Few remarks on NPT, the nuclear ban treaty and the CTBTThe NPT was signed almost exactly 50 years ago. The need of an NPT can be certainly traced
back to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 that showed how concrete the risk of a nuclear
catastrophe has been and how we have been close to the nuclear brink. The idea was (and stillis) that if many countries possessed nuclear weapons, then the probability of a nuclear
holocaust would have been much higher. It can be easily said that the NPT is a very imperfectand, on many accounts, problematic treaty. It distinguishes between nuclear and non-nuclear
states, hence introducing a significant discrimination among member states; it does not require
any time schedule for the commitment to nuclear disarmament (art. 6), nor, in fact, imposes
any effective limitation on the quality and quantity of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear weapon
states. It is, on one side, practically impossible to amend and modify the treaty and, on theother side, as is the case of many international treaties, there is no serious obstacle towithdrawal for member states (if a country decides to do so taking into account its “supremenational interests”). The NPT reiterates the “inalienable right” to the access of nuclear civilian
technology without requiring a proper updated international control of civilian nuclear
activities, that we all know are very much related to nuclear military activities 1.
With all its problems, still the NPT is one of the most widely signed international agreements
and it has been successful, up to now, in limiting the number of nuclear weapon states to “5official nuclear weapons states”, while only 4 other states, not member of the NPT, possess
nuclear weapons. If the present discussion on creating a de-facto nuclear weapon free zone inNorth East Asia makes some progress, then we will have a very significant strengthening of theNPT. This will require, as it is obvious, the denuclearization of DPRK.
On the other side, there are serious threats to the NPT. One of the most important, and themost recent one, is connected with the JCPOA, namely with the agreement on the Iranian
nuclear issue. The decision of the USA to abandon the agreement and reinstate heavy sanctions
on Iran can generate serious problems for the NPT in the Middle East. If the other partners of
the JCPOA (Russia, China, France, Germany, the UK and the European Union) do not oppose thedemise of the JCPOA and do not fully commit to keeping the JCPOA alive 2, then Iran may decide
at some point to suspend its membership of the NPT, possibly creating a larger NPT problem in
the Middle East 3 and maybe even a war in that region.

1 Remember that the IAEA additional protocol, that is a significant improvement over thestandard safeguards agreements, is not compulsory at all.

2 This in particular will require to resist effectively to the so called “secondary sanctions”,

namely the sanctions that the US plans to impose on foreign entities that do not respect the(new) US sanctions on Iran.
3 Notice that already there is some talk of US and Saudi Arabia cooperating on nuclear
technologies and Saudi Arabia did not sign any additional protocol.

But other problems exist in relation with the NPT. Every 5 years the member states of the NPT
are supposed to gather for a quinquennial NPT review conference. Since the year 2000, thequinquennial NPT review conferences have been divided in two categories: those conferencesthat ended up with no final document 4 and those that ended up with a final document whose
recommendations have not been implemented. In the year 2000, thirteen steps have beenmentioned in the final document and, largely, have not been implemented. In the year 2010 it
was agreed to convene a conference, before 2012, on the creation of a zone free of weapons ofmass destruction in the Middle East. This conference, as is well known, was never convened. In
2005 and 2015 no final document was produced by the NPT review conference. The entire
setting of the NPT Review conferences has shown its weakness and, up to a point, its lack ofrelevance. The consequences for the credibility of the NPT itself should not be underestimated.
The final draft of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (in short NBT, or Nuclear
Ban Treaty) was approved on July 7th, 2017 by 122 States of the UN and has been signed, up toMay 2018, by 58 States and ratified by 10 States. When it will be ratified by 50 States it willenter into force. The treaty prohibits the development, testing, production, stockpiling,stationing, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance andencouragement to the nuclear military activities. For states joining the treaty that possess, own
or control nuclear weapons, there will be a deadline, determined by the member states of thetreaty, for the verified and irreversible elimination of their nuclear weapon programs.
It has been claimed by some that there is possibly an incompatibility between the NPT and theNBT. This argument is hardly understandable. First the NBT will just strengthen the NPT, by
fixing a deadline for the removal-elimination of nuclear weapons of member states. The NBT
also strengthens in principle the relations between the IAEA and member states. Moreover theNBT will explicitly forbid member states to host nuclear weapons of other states and tocooperate with the managing of and the operations related to the nuclear weapons that belong
to other states.
This last point is very important. For the first time there is a provision that will forbid thehosting of nuclear weapons and the “nuclear sharing” practice of countries that are allied ofnuclear weapon states. The NPT has been signed at a time when the nuclear sharing practice ofcountries allied with the US has been de-facto deemed not incompatible with the NPT rules.
This compromise was set in order to avoid the more involving and the more risky project of aNATO multilateral force.
But the question of whether the nuclear hosting and nuclear sharing practices are incompatible
or not with the NPT, remains open. And moreover we have all to understand that the nuclearhosting and nuclear sharing practices can be, in the future, a way to circumvent the NPT itself.
Think of nuclear countries, even non member of the NPT, deploying nuclear weapons in the4 In fact, has it has been pointed out to me, out of 9 quinquennial review conferences, 5 did not

end up with a final document

territory of non nuclear states members of the NPT. Will this be considered acceptable from thepoint of view of the NPT? For example, the Middle East could, in principle, be filled with nuclear
weapons belonging to other states. The NBT explicitly negates this possibility for its memberstates.
It is very clear, that given the present international environment, the path for a large scale
membership of the NBT will be far from an easy one. But we have to stress that the NBT is theright step in the right direction. Countries that are seriously interested in nuclear disarmamentshould do whatever possible to strengthen the NBT and promote its membership. And short ofa full membership of the NBT, countries should whenever possible promote some of its
significant goals, like the elimination of the nuclear sharing/nuclear hosting practice.
Finally let us get to the CTBT that forbids all nuclear weapons tests. As is well known the CTBT is
not yet entered into force as there are still 5 countries that did not ratify the treaty (US, China,Egypt, Iran, Israel) and 3 countries that did not even sign the treaty (DPRK, India, Pakistan).
These are 8 countries belonging to the group of 44 countries whose ratification is required,according to Annex II of the CTBT, for the entry into force of the CTBT itself. The only country
that has carried on nuclear tests, after the year 2000, is the DPRK. But DPRK has just now
destroyed its nuclear test facility. So there is some progress.
But what is the reason why those 8 countries have not yet ratified the treaty? With the possible
exception of DPRK, the reason has probably nothing to do with the need of performing nuclear
tests for the creation or the preservation of an “efficient” nuclear arsenal. The US, Israel, China,
India and Pakistan do not need further nuclear tests. They do not sign or ratify the CTBT sincethey want emphatically to preserve their role of nuclear weapon states and not accept furtherimpositions from the international community. It is a kind of “nuclear hybris”, that is apolitically dangerous signal given to the international community and to non nuclear weapon
states in particular. It is a signal that goes in reality against the NPT.
Iran, a member of the NPT, has been under pressure for its civilian nuclear program. With theJCPOA in force, it was very easy to forecast an Iranian ratification of the CTBT. But now that theJCPOA is in a critically difficult situation, the outlook looks not easy at all. Egypt, also a memberof the NPT, awaits for some movements for the creation of a NW (or WMD) – free zone in theMiddle East and, in such position, does not take any further step in the direction of “nucleararms control”. Despite the fact that the CTBT is not yet in force, the CTBTO is providing anenormous wealth of data and is covering the planet with seismic test sites that are able todetect, very efficiently, possible nuclear tests
In conclusion the strengthening of the NPT (and now the perseveration of the JCPOA), thecreation and consolidation of NW (or WMD) –free zones, the improvement of the NPT-related
mechanisms (making the NPT review conferences more efficient, enforcing the control by theIAEA of civilian nuclear activities), the widening of the membership of the NBT and the progress
towards the entry into force of the CTBT are all parts of a global effort to reduce the role ofnuclear weapons, to highlight the dangers for mankind represented by these weapons and tomove towards a more secure global environment.