Discussion Paper No.

968

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL STATUS
ON LONGEVITY:
EVIDENCE FROM TWO LITERARY PRIZESIN JAPAN

Shusaku Sasaki
Hirofumi Kurokawa
Fumio Ohtake

April 2016
Revised May 2017
Secondly Revised February 2018

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

Positive and negative effects of social statuson longevity: Evidence from two literaryprizes in Japan
Shusaku Sasaki*, Hirofumi Kurokawa, and Fumio Ohtake
February 15th, 2018

ABSTRACT
It is widely believed that a rise in social status extends longevity. A handful number of studies
examine datasets of candidates for prestigious prizes to exploit the causality. However, whilesome studies report positive relationships between receiving awards and recipients’ longevity,
others report negative relationships. In this study, we show evidence that receiving a prize hasboth positive and negative causal effects on recipients’ longevity, by using a dataset covering
Japan’s most prestigious and traditional literary recognitions, the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes.

*

Correspondence. Email: ssasaki.econ@gmail.com Tel.: +8190-6242-4510 Present address: Faculty of
Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan.
We thank Mika Akesaka, Daisuke Yasumoto, Yuriko Shiiba, Akihiro Nakajima, Tomoya Nomizo, Jun Kamohara,
and Yuta Matsuo for their support in dataset construction. We also thank Naoki Matayoshi, Kanako Nishi, Ryo
Kambayashi, Yoshiki Ishikawa, Ayumi Shintani, Naoki Kondo, Masaru Sasaki, Miki Kohara, and the participantsat the 10th Applied Econometrics Conference 2015, ABEF’s 9th Annual Conference 2015, and the 11th Annual
Conference of Japan Health Economics Association for the discussions, comments, and encouragement. This paper
is awarded “Young Best Presentation Award 2016” at the 11th Annual Conference of Japan Health Economics
Association.
This research is financially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Institute ofSocial and Economic Research at Osaka University [JSPS Grant Numbers: 14J04581 and 17J07242 (S., Sasaki),
13J05272 (H., Kurokawa), and (A) 26245041 (F., Ohtake)].
1

The results reveal that the recipients of the Akutagawa Prize for new or emerging novelists
exhibit lower mortality than their fellow nominees. The increase in longevity is estimated at
1.4 years. By contrast, the recipients of the Naoki Prize mainly for established novelists reporthigher mortality than their fellow nominees, and the decreased longevity is estimated at 5.2
years. We discuss with additional empirical analyses that we are likely to find a life-prolonging
effect from receiving a prize when candidates belong to a lower social stratum. In so doing, ourfindings provide narrative explanations for why earlier studies show conflicting relationships
between receiving awards and recipients’ longevity.

JEL: I12, H14
Keywords: Social Status, Mortality, Health Inequality, Cox’s Proportional Hazard Model,
Time-dependent Covariates, Time-dependent Parameters21. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and literature review
There is considerable academic interest in whether a rise in social status extends longevity.
Although several studies report positive correlations between social status and longevity/health(Marmot et al.,Marmot, 1981), their results do not demonstrate the causality from social status to longevity,
given that a reverse causality is also possible (Boyce and Oswald, 2012).
To exploit the causality, a handful number of studies examine datasets of candidates forprestigious prizes, including the Academy Awards (Oscars®), the Nobel Prize, etc. They do so,
because the recipients and nominees of distinguished awards are likely to be homogeneous in
multiple aspects and being awarded a prize can be viewed as an exogenous shock to their social
status. This allows them to exploit a causal effect from heightened social status to longevity, bycomparing the life expectancies and mortality rates of recipients and fellow nominees. Adopting
this empirical strategy, Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) show that actors and actresses who
receive Oscars® live 3.6 years longer than Oscar® nominees and support their hypothesis thata rise in social status has a positive causal effect on longevity.

3

Table 1. Studies examining relationships between receiving awards and recipients’ longevity
PapersPrestigious prizes

Positive effect,
or negative effect

Redelmeierand Singh (2001a)Academy Award for
actors and actresses

Positive effect

Actors and actresses who receive Oscars® live
3.6 years longer than fellow nominees.

Rablen and
Oswald (2008)

Nobel Prize inchemistry and physics

Positive effectNobel laureates in chemistry and physics live
1.6 years longer than fellow nominees.

Liu et al. (2017)

China's academician
election

Positive effectCandidates elected to the Chinese Academy live
1.2 years longer than fellow candidates.

Redelmeierand Singh (2001b)

Academy Award forscreenwriters

Negative effect

Screenwriters who receive Oscars® live
3.6 years less than fellow nominees.

Abel andKruger (2005)

Baseball Hall of Fame

Negative effectPlayers inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame live
5.0 years less than similar-age players.

Olenski et al. (2015)

National election toa head of government

Negative effectCandidates who served as a head of government live
4.4 years less than those who did not.

Leive (2017)

Olympic Track and Field
games

Negative effectGold medalists in Olympic Track and Field games live
2.0 years less than Silver medalists.

Summary

Notes: Positive effect means that receiving a prize extends recipients' longevity. By contrast, negative effect means that receiving a prize
shortens their longevity.

However, as shown in Table 1, some studies report positive relationships between
receiving awards and recipients’ longevity, while others report negative relationships. There are
two explanations for such conflicting results. First, receiving a prize has both positive andnegative causal effects. Second, analytical accuracy and precision differ by study and thesedifferences cause the size and directionality of the effects to vary.
The following literature explores the second possibility, to our knowledge. Sylvestre et al.
(2006) and Han et al. (2011) highlight that Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) do not properly deal4

with an immortal time bias, that is, the possibility that actors and actresses who live longer havemore opportunities to earn Oscars. To eliminate the bias, Sylvestre et al. (2006) re-estimate
Redelmeier and Singh’s (2001a) dataset by using a Cox proportional hazard model with timedependent covariates, treating a recipient as a nominee until they receive a prize, allowing othercovariates to also vary, and controlling the recipient’s status and activities between their first
nomination and winning. They show that the effect of receiving Oscars® on longevity is
positive but statistically insignificant.
However, it remains possible that the first explanation is credible. Rablen and Oswald(2008), using a method similar to that of Sylvestre et al. (2006), demonstrate that the effect ofreceiving the Nobel Prizes on longevity is positive and statistically significant. Thus, after
properly addressing the immortal time bias, one study reports a positive causal effect onlongevity, while another suggests no effect. In other words, although differences in how studies
address the bias partly explain differences in the size and directionality of the effects ofreceiving the prizes, it still remains unclear why studies have produced conflicting results on
the effects.

1.2. Hypothesis
This study explores the possibility that receiving a prize has both positive and negative causal
effects on longevity. We first investigate why previous studies have proposed the hypothesis
5that receiving a prize has only a positive effect.
We find three mechanisms backing the hypothesis. The first is based on improving mental
health: people with a higher social status are less likely to compare their own status with others’
and to experience feelings of shame, embarrassment, depression, and social anxiety (Dickerson
and Pickett, 2010).
The second is related to reducing work-related psychological stress: people with a higher social
status generally have greater control over their jobs and can avoid forced and monotonous jobs
Sa
Pickett, 2010). The third is enhancing a recipient’s economic conditions: people with a higher
social status have greater income and access to health-enhancing goods and services, such as
better living

2006).1
However, some recent studies present one possibility that although the first effect throughsocial comparisons is constantly positive, the second effect related to work environments issometimes negative (Damaske et al., 2016). That is, a rise in social status can increase workrelated psychological stress rather than reduce it. Other studies present another possibility that

1

Among studies with prestigious prizes, Redelmeier and Singh (2001a) discuss that award winners are likely tohave personal chefs, trainers, or other staff and they enable the winners to follow ideal lifestyles.
6the third effect through improving economic conditions is positive but heterogeneous withsocial stratification (Deaton, 2003).2 The third positive effect can be larger (smaller) whenpeople are in a lower (higher) social stratum. If these two possibilities are valid, we canhypothesize that receiving a prize has a life-prolonging effect when candidates belong to a lower
social stratum. In this case, the positive economic effect is strengthened, and the sum of the two
positive effects exceeds the negative work-related effect.
We introduce recent studies supporting that the second effect related to work environments
is sometimes negative. 3 Epidemiology and sociology indicate that highly ranked jobclassifications involve long working hours and high work demands, and these factors generate
psychological stress (Damaske et al. (2016) show that workers with a higher social status report greater stress at workand are more likely to fail in meeting work demands than those with a lower social status. A
rise in social status would compound workload, and workers with a higher social status might
struggle to meet competing needs and deadlines, working without rest. Furthermore, it is known

2

This study defines social stratification as classifying individuals into groups with different relative positions incommunities, including occupational ones. Individuals who belong to the same social stratum share a similar social
status, but there are certain variations in the social status even within the same social stratum. For example, newor emerging novelists similarly belong to the lower social stratum in the (unofficial) literary community, Bundan.
At the same time, there are novelists with a relatively high social status, such as those who receive awards or great
job opportunities as rookies.
3
It is theoretically and empirically known that the first effect through social comparisons is positive and constantwith social stratification. When people have higher social status and income within the same social stratum, it
increases utility, well-being, happiness, and satisfaction, and even decreases mortality risk (Ball and Chernova,-i-Carbonell andeffect of relative income on utility and health status even in developed countries and among wealthy people

7that working hours and work demands are positively correlated with job authority, autonomy,
and non-routineness

Schieman et al., 2006). Thus, we would find thestrengthened negative effect in the sample occupations characterized by such work conditions.
In fact, Redelmeier and Singh (2001b) and Olenski et al. (2015) use samples of screenwriters
and politicians, showing that a rise in social status increases mortality risk.
Other studies support that the third positive effect through improving economic conditions
is strengthened when people belong to a lower social stratum and it weakens as their social
stratum elevates. Epidemiology, sociology, and economics agree that there is a non-linear and

Kawachi, 2006). Several studies empirically show this association using cross-section and panel

Rogot et al., 1992).4
Accounting for the above discussion, we hypothesize that we find a positive net effect onlongevity from receiving a prize when using a sample of individuals with atypical occupations
and in a lower social stratum. In this case, the positive effect through improving economic

4

We find a stronger positive economic effect among people in a lower social stratum, because people who havea lower social status within the lower social stratum, such as the poorer, are less likely to care about their health.
Behavioral economics indicates that poverty impedes cognitive function and fosters present-biased decision-bias tend to indulge in risky behaviors,
including overeating, drinking, and smoking. Marmot et al. (1991) report that in the United Kingdom, a decreasein such risky behaviors explains one-third of the positive correlation between job classifications and the healthstatus of civil servants.
8

conditions is strengthened and the sum of the two positive effects exceeds the negative effectrelated to work environments. Conversely, when the sample belongs to a higher social stratum,
the negative effect prevails. In other words, heterogeneity in the positive economic effect partly
explains whether receiving a prize has a positive or negative net effect on longevity.
We test the hypothesis by using datasets of Japan’s two literary prizes, the Akutagawa andNaoki Prizes. Testing the hypothesis requires two types of datasets: one comprises candidates
in atypical occupations and a lower social stratum, and the other comprises candidates in similar
occupations but in a higher social stratum. As we will explain in Section2, the dataset of the
Akutagawa Prize for new or emerging novelists fulfills the former’s requirement, and that of
the Naoki Prize mainly for established novelists fulfills the latter’s one. That is, our empiricalhypothesis is that receiving a prize has a life-prolonging effect in the Akutagawa Prize sample.

2. DATA
2.1. Overview of Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes
The Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes are Japan’s most prestigious and traditional literary
recognitions.5 Print, broadcast, and Internet media cover their recipients, and receiving either

5

Among novelists awarded or nominated for the Nobel, Kenzaburo Oe received the 39th Akutagawa Prize in 1958
and the Nobel Prize for literature in 1994. Similarly, Kobo Abe won the 25th Akutagawa Prize, Shusaku Endo won
the 33rd, and Haruki Murakami was nominated for the 81st and 83rd Akutagawa Prizes. Yasunari Kawabata,
Junichiro Tanizaki, and Yukio Mishima were members of the review committee for the Akutagawa Prize. Worksby candidates for the Naoki Prize, including Ryotaro Shiba and Jiro Akagawa, have sold more than 100 million
copies worldwide, paralleling the sales of worldwide best-selling novelists Steven King and Sidney Sheldon (BBCNishinippon Shimbun Co., Ltd., 2016).

9

delivers an equivalently tremendous shock to social status.
The prizes share several characteristics and are often viewed as two sides of the same coin.
They were simultaneously established in 1935 and sponsored by the same organizations,
Bungeishunju Ltd. and the Society for the Promotion of Japanese Literature. Novelists canreceive either prize only once, but those who have received neither can be candidates for both.
Both have similar selection procedures and identical monetary and material rewards,6 and areawarded twice a year (January and July). The 154th awards are presented on January 19, 2016.
There have been 1,061 candidates, of whom 344 have received one of the two prizes.
However, a key difference exists. The Akutagawa Prize is awarded to new or emerging
novelists. This prize is also given for serious literature, which sells less than popular literature
in Japan. They generally have low income and a high level of anxiety about their future. In
these senses, the candidates are in the lower stratum in the unofficial literary community,
Bundan. By contrast, candidates for the Naoki Prize include a larger number of establishednovelists and the prize is awarded for popular literature. Thus, the candidates are expected to
be in the higher social stratum.
The Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes dataset parallels that of similar studies while better

6

Recipients receive prize money (¥1,000,000 = US $8,262, as per the 2015 exchange rate) and a pocket watch.
The monetary amount is identical for both prizes and the relative level does not vary over time. However, this does
not mean that the positive economic effect of receiving a prize is identical for both prizes. We define the positive
economic effect not as the effect of receiving the prize money but as that of improving a recipient’s economic
conditions, including greater job opportunities, higher payment fees, better living conditions, nutritious meals, andquality medical care.
10enabling us to draw causal inferences to longevity. First, the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes areawarded for works published between semiannual awards. Works appear near the date of award
presentation and the social stratum at the time of publication is similar to that upon receiving
the award. Second, candidates in our dataset know they are being considered. That is, the causal
effect from wining prizes to longevity includes the discouragement of unsuccessful nominees.
These two characteristics are shared by the Oscar® (Redelmeier and Singh, 2001a, 2001b).
Third, our candidates can receive either prize only once. However, this is not the case in
Redelmeier and Singh (2001a, 2001b) or Rablen and Oswald (2008). If candidates can receive
the same award multiple times, the analysis must consider that the previous recognition mightalter covariates for the second award.7 Analyzing datasets of the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes
allows us to ignore such influences.

7

Rablen and Oswald (2008) exclude recipients of multiple Nobel Prizes from the sample. Han et al. (2011),
Robins (1986, 1992), and Robins et al. (1992) use and develop g-estimation to eliminate bias caused by repeat
recognition.
11

2.2. Data sources
Table 2. Information sources for dataset
Information sources
List of recipients and fellow nominees

Bungeishunju Ltd.’s (2014a) official records

Date of birth
Place of birth
Date of death
Educational backgroundJob other than a novelist

Four biographical dictionaries for novelists in Japan(Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2002; Nichigai Associates, Inc., 2004;
Japan Writers' Association, 2015; Shinchosha Publishing Co., Ltd., 1988)
Japan's literary prizes homepages

Other prizes besides the two prizes
Published books

Database of National Diet Library in Japan (2015)

Cause of death (suicide or not)Three newspaper databases (The Asahi Shimbun Company, 2015; The Mainichi
Newspapers, 2015; The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015)

Note: We identify recipients and nominees from Bungeishunju Ltd.’s (2014a) official records and reaffirm information accuracy byusing supplemental documents (Bungeishunju Ltd., 2014b; Kawaguchi, 2015a, 2015b). Japan's Publishers must legally provide all of
their publications to the National Diet Library.

Our dataset covers the candidates for the 1st to 154th awards. The dataset captures their name,date and place of birth, date and cause of death (suicide or not)8, education, job other than beinga novelist, other literary prizes received9, and books published. We construct this dataset frommultiple sources, as shown in Table 2. For example, we identify recipients and nominees from
Bungeishunju Ltd.’s (2014a) official records and reaffirm information accuracy by using

8

Records for some novelists indicate only the year of birth or death. In these cases, we use January 1 as the date
and add a dummy variable denoting no record, considering it in our empirical analysis.
9
We consider the following literary prizes in Japan: All Yomimono Shinjin, All Yomimono Suiri Shousetsu Shinjin,
Asahi Shinjin Bungaku, Asahi Shimbun Kenshou, Bungaku, Bungakukai Shinjin, Bungei, Dazai Osamu, Gunzou
Shinjin Bungaku, Kawabata Yasunari Sakka, Mishima Yukio, Noma Bungei, Noma Bungei Shinjin, Noma Bungei
Shourei, Sakka (Doujin), Shibata Renzaburo, Shinchou Shinjin, Shinchosha Bungaku, Shinchosha Bungei Dai 1
Bu, Shinchosha Bungei Dai 2 Bu, Shousetsu Gendai Shinjin, Shousetsu Subaru Shinjin, Sunday Mainichi Taishu
Bungei, Subaru Bungaku, Tanizaki Junichiro, Umitsubame Shinjin Bungaku, Yamamoto Shugoro, Yoshikawa Eiji
Bungaku, Yoshikawa Eiji Bungaku Shinjin, and Waseda Bungaku Shinjin.
1210

2.3. Descriptive statistics
Our analysis uses 708 observations of novelists, of whom 363 (345) are recipients and nomineesof the Akutagawa (Naoki) Prize.11 In Table 3, Panel A presents the descriptive results of theoutcome variable, age at death, and reveals that, on average, Akutagawa Prize recipients are 6.3
years older at death than their fellow nominees (1% statistical significance) and Naoki Prize
recipients are 2.4 years younger than their fellow nominees (10% statistical significance).
Although we recognize that the descriptive results cannot support causal claims, the results
are consistent with our empirical hypothesis. The hypothesis depends on the assumption that
the Akutagawa Prize is for new or emerging novelists and its candidates are in the lower social
stratum compared to those for the Naoki Prize. We attempt to support the assumption, by using
information on candidates’ age and number of published books.
We examine candidates’ ages when they were first nominated. Panel B (Table 1) showsthat their average ages at the first nomination are 36.4 and 42.5 years for the Akutagawa and10

We collect information from four biographical dictionaries for Japanese novelists (Japan Writers’ Association,

We determine whether nominees have received other literary prizes by referencing “Akutagawa shou monogatari”“Naoki shou monogatari”
Kawaguchi, 2014). We compile published books from the National Diet Library (2015) database and identify
whether candidates commit suicide from obituary notices published in newspapers (Asahi Shimbun Company,
11

We exclude novelists nominated for both prizes, one novelist with a corporate identity, and two joint
nominations. We also exclude novelists for whom dates of birth or death are unavailable. Our analysis covers
Japanese male novelists to avoid gender-based and racial based differences in life expectancy.
13

Naoki Prize. On average, nominees for the Akutagawa Prize are 6.1 years younger than thosefor the Naoki Prize. In addition, the duration between debut and first nomination is shorter for
the Akutagawa Prize than the Naoki Prize. These results support that the candidates for theformer include a larger number of new or emerging novelists.
Next, we investigate the number of books published before a candidate’s first nomination,
for which we collected information from the National Diet Library database. Publishers must
legally provide all of their publications to the library. In fact, the library owns almost all the
books, which are particularly published for commercial purposes (The National Diet Library,2008). This feature helps check whether our assumption is plausible. Publishers conclude acommercial publishing contract with novelists when they expect the works to generate market
demand. If a candidate has published several books prior to their first nomination for either
prize, this means they are commercially established novelists.
Panel B shows that the number of books published before the first nomination is smaller
for the Akutagawa Prize than the Naoki Prize. Furthermore, almost half of the candidates forthe former have not published even one book before their first nomination. These results support
that the Akutagawa Prize is for new or emerging novelists and its candidates are in the lower
social stratum than those for the Naoki Prize.
However, the descriptive results could include reverse causality, particularly an immortal
time bias that novelists who live longer have more opportunities to be nominated and are more
14

Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Age at death and death (dummy)
Akutagawa Prize
Recipients
N = 109

Naoki Prize

Fellow nominees
N = 254

Recipients
N = 125

Fellow nominees
N = 220

Variable name

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Difference (SE)Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)Age at death
Death (Dummy)

74.42 (12.90)
0.50 (0.50)

68.09 (15.72)
0.51 (0.50)

6.33*** (2.42)‐0.01 (0.06)

72.48 (11.36)
0.58 (0.50)

74.89 (12.10)
0.60 (0.49)

Difference (SE)‐2.42* (1.74)‐0.02 (0.06)

Panel B. Social stratification
Akutagawa Prize

Naoki Prize

Recipients and fellow nominees
N = 363

Recipients and fellow nominees
N = 345

Variable name
Age

Time
At 1st nomination

Mean (SD)36.39 (8.05)

Mean (SD)42.48 (8.41)

Duration (years) b/w debut and 1st nomination
Number of published books

At 1st nomination

3.06 (5.67)
3.67 (11.84)

5.94 (7.11)
8.89 (15.02)

Difference (SE)‐6.09*** (0.62)‐2.88*** (0.48)‐5.22*** (1.01)

Proportion of no published bookAt 1st nomination

0.45 (0.50)

0.21 (0.41)

0.25*** (0.03)

Panel C. Comparison of recipients and fellow nominees
Akutagawa Prize
Recipients
N = 109

Fellow nominees
N = 254

Variable name
Age

Time
At 1st nomination

Mean (SD)35.33 (7.14)

Mean (SD)36.85 (8.39)

Duration (years) b/w debut and 1st nomination
Number of published books
Proportion of no published bookAt 1st nomination
At 1st nomination

2.70 (4.59)
3.73 (7.87)
0.35 (0.48)

3.21 (6.08)
3.65 (13.19)
0.50 (0.50)

B/W 1st and final nominations
B/W 1st and final nominations

2.00 (1.31)
1.66 (3.42)

1.70 (1.14)
0.94 (2.89)

Number of nominations
Number of published books

Naoki Prize
Recipients
N = 125

Fellow nominees
N = 220

Mean (SD)41.95 (7.86)

Mean (SD)42.79 (8.71)

Difference (SE)‐0.84 (0.94)

0.08 (1.36)‐0.15*** (0.06)

6.77 (7.85)
11.71 (19.17)
0.14 (0.35)

5.46 (6.63)
7.29 (11.79)
0.25 (0.43)

1.31** (0.79)
4.42*** (1.67)‐0.10** (0.05)

0.30** (0.14)
0.72** (0.35)

2.49 (1.76)
10.84 (21.02)

1.70 (1.16)
4.39 (12.93)

0.78*** (0.16)
6.45*** (1.83)

Difference (SE)‐1.53** (0.92)‐0.51 (0.65)

Number of other prizes
B/W 1st and final nominations
0.11 (0.37)
0.04 (0.19)
0.07*** (0.03)
0.07 (0.26)
0.05 (0.33)
0.02 (0.03)
Note for Panels A, B, and C: (1) SD is a standard deviation, and SE is a standard error. (2) *** p<0.01 (one sided test), ** p<0.05 (one sided test), * p<0.1 (one sided test). (3) The mean of age at death is calculated
by using only the sample who have been dead. That sample's number is 183 in the Akutagawa Prize and 203 in the Naoki Prize. (4) The variable "proportion of no published book" means the proportion of thecandidates who had no publication at their first nomination.

15

likely to be awarded. Panel C indicates differences in some aspects at the first nomination
between recipients and fellow nominees in both prizes, as similarly observed in the literature.
In addition, recipients’ numbers of total nominations, published books, and other prizes between
the first and final nominations are greater than those for the fellow nominees. The latter results
indicate the immortal time bias. In the next section, we introduce how our analysis statisticallydeals with this issue.

3. MODEL
3.1. Time-varying covariates and time-varying parameters
Our analyses use Cox’s proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates and timevarying parameters. The key advantage of this model is that it allows us to empirically deal
with an immortal time bias

Simon and Makuch,after first nomination. They are likely to be more enthusiastic about creating works between
their first and final nominations (or winning) than unsuccessful nominees, and the activities
could relate the recipients’ health levels. If we do not consider the difference, the estimatedparameter of winning a prize could include an immortal time bias. We apply time-varying
covariates, addressing the bias. More precisely, we set time-zero as the date of first nomination,and construct the dataset in a panel format capturing the first and final nominations. Then, using
16

time-dependent covariates, we code recipients as nominees until they receive a prize, and allow
age, number of nominations, published books, and other prizes received to vary between theirfirst nomination and winning. In so doing, we consider the recipients’ status and activities after
their first nomination.

Figure 1. Survival functions for recipients and fellow nominees (Graph)

0.50

0.75

1.00

The Naoki Prize

0.00

0.25

0.50
0.00

0.25

Survival rate

0.75

1.00

The Akutagawa Prize

0

10000

Time, days

20000

30000

Recipients (solid line)

0

10000

Time, days

20000

30000

Fellow Nominees (dashed line)

Notes: 10,000 days = 27.4 years, 20,000 days = 54.8 years, and 30,000 days = 82.2 years. The vertical line
within the Akutagawa Prize's graph shows 11,000 days, almost 30 years.

Furthermore, it is possible that the parameter of receiving a prize also varies with time
(Kleinbaum and Klein, 2012), although the basic Cox’s proportional hazard model assumes
they do not. Not considering this could generate biased parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn, 2001). Since we examine the long-term effect of receiving a prize, it could make the effect17

hold time-dependency. Therefore, we should explore and address the possibility, as in the caseof many medical studies and some social science studies (Barros et al., 2011
Torenvlied, 2009). To evaluate the time-dependency of parameters of winning, we draw on
Kaplan–Meier’s survival functions (Figure 1). The values on the vertical axis are survival rates
and those on the horizontal axis are the number of days between the first nomination and death.
We treat as censored samples novelists who are still alive at stopping observing, January 19,
2016, and those who died from non-natural cause, suicide.
If the parameters of receiving prizes hold time-dependency, the reduction rates for thesurvival functions among recipients vary with time. Figure 1 reveals that the reduction rate
among the Akutagawa recipients sharply increases by 11,000 days (almost 30 years) after the
first nomination. We find no such change in the reduction rate for the Naoki recipients.12,13 In
sum, the parameter for receiving the Akutagawa Prize varies with time. It could change after
30 years following an author’-dependency is notobserved for recipients of the Naoki Prize.
Finally, the model allows us to use a sample with candidates who are still alive and conduct
a survival analysis. In addition, it allows us to control differences in certain attributes at the first

12

In Appendix A, we evaluate Akutagawa recipients’ survival function, by using cumulative survival table. The
results still suggest that the reduction rate among the Akutagawa recipients sharply rises by 11,000 days after theirfirst nomination.
We also confirm this finding, by conducting a test detecting specification errors in a Cox’s proportional hazard
model.
13
We interpret that the time-dependency in the Akutagawa Prize is generated by a ceiling effect. Even if receiving
the Akutagawa Prize extends recipients’ longevity, this longevity might not exceed the biological upper limit of
the lifespan.
18

nomination between the recipients and fellow nominees by adding the attribute covariates. Also,
we calculate the propensity score for winning a prize and check whether our main results arestably observed when using the subsample within the common support.

3.2. Estimation model and variables
We estimate the following equation:

λ t x = λ t × exp

Winner +Winner ×+

Number of Nominations ++1- Number of Other Prizes + 0 2 .

> 11,000 +Age& Number of Published Books

1

The equation is divided into the baseline hazard of λ t and the regression of exp … .
In the regression, the variable Winner, distinguishes recipients from fellow nominees. We add
Winner ×> 11,000 to the regression analyzing the Akutagawa Prize and consider thetime-dependency of the parameter for receiving the prize. We also add time-varying covariates
for age, number of nominations, books published, and other prizes received. Furthermore, we
add several time-invarying covariates related to birth year, winning rate14 when nominated,educational background, job other than a novelist, and place of birth. For example, to consider

14

We define winning rate as the proportion of winners among nominees for each prize.
19the differences in economic safety nets, we use information on other jobs.

4. RESULTS
4.1. Basic analysis results
Table 4 presents the estimation results in hazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1,
mortality increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting
1 from the estimated value and then multiplying it by 100.
Column A1 shows that the recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 62.6% lower
mortality than other nominees for 30 years after the first nomination. After 30 years, theirmortality rises additionally four times higher than the control group. According to Column N1,
Naoki Prize recipients exhibit 60.0% higher mortality than fellow nominees. The three effects
are statistically significant at 1%. The accompanying columns show these effects are stably
observed when adding a suicide dummy and using the subsample within the common support.15
These results suggest
we still cannot state that receiving the Akutagawa Prize affirmatively and causally affects
longevity for the entire study period. To evaluate the average directionality and size of the effectof receiving the Akutagawa Prize, we use the predicted value to calculate the longevity of each

15

In Appendix B, we re-measure survival from date of birth, presenting additional estimation results. We find thateven if the starting point is different, the implications are the same.
20

Table 4. Basic analysis: effects of receiving a prize on mortality
Probability-of-death equations with time-varying covariates
Time-zero: date of first nomination
Akutagawa Prize winner：
After 30 years

Akutagawa Prize

Naoki Prize

A1
0.374***(0.123)A2
0.357***(0.116)A3
0.346***(0.121)4.071***(1.571)4.363***(1.668)4.674***(1.909)

Naoki Prize winner：
Time-varying covariates： Age
Number of nominations (Akutagawa)1.047***(0.017)1.210***(0.086)1.049***(0.016)
1.206***(0.084)

1.066***(0.020)1.197**(0.088)

Number of nominations (Naoki)
Number of published books
Number of other prizes

0.989(0.010)0.970(0.119)Suicide dummy

0.989(0.009)0.972(0.120)0.996(0.013)0.953(0.128)11.600***(4.597)16.404***(6.669)

N1

N2

N3

1.600***(0.260)1.637***(0.269)1.584***(0.269)1.078***(0.016)1.080***(0.016)1.088***(0.016)0.840***(0.053)0.840***(0.053)0.823***(0.054)1.003(0.003)0.998(0.081)1.003(0.003)0.985(0.081)

1.002(0.005)1.033(0.074)14.832***(6.180)14.138***(5.663)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time-invarying covariates：
Number of subjects：
363
363
328
345
345
329
Number of observations：
1,409
1,409
1,361
1,901
1,901
1,862
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors (exponentiated form) in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) We express estimation results inhazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from the estimated value and then multiplying itby 100. (4) Time-invarying variables are birth year, winning rate when nominated, educational background, job other than a novelist, and a place of birth. (5) Records of some novelists indicate
only the year of birth or death. In these cases, we use January 1 as the date and add a dummy variable denoting no record as a covariate. Also, to consider a fixed effect for each prize period, we
add a variable explaining the square root of the period number as a covariate. (6) When checking the time-dependency of the parameter among the Akutagawa recipients, we find that the
reduction rate of the survival function sharply rises by 30 years after the first nomination. We find no change in reduction rate among Naoki recipients. (7) In columns A3 and N3, we use thesubsample within the common support. We use information at first nomination to calculate the propensity score for winning a prize, and use the propensity score to construct the common support.

21

novelist and compare it between recipients and fellow nominees. The expected longevity forthe recipients of the Akutagawa Prize is 1.4 years longer than that for the nominees. By contrast,
the expected longevity for the recipients of the Naoki Prize is 5.2 years shorter than that for thenominees.16 Hence, we can say definitively that receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive
causal effect on longevity throughout the study period, whereas receiving the Naoki Prize has
a negative causal effect.
Next, we present the estimation results for age and number of nominations among several
covariates. Table 4 shows that aging increases mortality in both prize datasets and a larger
number of nominations increases the mortality of candidates for the Akutagawa Prize but
reduces it for those for the Naoki Prize. The former result is intuitive. We explain the latter bysurmising that the two prizes cause different degrees of mental shocks from not receiving theaward. Unsuccessful nominees for the Akutagawa Prize cannot hope to receive it after
becoming established authors, while those for the Naoki Prize can, assuming their standing asestablished authors does not falter. Perhaps, the mental shock from not receiving the award islarger among candidates for the Akutagawa Prize. In addition, the publicity effect would belarger among candidates for the Naoki Prize. Since the candidates have published more books,
their nomination for a prestigious award could boost sales of previous publications.

16
The increased longevity is estimated at 1.4 years (in column A1), 1.3 years (A2), and 1.1 years (A3), while thedecreased longevity is estimated at 5.2 years (N1), 5.5 years (N2), and 4.9 years (N3).
22

Here, some might argue that we fail to control unobserved factors, including unsuccessful
nominees’ expectations, and it causes the differential effects of receiving the prizes. However,
we arrest this concern in Appendix C. If the two prizes’ candidates constitute different
populations defined by such unobserved factors, estimation results of receiving the prizes withthe combined dataset will be inconsistent with those with each dataset. In Appendix C, we
actually combine the datasets of the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes, assume that every candidate
is extracted from a common population, and investigate the effect of receiving the Akutagawa
or Naoki Prize. We find that the estimation results of the combined dataset are still consistent
with those for each dataset.

4.2. Additional analysis results for interpretations
The above analysis shows that receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive causal effect onlongevity, whereas receiving the Naoki Prize has a negative causal effect. These results are
consistent with our empirical hypothesis that receiving a prize has a life-prolonging effect in
the Akutagawa Prize sample. We constructed the hypothesis using the following reasoning. First,
previous studies suggest that among the effects of winning prizes on longevity, the negative
effect related to work environments occurs in atypical occupations and the positive effectthrough improving economic conditions is strengthened when candidates belong to a lower
social stratum. Second, narrative descriptions and statistics support that the Akutagawa Prize is23for new or emerging novelists and its candidates are in the lower social stratum than those for
the Naoki Prize. Accordingly, we infer that when using the Akutagawa Prize sample, thepositive economic effect is strengthened and the sum of the positive effects exceeds the negative
work-related effect.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study simultaneously shows the existence of
positive and negative net effects, by using two types of datasets that are identical in most aspects
but contrasting in social stratification. 17 In this sense, our findings are quite unique in theliterature.
This subsection conducts additional analysis to discuss whether background mechanisms
function as expected. Here, note that our data availability is limited, and therefore, we are able
to discover some backgrounds. Nonetheless, we present the available results to deepen theinterpretations for our findings.
First, as an evidence of the negative effect related to work environments, we show thatreceiving a prize increases recipients’ workload. We use the annual number of published books
as the proxy for annual workload. We examine information on published books, because
previous studies use publication information to investigate the effects of winning a prize on
academicians’ workload and job-

17

Redelmeier and Singh (2001a, 2001b) report positive and negative relationships between receiving prizes andrecipients’ longevity, by using two types of datasets for the Academy Awards, actors/actresses and screenwriters.
However, follow-up studies point out that the authors do not enough deal with the immortal time bias. Furthermore,
the candidates’ occupations differ between the datasets.
24

2014). We compile the annual number of published books before and after receiving a prize or
the date of final nomination, subtract the former from the latter, and define the variable as theincreased workload. We construct the dataset in a panel format and use the fixed-effects modelfor estimation, excluding unobservable time-invariant individual effects.
In Table 5, Panel A shows that the Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes increase the annual numberof published books within several years of receiving the prizes. After receiving either prize, therecipients’ workload increases more than that of nominees. In addition, we find that the size ofthe one-year effect is around two times larger for the Naoki Prize (2.552) than for the
Akutagawa Prize (1.399). Recipients’ increased annual workload is larger with the Naoki Prize.
Furthermore, the Naoki Prize recipients annually publish 3.016 books before receiving the prize,
and the increased annual workload is 0.75 for their unsuccessful nominees. That is, the Naoki
Prize recipients need to publish six or more books annually after winning. If we consider
workload to be positively correlated with working hours and that a considerable increase in

Virtanen et al., 2011), the recipients particularly for the Naoki Prize feel greater stress.18
Second, as an evidence of the positive effect through improving economic conditions, weshow that receiving a prize extends recipients’ job-career longevity. Furthermore, we show that18

Previous literature did not find that the negative work-related effect may differ by social stratification or theother factors. However, this finding does not disturb our interpretation, because the interpretation is established atleast when the negative effect exists for the Naoki Prize.
25

Table 5. Additional analysis (1)Panel A. Effects of receiving a prize on increased annual workloads
Increased annual workloads
Fixed effects model estimation

Within 1 year
1.399***
Akutagawa Prize winner：(0.341)Time-varying covariates variables：
Number of subjects:

Yes

2-3 years
0.509**(0.239)3-5 years
0.871***(0.317)

Yes

Yes

Time-varying covariates variables：

10-15 years
0.240(0.592)

15-20 years
0.491(0.626)

Yes

Yes

Yes

1,346

Number of observations:
Naoki Prize winner：

5-10 years
0.653(0.420)363
2.552***

2.001***

2.631***

2.249***

1.365*

0.917(0.462)(0.442)(0.539)(0.721)(0.793)(0.866)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of subjects:
1,901
Number of observations:
345
Notes for Panel A: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) For the dependent variable, we compile theannual number of published books before and after receiving a prize or the date of final nomination, subtract the former from the latter, and define the variable as the increased annual workload.
(4) Time-varying covariates are age, number of nominations, and number of other prizes. (5) To consider a fixed effect for each prize period, we add a variable explaining the square root of theperiod number as a covariate.
Panel B. Effects of receiving a prize on job-career mortality
Probability-of-job-career-death equations with time-varying covariates
Time-zero: date of first nomination
Akutagawa Prize winner：

Akutagawa Prize

Naoki Prize

A1
0.817**

A2
0.824**

A3
0.844*(0.077)(0.077)(0.083)

Naoki Prize winner：

N1

N2

N3

1.027
(0.114)1.040(0.116)1.075(0.129)Time-varying covariates variables：

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time-invarying covariates variables：
Suicide dummy variable：
Number of subjects：

Yes
No
363

Yes
Yes
363

Yes
Yes
328

Yes
No
345

Yes
Yes
345

Yes
Yes
329

Number of observations：
1,346
1,346
1,298
1,901
1,901
1,862
Notes for Panel B: (1) Robust standard errors (exponentiated form) in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) For the dependent
variable, we collect information on publishing date for the most recent book, calculate the duration from the date of first nomination to the publication date, and define it as job-career duration.
(4) We express estimation results in hazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from theestimated value and then multiplying it by 100. (5) Time-varying covariates are age, number of nominations, number of published books, and number of other prizes. (6) Time-invarying
covariates are birth year, winning rate when nominated, educational background, job other than a novelist, and a place of birth. (7) Records of some novelists indicate only the year of birth ordeath. In these cases, we use January 1 as the date and add a dummy variable denoting no record as a covariate. Also, to consider a fixed effect for each prize period, we add a variable explaining
the square root of the period number as a covariate. (8) The model with job-career mortality does not use time-dependent parameters, which is different from that with physical mortality, because
our preliminary analysis confirms that the effects of receiving prizes on job-career mortality do not vary with time.

26

this extending effect is larger for the Akutagawa Prize than for the Naoki Prize. We define thatthe positive economic effect includes the effect of increasing recipients’ great job opportunities
and payment fees. These improvements would also have a positive impact on their job-career
longevity. We collect information on publishing date for the most recent book, calculate theduration from the date of first nomination to the publication date, and define it as job-career
duration.
Panel B shows that recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 15.6%–18.3% lower jobcareer mortality than fellow nominees during the study period.19 Conversely, receiving the
Naoki Prize does not have a statistically significant effect on recipients’ job-career mortality.
For the recipients, job-career durations are longer than those for the fellow nominees of the
Akutagawa Prize, while they are indifferent for both in the case of the Naoki Prize. These results
support our explanation that the positive economic effect is larger for the Akutagawa Prize thanfor the Naoki Prize.20
The above analyses indicate that the negative work-related effect exists particularly for the
Naoki Prize, while the positive economic effect is strongly observed for the Akutagawa Prize.
However, they do not identify the causes of such differences. This is possibly because the19

The model with job-career mortality does not use time-dependent parameters, which is different from that withphysical mortality, because our preliminary analysis confirms that the effects of receiving prizes on job-careermortality do not vary with time.
20
We assume that another positive effect through social comparisons is constant across social stratification. We
recognize that empirically investigating this mechanism is important for our analysis because the candidates in ourdataset are aware that they are being considered for the prize, and thus, a positive causal effect from winning the
prizes to longevity could include discouragement felt by fellow nominees. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us
to sufficiently test the existence and degree of this positive effect.
27

candidates for the Akutagawa Prize belong to the lower social stratum than those for the Naoki
Prize or because the treatment effects themselves differ between the two prizes.
Finally, we discuss whether the heterogeneity in the positive economic effect across social
stratification partly explains the difference in the effects of receiving a prize on longevity. We
divide the Naoki Prize sample into the following two groups: one group comprises relatively
new candidates in the Naoki Prize’s sample and the other consists established ones. We consider
the former group to resemble the Akutagawa Prize sample. And, we conduct survival analyses
with physical mortality and job-career mortality. If the size of the positive economic effectdepends on candidates’ social stratum, we likely find a positive effect on physical longevity andjob-career longevity from the former group or a negative effect on them from the latter.
The findings in Table 6 are consistent with our expectation. Panel A shows that receiving
the Naoki Prize shortens physical longevity more strongly for well-established candidates. In
contrast, we do not find such an effect for relatively new candidates. Panel B indicates thatreceiving the Naoki Prize extends job-career longevity rather for relatively new candidates, inparticular the candidates who had no publication at their first nomination. These results backup
our interpretation that the heterogeneity across social stratification at least partly explains thedifference in the effects of receiving a prize on longevity.

28

Table 6. Additional analysis (2)Panel A. Effects of receiving a prize on mortality(heterogeneity analysis)

Naoki Prize

Probability-of-death equations with time-varying covariates
Time-zero: date of first nomination
Naoki Prize winner：

Duration (years)
b/w debut and 1st nomination

Number of publlished books
at 1st nomination

Number of publlished books
at 1st nomination< 3.2>= 3.2

<3

>= 3

0

>= 1

N1
1.598*

N2
2.029***

N3
1.275

N4
1.693**

N5
1.174

N6
1.599**(0.412)(0.545)(0.344)(0.388)(0.529)(0.308)Time-varying covariates：

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time-invarying covariates：
Number of subjects：

Yes
172

Yes
173

Yes
152

Yes
193

Yes
72

Yes
273

Number of observations：

983

918

941

960

525

1,376

Panel B. Effects of receiving a prize on job-career mortality(heterogeneity analysis)

Naoki Prize
Duration (years)
b/w debut and 1st nomination

Number of publlished books
at 1st nomination< 3.2>= 3.2

<3

>= 3

0

>= 1

Naoki Prize winner：

N7
0.850
(0.152)N8
1.176(0.184)N9
0.768(0.146)N10
1.250(0.177)N110.413*(0.205)N12
1.172(0.142)

Probability-of-job-career-death equations with time-varying covariates
Time-zero: date of first nomination

Number of publlished books
at 1st nomination

Time-varying covariates：

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time-invarying covariates：

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of subjects：

172

173

152

193

72

273

Number of observations：
983
918
941
960
525
1,376
Notes for Panels A and B: (1) Robust standard errors (exponentiated form) in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) For the dependent variable inPanel B, we collect information on publishing date for the most recent book, calculate the duration from the date of first nomination to the publication date, and define it as job-career duration. (4) We express
estimation results in hazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from the estimated value and thenmultiplying it by 100. (5) Time-varying covariates are age, number of nominations, number of published books, and number of other prizes. (6) Time-invarying covariates are birth year, winning rate whennominated, educational background, job other than a novelist, and a place of birth. (7) Records of some novelists indicate only the year of birth or death. In these cases, we use January 1 as the date and add adummy variable denoting no record as a covariate. Also, to consider a fixed effect for each prize period, we add a variable explaining the square root of the period number as a covariate. (8) The median induration (years) between debut and 1st nomination is 3.2. And, the median in number of published books at 1st nomination is 3.

29

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Using datasets for Japan’s Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes for literature, this study shows thatreceiving a prize has both positive and negative effects on longevity. The recipients of the
Akutagawa Prize for new or emerging novelists live 1.4 years longer than fellow nominees,
while those of the Naoki Prize mainly for established novelists live 5.2 shorter years than theirfellow nominees. Our additional analyses indicate that we find a life-prolonging effect fromreceiving a prize when candidates belong to a lower social stratum. We discuss with empiricalevidence that in this case, the positive effect through improving economic conditions isstrengthened and the sum of the positive effects exceeds the negative effect related to work
environments.
Our findings are unique, because they simultaneously show the existence of positive andnegative net effects on longevity, by using two types of datasets that are identical in most aspects
but contrasting in social stratification. Our academic contribution lies in providing a reasonable
explanation of earlier studies, which show conflicting effects on longevity of receiving awards.
Some studies find a positive but statistically insignificant effect from receiving Academy
Awards for actors and actresses (Han et al.,because the candidates include not only rookie actors and actresses but also experienced ones.
Other studies highlight a negative effect from receiving the Academy Awards for screenwriters(Redelmeier and Singh, 2001b). Because the average age of the screenwriter recipients is higher
30

than that of the actor and actress recipients, many of the former tend to be well-experienced,
and the positive economic effect could weaken. In addition, the occupational characteristics ofscreenwriters could cause winning awards to increase recipients’ workload.
At a first glance, it is confusing that when using two unique types of datasets, the Nobel
Prize and China’s academician election, the authors find a positive and statistically significant

well-established similar to those of the Naoki Prize, and thus we expected to find a negative net
effect on longevity. One possibility is that winning these prizes might not increase recipients’workload. In the example for the Nobel Prize, the lags between the dates of achievement andrecognition are large, and the recipients may have retired from active research at the time ofrecognition. In this case, both the positive economic effect and negative work-related effect issmall, and the negative effect do not exceed the sum of the two positive effects. That is, we caninterpret that their findings offer strong evidence for the existence of another positive effectthrough social comparisons.

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44

Appendix A.
We evaluate Akutagawa recipients’ survival function (Table Appendix A). The reduction rate of
their survival function is 0.07 (from 7,000 to 11,000 days), 0.28 (from 11,000 to 15,000 days),
0.02 (from 10,000 to 11,000 days), and 0.10 (from 11,000 to 12,000 days). That is, the reduction
rate among the Akutagawa recipients sharply rises by 11,000 days after their first nomination.

Table Appendix A. Survival functions for recipients and fellow nominees (Table)
Akutagawa Prize

Naoki Prize

Survival Standard
Failuresfunction
error

95%
confidence intervalTime, days

Beg.
Total

Failures

5000

97

2

0.98

0.01

0.92

0.99

5000

100

8

0.92

0.03

0.85

0.96

6000

93

1

0.97

0.02

0.91

0.99

6000

94

3

0.89

0.03

0.82

0.94

Recipients

Survival Standard
function
error

95%
confidence intervalTime, days

Beg.
Total

Recipients

7000

84

2

0.95

0.02

0.88

0.98

7000

86

3

0.86

0.03

0.78

0.92

8000

78

1

0.94

0.03

0.86

0.97

8000

82

2

0.84

0.04

0.76

0.90

9000

72

1

0.92

0.03

0.84

0.96

9000

73

4

0.80

0.04

0.71

0.87

10000

68

2

0.90

0.03

0.81

0.94

10000

60

8

0.71

0.05

0.60

0.79

11000

64

1

0.88

0.04

0.79

0.94

11000

55

3

0.67

0.05

0.57

0.76

12000

56

8

0.77

0.05

0.66

0.85

12000

47

8

0.57

0.05

0.46

0.67

13000

50

4

0.71

0.05

0.60

0.80

13000

33

10

0.44

0.05

0.34

0.55

14000

44

3

0.67

0.06

0.55

0.76

14000

28

4

0.39

0.05

0.28

0.49

15000

36

4

0.60

0.06

0.48

0.71

15000

26

2

0.36

0.05

0.26

0.46

5000

202

25

0.90

0.02

0.85

0.93

5000

185

18

0.92

0.02

0.87

0.95

6000

194

2

0.89

0.02

0.84

0.92

6000

181

1

0.91

0.02

0.87

0.94

Fellow nominees

Fellow nominees

7000

189

3

0.88

0.02

0.83

0.91

7000

168

5

0.89

0.02

0.84

0.92

8000

177

8

0.84

0.02

0.78

0.88

8000

155

8

0.84

0.03

0.79

0.89

9000

164

8

0.80

0.03

0.74

0.85

9000

146

5

0.82

0.03

0.76

0.86

10000

153

7

0.76

0.03

0.70

0.82

10000

133

8

0.77

0.03

0.70

0.82

11000

142

2

0.75

0.03

0.69

0.81

11000

113

12

0.70

0.03

0.63

0.76

12000

125

10

0.70

0.03

0.63

0.76

12000

99

9

0.64

0.04

0.56

0.71

13000

108

10

0.64

0.03

0.57

0.70

13000

80

14

0.55

0.04

0.47

0.62

14000

97

7

0.60

0.04

0.53

0.66

14000

66

10

0.48

0.04

0.40

0.55

15000

94

3

0.04
0.51
0.65
15000
51
9
0.04
0.58
0.41
Note: Survival function is calculated over full data and evaluated at indicated timess; it is not calculated from aggregates shown at left.

0.33

0.49

1

Appendix B.
We re-measure survival from date of birth, investigating the effect of receiving a prize on
mortality (Table Appendix B). We find even if the starting point is different, the implications
are the same.

2

Table Appendix B. Effects of receiving a prize on mortality (Time-zero: date of birth)
Probability-of-death equations with time-varying covariates
Time-zero: date of birth
Akutagawa Prize winner：
After 65 years

Akutagawa Prize
A1
0.412**(0.142)
3.168***(1.227)A2
0.398***(0.135)
3.348***(1.276)

Naoki Prize
A3
0.464**(0.159)2.844***(1.107)

Naoki Prize winner：

Time-varying covariates： Age
Number of nominations (Akutagawa)

0.986(0.015)
1.348***(0.096)0.985(0.015)
1.347***(0.094)0.996(0.017)1.345***(0.099)Number of nominations (Naoki)

Number of published books
Number of other prizes

N1

N2

N3

1.440**(0.235)1.469**(0.242)

1.431**(0.242)1.004(0.014)1.004(0.014)1.009(0.014)

1.028

1.032

1.014

(0.054)(0.054)(0.057)0.990(0.009)
0.942

0.990
(0.009)
0.938

0.995
(0.013)
0.911

1.004
(0.003)
1.015

1.004
(0.003)
0.998

1.005
(0.005)1.042(0.108)(0.107)(0.114)(0.076)(0.076)(0.066)

13.633***(5.946)19.040***(9.204)22.886***(9.358)19.462***(8.811)

Suicide dummy

Time-invarying covariates：
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of subjects：
363
363
328
345
345
329
Number of observations：
1,413
1,413
1,364
1,901
1,901
1,862
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors (exponentiated form) in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) We express estimation results inhazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from the estimated value and then multiplying itby 100. (4) Time-invarying covariates are birth year, winning rate when nominated, educational background, job other than a novelist, and a place of birth. (5) Records of some novelists indicate
only the year of birth or death. In these cases, we use January 1 as the date and add a dummy variable denoting no record as a covariate. Also, to consider a fixed effect for each prize period, we
add a variable explaining the square root of the period number as a covariate. (6) When checking the time-dependency of the parameter among the Akutagawa recipients, we find that the
reduction rate of the survival function sharply rises by 65 years after the first nomination. We find no change in reduction rate among Naoki recipients. (7) In columns A3 and N3, we use thesubsample within the common support. We use information at first nomination to calculate the propensity score for winning a prize, and use the propensity score to construct the common
support.

3

Appendix C.
Section 4.1 shows that receiving the Akutagawa Prize has a positive causal effect on longevity,
whereas receiving the Naoki Prize has a negative effect on it. Some might argue that receiving
the Akutagawa or Naoki Prize produces a differential effect, because we might fail to control
unobserved factors, including unsuccessful nominees’ expectations and candidates’ talent andefforts, between the two prizes. For example, if the Akutagawa Prize assembles more talented
and earnest candidates than the Naoki Prize, some differences could appear in the effects ofreceiving the prizes.
However, we found that several novelists nominated for the Akutagawa Prize were
nominated or awarded the Naoki Prize. This supports that there is little difference in talent andefforts between candidates for the two prizes. Furthermore, we run another analysis, empiricallydealing with the concern. The analysis is based on the assumption that candidates for both prizes
are extracted from a common population. Concretely, we combine the datasets of the
Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes, assume that every candidate can win either prize, and investigate
the effect of receiving the Akutagawa or the Naoki Prize. 1 If the two prizes’ candidates
constitute different populations defined by unobserved factors, estimation results of receiving
the prizes with the combined dataset can be inconsistent with those with each dataset.
When combining the datasets, we consider the following: as mentioned in Section 4.1,

1This analysis adds to the sample 44 new candidates nominated for both prizes.
4unsuccessful nominees for the Akutagawa Prize cannot hope to receive it after becoming
established authors, while unsuccessful nominees for the Naoki Prize can expect to receive it
later, assuming their standing as established authors do not falter. There is a systemic difference
between the two prizes in nominees’ expectations of being re-nominated and eventually
receiving them. To empirically consider the difference, we add to the model a variable denoting
endorsements (letters, comments, feedback)2 of review committees for nominees who did notreceive the prize during previous selections. We assume that nominees with more endorsements
have stronger expectations of receiving the prize eventually. After adding the covariate,
candidates for both prizes plausibly become homogeneous (assuming equal talent and efforts).
In Table Appendix C, the model of Column 1 includes the variable that explains thenumber of letters reviewing nominees for the Naoki Prize only. This variable shows 0 for othercandidates. Model 2 includes the variable that explains the number of letters reviewing
nominees for both prizes.
The estimation results show that recipients of the Akutagawa Prize exhibit 52.9%–56.6%
lower mortality than fellow nominees until 30 years after their first nomination. After 30 years,
recipients’ mortality becomes additionally 3.2 times higher than that of fellow nominees’.
Conversely, recipients of the Naoki Prize exhibit 49.1%–52.4% higher mortality than fellow

21982-2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b).

5

nominees. We reject the null hypothesis that the first effect of receiving the Akutagawa Prizeequals that of receiving the Naoki Prize, and we do so for the second effect of receiving the
Akutagawa Prize. These results coincide with results in Section 4.1. This finding arrests theconcern that we detect a positive effect from the Akutagawa Prize and a negative effect fromthe Naoki Prize because of unobserved factors between candidates for the two prizes.

6

Table Appendix C. Effects of receiving a prize on mortality (with the combined dataset)
Probability-of-death equations with time-varying covariates

Akutagawa and Naoki Prizes

Time-zero: date of first nomination

1
0.434**(0.141)

2
0.471**(0.156)

3.194***

3.217***(1.126)(1.131)

1.491**

1.524***(0.236)(0.238)1.061***(0.011)

1.062***(0.011)

1.022

1.004

(0.058)(0.057)0.887**

0.899**(0.044)(0.045)

1.004

1.003

(0.003)(0.003)Akutagawa Prize winner：
After 30 years
Naoki Prize winner：

Time-varying covariates： Age
Number of nominations (Akutagawa)Number of nominations (Naoki)

Number of published books
Number of other prizes

Number of letters in reviews
for fellow nominees (Only Naoki)

1.010

1.010

(0.058)(0.059)1.014(0.012)

Number of letters in reviews

1.015

for fellow nominees (Both)(0.010)Time-invarying covariates：

YES

Number of subjects：

752

Number of observations：
4,049
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors (exponentiated form) in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by novelist. (2) ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (3) We express estimation results in hazard ratios. If the estimated value exceeds 1, mortality
increases and vice-versa. We read a change in mortality as a percentage by subtracting 1 from the estimated value and thenmultiplying it by 100. (4) Time-invarying covariates are birth year, winning rate when nominated, educational background, job
other than a novelist, and a place of birth. (5) Records of some novelists indicate only the year of birth or death. In these cases,
we use January 1 as the date and add a dummy variable denoting no record as a covariate. Also, to consider a fixed effect foreach prize period, we add a variable explaining the square root of the period number as a covariate. (6) When checking thetime-dependency of the parameter among the Akutagawa recipients, we find that the reduction rate of the survival function
sharply rises by 30 years after the first nomination. We find no change in reduction rate among Naoki recipients.

7

References for Appendix C
Bungeishunju Ltd. (1982-2002a). Akutagawa shou zenshu (The complete works of the
Akutagawa Prize). Vols.1-19. Bungeishunju Ltd., Tokyo, Japan. (in Japanese)
Bungeishunju Ltd. (2002b). Ⅲ Naoki shou “zen senpyou” senzen hen Ⅰ (Ⅲ All reviews of the
Naoki Prize, before the War Ⅰ). Ooru Yomimono, 10. (in Japanese)
Bungeishunju Ltd. (2002c). Ⅳ Naoki shou “zen senpyou” senzen hen Ⅱ (Ⅳ All reviews of the
Naoki Prize, before the War Ⅱ). Ooru Yomimono, 12. (in Japanese)
Bungeishunju Ltd. (2003a). Ⅴ Naoki shou “zen senpyou” sengo hen Ⅰ (Ⅴ All reviews of the
Naoki Prize, after the War Ⅰ). Ooru Yomimono, 1. (in Japanese)
Bungeishunju Ltd. (2003b). Ⅵ Naoki shou “zen senpyou” sengo hen Ⅱ (Ⅵ All reviews of the
Naoki Prize, after the War Ⅱ). Ooru Yomimono, 3. (in Japanese)
Kawaguchi, N. (2015a). Akutagawa Shou no Subete, no youna mono (All about the Akutagawa
Prize).

Retrieved

September

30,

2015

from

http://homepage1.nifty.com/naokiaward/akutagawa/. (in Japanese)
Kawaguchi, N. (2015b). Naoki Shou no Subet (All about the Naoki Prize). Retrieved September
30, 2015 from http://homepage1.nifty.com/naokiaward /. (in Japanese)8