Interview

Staying with the
Manifesto: An Interview
with Donna Haraway

Theory, Culture & Society0(0) 1–15! The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0263276417693290
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Sarah Franklin
University of Cambridge

Abstract
Donna Haraway’s recent volume, Manifestly Haraway, offers the opportunity not only
to compare two of her most influential writings side-by-side but also to revisit someof the enduring themes of her work over the past several decades. In this interview
with Haraway, feminist science studies scholar Sarah Franklin explores some of the
key terms in her work, looking back to some of her early work on embryology andprimatology as well as exploring the more recent themes of her latest book, Staying
with the Trouble.
Keywords
Capitalocene, compost, cyborg, fabulation, reproduction

Introduction
Donna Haraway is one of the most proliﬁc and inﬂuential theorists of the20th century whose many publications have reached an increasingly global
audience since the turn of the millennium. Her unique voice has become
ever more urgent and necessary during a period when the intersections
between social inequality, environmental decline, mass extinction eventsand increasing economic stratiﬁcation have required boldly creative
responses. Two long-awaited publications in 2016 underline the powerfulcontribution Haraway’s scholarship continues to make to the eﬀort toarticulate a comprehensive politics of more viable world-making in thename of a mutually survivable future. This interview took place inAugust 2016 shortly after the publication of Manifestly Haraway(Minnesota, 2016), a book that brings together two of Haraway’s mostsigniﬁcant essays with an interview by the series editor, Cary Wolfe, andjust before the publication of Haraway’s newest monograph, Staying with
the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Duke, 2016). In her interview,
Sarah Franklin, a long-time reader and admirer of Haraway’s work,
Corresponding author: Sarah Franklin. Email: sbf25@cam.ac.uk
Extra material: http://theoryculturesociety.org/

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Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)explores some of the core themes, key terms, and deﬁnitive writing practices that have enabled audiences from a wide range of backgrounds todraw inspiration from the form as well as the content of Haraway’s work.
Sarah Franklin: Okay. So the ﬁrst term that I wanted to ask you about
comes from the series title. This book is published in the post-humanities
series, and you have said in the past that you have some reservations
about ‘post-human’.1 So could you just say a little bit about that term
and why it is and isn’t useful?
Donna Haraway: ‘Post-human’, I think, is not useful at all, because it
colloquially means enhanced space race and post-space race type human,the kind of human who goes oﬀ-planet for a ﬁnal human trajectory.
It’s fundamentally a teleological term, the word ‘post-human’. ‘Posthumanism’ is another matter altogether. And clearly, ‘post-humanism’
has a wholly diﬀerent meaning for the word. The preﬁx ‘post-’ is a kindof marking of an examination and an inquiry into the histories, andmeanings, and possibilities, and violences, and hopefulnesses of humanism, which has a terribly complicated history. And I don’t feel, by anymeans, comprehensively critical of ‘post-humanism’. How could I? It’s
been a term that’s collected up so much rich work.
That said, I’m not comfortable with the term, except as a kind of
acknowledgement of collegiality and friendship and alliance withpeople for whom the term does a lot of work. And I greatly prefer theterm that Rusten [Hogness, Haraway’s partner] suggested, namely ‘compost’. And for the term ‘human’ – it can, of course, etymologically, go amillion (well, not a million!), but several sorts of ways. It can go toward‘homo-’, and I choose to have that root word mean the kind of parabolic,tragic detumescence of the phallic character ‘Homo’ as fundamentally‘Man’ who looks up and falls down in his tragic detumescence.
That root for ‘homo-’, I think, is a kind of . . . I use it to designate
human exceptionalism, a kind of singularity of the human, fundamentally masculine, no matter the empirical accidents of people collected up
into the category. It is fundamentally Euro, no matter the languages andethnicities and colours of people collected up, and basically, it is a colonizing term in all of its resonances. I’m letting ‘homo-’ do that. By contrast one can take the human equally easily, and indeed, more easily, into
the direction of humus, into the soil, into the multispecies, biotic andabiotic working of the Earth, the earthly ones, those who are in and of
the Earth, and for the Earth. Humus is what is made in soils and incompost, for those who would nurture the Earth. So when I say ‘compost’, it’s more than a joke, though it is also a joke. It’s a refusal to bequite so serious about categories, and to let categories sit a bit lightly
with the complexities of the world. But ‘humus’ is a term I’m very
attached to, that we make with, and we become with each other, as inin compost. We are truly with.

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3That’s why the word ‘companion’ was so important to me. It’s a companioning with, in companion species. It’s not about pets, though pets arealso often companion species. But it’s about companioning. It’s about
being in company with, being at table with. And in compost, we’re attable with, including those who will return us to the Earth in our dying. I
like the word ‘compost’ because it includes living and dying. If you’re incompost, the questions of ﬁnitude and mortality are prominent, not insome kind of depressive or tragic way, but those who will return our ﬂesh
to the Earth are in the making of compost.
And that’s not true, really, in post-humanism. You have to make it
happen. ‘Post-humanism’ is so tied to theoretical discourses, terribly important ones. The making live and making die issues. The question of who isdisposable, who counts. So much really important stuﬀ has happened under
the sign of post-humanism. But I think I just feel more comprehensively
worked by and with compost. By the way, Rusten also suggested in a joke at
breakfast that instead of human-ities we have the humus-ities.
SF: Yes, no, I love that – Humiversities!
DH: Academia sounds very diﬀerent if you bring it to humus.
SF: Well, compost was further down my list, but since we’re on the topic,
it does seem a very rich idiom for many of the things that you’ve been
writing about from the very beginning. It’s a very earthy idiom. It’s about
unpredictable and predictable interactions. It’s about life and death. It’s
about the symbiosis of the human with lots of other things. Clearly, it’swhat you might call a, kind of, quotidian ethicality. How people docompost. Do they do compost? Do they have a compost pile? You
know, how do they feel about composting?
DH: Well, you can do compost badly, which I also like. I like that about
the term. You can neglect your compost. You can put the wrong things
into it, you know, industrial (or, for that matter, organic) meat in it. You
can fail to turn it over. You can put it in an inappropriate place so that it
draws critters who shouldn’t be drawn to compost, and whose lives then
are themselves in danger from people, like raccoons, but who also endanger others. Compost is a place of working, a place of making and unmaking. And it can be a place of failure, including, well, culpable failure.
Compost can be a place of doing badly. And I like that aspect of compost, having had some failed compost piles in my life!
SF: Yes. So I was going to ask you that. Have you currently got a compost pile?
DH: Three, actually. One in this interesting black container with a lid
that’s supplied by the city, which is pretty much where our kitchen waste
goes. We have a container, a ceramic container – actually, no, it’s stainless steel. The ceramic one wasn’t big enough. We have a stainless steel

4Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)container on the sink, where things go on a temporary basis, and thenthey get walked out to the compost pile, which has a lid on it, and grassclippings and stuﬀ go in there too. And then we have a couple of otherpiles that are just, like, tarpaper cylinders with holes poked in them,where more ﬁbrous stuﬀ goes. And we’re not really good at keeping
them all in, you know, state-of-the-art cooking compost conditions.
We never get a high enough temperature. Also, we’ve got hens.
SF: Your compost doesn’t get hot enough.
DH: It doesn’t get hot enough. And the chicken poop goes into thecompost piles. And let’s just say, if they’ve got any bad microbes intheir shit, it’s going to end up in our gardens, because it doesn’t get out.
SF: Yes. Because it’s complicated, compost. In addition to the earthiness,the many piles of mixed ingredients, there’s the fact that it can fail, which
is another big theme in this book, the necessity of being proximate to
failure. You called it an openness to relentless failing. And there are alsoquestions of labour. Because certainly one reason a lot of people don’t docompost is because they don’t have time, or they don’t have space, orthey just don’t like it. They don’t want all that messy stuﬀ right next totheir sink.
DH: And there is also the question of class – that we have a yard speaks
to class. We own a house with a yard, wow! In a world with 20 million or
so just ﬂat out refugees, probably more than that, and more than
65 million people displaced from their homes, not to mention people
with insecure housing of every imaginable kind, or no housing at all,on and on we go. I mean, to have a house with a big enough yard tohave organic gardens and compost piles and hens speaks to class.
Perhaps, in another generation in my own family, it might’ve spoken
to being part of settler-colonial farming. Although, in my case, on myfather’s side, it would’ve spoken to slave-worked plantations.
In other words, I can’t work my compost pile without being in the
midst of the question of how to inherit the multiple histories and themultiple formations that allow this compost pile to be cooking badly in
my yard, you know. They are provocations to becoming more historical,
in the sense of bringing what you inherit into the present so as to somehow become more able to respond.
SF: That’s a very beautiful description. And I’m just going to ask you
one more question about compost before we move on. Is there a divisionof labour in your house about the compost?
DH: Yes. And it’s a multispecies division of labour, of course, because
the ﬂies, and the worms, and the microbes, and the fungi do most of thework, and we try to provide a decent habitat for them. Chickens do a lotof the work because their poop goes into it, and so forth. And Rusten

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5

and I do a good bit of the work. And there’s not much of a genderdivision of labour. Well, no, that’s not true. Rusten turns it over morethan I do. I add to it more than he does. We both work it. It’s not exactly
a gender division of labour, but there’s a little bit of that.
SF: Yes, I think compost is a fascinating subject because there are somany elements of, you know, the politics of everyday life at work inquestions around compost. And of course, the compost question has
become much more prominent now that people are trying to exercise
more responsibility about their domestic space and their domestic
consumption.
DH: And I want to add one tiny, little thing. I don’t think compost
excludes cyborgian politics. It doesn’t exclude cyborg entities at all.
And if one deﬁnes, as I would, as I have always deﬁned ‘cyborg’, interms of speciﬁc historicities, it’s not a synonym for machine. ‘Cyborg’
is not a synonym for robot. It’s not a synonym for shiny, you know,
shiny, metallic or something. It’s rather, speciﬁcally, a cybernetic organism involved in the communication sciences and apparatuses that were
provoked signiﬁcantly by the corporate communications industries, like
Bell Telephone, and the collaborations of World War II and the developments of the Cold War, in particular, its military and surveillance
apparatuses. So I insist that cyborg be taken on in terms of those historicities, and while always exceeding those historicities, even at the
beginning.
‘Cyborg’ includes ‘compost’ the same way it involves the kinds ofworldings and becomings of the contemporary biological sciences, ecological sciences, for example. The way that I, and I think we, think about
and interact with compost through the particular ways we understandmolecular and biological processes, and microbiomes, and nutrition – allthose things involve cyborg sciences fundamentally. Also, as I look out at
my own compost piles, their materiality is cyborgian too – plastic surrounds one of my piles. The history of plastics is there. The particular
structure of class and leisure enabled by the kind of economic system that
I am part of. There’s no way that these things are exclusive of what I
mean by cyborg worldings.
SF: Yes. Absolutely. Well, that opens up lots of directions we could go.
But making a slight shift back to the theme of words you use, and how
you use them, and your thoughts about that, probably the most important more recent word in this respect would be the ‘Anthropocene’, andyour thinking about that term in relation to the ‘Capitalocene’. Could
you just say a little bit about those two terms?
DH: Yes. ‘Anthropocene’ was proposed by a scientist who cared a great
deal about the acidiﬁcation and warming of the oceans, and theanthropogenic processes transforming life on Earth at its most

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Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)fundamental levels.2 If ever there was a cyborg term, it’s ‘Anthropocene’.
If ever there was a cyborg knowledge apparatus that is capable of measuring and making strong knowledge claims on those kinds of scales, theAnthropocene is the embodiment of that kind of scale making.
The term bothers me on several levels, not least the sense that theanthropos is the centre of attention, yet again, and that the trajectoryof destruction that ends in apocalypse, really, is, again, a story of theanthropos, a story of ‘the one who looks up’, which is one of the etymological meanings of ‘anthropos’, and is part of a story of man and mankind, that oﬀers a fundamentally humanist way of naming the trouble
we’re in. It does, of course, correctly name the way that human beings are
key agents – keystone agents, one might say – in the destructive processes
entrained among us. But it does also and unhelpfully tend to universalize
us as a species, and not situate us as human beings – or as a species.
Homo sapiens sapiens, over the last many tens of thousands of years, areill named. The anthropos is in trouble on that score because it tends togeneralize to species.
These are some of the reasons I prefer ‘Capitalocene’. If you could
only have one word, then surely, the history of capitalism – with its
imperatives to extract and grow, its relentless imperatives to expand
itself – would be the better single name, if you wanted a single name.
And that at least throws you back 500 years, say, if you’re serious about
the history of capitalism and its trading zones and extraction zones.
But I also want the term ‘Plantationocene’, partly because the historyof the plantation is fundamental to the history of industrial capitalism,
and the transportation of people and plants, and forced labour systems,
and simpliﬁcation of lifeways into monocropping, run by forced labour,whether it’s wage labour or slave labour. But particularly, slave labour,and the transportation, the destruction of peoples in order to supplantthem with other peoples under conditions of captivity. The forced migrations of organisms, including people, is the Plantationocene – and it’s notover. The oil palm plantations today are probably the most prominent
example, but also soy bean and corn.
The systems of plantation monocropping, and the forced labour of all
the Earth, including the people, but also including the microbes, and theanimals, and the other plants. The Plantationocene is far from over, andit’s a fundamental axis to the Capitalocene. And I think those words
name what’s going on better than ‘Anthropocene’. Also, I need theterm ‘Chthulucene’, that I spell like ‘chthonic’, C-H-T-H. The chthonicones, the entangled, ongoing, generative and destructive beings of the
Earth. It’s really almost a synonym for compost. Although, that’s notquite true, But chthonic is tied to compost.
And Chthulucene is not Lovecraft’s patriarchal Cthulhu monster
thing.3 It’s not Lovecraft at all, but it’s chthonic. The entangled forces
and powers and entities of the Earth are not ﬁnished, and we are of them,

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7

and aligning ourselves, you know, for a situated ﬂourishing which ispresent, not just past. These aren’t just the Ancient Ones, though thechthonic ones are also ancient. It’s rather about reaﬃrming ourselves as,in, of and for the Earth. So I like ‘Chthulucene’. And ‘-cene’, by the way,
the suﬃx ‘-cene’, means kainos, means now, a thick now, the recent times,
the times of now. This now is not an instantaneous point. It’s rather an
expansive temporality of response-ability – the capability to respond.
SF: Yes, responding, which, of course, is one of the main themes of thesecond manifesto, the Companion Species Manifesto [2003], that emphasizes attentiveness, responding, of being able to be responsive in thecontext of not necessarily understanding what’s happening or not needing to, actually. And so if we think about that question – the question‘what have we learned from non-humans?’ – the ﬁrst manifesto is very
much, what have we learned from non-human entities, in particularmachines? And the second is really, what have we learned from nonhuman animals?
DH: Foreground, background, because the ﬁrst one also included themboth. It has a, kind of, a triple boundary breakdown or entanglement –the machine-animal, the machine-organism, the not-just-animal, but also
microbe and plant. Machine organism, human animal, biotic, abiotic –all involved in the cyborgian reformulation of boundaries.
But foreground, background. The ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ [1985] foregrounded the techno entities – including cells and microbes, or cells andmolecules, reconﬁgured as techno entities. Whereas, The Companion
Species Manifesto [2003] didn’t exclude that at all, but foregrounded
the living critters in other kinds of relationships – including relationshipsof labour and play and sport and conquest, the dogs of conquest. It
foregrounded human-critter relationships, particularly animal, otherwise
than the Cyborg Manifesto did. So they’re foreground, backgroundmoves.
SF: One of the comments you made in the interview with Cary Wolfe
that follows the pairing of these two manifestos side by side in your new
book is that since you wrote The Companion Species Manifesto you havethought a lot more about what you might call the agriculture industrial
complex, the large scale farming and animal production methods that
determine the US food supply, as they do in many other developed
countries. So can you say just a little bit about why that took greater
prominence, in retrospect?
DH: Right. I think it took a greater prominence because my friends andcolleagues called me to account for not paying enough attention, andthey called me to account on many levels. I had already been aware ofindustrial agriculture as a problem and so on and so forth. But I reallyhadn’t paid adequate attention to the conditions of labour for animals

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Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)and human beings in industrial-animal factories. I refuse to call it
farming.
You know, I think, Annie Potts is a profound thinker, and actor, andwriter.4 And people like Carol Adams [see Adams, 2016], with whom I
remain in a kind of allied friction, in Anna Tsing’s sense [2011]. I thinkvegan feminists called me to account, and I had to pay attention that I
was really not getting it! Really, no good. And then people like Jocelyn
Porcher [2017] in France, who studies both animal husbandry, of a kindthat I continue to aﬃrm, and meat factories. She has worked with
Vinciane Despret on some projects. You know, she has really searing
ethnographic work on the pork production industry in North America.
And then students, especially Eric Stanley, a former student of mine, adeep thinker, a man who taught me to pay attention to forced life, notjust forced death. And forced life both in the human prison context, butalso in the animal factory context. Eric TA-ed with me and made me pay
attention. So speciﬁc people made me pay attention, and think and feel.
So I think we’re always in process on this. I now have a profoundrespect for veganism as a kind of witness, as a kind of No, a kind of loudNo! as well as an aﬃrmative politics. I am not a vegan, and I remaincommitted to sustainable animal agriculture for many reasons. The kindsof things Thelma Rowell does with her sheep are a good example.5 And apolitics that says, look, you know, pastoralists all over this planet havebeen subject to extraordinary state oppression, and corporate takeovers,and centralization, and on and on we go. And I am committed to the
support of pastoralists’ practices of situated kinds, and situated peoples. I
think indigenous sovereignty politics are involved in quite a lot of thesematters – hunting, for example, the Inuit of the Circumpolar North, andmany more peoples.
I also am not willing to see the critters and peoples who have developed farming over hundreds and even thousands of years become nothing but museum specimens. I think the labour of making food is a goodthing, and it involves killing and eating. So it’s not about innocence,
which has never drawn me . . . I am against pro-life politics, whether
one is talking about abortion politics or the question of our relationshipto working animals, because I think pro-life politics are exterminationistat their root. And that gets me in friction with many of my allies. And it’sa moving issue. I don’t know where I will come out. It’s not a teleologicalprocess. But I do know the struggles have intensiﬁed for me.
SF: Yes, that expression, ‘forced life’, has an interesting relation to thehistory of horticulture and farming and the plantation. It’s a way ofdescribing a relationship to the living in terms of what’s necessary toorganize the systems that are essential to organize production. I suppose
you could say that’s something that Marx didn’t really pay so muchattention to. He seemed to take the fertility of the soil a bit for granted.
Whereas, in fact, reproducing that fertility has been crucial to industrial

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capitalism, as well as to agriculture. So what is the sense of forcing, foryou, in forced life? Is it just control?
DH: No. It’s more than that. Because control is not always a bad term,for one thing. And I think control in agriculture, control in farming,
control in raising a puppy, you know. I dare anyone to raise a wellmannered and happy puppy without engaging in practices of control,
including controlling oneself!
SF: Yes, I agree. [both laughing]
DH: Anyhow, no, I actually think forced life, in the ways that I’m using it
and that Eric taught me, and that I think you’re using it [Franklin, 2013],
has to do with a kind of organization of all of the forces of generativity
toward extraction and proﬁt. It’s about extraction for proﬁt, and notliving. It’s not the organization of the forces of life and death for ﬂourishing, but rather for extractive proﬁt.
SF: Yes. Which is what the plantation epitomizes, in a sense. The very
integrated organization of life in such a way that extraction can be
maximized.
DH: Exactly, especially through violent simpliﬁcation. You know, when
Anna Tsing and I taught one of our geo-feminism seminars together, andwe read The Wide Sargasso Sea,6 we spent time on some other things,
too. We spent a lot of time talking about slave gardens in the Caribbean,
and the importance of the slave gardens. They were, of course, for foodand survival. They were also for beauty. And they were for a kind of
autonomy. Autonomy is not quite the right word. A kind of coming topossess oneself in the slave gardens, to a degree anyway. They wereplaces of growth and partial ﬂourishing, partial resistance. The slave
gardens, I think, have not gotten near enough attention in the historyof plantations. They’ve gotten some, but I think there’s a lot more roomfor understanding what still is to be inherited from the practice of slave
gardens.
SF: Yes. Absolutely. Yes. Well, the slave garden brings us in a sense to
the term ‘reproduction’. I know that in your work ‘reproduction’ hassometimes meant, sort of, the same old, you know . . .
DH: Reproduction of the same.
SF: Yes, the tyranny of the same. As in ‘Let’s do symbiotic, lateral genetransfer – that’s much more interesting than reproduction’! But at
another level, reproduction has been really critical to your work, both
reproduction as in narrative, and metanarrative – the myth of the Gardenof Eden and all that. And in terms of labour, especially in the, sort of,old-fashioned socialist feminist idea of mode of reproduction being prior
to and fundamental to productive work. You could say that a lot of your

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Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)work is about the politics of reproduction, in one form or another, evencompost, you know. So just tell me a little bit about your thoughts aboutthat term, and how you use it.
DH: I can’t use the term ‘reproduction’ without the term ‘production’.
Reproduction and production go together, and call up a complex historically-situated set of practices, worlding practices, world-making practices
that necessarily involve the biological processes of bodies, and in particular, women’s reproductive labour in its entire comprehensive sense of
making lives, and of bringing lives to the possibility of their taking oﬀ
and having lives of their own. Bringing children to mature adulthood is
one of the meanings of ‘reproduction’. And the importance of things likehousing, and freedom to move, and the, you know, the conditions of joy
that make lives possible.
All of that is involved in reproduction and in production. The kinds oflabour in play, labour in . . . The kinds of generative expression in
making. So production and reproduction are, of course, particularly,
categories of this thing called the West. Marilyn Strathern and you are
the key people for me, you know, in excavating the many ways that
production and reproduction are Euro categories, which is not an
insult [Strathern, 1980; Franklin, in press]. That doesn’t make thembad or unusable. It situates them. They are Euro categories that wereexpanded into the world through colonialism primarily, through capitalism, and its apparatuses, and falsely universalized, as both you andMarilyn have insisted.
So the making persons that Marilyn in The Gender of the Gift [1988]
and elsewhere worked so beautifully . . . She and her colleagues, whoworked in Melanesia especially, have really foregrounded for us andmade available for us whole kinds of world making and conceptual systems. Real practices as well, and including conceptual apparatuses, about
the making of persons, and the diﬀerence between dividuals and individuals. Individuals are produced by reproduction. Dividuals are produced
through other kinds of material exchanges in substance-making matters.
All of that has felt fundamental to being an adult in the world, an adultfeminist in the world.
And then my, really, bone-deep fury, and horror, and fear, and not
being happy about there being 7.4 billion human beings on this planet
right now. And if we’re incredibly lucky, by the end of the century, we –species, human – I don’t know, whoever the ‘we’ is, there’re likely to bewell over 11 billion people – if we’re lucky. If there is widespread global
war, it will only make the numbers worse. Although it is an engine ofsuﬀering, disaster will not, does not, ultimately depopulate. Quite theopposite, actually, which is another horror. So I know why population
is just a third-rail topic for feminists. The misogynism, the eugenics, theimperialism, the racism, the forced sterilization, the on and on we go.

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I know a lot about the history of population as a category in practice.
I’m reading Alison Bashford’s book, Global Population [2014], and she
knows a lot more than I do! I know all of this. And yet, somehow, all ofthese discussion do not make me let go of the category of population
because I think we need it to do work, however problematic. Bashford’s
study is really deep, and she oﬀers a non-aligned critical excavation ofheavy, immense, folded and layered sedimentations of Malthusian apparatuses, of population apparatuses. That said, 7-plus billion is not just an
abstract number. There’s something about actually needing to ﬁgure out
how to be . . . to notice as feminists, again, and as more than feminists,that we really truly are well more than 7 billion human beings on thisplanet.
And I don’t care how distributed, and how just, and how anti-imperialist, we are trying to be about all of this. This matter is just immense,and far from over. And I think what characterizes our time, what, the lastfew decades and the upcoming decades, are getting at is that this is notjust about the well-being of human beings. It’s really about extinction
crises and destruction crises. It’s about ecological obliteration throughturning all of the Earth into nothing but a resource for keeping humanbeings alive and growing. And I don’t think feminists are talking about
this, and it’s really not okay. Obviously, the conversation has to remain
tuned to its fraught histories and to the diﬀerential devastation wrought
primarily (but not only) by the rich in wealthy regions, all of that.
SF: Yes, well, it’s not, and as you say there’s deﬁnitely room for a different set of conversations about population, about what the term evenmeans. And I agree, there’s really not a lot of space for that at the
moment, and it’s a very apt focus to bring forward. So speaking ofbringing things forward, in addition to the Chthulian manifesto that I
think is waiting inside you, or has been seeded, or is already coming into
being, there’s another one, which might even come before then, which is‘Make Kin Not Babies’. Is there going to be a Make Kin Not Babies
manifesto?
DH: Well, there’s going to be a short, sharp, provocative paper writtenvery soon!
SF: Right. It’s imminent then?
DH: Yes, because Adele Clarke and I composed a panel at the 4S lastNovember [2015] called ‘Make Kin Not Babies’. And we were six
thinkers, feminist thinkers together – Alondra Nelson, Kim TallBear,
Chia-Ling Wu, Michelle Murphy, me, and Adele Clarke. Not all inagreement about everything (for example, Michelle Murphy and I are
in a relation of generative friction over the category of population, which
she thinks cannot be used anymore for what we need to do), but we shareconcerns under the label of ‘make kin not babies’. Especially the making

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Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)kin part, making kin other than genealogically. It’s not like genealogicalconnection somehow becomes bad, and that family should just be tossedaway in its various connections through genealogies. And again, you’re
one of my big teachers on the whole history of genealogy.
But making kin otherwise, making kin in both old and new ways.
Making kin that endure, that cross over generations, over long times
and short times. Making kin, otherwise, not babies, so as to be partof, over the next couple of hundred years, moving human numbers
down, radically down. But radically down where environmental justiceis a means and not just an end, so that we pay serious attention tomultispecies ﬂourishing, including issues of race and class and region
for human beings, as means of making kin, not babies.
That’s my political speculative fabulation. And feminist speculative
fabulation has a deep feminist history; speculative fabulation in the feminist mode is powerful. Feminist SF must be tuned to making kin,
exuberantly and creatively, not to making babies. Making babies, evenrare and precious ones, is actually quite diﬀerent to actually giving all
babies half a chance to have a good childhood, which is, on the whole,
not a priority anywhere these days. I’m actually terribly pro-child. I am
seriously and strongly pro-child. And I think feminist politics have beenleading, we’ve been leaders, I think, in understanding what it takes to be
pro-child, and pro-growing up well, having, you know, seriously vibrantcommunities. I also think the immigration issues among us worldwide
are fundamental to the project of making kin, not babies.
There are plenty of babies in the world. The eugenic nationalists just
don’t think that they’re the right babies. So we now have eugenic nationalist pro-natalisms in Singapore, Taiwan, Denmark, so forth, on andon we go.
SF: Yes, very true. And the future of those questions will link up withyour Chthulian manifesto, so maybe they will together produce someinteresting oﬀspring.
DH: Who knows? I’m an old lady now, and I refuse to do that. You
know, I refuse to do any more work!
SF: Good luck with that one, Donna! So, Donna, I’m going to ask you
one ﬁnal question. And I just would like to start with the observationthat so many of the things you’ve said about ethical responsiveness,about paying attention to labour, about, you know, the need to makenew, sometimes, fragile and diﬃcult kinds of aﬃnity that may well fail.
This is all very evident in your writing, at the level of citation, because
one of the things that’s very noticeable in both of the manifestos and inyour interview in Manifestly Haraway, and now, as we’re speaking, is thecare and attention you give to other scholars. It’s really quite remarkable.
And I wonder if you could just say a little bit about the way that
informs your work, and the politics of that kind of responsibility andFranklin

13

attention about writing and scholarship as they relate to these otherquestions? Because it seems to me that they do, and that one of thethings you manifest is a kind of generosity, reaching out, listening tothings that might be diﬃcult, and engaging with things that change
your mind, you know.
DH: That makes me feel all . . . It makes me feel really good, for you to
say that. I care about those things a lot. And I think I have a strong
personality and a strong I. I’m also acutely aware in ways that make me
feel more alive, not less, of how much that I is composed of we, and is an
ongoing practice of, you know, profound pleasure in the ongoing natureof friendship, and political aﬃnity, and family, and colleagueship, that it
has been such a life-giving experience.
And so I do pay deliberate attention to citation. I have some little
protocols I run through, you know, when I write a paper or give a talk, to
try not . . . to try to make sure I haven’t missed anything really big, or toat least, you know, to try to make clear to any readership or audience
how much of a collaborative work any work is. I care about that a lot.
And I do ﬂat-out protocol things along several axes to make sure, andI’m terribly embarrassed when I screw up, and somebody writes me andsays, you know, you used my painting, but I didn’t hear my name. I don’t
like that at all . . .
SF: When you say protocol, does that mean a certain kind of comprehensive search? Or what’s the protocol?
DH: It isn’t that systematic, but there’s a little list. I notice if I have citednothing but white people, if I have erased indigenous people, if I forget
non-human beings, etc. I notice on purpose. I notice if I haven’t paid theslightest bit of attention . . . You know, I run through some old-fashioned, klutzy categories. Race, sex, class, region, sexuality, gender, species. I pay attention. I know how fraught all those categories are, but I
think those categories still do important work. I have developed a, kindof, alert system, an internalized alert system.
So when I went through my citation apparatus for Staying with the
Trouble, I was aware that I had really been reshaped by a lot of indigenous
sovereignty struggles going on right now, but had really been awfully muteabout African American things, for example, in that the question of alliances around environmental justice hadn’t gotten enough attention. And I
tried . . . You know, it wasn’t possible to ﬁx it, but it was possible to cite it
well enough to highlight the fact that the book doesn’t do a good enoughjob. So I’m interested in the citation apparatus, not just noting what it
does do, but showing what it just is pointing at, but really hasn’t done.
SF: Yes. Well, Donna, I just want to end this interview by thanking you forthe two amazing manifestos that you’ve put in the book, and for describing
the two forthcoming manifestos that I’m already looking forward to, and14

Theory, Culture & Society 0(0)for discussing lots of aspects of your own work, and for ending with such agenerous description of how you write in a way that manifests so many of
the things that you describe politically. So thank you very much. It’s very
inspiring. And it’s always a great pleasure to speak to you, Donna.
Notes
1. See Haraway (2004, 2006) for critical discussions of ‘post-humanism’.
2. The term ‘Anthropocene’ has been variously used and reinvented since the1960s. However, the atmospheric chemist and Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen
and the ecologist Eugene Stoermer popularized the 21st-century sense of theterm as it is used in the still-pending proposal to the International Union of
Geological Sciences to add ‘Anthropocene’ as a formal unit succeeding the
Holocene to the Geologic Time Scale. See further at: http://quaternary.stra
tigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/
3. H.P. Lovecraft is the author of The Call of the Cthulu and Other Dark Tales,
New York: Barnes and Noble (2009).
4. Annie Potts is a New Zealand animal studies scholar and the author of many
works, including Chicken (2011).
5. Thelma Rowell is a former Berkeley primatologist who has spent three decades companioning and observing a flock of semi-feral Soay sheep on her hillfarm in Yorkshire. See further in Haraway (1988), Despret (2006) andFranklin (2007).
6. Jean Rhys’s 1966 novel is written as a prequel to Charlotte Bronte’s novel
Jane Eyre, and is set in Jamaica, Dominica and England in the 1830s, shortly
following the British Slavery Abolition Act of 1833.

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Despret, Vinciane (2006) Sheep do have opinions. In: Latour, Bruno andWeibel, Paul (eds) Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 360–370.
Franklin, Sarah (2007) Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Franklin, Sarah (2013) Biological Relatives: IVF, Stem Cells and the Future ofKinship. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Franklin, Sarah (in press) Feminism and reproduction. In: Flemming, Rebecca,
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Haraway, Donna (2003) The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People andSignificant Otherness. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press.

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Sarah Franklin is the Director of the Reproductive Sociology ResearchGroup (ReproSoc) at the University of Cambridge, where she holds the
Chair of Sociology. Her published work has explored many aspects of
new reproductive and genetic technologies, and she writes on gender andkinship theory as well as science studies.