RIPS Policy Perspectives

No.5

Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda
Kazuto Suzuki
October 2007

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issuesof national and international peace and security, publishes research reports, andproposes policy recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosh (Asian Security), whichsurveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded byboth the academic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars
for specialists and the public on national, regional, and international security andsponsors joint research projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation’sCenter for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue
security studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors tosecurity studies in Japan.

RIPS Policy Perspectives are intended to provide timely alternatives to and analysesof existing peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The
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RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues
No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006, October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?, December 2006
No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges and the Role ofJapan, March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?: Perspectives on Asian
Security, 2007, April 20073

Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda

Kazuto Suzuki*

The Diet’s 1969 Resolution on “Exclusively Peaceful Purposes”
In January 2007 when a Chinese missile destroyed an aging weather satellite, theJapanese government expressed its concern about the debris created by the ASAT
(anti-satellite) test. The government understood that this was a science and technology
mission rather than a military test.1 In its white paper, Defense of Japan 2007, theMinistry of Defense then referred to it as another example of China’s lack oftransparency.2 Japanese reaction was thus quite moderate, compared to the United States’
reaction to the test, which was much stronger.3 The United States called the test a threat
to its national security. Japan’s interest in protecting space system is different from that of
the United States. The U.S. military relies heavily on space for information gathering,
communication, and navigation.
Japan has restricted itself from using space for its security needs. Being theworld’s second largest economy, the world’s second largest spender on the civilian use of
space, and the world’s third largest spender on defense, Japan possesses technological and*Kazuto Suzuki is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University ofTsukuba. He specializes in space security issues.
1“’No more satellite tests,’ said the Chinese Defense Minister,” Asahi Shinbun, February
13, 2007.
2
Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2007, 50.
3For example, compare with the DoD document on China. U.S. Department of Defense,
Annual Report to the Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007,
20-21.
1

industrial capability to use space for its national security. Thus many non-Japanese spaceexperts may wonder why it has not done so, if only for nonaggressive purposes.
The main reason for Japan’s reticence is its pacifist constitution, which isinterpreted to prohibit using space for security purposes. In 1969, the Japanese parliament,
the Diet, passed a resolution “Concerning the Principle of the Development andUtilization of Space,” popularly known as “the exclusively peaceful purposes resolution.”
It stipulates that Japan’s space programs may be conducted by the civilian sector, not thedefense sector, and only for the research and development of new technology for
exclusively peaceful purposes.4
The principle of “exclusively peaceful purposes” is not new, as it appears in theOuter Space Treaty 5 and the ESA Convention. 6 The Japanese application of thisprinciple, however, is unique. While debating the resolution in the Diet in 1969, the Diet
members argued that it should be applied to the development and use of space in the same
way that nuclear technology had been. That is, nuclear technology and space have a dualuse, as they can be developed simultaneously for both civilian and military purposes. In
addition, because Japan’s Science and Technology Agency (STA) was in charge of both
nuclear and space technology, the Diet felt that the development of space should be
restricted as tightly as that of nuclear technology was. Ever since the horror of the nuclear
holocausts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have been skeptical of using
nuclear technology even for peaceful purposes, and therefore the Diet stipulated that it beused only for civilian purposes and that the military not be involved administratively,

4

For the history of Japanese space policy, see Kazuto Suzuki, “Administrative Reforms
and Policy Logics of Japanese Space Policy,” Space Policy 22, no. 1(2005): 11-19.
5
The official title of this treaty is Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities ofStates in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html.
6
The official title is Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency,
available at http://www.esa.int/convention/.
2

financially, and politically in its development and operation.7 Accordingly, this notion of“exclusively peaceful purposes” was applied to space as well.
Based on the interpretation of the Diet resolution, all of Japan’s operations inspace have been conducted for scientific and technological purposes. The strategic goal ofJapan’s space policy thus has been to “catch up” with the technology of other advanced
countries such as the United States and European nations. Thus the goal of most ofJapan’s space programs, even that of those for communication, broadcasting, andmeteorology, has been technological excellence. For many politicians, space was the“necktie of advanced countries,”8 suggesting that Japanese space policy should aim at
gaining national prestige.
The principle of “non-military” use of space is about to change, however, in
accordance with the draft Basic Law for Space Activities, which was submitted to theDiet in June 2007. The aim of the draft law is to redefine the purpose and rationale forJapan to invest in space, and for the first time, the term security appears in an official
document pertaining to space. Why has the notion of security suddenly appeared in thedraft law, and how is it likely to change Japan’s space policy?

The End of the Cold War Paradigm
For many years, particularly during the cold war, Japan’s strictly “nonmilitary” use of
space was not challenged. The reason was that the alliance between Japan and the UnitedStates already provided the necessary infrastructure for telecommunication andintelligence gathering from space. In addition, Japan’s pacifist Constitution was

7

Response by Masao Yamagata, member of the Space Activities Committee, in theSpecial Committee of the Promotion of Science and Technology, Lower House, minutes,
April 16, 1969.
8
This expression was used by Shinya Matsuura in his book Kokusan rokketo wa nazeochirunoka (Why Do Japanese Launchers Fail?) (Tokyo: Nikkei BP Publishers, 2004).
3

interpreted as prohibiting its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from being deployed beyond its
national border. When the cold war ended, however, Japan was forced to begin thinking
about changing its space strategy.
With the end of the cold war, the threat of Communism had waned, and so thereason for stationing U.S. troops in Japan also had become less compelling as well.
Although the United States still maintains a need for forward deployment bases in Japan,
it is no longer a condition of the alliance. The unilateral collective defenseIaccording towhich the United States is obliged to defend Japanese territory and forces but Japaneseforces are not obliged to protect American territory and forcesIhas now become too
great a burden, and so the U.S. government wants the Japanese government to share moreof responsibility for global security. Accordingly, Japan has enlarged its participation in
the war on terror, particularly by deploying naval forces to support the multinationalanti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and its own ground troops in Iraq.
It is through these operations that the Self-Defense Forces have come to realize
their technological shortcomings. Because the SDF are restricted from developing andoperating their own space capabilities, they have had to rely on commercial satellite
communication and commercial imagery services. But until now, because the SDF havenot been permitted to be deployed outside Japan’s borders, they have not needed long
distance communication or imagery of foreign countries other than its neighbors.
However, the SDF have recognized the gap in Japan’s military technology, particularly inregard to the United States’ military transformation and “Revolution in Military Affairs”(RMA) in recent years. Given the increasing possibility of Japan’s sharing its security
burden and joint operations with U.S. forces, the SDF and the Japan Defense Agency(JDA, now the Ministry of Defense) now acknowledge the importance of developing theirown space capability.
4In addition, the Japanese people’s perception of their security has been
dramatically changed by North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong missile over Japanese
territory in 1998.

The alarmed Japanese public thereupon demanded that the

government take measures to protect them, and the government immediately decided tolaunch what is known as the Information-Gathering Satellite (IGS) program.

The Information-Gathering Satellite Program: Treading a Narrow Paththrough a Legal Jungle
At the start, the IGS program faced the serious legal constraints of Japan’s space policy.
Although it was clear that the purpose of the IGS program was to monitor the militaryactivities of its neighbors, including North Korea, this was concealed under the guise of a“multipurpose” satellite program. This way the civilian nature of the program was impliedin order to comply with the 1969 Diet resolution.
But this arrangement ran into problems. In the 1980s when Japan and the UnitedStates were sparring over trade, the U.S. government pressured Japan to open its public
procurement market in order to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. The industry targeted was
the space satellite industry, in which Japanese companies enjoyed exclusive contracts
with the National Space Development Agency (NASDA, now the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency, or JAXA). The U.S. government maintained that it was unfair to
exclude Japan’s satellite industry from competitive bidding and therefore threatened touse its “Super 301” measure, according to which the U.S. government could impose
punitive tariffs on Japanese imports. In response, the Japanese government enacted the1990 Accord on Non-R&D Satellite Procurement. The accord obliged the Japanese
government to open the procurement market for civilian satellites to international
competitive bidding, and as a result, eighteen of a total nineteen civilian non-R&D
5satellites in orbit were contracted to American companies, and only one, the MTSAT-2,
was contracted to a Japanese company.9
As a result of the 1990 accord, the civilian multipurpose non-R&D satellites
under the IGS program were part of the open procurement procedure as well, which put
the Japanese government in a difficult position. If it wanted to avoid applying the 1990
accord, it would have to admit that the “multipurpose” satellites under the IGS program
actually had a military mission, a position that would violate the 1969 Diet resolution.
This problem was resolved by careful legal interpretation. The government
placed control of the satellites not under the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) but under the
Cabinet Secretariat, a small office with a national intelligence-gathering mission andcrisis management functions. The IGSs then were formally designated as “crisis
management satellites” with both civilian and military purposes.10
This incident made politicians realize that the legal constraints of the“exclusively peaceful purposes” resolution allowed no room for maneuver and that in thechanging security environment of the post-cold war period it seemed counterproductive tomaintain such a rigid pacifist position.
The Koizumi government’s decision in 2003 to participate in the missile defense
program raised another problem for Japanese space and security community. If JDA
depended completely on U.S. intelligence for initiating the deployment of counterattack
missiles, it might mistakenly shoot down hostile missiles flying toward U.S. territory. And
because shooting down hostile missiles aimed at U.S. territory would be an exercise of
the right of collective self-defense by Japan, which is considered unconstitutional, it

9M. Sato, T. Kosuge, and P. van Fenema, “Legal Implications of Satellite Procurement
and Trade Issues between Japan and the United States,” paper presented at the Institute ofInternational Space Law Conference (IISL-99-IISL.3.13):11-19.
10Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Tanjo kokusan supai eisei (The Birth of National Spy Satellites)(Tokyo: Nikkei BP Publishers, 2005).
6

needed to have its own early warning satellite to verify the U.S. satellite intelligence.
Thus many people in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), particularly those interested indefense issues, demanded a reconsideration of the “exclusively peaceful purposes” clauseof the 1969 Diet resolution.

Kawamura’s Initiative to Modify the 1969 Resolution
Despite the increasing demand to modify the resolution and the mounting pressure to
reduce the space budget, neither the government nor the politicians took any action until
the end of 2004．In early 2005 Takeo Kawamura, a LDP politician and a former ministerof education, culture, sports, science, and technology (MEXT), took the initiative forchange. While he was minister, Kawamura witnessed the failure of the H-IIA no.6 launchcarrying two IGSs. Although he was responsible for the actual launch on the H-IIA andnot the IGS program, both the public and the government accused him for not properly
supervising a strategically important satellite project like the IGS. From Kawamura’s
standpoint, those who accused him were confusing responsibility with competence. Thatis, even though JAXA was involved in developing some of the technological aspects of
IGS, Kawamura was clearly out of the loop and not in a position to take responsibility.
The JDA, the main user of the IGSs, also was not permitted to take part in this program,in compliance with the Diet resolution. Furthermore, the Cabinet Secretariat, the nominal
authority for the IGS, was unable to oversee the satellite’s development and launchbecause of a shortage of manpower. Thus, the JDA, the Cabinet Secretariat, and the
MEXT (or JAXA) had no direct responsibility for this program. To Kawamura, this was a
critical failure of Japan’s national strategy, and he was convinced that something had to bedone.
As soon as Kawamura left his post as Minister of MEXT in September 2004, he
7

convened an informal study group, the Consultation Group for National Strategy forSpace, popularly known as the Kawamura Consultation Group. It was made up of
members of LDP, including vice ministers in MEXT, the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry (METI), the JDA, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The Kawamura
Consultation Group considered the problems of Japanese space policy, including themodification of the 1969 resolution and several public-private partnership programs suchas the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS), as well as the privatization of H-IIA.11
After ten meetings, the Kawamura Consultation Group issued an over 100-page
report in October 2005, which argued that Japan’s space policy lacked a coherent strategy
and a clear institutional arrangement. 12 That is, because Japan’s space policy was
dominated by the Science and Technology Agency and MEXT, it did not have a plan forusing space to pursue its national strategic objectives. The result was a lack ofcompetitiveness in the Japanese space industry and the difficulty which Japan was facing
in assuming a larger role on the international stage.
The report therefore suggested drafting a new space policy and an institutionalframework within which a more coherent space policy could be formulated. First, it
proposed that the government create a new minister for space in the office of the Cabinet,
who would serve as the center for Japanese space strategy. Furthermore, the report
pointed out that Japanese space policy had been to develop new technology but that along
the way it had neglected the users’ needs and demands. The report thus recommended thatthe new minister for space should bring relevant ministries into the policymaking process

11

See Kazuto Suzuki, “Adopting the European Model: Japanese Experience in
Implementing a Public-Private Partnership in the Space Program,” paper presented to theCouncil for European Studies Fifteenth Biennial International Conference, Chicago,
March 31, 2006.
12
Report of the Consultation Group for National Strategy for Space, ”Toward a
Construction of New Institutions for Space Development and Utilization,” October 2005.
8and refer their needs to the R&D program. The minister of space also should be
authorized, the report continued, to use Japanese space assets to advance foreign andsecurity policy purposes under the current constitutional framework.
The Kawamura Consultation Group’s report also proposed that the politicalcommunity, including its own members, begin discussing the modification of the 1969
resolution. Although any modification of the resolution would have to come from the Diet,
the members seemed to have little interest in changing the resolution and not even to beaware of the issue. Consequently, members of the LDP and the government were pleased
with the report, as it paved the way for Japan to change its space policy.

Legalizing the Strategic Objectives of Space Policy
Kawamura also submitted this report to the LDP’s Policy Research Council. Because the
LDP is Japan’s ruling party, the council has great influence on government policy. In turn,the council has the prerogative to initiate policies and legislative actions, and without its
consent, no legislative proposal would be introduced to the Diet. Kawamura thus found it
more productive to bring his ideas about reforming Japanese space policy to the LDP than
to the government because he needed the support of Diet members to revise the 1969
resolution. With the support from Hidenao Nakagawa, then the Chairman of the Policy
Research Council and the third-ranking member of the LDP, Kawamura established theSpecial Committee on Space Development (SCSD) with himself as its leader.
With a large number of Diet members already on board, the SCSD attracted theattention of the media, and gradually more and more members began attending its
meetings. By making space a priority of LDP policies, many Diet members began torealize its importance to the national strategy, and through the media coverage, the public,
too, began to understand Kawamura’s intentions. In July 2006, when North Korea
9conducted a second missile test, the SCSD got another boost of support as public opinion
quickly shifted from guarding its pacifist principles to demanding a more flexible
interpretation of the 1969 resolution.
In this atmosphere, the SCSD decided to submit to the Diet its draft Basic Law forSpace Activities on June 20, 2007, although it was not scheduled to be discussed until
after the summer recess.
The first and the most important feature of the bill is its institutional renovation, in
accordance with the Kawamura Consultation Group’s report. It proposes establishing a
new Minister for Space Development and a Headquarters, which would serve as a forumof MEXT, METI and user ministries and several appointed members from academia andindustry and which would be given a broad authority. This ministry would also enable thegovernment to formulate a coherent space policy. The Minister for Space Development
would be “specially designated” and would not be in charge of managing the ministry but
would be a member of the Cabinet Office, coordinating space-related policies of various
ministries. One such ministry is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), which is
conducting a study of the utilization of Japan’s space technology as part of its foreign
policy.
This abrupt change of policy is ambitious. Given the Japanese government’s
conservative attitude toward any reform, it is hoped that these new institutions will attract
political attention and advance Japan’s space activities.
The second feature of the bill pertains to security. Article 2 of the bill states that
“Our space development shall observe the Outer Space Treaty and other international
agreements and shall be conducted in accordance with the principle of pacifism upheld in
the Constitution.” In other words, the traditional interpretation of “exclusively peacefulpurposes” as “nonmilitary” should no longer apply. Instead, the policy should be to adopt
10

the international standard interpretation of the “peaceful use” of space as the“nonaggressive” or “nonoffensive” use of space. The new bill would accordingly enable
the Japanese defense authority to become involved in the development, procurement, andoperation of space systems.
In addition, Article 14 states that “the government shall take necessary measures
to promote space development that will contribute to international peace and security andalso to our nation’s security.” Because this statement is so general, Article 14 could beinterpreted as allowing the government to use space systems for aggressive purposes. But
because Article 2 stipulates that the use of space systems for national and international
security comply with both the framework of international agreements and Japan’sconstitution, it implies that Japan may use its space assets for crisis management anddisaster monitoring in Asia and for peacekeeping missions outside its territory. Article 2
also suggests that Japan can use early warning satellites for its missile defense, as thisfalls into the category of self-defense.
The bill therefore is designed to strengthen Japan’s capability in settling disputes
and managing crises by peaceful means and is intended to change only the interpretationof the Diet resolution, preventing any use of space by Japan’s military authority.

Regional and Global Security
With the new bill on space development, the government will at last have a legal base forusing space to strengthen its national security and expand diplomatic activities. This
combination of security and diplomacy is important for two reasons. First, one of Japan’s
primary objectives of using space for security is to acquire the capability to defend its
own country, particularly by means of a missile defense system. Given the small size ofJapan’s territory, space is not a very useful tool. It may not require a constant surveillance11and communication capability. However, in the context of Japan’s expanding role ininternational security and the Japan-U.S. alliance, the SDF operations far from homewould require long distance telecommunications and satellite intelligence. Such needs
were confirmed by the Maritime SDF ships sent to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. andallied operations in Afghanistan as well as the Ground and Air SDF troops sent to Iraq.
The first SDF forces deployed outside Japan were sent to Cambodia in 1992 for
U.N. peacekeeping missions. Since then, Japanese troops have been sent to places such as
the Golan Heights, Mozambique, Zaire, and East Timor.13 Now the majority of Japanese
no longer doubt their country’s intention to contribute to international security and peace
through UN operations, and consequently, the 1969 resolution has become both awkward
and irrelevant. Although it states that space should be used for “exclusively peacefulpurposes,” during their UN operations, the SDF have not been allowed to use Japan’s
space assets to maintain “peace.” The new law would not only enhance the scope ofoperation and capability of Japanese contribution to global security, but it would also
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its participation in multinational operations.
Second, the combination of security and diplomacy in the new bill is importantbecause Japan would be able to change Asia’s security environment in Asia. A number ofissues are causing instability and threatening the security of the region, particularly North
Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, tensions between Taiwan and China, China’s opaquesecurity strategy and defense budget, China’s ASAT test in January 2007,14 and various
territorial and resource disputes. Although these conflicts have been contained by larger
international organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or

13

For a comprehensive list, see the webpage of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/index.html.
14Eric Hagt, “China’s ASAT Test: Strategic Response,” China Security 3, no. 1 (Winter2007): 31-51.
12

ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), they still need to be closely monitored to develop
confidence building measures to ensure stability in the region and to seek peacefulsolutions. Japan is, of course, the concerned party in some of these conflicts and needs toparticipate in such regional forums as ARF, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), and the East Asian Summit. Although it is committed to providing ideas andresources for their development, Japan needs first to prioritize the promotion of regional
interests as well as its own domestic interests.15
Japan also should use its technological advantages to assume a leadership role in
the region. To date, it has been providing its technological expertise through theAsia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), although most of its activities
still are uncoordinated and fragmentary, and its contributions still have not been fullyrecognized.
Thus the basic law, whose purpose is to increase Japanese capability of using
space for diplomacy and security, is important. It would enable the government toformulate a coherent policy by establishing an inter-ministerial forum and appointing a
minister for space who would coordinate Japan’s space-related activities in order tostrengthen its presence in international arena.

Japan’s Use of Space as a Peace Broker
Besides providing technology, Japan can play a useful role as a peace broker in using
space. For instance, it could supply the infrastructure for regional confidence building.
Although the United States has maintained stability in this region through the general
acceptance of its leadership, it may not always play such a “benign” role in Asia, due to15

Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe following his visit to Indonesia, August 21,
2007.
13

the changes just discussed. Thus, it is time for Japan to consider the possibility ofproviding an infrastructure for the region’s collective security.
Because of its network of intraregional relationships and its technologicalcapability, Japan is the best country in the region to supplement the United States’
leadership role. First, Japan should establish an early warning center to provide imagery
intelligence data to increase transparency of troop mobilization and to monitor the
proliferation of weapons. Satellites are a powerful tool for this. For example, the “Eye in
the Sky” project during the cold war allowed both U.S. and Soviet satellites to monitor
the progress of their disarmament, 16 and the European Union’s Satellite Centre in
Torrejon, Spain, is a platform for all EU member states to use for gathering satellite
imagery.17 Although providing intelligence data is a sensitive issue, Japan might be able
to contribute financially and technologically to establish “regional confidence-building
satellites” with a relatively low resolution and a “transparency information center” whereoperational decisions would be made and satellite images would be stored for all theregion’s intelligence agencies.
This is not a new idea. The European Union’s experience in sharing information
through the EU’s Satellite Centre, and BOC (Besoin Operationnel Commun, or Common
Operational Requirements) of France, Germany, and Italy, demonstrates that sharing
satellite intelligence capability can contribute not only to confidence building but also
improve the efficiency of peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.18 Because only a
few countries in Asia are capable of operating imagery satellites, it is important for those

16

Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibumi Sakata, eds., Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis
Monitoring (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1987).
17
http://www.eusc.europa.eu/.
18
Gérard Brachet and Bernard Deloffre, “Space for Defence: A European Vision,” Space
Policy 22, no. 2 (2006):92–99.
14

countries without them to have access to data for peacekeeping and disaster relief
operations.
Through this regional confidence-building satellite and transparency information
center, Japan would assume the role of a “peace broker” in the region. Although it would
not intervene militarily in regional conflicts, it could use its technological expertise and its
contribution to the region’s security as leverage on disputing countries to encourage theirself-restraint in using force when they depend on Japan. Indeed, if it were able to provide
useful and effective means for maintaining the region’s security, the Asian Pacific states
would have difficulty denying Japan’s request for arbitration. The credibility that Japan
has nurtured for the last 60 years as a pacifist nation will bear a fruit when Japan takes
action for improving regional security.
Some Japanese may argue that it is not politically feasible to contributeunilaterally to the region’s security when it is becoming increasingly unstable. Given
Japan’s constitutional constraints and its commitment to the principle of pacifism,however, it also could improve its own security and that of Asia as a whole through its
unique space program.

15

Appendix

The 1969 Resolution Concerning the Principle of
the Development and Utilization of Space(Private Translation)
Our nation’s development and utilization of satellites and rockets to be launchedbeyond the earth’s atmosphere shall be confined to exclusively peaceful purposes. They
shall be undertaken to promote the advancement of science, the enhancement of national
living, and the welfare of human society. They also shall contribute to the development ofindustrial technology and the promotion of international cooperation.

Extract from the Draft Basic Law for Space Activities19(Private Translation)
Article 1
Reflecting the advancement of science and technology and changes in domestic andinternational affairs, considering the increasing importance of space development andutilization (hereafter “space development”), and expanding the role that our nation canplay in space development, this law establishes the basic principles and measures for thedevelopment of space. The law defines the role of the government in enhancing ourdevelopment of space, as well as ways to formulate a Basic Plan for Space Development.
This law promotes steps toward developing space in a comprehensive and systematicmanner through measures such as the establishment of a Strategic Headquarters for Space
Development. The purpose of the law is to improve the lives of our citizens and thecountry’s socio-economic development while contributing to the improvement of world
peace and human welfare.
Article 2
Our space development shall observe the Outer Space Treaty and other international
agreements and shall be conducted in accordance with the principle of pacifism upheld in
the Constitution.

19

The draft bill contains thirty-five articles and two appended clauses.
16Article 3
Space development shall contribute to the improvement of the lives of our citizens, to thecreation of a safe and secure society, and to the elimination of various threats such as
disaster and poverty to human life and human survival. It also should be undertaken to
ensure international peace and security and also to contribute to our nation’s security.
Article 4
Space development shall be undertaken under a positive and planned program, and withthe aim of facilitating the commercial research and development of space. Space
development thus should be undertaken to generate competitive technology in space andrelated industries and strengthen their international competitiveness, thereby contributing
to the promotion of our nation’s industries.
Article 5
Recognizing that knowledge of space is an intellectual asset to humanity, spacedevelopment should be undertaken to contribute through advanced space science to therealization of dreams about space by human beings as well as to the progress of humansociety.
Article 6
Space development should be undertaken to play our nation’s active role in internationalsociety by promoting international cooperation in space and thus contributing to thepromotion of our nation’s national interest in international society.
Article 13
The government shall take necessary measures such as the possession of a stable
information network based on satellites, an information system for observation, and an
information system for positioning. The purpose of these will be to improve the lives ofour citizens, to create a safe and secure society, and to eliminate various threats such as
disaster and poverty to human life and human survival.
Article 14
The government shall take necessary measures to promote space development that willcontribute to international peace and security and also to contribute to our nation’s
security.
17