Lessons Learned and Future Challenges
A large quantity of radioactive materials, mainly radioactive cesium and radioactive iodine, was released
into the environment due to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident caused by the Great East Japan
Earthquake, and radioactive materials spread widely to the whole area of the Tohoku and Kanto districts.
(Special Decontamination Areas and Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (total) amounted to about
25,000 km2, population of about 7 million residents).
In response to the massive pollution on a scale that was unprecedented in Japan, the national government
decided to implement decontamination projects on a scale that was unparalleled worldwide.
The decontamination project was to be carried out based on the Act on Special Measures concerning theHandling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials, enacted in August 2011. The Ministry of theEnvironment (MOE) established the structures and institutional arrangements necessary fordecontamination work, including the related laws and decontamination guidelines, etc.
For decontamination work in Special Decontamination Areas (SDA), after the Self Defense Forces
decontaminated key locations such as municipal offices in evacuated areas starting in December 2011,decontamination work was done municipality by municipality, by construction companies under contract
with MOE. It started in January 2012, and was completed in March 2017.
The cumulative number of workers came to more than 13 million in total.
For decontamination work in Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (ICSA), starting around April 2011,
municipalities receiving requests from residents triggered the decontamination of schools, kindergartens,
nursery schools, and parks, etc., as a result of voluntary decontamination by residents. In response to theentry into force of the “Act on Special Measures,” each municipality developed a decontamination
implementation plan, and the construction companies contracted by the municipalities proceeded with thedecontamination work based on the decontamination implementation plans. The work started in January
2012 and was completed in March 2018.
An enormous cumulative number of workers, over 17 million people in total, was involved in thedecontamination work.
As a result, in Special Decontamination Areas, the evacuation orders could be lifted for an area of 780
km2, about 70% of the approximately 1,150 km2 of Areas under Evacuation Orders, and it was confirmedthat the annual additional exposure dose for residents who returned to this area was about 1 mSv/y(maximum about 5 mSv/y).
In Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, it was confirmed that the annual additional exposure dose ofresidents living here was 1 mSv/y or less in 2016, and the long-term goal set in the basic policy of the Act
on Special Measures was almost fully achieved, except in Areas where Returning is Difficult.
Meanwhile, it is also necessary to tackle new issues, including securing and prolonging Temporary
Storage Sites, and disposal methods for removed soils, etc. Also, much of the knowledge and experience
gained from these decontamination projects could be useful as lessons learned for the future.
The issues and lessons discussed by the Editorial Committee for the Paper on Decontamination Projects
are indicated below.
This is valuable knowledge not only for Japan but also for the world, so this information should bereported and distributed as appropriate going forward.
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6.1. Approach to Decontamination and Setting of Targets
Background<Goal of Decontamination>
A statement entitled “On the basic idea on radiation protection for the future lifting of evacuation orders
and reconstruction” (July 19, 2011, Nuclear Safety Commission) stated the following: “As a conservativereference level for the optimization of protection strategies, based on ICRP’s recommendations, a lower
dose of the range of 1 to 20 mSv/y annually applied to existing exposure situation, will be selected. Anintermediate reference level can be set to gradually improve the situation, but in the long term, we aim for
1 mSv/y for the additional dose rate.”
Based on this, the “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011,
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) indicated this as the goal: “As a long-term target, thegovernment aims at reducing the additional exposure dose to 1mSv/y in areas with existing exposure
situations (areas where the additional exposure dose is 20mSv/y or less per year, according to the current
operation). The Basic Policy based on the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling ofEnvironment Pollution (November 11 2011), formulated subsequently, set an “additional exposure dose of
1 mSv/y or less per year as the long-term target” for areas where the additional exposure dose is less than
20 mSv/y.
The Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1) include the “As Low As
Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA principle): “Protection must be optimized to achieve the highest levelof safety that can reasonably be achieved.”
Meanwhile, regarding the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, as described later in Section 6.3(Challenges in the stages of implementing decontamination), the IAEA perspective could not be simply
applied unchanged. The specific situation in Japan and Fukushima required that priority be given to
restoring livelihoods on the premise of being safe from radiation. Also, it was necessary to make decisions
in the context of limited knowledge and time available.
<Scope of decontamination>
Regarding the scope of decontamination, the “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on
Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) specifies that thescope for each region should correspond to the level of exposure dose.
① In regions under evacuation orders, the national government is mainly to implement decontamination.
② In areas where the additional exposure dose is generally between 1 to 20 mSv/y, municipalities areto formulate decontamination implementation plans and implement decontamination.
It was necessary to implement whole area decontamination in areas with relatively high dose rate, andin areas with relatively low doses it was important to implement decontamination in locations with locallyhigh doses.
③ In areas where the additional exposure dose was generally less than 1 mSv/y, there was no need formunicipal-level decontamination in terms of whole area decontamination, but locally high dose areas were
to be decontaminated.
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Based on these guidelines, in the second meeting of the Investigative Committee on Remediation(September 2011), the scope of designation of Special Decontamination Areas (areas where the national
government implements decontamination under direct control) was deemed to be areas under evacuation
orders (Restricted Areas and Deliberate Evacuation Areas).
It was also decided that an additional annual exposure dose exceeding 1 mSv/y would be the criterion
level for the designation of Intensive Contamination Survey Areas and the criterion for formulating adecontamination implementation plan.
Actually, based on the fact that the results of survey measurements are usually obtained as an hourly
value, for convenience, the value “individual annual additional exposure dose of 1 mSv/y” is converted toan hourly value 0.23 μSv/h based on an assumed specific life pattern (*), considered to be on theconservative side. Thus, the target that an additional exposure dose exceeds 0.23 μSv/h was substituted as
the criterion for designation.
* It is assumed that a person spends eight hours outdoors and 16 hours indoors (assuming a wooden
house shielding factor of 0.4).
This conversion method is based on the “Preliminary approach in deciding how to judge the use ofschool buildings and schoolyards in Fukushima Prefecture” (April 19 2011, Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology), and in this document, the annual exposure dose of 20 mSv/y is converted
into 3.8 μSv/h.
Regarding the criterion for designation, the Minister of the Environment consulted with the Chairmanof the Radiation Council and received a report that it is reasonable. Later, it was indicated in the“Ministerial Ordinance that specifies the requirements for designation of contaminated waste management
areas” (Ordinance of MOE No. 34, 2011).
Designations were made based on the average air dose rate of the subject area, and about 1,150 km2 in
11 municipalities were designated as Special Decontamination Areas, and about 24,000 km2 in 104
municipalities were designated as Intensive Contamination Survey Areas.
When considering the standards, numerical values were calculated conservatively, as there had not yet
been a sufficient accumulation of knowledge for converting to radiation doses from air dose rates in thecase of wide area contamination by radioactive materials. Opinions were voiced that for conservative
calculations, the shielding effect should not be considered, while other opinions were voiced that more
realistic coefficients should be introduced, for shielding effect and staying time.
<Implementation period of decontamination>
The Basic Policy of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution
formulated in November 2011 aimed to conduct decontamination work until the end of March 2014 inareas other than areas with particularly high additional exposure doses in Special Decontamination Areas,so in areas where the additional radiation dose was particularly high, the national government initiallyconducted model projects, followed by decontamination activities with step by step approach.
Also, regarding the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, it was decided to make plans considering
the priorities and feasibility based on the real circumstances of each area.

386

Issues<Goal of Decontamination>
As mentioned above, the annual additional exposure dose rate of 1 mSv/y as a long-term goal was
determined by the Nuclear Safety Commission as a lowest value from the range of 1 to 20 mSv/y.
It was said that an interim reference level could be indicated, but no concrete numerical value wasindicated and as it was difficult to provide a rational explanation to residents, 1 mSv/y became the longterm target value.
As a result, it was confirmed that the annual additional exposure dose of the returned residents in areas
where evacuation orders were lifted in Special Decontamination Areas was about 1 mSv (maximum about
5 mSv), and it was confirmed that the annual additional exposure dose of the inhabitants would beapproximately 1 mSv or less in the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas.
Internal exposure after 2012 was also confirmed to be 1 mSv/y or less for all measurements.
Meanwhile, the value was the long-term target of whole government to be achieved not only fordecontamination works but also by physical decay of radioactive materials, weathering effects, byunderstanding and managing exposure doses, and food safety management, etc.
Despite this, it was perceived as a goal to be accomplished through only by decontamination activities,
resulting in some confusion in the field.
<Scope of decontamination>
The aforementioned conversion method is a simple method of estimation under assumptions on the safe
side (that is, conservative assumption) to determine the scope of the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas.
The individuals’ external exposure dose in actual life is considered to be lower than estimated value dueto the reasons taken as examples as follows:-In many cases, the time spent outside is often shorter than the assumed 8 hours-The indoor shielding factor varies depending on the type of building etc. (e.g., the shielding factor of aconcrete building is 0.2).
-The air dose rate will decreases with elapse of time and varies depending on where an individual stays
and moves in daily life.
<Implementation period of decontamination>
The period of decontamination work was set to be finished by the end of March 2014 for areas otherthan the areas with a particularly high additional exposure dose in Special Decontamination Areas.
The decontamination work is an institution, which was necessary for local residents to understand andcooperate in each process such as field survey, implementation of decontamination, installation of
temporary storage site. It took a certain amount of time, but as a result of their understanding andcooperation, whole area decontamination was completed in March 2017 in the Special Decontamination
Areas and in March 2018 in the Intensive Contamination Survey Areas.
Lessons Learned
Initially, shortly after the accident, scientific knowledge was limited, and in light of the urgent need to387

set targets and designation criteria for Intensive Contamination Survey Areas for the additional radiationdose, it seemed like a reasonable policy to use 1 mSv/y as a long-term goal, which was at the lower end of
the ICRP reference level of 1 to 20 mSv/y for existing exposure situation.
On the other hand, in the event of a similar accident in the future, based on the above-mentioned ALARA
principle, deeper discussion on the setting of target values would be expected, seeking scientific knowledge
which emphasizes intermediate target values and individual doses, and in collaboration with related
ministries and international organizations.
At the same time, as described in Section 6.4 (Communication with residents), it is necessary to carefully
explain comprehensive measures, including risk management, to the residents and gain understanding inan early stage.
In addition, it is important to set up the construction period in advance based on workability, even though
it may be difficult due to the necessity of making decisions with the limited information and limited time,
and the necessity to coordinate with municipalities and stakeholders.
It is important to consider more effective and efficient measures for the planning of all the work as awhole, including goal setting and the project implementation systems, while taking into consideration theaccumulation of scientific knowledge through model projects and demonstration trials.

6.2. Establishment of Framework for Decontamination, RoleS of Stakeholders
Background
The IAEA’s Fundamental Safety Principles indicated that “The prime responsibility for safety51 must
rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks”(IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1).
On the other hand, concerning the accident of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS, there was a situation
unique to Japan and Fukushima that cannot be sufficiently explained by simply applying the IAEA
principle, as described in Section 6.3 (Challenges at the implementing stages of decontamination). Also, it
was necessary to make decisions with limited knowledge and limited time.
Therefore, while the Basic Principles of the Act on Special Measures make the nuclear power company
concerned (Tokyo Electric Power Company, TEPCO) unambiguously responsible, the principles also
recognize the social responsibility of the national government for having promoted nuclear policy. Thus,
the national government was made responsible to develop response measures, and in Areas under
Evacuation Orders, to implement decontamination directly as Special Decontamination Areas.
Meanwhile, regarding Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, as each municipality is most familiar withthe actual local circumstances, discussions proceeded on the understanding that, in principle,
municipalities would be implementing the decontamination.
IssuesRegarding decontamination of Special Decontamination Areas, it was one of the realistic options for the
The IAEA Basic Safety Principles state, “Safety measures include actions to prevent abnormal events andarrangements made to alleviate the effects of abnormal events if they occur.”
51

388

national government to implement decontamination under the social situation of the time, including thefact that the municipal governments themselves were forced to evacuate, but there were suggestions thatcooperation and information sharing with the municipalities could have been better.
Moreover, while the decontamination work under MOE was conducted to enable the early return of
residents, there were some comments that efforts done in cooperation with other ministries and agencies
had not been sufficient, including compensation and evacuation.
Regarding decontamination in Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, the “Basic Policy for Emergency
Response on Decontamination Work” (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, August 26, 2011),
stated that “Systematic decontamination work on a community-wide basis would be the most effective
solution because the residents still live in the community and the community grasps the individual situation
and resident’s needs.” However, some local governments expressed the view that the national government
should conduct decontamination in all these areas.
In addition, municipalities experienced problems with staffing, coordinating with other municipalities,
including the national government, and the prefecture during the implementation stage.
Fukushima Prefecture Government decontaminated its own facilities and managed funds, but the role ofthe prefecture was also pointed out for matters requiring wide-area arrangements such as overall planningand waste treatment.
In this case, it was thought that if the polluter was to conduct decontamination, it would be extremely
difficult to proceed with the decontamination work, considering the large scale of contamination, the factthat the polluter had to deal with both the decommissioning of reactors and decontamination, and residents’feelings toward the polluter.
In order to ensure that evacuation orders could be lifted, it was considered reasonable for the nationaland municipal governments to implement decontamination work with the burden of the polluter.
Lessons learned
It is thought that the response in this case was appropriate, considering the roles of the polluter, thenational government, the prefectures and municipalities, considering the situation in Japan and Fukushima,
in the context of limited time and, limited knowledge, based on international knowledge.
Various types of nuclear disasters could be considered, depending on cause, scale, released radionuclides
and their quantity, so it is not easy to generalize. It is important, however, to summarize the outcomes andknowledge gained from this decontamination work in the sense of creating effective implementation
systems, the role sharing of stakeholders and related organizations, information sharing, and collaboration,etc.
Currently, in Specified Reconstruction and Revitalization Bases within Areas where Returning is
Difficult, under the Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of Fukushima, eachproject entity works based on a specific plan called a Reconstruction and Recovery Plan for a Zone
Designated for Reconstruction and Recovery to cooperate with others in an unified and efficient way on
decontamination, dismantlement and infrastructure work. This kind of approach may also be a helpfulreference.

389

BackgroundAs for the verification of decontamination projects, as a whole, the Investigation Committee on the
Progress of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive
Materials reviewed the status of implementation, and MOE received IAEA missions and public review
processes for government works projects.
In the municipalities with Special Decontamination Areas, a verification committee was established ineach municipality, and the results of examinations were made public to the residents, and verification was
also carried out by all-members council meetings of municipal assemblies, etc.
In the municipalities with Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, nothing like a verification committee
was established, but for each municipality, the progress of decontamination and advisor’s evaluations, etc.,
were opened to residents through public relations newsletters, etc.
In addition, for individual projects, the projects received verification from the Labor Bureau concerning
issues such as work safety of decontamination workers, and from the Board of Audit regarding theappropriateness of contracts.
IssuesRegarding verification systems for decontamination projects, according to the IAEA General Safety
Requirements (GSR) Part 3 “Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Source”, “an independent
regulatory body with functions and responsibilities clearly specified for the regulation of protection andsafety (including radiation protection)” should be established under the law prescribed as a part ofgovernment, legal and regulatory framework for safety.
For this decontamination, the verification of whether or not work was done adequately would be carriedout by various entities.
Lessons learned
In the future, it would be beneficial to clarify the entities to be involved in verification, and to establish
a system to confirm work from a third-party perspective, right from the initial stage of implementation.
Also, verification should look at not only radiation doses but also whether or not necessary and sufficientdecontamination was done scientifically. Such an approach to verification might reduce inconsistencies inthe extent of efforts and methods of decontamination work by the bodies implementing decontamination.

BackgroundIn the implementation of decontamination, in terms of requests from residents especially at the initialstage, there were many comments that before consent was sought to implement decontamination, theyshould have received an indication of the compensation and revision of area designations .
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy were responsible for compensation, and Cabinet Office’s Support Team for390

Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) was responsible forrevising area designations, and these organizations offered explanations to the residents and others.
Also, in some cases the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Reconstruction Agency, andprefectures, etc., carried out reconstruction work at the same locations where MOE had implemented
decontamination.
Issues
Especially at the initial stage, residents had a sense of distrust, thinking that decontamination would goahead without them having received the information they needed about compensation and the revision ofarea designations, etc.
Also, when reconstruction projects were conducted in the same locations after decontamination was
implemented, there was some duplication and other issues with work between decontamination andreconstruction projects.
By coordinating the decontamination and reconstruction, the construction period could have beenshortened.
In addition, as time elapsed after the accident, weeds grew in the soil of yards of homes and otherproperties and on unpaved roads, and brush and shrubs grew in fields, resulting in an increase in work for
the weeding and cutting of brush and shrubs, compared with the initial decontamination work, etc.
Lessons learned
With this response, when it came to the stage of lifting the evacuation order at the end of thedecontamination project, MOE was able to make the explanation to the residents in cooperation with the
Cabinet Office’s Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents, and other parties.
In the future, in the event of a similar accident, it will be important for the relevant ministries andagencies to cooperate on the response right from the initial stages.
Also, decontamination and infrastructure construction are currently both being implemented together inconstruction projects for Specified Reconstruction and Revitalization Bases in Areas where Returning is
Difficult, implemented under the Act on Special Measures.
In the event of a similar accident in the future, it will be important that the related ministries and agencies,
prefectures, and municipalities cooperate to closely link the decontamination work with the reconstruction
work.

391

6.3. Challenges at the Implementation Stage of Decontamination
Background
This was the unique large-scale project and first experience for decontamination work to be done in sucha populated area that required action despite not having adequate technical knowledge and systems in place.
MOE, in addition to its own experience administering national parks, benefited from the capabilities ofministries such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), which have extensive experience with public projects. MOE
utilized existing rules and frameworks as prescribed by the MLIT and MAFF to create the common
specifications and estimation standards required for decontamination work, and strove to steadily improve
implementation methods through trial and error, depending on the actual situation on the ground at
decontamination sites.
(billion yen)

Total cost

(million workers)

Municipalities
14,000

Municipalities
1,800

National
Government
1,360

National
Government
15,000Decontamination Seto-Ohashi
Project
BridgeTotal number of workers

KurobeDam

Decontamination Seto-Ohashi
Project
BridgeSeikanTunnelKurobeDam

SeikanTunnelFigure 6-1 Decontamination and other major projects in Japan (copied from above)
Note: The total cost of decontamination indicated is as of September 2017, the total costs of other civilengineering works are as of the time of each project.
The numbers of decontamination workers in SDA as of the end of January 2018, and the numbers of
decontamination workers in ICSA as of the end of November 2017.
Construction period of each project:
Decontamination Project: July 2012 - March 2017 (4 years 9 months)
Seto Ohashi Bridge: October 1978 - April 1989 (9 years 6 months)
Kurobe Dam: April 1956 - June 1963 (7 years 2 months)
Seikan Tunnel: May 1964 - November 1987 (23 years 7 months)
Source: Ocean Bridge Investigation Committee "Seto Ohashi Bridge Construction Document" (October1988), Kansai Electric Power Company "Kurobegawa Fourth Power Station Construction History"(September 1965), Hokkaido Railway Company "Seikan tunnel in numbers"392

Issues
Characteristics and issues of decontamination work after the accident of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
NPS were as follows.
① Extensive environmental pollution by radioactive materials had not been foreseen, so theinstitutional preparations were not in place in terms of legislative arrangements and recovery from an
accident. Under such circumstances, it was necessary to deal with the situation despite a lack of enoughknowledge on radioactivity, as well as training and organization, etc.
② The environmental pollution caused by radioactive materials was extensive, so many types of land
use were affected, including residence, farmland and forest, and the affected population was large.
Table 6-1 Area, Population etc., of Special Decontamination Areas (SDA) and Intensive
Contamination Survey Areas (ICSA)
Area

Residential Population

Population Density

SDA

1,150 km2

80 thousand people

approx. 70 people/km2

ICSA

24,000 km2

6.9 million people

approx. 290people/km2* Reference: The forced resettlement area in 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident was 10,220 km2, and the area
where resettlement was encouraged was 19,070 km2. Approximately 120,000 people evacuated immediately
after the accident, and additional 200,000 were resettled between 1989 and 1995.52③ In the 11 municipalities that had been designated as Restricted Areas and Deliberate Evacuation
Areas and had been under governmental evacuation orders, the municipal administrative structure wasmaintained even after the evacuation orders were declared, and regional recovery and the early return ofevacuees were required.
④ The rapid return of the evacuees as well as safety and security measures became the top priority forthe national government, so there was not sufficient time available to prepare policies.
⑤ Environmental pollution from radioactive materials occurred together with damage from a major
earthquake and tsunami (earthquake magnitude 9.0, and in Soma City, Fukushima Prefecture, the tsunami
height was over 9.3 m (max.) and flooded area was 112 km2). As a result, decontamination work had to bedone together with the reconstruction from the earthquake and tsunami.
⑥ Control of internal exposure by thorough food inspection was effective.
⑦ Except for the initial period, radioactive cesium was the main radionuclide in pollution. Radioactive
cesium adheres strongly to soil, etc., in contaminated areas, and impacts by dissolving into water andscattering back into the atmosphere are not large. Thus, the main task was to deal with gamma rays fromthe radioactive cesium that had settled.
⑧ It was not easy to find sites to dispose of waste contaminated with radioactive materials, due toJapan’s limited land area.
52

Source: IAEA-TECDOC-1240 Present and Future environmental impact of the Chernobyl accident393

⑨ Because it was assumed that residents would return home and use buildings, roads, farmlands, etc.
as they had used before the accident, it was not possible to adopt decontamination methods such as
rebuilding, replacing roofing materials (roof tiles, etc.), and paving all roads, etc.
⑩ Wide area decontamination was possible with Japanese civil engineering technology.
At the beginning of whole area decontamination work, there were proposals for methods ofdecontamination using various existing techniques as well as new materials. Many types of work methods,
equipment and materials were tested and evaluated through trials, and after repeated improvements, they
were adopted as new technologies for decontamination.
Many of these methods were sequentially applied when the “Provisional Estimation Standards for
Decontamination, etc.” was revised.
Although the decontamination workers didn’t have to have special abilities, their work themselves were
the works were labor intensive. Therefore a large number of workers were required with the abilities tolearn and repeat what they learned in the work.
Also, as described below, in acquiring Temporary Storage Sites and obtaining consent fordecontamination work to be done, it was necessary for national and municipal officials to conduct repeatednegotiations in each area.
Lessons learned
In the context of this being a first-time experience for decontamination to be done in a variety of settings
including urban areas, roads, farmlands, rivers, and forests, implementation systems and decontamination
techniques were developed and improved as work proceeded.
With so many stakeholders involved, including national and municipal governments, decontamination
contractors (main and sub-contractors), residents, etc., the connection of people and trust among them
became the key factors, and had an enormous impact on subsequent interactions.
These experiences and findings will serve as valuable source of knowledge and experience if a similar
event occurs in the future not only in Japan but also elsewhere in the world.

Background
Based on article 30, paragraph 2 (Special Decontamination Areas) and article 38, paragraph 2 (Intensive
Contamination Survey Areas) of the Act on Special Measures, measures such as decontamination are to be
carried out with the consent of the persons concerned (which means any person who has rights to be an
obstacle to the implementation of decontamination of soils etc., that pertain the land or structures, trees or
any other fixtures existing on the land to be decontaminated).
IssuesAcquisition of consent in Special Decontamination Areas was extremely difficult under circumstanceswhere residents forced to evacuate by scattering all over the country.
In addition, in some situations not all residents were amenable to decontamination, which meant that394

decontamination could not be done at a specific location, and could not begin decontamination beyond thatlocation.
In municipal decontamination, where consent could not be obtained by municipal officials despite
numerous attempts, consent was eventually obtained in many cases with additional cooperation fromnearby residents.
In cases where stakeholders had already evacuated to distant locations, in some cases the municipal
officials travelled there to obtain consents.
In some cases the current landowner was not known due to the fact that the name on title had not beenchanged when the previous owner died, or in some cases, even if the landowners were identified, it wasdifficult to negotiate to obtain consent for decontamination, etc., and to explain subsequently due to theinvolvement of dozens of stakeholders (inheritors) to a single property.
Lessons learned
When decontamination involves access to private land, obtaining consent from landowners is seen as anecessity in the event a similar accident happens to occur in the future.
Thus, when it comes to preliminary surveys and obtaining consent, based on this knowledge, it isimportant to conscientiously explain the effects of decontamination and to engage in activities incooperation with the municipalities where the residents belong, and neighboring residents.

BackgroundIn implementing decontamination, it was necessary to set up Temporary Storage Sites to temporarily
store the removed soils, etc. In order to gain understanding of landowners and neighboring residents, thecooperation of the municipalities and administrative districts was important.
Many temporary storage sites were secured from 2012 to 2014, but at that time, the removed soils, etc.,
in Fukushima Prefecture were supposed to be transported to the Interim Storage Facility within about three
years, and the lease periods in contracts for the land of TSS were also limited to three years.
IssuesIn securing TSS, due to the evacuation of landowners and concerns about the safety, it took aconsiderable amount of time to gain the understanding of landowners and neighboring residents. It had
been resolved, however, during the repeated dialogue by MOE and municipalities with residents
Transportation to the Interim Storage Facility began on a trial basis in 2015, and it became clear that theuse of Temporary Storage Sites will be prolonged.
For this reason, between 2015 and 2017 it became necessary to renew the lease contracts for TSS.
Municipalities received criticism from landowners and neighboring residents that actions differed fromwhat was promised, but there were no major problems thanks to the cumulative effects of risk
communication until then and the achievement of management of temporary storage sites etc., which madeit possible to renew most of the contracts.
In addition, in 2017, due to the progress of transportation of removed soils, there were some temporary395

storage sites where stored soil was entirely removed due to the consolidation from small to large temporarystorage sites and loading areas, etc., so the stage reached to the restoration of those sites to original
conditions, and studies such as making rules to restore sites to the original conditions are under way.
Lessons learned
It is necessary to summarize the findings of this decontamination work. For example, air dose rates in
TSS were lower than the surrounding areas by decontamination and site preparation when some Temporary
Storage Sites were developed, and increases in air dose rate were prevented by installing shielding soil.
On the other hand, it became clear that it would be difficult to gain the understanding of landowners andresidents through the typical one-way flow of information.
By not only providing scientific explanations about the safety of the TSS but also sharing information
about radiation and contamination condition of the area, as well as the seeking of solutions throughdialogue to address common challenges in the area, it became possible to obtain the residents’ cooperationand secure and manage the TSS.

BackgroundAt decontamination sites, a large quantity of removed soil, etc., was generated because of the manytargets of decontamination, although efforts were made to minimize the generated amount of removed soil.
Removed soil, etc., generated in Special Decontamination Areas and Intensive Contamination Survey
Areas in Fukushima Prefecture have been stored mainly in large container bags and stored at Temporary
Storage Sites and at decontamination sites, and transportation to Interim Storage Facility began in FY2015.
This removed soil, etc., is to be finally disposed outside of Fukushima Prefecture within 30 years after
the start of the interim storage.
On the other hand, removed soil, etc. that was generated outside Fukushima Prefecture is currently being
stored properly in accordance with storage standards, and is to be disposed of according to disposal
methods specified by MOE in the future.
IssuesThe disposal methods of removed soil, etc., were not stipulated initially, since scientific knowledge suchas the behavior of radioactive cesium in the soil was limited. The Review Committee on Volume Reduction
and Recycling Utilization Technology Development Strategies for Removed Soil, etc., in Interim Storage
has been established and is currently studying volume reduction and recycling for removed soil, etc., within
Fukushima Prefecture.
For removed soil outside of Fukushima Prefecture, the Investigative Committee on Remediation has
begun to study disposal methods.
Lessons learned
In the event of a similar accident in the future, before commencing decontamination work, it will be
important to prepare the standards necessary for implementation, including disposal methods of removed396

soil, etc. The preparations should make use of what was learned from the Fukushima experience, including
the fact that radioactive cesium has been absorbed in soil, etc.
In addition, a large amount of removed soil, etc., was generated due to this accident, so it is important
to consider decontamination methods that minimize the amount of removed soil.
Soil is inherently a valuable resource, so even when removed soil, etc., is generated, it might beconceivable to separate out soil with a low radioactivity concentration using the appropriate pretreatment
and volume reduction technologies, and to utilize it only in certain public projects where the management
bodies and responsible authorities are clearly identified.
The above-mentioned Review Committee on Volume Reduction and Recycling Utilization Technology
Development Strategies for Removed Soil, etc., in ISF developed a “Volume Reduction and Recycling
Utilization Technology Development Strategy” and “Process Chart” as a mid- to long-term policy ofvolume reduction and recycling of removed soil in April 2016, and the “Basic Approach for Safe Usage of
Removed Soil Made as Recycled Materials” in June 2016.
Efforts for advancing the reuse of the removed soil, etc., should be steadily proceeded mainly by theCommittee in line with its work to date.

Background
Farmers in Areas under Evacuation Orders strongly requested topsoil stripping, with the concern thatradioactive cesium would remain in paddies and fields,.
In this context, on September 14, 2011, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries summarized
the results of research to date and announced its approach, saying, “On farmland with of radioactive cesium
concentrations at 5,000 Bq/kg or lower, it is appropriate to take measures, as necessary, to reduce themigration to agricultural crops and reduce the air dose rates, by inversion tillage etc.”
In Special Decontamination Areas, MOE offered options for farmland with relatively low concentrations,such as deep plowing and deep tillage, and in the farmland where concentrations were not low, topsoil
removal was implemented.
In Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, outside of Fukushima Prefecture, deep plowing and deep
tillage were done, while within Fukushima Prefecture, in some cases topsoil stripping was selected bymunicipalities.
IssuesWhen topsoil stripping was carried out for decontamination of farmland, a large amount of removed soil
was generated, which led to the problem that decontamination could not be performed unless expansive
Temporary Storage Sites were secured.
Lessons learned“The TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Report by the Director General” (IAEA 2015) points outthat “Remediation

strategies need to take account of the effectiveness and feasibility of individual

measures and the amount of contaminated material that will be generated in the remediation process.
397

Having established reference levels for residual radiation doses and contamination levels, it is essential tocontrol carefully the amount of contaminated material generated by implementing the remediation strategy
in order to minimize the amount of waste to be managed.”
Particularly, by farmland topsoil stripping, a large amount of removed soil is generated and quality ofthe soil is lost. Therefore, in consideration of exposure of farm workers and adsorption of cesium into
crops, it is important to conduct decontamination taking into consideration the advantages anddisadvantages of each method, such as ploughing, inversion tillage, and topsoil stripping.
Furthermore, much knowledge was obtained at universities and research institutes, etc., regarding therelationship between decontamination methods and the transfer of radioactive materials to animals andplants.

Background
During decontamination work, issues arose such as scattering and discharge into road gutters of waste
water during high-pressure washing, as well as illegal dumping and illegal burying of removed soil, etc.
IssuesIn the decontamination work, despite inadequate arrangements for the procedures and items to beconsidered, it was necessary to gather a large number of workers in a short period, so every effort wasneeded to ensure the properness of the that work.
For example, since some of the gathered workers included less experienced civil engineering
construction workers or completely inexperienced workers, a novice mark seal was affixed to the helmetof these workers to identify them, and consideration was made to have them work with veterans in thesame working group.
In addition, in order to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, special trainings were offered bydecontamination contractors on an ongoing basis, including at the time of starting at a new site, regularbasis such as monthly trainings, and as needed basis such as work procedure trainings, as well as on an
irregular basis such as for critical issues troubleshooting. In addition, education and awareness-raising
activities were done for JV officials, cooperating companies and workers, and quality patrols and safety
patrols were conducted on a day-to-day basis to ensure work was being done properly.
In addition to these efforts, decontamination contractors implemented their own curriculums to raiseawareness by explaining the significance of the decontamination work, and provided education to be
conscious of local considerations.
Lessons learned
MOE has offered the trainings and education and summarized the measures to prevent improper
decontamination. Going forward, MOE and decontamination contractors will continue to make constantefforts by making use of this experience.
Since a great number of workers are involved in decontamination work, there is a need to have education
for workers as well as project management and compliance systems for everyone, including subcontractors,
and efforts are also needed for consideration of local circumstances.

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6.4. Communication with Residents
BackgroundAt the time of the accident, the general public was not knowledgeable about the impacts and risks ofradiation but was repeatedly presented with confusing explanations that the impacts of radiation do not
immediately affect the human body. The result was an increase in public anxiety and distrust of thegovernment.
It was difficult to convince residents simply by one-sided scientific and technical explanations provided
by government officials and experts.
What was needed was for government staff, residents and experts to gather face-to-face for dialogue, toshare accurate information on the situation of the accident and pollution, as well as to study together about
radiation, the health impacts of radiation, and radiation protection, etc. to deepen the understanding torebuild a relationship of trust. In effect, what was needed was risk communication in the original intention.
Under these circumstances, MOE and Fukushima Prefecture jointly established the Decontamination
Information Plaza (currently the Environmental Restoration Plaza) in January 2012 as a base for the
dissemination of accurate information on radiation and decontamination. The Plaza personnel can engage
in activities such as public relations about decontamination, dispatching experts to public briefing sessions
and speak from a different position from the government. They ended up playing roles as experts andfacilitators, etc., in radiation risk communication.
In addition, various ideas were tried to explain in a clear way, including the creation of teaching materials
such as pictures and models, and visual explanatory materials.
IssuesIn the context of intense public critical scrutiny of the nuclear accident and strong sense of anxiety about
radiation, an enormous amount of time was spent to foster a sense of confidence in information.
In addition, there was a growing call for decontamination to aim for targets on the safe side, with theawareness that only through decontamination work could achieve an additional exposure dose of 1 mSv/y(and 0.23 μSv/h which is the value substituted for the sake of convenience as the air dose rate withconservative assumptions of specific lifestyle patterns)
Lessons learned
Related organizations need to cooperate to widely communicate decontamination policies, scientificknowledge on decontamination and radiation, etc., to residents in an accurate and easy-to-understandmanner. Also it is important to establish basic risk management systems, including education about
radiation during regular times, and information dissemination and sharing systems in times of emergency.
In addition to comprehensive measures to achieve long-term goals for additional exposure dose, it isimportant to make information comprehensible and to effectively promote communications obtained
through to the progress of work, including the effect of decontamination, the relationship between the air
dose rates, and individual exposure, etc.
In that effort, in order to broadly promote decontamination work by creating a good relationship with399

residents, it is important to deepen trust and understanding not only through information dissemination but
also through community dialogue based on information.
Specific examples of conscientious risk communication include information disclosure of measurement
results, dialogue including questions and answers to help people understand the information, enhancementof education on radiation (including the understanding of natural radiation and medical exposure), andinviting participation in ascertaining and managing risk, etc.
In addition, for local communities this was an important experience of public participation in policy
development, and a review of the sociological significance and outcomes of these experiences is expected
to be valuable for future community development.

BackgroundIn starting decontamination, MOE and decontamination contractors conducted individual explanations
to stakeholders and residents’ briefing sessions in order to obtain consent for decontamination and to secure
Temporary Storage Sites.
After decontamination work was done, reports on decontamination results were sent.
Meanwhile, at decontamination sites, many people showed their appreciation to decontamination
workers by giving them cold tea in the hot summers, and warm can coffee in the cold winters.
There was also high school students who painted a wall mural at a Temporary Storage Site in a town ,
attempting to improve the image of the Temporary Storage Site even a little.
Under such understanding and cooperation, the decontamination work has been progressed.
IssuesIn the implementation of decontamination, at residents’ briefing sessions in early stage, there were many
comments saying that before consent was sought they should have received an indication of compensationand the revision of area designations.
Residents had a sense of distrust, thinking that decontamination would go ahead without receiving suchinformation.
Also, decontamination contractors made an effort to respond as best they could to inquiries fromstakeholders, within the scope of decontamination projects, and they did so while reporting to andconsulting with MOE. They made an effort to establish good relationships with residents, but in some cases
came up with the requests about things they could not address in the context of decontamination work,
such as the repair of damaged houses, conversion from paddy fields to crop field, and improvements ofaccess roads, etc.
Lessons learned
It is important to plan responses (evacuation areas, compensation, and decontamination according toradiation dose) based on scenarios prepared prior to the occurrence of an accident, in cooperation with therelated agencies. in charge of compensation and reviews of areas under evacuation orders.
Also, it is important to develop consensus to implement projects while listening carefully to local voices,400

well explaining the scope and effectiveness of decontamination while building relationships of trust withthe local people.
Meanwhile, decontamination achieved certain results as a large-scale undertaking accomplished throughthe cooperation of the national government, prefectures, municipalities, residents, and the related nuclear
power companies, and the foundation of those results was the local residents’ understanding andcooperation with regard to decontamination, plus a variety of voluntary efforts to reduce radiation exposure.
Recording and organizing how these efforts have been done is important as a form of preparation for
future large-scale disasters.
Above all, above and beyond government measures, the fact that decontamination and other measures
to deal with radioactive pollution were an effort by many citizens acting voluntarily and proactively torestore the land is something to be told with pride to future generations.
[Reference]

Related Committee Comment

The main comments related to this chapter from individual committee members are provided below.
Please note that these are their personal comments.
Comments for Section 6.1 (1) “Relationship between the decontamination targets and 1 mSv/y”
Comments for <Goal of Decontamination>･As far as I understand, before the decontamination implementation system was in place, the government
had set a long term target of 1 mSv/y and a deadline, and work was proceeding in that context, throughtrial and error. I think it is important to review whether or not it was most appropriate to set a target andapproach in such a limited time.
･It is important to properly explain the thinking behind the standard for additional exposure dose, thereasons why the long-term target was set at 1 mSv/y, and doses actually dropped by decontamination andmeasures to be taken forward.
･Although it was required to lower the target dose as much as possible, I think that it was not necessarily
easy to reduce the dose in some cases.
･Some municipalities are implementing decontamination with a target of 5 mSv/y for now, rather than 1
mSv/y.
It could also be considered setting targets stepwise between 1 and 20 mSv/y. IAEA and other bodies saythat “Protection must be optimized to achieve the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved”(ALARA principle), and the lesson learned is that this should be clearly stated as a policy of
decontamination.
･It may be a problem that 1 mSv/y was perceived as the target for decontamination, rather than as a longterm goal to reach as a result of various initiatives.
･IAEA adopts a range of 1 to 20 mSv/y, so it is difficult to show an interim target. In that sense, the longterm exposure target 1 mSv/y may be suitable in the Japanese sense.
Rather, maybe it was a problem that the numerical value of 0.23 μSv/h, set as the target based on certain
assumptions, was perceived as the goal of decontamination.
･I think there was confusion on the site, since nobody knew how long the “long-term” of the long-term

401

target would be.
･We do not know how much scientific knowledge will be gathered in the future about the impacts of low
dose exposure.
･In discussions about the long-term goal, people were told that it would be lower than from other medical
exposure, but from the viewpoint of residents, they can obtain merits from medical exposure, while there
is no merit of radiation exposure from an accident, so people think that the less risk the better.
･It is necessary to remember that decontamination in Japan was conducted on the premise that it would
result in an environment where residents could return and live immediately.
･It should be stated clearly that, in contrast to overseas cases, in Japan it was assumed that people will
return home and live there again.
Comments for <Scope of decontamination>･ Although some areas were initially designated as Intensive Contamination Survey Areas, in somemunicipalities the designation was lifted without a decontamination plan being made, because subsequent
measurements found that the dose was already low.
･Regarding the relationship between 1 mSv/y and the air dose rate, the standard of 0.23 μSv/h is notunreasonable. On the other hand, there are scientific findings that the actual exposure dose is even lower(than 1 mSv/y under the environment of 0.23 μSv/h), and for example about 0.5 μSv/h (could correspondto the 1 mSv/y).
･It is important to clarify that the 0.23 μSv/h as the area designation and 1 mSv/y as the long-term target
are different from the decontamination target.
Comments for <Setting of work period>･With decontamination of Areas under Evacuation Orders, I understand that it was originally planned that
evacuees could return within three years, but in fact, decontamination and their return were delayed.
･Since decontamination began at the same time in Areas under Evacuation Orders and in municipalities
where people evacuated, some people may think that and decontamination was delayed in municipalities
where people evacuated, the evacuees’ reduction of exposure to radiation was also delayed.
Comments for Section 6.2 (1) “Role sharing for decontamination work”
Comments for <Overall division of roles>･Decontamination in municipalities where residents were living is considered to have been relatively
successful because each municipality was tuned in to the residents’ feelings as it did the work.
Even where the residents had been evacuated and the national government took direct charge of
decontamination, in some cases decontamination was done conscientiously as a result of interactions
with the residents who had evacuated.
･ This time, with the exception of local governments where evacuation orders had been issued,
municipalities were assigned to do the decontamination work, but if similar circumstances arise in the
future, it could be considered that municipalities could entrust the work to the prefecture.
･It is important to have balance in the sense of ownership between the development of overall plans and402

the implementation by the municipalities and the communities. The responsibilities of the implementing
side should also be clarified.
Comments for <Role of the national government>･If all of the work is done under the direct jurisdiction of the national government, the problem is that it
will be impossible to pay attention to detail. It is necessary to review what kind of system worked thebest.
･ Initially, each ministry and agency implemented its own efforts and there was no mechanism toimplement things systematically, so an integrated approach was not possible.
･ Due to the fact that the national government was responsible for decontamination, I think local
governments and citizens as a whole found it difficult to assume a share of responsibility and develop ashared understanding and awareness.
Comments for <Role of the prefectural government>･Disaster prevention was being done by municipalities, but decontamination is difficult for municipalities
to do. They cannot coordinate things in a wide area. The prefectural government definitely had a role,such as developing a plan for the entire prefecture.
･ In Fukushima Prefecture, when it was decided that municipalities would prepare their own
decontamination implementation plans, it was expected that there would inevitably be differences in the
progress and content of activities. If that was going to be a problem, it might have been an option for the
prefecture to develop an overall plan for a wide area.
･Because of the nature of the decontamination work, costs will vary as the project moves ahead, making
the necessary costs difficult to predict. Therefore, the method of the prefecture creating a fund based on
subsidies from the national government and making it available to municipalities was good in that it
permitted a flexible response.
･In the municipalities that did decontamination work while residents were living there, it was difficult togain residents’ acceptance for temporary storage sites, and for in-situ storage where it was hard to ensure
the temporary storage sites. There may have been a role for the prefecture as a local government for abroader region, including the management of stored soil, for example, the time of transferring from insitu storage to temporary storage sites, and consolidation to loading areas.
Comments for <Role of municipalities>･It was a good thing to have municipalities conduct decontamination as their proximity to the community
allowed them to respond well to residents, but I think it was a heavy load for municipal personnel due toa shortage of people.
･It would have been better for a bigger entity to develop the overall plans and then have municipalities
carry out the decontamination.
･For emergency decontamination activities, there were some merits of having municipalities
decontaminate at first, but I think there were issues such as the disposal of waste.
･After the whole area decontamination has been completed and municipal departments that were in charge403

are downsized, I think problems may arise in dealing with spot decontamination or other issues that
become evident in the future.
Comments for <Polluter pays principle>･The IAEA standard approach is that the polluter conducts the decontamination, and regulatory agencies
conduct approvals and reviews. On the other hand, Fukushima accident was enormous in scale, and so if
the polluter worked alone on decontamination it would never have been worked.
･Because the pollution of this time was on a large scale and the national government also had some
responsibility, the national government carried out decontamination, etc. However, there is some question
whether the national government should always do this, including cases where the pollution is on a small
scale.Consideration should be given to IAEA’s principle that “The prime responsibility for safety must
rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation
risks.”
Comments on Section 6.2 (2) “Enhancing verification systems”･It is important to clearly explain why the municipal verification committee was necessary, including thebackground. There are differences in approaches taken by various municipalities.
･There were some good examples of verification committees in some towns. For example, in one case amember explained the situation from the farmers’ perspective and got the committee to understand.
･Since there were no uniform standards, verification was difficult, but it was important to conduct
verification based on the actual situation in each municipality.
Comments on Section 6.2 (3) “Coordinating with relevant policies (reconstruction, etc.)”･For decontamination of Areas under Evacuation Orders, I understand that initially it was planned forevacuees to return within 3 years, but in reality decontamination and return were delayed.
･In the wake of regrettable cases in which hospitalized patients underwent significant hardships when they
were evacuated, one local government did not do an emergency evacuation and instead, conductedthorough decontamination and limited the patients’ exposure. In the future, such methods should also be
considered.
･Because of delays in developing recovery plans, the decontamination methods had to be undertaken, in
accordance with the land use before the disaster, regardless of the land use policy after the restoration(whether or not it would be farmland use, etc.). If land use policy was already determined at the time
decontamination was being done, it may have been possible to limit the amount of waste generated. I
think that a rational approach should be used for decontamination, based on long-term consideration ofevacuee return and reconstruction.
･Although the decision was made later to demolish some buildings due to the deterioration of the houses,
I think it should have been considered right from the beginning.
･I think it is important to formulate rational decontamination plans that are matched with the pace ofreconstruction and recovery plans, taking the reductions of observed doses into account.
･Even if they do decontamination and explain, there is no guarantee that people will return to the area, so404

you also need to assume that some people will not return.
･The return rate decreases over time. What the national government can do is to decontamination rapidly
and create an environment that will increase the return rate. The judgment of whether to return or not is
ultimately to be done by the residents.
･Even after the decontamination work has ended, weeds and small trees are growing in residential areas
and farmland over time, so weeding is required again. Even after the decontamination has ended, theresidents cannot immediately return home, so it is a problem that no one can manage and preserve theland.
Comments on Section 6.3 (1) “The first large-scale decontamination project in Japan”･ Decontamination work is labor-intensive, and it is difficult to mechanize and automate the work.
Knowledge about radiation is also necessary. In addition to technology, relationships and response to the
local community are also important.
･It is important to build trusting relationships, and there are cases where people were actively hired fromthe local community and they worked together on decontamination.
･Among all government ministries it was decided that MOE would be in charge of decontamination, andthis was the first large scale decontamination project in Japan.
･Since this was an enormous decontamination project on a scale never experienced before, I believe there
were initially some problems with certain management and monitoring methods on the site.
･There was some technical development using ideas from contractors (construction companies) for
decontamination methods and equipment. Examples include the development of large high-pressure
washing vehicles and cleaning paved roads using dry ice.
･As time passes, willow trees would grow in the paddy fields, etc., so it has been a need for not only
weeding but also tree and root removal.
･As decontamination project got long-standing, it became difficult to get effective results as time passed.
It is necessary to choose a flexible method considering the passage of time.
･Although the decision was made later to demolish some buildings due to the deterioration of the houses,
I think it should have been considered right from the beginning.
･When doing decontamination while people still live in the area, communication with landowners is
crucial.
･In Chernobyl, people were forcibly emigrated because relocation was cheaper than decontamination. The
United States has had many accidents at military facilities in the desert, but they were far away from
where residents live. Unlike these cases, Japan cannot forcibly relocate people, and there is no place torelocate them.
･Decontamination on a massive scale was possible thanks to Japan’s civil engineering expertise.
Comments on Section 6.3 (2) “Preliminary surveys and acquisition of consent”･The consent of stakeholders (landowners, building owners, managers, etc.) related to the decontamination
is important in planning decontamination projects and starting actual work.
･There were many cases where a large number of landowners together owned a property targeted for405

decontamination, where the rights holders were complex, or where the actual landowners were unknown,
and that could make it difficult to identify the stakeholders in some cases.
･ To obtain consent in Special Decontamination Areas, it was necessary to visit the places for the
explanations where evacuees were staying. In the ICSA, it was necessary to visit the decontamination
site, where the landowners live to give explanations.
･It was possible to obtain consent because the situation was relatively calm as the nuclear reactors werein a cold stop, rather than immediately after a disaster. In the case of real emergency, however, the consent
will not be obtained. I think it is necessary to consider whether a consent process is really necessary.
Comment on Section 6.3 (3) “Securing and prolonged management of Temporary Storage Sites”･There are cases progress was made in gaining understanding by asking residents to visit the actual
temporary storage sites, and making it easier to obtain consent.
･Initially, it was assumed that national forests would be used to set up temporary storage sites in order touse land of the national government, but in that case, it would have been necessary to revoke protected
forest designations and to level the land. That is why many temporary storage sites were located outsideof national forests.
･Regarding the securement of temporary storage sites, the situation may have been a little different, if thecorrect knowledge about radiation and health had been more common among prefectural citizens fromthe beginning, and public understanding had been well promoted that it would have been more effective
in terms of exposure dose reduction and safety measures when consolidating the removed soil rather thanhaving in different locations.
･In the municipalities that conducted decontamination work while residents were living there, it wasconsidered to be difficult to gain residents’ acceptance for temporary storage sites, and for in-situ storage
where temporary storage sites could not be found.
･While the terms of temporary storage sites and on-site storage have been extended, there were also
problems with underground storage due to nearby expansions and land transactions, and so relocation
became necessary in some cases.
･Restoration of temporary storage sites to their original state is important not only in terms of form but
also function, so it important to have long-term oversight of these sites from the landowner’s perspective.
･It is important to consider the standardization of identification tags on flexible container, whether it befor decontamination under the national government or decontamination by municipalities,
standardization during decontamination and transportation, and the collection of data at the time ofdecontamination, in anticipation of transportation (weight of flexible containers, etc.).
･Since the tags on flexible containers were not standardized, it was necessary to replace the tags or
examine the information at the time of transportation. Deeper discussions will be necessary when setting
standards.

406

Comments on Section 6.3 (4) “Disposal method of removed soil, etc. ”･ The treatment of removed materials (soil and waste) generated by decontamination is extremely
important and affects the entire treatment process
Comments on Section 6.3 (5) “Farmland decontamination work for the smooth implementation of the
projects”･It gets cheaper and leads to the conservation of topsoil, compared with stripping when conducting
inversion tillage, but I think more soil stripping was done in many areas to be on the safety side. As aresult, amount of removed soil increased, the area needed for temporary storage sites increased, and thestorage period was lengthened. It is also crucial to develop consensus about these tradeoffs.
･Although it is cheaper to buy all the land when considering the trade-offs, the national government
decided on decontamination based on policy. The cost in Japan will be a reference for policies in othercountries.
Comments on Section 6.3 (6) “Initiatives for proper implementation of decontamination”･Fraud in the decontamination business and violations of laws and regulations are also one of the issues.
･There were cases such as inflated billing and overpayments, etc.
･Regarding the occurrence of accidents and problems, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that thedecontamination work involved managing up to about 20,000 workers a day.
Comments on Section 6.4 (1) “Explaining the impact of radiation”･It is important to note in records that there was a strong sense of anxiety about radiation, that in somecases it was difficult to operate with existing systems, and that the responses were an attempt to deal withthese conditions.
･Adequately disseminating correct knowledge about radiation at an early stage is an important measure tosmoothly carry out a variety of subsequent work.
･The goal of decontamination was not well communicated, so it was that long-term targets were perceived
by residents as the goal of decontamination. Correct knowledge and correct information transmission areimportant.
･It is difficult to make a transition from decisions that were initially made, into reasoned judgment at alater time when scientific knowledge accumulates. It is necessary to carefully examine the modes ofcommunication and decision making.
Comments on Section 6.4 (2) “Resident participation”･There are guidelines on decontamination, but in comes some cases further decontamination was requiredat decontamination sites because special action was necessary or the dose did not decline.
･As an action to be on the safe side, topsoil stripping was carried out in many areas.
･Since decontamination was promoted under decontamination implementation plans developed by eachmunicipality, differences emerged in the content and progress of efforts by municipalities.

407

Afterword
This committee was established to consider and discuss this report’s composition, topics, contents,
issues and lessons learned, and to prepare the report. The members of the Editorial Committee are indicatedbelow.
This document is a compilation and summary of the experiences, lessons learned and knowledge
obtained in decontamination work implemented in Japan, with a focus mainly on the efforts of MOE.
We believe it is important for not only MOE but also other relevant ministries, local governments,
research institutions and organizations to summarize and archive their documents and data as a resourcein the event of another nuclear power station accident, and for related research and efforts.

< Editorial Committee for the Paper on Decontamination Projects >(Chair)Motoyuki Suzuki

Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo

Tadashi Inoue

Research Advisor Emeritus, Central Research Institute ofElectric Power Industry

Masahiro Osako

Director, Center for Material Cycles and Waste Management
Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan

Takashi Omura

General Research Programme Manager / Secretary General,
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Keiichi Kawase

Section Leader, Project Engineering Management Section,
Fukushima Environmental Safety Center, Fukushima ResearchInstitute, Sector of Fukushima Research and Development, Japan
Atomic Energy Agency

Kencho Kawatsu

Project Professor, Faculty of Symbiotic Systems Science,
Fukushima University,

Yuko Sakita

Journalist, Environmental Counselor

Akira Suzuki

Director, Decontamination Countermeasure Division, Social
Affairs and Environment Department, Fukushima Prefecture

Masatoshi Morita

President, Society for Remediation of Radioactive
Contamination in Environment

Yoshio Oshino

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Kajima Corporation)

Masao Konishi

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Okumura Corporation)

Kazuo SatoInterim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Taisei Corporation)

Kunio Nishi

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors ( Hazama AndoiCorporation)
Masaru Noda

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Obayashi Corporation)

Shintaro Hayashi

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Maeda Corporation)

Ken Watanabe

Interim Storage and Decontamination Committee, Japan
Federation of Construction Contractors (Shimizu Corporation)(Secretariat)

Office of Director for Environmental Regeneration, Environmental Regenerationand Material Cycles Bureau, MOE
Nippon Koei Corporationii

【Attachment】

Stage
Emergency Response Stage

Year/
Month
Mar
2011

Apr

May
Jun
Jul

Chronology of major events

Legislation and Regulations
3/11 Nuclear Power Station Accident
Associated with the Tohoku
District Off the Pacific Ocean
Earthquake
3/12 Evacuation orders within 20 km
radius of TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi NPS (NERHQ: the Act on
Special Measures concerning
Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness)
3/15 Order to remain indoors within aradius between 20 and 30 km of
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS
4/21 Designation of area within 20 km
radius of TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi NPS as a Restricted Area
4/22 Designation of certain areas
outside a 20 km radius of TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi NPS as
Deliberate Evacuation Areas andEvacuation-Prepared Areas inCase of Emergency

6/16 Designation of individual areas asSpecific Spots Recommended for
Evacuation

Aug

8/30 the Act on Special Measuresconcerning Handling ofEnvironment Pollution byRadioactive Materials
promulgated

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

4/19 Preliminary Approach in
Deciding How to Use
School Buildings andSchoolyards in Fukushima
Prefecture (MEXT)

5/2 Handling of Disaster Waste in
Fukushima Prefecture for
the Time Being (MOE)
6/23 Policy on Disposal ofDisaster Waste in Fukushima
Prefecture (MOE)
7/15 Guidance for Reduction of
Air Dose in Living Space(Fukushima Prefecture)
7/19 Basic Policy on Radiation
Protection for Terminationof Evacuation andReconstruction (NSC)
8/2 Formulation ofComprehensive Monitoring
Plan for radiation (NRA)
8/9 Basic concept on the Review
of Areas Under Evacuation
Orders (NERHQ)
8/12 EURANOS Data Sheet(AESJ)
8/26 Basic Policy for Emergency
Response on
Decontamination Work(NERHQ)
8/26 Guidelines for Municipal
Decontamination Work(NERHQ)i

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.

4/21 Start of decontamination
demonstration tests on
the grounds ofelementary schools (DateCity)
4/27 Start of topsoil removal
work at schoolgrounds
and other areas(Koriyama City)

StageDecontamination Preparation Stage

Year/
Month
Sep

Oct

Legislation and Regulations

9/30 Cancellation of EvacuationPrepared Areas in Case of
Emergency outside the 20 km
radius of TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi NPS

Nov 11/11 Cabinet Decision on the Basic
Policy per the Act on Special
Measures concerning theHandling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive
Materials

Dec

12/28 Designation of Special
Decontamination Areas (SDA),
Intensive Contamination Survey
Areas (ICSA), etc.

Policies, Guidelines, etc.
・Establishment of MOE
Decontamination Team
9/14 Hosting the 1st meeting ofCommittee on
Environmental Remediation(MOE)
9/30 Announcement ofAppropriate Methods, etc.
for Decontamination ofForests (NERHQ)
9/30 Announcement of theAppropriate Methods for
Decontamination of
Farmland (MAFF)
10/29 Basic Policy on Interim
Storage and Other Facilities
Required for the Handlingof the Environmental
Pollution from Radioactive
Materials Associated with
the Accident at the Tokyo
Electric Power TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station (MOE)
11/15 IAEA International Mission
Final Report on
Decontamination (IAEA)
11/22 Decontamination Technical
Catalogue (Cabinet Office)Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.

11/7 Start of detailed
monitoring
11/7 Start of Cabinet Office(JAEA)
Decontamination Model
Demonstration Project・Start of Fukushima
Prefecture Whole Area
Decontamination Model
Project
・Inauguration of Society for
Remediation of Radioactive
Contamination in
Environment
12/14 Formulation of
12/7 Start of Decontamination
Decontamination Guidelinesof Municipal Offices by(1st edition) (MOE)
the Japan Self-Defense
12/22 Promulgation of Regulation
Forceson Prevention of Ionizing
Radiation Hazards related toWork such as
Decontamination, release of
Guidelines on Prevention ofRadiation Hazards forWorkers Engaged in Worksuch as Decontamination(MHLW)
12/26 Basic Concepts and Future
Issues for Reviewing
Restricted Areas and Areas
Where Evacuation Orders
Have Been Issued Where
Step 2 Has Been Completed(NERHQ)
12/27 Formulation of Waste
Guidelines (1st edition)ii

StageDecontamination Start Stagr

Year/
Month
Jan
2012

Feb
Mar

Apr

May
Jun

Legislation and Regulations

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

1/1 Enforcement of the Act on Special
Measures concerning theHandling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive
Materials
1/1 Enforcement of Ionizing Radiation
Ordinance for Decontamination

1/26 Policy for Decontaminationin Special Decontamination
Areas (Decontamination
Roadmap) (MOE)
1/31 Technical Guidelines for
Decontamination Operations(Fukushima Prefecture)

3/31 Enforcement the Act on Special
Measures for the Reconstruction
and Revitalization of Fukushima

3/12 Guidelines on Handling
Local Areas Contaminatedby Radioactive Materials(MOE)
3/29 Handbook for Whole Area
Decontamination(Fukushima Prefecture)

4/1 Reorganization of Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Tamura City), Habitation
Restricted Areas and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Kawauchi Village)
4/13 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Naraha Town, TamuraCity)
4/16 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Minamisoma City)
4/18 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Minamisoma City)
5/24 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Iitate Village)Jul

7/17 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Iitate Village)Aug

8/10 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Kawamata Town)
8/10 Reorganization as Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Naraha Town)

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.
1/4 Establishment ofFukushima
Environmental
Restoration Office
1/6 Start of preliminary
decontamination (Naraha
Town)
1/20 Installation of
Decontamination
Information Plaza・Start of advancedecontamination (Tamura
City, Tomioka Town,
Okuma Town, Kawamata
Town, Kawauchi Village,
Katsurao Village)

4/12 End of Detailed
Monitoring

4/25 Inauguration of the
Nikken Decontamination
Committee
4/27 End of advancedecontaminatio (TamuraCity)
5/22 Start of advancedecontamination(Minami
soma City)
6/29 Final report on the・End of Cabinet OfficeDecontamination Model(JAEA) Decontamination
Demonstration Project in the
Model Demonstration
Restricted Areas andProject
Deliberate Evacuation Areas, ・Start of advanceetc. (MOE, JAEA)
decontamination (Namie
Town, Iitate Village)
7/5 Start of whole area
decontamination (TamuraCity)
7/25 Start of whole area
decontamination (Naraha
Town)
7/30 Start of whole area
decontamination(Kawauchi Village)
・Release of inspection at
National Highway No. 6 at J
Village Mae

Sep

9/25 Start of whole area
decontamination (Iitate
Village)
9/28 End of advancedecontamination(Kawamata Town)

9/28 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Katsurao Village)iii

StageDecontamination Implementation Stage

Year/
Month
Oct
Nov
Dec

Jan
2013

Legislation and Regulations

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

・Partial revision of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Naraha Town)
11/21 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Namie Town)
12/10 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (OkumaTown)
12/28 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Okuma Town)

10/23 Decontamination
Promotion Package (MOE)

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun
Jul
Aug

Sep
Oct
Nov

3/22 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders(Katsurao Village)
3/25 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Tomioka Town)
4/1 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult, Habitation
Restricted Areas, and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Namie Town)
5/28 Reorganization as Areas where
Returning is Difficult andPreparation Areas for Lifting of
Evacuation Orders (Futaba Town)
6/26 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Tomioka Town)

1/18 Program for Proper
Decontamination (MOE)
1/18 Effects of Decontamination
Techniques in
Decontamination Projects
Implemented to Date by
National and Local
Governments (MOE)
2/22 Technical Manual for
Decontamination of
Farmland (MAFF)

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.
10/31 End of advancedecontamination (Naraha
Town)
11/30 End of advancedecontamination(Katsurao Village)
12/6 Start of whole area
decontamination (Okuma
Town)

2/28 Fukushima
Environmental
Restoration Office,Opening of Naraha Town
branch3/28 End of advancedecontamination(Minamisoma City)

5/17 Publication of Collection ofBest Practices in
Decontamination (MOE)

4/25 Start of whole area
decontamination(Kawamata Town,
Katsurao Village)

6/28 End of whole area
decontamination (TamuraCity)

8/8 Cancellation of Deliberate
Evacuation Areas, reorganized as
Habitation Restricted Areas andPreparation Areas for Lifting of
Evacuation Orders (Kawamata
Town)

8/1

9/10 Overall Check on Progressof Decontamination (MOE)Start of preparatoryaccommodation (TamuraCity)
8/26 Start of whole area
decontamination(Minamisoma City)・Start work between JR
Joban Line Hirono
Station and Tatsuta
Station・Seven Eleven resumes
business in the 20 km
radius (Naraha Town)

11/26 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Naraha Town)

iv

Stage

Year/
Month

Dec

Decontamination Acceleration Stage

Jan
2014

Legislation and Regulations

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

12/20 Cabinet Decision on
Accelerating the Reconstructionof Fukushima From the Nuclear
Disaster
12/26 Partial revision of
Decontamination Implementation
Plans in Special Areas(Minamisoma City, Iitate Village,
Kawamata Village, Katsurao
Village, Namie Town, Tomioka
Town)

12/26 Effects (on Air Dose Rate)of Decontamination in
Decontamination Projects
Implemented by the
National Government andLocal Governments (MOE)
12/26 Review of theDecontamination
Implementation Plans inSpecial Areas (MOE)

Feb

Mar

Apr

4/1

1/23 Final report: The Follow-up
IAEA International Mission
on Remediation of Large
Contaminated Areas Offsite the TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station（IAEA）
2/13 Unified Basic Materials
regarding Health Effects,
etc. Caused by Radiation(First Edition) (MOE,
NIRS)

Cancellation of Preparation Areasfor Lifting of Evacuation Orders(Tamura City)May

6/10 Report on Results ofDecontamination Model
Demonstration Projects in
Areas where Returning is
Difficult (MOE)
6/15 Meeting to Exchange Views
with Knowledgeable
Persons regarding
Decontamination (MOE)

Jun

Jul
7/15 Formulation of Decontamination
Implementation Plans in Special
Areas (Futaba Town)

v

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.
11/27 Start of whole area
decontamination (Namie
Town)

12/28 Start of special
accommodation during
year-end and new year
(Naraha Town)
1/8 Start of whole area
decontamination(Tomioka Town)

2/22 Reopening of Joban
Expressway Hirono IC
to Tokiwa Tomioka IC
3/24 End of advancedecontamination(Tomioka Town)
3/28 End of whole area
decontamination(Naraha Town)
3/31 End of whole area
decontamination(Kawauchi Village)
4/15 Restart of juvenile
salmon release in the
Kido River (Naraha
Town)
4/26 Start of preparatoryaccommodation(Kawauchi Village)
5/15 Commencement ofresidents monitoring of
Temporary Storage Sites(TSS) (Naraha Town)
5/29 Declaration of decision
about returning town
(Naraha Town)
6/1 Resumed operation of
JR Joban Line Hirono
Station to Tatsuta
Station
6/26 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Naraha Town)
7/10 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Kawauchi Village)
7/29 Start of additional
decontamination(Naraha Town)
7/31 End of advancedecontamination(Kawauchi Village)
7/31 Opening of temporarycommercial facility

Stage

Year/
Month

Legislation and Regulations

8/1

Aug

Sep
Oct

Nov

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

Interim Report of Study
Group of National
Government and Four Cities
concerning Decontaminationin Municipalities (MOE)

10/1 Cancellation of Preparation Areasfor Lifting of Evacuation Orders,reorganized as Habitation
Restricted Areas into Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Kawauchi Village)

Dec

Jan
2015
Feb
3/5 Report of Decontamination
Verification Committee(Naraha Town)
・Report on Decontamination
FY2014 (MOE)

Mar

Apr

May
Jun

Jul
Aug

Sep

Oct

6/12 Cabinet Decision on Accelerating
the Reconstruction of Fukushima
From the Nuclear Disaster(revision)
8/31 TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
NPS Director General’sReport (IAEA)
9/5 Cancellation of Preparation Areasfor Lifting of Evacuation Orders(Naraha Town)

9/30 Summary of Status of
Enforcement of the Act on
Special Measures concerning
the Handling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive
Materials (MOE)vi

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.
“Kokonara Shotengai”(Naraha Town)
8/29 End of advancedecontamination (Namie
Town)
9/15 Traffic restrictions liftedand full line opening of
National Highway No. 6

10/31 End of whole area
decontamination (Okuma
Town)
12/5 Establishment Hamadori
Office for Interim
Storage Facilities
12/5 Establishment Hamadori
Office for Interim
Storage Facilities
12/24 End of advancedecontamination (Iitate
Village)
1/31 Start of alternate bus
service between JR Joban
Line Tatsuta station andHaranomachi Station
2/23 Start of whole area
decontamination (Futaba
Town)
3/1 Opening of all lines ofJoban expressway andopening of Naraha PA(Naraha Town)
3/13 Start of pilot transport(Okuma Town)
3/25 Start of pilot transport(Futaba Town)
4/6 Start of preparatoryaccommodation (Naraha
Town)
4/10 Start of pilot transport(Tamura City)
4/16 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Kawamata Town)
5/26 Start of pilot transport(Tomioka Town)
・Start of pilot transport(Naraha Town, Namie Town,
Kawauchi Village, Katsurao
Village)
8/31 Start of preparatoryaccommodation(Kawamata Town,
Katsurao Village)
9/1 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Tomioka Town)

10/10 Holding of Futaba
World in Naraha(Naraha Town)
・Full revival of salmon fishery

Stage

Year/
Month

Legislation and Regulations

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

Nov

12/21 Approach to Supplemental
Decontamination (MOE)

Dec

Jan
2016
Feb

・Opening of prefecturalclinic (Naraha Town)
3/29 Recommendations bydecontamination
verification committee(Kawamata Town)
3/31 End of whole area
decontamination (Futaba
Town)
・Lifting of rice shipment
restrictions (Naraha
Town)

Mar

Apr
May
Jun

Jun

Aug

6/12 Cancellation of Habitation
Restricted Areas and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Katsurao Village)
6/14 Cancellation of Habitation
Restricted Areas (Kawauchi
Village)
7/12 Cancellation of Habitation
Restricted Areas and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Minamisoma City)

Sep

・Restart of full-scale farming(Naraha Town)
6/3 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Namie Town)

7/12 Resume operation of JR
Joban Line Haranomachi
Station to Kodaka Station
8/31 Approach on the Handling ofAreas where Returning is
Difficult (NERHQ)

8/11 Start of special
accommodation (Okuma
Town)
9/17 Start of preparatoryaccommodation (Tomioka
Town)
10/4 Recommendations bydecontamination
verification committee(Tomioka Town)
11/1 Start of preparatoryaccommodation (Namie
Town)
12/21 Recommendations bydecontamination
verification committee(Minamisoma City)
12/31End of whole area
decontamination (Iitate
Village)
1/31 End of whole area
decontamination(Tomioka Town)
2/8 Start of decontamination
verification committee(Iitate Village)

3/3 Current Situation, Outcomesand Prospects ofDecontamination, Interim
Storage Facilities, and3/31 End of whole area
decontamination(Minamisoma City,
Namie Town)

Oct

Nov
Dec

12/10 Cabinet Decision on Basic
Policy for Accelerating theReconstruction of Fukushima
From the Nuclear Disaster

Jan
2017
Feb

Mar

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.
in Kido River (Naraha Town)
・Start of pilot transport(Iitate Village,
Minamisoma City,
Kawamata Town)
12/31 End of whole area
decontamination(Kawamata Town,
Katsurao Village)

2/10 Cabinet Decision on the Act on
Special Measures for the
Reconstruction and Revitalizationof Fukushima (revision)
3/31 Cancellation of Habitation
Restricted Areas and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Namie Town, Iitatevii

Stage

Year/
Month
Apr

May

Jun

Legislation and Regulations

Policies, Guidelines, etc.

Village, Kawamata Town)

Radioactive ContaminatedWaste Disposal (MOE)

4/1 Cancellation of Habitation
Restricted Areas and Preparation
Areas for Lifting of Evacuation
Orders (Tomioka Town)
5/19 Enforcement of the Act on Special
Measures for the Reconstruction
and Revitalization of Fukushima(revision)

Decontamination andMunicipal Actions, etc.

6/23 Recommendations bydecontamination
verification committee(Iitate Village)viii

Sources
Chapter 1: History and overview of decontamination projects
1.1 TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident and establishment of areas underevacuation orders
・Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations ofTokyo Electric Power Company (July 23, 2012).
・Fire and Disaster Management Agency “Report on the Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earthquake (Great East Japan
Earthquake) (Report No. 156)” (September 8, 2017).
・“Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness” (Act No. 156 of December 1999).
・Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), “Handling of radioactively contaminated food” (March 17,2011).
・NERHQ, “Monitoring plan and policy on setting and lifting of restrictions for food items and areas to be
subjected to shipment restrictions, etc.” (April 4, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Policy on planting of rice” (April 8, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Regarding the Establishment of a Restricted Area” (April 21, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Regarding the Establishment of a Deliberate Evacuation Area and Evacuation-Prepared Area in Caseof Emergency” (April 22, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Regarding Response to the Specific Spots Estimated to Exceed an Integral Dose of 20 mSv Over a
One Year Period After the Occurrence of the Accident” (June 16, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Basic Concept on the Review of Evacuation Areas” (August 9, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Lifting of Evacuation-prepared Area in Case of Emergency” (September 30, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Basic Concept and Future Tasks in Review of the Restricted Areas and Areas Under Evacuation
Orders After the Completion of Step 2” (December 26, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Regarding criteria for the Review of Areas Under Evacuation Orders (standards of 20 mSv/y)” (July
2012).
・Cabinet Office, “Review of Areas Under Evacuation Orders” (October 2013).
1.2 Emergency response against radioactive materials
・“Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors” (Act No. 166 of
1957).
・“Environment Basic Act” (Act No. 91 of 1993).
・“Atomic Energy Basic Act” (Act No.186 of December 1955).
・Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power
Company, “Interim Report” (December 26, 2011).
・Monitoring Coordination Meeting, “Comprehensive Monitoring Plan” (August 2, 2011).
・MHLW, “Preliminary Approach in Deciding How to Use School Buildings and Schoolyards in Fukushima
Prefecture” (April 19, 2011).
・MHLW, “Dose reduction for school buildings and grounds in Fukushima Prefecture” (August 26, 2011).
・Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), “Basic Policy on Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation andReconstruction” (July 19, 2011).
・Ministry of the Environment (MOE), “Handling of Disaster Waste in Fukushima Prefecture for the Time Being”(May 2, 2011).
・NSC, “Near-term Policy to Ensure the Safety for Treating and Disposing Contaminated Waste around the Siteof Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company” (June 3, 2011).
・MOE, “Policy on Disposal of Disaster Waste in Fukushima Prefecture” (June 23, 2011).
・MOE, “Measurement and Temporary Handling of Incinerated Ash at Non-Industrial Waste Incineration Plants”(June 28, 2011).
・Date City, “Three Years of History of Date City After the Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Power
Station Accident” (July 2, 2013).
・Koriyama City, “History of Koriyama City After the Great East Japan Earthquake” (February 2, 2017).

ix

・Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), “Air Dose Reduction Measures in
School Yards and Kindergarten Yards Based on Fieldwork” (May 11, 2011).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Guidance for Reduction of Air Dose in Living Space” (July 15, 2011).
1.3 Establishment of a legal framework and decontamination policy
・“Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials
Discharged by the Nuclear Power Plant Accident Associated with the Tohoku District Off the Pacific Ocean
Earthquake That Occurred on 11 March 2011” (Act No. 110 of August 30, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011).
・NERHQ, “Announcement of the Appropriate Methods for Decontamination of Farmland” (September 30,2011).
・NERHQ, “Announcement of the Appropriate Methods, etc. for Decontamination of Forests” (September 30,2011).
・Fukushima City, “Fukushima City Furusato Decontamination Implementation Plan (1st edition)” (September
27, 2011).
・MOE, “Basic Policy on Interim Storage and Other Facilities Required for the Handling of the Environmental
Pollution from Radioactive Materials Associated with the Accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (October 29, 2011).
・“Basic Policy per the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution byRadioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Plant Accident Associated with the Tohoku District
Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake That Occurred on 11 March 2011” (November 11, 2011).
・MOE, “Ministerial Ordinance Stipulating the Requirements, etc. for Designation of Contaminated Waste
Management Areas” (December 14, 2011, Ministry of the Environment Ordinance No. 34).
・MOE and JAEA, “Report on the Decontamination Model Demonstration Project in the Restricted Areas andDeliberate Evacuation Areas, etc.” (June 29, 2012).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Report on Implementation of the Fukushima Prefecture Whole Area Decontamination
Model Project” (October 26, 2012 MLIT National Land Technology Study Group 2012).
・MOE, “Report on Decontamination of Municipal Offices by the Japan Self-Defense Forces” (March 27, 2012).
・MOE, “Decontamination Guidelines” (December 14, 2011).
・MOE, “Guidelines for Waste” (December 27, 2011).
1.4 Implementation of decontamination projects
・MOE, “Policy for decontamination in the Special Decontamination Areas (Decontamination Roadmap)”(January 26, 2012).
・Cabinet Office, “The Reviews of Areas under Evacuation Orders” (October 2013).*・MOE, “Overview of the Results of the Model Demonstration Project inside the Joban Expressway RestrictedArea” (August 31, 2012).
・MOE, “Detailed Monitoring in Regions where the National Government Implements Decontamination basedon the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution (Final Report)” (May 17,2012).
・MOE, “SDA Decontamination Implementation Plans (Tamura City, Kawauchi Village, Naraha Town,
Minamisoma City, Iitate Village, Kawamata Town, Katsurao Village, Namie Town, Okuma Town and Futaba
Town).”
・MOE, “Decontamination Information Site” (http://josen.env.go.jp/).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Technical Guidelines for Decontamination Operations” (January 31, 2012).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Handbook for Whole Area Decontamination” (March 29, 2012).
・MOE, “Guidelines on Handling Local Areas Contaminated by Radioactive Materials” (March 12, 2012).
・MOE, “Decontamination Guidelines” (December 14, 2011).*
・MOE, “Decontamination Promotion Package” (October 23, 2012).
・MOE, “Program for Proper Decontamination” (January 18, 2013).
・MOE, “Effects of Decontamination Techniques in Decontamination Projects Implemented to Date by Nationalxand Local Governments” (January 18, 2013).
・MOE, “Collection of Best Practices in Decontamination” (May 17, 2013).
・MOE, “Overall Check of Progress of Decontamination” (September 10, 2013).
・MOE, “Review of the Decontamination Implementation Plans in Special Areas” (December 26, 2013).
・NERHQ, “For Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster” (December 20,2013).
・MOE, “Effects (on Air Dose Rate) of Decontamination in Decontamination Projects Implemented by the
National Government and Local Governments” (December 26, 2013).
・MOE, “Evaluation of the Goals of Basic Policy (Draft)” (December 26, 2013).
・NERHQ, “For Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster (revision)” (June 12,2015).
・”Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake in the “Reconstruction
and Revitalization Period” (March 11, 2016 Cabinet decision).
・MOE, “Approach to Follow-up Decontamination” (December 21, 2015, Committee on Environmental
Remediation).
・IAEA, “Fukushima Daiichi NPS Director General’s Report” (August 31, 2015).
・Reconstruction Agency, “Package of Measures for Radiation Risk Communication for Return” (February 18,2014).
・MOE, NIRS, “Unified Basic Materials regarding Health Effects, etc. Caused by Radiation” (February 13,2014).
・Reconstruction Agency, Ministry of the Environment, Fukushima City, Koriyama City, Soma City, and Date
City, “Interim Report on the Initiatives of the National Government and Four Cities for Acceleration of
Decontamination and Reconstruction” (August 1, 2014).
・Reconstruction Agency, Ministry of the Environment, Fukushima City, Koriyama City, Soma City, and Date
City, “Meeting to Exchange Views with Knowledgeable Persons regarding Decontamination - Thinking about
Future Approaches based on the Previous Findings of the National Government and four cities - Fact book”(August 1, 2014).
・MOE, “Summary of the Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling ofEnvironment Pollution by Radioactive Materials” (September 30, 2015 Investigative Commission on the
Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials).
・Fukushima Prefecture Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, “Quick Report on Damage Caused by the 2011
Earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tohoku” monthly final report.
・NERHQ, “Approach on the Handling of Areas where Returning is Difficult” (August 31, 2016).
・ “Act on Partial Revision of the Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of
Fukushima” (May 19, 2017).
<Related Documents>
・MOE, “Decontamination Information Site” (http://josen.env.go.jp/)
・Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Accident”(https://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/genpatsu_houshanou.html）
・METI, “Notices regarding Evacuation Orders to Date.”(http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/hinan_history.html）<Reference Documents >・MOE, “Elements of Standards for Measures such as Decontamination, etc.” (October 10, 2011 Review Meetingon Safety Assessment, Committee on Environmental Remediation Joint study group).
・MOE, Regarding Designation of Contaminated Waste Management Areas, SDAs and ICSAs based on the Act
on Special Measures” (December 28, 2011).
・MOE, “Policy on Future Treatment of Designated Waste” (March 30, 2012).
・Reconstruction Agency, “Basic policy for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of Fukushima” (July 13, 2012).
・Naraha Town, “Journal of Naraha Town Disaster” (June 2016).

xi

・Tomioka Town, “Great East Japan Earthquake struck, Memory and record of nuclear disaster” (July 2015).
・Okuma Town, “Journal of Okuma Town Disaster” (April 2017).
・Futaba Town, “Journal of Great East Japan Earthquake” (April 2017).
・Namie Town, “Journal of Namie Town Disaster” (March 2013).
・Minamisoma City, “Journal of Minamisoma City Earthquake” (March 2013).
・Iitate Village, “Iitate Village 2 Year History” (March 2013), etc.
・Katsurao Village, “Journal of Katsurao Village Great East Japan Earthquake” (March 2015).
・Kawamata Town “Journal of Kawamata Town Disaster” (March 2014).

Chapter 2: Characteristics and significance of decontamination
2.1 Characteristics of radioactive contamination and decontamination
・NERHQ, ”Report of the Japanese Government on the IEAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety” (June2011).
・MOE, Radiation Medical Research Institute “Unified Basic Materials regarding Health Effects, etc. Caused by
Radiation, FY2016 edition.”
・MEXT, “Measurement Results of the 4th Aircraft Monitoring by MEXT” (December 16, 2011).
・MEXT, “On analysis results of MEXT, (1) analysis results of gamma ray emitting nuclides, and (2) analysis
results of strontium 89, 90 (secondary distribution survey)” (September 12, 2012).
・MEXT, “On the results of nuclide analysis of plutonium and strontium by MEXT” (September 30, 2011).
・Prime Minister and Cabinet Official Website “Enhancement of science education on health risk of radiation Japan Science Council Recommendation” (http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/senmonka_g72.html)
・MOE, NIRS, “Unified Basic Materials regarding Health Effects, etc. Caused by Radiation, FY2016 Edition”(March 31, 2017).
・Fifth National Land Use Plan (National Plan) Overview.
・Meteorological Agency, “AMeDAS Fukushima Observatory, Onahama Observatory Observation Results for 10
Years of 2005-2014.”
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Fukushima Prefecture Position Manual in FY2016”（https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/sec/11045b/28youran.html）
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Regarding Fukushima’s Present Condition and Efforts toward Reconstruction” (5thSymposium of Decontamination and Waste Technology Council, November 16, 2016).
・Bridge and Offshore Engineering Association, “Document of Seto Ohashi Bridge Construction” (October1988).
・Kansai Electric Power Company, “Kurobegawa Fourth Power Station Construction History” (September 1965).
・Hokkaido Railway Company, “Seikan Tunnel in Numbers.”
2.2 The significance and objectives of decontamination
・MOE, “Decontamination Information Site” (http://josen.env.go.jp/about/method_necessity/index.html)
・The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection ICRP Publication 103(August 2009).
・Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), “Disaster Prevention Measures for Nuclear Facilities, etc.” (June 30, 1980).
・NERHQ, “Standards for Reviewing Areas Under Evacuation Orders (Standard 20 mSv/y)” (July 2012).*・MEXT, “Preliminary Approach in Deciding How to Use School Buildings and Schoolyards in Fukushima
Prefecture” (April 19, 2011).*・MEXT, “On the Reduction of Doses of School Buildings and Schoolyards in Fukushima Prefecture” (August
26, 2011).*
・NSC, “Basic Policy on Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction” (July 19,2011).*
・NERHQ, “Basic Concepts for Decontamination Promotion” (August 26, 2011).
・MOE, “Radiation hazards based on the provisions of the Special Measures Act concerning the handling ofpollution of the environment by radioactive substances released by nuclear power station accidents caused by
the Tohoku Region Pacific Offshore Earthquake that occurred on March 11, Regarding the formulation ofxii

technical standards concerning prevention (Inquiry)” (November 22, 2011).
・Radiation Council, “Radiation hazards based on the provisions of the Special Measures Act concerning thehandling of pollution of the environment by radioactive substances released by nuclear power station accidents
caused by the Tohoku Region Pacific Offshore Earthquake that occurred on March 11, Regarding theformulation of technical standards concerning prevention (Report)” (December 13, 2011).
・MOE, “Summary (draft) of Requirements, etc., for Designation of SDAs and ICSAs” (September 27, 2011.
Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Approach to Additional Annual Radiation Dose of 1 mSv/y” (October 10, 2011).
・MOE, NIRS, “Unified Basic Materials regarding Health Effects, etc. Caused by Radiation, FY2016 edition”(March 31, 2017).*<Reference Documents >・MOE, “About decontamination, etc. at the time of accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant” (September 14,
2011, Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・IAEA, “Environmental Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident and Their Remediation: Twenty Years ofExperience (2006)” (March 22, 2013, translation by Science Council of Japan).
・Reconstruction Agency, “Basic Information on Radiation Risk” (February 2014, Reconstruction Agency).

Chapter 3: Framework and methods of decontamination projects
3.1 Framework of decontamination projects(Refer to Chapter 1.)
3.2 Decontamination implementation systems
・“Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake” (Act No. 76 of June 24, 2011).
・ “Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of Fukushima” (Act No. 25 of March 31,2012).*
・On December 9, 2011 “Act for Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency” (Act No. 125 of 2011)
・Kencho Kawatsu (Fukushima Univ.) et al., “21st Dispatch from Disaster Area: Fukushima University’s Efforts
for Reconstruction after the Earthquake – Approach to Radiation Problems from the Perspective of Residents”(December 2014, Journal of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 99 No.12).
<Reference Documents>
・MOE, “Improvement of Decontamination Promotion System” (July 9, 2012, Committee on Environmental
Remediation).
・Reconstruction Promotion Meeting, “Drastic Strengthening of Fukushima Response System” (January 29,2013).
・MOE, “Improvement of System related to Decontamination, etc.” (April 22, 2013, Committee on
Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “History of Fukushima Environmental Revitalization Headquarters and Office” (February 8, 2017).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Measures to Decontaminate Fukushima Prefecture” (June 20, 2017).
・National Institute for Environmental Studies, “Kankyogi, No. 58” (September 30, 2015).
・JAEA, “Fukushima R & D Division” “Fukushima Environmental Safety Center.”
3.3 Budgetary measures<Reference Documents>
・MOE, “Outline of Radiation Dose Reduction Countermeasures Special Emergency Project Cost Grant
Subsidies” (December 22, 2011).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Implementation Procedures for Decontamination Countermeasures Projects”(December 9, 2011).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Outline of Grant Subsidies for Decontamination Countermeasures Projects” (December
9, 2011).
・Reconstruction Agency, “Outline of System Fukushima Revitalization Acceleration Grants” (February 28,

xiii

2014).
3.4 Establishment of decontamination methods
・AESJ, “EURANOS Data Sheet” (August 21, 2011).
・AESJ, “Decontamination Technical Catalogue” (October 24, 2011).
・Cabinet Office, “Decontamination Technical Catalogue” (November 22, 2011).*
・MOE, “Decontamination Guidelines” (December 14, 2011).*
・MOE, “Transition of Air Dose Rate after Decontamination Model Demonstration Project” (August 4, 2017).
・NERHQ, “Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011).*
・NERHQ, “Announcement of the Appropriate Methods for Decontamination of Farmland” (September 30,2011).*
・Fukushima Prefecture “Report on Implementation of the Fukushima Prefecture Whole Area Decontamination
Model Project” (October 26, 2012, MLIT National Land Technology Study Group 2012).*・Fukushima Prefecture, “Technical Guidelines for Decontamination Operations” (January 31, 2012).*・Fukushima Prefecture, “Handbook for Whole Area Decontamination” (March 29, 2012).*
・MAFF, “Technical Manual for Decontamination of Farmland” (February 22, 2013).
・JAEA, “FY2011, 2012, 2013 Technical Demonstration Project Report on Decontamination (MOECommissioned Project).”
・Nuclear Safety Technology Center (NUSTEC), “FY2014 Technical Demonstration Project Report on
Decontamination (MOE Commissioned Project).”
・NUSTEC, “FY2015 Technical Demonstration Project Report on Decontamination and Volume Reduction, etc.
(MOE Commissioned Project).”
・Fukushima Prefecture, “FY2011, 2012, 2013 Fukushima Prefecture Technical Demonstration Project Report on
Decontamination Implementation Results Report.”
・Fukushima Prefecture, “FY2014 Fukushima Prefecture Municipal Decontamination Technical Support Project:
Implementation Results Report.”
・MOE, “FY 2015 Fukushima Prefecture Municipal Decontamination Technical Support Project: Verification
Test Results Report” (June 2016).
・MOE, “Guidelines on Handling Local Areas Contaminated by Radioactive Materials” (March 12, 2012).*・Forestry Agency, “Technical Guidelines on Removal of Radioactive Materials and Control of Diffusion in
Forests” (April 27, 2012).
・MEXT, “Guidelines on Radiation Measurement” (October 21, 2011).
・MAFF, “Radioactive Substance Removal Technology of Farmland Soil (Decontamination Technology)”(September 14, 2011).
・MOE, “Common Specifications for Decontamination and Other Work” (May 2012, First Edition; April 2017,
Tenth Edition).
・MOE, “Common Specification for Decontamination-related Operations.”
・MOE, “Provisional Quantification Standards for Decontamination Work in Special Decontamination Areas”(May 2012, First Edition; April 2017, Tenth Edition).
・MOE, “Procedures for Quantity Calculation for Decontamination Work (draft)” (January 2015, First Edition).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Fukushima Prefecture Common Specifications for Decontamination Work” (July
2012).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Fukushima Prefecture Provisional Quantification Standards for Decontamination
Work” (August 2012).
・MHLW, “Ordinance on Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards at Works to Decontaminate Soil and Waste
Contaminated by Radioactive Materials Resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Related Works”(December 22, 2011, MHLW No. 152).
・MHLW, “Guidelines on Prevention of Radiation Hazards for Workers Engaged in Decontamination and Related
Works” (December 22, 2011).
・MHLW, “Guidelines on Prevention of Radiation Hazards for Workers Engaged in Work under a DesignatedDose Rate” (June 15, 2012).
・Radiation Effects Association, “Radiation Dose Control System for Workers Engaged in Decontamination, etc.”xiv

(November 15, 2013).
・MOE, website of “Committee on Environmental Remediation.”・MAFF, “Technical Document for Decontamination of Farmland (Part 1: Survey and Design)” (February2013).*
・MAFF, “Technical Manual for Countermeasures against Radioactive Materials in Reservoirs” (March 2016,
Second Edition).
3.5 Policies formulated after the start of decontamination
・MOE, “Approach to Supplementary Decontamination” (December 21, 2015, Committee on Environmental
Remediation).*・MOE, “Current Arrangements on Forest Decontamination Methods” (September 19, 2012, Committee on
Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Future Directions for Forests” (August 27, 2013, Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・Reconstruction Agency, MAFF, MOE, “Comprehensive Efforts towards the Restoration of Fukushima’s Forests
and Forestry” (March 9, 2016).
・MOE, “Summary of Future Approaches on Measures for Rivers and Lakes, etc.” (August 22, 2014, Committee
on Environmental Remediation).
・MAFF, ”Measures to Deal with Radioactive Materials in Reservoirs, etc.” (August 22, 2014, Committee on
Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Report on the Results of Model Demonstration Projects in Areas where Returning is Difficult” (June 10,2014).
・NERHQ, “For Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster” (December 20,2013).*
・NERHQ, “Approach on the Handling of Areas where Returning is Difficult” (August 31, 2016).*
・NERHQ, “Basic Policy for Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster”(December 20, 2016).
・“Act on Partial Revision of the Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of
Fukushima” (Act No. 25 of 2012).
・MOE, “Outlook for Interim Storage Facilities for the Next Five Years” (March 27, 2016).
・MOE, “Policy for the Interim Storage Facilities Project in FY2018” (November 2017).
<Reference Documents>
・MEXT, “Guidance on Measurement of Radiation at Schools” (August 26, 2011).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Fukushima Prefecture, Basic Policy on Decontamination of Agricultural Land, etc.
(Agricultural Land Edition, Forest Edition)” (March 27, 2013).
・MOE, “Summary of Knowledge on Forest Decontamination” (August 27, 2013, Committee on Environmental
Remediation).
・MOE, “Results of Forest Model Projects Over 20 m from the Forest Edge” (March 20, 2014, Committee on
Environmental Remediation).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Measures to Deal with Radioactive Materials in Forests” (March 19, 2015, Committee
on Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Direction of Measures to Deal with Radioactive Materials in Forests” (December 21, 2015, Committee
on Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Summary of Knowledge on Radioactive Substances in Rivers and Lakes, etc.” (August 22, 2014,
Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・Japanese Geotechnical Society “Review on the Behavior of Radioactive Cesium in Soil” (June 15, 2015,
Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Achievement Status of Decontamination Policy at Joban Expressway (Joban Tomioka to Namie)”(March 19, 2015).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Procedures for Quantity Calculation for Housing Decontamination Model Cases.”・MOE, “Basic Policy concerning Transportation of Removed Soil, etc., to Interim Storage Facilities” (November
14, 2014).

xv

・MOE, “Basic Policy on Interim Storage and Other Facilities Required for the Handling of the Environmental
Pollution from Radioactive Materials Associated with the Accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (October 29, 2011).*

Chapter 4: Implementation of decontamination projects
・MOE, “Decontamination Guidelines, Second Edition” (Supplement to September 2016).*
・Reconstruction Agency, Ministry of the Environment, Fukushima City, Koriyama City, Soma City, and Date
City “Meeting to Exchange Views with Knowledgeable Persons regarding Decontamination - Thinking about
Future Approaches based on the Previous Findings of the National Government and Four cities - Fact book”(August 1, 2014).*
・MOE, “Common Specifications for Decontamination and Other Work” (May 2012, First Edition; April 2017,
Tenth Edition).*・MOE, “Provisional Quantification Standards for Decontamination Work in Special Decontamination Areas”(May 2012, First Edition; April 2017, Tenth Edition).*・MOE, “Effects of Decontamination Techniques in Decontamination Projects Implemented to Date by Nationaland Local Governments” (January 2013).
・MOE, “18th Meeting of Committee on Environmental Remediation” Document (December 27, 2017).
・”Decontamination Information Plaza, Exhibit Lending Catalog (Model).”・MOE, “Standard Construction Methods for Temporary Storage Sites in Special Decontamination Areas.”
・MOE, “Guidelines for Storage of Removed Soil.”・MOE, Fukushima Environment Revitalization Office, “Collection of Best Practices in Decontamination” (May2013).
・MOE, “Temporary Storage Site Management Manual.”・MOE, “Maintenance and Management/Repair Manual (Provisional)” “Outbound Transport Consideration Items(Provisional),” “Methods to Restore Original Conditions (Provisional).”・MOE (editor), TEPCO Holdings.
・MHLW, “Ordinance on Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards at Works to Decontaminate Soil and Waste
Contaminated by Radioactive Materials Resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Related Works”(December 22, 2011, MHLW Ordinance No. 152).*
・“Radiation Dose Registration and Management System for Decontamination Workers, etc.” (November 2013).
・”Special Education Text for Decontamination Work, etc. (MHLW).”
・Radiation Worker Central Registration Center, “Publication of Statistical Data in Radiation Dose Registrationand Management System for Decontamination Workers, etc.” (2016).
・MOE, “Program for Proper Decontamination” (January 18, 2013).*・MOE, “Decontamination Optimization Promotion Committee (6th Meeting) Documents” (June 28, 2017).
・Fukushima Labor Bureau, “FY2013-2016 Supervisor Guidance Results for Decontamination Contractors.”<Reference Documents >・MOE, “Management of Temporary Storage Sites” (June 15, 2015, Committee on Environmental Remediation).
・MOE, “Responses to Incidents of Removed Soil Runoff Due to Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in
September 2015” (December 21, 2015).
・MOE, “Future Promotion of Safe and Secure Decontamination, Interim Storage Facilities, and Treatment ofRadioactive Contaminated Material Waste (Notification)” (June 9, 2017).
・MOE, “Re-estimation of Removed Soil, etc. in Fukushima Prefecture” (July 30, 2013 Interim Storage Facility
Safety Measures Committee (Second Meeting)).

Chapter 5: Effects, verification, and risk communication of decontamination
5.1 Status of implementation of decontamination projects
・MOE, “Decontamination Information Site” (http://josen.env.go.jp/)*<Reference Documents>
・MOE, “Current Situation, Outcomes and Prospects on Decontamination, Intermediate Storage Facilities,

xvi

Treatment of Radioactive Contaminated Waste” (March 3, 2017).
・MOE, “Progress Status of Decontamination Administered by the National Government” (April 7, 2017).
・MOE, “Results of Decontamination Progress Survey in Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (19th)” (May12, 2017).
5.2 Effects of decontamination
・MOE (editing), Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Co., Ltd. (TEPCO) (content).
・MOE (editing), TEPCO Holdings (content).
・“Documents from Bank of Japan, Fukushima Branch”, “Documents from East Japan Construction Surety Co.,
Ltd., etc.”
・”Documents from Bank of Japan, Fukushima Branch.”・”Documents from Fukushima Labor Bureau, MHLW.”
5.3 Verification of decontamination
・MOE, “Summary of the Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling ofEnvironment Pollution by Radioactive Materials” (September 30, 2015, Investigative Commission on the
Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials).*
・Naraha Town, “Naraha Town Decontamination Verification Committee (1st - 9th Meeting)”, “Naraha Town
Decontamination Verification Committee Secondary Report” (March 2015).
・Kawauchi Village, “Kawauchi Village Decontamination Verification Committee Documents (1st Meeting)”,“Kawauchi Village Decontamination Verification Committee Report” (December 2016).
・Iitate Village, “Iitate Village decontamination Verification Committee Documents (1st to 5th Meetings)”, “Iitate
Village Decontamination Verification Committee Report” (June 2017).
・Minamisoma City, “Minamisoma City Decontamination Promotion Committee Documents (FY2014-2016)”,“Proposal on Committee on Promotion of Sorting and Recycling Processing of Removed Soils Caused by
Decontamination” (December 2016).
・Katsurao Village, “Katsurao Village Reconstruction Committee Documents (FY2011-2015).”
・Kawamata Town, “Kawamata Town Yamakiya District Verification Committee on Decontamination, etc. (1st 6th Meetings)”, “Report of Verification Committee on Decontamination of Kawamata Town Yamakiya Area”(March 2016).
・Namie Town, “Namie Town Decontamination Verification Committee Documents (FY2016-2017).”
・Tomioka Town, “Tomioka Town Decontamination Verification Committee Documents (1st - 11th Meeting)”,“Tomioka Town Decontamination Verification Committee Report” (October 2016).
・Reconstruction Agency, Ministry of the Environment, Fukushima City, Koriyama City, Soma City, and Date
City “Meeting to Exchange Views with Knowledgeable Persons regarding Decontamination - Thinking about
Future Approaches based on the Previous Findings of the National Government and Four cities - Fact book”(August 1, 2014).*・IAEA, “IAEA International Mission Final Report on Decontamination” (November 15, 2011).
Fukushima Daiichi NPS Director General’s Report.
・IAEA, “Final Report: The Follow-up IAEA International Mission on Remediation of Large Contaminated
Areas Off-site the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (January 23, 2014).
・IAEA, “Summary Report of IAEA-MOE Expert Meeting on Environmental Restoration.”・Fukushima Prefecture, “FY2017 Summary of Fukushima City Glass Badge Measurement Result” (March,
2018).
・Fukushima Reconstruction Station, “Drinking Water Monitoring Inspection Results, Related Information.”(http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/site/portal/ps-drinkingwater-monitoring.html)
・MOE, “Measurement results of radioactive substance concentration in monitoring survey of groundwater
quality in Fukushima Prefecture (1st Report - 4th Report)” (June 21, July 7, July 14, August 4, 2011).
・MOE, “Radioactive Substance Monitoring Action Plan.”(http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/monitoring/actionplan.html)
・MOE, “Measurement Results of Flood Monitoring” (http://www.env.go.jp/jishin/monitoring/results_r-mr.html)

xvii

・MOE, (National Laboratory) NIRS, “Unified Basic Materials regarding Health Effects, etc. Caused by
Radiation, Part I. Basic Knowledge on Radiation and Health Effects (FY2014 Edition (Revised Edition)) (July
2015).
・Fukushima Prefecture, “History of Fukushima Reconstruction Outline Version <21st edition>“ (November2017).
5.4 Risk communication
・MOE, “Chemical Substance Advisor Certification Examination Text (FY2008 edition).”*・Decontamination Information Plaza, “Plaza’s Past Achievements (January 20, 2012 - June 30, 2017).”
・MOE, “Decontamination Information Site” (http://josen.env.go.jp/)*・MOE, “Environmental Remediation” http://josen.env.go.jp/en/
・Decontamination Information Plaza, “Fukushima Revitalization etc.”
・NRA, “Basic Concept of Safety and Security Measures for Returning (To Realize the Protection Measures
According to the Dose Level)” (November 20, 2013).
・NERHQ, “Basic Policy for Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster”(December 20, 2016).*
・Fukushima Prefecture, “Commutan Fukushima homepage.”

Chapter 6: Lessons learned and future challenges
・NSC, “Basic Policy on Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction” (July 19,2011).
・NERHQ, “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work” (August 26, 2011).*・IAEA, “ (Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1).”・Bridge and Offshore Engineering Association, “Document of Seto Ohashi Bridge Construction” (October1988).*
・Kansai Electric Power Company, “Kurobegawa Fourth Power Station Construction History” (September1965).*
・Hokkaido Railway Company, “Seikan Tunnel in Numbers.”*
・IAEA-TECDOC-1240 “Present and future environmental impact of the Chernobyl accident.”
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates multiple listings of the document.

xviii

Index / Glossary[A]◆ Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (P 11)
Legislation that regulates not only nuclear reactors but also the handling of nuclear material in general(Act No. 166 of 1957). As a result of the occurrence of a major accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station, the act was reexamined significantly as part of strengthening safety regulationsof nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors for power generation.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Nuclear Safety Commission were abolished as regulatoryorganizations, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority was established on September 19, 2012 as a neworganization that unified responsibility for safety regulatory administration.
◆ Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (P 1, 2, 11)This is legislation with the purpose to purpose of this Act is to strengthen nuclear disaster control measures,by providing special measures for the obligations, etc. of nuclear operators concerning nuclear disasterprevention, the issuance of a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation and the establishment, etc. of
nuclear emergency response headquarters, and the implementation of emergency response measures andother matters relating to a nuclear disaster, taking into consideration the particularity of a nuclear disaster,
thereby protecting the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from a nuclear disaster (Act No. 156 ofDecember 17, 1999).
◆ Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalization of Fukushima (P 36, 72, 141, 389)
This act promotes the reconstruction and revitalization of Fukushima, which has sustained serious andvast damage due to the nuclear disaster, are achieved based on the specific circumstances of the prefecture
and under the social responsibility of the national government, which has proactively promoted its nuclear
energy policy. It includes creating an environment where people can live with peace of mind and givebirth to and raise children, respecting the opinions of a diverse range of residents, revitalizing the local
economy, restoring and maintaining strong bonds among local communities in Fukushima, enabling eachand every resident to overcome the disaster and live a fulfilling life, respecting the independence andautonomy of local governments in Fukushima, preserving local communities, providing accurate
information, etc. (Act No. 25 of 2012)◆ Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials（P16, 18, 19, 36, 45, etc.）
The full name is the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution byRadioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku
District Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake That Occurred on 11 March 2011 (Act No. 110 of August 30,
2011)
Act was promulgated on August 30, 2011 for the purpose of promptly alleviating the impacts on humanxixhealth or the living environment due to pollution of the environment, by specifying measures, etc., to betaken by the national government, local governments, and related nuclear power companies, etc.,
regarding dealing with pollution of the environment caused by diffusion of radioactive substances
accompanying TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident.
◆ Additional exposure dose (P 17, 19, 52, 53, 54, etc.)
In addition to the radiation originally found in nature, the radiation dose due to radiation added byradioactive material released by this nuclear accident.
◆ Air dose rate (P 2, 6, 12, 13, 15, etc.)
Radiation dose (intensity) in air per unit of time.
Ambient radiation generally present in the air, including α (alpha), β (beta), and γ (gamma) rays from theground, as well as cosmic rays, etc.
◆ Areas where Returning is Difficult (P 6, 7, 15, 36, 66 etc.)
A category of area designated by reviewing evacuation areas.
On December 26, 2011, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERHQ) compiled the “Basic
Concept and Future Tasks in Review of the Restricted Areas and Areas under Evacuation Orders after theCompletion of Step 2. (December 26, 2011),” and even after five years have passed since the accident,
the annual cumulative dose may not fall below 20 mSv/y and the annual cumulative dose exceeds 50
mSv/y. In principle, it is necessary to restrict residence in the future, so the designation of these areas isfixed for five years.

[B]◆ Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (P 72)
In consideration of the fact that the Great East Japan Earthquake caused an unprecedented national crisis
due to extensive damage affecting a vast area and with all the characteristics of a compound disasterconsisting of an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, the purpose of this Act is to promote a smoothand prompt reconstruction following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the revitalization of a vibrant
Japan by way of setting forth basic principles on reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan
Earthquake, securing financial resources for the reconstruction, creating a System of Special Zones for
Reconstruction and deciding on other fundamental issues so as to create an economy and society where
current and future generations can lead safe and prosperous lives and by way of deciding on basic
guidelines regarding the establishment of a Reconstruction Headquarters in Response to the Great East
Japan Earthquake and a Reconstruction Agency. (Act No. 76, 2011)◆ Basic Environment Law (P 11, 20, 57, 73)
The purpose of this act is to comprehensively and systematically promote policies for environmental
conservation to ensure healthy and cultured living for both the present and future generations of the nationxxas well as to contribute to the welfare of humanity, through articulating the basic principles, clarifying the
responsibilities of the national government, local governments, corporations and citizens, and prescribing
the basic policy considerations for environmental conservation. (Act No. 91, November 19, 1993)◆ Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work (P 17, 19, 26, 52, 58, etc.)
This policy showed that in areas under evacuation orders, the national government conducts
decontamination, that the long-term goal in these areas is 20 mSv/y or less and the national government
aims for additional exposure dose of 1 mSv/y or less, and the national government provides technical andfinancial support for the creation and implementation of decontamination plans for municipalities.
It was announced by the NERHQ on August 26, 2011.
◆ Basic Policy for the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials（P 18, 45, 134）
This is based on the Act on Special Measures, and covers basic or important matters concerning theHandling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials, in addition to the basic direction on dealing
with environmental pollution caused by radioactive materials derived from accidents in Japan, monitoringand measuring the situation of pollution of the environment by accident-derived radioactive material,
treating waste contaminated with radioactive material, measuring such as decontamination of soil,
collection, transportation, storage and disposal of removed soil, and dealing with environmental pollution
by radioactive substances derived from other accidents.
◆ Bq (Becquerel) (P 12, 38, 40, 47, 93, etc.)
Unit of strength of radiation.

[C]◆ Cesium (P 12, 15, 29, 38, 39, etc.)
An artificial radioactive material. In case of contamination due to an accident at a nuclear power station,
two kinds of radioactive cesium are problematic: cesium-134 and cesium-137. Cesium-137 has a long
half-life of about 30 years, while the half-life of cesium-134 is about 2.1 years.
◆ Cleanup program (P 48)
A program to clean up environmentally polluted sites by the Environmental Management Bureau of the
US Department of Energy (DOE) following the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons production.
◆ Comprehensive Handbook for Residential Area Management (P 96)
This is one of the outcomes of the EURANOS project that the European Union (EU) Commission
conducted for the purpose of preparing for emergency situations involving radiation such as nuclear power
accidents.

xxi

The Japan Atomic Energy Society translated this Handbook and announced it as the “EURANOS Data
Sheet” on August 12, 2011.
◆ Controlled final landfill site (P 12)
A disposal facility that has the function of safely storing waste (with waterproofing to prevent thecontamination of groundwater and public waters by leachate from waste (by covering the side and bottomof the landfill site with plastic sheets, etc.)), with a water collection facility that collects leachate, and a
final disposal site that can also process any leachate collected.

[D]◆ Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation (P 1)
An emergency declaration issued by the Prime Minister based on the Act on Special Measures concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
◆ Decontamination Countermeasure Business Grant (P 80, 94, 114)
Grants to be delivered by Fukushima Prefecture within the budget in order to promote thedecontamination of municipalities that need to remove contamination by radioactive substances due tothe accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station caused by the Great
East Japan Earthquake, to the municipality, according to the definition of “Regulations concerning
delivery of subsidies etc. of Fukushima prefecture“ (Fukushima Prefecture Regulation No. 107 of 1970)
and the “Decontamination countermeasure project grant payment summary outline.“◆ Decontamination Guidelines (P 22, 27, 32, 78, 96, 106, etc.)
Materials specifically describing the Ordinance of the Ministry of the Environment, etc. that determine
the criteria for measures such as decontamination of soil, etc. and the standards for treatment of removed
soils based on the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials.
The first edition came out in December 2011, and it was revised thereafter.
◆ Decontamination Information Site (P 25, 27, 221, 288)
A portal website operated by MOE that aggregates and disseminates information and tools related todecontamination work.
◆ Decontamination implementation plans (P 6, 17, 18, 23, 31, etc.)
Implementation plans for the national government to conduct decontamination in Special
Decontamination Areas (SDA) and municipalities to conduct decontamination in Intensive
Contamination Survey Areas (ICSA), specifying the implementation of surveys and measurement on thestatus of pollution, as well as areas, the entities, and the methods of implementing decontamination.

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◆ Decontamination Model (Demonstration) Projects (P 22, 44, 59, 66, 72, etc.)
Projects conducted for demonstration testing of technologies, etc., necessary for effective implementationof decontamination. The results and achievements were utilized for decontamination work.
◆ Decontamination Promotion Package (P 23, 31, 79)
In order to further accelerate work and resolve anxiety concerning decontamination as the foundation of
Fukushima’s reconstruction and revitalization, MOE compiled measures and released this document on
October 23, 2012.
◆ Decontamination Technical Catalog (P 18, 96)
On November 22, 2011 the Cabinet Office publicly released the “Decontamination Technical Catalogue”
based on the results of decontamination activities and the “EURANOS Data Sheet” prepared by the Japan
Atomic Energy Society.
This technical catalogue describes the decontamination techniques for 23 types of decontamination targets.
◆ Deliberate Evacuation Areas (P 2, 4, 5, 12, 63, etc.)
A category of evacuation areas designated immediately after the accident at TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station.
These were areas with a cumulative dose of up to 20 mSv/y within a period of one year after the power
station accident, where deliberate evacuation was requested to another location within approximately one
month.

[E]◆ Evacuation-Prepared Areas in Case of Emergency (P 2, 4, 5, 8)
A category of evacuation areas designated immediately after the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
In the area within the radius of 20 km to 30 km from the power station, areas where sheltering indoors orand evacuation could be requested in case of an emergency, so preparations had to be made to be always
ready to shelter indoors or evacuate in the case of an emergency.
◆ Evidence (P 95)
Rationale or basis to prove a fact.
◆ Existing exposure situation (P 17, 51, 52, 59, 385, etc.)
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) establishes standards of protection in
the following three situations: normal circumstances where human exposure can be managed
systematically (planned exposure situation), emergency situations such as accidents and nuclear terrorism(emergency exposure situation), and situations such as during recovery and reconstruction after an
accident (existing exposure situation).

xxiii

Situations such as during recovery and reconstruction (existing exposure situation) are situations where
the source or sources already exist when decisions to control them are taken, and the reference level is ina low dose range of 1 to 20 mSv/y.

[F]◆ Flexible container (P 101, 104, 186, 222, 226, etc.)
Medium containers made of soft material such as woven fabric or resin film, with straps for lifting, andan opening for filling and emptying the contents.
The soil etc. removed by decontamination is put into flexible containers or large container bags, etc. Next,
it is placed on a water-impermeable layer (a waterproof sheet such as a water-impermeable sheet), andthe upper part is covered with a waterproof sheet or the like. In some cases these are abbreviated inJapanese as “flecon.”◆ For Accelerating the Reconstruction of Fukushima From the Nuclear Disaster (P 33, 36, 92, 140, 295)
With the aim of adding and expanding necessary measures such as early return and new life support toaccelerate the reconstruction and restoration of Fukushima from the nuclear disaster of the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi NPS, on December 20, 2013, this statement was announced by the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters and was subsequently revised.
◆ Fukushima Prefecture Whole Area Decontamination Model Project (P 22, 96, 98)
A model project conducted by Fukushima Prefecture in the Onami district of Fukushima City. Following
decontamination methods indicated in the Decontamination Guidelines, in an area with an additional
exposure dose of 1 mSv/y to 20 mSv/y, it aims to decontaminate a certain whole area to verify the effectof reducing the radiation dose, and to compile the findings obtained in this model project as a handbook.
◆ Fukushima Revitalization Acceleration Grants (P 139)
In order to accelerate reconstruction, these are grants to support collective measures, from supporting
long-term evacuees to responding to their early return.
The target of the grants consist of five items: the establishment of an environment for evacuees to return;the formation of living bases for long-term evacuees (community revival subsidies); emergency support
such as Fukushima settlement (child revitalization grants); supporting removal and treatment of sediments
in gutters of roads, etc.; and improvement of basic facilities such as dissemination of nuclear disaster
information.

[G]◆ General public (P 17, 33, 47, 51, 59, etc.)
People other than those people who deal with radiation as part of work.
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) sets dose limits according to thexxiv

circumstances of human exposure for the general public and radiation workers.
◆ Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination Work (P 18, 98)
These guidelines were announced by the NERHQ on August 26, 2011 to stipulate the decontamination
implementation plans necessary for each municipality, to implement decontamination efficiently andeffectively, including decontamination work, installation and management of Temporary Storage Sites,
and response after implementation of decontamination, etc.
◆ Guidelines for Waste (P 22, 32, 106)
Based on the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive
Materials, these guidelines explain the regulations of the Act on Special Measures concerning theHandling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials and relevant ministerial ordinances andconcrete methods, etc., about the survey, storage, collection, transportation and disposal of waste
contaminated with accident-derived radioactive substances, in an easy-to-understand manner, for entities
that dispose of waste, including waste emitters, municipalities, etc.
The first version was announced in December 2011 and the second version was announced in March 2013.

[H]◆ Habitation Restricted Areas (P 6, 33, 36, 78, 136, etc.)
A category the area designated by reviewing evacuation areas.
Areas where the NERHQ compiled the “Target of Step 2” on December 26, 2011, where there was adanger that the annual cumulative dose may exceed 20 mSv/y, and the continuation of evacuation wassought from the viewpoint of reducing residual exposure dose. Decontamination and reconstruction of
infrastructure were promoted here with the aim of enabling residents to return home in the future andrebuild the community.
◆ Half-life (P 39, 363)
The physical half-life is the time until the atomic nucleus of a certain radioactive substance changes toanother nucleus by releasing radiation and the original radioactive substance is reduced to half.
◆ High-pressure water washing (P 14, 99, 100, 105, 116, etc.)
One method of decontamination. Washing with high pressure (e.g., 15 megapascals) of water jet.

[I]
◆ Improper decontamination (P 31, 32, 87, 109, 263, etc.)
Activity that violate the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials, etc. The MOE has established the “Headquarters for Promoting Proper
Decontamination,” conducts surveys, and compiles measures to prevent recurrence of improperxxv

decontamination.
◆ Individual dose record book (P 132, 243, 247)
A passbook issued based on a “radiation dose registration and management system for decontamination
workers, etc.” in order to conduct unified tracking of exposure doses of decontamination workers. It
contains a worker’s registration number, exposure history, health checkup, and radiation protection
education history, etc.
◆ Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (P 17, 26, 28, 43, 52, etc.)
Based on the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive
Materials, targeting municipalities including areas with 0.23 μSv/h or more, areas designated based on
opinions of relevant municipalities and others. The designated municipalities decide theirdecontamination implementation plans based on survey measurement results, etc., of the pollution
situation, and decide on the areas where decontamination is to be carried out.
◆ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (P 11, 35, 42, 48, 51, etc.)
It was launched on July 29, 1957 with the aim of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power andpreventing nuclear power from being diverted from peaceful use to military use.
◆ Interim report of the efforts of the four cities (P 326)
In order to solve issues of dose reduction by decontamination and relieve residents’ anxiety, issues wereraised from four cities (Fukushima City, Koriyama City, Soma City and Date City), and a workshop washeld by the national government and the four cities, and this interim report was announced in August
2014.
◆ Interim Storage Facility (P 18, 69, 75, 77, 91, etc.)
Facilities for safe intensive management and storage during the final disposal of soil removed bydecontamination or waste contaminated with radioactive materials (more than 100,000 Bq/kg) in
Fukushima Prefecture.
◆ International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (P 11, 48, 51, 59, 329, etc.)
It was reorganized from the International X-ray and Radium Protection Committee in 1950, andrecommended the basic framework of radiation protection and protection standards.
It consists of the main commission and five standing committees (Radiation Effects, Doses from
Radiation Exposure, Protection in Medicine, Application of the Commission’s Recommendations, andRadiological Protection of the Environment).
ICRP stands for “International Commission on Radiological Protection.”◆ Inversion tillage (P 112, 113, 152, 159, 164, etc.)
One method of decontamination, used to turn over the soil using plows (agricultural tools used in tillingxxviwork etc.) so that the contaminated surface layer is placed in the lower layer and the soil without
contamination of the lower layer is placed on the surface layer. The cultivation depth of inversion tillage
is generally 30 centimeters.
◆ Investigative Committee on the Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special Measures（P 35, 297, 298,
299）
The full name is the “Investigative Committee on the Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special
Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials.”
A review committee established by MOE to examine the Status of Enforcement of the Act on Special
Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials◆ Iodine (P 38, 39, 40, 47, 335, etc.)
Iodine-131 is an artificial radioactive material.
Its half-life is as short as about 8 days, but if it enters the body, 10 to 30% accumulates in the thyroid
gland.
◆ Isotope Labo. (P 90)
Isotope laboratories, research institutes and laboratories.

[J]◆ J Village (P 88)
It was the first facility opened as Japan’s first football and national training center in 1997, and it is undersuspension as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake that struck and the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
NPS accident.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, it was used as a screening venue and TEPCO“Fukushima Reconstruction Headquarters,” etc., and use will be resumed in the spring of 2018.

[L]◆ Leachate (P 126, 127, 226, 35, 243, etc.)
Water from rain that has fallen on a Temporary Storage Sites, has penetrated through seams in covering
sheets, and leached out.

[M]
◆ Mower (P 116, 118, 187, 194, 195, etc.)
Measures necessary prior to decontamination of grasslands, lawns and forests. Cutting away weeds,
shrubs, etc. by chain saws, hanging-type mowers, etc.

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[N]
◆ NaI scintillation type survey meter (P 53)
A type of external radiation measurement equipment. It is suitable for gamma ray and air dose
measurements on the order of 10 μSv/h from the environmental level.
◆ Nuclear Safety Commission (P 12, 51, 52, 59, 385, 387)
Based on the Atomic Energy Basic Act, the Act for Establishment of the Japan Atomic Energy
Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission, and Act for Establishment of the Cabinet Office, thisis one of the commissions established in the Cabinet Office for the purpose of deciding the basic approachto safety regulation by the national government, in an independent neutral position and playing the roleof instructing administrative agencies and business operators. It was abolished in September 2014 andtransferred to the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
◆ Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (P 92)
In the event of large-scale nuclear damage, in order to promptly and appropriately implementcompensation for nuclear damages and secure a stable supply of electricity by conducting business suchas issuing necessary funds for compensation of damage by nuclear power companies, the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Facilitation Corporation was established on September 12, 2011.
Thereafter, from August 18, 2014, it was restructured as the Nuclear Damage Compensation andDecommissioning Facilitation Corporation, with added responsibilities to ensure proper and steady
implementation of decommissioning of nuclear reactors.
◆ Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERHQ) (P 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, etc.)
In order to promote emergency measures to address a nuclear emergency in relation to the accident at
TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this was established within the Prime Minister’s
official residence on March 11, 2011 based on the Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness.

[O]◆ Obtaining consent (P 23, 32, 44, 45, 46, etc.)
Obtaining consent from landowners, etc. (about decontamination work and Temporary Storage Sites
installation).
◆ Official gazette (P 149)
A daily agency publication issued by National Printing Bureau, Independent Administrative Institution inorder for the national government to inform the general public of legislation, treaties, budgets,
notifications, parliamentary affairs, personnel affairs, and appointments, etc.

xxviii◆ Overall check on progress of decontamination (P 32)
In order to confirm the progress of the decontamination work, MOE conducted a comprehensive review
on the progress of decontamination in Special Decontamination Areas and Intensive Contamination
Survey Areas designated under the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive Materials. It was announced on September 10, 2013.

[P]◆ Plutonium (P 38, 39, 40, 47, 48)
Plutonium-238, -239, and -240 are artificial radioactive materials.
Their half-lives are about 88 years, 24,100 years, and 6,540 years, respectively.
◆ Policy for Decontamination in Special Decontamination Areas (Decontamination Roadmap) (P 23, 63, 65,
66, 68, etc.)
As a decontamination policy for Special Decontamination Areas, this policy shows the flow of model
demonstration projects, advance decontamination, and whole-area decontamination, and the work flowin each area. MOE announced it on January 26, 2012.
◆ Post decontamination monitoring (P 94, 285, 286, 288, 289, etc.)
After decontamination, to verify whether decontamination effects are maintained, periodically andcontinuously monitoring and measuring the air dose rate.
◆ Preparation Areas for Lifting of Evacuation Orders (P 6, 78, 241, 254, 273, etc.)
An area confirmed to be sure that the annual accumulated dose will be 20 mSv/y or less, among the areas
where NERHQ summarized the “goal of step 2” on December 26, 2011 and that the cumulative dose forone year after the accident could exceed 20 mSv/y.
◆ Principle of justification (P 328)
One of the three principles of protection of International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
The principle that actions using radiation are acceptable only when the benefits provided exceed theradiation risk.
◆ Protected forest (P 408)
Forest designated by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) or the prefectural
governor in order to achieve specific public benefit objectives, such as recharging of water sources, andpreventing the collapse of earth and sand or other disasters, as well as the conservation and formation of
the living environment, etc.

[R]

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◆ Radioactive materials (P 1, 6, 11, 12, 13, etc.)
The ability to emit radiation is called “radioactivity,” and substances with this ability are called“radioactive materials.”“Radiation” is similar to light rays, has the ability to penetrate material, and includes α (alpha) rays, β(beta) rays, γ (gamma) rays, X-rays, and neutron beams, etc.
◆ Removed soil, etc. (P 19, 26, 31, 69, 101, etc.)
Wastes generated by decontamination, etc., such as decontamination soil and soil, etc.
◆ Risk communication (P 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, etc.)
Information on chemical substances such as environmental risk is shared by all actors, including citizens,
industry, governments, etc., with the aim of achieving communication and mutual understanding throughthe exchange of opinions.
◆ Restricted Area (P 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.)
A category of evacuation areas designated immediately after the accident at TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station.
These were areas within a radius of 20 km radius from the power station where entry was prohibited or
an order was made to leave for all persons except those engaged in emergency response measures, except
for cases where the municipal mayor temporarily approved entry.

[S]◆ Silt (P 314)
This has an intermediate grain size between sand and clay, which is 1/16 to 1/256 mm in geological terms
and 0.02 to 0.002 mm in soil sciences. What is commonly referred to as mud includes silt and clay.
◆ Special Decontamination Areas (P 6, 23, 25, 32, 58, etc.)
Based on the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive
Materials, a designated area as a region where the national government formulates decontamination plans
and advances decontamination work.
Basically, this means “Deliberate Evacuation Areas” where the cumulative dose for one year after theaccident exceeds 20 mSv/y and “Restricted Areas” within the radius of 20 km from Tokyo Electric Power
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
◆ Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation (P 2, 4, 5, 29)
Locations that are outside the Deliberate Evacuation Areas and Restricted Areas, where the cumulative
radiation dose for one year after the accident is estimated to exceed 20 mSv/y, although the regional extent
is not large enough for them to be designated as Deliberate Evacuation Areas.

xxx

◆ Stakeholders (P 44, 48, 134, 323, 324, etc.)
Persons who are entitled to impede the implementation of measures such as decontamination of soil andthe like with respect to the land on which the measures such as decontamination of soil etc. are to be
carried out or on the workpieces, standing trees and other objects existing in the land, which are to be
implemented on the land.
◆ Strontium (P 38, 39, 40, 47)
Strontium-90 is an artificial radioactive material. The physical half-life is about 29 years. Since its halflife is long and chemical properties are similar to calcium, it accumulates in bone if it enters the body.
◆ Sv (Sievert) (P 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, etc.)
Unit of radiation exposure dose in Sieverts (Sv) received by a person per unit time.

[T]◆ Technical Document for Decontamination of Farmland (P 98, 111, 135)
A document by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) with the aim of contributing
to the appropriate and efficient implementation of decontamination of agricultural land, and compilinginformation on criteria such as survey, design, accumulation and work management required fordecontamination of agricultural land, based on the results of demonstration projects of measures fordecontamination of agricultural land. MAFF published it as a technical document in February 2013.
◆Tellurium (P 38, 39)
Tellurium-129 is an artificial radioactive material. Its half-life is about 34 days.
◆ Temporary Storage Sites (P 17, 19, 24, 29, 45, etc.)
A place to temporarily store bags of removed materials such as soil and grass collected bydecontamination work.
◆ Topsoil removal (P 13, 14, 15, 112, 212, etc.)
One method of decontamination. A method of removing the topsoil thinly and removing radioactive
material accumulated in the soil surface layer.

[U]◆ UNSCEAR (P 329）
Abbreviation for “United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.”
This committee was established for the purpose of evaluating reports on the observed levels of ionizing
radiation and radioactivity in the environment and reports on the effects of ionizing radiation on people
and their environment, and reporting to the UN General Assembly, as a scientific committee underxxxi

jurisdiction of the United Nations, in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of 1955.

[W]◆ Water collection tank (P 226, 234)
At Temporary Storage Sites, the tanks used to store leachate.
When a certain amount of water has accumulated in the catchment tank, the radioactive cesium
concentration (Cs) is to be checked, and if it is below the control value (Cs-134 concentration / 60 + Cs137 concentration / 90 ≦ 1), it can be discharged.
◆ Whole area decontamination (P 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, etc.)
Based on demonstration projects and advance decontamination in decontamination work, whole-area fullscale decontamination conducted by the national government and municipalities.
◆ Whole body counter (P 82, 246, 306, 319)
Measuring device that from the outside of the human body detects gamma rays emitted from radioactive
materials deposited inside the human body. Radionuclides to be measured are gamma ray emitting
nuclides, such as manganese-54, cobalt-60, and cesium-137, etc.

[X]
◆ Xenon (P 38, 39, 40)
Xenon-133 is an artificial radioactive material. The half-life is short at about five days, and even if it istaken into the body by respiration, it does not stay in the body.
.

xxxii