 Chapter 1
A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment――Beyond the Policy of Maximum Pressure[Key Points]


The military option offers the only possibility of achieving the denuclearization of
North Korea within the short term. However, even if that were technically feasible,
the risk of failure could not be reduced to zero. Moreover, the toll in the case of
failure would be too high for anyone to be able to bear the responsibility for it. This is
the inconvenient truth for Japan, the USA, and South Korea.



There is also an inconvenient truth for North Korea. Even if it perfects a nuclear
missile capable of reaching the US mainland, prolonged military pressure andeconomic blockades would cause economic activities to stagnate and the maintenanceof the regime could not be guaranteed. Without some kind of agreement between the
US and North Korea over the denuclearization issue, its survival cannot be
guaranteed.

The key points of the policy of flexible containment are as follows: (1) The sanctions
adopted by the UN Security Council will be rigorously maintained until North Korea
completely renounces nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. However, (2) if North
Korea freezes its development, testing, and deployment, and accepts international
monitoring, the US and South Korea will curb aggressive military maneuvers andrelax economic sanctions correspondingly. (3) Inter-Korean reconciliation, exchange,
and cooperation will not be impeded.
Stances of Major Countries on the North Korean Nuclear and Missile Issues
USA & JapanKey Data

Achieve
North
Koreandenuclearization by applying
maximum pressure via economic
sanctions and military force. All
options are on the table.

North Korea
Basic approach is parallel economic
construction and nuclear arms
development. Aiming for a peace
treaty with the USA, but exploring a“South First, US Later” strategy ofinter-Korean dialogue first to put inplace the conditions for negotiations
with the US later.

South Korea

China & Russia

Aiming for denuclearization, like
Japan and the US, but opposed to
war on the Korean Peninsula.
Promoting inter-Korean dialogue,
while advocating a phased,
comprehensive solution.

Advocating a solution via dialogue.
China proposes a “double freezing”:
the freezing of nuclear and missile
development by North Korea and thefreezing of US-South Korean joint
military exercises.

Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Report | 11

1. Introduction
The Korean Peninsula situation is complex and fluid. Currently, the Trump administration’s
policy of maximum pressure is squaring off against the Kim Jong-un regime’s “South First, US
Later” policy. However, Chairman Kim Jong-un sent not only the president of the Presidium of theSupreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam, but also his own younger sister, Kim
Yo-jong, as special envoys to attend the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, and also requested thatPresident Moon Jae-in visit Pyongyang at the earliest possible opportunity. This perhaps suggeststhat US military pressure and international economic sanctions are having a quite substantial effect.
Following the agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit meeting, moves aimed at holding a
US-North Korean summit meeting also began, but this should probably be regarded as an
escalation in political horse-trading. North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship and the emergence ofPresident Trump on the political stage means that the Korean Peninsula could face a major turning
point comparable with that seen at the end of the Cold War or at the time of the Iraq War.
While North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship is approaching its end, its “South First, US Later”
policy has only just begun. Will peaceful foreign relations on the part of North Korea, including thefreezing of its development and deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, result ininter-Korean coexistence and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula? Could ignoring theregional mechanism of inter-Korean dialogue not place excessive pressure on North Korea,
resulting in unnecessary tension and catastrophic outcomes? Is there potential for China and Russia
to play some kind of role? Is there any possibility that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could build on
his close relationship to President Trump to achieve a breakthrough in Japanese-North Korean
relations and resolve the abductions issue, similar to the way in which Prime Minister Jun’ichiro
Koizumi’s close relationship with President Bush laid the foundations for the Japanese premier’s
North Korean diplomacy? However, a tense stalemate could become prolonged. Are there no
appropriate policies that can bring peace and prosperity to this region, like transforming alandscape of bare concrete buildings into a beautiful garden?

2. The Nuclear Armaments of a Divided Nation――Local Origins

As the 1980s drew to a close, the end of the Cold War saw North Korea facing defeat in thecontest of regimes with South Korea. Having accomplished economic development anddemocratization, South Korea hosted the Olympics in Seoul in 1988 and shifted its northern
diplomacy up a gear. President Roh Tae-woo first established diplomatic relations with the

12 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportcountries of Eastern Europe, followed by the Soviet Union and China. On the other hand,confronted by economic collapse and the fall of the socialist camp, President Kim Il-sungattempted to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan, but failed. Amid rumors about thedisintegration of the regime, Kim Il-sung’s successor, Secretary Kim Jong-il, succeeded inconcluding the Agreed Framework with the Clinton administration, ultimately agreeing to suspend
North Korea’s nuclear program. The agreement dealt with a long-term denuclearization process,under which, over a period of 10 years, North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors would be
replaced with light water reactors and relations between the US and North Korea would benormalized. However, the nuclear agreement between the US and North Korea collapsed in thewake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that followed the launch of the Bush administration. Criticized aspart of the “axis of evil,” North Korea forged ahead with its nuclear development program while
the Iraq War was getting underway. To put it another way, Kim Jong-il once again staked thesurvival of the North Korean regime on the development of nuclear weapons and missiles.
Thereafter, during the 20 years or so of Kim Jong-il’s reign as supreme leader, North Korea
continued to develop nuclear weapons and missiles at the cost of its people’s standard of living,with hundreds of thousands of North Koreans dying of starvation. In this sense, North Korea’s
nuclear development was undoubtedly a survival strategy. In order of importance, Kim Jong-il’spriorities were (1) his own safety, (2) the maintenance of the regime, (3) national security, and (4)purity of ideology. The development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was his last resort
for achieving those objectives. The failures of Iraq and Libya were no less than an example of what
not to do, from which North Korea needed to learn. However, the nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles that North Korea was trying to acquire were intended as a deterrent against attack by othercountries, rather than to bolster its own ability to wage war, and were a tool for securing both
domestic solidarity and diplomatic negotiations. In fact, another of North Korea’s goals has been
the normalization of diplomatic relations with major countries, as demonstrated by the history of its
negotiations with Japan and the US, along with the Six-Party Talks involving Japan, the US, China,
Russia, and North and South Korea. Even now, it is not only establishing a deterrent by perfecting a
nuclear missile capable of reaching the US mainland, but also urging the US president to enter
negotiations aimed at concluding a peace treaty.
However, despite the fact that its nuclear missile system is comparatively small and rudimentary,
one must acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear armaments as a serious threat to neighboring
countries, including Japan, the USA, and South Korea. This is because, unlike the nuclear arsenals
of major countries such as the US, Russia, and China, which have been built up in a stable way
based on the theory of mutual deterrence, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is constantly

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 13

unstable and regional conflict there has involved impulsive acts, including efforts to unify thepeninsula by force, military provocation, low-intensity conflict, guerrilla struggle, and terrorism. In
addition, rapid advances in developing a means of delivery make the threat posed by nuclear
weapons a severe one. For Japan, the Korean War in the 1950s was no more than “a fire on the
opposite shore” — a problem that did not concern it — but now, mainland Japan is within range not
only of North Korea’s old Rodong missiles, but also its new Scud-ER and Pukkuksong-2 missiles.
Incredibly, the North Korean political regime poses a threat to South Korea and Japan, as it
demonstrates more resilience than that of East Germany. To put it another way, the source of thethreat is not a Cold War-era power struggle between superpowers, but the division of the Korean
Peninsula by the US and the Soviet Union, and localized conflicts left over after the Cold War. It
will likely be impossible to achieve regional denuclearization without resolving these issues.
On the other hand, in contrast to North Korea’s persistent and ongoing efforts to acquire nuclear
armaments, the policies of those seeking to prevent it from doing so have lacked consistency andhave not been terribly effective. Above all, the policies of President Bush were lacking inconsistency. The initial policy of “blackmail” eventually developed into the multilateralism of the
Six-Party Talks, resulting in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, which
committed North Korea to denuclearization. However, financial sanctions were imposed on North
Korea immediately afterwards, on the grounds of money laundering, rendering implementation of
the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement impossible. Despite this, once North Korea conducted the firstnuclear test in October the following year, the Bush administration embarked upon direct
negotiations with North Korea and lifted not only the financial sanctions, but also the designationof North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. In contrast, throughout its eight years in power, theObama administration consistently maintained a policy of “strategic patience,” refusing to engage
in dialogue unless North Korea demonstrated the willingness to undertake denuclearization. While
President Obama dealt with the four nuclear tests during his time in office by means of economic
sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, this did not discourage North Korea in its strong
resolve to develop these weapons. In fact, it actually gave North Korea enough time to develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
Moreover, China also made North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development
possible, as it has supported the country’s survival because it regards North Korea as a buffer zone
for its own safety. At the time of the Korean War, China entered the war to prevent the US militaryfrom advancing into North Korea, but both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping consistently supported
the “independent and peaceful unification” of the Korean Peninsula; supporting, in other words,“federal unification.” However, China attaches the greatest importance to the peace and stability of

14 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportthe Korean Peninsula. At present, denuclearization — the second of the three principles of the
Korean Peninsula ((1) peace and stability, (2) denuclearization, and (3) a solution through dialogue
and consultation) — should probably be understood as denuclearization for the purpose of peaceand stability. In fact, the UN Security Council resolution (2270) concerning the fourth nuclear test,
on January 6, 2016, was not actually adopted until March 2. China was not only cautious about the
deployment of the state-of-the-art Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic
missile system at a US military base in South Korea, which it regarded as evidence of the US-South
Korea security framework being strengthened, but it was also not all that positive about economic
sanctions which could prompt North Korea’s destabilization. China’s attitude changed in 2017,
after the Trump administration came to power and a US-China summit meeting took place that
April.

3. North Korea’s Policy of Brinkmanship――Combining Technological Innovation With
Military Provocation

During the last year of the Obama administration and the first year of the Trump administration,
North Korea undertook intensive testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in an attempt toachieve a technological breakthrough that would lead to the completion of an intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) and an intercontinental ballistic missile (IBCM) capable of carrying a
nuclear weapon. Accordingly, the first year saw two nuclear tests and test firing of SLBM and
Scud-ER missiles, followed in the second year by test firing of the Pukkuksong-2, Hwasong-12,
Hwasong-14, and Hwasong-15, as well as North Korea’s sixth nuclear test. However, what waseven more astonishing was that North Korea pursued a kind of brinkmanship or “blackmail by the
weaker party” at precisely the same time as it was engaging in this technological innovation andmilitary provocation. Above all, in August and September 2017, the Trump administration’s severe
backlash brought about a critical situation. To put it another way, the ratcheting up of North Korea’s
policy of brinkmanship gave the rest of the world a shock. This had undoubtedly been a long timein the making and was systematically implemented over a period of two years.
Looking back, the first sign of this series of critical moments surfaced on October 30, 2015. This
was the date on which the decision by the Politburo of the Workers’ Party of Korea to hold theparty’s Seventh Congress at the beginning of May the following year was announced. Furthermore,on December 10, Kim Jong-un was reported to have stated that North Korea had become “apowerful nuclear weapons state ready to detonate a self-reliant A-bomb and H-bomb to reliably
defend its sovereignty and the dignity of the nation.” As if putting this announcement into effect,

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 15

North Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and launched a “satellite” using
an improved version of the Taepodong-2 rocket on February 7. However, at the time, these actions
were thought to be something akin to firing a salute to mark the forthcoming Congress of theWorkers' Party on May 6-9.
It was after the party congress that the North Korean nuclear missile threat actually escalated.
Most notably, North Korea successfully test fired an SLBM for the first time on August 24, whileon September 5 it launched three mobile Scud-ER missiles (with a range of about 1,000 km) almost
simultaneously, and then conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9. North Korea announced
that the objective of the nuclear test was to develop smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear
warheads. At any event, this was probably designed to expose the fact that the Obamaadministration’s policy of strategic patience had failed and prompt a policy shift by the next US
administration. Attention also focused on the fact that North Korean authorities singled out the Blue
House, South Korean government institutions, US military bases in the Asia-Pacific region, and the
US mainland as targets of a missile attack. This is because US military bases in western Japan, suchas Sasebo and Iwakuni, are within range of the test-fired Scud-ER. As Prime Minister Abe pointed
out, this placed the threat in a different dimension, as far as Japan was concerned. In his September
23 speech to the UN General Assembly, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho disclosed
North Korea’s intention to develop fully-fledged IRBMs and ICBMs, stating that his country “willcontinue to take measures to strengthen its national nuclear armed forces in both quantity andquality.”
However, in the sense of a policy of brinkmanship, it was after the Trump administration’s
inauguration that North Korea’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile test firing entered a new phaseand began to be perceived as obvious military provocation. The first target of this was the firstJapan–US summit meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Abe, which took place inPalm Beach, Florida, on February 11, 2017 (February 12 Japan time). Timing it to coincide withthis summit, North Korea fired a Pukkuksong-2 — an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
with an estimated range of approximately 2,500 km — on a lofted trajectory at about 07:55 on the
12th (local time) from a location close to Kusong in North Pyongan Province. Launched from acaterpillar-type vehicle, the missile reached an altitude of approximately 550 km and flew for about
500 km before falling into the Sea of Japan. Its new missile was a mobile ballistic missile based on
its submarine-launched SLBM, using solid fuel to enable its deployment on land. This finallybrought mainland Japan in range of North Korea's ballistic missiles, meaning that it can target all
US military bases in Japan. At a hastily convened joint press conference held at a Florida resort
owned by President Trump, Prime Minister Abe emphasized that the test was “absolutely

16 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportunacceptable,” while President Trump stated that “America stands behind Japan, its great ally,
100%.” It may well have been at this point that President Trump and Prime Minister Abe hardened
their resolve to work together in dealing with North Korea’s policy of brinkmanship.
The development of the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, and Hwasong-15 missiles that appeared
thereafter was in no small part due to successful “ground test of a new type of high-power engine”
on March 18, during a visit to the test site by Chairman Kim Jong-un to provide guidance. North
Korea called this the “March 18 Revolution.” For example, the Hwasong-12, which was launchedjust before 05:00 on May 14, reached an altitude of 2,100 km, and flew for 780 km or so, was anintermediate- to long-range ballistic missile with an estimated range of approximately 5,000 km,
which was aimed at Andersen Air Force Base on the island of Guam. This launch took place on the
opening day of an international conference in Beijing about China’s One Belt, One Road initiative.
Chairman Kim Jong-un attracted attention with the remark that nuclear weapon systems will never
become the eternal exclusive property of the US, expressing the belief that “the day when [North
Korea] uses the similar retaliatory means will come.”
At 09:00 on July 4, the Hwasong-14 two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was
launched, reaching an altitude of approximately 2,800 km on a lofted trajectory and flying for morethan 900 km. Interestingly, when Kim Jong-un said in his New Year Address on January 1 that
North Korea had “entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of [an] intercontinental
ballistic missile,” President-elect Trump quickly reacted on Twitter, tweeting, “It won't happen!”
After the test, Kim Jong-un called the missile “a gift” to the US on its Independence Day, whichmust have irritated Trump. North Korea did not stop at testing the Hwasong-14 just the once. At
about 23:42 on July 28, a Hwasong-14 was launched from northwestern North Korea, reaching an
altitude of approximately 3,700 km and flying for about 1,000 km before landing in the sea off
Okushiri Island in Hokkaido. With a range estimated at somewhere between 9,000 and 10,000 km
or more, it was regarded as having the ability to reach the West Coast of mainland USA. On July 5,
Korean Central Broadcasting reported Kim Jong-un’s statement that North Korea would not “put its
nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case...unless the U.S. hostile policy
and nuclear threat to [North Korea] are definitely terminated.” While couched in roundabout andparadoxical language, this was likely an announcement of North Korea’s willingness to negotiate
over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
One of the objectives of these two ICBM launches was to “press the US to make a choice
between ramping up pressure through antagonistic policies or negotiations with a halt in mind.”However, it goes without saying that the testing of an ICBM capable of reaching the US mainland
irritated the US government significantly. In the morning of July 29, the US and South Korean

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 17

militaries conducted a joint military exercise on South Korea’s east coast, reaffirming theircapabilities for a “precise strike on the enemy's leadership.” On the 30th, the US deployed two
B-1B strategic bombers from Guam over Kyushu and South Korea, and conducted joint exerciseswith Japan and with South Korea. On August 5, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 2371. As well as imposing a complete ban on exports of coal, iron ore, lead, andseafood from North Korea, the resolution requires UN member states to refrain from employing
North Korean workers. Estimates suggest that this will cut by one-third the value of North Korea’s
exports, which are believed to be worth approximately $3 billion a year.
However, the North Korean response in the wake of its successful test firing of the Hwasong-12
and Hwasong-14 was nothing less than astounding. Building on its successes with the Hwasong-12
and Hwasong-14, North Korea actually engaged in all-out military provocation in August and
September 2017. A government statement on August 7 denouncing the UN Security Council
resolution was followed the next day by a statement in which a Korean People’s Armyspokesperson said, “The KPA Strategic Force is now carefully examining the operational plan formaking an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic
rocket Hwasong-12.” Needless to say, this measure was a backlash against the planned US-South
Korean joint military exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG), which was due to take place on
August 21–31, and was carried out in the awareness that the UN General Assembly would meet in
September. This was the start of the August–September Crisis. Ultimately, North Korea did not goahead with “enveloping fire at the areas around Guam, ” but did carry out its sixth nuclear test on
September 3, the day before the opening of the BRICS Summit of five major emerging national
economies, which China was hosting in Xiamen. The explosion was estimated to have resulted
from the detonation of a hydrogen bomb with a power around 10 times (160 kt) that of the atomic
bomb used in Hiroshima. On August 29 and September 15, North Korea carried out Hwasong-12
medium-to-long-range ballistic missile launch drills, in which the missiles passed through
Hokkaido airspace.
Finally, at 02:48 on November 29, the Hwasong-15 two-stage ICBM was launched from theoutskirts of Pyongyang. Having reached an altitude of 4475 km and covered a distance of 950 km
in 53 minutes, it was estimated to be capable of reaching East Coast USA. Describing it as “capableof carrying [a] super-heavy nuclear warhead,” a North Korean government statement said that it
was “the most powerful weapon system that has reached the stage of completion.” Chairman Kim
Jong-un declared that North Korea had “accomplished the historic cause of building the state
nuclear force.” However, reports suggest a strong possibility that the warhead itself disintegrated at
the time of reentry, so North Korea’s nuclear capability is not believed to have reached the

18 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportoperational deployment stage. Nevertheless, Kim Jong-un’s declaration that North Korea had“accomplished the [building of] the national nuclear program” is of no small significance. Even if
the development of an ICBM mounted with a nuclear warhead is 100% complete and North Korea
continues its efforts to achieve operational deployment, it is questionable whether North Korea’s
policy of brinkmanship blending technological innovation with military provocation will be
repeated. Rather than this, there is a stronger possibility that it will attempt to transition away fromthis policy of brinkmanship, while proactively moving forward with inter-Korean dialogue, with aview to bringing negotiations with the USA to fruition. However, as North Korea has habituallyengaged in repeated military provocation, it certainly has no easy path to dialogue and negotiations,nor to economic reconstruction and economic sanctions.

4. The Trump Administration’s Policy of Maximum Pressure
It has already been pointed out that North Korea’s focus was on the February 11, 2017 Japan–US
Summit Meeting when it test fired its new Pukkuksong-2 ballistic missile. Naturally, one cannot
imagine that President Trump expected such blatant military provocation beforehand. However, in
his first defense policy statement, entitled “Making our Military Strong Again” and issued on
January 20, the day of his inauguration as president, Trump specifically named North Korea,
asserting that the US would “develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against
missile-based attacks from states like Iran and North Korea.” In addition, the first place he sent
newly appointed Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to visit was South Korea, which was reeling in
the wake of President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. Visiting South Korea on February 2,
Secretary Mattis touched down at the US Air Force base in Osan on an E-4B, which is capable ofserving as an airborne command post. He told South Korean defense minister Han Min-goo, “Anyattack on the United States or on our allies will be defeated and any use of nuclear weapons would
be met with the response that would be effective and overwhelming.” Regarding the deployment of
the THAAD antimissile unit at a US military base in South Korea, Mattis said, “There is no othernation that needs to be concerned about THAAD other than North Korea,” countering China’s
objections. All of these responses by the new administration to the military provocation by North
Korea that had been ongoing since the previous year demonstrated great caution.
After North Korea stirred things up with the Pukkuksong-2, President Trump began to perceive it
as the nation’s most immediate threat and ordered the National Security Council (NSC) toundertake a broad review of North Korea policy. The Trump administration’s policy graduallybecame clear as the US-South Korean joint military exercises Foal Eagle (field training exercise)

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 19

and Key Resolve (command post exercise) went ahead on the largest-possible scale, starting on
March 1 and March 13, respectively. Responding to North Korea’s simultaneous launch of fourScud-ER missiles from Tongchang-ri on its west coast on March 6, the US Air Force began
deploying a B-1B strategic bomber and F-35 stealth fighters over South Korea in the latter half ofMarch. Visiting South Korea on March 17, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that the
Obama administration’s “policy of strategic patience has ended,” announcing that US policy did not
rule out a military response. However, as has already been seen, this was precisely the time when
North Korea succeeded in its “ground test of a new type of high-power engine” (the March 18
Revolution). In fact, two large vehicles carrying what appeared to be ICBMs attracted attention
when they appeared in a military parade on April 15 to mark the 105th anniversary of the birth ofPresident Kim Il-sung. On the other hand, during telephone talks with Prime Minister Abe on April
6, President Trump himself asserted that “all options are on the table.”
However, the framework and distinctive features of the Trump administration’s North Korea
policy were probably only finalized through the US-China summit meeting between President
Trump and President Xi Jinping on April 6 and 7. The first distinctive feature was Trump’s
announcement that “all options are on the table,” bringing the Obama administration’s policy ofstrategic patience to a definitive end and revealing the new administration’s plan to resolve theNorth Korean nuclear weapon and ballistic missile issues at the earliest possible opportunity, while
applying “maximum pressure.” It would be fair to say that this was a point of differentiation fromthe Obama administration’s North Korea policy. In fact, on the first day of the US-China summit
meeting, the US astonished China by launching a lightning missile attack on a Syrian militaryfacility. This likely applied psychological pressure on China, as it suggested that the US could
unilaterally carry out an armed strike on North Korea. The increased effectiveness of economic
sanctions achieved through the cooperation of China — North Korea’s biggest trading partner —became the second feature of the Trump administration’s North Korea policy. Trump asked Xi
Jinping to fully implement the economic sanctions against North Korea and linked its actions inthis regard to US-China trade negotiations. In urging China to take action, Trump is believed tohave said that the US was prepared to act alone if China did not cooperate. On April 8, after thesummit meeting had ended, the US Navy announced that it would dispatch an aircraft carrier, the
USS Carl Vinson, to the Korean Peninsula from Singapore. Accordingly, rumors of an “April crisis”
began to intensify in South Korea.
The Trump administration’s new North Korea policy was dubbed “maximum pressure andengagement” even before its formal announcement, which finally came on April 26, in theauthoritative form of a joint statement by Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Mattis,

20 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportand Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats. Furthermore, President Trump took theunprecedented step of inviting all Senators to the White House for the briefing. The joint statement
asserted that the approach “aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, ballistic
missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic
measures with our Allies and regional partners” (underlining by author). While references tounilateral action or military operations by the US were curbed, the statement revealed that the goalof the engagement policy was not a freeze on nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development anddeployment, but denuclearization — in other words, dismantling. On May 5, Secretary Tillerson
told State Department staff “We do not seek a regime change, we do not seek a collapse of theregime, we do not seek an accelerated reunification of the peninsula, we do not seek an excuse to
send our military north of the 38th Parallel” (the “4 No’s”). However, shortly after this, on May 14,
North Korea successfully test fired the Hwasong-12 medium- to long-range ballistic missile. Even
after this, North Korea conducted repeated tests of missiles including the Pukkuksong-2 andsurface-to-ship cruise missiles.
Amid expanding military provocation by North Korea, the Trump administration was perhaps
unable to identify a means of effectively executing its new strategy at first. Or maybe it was warythat this might tip things toward the military option. At a press conference on May 19, Secretary of
Defense Mattis pointed out that “if this goes to a military solution, it is going to be tragic on an
unbelievable scale, and so our effort is to work with the UN, work with China, work with Japan,
work with South Korea to try to find a way out of this situation.” Adopted on June 2, theUS-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2356 merely imposed a ban on overseas travel by
14 North Korean individuals and four entities, as well as freezing their assets, in order to restrict thefunds available to North Korea for the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. In contrast,
Security Council Resolution 2321 — which was adopted in November 2016, in the final weeks of
the Obama administration’s time in office — imposed wide-ranging restrictions on coal imports
from North Korea (restricting imports to no more than 7.5 million tons in volume or no more than$400 million in value) and a complete ban on imports of metals such as silver, copper, and nickel.
However, over the course of the August–September Crisis that followed, US policy took shape asa policy of maximum pressure — specifically, a strategy of maximizing economic sanctions, while
not ruling out the possibility of military action. It would be no exaggeration to describe this as amilitary and economic blockade of North Korea. In response to the August 8 comment by the
Korean People’s Army about “enveloping fire at the areas around Guam,” President Trump
immediately retorted, “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will
be met with fire and the fury like the world has never seen,” he warned. At the UN General

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 21

Assembly on September 19, Trump stressed, “If [the US] is forced to defend itself or its allies, wewill have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” Strangely, however, Trump did not rule out
the possibility of dialogue with Kim Jong-un. Despite the military and economic pressure, Trump
told Bloomberg News on May 1, “If it would be appropriate for me to meet with [Kim Jong-un], I
would absolutely, I would be honored to do it...[w]e have breaking news.” On November 12, he
tweeted, “I try so hard to be his (Kim Jong-un’s) friend – and maybe someday that will happen!”and later said, “Strange things happen in life.”
On the other hand, as has already been seen, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions
including a complete ban on North Korean exports of commodities including coal, iron ore, andseafood in response to the two Hwasong-14 ballistic missile tests in July. In addition, North Korea’s
sixth nuclear test, on September 3, was answered on September 11 with the adoption of Resolution
2375, which imposed even tighter sanctions from 2018, including limiting the supply of refined
petroleum products (such as gasoline and kerosene) to North Korea to 2 million barrels andbanning North Korean exports of textile products. Moreover, member states were prohibited fromoffering new work opportunities to North Korean workers overseas. This was a prelude to imposing
even more stringent sanctions in response to the Hwasong-15 ballistic missile test launch on
November 29. UN Security Council Resolution 2397 adopted on December 22 limited exports ofrefined petroleum products to North Korea to no more than 500,000 barrels per year from 2018, as
well as prohibiting imports of foods, machinery, electrical instruments, and timber from North
Korea and imposing a complete ban on exports of industrial machinery and transportation vehicles
to the country. It also obliged member states to repatriate North Korean workers within two years.
Furthermore, member states were authorized to seize, inspect, and impound any vessel suspected ofviolating the resolution. All that remained was the supply of crude oil from China. This was themain content of the maximum pressure applied to North Korea.
Resolution Name and
Key Points of Sanctions Imposed
Date of Adoption
Security Council
Resolution 2375
September 11, 2017

・Banned the supply of crude oil to North Korea in excess of the amount suppliedin the period of 12 months prior to the resolution’s adoption
・Restricted the supply of refined petroleum products to 2 million barrels per year
and banned the supply of condensates and natural gas liquids
・Banned imports of textile products from North Korea
・Prohibited member states from granting work permits to North Koreannationals, in principle
・Banned the formation of joint ventures with North Korean entities andindividuals, and ordered the closure of existing joint ventures

22 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” ReportSecurity Council
Resolution 2397
December 22, 2017

・Designated additional subjects of asset freezing and travel bans (1 individual, 3
entities)
・Restricted the supply of crude oil to North Korea to 4 million barrels or 525,000
tons・Restricted the supply of refined petroleum products to 500,000 barrels per year
・Extended the scope of import and export bans, prohibiting the import of goods
such as agricultural products, machinery, and electrical equipment from North
Korea
・Called for the repatriation of all North Korean nationals working overseas within
24 months of the resolution’s adoption
・Targeted 16 new additional individuals and one entity with the asset freeze, as
well as imposing a travel ban on those 16 individuals

Figure 1 Recent UN Security Council Resolutions Concerning North Korea

5. The Kim Jong-un Regime’s “South First, US Later” PolicyFirst and foremost, what North Korea sought to achieve in the process of its policy ofbrinkmanship appears to have been direct negotiations with the USA, leading to the suspension of
US-South Korean joint military exercises, some kind of US-North Korean peace agreement, andthe easing of sanctions on North Korea, in return for North Korea provisionally freezing its
development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons and medium- to long-range ballistic
missiles, and promising to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula at some stage in the future.
Accordingly, it continued its military provocation for two years, at the risk of triggering military
retaliation by the US. However, one wonders what Kim Jong-un intended to do if the US refusednegotiations with North Korea, despite its development of nuclear weapons and medium- tolong-range ballistic missiles. Its only option in that case would have been to declare the completionof its nuclear missile system capable of reaching the US mainland, bring its policy of brinkmanshipto an end, and explore peace with the South. This would be the “South First, US Later” policy, inwhich North Korea would first achieve peace with South Korea and then attempt to negotiate with
the USA. Needless to say, the completion of the nuclear missile system was in itself a majorachievement for North Korea.
Its “South First, US Later” policy is essential if it is to avoid military reprisals by the US and put
in place an environment conducive to US-North Korean negotiations. This goes beyond mere
“smile diplomacy” into the realm of “strategic appeasement,” constituting a “peace offensive”
based on the assumption of an inter-Korean summit meeting. Chairman Kim Jong-un’s New Year
Address and dispatch of a North Korean team to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in South Korea
clearly pave the way for this. Naturally, one should probably regard “South First, US Later” as a

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 23

deliberate strategy that was being prepared from the very start of North Korea’s policy ofbrinkmanship two years ago. This is because it is unthinkable that a small country such as North
Korea would embark on a policy of brinkmanship toward a major power like the US without
having prepared a policy for the next phase. After the death of Kim Jong-il, the first project onwhich Kim Jong-un started work was the construction of the Masikryong Ski Resort. In that sense,“South First, US Later” was simply a policy for bringing a chaotic situation under control, as well
as being a plan B in case the policy of brinkmanship ended in failure.
However, looking at developments from the summer of 2017, it is hard to conclude that “SouthFirst, US Later” was entirely unrelated to the economic blockade measures imposed on North
Korea in the form of the two Security Council resolutions on sanctions (2371 and 2375) adopted in
response to the two Hwasong-14 test launches in July that year and the sixth nuclear test, which
took place in early September. Despite the fact that the Hwasong-15 ballistic missile test had still
not been carried out, on October 7, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) suddenly convened thesecond plenary meeting of its 7th Central Committee, at which it affirmed that North Korea would
hold fast to its strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and thebuilding of nuclear capability. Interestingly, at the start of his report, Chairman Kim Jong-un
remarked that “US imperialists are making last-ditch efforts to completely stifle our sovereignty
and rights to existence and development by cooking up UN Security Council ‘sanctions resolutions’one after another with mobilization of their vassal forces.” He went on to say, “The whole Party
should pay efforts to strengthening the primary party committees and party cells and thus make all
the basic party organizations move in a militant and viable manner at all times under the unified
leadership of the Party Central Committee.” Extraordinarily, the plenary meeting of the WPK’sCentral Committee was attended by observers in the form of senior officials from central
government bodies; provincial, city, and county administrations; and major industrial
establishments. Following on from this, the Conference of Cell Chairpersons of the WPK was held
on December 21 and it would be no exaggeration to say that this marked the launch of a system tomobilize the entire state.
However, as has already been pointed out, it was only in his 2018 New Year Address that Kim
Jong-un announced his “South First, US Later” policy to the rest of the world. Kim Jong-un said,“In no way would the United States dare to ignite a war against me and our country. The whole ofits mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on my office desk all
the time; the United States needs to be clearly aware that this is not merely a threat but a reality.”
However, this was not the main thrust of his speech. More important was the section in which hesaid, “This year is significant both for the north and the south as in the north the people will greet

24 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportthe 70th founding anniversary of their Republic as a great, auspicious event and in the south theWinter Olympic Games will take place...we should improve the frozen inter-Korean relations andglorify this meaningful year as an eventful one noteworthy in the history of the nation.” Chairman
Kim Jong-un continued, “As for the Winter Olympic Games to be held soon in [S]outh Korea, itwill serve as a good occasion for demonstrating our nation's prestige and we earnestly wish theOlympic Games a success. From this point of view we are willing to dispatch our delegation andadopt other necessary measures....” Thus, the new year marked the beginning of North Korea’s“Olympic Diplomacy.”

Figure 2 Key Points of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s 2018 New Year Address
・The whole of the US mainland is within the range of our nuclear strike and the nuclear button is on
my office desk all the time・Order to mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, to give a spur to the efforts for
deploying them for action
・Our country’s nuclear forces constitute a powerful deterrent capable of thwarting any nuclear threats
from the US
・Request to South Korea to discontinue military exercises with the US and refrain from deploying US
strategic weapons
・2018 is significant both for the north and the south, as North Korea will mark the 70th anniversaryof its founding, while the Winter Olympics will take place in South Korea
・We should improve the frozen inter-Korean relations
・We wish the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics a success and are willing to dispatch our delegation

North Korea’s decision to participate in the Olympics had been long awaited by theadministration of Moon Jae-in, which came to power in May 2017. This is because, first of all, it
could not have expected the Pyeongchang Olympics to be a success if they had taken place without
North Korea’s participation amid an atmosphere of increased military tension on the Korean
Peninsula. Indeed, the very staging of the Olympics would have been under threat if the crisis had
escalated. Second, for South Korea, the denuclearization of North Korea is an issue that must be
resolved by peaceful means, above all else. This is because, if the US were to choose a military
solution, South Korea would inevitably become a battlefield. Third, at home, the South Korean
government was expected to play some kind of proactive role in achieving a peaceful resolution tothis issue. This is a backlash against power politics by global superpowers. Fourth, President Moon
Jae-in had positioned “a phased and comprehensive approach” as the basic tenor of his North

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 25

Korean policy. For these reasons, ironically, both the maximum pressure policy of the US andNorth Korea’s “South First, US Later” policy encouraged South Korea to adopt a strategy of
appeasement toward the North. In fact, as inter-Korean dialogue progressed, President Moon Jae-in
identified a “proactive role” for South Korean diplomacy as an intermediary in US-North Koreandialogue. For example, during a conference at the presidential Blue House on January 22, President
Moon looked ahead to the difficulties that South Korea could face in its foreign and security
relations following the Olympics, remarking, "We must work to make the South-North Korea
dialogue lead to talks between the United States and North Korea. Only then can we peacefully
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and peace and prosperity can continue on the Korean
Peninsula,”
At this point, one of the factors behind the “South First, US Later” policy, namely diplomaticcooperation between China and Russia regarding the Korean Peninsula denuclearization issue,
should probably be noted. This is because the joint statement concerning the Korean Peninsula
issued by Chinese and Russian foreign ministers Wang Yi and Sergei Lavrov following their talks
in Moscow on July 4, 2017, ahead of the G20 Summit in Hamburg, has not received much attention,
despite its importance. In fact, the two foreign ministers came up with a “joint initiative” based on
the respective diplomatic initiatives of China and Russia. China proposed (1) a “double freezing”
initiative under which North Korea would freeze its nuclear and missile activities, while the US andSouth Korea froze their joint military exercises; and (2) “parallel advancement” toward thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of peace mechanisms on the peninsula.
Russia’s proposal was a stage-by-stage plan for settling the Korean Peninsula issue. Both called forthe use of military means to be ruled out and for the dialogue process to be resumed. The joint
initiative proposed by China and Russia is clearly closer to North Korea’s “South First, US Later”
and President Moon Jae-in’s phased and comprehensive approach than to President Trump’s policyof maximum pressure.

6. A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is the result of
single-minded determination across two generations of leaders: Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. The
military option likely offers the only possibility of making North Korea abandon this within the
short term. However, even if that were technically feasible, the risk of failure could not be reduced
to zero. Moreover, the toll in the case of failure would be too high for anyone to be able to bear the
responsibility for it. A number of defects have been pointed out regarding military action, whether a

26 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportfull-scale attack in the form of a “decapitation operation” or a limited “bloody nose strike.” In a
worst-case scenario, more than a million human lives could be lost and the costs involved inreconstruction would likely be astronomical. The collapse of the South Korean economy might
trigger a chain reaction of economic crises. Furthermore, there would undoubtedly be a loss of trust
toward the USA in both South Korea and Japan. The USA’s alliances with South Korea and Japan
would likely break up, leading to major upheaval in East Asia’s international system. These are theinconvenient truths that we must squarely confront.
However, there is also an inconvenient truth for North Korea. Even if it perfects a ballistic
missile capable of carrying a nuclear weapon to the US mainland, the existing military pressure andstringent economic sanctions would, if they became prolonged, merely cause economic misery andthe maintenance of the regime could not be guaranteed. To put it another way, without some kind ofagreement between the US and North Korea over the denuclearization issue, North Korea’s “SouthFirst, US Later” policy cannot offer a fundamental solution. Consequently, an appropriate means ofcorrecting North Korea’s overrating of its possession of nuclear missiles and inducing it to abandon
its development and deployment of them would be a policy of flexible “containment”; in otherwords, “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” (George F. Kennan). It is unlikelythat the situation would become as prolonged as the Cold War era if regional stability mechanisms
formed between North and South Korea were used to deploy this policy. North Korea is not asuperpower on the scale of the Soviet Union or China.
Figure 3 The Inconvenient Truths for Both Sides
・The military option would result in the loss of over a million lives in a worst-case scenario andJapan,
require astronomical sums to be spent on reconstruction
USA,・The collapse of the South Korean economy could potentially trigger a chain reaction ofandeconomic crises in Asia and around the worldSouth・Trust toward the USA would decline in Japan and South Korea. Risk that US alliances with

Korea
Japan and South Korea would crumble, leading to upheaval in the international order・Even if it perfects a nuclear missile capable of reaching the US mainland, military pressure
North
Korea

and economic sanctions are likely to continue
・International pressure will only cause economic misery and the maintenance of the regime —its top priority — could not be guaranteed

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 27

On the other hand, there needs to be an accurate perception of North Korea’s nuclear missiles,
which differ from those held by superpowers such as the US, Russia, and China. The latter are“nuclear weapons that will not be used,” based on the theory of mutual nuclear deterrence, as
demonstrated during the Cold War era, but this is not necessarily the case with the former. In thatsense, nothing would be more dangerous than causing the collapse of a nuclear-armed divided state
by means of external pressure. A containment policy would involve proceeding cautiously, while
discouraging the counterpart’s aggressive intentions and waiting patiently for its policies andregime to change. Looking back, part of the blame for the situation faced today lies withneighboring countries, who divided the Korean Peninsula in two at the end of World War II, left itthat way throughout the Cold War, and failed to achieve détente on the Korean Peninsula(cross-recognition of the two Koreas) when the Cold War came to an end. If the visits to North
Korea by Shin Kanemaru and Junichiro Koizumi had resulted in the normalization of diplomatic
relations between Japan and North Korea, the situation that we face today might not exist.
It is questionable whether the policy of maximum pressure — that is to say, military pressure andeconomic blockades — can achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. North Korea is already
90% of the way to perfecting an ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear weapon, so we should take it
as read that it will leave no stone unturned in its efforts to complete this process and will not yield
to blackmail or blockades. Even during the “Arduous March” of the late 1990s, North Korea did
not call a halt to its nuclear weapons development, despite its acute food crisis. Moreover, it paid
close attention to the fate of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who had abandoned nuclear development;
for North Korea, this became a good example of what not to do. Consequently, if China cuts off
North Korea’s supply of crude oil, the crisis is likely to escalate to extreme levels. If the outside
world mistakenly applies pressure greater than North Korea can withstand, Kim Jong-un mightchoose the path of explosion rather than implosion. Alternatively, he might be tempted to financethe maintenance of the regime through nuclear proliferation. In that situation, even if arms exports
by North Korea can be thwarted, it would probably be impossible to prevent the dispatch ofengineers overseas. To put it another way, the policy of maximum pressure does not necessarily
guarantee that North Korea will renounce nuclear missiles.
The supreme leaders of the US and North Korea are both unusual characters and it seems
unlikely that they have sufficient experience to manage a crisis. One is a dictator’s son in his early
30s, while the other is a real estate tycoon with no experience as a lawmaker or government official.
These two individuals have been exchanging provocative and hyperbolic words. Moreover, both areconstrained by domestic politics. For Kim Jong-un, his prestige as supreme leader is of paramountimportance, while Trump will inevitably be affected by suspicions of Russian influence and the

28 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportmidterm elections. Furthermore, if the preemptive strike doctrine based on wishful thinking
becomes widespread, one side’s fears of a preemptive strike by the other could lead it to launch apreemptive strike of its own. Alternatively, this kind of psychological interplay could provoke theother side to launch a preemptive strike. Under such circumstances, crisis management mechanisms(CMMs) prior to denuclearization will be crucial. As such, the first step toward crisis management
is probably the “double freezing” advocated by China and Russia: the freezing of nuclear weaponand missile testing by North Korea and of joint military exercises by the US and South Korea.
However, this is a measure to avoid a military crisis, merely providing the first catalyst forresolving the situation through negotiation.
In the first stage following on from crisis management, an international agreement will be
required, covering a freeze on North Korean development and deployment of nuclear weapons andballistic missiles, along with international monitoring and final disposal. To achieve this, it will
likely be necessary to hold not only the initially planned US-North Korean negotiations, but also
negotiations among the parties directly involved in the Korean War (the US, China, and North andSouth Korea) or the parties to the Six-Party Talks. This will necessitate the easing of relevant UN
Security Council resolutions on sanctions and sanctions imposed unilaterally by each country. In
any event, returning — as far as possible — to the joint statement adopted during the fourth roundof the Six-Party Talks in September 2005 offers a shortcut. However, caution is essential regarding
the conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty between the US and North Korea. This is because goingover South Korea’s head could lead a nuclear-armed North Korea to harbor gratuitous expectations
concerning its advantage over South Korea, possibly encouraging the destabilization of theregional situation.
If North Korea refuses to budge in negotiations over denuclearization, all that the US has to do
is consider redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at US military bases in South Korea. While thiswould largely be nothing more than a means of relieving the psychological burden on the South
Korean people, it would likely solidify the US–South Korean alliance and lay the foundations for apolicy of long-term containment. However, even if the opportunity for negotiations between the
US and North Korea does not arise, the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, exchange, andcooperation should not be excessively restricted. It would be a mistake to think that this could
thwart nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development by North Korea. On the other hand,North Korea’s shift toward inter-Korean dialogue using participation in the Pyeongchang
Olympics as a lever was largely the result of international economic sanctions. A moderate easingof economic sanctions, along with inter-Korean economic exchange, could actually energize North
Korea’s literal market economy and promote economic reform and opening up. Without this, there

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 29

is no hope of transforming North Korea’s regime.
In the second stage of working toward North Korea’s denuclearization, it will be important to
use the agreement already reached to secure the foundations for long-term, stable coexistence
between the two Koreas and for economic development in North Korea. If inter-Korean dialogue,
exchange, and cooperation promote the development of North Korean economic infrastructure,reform and opening up, and export-oriented economic development, leading to the formation of aregional stability mechanism, a kind of mutually dependent inter-Korean economic community
could emerge a decade hence. In the third stage, a confederation or federal unification based on
this could possibly be designed. Peace on the Korean Peninsula means long-term, stableinter-Korean coexistence. Until this is institutionally guaranteed, North Korea is unlikely tocompletely abandon its nuclear missiles.
Figure 4 The Envisaged Denuclearization Process (Proposal)
Crisis Management
Stage

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3As a preliminary step toward denuclearization, efforts are devoted to avoiding acrisis, with the first step being consideration of a freeze on North Korean
nuclear weapon and missile tests and joint military exercises by the US andSouth Korea
Conclusion of an international agreement covering a freeze on North Korean
development and deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as wellas international monitoring and final disposal
Formation of a regional stability mechanism by using the agreement on nuclear
weapons and missiles to secure the foundations for long-term, stablecoexistence between the two Koreas through dialogue and cooperation, and for
economic development in North Korea
Formation of a mutually dependent inter-Korean economic community,
providing the basis for the design of a confederation or federal unification,
which would institutionally guarantee long-term, stable coexistence between
the two Koreas, resulting in complete abandonment by North Korea of its
nuclear and missile program

Figure 5(1)

Key Points of the Policy of Flexible Containment

The sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council will be maintained until North Korea
fully renounces nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles

If North Korea freezes its development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons and(2) ballistic missiles, and accepts international monitoring, the US and South Korea will curb
aggressive military maneuvers and saber-rattling, and relax UN and unilateral economic
sanctions(3) Inter-Korean reconciliation, exchange, and cooperation will not be impeded
In the long term, North and South Korea will embark on an initiative with neighboring(4) countries — including Japan, the US, China, and Russia – to build a stable international
system on the Korean Peninsula

In conclusion, the key points of the policy of flexible containment advocated in this paper are as

30 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Reportfollows: (1) the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council will be continued until North Korea
completely renounces nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. However, (2) if North Korea freezes
its development, testing, and deployment, and accepts international monitoring, the US and South
Korea will curb aggressive military maneuvers and saber-rattling, and relax UN and unilateral
economic sanctions. (3) Inter-Korean reconciliation, exchange, and cooperation will not be
impeded; and (4) in the long term, North and South Korea will embark on an initiative withneighboring countries — including Japan, the US, China, and Russia – to build a stableinternational system on the Korean Peninsula. All of these are measures that should have beentaken 30 years ago when the Cold War ended and North Korea embarked on its nuclear weapon andballistic missile development program.
Ultimately, in the process of implementing the “South First, US Later” policy, North Korea
might propose resuming negotiations with Japan over the normalization of diplomatic relations,
including the resolution of the abductions issue. Along with an inter-Korean summit meeting, this is
the last diplomatic card remaining in North Korea’s hand. This is because the Trump administration
will not be able to refuse to negotiate with North Korea if an inter-Korean summit meeting takes
place and negotiations between Japan and North Korea resume. Even if relations between the US
and North Korea improve first, negotiations between Japan and North Korea will be inevitable.
Given that Prime Minister Koizumi brushed off strong concerns on the part of the US when hevisited Pyongyang, an improvement in US-North Korean relations would put in place theconditions required for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea.
Amid intense expectations on the part of the families of abductees, this proposal could actually be
the last opportunity to normalize relations between Japan and North Korea, so Japan will need thedetermination to accept this challenge. As Prime Minister Koizumi’s experience shows, building astrong personal relationship of trust with the US president is essential to negotiations with North
Korea. Right now, the only person with such a relationship is Prime Minister Abe. The resolution of
the abductions issue and the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea
could likely become the starting point for a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia.

Chapter 1 | A Proposal for a Policy of Flexible Containment | 31

References(Japanese)
Masao Okonogi (1994) “The End of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula” and “Japan-North
Korean Negotiations on Diplomatic Relations and Japan’s Role,” in Masao Okonogi (ed.)
Posuto-Reisen no Chōsen Hantō [The Korean Peninsula During the Post-Cold War Era], Japan
Institute of International Affairs
Masao Okonogi (2009) “A Curious Coexistence With Nuclear Weapons,” in Masao Okonogi and
Chung-in Moon (eds.) Higashi Ajia Chiiki Chitsujo to Kyōdōtai Kōsō [Regional Order andVisions for a Community in East Asia], Keio University Press
Kita-Chōsen Seisaku Dōkō [Policy Trends in North Korea], Tōa [East Asia](English)George F. Kennan（1947）“The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs
Michael D. Swaine （2017） “Time to Accept Reality and Manage a Nuclear-Armed North Korea”
The Carnegie Asia Program
Harry J. Kazianis（2017） “Memo to Trump: Contain North Korea, Don’t Attack It” The American
Conservative
Scott D. Sagan（2017） “The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option”
Foreign Affairs, November-December
Sue Mi Terry, Jung H. Park, and Bruce Klingner（2018） “Bloody Nose Policy on North Korea
Would Backfire: Ex-CIA Analysts” Korea Chair Platform, CSIS, February 12(Korean)Ministry of Unification (2017) Moon Jae-in’s North Korea Policy
IFES Diagnosis of Outstanding Issues
Rodong Sinmun, Korean Central News Agency, Choson Sinbo, Yonhap News Agency

32 | Japan Center for Economic Research, FY2017 “Asia Research” Report