KGRI Working Papers
No. 1

Japan Beyond Asia:
How the Middle East Could be Integrated
into the Indo-Pacific Geostrategy

Version 1.0
May 2024

Amane KOBAYASHI

Keio University Global Research Institute© Copyright 2024 Amane KOBAYASHI
Senior Researcher, The Institute of Energy Economics

Japan Beyond Asia:
How the Middle East could be integrated into the Indo-Pacific Geostrategy
Amane KOBAYASHI
Middle East for Japan and Asia: still critical for their energy security
The Middle East is crucial for Japan, particularly in terms of energy security. Since theGreat East Japan Earthquake and nuclear accident in 2011, Japan's energy selfsufficiency rate has remained below 10%. Japan's dependence on the Middle East for
crude oil supply has been higher than 80% since 1996 and is likely to remain at a highlevel in the future. Furthermore, in the summer of 2022, it increased to more than 95%
after Japan stopped importing oil from Russia due to the Invasion of Russia into Ukraine.
Many Asian countries are facing energy security challenges- growing energy demands
and limited supplies. The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) estimates that Asia
(East Asia, ASEAN, India, etc.) will need 46 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil in
2050. The Middle East, which is expected to export 32 million b/d, could be the only
major supplier to Asia.i On the other hand, the political and security instability and great
power competition in the Middle East will have negative impacts on energy security not
only in Japan but also in broader Asia.
From the perspective of energy geopolitics, it is necessary to consider not only the
instability of oil and gas producers, but also the risk of supply disruption such as shut
down of transportation route, large-scale natural disasters, and armed conflicts. In the
Middle East and Africa, there are multiple chokepoints for the supply of crude oil andnatural gas, including the Straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal.
Roughly 80% of the crude oil supplied for Japan goes through the Strait of Hormuz.
Power vacuum caused by political upheavals, armed conflicts, and great powercompetition in the region increase the risk of supply disruption. Not only the energy
supply, the volatility of energy prices increases if the oil and gas producing countries haveinsufficient surplus production capacity, or if international cooperation such as therelease of stockpiled reserves and reciprocity agreements does not succeed.
The North Africa is also geopolitically important, bordering the Suez Canal, theMediterranean Sea, and the Strait of Gibraltar, and facing Europe. Libya is one of theworld's leading oil producing countries with the world's 10th largest crude oil reserves.
Algeria has the world's 10th largest natural gas reserves and 15th largest crude oil

1reserves. The importance of natural gas development in the Eastern Mediterranean
region including Egypt increases due to the Ukraine crisis since February 2022. The
political and economic trends in the MENA also have a significant impact on policies
related to the economic statecraft and economic security, which have been the focus ofmuch attention in recent years.
Daily transit volumes of oil through maritime chokepoints (million barrels/day)

Source: Bloombergii

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Net exports and imports of oil (forecast)

Source: IEEJiii
New challenges
1) Abe’s legacy and beyond
Shinzo Abe was the first Japanese Prime Minister who had frequently visited Middle
Eastern countries in the decade. Through the 9 trips from 2013 to 2020, Abe visited 13
countries in the region. It includes the visit to Iran in June 2019 trying to mediate themilitary tension and facilitate dialogue between Iran and the U.S. and the gulf Arabcountries.
This was due not only to the vital importance of stability in the Middle East region forJapan's energy security but also to the increasing number of incidents in which Japanesecitizens and interests got targeted in terrorist attacks and armed conflicts amid instability
in the region. The Abe administration has also emphasized its engagement in thestabilization of the Middle East from the perspective of contributing to the stability of
the international order under its Proactive Pacifism policy. The administration promotedcooperation with the region in a wide range of economic and social fields, as well asbuilding multilayered relations, including political, security, and cultural exchanges. To
this end, the administration has been more active in strengthening relations with Middle
Eastern countries by increasing high-level government dignitary visits and meetings.

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The National Security Strategy, first formulated in December 2013, states, “Stability in
the Middle East is an issue that is inseparably linked to the stable supply of energy, andtherefore Japan’s very survival and prosperity. Given that the Gulf States are the largest
source of crude oil for Japan, in order to ensure the stability of the Middle East, Japan
will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with these countries,
encompassing wide-raging economic cooperation beyond resources and energy, as wellas politics and security. In this context, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolutionof major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East, including the issue of
democratization in Arab countries that stems from the Arab Spring, the situation in Syria,
Iran’s nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. In
the same vein, Japan will also collaborate with other countries that play important rolesin the Middle East, such as the U.S., European countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.”iv
Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Middle East
April- May 2007

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt

April- May 2013

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey

August 2013

Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Djibouti

October 2013

TurkeyJanuary 2014

Oman

January 2015

Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestine

November 2015

TurkeyApril-May 2018

UAE, Jordan, Israel, Palestine

June 2019

Iran

January 2020

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairsv
As the United States reduces its engagement in the Middle East and the political andsecurity environment in the region becomes more fluid, Japan seeks to promote
engagement with regional stability from the perspective of energy security and securing
sea lanes. Traditionally, Japan's relations with Middle Eastern countries haveconcentrated on economics and cultural aspects, and its diplomatic and security
leverage has been considered limited. To overcome this challenge, the Abeadministration has been strengthening its presence through enhanced summit
diplomacy, deployment of the Self-Defense Forces, and economic cooperation.

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Abe’s successors, Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, have been less engaging with theregion, mainly because of 1) the travel restrictions and the need to focus on the domestic
public health measures and economic recovery under the Covid-19 pandemic, 2) the
escalation of the U.S-China strategic competition and more international focus on Asia
(and Ukraine after February 2022), and 3) decreasing regional security tensions and risksof terrorist attacks.
Less diplomatic engagement made less presence of Japan in the Middle East. Crown
Prince Muhammad Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia canceled his trip to Japan on November
18, 2022, while he visited South Korea and other Asian countries. Chinese President Xi
Jinping visited Saudi Arabia and Riyadh hosted the China-Arab Summit on December 9.
A big and long-term contract for supplying LNG from Qatar to JERA, a Japanese major
electricity company was expired in 2021 and not renewed, while China made a long-term
contract for 27 years. More significantly, Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized diplomatic
relations for the first time in seven years brokered by China.
2) regional instability and changing political dynamics under less U.S. engagement
While Western countries focus on Ukraine war and tension in the East Asia, conflicts in
Libya, Syria, Yemen, and political and economic fragility in most regional countries, inparticular Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Tunisia continue and get worsened. Instability andpower vacuums in the region and less international attention create spaces for Russia
and China to increase their political and military presence and expand their sphere of
influence.
Some analysts see the Saudi-Iranian reproachment brokered by China as broader signsof a “changing global order vi .” Wang Yi, China’s Director of the Office of the Central
Foreign Affairs Commission, reportedly said China will continue to play a constructiverole in handling hotspot issues and demonstrate responsibility as a major nation. He
added that as a “good faith” and “reliable” mediator, China has fulfilled its duties as ahost for dialogue.
It is important for Japan to recognize that the U.S. is unlikely to engage with the Middle
East or Africa in the same manner and capacity to preserve its energy security given therise in its energy self-sufficiency rate. Of course, the interests of the U.S. in the regions
are not restricted to only energy but cover various economic interests as well as alliancesand partnerships with regional partners. The U.S. also has military interests in the regions

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where it maintains bases and American troops. While not directly linked to energy
security, energy companies operating in the Middle East and Africa play an importantrole in the U.S. economy. However, the U.S. has been reducing its contribution to thestabilization of the Middle East for energy security with bearing risks and costs.
The U.S. became a net exporter of oil and gas in 2020 and continue to be one until atleast 2050, due to an increase in shale production.vii As energy security is more robust
to external challenges, the U.S. will have more room for designing tough foreign policy.
The Trump administration’s sanctions against Iran and military confrontation clearly
illustrate the link between "energy independence" and the unilateral foreign policy trendof the U.S. In an environment where the U.S. engagement is not a priori, Japan needs toachieve its energy security and the safety of Japanese citizens and interests. Under the
U.S. retrenchment, countries in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, need to achieve energy
security by maintaining sea lanes and freedom of navigation.
FOIP and the Middle East: strategic hub or out of sight?
1) Importance of the Middle East and Africa for the Japanese FOIP concept
It was in Kenya where Prime Minister Abe advocated the concept of the FOIP strategy
for the first time. This suggests that the Middle East and Africa could play an importantrole for the FOIP from the viewpoint of securing stable sea lanes.viii At TICAD 7 in August
2019, leaders of Japan and African countries stated they will "take good note of theinitiative of a free and open Indo-Pacific announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at
TICAD 6 in Nairobi."ix Almost same statement appeared in the Tunis Declaration at the
TICAD 8 in Tunis held in August 2022x.
Taro Kono, former Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned “the Middle East sits in the
middle of our Indo-Pacific strategy. Maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East
itself is essential to ensure the free and open maritime order” at the IISS Manama
Dialogue in 2017xi.
Japan has stated that it will focus on "energy," "digital connectivity," and "infrastructure"as part of Japan-U.S. cooperation to promote the FOIP strategy/vision. U.S. Secretary ofState Pompeo announced in a July 2018 speech that the U.S. will commit to growing
sustainable and secure energy markets throughout the Indo-Pacific.xii

6At TICAD 7 in Yokohama, the governments of Japan and the U.S. signed a Memorandumof Cooperation (MOC) to expand U.S.-Japan energy cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa
through the Japan-United States Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) and to renew theircommitment to reducing energy poverty and increasing access to sustainable energy inAfrica. The two countries agreed in August 2016 to support Power Africa,xiii a U.S.-led
program to increase access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. The MOC will leveragecollective investments in clean energy solutions, geothermal power, and energy
efficiency, while supporting cross-border energy trade and regional power pools.
The region from the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea is a geopolitical hub facing the Gulf ofAden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The region connects transportation andlogistics between Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. Particularly, the Bab-elMandeb Strait, located between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Eritrea andDjibouti in the Horn of Africa, is the gateway to the south of the Red Sea and an
important chokepoint for global maritime and energy trade. Political tensions andconflicts within the regional countries in the Horn of Africa as well as security risks
related to terrorism and piracy in Somalia have had a huge impact on the stability of
global logistics.
Though Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in Africa located between the Gulf ofAden and the Red Sea, it hosts the bases of the U.S., China, France, and Italy. Troops from
Germany, the West, and other NATO countries are also stationed in the country. Since
2009, the Japanese SDF has been engaged in counter-piracy operations off the coast ofSomalia. In 2011, the SDF established a base in Djibouti, which has effectively served as
the SDF's only overseas base, including as a transit point for the evacuation of Japanesenationals in South Sudan during the conflict there.
Japan has deployed the Self Defense Forces and taken part in Combined Task Force 151
for anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to maintainmaritime security. Japan supports Comoros, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and other countries of the region by providing patrol vessels andmaritime security equipment as well as training by the Japan Coast Guard in order tohelp tackle piracy and transnational crimes.

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Foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa

Source: CSISxiv
2) China’s engagement to the Middle East and Africa through BRI
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2014, is also significant, both
strategically and physically, for the Middle East where the "Belt" and "Road" meet andconnect with the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Since the Middle East tour of Xi
Jinping in January 2016, China has been deepening its economic, political, and security
involvement with the regional countries. The background is to boost energy trade andsecure sea lanes and overseas interests in the Middle East, specifically in the Red Sea,
Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea, as part of efforts to address China's domestic security
risks that are intertwined with the Middle Eastern political instability. Beijing wasconcerned that Middle Eastern countries would take an unfavorable attitude toward
China on the Uyghur issue.
Rather than just imposing its national interests and strategic goals, China is diversifying
its approach in line with the interests of the Middle Eastern countries. China is also
strengthening relations not only bilaterally with the regional countries, but also throughmultiple forums, including regional and multilateral forums such as China-Arab States
Summit held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 2022. On the economic front, China
has stronger position in the development of communications networks and digital8infrastructure in particular, in addition to hard infrastructure. As of January 2020, theAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), led by China, had 17 members in the Middle
East and North Africa.xv
As a result, China's economic and political presence in the MENA region is likely to
expand further with growing security cooperation, narrowing the space for Westernpolitical and economic engagement in the region. Even if the U.S. and the EU implement
punitive measures against conflicts and human rights abuses in the regional actors, suchas economic sanctions and the elimination of trade preferences, China is unlikely to be
sympathetic, and in fact, this could lead to an increase in China's attractiveness to theregional countries.
3) Challenges for the FOIP
It is still unclear how Africa, which possess “huge potential of growth,"xvi and the Middle
East, the hub connecting Asia and Africa, could/should be integrated into the FOIP
strategy/vision. The Middle East, a major energy supplier, is an important player not only
for Japan, but also other countries of the Indo-Pacific, given the significance of regionalenergy security. However, there is no clear strategy on how the major powers, including
Japan, engage with the Middle East under the FOIP vision.
Regarding the geographical scope of the FOIP strategy/vision, the perceptions of Japan,
the U.S., Australia, and India are quite different. In fact, Japan is the only country thatclearly includes the Middle East and Africa in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that "Japan intends to promote peace
and prosperity in the region as a whole by promoting the success of Asia, which could
be called the 'leading part of the world,' throughout the Middle East and Africa throughfree and open Indo-Pacific, extracting the latent power of the Middle East and Africa; inother words, by improving the 'connectivity' of Asia, the Middle East and Africa."xviiIndia's Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech in June 2018, described the IndoPacific as a region extending "from the coast of Africa to the shores of the U.S.," andstated that India will work for enhanced connectivity between Southeast, South andWest Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Africa.xviii On the other hand, while India has been
engaging with the Middle East and Africa actively, New Delhi does not clarify that theirpolicy toward the regions is based on their FOIP strategy.

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The U.S. Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, published in June 2019,barely mentions the Middle East and Africa. The two regions are mentioned only in thecontext of China's "coercive attitude," activities of the Russian Pacific fleet, and the
Global Peace Operations Initiative, while there is no mention of engagement under the
FOIP strategy.xix There is no mention regarding the two regions in the updated reportpublished in February 2022xx. In January 2020, U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor
Matt Pottinger stated that the Indo-Pacific is "from California to Kilimanjaroxxi," but there
is no indication that the idea of engaging Africa through FOIP has been translated into
actual policy or projects.
Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper defines the Indo-Pacific as "the region fromthe East Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean by Southeast Asia," and does not include theMiddle East and Africa. xxii These differences in perception about the geographicalcoverage could be hindering the Quad's collaborative engagement with the Middle East
and Africa under the FOIP strategy.
Conclusion
While the MENA region plays important role for the energy security and geopoliticalstability of the Indo-Pacific regional countries, it is not yet connected to the Indo-Pacificstrategy/vision due to differences in the priorities and perceptions of major powers
including the QUAD countries. While the Middle East and Africa are considered
important for Japan’s FOIP landscape, it remains unclear how Japan would/could engage
with them, in collaboration with the U.S. India, and Australia. Japan should specify theconcept and policies so that the FOIP vision could play a significant role in achieving
energy security in Asia and mitigate China’s political, economic, and military dominancein the MENA. “Alignment maps” are required for the major powers of FOIP, particularly
the QUAD members, to share the strategy/vision.
Further coordination and collaboration between the U.S. and Japan are required in termsof policy toward the Middle East. Without the U.S’s military presence, it is difficult forJapan to effectively contribute to stabilization and development in the region including
conflict prevention and long-term deradicalization. In order to contribute to the
reduction of U.S. military costs, it is necessary to clearly the role Japan should play interms of preventing economic and social instability, which could be the seeds for theoutbreak and expansion of conflicts in the Middle East. The ways of "burden sharing" in10

between Japan and the U.S. should then be discussed.
Given the diverse sources of instability in the MENA, it is important to link efforts toward
the nexus of political stability and economic growth. Without political and security
stability, there is no opportunity for an improved business environment or sustainableeconomic growth, and without political stability, it will be difficult to achieve economic
growth. On the other hand, since elaborate discussions based on the actual situation ineach country are required to solve problems, the exchange of opinions with government
officials and experts in/of the Middle East region should be actively promoted.

IEEJ, IEEJ Outlook 2020, January 2020, https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/8650.pdf, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-26/bab-el-mandeb-an-emerging-chokepoint-formiddle-east-oil-flows, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
iii IEEJ, IEEJ Outlook 2020, January 2020, https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/8650.pdf, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
iv Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation), December 17, 2013,https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.
v Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Foreign Visits by Prime Ministers (October 2006 to January 2023), January 25,
2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/page24_000037.html.
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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/11/changing-global-order-china-restores-ties-with-iran-and-saudi.
vii EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2019.
viii Teruaki Aizawa, "The Philosophy and Practice of the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP)' decoded from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website," From the Oceans, July 30, 2018, https://www.spf.org/oceans/globaldata/20181116181023949.pdf, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
ix Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yokohama Declaration 2019: Advancing Africa’s Development through People,
Technology and Innovation, August 30, 2019,https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad7/pdf/yokohama_declaration_en.pdf, last accessed on February
15, 2020.
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https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100386626.pdf.
xi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speech by H.E. Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the IISS Manama
Dialogue, December 9, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000315610.pdf.
xii Michael
R. Pompeo, Remarks on "America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision," July 30, 2018,https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
xiii A U.S. government-led initiative to double electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa with two goals: 1) to increase
new generation capacity by 30,000 megawatts, and 2) to help create 60 million new electricity connections by 2030.
More than 100 private companies, along with EU, the U.K., World Bank, African Development Bank, and otherinstitutions, are part of this initiative.
xiv Judd Devermont, "The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Where is the United States?", CSIS Briefs, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, August 24, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/world-coming-sub-saharanafrica-where-united-states, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
xv Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Tunisia, Turkey, and the UAE.
xvi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf, last accessedon February 15, 2020.
xvii Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, June 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000290287.pdf,
last accessed on February 15, 2020.
xviii Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, June 1, 2018,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+
Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
xix Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked
Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/ DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSEi

ii

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INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
xxi Indrani Bagchi, “Raisina Dialogue: 'Indo-Pacific' a global common, says foreign secy Vijay Gokhale,” The Times ofIndia (Jan 17, 2020).
xxii
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017) 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/file/2651/download?token=Q5CYuX29; Tomohiko Satake, "Australia and IndoPacific: Searching for a new Order in a Multipolar Era," Journal of International Security, Vol.46, No.3, pp51-70,
December 2018, last accessed on February 15, 2020.
xx

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