Building National Resilience
1. Lessons Learned from Past Major Disasters

2. What is National Resilience?
3. Building Resistance
4. Fostering Resilience
5．Framework for Promotion
6. 45 Worst-Case Scenarios

7. Development of Countermeasures
８. Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building
National Resilience

Masaya Takaishi,
Counsellor of National
Resilience Promotion Office,Cabinet Secretariat

January 28, 2020

Lessons Learned from Past Major Disasters◯It is important to be prepared by learning from past disasters, keeping the worst scenarios
in mind, and avoiding the repetition of serious damage and long process of post recovery.
Ise Bay Typhoon (1959)
Large number of fatalities andmissing persons

Damaged by Ise Bay Typhoon(photo provided by Aichi Prefecture)

Basic Act on Disaster
Management enacted⇒ Clarified the idea of“Disaster Prevention”

Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake (1995)

Great East Japan Earthquake(2011)

Collapses of buildings and viaducts;
Large spread of fire in residential areas

Damage by enormous tsunami;
Large number of stranded ppl

Collapsed Viaduct of Hanshin Expy.
(photo provided by Kobe City)

Firefighters Searching for theMissing(photo provided by Sendai City)

Importance of seismic reinforcement,protection of populous areas,self and mutual support recognized⇒ Promotion of “Disaster Reduction”

Limitation of hard measures,
importance of DRR education
recognized⇒ Towards ”National Resilience”

Fatalities

4,697 people

6,434 people

19,533 people

Missing

401 people

3 people

2,585 people

Injured38,921 people

43,792 people

6,230 people

Damagedbldgs.

153,890 buildings

249,180 buildings

401,928 buildings

Total damage

Approx. 0.5 trillion yen

Approx. 10 trillion yen

Approx. 17 trillion yen1

What is National Resilience? (Strong and Resilient Society)
Level of activeness

Disaster Large-scale
prevention disaster

Strong and resilient society

Ordinary level
Capability to recuperate:
Resilience

Tolerance to shocks:
Strengthen

Vulnerablesociety

Disaster reduction

0Reference: “Kyodai Jishin (Mega Quake) X Day” authored by Satoshi Fujii,
with some content added by National Resilience Promotion OfficeTime

2

Building “Strength” (Ex Ante Prevention)〇Example from Osaka Bay (Typhoon No.21 in September 2018):
Effective countermeasures prevented flood damage in spite of highest high water level■Typhoon No.21 marked the highest high water level of Osaka bay, exceeding 2nd Muroto Typhoon
CY inundated by the 2nd Muroto Typhoon in 1961. Since then, damage from high■130,000Alteredhousesbyweretides in urban areas have been completely prevented by the construction of coastal/river dikes andfloodgates (approx. 130 billion yen) and their proper management (approx. 20 billion yen).
■ The effect of these measures is estimated to reach approx. 17 trillion yen.
Inundation prevented by thecountermeasures for high tides thathave been implemented in Osaka Bay
Inundated
Effect ofhouses
countermeasures

The tide exceeded highest high water levelby approx. 40cm
Highest high water levelin Osaka

Inundation
areaApprox.
3,100haSept. 16,1961(Highesthigh waterlevel)

2nd MurotoTyphoonin 1961

Approx.
130,000

Approx.
17 trillion
yen

Sept. 4,
2018
14:18

No damage
TyphoonNo.21
in 2018

Total
damage cost:

Estimated damage
No damage without measures

2nd Muroto Typhoon 2nd Muroto Typhoon
Typhoon
No.21
No.21
Typhoonin2018in 1961
in 2018
in 1961

Reference：Kasen Jigyo Gaiyou (Outline of River Management) 2019 published by Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(※1)

Effect of measures:Approx. 17 trillion yen

Maintenance: 20 billion yen
Construction: 130 billion yen

Costs for construction(※2)
and maintenance (※3)
of coastal/river dikes, etc.

（ ※1（ : Rough estimate in case of flood with infrastructural level as of
2nd Muroto Typhoon.
（ ※2（ : Total construction costs for coastal and river dikes, floodgates,etc., borne by the nation, Osaka Prefecture, or Osaka City.
（ ※3（ : Total maintenance costs for coastal and river dikes, floodgates,etc. managed by the nation, Osaka Prefecture, or Osaka City
since year 1965.

3

Fostering “Resilience” (Flowchart Analysis)■Vulnerability Assessment:①Investigation of situation, and assessment of the progress of measures.
②Analysis of the lessons learned from disasters that happened since plan proposal.
③Analysis of the process leading up to “the worst case”:
Flowchart analysis on the process from occurrence of disaster to the worst case was conducted.
Inadequate or lacking measures were identified through the visualization of causal relationships among
Altered thatby CY
conditions/phenomena
could not be expected from past experience or assumptions.
【E.g.】(2-1) Unable to supply essential goods/energy to damaged sites. (i.e. food, drinking water, electricity, fuel, etc.).
Initialissue
Number ofsoft measures
Number ofhard measures【F】
Food/drinking watershortage【B】
Lifeline facilities
damaged【I】
Energyshortage【C】
Energy facilities
damaged【G】
Fuel shortage【A】
Large-scale
natural disasteroccurs.
(Omitted)

Traffic
Paralysis【D】
Evac. centersdamaged

Worst
Case

IssuesPhysical damage【H】
Information
cannot be collected

【L】
Goods
cannot beprocured【M】
Goodscannot
reach sites【J】
Goods cannot
be transported

Lack of measures toaddress this linkage【K】
Increased
evacuees/stranded people【N】
Concentrated
population in areas
with high disaster risk

【W】
Cannotsupplyessentialgoods/
energy todamagedsites.
(i.e. food,drinking
water,electricity,fuel, etc.).

【O】
Goods cannot be
procured at sites【Example of an issue identified from the process analysis】○The establishment of a decent supply system through the collaboration of public and private sectors is required forthe smooth supply of essentials to damaged areas.

4Framework for National Resilience Promotion
Basic Act for National Resilience Contributing to Preventing and Mitigating Disasters for Developing Resiliencein the Lives of the Citizenry (Lawmaker-drafted legislation; Enacted on Dec. 4 and promulgated & enforced on Dec. 11, 2013)

Vulnerability Assessment
Fundamental Plan for National Resilience(Cabinet Decision on June 3, 2014)
Heavy rain in July 2018, and Typhoon No. 21 and Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi Earthquake, etc. in the same year largely affected thelives and economic activities of residents

Vulnerability Assessment
Revision of the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience(Cabinet Decision on Dec. 14, 2018)

Emergency inspection of important
infrastructure (Nov. 2018)

Formulation andPromotion

Three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention,
disaster mitigation, and building national resilience(Cabinet Decision on Dec. 14, 2018)2019 Annual Plan for National Resilience（Decision by National Resilience Promotion Headquarters on June 11,2019)

Regional Plan for National Resilience(Formulated by local governments)5

45 Worst-Case Scenarios
Pre-Disaster Preparatory Goals (Categories)
Worst-Case Scenarios to Be Avoided
1. Prevention of deaths directly caused by disaster by all means
Many casualties due to complex or large-scale collapses of houses, buildings, traffic
1-1
facilities, or where a large number of people gather.
Many casualties due to large fires in densely populated urban areas or facilities, where a
1-2
large number of unspecified people gather.
1-3 Many casualties due to large-scale and massive tsunami.
1-4 Many casualties due to sudden, extensive and long-term floods in urban areas.
1-5 Many casualties due to large volcanic eruptions and landslides (including deep collapses).
1-6 Many casualties due to severe snowstorms or heavy snow
2. Prompt rescue, first aid and medical activities, and securing of evacuees’ health and living
environment
Disruption of supply of essentials and energy in affected areas, such as food, drinking
2-1
water, electricity, and fuel.
2-2 Simultaneous occurrence of prolonged isolation in many areas.
Unavoidable lack of rescue and first aid due to rescue authorities being affected, such as the2-3
Self-defense Forces, Police, .Fire Department, and the Coast Guard
2-4 A large number of displaced people, leading to confusion.
Medical facilities and staff afflicted or lacking, support routes and energy supply disrupted,
2-5leading to medical services being paralyzed.
2-6 Massive spread of epidemic and infectious disease in disaster-hit areas.
Many deaths and illnesses among evacuees due to poor living conditions and poor health2-7management
3. Securing of essential governmental function
3-1 Decline in public order due to disaster-hit security authorities’ malfunction.
3-2 Malfunction of central government in metropolitan areas, etc.
3-3 Malfunction of local governments due to staff and facilities being affected.
4. Securing of essential functions and information and communication services
4-1 Communication networks for disaster response paralyzed or impaired.
4-2 Disaster information for those in need hampered due to disrupted broadcasts
Disaster information service impaired, information not collected or transmitted, and4-3evacuation, rescue and support delayed
5. Prevention of economic activities from being malfunctioned
Supply chain disrupted, and companies’ production and international competitiveness
5-1
deteriorating
5-2 Energy supply impaired, afflicting social economy and supply chains.
5-3 Industrial complexes or other key facilities destroyed, fires, explosions.
5-4 Maritime transportation disrupted, seriously affecting overseas trade.

Pre-Disaster Preparatory Goals (Categories)
Worst-Case Scenarios to Be Avoided
5
Arterial routes of the Pacific Belt Zone and main land and maritime traffic network disrupted
5-5or blocked, hampering the flow of people and goods.
5-6 Multiple airports damaged, seriously affecting international air transport.
5-7 Financial services and mail suspended, hampering livelihood and commerce.
5-8 Stable supply of foods and other goods hampered
5-9 Serious drought affecting water supply and hampering productions.
6. Minimize damage to lifelines, fuel supply facilities, transport networks, etc., and restore thempromptly.
Prolonged stoppage of power supply network (power generation, transformation and6-1
distribution), urban gas, or supply chain of oil or LP gas
6-2 Prolonged stoppage of water supply
6-3 Prolonged suspension of operation of sewage treatment facilities.
Prolonged blockage of land, maritime and air traffic networks from arterial transport such as
6-4
Shinkansen to regional networks.
6-5 Prolonged malfunction of disaster prevention infrastructures.
7. Prevention of uncontrollable complex or secondary disasters
7-1 Many casualties due to massive fires in urban areas after an earthquake.
7-2 Extensive and complex disasters in maritime and coastal areas.
Traffic network blocked or paralyzed due to collapse of roadside buildings or underground7-3structures, and sinkholes
Many casualties due to destruction or malfunction of reservoirs, anti-disaster infrastructure
7-4
or natural dams, or landslides including volcanic.
7-5 Damage worsened by extensive efflux of hazardous materials
7-6 Damage on and deterioration of national land such as farms and forests.

8. Establish more robust conditions for prompt recovery of society and the economy.
8-1 Prolonged recovery due to hampered treatment of massive amounts of disaster waste.
Lack of personnel (experts, coordinators, workers, or technicians) and visions for better
8-2
reconstruction, resulting in failure to recover..
Delayed recovery due to extensive and prolonged floods caused by wide-area land8-3
subsidence.
Precious cultural and environmental assets lost, local communities destroyed, and tangible
8-4
and intangible decline and loss of culture.
Prolonged recovery due to delay in procurement of operational land or construction of
8-5
temporary housing, stores, and offices.
Global reputation damage and lost credit, delayed recovery of production, massive
8-6
unemployment, bankruptcies, etc., afflicting the national economy.

6

Development of Countermeasures
In accordance to the vulnerability assessments conducted under each worst-case scenario, theissues identified are summarized and reorganized into 12 individual and 5 cross-sectoral categories.

Goal1-1) Many casualties
caused by complex orlarge-scale collapses ofbuildings and otherstructures.

Seismic
reinforcement ofGovt. facilities
and disasterprevention sites

5-1) Supply chain
disrupted, affecting
businesses andinternationalcompetitiveness.

Effective
sharing ofinformation fordisaster
response

…

…

６)
ICT

Improvement
and utilization ofEarthquake
Early Warning
systems

８)…
Transportation/Logistics

12)
Land Use（National）

Seismic
reinforcement oftransportation
infrastructures

Measures toaddress thedense
population inareas of highdisaster risk

…

Ｂ)
HR
Development…
5. Prevent economic
activities from
malfunctioning

Education of HR
for increasing
privatebusiness’s
resilience…
6. Minimize damage to6-4) Land, maritime andlifelines, fuel supply
air traffic networks, bothfacilities, traffic networks,
arterial and regional,
etc., and reconstruct themblocked for long periods.
promptly.
…

Individual
categories (12)Cross-sectoral
categories (5)Utilization ofprobe
information by
public & private

Improvement offeasibility ofplans forclearing
road/marine
debrisSecuring local
technical
experts of eachregion…

Vulnerability assessment of 45 worst-case scenario

1. Prevent deaths directly
caused by disaster by allmeans

Worst case１）Govt./Police/FireDep./Educ.

Evaluation and reanalysis based on each category

1) Government/ Police/2) Residence/ Urban 3) Healthcare/ Welfare
Fire Department/Education

4) Energy5) Finance6) ICT

7) Industrial Structure8) Transportation/Logistics

9) Agriculture/Forestry/ Fisheries

10) Land conservation

11) Environment12) Land Use(National)

A) Risk CommunicationB) HR Development

C) Public-PrivateCooperationD) Countermeasures
for aging infrastructureE) Research andDevelopment☆

7Three-Year Emergency Response Plan for Disaster Prevention,
Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience
A three-year (FY2018 to FY2020) plan is being conducted to address the 160 vulnerabilities that
require urgent action, whether structurally or non-structurally, identified as a result of emergency
inspections, focusing on the following two objectives.
I. To maintain the functions of important infrastructures that serve to reduce disaster risks(Examples)

To reinforce embankments of approx. 120
rivers prone to flooding

To support 125 disaster-medical and otherhospitals in introducing in-house power
generation systems

To upgrade multilingual voice translation
system for emergency use

II. To maintain the functions of important infrastructures that serve to support the national economy and people’s lives(Examples)

To protect the terminal buildings of 7 major
airports against inundation

To reinforce road slopes and embankments andexpand road widths at approx. 2,000 locations
prone to landslide

To introduce approx. 100 additional vehiclemounted mobile phone bases to enablemajor base stations to continue providing
8service in an emergency