The Nexus between Transnational
Organized Crime and Terrorism
in Latin America

The Nexus between Transnational
Organized Crime and Terrorism
in Latin America

We extend our sincere gratitude to the dedicated professionals in their different capacities andcontributors to this report. Their commitment to advancing knowledge and promoting security in theregion is commendable.
This report seeks to foster dialogue, cooperation, and evidence-based decision-making. With the hopethat it will contribute to our shared goal of building a safer and more secure future for the people of theregion, and serve as a vital resource for policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the international
community in addressing the multifaceted challenges posed by the crime-terrorism nexus in Latin America
and beyond.

© UNICRI June 2024

About UNICRIThe United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) wasestablished in 1968 pursuant to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1086 B (XXXIX)
of 1965, which urged an expansion of the United Nations’ activities in crime prevention
and criminal justice.
Working within the broad scope of its mandate to design and implement improved
policies and actions in the field of crime prevention and control, the mission of UNICRI
is to advance justice, crime prevention, security and the rule of law in support of peace,
human rights and sustainable development.
UNICRI’s work focuses on Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
which is centred on promoting peaceful, just and inclusive societies, free from crime andviolence. Justice, crime prevention and the rule of law are the basis for fighting poverty
and reducing inequalities while enhancing economic growth and stability and protecting
the environment. UNICRI supports governments and the international community atlarge in tackling criminal threats to social peace, development and political stability.
UNICRI’s programmes aim to promote national self-reliance and the development ofinstitutional capabilities. To this end, UNICRI provides a one-stop facility offering highlevel expertise in crime prevention and criminal justice problems. Technical cooperationis enhanced by the use of action-oriented research to assist in the formulation of
improved policies and concrete intervention programmes. Institutional and on-the-job
training of specialized personnel forms an integral part of UNICRI activities.
UNICRI was among the first United Nations (UN) entities to work on the nexus between
transnational organized crime and terrorism, starting its work in 2015, following the first
UN Security Council resolution on this topic, 2195 (2014). In 2018, UNICRI, under theaegis of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), developed the GCTF The Hague
Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, a
non-binding list of 25 recommendations in the categories of local engagement, researchand information sharing, local engagement, and capacity-building and law enforcement,following regional meetings covering the Sahel and West Africa, the Balkans, South andSoutheast Asia, and East Africa and the Horn of Africa regions, respectively.
In 2019, UNICRI published the Policy Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices on the Nexus
Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism which has been translated into
Albanian, Arabic, French, Portuguese and Spanish, and has been used for capacitybuilding of policy-makers and practitioners in the Balkans, East Africa, West Africa, theSahel region and more recently in Latin America.

Acknowledgments
This report by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute(UNICRI), was written by Christian Vianna de Azevedo, UNICRI Senior Fellow, andSupervisory Special Agent with the Brazilian Federal Police, currently serving as theUndersecretary of Justice and Public Security at Minas Gerais, Brazil, under the overall
guidance and editing of Chiara Bologna, UNICRI.
Special appreciation goes to Armando Antão Cortez and Juan Manuel Olima Espel fromthe Secretaría de Análisis Integral del Terrorismo Internacional (SAIT) of the Ministerio
Público Fiscal of Argentina, as well as the Americas, Asia Pacific Section, of the United
Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED),
and the Communication Office of UNICRI for the graphic design.
UNICRI expresses its gratitude to all the experts from national authorities and internationalorganizations that provided their insights in the data collection phase, especially throughinterviews, and their feedback during the review phase.

Disclaimer
The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do notnecessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute (UNICRI) or any other national, regional or international entity involved
or mentioned. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, websites,
studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and publication does notconstitute an endorsement by UNICRI of the opinions expressed in them. The designation
employed and presentation of the material in this publication does not imply the expressionof any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning thedelimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Contents of this publication may be quoted or
reproduced, provided that the source of information is acknowledged. UNICRI would liketo receive a copy of the document in which this publication is used or quoted.

List of Acronyms* AMIA - Asociación Mutual* ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and* AQIM - Al-Qaeda in Islamic* ISWAP - Islamic State West

* CBP - US Customs and Border* KST - Known or Suspected* CJNG - Cartel Jalisco Nueva* LCB - Lebanese Canadian Bank

Israelita Argentina
Maghreb

Protection

Generacion/ Jalisco New
Generation Cartel* CTED - Counter-Terrorism

Committee Executive Directorate

the Levant

African Province
Terrorist* MANPADS - Man-Portable
Air-Defence Systems* OFAC - U.S. Department of the* CV - Comando Vermelho

Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control* DEA - Drug Enforcement* PCC - Primeiro Comando da* FIU - Financial Intelligence Unit

* REPET - Public Registry ofAdministration* FARC - Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia* FPMR - Frente Patriotico ManuelRodriguez

CapitalPersons and Entities Tied to
Terrorism Acts or its Financing* TBA - Tri-Border Area (in thisreport it refers to the Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay border)* GCTF - Global Counterterrorism* TSDS - Terrorist Screening* ICE - Immigration and Customs* UNICRI - United Nations* IED - Improvised Explosive* UNODC - United Nations Office

Forum

Enforcement of the UnitedStatesDevices* INTERPOL - International

Criminal Police Organization

DatasetInterregional Crime and Justice
Research Instituteon Drugs and Crime

Contents
1. Introduction

7

1.1 Definitions

8

1.2 Executive Summary

10

1.3 Scope of the Report

12

1.4 Note on the Methodology

13

1.5 Background on the Nexus

14

1.6 Core Concepts

17

2. Context of the Nexus in Latin America

22

2.1 A Brief History of the Nexus in Latin America 

23

2.2 Current Nexus Status Throughout Latin America 

25

3. Cases Explained

27

3.1 Terrorist Organizations and the Nexus 

28

3.1.1 Drug Trafficking and the Nexus

28

3.1.2 Money Laundering and the Nexus

37

3.1.3 Migrant Smuggling and the Nexus

45

3.2 Criminal Organizations and the Nexus 

50

3.2.1 Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)

50

3.2.2 Comando Vermelho (CV)

54

3.2.3 Sinaloa Cartel

56

3.2.4 Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)

60

4. Conclusions & Recommendations62

4.1 Conclusions

63

4.2 Recommendations

65

Introduction

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

1.1 Definitions
Definitions used in this report will be aligned with the language of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions, particularly those relevant to the topic of the links between
transnational organized crime and terrorism.

Transnational organized crime:
The definition of organized crime used in this report is taken from the United Nations
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) of 2000, andadopted in the same year by the General Assembly (resolution 55/25): a group of threeor more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting inconcert with the aim of committing at least one serious crime or offence established inaccordance to the convention (55/25); in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial
or other material benefit.

Terrorism/terrorist/terror:
The terminology for these within the report are in line with the broad UN definitions
within resolutions. Taken as an example from a section of resolution 1566 (2004), which
aimed to assist States in meeting their obligations under Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001) to take domestic legislative action. It refers to “terrorism” as:“... criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to cause death orserious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a populationor compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiableby considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or othersimilar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, toensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature (Para. 3)".

10

INTRODUCTION

In some jurisdictions different groups
are designated as terrorist, whilst
in others, the same groups are notconsidered as such. To ensure that thisis taken into account, this report does
not seek to enter the debate of whichorganizations are listed as terrorist
or not internationally. The scope is tobring to the forefront where terror andterrorist-like tactics, modus operandi
and other means are used. This will beshown as an example of terror/terrorist
for the scope of this report. Taking
into account the different terrorism
designations of the Member States
relevant for this report.

Certain groups mentioned within thisreport are not listed by the United
Nations as terrorist organizations,however, their use of terrorist tactics
and their designation by some Member
States warrants mention in thisreport. Several states throughout theworld have designated Hezbollah as aterrorist organization. In the Americas,
as of the date of publication, thefollowing countries have designatedHezbollah as a terrorist organization:Argentina,
Canada,Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay andthe United States of America. The
S/2021/972, UN Global Survey of theimplementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1373/2001, mentions themore recent designations adopted in
Latin America by Argentina, Colombia,
Honduras, and Paraguay, which involve
Hezbollah. As for the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
the group was delisted in Colombia in
2020 and in the USA in 2021; however,the USA has designated as terrorists
some FARC dissident organizations
and individuals, such as FARC - EP
(Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia - People’s Army) and Segunda
Marquetalia and the respective
leaders of these organizations.

11

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

1.2 Executive Summary
The nexus that can exist between transnational organized crime and terrorism is anaccepted phenomenon impacting different global regions. At the international level,
this has been highlighted in several Security Council resolutions, including 1373 (2001),
2915 (2014), and, more recently, in resolution 2482 (2019), in which Member States
expressed concern that terrorists could benefit from organized crime – including
through the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, artefacts and cultural property – tofinance their activities. These resolutions called on states to consider establishinglaws and mechanisms, as appropriate, to allow for the broadest possible international
cooperation. Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, operative
Paragraph 4 “notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism andtransnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, andillegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials,
and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national,
subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response tothis serious challenge and threat to international security.” Although global advances havebeen made since 2014 in this regard, there has been limited focus on Latin America. It
is timely, then, that this report examines the evolving interactions between crime andterrorism in Latin America, particularly over the past three decades.
The report highlights the growing proficiency of both terrorist and criminal organizations
to develop in-house capabilities and forge alliances to advance their goals. Criminalorganizations increasingly adopt terrorist tactics to pursue their economic objectives.
At the same time, terrorist organizations in Latin America have transformed into
hybrid entities driven by both ideological beliefs and economic gains. Similarly, thetheoretical and analytical discussion surrounding the nexus between organized crime
and terrorism has evolved. It has transitioned from the approaches developed at the turnof the 21st century to the new and revisited concepts that emerged in 2019 as part of
the UNICRI/GCTF partnership known as the Nexus Initiative.1 This initiative supported
the international community in addressing the growing concern of UN Member States
regarding the nexus between organized crime and terrorism through the developmentof related policies and subsequent capacity-building tailored to specific national andregional contexts.

12

INTRODUCTION

The theoretical and analytical discussions surrounding the crime-terror nexus have
evolved since the 1990s, shifting from examining criminal funding by terrorists to
exploring the broader interplay between crime and terrorism. This report delves into
the changing motivations of terrorists engaged in lucrative criminal enterprises, as
globalization and the intertwining of terror and criminal networks blur the lines between
the two.
This report also addresses how the lure of financial gain from criminal activities can shift
the motivations of the terrorists involved in profit-making criminal activities. As terrorist
networks become increasingly globalized and interconnected with criminal networks,
the motivations of terrorists might change (from ideology to pursuing financial interests)
depending on the tasks they are entrusted to perform, the operating environment andlocal socio-economic factors. There are numerous cases in Latin America where
terrorists, driven by criminal motives to maximise their profits and power, hide behindthe façade of ideology to justify their activities. As a result, government agencies with amandate to combat crime and/or terrorism are often puzzled by these ‘grey zones’ andface challenges in finding appropriate responses to this phenomenon.
Understanding the concept of the “terrorist activity cycle” is crucial for addressing
the crime-terror nexus strategically. The cycle, which encompasses recruitment,
radicalization, training, funding, logistics, attack, evasion, and media exploitation, among
other core steps, offers multiple instances where crime and terrorism can intersect.
The report demonstrates that terrorist organizations operating in Latin America
have enhanced their capabilities in the criminal world, innovating at each step of theterrorist activity cycle. Similarly, criminal organizations that adopt terrorist tactics haveincreased their capacity to instil fear and terror, thereby weakening states and driving offcompetitors.
As terrorist groups globalize and become more adept at each step of the terrorist activity
cycle, they broaden relations with a vast network of transnational criminal organizations
that are constantly improving, thereby maximising their criminal enterprises andpotential terrorist reach. Similarly, criminal organizations that turned to terrorist tactics
to maximise their profits have also increased their capabilities as their illicit markets
expand to other regions globally. The exposure to different cultures and criminal settings
improves the organizations’ capability to operate in diverse regions and the global arena.

13

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

A globalized world has revealed that as the crime-terrorism nexus transcends physicalbarriers and extends to cyberspace, crime and terror have become more intimately
related, proficient and widespread. The constant evolution of society and technology
enables new forms of business opportunities and novel and creative forms of crime andterror interactions. On the other hand, if government agencies and states do not develop
better mechanisms for effective collaboration, these terrorist and criminal organizations
will continue to surpass the capabilities of states to provide a unified response.
The new categorizations of the theoretical concepts related to the crime-terror nexus,
as presented in the “Policy Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices on the Nexus Between
Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism” devised by UNICRI and GCTF, have beenrefined to align with the latest developments in the field. They consider that since theattacks of 9/11, both terror and criminal organizations have demonstrated their ability
to adapt to the constantly evolving global environment, particularly in response to thechanging strategies and tactics employed by counter-terrorism and law enforcement
agencies worldwide. Notwithstanding, national and regional characteristics still playa decisive role in understanding the expansion of the nexus in a given geographical andsociopolitical area. Therefore, it is essential to acknowledge how the nexus impacts an area,
region or country, by examining its influence at each step of the terrorist activity cycle.

1.3 Scope of the Report
The objective of this report is to explore and explain the various connections between
organized crime and terrorism in Latin America, recognizing the multifaceted natureof these relationships. This study presents case examples that illustrate the diverse
manifestations of the nexus involving different terror and criminal organizations acrossthe continent. Ongoing studies and assessments conducted by UNICRI on the nexus,
on organized crime and terrorism, have identified critical issues and links to the otherregions UNICRI has worked in, such as Africa, the Middle East, and Europe that require
further in-depth analysis.
The report examines two main categories: terrorist organizations leveraging criminal
activities to pursue their ideological goals and criminal organizations adopting terrorist
tactics to achieve profit-driven objectives. While the report covers a wide range of14

INTRODUCTION

criminal activities, it primarily focuses on drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and money
laundering. The discussion on terrorism tactics encompasses a range of activities suchas murder, kidnapping, threats, extortion, robbery, and attacks on civilians, government
workers and infrastructure. While the cases presented are not exhaustive, they serve as
illustrative examples of the diverse manifestations of the crime-terror nexus.
The objective of the report is relevant because it directly impacts policies and actions in
the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime. Therefore, it is necessary todelve deeply into the topic and explore ways to develop a more effective state response.
This entails adopting a more comprehensive approach to countering the threats posedby the crime-terror nexus.

1.4 Note on the Methodology
The initial phase of this research involved examining the subject from a historicalperspective, highlighting events, processes, and institutions that contribute tounderstanding the evolution of the nexus. A thorough review of primary and secondary
sources, such as books, articles, reports, narratives, and media, was then conducted to
explore the existing literature on the relationship between crime and terrorism.
In addition to accessing existing academic research, the data collection methodology
consisted of analyzing various primary sources. These sources include first-person
reports, official reports that shed light on the criminal activities carried out by criminal
and terrorist groups (when declassified and available for research), declassified
material, and interviews with key stakeholders. These include law enforcement officers,
judges, prosecutors, military personnel, intelligence officers, experts, representatives
from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and other professionals.
Whenever possible, individuals directly involved with terrorist and criminal groups werealso interviewed. The identities of some of the interviewees had to be anonymized due
to confidentiality and security concerns. The interviews conducted for this research
employed semi-structured or unstructured formats to encourage open and uninhibited
discussions.

15

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

These interviews illustrate specific arguments and/or complement other researchmethods used in this report. They served as supplementary material, particularly forthe cases described in the cases explained section. Interviews helped validate certain
points and enrich the study. Questions posed to interviewees were tailored to the cases,
issues, or events they had participated in or witnessed.

1.5 Background on the Nexus
Until the 1990s, crime and terrorism were commonly perceived as distinct and separate
phenomena. However, a closer examination of the nexus between crime and terrorism
reveals an evolving relationship between terrorism, organized crime, and the state, withincreasing intersections and frequent overlaps. The discussion about the convergence
between organized crime and terrorism, a relatively new phenomenon, started at theend of the Cold War. This period also marked a significant decline in state financing ofterrorism, which paved the way for terrorist organizations to search for alternative formsof financing, many of them criminal, such as drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion, andother various illicit enterprises.2 Consequently, countries and international organizations
turned their attention to this nascent threat from non-state actors. In the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, the debates on this issue have intensified. The heightened awareness of
the interconnectedness between crime and terrorism prompted states to seek effective
alternatives to tackle the crime/terrorism nexus.3
In the wake of the 1990s, most terrorist groups had already begun developing thecapacity to engage in criminal activities, creating an additional operational focus aimed
at funding. The post-Cold War era, coupled with the rise of intra-state tensions, regionalwars, and advances in globalization, exacerbated conditions that boosted the increasing
convergence of terrorist and criminal groups.4 Consequently, modern-day terrorists havelong realized the need to diversify their funding sources to avoid dependence on a single
source of income.
Another component that contributes to the equation is the phenomenon of globalization.
Since the mid-1990s, the global environment has experienced rapid and extensive
development, where everything is amplified, accelerated, expanded and disseminated at
a lightning-speed.5 Criminals and terrorists benefit from the advances of globalization

16

INTRODUCTION

and exploit the numerous gaps in legislation, law enforcement capabilities, andinternational cooperation to carry on with their illicit activities; in other words, criminals
and terrorists naturally surf the same wave of mainstream globalization and also perform
market-driven activities and benefit from the growing integration of the communication,transportation and financial systems.6
Organized criminals and terrorist networks can successfully destabilize a state internallyand generate disruption across borders; this has been recognized in different Security
Council resolutions where the nexus is seen as a threat to the peace, security, stability
and development of Member States. Nonetheless, these groups need a set of conditions
that enable them to thrive. One of the primary conditions underlying the advancementof crime and terrorism in any given state is corruption, which is pervasive in nearly
every relationship between crime and terrorism nowadays. The advance of corruption
encourages criminal as well as terrorist enterprises, ultimately strengthening theconnection between crime and terrorism.7
Both organized criminal and terrorist groups exploit any available space for their nefarious
ends when the state is confronted with multiple governance challenges and leaves apower vacuum. This is particularly the case when the state fails to exert control overan area, as criminals, insurgents, or terrorists inevitably seek to seize the opportunity
to occupy that area, seeking to empower themselves and establish, and/or expand andconsolidate their illegal activities.8
State borders and boundaries have become increasingly permeable as a consequence ofa more interconnected world. Recent efforts to promote trade and facilitate the movementof goods across international borders have contributed to relaxed border controls.9 This
has eased and sped up the movement of money, arms and people across countries.
Consequently, border areas may become more vulnerable and therefore increase
insecurity amongst neighbouring states.10
Therefore, organized crime and terrorist groups thrive when they set up their base ofoperations in transitional states, (post) conflict regions or poorly policed border areas,
where there is a thriving shadow economy.11 The crime-terrorism nexus also endangers
politically stable states. The manifestations of this nexus are usually less transparent
and more adaptive in environments with stronger government control. Consequently, thesophisticated nature of criminal and terrorist activities/interactions poses a potentially

17

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

greater danger to the politically stable state than elsewhere, considering that law
enforcement agencies usually face challenges in differentiating between petty crimes(high volume, low cost) that facilitate or enable a terrorist enterprise and local petty
crimes that are a community problem. The same applies to money laundering operations
conducted by terrorists and criminals, which are adeptly disguised in politically stablestates.
It is important to note that, despite the benefits of globalization, current terrorist andtransnational criminal actors cannot simply be seen as globalized versions of theirpredecessors. Their enterprises are not merely conventional criminal structures
on a larger scale. Instead, they have evolved to mirror the complex architecture andorganizational structures of modern global legitimate businesses. Their mindset,
operations, financial frameworks, and objectives are significantly more advanced
compared to those of their predecessors. They excel at establishing networks, rapidly
outsourcing, skillfully developing local leadership and human resources, enabling
individual cells to operate autonomously and resourcefully, and minimizing interaction
and contact with top leadership. As a result, they play a major role in distorting global
markets and undermining state stability, while posing considerable challenges for law
enforcement and intelligence agencies due to their multifaced and elusive nature.12
At the dawn of the 21st century, scholars in the field of terrorism have classified thecrossovers between crime and terrorism into three distinct elements:13 cooperation,transformation and convergence.14 The following section provides a brief descriptionof the key characteristics of each of these elements, based on insights from prominent
academics in this field.
As previously mentioned, the intersection between crime and terrorism extends
beyond financing. It also encompasses the preparatory actions leading up to a terrorist
attack and the subsequent processes, usually facilitated by criminal activities. This iscommonly referred to as the "terrorist activity cycle". The interactions (between theelements of organized crime and terrorism) concerning each step of the cycle canvary depending on whether the nexus entails a specific organization or transactions
between different groups.

18

INTRODUCTION

1.6 Core Concepts
The three elements of cooperation, convergence and transformation served as thefoundational pillars for initiating discussions on the crime-terror nexus. These elements
enabled both scholars and practitioners to better understand the developments of thenexus in the last decades. The three elements are not necessarily consequential andmay occur on their own, or concurrently.
Cooperation refers to a situation in which criminal and terrorist organizations develop
alliances. These alliances can be informal, short-lived and limited to a single transaction
or more complex, involving parties becoming more permanent partners. Alliances may
occur for several reasons, e.g., the need for expert knowledge (money laundering,counterfeiting, document fraud, among others) and operational support (e.g., access totrafficking routes, for example).15
Convergence, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a terrorist group recognizes
the distinct advantages and opportunities of operating as a hybrid organization, where
both terror and crime play a central role.16 Some authors argue that when a terrorist
entity converges with criminal activities, the primary focus shifts towards criminal
endeavours, with the political agenda becoming secondary. The political facet becomesnothing more than rhetoric or a façade to advance the group’s criminal activities aimed
at maximizing profit. As a result, the group’s motivation changes, although disguisedfor several purposes. Firstly, to puzzle law enforcement agencies, and divert the
government’s attention towards ideological or political issues, thereby deflecting focus
from criminal investigations. Secondly, to maintain the widespread use of terror tactics asa tool to combat adversaries and expand the "criminal market share", thereby increasing
profitability. And thirdly, to continue capitalizing on political or ideological grievances toattract recruits. These are the main reasons underlying the "disguised behavior".17
Finally, transformation comprises a situation in which a terror group undergoes a shift
in its objectives, where economic motivation gradually eclipses the political one. Then
comes the next step, which occurs when profit becomes the only goal. At this point,
the group abandons its political agenda and becomes a criminal organization. Or theother way around, in which the criminal organization adopts terror tactics to advanceits profit-making objectives. In extreme cases, the criminal organization undergoes afundamental change in ethos, adopting more terrorist-like characteristics.18

19

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

In recent years, an increasing number of case studies revealing the impact of the nexus
worldwide have prompted authors to revisit the relationships between crime and terror
and thus formulate, in our view, a more suitable and straightforward framework for
categorizing it. These new suggested concepts and categorizations were introduced in2019 through the previously mentioned “Nexus Policy Toolkit” published and researched
by UNICRI and the GCTF, in the framework of the “Nexus Initiative”19 to better analyze
the interactions between crime and terror. The two main categories identified are
the transactional nexus and the organizational nexus, which will be discussed in thefollowing paragraphs.
The transactional nexus typically involves the collaboration of a criminal organization
and a terrorist group to execute specific operational needs. This ‘collaboration’ can taketwo forms: an alliance or an appropriation of tactics through organizational learning.
Alliances between criminal and terrorist groups are often short-term in nature, as theycome with inherent vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the appropriation of tactics entails
the ability of either the crime or terror group to learn how to integrate the tactics of theother more effectively.20
As for the organizational nexus, it occurs when criminal and terrorist activities coexist in
the same space and time. Within the organizational nexus, the degree of overlap between
these activities can vary. Theoretically, this can be classified into four categories:
integration, hybrid, transformation and black hole.21
Integration can be divided into two distinct situations; the first results from an alliancethat evolves to the extent that the criminal organization is integrated into a terrorist one,or vice versa. The second one occurs when there is targeted recruitment into a terroristgroup. This type of integration is to obtain tactical capability within a potentially shorttime frame. It should be noted that this form of integration does not involve mobilizing
individuals with criminal backgrounds, but rather integrating a radicalized group of
experienced criminals who are typically already active within the local community.22
The hybrid type of nexus occurs when there is a shift in the core purpose of a group.
A hybrid group will simultaneously pursue ideological and economic motivations byconducting terror attacks and engaging in profitable criminal enterprises. The groupin question can be classified as both criminal and terrorist. This type of group is thehas the greatest potential of being overlooked by both anti-crime and counter-terrorism
agencies.23

20

INTRODUCTION

Transformation instead represents an evolutionary instance of the nexus. It occurs whena terrorist group evolves both organizationally and operationally into a criminal networkor vice versa. The transformation is corroborated when the group’s essential aims andmotivations undergo a significant shift to the extent that its original raison d’être ceases
to exist. In other words, a terrorist group becomes a criminal one, or vice versa.24
There is another concept, which is not a manifestation of the nexus, but rather an
expression that can be described as an extreme environment that serves as a fertile
breeding ground for the nexus in its many forms: the “Black Hole Syndrome”. This is
generally associated with a geographically defined area characterized by a lack ofgovernance and security, where territorial control is normally taken by the groups that
dominate the illicit economy and the population. The "Black Hole" represents the most
severe scenario for the nexus manifestation, where the convergence of crime and terror
contributes to perpetuating the extremely insecure conditions of a region, as groupscompete for control over economic and/or political power through the use of violence
and a range of criminal activities.25
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, one aspect closely intertwined with thecrime and terror nexus theories is the concept of the terrorist activity cycle. This concept
is crucial when examining terrorist activity in Latin America. Understanding the role of thiscycle is essential for grasping the interplay between crime and terrorism. While terrorist
attacks are often sensationalized by media outlets, leading to increased attention on
terrorist organizations and triggering counter-terrorism measures, it is important tounderstand that terrorism extends beyond the attack itself. The attack represents only asmall fraction of the comprehensive terrorist activity cycle. Each attack is preceded bya series of interconnected activities that form the foundation of any terrorist operation,
including recruitment, radicalization, funding, training, logistics, and planning, to name afew essential steps. Indeed, the terrorist attack is not the final action; terrorists engage
in other activities post-attack, such as evasion, escape, and exploitation of the attack
through media dissemination.26 On the whole, it is important to understand that terrorist
attacks are a product of a lengthy chain of actions and meticulous planning. Throughout
this process, the nexus between crime and terrorism can occur at various stages.27

21

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

RADICALIZATION
AND RECRUITMENTMEDIA
EXPLOITATIONATTACK AND
EVASION

TRAININGTHE
TERRORISTACTIVITYCYCLE
FUNDINGLOGISTICS▶

Figure 1: The terrorist activity cycle

As mentioned in the definitions, for this report, we consider the word “terrorism” aswell as the “terror act” as defined in the Security Council resolution 1566 (2004). This
resolution also encompasses the acts of supporting, facilitating, participating, financing,planning, preparing, commissioning and providing safe havens; which are essentiallythe acts within the terrorist activity cycle. In a broad sense, it encompasses two main
meanings: first, the terrorist attack per se; and second, the terrorist activity cycle.
Regarding the terrorist activity cycle, we adopt the following concept introduced by
Lasmar28 and Don et al.29 and further developed by Azevedo.30 The terrorist activity
cycle encompasses a range of interconnected actions that precede and succeed theterrorist attack. These actions include, but are not limited to proselytism, radicalization,
propaganda, recruitment, financing, training, logistics, resource management,
surveillance, attack, evasion and media exploitation.
These interactions have been noted by the United Nations Security Council beginningin 2014 with resolution 2195 and most recently through resolution 2482 (2019) on thelinks between international terrorism and transnational organized crime. Through the
adoption of resolution 2482, the Council expressed concern that terrorists can benefit

22

INTRODUCTION

from organized crime as a source of financing or logistical support through the traffickingof arms, persons, drugs, artefacts, cultural property and other means. The resolution
calls on States to consider establishing appropriate laws and mechanisms that allow
for the broadest possible international cooperation. Further, in an earlier resolution,
1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, operative Paragraph 4 “Notes
with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnationalorganized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal
movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, andin this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national,
subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response tothis serious challenge and threat to international security.”
Although the UN has not listed all the groups exemplified in this report as terrorist entities,
apart from ISIL and Al-Qaida, the tactics and strategies that they adopt undoubtedly haveterrorist characteristics. Consequently, after analyzing several groups and organizations
operating in the region, we have selected case studies involving terrorist groups andcriminal organizations due to both their regional representation of the crime-terror nexus
and their global significance and influence. Some of these groups have developed deeproots and have far-reaching networks across several countries. Furthermore, some ofthese groups operate or have operated all the steps of the terrorist activity cycle in Latin
America.
These core concepts and definitions outlined in the previous paragraphs serve as
valuable tools for contextualizing and identifying the range of interactions between
crime and terror. These interactions will be illustrated by examining specific cases in
Latin America, which will be discussed in a later section of this report.

23

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Context of the
Nexus in
Latin America

24

CONTEXT OF THE NEXUS IN LATIN AMERICA

2.1
A Brief History of the Nexus
in Latin America
At the beginning of the 1990s, terrorist groups were influenced by the large narcotrafficking cartels that emerged in Latin America in the 1980s, and they quickly entered
the business of drug trafficking because it offered them a source of funding. That is
why the first documented cases of interaction between crime and terrorism surfaced in
Colombia and Peru. The terrorist and guerrilla groups in these countries ushered in theera of using the proceeds of crime to finance terrorist activities.31 After all, insurgentswith standing armies of thousands of soldiers needed money to buy weapons, supplies,
food, and pay salaries; meanwhile, smaller terrorist groups needed funding to acquire
counterfeit documents, move people across regions, pay smugglers, and buy firearms
and bombs, among other expenses.32
The 1990s saw an expansion in relations between drug cartels based in Colombia,
Mexico and other parts of Latin America and insurgent/terrorist organizations on
the continent. They developed a criminal partnership through activities such as drugtrafficking, weapons trafficking, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, and more.
Simultaneously, Islamist-inspired terrorist organizations were deepening their ties in
the continent. The attacks on the Israeli embassy in the capital of Argentina, Buenos
Aires, in 1992 followed by the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) terrorist
attack in 1994, brought Lebanese Hezbollah to the centre of the debate, as Argentinian
investigators identified that all the steps of the terrorist activity cycle leading to the
AMIA attack were at least partly structured and conducted from the tri-border area (TBA)
between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Soon afterwards prominent figures from thethen newly formed Al-Qaeda visited the area to recruit members from the local Muslim
community and explore fundraising opportunities, starting with Osama Bin Laden in
1995, followed by Khalid Sheik Mohammed in 1995 and 1998 , respectively. However,they were not alone; members of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and various
other terrorist organizations have since been present in the TBA and the countries thatshare the TBA. Their activities have ranged from drug trafficking, arms trafficking, andsmuggling of migrants, to money laundering and other illicit practices.33 Lebanese

25

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Hezbollah, in particular, has steadily increased its presence in the region. Additionally,
Islamist extremists have been identified in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
Venezuela and in other nations, establishing connections with criminal organizations.
The 1990s also represented the growth of robust criminal organizations in both Brazil
and Mexico. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which was born inside Brazil’s
prison system in 1993, is now one of the largest criminal organizations in Latin America
and has a presence on four other continents. Brazilian Comando Vermelho (CV) also
grew much stronger during the 1990s. Led by the notorious ‘Fernandinho Beira Mar’,CV expanded its reach, especially in the latter part of the 1990s, at the height of its
alliances with the Colombian FARC.34 FARC and CV not only led a business of “armsfor drugs exchange” but also learned tactics from one another. The same happened
with the Brazilian PCC, which learned to use terrorist tactics (targeted assassinations,attacks against government facilities/employees and bombings against civilians, among
others). Since 2000, PCC has conducted a myriad of terror-like attacks across Brazil.
Mexican cartels have also benefited from partnerships with terrorist organizations (FARC,
Hezbollah, ISIL)35 mimicking their public executions and money laundering operations,among other techniques and tactics. In Venezuela, the advancing Cartel of the Suns does
not hide its enduring partnership with Colombian guerrillas such as FARC - and currently,
its dissident groups - and other terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, - leveraging theirregional reach and foreign logistic hubs for learning and mutual benefits. Conversely,
these terrorist organizations take advantage of the Cartel of the Suns’ power within
Venezuela, where it also exerts influence over sectors of the government. In Ecuador,authorities have noted that organized criminal groups are increasingly using methods,
equipment, and violent tactics commonly used by terrorist groups, increasing the risk ofattacks on critical infrastructure, affecting and disrupting the economy and perpetuating
the sense of fear and insecurity among the people. It was reported that in some partsof the country, organized criminal groups are also forcing business owners to pay a fee(a "vaccine") to be able to operate their businesses. It is evident that Latin America’s
regional dynamics and socio-political disparity have created a landscape conduciveto the convergence of criminal and terrorist organizations or non-state armed groups
designated as terrorist organizations.36

26

CONTEXT OF THE NEXUS IN LATIN AMERICA

2.2
Current Nexus Status Throughout
Latin America
In a globalized world, it is evident that criminal and terrorist organizations operate withfewer limitations in both physical and cyber spaces. As a result, these organizations
continue to expand across borders to enhance their efficiency and extend their reach.
Particularly, some Islamist-inspired terror networks have expanded their influence inthe Latin American continent by increasingly cooperating and interacting with local
and regional criminal organizations. This collaboration contributes to the threat ofglobal jihadism and the deterioration of law and order across the continent. Likewise,transnational criminal organizations originating in Latin America continue to derive
benefits from their connections with terror groups, particularly within prison systems.
These settings provide an opportunity for initial introductions and the formation of firstalliances, facilitating intergroup learning. The prisons in Latin America have proved to
be a conducive environment for the development of the crime-terror nexus, as will beshown later through examples.
The literature, government reports and intelligence findings provide evidence of criminal
syndicates such as PCC, CV, Mexican cartels, and Colombian drug trafficking rings
aligning themselves with terrorist organizations within the continent and globally.
Somali Al Shabaab collaborates with migrant smugglers in South and North America,
while Latin American criminal and terror-based organizations form partnerships with AlQaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) to
traffic cocaine across the Atlantic Ocean and through the Sahel region towards Europe
and the Middle East. Simultaneously, in the opposite direction, firearms come from
North Africa though the Sahel and West Africa, into Latin America37. Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has developed strong recruiting capabilities, leveraging its
cyber efficiency to extend its reach throughout Latin America. Al-Qaeda and ISIL haveestablished robust procurement channels for obtaining counterfeit travel documents
through the dark web, documents that are doctored by Latin American-based forgers. ISIL
has been able to move funds from Latin America to Syria and Iraq using a sophisticated27The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

hawala system (informal value transfer and remittance system based on the honour
and performance of a large network of money brokers), similar to the one employed
by Hezbollah to transfer profits to Lebanon derived from a myriad of criminal activities,
including cocaine trafficking, weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Additionally,certain criminal groups like Brazilian CV have progressively assimilated insurgency andguerrilla tactics and strategies from the Colombian FARC, evident in their current actionsin Rio de Janeiro and the Amazon jungle. The same tactics are also adopted by the
Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG in Mexico. Similarly, PCC has learned from terrorists how to
instill terror within the State to seek political advantages.

28

CONTEXT OF THE NEXUS IN LATIN AMERICA

Cases
Explained

29

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

The objective of this section is to illustrate the nexus in Latin America through a series ofcases. These cases will be categorized into two groups: first, the terrorists (groups and/or individuals) that develop criminal expertise and/or ally with criminal organizations;and second, criminal organizations that use terrorist tactics. We have selected three
primary manifestations of the nexus for the first group: drug trafficking and the nexus,
money laundering and the nexus, and migrant smuggling and the nexus. For the second
group, our focus will primarily be on the Brazilian transnational criminal organizations
PCC, CV and the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG.
These examples are not an exhaustive list of nexus cases in the region. However, they
provide valuable insights into the phenomenon and highlight the interconnected andinterdependent nature of criminal actions that facilitate its growth and prevalence.

3.1
Terrorist Organizations and the Nexus
3.1.1 Drug Trafficking and the Nexus
Financial and material resources are widely recognized as the lifeblood of terrorist
organizations, as they provide the necessary infrastructure that allows them to carryout their operations. In the first case, we will focus on the funding of terrorism throughdrug trafficking. Funding is a key element of the terrorist activity cycle as it provides
the financial means to support all the other phases. Notably, certain terrorist groups
like Hezbollah and FARC38 have transformed through their involvement in transnational
drug trafficking. By expanding into global drug markets, these groups have restructured
themselves to negotiate drug shipments abroad and establish a presence in othercountries, particularly those used as transit points for transnational drug shipments.
In the following paragraphs, we will examine several specific cases in the continent
showing how terror groups engage in transnational drug trafficking in Latin America.
These cases shed light on how their networks have managed to diversify, conceal andadvance their businesses within the region.

30

CASES EXPLAINEDOne such case involves the Omairi clan, which is linked to Hezbollah and is based in
the TBA. The clan, led by Farouk Abdel Omairi and his two sons, Khaled Omairi and
Ahmad Omairi, came under investigation during “Operation Camel” conducted by theBrazilian Federal Police in 2006. At that time, Farouk Omairi and Khaled Omairi werearrested, and Ahmad Omairi escaped. The charges brought against them included
involvement in transnational drug trafficking. Following their trials, Farouk Omairi andKhaled Omairi were sentenced to prison terms of 11 years and eight months, while
Ahmad Omairi received a sentence of nine years and seven months. Their businesses
revolved around the procurement of cocaine from Bolivia and Peru, which was thenexported by dozens of human drug couriers or ‘mules’ who travelled from São Paulo
International Airport to European countries and the Middle East, particularly Jordan.39
Considering that the Omairi clan owned a travel and exchange agency in the TBA,
they could purchase tickets, produce travel documentation, rent hotel rooms, wire andreceive money, and perform other necessary actions to support the individuals actingas ‘mules’ for their illicit operations abroad. During the investigation, law enforcement
authorities discovered that their involvement extended beyond the transnational drugtrafficking scheme to smuggling cocaine to the Middle East and Europe. Investigations
found that the clan was deeply engaged in document forgery, money laundering andother criminal activities. The Omairi family was involved in many different businesses
in Brazil, specifically in Foz do Iguaçu and Curitiba, as well as in Paraguay’s Ciudad delEste. Over the past three decades, their ‘legal’ businesses have encompassed sectors
such as textiles, electronics shops and travel/exchange agencies. By the turn of the 21st
century, Farouk Omairi emerged as a key intermediary between Hezbollah and the drugtraffickers operating in the region. In 2006, Farouk Omairi was designated by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as being part of a
Hezbollah fundraising network in the TBA.40
Omairi’s history as Hezbollah’s key figure within the TBA began nearly 20 years before
2006, when he, as a Hezbollah member, established his first professional contacts in theSouth Cone of the continent. According to the prosecutors of the AMIA41 case, Farouk
Omairi took part in the logistics of the AMIA bombing in Argentina in 1994. He acted
under Hezbollah’s orders with his counterpart in Buenos Aires, Mohsen Rabbani, who
acted on behalf of Iran.42 Omairi was in close contact with Rabbani from the late 1980s
and used to travel frequently to Buenos Aires to meet him at the Iranian embassy.43
Rabbani44 was involved in the AMIA bombing plot, and Argentine prosecutors accused
him of participating in the terrorist attack.45 In June 2023, an Argentine Federal Judge

31

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

granted a prosecutor’s request and issued an international arrest warrant (whichbecame an International Criminal Police Organization INTERPOL Red Notice) against
Farouk Omairi and three other Lebanese nationals (Abdallah Salman, aka Jose El Reda,
Ali Hussein Abdallah and Hussein Mounir Mouzannar) linked to Hezbollah over theirsuspected involvement in the 1994 AMIA terrorist attack. Additionally, on the following
day, the four suspects were added to Argentina’s Public Registry of Persons and Entities
Tied to Terrorism Acts or its Financing (REPET).
In late 2008, a Lebanese man named Chekri Harb, alias ‘Taliban,’ was arrested in
Colombia after a long investigation named “Operation Titan,” conducted by a combined
team of U.S.A. and Colombian law enforcement agents and prosecutors.46 Hezbollah’sconnections with Colombian drug cartels surfaced when Colombian wiretaps - intended
to monitor the drug cartel known as Oficina del Envigado - revealed Hezbollah as its
partner in crime. This investigation uncovered a large cocaine smuggling enterprise anda sophisticated money-laundering scheme that spanned the Americas, Africa and the
Middle East involving hundreds of operatives and a dozen front companies.47
During the investigation, law enforcement agents arrested more than 130 people, seized
US$ 23 million, 48 deployed 370 wiretaps and listened to 700,000 conversations.49 As
the investigators connected the dots, they learned the details of Chekri Harb’s cocaine
trafficking routes. One of the most important routes involved smuggling cocaine to
the Jordanian port of Aqaba (usually through Africa) and then transporting it overland
to Syria or Lebanon.50 The Lebanese kingpin’s criminal organization was capable ofshipping large quantities of cocaine to Lebanon and distributing it quickly. It was later
discovered that Harb had strong connections with Hezbollah, which allowed him tooperate freely within Lebanon. According to the investigators, Harb had made many trips
to Egypt, Lebanon and Syria and he maintained constant telephone communication with
Hezbollah’s leaders.51 According to police and prosecutors, Hezbollah charged Harb a
12 per cent tax from his drug income for permission to operate in Lebanon.52 Evidencecollected during the operation indicated a link between the drug profits and the financing
of Hezbollah which serves as a clear example of the crime-terror nexus.
Another case of the crime-terror nexus in cocaine trafficking emerged initially on the
Colombian-Venezuelan border and involved at least three distinct organizations: theCartel of the Suns, FARC and Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s crime and terror network in Venezuela
was uncovered in 2011 after a two-year investigation. This investigation exposed an
intricate and multi-million dollar drug trafficking and money-laundering scheme operated

32

CASES EXPLAINED

Operation Titan
US/Colombian joint effort
arrested in Colombia
Lebanon
Syria
Egypt

frequent trips to

Chekri Harb
alias “Taliban”
Oficina del Envigado
connected to

HEZBOLLAH

partners

Colombian drug cartels

SYRIA
LEBANON= COCAINEAQABA,JORDAN

COLOMBIA

Operation Titan in numbers

130

PEOPLEARRESTED23$
MILLIONSEIZED▶

370

WIRETAPS

700,000

CONVERSATIONSLISTENED TO

Figure 2: Operation Titan

33

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

by Hezbollah in Colombia and Venezuela with the participation of FARC and the Cartelof the Suns. At the helm of this criminal enterprise was Ayman Joumaa, a LebaneseColombian drug kingpin who worked in tandem with a prominent Shia businessman
in Venezuela and a Hezbollah-linked drug trafficker named Ali Mohamad Saleh.53 For
several years, the Saleh clan controlled the illegal market of drugs, weapons, money
laundering and smuggling in Maicao, Colombia. Following the indictment that resulted
from this investigation, Ali Mohamad Saleh fled Colombia to Venezuela and sought
refuge under the protection of the Cartel of the Suns.54
Ghazi Nassereddine55 is another important figure in these triangled drug trafficking
operations. He is a Hezbollah facilitator56 who holds Lebanese and Venezuelan citizenship.
The Nassereddine family gained political influence when Hugo Chávez became president.
Ghazi Nassereddine was appointed by Hugo Chávez as the Venezuela’s ambassador
to Damascus, Syria in 2008. While in Damascus, Nassereddine maintained frequentcontact with high-ranking Hezbollah operatives. Hezbollah, aiming to expand its funding
and logistics operations in Venezuela, relied on Nassereddine’s connections. As a result,he arranged a meeting between Tareck El Aissami,57 who was serving as Venezuela’s
Interior Minister at that time, and Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. This meeting
led to the arrangement of a ‘cocaine for weapons’ deal between FARC and Hezbollah.
Subsequently, from 2014 onwards, irregular flights between Lebanon and Caracas werereported and large quantities of weapons - ranging from assault rifles to man-portableair-defense systems (MANPADS)58 – were transported to Caracas. Once the weapons
arrived at the airport, they were transferred to a military base in Guárico, Venezuela,
before being transported to FARC in Colombia. They were transported either by air,using illegal airstrips to land in Colombia, or by land through the porous VenezuelanColombian border. These weapons were part of the payment for the cocaine supplied by
FARC through the Cartel of the Suns.
Nassereddine, who is no longer serving as the Venezuelan ambassador to Syria, andTareck El Aissami, who has held various government positions in Venezuela, have been
acting as facilitators for Hezbollah and are suspected of involvement in the group’s
criminal funding activities in Venezuela. However, it is important to note that they are
not part of Hezbollah’s hierarchical chain of command.59
In early 2001, an operation led by the Colombian military known as “Black Cat” disrupted
one of the FARC’s largest cocaine trade businesses in the eastern part of the country.
This operation targeted FARC’s Front 16, which dominated the border region between

34

CASES EXPLAINED

Operation Black Cat
KEY LEADERSHIPMET IN COLOMBIATomas Molina
alias “Negro Acacio”
former leader of FARC Front 16

Luis Fernando da Costa
alias “Fernandinho Beira-Mar”
former leader of Comando Vermelho (CV)VENEZUELASURINAME

COLOMBIAFARC FRONT 16

EUROPE

3 TO 4 TONS OF
COCAINE
PER WEEK

AFRICABRAZIL= COCAINEPARAGUAY
ARMS

DRUGS

= ARMS

Operation Black Cat in numbers

55

16

TONS
OF COCAINE SEIZEDKEY
INDIVIDUALSARRESTED
7 BRAZILIANS

20

-DAY
OPERATION

FARC
CAMPS
DESTROYEDCOCAINELABORATORIESDESTROYED

18

29

22 COLOMBIANS▶

Figure 3: Operation Black Cat

35

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

the states of Guainía and Vichada. At that time, the area was considered the central
hub for FARC’s financial and logistical operations, primarily derived from the profits ofcocaine trafficking. The cocaine trade in this area accounted for a considerable amountof FARC’s annual income. Additionally, this area was part of the “Orinoco Axis”, which
was the main weapons smuggling route for the FARC.
The military forces conducted operations for 20 consecutive days, during which they
destroyed 55 cocaine processing laboratories and 16 FARC camps. They also seized over
18 tons of cocaine and arrested numerous FARC fighters and drug dealers, including 29
key individuals comprising seven Brazilians and 22 Colombians. The government forces
gathered substantial evidence that unequivocally confirmed FARC’s deep involvementin the drug trade. However, the leader of Front 16, Tomas Molina, also known as ‘Negro
Acacio,’ managed to escape from the area moments before the Army arrived. Despite
this, the Colombian forces were successful in capturing their second most important
target: the Brazilian national Luis Fernando da Costa, also known as ‘Fernandinho
Beira-Mar.’ The interrogation following his capture provided investigators with crucial
information regarding the partnership between one of the most powerful Brazilian drug
dealers and FARC’s most prominent commander.
By the time Beira Mar was arrested in Colombia in 2001, he was one of the mostwanted individuals in Brazil as the leader of CV. He had escaped from jail in the State ofMinas Gerais in 1997 and soon afterwards was introduced to ‘Negro Acácio.’ Beira Mar
began dealing with the FARC in the mid-1990s but worked through middlemen basedin Colombia. After he escaped from jail in 1997, he cut out the middlemen to establish
direct contact with the FARC and moved with his family to Bogotá. By late 1999, however,
he realized that INTERPOL had detected his location in Bogotá, so he relocated to the
FARC-controlled jungle area of Guaviare to run his business directly from the jungle.
The FARC was interested in Beira Mar due to his successful arms smuggling operations
that fueled his drug trafficking organization in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Not long after
they met, Beira Mar began sending thousands of pistols, explosives and automatic
rifles to the FARC through his connections in Front 16. He then used illegal airstrips innorthern Brazil and Colombia to deliver arms and import cocaine. Beira Mar was able
to establish a powerful business where he was delivering cocaine not only to Brazilian
drug traffickers but also to Paraguay, Venezuela and Suriname, before further exportingto five continents, particularly Europe (The Netherlands and Spain) and Africa (mostly

36

CASES EXPLAINED

Ghana). At that time, approximately half of the cocaine produced in the Departments of
Vichada, Guainía and Guaviare was traded for weapons brought by Beira Mar, an amountalmost equivalent to three to four tons of drugs per week. The partnership between
FARC fighters, Beira Mar and CV continues to this day.60
Finally, there is a growing nexus between Latin American cocaine traffickers and terrorist
organizations in Africa, including Boko Haram, AQIM and ISWAP, among others. Thisconnection has puzzled law enforcement agencies across continents. Although reportsof their activities and modus operandi exist, there is insufficient information about theroutes, strategies and actors on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean due to coordinationand cooperation challenges between Latin American and African authorities.61▶

COLOMBIA▶

Figure 4: Operation “Black Cat” deployment area

37

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Venezuela
Colombia

Venezuela

AIRSTRIP SERRA DO CAPARROCOCAINE
Exchange
Location

ARMS

Brazil Brazil▶

Figure 5: Drugs for arms exchange in the TBA

UNICRI has been actively providing capacity-building assistance to practitioners andpolicy-makers (law enforcement, prosecutors, judicial system, civil society, politicians)
to strengthen their capacities to understand, identify and address this growing threatof terrorism and organized crime in Africa and its connection to other regions globally,
particularly South America. Substantial work has been conducted in North Africa, thewider Sahel and West Africa (Algeria, Benin, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger andTogo) in cooperation with other UN agencies.
Statistics on drug seizures collected by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC) suggest that North and West Africa have consolidated their strategic position
as transit zones for cocaine destined for Europe, with numbers on a steady increasesince 2019. The strategic geographical location of both North and West Africa makes
the continent a convenient stopover point for cocaine en route to Europe, especially for
cargo ships departing from Brazil and other South American countries.62 The routes toEurope via Africa have become more popular due to the regular seizures of cocaine
shipped directly from South America to Europe. Therefore, rerouting shipments throughAfrican countries makes it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect andtrack both the cargo and actors. Besides, with the participation of terrorist facilitatorsin the business, the whole criminal enterprise becomes even more elusive and poses a
significant challenge for counter-crime agencies.
38

CASES EXPLAINED

3.1.2 Money Laundering and the Nexus
Assad Ahmad Barakat, the leading figure behind the Barakat clan, is allegedly the mostwell-known Hezbollah member in the TBA, according to the US Department of theTreasury, which sanctioned and designated him in 2004 as a key Hezbollah financier
in the area, together with his brothers Hatem Barakat and Hamze Barakat.63 He was thegroup’s head of military operations and fundraising in the TBA in the 1990s. He allegedly
continues to operate a financial network for Hezbollah in the region and has owned
several businesses that conduct money laundering operations to generate funds for thegroup. The US Department of the Treasury claims that he has been involved in a wide
range of criminal activities in support of the organization. Barakat was arrested in Brazil
in 2002 and 2018 for crimes committed in Paraguay, where he was prosecuted andconvicted for tax evasion in 2002 and identity theft in 2018, when Paraguayan authorities
discovered that he had used fake documentation to obtain citizenship and a passport inParaguay.64 He served prison sentences in both Brazil and Paraguay. The clan is currently
being prosecuted in a pending case in Paraguay for fraud and forgery.
By the time he was arrested in Brazil in late 2018, an Argentine court was alreadyinvestigating the Barakat clan for money laundering involving a casino in Puerto Iguazu
located in the province of Misiones, Argentina, within the TBA. The Argentine Federal
Court in Eldorado municipality65 continues to investigate the Barakat clan and 16 other
Lebanese businessmen who live in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil,of whom 11 live in Brazil and five in Paraguay. In mid-2019 the judge overseeing the caseordered the freezing of assets belonging to 14 of them, as there was sufficient evidence
to suggest that the clan was transferring money laundered through the casino from the
TBA to Hezbollah's accounts in Lebanon. Additionally, the judge ordered the inclusionof 14 of Barakat’s closest clan members66 in Argentina’s terror watch list, known as the
Public Registry of Persons and Entities Tied to Terrorism Acts or its Financing.67
Information obtained from the lawsuit filed at the court in Eldorado, Argentina,
demonstrates that the 14 Barakat clan members under investigation have enteredArgentina multiple times from Brazil. The investigation revealed that they injected
about of $ 21.8 million into the casino in Iguazu between 2010 and 2018. Furthermore,according to court files, they subsequently retrieved over $ 20.3 million between 2012
and 2018. Investigators established that a portion of this money was invested in front
companies in Brazil (Rio Paraná Incorporadora LTDA) and Chile (Saleh Trading Limited
and Importadora y Exportadora Barakat Limitada). Moreover, between January 2017 and39

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Assad Ahmad Barakat
1985

TIMELINE

IMMIGRATES TO PARAGUAY
TO ESCAPE THE LEBANESECIVIL WAR1990
APPOINTED THE HEAD OFHEZBOLLAH’S FUNDRAISING
AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
THE TBA

1992
ATTACK ON THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN
BUENOS AIRES 29 KILLED 242 WOUNDED(BARAKAT PARTICIPATED WITH THE
LOGISTICS)

1994
ATTACK ON AMIABUENOS AIRES
85 KILLED 300+ WOUNDED(BARAKAT PARTICIPATED WITH
THE LOGISTICS)

2001
INDICTED IN PARAGUAY ON CHARGES OFCRIMINAL ASSOCIATION, TAX EVASION

ARRESTED IN FOZ DOIGUAÇU/BRAZIL AND LATERTHAT YEAR EXTRADITED TO
PARAGUAY

2002

2004
DESIGNATED AS A GLOBALTERRORIST BY THE
US DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY2009

RELEASED FROMPARAGUAYAN JAIL

2018

INVESTIGATED FOR MONEY
LAUNDERING IN ARGENTINAPARAGUAYAN JUSTICE ISSUES AN
ARREST WARRANT FOR BARAKAT,CHARGED HIM OF IDENTITYTHEFT
BRAZILIAN FEDERAL POLICE
ARRESTED BARAKAT IN FOZ DOIGUAÇU2019
SERVING PRISON TIME IN
BRAZIL AWAITINGEXTRADITION TO PARAGUAY

2020

2021
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN
PARAGUAY AND DEPORTED
TO BRAZIL▶
40

Figure 6: Timeline of Assad Ahmad Barakat

EXTRADITED TO
PARAGUAY

CASES EXPLAINED

August 2018, the investigation found that most of the money laundered in the casino
was sent from Paraguay to Lebanon (specifically to Hezbollah-held territory in Lebanon)
to finance terrorism, according to the Eldorado Argentine Court.
The assets freeze was the culmination of a lengthy investigation. Argentine investigators
targeted a scheme that took advantage of two situations: firstly, a cash-intensive
business (the casino in Puerto Iguazu, Argentina); and secondly, lax controls at a border
post with high trafficking incidents between the three countries, particularly the landborder between Argentina and Brazil. Members of the Barakat clan exploited thesecircumstances. Moreover, as the investigation has proved, they crossed the borders
numerous times, transporting large quantities of cash, to launder it in the casino,
located about 100 metres from the Argentine Customs office. Personnel employed by
the Barakat clan would then convert the cash into chips and back to cash, occasionallyadding gambling wins in the process.68 These 14 members took turns making thesecross-border trips to the casino, using forged identification documents in an attempt
to conceal their identities and camouflage their frequent trips. The investigation foundthat they utilized 296 different identification documents for crossing the border between
Argentina and Brazil.
Argentine migration authorities revealed that Hassan Ali Barakat, a first cousin of
Assad Barakat, crossed the border from Brazil to Argentina 1,547 times between 1997
and 2018. Specifically, he made 620 crossings between January 2015 and October
2017, averaging three entries per day on the days he visited the country. According to
information provided by Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan migration services to theArgentine Federal Court, he used 23 different fake identification documents to crossthe border. His brother, Hussein Ali Barakat, crossed the border 257 times during thesame period, often accompanied by Hassan. Both brothers brought significant sums ofmoney into the casino, although the Argentine Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) authority
found no business interests associated with them in Argentina. Also, according tocourt documents, Mousa Hatem Barakat crossed the same border 1,390 times, often
accompanied by another clan member, driving the same car and during the same periodof the day, heading towards the casino (typically after midnight). Ahmad Ali Barakat
exhibited similar behaviour with 417 registered border crossings from Brazil to Argentina,
also in the company of other clan members in the same car and at the same time.
The investigation discovered that 99 per cent of these border crossings occurred at the
Presidente Tancredo Neves International Bridge - after midnight - using cars registered

41

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Barakat Clan

Assad Ahmad Barakat
leader of Barakat Clan
Designated and sanctioned
as a key Hezbollah
financierby the US Government in2004

Arrested twice in Brazil(2002, 2018)

INVESTIGATED IN ARGENTINA FOR
MONEY LAUNDERING
14 clan members included in theArgentinian terrorism watch list
(REPET)
Money laundering in a casino in
Puerto Iguazu in Argentina

Convicted in Paraguay, served
part of his sentence there andpart in Brazil
The clan has injected $ 21.8
in the casino
The clan has retrieved $ 20.3
from casino

Part of this money was invested
in companies in Chile and Brazil
Most of the money laundered in
the casino was sent from
Paraguay to Lebanon

BRAZILMONEY

CHILE
PARAGUAY
CASINOLEBANON

ARGENTINA
MONEY

▶
42

Figure 7: Barakat Clan Money Laundering Operations

LAUNDERINGCASES EXPLAINEDin either Paraguay or Brazil. Once at the casino, they would bring in an average of$ 15,000 to $ 20,000 per trip. All 14 clan members used the cash brought to the casino in
Argentina for money laundering purposes. During the investigation, personnel employedby the Barakat clan were identified by Argentine police and customs officials who noticed
their comfort in the routine of crossing borders and their lack of unease while travellingback and forth to the casino. Additionally, in their multiple border crossings, Barakatclan members never declared to customs that they were carrying $ 10,000 or more,
as required by both Argentine and Brazilian laws. It is suspected that they crossed theborder hundreds of times, often in pairs or groups, possibly carrying amounts below thethreshold of $ 10,000 to avoid complications with customs officials.69
Ultimately, in the abovementioned case, Ali Hassan Barakat and Ahmad Ali Barakat havebeen identified as key pillars within Hezbollah’s funding structure in the TBA, as they
are responsible for transferring cash to the group’s leadership in Lebanon, under theumbrella of the “Clan Barakat” led by its senior member Ahmad Assad Barakat.
Another case involves the Lebanese-Colombian citizen Ayman Joumaa and the
Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB). Following a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
investigation in 2011, a US court (Federal Grand Jury in Alexandria, Virginia) indicteda Lebanese-Colombian national named Ayman Joumaa for providing support fortransnational drug trafficking and money laundering operations. Meanwhile, the US
Department of the Treasury’s OFAC labelled Ayman Joumaa as a Specially DesignatedNarcotics Trafficker, along with his associates and a few companies related to thecriminal enterprise.70 Additionally, the US. Treasury froze his assets while highlighting
his ties to Hezbollah.71 According to the DEA, Joumaa’s criminal activities involved
coordinating the transportation and distribution of multi-ton shipments of cocaine,mostly from South America to the USA, Africa and Europe.72 Simultaneously, he ran acomplex money laundering scheme by moving hundreds of millions of US dollars of illicit
proceeds operated by him and his partners in crime through many Hezbollah networks
across the globe.73 He worked with front companies in Latin America, West Africa andLebanon, laundering money for Colombian and Mexican cartels (Los Zetas). He charged
fees that ranged from eight to 14 per cent to launder the proceeds all over the globe,
ensuring they could not be traced back to Colombia or Mexico.74

43

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Money Laundering at Lebanese Canadian Bank
The chart below shows the intricate money-laundering system the LCB used to divert money to the Shiite
militant group Hezbollah, according to United States officials.
According to American officials, the LCB was the hub of an international
drug money laundering operation with ties to Hezbollah. Used cars andother consumer goods sales revenues had been used to mask theproceeds of illegal drug trade.
Money from the LCB is sent
through US. accounts to
pay Asian suppliers ofconsumer goods

Some money is returned to the US
to purchase more used cars

LCB
Some money
is diverted to
Hezbollah

Drugs are sold in Europe.
Proceeds are mixed withlegitimate used car saleprofits in Africa and sent
to the LCB throughexchange houses

Exchanging
HousesUsed cars areshipped from the US
and sold in Africa.

U.S.

EuropeChina
Cocaine is sent from
Colombia to European
markets via Africa
Colombia
AfricaSouth
America

Goods from Asia are shipped to consumer productdealers and sold in South America in a scheme to
pay off cocaine suppliers▶

44

Figure 9: Money laundering scheme involving the Lebanese Canadian Bank.
Source: The New York Times

CASES EXPLAINEDThe money laundering scheme uncovered by this investigation benefited from the US
financial system and the ‘used car’ market, along with banks and companies locatedin West Africa and the Middle East. As part of the criminal enterprise, funds weretransferred from Lebanon to the USA to purchase used cars, which were then shipped toWest Africa and sold for cash. The cash revenue from these car sales and the proceedsfrom cocaine trafficking were then transferred to Lebanon. The cash was often moved
through bulk cash smuggling. Hezbollah members and facilitators were involved inseveral steps of this scheme. A considerable portion of the cash income from the car
sales was transported to Lebanon by Hezbollah’s money couriers, cash smugglers,
hawaladars and similar individuals. Cash carried from West Africa was usually received
at the Beirut Airport, where Hezbollah security apparatus ensured its safe passage to thefinal destination. In addition, Hezbollah facilitators were also involved in the purchase ofused cars in the USA.75
The investigation revealed that some Lebanese financial institutions and exchange
houses were key in this money laundering operation. Following these findings, the US
Treasury designated Ayman Joumaa and both Hassan Hayash and the Elissa exchange
companies (two Lebanese exchange houses) for their role in laundering Joumaa’s drug
proceeds. Additionally, other companies within the Elissa group, which were involvedin the used car trade based in Benin, Africa, were also designated (at the time of thedesignation, approximately 350 vehicles consigned to Elissa were identified). The listof designations continued to expand, encompassing more companies and individuals
linked to Joumaa and his illegal enterprise.
This was subsequently followed by the designation of the Lebanese Canadian Bank(LCB) due to its routine use not only by drug traffickers and money launderers operatingin Latin America, Europe, Africa and the Middle East but also by Hezbollah’s facilitators.
During the investigation, transfers totalling $ 329 million between 2007 and 2011 were
uncovered, originating from Lebanon and West Africa and destined for the USA topurchase used cars for shipment to Africa. Most of these funds were wired throughaccounts held in Lebanon at the LCB, with the remaining amount originating from otherbanks in Lebanon and West Africa. Notably, nearly two-thirds of the aforementioned
amount was transferred from Hassan Hayash Exchange and Elissa currency exchange
accounts at the LCB. The investigation also found close ties between Hassan Hayash
and Elissa Exchange, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.76

45

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

JoumaaDrug Trafficking & Money
Laundering Organization

Ayman Saied JOUMAA
a.k.a. Aiman Said JOMAA KHARFAN
DOB 21 June 1964
POB AI Karouan, Lebanon
Criminal Associates and Front Companies:
Lebanon, Colombia, Panama

Elissa Group: Lebanon, Benin,
Republic of the Congo

Hassan Ayash Exchange: Lebanon

Jamal Mohamad KHAROUBIGeneral Manager

Akram Saied JOUMA
Nationality: Lebanese

Mahmoud Hassan
AYACHEDOB 1943
POB Miziara, Lebanon
Nationality: LebaneseIsmael Mohammed
YOUSSEF
Nationality: Colombian

Hassan Mahmoud
AYACHEDOB 1 May 1963
Nationality: Lebanese

Hassan Ayash Exchange
Company SARL

Mohamad Saied
JOUMAALEBANON

Anwar Saied JOUMAANationality: Lebanese

ELLISSA HOLDING
a.k.a. ELLISSA SAL (HOLDING)KHARROUBI, Ali Mohamed(a.k.a. KHAROUBI, Ali)
Nationality: Lebanese

BENIN

ELLISSA GROUP SA

Ziad Mohamad YOUSSEF
Nationality: Lebanese
ELLISSA MEGASTORELEBANON

COLOMBIAELLISSA EXCHANGE CO. SARL
a.k.a. ELLESSA EXCHANGE
a.k.a. ELLISSA EXCHANGE
ELLISSA PARC COTONOUNEW LINE EXCHANGE
TRUST CO.

ALMACEN JUNIOR NO.
2
SOLMARELLISSA SHIPPINGCOMERCIAL PLANETACAESAR’S PARK HOTEL(a.k.a. CAESAR’s PARK HOTELPHENICIA SHIPPINGOFFSHORE SARLALMACEN JUNIORPANAMAAGROPHEN

REPUBLIC OF CONGOYAMEN BENIN SARLGOLDI ELECTRONICS
S.A.

▶

46

ZONA LIBRE
INTERNATIONAL
MARKET S.A.

SOCIETE ELLISSA GROUP
CONGOFigure 8: Joumaa's Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Structure.
Source: US Department of the Treasury

CASES EXPLAINED

3.1.3 Migrant Smuggling and the Nexus
The nexus between terrorism and migrant smuggling is not new. There are reports andarticles on terrorist groups like ISIL and Al-Qaeda using migrant smuggling networks tomove their fighters,77 facilitators and families across the globe, occasionally disguisingthem as economic migrants, tourists or regular travellers, providing them with forgedpassports and visas whenever needed and arranging all cross-border travel requirementswith criminals who specialize in smuggling people. Some migrant smuggling networks
follow traditional smuggling routes either by land, sea, air or a combination of some or
all three. In each continent, the already well-established routes serve as standards from
where the smugglers adapt to new ones and incorporate new actors as well. Migrantsmugglers can adapt to the dynamics and particularities of any continent and region.
The particularity of Latin American routes is that the migrants are generally headed to
North America, with Canada or the USA as their final destination. There are two flows of
migrants to Canada and the USA, one that originates within Latin America, and anotherthat comes from other continents. Most of the migrants that come from other continents
do not go directly to Canada or the USA, but instead, find the most convenient landing
place in Latin America from where they start their journey up north, taking advantageof the existing migrant routes and smuggling businesses to facilitate and conceal theircross-continental journeys.
The majority of migrants arriving in Latin America come from Africa, the Middle East andAsia. But even before they land on the continent, they would have already been assisted
by migrant smugglers whose networks span several regions across the globe. The
leadership of the migrant smuggling network is usually based in Latin America, where
the criminal strategy is planned, but they have tentacles to execute all the steps of the
migration plan in different countries. Still in their countries of departure, one of the firststeps the migrants take, after paying a portion of the smuggling fee to the criminals, isto obtain their forged travel documents (fake passports, visas and/or a Seaman Service
Book). Hence, the criminal network sends them the documents via regular mail so they
can board the flights to Latin America. The quality of the forged documents is usually
very high, as illegal migrants are often able to pass through passport control systems
undetected. Once the migrants arrive on the continent, they are met by the smugglers
and taken to safe houses controlled by the criminals. At this point, the smugglers usually
collect the migrants’ fake passports/visas for reuse by future clients overseas.

47

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Thus, the migrants are either provided with fake identity documents, or they travel
onwards undocumented, going overland since they would need identification documents
to board an aircraft. Nearly all communications within the criminal organization and withthe service providers they hire are done through messaging apps such as WhatsApp,
Telegram, and imo, among others). The migrants receive a vague briefing about theirlong and excruciating overland itinerary to the north, usually passing through Brazil,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexicoand the USA. During the journey, there are two specific places that the migrants consider
to be the most difficult and dangerous: the first is the Darién Gap between Colombia
and Panama, where the jungle is dense and the hike through this treacherous area
takes between five to 10 days. They face dangers from the wild environment, as well as
drug dealers and criminal organizations that constantly harass them. Some migrants
lose their lives while crossing the Darién Gap. The second most dangerous place is in
Mexico, near the border with the USA, where kidnappings for ransom are common as
Mexican cartels view the thousands of migrants who arrive weekly as a lucrative sourceof income. Finally, most of the migrants who manage to reach the US/Mexico border are
arrested for crimes related to illegal migration.
An investigation conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police in collaboration with the US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), revealed the increasing popularity of thisroute over the years. In 2016, after being tipped off by an informer, Brazilian Federal Police
seized a package intended to be sent from a DHL office in São Paulo to Johannesburg,
South Africa, containing five sheets of passport pages with fake Brazilian visas under thename of two Kenyans, two Somalis and one Eritrean national. The visas were supposedly
granted and stamped by the Brazilian consulates in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa and Zimbabwe. The ensuing investigation found that the main smugglers
were based in Brazil but were connected to a smuggling network operating in Africa.
The smugglers’ modus operandi involved handing these passports with fake visas tothe migrants either in Kenya or Ethiopia and assisting them to board flights from Addis
Ababa to São Paulo. This is currently the busiest commercial air route linking Brazil to
Africa, with daily flights from São Paulo to Addis Ababa.
Following the seizure and subsequent investigation mentioned above, the police identified
Abdifatah Hussein Ahmed, a Somali and South African citizen residing in Brazil, who
had attempted to send passports with fake visas to South Africa. As the investigation
progressed, the police discovered two additional partners in crime: Abdessalem Martani,

48

CASES EXPLAINEDan Algerian national, and Mohsen Khademi Manesh, an Iranian national, both living in São
Paulo, Brazil. The Brazilian Federal Police later determined that these three were indeed
the leaders of a transnational criminal organization specialized in migrant smuggling. In
August 2019, all three men were arrested in Brazil during an operation named “Big Five”.78
The smugglers were known to supply illegal migrants from Africa and the Middle Eastwith counterfeit documents for their travel to Brazil and subsequent overland journeys to
Canada and the USA. During the investigation, it was discovered that the smugglers had
assisted and offered their services to two suspected terrorists. The network facilitated
the transportation of Abdi Yusuf Wardere (a Kenyan national) and Mohamed Ibrahim
Qoordheer (a Somali national) from East Africa to South America. Both individuals were
believed to be members of the Somali Al Shabaab terrorist organization. They werearrested in Central America before reaching the USA.79
However, these two suspected terrorists are not the only ones to have used the servicesof migrant smugglers to enter Latin America to reach Canada and the USA. According tosources80 in Panama and other Central American countries, there have been numerous
instances over the years involving suspected terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIL
and their affiliated Africa-based terrorist organizations exploiting migrant routes andsmuggling networks to travel to South America en route to North America. In 2017, othermigrant smuggling enterprises in Latin America came under scrutiny when Panamanianauthorities identified and detained 26 Yemenis suspected of terrorism while attempting
to cross overland the Darién Gap from Colombia.81
In 2018 the INTERPOL-led “Operation Andes” resulted in the arrest of 49 people
smugglers. This coordinated action involved 11 countries in Latin America and 44,000
checks at air, land and sea borders to identify and disrupt migrant smuggling routes.
Subsequent investigations revealed further details about the modus operandi of thesecriminal networks. As a result of the operation, additional arrests were made, including
the detention of four individuals who were listed in INTERPOL’s red notices for crimes
such as fraud, homicide and terrorism.82
Evidence points to members of terrorist organizations having found their way to Canada
and the USA through Latin America (see end note 88). Additionally, countless law
enforcement investigations have uncovered Panama as a critical spot in the migrants'
journey from South America to North America. Due to its geographical features, as
described in the paragraphs above, Panama became a point of attention for authorities.

49

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Operation Big Five

Abdifatah Hussein Ahmed

Abdessalem Martani

Somali/South African national
residing in Brazil

Mohsen Khademi Manesh
Iranian national
residing in Brazil

Algerian national
residing in Brazil

CANADA

UNITED STATESSYRIAMEXICOERITREAPANAMA
COLOMBIAETHIOPIAKENYAECUADORPERU

SOMALIA

BRAZIL

FAKE
BRAZILIAN VISAS

SOUTH AFRICA

Smugglers had assisted and offered theirservices to two individuals who weresuspected members of the Somali Al Shabaabterrorist organization.

MIGRANT▶
50

Abdi Yusuf Wardere
Kenyan national

Mohamed Ibrahim Qoordheer
Somali national

SMUGGLING

Figure 10: Irregular migration routes. Operation Big FiveCASES EXPLAINED

Hence, the government of Panama has improved its migration control measures, and by
furthering the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396, terrorist suspects havebeen detected in Panama through enhanced border security screening and the use ofbiometric tools by migration authorities (fingerprints, retinal scans and other biometrics)
as well as the sharing of information with regional partners.83 The biometric andbiographic data collected is checked against USA and international criminal databases,
as part of a USA/Panama joint task force responsible for sharing information on known
and suspected terrorists and cooperating on cases related to counter-terrorism.84
In 2021, according to statistics provided by the Panamanian migration authorities,
nearly 134,000 individuals illegally crossed the border between Colombia and Panama
across the Darién Gap; in 2022 the number rose to around 248,000 and in the first twomonths of 2023 more than 48,000 irregular migrants were detected.85 According tolocal sources, in 2021, 38 irregular migrants coming from the South American routewere identified in Panama as terrorist suspects after their biometrics were collected,
analyzed and checked against international watch lists. These suspects were allegedly
from the following countries: Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Yemen.
Another feature that stands out is the regular detection of Venezuelan passport holders
who actually are from Syria, Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern countries; in this case,these Venezuelan passport holders have no ties to Venezuela, hence the suspicion of
document fraud.86
In recent years, due to the rapid deterioration of the security situation in Ecuador
brought about by the activities of transnational organized crime groups, there has beena significant increase in the number of Ecuadorians attempting to migrate to North
America. This has led to the growth of criminal organizations involved in the smugglingof migrants. The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, in its assessment
visit to Ecuador in October 2023, identified as a potential emerging threat the use ofsome locations in Ecuador with deteriorating rule of law conditions as a safe haven byterrorists from elsewhere. In May 2023, the Ecuadorian police detained, in an operationin Carchi, an individual with an international terrorist alert issued by the United States.
Open-source data from US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides statistics
covering both USA south and north borders on encounters of suspected terrorists listed
in the Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS) who have attempted to cross USA borders.
According to CBP, this database houses information on known or suspected terrorists(KSTs). Consonant to the statistics, a significant number of terror suspects have

51

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

attempted to cross USA land borders in recent years.87 One notable case involves asuspected Somali terrorist with links to ISIL who was arrested in Alberta, Canada, in 2017.
The individual had conducted a vehicle ramming attack, displaying an ISIL flag, which
resulted in injuries to five people, including a police officer. The terrorist, Abdulahi Sharif,
departed Somalia around 2008 and subsequently travelled to various African countries.
Eventually, he made his way to Angola, where he encountered a migrant smuggler who
assisted him in reaching Brazil, where he arrived in 2011. Sharif stayed in Brazil for sometime, working in a chicken processing factory before he decided to move on northwards.
In July 2011, he arrived at the US-Mexico border - undocumented - where he was briefly
detained on the US side. His biometrical information revealed no criminal or terrorism
suspicion. After arriving in Canada in 2012, Abdulahi Sharif applied for refugee status.
However, within three years of living in Canada, local police became suspicious of his‘genocidal ideology’ and possible links to ISIL.88

3.2
Criminal Organizations and the Nexus
3.2.1 Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)
In the first half of 2023, a PCC plot to murder a Brazilian Senator, a public prosecutor
and a police commissioner was disrupted by the Brazilian Federal Police after a monthslong investigation that resulted in the arrest of nine PCC members in Brazil. The plot
also involved the kidnapping of the senator’s family as a means to negotiate the releaseof Marcos Henrique Camacho, aka ‘Marcola’, who is the top leader of PCC. Marcola
is currently serving consecutive prison sentences and is in custody in a federal
penitentiary in Brazil.
PCC is the largest criminal organization in Brazil. It has approximately 40,000 members
dispersed across Brazil’s 27 states, neighbouring countries and three other continents:
Africa, Europe and North America. PCC’s main criminal activity is transnational cocaine
trafficking. However, in recent years, the group has expanded its operations and become
increasingly involved in cybercrimes, money laundering and weapons trafficking. The

52

CASES EXPLAINED

group was born in the Brazilian prison system in 1993; it was then organized under asort of a ‘mutual-help’ ideology in which PCC’s members claimed to protect each otherfrom alleged state violence, given that the group was initially formed to ‘resist’ thestate. Under the banner of “peace, justice and freedom”, PCC rapidly gained a numerous
followers within the prison system who were willing to adhere to its harsh statutes andregulations. The criminal organization eventually expanded beyond the prisons, and its
influence gradually spread throughout Brazil. In 2021, the US Department of the Treasury
designated the PCC as a transnational criminal organization; enabling the identificationand freezing of its assets in other countries.
In the early 2000s, the PCC had already established itself as a significant threat to Brazil,
especially in the State of São Paulo. To gain advantages within the prison system andto exert influence over top government officials, the PCC embarked on a phase thatprioritized violent acts. The organization planned and executed multiple attacks against
government facilities and personnel, some of which were successful, while others were
not. The primary objective behind these attacks was to spread fear among the population
and use it as leverage in negotiations with the government, seeking the release of theirimprisoned members or their transfer to prisons under their influence.
Curiously, this phase of the PCC’s activities began after the arrest of Mauricio Hernandez
Norambuena, a Chilean guerrilla who was a member of an insurgent organization called
Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR). In 2002, Norambuena was apprehended
in Brazil for being the mastermind behind the kidnapping for ransom of a well-known
Brazilian businessman. Before his arrest in Brazil, he had been a fugitive from the Chilean
Justice system since 1996. In Chile, he had been convicted and sentenced to serve twoconsecutive life sentences for charges including murder, kidnapping for ransom andcoordinating terrorist attacks.
While incarcerated in the Brazilian prison system in 2002, Norambuena, an expert ininsurgency techniques, shared the same space with Marcola for over a year and a half.
During their time together, Norambuena imparted his knowledge of concepts suchas asymmetric warfare, and urban guerrilla and terrorism tactics, to Marcola. This
enabled Marcola to formulate a political objective that would fuel the growth of PCC
throughout Brazil. Marcola’s plan envisioned the involvement of PCC in politics, with theorganization fielding its political candidates for office not only in the state of São Paulobut also in other parts of Brazil. Norambuena was granted the status of "brother" by53

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

PCC, conferring on him an honorary leadership status and earning him high regard fromthe organization’s leadership. PCC even paid the legal fees of Norambuena’s defence
lawyers for many years.

Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)‣ The largest criminal organization in Brazil.
‣ Present in 4 continets: Latin America, Africa, Europe and North America.
‣ Criminal sources of revenue:transnational cocaine
trafficking

cybercrime▶

money launderingarms trafficking

Figure 11: PCC Core Elements

The collaboration between Norambuena and Marcola was a significant turning point for
the PCC, marking the beginning of a new phase in 2002 with a plot to bomb the courthouseof Barra Funda, São Paulo. The courthouse employed 5,000 people daily. PCC’s membersparked a car filled with 40 kilos of explosives in front of the courthouse in an attempt
to explode the building’s facade. However, the attack failed due to a malfunction of thedetonator device. PCC aimed to spread terror and destabilize the ongoing local electoral
process. At the same time, law enforcement agencies were conducting an investigation,
which involved surveillance and wiretapping of PCC members. The police concluded
that the group intended to interfere in São Paulo’s State governor elections to preventthe reelection of the leading candidate, who had a strong stance against PCC.
A few months later, the PCC attempted another bombing attack; this time the target
was São Paulo’s stock exchange building. Again, PCC planned to park a car filled with
explosives in front of the building. PCC’s objective was not only to destroy the building andinstil fear in the population but also to undermine Brazil’s economy by targeting one ofAmerica’s largest stock exchanges. Once again, the attack aimed to disrupt the ongoing
election process and create chaos within the political system, ultimately benefiting the54

CASES EXPLAINEDMET IN PRISON IN
2002

Marcos Camacho –“Marcola”

Mauricio Hernández
Norambuena

PCC

FPMR

2021: the US Department of theTreasury designated PCC as atransnational criminal organization

PCC plotted several attacks
against government facilities andgovernment employees

2002

2002

2006

Court house of Barra
Funda/São PauloSão Paulo’s stock
exchange buildingSão Paulo: successful
wave of attacks‣ car with 40 kilos of‣ car loaded with‣ 293 attacks within‣ attack failed due to a

‣ attack failed due toexplosives

explosives

malfunction of thedetonator device▶

police intervention

9 days aimed at:law enforcement,
firefighters, publicbuildings and public
transportation

Figure 12: PCC Appropriation of Terrorist Tactics

criminal organization. Later, PCC claimed that the 9/11 attacks inspired their choice oftarget for two reasons: firstly, they aimed to strike what they referred to as the ‘symbolof Brazilian capitalism’; secondly, the location of São Paulo’s stock exchange building ina densely populated area meant that the bombing would result in numerous casualties.
PCC intended to inflict maximum destruction and loss of life. Nevertheless, once again,
the attack failed due to quick police action. The ongoing surveillance of PCC’s leadership

55

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

and the information obtained from wiretaps conducted a week before the planned car
bombing enabled the police to locate and intercept the vehicle loaded with explosives.
Four years later, PCC would shake São Paulo state with a coordinated wave of violence
consisting of 293 attacks carried out over nine days. Their strategy changed; insteadof planning large-scale car bomb attacks similar to the ones that had previously failed,
PCC launched a series of coordinated smaller attacks targeting several locations,with a particular focus on law enforcement, firefighters, public buildings and public
transportation. Dozens of buses were set on fire, and buildings, housing, police andfirefighters were targeted with explosions; civilian and government personnel wereassassinated. Moreover, simultaneous riots erupted in 83 prisons where PCC members
were serving sentences. The wave of violence led to the death of dozens of law
enforcement officers, firefighters and prison guards. Additionally, a significant numberof civilians were murdered. The wave of violence subsided when São Paulo’s government
allegedly negotiated with Marcola. As a result, within 48 hours of the mediation, theattacks came to a halt.
After that episode, PCC ‘exported’ this strategy to other Brazilian states where its local
leadership has been randomly using terrorist tactics as a means of allegedly trying tonegotiate with the government. However, the criminal organization has not executed
another large-scale and coordinated attack, likely because its key leaders are currently
incarcerated in high-security federal prisons with limited contact with the outside world.

3.2.2 Comando Vermelho (CV)This criminal organization is mentioned in a previous section of this document,
highlighting its connection with the Colombian FARC during a business deal involving‘weapons for drugs exchange’ in the Amazon jungle in the late 1990s. These twoorganizations share some strategies, including reliance on narcotrafficking as theirprimary source of income and the insurgency strategies employed to control territorial
areas. The FARC focuses on rural areas, while the CV operates predominantly in urban
areas of Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, both organizations employ terrorist tactics to exert
control over the population and resist government intervention within their territories.
Similarly to PCC, the CV also originated within the prison system, specifically in Rio deJaneiro, Brazil, in 1979. At that time, Brazil was under a military regime, and there was a56

CASES EXPLAINED

prison (Instituto Penal Cândido Mendes) that housed left-wing insurgents and guerrillas
who were convicted under the national security law. In addition to housing left-winginsurgents and guerrillas, this prison also received inmates from Rio de Janeiro’s favelas
who were convicted of ‘common crimes’ such as murder, drug trafficking, theft, and bankrobbery. The most dangerous ones - Rio de Janeiro’s worst criminals and Brazil’s mostwanted guerrillas - had the opportunity to interact and learn from each other. In addition,
the prison conditions at Cândido Mendes were harsh (e.g. overcrowding, violence andisolation). These difficult conditions provided a fertile ground for the development of an
ideology centred around “mutual help” where – similar to PCC –members would protect
and support each other against the State. This ideology became the foundation of the
newly formed CV.
CV quickly expanded its influence outside the prison in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas to become
the most powerful criminal organization in the city. At one point, it controlled 90 per centof the city’s favelas. Its main business was drug trafficking and armed robbery, but its
leadership learned from the guerrillas the importance of infiltrating state institutions. They
began funding politicians, Rio de Janeiro’s Samba Schools and even certain segmentsof the private sector. However, in the early 2000s, internal conflicts and power struggles
within CV led to fractures and the emergence of splinter criminal organizations. As aresult, CV lost some of its territorial control and influence. Nevertheless, CV expanded
its operations into other Brazilian states and overseas to neighbouring countries. It iscurrently the second-largest criminal organization in Brazil.
In Rio de Janeiro, CV exerts control over several favelas through the use of force
and coercion. The local population is subject to the organization’s social rules, anddisobedience often results in severe punishment, including the death penalty. CV’s
members are heavily armed and trained in guerrilla warfare tactics. Their arsenalconsists of a wide range of weapons, including rifles, hand grenades, man-portable airdefense systems, .50 calibre anti-aircraft machine guns, and other heavy weaponry. CV
employs brutal and violent methods to repel police forces entering their territories. They
resort to horrific tactics, such as burning people alive, including captured police officers.
CV has also its own ‘crime tribunal’ within the favelas, primarily for population control
purposes. This internal court passes judgments on various crimes, including imposing
the death penalty on police informants and defectors. Rapists are also sentenced todeath, although CV members themselves engage in acts of sexual assault without
consequences. Additionally, individuals who commit theft face punishment such as

57

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

hand amputation. These are just a few examples of the range of punishments metedout by the CV’s tribunal.
The failure of governance in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas has resulted in a power vacuum thatwas filled by criminal actors like CV. This situation has imposed significant costs on local
government authorities. CV’s use of terrorist tactics has enabled them to establish control
over urban territories and bolstered their power beyond Rio de Janeiro. As a result, theorganization has gained notoriety as a capable, assertive, and ruthless criminal group.
Their territories in Rio de Janeiro have become havens for wanted criminals from acrossBrazil and other countries. Recent police operations uncovered numerous fugitives andhigh-profile wanted criminals seeking refuge within CV’s controlled areas. However, thissanctuary comes at a steep cost, CV imposes substantial fees on criminals and terrorists
from outside Rio de Janeiro who seek shelter in their territories. In return CV offers
protection from police raids, effectively shielding these criminals from the reach of law
enforcement. Recent large-scale police operations in Rio de Janeiro - in CV-controlledareas – have been aimed at apprehending high-profile convicted criminals who sought
refuge in the city’s favelas. However, these police operations come at a significant costfor the State. They involve loss of lives in clashes with CV members, require substantial
financial and logistical resources, and can diminish political capital for the government.
Moreover, CV uses the narrative of ‘oppression’ whenever the police conduct raids in the
favelas, effectively garnering sympathy and support from disgruntled segments of thesociety. By positioning itself as a victim of “state oppression”, CV enhances its influenceand strengthens its position among the population it controls. Furthermore, by projecting
a narrative of victory in the face of police operations, CV effectively utilizes propaganda
tools to recruit and retain specialized members, bolstering its criminal capabilities.

3.2.3 Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa Cartel is widely regarded as one of the largest and most influential drugtrafficking organizations in the Western Hemisphere. It originated in the Mexican stateof Sinaloa and has expanded its operations globally. While it is referred to as a cartel, it ismore accurately described as a federation or alliance of several drug trafficking groups
led by prominent Mexican drug lords, since the cartel is not a hierarchical structure.
The state of Sinaloa in Mexico has historically been associated with contraband and drug
cultivation, particularly marijuana and poppy plants. The region has been a significant

58

CASES EXPLAINED

Sinaloa Cartel
CORRUPTIONMONEYLAUNDERINGCARTEL’S
POWER AND
INFLUENCETERRORISMTACTICSDRUG
TRAFFICKING▶ VIOLENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES▶ KIDNAPPINGS▶ BOMBINGS▶ TARGETED KILLING▶ ASSASSINATIONS▶ MARIJUANA▶ COCAINE▶ FENTANYL▶ HEROIN▶ METHAMPHETAMINE

TRANSPORTATION METHODSDESTINATIONS▶ CARGO AIRCRAFT▶ PRIVATE AIRCRAFT▶ SUBMARINES▶ SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS▶ CONTAINER SHIPS▶ FISHING VESSELS▶ BUSES▶ RAIL CARS
▶ AUTOMOBILESUNITED STATES"El Chapo"

INTERNATIONAL
MARKETS

Arrested and extradited to the UnitedStates in 2017

Joaquín Guzmán Loera
LEADER OF SINALOA CARTEL

Sentenced to life imprisonment"Los Chapitos"
successors

Ovidio Guzmán
López

Iván Archivaldo
Guzmán Salazar

Joaquín Guzmán
López

▶

Ismael "El Mayo"
ZambadaJesus Alfredo
Guzmán Salazar

Figure 13: Sinaloa Cartel Overview

59

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

hub for drug trafficking organizations, many of which trace their origins back to Sinaloa.
The genesis of some of these organizations can be attributed to small farming families
in rural parts of Sinaloa. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of these families transitioned
from contraband to the drug trade, focusing primarily on marijuana. Pedro Aviles, oneof the early figures in the marijuana trade, played a role in introducing Joaquín Guzmán
Loera, commonly known as ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán to the business. Gradually, El Chapo rose
to prominence in what would be the Sinaloa Cartel.89
El Chapo’s leadership and strategic alliances allowed the Sinaloa Cartel to dominate theillicit drug trade, particularly the smuggling of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, andmarijuana into the United States and other international markets. Currently, the Sinaloa
cartel is deeply involved in the manufacturing and export of fentanyl to the United States
and beyond.
Sinaloa cartel has been known to utilize a wide range of transportation methods andnetworks to transport drugs and precursor chemicals for their drug trafficking operations.
These transportation methods include cargo aircraft, private aircraft, submarines andsubmersible vessels, container ships, supply vessels, go-fast boats, fishing vessels,
buses, rail cars, tractor trailers, automobiles, and both private and commercial interstateand foreign carriers. The cartel often adapts and uses different modes of transportation
based on its resources, the type of drugs being transported, and the location of its
operations. To facilitate their operations, Sinaloa Cartel establishes and maintains
extensive networks of couriers, stash houses, and tunnels. These networks span across
Mexico and sometimes extend into the United States of America.90
The cartel’s power and influence extend beyond drug trafficking, as it has been involvedin various criminal activities such as money laundering, corruption, and acts of violence,
including territorial disputes with rival cartels. The organization has a reputation for
its ability to adapt to law enforcement efforts and maintain its operations despite thecapture or death of its leaders.
Additionally, the cartel has proved very capable in the use of violent tactics to gain
and maintain control over territories. It has engaged in conflicts with rival cartels andgovernment forces, using violence as a means to secure its dominance and protect
its operations. This has contributed to its status as one of the most feared criminalorganizations in Mexico.91 An incident, known as “the battle of Culliacán”, on 17 October

60

CASES EXPLAINEDTHE BATTLE OF CULLIACÁNOCTOBER, 2019
STREETS OF
CULLIACÁN

Ovidio Guzmán López arrested

SINALOA CARTEL

Surrounded
government forces

Deployed around
700 gunmen

Attacked civilians

Set up street
blockades

Attacked government
and military targets

used by the cartel commandos in thebattle of Culliacán:

ARMOUREDVEHICLES.50 MACHINEGUNS▶

ROCKETLAUNCHERSGRENADESHEAVY WEAPONS

Figure 14: Facts about the Battle of Culliacán

2019 demonstrated the Sinaloa cartel’s capacity to employ terrorist tactics to advanceits goals. On that day, one of El Chapo’s sons, Ovídio Guzman Lopez, was arrested during
a coordinated police and military operation. In response, Sinaloa Cartel deployed around
700 gunmen in the streets of Culliacán, who surrounded government forces, set up
street blockades and attacked civilians, government and military targets throughout thecity. The cartel commandos were equipped with armoured vehicles, .50 calibre machine
guns, rocket launchers and grenades, among other heavy weapons and artillery. Ovídio
Guzmán was released from custody later that day, after an impasse between thegovernment forces and the cartel’s gunmen.92

61

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Although El Chapo was arrested and extradited to the United States in 2017, andsubsequently sentenced to life imprisonment, the Sinaloa Cartel continues to operate
under the leadership of his successors, his sons known as “Los Chapitos” comprisedof Ovidio Guzman Lopez, Ivan Guzman Salazar, Alfredo Guzman Salazar and Joaquin
Guzman Lopez, and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, a long-standing figure within theorganization, who is believed to play a significant role in its operations.93
However, it’s important to note that the dynamics of drug cartels can change over time,
and the power and influence of specific organizations may fluctuate. Other cartels, suchas the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), have also risen in prominence and posesignificant challenges to the Sinaloa Cartel’s dominance.94

3.2.4 Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) emerged in 2010 and has become a prominentand powerful criminal organization in Mexico. It has capitalized on the power vacuums
created by the killings, captures, and internal conflicts within older cartels, such as the
Sinaloa Cartel. The CJNG is known for its aggressive use of violence, including targetedassassinations, public displays of brutality, and confrontations with rival cartels. They
have employed tactics aimed at instilling fear and terror, asserting their dominance in the
territories they operate in. Additionally, the CJNG has been reported to engage in public
relations campaigns, using social media and other channels to disseminate propaganda
and project an image of power and control.
Despite the capture of some of its top leaders, the CJNG has shown resilience andadaptability, allowing it to maintain its position as one of Mexico’s foremost criminal
threats. The organization has demonstrated a willingness to expand its influence andoperations into new territories, challenging the control of other cartels and engaging
in violent confrontations. The CJNG is heavily involved in drug trafficking, particularly
the production and distribution of illicit drugs such as methamphetamine, cocaine,
heroin, and fentanyl. They control significant portions of drug trafficking routes and have
expanded their influence across multiple Mexican states, including Jalisco, Michoacán,Colima, and Guanajuato. The CJNG is also involved in other criminal activities such asorganized crime, extortion, kidnapping, and acts of violence.95

62

CASES EXPLAINED

Known for its extreme violence and brutal tactics, the CJNG engages in territorial battles
and confrontations with rival cartels, that often result in high numbers of casualties.
The CJNG has been involved in mass killings, public displays of violence, and the useof military-grade weaponry. They have also targeted law enforcement and government
officials in their operations,96 shot down military helicopters, ambushed high-levelgovernment employees and politicians, and also attempted to take control of the cityof Tepalcatepec using infantry and terrorist tactics.97 In May 2015, the CJNG launcheda series of attacks in the State of Jalisco and its capital Guadalajara, one of Mexico’s
largest cities. During the wave of attacks, the cartel torched several businesses,
hijacked and burnt dozens of buses, trucks and cars and used them to set up numerous
roadblocks throughout the state; they also shot down an Army Cougar Helicopter, killing
several soldiers and wounding many others.98 CJNG has in its ranks armed commandos,
deploys armoured vehicles and is among the first to use drones, land mines and various
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).99
Moreover, the CJNG has expanded its influence beyond Mexico and has establishedconnections and operations in other countries, including the United States, SouthAmerica, and Europe. They have developed partnerships with international drugtrafficking organizations, facilitating the global distribution of drugs. Consequently, theCJNG has grown in prominence and has become one of the most powerful and feared
criminal organizations in Mexico. They have demonstrated their ability to challenge otherestablished cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel, in their quest for control over lucrative
drug trafficking territories.

63

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Conclusions &Recommendations
4. Conclusions &Recommendation

64

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions
FARC (dissidents), Hezbollah, PCC, CV, Cartel of the Suns, and Mexican Cartels, among
others that operate in Latin America, have undoubtedly enhanced their capabilities
over time in both the criminal and the terrorist arenas. Groups have displayed acapacity for innovation at every stage of the terrorist activity cycle. As they continue
to globalize, their proficiency in each step of the cycle is likely to improve, as theircriminal enterprises and potential for terrorist activities expand through their growing
connections with transnational criminal organizations worldwide. As this scenario
unfolds, these organizations will continue to learn from different cultures, and distinct
criminal environments and their ability to operate in diverse regional and global theatres
will expand. The same applies to other criminal organizations operating in the continent.

EXPANSION

innovation in every step of the terrorist activity cycle

DISTINCT CRIMINAL CAPABILITY TO
OPERATE IN DIVERSE REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL THEATRESDISTINCT CRIMINALSETTINGSLEARNING FROMDIFFERENT CULTURES

FARC-D,
Hezbollah, PCC,CV Cartels of the Suns,
Mexican Cartels

INTERACTIONS OF CRIME ANDTERRORISM ENTAIL MULTIPLE
MANIFESTATIONSCRIME AND TERRORISM HAVE BECOME
CLOSELY RELATED AND WIDESPREAD▶

Figure 16: Crime-terror Nexus Expansion

65

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

Their interactions with terrorist organizations have heightened their danger and enhanced
their ability to carry out more destructive actions and adopt strategies that further theirprofit-making objectives.
Recent events in the Latin American continent have demonstrated how the crime andterror nexus threat is indeed in constant evolution.
At the beginning of January 2024, Ecuador’s gangs unleashed a wave of violence inretaliation for Government actions to counter criminality. In recent years the country has
been facing increasing levels of gang violence. The prison system has been the fulcrumof the escalating violence and drug trafficking has been its driver. Gang members rioting
in prisons, brutal attacks on security forces, and an invasion of a TV news broadcast
have prompted the Government of Ecuador to declare a state of internal armed conflict
followed by the designation of 22 criminal gangs as terrorist organizations. What we
see unfolding in Ecuador is no different from what happens in other Latin Americancountries: an enduring crisis in the prison system, a criminal environment conducive tointer-group learning of terrorist tactics and the growing demand for cocaine in European
countries as well as in other parts of the world.100
In Brazil, a recent counter-terrorism operation carried out in November 2023 interrupted
a Hezbollah preparatory terror act and its connected recruitment efforts. The recruiters
lured Brazilian nationals to travel to Lebanon to meet Hezbollah members. The Brazilians
were interviewed by Hezbollah to check if they were capable of conducting terrorist
attacks in Brazil, including carrying out possible target assassinations. Hezbollah
recruiters asked if they belonged to any criminal organization in Brazil, among otherquestions, seeking to recruit Brazilian nationals who had criminal experience. Foreign
law enforcement agencies flagged a small group of Brazilians - possibly involved withcriminal organizations, drug trafficking and terrorist activities - travelling to Lebanon ina suspicious manner. Some of the suspects were arrested in Brazil under the counterterrorism law. However the main recruiter is still at large, with an international arrest
warrant issued against him by INTERPOL. In February 2024 a Brazilian Federal Court
accepted the complaint presented by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and made thesuspects defendants for alleged connection with Hezbollah. In the same legal sentence,
the judge authorized a parallel case to investigate the crimes of smuggling, document
forgery, and terrorism financing allegedly perpetrated by the defendants in the course of
their disrupted terrorist plots.101

66CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Indeed, as demonstrated in this report, the interactions between crime and terrorism
exhibit multiple manifestations. These can be observed within organizations themselvesor through transactions between independent groups at distinct stages of the terrorist
activity cycle, showcasing both similarities and differences. Therefore, the nexus
between crime and terror has grown closer, displaying greater proficiency and wider
reach. This phenomenon permeates every continent, albeit with regional variations.
Furthermore, the continuous evolution of society and technology has created avenues
for new business opportunities, while giving rise to innovative and diverse forms ofinteraction between crime and terrorism.

4.2 Recommendations⁕ Political commitment is crucial for strengthening strategic actions to combat
organized crime and terrorist movements. The political leadership of a state or
region must have a comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by the crime
and terror nexus and recognize that countering this threat requires concerted efforts
and commitment from multiple political entities. Coordinated high-level policies in
conjunction with ground-level actions, greatly enhance the chances of success in
adopting a comprehensive whole-of-government approach.

⁕ Promote the adoption of legislation against terrorism and transnationalorganized crime, in accordance with international standards according toUnited Nations international treaties and conventions, United Nations Security
Council resolutions and the recommendations of the International Financial
Action Task Force. The criminalization of acts of terrorism and its financing, terroristgroups and organized criminal groups, as well as efficient legislation in the adoptionof targeted financial sanctions and terrorist designation criteria in accordance withinternational obligations, will facilitate the work of judges, prosecutors and law
enforcement officials to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions of cases
involving terrorist groups or transnational organized crime groups.

⁕ Governments and non-governmental organizations and academia should
enhance awareness programmes to address conditions conducive to crime
and terrorism within local communities. The identification of the causes and the67The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

conditions that are conducive to and enable the radicalization of individuals within agiven population and/or their recruitment for criminal activities is paramount. Once theconditions are identified, government agencies and non-governmental organizations
could come together to design, with the inclusion of academia, specific programmesthat could minimize or eliminate the root causes that drive certain individuals to thearms of the criminals and/or terrorists.

⁕ Collaboration with the private sector, civil society, multilateral organizations,and academia helps to broaden “threat knowledge” and provide strategic tools.
Government institutions and agencies cannot efficiently counter the crime and terror
nexus on their own. Combating this complex problem requires a multidimensional
approach that is more effective and targeted. Collaboration with the private sector,
civil society, multilateral organizations, and academia can provide additional tools,
approaches, and insights. Moreover, failure to involve local communities at thegrassroots level in preventing and combating these threats hampers the effectivenessof any response.

⁕ Disruption of finance and logistics is key in dismantling criminal, insurgent andterrorist organizations. Recent law enforcement cases worldwide on the crime
and terror nexus have demonstrated that the most effective strategy for weakening
or dismantling criminal and terrorist organizations is targeting their financial flows
and logistical networks. By disrupting these critical aspects, their ability to carry out
harmful activities is significantly impeded, and their capacity to regroup and reorganize
is compromised. These actions are generally more effective than techniques that
focus on apprehending or neutralizing the organization’s leadership or seizing illicit
commodities like drugs, weapons, and contraband.
Strengthening the measures in place and taking decisive actions to effectively identify
and address the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, including to identify
cases in which proceeds from human trafficking, illegal trade in weapons, drugs,
metals or cultural property, etc., finance terrorism. In this regard, Member Statesshould consider establishing a mechanism to prioritize investigations regarding
potential terrorism financing and facilitation when investigating organized crime.

68CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS⁕ Efficient inter-institutional cooperation and coordination at both national andinternational levels are critical for more effective actions. Success stories incountering criminal and terrorist organizations highlight the necessity of converging
institutions, agencies, and governments in a collaborative effort. This can only be
accomplished through cooperation and coordination at every level among different
institutions and governments. Cooperation starts with the effective exchange of
information and intelligence between cooperating agencies, leading to the gradualdevelopment of trust through joint intelligence analysis.

⁕ Ample recognition of the threat by government and private actors involved– directly or indirectly – in countering crime and terrorism is essential. Ina domestic or international cooperation and coordination environment, the fullacknowledgement of the threat is crucial for the free flow of information andcoordination of actions. Optimal outcomes in interagency work require a sharedperception of objectives and the threat being countered. If a cooperating agency,
whether governmental or private, fails to recognize or consider the risks posed by
the threat being confronted, its contribution to a joint effort may be suboptimal,
potentially impacting the overall success possibilities.

⁕ Government agencies with different mandates (counter-crime vs. counterterrorism) should be able to work in tandem when faced with a terrorist threat(any of the steps within the terrorist activity cycle). Crime and terror interactions
pose an additional challenge when the underlying motivations of a terrorist/criminalgroup or a cell are misunderstood. In Latin America, there are numerous cases
where terrorist groups are primarily motivated by financial gains, using ideology as acover to conceal their profit-making ethos. This situation creates a ‘grey zone’ where
government agencies may incorrectly assess the actual threat: is it purely terrorist,
purely criminal or a combination of both? In such cases, agencies working together
are better equipped to overcome the challenges presented by this phenomenon.

⁕ Creating fusion centres optimizes intelligence work, while multi-agency task
forces enhance operational work. When faced with a complex, dynamic, andtransnational threat, fusion centres and task forces serve as valuable tools for
effective counteraction and prevention. By bringing together collaboration partners
in a shared physical space with common tools and objectives, these environments

69

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

enable quick and robust responses at both strategic and tactical levels. These
collaborative environments foster trust-building through personal and professional
relationships, shaping networks of individuals and agencies that share best practices
and lessons learned.

⁕ Intelligence collection and criminal proceeding evidence collection should betreated differently since intelligence information presented as evidence incriminal proceedings by law enforcement authorities is a controversial practice.
Intelligence officers, law enforcement officers, and prosecutors occasionally struggle
to work with the concepts of “intelligence” and “legal evidence.” In some cases,
there is a grey line between them, and officers and prosecutors are challenged withthe prospect of using or not using intelligence material in criminal prosecutions.
Occasionally, police officers and prosecutors include intelligence reports in theircriminal proceedings, which weakens their cases since intelligence reports are
not considered a body of court evidence and may jeopardize an entire prosecution
strategy.

⁕ Expanding training opportunities to address the crime-terror nexus and raisingawareness about the nexus across the region is essential. Raising awarenessabout the nexus in the region and beyond is critical. Currently, there is a lack of solid
knowledge on this issue among governments, the private sector, academia, NGOs,
and others stakeholders. This results in a low level of nexus threat perception in Latin
America. Moreover, this gap prevents government agencies from addressing thethreat more consistently and consequently, the private sector, academia and NGOs
are not fully engaged.
Enhancing capacity-building to effectively address the crime-terror nexus isfundamental. These training initiatives should cover various aspects, including
threat assessment, intelligence analysis, investigative techniques, legal frameworks,
and cooperation strategies. Additionally, specialized training modules focusing on
emerging trends, evolving tactics, and case studies can help practitioners develop
the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively combat the crime-terror nexus. By
investing in such training opportunities, authorities can enhance their capacity toidentify, investigate, and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities, ultimately contributing
to the overall security and stability of their jurisdictions. Capacity-building should be
extended to different groups, beyond law enforcement.

70

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The above recommendations serve
as general guidelines for Member
States in Latin America and should
be adapted to each country’s
specific circumstances and realities.
These recommendations are notexhaustive and should be considered
in conjunction with the more specificrecommendations outlined in the
GCTF The Hague Good Practices on
the Nexus between Transnational
Organized Crime and Terrorism andthe related Policy Toolkit developed
by UNICRI. These resources provide
further guidance and practical tools
to address the crime-terror nexus
which can be valuable references
for developing tailored strategies
and approaches at the national andregional levels.

71

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

References

1. The Nexus Initiative envisaged four regional

meetings (West Africa and the Sahel, theBalkans, South Asia and Southeast Asia, andEast Africa and the Horn of Africa regions)involving representatives from governments, international experts, practitioners,
international and regional organizations, civilsociety, non-governmental organizations andacademia. Through information gatheredfrom the meetings and different consultations on regional contexts, the GCTF The
Hague Good Practices on the Nexus Between
Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism
were developed and the related Nexus Policy
Toolkit.

2. Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism. Fa-

naticism and arms of mass destruction.
Oxford University Press; Makarenko, T.
(2004). The crime terror continuum: tracing
the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis; Perri, F. & Brody,
R. (2011). The dark triad: organized crime,
terror and fraud. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 14(1); Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty
entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism. Cambridge University Press; Schmid,
A. (2004). Links between terrorism and drugtrafficking: a case of narcoterrorism? Global
Security, available at http://turkishpolicy.
com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPQ2004-2-schmid.pdf; Williams, P.
(2014). Organized crime and terrorism.
LACC Working Paper 2/2014, Latin American
and Caribbean Center. Florida International
University.

72

3. Farah, D. (2013). Fixers, superfixers andshadow facilitators: how global networks
connect. In: Convergence: Illicit networks
and national security in the age of globalization. NDU Press; Hubschle, A. (2011). From
theory to practice: exploring the organizedcrime-terror nexus in sub Saharan Africa.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 5(3-4); Realuyo,
C. (2016). The ISIS convergence. Defense
Dossier, American Foreign Policy Council,
available at https://www.afpc.org/publications/e-journals/new-near-east-challenges; Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty entanglements.
Corruption, crime and terrorism. Cambridge
University Press; United Nations. (2001).
Security Council Resolution 1373/2001,
available at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/
crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf

4. Ibid.
5. Gilman, N., Godhammer, J., & Weber, S.

(2011). Deviant Globalization: Black market
economy in the 21st century. Continuum
Books; Miklaucic, M. & Brewer, J. (2013). Introduction. In: Convergence: Illicit networks
and national security in the age of globalization. NDU Press; Nye, J. (2009). Cooperação e conflito nas relações internacionais.
Gente Editora; Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism.
Cambridge University Press.

6. Andreas, P. (2004). Illicit International Polit-

ical Economy: the clandestine side of globalization. Review of International Political
Economy, 11(3):641-652; Farah, D. (2013).
Fixers, superfixers and shadow facilitators:
how global networks connect. In: Convergence: Illicit networks and national security
in the age of globalization. NDU Press;
Gilman, N., Godhammer, J., & Weber, S.

REFERENCES(2011). Deviant Globalization: Black market
economy in the 21st century. Continuum
Books; Miklaucic, M. & Brewer, J. (2013). Introduction. In: Convergence: Illicit networks
and national security in the age of globalization. NDU Press; Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty
entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism. Cambridge University Press; United
Nations. (2001). Security Council Resolution
1373/2001, available at https://www.unodc.
org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.
pdf

7. Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism. Cambridge University Press.

8. Dishman, C. (2016). Terrorists and criminal

dynamics: a look beyond the horizon. In: H.
Matfess & M. Miklaucic, editors, Beyond Convergence: a world without order. Center for
Complex Operations: National Defense University; Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent
global terrorism and criminality converge?
General parameters and critical scenarios.
Journal of the Spanish Institute of Strategic
Studies, (1); Makarenko, T. (2008). Criminal
and Terrorist networks: gauging interaction
and the resultant impact on counter-terrorism. In E. Brimmer, editor, Five dimensions ofhomeland security. Center for Transatlantic
Relations, John Hopkins University.

9. Makarenko, T. (2008). Criminal and Ter-

rorist networks: gauging interaction andthe resultant impact on counter-terrorism.
In E. Brimmer, editor, Five dimensions ofhomeland security. Center for Transatlantic
Relations, John Hopkins University; Shelley,
L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption,
crime and terrorism. Cambridge University
Press; Shender, W. & Abraham, I. (2005). Illicit
flows and criminal things: States, border andother side of globalization. Indiana University
Press.

10. Atzili, B. (2010). State Weakness and Vacuumof power in Lebanon. Studies in Conflict andTerrorism, 33:757-782; Dishman, C. (2016).
Terrorists and criminal dynamics: a lookbeyond the horizon. In: H. Matfess & M.
Miklaucic, editors, Beyond Convergence: aworld without order. Center for Complex Operations: National Defense University; Shelley,
L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption,
crime and terrorism. Cambridge University Press; Sell, S. (2014). Ahead of her time?
Reflections on Susan Strange’s contributions
to contemporary political economy. George
Washington University; Williams, P. (2013).
Lawlessness and disorder: an emerging
paradigm for the 21st century. In Convergence: Illicit networks and national security
in the age of globalization. NDU Press.
N.B. border areas may not necessarily always
be more tense though in some settings, theconditions created by poverty, perceived
marginalization and the state's vacuum cancreate vulnerabilities that allow for the competition for scarce resources among populations on either side of the border.

11. Shadow economy, or informal economy islargely seen in South American land borders.
The busier borders generally entail larger
informal economy. One case in point is the
TBA between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay
whose informal economy represents a large
portion of the local economy. (Neumann, V. &Page, S. (2018). The many criminal heads ofthe Golden Hydra: How the tri-border area’s
interlocking arcs of crime creat Latam’s
number 1 international fusion center. Counter
Extremism, avaliable at https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/The%20
Many%20Criminal%20Heads%20of%20
the%20Golden%20Hydra%20%28May%20
2018%29.pdf Robust criminal organizations based in Latin America have alreadyexpanded their operations overseas, sometimes assisted by international terrorist organizations. Both criminals and terrorists
have profited by engineering alliances with73The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

each other, and they are not afraid of state
repression because in these cases they
benefit from the corruption, ineffectivenessand leniency of the states and their incapability to repress them or exert control of theareas they are nested. (Asal, V., Deloughery,K., & Phillips, B. (2012). When Politicians selldrugs: examining why Middle East ethno
political organizations are involved in the
drug trade. Terrorism and Political Violence,24(2):199-212; Perri, F. & Brody, R. (2011).
The dark triad: organized crime, terror andfraud. Journal of Money Laundering Control,
14(1); Realuyo, C. (2013). Collaborating tocombat illicit networks through interagency
and international efforts. In Convergence:
Illicit networks and national security in theage of globalization. NDU Press; Shelley, L.
(2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption,
crime and terrorism. Cambridge University
Press).

12. Dishman, C. (2016). Terrorists and criminal

dynamics: a look beyond the horizon. In:
H. Matfess & M. Miklaucic, editors, Beyond
Convergence: a world without order. Centerfor Complex Operations: National Defense
University; Leuprecht et al. (2015). Hezbollah’s global tentacles: a relational approachto convergence with transnational organized crime. Terrorism and Political Violence,29(5): 902- 921; Miklaucic, M. & Brewer, J.
(2013). Introduction. In: Convergence: Illicit
networks and national security in the age ofglobalization. NDU Press; Realuyo, C. (2013).
Collaborating to combat illicit networks
through interagency and international
efforts. In Convergence: Illicit networks andnational security in the age of globalization.
NDU Press; Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism.
Cambridge University Press; Sthol, C. &Sthol, M. (2007). Networks of terror: theoretical assumptions and pragmatic consequences. Communication Theory, 17(2):93124; Williams, P. (2013). Lawlessness anddisorder: an emerging paradigm for the 21st74

century. In Convergence: Illicit networks andnational security in the age of globalization.
NDU Press; Williams, P. (2001). Transnational Criminal Networks. In J. Arquilla and D.
Ronfeldt. Network and netwars, the futureof terror, crime and militancy. Rand Corporation, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/
monograph_reports/MR1382.html.

13. For the purpose of this report, we will be using
the terms that are essentially a ‘common
ground’ among the scholars: cooperation,transformation and convergence.

14. Dishman, C. (2001). Terrorism, crime andtransformation. Studies in conflict and terrorism, 24(1): 43-58, available at https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/248984170_
Terrorism_Crime_and_Transformation;
Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent global
terrorism and criminality converge? Generalparameters and critical scenarios. Journalof the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies,(1); Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror
continuum: tracing the interplay between
transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis;
Shelley, L. et al. (2005). Methods and motives:
exploring links between transnational organized crime and terrorism. National Institutefor Justice: US Department of Justice.

15. Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent global

terrorism and criminality converge? Generalparameters and critical scenarios. Journalof the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies,(1); Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror
continuum: tracing the interplay between
transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis;
Shelley, L. et al. (2005). Methods and motives:
exploring links between transnational organized crime and terrorism. National Institutefor Justice: US Department of Justice.

16. Dishman, C. (2001). Terrorism, crime andtransformation. Studies in conflict and terror-

REFERENCES

ism, 24(1): 43-58, available at https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/248984170_
Terrorism_Crime_and_Transformation;
Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent global
terrorism and criminality converge? Generalparameters and critical scenarios. Journalof the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies,(1); Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror
continuum: tracing the interplay between
transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis;
Shelley, L. et al. (2005). Methods and motives:
exploring links between transnational organized crime and terrorism. National Institutefor Justice: US Department of Justice.

17. Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror con-tinuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis.

18. Dishman, C. (2001). Terrorism, crime andtransformation. Studies in conflict and terrorism, 24(1): 43-58, available at https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/248984170_
Terrorism_Crime_and_Transformation;
Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent global
terrorism and criminality converge? Generalparameters and critical scenarios. Journal of
the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies, (1);Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis;
Shelley, L. et al. (2005). Methods and motives:
exploring links between transnational organized crime and terrorism. National Institute for Justice: US Department of Justice.
Makarenko (2004) devised a concept called‘the crime-terror continuum’ in which organized crime and terrorism are situated in thesame plane, but in opposite sides, thus bothare theoretically capable of converging at a
central point. Organized crime is placed at
the far left, while terrorism is placed at the far
right. Halfway through the ‘continuum’ lies
the point of convergence. When the entity

reaches that point it simultaneously presentscharacteristics of both crime and terror.

19. Global Counterterrorism Forum (2017). First

Regional Meeting on the nexus between
Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism
Initiative, available at https://www.thegctf.
org/What-we-do/Initiative-Activities/Detail/
ArtMID/842/ArticleID/53/First-Regional-Meeting-on-the-Nexus-between-Transnational-Organized-Crime-and-Terrorism-Initiative; United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute (2019). Policy
Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices on
the nexus between transnational organizedcrime and terrorism, available at http://www.
unicri.it/in_focus/on/Policy_Toolkit_nexus_
crime_terrorism.

20. United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute (2019). Policy
Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices on
the nexus between transnational organizedcrime and terrorism, available at http://www.
unicri.it/in_focus/on/Policy_Toolkit_nexus_
crime_terrorism.

21. Dishman, C. (2001). Terrorism, crime andtransformation. Studies in conflict and terrorism, 24(1): 43-58, available at https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/248984170_
Terrorism_Crime_and_Transformation;
Ibañez, L. C. (2013). To what extent global
terrorism and criminality converge? Generalparameters and critical scenarios. Journalof the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies,(1); Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror
continuum: tracing the interplay between
transnational organized crime and terrorism. Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor andFrancis; United Nations Interregional Crime
and Research Institute (2019). Policy Toolkit
on the Hague Good Practices on the nexus
between transnational organized crime andterrorism, available at http://www.unicri.it/
in_focus/on/Policy_Toolkit_nexus_crime_
terrorism.

75The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

22. United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute (2019). Policy
Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices on
the nexus between transnational organizedcrime and terrorism, available at http://www.
unicri.it/in_focus/on/Policy_Toolkit_nexus_
crime_terrorism.United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute (2019).
Policy Toolkit on the Hague Good Practices
on the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism, available at http://
www.unicri.it/in_focus/on/Policy_Toolkit_
nexus_crime_terrorism.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.; Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror

continuum: tracing the interplay between
transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis.

26. Lasmar, J. (2015). A legislação brasileira decombate e prevenção ao terrorismo quatorze
anos após o 11 de setembro: limites, falhase reflexões para o futuro. Revista de Sociologia e Política, 23(53):47-70; Rand (2007).
Network technologies for Networked terrorists. Assessing the value of information andcommunication technologies for terrorist organizations. Rand.

27. Financing of Recruitment for terrorist

Purposes (2018). FATF Report. Financial Action Task Force, available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-recruitment-terrorist- purposes.html. Lasmar, J.
(2015). A legislação brasileira de combatee prevenção ao terrorismo quatorze anos
após o 11 de setembro: limites, falhas e reflexões para o futuro. Revista de Sociologia e
Política, 23(53):47-70; Rand (2007). Network
technologies for Networked terrorists. Assessing the value of information and communication technologies for terrorist organizations. Rand.

76

28. Lasmar, J. (2015). A legislação brasileira decombate e prevenção ao terrorismo quatorze
anos após o 11 de setembro: limites, falhase reflexões para o futuro. Revista de Sociologia e Política, 23(53):47-70.

29. Don, B. et al. (2007). Network Technologies

for Networked terrorists. Assessing thevalue of informations and communication
Technologies to modern terrorist organizations. Rand.

30. Azevedo, C. V. (2022). Locating the Crime

Terror Nexus in the Terrorist Activity Cycle:
the case of Hezbollah and FARC. PhD thesis.
International Relations. PUC Minas – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais.
Belo Horizonte/Brazil.

31. Makarenko, T. (2004). The crime terror con-tinuum: tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism.
Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor and Francis;
Schmid, A. (2004). Links between terrorism
and drug trafficking: a case of narcoterrorism? Global Security, available at http://turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPQ2004-2-schmid.pdf;
Perri,
F. & Brody, R. (2011). The dark triad: organized crime, terror and fraud. Journal of
Money Laundering Control, 14(1); Shelley,
L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption,
crime and terrorism. Cambridge University
Press; Williams, P. (2014). Organized crime
and terrorism. LACC Working Paper 2/2014,
Latin American and Caribbean Center.
Florida International University; Dishman, C.
(2016). Terrorists and criminal dynamics: alook beyond the horizon. In: H. Matfess & M.
Miklaucic, editors, Beyond Convergence: aworld without order. Center for Complex Operations: National Defense University.

32. Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism. Fanat-

icism and arms of mass destruction. Oxford
University Press; Makarenko, T. (2004). The
crime terror continuum: tracing the interplay
between transnational organized crime andREFERENCES

terrorism. Global Crime. Routledge/Taylor
and Francis; Perri, F. & Brody, R. (2011). The
dark triad: organized crime, terror and fraud.
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 14(1);Shelley, L. (2014). Dirty entanglements. Corruption, crime and terrorism. Cambridge
University Press; Schmid, A. (2004). Links
between terrorism and drug trafficking: acase of narcoterrorism? Global Security, available at http://turkishpolicy.com/images/
stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPQ20042-schmid.pdf; Williams, P. (2014). Organized crime and terrorism. LACC Working
Paper 2/2014, Latin American and Caribbean Center. Florida International University;
Dishman, C. (2016). Terrorists and criminal
dynamics: a look beyond the horizon. In: H.
Matfess & M. Miklaucic, editors, Beyond Convergence: a world without order. Center for
Complex Operations: National Defense University.

33. Hudson, R. (2010). Terrorist and organizedcrime groups in the Tri-border area (TBA)
of South America. The Library of Congress,
available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf; Lasmar, J.
(2015). A legislação brasileira de combatee prevenção ao terrorismo quatorze anos
após o 11 de setembro: limites, falhas e reflexões para o futuro. Revista de Sociologia
e Política, 23(53):47-70.

34. FARC was delisted in Colombia as a terror-

ist organization in 2020 in the wake of thePeace accords celebrated in 2016. The
peace accords aimed to end the armed
struggle with FARC and provide a transition
that allowed the group to emerge politicallyas a regularly constituted and formally recognized party, since the peace negotiation
included guaranteed parliamentary seats to
FARC. Nevertheless, FARC dissidents have regrouped after the peace accord and rejoined
the guerrilla under different banners. They
are referenced in generic terms as “FARC -D”.

35. For more on these Mexican cartels crime/

terror partnerships: Valencia, Daniel (2014).
The evolving dynamics of terrorism: the terrorist-criminal nexus of Hezbollah and Los
Zetas Drug Cartel. Published By University ofTexas in El Paso – UTEP; Montaruli, Florencia (2021) Ex-Mayor’s meth bust reveals Hezbollah’s power in Mexico. Iranwire; Palacio,
Raimundo (2019) Hezbolá en Mexico. El Financiero; Rojas, Juan (2023) Mexican Cartels
bolster foothold and alliances in Colombia.
Diálogo Americas.United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute(2019). Policy Toolkit on the Hague Good
Practices on the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism, available
at http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/on/Policy_
Toolkit_nexus_crime_terrorism.

36. Findings from the United Nations Coun-

ter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) visit to Ecuador on behalf of
the Counter-Terrorism Committee, 23-27
October 2023.

37. Quintana, A.R.; Florance, C.M. (2015).

Regions of Enduring Interest: Latin America,
The Caribbean and Africa. The Heritage Foundation. Available at: https://www.heritage.
org/sites/default/files/2019-10/2015_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_Regions%20of%20
Enduring%20Interest_Latin%20America%20
the%20Caribbean%20and%20Africa.pdf.
US Congress. (2014). Terrorist Groups in Latin
America: the changing landscape. Hearing
before the Subcommitte on Terrorism, Non
Proliferation and Trade of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86587/html/
CHRG-113hhrg86587.htm

38. After the peace accords of 2016, FARC dis-sidents took over its transnational cocaine
business together with other Colombian
based drug trafficking organizations thattook advantage of the power vaccum left

77

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

after FARC demobilized. However, in theyears following the peace accords an increasing number of former FARC fighters
have abandoned the peace process andrejoined the guerrilla and its profitable transnational cocaine trafficking business.

39. Tribunal Regional Federal 4a Região (2007).
Lawsuit 2006.70.02.002541-9. Diário TRF4,
available at https://www.radaroficial.com.
br/d/27654786?q=2006.70.02.002541-9.

40. Nisman, A. (2006). Indictment AMIA’s case.

Investigations Unit Office of the Attorney
General, available at https://albertonisman.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2006Nisman-indict-AMIA-full-ENG_.pdf; Tribunal
Regional Federal 4a Região (2007). Lawsuit
2006.70.02.002541-9. Diário TRF4, available at https://consulta.trf4.jus.br/trf4/
controlador.php?acao=consulta_processual_resultado_pesquisa&selForma=NU&txtValor=2006.70.02.002541-9.&chkMostrarBaixados=&todasfases=&todosvalores=&todaspartes=&txtDataFase=&selOrigem=TRF&sistema=&txtChave=;US
Department of the Treasury (2006). Treasury
targets Hizballah fundraising network in
the triple Frontier of Brazil, Argentina andParaguay. Press Center, available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp190.aspx

41. AMIA – Argentine Israelite Mutual Associ-ation. AMIA is located in Buenos Aires, Argentina and was struck by a deadly suicide
attack in 1994. This attack left 85 dead andhundreds of wounded (Nisman, A. & Burgos,
M. (2013). AMIA case. Office of Criminal Investigations, Investigations Unit of the Officeof the Attorney General, available at http://
www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/4/2015/01/nismanindict.pdf)

42. Mohsen Rabbani is an Iranian citizen who

arrived in Argentina in 1983. Rabbani conducted the intelligence operations that led tothe bombing (Ibid.; Levitt, M. (2015). Hezbol-

78

lah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Partyof God. Georgetown University Press).

43. Omairi and Rabbani became close friends

at the time Omairi lived in the Shia Mosque
in Buenos Aires in the 1980s (Al Tauhid
Mosque). This mosque was a place wheremoney collected from Muslim donations in
TBA and the region were counted, stored andlater sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon. (Nisman,A. (2006). Indictment AMIA’s case. Investigations Unit Office of the Attorney General,availableathttps://albertonisman.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2006-Nisman-indict-AMIA-full-ENG_.pdf.

44. Mohsen Rabbani’s INTERPOL Red Notice(arrest warrant) is currently active and canbe seen in INTERPOL’s website: https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Notices/
View-Red-Notices#2007-49960.

45. Nisman, A. (2006). Indictment AMIA’s case.

Investigations Unit Office of the Attorney
General, available at hhttps://albertonisman.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2006Nisman-indict-AMIA-full-ENG_.pdf

46. Levitt, M. (2016). Hezbollah’s criminal

networks: useful idiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfessand M. Miklaucic. Beyond Convergence: aworld without order. Center For Complex
Operations, National Defense University;
Realuyo, C. (2014). The terror/crime nexus.
Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1).

47. Constanza, W. (2012). Hizballah and its

mission in Latin America. Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 35(3):193-210; Levitt, M.
(2016). Hezbollah’s criminal networks: usefulidiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfess and M. Miklaucic.
Beyond Convergence: a world without order.
Center For Complex Operations, National
Defense University; Rabasa, A. et al. (2017).
Counternetwork. Countering the Expansionof Transnational Criminal Networks. Rand;

REFERENCES

Realuyo, C. (2014). The terror/crime nexus.
Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1).

48. US$: United States Dollar.
49. Realuyo, C. (2014). The terror/crime nexus.

Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1);Levitt, M. (2016). Hezbollah’s criminal
networks: useful idiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfessand M. Miklaucic. Beyond Convergence: aworld without order. Center For Complex Operations, National Defense University.

50. Constanza, W. (2012). Hizballah and its

mission in Latin America. Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 35(3):193-210; Levitt, M.
(2016). Hezbollah’s criminal networks: usefulidiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfess and M. Miklaucic.
Beyond Convergence: a world without order.
Center For Complex Operations, National
Defense University; Rabasa, A. et al. (2017).
Counternetwork. Countering the Expansionof Transnational Criminal Networks. Rand;
Realuyo, C. (2014). The terror/crime nexus.
Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1).

51. Constanza, W. (2012). Hizballah and its
mission in Latin America. Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 35(3):193-210; Levitt, M.
(2016). Hezbollah’s criminal networks: usefulidiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfess and M. Miklaucic.
Beyond Convergence: a world without order.
Center For Complex Operations, National
Defense University; Realuyo, C. (2014). The
terror/crime nexus. Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1).

52. Levitt, M. (2016). Hezbollah’s criminal

networks: useful idiots, henchmen and organized criminal facilitators. In: H. Matfessand M. Miklaucic. Beyond Convergence: aworld without order. Center For Complex
Operations, National Defense University;
Realuyo, C. (2014). The terror/crime nexus.
Hezbollah’s global facilitators. Prism, 5(1).

53. Ali Mohamad Saleh was designated by

US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) in2011 for his involvement in Hezbollah’sfunding. Designation in this website: https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.
aspx?id=12992

54. Belandria, M. T. (2020). O narco colonialism

socialista. Seminário: Como destruir um
país: uma Aventura socialista na Venezuela. FUNAG – Fundação Alexandre Gusmão,available at https://www.gov.br/funag/pt-br/
centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/seminario-201ccomo-destruir-um-pais-uma-aventura-socialista-na-venezuela201d; Coutinho, L.
(20018). Hugo Chávez: O espectro. Editora
Vestígio; Humire, J. (2020). The Maduro/
Hezbollah nexus: How iran backed networks
prop up the Venezuelan Regime. Atlantic
Council, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
issue-brief/the-maduro-hezbollah-nexushow-iran-backed-networks-prop-up-the-venezuelan-regime/.

55. Ghazi Nassereddine was sanctioned by the

US Department of Treasury for supporting
Hezbollah’s facilitation and logistics in Venezuela. (US Department of the Treasury.
Treasury targets Hizballah in Venezuela(2008). Press Center, available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp1036.aspx).

56. A facilitator may have many roles within aterrorist organization including the provisionof logistics, communications, forged travel
documents, safe houses, providing financial
resources, money laundering schemes, recruitment structures, among other tasks.

57. Tareck El Aissami was sanctioned in 2017by the US Department of the Treasury fortransnational drug trafficking and money
laundering together with all the companies
related to his illegal business. (Treasury(2017). Treasury sanctions prominent Venezuelan drug trafficker Tareck Al Aissami and

79

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

his primary front man Samark Lopez Bello.
Press center US Department of the Treasury,
available at https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases?src=ilaw).

58. Man pad – Man portable air defense system.
59. Azevedo, C. V. (2018). Venezuela’s Toxic Re-

lations with Iran and Hezbollah: an avenueof violence, crime, corruption and terrorism.
Revista Brasileira de Ciências Policiais, 9(1):43-90, available at https://periodicoshom.
pf.gov.br/index.php/RBCP/article/view/520;
Belandria, M. T. (2020). O narco colonialism
socialista. Seminário: Como destruir um
país: uma Aventura socialista na Venezuela. FUNAG – Fundação Alexandre Gusmão,available at https://www.gov.br/funag/pt-br/
centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/seminario-201ccomo-destruir-um-pais-uma-aventura-socialista-na-venezuela201d; Drug Enforcement Administration (2020). Nicolas
Maduro Moros and 14 current and former
Venezuelan Officials charged with Narco
Terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking andother criminal charges. Media Relations,available at https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2020/03/26/nicolas-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials; Humire, J. (2020). The Maduro/
Hezbollah nexus: How iran backed networks
prop up the Venezuelan Regime. Atlantic
Council, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
issue-brief/the-maduro-hezbollah-nexushow-iran-backed-networks-prop-up-the-venezuelan-regime/.

60. Azevedo, C. V. (2022). Locating the Crime

Terror Nexus in the Terrorist Activity Cycle:
the case of Hezbollah and FARC. PhD thesis.
International Relations. PUC Minas – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais.
Belo Horizonte/Brazil.

61. This also comes from the author’s extensive
field work in several countries in both SouthAmerica and Africa. Besides, the author was

80

able to speak to dozens of law enforcement
agents as well as judges, prosecutors andmilitary from countries within the two continents. However, by necessity these sources
are anonymized.

62. UNODC (2023). Global Report on Cocaine.

Local Dynamics, Global Challenges. Crime
Just, available at https://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/cocaine/
Global_cocaine_report_2023.pdf

63. US Department of the Treasury (2006).
Treasury targets Hizballah fundraising
network in the triple Frontier of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Press Center, available
at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp190.aspx; US Department of the Treasury (2004). Treasury
designates Islamic Extremist, two companies supporting Hezbollah in TBA. Press
Center, available at https://www.treasury.
gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
js1720.aspx.

64. Agência Brasil (2020). Brasil extradita parao Paraguai libanês preso em 2018, available at https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2020-07/brasil-extradita-Assad-Barakat; Brito, J. (2021). Paraguai
expulsa libanês suposto operador do Hezbollah para o Brasil. CNN Brasil, available athttps://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/paraguai-expulsa-libanes-suposto-operador-do-hezbollah-para-o-brasil/.

65. We have interviewed the Judge Miguel

Guerrero who is in charge of this case within
the Federal Court of Eldorado (Juzgado
Federal de Eldorado). He leads a team ofexperts who is responsible for conducting this successful case: Valeria Kuppers,
Cinthya Sandberg, Valeria Rivas, Eliana Dornelles and Nerea Urruti. Also, the prosecutor’s office in charge of this investigation isthe ‘Money Laundering and Financial Crimes
Office’ (PROCELAC – Procuradoria de Criminalidad Economica y Lavado de Activos).

REFERENCES

66. These 14 names included in the Argentini-an terror watch list are: Hassan Ali Barakat,
Ahmad Ali Barakat, Hussein Ali Barakat,
Mousa Hatem Barakat, Merhi Riad Hassan,
Ibrahim Fadi Ibrahim, Hussein Mohamad
Jomaa, Hussein Ahmad Youssef, Youssef
Hassan Jaber, Mohamad Ibrahim Melhem,
Rabah Diab Nour Edinne, Hamze Ali Hachemand Hassan Fawaz.

67. In Spanish: “Registro Público de Personas y

Entidades Vinculadas a Actos de Terrorismo
y su Financiamento – REPET”. (Unidad Inteligencia Financieira Argentina. UIF ordena
congelamento de activos de Hezbollah, su
ala militar y líderes de la organización. Argentina, available at https://www.argentina.gob.
ar/noticias/uif-ordena-congelamiento-deactivos-de-hezbollah-su-ala-militar-y-lideresde-la). Independiente Iguazu (2019). Exclusivo: se filtran nuevos nombres en la causadel llamado Clan Barakat, todos de Ciudaddel Este, Paraguay, available at https://www.
elindependienteiguazu.com/2019/02/16/
se-filtraron-nuevos-nombres-en-la-causadel-llamado-clan-barakat-todos-de-ciudadde-este/.

68. The funds of criminal origin are launderedtaking advantage of the process of buying/selling and the subsequent exchange ofcasino chips. Another technique that Barakatclan uses is the purchase of winning prize
vouchers with the criminal funds. In thiscase, the terrorists collect the prize and thus
justify the origin of the money.

69. Unidad Inteligencia Financieira Argentina.

UIF ordena congelamento de activos de Hezbollah, su ala militar y líderes de la organización. Argentina, available at https://www.
abc.com.py/internacionales/clan-barakat-allanan-casino-en-puerto-iguazu-1782736.
html; Independiente Iguazu (2019). Exclusivo: se filtran nuevos nombres en la causadel llamado Clan Barakat, todos de Ciudaddel Este, Paraguay, available at https://www.
elindependienteiguazu.com/2019/02/16/

se-filtraron-nuevos-nombres-en-la-causadel-llamado-clan-barakat-todos-de-ciudadde-este/.

70. Drug Enforcement Administration (2020).

Nicolas Maduro Moros and 14 current andformer Venezuelan Officials charged with
Narco Terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking
and other criminal charges. Media Relations,available at https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2020/03/26/nicolas-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials; Department of Justice (2011).
US charges alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin
with laundering drug proceeds for Mexican
and Colombian cartels. US Attorney’s Office.
Eastern District of Virginia, available athttps://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/vae/
news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html;
US Court (2011). Ayman Joumma Indictment. Eastern District of Virginia. Alexandria
Division, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4325659-Joumaa-Indictment.html; US Department of theTreasury (2015). Treasury sanctions
maritime network tied to Joumaa criminalorganization. Press Releases, available at:https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0196; Unodc (2019). Linkages
between Organized Crime and Terrorism.
Module 16. Education for Justice University Module Series. 2019, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/FINAL_
Module_16_Linkages_between_Organized_
Crime_andTerrorism_14_Mar_2019.pdf.

71. US Department of the Treasury (2015).
Treasury sanctions maritime network tied
to Joumaa criminal organization. Press
Releases, available at: https://home.treasury.
gov/news/press-releases/jl0196.

72. Drug Enforcement Administration (2020).
Nicolas Maduro Moros and 14 current andformer Venezuelan Officials charged with
Narco Terrorism, corruption, drug trafficking and other criminal charges. Media Re-

81

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

lations, available at https://www.dea.gov/
press-releases/2020/03/26/nicolas-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials. Drug Enforcement Administration (2011). DEA investigation leads
to OFAC designation of Lebanese- based
Drug Trafficking and money laundering
network. Available at: https://www.dea.
gov/press-releases/2011/01/26/dea-investigation-leads-ofac-designation-lebanese-based-drug-trafficking

77. For further reading on this topic: Azevedo,

print of Lebanon’s Party of God. Georgetown
University Press; Ottolenghi, E. (2018). State
sponsors of terrorism: an examination of
Iran’s global terrorism network. Congressional Testimony. House of Homeland Security
Committee. Subcommittee of Counter Terrorism and Intelligence, available at https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/EO_HHSC_
WrittenTestimony.pdf

C. V. ISIS Resurgence in Al Hawl Camp andHuman Smuggling Enterprises in Syria:
Crime and Terror Convergence? Perspectives On Terrorism. Volume, XIV, Issue 4.
2020. Available at: https://pt.icct.nl/article/
isis-resurgence-al-hawl-camp-and-humansmuggling-enterprises-syria-crime-and-terror; Zelin, A. Wilayat Al Hawl: remaining andincubating the next Islamic State generation.
Policy Notes. Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. 2019. Available at: https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/media/907?disposition=inline; CTED – Counter Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate. Identifying
and Exploring the Nexus between Human
Trafficking, Terrorism and Terrorism Financing. 2019. Available at: https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/
Jan/ht-terrorism-nexus-cted-report.pdf.

74. Department of Justice (2011). US charges

78. Department of Justice (2019). Internation-

73. Levitt, M. (2015). Hezbollah: The Global Foot-

alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin with laundering drug proceeds for Mexican andColombian cartels. US Attorney’s Office.
Eastern District of Virginia, available athttps://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/vae/
news/2011/12/20111213joumaanr.html; US
District Court (2012). US versus Lebanese
Canadian Bank and others. US District Court
New York, available at https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/U.S.%20v.%20Lebanese%20
Canadian%20Bank%2C%20et%20al.%20
Amended%20Complaint.pdf

75. US District Court (2012). US versus Lebanese

Canadian Bank and others. US District Court
New York, available at https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/U.S.%20v.%20Lebanese%20
Canadian%20Bank%2C%20et%20al.%20
Amended%20Complaint.pdf

82

76. Ibid.

al Law Enforcement Cooperation leads to
Brazilian takedown of Significant Human
Smugglers. Justice News, available athttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-law-enforcement-cooperation-leads-brazilian-takedown-significant-human.

79. Rojas, R. (2019). A cruel business. Migrantesde Outro Mundo, available at https://migrantes-otro-mundo.elclip.org/un-negocio-cruel/un-negocio-cruel.html; Bensman,Todd. Assessing the report about four ISIS
terrorist suspects caught in Nicaragua.
Center For Immigration Studies, available at https://cis.org/Bensman/Assessing-Report-about-Four-ISIS-Terrorist-Suspects-Caught-Nicaragua.

80. Interview with sources who belong to law

enforcement agencies and others from local
NGOs whose names are withheld for confidentiality reasons.

REFERENCES

81. Puigrefagut, A. (2019). EEUU y Panama de-spligan uma fuerza operativa para filtrar el
Paso de Darién. Universidad de Navarra.
Global Affairs, available at https://www.unav.
edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/
eeuu-y-panama-despliegan-una-fuerza-operativa-para-filtrar-el-paso-de-darien.
Drug
Enforcement Administration (2011). DEA
investigation leads to OFAC designation of
Lebanese- based Drug Trafficking and money
laundering network. Available at: https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2011/01/26/
dea-investigation-leads-ofac-designation-lebanese-based-drug-trafficking

82. INTERPOL (2018). Americas: INTERPOL

led operation Andes nets 49 people smugglers, available at https://www.interpol.int/
News-and-Events/News/2018/Americas-INTERPOL-led-Operation-Andes-nets-49-people-smugglers

dades-detuvieron-38-migrantes-irregulares.

87. Customs and Border Protection (2023). Ter-

rorist Screening Dataset Encounters. CBP
Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2023. US
Customs and Border Protection, available
at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
cbp-enforcement-statistics

88. Bensman, T. (2018). The first border crosser

to attack in North America: finally, an update.
Center for Immigration Studies, available athttps://cis.org/Bensman/First-BorderCrosser-Attack-North-America-Finally-Update

89. Insight crime (2021). Sinaloa Cartel. Availa-

ble at: https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

90. US Department of Justice (2023). Justice

US Migration Policy. Argument. Foreign
Policy, available at https://foreignpoli c y . c o m / 2021 / 06/ 2 4/ p a n a m a - c o l o m bia-darien-jungle-gap-latin-america-migration-crisis-united-states-biden-harris/

Department announces charges against
Sinaloa Cartel’s global operation. “Chapitos”
charged in Department’s latest actions to
disrupt flow of illegal fentanyl and otherdangerous drugs. Available at: https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-against-sinaloa-cartel-s-global-operation

84. United Nations Security Council Resolution

91. Sullivan, J. (2022). Crime Wars. Operational

83. Mouynes, E. (2021). The (literal) gap in(2017). UNSCR 2396, available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N17/460/25/PDF/N1746025.pdf?OpenElement; Country Reports on Terrorism.
Panama (2021). US Department of State,available at https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/panama/

85. Migración (2023). Migración Panama. Es-

tadísticas. Transito Irregular por Darién.
República de Panamá, available at https://www.migracion.gob.pa/inicio/estadisticas

86. Coriat, A. (2022). Terroristas intentan llegar a

Norteamérica a través de Darién. La Estrella
de Panama, available at https://www.laestrella.com.pa/nacional/220202/220201-autori-

Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in
Mexico and Brazil. International Review of
the Red Cross – IRRC. Cambridge University
Press.

92. Ibid.
93. US Department of the Treasury. Office ofForeign Assets Control (2023). Sinaloa
Cartel. Los Chapitos. Available at: https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/202305/20230509_sinaloa_guzman_chart.pdf ;DEA. US Drug Enforcement Administration(2023). Press Conference. DOJ and DEA
announces charges against Chapitos inthe latest actions to disrupt flow of illegal
fentanyl and other dangerous drugs. Avail-83

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

able at: https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/
files/2023-04/DOJ%20and%20DEA%20
Announce%20Charges%20against%20
Chapitos%20in%20the%20Latest%20
Actions%20to%20Disrupt%20Flow%20
of%20Illegal%20Fentanyl%20and%20Other%20Dangerous%20Drugs_final.pdf

100. Decreto Presidência de la Republica de

Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in
Mexico and Brazil. International Review of
the Red Cross – IRRC. Cambridge University
Press.

Ecuador. No 111. Daniel Noboa Azín. 2024.
Available at: https://www.comunicacion.
gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/
Decreto_Ejecutivo_No._111_20240009145
200_20240009145207.pdf

95. Insight Crime. (2020). Jalisco Cartel New

101. TRF6. Tribunal Regional Federal 6ª Região.

94. Sullivan, J. (2022). Crime Wars. Operational

Generation. Available at: https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/
jalisco-cartel-new-generation/; DOJ (2018).
Justice, Treasury and State Departments
announce coordinated Efforts against
Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion. Available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-treasury-and-state-departments-ann o u n c e - c o o r d i n a t e d - e n f o rc e m e n t - e f forts-against

96. Sullivan, J. (2022). Crime Wars. Operational
Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in
Mexico and Brazil. International Review of
the Red Cross – IRRC. Cambridge University
Press.

97. Ibid. Felbab-Brown, V. (2021). Criminal

violence, politics and state capture in
Michoacán. Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/criminal-violence-politics-and-state-capture-in-michoacan/

98. Sullivan, J. (2022). Crime Wars. Operational
Perspectives on Criminal Armed Groups in
Mexico and Brazil. International Review of
the Red Cross – IRRC. Cambridge University
Press.

99. Sullivan, J.; Bunker, R.; Kuhn, D. (2022). Useof Improvised Land (Anti-vehicles) Mines84

in Mexican Wars. Small Wars Journal – El
Centro. Sullivan, J. (2022). Crime Wars. Operational Perspectives on Criminal Armed
Groups in Mexico and Brazil. International Review of the Red Cross – IRRC. Cambridge University Press.

Lawsuit
1100180-44.2023.4.06.3800.
Ação Penal. Procedimento ordinário. 2ª
Vara Federal Criminal de Belo Horizonte.
Direito Penal. Terrorismo. Organização
Terrorista. Available at: https://pje1g.trf6.
jus.br/consultapublica/ConsultaPublica/DetalheProcessoConsultaPublica/
listView.seam?ca=8a647267ad2050a12f37be92a0d25a597ac7bfa1300bdd79. Ottolenghi, E. (2024). Hezbollah Terror Plotin Brazil. International Institute for Counter
terrorism - ICT. Reichman University. Available at: https://ict.org.il/hezbollah-terror-plot-in-brazil/

UNICRI, Viale Maestri del Lavoro, 10, 10127 Torino – Italy
Tel: + 39 011-6537 111 / Fax: + 39 011-6313 368
Website: www.unicri.org
Email: unicri.publicinfo@un.org

REFERENCES

87

The Nexus between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Latin America

88