RIPS

Policy Perspectives No.7

Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter
Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports
Yukari Kubota
November 2008

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research institution
established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues of national andinternational peace and security, publishes research reports, and proposes policy recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security), which surveys thechanging security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded by both the academic andthe security communities, the institute also organizes seminars for specialists and the public onnational, regional, and international security and sponsors joint research projects with institutes inother countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation's Center for
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RIPS Policy Perspectives are intended to provide timely alternatives to and analyses of existing
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RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues
No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006, October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?, December 2006
No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges and the Role ofJapan, March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?: Perspectives on Asian

Security, 2007, April 2007
No.5 Kazuto Suzuki, Space:Japan’s New Security Agenda,October 2007
No.6 Masashi Nishihara, Tenser in Southwest Asia,Calmer in East Asia －Perspectives

in Mid-2008－,July 2008

Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter
Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports
Yukari Kubota ∗Japan’s Ad Hoc Arms Export Control Policy
In 1967 the Japanese government under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
adopted the Three Principles on Arms Exports, in response to the opposition
Japan Socialist Party’s objection to Japan’s logistical support for U.S. forcesin the Vietnam War. These principles prohibit Japan from exporting weapons
to Communist-bloc countries, those countries subject to embargoes on arms
exports under the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions, and those countries
engaged or likely to be engaged in international conflicts. They were
reinforced in 1976 by the government of Prime Minister Takeo Miki, which
imposed a total ban on the export of arms and arms-related equipment to all
regions in the world, in line with the pacifist spirit of the JapaneseConstitution.
Then in 1983, when Yasuhiro Nakasone became prime minister, theprinciples were relaxed to exempt transferring arms-related technologies,
though not military end items, to the United States. With this exception,∗

The author is a part-time lecturer of Osaka University. She was a fellow of the
Security Studies Fellowship Program of the Research Institute for Peace and Security
from 2000 to 2002.

1

however, Japan’s policy to ban arms exports has since remained unchanged.
In accordance with the 1983 modification, Japan and the United States havecarried out, since 1999, a joint technological research project, the Navy
Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) program, to improve their missile defense
system. 1 If this research should lead to joint development and production,
Japan would find itself exporting missile defense-related arms to the UnitedStates. Thus, in December 2005, when the two countries began their joint
development and production of the future missile defense system, theJapanese government determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports
would not be applied and that the export of other future defense projects to
the United States would be examined on a case-by-case basis. The
government also confirmed, however, that Japan would continue to enforce
its arms export control policy, in light of the country’s basic philosophy as apeace-loving nation, on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports andtheir related policy guidelines are based. 2
The fundamental problem with Japan’s arms export control policy lies
in its ad hoc nature, that is, its having to make exceptions to its Three
After the approval of the Japanese Security Council in October 1998, theMemorandum of Understanding on the joint technical research on the NTWD between
the two was concluded in November 1999.

1

Shusho kantei (Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet), “Heisei 17-nendo ni kakaru
boei keikaku no taiko ni tsuite” [On the National Defense Program Guidelines,
FY2005-], Naikaku kanbo chokan danwa [Statements and announcements by the chiefcabinet secretary] 10 December 2004, available online at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyokan/koizumi/2004/1210danwa.html; andhttp://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html. Shusho kantei,“Dando misairu boei noryoku kojogata geigeki misairu ni kansuru Nichibei kyodo
kaihatsu” [U.S.-Japan joint development on missile defense] Naikaku kanbo chokan
danwa [Statements and announcements by the chief cabinet secretary], 24 December
2005, available online at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyokan/koizumi/2005/1224danwa.html.
22

Principles on Arms Exports and announcing its intention to examine otherarms exports on a case-by-case basis. Although the country’s international
relations, technological environment, and industrial structures all havechanged since the Three Principles were established, Japan still does nothave a clear-cut policy for arms exports that can meet today’s needs. The
restriction was effective during the cold war, as it allowed Japan to refuse tohelp the Communist-bloc countries strengthen their military capabilities,
but now that the cold war is over, the policy is no longer feasible.

Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports
Keeping in mind the current trends in defense technology and acquisition,
Japan should revise its arms export control policy to reflect its national
security and defense industrial and technological base. At present, the Three
Principles on Arms Exports allow Japan’s defense businesses to operate only
within its small domestic market. How, then, will the current policy banningthe export of arms affect Japan’s defense industry? How can the industry be
productive in the future? How can Japan use its industrial capability tofulfill its strategy of national security and technological development?

Growing International Cooperation in Defense Systems
Since the end of the cold war, the United States and the NATO countries
have begun emphasizing international cooperation in major defense projects.
Because the defense budgets of the United States and its allies have been cut,the U.S. Department of Defense now places a high premium oninteroperability. According to the department, international cooperative3

efforts offer an opportunity to enhance interoperability, stretch shrinking
budgets, and preserve local defense industrial capabilities. Such cooperation
ranges from simple subcontracting relationships to licensing and royalty
arrangements, joint ventures, and bilateral and multilateral cooperative
programs. 3
According to British and French officials, Europe’s hope that the issueof missile defense might go away if it were ignored long enough seems tohave evaporated after the exchanges at the Munich Conference on Security
Policy in February 2001. At that time, the German chancellor, Gerhard
Schroeder, responded positively to the project, stating, “Europeans place
great value on frequent exchanges with the American administration onplans for missile defense.” 4 Now, therefore, cooperation on a missile defense
project by the United States and its allies is building and includes the
U.S.-Italian-German Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Program, and the U.S.-Israeli Arrow Program. 5 Because developing highly
advanced weapons systems, such as the missile defense project, requires
much time and cost, international cooperation may be the best solution whenbudgets are tight.
Although the Japanese government decided that the Three Principles
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress 1995,
available online at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/index.html.

34Joseph Fitchett, “U.S. Intends to Put Anti-Missile Shield around the World,”

International Herald Tribune, 5 February 2001.

The MEADS program is a trilateral project to develop a missile defense system that istransportable, tactically mobile, and capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles
in the terminal phase of their flight. The Arrow Program is a bilateral project to develop
an arrow weapons system that can be used with the U.S. Patriot and Navy Area
Theater Missile Defense systems.
54

on Arms Exports would not be applied to the missile defense project with theUnited States, it did reconfirm that Japan’s arms export ban policy would
remain in place. As a result, despite Japan’s strategic importance to the Asia
Pacific region, the United States is free to seek suppliers in other countries
that have few legal constraints on the sales of arms. Therefore, unless Japanrevises its attitude toward multilateral defense and technologicalcooperation, the United States may strengthen its ties with other countries,
such as the members of NATO. If this were to happen, it might well damage
the relationship between Japan and the United States, which would not bedesirable for Japan’s national interests.
In addition, if Japan continues to adhere to the Three Principles on
Arms Exports and does not participate in international defense projects, itwill have no influence on setting international technological trends andstandards. Moreover, Japanese users have had no tactical experience (andthus have no market data), and Japanese-made weapons have not beentested in combat, whereas the United States has accumulated decades of
information and has had many opportunities to test its defense systems. The
Japanese government therefore was right in deciding to develop and produce
a missile defense system with the United States. Its making it an exception
to the Three Principles on Arms Exports means that Japan can maintain its
technological ties with the United States, the world’s leader in militarytechnology.
Japanese companies still, however, are not allowed either to freely
export any military end items or to participate in multilateral defense
projects with countries other than the United States. In addition, other5defense projects must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Not specifying clear
criteria for the country’s arms export control policy greatly complicates
research and development, whether in the public or the private sector, when
mapping out an R&D strategy based on international trends. In this respect,
the Three Principles should be modified so that a new arms export control
policy will enable Japan to join multilateral defense R&D and projects and tostay abreast of advancements in military technology.

The Problem with Japan’s Defense Industry
In order to participate in multilateral defense projects, Japan’s defense
industry must be competitive. Up until now, Japan’s defense industry has
operated in a noncompetitive market environment, with a few companies
dealing with the Japanese government as the sole buyer. 6
In Japan, the basis for defense acquisitions is a quantitative target set
in a five-year defense buildup plan and achieved within a restricted budget.
As a result, Japan’s defense plans seldom include new weapons systems;
instead, replacing obsolete systems with new ones is given higher priority.
Part of the reason for this is that Japan’s defense buildup is planned inaccordance with the “concept of basic and standard defense capability”(kibanteki boeiryoku koso), meaning that Japan will not become a source ofinstability in the surrounding region by creating a power vacuum.
6 The data on the market share of Japanese defense contractors from 1975 to 2005 showthat in every fiscal year, the top twenty companies have controlled about 70 percent ofdefense contracts and the top ten companies alone have captured about 60 percent. The
concentration in the Japanese defense market is relatively high compared with theUnited States: in FY2005, 35.3 percent of defense contract awards were captured by the
top ten firms and 42.6 percent by the top twenty.

6

Because the defense budget is not based on a capability directly linked
to an assessment of military threats to Japan, drawing up a budget andestimating the future demand for defense equipment are easy. This method
enables defense production programs to be confined to a small number ofcompanies, which in turn creates a noncompetitive market environment inwhich the informal “defense family” has long had an advantageous position. 7
Coupled with this distinctive defense acquisition process, Japan’s arms
export ban policy has brought the industry to a standstill. Those companies
in the market, blessed with the small but stable demand at home, continue
to receive defense contract awards from the Ministry of Defense. In such anenvironment, Japanese defense companies with vested rights do not have tocompete with one another or with foreign suppliers in the overseas market.
In addition, the Japanese defense market does not attract newcomers
because of the country’s static defense industrial structure and the legal
restraints on arms exports. If the Japanese defense industry remains in sucha noncompetitive market environment, it may end up weakening its own
industrial and technological capabilities. But if Japanese-made defense
products are allowed to be exported, newcomers with potential industrial
capabilities might enter the defense market, and the informal “defense
family” companies would be forced to change their traditional businesspractices. Unless they are competitive, Japanese companies will have7

For further analysis of the characteristics of the Japanese defense industry, see
Kubota Yukari, “Nihon no boei sangyo no tokushitsu: Sangyo kozo to anzenhosho
seisaku ga ataeta eikyo no bunseki” [Characteristics of the Japanese defense industry:An analysis of its structure and the influence of national security policy], Kokusai seiji[International Relations] 131 (2002).

7difficulty participating in international defense projects.

New Trends in Defense Acquisition
The U.S. Department of Defense is now trying to apply commercial practices
and standards to its major defense projects, including missile defense, which
has implications for the Japanese defense industry that cannot be ignored.
In 1994, the then U.S. secretary of defense, William Perry, began trying
to streamline U.S. defense acquisitions, particularly in the recognition that
future weapons systems would largely depend on rapidly changing
commercial technology. The U.S. Department of Defense thus began shiftingfrom its reliance on unique military specifications to morecommercial-oriented performance standards, and it also adopted
best-business practices to align itself more closely with the private sector.
One of the main objectives of this defense acquisition reform was reducing
both the costs and the time needed to develop a complex weapon system.
As a result, the United States now places greater emphasis on
Evolutionary Acquisition as the preferred strategy to rapidly acquire anadvanced war-fighting capability. Instead of attempting to develop a systemthat will, on its first deployment, fully satisfy a detailed militaryrequirement, the Evolutionary Acquisition strategy is to develop, test, deploy,and modify systems in a cyclical process that, in principle, will permit
weapons developers to progress incrementally toward a final system
configuration that will eventually meet their required objectives. 8 The
8Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf, Missile Defense: The Current Debate (CRS Report
for Congress), 25 February 2002, available online at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-6841:1. For more details

8concept of Evolutionary Acquisition is a common business practice in theprivate sector, in which a new product is usually developed andmanufactured with the latest or best possible technology and then, after
being put on the market, is modified to improve its performance. In this way,
the product can “evolve” from the original model into an up-to-date and moresophisticated model.
The Evolutionary Acquisition strategy is best suited to high-technology
and software-intensive programs in which requirements beyond a corecapability may be generally, but not specifically, defined. Accordingly, themissile defense system has no fixed or final architecture; rather, it
concentrates on improving the effectiveness of defensive capabilities overtime as resources allow. This acquisition strategy is suitable for the complex,
multilayered missile defense project. The project was initially structured todeliver capability in two-year “blocks,” each providing capability upgrades
and new fielding opportunities. The first period, Block 2004, represented
calendar years 2004/2005; Block 2006, 2006/2007; and Block 2008, 2008/2009
deliveries. Over the past few years, the United States has fielded an initial
missile defense system that it is improving with additional capabilities in theform of deployed sensors, interceptors, and enhanced command and control.
The current system architecture includes SM-3 sea-based interceptors, Navy
Aegis cruisers, PAC-3 missiles, and sea-based X-band radar. 9
about the Evolutionary Acquisition strategy, see U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, 12 May 2003, available online at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002p.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, BMDS Booklet, 5th ed., 23
October 2007, available online at http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/factsheet.html.

99Japan and the United States have been working jointly on theSM-3-related technologies and subcomponents. The Japan-U.S. technologicalresearch project on NTWD for the missile defense system covers (1) nose
cones to protect missile heads from air friction; (2) kinetic warheads todestroy ballistic missiles; (3) infrared seekers to detect, identify, and track
ballistic missiles; and (4) motors for second-stage interceptor rockets. These
are the technologies for SM-3 missiles launched from Aegis cruisers tointercept ballistic missiles at the upper layer of or outside the atmosphere.
Three of the four items are material components, and the other is sensor
technology. As long ago as June 2004, a leading Japanese newspaper
reported that the nose cones for missile heads had been developed by one ofJapan’s major companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), and would be
adopted as a major subcomponent of the SM-3 interceptor. According to thereport, although the components were developed by both a U.S.
manufacturer and MHI, the U.S. government chose some of MHI’s
technologies. 10
Following the Evolutionary Acquisition strategy, system components ofmissile defense have been, and will be, upgraded and improved. Now that it
is taking part in this bilateral project with the United States, the Japanese
defense industry should consider the U.S. Department of Defense’s newacquisition system. Both the U.S. and the Japanese defense industries
should be able to adapt to the changing defense market environment and tomeet demands for the best possible technologies effectively and promptly. If

10Mainichi shimbun [Mainichi newspaper], 9 June 2004.
10

the Japanese defense industry can do this, it should be able to look forward
to more opportunities like that of MHI.
Along with international cooperation on defense projects, the UnitedStates’ streamlined defense acquisition could intensify worldwide
competition among countries with technological capabilities. Despite theadvantages of “international cooperation in defense acquisition,” both thecooperation and the new standard of U.S. defense acquisition require thatparticipants be industrially competitive. The Japanese government therefore
should consider whether its policy decisions on arms exports that allow for
exceptions will benefit the Japanese defense industry in the future. Legal
constraints that confine the industry to the domestic market should be
revised to permit the defense industry to be part of a multilateral framework.
Japan’s participation in the missile defense project is an opportunity for theJapanese defense industry to demonstrate its competence in the emerging
market being created by the United States and its allies.

Japan’s Potential CompetitivenessIf the Japanese government does decide to allow arms exports, will Japan’s
defense industry succeed overseas? Although this question is difficult toanswer, we can use rough indicators to estimate its competitiveness. In 2006,
using questionnaires sent to its 137 member companies, the Japan
Association of Defense Industry conducted research on the defense industry’s
technological base. 11 The main purpose of this research was to evaluate the
Nihin boei sobi kogyokai [Japan Association of Defense Industry], Boei sangyo no
kokunai seisan gijutsu kiban iji kojo no tame no kenkyu chosa [Study on maintaining

11

and improving the defense industry’s domestic production technology], March 2006.
11

companies’ productive capability and to measure how well they would
maintain and improve this capability in the future. The survey showed thatJapan’s defense R&D and production capability varied from system tosystem. Based on these findings, I established three categories ofJapanese-made defense systems: (1) fairly competitive, (2) arduous in termsof cost and technology, and (3) less competitive but offering many
opportunities. 12 I then determined the industry’s possible success as an arms
exporter, on the basis of its competitiveness.
The first category includes technologies related to minesweeper andsea-based equipment such as identification of friend or foe (IFF), radar,
missile-launching systems for antiaircraft operations, sound navigation andranging (sonar), infrared imaging sensors, and periscopes for antisubmarine
operations. These systems, most of which use dual-use technologies, were
designed and manufactured in Japan on an established production base, inwhich Japanese companies already had a competitive edge over their foreigncounterparts. Japan’s technologies for sea-based missile-launching systems,
heat-resistant construction, high-density welding, composite material
processing, strengthened-steel technology, electric control technology, andairtight control technology are highly advanced. The country’s expertise islargely derived from its experience with the Aegis cruiser project. MHI’s nosecone, for example, was adopted as a major subcomponent of the SM-3

Prospects for Japan’s success in arms export, reevaluated in this paper, are based on
the Japanese defense industry’s own production capability, such as design, manufacture,
test and evaluation, and quality control; its technological edge over their foreigncounterparts; and cost competitiveness.
1212

interceptor. When the Three Principles on Arms Exports are revised, theindustry’s exports in the first category will rise, and its cost competitivenesswill be enhanced by the addition of more dual-use technologies.
The second category consists of magnetic measurements ofunderwater-weapon ranges, onboard surface ship data processing of combat
control systems for antiaircraft operations, and sea-based passive towedarray sonar for antisubmarine operations. Although the Japanese defense
industry already possesses most of the technologies and equipment
necessary to design and manufacture these systems itself, it is not costcompetitive, owing to the Three Principles on Arms Exports. Furthermore,
the production capability of a small percentage of the items in this category
is inferior, and most of these systems rely more on military technologies than
do those in the first category. Destroyers (or escort ships) also fall into thiscategory. Japanese shipbuilders’ development and production are based on
their existing capability, which is superior in designing and manufacturing
hulls. Shipbuilders must, however, acquire the same expertise in
manufacturing engines in order to compete with their foreign counterparts.
Revising the Three Principles on Arms Exports would certainly brighten theprospects for their success in the international market, but Japanese
shipbuilders will need more time and effort, compared with the first category,to succeed.
The third category refers to communication electronics like groundradio equipment, ground radar, sea-based lasers for antiaircraft operations,and sea-based communication satellites. Even though the Japanese defense
industry has an advanced production capability, it must meet other13

challenges in order to be a successful exporter of these systems. In regard tocommunication electronics, Japanese companies still need to reduce current
costs, by reexamining military specifications in cooperation with theJapanese government. In the past, because most R&D projects forcommunication satellites were initiated by the government and focused oncommercial purposes, their applicability may be determined by theusefulness of commercial technologies for defense purposes. This third
category also includes aircraft. Japanese companies already have theadvanced aircraft technology and equipment necessary for domestic
production through the postwar system of production licensed by the UnitedStates. As with the destroyers in the second category, however, they are facedwith technological challenges to develop engines at home.
In sum, the Japanese defense industry has the technological edge on
sea-based subsystems, albeit more for defensive and searching systems thanoffensive systems. Japan’s competitive edge in naval technology stems fromits deliberate efforts in this area, since Japan is a maritime nation and islocated in a geopolitically vital position in the Asia Pacific region. During thecold war, Japan needed to keep a careful watch on military activities by
Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union. Today Japan must keep
track of China’s naval activities and try to prevent terrorism and piracy inthe region. As mentioned earlier, Japan’s defense buildup is based on the“concept of basic and standard defense capability.” It thus has establishedthe minimum defense capability necessary for defensive purposes only,
which has helped the country excel in sea-based defensive and searchingsubsystems.
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New Directions for Japan
Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter
This analysis of the three categories of the Japanese defense industry
suggests that Japan can find a place in the overseas market as a subsystem
supplier specializing in sea-based defensive and searching technologies, witha competitive edge on commercial and/or dual-use technologies applicable tomilitary systems, such as electronics, materials, semiconductor, andmanufacturing technologies. But because Japan’s defense industry and users
do not have overseas market data on Japanese-made weapons, it would be
difficult for the industry to participate as a systems integrator ininternational cooperative projects. Instead, Japan would have more successas an exporter of subsystems, especially sea-based defensive and searching
technologies, as MHI’s SM-3-related technology demonstrates.
Japan’s technological superiority in sea-based defensive and searchingsystems is shown in the following example. In 2006, the Japanese
government selected Indonesia for one of its official development aid (ODA)
projects, which was supplying the country with three patrol vessels toprevent piracy, maritime terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons in theStrait of Malacca. Because the patrol vessels to be exported under thisproject were made bulletproof in order to protect their crew members, theyfell under the category of “military vessels” stipulated by the Export Control
Trade Ordinance, being defined as “arms” in the Three Principles on Arms
Exports. The Japanese government, therefore, decided to regard theprovision of these vessels as an exception to the Three Principles. The reason
15

was that the Strait of Malacca is an international maritime artery, with morethan 200 vessels per day in all navigating through it. About 14,000 vessels
per year are bound for Japan via the strait. More than 10 percent of theentire world’s piracy takes place here, so it is in Japan’s interest to ensure its
security. 13
This example also shows that the Three Principles on Arms Export isan impediment to Japan’s contribution to international cooperation,although the Japanese government decided to exempt this ODA project, as it
did for the missile defense project. Instead, however, Japan should establish
a new arms export control policy, rather than granting exceptions on an ad
hoc basis. This new policy should set minimum regulations on arms export
and give Japanese defense companies an opportunity to expand theirbusiness overseas.
Some Japanese worry that if Japanese companies become subcontractors,
such as for the United States in the missile defense project, the country will
become more dependent on foreign defense suppliers. But this should not be
a problem so long as Japanese technologies are competitive enough to meetthe demands of the overseas market. Given that international cooperation in
defense technology is becoming the norm in defense acquisitions, it isimportant that the Japanese defense industry demonstrate its competence inJapan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, “Indoneshia ni okeru ‘kaizoku kaijo
tero oyobi heiki kakusan no boshi no tameno junshi sentei kenzo keikaku’ ni taisuru
musho shikin kyoryoku ni tsuite” [Grant aid to Indonesia for the project for constructionof patrol vessels for the prevention of piracy, maritime terrorism and proliferation of
weapons], 15 June 2006, available online at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/MOFAJ/press/release/18/rls_0615c.html. Japan, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, press release, “Grant Aid to Indonesia for the Project for Constructionof Patrol Vessels for the Prevention of Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Proliferation of
Weapons,” 16 June 2006, available online at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3.html.
13

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those fields in which it has a competitive edge. By revising the Three
Principles on Arms Exports, the Japanese defense industry can become asuccessful exporter of sea-based defensive and searching systems andcomponents and thereby be in a position to expand its exports to othertechnologies.

New Criteria for Arms Export Control
New export controls should be applied to those countries that are engaged or
likely to be engaged in international conflicts, those that are not making
efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, those thatare planning a rapid expansion of their military capability, and those forwhich Japan’s exports may cause regional instability. When revising theThree Principles on Arms Exports, the Japanese government should ensurethat Japanese-made products will not intensify any conflict, lead to theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or help terrorist groups. That is,Japanese exporters of arms and arms-related equipment must confirm theirend use and end users and make sure that the exported arms will be used
only for purely defensive purposes, counterterrorism and counterpiracy
measures, and postconflict reconstruction.
These criteria not only are consistent with today’s international politicaland technological practices but also can enlarge the range of Japan’s defense
industries. These companies will have more opportunities to take part ininternational programs and will avoid being excluded from settinginternational technological trends and standards. The new criteria will lower
the entry barriers to the defense market and make it easier for companies to17map out a strategy for the future. Japan’s technological capabilities can also
contribute to international security. With this strategy in mind, the Japanese
government should revise the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

18