Living Under COVID-19 in Asia

【論 文】

Living Under COVID-19 in Asia:
Tackling the Challenges of the ‘Shadow Pandemic’in Japan and Indonesia
CHI Naomi  and Dias PABYANTARA
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 has been proven to increasing risk factors for violence against women
globally. According to UN Women, this so-called "shadow pandemic" manifested in one in three
women subjected to intimate partner violence in 2020. The number is increasing globally eversince strict measures against COVID-19 were enacted worldwide. For example, France reported
increasing violence against women by 30% at the beginning of the lockdown policy on 17 March
2020 1). In addition, Argentina also experienced the same pattern, as violence against womenreport by 25% since lockdown on 20 March 2020. The same goes with Canada, Germany, Spain,
United Kingdom, and the United States that have also experienced a drastic increase inemergency shelters related to violence against women. In many of the cases around the world,
the increase in violence is due to the increase in tensions in households, increased perpetrator'srisk factors for violence, economic burden and survivors' limited access to support services
available pre-lockdown2).
The mentioned cases are happening worldwide, including in Japan and Indonesia. Countries
have tried to contain the virus in various ways, from governments encouraging people to “stayat home” and in some cases a severe “lockdown”. These strategies have had an unintended
impact on the most basic social institution in society, the family, and has led to the increase in



1)
2)

Associate professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Hokkaido University.
Email: n_chi@hops.hokudai.ac.jp.
Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Jenderal Soedirman University as well as theManaging Director of the Center for Identity and Urban Studies (CENTRIUS), Indonesia.
Email: dias@centrius.my.id.
UN Women (2021), “The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19,”https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19response/violence-against-women during-covid-19 (last accessed August 9, 2021).
Jinan Usta, Hana Murr, and Rana El-Jarrah (2021), “COVID-19 Lockdown and the Increased
Violence Against Women: Understanding Domestic Violence During a Pandemic,” Violence andGender (8:3) https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vio.2020.0069 (last accessed Jan. 3, 2022).

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interpersonal violence at home. The World Health Organization (WHO) has also reported that
there is an increase of domestic violence globally amid the COVID-19 pandemic3). In both Japanand Indonesia, where there are still considerable structural gender inequalities, together with theeconomic instability caused by the pandemic has led to the somber reality of higher incidencesof not only domestic violence, but also child abuse and sexual exploitation.
Against this backdrop, this article will execute the following: 1) examine the current socialand economic circumstances of the two societies under COVID-19, 2) analyze the various
factors causing the increase in domestic violence and its long-term implications, 3) explore
possible measures and policies to counter the violence and abuse against women attentive to thecontext of the ongoing crisis.
2. The “Shadow Pandemic” under COVID-19(1) Case of Japan
Ever since the initial breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic in the beginning of 2020, theJapanese government did not resort to strict measures, such as a full lockdown. Instead, thegovernment encouraged its people to “stay at home” and switch to teleworking or working fromhome. With the increase of people staying home or working from home, combined the social
stress caused by the pandemic, the number of domestic violence consultations in May 2020 hit
a record high of more than 190,030 cases, compared to the 110,000 cases in May 2019 4 ).
Moreover, according to the “Survey on Violence against Men and Women” released by theJapanese Cabinet Office reported that overall 22.5% responded that they were victims ofviolence from their spouse, while 25.9% of women and 18.4% of men responded they werevictims of violence from their spouse, respectively5). In addition, one in four women responded
that they have been a victim of domestic violence6).
In terms of sexual violence and crime, the number of consultations also hit a record high at

3)

4)

5)
6)

World Health Organization (2020), “Levels of domestic violence increase globally, including in the
Region, as COVID-19 pandemic escalates” http://www.emro.who.int/fr/violence-injuriesdisabilities/violence-news/levels-of-domestic-violence-increase-as-covid-19-pandemicescalates.html (last accessed July 27, 2020).
「コロナ禍 DV 相談1.6倍：20年度過去最多、在宅など影響か」(“DV Consultation under
COVID 19 increases 1.6 times: Record high in 2020, Working from Home a Factor”), Nikkei Shimbun(May 24, 2021) https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUE21C9Z0R20C21A5000000/ (last accessed
Dec. 2, 2021).
Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office(2020), “Challenges to Gender Equality under COVID19,” Gender Equality White Papers https://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/whitepaper/r03/zentai/
html/honpen/b1_s00_02.html (last accessed Dec. 2, 2021).
Ibid.

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51,151 cases in 2020, compared to 41,384 cases in 20197). According to the “Survey on Violenceagainst Men and Women,” one in fourteen women responded that they have been a victim ofsexual violence and/or crime8 ). Furthermore, when asked about the perpetrator, 10% of thewomen responded that the perpetrator was a stranger, while 30% of the women responded that
it was someone they knew (current and/or former intimate partner)9).
Lastly, according to the survey conducted during the state of emergency declared in April to
May 2020, in terms of the time spent on domestic work and child rearing in a household with achild under the age of 8 under COVID-19, 37.5% of women responded that they feel a heavier
burden and responsibility to execute domestic work and child-rearing under the state of
emergency, compared to 19.8% of men.
(2) Case of Indonesia
The Indonesia Women National Committee (Komnas Perempuan), which has annually
released a national report of violence against women, published that nationally 299,911 cases
were reported in 202010). It is suspected that the actual number is much more significant because
they were able to only collect 31% of the total data due to the pandemic. In order to compensate
for the lack of data, the committee combined the data from the 291,677 domestic violence cases
handled by the District Court and Religious Court, the 8,234 cases handled by their organization
partner and the rest coming from those who reported directly to the Komnas Perempuan.
Of the 8,234 cases Komnas Perempuan's partner reported, 79% (6,480) were cases ofdomestic violence. The breakdown of that number consists of violence against wives at 49%(3,221) and violence against intimate partners at 20% (1,309). Furthermore, violence against
daughters in the family was 14% (954). The rest consists of violent conduct by ex-husband, exintimate partner, and violence towards housemaids11). These numbers could double or triple,
judging by the trajectory of cases that have increased in the last five years.

7)

Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office (2020), “Figure of Number of Consultations concerning
Sexual Violence and Crime,” Gender Equality White Papers https://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/
whitepaper/r03/zentai/html/zuhyo/zuhyo01-00-29.html (last accessed Dec. 2, 2021).
8) Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office (2020), “Survey on Violence against Men and Women,”https://www.gender.go.jp/policy/no_violence/e-vaw/chousa/h11_top.html (last accessed on Dec. 2,2021).
9) Ibid.
10) Komnas Perempuan (2021), “Catatan Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Tahun 2020,”
https://komnasperempuan.go.id/uploadedFiles/1466.1614933645.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2021).
11) Ibid.

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3. Factors and Long-Term Implications(1) Factors Causing Domestic Violence in Japan
The increase in domestic violence and abuse in Japan under COVID-19 stem from two main
factors: 2) socio-cultural factor: deep-rooted gender inequality and gendered stigma in Japan; 2)structural-economic factor: ineffective and fragmented measures to balance the economy anddisease control. The topic of gender equality continues to make headlines in Japan, but as news
about Japan ranking 121st out of 153 countries, and 120th out of 156 countries in the Global
Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum in 2020 and 2021 12), respectively, genderinequality is beyond a mere economic issue. These results come despite the well-publicizedpolicies aimed at promoting women’s representation in society. One of the major reasons is theway traditional gender roles still prevail, significantly undermining the path to gender equality
in Japan. Moreover, the prevailing domestic violence and abuse also arise from gender
stratification, which is the result of longstanding discourse of “good wife and wise mother (良妻賢母 or ‘ryosaikennbo’),” or “housewife (専業主婦 or ‘sengyoshufu’) as well as theJapanese concept or unspoken rule of “self-responsibility (自己責任論 or ‘jikosekininron’).”Moreover, the economic stagnation caused by the pandemic also has a dire effect on not only
women themselves but also their safety and well-being, as victims are literally “trapped” insidewith their abusive partners. The following section will examine the socio-cultural and structuraleconomic factors that lead to the “shadow pandemic.” This section will also convey that eventhough COVID-19 has had detrimental consequences to the safety of women, the perpetuationof domestic violence and abuse was already a serious problem in Japan before the pandemic.
The current COVID-19 crisis has highlighted, revealed and made the “shadow pandemic”
visible to the eyes of the public.
a. Patriarchy and Traditional Gender Roles in Japan
Japan is regarded as a conservative patriarchal society, and many refer to the influences of
traditional Buddhist and Confucian values as the basis of such culture. While there is no denyingthat the culture is influenced from such traditional values, the manifestation of gender relationsin Japan stems from the era of rapid modernization after the Second World War (WWII) throughthe implementation of a state system that promoted a gendered division of labour as a key factor12) “Japan ranks 120th in 2021 gender gap report, worst among G-7,” Kyodo News (March 31, 2021)
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/03/1ba0fea560c2-japan-ranks-120th-in-2021-gender-gapreport-lowest-among-g-7.html (last accessed Dec. 1, 2021); Makiko Eda, “Wanted: A Strategy to
Narrow Japan’s Widening Gender Gap,” The Japan Times (March 6, 2020). https://www.japantimes.
co.jp/opinion/2020/03/06/commentary/japan-commentary/wanted-strategy-narrow-japans-wideninggender-gap/ (last accessed on Dec. 1, 2021).

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for the country’s success13). This system enforced the notion of women as housewives and men
as the breadwinners. The resulting androcentrism 14 ) has created a myriad of difficulties for
women in Japan, such as limited self-determination due to cultural pressures and a lack ofsignificant opportunities for participation in society15).
Even before Japan’s rapid modernization, in the late 19th and early 20th century, contributions
to society by men were measured in productive capacity and military service, while women wererecognized for their domestic support of their husbands’ activities and raising the next
generation 16 ). Moreover, the promulgation of the ie (家 meaning family) 17 ) system further
enforced the gendered roles of men and women. Japan’s androcentric culture has promoted
specific perceptions of women’s roles in marriage and motherhood.
Marriage in Japan continues to be a rigid institution that is strongly influenced by traditional
elements such as gender role division and the vertical generational ties from the ie familysystem 18 ). For women, marriage comes with implicit obligations including childbearing,childrearing and caring for the elderly, and once in a marriage they are expected to commit
themselves to such obligations19).
The role of motherhood in Japanese society is one of self-sacrifice and devotion. There is
still a strong belief that whether a child can build successful relationship in society solely
depends on how the mother prepares her child for socialization in the first three years, which“reinforces the notion that a child will not develop normally without a mother that dedicatesherself to her child.”20) This can make mothers feel guilty about wanting to work and it pressures
13) Luisa Fernanda Villa (2019), “Classic Patriarchal Values and Their Effects on Working Japanese
Women,” Revista Mundo Asia Pacífico (8:14), pp. 60-75.
14) Androcentrism is defined as the assumption that the male experience is the norm of humanity, while
the female experience is a negative deviation from that alleged neutral standard. See Peter Hegarty
and Carmen Buechel (2006), “Androcentric Reporting of Gender Differences in APA Journals: 19652004,” Review of General Psychology (10:4), pp. 377-389; M. Christina Luera (2004), “No More
Waiting For Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive Action To Implement The Convention On The
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal(611) https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol13/iss3/5/ (last accessed Jan. 4, 2022).
15) Villa, op. cit.
16) Ana Micaela Araújo Nocedo (2012), “The ‘Good Wife and Wise Mother’ Pattern: Gender Differencesin Today’s Japanese Society,” Crítica Contemporánea - Revista de Teoría Politica (2), pp. 156-169.
17) Ie refers to a family’s lineage, including property, business, and the family name. The ie is maintainedby the sucession of the eldest son. Yoshihiro Sakane (2017), “The Characteristics and Global Positionof the Japanese ie System,” Studies in Humanities and Sciences (57:2), pp. 47-64. 1
18) Fumie Kumagai (1995),“Families in Japan: Beliefs and Realities.” Journal of Comparative Family
Studies (26:1), pp. 135-163.
19) Ronald Rindfuss, Minja Choe, Larry Bumpass, and Noriko Tsuya (2009), “The Institutional Context
of Low Fertility: The Case of Japan,” Asian Population Studies (5:), pp.215-235. See also James M.
Raymo, Hyunjoon Park, Yu Xie, and Wei-jun Jean Yeung (2015), “Marriage and Family in East Asia:
Continuity and Change,” Annual Review of Sociology (41:1), pp. 471-92.
20) Mariko Fujita (1989), "It's All Mother's Fault: Childcare and the Socialization of Working Mothers in- 119 -

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women into having to choose between motherhood and having a career.
Such traditional gender roles still prevail and significantly reduce women’s participation insociety as well as leadership roles in business and politics. “Historically, after the second World
War, the combination of a hardworking husband who devotes his life to his company, and a stayat-home mother, was encouraged.”21) This encouragement has led to a norm in which husbands
work very long hours, unscheduled overtime and holiday work in return for a lifetime
employment and seniority-based salary, while housework and childrearing fall heavily on
wives22). The government’s latest national survey in 2020 reported that mothers still do 3.6 times
more housework than fathers23). Because of these norms – as well as hiring biases in somecompanies, and the change-resistant working culture – many women stop working after having
a child or opt for part-time or contract work that generally does not lead to promotions24).
Patriarchy and traditional gender roles subjugate women in the family and put them in an
inferior position, not to mention that these factors remain as one of the major obstacles forgender equality in Japan. The next section will explore how gender stratification is createdthrough unique Japanese discourse, which result in domestic violence and abuse.
b. Gender Stratification, Unspoken Rule and Domestic Violence in JapanThe above section examined how patriarchy and traditional gender roles subjugate womenand hinder gender equality in Japan. This section will analyze in further detail how the discourseof “good wife and wise mother”, or “housewife” subjugate women and the Japanese unspoken
rule of “self-responsibility” put women at a higher risk of becoming victims of violence andabuse.
The ideal of “good wife and wise mother” can be traced back to the late 19th century, but theidea evolved in the early twentieth century as a result of the state policies and campaigns overthe education system25). The idea itself is a modern phenomenon of state policies designed toretain and reinforce women’s profile of stay-home mothers in the middle and upper classes26).
They were also referred to as “education mothers” who dedicated their life in children’s success
Japan," Journal of Japanese Studies (15:1), pp. 67-91.
21) Statement by Hiroki Komazaki, founder and CEO of Florence, a non-profit organisation which
advocates for solutions that help working parents. See Mariko Oi, “Why Japan Can't Shake Sexism,”
BBC (April 9, 2021) https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20210405-why-japan-cant-shake-sexism(last accessed Jan. 4, 2022).
22) Yanfei Zhou (2015), “Career Interruption of Japanese Women: Why Is It So Hard to Balance Workand Childcare?” Japan Labour Review (12:2), pp. 106-123.
23) Oi, op. cit.
24) Zhou, op. cit.
25) Kathleen Uno (1993). “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?” in Postwar Japan as History
Andrew Gordon ed. (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press).
26) Ibid.

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in education 27 ). This ideal of social model has been entailed for the scope of national
development and still remains as the way gender roles are seen28).
Furthermore, in Hendry’s study of housewives or sengyoshufu, she asserts that houseworkand the care of the children has undoubtedly always been a part of the working life of Japanesewomen, as it is part of the lives of most women, but in few parts of the world have these roles
been granted the importance and status they have acquired in Japan29). Such kind of social model
has a direct effect on gender stratification in Japan, as women are socially expected and often
feel pressure to abide by such social model. Evidence to this, the labour supply of married
women across childbirth is one of the lowest compared to the rest of the developing countries.
One of the factors that it is more influential in inducing the M-shaped curve specific to Japan ischildrearing.
Against this backdrop, as aforementioned, many women opt to quite their job after childbirthand return as part time or contract workers after their child/children start grade school (thus theJapanese female labour M-shaped curve). The implication of such behaviour is that women
become dependent on their husbands, or the breadwinner, for financial and economic stability.
Thus, even if the women is in an abusive relationship, often times many feel obliged to stay inthe relationship because they do not have the means to support themselves and their children
should they decide to get a divorce or terminate the relationship.
Moreover, many abused women and victims of domestic violence feel hesitate to raise their
voice. Sachiko Nakajima, from the NPO Resilience30), explains that there seems to be a strong
tendency to “self-blame” by Japanese victims, in this case, for female victims of domestic
violence to blame themselves for the violence perpetrated upon them and further explains thatwhen women confide in others about their abusive partners, they are often told that the abuse isher fault or that she is to blame for having chosen that partner31). In the Survey on Violence
Against Men and Women conducted by the Gender Equality Bureau of the Japanese Cabinet
Office in 2020, out of the 582 people who responded that they had been harmed in some form,
47.4% replied that they did not consult anyone about the abuse they were experiencing 32 ).
27) Ibid.
28) Nocedo, op. cit.
29) Joy Hendry (2003), Understanding Japanese Society 3rd ed. (London: Routledge). See also Aya Ezawa(2009), “Motherhood and Class: Gender, Class, and Reproductive Practices among Japanese Single
Mothers,” in Social Class in Contemporary Japan Hiroshi Ishida & David H. Slater eds. (London:
Routledge).
30) NPO Resilience is a Japanese non-profit organization that aims to spread awareness of domestic
violence and the effects of trauma as well as provide support and care for victims of domestic violence
and abuse.
31) Rei Ando (2020), “Domestic Violence and Japan’s COVID-19 Pandemic,” The Asia-Pacific Journal(18: 18: 7), pp. 1-11.
32) Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office (2020), “Survey on Violence against Men and Women,”- 121 -

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Vol.16Moreover, when asked why they did not consult anyone, 47.8% responded that they did notthink the incident merited consultation, 32.6% thought they were also to blame, 23.6% thought
it would be pointless and 20.3% thought they could get through the situation alone33). The notionof self-responsibility is reflected in such reactions by the respondents34).
The next section will explore the relations between economic security and Japan’s COVID19 measures and how this relation also affects the worsening of domestic violence in Japan.
c. Economic Security and Japan’s “Fragmented” COVID-19 Measures
Sylvia Chant states that, “gender inequalities occur in ‘public’ arenas such as the labour
market and formal politics, as well as the nominally ‘private’ sphere of home and household.”35)
This is also true in Japan, and as mentioned above, such gender inequalities provide a breeding
ground for abuse and violence. This section will explore how Japan’s “fragmented” COVID-19
measures not only undermine economic security but also has resulted in the increase in domestic
violence during the pandemic.
During the first year of the outbreak of COVID-19, more than 700,000 women and 390,000
men were not in the labour force36). Moreover, while 80% of men were working full-time, morethan 50% of women were working part-time or on contract basis37). For women, working hours
fell 15.5% and monthly income fell 8.8%38).
One of features of the Japanese response to the COVID-19 crisis has been the inability of
the central government to impose its pandemic policies on prefectures and cities, even during astate of emergency. Japan’s 2012 Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New
Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response (hereafter, Pandemic Special Measures Act)gives the prime minister the power to declare a state of emergency in any or all prefectures,
however, enforcing instructions on disease control has proven extremely difficult.39) Since thehttps://www.gender.go.jp/policy/no_violence/e-vaw/chousa/pdf/r02/r02danjokan-12.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 20, 2022).
33) Ibid.
34) Ando, op.cit.
35) Sylvia Chant (2004), Urban Livelihoods, Employment and Gender in Latin America Transformed:
Globalization and Modernity Robert N. Gwynne and Cristóbal Kay eds. (United Kingdom: Hodder
Education).
36) Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office (2020), “Figure Concerning Labour Force and
Employment,” Gender Equality White Papers https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/
gian/gian_hokoku/20210611danjogaiyo.pdf/$File/20210611danjogaiyo.pdf (last accessed Dec. 2,2021).
37) Ibid.
38) Yanfei Zhou (2021), “How Women Bear the Brunt of COVID-19’s Damages on Work,” Japan Labor
Issues (5:28), pp.2-8.
39) Harutaka Takenaka, “Japan’s Fragmented COVID Response: A Systemic Failure of National
Leadership,” Nippon.Com (April 8, 2021) https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00695/# (last- 122 -

Living Under COVID-19 in Asia

prime minister nor the Minister of Health have any coercive powers vis-à-vis the local
authorities that bear actual responsibility for implementation, it is up to the governors to decide
whether to follow the central government’s instructions40). By the same token, governors havelittle power to impose their decisions on the cities or special wards in their jurisdictions41). Due
to such Japanese government’s inability to impose strict pandemic policies, the government
never implemented a full lockdown policy, and left much of the decision to the local
government’s discretion. Therefore, compensations for the self-employed and safety net
measures for non-regular workers remain weak and fragmented42).
Like many other countries around the world, being unemployed makes the female morefinancially dependent and more susceptible to domestic violence 43 ). In patriarchal societies
where the male is expected to be the provider of the household, financial and psychologicalstressors are thought to increase domestic violence by threatening the male's authority at homemaking him more aggressive in an attempt to regain his authority44). The economic burden
leaves female dependent on the male partner making it harder to leave a violent relationship.
Lastly, the author would like to share few of the stories of the victims obtained through aseries of interviews. In order to ensure the safety of the victims, their names remain anonymous.
i) Ms. A (aged 35): “My husband and I got married 10 years ago when we found out that I
was pregnant. In order to put our daughter through school we needed to increase the householdincome, so 5 years ago he quit his day job as a mechanic and decided to own and run aguesthouse. The guesthouse was doing quite well, but when COVID-19 broke out and inboundtourists stopped coming to Japan, we had to suspend the operation of the guesthouse, and myhusband had to look for a temporary job. It was difficult to find anything during the first year of
the pandemic, and he started to spend more time at home. He would drink alcohol from irritation,and started to lash out on me and my daughter. At first I tried to understand him and hoped thatthe situation would get better, but it didn’t. The violence got worse day by day, but I was too
ashamed to tell anyone. One day he tried to hit my daughter and while defending her he broke
my rib and I was taken to the hospital. With COVID-19, many of the hospitals would not accept
new patients, but finally I was admitted to a hospital. Since this incident, my daughter got very
accessed Jan. 9, 2022).
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
42) Magdalena Osumi, “For Japan's nonregular workers, a weaker safety net as COVID-19 spreads,” The
Japan Times (March 31, 2020) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/31/national/nonregularworkers-japan-coronavirus/ (last accessed Dec. 10, 2021).
43) Jinan Usta, Hana Murr, and Rana El-Jarrah, “COVID-19 Lockdown and the Increased Violence
Against Women: Understanding Domestic Violence During a Pandemic,” Violence and Gender (8:3)
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vio.2020.0069 (last accessed Jan. 20, 2022).
44) Ibid.

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scared and told her teacher at school, and the teacher called the local ward office and support
centre for victims of domestic violence. If it weren’t for my daughter, her teacher, officer fromthe ward office and the staff from the support centre, I think I would have been in a serious
situation. Since then, I have divorced my husband and now live with my daughter at my parent’s
house, but I still fear that he may come find me and my daughter.”ii) Ms. B (aged 40): “My husband was a very nice and decent man. When COVID-19 hit, he
had to voluntarily take leave from his job, and spent most of the time at home. In the beginninghe said he enjoyed his time off, but it was only a matter of time until his stress level started torise and he became irritable and aggressive. When I think of it now, his irritation most likely
came from his insecurity of whether he would actually be able to return to his job and provide
for the family. It started from shouting insults, hours and hours of preaching about how I didn’t
do the dishes properly or how dirty the house was. The situation got worse and he would noteven allow me to go grocery shopping or go to the dentist because he was afraid that I may catchthe virus and bring it inside the house. I was literally trapped in my own house. Day in and dayout, he would scold me for hours about what I didn’t do right. One day, when the local restaurants
and bars reopened, he left the house to have a drink with his friends. I finally got the chance tocall my family and tell them my situation. I packed my bags that day and left my husband.”
2) Factors Causing Domestic Violence in Indonesia
As in the case of Japan, the increasing number of violence against women in Indonesia,
especially in times of the pandemic, can be traced to two main factors: 1) socio-cultural factor:
how society perceives gender relations; 2) structural-economic factor: how the indecisive
response of the government to the pandemic helps deepen the root of the problem. The cultural
aspect shows how Indonesian culture is instilled with hegemonic masculinities due to the long
period of colonialism. It results in male superiority over women in present day Indonesia.
Tragically, it helps prolong the story of domestic violence against women in the age of thepandemic. On the other hand, the indecisive response of the government to the pandemic andthe pseudo-science-based policy implemented to counter COVID-19 have negatively affected
the situation. Both factors go hand in hand to undermine gender equality in Indonesia under
COVID-19. The following section will look at the genealogy of hegemonic masculinities, theeffect of such masculinities on marriage and how the inadequate action by the government isworsening the “masculinity crisis” in Indonesia.
a. The Genealogy of Hegemonic Masculinities in Indonesia
The cultural aspect deals with the dominant patriarchal perspective of Indonesian society
toward family and marriage. A recent study suggested that the conception of masculinity in- 124 -

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Indonesia dwell in two parts: steady worker and reliable provider for the family45). In otherwords, men often conflate their fatherhood role as with that of being the breadwinner46).
There is a massive gap between how western society perceives masculinity compared toIndonesia. The west favors masculinity as the need to distinguish males from others throughpersonal expression 47 ). On the other hand, what happened in the eastern society is thatmasculinity resembled domination. Referring to the work by Connell 48 ), “it manifested inconquering those who lack masculine characteristics, such as a female and colonized subject.”
It is impossible to detach the effect of Dutch colonial era to the manifestation of masculinity
in Indonesia, amidst the 300 years of colonialization49). Recent studies have identified an active
effort by the Dutch administration to construct a juxtaposition between native chief and theDutch by comparing their clothes. This act indicated that they wanted the community to thinkthat the Dutch is the ideal form of masculinity, despite the native chief 50).
The predominant narrative of masculinity continued in the era of the first two Indonesianleaders, Sukarno and Suharto. The Sukarno era constructed a Javanese” alpha male” leader close
to a “wealthy polygamy practitioners' icon.”51) As a President from 1945-1966, Sukarno became
the role model of Indonesian men to perceive masculinity. Although there is a backlash from thewomen empowerment movement in this era52), the predominantly masculine narrative prevailed
until the end of the Sukarno era.
The next important figure in the construction of Indonesia masculinities is in the shadow of
the authoritarian Suharto "New Order," which remained unchallenged for 32 years from 19661998. He successfully imposed a hegemonic masculinity logic where the men perpetuatedgender inequality and later took advantage of the unjust relations53). This regime normalized the45) Pam Nilan, (2009), “Contemporary Masculinities and Young Men in Indonesia,” Indonesia and the
Malay World (37:109), pp. 327-344.
46) Michael S. Kimmel (2011), The Gendered Society 4th ed. (Oxford University Press; Oxford, UK).
47) Michael S. Kimmel (1994), “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in theConstruction of Gender Identity,” in Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman, eds. Theorizing Masculinities
2nd ed. (London: Sage), pp. 119-141; G. Lloyd, (1993), The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ inWestern Philosophy 2nd ed. (London: Routledge).
48) Raewyn W. Connell (2005), Masculinities 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press).
49) Desi Dwi Prianti (2019), “The Identity Politics of Masculinity as a Colonial Legacy,” Journal ofIntercultural Studies (40:6), pp. 700-719.
50) Frances Gouda (2007), “From Emasculated Subjects to Virile Citizens: Nationalism and Modern
Dress in Indonesia 1900-1949,” in Stefan Duddink, ed. Representing Masculinity: Male Citizenshipin Modern Western Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 235-257.
51) Sonja Van Wichelen (2009), “Polygamy Talk and the Politics of Feminism: Contestations over
Masculinity in a New Muslim Indonesia,” Journal of International Women's Studies (11:1), pp. 173187.
52) Nur Janti (2019), “Angka Poligami dari Masa ke Masa” https://historia.id/kultur/articles/angkapoligami-dari-masake-masa-vgXwV/page/1 (last accessed August 9, 2021).
53) Raewyn W. Connell (1987), Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (Palo Alta:- 125 -

年報 公共政策学

Vol.16“Bapakism” ideology. Bapak originated from the term “father” in Bahasa. The ideology definedthat the Bapak as the family leader, the business, the town, and the nation-state. Moreover, thesuperior quality of Bapak came from God-given wisdom, self-control, and mastery of emotion54).
Suharto's calm, friendly and passive attitude reflected the glory of Akal (rationality and selfcontrol) over emotions55). Due to his long regime, this was internalized and became a traditional
Indonesian value.
b. Hegemonic Masculinities and Marriage
These trajectories of the concept of masculinity also shape the nationwide construction overfamily. The family is a manifestation of a masculine leader and other's identity as a member. As
per institutionalized in the Point 3, Article 31 of the Indonesian Marital Law of 1974, “thehusband is the family leader and the wife is the housewife.” Although the implementation isrelatively weak, it is accepted as a common understanding nationwide 56 ). The government
adopted the trajectory of masculinity laid by the Dutch back in the colonial era. Moreover, theprimary value is also intertwined with Islamic teaching about the roles in the family, which waslater adopted by the state through the Compilation of Islamic Laws back in 1991 57).
According to state political perspective intersecting with Islamic teaching, the laws laid thefundamental approach towards the ideal Indonesian family. In this law, marriage is regarded as
Ibadah, a religious term for observance. In this sense, the sole purpose of marriage is to create apeaceful, calm, and loving family as a form of obedience to God58). The structure is a nuclear
family, with the husband as the breadwinner and the wife as the household manager. The
conception throws back to the long-standing masculinities which preserve the male-dominatedculture.
In addition, the deep-rooted and institutionalized family conception and masculinities
contribute as a push factor for Indonesians to get married. Research conducted by Himawan59)
found that marriage in Indonesia is a socially-expected event. One of the reasons is pressure
from the larger community. It is common for a single who prioritize their education or career toUniversity of California Press).
54) Pam Nilan (2009), “Contemporary Masculinities and Young Men in Indonesia,” Indonesia and the
Malay World (37:109), p. 327-344.
55) Michael G. Peletz (1995), “Neither Reasonable nor Responsible: Contrasting Representations of
Masculinity in a Malay Society,” in A. Ong and M. Peletz (eds), Bewitching Women, Pious Men:
Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 76-123.
56) Lyn Parker et al. (2016), “The Stigmatisation Of Widows And Divorcees (Janda) In Indonesia, and
the Possibilities for Agency,” Indonesia and the Malay World (44:128), pp. 27-46.
57) Ibid.
58) Ibid.
59) Karel Karsten Himawan (2018), “Either I Do or I Must: An Exploration of The Marriage Attitudes ofIndonesian Singles,” The Social Science Journal (56:2) pp. 220-227.

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be scoffed by their surroundings because their efforts for self-development are deemed selfish60).
From this point of view, one may conclude that proper knowledge is lacking in most marriages.
Furthermore, many marriages come from social pressure instead of one's need, making it afragile social foundation.
These aspects mentioned above contribute to the increased tension among family members
while forced to confinement, as many relationships are already abusive61). The most affected arethose confined in the same space with one’s husband, intimate partner, ex-husband, and otherfamily members 62 ). The unjust relations between family members create a fertile zone forabusive attitude in social distancing.
c. Inadequate Action by the Government and the “Masculinity Crisis”
Indonesia also faces an indecisive and miscalculated government response toward COVID19. In the beginning of 2020, when COVID-19 first outbroke in Wuhan, the Indonesian
government did not take this matter seriously63). The first case in Indonesia was declared on
March 2, 202064), yet the task force to respond to it was not established until March 13, 202065).
Many criticized that had the World Health Organization not declared the pandemic on March 11,
2020,66) the Indonesian government would have not responsively taking action towards COVID19. The government's political gesture, statement and attitude tended minimize the problem's
scale and even asked the public to not take the pandemic so seriously67).

60) Augustina Situmorang (2007), “Staying Single in a Married World: Never-Married Women in
Yogyakarta and Medan,” Asian Population Studies (3:3), pp. 287-304.
61) Jones, Balawyn. 2020. “‘Home Is Not Safe’: Domestic Violence Increases as COVID-19 Pandemic
Takes Hold,” https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/home-is-not-safe-domestic-violenceincreases-as-covid-19-pandemic-takeshold/ (last accessed August 9, 2021).
62) Komnas Perempuan (2021), “Catatan Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Tahun 2020,” https://komnasperempuan.go.id/uploadedFiles/1466.1614933645.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2021).
63) Dumilah Ayuningtyas et al. (2021), “Requestioning the Indonesia Government's Public Policy
Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Black Box Analysis for the Period of January-July 2020,”
Frontiers in Public Health (9:612994).
64) Ihasnudi (2020), “Fakta Lengkap Kasus Pertama Virus Corona di Indonesia,” https://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2020/03/03/06314981/fakta-lengkap-kasus-pertama-virus-corona-di-indonesia?page=all(last accessed August 10, 2021).
65) Egi Adyatama (2020), “Jokowi Tunjuk Doni Monardo Pimpin Tim Reaksi Cepat Atasi Corona,”
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1319171/jokowi-tunjuk-doni-monardo-pimpin-tim-reaksi-cepat-atasicorona/full&view=ok (last accessed August 10, 2021).
66) World Health Organization (2020), “WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing
on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020,” https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020(lastaccessed
August 10, 2021),
67) Dumilah Ayuningtyas et al. (2021), “Requestioning the Indonesia Government's Public Policy
Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Black Box Analysis for the Period of January-July 2020,”
Frontiers in Public Health (9:612994).

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Vol.16After being sharply criticized, the government later enacted Pembatasan Social Berskala
Besar (PSBB), a lockdown-like policy that the government had chosen to perform instead oflocking down the country entirely. The approach also generated criticism for Indonesia, which
had already ratified a Health Quarantine Law (UU Karantina Kesehatan Number 6 2018) thatdetailed a lockdown in case of a widespread infectious disease. Yet, the government chose to
implement an alternative policy like PSBB to dodge responsibility to fulfill the basic need of
the community even though there were enacting de facto lockdown68). The critics match with
the President's statement that the lockdown will hardly affect the economy69). In accordance, theChief of the Task Force for COVID-19 Response clearly stated that it is hard to fulfill the nation's
basic needs during lockdown due to the economic situation70).
After more than a year, the lockdown-like policy has resulted in massive unemployment.
The traditional family positions the husband as the breadwinner, meanwhile, the pandemic has
had a detrimental effect on the Indonesian economy. According to Statistics Indonesia,
approximately 19.10 million workers are affected by the pandemic; 1.7 million lost their jobs in
February 202171). The same source stated that 73.57% are men. These numbers excessively
reveal how the government response towards COVID-19 have affected family structure bylaying off the breadwinner.
Aside from the economic consequence, the inadequate government response also contributes
to the increase in domestic violence. The layoff disrupts the assertion of masculinity ideologythat lies in the very heart of the family. The layoff has forged a crisis-like sphere towards thecommon ideology of becoming a man on a day-to-day basis. The conditions blatantly exposed
the unequal gender relations within society, with the number of increasing domestic violence
conducted mainly by the male family member. The frustrating situation of lockdown-like policy
without social safety net, the increasing number of people getting laid-off from their jobs andthe predominant hegemonic masculinities mindset assemble the high number of domestic abuse
during the current pandemic.
Study conducted by Hobbs states that violence is always and has been part of working-class68) Bachtiarudin Asfinawati in Alam (2021, “Pilih PPKM Dibanding Lockdown, Pemerintah Dinilai Mau
Hindari Kewajiban Bansos,” https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/pilih-ppkm-dibanding-lockdownpemerintah-dinilai-mau-hindarikewajiban-bansos.html (last accessed August 10, 2021).
69) Ihsanuddin (2020), “Jokowi Akhirnya Blak-blakan soal Alasan Tak Mau Lockdown,” https://nasional.
kompas.com/read/2020/04/02/05405561/jokowi-akhirnya-blak-blakan-soal-alasan-tak-maulockdown?
page=all (last accessed August 10, 2021).
70) Agung Sandy Lesmana (2021), “Pemerintah Akui Ogah Pilih Lockdown karena Berat Penuhi
Kebutuhan Rakyat,” https://www.suara.com/news/2021/03/09/112337/pemerintah-akui-ogah-pilihlockdown-karena-berat-penuhi-kebutuhanrakyat (last accessed August 10, 2021).
71) Badan Pusat Statistik (2021), “Keadaan Ketenagakerjaan Indonesia Februari 2021,” https://www.
bps.go.id/pressrelease/2021/05/05/1815/februari-2021--tingkat-pengangguran-terbuka--tpt--sebesar6-26-persen.html (last accessed August 10, 2021).

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life 72). It provides the construction of a way to earn respect from their male peers 73). Most
working-class men are embedded with the idea that taking part in a fight resembled the ideal
conception of masculinities74). As a form of ideology, it needs to be exercised outside oneself.
The most common place is in the neighborhood, giving a sense of territorial dignity andleadership through toughness and aggressive style75).
The need for peer approval comes from a homogenous workplace. The labour division is
one of the most gender-segmented aspects. The most low-end position that men fill will likely
have men-filled coworkers. It seldom has a diverse gender composition because women are
most likely to get into the most domesticated line of work. Thus, there is a demanding peerpressure to be harsh and violent alongside the common masculinity values. In the context ofIndonesia, the most severe layoff occurred in production assembly lines, manufacturing,transportation and logistics, as well as other blue-collar work, which are predominantly maleworkers76).
The main feature of the government's inadequate response toward COVID-19 is that it
indirectly takes the neighborhood where the male working-class assess their ideologicalmasculinities close to violence. The lockdown-like policy forces the male worker into
confinement, separating the subject of ideology from the practice. One cannot exist apart fromthe other. The discourse and the activity must go hand in hand77). Otherwise, they will lose thegravity of who they are and how they are becoming a man. Hence, the male worker has to findanother way to assert their ideology and, in this case, power. Unfortunately, the proximate
circumstance is the family since the house becomes a solitary confinement. Therefore, it ispaternally that the laid-off male worker often falls into committing domestic violence upon his
family.
On the other hand, there is no safety net for the victim, most likely women from the domestic
violence by the male family member. The absence of a law on abusive domestic violence plays
a crucial role in the wide-open opportunity for a domestic abuser. It prepares the dominantaggressive male to go unchecked while expressing their ideology. Indonesia's gender movement
72) Dick Hobbs (1988), Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, Detectives and the Working Class in the
East End of London (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
73) Simon J. Charlesworth (2000), A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
74) Antony Whitehead (2005), “Man to Man Violence: How Masculinity May Work as a Dynamic Risk
Factor,” The Howard Journal (44:4), pp. 411-422.
75) Andrew Tolson (1977), The Limits of Masculinity (London: Tavistock).
76) Ruth Meiliana Ngadi and Yanti Astrelina Purba (2020), “The Impact of COVID-19 on Worker Layoffs
and Income in Indonesia,” Jurnal Kependudukan Indonesia Edisi Khusus Demografi dan COVID-19(July 2020), pp. 43-48.
77) F. Franco, V. Sarvar and Sherry Chand (1989), Ideology as Social Practice: The Functioning of Varna.
Economic and Political Weekly (24:47), pp. 2601-2603, pp. 2606-2612.

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faced a significant setback on domestic violence eradication since the last time the draft for
Sexual Violence Bill had been drawn from the national legalization priority in the Parliament78).
The bill is set to cover other aspects of gender-based violence outside rape and sexual
harassment79).
4. Possible Measures and Policies to Counter Domestic Violence(1) Case of JapanThe surge of domestic violence under COVID-19 and the media coverage of the situation
has gained some attention of the public. However, there is still a lack of measures and policies
to respond to this “shadow pandemic.” This section will explore, short and long-term measureand policies that need to be considered in order to curtail domestic violence.
In the short-term, it is crucial to provide shelters and safe houses for the victims so that they
can be removed from the violent environment. In Japan, there are both private and public shelters.
Public shelters are commonly called the Spousal Violence Counseling and Support Centres(SVCSCs), and private shelters are provided by organizations such as DV Soudan+ and HELP
(House in Emergency of Love and Peace) to name a few (there are also private shelters in major
cities around Japan), but there is still a lack of shelters. Moreover, many shelters and consultation
services are understaffed, thus, more human power needs to be put into place in order to provide
the necessary services for the victims.
One of the problems during COVID-19 was that the shelters and consultation services weresuspended due to the scare of the spread of the disease. Also, many shelters have a two-week
temporary protection period, but during the pandemic it is important to have some flexibility inconsideration of COVID-19 measures 80). Moreover, one of the issues that sparked a heateddebate was the way in which residents received the 100,000 yen special cash payment asemergency aid money. Initially, the government sent out the notice to each household according
to the residence registry and depositing it to the bank account of the head of the household. Thissystem proved to be problematic for victims of violence and abuse, because in cases where thevictim no longer lived in the house, she (and often times the child) could not receive the benefit.

78) Hanif Gusman (2020), “Penarikan RUU PKS & Meroketnya Angka Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan,”https://tirto.id/penarikan-ruu-pks-meroketnya-angka-kekerasan-terhadap-perempuan-fPpl (last accessed
August 10, 2021).
79) Amnesty International (2020), “Empat Urgensi Pengesahan RUU PKS,” https://www.amnesty.id/
empat-urgensipengesahan-ruu-pks/ (last accessed August 11, 2021).
80) Tomoko Suga (2021), “Response to Domestic Violence During the COVID-19 Outbreak in Japan,”Violence and Gender (8:3) https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vio.2020.0043 (last accessed Jan.
21, 2022).

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Living Under COVID-19 in AsiaThus, it is important to establish and implement special measures for victims of violence andabuse and provide some flexibility during times of emergency.
As for long-term measures, while Japan has its share of laws pertaining to domestic violencesuch as the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims Act of 2001, Japanesewomen remain vulnerable. The law stipulates that in the case of a claim made by a victim, thealleged perpetrator is required to vacate the site of primary shared residence for a two-month
period from the day which the order goes into effect81). However, after that, the claimant (thatis, the victim, not the perpetrator) must vacate the house, which means that the law “punishes”
the woman with eviction from her own home for making a claim against a husband who isputting her life in jeopardy.82). The dangerous effects of this peculiar situation are particularly
evident in the context of COVID-19, where women have to vacate their homes in a time of a
global pandemic. Therefore, it is crucial to reinforce legal institutions to protect the victim, notthe perpetrator.
(2) Case of Indonesia
The grave liability of domestic violence during the pandemic in Indonesia demands special
treatment. Having pointed out the predominant traditional masculinity as the root of the problem
paves the road to working on an immediate and long-term solutions. The first step should be
mitigating the physical risk of the violence, by providing a safe space for the victims structurally
by removing them from the source of the violence.
In Indonesia, there are safe houses established by the government as well as civil society
network that provide protection for women and children. The Ministry of Women's
Empowerment and Child Protection Indonesia has established twenty-five secure house services
nationwide83). In addition, the civil society network led by the National Commission on Violence
Against Women marked eighty-six establishments that provide protection for women andchildren84). Yet, the case filed to the authority through the safe house service is relatively low.
Only 31% of total cases in 2020 have proceeded to legal action, 29% settled through disputesettlement forum facilitated by the civil society network and the rest of the cases are still
unknown85).
81) Ando, op. cit.
82) Ibid.
83) Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan Dan Perlindungan Anak Indonesia (2019), “Peta Persebaran
UPTD PPA,” https://www.kemenpppa.go.id/index.php/page/view/132 (last accessed August 11,2021).
84) Komnas Perempuan (2021), “Mitra Pengada Layanan Komnas Perempuan,” https://komnasperempuan.go.id/mitrakomnas-perempuan/pengada-layanan (last accessed August 11, 2021).
85) Komnas Perempuan (2021), “Catatan Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Tahun 2020,” https://komnasperempuan.go.id/uploadedFiles/1466.1614933645.pdf (last accessed August 11 2021).

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There is, however, the protocol by the Ministry of Health to responding to gender-based
violence during pandemics. However, the solution is to make victims report to the nearest
facility86). A survey conducted by the Indonesia Judicial Research Society (ICJR) asserted that
33.5% responded that they are afraid to seek help outside their circle. Furthermore, 29%
responded that they feel shameful, 23.5% responded that they do not know where to report, and18.5% responded that they feel guilty87). The number does not come from a lack of safe houseservice but the reluctance of the victim to come to seek help. The conventional family traits inIndonesia make it harder to rationalize the need to seek professional help in terms of domestic
violence. It is because they claim that domestic violence is a private family matter, and it will
be shameful if the case is exposed.
Hence, it is crucial to link the rescuer and the victim by utilizing social networks. The
neighbour next door must be the first to identify the problem and act accordingly. The social
network in the grassroots Indonesia make this possible since there is a long-standingorganization at the village level called Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga – PKK (Family
Welfare Movement)88). The PKK is a grassroots organization that is spread nationwide whose
mission is to integrate family welfare into national development89).
Such kind of movement can be utilized to tackle the problem of reluctant women to reportdomestic violence90) and enable them to talk about their personal affairs among neighbours. Thisway, the first aid to domestic violence can rely on the neighbourhood network rather than an86) Kemenkes (2020), “Protokol Penanganan Kasus Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan di Masa Pandemic
COVID-19,”https://infeksiemerging.kemkes.go.id/download/Protokol_Penanganan_Kasus_Kekerasan_terhadap_
Perempuan_di_Masa_Pandemi_COVID-19.pdf (last accessed August 11, 2021).
87) International Judicial Research Society (2020), “Mengapa Korban Kekerasan Seksual Enggan
Melapor?” http://ijrs.or.id/mengapa-korban-kekerasanseksual-enggan-melapor/ (last accessed August
11, 2021).
88) PKK became a mass organization in 1972 by the order of President Suharto. In this era, PKK was
crucial in carrying out the idea of national development and harness women's support for the national
agenda. In the post-Suharto era, PKK became a government partner in shaping the democratization
process. Their role-shifting was maximized by incorporating protocol to reach out to the victims in
the neighbourhood. The members primarily consist of poor women in the village and have regularmeetings and routine activities. See also: Sharon Bessell (2004), “Women in Parliament in Indonesia:
Denied a Share of Power,” Discussion Paper, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Governance, The
Australian National University 04-07, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/10440/
1170/1/Bessell_Women2004.pdf (last accessed August 11, 2021); Amaliatulwalidain and Novia
Kencana (2019), “Peranan Politik Gerakan Perempuan Dari Masa Ke Masa,” (Studi: Tentang Sejarah
Organisasi Pkk Di Indonesia) Jurnal Pemerintahan Dan Politik Global (4:1). http://ejournal.uigm.
ac.id/index.php/PDP/article/viewFile/679/831 (last accessed August 11, 2021).
89) PKK (2017), “Visi Misi PKK,” https://tppkk-pusat.org/tentangkami/ (last accessed August 11, 2021).
90) Niken Kusumawardhani and Ana Rosyida Tamyis (2018), “Mengapa Perempuan Miskin Enggan
Melaporkan KDRT Ke Pihak Berwenang?” https://theconversation.com/mengapa-perempuanmiskin-enggan-melaporkan-kdrt-ke-pihakberwenang-106495 (last accessed August 11, 2021).

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external actor, such as the government. Under COVID-19, grassroots solidarity tend to more
effective than a government-led initiative that tends to be late and misplaced. The Warga Bantu
Warga (residence helping each other) initiative has proven to help many people in need of healthfacilities, medical goods and daily basic needs when the government stays idle91). Judging by
the current pattern, it is best to manifest the solution to grassroots or societal solidarity insteadof a structural approach.
There is also a potential to develop religious communities (Mejelis Ta'lim) to be a safe
cocoon for victims of domestic violence. In Indonesia, women's religious communities have asolid base in both rural and urban areas. The top-down culture from the teacher to the memberthat runs in the community makes it easier to assert ideas. For instance, research conducted on
the women's religious community in Cinere, Depok 92 ) demonstrated that they successfully
developed awareness of cervical cancer from 2% to 86%, by socializing through their regularforum93).
The same goes for the women's religious community in Wiyung Surabaya, who successfully
developed skills in making traditional jewelry 94 ). It is tempting to imagine that the idea of"moderate" masculinity is resonating through that forum to start a change in every household.
The bottom line is that the social hub to transmit the idea of first-aid for domestic violence iswidely available. It is a matter of how to start activating them to create a chain of reform.
A similar government-led practice has been executed before on a small scale. Bandung95)
local government started the initiative to bring back the father to get involved in the children's
education and later share responsibility with the mother to develop children's character in 202096).
It is an initiative to reconstruct the masculinity perception toward being a father and a man—one of which we could revisit after knowing that hegemonic masculinities play a crucial role indomestic violence. Unfortunately, the programme has been suspended for the next year due tothe pandemic and social distancing policy. However, the point that needs to highlighted is theurgent need to deconstruct the masculinities on a large scale through a cultural approach toachieve gender equality and practically suppress domestic violence.
91) Impian Nopitasari (2021), “Warga Bantu Warga, Negara Bantu Siapa?” https://news.detik.com/
kolom/d5647609/warga-bantu-warga-negara-bantu-siapa (last accessed August 11, 2021).
92) Cinere, Depok is a satellite city of Jakarta.
93) Tiwuk Susatiningsih et al. (2020), “Pelatihan dan Penyuluhan mengenai Bahaya Kanker Serviks pada
Kelompok IbuibuPengajian di Pangkalan Jati, Cinere, Depok,” Jurnal Pengabdian Pada Masyarakat(5:2). pp. 554-563.
94) Wahidah Salsabila (2020), “Evaluasi Hasil Pelatihan Membuat Bros Anting Bagi Ibu-Ibu Pengajian
Upkq Ai-Hikmah Di Wiyung Surabaya,” Jurnal Tata Busana (9:9).
95) Bandung is the capital of West Java Province and is one of the major cities in Indonesia.
96) Humas Kota Bandung (2020), “Sekolah Ayah Seimbangkan Pendidikan Keluarga.” https://humas.
bandung.go.id/layanan/sekolah-ayah-seimbangkan-pendidikan-keluarga (last accessed August 11,2021).

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Vol.16The cultural community-based solution is nothing without a good long-term and nationwide
effort to impose change. The most realistic solution is to keep pressing the Parliament to pass
the law of the Elimination of Sexual Violence Bill. The law is the rational and procedural way
to comprehensively overcome domestic violence since it encompasses a broader concept ofsexual violence and includes the rehabilitation for the victims, which is a drastic shift fromIndonesia Criminal Code (KUHP), which focuses on the perpetrator rather than the victim's
needs.
The bill is still situated between two major political ideologies, the Islam Conservative andthe rest. The primary opponents are the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), theNational Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) and the Indonesian Ulema Council, whose
ideology rests in Islamic values97). The proponent is the rest of the political parties and theexecutive. The opposition brought up a counter bill called the Family Resilience Bill (RUU
Ketahanan Keluarga) carried out by the Islamic Civil Organization, which has a more Islamic
nuanced chapters98).
Nonetheless, most civil society movements that have formed alliance under the Civil Society
Coalition have given their full support and continue to apply pressure to the Parliament to pass
the law urgently 99 ). In accordance, a survey by IJCR and International NGO Forum on
Indonesian Development (INFID) reported that 70.9% of the respondents from 34 provinces
agree to pass the law, while 29.1% reject it100). Although there is a need for a more structural
approach to press the Parliament to reconcile their political dispute, there is a significant relief
knowing that the public supports the bill. It is a heartwarming sign that the duty to activate publicawareness about domestic violence in a particular and gender-based problem, in general, is on
the right track. Lastly, it is always the combination of cultural and structural approaches thatwork best to deal with social-political problems. In the context of Indonesia’s "shadow
pandemic," there is a dire need to find the balance between imposing a solution structurally andapproaching the grassroots culturally.

97) Antara (2020), “MUI Berharap RUU PKS Ditolak DPR,” https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1249426/
mui-berharap-ruupks-ditolak-dpr (last accessed August 11, 2021).
98) Fajar Pebrianto (2020), “10 Pasal RUU Ketahanan Keluarga: Agama Anak sampai Homoseks.
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1404887/10-pasal-ruu-ketahanan-keluarga-agama-anak-sampaihomoseks/full&view=ok(last accessed August 11, 2021).
99) Fitria Chusna Farisa (2020), “Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Dukung Pengesahan RUU Penghapusan
Kekerasan Seksual,” https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/07/02/15290161/koalisi-masyarakatsipil-dukung-pengesahan-ruu-penghapusankekerasan-seksual?page=all (last accessed August 11,2021).
100) Nicholas Ryan Aditya (2020), “Studi INFID-IJRS: 70,9 Persen Responden Setuju RUU PKS Segera,”https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/02/02/15173551/studi-infid-ijrs-709-persen-respondensetuju-ruu-pks-segeradisahkan (last accessed August 11, 2021).

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Living Under COVID-19 in Asia

5. Tentative Conclusion
Since the outbreak of COVID 19 from the beginning of 2020, the pandemic has brought
about fundamental changes in the way we live, work and communicate. The responses andstrategies to curtail COVID-19 have had an unintended impact on basic social institution insociety, the family, and has led to the increase in interpersonal violence at home. Amidst the
spread of the novel coronavirus, the shadow pandemic lurks underneath. In both Japan andIndonesia, where there are still considerable structural gender inequalities, together with theeconomic instability caused by the pandemic has led to the somber reality of higher incidencesof violence and abuse.
Having identified the underlying causes, despite the difference in detail, Japan and Indonesia
share similarities in terms of linkage between domestic violence in times of the COVID-19
pandemic. Both are derived from deep-rooted gender inequality and ineffective and fragmented
measures to balance the economy and disease control by the government. The traditional genderconstruction in both countries result from a long historical trajectory. Japan is a mixture of
traditional Buddhist-Confucian values and rapid modernization. On the other hand, Indonesia
has experienced colonialism, state-imposed gender role, and traditional Islamic values. Yet theresults stay the same, a deep-rooted patriarchal culture.
The similarities above lead us to believe that the best remedy to inflate responses toward
domestic violence in times of the pandemic is to provide various safe-shelter and consultation
services for the victims and encourage them to report. Furthermore, in the long run, bothcountries need to strengthen the domestic violence bill; in the case of Indonesia, to erect one. Ina patriarchal culture, where feminine identity remains vulnerable, it is obligatory that they haveproper safe space to ensconce, especially amidst the pandemic.
In this article, two authors that specialize in gender issues in Japan and Indonesia,
respectively, examined the current social and economic circumstances of the two societies under
COVID-19, analyzed the various factors causing the increase in domestic violence and exploredpossible measures and policies to combat domestic violence and abuse attentive to the context
of the ongoing crisis.
While this article examined in detail the situation of the rise in domestic violence and abuseof women under COVID-19 in Japan and Indonesia, however, there are limitations to thisresearch as well. Domestic violence is often regarded as a gendered issue and while this article
also provided statistical data that many of the victims are women subjected to violence by men,
we must not forget that violence and abuse can occur in different forms and relationships. As
stated by Vickie Skorji, director of TELL Japan, “We often think of this as the man being theabuser, but it could be the woman, or mother with their child, an older child with their aging- 135 -

年報 公共政策学

Vol.16parent, in same-sex relationships and when one partner is foreign.”101) Violence and abuse does
not only take the form of physical violence or abuse. Psychological and emotional abuse throughverbal intimidation as well as sexual abuse in the form of unwanted sexual acts can be just as
harmful and detrimental to one’s quality of life and health. The prolonged pandemic is causing
serious economic setbacks and social repercussions, but use of violence against another humanbeing (or animal for that matter) cannot be justified under any circumstances.

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[Newspaper Articles]
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Living Under COVID-19 in Asia:
Tackling the Challenges of the ‘Shadow Pandemic’in Japan and Indonesia
CHI Naomi and Dias PABYANTARA

Abstract
More than 400 million people have been infected by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) since
its outbreak from the beginning of 2020. The pandemic has not only affected the way we live
and work, but it has also brought about the spread of the “shadow pandemic”—domestic
violence. Countries have tried to contain the virus in various ways, from governments
encouraging people to “stay at home” and in some cases a severe “lockdown”. These strategies
have had an unintended impact on the most basic social institution in society, the family, andhas led to the increase in interpersonal violence at home. The World Health Organization hasreported that there is an increase of domestic violence globally amid the COVID-19 pandemic.
In both Japan and Indonesia, where there are still considerable structural gender inequalities,
together with the economic instability caused by the pandemic has led to the somber reality ofhigher incidences of not only domestic violence, but also child abuse and sexual exploitation.
In this article, two authors that specialize in gender issues in Japan and Indonesia, respectively,
will attempt to execute the following: 1) examine the current social and economic circumstancesof the two societies under COVID-19, 2) analyze the various factors causing the increase indomestic violence and its long-term implications, 3) explore possible measures and policies tocounter domestic violence and abuse attentive to the context of the ongoing crisis.

Keywords
COVID-19, Domestic violence, Abuse by intimate partner, Gender inequality, Gender roles,
Patriarchy, Masculinity- 142 -