YIMBY or NIMBY?
Municipalities' reaction to disaster waste from the Great East Japan Earthquake
Yuichi Ishimura*, Kenji Takeuchi†, and Fredrik Carlsson‡

March 2014
Discussion Paper No.1413
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University

Abstract
This study investigates the determinants of transfer of waste between the affected areas
and other municipalities that resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake. In
particular we investigate to what extent economic factors, but also other factors such as
reciprocity and pro-social concerns affect municipalities decision to accept disaster
waste. The results show that the amount donated to the victims of the disaster, thecapacity of disposal sites, and the intentions of the prefecture positively affected thedecision to accept the disaster waste. On the other hand, municipalities with a higher
number of workers in agriculture did not accept disaster waste. Thus, both economic
and social factors were important determinants of the decision.

Keywords: Disaster waste; Wide area treatment; Econometric analysis

Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University ishimura0601@yahoo.co.jp
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University takeuchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp‡ Department of Economics, the University of Gothenburg
fredrik.carlsson@economics.gu.se*†1

1. Introduction
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred off the Pacificcoast of Japan triggered a massive tsunami. The most heavily impacted areas were in
the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. In the areas along the coast ofthese prefectures, many people were injured or died. The Tsunami also destroyed many
houses and buildings as well as generated a huge amount of disaster waste. Additionally,
the Tsunami damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, located on the coastof the Fukushima prefecture. The amounts of waste generated were much larger thanthat of the annual municipal solid waste in these prefectures. Therefore, the Japanese
Ministry of Environment inquired municipalities about the possibility of accepting thedisaster waste from the Iwate and Miyagi prefectures. The disaster waste generated in
Fukushima Prefecture was not been included in the wide area treatment because of therisk of radiation. Initially, 572 municipalities stated that they could accept disaster waste.
Later on, as we will discuss, only 54 municipalities actually accepted disaster waste.
The tragic event of the tsunami provides us with an interesting case of movement ofwaste between regions/municipalities. There is an empirical literature that has
investigated the determinants of the transfer of waste between states and countries. For
example, Levinson (1999a, 1999b) investigated the influence of the waste disposal tax
on the movement of hazardous waste between states in the United States. It was foundthat factors such as population size and density, land area, and capacity of the disposalsite had a positive impact on the amount of wide area treatment while factors such as
the distance between states, and income had a negative impact. Baggs (2009) studied
the international hazardous waste trade using data collected through the implementationof the Basel Convention. The results suggest that the movement of waste is better2explained by the differences in capital per worker than by differences in income percapita. Jensen and McIntyre (2010) examined a similar study by using the wide area
treatment of the industrial waste in Wales.
The focus of the previous studies has mainly been on the impact of economic factors.
While they might be of importance for disaster waste, it is also likely that other factors
such as pro-social and anti-social behavior, and reciprocity could play important roles.
Studies in psychology suggest that disasters can invoke both pro-social and anti-social
behavior among individuals; see e.g. Gantt and Gantt (2012). Using economic
experiments, Becchetti et al. (2012) find that there are long-run negative effects on
altruism of being a victim of a natural disaster such as a Tsunami, while Li et al. (2013)
find heterogeneous effects depending on the age of the victim.
In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of the municipalities that responded to
the request for accepting the disaster waste of the Great East Japan Earthquake. In
particular, we are interested in the importance of economic factors, such as slack
capacity of incinerators, as well as altruistic reasons, measured as the amount of
donations to the disaster victims, and reciprocity, i.e. if they themselves face the risks ofa tsunami.
The next section contains a description of the situation and the request for treatment
of disaster waste. Section 3 introduces the data and the empirical strategy. Results arepresented in Section 4 and section 5 presents the conclusion.

2. Background on the tsunami and the request for treatment of disaster waste
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred off the Pacificcoast of Japan triggered a massive tsunami. The most heavily impacted areas were in3the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The Tsunami destroyed many
houses and buildings and generated a huge amount of disaster waste. The amount of thedisaster waste in Iwate prefecture was about 5.25 million tons, in Miyagi prefecture was
11.54 million tons, and in the Fukushima prefecture was 2 million tons. These amounts
are approximately 12 times, 14 times, and 3 times larger than that of the annual
municipal solid waste in these prefectures respectively. Iwate and Miyagi prefectures
requested other municipalities to accept wide area treatment of the disaster waste
through the Ministry of Environment. The disaster waste generated in Fukushima
Prefecture has not been included in the wide area treatment so far because of the risk ofradiation.
The Ministry of Environment inquired municipalities about the possibility ofaccepting the disaster waste in April 2011. As a result, 42 prefectures and 572
municipalities displayed intentions of accepting the disaster waste. The aggregate
capacity of the incinerators in these municipalities amounted to about 2.93 million tons
per year, suggesting that the wide area treatment could help a prompt response fordisaster recovery. However, when the Ministry of Environment investigated theintentions again in October 2011, there were only 54 municipalities that had alreadyaccepted, or began actions towards acceptance. Compared to the investigation results ofApril 2011, it is clear that negative attitudes among the municipalities had increased.
The main reason was the anxiety over the possibility of radioactive contamination of thewaste. In June 2011, it was detected that the radiation level in the incineration ashes ofthe municipal solid waste in Edogawa Ward, Tokyo was higher than the standard level.§§

According to the guidelines of the Ministry of Environment, radiation levels in the combustible waste
must be less than 240Bq/kg for incineration and the incombustible waste must be less than 8,000Bq/kg
for final disposal. Although the high radiation level found in the incineration waste of the Edogawa Ward

4

The incident invoked distrust of the government and suspicion that sufficient
information was not provided.
We use cross-sectional data from 1,592 municipalities that does not include themunicipalities of Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures. The data on the acceptanceof disaster waste is based on the reports from the municipalities, collected by the
Ministry of Environment as of June 26, 2012 and October 25, 2013. Table 1 shows thenumber of municipalities from 2011 to 2013 that are either positive or negative toward
accepting some of the waste. For 2011, we only have information about the total
number of municipalities that were positive, but not which these municipalities are.
On June 29, 2012, The Ministry of Environment informed that there were enoughintentions of acceptance from municipalities to treat the existing tsunami waste andthere was no need to examine further acceptance. As of June 2013, 76 municipalities
have accepted the tsunami waste. Most of these municipalities are in eastern Japan.
Figure 1 shows the rate of municipalities that accepted the tsunami waste in eachprefecture as of October 25, 2013.

Table 1: The number of municipalities and acceptance
2011

2012

2013

Total

West

East

Total

West

East

Total

Positive

572

25

166

191

2

74

76

Negative

1030

678

723

1401

703

815

1516

Total

1596

703

889

1592

705

889

1592

Note: The number of municipalities change over the years due to municipal mergers. As for the data in
2011, only the aggregated number of the municipalities is known.

does not relate to the wide area treatment, it invoked an anxiety over the radiation risks.

5

Figure 1: The acceptance rate as of October 25, 2013

Western Japan

Eastern JapanThe 2012 report by the Ministry of Environment contains the list of municipalities
that have considered acceptance, that expressed the intention of acceptance, or that havealready accepted the disaster waste. We treat these municipalities as positive towards
acceptance. The 2013 report contains a list of municipalities that have already accepted
the disaster waste. Since the Ministry of Environment sent a message on June 29, 2012that there was no need to examine further acceptance, there are no municipalities
considering the acceptance or expressing any intention of acceptance in the 2013 report.
The role of the Ministry of Environment in the wide area treatment was to coordinate
the stakeholders. The Ministry facilitated the cooperation between the affectedmunicipality and the accepting municipality and requests the acceptance of disaster
waste for prefectures. The role of the prefecture was to investigate municipalities

6belonging to the prefecture about acceptance. Some prefectures that have their own
incineration facilities or waste disposal, have accepted disaster waste. One example ofthis is Tokyo, which accepted about 25,000 tons of tsunami waste from several
municipalities.
The role of the municipality is to accept the disaster waste and incinerate or disposeof it in their facility for treatment of municipal solid waste. In addition, the accepting
municipality measures the radiation level of the waste and announces the results toalleviate any anxiety the inhabitants may have. An affected municipality can obtain a
subsidy from the Ministry of Environment to cover the entire cost of implementing thewide area treatment. Thus, in principle, the accepting municipality does not need to bear
any of the cost of disaster waste disposal.
The practice of wide area treatment is as follows. Table 2 describes the flow of thewide area treatment as in the case of Osaka city, which accepted 15,000 tons ofcombustible disaster waste from the Miyako area in Iwate prefecture. The required
disposal cost was at least 290 million yen. The tsunami combined many materials suchas mud, concrete, plants, houses, cars, and various products. At the first temporary site
in the Miyako area, the disaster waste was separated into combustibles andincombustibles, hazardous or non-hazardous, and recyclable or non-recyclable (by handor machine). The separated waste was sent to a second temporary site and further
separated by hand. The radiation level of the separated disaster waste was measured at
the second temporary site. The radiation level was measured again before loading it
onto ships and trucks to transport the waste for wide area treatment.
When the disaster waste arrives at a harbor and a transshipment facility, the radiationlevel is measured again. In the transshipment facility, machines remove hazardous

7

waste and incombustibles found in the disaster waste. Lastly, the disaster waste istreated in an incineration plant and sent to a final disposal site, where it is disposed
together with municipal solid waste after being measured for concentration ofradioactive material.

Table 2: The flow of the wide area treatment
Miyako area
1. Separation by machine and hand

Fist temporary site

2. Separation by hand

Second temporary site

3. Measurement of the radiation level
4. Measurement of the radiation level

Harbor in Iwate

5. Loaded onto a ship
Osaka city
6. Unloading of containers

Harbor in Osaka7. Measurement of the radiation level
8. Separation by machineTransshipment facility

9. Measurement of the radiation level
10. Incineration with municipal solid waste

Incineration plant

11. Measurement of the radiation level
12. Final disposal with municipal solid waste

Final disposal site

13. Measurement of the radiation level83. Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Factors affecting the acceptance of waste
As discussed in the introduction, there is evidence that factors such associo-economic and geographic characteristics of the municipalities and prefectures canaffect the likelihood of accepting the disaster waste (see e.g. Levinson 1999a, 1999b).
To begin with, we therefore include information on the population density, the rate ofprimary industry workers, population share under age 15 and the distance from
Fukushima Daiichi as explanatory variables. We include these four variables primarily
to control for the importance of anxiety over the radioactive contamination. Since thelack of understanding about the situation and the radiation risk may increase for those ata greater distance from the affected area, the location may have negative impact on
acceptance. In municipalities with a higher number of children, there may be parents
who feel anxiety over the health effects of radiation on their children. Similarly, in themunicipalities with a higher number of agricultural workers, there may be more
inhabitants who feel anxiety over the impact of radioactive material on the sale ofagricultural products. Reluctance to accept may be stronger in municipalities with ahigher population density due to the shorter distance to the facility that treats thedisaster waste.
The main economic factor that we will include is the slack capacity of theincinerator plants. The idea is that municipalities will try to manage their incinerators
efficiently if it is economically rational. If there is a larger slack capacity in incinerators,
they can bring the operation of the facility to a more efficient level by accepting
additional waste from other municipalities. Data on the slack capacity of incineration
plants, the slack capacity of final disposal sites, and the implementation of wide area

9

treatment of municipal solid waste were available from a survey by the Ministry ofEnvironment. The slack capacity of incineration plants is calculated as the difference
between the annual capacity of the facility and the annual throughput.
We also investigate the effects of the pre-existing implementation of wide area
treatment of municipal solid waste. While each municipality has responsibility to thetreatment of its household waste, the Ministry of Environment has promoted wide area
treatment because of the scale economy since 1997. Many municipalities form a
coalition to treat household waste and share the incineration plants and final disposalsites that are operated based on the cooperation of these municipalities. Municipalitythat is used to accepting the solid waste of other municipalities might have lessreluctance to the wide area treatment of disaster waste.
Although the acceptance of the disaster waste by municipalities was determined
independently, the intentions of the prefecture that they belong to might have an
influence. For example, the municipality can receive cooperation and support on thewide area treatment from the prefecture if the prefecture is also in favor of acceptance.
We therefore also include information on whether or not the prefecture was in favor of
acceptance.
Reciprocity reasons could also be important for why a municipality accepts thedisaster waste. Municipalities may willing to accept the disaster waste because they
could be harmed by a disaster in the future, and thereby are able to ask othermunicipalities for help as well. Specifically, this motive would be strong if themunicipality is located near the nuclear power plant as the risk is higher. Data on thelocation of nuclear power plants was sourced from the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum,
Inc. This is a dummy variable that takes the value one if there is any nuclear power

10

plant within the boundaries of the municipality. As of March 2, 2011, there were 54
nuclear power reactors located in 17 municipalities in 13 prefectures.
Finally, it is possible that cooperation for emergency restoration between
municipalities is implemented from a humanitarian point of view. An interestingquestion then is, first of all, if there are differences in the extent of pro-sociality among
municipalities in general, and in particular with respect to altruistic concerns regarding
the actual disaster in question. Second, if these potential differences affect thelikelihood of acceptance. In order to investigate this, we include two measures relating
to the extent of pro-sociality among the municipalities and prefectures. The first one is ameasure of the extent of volunteer activity in each prefecture. The data comes from the2011 survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities by the Statistical Bureau of theJapanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The data measures thepercentage of people above 10 years old who participated in any volunteer activity inthat year. Since the October 2011 survey was conducted after the disaster in March
2011, it also contains the volunteer activity for the Great East Japan Earthquake. The
second measure is the amount of donations from the inhabitants of the prefecture to thevictims of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The Japanese Red Cross Society provides
data on the donations for victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The amount of
donations came from each prefecture in Japan from March 2011 to March 2012. The
Japanese Red Cross Society is one of the biggest organizations that collected donations
for the victims. The data does not contain the money that was sent directly to the head
office of the Japanese Red Cross Society. Thus, if the ratio between the donations to theprefectural office and those to the head office is significantly different among
prefectures, it does not accurately represent the exact donations from each prefecture.

11

While both our measures of pro-social preferences could explain the willingness to help
the affected municipalities with handling their waste, the second measure is directly
related to the disaster itself. The relationship between donations and acceptance ofwaste is not clear. On the one hand the size of the donations could be a good measure of
the extent of altruistic concerns. On the other hand, psychological studies suggest moral
licensing (Monin and Miller, 2001), that is, people who have undertaken a praiseworthy
act, receive an implicit license for subsequently conducting a more selfish act. For
example, Mazar and Zhong (2010) found that people become less altruistic after
purchasing environmentally friendly products than after purchasing conventional
products. In the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake, donations to help the victims
might have lead to moral licensing. Summary statistics of all the variables are presented
in Table 3.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Average

Min.

Max.

SD

Donation (yen/person)

0.81

0.14

2.69

0.52

Volunteer (%)

3.31

2.00

6.90

1.05

Proximity of nuclear plant (dummy)

0.01

0.00

1.00

0.10

Prefecture intention (dummy)

0.40

0.00

1.00

0.49

Slack capacity of incineration plant (1000 t/per year)

31.35

0.00

1,179.67

58.82

Slack capacity of final disposal site (1000 t)

26.37

0.00

4,309.47

182.80Distance from Fukushima Daiichi (100 km)

5.91

0.73

22.38

3.63

Population under age 15 (%)

12.70

4.25

21.81

2.28

Primary industry workers (%)

11.55

0.10

75.64

10.78

204.450.14

5,007.40

542.64

0.58

0.00

1.00

0.49

2

Density (person/km )Wide area treatment of municipal solid waste (dummy)
Note: SD is standard deviation.

12

3.2 Model
We estimate the determinants for the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster waste
using the logit model. The model is:!

𝑒𝐱 𝛃Prob 𝑌 = 1|𝐱 = Λ 𝐱 𝛃 =!
1 + 𝑒𝐱 𝛃!

Y is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the municipality is positive
toward the acceptance of the disaster waste and x represents explanatory variables. As
discussed we will estimate two models. One based on the 2012 data and one based on
the 2013 data. Regarding the 2012 data, three kinds of municipalities are treated as
positive toward the acceptance: municipalities that have considered the acceptance;municipalities that have expressed the intention of the acceptance; and those that havealready accepted the disaster waste. With regard to estimations using the data of 2013,
municipalities positive toward the acceptance are those have already accepted thedisaster waste.
There are large differences in the acceptance rate between the regions, in particularbetween east and west Japan. In particular there are very few municipalities that finallyaccepted waste in 2013 in West Japan. We will therefore also estimate models focusing
only on East Japan.
The explanatory variables represented by x are various characteristics of themunicipalities. When a municipality already disposes of municipal solid waste by wide
area treatment with neighboring municipalities, it is necessary for the municipality toobtain permission from other municipalities to accept disaster waste. Hence, all of these13

municipalities belonging to the group of wide area treatment are counted as accepting
municipalities because they actually agreed upon acceptance.

4. Results
Table 4 reports the results from the binary logit models with the acceptance of waste
as the dependent variable. The first two models report the results from the 2012 and2013 data respectively, and include all municipalities. The third and fourth model
reports results focusing only on the municipalities in East Japan.
Most of the estimated marginal effects have signs that are in line with our hypotheses.
The statistical significance varies somewhat between the 2012 and 2013 data. In
municipalities with higher amount of donations, the likelihood of accepting waste ishigher, but the effect is only statistically significant for the 2013 data for the full sample.
However, for the East Japan sample, the effect is statistically significant for both the2012 and 2013 data. The size of the marginal effects is non-negligible although not
huge. For example, for the 2013 model if donations increase by one standard deviation,
the probability that a municipality accepts waste increases by almost 0.02 units. The
measure of volunteer activity is also positively correlated with the likelihood of
accepting waste for three of the four models. In particular if we focus on the sample ofmunicipalities in East Japan, the effect is statistically significant. Thus, both ourmeasures of pro-sociality are positively related to acceptance, and since the amount of
donations is positively related, any type of moral licensing is not so strong so that it
counteracts the effect of pro-sociality on the acceptance of waste.
Results related to the factor of reciprocity show that proximity to a nuclear power
plant has statistically significant and positive marginal effect. A municipality that has a14

nuclear power plant within its boundaries may accept the disaster waste because theywould expect other municipalities to help if a severe nuclear accident occurred in theirown municipality. The results suggest that the concept of reciprocity motivation leads toa municipality’s acceptance.
The impact of the prefecture’s intention is negative and statistically significant inmodels that use the data from 2012. On the other hand, the effect is positive andstatistically significant in models that use the data from 2013. Since the 2012 datacontains municipalities that show intentions of accepting disaster waste and the 2013
data does not, this suggests that the intentions of the prefecture tend to be positive whenthe municipalities move to the actual stage of acceptance. While the negative coefficientin models with the data from 2012 is difficult to interpret, the influence of different
levels of government might not be weak in coordinating the inter-municipal transfer ofdisaster waste.
While the above variables are mostly related to non-economic motivations for
acceptance, the estimated results suggest that economic incentives are also important forthe decision to accept disaster waste, at least in some cases. This because either theslack capacity of the incineration plant or the disposal site is positively correlated withthe decision to accept waste or not, at least if we look at all municipalities in 2012.
However, if we only look at the municipalities in East Japan, this is no longer true. Thus,
the municipalities in eastern Japan may tend to accept the waste regardless of economic
rationality.
The results related to the influence of the radioactive contamination also support our
hypothesis. The estimated marginal effects with the data from all of Japan show that the
distance from the Fukushima Daiichi is negative and statistically significant. This15

suggests that there is a lack of recognition regarding the urgency of the situation, or alack of understanding regarding the risk of radiation in municipalities that are far fromthe affected area. The size of the marginal effect is sizeable, for the 2013 model anincrease in distance corresponding to a standard deviation increase, decrease theprobability of acceptance by 0.055 units. On the other hand, the marginal effect ispositive and statistically significant in estimation with the data of eastern Japan inmodels estimated with the 2012 data.
The ratio of the population working in the primary industry as well as population
density is statistically significant and negative. The agricultural workers might fear that
accepting the tsunami waste could create a negative image of their products. As for the
population density, many inhabitants worried about the influence of radiation when the
distance to the facilities that accept the waste is short. Results of these variables suggestthat the reluctance to accept disaster waste is strong in the municipalities with a higher
number of workers in the primary industry and a higher population density. On theother hand, those under 15 years of age are not statistically significant in any of themodels. While it is conceivable that parents feel anxious about exposing their children
to radiation, it does not have a statistically significant impact on the municipalities’
decision to accept disaster waste.
	
 16

Table 4: Marginal effects, logit models on the decision to accept waste in 2012 and2013.

All of Japan

Donations
Volunteers (*102)

2012 Data

2013 Data

2012 Data

2013 Data

0.014

0.038

0.103

0.066

(0.014)(0.007)

3.806

***

(0.848)Proximity of nuclear plant

0.147-0.075

0.802

***

***

0.139

*

(0.017)

0.070

6.931

***

0.219

***

-0.059

2.017

***

0.227

**

0.129

(0.025)(0.029)

0.004

0.018

0.008

(0.013)(0.005)(0.017)(0.011)

0.002

0.006

0.013

0.007

(*102)(0.003)(0.001)(0.008)(0.006)

Distance from Fukushima nuclear plant-0.012(*102)
Slack capacity of final disposal site

Population under age 15 (*102)
Primary industry workers (*102)
Density (*102)

Wide area treatment of municipal solid
waste
Observations

0.034

***

***

-0.015

***

***

0.016

*

(0.004)(0.010)(0.010)0.288-0.006

0.375

0.021

(0.402)(0.278)(0.587)(0.483)***-0.205(0.137)(0.090)-0.002-0.003(0.001)**-0.994***-0.364(0.192)(0.156)-0.002-0.006(0.002)(0.002)(0.003)

0.009

0.016

0.034

0.026

(0.015)(0.010)(0.024)(0.018)

1592

1592

889

889

*

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p< 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

17

***

-0.010(0.004)-0.666***(0.044)(0.016)

Slack capacity of incineration plant**(0.894)(0.067)******(0.013)(1.115)(0.025)******(0.021)(0.485)(0.050)Prefecture intentions

East Japan****

5. Conclusions
This study investigated the determinants for the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster
waste resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake. The results of the analysis showthat the municipalities accepted the tsunami waste due to suggested motivations throughsocial preferences as well as economic rationality. Previous studies have focused on
economic reasons for transfer of waste between regions or municipalities. Thus, what
we show is that other reasons could explain the decision as well.
Many news articles reported that inhabitants protested or opposed the acceptance ofdisaster waste while hoping for the revival of the stricken area. Our results show that the
opposition to some extent comes from the inhabitants’ anxiety over radiation
contamination from the disaster. Information disclosure and communication about theradiation risks are important, especially for municipalities that are located far from thedamaged area. The finding pertains to many NIMBY problem and the wide area
treatment of other hazardous waste. On the other hand, variables related to pro-sociality
positively affect the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster waste. We could not find any
evidence of moral licensing or negative relation between pro-social behaviors.
Understanding how pro-social behaviors can positively affect cooperation is importantfor policy interventions for disaster recovery. It can create a feeling of YIMBY, i.e. Yes
in my Backyard. It can be helpful for the ministry in the central government when it
comes to coordinating the decision making of municipalities in different areas and atdifferent levels.

18

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