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一般財団法人平 和・安 全 保 障 研 究 所

Research Institute for Peace and Security

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research institution
established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues of national andinternational peace and security, publishes research reports, and proposes policy
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The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security), which surveys
the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded by both theacademic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars for specialists andthe public on national, regional, and international security and sponsors joint research projects
with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation'sCenter for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue security
studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors to security studies inJapan.

The RIPS Policy Perspectives is intended to provide timely alternatives to and analyses ofexisting peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The views of theauthors are their own and do not represent the official position of the RIPS.

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All rights reserved. No part of this booklet may be reprinted or reproduced without permission in writing fromthe publisher.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 20

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation

Series 3

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 ..................................................................................................................... 1
Masashi Nishihara, China’s Assertive Conduct Leads to the Expansion of Japan’s
Security Role

Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................... 6
Yoji Koda, Responses to Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: A Japanese
PerspectiveChapter 1
China’s Assertive Conduct Leads tothe Expansion of Japan’s Security Role

Masashi Nishihara
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

1. New Tensions in East Asia

Between late November 2013 and June 2014, the biggest concern for East Asian
security was China’s assertive conduct, which was creating new tensions between
China and the countries it was targeting. The balance of power, however, remained infavor of the latter, especially as U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed his strong
support of regional security during his trip to Asia in April 2014. China’s diplomatic
isolation in East Asia thus continues.
On November 23, China unilaterally established an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea, a zone that covers the Senkakus. Then on May 24 andJune 11, Chinese fighters flew dangerously close to Japanese fighters and transports. In
early May, China began installing a huge oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam. In
response, Vietnam mobilized ships to disrupt the rigging operation and permitted
street demonstrations in some of its major cities, which resulted in the deaths of some
Chinese.
In December 2013 and in early April 2014, respectively, Vice President Joe Biden and
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Beijing to try to persuade the Chinese torescind their establishment of the ADIZ, but to no avail. Japan also condemned China’s
actions, and in return, China’s top leaders continued to refuse to hold a summit
meeting with their Japanese counterparts.
In late April 2014, President Obama visited four East Asian capitals to reaffirm theUnited States’ response to their respective security concerns, including a new military
cooperation agreement with the Philippines. Not surprisingly, Beijing was very criticalof his trip, and on May 21, in his speech at the Conference on Interaction andConfidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, President Xi Jinping stated
Policy Perspectives No. 20-1-that “Asian security should be discussed among Asian people themselves,” implyingthat Americans and Australians should be excluded.
On May 30 and May 31, both Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Secretary Hagel spokeat the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, respectively, stressing the need for the rule oflaw to be observed in settling territorial disputes. Then in a speech on June 1,
Lieutenant General Wang Guangzhong, deputy chief of the People’s Liberation Army’s
General Staff, attacked Abe and Hagel for having “coordinated” with each other andmaking “provocative” remarks about China. But China, receiving little support, wasnearly isolated in the meeting.
President Obama also moved to strengthen the United States’ position in East Asia
by mediating between Japan and South Korea. The trilateral summit at the U.S.
embassy in The Hague that he hosted in late March was the first time that Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and President Park Geun-hye had met since they took office. They
talked primarily about North Korea’s missile and nuclear issues and avoided thorny
bilateral issues. The U.S. interest here was to keep the trilateral coalition intact and toprevent South Korea from leaning toward China in security matters. Then in early July,
the trilateral meeting of these countries’ top military leaders met in Hawaii.
President Obama’s visit to Asia was meant to reconfirm the United States’ close ties
to Tokyo, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila. In Tokyo, the president publicly referredto the United States’ treaty obligation to help defend the Senkakus, and in Manila, he
confirmed his support of the newly signed Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement(EDCA). All this should have signaled Beijing that China must respect the rule ofinternational law in settling territorial disputes.

2. China’s Shift to Tactical Self-Restraint

In response to the tension between China and those East Asian countries worried
about its coercive behavior, China began to pull back and gesture toward joining thesecurity community. This shift, however, should be understood as a tactical decision.
To wit: for the last few months, Chinese fishing boats, coast guard, and naval ships
have maintained a low-key presence around the Senkakus, compared with the highly
risky and dangerous incident on February 5, 2013, when a Chinese naval ship directed
its fire-control radar to a Japanese destroyer. In contrast, Chinese ships defending theoil rig in the South China Sea have used only water cannons, not guns, against
Policy Perspectives No. 20-2-1Vietnamese ships.

Even though President Xi Jinping maintains that Asian security should be discussed
only among Asians, the Chinese navy participated in the biennial Western PacificNaval Symposium, held in Qingtao in April. The symposium, led by the United States
Navy, adopted the “code for unplanned encounters at sea” (CUES) by unanimous
agreement. Despite its having been proposed ten years ago, the Chinese opposed thecode because, they asserted, the word code implied legal force. Also this year, for the
first time, China is participating in RIMPAC, the U.S.-led multinational naval exercisethat was held off Hawaii in July. China sent four ships, including its second largest
destroyer, which reflects its desire to participate in this multinational exercise and to
conform to the U.S.-led multinational rules.
Thus China has two faces, a coercive face pressing those East Asian countries withterritorial disputes to give up their claims and trying to drive the United States out of
the Western Pacific. But it also has a concessionary face willing to work with the UnitedStates and its like-minded partners in Asia. It seems safe to assume that the first face isstrategic and the second one is tactical. Indeed, President Xi Jinping revealed China’strue strategic motives in his remarks in June 2013 when he stated that “the Pacific isvast enough to accommodate two large powers.” China wants the western half of the
Pacific Ocean under its own sphere of influence, thereby placing Japan under China’s
control, an idea that recalls President Xi’s assertion that Asian security should be
discussed only among Asians.

3. Japan’s Decision to Expand Its Security RoleOn July 1, 2014, the Abe government announced that it would revise theinterpretation of Japan’s constitution so as to permit Japan to exercise its right tocollective self-defense, as sanctioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter. After that, theJapanese government would proceed to revise those laws related to its Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) to put into practice the notion of collective self-defense and then revise

1

In mid-July, China withdrew the big oil rig that it installed in early May, explaining that it hadcompleted its research earlier than expected. The withdrawal also may be interpreted as a tactical moveto avoid strong criticism by the ASEAN nations, the United States, Japan, and Australia.
Policy Perspectives No. 20-3-the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. The revised laws and the revised
guidelines would accordingly expand the SDF’s security role, thereby strengthening
the alliance. The Abe government’s main reason for wanting to reinterpret Article 9 is
to be able to respond to threats by North Korea, China, Iran, and the like.
If and when the SDF is able to exercise the right to collective self-defense, it could,
for example, help defend U.S. warships operating outside Japanese territory, such as in
the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and perhaps the South China Sea. This expansion
also would strengthen Japan’s partnership with such Southeast Asian countries as
Vietnam and the Philippines.
The U.S. Defense Department issued a statement on July 1 that welcomed the Abegovernment’s decision. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, however,expressed concern that Japan may deviating from the path to peaceful development
long held in the postwar period. The South Korean Foreign Ministry also issued asimilarly critical statement, demanding that Japan revise any defense-related laws
more transparently. It also insisted that it could not accept Japan’s taking part in any
situation involving the security of the Korean peninsula and its national interests
without Korea’s request and agreement.
As the South Korean and Chinese reactions indicate, today both the two countries
have taken a critical position against Japan. This was demonstrated during President Xi
Jinping’s visit to Seoul on July 3. He and President Park Geun-hye issued a statementthat included the beginning of joint research on Japan’s wartime use of “comfort
women.” Therefore, because it is in Japan’s interest to prevent China and South Korea
from also jointly “ganging up” on it, Abe announced on the same day that Japan would
lift some of the sanctions imposed on North Korea, in return for the latter’s willingness
to help investigate North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens. It was Abe’s way of
discouraging South Korea from leaning toward Beijing. Indeed, the Abe government’s
new security policy will actually strengthen Japan’s defense posture and make thecountry a more credible partner in its alliance with the United States as well as astronger supporter of regional peace, giving South Korea a strategic advantage inworking with Japan.

Policy Perspectives No. 20-4-4. An Assertive China Deepens Japan’s Security Concerns

Japan’s decision to strengthen its security role is being driven primarily by China’s
actions in the region. Japan has paid close attention to China’s ever increasing military
budgets and military capabilities as well as its decision to impose its ADIZ without
consulting Tokyo. Chinese jet fighters scrambling against Japanese planes are a worry
for the Japanese government. Perhaps more important, China’s search for weak spots in
the South China Sea and gradually but coercively expanding its presence there has
shown Japan how China later may act in the East China Sea.
As China becomes stronger, it is becoming hegemonic in its desire for domination
over the two Koreas. Consequently, China’s growing political “alliance” with South
Korea will enhance its presence there, in addition to its overwhelming influence over
North Korea, although at the moment President Xi Jinping and the North Koreanleader Kim Jong Un are not on good terms. Therefore, unless Japan and the UnitedStates find ways to restrain China’s influence on the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia’s
strategic landscape may drastically change.

Policy Perspectives No. 20-5-Chapter 2
Responses to Rising Tensions in the South China Sea
A Japanese Perspective
Yoji Koda
Vice Admiral (Retired), JMSDF
Today the situation in the South China Sea is extremely dangerous, with a larger riskof escalating into military clashes between China and the nations in the region thanthat between Japan and China in the East China Sea.
In May of this year, China began exploratory drilling for oil in a contested exclusive
economic zone (EEZ), a move strongly resisted by Vietnam. Besides attracting theworld’s attention to its aggression, China also may have misinterpreted the last,
relatively calm, forty years as Vietnamese complacency in regard to territorial
ownership.

1. China’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea

China has drawn “a strategic line” connecting Sanya (Hainan Island), Woody Island(Paracel Islands), and Johnson South Reef (Spratly Islands). The distance from Sanya to
Johnson South Reef is about 1,200 kilometers (750 miles or 650 nautical miles). The
distance between Sanya and Woody Island is 700 kilometers (440 miles or 380 nautical
miles), and that between Woody Island and Johnson South Reef is about 900 kilometers(560 miles or 490 nautical miles). [Map-1]
Hainan Island and Woody Island are located in an ideal position to control Tonkin
Bay and the coastline of northern and central Vietnam, a future key nation in regional
security. These islands also are in a good place to keep an eye on, and possibly takemilitary measures against, the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The location of Johnson
South Reef, in the middle of Paracel Islands, is well positioned to link Woody Islandand Sanya, as well as to keep a close watch on the sea lines of communications in the2South China Sea.

2

In addition to these three island groups are four clusters of banks, shoals, and sea mountains, most ofwhich are submerged in the vast central South China Sea (740 kilometers (460 miles or 400 nautical
miles) north to south, and 430 kilometers (279 miles or 230 nautical miles) between the three islandgroups. A breakdown of their locations is eight shoals and sea mountains in the north, nine shoals andPolicy Perspectives No. 20-6-Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands, offers various facilities, including anairport with a 2,400-meter (7,900-foot) runway with a parallel taxiway, as well as threeports. Despite China’s campaign to promote the island as a leisure resort, the island isregarded as a core military base for its navy and air force because of its size andwell-developed infrastructure. For decades, Woody Island has been a stepping-stone
for China’s maritime expansion into the South China Sea. It is important strategicallynot only to China but also to other nations in the region.
In addition, China has begun reclaiming a huge lagoon in Johnson South Reef, which
it seized from Vietnam in 1988. The reef is about 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles) from northto south and 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) from east to west. A deep channel runs throughthe middle of the lagoon from north to south, opening to the sea at the north.
According to various media reports and news releases by the Philippine government,
China seems to be reclaiming the eastern half of the lagoon and plans to build a one
jet-capable 2,500-meter (8,200-foot) runway, with a parallel taxiway and other facilities,
including several ports and piers to accommodate deep-draft ships. The reclamationand construction of facilities reportedly are to be completed in the next several years.
Johnson South Reef thus has a huge potential for Chinese military use. For the firsttime, China will have a secure foothold in the Spratly Islands, one that is far larger andmore capable than anything the thirteen islands and reefs, which have a potential for3

military use, controlled by four other nations have. In future contests for power in theSouth China Sea, this reclaimed reef will surely be a game changer. China will have
two bases in the South China Sea: one on Woody Island in the north and the other on
Johnson South Reef in the south. [Map-1]

sea mountains in the east, four shoals and sea mountains in the south, and fourteen shoals in the west.
3

Since 1988 China has gradually seized other small outcroppings in the Spratlys and expanded its control.
However, as of June 2014, China still had failed to take over any of twelve “major” islands and reefs,
controlling only ten small outcroppings and reefs. The current breakdown of those countries that
control the thirteen islands is six by the Philippines, five by Vietnam, one by Taiwan, and one by
Malaysia. Four islands that have short airstrips with parallel taxiways are Itu Aba Island (1,150 meters[3,800 feet], Taiwan), Thitu Island (1,800 meters [5,900 feet], the Philippines), Spratly island (500 meters[1,700 feet], Vietnam), and Swallow Reef (1,300 meters [4,300 feet], Malaysia). Except for Thitu Island,
the airstrips on the other three islands are not suitable for jets or large aircraft.
Policy Perspectives No. 20-7-Source: Author

Being in the middle of the Spratly Islands, Johnson South Reef is in an ideal location
to control most of sea lines of communication and naval/maritime activities in theSouth China Sea. In this way, China’s strategic chain of islands in the South China Sea,
demarcated by its unilaterally claimed “nine-dashed / nine-dotted line,” will complete
its plan to expand its presence. This is bound to have a huge impact on the strategies of
the Asian regional coastal nations, Japan, and the United States.
Another place that deserves attention is Scarborough Shoal, which China seizedfrom the Philippines in 2012. It is the only shoal in the eastern part of the South China
Sea near the Philippines that is not submerged. Since China lacks a stronghold tocontrol the eastern South China Sea, it is likely to reclaim part of the shoal for militaryfacilities.

Policy Perspectives No. 20-8-2. Primary Objectives of China’s Territorial Claims

China has several objectives for establishing monopoly control over the entire islands
and water area within the “nine-dashed line” in the South China Sea. First, control ofthis area would protect its southern front. Second, China wants to establish an EEZ thatguarantees its free and unimpeded access to all maritime natural resources. Then,through its free access to oil deposits and other natural resources in the seabed, it will
be able to prepare for any future shortages of land-based resources.
China also wants to build a strategic nuclear strike capability, comparable to that of
the United States. But because it has no long-range bombers, an important part of
TRIAD, it depends more on nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) andnuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) than the United States and Russia
do. So far, to test its missile launches, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has
kept its nuclear submarines in the Bohai Sea between the Liaodong and Shandong
peninsulas, though a recent media report reveals that PLAN has completed
construction of a new nuclear submarine base in Hainan Island.
The base in Hainan Island has a serious drawback, however. Unlike the Bohai Sea,
the Hainan base directly faces the South China Sea. PLAN submarines operating fromthe risky base thus are exposed to the US Navy’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces.
Nonetheless, PLAN is determined to carry out a plan to exert more sea control, withthe two major strongholds of Woody Island and Johnson South Reef as key. The
reclamation of Johnson South Reef is the more important, as it is here that PLAN willbuild an air base for its aviation-ASW force, to protect against the SSNs of the US Navyand other neighbor navies. Likewise, if China converts the eastern Scarborough Shoal
into another ASW base, PLAN’s ASW capability will be substantially enhanced.
The South China Sea is an area where several vital sea lines of communications(SLOCs) connect the Malacca Strait / Singapore and the Luzon Strait / Bashi Channel,
which are the lifelines of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China itself, as well as of theUnited States and other Pacific nations. Control of the South China Sea thus is criticalto China, so the geographic locations of Hainan Island, Woody Island, Johnson South
Reef (if fully reclaimed), and perhaps also Scarborough Shoal are strategicallysignificant. From this perspective, although Itu Aba Island (Taiwan), Thitu Island (thePhilippines), Spratly Islands (Vietnam) and Swallow Reef (Malaysia) are smaller andhave only shorter single runways. [Map-1]

Policy Perspectives No. 20-9-3. Southeast Asia’s Response

Faced with China’s growing naval capabilities, the Southeast Asian nations have
responded by acquiring submarines and launching ambitious submarine programs.
According to some reports, the Indonesian navy has started an aggressive submarine
program to introduce two Type-209 boats from South Korea and twenty-four
additional submarines of an undetermined class by 2024, although other reports
indicate the number as twelve, not twenty-four.
The Malaysian navy is operating the two latest Perdana-Menteri–class submarines,
which represent the most recent Scorpene class of French-Spanish development.
Singapore’s navy has two Archer- and four Challenger-class boats, which were,respectively, Vaastergotlands and Sjoormens of the Swedish navy. Although thesesubmarines are twenty to forty years old, they have been thoroughly refurbished andare considered suitable assets for the Singaporean navy. It is also reported that theSingaporean navy has a plan to replace these old boats by new ones in the near future.
Although details of the program are not yet known, the Vietnamese navy has begun
acquiring six Kilo-class submarines. According to media reports, the first two weretransferred to the Vietnamese navy in 2013 and early this year. Thailand’s navy also isreported to acquire several submarines.
When completed, the submarine forces of all these Southeast Asian navies will be arobust conventional deterrent force against PLAN’s surface force, especially its aircraft
carrier battle group(s), which may operate in the South China Sea. This capability
could form an integral part of the Association of Southeast Nations’ (ASEAN)
anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the future, although these submarine
forces will complicate overall control of the South China Sea.
In addition, the region’s water space must be managed effectively in order toguarantee the safe navigation of submarines operating in the relatively small area of
the South China Sea. Unfortunately, there is no functioning control mechanism for thispurpose today, so a water-space management scheme must be established before alarge number of submarines are deployed. Also, as the number of submarines
operating in the South China Sea increases, the possibility of submarine accidents willrise as well. In general, a nation that has submarines is responsible for its own
submarine rescue capability, but a multinational rescue framework involving all thesubmarine-deploying navies in the region would be desirable. The Southeast Asian
Policy Perspectives No. 20- 10 -

nations therefore should create both a water-space management scheme and amultinational rescue framework as soon as possible. These also should help promote a
new type of regional naval cooperation.

4. The United States’ “Freedom of Navigation” Response

The position of successive US governments on territorial disputes in the South China
Sea has been clear: The United States does not support any specific nation’s claims.
Instead, it encourages nations to settle their problems by peaceful means. The US
government is likely to adhere to this policy in the future.
Accordingly, the position of the US government has been neutral vis-à-vis China on
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But with the recent quick and substantialbuildup of China’s naval capability, the United States started reemphasizing its
fundamental position on the South China Sea problems, now citing “freedom ofnavigation” as one of its key national interests. Therefore, if the United States interprets
any conflict in the South China Sea as interfering with its national interest, it may
decide to intervene. This U.S. policy should give pause to China’s aggression, which
may be why, at an ASEAN’s foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012,
China showed some signs of concession on the code of conduct (COC) for the South
China Sea.

5. How should we cooperate to cope with China in the South China Sea?

To promote multinational efforts to cope with China, the nations in the region could
undertake the following initiatives:(1) Support the Southeast Asian nations’ maritime capacity building, especially thatof Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s unilateral maritime expansion in the South
China Sea is causing serious frictions with the region’s coastal nations, particularly thePhilippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. It also has caused deep concerns amongthe “nondisputing” nations, Indonesia and Singapore. In particular, both thePhilippines and Vietnam are facing strong pressure from China’s maritime expansion
in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The United States, together with Japan and Australia,
should develop a robust joint action plan as soon as possible to support and implement
the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s capacity building.
Policy Perspectives No. 20- 11 -

(2) Stop China’s reclamation of Johnson South Reef and Scarborough Shoal. Only oneof these islands has a jet-capable air base: Woody Island in Paracel Islands. It is no
surprise, then, that China started land reclamation at Johnson South Reef in late 2012and may do the same in the eastern Scarborough Shoal. If military facilities on the twoislands are completed, the strategic power balance in the South China Sea will be
substantially and irretrievably lost.
Claimants to both Johnson South Reef and Scarborough Shoal should refrain fromunilateral action, including reclamation. Moreover, reclamation on top of coral reefs
and use of coral reefs as landfill destroy the area’s natural environment. For thesereasons as well, the United States, together with Japan and Australia, should team up
to help Vietnam and the Philippines. Especially Chana’s high-handed challenge againstpreservation of natural environment in the great South China, i.e., unilateral
destruction and killing of live-coral in the Johnson South Reef, must be stopped, or atleast be made as an international issue which should call for interested nations toconvene an international conference to discuss the matter.
(3) Help build up Vietnam’s maritime capabilities. As quickly as possible, Vietnam,
which is under the strongest pressure of China, should develop an appropriate
maritime domain awareness capability that includes its airspace. In addition and at thesame time, the current maritime strength and capability of the Vietnamese navy andcoast guard needs to be upgraded in both quantity and quality. Although the UnitedStates should support these efforts, they are primarily the responsibility of theVietnamese government as a sovereign nation.
(4) The United States should promote freedom of navigation. Despite the US
government’s insistence on freedom of navigation, in recent years, its action vis-à-vis
China has often failed to match its strong statements. A typical example is China’s
underhanded seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and 2013 from the Philippines’
territorial control. Another example is the recent skirmish between Vietnamese andChinese ships, prompted by China’s moving in its oil rig. The United States criticized
China but took no other action. Nonetheless, freedom of navigation is still a huge
psychological deterrent to China’s decision makers.
(5) The United States should have a more visible military presence in the South
China Sea. Deterring China’s heavy-handed moves in the South China Sea requires amore visible and prominent US presence. During last several years, the US presence
seems to have been mainly scheduled deployments and exercises, with few actions in
Policy Perspectives No. 20- 12 -

response to crises like the Chinese seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and 2013.
Japan, as well, needs to play its role as an allied partner in the United States’ global andregional strategies.
(6) The United States should maintain a strategic deterrence posture by means ofconventional force. The best way to control China’s actions in the South China Sea is tostop them before they become military measures. None of the region’s coastal nations
has a conventional deterrence capability; only the United States has the capability todestroy China’s major infrastructures and military facilities in the region.
As I pointed out earlier, Sanya, Woody Island, Johnson South Reef, and perhaps
Scarborough Shoal in the future have huge strategic significance for China. But theyalso are vulnerable to precision-guided missiles. Since all of these key bases are
exposed to sea and airspace, they could easily become targets of US long-range
Tomahawks and air-launched cruise missiles. China would not be able to protect thesebases from such swarm attacks. Accordingly, the United States should send a clear
signal to Beijing that it would use this capability if necessary. This would be the UnitedStates’ most useful contribution to the region’s coastal nations.
(7) Japan and the United States should have a joint strategy to protect the Pratas
Islands. The Pratas Islands, which have been forgotten islands in maritime strategy in
the South China Sea for decades, are located about 440 kilometers (280 miles or 240
nautical miles) west of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, and 310 kilometers (190 miles or 170
nautical miles) southeast of Hong Kong. The islands, which are Taiwanese territory, arecomposed of three large reefs and sea mountains. Pratas Island, the largest island in thearchipelago with an area of 1.74 square kilometers (0.67 square miles), has a
1,500-meter (4,900-foot) runway but no parallel taxiway or other support facilities.
Together with mainland Taiwan, the islands are in a key location to control the Bashi
and Luzon Channels, which are the eastern approach to and from the South China Sea.
In a geopolitical crisis, if China took control Pratas Island, the balance of power in theSouth China Sea region would shift to China. Consequently, Japan and the UnitedStates should have a joint strategy regarding this obscure archipelago, which in turnwould help defend Taiwan. In sum, we should not underestimate China’s real intent inconstructing military facilities on small islands in the South China Sea.

Policy Perspectives No. 20- 13 -

RIPS Policy Perspectives
Back issues
No. 19 (September 2014)
Masahiro Matsumura, 「自衛隊による下地島空港の活用に備えよ」Using Okinawa’s Shimoji
Airport for National Defense
No. 18 (February 2014)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation Series 2: The Changing
Security of the Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Masashi
Nishihara and Yoji Koda)
No. 17 (November 2013)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation: Analyses fromJapanese perspectives (Satoru Mori and Masashi Nishihara)
No. 16 (December 2012)
RIPS Symposium 2012, Summary Report: Responses to Japan’s New Arms Export Policy
No.15 (November 2012)
Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Restore Its Place in Asia?”
No.14（2012 年 3 月）
RIPS 公開セミナー2011（2011 年 10 月）「災害対策と防衛のために新技術をどう活かすか」
No.13（February 2012）
RIPS Symposium 2011, “New High-Techs for Disaster Relief and National Defense.”
No.12 (2012 年 2 月)
RIPS 春季公開セミナー(2011 年 5 月)、「日露関係と北方領土返還の展望―東日本大震災後に考える日本の対応」
No. 11 (August 2011)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s ‘Coercive’ Diplomacy Leads to
New Power Realignments.”
No.10 (January, 2010)
Michimi Muranushi, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens: The Centrality of
Human Rights Violation.”
No.9 (July 29, 2009)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs and Growing Concerns.”
No.8 (June 3, 2009)
Masahiro Matsumura, “Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan- June 2009.”

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