Forest Policies
for aSustainable Humanosphere
CIAS Discussion Paper 8
Wil de Jong, Editor

CIAS Discussion Paper No. 8© CENTER FOR INTEGRATED AREA STUDIES, KYOTO UNIVERSITY
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March 2009
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Contents
Foreword
Wil de Jong....................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Forest policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and opportunities forclimate change and globalization
Yemi Katerere.................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 2: Optimizing forest government and governance in Europe: Defining forest
policy with national tradition or European Union “modernization”
Max Krott....................................................................................................................... 13
Chapter 3: New agendas, old habits in Amazonian forest policies
Wil de Jong..................................................................................................................... 25
Chapter 4: Theories for forest policy: An overview
Bas Arts and Roel van de Graaf........................................................................................ 35
Chapter 5: Bridging a divide? Local initiatives in a multi-level policy context
I.M. (Marleen) Buizer..................................................................................................... 41
Chapter 6: Evaluation of the institutional structure of sustainable forest management in
the Netherlands
Ir. Peter Van Gossum, Prof. Dr. Bas Arts, Ir. Sophie Baert, Prof. Dr. Ir. Robert De Wulf andProf. Dr. Ir. Kris Verheyen................................................................................................ 49
Chapter 7: Science in policy making: The eucalyptus debate and villagers in Thailand
Fumikazu Ubukata......................................................................................................... 57

Foreword
The role of forests in human society has evolved
throughout modern history. Major changes in the
global importance of forests have taken place inrecent decades. During much of the second halfof the 20th century forests remained a source
for timber to feed a vibrant timber industry. In
Europe, landscape, biodiversity and recreational
values became more important in the 1970s. In
tropical countries forests became recognized ashaving importance for their potential to promoterural development, their high biodiversity value
and as a source of timber. Since 2008 we have seen
an important revaluation of forests. Deforestation
is now believed to comprise approximately 20%
of global carbon dioxide emissions. Reducing
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) andpromoting reforestation are being advocated asimportant options to curb global emissions.
At the same time, forests compete for land withprospective biofuel crops. Biofuel production, theinternational financial crisis and fluctuations in oil
prices are increasing the costs of living worldwide,
putting pressure especially on poor families’
budgets. Many of those who are negatively affectedby high food prices turn to forests to complementmonetary income or to substitute consumables
lacking because of declining incomes.
The changing role of forests requires adequate
policy responses. Policy is a key element thatmediates the relationship between human societies
and the environment. For that reason, policy
making is very much debated among academics
as well as practitioners concerned with either
environmental dependency or the impact of society’s
environmental use. Policies need to be adapted
constantly to changing societal environmental
needs or to changing environmental capacities todeliver goods and services.
For that reason, the Center for Integrated Area
Studies (CIAS, Kyoto University) and partners
held an international symposium to address thetwo following questions:
1.

2.

What are the general features of forest policies
for the coming years or decades, considering
the changing demands of human society on
forests and the changing forest capabilities
to provide for those demands?
How can academic research contribute toa better understanding of forest policy andthus improve the process of forest policy
making?

The symposium “Forest Policies for a Sustainable
Humanosphere” was held on February 17 and 18,
2009 at the Inamori Center, Kyoto University.
Participants included experts on forest policy inJapan, Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. Thispublication, CIAS Discussion Paper 8, contains
seven papers from participants at the event.
The composition of chapters in this volumereflects the issues of forest policy worldwide as
they are evolving today. Katerere’s Chapter One
and de Jong’s Chapter Three review the status andchallenges of forest policy in major regions in Africa
and South America. The contrast with Krott’s
Chapter Two is remarkable, but also indicativeof possible future trends in tropical regions. The
degree of negotiations and processes to establish
multinational governance without losing national
identity is a struggle in Europe. The same struggle
is likely to take place in the three tropical regions of
the world as the need to streamline forest policies
across borders is widely recognized.
Policy sciences and research have an important
contribution to make to the policy formulation andimplementation process. Academic analysis canassess the rationality and effectiveness of policies.
Arts’ Chapter Four demonstrates that policy analysis
and the outcomes of such analysis are influenced
by the underlying policy theories and models thatare used. Three case study chapters, two from theNetherlands by Buizer and van Gossum respectively
and one from Thailand by Ubukata reinforce andillustrate the general points that are made in theinitial chapters.
Together the chapters in this volume provide acomprehensive overview of the challenges that lie
ahead for forest policy in tropical and temperateregions and point to some new directions thatcan be taken. They show that while situations inmajor regions are different, there are importantsimilarities and opportunities to learn from eachother. The papers also show that academic views
on forest policy and its analysis are an undervalued
resource that could benefit forest policy formulationand implementation during a time when forests
are achieving yet greater recognition as importantresources that can help solve pressing problems ofhuman society worldwide.
Several institutions have generously provided
funds for the symposium and the publication ofthis Discussion Paper. Kyoto University sponsoredthe organization of the event, as did the Center for
Integrated Area Studies. Participants’ travel was
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 1

sponsored by the Forest and Nature Conservation
Policy Group at Wageningen University andResearch Centre in the Netherlands, by the Chairof Forest and Nature Conservation Policy at GeorgAugust University in Göttingen, Germany, by theInstitute of Environmental and Forest Policy atAlbert-Ludwigs University of Freiburg and by theInstitute of Forest Management and Planning,
Dresden University. All contributors of chaptersfor this Discussion Paper generously donated theirtime and efforts. The Kyoto University program“Towards a Sustainable Humanosphere in Africa
and Asia” supported the editing process of thisDiscussion Paper.

Wil de Jong
EditorPage 2 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Chapter One
Forest policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Challenges and opportunities for climatechange and globalization
by Yemi Katerere1
Centre for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. E-mail address: y.katerere@cgiar.org

1

Abstract
This paper offers broad forest policy options for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the face of new realities
under climate change and globalization. The analytical framework starts with background informationand trends for the region before examining the challenges and opportunities presented by climate change
and globalization. The paper points out that SSA, home to 800 million people, has17% of the world’s
total forests and 20% of the world’s biodiversity hotspots. In recent years SSA has experienced someencouraging annual economic growth rates reaching 7% in 2007. Despite this progress, Africa has 22 of
the world’s 25 poorest countries, and the number of people living in extreme poverty has been increasing.
With forests gaining a new prominence due to their significant contribution to global carbon emissions,the paper analyzes the policy challenges presented by the evolving global carbon markets, concluding that
REDD will not benefit all forests and countries equally. The impacts of climate change will affect SSA
more than any other region because its people largely lack the means to adapt. Globalization is not new,
but its pace and scope has accelerated, and it has created winners and losers. The paper highlights how
under globalization, impacts affecting forests are driven by decisions in far away places and often outside
the sector. The pace and complexity of globalization demands new national policy capacities, nimblenessand a transformation of forestry and related institutions. The paper briefly looks at how globalization is also
driving biofuel development in SSA. The paper concludes with six key policy challenges that will confront
SSA and how countries might respond.

Introduction
This paper examines the opportunities andchallenges for effective forest policy making andimplementation in Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
in the face of climate change and globalization.
Climate change and the globalization process
could potentially undermine SSA’s ability to benefit
from its timber and forest ecosystem services forlivelihoods and national development. Whenreviewing the challenges and opportunities forforest policy in the context of globalization andclimate change, we need to understand that while
SSA forests and people are diverse, they do sharemany commonalities. For example, while the region
varies economically, geographically, ecologically andsocio-culturally, there are similar patterns of forest
and other resource dependency. Thus, without
denying that the subcontinent is heterogeneous, thispaper offers some broad directions for responding
to new realities affecting the region.
Any country that hopes to respond effectively
to the forest policy challenges and opportunities
presented by climate change and globalization
requires the capacity to analyze and synthesize
complex and dynamic sets of information andinteractions that inform the forest policy-making
environment. The fluidity of global trends also
demands that policy actors and policy analysts
shift mindset and recognise that the strong links
between adverse environmental change, such as
climate change, and human vulnerability demand
more active collaboration between biophysical andForest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 3

social scientists and between key sectors such as
NGOs and governments. Furthermore, forestry andrelated institutions are under pressure to transformfrom promoting a forest management agenda andapproach that is driven by a preoccupation with
control and enforcement to one emphasising theservices provided by forests. More importantly, there
needs to be recognition that forest policies cannot
be developed in isolation from other sectors. Often
the greatest constraints to forestry development
lie outside the forestry sector. Understanding andaddressing these constraints can go a long way inrealising the value and benefits of forests.
Globalization is not a new paradigm for SSA.
The first serious impacts of globalization on SSA dateback to the late 1980s and 1990s when structuraladjustment programs (SAPs) were imposed asconditionality for loans from the Brenton Woods
Institutions. Many of these SAPs failed to take theenvironment explicitly into account in their design.
In 2008 the adverse impacts of globalization cameinto sharp focus in the form of the global financial
crisis. Oil and food price shocks and turmoil inthe commodities market presented substantial
challenges for the subcontinent. While the record
high oil prices reached in July 2008 benefited
oil exporting countries, such as Nigeria, Central
African Republic and Angola, they have hurt manyoil importing countries, including Malawi, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. The December 2008 decline inoil prices might provide much needed relief if it issustained.
As in other parts of the world, the fluctuating
price of oil and the emission levels generated by
the global transport sector have also contributed
to a growing interest in renewable energy, which
has encouraged the production of biofuels fromcrops such as corn, rapeseed, sugarcane and palmoil. There are real concerns that a growing demandfor biofuels could result in increased competition
for land that threatens food production, which

Figure 1: Forest, woodland and vegetation cover in Africa. Source: UNEP.

Page 4 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

in turn contributes towards food price hikes andexacerbates inequities between rich and poor.
While much of the subcontinent appears
largely unaffected in the short term by the impactsof higher fuel and food prices and market turmoil,
its economies are still likely to suffer. The slowing
global economy could reduce the appetite for
African products (including forests), impact
tourism and reduce remittances sent by Africans
working abroad. For example, in Kenya remittances
which contribute up to 5% of GDP are projected
to decline by as much as 40% (Mass and Willem te
Velde 2008).

tropical dry forest in east and southern Africa,
predominately in dryland regions, accounted forthe majority of this decline (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2004). Human population growth,
poverty, high dependence on natural resources andeconomic pressures to increase exports—especially
agricultural, timber and mineral products—are
key contributors to this decline in forested area
(UNEP 2008). As supplies of wood and non-wood
products from forests decline, the protection oftrees and small groves of indigenous trees outside
forests—e.g. grown on homesteads and communal
lands—is becoming more important.

Forest Resources

Growing Population
Current economic trends, climate change, a
growing population and high rates of urbanization
will have enormous implications for reducing
poverty in SSA. Estimates show that by 2020 theurban population will be 646 million, more thandouble what it was in 2000 (302 million). By 2050
Africa’s urban population is expected to be 53.5%of the total population, compared to 39% in 2005
(ESA 2007). All these trends will threaten accessto food, water and forests, possibly increasing
conflict. Policy interventions informed by research
are essential to prevent or mitigate the impact ofthese changes.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s forest resources are
estimated to cover an area of 650 million hectares(See Figure 1 for distribution of forest and woodland
cover). This represents approximately 17% of theworld’s total forest cover and 20% of the world’s
biodiversity hotspots (FAO 2007). The Congo Basinis the second largest continuous block of tropicalrainforest in the world after the Amazon. The Basinaccounts for more than 60% of Africa’s biodiversity
and ranks first in Africa for many taxonomic
groups in terms of species richness (Ibid.). The
miombo woodland, covering an estimated 270
million hectares, is the most extensive tropicalseasonal woodland and dry forest formation in
Africa and includes areas that receive more than
700mm of mean annual rainfall on nutrient poor
soils. Substantial portions of South and Central
African countries, including Angola, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and mostof the southern part of the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) are covered by miombo woodland(Frost 1996). An estimated 40 million people
inhabit areas covered, or formerly covered, by
miombo woodland, with an additional 15 million
urban dwellers relying on miombo sourced woodor charcoal for household energy (Campbell et al.
2006, SEI 2002).

TrendsForest and tree loss
Despite their importance, Africa’s forests
continue to decline at a rapid rate: from 1990 to
2005, more than 9% of Africa’s forests were lostat an average annual rate of approximately four
million hectares. Although Africa hosts only 17%of the world’s forests, the continent accounts forover half of global deforestation (FAO 2007). The
greatest global net reduction of forest area between
1990 and 2000 occurred in SSA and was estimatedat 52 million hectares, a loss of approximately 0.8%of the forest area per year (UNEP 2008). Loss of

Increasing resource dependency
An estimated 70% of the population of SubSaharan Africa (SSA) is rural and depends directly
or indirectly on forests and woodlands for its
livelihood (World Bank 2004). The World Bank
further estimates that at least 20 percent of thedisposable income available to landless and poorfamilies also comes from forests (Ibid.). Highdependence on natural resources in the absenceof effective mechanisms for managing trade-offs
has driven competition between different sectors
and interests, resulting in increasing conflicts andresource degradation. Furthermore, rural poverty
levels are high. Improved land management istherefore critical for national development, poverty
reduction, and social stability.
SSA’s dynamic landscape mosaics are changing
due largely to anthropogenic factors, the interplayof people with changing ecosystems and climatechange. In most areas of SSA there are pressures
on forests due to heavy dependence on ecosystem
resources for subsistence and economic activities
such as mining, hydro-power generation andirrigation. These trends in deforestation and resource
dependency are likely to be compounded by highpopulation growth which will remain largely rural.
Economic trends
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,
outside of South Africa, achieved a remarkable 7%
annual increase in 2007, the highest in some 35
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 5

years. By 2010 this annual growth is expected to
decline to 6.6%. Despite positive gains in economic
development, 22 of the world’s 25 poorest countries(and 33 of the poorest 50), based on gross national
income, are in Africa, as are 29 of the 31 least
developed countries. Such trends have resulted in
Africa having one of the highest levels of inequity.
South Africa and Namibia, for instance, are among
the world’s most inequitable nations (World Bank
2008).
In many forest rich countries commercial
logging is an important source of foreign currency.
Cameroon, for example, is among Africa’s leading
producers and exporters of sawn timber andtropical logs; it ranks fifth in the world. In 2001,
Equatorial Guinea exported US$62 million ofwood-based panels, representing 14% of its GDP(ADB 2007). The dependence on exporting raw
materials to earn much needed foreign currency
continues to encourage a pattern of unsustainable
natural resource use.

Forests and Climate
ChangeForests started gaining new attention in2005 when a group of developing countries with
rainforests presented a proposal requesting that
the Conference of the Parties (COP) at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) include reducing emissions
from deforestation in their discussions. This proposal
was made following a growing recognition that
deforestation generates carbon emissions (Coalition
for Rainforest Nations 2008). Forests gained further
prominence with the publication of the Fourth
Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC estimatedthat 1.7 billion tons of carbon are released annually
due to land-use change, of which the majority is
tropical deforestation. This represents 20–25% of
current global carbon emissions, which is greaterthan the percentage from the fossil fuel-intensive
global transport sector (Parry et al. 2007).
The potential for emissions mitigation throughforestry in the African region per year is estimatedat 14% of the global total and the avoideddeforestation potential at 29% of the global total(Bryan et al. 2008). The Central African forests
provide a critical buffer against global climatechange, storing an estimated than 23 billion tons
or more of carbon (World Bank 2004).
While forests are receiving this new interest,
policy makers should not lose sight of the factthat there are other carbon-rich ecosystems suchas grasslands. This is particularly important fordry forest countries that are concerned that theymight be excluded from a post-Kyoto Reducing
Page 6 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation(REDD) regime.
Climate Mitigation: REDD
Forestry contributes 17.4% and agriculture
another 13.1% of global annual emissions (IPCC
2007a). Hence controlling deforestation in tropicaldeveloping countries is seen as a low cost strategy
for reducing carbon emissions (Seymour 2008). The
magnitude of carbon emissions from deforestationand degradation means that REDD requires a
global and national mitigation response. Any
action on reducing emissions from deforestationand degradation in developing countries could
lead to better protection of forests with prospects
for rewarding countries taking measures to protect
their forests. This would require establishing a
trading mechanism to enable developing countries
to sell carbon credits on the basis of successful
reductions in emissions from deforestation andforest degradation (Miles and Kapos 2008). The full
extent and implications of such arrangements undera post-Kyoto emissions reduction agreement is still
unknown, however simplifying the rules under the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in responseto additionality criteria, changing the definition ofafforestation and reforestation and addressing hightransaction costs will increase effectiveness (Bryan
et al. 2008). Currently developing countries canbenefit from the regulated carbon market under
the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. With only 2% of all
CDM projects, Africa lags behind Latin America,
Asia and the Pacific regions which collectively host
96% of all CDM projects. (UNEP-RISO Centre;
CD4CDM 2009).
As attention refocuses on forests and their newly
appreciated linkages to climate change mitigation
and adaptation, the spotlight on REDD and carbon
trading will inevitably shift forest management
objectives towards carbon trading and climatechange. However, it is important for policy makers
to recognise that REDD will not benefit all forests
or countries equally. The impending transition from
CDM to REDD in the forestry sector shifts the focus
from afforestation and reforestation to managementof tropical humid forests, raising concerns about
potential funding inequities between humid anddry forests. Additionally, the effects of REDD onforest ecosystems and forest based livelihoods arelikely to be both positive and negative. Design of
REDD schemes will not always take into accountother forest values (e.g., livelihoods support andtimber provision) unless provisions are madeduring the establishment of baselines. REDD could
potentially exacerbate existing inequities, keeping
the poorest people on the benefit-fringe. For thisreason it is important that forest management andgovernance policies incorporate climate change
issues (adaptation and mitigation) and that climate

change policies incorporate sustainable forest• and a lack of safety nets outside of natural
management objectives.
systems e.g. insurance.
A key challenge under any REDD scheme willbe the continued demand for food, forest products
Under these conditions, climate change
and biofuels. This could mean that forests excluded threatens to undermine the livelihoods of the poor.
from any REDD scheme could come underIt will adversely impact forests, water resources,
increased pressure to provide land and timber human settlements (including coastal cities) andproducts (Miles and Kapos 2008).
well-being, increasing vulnerability and reducing
The primary focus of carbon financing schemes isresilience. For many countries, climate change will
to offset emissions through forests, not to guarantee undermine national economic development andlivelihoods. Understanding this distinction is the potential to achieve the targets established byimportant for policy makers keen to jump on thethe Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
carbon bandwagon. The risks of a singular focus
It can be reasonably assumed that direct andon carbon could easily undermine investment indirect impacts of climate change on livelihoods
in biodiversity and conservation programs as
and governments will undermine human security,well as smallholder
inducemigration
production forestry
and lead to conflict.
that is essential for BOX 1: Possible impacts of climate change
The vulnerability of
livelihoods.
people to climate
Policy makers will
1. Declining productivity of agricultural land will impacts will to a large
need to acknowledge
put pressure on forests for new agricultural land. extent depend on thethat making REDD
Net revenues from rainfed agriculture could extent to which theirwork
involves
decline by as much as 50% by 2020.
relative dependence
understanding
2. Threats to ecosystems and species increase in on climate sensitive
a complex value
coastal forest areas (West Africa) and in the resources, such as
chaincomprisingwoodlands in east and southern Africa.
forests, for theirgovernments, local
3. Water stress and scarcity develop, with livelihoods (Barnett
communities,
theconsequences for agriculture and economic and Adger 2007).
private sector anddevelopment.
Thevulnerability
donors. The full
4. Reduced forest diversity and resilience altersof communities tocosts of managing
the environmental and livelihood services of climate change cannot
carbon along thisforests.
be viewed in isolation
value chain must be
5. Reducing access to, and the quality of, natural from issues of poverty
taken into account,resources that are important to sustain livelihoods and other factors that
including operational
undermines human security.
may determine theircosts,
monitoring
6. The kinds of human insecurity that climate adaptation capacity.
costs
and
costs
change may affect can in turn increase the risk
The potential for
associated with reof violent conflict.
climate change totooling institutions.
7. The capacity of states to act in ways that promote undermine
human
Given the number
human security and peace is undermined.
securityinSSAof
potential
8. The direct effects on livelihoods and indirect
could conceivably bebeneficiaries,
theeffects on state functions increase the risk of high because of thecost of carbon might
violent conflict.
dependence of mostprove to be higherof the subcontinent’s
thancurrently
Source: IPCC (2007a)
population on climate
anticipated.
sensitive
resources
such as water, forests
Climate Change Adaptation
and agricultural products. For instance, SubThe impacts of climate change (see Box 1) are Saharan African agriculture is 96% rain-fed andlikely to be considerable for SSA. Many countries highly vulnerable to weather shocks. Additionally,in SSA are considered to be particularly vulnerable
70% of the rural population of SSA depends
due to:directly or indirectly on forests and woodlands for• a high reliance on natural resources such as household livelihood resources such as fuel woodforests for economic development and as and charcoal for energy, food, herbs, tree bark andlivelihood safety nets;
nutritional supplements, especially vitamin and• limited ability to adapt financially andmineral sources for children (World Bank 2007).
institutionally;
Climate change is likely to alter the temporal and• low per capita GDP and high poverty;
spatial distribution of diseases such as malaria and• weak institutional and political conditions;dengue, potentially increasing the disease burden
and child and maternal mortality. The availability
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 7

of medicinal plants could also be affected by climatechange. The net effect will be a reduced capacity torespond to diseases.
Experience gained from managing SSA’s large
number of shared river and lake basins could
provide a workable framework for implementing
climate change adaptation measures, including
minimizing potential conflicts. A transboundary
approach to water management will not only help
minimize the impact of climate change but has theadded potential of yielding a peace dividend.
A major challenge for SSA is reducing thevulnerability of climate-sensitive sectors—
including forestry, energy and water resources—tocurrent climate variability and “climate-proofing”
future development activities. Some countries have
responded to climate risks by developing National
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
through the UNFCCC special assistance to Least
Developed Countries (LDC). As of October 2008
the UNFCCC secretariat had received NAPAs from38 developing countries in SSA (UNFCCC 2008).
But few of these adaptation plans and policies
incorporate forests, despite clear reasons to do so.
Forests play key roles by mitigating extreme climate
events like floods, droughts, heat and dust storms.
Many socioeconomic sectors and people dependon ecosystem services provided by forests, e.g.
hydropower or local communities depending on
reliable water quality and quantity. These and otherecosystem services—e.g. watershed protection,
timber production and biodiversity conservation—
are highly vulnerable to climate change. These
forest services can be secured through adaptation
approaches such as the conservation and improved
management of forests.
Responding to climate change throughmitigation and adaptation requires synergies andintegrated cross-sectoral approaches; otherwise
forests might be excluded from adaptation policies.
People’s capacity to adapt to adverse climatechange impacts is reduced by a complex array ofsocial, economic, environmental and many nonclimatic stresses. For adaption to be equitableand effective, policy makers need to understandthe multidimensional and differentiated nature ofpoverty and vulnerability (Tanner and Mitchell
2008a).
Reducing the vulnerability of forests and thoseelements of society that depend on forests will
require both mainstreaming adaptation into forest
management so that forest managers consider
climate change threats on forests. It will also
demand mainstreaming forests into adaptation sothat non-forest sectors consider improved forest
management as adaptation measures.

Page 8 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

GovernanceHalting deforestation and degradation while
simultaneously improving livelihoods requires
making hard choices. These choices involve issues
such as access to forest resources, equity, benefit
sharing and the rights of indigenous peoples andcommunities. Consideration will have to be given
to the appropriate role and capacity of traditional
knowledge and community based forest andresource management organizations as climatechange impacts land use options and forests.
One of the biggest forest policy challenges isthat of governance, specifically tenure. The tenure
disconnect has compromised development inmany African countries over decades and could
undermine implementation of REDD. REDD
may not succeed if the underlying causes ofdeforestation and poor governance—corruption,
tenurial insecurity, multi-layered tenure regimes,
illegal logging—are not adequately addressed.
Lack of clear tenurial arrangements can fuel local
conflicts and constrain climate adaptation andbenefits distribution efforts.
As the impacts of climate change take effect,
the tenure forms existing today are likely to bealtered in unanticipated ways. For example, areas
currently designated as protected forests may infact revert to non-forest land, requiring rethinking
land-use patterns and tenure. Policy makers willneed to monitor the implications of climate change
induced land-use changes on tenure regimes andrights holders.
A recent study by the Rights and ResourcesGroup found that, while challenges remain, thedecades-old global trend of transferring forestsfrom government to local ownership has continued.
The report also found that the area of forest undermanagement of local communities, indigenous
groups, private companies and individuals has
increased (Sunderlin et al. 2008). If these rights are
fully realized in practice, the trends reported above
are encouraging and present an additional policy
challenge for REDD activities. Many NGOs areconcerned that the benefits and costs of REDDrelated activities will not be shared equitably withindigenous peoples and local communities, groups
that currently contribute to the conservation andmanagement of carbon rich ecosystems including
forests. Indigenous peoples and local communities
will most likely have to form legally recognised
institutions so that any funds that they might earnfrom incentive schemes can be paid to them.
An additional policy concern regarding equity
is the inevitable elite capture of revenue withincountries and communities that could result froma sudden increase in financial support for REDD
activities either through market-based mechanisms
or through public funding. Minimizing elite
capture requires strengthening of local institutions

so that any increase in the value of forests arisingfrom carbon trading is equitably and legitimately
distributed (Luttrell et al. 2007).
Debates on the impacts of climate change often
argue that it is the poor who are most vulnerable.
While this is generally true, it is important tounderstand that poverty affects people differently.
This means that the vulnerability of poor people toclimate change will also vary. Clear understandingof the links between poverty and vulnerability canhelp design relevant responses to climate change.
This calls for an approach that closely examines
the geographical and asset context of vulnerable
communities and how household vulnerability
varies within these locations (Tanner and Mitchell
2008b). Understanding the context of vulnerability
is not an academic exercise. It can mean choosing
between advocacy and technical responses toadaptation. For example, if justice and equity
are key considerations, then the response is often
raising funds for advocacy rather than for researchand technology (Ibid.).
Expanding the role of individuals and companies
in the growing, protection and management of forest
and trees requires secure tenure and institutionalarrangements that guarantee inclusion by thoseinvesting in these efforts (FAO 2003). However,carbon forestry is not the same as in community
forestry, and at the national level, the ownershiprights of forests for carbon reductions are not clear,creating uncertainty among producers and buyersof carbon (Luttrell et al. 2007).

Globalization
The globalization paradigm has gainedmuch currency in the past 10-15 years in thecontext of economic, environmental, community
and technological phenomena. While globalchange has brought real benefits to SSA in
the form of greater productivity, increased
trade, improved communication and a more
informed and questioning society, millions of theregion’s people remain mired in poverty. Unlesscountries understand the “rules of the game,” theglobalized economy poses many risks, especiallyfor economically weak countries and the poorest
people within them. Hence globalization cannot
be unqualified and unrestricted. Mechanisms
to protect poorer countries and the poor withinthem against negative impacts must be built into
globalization processes.
Historically, globalization has been linked to
the failure of environmental management policies
in many developing countries. The globalizationof certain macro-economic policies was achieved
through structural adjustment programs (SAPs)
and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
The World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) used SAPs as part of the conditions
for developing country governments to secureloans. The SAPs were criticised for undermining
economic development and for explicitly excluding
the environment in their design (Khor 2005). While
being silent on the environment, SAPs were blamedfor unprecedented natural resource extraction forexport and undermining the interests of resource
dependent communities.
The discourse on the implementation of REDD
projects and carbon trading is global in nature formany reasons, including the commitments madeunder the UNFCCC, the growth of the carbon
market and proposed funding mechanisms forcarbon trading. However, REDD implementation
requires national action and regulation. Thismeans that in responding to global climate change,
the issues of equity and responsibility between
developed and developing countries need to beaddressed within the context of the principle of“common but differentiated action.”
The process of globalization means thatmost impacts on forests will be driven by factors
outside the sector, and consequently the abilityof governments to influence them will often belimited. Global forest trends and decisions made in
far flung places impact how forests are managed at
the national and local levels. Even in those cases
where the possibilities to influence do exist, many
developing country governments lack the capacity
to monitor global trends in forest products or
decisions made at international fora that impact
national level priorities and policies.
Physical distance has become less importantunder globalization. The growing demand fortimber in countries such as China and India is
having a major impact on forestry practices incountries such as Gabon, Equatorial Guinea,
Cameroon and the DRC. China’s trade with Africa
has grown as demand for imports has risen to fuelthe rapidly expanding manufacturing sector; China
has recently surpassed Britain to become Africa’s
third biggest trading partner behind the U.S. andFrance (Canby et al. 2008). However, the global
financial crisis might dampen China’s appetite forwood. An estimated 60% of wood imports are reexported and with demand in Europe and North
America declining due to a global recession, Chinamight reduce its imports of timber from Africa andother parts of the world.
With multiple drivers of change and interested
actors both within and outside the forestry sector,
predicting impact pathways is difficult (Nair2005). New partnerships and alliances in varying
configurations (between governments, the private
sector and communities) are constantly emerging
and influencing how forests are managed based onnegotiations and joint actions that could undermine
local interests in the forest. Whether these newpartnerships and alliances can reduce deforestation
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 9

is not clear. Such a dynamic and fluid situation
could make coordination of REDD projects morechallenging and attribution of impacts (carbon
reduction) to a particular alliance or partnershipequally difficult.
Globalization also brings into sharp focus thecompetition between “globalism” and “localism.”
This is manifested in the implementation planof REDD which addresses the principle thatdeveloped countries should assume greater
responsibility for GHG mitigation than theirdeveloping counterparts. This risks the possibility
that local adaptation needs are subjugated to global
concerns. Forest areas identified as a priority fortackling deforestation to reduce emissions (forthe global benefit) may not always reflect local or
national forest values (e.g., conservation, livelihoods
support, or culture). Similarly, some forest areas andhence management objectives may be less valuablefrom a carbon perspective but of high priority forother reasons. The challenge is to ensure that thesecompeting values get equal recognition and funding
under a shared global responsibility in responding
to climate change.
If SSA is to make any meaningful progress inmeeting its development objectives, it must address
its energy poverty. It has diverse and abundant
energy sources that are underdeveloped and poorly
utilized. Unstable fuel prices, aspirations of fuelself sufficiency (especially for non-oil producing
and landlocked countries), concerns over global
warming and worldwide energy use have beenstimuli for many countries to look into developing
alternative energy sources including biofuels frompalm oil and jatropha. Failure to address energy
poverty will increase pressure on the forests andwoodlands that are a primary source of energy
for an estimated 575 million people (Cotula et al.
2008).
Biofuel development could have positive
impacts on remaining forests and forest dependent
people if developed on degraded forest lands in amanner that supports income generation fromsmallholder producers and takes into accountenvironmental conservation concerns. But there
are debates about the pros and cons of commercial
biofuel production. Where there are competing
land uses with no security of land tenure, theexpansion of commercial biofuel production canmarginalize poor local resource users, denying
them access to land and resources that are essential
for their nutritional, health, cultural and economic
well-being (Ibid.)
Any rapid expansion of biofuel plantations
should be of concern to policy makers for several
reasons. First, the demand for land is likely tocause governments to enter into agreements withprivate investors—resulting in land “give-aways”—
without adequately protecting the interests of local
people or minimizing ecological damage. Such land
Page 10 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

grabs could reverse progress that has been madetowards securing community forest rights. Second,
unsustainable biofuel polices can lead to large
scale forest conversion as is the case in the DRC.
Having identified biofuel production as a priority
for industrialization, the Congolese governmentis reported to have awarded a Chinese company
the right to develop a 3 million hectare oil palm
plantation (Biopact 2007). Third, biofuel polices
need to be developed in concert with policy makers
in other sectors, especially agriculture, energy andmacro-economics.

Conclusion
The key forest policy challenges that will facecountries in SSA include:
1. Transforming forestry organizations: The policy
context and content for sustainable forest
management has become more complex,
requiring fresh approaches, innovative
institutional arrangements and new skills.
Procedures and legislation developed in
response to past demands for forest goods
and services and contexts might have tobe reviewed and refined in response to theclimate change agenda. In many countries
national forestry institutions involved inresearch, extension, administration andeducation have not kept pace with rapidchanges in the sector after colonialism.
Issues such as decentralization of forest
management, increasing numbers of tradeoffs
that need to be considered when allocating
forest resources, the emergence of newmarket opportunities for forest goods andservices and the changing role of the private
sector are often inadequately addressed. In
this context, planning and coordination
are weak. As a result, the full potential andopportunities of forests to enhance humanwell-being and the environment remain
unexploited, while key issues with large
impact potential such as climate change are
not being tackled.
2. Mainstreaming adaptation into forest
management and forests into management plans:
IPCC assessments place Africa as a priority
for adaptation assistance due to Africa’s
large share of the world’s drylands, thehigh number of least developed countries,
fragile resources, variable climates, relatively
weak institutions and low human capacity
for managing the multiple stresses related
to climate change vulnerability (IPCC
2007b).
3. Promoting a sub-regional approach forengagement
in
UNFCCC
processes:
SSA has a number of sub-regional economic

4.

5.

6.

groupings that can provide a basis fordeveloping common visions and a greater
voice in international negotiations to
overcome the diverse economic, social,ecological and cultural values. The Central
African Forest Commission (COMIFAC)
is a good example. Another example isprovided by the Common Market for Eastand Southern Africa (COMESA) which hasargued for greater attention to be given to thecarbon markets for dry forest ecosystems.
Reducing vulnerability and emissions
through a regional response: Urgent steps
must be taken to develop adaptationplans within the context of transboundary
resource management cooperation suchas management of shared river basins andforests. Such an approach will go some
way to limit transboundary climate change
impacts. In addition, such an approach canyield a peace dividend in the event of serious
resource conflicts. Furthermore, countries
should consider the possibility of using
similar methodologies for determining
emission levels and explore how regional
cooperation can contribute to reducing
regional displacement of emissions.
Clarifying rights and ownership: The questionof who will own carbon reductions is still
to be resolved. This issue is complicated by
the fact that along the impact pathway there
are likely to be many players contributing to
the carbon reductions. Without clarity over
the right to benefit from carbon it is difficult
to know at what level decision making overbenefit sharing will take place. In particularwhat will the role of the government be?
Understanding globalization: Climate change
is a global issue that presents opportunities
and risks for new forms of financing to forest
dependent communities. Understanding
the emerging arrangements and proceduresis essential for effective participation ininternational negotiations and in theequitable distribution of the benefits between
countries and within country.

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Chapter Two
Optimizing forest government andgovernance in Europe: Defining forest policy
with national tradition or European Union“modernization”
by Max Krott1
Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany

1

This paper is a revised version of the paper Krott, M. 2008. Forest Government and Governance withina Europe in Change. In: L. Cesaro; P. Gatto; D. Pettenella (eds.) The Multifunctional Role of Forests –Policies, Methods and Case Studies. EFI Proceedings, No. 55, European Forest Institute, Joensuu, Pp.1325.

Abstract
Since 1990, when Eastern Europe began the transition toward democracy and a market economy,
integration of the European Union has strengthened. This has caused both problems and opportunities
for the forestry sector, resulting in two types of responses in forest policy. In the first case, in the emerging
democracies, the classic instruments of forest government—the rule of law, private ownership and markets
for forestry—were instituted or rebuilt. With respect to these reforms, implementation is the major
problem today. In the second response, forest governance—cooperative forest policy-making with selforganizing networks of participants from policy, economy and society—was introduced through National
Forest Programs or the forest strategy of the European Union. This paper examines relevant policymaking theory, network analysis and case studies in order to demonstrate that this new forest governanceoffers opportunities for mutual learning, but that the results are also determined by power processes. By
showing how power is distributed, network analysis provides useful information in the decision whether
to join a specific network. Enhanced forest governance could be a new task for a “facilitating state forest
administration.” Whether the state forest service should jump into this new role depends on its ability
to become a trusted mediator among all stakeholders in the forests. In conclusion, to develop a strong
forest policy it is recommended not simply to follow the EU modern forest governance policy blindly but
also to rely on traditional national government instruments and to actively make use of the governanceinstruments in selected cases only.

1. European forest policy
crossing borders
Europe has approximately 1000 million haof forests which play an essential role in the livesof Europeans (Ministerial Conference on theProtection of Forests in Europe Liaison Unit Vienna
2003). The forests have multiple uses, and bothwood and non-wood products supply 500 million
inhabitants as well as a growing worldwide export

market. Creating a comprehensive and unified
European forest policy is an ambitious project sincein reality the forests of Europe are divided into
more than 40 national policies based on sovereignstates. In a certain sense, political borders cut theEuropean forest policy into 40 policy pieces.
Although national borders remain fundamental
realities in Europe, the project of integrating
Europe is a vision of creating a more open socialand economic space. Widening and deepening theEuropean Union has broken down many borders
in recent decades. For Europe’s forests, change has
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 13

also been driven strongly by cross-border trends
and activities.
On the ecological level, the diffusion ofpollutants and nutrients in air and water has not
stopped at borders. Plants and animals have spreadall over Europe, and the exchange of products bycross-border transport technologies has also had
major impacts. When considering the consequencesof climatic change, it is clear that cross-bordereffects have changed the ecological conditions forforests throughout Europe.
The emerging markets in Europe have createdstrong and accelerating pressures for change. Easy
access to cheap wood and labor has provided an
incentive for forest-based industries to relocate toEastern Europe. In Central and Western Europe,
the markets have forced the foresters on the wood
supply side to cope with new competition from
Eastern European forests. In highly developed
national economies, sinking wood prices and higher
labor costs have changed the economic parameters
for forestry dramatically. In order to survive in thesemarkets, structural reforms of forest production instate and private enterprises have been inevitable.
On the social level, many citizens in European
nations still think of members of other states as
foreigners who should not have the same rights as
residents. As a result, when employment or salaries
drop, conflict between nationalities emerges, andborder tightening is demanded by citizens. In
general, national agendas dominate and hinder
outside impacts on “national” forests; however,some environmental values regarding the forest
have gained influence because of cross-borderactivities (Schmithüsen 2004). Under the umbrellaof sustainability, new demands for environmental
and nature conservation standards have emerged.
These demands for non-wood ecosystem services
have diminished the options for economicallyprofitable wood production.
This snapshot shows that key issues fornational forests like guaranteeing ecologicalhealth, maintaining economically profitable wood
production or serving the new demands for nonwood products are driven by cross-border impacts
from both the European and the global contexts.
The cross-border effects are one reason why aunified EU forest policy could produce added value
to national forest policies. The question is how
such an EU forest policy relates to national forest
policies. Further questions to be asked are why EU
forest policy can claim to be “modern,” and how
and why it is accepted by member states.
The answer given in this paper is based on theinterest and power model of forest policy (Krott2005). The assumption is that the specific forest
policy of the EU can be explained by the interestsof stakeholders and their respective power. The
analysis focuses on the changes in forest policymaking at the national and international levels
Page 14 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

in Europe during the last two decades. By thenapplying concepts of governance and government,a theoretical basis is identified which is able toexplain the new developments. Finally, conclusions
are drawn as to how a proactive forest policy cancope with these challenges. The analysis is basedon literature and on two theoretical and empiricalstudies about networks and state forest institutions
by the author and his team (Hasanagas 2004, Krottand Stevanov 2004).

2. National andinternational responses
of forest policy
In the past two decades, forest policy makers
adapted to the emerging challenges for forestry
by initiating numerous activities on national andinternational level. In all European countries forest
policy makers reformulated forest law and initiated arather deep reform of the state forest services. Private
forest ownership was re-established throughout
countries in structural transition. Furthermore,sustainable forest management certification
spread in European countries and National Forest
Programs were initiated (European Commission
1999; Indufor et al 2003, Rametsteiner 2000).
On the international level, the Ministerial
Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe(MCPFE), involving more than 40 countries
including the Russian Federation, was establishedin 1990. The main task was to develop a common
understanding for the protection and sustainable
management of European forests. In contrast to thisforest-focused international body, the European
Union (EU) does not have an explicit mandate toformulate forestry policy. Nonetheless, it influences
forestry strongly with policies in agriculture,rural development, nature conservation and theenvironment. Additionally, the EU formulated aforestry strategy in 1998 which was renewed as EU
Forest Action Plan in 2006 for a planning period
until 2011 (Council of the European Union 2006).
As follow up to the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992, the forest
also became subject of global initiatives whichwere strongly reflected by the MCPFE and the EU(Hofmann 2002).
This rather confusing bundle of new national
and international forest policy initiatives can be
structured along two different types of policymaking (Benz 2004). Important forestry issues arehandled by the state through a policy process thatcreates regulatory programs and implements themthrough semi-compulsory means (Krott 2005). The
regulation of conflict is managed by the state with
its authority to implement binding solutions forall forest users e.g. formulating and implementing
the new forest law. This process is the heart of“traditional” forest government.
A growing number of forest policy instruments
do not fit into this concept anymore because
they go beyond the domain of a single stateauthority. A National Forest Program is policy
making for sustainably managed forests throughbroad partnership between government and nongovernment organizations (Glück et al. 1999).
Broad participation is essential, meaning that thestate becomes just one partner in the network, andsolutions must be based on broad bargaining insteadof on state power only. Such loss of power by anindividual state also happens on the international
level because there is no “state of Europe” andconsensus among the partners, which are sovereignstates, is necessary e.g. within the MCPFF. By
virtue of these distinctive features—networks andbargaining among partners from state, economy
and society—the new forest policy initiatives follow
a policy-making type which can be better describedthrough concepts of governance which differ fromstate-centered government processes.
Forest government and forest governanceare found on different levels of forest policy indifferent proportions (see Table 1). In forestry at
the national level, traditional forest government
dominates; however, a few forest governanceprocesses were initiated, mainly National Forest
Programs, Certification and integration with ruraldevelopment. At the international level, only
governance among sovereign nations is possible. A
striking exception is the EU. Based on the treaty
between the member states, the EU has a mandate
to use government instruments which are binding
for the member states. However, the power ofthe EU is rather limited; therefore it introduces a
number of governance instruments, especially inthe case of forestry.
The distinction between government andgovernance becomes meaningful in analyzing
forest policy because the two concepts differ

significantly with respect to the political dynamics
of their respective instruments. Understanding
the difference also facilitates choosing politicaltheories that are appropriate for describing andexplaining forest policy and, finally, results in usefulrecommendations for the practice. The following
sections seek to do this, focusing on theories ofadministrative policy-making and networks.

3. Forest government inEuropean countries
3.1 Rebuilding rule of law,
private ownership and markets inforestry
The transition of the communist centrallyplanned states into democracies and market
economies was the most significant development
in forest government. The countries in transition
strongly based the design of their government
instruments on the model provided by Westerncountries. When the formerly communist countries
were accepted into the EU, the requirements ofmembership gave strong additional impetus toadapt their policies.
As a result of the last two decades ofpolicy development, forest and forest related
environmental laws in all European countries sharequite similar ecological and economic standards ofsustainable forest management. But the unified legal
basis means different things for the government
process in old and young democracies. In the old
democracies, due to pluralistic balance-of-powersystems, laws had little room to change; by adjusting
implementation, state and private institutions wereable to move forward with new trends in ecology
and economy. For example, important ecologicalstandards far beyond the requirements of law have

Table 1: Forest Government and Forest Governance in Europe. *Estimated volume of activities in %2000-2008
Level offorest policy

State authority

National forest policies
EU forest-related activities
International forest activities

Full
PartlyNone

Type offorest policy *Government
Governance
90
80
0

10
20
100

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 15

been embraced by state owners and a group ofenvironmental oriented private owners (Schraml
et al 2003). With regard to economic innovation,
private owners and some state owned enterprises
have started to shift forest management towardhigher profitability well beyond the incentives
created by policy (Österreischische Bundesforste
2001).
In the new democracies, the process is quite
the reverse. New legal standards for sustainable
forest management and privatization were
formulated rapidly during the transition period,
but implementation lags far behind the law(European Commission 1999, Indufor OY et
al. 2003). Restitution and re-privatization has
produced a large number of small private woodlots,
whose owners often lack skills and capacity forforest management. They often cannot fulfill theirroles as private owner and active participant inforestry markets. Forest policy lacks the strength toprovide them with sufficient extension service andfinancial incentives which could help private forest
owners become the strong and responsible actors
in sustainable forest management expected by theconcept of private ownership.
Furthermore, the overall enforcement of therule of the law lags far behind legal requirements.
“Black” and “gray” markets for wood as well as
for labor in timber harvesting and transport arewidespread problems in the young democracies(Indufor OY et al 2003). The illegal activities areevidence that these countries are struggling toprovide the government framework which is abasic presupposition for the development of strong
markets.

The widespread implementation problems in theyoung democracies should not be misunderstoodas major failures of the national forest policies. The
opposite is true; the deficits are the consequences ofvery progressive, innovative and quickly formulated
new forest related laws with high standards. But theyshow where the challenges for forest government lie
in the young democracies today. Positive impacts forsustainably managed forests can be achieved if the
traditional government instruments of monitoring,extension and financial incentives are strengthenedin the implementation.
The outcome for the old democracies is different
because in their cases the law has fallen behindinnovative practices. The challenge for government
forest institutions is to reformulate the regulatory
instruments faster in order to keep up with theinnovations of the sector. For example, ecology has
not yet been sufficiently included in forest planningand financial incentives under forest government
to provide room for the emerging issues of forest
biodiversity. Another example is climate change andcarbon sinks in forests: specific forest government
instruments have not yet been formulated.
International regimes like the MCPFE andother international conventions that impact forests
can trigger the formulation of innovative national
government instruments, but they cannot change
them directly. It requires joint efforts from theentire forest sector and the skillful use of national“windows of opportunities” to reform the legal basisof specific forest policy instruments. These crossborder pressures have not replaced the national
forest government process but have opened up newchallenges for it (Hogl 2000).

Figure 1: Benchmarking the state forest administration (SFA) forest policy goals on state andprivate forest land. Source: Krott, M., Stevanov M. 2004; Krott, M., Sutter, M. 2003.

Page 16 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

3.2 Economic streamlining of theforest administration
The state forest administration plays animportant role in the formulation and state-wide
implementation of forest policy. It is also a major
economic actor by managing the state owned forests.
The organization of the state forest administration
varies among European countries. Management
and policy tasks can be handled by one integrated
state institution—as in the majority of countries
in transition—or by two or more different state
institutions that the economic-driven reform has
newly created in some countries.
Defining the overall outputs of the state forest
administration is important for optimizing theinternal organization (Krott and Sutter 2003,
Krott and Stevanov 2004). In all European states,
forest policy formulates goals which can be used
as benchmarks for the state forest service (seeFigure 1). Ecologically sustainable management is
an accepted principle in all European states and is
expected to be supported by the policy activities ofthe state forest service and by the management of
the state land. There is also consensus that multipleuse forestry should produce marketable products
like wood as well as public goods such as recreationor biodiversity. Improving economic strength canbe done by increasing cost efficiency, maximizing
profits and developing new markets. Finally,in the political arena, there is a role for the state
forest administration to be a speaker for forestry
in national policy settings and to act as a mediatorand fair broker between the diverse interests in theforest that range from wood production to nature
conservation.
With respect to the rather small economic
potential of forestry, the state forest services arehuge institutions in Europe. In the old democracies,
the state expanded its administration during the
economically prosperous 1960s and 1970s in order
to offer private forest owners a powerful extension
service and to serve the general population by
providing recreation and nature protection
facilities. The young democracies inherited fromtheir centrally-planned communist systems a welldeveloped state forest administration which was
directly managing the entire forests of the states.
Today, in contrast to the prosperous past,
the driving force of reforming the state forest
administration is the lack of financial means for thestate institution. In the old democracies, the fiscalpressure of the state results in diminishing financial
means needed to cover the deficits of the state forest
administration. In the young democracies, the statebudgets lack the strength to cover any deficit of
the state forest administration; expectations andpolitical pressures are high to generate financial
revenue from the management of the state forests
to contribute back to the general budgets. At best,

the state forest administration gains a more or lessautonomous financial status (Krott 2001).
The reforms mean that the state forest
administrations must switch to a model of “profitseeking state forest administration.” As a result,the market orientation of wood production
turns increasingly towards maximizing profits. In
addition, new markets are expected to finance thepublic services of recreation, nature conservationand environment. Simultaneously, the pressure
to lower costs reduces public goods and services
to a minimum standard. Ecologically sustainable
management is still expected, but pressure for cost
efficiency forces silviculture management into a“mission impossible”—to be highly efficient in
the short run and simultaneously follow long term
ecological standards.
The reforms also have consequences for thepolicy role of the state forest administration.
Public funds are saved by shrinking the stateadministration, which in turn reduces activities inmonitoring, planning and extension. The market
becomes the trusted regulatory force: private forest
owners and industry acquire more freedom to run
forestry according to their own interests.
The model of “profit-seeking state forest
administration” fits very well into the overallchange of the role of public administration within
the government process (Jann 2002). The stateseeks to diminish the financial burden of a large
administration by limiting the direct and free
supply of public goods and services. A slim stateadministration should guarantee at minimumthat additional demands will be served by private
economy and society.
The change into a profit-seeking state forest
administration has already and will in the futurechange the way forestry is managed in the European
countries. By reducing the tasks of the state, theslim forest government concept leaves forestry to
the demands of markets to a greater degree. Twoconsequences are politically most important. Firstly,
shrinking the forest government gives a rather vague
answer as to how to serve the public demands whichcannot be organized into markets, such as manyenvironmental and recreation needs. Secondly,
sooner or later the shrinking forest government
will reach the point when the state forest service
becomes too slim to be able to monitor and guidethe implementation of forest policy in a properway. Consequently, the standards of forest law will
either lose their impact on forest practice or otherpublic administrations will take over the task ofguaranteeing the sustainability of forests.

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 17

4. Forest governanceon a national andinternational level
4.1 Success within forest
governance processes
In the last decade, the policy alternatives toforest government have increased, resulting in theconcept of forest governance. The key elementsof the forest governance concept are shown in
Figure 2. The first pillar symbolizes the state-driven
government process aimed at the formulation andimplementation of political solutions for the forest(Krott 2005). In addition to government, society
and economy also produce rules guiding the useof the forest. The dominant stakeholders in society
are non-profit organizations and associations. In
the economic system, private enterprise dominates
the markets. Whereas in the government concept
all three systems—policy, society and economy—
develop autonomous solutions for the forest, in thegovernance concept the interdependence between
policy, society and economy becomes the central
process for seeking solutions for forestry problems(Rhodes 1996).

Forest governance is forest policy-making as asocial bargaining process for regulating conflicts ofinterests in forests within a self-organizing networkof public and/or private members without formal
dominance of the state. The promise of governanceis that networks can be built up around specificproblems, organizing members from different sectors
with specific resources, competencies, interests,
responsibilities and means to solve problems offorestry. The open communication steers policy
learning, improving the mutual understanding andtriggering new solutions (Shannon and Schmidt
2002). If the willingness to learn is insufficient or
win-win solutions are not at hand, the networks
offer options for negotiations, paving the way forcompromises among the participants.
The National Forest Programs are important
initiatives for developing forest governance strategies
in many European countries (Rayner and Howlett
2004). Since 1992, 12 European countries havestarted National Forest Programs. The programs
are expected to develop improved solutions forsustainably managing forests based on the principles
of broad participation, collaboration and a holistic,
intersectoral approach (Humphreys 2004). In the
National Forest Programs, creating an institutional
platform for a long-term process which develops
iterative adaptive solutions for sustainable forest
management is as important as implementing a

Figure 2: Elements of government and governance in forestry

Page 18 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

specific plan of action (Schanz 2002). To date, 12countries with National Forest Programs, including
Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark, Belgium andGermany, have implemented National Forest
Programs. They operate with a philosophy of stateregulated self-regulation, which means that thestate remains the most important player in guiding
the process. On the other hand, countries like
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom
did not establish National Forest Programs per se,
but developed networks of private self-regulationof specific forestry issues like certification; in thesecountries, the driving factors are private actors witha high capacity to act.
The diverse nature of National Forest Programs
demonstrates that forest governance involves
not only optimally networking stakeholders
through communication with the common goalof sustainably managed forests; it is also a process
driven by power. The process and the outcome
depend highly on the distribution of power andinformation within the networks. Consequently,
for a specific forest institution, the challenge ofgovernance is to identify the patterns of power
and information which are relevant for a specificgovernance instrument. Based on this knowledge,
proactive participation can lead to success, but
in other cases it might also be rational to resist
participating and to save resources for alternative
activities.
Alternate strategies for acting within a network
were analyzed by a recent case study of 12 networks
comprising 234 state and private actors in Finland,
Germany, Greece, UK, Sweden, Spain, Ireland andDenmark (Hasanagas 2004). The analysis model
explains that success within a network is basedon two sets of variables: network conditions andactor-related means. The theoretical explanations
are based on statistically tested data produced by atelephone survey in eight European countries. The
results can be illustrated by an example focusing

on cross-sectorality as a major goal of networking.
In principle, a specific actor can use information,
financial means or pressure for surmounting theborders between sectors (Krott, Hasanagas 2005).
In networks which are dominated by stateagencies and which are strongly formalized,
information or pressure is seldom sufficient to build
new linkages between sectors (See Table 2). Within
this discourse, new arguments from private actors
are selectively used by the state agencies to support
their programs. Even scientific proofs cannot
influence the dominant formal arguments of thestate agency. Additionally, the pressure of private
actors is not strong enough to achieve an impact. The
only effective means is to use financial incentives.
Paradoxically, in the opposite setting, networks thathave low state influence and low formalization do
not offer good chances for effective arguments inthe discourse either. In such networks, the whole
structure is too flexible to pin down commitments
for a joint cross-sector project. This flexibility alsomeans that participants can easily escape pressure.
Nonetheless, financial incentives can again be
sufficient to attract partners.
Networks with low state influence and highformalization offer the best setting for building
bridges across sectors by means of information,
financial means and pressure. Such networks,
described as social corporatism (Jordan, Schubert
1992), enable associational arrangements andspontaneous cooperation. They follow voluntary
political and social procedures which involve theparticipants in cross-sectoral formulation andimplementation of joint solutions. The example
proves that specific network factors do decide
whether and how integrative solutions can beachieved. This supports the conclusion that in somesettings only forest governance will improve thesituation for the forest partners. In other settings,
governance instruments will weaken the position offorestry because certain participants will dominate

Table 2: Means for cross-sector linkages

Actor related means
Use ofinformationUse ofpressure

Use of incentivesLegend:  incompatible;

Network factors





State
importanceFormalization degree

High

High

Low

Low

Low

High

 effective

Source: Krott, M., Hasanagas, N. D. 2005

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 19the results. Network analysis can help identify inadvance the most promising networks.

4.2 New role for a “facilitatingstate forest administration”
The different—but still important—role ofthe state within the governance model also meansa new challenge for the state forest administration(Jann and Wegrich 2004). In practice, governanceneeds a mediator who supports the build-up of awell balanced network of partners and is able tofollow some procedures. In absence of network
rules and mediation, the stronger participants
would easily misuse the arrangement to legitimize
their programs only.
Basically, the role of a mediator fits the state. The
state forest administration could take this position if
it leaves its role as speaker of a forest sector narrowly
focused on wood production and opens up to all
stake-holders interested in the use and protectionof the forest. The mediator must win the trust of
all participants by acting unbiased. The guiding
principle is to enable a sustainable multiple-use of
the forest by organizing a well balanced governanceprocess in joint search for solutions. The process
as such is already a public good and the results are
expected to complement the market-driven forest
use in the cases in which deficits from the point ofview of public goods became apparent.
The task of governance is to facilitate a process
where society and enterprises participate in joint
efforts to support sustained forests. It requires
the state forest administration to change froma profit-driven to a facilitating type of public
administration. Figure 2 demonstrates the essential
differences between the two types. The orientation
toward market demands will diminish and theorientation toward public-good demand and a roleof mediator will strengthen. The goal for efficiency
will remain high because the new role should also
be fulfilled with minimum costs. Throughout
European countries, the state forest administrations
have the best opportunity to be the most efficientfacilitating public administrations because of theirwidespread capacities throughout the region, theircompetence, and their experiences in managing
state-owned forests (Krott 2001). The most difficult
task is to be unbiased and acceptable brokers for allparticipants interested in forests. If the state forest
administrations fail to fulfill the requirements ofgovernance, other public administrations will takethe lead in forest governance. The outcome would
be that the forestry will be restricted to marketbased wood production and the multiple-use issuesof the forest will be taken over by environmental
institutions.

Page 20 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

5. Forest governmentand governance in theEU
In 2001 the EU published the White Paper
on European Governance (European Commission2001). The governance strategy is aimed at healing
the paradox that people all over Europe have: they
see growing problems and expect solutions frompolicy, but they simultaneously distrust all politicalinstitutions especially the EU. Involving people, thestate and private institutions in joint developmentof solutions should increase the acceptance of the
EU. The governance approach has not yet changed
the key elements of EU policy, which is governmentby binding solutions based on the Treaty, butgovernance adds elements of communication anddecision-making via networks to EU activities(Heritier 2001). Combining governance withgovernment means that the participants frompolicy, economy and society do have a chance tofind joint solutions, but if they fail the EU will
go forward with classic government actions. In
practice, governance is done in the shadow of thestate-driven government. Governance often either
becomes the first stage in a process which continues
in traditional legislation, or governance simply
supports the implementation of existing laws. In
both cases, classic government remains the stronger
element of EU policy-making. To date, the EU isstill far from becoming a “confederation of learning
networks.”
The dominance of government and the specific
but limited role of governance are of high relevancefor forest policy on EU level. Based on the Treaty,
the EU has no mandate for an EU forest policy.
This gap in EU policy means not freedom forautonomous national forest policies but rather the
opposite. The national forest policies are highly
influenced by numerous EU policies which haveside effects on forests and the international markets
supported by the EU become driving forces forchanging the forest sector.
Most important to forestry are the growing
demands of the EU environmental policy, e.g.
the Birds Directive, Habitats Directive, Water
Framework Directive and measures for meeting the
Kyoto targets by forest related sinks. Of the same
relevance is EU rural development policy in which
forestry is one integrated part of rural development(Flies 2004). Most financial incentives for forestry
are provided by the EU within the framework ofregional development, meaning that specific forest
sector needs lose relevance. The forest policy role in
EU environmental and rural development policy is
weak due to the lack of an EU forest policy which
could balance the prominent position of othersectors on EU level.

At the moment, the only vehicle for EU forest
policy is forest governance. The EU focuses on
governance in the EU Forest Action Plan 2007–2011. A key element of the strategy is better
communication in order to improve coordinationand cooperation in all policy areas relevant to theforest sector. The National Forest Programs are themost prominent new instruments to organize theimplementation of international commitments.
As discussed, proactive forest governance could
strengthen forestry, but governance is by no meansa guarantee that forestry interests will hold theirposition against growing demands from otherparticipants in the new networks. Of bigger concern
for forest policy is that even if forestry is successful
in the communication networks, these governanceinstruments cannot go beyond the limits drawn by
EU environmental or rural development policy.
A promising strategy for strengthening forest
governance is to focus on international markets.
Because EU government is strongly oriented
towards supporting markets, a market-driven
governance strategy will find a positive response
from EU institutions and policies. The vision
2030 “Innovative and Sustainable Use of Forest
Resources” formulated by the Forest-Based Sector
Technology Platform in February 2005 wants toenlarge the role of the forest-based sector in Europe(Forest-Based Sector Technology Platform 2005).
An innovative forest-based sector could contributesignificantly to the sustainable development of a
globally competitive EU. The initiative would be
driven by representatives of the forestry industry,
private forest owners and science. The basic idea
is the “transition of the sector from being largely
resource driven to being market and knowledge
driven” (Ibid.). Due to the strength of theparticipants and market orientation, the platform
could seed a powerful forest governance process.
The platform is a good example of how
governance in connection with government can havean impact on forest policy. It opens up a window
for all stakeholders interested in strengthening themarket-oriented profitable use of forests in Europe.
This initiative would find support in the important
government task of the EU of strengthening
European-wide markets. Within such a framework,
the interests for market-driven forestry will growstronger, whereas the interests in public goods fromforests as environmental, recreation and cultural
benefits remain limited. Such a setting of interests
within a governance process has a significant
potential to shift the priorities for the multipleuse of European forests under the umbrella ofsustainable development.

6. Labeling EU
forest policy as“modernization”
EU government and governance instruments
claim to address problems better than purely
national forest policies. They argue that cooperationand coordination within the EU will produce added
value. Joint activities gain a better understandingof the cross-border processes driving forestry:
they accumulate knowledge and experiences andgenerate innovative solutions. The EU presents
modern solutions superior to national forest policy,
which is limited by tradition, by strengthening new
governance processes in forestry (Hogl et al 2008)
and encouraging technological innovation. Why is
the EU claim—that it is modern and innovative—
widely accepted despite the common negative
image of the EU as “bureaucratic institution” farremoved from the needs of the citizen?
The reasons are partly because of the EU
information process and partly a result of power
strategies. On the information level, there are goodarguments that a community of 500 million people
has a greater potential for generating innovative ideas
than a single member country, and 1000 million
hectares of forests provide a significant incentive
for problem solving. More important than theseinformational or technical arguments are the power
strategies. For all EU institutions, it is essentialthat they claim to be better than the national
institutions. Being better, i.e. modern, legitimizes
the EU and its institutions. It is unthinkable for
the EU to admit that member states might knowa policy field better and simultaneously argue that
the EU should be more active in that field.
As important as the argument of superiorityof EU institutions is the informal power strategy
of member states. Stakeholders in a member state
can use the EU as an influential support policy thatfaces resistance within their own country. In thiscase they promote modern EU forest policy just tochange national forest polices in a direction they
prefer. For example, for environmental groups it
is easier to demand protected forest areas using
modern EU concepts of biodiversity and European
heritage than to demand protecting areas using
only national arguments.
Furthermore, member states compete ininfluencing EU institutions to formulate policies
which are in line with their respective national
interests and thus promote them as modern andoptimal solutions for all EU countries (Jordan
2005 p. 1). For example, in Finland, its National
Forest Program is well-suited to the local policy
style and forest policy framework, which are
dominated by the forest and wood-based industry
sector. Therefore Finland promotes National Forest
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 21

Programs as modern instruments of forest policy
and necessary part of the EU forest strategy. In
this way, the instrument preferred by a particularmember state is endorsed by the EU as the modern
instrument which each member state should use.
In summary, it is an advantage for both EU
institutions as well as certain powerful national
stakeholders to label EU policy as modern.
Therefore, EU forest policy solutions—especiallygovernance instruments in forestry—are claimed to
be innovative and superior much more often than isjustified. In conclusion, the dominance of national
forest policies within Europe does not mean thattraditional forest policy is outdated. It shows onlythat the golden shine of EU modernization is notstrengthening forests as much as other competing
sectors like nature conservation which getsreasonable warmth from EU.

6. Conclusion: Toward
a wise national useof “modern” forest
governance
The integration of Europe has created new
cross-border problems for national forest policies,
but at the same time the international policy process
has introduced governance as a modern concept
for forest policy. Based on theory and empiricalexamples, it is clear that governance is a new
approach to policy making within self-organizing
networks comprised of participants from policy,
economy and society. The challenge in a changing
Europe is to implement “modern” governance that
also complements the classic instruments of forest
government:
1.

2.

Forest government only has the ability
to solve problems by enforcing solutions
backed by the power of the state. Withina forest policy driven by real conflicts, thisbasic function cannot be replaced by a noncompulsory process like governance. The
challenges of forest government are different
in young and old democracies in Europe.
Whereas the young democracies have toimprove implementation to impact forestry
in the field, the old democracies need to
speed up the formulation of new legal
programs to keep up with innovation in thefield by private and state forest users.
Forest governance processes—as National
Forest Programs, certification or MCPFE—offer chances for mutual learning bystakeholders from policy, economy andsociety in forestry issues. Forest scientists inPage 22 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

particular could use these forums to increase
the transfer of knowledge about forests
between stakeholders.
Apart from information exchange, forest
governance processes deal with power as theytackle issues of forestry. It will depend on
the distribution of information and power
if a certain forest participant will be able toorganize support for his or her interests andneeds. Therefore, it is not recommended
to join every forest-related network. The
most important strategic decision is toselect the most useful networks. Scientificquantitative network-analysis provides
relevant information about the power andinformation processes within networks.
The state forest administration—comprisedof policy tasks and management of stateowned forest in different organization
models—is the key player in forest
government. The European trend ofdownsizing state budgets has caused highpressure on the state forest administrations
to focus on profit-oriented market activities.
The profit-seeking state forest administration
is forced to reduce services of public goods
from the forests.
Governance offers a new task for a facilitatingstate forest administration. Governanceprocesses need a neutral mediator to activate
the network. Such a role could be fulfilledby the state forest administration if it gives
up the narrow focus of being only the
speaker for profit-oriented sustainable wood
production. If the state forest administration
fails, another state administration will do thejob and gain a central role in the forest.
Governance can gain momentum if it fits
well into specific government programs. A
recent example is the Forest-Based Sector
Technology Platform 2005. The platform
promotes the shift toward a market-driven
forest sector throughout Europe. This focus
on markets fits well into the key agenda of
the EU to strengthen free markets.
Governance is weak when it tries to change
the impacts of government programs. The
EU Forest Action Plan is an example forsuch frustrating efforts. The non-binding
forestry strategy cannot protect forestry
from the impacts of other forest-related
policies of the EU, especially environmental
or rural development policy. In these cases,
governance means that forest participants
accept and adapt to the EU government
framework already decided by otherpolicies.
EU forest instruments are frequently labelled“modern” and thus superior to national forest
policy. To a great degree this label is applied

9.

by the informal interests of EU institutions
and specific member states. Therefore EU
forest governance is often unjustifiably
lauded as modernization. Traditional
national instruments might be better andmore innovative in many instances.
Governance is a challenging and sometimes
risky search for new solutions to forestry
issues by networking participants frompolicy, economy and society. A wise useof governance means keeping in mind thestrength and reliability of the classic forest
government instruments and moving
beyond them only after verifying that theeffort is worthwhile.

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Page 24 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Chapter 3
New agendas, old habitsin Amazonian forest policies
Wil de Jong1
1

Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto University

Abstract
The forest sector has experienced profound changes worldwide since the 1990s. Property rights
over forest lands have been devolved to resident populations. Over 60 countries with large extension oftropical forests have decentralized their government processes, including forest decision making. Where
decentralization has occurred, local people have gained a voice in local government, which in theory
extends to forest decision making. Forests have also gained a new role as a contributor to rural development
and community forestry has expanded as a result. This chapter reviews the unfolding of those trends in
the Amazon region, in particular in Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. While important progress has been madein devolution of forest property rights, forest decision making is still largely in the hands of specialized
agencies. However, often through grass roots organizations and NGOs, local interests are being taken
into account. Communal forestry is increasing, but still at a rather slow pace. The old political habitsslow down progress in forest governance reform. The timber industry continues to expand, and in theentire region illegal timber extraction exceeds legal extraction. Forest regulation is designed mainly for atimber sector forest exploitation model, and governments impose excessively complicated and expensive
administrative requirements on the new forest users. National political struggles in Bolivia and neoliberal
economic policies in Peru undermine the progress that Amazon countries have made in their reform offorest policy.

1. Introduction
The last two decades have seen important andencouraging changes in the forest sector worldwide,
what Sunderlin et al. (2008) call a forest paradigm
shift. Since the late 1970s tropical deforestation has
become an issue of worldwide concern. The issue
was high on the agenda of the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro, and this pivotal meeting has been
followed by subsequent intergovernmental forums
and plans of actions, currently known as the United
Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF 2009). This
forum and participating UN member countries
are committed to achieving sustainable forest
management and enhancing the contributions offorest to development goals. Similar changes havebeen taking place at the country level. Since theearly 1990s many countries have adjusted theirlegislation to reflect the changing views of forest.

This has included legislation to transfer property
rights to local forest users, which has encouraged
granting indigenous and small holder private
ownership or allocating forest land exclusively for
local users (Sunderlin et al. 2008). In addition
to these wider forest governance changes, related
projects in communal forest management andcommunal forest enterprise development haveemerged (Sabogal et al. 2008). Community forestry
has been introduced and promoted throughout
Latin America (Ibid.) with important successes inCentral America and Mexico (Bray et al. 2005).
The forest sectors in countries in the Amazon
basin have experienced equally profound changesof the last two decades. Most relevant, perhaps,
has been the change in formal property rights overforest lands, which has advanced more in SouthAmerican countries than anywhere else in the world(Sunderlin et al. 2008). Since the mid-1990s forest
policies have been adjusted to refocus the forest
sector on rural development and conservation, as
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 25

opposed to promoting corporate forestry dedicatedto commercial timber extraction. These recent shifts
suggest that forest conservation, equitable benefit
sharing and national development objectives are
better addressed now than they were several decadesago.
In 2008, tropical forestry took a new turn. The
contribution of forest conversion or degradation
to global carbon emission is generating many socalled REDD initiatives (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Degradation). REDD
was preceded by payment for environmental
services (PES), which includes REDD as well asother services like downstream water regimes andbiodiversity conservation. REDD and PES increase
the market value of intact natural forests. Holding
ownership over those forests should, in theory,
create conditions that allow people to benefit fromthe increased value of standing natural forests.
Other factors, however, are having worrisome
effects on forests and their benefits. Biofuel
production—carbon dioxide neutral alternatives tofossil fuel—is gearing up in major tropical forest
countries like Indonesia and Brazil. While biofuels
and REDD initiatives are the most visible and highprofile trends in tropical forestry these days, other
trends can also be expected to have impacts: highoil prices, as experienced in 2008, and the current
international financial crisis will arguably continue
to impact tropical forests. Both trends already haveseriously impacted rural livelihoods as commodity
prices have increased, incomes declined, foreign
remittances reduced and a vast number of people
returned to the countryside from cities because oflost jobs. The latter trends are likely to continue forsome time, and it can be expected that rural people
will increasingly turn to forests to make up for the
economic downturn.
While the sketch of the forest sector above
might suggest that Amazon countries would bewell positioned for appropriate policy responses tothe trends presented, a closer look at the politicallandscape invites a more sobering outlook. A
deeper examination shows important positive
developments but also some persistent obstacles
that have prevented the forest sector from achieving
rural development and conservation objectives,
even though these objectives were actively pursued
in policies and legislation. Furthermore, in severalof the countries with Amazon territories, the wider
political landscape is negatively affecting the forest
sector.
This paper aims to provide a brief synopsis
of the forest sector and its recent policies in the
Amazon basin. The paper also presents some of theextra-sectoral factors that are currently influencing
forestry itself. Based on this overview, the paper
then speculates on what may lie ahead given thecontemporary worldwide trends mentioned. The
focus of this discussion is Bolivia, Brazil and Peru,
Page 26 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

three countries that hold within their territories
7%, 60% and 13% respectively of the 5.5 million
km2 total Amazon tropical forest. These countries
are growing increasingly connected by an everexpanding road network, a fact that will greatly
influence the future of the Amazon forest landscapeand forestry.
Section Two summarizes the positive trendsof the last two decades in the forest sector in thethree countries. Section Three observes some of
the “old habits,” that constrain the forest agendas
for conservation, poverty alleviation or national
economic development. Section Four draws some
general points from the evidence presented in thechapter and Section Five concludes.

2. New forest agendas in
Latin America
The Amazon region countries have completed
important forestry reforms over the last decades,
as part of the global trends in forestry mentioned
above. There are three main indicators of thechanges that have occurred. The clearest indicator is
the widespread forest and forestland tenure reform.
A second indicator is the change in forest related
decision making and the extent to which decision
making became more democratic and participative.
A last indicator is the progress that has been made in
so-called “communal forestry” in various countries
in the region.

Tenure reform
Brazil’s most recent land and forest tenurereform began with the revised 1988 constitution
which recognized rights to land by indigenous
people and slave descendents. The same constitution
also distinguishes between public and private
property, determining that forests held under any
other regimes but private property are consideredpublic lands. The total area of 381 indigenous lands
and 35 extractive reserves is about 115 million ha,or over 20% of the Brazilian Amazon (Chirif andGarcia-Hierro 2007, Stone 2006). In addition tothese two categories, Brazil recognizes land rights
held by communities of slaved descendents, and socalled sustainable use settlement projects, which aresimilar to extractive reserves.
An important and widely known exampleof tenure reform related to forests is that of theextractive reserves of Brazil. Extractive reserves
are large areas of mainly forested lands, mostly
found in the Eastern Amazon, where the resident
population has been granted exclusive use for forest
exploitation. Extractive reserves result from claims
by local populations that protecting their customaryforest use is a sustainable development and forest
conservation strategy. By 2006, extractive reserves
totaled of over 8 million ha, with individual sizes
varying between 1,181 ha and 1,319,661 ha (Stone
2006, Cronkleton et al. 2008).
The establishment of indigenous territories in
Bolivia parallels the extractive reserves in Brazil.
Bolivia began to revise its forest governance inthe early 1990s. A significant step was signing theILO Convention 169 in early 1992, which calls
for the recognition of indigenous property rights
over lands which were historically under customary
ownership. Bolivia subsequently enacted legislation
to implement the convention and initiated wide
ranging land tenure reform. Since the mid 1990s,
large stretches of ancestral lands have been granted toindigenous groups as original communal territories(TCO for its acronym in Spanish). Sources provide
different figures about the number and extent of
TCOs. Chirif and Garcia Hierro (2008) provide
a figure of 12.5 million ha of land that has beenrequested by indigenous groups, of which 7.4
million ha had been titled by 2006.
In addition, other legislation allows formal
recognition of erstwhile legally nonexistent ruralcommunities and has allowed farmer communities
in the forest rich Bolivian Amazon to be granted
communal lands. The size of the grant is equivalent
to the number of families in the community times
500 ha. As a result several million ha of forestland in
the north are now communally owned, in addition
to the TCOS held by indigenous groups.
The picture of tenure reform in Peru is lessunequivocal as in Bolivia or Brazil. Taylor (2006b)
mentions that state recognition of indigenous
land rights already happened in 1916. However,
only in 1974 did the country’s legislation formallyrecognize indigenous communities as a legal
entity that can solicit property rights over forest
territory. A territory titling process for indigenous
communities only began in the 1980s, but has
meanwhile resulted in over 10 million ha of land
being titled for indigenous communities. This is
only 62% of about 16 million ha that AIDESEP,
the association representing Peru’s indigenous
federations, proposed as a goal (Chirif and GarciaHierro 2007).
The legislation, however, distinguishes between
rights to agricultural versus forest land. An
indigenous community may hold legal property
rights over the former, but only usufruct rights overthe latter (Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 2007). Lakes
and rivers, common in most parts of the Peruvian
Amazon and an integral part of customary territories,
are entirely excluded from the indigenous territories
legislation. These stipulations seriously weaken therights held by indigenous communities, and cases
have occurred in which government officials choseto ignore even those recognized rights and allow
intrusion by other parties, even leading to violent

conflicts (Chirif 2008). Of further concern is thequest for sub-soil natural resources. Almost theentire Peruvian Amazon is carved up for possible
exploitation; 36 million ha overlap with indigenous
territories. While communities must technically be
consulted if mineral exploration is to take place, itdoes not mean that communities are protected fromdanger: companies operating inside watersheds
have left parts of indigenous territories with highlevels of contamination and near toxic levels ofcontamination of the resident population.
In addition to indigenous communities, asignificant number of farming communities occupy
territory along rivers and the main roads. While mostof them have some degree of formal recognitionby the state, there are few who have acquired thelegal status of comunidad campesina. Those that do
not have this status are not able to hold legal title
over territory. In practice the communities in the
Amazon that are formally recognized also have acommunal territory (see http://www.siamazonia.
org.pe accessed 2009-2-6). These are usually small
areas, and formal property rights can be held only
by individuals. In addition, communities have socalled communal reserves, protected areas overwhich communities hold limited rights for natural
resource use.

Democratization of forest
decision making
The three countries reviewed here haveexperienced important decentralization processes
over the last two decades (Larson et al. 2006). These
decentralization reforms have been significant and
far reaching. While they have impacted forest
decision making in different degrees, without doubt
decentralization—as well as other related governancereforms—has had important implications for the
democratization of forest decision making.
Brazil has a federal political structure, whichmeans that while national policy and legislation
define the general aspects of forestry, state
governments have gained important influence
over forest matters: control of forest policies falls
within state jurisdiction (Larson et al. 2006,
Stone 2006). For instance, the state of Acre, thehome of the rubber tapper movement, has since1998 promoted sustainable forest management,
including community based initiatives (Stone
2006). Brazil, like many other countries in SouthAmerica and elsewhere, has also assigned important
responsibilities, authority and resources tomunicipal governments. However, most municipal
governments carry out little forest decision making.
Specific agencies in charge of forest property
categories dominate decision making where diverse
property regimes is concerned. The extent to which

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 27

these agencies allow for democratic decision making
varies per agency.
While formal governance reforms—mostly
reflected in the decentralization process—have yet
to seriously affect forest decision making, several
agencies and state governments have become more
susceptible to pressures from forest stakeholders
and their support organizations. The latter haveformed various more or less formal coalitions, often
reaching beyond national borders (Colchester et al.
2003). By using national and international media
and political lobbying, forest stakeholders havebecome effective in influencing agencies and state
governments in the definition of forest related
policies. The literature also reports that Brazilian
state governments have become more forest
and forestry development minded on their own
initiative, even where civil society organizations
remain weak (Stone 2006).
Beginning in the 1990s, Bolivia experienced
a municipalization process similar to Brazil’s.
Decentralization reforms and a new forest law gave
municipal governments wide reaching decision
making autonomy over municipal forest lands.
These reforms meant that forests could be given out
as concessions to organized groups other than forest
companies. Forest-rich municipal governments
were required to set up their own forest unit, andin some municipalities they actually took activities
over from the national forest agencies (Taylor
2006a). In addition to making forest decision
making more democratic, the changes also madethe forest sector more accountable and transparent
and eliminated some of the most blatant political
patronage that marked the sector before the mid1990s reform.
The forestry reform fundamentally changed therules of forest exploitation in Bolivia. Concession
holders, including communities, now pay a fee
per area and not per volume of product exploitedas before. The new fee structure was expected tofinance agencies in charge of implementing andmonitoring and leave funds to be invested into
forest research. Furthermore, the demands onforest management plans and annual operationplans became stricter.
While decentralization in Peru has notprogressed at the same pace as in Bolivia and Brazil,
the country has experienced other encouraging
forest governance reform mechanisms. Peru enacted
decentralization legislation to transfer importantfaculties and resources to departmental governments
and municipalities. The actual implementations ofthese new regulations, however, have been quite
slow, largely because of a tenacious resistance frompast several central governments in power. Only inthe last few years have Amazonian departmental
governments actually been taking over control offorest governance.

Page 28 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

However, as in Brazil, civil society in Peru
has been quite pro-active in pursuing local land
rights, sustainable forestry and communal forestry
agendas. During the early 2000s shortly after thecollapse of the Fujimori regime when the country
was in serious political crisis, in several regions in
the country including Lima so-called forest mesas
de concertación (reconciliation tables) emerged.
Mesas de concertación were regular meetings ofactors who had some interest or stake in the forest
sector to discuss pressing agendas that had notbeen agreed upon by the participants. While mesas
de concertación had no formal authority, they werequite influential and were taken very seriously by
the various government agencies. The latter also
actively participated in the meetings. The mesas
de concertación forestal or related groups continue
today in Peru and in some cases have become quite
influential forums.

Advances in communal forestry
Sabogal et al. (2008) consider communal
forestry as all forest management not carried out
by corporate or single person enterprises, with the
purpose of improving the well being of membersof villages or other types of settlements throughsustainable forest use. Community forestry
operates within the bounds of relevant legislation,
makes collective decisions on areas being managed,
applies reduced impact management, focuses
mainly on forest product commercialization andreceives external technical support. While thisdefinition of communal forestry excludes, forinstance, forest management carried out by many
Amazonian residents that is not market-oriented,
it does, however, allow for an assessment of how
much progress forestry reform is making inachieving development objectives. Regardless, dataon communal forestry is hard to come by, whichmakes assessing progress difficult even under such anarrow definition.
While communal forestry, often manifested
as communal forestry enterprises (Molnar et al.
2007), has made considerable progress in countries
like Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, theprogress is more limited in Amazonian countries.
In Brazilian state of Acre, where communal forestry
has progressed most (Ibid.), government support
for communal forest initiatives has significantly
improved (Cronkleton et al. 2008). The support
shifted its focus from rubber, to Brazil nut, andfinally to also include timber. Rubber used to be themainstay of communal forestry in Acre before it was
replaced by Brazil nut when state rubber subsidies
stopped. Brazil nut production was eventually
outstripped by Bolivia, prompting the recent focus
on timber that has taken place in Acre. While somecommunities have been making the transition totimber, this has not yet been a region-wide trend
because of locally limited capacities and persistentconstraints from regulatory agencies. Since 2000,
the state government has expanded its support to26 communities that previously largely focused on
rubber. In 2005 a cooperative was established tosupport timber producing communities. Because of
the constraints and limited progress, many people
are turning to cattle ranching as an alternative tocommunal timber production (Cronkleton et al.
2008).
One trajectory of communal forestry can be seenfrom the example of the sustainable development
reserve in Mamirauá in the state of Amazonas.
Beginning in the late 1970s, communities began
to protect fish stocks in lakes located within theforest territory. In the mid-1980s, conservationists
started to promote the region as a conservation area.
Since then, communities, conservationists and the
Amazonas government have negotiated to reachcommon ground. Existing communal organizations
set up since the 1970s played an important rolein the progress made. Important advances havealso been made in organizing communal logging,building very much on existing communal practices.
An important adaptation has been to simplify theregulatory norms for communal logging so thatparticipants do not have to prepare the elaborate
and expansive management plans usually required(Cronkleton et al. 2008).
Communal forestry in Bolivia has equallysignificant experiences to report. Communities
have several ways to access the forest for communal
forestry. They can organize themselves as a social sitegroup (ASL for its acronym in Spanish) in whichcase they can access public lands outside communal
territory. By 2006 the Forest Service had approved
29 ASL management plans for a total of 600,000
ha, and some 83 ASLs had registered. Not all ASL
members, however, are community members,
as several cases are known of ASLs composed ofmembers who reside in local towns.
Bolivia’s forest law grants indigenous inhabitants
exclusive rights to exploit forest products from thelands they own, including TCO lands. Nebel et al.
(2003) estimate that indigenous groups hold 8.3
million ha of forest with commercially valuabletimber. In 2006, 83 indigenous community forest
enterprises had a forest management plan or anannual logging plan and exploited more than 1.3
million ha (Benneker 2008). NGOs finance mostof the forest management plans and annual logging
plans, and corporate forest enterprises finance animportant number of annual logging plans. About
20% of the plans were financed independently.
The influence of private companies incommunal forest development in Bolivia is mostnotable in the increase of farmer communities
managing forest areas over 200 ha, an area thatneeds a formally approved management plan. By

2006, 52 communities held forest management
plans and 28 held annual logging plans of a
combined area of more than 500 thousand ha.
About two thirds of these plans were financed bytimber companies and about one third by NGOs.
When timber companies finance the management
plans, communities sell their timber exclusively tothe company, and the company may be fully incharge of the logging. Several mechanisms exist forfarmers to log smaller tracks of forest with more
simple procedures. However, in many instances,these mechanisms have been used to illegally log
timber from wider areas (Cronkleton and Albernoz
2004, Benneker 2008).
The Brazil nut sector in northern Bolivia
has experienced important communal forestry
progress. Previously most Brazil nut stands were
held in private estates by the regional economic
elite. As a result of the region-wide devolution offorestlands to communities, community members
have increasingly shifted to harvesting Brazil nuts
from their own communal lands instead of working
as laborers on private estates. In the department of
Pando alone, 157 communities had their communal
land formally recognized as part of the national land
titling process. Approximately 40% of the territory
in Pando, a total of 2.4 million ha, is now underindigenous or communal ownership. All of thesecommunities are likely to be harvesting Brazil nuts
from their own lands.
Peruvian legislation defines communal forests
as located within indigenous lands and small farmer
communities; these forests are for exclusive use by
the communities, providing they are exploited withapproved management plans. Legislation related toprotected areas requires consultation with resident
communities, and their representatives must joinprotected area management committees.
Peru’s progress in communal forest management
was heavily influenced by its turbulent recent
history. During much of the 1980s and 1990s,
the important forest regions were controlled byinsurgent groups or were the theater of battles witharmed forces. The actual management of forests
by communities, to the extent that community
forestry as defined by Sabogal et al. (2008) is taking
place, is still limited to some 80 initiatives. Some
important experiences do exist related to protectedareas and forest with similar status (Alvarez etal. 2007). However, in general protected area
management remains top down and does nottruly meet participatory standards (Swiderska et al.
2008).

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 29

3. Old habits in Latin
American forest policies
The persistent timber industry
In Brazil, Bolivia and Peru the timber industry
has continued to thrive and remains an important
player in the forest policy arena; as such, timbercompanies often interfere with the forest activitiesof other actors.
Since signing the new forest law in 2006,
Brazil introduced the concept of national forestsand expects to designate 50 million ha as national
forests by 2010. In 2005, a new concession system
was enacted for the exploitation of national forests,
and the newly establish Brazilian Forest Service is
now in charge of its implementation. This policy,
however, still awaits full implementation as only 14
million m3 of timber were authorized to be logged
in 2004, while that year saw production 24.5
million m3 (Barreto et al. 2006), about two thirds
for domestic consumption. Brazil also has 28% of
its Amazon territory designated as conservation
area and plans to protect an additional 10% (GFW
2009).
The forest sector in Bolivia has changed
dramatically in the past three decades. The country’s
timber industry expanded significantly in the 1970s
when tropical forests became accessible becauseof oil exploitation. Then nationwide economic
decline, particularly the differential exchange rateapplied at the time, negatively affected the timber
sector. Once Bolivia adopted neoliberal economic
policies, the timber sector bounced back. However,the sector became notoriously corrupt and a tool
for political patronage. By 1994, timber companies
had been granted 20 million ha of forests for
logging; production had increased from 320,000
to 448,000 m3. During the late 1990s, production
declined drastically because of a regional economiccrisis and also because of the new, stricter forest
regulations. The 2005 production reached 826,000
m3 and in Bolivia some 2 million ha of forest land
were certified, mostly in large concessions (Pacheco
et al. forthcoming).
The forest sector in Peru had mostly collapsedby the beginning of the 1990s because of civil war
and threats from insurgent groups which controlled
access routes to timber-rich forests. When the civil
war subsided, the industry rebounded thoughinitially with little effective regulation or control.
Timber came mostly from annual harvestingrights over 1000 ha areas, but companies were
exploiting much larger areas in reality. The newtimber legislation assigns exploitation rights basedon public bidding with an area-based fee andunder strict management and administrative rules.
However, the implementation of forest regulation
Page 30 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

is minimal, and almost all of Peru’s timber is fromillegal sources.
The fact remains that, despite efforts tocontrol the timber industry, illegal logging is
rampant in Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. Barreto et al.
(2006) suggest that 40% of Brazil’s production isillegal, and most experts estimate that 90% of thetimber from the Peruvian tropical lowlands is logged
illegally. Furthermore, given the administrative andtechnical requirements required to run logging
operations (see the next section), new forest actors
often have no other choice than to turn to companies
to assist them when trying to get access to timberon land that is now theirs (Benneker 2009), mostly
on very unfavorable terms for communities.

Regulatory obstacles todemocratic forestry
One of the consequences of the forestry reforms
described above is that stricter rules on forest
exploitation apply to all users. Corporate actors,
small entrepreneurs, and community actors are
required to follow often unreasonable regulations
that do not adequately consider the potential impactof certain forest uses or users or the capacities of theusers to comply with the regulations.
In Bolivia and Peru, there is no distinction
between who engages in forest exploitation andthe technical requirements of the exploitation. In
Bolivia, a distinction is made for timber exploitationof areas larger and smaller than 200 ha. Areas under
200 ha do not require a detailed management plan.
However, for areas over 200 ha, forest companies,
ASLs and communities all need to prepare
technically complicated management plans that are
costly to prepare and require expensive expertise,
yet which are often ignored once approved.
Brazil nut collection is another forest activity
for which the Bolivian Ministry of Sustainable
Development has elaborated a set of norms (MDS2009). However, the norms are shaped largely ona timber extraction model. In most cases, only
people with professional training, certified as forest
technicians, are allowed to prepare the necessary
inventories and management plans in order to get
official permission to extract Brazil nuts. This implies
that, according to the rules, potential Brazil nut
collectors, even those who collect from communal
forest land, would need to engage universitytrained specialists to undertake the necessary datacollection and prepare a management plan that
conforms to the technical guidelines. However,the costs required for such management plans far
surpass the income from Brazil nut collection. As
a result, Brazil nut collection in Bolivia remains
largely outside of any regulatory mechanism.
As mentioned above, Brazil has actuallyadopted regulations that simplify the procedures

for communities engaging in timber extraction.
However, Brazil is still the exception rather than
the rule. In addition to the complex regulations
and administrative procedures required to gain
legal access to forests in Amazonian countries,
institutional weakness, lack of administrative
capacity and rampant corruption among agencies
in charge of natural resource administration arecommon. One example from Peru that demonstrates
these constraints involves an indigenous group, theYacutaita. The group began an initiative in the late
1990s to manage fish reserves—especially the highly
priced and much sought after Arapaima gigas—in
the Dorado Lake, located within the tropicallowland National Reserve Pacaya Samiria. Withassistance from a Peruvian NGO, the Yacutaita
prepared an A. gigas management plan, which
focused mainly on monitoring the lake to keep out
all illegal fishing. However, the plan took nine years
to be approved, even though monitoring the species
and establishing a corresponding fish quota is afairly straightforward process. During these years,
the community achieved an A. gigas population
increase from a handful to 600 mature individuals.
Only 10 percent of the mature population was tobe harvested and sold annually, with which thecommunity could finance the monitoring costs andstill obtain a handsome profit. However, in 2008,
even though the community had an approved
management plan, the annual harvesting permit
was rejected because of technical observations. This
will likely undermine the monitoring activities,
which are financed by the annual harvest. As aresult, the Dorado Lake fish population will once
again be subject to rampant illegal fishing (Chirif2009).

Political battlefields and forest
policies
Bolivia, like many Latin American countries,
has seen significant upheaval throughout most of
its history. A new chapter began when Evo Morales
and the MAS social movement were voted into
power three years ago. MAS and Morales represent
mostly Andean indigenous people and traditional
coca growers, people who until recently had largely
remained at the margins of the political theater,which, until recently, had been dominated byparties representing the economic elite and themore traditional labor organizations.
The political victories of MAS and Moralescaused alienation with the elites in four of Bolivia’snine departments in the eastern area of the country.
Three of these departments, Santa Cruz, Beni andPando also hold most of the country’s tropicallowland forest.
While the forest sector in Bolivia has experienced
important and positive changes, as explained above,the sector also has serious structural weaknesses that
require a sustained political and institutional support
and possibly future adjustments (Ruiz 2005). The
new forest regime relies on a national agency toadminister and monitor, and municipalities anddepartmental governments are largely in chargeof forest development of forests that are held as
private property by indigenous groups and small
farmer communities or as concessions by timbercompanies and ASLs. The system was working
poorly, even before the MAS government took
control of Bolivia. The national forest agency
relied on fees and taxes from the sector for its
daily operation, but forest users, especially timbercompanies, were unwilling or unable to pay the per
area fees established under the new regulation. The
forest sector was of little interest to departmental
governments, and municipal governments often
had insufficient capacity and resources to establish
effective forest units. As a result, the new forest
regime has almost collapsed. While it promoted
forest devolution, allowed multiple actors to enter
the sector and promoted democratic decision
making, the new forest regime was largely aneoliberal endeavor, since it promoted profits andrelied on market mechanisms.
The MAS government intended to pursue amore socialist agenda, making community forestry
a top priority (Pacheco et al. in preparation). This
new focus, however, has hardly been pursued yet,in part because most of Bolivia forest activities
are located within three departments that oppose
the government. The departmental governments
view the heads of the departmental offices of thenational forest agencies as representatives of the
MAS government. Furthermore, the same political
battles are being played out at higher levels: USAID
and various other international development
agencies that supported forestry joined the trend ofantagonizing the MAS government, even before theUnited States’ ambassador to Bolivia was expelledfrom the country in 2008. As a result of theserecent developments, the Bolivian forest sector isin virtual stalemate. The successfully passed recent
referendum, in which a new Constitution was
adopted that promotes distribution and equity,
including access to forest lands, is likely not tochange the conflicting positions between thenational government and forest-rich departments
and municipalities.
Similar conflicting national and regional
tensions can be reported from Peru. In October
2007, Peru’s president, Alan Garcia Perez, wrote
in El Comercio, the country’s most respected
newspaper, an article with the title: El syndrome delperro del hortelano, which loosely translates as “thedog in the manger.” It is a metaphor that symbolizes
Garcia’s disagreement with forest policies whichemphasize forest conservation, which recognize

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 31

ancestral rights, and which promote locally driven
economic and social development.
The Garcia government’s views on the forest
sector are driven by two main forces. One is its faithin neo-liberal economics as the way to solidify or
expand the macro-economic growth that Peru has
experienced since the end of 1990s economic crisisand political turmoil. When in power from 1985
until 1990, Garcia and his APRA party pursued
a progressive economic policy, which included amoratorium on national debt payments and thenationalization of major banks. Since returning
to power in 2006, Garcia has pursued a neoliberal
economic policy, continuing the trajectory of
his predecessor, Alejandro Toledo. The second
driving force is the recent free trade agreementwith the United States. While that agreement
was approved under the Bush administration, themajority Democratic Congress required that Peru
address illegally logged timber entering in the
United States. The Garcia Government has used
the Peru-US FTA to pursue forest policies that are
ultimately driven by a neoliberal economic agenda,
favoring privatization and capital investment,with the expectation that this will benefit all forest
stakeholders. The Garcia government proposed
legislation—Decree 1015 and 1073— which
would allow a simple majority of votes, as opposed
to requiring a 66% majority as was established byprevious legislation, to decide on the assignment ofcommunal lands, including sales to outsiders. Thiswas seen by many people as a measure to permit
private companies to buy communal lands anduse them as private investments. After widespreadnational and international protests, the proposal
was voted down in August 2008.
A similar example is the proposition of Decree
1090, essentially a revision of the forest law
demanded by the United States for the free trade
agreement to be signed. The revision ironically
identified as “the law of the jungle” created theopportunity to obtain private ownership over socalled “vacant lands” (tierras eriazas). The lands
described under this legislation can only be used forreforestation purposes. Supposedly, some 8 million
ha of the 63 million ha of forest lands, are apt forsuch reforestation on privately held forestlands.
Already some cases have been reported in which
fully-grown forest was given as a reforestation
concession, effectively giving a carte blanche forindiscriminate logging of the forests, something thatis widely expected to occur under the proposed newlegislation. Many also foresee legal opportunities
for economically powerful actors to obtain legal
ownership rights over land held under usufruct
property rights by others.

Page 32 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

4. Amazonian forest
policy: A Sisyphus
syndrome or a tripudium
step?
On reviewing the evidence presented in
sections two and three, there seems to be reason to
be optimistic about Amazonian forestry and related
forest policies; but at the same time there is reason
for concern. Probably the biggest advance in thelast two decades is that forestry is now generally
viewed as a sector that can address some social goals
by providing various services and addressing certain
needs, including development and conservation, in
addition to national economic growth. Not least ofall, it is now widely recognized and even enacted
as law that development objectives are primarily amatter to be determined by those who are to beaffected.
The tenure reforms summarized above anddescribed in more detail elsewhere (Larson etal. 2008) are certainly important and relevant
advances, because they provide the very foundationnecessary to realize the multiple goals that forests are
now expected to fulfill. However, gaining property
rights without any significant opportunities toimprove additional outcomes make these changes
meaningless. So far, the evidence suggests thatproperty rights reforms have not yet generated
major additional positive outcomes. Whilecommunal forestry is being promoted and ishaving some success, the commercial timber sector
has continued to expand, in many cases competingwith communal forestry (Sabogal et al. 2008).
Sunderlin et al. (2008) had to search extensively
in the material that they have gathered on forest
property changes between 2002 and 2008 to comeup with a short list of examples where changes inproperty rights resulted in benefits to communities,
lower levels of illegal logging or more sustainable
use of forests. As Benneker (2008), de Jong et al.
(2006) and Cronkleton et al. (2008) have shown,the private sector has adjusted to the property rights
changes, but is in many cases coercing the newforest owners into agreements and collaborations inwhich the terms are largely dictated by the powerfuland political well-connected private sector.
The governments and government agencies
responsible for regulating and administering
natural resources of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil are
to be commended for advances, but at the sametime they can be blamed for lack of progress.
While at times enlightened government personnel
might go to great efforts to adjust forest agendas
to better comply with the multiple goals of theforest sector, it is this same sector that imposes
obstacles to progress. For example, even thoughthere were serious weaknesses, there was muchpotential in the forest sector reforms in Bolivia
in the 1990s; nonetheless, political infighting has
seriously curtailed the positive trends. This hascome on top of disingenuous attitudes among
lower tiers of governments where often political
success and survival had priority over implementing
forest policies that would assure more equitable,
democratic and sustainable outcomes.
The forest sector worldwide has been plagued
in recent years by rampant illegality. This illegality
is of great concern. It reflects on the one handthat societies are more concerned about theirnatural resources, that the value of tropical forest
has increased, and that the sector is now better
incorporated in national administration andregulation processes. As a result illegality has
become more visible. On the other hand, theillegality shows that the possibilities to impose therule of law on the forest sector have yet been quite
limited. International Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade initiatives have arisen in
response (e.g. Van Bodegom et al. 2008).
A major question remains on how theseprocesses will influence the outcomes of future
trends in forestry, now that the value of forest
is being upgraded because of recognition of its
importance in mitigating climate change. Many havesuggested that REDD processes create important
opportunities to generate incomes and that agreat part of these incomes can be captured by thepeople who most need them and who traditionallyhave been excluded from capturing forest benefits
by other players in the sector (Angelsen 2008).
However, the Amazon has a history of economic
booms and busts, when certain forest products
from the region—quinine, rubber, barbasco, oiland timber—experienced increased international
demand followed by sudden drops in prices.
Compliance with rules and regulations and fair play
has never been a common feature of the Amazon
forest sector, and such compliance was certainly
not a characteristic of the boom periods. While
this is no ground to be pessimistic, it should posea warning of the challenges ahead, if compensation
for reduced deforestation or degradation will be
widely implemented in Amazonia. Fortunately,
since the issue at stake—global warming and its
expected negative climatic consequences—is ofinternational concern, there is likely to be serious
international monitoring and pressure to ensurecompliance with globally accepted standards ofgood governance. For instance, internationalpressure can in part be credited for the changes inproperty rights mentioned above.
The possible impact of the current financial
crisis and future economic instability for groups
that are at the edge of poverty, and what thismeans for the forest sector, should be of concern.
In a future scenario of possible destitution caused

by international economic instability, cases where
people turn to forest and forest lands for solutions
is not merely imaginary. Neither are possible related
conflicts with the new forest owners, companies,
or conservationists. The Peruvian case of Flor dela Frontera, where an indigenous group violently
evicted illegal settlers within their territory in 2002
and caused the death of 16 people, should be viewed
as a warning of things to come. The administrative
apparatus was inadequately prepared to deal
with such problems; this is even more reason forconcern.

5. Conclusions
Forest policy in countries of the Amazon
basin has experienced many changes in the lasttwo decades. Property rights reforms, improved
democratic decision making and progress incommunal forestry are all positive developments.
On the other hand, national governments are
reluctant to give up old ways because they want tomaintain a viable timber sector for its contribution
to the national economy and the need to satisfy
national demand for timber. The tropical forest
sector suffers from poor governance more thanother sectors because of its recent history as a sector
dominated by a small group of wealthy entrepreneurs
and political cronies and because of the practicaldifficulties of monitoring the forest for compliancewith the law. The unfamiliarity of many of the
new actors, including remote local communities,
with administrative procedures and/or theirlack of political clout has limited their potential
to seriously influence forest policy formulationand implementation. Furthermore, if economic
instability affects large populations in Amazonian
countries, people may increasingly turn to forests
to make up for losses suffered elsewhere. Some
recent cases suggest that this could increase conflicts
between the new owners of tropical forests andpeople who are affected by economic decline. Thisis the landscape within which REDD mechanisms
will be implemented, and these conditions need tobe considered seriously if REDD mechanisms areto contribute to furthering the goals of equitabledevelopment and democratization.

References
Angelsen, A. ed. 2008. Moving ahead with REDD:
issues, options and implications. CIFOR,
Bogor, Indonesia.
Barreto, P., Souza, C., Noguerón, R., Anderson. A.,
Salomão, R. 2006. Human pressure on theBrazilian Amazon forests. World Resources
Institute, Washington DC, United States.

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Benneker, C. 2008. Dealing with the state, the market
and NGOs. The impact of institutions on theconstitution and performance of community
forest enterprises in the lowlands of Bolivia.
Ph.D. thesis. Wageningen University,
Wageningen, Netherlands.
Bray, D.B.L. and Merino-Pérez, D. 2005. The
community forests of Mexico: managing forsustainable landscapes. University of Texas
Press, Austin, United States.
Chirif, A. 2008. La lucha contra los engaños y la
prepotencia.
http://www.servindi.org/
actualidad/4517/4517, accessed 2009-2-11.
Chirif, A. 2009. Perú: El drama de los Yacutaita, grupo
de manejo pesquero modelo para la Amazonía.
http://www.servindi.org/actualidad/6990.
Accessed 2009-2-10.
Chirif, A. and Garcia-Hierro, P. 2007. Marcando
Territorio. Progresos y limitaciones de latitulación de territorios indígenas en la
Amazonía. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
Colchester, M., Apte, T., Laforge, M., Mandondo,
A. and Pathak, N. 2003. Bridging thegap: communities, forests and international
networks. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 41.
vii, 60p.; ill. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
Cronkleton P. and Albornoz, M.A. 2004. Uso y abusodel aprovechamiento forestal en pequeña escala– Provincia Guarayos. CIFOR, Santa Cruz,
Bolivia.
Cronkleton, P., Taylor, P.L., Barry, D., Stone-Jovicich,S. and Schmink, M. 2008. Environmental
governance and the emergence of forest-basedsocial movements. CIFOR Occasional Paper
No. 49. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
de Jong, W., Ruiz, S. and Becker, M. 2006. Conflicts
on the way to communal forest management innorthern Bolivia. Forest Policy and Economics,
8, 447-457.
Global Forest Watch (GFW). 2009. http://www.
globalforestwatch.org, accessed 2009-1-21.
Larson, A., Pacheco, P., Toni, F. and Vallejo, M.
2006. Exclusión e inclusión en la foresteria
latinoamericana: Hacia donde va ladescentralizacion? CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible (MDS). 2009.
Norma técnica para aprovechamiento comercial
sostenible de productos forestales no maderables
en bosques y tierras forestales naturales. http://
www.sforestal.gov.bo/descargas/Norma%20
Tecnica%20
productos%20No%20
Maderables. Accessed 2009-2-10.
Molnar, A., Liddle, M., Bracer, C., Khare, A., White,
A. and Bull, J. 2007 Community-based forest
enterprises in tropical forest countries: status
and potential. International Timber Trade
Organization, Yokohama, Japan.
Ruiz, S. A. 2005. Institutional change and social
conflicts over forest use in the Northern
Bolivian Amazon. Freiburger Schriften zur
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Forst- und Umweltpolitik Band 10. Verlag Dr.
Kessel. Remagen-Oberwinter, Germany.
Sabogal, C., de Jong, W., Lauman, B. and Pokorny,
B. eds. 2008. El manejo forestal comunitario
en América Latina: experiencias, lecciones
aprendidas y retos para el futuro. CIFOR,
CATIE, Turrialba, Costa Rica.
Stone, S. 2006 Forest tenure and poverty in
Brazil. Rights and Resources. http://www.
rightsandresources.org/~rightsan/publication
details.php?publication ID=950. Accessed
February 6, 2009.
Swiderska, K., Roe, D., Siegele, L. and Grieg-Gran,
M. 2008. The governance of nature and thenature of governance: policy that works forbiodiversity and livelihoods. IIED, London,
United Kingdom.
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). 2009. Web
site: http://www.un.org/esa/forests/index.html,
accessed 2009-1-15.
Van Bodegom, A.J., Klaver, D., van Schoubroeck, F.
and Van der Valk, O. 2008. FLEGT beyond
T: exploring the meaning of “Governance”
concept for the FLEGT process. Wageningen
University and Research Center, Wageningen,
Netherlands.

Chapter Four
Theories for forest policy: An overview
by Bas Arts1 and Roel van de Graaf

1
Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, Wageningen University and Research Centre, The
Netherlands. Correspondence address: bas.arts@wur.nl.

Abstract
This paper is an overview of political and policy theories which are used in the sub-discipline of forest
policy analysis. Also, trends over time in theory use are followed. The aim is to consider whether the
sub-discipline of forest policy analysis deviates from the “mother discipline” of policy science in general,and if so, how and to what extent. While doing so, the paper also offers an overview of current theories
in forest policy analysis. Such an overview might be helpful for MSc and PhD students as well as forother researchers who are searching for a relevant theory to structure their data collection and analysis
on forest policy. Finally, the overview offers a guide to the theories provided by the various papers in thispublication.

1. Introduction
Forest policy analysis originally developed
as a sub-discipline from the forest sciences. This
meant that it was foresters, rather than politicalscientists, who primarily became involved in policy
analysis. As a consequence, the role of politicaltheory in such analyses remained limited. Also,
the analyses tended to be normative and oriented
towards policy advice (Glück 1992). Two decadesago, this situation gradually but fundamentallychanged. Foresters became more knowledgeable
about political and policy theories when forestry
curricula at several universities started to introduce
policy courses, both at the BSc and MSc levels. In
addition, political and policy scientists got more
involved in forest issues, probably because “green
politics” had become a serious topic within theirdisciplines. Today, when reading forest journals
that include policy analyses, many political andpolicy theories that are fashionable in the ”motherdiscipline” can be encountered. This article gives
an overview of the use and trends in such theories
in the forest sciences, both from a contemporary
and a historical perspective. It does so by (1)presenting an overview of relevant political andpolicy theories, based on two handbooks; (2)producing an overview of the use of such theories
in forest policy papers as can be deduced from thedatabase Scopus; and (3) distinguishing trends intheory use in the forest policy sciences.

2. An overview oftheories
There are naturally many handbooks fromwhich one can construct an overview of politicaland policy theories. As an illustration, we selecttwo—one from the political sciences in general andone from the policy sciences in particular—which
are frequently used in university curricula, often
cited in the literature and of which the authors arewidely recognized as being authorities within theirdisciplines. The first one is Theory and Methods in
Political Science of Marsh and Stoker (2002). They
distinguish the following political theories relevant
for current political analysis:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Behavioralism
Rational choice
Institutionalism
FeminismInterpretative theory
Marxism
Normative theory

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 35

We briefly introduce these theories here.
Behavioralism focuses on observable conduct inpolitics and on empirical testing of theoreticalclaims to explain such political behavior, forexample political activism; so observing, testing andexplaining are the three key words. To generalize
findings, large-N datasets are preferred. With that,behavioralism stands in the positivist tradition,
which claims that: (1) reality exists independently of
our knowledge (this is the so-called realist position),(2) natural and social sciences are analogous, (thisis the so-called naturalist position), and (3) scienceshould explain phenomenon, generalize findings
and separate facts from norms and values (this is
the so-called objectivist position (Crotty 1998). This
mainstream philosophy of science is contested, forexample by interpretative theory, the counterpoint of
behavioralism. This position rejects the notion thatthe world exists independently of our knowledge.
On the contrary, it is claimed that, through scientificinquiry, scientists construct specific “facts” about
the world (the so-called constructivist position).
Hence, there is no objective, real and independentworld “out there,” since our scientific assumptions
and theories create its image and characteristics
in the first place. Moreover, scientists—being
people after all—are influenced by their normativeenvironments (anti-objectivist position). As aconsequence, facts, values, norms and meanings arestrongly intermingled. Also, a distinction is madebetween the natural and social sciences, because theobjects—either nature or society—are so different(anti-naturalist position). Since political scientists
have to understand a socially constructed andmutually interpreted world a double hermeneutics
characterizes the social sciences. In contrast, thenatural sciences are based on a single hermeneutics,
because nature does neither “interpret itself ”
nor “speak back” to the researcher. Just likebehavioralists, interpretative theorists can study
political activism, but their approach would bevery different. Instead of sending a questionnaire to
many political activists, statistically processing theiranswers and providing general explanations, theywould visit some of them personally and interview
them openly and in-depth to reconstruct themeanings that activists attach to their own politicalactivism.
The other theories, dealt with in Marsh andStoker (2002), stand somewhere on the continuum
between these two extremes. Rational choice is a
specific elaboration of behavioralism which does
not build on sociology or psychology but on
economics. The central idea is that individuals
make political choices on the basis of the highest
expected utility, this is to say, they choose that
option that probably yields the highest benefits
and lowest costs in the near future. Institutionalism,
next, can be considered a critique of rationalism.
It claims that rational choice is mediated by rules,
Page 36 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

conventions and traditions, to be defined as“institutions.” People do not behave on the basis of
the highest expected utility alone, but on the basisof what is appropriate in a certain institutionalsetting. For example, corruption in politics may
produce the best financial outcomes, but in certain
political cultures this is not an option at all.
Whereas most institutional approaches still standin the positivist tradition, normative theory departs
from this. Instead of trying to objectively analyze
and explain political behavior by scientific inquiry,
either through rational choice or institutional
constraints and opportunities, normative theorists
try to judge current political practices against somemoral reference points, through applying politicalphilosophy or ethics. The central question is: Whatis a just, democratic and fair political order? Criticaltheories like Marxism and feminism also stand in thistradition; however they add a radical social change
program to their scientific work. Feminist scientists
often analyze the power structure of current politics
and conclude that it is gender-biased. Politics are
male-dominated and male virtues are overvalued.
On the basis of such characteristics, a just politicalsystem cannot be built. It should therefore be “regendered,” e.g. through positive discrimination of
women for vacant power positions. Finally, Marxism
takes the unjust, capitalist world economies andthe unfair superstructures built on them—like thenational state or the World Bank—as their pointsof departure for critical analyses. However, as Marx
already wrote, philosophy and science should not
aim at interpreting the world, but at changing
it. Therefore a lot of intellectual attention is paid
to new social movements and their potential forradical social and political change.
The second book is Theories of the Policy Process
by Paul Sabatier, which has been published in two
editions (Sabatier 1999, 2007). Together, thesevolumes describe the following policy frameworks:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Stages approach
Institutional rational choice
Multiple streams framework
Social constructivism
Policy networks
Punctuated-equilibrium theory
Advocacy coalition framework(Note: In his volumes, Sabatier adds a“comparative policy analysis framework” to his
overview. However, this is not a theory in its own
right, but a certain methodological approach. For
that reason, it is not integrated in the overview ofthis paper.)
Until recently, the stages approach—often
referred to as the policy cycle model too—was themost dominant framework for understanding
policy making in the political sciences. It divides thepolicy process into a number of stages or phases—for example, agenda setting, policy design, decision
making, policy implementation and evaluation—in order to simplify the complexity of current
policy processes and enable meaningful analysis.
However, this model has been severely criticized.
According to the critics, it is not accurate and too
simple in a descriptive sense, not a “real” theory
in an explanatory sense and it is too top-down,
legalistic and rationalistic in its approach. However,there are a number of other approaches within thepolicy sciences that serve as alternatives. Institutionalrational choice is a “thin” institutional approach, as
briefly discussed above, which stays close to rational
choice. The premise of self-interested and utilitymaximizing individuals is maintained, however
the fact that rules in politics or cultural settings
may alter preferences, cost-benefit analyses, option
rankings and—consequently—behavior is taken on
board. This model, with its clear action-theoreticalpremises, is much more analytical and explanatory
in nature than the policy cycle model. Next, themultiple stream framework (MSF) is a response to
the simplicity of the stages approach. Policy making
is considered to be much more complex. The key
assumption is that policy making can only take off
when the three so-called “independent streams” ofproblems, policies and politics are brought together
by entrepreneurs on the one hand and windows ofopportunity on the other. In other words, if thestreams are not well managed by agencies and/or
the political situation is not ripe, no meaningfulpolicy making will happen. Again, MSF is a much
more explanatory model than the stages approach.
A third alternative is the punctuated equilibrium
framework (PEF). The starting point for PEF was
the observation from American politics that long
periods of continuity have been punctuated by brief
periods of major policy change. A Dutch example
is the change in water management policy in thelate 1990s, where a “water run off” paradigm has
been replaced by a “room for the river” paradigm(Wiering & Arts, 2006). The founding fathers of
PEF asked themselves where such sudden policychanges may have originated, and their assumption
was that it was a result of countervailing coalitions
that challenge dominant policies and that gain
ever more ground by fashioning new “policy
images” through “venue shopping”, that is, by
advocating their views in as many political venues
as possible. This was indeed the case in Dutch
water management, where a movement for a more
ecologically sound type of water management got
ever more response, although external shock events—for example the near-flooding of the River Rhine
and the precautionary evacuation of more than
200,000 people in 1995—played crucial roles too.
Another approach that focuses on policy change
and policy coalitions is the advocacy coalition
framework (ACF) of Sabatier himself. Contrary torational choice theory, the driving forces for politicalaction are assumed to be “shared belief systems”
and not rational calculations. Actors from different
backgrounds who share certain deep policy andtechnical beliefs regarding a certain issue may form
coalitions, which generally compete with opposing
beliefs and coalitions in a plural political system.
From this competition and through interaction
with policy brokers and outside events, policy
learning and change may eventually occur. Social
constructivism, next, refers to another philosophyof science that Sabatier himself adheres to, namely
post-positivism, and has been briefly explained
above. In terms of specific policy models, one might
for example think of policy discourse analysis orframe analysis. Policy dynamics are explained by
how the policy issue and process are named andframed by powerful individuals or hegemoniccoalitions in terms of narratives and concepts. The
policy network approach, finally, does not take therational, individual actor as the starting point, but
as the social agent in policy networks, interactingwith and being dependent on others. This leads
to patterns of resource exchange, communication,issue framing, social learning and joint policy
making in networks.

3. Methodology
The list of theories deduced from the bookof March and Stoker as well as from the two
editions of Sabatier’s volume—in total 11 theories,
when overlapping ones from the books are taken
together—was used as an input for an analysisof theory use in the forest policy sciences, to becompared with the policy sciences in general.
Also, a trend analysis over time was made. For
the analysis, the database Scopus, in which a vast
number of scientific papers is stored, was used tosearch the main international peer reviewed journals
of various disciplines. The program also includes anextensive search machine through which samples ofliterature can be constructed. For this paper, twosearches were performed, one on the forest policy
sciences particularly and one on the policy sciencesin general. The keywords used were “forest policy,”“forest governance” and “forest politics” for theformer and “policy,” “governance” and “politics”
for the latter. These keywords were searched in thetitles, keywords and abstracts of all papers. For thepolicy sciences in general, the search was limited tothe social and environmental sciences, the “motherdisciplines” of the forest policy sciences. These
searches were constructed as such: (1) TITLEABS-KEY [“forest policy” OR (“forest governance”
OR “forest politics”)] and (2) TITLE-ABS-KEY[“policy” OR (“governance” OR “politics”)] LIM(“social sciences” AND “environmental sciences”).
These searches resulted in two samples of about
12,000 papers on the one hand (forest policy
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 37

sciences) and about 220,000 papers on the other(policy sciences). In a next step, the theories fromthe list and their various synonyms were used as key
words to further delineate sub-samples of individual
theories. Finally, a top 5 of mostly used theories in
the forest policy sciences was constructed.
This method has some drawbacks. If the abstractsof papers are taken into account in the search for
keywords, the reference list is automatically includedin the search too. This cannot be separated in Scopus.
For example, a rational choice paper that cites a
Marxist book in the reference list with the term
“Marxism” in the title will also be marked, not only
as a rational choice paper, but as a Marxist paper aswell. However, deleting the abstract is not an option,
since the first mention of the application of a certain
theoretical approach is normally in the abstract.
Therefore we should extend the notion of “theoryused” to “theory used or referred to.” Moreover,the example of rational choice and Marxism showsthat there might be overlap and double countingof papers. Therefore the figures below only givea rough indication of theory use and reference inthe forest policy sciences. But since we do not use
these figures in an absolute sense, but only rank thevarious theories, the tables below remain modest in
their quantitative ambitions. Finally, it should benoticed that both the handbooks and Scopus havetheir own Anglo-American biases. The handbooks

show the theories which are most popular in theWestern world—for example excluding postcolonial theories developed in Latin-America—andscientific papers in languages other than English are
hardly represented in Scopus.

4. Use and trends
The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The firsttable shows the top five theories used or referred
to in the policy sciences literature in general aswell as in the forest policy sciences in particular. It
shows that the classical political theories—rational
choice, institutionalism, Marxism—are still quite
strong in the general literature, but that the newer
ones—policy networks, social-constructivism—arepresent in the top five as well. This mirrors whatsome have called the “argumentative turn” in thesocial sciences (Fischer 2003). Clearly this turn has
been more prominent in the forest policy literature.
Here policy networks and social-constructivism arehigher in the hierarchy, while institutionalism andrational choice are positioned lower. Moreover,Marxism is absent in the top five in the forest policy
sciences, although its ranking is still six. Anotherstriking difference is the prominent presence of the
advocacy coalition framework (ACF). ACF is clearlyparticularly popular among forest policy analysts; it

Table 1: Top five theories used or referred to in forest policy literature
Top five theories in policy literature

Top five theories in forest policy literature

Rational choice

Policy networks

Institutionalism

Advocacy coalition framework

Policy networks

Institutionalism

Marxism

Social constructivism

Social-constructivism

Rational choice

6% coverage

9% coverage

Table 2: Rankings of the five core theories in forest policy literature by five year period< 1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2010
Policy networks
Advocacy coalition framework
Institutionalism
Social-constructivism
Rational choice

Page 38 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

-

4
1
2
3

2
1
4
3
5

1
5
2
3
4

ranked second in the forest policy literature, but
only eighth in the policy sciences in general. Thismay be explained by its origin, the environmental
policy sciences, of which forest policy analysis ispart. A final observation regarding Table 1 is theextent to which the top five theories cover part ofthe samples: the top five theories cover 6% of thesample of policy sciences papers as a whole. This
figure is lower than expected. It might imply that
more than 90% of those papers are just descriptive
or use theories other than those in our list, but thisis highly unlikely, because it is based on the core
handbooks of the disciplines. Again unexpectedly,
this score is higher for the forest policy sciences at
9%. Implicitly, it was expected that this literature
would be more descriptive than the policy sciencesin general, because forest policy is limited to a
specific empirical field; however, this expectation
is false. Obviously, the forest policy sciences are as
current, in terms of theory use and reference, whencompared to the mother discipline.
Table 2 shows the trend in theory rankingsin the forest policy sciences in timeframes of five
years. Here it is clear that: (1) the policy network
approach and social-constructivism have become
more popular over time; (2) the opposite is true
for the ACF; and (3) institutionalism and rational
choice have more or less maintained their positions.
These observations further support the thesis of
the argumentative turn, although this conclusion
should not be overemphasized, since the classicaltheories remain present. Striking is the recent
decrease in the rating of the ACF. Obviously, ACF
has lost attractiveness, as it appears to have beena fashionable instrument for some time. A final
striking observation in Table 2 is the fact that all
theories are absent in forest policy sciences literature
published before 1995. Certainly these sciences
are a young sub-discipline, but they definitely
existed before 1995 (Glück 1992). Therefore one
can conclude that this literature has become lessdescriptive over time. Hence, it is not only current,in terms of theory use and reference, but it has beenscientifically professionalized over time as well.
This publication also contains a number ofrelated theoretical perspectives that were presented
at the CIAS Conference Forest Policy for a Sustainable
Humanosphere, held at Kyoto University, Japan,
February 17-18, 2009. Besides regional accounts of
the latest empirical developments in forest policyin Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe, this
discussion paper also presents several case studies inwhich theory has a prominent status. Buizer, in her
study of local initiatives by Dutch farmers to manage
nature, applies the policy arrangement approachthat builds on network theory, institutionalismand discourse theory. This approach helps her toanalyze the different nature discourses of farmers
on the one hand and official policy makers on theother. The discourses are played out in power games

and formal rule settings, leaving the local initiatives
with little room to maneuver and scale up. Van
Gossum uses the same approach but applies it quite
differently. He evaluates the governance capacity of
institutional arrangements on sustainable forest
management (SFM) in a Dutch province. He
concludes that all stakeholders more or less share thesame SFM discourse. Moreover, the institutionalarrangement fits the shared discourse quite well.
Due to this congruence, Van Gossum believes
that the chance that SFM will be realized in thisregion in the near future is quite high. A socialconstructivist account is to be found in the paperof Ubukata. He shows how agricultural science iseasily re-interpreted—and misused—to legitimize
certain forest policies. To illustrate this, he goes
into the Thai Eucalyptus debate. Although local
communities and NGOs criticized the use of thisspecies, due to assumed adverse ecological effects,
forest departments selectively mobilized FAO
knowledge to move their own policy forward.

5. Conclusion
The five most popular theories used or referred
to in the forest policy sciences are the policy
network approach, advocacy coalition framework(ACF), institutionalism, social-constructivism andrational choice. The papers applying or mentioning
these theories cover about 9% of the forest policy
sciences sample from Scopus. This implies that about
90% of the papers apply other theories or remainrather descriptive. However, forest policy sciencescarcely deviates from its mother discipline. The listof theories as well as the coverage percentage comevery close to the observed rankings and figures in
the policy sciences literature in general. This implies
that the forest policy sub-discipline is current. Thisconclusion also goes for this publication, in which
a variety of theories are applied to forest policy
cases. Over time, the policy network approach andsocial-constructivism have become more popular,
suggesting that the so-called argumentative turn has
also taken place in forest policy analysis. At the sametime, the more classical theories of institutionalism
and rational choice have remained with the samerankings. Only the ACF has become less popular.
Overall, the use and reference to theories has
increased compared to 20 years ago. Hence, theforest policy literature is not only current, in termsof theory use and reference, but it has scientifically
been professionalized at the same time.

References
Crotty, M. 1998. The foundations of social research.
Meaning and perspective in the research
process. SAGE, London, United Kingdom.
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 39

Fischer, F. 2003. Reframing public policy. Discursive
politics and deliberative practices. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Glück, P. 1992. Evolution of forest policy science inAustria. IUFRO, Vienna, Austria.
Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. 2002. Theory and methodsin political science. Palgrave McMillan,
Houndmills and New York, United States.
Sabatier, P. (ed.). 1999. Theories of the policy process.
Theoretical lenses on public policy. Westview
Press, Boulder, United States and Oxford,
United Kingdom.
Sabatier, P. (ed.). 2007. Theories of the policy process.
Second edition. Boulder, Oxford: Westview
Press, Boulder, United States and Oxford,
United Kingdom.
Wiering, M. and Arts, B. 2006. Discursive shifts in
Dutch river management: ‘deep’ institutionalchange or adaptation strategy? Hydrobiologia,
Vol. 565, No. 1, pp. 327-338.

Page 40 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Chapter Five
Bridging a divide?
Local initiatives in a multi-level policy
context
by I.M. (Marleen) Buizer
This paper is based on a PhD research “Worlds Apart; The Interactions of Local Initiatives andEstablished Policies” (Buizer 2008). The PhD research contained three cases. This paper focuses on the twoof these which involved forest policies.

Abstract
This paper presents two case studies about private actors aspiring to realize their innovative ideas onland management and design in two small areas in the Netherlands. One case involves an area that is tobe partly forested in line with operative policies to establish a large urban green structure; the second caseis an area that is part of a national ecological structure and already primarily consists of forest. However,in both areas various groups and organizations were seeking to implement alternative land uses and taking
action to promote their ideas. It was clear from the start that the ways in which the initiators of these ideas
gave meaning to the areas differed from the ideas enshrined in existing policies. The case studies show that
there was ample innovative potential at the local level and that ideas do get implemented with considerable
effort, due to factors such as personal zeal, perseverance, trust and empathy that developed in people “inthe field.” However, an analysis of the cases also shows that there has been only limited discussion about
the possible wider policy implications of these local innovations. Thus, the study revealed an asymmetry
between local innovative potential and an apparent lack of responsiveness on the part of established policy.
The study used the policy arrangements approach, consisting of 1) an analysis of the relationships between
discourses, actor coalitions, rules and resources at the level of day-to-day interactions between the initiatives
and established policy, and 2) an analysis of the relationship between these day-to-day interactions andan assumed more general, structural process of sub-politicization. The study concludes that there was asimultaneous occurrence of sub-politicization and depoliticization which both have significant impacts on
the direction of green space policies and determining who can participate in them.

1. Introduction
Governments often express the wish to involve
citizens and civil society organizations more closelyin policy development. This applies to issues at theneighborhood level, such as how a street, a square ora park should be designed, and it also involves issues
at a larger scale, such as who will manage green spacein the future and how. Governments attach various
labels to these ambitions, such as: “interactive
policy development,” “co-responsibility” and “newdivision of roles between governments and society.”
But what are their full implications? Various authors
agree that the state of the art in interactive policy

making is still generally poor in terms of concrete
influence on outcomes (Duyvendak and Krouwel
2001, Goverde and Lako 2005, Edelenbos andKlijn 2005, Cornips 2006a, 2006b). Others haveemphasized that, rather than questioning the effects
of interactive policy making, it is more importantto question how all participants in interactive
policy making processes—including politicians orofficials—use it as a power instrument to further
what they want. With good reason these authorsemphasize that the question has an empirical natureand therefore there are a great many answers (Vanden Arend 2007). This paper, although based on

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 41

empirical data and touching on aspects of power,
approaches the issue from a different angle.
Rather than taking “interactive policy making”
as a point of departure, this paper approaches
the issue from the opposite direction, focusing
on substantive innovative initiatives by private
actors that target alternative management ofgreen space. The first case, Biesland, concerns anagricultural enclave situated in the midst of towns
and recreation areas in the Randstad, in the westernregion of the Netherlands. Part of the enclave is
projected to become part of the Balij Bieslandse
Forest. There is only one active farmer left in thearea, and—together with researchers, civil servants
and a few local residents—he worked out a conceptof ”nature-oriented” farming, expecting that thiswould convince policy makers to consider it as
a viable alternative to expropriation of some of
his farmland for afforestation. The Minister ofAgriculture, Nature and Food Quality (ANF)
promised early in the process to finance half ofthe plans, provided that the other half would be
financed by regional parties. The Minister also
stated that the European Commission should
approve payments to the farmer before further
steps could be taken. Indeed, the initiative was
supported financially by regional administratorsand politicians. However, the process got stuck inBrussels and there was a danger of its progress being
blocked in the region as well. In the second case—
Loonsche Land—a theme park, the Efteling, andtwo nature conservation organizations reached anagreement about the development of a joint land
use management plan. The initiative came about
after years of conflict between these parties over thebuilding of lodging and accommodations in an areaof woods and fields bordering the Efteling theme
park; this conflict led to legal cases that went rightup to the Council of State. The new plan included
the possibility of development in some parts of
the area, as well as measures to enhance the nature
value of the area as a whole. According to the local
initiators, this would be achieved by cutting down
forest and improving the conditions for the growthof heather, which is a threatened ecosystem in the
Netherlands.
Both initiatives came primarily from private
actors, although the government and a complex
network of communication channels between
citizens and/or civil society organizations, businesses,
politicians, managers, researchers and civil servantsalso played a role in the ensuing processes. In the
Biesland case, collaboration grew up via a chanceencounter between a farmer, a volunteer and someresearchers. In the Loonsche Land case, a private
party and civil society organizations wanted tobreak an impasse when facing the prospect of yet
another long-running legal battle. Both initiatives
were subject to decision-making processes atdifferent levels of government.
Page 42 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

The paper addresses the confrontation between
these initiatives and established policy. It pays
specific attention to the circumstance that theinitiators had to challenge established forest policies
at some point in time. This study asks what factors
influenced the development of both the policies
and the initiatives and also looks at possible broader
impacts of the local processes in a multi-level policy
context.
The author’s own experiences in various
contract-research projects laid the foundation for
the PhD research which forms the basis of this paper.
These projects were commissioned by government
institutions (national government, province andmunicipality) and by a private company. In termsof methodology, the study consisted of various
activities: participating in meetings, following theexchange of e-mails, frequenting kitchen tablediscussions, talking during occasional car rides andconstantly communicating through phone calls.
These elements all gave insights that allowed detailed
descriptions of what had happened, of emotions
accompanying key events in the process and ofstrategic thinking of actors involved. In one casein-depth interviews were included to complement
field experiences.
In the following sections, section two explains
the theoretical framework that was used. Section
three sums up the results of the study. Conclusions
in section four focus on the more general questionof “what’s next.”

2. Policy arrangements
approach
Introduction
The research used the policy arrangements
approach developed by Arts, Van Tatenhove andLeroy (Arts and Leroy 2006, Van Tatenhove et al.
2000, Arts and van Tatenhove 2004, Arts and vanTatenhove 2006). A policy arrangement is defined
as a temporary stabilization of the substance andorganization of a policy domain (Arts et al. 2000).
The policy arrangements approach aims to elucidatechange and stability of policy arrangements byanalyzing the interaction between everyday policy
practices and the overarching structural processes of“political modernization” such as individualizationand Europeanization. Every day policy practices
are described with reference to four dimensions:discourse, which relates to content; actor coalitions,
resources and rules of the game, which relate
to organization or in other words process. The
assumption is that these four dimensions can help
clarify how change—or indeed stability—comes
about in policy arrangements. In the research on

which this paper is based, the dimensions are used
as “sensitizing concepts” (Blumer 1954), whichmeans that they provide guidelines as to what tofocus upon but do not impose narrow definitions.

Methodological challenge
The four dimensions pose a methodologicalchallenge because the dimensions require that they
be distinguished from each other. This is not a new
problem in scientific theory and methodology.
This can be explained with sociologist Anthony
Giddens’ “Structuration Theory.” Structuration
Theory has been an important inspiration for thepolicy arrangements approach, which involves asimilar methodological challenge. Giddens (1984)
claims that too many attempts to explain socialchange have focused on the behavior of actors oron the potential and limitations that structures
such as rules and resources provide or impose. He
asserts that these possibilities or impossibilities
come about through an interaction between thetwo, and that there exists a “duality of actor andstructure.” Neither the actors nor the structures
are omnipotent. There has been serious debate
as to the feasibility of researching the interaction
between actor and structure: if they influence eachother so much, how can we distinguish between
them (Archer 1995, Stones 2001)? What becomesof the time dimension if actor and structure cannot
be differentiated in terms of time (Archer 1995,
1996)? Here the relationships between the four
dimensions are looked at from the point of viewof Archer’s “analytical dualism” (Archer 1995,
1996). Analytical dualism means that actor andstructure should be treated as distinguishable.
According to Archer, it is only in such a way thatthe relationship can be studied at all. The policy
arrangements approach elaborates the duality ofactor and structure in two ways. It does so firstby means of the four dimensions which together
form everyday policy practices. Obviously, “actor
coalitions” represent Giddens’ actor or agency.
Discourse coalitions, rules and resources standfor Giddens’ structure. Together, these four
dimensions shape a policy arrangement. Second,
the policy arrangements approach elaborates theduality in terms of the interaction between theseeveryday policy practices and structural processes.
In conclusion, the methodological challenge that
follows from Giddens’ “duality of structure andagency” is inherent to the policy arrangements
approach as well, but by looking at the four
dimensions as related, but distinguishable entities(i.e. analytical dualism), this challenge can be met.
The following sections explain the four
dimensions and then continue to specify and explain
the assumed structural process, sub-politicization,that is the focus of this paper.

Four dimensions to understandday-to-day policy practices
The main message behind the concept of
discourse is that social reality is not neutral; it isgiven meaning in many different ways. A commonlyused example of this concept in discourse theory or
discourse analysis is about a forest.
“A forest might be an object of intrinsic natural
beauty, an obstacle to the building of a motorway,
or a unique ecosystem, depending on the horizonof classificatory rules and differences that confers
meaning to it.” (Howarth 2000: 9)
Discourses, also known as systems of social
relations according to Howarth (2000:8), do
not stand on their own. They are organized into
historically formed rules, into the allocation of
resources or into the way in which actors form
coalitions. Therefore, rules, resources and actor
coalitions form the other three dimensions of
the policy arrangements approach in addition to
discourse. These other three dimensions refer to thepractices in which discourses are embedded. Actor
coalitions are people or organizations which join
forces around a certain discourse: in other words
they form a “discourse coalition.” The concept ofresources encompasses all resources necessary toachieve a goal, for example money, knowledge or
number of members. Achieving the goal can bevery difficult, if not impossible, if there is a shortageof resources or if a certain group lacks access toresources. The “rules of the game” are the formal
and informal rules which influence the process andare used by the actors in all of their activities.
To look at discourse in relation to these threepractices—setting rules, organizing resources andforming actor coalitions—bears resemblance to a
Foucauldian type of discourse analysis. Authors
who have been inspired by the French philosopher
Michel Foucault argue that the analysis of discourseshould not just be a linguistic affair but should
also include the study of what they call discursive
practices. Otherwise discourse analysis does notfacilitate a deeper understanding of political action(Hook 2001, Hajer 1995). This understanding of
discourse, not just as a linguistic concept but also
as something institutional and practice-related,makes it possible to pursue an enquiry into themeanings, the hidden conceptual frameworks
and the consequences of these for institutional
practices, as well as into the way that these practices
in turn influence the conceptual frameworks. (Foran overview of approaches to discourse analysis
and an application to global forest policies see Arts
and Buizer, 2008.) Following these theoreticallines of thought and the accompanying concepts,
the empirical data from the cases needed to beinterpreted in terms of these questions: what
discourse prevailed in the relevant forest policies atdifferent levels and what discourse prevailed in theForest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 43

initiatives? What practices, in terms of coalitions,rules and resources, went along with these?

Structural process: subpoliticization
The focal concepts which were used in theanalysis and explained above do not provide
answers with regard to the question of how dayto-day practices—as they are described by meansof the four mentioned dimensions—relate to moregeneral structural processes. There are a great many
structural processes, such as individualization,
globalization, commercialization, etc. Ulrich
Beck’s sub-politicization theory is a natural choice
to uncover the factors influencing the developmentof both the policies and the initiatives and tounderstand the possible broader impacts of local
private initiatives in a multi-level policy context.
According to Beck, it is in the context of thepresent day risk society that sub-politicization takes
place. In Beck’s own words, this means that “Thereare even opportunities for courageous individuals
to ‘move mountains’ in the nerve centers ofdevelopment” (Beck 1994: 23). Centralized
management takes a back seat, and consumers canwield an influence through their spending power,
as they did for example during the discussion
about dumping the Brent spar oil rig. Inspired by
the media campaign of the environmental NGO
Greenpeace, consumers decided to refrain frombuying fuel from Shell, the owner of the oil rig,in order to press for onshore dismantling. Theirboycott was successful: Shell decided to bring theoil rig to land. Beck argues that these are signs of
sub-politicization: Greenpeace and the consumers
unveil the lack of power and legitimization of theprevailing political order and start to exert direct
participation in political decision-making (Beck1996, 1997). Other observers speak of politicaldisplacement or dispersion (Engelen and Sie Dhian
Ho 2004). The formal representative system thathas long been established in the Netherlands is nolonger the only political arena; instead, politicalideas have begun to emerge from many other places
as well. This paper examines the two cases in thelight of this posited political development and asks
this question: how exactly do the cases exemplify
sub-politicization?
In short, the main aim of the research is
to expand understanding of innovative, local
initiatives by private actors and their interactions
with established policies. In this paper the more
specific question is how two local initiatives to effectchange in land management and design interactedwith operative mainstream forest policies and withwhat results, both in the two areas as well as in a
broader context.

Page 44 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

3. The main results
Although there were differences, there turned
out to be several striking similarities between thecases. The most salient of these similarities is theway that the cases reveal the great potential for
innovation among private parties. Getting theirideas onto the agenda and ensuring they werecarried through required a lot of stamina, creativity
and adaptability. Without these driving forces,
it would not have been possible to obtain thenecessary authorization and financing. In contrast
to the question often posed within government as
to how to stimulate support among citizens forpolicy implementation, these examples suggestthat the real issue is how to involve governments inrealizing the wishes of coalitions of private parties.
The following summarizes the results of thestudy organized by the following themes:
1.

2.
3.

Interactions between initiatives andestablished policy (in terms of re­la­tion­ships
between discourse, actor coalitions, resources
and rules of the game)
Sub-politicization and depoliticization
Perseverance, trust, empathy and othersocial-relational factors

Interactions between initiatives
and established policy (interms of re­la­tion­ships between
discourse, actor coalitions,
resources and rules of the game)
Although in different ways, both initiatives
stemmed from the wish to approach the design andmanagement of a public space in a manner thatwas not possible within the terms of existing policy.
Both cases also had a history of years of unresolved
conflict. In the Biesland case, there was an impasseover the conversion of part of a polder—a low-lying
piece of land in which water levels are artificiallymanaged to suit agricultural land use—into forest,a plan which formed part of broader greenstructureplans (Randstad greenstructure and Green Blue
Streamer). The farmer and a nature conservation
volunteer believed that they could create anatural environment that would be attractive tocity-dwellers and did not see the need to buy up
agricultural land for forest development. In theLoonsche land case, there was a conflict between
the Efteling and nature conservation organizations
over the building of holiday accommodations. A
legal battle was fought right up to the Council ofState, contesting the harmful impact of the building
plans and the accompanying compensation rights
and obligations. In other words, these initiatives

did not come about in a policy vacuum, but inreaction to a policy.
When considering the cases from theperspective of the relationships between discourse,
actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game,a number of features become clear. First, there
was a lot of potential in terms of discourses andcoalitions, with new coalitions being formed andvarious discourses co-existing. In other words, it
was a discursive space, fostered by new coalitionsof both non-government and government actors.
The divisions did not necessarily exist directly
between government and non-government. In fact,
the study has revealed the need for greater subtlety
in differentiating between them. Civil servants whoare involved in the field were particularly activein their efforts to promote these initiatives, evenoutside of working hours. Their dual role was oftenvery fruitful.
In Biesland, three discourses were very
important. The well established nature-oriented or“green structure” discourse and the strong internalmarket discourse turned out to reinforce each otherwith regard to who would, and who would not, be
perceived as capable of managing nature. Alongsidethese two, a new approach grew up in which
the qualities of the area were central and which
managed to combine the priorities of agriculture,
nature conservation and access to the area for citydwellers. In this context, and in defiance of the fearof unfair competition which was firmly embeddedin the European policies, the farmer could be paid
for his nature conservation activities, such as aclosed nutrient cycle. Discourse and coalitions were
therefore flexible and could co-exist or even overlap
each other.
The flexibility of the rules of the game andresources was much more limited, however. In
order to keep the process moving, the content
of the initiatives was partially adapted to comply
with existing rules. Biesland provides a clear
example of this: in the final EU directive approving
implementation of the measures, a number ofprovisions were included which ensured that theinitiative broadly tied in with established policy.
Similarly, in the Loonsche Land case, initialapproaches thought in terms of the area as a wholeand of combining various different interests. These
approaches were sacrificed to thinking in termsof “compensatory hectares.” This compensation
discourse required that for every square meter oftrees of a certain age that was felled, 1.66 square
meters of trees would need to be newly planted.
While this may be perceived as a strong policy
in favor of a weak sector, it nonetheless createdsituations in which there was little motivation
to think from the perspective at the other side of
the table or to look for alternatives which would
perhaps be preferred by both developers andnature organizations, for example achieving ahigher nature value together with building anddevelopment activities. The push to translate results
into compensatory hectares facilitated approval of
the initiative by policymakers, but it also made it
more difficult to encourage a new way of thinking.
As a result, some of the essential elements of theoriginal idea did not gain a foothold, and there
remained an asymmetry between the flexibility of
discourses and actor coalitions and the inflexibilityof resources and rules of the game. In the end, theexisting distribution of resources and the operative
rules of the game continued to be geared to buy up
land to give it to nature organizations (in Biesland),and to compensate nature values in a way that had
led to lengthy legal procedures and not to proactive collaboration between developers and natureorganizations (in the Loonsche Land). The main
point here is that this asymmetry significantly
reduces the chances of the initiatives being able
to prove their worth in a wider context, eventhough the perseverance, efforts and courage of theinitiators has enabled them to achieve their goals
within their own areas.

Sub-politicization anddepoliticization
The question now arises as to what type ofpoliticization is occurring in these examples.
Obviously, Biesland and Loonsche Land areinteresting cases in terms of Beck’s theory of subpoliticization. Firstly, it is clear from the analysisof the relationships between discourse, actor
coalitions, resources and rules of the game that new
coalitions of actors create a new discursive space inwhich they can develop and implement their ideas.
This discursive space mainly comes into being inplaces outside the formal representative system.
This does not mean, however, that there is no role
for the municipal council or even for parliament:
sometimes these institutions can provide just theright support at a crucial juncture. Yet the ideas forthese initiatives were largely developed outside ofthese formal political arenas; they evolved around a
farm kitchen table in Biesland or in a workshop on
the golf course at the Efteling. What is most striking
about these cases is the way people organized
themselves, formed new coalitions and developed
a new language in order to gain influence over land
use and management of the areas.
However, these cases also demonstrate atendency that would seem to run counter to thetrend towards sub-politicization, namely “depoliti­
cization.” The core ideas in these initiatives—thepossibilities for farmers to manage nature in new
ways in Biesland or opportunities to combine
holiday accommodation with nature conservationin the Loonsche Land—were often sidelined byForest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 45

the conditions prevailing in the system. As a result,procedural detail set the tone for the process.
There was a simultaneous process of inclusionand exclusion. The process was inclusive in the sensethat the initiatives, even if in modified form, did
get a chance to be implemented at local level andshow their value; it was exclusive in the sense thatthe ways in which the initiatives intended to bridge
the constraining distinctions that were part ofmainstream policies, such as the distinction between
nature and forests on the one hand and agricultureon the other hand, between city and countryside,and between nature and constructions projects,
were not debated. Based on this observation, it
is possible to further refine the sub-politicization
theory. The fundamental political implications of
the issues at stake were not made explicit, and nongovernmental actors had no access to joint decisionmaking—or even simple discussion—about theissues. The same problem can be seen in the waythat legal jargon gradually became dominant as thecontent of the initiatives shifted in the directionof the established arrangement. There was also asustained decrease in face-to-face contact between
actors. These depoliticization mechanisms led toexperiences loaded with negative emotions among
the initiators and their supporters, who operated at
a distance from the procedures concerned.

Perseverance, trust, empathy andother social-relational factors
The fact that the initiatives did bear fruit, in spiteof all obstacles and even though the content waspartially adapted to established policy, has a lot to
do with a dimension that has not yet been explicitly
mentioned here: social relations. Perseverance,
trust and empathy may be viewed as aspects orfeatures of the actor dimension, but these socialrelational factors deserve special attention. The
trust nurtured through the actual contact between
people who developed a feeling for a place during
their time in the field made it possible to build up
long-term relationships. The cases demonstratevarious situations in which personal contact on
the basis of mutual trust survived quite difficult
confrontations. Furthermore, trust grew in thecourse of intensive collaboration. Stamina, skills in
dealing with conflicts, and empathy fostered by faceto-face contact made it easier for those involved topersevere and continue the process to completion.
Personal friendships developed, and participants
were inspired to continue forward because they
were sharing pleasures, disappointments, thefeeling of powerlessness and indeed of the sense of
combined power.
However, as soon as the chances of
implementation of the initiative or emergence of
space for policy innovation grew, the discussions
Page 46 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

shifted to the level of legal and financial-technicalissues, which were very different from what had
been important in the field. There was less faceto-face contact too, notwithstanding that theimportance of personal contact was repeatedly
stressed. In the course of the process, it took more
and more creativity on the part of the initiators tofind ways of applying their own rules of the gameabout contact with other actors the field.
Distance between civil servants and people in
the field was a particularly significant factor. For
example, major final decisions were usually taken
by civil servants who did not know the situationin the field, sometimes in locations as far away
as Brussels. Furthermore, civil servants regularlychange jobs in policymaking ministries. This had
drastic implications for the Biesland case since
there was frequently little time to build up trust
between governmental and non-governmental
actors. In contrast, civil servants who did stay in
one post throughout the process contributed a great
deal to the continuity of efforts: they took on theinitial ideas, helped to develop them further andstood their ground, sometimes against their own
colleagues. Where there was contact with otheractors, these relationships bore fruit in the form oftaking the initiatives further. The frequent changing
of the guard was very frustrating for the initiators
at times, because they repeatedly had to invest in
new relationships. Furthermore, a “not invented
here” attitude—where actors disclaim ownershipof a process if they did not initiate it—hindered
the transfer of knowledge about the idea within
the organization. The current policy of frequentchanges of job is problematic if governments wantto ensure that initiatives for policy innovation cancome from non-governmental sources as well asfrom the government.
Clearly the social-relational factors in relation
to operative rules of the game need to be considered
in order to reach a better understanding of policy
innovation.

4. Conclusion
In the field of forest and nature conservation, it
is essential that researchers look for local initiatives
that are not yet bogged down by establishedpolicy. The research presented here suggests that
there seems to be plenty of potential for local
initiatives, but that the translation of that potential
into public discussion of possible improvements
to government policy seems to lag behind. In thespecific cases studied here, alternative options toexisting forest policies were proposed; these were
options which could possibly have engaged a wider
range of actors to take responsibility for design
and management of green space. However, they
did not become a topic of wider political debate.

This created a situation where discursive space wasat odds with immovability of rules and resourcesand discourse embedded in these. In this sense not
only sub-politicization but also depoliticization
were present. This study sheds some light on why
this is so. For the time being however, the space forpolicy innovation is to be found in the discursive
space that is created by new actor coalitions. The
role of social relational factors such as empathy,
perseverance and trust, and also feelings of identityand “not invented here” sentiments should get
attention, in addition to the role of discourse, actor
coalitions, rules and resources.
This paper does not provide answers withregard to how to deal with asymmetries such as theones presented here. However, it presents several
key issues and questions that should be part ofdiscussions about them. Some of these questions
are very concrete: what are the consequencesof the distance from the field and the habit of
frequently transferring civil servants from one
post to another? Does this distance contribute toa lack of political discussion over the implicationsof a local initiative for existing policy? If trust,
empathy and perseverance emerge chiefly fromsituations in which there is personal contact, what
are the implications for a policy of remote control?
In view of the multi-level context in which local
initiatives mostly come about, how can European
regulations, with their own specific embedded
discourse, substantially be debated at local level
without procedural detail setting the tone? Other
questions are more general: if a shift in the content
of a local initiative towards established policy
is a condition for realizing the initiative, is thatdesirable? How can the considerable local potential
for innovation observed during this study generate
wider policy implications? What could that mean
for the contents of forest policies? And importantly,
how can politicized discussion about the contentsof policies which are initiated from below beconnected to the formal representative system?
These issues deserve to be addressed anddiscussed more often by researchers, policymakers
and practitioners in order to bridge the divide
between established policy and the wealth of ideas
generated by local private parties.

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Chapter Six
Evaluation of the institutional structureof sustainable forest management in the
Netherlands
by Ir. Peter Van Gossum1, Prof. Dr. Bas Arts2, Ir. Sophie Baert1, Prof.
Dr. Ir. Robert De Wulf3 and Prof. Dr. Ir. Kris Verheyen1
Laboratory of Forestry, Ghent University, Belgium
Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands
3
Laboratory of Forest Management and Spatial Information Techniques, Ghent University, Belgium
12Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existing Dutch institutional structure on sustainable forest
management (SFM). The evaluation was performed using criteria and indicators that were based on thefour-dimensional structure (discourse, rules, power, and actors) of the policy arrangement approach. The
data collection and analysis was done with a case study approach. All indicators show that the governmental
capacity of the SFM arrangement is high. Most actors understand SFM in a similar way while accepting thatdifferent actors may emphasize different aspects of it. Some focus more on the economic functions of SFM
while others focus on the nature conservation function. The SFM regulations (or interaction rules) are wellknown and not coercive, and are accepted by the respondents, likely resulting in enduring behavior change.
The government and the actors who support the governmental SFM vision are powerful. Furthermore,
the relationships between actors are positive and trusting. Given this high governance capacity, it is likelythat the policy will be able to effectively realize its goals of sustainably combining the ecological, social andeconomic functions in most forests.

1. Introduction
The concept of sustainable forest management(SFM) arises from the notion of sustainable
development that gained increasing recognition
worldwide in the late 1980’s (Wang 2004). SFM is
generally defined as achieving a balance between thesocial, economic and ecological values associatedwith forest resources with consideration of thosevalues for future generations. It is important to take
into account that SFM means different things todifferent people, at different scales of management
and at different time periods (Hickey 2008).
In addition to the focus on management, otherissues are important and need to be considered:institutional issues (Cortner et al 1996, 1998); theprocess of consensus-building around the meaningof “sustainability;” and the process by whichsustainability becomes institutionalized in rules,

actor relations and power structures (Jennings
and Zandbergen 1995). Although some studies
have investigated these topics for ecosystem-based
management (e.g. Imperial 1999a, 1999b) andcommunity-based natural resource management(e.g. Leach et al. 1999), in general, evaluations of the
SFM institutional structure are rarely conducted.
The aim of our research is to evaluate the existing
Dutch institutional structure on SFM. The Dutch
state, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture’s divisionof Nature and Food Quality (LNV), has clearly
formulated its definition of SFM and wants toimplement this vision of SFM in most forests withregulation and cooperation from other actors. Some
forests, i.e. the forests with a nature conservation
focus, are the subject of another policy aim. Again,
it is important to take into account that actors’
understanding of SFM can differ.

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 49

In this paper we first describe a framework forinstitutional evaluation. Next, we provide a brief
description of the case study approach our strategy
for data collection and analysis which is a. Finally,
we apply our theoretical framework and discuss
the institutionalization of the SFM discoursewith regard to rules, actor relations and power
structures.

organization of a particular policy domain” (Van
Tatenhove et al. 2000, p. 54, emphasis added). The
stabilizations are assumed to be only temporary
because the arrangements are under pressure ofconstant change (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004).
The structure of a policy arrangement is analyzed
along the following four dimensions: (1) the actors
and their coalitions involved in the policy domain(organization), (2) the division of resources between
these actors (organization), (3) the rules of the game(organization and substance) and (4) the current
policy discourses (substance) (Van Tatenhove et al.
2000, Arts et al. 2006). These four dimensions ofa policy arrangement are inextricably interwoven,
implying that any change on one dimension induceschange in other dimensions.

2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework that we use is
the policy arrangement approach (PAA) (Van
Tatenhove el al. 2000, Arts el al. 2006). The
central concept of the PAA is an analysis of “thetemporary stabilizations of the substance andTable 1: SFM criteria & indicators for institutional evaluation

Concept

Aspects

Substance

Dimensions

Discourse

Rules

Criteria

Indicator

SFM
perspectives
Multifunctionality

Similarity inperspectives

SFM
regulation

The extent towhich regulation
supports SFM
policyPolicy arrangement

SFM rules-inuse

ActorsPlace of actor
in social
network

Organization
Trust

Resources

The relative
distribution of
power resources
between actors

Reputation

The extent that
other actors
believe that a
specific actor is
powerful

Power

Page 50 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Acceptance ofthe rules
Number ofmutually
developed ties
between one
actor and theother actors
The extent towhich otheractors trust a
specific actor

Governancecapacityrequirement
Similar perspectives
or differences inperspective are
accepted
Existence of SFM
regulation and no
negative effects
from other landbased policies
High level of
acceptance
Actors who
promote SFM
have many positive
relations with otheractorsActors who
promote SFM aretrustworthy
Actors who
promote SFM have
many resources attheir disposal andother discourse
coalitions do not
Actors who
promote SFM havea strong reputationand other discourse
coalitions do notThe PAA has mainly been used as an analytical
tool. Recently it has been introduced as a tool forevaluation to investigate the potential governancecapacity of the arrangement (Arts and Goverde2006), i.e. the extent to which new forms ofgovernance are able to successfully mitigate orsolve societal and administrative problems which
are legitimately recognized by the stakeholders(Nelissen et al. 2000). A high governance capacity
means that the institutional preconditions of thepolicy arrangement to contribute to an effective
realization of the desired policy impact are fulfilled.
In order to measure this capacity, Arts and Goverde(2006) borrowed the concept of “congruence”
from Boonstra (2004). Capacity is high when
there is sufficient coherence among respectively (1)the policy views of the different actors (strategic
congruence) and (2) the dimensions of a policy
arrangement (structural congruence). To evaluate
strategic and structural congruence we follow theidea of Wiering and Arts (2006) to link a numberof criteria, indicators and requirements to thedifferent dimensions of the arrangement (Table 1).
The first dimension, discourse, is restricted tothe actors’ perspectives of the research theme, in thiscase “sustainable forest management.” Discourse
consists of two criteria: “SFM perspectives” and“multi-functionality.” The former investigates
the actors’ perspectives of SFM in general, andthe latter pertains to concrete SFM activities (seesection 3). This division is important for rather
abstract concepts like SFM because private forest
owners might display a relatively favorable attitude
towards abstract concepts such as ecosystemmanagement or SFM, but frequently oppose thespecific elements of an actual plan (Brunson et al.
1997). These indicators are used to evaluate thestrategic congruence and thus the similarity in
SFM discourse.
The second dimension, rules, consists ofsubstantive and organizational aspects. The
substantive aspect is the extent to which a change inforest management discourse is reflected in changes
in regulation (Wiering and Arts 2006). To evaluate
the criterion “SFM regulation,” it is necessary toinvestigate to what extent the forest regulation
was changed after the introduction of the SFM
policy goal and to what extent this SFM regulation
conflicts with existing land based policies. The
organizational aspect is described by rules-in-use,
i.e. the rules that individuals refer to when asked
to explain and justify their interactions with otherparticipants in an action arena (Ostrom et al. 1994).
The evaluation of the criterion “SFM rules-in-use”
requires an investigation of the acceptance of these
SFM rules by the various actors. The governancecapacity requirements for rules are the existence ofspecific SFM regulation, no negative effects fromother land-based policies and a high acceptance ofthe rules-in-use.

The third dimension, policy actors, is analyzed
based on social capital. Social capital is regarded
as the glue for adaptive capacity and collaboration(Pretty and Ward 2001) and for effective governancesystems including ecosystem management (Pretty
and Ward 2001, Folke et al. 2005). Social capitalis built by investing in social relationships (Scheffer
et al. 2003) and is evaluated by the criteria “placeof an actor in the social network” and “trust.”
The first criterion, “place of an actor,” refers to
the number of mutual ties between one actor andother actors in a social structure (Wasserman and
Faust 1994). The second criterion, “trust,” refers
to a more or less stable perception of actors about
the intentions of other actors, i.e. that they refrainfrom opportunistic behavior (Edelenbos and Klijn
2007). The governance capacity requirements
for actors are that actors who promote SFM aretrustworthy and have many positive relations withother actors.
Finally, power is a multidimensional concept
with relational, dispositional and structural aspects(Arts and van Tatenhove 2004). In our research,
the focus is on dispositional power. The two otherpower concepts are less important for our research:
the focus of relational power is on the micro-level inthe sense that relational power means the extent towhich a specific actor achieves outcomes in relation
to other actors in a specific situation; likewise
structural power focuses on the macro-level. The
core idea of dispositional power is that policy agentsare positioned vis-à-vis each other in arrangementson the basis of rules of the game as well as on thebasis of an asymmetrical division of resources (Artsand Van Tatenhove 2004). To determine an actor’s
power position it is important to take into accountthat only the relative difference in power resources
is important (Goverde and Hinsen 1994). When all
actors have the same quantity of power resources attheir disposal, none of the actors has a competitive
advantage over the others. By mapping the actors’
resources it becomes clear that certain actors needeach other to realize their respective goals (Liefferink2006). However the criterion “relative power
position” gives only an indication of an actor’s
potential power. The second criterion, “power
reputation,” provides a better indication of actualuse; it can be thought of as analogous to fire andsmoke, i.e. smoke is an indicator of fire. According
to this perspective, an actor is powerful if “smokefrom power” or reputation of power is perceived byother actors (Lieshout and Westerheijden 1994).
The governance capacity for power requires that
actors who promote SFM have many resourcesat their disposal and have a strong reputation of
power; other discourse coalitions do not.

Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 51

3. Material & Methods
The research sub-questions (e.g. “how to define
the different actors in SFM”) were best answeredwith a case study approach. Case studies are
preferable when “how” and “why” questions arebeing asked about a contemporary set of events
over which the investigator has little or no control(Yin 2003). The case study in this research project
was conducted in a stepwise approach. The firststep, familiarization, involved an investigation of
all documents (n=29) which were related to thiscase and the research subject. The second step was
the collection of the field data through in-depth
interviews. In all interviews questions on SFM
discourse (in general, wood production, recreation,
reducing the use of exotic trees and increasing
the amount of dead wood), acceptance of rules,
possible conflicts with other land-based policies,
actor relations, trust in other actors, power resources(forest area, money and personnel, knowledge,
communication possibility, formal and informal
authority) and power reputation were asked. Theinterviews were held with ten private forest owners,

Table 2: Discourse coalitions: name, members and differences from the SFM perspective of thegovernment
Coalitions
SFM coalition

Economiccoalition

Members
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Water harvest/
military use
coalition•••

Naturecoalition•

Local usecoalition•

Timbercoalition•

two municipalities
three forest consultancies
Forest group “Zuid-Nederland”
State Forest Service
landscape organization “Brabants
Landschap”
Forest Groups Union
Forest Board
five private forest owners (>60 ha)
Federation private landownership
one estate agent

Difference from the perspective of
the government
No difference

Multi-functionality: Woodproduction is the main function;
the other two functions are possible
when they have no negative effects
on this main function.
Exotics: Douglas and larch areimportant.
Dead wood: No girdling.
two water harvest companies
Multi-functionality: Water harvest/
Ministry of Defense
military use is the main function;
one private forest owner >60 ha
the other three functions are
possible when they have no negative
effects on this main function.
Natuurmonumenten
Multi-functionality: Nature
conservation is the main function;
recreation is possible when there
is no negative effect on the mainfunction.
Wood production: No target.
four private forest owners (<30 ha) Social function: Forest is garden.
Economic function: Wood for own
use.
Exotics: Only invasive exotics mustbe suppressed.
Dead wood: No girdling.
three timber merchants
Exotics: More important thanindigenous.
Dead wood: No girdling and can be
dangerous.
Wood operations: Prefer former
clear-cut system.

Page 52 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

Table 3: Respondents’ familiarity and acceptance of policy instruments
Instrument
Forest Act
Flora and Fauna Act(including behavior
code)
Grant scheme NatureManagement 2000
Estate Act
Economic part ofprovincial scheme
Communicative partof provincial scheme
Communication
project on SFM by
the state

Aim
Maintain forest area
Protect plants andanimals

Familiarity
High
High

High
High

AcceptanceHigh, even praised
Very low by timber merchants
Low by many private owners
Accepted by most organizations
Idea is accepted, but control
system is too rigid and the financial
difference between the plus and thebasic package is too low
High
High

Provide financial
support for
nature and forest
management
Tax advantages
Provide financial
support to develop
SFM planPromote SFM andcapacity-building
Promote SFM andcapacity-building

High

High

High

Low

The idea is accepted, but thisspecific project was not well
executedfour public owners (two municipalities, Ministryof Defense, State Forest Service), two nature
NGO’s (“Natuurmonumenten” and “Brabants
Landschap”), two water collection companies,
three forest consultants, one estate agent, threewood merchants, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature and Food Quality (LNV), the Forest Board(a lobby organization which unifies all forest
and nature stakeholders), the Federation Private
Landownership (FPG), the Forest Group Union andthe Forest Group “Zuid-Nederland” (a cooperative
organization of forest owners). In addition, it was
important to interview the province of NoordBrabant, but the province refused to cooperate.

4. Results
We first provide the results for strategic
congruence, i.e. similarity between SFM
perspective of the government and the different
actors (discourse). Next we present the results forstructural congruence, i.e. sufficient coherence
among the dimensions of the SFM policy
arrangement (discourse, rules, actors, power). Eachsection concludes with an evaluation of governancecapacity.

4.1. Evaluation of strategic
congruence
4.1.1. Discourse coalitions

With regard to SFM, the Dutch state (LNV)
emphasizes an integration of social, ecologicaland economic forest functions at the forest standlevel. LNV wants to convince forest owners to
use indigenous tree species, to increase dead woodin their forests naturally or even with silviculture
techniques such as stem girdling, to increase thepublic accessibility of their forests and to improverecreational quality. The economic function of
the forest is important for several reasons: theLNV encourages domestic wood production
over imports, the economic function serves as an
SFM steering mechanism, and the forest is an
important source of income for many private forest
owners. However, as mentioned before, this multifunctionality is not a goal for all forests; there arealso forests managed for nature conservation. ThisLNV SFM vision can only be realized in thoseinstances where other actors agree with the state’svision. By analyzing similarities and differences
between actors’ SFM perceptions, we distinguished
six discourse coalitions. Table 2 describes thedifferent discourse coalitions.
4.1.2. Evaluation
To have a high level of strategic congruence,differences in perspective between the governmentand other actors must be small. The SFM coalition
has the same SFM perspective as the government
and thus congruence is high. The same goes forthe economic and the water collection/military
use coalitions; both coalitions agree with thegovernmental perspective on SFM when thebenefits cover the costs or when SFM does not
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 53

endanger the primary respective functions of water
harvest or military use. The congruence is lower for
the wood coalition, the local use coalition and thenature coalition. Nevertheless this dissimilarity is
not problematic; most other coalitions can accept
the different perspectives of these groups. The
nature coalition, i.e. “Natuurmonumenten,” fulfills
the policy aim of forests with a nature conservation
function. The wood coalition emphasizes thepolicy aim of the Dutch need for domestic wood
production and the importance of exotics to fulfill
this role. The difference with the local use coalitionis partly a knowledge problem; already the coalition
reacts favorably to fulfill the ecological forest policy
objectives. Only the differences of perspective
between the wood coalition and the nature coalition
are significant and not completely resolved. The
wood coalition deplores that “Natuurmonumenten”
does not have a focus on productivity. Nonetheless,in general most differences in perspectives are smallor accepted, resulting in a high strategic congruence
for this case.

4.2. Evaluation of structuralcongruence
4.2.1. Rules

Governance capacity is high when the SFM
discourse is institutionalized in clear, well known
and accepted rules and when there are no conflicts
with other land-based policy, which seems tobe the case here. First, the Dutch state and theprovince of Noord-Brabant designed regulations
with SFM as a main goal. Second, the respondents
mentioned that there were no negative effects ofother land-based policies on the SFM policy. Third,
this requirement is to a large extent fulfilled formost policy instruments, as was discovered whenfamiliarity and acceptance of the different SFM
relevant policy instruments were surveyed (see Table
3). Nevertheless, the high acceptance can further
be improved by an adaptation of the current grantscheme Nature Management 2000 to a schemethat has more self-regulation, is less rigid and has
a greater difference in financial compensation
between the basic and the plus package.
4.2.2. Actors and PowerThe governance capacity requirements for theindicators “place of actor in social network,” “trust,”“power resources” and “power reputation” were
evaluated on the level of the discourse coalition (seeTable 4). All indicators have the same governancecapacity requirement: the indicator value must be
high for the discourse coalitions that have the sameor only slightly different SFM perspective than

Table 4: Evaluation of the governance capacity requirements for the indicators “place of actor insocial network”, “trust”, “power resources” and “power reputation”
Coalitions

SFM coalition
and LNV
Economiccoalition
Water harvest/
military use
coalition
Nature coalition
Local usecoalition
Timber coalition
Province ofNoord-Brabant(coalition not
known)

Network place(actors which havepositive rewarded
relations with atleast 50% of the
respondents)
Forest group,
Brabants Landschap,State Forest Service-

Trust (70% of
respondents showa high trust in thisactor)

Power
resources(%)

Power reputation(70% ofrespondents
believe that actor is
powerful)

Forest group,
Brabants Landschap

61

LNV, Forest Board,State Forest Service

-

14

-

-

-

8

-

Natuurmonumenten-

Natuurmonumenten 90Natuurmonumenten---

Province of NoordBrabant

Page 54 | CIAS Discussion Paper 818

the government (e.g. SFM discourse coalition,
the economic discourse coalition) and low for
the discourse coalitions that have a different SFM
perspective (e.g. wood coalition). It is possible toconclude that these requirements are fulfilled.
The SFM coalition and the government (LNV)
control 61% of the power resources. This increases
to 83% when the economic and water harvest/
military use coalitions are taken into account.
Most actors believe that the Forest Board, theState Forest Service and the government itself are
powerful. In addition, the forest group “ZuidNederland,” “Brabants Landschap” and the State
Forest Service play an important role in the social
network. Most actors also trust the forest groupand “Brabants Landschap.” In addition to the SFM
coalition members, “Natuurmonumenten” and theprovince of Noord-Brabant are important actors.
“Natuurmonumenten” scores high for network
place and trust, and it controls 9% of the power
resources. As mentioned before, this is not a problem
because almost all actors know and accept that thisorganization realizes another governmental aim:
managing forests for nature conservation focus.
Finally, because the provincial official of NoordBrabant refused to cooperate, it is unknown inwhich coalition the province will be. This can beimportant because the province of Noord-Brabantcontrols 8% of the power means and has a strong
reputation.
4.2.3. Evaluation
The structural congruence—coherence among
the dimensions of the policy arrangement—of theinvestigated case is high. The SFM discourses are
institutionalized in clear, well-known and acceptedrules. All actors of the SFM coalition, together with
the LNV, control almost two thirds of the power
resources. Two of the members of the SFM coalition(State Forest Service and the Forest Board) and theDutch state enjoy also a high reputation in the local
network. In addition, some of the SFM members
are trusted and esteemed actors. There are also no
negative effects of non-SFM coalition members.

5. Conclusions
All indicators show that the governmental
capacity of the SFM arrangement is high. Most
actors understand SFM in a similar way and accept
that different actors emphasize different aspects of
SFM. Some focus more on the economic function;other actors focus on the nature function. The
relevant SFM regulation is well known, not coercive
and accepted by the respondents. The government
and the actors who support the government’s SFM
vision are powerful. Furthermore, several of theSFM members are trusted and esteemed actors.
Given this high governance capacity, there is a highprobability that the policy objective of combining
ecological, social and economic functions in asustainable way can be successfully implemented inmost forests.

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Chapter Seven
Science in policy making: The eucalyptus
debate and villagers in Thailand
by Fumikazu Ubukata1
1Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. fumi@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp. Note: This paperdraws upon Ubukata (forthcoming).

Abstract
In policy making, different actors in various cases compete over distinct interests and values. Particularly
in cases where problems and goals are ambiguous, the policy process is prone to manipulations in order tocontrol outcomes. How are scientific debates utilized in the manipulation process? What are the missing
elements in such a process? Given that science is not neutral, how can we more wisely involve science in thepolicy making? This paper tries to answer these questions by examining the case of the “eucalyptus debates”
and the policy of industrial plantation in Thailand. Facing severe protests sparked by land conflicts, thestate and private industry introduced a “farm-based” production system by rearranging the institutions,policies and strategies regarding eucalyptus planting. At the same time, they created an official discoursethat claimed that eucalyptus itself had no ecologically harmful effects. Through de-contextualization andlegitimization, science contributed significantly to this discourse and was manipulated to sustain conclusions
beyond what it could support. Nonetheless, the villagers’ negative views toward eucalyptus production andecological problems still persisted, despite the state’s efforts to emphasize the harmless nature of eucalyptus.
As this case demonstrates, science is vulnerable to politicization in policy making, particularly when its
goals and methods are unclear and power relations among actors are biased. Nevertheless, the author does
not deny the important role of science in making better policy. In order to avoid the problems identified inthis paper, scientists should make efforts to recognize and integrate different “rationalities.”

1. Introduction
In policy making, different actors in various
cases compete over distinct interests and values. In
such cases, science or the scientific way of thinking
tends to play a key role in the process by putatively
providing neutral or objective judgments. However,recent studies on science, technology and policy
issues suggest that science is neither neutral nor
objective but instead creates certain political
discourses (e.g. Hajer 1995, Forsyth 2003). Someauthors also criticize the top-down nature of scienceand scientific studies for neglecting the standpointof less-advantaged citizens, such as women and thepoor in the third world (Harding 2008).
Furthermore, scientific implications are
sometimes interpreted differently by each party
in the policy making process and deviate fromthe direction that scientists originally intended.
Particularly in cases where problems and goals
are ambiguous, the policy process is prone tomanipulations in order to control outcomes(Zahariadis 2007). How are scientific debates
utilized in the manipulation process? What are
the missing elements in such a process? Given thatscience is not neutral, how can we more wisely
involve science in the policy making?
Forest and natural resource management
policy in developing countries are good cases forconsidering the questions above (e.g. Forsyth andWalker 2008). This paper tries to answer thesequestions by examining the case of the “eucalyptus
debates” and the policy of industrial plantation in
Thailand. In Thailand, as in other places, forest andnatural resource management policy seek dual goals:
attaining sustainable resource use—often meaningsustainable industrialization—and improving
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 57

people’s welfare. These goals are sometimes notachievable simultaneously and are often at odds;
achieving both is sometimes not possible. There
are also competing explanations for the cause ofresource depletion problems as well as proposals forsolutions. The problems over eucalyptus planting
are not exceptions. There have been continuoussocial conflicts and ecological debates over the useof eucalyptus trees to reforest Thailand.
In the following section, the author first
overviews the history of the introduction of
eucalyptus in Thailand, the accompanying social
conflicts and subsequent policy changes. Second,
the author highlights the ecological debates overeucalyptus—one of the major battlefields in thedisputes—and examines how the state created
official framing of the debates by employing a
supposedly scientific way of thinking characterizedas “de-contextualization.” Third, based on fieldobservations and interviews, the author introduces
farmers’ attitudes on eucalyptus trees as a different
rationality. Finally, the prospects to move beyond
polar rationalities and a potential role of science arebriefly discussed in the conclusion.

2. Eucalyptus Planting,Social Conflicts, andPolicy Change in
Thailand
Eucalyptus is a genus of tree that is naturally
found in Australia and its neighbors. It is fastgrowing, regenerates by coppice and is a sourceof raw material for various industrial products
such as pulp and paper, timber, fiberboard,plywood, fuelwood, oil and others. The recorded
introduction of eucalyptus in Thailand was in 1941
(Pousajja 1996). After long years of growth tests,
the Royal Forest Department (RFD) decided topromote Eucalyptus camaldulensis since it can adapt
to diverse environments in Thailand. Therefore theword “eucalyptus” or “yukaliptat” in Thai generally
refers to this species.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the plantedarea of eucalyptus in Thailand rapidly expanded,particularly in the east and northeast regions. The
production has been utilized primarily as raw
material for pulp, while a part of it is used in theurban construction pole market. The total plantedarea in the country increased remarkably from62,000 ha in 1985 to 350,000 ha in 1995. [SeeUraphiphathanaphong et al. (undated) RUAB
and FRC (1997), for the total area and the area
planted by private sector in 1985, and the total
area in 1995, respectively. Unlike other agriculturalcommodities, there are no official statistics on
Page 58 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

eucalyptus plantation area which include villagers’
spontaneous plantations.] Planting by peasants has
been especially vigorous. Some reports claim that
small farmers have planted over 64% of the total
eucalyptus area (Barney 2005).
Plantations of eucalyptus have been targeted asa major battlefield by many NGOs and grassroots
organizations. This is largely because of land
conflicts between RFD and villagers. In Thailand,
forests belonged to the state and were managed
exclusively under the legal system. As a result of therapid designation of national parks and national
forest reserves (NFRs) on one hand, and thecommercial crop boom during the 1960-1970s on
the other, millions of villagers came to live in the
NFRs or national parks, and they were viewed as“forest encroachers.”
Facing rapid forest depletion, the policy makers
drew up the National Forest Policy in 1985. Its aim
was to recover 40% of the total land area as forests,
consisting of 25% as production forests and 15% as
conservation forests. In order to reforest the country,
it encouraged the private sector to participate andestablish production forests. Degraded NFRs wereleased to private companies at a reasonable rate. As
a result, many pulp and paper companies rushed
into the reforestation businesses by acquiring
as many degraded NFRs as possible. When thereforestation plan was implemented, villagers wereimmediately treated as illegal forest encroachers.
Their land for cultivation or communal land wasseized for eucalyptus planting, and in the worst
cases, they were scheduled for eviction. The
government supported this process both implicitly
and explicitly. These hard-line approaches sparked
strong resistance among villagers and NGOs during
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
These social protests forced the government
and private firms to reconsider both their strategy
for supplying raw material and the underlying
forest policy. A cabinet resolution of May 15, 1990
blocked the leasing of NFRs for tree planting byprivate firms. In the Seventh National Economic
and Social Development Plan (1992-1996), thereforestation target of the 1985 National Forest
Policy was revised to 25% for conservation forestsand 15% for production forests. Furthermore, on
September 8, 1992, another cabinet resolution
specified five conditions for tree planting in NFRs
by the private sector, which included a restriction
on the total area covered by planting plots to lessthan eight ha per household (Hatakeyama 1993).
Under these conditions, the government finally
included eucalyptus in the list of eligible tree species
for promotion in September 1993 (Kuaycharoen
2004).
Consequently, the government came topromote small-scale tree planting by villagers,
while it trod warily on large-scale tree planting
by private firms. The firms also switched from aplantation-based strategy of establishing their own
large-scale plantations to a farm-based strategy
under which villagers were either encouraged toplant raw material or wherein it was simply boughtfrom them.

3. Ecological Debatesover Eucalyptus by the
State
Apart from land disputes mentioned above,
there was another important debate about ecologicalimpacts that affected policy on eucalyptus planting.
At the time, there was a broad discussion on theseissues not only in Thailand but in other countries,
such as India (Raintree 1991). It was said that there
are some ecological risks posed by the cultivation of
eucalyptus trees (Shiva and Bandyopadhyay 1987).
Their high water and nutrient consumptions may
affect crops nearby, and in more harmful cases,
lead to soil degradation and a drop in groundwaterlevel (FAO 1988). These considerations added
an important question of the socio-ecologicalcosts in eucalyptus planting, particularly in largescale plantations. However, others experts, while
admitting that there are ecological risks undercertain conditions, counter-argued that there was
not enough scientific evidence to support suchclaims (Davidson 1985).
Studies in Thailand also showed mixed results.
For example, Craig et al. (1988) reported significant
crop losses near eucalyptus trees in paddy fields innortheast Thailand. On the other hand, the RFD
insisted that such effects were minimal and did
not differ from other tree species. According to
the report by the working committee on researchon this issue, a study by the RFD research teamshows that there was no significant difference interms of the effects on soil and water conditionsin the initial phase (0-4 years) between Eucalyptus
camaldulensis and another fast-growing tree species(Acacia auriculiformis) (RFD undated: 12-15). It
argued that eucalyptus planting is less ecologically
harmful than cassava cultivation, a competitive crop
to eucalyptus. It even pointed out that eucalyptus
planting can be ecologically beneficial on degraded
land, although the report admitted some ecologicalrisks of eucalyptus planting under specific conditions
and the need for some care (RFD undated). These
conditions include planting too close to cultivatedcrops, which may lead to crop losses, or too close
to water sources, which may cause water level todrop, or under dry conditions with annual rainfall
less than 750 mm, which inhibits infiltrationof allelopathic chemical in its dead leaves (RFD
undated: 32).

In response to settle such polarized arguments,
the Food and Agricultural Organization of theUnited Nations (FAO), Regional Office for Asiaand the Pacific held a consultation with experts on
this issue in 1993 at Bangkok. This was done ona purportedly scientific basis with forestry experts.
According to the participant list in the report ofthe consultation, there were 82 total participantsof the consultation, from 15 countries in Asia andthe Pacific plus from international organizations, ofwhich 29 were from the state forestry offices andresearchers in universities, 14 from state/privatecompanies, eight from international/bilateral aid
organizations not including FAO, 13 from FAO
offices and projects, two from mass media, and
16 from NGOs and others (White et al. 1995:
159-170). Biophysical, environmental, social andeconomic impacts of eucalyptus planting and policy
issues were discussed thoroughly for five days.
As a result, the participants acknowledgedsome of these negative impacts. These include 1)
nutrition, water competition and allelopathic effects
with crops nearby under dry conditions of less than
1,200 mm annual rainfall, particularly that of lessthan 400 mm, 2) social and economic injusticeagainst villagers, 3) loss of villagers’ benefits e.g.
non-timber forest products from degraded forestsby their replacement to plantations, and 4) loss of
biodiversity compared with natural forests. Manyof these, particularly 2-4, are according to Kashio(1998), not specific problems of eucalyptus itself,
but of tree plantations in general or socioeconomic
conditions which the country faces. At theconsultation, several recommendations were madeby the experts: the need for more participatory
approach to plantation management; the need forforest policy reforms and considerations of existingland tenure; the importance of special attention towater competition, soil nutrients and allelopathic
effects under dry conditions and soil erosion;
the importance of not replacing undisturbed
natural forests, yet the recognition that eucalyptus
plantations have higher biodiversity than many typesof degraded lands. Finally, the report concluded
with the following statement on the root cause of
the eucalyptus debate:“There is now recognition by all who
attended the consultation that the problems
and conflicts formerly blamed on species of
the genus Eucalyptus arise more from theintensive application of government policies
on afforestation and from social justice thanfrom the eucalypts (Ibid.: 148).”
This statement might be reasonable from ascientific point of view. However, beyond thescientific arguments, the consultation was importantin the following two senses. First, it provided a
profound base of legitimacy for state agencies,
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 59

private companies and aid organizations to further
promote planting eucalyptus. For instance, shortly
after this consultation, the internal committee of
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
reached a similar conclusion on this issue and gave agreen light to continue support for planting projects(JICA 1993). [See Kami Parupu Syokurin Mondai
Network (1994) about the Japanese NGO’s critics
to this response.] Similarly, the attitude of RFD on
eucalyptus (RFD undated) was reinforced by thestatement from the consultation, even though thestatement ostensibly implied more policy reform.
In fact, risk factors that the consultation pointedout did not seriously affect their promotion policy.
For instance, no cautious comments are written in
the RFD’s homepage on eucalyptus planting, partof RFD’s private reforestation division homepage.
In effect, the consultation simply endorsed existing
strategies.
Second, the above statement was the product ofde-contextualization of eucalyptus from its broadersocial, economic, and political context. Ecologicalfactors are separated from the other factors andindependently examined. The scientific way of
thinking by the experts, particularly reductionism,did matter. Interestingly, one of the FAO officers at
the time who was actively involved this consultation
made a reflection on the matter:“If someone argues for a ban on knives
because they can kill people, everybody gets
angry as this is an absurd remark. Planting
eucalyptus also has some elements that offersome socioeconomic demand. We should
not exclude rational thinking to utilize its
advantage and overcome its shortcomings.”(Kashio 1998: 244, translated by the author)
Though it might be scientifically rational, thismetaphor of the knife clearly shows the effect ofde-contextualization. By disconnecting eucalyptus
from its social, economic and political issues, thepros and cons of eucalyptus were scientificallyrationalized factor by factor, thereby successfully
creating a set of policy recipes that conferred
legitimacy on eucalyptus planting. Furthermore,cautions or warnings about eucalyptus were notincluded in the promotion activities since theproblems were determined not to be because of
eucalyptus itself but part of the socioeconomic
structure. In this way, the state and the industry
created an official ecological discourse on eucalyptus
planting. This was in line both with the existing
policy and strategic move toward a farm-based
system of production. Together with planting
techniques, this knowledge was included in the
RFD’s training programs for villagers.
However, using the same metaphor of the knife,
one may argue that the employment of the knife,
i.e. when, by whom and where the knife can be
Page 60 | CIAS Discussion Paper 8

used, greatly depends on the situation and context
that the potential user faces. In fact, Raintree (1991:30), one of the participants of the consultation,rightly pointed out that what was needed was “amuch expanded repertoire of tree growing practices
and the recognition that what we are dealing withare always the attributes of a particular species in
the context of a particular technology intended fora particular user within a particular socioeconomic
setting in support of a particular development
strategy” (emphasis in original). The question
remains, however, whether combinations of theseelements really create a greater repertoire or not.
In the real world where many factors areinterwoven, reductionism does not necessarily
obtain a socially optimal set of choices. Moreover,there should be an understanding of the different
types of rationalities held by the relevant actors. An
analysis of the villagers’ point of view is valuable inthis regard and follows.

4. Villagers’ Attitudes
and Scientific
Explanations
As a result of policy and strategic change
toward “farm-based” systems, eucalyptus planting
was accepted by many villagers during the 1990s.
Furthermore, the stagnating price of cassava and awage hike drove many villagers to plant eucalyptus
trees even outside the policy and contract farming
scheme. However, planting eucalyptus did not meanthat the villagers came to hold positive perceptionsof the ecological aspects of eucalyptus. On thecontrary, many villagers believed that eucalyptus
affects the water table and damages nutrientsin the soil, despite the state’s continual efforts toemphasize eucalyptus’ harmless nature.
In contrast to the scientific discussions by
the state and the industry, villagers’ judgments
were based on their own direct field observations
or indirect information from their friends andneighbors. For instance, they heard that a crop
nearby had been negatively affected. They witnessedthat eucalyptus was fast-growing and very tough.
Once planted, uprooting eucalyptus was very hardtask because the roots grow deep, making it difficult
to change crops. They claimed that weeds did notcome up after trees were planted. In addition, poor
growth performance, fire damage, lower profits than
expected and the decreasing trend of eucalyptus
price in real value after the economic crisis might
have exacerbated their persisting perceptions ofagro-ecological impacts.
Such information was quite common andfelt reliable to villagers. In contrast, scientificinformation on eucalyptus provided by the stateseemed unreliable to them. For example, when
asked about effect on crop yield, one grower in
Chaiyaphum province who took a training courseon tree planting by the RFD, anxiously replied that,“According to the training course…eucalyptus is
not harmful…” (author’s interview, June 2000).
The scientific way of thinking may indeed
provide explanations for villagers’ observations andclaims. However, scientific debate most neededwith regard to eucalyptus is not to identify pros andcons of it, but to provide scientific explanations of
why and under what conditions villagers recognize
negative ecological effects. For example, narrowtree spacing, 2m by 2m, which most villagers
apply, may be one of the reasons for the absence of
weeds. Improper site selection can also cause thiseffect, and simple crown closure can inhibit thegrowth of weeds. Moreover, the absence of weeds
may not necessarily indicate the deterioration ofsoil and water. By comparing with ceteris paribus
factor by factor, we may identify causal factors forweed absence. Such analyses, however, are almost
impossible in the actual settings. More importantly,
factor by factor analysis may underestimate
composite effects of these factors. In contrast,
villagers’ rationality is more holistic, site specificand experience-based. Even though the state makesa serious effort to present scientific evidence, itwould be unreasonable for villagers to consider
these contingent situations. Therefore, it is hard toalter the villagers’ perception by simply declaringthat eucalyptus is harmless, because in this situationdifferent rationalities are competing with eachother, as Beck (1992: 29-30) argued in his analysis
of a risk society.

5. Conclusion
This paper demonstrated how the state created
an official ecological discourse on eucalyptus inpolicy making by employing science and scientificthinking; yet this discourse was at odds withvillagers’ experience-based knowledge.
Facing severe protests sparked by land conflicts,
the state and private industry re-arranged theinstitutions, policies and strategies regarding
eucalyptus planting. At the same time, they created
an official discourse that claimed that eucalyptus
itself had no ecologically harmful effects. Science,or the scientific way of thinking, contributed
significantly to this discourse and was manipulated
to sustain conclusions beyond what it could
support. First, de-contextualization was used toseparate the ecological nature of the tree from its
socioeconomic context. Second, it provided thestate and aid agencies with scientific legitimacy forexisting projects, while acknowledged risks were
not presented in the actual eucalyptus planting
promotion efforts. In the discourse, the positive

aspects were emphasized, while risk factors werelargely eliminated.
On the other hand, the villagers’ negative
views toward eucalyptus production and ecologicalproblems still persisted, despite the state’s efforts
to emphasize the harmless nature of eucalyptus.
This was due to a distinct quality in the villagers’
rationality, which is based on individual andcollective experiences. As a result, the state andindustry did not succeed in creating discourses thatpenetrated the whole production system, while
they succeeded in rearranging production to someextent by introducing “farm-based” production
system.
As this case demonstrates, science is vulnerable
to politicization in policy making, particularly
when its goals and methods are unclear and power
relations among actors are biased. Nevertheless,the author does not deny the role of science inmaking better policy. Scientists should makeefforts to provide explanations for the phenomenathat villagers witness as negative ecological effectsof eucalyptus. Furthermore, some of the problems
villagers faced were caused by inappropriate site
selection and other techniques that were partly
introduced by the state promotion program.
This implies that the existing scientific way of
promotion is still very weak, and some of these
problems may be mitigated by introducing
appropriate techniques or integration into existing
farming systems and villagers’ rationality. For
example, the tree spacing technique promoted by
the RFD (2m by 2m) may provide neither good
production nor be ecologically sound. There is also
room for improving productivity and sustainability
by combining tree planting with existing farming
practices. For example, paddy-bund planting is oneof the practices that can commonly be observed innortheast region. This allows entry to smallholders
with lower opportunity costs and fewer negative
ecological disturbances. The authors’ interviews
with the villagers also indicate higher satisfaction
rate with lower gross profits (Ubukata and
Akarapin 2007). Technological developments that
support such low-cost-low-risk strategies are likely
to bear more fruit than current high-cost-high-risk
approach.
Thus, if we are fully aware of the embedded
nature of science and technology, the author does
not deny the de-contextualization of knowledge
itself. If it can be re-contextualized in certain
directions, such as empowerment of people, it may
create previously unrecognized combinations of arepertoire of tree growing practices. In that sense,
science is not dangerous, but can be useful inpolicy making. Finally, the author concludes withthe following: “scientific rationality without social
rationality remains empty, but social rationality
without scientific rationality remains blind (Beck1992: 30 emphasis in original)”.
Forest Policies for a Sustainable Humanosphere | Page 61

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