RIPS Policy Perspectives
No. 1

Perspectives on Asian Security 2006
Akio Watanabe

October 2006

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research institution
established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues of national andinternational peace and security, publishes research reports, and proposes policy
recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhoshō (Asian Security), which surveys
the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded by both theacademic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars for specialists
and the public on national, regional, and international security and sponsors joint research
projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation’s Center
for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue security studies.
Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors to security studies in Japan.

RIPS Policy Perspectives are intended to provide timely alternatives to and analyses ofexisting peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The views of theauthors are their own and do not represent the official position of the RIPS.

Perspectives on Asian Security 2006 *Akio Watanabe

A New Phase of the Japan–United States Alliance

The transformation of U.S. forces overseas and the concurrent reshaping of theJapan–United States alliance were the two most important developments in the strategic
environment of the Asia-Pacific region during 2005 and 2006.
After close consultation between high-ranking U.S. defense and foreign policy
officials and their Japanese counterparts in Washington, D.C., between February 2005
and May 2006, they issued a document entitled “The Japan–U.S. Alliance:
Transformation and Realignment for the Future” on October 29, 2005, followed by“The Japan–U.S. Road Map for Realignment Implementation” on May 1, 2006. These
documents, coming at the start of the twenty-first century, will greatly influence theregion for many years to come. These developments also represent a milestone in thenearly half century of the Japan–United States alliance.
These consultations were part of the overall review of the United States’ global
posture—to which President George W. Bush referred in his November 2003 speech
and also in his August 2004 statement—to bring home between 60,000 and 70,000 U.S.
*

This is an English rendition of the lead article of the 2006/2007 issue of Ajia noanzenhosho (Asian Security), an annual survey by the Research Institute for Peace andSecurity(RIPS) of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region from 2005
through 2006. The writer is an emeritus professor of the University of Tokyo andAoyama Gakuin University, vice-chairman of the institute, and its president for the last
six years. The English version was edited by Margaret B. Yamashita.

1soldiers over the next ten years. Whereas substantial force reductions are planned for
Korea and Germany, most of the U.S. forces in Japan will be realigned, so as to ensure
their more effective and swift deployment and also to transform the mission of Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces.
The agreements reached in Washington on May 1, 2006, included the transferof U.S. facilities at Futenma (near Naha) to Nago, Okinawa, and of several thousand
U.S. Marines to Guam (with some of the transfer costs to be borne by the Japanese
government). Although this will mean some reductions of U.S. forces and their facilities
in Japan (including Okinawa), the changes at Zama, Iwakuni, Yokota, and other U.S.
bases should strengthen the joint response time of both the U.S. forces in Japan andJapan’s Self-Defense Forces, which is the basis of the realignment plan.

The Asia-Pacific Region’s Greater Strategic Importance

The emphasis of American and Japanese policymakers is on enabling their forces to
respond more quickly and effectively, as they believe that the Asia-Pacific region is
becoming increasingly important to U.S. global strategy.
The document of the Security Consultative Committee meeting (SCC, also
known as the 2+2 meeting [of the Japanese foreign and defense ministers and the U.S.
secretaries of state and defense]), on which the two governments agreed in February
2005, underscored the two nations’ common strategic objectives. In addition to Japan’s
security, which was obvious, they encompassed such regional affairs as the peacefulunification of the Korean Peninsula, various other issues pertaining to North Korea, anonviolent solution to the Taiwan problem, and the greater transparency of China’s
military policy. This document also stated that both nations sought cooperative relations

2with China and would welcome the responsible and constructive role of China as wellas Russia. Other shared strategic goals were global matters like the promotion of
democracy and other fundamental values, greater cooperation for international peace,
the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the prevention anderadication of transnational terrorism, and a more efficient United Nations Security
Council.
References to the issues of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait were
not new, as the Japanese government had repeatedly mentioned them, but it isremarkable that these regional and global issues were singled out as Japan’s main
security goals.
The increased attention to Asia and the Pacific by defense officials of the twonations reflects the policy shift eastward from Europe at the start of the twenty-first
century. Although the so-called arc of instability is defined somewhat differently aroundthe world, it is commonly understood as the belt-shaped land and adjacent sea area
stretching from the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean throughCentral Asia to the Strait of Malacca into Southeast Asia and farther north to the areas
adjacent to the Japanese archipelago.
This area is characterized by rich deposits of oil (Middle East and Central Asia),
unstable and fragile political systems, and a tendency toward Islamic extremism.
Accordingly, it requires a watchful eye in post–cold war, and especially post–September
11, international relations. Furthermore, these characteristics make this region difficult
for the Western powers in general, and the United States in particular, to penetrate, andso the region also requires serious strategic attention. A strategic environment isgenerally defined by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, which certainly
apply to the arc of instability. In the past few years, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indian3

Ocean have become the main tests for Japan’s Self- Defense Forces, providing
sufficient evidence of the region’s precarious security environment.
Iraq and Afghanistan have taught Japan that a swift and decisive militaryresponse is mandatory when dealing with such a strategic environment. But thecomplexity of the situation also shows that a direct military approach is not sufficient byitself. For example, the successful military campaign to overthrow Iraq’s Saddam
Hussein has been followed by the as yet unsuccessful “stability operations,” which havereminded Japan of the intractable nature of “postconflict peace building andstabilization.” Based on these observations, this article will try to elucidate the current
situation in Asia and the Pacific.

Southeast and South Asia as Areas Vulnerable to Terrorism andEarthquakes

Southeast Asia is sometimes referred to as the second front in the global war on
terrorism, with the first front being the Middle East. Terrorists certainly have made theirpresence known here. Since February 2002 in the Philippines, conflict between the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the national army has remained intense, andthe recent bombing and frequent attacks on public buildings in Mindanao, presumably
by the MILF, have halted the nascent peace negotiations yet again. And since early
2004, Thailand’s three southernmost provinces (Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala) havebeen the scene of a series of bombings, arson, and other attacks on the facilities of thearmed forces and police and the general public. Although the government stepped up
security measures and economic assistance, from 2005 through mid-2006 the provinces
still were unstable.

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It is extremely difficult to connect disparate acts of terrorism. But it is clear thatpeople living in Southeast Asia must constantly be prepared for incidents like thebombings in Bali, because this area is prone to earthquakes both metaphorical andliteral. Indeed, not long ago, real earthquakes in Java and Pakistan and the tsunami off
Sumatra struck one after another. But just as the term disaster diplomacy suggests, suchnatural disasters can and did offer the countries in this region an opportunity to organize
relief measures on an international scale, because in these cases, unlike man-madedisasters such as terrorism, there is little room for blame and internal fighting.
U.S. forces in Japan (including marines in Okinawa) and Japanese disaster
relief troops were quickly dispatched to the affected areas and joined with Australia andother nations to provide emergency help, a good example of “turning a misfortune into a
blessing.”
Natural disasters of a different sort—SARS, bird flu, extreme weather events,
environmental catastrophes, and the like—also have emerged as a new type of security
issue. Unfortunately, however, artificial barriers have sometimes prevented international
cooperation. For instance, even though SARS and bird flu require multilateral solutions,
Beijing made an issue of Taiwan’s international status and objected to World HealthOrganization (WHO) experts entering Taiwan. These and similar cases will be a test of
Chinese leaders’ favorite phrase, the “win-win game,” to see whether their deeds
correspond to their words.

Have Human Rights and Democracy Progressed?

Among the common goals in the 2+2 agreement between Japan and the United States
was the promotion of fundamental values like democracy. Have Asia and the Pacific5progressed in this regard?
Although the region has not failed the test for democratization, it also has not
excelled. With the exceptions of China, North Korea, and the remaining Communist
regimes in Indochina, many countries—including Iraq and others in the Middle East as
well as Uzbekistan and other former Soviet republics—are, on the whole, moving awayfrom authoritarianism. Nonetheless, it is premature for countries like Cambodia todeclare that they have achieved democratic stability. In addition, the recent politicalinstability in the Philippines, Thailand, Nepal, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, andEast Timor suggest that here, democracy has not yet made an inroad into the indigenous
political culture.
Accordingly, imposing democracy under the guise of a global war on terror
probably would be resisted by many of these countries. Indeed, “democracy, yes, but
not the made-in-America version” is a common reaction from quite a few of them.
Some Asian countries often express their concern about the West’s demands for
democratization and human rights by citing basic principles of international law, such as
not intervening in domestic affairs and maintaining equality among sovereign states.
Thus these countries call for “democracy in international society” at such gatherings as
the ASEAN Regional Forum.
Former republics of the Soviet Union, like Belarus, have moved toward
democracy. Russia, however, recently began to intervene in order to retard the progress
toward what it regards as “excessive democratization.” In Asia, Myanmar presents a
dilemma for the democratic cause because its military regime leans toward China toward off pressure from the United States and Europe to democratize, thereby further
strengthening China’s influence there. In addition, the relative decline in influence of ademocratic India, a traditional rival of China in Myanmar, should concern those6

countries interested in promoting democratic values. Even though the concept of an
East Asian community is not yet a realistic one, Japan and the United States must
approach these issues with care so that an eventual East Asian community will not bedesigned as a dam to contain the global trend toward democracy.

The Dichotomy Concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction

In summarizing their common global strategic objectives, the Japanese–U.S. 2+2
documents state that their joint efforts to promote international peace have beenencouraging, as exemplified by the multinational relief activities in the aftermath of thetsunami and the earthquakes. But the documents also admit that the two countries needa more farsighted and prudent strategy.
The issue of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) requires prompt attention, as
the current relationship between Japan and the United States lacks a well-coordinatedpolicy and, therefore, any signs of progress. Among the various reasons for the absenceof such a policy, the most important is the U.S. government’s indecisiveness in choosing
between Iran and North Korea as its most immediate priority. For Japan, the obvious
priority is North Korea, but the United States is leaning toward Iran. Another awkward
problem pertains to India, which the Bush administration has decided to treat as a defacto nuclear power, thereby threatening the already fragile Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), by undercutting their legitimacy and efficiency. A pro-India stance
may be understandable from the standpoint of American policy in South Asia, in thecontext of the war in Afghanistan and its aftermath, but it is hard to justify in regard to
the long-term goal of WMD nonproliferation.

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Two Nations at a Crossroads: Russia and China in the Thick Fog ofNortheast Asia

The Japanese–U.S. 2+2 documents list as their common regional strategic concern thepeaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula and the peaceful solution of thelong-standing issues related to North Korea and also those related to China, such as anonviolent resolution of the cross-strait question and the greater transparency of its
military policies. In the long term, as the documents observe, efforts to induce China tobehave as a stakeholder in both the global and the regional community depend on its
attitude toward the problems just cited. As shown by North Korea’s most recent missile
launch, the abduction of Japanese citizens, and intraregional affairs, the country’s
behavior has been quite irrational. Indeed, there has been no progress but, rather,
setbacks from the position at the six-party talks in 2005.
Pyongyang bears most of the blame, but the other participants’ lack of
coordination, especially that among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, is
responsible as well, since it has allowed North Korea to take advantage of theirdisorganization. Most unfortunately, the foreign policy of South Korea’s current
government is in disarray, as the country has distanced itself from both Tokyo andWashington, instead placing faith in its “smiling diplomacy” vis-à-vis North Korea
while arguing with Japan over a tiny rock in the Sea of Japan. South Korea’s diplomacy
is directed not by prudence but by passion and resentment, thus wasting political energythat should be spent on confronting the North.
Russia, meanwhile, is preoccupied with Iran because there it can hope to be amajor player, leaving the matter of North Korea to China. More broadly, Russia is eager

8to regain its international influence by using the high prices of oil and natural gas to its
advantage. Russia will continue to pursue a pro-Western policy to the extent that itpreserves its standing in the peer group of advanced nations [G-8] that gathered in St.
Petersburg, but Russia should not be expected to take a leading role on the Korean
Peninsula. Today, China is a greater puzzle than Korea and Russia, in that it isextremely difficult to discern the direction in which that gigantic nation is moving.

China’s Aggressive Diplomatic Offensives

It is important to emphasize repeatedly that the Japan–United States alliance is not
motivated by designs against China. Nonetheless, Japan cannot afford not to have awell-prepared strategy with which it can meet the various challenges that China will
present in the future. It is clear that China’s foreign and security policies are directed byits own national security strategy, which is aimed at competing with the close alliance
between Japan and the United States.
Therefore it is important not to speak of China as a threat but to create astrategy and policies to soften its impact. The first step toward that end is to interpretaccurately what China is thinking and doing. It is widely known that China has beenbuilding up and modernizing its armed forces for more than ten years, with its military
budget increasing more than 10 percent each year. The details of this military buildup
are not so well known, however, causing anxiety and suspicion among concerned
nations. And what China intends to do with its newfound military strength is even lesswell understood.
The notions of a “peaceful rise” and “new diplomatic thinking” (the win-wingame) are apparently inventions of Beijing’s policy and opinion leaders, intended to9ease foreign observers’ suspicions. Thus not the words but the actual implementation ofChina’s foreign and international policies need to be considered. The country’s
diplomatic offensive is impressive. It is marked by a series of systematic, and global,
efforts to cut into Japan’s “sphere,” to use that word in a diplomatic sense. A notable
example is the aggressive attempt by Chinese leaders and the Chinese public to delay
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. When the leaders ofRussia and China met in Moscow in May and then in Beijing in July 2005, their jointstatements underscored their objections to Japan’s bid. Moreover, China has adopted apolicy of not making alliances except for occasional, and temporary, diplomatic
coalitions. Instead, it depends on the United Nations to prevent any concerted actions
led by the United States that might threaten the sovereign rights of it and its dependents,
like North Korea. For precisely this reason, China objects to an enhanced role for Japan,
which is interested in helping the UN deal more efficiently with the various issues
pertaining to globalization.
For China, therefore, Japan’s role in the UN is a serious matter. In thisinterpretation, the street demonstrations in Chinese cities aimed at “stopping Japan at
the UN” can be better understood, and Chinese leaders can be seen as traveling aroundthe world to pressure less-developed countries in Asia and Africa to vote against Japan,
in return for generous economic assistance programs.
In this context, those countries belonging to the African Union (AU) and thePacific Islands Forum (PIF) do count, because despite their being small and weak
individually, their collective voice speaks loudly in the multilateral diplomacy at the UN
and other bodies. For this reason, during the past several decades these countries havebeen an important focus of Japan’s UN diplomacy. And for the same reason, China hasrecently intensified its diplomatic offensive toward these countries. Since the first10

meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)(hosted by Japan in 1993), Japan has continued its programs of economic and social
assistance to African nations, the most recent examples being its hosting of TICAD’s
third meeting in 2004 and the TICAD conference on peace stabilization in February
2006. To follow up these achievements, Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi visited
Ethiopia in April 2006. In his speech at the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, heoffered several official development assistance (ODA) packages, including US $8.7
million for immediate relief for Darfur, Sudan. The African countries then expressed
their support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat at UN Security Council. The Chinese
premier thereupon quickly visited Angola and seven other countries in Africa in
mid-June as if to cancel out Koizumi’s visit. It was the first time that a Chinese leader
had made an official visit to Africa. China’s African diplomacy also is motivated by its
interest in that continent’s oil reserves (Angola recently surpassed Saudi Arabia as the
top supplier of oil to China). But the UN was undoubtedly on China’s agenda as well.
China now is playing a similar diplomatic game in the Pacific. Until recently,
China was only Taiwan’s main contestant for influence, but it now has become acompetitive player against Japan as well. The Japanese government was scheduled tohost the conference of PIF leaders in May 2006 in Naha, Okinawa, the fourth meetingin the series initiated by the former prime minister, Keizō Obuchi, in 2000 (known as
the Pacific Islands’ Leaders Meeting, or PALM 2000, held in Miyazaki). Then China
decided to hold a similar conference, the “China-Pacific Island Countries Economic
Development and Cooperation Forum,” in Fiji in April of this year, in which it pledged
US $374 million over three years in special loans for the Pacific island nations, as wellas preferential trading concessions. Such diplomatic behavior indicates that China is
keeping a careful eye on Japan.

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Asia and the Pacific in History

The year 2005 should have been an ideal time to look back at the past century’s history
of international relations in East Asia. The occasion could have been used to resolve
differences over immediate issues and to renew efforts to achieve long-term goals.
Unfortunately, the reverse was what actually happened. The customary fuss over theinsignificant rock islets in the East China Sea dominated, permitting no escape from theprison of narrow-mindedness and shortsightedness. The name of the prison is “history
perception,” but it surely is a misnomer, since no forward-looking and creative vision of
East Asian history could be expected to rise out of such inhospitable soil.
Thus East Asia missed an opportunity to learn from past leaders’ received
wisdom. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Okakura Tenshin wrote Ideals of theEast (1903) and Awakening of Japan (1904), observing that Japan, which had defeated
Russia, was the solitary spot of light in the midst of an Asia where darkness stillprevailed. How different is today’s Asia from Okakura’s? However Japan’s role in thehistory of international relations during the past hundred years might be interpreted, that
history must include the undeniable impact of a modernizing Japan. Now a new phaseof historical evolution is beginning, which is centered on a modernizing China. Howvarious countries respond, both individually and/or collectively, will certainly be thisphase’s most important theme. Perhaps the real history of Asian international relations
starts today. Who will pass the test of that history? Asians cannot afford to quarrel with
one another on a shrinking globe—which could be compared to dogs fighting on asnail’s horn.

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