SWP

Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) is an independent research
institution established in Tokyo in October 1978. The RIPS conducts research on issues ofnational and international peace and security, publishes research reports, and proposes
policy recommendations.

The institute publishes an annual report, Ajia no anzenhosho (Asian Security), whichsurveys the changing security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Well regarded by boththe academic and the security communities, the institute also organizes seminars for
specialists and the public on national, regional, and international security and sponsors joint
research projects with institutes in other countries.

In addition to its research activities, the institute, together with the Japan Foundation'sCenter for Global Partnership, offers fellowships to young scholars wishing to pursue
security studies. Many of these recipients have since become valuable contributors tosecurity studies in Japan.

The RIPS Policy Perspectives is intended to provide timely alternatives to andanalyses of existing peace and security policies, thereby contributing to further debate. The
views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the RIPS.

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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

Restless Rivals:
Trump, China and the implications for Japan and East Asia

German Institute for International and Security Affairs(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: SWP)
Konrad Adenauer Foundation(Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung: KAS)
andResearch Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS)

May 2017

FOREWORD
On March 6, 2017, the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) held in Berlin botha roundtable with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) and a public symposium with the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, KAS). The program planners of the three
institutes shared their concerns regarding the security challenges that East Asia poses toboth the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, being well aware of the importance of exchanging
their views of the region’s political and military developments and their implications for
global security.
During “The Changing Security Environment in East Asia: Issues, Trends and
Implications for Japan and Europe,” at the SWP roundtable, and “Restless Rivals: Trump,
China, and the Implications for Japan and East Asia,” at the KAS public symposium, themajor concerns discussed were North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development
programs, China’s eastward military expansion, territorial disputes in the East and South
China Seas, and new tensions between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping
and between Trump and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un.
The following are six papers submitted to the two meetings, written by two European
participants (Giovanni Andornino [Italy] and Mathieu Duchȃtel [France]), two Americans(Bonnie Glaser and Robert Eldridge), and two Japanese (Hideshi Tokuchi and Masashi
Nishihara). They highlight the sources of these tensions and conflicts in East Asia today,suggesting areas of policy coordination among Europe, the United States, and Japan.
It was indeed a pleasure and an honor for RIPS to cosponsor these programs with thetwo German institutes. Our special thanks go to Professor Hanns Maull and Dr. Hanns
Günther-Hilpert of SWP and Mr. Tomislav Delinic of KAS, as well as Dr. Atsushi Yasutomi
of RIPS.
Masashi Nishihara
President
Research Institute for Peace and Security
April 2017

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

Table of Contents

FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Trump’s China Policy: Implications of an “America First” Policy for East Asia ............. 1
Bonnie Glaser
2. How do we Assess China’s Foreign and Security Policy? – A Japanese View ................. 8
Hideshi Tokuchi
3. How Do We Assess China’s Foreign and Security Policy?................................................. 13
Giovani B. Andornino
4. China’s Maritime Security Policy: Trends in Early 2017 ..................................................... 18
Mathieu Duchâtel
5. East Asia: Territorial Issues And Regional Security Developments: The View FromJapan’s Alliance Partner, With A Focus On The Senkaku Islands Dispute........................ 22
Robert D. Eldridge, Ph.D.
6. The Korean Peninsula: Focus of Tensions ............................................................................. 28
Masashi NishiharaǦ ǻ ˝ ˉ ǧ ....................................................................................................................................... 33

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

1. Trump’s China Policy: Implications of an “America
First” Policy for East Asia
Bonnie Glaser

Donald Trump’s approach to China is still evolving. During the campaign and thepresidential transition, Trump demonstrated an impulse to get tough with China,
especially in the area of trade, and pledged to take a series of steps to turn the U.S.-China
relationship to America’s advantage. In his first month in office, however, Trump has
adopted a more cautious, pragmatic stance. Although his rhetoric remains critical of
Chinese policies, Trump has eschewed taking harsh actions such as imposing tariffs on
Chinese goods or labeling China a currency manipulator, for example. Instead, President
Trump has expressed a desire to have a “constructive relationship,” and taken steps
contrary to his campaign statements that have prevented U.S.-China ties from going off therails, including reaffirming the long-standing U.S. “one China” policy. In the first month of
his presidency, Trump has shown a willingness to listen to and accept advice from his
cabinet and national security staff. These early signals suggest that an early crisis in
U.S.-China relations will be averted. However, a clear Trump administration policy toward
China that is grounded in a broader regional and global strategy has not yet beenformulated and will likely take many months to emerge. In the meantime, Trump’s steps aspresident to lower the risk of conflict with China are beneficial to East Asian security.

Trade/Economics
Although there is no coherent strategy yet toward China, there is an apparent intention
by the Trump administration to rebalance the bilateral relationship so it is moreadvantageous to the United States, especially economically. Trump and his key associates
believe that as part of the “America First” policy, the U.S. must put an end to Chinese
practices that benefit China at the expense of American interests. During the campaign,
Trump accused China of “raping our country” by keeping its currency undervalued topromote exports. In his campaign manifesto, Trump pledged to “cut a better deal with
China that helps American businesses and workers compete.” He set out four goals,
including putting an end to China’s illegal export subsidies, and lax labor andenvironmental standards,” as well as declaring China a currency manipulator.
Trump’s trade policy hasn’t become clear yet, in part because four weeks into the newadministration, the entire economics and trade team is not yet place. Once the teammembers are all in their positions, it will probably take additional time to sort out various
roles and forge a consensus on China policy. Available information suggests that the five

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-1-

key officials diverge in fundamental ways in their views. Peter Navarro, a hardline
mercantilist China basher who heads the newly-created National Trade Council, favors
tariffs and other harsh measures. Gary Cohn, at the helm of the National Economic Council,
is on the record as saying China’s currency is too strong, not too weak. Like Navarro,
Robert Lighthizer, the nominee for U.S. Trade Representative who has yet to be confirmed,
has advocated imposing unilateral tariffs on China “to force change in the system.” Steven
Mnuchin, the new U.S. Treasury Secretary, has no known history of antagonism toward
China.
The final member of the team is billionaire Wilbur Ross, who Trump has designated as
his bureaucratic point person on trade policy. Ross was confirmed as Commerce Secretaryon February 28. In his confirmation hearing, Ross called for leveling the playing field with
China, which he said is “the most protectionist country among very large countries.” Ross
also noted China’s practice of dumping excess steel and aluminum and supporting
unprofitable state-owned enterprises. Prior to his nomination, however, Ross disagreed
with mounting criticism of China, noting in 2008 that China “has become the whipping boy
in the U.S. just as Japan was some 15 years ago.”
If the hard-line approach prevails, any or all of the following steps could be taken:lImposing tariffs on Chinese importslDeclaring China a currency manipulator, possibly when the next semiannual
currency report is delivered in April by the U.S. Treasury Department.

lLaunching unfair trade cases based on Chinese barriers to U.S. exports andintellectual property violationslTightening the official approval process for Chinese investment in the U.S. andacquisition of U.S. companieslImplementing changes to make it easier to U.S. companies to obtain relief from
Chinese imports

Over the longer term, Trump may alter the US tax structure by giving businesses income
tax deductions for producing at home and protecting them from imports by imposing
Border Adjustment Tax (BAT), which would damage Chinese exports to the United States.
These actions would likely lead to Chinese retaliatory measures, a possible trade war, andperhaps a global depression.
For East Asia, these anti-globalization, protectionist policies would be bad news.
U.S.-China trade conflict would likely have spillover effects in other areas, most critically
East Asian security. The pursuit of “America first” policies by the U.S. would be

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-2-detrimental to Asian economies that rely heavily on exports. Trump’s shift from amultilateral to a bilateral approach to trade – which has nothing to do with China – isespecially harmful. The U.S. withdrawal from TPP is widely viewed as a strategic blunderthat has created a vacuum in the region that China will happily attempt to fill.
Privately, influential Chinese have suggested that Beijing is willing to cut some deals on
trade in order to preserve good relations with the United States. For example, China canmake its market more open to foreign investment in exchange for assurances that its own
direct investments in the United States can continue unimpeded, with limited exceptions
that relate to U.S. national security. If such deals can be reached, trade tensions canpossibly be tamped down and managed.

North Korea
There is a consensus in the United States that North Korea is the most pressing security
problem in Asia. The Trump administration has wisely undertaken a policy review toassess “lessons learned” from past administrations and consider options. With thelikelihood that North Korea will soon have the capability to launch a nuclear-tipped ICBM
at the continental United States, the matter is urgent. There are essentially three tools todeal with North Korea: diplomacy, sanctions and deterrence. The question is what the mixof these will be employed by the Trump administration.
There are already signs that Trump, like prior presidents, will urge China to use its
influence on North Korea to effect change in its nuclear weapons and missile programs.
After his election victory and prior to the inauguration, Trump blamed China in a tweet for
not helping with North Korea. His tweet came an hour after an earlier tweet in which
Trump had said: “North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a
nuclear weapons capable of reaching parts of the U.S. It won’t happen!” When Trump andXi Jinping spoke by phone on February 9, he raised concerns about North Korea.
The increasing nuclear and missile threat from North Korea was at the top of Secretary ofState Rex Tillerson’s agenda when he met with his counterpart Wang Yi on the sidelines of
the G-20 In Bonn. Tillerson urged China to use all available tools to moderate North
Korea’s destabilizing behavior, according to a U.S. Department of State spokesman. Trump
told Reuters in a February 23 interview that “China has tremendous control over North
Korea. Whether they say so or not is up to them, but they have tremendous control over
North Korea. I think they could solve the problem very easily if they want to.” North Korea
was one of the main topics of discussion during State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s February
27-28visit to Washington DC.
Xi Jinping may opt to take steps to increase pressure on North Korea to win favor withRIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-3-the Trump administration. The Chinese realize that they need a positive issue on which the
U.S. and China can cooperate that will cushion friction in other areas. Under the Obamaadministration, that issue was coping with climate change, but the Trump administration isunlikely to attach priority to global warming. Under the precondition that pressure does
not create regime threatening instability in North Korea, which would be detrimental toChinese interests, there is certainly more that China can do. Beijing’s announcement that it
will suspend coal imports from North Korea through the end of 2017 is evidence that China
is willing to do more.
Prospects for enhanced U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea will grow if the Trumpadministration decides to return to negotiations under the Six Party Talks Framework.
Whether Pyongyang would agree to negotiations depends on several factors, including thepreconditions for talks and Kim’s calculation of what can be gained. The implications for
East Asian security are uncertain, depending on what is achieved. A freeze in someelements of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs would be positive for the region,but may not be attainable.

South China Sea
Trump administration officials have sent muddled signals on the South China Sea and as
a result, its policy is unclear. At his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Tillerson
threatened to deny China access to its newly created islands in the South China Sea, which
many observers interpreted as likely to lead to a U.S. naval and air blockade. The Chinese
are not likely to be deterred from using these islands, and therefore the potential for
conflict would be high. In Questions for the Record (QFR) posed by the Senate after the
hearing, however, Tillerson clarified that the U.S. should be prepared to deny access only
in a contingency. That position is likely similar to the Obama administration, although suchdetails were never discussed publicly.
In the meantime, White House spokesman Sean Spicer weighed in on the matter, but
further muddied the waters. He stated that the U.S. would protect its interests in the South
China Sea, adding that “If those islands are, in fact, in international waters and not part ofChina proper . . . we’ll make sure we defend international interests from being taken overby one country.” His remarks provided further evidence of the Trump administration’s
impulse to be tough on China, but showed no understanding of the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
In what was likely an attempt to provide reassurance, when visiting Tokyo Secretary of
Defense Jim Mattis emphasized the need for the U.S. “military stance” to reinforce
diplomacy and stated that “there is no need right now at this time for military maneuvers
or something like that.” Some observers found this reassuring, but for those who want the

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-4-

U.S. to push back harder against China’s gains in the South China Sea (including many ofChina’s neighbors), Mattis’ messages were likely seen as too soft and creating the potential
for miscalculation by China. Mattis call for a rules-based international order was widely
welcomed, however. He is the first Trump administration official to do so, and also said
that “freedom of navigation is absolute.”
The deployment of a carrier strike group to the South China Sea on February 18 indicatesan early willingness to strengthen deterrence, but it remains to be seen whether and how
Trump administration strategy will differ from Obama’s. The Obama administration was
generally cautious and unwilling to incur risk in the South China Sea as evidenced by the
careful exercise of its Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs). The timing of those
FONOPs also suggested a desire to avoid undermining cooperation with China on otherissues. Time will tell whether Trump administration FONOPs will be less cautious, forexample by including flight operations when sailing within the 12nm waters around
Mischief Reef, which was determined by the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal to be a low-tide
elevation within the Philippines’ EEZ.
Although the possibility exists that Beijing will seize an opportunity to further
consolidate its claims by dredging at Scarborough Shoal, declaring baselines in the Spratlys,
or establishing an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, none of theseactions are likely to take place before China’s 19th Party Congress planned for this fall. Even
beyond the Party Congress, China may refrain from destabilizing actions in order topreserve positive relations with Philippines’ President Duterte and China’s otherneighbors.

Taiwan and the “one China” Policy
Since Trump hardly mentioned Taiwan during the campaign, his decision to accept aphone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen after the election came as a surprise. Even
more astonishing than the phone call, however, was Trump’s subsequent statement on Fox
News that his administration would not necessarily be bound by the “one China” policy“unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.” Thissuggested that Trump might be willing to use the “one China” policy as a bargaining chip
to extract concessions from China on other issues. Underlying this position was the belief
that China would have no choice other than to accept and adjust to U.S. abandonment of
the “one China” policy.
In the weeks that followed, however, Beijing made clear that the issue was“non-negotiable.” China refused to have any discussions with the Trump administration,
including holding a phone call between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, until its position on
Taiwan was stated plainly. Recognizing that refusing to endorse the “one China” policy

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-5-would have high costs and yield few benefits, senior Trump administration officials,
including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, persuaded the president to back down from his
earlier stance.
Trump’s about face averted an immediate crisis in U.S.-China relations, but left much
uncertainty about U.S. policy toward Taiwan and therefore it is premature to conclude thatdifferences over Taiwan will be easily managed. First, although President Trump said hewould honor the “one China” policy, he did not define it. There was no mention by Trumpof the three U.S.-China communiques, which Beijing will undoubtedly insist that hereaffirm at an early date. By simply stating that he would support the “one China” policy,
Trump has left room to interpret it differently than his predecessors. Second, Beijing willremain suspicious of U.S. intentions toward Taiwan and will likely react strongly to any
perceived efforts by the Trump administration to strengthen ties with Taiwan. If Trump
decides to sell advanced weapons systems to Taiwan, permit flag officers to visit Taipei,
negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) or take other steps to upgrade U.S. relations with
Taiwan (even though such actions arguably fall within the “one China” framework), U.S.China tensions will likely increase significantly. Third, Trump might still seek to use
Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the future—a possibility that has created much anxiety in
Tsai Ing-wen’s administration.
The role of Taiwan in Trump’s Asia strategy has yet to be determined. Those who seek topressure Beijing to make concessions to the U.S. on trade and economic matters may be
tempted to try to use Taiwan as a lever to influence Chinese policy. Other individuals
within the administration who support strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations are likely to
oppose such a policy, however. The Trump-Taiwan phone call and the early kerfuffle overwhether to reaffirm the U.S. “one China” policy do not provide clear insight into theapproach that the new U.S. administration will take toward Taiwan going forward.

Questions about Implications for Regional Stability
A month into the Trump administration, there is considerable uncertainty about the new
U.S. president’s approach to China, and how his China policy will fit into a broader
strategy to toward Asia. There are some reassuring signs to point to, including Secretary
Mattis’ early trip to Tokyo and Seoul; Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the UnitedStates; Trump’s phone call with Xi Jinping; and Yang Jiechi’s visit to Washington DC. Yet
many questions remain.
Some of the most pressing questions that have yet to be answered are:
1. Will the U.S. rely chiefly on military approaches to security? Will the Trump administration havean economic pillar to its Asia strategy? What will be the extent of the administration’s diplomatic
engagement with the region? Will diplomacy, economics, and military policies be integrated into

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-6-a comprehensive regional strategy? I would posit that a strong U.S. military presence alone will
not be sufficient to ease Asian allies’ and partners’ concerns about U.S. staying power andcommitment to the region.
2. Will Trump administration foreign policy be centered on rules and norms or will the U.S. jettison
this long-standing approach to East Asia? Will the U.S. seek to strengthen the international orderand its role as regional and leader or abdicate that role to China? There may be contradictions
between Trump’s “America first” policies and long-standing U.S. policies to underwrite andprovide security in the Asia-Pacific.
3. Will the Trump administration ratchet up tensions with China and force countries to take sides?
No country in Asia wants to be compelled to choose between the U.S. and China. There isreasonable fear of being dragged into a more competitive dynamic. The Trump administrationmust strike the right balance between engaging and deterring China.
4. Will regional countries hedge against or toward China? Some countries have clearly been in
China’s orbit, including Laos, Cambodia, and to some extent Thailand and Brunei. Other
countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia were leaning toward the U.S. during the
Obama administration, but now they are hedging their bets by leaning toward China in an effort tobenefit economically and in part because they view the U.S. as unreliable.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-7-

2. How do we Assess China’s Foreign and Security
Policy? – A Japanese View
Hideshi Tokuchi

In May 2015, China released its biennial defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy.”
It is filled with abstract language about Chinese military concepts but lacks any details
about PLA’s budget or operations, to the disappointment of many observers.
Furthermore, the real meaning of each of these concepts is difficult to ascertain. For
example, in describing “Military Force Building Measures,” the document states, “China
will innovate and develop theories and practice in relation to running the armed forces inaccordance with the law, establish a well-knit military law system with Chinesecharacteristics, so as to elevate the level of rule by law of national defense and armed forcesbuilding.” We do not know, however, if China has a correct legal mind. Although
President Xi Jinping stated at this year’s World Economic Forum that “we should honor
promises and abide by rules. One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit,” thisstatement sounds hollow, because China rejected the July 2016 award of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) and does not intend to comply with it.
The strategy’s key concept, “active defense,” is defined as adherence to the unity ofstrategic defense and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles ofdefense, self-defense and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that “We will
not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” According
to US DOD’s annual report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China,” this statement is “a decade-old PLA commitment not toattack until attacked, but to counterattack strongly once struck.” If this interpretation iscorrect, it does not contain any meaningful message at all. The report then elaborates bynoting that China would “respond aggressively once an adversary decides to attack,”
which is even more worrisome because China might act in accordance with its own
arbitrary interpretation of an adversary’s intentions, not actions, which will cause atremendous problem for the international order.
China’s strategic requirement leads the PLA Navy to the combination of “offshore waters
defense” with “open seas protection,” based on the strategic tasks such as “to safeguard the
security of China’s overseas interests” and based on the importance attached to “protecting
maritime rights and interests.” That is, China is building up its military forces while
focusing on both the seas and new domains such as outer space and cyberspace. China’s

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-8-military budget grew by double digits each year from 1989 to 2015, and became 3.4 times asmuch in the recent 10 years (from 2006 to 2016), and sustains rapid military expansion.
With all this in mind, I discuss here some of the challenges China poses and some of themeasures we should take in response.

China’s Dream and Its Maritime Expansion
As described in the white paper, China believes that a world war is unlikely in theforeseeable future. In China’s mind, the international situation is expected to remain
generally peaceful. China regards this situation provides important opportunities for its
development. In order to capture the opportunities, China is trying to remove any obstacle.
China believes that multiple and comprehensive security threats and increasing external
impediments and challenges exist in front of it. China has indeed given itself “an arduous
task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.”
As it maintains, “the Taiwan issue bears on China’s reunification and long-term
development,” and “Some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce
their military presence on China’s reefs and islands.” In addition, “with the growth of
China’s national interests, … the security of overseas interests concerning energy andresources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel
and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.”In 2049 China will celebrate the centennial of the People’s Republic. In order to make thecountry strong, China is trying to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation bythen under the banner of the “Chinese Dream,” part of which is building a strong military.
To do this, the Chinese have been strengthening their military capabilities and have also
become more assertive. Feeling that they have been hemmed in by the US and its associate
powers, China may be looking for ways to break out, but to the Americans and theJapanese, such attempts only succeed in disturbing the regional order and disrupting thefreedom of navigation and may lead to the exclusion of the US from the region. In militaryterms, China is trying to keep foreign forces away from its territory by denying foreign
forces’ power projection capabilities and benefits of their forward deployment and also by
expanding its own overseas deployment.
China, however, does not want to destroy the stable environment that has helped thecountry develop, and thus seems to want to avoid full confrontation with the US and othermajor powers. From this view-point, China will try not to push the US and its allies, like
Japan, too far, although China will continue to criticize these alliances and to try to drive awedge among the members. The Chinese will probably continue to be assertive on theissues of territories and sovereign rights as they define, albeit while carefully avoiding full
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25-9-confrontation. They will continue, therefore, to resort at sea to coercive tactics short ofmilitary conflicts, by expanding their maritime law-enforcement capabilities.
To that end, Chinese law-enforcement vessels continually intrude into the Japanese
territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, with some Chinese even calling these illegal
operations “joint management of the islands.” In the summit meeting between China andJapan in September 2016, when Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe urged China’s president
Xi Jinping to seek peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes based oninternational law, President Xi reminded Japan that it was not a party to this issue and thus
should exercise caution in its words and deeds in regard to this matter. Possibly inresponse to Japan’s support of the PCA award, a large number of Chinese fishing boats
operated near the Senkaku Islands and China’s law-enforcement vessels illegally entered
Japanese territorial waters around the islands in early August.

China Poses Four Challenges
First, this should not be viewed as a matter of security dilemma. China has the world’s
second largest economy, and it is the crux of the Asian economy, which gives it evengreater responsibility for both the regional and global order Unfortunately, though, theChinese lack a fundamental understanding of the rule of law as the basis of the order andare taking advantage of other countries’ efforts to maintain the order.
Second, despite the Chinese perception, the rise of China is not an obstacle to any othercountries in the Asia-Pacific. China is not like the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, andneither Japan nor the US has a policy of containment. They do not intend to isolate China
so that it will decay. Instead, they helped China develop. China should not misunderstandit.
Third, China’s actions differ from its words. For instance, even though China termed its
land reclamation in the South China Sea a “green project,” the PCA found that China
caused severe harm to the area’s marine environment. For another example, the Chinese
say that “one belt, one road” (OBOR) and AIIB to undergird it enhance the world’s
connectivity, but in fact, what China has been doing in the South China Sea is disruption ofconnectivity.
Fourth, China views the sea with a continental mindset. That is, its concept of “maritime
territory” includes not only its territorial waters but also its contiguous zones, EEZ and thecontinental shelf. China also calls it “state- administered area.” Consequently, it insists thatit has the power to restrict other states’ military activities in its EEZ.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 10 -

How We Should Address the Challenges
There will be no quick fix or silver bullet to address these serious challenges. I propose
the following four responses to these challenges.
First, in order to educate China and to help it behave as a responsible member of theinternational community, we should establish a network of regional security cooperation to
include China. Incidentally, the hub-&-spokes regional security system centering on the US
has become a kernel of such a network. For example, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise(RIMPAC), a biennial naval exercise first conducted by some of the US regional allies
during the Cold War, keeps evolving. In 2016, 45 surface ships, 5 submarines, more than
200 aircraft and 25,000 troops from 26 nations participated, including India, Indonesia andeven China.
Second, we should preserve the regional balance of power in response to China’s
maritime expansion. All activities of maritime expansion of China are headed toward thesea in East Asia. Japan in Northeast Asia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, these tworegional allies of the US directly face the impact of this expansion. A regional balance ofpower, however, can be maintained only by strengthening the US-centered regional
security system, of which Japan-US Alliance is the principal component. In the most recent
Japan-US summit meeting, the two countries’ leaders confirmed that their bilateral alliance
was the basis of peace, prosperity and freedom of the Asia-Pacific. They also confirmedthat the US and Japan would oppose any attempt by any country to assert maritime claims
by means of intimidation, coercion or force. The two nations also called on the countries
concerned to refrain from taking any actions that would escalate tensions in the South
China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to act in accordance withinternational law. This summit meeting generated a big achievement, but we cannot becomplacent. Both Japan and the US must continue to strengthen their alliance’s capabilities,
and we must communicate the will of the alliance to the Chinese. China advances to themaritime domain in Southeast Asia often by taking advantage of the power vacuum there
and establishes irreversible changes in a short period of time. China conducts salami slicing
tactics in the South and East China Seas to discourage its adversaries from responding
forcefully. Consequently, we must maintain our physical presence at sea, continue building
our capabilities to address every stage of the escalation, and clearly articulate ourintentions.
Third, we must establish mechanisms for crisis management. The China-ASEAN summit
in September 2016 reaffirmed the commitment to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (CUES) to improve the operational safety of naval ships and naval aircraft in the South
China Sea. Although this is a positive development, CUES is not legally binding, and it
does not apply to air force aircraft, which patrol airspace in peacetime. Therefore, an
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 11 -

Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (INCSEA) that islegally binding in a multilateral format is worth exploring, in addition to a legally binding
and effective Code of Conduct (COC).
Fourth, we must continue to work on China for more transparency in military affairs.
China releases its defense white paper only every other year. The 2015 white paper does
not include any information about its military expenditure or any details of the PLA’soperations. China has become less transparent in military affairs. Although we cannot
expect a nondemocratic country like China to be truly open, demanding more transparency
might help head off any arbitrary actions. Transparency is one of the useful weapons ofopen democracies, and therefore the value of this approach should not be underrated.
Incidentally, one of the very opaque issues on the part of China is maritime militia. It is notclear if they have sufficient professional expertise and skill to operate as military. If they
are not professional enough, it causes much jeopardy to adversaries. China should betransparent on this issue as well.

Conclusion
Our common goal is to achieve rules-based and liberal order in the international
community. This goal cannot be attained without power or cooperation. To this end, thehub-and-spokes system in the Asia-Pacific provides an indispensable tool to bring together
the powers of like-minded countries in order to maintain the order in the region,
particularly in the face of China’s maritime expansion. This is why the US policy vacuumin the region will make it unstable and unpredictable. Thus, the US should establish its
security policy toward the region as an urgent agenda.
In addition, the continuous engagement of those European nations with an interest andbenefit in the stability of the East Asian sea is strongly desired. Indeed, the sea is not a wall
to separate nations but a road to connect them.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 12 -

3. How Do We Assess China’s Foreign and Security
Policy?
Giovani B. Andornino

China’s foreign and security policy is primarily a function of its domestic politics, whosepolar star is the preservation of the current political-institutional setup of the Chinese
Party-State. The Chinese leadership explicitly articulates this posture when referring to
China’s “core interests”, as most recently done by State Councillor Yang Jiechi during his
meeting with President Donald Trump on February 27, 2017. Such interests, hierarchicallyordered, allow for a progressively less compromising negotiating stance on part of Beijing
the further one moves to the top of the three-item list: 3) the continued stable developmentof China’s economy and society; 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 1)
preserving China’s basic state system and national security.
While the Chinese Communist Party assumes that the stability of its political regime
naturally equates with China’s supreme national interest, such premise does put China on
a different level vis-à-vis most global players, determining a degree of heterogeneity in theinternational system that appears to be deepening in conjunction with China’s reemergenceand the fraying of the established liberal world order. Calls for adjustments to global
governance entailing new approaches to sovereignty - embracing obligations andresponsibilities, as well as prerogatives and rights - face China’s intrinsically idiosyncratic
posture in the realm of high politics. It thus seems appropriate to assess China’s foreignand security policy looking at two internal dynamics shaping Beijing’s behaviour on the
global stage: the role of the leader and the evolving national identity underpinning China’s
worldview.

Xi Jinping as a “primus inter inferiores"
The salience of a national leader’s input in foreign policy definition and implementationis generally hard to assess, except in retrospect, and becomes especially impervious toanalysis when decision-making processes are as opaque as they are in China. Also, aleader’s impact is most obvious during major crises, which have not really taken place
during Xi Jinping’s first term in office (2012-2017) .
Xi Jinping’s leadership, however, does seem to lend itself to some consequential
observations. For one thing, it may be argued that, despite the absence of immediate
foreign policy emergencies, the current international environment in and of itself is looking
increasingly worrisome from Beijing’s standpoint. Marked by a disturbing level of power
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 13 -

diffusion (including potentially disruptive individual empowerment) and unprecedented
uncertainty over the shifting posture of the US and Europe - the key anchors of the orderwhich has allowed China to develop over the past four decades - global politics is
becoming more and more complex precisely at a time when China’s leadership needs tosoft-land its over-invested economy into a “new normal” equilibrium.
While Beijing’s assessment of the state of the world has not yet changed in its
fundamental components - “international multipolarisation, the globalisation of theeconomy and the democratisation of international relations” remain the defining trends clearly the medium-term tendencies being observed require a break with the prudent
conduct of the recent past. In this context, on February 17 Xi Jinping has used his role aschairman of the State Security Commission to indicate for the first time that China should“guide” the shaping a “new world order” and “safeguard international security”.
Secondly, the evolution of Xi’s own political-institutional physiognomy offers insights as
to the transformation of top policy-making in today’s China, a dynamic that is likely to
become more evident after the XIX Congress of the CCP in autumn, when the ongoing
personnel reshuffle will reach its climax with the renewed membership of the Politburo
and its Standing Committee, likely affording Xi even grater political leeway. The outcomeof this critical transition will set the stage for the next half-decade of government action in
China, which many deem to be the timeframe within which China has to either robustly
reform its growth model, or face a more radical and potentially disorderly adjustment
down the road. Greater cohesiveness in the “collective wisdom” of the incoming leadershipand its will (and capacity) to see substantial implementation of the bold decisions outlinedin the 3rd Plenary Session in November 2013 will fundamentally influence China’s domestic
stability and hence its propensity to walk the walk of a more “inclusive globalisation” (asopposed to - say - sliding toward populist revanchism).
Clearly, Xi’s hyperbolic enhancement of his own position once appointed at the apex ofpolitical power in China confirms the remarkable institutional flexibility of the Party-State,
which has been stretched to the point where the role of General Secretary of the Party andPresident of the People’s Republic - formerly a primus inter pares in the Politburo Standing
Committee - has morphed into a condition of primus inter inferiores. With the assumptionof the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commissions at the very onset of his first term
in office, Xi upended the previous practice, setting the stage for his unprecedented andvery public proclamation as “Commander-in-chief of the CMC Joint Operations Center” inApril 2016. While Xi’s determination to concentrate power in his hands has clearly met adegree of resistance - as suggested by the lack of progress in the implementation of
economic reforms, but also by the enduring and highly discretionary anti-corruption
campaign, ubiquitous calls for unquestioning loyalty to the Party, and increasingly
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 14 -

paranoid measures of social control - his authority was further enhanced by the decision of
the CCP Central Committee to elevate him to “core” of the fifth generation of leaders, a title
that had eluded his predecessor Hu Jintao. Coupled with his heading several key Leading
Small Groups of the CCP Central Committee, such development has led influential
scholars to refer to him as the “Imperial President”.
Xi’s authority is anything but titular, especially in the foreign and security policy realms.
Not only has he deliberately chosen to cast himself as a transformative leader (with apervasive media presence echoing what has been described as a supremely selfconfidend
personality): he has actively sought ownership of all major foreign policy dossiers,
including some previously handled by the PRC Premier (notably Europe and the West Asia,
Northern Africa region). From a symbolic-normative perspective, Xi has quickly broken
with his predecessor’s defining tifa (official discourse) by advancing his own keywords,
chiefly the “China dream” of the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. It is noteworthy thatthe first instance of Party-State tifa gaining enough symbolic-normative traction as to shape
the global discourse took place under Xi’s tenure, and precisely in the foreign policy
domain: the New Silk Road project - then renamed “One Belt One Road” and finally “Beltand Road Initiative” (BRI) - is very much Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy proposition,
and while not quite a grand strategy in itself, it surely is a test case of China’s success inbreaking Western hegemony in the production of globally influential symbolic capital.

China’s evolving national identity and worldview
Besides holding the monopoly over political power, the CCP jealously preserves its roleas the sole authority permitted to mould China’s official identity and worldview. Over the
past five years the Party’s cultural hegemony has been markedly reinforced: in thebureaucratic sphere, veteran leader Liu Yunshan has commanded over a tightly integrated
system combining orthodoxy-defining institutions (Central Party Schools), propaganda
channels (traditional media at home and abroad, with a special effort made to target
overseas Chinese), and tools to repress views contesting the State-sanctioned narrative.
Operationally, not even the most prestigious universities and research institutions havebeen spared from the forced narrowing of the spectrum of ideas that may legitimately be
debated in public. Some analyses relate this tightening ideological grip to the ambitious
rebalancing China needs to implement in the coming years. This line of thought,
popularised in the 1980s as neo-authoritarianism, posits that the structural reforms needed
to fully modernise China require a robust central authority to reduce the transaction costsof major adjustment.
However, while efficient in suppressing political participation, this approach has so far
been less than successful in curbing the most immediate threat to economic reforms,

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 15 -

namely vested interests concentrated in the Party-State apparatus. Barring significant
discontinuity after the XIX Congress, it would appear that the official identity being crafted
for China as it heads for the two centennials (2021 and 2049) is one combining Leninism inthe political sphere, a technological closed society mollified by sanitized confucian
attributes, and semi-contendible economic and financial playing fields heavily populated
by Party-controlled national corporate champions. This trajectory, advocated by membersof Xi Jinping’s closest entourage such as Wang Huning, has several implications for theforeign and security policy domains.
Firstly, the increasingly focal role of the Party, as remarked by Xi during the 2014 Central
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, lies at the heart of China’s quest for its
own - quintessentially Chinese - version of modernity. Far from being a purely domestic
goal, this project reflects an overarching foreign policy objective: China’s insistence on
inclusiveness and especially “harmony” (he er butong) in world affairs effectively implies
the end of the Western hegemonic prerogative to define the contours of the “international
community”, and the recognition that alternative social, economic and political models
may coexists with equal legitimacy.
Secondly, the promotion of conformism and active discouragement of systematic
engagement with foreign ideas - especially among China’s youth, already pervasivelysocialised to the tenets of patriotic education - may in the long run restrict the spectrum ofpolicy options fed to the leadership. While Xi Jinping has recently expressed his vision for“agglomerating talent into research institutions” and “breaking institutional boundaries”
to allow for an exchange of talent between the private sector, the government, and thinktanks, the benefit of “revolving doors” is easily offset when scholars are intimidated andresearch grants foster generalised sycophancy.
Thirdly, as greater emphasis is placed on the “Chinese characteristics” of China’s
socialist market economy - particularly the role of national corporate champions inspearheading global investment, market penetration, strategic assets acquisition, andproductivity acceleration - a number of practical implications are likely to challengeestablished practices and exacerbate departmental fragmentation across the Party-State:a) the growing stock of China’s outbound foreign direct investment is outpacing thecapacity of the state and PLA to provide necessary protection and supervision to Chinese
citizens, personnel and assets overseas;b) public opinion in key countries appears to reflect increasing diffidence towards China,
especially in Europe, where Beijing’s lack of reciprocity in several trade and investment
domains is frustrating governments too;

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 16 -

c) the investments that would give substance to the Belt and Road Initiative requirelong-term stability and cooperation with myriad interlocutors in very complex regions ofAsia to generate returns: unlocking the potential of Eurasian connectivity is as much apolitical-diplomatic conundrum as it is a financial and infrastructural challenge;d) encouraging economic dependency on China in volatile countries where Beijing isreluctant to get too involved politically (i.e. the Middle East and North Africa) may notshield it from the public hostility of nationalist or radical movements, with potential
spillover effects inside China (the restive region of Xinjiang being a case in point).

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 17 -

4. China’s Maritime Security Policy:
Trends in Early 2017
Mathieu Duchâtel

China’s South China Sea policy in the beginning of 2017 is determined by two immediatefactors: uncertainties regarding how the Trump administration will handle the issue of
freedom of navigation, and the management of the post-arbitration “new normal”. These
two factors tend to generate a more cautious and low-key approach than was the case in
2013-2016, but it is likely a phase of tactical pause, and one during which China continues
to work at discreetly consolidating its newly established strategic presence. A similar
pattern can be observed in the East China Sea, where there are no longer quick gains tosecure now that China successfully – seen from Beijing at least – projects an image of“shared administration” through regular presence in the territorial seas and the contiguouszone of the Senkaku Islands. In the short term, China is expected to gauge the intentions of
the Trump administration; is likely to test the US resolve in the South China Sea; but is also
very much constrained by the very real possibility that the Taiwan issue may take center
stage again during the course of the year as the key national security priority. Overall,
China should be expected to continue to seek expansion in the empty spaces where it faces
no serious resistance – thus rather in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea, hence
the focus of this discussion paper on the former.

China has successfully neutralized the effects of the arbitration rulingAfter the highly unfavourable arbitration ruling issued last July, China has manoeuvredrather successfully to neutralize the impact of the verdict on its position in the South China
Sea, by exploiting the lack of enforcement in the international system and the lack of action
from the Philippines. China has not withdrawn from UNCLOS, as some feared, but it hasreinitiated bilateral diplomacy with Manilla, with President Duterte making clear that thearbitration award remains in his “pocket”. Who can help enforce the arbitration award if
the Philippines is not taking decisions to interdict actions deemed illegal according in theruling?
China has regained the strategic initiative, helped by the weakness and the division of its
opponents and the new foreign policy of the Duterte administration. Japan and Australia
were rather isolated when issuing the only statements that explicitly called for abiding by
the ruling. The EU’s statement was weak and the reflection of internal divisions. ASEAN
did not even produce a statement. This lack of cohesion among the usual proponents of a

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 18 -

rules-based international order was worsened by the American reaction. In the late days of
the Obama administration, the division between the White House and PACOM on theimportance of FONOPs was public The lack of FONOPs to enforce the ruling after July 12
may have been a factor in Duterte’s decision to turn his back on the arbitration process.
The restart of talks with the Philippines projects internationally the image of acommonality of views between Beijing and Manila that going to arbitration was a mistake.
It signals that the arbitration is now good for the books, as the two sides are back on thecorrect track of bilateral diplomacy – China’s constant position since the beginning of theprocedure. China has pursued a mix of two politics. On the one hand, China has provided
economic incentives and diplomatic support, with promises to integrate the Philippines in
the future maritime Silk Road and political support for the controversial war on drugs ofthe current government. On the other hand, China has checkmated the arbitration bychanging its approach on Scarborough Shoal. According to the ruling, both China and thePhilippines enjoy ‘traditional fishing rights’ in the shoal, and resources should thus beshared. China has made non-committal and reversible concessions without stating them
politically: lifting the interdiction of access to the waters around the Shoal to fishing boats
from the Philippines, and most probably making an oral promise behind closed doors thatno militarized artificial outpost would be built on the Shoal through land reclamation. Thisfragile outcome enables President Duterte to argue internally that bilateral negotiationsdeliver more than confrontation in courts of law.

China continues to consolidate its gains in the South China Sea but in a more
low-key mannerThis successful neutralization of the arbitration process reinforces the assessment inBeijing that the expansionist policy of the Leading Small Group on the protection ofmaritime rights, since its inception in 2012, has enabled China to make concrete gains in theSouth China Sea. As often the strategic goal has been expressed very clearly by the Chinese
themselves – it is about progressively establishing administrative control (both in the East
China Sea and the South China Sea). Chinese military officers are on the record saying to
the press that the goal of the PLA in the SCS is to administer the waters within the 9 DashLine. China already controlled the Paracels and Scarborough Shoal, it now has establisheda dominant presence in the Spratleys through the construction of artificial islands.
It is likely that China will further consolidate this presence to further alter the balance ofpower. Recent news include reports that China prepares for deployment of surface-to-air
missiles on the artificial islands; the vice-director of SASTIND has confirmed that China iscarrying out research on floating maritime nuclear power plants, with the South China Sea
in sight, “to provide stable power to offshore projects”; and Xinhua has reported on
RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 19 -

possible upcoming revisions to China’s 1984 Maritime Traffic Safety Law, in the sense of
more restrictions for foreign vessels. These three recent developments are part of the same
trend of continuing to progress in empty spaces to reinforce China’s power to administer
its maritime claims.
At the same time, there are no signs that the PLA is ready to do what it would take toreally administer the South China Sea: seize by force the features controlled by rival
claimants. Despite the numerous violations it has suffered, the 2002 declaration on the
Code of Conduct still works as a tacit confidence measure. And a positive scenario is not to
be entirely discarded, as the ruling of The Hague opens a face-saving solution as allfeatures in the Spratly have been defined as not being islands but rocks or low-tide
elevations. China could accept a modus vivendi by which a new status quo is frozen
through a set of bilateral negotiations if the new status quo freezes a position for China as
the dominant regional power, because the South China Sea is more about power andhierarchy than actual territorial control and exploitation of resources.

China is expected to test the Trump administration on freedom of navigation
The Obama administration has faced criticism, particularly in Japan, for having given
China a free hand in the South China Sea – mediation without enforcement of the outcome
on Scarborough Shoal and hesitations and divisions over FONOPs during more than a year.
As of today, it is impossible to know with certainty what will be the policy of the Trumpadministration on the South China Sea. Contradictory statements have been pronounced
and so far no clear action has been taken.
The December underwater drone incident was China’s way of testing the Trumpadministration without risking too much – Trump was only the President-elect. There is agenuine anxiety in China that the Trump administration will overreact when challenged
and will seek to unilaterally impose American terms on all foreign policy issues, and will
use all available leverage to reset the US’s foreign trade. It is unclear how much Chinalearned from Trump’s tweets and subsequent exchanges with the US strategic community
regarding what will be the reaction of the Trump administration to a naval or air incident
linked to American surveillance of China’s naval activities in the South China Sea. The
drone incident was China’s way to communicate the importance of the issue and Chinese
resolve to continue making these patrols more dangerous. As there is a lack of clarity on
FONOPs while surveillance continues to intensify, it is extremely likely that a new test will
be mounted.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 20 -

Where Europe stands
Europe simply is not in a position to provide political leadership on international law
solutions if the main stakeholder is not seeking enforcement of the ruling. There isawareness in Europe that the undermining of the rules-based order in the South China Sea
could have global repercussions. In military circles, some start to realize that there is also a
long-term question of political influence at stake in the South China Sea. Once China
becomes the dominant military player, market access for other players will be moredifficult. In this period of crisis, Europe has no choice but to continue to speak out in favourof international law. With ASEAN and with China separately, Europe has space to be
active in the area of ocean governance and fisheries management. Time has also come toEuropeanize the annual French naval presence in the region to send a political signal withregularity and commitment. This should be complemented by more talks with the PLA –this is the missing channel in Europe’s attempt to exert influence on China’s strategic
behavior – in support of UNCLOS.
If there are tensions in the South China Sea, a key dimension will be the international
perception of who has caused trouble. The issue of moral high ground will be important todetermine Europe’s position in a crisis, as Europe still pursues a values-based foreign
policy but without hard power. People have always assumed that while Europe has been
low-key and disengaged on the South China Sea, it would automatically side with the US
in times of conflict. This probably should no longer be taken for granted given the rise of
strategic distrust in transatlantic relations.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 21 -

5. East Asia: Territorial Issues And Regional Security
Developments: The View From Japan’s Alliance Partner,
With A Focus On The Senkaku Islands Dispute
Robert D. Eldridge, Ph.D.

One year has elapsed since I last presented at a RIPS conference about the Senkakus. At
the time, the regional meeting was held in Manila, and was attended by representatives
from about seven countries, all of whom were concerned to varying degrees about China’s
regional ambitions and efforts at territorial aggrandizement. I spoke at that time primarily
about the U.S.’ historical involvement with the Senkaku Islands, and my country’s need toalso “own” the problem, more than simply acknowledging that the islands fall under
Article 51 of the bilateral security treaty, which it now does every time leaders of theUnited States and Japan do when they meet.2
Unfortunately, during the past year, the situation if anything has worsened, which
would not surprise any of the participants then, especially yours truly. Within thePhilippines, a new, nationalist president was elected who has sought to distance himself
from the United States and buddy up to Russia and China. The latter country, in themeantime, continues with its build-up of the artificial island and its militarization.
Furthermore, it continues with its military expansion, recently testing the capabilities of its
new aircraft carrier in regional waters and flying a variety of military aircraft through the1

Article 5 reads: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Suchmeasures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.”2

Most recently, the U.S. government acknowledged the treaty’s coverage in meetings between Defense Secretary James N. Mattis
and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō/Defense Minister Inada Tomomi on February 3, 2017, Secretary of State Roy Tillerson andForeign Minister Kishida Fumio on February 7, and Prime Minister Abe and President Donald J. Trump on February 10. Abe andTrump even included a paragraph on the Senkakus in their joint statement: “The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action thatseeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. The United States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard
the peace and stability of the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order
based on international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States
and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States
and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including themilitarization of outposts, and to act in accordance with international law.” See “Joint Statement from President Donald J.
Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,”https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-ab
e . For a critique of the defense minister’s meeting, see Robert D. Eldridge, “Mattis, Inada, and Another Missed Opportunity,”
Japan Forward, February 6, 2017 (https://japan-forward.com/mattis-inada-and-another-missed-opportunity/ ). For a copy of theauthor’s 2016 paper, please contact RIPS at rips-info@rips.or.jp, or the author at robert@reedintl.com .

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 22 -

first island chain, between Okinawa Island and the Miyako group. North Korea, likewise,
continues to develop its missile technology, ignoring international criticism and warnings.
Tensions between the U.S. and China, including fears of a trade war, and between the U.S.
and Russia over the latter’s alleged interference in the U.S. presidential elections usinghacking and other means has dramatically cooled relations in recent months leading toimages of a new, new Cold War. President-elect Donald J. Trump’s receipt of a“congratulatory” telephone call by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen shook theinternational status quo, especially in the U.S. capital, and brought hopes that a sea-change
in regional dynamics was afoot, but Trump’s admittedly cryptic reaffirmation of the “OneChina” policy in January has temporarily reduced hopes.
With regard to the Senkakus, the focus of this paper, China, in addition to its
unconscionably rapacious behavior in fishing and coral plundering (and other crimes
against ecological systems), has sought to heat up things by sending military aircraft andnaval ships in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands on a number of occasions, as well as
regular Coast Guard incursions and a mass dispatch of 230 fishing vessels to the area inAugust. With regard to air incursions, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force scrambled 407
times against Chinese aircraft in the first half of 2016 alone, an increase of almost 600
percent in just five years. By the end of the year, the number of scrambles had exceeded
more than 1000 times, the highest ever, and more than at the height of the Cold War in 1984
when the ASDF scrambled 944 times primarily against Soviet fighters.
As the increase in scrambles show, Japan has firmly, although in a limited andincremental manner, been responding to the worsening situation. In January last year, it
doubled the number of F-15s (to 40) stationed at Naha Air Base to meet the threat,something that was long overdue. Due to the distances involved, limited number of aircraft
assigned, and dual use with the Naha International Airport that gives priority tocommercial flights, quite often the scrambles were too little, too late.
With the increase in aircraft available, Japan is now sending up four F-15s at a time, twoin the rear to be on alert to handle any additional aircraft that join an incursion which there
are certain to be, as China historically tends to increase in a highly calculated manner thefrequency, number, and scale of its incursions, whether by military aircraft or ships, orcivilian agency and vessels.
In light of this, the increase in Japanese aircraft may not be enough to handle futurechallenges, particularly as the number of incursions grow annually. As such, I have argued
that two options need to be pursued with regard to its ability to strengthen its air
defenses—joint air patrols with the U.S. military (Air Force, Navy and/or Marines) and/or
the stationing of the aircraft (Japanese aircraft alone, or those of both the U.S.-Japan) closer

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 23 -

to the Senkakus at the 3,000-meter runway of Shimoji Island in the Miyako group. A former
U.S. naval officer knowledgeable about the region who believes the People’s Republic ofChina has been tightening its military “noose” around the Senkakus since September 2012
and is preparing for a “short, sharp war” to seize the islands, echoes the view of joint
patrols by stating it is “time for the [U.S.] to begin to conduct concurrent responses with
their counterparts. If we are ever going to deter the PRC, it had better start this year.”
Restarting use of the U.S.-managed training ranges in the island group at Taishō Jima andKuba Jima, which have been unutilized since 1978, or sharing them with the SDF (orreturning the islands outright to Japan) would be ways to ways to demonstrate to Chinathat Japan and the United States are serious.
Japan has done other things to strengthen its defenses3, or more precisely, its policing
capabilities, by developing a fleet of 12 Japan Coast Guard ships assigned to Ishigaki City
(under whose administrative jurisdiction the Senkaku Islands fall) in April 2016. Ten of theships are newly built 1,500-ton vessels, and 2 are helicopter-equipped ships. Prior to this,similar to the challenge that the ASDF had with the limited number of aircraft anddistances involved, the Japan Coast Guard was overtaxed. Aware that the JCG is
overburdened, the Abe Shinzō administration is seeking an increase of nearly 20 billion yen
in the Coast Guard budget in order to purchase new, larger ships to patrol the Senkakus, tobring the total to 210 billion yen (1.82 billion dollars).
Despite these efforts, Japan, however, has failed to adopt some of the more fundamental
measures administratively with regard to the islands, thus, ironically, making a military
clash all the more likely. Although Japan is recognized as having administrative rights overthe islands by the United States, which returned the islands to Japan in 1972 as per the
Okinawa Reversion Agreement, and has administered the islands since 1895 (minus theperiod from 1945-1972 of U.S. occupation and administration), it has hesitated over the past
46 years to robustly implement this administrative control in order to avoid tensions with
Taiwan, which also claims the islands, China, and even the United States. What Japan
should have done, and can still do today, is to: build a lighthouse, a weather station, acommunications/radar facility, an emergency port, and a heliport, and man these facilities
as appropriate with Japanese government personnel. This would be entirely within thescope of having “effective administrative control” over the islands, and would serve as adeterrent for any authorized landings on the islands.

3

A GSDF surveillance unit was deployed in March 2016 to the new installation known as Camp Yonaguni, and a new Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade is scheduled to be stood up in March 2018, along with other units and installations in the island chain
on Miyako, Ishigaki, and Amami. For more, see Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford, eds., The Japanese Ground Self-Defense
Forces: The Search for Legitimacy (New York: Springer, 2017).

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 24 -

In contrast, not having these facilities and personnel on the islands (which supported at
one point a community of almost 250 Japanese in the prewar period) only invites regional
misunderstanding and international doubt over the true ownership and administration of
the islands. In other words, if Japan does not take action on the islands, other than
externally patrolling them, it must not believe that it truly owns the islands. That it does
not allow its own citizens to visit the islands, or its own officials and elected representatives
to go there any longer and conduct the necessary investigations and research, further lends
credence to the perception that Japan’s case is weak.
Of course, this all does not mean that China’s claims are any stronger. In fact, they are
weaker, historically and legally. This is equally true of Taiwan’s, and indeed Taiwan’s own
former President Lee Teng-hui has on numerous occasions following his time in officepointed out that the Senkakus are without doubt Japan’s, most recently when I met withhim at his home in May last year.
So, while China’s (and Taiwan’s) claims are incorrect, bilateral and international calls forjoint development misplaced on the one hand, and Japan’s handling of the issue too tepid
on the other, the origin of the Senkaku issue actually resides with the United States’
problematic stance in this writer’s opinion. Namely, the U.S. Government has tended towalk an all-too-fine line, taking a “neutral” stance on the issue of the territorial sovereigntyof the Senkaku Islands. 4 This stance has unfortunately been historically inaccurate,
diplomatically unnecessary, and strategically harmful. In particular, the ambiguity of its
position, which was announced in 1971 at the time of the signing of the Okinawa Reversion
Agreement and deliberations in the Senate and done in the hopes that Japan and Taiwan(ROC), and later China (PRC), would work out their differences peacefully, actually laid
the seeds for further conflict.
The U.S. position was problematic for several reasons, which I elaborate on in myprevious RIPS conference paper, but suffice it to say: (1) U.S. policy from 1952 to 1972 hadbeen to recognize Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over Okinawa, including the Senkaku
Islands as per the public and international interpretation of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peacewith Japan (colloquially known as the “San Francisco Peace Treaty”)5; (2), Second, theUnited States could have easily argued, if not outright dismissed, the arguments andclaims of the ROC (and the PRC) had it chosen to do so, as the claims of both the ROC and
PRC were then (and now) violations of the principle of estoppel in international law, by

4

For details, see Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa’s Reversion and
the Senkaku Islands (London: Routledge, 2014).

5

For details, see Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations,
1945-1952 (New York: Routledge, 2001).

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 25 -

which a government is not allowed to deny or assert anything to the contrary of that which
has been established as the truth by its own deeds, actions or misrepresentations6; and (3)the policy was harmful because it created instability to the acceptance and confusion ofmultiple claims, which have over the years gotten only more intense and competitive, andemboldened China, which has long sought to overthrow the status quo.
My paper further goes on to discuss why the U.S. Government likely took thecontradictory and self-weakening position it did at the time, based on my The Origins of U.S.
Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa’s Reversion and the Senkaku Islands (which
was translated into Japanese and published in 2015). I invite you to read the book or thepaper, and note that we continue to live with the consequences today.
Bold ideas are necessary, both to correct the doubly faulty historical record (on thequestion of sovereignty over the Senkakus and on Taiwan’s international status), as well as
in light of the fact that the status quo on the Senkakus is untenable (with a rising China)
and the security guarantees as is being superficial.
For this reason, I have argued that the U.S. government should reverse itself and publicly
acknowledge Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkakus. Obviously, both Taiwan and China
will be upset. In China’s case, that is to be expected as it has spent the past 40+ years
bluffing over its claims and bullying Japan. With Taiwan, however, a quid pro quo may bepossible.
The formula I have suggested involves in exchange for Taiwan’s acceptance of a clear
U.S. statement on the Senkakus, the U.S. and Japanese governments would immediately
recognize that Taiwan is indeed an independent, sovereign nation, and not a part of China.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Japanese representatives would nominate President Tsai for theNobel Peace Prize for essentially, unilaterally, relinquishing Taiwanese claims over the
Senkakus. I call this the “Grand Bargain.”7With regard to the superficiality of the security guarantee, the Japanese have regularly
sought an oral statement that the islands fall under the bilateral treaty. However, I havelong pointed out that an Article 5 scenario—when an attack on territory administered by
Japan occurs—is an easy one politically (and legally), although less so militarily, to deal
with.8 It is all the scenarios just below this—an incursion by armed “fishermen,” a massive
6

Robert D. Eldridge, “Facts Stack Up Against China’s Senkaku Claim,” Japan Times, January 28, 2013(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/01/28/voices/facts-stack-up-against-chinas-senkaku-claim/ ).

7

Robert D. Eldridge, “A U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Grand Bargain over the Senkakus,” Japan Times, June 10, 2016(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/10/commentary/japan-commentary/u-s-japan-taiwan-grand-bargain-senkakus/#.W
LYbxW996M8 ).

8Eldridge, The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute, especially Conclusion.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 26 -

arrival of fishing vessels seeking shelter from a storm, an emergency requiring use of theislands or the area, a maritime clash at sea where Japan is made out to be theaggressor—that are more worrisome, partly because any one of them could possibly place
a wedge in between the United States and Japan diplomatically, and cause confusion
operationally. Particularly in the latter scenario—a clash at sea and Japan was seen to havedrawn first blood—is the most dangerous for the alliance, as Article 5, in which Japan has
placed all hopes, would NOT, in fact, apply.
There are many—academics and observers around the world—who ask, “why fight over‘just a bunch of rocks’?” Others, still, call on the two/three countries simply to put off (orshelve) the question of sovereignty, and focus on joint development of the area and its
mineral and other resources.9 Moreover, those with pro-China sympathies or who haveantipathy toward Japan argue the islands are actually Chinese territory. In fact, none ofthese is true or is a viable option. China has no legitimate claims to the Senkaku Islands
whatsoever. Simply repeating that it does, or treating the China as a “disputant” and thus
giving it credibility, will not give the statement legitimacy, nor does outside support for
those claims by the above academics and observers. In reality, it further clouds the issue
and makes a solution all the more difficult and conflict all the more likely.
I think we all would agree a China in control of the Senkakus would be dangerous forJapan, for the United States, and for the region as a whole for many reasons. This cannot beallowed, diplomatically if possible, militarily if necessary. In either case, Japan and theUnited States must work closely together and with like-minded countries of the region who
also have similar pressures and concerns.

9

One example of this sort of—misplaced, in my opinion—was found in Akikazu Hashimoto, Michael O’Hanlon, and Wu Xinbo,“A Framework for Resolving Japan-China Dispute Over Islands,” Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2014.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 27 -

6. The Korean Peninsula: Focus of Tensions
Masashi Nishihara

Is Korean Unification Realistic?
Reunification of the Korean peninsula has never seemed so remote as it does today.
Political turmoil has reigned in South Korea since President Park Geun-hye was impeachedby the National Assembly and since Lee Jae-yong, vice chairman of a conglomerate
responsible for 20 percent of the nation’s GDP, was arrested on charges of bribery. The
government succeeding Park is likely to be leftist and to take a proNorth Korea stance.
In North Korea, the position of Kim Jong-un, chairman of the North Korean Workers’
Party and the country’s supreme leader, is far from stable. Kim Jong-un’s half-brother Kim
Jong-nam was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur due to his fear that Kim Jong-nam might
eventually threaten his regime. In addition, North Korea’s escalating development of its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as well as its questionable leadership, has createdhuge security issues for Northeast Asia and the United States. Consequently, unification is
not on the agenda for any of these governments.
The media and many experts tend to regard the young Kim Jong-un as not only
inexperienced but also irrational. But despite the execution of both his uncle, Jang
Song-thaek, and his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un should not be consideredirrational. Cruel as he may be, he has carefully devised a strategy to speed up themodernization of his nuclear weapons while preventing any pushback by the United Statesand South Korea.
In her February 2013 inaugural address, President Park stressed a trust-building processwith North Korea. But her bold “trustpolitik” initiative, which aimed to “turn mistrust andconfrontation in Northeast Asia into trust and cooperation,” soon failed, for it presumed
the collapse of the North Korean regime and its absorption by South Korea. As a result,tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang grew. Soon after North Korea conducted a test of
its nuclear weapons in January 2016, President Park, showing her displeasure, shut down
the Kaesong industrial complex, the only joint Korean venture. In September of that year,
Kim Jong-un again taunted South Korea and the United States by conducting anothernuclear test.
In addition to these two nuclear tests, North Korea launched ballistic missiles 24 times in2016. Then on January 1, 2017, Kim Jong-un announced in his New Year’s Day message

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 28 -

that his military was preparing to conduct its first launch of an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM). In order to defuse this threat, the new US secretary of defense, James
Mattis, visited Seoul and stated that the United States would retaliate against a nuclear
attack by North Korea “with an effective and overwhelming response.” The new US
president and Shinzo Abe, who was in Washington, also talked about their strong bilateralalliance in regard to North Korea’s threats. Kim Jong-un then launched anintermediate-range missile into the Sea of Japan on February 13.
Today, South Korea, Japan, and the United States have no interest in negotiating with
North Korea on its nuclear weapons. Their position is to denuclearize North Korea. No
country wants to see a united nuclear Korea, whether under Kim Jong-un or Park
Geun-hye’s successor. China’s basic strategy is to keep North Korea as a buffer against the
US forces in South Korea and to prevent North Korea from turning toward Russia. To that
end, China only halfheartedly enforces the sanctions on North Korea, thereby continuing tohelp sustain its economy.
Nonetheless, China is opposed to North Korea’s nuclear development, and Kim Jong-un
in turn was angry with President Xi Jinping for visiting Seoul before going to Pyongyang.
For a while in 2013-2015 Xi formed a supportive relationship with President Park Geun-hye
mainly in order to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. Park thensought Xi’s help in preventing Kim Jong-un from further developing nuclear weapons.
When Xi did not help her, however, Park has moved away from him, and China now
criticizes Park for agreeing to deploy the US-made THAAD antimissile system, which will
weaken its own defense system, although Seoul needs the system to defend itself from
North Korea’s nuclear attack.
The United States, too, has no interest in pursuing a united nuclear Korea. During
President Barack Obama’s 8-year tenure, North Korea conducted as many as four nuclear
tests. Obama’s “strategic patience” policy has clearly failed.

Similarly, Japan opposes aunited, anti-Japan, Korea. It would not result in the release of Japanese abductees. (OnFebruary 10, 2017, the Japanese cabinet disclosed that as many as 883 Japanese nationals
may have been abducted by North Korea.)
Japan’s relationship with South Korea also remains tense. South Korea claims territorial
sovereignty over the island of Takeshima (in Korean, Dokto). Japan’s position is that South
Korea illegally took possession of the island in January 1952 while Japan was still under US
occupation. Another issue is the two countries’ dispute over wartime damages. Protesting
the South Korean government’s handling of comfort woman issues, on January 9, 2017,
Japan recalled its ambassador in Seoul and its consul general in Busan. Indeed, many
Japanese fear that a united Korea would become even more anti-Japan than the two Koreas

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 29 -

currently are, and this fear even might persuade Japan to develop nuclear weapons of its
own.

Is a Second Korean War Likely?
Is another Korean War likely under these circumstances? Probably not, since no country
wants a large-scale conflict in East Asia. Although Kim Jong-un attacked Yongbyong island
off the west coast of South Korea in November 2010, he must be aware that his
provocations have limits. A large-scale conflict on the peninsula would result in a huge
number of casualties and devastate the North Korean economy.
Yet history shows that in similar situations, the party that feels stronger than its
opponent is often tempted to be the first to use force and to try to expand its area of
dominance. Or the stronger party tends to treat a political and military vacuum in a region
as an opportunity to enlarge its dominance. The 1950–1953 Korean War is a case in point.
Today, then, North Korea may see the turmoil in South Korea as a political vacuum.
Perhaps this is the main reason why Secretary of Defense Mattis visited Seoul in February
to reaffirm the United States’ command of their joint forces, to reaffirm the US commitment
to defend South Korea and to take a firm position against North Korea’s nuclear threats.
As long as the balance of power on the peninsula is sustained, a precarious stability islikely to continue. Kim Jong-un, however, may consider that time is on his side. He has
intensified the allocation of vital resources to speed up the development of the country’s
nuclear and ballistic missiles. The intermediate-range missile launched on February 11 isconsidered to have achieved a new level of sophistication. North Korea also has had
success in its cyberattacks, as well as in terrorism and espionage. If Kim’s confidence grows,
he may be tempted to use these weapons to enhance North Korea’s external position and toundermine South Korea’s government. Indeed, one South Korean government source hassuggested that in a few years, North Korean ballistic missiles may enter an epoch-making
phase.

Is There a Resolution?
Is there a reasonable way to create a peaceful, denuclearized, united Korea? First, the two
Koreas must develop confidence in each other. In the past, a few attempts were made tobuild mutual confidence, but none—including the six-party talks, the promise of alight-water reactor, and the construction of the Kaeson industrial park—were successful.
Diplomatic efforts like the UN Security Council’s resolutions and sanctions have proved

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 30 -

ineffective.
Even though these measures have not helped, Japan, South Korea, the United States, andthe European Union should maintain close coordination and continue to press China andRussia diplomatically to try to prevent North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. Because China and Russia are in a position to pressure North Korea,
the allies need to engage them first.
Coordination between China and its Pacific neighbors has often been hindered byconflict. China and the United States disagree on many regional security issues, including
the US deployment of THAAD in South Korea, the disposition of the Senkaku Islands (inChinese, Diaoyudo), Taiwan, the South China Sea. Similarly Japan and China disagree on
the Senkakus and the South China Sea in addition to China’s military expansion andcoercive actions in the wester Pacific.
Economic sanctions against North Korea have so far proved unsuccessful, largely
because China has continued to trade with North Korea. But on February 19, 2017, China
announced that it would suspend its imports of coal from North Korea until the end of thisyear, to pressure North Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons and perhaps to retaliate
for the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, whom China favored. China’s suspension of coal
imports, which account for 50 percent of China’s total imports from North Korea, may havea significant negative impact on North Korea’s economy and foreign currency earnings,
although loopholes are still suspected. .
Even though sanctions have been ineffective, we should try even harder to strengthen
them. At the same time, we should find ways to engage North Korea. One such approach
may be for the United States and its partners to assure North Korea that in exchange for its
denuclearization, they will not pursue regime change.
To accept North Korea as a nuclear state would be a dangerous option, for it may
encourage other nuclear-aspiring countries to follow suit. Kim Jong-un also might regard
this as a diplomatic victory and may even try to take the upper hand in dealing with the
big powers.
Another approach may be to instigate regime change in Pyongyang. This would be
dangerous. Yet the price of risking an uncertain future may surpass the price of doing
nothing and allowing the current regime to threaten the world with its nuclear weapons. In
the end, much of what will happen on the Korean peninsula will depend on what policy
President Trump may pursue.

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 31 -

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Hideshi Tokuchi
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 35 -

EȪɟƸǿâ0<&ɺ˺13̔ɕF0 &),ȪɟƸǿâ2Eʈą2ò
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 36 -

3. How Do We Assess China’s Foreign and Security Policy?
Giovani B. AndorninoĞ2ĵŇË½̴ǚʂ3. ,ĞÏǚȨ2̩ǝ-D%F3Ğ2ÉĞŎ[]f|Iʕƽ"E.1EĞ2ƾŘŠ3%FIĞ2 ȆƌɟÚɠ .ɕ˝-Î²ɟ1˂ɑ"E÷E 2 ǵ 27 Ǧ1ȋɁʇĞëĿĐhtĸʑͅ.2®ˢ-̅9&B1%F3q{eiŻ1°C̅9,Ğ2ʎȵɮ®2ŇŊɟɜŞĞŎȔ.ͅġ½Ë% ,Ğ2ĬǻɟĞŎ²Û.ĞŎŇË½̴2ʕƽ.0E
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 37 -

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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 38 -

4. China’s Maritime Security Policy: Trends in Early 2017
Mathieu Duchâtel2017
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 40 -

5. East Asia: Territorial Issues And Regional Security Developments:
The View From Japan’s Alliance Partner, With A Focus On The Senkaku
Islands Dispute
Robert D. Eldridge
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 41 -

6. The Korean Peninsula: Focus of Tensions
Masashi NishiharaǸ͏ñţ2ʑ3ɑŋɟǼȑƙĸʑͅ1œ"EĞ®-2ƀéȦ˦ǽģ̣Z|]Þ®̥
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RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25- 42 -

RIPS Policy Perspectives
Back issues
No. 24 (May 2016)
Prospects and Agenda for Maritime Security Cooperation in the East and South China Sea –The Manila Symposium
No. 23 (April 2015)
RIPS’ EYE 2014-2015 (2014

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No. 22 (February 2015)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation, Series 4: How JapanCan Counter China’s Coercive Actions & Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
No. 21 (January 2015)(Japan's Defense Industries and
Its New Principles of Arms Transfer)No. 20 (September 2014)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation, Series 3: China’s
Assertive Conduct (Masashi Nishihara), Responses to Rising Tensions in The South China
Sea (Yoji Koda)
No. 19 (September 2014)
Masahiro Matsumura,
Airport for National Defense

Using Okinawa’s Shimoji

No. 18 (February 2014)
Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation Series 2: The Changing
Security of the Sea Lines of Communication in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Masashi
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Building a Framework for Japan-US-Vietnam Trilateral Cooperation: Analyses from Japaneseperspectives (Satoru Mori and Masashi Nishihara)
No. 16 (December 2012)
RIPS Symposium 2012, Summary Report: Responses to Japan’s New Arms Export Policy
No.15 (November 2012)
Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Restore Its Place in Asia?”

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

No.142012  3 
RIPS Ì̧_{j2011͑2011 Ŵ 10 ǵ͒Ʉōœʂ.̬ʿ2&?1ǡƯʾI/ȭ"

No.13February 2012
RIPS Symposium 2011, “New High-Techs for Disaster Relief and National Defense.”
No.12 (2012  2 )
RIPS ǬŃÌ̧_{j(2011 Ŵ 5 ǵ)
ʢEǦǻ2œƐǦ̼̩».ïǢͅġ̗̃2ŞǷ―ȂǦǻĸ̻ɄƇ1

No. 11 (August 2011)
Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2011: China’s ‘Coercive’ Diplomacy Leads to New
Power Realignments.”
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Michimi Muranushi, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens: The Centrality of
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Masashi Nishihara, “Asian Perspectives in 2009: Hopeful Signs and Growing Concerns.”
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Masahiro Matsumura, “Japan’s Policy Options for Taiwan- June 2009.”

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25

RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 25