IJERD – International Journal of Environmental and Rural Development (2011) 2–1

Research article
erd

Local Good Governance of Rural Infrastructure
Development Planning: Case Studies of Commune Councils
in Cambodia
YOUNG SOKPHEA
Regional and Rural Development Planning, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand
Email: sophiabelieve@gmail.com

SOPARTH PONGQUAN
Regional and Rural Development Planning, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand

SOPHAL EAR
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, United States of America
Received 10 December 2010

Accepted 30 January 2011

Abstract The research examines the application of local good governance (LGG) in theimplementation of rural infrastructure development planning (RIDP) and analyzes its
strengths and limitations. Two communes with longer and shorter working experience inthe application of LGG in RIDP, viz. Khnach Romeas (KR) and Prey Khpos (PK) in
Battambang province were selected. The study covered six elements of LGG: rule of law,participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and effectiveness andefficiency. The research revealed that the commune with relatively longer working
experience (KR) had achieved better performance on several key elements of LGG thanthe one with shorter working experience (PK). Better performance in LGG by KR than PK
commune was due to several factors, including better understanding and application of
LGG in RIDP, wider learning by doing in RIDP, more effective fundraising for project
implementation, stronger commitment among commune councils (CCs), better coaching
and mentoring support from district planning facilitators and authorities and more active
local participation. CCs and sampled households expressed relatively higher satisfactionlevels on rural infrastructure projects as a result of the use of LGG. Therefore, the LGG
performance in applying RIDP of the two study communes was significantly determinedby several institutional, economic, and social factors.
Keywords decentralization, rural infrastructure, rural development planning process,local good governance, commune councils

INTRODUCTION
The   Royal   Government   of   Cambodia’s   strategic   policy   framework, outlined in the Rectangular
Strategy Phase II, puts deconcentration and decentralization (D&D) policy to achieve good
governance (RGC, 2008). D&D policy was formally put into action in February 2002 (Romeo andSpyckerelle, 2003), when commune elections were held, following extensive piloting since 1996
by the donor-funded Seila Program of the Royal Government of Cambodia which aimed tomobilize aid and coordinate D&D reforms and to alleviate poverty in selected northeastern
provinces of Cambodia (RGC, 2000) through local governance reform and participatory planning.
Five years of Commune Development Planning (CDP) and annual Commune Investment Plan
(CIP) manuals were developed and endorsed for CCs in 2001, then revised in 2007 to improve theplanning process (MoI and MoP, 2007). The investment grant through a fiscal transfer from thenational budget to CCs for CDP implementation gives priority to rural infrastructure. The
arguments for this are that rural infrastructure creates favorable opportunities for production,
movement of goods, and market access and contributes to poverty reduction (NCSC, 2005).
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The enabling environment for local good governance is still weak. An unclear legal frameworkand fragmented application of local governance contributed to a lack of decision-making at local
levels; top officials have tended to exercise their power and control in local planning (ADB, 2000).
There is limited participatory local governance, as democratic decision-making is poorly
understood and internalized among the various committees of CCs (NCSC, 2005; Pellini and Ayres,2007). To some extent, CCs still have limited capacity in the application of LGG through existing
traditional and hierarchical decision-making structures (NCSC, 2005) that continue to affect the
emergence of an effective local development process in developing countries (Hop, 2009).
Specifically, there is poor participation in CDP and CIP, and limited engagement with the demandsof local people (Vuthyand Craig, 2008). Moreover, local officials who facilitate planning processes
lack experience in encouraging local participation in both planning and implementation (Charny,1999). Accountability of CCs to local people through CDP is still weak and difficult to establish(Rohdewohld and Porter, 2006). The ongoing public administrative reform has not yet built
effective systems for transparency and accountability (Sokha, 2005). Therefore, many aspects of
LGG are weakly developed or nonexistent: there is low participation, lack of transparency, weakaccountability, and low inclusiveness.
The research examines the application of local good governance (LGG) in the local planningand implementation process of rural infrastructure development planning (RIDP), and analyzes its
strengths and limitations in order to identify the challenges and prospects for further strengthening
LGG of RIDP.
METHODOLOGY
Rural Infrastructure Development Planning (RIDP), which is planned and implemented under the
CDP and CIP, was conceptualized in seven key stages: 1) plan formulation; 2) identification/reviewof needs and problems; 3) selection of the priority project; 4) district integration workshop; 5)
approval of the development plan; 6) project implementation; and 7) project monitoring andevaluation. Rural infrastructure projects studied in this research include rural laterite roads, box
culverts, and earth roads. Six key elements of LGG assessed in this study are rule of law,participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and effectiveness and efficiency.
The study was based in two purposely selected communes with relatively different working
experience in RIDP, located in Battambang province. Khnach Romeas (KR) had longer experiencein decentralization, since 1996, and Prey Khpos (KP) became involved in 2002. Primary data werecollected by using two sets of standardized questionnaires designed for 60 CCs and committees,
and 110 sampled households. Checklists were used for focus group discussion, key informant
interviews, observation, and case studies on RIDP commune projects. Secondary data wasscrutinized from literature, related laws, policies and development plans, sub-decrees, declarations,manuals, books, journal articles, and papers. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques wereapplied. A weight  average  index  (WAI)  based  on  Likert’s  five  social-scale interval was applied toassess local perception of achievement and satisfaction of LGG applied in RIDP from CCs andcommittees, and sampled households.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis of application of LGG in RIDPThe application of LGG in RIDP was synthesized in both study communes and a comparison madeagainst each element of LGG (Table 1).

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Table 1 Synthesis of LGG applied in RIDP of KR and PK communes
Khnach Romeas (KR)Prey Khpos (PK)
Rule of Law
 Rule of law in terms of guidelines and manual on RIDP and project implementation was well applied by bothcommunes.
Participation
 Planning and Budgeting Committees (PBCs) participatedin preparing budget and development framework during
the initial stage of RIDP and reviewed local problems andneeds.
 Villagers, including women and vulnerable groups,
actively participated in meetings to identify and prioritize
their needs and identify locations for the project site.
 NGOs and line departments participated in technical andfinancial support of proposed projects presented by PBCs,
who were also active in exchanging ideas and explaining
RIDP to supporters.
 PBCs and CCs participated in decision-making to approve
RIDP.
 Local villagers were involved in the feasibility study. This
led to harmonious solutions on the land contribution andimpact assessment. Villagers were also involved in project
implementation, in site clearance for the convenience ofcontractors and labor contribution, in addition to their cash
contribution (10 percent of the project cost).
 Villagers participated in project M&E as well as
maintenance and gave comments on projects that were
well received by village headmen and on which actions
were taken.

 PBC members reviewed and prioritized problems andneeds.
 Villagers, including women and vulnerable groups,

participated in meetings to identify and prioritize local
problems, needs, and project sites. PBCs were unable tomobilize many of them to join in the activity. People did
not speak out and mostly listened to PBCs, who led thedecision-making.
 NGOs and line departments provided technical andfinancial support to proposed projects by PBCs, but the
PBCs were not so active in exchanging ideas andexplaining RIDP to potential supporters.
 PBCs and CCs participated in RIDP approval, but not all
were present.
 Villagers were involved in the feasibility study, yetproper action was not undertaken by CCs in order tosolve key issues such as land acquisition for the
infrastructure. Limited numbers of villagers participatedin site clearance for project implementation, but villagers
contributed cash (10 percent of project cost) for project
implementation.
 Villagers’   participation   in   project   M&E   was   weak,   and  comments from villagers were not acted upon by CCs
and M&E committees. Local participation in project
maintenance was not adequate.

Accountability
 PBCs were involved in annual District Integration  PBCs were involved in the DIW to finalize projects andWorkshop (DIW) to select infrastructure projects to be get endorsement from CCs, but persons to be in charge of
implemented, and to be endorsed by CCs.
this activity were not designated clearly.
 The procurement committee took responsibility for  The procurement committee did not prepare and handle
preparing bidding documents and handled bidding the bidding well, due to a lack of clarity andproperly.
understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
 The M&E committee mobilized public participation in  The M&E committee did not adequately mobilize people
project monitoring and evaluation, and reported on project to participate in project monitoring and evaluation, andprogress to all participants at the monthly meetings.
did not make proper reports about project progress to the Operation and maintenance groups functioned well.
monthly meetings.
 Operation and maintenance groups were not wellestablished and lacked clear responsibility.
Transparency
 Information on the RIDP was disseminated to local people,  Information on the RIDP was disseminated to local
line agencies, and NGOs.
people, line agencies, and NGOs.
 Bidding was conducted in a public place with participation  Bidding was conducted in a public place and withfrom all interested stakeholders. The bidding documents participation from all interested stakeholders. The
were accessible and the contract was awarded based on the bidding documents were accessible and the contract wasgiven criteria. Villagers were satisfied with the outcome. awarded based on the given criteria. Villagers were not
The result of bidding was announced publicly, and the satisfied with the contractors due to their unfavorable
contract was signed using a standard format.
reputation in the commune. The result of bidding was Reports on RIDP implementation and finances were announced publicly, and the contract was signed using a
posted on public information boards. Project information standard format.
was reported to the monthly meetings. Payment to  Reports on RIDP implementation and finances were notcontractors was based on consensus decision among CCs posted on the public information board. Project
and the M&E committee. RIDP evaluation was conducted information was not disseminated properly at the monthly
in a timely fashion. Financial auditing was conducted both meetings. Payment to contractors was not based oninternally and externally. Project signboards were not consensus decision-making among CCs and the M&E
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Khnach Romeas (KR)credit by claiming that they had provided project support.
 Allocation of the commune fund to each village wastransparent, as it was given to prioritized projects in poor
villages.

Prey Khpos (PK)conducted on time and neither was the financial auditing.
Project signboards were not erected at the project site,
and thus political parties gained credit by claiming thatthey had provided project support.
 Allocation of the commune fund was not transparent, as
it was not given to prioritized projects in poor villages.

Responsiveness Villagers were satisfied with the project outputs, and CCs  Villagers were not satisfied with the project outputs, andwere accountable through the establishment of a CCs were considered to be weakly accountable, as no
maintenance committee that ensures the long-term use of maintenance committee had been established. The
project outputs. The identified infrastructure projects identified infrastructure needs were not met and the needs
solved the problems and needs of all groups of people in of all groups of people were not addressed.
the commune.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
 The project was implemented and finished per the given  Project implementation was delayed and therefore thetime line, and the objectives of RIDP have been achieved objectives of RIDP were not achieved.
in general.

Perception and satisfaction with LGG achievement in RIDP of communes
Based  on  the  WAI  values  shown  in  Fig.  1,  the  perception  of  CCs’  achievement  in  applying  LGG  in  RIDP in each commune was quite different. Overall, CCs in KR perceived a high level of
performance in all six LGG elements: rule of law (0.80), participation (0.79), accountability (0.84),
transparency (0.82), effectiveness and efficiency (0.90), and responsiveness (0.80). CCs from PK
commune perceived varying degrees of LGG achievement: high levels of effectiveness andefficiency (0.88), participation (0.66), accountability (0.72), and transparency (0.71), and moderatelevels of rule of law (0.60) and responsiveness (0.60).

Note: 0.00-0.20: Lowest, 0.21-0.40: Low, 0.41-0.60: Moderate, 0.61-0.80: High, 0.81-1.00: Very High

Fig. 1 Achievement of LGG in RIDP
Figs. 2 and 3 show the different degrees of satisfaction between the CCs and committees andsampled households in both communes. The CCs and committees and sampled households in KR
commune are mostly strongly satisfied with the levels of participation, accountability andtransparency; they also expressed satisfaction with the rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency, andresponsiveness of RIDP implementation. In PK commune, however, CCs and committees arestrongly satisfied with only two of the key elements of LGG, participation and accountability,
while for the remaining elements they are only satisfied. Interestingly, the sampled households inboth communes indicate they are satisfied with all LGG components.

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Strengths and limitations of the application of LGG in RIDP
Several key institutional, economic, and social factors contributed to the different perceptions ofsatisfaction with the implementation of RIDP. The key factors found in this study are contemplated
as strengths and limitations in both study communes and can be categorized into institutional,
economic, and social dimensions.

Note: -2: Strongly Dissatisfied, -1: Dissatisfied,
0: Neutral, 1: Satisfied, 2: Strongly Satisfied

Note: -2: Strongly Dissatisfied, -1: Dissatisfied,
0: Neutral, 1: Satisfied, 2: Strongly Satisfied

Fig. 2 Satisfaction of CCs and committees

Fig. 3 Satisfaction of sampled households

Some of the important institutional factors that contributed to LGG include the development ofrules and regulations, active participation by local people, coaching, mentoring and on-the-jobtraining, local/international NGO funding support, training in LGG, and exchanging and sharing
experience in LGG through exposure visits. Although these factors had a significant influence on
both study communes, in KR commune they were more significant. This led to higher levels ofachievement of the key elements of LGG in KR commune and they were perceived higher
satisfaction from CCs and committees. Economic factors also played an important role in theperceptions of LGG of RIDP. These included clear rules and fair commune fund allocation criteria(allocated funds to all villages and prioritized needs of local people); financial auditing and RIDP
evaluation, including but not limited to regular financial auditing from financial officers andexternal auditors, and evaluators; and ability to raise funds for additional infrastructure project
implementation. These factors were better developed in KR than in PK commune. Social factors
also affected the results in the two communes and include the degree of public awareness and its
spread, particularly among poor and more vulnerable groups; the presence of local leadership able
to generate and mobilize funds for RIDP implementation; and the regular monthly meeting of CCs
where interested people were invited to participate actively.
Lower levels of achievement in the application of LGG in RIDP were the result of several
institutional factors: the low levels of education, multiple responsibilities as a result of lack ofhuman resources, lack of small-scale infrastructure technical knowledge, and incompatibility ofroles and responsibilities among CCs who came from different political parties and had weak
deliberative processes to enable good decision-making. Moreover, these economic factors in bothcommunes were made worse by postponement of project implementation, inadequate amounts ofcommune funding, infrequent evaluation of RIDP and financial auditing, and low incentives andmotivation to perform the assigned tasks. In addition, a range of other social factors led to lowlevels of LGG implementation, including dissatisfaction with land compensation, reluctance of
local people to participate in planning processes, replacement of PBCs, inadequate levels ofparticipatory decision-making, lack of public information disclosure, and limited participation in
bidding processes of CCs. These factors had a significant influence on PK than KR commune.
These factors contributed to the different levels of performance in the application of LGG in
RIDP of both study communes.

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CONCLUSIONSKR commune had higher achievement in six major elements of LGG of RIDP than PK commune.
It appears that one of the main reasons for this is the longer time and higher levels of support thiscommune has had for decentralized planning.
The main areas of difference between the two communes are transparency (finance,
information dissemination, reporting), accountability (committees in charge of various project
activities), and effectiveness and efficiency (delivery of infrastructure projects), which need to be
improved by PK commune. KR commune demonstrated a greater understanding of the principles
and practice of LGG of RIDP. Its strength of LGG in RIDP came from higher levels of education
as well as longer practical experience implementing RIDP and learning by doing, strong
commitment of CCs and committees, more capable CCs that performed well in fundraising for
project implementation, significantly higher levels of coaching and mentoring from district
planning facilitators and authority, and higher levels of local participation. Despite theseachievements, both communes face key policy challenges. These include weak incentives toactively encourage local participation and develop good deliberative processes. There is limited
enforcement of proper compensation processes in land acquisition for infrastructure, and low
continued support for capacity building of the key local government-citizen interface, the CCs.
These factors all need to be addressed to help secure future progress of decentralization and local
governance in Cambodia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND DISCLAIMER
The authors would like to extend their deepest gratitude to the CCs and villagers in the two study
communes, who gave their warmest welcome and provided valuable information. We also appreciate
the cooperation from the NCDD in Battambang province. Special gratitude is given to Mr. Young
Pheak for his kind assistance in data collection and facilitating local communications and contacts
during the field work for this research. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views of sponsoring agencies, funders, or the authors' institutions of employment.

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