GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Global COE Program

Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics
Discussion Paper No.51

Trust and Reciprocity among International Groups:
Experimental Evidence from Austria and Japan

Kenju Akai and Robert J. Netzer

May 2009; revised August 2010

GCOE Secretariat
Graduate School of Economics

OSAKA UNIVERSITY

1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

Trust and reciprocity among international groups:
Experimental evidence from Austria and Japan
Kenju Akaia, Robert J. NetzerbaInstitute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka,
Ibaragi, Osaka 5670047, Japanb

Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck, Unicersitaetsstrasse 15, A6020 Innsbruck, Austria

Abstract: This paper explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at the intraand international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups
from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee
consecutively without any information feedback. Intra- and international trust levels
are identical across nationalities. Intranational reciprocity in Austria is greater than inJapan, but there is no significant difference in international reciprocity between thetwo countries. We also examine the relationship between trust and reciprocity andthe relathionship between trust/reciprocity and expectations, demographic variables,
the individualism index, and trust indices. International trust enhances international
reciprocity in both countries, although this effect is weaker in Japan than in Austria.
Expected returns enhance trust in both countries at the intra- and international levels.
In Japan, expected transfers enhance international reciprocity less than they dointranational reciprocity. A larger number of females in the group reduce
international trust. In Austria, this reduces international trust more than it does
intranational trust.
Keywords: Trust, Reciprocity, Trust game, Group norm, International teamexperiment
JEL classification: C92, C71
This is revised version of " Trust and reciprocity among international groups:
Experimental evidence from Austria and Japan" published in ISER Discussion Paper
No. 737.

Corresponding author: k-akai@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka
University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaragi, Osaka 5670047, Japan.
Tel.: +81-6-6879-8552;
Fax: +81-6-6879-8584.
E-mail: jiro.netzer@medel.com (R. Netzer)

1

1 Introduction
With the rapid pace of globalization, national identity and cultural differencesin trust and reciprocity are the key to economic exchange between different nations,cultures, or ethnicities. For instance, when a company begins to jointly develop newtechnologies at the international level with a foreign company, it faces much
uncertainty and risk stemming from problems unique to each country, in terms ofaccounting systems, labor customs, patent laws, and so on. Even if the risks areminimized, there is a chance that the partner company will tear up the contract andsteal newly developed technologies or free ride on the partner’s developmental
efforts—unless the trust and reciprocity levels between the two are sufficiently
established.
To avoid such issues, the company builds a professional team in which
several members orally discuss whether they trust the partner company and carefully
decide whether to invest. The contract is not signed unless the team from thecompany, on the basis of its own discussions, expresses trust in the partnercompany’s team.
As Arrow (1972) indicated, every commercial transaction has an element oftrust. The fact that globalization is based on international economic exchange such asgroup interaction allows us to investigate international trust and reciprocity based ongroup decisions.
Our main purpose is to investigate national or cultural differences in trust andreciprocity at the intranational (when people interact with the same nationality) andinternational (when they interact with a different nationality) levels
We conduct modified trust games (Berg 1995) played between Austrian andJapanese groups, whose members interact freely in their decision-making processes,
in what we refer to as an international experiment. To evaluate the results of thisexperiment vis-à-vis the situation within each country, we also carry out intranational
experiments for the purpose of comparison. In this case, the same game is playedinternally in each country, among Austrian and Japanese groups.
Our main findings are as follows. Intra- and international trust levels are
identical across nationalities. Intranational reciprocity in Austria is higher than inJapan, but there is no significant difference in regard to international reciprocity
between the two countries. International trust enhances international reciprocity, but
this effect is weaker in Japan than in Austria. In each country, at both intra- andinternational levels, expected returns enhance trust. In Japan, expected transfers
enhance international reciprocity less than they do intranational reciprocity. A larger
number of females in the group reduce international trust. In Austria, it reduces
international trust more than intranational trust.
Camerer (2003) cites culture as having the most significant and robust effects
in social preference experiments. Now culture is too important a force to be ignoredin the context of the trust game. Buchan et al. (2002, 2006), Holm and Danielson(2005), and Ashraf et al. (2006) discover differences in trust and/or reciprocity
among different countries. In these studies, counter partners belong to the samenationality.
However, our most interesting situation is one in which the counter partners
belong to a different culture or nationality. In this situation, the seminal paper of
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) identify ethnic stereotypes as the cause of the2

Ashkenazi and Eastern Jews’ mistrust of Eastern Jews. Willinger et al. (2003) findthat the amount that the Germans invest to the French is higher than the reverse case,whereas, the amount that the Germans return to the French is not different from what
the French return to the Germans. Further, Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) find thattrust and reciprocity of both Turkish and Belgian small bussinessmen are
independent of ethnic origin and the ethnic origin of the opposite party. In addition,
Netzer and Sutter (2009) find that Austrians are more trusting of the Japanese andthat the Japanese reciprocate less toward the Austrians than the other way around.
In socio-psychology, on the other hand, Takahashi et al. (2008) employ a variation of
the trust game and discover that the Japanese display less in-group favoritism withrespect to both trust and trustworthiness than the Chinese and Taiwanese.
Our study differs from the ones mentioned above in the following ways. To
begin with, we employ subjects in geographically distinct countries that have notexperienced serious conflicts relating to their historical background, especiallyWorld War II (WWII). Apart from Netzer and Sutter (2009), a common feature ofprevious intercultural experiments is that the subjects lived in geographicallyproximate areas that had experienced potential conflicts in relation to their historicalbackground. These negative relationships may induce the negative effects of trust
and reciprocity more easily, or the collective guilt for WWII, as for the Japanese,
which Takahashi et al. (2008) report.
We exclude such negative relations and keep enough geographicaldistinctions. We then re-consider the effect of cultural differences on trust andreciprocity when subjects interact with a different culture. That is, do subjects havein- or out-group favoritism when they are not affected by collective guilt for WWIIor other serious negative relationships in their historical backgrounds? To investigate
the answer to this question as a group behavior, we chose Japan and Austria torepresent East Asia and Europe, respectively, as Netzer and Sutter (2009) did. Netzer
and Sutter (2009) intermediate the interactions of subjects, who do not join theexperiment at the same time, whereas our subjects directly interact in real timethrough the Internet, seated in a laboratory of their own country, as with Takahashi etal. (2008) 1 .
Second, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first experimentemploying a trust game played among international groups. Group norms on trust
and reciprocity constitute a topic that is still open to discussion. Even if we
exclusively consider domestic interactions, only two studies deal with groupinteractions in the trust game. The first is Cox (2002), who finds that trust levels do
not differ between individuals and groups, whereas reciprocity among groups is lessthan that among individuals. Second, Kugler et al. (2007) find a contrary result: trustin groups is less than that in individuals, whereas there is no difference in reciprocity
between groups and individuals. Our interest is to investigate cultural difference ingroup norms as regards trust and reciprocity at the international level.
On a comparison of our subject pools, one of the cultural differences relates
to individualism versus collectivism. According to Hofsted (2009), Austria’s
individualism index is higher than Japan’s 2 . With regard to trust, respondents of the1

Apart from the trust game context, Chuah et al. (2007, 2009) conduct ultimatum games played
between Chinese living in Malaysia and the UK.
2
Refer to http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php for further details.

3World Value Survey were asked how much they trusted people in their own country,
and a higher ratio of respondents in Austria than Japan chose the answer “completely
trust 3 ”. Although some predictions of Fukuyama (1995) and Yamagishi et al. (1998)
are related to our study, there exists no international comparison of group norms
related to social preferences.
Third, we choose repeated games in which subjects play the role of trustor
and trustee consecutively. Buchan et al. (2002) find that a high (low) level of trust
induces a high (low) level of reciprocity in China (Japan). However, they hold thatsuch relationships are still open for discussion and suggest, referring to Axelrod(1984), that repeated games are required to investigate robust relationships. We try toinvestigate such a relationship between the internalized trust and reciprocity as an
explanation of inherent behavior when they interact with a different culture.
Repeated trust game experiments have been conducted by Anderhub et al.
(2002), Enngle-Warnick and Slonim (2004), King-Casas et al. (2005), and EnngleWarnick and Slonim (2006). King-Casas et al. (2005) find, in the f-MRI, that trustor
gradually begins to anticipate returns and to have willingness to invest more before
trustee sends back. To prevent such involuntary thought processes on the part ofsubjects, we choose repeated games in which the subjects play both rolesconsecutively without pre-announcement of this fact or information on theinteracting group’s behavior. This design is different from the one accomplished by
Burks et al. (2003), who make all subjects play trustors first, and then trustees, andfind that playing both roles reduces trust and reciprocity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theexperimental design and procedures. Section 3 analyzes the results and Section 4
provides detailed survey analysis. Finally, Section 5 contains the conclusion anddiscussion.

2 Experimental design and procedure
2.1 Design of our trust gameThe subjects were allocated to separate rooms, designated as Rooms A and B.
The subjects in the two rooms were randomly assigned to three-member teams whointeract freely in making a decision 4 . To investigate the relationship between
internalized trust and reciprocity, we make subjects play both roles sequentially in
two separate parts. Our specific design is as follows.
The subjects were informed that the experiment included two independentparts and that the result of either part 1 or part 2 would be randomly determined as
their final payments. Further, they were told that a detailed explanation of part 2 ofthe experiment would be provided after the completion of part 1 5 .

3The Austrian data are collected in 1990 and 1999, and the Japanese in 1981, 1990, 1995, and 2000.
Refer to http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ for further details.
4
We collectively refer to the three-member groups in each room as “team,” namely, Team A (RoomA) and Team B (Room B).
5
We make this announcement to avoid deception, although it may cause the subjects to expect a
repetition of the same game.

4

In part 1, the teams in Rooms A and B were anonymously matched in pairs.
They were given 10 initial tokens as the experimental money. Team A and Team B
play the roles of trustor and trustee, respectively. First, Team A inclusively
determined how many tokens between 0 and 10 to send to Team B and retained theremaining tokens. The number of tokens that Team A sent to Team B was tripled.
Then, Team B decided how many of the tokens it would send back to Team A.
Denote the number of tokens sent by Team A as x and those sent back by Team B asy. Team B determined y between 0 and 10+3x inclusively 6 . The amount Team B sent
back to Team A was not tripled. Since we obtain more elaborate information on theinternalized reciprocity that the subjects potentially maintain before they interact
with the others in the experiment, we used a strategy method (Selten 1967). While
the trustors decided on a single transfer, x, the trustees had to indicate a return, y, forall possible transfers, x, from the trustors. Hence, the trustees decided on returns for
11 transfer possibilities.
We deliberately did not provide information on the interacting group’s
behavior in part 1 to the subjects to avoid the possibility that the results of part 1
would influence those of part 2. In part 2, they were informed that the same gamewas to be played again, but with their roles reversed. This time around, Team A
would play the role of trustee, and Team B that of trustor. The members of bothteams were the same as in part 1. The subjects were anonymously matched in pairs
and, as before, given 10 initial tokens. Other rules were the same as in part 1.
The rules of part 2 of the experiment are not disclosed to the subjects at the
beginning of the experiment, nor are the results of part 1 announced. If these parts
were independent, the transfers and returns in each part would be zero in a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. To simplify, on the basis of this theoretical prediction, we
consider the relative transfer to its holdings, given by x/10, to reflect the trust
involved in a decision made under a risk stemming from the social uncertainty ofwhether or not the counterpart would behave reciprocally. On the other hand, we
consider the relative return to its holdings, y/(10+3x), to reflect the reciprocity shownin the willingness to honor the trust received. According to Camerer’s survey (2003),
average transfers range from 40% to 60%, with returns averaging 110% of thetransfers in many previous experimental studies.
-------------------------------Table 1 is around here-------------------------------As summarized in Table 1, our design features two experiments comprisingfour treatments that differ with respect to which subjects belong to Teams A and B.
The intranational experiment consists of treatments AA, where both Teams A and B
are Austrian groups, and JJ, where both teams are Japanese groups. Further, theinternational experiment consists of treatments AJ and JA. In the former treatment,
Team A comprises Austrians, and Team B Japanese, with the other way around in
the latter treatment. A treatment consists of four sessions, each involving 24 or 30
6

In the original trust game (Berg 1995), the trustees are given $10 as a show-up fee; they were toldthat they cannot use this money in the game. However, in order to avoid the possible effect of animbalance in the endowments on a trustee’s decision, we allow the trustees to use their endowments.

5subjects. Further, each treatment involves the participation of 36 groups (18 fromTeam A and 18 from Team B), comprising 108 subjects in all.
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree(Fischbacher, 2007). Each treatment consisted of the same number of subjects. The
subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from Innsbruck University inAustria and Osaka University in Japan. They were invited through flyers posted
around the campuses. None of the subjects participated in more than one session.
The intranational experiment proceeds as follows. All subjects initiallyarrived at a single location for registration before being assigned to their rooms; thiswas done to dispel any doubts about the existence of interacting groups in otherrooms (Frohlich et al., 2001). The subjects were then assigned to Room A or B, andtheir group identification number was designated through a lottery. Upon arriving at
each room, the subjects were seated at separate computer terminals with the othergroup members. No communication was permitted throughout the sessions, butgroup members could have verbal discussions when they had to make decisions.
The subjects were made to listen to prerecorded instructions, which they
simultaneously read from the copies handed to each of them 7 . The instructions
informed the subjects that the experiment included two independent parts and thatthe result of either part 1 or 2 would be randomly determined as their final payments.
Further, they were told that a detailed explanation of part 2 of the experiment would
follow, after part 1. Any remaining questions were privately answered.
At the beginning of part 1, each team received a decision sheet. Team A, thetrustor, entered a single transfer of tokens, from 0 to 10 inclusive, on its record sheets
and computers in 10 minutes. At the same time, Team B, the trustee, entered its
returns for all possible transfers from Team A on its record sheets and computers.
Accordingly, Team B decided on the returns for 11 transfer possibilities. They also
indicate their expectations regarding the return or transfer made by their interacting
group.
After the conclusion of part 1, the decision sheets were collected. The
subjects did not receive information about their interacting group’s behavior in part
1, and part 2 of the experiment was commenced. Again, the subjects were made tolisten to prerecorded instructions while simultaneously following these from theirown copies. They were told that the rules in part 2 of the experiment were the sameas those in part 1, except that the roles of Teams A and B were reversed. This time,
Team A played the role of trustee and indicated its returns for all possible transfersfrom Team B, which played the role of trustor. Team B decided on one single
transfer of tokens, from 0 to 10 inclusive. Both teams also indicated its expectations
regarding the return or transfer made by its interacting group.
After part 2 ended, each subject filled out a post-experimental survey. Afterthe subjects answered all questions, we presented the results of parts 1 and 2. Either
part was randomly determined for calculating their earnings.
In the international experiment, the subjects were informed that the Austrianand Japanese teams would be matched with each other. Further, we disclosed the7Instructions and other materials distributed in the experiment are provided in the supplementarymaterial.

6

university and experimenter names and the experimenters’ e-mail addresses. In order
to dispel doubts about the existence of interacting groups in the other country, we
connected the two laboratories in the respective countries over the Internet in realtime through a Skype call at the beginning of each treatment, and broadcasted a live
stream of each room via a webcam.
To avoid any possible emotional effect from seeing the faces of theindividuals they interacted with, we asked the subjects to hide their faces and played
the live stream in the following manner. First, the live stream of the room in Austria
was shown to the subjects in Japan, but the Japanese stream was not shown inAustria. The Austrian subjects were asked to keep their faces down. Using the Skypechat system, the Japanese experimenter asked the Austrian experimenter to tell theAustrian subjects to raise their hands during the broadcast. The Japanese subjects
were shown the Skype chat window in addition to the live stream that was played ona big screen, and they observed that the Austrian subjects responded directly to the
instructions of their experimenter but did not see the faces of their interacting
subjects. As it was nighttime in Japan and daytime in Austria, the Austrianexperimenter then moved the webcam toward the window to demonstrate that it was
daytime in Austria. Then, the Skype video broadcasting from Austria ended, and thelive stream from Japan was shown to the Austrian subjects according to thepreviously described procedure. Subsequently, the same procedures were followed
for the intranational experiment.
All the treatments lasted roughly 1 hour. The subjects were paid in cash as per
the value of the tokens held by their own group in a randomly determined part; theconversion rate was 1 token to 0.08 euro in Austria and 12 yen in Japan. Further, theshow-up fees were 3.5 euro in Austria and 500 yen in Japan.
We controlled for country-specific variables that could influence our results
and accounted for any potential methodological problems. Roth et al. (1991) mention
three main problems accompanying multinational experiments: the experimenter
effect, language effect, and currency effect. Our experiments were conducted by
identically following a precisely predetermined written plan of procedures that met
the requirements of each step of a session. In each country, the experimenters werelocal male Ph.D. students who were experienced in conducting experiments. In order
to control for language effects, the instructions were originally written in English andtranslated into German by the second author and Japanese by the first author; they
were then translated back into English by an another translator and checked forpossible discrepancies. We avoided unwanted currency effects by choosing
denominations that kept the purchasing power equal across countries. Since our
subject samples consisted only of students, we relied on typical student expenditures
to determine the payments.

3 Results
3.1 Overview of the results
Table 2 summarizes the means and standard errors of relative transfers andreturns of the first- and second-order trustor/trustee, their pooled data and payments
to subjects. Note that the relative returns in this table are actual transacted values
against actual transfers. In the intranational experiment, the pooled data combine

7

parts 1 and 2 in each country. In the international experiment, on the other hand,pooled data constitute across treatments AJ and JA in each country. In bothcountries, the means of relative transfers and returns in the international experimentare higher than those in the intranational experiment. Average payments to thesubjects were 16.19 euro in Austria and 18.11 euro (2,716 yen) in Japan for the
intranational experiment, and 16.70 euro in Austria and 16.40 euro (2,460 yen) inJapan for the international experiment. The responses to the survey questions areanalyzed in Section 4.
In this section, we statistically compare the relative transfers and returns fromthe viewpoint of trust and reciprocity. First, we compare the trust levels between theAustrian groups and Japanese groups in Section 3.2. Next, we compare theirreciprocity in Section 3.3.
-------------------------------Table 2 is around here-------------------------------3.2 Trust
Here, we compare the trust behavior between two countries. Figures 1 (a) and(b) present histograms of the pooled relative transfers across the first- and secondorder trustor in each country in the intra- and international experiments, respectively.
-------------------------------Figure 1 is around here.
-------------------------------To begin with, we examine the order effect of the relative transfers. The
average of relative transfers for the first trustor is higher than that for the second
trustor in each country in both the experiments. In the intranational experiment, theWilcoxon rank-sum test marginally rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in the
distributions of relative transfers between the first- and second-order trustor in both
Austria and Japan (two-tailed p-values are both 0.09). In the international
experiment, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not reject the null hypothesis of nodifference in the distributions of relative transfers between the first- and second-ordertrustor in Austria (two-tailed p-values = 0.24) but marginally rejects the hypothesis
in Japan (two-tailed p-values = 0.07). However, these differences are not significant
at less than the 5% level so that we pool the data across orders and increase thesample size.
Second, we focus on trust levels within each experiment to investigate thenational differences between two countries at the intra- and international levels. In
the intranational experiment, the means for Austria and Japan are 0.56 and 0.62,
respectively. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not reject the null hypothesis of nodifference in the distributions of relative transfers between two countries (two-tailed
p-value = 0.36). In the international experiment, on the other hand, the means are
0.68 and 0.65 for Austria and Japan, respectively. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test does
not reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of relative transfers for the Austriangroups is the same as that for the Japanese groups (two-tailed p-value = 0.95). Thus,8there is no significant difference in regard to both intra- and international trust levels
between Austria and Japan.
Third, we compare intra- and international trust levels for each country inorder to examine whether or not foreign interaction groups affect trust levels. The
Wilcoxon rank-sum test does not reject the null hypothesis that the distribution ofrelative transfers among the Austrian groups in the intranational experiment is thesame as that in the international experiment (two-tailed p-values = 0.29). Further, theWilcoxon rank-sum test does not reject the null hypothesis that the distribution ofpooled relative transfers among the Japanese groups in the intranational experimentis identical to that in the international experiment (two-tailed p-values = 0.90). Thus,
there is no significant difference between intra- and international trust levels in bothcountries.
3.3 Reciprocity
First of all, we pool the relative returns across the first- and second-ordertrustee and show the tendency of the reciprocity level toward the interacting group’s
trust level. To this end, we use all the relative returns of trustees predetermined on 11
possibilities of relative transfers. Relative returns are censored variables from 0 to 1
inclusive; thus, we consider a Tobit regression of relative returns on 11 possibilities
of relative transfers with subject group identification clustering for each part:Returnij = a + b·Transferij + εij,
for i = 1,…,36; j=0,…, 1
For simplicity, in the following regression equations, we refer to relative returns andrelative transfers as Return and Transfer, respectively. Figures 2 (a) and (b) show all
the relative returns of trustees predetermined on 11 possibilities of relative transfers
and the respective Tobit regression lines for each country in the intra- andinternational experiments, respectively.
-------------------------------Figure 2 is around here.
-------------------------------Table 3 summarizes the results of the above Tobit regressions. The coefficient on
Transfer in each country is positive and significant at the 1% level in bothexperiments. At the 5% level, the intercept in each country is negative and significant
in the intranational experiment, but this is not the case in the international
experiment.
-------------------------------Table 3 is around here.
-------------------------------To compare the relative returns between the first- and second-order trustee, we show
the regressions for the first- and second-order trustee separately. Table 4 summarizes
the results of Tobit regressions of relative returns on 11 possible relative transfers ineach order of playing trustee. The coefficient on Transfer in each country is positive9

and significant at the 1% level in both experiments. Some intercepts are marginallysignificant but others are not. Combining with the above result of pooled data, both
intra- and international reciprocative levels increase as the interacting groups’ trustlevels increase in both countries.
-------------------------------Table 4 is around here.
-------------------------------The coefficients on Transfer for the second-order trustee (who played trustor
in part 1) are higher than those of the first-order trustee (who played trustor in part2), apart from the Japanese groups in the international experiment. To examine theorder effects, we consider the following Tobit dummy regressions in eachexperiment:
Returnij = a + b·Transferij + c·2nd + d·Transferij·2nd+ εij,
for i = 1, …, 36; j = 0,…, 10
where 2nd is an order dummy variable taking the value 1 for the second-order trustee
and 0 for first-order trustee. The results are summarized in Table 5.
-------------------------------Table 5 is around here.
-------------------------------The coefficient on Transfer·2nd is significant only for the Japanese groups inthe intranational experiment. The coefficients on 2nd are not significant in either
country in both intra- and international experiments. Thus, the order difference ofplaying trustee does not affect intranational reciprocity in Austria, but Japaneseplaying trustee second show higher intranational reciprocity than those playing
trustee first. However, the order difference of playing trustee does not affectinternational reciprocity in both countries.
Except for the intranational experiment in Japan, we can pool the data acrossthe first- and second- order trustee. A comparison of the Tobit regression lines for thetwo countries in Figure 2 reveals that although the reciprocity levels of Austrian andJapanese groups are not very different in the intranational experiment, the Japanesegroups display higher reciprocity than the Austrian groups in the international
experiment. To examine the difference between the two countries, we consider thefollowing regressions in each experiment:
Returnij = a + b·Transferij + c·JPN + d·Transferij·JPN+ εij,
for i = 1, …, 36; j = 0, …, 10
where JPN is a country dummy variable taking the value 1 for Japanese groups and 0
for Austrian groups. These results are summarized in Table 6. Notice that we provide
both pooled and separate analyses on the intranational experiment in Japan to allow
for comparison.
--------------------------------

10

Table 6 is around here.
-------------------------------The coefficient on Transfer·JPN is not significant at less than 5% in theintranational experiment in any regression. On the other hand, it is significant at the
5% level in the international experiment. The coefficients on JPN are not significant
in both the intra- and international experiments. Thus, there is no significant
difference in intranational reciprocity between two countries. However, international
reciprocity in Japan is higher than that in Austria.
Next, we compare the intra- and international reciprocity of each country to
examine whether or not foreign interacting groups affect reciprocity. We consider thefollowing regressions for each country:
Returnij = a + b·Transferij + c·INTER + d·Transferij·INTER+ εij,
for i = 1, …, 36; j = 0, …, 10
where INTER is an experimental dummy variable taking the value 1 for theinternational experiment and 0 for the intranational experiment. These results are
summarized in Table 7.
-------------------------------Table 7 is around here.
-------------------------------The coefficient on Transfer·INTER is not significant for Austria. In Japan, thecoefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level for the 2nd intra- vs.
international experiment, and significant at the 10% level for the pooled intra- vs.
international experiment. The latter significance is marginal, and we defer support
for any difference in Japn between intra- and international reciprocity. Thus, there isno significant difference between Austrian intra- and international reciprocity.
However, as regards Japanese, although there is no significant difference between
intra- and international reciprocity, the international reciprocity of all Japanese ishigher than the intranational reciprocity of the Japanese playing trustee second.

4 Survey analysis predicting trust and reciprocity
4.1 Group characteristics
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find that high-trust
societies exhibit high rates of investment and growth and, further, that trust declines
as social distance increases. Even when behavior is the same across countries,
though, Holm and Danielson (2005) argue that underlying preferences can differ, assuggested by a combined consideration of behavioral relationships and responses tosurvey questions.
The current study similarly employs both behavioral and self-report measures
to explore cultural difference and national identity, and its results suggest an
explanation for the similarities and differences in cross-cultural studies (for instance,
Burks et al., 2003; Holm and Danielson, 2005; Buchan et al., 2008).

11

In this section, our goal is to investigate what factor enhances or reduces trust
and reciprocity. To this end, we use Tobit regressions of relative transfers or returns
on three kinds of variables, including responses to survey questions, in addition to
the variables we employed in the previous sections.
The first type is a different behavior that subjects displayed in the other partof the experiment. That is, we employ their own return (transfer) for predicting theirtrust (reciprocity). We refer to the relative transfers they send while playing trustor as
My transfer. We refer to the relative returns—not the actual returns to the counter
partner—corresponding to their own transfers while playing trustor as My return.
These variables help us examine whether trustors’ inherent reciprocation level affects
their trust behavior.
The second type consists of expectations. A number of studies have observedthat high expectations of counter partner’s reciprocity (trust) enhance trust(reciprocity), as also verified in the f-MRI by King-Casas et al. (2005). Since our
subjects play both roles of trustor and trustee, we examine not only the relationshipbetween trust and expected returns subjects hold when they play trustor but also therelationship between trust and expected transfers subjects hold when they playtrustee. In other words, we also explore whether high expectations of trust from theircounter partner enhances their own trust. The variables Expected transfer andExpected return are calculated as relative values to the interacting groups’ holdings.
The third kind consists of group characteristics self-reported in the survey. In
the survey, we collected basic demographic information: age, gender, parents’
education, place where subjects grew up, and family income. We also asked subjects
about experience of traveling in Austria and Europe for the Japanese or Japan andAsia for the Austrians, preference of team decisions in order to measureindividualism, and many trust questions, including trust in others, in themselves, andin their own culture. Questions are partly taken from Yamagishi and Yamagishi(1994) and Holm and Danielson (2004). Detailed explanations for those values are
summarized in the appendix.
To compare national identity in each experiment, we create cross-effectvariables by multiplying a Japanese dummy variable by the significant different
variables between two countries in both t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for both
intra- and international experiments. Table 8 summarizes means and results ofstatistical tests for variables created from the answers in each group. In this statisticaltest, there are significant difference in Age, Female, Living in a foreign country,
Parents’ education, Growing up in a foreign country, Leadership, Consensus, Trust inothers, Trust in yourself, and Cultural trust. We, however, eliminate some variables
that have no significant effect on either trust or reciprocity to focus on the more
important variables and avoid multicollinearity due to including too many explained
variables.
Four factors in Table 8 are interesting from the viewpoint of national identity
and cultural difference. Expectations are the most interesting factors. Austrians’
expected transfer and returns in the international experiment are higher than those in
the intranational experiment 8 . That is, Austrian groups expected higher transfers and
8

The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the distributionsof expected transfers between the first- and second-order trustor in Austria and Japan at both the intra(two-tailed p-values are 0.70 and 0.07, respectively) and international (two-tailed p-values are 0.24

12

returns to Japanese groups than those to Austrian groups. Japanese groups, however,
do not entertain such expectations for Austrian groups. Second, the Individualism
score in the international experiment is significantly higher in Japan than in Austriain t-test, although this result is inconsistent with Hofsted’s (2009) findings. However,the score does not significantly differ between the countries in the intranational
experiment. Third, both indices of Trust in others and Trust in yourself in the intraand international experiments are significantly higher in Austria than in Japan in botht-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This is consistent with the result of the World
Value Survey. Fourth, cultural trust is significantly higher in Japan than in Austria inboth t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
In the following paragraphs, we first focus on the relationship between trust and theabove variables and then explore the relation between reciprocity and the variables.
-------------------------------Table 8 is around here.
-------------------------------4.2 Trust and group characteristics
To begin with, we examine national identity in each experiment. Table 9summarizes the results of Tobit regressions of relative transfers on three kinds ofvariables: My return variables, expectations, and demographic variables. A model isincrementally built from columns (1) to (7) with important demographic variables,
the individualism index, and trust indices. Four results are important.
First, JPN is not significant in both experiments, except for columns (2) and(3) in the international experiment. Therefore, we support no significant difference
between the two countries in both intra- and international trust levels, as with theresults of non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests in the previous section. That is,
our last results of non-cultural difference in intra- and international trust are robust.
Second, My return is significantly positive but My return·JPN is not
significant in the international experiment. International reciprocity enhancesinternational trust, and there is no significant difference between the two countries inthis relationship. In the intranational experiment, although My return is not
significant, My return·JPN is significantly negative in all regressions. Thus, theintranational reciprocity in Austria enhances their intranational trust more than that inJapan does.
Third, Expected return is significantly positive in both the intra- andinternational experiments. In both countries, higher expectations of reciprocity
enhance both intra- and international trust. However, since Expected return·JPN issignificantly positive only in the international experiment, Japanese expectations ofinternational reciprocity enhance their international trust more than Austrian
expectations do. Expected transfers, however, have no significant effect in bothexperiments. Trust behavior has a linkage with the expected return in the same partof the experiment but not with the expected transfer in the other part.
and 0.45, respectively) levels. Also, the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of
no difference in the distribution of expected returns between the first- and second-order trustee inAustria and Japan at both the intra- (two-tailed p-values are 0.57 and 0.12, respectively) andinternational (two-tailed p-values are 0.51 and 0.12, respectively) levels.

13

Fourth, Females is significantly negative in the international experiment.
Increasing the number of females in the group reduces international trust. As
Female·JPN suggests no significance, there is no significant difference in this effectbetween the two countries. Trust in yourself·JPN is significantly negative in theinternational experiment. In Japan, the scale of Trust in yourself has a negative effecton their international trust. Other demographic variables, the individual index, andtrust indices do not have significant effects on their trust behavior.
-------------------------------Table 9 is around here.
-------------------------------Next, we examine whether foreign interacting groups affect trust behavior ineach country. Table 10 summarizes the results of Tobit regressions of relativetransfers on three kinds of variables: My return variable, expectations, anddemographic variables. A model is incrementally built from columns (1) to (6) with
important demographic variables, individualism index, and trust indices. Four results
are important.
First, INTER is not significant in Japan and Austria, except for columns (2)and (3) in Austria. This result supports the view that intra- and international trust are
identical across the two countries as suggested by non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum tests in the previous section. That is, no difference between intra- andinternational trust is robust.
Second, Expected transfer is significantly positive in Japan but is not
significant in Austria. In Japan, expectations of transfer enhance trust. Additionally,
Expected return exhibits significantly positive values in both countries. In bothcountries, expectations of return enhance their trust. Both expected variables,
however, do not show significant differences between intra- and international
experiments in each country.
Third, Female·INTER exhibits a significantly negative value in Austria but
not in Japan. In Austria, a larger number of females reduces international trust levels
more than the intranational. As suggested in Table 9, Female robustly reduces
international trust.
Fourth, Leadership is significantly negative in all regressions in Japan.
However, Leadership·INTER is not significant in Japan. Japanese reduce their trust if
the leadership of group members increases. Additionally, since Family income has asignificant negative value in Austria, Family income enhances Austrian trust.
However, there is no significant difference between intra- and international
experiments. Other demographic variables do not exhibit significant values, andsome trust indices have a marginal effect.
-------------------------------Table10 is around here.
--------------------------------

14

4.3 Reciprocity and group characteristics
To begin with, we examine cultural difference in each experiment. Table 11
summarizes the results of Tobit regressions of relative returns on possibilities oftransfers and three kinds of variables: My transfer variables, expectations, anddemographic variables. A model is incrementally built from columns (1) to (7) with
important demographic variables, individualism index, and trust indices. Four results
are important.
First, Transfer·JPN is significantly negative, most at the 10% level, in all
regressions in the intranational experiment. This result is not consistent with Table 6.
Table 6 does not include Transfer·2nd·JPN. Here, this variable, however, exhibits asignificantly positive value at the 1% level in the intranational experiment. This
result is the same as in Table 5. It is robustly shown that the Japanese playing trustee
second display higher intranational reciprocity than other groups. Thus, Transfer·JPN
in the intranational experiment in Table 6 may be a misspecification. We employ the
result in this section and conclude that the Japanese display less intranational
reciprocity than the Austrians do. On the other hand, the significance of Transfer·JPN
in the international experiment is weaker than that in Table 6. However, the values
are similar to those in Table 6. In the international experiment, other variables added
weaken the effect of Transfer·JPN.
Second, in the international experiment, My transfer displays significantly
positive values, and My transfer·JPN significantly negative values. In both Austria
and Japan, international trust behavior enhances their own international reciprocity,
but this effect is weaker in Japan than Austria.
Third, in the intranational experiment, Expected transfer displays
significantly positive values, but there is no significant difference in this effectbetween the two countries. Expected return, however, does not display significant
values in both experiments. Similar to trust behavior, reciprocity is dependent on the
expected transfer in the same part of the experiment but is independent of the
expected return in the other part. Since Expected return·JPN in the international
experiment is marginally significant and positive, Japanese expectations ofinternational reciprocity enhance their international trust slightly more than Austrian
expectations do.
Fourth, Parents’ education weakly increases reciprocity in the international
experiment, but its effect is weaker in Japan than Austria. Additionally, Economics issignificantly positive in the international experiment. Increasing the number of
economics students in the group enhances reciprocity. In the intranational
experiment, on the other hand, Family income, Individualism, and General fairness
enhance reciprocity.
-------------------------------Table 11 is around here.
-------------------------------Next, we examine whether foreign interacting groups affect reciprocity
behavior in each country. Table 12 summarizes the results of Tobit regressions ofrelative returns on possibilities of transfers and three kinds of variables: My transfer
variables, expectations, and demographic variables. A model is incrementally built

15

from columns (1) to (6) with important demographic variables, the individualism
index, and trust indices. Four results are important.
First, in Austria, 2nd·INTER displays significantly negative values. Austrians
playing trustee second reduce international reciprocity more than the intranational
type when their interacting group’s transfer is zero.
Second, in Austria, My transfer does not display significant values, but My
transfer·INTER shows significantly positive values. In Austrian, the international
trust enhances their reciprocity more than the intranational trust does.
Third, Expected transfer displays significantly positive values in bothcountries but Expected return does not. Reciprocity is dependent on the expectedtransfer in the same part of the experiment but is independent of the expected returnin the other part. Additionally, since Expected transfer·INTER in Japan exhibits
negative values, Japanese expectation of transfers enhances international reciprocity
less than it does the intranational type.
Fourth, Economics exhibits significantly positive values in both countries.
Increasing the number of economics students in the group enhances reciprocity inboth countries. Additionally, in Japan, Family income, Individualism, and the index
of Trust in yourself enhance reciprocity.
-------------------------------Table 12 is around here.
--------------------------------

5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we explores national identity in trust and reciprocity at the intraand international levels by adopting a modified trust game played among groups
from Austria and Japan, in which subjects play the roles of trustor and trustee
consecutively without any information feedback. Our first primary results are as
follows.
Trust: There is no significant difference in both intra- and international trustlevels between two countries. Further, there is no difference between intra- andinternational trust levels in each country.
Reciprocity: The intranational reciprocity in Austria is higher than in Japan,
but there is no significant difference in international reciprocity between the twocountries. The Japanese playing trustee second display higher intranational
reciprocity than other groups. Austrians playing trustee second show lessinternational reciprocity than intranational type if their transfer receipts are zero.
The results of Cox (2002) and that of Kugler et al. (2007) suggest that
individual norms are not always consistent with the group norm. Our results areinconsistent with the original study of Netzer and Sutter (2009), who find that theAustrians exhibit greater trust toward the Japanese and the Japanese reciprocate lesstoward the Austrians. While Netzer and Sutter find that the Japanese display less ingroup favoritism in trust, Takahashi et al. (2008) observe that the Japanese also
display less in-group favoritism in both trust and reciprocity. Our findings aredifferent from these studies, and show that the Japanese groups display less in-groupfavoritism only in the intranational reciprocity.

16

Apart from the trust game, non-cultural differences in trust behavior of our
subjects support some previous studies comparing Western and Japanese norms.
Brandts et al. (2004) find no significant differences in public good contributions
among the US, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain. Further, Okada and Riedl (1999)
find no significant differences in terms of offers, by employing a variation of theultimatum game between Austrians and Japanese. Konow et al. (2009) find nodifference in the preference of allocation in the dictator game in US and Japan. Our
results are, however, different from Roth et al. (1991), who find that offers in theultimatum game are higher in the US and Slovenia than in Japan and Israel.
Second, while Buchan et al. (2002) find that a low level of trust induces a low
level of reciprocity in Japan, we also find that international trust behavior enhancesinternational reciprocity and this effect is weaker in Japan than Austria. Additionally,
the intranational reciprocity in Austria enhances their intranational trust more thanthat in Japan does theirs. Further, in Austria, the international trust enhances thereciprocity more than the intranational trust does.
Third, in each country, at both intra- and international levels, expected returns
enhance trust. In Japan, expected transfers enhance trust. At the international level,
the expected returns in Japan enhance their trust more than those in Austria do.
However, in Japan, the expected transfer enhances international reciprocity less thanit does intranational reciprocity. The last result appears to be related to the fact that
the Japanese display less in-group favoritism in intranational reciprocity. In theseresults, the bottom line seems to be that trust and reciprocity are dependent on the
expected return and transfer, respectively, in the same part of the experiment but are
independent of the expected transfer and return, respectively, in the other part of theexperiment.
Fourth, regarding demographic characteristics, increasing the number offemales in the group reduces international trust. In Austria, this reduces international
trust more than it does intranational trust. These results are contrary to those of
Croson and Buchan (1999) and Buchan et al. (2008), who find that females increase
reciprocity in the individual trust game. In the group norm, the gender effect is not
negligible.
Additionally, the scale of trust in yourself reduces international trust in Japan.
Increasing members’ leadership reduces Japanese trust. Family income enhances
Austrian trust. Increasing the number of economics students in the group enhances
reciprocity. Family income, Individualism, and General fairness enhance
intranational reciprocity. Family income, Individualism, and the index of Trust in
yourself enhance Japanese reciprocity.
When one group trusts an interacting group, they face uncertainty of how
much their interacting groups send back. On the other hand, when they reciprocate
their interacting group’s investment, they do not face uncertainty because they canmake their decisions for all possible transfers from the interacting group, at least, inthe laboratory. Therefore, reciprocity displayed by the strategy method in thelaboratory can be regarded as the behavior undertaken in a no-risk environment.
Additionally, intranational reciprocity is expressed as a less risky behavior than theinternational type because subjects know their counter partner’s culture or national
identity. In this sense, our findings that trust and international reciprocity are
identical but intranational reciprocity differs across nationalities imply that less risky

17environments well expresses the national identity of group norms. That is,
intranational reciprocity in Japan is lower than in Austria.
This is the first step to international comparison of trust and reciprocity undergroup decisions. Our findings shed new light on economic theory from the viewpointof international trade, joint venture, M&A, technical support for foreign customers,
etc. Our study has an important implication in terms of its contribution toward
comparative analyses of group norms not only between the EU and Japan but, in alarger sense, between individualism and collectivism as well.
Acknowledgments This research was financially supported by the Austrian Science Foundation(FWF project No. P16617), the University of Innsbruck, and the Japanese Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (the COE program of Behavioral Macrodynamics based on
Surveys and Experiments and the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas). We also
wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Akihiko Matsui, Martin Kocher, Kazuo Ogawa,
Matthias Sutter, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Toshio Yamagishi and the participants at the sessions of the 2006
World Meeting of Economic Science Association in Rome and 2009 European Meeting of Economic
Science Association in Innsbruck. Further, we thank Keiko Aoki, Stefan Haigner, Atsushi Hirata,
Wolfgang Luhan, Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi, Florian Oswald, and Florian Wakolbinger for their assistanceprovided in conducting the experiment.

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20Appendix: Definitions of variables
Table A1 summarizes the definitions of variables created from responses tosurvey questions. Age, Leadership, and Cultural trust are average values of answers
by three subjects in each group. Trust in others and Trust in yourself are index
variables created from questions 15–24 and 16–30, respectively, in the following
manner. First, we summarize the answers of each subject to questions 15–24 forTrust in others and questions 16–30 for Trust in yourself and normalize therespective summations to the average of all subjects. Then, we calculate the averagesof the normalized summations in each group for each variable. The total number ofanswers in each group is taken as 1.
Table A1. Definitions of variables
Variable
Question/Description
AnswerAge
AgeFemaleGender
1: female; 0: male
Economics
Major
1: economics; 0: others
1. About how many other
Friends
participants in this room do you
know?
Travel to
2. Have you ever been to
1: yes; 0: noEurope/Asia
Europe/Asia?
Travel to
3. Have you ever been to
1: yes; 0: noAustria/Japan
Austria/Japan?
Living in a foreign 4. Have you ever lived in a foreign
1: yes; 0: nocountry
country (at least 6 months)?
5. Did your parents graduate from 1: yes in both father andParents’ education
University?
mother; 0: others
6. Where did you grow up? (IfGrowing up in anecessary, please check more than 1: foreign country; 0: others
foreign country
one answer with a cross.)
7. Compared to other Japanesefamilies in general, would you say
Family income
1: below average; 0: others
your family income at the age of 16
was roughly
8. Generally, do you prefer to makeIndividualism
1: myself; 0: teamdecisions by yourself or as a team?
9. How large was your role in
1: very small; 2: small; 3:
Leadershipmaking the team decisions?
normal; 4: big; 5: very big
10. Were your team decisions madeVoting1: yes; 0: noby vote?
12. Did all members of your teamConsensus
1: yes; 0: nohave an equal say in the final
decision?
13. Do you think most people
0: take advantage of you if
General fairness
would try tothey got a chance; 1: be fair
14. Do you think most people can 0: generally no; 1: generally
General trust
be trusted?
yes21

1: strongly disagree
to5: strongly agree
Questions 22 and 23
5: strongly disagree
toNormalized summation of
1: strongly agree
Trust in yourself
questions 25–30
Others
1: strongly disagree
to5: strongly agree
1: nearest to your own
31. Which culture do you trust
country
Cultural trustmore?
to
5: farthest from your country
Note: Travel to Europe (Asia), Travel to Austria (Japan) and Cultural trust are asked
only in the international experiment. Travel to Europe (Asia) is the question forJapanese (Austrians). Travel to Austria (Japan) is the question for the Japanese(Austrians).
Trust in others

Normalized summation ofquestions 15–24

22

Table 1. Experimental design
NumberExperiment Treatmentofsessions
Intranational
AA
4
JJ
4
International
AJ
4
JA
4

Team A
1st: trustor
2nd: trustee
Austrian groups
Japanese groups
Austrian groups
Japanese groups

Team B
1st: trustee
2nd: trustor
Austrian groups
Japanese groups
Japanese groups
Austrian groups

Number ofteams ineach role
18
18
18
18

Table 2. Statistical results of relative transfers, returns, and payments
The intranational experiment The international experiment
AustriaJapan
AustriaJapan
Relative transfers
1st trustor 0.67 (0.09)
0.73 (0.08) 0.77 (0.06)
0.76 (0.07)
2nd trustor 0.44 (0.10)
0.51 (0.10) 0.58 (0.10)
0.54 (0.09)
Pooled data 0.56 (0.07)
0.62 (0.07) 0.68 (0.06)
0.65 (0.06)
Relative returns
1st trustee 0.18 (0.05)
0.10 (0.04) 0.25 (0.05)
0.29 (0.04)
2nd trustee 0.14 (0.05)
0.16 (0.05) 0.17 (0.05)
0.20 (0.05)
Pooled data 0.16 (0.03)
0.13 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03)
0.24 (0.03)
Payments
16.19 (0.71)
18.11 (0.94) 16.70 (0.56) 16.40 (0.60)
Total number of teams
36
36
36
36
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Expected transfers and expected returns arecalculated as relative values to the interacting group’s holdings.
Table 3. Results of Tobit regressions for pooled data
The intranational experiment The international experiment
AustriaJapan
Austria
Japan
Intercept−0.11**−0.12**−0.09*−0.02(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.03)
Transfer
0.34***
0.34***
0.35***
0.39***(0.03)(0.04)(0.02)(0.03)
2
R
0.17
0.14
0.16
0.32
No. of obs.
396
396
396
396
# Left-censored
179
188
172
117
# Right-censored 0000Note: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 36 clusters for a total of 396
subjects. R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** denotesignificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

1

Table 4. Results of Tobit regressions for each order
Experiment
The intranational experiment The international experiment
Country
AustriaJapan
AustriaJapan
Order of playing trustee 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Intercept−0.04 −0.18* −0.11 −0.13* −0.02 −0.17* −0.06 0.02
−0.05 −0.08 −0.08 −0.06 −0.06 −0.08 −0.05 −0.04
Transfer
0.32***0.37***0.22**0.43***0.30***0.41*** 0.40*** 0.39***−0.04 −0.03 −0.07 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03
Adjusted R2
0.21
0.15
0.07 0.23
0.15
0.18
0.34
0.33
No. of obs.
198
198
198 198
198
198
198
198
# Left-censored73
106
105 83
72
96
68
49# Right-censored
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 18 clusters for a total of 198
subjects. Adjusted R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5. Results of dummy test for order effects
The intranational experiment The international experiment
AustriaJapan
Austria
Japan
Intercept
−0.06
−0.09
−0.03
−0.06
(0.05)(0.06)(0.06)(0.05)
Transfer
0.34***
0.21**
0.30***
0.40***(0.05)(0.07)(0.03)(0.04)
2nd
−0.09
−0.07
−0.13
0.08
(0.06)(0.07)(0.07)(0.05)
Transfer·2nd
0.01
0.25**
0.10−0.01(0.07)(0.08)(0.06)(0.06)
2
Adjusted R
0.19
0.16
0.17
0.35
No. of obs.
396
396
396
396
# Left-censored 179
188
172
117
# Right-censored 0000Note: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 36 clusters for a total of 396
subjects. Adjusted R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

2

Table 6. Results of dummy test for Austria vs. Japan in each experiment
The international
The intranational experimentexperiment
Austria vs. Austria vs. Austria vs.
Austria vs. Japan
1st Japan
2nd Japan Pooled Japan
Intercept−0.11***−0.10**−0.12***−0.07*(0.04)(0.04)(0.04)(0.04)
Transfer
0.34***
0.35***
0.35***
0.33***(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.02)
JPN
−0.04
0.03
0.00
0.03
(0.05)(0.06)(0.05)(0.04)
Transfer·JPN
0.10*−0.14*−0.02
0.08**(0.06)(0.07)(0.06)(0.04)
0.20
0.14
0.16
0.25
R2
No. of obs.
594
594
792
792
# Left-censored
262
284
367
289
# Right-censored 0000Note: 1st (2nd) Japan is the Japanese groups playing trustee first (second) Standard
errors in parentheses are adjusted for 72 clusters for a total of 792 subjects. R2
indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 7. Result of dummy test for the intra- vs. international experiments in eachcountry
AustriaJapan
Intra- vs.
1st intra- vs. 2nd intra- vs. Pooled intra- vs.
International International International International
Intercept−0.11***−0.11**−0.06−0.09**(0.04)(0.05)(0.05)(0.04)
Transfer
0.35***
0.41***
0.20***
0.31***(0.03)(0.04)(0.06)(0.04)
INTER
0.03
0.08*
0.03
0.06
(0.05)(0.05)(0.05)(0.04)
Transfer·INTER
0.00
−0.01
0.21***
0.10*(0.04)(0.05)(0.07)(0.05)
2
R
0.17
0.31
0.29
0.26
No. of obs.
792
594
594
792
# Left-censored
351
200
222
305
# Right-censored0000Note: 1st (2nd) intra- is the Japanese groups playing trustee first (second) in theintranational experiment. The standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 72
clusters for a total of 792 subjects. R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **,and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

3

Table 8. Summary statistics of survey results for each group
Statistical summary
The intranational
experiment
Variable
My transfer
My returnExpected transfer
Expected return
Age
FemaleEconomics
FriendAustriaJapan

Compared test
The intranational The international
Japan
Austria
The international
experimentexperimentexperimentIntra- vs.
Intra- vs.
Austria vs. Japan Austria vs. Japan
International
International
W. rankW. rankW. rankW. rankAustria Japant-testt-testt-testt-testsum test
sum test
sum test
sum test

0.56

0.62

0.68

0.65

(0.07)(0.07)(0.06)(0.06)

0.20

0.22

0.24

0.30

(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)

0.41

0.48

0.65

0.55

(0.06)(0.06)(0.05)(0.05)

0.25

0.29

0.35

0.33

(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)(0.03)

22.74

21.40

22.65

21.24

(0.25)(0.18)(0.26)(0.25)

1.53

0.94

1.64

0.50

(0.17)(0.13)(0.14)(0.09)

0.22

0.28

0.08

0.25

(0.07)(0.09)(0.05)(0.07)

0.85

0.57

0.47

0.54

(0.12)(0.12)(0.13)(0.07)

Travel to Europe (Asia) 0.00

0.00

0.75

0.50

0.00

0.00

(0.13)(0.11)

Travel to Austria (Japan) 0.00

0.00

0.06

0.17

0.00

0.00

(0.04)(0.06)

1.39

0.11

1.06

0.06

(0.16)(0.05)(0.13)(0.04)

Living in a foreigncountry
Parents’ education

0.50

1.14

0.28

1.28

(0.10)(0.16)(0.08)(0.15)

0.00

0.53

0.00

0.00

(0.13)

0.00

Growing up in a foreign
0.75
country(0.12)
Family income
Individualism
Leadership
Vote
Consensus
General fairness
General trust
Trust in others
Trust in yourself
Cultural trust

1.17

0.81

0.81

1.11

(0.12)(0.11)(0.12)(0.17)

0.97

1.03

0.82

1.17

(0.10)(0.11)(0.11)(0.10)

3.79

3.05

3.64

3.05

(0.06)(0.08)(0.07)(0.06)

2.03

1.75

2.08

1.69

(0.16)(0.17)(0.15)(0.15)

2.97

2.47

2.89

2.53

(0.03)(0.12)(0.07)(0.12)

1.61

1.86

1.50

1.42

(0.17)(0.16)(0.17)(0.14)

1.36

1.39

1.11

1.31

(0.16)(0.13)(0.15)(0.15)

1.02

0.97

1.05

0.96

(0.02)(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)

1.05

0.95

1.04

0.96

(0.01)(0.01)(0.01)(0.02)

NA

NA

0.81

1.19

(0.03)(0.03)

*

***

***

***

***

**

***

***

***

*

*

*

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

**

**

***

***

***

***

***

**

**

*

**

***

**

***

***

*

**
**

**

***

***

*

*

***

***

*

**

4

***

***

**

***

***

**

***

**

**

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

**

**

Note: W. rank-sum test is short for Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The standard errors arein parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

5

Table 9. Survey analysis on trust for Austria vs. Japan in each experiment
The intranational experiment
The international experiment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Intercept
0.56*** −0.34** −0.45* −0.20 −0.11 −1.62 0.76***0.14
0.46*** 0.18
0.12
−1.36
−1.08
(0.16) (0.17) (0.26) (1.06) (1.02) (1.69) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.43) (0.42) (0.95) (0.98)
JPN
0.25−0.14 −0.01 1.31
0.82
2.21
0.02
−0.61***−0.93***−0.30
−0.39
1.93
2.06
(0.23) (0.25) (0.31) (1.21) (1.20) (2.36) (0.15) (0.22) (0.25) (0.63) (0.62) (1.32) (1.36)
My return
0.89
0.76
0.89
0.84
0.78
1.66*** 1.65*** 1.64*** 1.63*** 1.54*** 1.52***(0.59) (0.61) (0.61) (0.59) (0.57)(0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30)
My return·JPN−1.88** −1.70* −1.67* −1.47* −1.91**
−0.94
−0.62
−0.75
−0.53
0.05
0.36
(0.91) (0.92) (0.88) (0.86) (0.93)(0.57) (0.54) (0.56) (0.57) (0.65) (0.68)
Expected transfer
0.52
0.46
0.33
0.33
0.30
−0.11
−0.13
−0.15
−0.18
−0.19
−0.07
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32)(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22)
Expected transfer·JPN
0.42
0.42
0.62
0.60
0.74
0.19
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.29
0.04
(0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.59)(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32)
Expected return
2.03*** 2.10*** 2.11***2.05***2.19***0.75** 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.92***(0.57) (0.64) (0.61) (0.59) (0.62)(0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26)
Expected return·JPN
1.56
1.71
1.87* 1.96* 2.10*
2.09*** 1.72** 1.91*** 1.84** 1.34*
1.37**(0.98) (1.03) (1.03) (1.02) (1.14)(0.69) (0.67) (0.71) (0.70) (0.68) (0.68)
Female
0.05
0.07
0.10
0.09
−0.19***−0.18*** −0.18*** −0.19***−0.23***(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Female·JPN−0.16 −0.20 −0.18 −0.22
0.11
0.15
0.11
0.09
0.10
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19)(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Economics
0.11
0.18
0.17
0.15
−0.14
−0.11
−0.15
−0.19* −0.22**(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Parents’ education−0.08 −0.07 −0.14 −0.16
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
−0.03
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Parents’ education·JPN
0.05
0.06
0.12
0.20
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.15
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Family income
0.07
0.13
0.14
0.16
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Individualism−0.10 −0.08 −0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
−0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Leadership−0.06 −0.13 −0.12
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.02
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27)(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Leadership·JPN−0.47 −0.36 −0.37
−0.20
−0.18
−0.20
−0.16
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34)(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
General fairness−0.02 0.02
0.06
0.08*
0.10**(0.07) (0.08)(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
General trust
0.12
0.16
−0.03
−0.03
−0.05
(0.09) (0.10)(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trust in others
0.37
0.43
0.52
(0.88)(0.69) (0.70)
Trust in others·JPN
−2.10
−0.18
0.01
(1.43)(1.11) (1.13)
Trust in yourself
0.92
1.03*
0.79
(1.05)(0.57) (0.57)
Trust in yourself·JPN
0.80−2.14** −2.50**(1.72)(0.99) (1.01)
Cultural trust
0.17(0.31)
Cultural trust·JPN−0.19(0.48)
Travel to Europe (Asia)−0.11*(0.06)
R2
0.01
0.72
0.72
0.74
0.75
0.76
0.00
0.72
0.76
0.77
0.78
0.80
0.81
No. of obs.
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
# Left-censored
17
17
17
17
17
17
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
# Right-censored
26
26
26
26
26
26
25
25
25
25
25
25
25

Note: The standard errors are in parentheses. R2 indicates the results of OLS
regression. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

6

Table 10. Survey analysis of trust behavior for intra- vs. international experiments ineach country
Japan
Austria
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Intercept
0.79*** −0.37** −0.23 0.95** 0.66
0.75
0.56***−0.28* −0.43* 0.03
0.06
−1.37
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.42) (0.48) (1.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.91) (0.89) (1.40)
INTER
0.04
−0.15 −0.25 −0.92−0.63 −0.09 0.21
0.38* 0.85*** 0.18
0.07
−0.81
(0.20) (0.25) (0.27) (0.68) (0.72) (1.61) (0.17) (0.22) (0.30) (1.04) (1.03) (1.75)
My return−0.85 −0.64 −0.50−0.47 −0.88
0.82
0.61
0.58
0.52
0.48
(0.54) (0.54) (0.52) (0.53) (0.57)(0.51) (0.48) (0.52) (0.51) (0.48)
My return·INTER
1.61** 1.49* 1.03
0.99
1.92**
0.99
1.01
1.05
1.13* 1.07*(0.77) (0.78) (0.75) (0.79) (0.93)(0.64) (0.61) (0.64) (0.64) (0.60)
Expected transfer
0.83** 0.76** 0.78** 0.79** 0.87**
0.48
0.48* 0.48
0.48* 0.43
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.39)(0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27)
Expected transfer·INTER−0.73 −0.60 −0.74−0.71 −0.74−0.59 −0.69* −0.68 −0.66 −0.60(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48)(0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.38)
Expected return
3.18*** 3.15***3.20*** 3.26*** 3.31***
1.91***1.79*** 1.72*** 1.76*** 1.93***(0.66) (0.63) (0.64) (0.66) (0.72)(0.49) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51)
Expected return·INTER−0.22 −0.44 −0.04−0.13 −0.63−1.09* −0.85 −0.79 −0.91 −0.93(0.95) (0.93) (0.91) (0.90) (0.92)(0.59) (0.59) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60)
Female−0.11 −0.11−0.08 −0.14
0.07
0.08
0.07
0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Female·INTER
0.03
0.10
0.06
0.07
−0.29** −0.29** −0.29**−0.33**(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Economics
0.02
0.08
0.11
0.05
−0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.10(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Parents’ education
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.08
−0.13 −0.15 −0.18 −0.22*(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Parents’ education·INTER
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.10
0.13
0.15
0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Family income−0.05 −0.01−0.02 −0.05
0.14* 0.15* 0.16** 0.19**(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Individualism−0.08−0.08 −0.09
0.03
0.03
0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Leadership−0.40***−0.37**−0.35**−0.12 −0.16 −0.15(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)(0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Leadership·JPN
0.25
0.17
0.15
0.17
0.20
0.15
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24)(0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
General fairness
0.03
0.06
0.05
0.08
(0.05) (0.05)(0.06) (0.06)
General trust
0.07
0.05
0.02
0.07
(0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.07)
Trust in others−1.45*
0.05(0.78)(0.73)
Trust in others·INTER
1.94
0.89
(1.38)(0.98)
Trust in yourself
1.38
1.17
(0.95)(0.89)
Trust in yourself·INTER−2.55*
0.20(1.38)(1.15)
R2
0.00
0.76
0.77
0.79
0.80
0.81
0.03
0.68
0.72
0.73
0.73
0.75
No. of obs.
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
72
# Left-censored
11
11
11
11
11
11
15
15
15
15
15
15
# Right-censored
30
30
30
30
30
30
21
21
21
21
21
21

Note: The standard errors are in parentheses. R2 indicates the results of OLS
regression. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.

7

Table 11. Survey analysis on reciprocity for Austria vs. Japan in each experiment
The intranational experiment
The international experiment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Intercept−0.11***−0.28*** −0.35***−0.39 −0.36 −0.57 −0.06* −0.44***−0.53*** −0.54* −0.53* −0.24−0.10(0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.36) (0.36) (0.51) (0.04) (0.10) (0.13) (0.31) (0.31) (0.51) (0.53)
Transfer
0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.33***0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33***(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
JPN
0.03
0.09
0.07
−0.11 −0.31 −0.66 −0.01 0.26** 0.38*** 0.55
0.59
−0.63
−0.41
(0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.40) (0.42) (0.66) (0.05) (0.12) (0.15) (0.39) (0.39) (0.57) (0.67)
Transfer·JPN−0.14* −0.15** −0.14* −0.14**−0.15**−0.14* 0.09* 0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
2nd·JPN−0.07−0.13* −0.10−0.16**−0.15**−0.14**0.09* 0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Transfer·2nd·JPN
0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** −0.02 −0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
My transfer
0.03
−0.05
−0.05 −0.09 −0.08
0.50*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.46***(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
My transfer·JPN
−0.13
0.01
−0.01 0.04
−0.01
−0.65***−0.54** −0.56*** −0.56***−0.59***−0.53***(0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)(0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Expected transfer
0.41*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.33**
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.22
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Expected transfer·JPN
−0.04
0.03
0.14
0.14
0.16
−0.11
−0.24
−0.22
−0.22
−0.24
−0.25
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)(0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18)
Expected return
−0.06
0.10
0.02
0.15
0.24
−0.27
−0.19
−0.19
−0.20
−0.31* −0.29(0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31)(0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.19)
Expected return·JPN
0.23
−0.04
−0.02 −0.13 −0.33
0.87*
0.74*
0.76** 0.67*
0.66*
0.59*
(0.47) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.47)(0.46) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.34) (0.35)
Female
0.02
0.02
0.00
−0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Female·JPN
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.10
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Economics
0.06*
0.06
0.08** 0.05
0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.14***(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Parents’ education−0.05−0.07 −0.09 −0.10**
0.10*
0.11*
0.10*
0.10*
0.10*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Parents’ education·JPN
−0.01
0.02
0.03
0.08
−0.16** −0.17** −0.16** −0.18***−0.17***(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Family income
0.07** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08***
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individualism
0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12***
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Leadership−0.01 −0.04 −0.03
−0.01
0.00
0.00
−0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Leadership·JPN
0.05
0.08
0.05
−0.06
−0.07
−0.02
−0.03
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10)(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
General fairness
0.05** 0.04*
−0.03
−0.03
−0.03
(0.02) (0.02)(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
General trust
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.02
(0.03) (0.03)(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trust in others
−0.35
−0.10
0.02
(0.32)(0.38) (0.40)
Trust in others·JPN
0.18
0.23
0.23
(0.43)(0.54) (0.56)
Trust in yourself
0.53
−0.18
−0.19
(0.55)(0.33) (0.32)
Trust in yourself·JPN
0.39
0.92*
0.75
(0.65)(0.47) (0.46)
Cultural trust−0.14(0.21)
Cultural trust·JPN−0.02(0.26)
Travel to Europe (Asia)−0.04(0.03)
R2
0.17
0.42
0.48
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.27
0.44
0.51
0.52
0.54
0.58
0.59
No. of obs.
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
# Left-censored
367
367
367
367
367
367
289
289
289
289
289
289
289
# Right-censored
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8

Note: The standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 72 clusters for a total of 792
subjects. R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

9Table 12. Survey analysis of reciprocity behavior in intra- vs. international
experiments in each country
Japan
Austria
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Intercept−0.09** −0.25*** −0.30***−0.50***−0.46***−0.94** −0.11***−0.26*** −0.30*** −0.53 −0.51 −0.53(0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.41) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52)
Transfer
0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.34***(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
INTER
0.01
0.06
0.13
0.45
0.41
−0.19
0.09
−0.09
−0.11
0.21
0.17
0.32
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.28) (0.30) (0.53) (0.05) (0.12) (0.17) (0.47) (0.48) (0.69)
Transfer·INTER
0.11* 0.10*
0.09*
0.09
0.09
0.08
−0.05
−0.02
−0.02
−0.02 −0.02 −0.02(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
2nd·INTER
0.09* 0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.05
−0.13* −0.15** −0.14** −0.15**−0.16**−0.16**(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Transfer·2nd·INTER−0.02 −0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
0.10*
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
My transfer
−0.10
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.09
0.03
−0.02
−0.01 −0.05 −0.05(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
My transfer·INTER
−0.05
−0.03
−0.04
−0.05
0.03
0.54*** 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.61***(0.26) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19)(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
Expected transfer
0.36*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.40***
0.40*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.32**(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Expected transfer·INTER−0.29−0.39** −0.39** −0.40** −0.41***−0.30* −0.21−0.22 −0.24 −0.21(0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15)(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Expected return
0.18
0.07
−0.01
−0.03
0.00
−0.05
0.11
0.09
0.20
0.27
(0.34) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33)(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31)
Expected return·INTER
0.42
0.45
0.52
0.54
0.35
−0.22
−0.31
−0.29 −0.54 −0.55(0.55) (0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.42)(0.36) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39)
Female
0.06*
0.06*
0.06*
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.00
−0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Female·INTER
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.05
−0.01
−0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Economics
0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07**
0.09*
0.10* 0.11** 0.10*(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Parents’ education−0.05** −0.05* −0.05* −0.03−0.02−0.03 −0.04 −0.05(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Parents’ education·INTER
−0.01
−0.02
−0.02
−0.07
0.10
0.13
0.15* 0.16*(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Family income
0.04*
0.04** 0.05** 0.05**
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Individualism
0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
0.05
0.06
0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Leadership
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Leadership·JPN
−0.11
−0.10
−0.04
−0.09 −0.07 −0.08(0.09) (0.10) (0.10)(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
General fairness
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.01
(0.02) (0.02)(0.02) (0.03)
General trust
−0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
(0.02) (0.02)(0.03) (0.03)
Trust in others
−0.30
−0.33
(0.28)(0.32)
Trust in others·INTER
0.37
0.19
(0.54)(0.45)
Trust in yourself
0.79**
0.32(0.39)(0.60)
Trust in yourself·INTER
0.12
−0.32
(0.55)(0.67)
R2
0.28
0.40
0.49
0.52
0.52
0.57
0.18
0.46
0.53
0.54
0.54
0.54
No. of obs.
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
792
# Left-censored
305
305
305
305
305
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
# Right-censored
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Note: The standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for 72 clusters for a total of 792
subjects. R2 indicates the results of OLS regression. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

10Fig. 1 Relative transfers across countries(a) The intranational experiment(b) The international experiment

16
15
14
13

Number of observations

12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0

.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .91

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9Austria1

Japan

Fig. 2 Relative returns across countries(a) The intranational experiment(b) The international experiment.6.5

Relative returns

.4
.3
.2
.1
0
-.1
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

Relative transfers
AustriaJapan

Tobit regression line for Austria

Tobit regression line for Japan

1

.9

1

Supplementary Material for“Trust and reciprocity among international groups:
Experimental evidence from Austria and Japan”
This supplementary material has three sections. Section 1 provides instructions in theinternational experiment. Section 2 contains decision sheets in Teams A and B, andSection 3 provides post-experimental survey in the international experiment.

1. Instructions in the international experiment
Experimental instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. During this experiment
we ask you and the other participants to make decisions and to fill out a questionnaire.
Please do not talk to anyone except of your team members during the experiment.
Communication between teams will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and theforfeit of all monetary earnings.
For identification purposes your team has received an ID card with a number on it. The ID
card is your identity during the course of this experiment. Your decisions in the experimentand the data from the questionnaire will be used for scientific purposes only.
Participants in this experiment are from 2 universities in different countries: Students of
the University of Osaka in Japan and the University of Innsbruck in Austria (Europe) willplay the experiment simultaneously over the internet.
No participants at any university will see any decisions by the other participants before
they make their own decisions.
The experiment consists of two parts that are independent from each other.
You will receive the earnings from either part one or part two of the experiment. Whichpart is going to be taken for the calculation of your earnings, will be determined after thesecond part of the experiment by a random mechanism programmed at the computer.
Your earnings in this experiment will be in “tokens”. After the experiment tokens will be
converted into Yen (Euro) at an exchange rate of 1 token = 120 yen (80 euro cent).
Additionally to the earnings of the experiment you will be paid a showup fee of 500 yen(3,5 euro). At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand after we have finished reading the
instructions. A staff member will then come to you and answer your questions privately(this means in a low voice).

1

Part One:In this game, there are two roles: A and B.
You find yourself in a team with 2 other people. For the rest of the experiment the 3 of you
will make your decisions in this team. Teams in this and the other room are either in therole of A or B.
Please note that each team of this university will be paired with a team from the Universityof Innsbruck. More precisely, each team A in this room will be anonymously matched witha team B of the University of Innsbruck and each team B in this room will be anonymously
paired with a team A of the University of Innsbruck.
During and after the game you will not be told with which team you have been paired andthe other team will not be told that they have been matched with you.
At the beginning of the experiment, both teams A and B receive an initial endowment of
10 tokens. According to the exchange rate, the initial endowment of 10 tokens is worth
1200 yen (8 euro).

Team A has to decide how many tokens of their initial endowment to transfer to team B.
Any integer number of tokens between and including 0 and 10 tokens is feasible.
Team A keeps the number of tokens that team A does not send to team B.
The amount of tokens that team A sends to team B will be tripled. That means that team B
receives, additionally to its initial endowment of 10 tokens, three times the amount oftokens team A has sent.
The members of team B have to decide how much of this amount they would like to sendback to team A. Any integer number of tokens between and including 0 and the amountteam B owns at that time is feasible.
Please note: The amount team B sends back to team A will not be tripled. That is to say,team A will receive exactly the amount that team B returns to team A (in addition to what
team A has kept from his/her initial endowment).
Procedure:
Each team is given 10 minutes for its decision. We ask you to put your decisions into thecomputer but also to fill in your decisions on the decision sheet. The latter is used as a
backup in case the computer system crashes down.
Team A will have to write down/ fill in how much they want to send to team B.
Team B has to indicate how many tokens they want to send back to team A for eachpossible transfer from team A. In the end, only the decision that corresponds to the actual
amount that Team A sends will be taken for the calculation of the profits.
This will become clear to you when you check the following table:2

A sends to B

A’s current
profitB receives in
addition to
his/her
endowment

B’s current
account

10

0

10

0

10

10

1

9

3

13

10

2

8

6

16

10

3

7

9

19

10

4

6

12

22

10

5

5

15

25

10

6

4

18

28

10

7

3

21

31

10

8

2

24

34

10

9

1

27

37

10

10

0

30

40

A’s initialendowment

B sends backthe following
amountTeam B has to decide how many tokens it would like to send back for each possible
transfer from Team A. The amount that is taken for the calculation of the profits will be theone decision of team B that corresponds to the actual amount that team A sends.

Profits:

Team A:Team A will receive the amount kept for themselves out of their initial endowment, plus
the amount that has been sent back by team B. The amount of tokens that your team earns
will not be divided by three. Each member of the team receives the full amount of tokens
that it has earned with its decisions in the team!

Team B:
Members of Team B will receive their initial endowment plus the tripled amount that team
A has sent minus the amount which team B sends back to team A. The amount of tokens
that your team earns will not be divided by three. Each member of the team receives thefull amount of tokens that it has earned with its decisions in the team!

3

Part 2
Part 2, the same game will be played again but the teams will change their roles.
Those teams who have been in the role of A in part 1 will be in the role of B in part 2 andteams B of part 1 will be A now.
Again, your team will be anonymously paired with a team (A,B) from the University of
Innsbruck, Austria.

As a reminder:
Each team’s initial endowment is 10 tokens á 120 yen (80 euro cent).
Team A decides how many tokens they want to send to team B. Team B receives
additionally to their initial endowment of 10 tokens the tripled amount team A sends. TeamB has to decide how many tokens it would like to send back for each possible transfer fromTeam A. The amount that is taken for the calculation of the profits will be the one decisionof team B that corresponds to the actual amount that team A sends.
The amount Team B returns to Team A will not be tripled.
Each team is given 10 minutes for its decision. We ask you to put your decisions into thecomputer but also to fill in your decisions on the decision sheet. The latter is used as a
backup in case the computer system crashes down.
Profits:
Team A will receive the amount kept for themselves out of their initial endowment, plus
the amount that has been sent back by team B. The amount of tokens your team earns will
not be divided by three. Each member of the team receives the full amount of tokens thatyour team earns!
Members of team B will receive their initial endowment plus the tripled amount that team
A has sent minus the amount which they send back to A. The amount of tokens your teamearns will not be divided by three. Each member of the team receives the full amount oftokens that your team earns!
After all participants have made their decisions a random mechanism programmed at thecomputer will determine whether part 1 or part 2 will be paid out to you after theexperiment.

4

2. decision sheets in Teams A and B
Team ID number _______
Decision Sheet team A
This form serves as a security copy for your decisions made at the computer

Your team is in the role of A and will be paired with a team B from the University of
Innsbruck in Austria.
Please decide how many tokens out of your initial endowment your team would like tosend to team B. You will automatically keep the rest for yourself.

As a reminder:Your team’s initial endowment is 10 tokens.
Team B receives additionally to its initial endowment of 10 tokens the tripled amount ofwhat your team sends. Team B decides how many tokens they want to send back to yourteam. The amount that B sends back to you is not tripled.
Your team has 10 minutes to decide.

How many tokens would your team like to send to team B?
Only integer numbers are feasible {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}!

We would like to send ________tokens to team B in Innsbruck.

How many tokens do you think will team B send back to you?
Please note: Team B will not be informed about your expectation and your expectation
does not influence the calculation of your earnings.

We think that team B will return ________ tokens.

5Team ID number__________
Decision sheet team B
This form serves as a security copy for your decisions made at the computer

Your team is in the role of B and will be paired with a team A from the University of Innsbruck inAustria. You have 10 minutes to decide.
Please indicate how many tokens out of your current account you want to send back to team A.
Please fill in a number for each possible transfer from team A. In the end, only the decision that
corresponds to the actual amount that Team A sends will be taken for the calculation of the profits.
Please note that the amount your team sends back is not tripled and that this amount will be
deducted from your current account and determine your earnings from this part of the experiment.
Please fill in only integer numbers{0, 1, 2, 3, … 38, 39, 40}.

Initialendowment A

Team Asends you(x)Current
account teamA

You receive(3x)Your team’s
current account(including yourinitialendowment)

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30

10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
37
40

We would liketo send backthe following
amount oftokens to team
A in
Innsbruck

How many tokens do you think will team A send to your team?
Please note: Team A will not be informed about your expectation and your expectation does not
influence the calculation of your earnings.

We think that team A will send ________ tokens.

6

3. Post-experimental survey in the international experiment
About Yourself:
Age: ______

Gender:  m

fMajor: _________________
1.) About how many other participants in this room do you know?
2.) Have you ever been to Europe?  yes no3.) Have you ever been to Austria?  yes no______

4.) Have you ever lived in a foreign country (at least 6 months)?  yesno

The following questions concern your family:
5.) Did your parents graduate from University?
Father:  yes no;Mother:  yes no6) Where did you grow up? (If necessary, please check more than one answer with across.)
 Tokyo  cities designated by government ordinance  cities  district areas
 foreign country7) Thinking about your family income, compared with other Japanese families in general,
would you say your family income at the age of 16 was roughly Below average average
above average

About teams:
8.) Generally, do you prefer to make decisions by yourself or as a team?
 myself
 team9.) How large was your role in making the team decisions?
 very small
 small normal very big10.) Were your team decisions done by vote?
no



 yes

big



11.) If not, how did your team agree on its decisions?___________________________________________________________________________________________________

712.) Did all members of your team have an equal say in the final decision?
 yes
 no

About other people:
Circle only one response for each of the following questions.
13.) Do you think most people would try to Take advantage of you if they got a chance?

 Be fair?

14.) Do you think most people can be trusted?
 Generally no generally yes
Please indicate your level of agreement on the following statements15.) Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree16.) Most people are basically good& kind
Strongly disagree 






 strongly agree17.) Most people are trustful of others
Strongly disagree  strongly agree18.) Most people will respond in kind when they are trusted by others
Strongly disagree  strongly agree19.) People are always interested only in their own welfare
Strongly disagree  strongly agree20.) In this society one does not need to be constantly afraid of being cheated
Strongly disagree  strongly agree21.) To make money, there are no right and wrong ways any more, only easy and hard
ways.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree22.) These days you can’t count on strangers.
Strongly disagree 






 strongly agree23.) These days, a person doesn’t really know who he can count on.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree24.) Most people are basically honest.
Strongly disagree 







8

 strongly agree

About yourself:
Please indicate your level of agreement on the following statements25.) I am always trustworthy
Completely wrong 








 Completely correct26.) In general, I treat other people the same way that they treat me.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree27.) The people I trust are only those with whom I have had long lasting relationships.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree28.) How much do you tend to trust people, when you have a lot at stake?
not at all  totally29.) On a scale from 1 (always careful) to 6 (always trusting), how would you rate yourwillingness to trust others?
always careful  always trusting30.) Regardless of whether I know my counterpart, I think that I should honor being trusted
accordingly, even if it means to make sacrifices, like in this experiment.
Strongly disagree  strongly agree31.) Which culture do you trust more?
Austria 





Japan

32.) Please write down, if you have other thoughts or comments about the experiment, on
your strategy, on your reasons for your decisions or on other matters:

9