 Chapter 8
Japan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsula―― Historical Relations and Future Prospects
Kazuo Ogura
Former Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Senior Advisor, Japan Foundation[Key Points]
When thinking about Japan’s Korean Peninsula policy from a long-term perspectivethat also takes into account the North-South unification issue, it is important to provide
an overview of the relationship between Japan and Korea in the context of the history
between them, which stretches back more than 1,500 years, and to use this to explore
lessons and challenges.

Another approach to mapping out the medium- to long-term prospects is to draw up avision for establishing what might be termed a borderless economic and politicalcommunity in the East Asia of the future, and to consider the course of action forachieving this. It is also necessary to be aware of such issues as shared values, dealing
with past history, and disputes with third party countries.

Considered in the comparatively short term, the question of how to assess and tackle
the threat or risk from North Korea is a major problem. Nuclear-related risks, militaryrisks, and political risks can be envisaged; in the case of political risks, one cannot
ignore such risks as a worst-case scenario involving the supreme leader.

Japan Center for Economic Research

FY2015 “Asia Research” ReportJapan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsula
Historical Relations
・A borderless neighbor
・A partner with sharedvaluesFuture Issues and Prospects
・Creating a vision for a “borderless”
community
・Exchanges aimed at sharing values

・Korea as “other”

・Transition from “enemy” to “other”

・Korea as the seed of・Initiatives aimed at separation frompolitical strife

domestic politics

・Korea overshadowed by
the past
・The site of disputes withthird party countries

・Dealing with the shadows of the past・Responses to the China factor

Source: Compiled by the author

1. Introduction
What did the Korean Peninsula mean to Japan?
Today, the answer to that question could in most cases be generally summed up as “a place that
was a Japanese colony, which gained independence when Japan lost the war, then, in a conflict partly
stoked by the East-West Cold War, split into two parts, north and south; whereas Japan establisheddiplomatic relations and has various exchanges with the Republic of Korea, which controls thesouthern half, it is in a state of conflict – both military and political – with the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, which controls the part of the peninsula north of the military demarcation line.”
However, one has to ask whether it is really acceptable to talk about present-day policy on the
Korean Peninsula without looking at why Korea (for the sake of expedience, in this chapter, the term
“Korea,” without directional modifiers, indicates the whole of the Korean Peninsula) became aJapanese colony, what the state of relations between Korea and Japan was prior to Japan’s
modernization (it is often described as a period of cultural exchange, as typified by the Joseon missions
to Japan of the Tokugawa period, but why had this relationship come to exist?), and, furthermore, what
was behind Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s plans to invade Korea.
When thinking about Japan’s Korean policy and examining it from a long-term viewpoint that also
takes into account the North-South unification issue, it would seem necessary to provide an overview
of the relationship between Japan and Korea in the context of the history between them, which

Japan Center for Economic Research“Asia Research” Reportstretches back more than 1,500 years, and to use this as a starting point for exploring lessons andchallenges. This chapter re-examines past relations between Japan and Korea from this perspective,
looking at what Korea historically meant to Japan, and seeks to identify pointers that could serve as
lessons for dealing with modern-day challenges.

2. Main Perspectives of This Chapter
Firstly, when taking an historical perspective, we must first take note that Korea was Japan’s close
neighbor and had special significance in political, diplomatic, and economic terms.
Flows of people and goods are more frequent between neighboring countries than between
countries and areas located further apart, so it is common for such interaction to take a different form
from the more usual kinds of exchange across borders, as symbolized by what is termed “border
trade.”
In such exchanges, nationality and national borders do not necessarily have great significance. To
put it another way, it would be fair to say that a state of almost borderless relations existed between
Japan and Korea, and could exist again. That is to say, for Japan, Korea was first and foremost aneighbor and partner without borders.
Secondly, to treat someone as a neighbor, one has to share fundamental ideas and values with that
person, otherwise it is hard to forge a good relationship. In other words, Korea was (or should be) apartner with whom Japan shared values.
However, this leads into the third dimension. That is to say, a neighbor tends to become a mirror
used to ascertain what one is oneself, so for each party, the neighbor becomes the “other” by which it
defines itself. In this sense, Korea was Japan’s “other.”
All of this has a fourth meaning, in political terms. Specifically, there is a tendency for Korea tobecome the seed of domestic political problems for Japan. Korea is what one might describe as “theseed of political strife.”
This fourth point relates to both Japanese and Korean history. That is to say, Japan and Korea
have a long history of interaction and, whether they like it or not, they have come to be greatly
influenced by the shadows of the past; for that reason alone, it is fair to say that Korean issues tend
to become political problems within Japan. To put it another way, Korea is a place where theshadows of the past have historically lingered; this could be described as the fifth dimension.
On the other hand, if we try to retrace the history of relations between Japan and Korea, we cansee that their relationship has been greatly influenced not only by both countries’ policies and plans,
but also by third parties. To put it another way, for Japan, Korea has been the venue for power
struggles between third parties. That is the context of the sixth dimension.

Chapter 8: Japan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsula3. Historical Relations between Japan and the Korean Peninsula
3.1 A Borderless Neighbor
Although the backgrounds and reasons differ, the Yamato period, the Baekje and Silla periods, theera of the wokou pirates in the early Muromachi period, and the colonial period were all periods inwhich the flow of refugees, merchants, and/or migrants between the two countries was such that one
could describe them as borderless neighbors. The interaction between Japan and Korea during these
periods was of a quite different nature from country-to-country relations.
Today, now that Japan and Korea are modern states, this kind of borderless relationship would, at
first glance, appear to be impossible. However, in fact, as a result of globalization, exchanges andrelationships of all kinds that are entirely separate from formal bilateral relations exist between Japanand South Korea even today. In fields such as culture, sport, investment, trade, and tourism,
relationships completely divorced from the political or diplomatic concepts of Japan and Korea havebeen formed. Under normal circumstances, such relationships could exist not only between Japanand South Korea, but also between Japan and North Korea; indeed, until the 1990s, such
relationships did exist between progressive or socialist groups in Japan and relevant individuals inNorth Korea.
Currently, due in part to international sanctions, people-to-people exchanges between Japan andNorth Korea are extremely limited, and even people-to-people exchanges with South Korea arefrequently suspended or postponed for political or diplomatic reasons. Such exchanges, particularly
those in the fields of culture and sport, actually help to alleviate political risk in the long term, in thesense that they correct misunderstandings between and misconceptions about each other,(Looking at the effects of globalization from a different angle, North Korea has not opened its
doors to the international community a great deal, attempting to minimize the impact of such actions,as far as possible. One point on which attention will focus in future will be whether North Korea
maintains its fairly closed-doors approach while at the same time cultivating personnel with a global
mindset, thereby endeavoring to increase the objectivity of assessments of risk arising from friction
between North Korea and the international community. For example, the size of the segment of theNorth Korean population with international knowledge and experience, as well as the depth thereof,(together with the issue of nuclear development by countries such as Iran, Israel, India, andPakistan.)will have a strong bearing on any evaluation of risks posed to the international community by theNorth’s nuclear development .

3.2 A Partner with Shared Values

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The sharing of Buddhist thought between the Baekje kingdom and Japan, and the sharing ofConfucian thought during the Edo period could be cited as examples of periods when Japan and
Korea shared fundamental values. The sharing of such values helps to deter military tension and theuse of force by promoting mutual understanding and respect. Conversely, one factor that could besaid to have contributed to the tense relationship between the Silla kingdom and Japan in ancient
times was the difference in their views on how to respond to Chinese civilization. In early modern
times, the friction between Yi dynasty Korea and Meiji Japan could also be attributed to differencesin Japanese and Korean perspectives on how to respond to sinocentrism and, consequently, how to
respond to the values of early modern Western civilization.
Today, given that the issues of the past also come into play, opinions probably differ on theimportance that Japan and South Korea attach to the shared values of freedom, human rights, anddemocracy in their relationship, but a broader, deeper discussion of this point is essential to thestability of Japanese-South Korean relations, as well as being crucial in addressing North Korea. For
example, the extent to which Japan can establish shared values with North Korea on the subject ofhumanitarianism will be a key point in dealing with specific topics.

3.3 Korea as “Other”
Because it was a neighbor, Korea was the “other” against which Japan compared itself andbecame a kind of mirror when Japan was establishing its own identity. In the distant past, for Japan
under the Yamato dynasty, Korea played the role of “other” as Japan was forming “national” unity.
When, in the Meiji period, Yi dynasty Korea initially rebuffed Japan’s attempts to establish a modern
diplomatic relationship, Korea became a “good example of what not to do” for Meiji Japan, in thesense that Korea had turned its back on modernization based on the absorption of Western
civilization.
Today, Japan is the “other” for South Korea, in a sense. Japan, as a country still influenced by thepast has become fodder for establishing South Korea’s identity, as the kernel that fortifies andconsolidates the nation that is the Republic of Korea.
In this regard, North Korea’s hostility towards Japan appears to be more “independent” from its“nationalism.” In addition, North Korean hostility toward Japan also encompasses hostility toward
the USA – theoretically, at least – whereas anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea does notnecessarily have an anti-American component. This point must be borne fully in mind whennegotiating the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, for example.
As well as being a neighbor, Korea continued to be “other,” becoming a kind of “marginal figure;”
consequently, it became the target of discrimination and prejudice from Japan (the inverse of the way
in which pre-early modern Korea despised “the land of the dwarfs,” as it used to refer to Japan). In
Japanese-South Korean relations today, we must ask ourselves how symptoms bordering on the

Chapter 8: Japan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsularesurgence of this kind of phenomenon will affect Japan-Korea relations and, also how North Korea
will be perceived by Japan in the event that relations between the two countries improve andexchanges between them deepen, given that North Korea will, until that point, have been treated by
Japan entirely as “other,” rather than as a neighbor.

3.4 Korea as the Seed of Political Strife
From Fujiwara no Nakamaro in the 8th century to Saigo Takamori in the 19th, any time thequestion of invading Korea has arisen, it has become the seed of political strife within Japan.
Moreover, major political changes in Korea – including the Baekje kingdom’s call for military
assistance from Japan, the reform movement of Kim Ok-gyun in the Meiji period, and the links
between Kim Dae-jung’s democratic movement while in opposition and Japan’s popular democratic
movement – have had echoes that reverberated in Japanese politics. Traces of the extent and natureof these reverberations can still be found today.
At one time, the concept of the “threat from the north” became the seed of conflict in Japanese
domestic politics, triggering an endless round of debate over its rights and wrongs; going forward, as
we address relations between Japan and South Korea, and Japan and North Korea, we must give fullconsideration to the extent to and manner in which policy issues concerning Korea are influenced by
Japanese domestic political considerations and the form that this takes.

3.5 Korea Overshadowed by the Past
Today, the shadows of the past still loom over Japan and South Korea in relation to Japan’s actions
during the colonial period; from the perspective of Korea as a whole, these also include the shadowsof Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, while from Japan’s perspective, there is the question of
how to address the fact that Goryeo forces invaded Japan alongside the forces of the Mongol Yuan
dynasty.
The diplomacy conducted through the Joseon missions to Japan during the Edo period was madepossible by the fact that, after Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, the Tokugawa clan overthrew the
Toyotomi clan and took power; thus, the shadows of the past have a significant influence here as
well.
More recently, one of the key factors that facilitated a very close relationship between theadministrations of Kim Dae-jung and Keizo Obuchi was the fact that the Kim Dae-jungadministration signified a clean break from the military dictatorship of the past, while the Liberal
Democratic Party under Obuchi also distanced itself from the traditional LDP mode by including
Komeito and progressive trends witnessed since the Murayama Cabinet.
Thinking about the future relationship between North Korea and Japan, addressing the past isgoing to be the biggest issue, alongside the issues of abductions and nuclear development.

Japan Center for Economic Research“Asia Research” Report3.6 The Site of Disputes with Third Party Countries
Historically speaking, moves by China and other third party countries focused on the Korean
Peninsula have significantly influenced the relationship between Korea and Japan. When there was
the split between China’s northern and southern dynasties, or when Chinese authority and influence
over Korea was too overwhelming, or when Russia’s far eastern expansion was witnessed, or whenthe Asian strategy of the USA was prominent, Korea became an arena for international power
struggles.
Even now, it would be fair to say that this state of affairs remains basically unchanged.
Consequently, Japan’s strategy for the future of the Korean Peninsula will likely be coordinatedwith hypotheses or forecasts of the extent and nature of third country involvement in Korea.
Currently, looking at the situation through the prism of military alliances, Korea is potentially thesite of antagonism and conflict between the USA and China, due to the Chinese-North Korean
alliance on the one hand, and the US-South Korean alliance on the other. As such, it would be fair tosay that Japan faces the question of how it will engage with this state of affairs in future.

4. Korea’s Future and Japan as Seen from its Historical Prospects
If we use this review of the long history between Japan and Korea as the starting point for
examining the relationship between them in the medium to long term, the following prospects
present themselves.

4.1 Korea and Japan amid a “Borderless” Community
Rather than regarding the unification of North and South Korea and the relationship between
Japan and Korea as bilateral relationships, mapping out a vision for the future of East Asia as awhole and examining how their mutual relationships should be positioned within that vision offers
the opportunity to depict the prospects for establishing a borderless economic and politicalcommunity in East Asia in the future and to consider the process required to achieve this.
In this process, first of all, Japan and South Korea will likely need to build a solid economic union,
whether via an economic partnership agreement (EPA) or free trade agreement (FTA). This could
probably be carried out regardless of the state of relations between North and South Korea.
However, the question of which procedure to prioritize next (or which to undertake concurrently)– (1) pursuing radically closer economic relations between North and South Korea; (2) pursuingcloser relations between Japan and North Korea; and /or (3) pursuing a deeper trilateral economic
partnership between Japan, South Korea, and China – is one that should be assessed carefully.
In this process, multinational corporations could conceivably move forward with economic

Chapter 8: Japan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsula

partnership in East Asia from a standpoint that differs from that of governments, with legal orpolitical institutionalization following later.

4.2 Shared Values and Japanese-Korean Relations
If the sharing of common values leaves something to be desired even in Japanese-South Korean
relations, it is unrealistic to consider measures aimed at establishing shared values between thewhole of Korea and Japan. Based on this perspective, the first thing for which we have to aim is forJapan and South Korea to establish shared values on global issues such as the environment,anti-terrorism measures, and measures against infectious disease, and shore up the foundations fortaking joint action in this process. We must attach greater importance to the role that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), and interaction between
such bodies can play in this.
During this period, North Korea and Japan must spare no effort in seeking to establish a shared
basic belief in the significance of exchanges in such fields as humanitarian issues, culture, and sport
by actively engaging in such exchanges. Moreover, Japan and China too should lay the foundations
for establishing a shared approach to exchange in such fields, entirely separate from political anddiplomatic affairs.

4.3 Transition from “Enemy” to “Other”
Currently, Japan and North Korea could be said to have a kind of antagonistic relationship; if it isdesirable to alleviate tensions by transforming this into a relationship in which they regard eachother as merely “other” (and that is something that itself requires quite a lot of debate, but let us takethis as our assumption for the moment), then we must start by asking whether or not we can think ofNorth Korea not as a threat, but as a strategic piece on the chessboard. For example, there is thequestion of how to evaluate its role as a kind of buffer zone against China’s growing influence.
Moreover, we could explore the potential for achieving stability on the Korean Peninsula as awhole by internationally guaranteeing the status quo of the north-south division, while leaving thebanner of north-south unification in place as a long-term possibility. In this connection, we could
reappraise the significance of strengthening exchange with North Korea within internationalorganizations.

4.4 Separation from Domestic Politics
Korean issues cannot be completely separated from Japan’s internal political strife; nevertheless,to minimize the likelihood of internal political strife making diplomacy more complex, the crucial
question will be how to deal with the fact that, for example, cooperation between
anti-government/anti-establishment elements in the counterpart country and groups in Japan goes

Japan Center for Economic Research“Asia Research” Reportbeyond the involvement of civic groups and assumes a strongly party political hue. One way oflooking at this is to adhere to the policy that the activities of such anti-establishment groups must
follow international rules. One may recall in this respect that for a long time after the Second World
War, unofficial – yet still quite political – channels existed in parallel with official channels ofinteraction between Korea and Japan, and China and Japan and they played a certain role in bridging
the gap of communication between the official channels

4.5 Dealing with the Shadows of the Past
Efforts to deal with the shadows of the past between North Korea and Japan will have to differ
from efforts to address the relationship with South Korea in at least two respects. Firstly, there is theissue of US involvement. North Korea fought against the USA in the Korean War, so the positioningof the Japan-US Alliance is likely to be a major problem.
Secondly, the question of China cannot be ignored. This is because victory against Japan in the
war is one of the grounds for the founding of both North Korea and China, as well as for thelegitimacy of their administrations.

4.6 The Issue of Disputes with Third Party Countries
Looking at the situation from an historical perspective, it would be no exaggeration to say that the
Korean Peninsula was the flashpoint for war between Japan and China. To put it another way, one
could say that Korea was the venue for a struggle for supremacy between Japan and China.
Going forward, whether the economic dependence on China of not only North Korea, but alsoSouth Korea increases or is maintained at its already high level, there can be no doubt that theireconomic dependence will deepen further. Whether South Korea’s economic dependence on China
should be prevented from developing into political dependence is a delicate issue. As long as therelationship between North Korea and China remains fundamentally friendly and courteous, closer
relations between South Korea and China could become a good catalyst for China to guarantee thestability of the Korean Peninsula and if so, this is probably not something for Japan to worry about,in general. The problem would be Japan’s response in the event that China adopted a strategy ofmanipulating North and South Korea, exerting political and economic influence over both countries
and, through this, seeking to achieve Korean unification or maintain the north-south division in aform that suited China’s own purposes.
Considering this possibility, it is vital for Japan to maintain channels for political dialogue andexchange with both North and South Korea.

Chapter 8: Japan’s Perspective on the Korean Peninsula