RIPS Policy Perspectives
No.18

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation
Series 2
The Changing Securityof the Sea Lines of Communicationin the Indian and Paciﬁc Oceans
Masashi Nishihara
Yoji Koda
February 2014
Research Institute for Peace and Security
Tokyo

一般財団法人平 和・安 全 保 障 研 究 所

Research Institute for Peace and Security

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18

Building a Framework forJapan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation
Series 2
The Changing Securityof the Sea Lines of Communicationin the Indian and Pacific Oceans

Table of Contents

1. Recent Five Developments in East Asia Security (Masashi Nishihara) ···················· 2

2. The Changing Security of the Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian andPacific Oceans (Yoji Koda) ································································································· 8* These articles were originally presented to the Japan- U.S.-Vietnam TrilateralWorkshop, Hanoi, Vietnam on November 19, 2013.

Recent Five Developments in East Asia Security
Masashi Nishihara1

S

ince late last year (2012) the new governments that have been formed in
China, South Korea, and Japan have been shaping new power relations in
the Asia-Pacific region. Five major developments will be discussed here. Allof them are important for the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Shift in U.S.-China Relations
U.S. President Barack Obama’s “rebalancing” strategy for Asia has hedged
against the building of “a strong maritime power” and “the great revival of theChinese people,” which China’s new leader Xi Jinping has started to advocate since
he took office in March. In his meeting with President Obama in California in June,
President Xi even proposed “new style of big power relations.”
Clearly Xi intended to establish China’s sphere of influence in the western halfof the Pacific. China continues to send patrol and surveillance ships as well as naval
ships, fighters, and even a drone near the Senkakus, Japan’s southwestern islands.
The number of approaching Chinese fighters “scrambled” by Japanese Air
Self-Defense Force has amounted to about 300 times between January throughSeptember this year.
In July the Chinese navy conducted a largest-ever joint exercise with the Russiannavy off Vladivostok, and returned home via the Sea of Okhotsk and the Western
Pacific rather than straight through the Sea of Japan. In late October the PLA(People’s Liberation Army) conducted another large-scale naval exercise in theWestern Pacific. Clearly China aims at establishing its naval hegemony in theWestern Pacific.
On the diplomatic scene as well, China has successfully sought its active
presence in Southeast Asia. It was conspicuous particularly in October, when

1

Dr. Masashi Nishihara is President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security,
Tokyo.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-2-President Obama failed to visit Indonesia and Malaysia and more importantly toattend the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit in Bali and the EAS(East Asia Summit) in Brunei, due to the government shutdown. Because President
Obama did not come to Southeast Asia, President Xi Jinping monopolized star
attraction and worked to “embrace” the region economically and politically. The
United States was temporarily pushed to the defensive side.
Although China has thus appeared more vigorous in military and diplomatic
activities than the United States has, it faces serious domestic challenges in the areasof economic disparity, corruption, environmental degradation, and ethnic and otherpolitical disturbances. In fact, there are many indications of economic turndown.
Some analysts argue that China has no chance of overtaking the United States. How
U.S.-China relations may change in the future remains to be seen.

Changing International Relations in the Korean Peninsula
Since President Park Geun-hye came into office in February, she has stressed theimportance of building “trust” with Pyongyang. She sought conciliatory gesture
toward North Korea by responding favorably to the reopening of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and the reunion of separated families and sightseeing tours atGeumgansan, a high mountain just north of the DMZ (De-Militarized Zone).
However, so far she failed in all of them.
In the meantime, President Park has had successful diplomatic activities withmajor countries including the United States, China, Vietnam, and major European
countries, but excluding Japan. President Park’s China visit in June was particularly
significant. Seoul’s high dependency upon China for trade encourages it to lean
toward Beijing. Koreans argue that since the United States failed to prevent North
Korea from developing nuclear weapons they should move closer to China, which
they say can help control North Korea and help attain a unified Korea.
One contributing factor to a growing ROK-China link is President Park
Geun-hye’s anti-Japanese stance. Being preoccupied with Japan’s “lack of sincerity”
in admitting wartime conducts, she refuses to meet Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
This has led her to continue to disregard GSOMIA (General Security of Military
Information Agreement) and ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-3-with Japan. She intends to promote a partnership among South Korea, the UnitedStates and China, rather than the one among South Korea, the United States, andJapan.
South Korea is in confused state vis-à-vis the United States. On one hand it
wants to have greater independence of Washington than today. The Korean military
has decided to acquire longer-range missiles despite the U.S. opposition. They also
want to build its own missile defense system, not integrated with the U.S. system.
On the other hand, they would like to postpone the time of transfer of wartime
operational control from the United States to the Korean forces beyond December
2015.
This dynamic process in the peninsula suggests that relations among the nations
involved are changing with the increasing influence of China. Beijing now can exert
its influence over both North and South Korea. It would not be in China’s interest to
help unify the two Koreas but rather to maintain the divided Korea so that thenorthern half will remain as a buffer against U.S. power. If the military ties between
the United States and South Korea should become weaker, the alliance between
Japan and the United States will become all the more important.

China’s More Vigorous Efforts in Winning over ASEAN
In March President Xi Jinping spoke of “the Chinese dream,” namely “the great
revival of the Chinese people,” which has since become his favorite slogan. Since
then he has extensively traveled to Latin America, Central Asia, Africa, Southeast
Asia as well as Europe and Russia. His particular focus appears in Southeast Asia,
however. As will be discussed later, in October, taking advantage of President
Obama’s absence in the APEC and East Asia Summits, he unfolded a charm
offensive diplomacy. The president went to Jakarta as the first foreign leader tospeak before the Indonesian parliament, where he called for stronger ties withIndonesia and proposed building a “maritime Silk Road.”

His desire was tostrengthen trade link between China and Southeast Asia. He promised generous
economic support to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries.
China now can afford promising a huge amount of aid and trade. This way it can
win over ASEAN countries to his side. He offered to Malaysia to build a pipeline
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-4-across the Malay peninsula, for example. His diplomacy worked in Malaysia as
well and at the APEC and East Asia Summits.
China has gained its heightened status in the region. President Xi Jinping
attended the APEC Summit, whereas Premier Lee Keqiang was in Brunei, attending
the East Asia Summit. Xi Jinping primarily focused on peace, stability anddevelopment in his speeches.
At the APEC meeting, the Japanese, U.S., and Australian foreign ministers
issued a joint statement indicating their opposition to any attempt to change thepresent status by force or by coercive action, referring to China’s aggressive
activities in East and South China Sea.
The Chinese leaders met all ASEAN leaders except for President Aquino of thePhilippines. They tried to isolate the Philippines because it submitted its territorial
claims to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

“Japan Is Back” to the Region
Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to his position in December last year
(2012), he has unfolded active diplomacy both in economic and security fields. His
economic recovery policy called “Abenomics” has many signs of good start. There
are strong indications that Japan is restoring its economy. Japan seems finally todepart from the two “lost decades.”The business community holds cautious

optimism. In security fields as well, Abe has taken several bold initiatives instrengthening the legal and political base for a larger security role and establishinga national security council. These initiatives include the reinterpretation of theconstitutional clause that has prohibited the Japanese forces from exercising theright of collective self-defense.
Abe also would like to play a more active regional leadership role. Because hecannot visit China and South Korea, his strategy is to strengthen ties with thosecountries around the two unfriendly countries. He also has traveled extensively. He
has visited eight Southeast Asian countries. In November he will visit theremaining two countries, Laos and Cambodia. Japan has been in fierce competition
with China for winning over ASEAN countries. He has extended his support to
ASEAN nations, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, in providing patrol
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-5-

ships which can protect their own commercial ships and watch Chinese patrol boats
in the South China Sea.
Under Prime Minister’s leadership, Japan has increased its defense budget,albeit small, and deployed more forces to defend its southwestern islands,
especially the Senkakus. The Self-Defense Forces are forming special units foramphibious landing operations, and are training them together with the U.S.
Marines. Japan is sending a message to China that it will be opposed to any attempt
to change the present status by use of force. As he said in his February 2013 speechentitled, “Japan is back,” in Washington, DC, Japan is becoming a political player inthe region.

Security Talks between Japan and Russia
Japan and Russia are becoming close political and security partners. This is
another new development in the region. In early November the foreign and defense
ministers of Russia and Japan (so called “two plus two”) met in Tokyo for the very
first time. Prime Minister Abe has actively engaged himself in talks with President
Vladimir Putin to promote economic and security cooperation. Naturally he has inmind the Northern Territories to be settled. President Putin has shown interest in
finding solutions of the disputed territories. Russia is Japan’s third partner andJapan is Russia’s fifth partner in holding the two-plus-two meetings.
The meeting of the four ministers discussed areas of cooperation including
cyberdefense, anti-piracy, and anti-terrorism. They also agreed to regular exchangeof visits by defense ministers and closer policy coordination for the East Asia
Summit. However, they did not agree on how to approach China and territorial
disputes. The Russian side also opposed the presence of U.S.-led ballistic missile
defense system, which they considered would threaten Russian security and wouldchange the balance of power in the Pacific.
There are limits to their partnership. Russia and China are strategic partners,
often confronting the United States, while Japan and the United States are allies.
How far the Japanese-Russian partnership will develop remains to be seen.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-6-

To Sum
Despite President Obama’s cancellation of attendance in the APEC and EAS
meetings in September, the United States remains as a strong Pacific power and insome areas it is more vigorous in reinforcing its position than before. First, theUnited States with the aircraft carrier George Washington based in Yokosuka
conducted large-scale emergency operations in providing assistance to thePhilippines hit by Typhoon Haiyan in November (2013). Second, the United States
has continued to hedge against China’s coercive action in the South China Sea andindirectly to support the Philippines’ territorial claims. Third, both the U.S.
secretaries of state and defense visited Tokyo in early October to hold thetwo-plus-two talks with their Japanese counterparts to demonstrate their strong
partnership. It was a very important event to send a message to China and North
Korea, and, to a significant extent, to South Korea as well. Fourth, the United States
is making more vigorous efforts to push forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
multi-nation trade negotiations with Pacific countries, including Japan and
Vietnam.
These moves by Washington certainly help counterbalance China’s encroaching
expansionism in the Pacific region. They encourage the U.S. partners to promote
their common objectives.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-7-

The Changing Security of the Sea Lines ofCommunication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans
Yoji Koda2

T

he security of the sea lines of communication that extend along the coastsof the Indian and Pacific Oceans is challenged not only by insecure chokepoints but also by the now competitive sea lines in the Arctic Ocean. In

this paper, I look at ways that Japan, the United States, and Vietnam mightcooperate to make these sea lines more secure.

The Persian Gulf
The region around the Persian Gulf produces about 25 percent of the world’s
crude oil, on which many nations, including Japan and Vietnam, depend heavily.
Iran’s nuclear development and its announced plan to blockade the Strait of
Hormuz, however, have threatened the security of this region. Adding to this threat
is the Iranian navy’s midget submarines, which carry torpedoes and operate in theshallow waters of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as its conventional
submarines, which operate only in the deeper water of the adjacent Gulf of Oman.
Both are capable of striking large civilian tankers and surface ships, including the
U.S. Navy’s carrier strike group. The Iranian navy also has reportedly deployed
2,000 seabed mines. At this time, Japan is not prepared to deal with worst-caseconflicts in this area.

Rising Tensions in the Indian Ocean
The geopolitical and strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, at the center ofthe shipping routes between Asia and Europe, is rapidly increasing. For China, theIndian Ocean is important as its trade route with the Middle East and Africa, withwhich China is developing close ties. For India, the Indian Ocean is important as acore national interest, just as the South China Sea is to China.

2

Koda Yoji is Vice Admiral, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (Retired).
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-8-One way that India could protect itself is for the Indian navy to adopt its own
version of an AA/AD (anti–access/area denial) strategy against China’s People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) forces that approach, or operate near, the Indian
Ocean. This strategy is similar to the AA/AD strategy that PLAN currently employs
against the U.S. Navy in East Asia, often referred to as a “string of pearls” strategy.
As a nonaligned nation, China does not have military bases in other countries,
although in recent years it has been strengthening its ties with both island nationsin the Indian Ocean and nations bordering the ocean, by providing a large amountof aid, investment, and trade. For instance, China has helped build commercial
ports and piers with modern facilities, in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (SriLanka), Sittwe (Myanmar), and Chittagong (Bangladesh). Although these ports are
not naval bases, China is likely to use them to contain India and also as footholds
and staging points for PLAN forces in case of conflict with the Indian navy.
Against Beijing’s “string of pearls,” India may insist on its rights as a coastal
state in the Indian Ocean and deny PLAN’s activities and operations, just as China
unilaterally claims its rights as a coastal state in the South China Sea.

Evaluating the Chinese and Indian Navies
Both China and India now have modern combat fleets and similarly ambitious
plans to further enhance their navies. One of these is the two countries’ aircraft
carrier programs. In September 2012 China deployed its first aircraft carrier, theLiaoning, a refurbished Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier. In November of that year,
PLAN released a video of what seemed to be a J-15 jet fighter taking off andlanding on the carrier. China also plans to build two aircraft carriers of its own,
whose completion is expected in about 2017. In October 2013, India also completed
upgrading a Soviet Kiev-class carrier, the Vikramaditya, and it, too, plans to build
another aircraft carrier, in addition to one launched in August 2013.
All these aircraft carriers, both refurbished and new, are equipped with “skijump”-style flight decks instead of the steam catapults like those on U.S. aircraft
carriers. PLAN’s second carrier, however, is an exception. It is the first to be
designed and built by China itself, and it is likely to have domestically developed
steam catapults.
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18-9-In addition, both nations have ambitious plans for submarines. Although PLAN
has built two Jin-class nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN), it has not yet
produced the second generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM),
which it urgently needs, as PLAN expects its SSBN fleet to function as a strategic
deterrence force against both the United States and India.
India’s Arihant-class SSBN is to be completed soon, and it also will have a newly
developed SLBM, the Sagarika. The combination of these two strategic missiles
should be a good nuclear deterrence against China and Pakistan. In order to beeffective, the Indian navy will require probably four to eight SSBNs, which enable
the Indian navy to maintain two to three SSBN patrol spots, namely, one or two in
the Indian Ocean for deterrence against Pakistan, and one in the South China Sea
for deterrence against China.
The force strength and structure of the Chinese and Indian navies will beroughly equal; even their time frames for their buildups will be similar. They bothwill become fully operable in the mid- to late 2020s at the earliest and the 2030s at
the latest, making the strategic situation in the Indo-Pacific region complicated anddifficult.
PLAN has many missions, including AA/AD operations, humanitarianassistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and antipiracy operations. The question is
how many forces it can allocate to the Indian Ocean in an emergency. The Indiannavy, too, must consider two factors: a nuclear-powered Pakistan, which is China’s
ally, and the defense of the Andaman and Nichobar Islands. Defending theseislands, which are far from the homeland, is very difficult, but important to prevent
Chinese forces from reaching India through the Straits of Malacca. Thus the
Andaman and Nichobar Islands could be a key to the defense of India itself and astrategic advantage against a Chinese advance.

The South China Sea
The South China Sea is even more difficult to defend than the Indian Ocean. It
has several choke points, such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Luzon
Strait, and the Bashi Channel. But China’s geostrategic position is advantageous. Its
Hainan Island is located in an ideal position to oversee Tonkin Bay and the
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18- 10 -

coastlines of northern and central Vietnam. China also is well positioned to defend
the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Likewise, with its bases at Tonkin Bay, Da Nang,
and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam is in a geostrategically advantageous location tocontrol the South China Sea. Accordingly, if Vietnam’s navy has sufficient capability,
it can serve as a vital counterbalance to China’s attempt to control the sea.
Indeed, China’s desire to control the South China Sea has caused territorial
disputes with several Southeast Asian nations. As a result, tensions between China
and these Southeast Asian claimants and also between China and the United States
are weakening the security of the sea lines of communication in this area. By
imposing a “nine-dashed/dotted line” to demarcate its claim over the South China
Sea, China has tried to quash the proposal by ASEAN for a “code of conduct” topromote peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and to be signed by the
association and China.
For many years, the United States has taken a position of neutrality on any
territorial disputes. But now, with China’s aggressive expansion of maritime
activities and its assertive stand on issues related to territories and exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), the United States has started to favor “freedom ofnavigation” as its main national interest.
China opposes the U.S. call for “freedom of navigation” and is using its AA/AD
strategy against potentially hostile (particularly American) forces. China’s goal is toachieve PLAN’s two other key missions there: to maintain a robust strategic nuclear
capability with SLBM-armed submarines (SSBNs) and to protect its forces from theantisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of potential adversaries. China has only a
few SSBNs and has so far failed to produce a fully operational second-generation
SSBN. A recent report revealed, however, that at the Hainan Island, which faces theSouth China Sea, PLAN has completed the construction of a new, fully functional
naval base that can accommodate more than one SSBN, which also can be protectedin superbunkers. Although this base would make U.S. ballistic-missile defense
operations difficult, Hainan Island still is vulnerable to the U.S. antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) operations, as it is exposed directly to the South China Sea. This is
another reason for China’s aggressive use of the nine-dotted line. In addition to one
large airfield on Woody Island in the Paracels, it plans to construct airbases for its
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18- 11 -

aviation-ASW on some of the larger Spratly Islands if it succeeds in taking themover.

The ASEAN Navies’ Submarines
A new and important development here is that many ASEAN countries now
have ambitious submarine programs. The Indonesian navy plans to introduce two
type 209-class submarines made in South Korea. Indonesia also plans to acquire
twenty-four additional submarines of undetermined class, although some sourcesindicate twelve rather than twenty-four. The Malaysian navy is operating two
Scorpene-class submarines codeveloped by France and Spain. The Singaporeannavy possesses two Archer- and four Challenger-class submarines, purchased fromthe Swedish navy. Although they are secondhand and twenty to forty years old,they have been thoroughly refurbished.
Although the details are not known, the Vietnamese navy reportedly will buy
six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, with the first delivered to Vietnam in
November 2013. Finally, the Thai navy, too, is considering the acquisition of several
submarines.
If the ASEAN navies combined their submarines, they would form a robust
conventional deterrence force against China’s surface ships, especially against its
aircraft carrier battle group(s) that may operate in the South China Sea. This force
would become an integral part of the ASEAN navies’ AA/AD strategy and would
complicate China’s plans to control the South China Sea.
At the same time, the ASEAN navies must be able to control its water space inorder to ensure the safe navigation of submarines operating in relatively constrictedwaters, and they should establish an effective water-space management scheme
before many of the submarines begin operating. As the number of submarines
increases, the opportunity for accidents will increase as well. Even though eachnavy is responsible for coping with its own accidents and rescues, ASEAN might
consider establishing a multinational rescue plan. In turn, this could serve as thefirst step toward multinational naval cooperation and help ensure the security of
the South China Sea.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18- 12 -

The Impact of the Arctic Ocean’s Sea Lines
The possibility of new sea lines of communication being opened through the
Arctic Ocean will have an important impact on the sea lines of communication in
the Indian and Pacific Oceans. First, the Northern Sea Route, which goes from theBering Strait through Russia’s vast coastal waters to Norway and the rest of Europe,is 30 percent shorter than the Southern Sea Route, which goes from the Western
Pacific to the Bashi Channel, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal,
the Mediterranean Sea, and the Eastern Atlantic. Thus if the northern route
becomes a regular shipping route for business use, it will lessen the importance ofthe southern route and could even cause Singapore to decline as a trading hub.
Singapore’s loss of revenue and national income could then lead to politicalinstability, which in turn would hurt the security of the Indo-Pacific shipping lanes,
which would also hurt Vietnam.
Second, the opening of the shorter northern route might increase traffic in thenorthwestern Pacific, since China and South Korea probably would opt for thenorthern route. Their ships would have to sail through one of the six strategicstraits in the long Japanese archipelago on the way to and from the Bering Strait
and the Arctic Ocean, possibly leading to traffic congestion. Japan, therefore, would
have responsibility for keeping traffic flowing smoothly. But tensions may arise if
Japan’s immediate neighbors feel that Japan is controlling them, and they mighteven insist on having their own navies patrol the straits.

Conclusion
The sea lines of communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans pose many
challenging security issues. In order for three Indo-Pacific countries – Japan, theUnited States, and Vietnam – which share many of the same concerns, to contributeto these lines’ stability and security, they must have a dialogue and explore areas inwhich they can cooperate.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18- 13 -

RIPS Policy Perspectives
Back issues
No. 17 (November 2013)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation: Analyses fromJapanese perspectives (Satoru Mori and Masashi Nishihara)
No. 16 (December 2012)
RIPS Symposium 2012, Summary Report: Responses to Japan’s New Arms Export
PolicyNo.15 (November 2012)
Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Restore Its Place in Asia?”
No.14（2012 年 3 月）
RIPS 公開セミナー2011（2011 年 10 月）「災害対策と防衛のために新技術をどう活
かすか」
No.13（February 2012）
RIPS Symposium 2011, “New High-Techs for Disaster Relief and National
Defense.”No.12 (2012 年 2 月)
RIPS 春季公開セミナー(2011 年 5 月)、「日露関係と北方領土返還の展望―東日本大震災後に考える日本の対応」
No. 11 (August 2011)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s ‘Coercive’ Diplomacy
Leads to New Power Realignments.”
No.10 (January, 2010)
Michimi Muranushi, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens: The Centralityof Human Rights Violation.”
No.9 (July 29, 2009)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs and Growing
Concerns.”
No.8 (June 3, 2009)
Masahiro Matsumura, “Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan- June 2009.”

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 18- 14 -

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