7

April 2019Japan, China, and the United States:
What Future for East Asia?
KCL-RIPS Symposium
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)
andKing’s College London (KCL)

RIPS Policy Perspectives
RIPS Policy
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No. 27
April 2019

April 2019

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King’s College London
King’s(KCL)College London
King’s(KCL)
College London (KCL)Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research institution established inTokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues of national and international peace andsecurity, publishes research reports, and proposes policy recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security), which surveys the changing
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communities, the institute also organizes seminars for specialists and the public on national, regional, andinternational security and sponsors joint research projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation's Center for Global
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The RIPS Policy Perspectives is intended to provide timely alternatives to and analyses of existing peaceand security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The views of the authors are their own and do
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 27

Japan, China, and the United States:
What Future for East Asia?
KCL-RIPS Symposium

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)
andKing’s College London (KCL)

April 2019Foreword
The events that took place at the King’s College, London, on 12 February 2019 proved to be highly successful.
Both the closed-door roundtable discussion by 24 specialists from six countries (France, Italy, Japan, Philippines,
United Kingdom, and United States) and the public panel presentation by four speakers (Japan, UK, USA, andFrance, in order of speaking) presented timely and perceptive analyses of the key security issues facing Japan,
China, and the United States. London was the third site in Europe for our Research Institute for Peace andSecurity to hold these events, following Berlin in 2017 and Geneva in 2018.
The specialists covered many important issues, including what the implications of United States–China
relations are for future international security, how to respond to China’s aggressive conduct in the South andEast China Seas, and what the prospects of peace and security on the Korean peninsula are. The participating
countries’ different perceptions of China’s growing power were especially interesting. For instance, Tokyo andWashington were particularly concerned about some of the EU member nations’ treatment of China as a strategic
partner. Both Japan and the United States also suspect that China’s hegemonic activities in the South and East
China Seas are aimed at achieving its “hidden” goal of national unification by 2049, the 100th anniversary of
the People’s Republic of China.
Most of the participants believe that any major armed clashes in East Asia would take place in the South
China Sea. Indeed, the recent case in which a Chinese destroyer tried to intercept an American destroyer sailingin the South China Sea suggests that the situation is serious. But whereas the United States and Asia naturally
attach strategic importance to the situation in the Strait of Taiwan, the European countries may be less concerned.
In addition, there was surprisingly little discussion about Russia’s role on the Korean peninsula and in otherparts of Asia.
In our discussion, which took place two weeks before the second United States–North Korea summit, nearly
all the participants expressed skepticism regarding North Korea’s denuclearization. Some pointed out the
decline of US influence on the Korean peninsula, and others even suggested the possibility of Japan’s acquiring
nuclear weapons if North Korea retained its nuclear arsenal.
As the Japanese organizer of the events, I was pleased that some of the EU participants raised the issue oftensions between Japan and China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as an intractable and important issueof regional security.
In sum, this discussion once again confirmed the usefulness of this kind of intellectual exercise in Europe.
The Research Institute for Peace and Security is very pleased to have been able to share these events with theKing’s College, London, and our special thanks go to Dr. Alessio Patalano, a superb co-organizer.

Dr Masashi Nishihara
President
Research Institute for Peace and Security

Foreword
On 12 February 2019, the Department of War Studies and the King’s Japan Programme were honoured tojointly host in London the Symposium ‘Japan, China, and the United States: What Future for East Asia?’
together with the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS).
The symposium was designed to include two activities. The first centred on a stakeholders’ closed-door
workshop, bringing together senior experts and professionals to share their views and experiences on East Asia.
The second activity delivered a public roundtable discussion with leading experts debating the role that China,
Japan, and the United States can play in shaping the future trajectory of East Asian Security.
The structure of the symposium was meant to be innovative in the way it sought to bridge the divide between
academics and practitioners, university experts and senior policy analysts. The combined format aimed todeliver robust and highly informative exchanges, whilst favouring a frank and open atmosphere among theparticipants and a sense of engagement with the wider audience.
My impression is that the events did just that. Insofar as the workshop is considered, academics from threecontinents, government officials, and think-tanks experts, all came to share their expertise and findings on key
regional issues. Topics such as maritime security tensions in the East and South China Seas, and Korean
peninsula stability were central to the discussions. In particular, one of the more significant contributions of theevent was its ambition to investigate how interactions among the region’s main actors, Japan, China, and theUnited States, may affect future security trends.
One of the most stimulating deliberations of the workshop was the overall perception of the too often
underestimated role of Japan in managing growing tensions in Sino-American relations, and the ability of theJapanese government to act as a bridge between Beijing and Washington.
The public roundtable discussion was equally stimulating in that it offered the opportunity to present national
perspectives on regional security and explore the role that European countries – both individually and in
multilateral formats – can play in managing regional stability by means of their growing ties with regional actors,
chiefly Japan and China.
From a professional perspective, I was delighted of the opportunity of this collaboration. RIPS has been an
intellectual lighthouse in the Japanese security landscape, standing today as the oldest private think tank inJapan dealing with defence and security issues. Its prestige and repute as an organisation committed in delivering
cutting edge research was at the heart of the ability to work together to deliver an innovative project seeking toreach out in a substantive fashion to a large community.
On a more personal note, I was particularly pleased to have an opportunity to work alongside with Prof
Nishihara and his team. Having had the honour to study his work as a doctoral student and learn from his
experience as a leading scholar and educator in the field of defence matters, I knew I would only learn a great
deal from this experience.
This was indeed the case. I trust that the publication of these proceedings and the format of the Symposium
will contribute to inform future discussions on these topics as much as the individual contributions and theirdynamics of interaction provided an opportunity for a lively and enriching discussion on the day.
Dr Alessio Patalano
Reader, East Asian Warfare and Security
Department of War Studies
King’s College London

Table of Contents
Two Faces of the Possible Impact of the U.S.-China Confrontation on the Future of theInternational Order in East Asia and Grobally
Matake Kamiya............................................................................................................................................ 1
The China Seas: What Prospects for Crisis Management A European perspective
Nicola Casarini ........................................................................................................................................... 6
Prospects for a (Stable) Crisis in the China Seas: The Challenge of Averting the Single Spark that
Could Ignite a Prairie Fire
Renato Cruz de Castro .............................................................................................................................. 12South China Sea: What Prospects for Crisis Management?
Bill Hayton................................................................................................................................................. 17
Growing Tensions in the China Seas and Dim Prospects for Regional Peace
Masashi Nishihara..................................................................................................................................... 22
Japan, China, and the United States: What Future for East Asia?
Jonathan Pollack ....................................................................................................................................... 26
The North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Problem and the Stability of the Korean Peninsula- A
Japanese Perspective
Hideshi Tokuchi ....................................................................................................................................... 34
China and Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Stability
Nicola Leveringhau ................................................................................................................................... 41
The Koreas have decided to take control: What this means for the future of the Korean Peninsula
Ramon Pacheco Pardo .............................................................................................................................. 45
Japan, China and the United States: What Future for Asia?
Yuji Miyamoto ........................................................................................................................................... 49
Japan, China and the US
Kerry Brown .............................................................................................................................................. 53
US-China great power competition in East Asia, escalation risks and crisis management
Mathieu Duchâtel ...................................................................................................................................... 57
日本語要旨 ............................................................................................................................................... 61

Two Faces of the Possible Impact of the U.S.-China Confrontation on the Futureof the International Order in East Asia and Globally
Prof Matake Kamiya
Professor, International Relations
National Defense Academy of Japan

Introduction
Despite the intensified America's political divide during Donald Trump’s first two years as the President of theUnited States, the U.S. policy toward China has been forming a near bipartisan consensus during the same
period. The perception of China as an economic, security, and even ideological threat has been spreading
through not only the Republicans but also among Democrats. Consequently, the U.S.-China relations have been
becoming increasingly worse. The "National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” issued in
December 2017, labeled China, along with Russia a “revisionist power” to the exiting, U.S.-led international
order, and maintained that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting toerode American security and prosperity 1 .” More recently, on October 4, 2018, in his remarks on Trumpadministration’s policy toward China delivered at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., U.S. Vice President
Mike Pence criticized China as a military aggressor, a prolific thief of U.S. technology and as interfering in
American elections, and said that President Trump “will not back down,” demonstrating the strong resolve by
the United States not to be hesitant to take a confrontational attitude toward China when necessary. “[W]e willcontinue to stand strong for our security and our economy, even as we hope for improved relations with Beijing,”
said Pence2.
The current U.S.-China confrontation is often described as a “trade war.” A trade war is, however, in fact only
a part of the overall bilateral tensions. The competition between Washington and Beijing is being fought overthe future state of the international order in East Asia and globally. Because of this reason, it is not appropriate
to see the impact of this confrontation to the East Asian and global security as simply negative. In fact, thisconfrontation has two contrasting faces. In one sense, it is certain that the ongoing U.S.-China confrontation
involves risks that could lead to disruption of the international order in East Asia and globally. In another sense,
however, it is desirable for the liberal democracies in the world, including Japan and Britain, that the UnitedStates has finally become serious about the competition against China. China’s increasing assertiveness, if left
unattended, could lead to the replacement of the U.S.-led liberal, rules-based order which has served as the basisof the peace and prosperity in East Asia and globally during the postwar period by some illiberal order led by
China. In order to prevent that from happening, it is indispensable that the United States become willing to take"National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, December 2017, pp. 2 and25.
2“Remarks by Vice President on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” The Hudson Institute, Washington,
D.C., October 4, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administratio
ns-policy-toward-china/.
11

a tough, even a confrontational attitude toward China when it finds it necessary to do so.

The First Face: U.S. Confrontation with China for the Sake of Protection of the Existing
International Order Is Desirable for the International Society
In recent years, there has been an increasingly shared awareness in the international society, particularly among
the liberal democracies, that it is critically important to protect the existing rules-based international order inthe face of an increasingly assertive China. Japan and the United States, for example, have consistently referredto the necessity to do so in joint summit and 2+2 statements. The two allies have made it clear that the conceptof rules-based international order is based on “shared values” featuring “respect for human rights,” “freedom,”“democracy,” “free and open markets,” “high trade and investment standards,” and the “rule of law3.”
For Japan and the United States, the maintenance of a rules-based international order means the maintenanceof an international order in which “large countries, small countries, all have to abide by what is considered justand fair,” and disputes are resolved “in peaceful fashion4.” In the post-World War II world, the United States,
despite its overwhelming power, did not very often try to promote its national interest by coercing weaker
countries by its power. The United States, in most of the occasions, pay considerable respect to the internationalrules most of which had been formed under the leadership of itself. In the case of China, however, the patternof external behavior which we have observed so far has been considerably different from the pattern of behavior
taken by the postwar United States. As its power grows, China has increasingly shown a tendency to attempt topromote its national interest and even to “change the status quo” by power-based actions, rather than rules-based
actions, including intimidation and coercion over weaker countries.
China’s external behavior in recent years, particularly in the South China Seas and East China Seas includingin the sea area near Japan’s Senkaku Islands, has become increasingly inconsistent with the concept of the“protection of rules-based international order.” In response to that, Japan and the United States have repeatedlyemphasized their resolve to “oppose any attempt to assert territorial or maritime claims through the use of
intimidation, coercion or force5.” The two allies have even warned that “state actions that undermine respect forsovereignty and territorial integrity by attempting to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion posechallenges to the international order6.”
Until recently, however, such concern over an increasingly assertive China, was only weakly sensed amongliberal democracies other than Japan and the United States, including European countries. Those countries

3

These words and phrases have appeared regularly in the joint statements issued after the summit, 2+2, and ot
her high-level meetings between Japan and the United States since the early 21st century.
4
Words by U.S. President Barack Obama, “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister
Abe of Japan,” Tokyo, April 24, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan.
5“U.S.-Japan Joint Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond” (Joint Statement issued after the Abe-Obama summit in Tokyo), April 25, 2014, https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na
1/us/page24e_000045.html.
6“U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement,” April 28, 2015,https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_000332.html.

2

tended to pay more attention to the opportunities presented by the remarkable economic growth of China, rather
than the risks presented by the increasing assertiveness of China. In Europe, the recognition that the postwar,
U.S.-led, liberal rules-based order was under increasing strain started to spread after early 2014. However, themain challenge to the existing international order initially recognized by the European countries was Russia.
Until around 2015, most foreign and security policy experts in Europe tended to dismiss the seriousness ofChina’s challenge to the rules-based international order by pointing out that China had not started any war in
East Asia and very few had died in disputes and confrontations between China and neighboring countries, while
Russian intervention in Ukraine had resulted in substantial casualties in Europe. It was in the last two or three
years that Europeans finally came to realize the significance of China problem for the future of the international
order not only in East Asia but also globally.
By now, however, liberal democracies in the world, including European countries, have come to a consensus
that they should not allow China to revise the existing rules-based international order by force. Meanwhile, a
new serious challenge has risen with regard to the future of the rules-based order, that is to say, the emergenceof the Trump administration in the United States. President Trump, who has raised the banner of “America First,”
has shown little interest in the issues of international rules and order. Consequently, the future of the existingliberal, rules-based international order has become more uncertain, because at the very time when the existingliberal, rules-based order is facing the serious external challenges by China and Russia, another new “internal”
challenge has come to surface: The United States, who has lead the formation and maintenance of thatinternational order for more than seven decades, may weaken or even abandon that leadership, due to President
Trump’s astrategic, haphazard decision-making.
From this point of view, the show of its will by the United States not to be hesitant to take a tough,confrontational approach to China when it believes it necessary, has a welcome aspect for East Asia, for theworld and for liberal democracies such as Japan and Britain. Trump dislikes the concept of “liberal.” It is
unlikely that he will become willing to protect the “liberal international order.” Also, he seems to remain by andlarge indifferent to the issues of international rules and order. He, however, is eager to “make America great
again” and that represents the overriding foreign policy goal for President Trump. In order to achieve that goal,
Trump’s America has to maintain the world that is led by the United States. If the U.S.-led world is undermined
and is replaced by the China-led world, that represents the worst nightmare for him. In order to prevent suchfrom happening, Trump has started to take increasingly harsh stance toward an increasingly assertive China.
And if his America starts to take actions to protect the existing U.S-led world, that inevitably means that theUnited States takes actions to protect the existing liberal rules based order in East Asia and globally, even if
President himself does not realize that. And if that happens, that means that the United States maintains aleadership role in the protection of the existing international order.
Seen in such a light, there is a reason for East Asia and the world to welcome the intensifying standoff between
the United States and China particularly in recent months.

3

The Second Face：U.S. Confrontation with China in the Form of Undermining the Existing
International Order Is Undesirable for the International Society
The intensification of the standoff between the United States and China, of course, involves a substantial risks.
The most apparent risk is the economic one. China today represents the world’s growth center, and presents avariety of opportunities to the international society. If the U.S.-China confrontation leads to the slowdown of
China’s economic growth, that will lead to a considerable decrease of such opportunities. Today, all the countries
in the world, including the United States and other liberal democracies, are receiving a significant benefit from
economic relations with China. If the relationship between the United States and China, or between liberal
democracies and China, deteriorates, it is likely that such benefit will shrink.
Is it appropriate, however, to think that the international society should always prefer cooperation toconfrontation in order not to damage the economic opportunities which China presents? Should the UnitedStates always avoid collisions with the China? As is clear from the arguments made in the previous section, theanswers to these questions are “no.” Today, every country in the world desires to enjoy the economic
opportunities presented by China. Everyone wants to gain benefits from economic exchanges with China. What
will however happen if everyone always tries to maintain “good relations” with China — whatever it does,
however it behaves — out of fear that disputes or collisions with China may undermine such opportunities?
That will help China’s attempt to undermine the existing liberal, rules-based order to succeed, possibly leading
to the transformation of the East Asian and global order to an illiberal one led by China instead of the UnitedStates. Those who do not want to see that happen should not be afraid of disputes and collisions with China. It
is natural for all the countries in the world today to hope to build and maintain cooperative relations with China
as much as possible. However, depending on how China behaves externally, there is a time when theinternational society has to confront with challenges posed by China.
Even in such cases, it is significant to choose appropriate means to confront with China’s challenges. In
principle, actions to be taken to counter China’s illegitimate challenges to the liberal, rules-based international
order should be the ones that are liberal and rules-based in nature.
Trump’s way of countering China has often been seriously problematic from this perspective. To fight against
China, Trump’s America has adopted a series of policy tools that are not liberal nor do not pay sufficient respect
to the existing international rules. The typical example has been tariff hike against China. Tariff hike is a measurethat is inconsistent with one of the most essential characteristics of the liberal postwar order, i.e., free trade. It
is also inconsistent with the WTO rules. The potential damage that could be done to the existing liberal, rulesbased order by such behavior of the world’s most powerful country could be immense. To put it in short, while
the U.S. actions to protect the U.S.-led international order could be beneficial for other countries in the world,
particularly liberal democracies, the U.S. actions could also undermine the order it wants to protect if
inappropriate measures are chosen to pursue that goal. This represents a more essential risk involved in Trumpadministration’s ongoing confrontational policy against China.
There is still another type of risk for the future of the international order in East Asia and globally that could4be brought about by the ongoing U.S.-China confrontation: The confrontation between these two countries could
lead to the undersupply of international public goods. China now represents the world’s second largest economy.
Even when the United States is determined to maintain the U.S.-led international order and other liberal
democracies and many others in the international society support that determination of the United States, it will
be important to obtain constructive cooperation from the second largest economy in the world with regard to
the supply of the international public goods necessary to form and maintain an stable international order. If the
U.S.-China confrontation develops into an unbounded “new Cold War,” this danger may become real. Even
when the United States “wins” the new Cold War, if China refused to shoulder costs to supply necessaryinternational public goods commensurate with its power, the stability of the U.S.-led order could be seriously
damagedIn Lieu of Conclusion
It is not appropriate to interpret the impact of the U.S.-China confrontation on the future of East Asian andglobal security simply as negative. It is also inappropriate to believe that disputes and collisions with China
should always be avoided, in order to obtain economic cooperation from China.
For any countries in the world, it is of course that cooperation with the second largest economy in the worldis desirable. However, the United States and other liberal democracies in the world, including Japan and Britain,
need to recognize that there are times when they have to confront with China. When they observe China’s
behavior that undermine the existing liberal, rules-based international order in their respective region or globally,
which they desire to protect, they should not shy away from taking a tough stance toward China.
Will the United States recognize appropriately the two faces of the ongoing U.S.-China confrontation
described in this paper? Will it be able to “win” that competition and succeeds in maintaining U.S.-lead liberal,
rules-based international order without employing measures damaging to that order? Will the level of the U.S.China rivalry be controlled to the minimum level necessary to prevent China from taking revisionist actions toalter the existing international order? The nature of international order and security in East Asia and beyond
going forward will largely depend on what answers will be given to these questions.

5

The China Seas: What Prospects for Crisis Management
A European perspective
Dr Nicola Casarini
Senior Fellow and Head of Asia Research
Istituto Affari Internazionali, RomeIntroduction
The future of East Asia will be fashioned by the strategic triangle formed by Japan, China and the United States(US). However, given its economic weight and global ambitions, the European Union (EU) will also have a roleto play in the region. Untrammelled by binding military alliances and endowed with a formidable array of soft
power capabilities, the EU has recently stepped up its involvement in East Asia. This paper focuses on what the
EU and its member states have done to address security crisis management and provide support for a rulesbased order in the China Seas. It argues that the EU is gradually shedding its traditional neutrality in favour ofa position more in line with that of the US and its Asian allies – something that opens up new opportunities forsecurity cooperation between Japan and Europe unthinkable only a few years ago.

Europe’s commitment to security cooperation in and with Asia
The EU Global Strategy devotes a fair amount of attention to East Asia’s security affairs, also due to Europe’s
expanding economic interests in the area. 1 The Union is today China’s biggest trading partner, the third largest
for Japan; and the fourth most important export destination for South Korea. ASEAN as a whole represents theEU’s third largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China). In East Asia, the EU is as much
important – economically speaking – as the United States.2
In this context, the EU has recently decided to scale up its security engagement in and with Asia to better
complement its economic reach.3 In its Conclusions on Enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia
adopted by the Council of the EU (Foreign Affairs) on 28 May 2018, the EU states its commitment to exploring
possibilities to deepen security cooperation with its Asian strategic partners, in areas such as maritime security,
cyber security, counter terrorism, hybrid threats, conflict prevention, the proliferation of chemical biological

1

European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Uni
on’s Foreign And Security Policy, Brussels: EU Publications, June 2016 - https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/glo
balstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf
2
Nicola Casarini, “How Can Europe Contribute to Northeast Asia’s Security?”, The Diplomat, 11 September 20
17, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/how-can-europe-contribute-to-northeast-asias-security/
3
European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Uni
on’s Foreign And Security Policy, Brussels: EU Publications, June 2016 - https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/glo
balstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf

6

radiological and nuclear weapons and the development of regional cooperative orders.4
In this vein, the European External Action Service (EEAS – Europe’s diplomatic service) and the European
Commission have launched a pilot project in December 2018 to support tailor-made security cooperation withan initial set of five countries: India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea and Vietnam, with particular focus infour areas: maritime, counter-terrorism, crisis management (peacekeeping/CSDP) and cybersecurity.5 To notethat China does not feature in the list, notwithstanding Beijing being one of the EU’s strategic partners in Asia.
This pilot project builds on – and aims to expand - security cooperation initiatives established with South
Korea, Japan and ASEAN in the last years. For instance, in 2014 Brussels and Seoul signed a Framework
Participation Agreement (FPA) aimed at facilitating the ROK’s participation in Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. In the same year, the EU and ASEAN established a High Level
Dialogue on Maritime Security which now includes exchanges on piracy lessons, maritime surveillance, port
security, disaster relief and capacity building. The EU is also training members of the ASEAN Regional Forumon preventive diplomacy and mediation. In July 2018, Japan and the EU adopted their bilateral StrategicPartnership Agreement (SPA) which is aimed at further institutionalising their cooperation in regional –including East Asia – as well as international security affairs.
But what have the EU and its member states done, in practice, to address security crisis management in the
China Seas?

East China Sea
The East China Sea presents two intertwined territorial questions which are currently unresolved between China
and Japan. The first concerns sovereignty issues regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The islands areadministered by Japan which does not recognise the existence of a territorial dispute. The second question
concerns the maritime delimitation in the East China Sea. The 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones(EEZ), which are calculated from the baselines of the coasts of the two countries, overlap over a vast stretch ofsea. China claims the extension of its EEZ along its continental shelf all the way to the coast of Japan.
China has regularly sent its ships around the Senkakus since the Japanese government purchased some of theislands from a private Japanese owner in 2012, bringing them under state control. In 2013, China declared an
air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea to emphasize its sovereignty in the area.
In August 2016, tensions around the Senkakus were heightened by the arrival of more than 20 Chinese coast
guard vessels, some of them armed, a larger than usual presence in the area. In December 2017, Japan and Chinareached an agreement on the implementation of a crisis management and communication mechanism to avoid4

Council of the EU (Foreign Affairs) Conclusions on Enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia, Br
ussels, 28 May 2018. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/28/deepening-eu-security-cooperation-with-asian-partners-council-adopts-conclusions/pdf
5Council of the EU – General Secretariat, Working Paper (EU security cooperation in and with Asia under th
e Partnership Instrument), Brussels, 3 December 2018 (WK 15000/2018 INIT) – mimeo.

7

sea and air clashes in the East China Sea.
The EU welcomed the Japan-China agreement, reiterating its strong commitment to an international maritime
order based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The EU has, so far, avoided
taking side with regard to the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, contrary to the US whose statementsin the last years do mention Japan’s administration of the islands. The EU has also refrained from any declaration
regarding Japan’s official stance that there is no sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. By nottaking side, the EU wants to project an image of neutrality – at least at the official level – in order to avoid
eventual retaliation coming from Beijing.6
In reality, however, Europe has chosen a camp. On territorial and maritime questions in the China Seas, theEU acts increasingly as a norm-setting status quo power - a position hardly in line with that of Beijing which is
challenging the status quo and prefers to settle disputes with neighbouring countries on a bilateral basis. It is
worth recalling the firm statement issued by the EU in 2013, following China’s declaration of an ADIZ on the
East China Sea. The statement was appreciated by Japan and South East Asian countries, since it was seen as
contributing to China’s restraint in enforcing airspace control.
The overall approach of the EU is more on security crisis management, than on sovereignty crisis solution.
An approach which could prove useful in the South China Sea which has become a hotspot for competing
territorial and maritime claims.

South China Sea
The security situation in the South China Sea has been deteriorating in the last years, mainly due to Beijing’s
decision to step up territorial and maritime claims over large areas of the Sea. These claims are not only basedon economic and security considerations, but also on national identity and the renewal of China’s past glories.
President Xi Jinping’s reiteration of his vision of a ‘Chinese dream’, as outlined during the 13th National People’s
Congress held in Beijing in March 2018, reflects these efforts to rebrand China’s image and polish its credentials
as a global actor.7
Xi’s closing speech at the 2018 National People’s Congress cited China’s island-building campaign in theSouth China Sea as one of the key accomplishments of his Presidency. This implicitly linked his vision of a
Chinese dream and the rejuvenation of the country with the idea of restoring the glory of the ancient times when
China presided over a Sino-centric order in East Asia.
Xi’s vision of the South China Sea goes to the very heart of China’s national identity. For instance, in
geography classes across the country, Chinese school children study maps of China’s territory including theMathieu Duchâtel and Fleur Huijskens, The European Union’s principled neutrality on the East China Sea, St
ockholm: SIPRI Policy Brief, February 2015 - https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB1502d.pdf
7‘Speech delivered by Xi Jinping at the first session of the 13th NPC’, China Daily, Wednesday, March 21, 2
018 - https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/184/187/127/1521628772832.html
68

entire South China Sea, where the 'nine-dash line' is clearly highlighted.8
The so-called 'nine-dash line' is the border drawn around what China considers to be its sovereign rights in
the South China Sea. It includes the islands, banks, and shoals as well as the surrounding waters of the Paracels,
Spratlys, Scarborough Shoal, and Macclesfield Bank, and the Pratas Islands all the way down to James Shoal
as its southernmost tip -1,800 miles from Mainland China.
Chinese claims emphasise its sovereignty over territorial ‘features’ (i.e. islands) within the area demarcatedby the dashed lines. It follows that overlapping claims, and alternative interpretations, by other countries in theregion – in particular Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam – are not recognised by Chinese
authorities. The hard-line approach taken by the Chinese Communist Party is supported among Chinese public
opinion, which has come to view Beijing’s construction of artificial islands as perfectly within its rights, since
it occurs within Chinese territory. The overwhelming view in China is that these are ‘our islands’.9

Promoting a rules-based order
There appears to be a glaring division between China, on the one hand, and Japan and the West, on the other,when it comes to the application of international law to sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. In July
2016, after more than three years of deliberation, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on the
Arbitration between the Philippines and China, making it clear that China’s extensive claims to maritime areas
within the so-called ‘nine-dash line’ are incompatible with UNCLOS and therefore illegitimate.10 The tribunal
also underscored that none of the land features claimed by China qualify as ‘islands’ – something that would inturn warrant the claiming of an exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS.11
Following the ruling by The Hague Tribunal, the US and Japan issued strong declarations condemning China.
The EU – through Federica Mogherini, the Union’s High Representative - issued a milder declaration stressing
the need for the parties to resolve the dispute in accordance with international law.12 Beijing had tried to block
the statement by putting pressure on some EU member states that had received significant Chinese investments.
In the end, the declaration’s final version was watered down by Greece, Hungary and Croatia.13

8

For more information on the nine-dash line see: http://www.southchinasea.org/maps/territorial-claims-maps/; seealso: Marina Tsirbas, ‘What Does the Nine-Dash Line Actually Mean?’, The Diplomat, 2 June 2016 - https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actually-mean/
9
Lisa Murray and Angus Grigg, ‘Chinese public opinion firmly behind Beijing’s actions in the South China Se
a, Financial Review, 16 July 2016 - http://www.afr.com/brand/special_reports/asia_trade/chinese-public-opinion-fir
mly-behind-beijings-actions-in-the-south-china-sea-20160714-gq5v56
10
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The
People’s Republic of China) - https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7
11
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 - http://www.un.org/depts/los/conven
tion_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
12
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the Arbitration betwe
en the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, Brussels, 15 July 2016 - https://eeas.eur
opa.eu/delegations/tunisia/6873/declaration-award-rendered-arbitration-between-philippines-and-china_en
13
Robin Emmott, ‘EU's statement on South China Sea reflects divisions’, Reuters, 15 July 2016 - https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisions-idUSKCN0ZV1TS

9

China strongly condemned the ruling, declaring it ‘null and void’ and questioned the legitimacy of the tribunal
itself. This promoted other countries with interests in the South China Sea to reiterate their claims and the US
to intensify its freedom of navigation operations (deliberately sailing into waters claimed by China without
notification to assert that they remain international waters) to deter Beijing from adopting more confrontational
policies.
The US challenges excessive maritime claims under its Freedom of Navigation Programme, the purpose ofwhich is to object to excessive maritime claims that could limit freedom of the seas coming from all states. 14
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea are thus operations by US naval and airforces that reinforce internationally-recognised rights and freedoms by challenging excessive maritime claims.
Japan’s navy has also begun to patrol the South China Sea in response to Chinese assertiveness andexpansionism in the area – and so have some EU member states. These operations are also a way to salvage
UNCLOS and the principles on which it - and the larger rules-based order - are based. The aim is to convince
Beijing to fully agree and support a code of conduct in the area, which should be legally binding, comprehensive,
effective and consistent with international law.
At the 31st ASEAN summit in Manila in November 2017, China agreed to begin talks with the regional bodyon details of a code of conduct for the South China Sea.15 At the annual ministerial meeting between China and
ASEAN held in Singapore in August 2018, the parties agreed on a draft code of conduct.16 Yet, no timeframe
has been given for its completion or implementation and many in the region remain sceptical about Chinese
intentions.
The EU has made itself available to facilitate ASEAN-China dialogue on devising a code of conduct for theSouth China Sea. The EU’s soft power approach goes hand in hand with a firmer stance taken by Paris andLondon.
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2016, then France’s Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Driandeclared that Paris would encourage the EU to undertake ‘regular and visible’ patrols in the area.17 In June 2018,a French maritime task group, together with UK helicopters and ships, joined the US and other countries to
conduct freedom of navigation operations, sailing naval vessels through international waters in the South China
Sea. On board of one of the French vessels there were officials from other EU member states as well as arepresentative of the Council of the EU (from COASI – the Working Group on Asia-Oceania).

14

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Memorandum for Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, et al., Navigational Freedom
and U.S. Security Interests, The White House: Washington D.C., 20 March 1979 (declassified 22 August 200
0).
15
31st ASEAN Summit, Manila, Philippines 13-14 November 2017 - http://asean.org/?static_post=31th-asean-sum
mit-manila-philippines-13-14-november-201716
Carl Thayer, ‘ASEAN and China Set to Agree on Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct’, The Dip
lomat, 27 July 2018 - https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/asean-and-china-set-to-agree-on-single-draft-south-china-sea-c
ode-of-conduct/
17
Jean-Yves Le Drian’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore 5 June 2016 - https://www.defense.gou
v.fr/content/download/476643/7635877/file/20160605_MINDEF_Discours%20de%20JY%20Le%20Drian%20%C3%A
0%20l%5C%27occasion%20du%20Shangri-La%20Dialogue%20-%20version%20anglaise.pdf

10Conclusion
The EU is gradually shedding its neutrality stance vis-à-vis the China Seas. While official declarations continue
to avoid hurting China’s sensitivities for fear of economic retaliation, in practice both the EU and importantmember states such as France and the United Kingdom have chosen to side with the US and its Asian allies inenforcing a rules-based regional order, countering what they perceive as Chinese assertiveness andexpansionism.
At the EU level, this choice of camp is made explicit in recent documents, including the Council Conclusions
on Enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia (May 2018), the EU’s connectivity strategy (September2018) and the decision (December 2018) to launch a pilot project on security cooperation with five Asianpartners - but not China.
France, in particular, is pushing the EU in a direction more in line with the Quad – the informal strategic
dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In January 2019, during the fifth ‘two-plus-two’round of defense and security talks – the annual meeting of the foreign and defense ministers of France andJapan – the two sides stated their commitment to freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region, expressing
concern about China’s growing maritime assertiveness in the China Seas. France seems to have irrevocably
moved to the camp hostile to China’s broadening global influence. Likewise, the United Kingdom seems tohave liquidated its ‘golden relationship’ with Beijing for a more traditional US-led alliance of democracies
aimed at keeping China in check. These developments open up new opportunities for security cooperation
between Japan and Europe unthinkable only a few years ago.

11

Prospects for a (Stable) Crisis Management in the China Seas:
The Challenge of Averting the Single Spark that Could Ignite a Prairie FireProf Renato Cruz de Castro
Professor, International Studies Department
De La Salle University
Since the first decade of the 21st century, China has enjoyed a phenomenal economic boom which its national
economy into an engine of growth in East Asia and the wider world. Its economic success has not only made it
confident and assertive in foreign affairs but also intensified its military prowess. Chinese leaders are now
confident that with their country’s new political and economic influence and the modern People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), China can boldly advance its “core interests” in the maritime domain. This thrust is reflected by
China’s insistence on the “Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” in the East China Sea, the conduct of livefire exercises by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the People’s Liberation Air Force (PLAAF)
in the West Pacific, and the hardline response of PLAN and other maritime law-enforcement agencies during
several confrontations with Philippine and Vietnamese civilian ships in the disputed waters.
Early on, China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas has caught the attention of the U.S.,
which is trying to maintain its naval primacy in East Asia, albeit China’s emergence as an economic and military
power. In 2011, the Obama Administration announced the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.
Interestingly, Japan has also become interested in the dispute. As China’s geo-strategic rival and the U.S. key
ally in East Asia, Japan is bent on playing a balancing role in the dispute by helping other claimant states build
up their respective naval capabilities in the South China Sea. The U.S.’ and Japan’s growing involvement in theSouth China Sea row has generated a strategic balance in the region.
This paper examines the current strategic competition between the U.S. (and Japan) and China in the China
Seas and the confidence-building measures in place aimed to foster strategic stability in the China Seas. It
explores this main question: What is the prospect of a stable crisis-management regime in the face of U.S.China strategic competition in the China Sea? It also addresses the following questions: What events led to theemergence of U.S.-China strategic competition? What is nature of the U.S.-China strategic competition? What
are the confidence-building measures in place to foster strategic stability amidst a strategic competition between
the two major powers? In addition, how can a stable crisis-management regime be established in the China
Seas?

Strategic Impasse in the China Seas
Fundamentally, the Obama Administration rebalancing required reinforcing the Seventh Fleet to expand theAmerican strategic footprint from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and to build-up the capacities of the small
states around China to protect their maritime and air spaces. The first component involved shifting 60% of the
12

U.S. Navy’s ships to the Asia-Pacific, primarily its six aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
The Pentagon also plans to station the latest F-35 aircraft and two additional Virginia class attack submarines in
the Pacific. Likewise, it will utilize the F-22, P-8A Poseidon maritime reconnaissance planes, V-22 Ospreys, B2 bombers, advanced undersea drones, the new B-21 long-range strike bomber, and state-of-the-art tools forcyberspace, electronic warfare, and space.
The U.S. pivot to Asia was announced at the time when China loomed large because of its naval build-up andaggressiveness in the South China Sea. Since 2010, the South China Sea has become a focal point of U.S.-China
strategic rivalry. The stretch of maritime territory from the Yellow Sea through the East China Sea, and down
to the Strait of Taiwan towards the South China Sea is part of the first-island-chain that forms the front line ofChina’s naval defenses. The projection of Chinese naval power in these maritime areas will enable the People’s
Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) to respond rapidly to diverse threats originating from the far seas. In the longrun, China’s naval capabilities will enable it to expand its maritime domain and deny foreign navies passage to
the South and East China Seas. In time, it can deprive the U.S. Seventh Fleet access to the Western Pacific insideof the so-called first—island chain.
Japan has also been concerned with China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Thus, since the mid1990s, Japan has closely monitored the PLAN’s build-up and sporadic flaunting of its naval prowess. There are
two other reasons why the South China Sea dispute worries Japan. First, if China succeeds in intimidating thesmall littoral Southeast Asian states, it could use the same gambit in the East China Sea where Japan has stakeda claim to the Senkaku Islands. Second, China’s control of the South China Sea and the East China Sea is partof the strategy of depriving the U.S. Navy access to China is surrounding waters, and giving the PLAN ingressto the Western Pacific outside of the first island chain. If the U.S. Navy is driven out of the western part of the
Pacific, the PLAN can easily dominate the South China Sea because even the combined navies of the Southeast
Asian claimant states cannot match Chinese naval prowess.

The Perils of the Strategic Impasse in the China Seas
China claims almost 80% of the South China Sea. However, it cannot exercise complete territorial control over
the South China Sea, in particular, and the East China Sea in general because of the growing involvement of the
U.S. and Japan in this maritime domain. The stable but fragile security situation can be described as an oldfashioned strategic balancing of an emergent regional power by two small powers that depend on external major
maritime powers to maintain a precarious status quo in the South China Sea for the present and the future. Thusfar, this balance of power system in the China Seas Sea has averted an armed conflict among the claimant states,
prompting Professor David Scott to quip that “the benefits of such balancing may become apparent becausebalancing is itself a stabilizing process.”
However, the balance of power situation has two major flaws. One, it generates a very fluid situation wherein
any error or miscalculation by any claimant state may trigger an armed confrontation that may escalate or evendrag the other maritime powers into a major systemic war. Two, while the balance of power system has stabilized13

the situation, it has simply failed to resolve the dispute, creating a tense and protracted impasse. Currently, themajor naval power, along with littoral states, are using this lull to build-up their respective military capabilities
for any eventuality.

From Strategic Impasse to Strategic Competition in the China Seas
The Trump Administration has altered the Obama Administration`s strategic rebalancing policy on China bytreating it a strategic competitor rather than a responsible stakeholder. For this current administration, however,ensuring American primacy in the Indo-Pacific region requires doing away with any delusion of integrating
China into the liberal world order. The Trump Administration simply sees China`s actions and goals as the
major destabilizing element in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Trump Administration’s policy of engaging China in a strategic competition is contained in the new IndoPacific Strategy. Current U.S. strategy is to maneuver China into unfavorable position, frustrate its efforts,
preclude its options while expanding the U.S. `, and forcing it to confront the possibility of military conflict
under adverse conditions. This policy stems a broad consensus among American policy-makers in the national
security establishments and legislature that “China poses the greatest economic and security challenge to the
U.S. and the softer approaches followed by Trump’s predecessors have been interpreted in Beijing not as sincere
gesture of cooperation but as weakness to be exploited.”
In pursuit of this strategy, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is conducting the following
active measures to generate strategic uneasiness to China: 1) increasing U.S. forward projection up to the firstisland chain off the Chinese coast; 2) maintaining continuous bomber presence at Guam from where patrols
over the South China Sea has become routine; 3) initiating talks about greater military cooperation with Taiwan;
And 4) increasing defense cooperation with states that are concerned with China.

The Challenge of Crisis Management amidst Strategic Competition
The U.S. and China have two major confidence-building measures on hand. At the strategic level, the two major
powers have formed a new cabinet-level framework for bilateral negotiations in April 2017, the U.S.-China
Comprehensive Dialogue, which is overseen by the presidents of the U.S. and China and have four pillars: theDiplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD); the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (CED); the Law
Enforcement and Cybersecurity (LE&CD); and the Social and Cultural Dialogue (SCD).
At the tactical level, China and the U.S. are signatories to the April 22, 2014 agreement on the Code for
Unplanned Encounter at Sea (CUES). This agreement provides the code of conduct when two foreign naval
vessels stumble to each other in the open seas. The CUES is only a code for proper behavior at the sea with no
obligation to comply with and it only applies to naval vessels operating in the Western Pacific. These measures
are aimed to maintain a precarious strategic stability between the U.S. (and Japan) and China at the time that14

these two major powers are locked in a tense strategic competition in the China Seas. However, their potential
to foster long-term strategic stability in China Seas is challenged by the following:

1)

The issue of U.S.-China strategic competition is not about miscommunication it is about managing avolatile systemic change-- Many current regional security problems in East Asia, including the U.S.China strategic competition, cannot be solved simply through dialogues and even diplomaticnegotiations because of the historical origins of and the stakes involved in these disputes. It is often
assumed that most disputes, even among major powers, arise because of simple misunderstanding andlack of trust, and these squabbles can be mitigated by communication and confidence building.
Actually, many historic and lingering conflicts stem from competition over scarce resources, strategic
advantage, control over a certain population, tilting the balance of power, or from the desire to be themajor regional hegemonic power. Communications nor confidence building, by themselves, will not
redefine what vital interests are involved nor will they resolve the clash of national interests. Theseissues can only be resolved when the states involved (usually the great powers) agree to compromise or
settle them through a systemic conflict or a hegemonic war.

2) China’s maximalist approach to crisis management— it has been observed that China’s approach tocrisis management is not simply to prevent an escalation but to maximize its national interests.
Accordingly, Chinese approach to crisis-management has three components: a) Firmness on issues
related to principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and hardly anything should be compromised;b) propensity to keep the appearance that the opponent, not China, is always at fault during the crisis,
while taking the initiative in its actual conduct; And c) instead of deescalating a crisis, China uses its
military, diplomatic, and economic tools to advance its interest in a crisis. Hence, it has been observedthat China considers a crisis as an opportunity to maximize its interests, and tries to implement thispolicy in the middle of an international crisis management situation. China has used several recent
maritime crises to advance its interests of delegitimizing the claims of other littoral states and restricting
U.S. naval operations in the China Seas. This accounts for the fact that China has a cynical view ofconfidence-building measures as reflected by its reluctance to reveal its strategic intentions that isnecessary so that the two sides might defuse a crisis. Furthermore, it has also been observed that when
U.S. and Chinese senior officers met for confidence-building measures, the Chinese tend to spend muchof the time criticizing American foreign policy rather than discussing how to foster trust and confidence
for both sides. Clearly, China’s approach to crisis management does not seat well for creating long-term
strategic stability in the China Seas.

3) Long-term strategic stability between China and U.S. could be undetermined by third parties—
Maintaining long strategic stability in China Seas is not only the responsibility of the U.S. and China.
15

It is also the responsibility the littoral states. However, some of the littoral states that have territorial
disputes with China are also American allies. For example, in the East China Sea, Japan is building up
the defenses of its southwestern chain in reaction to China’s efforts to expand its naval operations further
from its coast to the Western Pacific. In the South China Sea, the Philippines has build-up its navy andair force in response to China is building of artificial islands and the militarization of these land features.
Chinese use of force against any of America’s East Asian ally can trigger a U.S. military action against
China that can lead to the breakdown in the fragile strategic stability and transformed the current
strategic competition to an outright systemic war in East Asia.

Prospect of a Stable Crisis-Management Regime in the China Seas
A stable and durable crisis-management system in the China Seas can only be possible if the China and the U.S.
can effect a rapprochement. This means both major powers standing down from their current strategic rivalry,and moving away from the prospect of armed confrontation to a relationship characterized by mutual
expectations of peaceful coexistence. This will require China and the U.S. avoiding seeing each other as geostrategic rivals and considering each other as benign powers. Consequently, both great powers will end theirgeopolitical rivalry and foster a nascent form of an international society, where the use of force against eachother will be rendered unimaginable. However, in the light of the current U.S.-China strategic competition, theprospect of rapprochement between the two powers is unlikely to happen in the near future. For the time being,
China and the U.S. can only hope that the single spark that could start a prairie fire will not be kindled sooner
than later.

16

South China Sea: What Prospects for Crisis Management?

Mr Bill Hayton
Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Chatham House

Introduction
At first sight, the South China Sea appears calm. There have been no reports of physical clashes between therival claimants for years and talks on a ‘Code of Conduct’ between the ten member states of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continue. Nonetheless, tensions
persist and, in particular, China continues to violate the rights of the other coastal states within their claimed
Exclusive Economic Zones.
China’s actions in the South China Sea also pose a threat to the global maritime order as embodied in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). PRC threats to governments and oil companies,
warnings to transiting warships – including one recent near-collision – along with other actions, all suggest that
the PRC regards the Law of the Sea as something it can take advantage of in other parts of the world but denyin waters closer to home. An increasing number of states from outside the immediate region are becoming
concerned about China’s behaviour. This paper will argue, however, that these states’ interventions – currently
focused on questions of ‘freedom of navigation’ – should be broadened to include the main threats to peace andsecurity in the region: infringements of coastal states’ resource rights. This is particularly important given that
discussions between ASEAN and the PRC over the South China Sea ‘Code of Conduct’ have made little
progress and efforts to resolve the underlying territorial and maritime disputes have stalled.

Stability of the SCS
Too often analysts of the South China Sea disputes tend to treat them as somewhat abstract debates over rivalmodes of global governance. While questions of ‘freedom of navigation’ are legitimate concerns for all statesinterested in the international rule of law and the safe transit of vessels through the region, the fate of the EEZregime is a far more serious concern to the countries around the South China Sea. China’s actions pose a clear
and present danger to the livelihoods and living standards of millions of people and to the security of Southeast
Asian states.
There are many motivations for the PRC’s actions in the South China Sea: coastal defence, regime security,
sea-lane control and resource grabbing all play a role. However, all these drivers of state policy are underpinned
by a sense of righteousness. I have written elsewhere about the way this nationalistic narrative constructed a17

sense of entitlement to the maritime territory through the use and misuse of historic evidence.1 There are many
parallels here with the situation that Japan finds itself in with the disputes in the East China Sea over the Senkaku
Islands. In both cases, the intersection of territorial disputes between the rival claimants and the maritime
disputes that involve powers from outside the region has the capacity to turn a local incident into serious conflict.

Clashes
China’s actions appear aimed at reversing centuries of international consensus around maritime law by closing
off access to the South China Sea for military vessels. We saw an ominous example of this on 29 September
2018 when a Chinese destroyer, the Lanzhou, deliberately sailed in front of a transiting American warship, theUSS Decatur, and threatened it with the warning, “If you don’t change course you will suffer consequences.”

Island-building
China’s island-construction programme in the Spratly Islands appears to be close to completion. It is now
finishing facilities on the seven artificial islands built since 2013. Satellite imagery has revealed the presence ofbarracks, weapons systems and hangars. US military sources say China has deployed anti-ship cruise missiles
and surface-to-air missile systems to some of the new bases. Three of the islands have runways andinfrastructure to support aircraft. At the time of writing no attack jets have landed on any of them. However, it
is likely that, China has the ambition to deploy them at some point. If past behaviour is anything to go by, thenit will wait for a pretext – some perceived ‘provocation’ by the United States, for example – before it does so.
Where might China build next? It is possible that it has ambitions to build structures on underwater features
such as the Macclesfield Bank in the centre of the South China Sea or the James Shoal – officially the‘southernmost point’ of Chinese territory. Some recent maps of the South China Sea shown in the Chinese media
have marked underwater areas as ‘territory’. This suggests a possible preparation of public opinion for a radical
move that would go against the entire premise of maritime law.

Resource development
Importantly for China’s Southeast Asian neighbours, and other states with an interest in peace and security inthe region, the artificial islands give China the capacity to maintain a large-scale presence of naval andcoastguard ships in disputed areas. China has the ability to prevent the other coastal states from developing
resources in the South China Sea. This has included explicit threats of military force. In 2017 and 2018 we saw
China block the Spanish energy company Repsol from developing gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zone

Hayton, Bill. ‘The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims: Maps, Misunderstandings, and the M
aritime Geobody’. In Modern China, Vol 45, Issue 2 (2018) pp1–44
118

(EEZ) claimed by Vietnam.
These are not abstract problems. China’s actions have caused falls in government revenues and problems withcountries’ energy supplies. Reported figures suggest that Vietnam’s national oil output fell 12% between 2014
and 2017. 2 In April 2018 the government said it expected a further 15% fall from 2017 figures. 3 The
contribution of the oil and gas sector to the government’s budget has fallen in both absolute and relative terms.
According to the International Monetary Fund’s 2018 ‘Country Report’, the Vietnamese government’s oilrevenue fell from 3.4% of GDP in 2013 (VND 120 trillion) to 0.7% (VND 36 trillion) in 2018.
The Philippines faces a looming and critical energy shortage because of the depletion of its existing offshore
gas field, Malampaya. It currently generates over a fifth of the Philippines national electricity output. One
potential solution is for the country to develop the large gas resources under the Reed Bank, not far fromMalampaya. An International Arbitration Tribunal ruled in July 2016 that these resources lie within thePhilippines’ EEZ. However, President Duterte of the Philippines said in May 2017 that his Chinese counterpart,
Xi Jinping, had told him there would be “war” if the Philippines tried to exploit that gas.
What is true for Vietnam and the Philippines is also true for countries that have historically relied on oil andgas income for their state budget. Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia have all suffered budgetary difficulties as aresult of declining hydrocarbon production and prices.
Fishing is also in crisis in the South China Sea. While fishers from all coastal states are implicated in the
problem of over-fishing, the situation is made worse by the violation of EEZs by foreign boats. Chinese
government policy has had a particularly deleterious impact because it has subsidised its own fishers to operatelarger boats able to travel longer distances and poach stocks along other countries’ coasts.
Less catch means less food for people to eat. Less landed value means reduced incomes for fishing households,
businesses, local economies and, ultimately, the government. Faced with such declines, the likely humanconsequences will include increases in poverty and malnutrition, the de-development of certain localities andsubsequent outward migration. Even in areas outside coastal regions, the on-going collapse of fish stocks will
generate a major food security problem for urban populations used to eating affordable fish.
It is remarkable that despite years of diplomatic, economic and military pressure the Southeast Asian claimant
states have refused to concede the principle of ‘joint development’. They are holding the front line for UNCLOS
and the global maritime order and deserve international support.

James Pearson, Greg Torode, ‘Drilling down: Risky hunt for oil in Vietnam's South China Sea blocks’; Reuters, 23 May 2018 https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-oil-southchinasea/drilling-down-risky-hunt-for-oil-in-vietna
ms-south-china-sea-blocks-idUSKCN1IO0QV
3
Khanh Vu, ‘In rare comment, PetroVietnam says South China Sea tension to hurt offshore operations’; Reuters, 3 April 2018 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-petrovietnam/in-rare-comment-petrovietnam-says-so
uth-china-sea-tension-to-hurt-offshore-operations-idUSKCN1HA0QO
219

Code of Conduct
I remain deeply sceptical about the prospect of ASEAN and the PRC ever agreeing a meaningful Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea. Put simply, the ASEAN states wish to constrain China’s behaviour in theSouth China Sea while China clearly has no wish to be constrained. In the absence of any pressure, why would
the PRC agree to any meaningful Code of Conduct?
The ASEAN-China CoC process began with a joint statement between the Chinese and Philippines foreign
ministries in August 1995.4 That was endorsed by ASEAN foreign ministers at their meeting in July 1996 but
it took until November 2002 before an agreement could be reached with the PRC. That agreement was not a
CoC but a ‘Declaration on Principles’ for a CoC. Since then the process has produced ‘Guidelines’ in July 2011,a ‘Framework’ in August 2017 and a ‘Single Draft Negotiating Text’ in August 2018. In November 2018, the
PRC Premier, Li Keqiang said he hoped that the negotiations would “bear fruit” within three years. That would
take us to 2021 – a full quarter-century since that initial agreement in Manila!
The most positive thing that can be said for the CoC process is that it provides a channel for communication
between the ASEAN states and the PRC and that talking is better than fighting. However, we should not haveany expectations that the process is going to lead to a peaceful settlement of the various disputes in the South
China Sea. Looking back over the process so far, it is noticeable that China only takes a serious interest in thediscussions at times when its behaviour so upsets the ASEAN states that they involve outside powers in thedisputes. Its consent to the DoC in 2002 was preceded by the Philippines ratifying a ‘Visiting Forces Agreement’with the United States in February 1998 and Singapore’s announcement the previous month that it would host
visiting American aircraft carriers. Its renewed interest in 2016 followed the Award of an International
Arbitration Tribunal which ruled that Chinese activities in the Philippines’ claimed EEZ were not compatible
with international law. From China’s position, the CoC process is more a vehicle for constaining ASEAN’s
policy choices than a mechanism to resolve the underlying disputes.

European involvement
European governments are becoming more aware of the threat posed to the global order by the PRC’s actionsin the South China Sea. The UK has demonstrated its increased interest in the region with four naval transits inthe past year, including one that challenged PRC claims to ‘internal waters’ within the Paracel Islands. It is also
strengthening military and diplomatic ties with long-standing partners in Southeast Asia. The British
government has announced that its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, will sail through the South China
Sea next year. It is likely that it will be accompanied by ships from at least one other European country. The
Netherlands has already indicated that it will join the flotilla. France is also continuing to deploy ships in the
Asia-Pacific in accordance with long-standing practice and may also take part.

Leszek Buszynski, ‘ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea’ in Contemporary Southea
st Asia Vol. 25, No. 3 (December 2003) p350
420

Conclusion
European states need to take a concerted approach to defend UNCLOS and the maritime rights of the Southeast
Asian states. The EU and its member states need to maintain clear support for the convention in all their publicstatements on maritime affairs and communicate this frequently to the South China Sea claimants. The next stepshould be an investigation of which claims in the sea are compliant with UNCLOS and which are not. This
would be followed by public statements and diplomatic representations to defend the UNCLOS regime. In
particular, suggestions that China enjoys ‘historic rights’ that supersede UNCLOS must be challenged andrefuted.
Those EU states with the capacity to do so should be encouraged to demonstrate their continuing interest in
the peaceful international order by deploying naval vessels into the South China Sea to demonstrate that Europe
regards a threat to the international order in one part of the world to be a threat to it everywhere.
European states have other levers too. They could refuse Chinese naval ships permission to make port visits
and reduce other forms of military cooperation. They could help Southeast Asian states to build up the capacity
to monitor and control their legitimate EEZ claims and increase military cooperation with them. They could
sanction Chinese companies that are engaged in predatory behaviour within other countries’ legitimate EEZs.
They could add stipulations about respecting legitimate EEZ claims to all maritime agreements with the claimant
states and insist that fish catches, for example, are traceable to domestic EEZs. These, and other relevant andtargeted, countermeasures could be adopted to deter rule-breaking in the South China Sea.
This is clearly an idealistic strategy. It would demand funding and time and carries diplomatic risk. The
alternative, however, is worse.

21

Growing Tensions in the China Seas and Dim Prospects for Regional Peace
Dr Masashi Nishihara
President
Research Institute for Peace and Security
As China attempts to surpass the United States in many vital fields and as China’s military expansionism isgaining ground in the Western Pacific, the United States stands to confront the Asian giant. The Trumpadministration demonstrates its determination to “crush” it and restore its own traditional primacy in global
politics.
Japan and the United States as well as other East Asian countries concerned feel threatened by China’s
economic expansionism as seen in the large investment for its Belt and Road Initiative, its advancement in cyberand space technology, and its military expansionism in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. President
Trump has taken a clearer stand to confront China’s “hegemonic” posture than the previous governments did.
Can Japan and the United States manage to gain their positions by taking tougher policies and yet deterring
military conflicts with China?

Political Tensions in the East China Sea
The East China Sea has three geographical areas of political tensions between China on one hand and Japan or
the United States on the other: the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudo in Chinese), Japan’s southwest archipelagoes,
and Taiwan.
Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands was legally established in 1895 as its territory under the internationallaw doctrine of prior occupation or acquisition by occupancy. China never claimed the islands until 1971, when
it began to argue that they historically belonged to itself. Now Beijing refers to the islands as part of its “corenational interest.” Its military pressure has become prominent during the last few decades. Coast guard ships,
fishing boats, and naval fleet, plus military aircraft frequently intrude the territorial waters and airspace of theislands. In January 2018, then, nuclear submarines were detected navigating under sea near the islands. In midNovember last year the U.S.-China Economic Security Committee released its annual report, which warned that
China was mounting its offensive pressure against the islands, possibly leading to armed clashes between Japanand China.
Though China officially claims none of Japan’s southwest archipelagoes (the Southwest Islands) south of themain Okinawa island, they are its “first island chain,” a vital defense line (A2AD) against Japanese andAmerican forces. Tokyo suspects that Beijing is eyeing a chance to increase its presence at the East China Sea
and occupy Japan’s southwest archipelagoes to ensure its route to the Pacific Ocean in wartime. The samearchipelagoes serve as Japan’s and the United States’ defense line to contain Chinese forces into the East China
22

Sea.
The Trump administration desires to strengthen political and military ties with Taiwan. In June and September
2018 it arranged to sell military hardware to Taiwan as part of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Randall Shriver,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, favored elevating the level of contacts to that ofintergovernmental foreign military sales. President Xi Jinping has given increasing pressure against Taiwan forbuilding closer relations with the United States than in the past. In April 2018 PLA conducted a large naval
exercise in the Taiwan Strait to hedge against Taiwan’s independence and closer relations with the United States.
In June Taiwan held a large military exercise. Then in August Taiwan faced a fifth nation that severed diplomatic
relations, since President Tsai Ing-wen came into office.
In early January this year Xi made a speech on Taiwan on the occasion of the 40 th anniversary of the 1979
CCP policy statement of “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” He stressed that “Taiwan must and will be united
with China.” He was immediately rejected by President Tsai, who emphasized that “Taiwan will never accept.”
This is a new phase of tensions in Beijing-Taipei and Beijing-Washington relations.

Armed Tensions in the South China Sea
In their talks with ASEAN, China has shown the posture favorable to “an early agreement” on the Code of
Conduct (COC) in regulating their conducts in the South China Sea. However, in reality it has been building
military installations in seven man-made islands based on reefs, to become a dominant power in the South China
Sea.
In July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued an award, favoring the Philippine claim, that China
could not justify its control of the area inside the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea. China simply ignored
the award and the territorial claims by other claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
By claiming the reefs inside the nine-dashed line and converting them into man-made islands, China has
ventured to control the sea lines of communications and economic activities there. COC talks have been goingon since 2002. China seems to prolong the talks in order to buy time to “fortify” its military positions.
China has constructed runways, radar sites, missile sites, and warehouses on those man-made islands. In orderto resist China’s such moves, the United States has undertaken the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP)
by having its naval ships sail through the “territorial waters” of the man-made islands.
As Chinese ships often obstruct American ships sailing through the South China Sea, collisions become areal possibility. On September 30, 2018 an American destroyer was harassed by a Chinese warship, which camewithin 45 yards (40 meters), and had to do evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision. The United States and China
are in spiraling tension.

23

Prospects for Managing Crises in the China Seas
Most regional and international crises tend to break out where the balance of forces is lost with the vacuum of
power being created. If Japan should lack in its ability to adequately defend the Senkaku Islands, the balance offorces over the islands between China and Japan tilts in favor of the former. China will take advantage of thevacuum of power created over the islands and is likely to take over them.
In order to maintain a favorable balance of forces, Japan has increased the number of Coast Guard ships topatrol the area around the Senkaku Islands. It has also built large ships to compete with their Chinesecounterparts. It has reinforced the airfield in Naha, the prefectural capital of Okinawa, to provide a large spacefor fighter aircraft whose mission is to “scramble” approaching Chinese counterparts. What is more importantis that President Obama confirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands in accordance to
Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In February 2018 Secretary of Defense James Mattis reconfirmed it
in a press conference: “I made clear that our long-standing policy on the Senkaku Islands stands—the US willcontinue to recognize Japanese control of the islands and as such Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty
applies.”
Despite the lack of friendly relations between Japan and China, they agreed in June 2018 on a communication
mechanism between their defense authorities, in order to avert accidental clashes in the air and at sea. The
Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism was a pending matter for many years, but the recent thaw
between the two countries helped produce the mechanism. Although this is a positive step, it will not apply to
the Senkaku Islands and its territorial waters and airspace. The air defense of the Senkaku Islands is complicated,
as its ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) overlaps with China’s.
Japan is also reinforcing the defense of the Southwest Islands in several ways: the communications and patrol
post in Yonakuni Jima, the southernmost island, which opened with some 150 troops in 2016; additional coast
guard ships in Ishigaki Jima; a plan to deploy amphibious troops; and a plan to convert the currently unused
airfield for national defense purposes. Today the defense of the southwest archipelagoes, which is the first
defense line for Japan, is a major defense policy.
Both the United States and China seek the competitive values of Taiwan’s geostrategic importance. The
United States wants to strengthen Taiwan’s role as a buffer against China’s strategy to annex Taiwan and to
expand its sphere of influence across the Pacific. China threatens to use force to prevent Taiwan’s independence.
In fact, Japan needs a friendly Taiwan and a safe and friendly Taiwan Strait to maintain the safety of sea lines
of communications in the Western Pacific. The two countries also need each other for their respective national
security needs. Their formal relations would ensure Taiwan and Japan’s southwest archipelagoes. Although thecurrent absence of their diplomatic relations makes their security cooperation politically impossible, hopefully
there will be ways to engender security ties.
The possibility of clashes between Chinese and American naval ships or aircraft in the South China Sea isstronger than that of any other possible incidents. However, there seems to be little possibility of managing suchcrises. The near-miss incident in September 2018 was not the first such incident. A more serious mid-air clash
between a U.S. Navy intelligence aircraft and one of the two PLA Navy interceptor fighters occurred near the24

Hainan Island on April 1, 2001.
Now that American ships and aircraft participate in the FONOP missions and that Australian aircraft andBritish, French and New Zeeland ships also expressed willingness to participate similar operations, naval andaerial clashes are likely to happen more often. Japan does not participate in FONOP, but its destroyers havevisited the Philippines and Vietnam from time to time. On August 31, 2018 a Japanese destroyer was dispatchedto the South China Sea and held joint exercises with the U.S. ships, including an aircraft carrier.
If China continues to apply salami-slicing tactics in settling these islands disputes to its advantage, prospects
for regional peace will remain dim. It is important for the US and its partners to maintain a favorable balanceof power in the Western Pacific. The role of the US Guam bases will become more important in the future.

25

Japan, China, and the United States: What Future for East Asia?
Dr Jonathan Pollack
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Brookings Institution

East Asia at present confronts possibilities of political and strategic realignment greater than at any point since
the United States sought to assemble a post-war regional order in East Asia more than seven decades ago.
America’s early efforts, born of immediate exigencies following the end of war in the Pacific and the onset of
the Cold War, served as the East Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan. Even acknowledging crises, wars and(at times) outright policy failure, the ensuing results have proven successful beyond all reasonable measure.
The US has continued to serve as the principal load-bearing wall of regional order, fostering relationships andunderstandings that have enabled unparalleled prosperity and political advancement across East Asia.
The central question is the continued viability of this order under very different international circumstances.
The answer will depend on the ability of the United States, China and Japan to fashion a new strategic
equilibrium to manage the risks to peace, and ensure continued prosperity and security. In this paper, I will
briefly assess the factors that could endanger or dilute these achievements; consider how to limit the risks; andprovide some examples of what could go very wrong.

The Trump Administration
Any assessment of the regional future must begin with the policies of the Trump Administration. Donald Trump
campaigned for office and has governed according to an “America first” doctrine backed by his core politicalsupporters. His beliefs about diplomacy, trade policy, and national security are jarringly different from thosepursued by all other US presidents since the end of World War II. Some of his actions have already disrupted
regional order, raising the issue of whether East Asian states ultimately decide to rely less on American
leadership to protect their vital interests.
President Trump’s foreign policy views first took shape in the mid to late 1980s, when he railed against
Japan’s growing trade surpluses with the United States. His views appear to have changed little since then. As
my Brookings colleague Thomas Wright has observed, Trump’s central preoccupations remain focused on four
principal issues: US trade deficits; the role of alliances; immigration; and international terrorism. The first two
issues bear directly on East Asia. At times, President Trump has threatened to withdraw or sharply reduce US
military forces in East Asia and in Europe, arguing that America’s allies do not make a sufficient contribution
to defraying the costs of the US military presence. Burden sharing is a legitimate issue to be discussed between
allies, but threats to dismantle America’s alliances serve no useful purpose, and represent a gift to America’s
adversaries.
26

However, President Trump continues to adhere to a stark, highly predatory view of international politics.
He views the world in very zero-sum terms: countries (and leaders) either “win” or “lose,” with little space inbetween. He is a mercantilist. He contends that allies and security partners have long taken advantage of theUnited States. He argues that trade deficits between the US and any other nation are by definition unacceptable,
though he has never explained how this would be arithmetically possible. He has imposed (or has threatened to
impose) tariffs as retaliatory measures, in contravention of WTO rules. His actions defy basic economic logic,
disregarding America’s ballooning trade deficits and the need to borrow to compensate for the shortfalls.
These continue to increase because of the tax cuts passed by the US Congress. The US dollar’s status as theworld’s preeminent reserve currency has pushed the value of the dollar even higher, further heightening the US
trade imbalance.
President Trump also regards multilateral agreements with deep suspicion, bordering on outright contempt.
He believes they tie America’s hands, and limit the US ability to act in its self-interest. The unilateral US
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership was among Trump’s very first actions as President, thereby
overturning years of detailed negotiations during the Obama Administration to develop new rules for 21st
century commerce between the US and many of its leading trade partners along the Pacific Rim. (In fairness to
President Trump, Hillary Clinton had also pledged that she would withdraw from the TPP, even though she hadfavored it while serving as Secretary of State.) Trump has also withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Planof Action (JCPOA) designed to inhibit Iran’s nuclear weapons potential, and from the Paris climate accords.
Trump has also announced that the US would withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of
1987, with the fate of new START treaty now hanging in the balance.
The president approaches foreign policy in starkly transactional terms, quick to anger and disdainful of
traditional policy making norms. He has sought to dismantle or weaken many of the core institutions andrelationships that have long guided American policy, and voices open dissatisfaction when existing policies
limit the possibilities of autonomous action by the United States. Virtually all the senior officials in the Trump
Administration advocating more internationalist policies (most prominently, former Secretary of Defense James
Mattis and former Chairman of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn) no longer serve in government, andfew if any seem able to constrain the president’s worst impulses.
Where does President Trump intend to take US policy in East Asia? He seeks to sustain unquestioned
American predominance in all dimensions of national power, and expects deference from all others in return.
He remains highly prone to flattery, which leaders in East Asia (including Shinzo Abe, Moon Jae-in, Xi Jinping,and Kim Jong-un) all practice to varying degrees. But how does he propose to protect enduring Americaninterests in a region vital to American prosperity and security? Is there are a discernible strategy underlying allof Trump’s bombast, and will it enable the United States to retain close relations with its core regional partners
in future years? These questions have yet to be answered.

27

Coping with an Unpredictable President
The jarring changes in US foreign policy under the Trump Administration have generated widespread debate in
East Asia, as leaders, analysts and mass publics come to grips with an American president unlike any they haveever known. Unlike previous crises that have resulted in major shifts in US policy –for example, September
11 and the US decision to invade Iraq- the policy changes of the past two years were triggered by shifting
sentiment within the United States, not by overseas events. Domestic grievances (including industrial job losses
in the Midwest as American firms relocated to East Asia and to Mexico) helped elect Donald Trump, and thesegrievances continue to energize his policies.
These shifts in US policy have generated questions in East Asia that few thought they would ever ask aboutan American president. The first and understandable response across the region has been to avoid or at least
defer open challenges to President Trump, and to determine if there are ways to accommodate him. In the nearterm, this has limited some of the potential damage. For example, no regional leader has made more of an effort
to curry favor with Donald Trump than Prime Minister Abe. Close relations with the United States are far too
important in Japanese strategic calculations to risk a major break with Washington. This has included majorpurchases of advanced American weaponry and Abe’s effusive praise of the US president, including disclosurethat US officials privately solicited a letter from Prime Minister Abe recommending Trump for the Nobel Peace
Prize.
But this can only take Prime Minister Abe so far. Japan is acutely mindful of Trump’s enduring obsessions
with trade imbalances and his incessant complaints about the “unfairness” of the alliance bargain with Tokyo.
Though Prime Minister Abe might not say it, he knows that Trump can turn on a dime. Moreover, there is an
inherent potential for Trump to take actions that are overtly prejudicial to Japanese interests. For example,
Trump’s attacks on globalization and free trade directly undermine Japan’s need for unencumbered trade: thecountry’s wellbeing depends on it. President Trump’s continued cultivation of relations with Kim Jong-un could
prove equally or even more perturbing to Japan, an issue to which I will return.
To protect its interests, Japan has undertaken efforts to enhance its own power (including a substantial
strengthening of Japanese military capabilities under the new National Defense Program Guidelines) and todiversify its economic partnerships. Tokyo has resurrected the Trans-Pacific Partnership under theComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), now ratified by all
eleven original signatories to the TPP, minus the United States. It also displays continued interest in the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in which China and Japan would simultaneously serve as theprincipal anchors. Equally or even more important, Japan and the European Union have just entered into an
economic partnership agreement, creating a massive free trade area that accounts for approximately 30 percentof the world’s total domestic product. Americans frequently tend to be dismissive of the alphabet soup of tradeand investment acronyms favored in East Asia, but they represent the underpinning and lifeblood on which all
regional economies depend.
Prime Minister Abe has also undertaken a low key but meaningful accommodation with China. In October
2018, Abe undertook the first formal bilateral visit to China by a Japanese leader in nearly seven years. The
28

visit reflected realism and self-interest on both sides. Throughout their respective leadership tenures, Prime
Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping have let political-military rivalry (especially in the maritime
domain), enduring historical grievances, and competing conceptions of Asian infrastructural development
dominate their relations. But the two leaders exhibit increased disquiet about American actions that could
undermine the prosperity of both states. In essence, Japan has begun to develop a hedging strategy, not as analternative to a close alliance with the United States, but as a supplement to it, and as protection against possible
adverse developments.
Perhaps the most important result of Abe’s visit to Beijing concerned the readiness of the two sides tocoordinate their respective efforts on infrastructural development in continental Asia. Senior US officials
characterize China’s One Belt, One Road initiative in near alarmist terms, fearing that China’s ability to financeprojects across Asia and into Europe and also across Africa and Latin America will enable China to dominate
global investment and trade. But Japan brings a wealth of experience and knowhow to bear on such endeavors,and sees possibilities for complementarity with Beijing’s initiatives. Enduring suspicions toward one anotherpersist within leadership and public opinion in both countries, especially in Japanese views of China. Even as
larger strategic differences persist, both leaders have ample incentives to test the waters of a “new normal” inbilateral relations, which have included the resumption of a security dialogue involving senior diplomatic anddefense officials from both countries. Japan thus refuses to accept the logic of a zero-sum world.
These developments in no way invalidate long-term concerns about the growth of Chinese power. Japan andall major export economies have legitimate grievances with China, including major restrictions on market accessto protected sectors of the Chinese economy; a frequently inhospitable business climate, often including
insistence on technology transfer as a requirement for business transactions; violations of intellectual property
rights and outright intellectual theft; and a continued unwillingness to acknowledge the country’s steady advancetoward developed-economy status. However, as Hiroaki Nakanishi, the new chairman of Keidanren, openly
observed in a recent interview in the Wall Street Journal, “it is impossible for Japan to exist if we turn [China]
into an enemy…Maybe they can do that in America, but it doesn’t work like that in Japan.”
China nevertheless remains a mass of contradictions. It is already the world’s largest trading state and puts
forward extremely ambitious goals in technological innovation in high priority scientific and industrial sectors.
But it again favors state owned enterprises at the expense of the private sector, which has been the primaryengine of growth and job creation in the Chinese economy. (This latter development partially explains the
slowdown in Chinese economic growth.) Chinese leaders present themselves as unabashed advocates ofglobalization at Davos and other international fora, while they continue to restrict the role of foreign firms in
China’s service sector, where China’s performance lags well behind. It is also engaged in horrific forms ofrepression, incarceration and “reeducation” of ample portions of the Uighur population in Xinjiang, which isalso extending to Muslim minorities in other locales. In addition, Beijing’s repression in Tibet continues
unabated.
For a state that aspires to renewed national greatness, China’s conduct falls well short of the requirements oftransformation. Beijing exhibits a narrowness of vision and a self-protectiveness, all as it warily eyes US
29characterizations of Chinese ambitions that seem increasingly stark and threat driven. The Trump administration
has embarked on a full-court press against China, most fully captured in the worst case assessment presented inan early October speech delivered by Vice President Pence. The China mood in the United States (especiallyinside the Beltway) has turned increasingly antagonistic. Characterizations of future US-China relations inadversarial or quasi-adversarial terms are now widespread in the media and think tank world.
Despite the administration’s pairing of China and Russia as “revisionist states” in its National Defense
Strategy and in its National Security Strategy, the administration’s predominant moves against China arefocused on geo-economics, not on Beijing’s sustained military advancement. As a January 2019 RAND
assessment has argued, “Russia and China represent distinct challenges to US national security. Russia is not apeer or near-peer competitor but rather a well-armed rogue state that seeks to subvert an international order it
can never hope to dominate. In contrast, China is a peer competitor that wants to shape an international orderthat it can aspire to dominate…China’s growing influence is based largely on more positive measures: trade,investment, and development assistance. These attributes make China a less immediate threat but a much greater
long-term challenge.”
At present, many of the President’s closest economic advisers seek to impede China’s continued economic
rise, and a few even speak of “decoupling” China from those portions of the global economy led by the UnitedStates and Europe. The ongoing efforts of the United States to extradite Mme. Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief
financial officer, on charges of financial fraud and the effort to deny Huawei opportunities to export its 5-G
technology to the US market are both part of a preventive economic strategy. The intense negotiations between
the United States and China as they approach a March 2 deadline to open major sectors of the economy to US
investment also entail a US push for rapid structural transformations inside China that seem almost breathtaking
in scope. The coming weeks will reveal whether Chinese concessions and its large-scale purchase of American
agricultural commodities and other US products will prove sufficient to forestall President Trump’s threat to
impose additional tariffs on Chinese exports.
The prospect (though not the certainty) of a full-scale trade war between the United States and China highlightthe looming dangers to regional order that could quickly envelop East Asia and the Pacific. Many states including long-time friends and allies of the United States- express open disquiet about where the Trumpadministration could be headed, with some voicing outright incredulity. All key regional actors hope to forestallmore worrisome possibilities, but there are potential triggers to regional disequilibrium that they might not beable to control.

Conclusion: What Could Go Very Wrong in East Asia?
Three especially worrisome possibilities loom in East Asia, any one of which has the potential to profoundly
destabilize the region. My intent is to briefly describe how all three heighten the risks to East Asia, and to begin
to consider what can be done to prevent them from taking place.
The first possibility would be a major breakdown in US-China relations, linked to looming efforts to inhibit
30

China’s technological advance and to circumscribe its access to markets in the developed world. Though the
Trump Administration prefers to depict economic rivalry with China in exclusively bilateral terms, this is
profoundly mistaken. China is already deeply integrated with regional supply chains involving major US allies,
including Japan. At the same time, firms like Huawei have long relied upon large-scale purchases of American
technology for their products. China is already the world’s largest trading state, and the lead trade partner ofvirtually all its neighbors. Some Administration officials contend that the states of East Asia must choose
between the United States and China. This would be a fool’s errand. It would be deemed a worst case scenario
all across the region. None wish to be caught in overt contention between Washington and Beijing. At thesame time, should trade tensions devolve into a full-scale trade war between the world’s two largest economies,
its reverberations would cascade across the region, sharply curtailing regional and global growth.
Senior American officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo, have advocated “a free and open IndoPacific” (FOIP) as an organizing concept for economic relations across the entire Asia-Pacific region. The IndoPacific concept originated under Prime Minister Abe during his first tenure as Prime Minister. Setting aside thefact that many of the states presumably subsumed under this concept are neither free nor open, it remains more
a bumper sticker than a genuine strategy. Though US officials contend that it is not designed as an anti-China
strategy, few in the region believe such denials, and the concept generates very little support, either in public
opinion or among policy elites.
For all the efforts within the Trump administration to depict China in ominous terms, almost no one in theregion supports an avowedly anti-China strategy, and far larger numbers express open disquiet at the prospectof a full-scale trade war between the US and China or a strategy of economic denial. Few possibilities would be
more damaging to East Asia as a whole, and it is therefore incumbent on major US allies and security partners(obviously including Japan) to impart their concerns to the Trump administration. Without such warnings, it ispossible that the administration would be oblivious to the potential risks and the damage this could inflict on
the entire region.
A second extremely worrisome scenario would involve US consent to a bad nuclear deal with North Korea.
President Trump regards his opening to the North Korea among his major accomplishments. Throughout 2017,
he repeatedly threatened North Korea with attack as the DPRK greatly accelerated its nuclear and missile testing
programs. He also repeatedly characterized Kim Jong-un in highly disparaging terms, and Kim replied withdisparaging words of his own. To its credit, the administration initially intensified efforts to impose major
political and economic costs on Pyongyang through multiple UN Security Council resolutions, characterized as
its “maximum pressure” campaign. However, Trump then sharply and impulsively shifted course in early 2018,
becoming the first American president to meet with the supreme leader of North Korea, with whom he now
claims a “great” relationship, even as there no evidence whatsoever of Kim’s readiness to forego his nuclear
weapons capabilities.
The Singapore summit was a media event, not a negotiation. President Trump agreed to the meeting without
any deliberations among his senior advisers, and with minimal if any preparations on the President’s part.
Trump had no “asks” of Kim Jong-un. Worse, in his private meeting with Kim, Trump made unilateral31

concessions to the North Korean leader, agreeing to cancel various major military exercises scheduled between
the United States and the ROK, as well as pledging that he would agree to an end of war declaration.
Discussion of denuclearization was virtually non-existent in the deliberations between the two sides, even as
Trump upon his return to the United States declared that the nuclear issue had been solved. His claim waslaughable. In subsequent months, administration officials repeatedly claimed advances on the denuclearization
agenda, when there was no discernible evidence of forward movement.
President Trump has now agreed to a second meeting with Kim Jong-un, to be held in Vietnam at the end of
February. Though there is somewhat more evidence of preparations for the second meeting than occurred in the
Singapore meeting, meaningful steps to flesh out an agenda remain minimal at best. US officials have begun to
intimate a willingness to forego their past insistence on definitive steps toward denuclearization before theUnited States would undertake “corresponding measures,” the term of art in North Korea’s current politicallexicon that Pyongyang insists upon. President Trump made this explicit in Rose Garden remarks on February
15, asserting that he was in no hurry to achieve denuclearization, and that he only insisted that North Korea
continue to forego any additional nuclear or missile tests.
The question is what Kim Jong-un might raise in his next private meeting with Trump, and whether Trump(in his eagerness for a “win” as he prepares for his reelection campaign) consents to Kim’s demands, as he didin Singapore. In one prospective scenario, North Korea would pledge to forego its posited ICBM threat to the
US homeland, which would leave intact North Korea’s strategic capabilities that directly threaten the immediate
region, including Japan. Such an outcome raises the prospect of US acceptance of the de facto if not de jurepossession of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang, while possibly agreeing to withdraw major portions of the US
forces deployed on the peninsula. The US might also agree to other restrictions on the scope of US militaryactivities in or near the ROK. This is an especially bleak scenario, but (to judge by President Trump’s
pronounced aversion to open ended overseas deployments of US forces) not an implausible one. The weakeningof US regional security commitments, including its extended deterrence pledges, would be palpable, and deeply
worrisome, especially to Japan.
The third possibility would involve a major undermining of US alliance ties in Northeast Asia. At various
times, Donald Trump has suggested that states assume responsible for their own security, thereby ceasing or
substantially redefining US alliance obligations. Trump continues to conflate trade imbalances with allianceburden sharing agreements that he deems inadequate and “unfair.” His unrelenting pressure on the Republic ofKorea to consent to large-scale increases in its provision of funds to the United States offers an especially tellingexample. The irony in Northeast Asia is that Japan and South Korea contribute more in proportional terms to
defraying the in country costs of US military personnel than any other US allies.
However, by treating alliance commitments as equivalent to business transactions, President Trump
undervalues the shared security interests that have long animated US strategy in East Asia. It is, of course,
possible that Trump regards threats to withdraw US forces or demand additional budgetary support as abargaining chip, to be freely employed to garner a better “deal” for the United States. For example,
notwithstanding America’s extraordinary reliance on Japanese bases and facilities for US power projection32

missions in and through the Pacific, Donald Trump continues to remind Prime Minister Abe that the US could
impose tariffs on Japanese automotive exports to the United States.
If China were to reach agreement with the US that President Trump deems a victory for American economic
interests, could Japan be his next target? In Trump’s deeply transactional view of the world, such a possibility
is hardly remote. But reputation is a singular asset in international politics which can dissipate quickly, eroding
and corroding the bonds and obligations that have been the wellspring of American power and policy in East
Asia. As Thomas Wright observes, the departure of the remaining senior US officials committed to US regional
obligations has dwindled severely. In his resignation letter, Secretary of Defense Mattis (who President Trump
now openly disparages) wrote about “treating allies with respect and also being clear eyed about malign actors
and strategic competitors…you have a right to have a Secretary of Defense whose views are more aligned withyour views on these and other subjects.”
Under an American president with a decidedly different temperament than all of his postwar predecessors,
the United States is now the largest independent variable in East Asian security. Japan and other East Asianstates have begun to deliberate whether the US will remain a reliable source of support for the region, or whether
the US has only its own needs in mind. Without exaggeration, the sustainability of regional order hangs in thebalance.

33

The North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Problem andthe Stability of the Korean Peninsula – A Japanese Perspective
Mr Hideshi Tokuchi
Vice-Minister of Defence, JMoD (Ret.)

Introduction
Until around one year ago, when security experts discussed the regional security of the Asia-Pacific, one of theirmain focuses was definitely on the Korean Peninsula. However, now that the “Indo-Pacific” is becoming a more
popular expression of the region, they tend to focus much on the shifting balance of power involving the Indian
Ocean region caused by China’s expansion and by the rise of India. The Korean Peninsula is marginalized oreven out of scope in a lot of maps displaying the Indo-Pacific. The rise of the expression of “Indo-Pacific”
coincides with the shift of political situations involving North Korea, but the North Korean nuclear and missile
problem has not disappeared yet.
The issue is becoming even more difficult to address. Just recall that North Korea has achieved nuclear
armament, but the meaning of the word “denuclearization” in the Panmunjeom Declaration of April 27, 2018
and in the Trump-Kim Joint Statement of June 12, 2018 is vaguer than in the previous documents agreed uponby North Korea such as the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. Inother words, the goal is further away, but the starting line has receded.
No doubt non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a serious issue to address in establishingstability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. With this point in mind, this paper discusses the following threepoints: first, the difficulty of achieving “denuclearization” of North Korea; second, the importance of thealliance between South Korea and the US to the regional security; and third and finally, the security relations
between Japan and South Korea.

“Denuclearization” of North Korea – Will it be realistic?
The three inter-Korean summit meetings and the US-North Korea summit meeting in 2018 were historic events.
Chairman Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year Address began by addressing not only his fellow North Koreans andcompatriots but also “comrades and friends.”1 According to Ruediger Frank, Kim’s address to “Dear comrades
and friends,” which was not done in his 2018 speech, means non-Koreans, and it suggests the confidence andself-perception of North Korea as a global player, based on North Korea’s status as a nuclear power and the1

The National Committee on North Korea, Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year Address: English translation via Ro
dong Sinmun, January 1, 2019, www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf/file_view.

34

broad international recognition after the series of the 2018 summits.2 For Kim Jong Un, these summit meetings,
particularly the meeting with the US president, provided unprecedented opportunities to indicate to his domestic
audience that he proved himself a worthy counterpart of the US president and vied squarely with him.
Therefore he must be much confident.
Then, has he decided to denuclearize, i.e. abandon all the nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs,
capitalizing on the confidence? There are a variety of views on this point among the experts in Japan. Someargue that Kim Jong Un made a strategic decision to denuclearize because nuclear armament could not feed theNorth Korean nationals. Some other people argue that he does not have a will to abandon nuclear weapons
because he and his regime continue to need them as their tool for survival, and that he is just cheating theinternational community as in the past in order to relax sanctions and get economic assistance. There are others
who have a view that he is willing to abandon nuclear weapons but has not made his final decision and he iscarefully watching the response of the US and the international community.
Kim Jong Un’s real mind is unknown. The important thing at this juncture is to put the denuclearization
process on the right track, removing obstacles and to facilitate the process. Although the Trump-Kim summit inJune 2018 was not up to the prior expectation in its substance, the meeting itself had an extraordinary importance.
The president of the US met with the leader of the closed regime of North Korea, opened a channel for directcommunication with him, and established their personal relationship, and succeeded in having Kim Jong Un
committed to “denuclearization.”
However, there is no clear definition of the term “denuclearization” between President Moon Jae In and
Chairman Kim Jong Un or between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un. According to thedecision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party on April 20, 2018 to declare thegreat victory of the “byungjin” line to attain nuclear deterrent in parallel with economic development, North
Korea declared that it achieved weaponization of nuclear power, and committed to dismantlement of Punggyeri nuclear test site, to no-use of nuclear weapons unless it has nuclear threats or provocations, and to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies.3 Although the decision said that North Korea would devote
all of its efforts to economic development, it does not declare its will to abandon the other one of the parallellines, i.e. nuclear deterrent.4
Moon Jae In said in his New Year’s press conference on January 10, 2019 that the denuclearization processof this time is going to be much different from the failed approaches taken in the past.5 South Korea’s Foreign
Minister Kang Kyung Wha had suggested in October 2018 that permanent dismantlement of nuclear facilities

Ruediger Frank, “Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Address: Dropping a Strategic Bombshell,” 38 North, January 2, 2019, www.38north.org/2019/01/rfrank010219.
3
平壌 2018 年 4 月 21 日発朝鮮中央通信[Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang, April 21, 2018], http://dprk-doc.com/jp/archives/1382.
4
The author of this paper heard a North Korean representative’s remarks in a closed academic conference in f
all 2018 as a part of his comment about the Central Committee Plenum of April 2018 that without the capabil
ity to defend the country which North Korea has finally acquired economic development is not possible.
5『読売新聞』January 11, 2019, p. 11.
235

in Yongbyon on the part of North Korea in return for the end-of-war declaration on the part of the US could bea huge step forward for denuclearization, instead of starting with a list of facilities for verification, given thelack of trust with North Korea.6 Asked if South Korean officials are naïve about North Korea, she flatly denied
the allegations of naivety, answering, “I think we know North Korea better than any party in this process, andthe goal of denuclearization is about our future. … We know North Korea, we know the personalities, we know
how to negotiate with them, we know how they negotiate.”7 Both of them emphasize the importance of building
trust first in their remarks.
The new approach may or may not work. The important thing is the balance between pressure andengagement. While overall priority of the international community was on pressure until 2017, the current
priority is on engagement. Donald Trump, who had once called his North Korean counterpart “Little Rocket
Man,” said in September 2018, “We fell in love.”8 In June 2018, when they met in Singapore, he agreed tosuspend some of the military exercises as a concession to Pyongyang during the disarmament talks and somedrills were cancelled accordingly. 9 China suggested the possibility of suspension and lift of sanctions, 10
Russia’s Foreign Ministry appreciated Trump’s negative view about the continuation of US-South Korea
military exercises.11

South Korea is pursuing economic cooperation with North Korea in accordance with the

Panmunjeom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration. Moon Jae In even said in his opening remarks
at the New Year’s press conference, “The Gaeseong Industrial Complex and tourism in Geumgangsan Mountainwere beneficial to both South and North Korea. We welcome North Korea’s intention to resume their operation
without conditions or compensation. As such, the prerequisites for the two Koreas resuming operation of theComplex and Geumgangsan tourism have essentially been met already. My Administration will cooperate with
the international community, including the United States, to resolve the remaining issues such as internationalsanctions as soon as possible.”12
The balance of pressure and engagement of the international community toward North Korea is no doubt
tilted toward the engagement side even without substantial progress of the denuclearization process. It is truethat Kim Jong Un is verbally committed to “advance toward complete denuclearization” and said in his New

John Hudson, “South Korean foreign minister on nuclear talks: ‘We want to take a different approach,’ Washi
ngton Post, October 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/south-korean-foreign-ministeron-nuclear-talks-we-want-to-take-a-different-approach/2018/10/04/61022629-5294-4024-a92d-b74a75669727_story.htm
l?utm_term=.1f7ec50d6725.
7
Ibid.
8
Brian Harris, “Donald Trump speaks of his ‘love’ for Kim Jong Un,” Financial Times, September 30, 2018,https://www.ft.com/content/acc8cc26-c49d-11e8-8670-c5353379f7c2.
9Paul Sonne, “U.S., South Korea suspend joint military exercise because of North Korea talks,” The Washingto
n Post, October 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-south-korea-suspend-joint-military-exercise-because-of-north-korea-talks/2018/10/19/07990f06-d3c3-11e8-a275-81c671a50422_story.html?utm_term=.
57715fd15c17.
10Remarks by a spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry in the press conference on June 12, 2018, 『読売新聞』June 13, 2018, p. 9.
11『朝日新聞』June 13, 2018, p. 11.
12“Opening Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at New Year Press Conference,” January 10, 2019, http://www.
korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=167057&pageIndex=1.
636Year address, “Accordingly, we declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear
weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various practical measures.”13 As RobertCarlin pointed out, Kim did not clearly say denuclearization “of the Korean Peninsula,” but it is not certain if it
is by design or not. Carlin also pointed out that before the New Year’s address there had been no reference tostopping production of nuclear weapons by the North Koreans, and suggested the possibility that Kim slippedin a pledge to halt production while making it appear this was not new and thus not a further concession on his
part.14 Even if these new expressions should be a sign of Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearization, theinternational community should remain careful about the assessment of his real intention. For example, while
he used the expression “neither make … nuclear weapons any longer,” he does not say anything about thedismantlement of the stockpile in the inventory.
As the present approach the US and South Korea are taking toward North Korea is different from the past
approaches and the true intention of North Korea (or Kim Jong Un) remains unknown for outside observers, it
is more difficult take the right balance of pressure and engagement. Without relaxation and lift of sanctions
North Korea’s economic development would not be expected, while the progress of denuclearization process isprerequisite to the relaxation and lift of sanctions. Kim Jong Un is no doubt aware of it, but it does not meanthat he has committed himself to “denuclearization” in good faith.
At this difficult stage, two things are necessary. One is to raise the awareness of the real threat North Korea
continues to pose to the region and to the entire world. The other is solidarity and concert of the international
community, particularly of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and South Korea and Japan.
These countries must enhance their efforts to exchange views on the situations involving North Korea and to
close the gap of approaches toward North Korea. The relationship between Japan and South Korea is
indispensable, and I will discuss this point at the end of this paper. In this section, I would like to refer to theview of the Government of Japan on the North Korean threats.
The Defense White Paper of Japan published in August 2018, two months after the Trump-Kim Summit,
stated, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts toenhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become thedelivery vehicles of WMDs, poses an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan, andseriously undermine peace and security of the region and international community. Therefore, it can never betolerated.” 15 This expression is almost identical to that of the previous year, and the threat is even moreemphasized by adding the word “unprecedentedly.” The White Paper of 2018 also referred to the nuclear
technological advancement of North Korea, stating, “It is possible that North Korea has achieved the

The National Committee on North Korea, Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year Address.
Robert Carlin, “Hints for 2019: Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address,” 38 North, January 3, 2019, www.38no
rth.org/2019/01/rcarlin010319/.
15
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2018, August 2018, p. 68, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/20
18/DOJ2018_1-2-2_web.pdf.
13
14

37

miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads.”16 Then, the new National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG), which is the cabinet decision to define the defense policy of the Government ofJapan, established on December 18, 2018, notes, “There has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear
and missile capabilities.” It also notes, “North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized
nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads,” showing a more in-depth analysis than the White Paper dis.
Although China now comes first and North Korea second in the order of Japan’s threat perception described in
the new NDPG, different from its previous version of NDPG in 2013, the threat perception of the Japanese
Government toward North Korea per se has become more serious.
Even if the denuclearization process makes substantial progress, the way to a final solution will be long anddifficult. The international community’s painstaking efforts to skillfully combine pressure and engagement
based on cautious views will be increasingly necessary in the coming years. It is pretty certain that thedenuclearization would not be achieved with pressure alone, but the significance of keeping pressure could not
be overstated at all, particularly in today’s situation in which the world is prone to explore engagement.
Incidentally, the Japanese public is more skeptical about the denuclearization process than before.
According to an opinion poll conducted in Japan in mid-July 2018, 17% of the respondents had a positive
prospect on the possibility of solution of this issue while 73% had a negative prospect. As a poll just after theSingapore summit had shown 24% and 64% respectively, the public proved to become more negative in one
month. The Japanese public had preferred dialogue more to pressure (48% vs. 39%) just after the Singapore
summit, but in mid-July their preference was more tilted toward pressure (46% vs. 45%). 17 According toanother poll conducted in September, 36% hoped that the inter-Korean summit meeting would lead to thesolution of the North Korean nuclear and missile problem, whereas 53% did not. 18 The Japanese public
maintains the skeptical position on this issue, and probably this sentiment is relevant to the fact that the situationof the Korean Peninsula has in any period of time in history affected Japan’s peace and security.

The US-South Korea Alliance and the Regional Security19
Japan’s recognition that “the security of South Korea is vital for the safety of Japan itself” as in Paragraph 4 of
the Japan-US Joint Statement between Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon in November
1969 and Japan-US bilateral recognition that “the security of South Korea is critical for maintaining peace on
the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula is essential to the peace of Asia
including Japan” in Paragraph 3 of the Joint Announcement to the press issued from the Japan-US summit talks
between Prime Minister Takeo Miki and President Gerald Ford in August 1975 remain valid today. These

16

Ibid.
『読売新聞』July 24, 2018, p. 2.
18『読売新聞』September 24, p. 8.
19This section is based on Hideshi Tokuchi, “Korean Peninsula Issue and Japan’s Future Security Policy,” Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies, 2018, http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/en/proposals/18.html.
17

38

recognitions are more relevant to today’s situations in light of the North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
In Singapore, Trump referred to a reduction in the United States Forces Korea (USFK), saying, "I want tobring our soldiers back home" as promised during the presidential election campaign. He also took up the topic
of the joint US-South Korea military drills, stating "We will stop the war games, which will save us a tremendous
amount of money." Furthermore, he expressed his unwillingness to threaten North Korea as if wanting to avoid
any reference to US military options against the North.20
What is of utmost importance in relation to the regional security structure is the presence of the US Forces
Korea (USFK). Cancellation of joint US-South Korea military drills will affect the proficiency and readiness ofthe forces, but more problematic is Trump's view on US alliances including the alliance with South Korea. He
has a wrong view that through these alliances the US is unilaterally providing benefits to its allies. If one looks
at the USFK, some 15,000 or 65 percent out of a total of 23,000 troops are army personnel, while the navy isjust an auxiliary force.21 The setup of USFK differs widely from that of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ).
It clearly shows that the main role and mission of USFK is to serve as deterrence against North Korea.
However, one should note two things in this regard. First, USFK is the only US military presence in thecontinental part of Asia, and it would have a major impact on the entire balance of power in East Asia if it werelost. Second, the scope of the US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty is “the Pacific area” and is not limited to
the Korean Peninsula. In the discussion of the future of USFK, these points should not be neglected.
Moon Jae In said in his New Year’s press conference that Kim Jong Un understood that the issue ofdenuclearization and the status of USFK are different matters. He also noted that if the end-of-war declaration
is attained and the peace accord is concluded, the issue of whether USFK should be maintained or not will all
depend on the US and South Korea and that Kim Jong Un understands it.22 Careful management of the issue ofthe USFK presence is necessary so as not make the issue a bargaining chip for the denuclearization of North
Korea.

The Security Relations between Japan and South Korea
The new NDPG states on the defense cooperation and exchanges with South Korea, “Japan will promote defense
cooperation with the Republic of Korea in a broad range of fields and will make efforts to establish a foundation
for cooperation,” whereas the previous NDPG of 2013 stated, “Japan will promote close cooperation with theRepublic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together withJapan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example byconcluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.”
The difference of the nuance is noticeable. More importantly, defense cooperation with South Korea is the fourth『朝日新聞』June 13, 2018, p.10.
The 2017 version of "Defense of Japan," ed. by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, August 2017, p. 79
22『読売新聞』January 11, 2019, p. 11.
20
21

39

priority next to Australia, India, and Southeast Asian countries in the new NDPG, while it was the first priority
in the previous NDPG.
In this critical moment when both Japan and South Korea have to cooperate to address North Korea much
more closely than ever as the two US allies in the region, the Japanese side has suffered Korea fatigue. The
above-mentioned expression on South Korea in the new NDPG is presumably a sign of such an atmosphere in
Japan. Moon Jae In had said in his written interview with a Japanese newspaper on May 8, 2018 that he would
make utmost efforts to attain full friendship between the two countries through the approach to promote a futureoriented cooperation, separately from the history issue while the two nations make efforts to overcome thehistory issue wisely.23 However, it is highly questionable if such a two-track approach will work any longer.
Not only the history issue (including the issue of compensation to the “forced laborers”) but also the radar lockon incident in the Sea of Japan caused by a Korean naval ship to a Japanese naval patrol aircraft has been
seriously injuring the ever fragile foundation for bilateral cooperation and coordination.
The two Koreas agreed in the Pyongyang Joint Declaration “to hold meaningful events … to commemorate
the 100th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement Day.”

The day is approaching. In themeantime, February 22, the Day of Takeshima, established by Shimane Prefecture to commemorate theprefecture’s declaration on the jurisdiction of the island in accordance with the decision of the Meiji Governmentof Japan is also approaching. Takeshima is Japan’s inherent territory illegally occupied by South Korea for morethan six decades.
The important thing here is not to inflame nationalism capitalizing on these special days, but to close the gap, by minimizing the difference and to broaden the scope of cooperation between the twocountries. Otherwise, it will end up only with benefitting the common adversary. Japan and South Ko
rea are the only two countries in Northeast Asia to sustain robust military presence of the US, and t
hus without the cooperation of these two nations stability of the region including the Korean Peninsu
la would not be feasible.

23『読売新聞』May 8, 2018, p. 9.

40

China and Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Stability
Dr Nicola Leveringhaus
Lecturer, Department of War Studies
King’s College London
North Korea’s recent technological advancements following nuclear and missile tests in 2016 and 2017 have started
to shift the academic debate beyond a long fixation on non-proliferation and engagement strategies, towards a focus
on nuclear deterrence. This paper for the KCL-RIPs workshop examines the extent to which North Korea, now
technically (though not recognized diplomatically) a nuclear armed state, outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT,
which it left in 2003), has a nuclear weapons strategy and considers two issues: firstly, if North Korea has a nuclear
weapons strategy, is it stabilising or destabilising for the Korean Peninsula; and secondly, what role, if any, can China
play in shaping North Korean thinking on nuclear deterrence?

Does North Korea have a nuclear weapons strategy?
It would be tempting to argue that North Korea, as a relatively young nuclear weapons state, run by a regime that has
sometimes been labelled irrational, cannot ‘do’ nuclear strategy. Indeed, even former US Secretary of Defence
famously questioned whether Kim was ‘madder than MAD [mutual assured destruction]’. This paper argues that
Kim Jong Un does indeed have a nuclear weapons strategy and is not ‘madder than MAD’. Rather, North Koreanconceptions of nuclear strategy have evolved over time (Joseph Bermudez, Jnr., 2015). Initially, these weapons were
not seen as usable weapons but political symbols. Chemical weapons, which North Korea had developed much earlier,
were considered sufficient for credible strategic deterrence. Later, under Kim Jong Il, and recently, Kim Jong Un, thenuclear element of strategic deterrence has become more visible. For instance, nuclear deterrence was first mentioned
by North Korea in June 2003, before its first nuclear weapons test in 2006, and after withdrawal from the NPT in
January 2003. Later, in 2012/3, North Korea labelled itself a nuclear weapons state in its constitution. This wasfollowed on 1 April 2013 when North Korea issued the Nuclear Weapons State Law. Two points in this law bearreiterating:First: ‘Nuclear Weapons are a self-defensive means of coping with the hostile policy of and nuclear threat
from the United States’;
Second: ‘Nuclear weapons serve the purpose of deterring and repelling aggression and retaliating against
enemies’On the surface, North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy seems minimal, based on retaliation and countering aperceived military threat from the United States. It also includes a shaky declared commitment to No First Use (NFU).
NFU pledges are uncommon and unpopular among nuclear weapons states. Apart from North Korea, only China(which maintains an unconditional NFU pledge since 1964) and India (a conditional pledge) have them. In China and41

India, NFU has been used, with mixed success, to signal nuclear restraint (Leveringhaus and De Estrada, 2018). It is
unclear whether North Korea seeks to do the same. Its commitment to NFU has been shaky, given that it discussed
pre-emptive use after a US-ROK joint military exercise in 2016. Pre-emptive use would violate NFU.
Yet the focus on retaliation is perhaps on less shaky strategic ground. At present, given small numbers of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems, North Korea has at best an uncertain form of retaliation. In other words, the enemy
cannot be fully certain that a first strike would eradicate all the capabilities of its opponent, thereby cancelling out
the chances of an overwhelming response. This is not dissimilar to China’s own nuclear weapons strategy from themid-1960s to early 1980s when it did not yet possess sufficiently secure and survivable land missile capabilities(Horsburgh, 2015). China has transitioned to a more assured form of retaliation in recent decades (mobilising its land
missiles, MIRVing the DF5 and is developing, for the first time, a potentially credible sea based SLBM capability).
To return to North Korea, if like China in the past, it seeks to eventually pursue an assured retaliatory capability thensome limited nuclear force modernization and a small number of further tests might be likely in the future (China
conducted 47 overall, much less than over a thousand conducted by the United States). It seems that North Korea’s
deterrence strategy, whether uncertain or assured, reflects the same goal: to weaken US extended deterrence (which
includes nuclear as well as non-nuclear elements) with South Korea and prevent the United States from using nuclear
weapons against North Korea itself (Kim and Cohen, 2018). It is likely – given the limits of the nuclear capabilities
North Korea currently has-- that South Korea would be a first target in a North Korean nuclear attack, followed by
US allies in Asia like Japan and possibly US forces on Guam.

China and North Korean nuclear weapons strategy
Where does uncertain and assured retaliation as a nuclear strategy come from? Chinese approaches to nuclear strategy
have long emphasised retaliation. Indeed, as early as 1964, when China first tested a nuclear weapon, it declared theaforementioned pledge of NFU and a focus on minimal numbers of nuclear weapons purely for the purposes ofretaliation (against an explicitly stated US threat). At that time, the Chinese post-testing statement in October 1964
declared that these weapons were for self-defence only, to counter perceived US nuclear blackmail. This statement
is not dissimilar to North Korea’s 2013 law. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, North Korea was also mindful ofChinese positions on other nuclear matters, including denouncing the NPT in the 1960s and 1970s as a tool of thethen superpowers to freeze the nuclear status quo.
The issue here is whether this mirroring of positions is occurring under Kim Jong Un and what this means in termsof Chinese leverage over North Korea. China’s leverage and role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis has
typically been framed in terms of an extensive economic/trading relationship; its historical and political relationship(the depth of which can be debated, however) since the Korean War; and a bilateral security treaty since 1961. This
treaty has been a topic of debate among Chinese analysts in recent years, specifically whether it should a) continue,
and b) includes an obligation to assist North Korea if attacked. Yet this paper proposes a potential fourth role for
China: that of mirroring nuclear strategy.
Some have argued that in the past North Korea has used nuclear advancement to catalyse Chinese support (Narang,2015). Linked to this, if North Korea feels it cannot rely on China, would it change strategy and seek to threaten
42limited early use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks by superior conventional forces? In other words, is Chinese
support of North Korea key to keeping North Korean nuclear strategy minimal and focused on retaliation, as opposed
to a more assertive warfighting strategy? This is unclear at present, but four visits (and upcoming Xi visit to North
Korea if it happens in 2019) are arguably positive developments. For instance, during Kim’s first visit to China in
2018, Kim was apparently shown an exhibition that included a history of the development of China’s nuclear
programme. This suggests China saw value in showcasing its own nuclear thinking to its neighbour.
In terms of nuclear strategy, it can be argued that among the nuclear weapons states, China’s approach typifies
restraint: painfully slow nuclear force modernisation, since it still does not have a full TRIAD of nuclear forces (air,sea and land) compared to the United States, and has a significantly smaller nuclear arsenal, both quantitatively andqualitatively. Moreover, unlike other nuclear weapons states, China de-alerts its missiles (de-mating the warhead
from the missile), maintains an unconditional NFU pledge, as well as de-targeting agreements with the United States
and Russia, respectively.
To summarise, several aspects of Chinese nuclear deterrence might be ‘transferable’ to North Korea:

 Announcing restraint in numbers and development; De-alerting warheads;
 Strengthening the unilateral commitment to NFU by joining China in calling for an international NFU
treaty; Entering into de-targeting agreements;
 Freezing nuclear testing and production of fissile material.

How much appetite there is in China for sharing strategic approaches is unclear (Chinese media reports on public
opinion and North Korea suggest there is growing exasperation in response to the nuclear actions of their neighbour)
but the exhibition in 2018 was encouraging. Crucially, mirroring Chinese strategic approaches with North Korea
would not undermine China’s long-standing core preferences over the Korean peninsula, which have remained
consistent since the North Korean nuclear crisis emerged: stability over denuclearisation. Moreover, the alternatives
for China in terms of what it can do to shape the outcome of the crisis, from support for harsh sanctions to renewing
and hosting the Six Party Talks again, seem unlikely.

Beyond North Korea: South Korean approaches to deterrence
Beyond China, how South Korea approaches strategic deterrence is also likely to shape North Korea’s strategic
preferences. South Korea’s deterrence is not just nuclear, through extended nuclear deterrence (END) provided by
the United States but includes cyber and conventional exercises with the United States. Today, the preferred term(though not described in detail) is ‘tailored deterrence’. The United States withdrew nuclear forces on South Koreansoil in the early 1990s, though as academic analysis has recently shown, the presence of nuclear weapons on alliedsoil adds little to END (Fuhrmann, 2018).
One question is whether South Korea has confidence in US END, or whether it will seek its own arrangements.
43

For instance, in February 2017, floor leader of the then ruling Saenuri party stated: ‘We can't borrow umbrellas fromnext-door every time it rains. We should wear a raincoat of our own.’ Likewise, Asan Institute Founder Chung MongJoon has controversially argued that if South Korea were not allowed to host US tactical nuclear weapons again, thenthe United States should allow South Korea to leave the NPT and develop its own nuclear weapons. These may beminority voices, however. Others have argued that South Korea’s confidence in US END will depend not on theactions of the United States, but of other US allies, especially Japan. Mark Fitzpatrick, in an Adelphi Paper in 2016,
argued that should Japan decide to develop nuclear weapons, South Korea might likely follow.
For now, South Korea seems content to focus on deterrence by denial. This includes Kill chains, Korean Air andMissile Defence. The current President Moon Jae-in, who campaigned on an anti-nuclear platform prior to hiselection, has since declared (like previous leaders) that nuclear weapons would be incompatible with unification.

Conclusion: what would stable deterrence look like on the Korean Peninsula?
Now that North Korea is technically a nuclear weapons state, securing a commitment (whether openly or throughdiplomatic back channels) by Kim Jong Un to freeze nuclear testing and establish a nuclear strategy that is restrained
would likely be stabilising. China’s role in this regard could be helpful given that it practices a restrained and minimal
type of nuclear deterrence. The extent to which China is willing to do this is not clear but signs in 2018 are positive.
Any Chinese efforts could be derailed by shifts in the deterrence strategies of other Asian states, especially South
Korea and Japan. Yet this doesn’t mean that the spread of Chinese thinking on strategic deterrence to North Korea
should not be encouraged.

44

The Koreas have decided to take control:
What this means for the future of the Korean Peninsula
Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Reader, International Relations, King’s College London
KF-VUB Korea Chair, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Introduction
The year 2019 has started with a second summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader
Kim Jong-un. This is likely to be followed by a third summit, as well as a fourth summit between South Korean
President Moon Jae-in and Kim. These two summits would come after months of unprecedented diplomatic
activity at the highest level involving North Korea. In sharp contrast with heightened tensions in 2017, whichsome feared would lead to a US strike on North Korea, the year 2018 was marked by a succession of summits
and confidence-building measures serving to pave the way for a possible diplomatic solution to the North
Korean nuclear conundrum.
The two summits between Trump and Kim, the only ever between a sitting US president and a North Koreanleader, understandably received the most attention. Equally relevant, however, were the three summits between
Moon and Kim in a period of five months between April and September 2018. In sharp contrast, only two interKorean summits had been held in the previous 65 years since the end of the Korean War. Furthermore, there
have been four meetings between Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in a period of ten months between March2018 and January 2019. In contrast, they had never meet since Kim replaced his father as Supreme Leader ofNorth Korea in December 2011. In other words, diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula goes beyond US-North
Korea relations and involves the four key players in Korean affairs.
Interestingly, and differently from other post-Cold War diplomatic processes such as US-North Korea talks
to solve the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94, the four-party talks of 1997-99 or the Six-Party Talksof 2003-08 to deal with the second nuclear crisis, the current diplomatic process is led by the two Koreas. The
only previous post-Cold War diplomatic process led by one of the Koreas, the Sunshine Policy of 1998-2003
implemented by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung had no support from Washington once George W. Bushwon the November 2000 US election. We now have a diplomatic process not only led by the Koreas, but withthe active support of the US plus China. We can therefore argue that conditions are ripe for permanent peace inthe Korean Peninsula and a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear conundrum.

Why the Koreas have taken control
Arguably, the Koreas taking control of the situation in the Korean Peninsula is the most relevant development
for its immediate and long-term future. It sets the Korean Peninsula on a specific path and limits the options for45other actors, including the US. On the South Korean side, both post-Cold War structural changes and the figureof the current president, Moon, explain the push to take control of inter-Korean relations and the geopolitics ofthe Korean Peninsula more broadly. On the North Korean side, it is the leader of the country, Kim, that drives
this push.
South Korea has undergone a transformation in its foreign and North Korea policies that can be traced backto the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. In short, South Korea has tried to forge a middle power identity
including a more independent foreign policy going back to President Roh Tae-woo’s (1988-1993) Nordpolitik.
Once the Cold War was over, Seoul did not want to be defined by its ideological confrontation with Pyongyang.
It thus became more involved in global affairs and more willing to set its own North Korea policy. The quest
for a more independent foreign and North Korea policies was clearest under President Roh Moo-hyun (20022007), who had frequent clashes with US President George W. Bush due to his pro-engagement North Korea
policy. But even President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) was willing to disagree with Bush’s then-engagement
policy upon his election. In other words, South Korean presidents are willing to push their own preferences
when it comes to North Korea policy.
Enter Moon. The current South Korean president was elected on an openly pro-engagement policy. He took
office in May 2017, in the midst of growing US-North Korea tensions. These would eventually lead to North
Korea’s sixth nuclear test in September 2017 and three ICBM tests, the last one of which was the Hwasong-15
test in November that effectively put the whole of the US mainland under the threat of a North Korean strike. 1
In spite of these growing tensions, Moon made clear that diplomacy and engagement were his preferred way tobring permanent peace to the Korean Peninsula. 2 He repeatedly extended an olive branch to North Korea,
making use of the opportunity afforded by the February 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games to kickstart diplomacy with Pyongyang.
It should be noted that there is broad support in South Korea for engagement with North Korea. This support
transcends the liberal-conservative divide and the approval ratings of Moon himself,3 which means that his
successor once his non-renewable five-year term expires in 2022 is likely to continue down the engagement
route. Only a clear North Korean provocation such a new nuclear or ICBM test or another attack on South Korea
such as the ROKS Cheonan sinking or the Yeonpyeong Island shelling would make Seoul change course.
With regards to North Korea, the shift towards engagement and co-leading the geopolitical situation in the
Korean Peninsula under Kim has immediate and longer-term causes. With regards to the former, North Korea
has become a de facto nuclear power and now wants to focus on economic development. Following the
Hwasong-15 test of November 2017, Kim announced that North Korea had successfully completed its nuclear

For a full list of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and missile types, see https://missilethreat.csis.org/no
rth-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/.
2
For a detailed explanation of President Moon Jae-in’s North Korea policy, see his address at the Korber Foundation in July 2017: http://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/65.
3
Ramon Pacheco Pardo (2019), ‘Moon’s Quest for Permanent Peace’, KF-VUB Korea Chair Policy Brief, Janu
ary.
1

46

programme.4 In April 2018, Kim told the (North) Korean Workers’ Party Committee that his focus would beon economic development.5 This is thus North Korean official policy now.
Kim has been following a policy of byungjin or parallel development of North Korea’s nuclear programme
and the economy dating back to March 2013. This is thus a long-term policy, one which relies on engagement
and better relations with South Korea, the US and the outside world in general to bring much-needed external
investment and expertise. Leaving aside North Korea’s official juche or self-reliance ideology, Kim’s quest tolead the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula links to a need to improve inter-Korean relations. Without said
improvement, North Korea cannot become properly integrated in the regional economy of Northeast Asia anddevelop. Thus, it is likely that the current engagement policy will continue in years to come as long as North
Korea receives incentives to do so.

Implications of Korean Peninsula geopolitics being led by the Koreas
The Koreas taking control of the geopolitical situation in the Korean Peninsula matters insofar it addresses the‘shrimp among whales’ syndrome that has afflicted Korea for centuries. In other words, the idea that the destinyof Korea is in the hands of great powers: China first, China and Japan later, and China and the US since thedivision of the country into two. Equally relevant, the fact that both Koreas want stability and, crucially, amajority of South Koreans support this option means that we can expect diplomacy to continue to dominate
inter-Korean relations. There might be hiccups and even moments when the process will stall along the way.
But the direction of travel is clear and has implications for the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula.
To begin with, the US has no real option but to follow the diplomatic route to deal with North Korea. As longas South Korea supports engagement, politically it is very difficult for any US president to follow a different
route. Bush, for example, ended up having to negotiate with North Korea, among other reasons, because Rohwould not support isolation and pressure. Trump, meanwhile, would find it very difficult to convince othercountries to go back to ‘maximum pressure’ if South Korea is not on board. On the other hand, US President
Barack Obama was able to follow a ‘strategic patience’ policy gradually increasing pressure, among others,
because neither Lee nor South Korean President Park Geun-hye pressed him for a different approach.
In addition, the Koreas support for stability suggests that the preferred option of China, and Russia, based on
gradual mutual concessions by the US and North Korea as they improve relations with each other is the most
realistic way forward. A maximalist approach based on Washington’s initial demand of full denuclearization
before North Korea received any incentive in return seems not to be US policy anymore. US Special
Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun recently articulated the Trump administration’s policy towards
Pyongyang, which includes gradual mutual concessions. 6 Moon has been championing this approach for

KCNA (2017), ‘DPRK Gov’t on Successful Test-fire of New-Type ICBM’, KCNA, November 29.
KCNA (2018), ‘Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un’, KCNA, A
pril 21.
6
Special Representative Stephen Biegun’s speech and Q&A is available here: https://www.state.gov.
4
547

months.
Ultimately, Korean Peninsula stability will happen if both Koreas want it. If Seoul and Pyongyang continue
to hold top-level summits, implement military confidence-building measures as they have been doing in recent
months, engage in cultural and sports exchanges, and, last but not least, kick-start proper economic engagement,
it will be very difficult for the international community not to support inter-Korean reconciliation. This includes
the US, regardless of the president in power. Considering that both Koreas seem committed to long-term stability,
this is likely to be the de facto state of affairs in the months and years to come.

A stable Korean Peninsula and the future of Northeast Asia
A stable Korean Peninsula would be very beneficial for Northeast Asia and East Asia more generally. To begin
with, it would eliminate a significant security flashpoint in the region at a time when tensions in other areas
such as the South China Sea are growing. A North Korea pursuing economic reform with the support ofinternational investors and technical experts would have little incentive to conduct nuclear or ICBM tests. Any
test would most likely end any support by South Korea, the US and the international community for years.
Thus, North Korea’s nuclear programme should not raise tensions in the near future.
Furthermore, a stable Korean Peninsula would be beneficial for the economy of Northeast Asia. The
rebuilding of North Korea’s economy is often seen as an unbearable economic cost on South Korea. But it isalso an opportunity, and Moon is among a growing number of political, business and think tank leaders who see
stronger inter-Korean relations as an economic opportunity for South Korea.7 Connecting North Korea to therest of Northeast Asia would allow South Korea, and also Japan, to export to the Eurasian landmass by railroad,cutting the cost and time of sending goods all the way to Western Europe. Potentially, it would also allow overtwenty million North Koreans to become middle-class consumers as hundreds of millions of Chinese have overthe past four decades.
Last, but not least, a stable Korean Peninsula would allow to start a proper discussion about a Northeast Asia
security mechanism including China, Japan and the two Koreas together with the US and, perhaps, Russia. Thismechanism has been discussed in the past, including as part of the Six-Party Talks. But it cannot be implemented
while the Korean War is technically not over and without inter-Korean reconciliation. A security mechanism
covering Northeast Asia could serve as a forum to discuss traditional and non-traditional security issues
including maritime security, energy security or pollution and climate change. Currently, Northeast Asian
countries discuss these and other matters in a range of different institutions or on an ad hoc basis. If North Korea
is integrated into regional economic flows and diplomatic structures, there would be a stable Korean Peninsula.
As a result, Northeast Asia could develop its own, all-encompassing security mechanism.

See, for example, President Moon Jae-in’s New Year message of 2019, available here: https://news.joins.com/a
rticle/23255691 (in Korean).
748

Japan, China and the United States: What Future for Asia?
Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto
ChairmanMiyamoto Institute of Asian Research
Since the theme of our discussion is a complex one and my presentation time is limited, it’s better to frame somehypotheses to facilitate our deliberations:First, China is going through a trial and error process, defining itself and attempting to formulate its
relationship to the world. China’s past 40 years under the Open and Reform Policy have created a miracle ofunprecedented economic development by such a large country. It has also been a period of learning andawakening for China. The speed of its progress was so fast that it inevitably lead to insufficient digestion time,
particularly in the middle and low levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There still exist areas eventhe leaders don’t understand well. China is still struggling to find answers. Thus, it is still almost impossible forthem to establish a comprehensive vision or program for global governance. There exists room for China to beflexible to amend or alter current proposals.
Second, China continues to face serious domestic problems. Its GDP will surpass that of the US sometime in
the near future, but it will not enjoy the status that the US has in many areas today. In GDP terms, the US will
not be left behind by China as much as Japan was, while India will catch up to China. In terms of military power,
it’s almost impossible to imagine China will surpass the US. Regarding soft powers, China has a long way to
go to create a new world culture by digesting its own traditional culture, a vast heritage of Western civilization,
as well as the essence of modernity realized by technological innovations. In other words, the world is heading
toward a multi-polar structure instead of an uni- or bi-polar structure.
Third, the US will remain the leading player when formulating international relations. Its total national
strength will be ranked number one for many years to come so long as it sticks to its basic principles and values
that safeguard an open, fair and free society, allowing a continuous inflow of talents from all over the world.
Fourth, though in the US and the EU the unsympathetic tendency of society toward the current international
order has increased, both the US and the EU will return to the ranks upholding the principles and values that
underline the current international order after their democratic adjustments are completed. No alternative to thecurrent world order has emerged in the horizon. No country will support an authoritarian world order that reflects
a repressive domestic governing system, and no authoritarian hegemon dominating the world will appear in theforeseeable future.
Fifth, Japan will, or rather should, continue to be an indispensable and influential player in Asia and the world,
for Japan is the only embodiment of an advanced market economy and a matured democracy in Asia. It’s anirony that Japan is badly needed in a time when Japan has entered into a declining process of relative national
strength. Nevertheless, Japan should play a vital role trying to alleviate mounting tensions between the US and49

China. No other county but Japan is able to fulfill that responsibility.

The future of Asia will be literally decided by the evolution of the relationship between the US and China
until a new equilibrium between the two countries is reached.
The US adopted a new set of policies toward China that US Vice President Mike Pence described in his
Hudson Institute remarks. Those policies seek a relationship grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect forsovereignty, while taking strong and swift action to achieve that goal. These US policies will remain for theforeseeable future.
China must adjust the direction of its policies to avoid an inevitable collision course with the US. China
adopted hardline foreign policies around 2009, heavily influenced by its unexpected success in defeating thefinancial crisis in 2008. China became overconfident. Japan-China frictions over the Senkaku Islands in 2012
made nationalistic emotions erupt dramatically, letting some strategic thinkers take advantage of the situation,and to fill the gap between its territorial demands and existing realities in the East and South China Seas. The
Chinese handling of external relations has entered into a new phase to alter the status quo by using physicalpower.
The Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan as an inherent part of the territory of Japan. The
short background of the situation is that in September of 2012 China started to frequently invade the Japanese
territorial sea for the first time with Government vessels to nullify the valid Japanese control of those islands,
that, from the international law’s point of view has no meaning at all. They started to build artificial islands in
the South China Sea in December 2013 at an amazing speed and scale so that the project was completed by
mid-2016. This was also to challenge the status quo with physical power.
Thus, neighboring countries are reacting to China’s behavior through enhancing self-defense capabilities andmilitary ties and alliances with the US. They assume that if the military balance in the region swings in China’sfavor, then China will continue to use its physical power to challenge the status quo.
For the sake of establishing regional peace and security as well as avoiding a US and China collision, China
must do three things:
One, China must adjust its foreign policies toward more self-restrained and constructive ones. They initiatedthis adjustment process from the beginning of 2017 under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. This is themain reason why I insist we can still reach some agreement to strengthen and improve the current international
order.
Two, China must adjust its economic policy direction. China needs to create “fair and reciprocal” economic
policies and practices for foreign counterparts through reforms. Fortunately, the main stream economists in
China believe these kinds of reforms are the only way to achieve sustainable economic developments thatfacilitate the public support of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. This means there exists a probability
that the US and China may reach a compromise to contain their economic frictions.
Three, China must adjust its politico-military direction to avoid a future collision with the US and its allies
and friends. The political aspect of China’s future direction is partly covered by its foreign policy adjustment.
50But the grand vision, which President Xi presented to the world as “a community with a shared future of
mankind”, is not spelled out in detail and does not form any part of Chinese military objectives and strategies.
The military doctrine and strategy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exclusively focuses on China’s
narrowly defined national interests such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, maritime interests, development
interests, etc. If such PLA continues to develop its strength, it will unquestionably pose serious threats to thepeace and security of the neighboring countries and beyond.
China can make its politico-military direction adjustments in two ways: one is to provide transparency of its
military stance, to present the persuasive logics behind its military doctrine and strategy and to prove it withactual deeds; two is to slow down its military build-up in a meaningful way and to enter into consultations
amongst interested countries in the region to seek a new set of regional arrangements that facilitate lowering
tensions and enhance the peace and security of the region.

The US must understand that China is still in the process of development and transformation, even in its wayof thinking. Nothing has been finalized in China. This means there exist room for China to adapt. Although its
objective to become number one in the world will not be abandoned, it is possible it will adjust its approach toattain that goal. The US and China shall find common grounds and common interests to reach somearrangements to avert direct confrontations despite the fact that the battle for the leadership of the world andtechnological hegemony between the two countries will be prolonged.
Vice President Mike Pence had some interesting quotes I would like to share with you. “China’s rulers canstill change course and return to the spirit of ‘reform and opening’ and greater freedom. The American people
want nothing more; the Chinese people deserve nothing less.” With that quote, we can see that the US asks toreturn to the starting point of the “reform and opening” policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping and is not asking forchanging the regime. This request from the US should have a substantial audience in China.

Under these circumstances, any mis-handling or tactical mistakes could lead to a direct confrontation between
the US and China. The case in point is the Taiwan issue. We better be prepared for the possibility that a minor
confrontation could take place even in the economic fields. Any direct collision will shake the world, needlessto say, it will also affect the peace and development in East Asia. Therefore, something must be done to alleviate
the situations and pave the way for a future architecture of peace and security in East Asia.
Firstly, crisis management is badly needed. In this juncture, I believe, only Japan can act as an intermediary
between these two countries, making efforts to avert a collision course. Japan supports any effort to encourageor press China to adjust its direction. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s unwavering efforts to improve relations with
China have paid off. Now Japan entertains a quite solid relationship with China. Prime Minister Abe’s personalcordial relations both with President Trump and President Xi will also play an indispensable role in this regard.
Secondly, the US and China, together with the world community should identify, share and pursue common
goals. In my point of view, it should be to defend, maintain and improve the existing world order. Ironically,
China has shifted gears to this direction, but the current US administration has turned its back. No other plausible
51alternative has emerged in the horizon. We better stick to this direction. Likeminded countries should sit down
and deliberate how to achieve our common goals. China should be included. We can test to what extent theirwords will be supported by actual deeds. When the world, the US and China in particular, are able to share acommon goal, we can review the current situation from that angle and adjust our direction correctly.
Thirdly, time has come to redesign the security architecture of East Asia. New architecture should include aregional security arrangement that guarantees the security of each member state. This arrangement should
include the US, China and Russia, because their geo-political interests collide in this part of the world. The
Peace and Friendship Treaty Between Japan and China retains the well-known anti-hegemony clause andpledges both countries should not seek to form a hegemony and to object any efforts to establish a hegemony.
New regional security arrangements should be powerful enough to restrain any country from becoming ahegemon and to provide equal security for all. Until then, the Japan-US security alliance shall remain as thecornerstone of regional security.
It is already late for intellectual communities of concerned countries to initiate deliberations on this subject.
This task to produce a feasible concept and structure is overwhelmingly difficult and takes time. Even so,
intellectual communities must sit together, engage in in-depth deliberations and strive to create the essence of aregional security arrangement. It takes time to have conditions allowing the governments to discuss this subject.
But when these governments need ideas, concepts, and actual ways to materialize them, intellectual
communities should already have the answers in their hands.
Fourthly, we better engage China in fixing the world order. These so-called engagement policies are branded
as a failure, due to the fact that those policies had two fatal defects; one is their wrong assumption that China
will become like the US; two is they only give the carrot but not the stick. Now that the US has the stick, weshould embolden to deepen our dialogue with China and induce it to play a more constructive role. In fact, wehave many ideas and principles in common with China. For example, China supports the spirit and the principlesof the United Nations Charter as well as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The central challenge tothis endeavor is that China very probably holds different connotations of the agreed principles.
It, therefore, becomes indispensable to collaborate with China and produce a rule book that can materialize
these principles by following a set of rules. For example, Japan and China have an obligation to settle any“disputes” by peaceful means according to the treaty, but the definition of “disputes” is unclear. By making a
set of rules to implement this clause, both sides have an excuse vis-à-vis their public to sit down and negotiatewith rules.
Thus, we better embrace China to create, for example, “a community with a shared future of mankind” based
upon our definition, not theirs, and by the rules of the law, not to rule by law.
We need to form a common front amongst likeminded countries bound by commonly shared values andprinciples in order to thrive and create a new world order based upon the fundamental principles inherited form
the existing world order.

52

Japan, China and the US
Prof Kerry Brown
Professor
King's College London
The relationship between the US, China and the Japan, the world’s first, second and third largest economies
respectively as of 2019, is a self-evidently important one. In the last few decades it is a relationship which has
occurred within a relatively predictable structure. Japan and the US are treaty allies, and share the same
democratic political values, despite the profound difference in their cultural outlook. China of course sits outsideof this, as the world’s final Communist run country. But it has enjoyed increasingly important, pragmatic
economic relations with both.
In the era of Trump and Xi Jinping, however, a fundamental shift which is creating greater liquidity anduncertainty in international diplomacy is occurring. Boundaries that once seemed reasonably clear are no longer
so evident. The era of engagement with China leading, it was hoped, to some kind of political transformation
there which started in the 1980s is now over. A harsher realism reigns. Japan’s role in this new world is so far
unclear. This essay will attempt to sketch out the kind of new space that it needs to take stock off.

The US and China
To start this exercise, one needs to accurately conceptualise the relationship between the US and the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and where this currently stands (as of February 2019). Since rapprochement in theearly 1970s, the PRC and the USA have never been easy partners. Neither all-out enemies in the model of the
USSR in the Cold War, since 1978 the two have seen their economies become increasingly entwined. China’s
practice of `socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has managed at least to create the illusion of a shared set ofpractices similar enough to capitalism for them to work together to the extent that they are now the world’s
largest trading partners. But creating a language to capture the nuances and complexities of this relationship has
proved challenging. They have certainly never been allies, even though, in the early 2000s with the Global War
on Terror they had moments of closeness. But nor are they full enemies. The competitiveness at the heart oftheir link, however, has never really been full exposed until recent years. Awkward neologisms like `frenemies’
have been coined to try to capture this deeply ambiguous relationship. Policy frameworks to manage it havebeen devised, perhaps the most contentious that of Hugh White in Australia who talked of the US tacticallyceding the Asia region to China to acknowledge the importance of its economy and its legitimate claim to havea larger role in the world. Under Obama, there was an era of a `soft pushback’ with the assertion of Asia being
an area of strategic importance for the US, which increasingly identified as a Pacific power.
With the election of Trump in the US in the late 2016, for all the unique attributes and qualities of his
53leadership, one thing can be seen as a natural development of the Obama era – the tightening of intention andthe manifestation, almost daily, or a relationship between Beijing and Washington that is increasingly, andunambiguously, competitive. While the intensifying trade war between the two from mid-2018 is a symptom of
this, it only indicates a little of the deepening distrust between the two. This is something that any partner of
either, and that includes most of the rest of the world, needs to ponder on. It is a shift that has historic
implications, and is leading towards a much more polarised world, with much clearer but sharper and potentiallymore dangerous boundary lines. Japan sits in key strategic space, and in amongst a dense network of alliancesand political links in this new situation. This issue, which impacts on everyone, impacts particularly directly on
it and its interests and future direction.

Causes
The era of deeper and clearer competitiveness between the US and China is the result of two things. One is theunexpectedly rapid development of the Chinese economy, and the vast geopolitical asset this has gifted Beijing.
Without making any major compromises in terms of changing its political model, Beijing now stands poised toovertake the US economy some time in the next decade. This is a moment of massive symbolic importance,even though it will still mean that in per capita terms China will lie far behind the US, probably for many
decades. In gross terms it will be number one. That will present a major psychological challenge to the US. It is
unclear how easy this moment will prove to be. Portents do not look good.
Secondly, the West (meaning the US and its widespread network of alliances sharing the broadly same set ofpolitical and to a large extent social values) has needed to accept defeat in the strategy of engagement exercised
towards China since the Reform and Opening Up Policy was launched in the late 1970s. A hope continued
largely to the end of the Hu Jintao presidency in 2012 that economic engagement might lead to meaningfulpolitical reform in the PRC. Despite evidence that this was unlikely to turn out so neatly, western governments
maintained the belief that modernisation theory would be proved right, and that eventually as per capita GDP
levels rose, China would experience the same kind of pluralism and development of civil society leading todemocratization that had occurred in the Russian Federation and elsewhere. With the Arab Spring in 2010,
however, the response of the Chinese government became much more emboldened in its outright rejection ofwhat it called Western interference, and the attempt to propagate its political system through engagement intrade, investment and other economic areas.
The Xi presidency has seemingly placed in the final nail in the coffin of these hopes. Its resistance to what
have been labelled domestically as `western universalism’ antagonistic to traditional Chinese values and Chinese
national self interest has been consistent, and backed up by effective, brutal campaigns of news control, internal
repression and clampdowns on rights lawyers and other forms of social organisation distrusted by theCommunist Party. China has been able to export its mechanism of control beyond its borders, standing accusedof using cyberspace and other inducements to influence political systems in the West in areas which matter tothe PRC – policy on the South China Sea, on Taiwan, and intellectual property rights. In the end, critiques of54

engagement have now led to an abandonment of the ideas of working with China in order to help it achieve
legal, social and political reform. There is now a new consensus. China is looking well placed to prove thewest’s assumption wrong: it can have a developed, middle class-centred economy, and a system where one party
run on a Marxist Leninist system enjoys a monopoly on power. Not the least of the difficulties of this outcome
is that it is a tremendous humiliation to the US and the allies around it. The Chinese talk of their century of
humiliation before 1949 and the creation of the PRC. In a different context, and in a different way, the West has
just enjoyed its own moment of humiliation with China. This accounts for some of the heightened emotions,frustration and anger. Rightly or wrongly (and the US and others were clearly naïve in the assumptions
underlying much of their engagement philosophy) there is a sense of now needing to create a far harsher, more
realistic framework to deal with China, one where tangible gains which work to the interests of the US are to
the fore – and a clearer recognition that in not sharing the same values, the PRC is therefore seen as a threat,
and an issue that needs a restraining policy response. Even if the tariff dispute is dealt with in the next few
weeks, these deeper structure issues do not do away. The problem is that the world’s first and second largest
powers, militarily, economically, and geopolitically, are on a course of sharpening conflict, and the risks of there
being real conflict between them, while still remote, has become increasingly more likely since 2018.

Japan’s Role
Ironically, from experiencing a brittle and cold relationship with China at the start of the Xi era from 2012 andhis ascendancy, with almost no top level contact for a couple of years, China and Japan are now enjoying a
relatively good relationship. Part of this is a side effect of Beijing feeling increasingly isolated as the US focusses
on it, and wanting to diversify and widen its circle of loose diplomatic alliances. As with the EU, Japan istherefore faced with the unusual situation of dealing with a China which, at the moment at least, seems to be inneed. The question is how far Tokyo should, and can, go in exploiting this situation without antagonising its
most important ally – the US. And at what point does the US’s sharp push back against China create challenges
for Japan that it should start to delicately say no to and try to persuade Washington not to enact.
Seeing China placed in a more subsidiary and manageable framework might be attractive to Japan. It has toinhabit, after all, the same neighbourhood, and a more socialised, less assertive China would be a plus. The
question is whether the US’s methods in trying to achieve this will, in the long term, work. After all, if there isa problem that unexpectedly flares up, then Japan stands far closer to the source of the strife than the US. And
unlike the US, it has to balance this proximity into its calculations. As a frequent object of nationalist anger andattention in the PRC, too, Japan is highly aware of the way it could be figured as a convenient fall guy or enemy
for the Chinese government and public. At the moment, therefore, its priority seems to be to create at least somespace between the US and China where it can have a modicum of agency and autonomy.
That balancing act is one that Japan is sharing with many other partners across the region and the world.
Everyone is in the position of trying to veer between a China where there is so much vested economic interest,
and the US, which serves as the most significant security ally. Trying to achieve this `balance’ is increasingly55

problematic. Engaging with Chinese companies like Huawei will mean answering the US’s demands about how
trustworthy regimes are against the security threats these are believed by Washington to pose. And there areplenty of areas where the US’s actions are as full of naked self interest as those of China. Trump’s policy hasoften been to walk away from international agreements in security (with Iran), environment and trade in waysthat seem to go against the interests of Japan and others. On the environment, and combatting climate change,
for instance, Tokyo is currently closer to Beijing than Washington.
Preserving strategic space is a priority for Tokyo, of course. But this balancing act is getting harder. There
are plenty of opportunities ahead for the US to present Japan with imperatives – chose us, or them, and bear theconsequences. Diplomacy is increasingly a quandary in the current circumstances – with powers seeking to try
to disengage where they can from a China which, In so many places, is now unavoidable, and where there areno easy alternatives. India and Vietnam and others offer some economic options, of course, as manufacturers ormarkets. But the brute fact is that in terms of size and short to medium term prospects for growth, the emerging
service sector, consumer orientated middle class economy in China is the single most likely source of decent
expansion – for China, and the outside world. And unfortunately, to deal with this market, like it or not the world
has to deal with the political party that governs it. The two cannot be separated. The most that Japan can do atpresent is to be alert, flexible, and pragmatic. Its alliance with the US is not in question. But its need for somekind of pragmatic, developing relationship with China and the limits of this is less clear. The question is what
happens if this challenge of what price Japan is willing to pay for its relationship with the US, and how far it
can really trust and be aligned to China is asked. Thankfully, at the moment, no one is asking – but very soon,
they might, and it is worth thinking about potential answers to this question before they start being demanded.

56

US-China great power competition in East Asia,
escalation risks and crisis management
Dr Mathieu Duchâtel
Director of the Asia Program
Institut Montaigne

Introduction
What are the concrete consequences on East Asia’s strategic balance of the Trump administration’s “systematic
pushback” against Chinese interests? The Trump administration’s clear choice to compete with China has led
to visible adjustments in China’s foreign policy, but also in the posture of China’s East Asian neighbors. Manyare questioning whether the US pushback is long-term and sustainable or short-term, with “tactical” tariffs torebalance the US-China trade relationship. If US-China competition becomes structural, many states will beforced to make choices. This article explores one question in particular, whether the current phase of US-China
competition is an incentive for China to take escalatory action in territorial disputes, especially over Taiwan and
the South China Sea, or on the contrary if a more aggressive posture by the United States successfully deters
China from taking risky action. Seen from Europe, an external stakeholder with limited but non-negligible
impact on East Asian regional trends, the question is how to optimize our impact on regional trends to contributeto the reduction of security risks in the region.

From Cambodia to Malaysia, infrastructure projects and great power competition
Under the Trump administration, US-China competition in third countries has expanded beyond traditional
security hotspots. Infrastructure construction in developing countries is increasingly perceived in the UnitedStates as an area where political influence is at stake. This is a reaction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, thelatest incarnation of the globalization of Chinese firms, and the playground is railway construction, shipping
and port management, energy and digital infrastructure.
In Southeast Asia, China’s projects are currently experiencing a relative slowdown. Malaysia’s turnabout on
Belt and Road projects registers as a major setback for China, with larger implications on China’s BRI public
diplomacy, that has become more discreet. China’s efforts to revive large infrastructure projects in Myanmar(Myitsone Dam, Kyaukpyu port) are also encountering serious resistance, showing the limits of China’s ability
to fill the space of Western sanctions. Overall, there is a wind of caution regarding the possible implications of
big-ticket infrastructure projects in terms of debt burden and political influence.
This trend results partly of actions undertaken by the United States and its friends and allies. The effort tomake available alternative solutions for developing countries in need of infrastructure financing is at the centerof the “free and open Indo-Pacific” promoted by the US and Japan, and supported by Australia, India, France57and the United Kingdom. The “Build Act” might be at an early stage and there are doubts regarding its future
impact in Southeast Asia. In the railway sector, Japan is a serious competitor. China won the bid in Indonesia
but has not delivered on the 2015 promise to complete projects within there years. The Japanese
Bangkok/Chiang Mai branch and the Chinese Bangkok/Vientiane/Kunming projects are still pending. The
Kuala Lumpur/Singapore project will be unfrozen at one point, raising the question of China-Japan competition
or whether there is space for cooperation.

China consolidating gains in the South China Sea
In the South China Sea, China follows a policy of gradually expanding effective administrative control. The
artificial islands built in the Spratly have already secured for China a position of military superiority vis-à-vis
other claimants. Under Xi Jinping, actions framed as “protection of maritime rights” have been bold. The
construction of artificial islands, the deployment of oil rig HYSY 981 and the de facto capture of ScarboroughShoal have shown a high tolerance to risk. From the Chinese perspective, risk has paid – the construction of
artificial islands ranks very high in Xi Jinping’s work report to the 19th Party Congress, as a major achievementof his first term as Party General Secretary.
China has options for further escalation. China could reclaim land on Scarborough Shoal or Saint James Shoalin cases relations with Malaysia or the Philippines deteriorated considerably. Chinese military authorities could
create an incident with foreign navies exercising their freedom of navigation in the South China Sea – there aremany candidates besides the United States, since Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the United Kingdom all
sail through these waters. China could declare baselines around the Spratly.
In the short term, such costly actions are unlikely. The current phase centers on consolidating gains alreadysecured. China’s presence in the Spratly is being beefed up with new weapons deployment. At the same time,
China’s diplomacy in the Code of Conduct negotiations have shifted to a clear support for a Code that would
exclude a naval presence of extra-regional powers in the South China Sea, confirming that military dominanceranks extremely high on the list of goals served by China’s South China Sea policy.
The current phase of tactical pause immediately follows the UNCLOS arbitration award. From Beijing’s
perspective, China’s policy has succeeded in shifting the regional dynamic in the South China Sea away fromthe logic of international law and back to a logic of power politics.
Does the US-China confrontation contribute to explain the current relative restraint in China’s South China
Sea policy, by comparison to the 2012-2016 phase of escalation? With the quasi-collision between the PLAN
destroyer Lanzhou and the USS Decatur in November 2018, China has signaled that it could choose escalation
despite existing confidence-building agreements with the US. However, it has so far refrained from taking actionthat could severely hurt ties. Politically, China has shifted attention to the Taiwan Strait, as the 2020 election
promises to be an important milestone in the history of cross-strait relations.

582019, the ghost year in the Taiwan Strait
There is less than a year before the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, and uncertainties remain
regarding the candidates who will join the race on behalf of the DPP and the KMT. President Tsai is likely to
run for reelection but she is challenged by the radical independentists within her Party. Chu Li-lun has alreadydeclared that he would run to represent the Kuomintang, but there will be a primary which he may lose.
China’s tactics to create the conditions for a KMT victory are already visible. They rely only lightly on
coercion, and very much on active influence measures. From June 2018 to the Taiwanese local election in
November 2018, the Chinese military interrupted the PLA Air Force flights around Taiwan. Those flights areimportant politically to signal to the Taiwanese public the Chinese resolve to use military power if deemednecessary in Beijing. The decision to interrupt those flights show that China has become more cautious to takecoercive actions that might boost the electoral support for the DPP.
However, Xi Jinping’s January 2019 speech to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the “message to Taiwan
compatriots” that formally ended the policy of “liberation by force” resulted in boosting Tsai Ying-wen’s support
rate by ten percentage points. Even though the speech was a reiteration of China’s Taiwan policy, the greater
emphasis on “one China, two Systems” had a major counterproductive effect, showing the extreme sensitivityof the Taiwanese public opinion to high profile statements in support of a non-attractive future for the island’ssociety.
Commentators on both sides of the Taiwan Strait know that 2021 is a year of danger, given how Xi Jinping
links his project of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” to unification with Taiwan. A KMT government
would be under great pressure to sign a political agreement, while a DPP government would face a risk ofcoercive action. The continuous support of the United States for Taiwan will be decisive to preserve the statusquo, as any sign of weakening support would be interpreted in Beijing as space to take a riskier approach.

Japan’s delicate balancing acts
Can Japan pursue cooperation with China in third countries on infrastructure projects while maintaining a strong
defensive posture militarily and an active policy in the South China Sea? This is the current approach of the
Abe administration, which fuels the view that a firm attitude towards China over a long period of time creates
opportunities for cooperation on better terms.
China-Japan relations have indeed experienced an important adjustment in 2018. The agreement to cooperate
in third countries on infrastructure projects results of the two sides going around their strong differences on theBelt and Road Initiative and seeking common ground without Japan formally endorsing the BRI. The Aerialand Maritime Communication Mechanism is also formally implemented, and while it remains in many ways asymbolic framework reflecting the current cordiality in sino-japanese ties, it nevertheless offers the two
militaries a channel to communicate.
China has achieved a tactical goal in the East China Sea: having a regular presence around the Senkaku59

Diaoyu Islands. This constant challenge to Japan boils down to the Chinese view that the administration of theIslands is shared. But at the same time, deterrence works – China’s only remaining offensive option short of
provoking a conflict is to play with the frequency and the size of the Coast Guards deployments.
The current détente means a phase of lowering importance of maritime security issues on the bilateral agenda,
but not shelving the disputes. Japan has increased its presence in the South China Sea, including through joint
operations with the British Navy, but China has responded by challenging Japan’s EEZ around Okinotorishima.
This reciprocal naval signaling is maintained at a low-level of conflictuality but also shows the lack of political
will to find lasting solutions to existing disagreements.

Conclusion: Europe’s impact on these trends
Europe’s space to play a positive role in crisis management in East Asia is limited by its relative lack of power
projection capabilities. Europe has an impact on the regional military balance through arms sales but also as aresult of the restrictions in place to prevent access of European technologies to military end-users in China.
France and the UK have a regular naval presence in the South China Sea to signal to China their defense of
UNCLOS. This presence does not aim to achieve a rollback in the Spratly, it is about helping prevent escalation– it has been framed by a French naval officer as “counter-intimidation”.
These actions are designed to contribute to regional stability and so far have come without a significant costin Europe-China relations. This could obviously change if political relations between China and Europe
deteriorate. A key milestone will be Europe’s decisions on Huawei and 5G infrastructure. China and Europe
currently maintain a relationship that allows space for profitable business dealings but in an overall politicalclimate that is increasingly clouded, and without serious prospects of mutual concessions on investment, trade,technology transfers, cooperation in third countries, etc… Whether US-China competition will allow such acreative ambiguity to prosper is an open question.

60日本語要旨61

米中対立が国際秩序の将来に与える二つの衝撃
神谷万丈
現在進行中の米中対立は、しばしば「貿易戦争」と描写される。しかしながら貿易戦争は、二国間の緊張全体の一部でしかない。米中対立は二つの対照的な面を持っている。一方で日本や英国などを含む自由民主主義国から歓迎されるべきであり、他方、対立の行く末に注意深くあるべき十分な理由もある。
第一の面：既存の国際秩序を守るための米中対立は国際社会にとって望ましい
中国は国力の成長に伴い、国益を促進し力による「現状変更」の傾向を強めている。世界の自由民主主
義諸国は欧州を含め、中国の力による現状変更を許してはならないというコンセンサスに達している。
他方、既存の秩序の将来に新しい深刻な問題が浮上している。トランプ大統領の出現である。トランプ
大統領は「アメリカ・ファースト」を掲げ、国際的ルールや秩序にあまり関心を示さない。既存のリベラ
ルでルールベースの秩序は、中国やロシアの外的な挑戦と同時に、新しい「内的な」挑戦に直面している。
この点から、必要とあれば中国に強硬で対立的な態度をとることをためらわない意思を米国が見せることは、自由民主主義諸国や東アジアにとって歓迎されるべきである。トランプは「リベラル」の概念が嫌いである。しかし「米国を再び偉大にする」ことを望むならば、彼は米国主導の国際秩序を維持せざるを得ない。米国主導の世界が縮小し中国主導の世界に代わられないよう、トランプは中国に強硬な姿勢を見せている。もし米国主導の既存秩序を守る行動をとるならば必然的に、たとえトランプが気づかな
くとも、米国がリベラルでルールベースの既存秩序を守る行動をとることを意味する。
このように考えると、深刻化する米中の行き詰まりを東アジアと世界が歓迎する理由がある。
第二の面：既存の国際秩序を損なう米中対立は国際社会にとって望ましくない
深刻化する米中の行き詰まりは、重大なリスクも抱えている。もっとも顕著なのが経済的リスクである。世界中のすべての国々が、中国との経済的関係から大きな利益を受けている。
しかし国際社会が中国との経済的機会を損なわないよう、常に対立ではなく協力を好むべきだと考えることは適切であろうか。答えは「ノー」である。中国の対外的な行動如何によっては、国際社会は中国から突き付けられる挑戦に対峙しなければならない。そして挑戦に対峙する際に適切な手段を講じることが重要である。原則として中国の挑戦に対する行動は、リベラルでルールベースな性格でなければならない。
トランプの中国へのやり方は、この点からしばしば問題である。関税引き上げが典型例だ。国際秩序を守る米国の行動は他の国々を利する一方、不適切な手段であれば守るべき秩序を損なうかもしれない。
別のリスクもある。世界第二位の経済大国の建設的な協力を得ることは、国際秩序を形成し維持するのに必要な国際的公共財を獲得する観点から重要である。米国が「新しい冷戦」に勝利しても、中国が国力に見合った国際公共財の負担を拒否すれば、米国主導の秩序の安定性は著しく損なわれるであろう。
結びに代えて東アジアとグローバルな安全保障の将来への米中対立の影響を単に否定的に理解するのは適切ではない。同様に中国の経済協力を得るために中国との紛争や衝突を避けるべきだと信じるのも不適切である。
米国は、本稿が論じてきた米中対立の二つの側面を適切に認識しているだろうか。米国はこの競争に「勝ち」、米国主導のリベラルでルールベースの国際秩序を、その秩序を損なうような手段を用いずに維持することができるだろうか。米中対立は、既存の国際秩序を変えるような中国の現状変更の行動を防ぐのに必要な最小限の程度に抑えられるだろうか。東アジアのそして東アジアを越えた国際秩序と安全保障の将来は、このような問題にどのような回答が用意されるかに左右されるだろう。
62

南シナ海、東シナ海：危機管理の見通し：欧州からの視点
ニコラ・カサリーニ
東アジアの将来は、日本、中国、米国の戦略的三角関係によって方向づけられるだろう。しかし EU も経済的関心などから東アジアへの関与を強めている。本稿では、EU とその加盟国が東・南シナ海のルー
ルベースの秩序のために提供できる安全保障危機管理と支援に焦点を当てる。
アジアとの安全保障協力への欧州のコミットメント
EU は増大する経済的関心から、東アジアの安全保障に公正な注意を払ってきた。今では中国の最大の貿易相手地域であり、日本は 3 番目の規模になる。EU は東アジアにおいて米国と同等の重要性を持つ。
このような文脈において EU はその経済的拡大を補うため、アジア地域の安全保障への関与拡大を決定した。2018 年 5 月 28 日に EU 理事会で採択された「アジアでのアジアとの EU 安全保障協力強化」の結論では、EU がアジアの戦略的パートナーとの安全保障協力深化の可能性を探ると述べている。
東シナ海
東シナ海には、日中間の互いに絡み合う未解決の問題がある。第一に、釣魚／尖閣諸島の主権に関するものであり、この諸島は、領土問題の存在を認めない日本によって統治されている。第二に、東シナ海における海域決定であり、沿岸から 200 海里の EEZ は海洋の大部分で重なり合っている。
EU は米国とは対照的に、北京の報復を避けるため、尖閣・釣魚諸島の主権について公式レベルで中立イメージを示し立場を明確にしていないが、現実には南・東シナ海の領土、海域問題について現状維持勢
力として行動している。2013 年に中国が行った東シナ海の ADIZ 宣言に関して EU が発行した断固とした声明は、中国の強硬な空域統制に対して抑止となったことから、日本と東南アジア諸国に歓迎された。
南シナ海
シナ海の安全保障環境は、北京の領域拡大要求によって過去数年悪化している。中国は、九段線によって区別される領域内の主権を強調する。すなわち、当該地域の国々、例えばブルネイ、マレーシア、台湾、
ベトナム等からの重複する主張やそれらに代わる解釈を認めない。
法に基づいた秩序の促進
南シナ海の主権に関する紛争に国際法を適用すべきかどうかを巡っては、中国と日本や他の西洋諸国の間に隔たりがある。2016 年 7 月、ハーグ常設仲裁裁判所は中比間の論争を仲裁し、中国の海域に対する行き過ぎた主張、いわゆる「九段線」が国連海洋法条約に反し、正当ではないことを明確にした。ハー
グの判決に続き、日米は中国を強く非難する声明を出した。EU は日米両国よりは穏当な声明を出し、当事者に国際法に従って紛争を解決する必要を強調した。
一方中国は、判決を「無効で法的効力がない」として強く非難し、裁判所判決の正当性に疑義を示した
ため、南シナ海に利害を持つ国々は自身の主張を繰り返し、米国は航行の自由作戦を強めた。日本の海自も EU 加盟国と同様に、南シナ海での中国の攻撃的、拡張的な行動への対応としてパトロールを始めた。
結論
EU は、東・南シナ海における中立の立場を徐々に修正している。公式声明では経済的報復の恐れから中国のセンシティブな問題に触れない一方、実際には EU とその重要な加盟国であるフランスや英国は、
米国や米国のアジアの同盟国によるルールベースの地域秩序を強化する立場を選び、彼らが攻撃的で拡張主義だとみなす中国の行動に対抗している。このような展開は、日欧間の安全保障協力の新しい機会を提供している。それは数年前には考えられなかったことである。
63

東・南シナ海における安定した危機管理の見通し
レナト・クルス・デ・カストロ

このペーパーでは、米国、日本、中国の戦略的競争と南・東シナ海における安定した危機管理システムを構築する上での課題について述べたい。2011 年より中国、米国、日本は第一列島線海域に海軍力を展開することで、南・東シナ海における戦略的な行き詰まりが引き起こされた。この戦略的な行き詰まり
は、流動的な状況である。三つの海軍力が互いに対峙し、旧来の勢力均衡の原理が働いていることに特徴がある。南・東シナ海におけるこの勢力均衡は、この三つの海軍力の間の武力紛争を防いでいる。

しかしながら、この勢力均衡の状況には、二つの大きな流れがある。一つに、これはきわめて流動的な状況を生み出しており、いずれかの当事国のちょっとした誤りや計算違いが、武力対立の引き金となるだろうし、それがエスカレートし、あるいは、大規模で地域構造を変えるような戦争へと他の海軍国を招き入れることになるかもしれない。

第二に、勢力均衡システムが状況を安定化させているが、問題（disputes）を解決しておらず、緊張と長引く行き詰まりを作り出している。最近、この戦略的行き詰まりは、戦略的競争に変化してきた。というのも、米国が、南・東シナ海における中国の海洋進出に対し強力に対峙することを決めたからである。

結論として、二つの超大国の信頼構築の度合いは、米中の戦略的競争や第三国が選択可能な行動によって左右される。そして少なくとも両国が再接近する可能性は近い将来において見込まれない。

64

南シナ海：危機管理の見込み
ビル・ヘイトン南シナ海は穏やかに見える。しかし緊張は継続しており、特に中国は他の沿岸国の排他的経済水域（EEZ）における権利を侵害している。本稿では「航行の自由」に着目し、中国の行為が地域の平和と安全への脅威とみなされなければならないと主張する。南シナ海の「行動規範（CoC）」を巡る ASEAN と中国の論争は進展せず、根底にある領土紛争、海洋紛争を解決する努力も行き詰まっている。
南シナ海の安定性
南シナ海紛争はグローバルガバナンスの競合を巡る抽象的な紛争として分析される傾向にある。航行の自由は確かに、国際的な法の支配と地域の船舶の安全な航行に関心を持つ他の国々の正統な関心事である。他方、EEZ の運命は、南シナ海周辺の国々にとってはるかに深刻な問題である。競合国間の領土紛争と域外勢力を巻き込む海洋問題は交錯し、局所的な事態が深刻な紛争に転換する可能性がある。
資源開発
中国は人工島によって、東アジア隣国やその地域の平和と安全に関心を持つ諸国に対して海軍、沿岸警
備艇を大規模に展開することが可能となる。2017、18 年に中国は、スペインの電力会社レプソルのガス開発をベトナムが主張する EEZ から締め出した。これらは、決して抽象的な問題ではない。中国の行動
は、ベトナム政府の収益を下落させ、国の電力供給に問題を引き起こしたのである。
漁業も南シナ海において危機にある。沿岸国の漁師は乱獲に悩まされており、中国船の EEZ への侵入
で状況は一層悪化している。中国政府は自国の漁師に、遠く他国の沿岸まで行き漁獲できる大型船操業の便宜を図ることで多大な悪影響を与えている。
中国の長年の外交的、経済的、軍事的圧力にもかかわらず、東南アジア諸国は「共同開発」の原則を認めていない。彼らは国連海洋法条約とグローバルな海洋秩序の前線にあり、国際的な支援が必要だ。
行動規範（CoC）
私は、ASEAN と中国が南シナ海に関して有意な行動規範に合意する見通しに懐疑的である。
CoC 交渉プロセスの最も肯定的な側面は、そのプロセスが ASEAN 諸国と中国の間のコミュニケーシ
ョンチャンネルとして機能していることである。しかしこのプロセスによって南シナ海の様々な紛争が平和的解決に至るという期待を抱くべきではない。中国の立場からは、交渉プロセスは係争中の紛争を解決するためのメカニズムではなく、
むしろ ASEAN 諸国の政策の選択の幅を狭める手段となっている。
結論
欧州諸国は UNCLOS と東南アジア諸国の海域の権利を守るために一致したアプローチをとる必要がある。特に中国による、UNCLOS に代わる「歴史的権利」の主張には疑義を示し、論駁する必要がある。
EU の能力ある国々は、国際秩序の平和への継続的な関心や、世界の一部での脅威を国際秩序全体の脅
威だとみなす態度を示すためにも、軍艦を南シナ海に展開すべきである。
欧州諸国は他の手段も持っている。中国軍艦の寄港許可を拒否できるし、他の形態の軍事協力を減らすこともできる。これらの限定的な対抗策は、南シナ海における中国の違法侵犯への抑止になるだろう。
これらは明らかに理想主義的戦略である。お金と時間を要し、外交的リスクも伴う。しかし考え得る限り最善であるようにも思われる。

65

東・南シナ海において高まる緊張と地域的平和への淡い見込み
西原正
日本と米国は、中国に対しより強固な政策をとり中国との軍事紛争を抑止することでその地位を守ることができるだろうか。
東シナ海における政治的緊張
東シナ海の三つの地理的領域において、中国対日米の政治的緊張が高まっている。それは、尖閣諸島（中国では釣魚島）、日本の南西諸島、台湾である。日本による尖閣諸島の統治は、法的には国際法の原則である先占取得のもと 1895 年に日本領土として確立された。中国は 1971 年まで同諸島の領有を主張しなかったが、今では核心的利益の一部として主張し、ここ数十年間に軍事的圧力を顕著にしている。
南西諸島は中国にとって第一列島線であり、日本とアメリカの力に対する接近阻止・領域拒否の死活的戦略線である。この群島は、中国の東シナ海への進出を阻止する日本と米国の防衛線でもある。
トランプ政権は、台湾との政治的、軍事的紐帯を強めることを望んでいる。習近平は、1979 年の改革開放から 40 周年に当たる 2019 年のスピーチで、「台湾は中国に統一されなければならないし、統一されるであろう」と述べた。彼は、蔡英文総統により即座に拒否され、台湾は決して受け入れることはないと強調した。これは、北京－台北と北京－ワシントン関係の新しい段階での緊張である。
南シナ海における軍事的緊張
中国は、ASEAN との会合において、南シナ海の行動を規制する行動規範に対する“早期妥結”に好意的な姿勢を見せた。しかしながら現実には中国は、礁の上に建設された 7 つの人工島に軍事施設を建設し、南シナ海の支配的な勢力となっている。中国の動きに対抗するために、米国は軍艦に人工島の「領海」を航行させ、航行の自由作戦（FONOP）を実施した。
中国の艦船が、南シナ海における米国艦船の航行を妨害するにつれ、衝突は現実的な可能性を帯びてきた。2018 年 9 月 30 日には、米国の駆逐艦が中国の戦艦に 40 メートルの距離まで接近され、衝突を防ぐ
ため、回避操縦をしなければならなかった。米中は火花散る緊張関係にあるのだ。
東・南シナ海における危機管理の見込み
多くの地域的、国際的危機は、勢力均衡が崩れ権力の空白が作り出されたたところに生じる傾向がある。もし日本が、尖閣諸島の防衛に十分な能力を有していないならば、同諸島を巡る日本と中国の勢力均
衡は中国に有利な状態になるだろう。
日本はまた、日本の南西諸島をいくつかの点で防衛強化する必要がある。今日では、第一防衛線である
南西諸島の防衛は、主要な防衛拠点である。
米国と中国は、台湾の地政学的重要性をめぐって競合的な利益を追い求めている。米中の南シナ海における空海の衝突の可能性は他の潜在的な事柄より大きい。もし中国がサラミスライス戦略を続けこれらの諸島問題を有利に決着させようとするならば、地域的平和の見通しは不透明である。米国とそのパー
トナーは西太平洋の勢力均衡を有利に維持することが重要である。グアムの米軍基地の役割は将来的により重要になるだろう。

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日本、中国、米国‐東アジアの将来とはジョナサン・ポーラック
東アジアは、米国が 70 年以上前に戦後地域秩序の構築に取り組み始めてからもっとも重大な政治的・戦略的再編成の可能性に直面している。中心的問題は、この秩序が当時とは全く異なる国際環境においてなおも存立できるのかである。答えは、米国、中国、日本が新しい戦略的均衡や平和の危機を管理し、持続的な繁栄と安全を確立する方向に向かえるかどうかにかかっている。本稿では、過去 70 年の米国主導の偉業を危険にさらし、減退させる要素を評価する。リスクを限定するためにできること、および東アジアにおいて悪化していることについての推論的ではあるがありそうなシナリオを提示する。
東アジアには地域を不安定化させる恐れが 3 つある。第一に、米中関係の瓦解である。中国の継続的な技術進歩に対する米国による抑制や、先進世界の市場への中国のアクセスを制限する等の不穏当な試みがありうる。トランプ政権が中国との対立を二国間問題として描写するのは、誤りである。中国はすでに地域のサプライチェーンに深く統合されており、日本を含む米国の主要同盟国と緊密に繋がっている。
トランプ政権内の、中国を邪悪な言葉で言い表す試みについて、地域のどの国も公然と支持を示していない。多くの国は、米国の戦略的な経済関係拒否や大規模な米中貿易戦争の見通しに不安を表明している。このような警告がなければ、政権は潜在的リスクと地域全体への損害に気づかない可能性がある。
第二の気がかりなシナリオは、米国が北朝鮮との不利な核交渉に巻き込まれることである。トランプ大統領は、北朝鮮との交渉の契機を開いたことを自身の主要な成果とみなしている。しかしシンガポール
会談は、交渉ではなく、会議であり、メディアイベントだった。トランプ大統領は、2 月末にベトナムで金正恩との第二回の会合に合意している。
問題は、金正恩が次回のトランプとの個別会談でなにを提示するかであり、トランプが金の要求に同意するかどうかである。拡大抑止の保証を含め、米国の地域安全保障へのコミットメントが弱まれば、特に日本にとっては明らかに深刻である。
第三の主要な可能性は、北東アジアにおける米国の同盟との結びつきが深刻に弱体化する恐れである。
トランプは、同盟国が自国の安全保障に責任をもつことへの期待を幾度となく示し、そうでなければ米国の同盟義務を解消するか、本質的に再定義する方向をほのめかしている。北東アジアにおける皮肉は、
日本と韓国が、米国の他の同盟国よりも釣り合った防衛負担費を支出しているという事実である。
しかしながらトランプ大統領は、同盟へのコミットメントを商業取引と同等に扱うことで、東アジアにおける米国の戦略を長らく支えてきた安全保障上の共通の利益を損ねている。
仮に中国が米国との間で、トランプ大統領が米国の利益に適うと考える同意に達したら、日本は彼の次なる標的になるだろうか。トランプが世界を商業的取引のように理解する限りにおいて、このような可能性を完全に排除することはできない。国際政治においては名声は有効な強みとなるが、簡単に霧散しもする。東アジアにおける米国の力の源泉となり続けてきた紐帯と義務は浸食され、腐敗するかもしれない。
戦後のどの前任者とも決定的に異なるアメリカ大統領の激しい気性に鑑みると、米国は東アジアの安全保障においてもっとも大きな独立変数である。日本とその他の国がどのように反応するかの選択に、
地域秩序の未来の大部分がかかっている。

67

北朝鮮の核ミサイル問題と朝鮮半島の安定性：日本の視点
徳地秀士「インド太平洋」という表現が流布しているが、北朝鮮の核とミサイル問題が消え去ったわけではない。大量破壊兵器の不拡散はインド太平洋においても、安定と繁栄を確立するために重要な問題である。
このことを念頭に置きながら、次の三点について論じたい。第一に、北朝鮮の「非核化」の難しさ、第二に、地域の安全保障における米韓同盟の重要性、第三に、日韓の安全保障関係についてである。
北朝鮮の「非核化」－現実的か？
3 度の南北首脳会談と 2018 年の米朝首脳会談は歴史的な出来事だった。2018 年の米朝首脳会談は事前の期待通りにはいかなかったものの、両首脳が直接交渉の場を設けるなど会談自体は極めて重要であった。しかしながら、両者における「非核化」の定義は明確ではない。
重要なのは圧力と関与のバランスである。2017 年まで国際社会の全体的な優先順位は圧力だったが、最近は関与が優先されている。北朝鮮の真の意図が外部の観察者から分からない以上、圧力と関与の正しいバランスをとるのは難しい。
この困難な状況では、次のことが必要である。第一に、北朝鮮の現実の脅威が地域や世界全体に及ぶとの認識を強めること、第二に、国際社会、特に国連安保理常任理事国や日本、韓国の一体性と調和である。
日本政府の北朝鮮に対する脅威認識は深刻になっている。日本の世論も非核化プロセスに以前より懐疑的だ。この傾向は、朝鮮半島情勢が日本の平和と安全に与え続けてきた影響を考えると妥当である。
米韓同盟と地域安全保障
1969 年の佐藤・ニクソン会談や 1975 年の三木・フォード会談で示された韓国の安全保障や朝鮮半島の情勢が日本を含むアジアの安全保障にとって重要であるという認識は、北朝鮮の核ミサイル脅威という点から今日の状況にも一層妥当するように思われる。地域安全保障構造との関係で重要なのが、駐韓米軍（USFK）である。トランプは米国が同盟国に一方的に利益を提供しているとの誤った認識を持っている。この点について次の二つのことが認識されなければならない。第一に、アジア大陸部の唯一の米軍プレゼンスであり、失われると東アジアの勢力均衡全体に大きな影響を与えうること、第二に、米韓相互防衛条約の射程は、太平洋地域であり、朝鮮半島に限定されていないことである。駐韓米軍のプレゼンスの問題については北朝鮮の非核化への交渉カードにするのではなく、注意深い管理が必要である。
日本と韓国の安全保障関係
新しい防衛大綱において韓国との防衛協力は、オーストラリア、インド、東南アジア諸国に次ぐ第 4 番
目の優先順位にある（前回 1 番目）。日本側は「韓国疲れ」に悩まされている。南北朝鮮両国は平壌宣言
で、独立運動日の 3 月 1 日に 100 周年記念イベントを行うことに合意した。重要なのは、このような特別な日を利用してナショナリズムを煽ることではなく、両国の協力範囲を広げ、違いを最小化し、溝を埋めることである。そうしなければ両国は共通の敵を利してしまうことになるだろう。日韓は、北東アジア
において米国の強力な軍事的プレゼンスを維持している二国であり、この二国の協力なくしては、朝鮮半島を含む地域の安定は実現されない。

68

中国と朝鮮半島における核抑止：安定化の見通し
ニコラ・リーベリングハウス
本稿の目的は、核不拡散条約（NPT）体制の枠外にいる技術的核保有国である北朝鮮が、どの程度の核兵器戦略を有しているかを検討することである。第一に、北朝鮮が核兵器戦略を有しているなら、朝鮮半島を安定化するかどうか。第二に、北朝鮮が核抑止戦略を形成する上で中国が果たしうる役割は何か。
北朝鮮は核兵器戦略を有しているか？
本稿は、金正恩が実際に核兵器戦略を持っており、それは相互確証破壊戦略（MAD）ほど破壊的ではないと論じるものである。第一に核兵器は使用可能ではなく、政治的象徴である。表面上、北朝鮮の核抑止は、米国への報復という最小限度にとどめられているように見える。実際、NFU が宣言されている。
しかしながら、現時点での小規模な発射、運用システムを見る限り、北朝鮮に対米報復能力があるかどうかは不明確である。このような限定された核運用能力を考慮すると、韓国が第一の標的であり、次に米国のアジアの同盟国である日本、米国のグアム基地などが続く形となるだろう。
中国と北朝鮮の核兵器戦略
北朝鮮が、報復を不確実ながらも核戦略とするのはなぜか。中国の核戦略は長らく報復を強調してきた。冷戦期を通じて北朝鮮は、核不拡散条約が超大国による現状維持だという中国の立ち位置に追従してきた。問題は金正恩政権下でも、同様の路線が維持されるかどうか、そしてそのことが中国の北朝鮮に対する態度に何らかの変化をもたらすかどうかである。中国の北朝鮮への支援からは、その意図が北朝鮮の核戦略を戦争戦略ではなく最小限度の報復にとどめることにあるかどうかは分からない。しかし金正恩の 4 度の訪中はポジティブな発展だと言えるだろう。特に 2018 年の訪中時に、中国の核計画の歴史展示を見せたのは、中国が隣国に核に関する考えを披露することに価値を見出していることがわかる。
北朝鮮が中国の戦略を模倣することによって、中国の朝鮮半島への長期的な態度が変化することはないだろう。中国は北朝鮮の核危機以来、一貫して非核化と安定化への態度をとっているのである。
北朝鮮を越えて：韓国の抑止へのアプローチ
中国のみならず、韓国の戦略的抑止も北朝鮮の戦略の方向性に影響を与えうる。韓国は、米国の拡張的核抑止（END）に信頼を寄せているのか、それとも自国の取極めを整えようとしているのだろうか。END
は米国の同盟国である日本の行動にも左右される側面がある。韓国は現時点で、否定的抑止への注力で満足しているようである。
結論
今や北朝鮮は技術的な核兵器保有国であるが、金正恩の核実験の凍結や核戦略の確立へのコミットメ
ントを鑑みるに、情勢は安定するように思われる。中国が制限された最小限の核抑止を実践しているのは有益である。もちろん、中国の抑止戦略は日本や韓国といった他のアジア諸国の抑止戦略如何によって変更されうるものではある。しかしだからといって中国の戦略的抑止の考えが北朝鮮によって採用されるべきではないという理由はない。

69

自分たちで管理すると決断した南北朝鮮：朝鮮半島の将来への含意
ラモン・パチェコ・パルド
朝鮮半島外交は、米朝関係だけでなく、中国や韓国といったキープレーヤー4 者を巻き込んでいる。昨今の外交プロセスが冷戦後のそれと異なるのは、二つの朝鮮（two Koreas）が半島を主導していることである。それのみならずこのプロセスは米国と中国の活発な後ろ盾も持っている。朝鮮半島の恒久的な平和と北朝鮮の核という難問に関する外交的解決への機は熟したということができるだろう。
南北朝鮮はなぜ管理するのか
南北朝鮮による朝鮮半島の管理は、短期的・長期的将来のために最も妥当な展開である。特筆すべきは、韓国の北朝鮮関与への広い国内支持である。これは革新－保守分断を越え、文の後継者も関与路線を継続するだろうことを示唆する。北朝鮮からの挑発がない限り、ソウルの路線は維持されるだろう。
金政権が朝鮮半島の地政学的情勢に対して関与と共働にシフトしたのには、短期的、長期的要因がある。短期的要因は、北朝鮮が事実上の核保有国になったこと、および経済的発展へ注力したことである。
金は 2013 年より、「並進（ビョンジン）」路線、すなわち核計画と経済の並行的発展を目指す政策に則っている。北朝鮮が対外投資や専門家などのインセンティブを受け取る限り、この路線は数年続くだろう。
南北朝鮮によって主導される朝鮮半島地政学の含意
南北朝鮮が朝鮮半島の地政学的状況を管理することは、朝鮮半島の運命は大国に委ねられているという長い間の苦悩に対処できる点で重要である。南北朝鮮が安定を望み、韓国に多数の支持があるという事実は、南北朝鮮を巡る外交関係を主導できることを意味する。
まず米国は、北朝鮮への関与のために外交ルートに従うしかオプションがない。韓国が関与を支持する
かぎり、米国のいかなる大統領も政治的に違う路線をとることができない。
加えて、中国やロシアにとって望ましい選択肢も米国と北朝鮮による漸進的な歩み寄りに基づいていることを鑑みるに、南北関係安定を支持することはもっとも現実的な路線であることを示唆している。
最終的に南北朝鮮が望めば、朝鮮半島の安定はもたらされる。国際社会が南北朝鮮の和解を支持しないというのは困難である。南北朝鮮が長期的安定にコミットしているように見えるなら、これが、この先数か月、数年の事実上の状態とみなせるだろう。
朝鮮半島の安定と北東アジアの将来
朝鮮半島の安定は、北東アジアや東アジアの大きな利益になるだろう。また朝鮮半島の安定は、北東ア
ジアの経済的利益にもかなっている。北朝鮮の経済再建は、韓国にとって耐えられない経済的負担とみなされることもあるが、チャンスでもある。文大統領は、より強固な南北朝鮮関係を韓国にとっての経済的チャンスだと考えている数ある政治的、経済的、政策的指導者の内の一人である。
朝鮮半島の安定によって、中国、日本、南北朝鮮のみならず、米国とロシアを含めた、適切な北東アジ
アの安全保障メカニズムについての議論が可能になるだろう。これは 6 者協議で論じられはしたものの、朝鮮戦争が形式的には終結しておらず、南北朝鮮の和解もなかったため、実行できなかった。北東アジア
は、全参加型の地域独自の安全保障メカニズムを発展させることができるだろう。

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日本、中国、アメリカ、アジアの将来は？
宮本雄二

5 つの仮説を示したい。第一に、中国は自国の役割を定義し、世界との関係を形成しようと試行錯誤している。改革開放政策によって中国は大きく発展したが、世界に示せるようなグローバルガバナンスのビジョンを描けないでいる。第二に、中国は深刻な国内問題に直面し続けており、米国を経済や軍事で上回り、新しい世界の文化を創り出すようなソフトパワーを構築するには程遠い。
第三に、米国は開かれた公正で自由な社会を守る原理や価値を維持する限り、国際関係において指導的なプレイヤーであり続けるだろう。第四に、米国と欧州は、近年の国際秩序に反発する傾向があるが、国内的調整を終えれば、国際秩序の根底にある価値や原則を保持する重要なアクターとして戻ってくるだろう。第五に、日本はアジアや世界で影響力のあるプレイヤーであり続けるだろうし、あらねばならない。というのも、日本は発展した市場経済と成熟した民主主義の国であるからだ。
アジアの将来は、米中がどのような均衡に落ち着くか、その関係の進展にかかっている。明らかに日本の領土の一部である尖閣諸島を侵犯するなど、現状を力によって変更しようとする中国に勢力均衡が傾くなら、中国は物理的な力を使い続けるだろう。中国は、アメリカとの衝突を避ける方向に政策調整しなければならない。地域的な平和と安全を確立するために、中国は三つのことを行わなければならない。
第一に、中国は外交政策をより自制的で建設的なものにしなければならない。第二に、経済政策を調整しなければならない。公正で互恵的な経済政策を実施する必要があるが、この点については中国国内の経済学者も同意しており、米中が妥協に踏み切れる可能性は少なくない。第三に、中国は米国とその同盟
国および友好国と衝突がないように行動しなければならない。政治的、軍事的な方向転換には二つの道がある。一つには、軍事的立場の透明性を確保すること、そしていま一つは、軍事的拡大を減速させることである。
米国は中国が発展と変化の途上にあることを理解しなければならない。いかなる戦略的ミスも米中の直接的な衝突へと至りうる。それゆえ、東アジアの平和と安全のアーキテクチュアの道筋をつけるために以下のことがなされなければならない。
第一に、危機管理が必要である。第二に、米中が国際社会と共に、共通の目的を明確化し、共有し、その目的を目指さなければならない。私見では、既存の世界秩序を守り維持し改善していくべきである。第三に、東アジアの安全保障アーキテクチュアを再編成するときが来た。新しいアーキテクチュアは、それぞれの国の安全を保障する地域安全保障の仕組みを含まなければならない。そして、この仕組みは米国、中国、ロシアを含まなければならない、というのも、これらの国々の地政学的な利害関心がこの地域において衝突しているからである。第四に、世界秩序をよりよく改善していくために国際社会は中国に関与すべきである。

71日本、中国、アメリカ
ケリー・ブラウン
世界経済で、それぞれ第一、第二、第三位の米国、中国、日本の間の関係が重要であることは自明である。しかしトランプと習近平の時代にあって、外交の流動性や不確実性は高まっており、日本の役割は必
ずしも明らかではない。この論文は、この新しい吟味されるべき事柄について述べたい。
米国と中国
オバマ政権下では、アジアの戦略的重要性を主張する「ソフトプッシュバック（柔らかな押し返し）」の時代であった。2017 年からのトランプ政権下では、彼の独特なリーダーシップによって、それは大枠ではオバマ政権期からの自然な成り行きではあるものの、北京とワシントンの関係が徐々にかつ不穏に競争的なものになった。日本はこの新しい状況において、密集した政治的ネットワーク、同盟的つながりのただなかに位置し、戦略的に重要な場所を占めている。
原因
深刻で明白な米中競合の時代は次の二つの事柄に由来する。第一には、中国経済の予期せぬ速さでの発
展と経済発展によってもたらされる膨大な地政学的利得である。
第二には西洋（政治的価値と社会的価値を多くの部分において共有している米国とその広大な同盟ネットワーク）は、中国が 1970 年代以降に行った改革開放政策に対する自分たちの関与政策が失敗したことを認めなければならない。特に 2010 年のアラブの春以降、中国は西洋の介入を明確に拒み、貿易や投資などを通して自国の政治システムを普及させようとしてきた。習政権は、西洋の望みを葬り去る最後の一歩まで来ている。
問題は、世界の第一、第二の大国が、軍事的、経済的、地政学的に対立を先鋭化させる方向に向かっていることである。実際の紛争が起こるリスクはほとんどないものの、2018 年を通して紛争の蓋然性は高まってきている。
日本の役割
現在、日本と中国は比較的良好な関係にある。問題は、東京が、この状況を重要な同盟国である米国と対立せずにどれだけ利用できるか、利用すべきかにある。中国との経済的利益と米国という最も重要な安全保障上の同盟との間でバランスをとることはますます難しくなっている。というのも中国の市場と取引するということは、それを統治する政党と取引することを意味するからである。米国との関係にどれだけ挑戦し、そして中国にどれほど信頼を置き関係を築くかが問われている。この問は幸運にも現時
点ではだれも問うことのない問題であるが、このような問が必要となる前に、可能な回答を考えることに意義はあるだろう。

72東アジアにおける米中競合、リスクのエスカレーションと危機管理
マシュー・ドゥシャテル
中国の権益に対するトランプ政権の巻き返しは、東アジアの戦略バランスにどのような結末をもたらすだろうか。この論稿では、米中対立において、中国が台湾と南シナ海を巡る領土問題をエスカレートさせる行動をとるか、また反対に、米国の強硬な姿勢が、中国にリスキーな行動を思いとどまらせるかを検討したい。影響力が限られる域外の関係者である欧州からすると、この地域における安全保障リスクを軽減するために、その影響力をどのように最適化するかは重要な課題である。
カンボジアからマレーシアまで：インフラプロジェクトと大国間競争
トランプ政権では、第三国における米中競争は伝統的な安全保障領域にとどまらない広がりを見せている。途上国へのインフラ建設は、政治的影響力を及ぼす重要な領域だとみなされるようになっている。
東南アジアにおける中国のプロジェクトは近年、落ち着いてきている。というのも、マレーシアやミャンマーが高額なインフラプロジェクトがもたらす政治的影響や負債に関して、中国への警戒を強めているからだ。これは、米国を中心とする陣営による批判の結果でもある。日米主導の「自由で開かれたインド太平洋」はインフラ融資を必要とする途上国に対して代替案を提供しようとするものである。
強固になる南シナ海における中国の利得
中国は南シナ海において実効的な行政支配を拡大している。スプラトリー諸島における人工島建設などである。中国にはこれをエスカレートする選択肢があるが、実際には行動しそうにない。中国の行動が比較的抑制されているのは、米中対立のためである。中国は、米中対立との関連を印象付ける行動は制限
し、関心を台湾へと向けている。2020 年の総統選挙は両岸関係史において分水嶺となるだろう。
2019 年、台湾海峡の Ghost Year
台湾の総統選挙まで一年をきった。情勢は、習近平が中国の大躍進政策と台湾の併合を結びつけるその度合いよって左右される。このような状況において、台湾に対する米国の継続的な支援は、現状を維持するために決定的に重要である。
日本の繊細なバランシング
日本は、第三国におけるインフラプロジェクトで中国との協力を模索するだろうか。近年の緊張緩和
は、二国間関係における海洋安全保障問題の深刻さが低下したことを意味しており、必ずしも紛争が解決したことを意味しない。両国の海洋におけるシグナリングは紛争可能性が低レベルで推移していることを示唆するが、恒久的な解決を見出そうとする政治的意思が欠如していることも意味している。
結論:このような潮流への欧州の影響
欧州が積極的な役割を果たす余地は、その相対的な能力展開力が乏しいため、限定的である。中国と欧州の関係は、有益なビジネスに関する交渉ができる程度だが、政治的雲行きは怪しく、投資や貿易、技術移転等の互譲の見通しはない。米中競争にあって欧州が積極的な役割を果たす余地が残されるかどうか
は未解決の問題である。

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