February 27, 2023

The current state and future prospects of Japanese fisheries
in the East China Sea
SASAKI Takafumi
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Fisheries Sciences, Hokkaido University

Introduction
Fishing and seafood processing industries are susceptible to changes in international affairs.
Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Japanese fishing vessels are having difficulties operatingin the northern territories due to Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine.
In June 2022, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Japanese governmentthat it would temporarily suspend safe fishing operations (implementation of the agreement),
which had been underway in accordance with the “Framework Agreement for the Operationof Japanese Fishing Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Northern Territories,” 1 until
Japan fulfills all of its financial obligations, citing Japan’s delay in finalizing the paperwork
related to the provision of free technical assistance to the Sakhalin Oblast and the freezing of
payments that were due under the agreement.2
According to Tetsuro Nomura, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan,
intergovernmental negotiations concerning this agreement had not advanced even by January2023 because "the Russian side, through diplomatic channels, stated that the timing of
implementation cannot be adjusted at this time."3 In response to this impasse, the Fisheries
Agency of Japan has proposed measures to support fisheries in the surrounding area.
Evidently, Russia’s diplomatic influence over Japan's fishing industry persists.
Within the fishing and seafood processing industries, offshore fisheries are particularly
vulnerable to changes occurring in international affairs. Offshore fisheries constitute a“border industry” that occasionally carries out operations in close proximity to nationalboundaries. As such, it represents a key economic activity at the forefront of Japan’sinternational relations. Consequently, any shifts in the relationship between Japan and theneighboring countries can directly impact this industry.
In March 2022, soon after the invasion of Ukraine, Jiro Kanekohara, then Minister ofAgriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, made a statement during a meeting of the Budget
Committee of the House of Councilors that succinctly expressed this. Specifically, he advised
caution in waters associated with Russia, stating that “in the past, even a brief entry into the1waters has resulted in capture. This time, we advise caution, as the danger is even greater.”
He candidly urged fishermen to exercise restraint in their operations, warning that “if you
take even one step into the area, you will be arrested by the authorities from the other side.”4Japan is close to China and Russia, two major "fishing powers,” as well as Taiwan, which
also has a significant presence in the global fishing industry. South Korea and North Korea
are also in competition with Japan in their operations in the Sea of Japan. Given the sensitive
nature of the fishing industry to international affairs, it is becoming increasingly necessary to
examine and analyze the fishing industry in Japan and its neighboring countries to establish amaritime order.
The present paper focuses on the East China Sea, where China’s maritime expansion
continues, and provides an overview of the current state of the Japanese fishing industry.
Furthermore, it examines the industry’s role and function in relation to the multifaceted
development of the maritime order.
I. The decline of Japan's fishing industry and concerns over food security
Based on the data compiled by the Fisheries Agency,5 it is evident that the Japanese fishingindustry, which once boasted the largest production volumes in the world, has been
consistently shrinking (refer to Chart 1). The persistent decline of the Japanese fishingindustry can be attributed to the loss of fishing grounds in the North Sea and high seas due tothe establishment of the 200-mile limit and the reinforcement of resource management
systems, which has resulted in the decline of critical forces such as far-seas bottom trawling
fisheries. Although the offshore fishing industry had remained stable due to abundant catchesof Japanese pilchards, it was inevitably impacted by resource fluctuations inherent to theindustry, leading to a challenging business environment with limited prospects for a reversal.
While Japan's fishing industry has been in decline, the rapid expansion of China's fishingindustry since the 1980s has been noteworthy. Currently, the production volume of Chinese
fisheries from their fishing vessels greatly surpasses Japan's 3-million-ton level. Although
there are indications of a recent plateau, it is undeniable that China maintains a dominantfishing industry that eclipses other countries.
Since 2000, Japan has been surpassed by emerging fishing powers such as Indonesia, India,
and Russia, a traditional fishing nation. A steady expansionary trend can also be observed in
Vietnam’s fishing industry. The contrast between the growth of these emerging powers andthe decline of Japan’s fishing industry has become increasingly pronounced.
Due to a decline in production and shifts in consumption patterns, Japan's self-sufficiency
rate for marine products (edible seafood by weight) has experienced a downturn since peaking
at 113% in fiscal 1964. It currently fluctuates between 50%-60%, with a confirmed rate of2

57% for the fiscal year 2020.6 These figures are so grim that they obscure the history ofJapanese fisheries as a prominent export industry.
Consequently, Japan has resorted to importing a substantial quantity of marine products tosatisfy its domestic demand. In the fiscal year 2021, the total import value of seafood such as
salmon, trout, skipjack tuna, other tuna varieties, and shrimp amounted to 1.6099 trillion yen.7
China is the biggest supplier of marine products for Japan, comprising 18.0% of the total
marine product imports. Chile and Russia rank second and third, with 9.2% and 8.6%,
respectively. In addition to paying China a substantial sum of 290.4 billion yen, Japan faces
the reality that two of its top three marine product suppliers are also countries that present
security concerns. It is crucial to acknowledge the importance of food, including seafood, as avital commodity for the Japanese population.

1800

Figure 1. Fisheries Production by Countory from Fishing Vessele(Unit : 10,000 tons)

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
China
RussiaJapan

Indonesia
United States of America

India
VietnamII. Inferiority in the East China Sea and the new Japan-China fisheries agreement
The contraction of the Japanese fishing industry is evident in the fishing grounds
surrounding Japan. In the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, there is competition from
Chinese and South Korean fisheries. In the Sea of Okhotsk and around the northern territories,
relations with Russia have been strained due to sudden seizures and on-site inspections,leading to the deterioration of operating conditions. Recently, an expansion of Taiwanesefishing activity has been observed in the southern part of the East China Sea, particularlyaround the Senkaku Islands. Thus, various factors have compounded, perpetuating thedecline of Japan’s fishing industry.

3The diminished presence of Japan in the East China Sea has been viewed with grave
concern, given the rapid expansion of Chinese fishing operations. According to data from theJapan Far-Seas Purse Seiner's Association, the landings of large- and medium-size purse seine
fleets, which primarily operate in the East China Sea, have decreased from 386,000 tons across
64 fleets in 1989 to 114,000 tons across 20 fleets in 2018.8
The state of the bottom trawl fisheries operating in the waters west of Japan is even more
severe. Due to a government ordinance that restricts the permitted fishing area to the west of
128°29'53" E longitude, the options for fishing grounds are limited. Consequently,
competition with Chinese fishing vessels became inevitable, leading to a decline in theindustry. In contrast to the 1960s, when around 800 vessels caught approximately 350,000
tons of fish, only 8 vessels (4 fleets) remained in 2020, catching about 3,200 tons per year.9
The diminished presence of Japan’s fishing vessels; operations in the East China Sea fishinggrounds can be attributed, in part, to the ratification of the new “Japan-China Fisheries
Agreement,” which broadly recognized the flag state principle and facilitated the expansionof China’s presence in the waters. From the perspective of the Japanese fishing industry, thenew pact established the “Provisional Measures Zone,” “Intermediate Zone,” and “Zone
South of 27 Degrees North Latitude,” which had the detrimental effect of preventing theestablishment of exclusive economic zones throughout almost the entire East China Sea (seeFigure 2).
The severity of the situation was highlighted in the May 2013 National Diet. During ameeting of the House of Councilors Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, thethen-minister Yoshimasa Hayashi mentioned that in 2011, Japan’s landings in the provisional
measures zones of the East China Sea reached 38,278 tons, while China’s landings were
overwhelmingly larger at 1.7 million tons.10
According to the Government of Japan, “China does not recognize any of Japan’s claims to
the median line”11 pertaining to the boundary between their exclusive economic zones in the
East China Sea. Consequently, despite the need for a mutual agreement between the twocountries to establish the boundaries, “the demarcation of the exclusive economic zones andcontinental shelf in the East China Sea is still pending."12
Be that as it may, it is important to "exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction followinginternational law within the waters extending to the median line until the boundary isestablished" and "to assert Japan’s entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline of its territorial sea."13
The new "Japan-China Fisheries Agreement" fails to adequately address such vital claims.
In order to sustain Japan’s fisheries production and fishing fleets, it is imperative that efforts
be made to address issues with a long-term perspective in mind.

4Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of the "Japan-China Fisheries Agreement" (Takafumi Sasaki,"East China Sea," Kadokawa Shinsho, 2021, p. 41)
III. The shifting “borders” in the East China Sea
China’s maritime presence in the East China Sea has expanded since around 2000.
Incidents surrounding the Senkaku Islands have occurred frequently, including illegal arrivals
on the Senkaku Islands by activists and operations by Chinese naval vessels and ships fromthe China Coast Guard.
Taiwan also strengthened its territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands under the Ma Yingjeou administration. In August 2012, Taiwan announced the “East China Sea Peace Initiative,”based on the premise that the “Diaoyutai Islands” are affiliated with Taiwan, and proposed
joint development of resources in the East China Sea. Furthermore, as there have been moves
toward collaboration between Taiwanese and Chinese (Hong Kong) “Diaoyu activists,” theJapanese government has grown increasingly apprehensive about the potential for SinoTaiwanese cooperation regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute.

5One measure to dispel the accumulated concerns between Japan and Taiwan was theratification of the “Japan-Taiwan Private Fisheries Agreement” 14 in April 2013. Despite
being labeled as a “private fisheries agreement,” it functioned similarly to other fisheries
agreements, such as the “Japan-China Fisheries Agreement” and the “Japan-Korea Fisheries
Agreement,” through the amendment of the enforcement ordinance that accompanies Japan’s“Fishery Sovereignty Act” (Act No. 76 of 1996).15
In essence, Japan refrains from applying Articles 5 through 13 of the aforesaid act toindividuals listed in the Taiwanese family register within two designated areas: “exemptedwaters” and “special cooperation waters,” which surround the Senkaku Islands south of 27
degrees north latitude [refer to Figure 3]. In addition, Japan permits "fishing, harvesting or
exploration of aquatic animals and plants" without the need for authorization or payment of afishing fee.
The agreement permits both Japanese and Taiwanese fishing vessels to operate within two
designated water zones on a flag-state basis, akin to the “Provisional Measures Zone”
established under the new “Japan-China Fisheries Agreement.” This effectively grants
Taiwanese fishermen access to Japan’s exclusive economic zone (fishing grounds). It can beinferred that the fisheries agreement serves a diplomatic function by preventing collaboration
between China and Taiwan on the issue of the Senkaku Islands through concessions made to
Taiwan in the fisheries sector.16
However, Japanese fishermen, particularly those from Okinawa and Miyazaki prefectures,strongly opposed the decision to allow Taiwanese fishermen access to their fishing grounds.
For instance, the "Resolution on the Ratification of the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement,"
unanimously passed by the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly in April 2013, stated that thewaters surrounding the Senkaku Islands are crucial fishing grounds for Okinawa Prefecture’s
fisheries that specialize in fishing tuna and pole-and-line fishing. Therefore, the assembly
requested that the Japanese government base its negotiations on the geographical midline of
the exclusive economic zone claimed by Japan when establishing the fishing zone. Alas, thiswas not realized. Furthermore, the assembly strongly protested against both the Japan-China
Fisheries Agreement and the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement and called for their review
because they would inflict significant harm on fishermen’s safe operations and livelihoods.
The citation of the "Japan-China Fisheries Agreement" in the aforementioned resolution
has led Japanese fishermen operating in the East China Sea to understand that this represents
the second instance of losing their fishing rights, which resulted in a significant impact.
In August 2022, China conducted “critical military exercises” near the waters legally exempt
from the Japan-Taiwan Agreement. Yonaguni Island's fishermen were forced to suspend theiroperations due to missile launches from the continent, some of which landed in nearby

6

waters.17
The current state of affairs surrounding the fisheries in the East China Sea indicates that
initiatives to prevent the diminution of Japan’s interests in the region, such as protecting its
exclusive economic zone, are anticipated.

Figure 3. Conceptual diagram of the "Japan-Taiwan Private Fishing Arrangement" (Takeshi
Hamada and Takafumi Sasaki, “Fishery and Borders,” Misuzu Shobo, 2020, p. 294)
Conclusion
The Japanese fishing industry faces a number of challenges that must be addressed inconjunction with the underlying diplomatic issues. These include a chronic shortage of humanresources18 and the depletion of fishing villages (communities behind fishing ports)19 thathave historically supplied human resources, which are examples of the vulnerabilities thathave accumulated within the industry.
Japan’s offshore and far-seas fisheries remain a significant source of food supply,
accounting for over 50% of the country’s total seafood production from marine sources (refer
to Figure 4). The maintenance of this "border industry" is an issue that cannot be ignoredfrom a security standpoint. Naturally, as "fishing powers" such as China and Russia strive tomaintain or expand their influence, this could serve as an important perspective incontemplating the multifaceted development of maritime order in the waters surrounding
Japan.
The East China Sea remains a significant fishing ground for China’s fishing industry, whichboasts the world’s largest fleet of fishing vessels. This industry continues to adversely impact
Japan’s mainstay bottom trawling and purse seine fisheries. The northward expansion of7

Taiwanese fishing vessels within the waters that fall under the Japan-Taiwan Private Fisheries
Arrangement cannot be ignored. In the Sea of Okhotsk and the North Pacific Ocean, Russia’stangible and intangible pressure on Japanese fisheries has become increasingly evident
following its invasion of Ukraine, as earlier discussed.
Japan’s fishing industry currently lacks the capacity to cope with all of the deterioratingexternal conditions, including diplomatic factors. In the era of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, securing stable fishing grounds such as exclusive economic zones is anational mission, not a responsibility that should fall solely on individual fishing operators.
In this context, it is crucial to consider the development and expansion of public opinion on
marine issues. For the fishing industry, this will foster an environment that encourages thereevaluation of the industry’s r significant value to the public.
The Japanese fishing industry is currently in decline, and the concerns of fishermen are
struggling to reach the general public and political spheres. Despite this, the Japanese fishingindustry remains an essential sector for national security, as it provides vital food resources tothe population and maintains industries along the fringes of the sea or "borders" of Japan.
Together with fishing villages, it also contributes significantly to preserving Japan’s vast
coastal regions and numerous remote islands.
Ultimately, it is essential to foster public understanding and sympathy for the industry’s
significant public nature to sustain the Japanese fishing industry, which plays a crucial role insupporting the “multifaceted development of the maritime order.” The development andimplementation of concrete measures to achieve this objective are eagerly awaited.

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Figure 4. Trends in marine fisheries production (units: thousand tons, %)Total

Aquaculture

Fisheries
Subtotal

CoastalOffshore

Far-seas

Industry

Share

Share

Share

Share

of Coastalof Offshoreof Coastalof Aquaculture

Fisheries

Fisheries

Fisheries

Fisheries

2010

5,233

4,122

1,286

2,356

480

1,111

24.6

45.0

9.2

21.2

2011

4,693

3,824

1,129

2,264

431

869

24.1

48.2

9.2

18.5

2012

4,786

3,747

1,090

2,198

458

1,040

22.8

45.9

9.6

21.7

2013

4,713

3,713

1,151

2,169

396

997

24.4

46.0

8.4

21.2

2014

4,701

4,701

1,098

2,246

369

988

23.4

47.8

7.8

21.0

2015

4,561

3,492

1,081

2,053

358

1,069

23.7

45.0

7.8

23.4

2016

4,296

3,264

994

1,936

334

1,033

23.1

45.1

7.8

24.0

2017

4,244

3,258

893

2,051

314

986

21.0

48.3

7.4

23.2

2018

4,364

3,360

968

2,042

349

1,005

22.2

46.8

8.0

23.0

2019

4,143

3,228

929

1,970

329

915

22.4

47.6

7.9

22.1

2020

4,183

3,213

871

2,044

298

970

20.8

48.9

7.1

23.2

Note: The data were compiled from “Fisheries and Aquaculture Production Statistics,” Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. The values in each column have been rounded off, so there
may be differences in the total values for some years.

References
Editorial Board. The Encyclopedia of Contemporary Geopolitics. Maruzen Publishing.
January 2020
Notes
1

The official name is "Agreement on certain matters pertaining to cooperation in operations

concerning biological marine resources between the Government of Japan and theGovernment of the Russian Federation."
2

From "Question No. 70: Questionnaire on Safe Operation in the Waters Surrounding theFour Northern Islands." House of Councilors Questionnaire. June 14, 2022. The suspension
was subsequently lifted.
3

From the "Summary of Press Conference by Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,

Nomura." Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. January 27, 2023.
4

From the "Minutes of the House of Councilors Budget Committee Meeting in the 208th

Diet Session.” Record No. 6. March 2, 2022.
5

For countries other than Japan, the data is based on the FAO’s "Fishstat (Capture9

Production)." For Japan, the data is based on the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, andFisheries’ "Fisheries and Aquaculture Production Statistics" and compiled by the Fisheries
Agency.
6

Fisheries Agency. "Overview of Food Self-Sufficiency Rate (Marine Products) for Fiscal

Year 2021." According to the "Table of Food Supply and Demand (FY2021)" published by
the Policy Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the total food selfsufficiency rate based on the caloric value of supply for FY2020 was 37%. August 5, 2022
Fisheries Agency. "Trends in the Trade of Marine Products," in White Paper on Fisheries
Production, Fiscal Year 2022 Edition. Norin Tokei Kyokai. Agriculture and Forestry Statistics
Association. 2022. pp. 51–52
8

Japan Far-Seas Purse Seiner's Association. "Trends in the Numbers of Large and Medium-

Sized Purse Seine Fishing Fleets Operating in the East China Sea and Northwestern Kyushu
Sea Area and Their Landings." 1989–2018
9"Fisheries and Aquaculture Production Statistics" of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry

and Fisheries for each fiscal year and materials provided by Yamada Suisan Co., Ltd.
10Remarks by then-Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Yoshimasa Hayashi at the183rd National Diet Session of the House of Councilors Committee on Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries. May 21, 2013
11

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Japan’s Legal Position on Resource Development in the East

China Sea." August 3, 2015
12

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Current Status of Unilateral Resource Development by China

in the East China Sea." March 31, 202013

Ibid., "Japan's Legal Position on Resource Development in the East China Sea"

14

The official name is "Agreement on the Establishment of a Fisheries Order between theJapan-Taiwan Exchange Association and the Association of East Asian Relations."
15

The official name of the "Fishery Sovereignty Act" is the "“Act on the Exercise of theSovereign Right for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone." Following the conclusionof the "Japan-Taiwan Private Fisheries Agreement," the "Enforcement Ｏrdinance for the Act
on the Exercise of the Sovereign Right for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone" wasrevised (2013, Government Ordinance No. 135) to allow Taiwanese fishermen to operate in
the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
16

Takafumi Sasaki. "Japan-Taiwan Private Fisheries Agreement" in The Encyclopedia ofContemporary Geopolitics, ed. by the Editorial Board of The Encyclopedia of Contemporary
Geopolitics. Maruzen Publishing, January 2020). pp. 718–719
17

Takafumi Sasaki, "The Plight of the Japanese Fishing Industry as Seen from Chinese

Military Exercises in the Waters near Taiwan," Foresight (Shinchosha), September 2022.
URL: https://www.fsight.jp/articles/-/49178, viewed February 22, 2023.

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18

The number of individuals employed in the fishing industry has been rapidly declining.

According to a report from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (2021 Reporton Trends in Fisheries), the number of fishery workers decreased from 625,940 in 1963 to
180,990 in 2013, a reduction of over 70% in half a century. In 2021, the most recent year forwhich data are available, the number was 129,320, indicating that the downward trend has
not abated. The number of individuals working on fishing vessels is also declining; the numberof "fishermen for hire," including fishing boat crew members, decreased from 71,740 in 2013
to 55,080 in 2021. The population is aging, with the situation being particularly acute among
engineers.
19

According to a survey conducted by the Fisheries Agency, the aging rate in fishing villages(communities that support fishing ports) is projected to reach 40.1% by 2021, exceeding thenational average of 29.3% by more than 10 percentage points. Furthermore, 67.9% of the4,492 fishing villages are classified as ‘depopulated areas.’ See ‘The Current State of Fishing
Villages,’ in The White Paper on Fisheries, 2022 Edition (pp. 153-154). These fishing villages
have historically been an important source of human resources for the fishing industry, andtheir decline is closely linked to the shortage of human resources in the industry.

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