What Makes a Story Plausible?
The Need for Precedents
Floris BEXa,1, Trevor BENCH-CAPONb and Bart VERHEIJca
School of Computing, University of Dundee, UKb
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, UKc
Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Abstract. When reasoning about the facts of a case, we typically use stories to link
the known events into coherent wholes. One way to establish coherence is toappeal to past examples, real or fictitious. These examples can be chosen andcritiqued using the case-based reasoning (CBR) techniques from the AI and Law
literature. In this paper, we apply these techniques to factual stories, assessing astory about the facts using precedents. We thus show how factual and legal
reasoning can be combined in a CBR model.
Keywords. Stories, precedents, case-based reasoning, argumentation

Introduction
In a criminal case, we are often presented with a body of evidence which establishes anumber of observed facts. However, this evidence is typically incomplete, and thesefacts will need to be linked together with some further conjectured events to make anarrative, or story, which will fill the gaps and so present a coherent whole [14]. Therecan be several narratives that conform to the evidence (e.g. the defence’s story and theprosecution’s story) and so there can be a debate as to which story we should believe.
This approach, that reasoning with evidence revolves around the construction andcomparison of stories, has been developed in AI and Law in a series of publications on
the so-called hybrid theory of stories and arguments [4][5][6], in which hypotheticalstories that explain the observed facts are supported by arguments based on evidence.
The hybrid theory has been presented as a combination of a standard model of
causal-abductive reasoning (e.g. [7]) and an argumentation framework in the style of[9]: observations are explained by hypothesised causal rules and facts (e.g. observing
smoke we hypothesise fire and the rule fire causes smoke) and these hypotheses can besupported or attacked using arguments (e.g. Bob said “I saw a fire” so fire or Wilma
said “I did not see a fire” so ¬fire or fireman Sam says “Fire can cause smoke” so firecauses smoke). This formalisation of the hybrid theory draws inspiration mainly from“rule-based” approaches in AI and Law, in particular [10]. This is not just evident in
the hybrid theory’s modelling of supporting and attacking arguments but also in thestyle in which it models stories (i.e. as networks of causal rules).

1
Corresponding Author: School of Computing, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, UK.
florisbex@computing.dundee.ac.uk.

The work on the hybrid theory has so far not directly used ideas and concepts fromthe “case-based reasoning” (CBR) approach, as proposed by, for example, [1][2]. Thisis a somewhat surprising omission, as the comparison of clusters of legally relevantfacts (cases) in the CBR approach seems to be a natural fit for reasoning with clusters
of facts (stories) as performed in the hybrid approach. Accordingly, this paper aims toshow the relation of the hybrid theory to CBR as performed in AI and Law. Moreprecisely, we integrate legal and factual reasoning in the CATO approach of [1]. In
previous work [6] we showed that for more rule-based approaches the legal reasoning
in a case has many structural similarities with the evidential (factual) reasoning in acase. Here, we aim to demonstrate that the same is true if we adopt a CBR approach.
Thus we continue our efforts to integrate argumentative and narrative considerations byconsidering how the roles of stories, cases and precedents are connected.
By looking at stories from the perspective of CBR, we can make improvements tothe hybrid approach. For example, we can apply argumentation techniques used in the
CBR approach (e.g. showing the similarity between cases, emphasising a distinction
between cases) to the factual stories as used in the hybrid theory. This allows for amore precise and, perhaps most importantly, more realistic way of determining story
coherence. In previous work, we argued that a story is coherent if it fits a story scheme,
a generalised pattern of events. In actual argumentative situations, however, people willcite similar, particular, stories as precedents rather than a generalised pattern. Certainly
specific stories are more vivid and more persuasive.
Integrating the hybrid theory into the CBR approach can also enhance existing
work on CBR. This work has mostly concentrated on legal reasoning (that is, reasoning
with legal cases and only considering facts which are directly legally relevant) and thespecific facts of a case, the stories about these facts and the reasoning with these facts
have not been explored in detail. Furthermore, [15] has argued that the hybrid theory’s
concept of story schemes (abstract scenarios that can serve as a scheme for particularstories) can be used to identify, analyze and evaluate arguments from analogy, andshow their function in CBR where precedents are involved.

1. Case Based Reasoning in AI and Law
The leading CBR systems in AI and Law are HYPO [2] and CATO [1]. We will base
our approach to CBR on CATO (cf. also [3][8][11]).
The key idea of CATO is that cases can be described as collections of factors2. A
factor is a stereotypical fact situation that has legal relevance, such as bribed-employee,
information-disclosed-in-negotiations, information-reversed-engineered, plaintiff-tooksecurity-measures and the like. The facts of the case determine whether particularfactors are present or absent from a case. If present, the factors provide a reason todecide for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus bribed-employee and plaintifftook-security-measures are reasons to find for the plaintiff, and information-disclosedin-negotiations and information-reversed-engineered are reasons to find for the
defendant in a trade secrets case. Typically a case will contain a number of factors,some favouring the defendant and some favouring the plaintiff, and the court will needto decide which set of reasons prevail.
2
HYPO used dimensions rather than factors, where a dimension has an associated continuous or discrete
magnitude. Factors can usefully be seen as points on particular dimensions.

Guidance on the relative strengths of sets of factors can be obtained from theprecedent cases. If the combination presented in a case under consideration (the currentcase) has been found before, then it would be expected that the decision in the past casewould be the decision in the current case. Equally if the current case contained asuperset of the factors, with the additional factors favouring the side that won before
one would expect that side to win a fortiori. Normally, however, there will be no exact
match and missing and additional factors will serve to distinguish the current case fromthe precedent. Equally some precedents may point one way and other the other, so
providing counter examples.
As HYPO, CATO supports a three ply form of argument:
1. One side cites a precedent case (a case with factors in common with thecurrent case) decided for their side;
2. Other side presents counter examples (cases with factors in common decided
for the other side) and distinguishes the cited cases;
3. Original side may distinguish the counter example, and cite any additional
reasons to support their side.
Whereas the dimensions of HYPO are independent, CATO arranges the factors in ahierarchy where the base level factors are reasons to decide that a more abstract factor
is present or absent. Thus if information-improperly-obtained is an abstract factor(favouring the plaintiff), bribed-employee is a reason to think it present while
information-disclosed-in-negotiations and information-reversed-engineered are reasons
to think it absent. Factors belonging to the same abstract factor may be substituted for
one another (if their polarity is the same) or cancel one another (if the polarity isdifferent). This enables distinctions to be downplayed by cancelling a factor, or by
substituting a factor in the precedent but not the current case by one in the current casebut not the precedent.
CATO recognises the following argument moves: Citing a case to a past case witha favourable outcome (Ply 1); Distinguishing a case with an unfavourable outcome (Ply2); Emphasising the significance of a distinction (Ply 2); Downplaying the significanceof a distinction (Ply 3); Citing a favourable case to emphasise strengths (Ply 3); Citinga favourable case to argue that weaknesses are not fatal (Ply 3); Citing acounterexample (Ply 2). In section 4 we further discuss these moves when we relatethem to stories about the facts.

2. The hybrid theory for Inference to the Best Explanation
The hybrid approach combines stories and arguments in a framework for abductive
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) [4][5][6]. In IBE, we have a set of observed
facts which have to be explained by a hypothesis. In other words, given a set O ofobservations and the knowledge that hypothesis H explains O, we infer that H isprobably the case. A hypothesis can take the form of a story, a chronological sequenceof states and events that forms a coherent whole. Arguments are used in the hybrid
theory as the basis for the observations: every element of O is the conclusion of anargument (usually based on evidence) that is part of the hybrid framework.
In IBE it is imperative that we also consider alternative hypothetical stories that
explain the observations, and these stories will then have to be compared. In thiscomparison, it is not only important that a story conforms to the evidence but also thata story is coherent.3 Generally, we say that a story is coherent if it conforms to the way
we expect things to happen in the world. This means not only that a story should beconsistent, but also that it should be anchored in plausible common-sense knowledge of
the world [14]. For example, a story where a man enters a restaurant, orders ahamburger, receives his hamburger from the waiter, removes his pants and offers thewaiter his pants in exchange for the hamburger can be considered incoherent and hence
implausible4: people do not normally remove their pants in restaurants, nor do they
offer their pants as barter for food.
Bex and colleagues distinguish two perspectives on story coherence. The first
perspective is on an atomistic, more local level, as it concerns the individual causal
links and events that are assumed and does not consider the story ‘as a whole’. If, in the
hybrid theory, valid arguments against the plausibility of such assumptions in the story
are given, the story coherence decreases. For example, in the story of the man in therestaurant, the causal link between receiving a hamburger and removing one's pants iseither non-existent or at best tenuous in the extreme. In contrast, a holistic and global
perspective on story coherence is provided by story schemes, abstract scenarios that canserve as a scheme for particular stories [4][6]. The knowledge used in determining
story coherence often does not take the form of individual (causal) generalizations but
is more naturally thought of as a cluster of generalized events and other backgroundinformation forming an abstract rendition of how things generally happen in the world[13]. One example of such a story scheme is the restaurant script, which lists the roles(customer, waiter) and sequence of events (ordering, eating, paying) for a restaurant
visit. The coherence of a story can be assessed by seeing if it fits a plausible story
scheme. A story which is not backed by such a scheme is less coherent, unless thedeviation can be motivated by specific evidence. For example, to be at all plausible thestory about the restaurant would need some additional events supported by evidence,such as the waiter spilling hot liquid on the man.
2.1. Precedents in factual reasoning
The question now is how to find valid, plausible story schemes. Story schemes ideallymodel the way things tend to happen in the world. This means that the plausibility ofstory schemes depends on precedent stories: the restaurant scheme we use is based on
our experiences of restaurants, and none of the authors ever had a strange experience
like the one described above. Here, a precedent is an instance of a story scheme, and so
can help to establish the validity of the story scheme as a determinant of global
coherence. Furthermore, in realistic contexts people will usually find it more effective
to cite a precedent story rather than an abstract story scheme.
As an example, suppose two people meet on a train: on one story it is a chanceencounter, in another it is an arranged meeting. If both people regularly use the train atsimilar times a chance meeting is entirely plausible. If they rarely use the train, or live
elsewhere, it is less so. But citing a particular story can help, particularly a personal
one: you remember when you met Bill on the Rialto bridge? Neither of you knew theother was in Venice, but these coincidences do happen. The object here is to establish
3

This coherence is independent from the evidence, as it is general whereas the evidence is specific; only inthe absence of specific evidence we use generalised patterns to fill the gaps. Furthermore, less common
events must be better justified by evidence in order to be considered in a story.
4 We use the terms coherence and plausibility interchangeably: a story is coherent if it adheres to (i.e. isanchored in) plausible common-sense knowledge and being more coherent makes a story more plausible.

from personal experience that the improbable actually does occur from time to time, so
the coincidence is at least possible. An appeal to personal experience or an appeal to awell-known story is much more powerful than citing a story scheme for chanceencounters: A is at location L for reason RA - B is at location L for reason RB - RA andRB are unrelated - A and B meet. The real story provides a unity to elements which
would remain entirely disconnected in the abstract scheme.
Citing a similar story thus helps establishing coherence. Here, it is important thatthe current story and the supporting example be relevantly similar: that is, it can
explain similar observations (relevance) and resist attempts to distinguish it (similarity).
As [15] argues, we would want the story and the precedent to be an instance of thesame story scheme: the chance meeting on the train and the meeting with Bill are bothinstances of the scheme for chance encounters. If we cannot find a precedent story
which matches on enough facts, we can attempt to find a more general precedent (e.g.
citing a story which contains a coincidence but says nothing about chance meetings).
However, in such a case it is easier to reduce the force of the example by pointing torelevant differences. These distinctions can then be emphasised and downplayed, andso we suggest that precedent stories can be selected, attacked and justified using
techniques from CBR, which is itself centrally concerned with identifying relevant
similarities and differences.

3. Incorporating Factual Reasoning into CBR
In this section we aim to give a basic overview of how factual stories and story
precedents can be modelled and analysed in a way similar to CATO’s modelling oflegal cases and precedents. Section 3.1 introduces stories and story schemes (loosely
following their formalisation in [4],[6]) and briefly relates these factual stories andschemes to the (legal) constructs present in CATO. In section 3.3 we show how theargument moves of CATO, designed to establish whether a precedent is relevantly
similar, can be applied to stories.
3.1. Stories, story schemes and cases
Stories are finite sequences of facts, events or states of affairs that are assumed, at least
for the moment, to have happened or existed. Stories are specific rather than general.
Consider a simple example story about Tony (T), who killed Gordon (G) in a knife
fight: [T stabs G, stabbing injured G, G died]. Story schemes are abstract scenarios, thestructure of which is close to that of stories. Basically, a story scheme is a sequence
containing narrative units [12], which represent (sets of) generalized facts or types offacts: [X has motive to stab Y, X stabs Y, stabbing causes injury, Y dies]. The narrative
units thus represent what we call story roles, general roles that facts in a story can take.
Note that story schemes are hierarchical, in that narrative units can be specifications ofother, more abstract narrative units. For example, the narrative units X and Y are in anargument, Y draws a knife can be a specification of X has motive to stab Y.
A story can be matched to a story scheme by assigning the facts to their respective
story roles, that is, matching the facts in the story to the relevant narrative units in thescheme. This matching is done through a combination of variable instantiation (e.g. T
stabs G is an instance of X stabs Y) and so-called abstraction rules, rules that generalisefacts to their more abstract versions (e.g. if T and G are in an argument and G draws aknife then T has motive to stab G). Coherence of the story is determined by checking
whether the story has no “loose ends” (there are facts in the story that do not match anarrative unit in the scheme) and whether the story “has all its parts” (all the narrative
units in the relevant scheme are matched by a fact in the story) [4]. For example, ourexample story does not complete the example scheme, as there is no fact that matches
the narrative unit X has motive to stab Y.
CATO’s cases are very similar to story schemes. Story schemes are clusters of
abstract facts, narrative units, and cases are clusters of legally qualified abstract facts,
factors. In other words, the factors represent what we call the legal roles that facts in astory can play. Here, we distinguish between a specific case and a general case withfactors. An example of a general case is [Defendant killed Victim, Defendant intended
to kill Victim, Defendant killing Victim was premeditated]; a specific case is not ascheme but rather an instantiated “legal story”, e.g. [T killed G, T intended to kill G, T
killing G was premeditated]. Facts in a story can be matched to the factors in a case in
the same way as they are matched to the narrative units in a story scheme, namely
through a combination of variable instantiation and rules. For example, an abstraction
rule if T stabs G and stabbing injured G and G died then T killed G can be used tomatch the story to the Defendant killed Victim factor in the case.
3.2. Argument Moves and Precedents
In the current paper, the notion of coherence is based on precedent. That is not to saythat story schemes play no role in determining coherence; the story and the precedentshould be an instance of the same (plausible) story scheme (cf. [15]). Rather, this paper
presents new ways to determine the coherence: instead of citing a story scheme, we citea precedent story as the basis for the construction of a story scheme. After a precedent
has been cited, variants of CATO’s argument moves can be used to argue about thedifferences and similarities between the precedent and the current story. Effectively,
these argument moves are about whether the current story relevantly matches the story
scheme based on the precedent.
Citing a precedent story: This move establishes a story scheme based on the precedentstory, and then (implicitly) argues that the current story matches that scheme.
Distinguishing a precedent story: The precedent story and the current story will eachcontain elements beyond those required for matching a common story scheme. For
example, the current story and the precedent may have the central action in common(stabbing), but may well differ as to the type of people involved. Such differences canbe offered as reasons to argue that the current story does not match the scheme
established by the precedent.
We can identify different kinds of distinction between stories (cf. [16]), dependingon whether the current story is missing a fact required to make the story coherent, or
has an additional fact (that the precedent lacks) which jeopardises the coherence of thestory. In the first case, there is an assumption satisfied in the precedent which is notsatisfied in the current case: this means that the current story is not complete, it doesnot “have all its parts”. In the second case, there is a fact in the current story which
supplies an exception to the story scheme.

Emphasising the significance of a distinction: this move accompanies a distinction andattempts to pre-empt any attempt to downplay; it seems as much rhetorical as logical.
Downplaying the significance of a distinction: Downplaying a distinction has variants
according to the nature of the distinction. If the distinction is an unsatisfied assumption,
it is necessary to point to some fact in the current story which can play a similar role,thus having the current story complete the story scheme after all. If the current story
has what appears to be an exception, downplaying involves finding a fact in the current
story that provides an exception to that exception.
Citing a case to emphasise strengths and citing a case to argue that weaknesses are notfatal: These two moves respond to a distinction and involve citing other stories which
can serve as precedent stories. When it is argued that the current story misses anassumption, new precedent stories can help to show that this assumption is not vital tothe coherence of the story. Against the second type of distinction one can cite further
precedent stories matching the current story and containing the alleged exceptions,
showing that it is possible to have this additional fact in a coherent story. These moves
are essentially attempts to shift the story scheme relied on slightly. The difference
between emphasise strengths and weakness not fatal seems to be largely rhetorical,
focusing on the strengths or alleged weaknesses of the current story, respectively.
Citing a counterexample: This move involves citing a new precedent story that argues
for a different story scheme. Counterexamples are used to demonstrate that there arealternatives, and so avoid tunnel vision.
3.3. An example of CBR with stories and precedents
Having looked at the individual moves, let us consider an example to show them inaction. In our example, the observation to explain is that Tony killed Gordon in a knife
fight. That Tony killed Gordon is not at issue: there were plenty of witnesses as it took
place quite openly in a Glasgow street. But it is important to get a story establishing
Tony’s motive, as this will affect the sentence. Wilma and Bert are discussing thematter.
• Wilma: ‘Tony and Gordon were youths from the same neighbourhood; perhaps it
was a gang thing, like West Side Story.5’ In the precedent, Bernardo (B) of the
Sharks gang kills Riff (R) of the Jets gang in a knife fight. Here, citing a precedentstory attempts to establish that the motive was gang feud:
Precedent Story 1: B and R from same area, feud between B and R, B kills R↓match↓match↓matchStory Scheme 1: X and Y from same area, feud between X and Y, X kills Y↑match↑match↑matchCurrent Story:
T and G from same area, feud between T and G, T kills G• Bert: ‘But Tony and Gordon are middle class kids, and whoever heard of middle
class kids being in gangs?’ Here Bert distinguishes by mentioning an exception:
the story has an additional fact, that Tony and Gordon are middle class, that theprecedent story lacks – Jets and Sharks are lower class immigrant gangs. Thus, Bert
5
Most of our precedents will be taken from fiction. Everyone knows real examples of these schemes, butthey know different examples: classic fiction provides a common cultural repository of stories.

argues that the current story does in fact not match the scheme established by theWest Side Story precedent, because being middle class is an exception to the rulethat people from the same neighbourhood may be involved in a feud:
T and G from same area, T and G middle class so ¬(feud between T and G)
This rule means that there can be no match between the current story and scheme 1.
• Wilma: ‘Maybe it was a family feud like in Romeo and Juliet, they were middle
class.’ This is an example of weaknesses not fatal, citing a precedent story with asimilar motive that does include the alleged exception: Romeo Montague (R) kills
Tybalt Capulet (T) with a knife and the Capulets and Montagues were middle class:Precedent Story 2: R and T middle class, feud between R and T,
R kills T↓match↓match↓matchStory Scheme 1.1: X and Y middle class, feud between X and Y,
X kills Y↑match↑match↑matchCurrent Story:
T and G middle class, feud between T and G,
T kills G• Bert: ‘The Capulets and Montagues were Italian, and vendettas are very
Mediterranean, but this was Scotland.’ Bert distinguishes by mentioning a missing
assumption, that only in Italy do middle class people get into feuds:
Precedent Story 2: R and T middle class, R and T Italian,feud between R and T↓match↓match↓matchScheme 1.2: X and Y middle class, X and Y prone to feuding, feud between X and Y↑match??no match↑matchCurrent Story: T and G middle classfeud between T and G• Wilma: ‘But Tony and Gordon’s families were supporters of football clubs
involved in a notorious feud, Glasgow Rangers and Celtic FC’ Wilma downplays
the distinction by providing facts that can take the place of X and Y are Italian:
Story Scheme 1.2:
Current Story:

X and Y prone to feuding↑matchfamilies support different clubs• Bert: ‘But Tony was estranged from his family, as he was in a relationship with
Gordon’s sister.’ Bert again distinguishes with exception: once disowned and allied
to the other family it is unlikely that Tony would continue the football feud.
families support different clubs, T involved with G’s family → ¬(feud between T and G)• Wilma: ‘But Romeo still killed Tybalt in Romeo and Juliet, even though he wasinvolved with Tybalt’s cousin Julia.’ Wilma downplays by denying the exception,
pointing to her previous precedent.
Precedent Story 2: R and T are Italian, R involved with T’s family, feud between R and T↓match↓match↓matchScheme 1.3: X and Y prone to feuding, X involved with Y’s family, feud between X and Y↑match↑match↑matchStory: families support different clubs, T involved with G’s family, feud between T and G• Bert: ‘Maybe it was about Gordon’s sister. Perhaps Gordon started the fight, like in
Hamlet, so Tony acted in self defence.’ Bert now changes main story scheme byciting a counter example, in which Hamlet (H) defends himself after Laertes (L)attacks him because the latter blames Hamlet for the death of his sister, Ophelia (O).
Precedent Story 3:
Story Scheme 2:
Current Story:

L attacks H and H defends himself↓matchX defends himself against Y’s attack↑match
G attacks T and T defends himself• Wilma: ‘But in Gordon’s case, his sister did not die so he would have less incentive
to attack Tony.’ Wilma distinguishes by mentioning a missing assumption, that theattacker’s sister died.
Precedent Story 3:

O dies,↓matchStory Scheme 2.1: Z (Y’s sister) dies??no match
Current Story:

L attacks and H defends himself↓matchX defends himself against Y’s attack↑match
G attacks T and T defends himself• Bert: ‘In Cavelleria Rustica, no-one died but Alfio (A) still attacked Turrido (T) to
protect his honour’ Bert argues that weakness not fatal: and cites another precedentthat also does not include the missing assumption (that the attacker’s sister died) but
still matches the story scheme.
Precedent Story 4:
Story Scheme 2:
Current Story:

A attacks T and T defends himself↓matchX defends himself against Y’s attack↑match
G attacks T and T defends himself

Note that the debate is not just there to satisfy curiosity. It matters legally which storyis accepted. A fight mutually entered into (West Side Story and Romeo and Juliet)
would be manslaughter, but a gangland killing would get a heavier sentence than afamily feud in the current climate. Finally if we follow Cavelleria Rustica and theLaertes role of Hamlet, we can explain Tony’s role as self defence and he might evenbe acquitted. These different legal options can be expressed by matching the different
stories to different legal factors that give rise to different legal consequences. In [6], theauthors explain this interplay between factual stories and legal cases in more detail.

4. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have shown how reasoning with factual stories and story schemes canbe modelled in the style of Case Based Reasoning models from AI and Law [1],[2],demonstrating the connection between CBR and the hybrid theory of [4][5]. It turns outthat the precedent cases of CBR have a natural counterpart in factual reasoning: story
schemes. The facts of the story can then be mapped to the elements of these story
schemes (narrative units) as well as to the elements of cases (factors), thus enabling us
to give factual as well as legal interpretations of a story in a similar way. This further
allows for the argumentative moves of CATO to be applied to factual stories, enabling
moves like citation and distinction in discussions about the facts of a case.

The link between CBR and factual stories allows for a more realistic way of
discussing story coherence in the hybrid theory: precedent stories can be cited,obviating the need to explicitly model abstract story schemes. The argument moves
then enable a natural dialogue concerning the facts of the story. Furthermore, we havespecified the relation between the facts of a case and the factor-based cases, somethingwhich is often left implicit in the literature on CBR. Finally, the current model specifies[15]’s Scheme for Argument from Analogy, which uses story schemes to determine thesimilarity between precedents cases/stories and the current case/story.
Our emphasis here on the coherence of stories does not mean that the evidence
plays a secondary role; cf. the slogan that a “good” (i.e. coherent) story does not win
over a “bad” (i.e. incoherent) story. We would certainly not want to sentence someone
just on the basis of West Side Story and Romeo and Juliet! Instead, when a story iscoherent (as established here by CBR styled techniques), we have found a good
hypothesis of what may have happened. It is then the evidence that is provided for sucha hypothetical story that determines whether it can be believed or not (cf. [4][5][6]).
In future research, it might be interesting to explore how techniques from CBR canbe used to discuss the evidence in the case. For example, one party might try todiscredit a witness by citing a precedent: ‘Do you remember the other case where thevictim’s wife testified? It turned out she was lying all along’. The other party can thendistinguish the current case: ‘Yes, but in the other case the wife gained financially inthe event of an acquittal, which is not so in this case.’

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