ラインハルト･ドリフテ

Aichi University ICCS International Symposium 9 October 2004
Current Japanese-Chinese relations seen from a European perspective
By Prof. Reinhard Drifte(Visiting Research Fellow, LSE, London/Visiting Professor, Waseda University)
http:/www/staff/ncl.ac.uk/r.f.w.drifte/

INTRODUCTION
Superficially, a European observer of Japanese-Chinese relations may be reminded of Europe’s
past difficult relationship with Eastern Europe and notably the Soviet Union before 1989. While
China’s communism and adaptability can in no way be compared with the characteristics of thedoomed Soviet Union, the West European countries adopted a similar strategy as Japan to live as
comfortably as possible with that big neighbour while deterring it against any aggression. This
policy of engagement is a combination of economic and political enmeshment (providing
economic and political incentives to integrate the communist counter part into theregional/international political and economic system) and political and military power balancing(military force resting on national as well as alliance relations). Such a complex policy has many
ambiguities and inherent contradictions and it can easily be misunderstood by the communist
counterpart because there is an overlap with the policy of containment which mainly relies on the
instrument of military force.
In the following I want to provide one European perspective of this policy of engagement, lookat the role of Europe in its implementation and consider some scenarios for Japan’s China policy.
THE COMPLEXITIES AND DYNAMICS OF ENGAGEMENT
So far, engagement has been successful because peace has been preserved between Japan and
China, domestic stability of China has been maintained and China has become integrated into theglobal economy to an extent which in some respect is more far reaching than that of Japan andwhich seems to be irreversible without incurring very high costs to the Chinese political andeconomic system. This success is, of course not only due to Japan’s engagement policy which isshared by the other Western countries, but in the first instance to China’s positive reaction to theopportunities offered by the international system.
However, while engagement has pushed China into the intended direction and has beensuccessful in setting a welcome process into motion, none of the major traditional security issues
between Japan and China has been settled. On the contrary we see currently an aggravation of
territorial conflict (Senkaku/Diaoyu and the naval border between the two countries) and Japanrisks being involved in the Taiwan conflict as the security partner of the US. Concerning
non-traditional security challenges there is also no change although a dialogue and even somecooperation has started on transboundary pollution and crime. The bilateral relationship between
Japan and China has become much more substantial, the economic relationship has achieved
wide-ranging interdependence which dampens political disputes, there are now more fora

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between the two countries at all kinds of levels, including among civil society. But trust has not
yet been established for old as well as new reasons: Japan’s historical legacy (in combination
with China’s historical determinism and instrumentalization of the ‘history card’) and Chinese
vehement opposition to the strengthened Japan-US military alliance as well as rising strategic
rivalry. China is only a reluctant and reserved participant in multilateralism. But this does notmean that the process cannot be successful, only that more efforts in the right directions areneeded on all sides.
Particular attention has therefore to be paid to the centrifugal dynamics which the process ofengagement is engendering due to its complexity, inherent contradictions, ambiguities andtriangular aspects. The major source of negative dynamics derives from trying to equilibrate
military and political power balancing, economic enticement/confidence-building and restraintvis-à-vis a Chinese leadership which is still steeped in Realist thinking and historic determinismand has major revisionist goals in terms of its international status and the integrity of its national
territory. The danger always exist that engagement reinforces (at least for tactical purposes) theconviction about international relations being a zero sum game and requiring greater Chinese
economic and military power.
Another major source of negative dynamics threatening to undermine engagement (but at thesame time the source of hope for a peaceful and prosperous China) is China’s rapid economic
growth as a developing country of tremendous demographic and geographic dimensions.
According to Realism but also empirical evidence, China’s economic growth is allowing China
to modernize its military potential and to pursue its revisionist goals with greater vigour. Theinternational environment (notably US positions, supported or not by Japan) and the achievementof balanced political and economic development in China (on which Japan has also a
considerable impact) will in the end decide whether Liberalism and the ‘democratic peace
theory’ is right or Realism.
China’s economic growth carries potentially the seeds of self-destruction in terms of ecologicalunsustainability, political unsustainability (the creation of social imbalances and dislocation) andeconomic unsustainability (for example collapse of the underlying economic model of export-led
and FDI-driven development due to an international recession). These negative dynamics are
partially already now existent and affect Japan to some extent by way of transboundary pollution,illegal immigration, transboundary crime and economic losses. But while Japanese experts do
not rule out China’s economic failure and perceive such an outcome as very serious for Japan’s
security and welfare, it is also concerned about China’s economic success challenging its identity
as a civilian power and as the world’s second biggest economy.
Both the Realist as well as Liberal elements of engagement contribute to yet another negative
dynamic which is the increasing strategic/political and economic rivalry between Japan and
China. Military and political power balancing, notably the strengthening of Japan-US military
cooperation with its perceived impact on Taiwan, will reinforce China’s military and politicalassertiveness and Realist thinking. For the Chinese leadership the Taiwan issue has become sosensitive that it cannot afford to be seen soft on it. 1 While the increasing integration of China
Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China: Getting the questions right’, The National Interest, Winter2000/01, p. 22.

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into regional and global institutions can partly be attributed to Japan’s political enmeshment
policies, it also leads to competition and rivalry in the UN (for example China opposes Japan’squest for a permanent UN Security Council seat) as well as to China working against cooperative
security proposals within regional fora. Increasing trade frictions are relevant in our context since
they can contribute to a general atmosphere which may facilitate the violent eruption of security
disputes. Closer economic relations and the growth of mutual interdependence are bound to leadto frictions, particularly between countries with different political-economic systems, different
economic level of development and different economic size. Moreover, given China’s size but
also Japan’s current economic difficulties which is leading to ODA cuts and Japan’s lesser
importance as an economic partner for China, Beijing’s economic success will increasingly
reduce Tokyo’s ability to politically influence its giant neighbour.
While Japan’s past restraint and deference towards China has been for a long time a means tosoothen the contradictions of engagement, reduce conflicts of interests and offset the strength of
Beijing’s history card, it is now increasingly perceived as outdated, ineffective and evenbecoming counterproductive. The restraint and deference shown by Japan’s leaders in the face ofChina’s assertive security policy has bred resentment in Japan, and a negative backlash has beencaused which generates pressure for radical shifts (e.g. the EEZ border conflict now). Moreover,Japanese deference has bred Chinese distrust of Japan’s true intentions because of their own
Realist approach to international relations. The resulting drive in Japan to have a ‘normal’
relationship with China by communicating more clearly and openly would be a positive outcomeof this negative dynamic (but not necessarily always and/or in the immediate future). China
seems to understand the negative dynamics of Japanese restraint and deference and may refrainfrom further fomenting this negative backlash.
Finally, the comprehensive relationship with the US also creates some negative dynamics. The
different mix of engagement policy tools, different perceptions of China and other asymmetries
between Japan and the US generate sometimes centrifugal dynamics which not only impact
negatively on Tokyo’s engagement, but ultimately also on the future shape and even survival of
the Japan-US military alliance. The crucial issue is Taiwan, but a military move China’s in thedisputed EEZ of the East China Sea or even against the Senkaku Islands could become a severe
test for the military alliance. Apart from the Taiwan issue it is Japan-US TMD cooperation which
vividly illustrates the negative dynamics of the strengthened alliance. The triangularJapan-US-China framework is moreover creating centrifugal dynamics with which Japan finds it
difficult to deal while China, despite its disadvantaged position as the ‘outsider’, skillfully playson them.
EUROPE’S ROLE
Japan’s engagement policy cannot be considered in isolation because other major powers are
pursuing similar policies, and the US is the most important one among them. The US is not only
pursuing a very similar engagement policy, but it is also an enabling as well as conditioning
factor for Japan’s own policy. Europe’s role is on a lesser scale, but nevertheless weighs heavily
on the delicate balance of the various policy tools associated with engagement. While ODA is
one of the major elements in Japan’s economic enmeshment policies towards China, the US
cannot wield this instrument because of its domestic legislation which does not allow ODA to a

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communist country. Europe’s engagement policy toward China, on the other hand, almost solely
relies on economic and political incentives which naturally at least to the outside enhances theprominence of economic and political enmeshment as part of the West’s engagement policy.
This does not mean that Europe is always on the side of Japan’s combination of engagement
policies or is more supportive of Japan in case of a Japanese-American policy difference on
China as the European support for the US-led boycott of China after the Tiananmen massacre in
1989 has shown, or as Europe support of human rights, greater independence for Tibet and otherissues illustrates. Distance from China makes it inevitable that Europe’s power balancing against
China relies predominantly on supporting international and regional regimes such as global
disarmament regimes or the ARF (the EU is a member) and that it is easier for Europe toemphasize ethical principles such as human rights. Distance may also explain why the Europeans
are less concerned than the Japanese about the dangers inherent in China’s rapid modernization
although the EU has a sizable environmental programme in China.
OUTLOOK
While Western Europe - together with the US - finally overcame the division of Europe, albeit atconsiderable costs, the verdict on Japan’s engagement policy is still pending as long as
traditional and non-traditional security concerns have not been reduced to a level where military
conflict has become unimaginable. In sum, when considering the sustainability and costs ofJapan’s engagement one has to weigh the strength of the positive process towards China
becoming a stakeholder in regional and global peace and stability and adopting the norms of
democratic countries, against the strength of the negative dynamics generated by even the
successes of engagement, let alone by its complexities and ambiguities.
I suggest four possible scenarios for the future of Japanese-Chinese relations :- Japan managing to skillfully equilibrate the divers elements ofengagement;- Japan accepting China’s predominance in Asia and making itself
accepted by scaling down the military alliance with the US(bandwagoning);- Japan further integrating itself into the Japan-US military
alliance and strengthening political and military power
balancing against China;- Japan developing its own autonomous military power and trying
to assume a posture of neutrality and a role as mediator among
the powers in Northeast Asia;
Which of these four scenarios is more likely depends mainly on the development of China-US
relations and China’s ability to promote balanced political and economic development. However,the last scenario seems to be the least likely: First, given Japan’s nature as a post-industrial
consumer society, its lack of political leadership, its historical legacy, its enmeshment in

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international interdependencies (economically, politically, culturally), its economic crisis and its
record of aligning with the strongest power during the last 150 years, there does not seem to bemuch room for becoming a neutral and autonomous military power which would be accepted byeither China or the US. Japan as a mediator or bridge between East and West has always had
some residual resonance in Japan and it has also been proposed by some Japanese. 2 Japan has
lost much time to establish an impressive long-standing record of ability and sincerity (forexample in coming to terms with its past) while its economic power was at its peak and that ofChina much lower. There is therefore now not much likelihood for China accepting such aJapanese role: while China may welcome any Japanese move which could weaken the US or
US-Japan relations, it would be reluctant to give Japan the opportunity to expand its regional or
global role by playing a mediating role between Beijing and Washington. Despite the enormous
assumptions underlying it, the first scenario outcome cannot be totally excluded, even if there
may be many difficulties and conflicts in the interim.
The most likely scenario for the time being is the third one, which is encouraged and supported
by concern about developments in China and in US-Chinese relations as well as by Japanesepolitical and economic weaknesses. It would depend on the successful management of the mostdangerous negative dynamics arising from engagement. But this scenario is not likely to last long
because either China’s successful economic and political development makes Japan’s reliance on
US protection and on US regional hegemony unnecessary or unacceptable to China or even to
Japan (a democratic China is likely to be as nationalistic as the US today), or Japan feels forced
into bandwagoning with China because of rising intolerable military tensions between the US
and China.

This paper relies heavily on the author`s book `Japan`s security relations with China since 1989.
From balancing to bandwagoning?` (Routledge: London 2003, Japanese version: Minerva
Shobo: Kyoto 2004)2

Former Prime Minister Taskeshita Noboru suggested that Japan should assume an intermediary role between China
and the West: Yomiuri Shimbun 14 January 1997, quoted in: Tennichi, Takahiko, Debates on Japan’s foreign Policy,
in: Kokubun Ryosei (ed.), Challenges for China-Japan-US Cooperation, Tokyo: Japan Center for International
Cooperation, 1998, p. 83. The Japan-based Chinese scholar Zhu Jianrong suggest also such an intermediary role forJapan: Dai 136 kai Kokkai. Sangiin Gaimuiinkai Kaigiroku dai juichi go (House of Councillors, Foreign Affairs
Committee) 16 May 1996. p. 45.

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China’s traditional security
challenges for Japan• Double-digit increase of defence expenditures
since 1988-89 and its non-transparency• resumption of nuclear tests between 1992 and1995 (C’s nuclear deterrent/exports)• 1992 ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on
its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas’• military exercises and missile tests around Taiwan
in 1995-96• 11 % see China as the single largest milit. threat

Japan`s security policy towards China- From power balancing tobandwagoning?
Prof. Reinhard Drifte䇭ᴰ⌽ 䍃࡜ࠗࡦࡂ࡞࠻࡮࠼࡝ࡈ࠹
Emeritus Professor, U. of Newcastle
Visiting Research Fellow, LSE
www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/r.f.w.drifte/

China’s non-traditional security
challenges

Japan’s policy - engagement• ecological unsustainability?
• political unsustainability (the creation of social
imbalances and dislocations)?
• economic unsustainability (for example collapseof the underlying economic model of export-led
and FDI-driven development due to aninternational recession)?
• China’s economic success: 56 % see China as
econ. threat in 10 years’ time

• providing China economic and political incentives(political and economic enmeshment)• hedged by military and political power balancing
through its own military force, the military
alliance with the US, and political front-building• Element of coercion has to be recognized +overlap of force instrument in containment policy

The core tasks for practitioners
and analysts:

Success of engagement?

• To clarify the various outcomes associated withengagement (e.g. economic interdependence,
integration into the political/economic worldcommunity, systemic change, deterrence), andaccordingly• To clarify the choice from among the options ofpolicy tools (i.e. economic/political enticements,
political/military power balancing) as well as theemphasis and robustness with which these tools
are to be employed• peace has been preserved between Japan andChina• domestic stability of China has been maintained• China has become integrated into the global
economy (in some areas more than Japan;
irreversible without incurring very high costs to
the Chinese political and economic system)• Wide-ranging interdependence160ラインハルト･ドリフテ

20 – But also ….

21- Complexities of engagement• No trust established (historical legacy; Chinese opposition
to strengthened J-US security relations)• No solution of traditional/non-trad. challenges• Centrifugal dynamics due to its complextiy,inherent contradictions, ambiguities, Japan-USChina triangular aspects:• 1. Military-polit. power balancing vseconomic/political enmeshment• 2. Econ./polit. Enmeshment has sting…
• 3. China: reinforcing Realism?
• 4. Seeds of self-destruction of economic eng.
• 5. Japan-US: abandonment-entrapment dilemma• 6. Japan’s economic & polit. Weaknesses• Deepening strategic rivalry (Asia, FTA, UN…)
• J’s ODA declining; leverage? FY 02:- 24.7 % loan
• Increasingly equal economic relationship – or inversing
dependency?
• China reluctant /reserved participant in multilateral fora
• Cultivation of enmity – China`s resurgent nationalism(new C-J or J-C Thinking?)

22 - Scenarios

Policy recommendations• skilfully equilibrate the divers elements of engagement• accepting China’s predominance in Asia and making itself
accepted by scaling down the military alliance with the US(bandwagoning)• Japan further integrating itself into the Japan-US military
alliance and strengthening political and military power
balancing against China• Japan developing its own autonomous military power andtrying to assume a posture of neutrality and a role asmediator among the powers in Northeast Asia

• Calmly addressing rising economic conflicts + rivalry• Reducing history conflict (J: be more sincere, C: not to use
it for political purposes)• Defusing territorial conflicts (beyond 0 sum game!)• Better communication (C can’t make communication
dependent on prior Japanese assent to Chinese position; C
has to properly understand CBMs)• Opening up rigid bilateral alliance system (Partnership for
Peace)• China has to accept the legitimacy and US-independent
character of Japanese security concerns

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