RIPS Policy Perspectives

No.6

Tenser in Southwest Asia, Calmer in East Asia
―Perspectives in Mid-2008―
Masashi Nishihara
July 2008

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issuesof national and international peace and security, publishes research reports, andproposes policy recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosh (Asian Security), whichsurveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded byboth the academic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars
for specialists and the public on national, regional, and international security andsponsors joint research projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation’sCenter for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue
security studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors tosecurity studies in Japan.

RIPS Policy Perspectives are intended to provide timely alternatives to and analysesof existing peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The
views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the
RIPS.

Research Institute for Peace and Security

Akasaka HKN Bldg., 2th Floor
1-8-6 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan
Tel: 81-3-3560-3288 Fax:81-3-3560-3289
E-mail: rips-info@rips.or.jp
URL: http://www.rips.or.jp/

RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues
No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006, October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?, December 2006
No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges and the Role ofJapan, March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?: Perspectives on Asian
Security, 2007, April 2007
No.5 Kazuto Suzuki, Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda, October 2007

Tenser in Southwest Asia, Calmer in East Asia
)Perspectives in Mid-2008)

Masashi Nishihara*

The replacement of leaders often changes the security environment of a region, and frommid-2007 through mid-2008, the new leaders of several countries in the Asia Pacificregion have changed its political climate and international relations. The result has beenthat as tensions have increased in Southwest Asia, they have decreased in East Asia.

More Political Violence in Southwest Asia

The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto

Many factors have contributed to the current tensions on the Indian subcontinent and in
Afghanistan. Notable among them was the assassination on December 27, 2007, ofBenazir Bhutto, a former prime minister and the head of the Pakistan People’s Party(PPP). In October, Bhutto returned home from an eight-year exile. She was greeted
enthusiastically, especially since the sitting president, Pervez Musharaf had become*

President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security. Chairman of the Japan
Association for International Security.
1

extremely unpopular owing to his poor handling of domestic politics such as the abortive
dismissal of the chief justice of Pakistan’s supreme court. Musharaf, who also was army
chief of staff in control of Pakistan’s most powerful political machine, resigned from thisposition on November 29, to establish the pretense of a civilian government. Bhutto
began to campaign for general elections scheduled for January 2008, when she was shot
to death.
In addition, the United States wanted to steer Musharaf to form a coalition civilian
government with Bhutto, who supported the United States and opposed the Taliban and Al
Qaeda. Complicating the situation was the relationship between Bhutto and her staunch
political rival, Nawaz Sharif, who also had returned to Pakistan from seven years in exile.
Who shot Bhutto in a vehicle moving in the midst of a politically agitated anduncontrolled crowd on the street remains to be identified. But the incident drasticallychanged the political map. The general elections, which were delayed, finally took place
in February and produced a slim majority for the PPP, who is co-chaired by Bhutto’s
husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and their son. The consequently fragile coalition government of
the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) has made Pakistani politics
even less stable.

The Weak Civilian Government and the Growth of Terrorists

Unlike Musharaf, who attempted to confront the Islamic terrorists, the new prime ministeroffered to negotiate with them, which has been widely seen as a sign of the government’s
weakness. The Taliban insurgents have expanded their area of control in Pakistan andhave become more violent. The number of bombing incidents attributed to the Taliban has
increased in the major cities, further damaging the credibility of the coalition government.

2

The Taliban also uses Pakistan’s border tribal areas to train and send terrorists to Pakistan
and Afghanistan, as well as a convenient place to tax local resources and smuggle opium.
In Pakistan, then, the terrorists are filling a political and administrative vacuum.
On June 13, 2008, Taliban militants blew up the front gate of the largest prison in
Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, permitting nearly one thousand Taliban prisoners toescape. Then on July 8, a car-bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul killed
forty-one people and wounded more than 130.
Since 2001, India has been assisting Afghanistan with its largest foreign aid
package, training civil servants, and building a vital passage into resource-rich Central
Asia. Pakistan, however, considers the India-Afghan partnership against the Taliban to beendangering its own national security. In fact, when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan
between 1996 and 2001, Pakistan was its main supporter. Therefore, if India were toconsider sending troops to Afghanistan, it would result in widening the war on terrorism
in Southwest Asia, bringing Pakistan and the Taliban even closer. Another fear is amilitary coup in Pakistan. In addition, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, has accused
Pakistan of being involved in the bombings in his country, including the car-bombing at
the Indian embassy. Thus for Afghanistan, too, Pakistan’s conciliatory approach has only
exacerbated the tension.

The Response by the U.S. and ISAF

Pakistan’s new conciliatory posture toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda under the civilian
rule has naturally made Washington highly apprehensive of the growth of the Taliban andthe future of a nuclear Pakistan. During the past year Washington has sent more forces in
Afghanistan, and NATO has sent 20,000 forces more for its International Security

3

Assistance Forces (ISAF) to southern Afghanistan, still the Taliban’s stronghold.
Washington is reportedly considering adding another 10,000 troops. The U.S. and NATOthus must contend with weak governments in both Kabul and Islamabad. The Taliban isincreasingly using Pakistan’s border areas as a sanctuary from ISAF and U.S. forces,
which has added to the United States’ and the ISAF’s difficulties with Pakistan. Indeed,
how can the United States and its coalition forces effectively fight the Taliban and bringabout a civilian democracy in Pakistan? This will be one of the principal challenges forthe new U.S. administration in 2009.

Tensions Falling in East Asia

Five New Leaders Changing the Political Climate

By contrast, tensions are falling in East Asia. Five new leaders took office between
September 2007 and March 2008HPrime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan (September),Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia (November), President Lee Myun-bak of South
Korea (February), President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia (March), and President Ma
Yin-jeou of Taiwan (March)Hall of whom have helped transform the political climate in
East Asia.
Fukuda, who replaced Shinzo Abe on short notice in September, has taken a much
more conciliatory posture toward Beijing. First, he promised even before he was installed
as prime minister that he would not visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, a decisionthat Beijing welcomed. Second, Fukuda ended Abe’s diplomatic initiative of promoting
security links among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. In addition, Abe’s

4foreign minister, Taro Aso, had advocated close links with the new democracies in the“arc of freedom and prosperity,” stretching from the Asia Pacific to Central Asia andeastern Europe, but Fukuda has discontinued this initiative as well.
Also sensitive to China’s reactions, Australia’s new prime minister, Kevin Rudd,
decided not to continue the policy of the former prime minister, John Howard, toward
China.
The election of President Lee Myun-bak, an ex-Hyundai CEO, similarly changed
the climate in Northeast Asia by shifting the North Korea policy that his predecessor, Rho
Moon-hyun, had pursued for the last four years. Instead, Lee has instituted a tit-for-tat
policy to replace Rho’s conciliatory “sunshine” policy. He declared that South Korea’s
economic assistance to North Korea would now be coordinated with the pace of North
Korea’s denuclearization. Lee also reversed his predecessor’s policy and moved to restore
South Korea’s partnership with Japan and its alliance with the United States. Unlike his
predecessor, President Lee has refrained from referring to South Korea’s role as that of anintermediary between Washington and Pyongyang, a move that has changed the politicalclimate of the Korean peninsula. However, eager to rebuild the relationship with
Washington, he decided to open the Korean market for controversial American beef too
hastily, causing widespread popular anger over fears of mad cow disease. As a result,
Lee’s popularity has plummeted.
In the meantime, the March election of Ma Yin-jeou in Taipei has also influenced
the relations between Taipei and Beijing, Taipei and Washington, and Taipei and Tokyo.
The rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing began with the meeting of the top leadersof Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and Taipei’s Strait
Exchange Foundation, the visit by Kuomintang leaders to Beijing, and weekend chartered
flights and reciprocal visits between Taiwan and China. Ironically, the lowering of5cross-strait tensions, however, may have weakened relations between Taipei andWashington, particularly their military cooperation, although President Ma has mentionedthat he will not make concessions on Taiwan’s security.
The Russians elected Dmitri Medvedev to succeed President Vladimir Putin who,
by taking the position of prime minister, has remained as the de facto leader of Russia.
For his first foreign visit, in May, President Medvedev went to Kazakhstan to talk about
Russia-Kazakhstan-China pipeline links and access to that country’s oil and natural gas,much of which is now being diverted to China. Because the competition between
Moscow and Beijing over access to natural resources in Central Asia has become so fierce,
it was not surprising that Medvedev chose China as his second country to visit as
President.

Relations Have Improved in East Asia

On the whole, international relations have improved in East Asia, especiallyChinese-Japanese, South Korean-U.S., Japanese-South Korean, and cross-strait relations,as well as those in the six-party talks. (Since late June, relations between Japan and South
Korea have become tenser again, this time because of Tokyo’s decision to educate school
children about the Japanese claim to Takeshima islands [Dokdo, in Korean]). The region’s
political and security climate was tested by three major incidents, all of which wererelated to China: the Tibetan revolt in March, the disorderly Olympic torch relays in April
and May, and the enormous earthquake in Sichuan Province in May. Yet East Asia has
managed to survive what could have been political turmoil. None of G8 Summit leaders,
who met in Toyako in early July, strongly criticized President Hu Jingato’s handling of the
Tibetan minority. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, President George W. Bush, and6

Prime Minster Yasuo Fukuda expressed their intention to attend the opening ceremoniesof the Beijing Olympic Games on August 8. Whether or not relations in East Asia havereally changed, however, is not clear, for North Korea’s denuclearization and relations
between Japan and China still are precarious.

North Korea’s Intensions Still Suspicious

North Korea’s Tactics of Prolongation

North Korea’s denuclearization is, nonetheless, an important example of declining
tensions in the region. Compared with the situation in October 2006 when it conducted its
nuclear tests, relations with North Korea since then have been manageable and seem to bemovingHalbeit slowlyHtoward this goal. Moreover, the participants in the six-party talks
have maintained relatively cooperative relations.
During the past year, however, North Korea has continued to prolong its
denuclearization process and to extract maximum economic returns. The United States, incontrast, has alternated between hawkish and conciliatory stands, and as the end of his
term approaches, Bush has been driven by his desire to burnish his administration’s
diplomatic legacy, all of which have affected U.S.-North Korean negotiations.
The joint agreement of February 13, 2007, announced the following three-stage
process of denuclearization: In the first stage, all North Korean nuclear activities wouldcease, including the shutdown of nuclear facilities in Yonbyon, in return for 50,000 tonsof heavy oil from the other five parties to the talks (although Japan refused to join until
the issue of its abducted citizens was settled). In the second stage, North Korea would

7

disable all its nuclear facilities and disclose all its nuclear programs, in return for 950,000
tons of heavy oil. Finally in the third stage, North Korea would dismantle its nuclear
weapons, in return for the construction of light water nuclear reactors and other energy
and economic assistance.
During the first stage, however, which was supposed to be completed within sixty
days, North Korea demanded the return of US$25 million in assets frozen at the Banco
Delta Asia in Macao. Although this was not part of the February 13 agreement, the UnitedStates consented. But because the return of the assets was complicated, it was notcompleted until June 21, so the first stage lasted about two months longer than scheduled.
Consequently, the six-party talks to negotiate the second stage did not begin until
July 18, and again North Korea delayed the talks by demanding, among others, the repairof its power stations. The parties finally met on September 27 and reached a joint
agreement on October 3 that North Korea disable, with the U.S. financial aid, three major
nuclear facilities by the end of the year. By the end of 2007, North Korea would disclose
all its nuclear programs, in return for the rest of one million tons of heavy oil promised
earlier plus the United States’ promise to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist
states.

North Korean-Syrian Connections

North Korea’s denuclearization stalled yet another time in the fall, when U.S. newspapers
reported in September that Israel had removed nuclear materials and then bombed a site
in northern Syria. Washington revealed that secret photos showed North Korean workers
on the site. (On April 28, 2008, President Bush official confirmed North Korean-Syrian
nuclear connections.)8

North Korea’s links with Syria angered Washington’s conservative camp, whichargued against providing any help to Pyongyang. Although Pyongyang naturally denied
its nuclear assistance to Syria, but its sincerity was questioned. North Korea also has kept
silent about its suspected program on enriched uranium, which the United States hadoriginally disclosed in October 2002.
Despite U.S. conservatives’ strong opposition to making concessions to North
Korea, President Bush sided with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant
Secretary of State Christopher Hill in moving ahead. In December, President Bush sent a
letter to Party Secretary Kim Jong Ill to urging him to observe the October 3 agreement.
In the meantime, North Korea complained about the slow supply of heavy oil and did notmeet the deadline of December 31 in issuing a declaration of the disablement of its
nuclear programs and reporting on its nuclear programs.
In February 2008 the New York Philharmonic Orchestra went to Pyongyang for ahistoric live-televised concert. It was the first time that the U.S. national anthem was sungthere, with North Korean officials standing in front of the U.S. flag on the stage at theconcert hall. Nonetheless, the declaration had to be delayed till June 26, 2008, when
North Korea submitted to China, chair of the six-party talks, a sixty-page document.
North Korea deemed it “a complete and correct declaration.” North Korea also handed to
the United States a short classified document regarding its links with Syria and thewhereabouts of the enriched uranium. This time the process was delayed for half year.

North Korea’s June 26 Declaration and U.S. Hasty Concessions

Again, the United States made hasty concessions. The Bush administration notified theCongress that it would remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states. Originally its

9removal was to accompany the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations. In addition,
the delisting will take effect in forty-five days, namely, August 11, 2008. The six-party
talks met on July10 to discuss how to verify the June 26 declaration, but could not reachan agreement. They and the United States reportedly plan to complete the verification
before the end of October. Most likely, the U.S. will not postpone the delisting beyond
August 11, although many specialists argue that first the June 26 declaration should beverified and that the exact links between North Korea and Syria be identified. If it delays
any longer, the United States fears that the whole process may be damaged. But
Washington’s hasty concessions have put it in an extremely awkward position.
In addition, Japan is very dissatisfied with Washington’s decision on delisting.
Tokyo counted on President Bush’s keeping North Korea on the United States’ list of
terrorist states, to pressure North Korea to release more information about the Japaneseabductees. But now that it is no longer regarded as a terrorist state, North Korea has no
incentive to release more information to Japan about the abductees. Moreover, it isentitled to substantial economic aid through such major international banks as the World
Bank. Washington’s precipitate decision to delist North Korea has now created new
tension between Japan and the United States.

U.S.-North Korean Talks with Four “Observers”

Furthermore, the six-party talks have increasingly taken the form of U.S.-North Korean
talks with “four observers.” Of the four “observers,” China, as the chair, plays a specialrole. Yet, in reality the United States is singlehandedly negotiating with North Korea. The
lack of coordination among Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul has placed both of
Washington’s Asian allies in a difficult position. This is unfortunate, especially since the10new South Korean leader, Lee Myung-bak, has tried to strengthen his country’s ties with
the United States as well as Japan.
Nevertheless, the negotiations with North Korea have not been marred by theinternational tensions created in the wake of the protests in Tibet and during the Olympic
torch relays. President Hu Jingtao’s official visit to Tokyo went smoothly. China’s role as
the chair of the six-party talks also has apparently not been weakened. Its vice president,
Xi Jinping, visited Pyongyang on June 18 and urged Kim Jong Ill to keep the six-party
talks moving, which certainly contributed to their resumption on June 26 and July 10.
North Korea will continue to apply its skillful tactics to prolong thedenuclearization process and to extract maximum economic returns. The joint statementof the six-party talks of September 2005 mentioned, among other things, that North Korea“committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” and thatit should also return at an early date to the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons) and to IAEA safeguards. Will North Korea ever give up its nuclear
weapons? There will be no way to see this goal achieved during the Bush administration.
How to bring about North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs will be a big challenge
for the new presidency.

A New Phase for Japan and China

Improved Tokyo-Beijing Relations

Relations among the three trans-Pacific powersHJapan, the United States, andChinaHhave changed since Japan’s leader, Yasuo Fukuda, took office in September 2007.

11

Fukuda does not want to upset foreign countries, nor does China’s President Hu, who
appears to want good working relations with Japan despite the opposition forces he faces
inside his country. It is too early to determine whether Hu has made a strategic change toseek long-term stable and equal relations with Japan or a tactical shift to show short-term
friendly relations with Japan just to get through, without incident, the Beijing Olympic
Games and the 2010 World Trade Fair to be held in Shanghai.
In December 2007, when Fukuda visited Beijing, Hu made conciliatory moves on
the highly controversial maritime boundary issue. In return, Fukuda muted his criticism inJanuary 2008 when frozen dumplings imported from China were found to containpoisonous pesticides, which naturally caused great anger in Japan. Then in February,
China’s public security authorities stated that after conducting a “thorough investigation,”they had found nothing wrong on their side, and so blamed the incident on Japan. The
Japanese public was furious, suspecting that the Chinese authorities had covered up thetruth. Prime Minister Fukuda, however, curiously referred to China’s “thoroughinvestigation” as a “positive posture.”
After March 14, when Chinese armed police carried out an extensive and harshcrackdown on antigovernment demonstrations by Tibetans, the Japanese public wasdeeply critical of the Chinese government’s behavior. But Fukuda again restrained
himself from making any controversial remarks. During President Hu Jintao’s official
visit for a few days from May 6, he did not criticize Hu publicly, although privately hesuggested that China try to create an atmosphere that would make all countries at the
Olympic Games feel welcome. Fukuda’s cordial gesture might have contributed to an
unexpected agreement on May 18 regarding joint development of seabed resources
around the disputed boundary areas, although the actual solution of the boundary was put
off.

12

In turn, this nascent partnership encouraged Japan to offer assistance on May 12
when a massive earthquake struck Sichuan Province. China accepted a Japanese rescue
team equipped with high-tech devices as well as medical teams. China also accepted,
initially and unofficially, Japanese emergency goods such as blankets and tents, to betransported by an Air Self-Defense Force airplane. But the offer was rejected by the
People’s Liberation Army authorities, who feared anti-Japanese protests from the public.
Nonetheless, the whole episode was indicative of the improved political climate of thetwo countries.
A Maritime Self-Defense Force escort ship (destroyer) visited China for a few
days starting on June 24, 2008, as a confidence-building measure for the two countries. It
was the first visit that a Japanese military ship had entered a Chinese port since WorldWar II. The purpose was to reciprocate a similar visit by a Chinese naval ship to theTokyo Bay in November 2007. Zhangjiang, a remote naval port in southern China,
reportedly was chosen because of Chinese authorities’ fear of anti-Japanesedemonstrations.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment Still Strong

Although government-to-government relations seem to have improved, the public
sentiment in both countries continues to be hostile toward each other. Most Japanese point
to serious crimes committed by Chinese living illegally in Japan, anti-Japanese sentimentin China, restriction of freedom of press and assembly in China, the lack of safety ofChinese-made food and toys, and, most recently, Tibet and air pollution. Most Chineserefer to wartime Japanese treatment of Chinese people as a major source of their hatred
and to Japanese control of the Senkaku (Daioyu, in Chinese) islands.

13

The Chinese people’s hostility toward the Japanese has deeper roots than those ofJapanese people’s hostility toward Chinese. Even the education of Chinese children isanti-Japanese and includes visits to war museums to see photos of Japanese atrocities.
Consequently, when President Hu Jintao wishes to establish a partnership with Japan, hemust take extreme care with what he says about Japan and China’s relations with Japan.
For example, when the Chinese government announced on May 18 that it had reached ajoint agreement with Japan to develop oil and natural gas reserves in the East China Sea,
Chinese responded on the Internet with condemnations of their government. And when
the news spread that a Japanese military plane might fly to China with earthquake-related
emergency goods spread, the government again was condemned, leading to thecancellation of the flight.
In the spring of 2008, Chinese youths in major cities demonstrated on the streets
during the Olympic torch relay. They also staged a boycott in front of Carrefour, a popular
French chain store, to protect the torch play runners who had been harassed in Paris. But
there were no repeats of the anti-Japanese demonstrations or boycotts that had taken placein April 2005. Nonetheless, such anti-Japanese disturbances could easily be reignited.
The Beijing Olympic Games, which are scheduled to start on August 8, are highly
likely to be an occasion for Chinese nationalism or antiforeign sentiment. In particular, if
a Chinese team should lose to Japan, Chinese authorities may not be able to control thewrath of its Chinese supporters. The two governments will thus be hard put to maintaintheir fragile relations. The stability of Tokyo-Beijing relations, however, is a key to bothpeace and stability in East Asia and the stability of trans-Pacific relations of the major
powers. The situation is calmer but still uneasy in East Asia.

14