RIPS Policy Perspectives No.10

North Korea’s Abductionof Japanese Citizens:
The Centrality of Human Rights Violation
Michimi Muranushi
January 2010

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North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens:
The Centrality of Human Rights Violation

Michimi Muranushi*

When the families of Japanese people abducted by North Korea visited
U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House, he expressed his
sympathy. But did the president fully understand the complexity ofthis problem? In the final days of his presidency, when he decided toremove North Korea from the United States’ list of so-called
terrorist-sponsoring states, Bush promised that he would not forget
the abduction problem. But did he realize how many people should not
be forgotten? Does anyone know this number? Although the world has
been aware of the abduction of Japanese citizens for the past several
years, few of the details are certain.

The Issue
First, as of 2009, the Japanese government’s official number ofJapanese men and women who have been abducted by North Korea wasseventeen. 1 These “recognized” cases are based on solid circumstantial*Michimi Muranushi is Professor of International Relations,
Department of Law, Gakushuin University, Tokyo. He specializes in
Asian and African problems. He was a fellow of the RIPS Security
Studies Fellowship Program, 1991-93.
1evidence that the identified missing persons were either kidnapped onJapanese territory by North Korean agents and taken to North Korea
by boat across the Sea of Japan, or they were lured into North Korea by
North Korean agents and were not allowed to return. Most of theseseventeen were kidnapped in the 1970s, on the order of none otherthan Kim Jong-il, the son of the then leader of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, although the country has never admitted it.
Second, a larger number of missing Japanese may have been, or
are likely to have been, kidnapped. This number could be as high as
one hundred and is growing. A private organization, the Investigative
Commission for Missing Japanese, 2 has examined the cases of many
missing Japanese and has concluded that some of them probably or
possibly were abducted by North Korea. 3 The earliest case in thiscategory was in the 1950s, and the latest case was as recent as the
1990s.
Has the Japanese government confirmed all the Japanesenationals now being held in North Korea? Of course not. Could theJapanese government add more people to the list of the “recognized”
abduction victims? Yes, and recently it did. Some of the names on theSee
Uhttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/leaflet.pdfU, forexample. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss what North Korea
wanted to achieve by these abductions or how it carried them out.
2 Its official name is the Investigation Commission on Missing
Japanese Probably Related to North Korea (特定失踪者問題調査 会).
See Uhttp://www.chosa-ka.jp/indexeng.htmU.
3 See
Uhttp://www.listserver.sakura.ne.jp/cgi-bin/list/list3.cgi?mode=list2U.
1

2

Investigative Commission’s list now are on the government’s list as
well. Has the commission identified all missing Japanese citizens who
might be held in North Korea? Probably not. In this respect, this issue
is very different from simply securing the freedom of known
individuals. When two young American journalists were arrested on
the Chinese–North Korean border and held in North Korea in 2009, theAmericans knew who they were. In contrast, Japan has no definitive
information

about

specifically

whom

the

North

Koreanshavekidna pped or even whether they are still alive.
Third, the victims abducted from Japan are not necessarily
Japanese citizens. For example, some Japanese Koreans who were
lured into entering North Korea have not been permitted to return. 4
But people in thi s category are seldom mentioned, even in theJapan ese media.
Fourth, many people are not regarded as victims of abduction,although they share some similarities. Since the 1950s, tens of
thousands of Koreans in Japan have gone to North Korea, believing theNorth Korean propaganda that their motherland was a land of hope forthem. Many of them also took their Japanese spouses with them. Mostof these Koreans and their Japanese spouses now are living in thisland of ho pe under discriminatory conditions and cannot come back toJapan .
Fifth, over time, many of the abductees in North Korea have
See Kang Chol Hwan, Shuuyosho kokka Kita Chosen (A farewell tothe lageri state, North Korea) (Tokyo: The Masada, 1994), pp. 132–135.
43

married and had children and, by now, may have more relatives inNorth Korea than in Japan. Today would they choose Japan as theirmotherland or North Korea as their home? Would they be free to makethis c hoice?
Sixth, whether the people in any of these categories are still
alive is not clear. If North Korea admitted that it had abducted thesepeople but denied that they still were alive, it would have to prove thatthey had died. Japan thus has good reason to doubt North Korea’s
statem ents about these people.
In sum, Japan knows what the problem is, but only North Korea
knows the details. And Japan cannot go to North Korea in search of thet ruth.

ExamplesThe best-known of the seventeen abductees is Yokota Megumi, who was
only twelve when she was kidnapped from a town on the Sea of Japan.
She was walking home from school when she apparently encountered a
North Korean agent. Later, another North Korean agent who defected
to South Kore a testified that he had seen her in a special school inNorth Korea.
Arimoto Keiko, twenty-three, was studying English in London.
When she was looking for an interesting job, she was lured to North
Korea by an agent in Britain. She is thought to have married anotherJapanese abductee, based on a letter that her husband risked handing
to a Polish man who was traveling in North Korea, who then sent the4letter to his parents in Japan. The letter, written in Japanese, said
that he and his wife were in North Korea and were well. An enclosed
photo showed the couple and a baby.
One of the least-known cases identified by the Investigative
Commission as a probable case of abduction is Tokunaga Yoichiro, aneighteen-year-old man who vanished from Japan in the early 1950s. A
North Korean man who defected testified in the 2000s that he had seen
Tokunaga in a prison camp in North Korea. He noticed a scar on theprisoner’s shoulder and asked him how he got it. The North Korean
said that the Japanese prisoner told him he got it in Hiroshima. His
recollection

corroborated

with

this

missing

person’s

personal

in formation.

The Time Factor
Japan now is fighting against time. Beginning in the 1970s, more thanten years passed before people had found enough evidence to believethat the victims had probably been taken to North Korea. Then more
years passed until the family members were able to obtain help andsupport from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese politicians,
who had been reluctant to raise the issue for fear of disturbing thenormalization of North Korean-Japanese relations. And even moretime went by before the Japanes e government began to try to discuss
this p roblem with North Korea.
Finally North Korea admitted that five abducted Japanese were
living in North Korea, four of whom were on Japan’s list and one who
5was not. In September 2002 when North Korea acknowledged that it
had captured still others on Japan’s list, but insisted that they had
died, and declared that some of the rest had never entered North Korea
under any circumstances.
Soon after this admission, the five Japanese and their family
members in North Korea were allowed to return to Japan, although
North Korea initially intended only to let them visit and not remain in
Japan permanently. The five, however, refused to return to North
Korea. After the two countries negotiated, North Korea agreed to let
the family members in North Korea move to Japan as well. One ofthese family members was Charles Jenkins, a U.S. veteran of the
Korean War who was thought to have defected to North Korea andmarried Soga Hitomi, the fifth victim that North Korea recognized andwho w as not on the Japanese list of abductees.
After all this time, North Korea still has not confirmed whether
the people whom it insists have died are really no longer living. By now,t he victims’ families in Japan are old or have themselves died.

What Japan Should Do
The Japanese government often uses the term solution in regard to theabduction problem and states that its solution is a precondition for
normalizing relations with North Korea. With so many unansweredquestions about the problem, however, a solution is difficult to specify,
and eac h of its many issues could cause a diplomatic nightmare forJapan .
6

To resolve this dilemma, the problem first should be defined. Are
there really no abductees other than those that North Korea
acknowledged in 2002? North Korea very likely kidnapped allseventeen of the people on Japan’s list as well as many, if not all, thoseon the Investigative Commission’s list. Second, North Korea needs toestablish and disclose the abductees’ current status. Are these people
still alive? If they are not, North Korea must supply evidence that they
are dead and the cause of their death. Third, the abductees’ desires
need to be ascertained. Do they still wish to return to Japan? They
should be given freedom to decide either way, but it is doubtful that
North Korea would accede to this. Fourth, although the North Koreans
who actually abducted the Japanese should rightfully be handed overto the Japanese, this will never happen. Indeed, one of the known
kidnappers has sometimes been seen at North Korean nationalc eremonies as an invited guest.

Japan’s and North Korea’s Interests
Before 2002, North Korea denied the abductions, but after 2002 when
the five Japanese and their families had returned to Japan, it declaredthat the abduction issue had been settled. Japan and North Korea do
not have normal diplomatic relations and probably will not until Japan
stops raising the abduction issue. With normalization Japan would
certainly proceed as it did when it resumed diplomatic relations with
South Korea in 1965. At that time, Japan paid South Korea a huge sumof money, which effectively was compensation for Japan’s occupation of7

the Korean peninsula before the end of World War II. So, even though
the abduction issue is obstructing the flow of money from Japan into
North Korea, North Korea still is denying that the problem even exists.
Indeed, North Korea could use this money to prop up its weak economy,in other words, to extend the life of the Kim dynasty disguised as acommunist regime.
From this perspective, Japan’s resolution of its abduction issue
probably would have a global impact. Those who believe that the issue
is small compared with North Korea’s nuclear weapons should ask
whether they woul d prefer a stronger North Korea prospering with
J apanese money.

Disputes
As of 2009, Japan and North Korea are not discussing this issue, asNorth Korea is adamant that the abduction problem has been settled.
Accordingly, this means, first, that North Korea does not acknowledge
the seventeen Japanese abductees listed by the Japanese governmentor the probable cases of abduction listed by the Investigative
Commission. Second, North Korea still maintains that some of theabductees died in North Korea, which was central to the dispute
between the two countries for several years after 2002. North Korea,
however, has failed to provide credible evidence of the victims’ death.
What it claims to be the remains of some of the victims—crematedtwice at an extraordinarily high temperature, even though cremation
is rare in this country—failed to pass the DNA test conducted by Japan8

and did not convince the Japanese of its authenticity. Furthermore, thedocuments that North Korea offered to Japan regarding the “dead”
victims were evidently forged, and its official accounts and proof of
their “death” are not persuasive. For example, North Korea insisted
that a young person with no history of heart disease had died of a heart
attack. It also maintains that some of the victims’ graves were washedaway by floodwaters. Not only the initial crime but also the way that
North Korea treated the so-called deaths of the Japanese abductees
with such disrespect infuriated the Japanese public. Third, responding
to Japan’s request, North Korea agreed to “reinvestigate” the people on
the Japanese government’s list, but it did not commence its
reinvestigation until after the Abe administration had left office, given
its uncertainty about Japan’s political future. Finally, no progress has
been made on the abductions of Koreans from Japan and the Japanesespous es of repatriated Koreans.
Since 2002, when North Korea reversed its previous position of
total denial, Japan has achieved little on the abduction issue. The
following factors, however, may have some influence on North Korea.
First, the abduction issue is reminiscent of North Korean terrorist ac ts
in the past. One of the Japanese victims is Taguchi Yaeko, who was
abducted in the 1970s. Kim Hyon Hui, an ex–North Korean agent wh o
was sentenced to death by a South Korean court for the bombing of
Korean Airlines flight 857 in 1987 but later was pardoned, revealed in
the 1980s that Taguchi Yaeko was the same person as Lee Un Hae, theagent’s official personal teacher of Japanese language and etiquett e in9North Korea. This means that if Taguchi Yaeko were permitted toreturn, she could provide important information about North Korea’s
involvement in the bombing. Although North Korea admitted in 2002
that Taguchi Yaeko did enter North Korea, it claimed that there was nosuch person as Lee Un Hae and that Taguchi Yaeko had been killed in a
traffic accident.
The release of Japanese abductees besides Taguchi Yaeko also
might lead to the disclosure of secret information that North Korea istrying to hide, including information about other abduction victims.
For the North Korean leadership to acknowledge North Korea’s
involvement in this crime, however, would cause a considerable loss offace. Many members of the Korean community in Japan already havewithdrawn their support of North Korea, especially in 2002 when Kim
Jong-il asserted that North Korean agents had dec ided on their own tokidnap Japanese and already had been punished.
North Korea may regard negotiations with the United States as
more promising. The only time that North Korea revealed to Japan its
part in the abduction issue was in 2002 when President George W.
Bush made his infamous speech claiming the existence of an “axis ofevil” made up of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. At that time North Korea
probably felt it necessary to make some concessions. But when the
failure of Bush’s Iraq policy became clear, North Korea’s fear of theUnited States faded, and a s a result, it regarded Japan’s role as ago-between less important.
Perhaps not surprisingly, North Korea itself may not have full10

information about the abductees. Indeed, even if they really have died,
the government may not be able to provide accurate information about
the circumstances, although this is a possibility that Japan does not
w ish to confirm.

The Nuclear Weapons Issue
North Korea’s problems with the world are many, such as its
development of nuclear weapons and missiles, refugees, concentration
camps, famine, export of illegal drugs, and forgery of foreign currencies.
Ironically, this multitude of problems has given the country a bizarre
advantage. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons has eclipsed
even its gross violations of human rights. Although the six-party talks
have succeeded in bringing North Korea to the international
negotiating table, they also have diverted the world’s attention fromthe lack of justice inside this prison state.
In fact, the six-party talks may enable North Korea to control its
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. That is, North Korea has beenable to enhance its global position by manipulating its policy on
nuclear weapons. Without making any progress in human rights,
including the abduction of Japanese citizens, North Korea has
succeeded in being removed from the U.S. list of terrorist-sponsoringstates. By denying any connection to the bombing of the Korean
Airlines plane in 1987 and to the bombing of Yangon (Ran goon) in 1983,
it also was able to reverse its status as a terrorist state.
If the other members of the six-party talks reward North Korea
11

for its seeming “progress” in nuclear matters, Japan may be left out inthe cold. In short, the six-party talks have oversimplified North
Korea’s problems in return for the chance to hold discussions with
North Korea. In this way, North Korea gains time and opportunities for
direct talks with the United States about guarantees of its own
security.
Accordingly, in this current framework, the United States andJapan’s neighbors first may ask Japan to soften its economic sanctions
against North Korea in return for “progress” on nuclear weaponsissues. Second, the United States may decide to negotiate directly with
North Korea, which could lead to its normalizing relations with North
Korea. Then other nations could follow suit in the hope of achieving
stability in East Asia, and Japan may be asked to normalize its
relations with No rth Korea without having made any progress on the
ab duc tion issue.
The current stagnation could last for more than ten years, atwhich time Japan’s support for the abductees probably would declinewith the aging or death of the victims’ family members and also of thea bductees themselves.

Steps to Resolve Japan’s Abduction Problem
First, the attention of the United Nations and individual nations toNorth Korea’s human rights problem should not waver and should be
kept separate from their attention to military matters. North Korea
must understand that a discussion of nuclear weapons issues does not12mean that its human rights disaster will be tolerated.
Even if North Korea’s nuclear weapons issue is resolved to thesatisfaction of the United States and other interested parties, otherissues, especially human rights, would remain. Any reward given to
North Korea for its military cooperation should be limited so as not to
let North Korea’s leaders think that the rest of the world is satisfied
with its behavior.
Human rights in North Korea need to be discussed in a separate
forum, and the talks should be based on a UN resolution, so that North
Korea could not dismiss them as interference in its internal affairs.
North Korea’s willingness to help Japan resolve the abduction p roblem
also would signal its willingness to improve its human rights.
Japan should ask the United States for cooperation on theabduction issue on the basis of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, just as theUnited States asked Japan for cooperation on its Iraq policy on thebasis of the two countries’ alliance. The admission of the crime and therelease of some of abductees in 2002 probably were a result of
President Bush’s apparent willingness to defy what the United States
regards as a rogue state. Accordingly, if the United States regarded thedisclosureofinformation

about

the

Japanese

abducteesasaprecondition for better relations with the United States, North Korea
might be forced to divulge more details. This would be a reasonableprecondition if the United States reconfi rmed human rights as afundamental value of diplomatic relations.
Japan also should ask, with the United States’ support, China
13

and Russia to be more sensitive to North Korea’s violations of humanrights. If China decided to recognize the North Korean escapees to its
country as refugees, the change in Chinese policy would send an
important message to North Korea. Japan and the United States thenshould reward China for its reversal of policy.
Japan should request, as well, South Korea’s cooperation on
abduction issue. Although South Korea itself has about five hundred
abductees in North Korea, the problem has been linked to the issue ofseparated families. But whereas the problem of abduction is apeacetime crime by North Korea, the problem of separated families is awartime crime by North Korea committed during the Korean War.
In short, Japan’s success in the issue of its abductees depends on
its influence on North Korea’s, Japan’s, and third countries’ tripartite
relations t o break the deadlock in North Korean- Japanese bilateralr elations.

Conclusion
North Korea has gained nothing by kidnapping Japanese citizens, but
it has thus far escaped any serious punishment, except that it has beendenied Japan’s compensatory funds. Although North Korea is poor, it
nonetheless is clever, manipulating the world with its outsized
military ventures. And although Japan is rich, it has no effectivemeans of brin ging justice to North Korea and repatriating its Japanesen ation als.
Japanese political discourse insists on a solution to this complex
14

problem, but it has not even specifically defined what this solution
would entail. Japan thus needs the active cooperation of the world’s
other major powers to resolve this problem, not only for the abductees
and their families but also for the vast silent majority of North
Koreans. Even though nuclear weapons may appear to crowd out sucha seemingly small-scale issue as the abduction of Japanese citizens,the world should also recognize the centrality of this issue to the rest of
the problems with North Korea. If Japan should abandon this issue,
North Korea with Japanese money will be able to build even higher
walls around its numerous prison camps. That is, the world should see
the abduction issue as a way by which the outside world can demandthat North Korea start attending to the human rights of its own people.

15

RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues(available at http://www.rips.or.jp/english/publications/policy_perspectives.html)

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No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?, December
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No.3 Chiyuki Aoi, Peace Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges andthe Role of Japan, March 2007
No.4 Masashi Nishihara, Heading for a Strategic Uncertainty?: Perspectives on

Asian Security, 2007, April 2007
No.5 Kazuto Suzuki, Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda, October, 2007
No.6 Masashi Nishihara, Tenser in Southwest Asia, Calmer in East Asia －Perspectives in Mid-2008－, July 2008
No.7 Yukari Kubota, Japan’s New Strategy as an Arms Exporter－Revising theThree Principles on Arms Exports－, November 2008
No.8 Masahiro Matsumura, Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan, June 2009No.9 Masashi Nishihara, Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs andGrowing Concerns, July 2009