RIPS

Policy Perspectives
No.8

Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan
Masahiro Matsumura
June 2009

Research Institute for Peace and Security
Tokyo

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Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issuesof national and international peace and security, publishes research reports, andproposes policy recommendations.
The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security), whichsurveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded byboth the academic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars
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RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues
No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006, October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?,
December 2006
No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges andthe Role of Japan, March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?: Perspectives

on Asian Security, 2007, April 2007
No.5 Kazuto Suzuki, Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda, October, 2007
No.6 Masashi Nishihara, Tenser in Southwest Asia, Calmer in East Asia －Perspectives in Mid-2008－, July 2008
No.7 Yukari Kubota, Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter－Revising

the Three Principles on Arms Exports－, November 20083

Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan
Masahiro Matsumura *Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in May 2008 as President of the Republic ofChina (ROC) was a turning point. It helped defuse tension with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), which had built up during President Chen
Shui-bian’s preceding two terms (2000–2008).
This paper first analyzes Ma’s rationale for détente, focusing on someof the major weaknesses of the current cross-strait détente in general andTaiwan’s de facto independence in particular. The paper looks at thoseconditions under which the détente most likely would collapse. That is, if
Ma’s approach made Taiwan too dependent on the mainland’s economy for its
survival and prosperity to withstand Beijing’s economic, political, andmilitary pressures, Taiwan would be compelled to accede to unification on
Beijing’s terms. Next, the paper examines some proposals to help Japanesepolicymakers cope with cross-strait relations after détente, identifying
Japan’s national interests in regard to Taiwan and analyzing the constraints
and limitations of Japan’s Taiwan policy after 1945.
1. Ma’s Rationale for Détente
In his inaugural address on May 20, 2008, President Ma confirmed the 1992
consensus reached between Beijing and Taipei and unequivocally rejected
the de jure independence of a Republic of Taiwan. １ The consensus refers to
the recognition of “one China” with its “respective interpretations”, without
Masahiro Matsumura (masahiro@andrew.ac.jp) is Professor of International Relationsof Momoyama Gakuin (St. Andrew's) University in Osaka. He was a fellow of RIPS
Security Studies Fellowship Program from 1992 to 1994. His works include: "Deploying
Theater Missile Defense Flexibly," Defense Analysis, August 1998, and "The JapaneseState Identity as a Grand Strategic Imperative," Working Paper, Brookings Institution
Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, May 2008.
*1

determining whether “one China” means the ROC or the PRC. The President
also confirmed his respect for the ROC’s constitution and committed toadhering to it rather than amending it to reflect the ROC’s effective control
over only Taiwan and the other adjacent islands. ２
President Ma’s inaugural address also stressed the need to maintainpeace with the mainland as well as regional stability. He stated that Taiwan
has to be a "peace-maker" although it used to be a “trouble-maker” under
Chen’s pro-independence hard line. Ma’s assertions agreed with PRC
President Hu Jin-tao’s opening address to the Boao Forum on April 12, 2008.
That is, they both believe that “reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait
and international arenas” will be made possible by “building mutual trust,
shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, andcreating together a win-win solution.” For the initial concrete steps towarddétente, Ma proposed “the normalization of economic and cultural relations”
across the Taiwan Strait and the cease of “vicious competition and the wasteof resources” in the diplomatic battles both for and against Taiwan’s
statehood.
On September 25, 2008, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
submitted a Foreign Policy Report to the legislature, which elucidated Ma’s
cross-strait policy in terms of “flexible diplomacy” characterized by“diplomatic truce” and “proactive diplomacy.” ３ The primary aim of “flexible
diplomacy” is minimizing the PRC’s threat, amassing Taipei’s bargaining
power vis-à-vis Beijing, and expanding Taipei’s ability to maneuverinternationally amid Beijing’s all-out diplomatic offensives. This Reportpresumes that Taipei’s commitment to the 1992 Consensus will form thesolid foundation of a cross-strait détente, focusing on improving Taipei’s
relations with Beijing by discussing their common interests and fostering
mutual trust. Under this cross-strait “diplomatic truce,” Beijing should atleast suspend its unflinching diplomatic battles against Taipei and free itfrom endlessly bleeding its limited resources to aid diplomacy for merely2retaining its current diplomatic allies. These resources then could be used “tostrengthen relations with [Taipei’s] diplomatic allies” and to “upgrade thelevel of contact with many countries in each region and integrate [Taiwan]
into the Asia-Pacific regional economy.” The “diplomatic truce” also should
end Taipei’s diplomatic isolation, leading to opportunities to participate infunctional and specialized international organizations.
In sum, Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” is based on the strong optimismthat Beijing would accept cross-strait détente as a win-win game of mutual
growth and prosperity, as far as Taipei withdraws the pro-independence hardline.
2. The Pitfalls of Détente
In order to ascertain Beijing’s real motives in pursuing a cross-strait détente,
it is critical to analyze not only Beijing’s immediate need for rapprochement
but also its expected power-structural transformation. Beijing seems to havesupported the Ma Administration and the ruling party, the Kuomintang(KMT), as demonstrated by Hu’s speech at the Boao Forum. Indeed, its
failure to do so would most likely turn Taiwanese public opinion against
détente and then bring back to power the opposition Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) that would adopt a more tenacious pro-independence position.
Thus Beijing is compelled to reciprocate Taipei’s détente initiatives, at least
as long as Ma and the KMT continue in power. In turn, Beijing will be
restrained from resorting to armed attack or imposing an economic blockadeof Taiwan, unless, of course, Taiwan provokes Beijing, for instance, byabruptly switching to de jure independence.
Beijing’s need to reciprocate does not necessarily mean, however, thatits top leaders are firmly committed to détente. Beijing has discretion overits response to Taipei, in regard to the scope and the levels of reciprocation:
which issue-area to select and to which extent to implement. Accordingly,
Beijing may try to minimize the substance of détente and then tip the3cross-strait balance of power in its favor. Taipei then would face anincreasing military threat and deepening economic dependence on themainland’s markets.
Important here is a lesson learned from the failed U.S.-Soviet détente
in the 1970s to which Washington and Moscow agreed without a common
understanding of what it entailed. Washington saw détente as necessary for
global international relations and the peaceful coexistence of Western
capitalism and Eastern Socialism/Communism. Moscow, however, considereddétente as applying to only its European front. As a result, Moscow
continued its aggressive military intervention in the rest of the world,
particularly in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Central
America, since under its conception of “détente,” Washington was largely
unprepared to counter Soviet military offensives. Consequently, in the 1980s,
Washington responded with an even harder line against the Soviets.
It therefore is critical to determine Beijing’s real motives because it
could take advantage of the current cross-strait détente to gain a decisive,
and irreversible, superiority in all areas.
In the military sphere, Beijing has not at all decelerated its defense
spending, arms buildup, training, and deployment of forces directed at
Taiwan, even during this cross-strait détente. For more than two decades,
Beijing has maintained that its offensive posture is justified in deterring
Taiwan’s de jure independence or preparing for possible cross-strait
contingencies if it did declare its independence. Yet this justification is nolonger tenable, because both Ma and the KMT are firmly committed tomaintenance of the cross-strait status quo that denies the de jureindependence. In addition, Taiwan’s arms buildup and modernization havestalled, owing to the slowdown of arms imports from the United States,
essential to maintaining its military balance over the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing’s continuing arms buildup, therefore, indicates either its disregard ofdétente or the inability of its civilian leadership to control its
4resource-hungry military, thereby upsetting the cross-strait balance ofmilitary power as the indispensable foundation of détente.
In the political sphere, despite the seminal importance of the 1992
Consensus, the Ma Administration and the ruling KMT do not explicitly
subscribe to “one China, respective interpretations”, thereby failing to reject
the Beijing claim that “one China” means Taiwan is part of the PRC. On May
28, 2008, KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung met with Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Chairman and PRC President, Hu Jin-tao, in Beijing. Althoughboth referred to “one China,” Wu failed to obtain Hu’s confirmation on themeaning of “one China, respective interpretations.” ４ Also during themeeting, Wu addressed Hu Jin-tao as President Hu but referred to Ma
Ying-jeou as Mr. Ma. ５ Finally, Wu was unsuccessful to secure Hu’s
commitment to Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization(WHO). Hu was willing only to discuss the WHO issue. ６ The Ma
Administration and the ruling KMT could not but submit themselves to theirunequal relationship with Beijing, even on a party level. This submissive
stance was clear in Ma’s interview on August 26, 2008, citing the cross-strait
relationship only as between two administrative regions and not as aninter-state relationship. This admission contrasts with the “special
state-to-state relations” and the “one country on each side” ７ of the former
ROC Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, respectively. Moreover,Beijing so far has shown no significant sign of committing to Taipei’sinterpretation of détente. ８
In the economic and social spheres, the Ma Administration was quick
to implement a series of economic engagement measures, such as starting
direct charter flights to the mainland on weekends, the arrival of mainland
tourists, deregulating Taiwanese investment in the mainland, andpromoting mainlanders’ investment in Taiwan. These measures will surely
bring about Taiwan’s integration with the mainland, which already is
Taiwan’s largest market. ９ Closer relations will strengthen the pro-Beijing
5forces in Taiwan, particularly among the KMT political and economic elites.
They will be inclined to choose unification on Beijing’s terms in asocial-political progression similar to the run-up process of Hong Kong’s
reversion to the PRC. １０ Such integration could benefit both Taiwan and themainland through a win-win game of development and prosperity, but overtime, the mainland will inevitably become dominant economically amid
increasing Taiwan’s dependence on and vulnerability to the mainland. The
cost of breaking this interdependent relationship, therefore, would be muchhigher for Taipei than for Beijing. And when their relationship progresses tothe point that Taiwan cannot live and prosper without the mainland, Taipei
will have to capitulate to Beijing’s terms of unification.
Since the inception of Ma’s “flexible diplomacy,” cross-strait
interaction has rapidly grown economically and socially, but with few
military and/or political achievements. This state of affairs hints at, or
perhaps attests to, Beijing’s only lightly veiled intent to take advantage ofthe détente to create the necessary military and economic conditions forcross-strait unification on its own terms.
3. Japan’s Taiwan Policy
Over time, this cross-strait détente will have a highly corrosive effect on both
Taiwan’s de facto independence and the regional status quo, even though it
has significantly reduced the uncertainty inherent in the spiral of
provocation, miscalculation, armed conflict, and escalation. That is, thecurrent stability does not necessarily mean long-term peace. Although inresponse to this détente, Japan has taken a wait-and-see approach, it must
begin to recalibrate its cross-strait policy in order to defend its national
interests.
Taiwan is of vital strategic importance to Japan’s national security.
Because of the island’s location on Japan’s major south-bound sea-lanes ofcommunication, allowing the PRC to take control of them is simply not6acceptable for Japan. This means that Japan needs to secure the freedom ofnavigation on both sides of Taiwan, though not necessarily the de jureindependence of a Republic of Taiwan. But Taiwan also is Japan’s fourthlargest trading partner, after the PRC, the United States, and South Korea.
Therefore, Taiwan’s continued prosperity as a democracy and a free-market
economy is indispensable to Japan’s economic and commercial interests.
Thus, ceteris paribus, an independent Taiwan is in Japan’s best interests.
For practical reasons, the Japanese government has consistently
taken a noncommittal position on Taiwan’s status under international law.
From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire, but Japangave up its sovereign rights to the island in accordance with the 1952 San
Francisco Peace Treaty. Since then, the official Japanese government
position has been to say nothing about who possesses Taiwan. Moreover, itcannot support one country’s claim to the island while denying another’s.
Supporting any country’s claim is surely in contravention of the obligations
under the Peace Treaty. Because the Treaty does not stipulate which country
should have sovereign rights to Taiwan, its status remains unsettled and canbe determined unequivocally only by a second peace conference. The 1972
joint communiqué between Japan and the PRC stipulates that Japan fully“understands” and “respects” the PRC’s sovereign claim on Taiwan; in turn,Japan has never “recognized” that Taiwan is part of the PRC’s territory.
Japan’s strategic interests regarding Taiwan and its official
international legal position on the island diverge. To sidestep the issue,
Japan has taken two approaches to cross-strait relations. The first is forJapan to stay out of the conflict as much as possible and, at most, to provide
logistical and intelligence support for any U.S. military operations in thisarea: buck-passing. The second is for Japan to openly support the UnitedStates against the PRC: balancing power.
The first “buck-passing” approach is better because Tokyo then can
avoid the issue and can benefit from the cross-strait status quo which
7ensures both the freedom of navigation in the area around Taiwan and free
trade with it. Nonetheless, this approach makes sense only if the UnitedStates is willing as well as capable to use its military power to maintain thestatus quo. Over the last decade in which U.S. hegemony has graduallyexperienced relative decline, however, this assumption has become less sure,and now increasingly less sure because the ongoing financial and economiccrisis and the quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan have severely weakened
the hegemony. As a result, Washington is expected to become less and lessinclined to intervene in support of Taiwan.
The second “balancing power” approach carries a significant risk forJapan because it could lead to military confrontation with the PRC. Even so,Japan’s defense policy has slowly but steadily shifted in this direction.
Currently, Japanese policy contains elements of both approaches, but thesecond approach is taking precedence. In the first approach, Japan would
give the United States logistical and intelligence support only from Japanese
territory. In contrast, the second approach would include such support also
from the high seas and the air space over them, as long as Japanese forceswere not deployed to a combat zone or Japan’s support did not become
integral part of a U.S. military operation. In 1996, the United States andJapan drew up the bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, and in 1999,
Japan enacted the law ensuring Japan’s peace and security in situations inareas surrounding Japan, which authorizes Tokyo to take military action inaccordance with the second approach.
The North Korean crisis in 1990s was the impetus for the Guidelines,
but both Japanese policymakers and the informed public recognize that the
PRC is now a principal target of the Guidelines, although Tokyo has neveradmitted so explicitly. In addition, “the areas surrounding Japan” is asituational, not a geographical, concept. In February 2005, Japan advanced
toward the second approach by concluding a joint communiqué with theUnited States that openly regards Taiwan as a common security concern. For
8its part, Tokyo agreed to give logistical and intelligence support to U.S. forcesin case of a Taiwan contingency, but it ruled out any combat missions. In fact,
Director-General of Japan’s Ministry of Defense Bureau of Defense Policy,
Takamizawa Nobushige, announced at a meeting of the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party on March 13, 2008, that a Taiwan contingency would betreated as an area-surrounding-Japan situation. １１
As long as the cross-strait status quo holds, Japan’s Taiwan policy
will be reasonably stable, needing only minor adjustments between the firstand second approaches. But if the détente should collapse, Japan will have torethink its policy. Next, the following will discuss about some ideas andpolicy measures in regard to preparing for or preventing the worst-casescenario.
4. Risk Management Options for Japan’s Taiwan Policy
Preserving the cross-strait status quo until Taiwan and a fully democratized
PRC are peacefully united is paramount, owing to the strait’s geo-strategic
importance to Japan’s national security. The alliance between Japan and theUnited States is premised on Japan’s giving up its strategic independence
and relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But if the alliance fails to ensure
peace and security in the strait, Tokyo will no longer rely on the alliance andeither restore its strategic independence or submit to rapidly growing PRC’s
military power in the area. Whichever its choice, Japan will become a wildcard, upsetting the San Francisco Peace Treaty system as the Asia-Pacificpart of the Yalta regime. Although it would be intriguing to explore thesevarious scenarios, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
More practical is preserving the cross-strait status quo by Tokyo
using specific policy measures to head off or minimize any risks to détente.
These measures not only must compensate for Taipei’s naïve, hasty, andimbalanced concessions in pursuit of the cross-strait détente, but also must
supplement or even complement U.S. military power so that Washington
9remain willing and capable to intervene if necessary. Tokyo will no longer beable to settle in an approach premised on full U.S. hegemony (or the“buck-passing” approach), but instead must increasingly tilt toward
reinforcing the United States’ power in the region (or the “balancing power”
approach).
First, Tokyo must accelerate its formal and informal policy
discussions with Taipei and Washington, with the aim of preserving thecross-strait status quo. Discussions by Japanese, Taiwanese, and American
policy researchers and academics are particularly important, since neither
Tokyo nor Washington has formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. Suchdiscussions should center on persuading Beijing to agree to slow its rapid
buildup of arms and to cease trying to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. Tokyo
must reach a common understanding with Washington, and then both mustpress Taipei to stop making unilateral concessions without concrete
reciprocation by Beijing. In addition, to preclude any uncertainty aboutcross-strait relations, Taipei must remain committed to the 1992 Consensus.
Second, Tokyo must strengthen its involvement in the Taiwanese
economy so as to limit Taiwan’s economic dependence on and vulnerability to
the mainland. Japan’s support will help halt Taiwan’s downward spiral of
unilateral concessions and deepening dependence on the mainland. Tokyoalso must expand its trade with Taiwan and encourage Washington toconclude its proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Taipei. If Japan’s
closer economic engagement is successful, it will exert a significant
countervailing effect on the mainland’s sway over Taiwan. For example,
Tokyo’s and Taipei’s recent decision to have their major microchip firms forma strategic alliance during the ongoing global economic crisis may help
further integrate Taiwan into Japan’s regional supply-chain networks ofinvestment, production, and trade. Such networks could coexist with aU.S.-Taiwan FTA in context of the evolving webs of open regional economic
integration. １２
10Third, in cooperation with Washington, Tokyo has to persuade Taipei,
through informal policy discussions, to follow through on its pending arms
import agreements with the United States, in order to counterbalance
Beijing’s extensive arms buildup, which already has had a serious
destabilizing effect on the cross-strait status quo. In addition, along with
Washington, Tokyo must welcome Taipei’s efforts to modernize andprofessionalize its military, including the proposed abolition of conscription,and encourage Taipei to expend the contrived funds for arms imports. Both
Tokyo and Washington need to prompt Taipei to enhance qualitatively, if notquantitatively, its defense capability.
Fourth, Tokyo must strengthen its military power in the areas
surrounding Japan in general and its south-bound sea-lanes ofcommunication in particular. Japan also must accelerate the modernizationof its maritime and air capabilities. Its priorities should move from theearlier Cold-War emphasis on the northern front, in Hokkaido, to thewestern and southern fronts, in Kyushu and Okinawa. Funds formechanized ground forces will need to be reallocated accordingly.
Tokyo is now moving in this direction. For instance, its Air
Self-Defense Force (SDF) is planning to acquire next-generation tactical air
superiority fighters to replace the current F-15 aircraft. The Maritime SDF(MSDF) has recently commissioned the first de facto helicopter aircraft
carrier, １３ after having built three large flush-deck landing ships withlimited amphibious assault capability. １４ A second helicopter carrier isscheduled to be commissioned in 2011, and a third being considered is a
VSTOL carrier. １５ All these will augment the SDF’s military power, which
has been improved gradually but substantially through cumulative
investment over the decades in major platforms, weapon systems, military
infrastructures as related to AEGIS vessels, AWACS aircraft, airborne
refueling aircraft, and a missile defense system.
Fifth, Tokyo might have to take more drastic measures to supplement
11and even complement U.S. military power if Beijing’s arms buildup
accelerates and if Washington becomes less willing to intervene in case of a
Taiwan contingency. In this case, Japan’s MSDF could double the size of its
submarine fleet by extending the duration of each sub’s service from fifteen
to thirty years, which is the major navies’ standard. Tokyo has long halved
the life cycle simply to maintain its submarine-building capability. The newsubs are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) capability,
reinforcing the inclusion of the SDF’s sole semi-strategic capability in thecalculation, particularly by Beijing, of the region’s balance of power. Tokyo
might even consider the addition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. It
also could build a few medium-size aircraft carriers for fixed-wing airplanes
for carrier battle groups, particularly if Beijing built a blue-water navy that
included carrier battle groups. Most likely, Tokyo will follow a prudent andreactive approach aimed to prevent a regional arms race. But if Japan were
faced with an overwhelming threat, it would be compelled to act quickly anddecisively.
Sixth, Tokyo must conclude a nuclear-sharing arrangement with theUnited States, １６ in the event that Washington should be unwilling tointervene on behalf of Taiwan. Washington has concluded similar
agreements individually with Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Netherlands,
which give Washington control over its nuclear weapons stored in thesecountries in peacetime through Permissive Action Links (PALs) but handover control of the weapons to each party to the agreements in wartime. １７ A
similar arrangement between Japan and the United States would give Tokyoa limited yet effective nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis Beijing.
The preceding six options are step-by-step policy measures for Tokyo
to consider implementing in response to the threats it faces. The worst-casescenario, which currently is improbable but still is possible, is Washington’slosing its hegemony and subsequently withdrawing from the region’s security,
thus forcing Tokyo to revert to being strategically independent. These six
12options, however, mesh with the worst-case scenario, because the sequential
implementation of the options will be essential to meet it.
Notes
See http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105499687.
This refers to the fiction that the ROC has jurisdiction over all the territories
inherited from the Qing Dynasty, which include not only the PRC’s territory but also
Outer Mongolia, Tuva, and other areas adjoining today’s Myanmar and India, with its
capital still in Nanjing, a major city on the mainland. Only twenty-three countries in
the world recognize this claim and maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC.
３ See http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=33802&ctNode=1027&mp=6.
４ “Hu Jintao Meets KMT Chairman Wu Poh-Hsuing,” Xinhua, May 28, 2008, available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/28/content_8269806.htm; and,
Kichinosuke Ihara, “Seven Months of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration,” Kaigai Jijo:
Journal of World Affairs, Vol.57, No.1, January 2009, p. 9.
５ Jimmy Chuang, “DPP Condemns Wu’s Comments,” Taipei Times, May 28, 2008,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/05/28/2003413164.
６ “Taiwan and China in ‘Special Relationship’: Ma,” China Post, September 4, 2008,
available
at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/T
aiwan-and.htm.
７ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_state-to-state_relations;and, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Country_on_Each_Side.
８ Faced with the imminent danger of a swine flu pandemic, Beijing has decided totolerate Taipei’s observer status in WHO’s 2009 general assembly but not its formal
membership in WHO. Because observer status requires annual renewal, it does notmean a permanent right to attend the meeting. See Yomiuri Shimbun, April 30, 2009.
９ As of 2008, the last year of the Chen Administration, the mainland already was
Taiwan’s largest trading partner (US$132.5 billion) and the largest recipient of its
investments (US$150 million–US$200 billion). In addition, five million Taiwanesevisited the mainland that year. See Nikkei Shimbun, May 4, 2009. As of April 2009, one
million Taiwanese, 4.4% of the total population, reside in the mainland. See U.S.
Department of State Background Note: Taiwan, available
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm, accessed on May 7, 2009.
１０ DPP President Tsai Ing-wen Made a Similar Observation. See Sankei Shimbun,
April 10, 2009.
１１ Sankei Shimbun, March 13, 2009, available
at http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/080313/plc0803131934007-n1.htm.
１２ Nikkei Shimbun, April 15, 2009, evening ed.
１２

１３

See http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%81%B2%E3%82%85%E3%81%86%E3%81%8C_(%E8%AD%B7%E8%A1%9B%E8%89%A6).
１４

See http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%81%8A%E3%81%8A%E3%81%99%E3%81%BF%
E5%9E%8B%E8%BC%B8%E9%80%81%E8%89%A6.
１５ Sentaku, May 2009, p. 99.
１６ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing.
１７ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link.
13