Abstracts
State, Political Parties, and the Nation:
Triangular Political History without a Center of Gravity
Shimizu Yuichirō
Last year, Japan celebrated the one hundred and thirtieth anniversary of
the establishment of the Meiji imperial constitution. As the first constitutional
state in Asia, Japan’s experience soon garnered the attention of the world. As in
the post-war era where Japan’s model of high-speed economic growth proffereda model for developing countries, in the pre-war imperial world, Japan’s
experience with constitutionalism provided encouragement to those nations,then colonies of the European powers. Yet this history of constitutionalism wasby no means a story of unalloyed successes. Rapid modernization and economic
growth in no short order destabilized Japan’s traditional order, giving birth to an
unstable social structure.
How to design the relationship between the state, political parties and nation has
remained a major question which has continued up to the present. Clarifying
how the three parts of the triangle (state, parties, nation) have evolved over thelast one hundred and thirty years provides important insights into how thedevelopment of Japanese ‘democracy’ has differed from the experience of theWestern democracies.
Keywords: Modernization, democracy, constitutionalism, state, political parties

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation:
Triangular Political History without a Center ofGravity *Shimizu Yuichirō

A Noisy Beginning: The Ideas and Reality of the Meiji Restoration
The Meiji Restoration marked the opening of an ideal. As part of thepledge made in the Meiji Charter Oath of Five Articles 1868, the restoration
government called for all matters to be publicly discussed, for nationalcohesion, and realization of a self-fulfilling society, revealing the new nation’s
willingness to break with convention and learn from the world. Though theyfelt aversion towards excessive idealism, it was necessary to put forwardjustifications –which would resonate powerfully– for having brought to an
abrupt end to the 260 years of relative peace sustained by the Tokugawa
shogunate. However, the realization of ideals is not easy. More than anything,
for a people who have lived in a stable and conservative society for so long,the Restoration was violent cataclysm, unparalleled in both the experience ofmen and the nation.
In the inaugural year of the Meiji monarchical era, the restoration
government convoked the Kōgisho, 1869. A deliberative body, composed ofrepresentatives from 260 domains, was something which no one had assembled
before. The orientations of members of the Kōgisho –retainers of the domains,*

16

This article is the English translation of the following article with the same title in Japanese:“Kokka, Seitō, Kokumin: Rikken Seiji no 130 nen”, ASTEION, No. 90(2019), pp. 14-28. Translated
by Dr. Andrew Levidis. Prof. Shimizu is currently teaching at Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University. yuichiro@sfc.keio.ac.jp

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

who had been educated and reared on classics of Chinese civilization– collided
violently with government officials who had been educated in the Westernmode. Gathering in tea houses, various factions conferred to build majorities
in the new deliberative body and increase the number of their supporters.
The confrontation between the two groups reached its apogee over the sword
prohibition edicts (Haitōrei), leading the restoration government, increasingly
worried about the future, to dramatically reduce the size of the deliberative
body (Yamazaki 2005). As a result, the government was forced to abandon
the idea of public deliberations as premature.
For people in the street, the reforms of the new government werevertiginous. When the old social order collapses, information becomescomplicated. A raw silk farmer who borrowed to expand production in
anticipation of higher prices could be hit by a deflationary national policy.
And as a consequence, the land which served as collateral for the loans
would be lost (Matsuzawa 2018). In the absurdity of a rapidly transforming
nation, the people became more and more discontented. Where did the selfactualizing society go? What is one to believe, in order to go on living? The
new nation, which began in ideals, was soon beset by frustrations at the
distressing realities of the massive transformations instituted by the Meiji
government.

In the original language, ‘kenpō,’ i.e., ‘constitution’, carries the meaning of‘building up together’, yet the constitution of the Greater Japanese Empire
did not aim at ‘building up together’ with the masses. While a number ofprivate bills were drafted, Itō Hirobumi and his fellow drafters of the imperial
constitution were shut off from the outside world. Perhaps as a reaction to
the experience of the Kōgisho, and as a desire to avoid the contention of the‘hundred schools of thought’ (hyakka sōmei)1 of the beginning of the Meiji
period, constitutional framers placed much emphasis on what was realizable
or practical as they sought to curb the excessive idealism of the early years of
the restoration.
Under the imperial constitution, it was the emperor who sustained theconsciousness of ‘unity’. Having assumed the throne at a young age, theMeiji emperor came to be seen as a singular presence; however, the peoples
adored the Tokugawa shogun much more than the young emperor. Indeed,in the twenty-years before the promulgation of the imperial constitution, the
new Meiji government worked to establish a system for an emperor-centric
government, ruled directly by the throne (Kasahara 1995). The Emperor,
through his attendance at daily deliberations on constitutional drafts, used
the process of drafting a new constitution to both confirm its centrality to
the Meiji state, and simultaneously to affirm his own role as sovereign andpatron of the peoples.
Although the constitution which came out of this process was limited to
76 articles, within this albeit circumscribed legal vision, freedom of speech,
religious freedom, and the right of political participation were all granted.
Supposedly, under the emperor’s sovereign rights, a system of the separationof powers was created to ensure that no dictator could arise. In addition to
the cabinet based on a committee structure, the constitution established theImperial Diet as a cooperative body, thus the foundation for the theory of
public discussions was established.
As a place where the people could come together in the name of theemperor and despite having the essence of a parliament, the early experimentin parliamentarianism did not always enjoy the support of the people. The

The Light that Illuminates the Stage: Establishment of a Constitution
In the midst of this challenging environment, a ray of light beckoned with theestablishment of the imperial constitution, promulgated in 1889. Twenty years
after the Meiji restoration, the masses of people whose voice could not reachthe national government found expression through the new Imperial Diet.
This innovation raised expectations at the inauguration of new avenues forpolitical participation, while the establishment of the basic or fundamental lawof the nation provided a sense of certainty that the affairs of state operated ona fixed basis. Including the ‘Itsukaichi constitution’ (Itsukaichi kenpō) –one of theconstitutional drafts made at the beginning of the Meiji– the writing of a great
number of private constitutional proposals can be interpreted as a broader
manifestation of the desire for stability and participation in the new state.

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1

hyakka sōmei 百家争鳴: A phrase used to refer to a place or period in which many scholars andthinkers share their ideas freely —ed.n.

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

suffrage in the Lower House was restricted to men over the age of 25 who
were able to pay the national tax of 15 yen or more, meaning, in practice, mostparliamentarians were drawn from landed men of influence. Institutional
designers had in mind that the 1%, according to their assets, who were men of
responsibility and fixed stance, could represent the interest of the 99% of thepeople. This kind of thinking drew from the Confucian ideal that “(w)here
there is constant production, there is constant will.” As an ideal, however, it
was shallow.
Before the Meiji restoration, society in the Edo period worked under arural self-governing system of taxation. Since the amount of taxation paid
was set for each village, men of influence were required to take care of thevillage. With the abolition of the rural self-governing system following the
Restoration, there was no institutional responsibility to look after the interestsof the village, aside from that which flowed from morality. Thus, there wasno responsibility to think of the interests of the 99% of the common people.
Eligibility for elections had similar requirements. There were of course
the cases of Ozaki Yukio and Inukai Tsuyoshi who qualified due to theirinfluential positions in the countryside, but for the most part, members of
the Imperial Diet were drawn from the land-holding classes (Inada 2018).
Disposed to the intentions of the landowning classes, the political parties
and Diet clashed with the hanbatsu (han-clan) government and constantly
clamoured for reductions in the public burden. In this way, the Diet operated
not as a forum of the peoples, but as a vehicle of private interest, where
political representatives of the landowners clashed with the government.
With Diet members not representing the whole body politic, what could
the masses hope for? Here we can see the spirit of self-help inspired by theenlightenment reformers (Keimōka); that is the ideal that if one makes every
effort, they will be rewarded. People gave their all to education. When theschool system expanded across the country, various places competed to build
schools and attract excellent teachers who would enthusiastically educate theyouth. To students of surpassing abilities, they provided financial resources,and opened avenues for them to attend the higher school system and imperial
universities.
How was one to succeed in life? Through the constitution? No, the stateorganized this quite splendidly. In the second title of the constitution,

immediately after stating the rights and obligations of imperial subjects, it
is stipulated by law that subjects could be appointed bureaucrats or militarymen depending on their abilities and qualifications. In the pre-Restorationsociety, positions were doled out based on status, with only samurai enjoying
the privilege of serving as military men or bureaucrats. It was thus a major
reform, which garnered great attention and interest. Itō Hirobumi correctly
proclaimed this “the principal fruit of constitutional government.” (Shimizu2019).
Young people of excellence were able to advance to middle school, study
at higher schools, and upon graduating from imperial universities, the path
to becoming a bureaucrat lay open. Thus, these young bureaucrats, acquired
their ‘samurai status’ as a result of their efforts, and not as a consequence of
their family backgrounds. Of course, it was an era when only a few selectboys – around 10% – were even able to proceed to middle school.
In the villages, there was perhaps one every few years who proceeded
to higher levels of education and then went on to study at university. Of
the talented villagers who struggled and worked hard, there were among
them youths of surpassing talent who would rise ever higher, becoming
high-ranking bureaucrats. For this reason, bureaucrats came to be viewed as
figures of trust, and of course, with yearning.
Even without school-expenses, there were a variety of avenues to becomea military man. With a clear mind and sturdy body, one was able to proceed
on a stipend to military schools. Without concern for living expenses, theroad to becoming an officer was open. As in the backgammon style game of
Sugoroku, one could rise and stand as either a minister or military general.
Five years after the promulgation of the constitution, the Sino-Japanese
War (1894-05) was produced by the rising nation with the rising youth. The
war was waged by young bureaucrats who had left the higher education to
support the state administration, and young generals trained in the militaryschools who now led soldiers on the front lines of battle. Through fighting
a common enemy in a full-scale foreign war, by volunteering to become
soldiers, and working hard to raise money for the battle, the masses becamea new nation (Makihara 1998). For his part, the emperor moved the imperial
general headquarters to Hiroshima, and victory in the war ensured that his
dignity as a national leader remained untarnished. With the emperor at its

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Shimizu Yuichirō

State, Political Parties, and the Nationcore, each organ of state worked along their own will. The organic nation
designed by the drafters of the Imperial constitution, was complete.

public opinion, there was a growing recognition of the need to move from a
confrontational to a coordinated parliament of national policy. To integrate
the public will with state governance, it was the bureaucrats who studied
constitutional politics at the imperial universities, who led the effort toscrutinize the experience of foreign countries.
In the face of these institutional changes, the Liberal Party made amajor about face. Their choice was to present the Liberal Party as a ‘rulingparty’ aligned with the government. Under the system of divided powers
embodied by the Meiji constitutional order, it was the state and the military
which wielded the strongest institutional power. In order to counter these
institutional powers, the Liberals believed that they should be united into amajority party. For this reason, at the end of the nineteenth century, politicalparties consolidated to confront the government forming the short-lived
coalition government of Ōkuma Shigenobu and Itagaki Taisuke, known
colloquially as the ‘Waihan-naikaku’ (Okuma-Itagaki Cabinet) in 1898. The
experiment collapsed after just four months as a consequence of internal
conflicts. Despite this, their intentions behind the coalition –to forge apolitical party which would extend its reach in to the administrative andparliamentary organs of state– came to dominate the political imagination.
The partners in the birth of constitutional politics were Itō Hirobumi
together with the talented members of his staff. By calling on a wide
spectrum of talent from the business and media worlds, in addition toimperial bureaucrats, politicians and industrialists, their aim was to promote
the establishment of a comprehensive centralized party. It was from thisidea that the most famous of the imperial conservative party, Rikken Seiyūkai(Seiyūkai), was born in 1900.
Although the Liberal Party served as the base of the Seiyūkai, it had a very
different character from political parties up to that point. The party’s program
reads, “We will defend the constitution… and perfect sovereign governance,
as to national duties, we aim to preserve the rights and freedoms of eachindividual.” The Seiyūkai was created as an instrument of constitutional
government to perfect sovereign governance.
When compared to past political parties, its uniqueness and innovation
immediately stands out. The Liberal Party, which composed the nucleus of
the Seiyūkai, aimed at “expanding freedom, preserving rights, promoted theCompetition Among the Actors: Political Parties and Bureaucrats
As in any natural organism, evolution is inevitable. The change came first fromthe base, the masses. The citizenry, having played a major role in the SinoJapanese War, gained a new sense of ownership, and consequently, voices
demanding greater political participation rose. Throughout the country, thecampaign for the right of universal manhood suffrage gathered momentum.
There was also a crisis of the political parties. In this dawning era of massified
politics, being a representative of the land-owning classes threatened theparties with irrelevance. Questions abounded: Should the party pull close to
the government and become a ruling party uniting the masses directly withthe state? Or should the parties adopt the stance of rigorously criticizing thegovernment to establish a new government which drew its legitimacy fromthe masses? The response was, of course, divided. The former position was
adopted by the Liberal Party led by Itagaki Taisuke and Hoshi Tōru; while
the latter position came to be broadly adopted by the Progressive Party ledby Ōkuma Shigenobu.
Even up to this moment, there are parliamentarians who expressed interested
in a politics oriented towards the masses. However, the constraints impliedby the equation ‘voters = landowners’ did not allow them to go any further.
In single seat constituencies, the ancien regime maintained powerful influence,and unless one maintained their relationship with local men of influence, they
could not hope to be elected. It was for this reason that parliamentarians urged
the abolition of the single-seat district, and its replacement by a multimember
district system (Shimizu 2016). Under this system, the entire prefecture would
form one large electoral district, diluting the influence of local mean, andallowing parliamentarians to fight over policies.
In response to the people’s desire to extend the suffrage, the state lowered
the tax payment to 10 yen and adopted a multimember district system.
From the hanbatsu government’s side, the intention of adopting a favourable
attitude towards the multimember district system was related to the difficultyof forging a mass party under such a system. Against the backdrop of a rising
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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

advancement of well-being, as well as aimed to improving society”; Okuma’s
Progressive Party aimed at expanding rights and well-being of the masses.
The Kenseito, which is the ruling party of the short-lived coalition governmentof Ōkuma and Itagaki, describe their political aim as, “Admiring the imperialfamily, championing the constitution, establishing the party cabinet andclarifying the political accountabilities.”
Does the Seiyūkai’s manifesto mark the retrocession of constitutional
politics? To be sure, from a present perspective it may well seem a democratic
recession. But what we need to think about is its context as it existed at thetime. Even though Japan had been victorious in the war against the Qing
Empire in 1895, the revision of international treaties –which had been an
issue since the end of the Edo period– remained incomplete, while tensions
with Tsarist Russia, a powerful European empire, were gathering. Turning
to the Pacific Ocean, the United States, which had emerged victorious fromthe Spanish-American War in 1898, annexed the kingdom of Hawaii andcolonized the Philippines. There was, without question, a pressing need foran organization to bridge the structure of divided powers at the core of the
Meiji state.
Until this point, it had been the hanbatsu leaders who were the force able
to unify the Meiji state. The prime minister was the first among his peers, androtations for positions of power were carried out between the two dominant
powers, Satsuma and Chōshū, of Itō Hirobumi (Chōshū), Kuroda (Satsuma),
Yamagata (Chōshū), Matsukata (Satsuma). It was not a real governmental
change, but rather can be better understood as the administrative rotationsin the hanbatsu government. By the third Itō government, the limits of thissystem were glaringly obvious, as the struggle with the political parties overtheir request for tax cuts began to threaten orderly operation of government.
Establishing the Seiyūkai was the solution.
The role of the Seiyūkai was to cover the government, parliament, andthe industrial worlds, and connect them to the masses. It is for that reason,that Itō Hirobumi accepted the leadership of the party (Itō 2000). The biggest
difference at the time was adoption of the multimember district system.
With the multimember district system, the prefecture became the unit of theconstituency, and if one could not garner votes from across the prefecture,
rather than just a specific area, they could not be elected. The voices of local

men of influence were weakened, and there was a need for cohesion andcoordination between the party branches. The Seiyūkai responded flexibly
to this new situation. A vertical party organization known as the centralprefectural-regional branches were thus established wherein branches sought
direction from the party central headquarters over adjusting the candidates
and votes to ensure cohesion.
The emergence of consecutively elected Diet men (i.e., professional
politicians) symbolized their growing dominance over the party organization.
Most of the members of the early parliamentary period were landowners
who –other than pushing for tax cuts– had little interest in national affairs.
Since they regarded the seats as an honorary position for which they would
be awarded with honors, there were few winners within the “distributionof honor” from one local man of influence to another (Mitani 1995). No
professionalized political party would be able to be forged in a situation
where parliamentarians retired after just one term of office.
What the Seiyūkai hoped for were politicians who were regional businessfolk. For landowners who lived stable lives on the land, sweeping changes
were viewed unfavorably, while business folk flourished in a rapidly changing
environment and were more willing to reform. Despite an acrimonious
break with the powerful financier Shibusawa Eiichi, which ruptured the
Seiyūkai’s relationship with the business world, the party continued to attract
a wide variety of business folk in the regions. Participating in politics andrestoring the economy was, for these men, a matter of life or death. They were
enthusiastic, motivated, and importantly, a proprietary class.
There were others, too, who harbored high-spirited motivation. There werethe middle-ranked bureaucrats. They had proceeded into education carrying
with them the hopes of the local community, going on to study at university,
and, once in the ministries, stood at the core of operations as managers andcounsellors. Many of them were the children of local notables, or those who,
as an adopted child, went to school with direct or indirect support. These
were men reared in an atmosphere surrounded by politics.
At universities they studied politics, law, and economics, and at the
cutting edge of political ideas was the imperial British parliamentary cabinet
system. Under this system, parliamentarians elected by the voters form thegovernment, and there is debate and a degree of coordination over policies

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Shimizu Yuichirōand their implementation. Many saw this as the ideal which the nation
should aspire. Their careers were enmeshed in national politics as chiefs
and vice-ministers, before finally entering the political world. The principal
beneficiary of this talent was the Seiyūkai (Shimizu 2007).
In the countryside, there was reason to welcome the bureaucrats-turnedpoliticians, who enhanced their home regions, as their representatives. First,
name recognition was indispensable to victory in large constituencies. As ahigh-ranking official in the central government, there was no one of importancethat these bureaucrats did not know in the prefecture. Additionally, there
was a strong regional network based on the middle school’s alumni.
Of course, many had been away from their home regions for years at atime. Underpinning their intimate connections were fraternal bonds, and aview of the regional political economy as a cooperative body. At the time theeldest son, if he was seen as first-class, would not be permitted to advance toeducation in the imperial capital, Tokyo. Even if he was eventually permitted
to go, it was considered as a matter of course that they would return to theregions and take over their house of birth without ever entering government
service. In other words, most of the youth who became bureaucrats were
the second and third sons, while the eldest son inherited and took over
the running of the family business in the local region. It is clear that elder
brothers in the regional cooperative economy, saw much profit in terms of“pork barrel” contracts through supporting their younger siblings movefrom the imperial bureaucracy to the Diet. Here, there are many complicatedmotives and ideas, but in the standing of men of influence in elections, wefind a simple and harmonious structure operating.
The Seiyūkai established connections between government, parliament andbusiness worlds, which allowed for the creation of an informal mechanism
for the transfer of power. Even when the Seiyūkai was in opposition, thegovernment explained in advance its budgetary policies, and worked tomake it the ruling party (Fushimi 2013). In this manner state administration
would operate smoothly and national governance would be able to enter aperiod of stability.

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

A New Scenario: Taishō Democracy
Peace, according to the Seiyūkai… Even though constitutional politics
proceeded gradually, in fits and stops, one would be hard pressed not toadmit that democracy was advancing. Still, even if the tax requirements were
further eased, voters would still account for only roughly 2% of the total
population and only 5% of the adult population. Satisfying the request of the
5%, with the aim of stabilizing governance, was the mission of the Seiyūkai.
On the other hand, reformist politicians such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, who had
been mentored by Ōkuma Shigenobu, began a movement to represent thevoices of the masses. He broke with Ōkuma who was accused of abandoning
the people, and together with reformist allies, launched a new politicalparty, the Rikken Kokumintō (Kokumintō) (Iokibe 2003). They were devoted toconstitutional politics, in contrast to the Seiyūkai, avowing that their patronis ‘the people’. Their party declaration, read in part “As the mass movement
accelerates and develops, the people seek to achieve the true meaning of
constitutional government, they seek a more appropriate interpretation, one
which is envisions national prosperity,” as they appealed for a constitutional
politics centered on the general interests of the masses.
The movement for universal manhood suffrage moved into full-swing
after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). The dead and wounded were tentimes the amount of the Sino-Japanese War, and a special tax to cover war costs
increased the hardship in people’s everyday lives. Even with victory, life was
not richer, and the burdens only grew. Dissatisfaction with the government
grew in every quarter across the country. Fortunately, or not, the Seiyūkai was
not the focus of this criticism. They sometimes served as an opposition party,
and when they took the reins of power, launched administrative reforms,
which presented their image as flexible, and importantly, on the side of thepeoples.
Factions within the Kokumintō, impatient to gain power, formed a
breakaway party, the Rikken dōshikai, which united under the secondgeneration leader of the hanbatsu, Katsura Tarō. The new breakaway party
raised its banners in a declaration “…articles of the imperial constitution
must be vigorously adhered to… the responsibility of ministers of state must
be made strict and clear, and rights of subjects should be preserved.” As is27

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

clear from the name of the new political association, it was envisioned by its
founders as ‘the second Seiyūkai’.
Yet the rump Kokumintō continued to fight under the leadership of Inukai
Tsuyoshi. Katsura, who was from the hanbatsu, sounded the warning about thegrowing trend towards party government, and as a consequence he turned tothe mass media, launching a large-scale government campaign. In response,
the slogan “Protect constitutional government, abolish the hanbatsu,” wasraised by the first movement to protect constitutional government in 1913.
Popular politicians such as Inukai and Ozaki Yukio were active in the
movement which came to be regarded by historians as a major period in
democracy, one which drove Katsura and the hanbatsu from government. Byskillfully drawing on a public frustrated with the government, the new party
forces succeeded in bringing about the collapse of the hanbatsu government.
The problems –as they invariably do– came afterwards. The new gov­
ernment was entrusted to Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei who assembled a
Satsuma-han and Seiyūkai coalition government. The Seiyūkai role in the
new government was criticized by Ozaki who left the party, somethingwhich was convenient from the perspective of the Seiyūkai who were rideof a troublesome and powerful rhetorical voice for party government. The
movement for constitutional government brought down the Chōshū-han; yet,rather than ushering in a new era of constitutional government. Instead, it
provided the conditions for the political ascendency of the rival Satsuma-han.
As a result, only a year later, they gave up the reins of government due tohard criticism for corruption involved with the Navy.
Continuing into the second Ōkuma Shigenobu cabinet, the Rikken Dōshikai,
which served as the ruling party, were deeply antagonistic towards Inukai
and the Kokumintō; yet, Ōkuma brought together many of the representative
figures of constitutional politics such as Ozaki and was met with highexpectations amid liberal opinion. The Ōkuma cabinet was the first politicalparty government widely supported by the masses.
The Ōkuma government, which began as a minority party, led Japan into
the First World War, and it was this moment that led to dissolution and thenational general election in 1915. In the election campaign, Prime MinisterŌkuma led the election campaign, giving speeches from the window of train
to those who had assembled across the country. Conscious of the need for

new campaigning tactics to adapt to the new environment, a record of theprime minister’s voices was made and broadcast at political meetings inmany parts of the nation. It was the first time that a prime minister had taken
part in electioneering (in the form of a stump speech tour) with the aim ofsupporting the election. In the election, the Rikken Dōshikai emerged as thelargest party, and with the Chūseikai (Impartiality Society) and Ōkuma-haku
Kōenkai (Supporters association for the Count Ōkuma) together formed theruling party with the majority of seats in the Imperial Diet. It was a result
which was interpreted as the true beginning of the Taishō democracy.
Can we call this populism? The Ōkuma government carried the hopes of thepeople, yet just two months after the national general election, the government
presented Chinese leaders with the twenty-one demands (21-kajyō no yōkyū),marking a forceful intervention and departure from traditional policy.
Accordance with Ōkuma’s desire to institutionalize the principles of cabinet
responsibility, led to this diplomatic initiative being launched without priorconsultations with the senior statesmen (genrō) (Naraoka 2015). And it goes
without saying, that the policy was a failure. As part of the idea of cabinet
responsibility, ministers are forced to take responsibility.
The result might have been different, had public opinion truly guided policy.
In the subsequent general election held by the Terauchi Masatake government,
the people chose the Seiyūkai rather than the Kenseikai, the former rulingparty which had united when the Ōkuma government resigned. As with theŌkuma faction, the Kenseikai was kept at arm’s length from the government.
The Kenseikai carried with them the people, but lost the state power.
Two years later, in 1918, the “first full-fledged political party cabinet” led byHara Takeshi-led Seiyūkai was established. Ministers were Seiyūkai memberswith a background as bureaucrats; and by making each vice-minister into a
political appointment, the government strengthened the connections between
the cabinet and state ministries to achieve a high degree of policy-making
coordination. In the Diet, a large-scale ruling party was formed through theintroduction of a single-member constituency, while stable parliamentary
operations became possible through cooperation with powerful factions in
the House of Peers (Shimizu 2007).
In terms of military affairs, Yamagata Aritomo and his successor Tanaka
Giichi made compromises and cooperation. As a result, the withdrawal of28

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

Japanese soldiers in Siberia was delayed, and they succeeded in skillfully
promoting their conversion to the politics of disarmament after the FirstWorld War (Asada 2016).
The Hara government, which was supported by the Seiyūkai as the rulingparty, ran the affairs of state not as a form of massified politics, but morealong the lines of realistic administration. Despite appearing as the apogee ofTaishō democracy, Hara viewed changes in government among the politicalparties as premature and instead called for power to shift between the biggest
factions in the House of Peers (Tamai 1999). He also adopted a cautious stancetowards the campaign for universal manhood suffrage, and instead favoured
reduction of the tax payment requirement to 3 yen. For this reason, the Hara
government is also described as ‘undemocratic’.
How should we think about that? During the three years of the Hara
government, industry was encouraged, education promoted, and domestic
policies made great progress particularly in the field of labor relations. Japan
became a founding member of the League of Nations Council and helped
to forge the Washington system of international cooperation. National
governance was carried out on the basis, not of the populism of the Ōkuma
government, but rather on the principles of free delegation.
In the election system, the tax requirement which had been left unchangedfor 19 years was reduced from 10 yen to 3 yen, and the number of votersdoubled from 5.5% of the population to around 11% of the total adult malepopulation. Around one in five male adults became voters. When the ratio
increases to this point, the sentiment of those excluded intensifies. Hara wasfrom the Tōhoku region, and every time he returned to his hometown, heemphasized that the people of Tōhoku should be independent rather thancontinue to rely on the government. This reason –and not only politicalcooperation with Prince Yamagata Aritomo– helps to explain why Hara did
not proceed smoothly towards universal manhood suffrage. As Hara saw it
the existence of an independent popular will –or its absence– can affect thefate not only of party politics, but also and eventually the nation itself.
Hara’s time in government was supported by able bureaucrats. No, it
may be more correct to say those who were raised as bureaucrats continued
on as politicians. The Terauchi government –which ruled during the FirstWorld War– dispatched many young bureaucrats to wartime Europe under

the direction of Home Minister Gotō Shinpei. In this new world of total war,completely different from the one which came before, young bureaucrats
undertook close observations of the massively changed societal conditions.
For his part, Gotō advised the young bureaucrats embarking for Europe to
get out of the libraries and onto the city streets to broaden their horizons,
regardless of the purpose for which they were dispatched (Shimizu 2019).
In Europe these young bureaucrats witnessed the masses were sufferingfrom the drastically changes of society, and caught in a moment of swellingreformist ambitions; they learned much about social, labor, economic andelectoral policies and systems, which they brought back with them on theirreturn to Japan. It was comparable to the Iwakura Mission in Meiji restoration.
After returning to Japan, they set about the establishment of the Social Bureauof the Home Ministry, and it appeared as if there would be a renovation or
renewal of traditional policy structures unseen since the Meiji.
It is not inconsequential that many of these young bureaucrats hailed
from rural regions. While many of the pressing problems, such as poverty,
were centered in the city, these bureaucrats incorporated the city and thecountryside, Japan and the world, together into a rich comprehensive vision.
After returning to their various ministries from their time abroad, theseyoung bureaucrats discussed and debated with their colleagues at the local
level, and it is no wonder they grasped the need for policies which answered
the needs of the masses. In an important sense, the Taishō democracy wasrealized not only by politicians through legislation, but by bureaucrats
through rationalized administration.

30

Whimsical Audience: Party Politics and Political Awareness
Unfortunately, Hara was murdered in 1921. Three year later, the second‘movement for protection of constitutional government’ was launched in
1924. This movement was not like the first. The governing party, nearing
the end of its parliamentary term, and faced with intensified criticism anduproar in the Diet, sought to win an election under the banner of “protect
constitutional government, oust the hanbatsu.” In other words, it was not therealization of democracy but the competition for political power which drove
the movement.
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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

The Seiyūkai was divided over its support for the government, and thegroup which traditionally supports state administration withdrew fromthe party forming the so-called Seiyū Hontō (True Seiyūkai). The remnant
Seiyūkai now cooperated with the Kenseikai and formed the Goken Sanpa(Three Parties Coalition for Protecting Constitutional Government) alliancewhich expanded to include Inukai‘s Kakushin Kurabu (The Lawmaker Groupfor Political Innovation). The three factions of the Goken-sanpa meant thatfor the first time in the history of Japan, as a result of the national generalelections, the largest party formed the government. It was the opening of theperiod of ‘normal constitutional government’ (kensei no jōdō).
Contrary to the beauty of the name of Goken (‘protect the constitution’),the reality of the election was unseemly. Even if each party’s central
headquarters had forged partnerships between the three parties at theleadership level, at the regional level, it was difficult to overcome longstanding antagonistic relations over the competition for seats; this alongwith insufficient coordination over where to stand candidates led to fierce
divisions among the members of the Goken-sanpa (Shimizu 2013). The factthat the Kenseikai became the largest party was due to their ability to profit
while Seiyūkai and Seiyū Hontō were fighting. For the first time a government
had been established which directly reflected the will of the people; however,in reality, the will of the people was distorted.
Regardless, the Goken-sanpa coalition cabinet did not collapse. Rather, they
introduced laws on universal manhood suffrage and set out to reform theHouse of Peers. Until this had been realized, that coalition remained unitedand could not be driven from power. The major reforms of the coalition were
driven by the enthusiasm of party leaders, and most prominently, Baron
Katō Takaaki (Naraoka 2006).
The distance between the state and the people rapidly shortened. The
electorate was now 21% of the entire population, meaning one out of every
two adults had the right to vote. Political parties themselves had undergone
major reforms and were now reorganized and proceeded towards an era of
two major parties. The Kakushin Kurabu, which had advocated for national
politics, with the realization of universal manhood suffrage, lost its raisond’etre and was absorbed by the Seiyūkai, the party which best incarnated thepoke-barrel politics of the era. Many of the politicians who broke away fromthe Seiyūkai to form the Seiyū Hontō were ex-bureaucrats, and they turned to
the Kenseikai, which had a similar structure and merged to form the Rikken
Minseitō (Minseitō). The Seiyūkai promoted policies based on positive finances
through local development, while the Minseitō insisted on a policy of austerity
with an emphasis on centralization. It was envisioned that the era had comewhen politics would be based on a choice over policies.
There were still two problems to overcome. The first was the selectionof the head of government. The Imperial constitution did not stipulate aparliamentary cabinet system, and traditionally leaders were appointed by
the emperor on recommendation of the senior statesmen (genrō), not theresult of the national general election (Murai 2005). As a result, the incentive
was for opposition parties to launch negative campaigns to force the rulingparty from power. If the government should reach an impasse or deadlock,then in accordance with the ideal of ‘normal constitutional government’, thesenior statesmen would entrust the government to the opposition party.
When a party which did not control a plurality of seats in the Diet wereappointed as caretaker governments, their rule was inherently unstable
and chaotic. To form a new majority, policies which appealed to the people
were devised, parliament was dissolved, and elections were called. As aconsequence of the constitutional government and the parliamentary cabinet
system, the order of elections and forming government were reversed(Machidori 2018). Parliamentary politics is where the opinion of the publicshould find expression; however, the institutional relationship with thegovernment allowed corrupt practices to taint politics.
Another more serious problem had to do with the people. With theintroduction of universal male suffrage, experts wondered whether thepeople would judge and vote for themselves. In response, Gotō Shinpei
and former Home Ministry social bureaucrats launched a “political ethics”
movement which included lectures and screenings nationwide to instil
political education. Serving Home Ministry bureaucrats also accelerated
efforts to raise the level of political education of the role of elections throughpamphlet and poster campaigns (Tamai 2013).
There were other issues which affected the masses. There was, of course,
the justice of the village, as their living community. This meant that the village
would decide which politicians to support. If someone did not support the32

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

candidate who was delivering money to the village, then it was seen as arevolt against the village order (Sugimoto 2007). As part of the politics ethics
movement, crude animated films to enlighten the masses were produced.
One such film showed a figure handing over a gold bag and asking for theright to carry the mikoshi (portable shrine), a politician with one foot in thegrave; in the next scene a young craftsman piling up bricks says, “politics is
power,” and then knocks them down saying, “I did one good thing.”2 This
animate campaign allows us to understand how widespread and deep-rooted
money politics were at the height of the Taishō democracy.
On the other hand, one could profit greatly from cooperation with theruling party. Votes could be exchanged for profit. The ruling party almost
invariably won the election, with the opposition party forced to furiously
attempt to bring down the ruling party through muckraking and scandal.
The reality was that the dream of choosing government through elections
was a dream and dream again.
In the pre-war period, the political parties served as vehicles for
coordination and unification in a system of divided powers. There have been
five extrinsic factors which have been pointed out as realistic causes for thissituation. One was that, it was inherent in party politics itself, or in otherwords it was the people and the parties (Mitani 1983).

When the defeat came in 1945, soldiers and politicians were purged, yet
the bureaucrats remained. To establish a new constitution, a constitutional
council was required. Home Ministry bureaucrats sought to wipe the slateclean, abolishing mid-sized constituencies which were adopted with theright of universal manhood suffrage in 1925, and introducing multimember
districts. The age of voting rights was lowered to twenty and the suffrage
expanded to include women. Under this new system, 81% of representatives
were replaced with freshman faces, including 39 female members. The
new Japanese constitution, enacted through the reconstituted parliament,a parliamentary cabinet system was enshrined in law, and the people were
finally made sovereign. No more were the Japanese citizenry treated as theinvitees at the ball.
Little over a year later, the electoral system reverted to the mid-sized
constituency. With the rise of minority parties, stable functioning of thegovernment became a problem, and public will within the Diet was fickle andlacked guiding principles. One after another, in the large constituency, newly
elected members, especially the communist party member, lost their seats.
When the Occupation ended and the purges of wartime elites lifted, prewar parliamentarians rapidly returned to the national scene. Their jiban (local
bases) had remained intact, protected by their wives and children. Not longafter the right and left of the Socialist Party united, the conservative parties
soon followed suit and consolidated at the end of 1955, with parliamentary
politics pivoting on the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist
Party, a state of affairs which came to be known as the 1955 system.
The Liberal Democratic Party is often compared to the pre-war Rikken
Seiyūkai. In terms of the role the party played in the transfer of power, thesimilarities are obvious. These connections are also visible in the connections
with state bureaucrats, and in the use of their administrative expertise todevise national policy. On the other hand, the LDP ability to incorporate
various policies –amoeba like– means that it was no simple post-1945 Seiyūkai.
To meet the ever-expanding demands of the people, the politics in Japan
expanded unstoppably in all directions.
There is no doubt that the main vehicle for uniting the nation and thepeople has been the political party. In many ways the structure of politicalparties has the characteristic of each nation, in the case of Japan, this is deeply

The end? Or the Beginning? Post-war and the New Constitution
Consumed by internecine political conflict and weakening policy expertise,the parties were in no position to cope with the massive crisis unleashedby the Great Depression, and rapidly lost the support of the masses. In
seeking support from the voters, the mainstream conservative parties could
not escape from the paradox that party politics itself was losing support. It
was the armed services –supported by reformist bureaucrats– which were
responsible for the breakthrough in the situation. The Diet also followed suit.
And, of course, the masses supported the war.

2

34

Film Address “Ethicization of Politics” by Shinpei Goto, 1926. https://animation.filmarchives.jp/
works/view/43609

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State, Political Parties, and the Nation

connected with administration, and in terms of the ever-changing distance
between rational administration and the will of the people. The fact thatpolitical parties are not based on clear legal provisions, is in some sense
reminiscent of the versatile and adaptable thought of the senior statesmen inmodern Japan.
We are rarely aware of the state. Does the historical memory of the pre-war
kyakubun still remain in some forms? Amoeba-like, we watch the unconscioustransformations in the connections between the state and the people madeby the parties. From another perspective, however, this is little more thana reflection of what 130 years of constitutional politics has taught us, as if itwere an apothegm.

Murai Ryōta. (2005). Seitō naikakusei no seiritsu sen-kyūhyaku-jūhachi—nijūshichinen(Tokyo: Yūhikaku).
Naraoka Sōchi. (2006). Katō Takaaki to seitō seiji: nidai seitōsei e no michi (Tokyo:
Yamakawa shuppansha).
Naraoka Sōchi. (2015). Taika nijūikkajō yōkyū toha nandatta noka: daiichiji sekai
taisen to Nitchū tairitsu no genten (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai).
Shimizu Yuichirō. (2007). Seitō to kanryō no kindai: Nihon ni okeru rikken tōchi kōzō
no sōkoku (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten).
Shimizu Yuichirō. (2013). “Rikken Seiyūkai no bunretsu to seitō shiji kōzō no henka”,
in Sakamoto Kazuto et al. eds., Nihon seijishi no shinchihei (Tokyo: Yoshida
shoten).
Shimizu Yuichirō. (2016). “Nihon no senkyoku ha dou tsukurareta noka?”, Nenpōseijigaku, No. 67 Vol. 2.
Shimizu Yuichirō. (2019). The Origins of Modern Japanese Bureaucracy (London:
Bloomsbury).
Sugimoto Jin. (2007). Senkyo no minzokushi: Nihon-teki seiji fūdo no kisō (Tokyo:
Fukurō-sha).
Tamai Kiyoshi. (1999). Hara Takashi to Rikken Seiyūkai (Tokyo: Keiō gijuku daigaku
shuppankai).
Tamai Kiyoshi. (2013). Daiikkai fusen to senkyo posutā: Shōwa shotō no senkyo undōni kansuru kenkyū (Tokyo: Keio gijuku daigaku shuppankai).
Yamazaki Yūkō. (2005). “Meiji shonen no Kōgisho: shūgi’in,” in Toriumi Yasushi eds.,
Nihon rikken seiji no keisei to henshitsu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan).

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