RIPS Policy Perspectives
No.17

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation:
Analyses from Japanese perspectives
Satoru Mori
Masashi Nishihara

November 2013

Research Institute for Peace and Security
Tokyo

一般財団法人平 和・安 全 保 障 研 究 所

Research Institute for Peace and Security

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research institution
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No.17

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation:
Analyses from Japanese perspectives

Table of Contents

1. The Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea: Assessment andRecommendations (Satoru Mori) ······················································································· 2

2. A Japanese View of U.S-Vietnam Relations (Masashi Nishihara)································ 9

The Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea:
Assessment and Recommendations 1
Satoru Mori 2Japan regards three major trends in East Asia as relevant to its security:
1. China is rapidly expanding its military and maritime law enforcement
capabilities at the same time that North Korea is developing its nuclear andmissile capabilities.
2. Other states in the region also are gradually augmenting their militarycapabilities while simultaneously strengthening their economic ties to China.
3. The United States would probably not take sides on the issue of third parties’sovereignty over territories while its military budget is being cut in accordance withthe so-called sequestration.
This article considers how these trends will affect Japan’s security, especially its
maritime security in the East and South China Seas.
The Senkaku Islands
The tension between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands is likely toworsen.
First, however, despite China’s rapid military buildup, the alliance between
Japan and the United States is strong and should be able to deter any overt Chinese
military aggression against Japan’s southwestern islands—but only if Japan makes
the right decisions now.
That is, Japan should not rush to any conclusions before carefully comparing U.S.
and Chinese military capabilities. Some Japanese security experts are concerned
1This article was presented at the U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Workshop held in
Washington, DC on July 15, 2013, organized by the Center for the National Interest(Washington, DC), the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Hanoi), and the ResearchInstitute for Peace and Security (Tokyo).
2

Dr. Mori is Professor at the Department of Global Politics, Faculty of Law, Hosei
University.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-2-that sequestration is undermining U.S. military readiness and that the current fiscal
situation in the United States will make the U.S. strategic rebalance to Asia
unsustainable. Indeed, U.S. government officials and numerous think tanks in the
United States have pointed out the negative consequences of a substantial cut indefense spending.
Many of their warnings seem valid. But most of their assessments focus solely
on the implications of a reduced U.S. defense budget; they do not compare thepredicted American, Chinese, and Japanese military capabilities in the 2020s. For
example, even though the development of cyber capabilities complicates any net
assessment, such an assessment is necessary in order to accurately estimate where
our militaries’ capabilities will stand in the next decade.
Whether or not Japan and the United States will be able to maintain a robust
alliance capable of preventing China from suddenly taking military action against
Japan’s southwestern islands will depend on whether Japan makes the rightdecisions now. Even though sequestration is causing many problems for the U.S.
military, it also is encouraging cooperation between the two countries.
The updating of the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines, scheduled to take place inthe coming year, will be crucial. Equipping, deploying, and training the twocountries’ forces based on operational concepts designed to counter China’s
anti-access / area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities; hardening their military bases; andmaximizing the benefits of the Japanese and U.S. forces’ complementarities andinteroperability will be key tasks in the exercise. In addition, the Japanese
government is currently revising its National Defense Program Guideline toaccelerate the adaptation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to the changing security
environment.
Japan and the United States must continue, as well, developing a security
cooperation outreach network based on a “Japan–U.S. Plus” approach that would
involve third countries like Vietnam, Australia, and India.
If Japan makes the right decisions now, it has a good chance of maintaining afavorable balance of military capabilities in the western Pacific. Nonetheless,Japanese and U.S. forces will have a harder time tracking China’s naval maneuvers,
whose speed and scale will increase in the foreseeable future.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-3-Second, China is likely to continue probing and challenging Japan’s control over
the Senkaku Islands on a nonmilitary level—or what could be called a“subconventional” level—by using primarily maritime law enforcement vessels andaircraft. China will probably try to force Japan to accept that the territorial dispute
over the Senkakus is legitimate. Indeed, the Chinese government has reportedly
made this a precondition for talks between the two countries. To this end, China
would concurrently take measured actions around the Senkakus that are subtle
enough to avoid provoking a strong reaction from the United States but frequentand damaging enough to put pressure on Japan.
Even though China’s claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus is blatantly
unfounded and misleading, the Japanese government’s reaction to this issue has
been judicious. During his visit to Washington, D.C., in February 2013, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe stated that he had “absolutely no intention of climbing up theescalation ladder.” This is because Japan does not want to further complicate
Sino-Japanese relations and instead wants to stabilize the two countries’ otherwise
mutually beneficial relationship.
The current situation, however, presents a dilemma for Japan. On the one hand,
if China’s goal vis-à-vis the Senkakus is to force Japan to accept the legitimacy of theterritorial dispute over the islands, and Japan reacts calmly and avoids escalation,
the Chinese leaders might conclude that they are not putting enough pressure on
Japan and thus decide to increase it. On the other hand, if Japan tries to deter
Chinese escalation over the Senkakus by taking measures like stationing personnel
and sending Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to patrol the islands, China might
use that as a pretext to dramatically escalate its own actions. In other words, thetension will worsen either way—if Japan exercises self-restraint or if Japan tries todeter Chinese escalation.
China will continue to pursue this course of action because it believes that it will
not be penalized for it. Its takeover of the Philippines’ Scarborough Shoal may havereinforced this belief. China assumes that Japan is unlikely to retaliate and theUnited States will remain on the sidelines unless it takes direct military action. Thismeans that even if Japan exercises self-restraint, China’s forceful assertion of its
claim will continue, and consequently, the danger of confrontation between the two
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-4-countries’ maritime authorities will increase. In short, deterrence at the“subconventional” level is unlikely to work, and China will feel free to pursue thistactic.
Third, given this dangerous situation, Japan has been exploring ways toestablish a maritime crisis management mechanism (known as the Japan-China
Maritime Communications Mechanism) with China, although China seems unlikely
to agree to it. Even though it might resume consultations on a mechanism, it will
not agree to a formal agreement, for two reasons. First, a crisis management
mechanism would defeat China’s purpose for pressuring Japan into accepting theterritorial dispute because such a mechanism would relieve the pressure on Japan.
Second, any move that would alleviate the pressure on Japan would lead to
criticism and denunciation from the heavily anti-Japanese public in China. In thisregard, China’s inflexibility vis-à-vis Japan is problematic because it is rooted in the
public’s widely shared animosity. Thus, from the Chinese leadership’s perspective,
the creation of a crisis management mechanism would be unsound on both
strategic and political grounds. Although China could pretend that it was being
cooperative, it could always find a way to blame the Japanese for stalling and thus
avoid a formal agreement.
Fourth, since Japanese trade is heavily dependent on China, China will likely
exploit this vulnerability. Japan, however, is unlikely to submit to economic
pressure, because even Japanese business leaders operating in China seem to be
standing firm against Chinese bullying and submission would be politically fatal
for any Japanese prime minister. Under these circumstances, the Senkaku Islands
issue will continue to be a test of resolve for both Japan and China and may evenlead to more frequent skirmishes between the Japanese coast guard and Chinese
maritime authorities.
A major concern here would be the Japanese public’s reaction to an increasing
number of skirmishes between Japan and China and its implication for theJapan-U.S. alliance. Japanese antipathy to the Chinese government would obviously
rise, but the Japanese public might also wonder why its foremost ally, the UnitedStates, was not telling the Chinese that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan, since
the United States is the only country to which China might listen. Such a simplistic
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-5-reaction could undermine U.S. credibility in the eyes of the Japanese public andcould also cause complications if activists begin to connect this issue to the U.S.
base issue by asking, “What good is stationing U.S. forces in Japan if they can’t help
us with the Senkaku issue?” Skepticism and criticism of this kind, however
unsophisticated and misleading, could erode public support for the alliance andwork to China’s advantage. Thus, an important task for the alliance in the coming
years is to launch new initiatives that would demonstrate to the Japanese publicthat the Japan-U.S. alliance still is necessary to protect the integrity of Japan’s
sovereign territory. For example, enhanced maritime domain awareness throughjoint information systems research (ISR) activities in the East China Sea would be
important, with maritime information relayed to Japan’s coast guard. If amechanism of this sort were established, it also should be widely publicized.
The South China Sea
China is increasing the number of its maritime law enforcement vessels in theSouth China Sea and constructing naval ports on Hainan Island. Apparently, it may
be considering a code of conduct, but it is questionable whether China would agree
to a legally binding code that prohibits unilateral change in the status quo.
Meanwhile, other states in the South China Sea are increasing their economic ties toChina.
These trends should motivate China to take subtle, unilateral measures in theSouth China Sea. That is, it could appear to be cooperative but at the same time takeassertive actions, sometimes known as “small stick diplomacy.” China could alsouse economic incentives to placate any states that protest these actions. The
takeover of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines is a case in point: Manila
now is reporting that China has military and paramilitary ships anchored at the
shoal.
If China becomes a dominant maritime presence in the South China Sea, Japan,
as a heavy user, would necessarily come under its sway. Although China probably
would not block ships destined for and departing from Japan, if it were able toharass these ships, Japan would always have to take this into account when dealing
with China on any issue.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-6-An example is China’s actions following the detention and indictment of thecaptain of the Chinese fishing boat that collided with a Japan coast guard vessel in
September 2010. In retaliation for Japan’s rightful exercise of national jurisdiction,
China arrested Japanese company workers in China and stopped exporting rareearths. China also prevented tourists from visiting the Philippines during the 2012
Scarborough Shoal incident.
In ten or twenty years, China’s maritime law enforcement fleet will have grown
substantially, which in turn will complicate how Japan calculates its response to
China’s assertive actions. Accordingly, Japan would welcome countries like Vietnam
and Indonesia as counterweights to the rising Chinese maritime presence in theSouth China Sea.
Recommendations
In conclusion, Japan believes that the current trends will increase the tension
between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and will hasten China’s
domination of the South China Sea.
The fundamental problem underlying maritime security issues over the
Senkakus and the South China Sea is that China feels less inhibited about using its
maritime law enforcement vessels to take unilateral action. In response, Japan, theUnited States, and Vietnam should consider imposing political costs for any
forceful unilateral actions intended to change the geopolitical map.
In this regard, Japan would like to cooperate diplomatically with Vietnam andthe United States in order to discourage China from engaging in low-intensity
unilateral actions and coercion. Compiling a record of its unilateral actions in the
East and the South China Seas could help achieve this goal. If a record could becompiled, it could be published annually and distributed at international
conferences. Conversely, if China did not take any unilateral actions, there would be
no report.
Second, Japan would like Vietnam to enhance its maritime presence in the South
China Sea in order to counter China’s presence there. To this end, Japan and theUnited States should provide: (1) coast guard patrol boats and personnel training
through their development assistance schemes, (2) loans for the development of
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-7-harbors along the Vietnamese coast, and (3) equipment and facilities to enhanceVietnam’s maritime surveillance capabilities.
Third, if China continues its pressure despite strong diplomatic protests from,and security cooperation activities by, Japan, the United States, and the other South
China Sea states, the United States should consider deterring further Chinese
escalation by contemplating a change in its position regarding territorial
sovereignty issues. For the moment, it may seem wise for the United States not totake sides on territorial sovereignty, but if China continues to engage in pressuring
tactics, the danger of an accidental clash and escalation in the East and South China
Sea will increase and subsequently entail the United States. At that point, it would
be more dangerous for the United States to stay on the sidelines and safer for it totake positive action and diplomatic initiatives regarding these issues.
Japan is now seeing a reinvigoration of its alliances, an expansion of its security
cooperation network, and an increase in international cooperation and, possibly,
regulation. A rules-based regional order seems to be reasonable, but its success will
depend on deterring China’s unilateral actions through alliances and security
cooperation. Without China’s adherence to this order, it will be very difficult toestablish strategic trust, or a mutual expectation, that conflicting interests will be
resolved through peaceful means and not force. The current challenge is
discouraging China from pursuing its territorial goals through unilateral means at a
“subconventional” level. Any rules-based regional order must overcome thischallenge to create regional interstate relations based on strategic trust.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-8-A Japanese View of U.S-Vietnam Relations
Masashi Nishihara 3O

U.S.-Vietnam Security Relations
ver the last decade, the United States and Vietnam, once staunch
enemies, have been normalizing their relations at great speed.
Although the war between the two countries ended twenty years earlier,once they began this process, in July 1995, their relations have grown especiallyquickly in foreign, security, and economic policy.
U.S.–Vietnamese naval relations grew particularly close in June 2010 when the

United States hosted a meeting of the Pacific Partnership, an HA/DR (Humanitarian
Aid/Disaster Relief) program, which Vietnam and Cambodia attended. In Augustof the same year, when the nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington anchoredoff Danang, Vietnam, Vietnamese naval officers and government officials wereinvited on board. The two countries also held joint naval exercises. Then in June
2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Cam Ranh Bay, once a U.S. airand naval base.
The two countries are strengthening their ties by broadening and deepening
their bilateral relations. Since 2009, the U.S. State Department and the Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry have held regular political, security, and defense dialogues(PSDD), which involve bilateral exchanges ranging from ministerial-level visits toworking-level meetings. The U.S. Defense Department and the Vietnamese Defense
Ministry have held regular defense dialogues as well and signed a frameworkagreement regarding cooperation on defense in areas such as peacekeeping,humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maritime security, and search and rescue. They
also have begun exchanges of officers at their defense universities and research
institutes.
In addition, U.S. and Vietnamese officials often meet in regional multilateral

3

Dr. Masashi Nishihara is President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security,
Tokyo. This article was presented at the U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Workshop,
Washington, DC, July 15, 2013.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17-9-security frameworks, including EAS (East Asia Summit), ARF (ASEAN Regional
Forum), ADMM Plus (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus), and the Shangri-La
Dialogue.
Economic and Other Relations
Bilateral trade between the United States and Vietnam also has been growing
rapidly, despite some minor disagreements. Vietnam joined ASEAN (Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations) in 1995, became a member of APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation) in 1998, and, six years later, hosted the APEC summit. In
December 2001 the United States extended “normal trade relations” (NTR) status toVietnam, and in January 2007 Vietnam became the 150th member of the World
Trade Organization. Although negotiating Vietnam’s entry into the Trans-PacificPartnership might be challenging, its participation would further strengthen its
own economic positions.
The United States has been a key partner of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI),
which Washington established in 2009. LMI promotes cooperation and capacity
building among the United States and the Lower Mekong countries (Myanmar [orBurma], which joined in 2002, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam). The goal of
the LMI is subregional integration with U.S. initiatives in such areas as education,
health, the environment, and infrastructure.
Strategic Partners?
Japan recognizes that the United States and Vietnam share a strategic interest in
restraining China’s coercive and expansionist diplomacy and military policy in theWestern Pacific. The United States wants to maintain freedom of navigation in theSouth China Sea and has urged China to settle territorial disputes with Vietnam
and other Southeast Asian claimants through negotiation instead of force. Vietnam
supports the United States’ position and sees restraining China’s aggressive
behavior to be in its national interest.
The United States and Vietnam still have a few political constraints to overcome
before they can elevate their bilateral relations to the level of “strategic
partnership.”
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17- 10 -

First, although the two nations have common strategic outlooks, they differ intheir emphases. For example, whereas the United States wants Vietnam as a
strategic partner against China, Vietnam is wary of becoming too close to
Washington. Mindful of this, Japan observes Vietnam’s official policy of “threeNOs,” namely, that Vietnam seeks no alliances, will accommodate no foreign
military bases on its soil, and wants no intervention from a third country in settlingits bilateral issues.
In August 2010, when the U.S. aircraft carrier was in Danang, Defense Vice
Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh pointed out that its visit was a result of U.S. initiatives.
And before Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s visit to Cam Ranh Bay in June 2012,
Vinh reportedly briefed the Chinese on his visit. Similarly, Defense Minister
General Phung Quang Thanh mentioned in a press conference in June 2012 that heexpected the United States would use Cam Ranh Bay’s commercial port facilities for
its naval ship repairs. Vietnam thus appears to be seeking a precarious balance
between the United States and China and does not regard its relations with Beijing
and Washington as a zero-sum game.
Second, the issues of human rights and religious freedom have prevented thetwo countries from developing closer relations. Human Rights Watch reports thatin the first five months of 2013, fifty Vietnamese were convicted in political trials.
Vietnam wants to treat these issues as separate from its other strategic relations.
The United States, however, wants to include them as integral part of its overall
relationship, which Vietnam considers as interfering in its domestic affairs. Thistension derives from the difference between the United States’ and Vietnam’s
political systems, with Vietnam’s authoritarian Communist regime restricting
political and religious freedom.
Third, the two countries are continuing to try to resolve some of the “legacies” ofthe Vietnam War: POW/MIA and Agent Orange. These issues have not divided thetwo countries; rather, their cooperation seems to have forged a stronger bond
between the two peoples. Even today, more than two thousand Americans who
served in Indochina during the war are still unaccounted for, and hundreds ofthousands of Vietnamese remain missing. The two governments together are
searching for and identifying the missing. The United States will have difficulty
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17- 11 -

compensating for the damage that Agent Orange and dioxin caused on the people
and the environment of Vietnam. But again, the two governments are making
efforts to mitigate the impact of these toxins. Nonetheless, these issues have
hampered the smooth development of the two countries’ bilateral relations.
Long-Term Strengths of U.S.-Vietnamese Relations
The relations between the United States and Vietnam have two advantages thatJapan’s relations with the United States do not: the role of Vietnamese Americans asinterlocutors between the American and Vietnamese societies, and the extensive useof English in Vietnamese government offices.
Vietnamese who are naturalized U.S. citizens or were born in the United States
now number about 1.7 million. Many Vietnamese Americans are now serving asimportant intermediaries in bilateral economic and business relations. Some now
have high-ranking government positions in Washington, and others are serving in
the U.S. military. As they become even more integrated into American society, they
will play an even larger role.
Related to this is the extensive use of English in Vietnam. Vietnam’s decision tojoin ASEAN in 1995 prompted government officials to learn English quickly. Thiseffort is paying off by helping strengthen both Vietnam’s political and economic
relations with the United States and its role in ASEAN.
The Benefits of Japan’s Role in the U.S.-Vietnam PartnershipJapan’s strategic outlook on China is basically like that of the United States andVietnam. It fully supports the U.S. policy of keeping the South China Sea free fornavigation, as the South China Sea is an important sea-lane for Japan as well. It also
supports Vietnam’s strategy regarding China’s coercive behavior while at the sametime appreciating its cautious approach to Beijing.
Like U.S.-Vietnamese relations, Japanese-Vietnamese relations are excellent,with many areas of cooperation. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have been working
with its Vietnamese counterparts at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with ARF
and ADMM Plus providing particularly useful frameworks for cooperation. In
November 2011 the defense ministers of Japan and Vietnam signed a memorandum
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17- 12 -

for bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, under which the two defense
ministries hold regular bilateral defense dialogues at the vice-ministerial level andpromote visits by each other’s high-ranking officers, such as chiefs of staff. Their
cooperation covers a wide range of areas such as humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief, search and rescue, education, antiterrorism and antipiracy measures.
In addition, Japan is assisting the “capacity building” of Vietnamese forces throughtraining programs in these areas.
Because Japan and the United States, as allies, have the same strategic outlook
on Asia-Pacific security, their alliance will strengthen the three countries’ security
cooperation, although Japan and the United States should recognize Vietnam’s
difficulty in coping with China’s threats while at the same time maintaining
economic relations with that country. Japan and the United States also may jointly
provide the technology for the nuclear power plants to be built in Vietnam in thenear future. In addition, Japan has initiated programs promoting the developmentof the Mekong-region countries. Since the first meeting of the Japan-Mekong
Partnership Program in 2007, Tokyo has held regular ministerial meetings with its
regional counterparts. At the summit meeting held in Tokyo in April 2012, Japan
pledged ¥600 billion (about $6 billion) for the following three years, and this may be
another area in which Japan and the United States can coordinate their support ofVietnam.
In sum, the relationship of Japan, the United States, and Vietnam should not be
exclusive but should include other, like-minded, partners, such as India andAustralia, with which Japan already has close security relations.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17- 13 -

RIPS Policy Perspectives
Back issues
No. 16 (December 2012)
RIPS Symposium 2012, Summary Report: Responses to Japan’s New Arms Export
PolicyNo.15 (November 2012)
Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Restore Its Place in Asia?”
No.14（2012 年 3 月）
RIPS 公開セミナー2011（2011 年 10 月）「災害対策と防衛のために新技術をどう活
かすか」
No.13（February 2012）
RIPS Symposium 2011, “New High-Techs for Disaster Relief and National
Defense.”No.12 (2012 年 2 月)
RIPS 春季公開セミナー(2011 年 5 月)、「日露関係と北方領土返還の展望―東日本大震災後に考える日本の対応」
No. 11 (August 2011)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s ‘Coercive’ Diplomacy
Leads to New Power Realignments.”
No.10 (January, 2010)
Michimi Muranushi, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens: The Centralityof Human Rights Violation.”
No.9 (July 29, 2009)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs and Growing
Concerns.”
No.8 (June 3, 2009)
Masahiro Matsumura, “Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan- June 2009.”

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 17- 14 -

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