)
Percentage of women visiting primary care station 73%
100%
for prenatal care
Percentage of malnourished children (below 5 years 14.1%
12.6%
of age)Total no. of people receiving pension (official
Total 494 （37, 12, 10, 17, 19, Total 236（96, 5, 1, 6, 3, 8, 0,
pension, military pension, benefits for people who 212, 117, 17, 36, 17）74, 48, 3）
have lost the ability to work, death benefits, benefits
for retired commune officials, benefits for lonely
elderly, student assistance benefits, benefits for war
martyr families, benefits for wartime invalids,
benefits for people exposed to dioxin)
No. of members of the Party Committee (No. of
215（17）
192（15）members of the Party Executive Committee)（Notes）Drawn up by the author, based on data offered by the Institute of Sociology, VASSThe following is the comparison between the two communities based on the data shown in Table 39.
Statistics on household income could not be obtained. Based on the classification of living standards
into “wealthy”, “above average”, “average”, and “poor”, the percentage of households in the HV
commune that falls into each category is 30.0%, 35.0%, 29.9%, 5.2%, respectively. (The number of poor
households is 145, and the number of households receiving poverty benefits is 145.) On the other hand,
9
The data obtained from the Institute of sociology (VASS) includes ambiguous figures. For example, the number of
persons receiving pension in the Table 3 is different from the figures that I obtained through my interviews with thePeople’s Committee of each commune. When there are any differences between the data obtained from the Instituteof Sociology and the figures I obtained through my interviews, the latter (the data I obtained directly) is regarded asright data that better reflects the reality, although it might not be accurate.

－ 46 －

the percentage of households in the TCN commune that falls into each category is 12.1%, 40.0%, 43.3%,
5.5%, respectively.
The percentage of wealthy households is larger in the HV commune than in the TCN commune, but
this percentage does not reflect the level of income of the people in the two communities. The wealthy
households in the TCN commune are assumed to enjoy a higher level of income and living standards,
judging from a comparison of the properties they own.

This fact was evident in the higher

electrification rate, percentage of HHs that own a TV, percentage of women visiting primary care station
for prenatal care, and other statistics for the TCN commune. In particular, the rate of HHs that own acomputer and have Internet access is significantly higher in the TCN commune, which is much more
modernized than the HV commune.
When I visited the households in the “poor” category in both communities, the poor household(family of a widow) in the HV commune appeared to be faring better than the poor household (husband
was handicapped and unemployed, wife was working in a part-time job) in the TCN commune. This was
related to the fact that poor households were taken care of by the commune more comprehensively in the
HV commune than in the TCM commune, because all poor households (95 HH) in the HV commune
received assistance but only four among 85 households received assistance in the TCM commune. The
number of households in the HV commune was less than in the TCN commune, but the number ofrecipients of several forms of benefits was larger in the HV commune. These included military pension,
benefits to people who have lost the ability to work, death benefits, benefits for retired commune
officials, benefits for lonely elderly, student assistance benefits, benefits for people exposed to dioxin(excluding official pension). The number of recipients of benefits for war martyr families and benefits
for wartime invalids was large in the TCN commune, because the commune is located in an area where
fierce battles were waged during the Vietnam War. The HV commune was assumed to have a close
relationship with the communist party, because the number of members of the party committee (andmembers of the executive committee) in the HV commune was larger than that in the TCN commune,
despite the fact that the population of the HV commune was only half that of the TCN commune.
3. Mutual help system of a community, and the market economy wave
I would like to summarize the results of our interviews, by illustrating the realities of the mutual help
system of a community and the market economy wave, observed through our interviews conducted in
the two communities.
A. HV Commune(1) Socio-economic situation in the HV commune
・Based on the data offered by the People’s Committee of the HV commune, annual per capita income ofthe people in the HV commune had increased from 20 million Dong in 2008 to 29 million Dong in
201310. The increase had been brought about by the increase in income from construction works backed

10

1 million Dong is about 5,400 Japanese Yen in 2014.

－ 47 －

by a construction boom in cities, as well as growth in the furniture and wood processing industry.
Furniture produced in the HV commune was mainly for domestic consumption and not for export. Oneof the factors behind the growth of the furniture industry in the HV commune was the improvement intransportation infrastructure (i.e. improvement of National Road No.1).
・Small scale enterprises that have less than 30 employees constitute a major part of the furnitureindustry. At the point of starting a business, the Social Policy Bank and Agro Bank serve as lenders.
Both of these are state-owned banks, and there are no major private banks in Vietnam.
・89% of the population in the HV commune is Catholic, and there are many churches there.
・Since the introduction of the Doi Moi policy in 1986, agricultural production has been increasing, andthe HV commune has become a model “Cultural Commune” that many government leaders visit toobserve and study.
・A new hospital facility was constructed by the HV commune using their own budget. Its operational
cost is covered by the Ministry of Health.
・The school was divided into primary school and secondary school in 1993, and a new school wasconstructed in 2005. The IT classroom was constructed in 2009. About 20 students have been added
every year. Tuition is free, but uniforms and textbooks are paid for by the students.
・All kindergartens are public, and there are no private kindergartens. The number of students has
increased from 493 in 2008 to 621 in 2014. The cost of lunch is 8,000 Dong for a student below two
years of age, and 10,000 Dong for a student between the ages of three and five. Annual government
budget is 120 million Dong, which is used for management costs and for purchasing books etc.

Photo13: Wood processing industry

Photo 14: A newly built hospital(2) Benefits system (Benefits from the state, mutual benefits from the community)
・Examples of public unions under the People’s Committee include the Women’s Union and the Farmers’
Union.
・The commune has a system that offers poverty benefits to poor households. The amount of poverty
allowance is 180,000 Dong per month, and livelihood allowance is 30,000 Dong per month, making a－ 48 －

total of 210,000 Dong per month11. 2.8% of the population of the HV Commune was classified as “poor”
in 2014.
・All farmers are members of the Farmers’ Union, which was established in 1956 in the HV Commune.
The Farmers’ Union was transformed in 1997 from an organization of the Communist Party, to anindependent organization that provides services for its members, but it is still under the supervision of
the Ministry of Agriculture.
・The Farmers’ Union has 1,800 members, about 40% of whom are women. The role of the Farmers’
Union is to assist in agricultural production (purchase of fertilizers, technical assistance and seminars,etc.), collection of water usage fees (24,000 Dong per square meter every half year [one season]), sale ofagricultural machines (30% cheaper than market prices), and provide other forms of support. A new law
was enacted in 2012, which allowed the Union to provide micro financing services.
・The leaders of the Farmers’ Union are not public servants but representatives of farmers. The Farmers’
Union is a non-profit organization that has become increasingly similar to a private company in recent
years, and now undertakes activities such as the sale of vegetables to private companies, and thepurchase of vehicles for collecting and selling produce. The Farmers’ Union is also eligible to receive
low interest rate loans from the Social Policy Bank.
・The Women’s Union has been putting efforts into reducing the poverty of women. Once recommended
as a “poor household”, the women in the household will be eligible to receive poverty benefits of up to 1
million Dong per month. The number of members (all women) of the Union is 2,108, and 96.9% of them
are farmers. In other words, most farmers are women.
・The Women’s Union launched its micro financing project in 2008 in collaboration with a Belgian
University which offers 100 million Dong as its fund. The fund had increased to 110 million Dong in
2014. The micro financing scheme lends women classified as “poor” 2 million Dong per year (0.5%interest rate per half year), and 49 women have taken loans under the scheme. The money borrowed isused for the purchase of livestock such as chickens, pigs, and running small businesses. A management

Photo 15: Poor household in HV commune
11

Photo 16: The house of a leader
in the People’s Committee

1 thousand Dong is about 5.4 Japanese Yen in 2014.

－ 49 －

committee has been established, and the head of commune is the supervisor of the Union. Three to four
experts provide support for their activities, audit the results, and report the situation to the Union once ayear.
(3) Support from (state-owned) banks
・The Social Policy Bank had originally been a part of the Agro Bank, but became an independent bankin 2003 to raise its poverty reduction programs to the international level.

Its activities include: (1)Provision of low interest rate loan to improve the living conditions of poor households (30-50 million
Dong for three years, 0.6% interest rate), (2) Loan for education to households with children and/or
university students (11 million Dong per year), and (3) Loan to improve sanitary conditions such as
toilets.
・The number of users of the Social Policy Bank was 303 households (including 67 “poor” and 15 “nearpoor” households, 102 households with university students, and 104 borrowers for improving sanitaryconditions). The Bank began to provide loans to poor households in 2003, and began to provide loans tohouseholds with university students in 2006. It is increasing its loans for improving sanitary conditions.
The percentage of poor households has decreased from 6.9% in 2003 to 2.9% in 2014, marking a drop of
about 4 %.
・The Social Policy Bank is managed by the district authority. The Farmers’ Union collects informationon the properties (houses, lands, etc.) of borrowers and reports them to the district authority. Land deeds
are necessary, but no collateral is required at the time of borrowing. A group lending scheme (1 million
Dong per person at 1% interest rate, with the amount of loan differing among groups) is also available,
and is popular in the northern area.
・Loans to support small businesses is offered by the Agro Bank (0.95% interest rate per year, 0.8%
special interest rate in the cases of improvement of sanitary conditions and construction of new houses).
293 households have taken out loans, mostly for running handicraft businesses. The maximum amountof a loan is 5 billion Dong, and borrowers are required to present certificates of capability for running abusiness. A typical example of the scheme is the loan to furniture factories.
B. TCN Commune(1) Socio-economic situation in the TCN Commune
・The TCN commune has about 5,000 households and population of about 20,000, many of whom own
middle-sized parcels of land for agriculture. There were three hamlets in the French colonial era, andtoday, there are seven hamlets in the TCN commune.
・A leader of the People’s Committee explained that the following major changes occurred in the last 10
years: (1) Economic growth and increase in income, (2) Improvements in infrastructure such as road,houses, and irrigation system, (3) Advancements in culture such as spread of TV and mobile phones,
travel, participation in festivals, sports, and shows, and on the other hand, (4) Increase in fights
especially among the younger generation.
・Average annual per capita income in the TCN commune has increased from 15.45 million Dong in－ 50 －

2010 to 25.45 million Dong in 2014. 4.5% of the population is classified as poor, which means that theirincome level is below 400,000 Dong per month.
・It normally takes three months to harvest rice and one month to harvest vegetables; therefore, vegetable
cultivation is more profitable. The rice, vegetables and coconuts that is harvested or produced are sold toprivate buyers who come to the farmers, and most of these buyers are from Ho Chi Minh City. The
selling price for these agricultural products depends on negotiations, and fluctuates every month. A new
breed of coconuts in the southern part of Vietnam is sold at a higher price (15,000 Dong each) thannormal Thai coconuts (6,000 - 7,000 Dong each), because the quality of the former is better than that of
the latter.
・A new industrial zone was constructed in 2009, located about 4 km away from the TCN People’s
Committee. This has contributed to growth in employment to some extent (most workers come from Ho
Chi Minh City). The wage at the factories is about 4.5 million Dong per month.
・The revenue of TCN Commune has been increasing every year from 1.7 billion Dong in 2010 to 3
billion Dong in 2014. The revenue is transferred to the provincial government and distributed tocommunes based on its budget plans. For example, a primary school and kindergarten were constructed(total cost of 20 billion Dong), and 10 local roads were improved (total cost of 9 billion Dong) under theprovincial budget. The TCN commune paid 15% of the cost of improvement for roads between thehamlets. The irrigation system has been improved, especially after 2000.

Photo 17: Road connecting hamlets

Photo 18: TCN commune People’s Committee(2) Benefits system (Benefits from the state, mutual benefits from the community)
・Examples of public unions under the People’s Committee are the Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, andthe Youth Union.
・One of the activities undertaken by the Women’s Union is providing micro financing to members,
through a fund (Fund for Women) of 1.2 billion Dong with the support of the Norwegian Organization.
The fund is managed by the province, and each commune participates in the management committee. 12
communes selected out of 22 communes have been using this Fund.
・Poor households can borrow up to 5 million Dong per year. Once the borrower is able to repay the 5－ 51 －

million Dong, the household can borrow an additional 6 - 7 million Dong the next time. At the time ofinterview in 2014, 378 households had borrowed and used the money for the purchase of livestock,construction of fisheries, and other activities. Some staff from the Women Union check on progress
every few months, and the Union also conducts seminars three or four times per year.
・The classification of “poor households” is decided by members of each commune every year, based onstandards drawn up by the Ministry of Labor and Local Affairs. The chief of each hamlet draws up a listof candidates that qualify for the category of “poor households,” as well as an official list after voting byresidents at a hamlet meeting. The list is finalized after verification by the commune authority (People’s
Committee).
・Poor households can receive electricity benefits, poverty benefits from the commune, and benefits forhandicapped persons, in addition to the loan from the Social Policy Bank. There are food benefits in caseof illness (1,000 Dong per day) and death benefits for members of the Elderly Union. (Neighbors also
provide assistance during difficult times, on a personal basis.)
・The role of the Farmers’ Union includes: (1) Publicize the “New Community Plan”, (2) Promote
understanding of joint activities such as the provision of land for water usage, (3) Provide support for
agricultural production such as diversion to vegetable cultivation from rice production, and organic
cultivation, and (4) Conduct training seminars (a few times a year).
・At the time of the interview in 2014, 2,811 households were members of the Farmers’ Union, of whom
816 members were women. The Farmers’ Union has established its own fund for poor farmers bycollecting contributions from richer farmers. Farmers classified as “poor” and “nearly poor” can takeloans of 3 to 5 million Dong for three years from the Union (at 0.65% interest rate), and about 50
households are currently on this loan. Contributions to the fund are made by richer famers, who canreceive “excellent farmer” certificates by contributing 1 to 1.5 million Dong to the fund. Richer farmers
typically increase their income through vegetable cultivation, straw hat making, fish farming, chicken
farming, and other activities. Income in the agricultural sector in the TCN commune has been rising in
general, as a result of improvements in transportation infrastructure and better access to credit.

Photo 19: Poor household in TCN commune

Photo 20: Rich farm household－ 52 －

(3) Support from (state-owned) Banks
・The role of the Social Policy Bank include: (1) Provide support for improvement of livelihood of poor
households, (2) Bring about the realization of “Happy Families,” which means stable economy, genderequality, women’s participation in the Union, and improvements in education for children, and (3)Improve education. The Social Policy Bank provides loans not only to poor households, but also to 488
households of the Women’s Union.
・The Social Policy Bank provides loans to “poor” households (at 0.45% interest rate) and “nearly poor”
households (at 0.95% interest rate), and the number of borrowers is 313 in total. The Bank loans areused for the purchase of livestock, construction of houses, provision of assistance to persons looking forjobs (10 - 20 million Dong), provision of assistance to households with university students (10 - 11
million Dong per year), provision of assistance to nearly poor households (5 - 20 million Dong), andimprovement of sanitary conditions (toilets, water supply system, etc.)
・There are other state-owned banks such as the People’s Credit Bank and the Agro Bank. The People’s
Credit Bank offers credit at 11% interest rate without review of personal properties. The Agro Bank
offers credit at 10% interest rate with review of personal properties. The Agro Bank normally provides
loans of 700 - 800 million Dong, after checking the land owned by the applicants as collateral for loan.
The number of borrowers was about 400 households in 2014.
・The ADB (Asian Development Bank) has been offering technical assistance for organic cultivation tofarmers since 2013, in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Rural
Development. The total amount of assistance is 50 billion Dong, and 13 billion Dong is allocated to theChat Tran District where two communes are active; the TCN commune is one of the two active
communes. Two agro-processing centers were under construction as an ADB pilot project in 2014. This
project is expected to contribute to increasing farmers’ income and providing a stable supply ofenvironment-friendly foods in the future.
4. Conclusions
In the previous sections, the current situation of social safety net in Vietnam and the differences
between the north and the south were described. The summary is as follows.
(1) Although differences exist between the north and the south, the basic framework of the SSN system
is almost the same. The most significant common characteristic is that a socialist government-led system
of mutual benefits has been constructed in both communes. Unions under the supervision of People’s
Committee such as the Women’s Union and Farmers’ Union play key roles in providing support to poor
households. They provide benefits to poor households under the systems that are socialist, communitybased, and participatory, which are common features in both communes in the north and the south.
(2) Both communes in the north and the south have been developing, as the Vietnamese economy has
developed as a whole. In the HV commune in the north, the wood-processing and furniture industry
have developed, and the per capita income of residents and the revenue of the commune have also
－ 53 －

increased. In the TCN commune in the south, growth in vegetable cultivation and fruits production havecontributed to an increase in the income of farmers and the revenue of the commune, and the number ofrich farmers is on the rise. Improvements in infrastructure of roads and irrigation in the area is anotherfactor contributing to the development of the area that the TCN commune is located in.
(3) On the other hand, one of the major differences between the northern commune and the southern
commune is that a stronger wave of market economy can be observed in the south.

Agricultural

production and distribution system of rice, vegetables, coconuts, and other products take place in acapitalist manner based on a market economic system. The value chain of agricultural products, the pricedecision mechanism of the products, farmers’ preferences and incentives in the selection of products andfarming, are based on a free market system as well as the demand and supply mechanism. One of thefactors behind the characteristics of the TCN commune is the presence of Ho Chi Minh City as a hugemarket, but the previous experiences of the capitalist market economy is considered as another factor
contributing to the progress of the market economy in the south.
(4) In spite of the steady development of the regional economy, the growth in people’s income both in
the north and the south, and rapid progress of the market economy even in the agricultural sector in thesouth, the socialist social safety net system that prevails both in the north and the south are very similar.
The socialist mutual benefits system offered by communities seems to function even under conditions ofrapid economic development, especially as a social safety net for poor households and sociallyvulnerable persons. This should be highly evaluated as an effective mechanism so far.
On the other hand, there are almost no private systems that can supplement the public SSN system,
which has been observed in other advanced countries and some emerging economies. Direct assistanceto the poor and the vulnerable by foreign NGOs is still restricted by the government, except in the caseof collaboration with official governmental organizations such as the Women’s Union.
(5) We should monitor the progress of the SSN system in Vietnam and check if the official SSN system
continues to be effective in a changing society that is experiencing rapid economic development. We
have observed that emerging middle income citizens and/or rich households are beginning to look for
new or supplemental systems for their pension, health care, etc.12 It would be beneficial for researchersof Vietnam, Japan, and other countries to have the opportunity to exchange knowledge and experiencesof effective SSN systems in each country, and to come up with ideas for better SSN systems that aresuitable for Vietnam in the future.

12

As an example, Daiich Seimei (Japan) has launched the sale of a new health care insurance in Vietnam.

－ 54 －

研 究 会・シンポジウム報告2015 年 6 月 20 日（土）テーマ：

定例研究会報告

現代制度経済学の射程

報告 1：コンヴァンシオナリスト・アプローチ ―新しいフランス官僚経済学の誕生―
報告者：

黒澤悠(大阪市立大学都市研究プラザ特別研究員：同大学院博士課程)

報告 2：J.R.コモンズ『制度経済学』における適正価値論とは報告者：

北川亘太(京都大学学際融合教育研究推進センター研究員）※本報告は同センター井澤龍研究員との共同研究時

間：

13 時 30 分～17 時 30 分

場

所：

専修大学神田校舎 1 号館ゼミ 45 教室

参加者数：10 名
報告内容概略：
黒澤報告は、1980 年代に登場したフランスの新しい社会科学理論である「コンヴァンシ
オン理論」について、これまで日本では十分に理解されてこなかったその理論体系と意義を明らかにすることを試みたものである。
コンヴァンシオン理論は、社会科学理論であると同時に、官僚研究者達の政策上の課題として練り上げられてきた理論であることを特徴としているが、黒澤氏は、この理論が、80 年代以降の社会経済システムについてフォーディズム期と大きく異なった新しい資本主義システムであることを論証し、新自由主義の基層を明らかにしたけでなく、労働組合の再組織戦略のテキストとして用いられるなど、実践的にも大きな有用性をもっていることを明らかにした。
北川報告は、アメリカ制度学派の創始者ジョン・ロジャーズ・コモンズの経済理論についての研究報告である。コモンズは、主著『制度経済学』において，古典派経済学 や限界学派の批判的検討をふまえて、「適正な価値」（reasonable value）の理論を提唱した。適正価値論とは、賃金、サービスの料金、商品価格といった価値の決定に関与している要素
として制度に焦点を当て、その生成・変化に注目する理論である。同報告では、これまでの研究においては「制度経済学」の核心というべきこの適正価値論が正面から検討されてこなかったという先行研究批判に立ちつつ、アメリカ社会の動態という史的コンテクストのなかにコモンズの思想形成過程を位置づけてその経済理論を読み解くことが試みられた。
その結果、コモンズの経済理論におけるアメリカ革新主義の影響が明らかになるとともに、経済的な意思決定における「条理の原則」や、経済紛争解決過程における「機会」の重要性を不平等を捉えることができ，かつ，それを是正する主権による規制を組み入れることができる分析単位＝取引を構築したことの意義が明らかにされた。
記：専修大学経済学部・兵頭淳史－ 55 －

執筆者紹介
や ぶき

すすむ

いいぬま

たけ こ

いな だ

じゅういち

矢吹
飯沼
稲田

晋
健子
十一

横浜市立大学名誉教授
本学経済学部教授
本学経済学部教授〈編集後記〉『専修大学社会科学研究所月報』No. 624 は諸般の事情によりなかなかの難産となったが、ここにようやく刊行の運びとなった。矢吹晋先生の「習近平と文化大革命――現代に落とす文
革の影」、飯沼健子所員（Takeko Iinuma）“Civicness in Question: The Case of Women’s
Activities in Rural Vietnam”、稲田十一所員（Juichi INADA）“Social Safety Net (SSN) in
Vietnam: Comparative analysis of two villages in the north and south in terms ofcommunity-based SSN and the market economy wave” が今号の掲載論文である。矢吹先生には早々に原稿をいただきながら大変ご迷惑をお掛けする結果となってしまい、誠に申し訳ない次第である。様々な意味で台風の目となって注目度を高めている中国、習近平体制に文革はどのような影を落としているのかという誠に時宜を得た興味深い論稿である。飯沼所員と稲田
所員の英語論文は、歴史的に中国とは独特の緊張感にあるベトナムとの研究交流に基づくもの
である（直接に中越関係が扱われているわけではないが）。なお、これを機に、飯沼所員の提案により当月報にも国際発信に向けて英文タイトルを付することとなったことを報告しておく。
（n/s）

2015 年 6 月 20 日発行
神奈川県川崎市多摩区東三田２丁目１番１号

電話(044)911-1089

専 修 大 学 社 会 科 学 研 究 所
The Institute for Social Science, Senshu University, Tokyo/Kawasaki, Japan
（発行者）
製

作

村 上 俊 介佐藤印刷株式会社

東京都渋谷区神宮前 2-10-2 電話－ 56 －(03)3404-2561