STRATEGICCOMPASSNew bearings for EU
security and defence?
By
Daniel Fiott and Gustav LindstromWith contributions from
Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Bastian Giegerich,
Justyna Gotkowska, Volker Jacoby, Elena
Lazarou, Alessandro Marrone, Jean-Pierre
Maulny, Kristi Raik, Teija Tiilikainen

CHAILLOT PAPER /December 2021

171

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STRATEGICCOMPASSNew bearings for EU
security and defence?
By
Daniel Fiott and Gustav LindstromWith contributions from
Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Bastian Giegerich,
Justyna Gotkowska, Volker Jacoby, Elena
Lazarou, Alessandro Marrone, Jean-Pierre
Maulny, Kristi Raik, Teija Tiilikainen

CHAILLOT PAPER /December 2021

171

The authors
Daniel Fiott is Security and Defence Editor at
the EU Institute for Security Studies. He analyses EU security and defence, CSDP and theEuropean Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

Acknowledgements
Daniel Fiott would like to thank Marco Zeissfor his invaluable support with the EUISS
survey and for carefully reading through thetext. Alessandro Marrone would like to thankVincenzo Camporini, Karolina Muti, Nicoletta
Pirozzi, Stefano Silvestri and Paola Tessari for
their feedback on the survey responses that fed
into the drafting of this Chaillot Paper. Lastly,
Daniel Fiott and Gustav Lindstrom thank their
EUISS colleagues for their feedback and input
towards the Chaillot Paper. In particular, gratitude is extended to Florence Gaub and Giovanni Faleg for reviewing the report.

Gustav Lindstrom is the Director of the EU
Institute for Security Studies. His key areas of analysis include CSDP, cybersecurity,
EU-NATO relations and emerging security
challenges.

The EUISS Chaillot Paper series
The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes
its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéroarea of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building occupied by
the Western European Union (WEU). The hillis particularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,
and housed NATO’s provisional headquartersfrom 1952 until 1959.

1

CONTENTS
Executive summary

2

Introduction

4

CHAPTER 1
Enhancing the EU’s ability to act

8

CHAPTER 2
Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience

20

CHAPTER 3
Investing in capabilities and technologies

30

CHAPTER 4
Deepening the EU’s partnerships

38

Conclusion

46

Annexes52

Annex 1 EUISS support for the Strategic Compass process 52
Annex 2 Questionnaire for the Chaillot Paper authors

53

Annex 3 EUISS Survey

54

Abbreviations

58

Notes on the contributors

60

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Chaillot Paper provides an in-depth analysis of European security and defence policy
ahead of the adoption of the Strategic Compass in early 2022. It also offers numerous
recommendations and policy considerations
in support of the implementation phase of theCompass. To this end, the report combines theinsights of eleven expert contributors and theresults of a questionnaire sent by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to 120 individuals representing government-affiliatedresearch institutions, institutions affiliated tointernational organisations, think tanks anduniversities.
The Chaillot Paper is structured along fourchapters. These mirror the four baskets associated with the Strategic Compass: crisis
management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. The analysis suggests that while theEU has come a long way in the security anddefence domain, there is still progress to bemade and specific considerations to be taken
into account.
Within the crisis management basket, thegeographical regions likely to require mostattention from the EU over the next ten years
are the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Eastern Europe and theIndo-Pacific. Concerning planning and conduct capabilities for crisis management,
survey respondents suggest that current
military planning and conduct structures
are not well suited to meet the threats andchallenges the EU will face in the next 5 - 10
years. Specifically, just 8 % of respondents
agree that such structures are currently adequate. On the civilian side, 34 % of respondents consider current planning and conduct
structures to be well-suited. Looking ahead,greater flexibility represents an opportunity
for improvement. Examples of such measures include experimenting with the use of
Article 44 TEU, considering ‘scalable’ mission mandates for certain civilian missions

and further leveraging opportunities offeredby the newly created European Peace Facility.
In the area of resilience, several tasks are identified as the most pressing over the coming
5 – 10 years. Among those given the highest
level of attention (high importance and medium importance) are countering hybrid threats,
cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure, counter-terrorism, assistance forpublic health, border management, and managing the security-related effects of climatechange. To promote resilience, the EU could
take a broader outlook that goes beyond thecommon security and defence policy (CSDP).
This should help better respond to threatsemanating from strategic domains such as themaritime, space and cyber environments. A
potential building block is to leverage existing
concepts, such as the Coordinated Maritime
Presences concept, to new areas such as the
Indo-Pacific. More reflection is likewise needed to understand the potential applicability of
Articles 42.7 TEU (‘mutual assistance clause’)and Article 222 TFEU (‘solidarity clause’). Over
90 % of survey respondents agree that the EUshould be prepared to support a Member Stateor Member States after the invocation of either clause.
Concerning capabilities, there is a recognition that EU Member States will continue toface a considerable number of civilian andmilitary capability gaps. To develop the full
spectrum of capabilities needed to meet its
level of ambition in security and defence, theStrategic Compass may need to define capabilities beyond CSDP terms. Specific capability clusters that may provide the most utility
to the EU over the coming 5-10 years include
air capabilities (aircraft, strategic transport,
tankers), enablers (space, cyber, training) andnaval capabilities (frigates, submarines, andunmanned vehicles). With respect to domain
areas, EU Member States are likely to need toenhance their presence at sea and in space.

Executive summary ﻿

Relating to space, without the modernisationand protection of the EU’s space-based capacities, there is a risk that the Union’s ability
to conduct military operations, monitor arms
trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity andobserve environmental and climactic changes
from space will be undermined.
With regard to partnerships, the Strategic
Compass offers an opportunity to reassess
how the Union thinks about partnerships inrelation to security and defence. Survey respondents allocate the most importance to‘using partnerships more closely with international organisations such as NATO, the UN,
AU and ASEAN’ (92 % giving this high/medium importance) and ‘using partnerships to
support sub-regional security integration’ (83% assigning this high/medium importance).
Overall, there is growing recognition thatstrategic competition impacts partnerships, sothat these are seen less in transactional terms
and more in line with whether partners sharethe same sets of values, or at least, interests.
As a result, the Strategic Compass represents

3

an opportunity to solidify and further develop
the conceptualisation of partnerships towards
states, international organisations, non-state
actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private sector entities.
Overall, this Chaillot Paper should be seen as
one part of a broader contribution by the EUISS to the Strategic Compass process. The
Institute was actively engaged with providing analytical input to the process throughthe organisation of workshops. Indeed, outof the approximately 50 dedicated workshops
organised during the Strategic Compass dialogue phase, the Institute was responsible
for co-organising 12 workshops along with 9
different EU Member States and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) (see Annex I for
the full range of activities). Additionally, the
EUISS also supported a range of other activities through the moderation of panels, speaking engagements and direct substantive input
during the Compass drafting phase.

4

INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years the European Union has enhanced its role as a security and defence actor. The EU has proven its ability to
deploy civilian and military missions and operations to its near and wider neighbourhoods.
Since the early 2000s, the CSDP has evolved
from a political concept on paper into morethan thirty civilian and military deployments.
Today, the CSDP can claim its own autonomous decision-making apparatus and nascentcommand and control (C2) facilities. While itis true that many EU missions and operations
are conducted in relatively low-intensity environments, deployments are varied and tackle a range of tasks such as capacity building,military training, border monitoring and naval
operations (1).
Since 2016, and beyond CSDP missions andoperations, the Union has intensified workon a broader set of security and defence toolsthat include capability development anddefence-industrial policy (2). For example, today the EU can finance and develop militarycapabilities to support the European defence
industry. The EU is also investing in dual-use
transport infrastructure to facilitate military
mobility across Europe. What is more, the EU
is generating the capacities required to counter hybrid threats such as the manipulationof the information environment, attacks anddisturbances against critical infrastructureand election interference. Bridging its efforts between security and defence and justiceand home affairs also allows the EU to address cross-border security concerns such as

cyber-attacks and the instrumentalisation ofirregular migration and borders.
The EU has, therefore, sought to build on CSDP
with a broader EU security and defence policythat moves beyond crisis management and capacity building. Such a shift reflects the evolving and intensifying threats facing the EU. In
2021 alone, the Union has had to contend withforced irregular migration into the EU facilitated by Belarus and an air hijacking over EU
airspace, further deteriorating ties with Russia, war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, theinternational response to the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions with Turkey, strained tradeand investment relations with China, conflictin the Sahel, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and more. This is not even to speak ofconcerns about the transatlantic relationship,with Washington focusing on China and theIndo-Pacific. The climate and digital transitions equally pose major security concerns
for the EU.
The weight of such threats, risks and challenges calls for a robust and sustained diplomatic and security effort by the EU. CSDP
alone cannot be the answer as it largely addresses crisis management tasks and does not
exploit the full potential of the EU’s foreign,
security and defence tools. What is more, theEU is also trying to make sense of the insecureworld around it with a narrative that galvanises the efforts of institutions, Member States
and citizens. The High Representative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs and Security andVice-President of the European Commission(1)

Fiott, D. (ed.), The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris,
March 2020 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/csdp-2020).

(2)

Nunes, I.F., ‘European Defence Cooperation’, Nação e Defesa, No. 150, Institute for National Defence, Lisbon, 2018, pp. 4875 (https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/29549/1/NeD150_IsabelFerreiraNunes.pdf).

﻿Introduction(HR/VP) has stated that the EU ‘has to learn to
use the language of power’ (3) and he has alsogone on to call for the emergence of a strategic culture in security and defence (4). Both ofthese pleas point to a recognition that the EUneeds a more unified strategic approach to thesecurity challenges and threats it faces and theevident strategic competition that is defining
international politics presently.
This is where the EU’s Strategic Compass is
supposed to come in. Part strategy, part action plan, the Strategic Compass will provide
greater direction for the Union’s efforts in security and defence out to 2030. It will do thisby providing an account of the strategic environment of the EU and defining key deliverables that need to be achieved over the nextten years. The Compass should not be seen asa revision or a replacement of the EU Global Strategy, even if it will update how the EU
understands the world it inhabits. In fact, oneof the key and novel features of the Strategic
Compass is that it is based on a classified intelligence EU Threat Analysis (5). Unlike the EU
Global Strategy, the Compass process beganin November 2020 when the EU IntelligenceCentre (INTCEN), the EU Military Staff (EUMS)
intelligence branch and national intelligenceagencies assessed the strategic risks facing theUnion today and how they would evolve in thedecade leading up to 2030.
The EU Threat Analysis is novel in that it was
not a politically agreed document, and EU

5Member States did not have the opportunity
to dispute or amend (by toning down or removing) the conclusions of intelligence officers. While the document remains classified,
we have a general overview of the scope ofthe threats facing the EU. Indeed, the Threat
Analysis differentiated between three sorts ofthreats: global, regional and state/non-stateled. At the global level, the Threat Analysis
identified economic rivalry, resource dependencies, migratory pressures and military force
as the major threats facing the EU. At the regional level, the Analysis pointed to the riseof regional powers and the influence of actorsthat are hostile to the EU. In particular, theThreat Analysis stated that regional powers
will attempt to exploit the fragilities of certain
states and the spill-over effects of crisis situations. Lastly, the Threat Analysis outlined how
state and non-state actors are using unconventional or hybrid tactics such as information
operations, terrorism and disruptive technologies to undermine the Union’s security (6).
The Threat Analysis therefore not only set theparameters of the Strategic Compass process
but it also updated the strategic assessment
embedded in the EU Global Strategy, which already assumed that the EU was under threat (7).
More accurately, if the Global Strategy can belikened to a ‘national security strategy’, thenthe Compass can be seen as a sort of ‘WhiteBook’ on security and defence. In any case,the Strategic Compass was initiated to provide
greater clarity on an implementation plan that(3)

European Parliament, ‘Hearing with High Representative/Vice President-designate Josep Borrell’, 7 October 2019 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/hearing-with-high-representative-vice-presidentdesignate-josep-borrell).

(4)

Borrell Fontelles, J.,‘Europe cannot afford to be a bystander in the world. We need a “Strategic Compass”’, 10 October
2021 (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/105369/europe-cannot-afford-be-bystander-worldwe-need-“strategic-compass”_en). See also Koenig, N., ‘The EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: Just
another paper?’, Policy Paper, Hertie School/Jacques Delors Centre, 10 July 2020 (https://hertieschool-f4e6.kxcdn.com/
fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20200710_
Strategic_Compass_Koenig.pdf).

(5)

European External Action Service, ‘Memo - Questions and Answers: Threat Analysis - a Background for the Strategic
Compass’, 20 November 2020 (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89049/questions-andanswers-threat-analysis-–-background-strategic-compass_en).

(6)

Ibid. See also Simon, E., ‘Multiple security interests, multiple threats, one European response?’, Analysis, No. 11, April 2021
(https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Analyse-11-Multiple-security-interests-April-2021-.pdf);
Fiott, D., ‘Uncharted territory: Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence’,
Brief No. 16, EUISS, July 2020 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/uncharted-territory-towards-common-threatanalysis-and-strategic-compass-eu-security-and).

(7)

European External Action Service, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, June 2016, p. 7 (https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

6

derived from the Global Strategy (8). Specifically, the Compass has to provide a detailed
account of how the EU will secure the levelof ambition on security and defence that it
agreed in November 2016. This level of ambition called for the EU to be better at responding to crises, engaging in capacity building andprotecting Europe and Europeans. The Council
Conclusions in which this level of ambition
was outlined never quite articulated how theUnion should achieve these tasks (9).

engaged with the drafting process since at least
February 2021. Based on a series of scoping papers prepared by the EEAS, Member States were
engaged in a ‘dialogue phase’ between February and October 2021 where they drafted over
25 non-papers and organised approximately
50 workshops on various aspects of EU security
and defence (see Annex 1 on page 52). Member States are, therefore, well-prepared for theremaining months of negotiating the Strategic
Compass text.

The Strategic Compass document should be
adopted by the European Council in March 2022,
and it will be implemented by the EU and its
Member States by 2030. On 15 November 2021,
HR/VP Borrell presented the first draft of theCompass to EU defence ministers. While the document has still not been endorsed by EU Member
States, the HR/VP’s foreword to the draft indicated that concrete policy ideas had been presented to governments aimed at ensuring that
the Union can act more quickly and decisively
when facing crises, secure EU citizens against
fast-changing threats, invest in the capabilities
and technologies that the EU needs and partnerwith others to achieve common goals (10). Until
the end of February 2022, EU Member States will
be able to make substantive contributions to thedraft document. Based on this feedback, the HR/
VP will be expected to deliver two re-drafts of
the Compass in early 2022.

Nevertheless, with the remaining few monthsof negotiation left there is a need to couple thereflections of EU Member States and the EEAS
with the views of the research and analysis
community. This is essential as the Compass
is likely to define the shape of CSDP and EU
security and defence for the coming decade (11).
Indeed, this Chaillot Paper is designed to provide the EU Member States and EEAS with further views on the strategic threats facing the
EU and what more the Union can do to address
them. The HR/VP’s foreword to the Compass
already indicates that the EU must ready itself
for greater global strategic competition and it
must also rethink how it conducts itself as acrisis manager and capacity builder (12). Thereis, therefore, a clear need to be more concretein the ways that the Union can protect Europe
and Europeans. The Chaillot Paper addresses
these themes by drawing together the expertise of various think tank and research analysts
from across the EU, and it complements thefindings with the results of a survey conducted by the EU Institute for Security Studies in
February-April 2021.

Indeed, the draft delivered in mid-November
2021 is supposed to stimulate EU Member States
into thinking about whether existing EU tools
and approaches in security and defence are
fit-for-purpose in tackling the threats outlinedby the EU’s intelligence actors. The few months
until March 2022 may seem like a slim timeframe in which to provide feedback on the firstdraft, but in fact EU Member States have been

(8)

More specifically, this Chaillot Paper informs
the Strategic Compass process through fourquestions that are inspired by the frameworkof the ‘dialogue phase’ that began in February

Council of the European Union, ‘Implementation Plan on Security and Defence’, 14392/16, 14 November 2016 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22460/eugs-implementation-plan-st14392en16.pdf).

(9)

Ibid.

(10)

Borrell Fontelles, J., ‘A Strategic Compass to make Europe a security provider - A Foreword’, 15 November 2021 (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/foreword_-_a_strategic_compass_to_make_europe_a_security_provider.pdf).

(11)

For an account of how the CSDP could evolve in the years leading up to 2030, see Lindstrom, G., ‘Emerging security
challenges: Four futures for CSDP’, in The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, op.cit., pp. 88-96.

(12)

Ibid.

﻿Introduction﻿

72021 and ended in October 2021. During thisphase, the EEAS and EU Member States agreed
to divide the reflection process into four ‘baskets’: (1) crisis management; (2) resilience; (3)capabilities; and (4) partnerships (13). Clearly,
it is rather artificial to separate each of thesebaskets when thinking about EU security anddefence. Furthermore, it is also clear that thebaskets on crisis management and resilience
are action-oriented, whereas the baskets oncapabilities and partnerships can be considered as the means needed to ensure that theUnion is resilient and a more effective crisis manager. Nonetheless, for the purposesof providing an analysis that is focused andstructured it makes sense to follow the same
framework used during the dialogue phase of
the Compass.

understanding of the threats facing the EU, andthe volume provides 20 specific policy recommendations for the EEAS and the EU Member
States to consider as they negotiate the firstdraft of the Strategic Compass. The content ofeach chapter was generated by the responses of the 11 authors involved in this written
project. In preparation for each chapter, theauthors were asked to complete a qualitative
questionnaire of 20 structured questions (seeAnnex 2 on page 53 for the questions). The answers to these questionnaires were comparedand they form the basis of the substantive
points of convergence and divergence found ineach of the four chapters. It should be notedthat this is a collective effort, but none of theauthors can be held individually responsible
for the content of the work.

Accordingly, the four questions that this Chaillot Paper addresses are:

In addition to the contributions of the 11
authors, this Chaillot Paper benefits froman anonymous survey that was conductedby the EUISS in February 2021. The online
survey composed of 21 multiple choice andopen-ended questions was sent to over 120
individuals from think tanks and universities
based in the EU (see Annex 3 on page 54 for thequestions). Overall, 76 individuals responded
to the questionnaire, resulting in a response
rate of 63 %. Out of this number, 23 individuals represented government-affiliatedresearch
institutions,
6internationalorganisation-affiliated research institutions
and 47 independent think tanks or universities. The initial 120 invitees were selected on
the basis of a geographical and gender balance, as well as their expertise in the field of
EU security and defence. No government or
EU officials were surveyed in order to avoid
any institutional bias. The survey responses
are found in each chapter: multiple choiceanswers are represented in the form of visuals, and open-ended question responses canbe found in clearly marked boxes.

1. Crisis management: How should the EU
adapt its civilian and military missions andoperations between 2021 and 2030? In whatways can they be adapted to address theglobal, regional and state/non-state threats
identified by the EU Threat Analysis?
2. Resilience: What does resilience mean in thecontext of the threats facing the Union?
How can the EU strengthen its resilience
with security and defence instruments?
3. Capabilities: What critical capability gaps
does the EU need to fill over the next 5-10
years? Are there specific technologies andprogrammes that should be prioritised?
4. Partnerships: How should the EU conceiveof partnerships in security and defence andis there room to reframe how the Union
thinks about strategic partnerships?
Each of these sets of four questions are addressed in four individual chapters in thisChaillot Paper. Each chapter provides a strategic(13)

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Security and Defence’, 8910/20, 17 June 2020 (https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/44521/st08910-en20.pdf).

8

CHAPTER 1

ENHANCING THE EU’SABILITY TO ACTThe Strategic Compass will have to establish
how the EU can continue to be an effective crisis manager and capacity builder in the years
leading up to 2030. Crisis management andcapacity building are at the core of the EU’s
security and defence policy and the Union canalready draw on a 20-year experience of civilian and military deployments outside theterritory of the EU. Today, the EU deploys landand naval personnel to geographical states
and areas such as the Central African Republic, the Horn of Africa, Ukraine and more. In
this sense, the EU continues to plan and conduct crisis operations and capacity building
missions in line with the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (1),the Illustrative Scenarios (2) and the Headline
Goals. These guiding principles underline that
the EU should be able to effectively undertake
tasks such as peace enforcement, rescue andevacuation, combat operations, civilian assistance and more. At a basic level, the Strategic Compass offers an opportunity to reassess
the feasibility and necessity of such tasks inlight of the threats identified by the EU Threat
Analysis (3).
In this respect, the Compass has to show inmore detail how the Union will deliver on thelevel of ambition in security and defence thatwas set after the EU Global Strategy. As a firststep, there is a need to grapple with the concept of ‘permissiveness’ and CSDP operations
and missions (4). Indeed, the Union has become accustomed to deploying missions andoperations in relatively low-intensity environments. This implied a high-level of permissiveness where the EU’s political objectives
could be achieved without incurring severe
political costs (e.g. loss of life or capabilities intheatre). However, today EU deployments operate in a more hostile strategic environment
with the presence of strategic competitors andtactics such as disinformation campaigns andcyberattacks (5). The Compass offers a chance
to think about how existing and future CSDP
missions and operations can withstand suchpressures.

(1)

The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ can be found in Article 43(1) of the TEU and they include: (1) joint disarmament operations; (2)humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks:and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All thesetasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism intheir territories.

(2)

There are five Illustrative Scenarios: (1) peace enforcement; (2) conflict prevention; (3) stabilisation and support forcapacity building; (4) rescue and evacuation; and (5) humanitarian assistance.

(3)

Zandee, D. et al., ‘European strategic autonomy in security and defence: Now the going gets tough, it’s time to get going’,
Clingendael Report, December 2020, p. 23 (https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/Report_European_
Strategic_Autonomy_December_2020.pdf).

(4)

Fiott, D., ‘As you were? The EU as an evolving military actor’, in The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security anddefence, op.cit., pp.110-123.

(5)European Parliament, ‘CSDP missions and operations: sources, vulnerabilities and responses to disinformation
attacks’, November 2020 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/215640/Disinformation%20targeting%20EU%20
missions_16112020_summary.pdf).

CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act
However, there is a need to think about theterms ‘crisis management’ and ‘capacity
building’ in more detail (6). For example, theCompass affords the opportunity to question
what tasks like peace enforcement or stabilisation mean in a world marked by greater
strategic competition. The Union is used toresponding to land-based crisis situations,but we should ask whether threats on thehigh seas or climate change would necessitate
an EU crisis response. Additionally, we can
ask whether capacity building should extend
to developing maritime security and counter hybrid threat capacities in partner countries rather than police or judicial reform. In
this sense, the Compass could paint a clearer
picture of what the EU understands by crisis
management and capacity building today.
The task of this first chapter is to reflect on
the ways in which the EU’s civilian and military operations and missions should be adapted by 2030 given the global, regional andstate/non-state threats identified by the EU
Threat Analysis. To this end, this chapter isdivided into three main sections. First, it looks
at the geographical focus of CSDP and asks
how the EU should adapt its crisis management and capacity building tools in light of theevolving threats in the southern and easternneighbourhoods. Second, the chapter shows
the ways in which the EU can use its crisis
management and capacity building tools to
respond to strategic competition. Finally, thechapter argues that the Strategic Compass has
to find ways of incentivising the commitment
of EU Member States to CSDP.

9

THE GEOGRAPHICALCONTOURS OF
EU CIVILIAN
AND MILITARYENGAGEMENT
The prioritisation of threats will always be politically sensitive, especially if it is perceived
that the interests of certain EU Member States
are given precedence over collectively definedinterests. While it is natural to expect that EU
Member States will want the Strategic Compass document to reflect their particular interests and countries or regions of concern,
the Strategic Compass will have to grapple
with the full spectrum of threats facing theUnion - regardless of where they emanate
from. Prioritising one particular region would
be to fail to understand the geographically interconnected nature of the threats, risks andchallenges facing the EU today. As revealed by
the survey conducted for this Chaillot Paper,
the responses clearly show that the EU needs
to respond to crises unfolding along both its
immediate eastern and southern borders (seeFigure 1). The results show that the EU is
expected to, first and foremost, focus on its
immediate eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Among the eight geographical regions
listed as response categories, MENA came at
the top, with 62 % of respondents assigning
the region ‘high importance’ for future civilian and military crisis management deployments over the next ten years. At the otherend of the spectrum was Latin America andthe Caribbean, to which most respondents (87%) assigned low importance.
For example, the Western Balkans is fragile and there is a need for the Union to develop its strategic presence in the region. Putin the starkest of terms, the EU cannot ruleout a full-blown crisis in the region given(6)

Gotkowska, J., ‘The EU’s security and defence policy: In search of a Compass’, OSW Commentary, No. 408, Centre for
Eastern Studies, 17 September 2021 (https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_408.pdf).

Which geographical region will require themost attention from the EU in terms of civilian
and military crisis management deployments
FIGURE 1 |theWhich geographicalregionwill require the most attention from the EU in
overnext tenyears?
terms of civilian and military crisis management deployments over the next ten years?

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

10% of respondents% of respondents

High importance

Medium importanceMiddle East and North Africa 1

n/a
62

37

8

Sub−Saharan Africa 1

Eastern Europe

Low importance

37

7

45

Indo−Paciﬁc 1

11

25

18

11

63

30

4

64

68

High North

Latin America and the Caribbean 1
0

49

71

All/Full spectrum (360 degree)

Eurasia 1

54

87
25

3

29

12
50

75

100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

tensions between Bosnia and Herzegovina andthe Republika Srpska, the rise of nationalistic sentiment, deepening economic precarity,

Survey recommendation 1
When revising and deploying future
capacity-building missions there needs
to be more focus on countering hybrid
threats such as foreign manipulation of
information and cyber threats. In particular, the Western Balkans and the EaP
countries require support when countering malign Russian actions. Hybrid
threats are changing the nature of the
low-intensity environments in which EU
capacity-building missions are deployed
by influencing public opinion in hostcountries against the EU, undermining
critical infrastructure in partner countries and countering the Union’s norms
related to multilateralism, democracy
and rule of law.

the pandemic, organised crime, migration andinterference by Russia, China and Turkey. The
Western Balkans represents the EU’s soft underbelly and faces numerous challenges suchas illegal trafficking in goods and persons,irregular migration flows, organised crimeand radicalisation. Additionally, the EU needsa more coherent and responsive strategy for
the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea region and
the Arctic. These are geographical areas thatare increasingly in the sights of authoritarian states.
The eastern neighbourhood is also facing substantial security challenges that stem fromprotracted conflict with Russia and Belarus.
Rising political instability, hybrid threats, irregular migration, organised crime and thesmuggling of weapons, people and narcotics
pose direct risks to the EU. The events in Belarus, where people from the Middle East arebrought to the country and forcibly taken to
the border with Lithuania and Poland, is indicative of the type of tactic being used byhostile outside actors. The regime in Belarus isCHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act﻿11

instrumentalising irregular migration to undermine the EU’s borders in a bid to countermand the EU’s support for the pro-democratic
opposition in Belarus. The Eastern Partnership(EaP) countries require a sustained andlong-term approach to crisis management by
the EU, even though action in this region isseverely constrained by geopolitical considerations (7). While it is unlikely that the EU would
get involved in military operations in the region, especially if it means confronting Russia,
Moscow remains a threat on the EU’s borders
and this means that the EU and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) need to jointly
deter Russia from potential aggression.

EU border assistance mission is still largely
operating from Tunisia.

The experiences of NATO’s withdrawal fromAfghanistan in the summer of 2021 are likely
to create a long shadow over the Union’s crisis management and capacity-building efforts
in the southern neighbourhood. Not only does
the example of Afghanistan point to the continued capability gaps in airlift that the European armed forces still face, but it has opened
up a question about the nature of why Europeans should engage in crisis management in
the first place. Of course, weariness with the
Afghanistan stabilisation operation was already evident before the US-led
The southern neighbourhood is
extraction (10). Nevertheless, thedeployable
also witnessing increased fraexperiences since Afghanistan
force – evengility due to protracted conflict.
in places such as Mali have cerWithout persistent engage- if highly capable
tainly emboldened the view thatment by the EU in North Af- – means little
military intervention might berica, Sub-Saharan Africa andtoo high a price to pay without
if there is no
the Middle East the Union’s
clear political ambitions andpolitical appetite
economic interests are likely
will to stay in a theatre for ato be damaged. The spill-overto deploy it.
prolonged period of time (pereffects of terrorism, irregular
haps even indefinitely). One of
migration and climate change (8)the tasks of the Strategic Comare likely to create security challenges for the
pass should therefore be to explain why it isEU, especially in the ongoing context of thenecessary for the EU to engage in places like
Covid-19 pandemic (9). Migratory flows of peothe Sahel. What is more, if the Compass sees
ple might be manageable with proper investengagement in such places as a fundamental
ment in border control and a more coherent
necessity, then it needs to be clear about the
EU migration policy, but irregular migration
capabilities required to undertake and sustain
may still give rise to internal social pressures
such engagement.
and divisive political narratives. Yet, any enhanced presence in the southern neighbourDespite the experiences of Afghanistan, thehood should consider the EU’s relatively poor
survey results in Figure 2 underline the contrack-record in the region. The EU has hadtinued appetite for robust military operations
limited direct involvement in crises in Iraq,
in semi- or non-permissive environments.
Syria and Yemen and its approach in Libya is
Nearly 3 in 4 respondents identified joint crisis
based on a marginal local footprint — e.g. themanagement operations in situations of highA

(7)

Secrieru, S. and Saari, S. (eds.), ‘The Eastern Partnership a decade on: Looking back, thinking ahead’, Chaillot Paper No 153,
EUISS, July 2019 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eastern-partnership-decade-looking-back-thinking-ahead).

(8)

Gaub, F. and Lienard, C., ‘Arab Climate Futures: Of risk and readiness’, Chaillot Paper No 170, EUISS, Paris, October 2021, p.
22 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/arab-climate-futures).

(9)Giegerich, B., McGerty, F. and Round, P., ‘The geo-economics and geopolitics of Covid-19: Implications for European
security’, Research Paper, International Institute for Strategic Studies and Hanns Seidel Foundation, March 2021 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/03/covid-19-european-security).

(10)

Lapo, A., Giegerich, B. and Hackett, J., ‘Promoting and projecting stability: Challenges and perspectives’, Research
Papers, International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2020 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2020/12/
promoting-and-projecting-stability).

Given the possible evolution of threatsover the next 5-10 years, which are the mostpressing civilian and military tasks
identiﬁedby the Council Conclusions
FIGURE 2 | Given the possible evolution of threats over the next 5-10
years,1
which
are the most pressing
civilian (14149/16)?
and military tasks identifiedofNovember
2016
by the Council Conclusions of 1 November 2016 (14149/16)?

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

12% of respondents% of respondents

Joint crisis management operations in situations of highsecurity risk in the regions surrounding the EU

74

Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising,training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter−terrorism, resilience,
response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions

67

Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe

67

Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using
the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission−tailored Force package

62

Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations

42

Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust
force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.

41

Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance
Substitution/executive civilian missions

17
7
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

security risk in the region surrounding the
EU as the most pressing task identified in theNovember 2016 Council Conclusions. In addition, even though the survey was conducted
before the recent events in Afghanistan unfolded, there remains an interest in operations
where the EU could field forces, capabilities
and technologies that can ensure force protection and enhanced military intelligence. Of
course, any level of ambition in security anddefence requires that EU Member States makeready capabilities and personnel. For example,
the EU Battlegroups (EUBG) have never beenused by the Member States. A deployable force- even if highly capable - means little if there
is no political appetite to deploy it.
Despite the obvious point about the relationship between capabilities and political will,
the open questions posed in the survey gave
rise to numerous responses on crisis response
tools. Not only were there calls for the Headline Goal to be updated and for the EUBG concept to be overhauled, but the Union was urged
to create rapidly deployable forces similar to
the French Foreign Legion model and to create(11)

a European Special Forces Command. Goingfurther, EUISS survey respondents suggested
that the EU should establish a usable standing,high-readiness, force package under a single
EU command that would respond to the full
spectrum of operations.
Alternatively, when thinking about the Union’s future force capacities - e.g. the EUBGs
or a ‘Rapid Deployment Capacity’ (11) -, Member States should not neglect the fact that the
EU has a comparative advantage in civilian action. In this sense, the EU needs to continue toprioritise security sector reform (SSR), as well
as become more ambitious with regard to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation(DDR) in its CSDP actions. The Union needs tocontinue to address the full conflict cycle but
this will require substantial improvements inthe way the EU engages in and supports dialogue, mediation, mentoring and strategic advice. A renewed approach would promote
greater local ownership of security and development processes through CSDP missions,andenhancethe
EU’s
processesofBorrell Fontelles, J., ‘Honouring Europeans who paid the ultimate sacrifice’, 21 November 2021 (https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107612/honouring-europeans-who-paid-ultimate-sacrifice_en).

CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act﻿engagement with host governments, civil society and private actors (12).

Survey recommendation 2
The Strategic Compass needs to articulate why the EU should be engaged in
the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Drawing on the experiences of
Afghanistan, the EU Member Statesshould outline why they believe engagement in places like the Sahel is criticalfor European security. In addition, there
is a need to reflect on the mandates for
CSDP missions and operations and toascertain whether they deliver on enhancing the security of Europeans andcitizens based in host nations. Furthermore, it may be necessary for the EU
Member States to consider the potential
exit strategies involved in certain crises. While there are fundamental differences between the security dynamics
in Afghanistan and say the Sahel - notleast because the Sahelian countries actively invited the Union to deploy - thereis clearly a need to plan in case the EUneeds to leave a theatre in a less thanorderly fashion. Finally, if there is no
EU appetite to deploy CSDP military
missions and operations to respond tocrisis situations, then the Union needsa more coherent strategy for deploying
non-military tools such as law enforcement, technical support and intelligence
cooperation.

13

the Swahili Coast and the Mozambique Channel. These maritime areas in Africa are closely
linked to the security of transported goods,
organised crime, piracy and illegal humantrafficking and local and international terrorism. What is more, climate change-related
conflict and challenges are seen as two particular areas of concern in Africa and the Arctic
but drought, forest fires and unexpected meteorological events such as floods and tornadoes hit Europe directly too. In this respect,
the EU needs to be better prepared to tackle
climate- and health-related crises that may
also help give rise to hybrid threats.

Survey recommendation 3
To better embed maritime security in
CSDP, the Strategic Compass should
further strengthen the Union’s coastguard and border functions and invest in
naval capabilities that can enable the EU
to contribute to free and open access tomaritime routes, engage in rescue andevacuation efforts and protect overseas
territories and EU citizens in key maritime areas. Building on the EU’s Maritime Security*, Arctic** and Indo-PacificStrategies, the Union needs to factor in
the potentially devastating effects ofclimate change for coastal and littoral communities and increased demand
from partners for an EU response to climate crises.

*

Council of the EU, ‘EU Maritime Security
Strategy’, 11205/14, 24 June 2014 (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST%2011205%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf).

** European Commission and High Representative
Furthermore, the Compass could more concretely address how CSDP can be used to ensure the Union’s maritime security. Building
on its existing efforts, the EU will need to continue to focus on the Mediterranean Sea andAfrican waters such as the Gulf of Guinea, theHorn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf,(12)of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, ‘Joint Communication on a stronger
EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable
and prosperous Arctic’, JOIN(2021) 27 final,
10 October 2021 (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/2_en_act_part1_v7.pdf).

See European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, ‘Compact 2.0 : Integrating civilian CSDP into theStrategic Compass’, August 2020 (https://www.coe-civ.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/2021-08-26_coe_fft_paper_compact_2.0-strategic_compass.pdf).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

14

Survey recommendation 4
The Strategic Compass has to address
how the EU’s CSDP missions and operations are likely to be affected by strategiccompetition. This means having a clear
understanding of how the strategies andtactics of countries such as China, Russia and others are affecting the Union’s
ability to deploy civilian and military
missions and operations. In this respect,
there needs to be a clear understandingof the capabilities and technologies required to dissuade the actions of strategic competitors. Additionally, there is aneed to dissuade the actions of strategiccompetitors by working to support hostnations and reduce the incentives thatstrategic competitors have for disrupting EU crisis management and capacity
building efforts.

GEARING UP CSDPTO RESPOND
TO STRATEGICCOMPETITION
According to many survey respondents, theCompass will need to address how growing
strategic competition may hamper its efforts
for prolonged and deeper engagement in thesouthern and eastern neighbourhoods (13).
Strategic competition will be a growing issue
for the EU as it plans for crisis management
and capacity building missions and operations.
As the survey results in Figure 3 show, thoseindividuals polled were split on the relevanceof the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ to meet the geopolitical challenges facing the EU in the years leading up to 2030. Strategic competitors such as(13)

Russia, China and Turkey are also present in
the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods
and they are looking to fill strategic vacuums
along the Union’s borders, even if the tactics
they employ to do so vary. Russia and China
are both pursuing geopolitical and economic
interests in a growing number of states, andthe risk of poorly concealed proxy wars isrising. This implies that the EU has to better integrate counter-hybrid threat strategies
and capacities in its missions and operations.
Many of these hybrid threats are transboundary and trans-sectoral in nature and they
serve as a major common denominator in thethreat perceptions of EU Member States.
Competitors such as Russia are effectively interested in changing ‘facts on the ground’, tomake it harder for the EU to exert its interests and values and to buy political leveragevis-à-vis the Union. Libya, Syria, Belarus andUkraine are noteworthy examples of where
Russia exerts malign influence to undermine
legitimate governments and instrumentaliseborders and information in order to make itharder for the EU to pursue peace and stabilisation efforts. Turkey has also used a mixtureof border politics, information manipulationand provocative maritime actions to undermine security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Additionally, the potential for conflict with
China over its growing presence and geopolitical strategies in Europe, Eastern Asia, theMiddle East and Africa (e.g. the ‘Belt andRoad’ initiative) should not be taken lightly
either. Here, the EU is facing a conflict overnarratives with China and it is confronted withthe proliferation of Chinese political norms,
which are actively supported by Beijing’s
state-backed commercial operators in countries close to the Union.
Even though CSDP should grapple with strategic competition and more hostile environments, it is clear that the EU has the ambition
to secure its interests beyond its immediate

See Anghel S., et al. ‘On the path to “strategic autonomy”: The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment’, Study,
European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020, pp. 37-38 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2020/652096/EPRS_STU(2020)652096_EN.pdf) and Fiott, D. ‘European defence and the demands of strategic
autonomy’, Forum, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, August 2021, (https://hcss.nl/report/european-defence-anddemands-of-strategic-autonomy/).

to meet the geopolitical dynamics
FIGURE
3 | Arenext
the ‘Petersberg
Tasks’*
still fit-for-purpose to meet
of
the
5−10
years?
the geopolitical dynamics over the next 5-10 years?
CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act﻿15%
respondents% ofof respondents

Strongly agree

8
0

Agree

25

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree21
25

Strongly disagree

39
50

75

7
100

NB: * See Article 42 and Article 43.1 Treaty on European Union. The Tasks are joint disarmament operations; humanitarianand rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat
forces in crisis management (e.g. peacemaking and post−conflict stabilisation; and combating terrorism.)
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

Survey recommendation 5
The Strategic Compass should address
how the EU will ensure a presence in the
Indo-Pacific. The EU Strategy for theregion already makes clear that a larger
naval presence is required*, but the Compass should articulate in concrete terms
how it will achieve a more permanent
EU presence in the Indo-Pacific. This
may not necessarily mean pre-deployednaval forces, but the EU should nevertheless explain how it will use defence
diplomacy, preventive deployments andlive exercises to reassure partners anddissuade hostile activities.

*

European Commission and High Representativeof the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, ‘Joint Communication on the EU
Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’,JOIN(2021) 24 final, 16 September 2021
(https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf).

neighbourhoods. In particular, HR/VP Borrell’s foreword to the Compass already makes
clear that the Union should protect its interests on the high seas, cyberspace and outer space (14). As Figure 1 earlier indicated, one

obvious area where this increasingly applies
is the Indo-Pacific where is China is becoming more assertive. Developments in the
Indo-Pacific are likely to have a direct effecton the EU’s economic prosperity and security, as well as the Union’s partnership with theUnited States. Maintaining access to vital resources such as energy, raw materials, pharmaceuticals and technological components
such as micro-chips is vital for the EU’s economic prosperity. For example, China, Indonesia, Japan and Australia amount to 11 % of
the EU’s import dependence as a value of total
intra- and extra-EU imports, but this relatively small amount includes critical supplies
such as base metals and ores that are still concentrated in the hands of these countries (15).
However, if the EU is going to adapt its crisis management and capacity building tools
to be better prepared for strategic competition, there is a need to reflect on the current
state of the Union’s C2 capacities. Even though
the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) has been developed to enhance theEU’s military C2 capacities, the reality is thatyears after its establishment it still does nothave a full complement of staff or resources
to undertake its tasks properly (16). As the results of the survey show, 80 % of respondents
strongly disagree or disagree that the Union’s(14)‘A Strategic Compass to make Europe a security provider’, op.cit.

(15)

Fiott, D. and Theodosopoulos, V., ‘Sovereignty over supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while
engaging with the world’, Brief No 21, EUISS, December 2020, p. 4 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sovereignty-oversupply).

(16)‘Marching to where? The operational dimension of the EU Strategic Compass’, Workshop Report, EU Institute for Security
Studies and the Clingendael Institute, 28 April 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/marching-where-operationaldimension-eu-strategic-compass).

challenges that the Union will face over the
FIGURE 4 | Current EU military planning and conduct structures are well-suited for
next
years
the threats5−10
and challenges
that the Union will face over the next 5-10 years

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

16% of respondents
Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree210Strongly disagree

59
25

50

12
75

8
100

Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

Survey recommendation 6
The Strategic Compass should outline
how the EU Member States will dedicate
the appropriate level of capacities to the
MPCC and CPCC. Such a measure shouldbe accompanied with a clearer understanding of the C2 tasks that should
be undertaken by the MPCC and CPCC.
If the Union is to respond through civil
and military action to strategic competition then the MPCC and CPCC may need
to be adapted. For example, the MPCC
could become a fully-fledged EU headquarters for the C2 of all CSDP executive
and non-executive missions and operations. By 2030, it should also be given
responsibilities for C2 of all EU live military exercises and the conduct of an EU
operation on the high-seas.

military planning and conduct structure is not
well-suited to the challenges facing the EU today (see Figure 4). Particularly, given its existing resource base it is unclear whether the
MPCC can command and control more traditional crisis management and capacity building
missions and operations while simultaneously
undertaking more high-intensity tasks associated with strategic competition (e.g. policing
the high seas). In this sense, it is important
not to overload the MPCC without providing itwith the necessary means to conduct its work.

(17)

The risk with the Strategic Compass is that the
MPCC will be given a greater mandate, whilestill lacking essential personnel, technicalsystems and equipment.
Short of the idea of merging the MPCC andthe Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability(CPCC), the EU could redouble its efforts toimprove MPCC-CPCC coordination. This canalready be achieved by enhancing the Joint
Support Coordination Cell (JSCC). As far as
civilian planning and conduct structures areconcerned, respondents to the survey werealso unconvinced that civilian structures
were fit-for-purpose for the threats the EU
is confronted with (see Figure 5). Specifically,a minority 22 % of respondents agreed that
the CPCC is well-suited to address forthcoming threats and challenges. In this respect,
the CPCC also needs to evolve in light of themany challenges facing the Union, particularly when it comes to countering hybrid threats
and developing capacity in areas such as cybersecurity and countering disinformation.
Although the Civilian CSDP Compact alreadyacknowledges such needs (17), the Compass isnevertheless an ideal vehicle through which toreinforce this need and to create linkages with
the MPCC in this regard.

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Civilian CSDP Compact’, 13571/20, 7 December 2020 (https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/47185/st13571-en20.pdf).

and challenges that the Union
FIGURE 5face| Currentover
EU civilianthe
planning
and conduct
structures
are well-suited for
will
next
5−10
years
the threats and challenges that the Union will face over the next 5-10 years
CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act﻿

17%
respondents% ofof respondents
Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

110DisagreeStrongly disagree

33
25

34
50

22
75

100

Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

INCENTIVISINGENGAGEMENTIN EU CRISISMANAGEMENTAND ENHANCINGFLEXIBILITY
One of the core challenges facing the Strategic Compass in the area of crisis management
is how to bridge intentions with action. Even
though the Compass may outline an ambitious
plan of action for the Union in the years leading up to 2030, greater commitment on theside of Member States to deploy and consider
the potential use of force is required. One wayof generating greater interest in CSDP is to ensure that missions and operations contributeto securing European interests. Indeed, oneof the chief reasons why CSDP has remained
marginal in the minds of national capitals overthe past twenty years has been that it does nottackle the core security interests of a majority of Member States. Without CSDP evolving
beyond a limited crisis management tool for
low-intensity environments, national defence
planners cannot be expected to commit to EU
security and defence beyond the present levelof engagement.

Survey recommendation 7
The Strategic Compass should experiment with using Article 44 TEU to allow willing and able EU Member States
to conduct specific missions and operations or indeed specific taskings within
existing CSDP mandates. The use of Article 44 TEU could allow Member States
to use CSDP and the EU’s broader crisis management toolbox, while also
playing to their specific geographicalconcerns and comparative advantages.
Furthermore, more frequent exercises
at the EU level could allow not only for
greater buy-in to CSDP on the part of
EU Member States, but exercises could
also be used to draw in partners. Given
that there is no consensus on the useof Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)* forEU foreign and security policy, Article
44 TEU might provide a pragmatic andflexible legal basis for action.

*

Koenig, N., ‘Qualified Majority Voting in EU
foreign policy: Mapping preferences’, Policy
Brief, Hertie School/Jacques Delors Centre,
10 February 2020 (https://hertieschool-f4e6.
kxcdn.com/fileadmin/user_upload/20200210_
Policy_Brief_QMV_Koenig.pdf).

Disagreement between the EU Member States
is perceived as the major reason for a lack ofprogress under CSDP, but it is also true thatseveral EU governments view CSDP as an in-contested under the unanimity principle, sosome Member States are forced to launch missions and operations outside of the EU framework. Initiatives such as Operation Agénor(EMASOH) or the Takuba Task Force are good
examples. Of course, such deployments still
contribute significantly to European security

flexible policy tool. Decision-making can be
slow and mandates and financing may be

but they are deemed more flexible than CSDP
deployments. For example, in the case of

18

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

EMASOH Denmark was able to join, whereas
it has an opt-out from military CSDP and does
not participate in military CSDP operations. Of
course, it is not inconceivable that such missions and operations could better connect with
CSDP deployments (e.g. EMASOH and EUNAVFOR Atalanta), but before this can happen
there is a need to reflect on the political parameters and possibilities of CSDP.

Survey recommendation 8

In this respect, it is necessary to think about
how the EU framework can be made more
flexible while offering willing and able Member States the opportunity to make use of theUnion’s broader security and defence toolbox (18). Greater flexibility should not be readas a means by which a minority of Member
States — however big — can shape EU security and defence to their own particular national interests and agendas. A certain degreeof operational flexibility and scalability could
certainly enhance commitment to EU missions and operations over the next 5-10 years.
Greater flexibility may also further advancean EU integrated approach by bringing together military and civilian CSDP bodies andpolicies with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),
finance, health and economic ministries fromacross the EU.
Flexibility will also be key if the EU wants topartner with NATO or the US on specific civil
and military engagements. First, a clear-eyedapproach to the types of missions and operations that NATO allies do not want to undertake could be a basis for the EU to step up its
contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing.
Second, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements could
be further improved to enhance EU and NATOdecision-making. However, one challenge
is that the consensus rule in NATO leads todecisions to block the use of command, control and planning capabilities. Short of an

The EPF is already being used in a number of EU missions (e.g. the EU Training
Mission to Mozambique) but its application to covering common costs should beaccelerated. Using the EPF for increased
common costs could help offset any
disincentives created by the ‘costs lie
where they fall’ principle when it comesto deployments. It should be considered,however, that the EPF might only marginally increase the common costs formilitary operations up from 5-10 % under the Athena Mechanism and the EUBGs suffer from issues beyond financial
constraints. In the future, there might
be a need to enhance the EU’s financial
contribution — possibly up to 50 % —in order to further incentivise the engagement of EU Member States.

agreement in this regard, a group of willing
EU Member States could focus on developing
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
projects that enable autonomous C2 capabilities and the ‘EUFOR CROC’ project in PESCO
could serve this end. Finally, there is also aneed to ensure that new financial instruments
such as the European Peace Facility (19) (EPF)
contribute to common operational costs.
Additionally, flexible and scalable mission
mandates are of relevance for civilian CSDP
engagements. Such mandates could allow theEU to enhance its adaptability to crises, andthese mandates could be translated into scalable operations with an increased focus on
smaller-scale efforts such as mixed or specialised teams. In line with the principles(18)

See Fiott, D., ‘The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence: What type of ambition is the needle pointing to?’,
Policy Brief, No 2, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, March 2021 (https://brussels-school.be/publications/policybriefs/policy-brief-eu’s-strategic-compass-security-and-defence-what-type); Puglierin, J., ‘Direction of force: The EU’s
Strategic Compass’, Commentary, European Council on Foreign Relations, 1 April 2021 (https://ecfr.eu/article/directionof-force-the-eus-strategic-compass/); Latici, T. and Lazarou, E., ‘Where will the EU’s Strategic Compass point?’,
Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2021 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
BRIE/2021/698057/EPRS_BRI(2021)698057_EN.pdf).

(19)

Council of the European Union, ‘Establishing a European Peace Facility’, (CFSP)2021/509, 22 March 2021 (https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D0509).

CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act﻿of the Civilian CSDP Compact, scalable andflexible mandates and smaller specialised
missions and operations could enhance theUnion’s capacity to act. This method can
only be effective, however, if missions areplanned in accordance with a comprehensive
conflict analysis, in full cooperation with thehost government. Furthermore, there is alsoa need to ensure close coordination between
the Council of the EU, the EEAS, EU Delegations, JHA actors such as Frontex, Europol andEurojust and host governments. The European
Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management could play a role in enhancing such
coordination.
Striving towards a genuine EU integrated approach to crises and conflict would be
beneficial, as it would allow Member States
to dedicate personnel and resources that go
beyond contributions purely in military or
security terms. Broadening the scope of theintegrated approach could allow EU Member
States to draw on civil or private services for
medical care, logistics and transportation, especially given that only a handful of Member
States have these capacities under national
control. In relation to civilian missions, it isimperative to continue to involve ministriesof the interior and justice in planning andrecruitment. Here, EU financial instruments
such as the Trust Funds or the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) will remain vital for
improving local ownership and resilience.

19

20

CHAPTER 2

SECURING EUROPE AND
ENHANCING ITS RESILIENCE
If the first chapter focused on how the Compass can realign the Union’s approach to crises
and capacity building outside the EU, then thischapter on resilience addresses the threatsthat directly affect the Union. The notion of‘resilience’ is not new for the EU. Indeed, backin 2012 the EU framed resilience as an ability
to withstand, adapt to and recover from shocks
and stresses but the Union largely applied thisdefinition to challenges such as food security
and climate change (1). The EU Global Strategy
took this understanding a step further by referring to resilience as ‘the ability of states andsocieties to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’ (2).
In this sense, the Global Strategy broadened
the scope of the definition to include challenges such as democratic health and sustainable
development as well as including individuals- and not just states - in resilience strategies.
The EU Global Strategy underlined the factthat resilience covers security threats thatemanate from outside the Union, but which
can cause significant damage on the territory of the EU (3). Following the Global Strategy,

the EU further developed its concept of resilience and was more specific about the areasthat should be included in the Union’s resilience building strategies. These included
economic resilience, climate change, environmental degradation, migration and forced
displacement, critical infrastructure protection, energy security, civil protection, healthrisks, cybersecurity and hybrid threats (4). This
broadening of the concept of resilience fitswith the EU’s Security Union Strategy from
2020, which adds to the wide set of issues that
could challenge the EU’s resilience including
terrorism, technology production and supply
chain resilience (5).
Clearly, the growing reach of the term ‘resilience’ is being driven by security threats. For
example, the experience of Russia’s illegal
seizure of Crimea had the catalysing effect ofpushing the EU and NATO closer together, but
it also meant that the Union developed tools
to counter disinformation, boost its cybersecurity, protect critical infrastructure, enhanceborder protection and more. There have also
been attempts to directly influence democratic(1)

European Commission, ‘Communication on the EU approach to resilience: Learning from food security crises’, COM(2012)586 final, 3 October 2012 (https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf).

(2)‘A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, op.cit.

(3)

Zandee, D., Stoetman, A. and Deen, B., ‘The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence: Squaring ambition withreality’, Clingendael Report, May 2021, p. 3 (https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Report_The_EUs_
Compass_for_security_and_defence_May_2021.pdf).

(4)

European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Joint
Communication on a strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s External Action’, JOIN(2017) 21 final, 7 June 2017 (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/join_2017_21_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v7_p1_916039.
pdf).

(5)

European Commission, ‘Communication on the EU Security Union Strategy’, COM(2020) 605 final, 24 July 2020, p. 5
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605&from=EN).

CHAPTER 2 | Securing Europe and enhancing its resilienceelections and processes in the EU (6). Terrorist
incidents and cyberattacks on the Union’s territory have also given rise to the same tools.
Furthermore, the rise of global powers suchas China has intensified the Union’s focus on
critical supply chain security and it has led to
the need to better protect key technologies (7).
The Covid-19 pandemic has also raised fundamental questions about security of supply ofstrategic resources and equipment (8).
In the context of the Strategic Compass, however, it is necessary to build on these notions
with a clearer understanding of how resilience
specifically relates to the security and defenceof the Union. This is not an easy task because,
as we have already seen, the concept of resilience is broad and constantly moving (9). Whatis needed, therefore, is a plan of action for how
the EU will develop an integrated approach toensuring its resilience across multiple domains located across the internal-external
security nexus (10). One of the key dimensions
likely to be tackled by the Compass is hybrid
threats such as foreign manipulation of information and cybersecurity, but the Compass
is also likely to address technology dependencies and the security of strategic domains
such as maritime, air, outer-space and cyberenvironments (11).
This second chapter asks what resiliencemeans in the context of the threats facing theUnion and how best the EU can use its security

21

and defence instruments to strengthen its resilience. To this end, the chapter is divided
into two main sections. The first section looks
at the main areas of resilience that could betackled by the Strategic Compass. More specifically, the section looks at the need to counterhybrid threats, deal with climate and environmental crises and protect the global commons.
The second section then focuses on the EU’s
response capacities through the mutual assistance (Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the EU)
and solidarity (Article 222 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU) treaty provisions.
It contends that the Compass can bolster theUnion’s resilience through enhanced intelligence capacities and exercises.

SCOPING OUT OF
THE CONTOURSOF RESILIENCE IN
THE COMPASS
While it is likely that resilience will remain the
primary task of national governments, it isworth considering what role the EU shouldplay in assisting them during crises andshocks. Accordingly, based on the EU Threat
Analysis conducted at the end of 2020 it seems(6)

Bentzen, N., ‘Foreign interference in democracies: Understanding the threat, and evolving responses’, European
Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652082/
EPRS_BRI(2020)652082_EN.pdf).

(7)See, for example, the Union’s work on 5G and semiconductors. NIS Cooperation Group, ‘Cybersecurity of 5G networks: EU
toolbox of risk mitigating measures’, January 2020 (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybersecurity-5gnetworks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures); Breton, T., ‘How a European Chips Act will put Europe back in the techrace’, Blog Post, European Commission, 15 September 2021 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/
breton/blog/how-european-chips-act-will-put-europe-back-tech-race_en). See also Lindstrom, G., ‘What if… European
delays in 5G shortchange the path towards 6G?’ in Gaub, F. (ed.), ‘What If… not? The cost of inaction’, Chaillot Paper No
163, EUISS, January 2021, pp. 8-12 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_163.pdf).

(8)‘The Strategic Compass: How to ensure security of supply and enhance the EU’s resilience?’, Workshop Report, EU
Institute for Security Studies, the Finnish Ministry of Defence and the Latvian Ministry of Defence, 4 June 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-compass-how-ensure-security-supply-and-enhance-eu’s-resilience).

(9)

Puglierin, J., ‘Resilience’ in Mölling, C. and Schütz, T. (eds.), The EU’s Strategic Compass and its Four Baskets: Recommendations
to make the most of it, DGAP Report, No 13, German Council on Foreign Relations, November 2020, p. 8 (https://dgap.org/
sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-report-2020-13-en.pdf).

(10)

Hindrén, R., ‘Calibrating the Compass: Hybrid threats and the EU’s Strategic Compass’, Working Paper No. 12, European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, October 2021, p. 15 (https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/
uploads/2021/10/Hybrid_CoE_Working_Paper_12_Calibrating_the_compass_WEB.pdf).

(11)‘A Strategic Compass to make Europe a security provider - A Foreword’, op.cit.

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

22

reasonable to expect the Compass to address
the following challenges to the Union’s resilience: (1) managing critical supply and climate
threats; (2) countering terrorism and hybrid
threats; and (3) ensuring the security of interests and infrastructure in the maritime, spaceand cyber domains. Each of these areas may
not necessarily require a military response but
this only makes it more challenging for the EU
to develop actions for resilience. As the HR/VP
has remarked in his foreword to the first draftof the Compass, ‘the tools of power are not
only soldiers, tanks and planes but also disinformation, cyber-attacks, the instrumentalisation of migrants, the privatisation of armies
and the political control of sensitive technologies or rare earths’ (12).

Survey recommendation 9
Prepositioned stockpiles and earmarked
financial resources can be among thepractical means to make European responses more robust during complex crises, although there is a need to identify
what specific capabilities would be required for particular tasks at any given
time. In particular, the EU could attempt
to set its own standards and minimum
thresholds and to develop verification
mechanisms to ensure that EU Member
States are prepared to back up systems forenergy, water and cyber infrastructures.

The first major area of resilience is criticalsupply. In this respect, being able to manage
scarce resources in times of emergencies is anarea where demonstrating an EU added-value
is possible. The EU’s initial reaction to thepandemic, however, reveals that there is some
way to go here. Learning from the gaps in the
supply of medical equipment should serve as

an important lesson for potential shortages of
military equipment and supply shortages during times of crisis. The Compass should makeclear that the EU Member States need to better
manage critical supplies during health crises
and conflict and war, including the provisionof basic food supplies and secure critical supply chains. Again, the EU has the policy andfinancial resources to address these types ofvulnerabilities but there is still no coherent
system in place to ensure EU-wide supply intimes of crisis.

Survey recommendation 10
The Strategic Compass should set out
clear guidelines for the interaction of
military and civilian capacities and services during times of health and climate
crises. In particular, the Union needs
to outline the most appropriate chainof command for the integrated use ofarmed forces and civilian capacities
during crises that occur on the territoryof the EU or along the Union’s borders.
This is a particularly salient issue giventhat the Union needs to plan for potential future invocations of the Solidarity
Clause (Article 222 TFEU).

In addition to raising awareness about critical supply, the Covid-19 pandemic should also
give rise to a reflection about how the Union’s
civilian and military capacities can address
crisis response in times of health and climate
crises (13). Here, the role of civilian authorities
and the armed forces needs to be carefullybalanced, and it should be recognised that the
EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre(ERCC) should play a leading role for civilian crisis response along with Council of the
EU bodies like the Integrated Political Crisis

(12)

Ibid.

(13)

For more on CSDP missions and Covid-19 see Lazarou, E., ‘CSDP missions and coronavirus’, Commentary, European
Parliamentary Research Service, 16 June 2020 (https://epthinktank.eu/2020/06/16/csdp-missions-and-coronavirus/);
Pietz, T., ‘The impact of Covid-19 on CSDP’, Brief No 17, EUISS, September 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/
impact-covid-19-csdp).

most pressing tasks needed to protect the EU over
FIGURE next
6 | Utilising5−10
its militaryyears
mechanisms, which are the most pressingthetasks needed to protect the EU over the next 5-10 years?
CHAPTER 2 | Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience﻿

23%
respondents% ofof respondents

High importance

Medium importance

Low importance5

Countering hybrid threats

n/a

32

Cyber defence 1 5
Protection of critical infrastructure 3

63
53

41
13

38

46

20

Maritime security

34

46

12

Counter−terrorism

34

30

36

Territorial defence

28

61

24

63

Assistance for public health (e.g. pandemic response)
57

Countering people trafﬁcking
0

13

47

39

Border management

16

36

49

Managing the security−related effects of climate change

25

50

38
75

13
5
100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

Response. There is a risk, of course, that seeing every vulnerability through a military lens
may over-securitise issues and hinder a morecomprehensive approach to preparedness andcrisis response. However, as the results to
Figures 6 and 7 reveal, the EU should see its
unique blend of civilian and military crisis response tools as an asset.
Furthermore, both sets of results in Figures
6 and 7 show that there is a need to use theEU’s civilian and military tools to respond to
hybrid threats, terrorism and cyber vulnerabilities. In terms of military capacities suchas intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, survey respondents believe that the EUneeds to prepare for countering hybrid threats(95 % combined high and medium importance), cyberdefence (94 % combined high andmedium importance), counter terrorism (89 %combined high and medium importance) andthe protection of critical infrastructure (84 %combined high and medium importance).
Where civilian capacities are concerned, respondents stated that resilience could be enhanced in the areas of border management,
countering people trafficking, public health,climate change, countering hybrid threats,
cyberdefence and countering terrorism. Theseassumptions would appear to make sense given that the EU’s strategic competitors are increasingly using the ‘grey zone’ of ambiguousmost pressing tasks needed to protect the EU
over
5−10
years
FIGURE 7 |theUtilisingnext
its civilian
mechanisms,
which are the most pressing

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

24

tasks needed to protect the EU over the next 5-10 years?

% of respondents% of respondents

High importance

Medium importance

Low importance
12

Assistance for public health (e.g. pandemic response)
Countering hybrid threats

17

Cyber defence

14

47

36

41

45

7

Border management

50

38

37

57

Managing the security−related effects of climate change

18

46

36

Counter−terrorism

17

50

33

Countering people trafﬁcking

14

24

62

25

62

Maritime security
Territorial defence
0

20

39

41

Protection of critical infrastructure

25

97
50

75

13
3
100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

Survey recommendation 11

Survey recommendation 12

In order to counter hybrid threats suchas disinformation, cyberattacks and the
instrumentalisation of irregular migration at the Union’s borders, there is aneed to deepen the EU’s efforts in areas
such as increasing media literacy skills
and training at home and abroad, developing intelligence capacities and the
management of open-source data, deploying strategic communication attachés to EU Delegations and generating
a database of civilian experts with nicheknowledge (data protection, CBRN, harbour and airport management, energy
and water management, etc.).

The EU Member States should use theStrategic Compass to further develop
the Union’s intelligence capacities tocounter hybrid threats. Further still, theEU structures should dedicate resources
to strategic foresight and contingency
planning, as well as conduct more frequent threat assessments at the EU level.
Additionally, the EU has seen a proliferation of strategies (connectivity, hybrid
threats, Indo-Pacific, maritime, space,etc) in recent years and so more should
be done through the Strategic Compass
to improve coherence between them.

CHAPTER 2 | Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience﻿
political and legal norms to disrupt the Union’s interests (14).
More specifically on countering hybrid threats,
the EU needs to be better placed at deterring
hybrid threats in the first place. For example,
the possibility of imposing sanctions on individuals or groups responsible for cyberattacks
against the Union is a positive start by the EU.
However, the EU can also enhance its deterrence of hybrid threats by increasing the scope
and frequency of hybrid exercises. This is a
key way to ensure that the EU’s institutionalarchitecture is responsive to the broad sweepof hybrid threats (15). For example, the ongoing border crisis with Belarus shows how the
instrumentalisation of people, disinformationand military manoeuvres near the border cantest the Union’s security. In this respect, theEU needs to enhance its intelligence capacities to better understand how hybrid threats
are combined by strategic competitors. On thisfront, the Union still faces considerable constraints as the bulk of intelligence resources
remain with the EU Member States. Notwithstanding the presence of the EU Hybrid Fusion
Cell, there are still constraints in terms of staff
members working on intelligence in the EEAS
and the types of intelligence they can collect(e.g. open source rather than active intelligence gathering) (16).

25

Finally, there is a need for the Strategic Compass to clearly outline ways in which the EU
can protect its interests and values on the
global commons. In particular, the maritime,
space and cyber domains are under risk of becoming theatres for strategic competition (17).
There is a danger that established norms, law
and practices in these domains may be undermined for geopolitical reasons. At sea, we arewitnessing a rise in hybrid threats throughthe use of commercial fishing ships, energy
research boats and coastguard vessels to claim
territorial rights and control of resources (18).
CSDP missions and operations can play anenhanced role in situational awareness andintelligence gathering in the maritime domain. EU naval operations already provide theUnion with a presence at sea, but this can be
expanded in terms of the geographical areas
covered by the EU and the tasks conducted.
Work is already underway to this effect in the
Gulf of Guinea (19), but there is scope to expand
the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP)
concept to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally,
the Union should be more confident in using
its naval operations as nodes through which
partners can be brought onboard for live exercises, port calls and other confidence andawareness-raising activities at sea.
In outer space, there is a need for the Union to
rapidly develop its resilience due to the growing congestion of space and the presence of(14)Sari, A., ‘Hybrid threats and the law: Building legal resilience’, Research Report, No. 3, European Centre of Excellence ofCountering Hybrid Threats, 4 November 2021 (https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-3hybrid-threats-and-the-law-building-legal-resilience/).

(15)

See Calibrating the Compass: Hybrid threats and the EU’s Strategic Compass, op.cit. and Wigell, M., Mikkola, H. and Juntunen,T., ‘Best practices in the whole-of-society approach in countering hybrid threats’, Study, European Parliament, May 2021
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653632/EXPO_STU(2021)653632_EN.pdf).

(16)

Raik, K. (ed.), ‘Not yet fit for the world: Piecemeal build-up of EU military, cyber and intelligence assets’, JOINT Research
Papers, No 4, November 2021 (https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/joint_rp_4.pdf).

(17)‘Contested global commons: A multidimensional issue for the Strategic Compass’, Workshop Report, EU Institute for
Security Studies and the French Permanent Representation to the European Union, March 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.
eu/content/contested-global-commons-multidimensional-issue-strategic-compass).

(18)

Fiott, D., ‘Naval gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence’, Brief No 16, EUISS, July 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/naval-gazing-strategic-compass-and-eus-maritime-presence); Pajon, C. and Pejsova, E.,‘A region of flashpoints? Security in the Indo-Pacific’, Policy Brief, No 15, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy,
September 2021 (https://brussels-school.be/publications/policy-briefs/region-flashpoints-security-indo-pacific).

(19)

Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions launching the pilot case of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concepts
in the Gulf of Guinea’, 25 January 2021 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/01/25/gulf-ofguinea-council-conclusions-launching-the-pilot-case-for-the-coordinated-maritime-presences-concept/).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

26

key EU-space based capacities such as Galileo
or Copernicus (20). Space is being used by agreater number of private and state actors,
which increases the risk that the EU’s interests in this domain are threatened. Without
space there would be no Galileo or Copernicus,
and neither would the EU be able to rely on thegeospatial intelligence provided by the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen). Space is a source of economic prosperity for the EU and it enables awide range of activities including positioning
and communications. Accordingly, the Strategic Compass should underline the importanceof the EU Space Programme and the Union’s
efforts in developing Space Traffic Management (STM) capacities.

Survey recommendation 13
In order for the EU to respond to threatsemanating from strategic domains suchas the maritime, space and cyber environments, the Compass should be used
to emphasise the importance of a physical presence around the world throughnaval deployments, intelligence capacities and exercises. The EU should deploy
naval assets to protect sea lanes of communication and critical maritime infrastructure. In space, the Union should
invest in space traffic management capacities and ensure the security of theGalileo and Copernicus systems. Finally,
to ensure its cybersecurity the EU should
continue to develop its Cyber Diplomacy
Toolbox and complement this with rapid
reaction cyber teams that can be deployed in the EU during crisis situations.

In the cyber domain, state-backed groups andstate agencies are hacking European computer
systems to, among other things, steal and manipulate data and instigate kinetic risks (e.g.
electricity outages) (21). There is a clear need
for CSDP missions and operations to be maderesilient against cyberattacks. More than this,however, the Union should ensure that CSDP
missions can better develop the resilience ofpartners. For example, host countries that arelocated in or near critical strategic domains(e.g. Middle Eastern and East African states
and the maritime routes of the Indo-Pacific)
will require greater capacity in the domain ofcybersecurity. The forthcoming revision of the
Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive will also ensure that EU Member States
not only better report and enforce EU legislation in the cyber domain but also craft responses to new technologies such as Artificial
Intelligence (22).

MUTUALASSISTANCE AND
SOLIDARITY
Another important aspect of the EU’s resilience
relates to Treaty provisions that are designed
to ensure that EU Member States can rely on
EU efforts in case of a major crisis on its territory through armed aggression, terrorism
or natural and man-made disasters. In thisrespect, the mutual assistance clause (Article
42.7 TEU) and the solidarity clause (Article 222
TFEU) are recognised as a potential additional layer of reassurance and security. The very
existence of both treaty articles implies thata basis for shared interests, or even collective(20)

Fiott, D., ‘Securing the heavens: How can space support the EU’s Strategic Compass?’, Brief No 9, EUISS, April 2021
(https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/securing-heavens); Schütz, T., ‘The role of space as a global common good for criticalinfrastructure and industry’, Workshop Report, No. 21, German Council on Foreign Relations, October 2021 (https://dgap.
org/en/research/publications/role-space-global-common-good-critical-infrastructure-and-industry).

(21)

For more on cyber conflict see Pawlak, P., Tikk, E. and Kerttunen, M., ‘Cyber conflict uncoded: The EU and conflict
prevention in cyberspace’, Brief No 7, EUISS, April 2020 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/cyber-conflict-uncoded).

(22)‘Cyberspace and EU Action to 2030’, Workshop Report, EUISS, 9 July 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/cyberspaceand-eu-action-2030).

Article 42.7 TEU (mutual assistance clause)
FIGURE 8Article| The EU should
be preparedto support
member states incase of an invocation
and
222
TFEU
(solidarity
clause)of Article 42.7 TEU (mutual assistance clause) and Article 222 TFEU (solidarity clause)
CHAPTER 2 | Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience﻿27%
respondents% ofof respondents

Strongly agree

1
0

5

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

34
25Disagree

59
50

75

100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

security, exists in the EU. This point is alsostrongly implied in the survey results shownin Figure 8. As shown in the diagram, 59 % of
respondents strongly agree that the EU should
be prepared to support Member State during
an invocation of either Article 42.7 or Article
222. From a different perspective, only 1 % of
respondents disagree that the EU should display such commitment.
There are questions about how, when and why
the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses
could be triggered by Member States in timesof crisis. In particular, we must acknowledge
that whereas the two clauses are focused on
the EU’s internal security, CSDP missions andoperations are geared toward external threats.
This means that different mechanisms andresponses would be required depending on
the treaty article and crisis in question. Under an Article 42.7 situation CSDP tools would
be excluded from a response, save perhaps forwhere the crisis spills over into the Union’s
near geographical surroundings. Where Article 222 is concerned, CSDP is also generally
excluded although the Council of the EU may
decide to utilise CSDP frameworks and mechanisms depending on the crisis in question.
Either way, these legal parameters impose on
the Union a need to clarify what tools could
be used for crisis response under each treaty article.
The growing threats facing the EU make themutual assistance and solidarity clauses more
relevant than ever, even though a majority of(23)

EU-NATO countries still view Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty as the bedrock of collective defence. Over the next 5-10 years there isa lower probability for state-on-state armed
attacks against EU and NATO members andallies, although they cannot be completely discounted. Possible scenarios involving
Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic region orconflict in the Eastern Mediterranean should
not be underestimated (23). EU Member States
could possibly fall victim to terrorist attacks,
hybrid campaigns or natural and man-madedisasters (e.g. oil-spills or another pandemic). Furthermore, the likelihood of a major cyberattack on the EU should not be discounted
either, especially given how cyberattacks canimmobilise banking, energy, water, healthcare
and communications systems. In such cases,
an EU Member State could find itself overwhelmed by a complex and intense crisis in a
relatively short period of time.
However, despite a pressing need to develop
the EU’s response capacities in the event ofeither legal provision being triggered, there is
still a lack of clarity over how they could beapplied. For example, what would happen in acase where both provisions are triggered andhow would the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses apply should an EU-NATO Member
State or ally trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty simultaneously? Both the mutual
assistance and solidarity clauses raise important political issues and sensitivities becauseof the security guarantee under NATO. The reality today is that the majority of EU Member

Bajema, N.E., ‘Every trick in the book: A story of Russia and Lithuania’, in Gaub, F. (ed.), ‘Conflicts to Come: 15 scenarios
for 2030’, Chaillot Paper No 161, EUISS, December 2020, pp. 60-70 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/conflicts-come).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

28

States plan for their common defence in NATObecause it ensures a direct link to US military
engagement. The EU does not currently havethe capabilities or force and military structures to ensure a like-for-like security anddefence guarantee. Indeed, deriving capabilities from the two Treaty articles is likely topush the Union in the direction of collective
defence and this would likely be a step too far
for many EU Member States.

required in each crisis situation. As Figure 9
underlines, over half the respondents strongly agree that the Union should be prepared
to use the civilian and military assets it has
at its disposal for Article 42.7-type crises. Of
course, triggering Article 42.7 would be highly
context-dependent and there is the complication that this specific treaty provision does not
automatically trigger an EU institutional response - the triggering and response is left to
EU Member States. In this sense, the Compass
could help clarify the relationship between the
EU’s range of tools and the exclusively intergovernmental nature of Article 42.7. In theevent of a cyberattack against an EU Member
State, for example, would the Union’s Cyber
Diplomacy Toolbox be automatically available
to the Member State in question?

There is, however, a need to think about how
the mutual assistance clause could be appliedin a complex collective scenario involving
non-military threats. In particular, there arecrises that fall under the threshold of NATO’s
Article 5 and a coherent EU response to suchsituations could certainly benefit European
security. However, the only time Article 42.7
TEU was triggered was in 2015
Furthermore, it is worth conby France following the Paris
how the EU can opoth the mutual sidering
terrorist attacks, but this casetimise its responses for theassistance and possible triggering of Article
study has its limitations interms of lessons learned forsolidarity clauses
222 TFEU. The Council Decision
every possible form of crisis. In
of June 2014 on the Solidarity
raise important
this respect, the EU could use
Clause imposes a relatively highpolitical issues
the Strategic Compass to pushthreshold where an EU Member
for more scenario-based dis- and sensitivities.
State must be completely overcussions on Article 42.7 TEU inwhelmed with a crisis before itcases such as countering illegal
can trigger the treaty article.
migration surges at the Union’s borders, cyber
Only once this threshold is met, which implies
assaults on critical networks, foreignthat a State cannot ensure its own security,
state-backed disinformation or manipulation
can the handling of the situation be placed
campaigns against the Union, hostile foreignin the hands of EU institutions. Having said
activities aimed at disrupting energy supplies
this, there are scenarios where the Solidarity
or attacks against an EU Member State.
Clause might be invoked to the benefit of the
EU Member States affected. A wider regional
Such scenario-based discussions are impornatural, climate change-related or man-madetant, but they should lead to concrete asdisaster (e.g. extreme long-lasting droughts,
sessments of the capabilities that would be
floods or severe chemical pollution incidents)

B

The EU should be prepared to use civilian andmilitary assets to respond to invocations of themutualassistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU)FIGURE 9 | The EU should be prepared to use civilian and military
assets tosolidarity
respond to invocationsof the mutual
assistance clauseandclause(Article
222 TFEU )(Article 42.7 TEU) and solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU )% of respondents

Strongly agree
1
0

Agree

7

Neither agree nor disagree
3925Strongly disagree
53

50

75

100

Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

CHAPTER 2 | Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience﻿
affecting several EU Member States could be
difficult to handle nationally and this may require an EU response. In such cases, the Solidarity Clause could be used to limit the effectsof catastrophic events.
Finally, another area of critical concern thatis made relevant in the context of the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses is cybersecurity. Indeed, the EU’s 2020 Cybersecurity
Strategy clearly refers to the fact that a cyberincident or attack could constitute the grounds
for an invocation of Article 222 TFEU. Likewise, cyberattacks against the EU could giverecourse to an invocation of Article 42.7 TEU.
As called for by the European Parliament andthe Council of the EU, there is a need to better prepare for such events (24). In the context of the Strategic Compass, therefore, awell-defined framework for the future activation, scope and operational implementation of
the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses asa response to cyberattacks should be discussed– but not necessarily publicised to maintain acertain ambiguity and flexibility with respect
to response options. Additionally, focusing on
cybersecurity should not come at the expenseof scenario-based discussions and exercises in the areas of illegal immigration, attacks
on critical civilian infrastructure (e.g. airport,
maritime or satellite communication systems)
and biowarfare.

(24)

Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy’, 10048/19, 17
June 2019 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39786/st10048-en19.pdf) and European Parliament, ‘Resolution on
the Mutual Defence Clause (Article 42(7) TEU’, 2015/3034(RSP), 21 January 2016 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/TA-8-2016-0019_EN.html).

29

30

CHAPTER 3

INVESTING IN CAPABILITIESAND TECHNOLOGIES
According to respondents and chapter contributors, the EU and its Member States havea mixed record of using CSDP to stimulate
capability development. CSDP has proven incapable of providing the required impetus for
ambitious capability development in Europe (1).
As things stand today, the EU’s level of ambition in security and defence is unachievablein its entirety and the Union would find manyof the existing Illustrative Scenarios extremely
challenging to conduct (2). Indeed, EU Member
States could not conduct the recent rescue andevacuation tasks faced in Afghanistan alone
due to a lack of strategic enablers, even though
rescue and evacuation is included in the current set of Illustrative Scenarios. There canonly be an artificial comfort to be drawn fromthe knowledge that capability development
efforts among European allies in NATO does
not fare much better (3).
Even with the Strategic Compass, EU Member States will continue to face a considerable number of civilian and military capability

gaps. Persistent capability gaps can be traced
to a sustained period of underinvestment
in armed forces and questions about how
the Covid-19 pandemic might effect defence budgets in the coming years (4). Indeed,
while total European defence spending grewfrom 1.25 % of GDP in 2014 to 1.64 of GDP in2020 (5), spending is still not high enough tofill capability gaps and modernise Europe’s
armed forces. Added investment in defence
remains the genuine litmus test of whether
EU Member States are truly dedicated to developing capabilities. Yet, the challenge facing
the Union to develop capabilities between now
and 2030 is daunting. Despite the 60 PESCO
projects currently underway, and the capability development projects that will start under
the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2022, EU
Member States need to not only fill existing
capability gaps but also invest in the modernisation of their forces (6).
If the EU is to develop the full spectrum military capabilities needed to meet its level of(1)

Major, C. and Mölling, C., ‘The EU’s military legacy: Over-institutionalised, under-equipped and strategically divided’, in
The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, op.cit., pp. 38-49(2)

Barry, B. et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-based capability requirements for NATO’s European members’, Research
Paper No 3, International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2019 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/
defending-europe).

(3)‘The coordination problem in European defence planning’, Strategic Comments, Vol. 27, No 27, International Institutefor Strategic Studies, September 2021 (https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2021/the-coordinationproblem-in-european-defence-planning).

(4)

For example, Marrone, A. and Credi, O., ‘Covid-19: Which effects on defence policies in Europe?’, Documenti, No 20,
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020 (https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/covid-19-which-effects-defence-policieseurope).

(5)

McGerty, F., ‘Global defence spending on the up, despite economic crunch’, Military Balance Blog, International Institutefor Strategic Studies, 25 February 2021 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/02/global-defence-spendingincreases).

(6)

Fiott, D., ‘Digitalising defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the Cloud’, Brief No 4, EUISS,March 2020 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%204%20Defence.pdf).

CHAPTER 3 | Investing in capabilities and technologies
ambition in security and defence, then theStrategic Compass cannot narrowly define capabilities only in terms of CSDP. Indeed, theEU’s defence capability development tools already allow Member States to develop capabilities that are required for national, EU and
NATO capability needs and targets. In thissense, the core task of this third chapter is to
examine the type of capability gaps currently
facing the EU and to underline the importanceof filling them by 2030. Furthermore, thischapter offers an analysis of EU and national defence planning processes and it calls for
greater investments in emerging and disruptive technologies. In this respect, the Strategic Compass has the challenge of focusing on
present and future capability requirements (7).

PERSISTENTCAPABILITY GAPS
The gaps in European military capabilities are
well-known. As the survey results show at
Figure 10, the EU is perceived to have capability shortfalls in the areas of naval and air
capabilities and strategic enablers (e.g. space,cyber and training). Surprisingly, despite thegrowing importance of territorial defence
many respondents believed that land capabilities should be less of a priority for the EU. It
is difficult to provide a concrete explanation
for such a result, save for the fact that respondents may have felt that land capabilities
should be developed in a NATO context or thatland capabilities such as tanks are less relevant for CSDP missions and operations. Either

31

way, the capability gaps facing European governments in the EU and NATO are relatively
clear. In addition to deficiencies in the area of
C2 capacities, shortfalls persist in the following areas:> Air: fighter ground attack aircraft,
air-to-air refuelling tankers, strategic
heavy-lift transport, air medical evacuation
helicopters, electronic intelligence aircraft,maritime air patrol and combat unmanned
aerial vehicles.
> Land: light and armoured vehicles,
Main Battle Tanks, long-range artillery,land-based short and medium-range air
missile defence capacities.
> Maritime: aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates, attack submarines, amphibious ships and transport, harbour protection, maritime situational awareness andanti-submarine warfare capacities andmine countermeasures.
> Space: satellite communications, Space
Traffic Management capabilities and modernised secure communications links.
> Enablers: force protection technologies andsystems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies and cyberdefence capabilities (8).
European armed forces will have to engage
rapidly in the modernisation of capabilities,
particularly in areas such as armoured vehicles and defence against long-range andshort-range missile threats. What is more, it
is critical that the Union collectively develops(7)

Fiott, D., ‘Capability development’ in The EU’s Strategic Compass and its Four Baskets: Recommendations to make the most of it,
op.cit.

(8)This list of capability gaps has been sourced from the EUISS survey, the views of the co-authors of this Chaillot Paperand the primary and secondary literature. See, for example, European Defence Agency and EU Military Staff, ‘2020 CARD
Report - Executive Summary’, 2020 (https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/reports/card-2020-executive-summaryreport.pdf); European Defence Agency, ‘2018 CDP Revision: The EU capability development priorities’, 2018 (https://eda.
europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/eda-brochure-cdp); Zandee, D. ‘No more shortfalls? European militarycapabilities 20 Years on’, in The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, op.cit., pp. 50-58; Marrone
A. and Muti K. (eds.), ‘Europe’s missile defence and Italy: Capabilities and cooperation’, Documenti, No. 21, Istituto AffariInternazionali, April 2021 (https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/europes-missile-defence-and-italy-capabilities-andcooperation); ‘The Strategic Compass and capability development: Towards greater coherence?’, Workshop Report, EU
Institute for Security Studies, 28 September 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-compass-and-capabilitydevelopment-towards-greater-coherence).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

32

packages will be of most utility to the EU over
FIGURE 10 | In order to ensure the operational robustness of military missions
and operations,
within theyears
context of PESCO and the EDF, which capability
thenextand5−10
packages will be of most utility to the EU over the next 5-10 years?
%
respondents% ofof respondents

High importance

Medium importance

Low importance
12

Enablers (space, cyber, training)

36

53

Air capabilities (aircraft, strategic transport and tankers) 378
16

Naval capabilities (frigates, submarines, unmanned vehicles)

20
67

17

70

Land capabilities (tanks, armoured vehicles)
0

25

20
50

11

75

100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

the means necessary for enhancing its presence at sea and in space. To date, the EU lacks
sufficient capacities to ensure its manoeuvrability and resilience at sea and for this reason
it is welcome news that the Union will develop European patrol class vessels (9). The samecan be said for outer space, but this domain is
especially critical because of the presence ofEU space-based infrastructure such as Galileo
and Copernicus. Indeed, without the modernisation and protection of the EU’s space-based
capacities there is a risk that the Union’s ability to conduct military operations, monitor
arms trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity and observe environmental and climacticchanges from space will be undermined (10).
Despite these recognised capability shortfalls,
the EU has also made positive steps forward in
the area of military mobility (11). This area is aparticular capability that brings together
transport infrastructure, legislation and regulation and dual-use technologies. Military
mobility is a key plank of EU-NATO

Survey recommendation 14
The EU Member States should use theStrategic Compass to create capability cluster packages to ensure that investment is properly directed and thatkey platforms can be reinforced byhigh-tech strategic enablers. In particular, as a matter of urgency the EU needs
to invest in a European next-generation
fighter such as the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), combat and ISR
drones, hypersonic propulsion technologies, missile defence systems,
next-generation Main Battle Tanks,
automated ground combat systems, thedevelopment of a carrier strike group andanti-submarine warfare capabilities.

cooperation and it is a test case for whether
the EU can deliver a major capability and(9)‘Naval gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence’, op.cit.

(10)

Fiott, D., ‘The European space sector as an enabler of EU strategic autonomy’, Study, European Parliament, December
2020 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-space-sector-enabler-eu-strategic-autonomy).

(11)

Gotkowska, J., ‘A European Defence Union? The EU’s new instruments in the area of security and defence’, OSW Report,
November 2019, p. 42 (https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Report__A%20European%20Defence%20Union__
net_0.pdf).

CHAPTER 3 | Investing in capabilities and technologies﻿
contribution to Europe’s security (12). It is important that the momentum is maintained and
it is positive that third states such as Canada,
Norway and the United States are part of the
PESCO project on military mobility. Nevertheless, the Union should move at a more rapid
pace in putting in place legal and administrative regulations and standards. In partnershipwith NATO, the EU can also consider the futureof the project by volunteering new future steps
under the Strategic Compass. This could include steps for logistics centres for the storageof critical equipment, even if this might pose achallenge for financing under the Connecting
Europe Facility mechanism.

Survey recommendation 15
The Strategic Compass should underline the importance of strategic enablers. Military mobility is an excellent
example of EU-NATO cooperation oncapability development but greater investment is required by the EU. Additionally, electronic warfare capacities
and cyberdefence capacities are urgently needed. Moreover, investment inemerging and disruptive technologies
such as AI and quantum computing remain critical and the EU should be boldenough to develop a common military
cloud. An EU Cyber Response Operations
Centre is required too, and this could
lead to more standardised civil-militarytraining in the area of cybersecurity.

There is also a need to continue to develop civilian capabilities based on the conclusions of
the Civilian CSDP Compact. Looking to the2030 horizon under the Strategic Compass, itis necessary for the EU to consider the recruitment and deployment of conflict analysis, environmental and climate-security specialists
in civilian missions. Such expertise would

(12)

33

increase the Union’s suite of capacity-building
measures, boost partnerships with fragile
countries and allow the EU to combat environmental crimes. This includes streamlining EU
training and recruitment, removing procedural and financial obstacles to personnel contributions and enhancing coordination between
ministries of foreign affairs and other relevant
national ministries. In particular, recruitment
for civilian expertise should focus on criticalexpertise profiles such as judges, prosecutors,
cyber experts and other personnel that canhelp counter hybrid threats. Key skills here
include criminal investigation expertise, language skills and expertise on human rights,
gender, rule of law and countering corruption
and disinformation.

Survey recommendation 16
The Strategic Compass should stressthe need to deliver on the Civilian CSDP
Compact and the objective of being able
to deploy a civilian mission of 200 staff
in 30 days with all the necessary equipment provided by the Civilian Warehouse. Furthermore, to support the 22
commitments made under the Civilian
Compact it will be necessary for civilian missions to better rely on specialised
teams and multinational formations
such as the European Gendarmerie Forceor Civilian Response Teams for specific areas such as cyber, disinformation,
strategic communication, terrorism andclimate change.

There is a need to better incentivise the proposed career path for officials within civilian
missions, but this implies that national internal security structures adapt to the demandsof the shifting international security environment. There is also a need to ensure thatcivilian CSDP ensures cross-fertilisation with

‘EU-NATO cooperation and the Strategic Compass’, Workshop Report, EU Institute for Security Studies and the Slovenian
Ministry of Defence, 14 October 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-nato-cooperation-and-strategic-compass).

process* is ﬁt−for−purpose for the threats and
FIGURE 11 | The current
EU militarythecapability
process*
is fit-forchallenges
facingEUdevelopment
over thenext
5−10 years
purpose for the threats and challenges facing the EU over the next 5-10 years
Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

34% of respondents
Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

170DisagreeStrongly disagree

49
25

22
50

75

12
100

NB: * Military Capability Development Plan, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, High Impact Capability Goals,
Permanent Structured Cooperation (and National Implementation Plans) and the European Defence Fund.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

JHA bodies and mechanisms. Additionally, civilian CSDP would benefit from expertise on
early warning, situational awareness, strategic foresight and preventive action. Such expertise should be used in an interdisciplinarymanner and in conjunction with partners on
the ground. In this respect, such skills and expertise would boost the Union’s capacities toanticipate threats, risks and challenges. Suchsteps can only be supported from dual-use
capabilities such as the EU Satellite Centre,
which provides valuable geospatial intelligence to monitor conflict zones, uncover illegal activities such as logging, trafficking in
waste, illegal fishing, activities that financeterrorism, border management, etc.

DEFENCE SPENDING
AND PLANNING
Following the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, defence budgets in Europe hit adownward curve and this greatly affected thefinancial bandwidth needed to invest in capabilities. During this depression in defence
spending, Research and Development (R&D)
was particularly hit and this has meant thattoday there is an investment lag in criticaltechnology areas. This is why the Strategic Compass needs to reinforce the message(13)

that EU Member States should invest morein defence. PESCO, the Coordinated Annual
Review on Defence (CARD) and the EDF canhelp in this regard but they are no substitutefor national investments in defence. However, this may be a challenge in the context of
the unknown economic consequences of theCovid-19 pandemic. Thus far, defence budgets
appear to have been ring-fenced or even increased due to the changing threat landscapefacing the EU. However, there is no guaranteethat this situation will last as national budgets are geared to addressing the EU’s economic
recovery in the coming years.
Additionally, any ambitious approach to EU
capability development in the Compass will
have to contend with the well-documented
fragmentation and duplication of European civilian and military capabilities. As the survey
results in Figure 11 show, respondents clearlyfeel that the EU’s capability development process is not currently fit-for-purpose for the
threats facing the Union over the next 5-10
years. Two-thirds of respondents either disagree or strong disagree that the capability development process is not adequate enough to
help address looming threats and challenges.
For example, PESCO was initially designed toprovide the framework through which capability shortfalls could be addressed, but it is
not living up to expectations and projects do
not consistently address high-end capability
needs (13). In this respect, an important

Simon, E. and Marrone, A., ‘Linking PESCO and EDF: Mechanisms and political choices’, Report No 66, ARES Group, May
2021 (https://www.iris-france.org/notes/linking-pesco-and-edf-mechanisms-and-political-choices/); Lazarou, E. and
Latici, T., ‘PESCO: Ahead of the strategic review’, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652051/EPRS_BRI(2020)652051_EN.pdf).

and challenges facing the EU
FIGURE 12the| The current
capability
development process* is fit-forovernextEU civilian
5−10
years
purpose for the threats and challenges facing the EU over the next 5-10 years
CHAPTER 3 | Investing in capabilities and technologies﻿

35%
respondents% ofof respondents
Agree
5
0

Neither agree nor disagree

DisagreeStrongly disagree

30

45
25

50

20
75

100

NB: * Civilian Capability Development Plan, Civilian Annual Report on Capabilities,
National Implementation Plans, Joint Action Plan and Annual Review Conference.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

political dimension of the Strategic Compass
will be to re-emphasise the need to commit to
the twenty binding commitments already embedded in the notification establishing PESCO.
Such commitments need to be treated with agreater sense of urgency by Member States.

Survey recommendation 17
To increase the interest of national defence ministries in EU capability development processes, the Strategic Compass
could call for a political annual progress
report that provides an easily digestible overview of the progress made (orlack thereof) in capability development
for foreign and defence ministers. Morespecifically, the annual progress report
could bring together the priorities of the
CDP, CARD, EDF and Headline Goals andensure that the report involves the Chiefof Defence Staff, National Armaments
Directors, the Cabinet of Defence Ministers and even finance ministries in EU
Member States.

Furthermore, the Compass first has to help
streamline seemingly cumbersome EU capability development processes and it can do soby clarifying the strategic scenarios the EUshould plan for. While we should recognisethat the EU’s capability development process(14)

is still young, and that some strategic patience
will be required to see how and in what ways
the system delivers capabilities for Member
States, this is not an adequate excuse to shy
away from streamlining efforts. Part of thechallenge is ensuring that individual capability development tools are brought together
so that the Headline Goals, the High Impact
Capability Goals (HICGs), the Capability Development Plan (CDP), CARD, PESCO and EDF
better align. There is also a necessity to continue to show how the EU capability development process relates to the NATO Defence
Planning Process (NDPP).
Beyond the streamlining of EU capability development processes, however, there is a needto recognise the long-standing issue of a lackof national buy-in for EU security and defence
efforts (14). There must be a structural reason
why EU Member States do not adhere to thebinding commitments in PESCO or live up to
EU capability targets. Today, national defence
planners only view EU requirements as a distant third behind national capability priorities
and NATO planning requirements. The reality
is that CSDP only represents a small fractionof the defence tasks facing defence ministries,
and a majority of EU Member States are increasingly focused on territorial defence where
CSDP has no role. Most European states in the
EU and NATO prefer to develop capabilities tomeet the challenge of territorial defence, andthis means that a priority is given to the NDPP.

‘Making the Strategic Compass work: How to embed EU ambitions in national defence planning?’, Workshop Report, EU
Institute for Security Studies and the Croatian Ministry of Defence, 26 April 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/
making-strategic-compass-work-how-embed-eu-ambitions-national-defence-planning).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

36

Indeed, the first CARD report and PESCO review reinforced the view that EU capability
development mechanisms and initiatives
should be further embedded in national defence planning. In this regard, there is a
growing realisation that EU capability development efforts address the broad capability
suite and not just a narrow focus on the CSDP.
It should therefore be noted that EU capability
development processes are not designed to respond solely to the capability requirements of
CSDP. In fact, capabilities developed within an
EU setting are increasingly geared to simultaneously filling capability gaps in NATO. A
number of PESCO and EDF projects are indeed
relevant for NATO and specific projects and it
is ultimately up to EU Member States to decide
where to use capabilities they develop in the
EU framework.

DEFENCEINNOVATION ANDTECHNOLOGIESTechnological and defence-industrial competition is a reality in today’s geopolitical environment. Without mastery of critical technologies
and control over critical supply chains, it will
be difficult to sustain any notion of European technological autonomy or sovereignty. In
particular, the defence and space industries
are facing unprecedented global competition
and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies(EDTs) such as AI, robotics, automated systems, quantum computing and cyber technology are under-pinning and potentially altering
the global balance of power (15).
EU tools such as the EDF are
he EU
vital to enhancing the Union’s
defence-technologicaldevelwould be
opment, although such tools
right to stressshould pay attention to supportthe relevanceing transnational cooperationof innovationand small and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs) in a baland emerging
anced manner. While techand disruptive
nological solutions can nevertechnologies in
be a panacea, the EU would be
the Strategicright to stress the relevance ofinnovation and emerging andCompass.
disruptive technologies in theStrategic Compass.

T

Finally, civilian capability development processes should be
addressed by the Strategic Compass. Based on the Civilian CSDP
Compact, EU Member States
could use the Strategic Compass
to establish and implement capability development througha clustered approach focusing
on specialised capability needs.
The National Implementation
Plan (NIP) process embedded in
the Civilian Compact could also
be further strengthened by theStrategic Compass, but there
remains a need for EU Member States to commit to capability development and the provision of personnel and enablers. Based on thesurvey results found in Figure 12, respondents
were more positive about the civilian capability development process when compared withits military counterpart.

(15)

Dual-use technologies are also likely to playa significant role in helping the EU Member
States develop capabilities that can also respond to unconventional security threats andchallenges such as cyberattacks, health crises
and climate change. In this respect, investments in energy-efficient technologies canhelp the EU enhance its sustainability in thefield while also reducing strategic dependencies on fossil fuels. However, substantial investments in the space sector will be required

Sabatino, E. and Marrone, A., ‘Emerging disruptive technologies: The Achilles’ heel for EU strategic autonomy?’,Commentaries, No 21, Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2021 (https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/emerging-disruptivetechnologies-achilles-heel-eu-strategic-autonomy).

CHAPTER 3 | Investing in capabilities and technologies﻿
if the EU is to maintain its autonomy. Satellite communications are vital for defence andsecurity, humanitarian deliveries, civil emergency response, natural disasters and climatechange and secure diplomatic exchanges. In
this sense, the Compass should not only underline the importance of enhancing synergies between the civil, space and defence
sectors in the EU, but it should also give theright impulses for key technologies related
to secure communications and space traffic
management (16).

37

the importance of developing a coherent EU
approach to security and defence and disruptive technologies and processes such as AI,
big data, quantum computing, the Internetof Things and more. However, the Strategic
Compass should be aware of buying fully intoa ‘technology-driven’ approach to capability
development. Indeed, defence research andinnovation are essential but policies should
not neglect the fact that only platforms andsystems will contribute to greater military capabilities for the EU.

Fortunately, the EU is already undertaking work on technology and innovation. In
the context of the European Defence Agency(EDA), there is work on Key Strategic Activities (KSAs) and the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) which are mechanisms
designed to identify important technologies
and industrial processes for the EU. Additionally, in the context of the EDF the European Commission is dedicating a slice of theFund to disruptive technologies. Moreover, theCommission has published an Action Plan on
Synergies between the defence, space and civil
domains. The Strategic Compass can reinforce
these efforts, but perhaps it can also stress theimportance of technological dependences andsecurity of supply. Indeed, the Union still faces
a number of vulnerabilities in critical supply
areas (e.g. semiconductors and precious metals) and the Compass should help to address
how strategic dependences can be managed in
the years coming up to 2030.
Ensuring that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) can
stimulate industrial competitiveness in abalanced way is crucial for Europe’s skills,
industrial capacities, innovation and economic well-being (17). Yet there is a need for
the Strategic Compass to underline the importance of technological modernisation anddigitalisation. Here, the Compass could stress(16)‘The importance of space for EU security, defence and resilience’, Workshop Report, EUISS, 4 October 2021 (https://www.
iss.europa.eu/content/importance-space-eu-security-defence-and-resilience).

(17)‘A Strategic Compass for EU defence: What implications for the European defence industry?’, Workshop Report, EUISS,
the Real Elcano Institute and the Spanish Ministry of Defence, 18 May 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategiccompass-eu-defence-what-implications-european-defence-industry).

38

CHAPTER 4

DEEPENING THE EU’SPARTNERSHIPS
Partnerships have always been fundamental
to CSDP. The past has seen various partners
contribute to CSDP missions and operations
and there are a number of partnership agreements in place to ensure that the EU works
with non-EU states and regional/international organisations on security and defence.
For example, countries such as Canada, Chile,
Georgia, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Turkey,
Switzerland and Ukraine have directly contributed personnel to EU-led missions. The Unionalso maintains approximately 20 Framework
Partnership Agreements (1) (FPAs) for crisis
management missions and operations with
Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam and more. Yet, CSDP
partnerships should not be defined solely interms of personnel contributions and agreements. Indeed, the Union has used CSDP tohelp certain states build their capacity against
security and defence challenges. The existing
four EU military training missions to the Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique andSomalia are testament to how the EU works
with host governments to help deliver security
sector reform and training.
With the Strategic Compass, however, there
is an opportunity to reassess how the Union
thinks about partnerships and security anddefence. It is for this reason that EU Member
States insisted on having a specific “basket”

on partnerships during the Compass dialogue
phase (2). One of the key challenges facing any
reassessment of partnerships through theStrategic Compass is precisely what the EUmeans by “partnerships”. We have seen abovethat CSDP partnerships traditionally encapsulate cooperation on EU missions and operations and capacity building. The Compass willcertainly have to consider how these traditional forms of partnerships can be enhanced
based on the threat analysis conducted in November 2020. In this sense, the definition ofpartnerships is likely to be expanded beyond
CSDP to include areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity and countering hybrid
threats - these are security issues that were
not originally part of CSDP partnerships but
they have obvious relevance to the Union’s security and defence.
Under the Strategic Compass, therefore, there
will be a focus on ‘EU security and defence
partnerships’ rather than a narrow interpretation of ‘CSDP partnerships’. For example,
the United States may not necessarily wantto contribute to CSDP missions and operations but there is a growing desire to build
the EU-US partnership in relation to capability projects (e.g. military mobility), maritime
security in the Indo-Pacific, cybersecurity
and countering hybrid threats. Furthermore,through its Strategic Partnership Agreements(1)

Figures provided by the EEAS and correct as at 29 April 2021. See also: Koenig, N., ‘Revamping CSDP partnerships in the
shadow of Brexit’, Policy Paper, Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2019, p. 3 (https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eugs_
watch_9.pdf).

(2)

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Security and Defence’, 8910/20, 17 June 2020 (https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/44521/st08910-en20.pdf).

CHAPTER 4 | Deepening the EU’s partnerships(SPAs) with Canada (signed in 2016) and Japan (signed in 2018) the Union has tried totie together trade agreements with security
agreements in areas that go beyond the traditional scope of CSDP (e.g. maritime security,
cybersecurity, environmental protection, etc).
In this respect, a key challenge is being able tocapture the diversity and specificity of actorsthat the Union wants to work with in the areaof security and defence (3).
Furthermore, this broader approach to security and defence partnerships gives the Union
the opportunity to reflect on past strategic
partnerships that may appear problematic or
devoid of meaning today due to geopoliticalshifts and events. For example, the Union still
maintains strategic partnerships with Russia and China but the content and purpose of
these partnerships is questionable today giventhat they are now strategic competitors for theUnion. Consider that the EU-Russia strategic
partnership was signed in 2011 - three years
before Moscow invaded Ukraine. In this sense,
the EU’s security and defence partnerships
take on a normative basis because the Council of the EU has been very clear that partnerships should be founded on the basis of sharedvalues and whether they contribute to respect for international law and a multilateral,
rules-based order (4). Due to growing authoritarianism in international relations, there isa sense in which partnerships with the EU
in security and defence can support an open,
multilateral global order. Thus, the Strategic
Compass provides an opportunity to rethink
how the EU develops and deepens its partnerships in an era of strategic competition.
The aim of this final chapter is to provide areflection on the challenges of re-assessing
partnerships in the context of the Strategic
Compass, as well as offering recommendations
for how EU Member States can advance cooperation on missions and operations, capacity

39

building and wider security and defence policy
issues along the way. In particular, the chapter focuses on what should be the main guidelines for the EU’s partnerships, how they may
evolve in light of strategic competition andwhat additional resources will be required tomaintain and extend partnerships.

PARTNERSHIPS ANDCAPACITY BUILDING
The majority of the EU’s existing capacity
building missions are active in regions withsignificant instability such as the Sahel and theHorn of Africa. It is important that the Union
continues to provide capacity to these regions,
not least because security challenges can spillover from these areas into geographical areas
close to the EU. The Union should also continue to promote an integrated approach to instability and capacity building because while
the Union will now be able to provide lethal
equipment to host-nation security services
and armed forces through the EPF, there canbe no substitute for capacity building acrossthe whole of government and society in fragile countries and regions. This means that the
EU should maximise the use of the NDICI in
conjunction with EU-led civilian and military
missions, as this is one of the effective waysof implementing the EU’s integrated approachand assisting with peacebuilding and societal
resilience.
The Strategic Compass could also afford an opportunity to review how the Union’s tools are
combined and used in fragile regions. Such astocktaking could certainly play into a broader
review of how far the Union is implementing
an integrated approach in practice. Indeed,
there needs to be an honest appraisal of how(3)Bond, I., Scazzieri, L. and Aydin-Düzgit, S., ‘EU foreign, security and defence policy cooperation with neighbours:
Mapping diversity’, Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, 10 May 2021 (https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/
policy-brief/2021/eu-foreign-security-and-defence-policy-co-operation).

(4)

Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Security and Defence’, 8396/21, 10 May 2021, (https://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8396-2021-INIT/en/pdf). See also Serrano, P., ‘Truth and dare: A personalreflection on 20 Years of CSDP’, in The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, op.cit., p. 35.

What should partnerships in security anddefencelike overtheandnext 5−10 years?
FIGURE 13 | Whatlook
should partnerships
in security

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

40

defence look like over the next 5-10 years?

% of respondents% of respondents

High importance

Medium importance

Low importance
8

Linking partnerships more closely with international organisations(e.g. NATO, UN, AU, ASEAN)

26

66

17

Using partnerships to support sub−regional security integration(e.g. in the Sahel)

59

24

43

49

Linking partnerships with defence exports

28

Linking partnerships with trade deals
0

8

4

68
25

50

75

100

Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

far EU institutions and bodies such as the European Commission and EEAS are working together in the field in practical terms. Further
than this, it is necessary for the EU to think
through the logic of capacity building. In many
respects, capacity building should be seen as ameans to an end but the Union is not always
entirely clear on what this ‘end’ is. The risk isthat capacity-building missions will be viewed
by partners as only a subsidiary of military
missions and operations, which means thatcapacity-building missions are directly linked
to the success or failure of military engagement. This is problematic as capacity building
should be linked to an integrated EU response
to fragile zones that transcends a purely military approach to crises.
What is more, and as indicated in Figure 13,
the integrated approach is supposed to lead tostrengthened partnerships with regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) or the Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE). However, more can be done to boost
the operational dimension of such partnerships. It is also important for the EU to renew
its partnership with the United Nations (UN),especiallyasmultilateralism

is

under

Survey recommendation 18
The Strategic Compass should outline
a more modular approach to capacity
building partnerships through civilian
CSDP. To cater to the specific needs ofpartners, the EU needs to develop integrated partnership packages that include the provision of equipment andexpertise to fragile partners. In particular, the EU should work with partners to develop strategies for countering
cyberattacks and the foreign manipulation of information. Furthermore,strategic partnerships can only bestrengthened, and strategic competitors
dissuaded, through a long-term EU political presence in key partner countries
and regions.

increasing pressure – recognising that muchcollaboration is already ongoing. An example
of such cooperation is the periodically updated
UN-EU joint priorities on peace operations andcrisis management. Here, the EU and UN canstrengthen collaboration by focusing on new
areas of action such as environmental protection and climate change. Indeed, increasingly
the EU and UN will need to work closer

CHAPTER 4 | Deepening the EU’s partnerships ﻿
together on the climate-security nexus (5). As
the Union develops its own Roadmap for Climate and Defence (6) and a Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate and Security (7),the EU cannot afford not to build on the UN’s
work on climate-security early warning andits efforts on the link between environmental
crime and narcotics. Additionally, working
with the UN on the climate-security nexus canmean that international crisis response mechanisms are better prepared to address environmental factors that influence conflict cycles.

Survey recommendation 19
The Strategic Compass could establish aforum-like structure to allow for moreregular strategic dialogue with partners.
‘Partnership conferences’ could be organised on a thematic or regional basis
and allow the EU and partners to identify common political objectives, engage
in conflict early warning analysis or
better tailor capacity building measures.
Such a solution would allow the EU totailor its responses and give the EU andpartners the opportunity to develop
common threat analyses and situationalawareness.

Despite these needs, however, there is stillsome way to go before the EU can claim tohave a truly integrated approach to crises. To
date, non-executive military missions can beestablished faster than civilian counterparts
and this disconnect can push military personnel into roles for which they are not trained41

or equipped. Any EU stabilisation efforts will
require local buy-in, ownership and political
dialogue and there is a need for the EU to invest in cross-border operational cooperation
to ensure that a truly regional approach to crises can take root. This will require close cooperation between donor and recipient countries.
In this respect, instead of relying on militarytraining missions the EU could look at how
military and security actors could operate with
unfamiliar and non-military structures likefinance and treasury specialists – building
stability by, for instance, helping ensure that
troops are paid on time.
Yet, even if the EU has focused its
capacity-building efforts on Africa this region
cannot be the only priority. It is, for example,
also necessary for the Union to deepen its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership (EaP)
countries. In particular, the EU should develop ambitious responses to the security situation in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - thesecountries are especially important given theirclose economic and trade ties with the Union.
For example, while the EU will not be expected to play a hard security role in this region
any time soon, it should nevertheless engage
in capacity-building efforts with EaP countries in areas such as security sector reform,cybersecurity, countering disinformation andforeign intelligence operations (8). This could
be an effective way to dissuade Russia fromtrying to increase its sphere of influence ineastern Europe.
This same logic should also apply to the EU’s
approach to capacity building and partnerships in the Western Balkans (9). There is aneed for the Union to provide a coherent(5)‘Compact 2.0: Integrating Civilian CSDP into the Strategic Compass’, p. 6, op.cit.

(6)

Council of the European Union, ‘Climate Change and Defence Roadmap’, 12741/20, 9 November 2020 (https://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020-INIT/en/pdf).

(7)

Council of the European Union, ‘Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security’, 12537/21, 5 October
2021 (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12537-2021-INIT/en/pdf).

(8)

Gressel, G. and Popescu, N., ‘The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its Eastern neighbours’,
Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 3 November 2020 (https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-best-defence-whythe-eu-should-forge-security-compacts-with-its-eastern-neighbours/).

(9)‘The Strategic Compass and the Western Balkans: Towards a tailor-made and strategic approach to partnerships?’,Workshop Report, EUISS and the Slovenian Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategiccompass-and-western-balkans-towards-tailor-made-and-strategic-approach).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

42

framework for all of the activities it underit is important to ascertain whether partnertakes in the region, especially given the risingships are sustainable and durable over time.
tensions in that part of the world and how the
To date, it is unclear whether all of the EU’s
politics of EU accession is being instrumentalpartnerships meet these requirements. In theised by regional and foreign actors to underpast, the Union was eager to brand most of its
mine the Union’s presence in the Westerninternational relationships as ‘partnerships’,
Balkans. Not only should the EU use its signifbut this has proven unsustainable given theicant economic leverage in the region to enrise of authoritarianism and the relative desure local ownership for security, but thecline of the United States and Europe. It is
Union should actively invest in the region toalready clear that the EU’s existing stratecounter hybrid threats, enhance cybersecurity
gic partnerships with Russia and China apand combat disinformation and foreign interpear somewhat contradictory today given thatference. What is more, the EU needs to ensure
these two countries are the EU’s clearest straa suitable linkage between setegic competitors.
curity and defence and economU stabilisation To be sure, calls for a reassessic investment in the Western
efforts will
Balkans. For example, investment of EU partnerships in lightment in transport networks inrequire local buy- of major international events is
the region should be combinedin, ownership and nothing new for the Union. Afwith the financing of cybersethe EU Global Strategy, partpolitical dialogue. ter
curity capacities.
nerships were framed in termsof the post-Brexit settlementwith the United Kingdom and the relationshipwith the Trump administration (10). What isdifferent in the context of the Strategic Compass, however, is that the EU’s partnerships
are increasingly viewed through the prism ofstrategic competition. In particular, there isa sense in which the EU needs to respond to
the growing threats and challenges emanating from authoritarian powers such as Russia
Another major development in the way the EU
and China. The Union and its Member Statesconceives of partnerships relates to growing
recognise that the EU’s partnership with theglobal strategic competition. In this sense,
United States is particularly important in thispartnerships are increasingly less seen in
regard (11). Indeed, since the election of Prestransactional terms and more in line withident Biden the EU and United States have
whether partners share the same values andattempted to strengthen the transatlanticinterests. This normative aspiration should
partnership and the Joint Communication foralso be combined with whether partnerships
a new EU-US agenda for global change undercan contribute to effective problem-solving
lined that ‘Europe and the US face a growing
and the more efficient utilisation of resources,
number of serious transnational threats, fromalso by increasingly including the private sechybrid and military threats, violent extremism
tor as is likely to be underlined in the forthand global terrorism, to the proliferation ofcoming Global Gateway strategy. In this sense,
weapons of mass destruction’ (12).

E

STRATEGICCOMPETITION AND
PARTNERSHIPS(10)

Tardy, T., ‘Revisiting the EU’s security partnerships’, Brief No 1, EUISS, January 2018 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/
revisiting-eu’s-security-partnerships).

(11)‘Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 8396/21’, op.cit.

(12)European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Joint
Communication for a new EU-US agenda for global change’, JOIN(2020) 22 final, 2 December 2020, p. 10 (https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/joint-communication-eu-us-agenda_en.pdf).

security and defence are more than adequate to
FIGURE 14security| The EU’s existing
partnerships in thearea of the
securitynext
and defence
facechallenges
over
5−10 years
are more than adequate to face security challenges over the next 5-10 years
CHAPTER 4 | Deepening the EU’s partnerships ﻿

43

%
% of
of respondents
respondents

Strongly agree
3
0

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

25

50

32

DisagreeStrongly disagree

41

22

3

75

100

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

With regard to Russia, the EU is expected to play a complementary role to NATO instrengthening the defence of eastern partners
and its own EU Member States. Militarily theEU’s role is rather marginal, but it is moresignificant with regard to resilience. Moscow
sees it as its strategic interest to create divisions among and within EU Member States
and NATO allies. In recent years, Russia has
pursued disinformation and influence operations in Europe and the US through a variety
of informational, technological and economicmeans. For example, it has interfered in the
US and French presidential elections, hacked
the IT system of the German and Norwegianparliaments and supported various populist
parties of the left and right across Europe. The
EU has developed a range of tools to counterhybrid threats and this means that the EU’s
contribution to security goes beyond CSDP.
Nevertheless, the EU’s partnership strategy
needs to take account of the fact that Russia
is engaging through proxy forces in the EU’s
neighbourhood and this implies a greater needto boost the capacity of partners to withstandthreats of a hybrid nature.
China will be a top priority for the US and EU
for decades to come. China’s rise poses fundamental challenges to Western security, values and technological superiority. As it aims
to strengthen its regional and global influence, China is increasingly having a destabilising effect on international security and it isemploying hybrid tactics below the threshold(13)

of conventional warfare to advance its political objectives (13). The need to position itself
vis-à-vis sharpening US-Chinese rivalry puts
the EU in an uncomfortable situation. It isdifficult to find a balance between values andeconomic interests, and to find ways to defend
both. Zooming in from this broad picture to
CSDP, countering hybrid threats is increasingly relevant with regard to China. For example,
the EU’s activities in the fields of countering
disinformation and cyber threats need to pay
more attention to China in future. Through its
Strategy on Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific,
the EU can make a contribution to security inSouth East Asia in the form of CSDP missions
that help develop capacities and resilience.
Faced with increased strategic competition,
there is an opportunity to use the Strategic
Compass to enhance the flexibility of CSDP
partnerships as they specifically refer to thedeployment of EU civilian and military missions and operations. This is certainly reflected in the survey results found at Figure
14, which indicates that the EU’s partnerships
need to evolve with the shifting strategic
landscape. Indeed, the model for CSDP partnerships for missions and operations mightwell be outdated and there is a need to movebeyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach to partnerships. A more flexible and varied CSDP
partnership format is required that allows different non-EU partners to engage in specificgeographical regions. In this respect, CSDP
partnerships should not be the only form of

Aukia, J., ‘China as a hybrid influencer: Non-state actors as state proxies’, Research Report, No. 1, European Centre of
Excellence of Countering Hybrid Threats, 16 June 2021 (https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-researchreport-1-china-as-a-hybrid-influencer-non-state-actors-as-state-proxies/).

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

44

cooperation possible with the EU on security
and defence matters. Partnerships should bebuilt without geographical constraints in areas
such as training, interoperability, standards,
information exchange, technology partnerships and defence diplomacy.

in the Arctic or even cyberdefence. Furthermore, partners could be invited within the EU
framework to work on joint conflict analysis,
intelligence cooperation (16) or even to engage
in common situational awareness activities
and exercises.

For example, flexible tools such as the CMP
concept could be used to build up partnerships
in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a lot of
potential for the EU to develop partnerships
with countries in the Indo-Pacific, especiallywhen it comes to joint exercises and information exchange. Japan is an obvious contender
for a closer partnership, especially in the fields
of cybersecurity, resilience and maritime security. However, a greater EU presence in
the Indo-Pacific could help develop relations
with countries such as India, South Korea andmore. Stronger maritime partnerships basedon a flexible cooperation model can allow foran enhanced ‘plug and play’ mentality anda shift in the way partners view the EU as aconvening power. In particular, live exercises
could certainly boost the visibility of the EU in
the region.

Beyond partners such as states or international organisations, however, the Strategic
Compass could stress the importance of engaging with non-state actors such as NGOs
and private actors. Working with actors thathave an active presence on the ground in crisis
situations would allow the EU to gather information on conflict dynamics in a more effective and timely manner. It would also givenon-state actors greater buy-in to EU crisis
management procedures and concepts, andthis would allow the Union to attain a better
understanding of conflict dynamics. In turn,this could lead to more effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Of course,
this is not a new idea but there is a pressing
need to find new mechanisms for this type ofengagement.

Increasing strategic competition also implies
that the CSDP framework may need to be mademore flexible to encourage partners to cooperate with the Union. To tackle insecurity in theEuropean neighbourhood, new kinds of strategic partnerships could be developed for key
non-EU allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, Norway and Canada (14) as wellas with countries in the EaP and even Latin
America. Given that the creation of specific institutional arrangements is not foreseen, it istherefore important for the EU to think about
the most effective way to develop security anddefence consultations (15). One way would be tofocus partnership dialogues on pressing thematic issues such as hybrid threats, security

THE TRANSATLANTICPARTNERSHIP
For many EU Member States, NATO remains
the cornerstone of collective defence. Deeper
political consultations and information exchange between the EU and NATO would be of
benefit, especially if this paves the way forjoint dialogue on current and future security
and defence needs and challenges. Although
the question of a ‘division of labour’ between
the EU and NATO is sensitive, both the EU
Strategic Compass and NATO Strategic(14)

On cooperation between the EU and non-EU NATO allies see: Stefanini, S., Nagy, T.A. and Giske, M.T.E., ‘One step closer:
Towards deeper and wider EU defence partnerships’, Policy Report, GLOBSEC, February 2021 (https://euagenda.eu/upload/
publications/one-step-closer-towards-deeper-and-wider-eu-defence-partnerships-ver6.pdf.pdf).

(15)

Puglierin, J., ‘Sovereignty and strategic partners’, in Fiott, D. (ed.), ‘European Sovereignty: Strategy and Interdependence’,
Chaillot Paper No. 169, EUISS, July 2021, pp. 23-30 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_169.pdf)
and Maulny, J-P. et al., ‘European security after Brexit: A British, French and German perspective’, Analysis, Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, December 2020 (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/16865-20201215.pdf).

(16)‘Revamping CSDP partnerships in the shadow of Brexit’, op.cit.

CHAPTER 4 | Deepening the EU’s partnerships ﻿Concept should clarify the strengths of eachorganisation and how policy responses canbest be utilised for the security of the entire
Euro-Atlantic region. Here, it should be recalled that each organisation is unique - one isa military alliance, the other a political organisation - and each has its own decision-making
autonomy. Nevertheless, the EU and NATOshould continue to strengthen their efforts inmilitary mobility, countering hybrid threats,
strategic communication, ensuring operational coherence and addressing emerging security
challenges (17).

Survey recommendation 20
The Strategic Compass should be an
important step to define the contentsof the EU-US security and defence dialogue. For example, the Compass could
stress the importance of developing
multilateral defence export controls and
EDTs, coordinated sanctions and operational cooperation. In time, cooperation
could extend to intensified intelligencesharing, countering hybrid threats andsituational awareness. Furthermore, an
EU-US security and defence dialogue
could also focus on defence market access issues as the US market is still
relatively closed to European defence
manufacturers.

45

to better manage relations between the twoorganisations in areas such as crisis management and collective defence. The process may
also make it possible to undertake a politicalstocktaking of the existing areas of EU-NATOcooperation to ascertain whether the common
actions are really delivering. Keeping in mind
the ‘single set of forces’ principle, it should
be possible for the EU and NATO to build on
their existing cooperation in fundamental security areas such as EDTs, cyberdefence, outerspace (18) and climate change. By extension, theStrategic Compass should also provide a levelof ambition for EU-US relations that tackles
contentious issues such as defence industrial
cooperation and market access (19).
Finally, the EU and US can also enhance theircooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Although theso-called ‘AUKUS affair’ has raised questions for Europe, steps to ensure that the EU
can play a full role in the region in line withthe 2021 EU Strategy on Cooperation with the
Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance for
the Union. In this regard, the Strategic Compass should not only reiterate the importanceof the EU’s role in the Indo-Pacific but it could
also offer opportunities for enhanced cooperation in the region. For the EU, ASEAN will be a
key interlocutor and partner in the region but
the Union could also diplomatically push to be
associated with the ‘Quad’ arrangement with
the US, Japan, Australia and India.

In many ways, it is fortunate that the EU
Strategic Compass and the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept are happening almostin parallel to each other. Such a process provides the EU and NATO with an opportunity(17)

See Nunes, I.F., ‘Prospects for Euro-Atlantic cooperation’, IDN Cadernos, Institute for National Defence, Lisbon, No. 37,
June 2020 (https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/idncadernos/Documents/Texto%20integral/idncadernos_37.pdf);
Lindstrom, G. and Tardy, T., ‘The scope of EU-NATO cooperation’ in Lindstrom, G. and Tardy, T. (eds.), The EU and NATO:The essential partners, EUISS, Paris, 2019, pp. 5-12 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EU%20and%20
NATO.pdf).

(18)

Lindstrom, G., ‘Stability and security in outer space: Reinforcing transatlantic cooperation’, in Soare, S. (ed.), Turning the
Tide: How to rescue transatlantic relations, EUISS, Paris, 2020, pp. 154-169 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
EUISSFiles/Transatlantic%20relations%20book.pdf).

(19)

Fiott, D. and Maulny, J-P., ‘What scope for EU-US defence industrial cooperation in the 2020s?’, Policy Paper, No 70, ARES
Group, September 2021 (https://www.iris-france.org/notes/what-scope-for-eu-us-defence-industrial-cooperation-inthe-2020s/).

46

CONCLUSIONThe Strategic Compass promises to provide theEU with both a revised strategic vision and aplan of action for the next decade until 2030.
Save for a potential revision of the EU Threat
Analysis in around 2025, the Compass needs
to comprehensively answer the same questions
posed at the start of this Chaillot Paper. Indeed,by March 2022 national planners across the EUshould be left with no doubt about the type ofcivilian and military missions and operations
the Union should plan and be prepared for
until 2030. The Compass should also outline
the type of strategic environments European armed forces, police, customs officials andother personnel will face and what strategies,
technologies and resources they can rely on.
Furthermore, the Strategic Compass should
explain how the EU will enhance Europe’s resilience and promote its values and interests.
Finally, the Compass must lucidly outline what
capabilities and partnerships are needed for
the EU to fulfil its level of ambition in defence.
However, perhaps it is also worth stressing
what the Strategic Compass is not. First, it is
not a replacement for the EU Global Strategy,
even if it updates the Union’s strategic readingof the threat landscape. It is rather a follow-on
document that more concretely addresses thelevel of ambition in security and defence set
by Member States in November 2016. Second,it should not necessarily pave the way for any
follow-on strategy. Put another way, if anotherEU-level document is needed to more precisely
describe the findings of the Compass, then the
Compass process would have to some degree
failed in its core objective. Third, and mostimportantly, the Strategic Compass cannot beseen as a silver bullet for the lack of commitment to EU security and defence. In this sense,
while the Compass can incentivise cooperationand lead to a greater sense of strategic solidarity, it is only the EU Member States thatcan decide to spend more on defence, dedicate
capabilities and personnel to missions and operations or to develop capabilities collectively.

Indeed, those involved in the drafting andnegotiation of the Strategic Compass will beaware of the intractable hurdles that facedeeper cooperation under the CSDP. The Union
has had more than twenty-years’ worth of experience in trying to develop EU security anddefence. To be sure, since 2016 there has been
greater momentum and a good number of new
tools was developed. One might put this largely down to the nadir of transatlantic relations
from 2017 to 2021 and Brexit. In this respect, it
will be interesting to see whether the current
state of international affairs will have any major effect on the new initiatives and strategic
outlook embedded in the Strategic Compass.
The relationship with Washington is far fromrosy, even with a new administration. However, beyond the withdrawal from Afghanistanor the ‘AUKUS affair’, it will be interesting tosee how far EU Member States are willing toaddress their strategic competition with Russia and China within an EU context, and, more
specifically, within a document about security
and defence.
This Chaillot Paper has reflected on all of thesequestions. Based on the collective efforts of 11
analysts and a survey, the volume has touched
upon both the opportunities afforded by theStrategic Compass and what continued political faultlines exist in debates about EU security and defence. We began our analysis withfour sets of questions that were designed toaddress each of the four baskets that comprise
the Strategic Compass: crisis management,
resilience, capabilities and partnerships. Basedon the collective analytical thoughts and the
EUISS survey results, this Chaillot Paper haspresented 20 specific recommendations that
could be considered during the negotiation
phase that will run from November 2021 to atleast February 2022. To this end, we summarise the major recommendations and conclusions from each chapter below.

CHAPTER 4 | Conclusion

ENHANCING THE
EU’S ABILITYTO ACT: CRISISMANAGEMENT AND
CAPACITY BUILDINGIn terms of crisis management, there is agreement that the EU will face a far tenser environment in which to deploy missions andoperations in the future. The years to 2030 will
see a crisis management landscape marked
by intractable political crises that can be exploited by the Union’s strategic competitors.
There is also an acknowledgement that EU
crisis management concepts should adapt tothe ongoing evolution in technology and information warfare. In this sense, one of the
major tasks facing the Strategic Compass is toadapt the EU to less permissive environments.
Such an adaptation is not just about concepts
or new illustrative scenarios, for there is aneed to ensure that the EU updates its strategic guidance, capability development and C2
functions. What emerges from the discussionin Chapter 1 is that the EU today faces a greater task of enhancing its standing as a crisis
manager than at any time since the inceptionof the CSDP.
While it is true that this Chaillot Paper has outlined a number of ways in which the EU canboost the attractiveness of civilian and military
action under CSDP, the reality is that there aremajor questions that EU Member States needto confront during the Compass negotiation
process. First, there is a need to contend witharguments about military intervention. Afterthe experiences of Afghanistan, it seems as if
there is little consensus on whether Europe’s
defence ministries should plan for expeditionary missions or rather focus more on territorial defence. Second, there is a debate about how
the EU can better geographically balance its
action under CSDP between its southern andeastern neighbourhoods. Finally, it remains
to be seen whether the Strategic Compass will47

radically alter how EU Member States view
the CSDP.

‘Crisis Management Basket’ recommendations and considerations> Avoiddecompartmentalisingthesouthern and eastern neighbourhoods. To do so would be to risk solutions to transboundary threats that
do not respect neatly defined geographical classifications.
> The EU needs to step up its approachto security and defence in the Western Balkans. It is a fragile region thatis intimately linked to European security, yet it is increasingly fallingprey to the designs of strategic competitors such as Russia and China.
> While it is not the role of the EU tofind military solutions to Russia’s
actions, the Union can step up its efforts to build capacity in the Eastern
Partnership countries in the areas ofcountering foreign manipulation of
information and cybersecurity.
> In Africa and the Middle East, theEU needs to plan for an era of strategic competition where powers actively try to undermine and deny theUnion’s efforts to stabilise conflictzones such as the Sahel.
> Beyond its immediate borders, the EUneeds to enhance its presence in the
Indo-Pacific. This can be achieved byusing and expanding existing EU naval operations and new tools such as
the Coordinated Maritime Presence.
> The EU needs to adapt its crisis management concepts for the twin challenge of climate change and natural
disasters. Armed forces may be required as a last resort to help deal
with natural disasters both within
and outside the EU.

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

48> The Union’s concept of crisis management needs to be better adapted
to responding to the full conflict cycle and hybrid threats. The Union’s
C2 capacities need adapting to suchfeatures of contemporary crisis response too.
> To incentivise action within an EU
framework, greater flexibility is required to allow for coalitions of thewilling to undertake military action
and to ensure that the EU can support European-led ad hoc missions
and operations.

SECURING EUROPE
AND ENHANCINGITS RESILIENCE
An absence of resilience can lead to protracted crisis and the further exploitation of vulnerabilities by strategic competitors. Basedon the analytical reflection and survey in thisChaillot Paper, it is clear that the EU needs
to continue to conceive of crisis response in
a comprehensive and integrated manner. In
practice, this means going beyond CSDP tools
to address critical security risks such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity, climate and natural disasters and the protection of the EU’s
interests and values on the global commons.
Chapter two called for a ‘whole of Union’ approach to resilience, beginning with the policy
areas that need to be addressed. In particular,
it is clear that the EU has much to learn fromthe Covid-19 pandemic, and so the Strategic
Compass should assist with clarifying how the
EU should respond to complex political, healthand environmental crises.
Chapter two also made clear that the EU needs
to better protect its interests and values in
the global commons. Indeed, the Union’s safeand open access to the maritime, space andcyber domains is being called into question.
Given the largely external dimension to thechallenge of the global commons, the EU canalready rely on CSDP tools and mechanisms- even if CSDP needs to be adapted to securing the Union’s access to strategic domains.
Relatedly, in an era of strategic competition
we cannot discount the importance of mutual
assistance and solidarity between EU Member
States. Should Article 42.7 TEU and/or Article 222 TFEU be triggered in times of crisis,
the EU should be in no doubt about politicaland institutional roles or the response capacities required. Given that CSDP provisions andcapacities play a circumscribed role under themutual assistance and solidarity clauses, theCompass could provide greater direction forwhat other crisis response tools and mechanisms could be relied upon in times of crisis.

‘Resilience Basket’ recommendations and considerations> Resilience calls for a ‘whole of Union’approach that brings together theUnion’s complete set of crisis response tools. This approach shouldplay to the EU’s civilian strengths
in areas such as managing scarce
resources.
> Working with partners such as NATO,the EU should continue to develop its
own standards and minimum thresholds for the protection of critical infrastructure such as energy, water,
cyber and electricity.
> The EU needs to continue to counterhybrid threats and terrorism, but thiswill require an ability to bring together a multitude of different public
and private actors and to boost intelligence and information gathering
capacities.
> Specific responses to resilience could
include enhancing media literacy
and intelligence, deploying strategic communication attachés to EU
Delegations and investing in civilian specialists for niche tasks such as
harbour and airport management.

Executive summary ﻿> The EU should use the Strategic
Compass to enhance its access to theglobal commons. In particular, theUnion needs to enhance its maritimeand space surveillance capacities andit should develop further its naval
presence in key regions such as the
Indo-Pacific.
> In the maritime domain, the EU could
use the Strategic Compass to enhance its presence and partnerships
through the conduct of live naval exercises and port calls. It should alsoprioritise the expansion of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept
to the Indo-Pacific.
> In outer space, the EU should seek
to rapidly develop its Space Traffic
Management capacities to protect its
interests in space, including Galileo
and Copernicus. The Compass could
help the EU deepen its reflection on
the relationship between defence
and space.
> For many EU Member States, NATOremains the cornerstone of their defence and Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty is therefore of indispensablevalue. In this respect, it is importantto understand the place and extent
of Article 42.7 TEU in the context oftransatlantic security.
> With increased threats comes greater attention to Article 42.7 TEU and
Article 222 TFEU. The EU needs tocontinue to conduct scenario-based
discussions on these provisions, witha particular focus on areas such as
the cyber and space domains.
> More specifically on Article 42.7
TEU, the Union could use the Strategic Compass to clarify the available
Union-level response tools that could
be made available to Member States,
especially if CSDP tools and mechanisms are not legally applicable.

49

INVESTING INCAPABILITIES ANDTECHNOLOGIES
Chapter three of this Chaillot Paper revealed
that the EU continues to face a range of military and civilian capability gaps. If the Strategic Compass is to address the pressing threatsfacing the EU, then there is a clear need to fillcritical capability gaps and invest in innovation for the future. In the air, cyber, land, sea
and space domains the Union faces criticalgaps and the recent experience of Afghanistan revealed the operational cost of not having strategic enablers. At the same time, EU
Member States and NATO allies are increasingly focusing on territorial defence and thismeans that EU capability development processes must be geared to European capabilities more broadly, rather than just CSDP. In
many respects, when we consider the range ofcapabilities and enablers outlined during theanalysis and the survey, the task confronting
the EU may appear insurmountable. Indeed,
the sheer range of capability shortfalls facing
European countries is significant and this is achallenge that has not been successfully remedied by NATO either.
Of course, if Europe is to fill the capability
gaps it faces, a sustained financial commitment by European governments is required.
A temptation to lower defence budgets in the
post-pandemic era should be avoided. At thesame time, the Strategic Compass offers EU
Member States an opportunity to streamline
the Union’s capability development processes
and to enhance national buy-in for EU security and defence. Chapter three revealed that theCompass can achieve this by ensuring close
coordination between EU and NATO processes and by prioritising capabilities that address
core national interests. Where civilian capabilities are concerned, chapter three stressedthat expertise and special skills are required
if the Union is to comprehensively address
challenges such as hybrid threats and cyberattacks. Finally, the chapter made a case forStrategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

50

how the Compass should engage with emerging and disruptive technologies.

‘Capabilities Basket’ recommendations and considerations> Given the security threats facing Europe, governments will find
it increasingly harder to avoid filling critical capability gaps. Futurecombat will require a technologically sophisticated and robust suiteof capabilities that the EU cannot lose
time in developing.
> Beyond the Strategic Compass,
EU Member States need to make along-term commitment to defence
spending and collectively invest incapabilities. An alignment of budgetary cycles would help but sustained investments in defence are asimportant.
> There is a need to ensure close coordination between EU and NATO capability development processes, thereby
prioritising military capabilities that
can address the core national interests of EU-NATO countries.
> When developing future capabilities,
the EU should give greater consideration to electronic warfare and cybercapacities. In fact, capability development processes will have to simultaneously fill critical gaps while also
modernising Europe’s forces.
> The EU capability development process is perceived as being too complex and cumbersome. The Compass
could help here by outlining measures to enhance the complementarity of EU efforts and to give politicalrelevance to the process by involving
key national stakeholders.

dominate investments at the expenseof military platforms and systems.
> Civilian capability development needs
more effective training methods andan attractive career path for individuals that deploy with civilian CSDP
missions. Increasingly, expertiseshould cover conflict analysis, cyber,strategic communication and environmental security.
> The EU should develop its maritimeand space capacities, especially given that they can support economic
prosperity in the EU. Furthermore,
there is a need to ensure that military capabilities are made more energy efficient, while not undermining
performance.

DEEPENING THE EU’SPARTNERSHIPS
Chapter four made clear that partnerships area critical function of the EU’s security and defence efforts. There is a need for the Union to
use the Strategic Compass to think about how
it can deepen its existing partnerships, while
also giving other potential partners a reason
to engage with the EU. As a basis for cooperation, there is a need for the EU to engage withlike-minded partners where it can most readily secure its interests and values. Indeed, theEU’s partnerships need to meet the challenge
of increased strategic competition and for thisreason there will be a tendency to prioritisecertain partnerships. Close relations with
NATO and the US are particularly valuable ina more tense security environment. Additionally, given the challenges facing multilateralism it is necessary for the Union to deepen its
engagement with the UN and regional players
such as the AU, ASEAN, OSCE and others.

> The Union must avoid a purely‘technology-driven’ approach to ca-

The two main conclusions that derive from theanalysis conducted in chapter four and the EU-

pability development and ensurethat disruptive technologies do not

ISS survey are: (1) the Union needs to enhance
its model of capacity building; and (2) the EU

Executive summary ﻿

should think about enhancing the flexibility of
CSDP. In both of these areas, the chapter proposes that the EU engages in diverse security areas such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity
and environmental protection. The EU’s modelof capacity building should be adapted with aclearer picture of the ends of EU engagement,
to provide a greater geographical 360 degree
approach and increased opportunities for joint
conflict analysis and live exercises. Capacity
building should also be viewed as but one element of a more ambitious integrated approach.
In terms of the CSDP, flexible arrangements
such as the CMP concept could allow the EU toengage partners more effectively.

‘Partnership Basket’ recommendations and considerations> Capacity building remains a core EU
tool for partnerships and new tools
such as the European Peace Facility will help in this regard. However,capacity building is a means to an
end and it should be part of an integrated approach drawing on the full
EU toolbox.
> The Strategic Compass is an ideal
opportunity for the Union to undertake a review of its capacity building efforts and to assess how far EU
institutions and bodies are working
together in an integrated manner.
> Close cooperation with the UN and
AU is critically important and more
can be done to ensure that each actor
shares a common approach to threats
through joint conflict analysis, situational awareness and exercises.
> Capacity building should reflect a
360 degree approach that includes
intensified cooperation with Eastern Partnership and Western Balkancountries. If capacity building is seen
as an ‘Africa only’ tool, this will leadto a lack of buy-in by partners and
EU Member States.

51> Increasingly, the EU’s strategic
partnerships will need to develop
consistent and robust responses tocompetitors such as Russia and China. In particular, here partnerships
should focus on countering cyberattacks and interference and the manipulation of migration flows.
> Flexibility can be achieved throughthe CMP and this could allow theEU to develop closer ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond themaritime domain, it is necessary toprovide greater flexibility throughthe CSDP.
> The relationship with NATO is fundamental but there is a need to develop deeper relations. The parallel
tracks of the Strategic Compass andStrategic Concept offer an ideal opportunity for deeper dialogue.
> The EU needs a clearer agenda for the
EU-US security and defence dialogue
and concrete trust-building measures are required given the recent
experiences of Afghanistan and the‘AUKUS’ affair.
> The EU and NATO have a vested interest in developing cooperation in
new areas such as resilience, emerging and disruptive technologies,
outer space, cyberdefence and climate change.

52

ANNEXESANNEX 1 EUISS SUPPORTFOR THE STRATEGICCOMPASS PROCESS
During the ‘dialogue phase’ of the Strategic
Compass, which ran from February to October 2021, EU Member States were invited toprovide input to the Compass drafting teamin the EEAS. The dialogue phase began on 8
February when the EEAS produced a ‘Scoping
Paper’, which set out the parameters of theCompass process and posed a series of questions to Member States structured into eachof the four baskets. A meeting of EU foreign
ministers on 22 February, a European Council Summit on 25-26 February and an informal meeting of EU defence ministers on 2-3
March provided the necessary political support
for the process. Following the Scoping Paper,
EU Member States provided input to the EEAS
through written input and workshops.
During the dialogue phase, more than 50 workshops were organised and over 25 non-papers
were circulated by EU Member States. Basedon this input, the EEAS produced four working
papers based on each of the four baskets. A
paper on crisis management was shared withEU Member States on 23 April, the working
paper on partnerships on 17 May, the working
paper on capabilities and new technologies on
21 May and the working paper on resilience on
9 July. The EUISS was actively involved in the
dialogue process and it assisted EU Member
States with the organisation of 12 workshops
including:> 25 October - an online workshop on ‘CSDP
and Partnerships’, organised by the EUISS
and the EEAS.

> 14 October - an online high-level conference on ‘EU-NATO Cooperation and theStrategic Compass’, organised by the EUISS
and the Slovenian Ministry of Defence.
> 4 October - an online workshop on the‘Importance of Space for EU Security, Defence and Resilience’, organised by the EUISS and the Permanent Representation ofFrance to the EU.
> 28 September - an online workshop on the‘Strategic Compass and Capability Development’, organised by the EUISS and the
Hungarian Ministry of Defence.
> 9 July - an online workshop on the ‘Cyberspace and EU Action to 2030’, organised by
the EUISS and the Permanent Representation of France to the EU.
> 7 July - an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and the Western Balkans’,organised by the EUISS and the Slovenian
Ministry of Defence.
> 4 June - an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and Security of Supply’,organised by the EUISS, the Finnish Ministry of Defence and the Latvian Ministryof Defence.
> 18 May - an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and the European Defence
Industry’, organised by the EUISS, theSpanish Ministry of Defence and the Real
Elcano Institute.
> 28 April - an online workshop on the‘Operational Dimension of the Strategic
Compass’, organised by the EUISS, theClingendael Institute, the Dutch Ministryof Defence and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Annexes﻿> 26 April - an online workshop on the‘Strategic Compass and National Defence
Planning’, organised by the EUISS and the
Croatian Ministry of Defence.
> 12 March - an online workshop on the‘Strategic Compass and Contested Global Commons’, organised by the EUISS and
the Permanent Representation of France
to the EU.
> 19 February - a high-level online conference on the ‘Strategic Compass and the Future of EU Security and Defence’, organisedby the EUISS and the Portuguese Ministryof Defence.
Additionally, the EUISS was involved in a rangeof other related activities and it supported dialogue workshops organised by Belgium on thegovernance of EU security and defence (1-2
July 2021), France on strategic culture (18 June2021), Portugal on maritime security (1 June2021), EUNAVFOR Irini on maritime security(26 May 2021), Spain on geospatial intelligence (12 May), France on the objectives of EU
security and defence (18 December 2020), Germany on defence capability development (24September 2020 and 7 December 2020) andCroatia on the EU Threat Analysis (26 February 2020).

ANNEX 2 QUESTIONNAIREFOR THE CHAILLOT
PAPER AUTHORSThe 20 questions are grouped into the fourbaskets of the Strategic Compass reflection
process. The 20 questions are as follows:

(1)

53

Crisis management
1. What are the main crisis management scenarios the EU should be prepared to respondto with civilian and military missions andoperations over the next 5-10 years?
2. Which geographical area of the world
should the Union prioritise for its security
and defence, and why? Alternatively should
it avoid prioritising geographical zones,
and if so why?
3. Are the “Petersberg Tasks” (1) (Article
42 and Article 43.1 TEU) still relevant? If
not, how would you amend and/or add tothem and why?
4. Are the targets set under the Illustrative
Scenarios and the Headline Goal processes
for civil and military CSDP still relevant? If
not, how would you augment them?
5. How can the EU member states be incentivised to dedicate greater resources to crisis
management operations and missions?

Resilience
6. To what extent, and in what ways, should
CSDP tools and mechanisms be used insupport of an invocation of the mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU) and/or
the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU)?
7. Are there any likely scenarios over the next
5-10 years that could require the invocation of the mutual assistance clause (Article
42.7 TEU) and/or the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU)?
8. Are existing crisis response structures (i.e.
IPCR, EEAS Crisis Response System, etc.)
fit-for-purpose to deal with enhancing

The Tasks are joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict
prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management (e.g. peacemaking and post-conflictstabilisation); and combating terrorism.

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

54

the resilience of the EU? If not, how should
they be developed further?
9. Should specific capability benchmarks (i.e.
forces, civilian experts, equipment) be put
in place for security and defence tasks related to the EU’s resilience?
10. To what extent, and in what ways, could
CSDP operations and missions help to protect European critical infrastructure within
the EU and more globally?

Capabilities
11. Which civilian and military capability gaps
need to be urgently filled over the next
5-10 years?
12. What specific military and civilian operational capability packages should be developed over the next 5-10 years?
13. In what ways can the eventual conclusionsof the Strategic Compass be embedded innational defence planning processes? How
can national ministries use commonly
agreed priorities for capability development
as a guide for their national processes?
14. Given the existence of PESCO and the EDF,
what technological and industrial domains
should be prioritised by the EU in the Strategic Compass over the next 5-10 years?
15. Are existing civilian and military capability
development mechanisms fit-for-purpose?
If not, how could they be adapted to ensure more focused EU-level capability
development?

Partnerships
16. Are the EU’s capability-building missions
and military training missions the most
optimal manner through which to build
security and defence partnerships in places
such as Africa? If not, how could they be
augmented or modified?

17. Keeping in mind geographical priorities andshared values and interests, how should the
EU prioritise its strategic partnerships insecurity and defence?
18. What should partnerships in security anddefence look like in practice? Should partnerships relate solely to participation in
CSDP missions and operations or is there
scope for deeper partnerships? If so, in
what ways?
19. Are there specific areas of cooperation in
the domain of security and defence thatshould be prioritised in the context of thetransatlantic relationship?
20. How can the Strategic Compass reinforce
efforts within the NATO alliance? Is there
scope to develop the EU-NATO Joint Declarations and the Common Actions? If so, in
what new ways?

ANNEX 3 EUISS SURVEY
The 25 questions are grouped into the verysame four baskets that will organise the findings and conclusions of the Strategic Compass.

Introductory questions– Are you employed by a think tank associated with a government?
– Are you employed by a think tank associated with an international organisation?
– Are you employed by a think tank withno association to governments or international organisations?
– What is your main area of researchat present?

Annexes﻿

Crisis management
1. Which geographical region will require the mostattention from the EU in terms of civilian andmilitary crisis management deployments overthe next ten years? (Order in terms of priority
over the next 5-10 years):
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

All/Full spectrum (360 degree)
Central Asia
Eastern Europe
Great Lakes
Gulf of Guinea
Horn of Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
Sahel
Other (please specify)

2. The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (2) are still fit-for-purpose
to meet the geopolitical dynamics over the next
5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

3. Given the possible evolution of threats over the
next 5-10 years, which are the most pressing civilian and military tasks identified by the Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016 (14149/16)?
(more than one answer is permitted):> Joint crisis management operations insituations of high security risk in theregions surrounding the EU> Joint stabilisation operations, including
air and special operations> Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups
as a whole or within a mission-tailored
Force package

(2)

55

> Substitution/executive civilian missions> Air security operations including close
air support and air surveillance> Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe> Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring,
mentoring and advising, training) interalia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience,
response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions> Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions,
including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.
4. Current EU civilian planning and conduct structures are well-suited for the threats and challenges that the Union will face over the next
5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

5. Current EU military planning and conduct
structures are well-suited for the threats andchallenges that the Union will face over the next
5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

6. Are there ways in which the EU can enhance its
response to crises? If so, how?
> Open question – no word limit

See Article 42 and Article 43.1 Treaty on European Union. The Tasks are joint disarmament operations; humanitarian andrescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces incrisis management (e.g. peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation); and combating terrorism.

56

Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

Resilience> Assistance for public health (e.g. pandemic response)> Border management> Countering hybrid threats> Countering people trafficking> Counter-terrorism> Cyber defence> Managing the security-related effects ofclimate change> Maritime security> Protection of critical infrastructure> Territorial defence> Other (please specify)

7. The EU should be prepared to use civilian andmilitary assets to respond to invocations of themutual assistance (Article 42.7 TEU) and solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) clauses:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

8. The EU institutions should be prepared to support member states in case of an invocation of
Article 42.7 TEU (mutual assistance clause) and
Article 222 TFEU (solidary clause):
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

9. Utilising its military mechanisms, which are
the most pressing tasks needed to protect the
EU over the next 5-10 years? (order in terms ofpriority):> Assistance for public health (e.g. pandemic response)> Border management> Countering hybrid threats> Countering people trafficking> Counter-terrorism> Cyber defence> Managing the security-related effects ofclimate change> Maritime security> Protection of critical infrastructure> Territorial defence> Other (please specify)
10. Utilising its civilian mechanisms, which are
the most pressing tasks needed to protect the
EU over the next 5-10 years? (order in terms ofpriority):(3)

11. In what ways should the EU ensure the resilience of the Union through its security and defence policy?
> Open question – no word limit

Capabilities
12. In order to ensure the operational robustness of
military missions and operations, and within thecontext of PESCO and the EDF, which capability
packages will be of most utility to the EU over the
next 5-10 years? (Give order of preference):> Air capabilities (aircraft, strategic transport and tankers, etc)
> Enablers (space, cyber, training, etc)
> Land capabilities (tanks, armoured vehicles, etc)
> Naval capabilities (frigates, submarines,
unmanned vehicles, etc)
> Other (please specify)
13. The current EU civilian capability development
process (3) is fit-for-purpose for the threats andchallenges facing the EU over the next 5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

Civilian Capability Development Plan, Civilian Annual Report on Capabilities, National Implementation Plans, Joint Action
Plan and Annual Review Conference.

Annexes﻿
14. The current EU military capability development
process (4) is fit-for-purpose for the threats
and challenges facing the EU over the next
5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

15. If the EU were to have a flagship capability project that it could support via PESCO and/or the
EDF, what should it be?
> Open question – no word limit
16. Are there any civilian and military capability
gaps that need to be urgently filled over the next
5-10 years? If so, what are they?
> Open question – no word limit

Partnerships
17. The EU’s existing partnerships in the area of
security and defence are more than adequate toface security challenges over the next 5-10 years:
>
>
>
>
>

57
19. The EU’s military training missions are the mosteffective manner through which to build security and defence partnerships:
>
>
>
>
>

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

20. What should partnerships in security and defence look like over the next 5-10 years? (Rankin order of priority):> Linking partnerships more closely withinternational organisations (e.g. NATO,UN, AU, ASEAN)> Linkingpartnerships
withdefence exports> Linking partnerships with trade deals> Using
partnerships
tosupportsub-regional security integration (e.g.
in the Sahel)> Other (please specify)
21. In what ways can the EU enhance its partnerships through its security and defence policy?
> Open question – no word limit

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

18. The EU’s civilian capability-building missions
are the most optimal manner through which tobuild security and defence partnerships:
>
>
>
>
>

(4)

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
DisagreeStrongly disagree

Military Capability Development Plan, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, High Impact Capability Goals, Permanent
Structured Cooperation (and National Implementation Plans) and the European Defence Fund.

58

ABBREVIATIONSAIArtificial intelligence

AU
African Union

AUKUS
Security pact between
Australia, the United
Kingdom and the UnitedStatesASEAN
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations

C2
Command and control

CARD
Coordinated Annual Review
on Defence

CBRN
Chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear

CDP
Capability Development
Plan

CMP
Coordinated Maritime
Presence

CPCC
Civilian Planning andConduct Capability

CSDP
Common Security and
Defence Policy

DDR
Demobilisation,
Disarmament andRehabilitation

EDA
European Defence Agency

EDF
European Defence Fund

EDTIB
European Defence
Technological andIndustrial Base

EEAS
European External Action
Service

EMASOH
European Maritime
Awareness in the Strait of
HormuzEPF
European Peace Facility

ERCC
EU Emergency Response
Coordination Centre

EU
European Union

EUBG
EU Battlegroup

EUFOR CROCEUFOR Crisis Response
Operation CoreEUISSEU Institute for Security
Studies

EUMC
EU Military Committee

EUMS
EU Military Staff

FCAS
Future Combat Aircraft
SystemHICGs
High Impact Capability
Goals

HR/VP
High Representative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy/VicePresident of the European
Commission

INTCENEU Intelligence andSituation Centre

IPCR
Integrated Political Crisis
Response

JHA
Justice and Home Affairs

JSCC
Joint Support Coordination
Cell

KSA
Key Strategic Activities

MENA
Middle East and North
AfricaMPCC
Military Planning andConduct Capability

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization

NDICI
Neighbourhood,
Development andInternational Cooperation
Instrument

NDPP
NATO Defence Planning
Process

OSCE
Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe

OSRA
Overarching Strategic
Research Agenda

PESCO
Permanent Structured
Cooperation

Abbreviations

QMV
Qualified Majority Voting

R&D
Research and Development

SatCenEU Satellite Centre

SSR
Security Sector Reform

STM
Space Traffic Management

TEU
Treaty on European Union

TFEU
Treaty on the Functioningof the European UnionUN
United Nations

US
United States

59

60

NOTES ON THE
CONTRIBUTORSIsabel Ferreira Nunes is Head of the ResearchCentre and Director of the National Defence
Course at the National Defence Institute ofPortugal. She holds a PhD in political sciencefrom the University of Twente and a post-doc
in international relations from the Universityof Groningen.
Daniel Fiott is Security and Defence Editor at
the EU Institute for Security Studies, where heanalyses EU security and defence, CSDP and
the EDTIB. He also teaches European security at the Free University of Brussels and theBrussels School of International Studies, University of Kent. He holds a degree from the
University of Cambridge and a PhD in Political
Science from the Free University of Brussels.
Bastian Giegerich is Director of Defence and
Military Analysis at the International Institutefor Strategic Studies. He also leads the teamthat produces The Military Balance. He previously worked in the German Federal Ministryof Defence. He holds a Master’s degree in political science from the University of Potsdam
and a PhD in international relations from theLondon School of Economics.
Justyna Gotkowska is Coordinator of the Regional Security Programme at the Centre for
Eastern Studies in Warsaw, Poland. She analyses security and defence issues in the wider Baltic Sea region as well as NATO and theEU’s security and defence policies from theperspective of the eastern flank countries. She
holds a Master’s degree in Linguistics fromthe University of Warsaw and a Master’s degree in European Studies from RWTH Aachen
University.

Training at Germany’s Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF). He holds a PhD inpolitical science and international relations
and has more than twenty years of work experience, including postings in OSCE and UN
missions.
Elena Lazarou is Acting Head of the External
Policies Unit at the European Parliamentary
Research Service. Her work focuses on transatlantic relations, EU security and defence
policy and global governance. Previously, sheheaded the Center for International Relationsof the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil. She
received a PhD in international relations fromthe University of Cambridge and has held research positions at the University of Cambridge
and the London School of Economics. She is an
Associate Fellow of the ‘US and Americas’ programme at Chatham House.
Gustav Lindstrom is the Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies. In his capacity as
director, he also chairs the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific–EU Committee (CSCAP-EU). He holds a doctorate in policy
analysis from the RAND Graduate School and
MA in international policy studies from Stanford University.
Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence
Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. He is also professor at the
Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence and has been teaching for four years at
the University of Perugia. He is a member ofthe Editorial Board of IAI web-magazine AffarInternazionali and collaborates with several
Italian magazines.

Volker Jacoby is Founding Director of the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management. Previously, he was Head ofJean-Pierre Maulny is Deputy Director of theFrench Institute of International and StrategicNotes on the contributors

Affairs. At IRIS, he is in charge of studies
about defence, European defence and NATO,the arms industry and arms sales. He is the
Head of the Armament Industry EuropeanGroup (ARES Group), a network of European
researchers specialised in the defence industry. He holds a Master’s degree in defence
studies and a Master’s degree in public law.
Kristi Raik is Director of the Estonian Foreign
Policy Institute at the International Centre for
Defence and Security. She is also an Adjunct
Professor at the University of Turku. She has
previously worked at the Finnish Institute ofInternational Affairs and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. She holds a PhD
from the University of Turku.
Teija Tiilikainen is Director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. She is a part-time Professor at
the School of Transnational Governance atthe European University Institute in Florence
and an Associate Professor at the University
of Helsinki. She has held senior academic andpolicy positions with the Finnish Institute ofInternational Affairs, University of Helsinki,and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.
She is currently the Vice Chair of the executive
board of the University of Helsinki. She holds
a PhD from Åbo Academy University.

61

Over the past twenty years the European Union has
enhanced its role as a security and defence actor. However,in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the Union
faces new threats and security challenges and this calls
for a unified, robust and far-reaching approach from thebloc and its Member States. The Strategic Compass, to be
adopted in March 2022, will look to the 2025-2030 time
horizon and propose strengthened security and defence
measures in the areas of crisis management, resilience,capability development and partnerships. A first draftof the Compass was unveiled to EU defence ministers in
mid-November 2021, but there are still months of politicalnegotiation ahead on the precise content and framing of
the text.
This Chaillot Paper seeks to inform the remaining monthsof negotiation on the Strategic Compass up to its
approval in March 2022. It does so by offering numerous
recommendations and policy considerations, combining
the insights of eleven expert contributors and the resultsof an EUISS questionnaire responded to by over 70
individuals representing government-affiliated research
institutions, international organisations, think tanks
and universities. Based on these findings, the volume
asks how the EU should adapt its civilian and military
missions and operations between 2021 and 2030, how it
can strengthen its resilience with security and defence
instruments, what capabilities and technologies should
be prioritised and how best to reframe how the Union
thinks about strategic partnerships.

© European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021.

ISBN 978-92-9462-078-1
CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-21-006-EN-C