S/2017/437

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 May 2017
Original: English

Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union
Commission and the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations on the strategic review of the African UnionUnited Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
I. Introduction
1.
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2296 (2016), the Secretary-Generalrecommended in his letter dated 28 October 2016 addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/2016/915) that a joint African Union-United Nations strategic
review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur(UNAMID) should be undertaken, in close consultation with the Government of the
Sudan, to provide detailed recommendations to the United Nations Security Council
and the African Union Peace and Security Council on the mission’s priorities andconfiguration and that, if necessary, further revision of the benchmarks to reflect therealities in Darfur be proposed. It was recommended that the review be undertaken
in December 2016 and that the recommendations be submitted to both Councils in
January 2017. The previous review of UNAMID was conducted in December 2013(see S/2014/138).
2.
A joint African Union-United Nations strategic review team visited Khartoum
and Darfur from 5 to 17 March 2017. It was co-led by the African Union Liaison
Office in the Sudan and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and comprised
representatives from the African Union Commission, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department ofField Support and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), as well as from the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, representing
United Nations development and humanitarian agencies, funds and programmes,
respectively. The strategic review team held consultations with government officials
and the United Nations country team, visited all five Darfur states and a number ofteam sites and met state and local authorities, representatives of the communities ofinternally displaced persons, the native administration and civil society groups.
3.
The report provides a conflict analysis that depicts the current conflict
dynamics and drivers in Darfur, as well as the p olitical and humanitarian situation.
In the report, the strategic priorities of UNAMID are examined, and a refocusing of
the priorities in accordance with the conflict analysis is proposed. The reportconcludes with recommendations for the reconfiguration of UNAMID that seek to

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adapt the mission to the evolving realities on the ground and to the needs of thepeople in Darfur.

II. Conflict analysis
4.
Over the past three years, the armed conflict that gave rise to the deployment
of UNAMID has altered in the light of the military successes of the Government of
the Sudan against the rebel movements. Simultaneously, alongside the national
dialogue launched in October 2015, the political framework agreement for the
resolution of the conflict, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, has been
included in the Constitution. However, key provisions have yet to be implemented,
and a number of outstanding issues related to the aftermath of the conflict andcrucial grievances at the origin of the rebellion still need to be addressed.

A.

Conflict dynamics
Fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups and its
impact on security
5.
The hostilities between the Government of the Sudan and rebel forces havedecreased significantly as a result of the three-phased Operation Decisive Summer(from January 2014 to June 2016), which effectively reduced the presence of thearmed groups to parts of western Jebel Marra. According to UNAMID, the Sudan
Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) were considerably weakened and have not engaged militarily with the
Sudanese Armed Forces since April 2014 and April 2015, respectively. They are
currently reported to not have any active presence in Darfur or the Sudan.
6.
While the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) continues to bepresent in Darfur, UNAMID considers its military effectiveness and area of
operation to be considerably reduced. Since September 2016, there has been no
military confrontation between the government forces and SLA/AW, and dry season
combat (from late December to April), otherwise an annual occurrence, did not takeplace in 2017. The national armed forces currently maintain control of most areasand have deployed troops to Golo, Koron, Sarong and Guldo, while the following
areas reportedly remain contentious under SLA/AW control: Kilinge, Boullay, Kibli,
Bar Arie, Kalokitting, Kwila and Galol. Furthermore, SLA/AW is reported to havefragmented into an incohesive force of several factions, especially after a splintergroup signed the “Koron agreement” with the Government on 4 November 2016,
and even more so after the defection of its Deputy Commander, Alsadig Adam
Abdulkarim, on 21 January 2017 and, more recently, the defection of a third faction
led by Commander Abdel-Latif Abdel-Hamid on 14 April 2017.
7.
In the meantime, however, conflicts in the wider region surrounding the Sudan
are providing an opportunity for some of the Darfur armed groups to train andacquire military equipment and funds. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan hasreported on the engagement of SLA/MM in Libya, fighting alongside the Libyan
National Army in the area of the oil crescent since mid-2015, and in criminal
activities, such as the operation of illegal checkpoints, kidnapping for ransom andtrafficking in persons (S/2017/22). In an effort to prevent the infiltration of the
Darfur armed groups from Libya, the Government of the Sudan has deployed the
Rapid Support Forces along the northern borders of the region. A joint Libya -Sudan
border force established in November 2013, following a military protocol signed in2011, and mandated to protect their joint border, prevent the infiltration of armed
elements, terrorist groups and illegal immigrants and secure the commercial

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convoys was discontinued in 2015 by the internationally recognized Government of
Libya, owing reportedly to other security priorities.
8.
Reports also indicate the presence of JEM in Libya and South Sudan. As with
SLA/MM, the group was reportedly fighting alongside the Libyan National Army,
initially in the Qufrah area. In South Sudan, JEM is reported to ha ve had acontinuous presence since 2012 and has been engaged in fighting alongside theSudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in various areas of the country. Most
recently, the group was witnessed fighting on the side of SPLA against Fertit militia
and SPLA in Opposition in Raja and Wau as late as June-July 2016. The SudanSouth Sudan Safe Demilitarized Border Zone is monitored by the Joint Border
Verification and Monitoring Mission, as stipulated in the 2012 Agreement on
Security Arrangements, and is supported by the United Nations Interim Security
Force for Abyei.
9.
The joint Chad-Sudan border monitoring force, established in 2010 with theobjective of preventing cross-border attacks by rebel groups on both sides,
continued to contribute visibly to stability in the western border areas. Discussions
are ongoing regarding similar arrangements to cover the Darfur -Chad-Central
African Republic triangle. Although the Central African Republic expressed its
intention to join the Chad-Sudan force, to date this has not materialized owing tocapacity constraints and continued political instability in the country. In September
2016, the Presidents of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan held ameeting in Khartoum to discuss the deployment of joint border monitoring units.
Militia groups and proliferation of weapons
10. While the Government’s military campaign and efforts to improve security in
the Darfur state capitals have had a visible effect on the security front, the overall
security situation in Darfur remains precarious. This is due mainly to the activitiesof the militia groups, the prevalence of weapons among the population and acts ofbanditry and criminality, coupled with the absence of an efficient police force andthe rule of law.
11. Armed militias constitute one of the most complex issues in the security
landscape of present-day Darfur. Organized mostly along tribal lines, armed militias
have been present historically in Darfur as a protection arm of the communities in
the face of fierce competition for scarce natural resources and acts of criminality,
including cattle rustling. However, they gained notoriety as a result of theirinvolvement in the recent Darfur conflict with the Janjaweed in support of the
Sudanese government forces to quell the insurgency that started in 2003.
12. As the conflict evolved, some militias were incorporated into different
auxiliary units of the Sudanese government forces, such as the Border Guards, thePopular Defence Forces, the Central Reserve Police and the Rapid Support Forces.
Those auxiliary forces have since become key actors in the conflict between the
Government and the armed movements and in intercommunal conflict, greatly
influencing conflict dynamics in Darfur. Adequately equipped with small arms a nd
heavy weapons, some of those forces are not only fighting against the rebel
movements but, sometimes, also with each other or against government forces,
further exacerbating insecurity and threats against civilians in Darfur.
13. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur stipulates that “all armed militia
groups shall be disarmed and disbanded as a prerequisite for the implementation ofcomprehensive arms control measures” (art. 67, para. 399) and that the Governmentof the Sudan “shall be responsible for [their] disarmament” (ibid.). However, inpractice, alternative approaches have been adopted: at the national level, some
30,000 members of the Rapid Support Forces were absorbed into the national armed
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forces following the adoption of a parliamentary bill o n 16 January 2017; at thecommunity level, the review team was informed that Darfur state governments were
exploring models of local agreements between the tribes o f the area, such as the
Shattay-Kailak model in South Darfur, where, according to government sources,
some 600 farms were returned to their former owners, or the Amnounou model,
whereby the state government was mediating between the militia groups andinternally displaced persons the latter’s return to their lands.
14. It is widely considered that the prevalence of weapons among the population isseriously contributing to large-scale violence, including intercommunal violence,and criminality and is undermining the establishment of the rule of law. The Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur provides only for “a voluntary civilian arms control
programme” (art. 71, para. 416) and for the disarmament of former combatants(ibid., para. 432). The Darfur Disarmament High Committee was established bypresidential decree on 2 April 2016, and the Government is c urrently designing aphased civilian arms control plan, which includes: (a) awareness -raising; (b) arms
registration and marking; (c) voluntary surrender of arms; and (d) mandatory
disarmament. While a pilot project on arms registration and marking was con ducted
in 2016, the initial results remain to be assessed. For such a programme to be
successful, the Government of the Sudan should be in the lead, and the programmeshould include: (a) simultaneous collection of arms in the five Darfur states and inneighbouring Kordofan and Blue Nile; (b) a regional approach that includes
neighbouring countries, such as the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya andSouth Sudan; and (c) economic compensation for the communities. In the Doha
Document (ibid., paras. 416-417), the support of UNDP and UNAMID is requested
in developing a strategy and plans for the implementation of a voluntary civilianarms control programme.
15. Throughout Darfur, former battlefields remain contaminated with explosive
remnants of war. In Jebel Marra, initial assessments have indicated a large volume
of explosive remnants of war requiring wide-scale mine action interventions. The
National Mine Action Centre still lacks the capacity to undertake comprehensivemine action activities other than coordination. Furthermore, currently no capacity or
resources exist within the international community to provide support for clearanceof explosive remnants of war in Darfur.
Intercommunal conflicts
16. Intercommunal conflicts remain one of the main so urces of violence in Darfur.
Such conflicts are intimately related to the root causes of the conflict andexacerbated by armed militias, as well as by the proliferation of weapons among thecivilians and the inadequate capacity and effectiveness of the rul e of law
institutions. While conflicts among the myriad ethnic groups of Darfur havehistorically occurred, the upsurge of violence during the insurgency years resulted
in massive civilian casualties and population displacement. Management of land,
water and other resources and a perceived bias by the Government towards one
group over another are at the heart of those conflicts, which in 2013 claimed thelives of as many as 1,976 people. Following a concerted intervention by state
governments, the national armed forces and the police from mid-2015 onward, thenumber of casualties has fallen and mediation efforts, supported by UNAMID, havemultiplied, resulting in a significant decrease in intercommunal conflicts. However,conflicts continue to flare up in East Darfur between the Rizeigat and the Maʽaliya
over land ownership and access to resources, in South Darfur between the Fallata,
Salamat, Habbaniya and Masalit over access to farmland, grazing pastures and cattle
rustling, and in Central Darfur between the Misseriya and Salamat over access toland and cattle rustling.
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17. Land continues to be the most contested resource at the heart of mostintercommunal conflicts in Darfur. Lack of clear land ownership and management
systems, due to historical factors and government interventions on behalf ofdifferent tribal groups that have not addressed the issue in a comprehensive manner,have exacerbated and politicized such conflicts. The Unregistered Lands Act of1970, followed by severe desertification in the 1980s, in tandem with the weakeningof the native administration, the traditional administrative authority on land issues,and the ethnicization of the Darfur conflict since 2003 by the Government along the“Arab-African” narrative, with the open support of militia groups and extortion
practices in their favour, resulted mainly in the Fur and Masalit tribes losing theirfertile areas to several Arab tribes. Acknowledging the political dimension of landownership and management, the Doha Document for Peace in Dar fur provided forthe establishment of a land commission and a land database within the framework of
the Darfur Regional Authority. The Land Commission was mandated to develop
recommendations and a plan of land use for adoption by state legislatures and toserve as an arbitration forum on land rights disputes. Those tasks have yet to becompleted.

B.

Political developments
18. The Darfur peace process, led by the African Union High -level
Implementation Panel and supported by UNAMID, achieved measured progresswith the signature of the Panel-proposed Road Map Agreement in March 2016 by
the Government and in August by two out of the three remaining Darfur rebel
movements. The parties have yet to sign the cessation of hostilities agreement,
although the Government, SLA/MM and JEM/Gibril have declared unilateralceasefires until June 2017, the main disagreement being the role of the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur in future talks. The Government insists that the Doha
Document constitutes the sole framework for discussion, while the armed
movements are calling for its renegotiation. In addition, the Government questions
the purpose and practical value of a cessation of hostilities with armed groups thatare currently believed to have no active presence or military capacities in Darfur or
the Sudan. Nevertheless, the Government has expressed its readiness to engage inthe disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the rebel movements,
provided that they come to the borders of the Sudan.
19. Meanwhile, SLA/AW has rejected any participation in direct negotiations with
the Government of the Sudan and called for the overthrow of the Government. As
indicated above, three breakaway factions from SLA/AW have signed agreementswith the Government since November 2016, allowing their members to either be
integrated into the security forces or be demobilized under the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur. UNAMID support in this area has led to the demobilization of
9,766 combatants since 2009.
20. Following the conduct of the Darfur administrative referendum in April 2016,
the Government proclaimed the end of the conflict, thus effectively legitimizing theadministrative division of Darfur into five states, and dissolved the Darfur Regional
Authority. The Darfur Peace Follow-up Office was consequently established in
January 2017 to supervise the five residual commissions of the former Authority
and one residual fund, namely the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission,
the Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, the Land Commission, theVoluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, the newly established Commission
for the Development of Pastoralists and Nomads and the Reconstruction andDevelopment Fund.

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21. One year after being formally launched as a means o f achieving consensus on
constitutional reform in the Sudan, the national dialogue process concluded in
Khartoum on 10 October 2016 with the adoption of a national document. The
document contains 981 recommendations, which are expected to form the basis fo r
the drafting of a new Constitution, provides for a federal and presidential system ofgovernment, a two-chamber parliament and separation of the three branches ofgovernment and endorses the principles of democracy and the concept of equalcitizenship and a diverse Sudanese identity. Further to the conclusion of the process,the Government has moved forward with the document’s implementation, including
the appointment of the First Vice-President, Bakri Hassan Saleh, to the position ofPrime Minister on 1 March 2017 in preparation for the formation of a national unity
Government. Major opposition groups in the Sudan, including the Sudan Callumbrella, boycotted the national dialogue and criticized the process for being
conducted in an adverse political and human rights climate, instead calling for a
pre-dialogue meeting in accordance with the Road Map Agreement. While standing
firm in its view that the national dialogue has been concluded, the Government has
expressed openness to the opposition groups contributing to discussions on themodalities of implementing the recommendations agreed upon in the national
document.
22. In the wider region, the participation of the Sudan in the coalition against
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, its agreement with the European Union to stem
illegal migration to Europe, and achievements on the political and military fronts in
Darfur improved the Government’s political standing in the international arena andprovided recovery prospects (albeit limited) for its economy. I n that context,
considerations of mutual benefit on security (by cutting support to the Darfur armed
groups in particular) and in economic areas drove an improvement in its relations
with Uganda in 2015, following a similar rapprochement with Chad since 20 10, as
well as with South Sudan to a limited extent. In January 2017, the Government of
the United States of America announced a temporary and partial revocation ofbilateral sanctions against the Sudan based on progress made along five tracks,
including maintaining the cessation of hostilities in conflict areas, improving
humanitarian access, ending negative interference in South Sudan, enhancing
cooperation on counter-terrorism and addressing the threat of the Lord’s ResistanceArmy. Following the revocation, which was scheduled to be reviewed in July 2017,
the Government extended its unilateral cessation of hostilities in Darfur and the Two
Areas for another six months and eased access restrictions on UNAMID andhumanitarian actors.

C.

Humanitarian and protection challenges
Communities of internally displaced persons
23. Notwithstanding improvements in security in recent months, as a result of the
Darfur crisis, now in its fifteenth year, a total of 2.7 million people are currently
displaced in Darfur, of whom 2.1 million are in need of humanitarian assistance,
including 1.6 million in 60 camps. New displacement in 2016 was limited to theJebel Marra area, where armed conflict triggered the displacement of more than
140,000 people. An additional 40,000 displaced in 2016 subsequently returned totheir places of origin. Thousands more were reported to have been displaced, but
this could not be verified owing to access constraints, even though since December
2016 the United Nations and its partners had been given access to previously
inaccessible areas in order to carry out needs assessments and provide humanitarianassistance. No new displacement occurred in the first quarter of 2017. In addition,

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more than 300,000 Sudanese refugees are located in neighbouring Chad, while
about 121,000 South Sudanese are currently in Darfur.
24. Internally displaced persons continue to face grave security challenges. There
are reports of internally displaced persons being killed, raped or harassed as they
conduct life-sustaining activities outside the camps. Government security forces andarmed militias are often involved, and in some camps, such as Kalma (South
Darfur), tensions with the community of internally displaced persons are persistent.
Furthermore, large-scale displacement has exacerbated communal tensions, as in thecase of Sortony, North Darfur.
Protective environment
25. The review found that civilians continued to face serious protection issues
despite some improvements over the past several years. In 2016, UNAMID
documented 535 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 1,428
victims, an increase of 281 cases with a corresponding increase of 271 victims
compared with 2015. Of the 535 documented cases in 2016, 130 cases involving
399 victims were attributed to government security entities, with the remaining 405
cases involving 1,029 victims attributed to armed militias and other groups. In thefirst three months of 2017, UNAMID documented 133 cases of human rights
violations and abuses involving 255 victims, of which 22 cases involving 32 victims
were attributed to government security entities. This constitutes an increase incomparison to the same period in 2016.
26. Conflict-related sexual violence persists. In 2016, 100 such cases affecting 222
victims, comprising 102 women, 119 girls and 1 boy, were recorded. Internallydisplaced women are identified as being particularly at risk of conflict-related
sexual violence. Such cases are usually underreported owing to stigma, fear of
reprisals, weak institutions and the government-imposed restrictions on access tosites where incidents of mass rape have been reported in recent years.
27. Children continue to be particularly affected by the hostilities. In 2016, some
231 grave violations against children affecting 320 children were documented by
the United Nations. Killing and maiming accounted for 109 incidents affec ting 199
children (85 killed and 114 maimed). Some 20 schools were reportedly attacked,
looted or destroyed by government forces and armed militias, specifically in thecourse of aerial bombardments in Jebel Marra.
Challenges in the area of rule of law
28. Across Darfur, the presence and capacity of justice and corrections institutions
is limited. Notwithstanding the Government’s efforts to restore the presence ofcriminal justice chain institutions in the main cities, rural areas are severely affectedby their absence, which increases in particular the vulnerability of internallydisplaced persons. Established in 2012 to address serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law since 2003, the Special Court for Darfur Crimes
remains largely ineffective owing to a perceived lack of political will and financial
constraints. While limited progress has been made by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur in prosecuting ex-combatants of armed movements
and cases of sexual violence through the regular court system, impunity for serious
crimes remains widespread. Furthermore, despite UNAMID support for thereopening and strengthening of rural courts, which deal with land disputes and otherpotential conflict drivers, their presence remains limited.
29. The Sudanese police have re-established their presence in most of thelocalities in Darfur, compared with previous years. Approximately 13,000 officers,
4.7 per cent of whom are women, are deployed in 74 police stations and 5 4
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substations across Darfur. Challenges related to the inability to fully cover all the
localities, rural areas and camps for internally displaced persons, lack of skills andmobility, and competition for resources, infrastructure and communication affecttheir ability to effectively undertake their primary responsibility to protect thecommunities.

III. Strategic priorities and mandate implementation
A.

Peace process
30. In the context of its prioritization of “an inclusive peace process”, the mi ssion
provides support to the mediation led by the African Union High -level
Implementation Panel and to the parties in the implementation of the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur, with specific focus on the former Darfur Regional
Authority and the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process. The African
Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur continues to engage
the parties on the way forward, in particular the armed movements, with a view todefining their position on the Doha Document. To date, the Darfur peace process has
been hampered by the lack of constructive engagement on the part of the leaders of
the remaining armed movements, whose presence and representativeness have been
diminished. Their continued rejection of the Doha Document leaves the mediation
little room for manoeuvre.
31. Within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the mission
has focused, first, on the implementation of all outstanding provisions of the Doha
Document and, second, on the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process.
As a member of the Implementation Follow-up Commission, which monitors andassesses the implementation of the Doha Document, the Joint Special
Representative regularly reports on its progress. The mission, thro ugh its civil
affairs, rule of law and protection of civilians components, is working with theresidual commissions of the former Darfur Regional Authority with a focus on theissues of land, reconciliation, transitional justice and returns. As those commi ssions
are currently part of the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office under the presidency, themission will need to reinforce its engagement with the central Government inKhartoum while working closely with the state-level authorities in Darfur incoordination with the United Nations country team.
32. The implementation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, which
was foreseen as a “popular consultation and dialogue … to consolidate peace in
Darfur” (art. 76, para. 473), has been significantly delayed owing to serious funding
constraints. Originally envisaged to take place within 120 days of the signing of the
Doha Document, the process is complete in 64 Darfur localities, with the process
expected to be completed in another 10 localities in its curren t third phase, with thefacilitation of UNAMID. Despite contributions from the Governments of Qatar andthe Sudan and the European Union, an estimated $1.4 million is still required to
finalize the process. To date, participants from all five Darfur states have raisedsuch issues as insecurity, proliferation of weapons, land management, governanceand strengthening of state authority, voluntary return of internally displaced persons
and refugees, and reconciliation. As the consultation process is about to c onclude,
ways to channel its findings into processes related to the implementation of thenational document and the constitutional reform process should be explored.

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B.

Protection of civilians
Protection of internally displaced persons
33. UNAMID has developed a series of important protection tools, including a
mission-wide protection of civilians strategy. A robust protection coordination
mechanism has been established at the headquarters and sector levels with theUnited Nations country team, and at the field level, integrated field protection teams
have been established in team sites to provide early warning and enable swift
responses. Protection matrices identifying threats to civilians are regularly updated
in each state. A remaining key challenge for the mission’s efforts on protection issecuring unfettered access to Jebel Marra.
34. The military component, through its protection of civilians patrols, patrols insupport of livelihood activities, including firewood, water and grass coll ection, andescorts and logistical support for humanitarian agencies, plays an important role inproviding physical protection and facilitating humanitarian assistance. The military
currently conduct on average more than 250 daily protection of civilians p atrols andmore than 20 weekly humanitarian escorts. They also provide protection to
UNAMID personnel and property. UNAMID police (formed police units andindividual police officers), currently deployed across Darfur, are part of theintegrated field protection teams and support escorts of United Nations agencies andsupport the creation of a protective environment through the implementation of theircommunity-oriented policing strategy.
35. UNAMID, in coordination with humanitarian United Nations agencies andpartners, conducted a mapping of the settlements of internally displaced persons in
Darfur with the objective of defining its protection priorities, in line with Security
Council resolution 2296 (2016) and Peace and Security Council communiqué
PSC/PR/COMM.(DCV). The 2.7 million internally displaced persons in Darfur are
spread over 174 settlements, including 60 camps, which host 63 per cent of that
population, equivalent to 1.6 million people, while another 25 per cent live within
host communities. The assessment of risks with regard to the protection ofinternally displaced persons concluded that 29 per cent of the settlements fell into
the “very serious” and “serious” categories, the majority of them being camps forinternally displaced persons. It was also observed that internally displaced persons
were most vulnerable to incidents in areas of livelihood activities, such as farming
and firewood or grass collection, and in seasonal return areas, as we ll as at the maintransport arteries or roads to/from markets. On the basis of that analysis, UNAMID
will focus its efforts on reducing threat levels in high -risk locations, supporting thevoluntary return of internally displaced persons where appropriate, providing rapid
response to prevent new displacement and protecting those fleeing from violence incontingency situations, particularly in Jebel Marra.
36. Any durable solutions for internally displaced persons should take into
account the following: first, almost one third of the Darfur population is currently
displaced; second, camps for internally displaced persons have become a location ofservices and accumulation of relative wealth, which not only risks developing an
inclination for dependence for the internally displaced persons but also makes theman easy target for outside groups; third, a major process of de facto urbanization istaking place across Darfur, especially in areas with a large concentration ofinternally displaced persons around existing towns, which has set in motion new
dynamics affecting durable solutions; and fourth, there are indications that a numberof camps serve as shelter to armed movements, with weapons prevalent. Overall, it
is of paramount importance that durable solutions for internally displaced persons
be voluntary and in accordance with international standards.

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Human rights
37. The mission has implemented its human rights mandate through monitoring,
investigation and reporting, with a particular focus on vulnerable groups, advocacy
and dialogue, and institution- and capacity-building activities. The work of themission in this regard has been hampered by challenges that include a lack of accessto victims, fears of reprisals and stigma among them and a lack of coope ration fromgovernment institutions (including in the issuance of visas for international staff).
Furthermore, despite the support of UNAMID for the establishment of the Truth,
Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Sudan National Human Rights
Commission and the Special Court for Darfur Crimes, as provided for under the
Doha Document, these mechanisms have faced considerable operational challenges
in the lack of political will from the signatories and of resources. Further work isclearly required. OHCHR technical support for these mechanisms to discharge theirmandates in line with international human rights standards is critical.
Rule of law
38. UNAMID has focused its justice and corrections interventions on:(a) supporting the re-establishment of the criminal justice chain in areas to whichdisplaced persons return; (b) strengthening the capacity of rural courts to address
land disputes and other intercommunal conflict drivers; (c) promoting theimplementation of the Doha Document through support for the Special Court andthe Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur.
39. The Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur (2016 2019) was signed on 22 November 2016, bringing together relevant sections of
UNAMID (rule of law, police, human rights, gender) and 10 United Nations
agencies. The Programme reflects and complements the mission’s mandated rule oflaw priorities and offers a framework for the United Nations country team, inparticular UNDP, to take on many of the activities disco ntinued by UNAMID. So
far, only 10 per cent of the overall budget of $17 million is funded.
40. Through its Ordnance Disposal Office, UNAMID conducts survey andclearance of explosive remnants of war and provides education on explosive
remnants of war for local communities at risk and technical advice and support to
the National Mine Action Centre. Past activities include assistance to victims ofincidents from explosive remnants of war and technical advice to the police and the
National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission oninternational best practices and guidelines in the safe storage of arms andammunition.
41. In support of the implementation of the Doha Document, UNAMID provides
technical and logistical assistance to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration Commission for the demobilization (including reinsertion) of
ex-combatants from signatory armed groups. This support is complemented bycommunity stabilization projects, which are aimed at creating temporary econ omic
and training opportunities for youth at risk and internally displaced persons.
Although disarmament, demobilization and reintegration already constitute a
mandated task, greater clarity regarding the mandate in this area would be
advantageous, especially in the light of the peace process and the representation ofrebel groups. Any support provided to civilian disarmament efforts or the
integration of militia groups remains outside the mission’s current purview.

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C.

Intercommunal conflicts
42. In support of the prevention and mitigation of community conflicts, UNAMID
has developed a strategy and a set of mechanisms to address intercommunal
conflicts. In addition, specific initiatives such as the rehabilitation of natural water
points along migratory routes and the establishment of “crop protection
committees” are deemed to have considerably improved the access of nomadic
herders to water and the interaction with the farmers’ communities. Additionalrequests are formulated in support of the provision of services along the migrationroutes. In view of the numerous requests and in the context of limited resources, themission is considering refocusing activities towards supporting the state authorities
and the native administration in addressing conflicts of high impact on civilians andthe national political processes.

D.

Transfer of tasks
43. The transfer of tasks as currently mandated is incongruent with how United
Nations agencies, funds and programmes are structured and resourced. Owing to thelack of resources available to the United Nations country team, most tasks
considered for handover to the country team in the areas of gender and HIV/AIDS
have been discontinued. With regard to the transition of certain justice andcorrections tasks, assessed programmatic funds were transferred to UNDP to
implement clearly defined legal aid tasks and strengthen its capacity to mobilize
further resources to continue this activity beyond July 2017, but its extremely low
capacity in Darfur remains a concern. A handover of task therefore remains
unrealistic if partners continue not to be funded at levels sufficient to carry out mostof the tasks being handed over.
44. It is therefore recommended that a United Nations strategy for sustaining
peace in Darfur be designed, with a phased transition that may include support for
the transfer of personnel and funds, and for a joint UNAMID and United Nations
country team fundraising strategy to ensure the maximization of pooled resourcesand efforts. To help to address this funding shortfall, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and UNAMID should offer full support to country teampartners in the Sudan and New York to raise voluntary funds for development
projects that are important for stabilization in Darfur.

E.

Operational challenges
45. The review team noticed a positive trend in the issuance of visas for UNAMID
and the clearance of shipments for the mission, which began in the course of 2016.
During the period from 1 January 2016 to 1 May 2017, the mission submitted 3,576
visa requests, of which 3,095 were approved, representing an approval rate of 89 per
cent. Although the vacancy rate for international civilian staff due to difficulties
with visa issuance decreased from the previous reporting period, from 46 per cent to43 per cent, challenges remain for the Human Rights Section.
46. Following a similar trend, while all pending food ration containers have beenreleased from Port Sudan, customs clearance for 123 shipments of equipment owned
by contingents of UNAMID and the United Nations remained held at Port Sudan
and in Khartoum. Some shipments containing communications facilities, vehicles
and waste management systems have been awaiting clearance since 2015,
accumulating demurrages of more than $1.2 million.

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47. Overall, there has been a significant improvement in freedom of movement,
particularly in the processing of travel documents. The mission experienced 18
access restrictions in the first trimester of 2017, compared with 64 in the last
trimester of 2016 and 50 in the first trimester of the same year. In January andFebruary 2017, UNAMID and humanitarian actors received government clearance
to conduct inter-agency missions in some of the previously inaccessible parts ofJebel Marra. Restrictions remain in place on the conduct of night patrols all overDarfur, seriously hampering the protection activities of UNAMID uniformed units.

IV. Proposed adjustments to UNAMID
48. The strategic review team concludes that UNAMID deals with two sets ofissues that are both related to the root causes of the conflict: first, the continued
instability in the greater Jebel Marra area and the ensuing displacement in thevicinity; and second, intercommunal violence. Both have emerged from themarginalization of Darfur and the dispute over the scarce resources (especially land
and water) and have been exacerbated by the proliferation of militias.

A.

Refocusing the mission’s mandate
49. In the light of the above, the strategic review team proposes a two -pronged
approach to a new concept of operations that combines peacebuilding andpeacekeeping tasks. The areas outside Jebel Marra and the affected vicinity, that is,
those areas where there has not been any fighting for years, necessitate a morepeacebuilding-oriented approach than Jebel Marra. In those areas, the role of
UNAMID should be, in collaboration with the United Nations country team, tostabilize the situation, support the police and help to build rule of law institutions
while continuing to mediate intercommunal friction and investing resources in theresidual commissions/funds of the Darfur Regional Authority to develop adequate
legislation (especially on land and resource management), and to follow up on
security sector reform-related issues and the implementation of the Doha Document.
50. The greater Jebel Marra area, by contrast, still requires traditional
peacekeeping and emergency attention owing to the insecurity prevailin g in thearea, which prevents internally displaced persons from returning. A concerted effort
should be undertaken through a time-bound Jebel Marra task force in which military
protection, clearance of explosive remnants of war and emergency relief are
combined and coordinated with the humanitarian country team in order to deal withthe stabilization of the area and its hinterland through a Jebel Marra action plan. The
mission should therefore be configured to address those issues in a two -track
concept of operations. UNAMID state offices should also be strengthened andheadquarters thinned out so that the mission can work more closely with the state
governments and develop plans that address the needs of each state, as needs andhotspots vary greatly.
51. The mission’s priorities still address the main issues at stake and provide agood “chapeau” for the tasks that UNAMID should undertake and where it has themost value added. However, the focus of these priorities needs to be adjusted, as do
the indicators of the existing benchmarks.

B.

Reconfiguration of the military and police components
52. The main military effort of UNAMID should concentrate on the Jebel Marratask force, including enablers. In parallel, steps would be taken to draw down in the

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five sectors, thus ensuring that UNAMID is predominantly civilian in character inthose areas to be able to carry out the required peacebuilding tasks. In stable areas,
the formed police units would undertake tasks delinked from those performed by theforce so as to be in a position to operate independently. At the same time, adequate
capability would be retained to respond to any situation requiring a militaryresponse. That concept, which includes the closure of 11 team sites and thewithdrawal of the military from another 7 team sites out of a current total of 36,
represents a reduction of 44 per cent of the authorized ceiling for the military and30 per cent for the police component. The proposed reconfiguration would be
carried out in two phases, each extending over a period of six months.
53. In the first phase, the task force would be established at brigade strength, with
headquarters in Zalingei. It would include the temporary operating base to beestablished in Golo and incorporate the following team sites: Zalingei and Nertiti(Sector Central); Shangil Tobaya, Sortony, Kabkabiyah and Tawilah (Sector North);Kass, Menawashei and Khor Abeche (Sector South). The following 11 team sites
will be closed: El Fasher/Abou Shouk, El Fasher/Zamzam, Al -Malihah, Um
Kaddadah, Tine and Mellit (Sector North); Habila and Foro Burunga (Sector West);
Edd al-Fursan and Tulus (Sector South); and Muhajiriyah (Sector East). The
military troop level at the end of the first phase will be 11,395, as opposed to thecurrent level of 15,845, while the police component will be reduced from 3,403 to
2,748.
54. In the second phase, lasting six months, military units would withdraw fromthe following seven team sites: Kalma (Sector South); Masteri (Sector West); Sheria(Sector East); and Saraf Omra, Korma, Umm Barru and Sereif (Sector North). At
the end of the second phase, the central reserve battalion and four reservecompanies located in the state capitals would be withdrawn. UNAMID would
nonetheless maintain a military presence with appropriate troop strength in eachstate as a “security assistance force”, including command and control elements. The
police would continue to remain in the above-mentioned seven team sites, fromwhich the military will withdraw in the second phase, and formed police units
would be responsible for the provision of UNAMID camp security while continuingwith the mandated tasks. At the end of the second phase, the military troop level
would be reduced to eight infantry battalions (from the previous 16), with a total
force strength of 8,735, while the police strength would stand at 2,360.
55. Considering the volatility of the security environment, the impact of theenvisioned reduction of the UNAMID footprint has to be effectively mitigated byadequate and mobile quick-response capabilities so as to retain the minimum
capacity required to respond to security challenges based on the early warning
information that the mission receives. In view of the very significant cutsrecommended with respect to the size of the force, there will clearly be a need for
the Government to develop viable security plans and arrangements to fill the
resulting gaps and mobilize the resources required to ensure their effective
implementation.

C.

Political process
56. In terms of the political process, stronger focus should be placed on theeffective implementation of the Doha Document, which is incorporated into theConstitution and contains useful provisions to address the underlying causes ofconflict and to provide a peace dividend for the population in Darfur. UNAMID
should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Document’s implementation fora more focused approach on the outstanding provisions of the agreement and work
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to address land and disarmament issues in particular. This also includes efforts toadvance the normalization of the security sector in Darfur, which UNAMID might
not be equipped to tackle as a lead actor but to which it could contribute in a
supporting role. In this context, tackling the proliferation of arms and the presenceof militias is paramount to preventing a relapse into conflict in the medium term.
Furthermore, the mission should support the implementation of the Darfur Internal
Dialogue and Consultation at the local level.
57. As for peace negotiations with rebel movements, it has become increasingly
evident that the two movements that are willing to participate in the process, namely
SLA/MM and JEM, currently do not have any military presence in Darfur. Althoughremnants remain in South Sudan (JEM) and Libya (SLA/MM), with the latterprobably well-equipped and active in the local conflict, the ongoing negotiations
appear out of sync with the situation on the ground. The initiative of the African
Union High-level Implementation Panel, supported by the Joint Special
Representative, for an all-inclusive political process linked to the national dialogue
and a national constitutional reform process should remain the gu iding principle for
UNAMID support within the overall mediation structure, as set out in African
Union Peace and Security Council communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLVI) andreiterated in subsequent Security Council resolutions and Peace and Security
Council communiqués.
58. In this context, the mission’s priorities should remain: (a) support for the
implementation of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel framework
for ending the conflicts in the Sudan; (b) engagement with the Government of the
Sudan and armed movements to sign and implement a cessation of hostilities
agreement; and (c) full implementation of the remaining provisions of the Doha
Document.

D.

Protection of civilians
59. The protection of civilians, including women and children, and t he facilitationof humanitarian access remain a key priority for the mission. Given the new two pronged concept of operations proposed above, activities with regard to theprotection of civilians will also shift, in alignment with the mission’s newly refinedprotection of civilians strategy. In the greater Jebel Marra, in collaboration with thehumanitarian country team, the protection of civilians will heavily revolve around
the Jebel Marra task force action plan, whereas in the rest of the Darfur states i t will
focus on livelihood issues and police/rule of law capacities. The team also discussed
the possibility of a strategy on human rights to establish a working relationship at
the federal level by strengthening the human rights presence in the Khartoum
Liaison Office in order to engage with the Government and key human rights
institutions created through the Doha Document. The Government’s support in thisrespect will be crucial.
60. Specifically, the team recommends the establishment of a temporary opera tingbase in Golo in support of the facilitation of humanitarian efforts and the protectionof civilians as part of the Jebel Marra task force. In addition, it is recommended thatthe mission, in conjunction with the humanitarian country team, conduct acomprehensive situational analysis and needs assessment to prioritize areas forclearance of explosive remnants of war and identify possible quick -impact projects
and community stabilization projects for interventions in Golo and the north ofCentral Darfur, as well as the wider Jebel Marra, in support of returns.
61. Third-tier protection activities should focus on the establishment of aprotective environment by strengthening the capacity of the state, especially the

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police and judicial actors, promoting respect for human rights, facilitating therepresentation and participation of women, preventing and responding to sexual andgender-based violence and enhancing the protection of children and should beaccelerated in areas where fighting has subsided, as p art of stabilization efforts andsupport for the Government.
62. Given the challenges that prevail with regard to the protection of human rights
in Darfur and the opportunities that arise from current developments, the following
human rights priorities remain for UNAMID: (a) monitoring and reporting,including trial monitoring; (b) advocacy for the implementation of the provisions of
the Doha Document on militia groups and disarmament; (c) advocacy for the liftingof emergency laws in Darfur and the arresting powers of the National Intelligenceand Security Service; (d) support for and capacity-building of the human rights andjustice mechanisms under the Doha Document, namely the Sudan National Human
Rights Commission, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Special
Court for Darfur Crimes and the Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur;(e) increased human rights personnel in Khartoum to support institutional
development, advocacy with authorities and increased capacity-building aimed atstrengthening transitional justice and human rights institutions; (f) support for the
implementation of the Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in
Darfur.
63. The strategic review team recommends that UNAMID and the United Nations
country team work with Darfur state governments and other available partners todevelop comprehensive peace stabilization plans led by the state government andthe native administration for local areas that are most important for durable
solutions to problems of displaced populations, and to support the Government increating conditions conducive to a reduction in violence. In this regard, the two
Councils should consider including the mandated tasks of helping the Government
and native administrations to extend state authority in all five states of Darfur bystrengthening rule of law efforts and supporting state capacity for the mediation ofintercommunal conflict, to develop and implement peace stabilization plans for key
areas for returns of internally displaced persons or areas of the Jebel Marra withpotential for renewed armed conflict.
64. The Ordnance Disposal Office should remain anchored in UNAMID, with
explosive remnants of war clearance, risk education and technical advice tasks until
such time that the National Mine Action Centre will be fully capable of effectively
assuming mine action responsibilities throughout the territory. Such tasks are sinequa non conditions for the mission’s movement, the facilitation of delivery ofhumanitarian aid and the return of the displaced population. The Office should use
its capacity to support the mission in wider reconciliation efforts through assistanceto victims of explosive remnants of war. Simultaneously, community stabilization
projects should be enhanced as the emphasis of UNAMID increasingly moves awayfrom the provision of physical security to the stabilization of key areas affected by
the conflict and vital for the voluntary return of internally displaced persons.
65. The Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur
provides the framework necessary to contribute to sustaining peace in Darfur.
Considering current funding shortfalls, the implementation of the Programmeshould be sequenced, focusing on immediate priorities for community andinstitutional stabilization, including community security, access to justice,strengthening of the criminal justice chain in return areas and human rights
protection.
66. While the disarmament of armed militias is a complex endeavour, the issue
should be addressed in a sustainable way, including by taking into account their
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grievances. The African Union and the United Nations could offer technicalassistance to the Government of the Sudan on how to implement relevant provisionsof the Doha Document. Initiatives that aim to bring the militia into an accountability
framework, similar to the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the nationalarmed forces, should be supported. Furthermore, the mission should support
initiatives whereby the communities of internall y displaced persons engage militia
groups in mediation with the state authorities towards solutions for their return andresettlement. With reference to the proliferation of weapons among the civilian
population, the review team recommends that the mission support the efforts of theGovernment towards an arms control approach. The team also recommends that, on
security sector-related issues, specifically on “the reform of some military
institutions”, as provided in the Doha Document (art. 74, paras. 463 -464), theAfrican Union Security Sector Reform Framework could be useful in guiding
further engagement with the Government of the Sudan.

E.

Intercommunal conflict
67. On the issue of intercommunal conflicts, the strategic review team is of theview that the recent efforts to develop state strategies have worked well but that astronger partnership should be struck with the United Nations country team, which
requires additional donor support if it is to serve as a strong partner with UNAMID
on the issue of seasonal migration and the extension of the rule of law institutions,while working on tackling the root causes through a legislative and institutionalframework developed at the federal level. This should be based on the institutional
and physical infrastructure built by UNAMID and the local authorities to address
such conflicts, including state coordination mechanisms with local authorities, crop
protection working groups, the demarcation of corridors and the construction ofwater and service points.
68. The strategic review team is of the view that the work of the mission and theUnited Nations country team should prioritize those intercommunal conflicts, whichhave the potential: (a) to cause the highest number of casualties; and (b) to derail
national political processes. Such an approach will inform the prioritization of
mission efforts to prevent local violence and the allocation of resources for
mitigation and response.
69. Based on the above, the review team recommends that the benchmark of theintercommunal conflicts, namely prevention or mitigation of community conflictthrough mediation and, in conjunction with the United Nations country team,measures to address its root causes, remains relevant. It is proposed, however, thatthe requirements for progress relate to the residual provisions of the Doha
Document and former Darfur Regional Authority commissions and include:(a) strengthened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and greater respect
thereof; (b) establishment of a legal and institutional framework to address the root
causes of intercommunal conflict; (c) provision of access to the United Nations
country team to enable measures that address root causes related to natural
resources, recovery and reconstruction. Specific indicators should reflect theprovisions of the Doha Document on the Darfur Land Commission, the Darfur land use mapping database, legislation on empowering the native administration andprovisions on oil revenues. UNAMID should focus on its support role to local
initiatives through good offices and advisory and logistical support.

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F.

Impact of the drawdown on mission structure and management
70. As the military and police reconfigure their deployment and posture, thecivilian component will have to be equally adjusted to a greater presence in the field
offices and a less heavy headquarters in El Fasher and at the state level. Once the
new mandate of UNAMID is adopted, it will be necessary to conduct acomprehensive civilian staffing review to ensure that sta ffing levels are adjusted to
implement the revised mandate.
71. The security posture of the mission also needs to be assessed and reviewed by
the Department of Safety and Security and the mission leadership, through the
Security Management Team and in coordination with UNAMID military and police,
to reduce heavy escorts and protection arrangements that do not seem necessary,
especially in the state capitals. Not only do the current arrangements not correspondto security developments on the ground, but the y also have a negative impact on
mandate delivery and the image of UNAMID. This might also have an impact on
mission classification and related issues.

V. Observations
72. We are encouraged by the improvement of the security situation, the politicaldevelopments in the context of the national dialogue and the positive regional
environment in view of the cross-border cooperation between the Central African
Republic, Chad, the Sudan and Uganda. While it is widely accepted that UNAMID
has contributed to the stabilization of the security situation and the overall
protection of civilians environment, the mission should adjust to the new realities in
Darfur and the Sudan.
73. Overall, the African Union-United Nations framework for the facilitation of
the Darfur peace process established in 2012 remains relevant. In view of the above,the mediation process should be adjusted under the leadership of the African Union
High-level Implementation Panel. We call upon the movements to demonstratecourage and vision by engaging in the implementation of the Doha Document,
which constitutes a useful political framework, now part of the national
Constitution, to address the root causes of the conflict and create peace dividends
for the people of Darfur.
74. The rapidly changing landscape in Darfur opens up an opportunity for a morecooperative relationship between the Government and UNAMID. We call upon the
Government of the Sudan to positively engage with UNAMID and the United
Nations country team towards the implementation of the outstanding provisions of
the Doha Document, especially those related to the underlying causes of conflict.
75. As UNAMID is evolving in response to the security and politicaldevelopments in Darfur, we recommend the extension of its mandate for 12 months
and suggest that a joint African Union-United Nations report be submitted to bothCouncils by 1 March 2018 containing an assessment of the proposed reconfiguratio nin the light of the prevailing political and security situation and, provided that thecurrent trends continue, recommendations, as part of the exit strategy, for further
steps in the drawdown of the Operation, for consideration by both Councils during
the discussion on the mandate in 2018.

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