保健医療科学

2018 Vol.67 No.1 p.103－114

Topics: Lessons learned on public health from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident＜ Review ＞
History and lessons of science communication: implications
from and for the 3.11 triple disasters
Ryuma Shineha 1), Mikihito Tanaka 2)
1)

Faculty of Arts and Literatures, Seijo University

2)

Graduate School of Political Science, Waseda University

Abstract
The 3.11 disaster brought not only direct damages, but also huge ramifications to Japanese society. To
consider confusion and structural issues of communication regarding the 3.11, we overviewed history ofscience communication and current studies on media analysis concerning the 3.11.
In the 3.11 disaster context, we should not overlook that fact that the Nuclear Power Plant accident
deprived media attention from topics concerning the earthquake and tsunami, particularly in nationaland social media. There were also gaps in the media framing between national/social media and local
newspapers in the Tohoku area.
In addition, current studies on science communication taught us that we should not solely examine thescientific contents, but also the social contexts of science and technology. They indicated that the public
tends to be aware of and regard risks, responsibility and liability, and other post-disaster schemes asimportant factors rather. To secure “trust,” mutual understanding, and proper communication concerning
post-disaster schemes, including responsibility and liability, is essential. The opening of stakes will support
this process.
keywords: science communication, risk communication, framing, media, 3.11
(accepted for publication, 7th December 2017)

I．Introduction
On March 11, 2011, a massive earthquake and tsunami
and the severe accident of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant (the NPP accident) struck Japan. This
triple disaster (hereafter referred to as “3.11”) brought
extreme damage to people, buildings, communities, andsocieties. There were over 20,000 recorded deaths andmissing persons. Approximately 79,000 people evacuatedfrom their homes in Japan [1,2]. The tsunami wiped out
several hundred kilometers of coastline in Japanese towns.
Concerning the causes of death, drowning was responsible
for over 90 percent of lost victims, with about 65 percent ofvictims being over the age of 60 [3].

The 3.11 disaster brought not only direct damages, butalso huge ramifications to Japanese society. For example,
previous studies showed changes of media attentions in
national and social media from topics on “earthquake andtsunami” to “the NPP accident.” In other words, it can besaid that the NPP accident deprived the media attention
from topics concerning earthquakes and tsunamis [1,4].
In addition, it has been pointed out that there are gaps
in the media framing between national/social media andlocal newspapers in the Tohoku area [1,5-6]. At the sametime, issues concerning different media framing havebeen discussed repeatedly in the context of science,
risk, and crisis communication. Tanaka (2013) pointed
out that the adoption of an appropriate scheme and style

Corresponding author: Ryuma Shineha
157-8511 Seijo 6-1-20, Setagaya, Tokyo, Japan
Tel:+81-3-3482-9476, FAX:+81-3-3482-7740
E-mail: r_shineha@seijo.ac.jp

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 67 (1) : 2018103

Ryuma Shineha, Mikihito Tanaka
of communication according to situations of emergency
is necessary [7], but that it was not achieved in the 3.11
context. In our opinion, these communication issues arerooted in the history and structural issues of Japanesescience and technology policy (STP), as well as in Japanesecommunication practices.
To consider these issues, we would like to provide
an historical overview of the domestic and international
context on science communication, as well as theimplications of the media framing concerning the 3.11
context. Then, we would like to discuss common issues inJapanese science communication within the concept of a“structural disaster” [8,9].

II．Rough outline of the history of science
communication in Japanese science andtechnology policy
In this section, we will overview the history of science
communication in the context of Japanese STP. Since the
Meiji era, the cultivation of public scientific capabilities
has been a prominent political theme in Japan. Particularly
after the 1960s, various enlightened activities havebeen conducted. Namely, those include the “science andtechnology week” program, the establishment of the Japan
Science and Technology Agency, and others. Watanabe(2008) pointed out that these efforts were relatively earlycases in a worldwide context [10].
After activities on the “public understanding of science(PUS)” began in the 1980s in the UK, Japanese STP began
to focus on the keyword “science communication” in the
1990s. The National Institution for Science and Technology
Policy (NISTEP) published several reports concerningscience communication, and emphasized the gaps that could
not be filled with knowledge, as well as the importanceof two-way communication. Although these NISTEP
discussions were pioneering, the majority of discussions
concerning PUS in the 1990s (for example, discussions
on communication regarding genetically modified
organism:GMO) were based on the deficit model [11].
This situation changed around the year 2000. In 2001,
The 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan pointed out
the importance of scientistsʼ outreach activities [12].
Additionally, The 2nd Science and Technology Basic Plan of2006 discussed mutual communication between scientists
and the public, and anticipated the active participation ofscientific communities [13]. Simultaneously, working papers
analyzing science communication in the EU and othercountries were published [14-16]. Simultaneously, numberof café scientific increased and consensus conferenceswere tried [17-21]. In 2005, three educational programs for

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science communication were established at the Universityof Tokyo, Waseda University, and Hokkaido University[21]. The trend of emphasizing two-way communication
continued in The 4th and 5th Science and Technology Basic
Plan [22,23]. Generally speaking, the current Japanese
STP on science communication is directed to exceed
one-way communication policies, and will focus on the
ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of science andtechnology. However, Ishihara-Shineha (2017) pointed out
the ineradicable nature of one-way communication and the
deficit model, which will be discussed later [24].

III．History of science communication: aglobal context
Here, we discuss science communication in a global
context. We would like to start with an introductionof the UK context in the 1980s. In 1985, the Royal
Society published a landmark report entitled The Public
Understanding of Science (also known as the Bodmer
report). This report was written with to prevent the
public from losing interest in science, and emphasized
the importance of the idea of the public understandingof science (PUS), as well as the importance of scientists
who develop public communication activities [10]. As aresult, several governmental offices and institutions were
established in the 1990s concerning PUS activities.
The turning point for science communication occurred
around the year 2000. In the late 1990s, BSE affairs
damaged the trust of the government and related experts.
Extracting lessons from these experiences, the limitationsof the PUS model involving one-way communication
were realized, and methods of gaining the public trust andacceptance by informing them of scientific knowledge weredeveloped. This was the beginning of the so-called “deficit
model.” Although the details of discussions concerning
the “deficit model” will be illustrated in the next chapter,the idea has been discussed and criticized repeatedly.
Regardless, a direction of the concept that went beyond
deficit model was shown in a landmark report publishedin Science and Society by the House of Lords in 2000
[25]. This report discussed the mutual dialogue between
science and society rather than one-way communication
based on the deficit model. In this report, the expressions“science and society” or “science in/for society” wereseen as noteworthy features, and discussions beyond
the deficit model were conducted. We can interpret thishistory as having moved from PUS to PE. In the PE
context, knowledge is regarded as “knowledge in context”
and related to value [26]. This idea heavily impacted thediscussions and STP concerning science communication

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History and lessons of science communication: implications from and for the 3.11 triple disasters[25,27]. This change also meant that the importance ofcommunications on broader social impacts was recognized.
This two-way communication trend was shown in othergovernmental reports, such as in OPEN CHANNELS
Public dialogue in science and technology [28]. As well, in
the USA and in international discussion, the same trend
is evident. Unlocking Our Future: Toward a New National
Science Policy [29] and WORLD Conference on Science:
Science for the Twenty-First Century, A New Commitment[30], pointed out the importance of sharing of knowledge,
equal accessibility, and encouraging public engagement (PE)concerning science and scientific knowledge. In addition,
the EU commission (2002) also took up public engagement
as an important theme in their famous policy agenda
entitled Science and Society Action Plan (so-called as the
Lisbon Agenda) [31]. This trend can be seen in Taking
European Knowledge Society Seriously [32] and Horizon
2020, which is the current EU basic framework for STP.
At the same time, the attitudes of scientist and hurdles tocommunication activities have been examined repeatedly
according to the progress of science communication by STP[33-38].
Now, we would like to introduce a prominent largescale dialogue experiment in the UK that focuses on the
GMO controversy. From 2002 to 2003, the UK government
and The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology
Committee (AEBC) conducted “GM Nation? The Public
Debate,” which consisted of multi-level open meetings,
citizen workshop participation, focus group interviews,
stakeholder conferences, and consensus conferences.
An articulation of public interests and the extraction of
key messages in the GMO controversy surfaced throughthese PE trials. Through GM Nation, several key points
were discovered. That is, there were various types ofunease regarding scientific, political, and social risk, acomplicated understanding of risk-benefit (an increase of
the interest in long-term risk), value judgement against
rapid commercialization, suspicion of the government
and multi-national companies (particularly for their alibimaking communication), a request for more and various
types of information closure and scientific testing, interests
in developing countries, and a welcome recognition the ofvalue of participation in discussion and communication [3944].
In summary, GM Nation worked as system for knowledge
and information sharing through PE [44]. However, themost important lesson from GM Nation is that “GM Nation
was too late.” Thus, AEBC developed a mission to recover“the public trust.” However, the suspicion that GM Nation
was merely concerned with creating alibis could not be
removed. In addition, several issues were pointed out

through following studies [40-44], as follows:⃝Control participant bias. How to involve citizens with
low-interest in this theme.
◯Ambiguity of GM Nationʼs aim and transparency. The
position in the policy-making context and the way toreflect the results of policies.
◯Quality of information materials and discussion tools.
◯Evaluation system of PE◯Recovery of trust of science and the government
In a more current context, the discussion regarding
communication between scientists and society has been
progressing through the concept of “Responsible Researchand Innovation (RRI),” particular in the EU community
since 2011 [45-47]. Now, RRI has become the central
concept of the “Science with/for society” program of
Horizon 2020, which is the basic framework of EU science
policy [48]. As well, “Anticipation,” “Reflexivity,” “Inclusion,”and “Responsiveness” have been regarded as basic
ideas [49,50]. Thus, RRI was expressed as “Responsible
innovation means taking care of the future throughcollective stewardship of science and innovation in thepresent” (p.1570) [50]. With this idea, Horizon 2020 claimed
that RRI policy will perform the following [47]:◯Engage society more broadly in its research andinnovation activities,◯Increase access to scientific results,◯Ensure gender equality, in both the research process andresearch content,◯Take into account the ethical dimension, and◯Promote formal and informal science education.
This concept recommends greater communication,
engagement, and the inclusion of various stakeholders inscience and technology innovation. The societal impact ofscientific research, especially research related to SCR and
RM, and the ways in which visions for the future may beshared with society are the focus of such policies.

IV．Discussions on the “Deficit Model”
In the early 1990s, the model for science communication
policy was generally based on the idea that the public islacking in scientific knowledge and literacy. Because ofthat, the public irrationally declined advanced science andtechnology. Therefore, it was thought that the teaching andinforming of scientific contents was the solution. In otherwords, the more public knowledge there was about science,
the more acceptable new science and technology would

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Ryuma Shineha, Mikihito Tanaka
become. However, this idea has been called the “deficit
model,” and has been repeatedly criticized. Particularly
since 2000, there have been repeated efforts to overcome
PUS based on the deficit model.
For example, social psychological studies havediscovered that knowledge level does not simply affectpublic acceptance. Several studies using a large-scale
investigation in the EU (i.e., Eurobarometer) found thatpublic “informedness” on science and technology does
not simply encourage optimistic attitudes toward scienceand technology, but also aids in the development ofnegative attitudes toward concepts such as GMO [51,52].
The increased level of knowledge develops both critical
attitudes toward new technology and the overrating of
risk. Regardless, it can be said that the effect of knowledge
is more complicated than the expectations involvedin the deficit model. Risks were understood as being
multidimensional, as outlined in the epistemology ofdiversity and the perception of risk [53-55], the local andcontextualized understanding of knowledge [26,56], andknowledge about political context [57]. In Japan, Nagata
and Hibino (2008) pointed out that the perception of
biotechnology was influenced by moral recognition rather
than risk-benefit perspectives through an investigation ofuniversity students [58].
Another landmark example of these discussion wasprovided by Brian Wynne, a sociologist of science in the
UK. Wynne emphasized “knowledge in context” [26,56] .
He focused on the case of sheep farmers in the Sellafieldof the Lake district of Cumbria in the UK. Farmers inthis area faced the risk of dispersed radioactive material
from the Chernobyl accident. Wynne (1996) examinedthe contradictive ideas on the protection and handling ofradioactive risk, and the uncertainty of scientific knowledge
between governmental experts and local farmers [56]. In
this context, governmental experts lost “trust” in theirjudgement on false assumptions and ad-hoc handling,including the “deficit model” style of communication. Wynne
also pointed out three key points for wider understanding
as follows (p.21) [56]:◯The fundamental interaction between scientific expertiseand lay-publics is cultural, in that scientific knowledge
embodies social and cultural prescriptions in its very
structure;◯The problem of public uptake of science therefore lies in
the institutional forms of science and of its incorporation
into policy and administration;◯ʻLocalʼ case studies of this sort should be seen as
an expression of deeper problems of modernity as
embodied in dominant institutional cultures. They are106

not just a defence of ʻtraditional communitiesʼ against an
anonymous modernizing ʻcentreʼ, but a more fundamental
challenge to the very idea of a universalizing ʻcentreʼ inthe first place
One-way communication based on the offering of
knowledge is not an effective way to generate a positive
public perception of new science and technology. However,
it is necessary to point out the confusion of critics of the
deficit model, which is common. Critics of the deficit model
are at times criticized for refusing knowledge circulation.
This idea is incorrect. As already detailed in the discussion
above, the nature of criticism of the deficit model involves
the simple idea that offering knowledge will develop aperception of new science and technology. In short, critics
of the deficit model do not deny the importance of sharing
knowledge, but regard it as the basis of discussion anddecision making. In other words, the deficit model was
criticized as a top-down scheme of information management
and knowledge offering; critics of this model aimed toplace the sharing of knowledge as a basis for mutualcommunication with broader meaning, including knowledge
on social contexts [59].

V．Lessons from communication and media
attention after the 3.11 disaster
The 3.11 disaster brought not only direct damages, butalso huge ramifications to Japanese society. Considering
the impact of miscommunications after the 3.11 disaster,
media has become an important factor. This is because
media played various roles in agenda-building and bringing
attention to issues through framing [60-63]. Therefore, theeffect of media discourses on the agenda-building process
in the context of the 3.11 disaster should not be overlooked.
Entman (1993) explained that “Framing essentiallyinvolves selection and salience. To frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote aparticular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described” (p.52) [62]. Thus, it is necessary to examine thechanges of framing and its effects on society.
Previous studies showed that media attention to the
3.11 disaster decreased over time, and that the decrease
was more significant in social media. Although news on theearthquake and tsunami decreased, news concerning the
NPP accident increased. In other words, the NPP accident
shifted attention away from the earthquake and tsunami [46] and played a strong part in setting the agenda. On theother hand, local newspapers showed different realities

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History and lessons of science communication: implications from and for the 3.11 triple disasters
according to local contexts. For example, in Kahoku-shimpo,
a key local newspaper in the Miyagi prefecture, news on thetsunami continued to appear in equal proportion to news on
the NPP [1,5].
Takano, Yoshimi, & Miura (2012) pointed out that there
is no correlation between the number of times which
TV news program mentioned and the scale of damage ofdamaged autonomies [64]. For example, Yamamoto-town of
the Miyagi prefecture was seriously damaged, but this was
not as widely broadcast as other famous cities or the NPP
accidents. This phenomenon has been called a “depopulatedarea of information (Joho-Kasochi)”[65].
Surely, this lack of media attention and so-called“depopulated area of information (Joho-Kasochi)” haveexacerbated some of the issueʼs problems. Considering
previous discussions on media studies, it is clear that gapsof attention between national or social media and local
media will influence the distribution of capital and social
interest during the reconstruction process, largely as aresult of their agenda and frame-building process [60-63].
This is also true in the 3.11 disaster context, in which thegap of media attention resulted in gaps of capital in thesociety, including those of assistance grant funding, thenumber of volunteers, and public interest [64].
However, the disaster continues. The disaster struck
local sites, but the reconstruction process is influenced
by an agenda set at the national level. Previous studies
showed changes in media attention in national and social
media ranging from topics on the “earthquake and tsunami”
to “the NPP accident.” In other words, it can be said that
the NPP accident, and perhaps other kinds of severe
accidents, attracted media attention away from topics
concerning the earthquake and tsunami [1,4]. Thus, thisprocess is also influenced by gaps of power and interest
between metropolitan areas and devastated rural areasthat are mediated by gaps of attention between national orsocial media and local media. In other words, it seems thatthe locals were made “peripheralized” and the agenda wasdeveloped in the “center” without enough care for local
contexts and the diversity of “realities.”

VI．Beyond “risk communication”
What is the problem with communication activities
concerning science and risk moving forward? To consider
these important issues, we would like to introduce several
current studies. Particularly, we would like to look at thecase of the Japanese Society for Regenerative Medicine(JSRM). The activities conducted by JSRM were someof the newest and most insightful trials in the Japanesecontext. JSRM conducted risk communication activities
and investigations that were funded by the MEXT Programfor Developing Models of Risk Communication in Scienceand Technology. During this program, JSRM conducteda large-scale questionnaire for the purpose of providing
a comparative analysis of attitudes and interests toward
communication on stem cell science (SCR) and regenerative
medicine (RM) between experts and the public. Theycollected the responses of 1,115 experts who were JSRM
members, and 2,160 from the public [37,66].
Their results indicated that the public was moreinterested in the post-realization aspects of RM, such as
the cost of care, countermeasures for risks and accidents,
and the clarification of responsibility and liability, than they
were in the scientific aspects. The scientific aspects wereof greater interest only to JSRM members. In summary,communication trials concerning RM should be conductedthat consider the pragmatic interests of the public.
While scientific facts should form the basis of dialogues
between the public and JSRM members, there is a needfor increasing awareness on the wider aspects of RM,
such as that of developing an understanding of the factorsthat may arise after the implementation of RM, including
the responsibility and liability for accidental cases. At thesame time, the public “trust” of RM healthcare providers/developers should be considered while developing

Figure Summary of interests between the public and experts in the case ofregenerative medicine (Shineha et al. Stem Cell Translational Medicine. 2018;7(2):251-258)

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Ryuma Shineha, Mikihito Tanaka
strategies to bridge these gaps [66]. An interesting pointis that the above results are similar to those from previous
studies involving the nuclear energy case [67,68].
In other words, these results indicated that it is not
sufficient to cultivate “trust” by simply offering scientificcontents. Rather, a clear scheme of the countermeasuresand a clear post-accidental scheme, including responsibility
and liability, is necessary to cultivate “trust.” To establish
a responsible dialogue and cultivate “trust,” the points
discussed by Matsumoto of sociologist of science will be
useful and insightful. Matsumoto (2002) pointed out thatexperts were required to open their stakes and make theirinterests clear. In other words, if experts, communicators,
and interpreters try to conduct communication without
making or explaining their responsibilities, stakes, andinterests clear, their communication activities are notexempt from blame to be delusive [69].
In summary, although the sharing scientific contents
for discussion is an important process, the viewpoints
discussed above should not be overlooked. Then, toconsider the future direction of discussion, we would liketo introduce Matsumotoʼs “structural disaster” concept as
an auxiliary line [8,9]. Matsumoto (2012, 2013) discussed
the 3.11 events as having the character of a “structural
disaster.” He then examined the Japanese context of science
communication through the same concept. According
to Matsumoto, there are five elements that constitute a“structural disaster,” as follows [8,9]:
1. Following wrong precedents carries over problems andreproduces them.
2. Complexity of a system under consideration and theinterdependence of its units aggravate problems.
3. Invisible norms of informal groups virtually hollow out
formal norms.
4. Patching over problems at hand invites another patchingover for temporary countermeasures.
5. Secrecy develops across different sectors and blurs thelocus of agents responsible for the problems in question.
It seems that several factors of the “structural disaster”
can be seen in past Japanese science/risk communications(particularly factors 1 and 4). Considering the implications
mentioned above, such as in the cases of SCR/RM andnuclear power, past Japanese science communication
focusing on scientific contents has been conducted
repeatedly without sufficient examination of the political andsocial aspects, such as the post-handling phase of severeor accidental cases, including the responsibility and liability
scheme. Therefore, the Japanese STP on communication
should be discussed to avoid these structural disaster

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factors in the future.

VII．Delusion of neutrality
Additionally, the structural disaster concept is supportedby the delusion of its stakeholders. That is, they are
obstinate to espousing the neutrality of science and its
knowledge. Even before and after the discussion of the
deficit model, scientific experts are continually defining
themselves as the guardians of scientific knowledge, andtend to think that if society is pervious to their ideas,
every argument related to scientific issues might be solved[70]. Namely, the belief is based on the assumption thatknowledge is neutral, and that most societal disorders
related to science are caused by the misunderstanding of
knowledge or the malignant failure of media communication.
However, such a standpoint is overlooking the fact that an
act of science is essentially argumentative, and also runs
against the presumption of democracy and pluralism of
opinion. Ignoring these principles result in harm, and do nogood for communicating a sound scientific statement.
The cardinal concepts of democracy, such as neutrality,
fairness, and impartiality, have long been argued on thefrontlines of our societal arena. These are also some of thecurrent main issues in media and journalism. However,through the experience of continuous discussion, thoseconcepts have been removed from the codified norms.
That is, “it became clear that a number of familiar and even
useful ideas associated with news were too vague to rise to
the level of essential principles of journalism” (p.10) [71].
Those essential concepts are endearing and important, but
we can never achieve perfect fairness [72]. Those ideals
must be pursued with perpetual efforts to keep the society
intact.
Nevertheless, most experts believe that the knowledgeof science and technology is essentially neutral. However,mere numbers cannot escape societal and political contexts
during the constructive process or through application[73]. We are keenly aware of this fact through disputesthat occurred during the process of defining the criterionof a contaminated area or security for evacuation in oursociety after the 3.11 disaster. Every number and discourse
contained in our societal narrative is arranged in a politicalcontext whether or not we wish it to be; pure scientificneutrality can barely be realized.

VIII．Preparing message toward public
On facing the necessity to send a public message towardscientific controversy to allow for their accountability,
scientific experts or public information officers have two

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History and lessons of science communication: implications from and for the 3.11 triple disasters
choices for contextualizing the message. Namely, they canchoose internal or external pluralism. Choosing an internal
pluralism strategy involves the challenge of integratingbalance or fairness into the opinions of a message. This
strategy is effective when targeting a type of audience
possessing enough will to understand the situation, andthat is seeking for a choice. However, the quest for suchan internally pluralistic message may not directly offer
neutrality. Creating such a message will reflexively ask
you about the meaning of fairness. An internal pluralism
strategy can easily develop into a ritual of “including botharguments,” even for experienced journalists. Alternatively,
if you are a scientist, imagine the difficulty of drafting aperfect review paper in a field in which no peer would
criticize your efforts. Furthermore, whenever the message
is scientifically well-balanced and impartial, the majorityof the targeted audience may not hear or read it. Most
audiences favor a simple message, and the only audiences
who receive your message might be the people who wereinterested in and understood the issue beforehand.
One of the best practices in 3.11 disaster case was
performed by Toshio Katsukawa, a fishery scholar. In his
August 2011 book about fishery, Katsukawa added a small
chapter directed at consumers who were anxious about
radioactive-contaminated foods [74]. After describing
scientific evidence about radioactive food contamination,
Katsukawa offered three concrete choices to readers on
buying seafoods. These choices were directed at consumers
depending on their perceptions about the world. Namely,
those are the people who deeply trust governments, who
are a little anxious about the situation, or who are deeply
concerned about a beloved person, such as a little baby.
Note that this advice focuses on free will rather a debate
about scientific choice.
On the other hand, choosing an external pluralism
strategy indicates that the message will advocate asingle point of view and expect others to provide otherperspectives. When thinking about risk, however, thisstrategy is not favorable in the age of social media. Whenfacing such a message, people tend to obey their chosenpartisanship beforehand. That is, people will accept
the message if it fits their ideology. If the message iscontradictive toward that ideology, they will simply denyit or share it among their community by adding sarcastic
comments. Our society has not found an effective measure
to break through this so-called “filter bubble” [75]. Every
practitioner of communication has experience facing such a
nuisance, and has sought out countermeasures. However,
we should instead send a message toward the silent
majority that is willing to think about the issue and thenchoose. This is not a statement to ignore the people whoare yelling scientifically irrational requests. Every message
must include the expectation of senders to reach all
audiences. A supremely important point is that we should
maintain awareness of the power of our own stake, andcontinually trying to understand the rationality of others as
indicated in the deficit model argument. To be too humble
is not a problem. Namely, this involves more haste andless speed. That is, one should open their stake to secure
the external plurality, and, moreover, emphasize internal
plurality as much as the message.
Additionally, in the age of social media, the sender of amessage also has the duty to monitor flattering supporters.
Supporters may side with the message, but can sometimes
abuse it to defeat their “opponents.” This may offer a shortterm triumph, but will detract from the long-term goal ofreaching the democratic choice of scientific risk of society.
In this paper, we have chosen not to introduce a more
concrete methodology because of limited space. The fieldof risk communication already offers decades of history
and scientifically tested knowledge and wisdom. However,even people who call themselves “risk communicators”
are overlooking or ignoring the fruits of those studies. If
you have a chance, or become an accidental stakeholderof science communication, this wisdom should aid yourengagement [76,77]. The accumulation of the efforts ofeach stake could lead to the reform of our society after thedamage caused by the disaster.

IX．Conclusion
The 3.11 disaster brought not only direct damages,
but also huge ramifications to Japanese society, including
serious instances of miscommunication. We would like tomention two points concerning miscommunication from thecurrent studies.
In the 3.11 disaster context, we should not overlook thatfact that the NPP accident deprived media attention fromtopics concerning the earthquake and tsunami, particularly
in national and social media. At the same time, local
media outlets continued to observe the realities of eacharea. There were also gaps in the media framing between
national/social media and local newspapers in the Tohoku
area.
The current investigation of communication between
science and society, particularly in the SCR and RM cases,
taught us that we should not solely examine the scientificcontents, but also the social contexts of science andtechnology. This case indicated that the public tends to beaware of and regard risks, responsibility and liability, andother post-disaster schemes after the implementation of
RM as important factors rather than scientific contents, as

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Ryuma Shineha, Mikihito Tanaka
experts expected. To secure “trust,” mutual understanding,and proper communication concerning post-disasterschemes, including responsibility and liability, is essential.
The opening of stakes will support this process.
Sharing an imagination of the future and of responsibility
are regarded as important points in the current state of
STP in Europe. However, from overviewing the historyof Japanese STP concerning science communication, it
seems that the discussion mentioned above has not been
sufficient for progress. Finding ways to overcome this lackof discussion for a shared imagination of the future and of a
responsible scheme to avoid structural disaster should be
discussed more often.

Acknowledgement
Authors were supported by the grant-in-aid of MEXT's
Private University Branding Project, Seijo University(Tokubetsu-Kenkyu-Joseikin), and the Suntory Foundation.

Conflict of Interests
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests
regarding the publication of this article.

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Ryuma Shineha, Mikihito Tanaka

科学コミュニケーションを巡る歴史と教訓―東日本大震災からの示唆―

標葉隆馬 1），田中幹人 2）
成城大学文芸学部マスコミュニケーション学科
早稲田大学政治学研究科ジャーナリズムコース

1)
2)

抄録
東日本大震災は直接的な人的被害のみならず，大きな社会的被害と混乱をもたらした．この東日本大震災を巡る社会的課題の一端について考察するために，本稿では日本の科学コミュニケーションが持つ構造的問題とその歴史的経緯について検討を行う．
（特に再生医療分野のリスクコミュニケーショ
ンに関する）最近の研究において，科学的コンテンツは重要であるものの，それ以上に潜在的なリス
ク，事故の際の対応スキーム，責任の所在などへの関心事がより一般の人々の中で優先的であることが見出されている．このことは「信頼」の醸成において，責任体制も含めた事故後の対応スキームの共有が重要であることを含意している．また，コミュニケーションの実践においても利害関係や責任の所在の明示が重要であることを指摘する．
同時に，東日本大震災を巡るメディア動向とその含意についても，最近までの研究成果を踏まえながら考察を加える．東日本大震災において，とりわけ全国メディアとソーシャルメディアにおいて福島第一原子力発電所事故がメディア上の関心の中心事となり，東北地方の被災地における地震・津波に関する話題が相対的に背景化したこと，一方で被災現地のメディアでは異なるメディア関心が見出されてきたことを指摘する．
キーワード：科学コミュニケーション，リスクコミュニケーション，フレーミング，メディア，東日
本大震災

114

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 67 (1) : 2018