■ 特別講演会 ■政冷経熱──日中関係におけるナショナリズムの衝撃──◆
講師

フィル・ディーンズ
◆
質疑応答

司

会

山 本 一 巳2006年11月23 日

政冷経熱٨มળ㧔ጊᧄ৻Ꮘ㧕̆ ߘࠇߢߪ․೎⻠Ṷળߦ⒖ࠄߖߡ޿ߚߛ߈߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᗲ⍮ᄢቇߪ‫ ޔ‬ᐕ㧟᦬ߦ‫ࡦ࠼ࡦࡠߩࠬ࡝ࠡࠗޔ‬ᄢቇ᧲ᵗࠕࡈ࡝ࠞቇ㒮㧔㧿㧻㧭㧿㧕ߣቇⴚ੤ᵹදജදቯࠍ✦⚿޿ߚߒ߹ߒߚ‫⸥ࠍࠇߘޕ‬ᔨߒߡ‫ޔ‬㧿㧻㧭㧿߆ࠄࡈࠖ࡞࡮࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭㧔2JKN&GCPU㧕ߐࠎࠍ߅᜗߈ߒ
߹ߒߚ‫◲ޕ‬නߦࡈࠖ࡞࡮࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭ߐࠎߩ⇛ᱧࠍߏ⚫੺ߒߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ⃻࿷‫ࡦ࠼ࡦࡠޔߪࠎߐ࠭ࡦ࡯ࠖ࠺࡮࡞ࠖࡈޔ‬ᄢቇ᧲ᵗࠕࡈ࡝ࠞቇ㒮⃻ઍਛ࿖⎇ⓥᚲᚲ㐳౗਄⚖⻠Ꮷߢ޽ࠄࠇ߹ߔ‫ߡߒߘޕ‬หᤨߦ‫࡞ࡊࡦ࠹ޔ‬ᄢቇ㧔☨࿖㧕ᣣᧄᩞߩቴຬᢎ᝼߽ോ߼ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬߹ߚ‫࡞ࠬ࠶ࡖࠠ࡯ࡘ࠾ޔ‬ᄢቇ㧔⧷࿖㧕ߢඳ჻ภࠍขᓧߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ߘߒߡ‫ ޔ‬ᐕ߆ࠄ  ᐕߦᢥㇱ⋭ߩᄖ࿖ੱ⎇ⓥຬߣߒߡ᧲੩ᄢቇߦṛ࿷ߒ‫ ޔ‬ᐕ߆ࠄ ᐕߦ߆ߌߡᣣᧄቇⴚᝄ⥝ળᄖ࿖ੱ⎇ⓥຬߣߒߡ਄ᥓᄢቇߦṛ࿷ߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ਥߥ⎇ⓥಽ㊁ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣਛ‫ޔ‬ᣣบ㑐ଥࠍਛᔃߣߔࠆ᧲ർࠕࠫࠕ࿖㓙㑐ଥߢߔ‫ޕ‬ㄭᐕߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣਛ㑐ଥࠍߣࠅ߹ߊਔ࿖ߩᗲ࿖ᔃߦ㑐ߔࠆ⎇ⓥࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻ߦᓥ੐ߔࠆ߶߆‫ޔ‬㕏࿖␹␠ࠍ߼ߋࠆ⺰੎ߦߟ޿ߡ߹ߣ߼ߚኾ㐷ᦠߩ✬➏ߦ߽޽ߚߞߡ߅ࠄࠇ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ਥߥ⪺ᦠߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬‫ࠆߋ߼ࠍࡓ࠭࡝࠽࡚ࠪ࠽ߩࠕࠫࠕ᧲ޡ‬㕏࿖໧㗴‫ઁߩߘޔޢ‬ᄙߊ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ߘࠇߢߪࡈࠖ࡞࡮࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭ߐࠎߦߪ‫ޔ‬‫ޟ‬᡽಄⚻ᾲ㨪ᣣਛ㑐ଥߦ߅ߌࠆ࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓߩⴣ᠄
㨪‫⻠ߦࡑ࡯࠹ࠍޠ‬Ṷ޿ߚߛ߈߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㧝ᤨ㑆ߋࠄ޿⻠Ṷߒߡ޿ߚߛ߈߹ߒߡ‫ࠞࠬࠖ࠺ߣ޽ߩߘޔ‬࠶࡚ࠪࡦߦߒߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫߅ߊߒࠈࠃޔࠎߐ࠭ࡦ࡯ࠖ࠺࡮࡞ࠖࡈߪߢࠇߘޕ‬㗿޿ߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ǰ࿑ҝផ໮ǰ୑ѯጽྒǊǊஓ˹ᩜΡȾȝȤɞʔʁʱʔʴʄʪɁᚗ଒ǊǊ
ʟɭʵˁʑɭ˂ʽʄ
ᴹʷʽʓʽ‫ޙ۾‬ూูɬʟʴɵ‫ޙ‬᪋ᴬʐʽʡʵ‫ޙ۾‬ᴻ
Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I will begin with something
personal which is more of a thank you, a thank you to Aichi Daigaku for inviting me and for
all the hard work that I know that many of the organizers have put in to putting thisconference together ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 2‫ޤ‬. I realize how difficult it is and a special thank you to thetranslators. It is an extremely difficult task they have, especially when they have to deal
with a person such as myself, who does not provide their paper in advance.
I am going to be giving a very personal view of the relationship between China
and Japan.

I’ve spent almost my entire adult life looking at this issue, trying tounderstand it and trying to help it. But very much as a concerned outsider, as someone who
is not Chinese or someone who is not Japanese. I sometimes feel uncomfortable about
offering opinions, suggesting ways of changing the relationship. But I hope that as an
outsider, I can come at this relationship without carrying historical baggage, in some sense
concerned, but not overly involved. But I will make a prejudice of mine very clear at the13特別講演会

outset. I do not like nationalism. As a European, I am very conscious of the tragedy ofnationalism in Europe over the last 150 years and of the great horrors and destructions
that it wrought on Europe and European civilization. As a concerned outsider looking at
the relationship between China and Japan, I worry.

I worry about the role thatnationalism is playing, about the way that it is exploited by politicians and by the way that
it is mobilized by certain groups to pursue their own, often selfish, interests. And so, withthat prejudice of mine made clear at the start, I will move on with my paper.
I am concerned with this common phrase you hear today about relations between
China and Japan, the phrase economically hot/politically cold. There is a strong belief
that interaction – especially economic exchange, leads to improved political and social
relations ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 3‫ޤ‬. This belief is very deeply embedded in western liberal traditions.
You can see it in economics, in Adam Smith.

You can see it philosophically with

Immanuel Kant and much of the Western tradition and Western social sciences take thisas a given. You see it especially in theories of international relations.

I won’t coverinternational relations theory in detail but functionalism, the democratic peace hypothesis,
many of the dominant approaches to understanding international relations are premisedon the idea that more trade means better relations.
Here is a fairly classic statement of this view from the former American treasury
secretary, John Snow referring directly to the relationship between China and Japan‫ޣ‬SLIDE 4‫ޤ‬.

I will not read the slide.

Here he is clearly saying, “Politics is lessimportant than economics, doing business will overcome political problems”. If that is thecase, as so much Western theory suggests that it is, why is it that the political relationshipbetween China and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years?

I’ll argue thatnationalist narratives in China and in Japan present a direct challenge to the rational,
liberal assumptions. And these nationalist narratives also challenge other approaches,such as the realist assumptions which suggest that countries pursue their self-interest ininternational society, and that the pursuit of self-interest is also rational.
On the issue of methodologies, I believe very much that to understand China, weneed to understand its ideas and understand its ideologies. And that understanding ideas
is as important as material issues, if we are trying to explain this relationship ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 5‫ޤ‬.
It cannot be understood simply in terms of volume of trade or a series of historical facts.
So, to overview my paper, I will consider what the evidence is for economically hot
and I suggest that actually the relationship is probably hotter than we realize ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 6‫ޤ‬.
I’ll look at the evidence for politically cold, what the causes of cold may be and I will do thisin the context of two ideas I developed. One, a term I am developing called Japaneserevisionist nationalism which I will explain, and its counterpoint, a Chinese reactionary
nationalism. I do not believe there is only one form of nationalism present in China andJapan today. I think they have many forms, multiple forms. But these two are perhaps
the most troubling and the most worrying, particularly in the context of this bilateralrelationship.
14



政冷経熱

One of the arguments I make for this change is because of the evolving nature ofideology in China, the move from social class to nation as the key explanatory variable has
undermined the 1972 consensus in Sino-Japanese relations. And I will give three cases.
I will talk about the Yasukuni Shrine, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the Taiwan
question. I will be presenting some ideas here which many people may find offensive. I
certainly do find some of the opinions I will be showing you today upsetting, but I do soentirely for academic purposes.
Economically hot. We are all familiar, I think, with the expansion of the Chinese
economy and its changing economic place in the world. This graph shows the significant
increase in trade between Japan and the PRC ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 7‫ޤ‬. And as a comparator, I haveincluded in trade between Japan and Taiwan.

I include Taiwan because it is aparticularly important subset of Sino-Japanese relations and also because much of Japan’s
trade with Taiwan is connected now to its trade with the People’s Republic.
Here we have bilateral trade showing that since the mid-1990s, the trade surplus
has very much been in China’s favor and that China enjoys quite a significant and healthy
trade surplus with Japan ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 8‫ޤ‬.
This graph is in fact market share ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 9‫ޤ‬. And we can see how increases ofChina’s share of the Japanese market have occurred over time. In 1994, around 10% of
the Japanese market was taken by Chinese goods. In 2005, this had risen to over 20%.
So it doubled in a little over a decade. And I have added in Taiwan as a contrast and you
can see that this has remained fairly solid and fairly constant. Remember also, Japan isin a recession for much of this time, so the market in some senses contracted.
These charts show China’s major trading partners at 10-year intervals ‫ޣ‬SLIDE
10‫ޤ‬. So in 1990 Japan took just under one quarter of China’s trade. But since 1990, thisfigure has been lower, down to around 15%. So Japan’s absolute trading relationship with
China has declined as a proportion since the 1980s.
If we contrast this with Japan’s trading partners, we can see that China occupied
a relatively small position, only 3% in 1980, and again, in 1990. By the year 2000, it hadrisen to 10%, and in 2004, was as high as 16% ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 11‫ޤ‬. So while China’s economic
relationship with Japan as a proportion has remained constant, for Japan, China’s
significance has increased markedly. This, of course in turn raises issues of vulnerability,of dependence and of inter-dependence.
Another issue that receives considerable political attention is Japan’s overseas
development assistance to China. The sources here are JICA, and as we can see large
amounts of money that increased steadily over time, you have the blip in 1990 following theTiananmen student reform movement ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 12‫ޤ‬. And it grows up until the early 2000s
when, for political reasons, a decision is taken to bring aid to China to an end. And thismoney has been extremely important in key areas of the Chinese economy, and inparticular with regard to issues such as pollution control and environmental regulation.
So, I think I don’t need to labor the argument that the relationship is economically hot.
15

特別講演会

But political cold, what evidence do we have? The key factor that’s normallygiven is the cancellation of very high level contacts, especially under Prime Minister
Koizumi‫ޣ‬SLIDE 13‫ޤ‬.

We could also point to various government statements andpronouncements, the changing status of China in Japan’s Defense White Paper, criticismsof Japan in Chinese government announcements. Also opinion formers, various forms ofcommentary that you get, especially in the popular media and the popular press.
We can look at opinion polls. Opinion polls are always problematic. I try not torely on them but they do give us another form of measuring the coldness of the relationship.
Media coverage and internet use. Is the Chinese media, the state-controlled media hostile
to Japan? Is the Japanese media hostile to China? I remember a few years ago, theJapanese media was full of stories of a Chinese crime wave and a genuine sense of unease
was clear. Internet use in China in particular is a fascinating way of considering how
certain sectors of Chinese society view Japan. And, of course, the most prominent issue
that we’ve seen are the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China that occurred in 2005 andon a smaller scale in 2004. None of these are very easily quantified. This is qualitative
evidence. And as such it is problematic as much depends on the opinion of the observer.
Here, we have opinion polls showing how perceptions in Japan of China havechanged since 1978‫ޣ‬SLIDE 14‫ޤ‬. What causes this?
One argument that is put forward is that China is perceived now as an economic
threat to Japan, that the Chinese economy will somehow lead to the hollowing out of Japan,
will increase unemployment in Japan, and will cause significant problems‫ޣ‬SLIDE 15‫ޤ‬.
Another factor often suggested is that of military spending, cited by both sides.
Here, we appear to have a classic problem from international relations of perception andmisperception. The so-called security dilemma where both sides lack of trust leads toincreased defense spending and this creates a vicious circle of deteriorating relations.
And the area that I am most interested in, changing nationalist dynamics in the twocountries. I argue that in the last 15 years, in Japan, you’ve seen the growing strength ofa revisionist nationalism which has come to confront in China a popular reactionary
nationalism. And I think these occur not so much at the elite level where you do have adegree of antagonism, but these are very much rooted in popular understandings, popularmisperceptions, and popular or mass politics.
Here’s a chart of military spending by country using figures from the CIA (who I
assume we can trust on these things - their maps are very poor but their figures are useful)‫ޣ‬SLIDE 16‫ޤ‬. The United States clearly in a league of its own, followed by China. (Iwonder why France is spending so much on its military.) Japan and the United Kingdom
are in a similar bracket. But there are a lot of arguments over defense figures. No one
can agree how much China is really spending on its defense.
As a percentage of GDP, the official figure is 1.4%, SIPRI, the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute suggest 1.8%; the American Department of Defense,
4.2%; and the CIA, 4.3%‫ޣ‬SLIDE 17‫ޤ‬. Partly this is because of different measures of
16



政冷経熱

calculating these figures, partly it’s because of a broad uncertainty or even distrust of theofficial figures. But as you can see, the Americans can’t even agree on what their own
defense spending is.
Here we have defense spending, as a chart‫ޣ‬SLIDE 18‫ޤ‬, the blue line at the top is
Taiwanese defense spending as a percentage of GDP, declining from around 5% in the late1980s to around 2.5% today.

China’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP has

remained fairly steady, at around 2% to 2.5% and Japan of course is always the easiest tofollow, remaining more or less on the 1% line.
But, of course, as a percentage of what? If we look at this in dollar terms, wehave a huge variation in figures‫ޣ‬SLIDE 19‫ޤ‬. From just under 30 billion for the official
figure to a Department of Defense estimate of over 90 billion.

But again, look at theUnited States, the CIA has found $100 million that the Department of Defense didn’t know
it had. This suggests huge problems in the way we measure military spending.
And here we have it in dollar terms over the same time period‫ޣ‬SLIDE 20‫ޤ‬.
Japanese defense spending is still significantly higher than that of the People’s Republic ofChina.

But in dollar terms, defense spending in China is increasing significantly,

especially since the mid 1990s. Defense spending in Taiwan – the yellow line – remains
fairly constant. These figures are not discounted for inflation.
So to nationalism. In Japan since 1945 I suggest that a conservative nationalism
has been the dominant form, and I call it conservative because it does not seek change. It
broadly accepts the verdicts against Japan that were passed in 1945. Broadly, it supports
the constitution or does not regard revising the constitution as a priority. There is support
for the US-Japan alliance and for the security treaty, and there was a belief that Japan
should maintain a low international profile. In particular, Japan should avoid military
involvement. And this is the line that you usually would associate with Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru and it’s been the dominant position within the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party since its formation in 1955. However, this is not the only strand of nationalism inJapan. There is a significant revisionist nationalism‫ޣ‬SLIDE 21‫ޤ‬.
Revisionism here is the term I use because they seek to change, to rewrite and toreconsider the facts and interpretations of Japan’s imperial past and Japan’s present.
They also seek to revise the 1947 constitution.
They focus on what they regard as the many benefits that Japanese imperialism
brought to Asia, in particular the end of Western imperialism. They reject the verdicts of
the Tokyo war crimes trial and they reject the view that Japan was guilty of aggression
before 1945.

Some of the more extreme revisionists deny the importance or thesignificance or even the historical veracity of issues such as the Nanjing massacre, comfort
women and many of the other atrocities that we associate with Japan’s wars against China
in the early 20th century‫ޣ‬SLIDE 22‫ޤ‬.
The revisionists call for Japan to play a much more significant international role.
Some of them even call for an end to the US-Japan security relationship to allow Japan to17

特別講演会stand on its own. It is strongly anticommunist and invariably anti-Chinese. Revisionists
have developed a special relationship with Taiwan and especially with those groups on
Taiwan that support independence. Revisionist nationalism has always been present inpost-war Japan. Kishi Nobusuke is a very clear example, it’s been suggested that thecurrent Prime Minister Abe is also associated with the revisionist position, but revisionism
has usually been less influential than conservative nationalism. And in some ways, themost successful Japanese prime ministers (Sato, Nakasone and Koizumi) have been those
who have been able to bridge both camps‫ޣ‬SLIDE 23‫ޤ‬.
There are also a significant and vocal section of Japanese commentators we canassociate with this view. Those of you that ever read the Sankei Shimbun will be familiarfrom its editorials of variations of the revisionist position. But revisionism has grown
more significant since the 1990s and it’s grown more powerful. Partly, I think this is theresult of the recession in Japan and the growth of political and economic uncertainty here.
People are unsure the confidence of the 1980s has disappeared. People are concerned,
they are worried, they are uncertain, and the worries of China’s economic power, its
political power has been turned into a fear of China, often by populist politicians andcommentators. The Mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, is perhaps one of the most obvious
examples of this trend.
This is how this period is viewed by the revisionists. This is a poster produced by
the Japanese from the late 1930s and this is how they see Japan’s imperial past‫ޣ‬SLIDE24‫ޤ‬. It is one of friendship and community of Japan helping China, helping Manchukuo tostand up and support. One of the most prominent revisionists is this man, Kobayashi
Yoshinori. I wouldn’t worry too much about – this is how Kobayashi draws himself in his
cartoons. He’s a very interesting writer. He’s a very skilled cartoonist and he’s extremely
popular.

His cartoons sell very large numbers and he developed a very right wing

revisionist agenda.
And this is how we would draw himself‫ޣ‬SLIDE 25‫ޤ‬.
This is what he really looks like‫ޣ‬SLIDE 26‫ޤ‬.
As you can see, there is quite a contrast between his cartoon and himself. And I
think this is what Kobayashi does to history. He beautifies it. He changes the historical
record.

He changes Japan’s past to make it beautiful just as he changes his own

appearance in his cartoons. I realized this is slightly cruel and unkind but he deserves it.
In this period as well, we’ve seen changing nationalist dynamics in China‫ޣ‬SLIDE27‫ޤ‬. David Shambaugh has talked about the emergence of a defensive nationalism inChina, one that seeks to protect Chinese borders. Zhao Suisheng talks about a pragmatic
nationalism, a nationalism that the Chinese elite use in order to solve particular problems
and in pursuit of a particular agenda. But both of the nationalisms identified here are
elite nationalisms; the nationalisms associated with the communist party.
What we’ve also seen since 1989 - and 1989 may be the first emergence of this incommunist China - is a popular reactionary nationalism. It’s not controlled or directed by
18



政冷経熱

the Chinese Communist Party. It presents a direct challenge to other countries, especiallyto Japan and the United States: we see this in the “China that can say ‘NO!’” phenomenonof the 1990s.

It uses new and unusual methods of mobilization and activity.

The

Internet in particular is a very important vehicle for this new nationalism.
It is predominantly urban, it exists within the Chinese cities and the people
engaged in it are predominantly well educated: college level education and above. Mao
Zedong would have termed them intellectuals. And again, it’s a product of uncertainty
and insecurity. The reform and opening of China since 1978 has brought massive benefits
to the overwhelming majority of Chinese people. But at the same time, it has destroyed
many of the certainties and the confidence that people had. And people are looking for
new things to believe in, and ways of understanding themselves.
Reactionary nationalism in China has changed the discourse of China from beinga victim into a discourse of a China that must seek revenge, must seek to correct thewrongs of history.

And interestingly within this, significant numbers of reactionary

nationalists have studied in Japan and are familiar with Japan. There’s a belief thattravel opens the mind, sadly, it’s not always the case. Chinese students who come to
Japan and suffer discrimination, suffer racism, who are confronted with problems
adjusting to life in Japan, return home with prejudices reinforced and not removed.
There’s nothing new about nationalism in Communist China‫ޣ‬SLIDE 28‫ޤ‬. The
communist party has always relied on nationalism and on anti-Japanese sentiment togenerate and bolster its legitimacy.

However, since 1989, nationalist dynamics haveescaped from party control. And now they are significant to the extent that they even posea potential threat to the communist party. The Communist Party fears anti-Japaneseprotests. There is, certainly in the western media, a rather simplistic view which suggeststhat anti-Japanese demonstrations are created by the communist party to serve its ends.
I don’t believe the evidence supports this. Sometimes the demonstrations are tolerated,but as in 1989, the communist party fears that these demonstrations may take on theirown dynamic, that a protest against Japan could turn into a protest against the Foreign
Ministry, which could turn into a protest against China’s Japan policy. And increasingly,
the communist party is losing autonomy. It’s finding its ability to make and implement
policy constrained by anti-Japanese feeling.

And it’s interesting that state controlled

media in China often downplays public anti-Japanese protests and also avoids or
downplays important issues which may lead to public anger. And you can see evidence of
the Chinese government trying to diffuse the situation because of its concerns that
demonstrations may run out of control.
One way of explaining this is with the changing role of class as an analyticalframework in China. Before 1976, class-based analysis dominated official discourse on
the war and on Japan‫ޣ‬SLIDE 29‫ޤ‬. The war was understood and interpreted in classterms. Anti-Japanese official sentiment at the official level was expressed as warnings
over the revival of Japanese militarism. The war was caused because a clique – a militarist
19特別講演会group- which seized power in Japan and led Japan astray. The ordinary Japanese worker
was a comrade and therefore was not responsible for Japanese militarism.

And thisanalysis is at the heart of the compromise reached between Mao and Zhou Enlai in 1972.
It’s not the Japanese people that are to blame. It’s the small class of people and therefore
we can establish a friendship with Japan on that basis.
However, after 1978, you have the massive transformations initiated by Deng
Xiaoping‫ޣ‬SLIDE 30‫ޤ‬. Class, as a way of analyzing Chinese society, as a way of analyzing
international relations begins to fade.

Nationalism reappears both at an elite level

amongst senior politicians, amongst academics, and at mass levels. And the discourse on
Japan and the war is increasingly framed by reference to the nation.
de-legitimizes the compromise of 1972.

And this

The space for class analysis collapses and is

replaced by discourse on the nation and nationalism. And this means you can no longer
blame the war on a small group of people. Rather than it being a small social class, it is
the Japanese people who bear responsibility for the war.
I always enjoy posters‫ޣ‬SLIDE 31‫ޤ‬. Here’s a classic statement of China’s position
from 1965. You can see on the bayonet of this soldier he has an American army helmet, anationalist Chinese (Guomindang) flag and a Japanese flag. But the text is important.
It’s imperialism and reactionaries who were the paper tigers and who are to blame.
From 1971, it’s the revival of militarism.

It’s a small group of people, Sato

Eisaku in particular was the concern in 1971, who are going to lead Japan astray. It’s not
Japan itself, not the Japanese people, it’s a particular subset or class‫ޣ‬SLIDE 32‫ޤ‬.
On the left, changing times, this poster is from 1983 encouraging farmers to comeand invest in the special economic zones‫ޣ‬SLIDE 33‫ޤ‬. Look at the prominence given here
to the Japanese flag along with other ‘imperialists’, the British, the Americans (maybe not
the Swiss) inviting foreign capital and in particular the Japanese to come and help China
to develop. On the right, this is an unofficial poster from 2003. See how the discourse haschanged and the way in which Japan is presented has shifted over those 20 years.
A concrete example – the Shanghai World Financial Center will be the tallest
building in the world, replacing the 101 Building in Taipei‫ޣ‬SLIDE 34‫ޤ‬. The original was
design by the Mori Construction Company had the top of the building containing this large
circular motif to help it cope with high winds. Furious protests on the Internet led to thechange of the design to this prism. It was said if the sun shines through this hole on
Shanghai, what does that say about Japan and Japanese imperialism. This debate isfascinating and I will come to a Taiwanese example later. Please remember this slide.
My cases: Yasukuni. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has become one of the mostcontroversial issues in the relationship. And here are a series of images: the shrine itself,
the religious center, photographs of ordinary Japanese soldiers who died fighting against
China and the West‫ޣ‬SLIDE 35‫ޤ‬. Protestors complaining about Prime Ministerial visits,
far right extremists, celebrating Japan’s imperial past, and most strangely of all, thesecartoons produced by the Yasukuni authorities to invite you and say, “Welcome to
20



政冷経熱

Yasukuni.” Clearly not a Japanese person here. This lady has blue hair, I have no idea
where she is from. Yasukuni opens itself up to many interpretations, many readings; it isa very complex place.
This chart shows visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers‫ޣ‬SLIDE 36‫ޤ‬. Important dates, are 1959 when the Class B and C war criminals wereinterred; 1972, normalization of relations; and 1978, the signing of the Treaty of Peace andFriendship, and the date when the Class A war criminals were enshrined. Research I havedone recently in Tokyo has shown me that the war criminals were enshrined the day before
the Treaty was signed. And it appears that this was done as part of a deal to get rid of
opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party to the signing of the treaty.
Public opinion in Japan is unclear on this issue and every poll I read says
something slightly different. People will support the visits. They will oppose the visit.
I think really, everybody is in the “don’t know” category in Japan‫ޣ‬SLIDE 37‫ޤ‬.
Chinese government responses ‫ ޣ‬SLIDE 38 ‫ ޤ‬.

The protests began in 1985

following Prime Minister Nakasone’s visits. There were no protest regarding the 18 visitsthat took place between 1978 and 1984. There was no official level of complaint from the
Chinese government over this. Why? The immediate causes were a strong concern over
Nakasone. He had a nationalist agenda. He was increasing military spending and he
was deepening Japan’s relationship with the US. There was concern over revisionism, inparticular the textbook controversy of 1982.
There were also important conflicts taking place within China at the time over thecorrect policy towards Japan. Hu Yaobang was beginning to advocate a more mature,
more developed relationship with Japan and was facing problems as a consequence. As I
mentioned, the nationalist dynamics within China were changing. And Yasukuni has
become a litmus test of any Japanese political leader. The Chinese side views a visit to
Yasukuni as a statement of whether an individual takes China seriously or not. And it
has become extremely important for those reasons.
As I have said, the CCP has always relied on anti-Japanese sentiment‫ޣ‬SLIDE 39‫ޤ‬.
And since 1989, the nationalist dynamics having escaped party control and now pose athreat. There is fear of protests and constraints to policy and we see this to an extent in
the demise of the new diplomacy initiative – a very brave initiative to try to improve therelationship with Japan undermined by popular antipathy in China, and a failure on thebehalf of Japanese diplomats to seize a very important opportunity to develop therelationship.
I will go now to the – the Diaoyutai or Senkaku issue. I will use both terms. I
do not know who the islands belong to. I think most people would be happier if they
disappeared, to be quite honest. And I will explain that controversial argument to you.
Here is a map, locating them, a Japanese map for balance, and a picture of the islands
themselves‫ޣ‬SLIDE 40‫ޤ‬. We very rarely see what they look like.
China and Japan both have excellent claims to these islands‫ޣ‬SLIDE 41‫ޤ‬. But
21特別講演会

both sides fail to respect the other’s position and this is especially true I think of Japan, it
refuses to even acknowledge that China may have any case at all over ownership of theseislands. And if any resolution is to be made, both sides have to accept that there is some
legitimacy in the other’s position. Another thing I think is important is that the dispute is
not about natural resources. It is not about oil.

It is not about gas. It is not about fish.

We tend to use the resource explanation because it is simple. Why would people argue somuch about four small islands which have no value? So we look for natural resources togive meaning to the dispute. Sadly, the dispute is not rational. If it could be proved that
tomorrow 100% that there is no oil on or near the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands, would thedispute disappear?

No.

The dispute would remain.

The argument would remain,

because it is not a rational argument. It is an argument about nationalism and aboutpassion.
At the highest levels, governments since 1978 have tried to keep the ownershipissue off the agenda. They have tried to downplay it. However, nationalist groups on
both sides, whether far right groups like the Seinensha in Japan or various nationalist
activists from Hong Kong have repeatedly taken provocative steps to ignite this dispute,because they are pursuing their own nationalist agendas at home.

It is not the

governments necessarily in conflict here, it is governments being entrapped by nationalist
activists.
I love this slide‫ޣ‬SLIDE 42‫ޤ‬. I am often asked by students, whether I am in
London or whether I am in Tokyo, can you explain why Taiwan matters so much to China?
This slide explains the feeling of so many people in China better than any description I
could give. It is breaking China’s heart. Reunification will make China whole again. It
will be an emotional, a personal, reunification. This is why Taiwan matters so much.
And that is why I find this image incredibly useful.
Taiwan highlights both Japanese and American aspect of China’s humiliation.
Taiwan was a colony of Japan for 50 years. It was American intervention that prevented
reunification in 1950, so it brings together key elements in the story of China’s humiliation.
For the Communist Party, reunification is a key to its legitimacy; it has promised
reunification to the Chinese people repeatedly. It is not negotiable. Changing approaches
in the Communist Party to reunification reflect variations in radical and conservative
agendas in the party elite. The radicalism of 1957 in the Great Leap Forward iterates
with a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The rationality and pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping
sees the emergence of a new agenda. The new reactionary nationalism in China could
generate pressure to return to radicalism and to put more pressure on the Chinese
government to seek a quick or military solution.
This was the view towards reunification in the 1950s and 60s‫ޣ‬SLIDE 43‫ޤ‬.
Taiwan must be liberated. And we can see here the Kuomintang oppressing the ordinary
Taiwanese and their desperate search for freedom. We must liberate Taiwan.
What a different picture we have in 1990, attempting to entice Taiwan and China
22



政冷経熱

to come together‫ޣ‬SLIDE 44‫ޤ‬. The question of course is which ladies are Taiwanese andwhich ones are Chinese. My friends tell me that the Chinese ladies have more clothes on.
I do not know if it is true. See how the rhetoric and the discourse changes because of
economic rationality.
I will talk now briefly about Taiwan for Japanese nationalism and for Japaneserevisionist nationalism‫ޣ‬SLIDE 45‫ޤ‬. For Japanese revisionists, Taiwan is evidence andTaiwan is proof that Japanese imperialism was welcomed. It proves that Japan bought
benefits. It proves that Japan does not wage a war of aggression. It proves that Japan
should assert leadership over Asia. And it proves that Taiwan is not a part of China. I do
not accept this position.
But remember Shanghai. This is the Presidential Palace in Taipei built by theJapanese, completed in 1990‫ޣ‬SLIDE 46‫ޤ‬. This building here is the Mitsukoshi Shin Kong
department store completed in 1993. This was the tallest building in Taiwan up until a
few years ago.

The architectural features are identical.

There were no complaints.

There was no disagreement. There were no arguments. There was no discussion. It
was completed.

Japanese Imperialism in its earliest variant; Japanese economic

imperialism (if you want) in the 1990s. Nobody minded, nobody complained.
Nobody represents the fears of Chinese nationalism or the aspirations of Japanesenationalism as much as Lee Teng-hui. When Lee Teng-hui left office, he wrote this book‫ޣ‬SLIDE 47‫ޤ‬. He wrote it in Japanese. He did not write it in Chinese. He published itin Japanese before he chose to publish it in Chinese or in English. What other Asian leader
could you imagine dressing up in the clothes of his former imperial master in quite thisway?
Lee provides support and ammunition for the revisionist nationalist in Japan‫ޣ‬SLIDE 48‫ޤ‬. “Until my early twenties, I thought I was Japanese.” “The KMT felt likean invading force, an alien force”, the KMT are invaders for Lee Deng Hui. “My heartfelt
wish is to return to Japan”. “The Senkaku [I added Diaoyutai] Islands are Japanese
territory.” I cannot think of more provocative statement. Well, I could not think of amore provocative statement, a more extreme way of creating anger in China than this,until of course he said, “I hope to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for my brother.” Lee
Teng-hui’s brother Takamori Iwasato was a sailor in the Japanese Navy, killed in 1945
fighting for Japan against the United States.

He is enshrined at Yasukuni. Lee Teng-hui

wishes to go to Yasukuni to pray for his brother.
All of these comments are from interviews with Japanese correspondents and Lee
Teng-hui spent a lot of time with Kobayashi Yoshinori, helping him write his controversial
book on Taiwan.
Here are a few examples of pro-Japanese works by Taiwanese nationalists‫ޣ‬SLIDE49‫ޣޤ‬SLIDE 50‫ޤ‬. I will not go into any details. But something you often found is thisphrase here, qingshen or seishin. The idea of Japanese spirit that somehow the Japanesespirit is alive in the Taiwanese.
23特別講演会More controversial works.

Another reference to Kobayashi Yoshinori here.

Taiwan is often described as being like a peanut because of its shape. This is the Chineseversion of Kobayashi’s controversial book ‘On Taiwan’ ‫ޣ‬SLIDE 51‫ޤ‬. If you were to cut
open the Taiwanese peanut, what do you find inside? The Japanese flag: the Taiwanesepeople inside are inherently Japanese.
This is the cover of the Japanese version of the book‫ޣ‬SLIDE 52‫ޤ‬. And what
Kobayashi is doing is not talking to the Taiwanese and he is not talking necessarily to
China. He is talking to the Japanese. “Who are the Japanese?” “What is the nation?”“The last page has an important message for Japanese people.” And what Kobayashi issaying is we must rediscover our nationalist spirit. We must reinvent ourselves. We
must learn from Taiwan because they have kept the true values of Japanese.

So

Kobayashi is using Taiwan, pro-Japanese feeling on Taiwan, as a way of trying to inspire
Japanese nationalism.
I have this slide in Chinese and in Japanese, so I will leave both up‫ޣ‬SLIDE 53‫ޤ‬.
The man speaking is Shih Wen-long he was a Senior Presidential Advisor to President
Chen Shui-bian. . He is addressing the comfort women or sex slave issues and he issaying there was not a sex slave issue. “When I heard about the comfort women I thought
it was a lie, so I approached some of them and asked. They said there was no forced
conscription. The reality was that, like poor parts of Japan such as Tohoku, poor girls
12-13 years oldwould

be sold.

Taiwan was the same.

Furthermore, the Japanesemilitary was famous for its protection of human rights. Aware of this being a comfort
woman was a promotion, therefore many wanted to do this; there was no forced
labour.”Look how happy the women are.
Here is the same slide in Japanese‫ޣ‬SLIDE 54‫ޤ‬. This view of the past, it is deeply
offensive to most observers. But to revisionist nationalists in Japan, it is the evidence
they need for their new agenda. It is the key support. For nationalist in China, this is
the about as offensive a thing as you could possibly find.
On to my conclusions, we need to re-link politics and economics in Sino-Japaneserelations‫ޣ‬SLIDE 55‫ޤ‬. Ever since 1949, there has been an assumption in Sino-Japaneserelations that politics and economics can be separated. This is the seikei bunri argumentthat somehow these two realms can work differently. Zhou Enlai formulated this principle
and it became the rationale for the relationship between 1952 and 1972. It still remains
the rationale for the relationship between Japan and Taiwan today.
Sadly, the two are not linked‫ޣ‬SLIDE 56‫ޤ‬. The booming economic relationshiphas not yet led to an improved political relationship.

The collapse of Marxism has

undermined the 1972 system and reopened the question of Japanese war responsibility.
The irrational narrative of nationalism is derailing and undermining the rational
narratives of liberalism and realism.
To escape this and the dangers it threatens the Japanese government and theJapanese people need a serious debate about war responsibility‫ޣ‬SLIDE 57‫ޤ‬. This is a
24



政冷経熱

debate that has not taken place in Japan since the war. And the Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese people have to accept this will undermine the 1972 consensus.
That the consensus reached at the time of normalization is no longer sustainable. And at
the same time, China must address its own historical legacies and the way that the war
against Japan has been used in China to achieve political ends. The leadership on both side
need to exercise statesmanship. They are ugly and vicious elements in Japan. There areugly and vicious elements in China. If the political leadership in both countries appeal tothose, the relationship will only deteriorate. And on that unfortunately, not very cheerfulnote, I would like to thank you all for listening to me and I welcome any questions orcomments that you may have.
ٟٟٟٟٟ     ٟٟٟٟٟ     ٟٟٟٟٟ
٨มળ̆ ࡈࠖ࡞࡮࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭ߐࠎ‫ޕߚߒ߹޿ߑߏ߁ߣ߇ࠅ޽߽߁ߤޔ‬㕖Ᏹߦᄙጘߦᷰߞߡ᦭
⋉ߥ⹤ߢߒߚ‫ᤨ  ߣ޽ߩߎޔߪߢࠇߘޕ‬ඨ߹ߢ⾰⇼ᔕ╵ߦ౉ࠄߖߡ޿ߚߛ߈ߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬⊒⸒ߔࠆᣇߪ‫ޔ‬ᚲዻߣฬ೨ࠍ⸒ߞߡ߆ࠄ⊒⸒ࠍߒߡ޿ߚߛ߈ߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ߘࠇߢߪ⊒⸒ߐࠇࠆᣇߪ᜼ᚻࠍ߅㗿޿޿ߚߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬٨ᬢ᫟᪞̆ Ё೑फᓔ໻ᄺˈᴼᷟṕǄ਀њ‫ⱘ⫳ܜ‬᡹ਞˈᛳࠄᄺдᕜ໮Ǆ៥ᛇ䯂ϔϾ䯂乬ˈ‫⫳ܜ‬೼᡹ਞЁ䇜ࠄњЁ᮹ϸ೑ⱘ⇥ᮣЏН䯂乬ˈ៥ᛇ䯂ⱘ䯂乬ᰃˈᔧҷⱘǃ⦄೼ⱘϸ೑䛑ᄬ೼ᵕッⱘ⇥ᮣЏНˈ䖭Ͼ≵᳝䯂乬ˈ៥ᛇ‫⫳ܜ‬㛑ϡ㛑䇜ϔ䇜⦄೼ϸ೑⇥ᮣЏНᅗⱘϡৠ⚍Џ㽕೼ા䞠Ǆ៥᠔⊼ᛣࠄⱘሖ䴶ᰃ⇥ᮣЏНᅗⱘ䰊ሖ䯂乬ˈህᰃ䇈↨བ䴦ᑈҎǃⶹ䆚ߚᄤǃᬓ⊏ᆊˈ೼Ё೑੠᮹ᴀ᳝ҔМϡৠˈ䖭ᰃ䞠䴶ⱘϔ⚍Ǆ䖬᳝ϔ⚍ህᰃˈЁ೑ⱘ⇥ᮣЏН੠᮹ᴀⱘ䖭⾡ᵕッⱘ⇥ᮣЏНᅗӀ೼೑ᆊⱘ䖭⾡‫އ‬ᅮ೑ᆊᬓ⊏ᮍ৥៪㗙‫އ‬ㄪᔧЁߚ߿᠔থ᣹ⱘ԰⫼བԩ˛ᙼᗢМⳟ˛↨བ䇈Ё೑ⱘ⇥ᮣЏНߚᄤҪӀ೼೑ᆊЁǃ೑ᆊᬓㄪЁ㛑᳝໮໻ⱘথ㿔ᴗˈᇍᬓᑰⱘ‫އ‬ㄪ㛑᳝໮໻ⱘ԰⫼ˈ䙷М᮹ᴀজᰃᗢḋⱘ˛䇶䇶Ǆ٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you very much. It is a complex question and a complex set ofissues. The differences are perhaps not that extreme between Chinese reactionary
nationalism and Japanese revisionist nationalism. These are negative sentiments. It is
the politics of opposition. It is the politics of criticizing the other, criticizing the outsider.
In Japan, a key difference I think, is older generations are much more heavily involved inrevisionist nationalism than is the case in China.
In China, reactionary nationalism tends to be predominantly a phenomenon you
see amongst younger Chinese, the Chinese that have grown up enjoying the benefits of thereform era. And I think that is a key difference.
In Japan, the revisionists include those who remember the war, participated in
the war up to young Japanese in their 20s. And I think that for the demographic isdifferent. The second part of your question asked about influence on policy.
This is relatively easier to answer with regard to Japan. Japan has a democraticsystem and therefore politicians can appeal to these groups, seek support from these25特別講演会groups, whether financial or of other kinds, and therefore can try to mobilize this as a wayof getting support in electoral politics and in political competition.
Opinion formers can appeal to this as way of selling more newspapers, getting
more people to watch TV programs. So in Japan, the relationship between nationalism
and policy is much easier to understand.
China, of course, has a much less plural system and therefore the ability forpeople to directly influence policy is more limited. But we have seen it, for example, theJapanese attempts to win contracts to build high-speed railways in China generatemassive popular protest, mainly on the Internet. The architecture I showed you - protests
against certain types of design.

We can see and identify areas where the Chinese

government has had to restrict its policy or its preferred approach to Japan because ofconcerns that it will lead to protests and complaints at the mass level.
The communist party has considerable autonomy in China because of the natureof the political system but it does not have the autonomy that Mao enjoyed at his height.
He was able to say Mongolia is not part of China and Mongolia was no longer apart of China. He was able to say, we will have relations with Japan, and it happened.
Hu Jintao does not have that power and that authority and I think the changes in
China are behind that and that’s where nationalism comes in– it doesn’t determine orcontrol policy but it does influence it.
٨มળ̆ ߪ޿‫ߪߢࠇߘޔ‬ᰴߦ⾰໧ߩ޽ࠆᣇ‫߅ߙ߁ߤޔ‬㗿޿޿ߚߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬٨᭞ᩮാ̆ ᭞ᩮߣ↳ߒ߹ߔ‫ߪ⑳ޕ‬㧵㧯㧯㧿ߩⅣႺࠣ࡞࡯ࡊߩਥᩏࠍߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᄢᄌ㍈޿ߏᜰ៰ࠍ‫⥝ޔ‬๧ᷓߊ⡬߆ߖߡ޿ߚߛ߈߹ߒߚ‫⾰ޕ‬໧ߣ߅㗿޿߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ⾰໧ߪ‫ޔ‬వ߶ߤട‫ⷞߩߡߒߣ࡯ࡖ࠴࠶ࠜ࠙ޔ߇ߚߒ߹޿߾ߒߞ߅߇ࠎߐ⟤ޘ‬ὐߢߔ‫ࠅߪ߿ޕ‬ࡈࠖ࡞࡮࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭ߐࠎ߽㍈޿ߎߣࠍ߅ߞߒ߾޿߹ߔߌࠇߤ߽‫ߡߒߣ࡯ࡖ࠴࠶ࠜ࠙ࠅߪ߿ޔ‬᡽
ᴦߩಽ㊁޽ࠆ޿ߪ⚻ᷣߩಽ㊁߆ࠄߩࠦࡔࡦ࠻ࠍߥߐߞߚߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ⑳ߪⅣႺࠍᛒߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ⅣႺߣ޿߁߽ߩߪ᡽ᴦߦ߽⚻ᷣߦ߽‫ߪߦࠄߐޔ‬ᢥൻߦ߽߆߆ࠊߞ
ߡ޿߹ߔ‫⾰ޕ‬໧ߣ޿߁ߩߪ‫ߢߜߚ߆ߥ߁ࠃߚߞ߾ߒߞ߅߇ࠎߐ࠭ࡦ࡯ࠖ࠺ޔ‬᡽ᴦ߿⚻ᷣߩಽ㊁
ߛߌ߆ࠄ‛੐ࠍ⷗ࠆߛߌߢᣣਛ㑆ߩ໧㗴߇⸃᳿ߢ߈ࠆߣ߅⠨߃ߥߩ߆ߤ߁߆ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢߔ‫ޕ‬ ⑳ߪ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺߩ໧㗴ࠍ⠨߃ࠆߣ߈ߦߪ‫ߦߎߘޔ‬ᢥൻ߿᡽ᴦ‫ੱߪߦࠄߐޔ‬㑆ߩᗧ⼂ߩ໧㗴߹ߢ߽౉ࠇߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿ߣ޿߁ឭ᩺ࠍ‫ᧄޔ‬ᣣߩᦨᓟߩ⊒⴫ߢ޿ߚߒ߹ߔ‫⾰ޕ‬໧ߪߘࠇߦ㑐ㅪߔࠆߎߣߢߔ߇‫ᦨ߭ߗޔ‬ᓟ߹ߢᱷߞߡ޿ߚߛ޿ߡ‫ߦ⹤ߩ⑳ޔ‬ኻߔࠆࠦࡔࡦ࠻ࠍ޿ߚߛ߈ߚ޿ߣᕁ޿
߹ߔ‫ޕ‬
٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you very much for the invitation. I’ll do my best to attend. The
organizers were very generous and gave me two hours. If I was to cover the environment,
I would need maybe three or four hours. I don’t think people want to sit and listen to me
for three days.

So, on the environmental question; I agree it’s very important andsignificant. But I think the solutions to the environment, like its causes, lie in politics andthey lie in economics.
In one particular area where we can see damage being done is in the reduction ofJapanese aid to Japan, a significant portion of which has been dedicated to
26



政冷経熱

environmentally friendly, environment related issues. And this is money that will nototherwise be spent on the environment in China
Japan has become one of the causes of environmental pollution in China becauseof its investment, because of its desire to move its dirty factories out of Japan, elsewhere.
The Chinese and the Japanese leadership, businessmen need to accept theirinterdependence.

The environment is fascinating because it denies the importance ofpolitical borders, it makes them irrelevant and meaningless. A dust cloud or pollution
doesn’t carry a passport.

And therefore, I would agree with you, the environment isimportant. My time is so limited. Thank you.
٨มળ̆ ߘࠇߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᰴߦߏ⾰໧ߩ޽ࠆᣇ‫ޔ‬᜼ᚻࠍ߅㗿޿޿ߚߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬٨࠼࡝ࡈ࠹̆ I am Reinhard Drifte from the LSE. I have two questions; one is about thetrade figure between Japan and China for 2004.
If I saw this correctly, then in 2004, the trade with America was still greater thanthat with China? But as far as I remember, 2004 was a big change. The share of tradewith China is now bigger than that with United States, except if you of course only look atexports as a different issue.
The second thing is about tensions.

I want to depict a strong and positive

economic relationship as a bit more problematic.

You see it as hot.

But economic

relations, of course, have also contributed to deteriorate the relationship, not only because
the perception in Japan of China becoming economically bigger and more important, butalso there are lot of problems in the economic area with intellectual property rights and soon. There are a lot of complaints on the Chinese side also as well as on the Japanese side.
Just what do you think about that? Thank you.
٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ First of all, on the trade figures.

Trade statistics are collated andcollected in so many different ways. I think if we use the Japanese trade figures, you would
be correct. I was using American trade figures who count things slightly differently, theChinese trade figures, rather like the defense spending figures, everybody seems to keep aslightly different set of accounts and they can be used in various ways.
The big shift I think has been the emergence of the EU since its expansion to
become China’s largest trading partner in terms of official figures.

But that in turn

doesn’t take account of the proportion of Taiwanese and Hong Kong investment, which isreally Japanese.
Yes, the economy creates all sorts of problems as well as a positive angle to therelationship – the trade imbalance, fears of piracy, ways of Japanese produces. Last night,
I was watching NHK and a very concerned young woman was carrying a very large Daikon㧔ᄢᩮ㧕and saying, “It’s only ¥100.” How on earth can Japanese farmers complete with
Chinese agricultural products?

And so, those concerns are there in the economic

relationship. It’s not all good. At the same time, the biggest lobby for improved relations
with China is the economic business groups, Keidanren and others who have been furious
at Prime Minister Koizumi for the damage he’s caused to their business interests in China.
27特別講演会And I’d agree it is a mixed picture. I just wanted to try say something good as I went
through my presentation.
٨มળ̆ ߪ޿‫ޔ‬ᰴߦߏ⾰໧ߩ޽ࠆᣇ‫ޕ‬٨᧘ᤐ೑̆ ᗲ⍮ᄢቇ⚻ᷣቇㇱߩ᧘ᤐ೑ߣ↳ߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᄢᄌ߅߽ߒࠈ޿ࡊ࡟࠯ࡦ࠹࡯࡚ࠪࡦ‫޽ޔ‬ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ޿߹ߒߚ‫ߪ⑳ޕ‬ዊᨋࠃߒߩࠅߩบḧࡃ࡯࡚ࠫࡦࠍᜬߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ቇ↢ߦ⺒ࠎߢ߽ࠄߞߚߎߣ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㕖Ᏹߦ߅߽ߒࠈ߆ߞߚߢߔ߇‫ߛߚޔ‬ᄢ੐ߥߣߎࠈߪ߁߹ߊߏ߹߆ߒߡ
޽ࠆߥߣᕁ޿߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ ߘࠇߪ೎ߣߒߡ‫߇࠻ࡦࡔࠦޔ‬㧞ߟ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬ᣣਛ㑐ଥ‫ߌࠊࠅߣޔ‬ᣣᧄߩ࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓ
ࠍ⺆ࠆ႐วߦߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ࿖ౝߩ᡽ᴦ൓ജߩᄌൻࠍᛮ߈ߦߒߡ⺆ࠆߎߣߪߢ߈߹ߖࠎ‫ߩߘޕ‬ㇱಽߦ⸒෸߇ዋߥ߆ߞߚὐ߇᳇ߦߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬
 ⑳ߩ⷗⸃ߢߪ‫ߩࡦ࡝࡞ࡌޔ‬ო߇፣უߒߚ޽ߣߦ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ࿖ౝߩ㕟ᣂ൓ജߩᓟㅌߣ޿߁ᵹࠇ߇޽
ࠅ߹ߔ‫ࠬࠢ࡞ࡑߛߚޕ‬ਥ⟵‫⚻ࠬࠢ࡞ࡑߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ᷣቇߩᓟㅌߛߌߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޔࠆࠁࠊ޿ޕ‬Ყセ⊛Ꮐነࠅߩ‫ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬㕟ᣂ൓ജߣ๭߫ࠇߚ൓ജ߇᡽ᴦߩ໧㗴ߩ⥰บ߆ࠄᄢ߈ߊᓟㅌߒߚߎ
ߣ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߦࠇߘޕ‬ኻߔࠆ⠨߃ߪߤ߁ߥߩߢߒࠂ߁߆‫ޕ‬ ߘߒߡ‫ߪߟ৻߁߽ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩㆬ᜼೙ᐲߩᄌൻߢߔ‫ ޕ‬ᐕߦዊㆬ᜼඙೙߇ዉ౉ߐࠇ߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ዊㆬ᜼඙೙߇ዉ౉ߐࠇߚ႐วߦߪ‫ޔ‬㧝ߟߩㆬ᜼඙ߢߪ৻ੱߒ߆ᒰㆬߢ߈߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬એ೨‫ޔ‬ਛㆬ᜼඙೙ߢߪ‫࡯ࡃࡦ࠽ޔ‬㧞‫ޔ‬႐วߦࠃߞߡߪ࠽ࡦࡃ࡯㧟߽ᒰㆬߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߒߚ‫ޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕ‬᡽ᴦߩ⴫ߩ⥰บߢߪ‫␠ޔ‬ળߩ⴫ߩ⥰บߢߪ‫ޔ‬ዋᢙᵷ߽⊒⸒ߔࠆᯏળ߇޽ࠅ߹ߒߚ‫ߛੱ৻ߪ੹ޕ‬ߌߢߔ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ㆬ᜼ߦ಴ࠆੱ߽޽߹ࠅᄢ߈ߥჿߢ⊒⸒ߢ߈߹ߖࠎߒ‫࡯ࡃࡦ࠽ޔ‬㧞߽⊒⸒ߢ߈ߥߊ
ߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ዊㆬ᜼඙೙ߦߥߞߡ߆ࠄ㧟࿁߶ߤㆬ᜼߇߅ߎߥࠊࠇ߹ߒߚ߇‫ޔ‬ዋᢙ᡽ౄߩჿ߇ዊߐߊߥߞߚ
ࠊߌߢߔ‫߁߽߇ࠇߘޕ‬㧝ߟߩᣣᧄ࿖ౝߩ᡽ᴦ൓ജߩᄌൻߢߔ‫߇ࠇߘޕ‬వ߶ߤ↳ߒ਄ߍߚ㕟ᣂ൓ജߩᓟㅌߣ৻✜ߦߥߞߡ‫⷗ߩ⑳ޔ‬ᣇߢߪ‫଻ࠆࠁࠊ޿ޔ‬቞⊛ߥ൓ജߩჿ߇ᄢ߈ߊߥߞߚߩ߽੐ታ
ߢߔ‫ߩߘޕ‬ಽߛߌ㕟ᣂ൓ജߩჿ߇ዊߐߊߥߞߚࠊߌߢߔ‫࡮࡞ࠖࡈޔ߇ߔߢ࠻ࡦࡔࠦߩ⑳ߪࠇߎޕ‬࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭ߐࠎߩ߅⠨߃ߪ޿߆߇ߢߒࠂ߁߆‫ޕ‬٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you. On your first question, I agree. The collapse of the left inJapan in the 1990s is extremely important. Some people have criticized the Japanese Leftfor being ineffectual, for doing very little. But it played a very important role in that it
ensured those who wanted to revise the constitution would never have enough power to doso. The Left in Japan played a very important role in supporting the 1947 Constitution
and in ensuring that it remained in place and keeping its symbolic importance very high on
the agenda. The collapse of the left in Japan means that they no longer powerful, nolonger as able to block constitutional reform issues and that I think is why Prime Minister
Abe is now in the position to try and push this agenda forward. So I agree that that issue
is important. The changing election system, I agree with you, is a reduced diversity andother issues have contributed to this.
Prime Minister Koizumi has brought a level of discipline to the Liberal
Democratic Party that he had never seen before, his assassination of his opponents overpost office reform has set a new agenda perhaps that says, you must behave and obey party
discipline. This is not uncommon in British or American politics, but it’s very new in
28



政冷経熱

Japan, and I think this will create challenges.

But that alone, I think, does not explain

the strength you see of the revisionists in the LDP today.
If you look at the Koizumi cabinets, after the first cabinet with Tanaka Makiko,
they were dominated by pro-Taiwan figures, figures who had served in the pro-Taiwan
lobby, the Nikka Kankei Giin kondakai ᣣ ⪇ 㑐 ଥ ⼏ ຬ ᙣ ⺣ ળ or Nikkakon

Thatphenomenon remains with us and I am not sure what the root causes of that are and I
think they are about personal beliefs rather than simple electoral appeal.
٨มળ̆ ߪ޿‫ߪߢࠇߘޔ‬ᰴߩᣇ‫ޔ‬᜼ᚻࠍ㗿޿߹ߔ‫ޕߙ߁ߤޔ޿ߪޕ‬٨㚏ᤘᄻ̆ ᗲ⍮ᄢቇߩቴຬᢎ᝼ߩ㚏ᤘᄻߢߔ‫࠭ࡦ࡯ࠖ࠺ޕ‬వ↢ߪਛ࿖ߩ࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓ‫ߔޔ‬
ߥࠊߜ 5($&7,21#5<0#6+10#.+5/ ߦߟ޿ߡ߅⹤ߐࠇ߹ߒߚ߇‫ޔ‬5($&7,21#5< ߩᗧ๧ߦߟ޿ߡ߽
߁ዋߒ⹦ߒߊᢎ߃ߡ޿ߚߛߌߥ޿ߢߒࠂ߁߆‫ޕ‬䙷Мབᵰ䇈ˈЁ೑ⱘᰃ䖭Ͼ 5($&7,21#5<ˈ䙷М᮹ᴀⱘ⇥ᮣЏН 1$7,21$/,60 ህᰃ $&7,21+60ˈᰃϡᰃৃҹ䖭М䇈ਸ਼˛٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ The term reactionary, I use it partly because when I studied Marx,
reactionary was an insult and so partly I adopted it for rhetorical purposes. But also I
believe it is reactionary because this nationalism is predominantly negative. It’s about
criticism, it’s about what’s wrong with other people, it’s about why the Japanese are bad,
why the Americans are bad.
It had a much smaller content of what is positive about China, what is good about
China, what can we celebrate to that China. And that I think is why I call it reactionary,
it is because it’s full of bitterness, anger. It doesn’t suggest anything positive, it doesn’tlook for a way forward beyond criticism and denunciation and that’s why I’ve chose that.
It is, in a significant part, a reaction to the growing nationalism in Japan.
We are in a vicious cycle at the moment of provocations between Japaneserevisionists and Chinese reactionaries at the popular level. And occasionally, that rises up
into higher levels of government. We saw it to an extent with Prime Minister Koizumi
and his repeated visits to Yasukuni.
٨ᒛ₹ᨋ̆ ៥ᰃЁ೑फҀ໻ᄺⱘᓴ⥝ᵫˈ៥ᛇ䇋ᬭϔϾ䯂乬Ǆ᮹ᴀⱘ໻䚼ߚᬓ⊏ᆊˈࣙᣀ᱂䘡ⱘ⼒Ӯ㟚䆎੠䆌໮ᄺ㗙䛑䅸ЎˈЁ೑ⱘᇍ᮹⇥ᮣЏНˈ៪㗙᠔䇧ⱘĀড᮹ᛳᚙā䛑ᰃ⬅Ё೑݅ѻ‫ⱘܮ‬ড᮹ᅷӴ᠔❑ࡼ䍋ᴹⱘˈ䖭⾡ড᮹ᅷӴⱘ㚠ৢᰃϔ‫ܮ‬ϧᬓ៪㗙䇈ϔ‫ܮ‬⣀㺕ᇐ㟈ⱘǄҪӀⱘ㿔໪ПᛣህᰃˈབᵰЁ೑ⱘᬓ⊏ԧࠊᬍ䴽ᅠ៤њҹৢˈব៤њϔϾ⇥Џⱘ೑ᆊˈ䙷М䖭⾡ড᮹ᛳᚙৃ㛑ህӮϡᄬ೼Ǆ៥ϾҎ䅸Ў䖭ᰃ᮹ᴀⱘᇍढ䅸䆚ᮍ䴶ϔϾᕜ໻ⱘ䫭䇃ˈབᵰ䖭⾡㾖ᗉ䖬ϔⳈᄬ೼ϟএⱘ䆱ˈৃ㛑ᕜॅ䰽Ǆ៥ᛇ䇋ᬭᙼˈϡⶹ䘧ᙼᗢМḋⳟ䖭Ͼ䯂乬Ǆ䇶䇶ʽ٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you. I think I broadly agree with what you have been saying.
The Japanese bookshops are full of books talking about anti-Japanese education in China
and media coverage, newspapers like Sankei repeatedly giving this story that the Chinese
government is deliberately creating anti-Japanese feeling. To some extent, there is sometruth to this. If you look at the patriotic education campaigns of the mid 1990s, and theapproach that Jiang Zemin took to sustain the CCP, they did rely increasingly innationalism. But this has, to an extent, faded. And what the government was doing wasrecognizing an existing sentiment in China and building upon it, not creating it afresh. I29

特別講演会

think perhaps the Chinese government could do more to promote positive views of Japan.
And I think that is an area which would help with reconciliation, more recognition of thebenefits that Japan has brought since 1972.
On the question of democracy, when countries go through rapid economic andsocial change, it tends to increase extremism. If you look at the transitions in South
Korea and Taiwan, both of these transitions have led to a significant growth in nationalism.
If you look at the transformations of Japan, Italy and Germany in the latter part of the
19th and early 20th Century, this also led to a huge surge in nationalist sentiments.
There’s a simplistic argument that somehow democracy solves everything, and as
a transition will mean all the problems disappear. Unfortunately, rapid transformations
often generate uncertainty and discontent.
The rise of new religions, popular cults, and especially the nation, to give people
something to believe in, something to support and something to follow is one of the great
dangers of modernization and transformation, one from which Europe suffered enormously.
Transitions must happen slowly if they are to remain stable.
٨ࡂ࡯࠙ࠖ࠶࠻̆ I am Eric Harwit, a Professor at the University of Hawaii. I agreewith you that much of the anti-Japanese feeling is genuine for the young people in China.
But do you think that some of it is also a reflection of frustration with their own Chinese
government and that they are using the opportunity to protest against the Japanese in thestreets and on the Internet, mainly because they have no other way to express theirdissatisfaction with their own political regime?
٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Yes.

I think there is an element within some strands of popularnationalism in China. Nationalism is the key vehicle of politics in China in the 20th
Century.

It is the main mechanism for expressing opinions.

Nationalism is also

legitimate in China. Democracy is not a legitimate thing to appeal for or to. But if you
couch your protest in terms of nationalism, defending the nation, you are given a certainly
leeway and freedom that would not otherwise exist.
The Student Reform Movement of 1989 was very much a nationalist patriotic
movement.

It was about how political change, reform, democracy, can make China

stronger. And I think the two narratives are very much intertwined.
As with the case of course in Europe in the mid-19th Century, liberal nationalism
was a vital dynamic in political change. And I think that’s one of the positive elementsthat perhaps we can identify in China is that liberal nationalism may be progressive, may
lead to a more progressive China.
The danger is of course nationalism tends to eat itself. It tends to feed upon its
worse element and therefore we cannot simply embrace it, we must also watch for its
dangers.
٨มળ̆ ߪ޿‫ߪߢࠇߘޔ‬ᰴߩᣇ‫ޕ‬٨ᩉᰵ̆ ៥ᰃЁ೑फᓔ໻ᄺⱘ᷇⃷ˈ៥ᛇᇍᙼ߮ᠡⱘথ㿔Āᬓ‫ދ‬㒣⛁ā䖭Мߚᓔᴹ䅼䆎ᦤϔ⚍ⳟ⊩Ǆ᥂៥᠔㾕ˈЁ೑೼  ᑈҷ੠  ᑈҷˈৃҹ䇈ࠄ  ᑈПࠡˈᇍ᮹ᴀⱘᡔᴃᅲ䰙Ϟ‫݋‬᳝ᕜᔎ
30



政冷経熱

ⱘձ䌪ᗻˈ಴Ў  ᑈҷ  ᑈҷЏ㽕ⱘ೼ᡔᴃᮍ䴶ⱘкᰃҢ᮹ᴀ䖛ᴹⱘǄ䙷Мࠄ  ᑈПৢ䖭ᮍ䴶থ⫳њᕜ໻ⱘব࣪ˈ᮹ᴀ೼ᇍढᇍЁ೑ⱘⳈ᥹ᡩ䌘䞠䴶᠔ऴⱘ↨䞡੠⃻㕢Ⳍ↨ϔⳈᰃ೼ϟ䰡ⱘˈ䙷МЁ೑ⱘ㧳㧰㧼ⱘ๲䭓⥛㒣䖛䖭ѯᑈⱘ催๲䭓ˈᅲ䰙ϞҢ  ᑈৃҹ԰ЎϔϾߚ⬠⚍ˈথ⫳њᎼ໻ⱘব࣪ˈࠄⳂࠡЎℶˈ᮴䆎Ң㒣⌢ᅲ࡯੠೼ᬓ⊏Ϟ೑䰙Ϟⱘഄԡˈᅲ䰙Ϟ䛑থ⫳њϔϾব࣪ˈ䙷М៥ⱘⳟ⊩˖೼  ᑈПࠡЁ೑⬅Ѣ㒣⌢Ϟⱘॳ಴ᰃ᳝䌪Ѣ᮹ᴀⱘˈ೼  ᑈПৢˈЁ೑ᓔྟњ੠᮹ᴀⱘϔϾᑇㄝⱘゲѝˈ䙷М೼᳾ᴹⱘ↨བ䇈  ᑈࠄ  ᑈП‫ݙ‬Ё೑ⱘ㧳㧰㧼ᘏ䞣ৃ㛑Ӯ੠᮹ᴀⳌ᥹䖥៪㗙ᰃ䍙䖛᮹ᴀˈ䖭Ͼ㒣⌢㚠᱃ӮϡӮ੠ᬓ⊏Ϟⱘ䖭Ͼ݇㋏Ⳍ㘨㋏˛䖭ḋⱘϔϾ䯂乬Ǆ٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you. Yes, 1995, 1996 are really critical years. That is when the
key transformation happened. I think that’s the point where the 1972 system breaks
down. There’s a table – European and American assumption that 1989 is the year thatmatters. The Berlin Wall comes down, the Cold War ends, that’s the year of the greattransformation.

It isn’t in East Asia – ’95 and ’96 are the years of the greattransformation in Asian politics.
You’ve given some excellent examples in the economic area that I wasn’t asfamiliar with in how the relationship changes. But this ’95, ’96 is also the Taiwan missile
crisis, China’s nuclear test, a whole series of issues in the political and economic realms
which causes both the Japanese and the Chinese to reassess and reconsider theirrelationship, it is a critical turning point. And I agree that in many ways, China is now
less dependent on Japan economically. But perhaps, it is just differently dependent. If
you factor in the extent to which Taiwanese, Hong Kong and other investment into China is
directly linked to Japanese capital, Japan still has an overwhelmingly strong anddominant position within China, far stronger that I think many people in Japan and many
people in China realize. And the cost to both sides of a deterioration will be far, farstronger than even the headline figure suggest.
٨⾘଻⪇̆ ៥ᰃЁ೑ᇍ໪㒣䌌໻ᄺⱘᬭᏜˈি䌒ֱढǄ߮ᠡ਀њᙼⱘ䖭Ͼⓨ䆆ˈ៥㾝ᕫᕜফਃথǄ䖬᳝ࠡ䴶㗕Ꮬⱘᦤ䯂ˈ៥г㾝ᕫᇍᔧࠡЁ᮹݇㋏䛑ᰃᕜ䞡㽕ⱘǄ៥᳝ϔ⾡ᛳ㾝ˈᛇ਀਀ᙼⱘ
ᛣ㾕ˈህᰃ៥㾝ᕫЁ೑ⱘ⇥ᮣЏН੠᮹ᴀⱘ⇥ᮣЏН᳝ϔ⚍ⶹ䆚㚠᱃ϞⱘϡৠǄЁ೑ⱘⶹ䆚ߚᄤˈህϔ㠀㗠㿔ˈད䈵ᇍϪ⬠੠᮹ᴀⱘ⍜ᙃᴹ⑤ⱘ⏴䘧㽕᳈໮ϔѯˈⶹ䘧ⱘџᚙད䈵↨᮹ᴀ㽕໮ϔѯˈ៥ҹࠡᘏ㾝ᕫ᮹ᴀⱘ໻ӫӴၦད䈵ᦤկⱘϰ㽓ᕜ໮ˈԚᰃ៥ৢᴹ㾝ᕫ䖬ᰃ↨䕗᳝䰤ˈ↨བ೼᮹ᴀᕜ䲒њ㾷ࠄ㄀ϝϪ⬠೑ᆊⱘ㟚䆎ˈЏ㽕䛑ᰃ⃻⌆៪㗙㕢೑ⱘ㾖⚍ǄԚᰃ೼Ё೑᳝ᕜ໮ⱘ᡹㒌ˈ↨བǉখ㗗⍜ᙃǊˈৃҹՓЁ೑ⶹ䆚ߚᄤ㛑໳᳈໮ഄњ㾷ᭈϾϪ⬠ⱘ㟚䆎Ǆ᠔ҹ೼䖭ϾᛣНϞ៥㾝ᕫབᵰ䇈Ё೑੠᮹ᴀ䛑᳝⇥ᮣЏНⱘ䆱ˈ䙷МˈԐТЁ೑ⱘ⇥ᮣЏНⱘ㚠᱃ǃ㾦ᑺ㽕↨᮹ᴀ᳈ࡴᑓ
䯨ϔѯǄ᠔ҹ៥㾝ᕫ䖭ϸϾ䖬ᰃ᳝᠔ϡৠⱘǄᤶহ䆱䇈Ё೑ⱘᇍ᮹ⳟ⊩ϡᰃऩ㒃ᇍᅗᶤϔϾ㸠ࡼ៪㿔䆎㸼⼎ⱘϔ⾡ডᑨˈ㗠ᰃ೼ܼ⧗ᛣ䆚ϟ‫ߎخ‬ᴹⱘϔ⾡ডᑨ˗㗠᮹ᴀⱘ⇥ᮣЏН㾚䞢ԐТ↨䕗⣁䱬੠᳝䰤Ǆ᠔ҹ៥㾝ᕫ䖭ৃ㛑Ӯᕅડ᮹ᴀᇍЁ೑ⱘܼ䴶ⱘǃℷ⹂ⱘ੠ᅶ㾖ⱘ⧚㾷Ǆ಴Ў៥ϡᰃϧ䮼ⷨおЁ᮹ᬓ⊏䯂乬ⱘˈ᠔ҹ៥ᛇ਀਀ᙼⱘᛣ㾕Ǆ䇶䇶ʽ٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you for your question.

I would agree that media coverage ofChina in Japan is surprisingly limited, even the Asahi Shimbun, one of the Japan’s moreprogressive newspaper, it seemed to be dazzled by Prime Minister Koizumi, and it seemed
to be unable to present a coherent challenge to the policies he was pursuing. And I also31

特別講演会

think it is interesting that in some ways, the media in China is more diverse than the
media in Japan, given China’s authoritarian system, and Japan’s relatively plural one.
One of the issues I notice in Japan is that there are only two countries – there is
China and there is America. And it is very rare that opinions from outside of those twocenters are ever heard or discussed or engaged with – the European experience, theexperience of the Middle East, of Africa, rarely enters into Japan’s thinking and discussionof the China question. China, I agree, does have somewhat more diversity, albeit limited
by a different set of restrictions than the Japanese have to tolerate.
٨↰ፉ⧷৻̆ ᘮᙥ⟵Ⴖᄢቇߩ↰ፉߣ↳ߒ߹ߔ‫ߪ⹤߅ߩ੹ޕ‬ᣣᧄߣਛ࿖ߩ㑐ଥߣ޿߁ߎߣߢߔ
߇‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߣਛ࿖એᄖߦ‫ߊࠄߘ߅ޔ‬ᣣਛ㑐ଥߦᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ࠆߢ޽ࠈ߁ߣᕁࠊࠇࠆࡈࠔࠢ࠲࡯߇޿
ߊߟ߆޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫☨߇৻╙ߩߘޕ‬࿖ߢߔ‫ޔߊࠄߘ߅ޕ‬ᣣਛ㑐ଥࠍ⚐☴ߥࡃࠗ࡜࠹࡜࡞㧔DKNCVGTCN㧕㑐ଥߣߒߡ⠨߃ࠆߎߣߪ‫ޔ‬㔍ߒ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫☨ޕ‬࿖߇ਈ߃ࠆᓇ㗀ߪ‫⋧ޔ‬ᒰߦᄢ߈ߥ߽ߩ߇޽ࠆ
ߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬ฎ޿⹤ࠍߔࠇ߫‫ߩ੹ޔ‬᳃ᣖਥ⟵ߩ໧㗴ߦߒߡ߽‫ߩߘޔ‬ᩮᐩߦߪ‫ࠅߪ߿ޔ‬ᚢᓟಣℂ߇ߒߞ߆ࠅ
ߣߢ߈ߡ޿ߥ߆ߞߚߣ޿߁ߎߣ߇⑒ᩮߣߒߡ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᚢᓟಣℂ߇ߒߞ߆ࠅߣߢ߈ߥ߆ߞߚℂ↱ߩ㧝ߟߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖߇಄ᚢ᭴ㅧߩߥ߆ߢᣣᧄࠍ⷏஥㒯༡ߩ߶߁߳ᒁߞᒛࠅㄟࠎߛߣ޿߁ߎߣߦ޽
ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬ㆊ⒟ߢ‫ޔ‬ᭂ᧲ァ੐ⵙ್ߦ߅ߌࠆኻਛߩᚢ੎⽿છߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬ᗧ๧޿޿ടᷫߦ
ᷣ߹ߐࠇߡߒ߹ߞߚㇱಽ߇޽ࠆߩߛߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ߟ޿ᦨㄭߢ߽‫ޔ‬ᣣ☨ห⋖ߩౣ᭴▽߇บḧ໧㗴ߦ߹ߢᵄ෸ߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬๟ㄝ੐ᘒߩ⸃㉼ߣኻಣࠍ߼ߋࠆ⷗⸃߇‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖࿖ౝߩ᳃ᣖਥ⟵ߦἫࠍߟߌࠆࠊߌߢߔ‫⚿ޕ‬ዪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪਛ࿖ࠍߤ߁ߒߚ޿
ߩ߆ߣ޿߁໧㗴߇‫ࠄ߆ࠇߎޔ‬వߩᣣਛ㑐ଥߦ߽ᄢ߈ߥᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃ߡߊࠆߩߛࠈ߁ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ╙ੑὐߪ‫ߩ࠭࡯࠾ࠗࡖ࠴࡮࠭࡯ࠪ࡯ࡃ࡯ࠝޔ‬Ⴧടߢߔ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߢ߽࿾ᣇㇺᏒߢߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖♽ߩᣇ߇Ꮢ㐳ߦߥࠆߣ޿߁ࠤ࡯ࠬ߇޽ࠅ‫␠ੱ⪇ޔ‬ળ߇㊂⾰ߣ߽ߦෘߺࠍჇߒߡ߈ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ታߪ ᐕߩ෻ᣣ࠺ࡕߩᤨߦ߽‫ᦨޔ‬ೋߦᄢ߈ߥኻᣣ᛫⼏ⴕേ߇⿠߈ߚߩߪᶏᄖߢ޽ߞߡ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߢߪ޽ࠅ
߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖᡽ᐭߪ৻⽾ߒߡ‫ࠍࡕ࠺ߊߴࠆߥޔ‬᛼ߐ߃ㄟ߽߁ߣߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ၮᧄ〝✢ߪ߿ߪࠅᣣਛ෹ᅢߢ‫ޔ‬੐ࠍᄢ߈ߊߒߚ޿ߣߪ⠨߃ߡ޿ߥ޿ߢߒࠂ߁‫߽ߢࠇߘޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩ࿖ౝߦ㘧߮Ἣߒߡߒ߹ߞߚ⢛᥊ߦߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖‫᧲ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ධࠕࠫࠕߩ␠ળߢᐢ߇ߞߡ޿ߚ᛫⼏ⴕേߦ޽ࠆߣᕁ߁ߩ
ߢߔ‫ߩߤߥ࠻࠶ࡀ࡯࠲ࡦࠗޕ‬ᓇ㗀߽޽ߞߡ‫ޔߪߦ⊛⚳ᦨ߇ࠇߘޔ‬ਛ࿖ߦ㘧߮Ἣߒߡߒ߹ߞߚࠊ
ߌߢߔ‫ޕ‬ ߘ߁ߥࠆߣ‫ߩࠄ߆ࠇߎޔ‬ᣣਛ㑐ଥࠍ⠨߃ࠆ߁߃ߢ‫ޔ‬ዋߥߊߣ߽☨࿖ߣᶏᄖ⪇ੱ␠ળߩേะߦ
ߪᵈᗧ߇ᔅⷐߛߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬㧞ߟߩࡈࠔࠢ࠲࡯ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬వ↢ߪߤߩࠃ߁ߦ߅⠨߃ߦߥߞߡ޿ࠄߞߒ߾ࠆߩ߆ߣ޿߁ߩ߇‫⾰ߩ⑳ޔ‬໧ߢߔ‫ޕ‬٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ Thank you very much.

You raised some very important points.

I

consciously avoided a discussion of the United States in my paper, partly because ofreasons of time .
The United States and its Asia Policy is critical to the future of Sino-Japaneserelations. America effectively vetoes a change of the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. It
provides Taiwan with just enough support to prevent China from taking it over, but notenough support to allow Taiwan to become independent. That’s at the heart of Nixon’s
Policy.
32



政冷経熱

George W. Bush looked like he might be changing that, then he withdrew from it
but American policy there is very cynical but very successful, very effective and one of the
few areas where I can actually embrace American foreign policy. America is now trying toplay a better role at mediating the relationship between China and Japan. A number of
initiatives have come out of Washington recently to improve dialogue between the two sides
because America realizes how much it will suffer if the relationship between its two mostimportant Asian partners were to become even worse than it is at the moment.

So

America has a very strong interest in maintaining this relationship and improving it.
With regard to the overseas Chinese, it is a common aspect of Chinese nationalismthat it exists overseas and then returns to the Mainland. We see this with Sun Yat-sen,
we see this with Chinese nationalism in the early 20th Century.
We see this more recently with the Bao Diao – The Protect Diaoyutai Islands
Movements in the 1970s.

They became a key source of overseas Chinese nationalist

activity, and we see this again up to the present day, very strong nationalist actions
amongst overseas Chinese on that particular issue.
Exile nationalism has always been very strong. When you are separated fromyour mother country, you fantasize about what is good and what is bad about it. And
therefore, you tend to become more extreme, more exaggerated in your opinions. Morespecifically for Japan and the role of the United States, the terrible dilemma of Taiwan’s
future is the thing that keeps policy makers awake.

Should Taiwan push closer toindependence? Where does Japan turn? Does it reject China? Does it say “no” to anuclear armed hostile power on its border over the Taiwan question or does it say “no” to
the United States and reject its strongest and most important post-war ally?

It is aterrible dilemma for the Japanese government and that’s why it’s so important to prevent
the Taiwan issue reaching that stage.
٨㈅㛹̆ 䇶䇶ʽ៥ি䚍偹ˈᰃᴹ㞾Ё೑Ҏ⇥໻ᄺ⦃๗ᄺ䰶ⱘǄᛳ䇶ᙼⱘⓨ䆆ˈᴀᴹ៥г㽕ᦤ݇Ѣ㕢೑ᕅડⱘ䯂乬ˈࠡ䴶䖭Ͼৠᖫᦤњˈ៥ህᛇᦤϔϾ䖯ϔℹⱘⳌ݇ⱘ䯂乬ˈৃ㛑੠ߚᵤЁ᮹݇㋏ⱘᮍ⊩䆎᳝݇Ǆ಴Ў៥Ӏᰃ‫خ‬㒣⌢ᄺˈ᳝ᯊ‫׭‬дᛃ⫼मᓜ䆎˄ህᰃ *DPH7KHRU\˅ᴹⳟᕙϔѯ䯂乬ˈ៥ᛇ೼ߚᵤЁ᮹݇㋏ⱘᯊ‫ৃ׭‬㛑䖭гᰃᄬ೼ϔϾमᓜⱘḚᶊˈ䖭䞠䴶᳝ᕜ໮मᓜⱘᔧሔ㗙
˄SOD\HU˅ˈ䖭䞠䴶ࣙᣀᬓ⊏ᆊˈࣙᣀѻϮ⬠ⱘ݀ৌˈгࣙᣀ݀ӫˈࣙᣀၦԧˈ᳝ᕜ໮ⱘᔧሔ㗙
˄SOD\HU˅Ǆ៥ⱘ䯂乬ህᰃ⦄೼ᙼ䇜ⱘ䖭Ͼ⇥ᮣЏНⱘᵕッ⇥ᮣЏНⱘ䯂乬ˈ៥᳈㾝ᕫᅗ䈵ᰃϔ⾡⦄䈵ˈ䙷М೼䖭Ͼৢ䴶ˈϡৠⱘᔧሔ㗙ˈ៪㗙িϡৠⱘ SOD\HUˈҪӀ䛑೼থ᣹ⴔϡৠⱘ԰⫼Ǆ៥ⱘ䯂乬ህᰃѻϮ⬠ˈ᮴䆎ᰃ᮹ᴀᮍ䴶ⱘ䖬ᰃЁ೑ᮍ䴶ⱘˈҪӀᇍ䖭ḋⱘ⇥ᮣЏНⱘ⦄䈵ˈ៪㗙䇈ᇍϸ೑ⱘᬓ⊏ᆊӀⱘᕅડˈᙼᰃᗢМ䆘Ӌⱘ˛䇶䇶ʽ٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ I think – I used Game theory occasionally in my research. I recognize
what a powerful and useful tool it can be for analyzing certain situations. I find that when
I am confronted with these nationalist agendas, that irrationality can undermine some ofthe philosophical assumptions that operate within Game theory. But I agree when we
look at industry and business concerns, we can see that they have tended to act very
rationally with regard to the relationship.

We can see the way that business groups
33特別講演会

attempted to pressurize the Liberal Democratic Party, to pressurize Prime Minister
Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.

But Koizumi’s constant visits to Yasukuni

demonstrate just how important emotion and personality are in the relationship. There
was no obvious political gain for Koizumi to visit Yasukuni. It wasn’t especially popular in
public opinion, it clearly damaged Japan’s diplomacy, it was opposed by most businessgroups, many newspapers, but still he visited. Why? On one level, he was fulfilling apromise he made, but politicians don’t always keep their promises. But he was being
stubborn. He was going because someone has said “No.” And he was a very proud man
who didn’t care what the damage was because he didn’t want anyone to tell him what to do.
It’s very hard to model that kind of personal behavior because what were thebenefits to anybody from Koizumi’s visit to Japan? There was no electoral support, no
economic support, no social support for that. He did it because he could and because hewanted to. That’s why I find politics so fascinating and so unpredictable.
٨มળ̆ ߘࠇߢߪᤨ㑆ߩ೙⚂߽޽ࠅ߹ߔߩߢ‫ᦨߢࠇߎޔ‬ᓟߩ⾰໧ߣߐߖߡ޿ߚߛ߈߹ߔ‫ޕ‬٨᦯ㇱஜᴦ̆ ᗲ⍮ᄢቇߩ᦯ㇱߣ↳ߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬వ↢ߩ߅⹤ࠍ⡬޿ߡᕁ߁ߎߣߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩ࠽࡚ࠪ࠽
࡝࠭ࡓߣਛ࿖ߩ࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓߣ߽ၮᧄ⊛ߦߪหᩮߣ⸒޿߹ߔ߆‫ޔ‬หߓߣߎࠈ߆ࠄᵷ↢ߒߡ޿ࠆࠃ߁ߦᗵߓ߹ߔ‫ޕߔߢࡓ࠭࡝࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡮࡜࠻࡞࠙ޔ߽ߡߞ⸒ߣࡓ࠭࡝࠽࡚ࠪ࠽ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩ႐ว‫ޔ‬੹ߩ࠙࡞࠻࡜࡮࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓߩ߭ߣߟߩ․⦡ߪ‫ޔ‬ㆊ෰ߩᣣᧄߩᒝ޿ᤨઍ‫ࠍࠇߘޔ‬ᙏᙔߒߡ޿
ߊߣߎࠈߦᩮḮ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߦߟߣ߭ߩߘޕ‬บḧߩᬀ᳃࿾ᡰ㈩߇޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬บḧ߇ߘࠇࠍⶋ߼ࠆߣ߁
ࠇߒߊߥࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ㅒߦਛ࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬ㆊ෰ߦଚ⇛ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬㕖Ᏹߦᒙ߆ߞߚ‫ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ዮㄗࠍฃߌߚߣ‫ޔ‬ߎࠇࠍ᥍ࠄߒߚ޿ߣ޿߁ߣߎࠈߦᩮḮ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫߇ࠇߘޕ‬ㄭᐕߩ⚻ᷣഺ⥝ߩߥ߆ߢ᥍ࠄߒߡ޿
ߌࠆߣ޿߁ᗵᖱࠍೝỗߒߡ޿ࠆߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫⚿ޕ‬ዪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߽ਛ࿖߽ߣ߽ߦㆊ෰ߩߣߎࠈ߆ࠄ಴⊒ߒߡ޿ࠆࠃ߁ߦᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ ੹ᓟ‫⸃ࠍࠇߘޔ‬ᶖߒߡ޿ߊߚ߼ߦߪ‫ߦ᧪ᧂޔ‬ะ߆ߞߡߤ߁ߔࠆ߆ߛߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߘޕ‬႐วߦ‫ޔ‬ᤓ੹⸛⼏ߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ᧲ࠕࠫࠕ౒ห૕ߥߤߩ⹤ߒว޿ߩߥ߆ߢᣣਛ෺ᣇߩ࠙࡞࠻࡜࡮࠽࡚ࠪ࠽
࡝࠭ࡓࠍ⸃ᶖߒߡ޿ߊᣇ╷߇޽ࠆߩ߆ߤ߁߆‫᧪ᧂߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔߚ߹ޔ‬ᔒะߩߥ߆ߢ੕޿ߩ࠙࡞
࠻࡜࡮࠽࡚ࠪ࠽࡝࠭ࡓ߇⸃ᶖߢ߈ࠆߩ߆ߤ߁߆‫ޔ‬వ↢ߩ߅⠨߃ࠍ߅㗿޿ߒߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬٨࠺ࠖ࡯ࡦ࠭̆ I often look at extreme nationalism and it almost appears to me to be likea form of mental illness, a refusal to accept one’s own responsibility, a refusal to address
issue in one’s past, blaming somebody else, transferring all your problems, projecting all
your problems – I am married a psychoanalyst so maybe this is why I take this view.
The relationship needs therapy. It needs to talk openly and honestly about its
past. Both sides need to admit where they have been wrong, both sides need to accept
that there is some validity in the position of the other side. Only when these steps weretaken in Europe were the Europeans able to begin to move on and start to have a dialogue
about the present and about the future. And I don’t want to be an Orientalist and imposea European solution on Asia – it would not work. Asians must devise their own ways oftalking and having a dialogue. But only by both sides approaching the past honestly,
accepting shared responsibility, shared mistakes, and a common future can any progress be
made.
34



政冷経熱

٨มળ̆ ᤨ㑆ߩ೙⚂߇޽ࠅ߹ߔߩߢ‫ߢࠇߎޔ‬ၮ⺞⻠Ṷࠍ⚳ࠊࠄߖߡ޿ߚߛ߈ߚ޿ߣᕁ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㕖Ᏹߦ᦭⋉ߥ⻠Ṷߣᵴ⊒ߥ⾰⇼ᔕ╵߳ߩߏෳടߤ߁߽޽ࠅ߇ߣ߁ߏߑ޿߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬35