UCLF22

Independent Review

2022 UEFA Champions League Final

Chaired by
Tiago Brandão Rodrigues

February 2023

Independent Review Panel
Chair:
Dr Tiago Brandão Rodrigues
Members of the Panel:
Mr Ronan Evain
Ms Amanda Jacks
Mr Frank Paauw
Mr Daniel Ribeiro
Mr Kenny Scott
Mr Luís Silva
Prof Clifford Stott
Mr Pete Weatherby KC

UCLF22 Independent Review

Table of Contents
6

Foreword

9

1. Executive Summary
9

Introduction

12

The Review: process

13

What went wrong

18

20

The UEFA ‘model’

15

Policing

16

The failure of joint working, and the change of venue

17

Ticketless supporters and counterfeits

Recommendations

2. The Review process
24

27

14

CCTV footage

3. The Organisation of a UEFA Men’s Champions League Final (UCLF):
Framework and regulation

38

27

Organisation

29

Legal, policy and guidance framework

32

Monitoring and implementation

35

Consequences of failure to discharge the obligations of the 2016
Convention, or action recommendations

4. An evidence-based account of planning and delivery of the UCLF
safety, service and security operation

86

101

38

Introduction

38

The context and design of the Stade de France

40

The outline planning phase

45

The detailed planning phase

56

Match Day

5. The Clubs
86

Introduction

86

Liverpool Football Club

6. The Role of Key Stakeholders
101

Introduction

101

Union of European Football Associations (UEFA): ‘delegation anddeference’ versus ‘interoperability and accountability’124

Consortium Stade de France

128

Fédération Française de Football (FFF)

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Table of Contents
134

140

145

169

French State and Préfecture de Police
134

The DIGES138

The Préfecture

Summary of issues between key stakeholders: a lack of insight into whatwent wrong, a willingness to blame others without proper evidence, andwholesale interoperability failures

7. Evidence relating to themes
145

Late change of venue

146

Locals148

Ticketing151

Counterfeits

153

Statistics, mobility, travel, and ticketless supporters

158

Disabled Supporters

8. Overall Conclusions
169

Factors which caused or contributed to the ‘near-miss’170

The eight factors

179

170

Displacement of LFC supporters onto RER D

172

Failure to effectively route supporters arriving at RER D to safely
access the stadium

173

Defective access arrangements at ASPs

176

Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets

176

Defective access arrangements at the turnstile perimeter

177

Actions of locals

178

Use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on theconcourse

179

Lack of Contingency plans

Factors attributed by others
180

182

Supporters without valid tickets

Conclusions relating to specific stakeholders
182

Overview

182

UEFA (including UEFA Events SA)

188

Fédération Française de Football (FFF)

190

Consortium Stade de France (CSDF)

190

The DIGES and French State

192

Préfecture de Police

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Table of Contents

196

207

9. Recommendations
196

Introduction

197

Recommendation 1

198

Recommendation 2

198

Recommendation 3

200

Recommendation 4

200

Recommendation 5

201

Recommendation 6

201

Recommendation 7

201

Recommendation 8

201

Recommendation 9

202

Recommendation 10

202

Recommendation 11

202

Recommendation 12

203

Recommendation 13

203

Recommendation 14

203

Recommendation 15

204

Recommendation 16

204

Recommendation 17

204

Recommendation 18

205

Recommendation 19

205

Recommendation 20

205

Recommendation 21

Annex

Appendix (in a separate document)
I. Terms of Reference
II. Media Releases
III. Independent Review Panel’s Transparency Protocol andConfidentiality Undertaking
IV. Position Statements & Information Requests
V. Meetings Transcripts
VI. Additional Documents

UCLF22 Independent Review

Foreword
After two years of restrictions and compromised European club competition finals due tothe Covid-19 pandemic, including the UEFA Champions League Finals in 2020 and in 2021,
expectations for the 2022 final match of one of the most - if not the most - prestigious football
tournaments in the world were again very high worldwide. Real Madrid CF and Liverpool FC
are true legends of football, and the UEFA Champions League Final is much more than afootball game. It therefore came with no surprise that on 28 May 2022 many thousands ofsupporters of both clubs decided to travel to Paris to attend an eagerly awaited match andexperience a true festival of football.
Unfortunately, the enthusiasm around the game rapidly turned into a real “near miss” which
was harmful to a significant number of fans from both clubs. This should never have happened
at such an important sporting event, and it is unacceptable that it took place at the heartof the European continent. Since the first moments, as a football fan myself watching thegame with friends in my hometown, I realised that what was happening should constitute asource of immense concern, profound reflection, intense analysis, and consequent action.
The 2022 UEFA Champions League Final will be remembered as a moment of suffering formany fans but should also be a reminder of a situation we certainly do not want to witness
again in the future at any sporting event in Europe or anywhere in the world.
It is, therefore, imperative that relevant and significant lessons are learned from those events.
For this reason, it was of the utmost importance that the UEFA President established thisIndependent Review, to provide clarity and understanding of the events. A healthy organisation
welcomes scrutiny and criticism based on facts and evidence, even if the outcome is challenging
and requires changes for the organisation itself. Trustworthiness, critical evaluation, and acontinuous quest for improvement should be at the centre of any organisation’s roadmap. That
is why independent inquiries based on evidence are so important: they provide clarity regarding
past events and constitute a tool to help prevent a repetition of errors which might otherwise
have devastating consequences. Hence, it is fundamental that these proceedings have been
conducted in a way that enhances public trust in its outcomes.
I am thankful to have had the unique opportunity to chair this Herculean task and I am gratefulfor the general openness with which most of the stakeholders involved have collaborated in
the process, investing significant time to share their perspectives, experiences, insights, andexpertise with the Panel. Throughout the whole process, I felt that the different stakeholders
have generally demonstrated a true commitment to improve themselves to avoid future
similar events.
Supporters are the lifeline of football, and organisers should pay attention to theirorganisational needs to the same extent they do with all other stakeholders. Personally, themost impacting moments of this entire process have been hearing the direct and touching
testimonies of many fans affected by the shocking events. I would like to unequivocally stress
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UCLF22 Independent Review
that supporters attending this match were the main victims of the disgraceful events of thatday, not being their promoters or instigators. I would therefore like to respectfully thankeach individual supporter and each supporters’ association for the clear and unhesitating
way in which they have engaged with this review.
The independence of the Panel and the integrity of this report are paramount. From theoutset, I have indicated that the Panel would gather as much relevant evidence as it could
within the relatively short timeframe of its work. As a Panel, we have made it clear that wewould only reach conclusions based upon evidence, and that we would reference our reportand publish all documents, interview transcripts and other material as far as possible. The
openness and transparency with which this review has been conducted are cornerstones
for trust in its conclusions and recommendations. Anyone wishing to question the findingsof the Panel must do so with the knowledge of the thorough work carried out during thepast months, and mindful that the evidence collected is an integral part of this report, being
available for effective public scrutiny.
The Panel has undertaken three tasks to reach the main objectives of this review. It hasi) established a factual narrative of what happened based on the evidence collected; ii)
determined what failures and conduct caused or contributed to the events, and who isaccountable for them; and iii) made recommendations to optimise safety and security
standards in the organisation of sporting events, in order to prevent any such incident fromoccurring again at a UEFA Champions League Final, or any other major sporting event heldat the Stade de France, or indeed elsewhere.
Avoiding future disasters and improving the service provided at football events was the aim of
the Panel’s work during this process. I would like to thank the Panel for that and for its tirelesswork in putting collaboratively together the exhaustive and comprehensive report that is
now presented. In conducting this Review, I have highly valued their expert input and advice.
The report results from a collective writing process, reflecting an exercise which involved
compromise. This Review has been collectively signed off by the Panel. Any public declarationof a Panel member after the publication of this report represents his/her individual opinion only.
Sports are an essential part of our democratic societies, inspiring, guiding and uniting us,with unique excitement and pleasure. Sports equally reflect and shape our communities.
Accordingly, they must express and defend our common democratic values. It is thus of
crucial importance that sporting events meet the standards that people – and its supporters,in particular – expect and are respectful of all dimensions of Human Rights. We must act
collectively for the progress of our societies, so that they are safer, healthier, kinder, moredeveloped, and equal and true promotors of Human Rights, democracy, and the rule of law,also through sports. And through sports we should be able to set examples. That is why we must
guarantee that evenings like the one on 28 May 2022 in Saint-Denis must never happen again.
Tiago Brandão Rodrigues
Chair
February 2023
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UCLF22 Independent Review

1. Executive Summary
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. At about 15:30 on 28th May 2022, a highly experienced external UEFA Security
Officer appointed by UEFA to monitor safety and security measures at the UEFAChampions League Final (UCLF22), arrived at the Stade de France and began
an inspection of the temporary additional security and ticket check perimetersurrounding the stadium. At Additional Security Perimeter entrance 3 (ASP3),
positioned at the south-west corner of the stadium, he immediately noted that thearrangements were “not fit for purpose”, and reported such to his UEFA colleagues.
1.1.2. ASP3 was a known bottleneck involving a narrow ramp up to the concourse
between the ASPs and the turnstile entrances. In addition, the approaches to ASP3
were problematic, involving a narrow pedestrian underpass which was prone toflooding and congestion, and a confined avenue with little means of escape. ASP4
was a far wider and more accessible entrance on the Avenue Stade de France.
1.1.3. By about 18:00, it was clear that the assessment of the UEFA Security Officer
was correct, with very serious congestion occurring ahead of ASP3, and soonafter, at about 18:50, the stadium control room, alarmed that the congestion atthat point had become dangerous, issued a request to the police to divert arriving
supporters away from that entrance towards ASP4, the other entrance at the southof the stadium.
1.1.4. Despite the request to divert those still arriving, the police were slow
to react, and no effective action resulted. Thousands of supporters remained
corralled in this unsafe environment, unable to progress or escape, as others
unwittingly joined them at their rear. Those corralled were exposed to criminality,with some accounts of stolen match tickets and pickpocketing shared with thePanel.
1.1.5. By about 19:45, seventy-five minutes before the official kick-off time,
the police abandoned ASP3 and both police officers and stewards withdrew.
Consequently, thousands of supporters, and locals, flowed up the ramp onto theconcourse between the ASPs and the turnstile perimeter. This area, which was
confined and meant to be accessible in a controlled way only to those with tickets,
was quite full as there had already been problems at the turnstiles, and some gateshad been closed. As a result of the flow of thousands more into this space, such
1. Executive Summary

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UCLF22 Independent Review

arrangements as there were to optimise the entry rate of supporters through theturnstiles, were swept away. There was a clear and immediate danger of a fatalcrush.
1.1.6. Subsequently, a decision to delay kick-off was taken. The Panel has
concluded this was the correct decision, although the lack of messaging to thoseoutside the turnstile perimeter meant that it probably made little difference to thecongestion. The dangerous conditions on the concourse outside the turnstiles
were compounded by the police deploying tear gas at disorderly groups of locals,
as well as using pepper spray on supporters trying to gain entrance with valid
tickets. It is remarkable that no one lost their life.
1.1.7. All the stakeholders interviewed by the Panel have agreed that this situation
was a near-miss: a term used when an event almost turns into a mass fatality
catastrophe.
1.1.8. Many Liverpool supporters in that crowd were survivors of the 1989
Hillsborough disaster where 97 football supporters died, others were vulnerable –with disabled supporters, elderly people, and children amongst them. The parallels
between Hillsborough 1989 and Paris 2022 are palpable. The similarities include
the fact that both events were preventable, and both were caused by the failures of
those responsible for public safety. Neither was a ‘black swan’ event, or the resultof a ‘perfect storm’1. Both events were foreseeable. In the judgment of the Panel,the different outcomes were a matter of chance: in one nearly a hundred died, theother none, but through no merit of those in charge.
1.1.9. As the crisis in Paris unfolded, UEFA announced on big screens within thestadium and thereby via broadcasters to the world, that the delay in kick-off was
due to ‘late’ arriving supporters. This claim was objectively untrue.
1.1.10. On the night and in the immediate aftermath of the events, French Ministers,
UEFA and others blamed thousands of supporters at the Liverpool end of thestadium whom they asserted sought to actively enter the stadium without valid
tickets. As addressed below, the Panel has found that the evidence does notsupport these assertions.
1.1.11. It has been a feature of our investigations that several key stakeholders have
1 — A ‘black swan’ event is one which is unpredictable and has a high impact. A ‘perfect storm’ is a rare combinationof events which create a bad outcome.
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UCLF22 Independent Review

not accepted responsibility for their own failures but have been quick to attribute
blame to others. Some have continued to make allegations – in particular against
supporters – based upon ‘facts’ for which there is no evidence. Assertions thatlate, ticketless supporters were either the primary cause or contributed to thedangerous events have a particular resonance with Hillsborough where similar
allegations were made 33 years ago and persisted for decades before being
comprehensively disproved.
1.1.12. Institutional defensiveness, putting reputation and self-interest above truth
and responsibility, prevents progressive change. A healthy organisation welcomesscrutiny and criticism based on evidence, an unhealthy one hides behind prejudice
and baseless assertions, and contributes to a carousel of blame, where it iseveryone else’s fault. That is why independent investigations based on evidence
are so important, because otherwise the same will happen next week or next yearwith devastating consequences.
1.1.13. It is a matter of the greatest regret that during the currency of our work two
mass fatality crowd crushes have occurred elsewhere. On 1st October 2022, atleast 125 people died in a crush at an Indonesian football match2 . On 29th October
2022, 156 people died in a Halloween celebration in South Korea 3 .
1.1.14. The starting point for our investigations and review has therefore been therealisation that crowd events always carry known and predictable dangers, andconsequently, those responsible for public safety are under a duty to plan andoperate all reasonable measures to minimise the risk to life and threat of serious
injury.
1.1.15. The imperative to protect against risks to life is a matter of common sense,
but it is also a duty enshrined in domestic and international laws. In Europe, Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)4 , requires member States
to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to protect life from known threats.
1.1.16. In the footballing context, there are also a range of international agreements
to ensure the safety and security of supporters and others at football fixtureswith an international dimension. These instruments were developed following
the Heysel disaster in 1985 and have evolved since. The duties and obligations
2 — Indonesia football crush: How the disaster unfolded, BBC
3 — Itaewon crush: How South Korea let down its young people, BBC
4 — European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe
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UCLF22 Independent Review

arising from these are currently reflected in the provisions of the Council of Europe(CoE) Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at
Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No. 218), referred to as the ‘2016
Convention’, or hereafter the ‘Saint-Denis Convention’5 . Consequently, the Panel’s
conclusions have been set out with these in mind and measured against the
obligations set out in the Saint-Denis Convention.
1.2. The Review: process
1.2.1. UEFA established this review to examine events surrounding the 2022 UCLF
and appointed Dr Tiago Brandão Rodrigues as its Chair, who gathered a Panel ofexperts from several countries with different types of expertise.
1.2.2. The independence of the Panel, and the integrity of this report are
paramount. From the outset, the Panel has indicated that it would gather as
much relevant evidence as it could within the tight timeframe in which it agreed
to work. The Panel has made clear that it would only reach conclusions based
upon evidence, and that it would reference its report and publish all documents,
interview transcripts and other material so far as it could. Only throughopenness and transparency can there be confidence in the conclusions andrecommendations. Anyone wishing to question the findings and conclusions of the
Panel must do so in the knowledge that we have published almost all the evidence
and interview transcripts alongside the report, which is heavily referenced. The
process is set out in detail in Chapter Two.
1.2.3. The Panel has undertaken three tasks. It has:a. Constructed as definitive a factual narrative of what did and did not happen as
has been possible on the evidence.
b. Determined what failures and conduct caused or contributed to the events, and
who is accountable for them.
c. Made recommendations to ensure that everything possible is done to prevent
any such incident occurring again at a UEFA Champions League Final (UCLF), or
other major sporting event held at the Stade de France, or indeed anywhere else.
1.2.4. In order to complete those tasks, the Panel has approached as many
stakeholders, organisations, and individuals as it determined might be able to
5 — CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016, Council of Europe
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UCLF22 Independent Review

assist. Those who have been approached include: the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) and its wholly-owned subsidiary UEFA Events SA (togetherthe ‘event owner’), the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), the Préfecturede Police, the Inter-ministerial Delegate for Major Sporting Events (DIGES), andInter-ministerial Delegate to the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DIJOP), theConsortium Stade de France (CSDF), the Public Prosecutors in Bobigny and Paris,
the Mayor of Paris, the Mayor of Saint-Denis, Régie Autonome des Transports
Parisiens (RATP), Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF), Liverpool
FC (LFC), Real Madrid CF (RMCF), the Spirit of Shankly (SOS), the Liverpool
Disabled Supporters Association (LDSA), Football Supporters Europe (FSE),
Merseyside Police, United Kingdom National Football Information Point (NFIP-UK),
Football Association England (FA), Spanish National Police, Sponsors/Partners(through UEFA). Individuals who have provided assistance, include Richard Bouigue(Deputy Mayor of the 12th Paris Arrondissement), Adrian Dinca (Chair of the CoE
Committee on Safety, Security and Service), Steve Rotheram (Metro Mayor for theLiverpool City Region), Ian Byrne (Member of Parliament for West Derby, Liverpool,UK), Lord Birt (Member of the House of Lords, UK), and a large number of Liverpool
FC and Real Madrid CF supporters, as well as others who attended at the UEFAChampions League Final 2022 (UCLF22).
1.2.5. The level of cooperation has generally been very good, although a small
number of stakeholders have declined to assist, as we note in Chapter 2.
1.2.6. In the course of its work, the Panel has taken account of two official post
event reports from the DIGES and the French Senate and a pre-event reportfrom Football Supporters Europe (FSE). The Panel has also considered evidence,
analysis and footage reported by responsible journalists, including at: Le Monde,
the Guardian and the Daily Mail. Furthermore, the Panel has been assisted by
the report of Professor Scraton et al (2022) 6, in particular regarding its empiricalevidence. This has all contributed to our work, but we have only relied upon it
where it is supported by evidence we have seen, and our own analysis.
1.3. What went wrong
1.3.1. The Panel has concluded that there were two overarching organisational
failures that lie at the root of what went so disastrously wrong in Paris. Firstly,
the UEFA ‘model’ for organising the UCLF22 was defective in that there was an
6 — “Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the2022 Champions League Final in Paris, Phil Scraton et al. (2022)
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UCLF22 Independent Review

absence of overall control or oversight of safety and security. Secondly, the safety,
security and service model laid out in the Saint-Denis Convention, was ignoredin favour of a securitized approach which was inappropriately based on incorrect
assumptions that Liverpool FC supporters posed significant threats to publicorder. That inexplicable misconception resulted in a policing approach that lacked
capacity for engagement, and which actively failed to integrate into a coherent
multi-agency framework.
1.3.2. The UEFA ‘model’
1.3.2.1. UEFA, through its wholly owned subsidiary, UEFA Events SA, delegatedprivate safety and security responsibility to the French Football Federation (FFF)
and deferred to the Préfecture de Police on safety and security matters fallingwithin its policing duties, as per UEFA’s standard operating procedures whenorganizing Champions League Finals. This would have been an entirely reasonableapproach with one crucial addition: UEFA should have retained a monitoring andoversight role, to ensure it all worked. It self-evidently did not. This ‘delegationand deference’ model led to a lacuna whereby mobility and access plans, andcommunication and interoperability were not properly monitored. Flaws were not
identified, and consequently they were not rectified. The panel concluded thisrepresented an unacceptable abdication of responsibility by UEFA.
1.3.2.2. The fact that UEFA failed to take this oversight responsibility must be
viewed in the context that it had a mechanism to monitor, advise and assist withthe safety of planning and operational measures: UEFA’s own Safety and Security(S&S) Unit. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the senior managementof UEFA Events SA marginalised the UEFA S&S Unit and thereby removed themechanism through which the safety and security of the event could be ensured.
The Panel’s view is that UEFA Events SA’s lack of oversight upon delegation ofprivate safety and security matters, deference of all such matters in the public
space to policing authorities, and simply not following its own safety, security andservice requirements, was a recipe for the failures which in fact occurred. Senior
officials at the top of UEFA allowed this to happen, even though the shortcomingsof its model were widely known at senior management level, as acknowledged to
the Panel7.
1.3.2.3. The Panel notes that the UCLF is UEFA’s annual flagship event. It can
7 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 728-729, 731); Meeting with UEFA - Safety& Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1295-1297)
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UCLF22 Independent Review

compel private partners to comply with its requirements, and it has considerable‘soft power’ with which to encourage State authorities to fully engage with its
project and comply with their Saint-Denis Convention obligations. At UCLF22 UEFA
did neither.
1.3.3. Policing
1.3.3.1. The police, unchallenged and accepted without question by otherstakeholders, adopted a model aimed at a non-existent threat from football
hooligans, together with a preoccupation that ticketless supporters requireda public order policing approach rather than one based upon facilities andengagement. This was despite good information and intelligence from UEFA, UEFA
Events SA, the Clubs, and Merseyside and Spanish national police, which indicatedthat there had been no significant issues of football-related violence involving
supporters of either finalist club in recent years and that the phenomenon of
supporters without tickets travelling to a host city for the atmosphere had becomecommonplace.
1.3.3.2. There were multiple consequences of this defective policing model. The
police and other stakeholders were deflected from playing an effective role inensuring safe mobility of supporters to the vicinity of the stadium, or within thelast kilometre; they failed to plan or operate safe access arrangements through theadditional and turnstile perimeters; they did not have any effective contingency
plans once access arrangements failed; and they did not have any effective plan todeal with anti-social behaviour or violence perpetrated by locals.
1.3.3.3. Furthermore, although the Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis chaired
planning meetings relating to mobility, and although the French State wasrepresented in some planning meetings through the DIGES, together with UEFA,UEFA Events SA, FFF and other stakeholders, no one appears to have identified anddealt with, or escalated to higher political levels the acknowledged and evidently
poor interoperability.
1.3.3.4. Ultimately the failures of this approach culminated in a policing operationthat deployed tear gas and pepper spray: weaponry which has no place at a
festival of football.
1.3.3.5. The monitoring and oversight lacuna in the UEFA model, and thedominance of the public order approach adopted by the police, combined
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UCLF22 Independent Review

to aggravate the absence of joint working – or interoperability – between key
stakeholders to an extent that the Panel found remarkable. The Panel has
concluded that this was a major cause of the failure to prevent or deal with the
problems arising in four key areas: changes in patterns of travel by supporters
to the vicinity of the stadium, ‘last kilometre’ crowd management and routing,stadium access arrangements, and criminal attacks on supporters.
1.3.4. The failure of joint working, and the change of venue
1.3.4.1. There were in fact, multiple communication and interoperability failures
between stakeholders. Important historical and real time information was notshared. Plans were not properly agreed, and there is the clearest evidence ofan absence of stakeholders working together. Decisions were taken, without
communication to other partners, in particular by the police.
1.3.4.2. The failures of joint working were compounded by a further factor.
The UCLF22 was planned to take place in St Petersburg, however, following theinvasion of Ukraine, UEFA moved the venue to the Stade de France, Paris. The
late change of venue amplified the imperative for effective interoperability andcommunication between stakeholders, and the need to check all arrangements
were robust and fit for purpose. Safety and security are binary. Hospitality
and concessions can be compromised: safety and security cannot. The key
stakeholders should have ensured all arrangements were joined-up and allagencies were working together, with UEFA at the centre, overseeing the wholeproject. The Panel has concluded that this simply did not happen.
1.3.4.3. Instead of applying a more vigilant approach as a result of the shorter
timeframe, UEFA Events SA agreed with FFF to base its planning on the French
Cup Final, which took place three weeks before the UCLF. Although there wassome observation of the operation of the earlier match, problems were not
identified, and relevant changes were not made. The Panel has concluded that the
French Cup Final was not a proper comparator, and reliance on it constituted an
inappropriate planning short cut, which contributed to the failures on match day.
1.3.4.4. In the above context - the failure of UEFA to have oversight of its own
project, the misconceived policing model, and the multiple interoperability failures- the Panel has identified the following eight factors which almost led to disaster:a. A disproportionately large number of Liverpool supporters were directed to16

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UCLF22 Independent Review

arrive via the ‘Stade de France: Saint-Denis’ station, on train line RER D, which
was closest to the southwest of the stadium, compared to the volume of people
attending other major events at the stadium.
b. Defective route planning between RER D and the stadium, resulted in too many
people being directed by police toward the stadium via the south-west ASP3 entrance.
c. Defective access arrangements at the ASPs. The effect of this was particularly
acute at ASP3 because of the increased pressure created by the flawed routing,and that it was positioned on a restricted access ramp: a bottleneck.
d. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets, without extra measures tomaintain throughput rates, exacerbated access problems at ASPs.
e. Defective turnstile arrangements, which failed to ensure a sufficient throughput
rate to guarantee safe entry.
f. The activities of large groups of locals, some of whom were involved in attacks
on supporters and attempts to breach the perimeters and turnstiles to gain entry
to the stadium, and a failure to police them.
g. The use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse.
h. A lack of contingency plans relating to both additional perimeter and turnstileaccess: there was no Plan B when things went wrong.
1.3.5. Ticketless supporters and counterfeits
1.3.5.1. Key stakeholders, including UEFA, FFF, the French authorities - including
Ministers and the Préfecture – have asserted that large numbers of ticketless
supporters or those with fake tickets caused or contributed to the problems. This isa highly controversial and sensitive topic.
1.3.5.2. The Panel has made substantial efforts to gather and examine theevidence to support or refute these allegations.
1.3.5.3. All major sporting events must be planned with the realisation that somepeople may turn up and try to gain entrance without a valid ticket, as historicallyhas always been the case. A UCLF is no exception, and the Panel has no doubtthat there were people trying to do so on 28th May 2022. Some had no ticket, andthere is evidence that some had counterfeits. The issue is whether there was anabnormally high number of people without valid tickets, and whether they in factcaused or contributed to the problems.

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UCLF22 Independent Review

1.3.5.4. Based upon the wealth of evidence we have obtained from eyewitnesses
and footage, the Panel has concluded that there is no evidence of an abnormallylarge number of ‘ticketless supporters’ or supporters with invalid tickets, in thevicinity of the Stade de France on the evening of 28th May. This finding is not tobe misunderstood with respect to the number of locals without tickets who were
present, which was plainly substantial.
1.3.5.5. With respect to counterfeit tickets, the Panel notes there is some social media,
police intelligence, and anecdotal evidence from stewards. It acknowledges thereis turnstile data showing a total of 2,589 presentations of tickets with unknown QR
codes. Of these, 1,644 were at the end of the stadium at which Liverpool supporters
entered. We also note that the stated numbers incorporate attempted multiple
presentations including those taking their chance at different turnstiles. The Panelsought evidence about counterfeit ticketing from previous UCLFs. UEFA was unable toprovide any hard data, although its ticketing staff indicated that piles of counterfeit
tickets had been recovered at the 2016 UCLF in Milan8 . The external UEFA Security
Officer observing the south side of the stadium, and who had been the safety officer
at the 2017 Cardiff UCLF, indicated that the quantity of counterfeit and ticketless
supporters did not appear to be any greater at UCLF229. FSE concluded that there
were fewer counterfeit tickets available at UCLF22 than in Madrid in 2019. On thisbasis, the Panel has concluded that the evidence does not support the assertion
that there were more counterfeit tickets at UCLF22 than at other similar events.
1.3.5.6. The Panel further concludes that assertions concerning huge numbers of
supporters trying to gain entry without valid tickets have been wrongly inflated andexaggerated. Such allegations should only be made on a proper evidential basis,and the Panel draws the inference that they have been made primarily to deflect
from responsibility for planning and operational failures.
1.4. Recommendations
1.4.1. The final chapter contains 21 Recommendations (see Chapter 9). It is anunfortunate feature of many inquiries and reviews that when they report, theprocess comes to an end, and recommendations are soon forgotten and notactioned. We have addressed this in our recommendations. Public safety at major
sporting events is too important to pass up the opportunity of learning lessons
from Paris 2022 in order to ensure a safer future.
8 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1152-1157)
9 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500-1501)
18

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UCLF22 Independent Review

2. The Review process

1. Executive Summary

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UCLF22 Independent Review

2. The Review process
2.1. In the hours and days following the events at the UCLF22, there was muchfinger pointing and conflict concerning what had happened and why. The official‘narrative’ from French Ministers and authorities, UEFA and FFF was strongly
disputed by Liverpool FC, its supporters, Real Madrid CF supporters, the media,
and many others.
2.2. Consequently, UEFA set up this Review10, appointing Dr Tiago Brandão
Rodrigues, Member of the Portuguese Parliament, President of the Parliamentary
Committee of Environment and Energy and former Portuguese Minister of
Education (in charge of Sports), to be its Chair and setting wide-ranging ‘terms ofreference’11 . Dr Brandão Rodrigues appointed a Panel12, which includes memberswith different experiences and expertise, and he promised to publish this Final
Report within months of the events themselves, to set the record straight, and to
make recommendations in time to make a difference before UCLF23 in Istanbul,
Turkey.
2.3. It is important to emphasise that this Review is not a forensic exercise,conducted in a court room. No one is on trial, and it is not a formal legal process.
Nevertheless, the Panel has been careful to conduct the Review and present
its conclusions with fairness and rigour, and to make sure all its conclusions
and recommendations are evidence-based, reached without fear or favour, andpublicly referenced. Where the Panel has considered particularly important orcontentious issues, it has endeavoured to express the strength of its conclusions:
whether it is sure, or reached a position on the balance of probability, or whether it
believes an occurrence was a possibility, rather than a probability.
2.4. Although established and funded by UEFA, the Review is independent. It has
set its own process and has insisted on maximum openness and transparency. It
agreed its own ‘Transparency Protocol and Confidentiality Undertaking’13 and at allstages it has been clear with stakeholders and witnesses about the procedure it
has followed.
10 — UEFA commissions independent report into events surrounding UEFA Champions League Final, UEFA –Appendix, II.1
11 — Independent review into events surrounding the UEFA Champions League Final 2022 at Stade de France on
Saturday, 28 May 2022 (“Review”) and production of an independent report of such Review (“Report”) - Terms ofReference, UEFA – Appendix, I
12 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022 Independent Review sets final panel, list of experts and timeline, UEFA –Appendix, II.3
13 — Independent Review Panel’s Transparency Protocol and Confidentiality Undertaking – Appendix, III
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2.5. Some sections of the media have, perfectly properly, questioned the
independence of the Panel, given that some members have had a long and close
relationship with UEFA. The Panel notes that independence cannot be declared: it
must be demonstrated, and makes four points:
a. The publication of all evidence received by the Panel (subject to very narrow
exceptions), alongside the Report, allows the reader to judge for themselves
whether the Panel has asked the right questions and drawn proper evidence-based
conclusions.
b. The inclusion of members who have had experience of the inner workings ofUEFA has been invaluable to the Review.
c. Two members of the Panel represent supporter associations (the FSA and FSE),
and others have only minor historical or no kind of relationship with UEFA.
d. The working of the Panel and its conclusions and recommendations are basedon consensus, so far as has been possible. All members of the Panel have had
equal access to the evidence.
2.6. At the outset of its work, the Panel drew up a list of stakeholders from whomit should seek evidence. Inevitably, as the process has progressed, other sourcesof information have come to light, and further individuals and organisations havebeen asked to assist.
2.7. Given that this is a voluntary process, no one has been required to provide
documents or answer questions. However, with few exceptions, the response to
the Review has been positive. Where people or organisations have declined toassist, we make that clear in the Report.
2.8. The Panel sent requests for ‘position statements’ to each stakeholder,
where possible providing guidance as to issues the Panel wanted them toaddress. The requests sought an explanation from the organisation as to theirrole and responsibilities, and their involvement in the planning and operationof the UCLF22. The letters of request asked them to state what had been
witnessed, and asked them to provide all relevant documents, and lists of
witnesses who may have been able to assist the review further. The requests
also asked stakeholders to identify failures and what went wrong, as well as
good practice.

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2.9. Importantly, the letters of request made clear the intentions of the Panelregarding transparency and the publication of evidence. The letters stated: “Itis my intention to conduct this review with as much transparency as is possible,
to ensure the credibility and integrity of the process. I intend to publish allstatements, supporting material, and witness interviews, save to the extent thatthey include irrelevant personal details, sensitive material (for example, relating tocounter terror measures), or commercially sensitive details (such as the value ofcontracts). It is therefore essential that you identify any material which should not
be placed in the public domain.”
2.10. Almost all stakeholders responded positively, and a large volume of evidence
was gathered through this part of the process. Responses also helped the Panel
identify and obtain other evidence, and assisted in determining who the Panelshould interview and what questions to ask. The only stakeholder which declined
to assist was Real Madrid CF. The Mayor of Saint-Denis did not reply. The Public
Prosecutor in Bobigny, and Paris did not respond to a specific request for sight ofstreet CCTV relevant to the Review.
2.11. Once the Panel had gathered sufficient written evidence – contemporaneous
documentation, narratives prepared by stakeholders, and eye-witness accounts– interviews were held with witnesses from the Consortium Stade de France, FFF,
UEFA, Liverpool FC, the French authorities (the DIGES and Préfecture de Police(PP), and their staff), the CoE Standing Committee on Safety and Security at Sports
Events, UEFA Sponsors and Partners, Richard Bouigue Deputy Mayor of the 12th
Paris Arrondissement, and supporters from both Liverpool FC and Real Madrid CF.
2.12. The Panel thanks supporter groups, including the Spirit of Shankly andthe Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association, Federación de Accionistas y
Socios del Fútbol Español, and Football Supporters Europe for their assistance.
In addition to interviews with supporters, the Panel was assisted by over 8,500
written statements and accounts which LFC had obtained from their supporters
and supplied to the Panel, together with their analysis of them. These interviews
and written accounts have enabled the Panel to consider a wealth of eye-witness
evidence and also to understand the supporter experiences. The same approach
to transparency has been taken to supporter evidence, except with respect tothe written accounts provided by LFC, which have not been published for dataprotection and privacy reasons. Reference to this evidence has been anonymised,
as has evidence from UEFA’s operational staff, UEFA Sponsors and Partners, FFF,
and LFC staff, at their request.
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2.13. Some factual issues have been hotly disputed by different stakeholders
and witnesses. Many statements have been asserted by others as fact, without
any basis. Although the Panel has considered all available sources, it has been
careful to draw its own conclusions from the best available evidence, andas far as possible the Report is referenced, to properly ground and justify its
conclusions.
2.14. As stated at paragraph 2.9 above, all letters of request for evidence sent
to stakeholders set out that the review would be as open and transparent as
possible, and it was intended that all evidence should be published alongside thefinal report subject to three narrow areas of exception. Late in the process, two
key stakeholders raised objections to publication of some evidence. Initially UEFAagreed, in writing, to the process set out by the independent Panel, including
the publication of all evidence as above. In a subsequent recorded discussion
concerning the process, the General Secretary, confirmed this agreement, but
asked that junior staff be anonymised. The Panel agreed. In December 2022, UEFA
indicated that they were unhappy with publication of any of their witness interview
transcripts, but reached a compromise with the Panel that the transcripts would be
published subject to anonymisation of all their staff including senior management(despite the fact that they would be named in the report itself). Subsequently,
UEFA has used this anonymisation to justify redaction of questions and answers
regarding the evidence given to the French Senate by a senior executive. The
Panel is very disappointed that UEFA has taken this approach, in order to redact
obviously important evidence. At about the same time in December 2022, FFF
made similar objections. As a result, the transcripts relating to FFF are anonymised,and significant redactions have been required, which go far beyond the narrow
exceptions referred to above. The Panel is similarly disappointed at the approachtaken by FFF.
2.15. The Panel is clear that only by publication of the evidence, and by detailedreferencing of factual conclusions, can the Report gain the confidence of all
stakeholders, and dispel some of the false narratives which have been peddled byothers since the events.
2.16. The Panel believes that it has applied the highest standards of integrity, andinternational best practice, to ensure fairness to all, and to achieve an outcome
which commands the confidence of all.

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2.17. CCTV footage
2.17.1. Whereas the Panel has been pleased with the high level of cooperation with
the Review by most stakeholders, there is one aspect of the evidence which is ofsignificant concern: the unavailability of CCTV footage. The Stade de France andits surrounding area is well served by CCTV monitoring, and footage from boththe private stadium system and public street CCTV cameras is recorded. Footageof the events the Panel has been investigating was monitored in real time in boththe stadium control room and the adjoining police control room, and both sets offootage were recorded.
2.17.2. As the Panel has noted with concern, the recordings from all 260 Stadede France cameras were auto deleted about a week after the events. The Stadede France management did not take any measures to ensure retention, and noone else – including the French authorities, UEFA or FFF – asked them to retain
the footage. After media reports emerged UEFA sent a letter to Ministry of Interior
asking if the footage could be recovered14 . The Operations Director of UEFA
Events SA claimed in interview that they thought that UEFA had requested FFF to
ask CSDF to retain the material, “three or four days after the final”15 . FFF has notconfirmed this, and the Panel has seen no email, letter or telephone note relating
to what would be an important request, or any follow-up.
2.17.3. The Panel has been told that recordings of street CCTV footage is in thepossession of the Public Prosecutor. As noted above, the Panel has written toboth the Public Prosecutors in Bobigny and Paris. Requests to view relevant partsof that footage, in particular that relating to the access to ASP3 have not eliciteda response. Furthermore, the Panel understands that neither the DIGES nor the
Senate were permitted access to that footage during their own investigations.
2.17.4. Camera footage is often of great importance in understanding what did
and did not happen at complex events such as UCLF22. It is well-documented thatstadium CCTV and other footage was central to disproving false allegations thatdrunk, late, ticketless supporters had caused the Hillsborough disaster in 1989.
The Panel has no doubt that the retention of the Stade de France footage, and theprovision of street CCTV recordings would have materially assisted this Review andinvestigations by others.

14 — Letter of UEFA’s General Secretary to the French Minister of Interior (10 June 2022) – Appendix, VI.17
15 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 849)
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UCLF22 Independent Review

2.17.5. It should have been obvious to French State authorities, the Préfecture,
the DIGES, the Public Prosecutors, the CSDF, UEFA, and FFF that such footage
would be invaluable for multiple investigations which would follow the events of
the night. The Panel finds that it was a remarkable and serious failure that noneof those stakeholders ensured that the footage was retained. CSDF was the only
stakeholder to accept this criticism in interview.
2.17.6. CSDF told the Panel that they could have legally retained the footage for 30days without any judicial order. Obviously, that did not provide any impediment toretention, because it was plenty of time within which an appropriate body could
seek such authority. CSDF indicated that they have ensured that deletion would
not happen in the future.
2.17.7. The Panel has been advised that France has exacting privacy and dataprotection laws, and the retention and provision of footage is strictly controlled.
The Panel does not doubt or comment on that position. However, the Panel does
note that privacy and data protection laws are always qualified by the competingneeds of other rights and obligations, most particularly relating to the protectionof life and limb: security and public safety. The Panel notes that this is also arequirement of international law, which is binding upon France.
2.17.8. The Panel has therefore recommended that French authorities review theframework relating to the retention and provision of footage and other material,
for the purposes of investigations which are likely to improve security and public
safety. The Panel further recommends that this is a matter which should be
addressed by UEFA in its requirements of host States.

2. The Review process

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3. The Organisation of a UEFA
Men’s Champions League
Final (UCLF): Framework andregulation

26

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UCLF22 Independent Review

3. The Organisation of a UEFA Men’s Champions League Final (UCLF):
Framework and regulation
3.1. Organisation
3.1.1. The organisation of major football matches is a complex but regular matter,and always involves safety and security considerations which are of paramountimportance. However, the organisation of a UCLF is on a wholly different level. It isan annual flagship event and involves the organisation of an international football
festival rather than just the match itself. Ordinarily, it involves a host city and two
foreign teams, with spectators coming from across Europe, and indeed the world.
No two UCLFs are the same, although there are similar issues which must be
addressed each year.
3.1.2. In order to put on such a massive event, there needs to be maximum
cooperation and planning between UEFA and local partners, including the hostFederation (or Association) and stadium, and public authorities (the police andsecurity forces), State and municipal authorities, and transport companies andnetworks.
3.1.3. Where major public safety and security issues have occurred in the past,causes or contributory factors have included regulatory shortcomings, planning
failures, negligence by those in charge, technical faults, or a combination of
those things. However, in almost all such cases, there have been failures ofinteroperability - communication and joint working - between organisations andagencies. If the lead agency – here UEFA – solves the interoperability problem at
an early stage, most of the other issues will be identified and solved as the process
evolves.
3.1.4. The normal process for hosting a UCLF commences about three to four
years prior to match day with a bidding process. UEFA sets requirements andbidders complete a template. The successful host Federation then devises
a concept, with advice and assistance from UEFA, and eventually staging
agreements and an operational plan emerge following guarantees from the hostState relating to various matters including travel and security, the formation of a
local organising structure (LOS), and multi-agency planning meetings.
3.1.5. For UCLF22, the venue was to be St Petersburg, Russia, and much of
the normal process had been undertaken before Russia invaded Ukraine.
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UCLF22 Independent Review

Consequently, on 25th February 2022, the day following the invasion, UEFA took thedecision to change the venue to Paris. As the Panel notes elsewhere in this report,
there was little process involved with the change of venue, and it meant that all
arrangements had to be revisited with a timeframe of three months.
3.1.6. Almost all stakeholders have referred to difficulties presented by thetruncated planning period. None have suggested that a safe and secure event
could not have been organised within that period. The Panel agrees. There aremany features of a UCLF which could be compromised acceptably due to atruncated timescale or unforeseen circumstances – hospitality, concessions,comfort, for example – but safety and security are binary. Those responsible - here
UEFA, FFF, the Préfecture de Police and the Consortium Stade de France - had tomake a judgment. The event could be arranged safely and securely, or it could not
go ahead, at least as planned.
3.1.7. If the UCLF could not be safely and securely arranged within three months,
there were several options, including cancellation, postponement, or going ahead
with restricted numbers.
3.1.8. By the time the event was switched to Paris, it was far too late for the hostFederation to formulate a ‘safety and security concept’ for the arrangement of theevent, a document which is normally supplied to UEFA a year in advance of theevent. UEFA has told the Review that it produced a “hybrid template document(...) concentrating on strategic and operational arrangements”, and translated it
into French, to assist FFF and other local partners16 . In the Panel’s view, this was asensible approach and the document, dated 9th March 2022, appears to have been
produced quite swiftly after the venue change took place 17. However, in interview,
FFF indicated that it had not seen that document18 .
3.1.9. As the Panel considers at Chapter 6, UEFA Events SA management
subsequently agreed to arrangements for the UCLF22 to be based upon
operational plans for the French Cup Final, which took place on 7th May 2022. This
was an arrangement made without recourse to the UEFA Safety & Security Unit,
and for reasons which we set out later in this report, this was an inappropriate
shortcut without rigorous oversight. Most importantly, the UEFA S&S Unit neverreceived any operational plan for the French Cup Final or the 28th May.
16 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 26)
17 — UEFA SSNS Concept & Operational Plan (9 March 2022) – Appendix, VI.3
18 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1611-1612)
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3.1.10. Given the short timeframe, UEFA and all its partners, including FFF
and the Préfecture de Police, should have realised the imperative of effective
communication and joint working between planning and operational staff
with responsibility for safety and security, and for ensuring that all plans andagreements were reduced to writing and signed-off by senior officers. The Panelis firmly of the conclusion that these imperatives are axiomatic on a normal
timescale, but they were even more obvious and vital with such a truncated period.
3.1.11. The failures of interoperability and communications between stakeholders
have already been recognised by the DIGES and the Senate in their reports. The
Senate Report is headlined: “Champions League Final at the Stade de France: An
inevitable fiasco”. The summary highlights failures to put appropriate arrangements
in place, and poor communications between stakeholders. The Senate disagreed
with the DIGES that the failures were only operational – the possibility of “crisis
scenarios” was insufficiently considered, and the events should be seen as a“wake-up call” requiring the actors and the Government to learn the necessary
lessons before the 2023 Rugby World Cup and 2024 Olympic and Paralympic
Games19.
3.2. Legal, policy and guidance framework
3.2.1. In July 2016 the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety,
Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETSNo 218) 20 was launched during the UEFA Euro 2016 tournament in France. The
launch took place at the Stade de France in Saint-Denis.
3.2.2. This Saint-Denis Convention superseded and built upon the work doneinternationally since the adoption of the European Convention on Spectator
Violence in 1985. The 1985 Convention had been introduced urgently following
the Heysel Disaster, which resulted in 39 deaths at the UEFA European Cup Final in
Brussels that year.
3.2.3. In 2013 there was a recognition within the Council of Europe of the needto move away from a violence-focussed orientation and towards an integrated
approach based upon three interdependent pillars: safety, security and service.
The changing demands of the sport resulted in a new approach and the new
19 — L’Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions au
Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable, French Senate – English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2820)
20 — CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016, Council of Europe
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UCLF22 Independent Review

Convention. The Saint-Denis Convention is an international treaty and binding on
its State Parties.
3.2.4. France signed the Saint-Denis Convention on 3rd July 2016, and ratified it on
6th February 2017. The Saint-Denis Convention replaced the 1985 Convention andentered into force on 1st November 2017.
3.2.5. The aim of the Saint-Denis Convention is to provide a safe, secure, andwelcoming environment at football matches and other sports events with aninternational dimension. In order to achieve this, Parties shall21:
a. Adopt an integrated, multi-agency and balanced approach towards safety,
security and service, based on an ethos of effective local, national andinternational partnerships and cooperation;b. Ensure that all public and private agencies, and other stakeholders, recognisethat safety, security, and service provision cannot be considered in isolation andcan have a direct influence on delivery of the other two components;c. Take account of good practices in developing an integrated approach to safety,
security and service.
3.2.6. The Saint-Denis Convention has been complemented by formal
Recommendations adopted by the Standing Committee on Safety and Security
at Sports Events (T-S4) which incorporate three, extensive, inter-related Annexes
providing a range of good practices on Safety, Security and Service along with afourth Annexe containing a series of checklists intended to assist in monitoring theextent to which national arrangements are in compliance with that good practice.
3.2.7. With regard to implementation, the Standing Committee emphasised togovernments of State Parties to both the 1985 and 2016 Conventions that theymust ensure that the recommendations and good practices highlighted in theSaint-Denis Convention and their Annexes are taken into account in developing
and refining an integrated approach to football safety, security and service 22 .
3.2.8. The Standing Committee further emphasised that the Convention: “centreson the established need to develop and implement an integrated multi-agency
21 — CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016 (Article 2),Council ofEurope22 — Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events, Council of Europe
30

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UCLF22 Independent Review

approach to safety, security and service in connection with football and othersports events with an international dimension, based on comprehensive national
and local coordination arrangements and effective, international, national and local
partnerships.”23
3.2.9. It is important to emphasise that, viewed together, the Saint-Denis
Convention and the Rec (2021) 1 Annexes, provide a comprehensive framework
against which a safety, security and service model must be developed for football
events with an international dimension24 .
3.2.10. Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the 2016 Convention require State Parties to ensure
coordinated arrangements and a multi-agency approach to safety, security andservice, and emergency contingency plans. State Parties are to ensure both event
organisers and public authorities “provide a safe and secure environment for
all participants and spectators”, and a “welcoming environment for all sectionsof society, including children, the elderly and those with disabilities”. Specificprovision is made relating to travel and last kilometre mobility: “The Parties shallensure that risk assessment and safety and security measures take account of thejourney to and from the stadium” (A6(2)) 25 .
3.2.11. Article 8 of the 2016 Convention encourages engagement with supporters
and local communities by all stakeholders. Article 9 asserts: “The Parties shallensure that policing strategies are developed, regularly evaluated and refined”
consistently with the integrated approach, and Article 9.2 requires specificapproaches including “proportionate intervention to prevent the escalation ofrisk or disorder, [and] effective dialogue with supporters”. Article 9.3 states: “TheParties shall ensure that the police work in partnership with organisers, supporters,
local communities and other stakeholders in making football matches and othersports events safe, secure and welcoming for all concerned.”
3.2.12. The Panel notes that the drafting of Article 8 is aspirational, whereas thoseof Articles 4-7, and particularly Article 9 are mandatory.
3.2.13. These principles are reflected more expansively in Recommendation Rec(2021) 1 under the heading “Role of Police” at paragraphs 33-40, and further

23 — Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events (Paragraph 2),
Council of Europe
24 — Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events, Council of Europe
25 — Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events, Council of Europe
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explained in the guidance set out in Annexe B on Security-Good Practices.
3.2.14. The Panel notes and emphasises that the provisions of the 2016 Convention
are binding on France as a State Party, and should have underpinned theorientation of UEFA and all other stakeholders.
3.2.15. For its part, through its normal bidding process, UEFA requires applicants
to: “Confirm that you adhere to the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated
Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports
Events (Council of Europe Treaty Series- No 218)”26 . Although there was no bidding
process for Paris, there can have been no confusion concerning the applicability of
the 2016 Convention.
3.2.16. The Panel notes that UEFA held a finalists’ meeting on Friday 6th May. As
part of its presentation27, despite the truncated process, UEFA asserted: “TheLOS 28 should deliver a draft SSNS 29 Concept to UEFA; The safety and security
concept developed by the LOS should meet the standards required by UEFA fordelivery of the event. In this respect UEFA will assess and provide feedback on theconcept delivered and thereafter advise and assist with the development of theconcept into an operational plan, reflecting the event overlay required. The SSNS
concept should be integrated with the medical and mobility concepts to ensure
a holistic approach. The SSNS concept should reflect recognized best practice,as evidenced in the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on Safety, Security andService at Football matches.”
3.3. Monitoring and implementation
3.3.1. State Parties appoint representatives to the Standing Committee on Safety
and Security at Sports Events 30. The Convention states that this “Committee, withthe prior agreement of the parties concerned, shall monitor compliance with thisConvention through a programme of visits to the States Parties, in order to provide
advice and support on the implementation of this Convention.”31
26 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022 or 2023 Bid Dossier Template (Sector 05 – 5 - Question 07) - Appendix,
VI.13
27 — UEFA Champions League Finalists’ Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8
28 — Local Organising Structure
29 — Acronym for ‘Safety, Security and Service’
30 — CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016 (Article 13),Councilof Europe
31 — CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016 (Article
14.2),Council of Europe
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3.3.2. Between 17th and 19th April 2015, such a delegation from the Standing
Committee carried out a consultative visit to France in advance of the UEFAEuro 2016, to assess and make recommendations to enhance the safety andsecurity arrangements for the tournament. The report of the visit contained 35
recommendations and an ‘action plan’ regarding timescale, responsibility and resultsof implementation of its recommendations.32
3.3.3. Key recommendations of their report, which followed the consultative visit,
were as follows:a. Standing Committee (SC) Recommendation 1: The police and relevant authorities
should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting
supporters during the tournament and take steps to simultaneously provide
reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk would be
addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero-tolerance
policy towards any form of racism or other forms of discrimination.
b. SC Recommendation 2: Policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determinedon the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective
equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate
interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.
c. SC Recommendation 3: Police units likely to be deployed during UEFA Euro 2016
should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming andfriendly manner towards supporters.
d. SC Recommendation 16: The relevant authorities should: review and determine
the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament
and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (for example, effective signage
en-route to stadiums, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, prematch entertainment); consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry
generate safety risks; once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome
should feature in contingency plans designating responsibility for determining
whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety
scenario; as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a
multiagency table-top exercise.
e. SC Recommendation 28: The French Government should consider extending
the role and remit of DIGES, or establish an alternative government-led standing

32 — European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sport Events and in particular at Football
Matches Standing Committee Consultative visit to France (17-19 April 2015), Council of Europe
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national, multi-agency co-ordination committee (“National Committee”), to oversee
the development and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security andservice in respect of football matches and other sports events where appropriate.
f. SC Recommendation 29: The French Government should provide the DIGES,
or an alternative national co-ordination committee, with a clear remit andterms of reference which clarifies which Government Department has ultimate
responsibility on any matters where there is not unanimity within the committee.
3.3.4. The Panel viewed the 2015 delegation report with such importance thatit interviewed the Chair of the Council of Europe Standing Committee on Safety
and Security at Sports Events (T-S4), Adrian Dinca, in order to understand whether
the recommendations had led to meaningful changes. Mr Dinca had himself
participated in the 2015 consultative visit and indicated that no follow-up report on
implementation of the action plan had been provided by the French authorities. He
says this failure to provide an update may be partially explained by the timing of
the report, adopted by the Standing Committee on 26th May 2016, shortly before
the new 2016 convention superseded its predecessor, the 1985 Convention.
3.3.5. In light of the Panel’s conclusions regarding the nature of the policing model
used at the UCLF22 and its operation on the day, the Panel is disappointed that therecommendations of the delegation report appear to have been largely ignored by
the French authorities. Furthermore, the Panel notes that recommendations madeby the DIGES in his post-28th May report, prepared for the French Prime Minister,
repeat a number of those made in the earlier report.
3.3.6. In the report33 five recommendations are made. The first two are ofparticular note:a. Recommendation No 1 proposes “Institutionalised national governance forcertain Major International Sporting Events (GESIs) of major interest” and, amongst
other things, states: “Given the scale and circumstances in which certain eventstake place, the establishment of national coordination should be considered more
systematically to deal with the relationship between the international dimension
and local management.” In terms of the coordination role this recommendation
goes on to indicate that this could be placed under the authority and chaired
jointly by the Minister of Interior and Minister of Sport with the DIGES providing

33 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7
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administrative support. This reflects R28 and R29 of the 2016 Report, which has
not been actioned.
b. Recommendation No 2 aims to “Optimise the management of access flows
to the sites of major events to guarantee their safety, fluidity and the qualitative
experience of visitors.” In this regard the report goes on to say that “The purposeof the flow management must be to promote optimal control of arrival flows, overtime and with continuity.” This is similar to Recommendation 16 of the 2016 Report,
again, not actioned.

3.4. Consequences of failure to discharge the obligations of the 2016
Convention, or action recommendations
3.4.1. If the provisions of the 2016 Convention and the recommendations of theStanding Committee, and the 2015 delegation report had been followed by the
French authorities and Préfecture de Police on the one hand, and UEFA and Local
Organising Structure on the other, there may have been a very different outcome
at UCLF22.
3.4.2. Firstly, the problems of anti-social behaviour and attacks on supporters
would have been properly addressed in the planning and operational stages.
Secondly, had the police taken a proportionate approach to threats, and engaged
and properly communicated with supporters, the dangerous congestion may nothave occurred, and there would have been no deployment of tear gas and pepper
spray weaponry which affected so many innocent and vulnerable supporters.
Thirdly, had French authorities and UEFA ensured that there was properinteroperability across private and public partners, the serious mismanagement of
supporters travelling to the stadium and access points would not have arisen, andthe access points themselves would have been properly designed and operated toensure safe and effective access for those entitled to entry to the match. Fourthly,
there would have been proper contingency plans to deal with access problems
and congestion before they became dangerous.
3.4.3. In his evidence to the Hearing of the French Senate into events surrounding
the UEFA Champions League Final 2022, Julien Zylberstein, UEFA Director ofEuropean Affairs and Governance, referred to UEFA’s close cooperation with
the Council of Europe saying that: “an important part of our joint work is theimplementation of the Saint-Denis Convention, signed on the side-lines of Euro2016 at the Stade de France. We have been a driving force in its development and3. The Organisation of a UEFA Men’s Champions League Final (UCLF): Framework and regulation

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are now playing a leading role in its implementation. We are a historical member of
its Monitoring Committee.”34
3.4.4. He continued: “The Saint-Denis Convention is the culmination of decades ofwork with our European partners. Today, it is probably the most successful legallybinding instrument at the international level for the security, safety and services ofmajor sports events. In particular, it allows for a structured collaboration between
the various competent players, public authorities, event organisers and fanorganizations.”35
3.4.5. The Panel has concluded that the 2016 Convention, and the subsequent
complementary Recommendations of the Standing Committee, are fit for purpose,and set laudable, achievable aims. The problem was that those bound by them
– the French authorities - and those who organised the event – UEFA and UEFA
Events SA – failed to meet with the requirements or recommendations, or even to
apply the principles.
3.4.6. Moreover, the Panel expresses its concern that a senior representative ofUEFA was prepared to set out to the Senate the central role UEFA is said to playin the implementation of the Convention, yet fail to identify its own role in notchallenging the policing model or ensuring effective interoperability between
stakeholders at its annual flagship event.

34 — Rapport d’Information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage
universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale et de la commission de la culture, de l’éducation et de lacommunication sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022 (13 July 2022), French Senat (p. 194 –
206) - English translation at Appendix, VI.19 (p. 2835)
35 — Rapport d’Information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage
universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale et de la commission de la culture, de l’éducation et de lacommunication sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022 (13 July 2022), French Senat (p. 194 –
206) - English translation at Appendix, VI.19 (p. 2835)
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4. An evidence-based
account of planning anddelivery of the UCLF safety,
service and security operation

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4. An evidence-based account of planning and delivery of the UCLF safety,
service and security operation
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. As we have already noted, the security situation in Europe led the UEFA
Executive Committee to relocate the final of the 2021/22 UEFA Men’s Champions
League (UCLF) from the Russian city of Saint Petersburg to Stade de France inSaint-Denis, a northern suburb of Paris. It was President Macron that agreed that
the Stade de France (SDF) could host the final on 24th February, a decision thatwas ratified by an extraordinary meeting of the UEFA Executive Committee on 25th
February36 .
4.1.2. As noted, this left just over three months for all the preparations necessary
to host the UCLF to be put in place. The Panel concluded that this shortened
planning period was a key factor in the already accepted failures surrounding
the event. As the DIGES report acknowledged, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on
24th February 2022 prompted UEFA to take the decision, from 25th February, torelocate the final of the 2022 Champions League from the Krestovsky stadiumin Saint Petersburg to the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, with the approval of
the President of the Republic. This exceptional match was therefore preparedwithin a limited time of only 3 months, instead of 18 months typical under normal
circumstances”37.
4.1.3. As noted, a key outcome of this truncated time frame meant that insteadof a bespoke safety and security concept being prepared as part of the bid for
the UCLF, the plan for the event was modified from one already developed for the
final of Coupe de France, between Nice and Nantes, scheduled to be played at thestadium on 7th May.
4.2. The context and design of the Stade de France
4.2.1. The SDF serves as the national stadium of France. It was constructed for
the FIFA World Cup in 1998 and inaugurated in January that same year. It currently
has an official seating capacity of 80,698 making it the seventh largest stadium

36 — Guerre en Ukraine: comment Macron a obtenu la relocalisation de la finale de la Ligue des Champions au
Stade de France, BFM avec RMC Sport
37 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.738

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in Europe and as such is listed as a Category 4 venue by UEFA. The stadium
has previously hosted Champions League Finals in 2000 and 2006 and was avenue that hosted seven matches, including the Final, during the 2016 European
Championships.
4.2.2. The SDF is in the City of Saint-Denis to north of Paris, several parts of whichsuffer from very high levels of socio-economic deprivation. It is an area of ethnic
diversity and there are long-standing tensions between sections of the local
community and police. For example, serious disturbances developed in SaintDenis as part of a wave of rioting that spread across France in November 2005.
Saint-Denis is a crime ‘hotspot’ with relatively high rates of robbery, drugs offences
and murder. In 2010 the city had one of the highest rates of violence in Europe andwas classified as a Priority Security Zone by the French Government in 2012. As
well as social tensions in the surrounding area, the stadium itself was targeted on
13th November 2015 during a coordinated terrorist attack.
4.2.3. The stadium is located at the intersection of two major auto-routes, the A1
and A86. The stadium was designed with a very limited number of parking spaces,
so public transportation is considered the primary means of getting to the venue,
which is served by a metro station to the northwest and two RER stations, Line B
to south and Line D to the southwest. For those arriving via RER B the stadium isaccessed via Avenue du Stade de France which contains an expansive walkway
designed to accommodate high-volume foot traffic. For those approaching fromRER D the closest access point is via a relatively narrow slope from the Avenue du
President Wilson which we refer to as the Wilson ramp. For those accessing thenorth of the stadium, the primary access route is through Metro Line 13 and thestation Saint-Denis Port de Paris and via a narrow sidewalk to the northwest of thearena (see Annex Figure 1).
4.2.4. Squeezed into a narrow footprint between two roadways and a canalsystem, the stadium is effectively an ‘island site’ surrounded by a raised concourse
which is only accessible via a relatively limited number of access points,
particularly when approached from the rail or metro stations. The stadium bowl issurrounded by a high steel fence referred to as the Outer Security Perimeter (OSP)and is accessed via stairways that are accessible through eighteen alphabeticallylabelled gates (i.e., A through to Z). Each high steel gate can be locked but
when opened has a series of waist high electronic turnstiles or tripods. People
entering the stadium do so by placing their ticket onto a QR code reader which
on recognizing the ticket automatically releases the mechanism allowing one
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person to pass through. The turnstiles are not fenced in and can be relatively easily
traversed (see Annex Figure 2).
4.2.5. Stadium safety and security operations operate from a joint stadium control
room which is divided into two sections. The larger of the two areas is controlled
by the police and the smaller by the event organizers and CSDF.
4.3. The outline planning phase
4.3.1. Having outlined the context and design of the stadium we turn now to theplanning phases for the UCLF. The Panel has analysed the challenges of the latechange of venue at Chapter 7. Here we deal with what occurred.
4.3.2. In his report to the Prime Minister, dated 10th June 2022, the DIGES noted,“The organisation of this final was the subject of collaborative and constructive
work including the organisers (UEFA and FFF), the territorial authorities (the Cities
of Paris and Saint-Denis), the Central Government (the DIGES, the CNSJ, the
Préfecture de Police, the Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis, the DGAC) and thetransport operators (the RATP, SNCF, ADP, Île de France Mobilités)”38 . Subsequently,
the DIGES noted that “sixteen working meetings were held between 4th Marchand 28th May, either at the level of the Inter-ministerial Delegate for Major Sporting
Events (DIGES), or at the level of the Préfet de Police or its chief of staff, or at thelevel of the Préfet de Seine-Saint-Denis”39. A list of the meetings and organisations
who attended during this planning phase was provided by FFF and can be
consulted in the Appendix40. In the following section we focus on those where thePanel judged that decisions were made, or information discussed that was relevant
to our inquiry. We then go on to explore the implications of these decisions byoutlining how the safety and security operation was delivered and the problems
that flowed from that delivery.
4.3.3. The first step in the multistakeholder planning process involved the creationof a Liaison Group (LG), which met for the first time on 4th March, at the initiativeof the DIGES. In its report the DIGES asserts that the LG “was created to promote

38 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
122)
39 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
122)
40 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 189)
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relations between the organisers and the French institutions, facilitating theproper transmission of information and adapting arrangements to the requests
of clubs and operators involved in the system”41. Beyond its role of ensuring goodinteroperability the LG terms of reference appear to have been to accelerate
implementation and to act as a primary decision-making body regarding
implementation.
4.3.4. At the LG meeting of 4th March UEFA Events SA was present and laid out anoutline plan for the UCLF to senior representatives from various local stakeholder
organisations including the DIGES, FFF, City of Paris, City of Saint-Denis, Direction
Des Sports, and CNSJ. According to FFF it was at this meeting that UEFA Events
SA detailed the requirements it needed to be satisfied for the successful hostingof the UCLF. Again, according to FFF, one of these was to create a secure zone
around the outer perimeter of the stadium, to be achieved by implementing an
Additional Security Perimeter (ASP) at various access points surrounding thestadium. The Panel could find no reference to confirm this decision in the minutesof the LG’s first meeting, but they do record that the LG established a Security andMobility Working Group that was to be Chaired by the Préfecture de Saint-Denis
and included the police, and transport stakeholders (RATP, Préfecture de Paris etd’Île-de-France (regional Préfecture), Île-de-France Mobilités, ADP, SNCF, the CNSJ,DIGES, UEFA / FFF and the Cities of Saint-Denis and Paris)42 .
4.3.5. These minutes also record that a security and mobility plan or concept(i.e., the plan for how supporters would move into and away from the event) had
to be in place by 14th March. The meeting record also notes that the safety andsecurity concept for the UCLF would be based on the one being developed for the2023 Rugby World Cup and foreseeing issues with the rail network that “FFF andUEFA recalled that the proper functioning of the RER B on 28th May is an essentialcondition for the holding of the event”. At the meeting the City of Paris requested
clarification from UEFA about the need to provision “celebration zones” and themeeting concluded with a commitment from the stakeholders to ensure the event
was delivered in the best possible way. The slides used by UEFA Events SA to
support its presentation to this meeting also note an outline mobility plan whichindicates that those travelling by public transport would use the three primarystations noted above and, of note, it indicates that those arriving on RER D would
41 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
122)
42 — Groupe de liaison Finale de la Ligue des Champions de l’UEFA du 28 mai 2022 - Compte-rendu synthétique (4March 2022) - Appendix, VI.2
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use the Wilson Ramp to access the stadium footprint: that is ASP343 . The slides andminutes from the meeting therefore indicate an awareness at this early and outline
stage of potential disruption to the RER network. At this time this was because ofplanned maintenance works scheduled for the weekend of the UCLF.
4.3.6. Slides presented by UEFA Events SA at the meeting also provided
information about modal patterns of passenger flow for those travelling via the RER
and Metro (see Annex Figure 3)44 . This is important because they indicate that themeeting discussed that it would be normal to expect around 81% of the foot traffic
for the event to access from the south of the stadium and of these 37% would
arrive on RER D. One of these slides indicate that as many as 15,000 people could
be expected to enter via the stadium’s southwest corner. These figures were later
contradicted in written evidence provided to the Panel by SNCF who stated to the
Panel that during Stade de France events on average RER B (the Northern part ofwhich is managed by SNCF) conveys an average of 21,600 persons (45% of thespectators arriving on public transport) and RER D 9,600 (20%)45 . These figures andcontradictions are important because they demonstrate (a) an early lack of clarity
and shared understanding between stakeholders about the likely routes throughwhich supporters would flow onto the stadium footprint and (b) that from the earlyplanning stages stakeholders were aware that it might be the case that between
9,500 and 21,600 people might seek enter the stadium via the Wilson ramp.
4.3.7. Central to the plans for the event was the application of the ASP on theapproaches to the stadium footprint. According to the plan there were 12 accesspoints within the ASP, which spectators had to pass through to be able to thenaccess their designated gate. Whilst it is not unusual to have an ASP at the SDF or
UCLF, what is clear is that those responsible for the design and operation of such afacility must be satisfied in the planning phase that the number of entry points cansustain flow rates necessary to safely cope with the demands placed on it. In otherwords, there are crucial throughput calculations that must be undertaken to ensurethat enough people can pass through the ASP in sufficient time.
4.3.8. It is important to note here that in the case of the ASPs on 28th May, thereport of the DIGES stated “it had been decided by FFF, at the request of UEFA,

43 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1
44 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1
45 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
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with the agreement of police authorities, to activate double screening”46 . The
Panel remains uncertain exactly when and how this decision was reached but FFF
concurred with the DIGES that it was a requirement made by UEFA47. The Panelis aware that security checks have been a feature of events at the SDF since theterrorist attack in 2015. But, as we consider in Chapter 6, according to CSDF, thedecision to enact a ‘double system’ of checking at the ASPs is not usual, and in theview of the Panel was an important aspect of why problems began to develop at
the UCLF.
4.3.9. The next meeting of note was between FFF and the Préfecture de Parisand took place on 18th March where planning timelines, the stadium environment,
mobility as well as safety and security were again discussed. Slides presented at
the meeting state that there was now “written confirmation that RER B will be backin service for the weekend of the Final” suggesting that the planned maintenancework was to be suspended48 . The slides also indicate that ticketing was discussed,
and that some form of filtering was discussed. The concept at this time appeared
to have been to place an additional ticket check after the person had progressed
through the ASP and was to be in place immediately ahead of the gates throughthe OSP to allow for organized and efficient ticket activation and checking
just prior to turnstiles. This is important because as we discuss later, queue
management appears not to have been in place for the UCLF, but had it been sosome of the problems encountered may have been avoided (see Annex Figure 4).
4.3.10. A week later FFF and CSDF met with the Préfecture de Saint-Denis on
25th March. The minutes from this meeting are the first evidence the Panel could
obtain of emerging concerns about threats and risks posed by the qualification of
an English club side49. These minutes note that “thousands of English supporters
could join Paris for the occasion. Most of these spectators would not have a ticket
to attend the final”. This is interesting because it indicates that the stakeholders
appear to have concluded at a very early stage that the influx of large numbersof supporters was not something to be welcomed and facilitated but was being
viewed as a threat to public order. The proposed strategy to address this perceived
threat was the provision of a fan gathering area. Thus, the meeting noted that “FFF
46 — Double screening involved both ticket and security checks, Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions
League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major
sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)
47 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p.1566)
48 — Réunion avec la Préfecture de Paris – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (18 March 2022) - Appendix,
VI.4
49 — Compte-rendu de la réunion de présentation de la finale de la ligue des champions au Stade de France – 28
mai 2022 (25 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.5
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therefore supports the idea of creating a Fan Zone in Paris to limit the saturation of
public transport and disturbances to public order around the Stade de France”.
4.3.11. It was also noted at the meeting that “English supporters travel mainly bytrain and then metro”. On this basis a strategy was developed to use the transport
network as a filtering system to separate those fans with and without tickets. The
meeting noted it “is therefore important to provide a flow management system
upstream, from their arrival at the Gare du Nord with an orientation of the fanswith tickets to the Stade de France and those without a ticket to the Fan Zone”.
Moreover, while RER B was at that time expected to be working normally the“FFF could formulate a request to extend the train offer with the SNCF”, who fully
operate RER D. While it appears no decision to implement this plan was made, it
was agreed that these issues would be taken forward to the next meeting between
the DIGES and the Préfecture de Police scheduled on 4th April. These meeting
notes are important because they (a) indicate a shared mobility plan was emerging
based on the idea that a large influx of English fans without tickets was a publicorder problem and (b) a strategy was emerging to route supporters to the stadium
via RER Line D.
4.3.12. While the next significant meeting is mentioned in the Senate report, thePanel was not provided with the record of the meeting on 4th April. Nonetheless,on the following day Football Supporters Europe (FSE) conducted a preparatorysite visit to the SDF during which they were presented with the UCLF outline plan.
Contrary to the usual procedure, only UEFA and UEFA Events SA were present.
These meetings are usually attended by the host FA, local police, the National
Police Information Point and stadium management. According to FSE, UEFA was
unable at that stage to answer most of the questions related to policing andmobility despite the fact they raised several relevant concerns 50. Specifically,
the FSE report notes how they had emphasised “the high risk of congestions
around pre-OSP police checks” and that they were “highly concerned with
police operations around the stadium, especially with regards to the high risk ofcongestion/stomping around the exit/entrance of the metro station Saint-Denis
Porte de Paris and on the way between the RER D station and the stadium”. Theirreport also notes that “the small distance between police checks pre-OSP and
OSP is likely to cause congestions and crowd movements, as police usually tends
to disperse the crowd from behind”. We could find no acknowledgement of the
FSE report or the concerns they raised in the records of any subsequent planning

50 — FSE Position Statement - Appendix, IV.31 (p.614)
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meetings, suggesting that despite their ultimate validity these concerns werelargely, if not entirely, ignored.
4.3.13. As the Champions League knockout competition progressed, aquestionnaire was distributed by UEFA to the eight clubs who had reached thequarter finals stage. This questionnaire is part of the UEFAs routine planning andrisk assessment processes for the UCLF and enables them to gather information
including each clubs’ expectations about the movement and risks posed by theirown supporters.
4.3.14. This data fed into UEFA’s ongoing planning process and was discussed at
a subsequent meeting with representatives from the four semi-finalist clubs thatwas held in Paris between the 20th and 22nd April. During the meeting UEFA’s outline
plan was presented to the clubs and records indicate that initial risk assessments
were discussed. According to Liverpool FC there was some disparity even at thisstage between their own assessments of the risk posed by their supporters andthat of UEFA Events SA. As the club noted to the Panel, “we will always provide theinformation, from the quarter-final’s questionnaire. We [LFC] explained we would
have huge demand for tickets, [that] there would be 50,000 persons travelingwithout tickets. We kind of knew that straight away. It’s a very easy place to go to,Paris… Like, you can identify those risks in the questionnaire, what UEFA then or the
local authorities then do with that information, once we provide it at the quarter-final
stage, I’m not too sure. To go to the semi-final finalist stage, the risk assessment
that’s presented to us, I’m not sure was accurate, from what we believe the risks
would be”51 .
4.4. The detailed planning phase
4.4.1. On the 3rd and 4th May Real Madrid and Liverpool qualified as the two finalists
and on 5th May the LG was convened, once again organised by the DIGES 52 . At thismeeting UEFA and UEFA Events SA presented a more detailed safety and security
concept that covered ticket allocations, the security perimeter, parking, VIP entry,
mobility, and the general issue of public screening of the match 53 . The plan locatedReal Madrid supporters in the north of the stadium and Liverpool supporters in thesouth. In turn, this would then mean that Real Madrid supporters travelling by rail
51 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5
52 — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l’UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion dujeudi 5 mai 2022 (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.7
53 — UEFA Presentation UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.6
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would be encouraged to utilise Metro line 13 and Liverpool fans RER B & D. It isevident that the segregation of fans to the north and south of the stadium was a
key priority during the rest of the planning phase.
4.4.2. The minutes of the LG meeting on the 5th record that the Préfet de SeineSaint-Denis proposed that the sale of alcohol should be prohibited inside the
ASP and that such restrictions should extend as far as the RER stations. Such
restrictions would undoubtably had a dramatic impact on the capability of local
traders in Saint-Denis from profiting from the UCLF. This suggestion was resisted
by UEFA, FFF and the City of Saint-Denis on the grounds that it would increase
rather than decrease the likelihood of crowd problems. The meeting notes recordthat the contrary view was that it would be better to licence the sale of alcohol.
However, the primary rational was to do so only inside the stadium to limit a late
influx of supporters. The Préfet agreed to wait until after a trial evaluation of theplan at the Domestic Cup final on 7th May before making their final position on theissue clear to the DIGES on the 9th 54 .
4.4.3. The minutes of the meeting on the 5th once again noted the perceived
threat in hosting up to 50,000 Liverpool supporters without tickets and that the
fan zone was seen less as a way of facilitating them and more as a means for theauthorities “to concentrate and contain this public while limiting its movements”.
Consequently, that “the organization of a zone of viewing is deemed necessary forreasons of public order”. The minutes note that a proposal was put forward at thismeeting by the Préfet de Police to use the 36,000 m2 Cours de Vincennes given
its capacity to host up to 60,000 people. FFF and UEFA agreed to fund the zone,
but the proposal was resisted by the Mayor of Paris because of concerns about therisk of “fights between English supporters and possible groups of ultras from ParisSaint-Germain”. The Panel notes how evidence from this meeting further confirms
the idea that planning was based upon a securitized approach to public orderrather than based upon a facilitation and public safety perspective, something thatis contrary to the policing guidance set out in the Saint-Denis Convention.
4.4.4. According to the Deputy Mayor of the 12th Arrondissement, Richard
Bouigue, the decision to locate the fan park at Cours de Vincennes was taken by
the Préfecture and consultation with the local authority was extremely limited. He
noted to the Panel: “we found it difficult to get concrete answers to our questions
about the organisation of this fan zone. That is to say: where it would be located,
54 — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l’UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion
du jeudi 5 mai 2022 (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.7
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the opening hours, the link that there would be between this fan zone and theshops, the neighbours, the residents, and in particular the presence of a weekly
food market which is held on the Cours de Vincennes, on the side of the 12tharrondissement, and which we didn’t know whether it could be maintained or not…
In the same way, it is regrettable that at no time were we put in touch with theservice provider who set up the fan zone, although we could easily have imagined
possible synergies with actors from the arrondissement. I’m thinking in particularof the food trucks, I’m thinking of the entertainment in general, where we could
perhaps have had another type of relationship. And lately, we haven’t had any
precise information, except belatedly, concerning the barricading of the fan zone.
What we had seen when we asked about previous fan zones, notably those that
had existed in Madrid for the match between Tottenham and Liverpool, was a
fan zone that didn’t have these barriers all around it, and which therefore allowed
a link between supporters and the life of the arrondissement. Here, there was akind of gap that gave the impression of being a car park, something that broke up
the relationship between those who were in the fan zone and the inhabitants andshopkeepers of the arrondissement”55 .
4.4.5. In his evidence to the Panel the Deputy Mayor was not only critical of theuse of barriers to fence the supporters in as it cut off the gathering from the local
community. His position was that a lack of communication also undermined
his ability to facilitate the fans with guidance about how they could movefrom the park to the various transport hubs. This evidence suggests a lack ofcommunication between key stakeholders and Mr Bouigue commented on atendency of the Préfecture to act unilaterally, rather than to communicate andconsult, and seek collaboration with other partners.
4.4.6. He noted to the Panel: “Well, typically, I think it is perhaps an unfortunate
habit of the Préfecture of Police, but it is all the more regrettable that we had forthis event, both. I am talking about the fan zone, but even further, about what was
happening at the Stade de France. We had possible interlocutors. In France, wehave set up National Committee on Supporters 56, which would have been very
useful to us if we had been able to mobilise it for an event like this one. We have
Football Supporters Europe, which would have been very useful if they had been
more involved. We have relations with all the stakeholders. We have a lot of sports

55 — Meeting with Richard Bouigue – Appendix, V.13
56 — This is a consultative body coordinated by the Ministry of Sport and for the Olympic and Paralympic Games,
introduced by the 10/05/2016 law “reinforcing supporters dialogue and the fight against hooliganism”, see Dialogue
avec les supporters.
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clubs in this arrondissement. I think that they would have been useful actors
to mobilise. So, I think that there is a problem with these events, which is that,alongside a security approach which is perhaps normal... there should not just bea security approach. There must also be other elements, and these elements are
the welcome, the entertainment, the fact of understanding that people have cometo have a good time, to celebrate. And this is something which is not exactly in theusual specifications of the Préfecture de Police, and it is regrettable. And this is apoint on which we must improve greatly. I regret that we didn’t have a relationship,for example, with Liverpool City Council. I had a relationship with the supporters’
associations, but that will simply because [FSE] allowed me to have it, butotherwise I would not have had it. So, I find that, in the end, regrettable because
we have the means to do better, but there is a culture, perhaps, of supervisionfrom a “public order” perspective on events, which does not allow us to develop
anything else”.
4.4.7. At the LG meeting on the 5th a proposal was also put forward to create asimilar but much smaller fan gathering point for Real Madrid supporters in the
Parc de la Légion d’Honneur in Saint-Denis. Given that Real Madrid fans were
not expected to travel without tickets it was proposed that this zone would bescheduled to close at 18:00. The City of Saint-Denis proposed that consequently
it could be used as a viewing area for Saint-Denis residents. The Préfecture
resisted the latter proposal because they saw problems would be posed by agathering of locals in the vicinity of the stadium. The minutes note that “the policeand Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis point to several problems of security. The
Préfecture reserves its position and will communicate it to DIGES at the beginningof the week of 9th May after carefully assessing its law enforcement needs andcapabilities to the whole day of May 28”.
4.4.8. Importantly, in terms of transport, the rail operating companies are noted at
this meeting to have reversed earlier assurances by informing other stakeholders
that the planned closures of RER B over the weekend of 28th May would now begoing ahead, at least in part. The minutes state that “SNCF recalls that major workon the northern rail network on Saturday night in Sunday will lead to the closure ofline B of the RER on Sunday”. Consequently, a plan would be required that would
lead to “improved communication with the attention of the supporters… so thatthose who will remain in Paris on Saturday evening can anticipate their movements
the next day”. Accordingly, it was noted that “RATP will study measures to adapt
metro traffic in the event of activation of the transit zone viewing at the Cours deVincennes”. The DIGES requested position statements on these issues by 9th May
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and scheduled the next meeting on 19th May. This is significant evidence because
it suggests that circulation on RER B might not be optimal on the day and nightof the match and, therefore, planning to divert supporters away from RER B wasin place much earlier instead of being merely a late reaction to unexpected strikeaction.
4.4.9. The following day, on 6th May UEFA hosted a joint finalist meeting where adetailed safety and security presentation was delivered to representatives fromboth clubs. The records indicate that the meeting discussed that the “latest
estimated number of ticketless fans in Paris / Saint-Denis on [match day] MD-1, MD,
MD+1 is approximately 50,000 mixed in with around 10-15,000 with tickets whowill also come to the same areas”57. These records note that as a result the UCLF
was confirmed as high risk and that “confirmation of the fan meeting point will be
crucial in mitigating the risk of ticketless fans going to the stadium”. The meeting
also foresaw the importance of “the nature of the search regime process and OSP[which] will be imperative to guarantee the success of the event”. In other words,
from early May UEFA and other stakeholders were aware that a large movement of
supporters with tickets would take place from the Cours de Vincennes into SaintDenis and that it would be necessary to adapt mobility plans – particularly at the
ASPs to the south of the stadium - to mitigate accordingly.
4.4.10. The LG sat again on 19th May, a meeting that the Panel judged wasparticularly important because it considered the suitability of current security
and mobility planning following the apparent piloting of the plan at the Coupe deFrance final on 7th May58 . The meeting noted that once again the City of Saint-Denis
lobbied against the ban on alcohol consumption but importantly did so because“during the final of the Coupe de France [the ban] generated unrest that risked
being reproduced on Saturday May 28”. Considering this evidence, FFF expressed
its preference for an authorization to sell alcohol inside the stadium to facilitate theentry of supporters, a view that was supported by UEFA and the CSDF. The minutes
record that “in view of these issues and the type of supporters expected, deemed
less at risk than at the occasion of the final of the Coupe de France, the DIGES
arbitrated in favour of an authorization to sell of alcohol by merchants until 18:00
within the security perimeter and an authorization for the sale of alcohol inside theStade de France from 18:00”.

57 — UEFA Champions League Finalists’ Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8
58 — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l’UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion
du jeudi 19 mai 2022 (19 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.10
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4.4.11. What is apparent is that these decisions were less about facilitating a
festival of football and more about how alcohol could be used as a tool to manage
public order. Thus, at the same meeting the City of Saint-Denis was refused anauthorization to sell alcohol for businesses serving meals to seated consumers
because the “proposal is not very applicable and potentially generates risks ofpublic order disturbances”. Again, the Panel holds the view that such decisions
may have contributed to a negative view of the UCLF within the City of Saint-Denis
because of the way they disadvantaged local businesses. The meeting notes also
confirmed that a decision was made that the fan gathering areas for Real Madridand Liverpool would go ahead at the specified locations but record an intention
to delay the opening of the Cours de Vincennes to avoid interfering with a local
market in the same area. It was also recorded that Liverpool supporters would only
be notified of the intention to screen the match at the end of the afternoon of 28th
May. Finally, the meeting records note that “RATP will have to mobilize information
staff to support the organizer’s efforts to guide supporters in their pathways”.
4.4.12. The Panel concludes that the decision not to communicate to supportersthat the public screening of the match at the fan zone was confirmed is further
evidence that stakeholders were oriented toward the influx of ticketless supporters
as a threat to public order. The Panel does not understand how delaying
communication of the screening of the match until the late afternoon, minimised
ticketless supporters attending at SDF. Indeed, the opposite is the case. The Panelalso notes that it was recognised from early May onwards that managing the routetaken by thousands of Liverpool supporters with tickets through the rail network toSaint-Denis would be an important challenge that needed to be managed.
4.4.13. The LG meeting was then followed by what appears to have been aparticularly significant meeting of the Mobility Working Group on 23rd May. The
meeting was chaired by the Préfecture de Police and attended by FFF, CSDF,
the police Public Order and Traffic Control Division (DOPC) as well as other local
stakeholders. The meeting was subsequently controversial because, as the DIGES
noted in his report, as part of their mobility concept, FFF had prepared signage to
guide supporters arriving on RER D towards ASP4. It appears they had done thisbecause of an “error in the routing of Nice supporters observed during the French
Cup Final on 7th May”59. In other words, during the apparent trialling of the UCLF
safety and security concept, a problem had been identified that led FFF to adapt
the plan to divert supporters away from the Wilson ramp. However, according
59 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France
and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)50

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to the DIGES the “Préfecture de Police asked to remove the signs directing
passengers from the RER D to the exit route from RER B”60.
4.4.14. The minutes from the meeting on the 23rd show no record of this
discussion but note that “DOPC stated that routing the supporters arriving fromRER D into the A1 underpass was preferable in order to avoid a great influx ofpeople into avenue du Pressensé and Avenue du Stade de France that would be
full by supporters arriving from RER B”61 . Nevertheless, the fact that the signs were
not in place was acknowledged to the Panel as an issue by FFF and the Préfecturede Police took responsibility for this outcome during their interview with us.
4.4.15. As David Clavière from the Préfecture de Police stated: “First of all, during
this meeting on the [23rd May] it took place before the strike was known. So, thisalternative route, this signage that was set up by FFF was not intended, was not ananticipation of what was to happen later, to redirect the flow of passengers. This isextremely important. So, when the Préfecture de Police replied that it was askingthat this alternate route, that this signage be removed, it was simply for reasonsof simplicity and so that there would be only one route. But this was before theknowledge of the strike. We must be very clear… in no way did the French Football
Federation put up this signage because it expected a problem with traveller volume.
And for good reason, since we didn’t know that at the time this decision [to strike]was made… This signage corresponded to an objective of the French Football
Federation, that people leaving the RER D should not cross the VIP buses of FFF.
We did not share this objective, we thought that it was a source of complication,that it did not correspond to an objective of public interest, and that it would bebetter, for reasons of simplicity, to stick with the system that had always existed”62 .
4.4.16. In other words, the Préfecture asserted that their intention was todeliberately direct supporters arriving via RER D toward the Wilson ramp despite
the problems that had emerged at the cup final on 7th May. Indeed, FFF asserted intheir interview with the Panel that the removal of the signage was part of a flawedplan by the Préfecture de Police to direct supporters toward the Wilson ramp. FFF
claim to the Panel that they made repeated attempts to get this decision changed,
precisely because they were aware that the double checks planned for the ASP
would slow progress sufficiently to cause major disruption.
60 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France
and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)
61 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) - Appendix,
VI.11
62 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2
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4.4.17. They stated to the Panel: “[From] the beginning, as request by [FFF] to the
Préfecture de Police… if people from the normal way, from the RER D used ASP3,
it works for only body check. It never works with ticket check”. FFF later assertthat because of their concerns about ASP3 “we ask [the police] to block the route
Avenue Francis de Pressensé to change the normal flow of the, of the pedestrian to
go to the access of the ASP of RER B. We request to UEFA to create the signage, toput in place the signage and it was done, and, on match day minus one, Préfecturede Police, and we never know why say: no, we, we will not do that”63 .
4.4.18. The importance of evidence regarding the dispute between FFF on the one
hand, and the Préfecture de Police on the other, regarding the route from RER D to
the SDF is obvious, and the Panel analyses it in the following chapters.
4.4.19. What the minutes of the meeting on the 23rd do record is that RATP
agreed to make public service announcements in English, Spanish and French64 .
Importantly, these messages were not about the routes supporters should takethrough the network but discouraging those without tickets to travel at all: “inviting
supporters who have a ticket to go to the Stade de France and those who do not tojoin the fan meeting”. It was to be specified that this message would be reinforcedby operatives deployed between 09:00 to 19:00 at the stations of Châtelet, Antony– Orlyval (ORY airport), Porte Maillot, Nation and Denfert-Rochereau. The minutes
also record that SNCF planned to set up a reinforcement of its communications
from 09:00 to 19:00 at CDG airport, Gare du Nord and Gare de l’Est. No mention
appears to have been made of the important interchange station of Gare de
Lyon and the Panel notes that the emphasis in the content of these planned
communications was to prevent ticketless fans moving toward the stadium rather
than clarifying routes of travel for ticketed fans moving legitimately toward SaintDenis.
4.4.20. Perhaps most relevant to the events that subsequently materialised is thatthe record of the meeting confirms that “the DOPC [i.e., the police] specified that
it is desirable to route spectators arriving from the RER D via the A1 underground inorder to avoid an excessive flow on Avenue de Pressensé and on Avenue du Stadede France, which is lined by spectators arriving from RER B”. As noted above, thisdecision led to some reflection by the other stakeholders as a “question was raisedby the CANIF concerning possible removals of pedestrians on ramp no. 9 of the
63 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (Section redacted by FFF)
64 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) - Appendix,
VI.11
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A86 in the direction of Nanterre since it allows direct access to the car park of
the Stade de France. CANIF would like the presence of stewards at this location”.
CANIF also requested that the DOPC place forces at the pedestrian tunnel underthe A1 roadway which it was acknowledged posed considerable risk of flooding
should it rain on the 28th. FFF and the CSDF appear to have been, if not in fulldisagreement, then at the very least uncertain with the proposal as they agreed to“study this request and return to the police as soon as possible”.
4.4.21. The meeting records that while rail staff were to be deployed at the exitsof the rail stations to direct people, once again this was intended at this stage
merely to segregate out fans without tickets, such that “22 agents are planned…
in order to direct supporters with tickets either to the fan meeting point or to the
Stade de France”. In other words, the minutes of the meeting on 23rd do not record
any decision to remove signage but they do make clear a public order focusedstrategic concern of preventing those without tickets from approaching SaintDenis and the intention by the Préfet de Police to direct passengers arriving via
RER D toward the Wilson ramp despite problems that this route was already known
to pose for mobility and public safety.
4.4.22. The evidence suggests that an awareness of planned strike action by
workers on the RATP operated sections of RER B emerged late on 23rd or early on
24th May. Regardless of precisely when it was understood, the rail operators began
developing revised scenarios to ensure that the thousands of fans expected toaccess Saint-Denis by rail could still do so. On 24th May FFF, RATP and SNCF helda meeting to exchange information and discuss any impact the strike would haveon the management of the flow of Liverpool and Real Madrid fans 65 . According
to written evidence submitted to the Panel by RATP, FFF’s main concerns at thatmeeting revolved around public order and that a key priority was to ensure that therail operators revised plans ensured that “English and Spanish supporters do not
cross paths”66 .
4.4.23. The revised mobility plan was then presented at a Mobility Working Group
meeting chaired by the Préfecture on 25th May. According to written evidence
from SNCF, this adapted plan would revolve around “a reinforcement on thesides of lines D, 13 and 12” and the suspension of the connection to RER B from
Gare du Nord. The Panel assumes this will have meant that the thousands of fansexpected to arrive into Gare du Nord would have been required to utilise RER D to
65 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
66 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
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access Saint-Denis. Correspondingly, the rail operators began preparing to provide“passenger information of a suspended interconnection on B, with the maintenanceof the transport plan on B North and the recommended RER D on all media (social
networks, e-mail, audio announcements, etc.) and relayed by agents at the station”.
Thus, “the strike on the Southern part of Line B has led [SNCF] to adapt, along with the
RATP, our transport offering by proposing to direct travellers to Line D. This choice
is also motivated by considering the location of the Cours de Vincennes fan zone
which led us to reinforce Line D”. SNCF also confirmed that information provided“for travellers inviting them to preferably use Line D, was indeed issued, andreinforced, on all platforms (social networks, sound announcements in the station)
starting Thursday 26th May. Throughout the day on 28th May, we put in place aninformation device reinforced with over one hundred additional employees, toguide flows in the major stations concerned, on platforms and enclosed areas” 67.
4.4.24. RATP’s written evidence also notes other decisions taken at the meetingon the 25th include the Préfecture de Police agreeing to place a “mobile force unit
at Nation, a unit at Châtelet and half a unit at the Gare du Nord, both underground,in addition to the CRS/Mobile Gendarmes located on the surface at Nation”.
These forces would manage flow into the station at Nation by filtering travellers
and distributing flyers68 . In email correspondence on 25th May, operatives fromRATP and SNCF also discussed the management of passengers at Châtelet on theevening of the 28th. RATP operatives confirmed with SNCF “the need for a system
at Châtelet which would allow a better balance of the B/D flows for the routing of
the spectators for the Champions League. In view of the risks on the B line, we are
putting additional shuttles on the D line, in addition to the nominal transport plan (3shuttles for the transport before the match, 10 shuttles for the return)”. Importantly,
the communication notes that “line D is chronically less used for the Stade de France
service”. RATP continue by asking if SNCF could “envisage a system that would
balance the flows of line B and line D at Châtelet? We can imagine that many spectators
will come from the Vincennes fan zone”. SNCF replied shortly afterwards stating that
“we take note of the reinforcement of the D line before, but especially after the game”.
SNCF note that they were already in communication with another operative at
RATP “to look at how we can set up an Interception Point to manage the flow ofpeople, especially after the game, including from Vincennes”. SNCF requested for
RATP to “channel resource to send the fans back to the D”. They concluded, “finally,
if you have the schedules of the D (in both directions), we are interested!”69.
67 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
68 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
69 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
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4.4.25. In other words, taken together the Panel notes that evidence suggeststhat by 26th May the police and rail operators were working in tandem to actively
direct the bulk of passengers moving from the Cours de Vincennes toward
Saint-Denis via RER D and on arrival the plan by the police was to filter thesepassengers towards the Wilson ramp. Other stakeholders such as FFF and UEFA
claimed to the Panel that they were unaware of the rail operators plans to shift
passenger movement toward the SNCF operated RER Line D. The Panel concludes
that such lack of awareness reflects perhaps one of the most serious failures ofcommunication and interoperability we have detected.
4.4.26. The DIGES report states “the Préfecture de Police’s security service
plan is explicit by tracing a route from the RER D station down avenue François
Mitterrand and avenue des Fruitiers in the direction of the underpass, which runs
under the A1 to the pre-screening point located under the A86”70. The evidence
suggests this plan had already been shared with FFF who acknowledge thatthey were aware that the Wilson ramp and ASP3 would not have the capacity to
manage required through flow. The evidence also suggests that not only did FFF
do little to make other stakeholders aware of their concern, but the rail operators
also then subsequently developed a contingency plan that amplified the problem.
The failures of interoperability then appear to have continued because there is
no record or evidence of any concerns about the Wilson ramp and ASP3 being
discussed at the next major meeting of stakeholders on 26th chaired by UEFA71.
This is surprising because the meeting on the 26th is a crucial gathering of all key
stakeholders colloquially referred to as ‘Match Day minus Two’ (MD -2), referring to
the fact it is always held two days before UCLF. The meeting covers all aspects of
the organisation including safety, security and the mobility plan and it is attended
by UEFA safety and security officers charged with responsibility for scrutinising thedelivery of the plan. We do not have access to the minutes from the MD-2 meeting,but the PowerPoint slides clearly indicate that the mobility plan was discussed, andit was acknowledged by UEFA that the plan was to direct all supporters arrivingfrom RER D toward the Wilson ramp toward ASP3 (see Annex Figure 5). The Panel
understands that SNCF - the operator of RER D - was not invited to attend thismeeting or its subsequent site visit to scrutinise the proposed implementation.

70 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France
and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)
71 — UEFA Presentation Liverpool FC VS Real Madrid CF (26 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.12
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4.4.27. Thus, RATP and SNCF intended to direct Liverpool supporters toward RER
D. In addition, the Panel notes that during the latter stages of the planning phase
the Police decided to direct all supporters arriving by RER D toward ASP3. Importantly,
the Préfecture de Police was aware of both decisions but did not adjust their plansto create mitigation. It is evident that FFF and UEFA were aware of the decision
to direct supporters toward ASP3, but were perhaps unaware of the decision todisproportionately utilise RER D. The Panel concludes that the Préfecture de Police
were in effect acting unilaterally to direct supporters toward an entry point that would
be unable to cope with the level of demand placed upon it. This therefore represents asevere failure of interoperability between key stakeholders at a critical juncture.
4.5. Match Day
4.5.1. In this section we provide a chronological analysis of incidents that took place
on 28th May. We offer an objective account of events based upon multiple sources ofevidence. First, the Panel drew from existing reports and evidence produced fromprior inquiries including those conducted by UEFA, the DIGES and the Senate. From
this we produced an initial timeline. Second, the Panel cross referenced these withthree detailed analyses produced by three teams of investigative journalists including
those published by the Guardian newspaper, a video analysis produced by Le Mondeand a third published by the Daily Mail. Third, the Panel drew evidence from multiple
eyewitness accounts which we obtained primarily from our own interviews withrepresentatives of supporters’ organisations and individual supporters of Liverpool
and Real Madrid. We supplemented these by drawing upon the extensive and detailed
evidence published by Scraton, Haydon, Easthope, Canning and Marshall (2022)
whose Independent Panel Report drew upon inputs from 485 detailed statements. We
were also provided with further written testimonies of supporters and employees ofUEFA who had been present at the UCLF who written to the organisation in the wakeof events.72 Fourth, we drew upon the extensive testimonies and other data madeavailable to the Panel both in writing and verbally by the multiple stakeholders listed
in the Executive Summary and where possible published alongside this report. Finally,
we obtained video data directly from social and mainstream media and conducted
our own site visit to the SDF in mid-September. We triangulated all this data to provide
the following account of how the events on 28th May materialised chronologically. We
do not seek to describe every detail of what happened in every location and focus
only on key aspects of the event as we judged them to be relevant to our inquiry.
Throughout we draw upon this evidence to reach specific conclusions based upon
72 — While Liverpool FC offered access to the thousands of supporter accounts provided to them, we did not havethe resources to draw these in to our analysis.
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our understandings of what we judge to have occurred. We recognise the various
limitations of our approach but believe we have achieved a good standard of
objectivity and are confident our account broadly reflects what took place.
4.5.2. The two fan zones were both initially scheduled to open at noon. As noted
above, the zone dedicated to Real Madrid fans was located at the Parc de la Légion
d’Honneur, in Saint-Denis, just a short 20-minute walk to the north of the Stadium.
This location was able to accommodate around five to six thousand people but
was initially scheduled to close and reopen at 18:00 to provide a viewing location
for residents. The Panel remains unclear if this reopening took place but, in any
case, understands that it opened on schedule at midday. There were no incidents
of note that occurred there throughout the afternoon or later that evening.
4.5.3. As noted, the second fan zone was located within the city of Paris, in the
Cours de Vincennes, which was an area of linear roadway close to the Place dela Nation. The zone was enclosed by high security fencing. It was designed toaccommodate around forty-five thousand people, had controlled entry, a large
stage and four screens that were ultimately used to display the match. The Coursde Vincennes opened later than scheduled at approximately 13:15 and substantial
numbers of Liverpool fans gathered there throughout the afternoon.
4.5.4. The evidence suggests that the operation of the Cours de Vincennes was
generally very successful. For example, the DIGES report states that it “was openfrom 14:00 to 00:30 and welcomed up to 45,000 people, without any significant
disturbance to public order and in a festive atmosphere. Variations in attendancewere observed from time to time as inflows and outflows occurred, without thiscausing access difficulties or overcrowding”73 .
4.5.5. While it is evident the fan zone was experienced very positively by most
supporters, eyewitness accounts indicate that problems did develop at various
times both inside and outside throughout the afternoon and post-match. These
included issues with over vigorous policing, some difficulties with organisers
accessing the staging area, problems with crowd management entering the zone,
significant overcrowding in front of the first screen (the one located the closest to
the main entrance) and instances of petty crime against supporters.74

73 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France
and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.123)
74 — “Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the2022 Champions League Final in Paris, Phil Scraton et al. (2022) (p. 21-25)
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4.5.6. As Ian Byrne, a UK Member of Parliament, described to the Panel: “I think
we got there around 12:00 with my sons and other supporters and it was horrific.
You know, terrible, hostile policing. All standing there, grim faced, security fences
around the actual venue, so, I got there, I looked at the event, this is as far as a
festival of football that I’ve ever seen, it’s like a prison camp. And you were treatedlike a prisoner. You were treated in a hostile manner. It was really, really horrible”75 .
4.5.7. We understand from event organisers that the performance scheduleon the stage of the Cours de Vincennes had a hard stop at 17:30. During thefinal performance video evidence shows that the artist on stage advised fansplanning to attend the match that it would soon be time for them to depart. He
also announced that those not attending could remain to watch the match on thevarious large screens. As far as the Panel understands, it was during the afternoon
that the first confirmations were made to supporters that the match would beshown in the Cours de Vincennes.
4.5.8. As the Liverpool supporter Daniel Nicolson described to the Panel: “It was
only announced shortly before the fan park was due to close, that the match
would actually be broadcast there. Now, again, from a safety security point ofview, makes loads of sense if you got people already gathered in one place andthe event is taking place safely, show the match there, let’s stay there, you’ve got
everyone contained in one area, it would go off without a hitch. But they only
announced around 16:00, I believe it was, oh, we will actually show the match.
Because it seemed like they just wanted everyone to go off and do their own thing,
go to bars so that they were no longer the police’s problem”76 .
4.5.9. While Liverpool and Real Madrid fans were spread throughout the city
centre, by 16:00 the Cours de Vincennes was crowded. We could find no evidenceof the actual figures but estimates by various stakeholders combined with video
footage suggest the numbers gathered there were anywhere between thirty andfifty-five thousand people, almost all of whom were supporters of Liverpool FC.
A significant number of these supporters were also gathered in the Place de la
Nation, outside the metro station and around a nearby statue. According to the
FSE policing outside the fan zone was generally low key and supporters were notprevented from assembling or drinking publicly in that location.
4.5.10. At 17:26 the first message was issued via the UEFA App advising supporters
75 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6
76 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 3 – Appendix, V.8
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with tickets that it was now time for them to begin to move from their current
locations toward Saint-Denis. The message stated that it was “time to head tothe stadium from the Liverpool fan meeting point” using the station at Nationfrom where they should “hop on the metro line 1 to Gare de Lyon, then on to the
RER D to Stade de France Saint-Denis” or alternatively to “take the RER A, change
at Châtelet – Les Halles and take RER B to La Plaine – Stade de France”77. The
message did not prioritise one route over the other, but supporter testimonies
suggest the App was not a significant source of information for Liverpool fans.
4.5.11. In any case, it appears that from approximately 17:30 onwards significant
numbers of supporters complied with this advice and began to migrate onschedule from both the fan zone and other areas in the city toward the stadium,
predominantly via the rail network. Again, while it has not been possible for the
Panel to verify exact numbers, the DIGES report suggests that at least 12,000
people left the Cours de Vincennes heading toward the stadium at around thistime and the Panel has no reason to dispute this figure. The Panel notes that thismigration was not in any way late as it was consistent with messaging provided
by UEFA and some three and a half hours before the match was scheduled to
begin.
4.5.12. As Liverpool supporter Tom Whitehurst provided a description of his
experience of leaving the fan zone in written evidence to the Panel. “We werewalking to Gare de Lyon to get the train as Nation was already getting busy with
queues to get into the station. I should stress that everyone who travelled to the
Stadium had tickets, most from the club but also some UEFA ballot digital tickets- those who didn’t have tickets stayed to watch the match in the fan park. There
was plenty of space on the train - we went upstairs, and there were both locals
and Madrid fans in addition to mainly Liverpool supporters. There were loads ofsinging, but there was no problem - the Madrid fans and locals were enjoying it
and fist bumping us as we got off the train”78 .
4.5.13. Whilst supporters travelled to the stadium by other means, it is evident
a large proportion of those seeking to attend the match accessed Saint-Denis
from the centre of Paris via all three rail available routes: Metro line 13, RER B, andRER D. Various stakeholders have asserted different totals for passengers who
travelled to the stadium by rail on that day, some of which represent almost the
77 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix,
VI.16
78 — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7
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entire stadium capacity. The figures are the source of considerable controversy
because when combined with the figures for those arriving by road, these figures
have been used to support the contention that unprecedently large numbers ofticketless supporters tried to access the stadium and that this was a primary causeof the problems that emerged.
4.5.14. As outlined in the Executive Summary, the Panel has no confidence inthese figures and as such we devote a section to analysing the evidence on thisissue in the following chapters. Here it is sufficient for us to say that the route forsupporters from the RER station at Nation would mean that those travelling fromCours de Vincennes would change either at Châtelet – Les Halles or Gare de Lyon.
Travelling north, trains would arrive at Châtelet first, from where passengers could
normally transfer onto either RER B or D. It has not been possible for the Panelto gather data on precisely how passengers moved through the rail networks
because both SNCF and RATP have no technology that allows for automatedcounting. What is immediately evident to the Panel is that the only available figures
are those supplied by the rail operators, and those are merely estimates.
4.5.15. The Panel has been able to determine that these estimates are based onfield operatives at specific locations judging the number of trains and passengers,
for the purposes of avoiding overcrowding. The rail operators also acknowledge
that these figures are for the entire day and do not distinguish between thoseattending the stadium and other passengers. The operators accept their figures
include supporters who arrived at the stadium in the morning by road transport
and travelled into the City of Paris (e.g., to the Cours de Vincennes) before
returning to Saint-Denis later that day to watch the match and are therefore ‘double
counted’ in terms of the overall estimates of the numbers that attended the event.
The Panel notes the fact that this is a problematic way of assessing the overall
numbers of people attending any event at the SDF. As the DIGES report points out
it is therefore important to understand that these figures are merely “indicative but
not corroborated by technical sensors allowing objective results to be obtained.
The capacity of a train on RER line B is 1,600 passengers when a line D train cantransport up to 2,400 people; the trains on lines B and D also transport everyday
passengers in addition to spectators”79.
4.5.16. Despite the lack of evidence quantifying the number of supporters utilisingeach part of the rail network, the Panel does conclude with some confidence
79 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France
and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 127)60

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that the evidence indicates that most of the supporters traveling from the Coursde Vincennes and other parts of central Paris by rail utilised RER D, rather than
RER B, to access Saint-Denis. This is not surprising to the Panel given that the rail
operators had reconfigured their capacities and developed a communication
plan designed to encourage passengers away from RER B toward the SNCF
operated RER D. There is also evidence to suggest that police officers were indeed
present at the entrances to Nation as planned, monitoring, and potentially actively
directing fans onto RER D as they entered the subway.
4.5.17. Supporters travelling via the network were required to purchase a ticket
and stewards were in place advising supporters at the various interchanges.
Multiple eyewitnesses report that there were announcements in several languages
at Châtelet – Les Halles directing supporters toward RER D. Photographic evidence
and eyewitness accounts suggest that police officers were also distributing flyers
at Châtelet – Les Halles and some travelling on the network describe being unable
to access RER B when seeking to do so.
4.5.18. As the LFC supporter and journalist Daniel Austin80 recalled on entering the
network at Gare de Lyon: “I knew that there were two options to go north. You cantake the RER D, you can take the RER B. The RER B had strike action on it, whichis, you know, normal in France. They, they deal with the disruption caused by thaton a daily basis in different areas. So, I asked one of the station workers which one
is best for us to take here. She told me definitely take the RER D, we are telling
everyone to take that one, the other one is severely disrupted”
4.5.19. As Liverpool supporter Sheila Reeson also described: “When we left the
fan zone at 17:30, we knew which train we needed to get, but we weren’t allowed.
They had taped off a lot of the entrances and the police herded us all down one
stairway, down onto one platform, down onto one train and we had… I do speak a
bit of French and I had spoken to a French lady, and she was telling us which way
to go and the police would not let us go that way. They were determined that wewere all going to get on this train. And it was the same when we got off the train.
We’d put up the street map and they wouldn’t let us go that way. They made us goa certain way. All of us”81.

80 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6
81 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8
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4.5.20. Liverpool supporter Tony Fitzgerald also described his experiences to the
Panel: “Well, what I should have said was, when we got to the train station, we’dbeen told to get the RER B. Now, when we got there, we went to go on the platform
and the woman said you can’t go RER B. So, we said, “we’ve been told to do RER
B.” So, she said, well what you’re going to have to do is get the RER D. There areissues on the line.” So, we said, “are you sure? Cos that’s what we’ve been told –RER B?” “No, no, you must get RER D.” So, we got RER D”82 .
4.5.21. This evidence does suggest that the plan to route supporters through the
network by directing them toward the SNCF operated RER D did materialise on
match day, even though strike affected RER B was running at 80% capacity. As aresult, what is also evident is that it produced a pattern of passenger flow that wasvery different to that normally experienced for events at the SDF and therefore
should have been a warning sign that problems were beginning to emerge. The
Panel concludes that a lack of capacity to adequately monitor passenger flow
through the network is an issue that needs to be addressed given the importanceof the rail system for accessing SDF and for passenger flows through the system to
impact upon ingress into the stadium.
4.5.22. As the Panel analyses in subsequent chapters, there is no evidence ofovercrowding or other significant problems on the rail networks: evidence which
does not support assertions of a substantial increase in passengers over thenumbers expected. The networks successfully conveyed supporters to the vicinityof the stadium. The problem was what then happened.
4.5.23. As noted above, the area immediately surrounding the stadium was a ‘securezone’ accessible via an array of Additional Security Perimeters or ASPs. The Panelnotes these are spread unevenly around the stadium footprint (see Annex Figure 6). As
also noted above, a large majority of people attending events at SDF arrive by public
transport through RER B and D, and Line 13. The natural entry points for those arrivingfrom those hubs are ASP1, 3 and 4. This means that nine of the ASP entrances arelikely to be under-utilised whilst there will be a risk of congestion at these three.
4.5.24. The zone was activated around mid-day by police conducting a sweep
through the area, requiring those without appropriate accreditation to disperse
beyond the perimeter. However, the evidence indicates that significant breaches ofthe perimeter began to occur from the early afternoon onward.

82 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8
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4.5.25. According to FFF, people began to circumvent the secure zone from asearly as 13:00. By approximately 14:00, again according to FFF, the stadium control
noted concerns about a gathering of between two and three thousand peoplecausing blockages of the Avenue du Général de Gaulle which is a thoroughfare
outside the secure zone running adjacent to the Champions League Village.
As a FFF official stated to the Panel “with the help of the police and the private
security… We protect[ed] the Champions Village”. However, following this authority
intervention “part of them go through the VIP parking with broken the door. I don’tknow if you have the picture of the door.… It’s the fire door, so we can only openfrom inside to outside. And they broke and not only the door but all the material
around the door, so they [went] through and after that, during all the night, all thematch, they were around Stade de France, around the ASP and try to go inside of
the stadium”83 .
4.5.26. Whilst the Panel remains unclear about precise timings, as the afternoon
progressed, FFF noted that significant numbers of locals continued to circumvent
the ASP through retail outlets, bars, and restaurants as well as a school and abuilding site that traversed the perimeter. The evidence suggests that in parallel,from early afternoon onwards people, again assumed to be locals, began tocommit assaults and robberies against Real Madrid and Liverpool supporters, both
inside and outside the ASP.
4.5.27. From 17:00 a post event report by one of the event sponsors referred
directly to the situation immediately to the north of what was an apparently poorly
guarded perimeter. As the sponsored described: “Avenue du Général de Gaulle
was not closed on Match Day, which should be the case as this area was part ofthe ‘commercial perimeter’. As a result, many locals, including local youth, but nopolice were on the spot, which caused an unclear, chaotic, insecure, and unsafe
situation which was dangerous to our guests. This information was immediately
reported… as in the opinion of the [our] event security manager the situation could
deteriorate easily resulting in a most likely unsafe, insecure, and thus dangerous
situation to our guests and crew”84 .
4.5.28. Toward late afternoon and early evening those supporters utilising Metroline 13 began alighting at the station Saint-Denis Porte de Paris to the northwest of
the stadium. From there, most flowed toward the stadium concourse under the A1
roadway to access the secure zone via ASP1. Both video and eyewitness evidence
83 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3
84 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)
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indicate that significant congestion developed in this area around this time. At
around this time, video evidence suggests that minor conflicts with police developed,
and eyewitnesses describe sporadic robberies and assaults upon supporters
initiated by locals. Once through the security check at ASP1, people crossed thenarrow Passerelle de l’Écluse to access the stadium concourse, from where they
could enter the stadium via their respective gates, wherever these may have been.
4.5.29. As discussed above, for those approaching from the south, the primary
access route was via RER B, the station La Plaine - Stade de France and theninto the Avenue du Stade de France which contains a 20-meter-wide walkway toaccommodate high-volume foot traffic. According to an eyewitness, the accesspoint to the secure zone also accommodated 12 entry channels within ASP4.
4.5.30. In contrast, from late afternoon and early evening onwards passenger
flow into Stade de France Saint-Denis via RER D began to increase as supporters
who had migrated from the Cours de Vincennes and other parts of Paris began toarrive. On leaving the SNCF controlled station supporters initially walked toward
the stadium via the Avenue François Mitterrand. However, rather than continuing
northeast to connect with the Avenue Stade du France and enter via ASP4, mostpeople turned or were turned directly north into Avenue des Fruitiers, then east
into Rue Jean-Philippe Rameau where they crossed under the A1 roadway via anarrow pedestrian foot tunnel or underpass onto the Avenue du President Wilson
to enter the secure zone via ASP3.
4.5.31. It is unsurprising supporters took this route. The Panel understands it is avery usual direction and gathering point for people with tickets when entering to
the south of the stadium, partly because it is close to bars and restaurants locatedon the west side of the A1 and there is a small park adjacent to Rue Jean-PhilippeRameau where supporters can gather. Additionally, a video investigation publishedby French newspaper Le Monde showed that local business owners had installedsigns showing the direction of the stadium through to the underpass, to ensure
maximum footfall in front of their businesses.
4.5.32. As Liverpool supporter Sheila Reeson described in her evidence to the
Panel. “When we got off there were hand-written, like, A4 pieces of paper withan arrow and Stade de France on it, written and pointing in the direction that thepolice were taking us”.

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4.5.33. As the above account also notes, corroborated by UEFA and othereyewitnesses, spectators arriving via RER D and by coach were actively directed
towards ASP3 by police, who blocked off the Avenue connecting to ASP4.
4.5.34. As one anonymous Liverpool supporter stated in written evidence to UEFA.
“After leaving the train station, police were directing fans to turn left to Avenue desFruitiers, funnelling everyone towards the underpass. We were held on the stationside of the underpass for about 30 mins – all very orderly with adequate space
to hold spectators. Only when we were released it became clear that the police
were pulsing people through the underpass – a common tactic in crowd control.
At 19:00 once through the underpass we moved forward slowly under the bridge
via the narrowed route created by the police vehicles until we reached the foot of apedway/ramp. We remained here for circa 45 mins. Again - zero communication or
UCLF specific signage”85 .
4.5.35. However, other supporters describe a lack of stewarding, signage, andcommunication such that in a context of uncertainty people arriving via RER D
merely followed those in front of them assuming this must have been the correctroute.
4.5.36. As Liverpool supporter and journalist Daniel Austin stated to the Panel:“So, we got in the RER D. Anyway. 18:25. At 18:37 we arrived at the station ofSaint-Denis and began to walk towards the stadium. Now, not only was there no
presence of anybody to instruct you where to go — which there definitely was atboth Madrid and Kiev Finals —, but there was also zero signage, you know, nota single lamppost with a sign saying “Stade de France” or “Champions League
Final this way”. So, again, I knew the rough directions to the stadium from my own
knowledge of the area, and could see the way that people were moving, so, we justmoved in the same direction as everybody”.
4.5.37. Similarly, a Liverpool supporter quoted by Scratton et al (2022) statedthat “you just kind of had to guess where you were headed. I think a lot of people,
myself included, just followed the crowd. We went under a bridge before arriving
at a ramp that was meant to lead us to gates Y and Z”86 .
4.5.38. Despite these partly contrasting experiences, what is evident to the Panel
85 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)
86 — “Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the2022 Champions League Final in Paris, Phil Scraton et al. (2022) (p. 26)
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is that the police plan identified above to deliberately flow supporters arriving via
RER D toward ASP3 was being realised from approximately 17:00 onwards. Thiswas even though abnormally large numbers of passengers were flowing into andfrom the station. It is also evident that police were present along this route andtook little to no action to identify, communicate or manage the emerging risks. The
Panel has concluded that for at least significant periods, the police were directing
the flow of supporters toward the Wilson ramp.
4.5.39. As outlined above, entry into the secure zone from Avenue du Président
Wilson is via the relatively narrow Wilson ramp which is also adjacent to the A1dual carriageway. The ramp is accessed via an underpass created by the bridge
allowing the A86 to pass over the Avenue du Président Wilson. The Panel notes thaton the bridge is a CCTV camera that overlooks the Avenue du Président Wilson
which feeds directly into the police section of the stadium control room. ASP3
was positioned at the entrance to the Wilson ramp. Given the space limitations,
it was only possible to accommodate a small number of lanes for the security or
Vigipirate 87 checks, ticket checks and electronic ticket activation. Eyewitness andvideo evidence suggest that across the period it was operating there were as few
as four and no more than seven lanes in operation. As we consider in the following
analysis chapters, UEFA calculated the flow rates for ASP3 on the basis that it
would have fifteen lanes: a material and substantial error.
4.5.40. The Senate report notes that as early as 17:00 stewards at ASP3 began
reporting concerns that the chemical pens used by stewards to test if tickets were
genuine were not functioning appropriately. Accordingly, the report notes thatthese stewards were reassured by stadium control that they were dealing withcounterfeit tickets. This was confirmed by a UEFA representative in our interviews.
However, the Panel could find no evidence to establish on what basis thisaffirmation was made. In contrast, multiple eyewitnesses at several ASPs aroundthe stadium described stewards claiming their legitimate tickets were forgeries but
then subsequently accepting their validity.
4.5.41. As Liverpool supporter Liam Flanagan described regarding the activationof his electronic ticket in the vicinity of ASP3. “When I got to the underpass, there
were three stewards as far as I can remember, but the one I went to, I said, look, —I knew what I had to do — so, look, I need to get the ticket activated and stuff likethat. He looked at the phone and he goes, no, no, no, no, no. And it was just one
87 — Vigipirate is a counter terrorism plan which has operated in France at various alert levels since its creation in
1978.
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UCLF22 Independent Reviewof the other stewards that was close by, saw it, came over and he knew, and heactivated it. And then the ticket became active”88 .
4.5.42. Correspondingly, Real Madrid supporter Armando Sánchez Falcón
described similar experiences with a paper ticket to the north of the stadium.
“One thing that was amazing was that someone was checking the tickets with apen marker. I don’t know if you could see, here there was, well, that seemed to me
like technology from at least the last century. We got there, the initial pen marker
didn’t go through and the security personnel there was calling, fake ticket, faketicket. They were clearly nervous; I mean they were. And again, I don’t blame themfor that. They were surpassed and we said, “well, wait a minute, I’m here with myfather, he’s 87. My brother got this ticket from the Real Madrid offices yesterday.
There’s no chance this ticket is fake. So, they checked it again and say, Ok, Ok, thisis an original ticket. The first time they run the marker through this spot it didn’t
seem, probably I had the ticket in my pocket or whatever, but he said, “this is not
original, fake, fake” and he even started to shout, “fake ticket, fake ticket.” So, I say,“calm down, calm down, take your marker again, this is not a fake ticket.” Again,
we, there was probably 15 seconds before the 1st and the 2nd time the ticket
was checked, but I think it gives you a sense of how poor the organization was ingeneral”89.
4.5.43. The Panel’s interviews with UEFA security officials confirmed that the flow
rates through all ASPs had been calculated on the assumption that the Vigipirate,
conducted by police, would not disrupt flow rates. We discuss this issue in moredetail later in the report, suffice to say here that this judgement assumed thatthese security checks would be random and that around 10% of people would
be searched. However, observations by UEFA officials at ASP3 during the event
identified that police were imposing a far more rigorous search regime which
considerably slowed through flow.
4.5.44. As one UEFA official described to the Panel: “At one point when I arrived
at entrance [ASP] 3, I saw the police doing the body search, which wasn’t part ofthe plan, and they were basically checking pretty much everyone and every sooften stopping the entrance flow.” As a result, the official concluded that this fullsearching “was part of the problem, because then all of this calculation was thrownout the window”90.
88 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6
89 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10
90 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1
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4.5.45. In other words, UEFA officials acknowledged to the Panel that thecalculations of flow rates were made on the wrong basis. We analyse this further
in subsequent chapters, where the Panel concludes that the errors were evenmore fundamental. These miscalculations were very important because theyshould have alerted everyone to a serious problem. They are further evidence ofserious failures of interoperability because key stakeholders had evidently notcommunicated with one another about basic but fundamental aspects of planningand delivery. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the problems of restricted flow
rates were experienced at various ASPs, particularly those experiencing heavy
demand to the north and the south of the stadium.
4.5.46. As Real Madrid supporter Pablo Sanz described as he arrived via Metroline 13: “We went very early to the stadium. I don’t remember the exact timing, but
I think we arrived at 18:15. We went by subway. I don’t remember the line, but it was
the line that was specifically reserved for Real Madrid fans. The 1st and, in my viewthe main failure of organization was right when we went out from the subway. We
were caught in a trap… We went out from the subway. We could see the stadium,
I don’t know 200, 300 meters away. There were fences to both sides and we were
just caught, I mean like this, with zero room to move. It was, I mean if anything
would have happened there, I guess that dozens of hundreds of people might
have died because we couldn’t move… I saw women of 70 years old, child[ren]of 10 years old really frightened. Yeah, and it was like 45 minutes like that. Uhm,
the reason, uh, I guess that the first it was the fences, I mean, I guess that theintention was to separate Liverpool and Real Madrid fans but if you, if you put thefans in a trap, they are separated, but they are in danger. It took like a couple ofminutes every time they were checking a ticket. It was, I mean, obviously you haveto verify the tickets, but it was. I have never seen this, not in a football match, notin a in a concert, not ever! It was like a couple of minutes to check every ticket.
I saw the pen marker and they were I mean, it has to be 5/10 seconds I guess,but it was two minutes. So, the people kept on arriving by the subway at a higher
speed than they were exiting to the stadium, ok. That was really frightening and,in that case, thieves, uh, started to act and it was really dangerous because when
the thieves act, people reacted and there was no room for the reaction, so it wasa couple of moments where people reacting, they were stealing cell phones withthe tickets. I have my e-ticket here so, I saw people being stolen their cell phones
with their tickets, they were reacting and there was no room, so it was really, really68

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dangerous”91.
4.5.47. The Panel concludes that the observed congestion at various ASPs bothto the north and south of stadium was inevitable because there was not sufficient
capacity to move the expected number of ticketed fans through the limited
number of available channels in sufficient time. Consequently, between 17:00
and 18:00 to the south of the stadium, a combination of increased passenger
flow into RER D, the subsequent footfall into the Avenue du Président Wilson, thedouble checks, limited number of channels, apparently inexperienced stewarding,and absence of rejection channels, all led to rapidly growing and increasingly
dangerous congestion at ASP3. Despite the escalating dangers no immediatecontingency action appears to have been taken by the stadium control room,
even though the Senate report claims that RATP and SNCF were providing regular
reports regarding passenger flow to the stadium control room which itself also had
direct line of sight of ASP via SDF and Avenue de Président Wilson via street CCTV.
4.5.48. The Senate report notes that the congestion at ASP3 only became an
acknowledged concern to stadium control from approximately 18:00 onwards.
With limited crowd management in place between RER D and ASP3, increasingly
large numbers of supporters were flowing toward the entry point so by 18:45 the
Avenue du Président Wilson had become densely and dangerously crowded.
Consequently, at 18:50 stadium control finally issued a request to the police todivert people arriving at Stade de France-Saint-Denis toward ASP4. According to
the Senate report it then took a further twenty-eight minutes for a cordon to be put
in place and as such the congestion continued to intensify.
4.5.49. An anonymous Liverpool supporter described their experience of thesituation in a written submission to UEFA: “With the entry point [ASP3] effectively
closed (a trickle of entrants at best) and the volume continuing to build behind it
quickly got pretty scary. A crush began to ensue. A lady and her 8-year-old son
were beside us and we ended up taking them under our wing for probably 30 mins
to provide them with added protection. I witnessed another woman being ushered
outward towards the motorway in tears as understandably she felt uncomfortable –as we all did. All things considered in this circumstance the fans were unbelievably
compliant and patient”92 .
4.5.50. Liverpool supporter Jim Galvin described to the Panel how the dangerous
91 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10
92 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)
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crushing reminded him of earlier stadium disasters. “We must have arrived atabout half 5, quarter to 6. And by the time we got to the underpass, uhm, there
was obviously just no way, you know, you were going anywhere. And then it juststarted getting more and more and more congested, more and more and more
packed. And you know, after coming through Heysel and through Hillsborough, I
said to my daughter, “we’ve got to get out of here.” I said, “we’re just, we’re goingto have to get out of here because it’s just getting worse and worse”93 .
4.5.51. The Panel therefore concurs with the Senate in its judgement of theinadequacy of the stadium and police authorities’ responses to the emerging
situation in the vicinity of ASP3. The late timing of the implementation is confirmedby eyewitness and photo evidence that indicate the first people redirected awayfrom ASP3 began arriving at the Avenue du Stade de France at 19:52. As the
Senate committee stated in their report: “Passenger flows from each of the RER
lines were communicated to the stadium command post every half hour by the
SNCF from 18:05. From the outset, and especially from 18:30, the significant
difference in passenger numbers between line D and line B was known. However,this situation did not prompt a rapid reaction to redirect flows, neither on the partof the transport operators, who indicated that they had not been asked to do so,
nor the organizers, nor even the Préfecture de Police, which implemented theredirection only at 19:18, which was too late”94 .
4.5.52. As noted above, the limited capacity of the roadway in the Avenue duPrésident Wilson had been further restricted because several large police carriervehicles had been parked alongside the east side of the underpass. Althoughsequence and timings are not clear, photographic, video and eyewitness evidence
indicate that police manoeuvred two of these carrier vehicles to create an
impromptu cordon restricting flow into and under the A86 bridge. The police claimthat this was a tactic for preventing a vehicle-based terrorist attack. Whatever
the rationale for this manoeuvre it had the effect of slowing throughput flow
considerably and over time further increasing the density of the crowd. FFF andUEFA both indicated that this tactic had not been part of the planning: again,
evidence of a lack of joint working.
4.5.53. During the early evening photographic evidence shows people in front of
this vehicle cordon spilling over into, and ultimately blocking, the adjacent and
93 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8
94 — L’Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions
au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable, French Senate - English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2827)
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busy N1 dual carriageway bringing its north bound carriageway to a standstill.
This added considerably to the already heavy road traffic congestion and blocked
vehicle access to the VIP entrance just north of ASP3. According to eyewitnesses,
by 19:30, it was taking people between ninety minutes and two hours to progress
through ASP3, and the crowd now stretched back beyond the underpass and thePanel concludes that crowd pressures were becoming life threatening.
4.5.54. As one supporter quoted in Scraton et al (2022) described: “We hadparked in Saint-Denis, so I decided to go to that side of the ground to see if theaccess was any easier. At that entrance the police were using the same tactic ofblocking off the entrance with riot vans with the riot police marshalling the small
entrance gap left between the vans. I joined the mass of people waiting as thiswas the only means of access. As I got closer to the entrance gap, the squash was
becoming more like a crush. A young man next to me was having a panic attack
and a Spanish child on the other side was very scared. I was starting to breath a
bit faster myself at this stage. By the time I got to the front I had no control overmyself, with my arms pinned to the side of my body”95 .
4.5.55. By this time, the area both behind and between the two police vehicles andthe Wilson ramp was densely crowded. Access past the ramp north toward ASP2
was by then also entirely restricted and as noted above eyewitnesses describe
experiencing locals within the crowd robbing supporters and trying to illegitimately
access the secure zone. By 19:30, estimates place upward of fifteen thousandpeople in this location and because of the severity of the situation at some point,
between 19:39 and 19:54, ASP3 was withdrawn. According to the Préfecture de
Police the decision to remove ASP3 was taken by them at 19:45 and was a decision
based on their judgment that the situation had become life threatening. Throughthis entire sequence there appears to have been little to no verbal communicationfrom the authorities to those gathered in the crowd, although eyewitnesses describe
police officers without megaphones shouting instructions to very little effect.
4.5.56. As a Liverpool supporter described in a written submission to UEFA. “I will
never forget the next traumatic 90 minutes. We were initially held back around thecorner from the bar we had been at until we were released and allowed towards
and into a subway, which passed under a busy main road [the A1]. As we emerged,
we were channelled between two police vans and into an area under an underpass
which had been significantly narrowed by a long line of police vans. As the crowd
95 — “Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the2022 Champions League Final in Paris, Phil Scraton et al. (2022) (p. 27)
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built behind us and compressed in front of us, I was convinced that people
would be crushed to death. It was clear that we were being funnelled into as
significant pinch point. I could see that women and children were becoming very
uncomfortable and there was no real way out.”96 .
4.5.57. Also, as Tony Fitzgerald described to the Panel, it was not just the danger ofcrushing but the reactions of those in authority to the dangers of the situation thatwere disturbing to supporters: “So, all I kept saying to my wife was – and she’s only
5 foot 2 – is keep on to the right. Don’t go left under any circumstances. And by thisstage you could just feel the vibe where people like, we’ve been here before. This
isn’t right, this is not getting better by the second. This could really end up badly.
And you could hear voices going, “keep calm, keep it together.” And then you could
hear kids crying. You could hear women sort of getting scared in it all. You’re trying
to keep calm and yourself you’re thinking, “this isn’t right. This could end up backlike Hillsborough again.” And literally, I think we’ve got to where the point was, and it
was just sheer force and weight. We went through the ticket points. And as you went
through the ticket points, I still didn’t show my ticket. They’d stopped checking by
the looks of it, so we just went through so my wife went over to… there was a young
French gendarme there, and she said, “there are women and children really struggling
in there. It’s getting bad now. Something serious could happen. Somebody could die.”And she actually went, “yes, I know.” That was all she said. So, she then went over toa big UEFA chap who was standing there, and she said, “are you going to do anything
about this?” And he just turned his back on her. That was it. So, I then went over to agendarme who was standing there, and I’ve got to be honest, I’ve lost it a bit at thatpoint, and I used a bit of Anglo-Saxon on him. And he just stood there. I said “just do
your job. There are people are going to die in there. You’ve got to do something.” And
they just blanked you. That was it. They just blanked. They didn’t respond in any way,
shape, or form. It was like, well, you’re on your own here”.
4.5.58. After abandoning of the Vigipirate and ticket checks and activations at
ASP3, thousands of people began flowing slowly up the Wilson ramp onto theconcourse surrounding the stadium, with a significant number of these people
moving to the area adjacent to the turnstiles at gates X, Y & Z. The stadium
was now exposed to a multitude of safety and security threats. According toeyewitnesses, the density of the crowd as it moved up the ramp created further
dangers of crushing and there was now no capability for the stewards to check forthe possession of valid tickets, other than at the turnstiles themselves.

96 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)72

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4.5.59. Eyewitnesses describe significant numbers of locals also utilising the ramp toaccess the concourse. While some of these continued to assault and rob supporters,
the larger groups mounted several attempts to gain access to the stadium either
by individually climbing the outer perimeter fence or collectively trying to force entry.
Video footage suggests that there were particularly concentrated efforts at Gate Z.
4.5.60. However, an event sponsor also detailed in written evidence, theirexperiences of locals trying to force entry through the Champions Village to thenorth of the stadium from as early as 17:00, “Local youth tried to force themselves
entry in the direction of Champions Village via the stairs. Despite large groupsof locals, incl. local youth, were at the spot from 17:00 onwards, there was noother police - than traffic wardens - at the scene. The barriers on top of the stairs
consisted of low crush barriers which were not connected to each other and notsuitable for managing large crowds”.
4.5.61. As acknowledged in the DIGES report, there were also “numerous actsof robbery with violence observed by police officers on site, in unprecedented
proportions, by 300 to 400 very mobile individuals according to their estimatesand by images circulating in the media, demonstrate the presence of a large
number of offenders coming in gangs to commit acts of predation against
supporters identified as vulnerable foreign tourists”97.
4.5.62. While it has not been possible to identify exact timings, both the Senate
and UEFA note that attempts to breach turnstiles at the south of the stadium by
locals began at Gate Y at 18:52, approximately fifty minutes before the withdrawingof ASP3. The evidence presented to the Panel indicates that breaches into the
ASP had been occurring in multiple locations from early afternoon onwards but
do appear to have intensified toward late afternoon. Indeed, these gatherings andattempted incursions escalated into a relatively large-scale episode of collective
violence between locals and police that occurred at approximately 18:45 on andaround the Passerelle de l’Écluse, the narrow footbridge that crosses a canal andthrough which people access the stadium via ASP1 in its northwest corner. A
representative of FFF described how the police sought to forcefully disperse these
locals toward the Saint-Denis - Porte de Paris Metro station, but that the group had
resisted as they were “ready to fight”. Supporters in the area at this time describe
experiencing the effects of tear gas and the Panel is confident that a relatively
97 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
132)
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serious confrontation between locals and police took place in this location at thistime.
4.5.63. Regardless of the ambiguity about when they first began, the impactof these various collective conflicts and incursions by, at least, one large groupof locals was that stadium control enacted multiple gate closures as a direct
attempt to try to prevent them entering the venue. Head stewards at each gate
had been instructed and empowered to enact closures autonomously in suchcircumstances.
4.5.64. As UEFA state in their initial post-match inquiry: “The head steward at eachgate was briefed, with a standard operating procedure, to close the gates in caseof a breach”98 .
4.5.65. These gate closures severely restricted the through flows through various
gates which led directly to long queues developing at multiple locations aroundthe stadium concourse, and seriously exacerbated the dangerous congestion
which had already arisen. Moreover, as gates were periodically reopened multiple
eyewitnesses describe being unable to get through the turnstiles as the QR code
scanners initially rejected the validity of their paper and electronic tickets.
4.5.66. As Joe Blott and Liam Flanagan of the Liverpool supporter Association
Spirt of Shankly described: “JB: I went through one and two, think I’ve said before,
three or four times my ticket didn’t work. As my ticket turned green, two or threestewards were coming over to me to clearly eject me, because my ticket was
fake. LF: Yeah. But it comes back to the point before, that now my ticket’s beenregistered as fake two or three or four times, because it’s been red flagged. But it
was a genuine ticket”99.
4.5.67. An event sponsor also reported, after the event, how they had similar
experiences: “Some digital tickets did not work (including the event security
manager’s ticket; however, after he showed his passport, he was able to enter).”
4.5.68. Supporters seeking to access through disabled entrances described to the
Panel similar experiences, as Ted Morris, Chair of the Liverpool Disabled Supporters
Association (LDSA) noted. “Some friends of mine – Liverpool supporters, wheelchair
98 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix,
VI.16 (p. 2724)
99 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6
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users – had passed around about 18:00. So, when we went around the gate, theaccessible gate at 19:00, those 3 wheelchair users were still sitting outside thatgate. There was a commotion going on next to them at the non-disabled turnstiles,
because his support had gone through, but his PA’s ticket would not scan. He’s
trying, he’s trying, he’s trying it. This guy was getting understandably upset”.
4.5.69. Significant queues became dangerous congestion at multiple gates,
especially those to the south and north of the stadium, with the rapid influx ofsupporters onto the concourse in the southwest corner of the stadium, after theabandoning of ASP3 making the situation increasingly acute.
4.5.70. Sheila Reeson described her experiences around gates X, Y & Z to the
Panel: “There was a queue, about five or six across, and they were queuing to theleft of the gate and the right of the gate. So, we went to the left. Uhm, it did movea little bit, and while we were there, some French – and I know they were Frenchcos they were speaking French – pushed through, climbed the fence. There was
one steward stood the other side and he went [waves hands around] and didn’t
stop any of them. They all ran past and that happened two or three times and they
were not Liverpool supporters. They didn’t have anything Liverpool on them, they
were speaking French. The Liverpool people in the queue were trying to sort ofjust move to stop them, but they climbed the fence and went, uhm. I think we were
there in that queue for an hour and a half, and it had hardly moved. And then thesort of thing came back - they’ve closed the gate. So, I think my son got out of thequeue and walked down. He said, “the gate’s closed.” There’s nobody there to ask
why. And then suddenly there was a surge of fans, and the queue got from sort ofsix across too, well, it was nearly right across everywhere and people were saying“they’ve just let us… they’re not checking the tickets anymore,” and they’d comefrom the underpass, and they weren’t checking the tickets. They’d just let thewhole lot come through. And it was getting, time getting on, and everybody wasthen in amongst. Well, there wasn’t a queue anymore, it was just a mass of people.
There were a lot, a lot of French youths running about”.
4.5.71. Given the gate closures, supporters describe moving to those thatremained open but then experiencing an inability to get their tickets to register on
the respective turnstiles. The CSDF indicated to the Panel that valid tickets would
register at any turnstile - a position not consistent with UEFA’s evidence - and thiswas certainly not the experience of Liverpool supporters which added further
confusion and delay. Due to the poor flow rates the concourse around the stadium
became crowded with thousands of supporters with legitimate tickets unable to
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access the stadium, most of whom had been queueing for several hours without
access to water or toilet facilities. Contrary to the agreed plan official drink stallson the concourse closed at 18:00. In contrast to the planning documents, there
appear to have been no stewards deployed on the stadium concourse to check or
activate tickets or to otherwise manage people seeking to progress through theturnstiles, or at least they had been withdrawn due to the congestion.
4.5.72. As disabled Liverpool supporter Chris McNulty described to the Panel.
“Over in France there was no signage. You know, the gates are Y, X, Z - they
were all signposted, that was it. But then when you looked at it, you think: well,where’s the wheelchair one? You know, we didn’t know that it was, like, to the side,
there was a gate. The rest of them were all turnstiles. But, at gate Y where I was
supposed to go in, there were barriers along both sides where they were queueing
to come in. So, for me to get to that entrance, I’d have to join one of the queues,
but I didn’t know which one, because you can’t see. You couldn’t get near it to see.
No stewards, no one outside to ask”100.
4.5.73. Whilst eyewitness accounts suggest similar difficulties were occurring at
multiple gates around the stadium, the situation continued to become particularly
acute in the vicinity of gates X, Y & Z. Within the context of this melee, there is
eyewitness evidence that some Liverpool supporters did breach the turnstiles.
4.5.74. As a delegate from the English FA observed. “At 18:50 an ignited
pyrotechnic was thrown through entrance gate Y which landed under one of theindustrial waste bins. Red smoke then billowed from beneath, thereby distracting
the stewards and between ten and fifteen LFC supporters jumped through the end
left hand side turnstile. The supporters ran across the inner concourse to both theupper-level steps and lower concourse ramp. At this point the stewards closed all
the gate Y turnstiles”101.
4.5.75. With no police to protect anyone from sporadic criminality, it appears fromvideo footage and eyewitness accounts, that Liverpool supporters on this part ofthe concourse spontaneously formed orderly queues, regularly admonished thoseseeking to circumvent these and collectively organised to protect the vulnerable.
Indeed, the Panel concurs with Scraton et al (2022) that the capacity of theLiverpool supporters to self-organise within this context was a primary factor in
100 — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7
101 — English Football Association Security Advisor, Steve Lewis, Position Statement – Appendix, IV.25

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preventing harm and ensuring our inquiry is investigating a ‘near miss’ rather thana stadium tragedy involving fatalities.
4.5.76. Ian Byrne described his experiences in this location in his written
response to the Panel. “I called to all supporters nearby to take videos of theevents unfolding if they could and I went in search of someone in authority to
do something before people died. I ended up in a line of people being funnelledtowards one single open turnstile. All around me people were screaming thatthey were being crushed as the pressure being built up by the funnel. I shouted
at the police to open additional turnstiles, but to no avail. Some of us shouted tosupporters to take a step back to relieve pressure, which they did thankfully. We
had to steward the crowd ourselves, using our experience, due to the absence ofany stadium organisation. I eventually was funnelled through turnstile and cameout into the space behind turnstiles, then I saw a scene I thought and prayed
I would never see again; people with their faces pushed against the railings,
screaming, and being crushed. I ran to the two stewards I could see, and I begged
them to open additional turnstiles to relieve the pressure, because I could only see
people once again dying at a football match. A steward who looked senior camerunning up to me and told me I would be arrested if I did not stop protesting. I wasthen called over by LFC stewards who were in tears because they were shamefully not
being utilised and their warnings were being ignored by the stadium management”.
4.5.77. Such negative experiences were not isolated to Liverpool supporters
seeking to access the stadium from the south. Real Madrid fans accessing thestadium also had similar experiences, as an anonymous supported describedto UEFA. “The situation deteriorated when they suddenly opened again one ofthe doors at the gate, with people shoving and pushing. My brother and I at thatpoint were really scared as we had a sensation of being crushed. I realised thatnear to me was a father trying to protect his crying son and I was able to quickly
form a buffer of space with a few other people by using our arms to aid him. After
we finally broke free from the pushing and were allowed in the turnstile area, mybrother’s e-ticket worked but mine did not work. It was as if the stewards had
simply stopped doing their jobs because they had enough, and likewise they
were not even trying to stop or catch those entering without a valid ticket. We
entered the concourse and the stadium just as the Police were (finally) reacting
and heading to calm the situation at our gate. In all my years of attending footballmatches, I’ve never felt so insecure and vulnerable”102 .

102 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)
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4.5.78. Video footage and eyewitness evidence also indicates that at around thistime several individuals, who appear to the Panel to be French locals, climbed
the outer perimeter fence in the vicinity of gates X and Y. While one or two weredetained by stewards, several evaded capture and ran into the stadium. The
incursions and attempted breaches at Gate Z appear to have then led FFF torequest police support to protect the integrity of the outer perimeter and assist
with body searches at the turnstiles. Video footage shows that as police arrived alarge group of locals were attempting to collectively force their way through Gate
Z. As FFF representative present in the control room subsequently noted, “now the
only solution [was] to remove them because they are ready to fight. They are notafraid in front of the police… so they used tear gas because it was the only solution
to remove them away from the fences”.
4.5.79. Police in full protective equipment deployed out onto the concourse andattempted a forceful dispersal of a crowd of at least 300 people, who again appear
on video footage to be locals rather than supporters. This dispersal activity beganwith the firing of tear gas onto the concourse outside gate Z, but the wind blew thesmoke in the direction of gates X & Y where hundreds of Liverpool supporters weredensely crowded into the concourse.
4.5.80. Liverpool supporter Jim Galvin described his subsequent experiences to
the Panel. “When we were in the queue you see, you know, you did see the odd
person trying to get over the fence and I was trying to get into [inaudible] withmy daughter, and people were absolutely livid with the people that we’re getting
on the fence saying to them, “you’re never ever going to, we’re never ever goingto get in. If you’re getting over that fence, they’re never ever going to open thegates. Get down.” You know and shouting them down and pulling them down.
And everyone was just saying, “just stay calm. Just stay calm.” You know. But it’sdifficult when you’re getting pepper sprayed when you’re getting tear gassed.
And, you know, we were close to the fence that segregated the concourse fromthe ground itself. And you could just see the people, you know, in authority, on theother side of the fence, that were just standing and laughing at you. Absolutely justlaughing. No concern. Absolutely nothing, just absolutely laughing at you for 10,
15, 20 minutes. Unbelievable”103 .
4.5.81. Liverpool supporter Paul Corke was also subjected to these forceful

103 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8
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weapon-based police interventions and described his experience of them to the
Panel. “So, in the end, they wouldn’t open the gates, so I said to him, I said, let’s
just try another gate and we moved. Because we’re a little bit back from the gates,
as we moved to the centre [inaudible], I said hang on a minute, I said, just wait one
minute they, might open the gates again because it looked like there was some
activity. And instead of them opening the gates, and we’re standing [inaudible],they tear gassed us and the tear gas came right, and we weren’t even the closest, itcame right across and hit us both. My mate ended up on the floor choking. I was overa barrier with it in my eyes and my throat, you literally choke on it and it’s like, I can’t
believe this is happening and I really, really had to support, I came around quicker
than my friend and I had to support him, and he was absolutely devastated”104 .
4.5.82. Mr Corke goes on to describe how he and his friend moved to anothergate to try to escape from the disturbances only to be subjected again to what heexperienced as the random deployment of pepper spray by police. “By the time
we got off, we were then caught between, uh, there’s quite a large number ofParisian folks and the police and they were basically having a square off, a runoff.
The police were chasing them by this point. We had to dodge what was going on,which is fairly silly. I say to one of the policemen “look how do we get in? How do
we get in? We just been tear gassed” and he said, “go the next gate.” And when
we got to the next gate it’s just those folks there. There were loads of them there
again, it was just more folks there. We were doing better at the other gate with
Liverpool fans. So we were there again, and I was pushing and shoving outside,
this guy, and I’m not kidding, this guy who looks in charge, be it behind, behind
the gates, of the police force, [with] police uniform on, he was kind of suited, he’s
arguing with the people trying to get in and the next thing, he took the pepper
spray or the tear gas, whatever it is off the policeman next to him and started
spraying everybody, started spraying everybody. So, we ended up tear gassed
again, pepper sprayed whatever it was and, on the floor, again and my friend wason the floor with another guy who was on the floor. The guy who was on the floor,
he couldn’t see. He was literally blind. He was like, “I can’t see, I can’t see.” So, wewere there trying to work through that, and I was going “look, look, come on mate
you we’ve got to get up, we’ve got to get in. We’ve come this far, [inaudible] you
can’t just walk away” but, to say the truth, walking away probably would be moredangerous than trying to keep getting in”.
4.5.83. While the Panel concludes that these munitions were deployed primarily

104 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 2 – Appendix, V.8
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against the large group of locals involved in the attempted breach of gate Z,
footage and eyewitness accounts clearly indicate that these were used in confinedareas already densely populated by supporters otherwise peacefully queueing togain entry. The use of such munitions, particularly on the concourse around gate X,
significantly increased the dangers from crushes. Video footage shows temporary
fencing bent through pressures caused from supporters trying to escape 105 .
4.5.84. As Liverpool supporter Dawn Eaton, described to the Panel. “We didn’tknow about the tear gas because why would you even think that that could be athing? But we were just, again, patiently waiting and then, as Paul was saying about
the local folks. We were waiting there and, somebody, like you were saying, there
was somebody filming, I think they might have been Spanish, appeared behind us andhelped us move a couple of the fence Panels back a bit to give us a little bit more
space because it was starting to get like crushed and everybody sort of breathe a little
bit when they helped us move these, so that everybody had a little bit more room
because, as I say, there weren’t even any gates open where we were waiting”106 .
4.5.85. The Panel concludes that the deployment of tear gas in this confined location
was completely inappropriate as it was both life threatening and disproportionate, andit should have been obvious to any competent police commander that its use insuch circumstances would be dangerous to supporters legitimately and peacefully
trying to watch a football match. As FFF representative noted: “the consequences,
they are the Liverpool supporters. Who are so many - 100% of the guys of the fansof Liverpool with real tickets, who are so peaceful. It was incredible”.
4.5.86. In addition, to the deployment of gas, the Panel concludes that individual
police officers inside the outer perimeter in the vicinity of gates Y and Z also usedpepper spray targeted directly against ticketed supporters otherwise peacefully
queueing on the concourse, simply verbally remonstrating with police about theiruse of force or compliantly entering through the turnstiles with legitimate tickets.
Regardless of the underlying rationale for these interventions, the Panel judgesthat there was no justification for the use of this weaponry and its deployment wasalso entirely disproportionate and inconsistent with the model of policing agreed
within the Saint-Denis Convention.
4.5.87. While the difficulties entering through the turnstiles were particularly
acute, such experiences were not isolated to the south of the stadium. Eyewitness
105 — Video footage from UEFA’s Broadcaster Partners (publication not authorised)
106 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 2 – Appendix, V.880

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and sponsor accounts also describe gate closures, delays, and incursions bylocals to the north. Liverpool supporter Daniel Nicolson described to the Panel
his experiences trying to enter through gate A. “At gate A there were hundreds
and hundreds and hundreds of hundreds of people, sort of lined up queuing to
get in. This is when I first noticed, the gathering of people that, were clearly not
Liverpool fans and they, I’ve got enough experience of Paris to be able to say withconfidence, but not without any judgment, there was a huge gathering of people
from the local North African Community, so, I’ve spent enough time around SaintDenis to know the make-up of the population and there was a significant amountof people that, I feel, were from that local community. Without tickets. Trying togain access to the stadium, basically so they’d obviously broke through the firstline or second line even, of police checks, they broke through the external security,and they were in that internal part before the final ticket check, and they were justdoing anything by any means possible to get into that stadium.”4.5.88. Due to the delays in supporters being able to access through the various
gates, a decision was eventually made to delay the kick-off of the match. We deal
with this decision later in the report so do not discuss in any detail here other than
to note that the decision was not communicated to supporters queueing outside.
4.5.89. As a Liverpool supporter described to the Panel. “We came out of thequeue and tried to get at the side. We walked down to the next gate and that wasclosed. We walked to the gate before and that was closed with riot police acrossit. So, those gates were closed. Uhm… just got my notes here just so that, wephoned home to see what was happening and they said, “they’re saying the matchis delayed because Liverpool fans are late.” I said, “well, we’ve been here, sort of, 2
and a half, three hours.” They said, “that’s what was coming out on the telly.”
4.5.90. Eventually, the supporters queueing at the gates appear to have largely
managed to access the stadium, with the last supporters entering at 22:10. As
we analyse in subsequent chapters, the Panel has found no evidence to support
widely shared assertions that there were upwards of thirty thousand ticketless
supporters outside once those queuing had entered.
4.5.91. The Panel noted that the transport networks reported an increased numberof people who travelled back to central Paris during the period of the match,however it is also noted that UEFA have confirmed that about 2,700 supporters
with valid tickets were not recorded as entering the stadium. We cannot confirm if
these supporters were unable to access the stadium or withdrew because of the
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dangers they had encountered. Nonetheless there is a clear inference that most ofthem would have left Saint-Denis to return to central Paris, we assume largely by rail.
4.5.92. Inside the stadium the fact that many locals had managed to get inside
was apparent from multiple eyewitness accounts of people occupying seats forwhich they did not have tickets.
4.5.93. As Liverpool supporter Tony Fitzgerald explained to the Panel. “So, between,
I would say, 20:30 and when the game eventually kicked off at 21:30’ish, there was aconstant battle between Liverpool fans eventually getting into the ground and saying
to these locals who taken the seats, “you’re in my seat mate.” And it was constant,like, they’d move off, but then as more and more people came in there was less andless seats for them to go into, and bit by bit there was more and more confrontation.
Now, just after they had announced the fact that the game was going to be delayed.
In the kerfuffle, I was on the end of the row. I end up being dragged down 10 flightsof steps on my back. Purely because there was chaos going on, the stewards weren’t
doing anything. There were people coming in. There were people standing in thesteps. There’s just a constant flow of aggravations – the best description of it”.
4.5.94. As the match concluded, police in full protective equipment deployedpitch side. The UEFA event risk assessment indicated a high risk of pitch invasion
by Liverpool supporters. From interviews with UEFA staff, it is apparent that thiswas a linguistic error, and was meant to indicate the risk of incursion by individuals
rather than a mass invasion.
4.5.95. Whether even that risk assessment was correct is questionable, however
it evidently led to a substantial misdirection of police resources. As supporters
departed the stadium, many were confronted, once again, with hostility, violence,and robbery from locals, against which they were not afforded police protection.
4.5.96. As Neil Atkinson described to the Panel: “Got onto the footprints of thestadium outside the grounds. Could not for the life of me work out how to get
off the footprints of the stadium. It’s dark. It’s not very well lit there’s groups
wandering around, there’s gangs wandering rounds, there’s young people runningaround. We went to an underpass, and it was another kettle job with riot vans andpolice and railings of some description moving you to an exit and when we got tothe exit it was full of French riot police with the Shields in front of them.”107

107 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 3 – Appendix, V.8
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4.5.97. LDSA Chair Ted Morris also experienced similar problems as he moved
toward the rail station to return to central Paris via RER B: “It was the most terrifying
experience I’ve had following Liverpool football club in 41 years and it was 400
meters of sheer hell with everyone running for their lives… Wife’s terrified, she’s
still traumatized by the events of it. There wasn’t one policeman, there wasn’t one
policeman in that 400 meters from the underpass to when we got to the station.
The first time we saw a policeman, sounds pathetic to say this with nearly 60 yearsof age, I said to my wife, “it’ll be alright, there’s the police” and then the police
just started pepper spraying and gassing people and it was like “what?”. So, quite
upset by this time. Got to the accessible lift, we make them take us up to theplatform, got in the platform and this man is there with this 7-year-old girl, eyes
streaming from the tear gassing, in absolute [inaudible]. I’ll never forget that aslong as I live. Then there were two bangs, which must’ve been the cans, the teargas hitting the wall, we didn’t know that and, as naïve as this sounds, we thought
it was a bomb. We thought the station was being bombed, it was absolutely
terrifying, I’m not ashamed to say it. But then at the same time we start panicking
about our 24 and 25-year-old daughters. I got lifted onto the train, the train filled
up pretty quick and just left that ground… I’m just glad to get back to Gare duNord, get to the old town, and I’m just glad to be alive”.
4.5.98. Once again, such circumstances were not isolated to the south of
the stadium. Real Madrid supporters departing to the north also described
experiencing hostility and police inaction. Emilio Dumas described his post-match
experiences: “And after leaving the stadium, near the underground entrance wesaw again, local thieves molesting fans and without any reaction from the police.
The police were there but they didn’t do anything. In our case, the buses andprivate cars were parked almost 3 kilometres away. It was a frightening road for
Madrid fans, and many found their cars vandalized and the baggage stolen and soon”.108
4.5.99. Julian García Arribas also described how in the face of these threats heand others formed large defensive groups to move to places of safety: “Because
we have that problem, we knew the problem, so we decided to be... we talk toeach other, “OK, wait for us, wait for us. We go all together because we don’t wantto have any problem. Be careful, be careful.” We phoned other friends because we
knew that they were there so, they come with us because there is this problem, ok.
And we don’t really have any problem to get to the bus because we were about

108 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10
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maybe 30, 30 friends between 20 and 45, all of them men and so, I think we weredifficult for them to be the people who were stolen. But I could see… Ok, when
we go at the end of the match, the streets were full of police, a lot of police andpossibly the final where I could see more police, but they were doing anything,anything. I see a case where; some Real Madrid supporters were stolen, and they
run to catch the person who stole their thing. They caught them then the policecaught the Real Madrid supporter and let the other one go, like this. Some ofthe police were smiling, I could see the police talking one to each other like this,nothing happened, and they were smiling when people were really, really, afraid”.109
4.5.100. In addition, the Real Madrid supporters leaving from the north did socollectively because the bulk of them had stayed on to see their team lift thetrophy. Consequently, as they tried to depart across the narrow footbridge someexperienced significant dangers simply because of the inadequacy of the infrastructure for handling mass egress.
4.5.101. Emilio Dumas described his movement away from the stadium as hewalked over the Passerelle de l’Écluse. “Well, after the match my side is OK. It was
the winning one. But I must say that we were very worried because we had to leavethis stadium, and nobody was reassured. As I say we have to go again through thisgangway, it was very narrow and with rather low banisters at both sides. It was amouse trap. And anyone could have fallen in the canal underneath, the people
were pushing each other, I was really afraid for the children and the elderly and theelderly people who was there and people walking with crutches, whatever. And
I thought that if one single person had stumbled there and then, we could havegone through a second Hillsborough tragedy. I was very afraid for my friends andfor the people, for the supporters and for myself. And again, there was no police
either. The CRS, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, kept themselves
down the staircase, but they were of no help. The only thing they kept saying was,“get moving.” I have never seen a police force so unhelpful and passive.”.
4.5.102. We conclude our account of events that occurred during planning and on
match day and turn next to the Panel’s analysis of why events materialised in this way.

109 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.1084

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5. The Clubs
5.1. Introduction
5.1.1. The Panel has always considered the views of the finalist clubs – Real Madrid
CF and Liverpool FC – to be important to the Review, because they were partly
involved in the planning stages, and due to their proximity to and understanding of
their supporters.
5.1.2. The cooperation of Liverpool FC has greatly assisted the inquiry. For reasonsof its own, Real Madrid CF did not give a substantive response to our requests for
information. Supporters of both clubs have provided invaluable testimonies, which
the Panel has analysed and integrated into the narrative in Chapter 4.
5.2. Liverpool Football Club
5.2.1. The Panel interviewed senior executives and operational managers from
Liverpool FC, in Liverpool, on 25 September 2022. A wide range of topics relevantto the review were discussed and the club was able to offer its perspective on theplanning and circumstances surrounding the final in Paris.
5.2.2. Of particular help was the collation by the club of supporter testimonials,
which have been provided in full to the review. In their written evidence, LFC
highlighted the importance to the club of requesting a full and transparent
investigation into what happened in Paris. Central to this was the club being
proactive in asking supporters to put forward their own testimonies throughthe club. They note: “Supporters testimonials, we felt, were essential to any
independent investigation process and therefore immediately on landing at
Liverpool airport from Paris, Billy Hogan, Chief Executive recorded a video
message for supporters.”110
5.2.3. Following this call by the CEO over 8,500 written submissions werereceived. More than 700 were analysed by LFC and all have been made available
to the Independent Review. In addition, a comprehensive and in-depth analysis
of supporter accounts was conducted by Professor Scraton and others (2022),
and the Panel has drawn from that report. Furthermore, the Panel carried out an
extensive series of supporter interviews.

110 — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18 (p. 371)
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5.2.4. In this section, the Panel focusses on the evidence gathered during
interview with five senior executives of LFC on 25 September 2022.
5.2.5. During the course of interview, the club was asked if its candour in providing
information that circa 50,000 ticketless supporters would travel to Paris could
have had an adverse, unintended effect.
5.2.6. In response LFC said: “I think yes, I do - speaking openly - yeah, I do. I
think it’s a problem for us that being that open. I think if you take the 20,000
ticketed supporters, let’s say, that we get 20,000 allocation and then you’ve got
45 to 50,000 supporters without tickets. That’s 75,000 people. 75,000 footballsupporters descending onto a city it’s seen as a huge problem, despite the factthat there is no evidence of any disorder when we travel on mass, there’s certainly
no history of disorder between Real Madrid and the Liverpool fans.”111
5.2.7. LFC continued: “I feel our objective has always been to be as transparent
as possible about the numbers that will arrive, whether with a ticket or without
a ticket to enjoy the city, because it’s absolutely critical that a plan is in place toaccommodate that number of fans and as [LFC] points out, we just don’t believethat those numbers can’t be accommodated with an appropriate plan.”112
5.2.8. UEFA, FFF and other stakeholders complained to the Panel of the apparent
lack of information coming from LFC regarding the precise number and travelplans of its supporters. In principle, the Panel agrees with UEFA that clubs have a
responsibility to the organisers but moreover to their own supporters to optimise
the amount of information provided. The more accurate the information, the easier
it will be for arrangements to be made for extra travel capacity, accommodationand facilities, including ‘fan zones’ and information points. Indeed, the Panel
understands that this sort of assistance is already required by UEFA regulations,and it is an important feature within the 2016 Convention.
5.2.9. Therefore, the Panel has no difficulty with the proposition that Clubs
should be under a duty to collect as much information and data as is reasonably
possible, on the numbers of their supporters who are likely to travel to majorinternational fixtures, and their arrangements, as this has obvious benefits to the
supporters and organisers alike. The Panel also note that supporters enjoy the
111 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1697)
112 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1698)
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same freedom of movement as the rest of the population. Sharing personal travelor accommodation details can therefore only be expected on a voluntary basis
and in line with GDPR and national data protection regulations. The supporterorganisations, including Spirit of Shankly and the LDSA have close communication
and relations with LFC and these are the channels by which this information may
be collated. Merseyside Police also contribute intelligence as they did on thisoccasion. However, the Panel noted that LFC could have better prepared the fan
experience and the club acknowledged to us the need to evaluate arrangements
for fans during their site visits to future host venues.113
5.2.10. However, the Panel notes from its examination of the evidence, that the
LFC estimate of 70,000 LFC supporters travelling to Paris for the final - 20,000
with tickets, 50,000 without – was largely accurate 114 . Furthermore, the Panel
recognises that a feature of the Liverpool supporter base is that many prefer totravel independently and do so from across the world to attend fixtures of thescale and prestige of UCLF. The phenomenon of masses of supporters travellingto host cities without tickets is not universal but neither is it confined to LFC. It
is a fact of modern football, and it should be embraced. The UCLF should beconsidered a festival of football in the host city and not simply a match within astadium. As the 2016 Convention requires, proper facilities to welcome travelling
supporters should be an integral part of the planning process.
5.2.11. The need for the organisers of UCLF22 to make appropriate plans toaccommodate the large number of supporters travelling to Paris to enjoy theexperience and celebrate their identity with others, was emphasised by LFC intheir evidence to the panel. LFC expressed their frustration that in Paris “it wasquite difficult and quite late to actually get [a fan zone] agreed.” LFC consideredthat there should have been much earlier and better planning for how the fanzone would operate, and where it would be. Fan zones have been a successful
feature repeated and improved across multiple UEFA events and finals over recent
years. LFC asserted that the organization of fan zones should be a standard partof planning for a final and it did not believe that was the case in Paris. “Although,obviously, when the point was understood and agreed, I think the authorities did
react very quickly to assist.”115
5.2.12. The concerns expressed by LFC on the late organization of the fan zone at
113 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6 (p. 1859); Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1803)
114 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1690)
115 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1695)
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Cours de Vincennes, were echoed by Richard Bouigue, Deputy Mayor of the 12th
Arrondissement in Paris which was the host to this facility.
5.2.13. In evidence to the Review, Richard Bouigue stated: “For example, we found it
difficult to get concrete answers to our questions about the organisation of this fanzone. That is to say: where it would be located, the opening hours, the link that there
would be between this fan zone and the surroundings, i.e., the shops, the neighbours,
the local residents, and in particular the presence of a weekly food market which isheld on the Cours de Vincennes, on the side of the 12th Arrondissement, and which
we didn’t know whether it could be maintained or not. There were also concerns
about the information on what would be happening inside the fan zone. For along time, we didn’t have clear information from the Préfecture de Police. This
information even went against the information from UEFA concerning the presence,or not, of giant screens to broadcast animations and to broadcast the match when
it started. There were, still, three days before, from memory, indications on thewebsite of the Préfecture de Police that there would not necessarily be a screen.”116
5.2.14. In the Position Statement provided by UEFA, it was confirmed that: “Fanmeeting points were announced on 25th May, immediately after information wasprovided by FFF and UEFA communication greenlighted by FFF/public authorities.”
It goes on to state: “Approval from FFF/public authorities to communicate thematch screening for non-ticket holders in the Liverpool Fan Meeting Point was only
received on MD afternoon, at which point the message was pushed across UEFAchannels and shared with Liverpool FC.”
5.2.15. The Panel notes the earlier evidence suggesting that the fan zone wasestablished once English teams were likely to qualify and then primarily as ameans to address fears of a public order problem rather than as a means ofwelcoming supporters, with or without tickets, to the city. We assume the delay incommunicating that the fan zone would be available was, at least in part, due toassumptions that such knowledge might encourage more fans to attend adding to
the perceived difficulties that might be faced. We concur with the view that wherefans are expected to travel in number that fan zones/meeting points should beembedded as early as possible into the planning process. Information about theiravailability should also be disseminated at the earliest opportunity. They should
not, as appear to have happened in the present case, be a casualty of dispute orpoor cooperation between different local stakeholders.

116 — Meeting with Richard Bouigue – Appendix, V.13
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5.2.16. This interoperability failure is evidenced in the testimony of 12th
Arrondissement Deputy Mayor, Richard Bouigue, “The choice of the Coursde Vincennes, that is to say, the site that hosted the Liverpool fan zone wasmade by the Préfecture de Police but against or, in any case, without the initialapproval of the City of Paris, since the City of Paris and the Town Hall of the 12tharrondissement would have preferred other sites than this one. It should be notedthat this site had never before been chosen to host an event of this type, it wasa first, and that therefore it was not necessarily our initial preference. And this infact created organisational problems between the institutions themselves oncethe choice of site had been made. Obviously, there was a desire for things to go
as smoothly as possible, but for all that, there were dysfunctions that we might nothave had in other circumstances,”
5.2.17. Amongst other issues which were of importance to the club were themisconceptions upon which the risk assessments informing policing strategy werebased. Of particular note was the flawed intelligence referred to in the report of
the DIGES 117, which stated: “Because police’s responsibility had been pointed out inthe 1989 Hillsborough disaster (97 deaths) authorities decided to design a strong
police build up to maintain order. They wanted to be able to counter a possible
phenomenon of hooliganism and destruction as had happened in the 13 June 2016
England v Russia match in Marseille.”
5.2.18. When asked their opinion of this comment, LFC responded: “Absolute
outrage. Outrage. Because well, let’s deal with the Hillsborough issue. They’ve
conflated hooliganism with Hillsborough, and we don’t need to revisit that path.
It’s such a calamitous error of judgment, it beggars’ belief. Absolutely beggars’
belief. We’ve reiterated a number of occasions the profile of our football fan isthey will come, they will celebrate their team, they will support their team, they will
enjoy your city, and they will go home. It can’t be any simpler than that. So, that asplanning assumption, it’s absolutely outrageous. That was never challenged at thestart and never was it ever discussed with us.”118
5.2.19. The panel had already noted the inappropriateness of the police strategy
as commented by the DIGES, and this issue is covered elsewhere in this report.
The Panel concludes that basing a policing operation on such a flawed and

117 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
124)
118 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1719)
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prejudicial misconception was not just a remarkable failure by the Préfecture, butalso a substantial failure by the DIGES, UEFA and FFF for apparently not realising,challenging and escalating what was clearly an inappropriate policing approach.
5.2.20. Further to this, LFC commented on their concerns that the safety andsecurity focus was based upon disorder rather than on what the actual intelligence
provided by Merseyside Police and the Club presented: “I think the mindset to havereferred to an event which happened over 30 years ago, which has been proven tohave nothing to do with hooliganism and, frankly, nothing to do with the behaviourof the fans, I think just, absolutely beggars belief and, from our perspective, we
couldn’t have been, more outraged and more offended on behalf of the families,
on behalf of our fan base and on behalf of the club and the reputational damage
that comments like that continue to do to Liverpool and, frankly, to our fans,
but also, to supporters more widely. It’s unbelievably outrageous to have madethose comments. So, I’m thankful that you’ve raised them because the fact thatsomeone who is responsible for the event to be referencing something like that,a) incorrectly and b) that is 30 plus years ago, and that was part of their mindset isoutrageous.”119
5.2.21. LFC expressed deep concern about a different but related matter:messaging. In announcing the delay to kick-off, UEFA caused a message to be
displayed on the giant screens in the stadium indicating that the delay was due
to late arrival of supporters. The Panel has discussed this issue in chapter 7, but
it is important to record the concern of LFC and its supporters at this erroneous
message.
5.2.22. The LFC written evidence lists several key themes from supporter
testimonies, amongst which is mentioned:120 “The emotional impact of theincorrect reason for delayed kick-off being displayed in the stadium despite theissues many supporters had endured to get into the stadium. Some supporters
reference that this had echoes of the post Hillsborough narrative which heightened
the emotional impact for them both on the night and post-match (especially sinceUEFA did not remove this statement from their website for a number of days after
the event).
5.2.23. In the same vein, LFC in interview stated:121 “Between 21:00 and 21:20,
119 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1725)
120 — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18
121 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1754)
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I was pitch side and spoke to (UEFA Official) and told him forcibly that thecommunications channels had broken down and the decision-making process
was a mess and that the comments blaming the late arrival of fans for the delay
was untrue, as things had been shambolic outside when I arrived at 18:30. The
message was on the big screen and was being read out over the tannoy. He
eventually denied that that was what was being said and, at this point, it had gone
off the big screen. I then had a small discussion with him saying that was thecomments that were being put out by UEFA. He denied this, saying it wasn’t. In
almost comic timing, they then read it out over the tannoy, and it came up on the
big screen. At this point I’d started to walk away from him, at which point I turned
around, pointed at the big screen to him and he looked... well, he was incredibly
apologetic and embarrassed and held his hands up and said, I’m so, sorry, and I
said, well, I swore about what the messaging that was on the screen, I won’t repeat
it, but I swore and he clearly acknowledged that it was clear that he didn’t believethat was the communications that UEFA were putting out. And then it came on the
big screen.”
5.2.24. In explaining the sensitivities for LFC supporters around this messaging,
LFC explained that: “It was a narrative that was pedalled around Hillsborough,around late arrival of fans, fans that had been drinking and that didn’t have tickets.
It doesn’t stand up, that’s been proven by very vigorous reports into Hillsborough.
That wasn’t what contributed to the disaster. It was... it’s nonsensical. So, it seems
that the default position and why I think supporters get so disenchanted andwary of these figures is that its automatic position is blame the supporters, inthe interim, blame the supporters. Everything will be the supporters’ fault. The
supporters have a right to turn up to the stadium and expect to be able to enjoy anexperience. The default position, whenever something goes wrong seems to be
blame the supporters. It will be a supporter problem”122
5.2.25. The Panel agrees. Hillsborough occurred in the UK, but it remains the worst
sporting disaster in Europe in living memory. No one involved in the planning ofa major football match has any excuse for believing it was a disaster caused orcontributed to by the actions of supporters. Those responsible for the safety andsecurity of UCLF22 were right to consider whether supporters of either finalists
were likely to present a threat to security or safety. Hillsborough occurred morethan 33 years ago. UEFA and the French authorities had ample evidence andintelligence available to them from recent seasons from which to consider their

122 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1756)
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risk assessments. That evidence, from match delegates, UEFA Security Officers,
Merseyside police, and the UK NFIP, comprehensively showed that LFC supporters
did not engage in significant public disorder, or raise other abnormal safety or
security issues. The only relevant information was that LFC has a huge following,
including from places outside the UK, and many of their supporters would travel tothe host city even if they did not have tickets for the match. That was informationthat should have been embraced and managed, not by deploying riot police, butwith facilities befitting a showpiece festival of football.
5.2.26. The Panel has concluded, without hesitation, that referencing Hillsboroughwith respect to the policing approach was an appalling error, which should nothave been made. In addition, this error was amplified by publishing messages
blaming ‘late’ supporters for the delayed kick-off, which was not only untrue, but
was obviously going to offend and traumatise LFC supporters. The Panel accepts
UEFA’s explanation that it did not set out to do so, but the messaging represented
both a casual disregard for the truth and a lack of understanding of the supporterbase they were responsible for managing. UEFA senior managers should haveunderstood the way the message would resonate with well-known issues
surrounding the Hillsborough disaster and subsequent cover-up. Many survivors
from Hillsborough were at the Paris events.
5.2.27. Several concerns about risk assessments were highlighted by LFC. The clubnoted that as well as the risk to public order wrongly perceived by police, theirsupporters were wrongly assessed by UEFA as presenting a high risk of pitch invasion.
5.2.28. LFC stated: “I mean, the pitch invasion stuff is remarkable. I mean, maybe
lower league clubs, Anfield, it’s just not a thing. It’s, it’s almost self-policed. You
know, the fans don’t accept it. And yet there was this mindset of pitch invasions,
really high risk, ticketless supporters, really high risk. To us, there is a strong
chance, so, a high risk of ticketless supporters. What risk those supporters thenpose is a different question. But there will be ticketless fans. That doesn’t meanthat those fans are going to storm the gate, are going to attack people, going torampage through the city. They will just be ticketless fans who come to enjoy thecity. But that’s not a problem or a negative.”123
5.2.29. LFC highlighted concerns that this aspect of the UEFA event risk
assessment was not discussed with them until it was presented at the UEFA MD-2

123 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1717)
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Security meeting. In the Position Statement submitted to the Review, LFC referredto this meeting:124 “The UEFA-organised meeting was approximately ninety minutes
long but took on the form of a formal presentation from the UEFA Security Officer
with only a short time allocated to Clubs to ask questions. LFC had concerns
regarding some of the information that was contained in the risk assessment
section of the meeting, as the information appeared to have been taken out ofcontext, for example, “Pitch invasions” were deemed to be highly likely and highrisk. LFC pointed out that only minor incidents of “pitch invasions” were evidenced
through the club’s previous comparable fixtures (e.g., an individual entering thefield of play after the final whistle to obtain a souvenir) and that in fact mass pitch
incursions by large groups of supporters was something our supporters would
actively be against. Similarly, we noted that Real Madrid had similar misgivings
about some of the subjects contained within the risk assessments.”
5.2.30. The dissatisfaction with the risk assessment process was articulated
further by LFC during the interview: “I know we’re going to talk about risk
assessment, but the first time we get presented with risk assessment for the event
is at the match day minus two security meeting. And we’ve never had an input for
that, as to that risk present itself, what are your plans to deal with it? And if we goback to the ticketless fans and the tourist fans travelling. At quarter-finals stage,
those discussions should have been had to mitigate that risk and they weren’t,or they were, and they were dismissed. It was a point raised when we got to thefinalists’ meeting.”125
5.2.31. Taken together, it is evident that LFC were of the view that an erroneousand inaccurate approach to risk assessment had contributed to the overall
approach taken by authorities to the match. As they stated: “I think the difficultywith the risk assessment and the challenge of it is we didn’t really understandwhere they had got the information from. So, we didn’t feel we had fed into thatprocess. So, we challenged, no problem, we’ll change the colouring of it. And,so, to us, I think it’s almost a case of, in hindsight now, we could perhaps havesaid how much of what happened was based on that risk assessment? But,
given we hadn’t really fed into that, we hadn’t been asked about pitch invasions
particularly, we had raised, you might get the odd individual go on for a photo ora shirt at the end of a match, you know? But because we hadn’t really fed into it,it was difficult to know, have you based any of your practices and policies around
this? Because we haven’t fed into it. And then we challenged it, and it was like,
124 — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18
125 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1700)
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OK, no problem, we’ll change it. So, it felt like, this doesn’t seem a very, I don’t
want to say important document, but yeah, valid. It was almost just a colour chartof this is what we’ve identified and both sides go, no, no, no. OK, we’ll changeit, no problem. Well, if that’s a risk assessment that you’ve based things on thatthe police are reacting to, you wouldn’t just change it. There would be a level ofconversation, but this, it was just accepted. OK, no problem, we’ll change it. So,
then it was, we’ve not fed into this. They’ve changed it on our request. It mustnot be a particularly important table that they’ve based any of their policies orprocedures around, really.”126
5.2.32. The Panel later established during interview with the UEFA Safety andSecurity Unit, that the identified risk should not have been one of pitch invasion
but rather pitch incursion. The former relates to an incident with a mass of people
and the latter to an incident with an individual. The mistake was explained by theUEFA Safety and Security Unit as one of linguistics: confusion with the English
language terminology.
5.2.33. The panel shares the dissatisfaction of LFC regarding the format of
the UEFA Security Meeting on MD-2 and the misrepresentation within the risk
assessment. Despite the admission by UEFA that there was a mistake in language
over pitch invasions, the Panel is in no doubt that this mistake, left uncorrected,
was a direct influence on the decision by police to deploy a significant number ofofficers in front of LFC supporter sections inside the stadium towards the end of
the match. Given the subsequent eyewitness testimony of post-match attacks bylocals on both LFC and Real Madrid supporters (described elsewhere in this report)
outside the stadium, the Panel can only conclude that these police resources,
apparently deployed in response to erroneous risk assessment, would have been
better utilized outside the stadium protecting the egress of supporters.
5.2.34. As LFC stated in evidence to the Panel: “post-match, we’ve got somehorrific stories of things that happened to our fans and we’ve got hundreds ofriot police blocking our fans in, that could have been outside assisting fans, Real
Madrid fans as well as Liverpool fans, let’s be quite clear on. And we had hundredsof riot police protecting the pitch, and no one assisting supporters leaving thestadium who were just picked off and left the night, if you will.”127
5.2.35. The LFC were also critical of the reluctance of FFF to allow 50 stewards
126 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1709)
127 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1715)
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supplied by LFC to be deployed outside the stadium perimeter fence to assist with
communication to supporters on the emerging situation: “I had stewards deployedinside to welcome our fans in and direct them to whichever area inside thestadium. But we weren’t permitted to go outside. And this all comes back to how
this crisis was managed along the timeline, because, in my own view, is if the rightcommand and control structure had been in place, that would’ve been an option
for us to deploy at the transport hub to start speaking to our supporters which iswhat our stewards would have done.” 128
5.2.36. The Panel was told by LFC that a request by their stewarding manager toutilize the 50 LFC stewards outside the stadium perimeter fence was refused bya local stewarding manager on the ground without being referred to the stadium
control room.129
5.2.37. The Panel finds the absence of integration of the 50 LFC stewards into
the local stadium operation unsatisfactory. It was a missed opportunity. UEFA
Safety and Security Regulations 2019, Article 24, creates an obligation on visiting
clubs that stewards must be provided to accompany and assist the travelling
supporters130. As that document states: “These stewards provide a liaison point
for the match organisers, public authorities and supporters and assist supporters
during journeys to and from the venue and at the match.”
5.2.38. In the experience of the Panel, it is normal for the respective clubs’
stewards to be integrated into the stadium match day operation, alongsidedomestic stewards, in particular to facilitate active communication withvisiting supporters. The Panel concludes from the testimony of LFC that the
failure to optimise the use of the LFC stewards represents a further example ofinteroperability failure in addition to those evidenced elsewhere in this report.
5.2.39. LFC also commented on the refusal to allow their Security Director accessto the stadium control room during the operation. In evidence, he stated thatduring the emerging crisis before the match he attempted to enter the control
room but was denied access and was only permitted to enter after intervention
by the UEFA Project Leader. In the experience of the Panel, it would be normal
for both the stewarding deployment and the control room access to have been
decided in advance at either the MD-2 Security meeting or the MD Organizational
128 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1738)
129 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1737)
130 — UEFA Safety and Security Regulations (Article 24.02)
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meeting. It would appear that at UCLF22 this was not the case, exemplifying theextent to which the safety and security operation systematically excluded key
stakeholders who would have been important for improving decision making andcommunication during the crisis that emerged.
5.2.40. The Panel fully discussed ticketing matters during the interview, with mostof the discussion centred on LFC’s preference to have paper tickets as opposed
to digital tickets. The Panel decided to treat these issues as a separate theme in a
dedicated section of Chapter Seven, given the controversy this has generated.
5.2.41. Liverpool FC officials provided accounts of their experiences of arrivalat various times at the stadium and their subsequent experiences of the periodleading up to the delayed kick-off. They describe increasing tensions outside thestadium and a pressing need for action to be taken to delay the kick-off of thematch. Cumulatively their accounts point towards a breakdown in communication
and a breakdown of coherent crisis management, and consequently a failure byanyone to react to a situation which was spiralling out of control.
5.2.42. The comments of these officials included:· “At about 18:30, I was on the outskirts, I could see the stadium. It was hundreds ofyards from me. It was chaotic. And I said in the car a few times to my colleagues,
there’s something not right here. The number of supporters that were in the vicinity,
no one was moving, and things looked problematic. That was at 18:30. It clearly wasn’t
something that was just evolving. It was there. There was a problem already”.
· “It was at the Liverpool end of the stadium, the opposite side for the Presidential
Box. And I started to make my way around and you could see that there were
problems, and I was becoming quite concerned at this point, probably about
19:20, half seven, I begun to make my way around.”· “So, the reality of it is, as a senior leadership group, we started to become aware
after 20:00 that there were significant issues and that was really from [the CEO]’s own
experience coming via comments within the VIP lounge. I managed to get a holdof [LFC rep] in the control room at around about 20:15, and that was the first time,
as a senior leadership group, that we’d had any kind of briefing that there was an issue.
It was shortly after that I spoke to [LFC rep] again. We very quickly decided that
we needed to request to delay kick-off. It seemed like the most obvious or criticalthing that we could perhaps influence. And we decided to split up and, but [theCEO] went up into the VIP lounge and I focused on talking to [LFC rep] in the match
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day control room. And we took that decision because we’d assumed that match
day control was failing. It seemed obvious that that must be the case, because
we’d heard nothing, and the situation was so significant. It appeared to be the case- the way to formally request in match day control a delay to kick-off around 20:25.”· “The next sort of 10, 15 minutes went by and then I was told by [LFC reps] thatthey were having trouble, or they couldn’t communicate that kick-off had been
delayed outside. So, the people weren’t aware that they had, potentially had, moretime than they thought. And they, obviously, as the time wears on and people
have been there for two and a half, three hours in certain cases, they’re obviously
getting really desperate. I wasn’t aware at that point, yet, about the tear gassing
and the pepper spray and then the next conversation that I had with Giorgio[Marchetti] was actually after 21:00 and he said, at that point, we’re going forward
at 21:30. And I said, OK, is that safe? That we figured what’s happening outside,that this, you know, is everything under control? And he said, well, let me go checkon that, and then I never saw him again and we kicked that off at, I don’t knowwhat time was, 21:36, 21:35, something like that.”
5.2.43. The elected Mayor of the Liverpool City Region, Steve Rotheram, who
himself survived Hillsborough, was pickpocketed outside the ground, losing his VIP
pass, wallet and phone.
5.2.44. In his written statement to the Panel, he described his approach to thestadium: “My experience was highly distressing though I was, in a sense, one of
the lucky ones. I was not assaulted; I was not dangerously kettled by the police.
I was not tear gassed and I was not pepper sprayed. I have personally spoken
to others who were – and whose experiences were extremely frightening. With
the help of a police officer I was able to make it into the ground, passing by thequeuing fans who were waiting patiently to go to the turnstile area. On my way, I
witnessed chaotic scenes and what appeared to be a breakdown in policing, withfans left to self-steward.”131
5.2.45. As a Liverpool supporter who had experienced Hillsborough, Steve Rotheram,“still shocked at some of the scenes and worried about my fellow fans” attempted
to impress the need for an appropriate response on those present in the VIP area,
including the UEFA President, but he was unable to gain a meaningful response.
5.2.46. Ian Byrne, graphically recalled: “There was very clearly a palpable feeling
131 — Metropolitan Mayor of Liverpool City Region, Steve Rotheram, Position Statement - Appendix, IV.21
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of fear and terrifying déjà vu for LFC supporters of my generation. I was 16 at thetime of Hillsborough and 50 at the time of Paris, but when I witnessed the scenesof fans being crushed against the railings at the turnstiles in gate Z, including many
women and children, it chilled my soul. I was instantly taken back to Leppings Laneand April 15th 1989. I feared contemplating the potential scale of what could unfold
in Paris because so many people were suffering the same experiences around thestadium. I feared a loss of life greater than at Hillsborough. Panic began setting
in and I considered what I could do to help, both as an elected representativeof Parliament and as a Hillsborough survivor. I felt a profound duty of care to myfellow supporters, but I felt helpless. I did however take confidence from and pridein the absolutely magnificent behaviour of the Liverpool supporters, who kept calm
despite the worst provocation I’ve ever seen at a football match by the people who
were supposed to be in control of the event.”132
5.2.47. In concluding the LFC interview, the club voiced the following opinion:“This is the biggest team event in the world, in sports; and the idea that we would
be having a conversation that Paris, one of the cities, one of the world’s greatcities, couldn’t welcome more than 80,000 people, because those were thepeople who got to go to the event, is ridiculous. If you said to Miami or Phoenix or
Minneapolis, which hosted a Super Bowl in the dead of winter, that they could only
have the number of people that would come to that city that had a ticket to thematch, that is madness. This should be a celebration. People should be welcomed,
there should be signage all over the city. Our supporters were told that they
couldn’t wear colours inside the city the afternoon of the match or face getting
fined. That’s not a mind-set that is welcoming people to a city. And I understandthat there are issues around the timing and the selection of Paris, but I would goback to the comment around process. It starts with the decision to award the final
to a city. And if that can’t be defended and it can’t be defended by the people whowork in the organization who made the selection, then there’s a problem.”
5.2.48. The club continued: “I think, you know, the mind-set shift is exactly theright point. And the supporters, the people who are traveling, whether you havea ticket to the game or not, should be at the heart of that mind-set shift. And weshould be thinking about welcoming them and making that experience the bestexperience they can possibly have. It’s supposed to be a celebration, it’s supposed
to be there to be supporting your team.”
5.2.49. The Panel does not disagree.
132 — Member of Parliament for Liverpool West Derby, Ian Byrne, Position Statement - Appendix, IV.22
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6. The Role of Key Stakeholders
6.1. Introduction
6.1.1. This Chapter analyses the evidence related to the role of the key
stakeholders.
6.2. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA): ‘delegation anddeference’ versus ‘interoperability and accountability’
6.2.1. The Panel conducted extensive interviews with senior officers andexecutives, and operational staff at UEFA and UEFA Events SA. As well as theplanning, organisation and operation of the 28th May final, the interviews covered
management and governance, the model operated for the organisation of UCLFs,
and various relevant operational matters. UEFA also provided a written response
to our requests and a significant amount of disclosure of relevant documents. The
Panel is grateful for this assistance.
6.2.2. UEFA is the governing body of European football and a continental
confederation of 55 national associations, recognised as such by FIFA. It isbased at Nyon, Switzerland, and registered as a society in the Swiss register ofcompanies. Amongst other activities, it is a tournament organiser. It organises its
events through a wholly owned subsidiary: UEFA Events SA.
6.2.3. The President of UEFA is Aleksander Čeferin, and its decision-making bodies
are its Congress and Executive Committee. The administration is run by General
Secretary Theodore Theodoridis, and two Deputy-General Secretaries, Giorgio
Marchetti, and Kevin Lamour.
6.2.4. The CEO of UEFA Events SA is Martin Kallen, and its Operations Director is
Sharon Burkhalter-Lau.
6.2.5. Zoran Lakovic is the Director of the UEFA National Associations Division,
which includes the UEFA Safety and Security Operations Unit (S&S Unit). There isalso a Head of Safety and Security Operations and a Safety and Security Advisor,
who was the representative of the S&S Unit in the control room on 28th May 2022.
6.2.6. All of the above-named UEFA senior officers and executives were at the
UCLF22, indicative of this being the annual UEFA flagship event.
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6.2.7. The Panel has interviewed all of the above (with the exception of the
President who chose to reply to questions in writing), and a range of key
operational staff.
6.2.8. As described at Chapter 3, UEFA is the UCLF “event owner”, through UEFA
Events SA. Its model has been to set requirements and standards via a bid process
and subsequent staging agreements, and to delegate or sub-contract planningand operational components of the project to other stakeholders, in particular
the relevant local or ‘host’ federation/association. UEFA Events SA manages each
UCLF through a Project Management team and its Executives, with input fromoperational staff on specific components and issues.
6.2.9. Through its evidence to the French Senate hearings, UEFA has presented
this model in such a way as to avoid accountability for the failures which almost led
to catastrophe. As UEFA would have it, responsibility for public security and safety
was split between FFF and the French policing authorities133, and the actual issues
that arose were caused by a combination of the response to a strike on part ofthe public transport system, a huge number of Liverpool supporters who had faketickets or none at all, unilateral decisions taken by the police on the day, and local
criminals.
6.2.10. The Panel concludes that the public response of UEFA in the aftermathof the problems on the night, and in its subsequent evidence to the Senate wasstriking in its orientation to protect itself, rather than to seek to ensure that nothingsimilar can happen in the future. This continued to be evident in the interviews ofUEFA Events SA executives134 , although as we discuss below, we found a somewhat
different mindset from the General Secretary, his two Deputies and the Director of
National Associations. It was apparent also that UEFA’s S&S Unit, and its external
Security Officers recognised that things must change.
6.2.11. In reality, most of the reputational and financial rewards of a successful
UCLF event accrue to UEFA. It was a serious error for UEFA to assume it could
avoid accountability for a foreseeable near disaster at its flagship event, as the
public reaction has shown.
6.2.12. The current model is one the Panel defines as ‘delegation anddeference’ which stands in contrast to a preferred model of ‘interoperability and
133 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)
134 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)
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accountability’. The former, which casts UEFA as “event owner” and the local
federation as “event organiser”, has a superficial logic. In Paris, FFF has organised
matches at the Stade de France regularly. Constitutionally, the Préfecture andPréfet de Police are responsible for public security and safety. The Consortium
Stade de France operates the stadium. The local authorities control the spaces
which may be used for ‘fan zones’, and other public and private authorities control
the airports and transport networks.
6.2.13. However, from the evidence, the Panel concludes that UEFA is not simply
the “owner”, passing all responsibilities on to an “organiser” or deferring to publicauthorities, but via UEFA Events SA it maintains a substantial measure of control
through its senior management and project team and some operational staff.
For example, UEFA maintains control over most ticketing decisions, including
allocations and whether they are digital or paper, but FFF were formally the agents(primarily for legal and tax reasons) and were responsible for ticket-checking andaccess to the ground. Indeed, FFF used CSDF hardware – scanners and turnstiles– which involved a third partner. The ticketing operation involved joint working –interoperability – and thereby shared responsibilities.
6.2.14. The reality is that UEFA does maintain control over components ofthe project, which illustrates the fallacy that it can avoid consequences andaccountability when things go wrong. We can show this with a simple example.
One of the elements of any UCLF is ensuring that there is a high-quality pitch. In
theory, this will be dealt with by a series of agreements with the host federation,
the venue and contractors. If the final is remembered not for the excitement of
the goals, not for the tactical qualities of the teams, but for the commentatorscomplaining that the pitch was so uneven that the passing of the ball was all but
impossible, then it will be the reputation of UEFA that will be damaged, irrespectiveof where any legal liabilities may lie. Planning and operation of ensuring a pristine
pitch will be contracted but UEFA does strictly monitor its progress and delivery
through its project management.
6.2.15. On 28th May, French police used tear gas and pepper spray on locals andfootball supporters outside the turnstile perimeter, and failed to protect supportersfrom widespread street violence in the vicinity of the stadium. UEFA is entitled to
say that policing is the responsibility of the host State. However, the consequencesof the deployment of such weaponry, and failures to protect supporters, are thathenceforth a festival of football will be seen by supporters, sponsors, broadcasters,
and the wider public as an event which is less accessible, in particular for children,
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and those with disabilities. The constitutional position of security forces in hoststates is unquestioned, however, UEFA has enormous ‘soft power’, and it should use
it to ensure its customers and clients are treated properly and protected. This can beachieved by negotiating guarantees, joined-up planning and interoperability, andinvoking the 2016 CoE Convention, as we have discussed.
6.2.16. What emerges from our interviews is a need for clarity, and an acceptancethat where key components are contracted or delegated, it does not mean that
responsibility can be ignored. That is particularly so with issues of public safety
and customer experience, which rely on stitching together various elements of
the overall project, and ensuring the interoperability of various stakeholders. Thisis irrespective of actual legal liabilities and applies to deference to public authority
powers and responsibilities - such as policing duties - albeit in a different way.
6.2.17. On the evidence, the headline of the model is clear and reasonable: thefinal is a project with multiple components managed by UEFA Events SA. However,
responsibility for the execution of the components is ill-defined, and it is the
Panel’s judgment that this lies at the heart of what went wrong on 28th May 2022.
Of key relevance, the role of UEFA with respect to safety and security, and its
Safety and Security Unit in particular, was entirely unclear.
6.2.18. Giorgio Marchetti, Deputy General Secretary, told us that the S&S Unit wereinvolved in ensuring that the operational plan and its execution were appropriate135 .
That is not borne out by the evidence, but undoubtedly, he is correct that this iswhat should have happened. It was appropriate that UEFA delegated operational
planning to FFF, and deferred to police planning by the Préfecture de Police, but
its S&S Unit should have been fully involved in monitoring and ensuring both wereappropriate and intervened where they were not, or where there were deficits injoined-up working.
6.2.19. The description of UEFA as “event owner” and FFF as “event organiser”
is therefore inappropriate, because UEFA maintained control of key parts of theorganisation of the final. The failures in mobility arrangements, last kilometre
routing, additional perimeter and turnstile access - which all impacted on public
safety and nearly led to catastrophe - were also the responsibility of others, but
UEFA’s overall project was the way that all those strands should have been drawn
together, and problems identified before it was too late.

135 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 736)
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6.2.20. Where it is appropriate to sub-contract, the role of event owner should
only be to monitor, supervise and sign-off. With respect to state responsibilities– for example policing duties – UEFA’s role was to engage and assist, and to
identify problems and escalate where they are not rectified. In short, to ensure allcomponents of the project are covered, all contracts, agreements and warranties
are honoured and executed effectively, and to ensure UEFA is working efficiently
with all other stakeholders. Crucially, UEFA must be able to identify whereinteroperability between other stakeholders is deficient or challenged. That is therole of a responsible event owner, rather than delegation and deference being
misused as a device to avoid liability and reputational damage – and hence avoid
accountability.
6.2.21. The Panel noted that although they stuck to the official UEFA positionon the delegation of responsibilities, and therefore accountability for what went
wrong on 28th May 2022136, the General Secretary and his Deputies (the UEFA seniorleadership team: SLT) recognised that the UEFA model may be flawed. Mr Lamour
commented that this was a debate that had been going on for as long as he had
been at UEFA which was since 2007137 . Mr Theodoridis added: “after situations like
this, the debate starts again”138 .
6.2.22. At the outset of the interview with Mr Lakovic, Director of National
Associations, and the UEFA S&S Unit, the Panel were expressly asked by him toconsider this question, and it was explained that changes had already been madeto ensure the greater involvement of the S&S Unit going forward, and in particularfor UCLF23 in Istanbul139.
6.2.23. UEFA Events SA is a separate legal entity but wholly owned by UEFA. As
stated, Martin Kallen is the CEO and Sharon Burkhalter-Lau is the Operations
Director. Mr Kallen has been at UEFA since 1994, becoming Head of Events in 2002
and later, CEO of UEFA Events SA. Ms Burkhalter-Lau has undertaken several roles
at UEFA since 2004 and has been Operations Director of UEFA Events SA since2016 140. They each played a substantial role in the organisation of UCLF22, andwere at the head of the project management chain. Below them were a range of
operational staff. The relevant operational staff dealt with project management,
ticketing, and mobility.
136 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 722)
137 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 728-729)
138 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 731)
139 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1295-1297)
140 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 773, redacted by UEFA)
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6.2.24. A UCLF is viewed as a project, and the Project Leader is the single person
in charge of managing the event, which means he/she coordinates the UEFAteams involved and liaises with the partner organisations, in particular the hostfederation. The Project Leader reported to the Head of Unit for club finals, and inturn he reported to Ms Burkhalter-Lau 141.
6.2.25. Rationally, that model should include an important component coveringsafety and security, which should be undertaken by the UEFA S&S Unit. However,the UEFA Written Response to this Review asserted that all aspects of safety andsecurity for the final were to go through project management, rather than the S&S
Unit142 . UEFA was in fact represented at planning meetings involving security by the
Events team led by Martin Kallen, with no representation from the UEFA S&S Unit143 .
6.2.26. In interview, Ms Burkhalter-Lau indicated that the UEFA written response
was inaccurate, and that from the outset FFF had proposed using the security
concept from the French Cup Final on 7th May 2022, given the short timeframe, andthe plan for the French Cup was adopted for UCLF22 in substitution for the normal
process. Project management had agreed this without consultation with UEFA’s S&S
Unit144 . There were multiple problems with this approach, as we shall discuss.
6.2.27. The Project Leader – told us that he was not given the opportunity to get into
discussions with those involved in planning the policing operation, that UEFA did nothave access to the police at an operational level, and that FFF engaged in most of
the discussions with the Préfecture de Police 145 . The result was a policing operation
which involved what Mr Theodoridis suggested was a unilateral decision to diverta large volume of supporters onto RER D without notice to UEFA or FFF, the routingof those same supporters to the most vulnerable and limited access point - ASP3
- the consequent failure of the access arrangements, the subsequent teargassing
and pepper spraying of supporters, including those most vulnerable, and thefailure to stop criminal attacks on supporters arriving and leaving the event.
6.2.28. The DIGES accounts for the security-based policing strategy on a
woefully inaccurate view of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster - that it was caused byhooliganism. That UEFA were unaware even of the nature of the policing operation
is wholly unacceptable. This was not appropriate deference to the authorities of
141 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 777)
142 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 50-52)
143 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 36)
144 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 780)
145 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 983-984)
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the host State, it was a failure to engage, and through the right people. France isa signatory to the 2016 Convention, it is under an international, binding obligation
to police a UCLF through a supporter engagement plan. Such a plan implies fullcooperation with the event owner.
6.2.29. The Project Leader noted that he had approximately 33 components of the
UCLF to manage. He is not a safety and security expert. Even where he perceived
there to be a problem with policing, we were told the channel of escalation wasvia Ms Burkhalter-Lau to FFF146 . Had the UEFA S&S Unit had direct contact with thepolice commanders, had they been given a copy of the operational order, theywould have been able to establish an effective working arrangement – or foreseen
the impending problems and escalated them to the DIGES, or if necessary actual
Ministerial level or President Macron’s office. It was a nonsense that policing issues
were dealt with by project managers and generally through FFF, when UEFA had ahighly experienced S&S Unit.
6.2.30. This deficit was not mitigated by the presence of a S&S Unit safety advisor
and a security adviser at some of the planning meetings147. It was apparently
compounded by a reluctance to reduce agreements to writing for “cultural”
reasons148, which the Panel rejects without hesitation. Matters pertaining to public
safety at a major sporting event should always be reduced to writing, and there areappropriate and sensitive ways of so doing.
6.2.31. Mr Lakovic referred to the problem of communications concerning S&S
going through UEFA Events as “key learning” and that there needed to be directcommunication and working between his Unit and local partners including the
local Federation and the police commanders149. He stated: “the concept of UEFA:
are we the advisors, consultants, are we sharing the information, or we shouldtake more responsibility? This is the question number one”150. The panel took thisto mean not only joint working with relevant partners, but taking control of UEFA’s
responsibilities for monitoring and ensuring the effectiveness of all aspects of S&S
planning and operations for the event. Mr Lakovic asserted: “I would say…we should
treat safety and security a little bit in isolation”151. The Panel agrees, and we go further:UEFA should make this an express part of its model so that there is absolute clarity.
146 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 995-996)
147 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1044-1045)
148 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1051)
149 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1307-1309)
150 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1310)
151 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1310)
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6.2.32. The decision to switch venue to Paris was taken without engaging any
normal process. According to Giorgio Marchetti, Deputy General Secretary, there
were a very limited number of options, and it was merely a matter of working out
where was available and whether the host state and federation would undertakethe task at such short notice 152 . The decision was formalised through a conversation
between President Macron and President Čeferin. Any ‘process’ would have
reduced the preparation time still further.
6.2.33. In our view this led to a crucial error - there was no venue risk assessment,
which would have been the natural starting point for any UEFA S&S assessment,
and should have brought to the fore known access, congestion and crime anddisorder problems which we discuss below153 . The lack of a venue risk assessment
may have been overlooked - in the changed and curtailed circumstances –because there is a safety and security section of the normal bidding process154 ,but it is inconceivable that it would have been overlooked if the S&S Unit hadownership of safety and security issues155 .
6.2.34. As the venue for the UCLF had actually been changed in each of theprevious two years (due to Covid), changes to normal arrangements were generally
foreseeable even if the specifics were not. The Panel notes that a number ofstakeholders have referred to the impact that the late change of venue posed.
We do not doubt that a much-shortened preparation period created widespread
problems for the organisation of the event. It is therefore even more remarkablethat the S&S Unit were not involved from the outset and that they were effectively
side-lined. A responsible approach would have been the opposite: for UEFA Events
SA to ensure their full involvement from the earliest possible point, precisely
because of the increased chances of something being missed due to the changes.
6.2.35. The use of a previous plan as a starting point for event planning iscommonplace. However, adaptation is crucial – events are rarely identical. The
French Cup Final was a poor comparator for the UCLF22, and the adoption of its
planning without proper adaptation was an inappropriate short cut. Moreover,there had been novel security arrangements at that event, which included double
checks at the ASPs, and it could not therefore be seen as a tried and tested plan.
The usual perimeter checks at the Stade de France were for security only – as part

152 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 745-748)
153 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 649-650, 849-850)
154 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1318)
155 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1336-1341)
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UCLF22 Independent Reviewof the Vigipirate counter terrorism plan - but UEFA had asked for the addition of ticket
checks156 . As we discuss below, the position became even more complex with two
types of ticket checks at UCLF22, because of the mix of paper and digital tickets.
6.2.36. There was no crowd modelling for UCLF22, and the effect of multiple
different checks was not adequately factored in to throughput calculations relevantto the ASPs. The Panel concludes that these were serious deficits and highly
relevant to the problems on the night. In the view of the Panel, they were obvious
to any safety expert, yet they were entirely missed by UEFA (and indeed FFF andthe police).
6.2.37. Martin Kallen emphasised that the French Cup Final was just the starting
point and “we afterwards looked at the plan, it’s not that we took it blindly”157. Fromthe interview evidence, this was not correct: UEFA’s S&S Unit told us they did not
see an Operational Plan for either the French Cup Final or the UCLF22. Indeed,
they had no documentation relating to S&S at the French Cup Final, just theirown observations, which they noted showed different access arrangements to
those on 28th May. The documentation available to them for the UCLF22, notably
slides presented to the finalists on 6th May 2022 and to the MD-2 security andsafety meeting chaired by an external UEFA security officer, included inaccurate
representations of the actual ASP access plans158 .
6.2.38. The French Cup Final had different ticketing arrangements to UCLF22, andit had different ticket checking arrangements (a ‘soft’ check rather than activation
as on 28th May, and no use of chemical pens) 159. The French Cup Final involved
two domestic clubs, whilst UCLF22 involved two foreign clubs with different fan
cultures. For UCLF22 there was intelligence that a very large number of supporters
would travel to Paris without tickets. There was no such intelligence for the French
Cup Final160.
6.2.39. From the evidence, it is clear that UEFA Events SA project management,
through Mr Kallen, agreed to FFF plan for the French Cup Final to be the basis for
UCLF22, without reference to the S&S Unit. Although Mr Kallen has stated that theplan was then looked at, the UEFA S&S Unit told the Panel in express terms thatthey did not see any such plans for either the French Cup Final or UCLF22. There156 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 786, 868-869)
157 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 783-784, 789)
158 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1328-1332, 1345-1352, 1360-1365)
159 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1325-1327)
160 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 795-797)
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are also serious questions about a) the extent to which that event acted as an
appropriate comparator for UCLF22 and b) the fact of any UEFA evaluation of the
Safety and Security arrangements 161. When asked who signed-off the safety andsecurity access and ASP arrangements, Ms Burkhalter-Lau informed us that UEFA
does not sign off a “security concept”, and Mr Kallen repeated that safety andsecurity from the ASPs inward is always the responsibility of the host federation,and outward is the responsibility of the public authorities162 .
6.2.40. Although this does provide an explanation, it rather contradicts Mr
Kallen’s earlier assertion that UEFA looked at the Operational Plan and did not
accept it “blindly”. It does not sit with other evidence including the fact that UEFA
claims it provided FFF with a “hybrid template” document dealing with strategicand operational issues relating to safety and security, which they translated into
French163 (although FFF told the Panel that it had not received this document).
Nor does the explanation sit easily with the fact that the final security, safety andmobility planning meeting held two days before the match, was chaired by an
external UEFA Security Officer. When asked why this was, given his earlier answers,
Mr Kallen could only assert that this was the way it always had been done164 .
6.2.41. The issues relating to the ASP3 go further. The evidence indicates that
there was little or no joint working between FFF, UEFA and the police regarding
the arrangements or the operation of the perimeters. More generally, neither FFF
nor UEFA received any operational plan for the final from the Préfecture de Police
165. FFF made a particular point that the police failed to have a first line ahead of

the ASP checks, but from the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the lackof interoperability on the planning and operation of the ASPs was much more
fundamental than that.
6.2.42. Problems with joint working relevant to ASP3 started with mobility - travelto the vicinity of the stadium, and arrangements in the last kilometre. The police
and the transport networks apparently followed a different plan to UEFA and FFF
regarding travel from central Paris. The UEFA website advised supporters to travel
via RER B or D depending upon where they were coming from, advice UEFA says
was repeated by announcements at stations166 .
161 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1328-1332)
162 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)
163 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p.26), see UEFA SSNS Concept & Operational Plan (9March2022) – Appendix, VI.3
164 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 806-807)
165 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1599, partially redacted by FFF)
166 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1066)
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6.2.43. According to UEFA, customer service agents deployed jointly by FFF and
UEFA, at stations including Châtelet – Les Halles, to direct supporters onto RER B andthence to the main thoroughfare to the stadium, were countermanded by police
who were directing them onto RER D (although this is disputed by the Préfecture).
UEFA further assert, that on 27th May 2022, MD-1, the transport networks RATP
and SNCF had agreed between themselves and the Prefecture de Police to divert
supporters coming from central Paris onto RER D and away from RER B, but failed
to tell anyone else 167 (this is disputed by the networks, with some justification given
the minutes of the Mobility Working Group considered in Chapter 4, and below).
6.2.44. According to UEFA’s operational staff, the first they knew of the diversion
of supporters was 19:45 on MD, even though the police control room adjoined thestadium control room where UEFA was located and there was a representative ofthe transport networks with them168 .
6.2.45. So far as the transport networks are concerned, we add a caveat. On
the evidence from RATP and SNCF, discussed at Chapter 4, the Panel concludes
that their approach was to shift the volume of traffic to RER D, rather than wholly
divert supporters. This may well have been appropriate from their point of view,
however, the lack of proper interoperability meant that the consequences were
not dealt with downstream, with nearly catastrophic results. SNCF has also
contradicted UEFA’s position, asserting in evidence to the Senate that it provided
passenger flow information to the stadium control room every half an hour from18:05 169 .
6.2.46. General Secretary, Mr Theodoridis, noted the police diversion at
Châtelet–Les Halles to be a particularly significant failure, compounded by thelack of communication. The Panel has taken account of this assertion in lightof the factual disputes regarding the diversion of supporters and the extent ofknowledge. Mr Theodoridis noted that there was a strong driver to cooperation by
public authorities given the benefits to hosting the event, and asserted that UEFA
would have tried to talk the police out of operating the diversion, and would haveencouraged them to route supporters arriving at RER D to the wider access from
RER B 170, if UEFA was aware of it.
167 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1067); UEFA
Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 51)
168 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1066, 1070)
169 — L’Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions
au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable, French Senate - English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2827)
170 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 723-725)
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6.2.47. We reflect that if UEFA S&S Unit had established proper contact and joint
working with the Préfecture de Police and the commanders, and the transport
networks, there would have been little room for any factual dispute, and the risk ofa failure of this nature would have been minimised.
6.2.48. In the last kilometre, UEFA was aware of a dispute between FFF and the
Préfecture de Police which had arisen five days prior to the match regarding theremoval of signage and the routing of supporters arriving via RER D, and UEFA
had supported FFF position. Mr Kallen asserted that FFF was the organiser andsometimes there were differences with the police about an arrangement. He statedthat UEFA knew about the signage issue in advance but did not know about therouting issue until match day, and the responsibility and power rested with the
public authorities.
6.2.49. However, Mr Kallen did concede that UEFA are able to use ‘soft power’and do try to push to get the best outcome. We were told that the learning is tobe “more careful” in the future 171 . Mr Theodoridis suggested that similar problems
will not occur in 2023 in Istanbul because there will be close cooperation with thepolice commander172 . As we will develop, the Panel firmly concludes that being‘more careful’ or wishing for ‘greater cooperation’ are aspirations and not solutions.
6.2.50. The assertion by Mr Kallen that UEFA did not know about the routing issue
until MD is difficult to comprehend in light of various conflicting maps and slides
put out by UEFA during the planning phase (see Annex Figure 7).
6.2.51. The Panel concludes that the separate but cumulative police and transport
network diversions of supporters onto RER D, represented a major interoperability
failure. Likewise, the dispute over signage and its subsequent removal, and thefailure to have appropriate routing from RER D to the stadium, represented serious
joint working failures. Both plainly contributed to the problem at ASP3. The
diversion and routing failures were compounded by the fact that they were either
not communicated to, or were not acted upon by FFF and UEFA, a problem madeall the more surprising given that all relevant stakeholders had attended planningmeetings and were represented in the MD control rooms.
6.2.52. Evidence from the UEFA S&S Unit indicated that it was obvious that

171 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 812-813)
172 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 730-731, 735)
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ASP3 was only able to cope with a restricted number of people 173 . The Panelhas concluded that this fact made it imperative that any known problems withmobility in that vicinity were dealt with in advance, or at least as soon as they wereobserved. It also made it crucial that there was a contingency plan if congestion
did occur at this known bottleneck. There was no contingency plan for this, orindeed other access problems, except the placing of four volunteers on the route
between RER D and ASP3 as a response to the signage issue, which was ineffective
and plainly inadequate 174 .
6.2.53. The Panel notes that at the UCLF2019 in Madrid where there wereconcerns related to crowd ingress and egress an expert crowd flow modelling
report was commissioned by UEFA in advance of the event. In the present case nosuch crowd flow modelling exercise was conducted175 . An expert crowd modelling
report would have identified the vulnerability of ASP3 and the imperative to ensurethat only a manageable number should be allowed to access by that route, andothers should be diverted to ASP4. The fact that routing supporters from RER D
had been identified by FFF and UEFA as problematic but the police had overruled
the mitigation plan, should have led to escalation to resolve the matter. Had it doneso, an expert crowd modelling report would have been instrumental in resolving
the disagreement with the police.
6.2.54. The UEFA Project Leader told the Panel that the S&S Unit helped FFF todesign ASP3 176, although, on the evidence this overstates the position. A memberof the UEFA S&S Unit had considered flowrates for the ASPs, and he told the panelthat his assessment had led to advice being provided to the Head of Security for
FFF, which led to an increase in the number of stewards at ASP3. His assistance did
not go beyond this.
6.2.55. There were several problems with this evidence. Firstly, we were toldthat this was not put into writing and there is no documentation regarding thisadvice. Secondly, the flowrate calculation itself was wholly defective. It was
based on figures which did not take account of the security and ticket checks, ortheir combined effect. It was based upon 15 access lines, whereas it is apparent
from photographs that the width of the ramp at ASP3 could not accommodate
anywhere near that number. There were in fact 6 lanes at ASP3, separated bycrowd control barriers, although FFF and others have asserted that there were 10
173 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1315-1318)
174 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1078-1081)
175 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1495)
176 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1093-1094)
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channels for ticket checks, the difference being explained by an assertion that
there was room for two lines per lane. The UEFA Security Officer responsible forthe south of the stadium told us there was room for about 7 channels177.
6.2.56. As we discuss below, two members of the UEFA S&S Unit observed
aspects of the police operation which seriously affected throughput at ASP3 – thepositioning of vans and the extent of the security checks – and FFF added a third– the failure of the police to establish a line at the front of ASP3 to regulate accessto it. It is clear from this evidence that the S&S Unit member who undertook thethroughput calculation had not gathered this highly pertinent information: how
the police were going to operate the ASP. Neither had he taken account of the
double role of the stewards at ASP3: to activate digital tickets, and check paper
tickets with chemical pens, nor the absence of an escape lane. Congestion at
ASP3 caused its failure because too many supporters were directed or allowed to
go toward that access point, plus these multiple failures. It could not cope with thethroughput of valid ticket holders, irrespective of any issue of ticketless supporters,
fakes or problems with locals (see Annex Figure 8).
6.2.57. Whereas UEFA have been quick to assert that the stewards at ASP3
encountered a high proportion of fakes, they have been more circumspect
regarding the reliability and efficacy of the stewarding operation in that respect.
UEFA has accepted that a large proportion of stewards deployed on the day had
not completed its e-learning package, but it has been stressed that all the stewards
were accredited, and thereby fully trained as stewards under French regulations. In
written evidence UEFA stated: “Only 934 out of 1,716 successfully completed UEFAsteward e-learning which focusses on ticketing and access principles”178 . Although
it is impossible to say with certainty, the Panel considers that this is likely to be
relevant to what occurred at ASP3. The stewards may well have been trained to a
standard required by French law, but almost half of them had not undertaken theUEFA training related to access and ticket checking. It is clear no account of thiswas taken in calculating the throughput rates.
6.2.58. The Panel has no hesitation in concluding that the arrangements at the
ASPs generally, but most specifically at ASP3 where there were obvious andknown bottleneck and congestion issues, were wholly inadequate. There was asubstantial failure of joint working between UEFA, the Préfecture de Police and
177 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1364-1380); Flow Rates (as per security
concept) - Appendix, VI.14; Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1489)
178 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2746)
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FFF about this particular and crucial aspect of arrangements, both in planning andoperation. We single out UEFA, not only for its failure to assist in designing safe andeffective access arrangements, but for failing to spot the obvious dangers of thearrangements made by FFF. The fact that some effort had been made to look at the
ASP arrangements makes this failure even more stark. The Panel concludes that
all access arrangements at a UCLF should have been monitored and signed-off by
UEFA’s S&S Unit.
6.2.59. This conclusion by the Panel is underpinned by the view of the UEFA
Security Officer responsible for the south side of the stadium who was forthrightin his evidence. On arrival at about 15:30 on MD he accessed through ASP3. He
immediately identified that it was “not fit for purpose”. He stated “to my horror”
that police vans half-blocked the already narrow entrance ramp. He called hiscolleague, the other external UEFA Security Officer, and reported: “This will notsurvive contact”. Having looked at other ASPs, at about 16:27, he again reported tohis colleague: “I’m not sure the outer security perimeter will survive contact”, andat 17:19 he messaged to the UEFA S&S Unit WhatsApp group: “I asked [external SO
colleague] to accompany me around OSP cos it will need a lot of police for it tosurvive contact!”. The recipients of this message included Mr Lakovic, the Head of
Safety and Security Operations, the Safety and Security Advisor and the Head of
Unit for Club Finals who reported to Ms Burkhalter-Lau and was located within thestadium control room179. The UEFA Security Officer mentioned above also noted
other defects at ASP3 including the absence of any ‘escape’ lane, and he later
observed the congestion without any attempt by police to divert others away fromthe scene for a considerable period.
6.2.60. The failures relating to ASP3 are perhaps the single best example of theoverall defect of the UEFA model identified by the Panel. If UEFA viewed safety andsecurity as a priority component within its UCLF project, and required its S&S Unit
to play a full part in the arrangements – to monitor and sign-off each key part ofarrangements affecting safety and security – then it is far less likely that an accessarrangement described as “not fit for purpose” would occur.
6.2.61. The Safety and Security Advisor agreed that on the day, inappropriately
positioned police vans “had a huge impact on flows”. Another member of the
S&S Unit noted that the Vigipirate security screening at ASP3 involved checks on
179 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1479-1481); UEFA Champions
League 2021/2022 Final Security Report (publication not authorised); UCLF22 – SSNS WhatsApp Group - Appendix,
VI.15
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everyone accessing rather than a proportion as UEFA anticipated, which impacted
on flowrates, and he noted that police did not prevent further people joining thecrowd outside ASP3 once congestion occurred. The UEFA S&S representative in
the Stadium Control room had reports from his UEFA security adviser regarding
the congestion at ASP3, and its breakdown. In the stadium control room, he hadaccess to a CCTV feed for that location, the clarity of which has been noted by thepanel. By 18:52 he saw the congestion for himself when he went to the vicinity of
ASP3 to escort another UEFA manager to the ground. The congestion at ASP3 had
spilled over onto the adjacent motorway and a number of UEFA VIP vehicles had been
prevented from progressing further, with guests and the UEFA Match Delegate
having to finish their journeys on foot180. Inexplicably, none of these observations
led to any action by UEFA (although in later evidence he suggested that the reportby the UEFA Security Officer above may have resulted in escalation to FFF) 181.
6.2.62. Compounding the failures in the design of ASP3, there was no contingency
plan so when it was abandoned, there was no ‘plan B’ and the problems thentransferred to the concourse which became quickly overcrowded, and then to theturnstiles. At the turnstile perimeter poor queue management was overwhelmedby weight of numbers and supporters were left to self-regulate. The Panel agrees
with Scraton and Others (2022) that the collective actions of LFC supporters wasprobably instrumental in protecting vulnerable people and averting what mightwell have been more serious injuries and deaths182 . Congestion added to the
problems and gates were shut for significant periods.
6.2.63. Although UEFA managers at the control room were involved in meetings
with FFF, these related to arrangements at the end of the match and were notcrisis meetings. The Panel was unable to identify anything done by UEFA Events
SA managers or the UEFA S&S Unit once safety issues became apparent, which
was intended to mitigate the emergency. The explanation offered was that UEFAdoubted that the police commander would have taken any advice from them183 .
Evidence from the UEFA Security Officer mentioned above may support that view.
He observed attacks on supporters outside the stadium footprint and asked police
officers to intervene. They declined to do so on the basis they were deployed forcounter terrorism duties, and claimed that they were unable to contact other units.
180 — Meeting with UEFA – Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1407-1408)
181 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1316-1317, 1369, 1409); Meeting with UEFA Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1481-1483)
182 — “Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the2022 Champions League Final in Paris, Phil Scraton et al. (2022)
183 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1413-1415)
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He was unsurprised by the street crime as he had witnessed similar incidents
when working at a Wales v France friendly at the Stade de France in 2017. Asked tocomment on the DIGES report conclusions that police had deployed on a security
basis rather than with a supporter engagement approach, he stated: “Having done
several games in France, I think police doctrine doesn’t allow them to provide theservice element”, noting that France is a signatory to the Convention and neededto address this issue 184 . He later witnessed the use of tear gas and pepper spray,
describing it as disgraceful185 .
6.2.64. When asked whether the current model – based primarily upon delegationand deference – was the real problem, and that a joint planning and responsibility
model was required, Ms Burkhalter-Lau responded that there is no simple answer186 .
For reasons we have developed, the Panel disagrees.
6.2.65. The overall assessment of Mr Kallen was that there was good stakeholder
cooperation at the outset but in the final week: “it was not ideal because certain
police decision was done unilaterally… and [UEFA] were not informed”187. In ourview, this significantly understates the interoperability problems. Mr Theodoridis
is correct that there is such significant benefit to host countries that cooperation
should follow, and he recognised that UEFA has ‘soft power’ to drive such anagenda188 . UEFA plainly does not have legal powers regarding policing, and it may
be sensible for UEFA to delegate and sub-contract operational aspects relating
to safety, but it should exercise its considerable ‘soft power’ and require a fully
integrated model where it remains at the core of managing the event. The fact thatit can take its future events elsewhere should override any resistance.
6.2.66. The problems with the ‘delegation and deference’ approach were plainly
contributory to the substantial interoperability failures in planning, but they also
impacted on joint working on the day and evening. Once serious security andsafety problems became apparent, no discernible crisis management policy wasfollowed at command level. Although the main stakeholders - police, UEFA, FFF,
CSDF, and the transport networks - were located in two adjacent control rooms
within the stadium, there were no crisis meetings involving the police, and theothers decanted to an anteroom for purposes which remain unclear but included
discussions about VIP transport after the match.
184 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1470-1475)
185 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1503-1504)
186 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 813-814)
187 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 821-822)
188 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 732)
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6.2.67. According to Mr Kallen, safety and security was the domain of FFF andthe police who “constantly” liaised between themselves and therefore meetings
involving UEFA were unnecessary189. Ms Burkhalter-Lau added that under UEFA’s
crisis management policy she would have had the responsibility to call a “VCC 190
escalation group meeting” but felt that it would have been inappropriate because
it would have diverted the police and FFF from what they were doing, and it would
not have added value. In the Panel’s view, this is a surprising assertion. UEFA not
only had its senior Events managers in the control room, it had its Safety andSecurity Advisor stationed there too: representing the S&S Unit. For what purpose
was he in the control room if UEFA were going to stand aside when a crisis
occurred? In addition, the Head of the S&S Unit was present in the stadium as were
the two external UEFA Security Consultants.
6.2.68. Both Mr Kallen and Mr Marchetti went to the control room as the crisis
developed. General Secretary, Mr Theodoridis, indicated that elsewhere, in astairwell next to the VIP area, the UEFA President and senior executives met toconsider the delay of kick-off191. It is apparent that there was no crisis management
process included in the planning for the UCLF22, and that UEFA’s own policy was
not operated.
6.2.69. In the Panel’s view, the police commander should have had primacy oversuch serious threats to public safety as the crisis evolved, but there should havebeen a clear mechanism for the police command to have liaised in real time with
FFF and UEFA, both of whom had significant expertise and operational roles. Fromthe evidence, it is apparent to the Panel that there were no contingency plans
for the failure of the ASP. Neither was there any multi-agency crisis management
plan. There should have been. Furthermore, UEFA’s role in such crisis management
should have been through a senior member of its S&S Unit, probably the Safety
and Security Advisor as he was in the control room, and other managers shouldhave played a supporting role, irrespective of position within the organisation.
Amongst other matters, UEFA had access to public messaging, and highly
experienced staff who had a wealth of crowd management experience. Through amulti-agency crisis plan, those assets should have been utilised.
6.2.70. The Panel also concludes that decisions to delay the kick-off because of
security or safety problems should be taken by the police commander, in liaison
189 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 818-820)
190 — Venue Communication Centre
191 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 752-755)
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with the nominated FFF and UEFA S&S officers, and should not have been adecision taken or ratified elsewhere. In this regard the Panel notes the evidence ofPresident Čeferin that he was asked to make or ratify the decision, even though hehad been in a meeting with the King of Spain in the VIP area, and not been in thecontrol room or engaged with commanders192 .
6.2.71. UEFA did play a role in messaging once the crisis occurred, putting up two
messages on the main stadium screens, informing everyone within the stadium
firstly that kick-off had been delayed “due to a security issue”, and then thatthe delay was caused by late arriving supporters. As the General Secretary, Mr
Theodoridis, agreed, it was not true that the problem had been caused by late
supporters193, and in the words of Ms Burkhalter-Lau: “there would have been abetter option”194 . The Panel agrees. It was stressed to us that there was no intention
to cause offence, but messaging is important. It is important to allay fear, inform
people to remain in place or move, correct misinformation, and it is right for the
supporter experience to tell them what is going on if arrangements change.
6.2.72. Ms Burkhalter-Lau noted that UEFA Events SA used pre-preparedmessaging given the difficulty of composing text in the moment and the need fortranslation. There were hundreds of messages to choose from, but these were theonly two related to delayed kick-off. Whereas we do understand the reasoning for
the use of pre-prepared messages, there is no excuse for putting out inaccurate
information, and in this circumstance the message was not only wholly inaccurate
but deeply distressing to Liverpool supporters. The assertion that Liverpool
supporters caused the 1989 Hillsborough disaster in part by arriving late was oneof the central elements of the cover-up of the gross negligence by the police
commander which really caused the deaths of 97 supporters, and which had
persisted for more than 25 years. Many survivors of Hillsborough were within the
Stade de France when that message was displayed, many more were watching on TV.
6.2.73. On the evening of 28th May 2022, UEFA put out a press release assertingthat “the turnstiles at the Liverpool end became blocked by thousands of fans who
had purchased fake tickets…”195 . According to Ms Burkhalter-Lau that was what
UEFA thought at the time the press release was put out196 .

192 — UEFA President Position Statement – Appendix, IV.2
193 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 711)
194 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 831-832)
195 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 835)
196 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 836)
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6.2.74. We were informed by Deputy General Secretary, Kevin Lamour, that theoriginal draft had asserted that the problems on the night were caused in part by
locals, but that the Ministers for Interior and Sport, a representative of the Préfet,and the DIGES had asked them to remove that reference. UEFA did so197. The
problems were not caused by thousands of supporters with fake tickets. UEFA did
not have and still has no evidence of that. The problems were plainly contributed
to by locals. UEFA had observed that. UEFA also knew from its Security Officers
that the perimeter arrangements were not fit for purpose and had collapsed hours
earlier. UEFA should not have put out a media statement blaming supporters, andit should not have censored its own messaging due to pressure from the Frenchauthorities. Furthermore, UEFA failed to correct this inaccurate statement. Indeed,
as we shall see, it compounded it.
6.2.75. By 8th June 2022, UEFA produced a presentation which included its view of
the cause of the near-disaster: “it was therefore these late arrivals, and the massesof LFC supporters, many of whom without valid tickets, which caused the pressure
on the screening point, with people taking the opportunity to force access andthen to the stadium, profiting from this disfunction”198 . Given that the congestion
had overwhelmed ASP3 around 19:00, it is clear that the problems did not result
from anyone’s late arrival, as the General Secretary has acknowledged.
6.2.76. According to Mr Kallen and Ms Burkhalter-Lau, at the 8th June meeting,eleven days after the event, UEFA Events SA did not know that a mass of
supporters had been diverted onto RER D and far too many had thereafter
been directed to ASP3. Given their earlier assertions that customer service
stewards provided by FFF and UEFA Events SA at Châtelet station had a) beencountermanded by police officers directing supporters onto RER D, b) extensive
post event media coverage and c) UEFA attendance at a Ministry of Sport debriefon 30th May, the Panel finds their evidence about the state of knowledge on the 8thJune difficult to understand.
6.2.77. So far as the extent of supporters arriving without tickets, Mr Kallen
noted that UEFA had evidence from the turnstiles that around 2,600 tickets had
been presented which had wrong access codes, and it had learned from theinternet that fake tickets had been on sale. They also had evidence from stewards
undertaking the ticket checks at ASPs with chemical pens that there were a lot of
fake tickets. At the Senate hearing, Mr Kallen had fairly stated: “it is impossible to
197 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 738-739)
198 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 837)
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quantify the number of fake tickets”, but he then went onto say that in his view: “itcan be assumed that there were more than the previous finals”. In interview with
the Panel, Mr Kallen and Ms Burkhalter-Lau also agreed that the number of faketickets recorded at the turnstiles was not robust given that there may have been
multiple presentations199.
6.2.78. Deputy General Secretary Giorgio Marchetti commented that the fake ticket
issue: “may have been blown out of proportion”200. The external UEFA Security Officer
deployed to observe the Liverpool end of the stadium told the Panel that oncethe match actually kicked-off he observed many local youths outside the turnstile
perimeter but no mass of LFC supporters. This is consistent with media footage
available in open source. The UEFA Security Officer responsible for the south of thestadium had been in charge of perimeter security for the UCLF at Cardiff in 2017and he described problems with fake tickets as no more than he had seen there,
and the number of ticketless supporters was probably no more than foreseen201 .
6.2.79. The issue of ticketless supporters is analysed elsewhere. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the stadium messaging, the UEFA press
release on the night, and the UEFA analysis on 8 June 2022 all failed to mention anyof the planning and operational deficits the Panel’s inquiry has identified, and laid
the cause of the problems squarely at the feet of the supporters. That position is
not acceptable because it was objectively wrong. A failure to properly understandwhat caused the near disaster, and accept its own shortcomings, meant that UEFA
could not begin to put things right.
6.2.80. Mr Kallen was the voice of UEFA in the Senate hearings. When asked at the
Senate hearing what went wrong on 28th May - what UEFA had learned – Mr Kallen
mentioned the problems of paper tickets, the ASP arrangements, and difficulties
with communications between stakeholders.
6.2.81. The importance of UEFA giving full and correct evidence to a parliamentary
inquiry into a matter of such importance is beyond question. A lack of candour could
well prevent changes vital to improving public safety – saving lives. It could also
damage UEFA’s reputation and integrity with respect to the planning of future events.
6.2.82. When asked about assertions by French Ministers that 30-40,000
199 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 840-841, redacted by UEFA)
200 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 712)
201 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1507-1508, 1500)
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ticketless supporters had made their way to the stadium, Mr Kallen stated that
there were around 100,000 people within and around the stadium, not all of whomwere supporters. He had based these figures purely on statistics from the police
and transport networks, and could not verify them himself.202 As Giorgio Marchetti,
Deputy General Secretary, told the Panel: UEFA has no idea how many ticketless
supporters there were203 . He went onto say that it is important to recognise that the
final was a festival and ticketless supporters should not be seen as a problem, buta phenomenon to be catered for through fan zones204 . The Panel wholeheartedly
agrees that the UCLF should be viewed as a festival of football rather than justa match. However, the Panel has also concluded that none of the stakeholders,
including UEFA, really treated it as such. This is vital to moving away from asecurity mindset to a supporter experience one, with proper engagement.
6.2.83. As considered elsewhere in the report, the Panel notes that the numberof people in the vicinity of the stadium has been significantly over-stated, and theeffect of ticketless supporters has been used as an excuse to mask other failures.
6.2.84. During the Senate hearings, Mr Kallen asserted that UEFA knew the Stadede France well as a venue and had staged “several Champions League Finals there
without any problems, the last one being in 2006”. This was objectively untrue.
Mr Kallen was Head of Events at the time and was present at the 2006 final. The
assessment by UEFA after that final was that there had been serious interoperability
issues with partners, and in particular the police, and there had been access problems
and the Stade de France was not a suitable place for a Champions League final.
6.2.85. In interview, Mr Kallen stated that 2006 was a long time ago and there had
also been successful Euro 2016 matches at the stadium. The panel was particularly
unimpressed with this evidence. Before the Senate, as the UEFA representative,
Mr Kallen chose to give the 2006 as a successful example. It was not, and UEFA
expressly did not think so at the time, recording reasons which resonated with the
problems occurring on 28th May 2022: interoperability failures, particularly with thepolice, and access problems205 .
6.2.86. Mr Kallen was also asked about an event noted in the Cadot Report, page11, regarding the same route between RER D and ASP3, which had occurred at the
202 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 844-845, partially redacted by
UEFA)
203 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 712-713)
204 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 719)
205 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 850-853, redacted by UEFA)122

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2016 French Cup Final, and which he had not mentioned before the Senate. Mr
Kallen explained that he had not known about those problems, despite the factthat the incident had prompted a review before the Euro 2016 matches. If Mr Kallen
was not aware of those issues, he should have been, given the fact that he wasinvolved in organising Euro 2016.
6.2.87. Furthermore, UEFA had a 5th April 2022 report from Football Supporters
Europe, presented as part of the planning for the UCLF22, which had warned ofserious congestion problems between RER D and the stadium. In interview, Mr
Kallen stated that he had not seen the FSE report prior to giving evidence to the
Senate, and none of his staff had drawn his attention to it206 .
6.2.88. Mr Kallen had also told the Senate that during the planning phase, theUEFA S&S Unit had identified pitch invasion by ticketless supporters as a high-riskfactor207. That was incorrect: they had done no such thing.
6.2.89. In summary, the Panel considers that UEFA presented to the Senate acompletely misleading view of what it knew of safety problems at its previous
events at the Stade de France. This was unacceptable.
6.2.90. We have identified a key problem as the UEFA model. UEFA Events SA ran
the final as a project and managed it as a series of components. In delegating
safety and security to FFF and deferring to the policing duties of the Préfecturede Police, without maintaining any clear and effective role for itself, UEFA sought
to insulate itself from anything that went wrong. In doing so, it largely removed its
own S&S Unit from a vital role to monitor, supervise and draw together joint efforts,
and troubleshoot and escalate problems as they arose and were identified.
6.2.91. The management of UEFA Events SA were primarily responsible for thiscentral failure, however, by their own admission, the senior leadership of the wider
UEFA family were aware of this issue and had failed to rectify it.
6.2.92. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr Lakovic as Director in charge of
the S&S Unit, or the Head of the Unit, sought to clarify or assert their own position.
This led to members of the Unit being no more than passive observers at planningmeetings and in the control room, playing no positive role. No one involved in the
S&S Unit saw an operational plan for the French Cup Final or the 28th May from206 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 852-854, redacted by UEFA)
207 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 872-876, redacted by UEFA)
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either FFF or the police, nor did they see a venue risk assessment. UEFA presented
inaccurate slides to the finalists and to the MD-2 security meeting regarding
access through the perimeters, and prepared a completely defective throughput
analysis for ASP3. No crowd modelling report was sought: if it had been, theobvious problems with ASP3 would have been highlighted.
6.2.93. The role of the external UEFA Security Officers was equally unclear.
The Panel understands that these highly experienced professionals arecommissioned to provide a further check on arrangements at a late stage andto observe and provide reports on what actually happens on MD. Article 65 of
the UEFA Organisational Regulations 2020 Edition tasks these external officers to“monitor, assess and advise UEFA on safety and security concepts for UEFA clubcompetition finals…”, and ascertain if the clubs and public authorities are satisfied
that everything required has been done. The fact that one of them chaired theimportant MD-2 security, safety and mobility meeting should have indicatedthe centrality of UEFA to S&S issues, however their role appears to have been
reduced to chairing and presenting UEFA slides about MD arrangements, rather
than scrutinising anything. The fact that one of their Security Officers identified
that ASP3 was not fit for purpose on arrival at that location on MD is testament to
how badly arrangements had gone wrong, and the fact that there was a complete
failure of joint working, oversight, and monitoring.
6.3. Consortium Stade de France
6.3.1. The Panel interviewed Alexandra Boutelier, CEO of the Consortium Stadede France (CSDF), Benoît Lavallée, Sport Programming Director, Florent Coulon,
Development and Strategy Director, Jean-Philippe dos Santos, Security Manager, andLoïc Duroselle, Programming and Institutional Relations Director, also representing
the CSDF, and is grateful for their assistance208 . The Panel also received a detailed
written response to its request for a Position Statement, and were assisted by
the CSDF in attending a site visit which took in the stadium, its control rooms,
concourse and access points, the ASPs and the relevant routes to the RER stations.
6.3.2. The CSDF operates and maintains the national stadium: the Stade deFrance at Saint-Denis, on a concession contract with the French State, whichruns until 2025. It has multi-year contracts with the French Football Federation(FFF) and French Rugby Federation (FFR), and the UCLF22 involved adding an

208 — CSDF would not agree to the interviews being recorded and so references are to the minutes of the meeting.
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appendix to FFF general contract 209. UEFA was the ‘event owner’ and it delegatedresponsibilities to FFF as ‘event organiser’. Apart from being the host stadium
operator, CDSF retained responsibility only for fire security and seated capacity.
Other responsibilities were contracted to UEFA and FFF as event owner andorganiser, respectively. French law holds public authorities responsible for public
administration, order and security. Under French law the ‘organiser’ must bea French entity. The Panel views this as a formality and CSDF have referred to
the reality that UEFA and FFF were “joint organisers for the event”210. The CDSF
indicated that it had no general concerns given that UEFA had hosted Euro 2016,
and FFF were a regular partner, and its relationship with the main stakeholders,
including the Préfecture de Police, was good211 .
6.3.3. The Stade de France is situated in an urban environment in a very deprived
department, within the Grand Paris metropolis in the Île-de-France region. The
stadium is surrounded by developments and several major arterial roadways.
The combination of its difficult urban geography and social deprivation, was animportant context for the events of 28th May 2022.
6.3.4. In terms of problems which occurred on the day, CSDF has asserted to the
Panel that it is now aware that at around 16:00 on MD, the transport network RATP
unilaterally decided to direct supporters at Châtelet-Les Halles station (near to theLiverpool Fan Zone) to travel via RER D rather than the usual and better route, RER
B. The Panel notes that this is only partially consistent with information from otherstakeholders, as discussed more fully above. According to CSDF, this decision was notcommunicated to other stakeholders including itself, although, again, this is disputedby others. CSDF note that the strike action taking place on RER B had been discussed
at the planning meetings and it had been jointly agreed that RER B would be able torun almost normally (80% capacity), and therefore the strike action would not cause
undue problems. CSDF state that this ‘unilateral’ decision had caused a substantial
displacement of arriving supporters, and if CSDF had known, it would have raised “abig alarm signal”212. The Panel has not been able to fully resolve the dispute as to who
knew what about the displacement of supporters, however, the comments of CSDF
underline the imperative for joint working and communications, because this was suchan obvious issue which could have been resolved quite easily by proper routing fromRER D to the stadium.

209 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1674)
210 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 199)
211 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1675-1676)
212 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1676)
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6.3.5. CSDF also noted that it had been unaware that the Préfecture de Police hadoverruled a FFF plan to route supporters arriving via RER D to ASP4 rather than
ASP3, and had removed signage to that effect. This was yet another stark exampleof the failure of interoperability. The rationale for the signage plan was that ASP4
was a much more accessible entry point given the width of the Avenue du Stadede France, as compared with the alternative ASP3 which had a restricted capacity.
CSDF noted that they were unsurprised that they had not been notified, stating that
France is a hierarchical country, however, if it had known, it would have been ofsuch concern that CSDF would have raised it with stakeholders. CSDF noted thatroutes to the stadium was an issue not taken seriously enough, given the difficult
environment, and it would have welcomed involvement in such decisions213 .
6.3.6. CSDF asserted that the outer perimeter is usually only a counter-terrorism
check and the addition of ticket checks at the ASPs was a recent addition whichshould have been trialled at smaller events. CSDF had not been asked for its viewor approval, and described the addition of ticket checks at the outer security check
perimeter as “the main change” from the usual access arrangements214 . At ASP3
the space was tight, it was not optimal to have two different checks, and there wasno escape lane for rejected persons215 .
6.3.7. Although the CSDF was not responsible for security and safety or accessarrangements at UCLF22, its retained fire safety responsibilities meant that it
was involved in planning meetings, and its representatives were able to observeand take part in arrangements. The Panel notes that it is reasonable to contract
arrangements for events to organisers, however, those responsible for safety andsecurity at the stadium had local knowledge, and ‘muscle memory’ of problems
unique to the stadium and its environs, which others may not have. For that reason,
the Panel takes the view that the Stade de France should be more fully involvedin planning for major events at the stadium, irrespective of whether the actual
operation of the plans is contracted out. The above examples of a displacementof customers from RER B to RER D, the routing problem, and the shortcomings of
ASP3 arrangements, illustrate the point.
6.3.8. In its written response CSDF also referred to the presence of “30,000
people on site without valid tickets” as a contributory factor to the problems, afigure obtained from estimates provided by the transport networks, SNCF and
213 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1676-1677)
214 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 202)
215 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677)
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RATP. The combination of too many people near to the stadium, and the diversion
of supporters to RER D was too much for the outer perimeter checks at ASP3,
whereas the much larger access at ASP4 was left underutilised. Furthermore, thedouble checks at the ASPs – for tickets and security – slowed the flowrate andwas not usual practice, and in turn the mix of paper and digital tickets would have
had a further deleterious effect on flow216 . As considered elsewhere, the Panel has
found no evidence to support the assertion of 30,000 ticketless supporters being in
the vicinity of the stadium, but it is clearly correct that ASP3 was overwhelmed, whilst
ASP4 was underused, and the other criticisms put forward by CSDF are well made.
6.3.9. So far as ticketing was concerned, CSDF own the hardware – scanners
at the turnstiles and the connected IT - and it was compatible with the UEFA
blockchain software. The same had worked at a recent Ed Sheeran concert. CSDF
was aware of a problem which occurred due to a 4G outage and there were somecompatibility issues but otherwise it thought the IT did work on MD. CSDF were
however surprised that UEFA had allowed for a mixed system of digital and paper
tickets217.
6.3.10. A week after the events of the final, the CSDF CCTV system auto deleted
the footage from all 260 of its cameras for 28th May 2022. No official authority orother stakeholder had requested that the material be retained, and a judicial orderwould have been required to retain it for longer than 30 days. CSDF concededthat it was a mistake not to have retained the footage and that in the aftermathof a future incident it would not allow it to be deleted, accepting that the footage
would have been useful to investigations and potentially to the CSDF itself218 .
6.3.11. In view of the Panel’s conclusions on the overall model of the organisationof UCLF22, it is clear that greater involvement of the CSDF may well have madea significant difference to what occurred. The framework described by CSDF
places responsibility for safety and security on FFF and the Préfecture de Police,save with respect to fire and capacity which is a requirement placed on theowner or operator by French law. The underlying reason for the retention of
those responsibilities must be the fact that the owner or operator of a venue
has familiarity which an event organiser does not, irrespective of their generalexperience or expertise. In the Panel’s view, the same should pertain to access andmobility issues within the last kilometre.
216 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 201)
217 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677-1679)
218 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1681)
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6.3.12. Elsewhere, we criticise the lack of a venue risk assessment. We criticise thelack of an operational plan, and we criticise the lack of interoperability. As hosts,
the CSDF should not only have been involved in discharging their fire safety andcapacity obligations, but they should have been involved in a joined-up multiagency effort to ensure public security and safety and to maximise the positive
experience of those using their facility.
6.4. Fédération Française de Football (FFF)
6.4.1. The Panel interviewed the Director of International Institutional Relations andInternational Competitions of the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), the Headof National Teams and International Competition Department, and the Head of
Security. The Panel also received a substantial written response to its request for a
Position Statement, together with supporting documents. The Panel is grateful forthe assistance provided.
6.4.2. FFF is a member federation of UEFA and as such it will naturally play aleading role in organising UEFA events in France. The relationship regarding
UCLF22 has been characterised as UEFA ‘event owner’ and FFF ‘event organiser’.
6.4.3. The extent to which FFF was involved in the decision to switch the 2022 final
to Paris at three months’ notice is not clear, however FFF welcomed the decision“with pride and enthusiasm”219. In interview, FFF recognised that shortening the
preparation period from the usual eighteen months to three months createdinevitable problems and was “definitely… not enough”220.
6.4.4. FFF describe its responsibilities as providing private security guards(stewards), facilitating mobility (supporter travel to and within the stadium),volunteers, and relations with the host cities and government. UEFA was
responsible for the sporting event, TV and marketing, dressing the stadium,budgets and ticketing (although FFF was formally their agent for legal and tax
purposes) 221 . FFF told the Panel that it liaised with UEFA’s Safety and Security Unit
and with the Events team during the planning phase and on match day222 .
6.4.5. FFF deployed 1,680 stewards for security duties. 258 were allocated to
219 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 180)
220 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1553)
221 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 180)
222 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1596-1598)

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12 pre-screening points – referred to as ‘Additional Security Perimeters’ – and 212
were allocated to 18 access gates which consisted of 6 to 9 turnstiles, equippedwith QR code readers (sometimes referred to as scanners). According to CSDF,
there were 141 functioning turnstiles available on MD (although as we discusselsewhere, some were closed from time to time) 223 .
6.4.6. The stewarding was contracted through 12 different companies, 6 or 7 of which
worked regularly at the SDF. The effect of the pandemic had caused problems withrecruitment, and it was necessary to involve companies with less familiarity with thestadium. FFF told the panel that only 53% of the stewards had completed the relevant
e-learning package. The Panel has received evidence of a lack of professionalism
and inappropriate conduct by some stewards, and was concerned at the number ofcompanies involved and the apparent training deficits. However, FFF indicated thatall stewards were in fact fully trained and were required to carry accreditation. The
e-learning was an extra requirement and was most relevant to awareness of thestadium and event224 . Whereas it is impossible for the Panel to confirm that stewards
were all accredited and trained, the extent of failure to enforce the e-learning is ofconcern, as is the proliferation of different companies. The Panel concludes that thetraining deficits and lack of familiarity with the venue may have been a contributory
factor on the day, however, the evidence on this matter is inconclusive.
6.4.7. The evidence indicates that there were problems at many of the ASPs,
including ASPs dedicated for UEFA’s Commercial Partners, and that their design
was not fit for purpose. For the purposes of this report, the focus is on ASP3 and 4,
to which Liverpool supporters arriving on RER D and B were respectively directed.
The ASPs had a dual purpose: security checks involving the opening of coats andbags (known as “Vigipirate”), and ticket checks. According to FFF, the ticket checks
had been requested by UEFA, and were an addition to the normal arrangements
which were only a security check. The ticket checks were complicated by the factthat UEFA had sold both paper and digital tickets. Therefore, the ticket checks
involved both the use chemical pen and digital activation, depending upon thetype of ticket 225 .
6.4.8. FFF asserted that double security and ticket checks had been undertaken
during Euro 2016, although the Panel has not seen evidence of this, and this would
appear to be at odds with the CSDF evidence. FFF could not recall whether it had
223 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677)
224 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1604-1609, redacted by FFF)
225 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 181)
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undertaken throughput calculations, but asserted that it had designed the ASPs
based on estimated arrival figures provided by UEFA (although this seems unlikely
given that estimated figures were included on some of the earliest documents that
the Panel has seen). At ASP3, FFF had supplied the number of available channels
and UEFA had calculated the flow rate226 . As the Panel has noted, both the planned
arrival figures at ASP3 and the UEFA flowrate calculations were entirely wrong.
6.4.9. From the evidence of an external UEFA Security Officer, and images taken
by him on the day, it can be seen from these that there were 6 lanes at ASP3,
divided by metal barriers. FFF have asserted that this allowed for 10 channels
or lines of supporters. The Security Officer commented that ASP3 was locatedon a fairly narrow ramp about 10m wide, and in his opinion there was room for a
maximum of about 7 channels if ignoring the need for a return or escape channel
for rejected persons227. The only throughput calculation the Panel has seen for
ASP3 was provided by the UEFA S&S Unit and was based upon the assumption
there would be 15 channels at ASP3 228 .
6.4.10. The Panel notes the evidence from the Consortium Stade de France
concerning double checks at the ASPs being largely untested, and the conclusionsof the Senate investigation that double checks were a part of the problem because
they slowed throughput rates229. FFF has also noted in its written evidence andinterviews that the checks were “too long and tedious for the security guards”230.
In agreeing with all those observations, the Panel notes that it is axiomatic thatthe closest of attention should be paid to throughput rates at any access point.
Without such calculations, it cannot be known what volume of arriving supporters
can safely be directed through that entrance.
6.4.11. On the evidence, it appears that FFF took little or no account of throughput
rates at ASP3, and such calculations as were done by the UEFA S&S Unit used several
channels that was more than double that which is said by their own Security
Officer to have been physically possible. Moreover, the flowrates appear to havetaken no account of the fact that there were both security and ticket screening
checks in proximity or that two different types of ticket check were required.
226 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1568-1570)
227 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1486-1494)
228 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1376-1384)
229 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 201); Meeting with Consortium Stade deFrance - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677); L’Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale dela Ligue des Champions au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable, French Senate - English translation at Appendix,
VI.18 (p. 2823, 2826)
230 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 188); Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1627)
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6.4.12. FFF has identified three key factors regarding the number of persons trying
to access through ASP3. Firstly, that supporters travelling from the fan zone incentral Paris were diverted from the main route on RER B to RER D, without notice
to FFF or other stakeholders, and against their own guidance. Secondly, the factthat repeated requests from FFF to divert supporters arriving at RER D to themain access on Avenue du Stade de France, through ASP4, were rejected by the
Préfecture de Police and signage to that effect was removed. Thirdly, the number of
supporters arriving there without valid tickets, and anti-social behaviour by locals231 .
6.4.13. According to FFF, the usual number of supporters arriving at the Stadede France for major events via RER D is between 10-15,000, whilst 30,000 arrive
via RER B. On 28th May, FFF assert that 36,000 arrived via RER D and only 6,000
via RER B. The Panel has considered the actual figures in Chapter 7; however, it isundoubtedly the case that a major diversion of supporters took place on the day.
6.4.14. According to FFF, the planning meetings fully considered the fact that astrike notice had been issued with regard to RER B, but stakeholders had agreed
that the disruption would only reduce capacity by around 20%, and therefore noalteration to the usual transport planning was necessary since 80% capacity is
considered an acceptable level of service on RER B.
6.4.15. UEFA and FFF gave public guidance on this basis, through the UEFA App.
However, according to FFF, on the afternoon of Match Day, the transport network,
RATP, unilaterally decided to direct Liverpool supporters to RER D, in particular at
Châtelet-Les Halles station which is on route from fan zone to the SDF. This waseven though FFF had paid the transport networks to provide additional stewards
and leaflets to give directions to supporters in accordance with the normal plan.
6.4.16. FFF referred to the late change by the network as “crazy” and without
explanation, and they did not learn about it until 19:00232 . Compounding thatproblem, FFF allege that the police contradicted the UEFA/FFF mobility plan andhanded out 10,000 flyers at Châtelet and Nation stations to that effect233 . The Panel
has noted elsewhere that the transport networks dispute there was a change ofplan or that their intentions were not communicated. Furthermore, the Panel had
understood from other evidence that FFF knew about and objected in advanceto the police flyers, because they indicated that LFC supporters could travel via
231 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 185-187)
232 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p.1582-1584, 1627-1628)
233 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 187)
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Line 13, when that route had been earmarked for RMCF supporters, in particular
because the station was at the north of the stadium234 . This would indicate asecurity concern rather than safe routing.
6.4.17. In the days prior to match day, the Préfecture de Police had rejected
repeated requests from FFF to divert supporters arriving from RER D toward themain route to the stadium via Avenue du Stade de France and ASP4, where there
was a wide concourse and plenty of room, compared to the narrow entry point at
ASP3. This had apparently been the arrangement at the French Cup Final 235 . Oncethe serious problems arose at ASP3, the Director of Int. Competitions, positioned
in the stadium control room, asked the police commander in the adjoining police
control room to revert to the FFF/UEFA plan which had been rejected by the
Préfecture de Police days before, to direct arriving supporters away from ASP3
to relieve the pressure. It took almost half an hour to action that request, an
unacceptable delay which probably meant that ASP3 was rendered unrecoverable
except for a short period236 .
6.4.18. Whatever the actual figures, and whatever the true picture of priorknowledge, the Panel has concluded that it is beyond doubt that the decisions
to divert a substantial percentage of the arriving Liverpool supporters onto RER
D, without managing the routes to the stadium, meant that the restricted outer
perimeter entrance at ASP3 would be overwhelmed, as it was in fact.
6.4.19. The Panel recognises that the transport networks had a role to play, andwere involved in planning meetings, but fundamentally, the three key stakeholders
who should have ensured that the travel to the stadium, last kilometre mobility,
and access were safe, were FFF, the Préfecture de Police, and UEFA. Failures incommunication and joint working were down to them.
6.4.20. The Panel has dealt with the evidence relating to ticketless supporters
and locals in Chapter 7, but as noted, the transfer of supporters onto RER D andthe failure to regulate the flow to ASP3 led to the inevitable breakdown of ASP3
irrespective of whether supporters without valid tickets, or opportunistic locals
compounded the problems.

234 — Préfecture de Police Tweet: “@LFC fans, you got a ticket? Go to the @StadeFrance. You don’t have one? A
fan zone welcomes you, Cours de Vincennes!” (27 May 2022)
235 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1575-1577)
236 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1645-1647)
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6.4.21. FFF acknowledged that the MD-2 security briefing included the legend:“expect to see lots of fake paper tickets/screenshots”, and that information from
Merseyside police had informed them that at least 50,000 Liverpool supporters
would be travelling to Paris237. Whatever the evidence regarding numbers of
supporters without valid tickets, this was a factor actually foreseen.
6.4.22. FFF acknowledged that difficulties from locals were obviously apparent
from around 13:00 on MD. By 18:45 there was serious disorder involving locals.
Both CSDF and FFF have suggested that the scenes of disorder caused by locals
on the day were unprecedented. However, no effective action appears to havebeen taken to address the problems which were apparent at least 4 hours before
the stadium opened, and 7 hours before kick-off. The Panel has addressed thefailure of the Prefecture to deal with disorder below.
6.4.23. In addition to asserting that supporters without valid tickets were a majorpart of the problem, the Director of Int. Competitions maintained in interview
that late arrivals compounded the situation. Unhesitatingly, the Panel rejects thesuggestion that late attendance by supporters contributed to the problems on thenight, given that serious congestion problems had arisen at ASP3 by 18:30 at thelatest: two and a half hours prior to kick-off.
6.4.24. In terms of learning points, FFF identifies real-time collaboration with thetransport networks concerning the flow of supporters as a key issue. The Panelagrees, and understands that measures have already been taken to address thisissue. However, the transport networks had a representative in the stadium control
room, alongside FFF, UEFA, and adjoining the police control room. Irrespective ofthe dispute between stakeholders as to what was and wasn’t shared between themin the days prior to MD, it is both surprising and disappointing that the diversion ofsuch a substantial number of supporters went unspoken on the day.
6.4.25. Similarly, FFF expressed frustration at the refusal of the Préfecture de
Police to adopt its proposal for the appropriate routing of arriving supporters. In
interview, the Director of Int. Competitions of FFF, indicated that he recruited the
CSDF to support the concerns, and regretted that he had not taken the issue up with
President Macron’s office238. FFF also noted that it had not spoken with the Préfecturede Police regarding the policing operational plan, and they never received one 239.
237 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1630, 1636)
238 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1593-1594, 1608, both redacted by FFF)
239 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1599)
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6.4.26. The Panel notes the fact that as the host federation, FFF had a key role toplay in organising the event and in particular operational aspects of security andsafety. The issues with the transport networks and Préfecture involved serious
communication and interoperability failures. Those failures should not have arisen.
Where they were known, FFF should have escalated them.
6.4.27. As the Panel has already commented, the relationship between FFF andUEFA was less than clear. As event owner, UEFA coordinated the project throughUEFA Events SA. On the UEFA model, and on FFF’s own analysis, responsibility
and liability for private safety and security was delegated to FFF, and public safety
and security remained the responsibility of the police240. The position should nothave been viewed as binary, UEFA should not have washed its hands of thosematters, it should have utilised its specialist S&S Unit with annual experience, andit should have played a central role in ensuring arrangements were appropriate,
and ensuring effective joint working and communication between stakeholders.
Where it identified shortcomings, it was in a powerful position to escalate andtroubleshoot. It did not do so.
6.5. French State and Préfecture de Police
6.5.1. The Panel has taken account of the report of Mr Michel Cadot, the InterMinisterial Delegate for Major Sports Events (DIGES), dated 10th June 2022, and thereport of the French Senate, dated 13th July 2022, dealing with the events of 28th
May 2022. The Panel has also been assisted by a written response and an interview
with Mr Cadot who was assisted by members of his staff and an advisor from the
Ministry of Sports and of Olympic and Paralympic Games, and with David Clavière,
Chief of Staff, Jérôme Foucaud, Head of DOPC, and Alexis Marsan, Commissaire,of the Préfecture de Police de Paris. Mr Cadot is also the Interdepartmental
Delegate for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DIJOP) and he is under thejurisdiction of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Sports and of Olympic andParalympic Games.
6.5.2. The DIGES
6.5.2.1. The position of DIGES was established by Article 2 of Decree no 20081142 of 6th November 2008 (as subsequently amended). The DIGES role is defined
as follows: “While respecting the powers of the prefects, the interministerial

240 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 24, 27, 35-36)
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delegate for major sports events leads and coordinates the activities of the Stateadministrations and national public institutions involved in hosting and organisingmajor international sports events on French territory.”
6.5.2.2. The role involves coordinating the State’s responsibilities with theorganisers of major sporting events and related local authorities, takes part inpublic information, and advises the government.
6.5.2.3. With respect to the UCLF22, the DIGES took an active role in organisingmulti-agency planning meetings, although he had no decision-making powers241.
The DIGES office is small, consisting of seven or eight people. Its role is to facilitate
relationships as was the case with persuading local authorities to establish fanzones on MD, and in facilitating extra transport arrangements, in particularrail and airport management. Part of the role is to “seek a possible arbitration”
at a governmental level where there is no agreement on an issue between
stakeholders242 . The DIGES clarified that recommendation 1 of his report seeks theinstitutionalisation of the oversight of certain major sporting events where special
vigilance is required, and which is beyond the resources of the DIGES. Mr Cadot
commented that had this arrangement been in place for UCLF22, it may havehighlighted that the presence of a large number of supporters without tickets did
not equate to a risk of hooliganism243 .
6.5.2.4. The DIGES has confirmed that the Ministry of Interior, through its National
Division for Combating Hooliganism (DNLH), had information that between 5070,000 LFC supporters without tickets would travel to Paris for the final, but thatboth UEFA and DNLH confirmed that there were no causes for concern regarding
LFC supporters and the phenomenon of large numbers of supporters travellingwithout tickets was not unusual. The fact that there would be so many supporters
present, meant that arrangements were put in place for a fan zone at the Cours deVincennes244 .
6.5.2.5. The DIGES has clarified the statistics included in his report for supporters
travelling to the Stade de France. The figures were supplied by the transport
networks and were estimated based upon the number and capacity of trains
running during the relevant times. The DIGES used figures provided by FFF for

241 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 151, 158)
242 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
243 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
244 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 151, 158-159)
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those arriving by coaches, and figures provided by the Préfecture de Police fortaxis and private drivers.
6.5.2.6. The DIGES has informed the Panel that the information in his reportconcerning fake tickets was provided by FFF. He has not provided any basis forthe assertion that the number of fake tickets was ten times higher than usuallyencountered, or the assertion that there was intelligence relating to 50,000 forgedtickets. It appears that the latter related to the information available concerning
supporters without tickets, rather than counterfeits245 .
6.5.2.7. The DIGES has stated that he was not involved in planning meetings
which discussed the diversion of supporters from RER B to D, however he hascommented that the Préfecture de Police and transport networks were involved
in meetings to consider the effects of the notified strike on RER B, and FFF wereinvited to some of those meetings. The DIGES has further commented that theremoval of signage arranged by FFF, directing supporters arriving via RER D to themain avenue connecting RER B to the stadium was an error by the Préfecture, andthere should have been a redirection of supporters to the RER B route246 .
6.5.2.8. The DIGES report noted that the Préfecture de Police had adopted asecurity rather than engagement approach to policing at the UCLF22, becauseof the Hillsborough disaster in 1989. The DIGES has clarified to the Panel thatreference to Hillsborough was made by the Préfecture de Police in a note to the
Ministry of the Interior but not during the planning meetings. It is said that this was
relevant to a historical perspective of the management of the flow of supporters
and the possibility of supporters without tickets forcing gates at the Stade deFrance 247. The Panel is at a loss to understand how a mass fatality event more than
33 years previously, which involved no contributory behaviour by supporters,
could have provided any relevant “historical perspective”.
6.5.2.9. The Panel does understand how such a remarkable error by the
Préfecture de Police led to an inappropriate policing operation on MD. That error
should have been identified by the DIGES and other stakeholders, including
UEFA and FFF, during the planning stage, and addressed. As the Panel has noted,
France is a signatory to the Saint-Denis Convention, and its primary approach
to policing should have been engagement. If the planning stages had involved
245 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 152-153, 158-161)
246 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 154, 160-162); Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
247 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 156, 164)
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proper cooperation between the key stakeholders, the policing model would havebeen obvious at a stage where it could have been questioned, with escalation to
Ministers and the President’s office as appropriate.
6.5.2.10. The DIGES has confirmed that like the Senate, he has had no access tofootage of the events other than from the media and open-source material248. The
Panel recognises the need for strict data protection and privacy laws, however, there
must be a balance with public safety and security. The ability to identify systemic
failures and make changes for the future, which may save lives, is dependent on theextent to which inquiries and reviews are able to analyse what actually happened.
In many circumstances, CCTV footage is crucial to that endeavour. It is for thegovernment to determine the legal framework in France, but it is clear to us that theability of the Senate, the DIGES and this Panel to determine what changes need to bemade for the future has been hampered by the absence of available footage.
6.5.2.11. The Panel notes that the DIGES was asked to report on the events of
28th May 2022 very soon afterwards. Mr Cadot told us he did not ask for the
Stade de France footage because he has no investigative powers249. The Panel isdisappointed in this answer. Had the DIGES or the Préfecture de Police (or indeed FFF
or UEFA) asked the Stade de France to retain the footage, it would not have been
deleted, as the CSDF were permitted to keep it for 30 days without any judicial order.
With respect to the street CCTV which would inform the Review as to what happenedon the route between RER D and the stadium, and in particular what occurred at theapproach to ASP3, the Préfecture informed the Panel that this has been retained
and provided to the courts. Requests by the Panel to the Public Prosecutors for
Bobigny and Paris, for sight of this footage, have not elicited an answer.
6.5.2.12. Mr Cadot confirmed to the Panel that there had been significant
congestion problems at the underpass to the N1 which he described as being“quite narrow”, on the day of the French Cup Final on 21st May 2016. This had led
to a review of the access plan for the Stade de France in advance of the Euro 2016matches played there 250. The Panel notes that this same underpass was part of theroute between RER D and ASP3 to which supporters were directed on 28th May.
Had there been a proper venue risk assessment the previous problems would havebeen highlighted: this did not happen.
248 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 155-156, 162-164)249 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
250 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518); Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions
League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major
sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 128)
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6.5.2.13. In his report, Mr Cadot criticised the arrangements at ASP3, in particular
because of the double checks – security and tickets – and the two types ofticketing involved, which would slow the throughput flow. He also questioned thelegal basis for including ticket checks at these points251 .
6.5.2.14. In conclusion to the Panel, Mr Cadot referred to the “brief time frame”
in which preparations had to be made, and he expressed the view that 30,000
supporters who should have stayed at the fan zone created a bottleneck 252 . Despite
Mr Cadot’s willingness to accept that mistakes had been made, the Panel isconcerned that there remains a misconception about what actually happened anda complacency regarding what needs to change. This is particularly acute given
the proximity of the Rugby World Cup and Olympic and Paralympic Games and theimportance of the Stade de France to both events.
6.5.2.15. The Panel notes the five recommendations made by Mr Cadot in his
report 253 . These include the need for institutionalisation of national governancefor major sporting events, optimising access flows to stadiums, promotinginteroperability, requiring digital ticketing, and for a new Stade de France traffic
plan. The Panel respectfully agrees with each recommendation; however, it notesfrom the evidence that interoperability problems are deeply rooted, and haverecurred across the years. The Panel has already noted, the similarity between
some of the recommendations made by the DIGES and those made following the2015 inspection visit by the CoE delegation, which were not acted upon. Given
the forthcoming major events, the implementation of measures to adopt thoserecommendations will require swift and robust management at the highest levels.
6.5.3. The Préfecture
6.5.3.1. Mr Clavière, for the Préfecture de Police, explained that the Préfet dePolice was located at the police control room at police Headquarters in Paris,and he had delegated command for the MD operation to Alexis Marsan who was
located at the police control room in the stadium254 .

251 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
128-129)
252 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
253 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade deFrance and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.
135-136)
254 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
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6.5.3.2. Mr Clavière explained that the dispute with FFF over signage arose before
there was any question of a strike on the transport network, and he maintainedthat the purpose of the signs was to do with FFF wanting to avoid the flow of
supporters interfering with the access of FFF VIP buses rather than any crowd
volume issue. The Préfecture de Police had removed the signage for “simplicity”,
and to avoid overcrowding on the route between RER B and ASP4 255 . Mr Clavière
also told the Panel that he personally had met with RATP and SNCF on MD-1, to
discuss the strike on RER B. He had been told that RER B would be running at twothirds capacity on MD, and that: “it was not the police headquarters that decided
to transfer passengers from the RER B to the RER D”. He continued that it was
the decision of SNCF to transfer passengers from RER B to D and they had notinformed the police 256 .
6.5.3.3. Mr Clavière indicated that with a normal volume of supporters arriving
via RER D there was no problem of access to the stadium. The problem was theincrease through RER D and the “widespread ticket fraud, made possible bypaper tickets”. He continued that the Préfet de Police had taken action to avoid a
tragedy: namely the abandonment of ASP3 and the withdrawal of police officers
inside the stadium to prevent the stadium being “invaded”. He did not think thatpolice officers diverting supporters on the route between RER D and the stadium
would have made a difference, because the real problem was not the flow but
the presence of those without tickets. Mr Clavière concurred with the evidence ofothers that there had been no crisis meetings at the control room, but the police
had liaised with the organisers.
6.5.3.4. Mr Clavière told the Panel that the perceived threat of a stadium invasion
came from English supporters and that is why the police used pepper spray fromaerosols. The problem from locals came later and he estimated there were about300-400 of them, robbing and mugging supporters who were trying to get in.
The police had therefore used tear gas to push them back. The Panel notes that
this is an underestimation of the numbers of locals involved and contradictory toother evidence: from FFF as to much larger numbers of locals from early afternoon
causing difficulties, reports of fighting on the L’Ecluse footbridge north of thestadium, and footage widely available on open source which shows far greaternumbers. Mr Clavière denied that the perceived threat of hooliganism guided
the policing plan. Mr Clavière indicated that there were about 44,000 Liverpool
255 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) Appendix, VI.11
256 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
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supporters at the fan zone, 20,000 in the stadium and an unknown number,perhaps 30-40,000 supporters and local youths, in the vicinity of the stadium, but
outside the police system257.
6.5.3.5. An inspection visit to France by the Council of Europe Consultative Teamof the Standing Committee on Spectator Violence in 2015 , highlighted the factthat attacks on football supporters by groups of locals was a general problem forFrance. The extent of this phenomenon on MD may have been unprecedented, but
it was not unforeseeable and there should have been contingency plans in place.
The Panel finds it remarkable that the Préfecture de Police did not take effective
action at an early stage before supporters arrived, and re-deploy some of theconsiderable resources at its disposal to deal with ongoing problems should theyrecur, as they did later in the day. Eye-witness evidence from multiple supporters(including the Metropolitan Mayor of Liverpool) and UEFA’s external Security
Officer, responsible for the south side of the stadium, graphically shows how
there was little or no effort to prevent street robberies, assaults and pickpocketing
before and after the match.
6.5.3.6. The Panel has analysed the numbers of supporters and others in thevicinity of the stadium in Chapter 7, and has rejected the assertions of Mr Clavière
which have been made without proper evidential basis.
6.6. Summary of issues between key stakeholders: a lack of insight into whatwent wrong, a willingness to blame others without proper evidence, andwholesale interoperability failures
6.6.1. The Panel is grateful to the French authorities for their written and interview
evidence. However, the Panel is left with a sense of real concern at the lack of
insight into what occurred on 28th May and the failure to recognise the role of theauthorities. The Panel is also troubled by a number of stark differences as to thefacts of what happened, and a general default position of blaming the Liverpool
supporters, without any proper evidential basis.
6.6.2. The role of the DIGES should have helped ensure interoperability between
the authorities and the organisers. Undoubtedly the DIGES played a positiverole with respect to the fan zones and some other arrangements. However, theevidence clearly shows an unwillingness by the Préfecture de Police to work

257 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)
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collaboratively with other stakeholders, and a general failure of communicationand joint working.
6.6.3. The Panel has concluded that the problems on 28th May were a result ofa far larger number of supporters than expected arriving at the stadium via RER
D, a failure to direct them appropriately to ASPs which would not lead to them
being overwhelmed, and hopelessly designed access arrangements, in particularat ASP3. These issues were then compounded by an absence of contingency
plans, a failure to deal with the problem of local youths, and a failure to maintain areasonable throughput at turnstiles.
6.6.4. With respect to the first issue - the larger than expected arrivals via RER D this was not only foreseeable, it was also planned. All relevant stakeholders agree
that there were discussions concerning the likely effect of the strike on RER B, andthat there was general agreement that the effect would be marginal. However, it isclear from minutes of planning meetings that a transfer of a significant volume of
supporters onto RER D was contemplated, a point ignored by UEFA and FFF. UEFAand FFF say there was a unilateral decision by the Préfecture de Police to divert thepassengers, the decision was not communicated to them, and that police officers
countermanded their customer services officers positioned at stations in central
Paris. Mr Clavière flatly denies this. FFF, UEFA and CSDF also say the transport
networks followed a different plan to divert supporters onto RER D but did notcommunicate to other stakeholders, despite the existence of a press release
issued on 26th May. The transport networks accept that they did shift volumes
but did not seek to prevent supporters travelling on either RER B or D, a position
supported by evidence of increased trains running on both lines.
6.6.5. The transport networks were best placed to determine optimal flows of
supporters to the stadium vicinity, and there was no overcrowding or significant
incident during the movement of supporters to the RER B and D stations. The
failure was the lack of communication of a vital fact: the route by which large
numbers of supporters were approaching the stadium on match day. The
stakeholders cannot agree who took what decisions or had the relevant knowledge
in this respect, blaming each other. Whoever is correct, the Panel concludes that
this is a clear example of a failure of joint working.
6.6.6. The arrival of a disproportionate number of supporters via RER D, expected
or not, should have been obvious to the police and the stewarding operation forthe last kilometre. From the evidence it appears that the Préfecture de Police and6. The Role of Key Stakeholders

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FFF had officers and volunteers positioned on the route from RER D, but neither
were monitoring the flow volumes. If they had done so, it would have been
relatively straightforward to deploy officers to the area and divert supporters
toward the greater access at ASP4. No attempt to do so was undertaken until far
too late.
6.6.7. FFF had a plan to signpost a proportion of supporters arriving at RER D
toward ASP4, but this was countermanded by the Préfecture de Police several days
prior to the MD. The Préfecture de Police still defends this decision on the basisthat FFF had wanted the signage to prevent arriving supporters impeding the travelof VIP buses, and they removed the signs for “simplicity”. UEFA and FFF shouldhave escalated this issue as it posed the risk which in fact materialised: too many
supporters going toward the bottleneck at ASP3. They failed to do so. The Panel isconcerned that the Préfecture de Police continues to defend this decision now, on
the basis of FFF’s supposed motive. Given the historical issues with access to thestadium from this approach, the Préfecture de Police should have been alive to the
problems which in fact arose.
6.6.8. The dispute over the routing of supporters between RER D and ASP3 isclear evidence of a failure of joint working between the Préfecture de Police andother stakeholders.
6.6.9. The design of the ASPs, and in particular ASP3, was plainly defective.
According to UEFA, this was the responsibility of FFF. FFF have indicated that it
based its design on expected arrival patters and throughput flow rates provided byUEFA. UEFA has criticised the placing of police vans in front of ASP3 exacerbating
the congestion problem. FFF has criticised the police for failing to have a line of
officers in front of ASP3, and for the extent of the police checks being too long and“tedious”. CSDF say that ASPs normally only had security checks and the additionof ticket checks would have an effect on throughput. They noted the lack of an
escape lane at ASP3 and expressed surprise at the use of both paper and digitalticketing which should also have been taken into account. The DIGES concurs
with these opinions. UEFA’s external security officer, commissioned to observe MD
access arrangements at the Liverpool end, told us the arrangements were “notfit for purpose”. The police were responsible for public safety generally, FFF were
responsible for access arrangements. UEFA plainly paid some attention to the
ASPs with their (defective) throughput calculations. It is difficult to imagine a more
obvious or potentially disastrous failure of joint working than the design of ASP3.

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6.6.10. Undeterred by these obvious facts, Mr Clavière lauded the decision toabandon ASP3 and for police resources to retreat into the stadium to prevent
incursions. The Préfecture de Police has not accepted its role in failing to preventthe congestion at ASP3 or its failed design. The Préfecture de Police has notconceded that it failed to protect supporters from street crime, failed to prevent
local youths challenging access points or climbing fences into the stadium, and it
has not resiled from its use of tear gas or pepper spray.
6.6.11. UEFA and FFF have each told the Panel that they received no policing planor summary for the UCLF22, and UEFA has indicated that it did not have access tothe police at an operational level. From the evidence, and according to the DIGES,
it is clear that the police deployed with an orientation to dealing with hooliganism resulting from a wholly inappropriate and erroneous reference to the Hillsboroughdisaster. If there had been any real relationship between stakeholders, thisinappropriate policing model should have been understood during the planningphase and challenged.
6.6.12. The Panel concludes that despite multiple planning meetings, there wasan illusion of interoperability, and the reality was a substantial absence of joint
working between stakeholders, underpinned by key failures of UEFA to oversee
the safety and security aspects of the overall project, and identify and escalate
the obvious interoperability failures. Subsequently, key stakeholders have put
institutional defensiveness and protection of reputation above candour and awillingness to learn lessons. There has been a carousel of blame, whereby eachstakeholder has sought to offload accountability to each other, and there has
been a casual disregard for the evidence in their attempts ultimately to blame
supporters.

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7. Evidence relating to themes
7.1. Late change of venue
7.1.1. No stakeholder has asserted that the late change of venue was responsible
for the problems which occurred on 28th May 2022, however, several have referredto the complications which arose as a result of the change of location.
7.1.2. UEFA has explained the changes in the normal organisation of the UCLF
brought about by the late move of venue 258: “due to the change of venue, thepreparatory phase for the 2022 Final had to be accelerated. With a 3-monthpreparation period, it was clear that typical arrangements for the UEFA Champions
League Final would require a much more dynamic approach than usually timed
event. Typically, a number of documents would be requested to be producedby the Local Organising Structure (LOS) team in conjunction with local/ national
authorities. The main and first document is the Safety and Security Concept
integrating private and public security arrangements as described in the staging
agreement, followed by the Safety and Security Operational Plan. The completionof these documents is typically done in a period of several months”.
7.1.3. Under normal circumstances the LOS would submit a bid to host the Final,
using a template provided by UEFA. Upon being successful, the LOS is required
to deliver to UEFA a draft SSNS concept (UEFA acronym for Safety, Security andService). In consultation with the LOS, UEFA would then assist with transforming
the concept into an operational plan. Under UEFA guidance the SSNS concept
should be integrated with the medical and mobility concepts to ensure a holistic
approach.
7.1.4. These processes are designed to ensure the SSNS concept delivered by the
LOS will reflect recognized international best practice, as evidenced in the 2016
Council of Europe Convention on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches.
However, according to UEFA: “[due] to the shortage of time, it was deemed byUEFA that deviating substantially from FFF’s normal security operations of FFF’s
matches held at Stade de France would create uncertainty and confusion. It wastherefore proposed by FFF and agreed by UEFA that the 2022 UCLF safety andsecurity concept would be based on the French Cup Final security arrangements,
for the match (assessed Level 4 risk – highest on the scale) that was to be played

258 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 26)
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at Stade de France on 7th May 2022. These arrangements included the Additional
Security Perimeter operations which were implemented successfully at the French
Cup Final.”
7.1.5. In the case of the UCLF22, as well as no bidding process, there was noconcept, and ultimately no proper plan. The Panel has already analysed thedecision to replace these processes for a fixture with an international dimension by
adopting the safety and security concept for a domestic Cup Final, and concluded
that it was inappropriate and a significant error. If UEFA had operated proper
oversight of the arrangements through its S&S Unit, the defects in that approachshould have been identified and rectified.
7.1.6. The Panel is not confident that the ASP arrangements for the French Cup
Final, whatever these may have been, were as successful as UEFA suggest,in particular because of the stance taken by FFF and UEFA with regard to theroute signage from RER D. We are confident that such efforts as there were toobserve the working of any ASP arrangements at the French Cup, did not lead toany significant or meaningful changes at ASP3. This is despite the fact that the
problems noted at Paragraph 4.4.13 were apparently the reason FFF wanted thesignage to route supporters arriving at RER D away from ASP3. As it was, basing
the UCLF approach on planning for a match which was not a proper comparator
was a shortcut which contributed to the failures we have identified.
7.1.7. The Panel has concluded without hesitation that the late change of venue,
and shortened timescale, is not a reasonable excuse for any of the planningor operational problems which arose. The late change of venue should haveunderlined the requirement for full interoperability and effective communication
between stakeholders, and highlighted the need to check and re-check all
arrangements were robust and fit for purpose. As the Panel has already asserted:safety and security are binary, they cannot be compromised. A shortened
timescale should have been met by greater monitoring and oversight.
7.2. Locals
7.2.1. As already noted, the Stade de France is situated in Saint-Denis, an area witha significant degree of social deprivation, allegations of structural racism, and ahigh crime rate.
7.2.2. The Panel received evidence from one of the UEFA Security Officers
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regarding attacks on supporters arriving or leaving the Stade de France, during aprevious international fixture. The 2015 CoE delegation to France, preceding Euro
2016, highlighted significant issues of violence by locals against foreign supporters(in general, not specific to Saint-Denis).
7.2.3. As the Panel has already noted, FFF observed groups of locals who they
saw as a problem near to the Stade de France from around 13:00. FFF has told
the Panel of various break-ins and other disorder which occurred in the afternoon.
There are numerous reports of arriving supporters being attacked and mugged, or
pickpocketed, and footage shows large groups of locals involved in conflict with
police on the concourse as supporters queued to get in. Similarly, there are manyaccounts of locals climbing fences or jumping turnstiles to access the stadium,and further accounts of locals attacking supporters as they left the stadium.
7.2.4. It is not for the Panel to comment on the causes of social unrest in theenvirons of the Stade de France. There is some evidence that the scenes ofcriminality on 28th May were far worse than had been seen at other events.
However, the Panel is clear that conflict between some locals and the police, andcriminality against supporters was entirely foreseeable.
7.2.5. The Panel has not been informed of any initiatives taken in advance of theevent to relieve community tensions, for example through community leaders, andthere is evidence of unhappiness from some local traders with the organisation of
the event and the disruption it would cause to their businesses.
7.2.6. The Panel has concluded that plans to police foreseeable criminality against
visiting supporters were woefully inadequate. Furthermore, once problems
became visible, there was a lack of dynamic risk assessment and redeployment ofofficers to effectively protect the security of supporters both before and after thematch, despite the clear warning signs and incidents much earlier in the day.
7.2.7. The failure to police local criminality significantly exacerbated the accessproblems at the ASPs and turnstiles. Ultimately, it led to the deployment of tear gas
and pepper spray, which was ineffective in dealing with the actual problem, andwas used inappropriately against peaceful supporters as various footage shows,and affected a large number of vulnerable supporters, including wheelchair users,
the ambulant disabled, children, and senior citizens.
7.2.8. Quite apart from the serious consequences noted above, the Panel observes
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that the use of such weaponry, resulting from failed planning and an inappropriate
policing model, does great damage to the image of UEFA, France and football.
The Panel has therefore concluded that criminality and disorder by some locals
contributed to the problems at UCLF22. However, this should not be overstated.
The fundamental cause of the problems lay elsewhere, and the disorder should nothave been used by any stakeholder to avoid their own accountability.
7.3. Ticketing
7.3.1. The Panel deals with ticketing for UCLF22 as a separate topic for two
reasons. Firstly, it has generated considerable controversy, but secondly because
we have concluded that decisions on tickets made only a marginal difference tothe events of 28th May 2022.
7.3.2. The capacity of the SDF for UCLF22 was 74,234, plus 979 VIPs. The finalist
clubs were allocated 19,618 tickets each. LFC received all their allocation as paper
tickets, whilst RMCF received 8,504 paper tickets and the rest were digital259.
7.3.3. Paper tickets have been used to regulate access to football matches andmany other leisure activities and transport systems for as long as any of us canrecall. In recent years, digital tickets carried on mobile phones have begun toreplace paper for several reasons. Security is one reason - it is generally thoughtthat digital ticketing is harder to counterfeit than paper tickets - but there areothers, including cost and convenience.
7.3.4. It is likely that digital ticketing will completely replace paper over time,
however there are many reasons why this change cannot be achieved quickly:
including the development of the technology, compatibility of different systems,
cost, and user familiarity and competence. As a result, it is common to see bothmethods of ticketing used as alternatives on flights and train journeys. However,there may be good reasons why a dual ticketing system is not appropriate at a highfootfall event such as a UCLF: counterfeiting, and the effect on throughput rates
being two of them.
7.3.5. UEFA wanted to use digital ticketing exclusively for all its 2022 finals, however,there was pushback by several clubs. For UCLF22 UEFA relented and provided
paper tickets for the whole LFC and part of the RMCF allocations, and VIP ticketing.
259 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2759-2760)
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7.3.6. Both LFC and RMCF use forms of digital ticketing at their stadiums andit is clear that neither are against the use of such technology in principle. The
objections were primarily related to compatibility between the UEFA system andtheir own, and the speed at which allocation had to be undertaken before the final.
7.3.7. UEFA could have insisted on using only digital tickets, but it would havecreated practical difficulties with allocations and subsequent protests, anddiscord with LFC in particular. In interview, UEFA ticketing staff did not think
the LFC objections were insurmountable but also conceded that they were notunreasonable260.
7.3.8. UEFA asserted to the Panel that their digital ticketing system is robust
and well thought through. The Panel understands that digital ticketing had beensuccessfully implemented at previous UEFA events including the UEFA Europa
League Final in Baku involving two English clubs in 2019, the UEFA European
Football Championship in England in 2020 and other UEFA 2022 Finals. However,they also emphasised that this was the first time that they had attempted to haveexclusively digital tickets at a UCLF, and that their system was not perfect. UEFA
candidly conceded that it could not guarantee that its digital ticketing could not becounterfeited, although they were unaware of any successful attempt261 .
7.3.9. Ticketing staff also noted that considerable efforts had been made tocounterfeit-proof paper tickets, and this resulted in a position whereby valid
tickets could readily be distinguished from fakes by visual or simple chemical pen
techniques. However, the Panel understands that problems with paper tickets haveoccurred at previous finals.
7.3.10. The blockchain ticketing system used by UEFA involves activation at anouter perimeter check by a steward with a handheld beacon, and then entry through aturnstile by presenting the activated ticket to a scanner. This requires the ticketholder
to present the mobile device, with the ticket application open and Bluetoothturned-on, to the perimeter steward, and to use the scanner at the turnstile.
7.3.11. There are two back-up systems if Bluetooth is not on, or the ticketholder
makes their way to the vicinity of the turnstile without having the ticket activated.
Internet connection is not required for any of the activations or to enter throughthe turnstile, and stewards should be available to troubleshoot or assist.
260 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1109)
261 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1129-1131)
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7.3.12. UEFA informed the Panel that the system removes human judgment fromticket checks and access, and should lead to swifter throughput. From the lay viewof persons who have some general familiarity with digital ticketing, the principle
and processes of the UEFA system appear robust. However, we have seen no
evidence as to its actual efficacy and whether the claims made are correct.
7.3.13. In our view, both the resilience of the system – its ability to work reliably
time and again in different venues and with different hardware and stewards – andits effect on throughput rates, need to be further and thoroughly tested before
reliance can be placed upon it fully. We note that a fundamental technology
breakdown could cause very serious problems where a large crowd is converging
on a major sporting occasion. The Panel understands that there was a substantial
failure of the FIFA digital ticket system affecting supporters accessing fixtures in
Qatar during the World Cup in 2022262 . It is more difficult to devise contingency
plans for such an adverse event, than it is for access problems where there are
paper tickets.
7.3.14. The evidence from 28th May 2022 indicates that mobile ticketing was notas smooth as UEFA might suggest, with multiple reports of activation problems,and failures to pass through the scanner263 . The Panel also notes that there were
multiple reports of valid paper and digital tickets being refused at turnstiles, or
having to be presented multiple times before the scanner allowed entry. The
number of such reports strongly indicates that there was an issue with either theturnstile hardware or using the UEFA software on the SDF IT system.
7.3.15. However, the key point concerning digital ticketing on 28th May 2022
does not relate to the principle or the technology itself, but the effect on the ASP
arrangements. UEFA had agreed to use the arrangements for the French Cup Final
as a template for the UCLF22. But the mobile ticket systems were not the same andthe actions to be taken by stewards were different, which meant that the two finals
were not appropriate comparators.
7.3.16. The Panel has been presented with no evidence that the combinationof Vigipirate security checks, chemical pen checks on paper tickets, and digitalticket activation by beacon or back-up system, was considered at all with respect

262 — Angry England fans locked out of Iran match after Qatar ticket app chaos, The Telegraph
263 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised) (p. 62, 73, 93, 111, 131, 135, 136, 137,
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to throughput rates264 . Indeed, the evidence suggests that this was completely
overlooked, and was a significant factor in the breakdown of those arrangements.
7.3.17. UEFA Events SA has defended its hybrid approach to paper and digitalticketing at UCLF22, despite the complications it posed for ticket activation andchecks, and thereby throughput flow rates. However, the Panel notes that UEFA
Events SA has changed its stance for the Istanbul UCLF23, and will insist on 100%
digital ticketing265 .
7.3.18. The Panel has no expertise on digital ticketing systems and cannot properly
comment further on UEFA’s current system. It is clear that digital ticketing is the
future and the Panel understands the confidence of UEFA ticketing staff that digitalticketing is likely to reduce the possibility of counterfeits, even if it is unlikely toprevent the possibility of counterfeiting completely.
7.3.19. However, the Panel reiterates that reliance on any digital system should only
follow rigorous and independent testing, and there must be contingency plans forthe eventuality of a technology breakdown.
7.4. Counterfeits
7.4.1. In the immediate aftermath of the events of 28th May 2022, UEFA andothers asserted as fact that a major cause of the near disaster was thousands ofsupporters with fake tickets. The Panel concludes that it was irresponsible to makethat assertion without evidence.
7.4.2. As noted above, UEFA now accept that the issue of fake tickets may havebeen “blown out of proportion”. What therefore is the evidence?
7.4.3. UEFA’s written response to the Review indicates that there was a totalof 2,589 unknown ticket codes scanned and rejected at turnstiles during theingress period266 . This figure came from the access control system, which theirown ticketing manager was monitoring in real time. Of that number, 1,644 were
scanned at gates X, Y and Z which were dedicated to Liverpool supporters267.
This represents 63.5% of the total number of unknown ticket codes scanned andrejected at turnstiles.
264 — Flow Rates (as per security concept) - Appendix, VI.14
265 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1130)
266 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 44)
267 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 182)
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7.4.4. Given that ASP3 was abandoned, it is clear that anyone with a fake ticket
was able to attempt to gain access through a turnstile, and those gates were theones nearest to the failed outer perimeter.
7.4.5. The Panel considers that it is unlikely that a person who had made the effort
and had spent a considerable amount of money to travel to Paris with a fake ticket,
would not then have made such an attempt. It is a fair inference therefore that the
number of actual fakes was no more than the figures stated above, subject to one
caveat considered below: so-called ‘blag’ tickets (see 7.4.8).
7.4.6. However, the Panel considers that this number may in fact considerably
overstate the position. As UEFA accepts, the above figures do not reflect the actual
number of fake tickets, but the number of failed presentations. Most failed tickets
were not seized and therefore the holder was able to try their luck at another gate.
Once again, it is the Panel’s view that a person willing to try to get into the gamewith a counterfeit ticket, would be unlikely to give up after the first attempt. It istherefore a fair inference, again now accepted by UEFA, FFF and CSDF, that the
number of persons holding fake tickets outside the Liverpool gates could havebeen and almost certainly was significantly less than 1,644 268 .
7.4.7. The only other evidence of counterfeit tickets comes from police reports
of a raid on a house in Winsford, UK (with no details), intelligence from theEnglish FA and Wembley that an unknown number of Liverpool supporters had
used counterfeit or blag tickets to try to gain entry to the recent FA Cup final,
unidentified reports in the UK media about supporters being defrauded online
by fake ticket offers (which is a wholly different problem), and UEFA research
indicating an unknown number of social media accounts were offering blag
tickets. In addition, stewards at ASP3 “for some minutes” at a time prior to its
abandonment reported that chemical pen check failures were so high that they
doubted the pens were working269.
7.4.8. So-called ‘blag’ tickets are ones designed to be good enough to evade an
initial check, but not get through a scanner check at the turnstile. It is said that theholder uses the blag to get close to the turnstile with the intention of jumping theaccess system. Apart from the Wembley and social media research, reference toblag tickets is wholly speculative.
268 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1146-1147); UEFA
Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p.
2750)
269 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 31)
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7.4.9. In interview, UEFA’s ticketing manager was candid in stating that UEFA had
no figures for an ‘average’ number of counterfeit tickets at a final. The manager
recalled being at the Milan UCLF in 2016 where she personally dealt with “pilesof fake tickets”. The Project Leader added that passing reports of social media
offers of blag tickets to the police was normal for UEFA, and there was no way ofevidencing the extent of it270.
7.4.10. As noted above, the external UEFA Security Officer observing the LFC
entrances, told the Panel that in his view the problems of fake tickets and ticketless
supporters were no more than he had seen at the Cardiff UCLF in 2017 where hehad been responsible for perimeter security.
7.4.11. The Panel notes that counterfeit tickets are a fact of life at UCLFs and manyother sporting and other events. The Panel concludes that there is no evidence
that fake or blag tickets were a significant contributor to the problems on 28th May
2022, and indeed, what evidence there is, suggests that they were not.
7.5. Statistics, mobility, travel, and ticketless supporters
7.5.1. On the night of 28th May 2022, the French Minister of the Interior, Gérald
Darmanin, asserted as fact that the cause of the problems was the presenceoutside the stadium of 30-40,000 Liverpool supporters without tickets. Mr
Darmanin referred to ticket fraud on a “massive, industrial scale”, whilst Amélie
Oudéa-Castéra, Minister of Sports and the Olympic and Paralympic Games,
made clear her view that it was exclusively a problem that arose with Liverpool
supporters271 .
7.5.2. On 29th May 2022, Didier Lallement, Préfet de Police in charge of the security
operation on the night, wrote to Mr Darmanin, asserting that “without doubt” there
were 30-40,000 Liverpool supporters, with fake or no tickets, at the stadium in
addition to the 80,000 holders of valid tickets. In addition, Mr Lallement indicatedthere were “300 to 400 young people from sensitive neighbourhoods in SeineSaint-Denis” who were also part of the problem272 .
270 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1152-1154)
271 — French minister shows difference between ‘real and fake tickets’ from Paris match, Liverpool Echo; Stade deFrance : comment l’organisation de la finale de la Ligue des champions a viré au chaos, Le Monde; Gérald Darmanin
Tweet: “Avec @AOC1978, au PC sécurité du Stade de France. Des milliers de «supporters» britanniques, sans billet
ou avec des faux billets ont forcé les entrées et, parfois, violenté les stadiers. Merci aux très nombreuses forces del’ordre mobilisées ce soir dans ce contexte difficile.” (28 May 2022)
272 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2745)
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7.5.3. The Panel has considered the issue of counterfeits above. The Panel has
noted the fact that, on the night, the French authorities asked UEFA to remove
any reference to groups of locals contributing to the problems. We have found anabundance of assertions that there were a large number of ‘excess’ supporters, but
actual evidence is elusive.
7.5.4. It is convenient to start by looking at the position at around the actual kickoff time. Although the Stade de France CCTV footage is not available, the Panel has
viewed much media and mobile phone footage. At around the time of the delayed
kick-off, 21:36, the available footage shows there were still supporters queueing
at turnstiles, and fairly large groups of locals milling around on the concourse
sporadically running from the police. However, from this evidence, the Panelconcludes that there was no large mass of supporters, certainly not 30-40,000
supporters, outside the turnstile perimeter, with or without tickets at this time.
7.5.5. Furthermore, the external UEFA Security Officer specifically tasked withobserving and reporting on the access of Liverpool supporters at the South end of
the stadium, reflected the same view: there was no large mass of supporters leftoutside the ground by that time273 .
7.5.6. Some stakeholders have referenced that from around halftime there wasincreased train traffic for people returning to the city centre. The volume of extra
footfall on the networks is not clear, however, we note that UEFA has accepted that
2,733 Liverpool supporters with valid tickets were not recorded as accessing thestadium. In fact, UEFA has recorded that a total of 7,112 tickets were not scanned
as having entered the stadium, although it is said that some of the VIP guests were
not scanned on entry and there are accounts that some supporters were allowed
to enter elsewhere without being scanned274 . Nonetheless, it would seem likelythat many of those who did not access the stadium returned to the centre, and
the Panel considers that it is likely that this accounts for much of the increased
volumes on the train lines.
7.5.7. The justification for the figures of 30-40,000 ticketless supporters attendingat the stadium is said to come from figures provided by the transport networks.
The Panel has been provided with different figures from different sources for thesame modes of transport to the stadium on MD.
273 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500, 1507-1508)
274 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2776, 2780)
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7.5.8. According to the UEFA ‘Analysis and Initial Findings’ document, the“planning assumptions” were that 54,000 spectators would arrive at the stadiumby public transport: 17,000 via RER B, 9,000 via RER D, and 22,000 by Metro Line13, and a further 6,000 would arrive by taxis. The balance of approximately 20,000
were anticipated to arrive by coaches, private transport and UEFA VIP transport.
7.5.9. UEFA states that the “match day actuals” were 17,000 RER B, 37,000 RER
D, 26,000 Metro 13, and 6,500 by taxis, giving a total of 78,500, having adjusted
the total by 10% who were assumed to be “regular commuters”, and having used afigure of 6,200 for RER B but added an estimated 10,800 “due turnstiles standingdown”. We understand that this relates to turnstile barriers at the RER B stationand not the stadium, and there has been no explanation as to how that figure has
been estimated275 . This would appear to provide an overall total of 98,500. UEFA
comments that the planning assumptions were therefore accurate save for RER
D, with the discrepancy accounted for by the RER B strike notice and “significant
numbers of ticketless supporters”276 .
7.5.10. In its written response to the Review, FFF state the expected arrivals foran event to be 30,000 at RER B, and 10-15,000 at RER D. FFF state the actual MD
figures to have been: 6,200 at RER B, 36,000 at RER D, and 37,000 at Line 13,
plus 20,905 by buses, 6,680 by Taxis, and 4,111 by private cars – figures said tohave been provided by RATP and the Préfecture. FFF state that the overall totalof people attending at the stadium was 110,000, which included 35,000 without
tickets or having fake ones277.
7.5.11. The significance of these stated figures is that they both relate toconsidered analyses well after the event, and they are plainly incompatible. FFF
asserts that there were 11,500 more people at the stadium than does UEFA. The
comparable figures for RER B and Line 13 are both different in opposite directions
by 10,000. Interestingly, the combined expected and actual totals for each of RER
B and RER D given by FFF are similar (40-45,000 expected, and 42,200 actual),significant because these two lines serviced the south of the stadium, whereasLine 13 serviced the north. Although those arriving via Line 13 with a valid ticket
could access the outer perimeter through any ASP, it would have been less thanstraightforward for those without valid tickets to have made their way around to
ASP3.
275 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1190-1193)
276 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2707)
277 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 181, 184)
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7.5.12. As these figures are each said to rely heavily on those supplied by thetransport networks, the Panel has carefully targeted questions to the transport
networks to establish what the facts are and what are baseless assertions.
7.5.13. In its initial written response to the Review, RATP asserted that 60% of
spectators attending sporting events at the SDF use the 3 lines referred to above,
which equates to 50,000 passengers. RATP indicate the ordinary distribution ofpassengers for these events to be: 16,800 via Line 13 (although this can reach
30,000 as it is said was the case for the French Cup Final), 21,600 via RER B, and9,600 via RER D. No evidence or explanation is provided for these figures, and they
are significantly different to the ‘expected’ figures provided by either UEFA or FFF.
Furthermore, the Panel notes that arrival patterns must vary substantially given the
different origination points and modes of transport for spectators at various event.
7.5.14. The same RATP document asserts that the 28th May figures were 36,000
via Line 13, 6,200 via RER B, and 37,000 via RER D, but the explanation as to how
these figures were generated and the extent to which they are estimates is unclear.
RATP indicates there were manual counts carried out at La Fourche station on
Line 13, which led to an “estimate” of the flows to Saint-Denis, but no details areprovided of the extent of the counts or the basis of the estimates278 . RATP indicatedthat SNCF provided the figures for RER B and D, which is understandable as SNCF
operated the northern part of RER B which includes Saint-Denis, and the whole of
the RER D line.
7.5.15. Answers to a further request to RATP referred to the Line 13 estimates being
related to the number of trains and “field counts” at La Fourche station – there
is no automated counting system, and no explanation is given as to how RATP
estimate the number of passengers at La Fourche who alight at Saint-Denis279.
7.5.16. SNCF has provided a written response to the Review, and further answers
to targeted questions. SNCF has confirmed to the Panel that the ‘normal’ figures
for passengers travelling to sporting events at the stadium are those used forplanning, and it has no automated counting which can inform as to how many
people travelled to the Stade de France via RER B or D on 28th May. The figures
provided are estimates made: “on the basis of manual counting carried out
systematically by our agents on the outbound trains”.

278 — RATP Position Statement – Appendix, IV.13 (p. 208)
279 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15 (p. 273)
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7.5.17. Both networks have been asked to provide evidence of any data provided
to partners on MD. Both have asserted that they had real time contact and SNCF
has indicated it transmitted “counts” via their representative in the stadium control
room but has provided no detail or evidence.280 There is a dispute between thestakeholders concerning this issue.
7.5.18. UEFA has asserted that it did get real time figures from SNCF but only at
19:45 on MD. The UEFA Events SA mobility manager told the Panel that the figures
were provided orally by the SNCF representative in the control room who wascoordinating with RATP, and he noted them down. The figures were: 30,800 via
RER D, 4,340 via RER B, and 30,000 via Line 13. UEFA understood that the figures
were actual numbers of people auto counted as they exited through station
barriers, and that the figure from RER B was estimated by station staff as thebarrier system had gone down due to anti-social behaviour by local youths281. It isclear from the evidence of both RATP and SNCF that UEFA are mistaken, and thenumbers were not accurate auto counts, but estimates based upon some manual
headcounts for which we have no detail and no actual data. Furthermore, on 30th
May 2022, RATP had provided an overall figure for those arriving via Line 13 as
26,000, despite the figure at 19:45 being given as 30,000282 .
7.5.19. RATP and SNCF have reported no significant issues with the transport of
supporters to and from the SDF on 28th May, whatever the actual figures, save forthe anti-social behaviour at the Stade de France RER B station mentioned above.
There was no imperative for the transport networks to collect accurate data
relating to travel numbers, so long as it could avoid overcrowding. It did so. The
Panel does not criticise RATP or SNCF for being unable to provide evidence whichappears not to exist.
7.5.20. The travel figures have been the bedrock of assertions that there was amass of ticketless supporters at the stadium. The Panel has no doubt that a key
problem on the night started with the diversion of a large number of supporters
onto RER D, without any plan to safely route them to appropriate ASPs. However,the Panel has gone to some lengths to obtain evidence of the travel figures
without success. UEFA and FFF rely on very different figures. RATP has apparently
amended figures after the fact. UEFA is mistaken that the figures it received wereactual and based upon barrier counts: it is clear to us that all the figures were
280 — SNCF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.14; SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15
281 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1195-1199)
282 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1199)
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estimates. No one has been able to provide any verifiable data or even a clear
explanation as to how the figures were reached, even following specific requests.
7.5.21. The Panel are quite clear that the figures that have been asserted are wholly
unreliable. The stakeholders who have asserted these figures, including Ministers,
the Préfecture de Police, UEFA and FFF have acted irresponsibly in doing so.
7.5.22. The Panel accepts as a matter of common sense that there will have been
supporters without tickets outside the stadium. Despite significant efforts, thePanel has been unable to determine how many there were, and it concludes that
there is no evidence that there were an abnormal number of ticketless supportersor those with fake tickets, at the SDF on 28th May. There is undisputed evidence
showing that ASP4 – the access from RER B – was substantially underused. Other
evidence does not support there being a mass of ticketless supporters left outside
the ground at kick-off283 .
7.6. Disabled Supporters
7.6.1. As part of the consultation process undertaken by the Panel specificevidence was received regarding the spectator experience of disabled supporters
attending the match.
7.6.2. On 15th August 2022 a detailed written response to a request for a position
statement was forwarded to the Chair of this Independent Review by Ted Morris,
Chair of the Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association (LDSA). This responsecontained harrowing personal statements from disabled supporters and isincluded in full in the Appendix. On 24th September 2022 members of the Paneltravelled to Liverpool and took evidence in person from an LDSA delegation.
7.6.3. CAFE (Centre for Access to Football in Europe) also carried out an
investigation into the events surrounding the UEFA Champions League Final
2022.284We understand that CAFE developed two reports. One was focusedon recommendations to UEFA 285 and the other on recommendations to Frenchauthorities286 . The Panel notes with concern that UEFA only shared with us thereport directed to the French Authorities, which is public.
283 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1280-1281); Meetingwith UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500, 1507-1508)
284 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report (September 2022)
285 — CAFE submits UEFA Champions League Final feedback report to UEFA, CAFE
286 — CAFE publishes report for French authorities on UEFA Champions League 2022, CAFE
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7.6.4. This section draws upon both these reports as well as our other evidence toexplore the experience of disabled supporters across the different phases of theevent. We then discuss the content of the LDSA and CAFE reports and conclude byconsidering UEFA’s response to these submissions.
7.6.5. As with this inquiry more generally our approach to the Panel’s analysis of
the evidence is framed by the Saint-Denis Convention. In this regard it is relevant
to note from the outset that Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention states that
“Parties shall encourage the relevant agencies to ensure that stadiums provide an
inclusive and welcoming environment for all sections of society, including children,
the elderly and those with disabilities, and incorporate, in particular, the provisionof appropriate sanitary and refreshment facilities and good viewing conditions forall spectators.”
7.6.6. The following contains eyewitness testimonies from disabled supporters andtheir representatives. These individual spectator experiences illustrate the extent
of the impact of the factors highlighted by LDSA and CAFE.
7.6.7. The confusion generated by the RER B strike announcement combinedwith poor signage and lack of an ushering system in the last kilometre caused
huge circulation problems for disabled fans both outside and inside the security
perimeter. According to CAFE, this led to “crowding and pressure build-up inseveral areas, with many spectators waiting for extensive periods of time, despite
having arrived 3 hours before kick-off to avoid crowds”287. Jim Fitzsimons288
testimony (on behalf of Peter Rafferty) gives a good idea of the challenge facedby disabled fans in the last kilometre: “We arrived at the RER Saint-Denis at around
18:20. At that point, Peter was being pushed by his nominated assistant Vincent
Dowd and had the support of me, my son and my niece. The supporter’s file
was held a couple hundred yards from the RER station. Then we were allowed
to proceed to the underpass, which we didn’t know was coming as there wereno signs to inform anyone of the fact (or if there were signs, then they were notvisible). At the beginning of the underpass, we were faced with a large numberof steps down within the packed crowd. The help of the supporters there (bothLiverpool & Real Madrid) in helping carry Peter in the wheelchair down the stairs
and then up the stairs on the other side was the only reason we were able tonavigate this obstacle.”

287 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report (September 2022) (p. 9)
288 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20
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7.6.8. The crowding build-up in several areas in the last kilometre and around thestadium combined with the lack of dedicated lanes resulted in disabled people
being caught up in dense crowds exposed to a variety of risks. Also, no dedicatedlanes were identified at first security check (ASP) and inconsistent ticket & bagcheck for disabled people and their companions resulted in a very bad journey
experience, particularly for the most vulnerable.
7.6.9. Within this perimeter the situation was similar, with lack of signage regarding
accessible gates or priority lanes, which meant that disabled fans had to join
the regular queues at the turnstiles. There are also multiple reports of stewards
not being aware of accessible services at the stadium and being unprepared
to deal with this category of supporter. Michelle Dunmore 289, a wheelchair user,
describes the reality faced by disabled fans close to the gates: “We reached gate
Y and saw no disabled access, just masses of fans trying to get through the samegate. My sister attempted to find a steward to help; however, after speaking to 5
different stewards, no one spoke English, so no help was given. We returned togate Y to queue. The chaos and disorganization surrounding this gate turned thisexperience into one of the scariest of my life. When I eventually got to the frontof the entrance, the stewards pushed fans out of the gate I was supposed to go
through. Fans were shouting that I was there, but the stewards continued to pushfans out even though they saw me and made eye contact with me. I ended up witha shoulder dislocation (which is part of my medical condition but still incredibly
painful, and I had a mild panic attack when I got through. I was approached by
the only English steward I came across (I could have done with him before gettingin the stadium). It was hard to fully relax during the game due to what I had justexperienced, and I was in a great deal of pain due to my dislocated shoulder.”7.6.10. As well as all the previous issues, the tear gas and pepper spray used bypolice in several areas outside the stadium also affected many disabled fans, with
reports that some ended up separated from their companions and placed into
extremely dangerous, vulnerable, and frightening situations. Ted Morris in his
evidence states:290 “I started receiving messages saying our disabled supporters
were being gassed and crushed outside the turnstiles. They started contactingme, saying they were terrified and panicking. It was harrowing to receive thesemessages with me unable to help them. They said the situation outside thestadium was becoming critical, and they feared for their lives. I thought many ofour disabled supporters were now in danger of being crushed. This group included
289 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20
290 — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7160

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children with disabilities, blind fans and wheelchair users. At this point, they said teargas had been deployed on several occasions, and they were all suffering from its
effects. They told me that Liverpool fans, although subjected to extreme provocation,
helped them as best they could and took them to a safe place. In my opinion, it was
only thanks to the restraint and actions shown by the supporters of the LFC that amajor disaster and probably a death were averted. No one in authority helped ourdisabled supporters. The saddest thing about this is that our disabled fans have arrived
in Paris to attend a football festival, but at that very moment, they are in the middle of a
carnival of horrors, which will leave them with long-term mental scars”.
7.6.11. Regarding issues inside the stadium, there are several accounts of nondisabled spectators occupying companion seating, some remaining throughout
the match, meaning disabled people’s companion had nowhere to sit. According
to CAFE, “during the match itself, the 93 wheelchair user spaces available
also encountered sightline issues as no seating in front was killed despite
recommendations”. Throughout the match several non-disabled fans stood in andaround the reserved areas causing view obstruction for wheelchair users, despite
the continuous request from disabled fans, their companions, and some stewards
to move and allow full pitch view. The CAFE report also note that “some fans who
require easy access seats are not able to stand for periods of time and CAFE has
received reports of fans with easy access seats having to leave games early due tofatigue from having to stand to see parts of a match” (see Annex Figure 9).
7.6.12. Service levels for disabled fans inside the stadium were relatively poor, bothin terms of facilities and personnel. This is evident from several testimonies as, forexample, Ross Hovey291, a wheelchair user who requires two personal assistants:“Once we got in, there was a steward that showed us where to go, but once we got
into the concourse area, there was no one around. The area where the accessible
toilets were was full of fans queuing for the 4 or 5 toilets there, seemingly unawareof the empty general use toilets just at the top of the short ramp because of theabsence of adequate signage. Again, most Fans helped get us to the front of
the queue with the wheelchair, but the mood was changing as people were all
disgusted at how hard it was to get in or the fact, they’d seemed to stop letting
them in, and the ground was still half empty this was now around”.
7.6.13. Ted Morris292, LDSA Chair, also stated: “On attempting to use the accessible
toilet, a young steward informed us that there was no lighting in the toilet. He
291 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20
292 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20
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advised me to use the torch on my mobile phone; as you can see, given that I use awheelchair, it would be quite a challenge for me, another failure, unfortunately, oneof the many that happened on that terrible day and a snapshot of how disabledfans were being treated. At no time did the Stade de France feel inclusive.” The
Panel understands there were similar problems at the French Cup Final that shouldhave been identified if proper scrutiny by UEFA was in place for that event.
7.6.14. After the final whistle, the journey back had further safety and security
incidents with reports of narrow routes, lack of proper lighting, signage andguiding/supporting personnel. On top of this, disabled fans were also exposed tothe same threats from groups of locals and almost no police protection on their
way to public transport.
7.6.15. Kate Seaman who is the wife of Daniel Seaman, a completely blind
supporter gives this account: “We left the match a few minutes before the final
whistle and ran out of the stadium. I saw gangs of youths and Police with batonsand tear gas, and Daniel told me to run for the underpass as fast as I could. This
process was complicated to do when my husband was blind. Not only does hehave to hold onto me, but I also must run and shout to him when we reach steps,
obstacles, ramps etc. And I must do this quickly. Daniel is also highly vulnerable inthis situation as he relies on me to guide him quickly. We both heard what sounded
like a gun firing as we neared the underpass, and glass bottles flew through the air.
Although terrified, Daniel and I were running on adrenaline at this point, and it wasa primary flight-fight survival response that we both experienced. Daniel shouted
at me to get away from the middle of the underpass, get next to the concrete wall,and, if we heard anything again, drop us down to the floor. Once we got to the endof the underpass (we were at the front of the exiting crowds), we were met by ametal barrier and a police van. The Police had put barriers up across the exits, andwe were against the fence. At this point, I was shaking, and Daniel was panicky
and shouting at the Police to move the barrier. I could feel the weight of the crowd
starting to push against us, and there was nowhere to go. We both felt trapped,
and all we could do was scream and shout at the Police to move the barrier. We
both admitted afterwards that Hillsborough was all that was in our minds. We both
had thoughts that we were not getting out of that underpass alive.”
7.6.16. In his statement to the Independent Review, based on the evidence
presented by the LDSA to the Hearing of the French Senate in June 2022, Ted
Morris states: “Liverpool Football Club has received over 8,500 testimonies, manyof them from extremely vulnerable disabled fans. These show first-hand accounts
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UCLF22 Independent Reviewof the shocking treatment of the disabled; men, women and children should
shame those in positions of authority. They treated disabled fans like animals.
Our fans were simply at the Stade de France watching their team play in theChampions League final; the treatment they received will be to the eternal shameof all those in authority who were there to protect us, they were responsible for oursafety, but they failed. It was a complete dereliction of duty.”
7.6.17. The conclusions reached by LDSA in respect of the experiences of theirsupporters were as follows:· Transport to and from the stadium was inadequate and caused significant
problems for our disabled supporters.
· The outer perimeter ticket checks were wholly inadequate, understaffed andallowed groups of locals to access the stadium without tickets.
· The methods employed by the French Police to manage the Liverpool supporters
caused severe distress to disabled supporters, leaving them fearing for their lives.
· The indiscriminate use of gas and pepper spray caused harm and distress todisabled supporters as young as six years of age.
· The closing and re-opening of gates at the Liverpool end of the stadium caused
crushes and crowd surges that again left disabled supporters fearing for their lives.
This group included children, wheelchair users and supporters who are entirely blind.
· There was a complete lack of accessible signage advising disabled supporters of
their routes. Why weren’t any announcements made outside the stadium?
· No trained accessibility stewards on the entrance gates and no Police presence.
General admission fans used personal assistance seating, resulting in PAs(Personal Assistants) having to stand for upwards of four hours.
· Accessible toilets were unfit for purpose, and poorly prepared/trained stewards
allowed non-disabled supporters to access them.
· Exit gates were closed, some wheelchair users had to be lifted by Liverpool fans,
and the crowd surfed over the gates.
· No police protection was provided on the route back to La Plaine; disabled
supporters were attacked by groups of locals on the 400-metre terrifying gauntletof hate back to the station.
· On arrival at La Plaine, French Police indiscriminately gassed, and pepper sprayeddisabled Liverpool fans who had been running for their lives.

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UCLF22 Independent Review· La Plaine station was poorly staffed, and policies allowed locals onto the platform
with Liverpool fans.
· The heavy-handed approach of the Police is a stain on France, and it is only
because of the exemplary behaviour of Liverpool fans that there wasn’t a loss oflife. Disabled supporters, including children, were placed in harm’s way by the lackof planning around the stadium.
· Those in authority had a duty of care to warn disabled supporters about thepotential that local groups may attack them. Who was responsible for providing
this information to visiting fans? Why didn’t French Police provide safe passage
back to major transport hub.
7.6.18. Based on the evidence we have obtained the Panel concurs with theconclusions drawn, and is sympathetic to the comments made.
7.6.19. In their pre-event assessment CAFE noted in their report that: “Stade deFrance hosted matches at UEFA Euro 2016 and presented several accessibility
issues, including obstructed sightlines from wheelchair user spaces. The learningfrom this tournament led UEFA to commit to only selling wheelchair user tickets
that had a guaranteed view of the pitch, even when fans in the rows in front stood.
Since 2017, UEFA has encouraged venues hosting the Club Competition Finals
and EURO tournaments to invest in sustainable improvements to sightline issues.
Where these needed improvements have not been made, UEFA has killed rows ofseating in front of wheelchair user spaces to ensure a quality experience”.
7.6.20. CAFE was therefore surprised during its site visit to the SDF in April 2022
that “no improvements to the issues raised in 2016” were apparent. According to
CAFE, this was particularly evident at wheelchair spaces where “sightline issues
still occur from all 550 wheelchair user spaces available at Stade de France.
Companion seating for wheelchair users is located behind wheelchair user spaces
at a distance that makes communication between the disabled person and theircompanion impossible”.
7.6.21. The CAFE report further stated that “UEFA acknowledged number of seatsavailable to disabled and low mobility supporters was insuﬃcient, explaining that
operational and security challenges, linked in particular to the change of venue
for the ﬁnal on short notice, meant UEFA was only able to identify 93 wheelchairpositions that fulﬁlled the quality experience UEFA aims to oﬀer to disabled
spectators”.
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7.6.22. The outcome of the above was that only 123 out of 550 easy access tickets
were then sold to disabled supporters when the demand for accessible tickets
was extremely high. As CAFE note “This led disabled fans and journalists to rightly
question why a UEFA Final would be granted to a stadium with inadequate facilities
for disabled fans, and why France’s national stadium, which is also due to host the
Rugby World Cup 2023 and Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, has notinvested in providing sufficient facilities for disabled fans since 2016.”
7.6.23. The CAFE report concludes that “Many incidents at the UCLF22 could havebeen prevented had there been proper planning, had security staﬀ been trained
and had accessible facilities, services and policies been properly managed”. The
Panel concurs.
7.6.24. The conclusions of the LDSA report were forwarded to UEFA by the Chairof the Independent Review and the response was received by the Panel on 12th
December 2022. The UEFA response is reproduced in the Appendix 293 .
7.6.25. The UEFA response should be read in full but certain key passages are referredto here. Under the heading of General Information related to the arrangements for thedisabled supporters UEFA states that: “In relation to the 2022 UCLF, UEFA would like toprovide the following general comments: Based on the meeting with CAFE in April, thearrangements planned for disabled supporters (but also for general public and club
supporters) was considered adequate, except the following: Disabled toilets were inpoor state and not renovated since years: Due to time constraints, no further action
was taken. Disabled signs above disabled gates: It was planned for the staff positioned
at the start of the queue at each gate to provide the necessary information on
the dedicated gate for wheelchair users instead of relying on signage. Match day
disruptions, such as wrong directions provided by public transport staff basedon police instructions, additional perimeter congestion, closing of gates (whichwere discussed during the interviews) affected all target groups. Police operations
arising from the unilateral decisions of the police commander (as discussed during
the interview sessions) affected all target groups.”
7.6.26. Considering these admitted failures by UEFA, it is difficult to see how it
can be concluded that arrangements for disabled supporters were adequate.
Moreover, it is important to reference some inaccuracies contained in theUEFA response. At p.5 of the UEFA response, it is stated that: “As a European

293 — UEFA Social Responsibility Department Position Statement - Appendix, IV.3
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football governing body and event owner, UEFA’s aim is to create a safe, secure,welcoming, and festive environment around its tournaments and finals. When
preparing for any of our events, UEFA is providing active inputs and expertise to
the national authorities responsible for safe and secure environment in the publicareas of the host cities and around the stadiums. UEFA also cooperates proactively
with host associations being the event organizer in their respective country toensure the same safe and welcoming atmosphere inside the stadiums. As a part ofit, UEFA includes within stewards e-learning a module ‘Respect Access For All’ inorder to embed UEFA’s expectation in regard to treatment of disabled supporters
by the safety and security personnel.”
7.6.27. Whilst the Panel agrees that the statement is aspirationally correct, wehave concluded that it is misleading in the context of UCLF22. Whereas it iscommendable that UEFA’s stewarding e-learning course contains a module entitled“Respect Access For All”, what UEFA do not acknowledge here is that only 56% of
stewards completed this e-learning prior to the event294 .
7.6.28. UEFA goes on295 to confirm its commitment to the implementation of
the 2016 Council of Europe Convention by stating: “Since 2016 we maintainstrong cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe on theimplementation of the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety,
Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events(“Convention”), including through joint EU-UEFA programmes for national police
training. The Convention also calls for “creating a safe, secure and welcoming
environment in public spaces that are designated for supporters to gather before
and after the event, or locations in which supporters can be expected to frequentof their own volition, and along transit routes to and from the city and/or to andfrom the stadium”.
7.6.29. As has been pointed out elsewhere in the report, there is no evidence thatthe preparations for this event were indeed benchmarked against the standards ofthe 2016 Convention. Indeed, as highlighted earlier in this section UEFA themselves
admit failings in provision of disabled toilet facilities which are specifically referred
to in Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention, along with “good viewing conditions.”
As mentioned, the CAFE report was extremely critical of the viewing arrangements
for disabled supporters.
294 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2693)
295 — UEFA Social Responsibility Department Position Statement - Appendix, IV.3
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7.6.30. The Panel has concluded that the service provision made for disabled
supporters in respect UCLF22 fell far short of that which should reasonably havebeen expected. UEFA failed to adequately ensure the event met its obligations
toward disabled supporters as set out in Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention.
7.6.31. The Panel concurs with CAFE that there was a failure by the SDF to address
issues highlighted in 2016. We conclude it was unacceptable that, rather thanworking to address the issues constructively and equitably, a decision was madeby UEFA and FFF to address the problems by further limiting the accessibility of theevent to disabled supporters.
7.6.32. The Panel also concludes that the severity and magnitude of the negative
experiences of disabled supporters at the event is beyond the capacity of thisreview to fully assess within its terms of reference. It is also evident that such
failures and experiences are not isolated to UCLF22. The continuing failure to meet
minimum standards for disabled supporters indicates that an urgent dedicatedreview is needed to address the necessary improvements which should be madein advance of future UEFA events, including the forthcoming UCLF23.

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8. Overall Conclusions

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8. Overall Conclusions
8.1. Factors which caused or contributed to the ‘near-miss’8.1.1. The Panel has identified eight factors which caused or contributed to theconditions which almost led to disaster:a. A substantially larger number of Liverpool supporters were directed to arrive via
the ‘Stade de France: Saint-Denis’ station, on train line RER D, which was closest to
the southwest of the stadium, compared to the volume of people attending othermajor events at the stadium by that route.
b. Defective route planning between RER D and the stadium, resulting in too many
people being directed by police toward the stadium via the south-west ASP3 entrance.
c. Defective access arrangements at the ASPs. The effect of this was particularly
acute at ASP3 because of the increased pressure created by the flawed routing,and that it was positioned on a restricted access ramp: a bottleneck.
d. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets, without extra measures tomaintain throughput rates, exacerbated access problems at ASPs.
e. Defective turnstile arrangements, which failed to ensure a sufficient throughput
rate to guarantee safe entry.
f. The activities of large groups of locals, some of whom were involved in attacks
on supporters and attempts to breach the perimeters and turnstiles to gain entry
to the stadium, and a failure to police them.
g. The use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse.
h. A lack of contingency plans relating to both additional perimeter and turnstileaccess: there was no Plan B when things went wrong.
8.1.2. The Panel has identified two further matters which contributed to or
exacerbated those factors: the late change of venue, and a remarkable failure ofjoint working or interoperability.
8.1.3. The late change of venue meant that the normal timetable for organisation had
to be truncated, and planning for the event had to be adapted to the circumstances.
Compromises could be made to many areas of the event, but safety and security were
not among them. Whereas there could be no bidding process or development of aconcept, full attention should have been paid to the formulation and agreement ofvenue and event risk assessments, and proper operational plans. That did not happen.
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8.1.4. The truncated approach adopted was reliant on the planning for andoperation of the French Cup Final: a misconceived shortcut with an event which
was not a proper comparator. Such a tight timescale required enhanced oversightand monitoring of all matters which pertained to safety, with the fullest regard to
joint multi-agency working.
8.1.5. In reality, the opposite occurred. There was no venue risk assessment,
and no proper event risk assessment or operational plans. There were multiple
communication and interoperability failures between stakeholders. Important
historical and real time information was not shared. Plans were not properly
agreed, and there is the clearest evidence of an absence of stakeholders working
together with respect to almost all of the above factors.
8.1.6. UEFA was at the centre of the project, and the failure to ensure properinteroperability, and to challenge an absence of joint working, and to escalate andremedy such problems, was primarily theirs. However, the Préfecture de Police
and FFF also bear responsibility because of their important roles in ensuring public
safety.
8.1.7. The Panel concludes that assertions regarding huge numbers of ticketless
supporters, and those with fake tickets, have been wrongly inflated and have beenstated as fact, to deflect responsibility for the planning and operational failures of
stakeholders. This is reprehensible and has involved UEFA, UEFA Events SA, FFF,
the Préfecture de Police, Government Officials and French Ministers
8.2. The eight factors
8.2.1. Displacement of LFC supporters onto RER D
8.2.1.1. Although the numbers are disputed, there is no doubt that a large numberof supporters were diverted from the main public transport route to the south of
the stadium – via RER B – onto RER D. UEFA and FFF blame the “unilateral” actionsof the police and/or transport networks for this, and claim that they did not learnof it until it was too late to remedy. The police deny involvement, and the transport
networks assert that the displacement was a reasonable measure taken to avoid
any adverse effects of a planned strike on the capacity of RER B. The transport
networks further assert that their approach was transparent and had been raised inplanning meetings.

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8.2.1.2. The Panel has reached the following conclusions on this issue:
a. Of itself, the factual dispute is clear evidence of a lack of communications andinteroperability, and a major planning failure, between UEFA, FFF, the Préfecturede Police and the transport networks. This is remarkable given the fact that allof these stakeholders were involved in planning meetings, and all of them had
representatives within the adjoining stadium and police control rooms on match day.
b. The diversion did not adversely affect the travel of supporters to the vicinity of thestadium, nor did it cause any overcrowding or significant problems on the network. In
short, there was nothing inherently wrong with the diversion: it was not a failure of itself.
8.2.1.3. According to RATP, 60% of people attending sporting events at the Stadede France, travel via three public transport routes296 . The ordinary distribution isthat a third arrive on Metro Line 13 to the north of the stadium, and two-thirds
arrive via RER B or RER D to the south. Of itself, this created an obvious issue
as there were only two ASPs to the south of the stadium. This factor – the huge
disproportion between arriving supporters entering the stadium footprint via
ASP3 and 4, and those accessing via the other ten ASPs - should have focussed
those responsible for planning mobility on ensuring nothing was left to chance,
everything was monitored, and there were proper contingency plans in place.
8.2.1.4. The minutes of the planning meetings record that UEFA and FFF were
aware of the importance of ensuring supporters arrived at the south of the stadium
primarily via RER B. They were aware of planned works on RER B, and later they
were aware of planned strike action. The evidence suggests that the intention by
the transport networks to shift a proportion of supporters from RER B to D, shouldhave been known to other stakeholders days in advance of match day, as it was the
subject of a media release reported by the Press Association297.
8.2.1.5. If the movement of a greater proportion of supporters to RER D had
occurred unexpectedly, effective interoperability would have alerted each relevant
stakeholder prior to match day, and in real time on match day.
8.2.1.6. Travel disruptions are notoriously common. Those responsible for last
kilometre routing, and access arrangements – the police, FFF and UEFA – shouldhave ensured sufficient monitoring of real time arrivals so as to take effective
action to ensure public safety.
296 — See 7.5.13 above.
297 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15 (p. 307)
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8.2.1.7. The effect of the displacement of a large number of supporters onto RER D
was that it created conditions which made the second factor more critical than it
would otherwise have been.
8.2.2. Failure to effectively route supporters arriving at RER D to safely accessthe stadium
8.2.2.1. The ‘natural’ route for supporters to take to the stadium from RER D wasvia ASP3. The Panel has concluded that there were obvious constraints on thenumbers who could safely access via ASP3, including the narrow A1 pedestrian
underpass, the relatively confined approach via Avenue du Président Wilson, andthe limitation of the ASP3 entry ramp itself. Furthermore, the Panel has found that
there have been a number of historical congestion problems with access to the
Stade de France, which were or should have been known and taken account ofduring the planning phase by the relevant stakeholders, including UEFA, FFF and
the Préfecture.
8.2.2.2. In fact, solutions to avoid congestion on the route between RER D andthe stadium were readily available. What was required was real time monitoringof the volume of supporters arriving via RER D, and a cordon at the junction of
Avenue François Mitterrand, and Avenue du Président Wilson, preventing too many
supporters taking a left turn down toward ASP3. The cordons could have operated asimple pulsing method to allow only a manageable number of supporters to access
via that route. The ‘excess’ of supporters would be directed straight on, via Rue Francisde Pressensé, to the main access at ASP4 on the expansive Avenue Stade de France.
8.2.2.3. The Panel notes that FFF, supported by UEFA Events SA, put up signage todirect supporters coming from RER D to access the ground in either of the above
ways. The Préfecture de Police countermanded this plan and removed the signs.
Neither UEFA nor FFF escalated the dispute to the DIGES or other State authority or
took any other measure which might have mitigated the problem which in fact aroseon the day, other than placing a small number of volunteers at the said junction,
who were ineffective. The CSDF noted that it was not informed of this dispute until
after the event. If it had been, it would have raised it with stakeholders.
8.2.2.4. Furthermore, the Panel has found that UEFA shared different iterations ofa map of the vicinity showing one or other of the above routes, at various different
times. In particular, the significant, multi-agency security, safety and mobility meeting
two days prior to the event (MD-2), chaired by an external UEFA Security Officer,
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presented a map showing all supporters coming from RER D entering via ASP3, whilst
the UEFA website had the same map but with supporters accessing via ASP4.
8.2.2.5. On this issue, the Panel concludes that:a. Not only should the key stakeholders, in particular the Préfecture de Police but
also UEFA and FFF, have monitored the supporter arrival volumes in real time - factor
1 above - they should have monitored the routes between RER D and the stadium.
b. The obvious geographical and historical problems regarding access to thestadium from RER D were or ought to have been known by the key stakeholders.
In particular, there should have been a venue risk assessment which would havehighlighted such issues. Had proper attention been paid to the geographical andhistorical problems, effective planning would have led to an operation which would
have restricted the flow to ASP3 and directed the excess towards ASP4.
c. The fact that FFF had proposed a solution which was rejected by the Préfecturede Police should have resulted in escalation to the DIGES and other Stateauthorities by FFF and UEFA.
d. The absence of real time monitoring, or an agreed plan to operate a safe routing
scheme from RER D to the stadium was a further interoperability failure. This wascompounded by a failure to involve CSDF, given their local knowledge.
8.2.3. Defective access arrangements at ASPs
8.2.3.1. The ASPs were the interface between public space and the stadium
footprint, which included a controlled area outside of the turnstile perimeter,where only those with a valid ticket would be allowed entry. The ASP arrangements
included ‘Vigipirate’ security checks under the authority of the police, and ticket
activations and checks by stewards deployed by FFF.
8.2.3.2. The Panel agrees with the external UEFA Security Officer, that the ASP
arrangements were “not fit for purpose”. He had been responsible for outer
perimeter security at the 2017 UCLF at Cardiff, and is therefore well-placed to givesuch an opinion. We focus on ASP3 as the epicentre of where problems occurred,
but many of the shortcomings of that entry point were common to other ASPs. He
asserted that ASP3 access was defective for the following reasons:a. There was no plan or operation to monitor or restrict the number of supporters
approaching that entrance (factor two above). He observed no attempt to limit or
alleviate the congestion once it arose.
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b. Entry to the controlled area was via a narrow ramp (about 10m across), which
formed an obvious bottleneck. It was insufficient for the numbers accessing
through this entrance.
c. Photographs of ASP3 show that there were six channels for persons to enter
between metal barriers. FFF has asserted that there were 10 lines for supporters
going through the checks. UEFA undertook flowrate calculations on the basis of 15
lines. He expressed the view that there was room for about 7 lines.
d. The positioning of two different checks at ASPs - for security and tickets - was
not usual, as confirmed by CSDF. This affected throughput rates, slowing entry.
e. The effect of two different checks on throughput was compounded by the factthat there were two types of ticket – digital and paper. In reality this meant there
were three distinct processes at ASPs: security checks, chemical pen checks on
paper tickets, and digital activation of mobile phone tickets.
f. There was no ‘escape’ lane for those rejected at the checks, which meant thoseturned away impeded the access of those with valid tickets.
g. Police vans partially blocked the approach. UEFA’s S&S Unit has noted that thevehicles were positioned across part of the access to ASP3, which negatively
affected throughput.
h. Security checks were more thorough than expected. UEFA observed that the
Vigipirate checks were far more comprehensive than it had anticipated or assumed
in its flow rate calculations, again affecting throughput rates.
i. There was no police line across the front of the access checks. FFF asserted that
this had been expected and would have regulated flow.
j. UEFA noted that only about half of the stewards deployed on MD had completed
their e-learning package, which was focussed on ticketing and access principles(this may have had a contributory effect, but it is not clear whether those deployedat ASPs were the ones who had relevant training deficits).
k. There were no contingency plans to deal with congestion or other issues at ASPs.
8.2.3.3. The Panel notes that UEFA’s contention is that FFF were responsible for
ASPs, but its staff did assist with design. UEFA, UEFA Events SA and FFF criticise
failures of the police regarding the operation of ASPs. On the evidence, it appears
that UEFA’s involvement in the design and operation of ASPs was limited toinsisting on ticket checks and activation at ASPs, and one of the S&S Unit staff
undertaking throughput calculations.

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8.2.3.4. The Panel has concluded that UEFA should have taken a proactive
oversight role to ensure access arrangements were safe, irrespective of who
actually designed and operated them on MD. UEFA were not provided withnor did they seek to obtain any plan as to how ASPs were to work, nor did they
commission a crowd modelling report as is often the case where there arechallenges to access and egress arrangements.
8.2.3.5. The Panel found that the UEFA throughput calculations were completely
defective, for the following reasons:a. They were based on approximately twice the number of lanes as their own
external Security Officer reported was possible.
b. They took no account of the effect of dual checks, compounded by two
different ticketing forms.
c. They took no account of the actual police plans relating to congestion, and theextent of the Vigipirate checks.
d. They took no account of the absence of an ‘escape’ lane.
8.2.3.6. UEFA Events SA and FFF had agreed to use a plan used for the French
Cup Final as the basis for safety and security at the UCLF. Apart from the fact that
the UEFA S&S Unit did not see any plan for the French Cup or UCLF, the Panel has
concluded that the use of the earlier match was a poor comparator. It involved two
domestic clubs, and the mobility and risk profiles were completely different.
8.2.3.7. The Panel rejects attempts by UEFA, UEFA Events SA, FFF, and Préfecturede Police to blame ticketless supporters for the congestion and overwhelmingof ASP3. Whether or not there were supporters and locals without valid tickets
at ASP3, it could not cope with the number of supporters arriving from RER D
without a cordon regulating the flow at the junction where the crowd could be split
between ASP3 and 4.
8.2.3.8. The Panel also rejects any suggestion that late arriving supporters were acause of the problems, for the same reasons, and also because the problems wereapparent about three hours prior to kick-off.
8.2.3.9. The Panel has concluded that the evidence regarding the design andoperation of ASP3 shows an absence of interoperability between the Préfecture,
FFF, and UEFA, and a failure to involve CSDF in the planning, which had relevant
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knowledge and expertise. In particular, the police and FFF appeared to be
operating parallel plans which were not compatible, and with a lack of effective
communication or joint operational command.
8.2.4. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets
8.2.4.1. The use of both paper and blockchain digital tickets greatly complicated asituation where a large number of supporters had to be managed and directed totheir entrances.
8.2.4.2. Ticket checks at ASPs involved the use of chemical pens, and shouldhave involved assistance and an ‘escape’ lane and disputation process. In parallel,
the activation of digital tickets on mobile phones required a different form ofassistance and disputation, and the use of a handheld beacon, plus a fallback
activation process. This necessitated not only several different processes but
training for stewards on each.
8.2.4.3. The Panel has concluded that the overcomplicated ticketing exacerbatedthe other access problems, and contributed to the dangerous situation which
occurred. There are arguments in favour of using either paper or digital ticketing,although the latter is almost certainly going to be the future. The Panel has
concluded that a safe system can be provided with either paper or digital tickets,
but the use of both is problematic.
8.2.5. Defective access arrangements at the turnstile perimeter
8.2.5.1. The plan was to use ASPs to restrict access to the concourse aroundthe stadium to those with valid tickets. That was a laudable approach. It shouldhave avoided the congestion and serious access problems which occurred at theturnstiles on the night.
8.2.5.2. The turnstile arrangements at SDF include half height turnstiles andtripods. These present opportunity for anyone who is prepared to jump theturnstile or dive under it. Apart from controlling access through the ASPs, thephysical architecture required enough stewards to be positioned in front of andbehind the turnstiles, with an effective queuing arrangement. It is well known that alack of control at the entrance to turnstiles adversely affects throughput.
8.2.5.3. The Panel has found little evidence of effective stewarding or appropriate
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queuing arrangements in front of the turnstiles from the outset, however any sucharrangements were rendered ineffective when the ASP was abandoned and there
was free access into the controlled concourse area. In addition, the Panel has
heard much evidence of valid tickets having to be presented multiple times to gain
entrance, the resulting congestion seriously impeded flow through the turnstiles,
which, cumulatively exacerbated the congestion outside the turnstiles. Indeed,various turnstile blocks were closed for long periods of time as a result of thecongestion.
8.2.6. Actions of locals
8.2.6.1. The Panel has received widespread evidence that groups assumed to
be French residents - locals - were present around the Stade de France and in its
general vicinity. Some were involved in attacks on supporters and others in thevicinity of the stadium, and in trying to gain entry to the stadium without tickets,
some successfully, by breaking-in, or by climbing fences or jumping turnstiles.
According to evidence from FFF, these problems were apparent from around 13:00
on match day, and continued through the day and evening, including after the match.
8.2.6.2. The Stade de France is situated in an area with significant social
deprivation, and a high crime rate. There has been a history of social unrest andproblems between sections of the local community and the police and otherauthorities. This history has included tensions accompanying major footballmatches occurring at the Stade de France.
8.2.6.3. The 2015 Council of Europe mission to France, reported on the problem
of attacks on foreign football supporters by locals (albeit not specific to SaintDenis), and the Panel received credible evidence of such attacks on supporters at
previous international and domestic fixtures at the Stade de France.
8.2.6.4. The Préfecture de Police, FFF and CSDF have all commented on theunprecedented scale of this problem on the night. It is difficult for the Panel tocomment on the scale of these problems in the past, however crime targeted at
supporters and attempts to force entrance to the ground were foreseeable. These
incursions led to gate closures which amplified the throughput problems alreadyencountered.
8.2.6.5. The Panel notes that no effective action was taken to prevent these issues
or when these problems became apparent in the early afternoon of MD. The
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Panel further notes evidence that police officers near to the scene of attacks on
supporters failed to intervene, and that the attacks continued in various places
around the stadium, and on routes to transport hubs and at the stations, long after
the match finished.
8.2.6.6. The Panel has concluded:a. There is no evidence of any measures taken to relieve community tension which
was foreseeable, prior to MD, for example by meetings with community leaders.
b. There is evidence of unhappiness by some local businesses with MD arrangements.
c. There is no evidence that the targeting of supporters and others attending theevent by locals was addressed or prioritised during the planning phase.
d. There were insufficient police resources deployed to deal with the problems
which in fact arose.
e. Since the problems arose early in the afternoon, there is no evidence of aneffective dynamic risk assessment and application of contingencies to prevent the
problems continuing.
8.2.6.7. Finally in this regard, the Panel notes the request by French authorities to removereference to the role of locals from the UEFA media release following the events of
the night. This request should not have been made. UEFA should not have acted
upon it, the effect of which was to contribute to an already misleading statement.
8.2.7. Use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse
8.2.7.1. The Panel has considered a substantial body of eye-witness accounts fromsupporters and others regarding the use of tear gas and pepper spray. The Panel
has also viewed photographs and footage of the use of such weaponry.
8.2.7.2. On the evidence, the Panel concludes that tear gas canisters weretargeted predominantly at groups of locals, although the effect was indiscriminate.
Many supporters and others attending the event were seriously affected, includingchildren and the disabled. In addition, handheld pepper spray aerosols were
deployed against individual supporters. In clear cases, the supporters were doing
nothing other than holding up tickets in obvious attempts to obtain legitimate
entry. The use of such weaponry led to crushing as evidenced by buckled security
barriers. Although the tear gas caused groups of locals to move rapidly, this was
obviously dangerous within the confined space of the concourse.
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8.2.7.3. The Panel observes that the situation which led to tear gas being deployedshould not have arisen, and would not have done if there had been effective
engagement with the community, effective policing of crime, and effective accessarrangements.
8.2.7.4. The Panel concludes that the use of tear gas and pepper spray has noplace at a festival of football. Its use at UCLF22 will have disinclined families
and vulnerable supporters from future attendance, and will have damaged thereputation of the event. Furthermore, it raises a question mark over the ability of
the French authorities to properly manage major sporting events at the Stade deFrance.
8.2.8. Lack of Contingency plans
8.2.8.1. There were no contingency plans to deal with access problems at the
ASPs or for consequent problems at the turnstiles. No stakeholder has suggested
there were contingency plans and none of the minutes of the planning meetings
refer to contingencies. The Panel views this as a particularly serious failure.
Wherever large crowds attend to access an event there is a potential for accessproblems and congestion, which raise significant public safety issues. There wasno Plan B when things went wrong.
8.2.8.2. Contingency plans should have included the rapid redeployment ofstewards and police resources to a problem area, the redirection and managementof crowds, the reimposition of access arrangements where they have failed, andthe maintenance of throughput rates into the stadium for those with valid tickets.
Contingencies should have been reinforced by effective multi-agency crisis
management planning and arrangements, and means of communication withaffected supporters.
8.3. Factors attributed by others
8.3.1. Having summarised conclusions on what the Panel has found to be causal
factors in the events which nearly turned into disaster, we now summarise ourconclusions on whether ticketless supporters or those trying to gain entry withcounterfeit or blag tickets were a contributory factor. We emphasise that this isa different issue to the actions of locals, which is dealt with above at paragraph8.2.6.

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8.3.2. Supporters without valid tickets
8.3.2.1. A number of key stakeholders have stated as fact that there were a huge
number of supporters trying to gain access through ASP3 and the turnstiles
without valid tickets. The Panel notes that individuals trying to gain access to major
sporting events without valid tickets is a well-known phenomenon, and UCLF22
was no exception. These are matters that must be taken into account in planning,and operations on the day.
8.3.2.2. The Panel notes from various planning documents that the issue was not
only foreseeable but it was actually foreseen. The appropriate question is whether
the number of persons attending the vicinity of the Stade de France, trying togain access without tickets was so large and troublesome so as to overwhelm
reasonable and appropriate plans.
8.3.2.3. The Panel notes that the effect of ticketless supporters is relied upon by
key stakeholders to explain why they were not accountable for what happened on
the night. The Panel is also aware of the sensitivities of this for other stakeholders,
including the supporters, sponsors and clubs. Therefore, the Panel has been
focussed and rigorous in following the actual available evidence regarding bothticketless supporters and counterfeits.
8.3.2.4. The assertions of UEFA, FFF and the French authorities, including
Ministers and the Préfecture, have been based largely upon the numbers assumed
to have travelled to the Stade de France via both private and public transport. The
Panel has concluded:
8.3.2.5. The numbers asserted by multiple stakeholders are subjective estimatesand not actual objectively measured figures, and different estimates have beenasserted by different stakeholders.
8.3.2.6. Despite several targeted requests, the Panel has not been provided with
contemporaneous records of the estimates (except for one data set provided
orally to UEFA at around 19:45 on MD), or a clear explanation as to how they werereached or when. Some estimates were amended after the event. Consequently,
these transportation figures are both inconsistent and unreliable.
8.3.2.7. There is no evidence of a mass of ticketless supporters in the vicinity ofthe stadium.
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8.3.2.8. Footage from around the actual time of kick-off (21:36), and the evidenceof the external UEFA Security Officer who was observing the perimeter at thesouth side of the stadium (the LFC access), indicates that there were hundreds of
LFC supporters still queuing to get in, but no other substantial body of supporters
outside.
8.3.2.9. The same footage and accounts indicate that there were large numbers of
locals outside of the stadium at this time.
8.3.2.10. UEFA figures derived from the turnstile data, establish that 2,733 LFC
valid ticketholders were unable to register their tickets at the turnstiles.
8.3.2.11. The Panel therefore concludes that while the number of supporters trying
to gain access without a valid ticket is unknown, there is no evidence it was asubstantial number or any more than usual at such an event. At the time of actual
kick-off, there were some hundreds of Liverpool supporters still queuing to gain
entry, no doubt including many of the supporters with valid tickets who did not getin at all. There were groups of locals, but no other groups of supporters. By 22:10,
all ticketed supporters who still sought to enter were inside the stadium.
8.3.2.12. With respect to counterfeits, there is social media evidence of theavailability of fake and ‘blag’ tickets (the latter designed to get the person closeenough to the turnstile to be able to jump or tailgate into the stadium). There issome anecdotal evidence, second hand from stewards, that there were many faketickets at ASP3, but this is impossible to either verify or quantify.
8.3.2.13. In terms of verifiable evidence, there was a total of 1,644 presentations oftickets with unknown QR codes at turnstiles dedicated to LFC supporters (gates X,
Y and Z). The Panel notes:
a. The number of presentations will have been substantially higher than thenumber of counterfeits, as the holder would be expected to attempt entry at
multiple scanners.
b. Everyone with a fake ticket would have been able to access turnstiles, given the
failure of the ASP.
c. UEFA staff candidly accepted to the Panel that counterfeit tickets were a feature
at UCLFs.

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8.3.2.14. As noted in 8.1.7 the Panel concludes that the problem of fake tickets
has been overstated and there is no evidence that it contributed to the events of
UCLF22.
8.4. Conclusions relating to specific stakeholders
8.4.1. Overview
8.4.1.1. The Panel has concluded that there were a series of failures which caused
or contributed to the problems which occurred on 28th May 2022. Many of the
stakeholders are accountable for those failures to one extent or another, however,the Panel’s spotlight has focussed upon UEFA, FFF, and the Préfecture, because of
their key roles, which should have ensured the safety of UCLF22.
8.4.1.2. In summary, the UEFA ‘model’ created a lacuna, whereby no one hadproper oversight over the full planning and operational picture, and a particularconsequence of this was that there were substantial deficits in joint working
between stakeholders, which were not picked-up and remedied.
8.4.1.3. The policing model was inappropriately focussed on public order policing
and failed to meet the obligations set out in the 2016 Convention: a safety, security
and service model based on engagement with supporters and local communities
and a multi-agency approach. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that thisled to a securitised policing approach, there was minimal proactive engagementby the police with either supporters or other partners, and no other stakeholder
escalated this problem to higher French authorities. The outdated policing model
was based upon flawed assumptions about risk and was over reliant on thereactive use of munitions. As such the policing operation was not only inadequate
in meeting the challenges it encountered but actively contributed to the dangers
that materialised.
8.4.2. UEFA (including UEFA Events SA)
8.4.2.1. The Panel has concluded that UEFA, as event owner, bears primary
responsibility for failures which almost led to disaster. Whereas it was reasonable
to delegate various security and safety matters to others – primarily FFF – and todefer to the constitutional position of the Préfecture de Police regarding policing
duties, it did not follow that this absolved UEFA of responsibility. UEFA was central
to the organisation of the event, and it should have monitored, supervised and182

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assisted with security and safety measures, to ensure they were fit for purpose,and to identify and remedy problems before they arose in real time.
8.4.2.2. UEFA was at the centre of the event. It had an obligation to ensure allcomponents of the ‘project’ were fulfilled effectively. So far as safety and security
were concerned UEFA had requirements in its bidding process, it had a dedicated
S&S Unit, its Events management attended various multi-agency planningmeetings, its external Security Officers chaired the important MD-2 security
meeting, and it had a Safety and Security Adviser from the S&S Unit in the stadium
control room.
8.4.2.3. The ‘delegation and deference’ model was manifestly not a contract
which just transferred all obligations elsewhere, although the Panel has found that
UEFA and UEFA Events SA’s leadership treated it as such. UEFA did remain involved
throughout, and so it should. However, it did so ineffectually, without taking
responsibility and without doing so through the appropriate staff: its own S&S Unit.
8.4.2.4. The Panel has found that the presence of Events management at planningmeetings was not sufficient to ensure that there were proper safety and security
plans. The MD-2 security, safety and mobility meeting should have been chaired bya senior member of the UEFA S&S Unit, not external Security Officers as it should
not have been their role. The Panel has not been able to identify any effective
action taken by the S&S Unit Safety and Security Adviser present in the stadium
control room on MD, including during the crisis.
8.4.2.5. In addition, the Saint-Denis Convention obliges State authorities to work
together with organisers – UEFA must be central to how that works with respect
to a UCLF. Julien Zylberstein, Managing Director of UEFA European Affairs &Governance, told the Senate hearings of UEFA’s involvement with the Saint-Denis
Convention and its Standing Committee, but he was less forthcoming as to why
its provisions failed to ensure effective joint working, and proper engagement withsupporters at UEFA’s 2022 flagship event. Indeed, he failed to address that at all.
8.4.2.6. The Panel emphasises two points. Mobility and last kilometre routing
may well occur in the public space outside of the private stadium footprint, butthey involve ‘customers’ attending the event. Secondly, as is obvious from thefacts, mobility and routing had a direct effect on the arrangements at the interface
between the public and private spaces, and beyond.

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8.4.2.7. As a result, where the Panel identifies failures, it is not open to UEFA
to avoid accountability by attributing blame to others: the supporters, thetransport networks, the Préfecture, or FFF. There was contributory fault from otherstakeholders, but UEFA were at the wheel.
8.4.2.8. The Panel found that UEFA’s operational staff were motivated andcommitted to their roles. Although the Panel has highlighted a number oftasks which should have been performed better, UEFA and UEFA Events SA’s
responsibility for the failures on 28th May was mainly the result of the following
senior management failures and structural issues:a. The Senior management of UEFA Events SA used ‘delegation and deference’ totry to avoid accountability. Stewarding services were being sub-contracted, andpolicing authorities were fulfilling their duties: but with respect to a UEFA event.
Safety and security were components of the project. The marginalisation of UEFA’s
own S&S Unit was a consequence.
b. The failure of UEFA’s wider senior leadership to address these issues over anumber of years, despite clear knowledge of them.
c. The failure of the Director of National Associations, who is responsible for the
S&S Unit, and the failure of the Head of the Unit himself, to escalate the structuralproblems and side-lining of the unit.
8.4.2.9. In summary, the senior management of UEFA Events SA was responsible
for each component of the UCLF project. Safety and security matters should havebeen viewed as a specific component and overseen by the dedicated UEFA S&S
Unit. Its responsibility should have included:a. Overseeing each aspect of planning which affected safety and security andensuring it was appropriate.
b. Attending all planning meetings involving S&S issues, and fully engaging with all
relevant partners over plans and arrangements.
c. Ensuring effective joint working with each relevant stakeholder, in particular the
Préfecture de Police and FFF, but also the CSDF, transport networks, the Clubs, theirrespective national football policing authorities, supporter associations, and local
authorities responsible for the fan zones.
d. Ensuring that it received properly tested and validated venue and event risk
assessments.
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e. Ensuring it received and oversaw operational plans for the private security andsafety function, and received the operational order or summary of policing plan fromthe Préfecture, and critiquing these as and where they were not consistent with theSaint-Denis Convention.
f. Ensuring it checked the safety and security of mobility arrangements to the vicinityof the stadium, and in particular routing and safety within the last kilometre.
g. Ensuring it checked all access arrangements (ASPs and turnstiles) and made surethey were fit for purpose. This would include testing throughput calculations, andtaking account of all features of the entrances.
h. Ensuring there were contingency plans for a range of foreseeable problems,
including access point failures, and congestion.
i. Ensuring that all stewards were appropriately trained and accredited, not only inaccordance with the law, but also UEFA’s requirements for the event.
j. Ensuring that there were clear lines of communication with partners in real time on
MD, and that all stakeholders were fully engaged with joint working principles.
k. Ensuring it had sufficient observers to spot emerging issues in real time.
l. Ensuring that there was an effective, agreed multi-agency crisis management planfor emergencies.
m. Escalating problems with partners which it was unable to resolve.
8.4.2.10. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the S&S Unit was
marginalised by UEFA Events SA senior management. Insofar as it engaged withany of the above, the S&S Unit did not do so effectively. If the Unit had been
properly engaged, with clear lines of responsibility, the Panel has no reason tobelieve it would not have done so effectively, and there is a likelihood that the
problems that were allowed to arise on 28th May would have been identified andrectified before they happened.
8.4.2.11. The Panel has noted that UEFA’s external Security Officer deployed toobserve the south of the stadium had identified that the ASPs were not fit for
purpose when he arrived at the ground in the mid-afternoon of MD. He passed thatview on, firstly to a colleague and then on the S&S Unit WhatsApp message group.
No effective action followed. Although it was late to rectify the problems, thePanel concludes that UEFA representatives in the control room should have taken
decisive action and escalated these concerns with the police commander and FFF.
Even at that stage, measures could have been taken to monitor and regulate the
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flow of people going towards ASP3, diverting the excess to ASP4. The positioningof police vans and the cooperation between police and stewards could have been
improved, and the numbers of officers and stewards increased.
8.4.2.12. The Panel has noted the absence of contingency plans regarding
problems at the ASPs or turnstiles. The Panel has also noted that there was no
multi-agency crisis plan, and when problems occurred there was no joinedup approach. The absence of any such plans was a fundamental failure by the
stakeholders involved, which had real consequences on the night. It is a clear
example of the need for a lead agency to ensure planning is robust, and to identify
such lacunae. As event owner, UEFA was that agency.
8.4.2.13. Furthermore, although the Panel believes the decision to delay the kickoff was correct, it notes that the process by which it happened was confused,
and involved a meeting of the President of UEFA and other members of the seniorleadership team in a stairwell near to the VIP area. A decision to delay kick-off
either results from a security or public safety issue, or has consequences forsafety. It should be taken by those responsible for security and public safety: bya crisis meeting in the control room, chaired by the police commander or his/her representative. If the decision is taken or has to be ratified elsewhere, those
involved will not have the information or expertise required, and irrelevant factors such as the interests of broadcasters - may be taken into account.
8.4.2.14. Once the decision to delay kick-off had been taken, UEFA Events SA
displayed messages on the stadium big screens. The Panel notes that no attempt
at communication with those outside the stadium occurred. This could haveoccurred through the App and website, by a request to Liverpool stewards tospread the message, or by megaphone messaging at the turnstiles. The first big
screen message asserted that the delay was due to a security issue, and thatmessage was swiftly replaced by one stating that the delay had been causedby the late arrival of supporters. It was manifestly inaccurate that ‘lateness’ hadanything to do with the problems on 28th May. This is a matter of great sensitivity to
Liverpool supporters because, for more than two decades, ‘late supporters’ werefalsely accused of causing the Hillsborough disaster.
8.4.2.15. The Panel has no hesitation in finding that the message should nothave been displayed. It is never appropriate to post messages which are untrue.
However, the Panel does accept that this was a crass error of judgment rather thananything more, and there was no intention to cause distress. UEFA has explained
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that it uses pre-prepared messages, because it is too complicated to compile
messages in the moment and translate into multiple languages. The Panel has been
informed that UEFA Events SA has already taken measures to rectify this issue.
8.4.2.16. The Panel has noted the media release put out by UEFA in the immediate
aftermath of the event on the night. There are two points of importance. Firstly, it
blamed supporters with fake tickets. Secondly its original draft noted that locals
had contributed to the problems. The first assertion was incorrect and should
not have been made. The second was correct, but was edited out of the version
that was published, at the request of the French authorities. This was not a factual
correction by the French authorities, as several UEFA staff and officials had
witnessed the scenes of locals engaged in disorder and attacks on supporters. If
UEFA had to put out a media release it should have only included assertions based onverified data, and it should not have been self-censored, at the request of others.
8.4.2.17. Subsequently, UEFA has not recognised its own role or that of otherstakeholders in the problems on the night, nor has it corrected its assertions about
the supporters that have been removed from its website after request by FSE andSpirt of Shankly. In a UEFA presentation dated 8th June, UEFA was still blaming
late supporters many without valid tickets for the problems. The Panel finds, thateleven days after the event, it was unacceptable that UEFA continued to attribute
blame to the supporters.
8.4.2.18. UEFA Events SA’s senior management gave evidence to the Senate
hearings on behalf of UEFA. CEO Martin Kallen’s account of what occurred
was seriously flawed and contained assertions that were objectively untrue. In
particular, Mr Kallen asserted that UEFA had staged previous events at the SDF
without incident, making particular reference to the 2006 UCLF at which he waspresent. In fact, UEFA reported after the 2006 match that there had been serious
problems, including interoperability failures with the police and access problems.
In interview, Mr Kallen claimed not to know about congestion problems that had
occurred on the RER D to stadium route at the 2016 French Cup Final, even though
they had triggered a review before the Euro 2016 matches which occurred at the
SDF. Similarly, he told the Panel he had not seen an April 2022 report from FSE
which had been provided as part of the planning for the UCLF22 which had again
warned of congestion problems at this same area of the approach to the SDF.
8.4.2.19. The Panel concludes that it is beyond question that UEFA’s
representatives should have been properly briefed, and should have ensured
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that they gave only robust, accurate and complete evidence to a parliamentarycommittee holding hearings to determine what changes should be made to
improve public safety. Mr Kallen and Mr Zylberstein did not do so.
8.4.3. Fédération Française de Football (FFF)
8.4.3.1. The Panel notes that UEFA delegated many organisational issues to FFF.
In particular, FFF had a central role in planning and operating security and safetymeasures at UCLF22. The Panel concludes that FFF failed to establish effective
interoperability with multiple partners, including the transport networks, Préfecturede Police, SDF and UEFA.
8.4.3.2. We have been unable to resolve the factual dispute as to who knew what,
when, about the diversion of a substantial volume of supporters onto RER D. We havealready commented on the fact that the dispute itself evidences the lack of effective
joint working regarding the mobility of supporters to the vicinity of the stadium.
8.4.3.3. However, whatever the plans were thought to be, travel arrangements arenotoriously susceptible to change. The Panel notes that there was a representativeof the networks in the stadium control room alongside both FFF and UEFA, yetapparently no real time awareness of the much larger numbers arriving by RER D. It
appears that FFF and UEFA did not make any or sufficient checks on this until too late.
8.4.3.4. The Panel has concluded that the problem posed by a larger than
expected volume of supporters arriving via RER D should have been an obvious
concern to FFF, because:a. It had regularly staged events at the SDF and knew of the geographical issues
on that approach.
b. It was aware that ASP3 had limited access, that there had been access problems
at the domestic Cup final and that the police were planning to route all supporters
arriving via RER D in that direction.
c. It had been in dispute with the Préfecture de Police about the signage, and its
proposal to split supporters arriving at RER D between ASP3 and ASP4.
8.4.3.5. The Panel has therefore concluded that FFF should have ensured it
had real time information about arrival volumes at RER D, through effective
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RER D station and along the approaches to the stadium. Furthermore, it shouldhave escalated the dispute with the Préfecture de Police to the DIGES or otherministerial level, with the involvement of UEFA. The fact it did none of these was aserious failure.
8.4.3.6. The Panel has further concluded that FFF failed to obtain or preparea venue risk assessment, or to share a proper operational plan with partners,
including UEFA.
8.4.3.7. The ASP arrangements had been delegated to FFF. They were seriously
defective for the reasons already stated. FFF had failed to properly consider
the effect of the configuration on throughput rates in general, and in particularon the restricted ASP3 access. FFF may have placed reliance upon the flawed
UEFA calculations, however, given it was delegated to make these arrangements,
it should have made sure the access points were completely safe. Again, thePanel has noted that FFF has criticised the police involvement at ASP3 regarding
the blocking of access by vans, the failure to police the front of the checks,
and the comprehensive rather than profiled security checks. The Panel views
these criticisms as the clearest evidence – indeed an admission - of a lack ofinteroperability between the police and FFF.
8.4.3.8. Responsibility for operation of the turnstiles was also delegated to FFF.
The Panel has found that those arrangements were unable to cope with any
increased pressure, as occurred once ASP3 broke down. The fact that congestion
at turnstiles reduces throughput or leads to their closure is well known, and leads
to an obviously dangerous crush situation. The Panel concludes that there shouldhave been robust contingency plans to deal with such eventuality. The failure tohave such contingency plans was a significant failure.
8.4.3.9. Once the crisis occurred, FFF indicate that it liaised with the police
commander. There is no record of this or any joint decisions, which makes the levelof real time interoperability difficult to assess. A joint emergency strategy between
the police and the stewards was vital to alleviating the dangerous situation outside
the turnstiles, to manage the crowd - including by preventing further people
joining the congestion from behind - and alleviate pressure on the turnstiles toensure they stayed open and to maximise throughput. The Panel has found noevidence of any organised attempt to do so. Multiple accounts by supporters
illustrate chaotic turnstile operation with multiple gate closures, and no effective
management on the concourse.
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8.4.4. Consortium Stade de France (CSDF)
8.4.4.1. The Panel notes that the CSDF had an important role as stadium operator,
but it was not a central stakeholder in UCLF22, as it was not the event owner ororganiser. However, as CSDF retained legal responsibility for fire security andseated capacity it was involved in multi-agency planning meetings.
8.4.4.2. CSDF indicated to the Panel that:a. It was not aware until after the event that a large number of supporters had been
displaced from RER B to D, and if it had been so aware it would have raised “a big
alarm signal”.
b. It was unaware that the Préfecture de Police had overruled a FFF plan to routearriving supporters from RER D to the main avenue between RER B and the stadium(Avenue du Stade de France), and signage to that effect had been removed. If it
had been aware, CSDF would have raised it as an issue, as its view was that routes
to the stadium were not taken seriously enough, given the environment.
c. The outer perimeter is usually only a counter terrorism check, and the additionof ticket checks was recent, and needed proper trialling.
d. The access at ASP3 was obviously tight, it was not optimal to have security andticket checks together, and there was no ‘escape’ lane for those rejected.
8.4.4.3. The Panel concludes from the above that the venue security staff should
always be involved in mobility and access planning as they have local knowledgeand ‘muscle memory’ of previous problems, and they should be sighted on any
security and safety issue that arises. The Panel has already commented on the lackof a venue risk assessment. A venue operator would be a key contributor to thevenue risk assessment, which would highlight recurrent problems.
8.4.5. The DIGES and French State
8.4.5.1. The Panel notes the role of the DIGES is to lead and coordinate theactivities of the State administrations and public institutions involved in theorganisation of major sporting events. It is a very important role, and in this case
the DIGES chaired a number of the early planning meetings and played a part infacilitating local authority engagement with fan zones, and in assisting rail andairport management of arriving supporters.

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8.4.5.2. In the aftermath, the DIGES undertook the first report on the events
surrounding the UCLF22 and he found several key failures, which the Panel hastaken into account. Importantly the DIGES criticised the Préfecture de Police for
adopting a security rather than supporter engagement policing model for thegame, which he says was founded on a completely inaccurate understanding of
the Hillsborough disaster, 33 years previously. The DIGES also found that it wasa mistake to remove FFF routing signage, and the police should have directedsupporters arriving at RER D to B. He reported that there had been historicalcongestion problems on the route between RER D and the stadium, and hecriticised the arrangements at ASP3.
8.4.5.3. The Panel is astonished that the policing model was influenced by a viewof Liverpool hooliganism based on Hillsborough. The Panel fails to understand why
this was not apparent to the DIGES (and FFF and UEFA) during the planning phase,given his institutional coordination role. Similarly, the Panel has found substantial
interoperability failures across the relevant partners, and it is disappointing that
this was not something that the DIGES became aware of, given his role and ability
to escalate problems and seek a remedy.
8.4.5.4. The Panel has noted that the DIGES did not have access to SDF footage
when undertaking his investigation immediately after the events. He told the Panelthat this was because he had no investigative powers. The Panel takes the viewthat the DIGES should have asked the SDF to retain its footage, whether or not he
had a power to order it. A judicial order could then have been obtained for the
purposes of investigations, by other state institutions.
8.4.5.5. The DIGES made a number of recommendations in his report, including
the need for institutionalised national governance for major sporting events, a needto optimise access flows to the stadium, and to improve interoperability. The Panel
respectfully endorses those recommendations. However, the Panel comments thatthe first recommendation mirrors that made by the CoE delegation to France in 2015,
which has not been actioned. In considering this recommendation, the Panel urges
the French authorities to examine how the substantial interoperability failures in theplanning and operations of UCLF22 were not identified and remedied by existingmechanisms, and how the proposed national governance would rectify that problem.
8.4.5.6. The Panel further notes that the access and interoperability issues were
well known and had both been a feature of the UCLF at SDF in 2006. They appear
to be ingrained, and should be looked at as such.
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8.4.5.7. These comments underpin Recommendation One at the conclusion ofthis report: that there needs to be oversight of actioning recommendations fromofficial inquiries and reports. If there is no process, recommendations are too often
forgotten.
8.4.5.8. The Panel notes with concern that French Ministers and authorities
blamed the supporters in the immediate aftermath of the events. Furthermore,
the Panel is concerned that French authorities asked UEFA to remove reference tolocals contributing to the problems, when manifestly they must have known thatwas the case.
8.4.6. Préfecture de Police
8.4.6.1. The Panel has found that there was a striking lack of joint working by thepolice. No summary of the policing plan for UCLF22 was provided to UEFA or FFF.
8.4.6.2. Despite the fact that the Préfecture de Police was present or represented
at many planning meetings there was an unresolved dispute with FFF regarding
the routing of supporters to the stadium from RER D. The Préfecture de Policedenies knowledge of the shift of supporters onto RER D, indicating this was adecision taken by the transport network SNCF. Different partners and records ofmeetings suggest otherwise, however, whoever was involved there was a failure tocommunicate: a failure of effective joint working.
8.4.6.3. The Préfecture de Police indicated that with a ‘normal’ volume of
supporters arriving at RER D there would have been no problems with access. On
that basis the police planned that all those arriving from RER D would access thestadium via ASP3, and in fact they directed supporters to do just that on the day.
8.4.6.4. There is consensus between stakeholders that the number of supporters
arriving at RER D was greater than ‘normal’. Those responsible for public safety
cannot rely on ‘normal’ levels. They must plan to identify factors which may
cause a difference to the normal, and crucially they must be vigilant in real time.
The Panel are clear that the police should have monitored all access routes tothe stadium, and in particular the one from RER D because of the known accessproblems via the A1 underpass and ASP3. If they had done so, it would have been
obvious that too many supporters were approaching ASP3 and a simple cordon
could have been applied to divert others to ASP4.

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8.4.6.5. The Panel has already detailed the multiple problems relating to ASP3.
The Préfecture de Police failed to regulate the numbers of supporters approaching
the stadium via that entry point. Once congestion occurred, remedial action was
too little too late. Immediate cordoning to prevent further supporters joining
the congested area and re-routing those at the back of the crowd would havealleviated the problem. The police commanders had access to live CCTV footage
in the control room, and there was a significant police presence at ASP3. The
situation should have been obvious as it began to occur but instead is took thepolice about two hours before any remedial action was taken.
8.4.6.6. At ASP3, the Panel has concluded that the parking of police vans
exacerbated the bottleneck. Evidence from UEFA and FFF makes it clear to the
Panel that there was no effective joint plan for ASP3, nor any effective relationshipbetween the stakeholders to remedy it in real time. UEFA and FFF have asserted
that they expected a line of police at the front of ASP3 to control access to thechecks, and they were surprised at the intensity of the Vigipirate checks. If there
had been an effective joint plan, there would have been no such misconception.
No one appears to have consulted CSDF who told the Panel that there were clear
problems with the ASP3 arrangements.
8.4.6.7. The Préfecture de Police was reliant in part upon stewarding arrangements
to ensure public security and safety. The interface between their operations andthe stewarding, particularly at access points, was crucial. The lack of joint working
added to the effect of the poor design of those arrangements.
8.4.6.8. The Panel has already made its conclusion that there was an absenceof contingency plans. Given the importance of the integrity of the ASPs, andthe turnstile access, it was a serious and remarkable failure that there were no
contingency plans for access problems.
8.4.6.9. As addressed elsewhere, the Panel has received multiple accounts ofcriminal attacks on supporters throughout the access and egress periods, andsome accounts of police officers standing by and not intervening. The Panel has
concluded that there was no attempt to understand or de-escalate community
tension, or any effective plan to police crime and protect supporters frommuggings, assaults and pickpocketing, despite the problem being foreseeable.
The Panel further notes that there is clear evidence that disorder by locals
occurred from early afternoon, and concludes that there was an absence ofdynamic risk assessment and reaction from the police in this regard.
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8.4.6.10. Some witnesses have referred to cultural issues and the hierarchicalstructure of policing in France, as factors in what went wrong. Every nation has
its own approach to policing security and safety, and it is not for the Panel todescend into such matters. UEFA and other international sporting bodies must
engage with existing State authorities and ensure that guarantees for appropriate
public authority engagement – including policing – are in place before bids are
determined. UEFA has very considerable ‘soft power’ – it can literally take its ballelsewhere – and it has tools at its disposal, such as the 2016 Convention which isbinding upon its signatories.
8.4.6.11. The requirement for policing authorities to adopt a supporter
engagement approach, and the imperative for effective joint working must be
viewed as non-negotiable. References to cultural differences or deference tonational systems should not be viewed as relevant factors.

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9. Recommendations
9.1. Introduction
9.1.1. The UCLF is more than a football match. It is a festival of football and should
be promoted as such. In open societies, supporters are free to travel to host cities
with or without tickets. UEFA’s longstanding experience, both at club and national
tournament levels, demonstrates that certain supporters regularly travel to eventsen masse with or without tickets.
9.1.2. From the outset, all stakeholders involved with the delivery of UCLFs should
therefore view the event as a festival, embrace all supporters and treat fan zones
as an integral and positive part of planning. Such an approach is entirely in linewith the Saint-Denis Convention and its underlying principles and when adopted
should deliver an approach based upon safety, security, and service.
9.1.3. It has been recognised by UEFA, and is supported by scientific research,that where large crowds of supporters are positively facilitated and met with aproportionate and graded response to policing, fewer security or public orderproblems emerge 298 . Historically, this ethos has formed the basis for UEFA’s
approach to football fixtures and tournaments with an international dimension
since Euro 2004. This knowledge and experience are now enshrined within theSaint-Denis Convention.
9.1.4. The Panel has determined its narrative of events, identified failures whichcaused or contributed to what went wrong, and have made conclusions as to who
was accountable.
9.1.5. It is evident from our inquiry that the near miss experienced at UCLF22
was largely the result of poor planning, a lack of oversight of plans, poorinteroperability between various stakeholders, and a lack of contingencies. In thisregard we concur with the conclusions of the French Senate. However, as theevent owner, it is our view that it was ultimately UEFA who was responsible for the
failure of these multiple stakeholders to realise their shared obligation to comply
with the Saint-Denis Convention. In other words, this was not a failure of policy somuch as it was a failure of oversight by UEFA in adequately ensuring that policy
was applied.
298 — See “A new agenda for football crowd management: reforming legal and policing responses to risk”, Pearson,
G. & Stott, C. (2022)
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9.1.6. UEFA maintains that it always puts the safety and security of supporters at
the heart of its requirements. We have no reason to dispute this. However, it isself-evident that UEFA failed to achieve this objective at UCLF22. Its expressedcommitment to an integrated approach broke down. Hence UEFA must takeresponsibility for oversight of delivery, irrespective of whether these areconsidered to be private stewarding matters routinely delegated to other partners
or fall under the public duties of policing authorities.
9.1.7. Safety and security can never be compromised. However, since multiple
stakeholders are involved, this duty can only be realised if a holistic and integrated
approach is achieved. The UEFA model underpinning UCLF22 - whereby UEFA
Events SA project managed all the component parts of arrangements for a UCLF was flawed in this regard and therefore must change.
9.1.8. It is the Panel’s conclusion that the policing model for UCLF22 was not fit
for purpose and was inconsistent with the facilitation oriented, dialogue led, andgraded approach required by the Convention. Specifically, an overly securitised
approach, unilateral actions by police, an overwhelming focus on misperceived
public order threats posed by Liverpool fans, poor cooperation with the event
organiser, lack of engagement with supporters and over reliance on munitions
were all clear features of what went wrong at UCLF22.
9.1.9. The Panel found no evidence that so called ticketless supporters or those inpossession of forged tickets played any significant causal role in the problems that
occurred at UCLF22. In contrast, the Panel did find evidence that the dual digitaland paper ticket format was a factor that, in combination with others, underminedthroughput at critical entry points.
9.1.10. Therefore, we make the following 21 recommendations.
9.2. Recommendation 1:
9.2.1. Given UEFA experienced serious interoperability difficulties with the policing
authorities at the previous UCLF at the Stade de France in 2006. The CoE delegationof 2015 made a series of recommendations which were not actioned by the Frenchauthorities. Where failures are identified, UEFA must not just move on, but must rather
exercise due diligence to ensure corrective action is taken where required, in advanceof future events. This should be clearly documented, and a system instituted to ensure
it is included in the consideration of future bids, and the planning of future events.
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9.2.2. It is a key feature of many inquiries and reviews that recommendations arenever properly considered or put into action. The reasons for this are varied, but
without a robust process, the likelihood of recommendations being ignored, or alack of inertia leading to them being forgotten, increases exponentially.
9.2.3. Hence our first recommendation addresses this issue by focusing on
creating internal compliance mechanisms within UEFA. UEFA should constructa process to ensure the recommendations made by the Panel below are
implemented, including where appropriate, by other stakeholders.
9.2.4. To ensure transparency, by the 8th May 2023, UEFA should post on its
website an action plan containing a summary of action taken with respect toeach of the recommendations made in this report. It should highlight matters
outstanding and provide reasoning why any recommendations have not been
adopted. The published action plan should be regularly updated until all
recommendations have been subject to remedial action or considered andrejected with reasoning.
9.3. Recommendation 2:
9.3.1. UEFA, through its allocation process and subsequent agreements, contracts
and guarantees, should always require that all stakeholders – public and private –adopt the facilitation and service approach set out in the Convention.
9.3.2. In this respect UEFA should therefore provide proactive and demonstrable
support to the stakeholders to facilitate all supporters who wish to travel to thehost city for a UCLF final. Accordingly, supporters arriving in the host city without
access to match tickets should never be understood or treated as inherently apublic order problem but facilitated as tourists who are travelling to be a part of
the festival the authorities are seeking to promote.
9.4. Recommendation 3:
9.4.1. Specifically, we recommend that safety, security, and service oversightmust be recognised by UEFA, and UEFA Events SA, as an integrated but distinct
component of UCLF operations, so that such issues always remain the primary
responsibility of the UEFA S&S Unit. The Head of the Unit should have express
responsibility and accountability for oversight and signing-off all measuresrelating to safety and security, and where any significant dispute arises with other
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stakeholders, either public authorities (including the police) or private entities, theHead of the Unit should be responsible for escalating them to a resolution.
9.4.2. To adequately discharge its duty, the responsibilities of the UEFA S&S Unit
should include those responsibilities we set out in detail elsewhere in this Report.
However, in summary we propose that under a new UEFA model the S&S Unit
should adopt primacy regarding the following responsibilities.
a. The S&S unit should provide ongoing guidance and advice on security andsafety matters to partners at all stages of the bid process and once a venue isselected to work closely with all stakeholders regarding the formation of staging
agreements, contracts and guarantees, and the drawing-up of the operational
plan.
b. The S&S unit should take part in all relevant planning meetings, monitor all
private stewarding arrangements, and approve them only when they are fit for
purpose and optimal. In particular the S&S Unit should ensure that there are robust
venue and event risk assessments, a multi-agency operational plan for mobility,
safety and security, and a summary policing plan.
c. The Head of the S&S Unit should chair the final multi-agency security and safety
meeting prior to a UCLF.
d. The S&S Unit should make sure that all stewards are fully trained and accredited,
both to national standards, but also to UEFA requirements.
e. They should oversee the safety and security requirements of disabled and othervulnerable supporters, including children and the elderly (see below).
f. In particular, the S&S unit should be responsible for liaising with policing andGovernment authorities to monitor compliance with the Saint-Denis Convention,
particularly in terms of the policing model.
g. They should ensure that there is effective communication and interoperability
built into the private and public security and safety plans and provisions and that
there are contingency plans for all foreseeable emergencies.
h. They should ensure there is an effective and agreed multi-agency crisis
management plan, to be instituted in the event of an emergency. Where they occur
the S&S Unit should seek to actively resolve disagreements between partners
and escalate any which remain. This responsibility should extend to mobility of
supporters to the vicinity of the venue, arrangements for approach in the last
kilometre, and access and should include consideration of all manner of threat andrisk, including crime and congestion.
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i. UEFA S&S Unit should set clear criteria for when a crowd modelling report should
be commissioned. These should include where the topography of the area isdifficult for the movement of large crowds, including narrow underpasses, bridges
and walkways, bottlenecks, and narrow entrances, local crime issues, and a historyof previous congestion problems.
j. The S&S Unit should ensure that all oversight, dispute resolution and escalation,
and approvals are fully documented.
9.5. Recommendation 4:
9.5.1. UEFA has a policy already in place to ensure compliance with the Convention
as this relates to disabled supporters. This clearly failed at UCLF 2022. Therefore,
we recommend that the UEFA S&S Unit develops its capacity in this domain toensure that mobility and access arrangements are as safe and secure as possible
for supporters with any disabilities or special needs, and that service to them is
optimised.
9.5.2. This should include fuller and more proactive engagement with disabled
supporter organisations and the respective clubs to determine needs andrequirements, as part of UEFA’s fan dialogue policy. Furthermore, UEFA should
proactively monitor all relevant service provisions for disabled supporters, andindeed other vulnerable supporters including children and the elderly, during
the planning and delivery phases. Similarly, the S&S Unit should escalate deficits
through project management, to resolve them in advance of MD regarding themobility and access arrangements for this category of fans.
9.6. Recommendation 5:
9.6.1. The evidence from UCLF22 demonstrates that the CSDF may have identified
and escalated problems which were apparently not obvious to others, as it had
memory of previous local issues and problems. Although local variation will
occur, where relevant, UEFA should require as a term of the contract with thehost stadium, that the appropriate stadium safety team or equivalent be directly
and more fully involved in planning. This should relate to mobility issues beyond
the stadium itself and include routing, the last kilometre, access points, local
intelligence relating to crime, topography, traffic management and parking.
It should also include contributing to and agreeing the venue and event risk
assessments, and operational plan.

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9.7. Recommendation 6:
9.7.1. We recommend that it is made a requirement for UCLF host stadiums tohave well managed security perimeters, welcome services & crowd guidance andorientation. This should be integrated with efficient channelling and proper stewarding
deployment avoiding congestions at turnstiles. In its oversight role the UEFA S&S Unit
should stress test the electronic turnstile systems to ensure sufficient functionality.
Moreover, more rigorous procedures must be developed to calculate flow throughthese access points and such calculations must be stress tested before the event.
9.8. Recommendation 7:
9.8.1. Effective cooperation between the event owner, the event organiser andthe policing authorities are required under the Convention as is a graded andengagement focused policing approach. UEFA should therefore make it a formal
requirement of the bidding process that the police will commit to compliance with
the Convention. This should include a commitment to provide a summary of thepolicing operational plan to the S&S Unit in good time prior to MD.
9.9. Recommendation 8:
9.9.1. Where it is not already exercised, the UEFA S&S Unit should proactively
identify and engage Police Commanders by supporting access to relevant
expertise and inviting them to be active observers of police operations of UCL
quarter and semi-finals to gain experience, particularly of the supporter profile
of potential finalist clubs. Where problems are identified or subsequently occur
relating to interoperability, communication, and the delivery of policing plans,in the planning phase, if they cannot be resolved, these should be escalated toGovernment authorities who should themselves then act to realise the obligations
to which they are committed by the Convention.
9.10. Recommendation 9:9.10.1. The Panel therefore recommends that UEFA move as rapidly as possible todigital ticketing at future UCLFs. UEFA should ensure host venues are fully capableof supporting this, from the bidding process onward. Given that digital ticketing is
at present relatively novel, and ticketing for the clubs is not straightforward, UEFAshould obtain an independent expert audit of digital ticketing arrangements ingood time before its UCLF23 event.
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9.11. Recommendation 10:
9.11.1. UEFA should optimise its communications and messaging toward supporters,
using as many platforms as possible, regarding event facilities, mobility, routing andaccess arrangements. During the planning phase, UEFA should engage with partners
to synchronise messaging, and it should make the UEFA Communications teamresponsible for monitoring and ensuring no messaging conflicts arise prior to MD or inreal time. Above all else it should embed the involvement of supporter organisations
and Finalist club stewards in its communication strategy, to effectively spread
information and urgent messages. UEFA should also consider the use of large screensat key entry points and monitor and ensure the integrity of event relevant signage.
9.12. Recommendation 11:
9.12.1. It is recommended that there is scrutiny by UEFA to ensure that finalists
clubs fulfil their obligation under the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations to haveone or several defined Supporter Liaison Officer to act as the key contact for
supporters. The role of the SLO should be made clear, including involvement insecurity planning and supporting information dialogue between event organisers
and supporters. As part of their preparations for a UCLF, clubs should ensure their
SLOs play an active role in designing, clarifying, and implementing communication
to and from their supporters regarding the mobility concept and participate inpreparatory visits as well security and organisational meetings. Clubs should also
carry out their own due diligence on the UCLF venue and surrounding area fromthe perspective of their supporters.
9.13. Recommendation 12:
9.13.1. Whilst this was evident at UCLF22, it is also clear their input during theplanning phase was ignored and their observers during the event played no
meaningful role within the operation. This was despite the fact FSE had predicted
problems which ultimately materialised. This lack of integration should not have
happened, and in future that UEFA proactively integrate supporter perspectives
and input into the planning and delivery stages through better collaboration with
FSE and its affiliated organisations.
9.13.2. We therefore recommend that Football Supporters Europe and its affiliatedsupporter organisations therefore need to be involved as meaningful stakeholders
throughout the planning process and their representatives need to act on the day
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UCLF22 Independent Reviewof the UCLF as integrated observers. They should also be involved in post-matchanalysis. Protocols for achieving this should be laid out in writing.
9.14. Recommendation 13:
9.14.1. The poor monitoring of flow patterns and advising of supporters onsuitable routes to the stadium were clear failures at UCLF22. We recommend that
UEFA should therefore require the host Federation to deploy customer service
stewards, not only to key parts of the transport network, but also across the last
kilometre routes. These stewards – or marshals - should be trained and briefed toprovide information and guidance to supporters (in their own language), but also
to provide situation reports as necessary, and as problems arise, to the control
rooms. We suggest Finalists club stewards are also deployed in such roles, asmandated by UEFA S&S Regulations.
9.15. Recommendation 14:
9.15.1. Medical and First aid personnel should be always visible and accessible,
including inside the ASP, at the gates, and in the stadium concourse.
9.16. Recommendation 15:
9.16.1. As has been the case historically, UEFA should always conduct post event
scrutiny. However, in the case of UCLF22 post event analysis by key stakeholders
including UEFA and other Governmental authorities was inaccurate by incorrectly
attributing blame to ticketless supporters. Therefore, it is evident that UEFA’s
processes for post-hoc analysis should be more analytically and objectively robust.
To achieve this, we recommend that UEFA draw in relevant external operational,
academic, and supporter-based expertise. In the circumstances where events havegone well this routine scrutiny enables the capture and dissemination of scientificknowledge and operational good practice.
9.16.2. If UEFA has failed to resolve issues prior to a UCLF, it must not merely ask
why but also act on this feedback when it is created. UEFA will be back in thosestadiums and in those jurisdictions in future, and in the meanwhile, there will bemany other major sporting events which would benefit from UEFA learning (e.g.,the Olympics). UEFA should also avoid ‘rushing to judgment’ and communicating
its conclusions in the absence of conducting these forms of more robust analysis.

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9.16.3. Specifically, where failures with policing are identified, UEFA should seek
dialogue with Government authorities and assistance through the compliancemechanisms of the CoE regarding the application of the Convention. Ultimately,UEFA should make clear to State authorities that it will hold its events elsewhere if
issues of non-compliance persist.
9.17. Recommendation 16:
9.17.1. Given the extent of non-compliance with the Saint-Denis Convention
evidenced in this report, the Panel respectfully recommends that the CoE
Monitoring Committee reviews how compliance with the Convention can be better
monitored and its obligations more comprehensively enforced.
9.18. Recommendation 17:
9.18.1. The Panel notes that the DIGES and Senate have made recommendations
which may work towards resolving the interoperability difficulties both we and they
identified. Both the DIGES and the Senate have made respectful reference to thework of this Inquiry and the assistance it may provide to French authorities. With
that in mind, the Panel encourages French Government authorities to follow therecommendations of the 2015 CoE Monitoring Committee and the DIGES in termsof management and oversight of major sporting events at an inter-ministerial level.
9.19. Recommendation 18:
9.19.1. Given the conclusions of the Panel on the extent of the failure of joint
working between the Préfecture de Police and other partners, and the noncompliance with obligations under the Convention, the Panel respectfully
recommends that the Ministries of Interior and Sport institute their own reviewof the model used for the policing of sporting events. This should involve
supporters’ representatives, external experts and academics to ensuretransparency and objectivity. This could take place under the auspices of the
National Committee on Supporters (see 4.4.6.).
9.19.2. As acknowledged, the Panel noted its significant concerns about the
deployment of tear gas and pepper spray on the one hand, and the absence of any
discernible engagement or dialogue with supporters on the other. In particular, theguarantees sought should include an assurance that the policing authorities will
operate a supporter engagement model, and that the deployment of riot police
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and the use of weaponry including tear gas and pepper spray, will only ever beused proportionately in circumstances where ECHR Article 2 rights are at issue.
9.20. Recommendation 19:
9.20.1. The panel recommends that French authorities review the framework
relating to the retention and provision of footage and other material, for the
purposes of investigations which are likely to improve security and public safety.
The Panel further recommends that this is a matter which should be addressed byUEFA in its requirements of host States.
9.21. Recommendation 20:
9.21.1. In the UEFA Bid Requirements document for UCLF bidders are asked toconfirm they will adhere to the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated
Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports
Events (Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 218). We recommend this document
should also obligate stakeholders to undertake robust scrutiny to ensure suchcompliance.
9.21.2. In the case of UCLF22 no bidding process took place and therefore nosuch confirmation was received. In future, it is recommended that, in addition
to receiving confirmation form stakeholders, there is also scrutiny by UEFA S&S
unit to ensure that compliance is being achieved during the planning process. To
facilitate this, we recommend that for UCLFs, Government provides a nominatedState representative to take part in the planning processes with a specific remit ofensuring interoperability of the policing and other national and local authorities. In
effect this representative would act as single point of contact (SPOC) for UEFA S&S
and other partners.
9.22. Recommendation 21:
9.22.1. Finally, the panel has focused on UCLF22, but evidence suggeststhat similar problems, particularly regarding policing and access for disabled
supporters, are regularly experienced, though to a lesser scale, by supporters
attending other UEFA governed fixtures. As per Recommendation 15, werecommend that UEFA and the CoE Monitoring Committee looks closely at theircapacity to apply some of the above recommendations more generically to avoid
similar dangers developing beyond the remit of the UCLF alone.
9. Recommendations

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Annex
Figure 1: Map of the Stade de France and surrounds (note the A1 motorway
running north to south and A86 Motorway running East to West)299.

299 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1 (p.
2403)
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Figure 2: Gates and turnstiles at the SDF300.

300 — Photo from a Panel member
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Figure 3: Slide presented by UEFA Events SA showing expected route of travelfrom rail stations to SDF301.

•
•

•
•
•

301 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1 (p.
2393)
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Figure 4: Map of planned turnstile queue management at the SDF OSP302.

•

302 — Réunion avec la Préfecture de Paris – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (18 March 2022) - Appendix,
VI.4 (p. 2453)
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Figure 5: Slides presented at the MD-2 Meeting covering the mobility plan
clearly indicates awareness of intention to flow movement from RER D to
Wilson ramp and ASP3303.

AC C E S S TO S TAD E D E F R AN C E

Map Key

B
13
M
M

13

D

B

D

S S N S – C V & S TAD IU M

• 12 access points
through the Additional
Security Perimeter• Staff and spectators'
welfare high on theagenda,• Event declared as a“major event” in France• Multiagency approachfor the protection of thesite,• Exceptionally alcohol
will be served until
18:00 withing theperimeter.

303 — UEFA Presentation Liverpool FC VS Real Madrid CF (26 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.12 (p. 2639, 2654)
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Figure 6: UEFA Slides from its post Event analysis meeting June 8th showing
arrangement of ASPs and stadium entry gates304.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MAP. OVERVIEWLast KM plan

OSP
Outer Security
Perimeter

ASP
Additional Security
Perimeter

304 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2686)
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Figure 7: The various and different maps and slides disseminated by UEFA
Events SA during the planning phase.
MAP 1305: Presented to both sets of finalists at finalist meeting on 6th May.
PEDESTRIAN ACCESS TO STADE DE FRANCE

Map Key

La Plaine Stadede France

Zone G
150 spaces for coaches

B
13Team North
Coach Parking

Team South
Coach Parking

Team
North Flow

Team
South Flow

M
Saint-Denis
Porte de
Paris

M

13

Metro

B
Train

Zone F

Zone F

50 spaces for coaches
Stade de France
Saint-Denis

D
Train

70 spaces for coaches

D

MAP 2306 : Presented at meeting by local authorities 19th May.

•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•

305 — UEFA Champions League Finalists’ Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8 (p. 2575)
306 — UEFA Presentation UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (19 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.9 (p. 2601)
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Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated byUEFA Events SA during the planning phase.

MAP 3 307: Presented at the MD-2 security meeting Chaired by UEFA Security Officer
26th May.

AC C E S S TO S TAD E D E F R AN C E

Map Key

B
13
M
M

13

D

B

D

307 — UEFA Presentation Liverpool FC VS Real Madrid CF (26 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.12 (p.

2639)
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Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated byUEFA Events SA during the planning phase.

MAP 4 308: Event Guide via UEFA website.

308 — UCLF22 Event Guide, UEFA (Website no longer available)
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Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated byUEFA Events SA during the planning phase.

MAP 5 309: Map presented in UEFA’s Position statement to the Panel 18th August.

UCLF 2022 – Statement in response to the questions of the independent review panel

Public transport network

In addition to the event-related signage installed in the vicinity of the Stade de France, several proactive
measures were taken to facilitate movement of supporters to reach Stade de France and to discourage
ticketless supporters to travel to the stadium. Event dedicated posters and voice announcement messages
were prepared by UEFA and FFF, and shared with RATP:••

Implementation of event-related posters and maps at main transport hubs leading to Stade de France(Gare du Nord, Gare de Lyon, Nation, Porte Maillot, Gare de l’Est, etc..),Public announcement in English, French and Spanish were made available in the public transport
network to provide supporters with accurate travelling information.
309 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 23)

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Figure 8: Images of ASP3 and ASP4 in operation at UCLF22.

ASP3 – 18:07310

310 — Photo supplied by UEFA
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Figure 8 (cont.): Images of ASP3 and ASP4 in operation at UCLF22.

ASP4 – 18:23 311

311 — Photo supplied by UEFA
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Figure 9: Photo from CAFE report showing spectators standing with wheelchairusers behind.312

Below: Photo showing spectators crowding on row 26 and standing on row 25, w
wheelchair users behind. The tallest wheelchair user has elevated his seat to be
see over the standing spectators. Other wheelchair users do not have this featu

cafefootball.eu

312 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report (September 2022) (p. 17)
Annex219