May 2016

Prospects and Agenda
for Maritime Security Cooperationin the East and South China Sea– The Manila Symposium
Masashi Nishihara and Renato De Castro
Research Institute for Peace and Security, TokyoDe La Salle University, Manila
May 2016

  

  

  

  

  
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RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Prospects  and  Agenda     for  Maritime  Security  Cooperation     in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas  –  The  Manila  Symposium  
  
  
  
  
Masashi  Nishihara  and  Renato  De  Castro  

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security,  Tokyo  De  La  Salle  University,  Manila  May  2016  

  
  

  

Acknowledgment  The  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security  expresses  its  deep  appreciation  to  De  La  Salle  University,  Manila,  for  co-­‐‑hosting  the  Symposium  on  Maritime  Security  Cooperation  for  the  East  and  South  China  Seas  on  February  26,  2016.  We  wish  to  thank  all  the  participants  (panelists)  from  seven  countries  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  region  for  contributing  to  the  symposium  with  their  expertise  and  insight  and,  of  course,  their  papers.  
We  also  are  grateful  to  the  office  of  Japan’s  Cabinet  Secretariat  for  its  financial  support.  
  Masashi  Nishihara    President,  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security  May  2016  

  

  

  
  

  

Contents  Acknowledgment
Purpose  of  the  Manila  Symposium    1.  China’s  Objectives  in  Maritime  Asia  ...................................................................................  2    2.  Responses  to  China’s  Actions  ................................................................................................  3
ASEAN  Seeks  Peaceful  Resolutions  ....................................................................................  3
Non-­‐‑ASEAN  Nations’  Responses  Are  Tougher  ................................................................  4    3.  Responses  by  Individual  Countries  ......................................................................................  5
Indonesia  Is  More  Critical  ....................................................................................................  5
Is  Malaysia  Playing  It  Safe?  ..................................................................................................  6
The  Philippines  Is  Fighting  Back  .........................................................................................  6
Vietnam  Opts  for  Negotiation  .............................................................................................  7
Japan  Takes  a  Hard  Line  .......................................................................................................  8
Australia  Asserts  Its  Rights  ..................................................................................................  8
The  United  States  Uses  a  Combination  of  Responses  ......................................................  9    4.  Recommendations  ..................................................................................................................  10
Soft  Responses  ......................................................................................................................  10
Hard  Responses  ...................................................................................................................  11
Intermediate  Responses  ......................................................................................................  12    5.  Conclusions  .............................................................................................................................  13    Contributors  to  the  Symposium  ..............................................................................................  14
Co-­‐‑conveners  ........................................................................................................................  14
Guest  Speakers  .....................................................................................................................  14
Observers  ..............................................................................................................................  15
Secretariat  ..............................................................................................................................  15    Panelists  and  Papers  ..................................................................................................................  15

  

  

  
  

  

On  the  Manila  Symposium    On   February   26,   2016,   the   Research   Institute   for   Peace   and   Security   (RIPS),   Tokyo,   and  the   Department   of   International   Studies   of   De   La   Salle   University,   Manila,   convened   the  Symposium   on   Maritime   Security   Cooperation   for   the   East   and   South   China   Seas,   just   a  few  weeks  after  the  United  States  conducted  its  second  “freedom  of  navigation”  operation  in   the   South   China   Sea   and   after   China   installed   anti-­‐‑air   and   anti-­‐‑surface   missiles   on  Woody  Island  in  the  Paracel  Islands.  
The  thirteen  participants  attending  the  symposium  were  from  Indonesia,  Japan,  Malaysia,  the   Philippines,   Vietnam,   Australia,   and   the   United   States.   Their   exchanges   of   views   on  how   their   countries   should   react   to   China’s   expanding   area   of   influence   and   military  assertion  were  both  intensive  and  productive.  In  both  closed-­‐‑   and  open-­‐‑door  sessions,  the  participants   discussed   their   governments’   concerns   about   China’s   actions   in   the   East   and  South  China  Seas,  stressing  the  need  to  expand  their  cooperation.  The  main  points  of  their  discussion   are   summarized   in   this   report,   the   responsibility   for   which   rests   upon   the  co-­‐‑conveners,  Masashi  Nishihara  and  Renato  De  Castro.  

  
  

  

  
RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  1  -­‐‑  

  

  

1.  China’s  Objectives  in  Maritime  Asia  We  began  the  symposium  comparing  notes  on  China’s  motives  for  expanding  its  area  of  influence.   All   the   participants   expressed   serious   concerns   about   China’s   expansionist  military   claims   and   its   construction   of   artificial   islands   in   the   South   China   Sea.   They  generally   agreed   that   China’s   principal   objective   was   to   drive   out   the   United   States   from  maritime   Asia   and   to   establish   its   own   regional   hegemony   in   the   East   and   South   China  Seas.  Indeed,  China  refers  to  the  East  and  South  China  Seas  as  its  “core  national  interest.”  In   this   regard,   the   participants   brought   up   President   Xi   Jinping’s   speech   in   Shanghai   in  May  2014,  in  which  he  called  for  Asian  problems  to  be  solved  only  by  Asians  (that  is,  not  by  the  United  States).  
As   part   of   his   initial   presentation,   Patrick Cronin   (United   States)   noted   that   China’s  actions  “are  part  of  a  larger  pattern  of  challenging  a  post–World  War  II  regional  order  built  by   major   stakeholders,   including   the   United   States,   Japan,   and   many   others.”   He   stated  that   although   figuring   out   its   precise   aims   is   difficult,   “China   seeks   to   erode   America’s  preponderant   military   position   that   undergirds   the   regional   order.”   Alan Dupont  (Australia)   likewise   pointed   out   China’s   conviction   that   it   “can   never   be   number   one   in  Asia  unless  it  overturns  the  regional  order  established  by  Western  nations  at  the  end  of  the  Second   World   War.”   He   argued   that   China’s   objective   is   “pushing   the   US   out   of   the  western  Pacific  and  being  able  to  dominate  both  the  East  and  South  China  Seas.”  Renato De Castro   (Philippines)   emphasized   that   China   “no   longer   focuses   on  preempting  possible  US  intervention  in  a  Taiwan  Straits  crisis  but  on  denying  the  US  Navy  access  to  the  East  China  Sea  and  the  South  China  Sea  or  inside  the  First  Island  Chain.”  He  observed  that  “China’s  aggressive  pursuit  of  its  territorial  claim  over  the  South  China  Sea  has   increased   in   tandem   with   the   expansion   of   its   navy   and   maritime   services.”   Roilo
Golez  (Philippines)  then  talked  about  the  implications  of  a  militarized  Scarborough  Shoal  for   the   Philippines’   security:   “Under   the   control   of   China   and   once   militarized,  Scarborough   Shoal   could   be   transformed   into   an   unsinkable   aircraft   carrier   permanently  parked  in  our  front  yard,  well  within  our  EEZ.”  Dinh Nho Hung  (Vietnam)  interjected  that  “China   wants   to   control   strategic   choke   points   in   order   to   always   be   in   an   advantageous  position   to   maintain   its   geostrategic   centrality   in   Asia   and,   furthermore,   to   realize   the  ‘Chinese  dream.’ ”  Yoji Koda  (Japan),  however,  saw  China’s  main  interest  in  controlling  all  the  islands  and  reefs   inside   the   Nine-­‐‑Dashed   Line   as   protecting   its   strategic   nuclear   capability   and   using  Hainan  Island  as  a  base  for  its  anti-­‐‑submarine  warfare  (ASW)  capability  in  the  South  China  Sea.   He   added   that   China   also   wants   to   control   the   sea   lines   of   communication   (SLOC)  connecting   the   Indian   Ocean   and   the   Pacific   Ocean,   Japan’s   lifeline.   Referring   to   the    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  2  -­‐‑      importance  of  sea-­‐‑lanes  to  China,  Martin Sebastian  (Malaysia)  agreed  with  Koda,  stating  that   “the   Chinese   strategic   intent   protects   Chinese   interest   in   safeguarding   the   sea-­‐‑lanes  and  the  resources  it  needs  for  its  well-­‐‑being.”  Tran Viet Thai   (Vietnam)   then   pointed   out   that   China’s   massive   land   reclamation  activities  have  changed  the  balance  of  power  in  the  South  China  Sea  in  its  favor,  that  what  China  has  done  during  last  two  years  has  been  unprecedented,  and  that  it  has  completely  changed  the  region’s  strategic  security,  with  long-­‐‑term  implications.  
Turning  to  the  East  China  Sea,  Hideshi Tokuchi  (Japan)  stressed  that  “China  will  never  sacrifice  its  ‘national  core  interest,’  as  it  defines  it,  which  refers  to  both  the  Senkaku  Islands  and  the  South  China  Sea.”  Robert Eldridge  (United  States)  warned  that  Japan  should  not  “hope”  that  China  would  come  around  and  not  be  difficult  [regarding  this]  issue.”  He  also  noted   that   “a   China   in   control   of   the   Senkakus   would   be   dangerous   for   Japan,   for   the  United   States,   and   for   the   region   as   a   whole,   for   many   reasons.”   It   was   clear   that   both  Tokuchi  and  Eldridge  were  pessimistic  about  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Senkakus.  
China  is  trying  to  drive  out  the  United  States  from  maritime  Asia,  so  it  can  dominate  the  area  inside  its  Nine-­‐‑Dashed  Line  in  the  South  China  Sea.  In  2013  it  established  the  Hainan  Fishing   Zone   roughly   along   the   Nine-­‐‑Dashed   Line,   and   also   declared   an   Air   Defense  Identification   Zone   (ADIZ)   over   the   East   China   Sea.   Perhaps   in   the   future   China   will  establish  a  similar  ADIZ  over  the  South  China  Sea  and  a  fishing  zone  in  the  East  China  Sea.  
  2.  Responses  to  China’s  Actions  ASEAN  Seeks  Peaceful  Resolutions  Although   all   the   participants   agreed   on   China’s   objectives   in   the   East   and   South   China  Seas,   the   ASEAN   and   non-­‐‑ASEAN   participants   expressed   their   differences   on   how   to  respond.  The  ASEAN  participants  generally  sought  diplomatic  and  peaceful  resolutions  of  the   territorial   disputes.   With   some   exceptions,   their   responses   were   passive,   perhaps  because   their   countries   depend   heavily   on   trade   with   and   investment   from   China   and  because  they  also  are  militarily  inferior  to  China.  
Sebastian  (Malaysia)  wrote  in  his  paper  that  “ASEAN  is  not  used  to  superpower  games  and   has   not   been   in   military   alliance   with   any   power   as   a   bloc.   ASEAN   remains   as   a  political   security   community   preferring   passive   actions   against   China.”   Shafia Muhibat  (Indonesia)  maintained  that  “Southeast  Asia’s  engagement  with  China  is  aimed  at  securing  China’s   respect   for   norms   of   state   conduct   that   have   come   to   distinguish   the   collective    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  3  -­‐‑      culture  of  ASEAN  and  that  serve  the  cause  of  a  stable  regional  order.”  Sebastian’s   and   Muhibat’s   views   were   reminiscent   of   dialogues   that   have   been   taking  place   between   the   ASEAN   countries   and   China   since   the   1990s.   ASEAN’s   diplomatic  efforts   to   seek   peaceful   resolutions   and   not   to   resort   to   force   have   been   impressive.   For  instance,  the  organization  is  promoting  negotiations  to  establish  a  legally  binding  code  of  conduct   (COC)   for   the   South   China   Sea,   although   so   far   the   negotiations   have   not   been  successful.  The  Philippines,  however,  has  chosen  to  confront  China  directly  by  going  to  the  Arbitral   Tribunal   of   the   UN   Convention   on   the   Law   of   the   Sea   (UNCLOS),   at   the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  in  The  Hague.  
Worried  about  the  growing  wedge  between  China  and  ASEAN,  Beijing  has  conducted  a  “charm  offensive”  toward  the  ASEAN  nations  for  the  last  few  years,  proposing  a  third  plan  of   action   (2016–2020)   for  the  ASEAN–China   Joint   Declaration   on   Strategic   Partnership   for  Peace   and   Prosperity.   China   also   has   offered   to   conclude   a   treaty   of   good-­‐‑neighborliness,  friendship,   and   cooperation   and   to   upgrade   the   ASEAN–China   Free   Trade   Area.   More  recently,   China   proposed   a   “Maritime   Silk   Road   Initiative.”   ASEAN   has   welcomed   these  proposals  in  order  to  maintain  cooperative  relations  with  China.  
  Non-­‐‑ASEAN  Nations’  Responses  Are  Tougher  Although  non-­‐‑ASEAN  countries,  too,  have  sought  diplomatic  solutions,  they  tend  to  be  critical  of,  and  even  condemn,  China.  In  fact,  Australia,  Japan,  and  the  United  States  have  stated  that  they  would  be  willing  to  use  force  to  persuade  China  to  abide  by  the  rule  of  law.  
But  they  also  support  the  measures  that  ASEAN  has  taken  to  control  tensions  in  the  South  China   Sea,   as   well   as   such   ASEAN-­‐‑led   multilateral   institutions   as   ASEAN   Plus,   ASEAN  Regional  Forum,  East  Asia  Summit,  ADMM  Plus,  and  the  Shangri-­‐‑la  Dialogue.  
Even  so,  the  region’s  non-­‐‑ASEAN  countries  already  are  using  military  means  to  reinforce  their   diplomacy.   Since   October   2015   the   US   Pacific   Fleet   has   asserted   the   “freedom   of  navigation”   in   the   area   by   sailing   near   the   shoals   reclaimed   by   China.   Sebastian  (Malaysia)  wrote  about  Malaysia’s  having  sought  “the  assistance  of  Australia  and  United  States   to   conduct   aerial   patrols   in   the   South   China   Sea,   even   though   Malaysia   has   not  announced   this   publicly.”   Dupont   (Australia)   remarked   that   “for   many   decades   the  Australian  navy  has  periodically  sailed  through  the  South  and  East  China  Seas  on  freedom  of   navigation   exercises   while   Australian   maritime   patrol   aircraft   have   regularly   flown  surveillance   missions   over   the   South   China   Sea   from   Malaysia’s   Butterworth   Air   Base   as  part  of  Operation  Gateway.”  In  response  to  China’s  speedy  military  buildup  in  maritime  Asia,  Japan  has  increased  its    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  4  -­‐‑      defense   budget,   adopted   new   security   legislation   that   enables   Japanese   forces   to   work  closely  with  its  partner  forces  in  combat  situations,  and  revised  the  Japan–US  guidelines  for  cooperation   in   defense.   In   addition,   Japan   has   pledged   to   provide   coast   guard   vessels   to  Vietnam  and  the  Philippines.  “Minilateral”  security  arrangements,  which  include  Australia  and  India,  have  also  broadened  Japan’s  security  partnerships.  
  3.  Responses  by  Individual  Countries  The   countries   represented   in   the   symposium   all   have   different   relations   with   China,   in  accordance   with   their   history,   trade   and   investment,   domestic   politics,   and   geopolitical  factors   as   well   as   their   diplomatic   and   military   capabilities.   The   fact   that   Malaysia,   the  Philippines,   and   Vietnam   are   claimants   to   the   territorial   disputes   with   China,   whereas  Indonesia   is   not   has   also   colored   their   relations.   The   following   is   a   summary   of   the  participant  countries’  policies.  
  Indonesia  Is  More  Critical  Muhibat  (Indonesia)  stated  that  as  a  non–claimant  nation,  Indonesia  wanted  to  act  as  an  intermediary  in  the  territorial  disputes  in  the  South  China  Sea.  But,  she  wrote,  “Contrary  to  popular   belief,   Indonesia   is   not   a   ‘mediator’   because   the   dispute   has   not   entered   the  ‘mediation’   stage.”   As   an   alternative   confidence-­‐‑building   measure,   Indonesia   has   also  promoted   the   Workshop   on   Managing   Potential   Conflict   in   the   South   China   Sea.  
Indonesia’s   other   policies   include   support   for   the   ASEAN–China   dialogue   and,   with  Singapore,  another  non-­‐‑claimant  nation,  formulation  of  an  official  Code  of  Conduct.  
At  the  same  time  Muhibat  described  Jakarta’s  difficult  position.  By  insisting  that  Indonesia  must  strengthen  its  defense  of  the  Natuna  Islands,  its  naval  leaders  have  given  the  media  the  impression  that  Indonesia  no  longer  takes  a  neutral  position  in  territorial  disputes.  Although  China’s  territorial  water  claims  do  not  include  Indonesia’s  Natuna  Islands,  tensions  between  the  two  countries  have  mounted  since  2009  when  China’s  claims  encroached  on  Indonesia’s  Exclusive   Economic   Zone   (EEZ).   Tensions   then   peaked   in   March   2016   when   an   Indonesian  coast   guard   vessel   arrested   a   Chinese   fishing   boat   “illegally”   fishing   in   Indonesian   waters  and   began   towing   it   to   Indonesia.   Then   the   coast   guard   vessel   itself   was   intercepted   by   a  (larger)  Chinese  coast  guard  vessel.  
    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  5  -­‐‑  

  

  

Is  Malaysia  Playing  It  Safe?  
Even  though  it  is  a  claimant  state,  Malaysia  has  traditionally  pursued  a  “safe”  policy  in  the   South   China   Sea.   While   claiming   several   islands,   Kuala   Lumpur   at   the   same   time  has  been   careful   not   to   hurt   its   economic   and   political   ties   with   China,   which   is   Malaysia’s  largest  trading  partner.  
Yet  as  China  expands  its  sphere  of  domination,  creating  artificial  islands  for  military  use,  harassing  Malaysian  fishermen,  and  harvesting  rich  coral  beds,  Malaysia  has  become  more  and  more  critical  of  Beijing.  Indicative  of  this  change  are  President  Barack  Obama’s  visit  in  April   2014,   the   first   American   president   to   visit   Kuala   Lumpur   since   President   Lyndon  Johnson   came   in   1966,   and   the   tour   by   Malaysian   Defense   Minister   Hishammuddin  Hussein  of  a  US  aircraft  carrier.  
Although   Malaysia   agrees   with   other   ASEAN   countries   on   the   importance   of  establishing   a   formal   and   binding   code   of   conduct   (COC),   Sebastian   is   skeptical   of   its  efficacy.  In  his  words,  “China  clearly  did  not  have  much  interest  in  the  DOC  [Declaration  on  the  Conduct  of  Parties  in  the  South  China  Sea]  process  and  did  not  intend  to  implement  the  DOC  unless  it  jeopardizes  its  sovereignty  claims  in  the  South  China  Sea.”  Sebastian  also  referred  to  the  fact  that  China  had  placed  a  sovereignty  marker  on  James  Shoal,  the  southernmost  point  of  its  claim,  which  is  located  offshore  Sarawak,  Malaysia.  He  expressed   his   concern   about   Chinese   fishermen   catching   a   volume   of   fish   beyond   the  preservation   level   and   illegally   harvesting   coral.   As   he   noted,   “China’s   plundering   of   the  sea   goes   unnoticed   because   of   Malaysia’s   lack   of   capabilities   to   investigate   its   extent   of  China’s  plunder.  Kuala  Lumpur  has  requested  the  United  States  and  Australia  to  conduct  aerial  patrols  in  the  South  China  Sea.  
  The  Philippines  Is  Fighting  Back  The   Philippines’   conflict   with   China   heated   up   in   2012   when   the   latter   seized   the  Scarborough   Shoal.   Manila   decided   to   bring   this   case   against   a   series   of   China’s   claims  before   the   Arbitral   Tribunal   at   the   Permanent   Court   of   Arbitration,   in   order   to   build   up  strong   defense   ties   with   the   United   States   and   its   partners   as   well   as   to   buttress   its   own  armed  forces  and  coast  guard.  
In  its  statement  to  the  tribunal,  the  Philippines  asked  that  its  legal  entitlements  under  the  UN   Convention   of   the   Law   of   the   Sea   (UNCLOS)   be   determined   for   the   Spratly   Islands,  Scarborough   Shoal,   Mischief   Reef,   and   other   areas   inside   its   200-­‐‑mile   EEZ.   At   the   first  hearing  held  in  July  2015,  De Castro  (Philippines)  noted,  representatives  from  Indonesia,    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  6  -­‐‑      Japan,   Malaysia,   Thailand,   and   Vietnam   were   present.   Then   on   October   29,   2015,   the  tribunal  held  that  both  the  Philippines  and  China  were  parties  to  the  convention  and  thus  were  bound  by  its  provisions  on  the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  The  outcome  is  likely  to  be  issued  in  the  early  summer  of  2016.  
The   Philippines   has   responded   in   kind   to   China’s   military   expansionism   in   the   South  China   Sea,   clearly   the   toughest   decision   by   an   ASEAN   member.   The   Philippines   has  strengthened   its   security   ties   with   the   United   States   by   signing   the   Enhanced   Defense  Cooperation   Agreement   (EDCA),   accepting   the   rotational   presence   of   US   forces   in   its  country  and  providing  them  with  “the  most  extensive  access  to  Clark  Air  Base  and  Subic  Naval  Base.”  Manila   also   is   seeking   a   “strategic   partnership   with   Japan.”   President   Benigno   Aquino  and   Prime   Minister   Shinzo   Abe   have   met   often   to   promote   their   countries’   security  cooperation.  Japan  will  provide  the  Philippine  Coast  Guard  (PCG)  with  ten  patrol  boats  as  well  as  capacity-­‐‑building  training.  For  his  part,  President  Aquino  is  strengthening  both  the  Philippine   Armed   Forces   (PAF)   and   the   PCG.   As   De Castro (Philippines)   pointed   out,  Aquino’s   objectives   are   to   enhance   the   PAF’s   capabilities,   prioritize   its   needs,   and  gradually  restructure  its  forces  for  territorial  defense.  
  Vietnam  Opts  for  Negotiation  According  to  Tran  Viet  Thai,  the  official  position  of  the  Vietnamese  government  has  four  key   elements:   (1)   resolving   the   dispute   in   the   South   China   Sea   by   peaceful   means;   (2)  making   international   laws,   especially   the   UNCLOS   of   1982,   the   basis   for   resolving   the  dispute;  (3)  calling  on  all  concerned  parties  to  fully  implement  the  DOC  and  work  toward  realizing  a  binding  COC;  and  (4)  until  then,  persuading  all  parties  not  to  use,  or  threaten  to  use,  force  or  to  make  the  situation  more  complicated.  
Specifically,  although  Vietnam  and  China  should  resolve  bilateral  territorial  disputes  like  that  pertaining  to  the  Paracel  Islands,  multiparty  disputes  like  that  over  the  Spratly  Islands  should  be  settled  on  the  basis  of  equality,  mutual  respect,  and  international  laws,  especially  UNCLOS.   Vietnam’s   position   is   that   the   Nine-­‐‑Dashed   Line   is   not   based   on   international  laws  and  so  is  unacceptable.  Vietnam  opposes  any  action  that  might  restrict  navigation  and  overflights   in   the   South   China   Sea,   and   it   welcomes   external   actors   to   ensure   these  freedoms.  
Praising   Manila’s   action   in   The   Hague   as   “a   good   job,”   Tran Viet Thai (Vietnam)  maintained   that   Vietnam   also   sought   peaceful   resolutions,   noting   that   his   country   is  negotiating  with  China  on  issues  such  as  a  maritime  demarcation  of  the  waters  outside  the    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  7  -­‐‑      Gulf   of   Tonkin   and   is   presenting   its   position   on   the   unacceptability   of   the   Nine-­‐‑Dashed  Line.    Japan  Takes  a  Hard  Line  Japan   believes   that   its   sovereignty   over   the   Senkakus   is   “indisputable.”   Despite   this  explicit  position  on  the  legality  of  its  claim,  it  has  avoided  using  force  to  prevent  Chinese  government   vessels   and   fishing   boats   from   crossing   into   the   islands’   territorial   and  contiguous   waters.   Tokyo   opposes   China’s   unilateral   decision   to   create   an   air   defense  identification  zone  over  the  East  China  Sea,  which  includes  the  Senkakus.  It  is  concerned  as  well   about   the   militarization   of   Nanji   Island,   which   is   off   the   coast   of   Zheijiang   Province  and  only  300  kilometers  from  the  Senkakus.  
Eldridge   criticized   Japan’s   policy   of   “hope”—that   China   will   someday   acknowledge  Japanese   sovereignty   over   the   Senkakus—arguing   that   “it   has   in   fact   emboldened   China  over   the   past   few   years.”   He   proposed   that   instead,   Japan   set   up   weather   and   radar  facilities  and  station  government  officials  on  the  islands.        The   Japanese   government,   becoming   increasingly   worried   over   China’s   growing   naval  and  air  activities  in  the  East  China  Sea,  regards  Beijing’s  claim  to  the  Senkakus  as  part  of  its  bigger  strategy  to  drive  out  the  American  forces  from  Okinawa  and  establish  a  hegemonic  position  to  deny  access  to  the  East  China  Sea,  a  part  of  the  First  Island  Chain.  
As  Hideshi Tokuchi  noted,  four  of  China’s  nine  outlets  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  are  located  in  Japan’s  southwest  archipelago.  Japan  has  taken  several  measures:  increasing  its  defense  budget,   deploying   twice   as   many   F-­‐‑15   fighters   as   it   has   now   in   Naha,   Okinawa,   and  stationing   ground   troops   on   the   archipelago   as   well   as   constructing   larger   coast   guard  patrol  ships.  
Under   Prime   Minister   Abe’s   leadership,   Japan   is   establishing   closer   security   ties   with  Vietnam   and   the   Philippines   through   capacity-­‐‑building   assistance   and   is   supporting   the  ASEAN   and   the   ADMM   Plus   while   strengthening   its   alliance   with   the   United   States.   As  Yoji Koda   stressed,   “An   enhanced   Japan–USA   alliance   posture   will   surely   enable   a   more  flexible  deployment  posture  for  the  US  forces,  including  its  presence.”    Australia  Asserts  Its  Rights  According   to   Alan Dupont,   “As   an   Asian   Pacific   trading   nation   and   long-­‐‑standing   US  ally,   Australia   has   long   been   invested   in   the   preservation   of   a   rules-­‐‑based   regional    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  8  -­‐‑      maritime  order  that  respects  the  sovereign  and  legal  rights  of  all  countries  and  freedom  of  navigation   on   the   high   seas.”   For   many   decades,   Australian   naval   ships   have   sailed  through   the   East   and   South   China   Seas   to   conduct   their   freedom   of   navigation   exercises.  
The   navy   now   is   likely   to   conduct   its   missions   more   frequently,   in   order   to   support   the  ASEAN   countries’   maritime-­‐‑domain   awareness   and   to   strengthen   its   defense   and  intelligence  cooperation  with  like-­‐‑minded  partners.  
Australia’s  maritime  patrol  aircraft  have  conducted  surveillance  missions  over  the  South  China  Sea  as  part  of  Operation  Gateway,  using  Malaysia’s  Butterworth  Air  Base.  Since  late  2015,   Dupont   disclosed,   Australia’s   missions   have   often   encountered   Chinese   military  aircraft  warning  them  to  stay  away  from  the  area  under  Chinese  control.  
Australia’s   likely   responses   include   increasing   the   frequency   of   national   “freedom   of  navigation”   operations   (FONOPs)   in   the   South   China   Sea,   intensifying   and   broadening  joint   military   exercises   in   the   western   Pacific,   helping   improve   the   Southeast   Asian  countries’   maritime-­‐‑domain   awareness,   and   seeking   closer   defense   and   intelligence  cooperation  with  like-­‐‑minded  neighbors.  
As   Dupont   contended,   Australia   and   its   partners   should   expose   China’s   aggression   to  public  scrutiny  and  warn  China  of  its  loss  of  reputation  and  its  actions’  long-­‐‑term  political  cost.   Australia   and   its   regional   partners   should   coordinate   and   integrate   their   policies  toward   China,   spelling   out   possible   diplomatic,   political,   and   military   measures,   but   he  feels  that  they  should  not  gang  up  on  China.  
  The  United  States  Uses  a  Combination  of  Responses  With   its   strategy   of   “rebalancing”   the   region,   the   Obama   administration   has   been  countering  China’s  aggressive  salami-­‐‑slicing  tactics  in  maritime  Asia.  As  Cronin  indicated,  the   United   States   needs   to   “reassure   allies   and   friends   about   America’s   determination   to  remain   a   vital   and   permanent   Pacific   power.”   Washington   has   reassured   its   security  commitment   to   its   allies   and   like-­‐‑minded   partners   through   measures   such   as   high-­‐‑level  consultations,  new  security  arrangements,  and  joint  military  exercises.  
For  the  last  several  years,  the  United  States  has   successfully  moved  in  this  direction.  In  April   2014   President   Barack   Obama   visited   Tokyo,   Seoul,   Kuala   Lumpur,   and   Manila   in  order  to  reinforce  US  ties  with  Asia.  While  in  Tokyo,  he  reassured  Prime  Minister  Abe  of  the   United   States’   commitment   to   the   defense   of   the   Senkakus   in   accordance   with   the  countries’  bilateral  security  treaty.  President  Obama  also  was  the  first  US  president  to  visit  Malaysia   in   forty-­‐‑eight   years.   He   extended   US   military   support   for   the   search   for  Malaysian   Airlines   flight   370   and   urged   Malaysia   to   join   the   Trans-­‐‑Pacific   Partnership    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  9  -­‐‑      (TPP).   In   Manila,   he   bolstered   the   bilateral   security   treaty   and   supported   the   newly  arranged  Enhanced  Defense  Cooperation  Agreement.  In  November  2014,  President  Obama  visited   India,   Myanmar,   and   Australia.   Clearly,   these   visits   reflect   Washington’s   strategic  interest  in  counterbalancing  China’s  influence.  Finally,  in  February  2016  President  Obama  presided   over   the   US–ASEAN   Summit   in   Sunnylands,   California,   which   helped   solidify  their  ties.  Golez  praised  it  as  a  historic  achievement.  
The   United   States  should   have   a   long-­‐‑term   strategy,   founded   on   comprehensive   power  and   continuous   engagement.   According   to   Cronin,   the   United   States   should   be   able   to  sanction  China  for  “bad  behavior,”  but  at  the  same  time  it  should  have  adequate  economic,  diplomatic,   and   security   capability.   The   Obama   administration   has   been   diversifying   the  United  States’  regional  engagement  through  negotiations  on  the  Trans-­‐‑Pacific  Partnership  (TPP)  and  regional  conferences  like  the  US–ASEAN  Summit.	
 Washington  also  is  promoting  a   coalition   of   willing   states   to   voluntarily   support   a   binding   Code   of   Conduct   between  ASEAN   and   China   and   the   outcome   of   the   Arbitral   Tribunal.   And   the   United   States   has  worked   to   strengthen   its   alliances,   particularly   those   with   Australia,   Japan,   and   the  Philippines.     Building   partnership   capacity   is   important   to   most   of   the   countries   in   the   region,  including   Indonesia,   Malaysia,   the   Philippines,   and   Vietnam.   The   United   States’   strategic  relations   with   Vietnam   are   particularly   valuable   to   Washington.   Similarly,   greater  region-­‐‑wide   maritime   cooperation   can   lead   to   a   stronger   security   posture.   Accordingly,  Cronin   praised   Singapore’s   Information   Fusion   Center   for   calling   for   more   transparency  and  joint  operations  and  also  for  sharing  real-­‐‑time  information.  
  

4.  Recommendations  The   Manila   Symposium  participants   offered   a   number   of  recommendations   to   promote  cooperation  among  East  Asian  and  Pacific  countries  in  regard  to  China’s  expanding  naval  and  possibly  air  activities  in  maritime  Asia.  The  participants’  recommendations  described  in   their   papers   and   the   subsequent   discussion   may   be   categorized   as   soft,   hard,   and  intermediate  responses.  Each  nation’s  policies  tend  to  be  a  mixture  of  the  three.  
  Soft  Responses  Soft  responses  aim  at  resolving  disputes  and  tensions  in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas  through  diplomacy,  treating  China  as  a  partner  and  seeking  cooperation  on  security.  These    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  10  -­‐‑      responses  essentially  promote  confidence-­‐‑building  measures  and  include  the  following:  1.

Not  ganging  up  on  China.  In  the  long  run,  it  is  important  to  treat  it  as  both  an  economic  partner  and  a  security  partner.  Antagonizing  China  will  not  help  resolve  disputes.  

2.

Building  regional  norms  and  rules  and  emphasizing  international  rules  as  the  basis  of  regional  and  international  order  through  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  between  or  among  ASEAN  claimants.  

3.

Inviting  China  to  participate  in  regional  naval  and  ground  exercises,  confidence-­‐‑building  conferences,  and  crisis  management  mechanisms  to  demonstrate  the  benefits  of  being  a  cooperative  and  peaceful  member  of  the  community.  The  Western  Pacific  Naval  Symposium  was  cited  as  a  model.  In  2014  the  symposium  hosted  by  China  in  Qingdao  produced  the  Code  for  Unplanned  Encounters  at  Sea  (CUES),  a  confidence-­‐‑building  measure.  

4.

Continuing  to  support  ASEAN’s  position  on  the  COC  and  encouraging  ASEAN  to  continue  to  press  China  diplomatically  for  its  agreement.  

5.

Enhancing  the  ASEAN  secretary-­‐‑general’s  leadership  on  consultations  with  China  on  the  COC.  

6.

Supporting  Indonesia’s  and  Singapore’s  future  mediating  role  as  non-­‐‑claimants  in  bringing  about  reconciliation  among  the  disputants  in  South  China  Sea.  

7.

Encouraging  Japan  to  expand  its  public  diplomacy  and  declassify  information  on  the  Senkakus  in  order  to  convince  the  international  public  that  they  belong  to  Japan.  
  Hard  Responses  Hard   responses   involve   the   use   or   threat   of   force   and   intimidation   in   resolving   issues.  
The  recommendations  made  at  the  symposium  include:  1.

Creating  a  favorable  balance  of  power  against  China  and  making  sure  not  to  create  a  vacuum  of  power  in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas.  This  should  deter  China  from  taking  aggressive  and  intimidating  actions,  fearing  physical  retaliation.  The  stronger  US-­‐‑Philippines  alliance  and  US–Vietnam  strategic  relations  should  also  influence  the  regional  balance  of  power,  as  should  Japan’s  growing  security  relations  with  Manila  and  Hanoi.  The  Southeast  Asian  claimants  might  also  deploy  larger  law-­‐‑enforcement  ships  and  stronger  naval  ships  to  counter  Chinese  ships’  intimidation  tactics.  

2.

Encouraging  the  Philippines  to  develop  its  Oyster  Base  in  the  Palawan  Islands  to  gain  a  favorable  balance  of  power  in  the  South  China  Sea.  

3.

Preventing  China’s  reclamation  of  Scarborough  Shoal,  because  a  strategic  triangle  connecting  Woody  Island,  Fiery  Cross  Reef,  and  Scarborough  Shoal  would  tip  the  balance  of  power  in  the  South  China  Sea  in  China’s  favor.  
  RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  11  -­‐‑  

  

  
4.

Continuing  “freedom  of  navigation  and  overflights”  operations  but  perhaps  having  individual  countries  initiate  them  rather  than  depending  on  US-­‐‑led  multinational  operations,  to  avoid  the  impression  that  the  United  States  and  its  partners  were  ganging  up  on  China.  

5.

Lengthening  the  deployment  of  naval  law-­‐‑enforcement  vessels  by  the  United  States,  its  partners,  and  Southeast  Asian  claimants,  assuming  their  presence  will  increase  their  deterrence  capability  against  Chinese  ships.  
  Intermediate  Responses  Intermediate   responses,   between   the   soft   and   hard   responses,   include   the   following  recommendations:     
1.

Sharing  more  information  about  China’s  illegal  activities  and  exposing  them  to  public  scrutiny.  Singapore’s  Information  Fusion  Center  was  cited  as  a  model.  

2.

Continuing  to  support  the  Philippines’  case  being  considered  by  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  and  strongly  pressuring  China  diplomatically  when  or  if  it  is  supported  by  the  tribunal.  This  should  encourage  the  peaceful  and  law-­‐‑abiding  solution  of  disputes  according  to  international  law  (UNCLOS).  

3.

Considering  imposing  diplomatic  sanctions  on  China,  though  short  of  military  sanctions.  Prohibiting  the  import  and  export  of  certain  commodities  and  refusing  to  allow  tourists  to  visit  certain  attractive  areas  are  examples.  

4.

Building  a  web  of  security  “minilateral”  and  multilateral  linkages  among  like-­‐‑minded  countries  in  the  region,  which  would  include  stronger  US-­‐‑led  alliances.  Japan’s  transfer  of  coast  guard  vessels  and  its  support  of  capacity-­‐‑building  training  for  Vietnam  and  the  Philippines  were  cited  as  examples.  

5.

Protecting  the  marine  environment  in  the  South  China  Sea  from  China’s  indiscriminate  fishing  and  coral  harvesting,  through  a  region-­‐‑wide  monitoring  system.  
China  also  should  be  warned  of  the  cost  to  its  environmental  reputation  for  any  violations.  

6.

Reminding  China  that  the  United  States  is  committed  to  defending  the  Senkakus  under  Article  5  of  the  Japan-­‐‑US  Security  Treaty.  

7.

Strengthening  the  Japanese-­‐‑US  alliance  with  the  newly  revised  bilateral  Guidelines  for  Japan-­‐‑U.S.  Defense  Cooperation.  

8.

Encouraging  Japan  to  station  government  officials,  locate  communications  facilities,  and  perhaps  constructing  radar,  a  helicopter  base,  and  a  port  on  the  Senkakus.  
  

  

  

  
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5.  Conclusions  The  main  focus  of  the  symposium  was  on  what  China’s  leaders  intend  to  do  in  the  East  and   South   China   Seas   and   how   those   countries   affected   by   China’s   actions   could   work  together  to  dissuade  them.  All  the  participants  agreed  that  China’s  principal  motives  were  to  eliminate  the  United  States’  influence  in  the  Western  Pacific  and  to  dominate  maritime  Asia.  Even  while  the  Southeast  Asian  claimants  made  their  territorial  claims,  they  were  careful  not   to   damage   their   overall   relations   with   China.   Only   in   the   last   few   years,   after   China  started  its  extensive  and  unilateral  reclamation,  have  they  hardened  their  position.  
Among   the   Southeast   Asian   countries   covered   here,   Indonesia   and   Malaysia   have   been  more  constrained  in  their  criticism  of  China  than  Vietnam  and  the  Philippines  have  been,  and  they  now  have  invited  US  and  Japanese  naval  ships  to  visit  Cam  Ranh  Bay  and  Oyster  Bay,   respectively.   Although   Japan   now   finds   itself   in   a   different   security   environment   at  the  East  China  Sea,  its  tensions  with  China  are  the  same:  unilateral  coercive  behavior.  
On  the  whole,  the  regional  balance  of  power  in  the  South  China  Sea  is  more  favorable  to  China  than  to  the  United  States  and  its  partners.  How  it  can  tip  the  balance  in  its  favor  is  a  challenge.   Conversely,   the   balance   of   power   in   the   East   China   Sea   is   more   favorable   to  Japan  and  the  United  States  than  to  China,  although  it  is  slowly  shifting  to  China.  
The  responses  by  the  participants’  countries  are  a  mixture  of  soft,  intermediate,  and  hard  with  the  US  leadership  as  the  key  to  constraining  China’s  activities.  
Periodically   holding   a   symposium   of   this   kind   is   an   important   and   useful   way   of  discussing  where  the  participating  countries  stand  regarding  maritime  security  in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas.  

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Contributors  to  the  Symposium  Co-convenersn Dr.  Renato  De  Castro,  Professor,  International  Studies  Department,  De  La  Salle  University,  Manila  n Dr.  Masashi  Nishihara,  President,  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security,  Tokyo    Guest Speakersn Mr.  Vicente  Agdamag,  Deputy  Director  General,  National  Security  Council,  Manila  n Commodore  Joel  Garcia,  Director,  National  Coast  Watch  Center,  Manila  n Dr.  Gerardo  Janairo,  Chancellor,  De  La  Salle  University  n Hon.  Jesus  Yabes,  Undersecretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  for  Migrant  Workers  Affairs,  on  behalf  of  Hon.  Albert  Del  Rosario,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Philippines,  Manila  East  Asian  Countries  Indonesia  n Dr.  Shafiah  Muhibat,  Senior  Researcher,  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  (CSIS),  Jakarta  Malaysia  n Captain  Martin  Sebastian,  Head  of  Centre  for  Maritime  Security  and  Diplomacy,  Maritime  Institute  of  Malaysia,  Kuala  Lumpur  Philippines  n Hon.  Roilo  Golez,  former  National  Security  Adviser,  National  Security  Council  of  the  Philippines,  Manila  n Captain  Teddy  Quinzon,  Philippine  Navy,  on  behalf  of  Major  General  Guillermo  Molina,  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Plans,  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines,  Manila  Vietnam  n Dr.  Tran  Viet  Thai,  Deputy  Director-­‐‑General,  Institute  for  Foreign  Policy  and  Strategic  Studies,  Diplomatic  Academy  of  Vietnam,  Hanoi  n Mr.  Dinh  Nho  Hung,  Vice  President,  Diplomatic  Academy  of  Vietnam  Japan  
n Mr.  Hideshi  Tokuchi,  former  Vice  Minister  of  Defense  for  International  Affairs,  Ministry  of  Defense,  Tokyo  n Vice  Admiral  (Ret.)  Yoji  Koda,  Commander  in  Chief,  Self-­‐‑Defense  Fleet,  Japan  Maritime  Self-­‐‑Defense  Force  Pacific  Countries  Australia  n Dr.  Alan  Dupont,  Professor,  University  of  New  South  Wales,  Sydney  United  States  n Dr.  Patrick  Cronin,  Senior  Adviser  and  Senior  Director,  Asia-­‐‑Pacific  Security  Program,  Center  for  a  New  American  Security,  Washington,  DC      RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  14  -­‐‑      n Dr.  Robert  Eldridge,  former  Deputy  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Government  and  External  Affairs,  Marine  Corps  Installations  Pacific/Marine  Forces,  Japan,  Naha,  Okinawa    Observersn Mr.  Thanh  Vu,  Research  Associate,  Institute  for  Defence  International  Relations,  Diplomatic  Academy  of  Vietnam  n Mr.  Takakazu  Watanabe,  Cabinet  Secretariat,  Tokyo  n Mr.  Kenji  Maki,  Cabinet  Secretariat,  Tokyo    Secretariatn Dr.  Atsushi  Yasutomi,  Senior  Researcher,  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security  n Mr.  Santi  Castillo,  Teaching  Assistant,  Department  of  International  Studies,  De  La  Salle  University  n Ms.  Riko  Watanabe,  Research  Assistant,  Research  Institute  for  Peace  and  Security    Panelists  and  Papers  n Cronin,  Patrick.  “Challenge  and  Response  in  Maritime  Asia.”  n De  Castro,  Renato.  “Confronting  China’s  Maritime  Expansion  in  the  South  China  Sea:  The  Case  of  the  Philippines.”  n Dinh,  Nho  Hung.  “Towards  an  Enhanced  Regional  Security  Architecture  in  East  Asia.”  n Dupont,  Alan.  ”China’s  Maritime  Strategy  in  the  Western  Pacific:  An  Australian  View.”  n Eldridge,  Robert.  “How  Should  We  Cope  with  the  Situation?  The  View  from  the  United  States  (Western  Pacific),  with  a  Focus  on  the  Senkaku  Islands  Dispute.”  n Golez,  Roilo.  “An  Analysis  of  the  More  Recent  Developments  in  the  South  China  Sea  Situation.”  n Koda,  Yoji.  “Maritime  Security  Cooperation  in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas:  Japan’s  Perspectives.”  n Muhibat,  Shafiah.  “Indonesia  and  the  South  China  Sea.”  n Quinzon,  Terry.  (no  paper).  
n Sebastian,  Martin.  “China  and  the  South  China  Sea—The  Need  for  Collaborative  Action.”  n Thai,  Tran  Viet.  “China’s  Expansionist  Activities  in  South  China  Sea  in  2015  and  Some  Recommended  Ways  to  Cope  with  It.”  n Tokuchi,  Hideshi.  “Regional  Security  Cooperation  to  Address  Chinese  Activities  in  the  East  and  South  China  Seas:  A  Japanese  Perspective.”    RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  -­‐‑  15  -­‐‑      RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  Back  issues    No.  23  (April  2015)  「安倍政権の評価と展望−論評集」RIPS’  EYE  2014-­‐‑2015  (2014 年 2 月〜2015 年 3 月ウェブ掲載分)    No.  22  (February  2015)  Building  a  Framework  for  Japan-­‐‑US-­‐‑Vietnam  Trilateral  Cooperation,  Series  4:  How  Japan  Can  Counter  China’s  Coercive  Actions  &  Humanitarian  Assistance  and  Disaster  Relief    No.  21  (January  2015)  防衛装備移転三原則とグローバル化時代の日本の防衛産業   (Japan'ʹs  Defense  Industries  and  Its  New  Principles  of  Arms  Transfer)    No.  20  (September  2014)  Building  a  Framework  for  Japan-­‐‑US-­‐‑Vietnam  Trilateral  Cooperation,  Series  3:  China’s  Assertive  Conduct  (Masashi  Nishihara),  Responses  to  Rising  Tensions  in  The  South  China  Sea  (Yoji  Koda)    No.  19  (September  2014)  Masahiro  Matsumura,   「自衛隊による下地島空港の活用に備えよ」Using  Okinawa’s  Shimoji  Airport  for  National  Defense    No.  18  (February  2014)  Building  a  Framework  for  Japan-­‐‑US-­‐‑Vietnam  Trilateral  Cooperation  Series  2:  The  Changing  Security  of  the  Sea  Lines  of  Communication  in  the  Indian  and  Pacific  Oceans  (Masashi  Nishihara  and  Yoji  Koda)    No.  17  (November  2013)  Building  a  Framework  for  Japan-­‐‑US-­‐‑Vietnam  Trilateral  Cooperation:  Analyses  from  Japanese  perspectives  (Satoru  Mori  and  Masashi  Nishihara)    No.  16  (December  2012)     RIPS  Symposium  2012,  Summary  Report:  Responses  to  Japan’s  New  Arms  Export  Policy    No.15  (November  2012)  Masashi  Nishihara,  “Can  Japan  Restore  Its  Place  in  Asia?”    No.14（2012 年 3 月）  RIPS 公開セミナー2011（2011 年 10 月）「災害対策と防衛のために新技術をどう活かすか」    No.13（February  2012）  RIPS  Symposium  2011,  “New  High-­‐‑Techs  for  Disaster  Relief  and  National  Defense.”      RIPS  Policy  Perspectives  No.  24  

  
  

  

  
No.12  (2012 年 2 月)  RIPS 春季公開セミナー(2011 年 5 月)、「日露関係と北方領土返還の展望―東日本大震災後に考える日本の対応」    No.  11  (August  2011)        Masashi  Nishihara,  “Asian  Perspectives  in  2011:  China’s  ‘Coercive’  Diplomacy  Leads  to  New  Power  Realignments.”    No.10  (January,  2010)       Michimi  Muranushi,  “North  Korea’s  Abduction  of  Japanese  Citizens:  The  Centrality  of  Human  Rights  Violation.”    No.9  (July  29,  2009)    Masashi  Nishihara,  “Asian  Perspectives  in  2009:  Hopeful  Signs  and  Growing  Concerns.”    No.8  (June  3,  2009)  Masahiro  Matsumura,  “Japan’s  Policy  Options  for  Taiwan-­‐‑  June  2009.”  
  

  

  
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