RIPS Policy Perspectives
No. 22February 2015

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation
Series 4

Masashi Nishihara, Nozomu Yoshitomi,
Masahiro Taniguchi, and Atsushi Yasutomi

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
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The RIPS Policy Perspectives is intended to provide timely alternatives to and analysesof existing peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The viewsof the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the RIPS.

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RIPS Policy Perspectives No.22

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation

Series 4
Table of Contents

1. How Japan Can Counter China’s Coercive Actions
How Japan Can Counter China’s Coercive Actions ···························································· 2
Masashi Nishihara
Japan’s Capacity Building for Vietnam: Cooperating with the United Statesfor Maritime Security in the South China Sea ···································································· 8Nozomu Yoshitomi

2. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Japan’s Experience in the Haiyan Disaster Relief Operation ············································ 12
Masahiro TaniguchiInter-agency Coordination in Disaster Relief for the 2011 East Japan Earthquake
and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan ·························································································· 15
Atsushi Yasutomi※ These articles were originally presented to the Japan-U.S.-Vietnam Trilateral Workshop,
Washington, D.C., on November 18, 2014.

How Japan Can Counter China’s Coercive Actions
Masashi Nishihara
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
1. China’s Coercive Conduct
For many years China observed Deng Xiaoping’s lesson of “keeping a low profile” (taoguangyanghui). But in 2008 after the Olympics in Beijing and the swift recovery from the Lehman
Brothers shock, China turned this modest posture into a more aggressive one.
China is now the world’s second largest economic power, and as it becomes more confidentof its power and status in regional and international relations, it may expand its coercive
conduct to economic, political, and military areas. With its new power and status, President Xi
Jinping promises to realize “the Chinese dream” and establish “a strong maritime power,” bydriving off the U.S. power from the East and South China Seas and exerting hegemonic control
over them.
How should Japan counter such coercive action?

2. A Typical Case: The Senkaku Islands, September 2010
An example of China’s coercive conduct toward Japan was its demand that Japan release thecaptain of a fishing boat who deliberately rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the
Senkaku Islands on September 7, 2010, and was detained and put into Japanese custody.
The Chinese government took several measures to gain the captain’s release: It suspended its
export of rare earths to Japan—which must import more than 90 percent of these minerals.
China then ordered around 10,000 tourists to cancel their trips to Japan and arrested four Fujita
Company employees for taking photos in a military area, even though they apparently were notaware that it was restricted. Finally, China allowed anti-Japanese demonstrators in several cities,
including Beijing, to damage the Japanese embassy and consulate buildings, as well as Japaneseowned factories and stores, and to destroy Japan-made cars driving on the streets.
Bowing to Beijing’s vociferous complaints, the Naoto Kan government released the captainon September 24, without indicting him, despite having stated that it would do so. After Tokyo
released the captain, who returned to China as a hero, Beijing freed the four Fujita Company
employees. Beijing also quietly agreed to repair the damage to the Japanese embassy andconsular buildings.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-2-3. China’s Military and Other Coercive Measures
China’s coercive measures in September 2010 basically aimed at causing economic damage
to Japan thereby pressing Japan to free the captain. China’s other nonmilitary measures include
restricting certain Japanese individuals from entering China and using cyberattacks and viruses
to disrupt or shut down computer systems.
China may also use other, including military, measures to force Japan to make concessions
on the islands. For instance, China now is constantly sending coast guard ships and fishingboats to the area around the Senkakus, often entering their 12-mile territorial waters. [Figure 1]
Although Chinese naval vessels occasionally approach the islands, they are careful not to get
too close. According to the Japanese Defense Ministry, however, on January 30, 2013, a Chinese
navy frigate locked its fire-control radar on both a Japanese destroyer and a helicopter. Then in
May 2014 Japan revealed that a Chinese fighter jet had flown dangerously close to a Japanesefighter jet over the East China Sea. Such are China’s intimidation tactics.
Figure 1 Chinese ships near the Senkakus, 2011 through 2014
140

30
28

124
122

120

25

25
110

22
104

21

100

20

19
17 1786
81

80

89

88 88
84

80
15

77

15
71

69

72

14

15

13

65
12

60

57

59

11
53
49

51 10

9
8

40

10

8 42
36
6

6

6
5

26

4

10 10
48 9

49

9

4

20

5

2
1
7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 03
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
1
0 0 0
0 0 1
01 0

2011/10

2013/1

2012/1ships in contiguous areas/mo

2014/10

ships in territorial waters/mo

Source: Japan Coast Guard Homepage, re-designed by the author

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-3-4. Japan’s Countermeasures
Japan’s countermeasures against China’s coercive actions should be devised by the relevant
government offices in responding effectively to the next crisis. Some thoughts are:1) Economic Countermeasuresa. Countersanctions
China’s suddenly suspending its export of rare earths in 2010 brought home to Japan the riskof becoming overly dependent on China for a crucial resource. As a result, Japan has since
diversified its sources of these minerals, now importing them from countries such as France,
Vietnam, South Korea, and Estonia. Japan also should be aware of other, similar risks in its
investment in and trade with China.
In the last few years, China has not taken any notable economic action against Japan, althoughdemonstrations against Japanese firms in China have caused some of them to close down or
relocate to Southeast Asia and India. This in turn will only weaken the economic relations
between Japan and China.
Sanctions tend to lead to countersanctions, but Japan’s threats of countermeasures may actuallykeep China from going that route. In addition, Japan should consider suspending the export ofJapanese items popular with middle-class Chinese citizens, such as disposable diapers, electric
rice-cookers, and powdered milk. Likewise, Japan should consider boycotting certain Chinese
goods and discouraging Japanese tourists from going to China, damaging the latter’s tourism.
b. Stronger Economic Ties with the United States and Partners
Japan’s strengthening its economic ties with the United States and its like-minded partners
such as the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), Australia, and India would help both
Japan and its economic partners resist China’s coercive economic demands and sanctions. In
this regard, an early settlement of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations would bedesirable. Japan’s support of the ASEAN countries’ economies also is essential, as ASEAN’s
stronger economic foundation will ensure a balanced defense posture as a counterweight toChina’s coercive military activities.
2) Political/Diplomatic Countermeasuresa. Combating China’s Propaganda
China will continue to raise the issue of “history” and the Senkakus, in order to poison
Japanese diplomatic activities. For example, President Xi Jinping imposed the two issues aspreconditions for agreeing to meet with Prime Minister Shinzō Abe at the November 2014 AsiaRIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-4-

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Beijing. The first was Abe’s publicly
committing not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and the second was his publicly acknowledging adispute with China over the Senkaku Islands. Abe refused to accept either. The bilateral summit
became possible only after both sides made minor concessions. These two issues will therefore
remain sources of tension between the two countries.
To weaken the resolve of the Japanese government and people in defending the Senkakus,
China conducts what is often referred to as the “three warfares” regarding the Senkakus: legal
warfare, media warfare, and psychological warfare. Referring to the Cairo Declaration of 1943
and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, for instance, China argues that Japan “stole” theislands from China and that it is the one that has changed the regional order established at theend of World War II. Naturally, Japan regards these arguments as groundless, but China willundoubtedly use these three warfares to advance its territorial claims politically.
Beijing also would like to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, by bothemphasizing Prime Minister Abe’s “militarism” and “revisionism” and warning Washington
not to interfere in the dispute over the Senkakus. The key for Japan here is to demonstrate to
China the strength of the Japanese-US alliance.
Tokyo also should stress the importance of the rule of law in settling territorial disputes,
pointing out that it is China that is threatening to use force. In addition, Japan should publicly
remind China that it disregarded this issue between 1890s and 1960s and that it brought it up
only in 1971. Finally, Japan should launch its new defense strategy: exercising its right tocollective self-defense and Prime Minister Abe’s “positive contribution to peace.”b. Expanding Its Political Ties
Japan should strengthen its political ties with its neighboring partners as well. It already has
formed strong political and security ties with Australia, through the two countries’ “2 plus 2”
ministerial meetings and their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). At the
Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2014, Prime Minister Abe noted that Japan would offer more help
to those Southeast Asian nations that have territorial disputes with China. Already, Japan has
supported Vietnam’s stand against China over its territorial dispute and the Philippines’
decision in January 2013 to bring territorial claims to the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLS) in The Hague. China declined the court’s invitation to submit its case.
3) Military Countermeasures
China has most frequently employed military measures to press its territorial claims on the

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-5-

Senkakus and to thwart the activities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). On November 23,
2013, China suddenly established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East
China Sea and announced that any foreign aircraft planning to enter it must register in advancewith China. The Chinese ADIZ overlaps with the Japanese ADIZ, each of which covers the
Senkakus. This is another indication of China’s determination to assert its territorial claims. Boththe United States and Japan refused to recognize the ADIZ, flying their planes through it
without prior notification and meeting no opposition from China. It has set up a good example
of an effective countermeasure.
In May and June 2014, Chinese fighter jets scared its Japanese counterparts by flying
recklessly close to them in an overlapping zone of the ADIZs. A similar incident took place inAugust with a US plane patrolling in the South China Sea when a Chinese fighter jet approached
it extremely closely. The US patrol plane, a P8A, is capable of detecting and attacking
submarines from the air. Clearly, the Chinese intend to stop Japanese and American militaryactivities emanating from the First Island Chain, which extends from Japan’s southwest
archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippine islands.
There is growing concern, as well, that Beijing may establish a similar ADIZ over the South
China Sea, which would enable China to fortify its sphere of influence and its strategic
submarine base in Hainan. The submarines there will be capable of targeting the US mainland.
Its alliance with the United States is essential in defending the Senkakus, maintaining its
ADIZ in the East China Sea, and sustaining the security of its sea-lanes in the Western Pacific.
The Japanese-US alliance also can bolster Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ territorial claims
against China.
a. Expanding Its Security Role
The Abe government has decided to reinterpret article 9 of the Japanese constitution to allow
the JSDF to expand its security role, specifically to broaden its security contacts with Vietnam
and the Philippines as well as its security agreements with Australia as well as its security
contacts with Vietnam and the Philippines. Japan and Australia could conduct joint exerciseswith either each other or together with the United States, using the latter’s base facilities inGuam. Eventually, the JSDF should be able to reinforce US naval forces sailing in the East andSouth China Seas. The JSDF might also consider working with Vietnamese and Philippine forces.
Japan is gradually developing its own surveillance and intelligence-gathering capability,
based on its space satellite. The JSDF plans to include Japanese-US cooperation in this area in
the forthcoming revised Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and, after 2018, to
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-6-organize a team specializing in space-based surveillance. Last, Japan should cooperate on
cybersecurity with the United States and eventually work as well with Southeast Asian
countries like Vietnam and the Philippines.
b. Providing Arms and Conducting Joint Exercises
Japan has offered three coast guard vessels to the Philippines and six similar vessels to
Vietnam to help build their capacity to patrol in the South China Sea. Although China
undoubtedly is unhappy with this arrangement, it is important to keep the balance of power in
the South China Sea tipped toward the forces concerned about China’s coercive conduct.
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force will provide training for the crews of the coast guard
vessels as well as for broader capacity building. Japan and Vietnam can also practice submarinecrew rescue operations together. In the future, it should likewise broaden areas of joint exerciseswith ASEAN countries, which will send a strong message for China to restrain its coercive
activities.

As China becomes more confident in handling political and military matters, it is likely toreinforce its coercive conduct. Countering it, Japan should be firm with its own stands andprepare to implement effective countermeasures.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-7-

Japan’s Capacity Building for Vietnam: Cooperating with theUnited States for Maritime Security in the South China Sea
Colonel Nozomu Yoshitomi1
Chief, Division for Strategy/Concept,
GSDF Research and Development Command

1. Overview of Japan’s Capacity Building Efforts
Japan’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2013, refers to capacity building formaritime security, rule of law, and international peace cooperation.2 Moreover, Japan’s 2013
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) state that “as capacity building assistance iseffective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation,
Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official
Development Assistance (ODA), and aligning it with joint training and exercises andinternational peacekeeping activities.”3 Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) started its foreign
capacity building assistance program in 2012 with the goal of creating a stable regional andglobal security environment. The MoD believes that it can achieve this goal through humanresource development and technical security support. Since 2012, the MoD has already
implemented capacity building programs for Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Timor-Leste,
Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. These include humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HA/DR), disposal of land mines and unexploded ordnance, military medicine,peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and maritime security. 4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MoFA) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) have also conducted their own capacity building
assistance activities for maritime security in this region.

2. Japan’s Assistance with Vietnam’s Maritime Security
Now that the Vietnamese Navy has started building a submarine flotilla, with six Kilo-classThis article does not represent the positions and policies of this institute.
Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, pp.17–30; available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf
3 Government of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, December 17, 2013, p. 11;
available at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.
4 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, August 2014, pp. 273–275; available at
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_3-3-1_web_1031.pdf.
1
2

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-8-submarines, submarine medicine has become critical to the Vietnamese submariners’ health andsafety. Accordingly, between 2012 and 2014 the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) sent
instructors to Vietnam to conduct seminars on submarine medicine, and in 2013 the Japan Air
Self-Defense Force (JASDF) also sent instructors to Vietnam to teach aviation safety in South
China Sea. In addition, the MoD invited officers from Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense to Japanfor study tours on PKOs and general and underwater medicine.5 For its part, the JCG invited
young coast guard officers from Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, for courses on maritime
security and extended guided-study tours of the JCG’s activities.6 In September 2014, the MoFA
held a seminar, Capacity Building in Maritime Security and Disaster Relief, for participants fromSoutheast Asia, again including Vietnam.7 The MoFA also announced that Japan was providing
Vietnam, in connection with ODA, with six used vessels that could be converted into coast
guard cutters, in order to enhance Vietnam’s maritime security.8

3. Why Cooperation with the United States?
The Broad Range of Military Capacity Building Efforts
In figure 1, showing the areas of Japan’s military capacity building programs implemented
in Vietnam so far, reveals that they cover only a small portion of the broad range of militarycapacity building.
Figure 1

: Areas of Japan’s assistanceSource: author

The decisions regarding the specific capacity building program to be designed andimplemented are based on Vietnam’s needs and desires. But given Japan’s current legal
constraints and political sensitivity to providing military assistance to foreign countries, thecountry cannot respond to all requests. Nonetheless, the United States—which is still debating

Ibid. p. 275.
Japan Coast Guard Academy, The Coast Guard Capacity Improvement Program to Secure Safety andEnvironmental Conservation in Asian Oceans; available at http://ajoc.jcga.or.jp/programs_en.html.
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seminar on Capacity Building in Maritime Security and Disaster Relief; available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000422.html.
8 “Japan to Hand over 6 Ships to Vietnam to Patrol Territorial Waters,” TASS, August 1, 2014.
5
6

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22-9-whether to lift its ban on arms exports to Vietnam—has sufficient potential to respond toVietnam’s broader range of requests. It is essential, therefore, for Japan to cooperate with theUnited States by sharing its financial and human resources for Vietnam’s capacity building.

Overcoming the War Trauma
Despite the United States’ capacity building programs under way in Vietnam,9 the trauma of
the Vietnam War still hangs over its assistance with bilateral defense, just as it does for many
Vietnamese. But because Vietnam’s maritime security needs to be ramped up in a short periodof time, one remedy is using Japan as a catalyst. Seeing that Japan has been able to rebuild and,indeed, prosper after World War II and even to form a close alliance with the United States,
Vietnam may be encouraged to follow a path similar to Japan’s. Clearly, Japan and the UnitedStates must cooperate with each other in creating a favorable environment for Vietnam to fulfill
its defense needs while putting its war resentment behind it.

4. Challenges
Japan’s current whole-government approach is the first challenge to its capacity building
programs. The fact that many ministries and state agencies—such as the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Defense, Justice, and the Environment, as well as the Coast Guard and the Energy
Agency—may contribute capacity building activities for maritime security has complicatedintra-agency coordination. Therefore, the National Security Council must play a leading role inresolving this problem.
The second challenge is improving the capability of the Japan’s subject matter experts (SMEs)
to be sent to Vietnam. That is, many Japanese instructors are not familiar with Vietnam’s
political and security situation, language, and culture. To remedy this, some of the ongoing US
programs offer good examples. The US National Guard, for instance, offers the State Partnership
Program (SPP), a security cooperation program under the US Department of Defense, which is
divided into sixty-six individual programs with sixty-six partner states around the world. The
typical SPP event is an SME exchange program focusing on areas such as command and control,
disaster management, border operations, port security, and military medicine.10 The Oregon

US Department of State, Expanded U.S. Assistance for Maritime Capacity Building, December 16, 2013; available
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218735.htm.
10 Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino, The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, andOptions for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2011), p. 6.
9

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 10 -

National Guard has taken the lead since 2012 in the SPP’s program for Vietnam.11
The third challenge to Vietnam’s capacity building is coordination among the three countries,
which is critical to smooth and flexible planning, implementation, and assessment. Here,sending liaison officers from Japan and the United States to Vietnam is very effective.
The fourth and final challenge is the political sensitivity of some of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Japan and the United States cooperating on Vietnam’s
defense capability. ASEAN as a whole has registered its concern about the maritime security
issues developing in the South China Sea, but the individual countries’ defense policies
regarding maritime security are nonetheless caught in a power game between the United States
and China.12 Therefore, some of the ASEAN countries may express strong reservations about
the trilateral cooperation initiative, which may eventually weaken ASEAN’s integrity. At thesame time, this trilateral cooperation may further provoke China, leading it to take even morecoercive measures in the South China Sea. To avoid this, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam
must ensure transparency in their capacity building activities to alleviate any skepticism fromother ASEAN countries.

5. Positive Spillover Effects
If trilateral cooperation on Vietnam’s capacity building in maritime security succeeds, othercountries in the region—such as the Philippines and Indonesia, which are facing similar maritime
security challenges—may be followed by a similar form of defense cooperation. For example,
Australia and Britain could become donor states for this defense cooperation.

Furthermore,

success in trilateral cooperation may also create opportunities to promote civil-military
cooperation in other areas. For instance, civil-military dialogue on building a trilateral cooperation
framework on strategic, operational, and tactical levels may be possible, thereby also
strengthening the Japanese-US alliance. Japan then might be further encouraged to contribute tostability in the Asia-Pacific region by taking a leading role in building trilateral cooperation.

National Guard Bureau, The National Guard State Partnership Program Annual Report Fiscal Year 2013, January
2014; available at http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP%20Annual%20Report%20FY13.pdf.
12 Note that “Cambodia and Thailand, which do not have direct interests in this issue, sided with China.” See,
Suzuki Sanae, Conflict among ASEAN Members over the South China Sea Issue, Institute of Developing
Economies—Japan External Trade Organization, September 2011; available at
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201209_suzuki.html.
11

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 11 -

Japan’s Experience in the Haiyan Disaster Relief Operation
Masahiro Taniguchi
Former Emergency Response Officer
Secretariat, Japan Disaster Relief TeamJapan International Cooperation Agency

On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines, leaving approximately 6,000
people dead, 1,800 missing, and more than 4 million displaced. Japan was one of the eightnations that dispatched its military to help in the relief effort.
Following the Philippine government’s request for assistance on November 10, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) sent its civilian Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) medical
teams to the island of Leyte, which sustained the most damage, for a period of approximately
one month. The medical team consisted of medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists, andcoordinators, all of whom were registered volunteers trained by JICA’s pre-operational disaster
relief programs. The Japanese government also dispatched the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF)
as the military component of the JDR team, the largest military group ever sent abroad fordisaster relief.

1. Civil-Military Cooperation
In the Typhoon Haiyan relief operation, the JSDF offered (1) mobile medical assistance using
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)s and helicopters; (2) aerial transportation service for theaffected people, aid workers, military personnel, and relief goods using C-130Hs, CH-47JAs,
UH-1Js, and SH-60Ks; and (3) pest control using spraying units. The JSDF also sent liaison
officers (LOs) to the UN cluster meetings on health issues, the military-to-military coordination
center, US and British naval vessels, and the JICA office in Manila for information gathering andcoordination.
The cooperation during the relief operations between the civilian and military (JSDF)
components of the Japan Disaster Relief team included information exchange and sharing by
Tokyo, Manila, and Tacloban; transportation of the JDR’s civilian staff members between Manila
and Tacloban using the JSDF’s C-130H transport aircraft; and aerial damage assessment by the
JDR’s Expert team using the JSDF’s SH-60K helicopters.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 12 -

In addition, the JDR Secretariat in Tokyo also envisioned cooperation between the military(either the JSDF or the US military) and civilians (i.e., civilian JDR workers active in thePhilippines). One example was an evacuation plan for the JDR medical teams already operatingin Tacloban, using US military assets such as Ospreys or helicopters if their security was severely
threatened. Another possibility was to use military facilities for civilian JDR medical staff for
temporary shelter (e.g., for showers and laundry). Although the Japanese and US military held
negotiations with the JDR, none of these plans materialized. But these examples demonstratethat civil-military cooperation during disaster relief operations could be extended beyond theexisting plans, which seem to be limited to information sharing, transportation, and damage
assessment.

2. Speaking a common language
In order for both the civilian and the military sides to cooperate, each must be familiar withthe other’s organizational culture, including its decision-making procedures, managerial
structures, and operational capacity. Without this knowledge, it would be impossible to prepare
for civil-military cooperation, as cost of coordination is likely to increase.
As many observers have argued, creating a human network made up of civilians, the military,
the public sector, nonprofit organizations, private businesses, and individuals is essential. For
this, workshops, conferences, table-top exercises (TTX), and field training exercises (FTX) for
humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery (HA/DR) have been found useful.
Civil-military cooperation, however, usually is ad hoc and thus cannot be practiced in
TTX/FTX scenarios. Nevertheless, such exercises can give both civilians and the military
opportunities to create networks among the participating civilian and military officers.
Information sharing between civilians and the military refers to the timely and appropriate
translation, interpretation, and analysis of the information and thus is important to decide
whether cooperation between the civilian JDR team and the military is necessary. A thoroughknowledge of the technical terms used in humanitarian aid and by the military therefore isessential.

3. Avoiding Excessive and Misguided Expectations
Avoiding excessive and misguided expectations of the JSDF’s role in disaster relief is anotherchallenge. Even though the Oslo Guideline stipulates that using foreign military assets must be
the last resort for HA/DR, in Japan the JSDF has long been the first responder to domestic
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 13 -

disasters. Accordingly, the Japanese people have come to expect it to take an even more activerole in disaster relief. Overseas disaster relief operations, however, are conducted in a different
environment, in which logistics networks as well as language and cultural barriers may cause
operational problems. Because many civilian aid workers are not familiar with the JSDF’s
foreign operations, they may end up with excessive and misguided expectations of its
capabilities. Again, enhancing civilians’ knowledge of the military would remedy this problem.

4. The Drawbacks of the “All-Japan Approach”
The “All-Japan approach” can be defined as cooperation in HA/DR by Japanese actors,
including the JDR’s civilians and JSDF units, Japanese NGOs, and Japanese private businesses.
But political pressure to implement the All-Japan approach, either implicitly or explicitly, mayhinder relief activities that could otherwise be carried out more efficiently by non-Japanese
actors. Indeed, this approach could even reduce the opportunity for civil-military cooperation.
For instance, emergency relief goods might be airlifted more efficiently by other countries’
militaries or commercial aircraft. But if a Japanese actor (e.g., the JSDF’s air cargo) wereintentionally selected in connection with the “All-Japan approach,” despite the other, more
efficient options, the delivery could be delayed, thereby hurting the affected people. Those
working for humanitarian relief thus should always choose the best available resource for relief,
without regard to national preferences. Currently, the All-Japan approach still appears to have
only a symbolic and political function. It should remain one of the means to efficient relief
activities and must not be considered the goal in itself. In this sense, a decision to bypass civilmilitary cooperation if it is not feasible also is important. Civilians and the military should
cooperate on disaster relief activities only if it is the best available option.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 14 -

Inter-agency Coordination in Disaster Relief for the 2011
East Japan Earthquake and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan
Atsushi Yasutomi
Researcher, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Japan’s experiences with disaster relief after the earthquake in eastern Japan in 2011 andTyphoon “Haiyan” in the Philippines in 2013 have given the country useful lessons for more
effective and efficient intra-agency coordination among the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF),
state and local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and volunteer networks.

1. Good practice and challenges in civil-military cooperation in the 2011 Earthquake –building networks for cooperation
The JSDF’s relief efforts after the 2011 earthquake marked the first time that it had cooperated
with NGOs on the ground. The JSDF’s information sharing with civilian agencies resulted in theefficient delivery of relief goods, which was a highlight of Japan’s civil-military cooperation.
Nonetheless, it became evident that more formalized approaches are needed, such as
developing a peacetime civil-military cooperation network and providing training and exercises.
One of the best examples of civil-military cooperation during the 2011 earthquake took placein Miyagi Prefecture. The relief efforts began with on-site coordination meetings of the stateauthorities, relevant local authorities, the JSDF, and volunteer organizations (including NGOs)
to plan the distribution of food and other relief goods to evacuees in the region. For example,
for the distribution of food, first the local authorities identified the number and locations of thetemporary evacuee shelters; then volunteers identified those areas where the food would be
distributed and prepared; and finally, using this information, the JSDF clarified the current
status of the food distribution and the number of food packages yet to be distributed. In someareas, in order to avoid any duplication, the JSDF prepared hot rice and miso soup, and thevolunteers cooked the main dishes.13 This practice became a model for effective coordination
amongst the JSDF and civilian organizations.

13 Tomoya Kamino, “Disaster Response in the Great East Japan Earthquake: For collaboration among theJapan Self-Defense Forces, Business Enterprises, and civil society organization”, Journal of International
Security, Vol. 41, No. 2, September 2013, p. 40. [Original in Japanese]
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 15 -

Some Japanese believe that the country has become overly dependent on the JSDF for help
after major natural disasters.14 The role of the JSDF in disaster relief and the procedure fordispatching the JSDF are stipulated in Article 83 of the Defense Forces Act, which states that incase of a natural disaster, in order to protect people’s lives and assets, the mayor of a city in theaffected prefecture may request Defense Minister a dispatch of the JSDF. Upon the request,
Defense Minister determines that no other means of sending aid are available, he/she may
dispatch the JSDF. For the JSDF to be sent to provide disaster relief in Japan, three conditions
must be met: (1) the JSDF’s operations must protect people’s lives and assets to maintain the
public order; (2) the need for protection must be evident; and, (3) no other civilian means must
be available to do this.15
Given the constraints of the JSDF’s assets and the number of personnel engaged in disaster
relief activities, the third condition must be minimized. One way would be to develop a planfor coordination stipulating that after a major natural disaster, the JSDF would first concentrateon search and rescue and limit other functions, such as transportation and food distribution.
Such an agreement between the JDSF and private businesses may help enhance the JSDF’s
disaster response capability. To date, the JSDF has concluded a disaster relief cooperationagreement with Softbank, a private telecom company, allowing the exchange of information
through Softbank’s communication facilities, with the JSDF moving Softbank’s mobile
communication technicians into the affected areas if necessary. 16 The Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy, in the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), recently

14 Tomonori Yoshizaki, “A Japanese Perspectives,” in National Institute for Defense Studies, International

Security Symposium, “The Role of the Military Major Natural Disasters,” 2012, Tokyo, p. 76 [original in
Japanese].The JSDF has been dispatched to provide disaster relief in Japan more than 20,000 times since1951. The populations of those areas of Japan prone to natural calamities now expect the JSDF to be theprimary responder to disasters. In fact, in a national opinion survey conducted in 2012, more than 80% of
the respondents named disaster relief as the main purpose of the JSDF. Yoshizaki thus refers to the JSDF’s
role in disaster relief in Japan as “Japan’s strategic culture.” See also Tomoaki Murakami, “Historical
Development of Disaster Relief Operations by [the] JSDF”, Journal of International Security, Vol. 41, No. 2,
September 2013, pp. 15–30 [original in Japanese]. Murakami states that because the JSDF’s role in disaster
relief is highly visible to much of Japan, the population’s opinion of the JSDF has been high. Between Julyand September 2014 alone, the JSDF was dispatched as many as 65 times for disaster relief in Japan, with
24,509 personnel, 5,083 vehicles, and 258 aircraft deployed. See, The Asagumo Shimbun, 13 November 2014.
In this respect, Yoshizaki refers to the JSDF’s domestic roles in disaster relief in Japan as Japan’s strategic
culture. See, Yoshizaki (ibid).
15 S. Tamura, K. Takahashi, and K. Shimada, eds., Legal Systems concerning Disaster Response in Japan[original in Japanese].
16 Softbank,「災害時の相互協力に向けて『災害協定』を締結」[Softbank concludes treaty for mutual
cooperation in case of disaster], press release, June 24, 2014; available at
http://www.softbank.jp/corp/group/sbm/news/press/2014/20140624_01/
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 16 -

conducted transportation trainings with the Ministry of Defense, using the JSDF’s vehicle
between private oil refineries and private gas stations.17

2. Challenges in Inter-agency Coordination after Typhoon “Haiyan”
Japan’s relief efforts in the Philippines demonstrated that its current approach must
institutionalize its coordination of the military and civilian organizations at both the strategic
and tactical levels, concentrating on preliminary information exchanges and human resource
capabilities.
Just one year has passed since the colossal Typhoon Haiyan caused severe damage to thePhilippines in November 2013. The Japanese government offered US$56 million in financial
assistance and sent a medical support team from the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA). The government also sent 1,180 members of the JSDF to Cebu Island and then to Leyte
Island, under its Operation Sankay (meaning “friend” in the Visayan language) between
November 11 and December 9, 2013, to provide transportation for the service staff, relief goods,
pest control, and mobile clinics for medical assistance such as vaccinations.
Because it lacked officers with experience in coordinating with the international
humanitarian community, the JSDF’s medical team received assistance from the Embassy ofJapan in coordinating with civilian actors on the ground, including international organizations
and national and local authorities.
Conceptual mismatch between the strategic and tactical levels on civil-military cooperation
Japan’s strategy regarding civil-military cooperation in support and disaster relief activities
has been spelled out since 2002, most recently in the Advisory Group Medium-term Report on
Future Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). This report suggests that the JSDF use the Japanese
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in collaboration with civilian organizations, including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), through a whole-of-government approach, or the“All-Japan” policy.18 Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released in 2013, also stipulates
that Japanese PKOs should implement effective coordination with ODA projects and with

17 Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and Industry,「陸上自衛隊東北方面隊との間で、危機時の石油輸送協力

体制を強化します[METI enhances cooperation between with the Tohoku Arm Group JGSDF on transfer ofoil in case of disaster], press release, October 14, 2014. 経済産業省、プレスリリース 2014 年 10 月 14 日;
available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2014/10/20141014006/20141014006.html
18 Advisory Group Medium-term Report on Future PKO (PKO no arikata ni kansuru kondankai Chuukan
Torimatome), available at http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/info/pdf/20110704.pdf
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 17 -

NGOs. 19 While these strategic documents address Japan’s fundamental approach to civilmilitary cooperation, they contain few, if any, tactical guidelines on practicing the strategies in
actual missions, i.e. how the JSDF and potential civilian collaborators should actually cooperate.
As a result, the interpretations on civil-military cooperation between the capital city and fieldlevel may vary, raising the risk of making cooperation highly case- and person-dependent. Somecases in the Philippines present various witnesses suggesting inconsistencies and confusion
over the strategies created in Tokyo and the interpretations of them by the foreign offices and
JSDF officers at the tactical level in the Philippines.
The JSDF officer in charge of civil-military cooperation in Operation Sankay noted that the“All-Japan” (whole-of-government) approach was essential to the JSDF’s disaster relief
operations and international peace support operations. 20 For this reason, there has been
constant psychological pressure from Tokyo on the JSDF staff operating in the field seek out andrealize any civil-military cooperation projects. But at the same time, this officer acknowledgedthat the All-Japan approach should not take priority over responding to local emergency relief
needs. Indeed, the JSDF had more pressing needs for coordination with local authorities andthe UN agencies in Tacloban than seeking opportunities for cooperation with other Japaneseagencies.
A diplomat at the Japanese Embassy’s Provisional Office in Tacloban revealed that except forprotecting Japanese nationals in the disaster areas, it had not received any explicit task orders
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in Tokyo requesting support for the JSDF engaged
in Tacloban. He emphasized the serious lack of cohesion between the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defense concerning public announcements of the JSDF’s medical services to beoffered in Tacloban. The JSDF periodically gave press releases to the Japanese press, though not
to the Philippine media. It is imperative that the JSDF announce in advance its pest control
activities (aerosol application) and for the availability of its mobile clinics and to keep track ofsuch activities for future reference. Despite this, the two ministries in Tokyo did not have aunified policy regarding their roles vis-à-vis public announcements. The Provisional Office first
sent the announcement to the Embassy in Manila, which is better connected to the local
networks, so the announcement could then reach the Philippine and other media. This

19 Cabinet Office of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013; available at

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf
20 Saya Kiba and Atsushi Yasutomi, “Challenges in Japanese Approaches to Civil-Military Cooperation:

Cases in the International Peace Cooperation Missions in South Sudan and the Philippines,” Journal ofInternational Cooperation Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2014. [Original in Japanese]. The witnesses described in thisarticle are based on the authors’ interviews conducted in March 2014.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 18 -

important policy linkage between the two ministries was not formulated by the authorities inTokyo but came about on a purely on an ad-hoc and personal initiative basis.
Capability for pre-operation information-gathering
The work of the Japanese Embassy’s Provisional Office in Tacloban was essential for linking
the local authorities and the JSDF in cluster meetings at the On-Site Operations Coordination
Centre (OSOCC, a coordinating body in Tacloban for civilian humanitarian agencies),
conducting studies of local medical demands, and providing the JSDF with both information
about the community and language support.
The diplomat at the Embassy’s Provisional Office mentions two areas needing improvement.
The first is that the JSDF was unable to send in an engineering unit with heavy equipment, eventhough it had been told in advance the need for such equipment. He learned from his postoperation study that the mayors of the local authorities, and members of the state agencies(particularly the Ministry of Social Welfare and Development), and the international agencies
all had needed assistance in shelter building and agricultural reconstruction. In addition, theArmed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) expected the JSDF to assist in the transportation of relief
goods and to provide forklift and other heavy vehicle operators to clear away rubble.
The second area needing improvement is that the JSDF first operated in the north of Cebu
Island and only later moved to Leyte Island where the damage was much worse. These tacticalchallenges could have been avoided if the MoFA had arrived earlier in the damaged areas inorder to conduct more detailed studies of local needs and thus to be able to deliver the
information to the JSDF more promptly and accurately.
A JSDF officer seconded to the MoFA’s Southeast Asia Division agrees that the JSDF/MoD
should create a system of constantly strengthening their information-gathering capabilities
through peacetime exercises. At present, the Act Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster
Relief Team requires permission from the foreign minister to dispatch a JSDF foreign disaster
relief team. It is possible, however, to create at least a provisional legal framework to send
JSDF/MoD staff to disaster areas to study whether the JSDF’s help is truly necessary before
actually sending in a team. If their study determined that the JSDF was not needed, then thereconnaissance trip would have been prudent. But it would be better to have more JSDF staff(and defense attachés) capable of evaluating such post-disaster needs stationed at all times in
the Japanese embassies in disaster-prone countries so that they could instantly analyze andrelay emergency demands.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 19 -

Capability of human resources in inter-agency coordination for civil-military cooperation
The JSDF officer quoted earlier stated that ordinary JSDF staff are usually not able to oversee
coordination, as it requires expert knowledge of and experience with development assistanceand disaster relief. Officers without this expertise are not able to coordinate with UN agents andlocal and national authorities. For example, they may not be familiar with UN cluster systems
and the Oslo Guidelines, and they may not be aware that the military’s approach and mind-set
are not always compatible with those of the civilian actors. But the JSDF officers’ capabilities canbe strengthened through peacetime capacity building in these areas. Those who are sent on
disaster relief and peacekeeping operations should have at least a basic understanding ofJapanese foreign assistance and international cooperation. Moreover, the embassies will notalways be able to support the JSDF, so the officers on disaster missions must not depend on theembassy’s assistance.
Legal Constraints on Disaster Relief Abroad: The 1987 JDR Act
The roles of and the conditions under which Japan’s Disaster Relief team is to be sent abroad
are spelled out in the Act Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR Act).
This law—which first took effect in 1987, with six subsequent amendments—has allowed theJapan Disaster Relief Team (composed of search and rescue, medical, and expert teams from the
JICA and other civilian organizations, plus the JSDF) to be dispatched to disaster areas upon therequest of the affected country. Article III-2 states that the minister of foreign affairs may consult
with the minister of defense regarding the dispatch of the JSDF should it be deemed necessary.
This act has been challenged in several areas, particularly the JSDF’s cooperation with the
JICA. First, the act regulates what tasks the JSDF can perform during disaster relief operations
abroad. According to Article III, the JSDF is permitted to assist in search and rescue; medical
activities (including pest control); and the overseas transportation of relief goods, facilities, andpersonnel. This law currently does not cover the dispatch of engineering units. Due to thisconstraint, the JSDF was not able to send an engineering unit to conduct rubble removals in
Tacloban. In effect, the JSDF’s relief activities (vaccinations, pest control, and mobile clinics) weresimilar to those of the JICA. While Japan’s medical functions were multiplied in the disasterareas, the JSDF could not respond to the high expectation for rubble removal, which could be
best practiced by the JSDF in the disaster environment. Instead, the JSDF was virtually mirroring
JICA’s tasks. The second challenge is that the act does not make clear about the division of laborand its sequencing with civilian institutions, primarily between the JSDF and the JICA.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 20 -

Conclusion
Japan’s recent experiences with civil-military cooperation during disaster relief activities haverevealed some major problems. Despite the success of the 2011 relief activities, greater
peacetime civil-military cooperation network is further needed. Japan’s relief activities in thePhilippines offer some lessons in the cooperation of the JSDF and private Japanese organizations
operating in a foreign country. Japan lacks an institutionalized commitment to inter-agency
coordination for disaster relief. Although it has a solid strategy for civil-military cooperation fordisaster relief, the interpretation of this strategy is not yet consistent.
The JSDF’s experiences with the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the 2013 typhoon in thePhilippines demonstrate that concrete measures are still needed to move this strategy to atactical level. Inter-agency coordination must become institutionalized in order to prevent themission from stalling and perhaps even harming, rather than assisting, the intended
beneficiaries.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 22- 21 -

RIPS Policy Perspectives
Back issues
No. 21 (January 2015)

防衛装備移転三原則とグローバル化時代の日本の防衛産業 (Japan's Defense Industries and Its New Principlesof Arms Transfer)No. 20 (September 2014)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation, Series 3: China’s Assertive Conduct(Masashi Nishihara), Responses to Rising Tensions in The South China Sea (Yoji Koda)
No. 19 (September 2014)
Masahiro Matsumura, 「自衛隊による下地島空港の活用に備えよ」Using Okinawa’s Shimoji Airport for
National Defense
No. 18 (February 2014)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation Series 2: The Changing Security of the
Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Masashi Nishihara and Yoji Koda)
No. 17 (November 2013)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation: Analyses from Japanese perspectives(Satoru Mori and Masashi Nishihara)
No. 16 (December 2012)
RIPS Symposium 2012, Summary Report: Responses to Japan’s New Arms Export Policy
No.15 (November 2012)
Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Restore Its Place in Asia?”
No.14（2012 年 3 月）
RIPS 公開セミナー2011（2011 年 10 月）「災害対策と防衛のために新技術をどう活かすか」
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RIPS Symposium 2011, “New High-Techs for Disaster Relief and National Defense.”
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RIPS 春季公開セミナー(2011 年 5 月)、「日露関係と北方領土返還の展望―東日本大震災後に考える日本の対応」
No. 11 (August 2011)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s ‘Coercive’ Diplomacy Leads to New Power
Realignments.”
No.10 (January, 2010)
Michimi Muranushi, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens: The Centrality of Human Rights
Violation.”
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Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs and Growing Concerns.”
No.8 (June 3, 2009)
Masahiro Matsumura, “Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan- June 2009.”
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