RIPS Policy Perspectives
No. 3

Peace Support Operations:Contemporary Challenges and the Role of Japan

Chiyuki Aoi
March 2007

Research Institute for Peace and SecurityTokyoResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
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RIPS Policy Perspectives Back Issues
No.1 Akio Watanabe, Perspectives on Asian Security 2006, October 2006
No.2 Masashi Nishihara, Can Japan Be a Global Partner for NATO?, December 2006

Peace Support Operations:Contemporary Challenges andthe Role of Japan1
Chiyuki AOi

The “peace support operations (PSO) doctrine” has developed as a way to manage thecomplex operations that encompass conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacemaking,peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, thereby enabling long-term solutions to armed
conflict and regeneration of war-torn societies through a multi-actor engagement.2 As
a doctrine, it reflects the way Western nations (primarily NATO member states) have
responded, mainly within the framework of UN-mandated missions, to threats tosecurity deriving from the civil wars and other internal disturbances that are now thedominant source of conflict around the world. Understanding the doctrinal perspectiveof peace support operations today is critical for Japan, particularly given that thecountry is at a crossroads regarding its future involvement in international peace
support and reconstruction operations.
Although the aim of this paper is not to advocate a particular policy position
for Japan, the discussion here of recent doctrinal approaches is presented in the hope of1This article is modified from a paper presented at the Fifth Symposium on
Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation, Vancouver, 8-9 September 2006. The
views expressed here are strictly those of the author and in no way represent those of
the Japanese or Canadian governments. The author is Associate Professor ofInternational Politics, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo.
2
A PSO is defined as “an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil andmilitary means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles,
to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian
operations.” This is the NATO and UK definition. Allied Administrative Publication-6(AAP-6), “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” cited in The Military
Contribution to Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (JWP 3-50),
2nd Edition, June 2004, pp. 1-2.
3

better informing current efforts by Japan to reassess its legal framework for peacecooperation and reconstruction operations, such as the drafting of a “general law”
(ippanho) to guide these efforts. In light of PSO requirements, Japan should consider
ways to more meaningfully engage in peace support operations, especially given theconstraints imposed upon the activities of the Self-Defense Forces (namely the fiveprinciples of participation in PKOs and the current restrictive Rules of Engagement, orROEs). The ongoing discussion about Constitutional revision should also take into
account the requirements of peace support operations, although PSO involvement by
the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) may not necessarily require revision of theConstitution itself. No matter how the issue of constitutional revision is resolved,
issues related to collective self-defense, which relates to alliance relations—currently a
preoccupation of many conservatives—should not be allowed to monopolize thedebate on Constitutional revision. Peace cooperation or peace support operations do
not fall within the realm of collective self defense, as often mistakenly assumed, but
are undertaken in support of international peace.
After clarifying the strategic rationale and evolution of the doctrine of peace
support operations, this paper will identify the key dilemmas observed in suchoperations today. I will then examine Japan’s options, in light of the doctrinal
discussion and conclude with some practical recommendations for action on the part ofJapan in developing peace support mechanisms.

4

Strategic Rationale for Peace Support
Although major conflicts—the classic forms of warfare between rival great
powers—seem a more distant likelihood in the world today, war continues in muchgreater intensity in other forms: inter-communal violence, insurgency, and terror-based
political violence, to name a few. Indeed, there seems no end in sight to war, defined asarmed conflicts between political organizations.
During much of the modern era, threats to security were perceived as
emanating mainly from external sources, but today threats emerge from internalsources. Internal political instability, social unrest, and humanitarian, economic, andenvironmental situations all have links to international security, directly or indirectly,
because of social, economic, and technological changes that have occurred. The
post-Cold War practice of the UN Security Council indeed supports such a view. The
path-breaking declaration of the Security Council held at the level of Heads ofGovernment in January 1992 (S/23500 (1992)) stated:
The absence of war and military conflict amongst States does not in itself
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability
in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats
to peace and security.3
Since then, the UN Security Council has defined a number of internal situations
as a “threat to” international peace and security. These included treatment of suspected
terrorists (Libya); internal wars and arms transfer (former Yugoslavia, Somalia);
humanitarian situations (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere);
genocide (Rwanda); the nature of a domestic regime (Haiti); and international
terrorism (Afghanistan).
Stability, in short, has become a matter of vital international interest. Theinternational community has a common interest in keeping internal situations withincertain boundaries so that political, social, economic, and environmental instabilities
do not affect contiguous regions and beyond. Stability further serves as a basis ofphysical defense of the international community, particularly given the possibility that3

S/23500 (1992), 31 January 1992.
5

terrorism and other non-traditional threats may be generated by internal instabilities.
The challenge facing the international community is no longer limited to avoiding
major wars or securing borders after wars. The strong international stake in stability
drives the need to (re)build war-torn societies or unstable regions. The development of
Peace Support Operations corresponds to this need, which cannot be met without
long-term and multi-actor engagement by the international community.

The Development of Peace Support Operations
Peace support operations (PSO) are a practical invention responding to the security
environment prevailing since the end of Cold War. UN and Western experience indealing with Post-Cold War conflicts, especially in Bosnia, informed reevaluation of
traditional approaches to peacekeeping, especially the “trinity” of traditional (or UN)
peacekeeping principles, (consent, no use of force—except in self-defense—and
neutrality/impartiality). Developed during the Cold War, these principles served the
purpose of conflict containment in the Middle East, Kashmir, and elsewhere, where thepredominant concern was to prevent the spread or spiraling of regional strife into
broader conflicts. These principles proved to have limitations, however, when applied
to situations involving strategic fluidity—unstable peace, partial peace agreements, orvaried levels of consent—a factor present in most operations since the end of the Cold
War.
During the Bosnian conflict (1992-1995), the nascent PSO doctrine, Wider
Peacekeeping, prescribed a restrictive approach, where consent was taken as a
“Rubicon” (or “Mogadishu Line”), a line that divided peacekeeping/wider
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Once that line was crossed, it was considered
impossible to regain the consent of the local parties and to ensure the impartiality of
the force. This restrictive approach, however, resulted in the loss of credibility of the
UN force there and of the supporting NATO presence. Today’s PSO doctrine wasdeveloped much as a peace enforcement (PE) construct, designed to fill the “gray6zone” that existed between peacekeeping and war. 4 Consent is a long-term
requirement to achieve a successful mission, but it can no longer be assumed to be agiven; rather, consent is a variable that can affect the level of authority of the PSO.
Consent is something to be managed and built by a PSO mission through the use ofcredible force and civilian support activities. The principle of no use of force (inBosnia, this was minimum force) gave way to minimum force necessary, including
coercive force vis-à-vis “spoilers” of peace,5 to defend and accomplish the mission.
There is some variation in treatment of the principle of impartiality from one national
doctrine to another, but in general, it no longer implies passive inaction in the face of“spoilers” of peace or atrocities against civilians. Rather, it means proactive
impartiality, implying readiness to take appropriate action in support of peace
processes or international humanitarian and human rights law.
Further, corresponding to the need to rebuild, peace support operations now
encompass peacebuilding activities. In practice, most PSOs—for example the NATOand EU-led operations in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) or UN peace operations(such as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Timor Leste)—are in fact peacebuilding
operations. In PSOs, it is recognized that military forces alone cannot bring about theend-result of the mission, i.e., regeneration of the society. Hence emphasis is put oncivilian peacebuilding capabilities and partnership with civilian agencies, and the needhas arisen to manage ever-more complex multi-agency relations. In order to better
handle the multi-agency aspects of PSOs, most nations that have the capacity to mount
PSOs therefore emphasize inter-agency structure and processes that typically involve
military, police, foreign affairs, and development affairs offices. Likewise, the UN has
created the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office at UN
Headquarters to manage the complexities that come with contemporary peacebuilding
missions. To enhance coherence in the field between the UN’s humanitarian anddevelopment activities and security-peacekeeping activities, the UN has also endorsed
4

JWP 3-50, 1st Edition, 1998 and JWP 3-50, 2nd Edition, 2004.
The term was first defined academically in Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problem
in Peace Process,” International Security 22:2, Fall 1997, pp. 5-53. It is found also invarious UN documents, such as the Brahimi report.

57the Integrated Missions model.6
In PSOs today, a particular challenge lies in managing the transition from theinitial stabilization phase to self-sustained peace. Successful transition to self-sustained
peace builds upon successful implementation of civilian transition activities, involving
the political, security, humanitarian, human rights, and development dimensions.
Ultimately, a PSO’s nation-building tasks will revive a nation/society’s rule of law,education, commerce, humanitarian and health management, information (media)
industry, military/defense, economy, and governance, based upon endogenous culturesand values.
For both the credibility of the PSO force and the long-term, multi-agency
engagement that is sustained for the duration of nation-building, the mobilization andsustaining power of political will is critical to achieve success.

Challenges of Peace Support Operations
The transition from war to self-sustained peace, however, remains particularly difficult.
This difficulty derives from the necessity to fill four “gaps” in the process oftransition—the stability and reconstruction gap, the mandate/resources gap, thecoherence gap, and the technology gap.

The Stability and Reconstruction Gap. First among the challenges is filling theso-called S & R gap (“stability and reconstruction gap”) that lies between the initial
combat/peace enforcement phase and the stabilization and reconstruction phase.7 In an
immediate post-conflict situation, security is extremely poor, with few resources toprotect civilians and vital infrastructure, as well as to maintain public law and order. In
6

Cedric de Coning, “The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa,” presented at theconference on “Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future,” Helsinki, 29
May 2006. Espen Barth Eide, Anja Terese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen vonHippel, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives andRecommendations,” Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May
2005.
7
Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, “Transforming for Stabilization andReconstruction Operations,” Washington, DC., National Defense University Press,
2004.
8

an environment where the maintenance of security is particularly shaky, introducing
civilian nation-building capabilities, especially development agencies at an early stage,is not easy. For example, it is often argued that the S & R gap has widened in
Afghanistan and Iraq, as effective maneuver warfare was followed by less effective,
poorly planned stability and reconstruction operations. In many PSOs as well, there isa time lag between the initial security intervention that establishes the conditions for
PSO deployment and the stability/reconstruction and peacebuilding activities that
follow. As in the case of Kosovo after the initial NATO air campaign, local power
contenders often seize the opportunity left by this gap to establish parallel security andadministrative structures.
Ideally, plans for reconstruction and development should be included at theoutset of security intervention planning, but this requires an effective inter-agency
planning process as well as inter-agency training and evaluation at allphases—pre-deployment, in-theatre, and post-deployment. If the situation is so
precarious that civilian agencies cannot be deployed, the military should be mandated
to do reconstruction during a limited period of time, but in such a manner that enables
the realization of long-term goals.
Further, during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the rule of law(RoL) is one critical element of a functioning society that is missing, especially if thesewars had resulted in the collapse of the government, as happened in Somalia, Liberia,
and elsewhere. When societies emerge out of conflict, their rule of law institutions
need to be rebuilt, but in many cases, they suffer from lack of adequate legal systems,
absence of an impartial and functioning police force, adequate detainment facilities, or
experts in legal affairs. Thus, in post-conflict societies, the task of developing RoL
institutions is urgent and requires external resources and experts. Especially needed is afunctioning police, particularly formed units. Given the likelihood that local police are
either non-existent or dysfunctional, the deployment of international police capabilities
is often required. International police forces supervise and train the local police forces,
and if necessary, take up executive functions, including arrest, search, and detainment.
Bringing in RoL experts, especially civilians, at an early stage, however, may be risky
9and difficult if security is precarious.

The Mandate/Resources Gap. Another major challenge in peace support operations isfilling the gap between the political mandate (the mission’s strategic objective) and theresources provided for its achievement. This gap remains particularly in UN PSOs, less,yet still seriously, in U.S.-led, or NATO-led operations. The gaps tend to bepronounced in the following specific areas:

Security. There is continued need for a robust military capability in order to keep andenforce the precarious peace and implement peace agreements. Many post-conflictsituations require a continued security presence by outside personnel, as in the cases of
the Balkans, West Africa, and East Timor. In some situations, the hardest part isdealing with continuing atrocities, such as the case of the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC) and Darfur. Further, effective conflict prevention often requires a rapid
reaction capability, which may be in short supply especially in UN missions. One of
the recommendations of the Brahimi report was that the UN needs to be deployedwithin 30-90 days after a peace agreement to better support the peace process8. As partof the effort to realize this recommendation, the UN has established the UN Standby
Arrangement System (UNSAS), covering both military and police personnel, and is
assisted by other rapid-reaction mechanisms such as the Multinational Standby High
Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), led initially byDenmark and currently chaired by Canada. SHIRBRIG, for instance, was instrumental
in rendering headquarters support for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in its initial
deployment phase. Rapid response, however, is still a challenge, because the structureof UN mission planning makes it difficult to achieve the goal of deployment within
30-90 days. There is also a need for sophisticated mission support and intelligencecapabilities in contemporary PSOs. SHIRBRIG also needs to be expanded to enable itto assist more missions.
8

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21
August 2000.
10

Policing. Inability to meet demands for CIVPOL and formed police units(gendarmerie). In some cases, the police represent more than 10 % of the overall force9.
It often falls on the UN to provide the police, as was the case in Bosnia where NATO
forces were initially deployed, but the UN has a constant shortage of police toparticipate in its Peace Operations. The provision and training of impartial police
continues to be especially challenging in the US-led operation in Iraq as well as in
Afghanistan, undermining the coalition effort to stabilize these countries.

Sustained support. Development assistance needs to be sustained over a long period oftime. Nation-building requires an extended political and financial support over along-term, well beyond the holding of first formal elections. Institutions, once built,
still need to be supported to the point where self-sustained social and economic
development is possible. A recent study indicated the UN’s weakness in this area,
although the UN has done initial institution building fairly effectively.10 For instance,
the UN successfully paved the way for a broadly representative government in
Cambodia after organizing the election there. Its limited mandate in terms of time,
scope and resources, however, precluded adequate preparations for lasting democracyin that country.
Regional institutions. 11 One obvious focus of the support needed for regional
institutions is Africa. Africa remains the focus of the UN, hosting 8 of 18 UN Peace
Operations (of which 6 are complex operations), or 75 percent of 88,000 military,
police and civilian UN peacekeepers.12 Also it is here where the mandate/resources
gap is chronic. The unfortunate situation in Darfur, for instance, where the UN has yet
to establish a peacekeeping presence and where the African Union force (due in large
9James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq,
Rand Corporations, 2005.
10
Dobbins, 2005.
11
See also the recommendations of the Challenges Project in “Meeting the Challengesof Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination,” Challenges Project Phase II
Concluding Report, 2003-2006, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2005.
12
De Coning, 2006.
11

part to lack of resources) is particularly weak, is not by any means an exception to thegeneral trend. In addition, where peacebuilding efforts are called for, for instance, inWest Africa, African institutions lack resources to engage in civilian peacebuilding
activities. Therefore, it makes a great deal of sense to invest in strengthening local
capacity in Africa, most importantly that of the AU, so that it can develop balanced
peace support capabilities, consisting of both robust military and police capabilities aswell as limited civilian capabilities so that it can, in coordination with the UN, workout optimal long-term solutions.13

To turn to Asia, this region is filled with situations that call for PSO involvement. In
places such as Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Mindanao, and more recently Aceh, security
intervention or international mediation was followed by PK/monitoring missions,coupled with peacebuilding /development assistance. Although this region lacks an
institutionalized PSO capability, there are signs of nascent collaboration taking place
among participating states of ASEAN and ARF, involving external actors as well. For
instance, in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) operation in East Timor(1999), some ASEAN nations (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) took
part, a participation made possible by Japan’s financial contribution of $100 million. A
notable development has taken place in Aceh recently, where an EU Aceh Monitoring
Mission (AMM), with the participation of ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Singapore and Thailand), as well as Norway and Switzerland, has been
deployed since September 2005. The scope of the mission includes monitoring ofDisarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR),
human rights, legal reform, and political affairs. In Mindanao, an International
Monitoring Team, with the participation of Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya, has been
deployed, while Japan leads the facilitation of reconstruction and development in theregion.
13“Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force”(an AU tentative position paper), Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian
Dimension of the African Standby Force, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Center, Ghana, 28 August-1 September 2006.
12

Although there are limitations to the capability of ASEAN and ARF to address
regional conflicts, the region would benefit from (a) a stronger capacity for
coordinating security interventions and peacekeeping/observer missions, and (b) acapacity for long-term regional peacebuilding, centering on civilian capabilities, so that
long-term assistance to democratization, RoL, SSR, and economic liberalization could
be facilitated in coordination with the UN.

Achieving Coherence. Despite much focus on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC),
civil-military coordination (CMCoord), etc., there are still problems in achieving
coherence within a particular mission. Different organizational cultures, preferences,and interests lead to the setting of different priorities. Different operational procedures
and tools are often adopted side-by-side without coordination. Also daunting is that in
PSOs, many policy objectives must be pursued simultaneously, resulting inconsiderable gaps in policy coordination. For instance, contradictions and trade-offs
are said to exist between political and economic liberalization and stability; justice andpeace; local ownership of political processes and multi-ethnic peace, to name a few.
These difficulties notwithstanding, ensuring coherence among strategic, operational
and tactical-level goals and means is critical to a mission’s effectiveness.

Technology.14 Finally, it must be pointed out that there is a significant gap in thetechnologies being made available for UN Peace Operations. There is a tendency for
all PSOs to be short of necessary resources and equipment, but in the case of UN
missions, there is a significant gap between the severe security situations in which the
UN must now operate and the quality of equipment the organization is able to procure.
This technology gap can be observed in the range of weapons and other equipment
14

I would like to thank Professor Walter Dorn for making this point explicit. See also
his contribution to the Fifth Symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Security
Cooperation, Vancouver, 8-9 September 2006. Interviews at the Permanent Mission ofJapan to the United Nations in New York conducted by this author in March 2005 also
indicated a prevalent support among them for strengthening technological aspects of
UN Peace Operations. Many also singled out technology as an area in which Japan’scontribution could make a difference.
13

(armored personnel carriers [APCs], helicopters, etc.) made available by UN Member
States to the peacekeeping missions. Surveillance may be another area where
technological investment would make a difference in UN missions. The challenges ofmanaging security today make imperative a fundamental review of technologies
available to UN Peace Operations. The effectiveness of UN Peace Operations could besignificantly improved if Member States were prepared to assist the UN better in thisregard.

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Options for Japan
Currently, Japan does not have the capability to provide support for the
military-security arm of PSOs, in particular the peace enforcement element, due to theterms of its Constitution. It does, however, have the capability to engage in traditional
peacekeeping missions.15 The choice Japan now faces is therefore whether to develop
a full PSO capability, or to rely, as it has done so far, on other countries for theprovision of security. If the choice is the former, Japan would engage most typicallythe maintenance of security in the area of its operations, which would involve limited
and selective use of force in self-defense in order to defend and implement the mission
mandate. In this case, the preparation Japan needs to take would include: revision of
the so-called Five Principles of participation in PKOs16; preparation of a general law(ippanho) on participation in PSOs; and reconsideration of the Rules of Engagement
for the Japan Ground SDF (JGSDF), to apply to PSO circumstances. The government
may first examine these changes without revising the Constitution.
Even without significant revisions in the laws, however, Japan should be able
to contribute more to UN Peace Operations, especially by providing logistical support
to UN POs and other PSOs. Japan’s option in this case would also include joining the
UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and SHIRBRIG. Both mechanisms
support UN operations and allow for member governments to acquire diet orcongressional approval before deployment, presenting less of an obstacle for Japan
than is typically understood to be the case. Another area where Japan could contributesignificantly with some amendment of the laws is the provision of advanced
technology, in the area of surveillance for instance, for use in UN Peace Operations.
This, however, may require revision or modification in Japan’s three-point policy
banning arms export.
Regardless of its posture on exercise of military force, Japan could still
increase its civilian participation in peace support operations. The recommendations
15

International Peace Cooperation Law (1992), revised in 1998 and 2001.
These are: existence of a peace agreement; consent of the local parties; impartiality;
the freedom of Japan to withdraw whenever it chooses; and minimum use of weapons
for self-defense.

16

15

contained in the 2002 Report of the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for
Peace remain highly relevant. Among the more feasible possibilities for Japan is toincrease the number of civilians participating in election monitoring. In addition,
humanitarian assistance and election monitoring should be made exempt from theapplication of the Five Principles of participation in PKOs. Another priority area would
be participation by Japan’s civilian police in UN Peace Operations. Japan’s
development assistance in the area of peacebuilding would also need to move from thelevel of theory and guidelines to implementation. Japan’s expertise in infrastructurebuilding should be given more attention in peacebuilding, especially through rapid
deployment in the stabilization/post-conflict phase.17 A change in the institutional
culture of civilian agencies has to occur, however, before nascent civil-military
cooperation for post-conflict phase assistance can be implemented.
Japan should, in collaboration with interested parties, identify realistic ways tosupport and strengthen regional capabilities to conduct PSOs in Asia. Region-level orregion-UN dialogues there could be facilitated to explore possibilities for regional
cooperation in PSO. Further, possibilities for creating a regional PKO/peacebuilding
training center have been suggested in some circles. In the context of Africa, Japan’s
financial and in-kind assistance should target the strengthening of regional PSO
institutions, such as the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).

Priority Areas of Future Japanese Contribution to PSOs
Strengthening global PSO capabilities should be a priority area for Japan. Priority
areas could include:
1. Organizing training of CIVPOL forces, also involving other Asian nations, with aview to strengthening UN Peace Operations;
2. Holding training programs for civilian personnel on PSO affairs (humanitarian relief,
human rights, gender issues, legal and political affairs, DDR, mission planning and
17

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has conducted reconstruction
projects in the post-conflict phase in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, andAfghanistan (Kandahar), where JICA arrived even before/without the Japan
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).
16

support, electoral affairs, civil affairs) to strengthen region-level PSO capability inAsia;
3. Identifying areas where Japan’s development assistance can more effectively support
conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding. Priority should go, for instance, tosupport of recovery in Afghanistan;
4. Working out ways to strengthen UN rapid reaction capabilities by strengthening
existing mechanisms, such as UNSAS and SHIRBRIG.;
5. Identifying which advanced technologies are helpful for use in UN Peace Operations
that Japan can feasibly provide; and6. Working out ways to support African PSO capabilities, via political, financial andin-kind support—with special emphasis on immediate PSO needs of Africa (e.g.,financial support for the AU Peace Support Operations Division [PSOD], and helping
to develop the planning, logistics, and civilian arms of AU PSOs).

17