RIPS Policy Perspectives
No.9

Asian Perspectives in 2009:
Hopeful Signs and Growing Concerns
Masashi Nishihara
July 2009

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent
research institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts
research on issues of national and international peace and security, publishes
research reports, and proposes policy recommendations.
The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security),
which surveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.
Well regarded by both the academic and the security communities, theinstitute also organizes seminars for specialists and the public on national,
regional, and international security and sponsors joint research projects withinstitutes in other countries.
In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the JapanFoundation's Center for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young
scholars wishing to pursue security studies. Many of these recipients havesince become valuable contributors to security studies in Japan.
RIPS Policy Perspectives are intended to provide timely alternatives to andanalyses of existing peace and security policies, thereby contributing tofurther debate. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent theofficial position of the RIPS.

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RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues(available at http://www.rips.or.jp/english/publications/policy_perspectives.html )No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006 , October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO? ,December 2006
No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges

and the Role of Japan , March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?:
Perspectives on Asian Security , 2007, April 2007
No.5 Kazuto Suzuki, Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda, October,
2007
No.6 Masashi Nishihara, Tenser in Southwest Asia, Calmer in East
Asia － Perspectives in Mid-2008－ , July 2008
No.7 Yukari Kubota, Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter－

Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports－ , November 2008
No.8 Masahiro Matsumura, Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan , June
2009

Asian Perspectives in 2009:
Hopeful Signs and Growing Concerns

Masashi Nishihara

From early 2008 through May 2009, the security environment ofNortheast and Southwest Asia deteriorated. North Korea refused todismantle its nuclear facilities; China’s naval activities became more
expansionistic; the Taliban militants in the Afghan-Pakistani borderareas became more aggressive; and Pakistan was further beset byIslamist terrorism. In the meantime, the new leaders in South Korea
and Taiwan significantly changed their foreign policies to improve thesecurity environment, and China’s diplomacy became more assertive,
strengthened by its successful management of the 2008 Beijing
Summer Olympics.
Added to these developments were the global spread of thefinancial crisis that originated in the United States and the major shift
in U.S. foreign policy under the new Obama administration. President
Barack Obama seeks a deeper engagement with Asia. How fast the U.S.
economy recovers and what impact the United States’ Asia policy hason the region will affect the power relations among all these countries.
But while the U.S. economy retracts and the United States continues
to be involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan, China is gaining power.

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Accordingly, the Taliban in Southwest Asia, North Korea, and China
continue to be major factors of concern in Asia’s regional security.

The Impact of the International Financial Crisis on the Region’s
Security

The global financial crisis has caused unemployment to soar andconsumption to plummet, which has affected the many Asiandeveloping economies that depend on exports to the United States. The
result has been antigovernment and other demonstrations in several
countries, including South Korea, China, Japan, Thailand, andIndonesia. But perhaps because of these countries’ enormous economic
stimulus packages, these demonstrations have had little effect.
Thailand almost became an exception. The Abhisit Vejjajiva
government, which was formed in December 2008, introduced tax cuts
and antipoverty measures, temporarily giving the prime minister anapproval rate as high as 60 percent. Then those forces (the UDD:
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) that had supported
the ousted prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, turned against
Abhisit, insisting that his policy favored the rich and the military anddemanding that he step down. On April 10 the UDD forces gathered in
Pattaya, a southern resort town, and physically disrupted a series of
ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, South Korea, and China) meetings thatwere taking place there. This forced the ASEAN meetings to be2

canceled and then postponed, and on April 12 Prime Minister Abhisit
issued an emergency decree for Bangkok.
Although the financial crisis also affected many countries’
defense budgets and defense plans, other countries such as South
Korea, Russia, and China have continued to increase their alreadylarge defense budgets. In April 2009, however, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates announced reductions in the United States’
defense budget, cutting missile defense–related items and halting the
production of F-22 stealth fighters, despite the opposition of many U.S.
senators and representatives who want to keep the fighters to protect
jobs in their states and districts.
Although the financial crisis is likely to delay South Korea’s
implementation of its ambitious defense reform plan, which wascrafted by the Roh Moo-hyun government and scheduled to becompleted by 2020, South Korea still increased its 2009 defense budget
by 7.5 percent over that of the previous year. Because Russia depends
on oil and natural gas for 30 percent of its revenue, it was severely
affected by the sharp reduction of oil and natural gas prices, from $150
to $50 per barrel in just a few months in the second half of 2008.
Nonetheless, President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladmir
Putin, who are intent on building “a strong Russia,” increased Russia’s
2009 defense budget by 33.7 percent over the previous year’s. China, aswell, announced in March 2009 that it would increase its 2009 defense
budget by 14.9 percent. The exact impact of the global financial crisis

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on the Asian security environment will become clearer in the second
half of 2009.

The New Governments of South Korea and Taiwan

In February 2008, the Hannara (Grand National) Party’s Lee
Myung-bak took office as the new president of South Korea. He
immediately announced a new North Korea policy, which is in clear
contrast with that of his predecessor, President Roh Moo-hyun.
President Lee notified Pyongyang that South Korea would provide
economic assistance only after North Korea abandoned its nuclear
weapons. Furious, North Korea branded President Lee as “a traitor”
and immediately cut off diplomatic contacts. North Korea also scaled
back

its

participation

in

the

jointlyrun

KaesongIndustrial

Complex—which was developed using South Korean capital andtechnology—by ousting most of the managers and all of the South
Korean government officials while at the same time demanding an
enormous pay hike for North Korean workers.
In the meantime, under the Lee government, South Korea’s
relations with the United States and Japan improved. During the first
several months after Lee took his office, he was heavily criticized forresuming American beef imports in order to induce the United States
to ratify a bilateral free-trade agreement. Both violent and peacefuldemonstrations in Seoul protested the president’s alleged lack ofattention to food safety.
4

Then, however, the anti-Lee and anti-U.S. sentiment receded in
the second half of 2008, when the public recognized the need for close
relations with the United States. Similarly, the Lee government took “afuture-oriented” approach to the country’s relations with Japan,
thereby contributing to the revitalization of relations among the threenations.
By contrast, President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan, who took office in
May 2008, made good on his campaign promise of “Three No’s” (nounification, no independence, and no use of force against the mainland).
He also advocated a policy of reconciliation with the mainland. As his
Guomindang government began promoting an active flow of people andtrade, its pro-China position frightened the opposition Democratic
Progress Party, which held large antigovernment demonstrations but
was not able to win over the majority of Taiwanese who would benefit
from close ties with the mainland.
In

December

2008

the

Ma

government

launchedits“communications, traffic, and trade” policy with the mainland. When it
established direct links between eleven Taiwanese and sixty-three
Chinese ports, Taiwan became even more economically dependent on
China. In 2007, 41 percent of Taiwan’s exports were to the mainland,
and the percentage presumably rose even higher in 2008.
The number of China’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles
deployed along the Strait of Taiwan has continued to increase, leading
the March 2009 Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review , the first such
review, to warn of China’s threat.
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The United States, wanting to preserve the status quo of
Taiwan–China relations, welcomed the two countries’ reconciliation,
which, it believed, contributed to cross-strait stability. But if theirrelations should continue in this direction, Taiwan may lean evenfurther than anticipated toward the mainland. As Taiwan becomes
more economically dependent on China, it may have to acquiesce toBeijing’s pressure not to purchase high-quality arms from the UnitedStates. China also is likely to promote pro-China forces within Taiwan,
which may disrupt Taiwan-U.S. relations. Indeed, Taiwan’s
sovereignty may be compromised in the same way that Hong Kong’s
was. In the worst-case scenario, Taiwan’s U.S.-made arms may findtheir way into Chinese hands.

The Obama Administration’s New Emphasis on Asia

In February 2009 the new U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, chose Asia as her first overseas visit, going to Japan,
Indonesia, South Korea, and China, in that order. Traditionally, theU.S. secretary of state’s first trip is to Europe. Thus Clinton’s Asia visit
heralded Washington’s policy of concentrating more on Asia than in the
recent past.
The United States, of course, has interests in many parts of theworld. Accordingly, in March the U.S. secretary of state and theRussian foreign minister met in Geneva, agreeing to “reset” theirbilateral relations. In April President Obama attended the G-20
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summit in London and the NATO summit in Strasbourg and thentraveled to Prague, Ankara, and Baghdad. In this respect, the Obamaadministration did not really deviate from the country’s traditional
emphasis on Europe.
Secretary Clinton’s selection of countries indicates where U.S.
strategic interests lie in 2009. She visited Japan first, reaffirming its
importance to the United States. Earlier, Clinton testified during her
Senate confirmation hearings that “the alliance with Japan is thecornerstone of the U.S. policy on Asia.” While in Japan, she signed anagreement with her Japanese counterpart, Hirofumi Nakasone, inwhich about 8,000 U.S. Marines will be transferred to Guam by 2014.
The agreement will enable the United States to reinforce Guam as a
strategic base in the Pacific as well as to reduce the burden of thepeople in Okinawa in hosting the large U.S. base there. Thisagreement will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Secretary Clinton also sought Japan’s assistance in coping withthe growth of Taliban forces in the Afghan-Pakistani border areas andthe political and economic instability in Pakistan. Unlike herpredecessors, she refrained from high-handed demands and instead
showed her respect for Japanese initiatives. This also has contributed
to improving bilateral relations.
Clinton’s visits to Indonesia and South Korea likewise were
important. Indonesia is both the world’s most populous Islamic country
and a democracy. In addition, its location between the Pacific andIndian oceans gives the large archipelagic nation geostrategic
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significance. In the late1990s, the United States halted its military
assistance to Indonesia to protest the latter’s suppression of the
independence movement in East Timor. The relations between the twocountries quickly improved in late 2004, however, when the tsunami off
Sumatra brought in much-needed U.S. emergency assistance.
While in Jakarta, Secretary of State Clinton paid a courtesy callon Surin Pitsuwan, the secretary-general of ASEAN. The visit wasevidence of the United States’ recognition of ASEAN’s role in the region
and its willingness to respond to the region’s dissatisfaction with its
heretofore minimal engagement in Southeast Asia. Greater
involvement by the United States in the ASEAN region is an important
diplomatic step toward countering the growing influence of China inthis area.
Secretary Clinton’s visit to South Korea was important to the
Obama administration’s future talks with North Korea. The visit
provided an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the UnitedStates’ alliance with South Korea, together with President Lee
Myung-bak’s desire to strengthen ties with the United States. South
Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan have been muchbetter than those with the previous government. Weighing theimportance of the alliance with the United States and fearing North
Korea’s dismissive attitude toward South Korea, conservative Koreanswant to delay transferring the wartime command from the UnitedStates to the Republic of Korea, which the previous government
scheduled for April 2012. At the same time, other Koreans are8

concerned that the U.S. government may eventually accept North
Korea’s status as a nuclear state. Japan must keep careful watch on
the development of their bilateral relations.

The Deepening of U.S.-China Relations

Secretary Clinton visited China for three days beginning on
February 20 and agreed to expand the two countries’ strategic
economic dialogue, initiated by the Bush administration, to include
climate change and security. But her primary concern was promoting
cooperative economic relations. As of late December 2008, China held
$1.95 trillion in foreign-currency reserves, surpassing those of Japan.
China also is the world’s largest holder of U.S. treasury bonds, holding$727 billion, or 7 percent of the U.S. total of $10.4 trillion.
It is understandable, therefore, that the United States wants
good economic relations with China and also wants it to buy more U.S.
treasury bonds. Yet because of this need, the secretary did not spend
much time on human rights and Tibet, which led to strong criticism byhuman rights and conservative groups at home. In fact, this was one of
the few times when a high-ranking American official visited China
without referring to human rights issues. Clinton’s visit underscoredthe United States’ great need not to damage its relations with China.
China’s economic presence is impressive. In early 2009, three ofthe world’s twenty largest banks, in terms of current share prices, were
Chinese. In early April the Chinese government decided, on an
9experimental basis, to settle its trade accounts using its own currency.
For now, though, such accounts will be limited to Shanghai and othermajor cities in Guangdong Province.
At the G-20 summit meeting in London in early April, both
China and Russia expressed their disapproval of the dollar-based
currency system. Although the global financial crisis has enhanced theinternational importance of the Chinese renminbi (RMB), it is not
likely to become an international hard currency in the near future.
Nonetheless, now having the world’s third largest GDP, the world’s
largest foreign exchange reserves, and an enormous trade surplus,
China will push to raise the status of the RMB.
China also has expanded its naval activities. It submarines have
stepped up surveillance in the Pacific Ocean. According to U.S. naval
sources, they conducted surveillance five times in 2007, but as many as
twelve times in 2008, more often than Russian submarines did. In
March 2009, five Chinese ships surrounded two U.S. Navy oceanic
research ships that were collecting information about Chinese naval
activities in its exclusive economic zone off Hainan Island. In fact, theChinese ships shadowing the American ships came as close as ten
meters. Chinese military planes also buzzed the research ships morethan ten times.
The Chinese navy is scheduled to begin constructing two
diesel-operated aircraft carriers in 2009 and to complete them by 2015.
In addition, it plans to build two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers(50,000 to 60,000 tons). China has expanded its presence to prevent
10American naval activities in the South China Sea and to establish its
own sphere of influence there. In May 2007, a high-ranking Chinese
officer proposed to Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of the U.S.
Pacific Command, that their two countries divide control of the Pacific
Ocean, with the U.S. Navy patrolling it east of Hawaii and the Chinese
navy, west of Hawaii.
The idea of the United States and China collaborating in solving
major international issues, or a “G2,” is gathering momentum in the
United States. At a gathering in Beijing in January 2009 tocommemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the two countries’
diplomatic relations, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to
President Jimmy Carter, spoke in favor of a “G2.” He suggested that
the United States and China cooperate in settling international
security issues, such as the Israel-Palestine and India-Pakistan
conflicts, and in sending joint peacekeeping forces. He also stated that
the United States should raise its relations with China to the samelevel as those with Europe and Japan. While his ideas have been
received fairly coolly in the United States, China is showing someinterest in them.
As China extends its power, U.S.-China relations will draw closer,
although G2 is not likely to be realized in the near future. Because thetwo powers are the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, theycertainly should discuss ways of reducing emissions. But many
countries will oppose the two nations’ creating a global economic

11

framework and settling regional security issues for the Asia Pacificregion.

China’s Fear of Collapse in North Korea

The successful concert by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
in Pyongyang in February 2008, the first of its kind, raised hopes that
North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement, agreed on at the six-party talks
in October 2007, might indeed be realized. In October 2008, wanting toenhance its own diplomatic success, the Bush administration removed
North Korea from its list of terrorism-supporting states, ignoring
Japan’s opposition. Japan had wanted the United States to keep North
Korea on the list in order to pressure Pyongyang to release theJapanese abductees held in North Korea.
North Korea did not respond to the U.S. carrot, however. Instead,on the grounds that the United States had delayed the promised supplyof crude oil, it refused at the six-party talks in December 2008 to sign
the document allowing the United States to collect samples to verify
the nuclear dismantlement process. The resistance of the North
Korean military may be to blame. As a result, however, the UnitedStates not only damaged its relations with Japan but also gained
nothing from North Korea. Moreover, the Bush administration was
criticized at home for having made excessive concessions. North Korea
also was further isolated by the Lee Myung-bak government and the12Aso government, both of which adopted stringent policies toward
Pyongyang.
On April 5, 2009, North Korea tested a long-range ballistic
missile under the guise of launching a space satellite, despite theopposition of many countries, including the members of the six-party
talks. Although North Korea failed to put the missile into orbit, it
announced to its own people that “the successful launch of the satellite
marked a great happy event for the Korean people.” Such deceptive
propaganda and concealment of its mistakes are typical of North Korea,
but they may eventually weaken and undermine the Kim Jong-il
regime.
Besides failing its “satellite launch” test, North Korea also has
failed to build a strong position vis-à-vis the Obama administration on
nuclear talks. In addition, Japan decided on more severe sanctions and,in October 2006, asked for a U.N. Security Council resolution
condemning North Korea for violating Resolution 1718.
By contrast, China and Russia did not want tougher sanctions.
On April 13, the UN Security Council therefore settled on acompromise, with the council president making a statement, albeit
nonbinding, condemning North Korea. China apparently wishes toprevent sanctions from destabilizing the regime in North Korea andcausing a massive influx of refugees across the border into China. As
chairman of the six-party talks, China also wants to keep the talks
from collapsing, for fear of losing face.

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Then, on May 25, North Korea conducted yet another nuclear
test, now infuriating China and Russia as well as Japan, South Korea,
and the United States. This time China and Russia agreed to a binding
resolution by the UN Security Council condemning North Korea. The
council also began discussing economic and financial sanctions as wellas the inspection of cargo vessels suspected of carrying embargoedarms and matériel.
After almost three weeks, Resolution 1874 was finally adopted onJune 12, delayed by China’s insistence on watering down its contents.
China did not want ships going in and out of North Korea to beinspected by force, for fear of armed clashes. Instead, China wanted
them to be inspected only with the consent of their “flag states” (theirowners) and only on the basis of “information that provides reasonablegrounds to believe the cargo contains items, the supply, sale, transfer,or export of which is prohibited.”
China insisted on another critical loophole in the resolution,
namely, prohibiting “new commitments for grants, financial assistance,or concessional loans to the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea], except for humanitarian and developmental purposes.” Thismeans, in effect, that existing contracts for investment and assistancemay continue and even new contracts can be drawn up if they fulfill
humanitarian and developmental needs.
North Korea has asserted that it will never return to the
six-party talks, which means that it is likely to use this as a bargaining
chip when negotiating with the United States in the future.
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Furthermore, China opposes economic sanctions against North Korea
because it supplies 70 percent of the latter’s food and 70 to 80 percent
of its energy resources. To China, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons are
preferable to the regime’s instability or, worse, collapse.
Whether the new UN sanctions, plus sanctions imposed byindividual governments such as Japan, South Korea, and the UnitedStates, will have any effect remains to be seen. North Korea is unlikely
to give up its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang also is grappling with thequestion of Kim Jong-il’s health and his successor. Consequently, theunification of the Korean peninsula is unfeasible for the time being.

More Terrorism in South and Southwest Asia

During 2008, Islamist forces committed fewer terrorist acts inSoutheast Asia, except in southern Thailand and the southern
Philippines. The decline of terrorism owes much to the effective controlof radical groups like Jemaah Islamiyah by the governments ofIndonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Terrorism by Islamic radicals increased, however, in South andSouthwest Asia. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, apresidential candidate and former prime minister of Pakistan, in
December 2007, large-scale terrorist attacks were staged against amajor hotel and other buildings in Mumbai, India, in November 2008
and against a police academy near Lahore, Pakistan, in March 2009.

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The attacks in Mumbai inflicted enormous damage on thehistoric Taj Mahal Hotel, a Jewish synagogue, and a train station,
killing about two hundred people. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a radical
Pakistani group, which was believed responsible for the attacks, isknown to have been clandestinely supported by the Pakistani Army’s
intelligence organization, ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence). The popularbelief in Pakistan is that Kashmir, the border area claimed by bothPakistan and India, is its most important national security issue.
Accordingly, its main enemy must be India, not the Taliban and otherradical forces. Moreover, if the Taliban is destroyed, Pakistan is afraidthat it will be sandwiched in by a stable Afghanistan to the west andIndia to the east. Thus, it is in Pakistan’s strategic interest to keep the
Taliban militants active and the Afghan government weak. The
continued disputes over Kashmir, which bog down substantial Indianforces, likewise help Pakistan’s national defense.
Now that the situation in Iraq is stabilizing, President Obama
decided in March 2009 to send about 17,000 additional troops to
Afghanistan. His plan is to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq by
2010 and to increase the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Withthe Taliban and al-Qaeda forces using Pakistan’s northwest provinces
as a sanctuary and advancing toward Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital,
the U.S. government has begun to tackle the complex problems of
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a whole.
The United States is faced with enormous challenges in dealing
Afghanistan and Pakistan. It must crush the Taliban and al-Qaeda
16forces, help build a stable and democratic Afghanistan, and help
stabilize Pakistan and keep its nuclear weapons under tight control.
But when U.S. forces have used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, ordrones) against insurgents inside Pakistan, the result has been many
civilian casualties, thus turning Pakistanis against the United States.
This has become a difficult situation for the United States, and theAfghan-Pakistani issue may become the Obama administration’s“second Vietnam.”Japan’s Political Stagnancy

No sooner did Prime Minister Taro Aso take office in September
2008 than Japan was hit by the global financial crisis. The new
government thus immediately had to deal with the crisis, consultingwith the International Monetary Fund (IMF), providing emergency
financial help to Asian countries, and attending the G-20 summit heldin London. At home as well, the prime minister had to spend timetrying to reverse the rising unemployment and passing stimulus
measures in the National Diet.
International attention is often paid to Japan’s contribution tosecurity. But Japan’s diplomacy, no longer preoccupied with Japan’s
security role, has lost much of its vitality. When Aso was the foreign
minister in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government, he developed astrategy to create “an arc of freedom and prosperity.” But since hebecame prime minister, he so far has failed to implement it.
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Japan has lost much of its influence, too, by playing only aminimal role in international security. In January 2009 the Aso
government did manage to extend for a year the law for the Maritime
Self-Defense Force to participate in the Operations for Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. How Japan
will handle its role after the law finally expires in January 2010 isunclear. If the Democratic Party of Japan takes over from the Liberal
Democratic Party in the upcoming election, it may repeal the law.
On March 14, 2009, the government dispatched the Maritime
Self-Defense Force’s two destroyers to Somalia to protect Japanesecommercial ships against piracy. Their mission, however, wasrestricted to patrolling the area to protect Japanese ships only, notforeign ships. Moreover, the Japanese destroyers were not permitted toattack the pirates and their ships unless they themselves wereattacked. Then in April the government introduced a new bill allowing
the destroyers to use force to protect both Japanese and foreigncommercial ships. The bill was passed by the Diet on June 19. Now
Japanese destroyers can deal more forcefully with the pirates.
The term of the members of the House of Representatives (lower
house) expires on September 10, 2009, at which time Japan’s foreignand security policies may change significantly if the Democratic Party
wins the general elections. One focal point should be the flexibility of
the new government in interpreting Article 9 of the constitution. A
strict and narrow interpretation would restrict Japan’s options toassist Afghanistan and would also weaken its alliance with the United
18

States. But if Japan adopts a positive and creative foreign and security
policy, it will be able to assume a more important role in the Asia
Pacific region.

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