SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

CREDIT OPINION
29 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable
Update following methodology update

UpdateSummary
The credit profile of Iceland is supported by its wealthy and flexible economy with favourable
demographics that support its long-term growth prospects. Current-account surpluses havecontributed to a net external creditor position and large foreign-currency reserves. The
pandemic-induced fiscal deterioration is being gradually reversed, helped by robust economic
growth. The credit profile is constrained by the economy's small size and concentration in alimited number of sectors, which increase its vulnerability to shocks and cause volatility ingrowth.

Contacts
Kathrin+44.20.7772.1383
Muehlbronner
Senior Vice President
kathrin.muehlbronner@moodys.com
Dietmar Hornung+49.69.70730.790
Associate Managing Director
dietmar.hornung@moodys.com
Alejandro Olivo+1.212.553.3837
MD-Sovereign/Sub Sovereign
alejandro.olivo@moodys.com

Exhibit 1

Iceland's credit profile is determined by four factors
Economicstrength

Institutions andgovernance strength

Fiscalstrength

Susceptibility
to event risk

baa1

aa2

baa1

a

Economic resiliency
a1

Government financial strength

CLIENT SERVICES

a1

Americas1-212-553-1653

Asia Pacific852-3551-3077

Scorecard-indicated outcomeJapan81-3-5408-4100

Aa3 - A2

EMEA

44-20-7772-5454

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Credit strengths» Very high wealth levels and labour market flexibility provide buffers to deal with shocks;» Well-funded pension system, long working lives and favourable demographics;» Very large foreign-currency reserves and net external creditor position.

Credit challenges» Volatile growth performance due to sector concentration and small currency area;» Rebuilding fiscal buffers after large pandemic-driven increase in public debt.

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

Rating outlook
The stable outlook reflects our view that downside risks stemming from the economy's small size and high sector concentration are
mitigated by a robust external position as well as reduced private sector indebtedness and the improved health of the banking sector.
The economy has been recovering strongly from the coronavirus shock, and we expect the fiscal deterioration of 2020-2021 to be
gradually reversed from this year onwards, in line with the government's plans.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade
The outlook on Iceland’s rating could move to positive and the rating could eventually be upgraded in case of faster-than-expected
progress in restoring the government's fiscal buffers. Moreover, a push towards increased diversification which would lead to a lessvolatile economic performance would be positive for the rating.

Factors that could lead to a downgrade
Conversely, the outlook and subsequently the rating would come under downward pressure if the authorities deviated significantly
from their current medium-term fiscal consolidation plans that target a stabilisation of the public debt ratio by the middle of thedecade, resulting in a material increase in the public debt ratio.
An economic shock which would lead to a large and permanent damage to the tourism industry, or to substantial capital outflows,
weakening Iceland’s external position and threatening financial stability, would also be credit negative, although the latter is not a likely
scenario.

Key indicators
Exhibit 2
Iceland

2017

2018

2019

2020E

2021E

2022F

2023F

2024F

Real GDP (% change)

4.2

4.9

2.4

-6.8

4.4

5.5

2.5

2.8

Inflation (CPI, % change, Dec/Dec)

1.9

3.7

2.0

3.6

5.1

9.8

4.6

2.5

Gen. gov. financial balance/GDP (%)[1]

1.0

0.9

-1.5

-8.9

-7.9

-4.8

-3.3

-3.0

Gen. gov. primary balance/GDP (%)[1]

6.7

5.8

2.8

-4.9

-4.5

-0.5

0.1

0.7

Gen. gov. debt/GDP (%)[1]

71.6

63.1

66.0

77.2

75.3

70.1

68.3

67.2

Gen. gov. debt/revenues (%)[1]

157.9

141.1

157.9

184.1

182.3

167.9

167.8

172.3

Gen. gov. interest payment/revenues (%)[1]

12.6

11.0

10.3

9.5

8.3

10.1

8.2

9.5

Current account balance/GDP (%)[2]

4.2

4.1

6.5

1.9

-1.6

-1.5

0.2

1.0

[1] Includes public entities previously excluded from the scope of the general government[2] Excludes DMBs undergoing winding up in 2008-2015

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Detailed credit considerations
We assess Iceland's economic strength at “baa1” which balances the country's small size and associated history of economic boom
and bust episodes with very high wealth levels and strong competitiveness. Iceland's GDP per-capita is - at an estimated $59,965
in 2021 - the 15th highest in our sovereign rating universe, having recovered the significant losses registered during the country's
2008 banking and currency crisis. Iceland's economy is highly competitive, as evidenced by its ranking at 16th globally in the World
Competitiveness Index in 2021, – standing out compared with close peers.
Growth is also volatile, reflecting limited diversification and relatively high openness, which increases the economy's vulnerability tosector-specific and external shocks. More than 70% of the country's export revenues come from three sectors: tourism (23% of total
in 2021), marine products (24% of total) and aluminum (23% of total). The coronavirus pandemic and its impact on tourism caused
one of the largest economic contractions among advanced economies in 2020 but the recovery is well underway, helped by a pickup in
tourism and significant government support.

This publication does not announce a credit rating action. For any credit ratings referenced in this publication, please see the issuer/deal page on https://ratings.moodys.com for themost updated credit rating action information and rating history.

2

29 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

We assess Iceland's institutions and governance strength as “aa2”, reflecting the country's solid track record in restoring economic
and financial stability after the banking crisis. For example, the considerable strengthening in supervision and regulation of the banking
sector has helped to improve the resilience of the system. The authorities achieved a careful liberalisation of the capital account withminimal disruption. The monetary policy framework has gained credibility, following a major revamp, and the central bank has beensuccessful in reducing traditionally high and volatile inflation despite a recent spike driven by house prices.
Our assessment also takes into account Iceland's high-quality education system, an innovative business sector, an efficient and flexible
labour market and well-developed infrastructure. Iceland has a long tradition of broad cooperation and consensus on economic matters
between the government, employer and employee associations, which contributes positively to policy effectiveness. The score has beenraised last year from “aa3” to reflect our view that the strength of civil society and the judiciary is on par with the strongest sovereigns
at “aaa”. Iceland also scores strongly in the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
We assess Iceland's fiscal strength as “baa1”, reflecting the government's strong track record in reducing its large budget deficits
and very high debt burden after the 2008 crisis. Between the peak in 2011 and 2018 general government debt more than halved, andstood at 66% of GDP in 2019. The reclassification of 24 public-sector corporations into the general government sector in 2020, in linewith Eurostat statistical rules, raised the government debt ratio by around 32 percentage points of GDP but also implies much smaller
contingent liabilities. As such, the reclassification does not fundamentally alter our view of Iceland's fiscal strength. We had previously
taken the debt of these companies into account qualitatively, in particular the debt of the HF-Fund (A2 stable), which benefitted froman explicit government guarantee and is in a government-directed winding-down process.
We expect that general government debt will continue to decline thanks to strong GDP growth, declining budget deficits and asset
sales. The Icelandic government still holds significant equity stakes in two of the three largest domestic banks, and sale proceeds will
likely continue to serve debt reduction purposes. Iceland's multi-year fiscal framework with clear and credible fiscal rules is on par withthe best practices among highly rated sovereigns and is accepted across the political spectrum, giving high confidence that debt willagain be reduced in the coming years.
We assess Iceland's susceptibility to event risk as “a”, driven by our banking system and external vulnerability risk assessments. As
for the banking sector, the three large banks have solid levels of capitalisation and liquidity. The sharp rise in house prices has beenaccompanied by an increase in household indebtedness, which could pose risks to financial stability but the authorities have put inplace a number of macroprudential measures to reduce risks.
Political event risk is low, and scored at “aa” given consistent policy in key areas important to safeguarding the government's credit
profile. Political consensus on the economic and fiscal direction for the country is strong.
We assess government liquidity risk as “aa”. The previous marked reduction in government debt, prudent liquidity management, withsignificant cash buffers, and a large domestic investor base have mitigated the risks posed by markedly higher borrowing requirementsin the context of the pandemic.
Iceland's external vulnerability risk assessment at “a” , reflects Iceland's net external creditor position and very large foreign-currency
reserves, which can be used to help buffer external shocks. The current account has slipped into a deficit since 2020 because of weakertourism demand and large dividend payments of foreign-owned companies, but is expected to return close to balance again this year.
External surpluses have allowed the central bank to build substantial foreign-currency reserves equivalent to around 25% of GDP or
29% of the country's total external debt, a large buffer to help limit exchange rate volatility and support the country's external position.

3

29 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

ESG considerations
Iceland's ESG Credit Impact Score is Neutral-to-Low CIS-2
Exhibit 3

ESG Credit Impact Score

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Iceland's ESG Credit Impact Score is neutral to low (CIS-2), reflecting neutral to low exposure to environmental and social risks andvery strong institutions.
Exhibit 4

ESG Issuer Profile Scores

Source: Moody's Investors Service

Environmental
Iceland's exposure to environmental risks is neutral to low (E-2) as the country derives nearly all of its energy generation and use fromrenewable sources, in particular hydroelectric power and geothermal energy. Iceland's unique geological features imply some exposure
to physical climate risks but also offer opportunities for the country's key sectors. The impact of warming seas on fish stocks in Icelandic
waters is not yet clear; while some varieties may migrate out of Iceland's waters as seen with the decline in capelin fish stocks in 2019,other species have migrated into Icelandic waters. Also, the sector has considerable flexibility to adapt to changing stocks and has
proven so many times. Warmer temperatures are favourable for plant productivity and agriculture. Around 11% of Iceland's land massconsists of glaciers; while the melting of glaciers increases the risk of landslides it also increases availability of hydropower, at least forseveral decades.
Social
We assess its S issuer profile score as neutral to low (S-2). Iceland's demographic profile is more favourable than in many othercountries because of long working lives, high participation rates of women and the flexibility of the labour force. Iceland also benefits
from high-quality education, access to basic services and housing availability. Indicators for access to healthcare are very strong, as seenin the fast response to the coronavirus pandemic. Social risks exert themselves through intensive wage negotiations between employers
and trade unions every four years which can impact on Iceland's competitiveness.
Governance
Iceland's very high institutions and governance strength is reflected in a positive G issuer profile score (G-1). This is underpinned by its
strong scores in most of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, which reflects the high credibility of its institutions and the country's

429 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

well-developed macroeconomic policy environment. This contributes to its relatively strong resilience to E and S risks, along with very
high wealth levels.
All of these considerations are further discussed in the “Credit profile” section above. Our approach to ESG is explained in our report on
how the scores depict varied and largely credit-negative impact of ESG factors and our cross-sector methodology General Principles forAssessing Environmental, Social and Governance Risks Methodology.

529 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

Moody's rating methodology and scorecard factors: Iceland - A2 stable
Factor 1: Economic strength
Growth dynamics
Scale of the economy
National income
Adjustment to factor 1

baa1
Average real GDP growth (%)
MAD Volatility in Real GDP Growth (%)
Nominal GDP ($ billion)
GDP per capita (PPP, Intl$)# notches

2017-2026F
2012-2021
2021
2021

2.5
1.2
25.6
59,965.5

Factor 2: Institutions and governance strength
Quality of institutions
Policy effectivenessaa2

Quality of legislative and executive institutions
Strength of civil society and the judiciary
Fiscal policy effectivenessMonetary and macroeconomic policy effectiveness

baa1

50%

0

25%
10%
30%
35%
max ±9

aa2

50%

baa3
baa3
b2
aaa

aa
aaa
aa
a

20%
20%
30%
30%

Specified adjustment

Government default history and track record of arrears

0max -3

Other adjustment to factor 2# notches0

max ±3F1 x F2: Economic resiliency

a1

a1

Factor 3: Fiscal strength

baa1

baa1

Debt burden
Debt affordability
Specified adjustments

Other adjustment to factor 3

General government debt/GDP (%)
General government debt/revenue (%)
General government interest payments/revenue (%)
General government interest payments/GDP (%)
Total of specified adjustment (# notches)
Debt Trend - Historical Change in Debt Burden
Debt Trend - Expected Change in Debt Burden
General Government Foreign Currency Debt/ GDP
Other non-financial public sector debt/GDP
Government Financial Assets including Sovereign Wealth Funds / GDP# notches

2021
2021
2021
2021

75.3
182.3
8.3
3.4

2013-2021
2021-2023F
2021
2021
2021

-46.7
-6.9
11.0
4.6
11.2

ba3
a3
a2
ba2
1
0
1
-1
0
1

F1 x F2 x F3: Government financial strengtha1

Factor 4: Susceptibility to event riskaDomestic political risk and geopolitical risk

aa
aa
aa

Government liquidity risk

Adjustment to F4 BSR
External vulnerability risk
Adjustment to F4 EVR
Overall adjustment to F4

max ±3

a1

a

Min

aa

Political risk

Specified adjustment
Banking sector risk

1
0
1
-1
0
1
0

25%
25%
25%
25%
max ±6Ease of access to funding
High refinancing risk
Risk of banking sector credit event (BSCE)
Total domestic bank assets/GDP# notches
External vulnerability risk
# notches# notches

F1 x F2 x F3 x F4: Scorecard-indicated outcome

Latest available
2021

baa3
144.6

a
baa3
80-180aa

Aa3 - A2aa
0amax -20a

max ±200

max ±2max -2Aa3 - A2

Note: While information used to determine the grid mapping is mainly historical, our ratings incorporate expectations around future metrics and risk developments that may differ from the ones implied by the scorecard-indicatedoutcome. Thus, the rating process is deliberative and not mechanical, meaning that it depends on peer comparisons and should leave room for exceptional risk factors to be taken into account that may result in an assigned rating
outside the scorecard-indicated outcome. For more information please see our Sovereign Ratings Methodology.
Footnotes: (1) Initial factor score: scorecard indicators combine with the automatic adjustments to produce an initial factor score for every rating factor, as detailed in Moody's Sovereign Ratings Methodology. (2) Final factor
score: where additional analytical considerations exist, initial factor scores are augmented to produce a final factor score. Guidance on additional factors typically considered can be found in Moody's Sovereign Ratings Methodology;
details on country-specific considerations are provided in Moody's research. (3) Scorecard-indicated outcome: Factor 1: Economic Strength, and Factor 2: Institutions and Governance Strength, combine with equal weight into a
construct we designate as Economic Resiliency (ER). An aggregation function then combines ER and Factor 3: Fiscal Strength, following a non-linear pattern where Fiscal Strength has higher weight for countries with moderate ER
and lower weight for countries with high or low ER. As a final step, Factor 4, a country's Susceptibility to Event Risk, is a constraint which can only lower the government financial strength as given by combining the first three factors.
(4) There are 20 ranking categories for quantitative sub-factors: aaa, aa1, aa2, aa3, a1, a2, a3, baa1, baa2, baa3, ba1, ba2, ba3, b1, b2, b3, caa1, caa2, caa3, ca and 8 ranking categories for qualitative sub-factors: aaa, aa, a,baa, ba, b, caa, ca (5) Indicator value: if not explicitly stated otherwise, the indicator value corresponds to the latest data available.

629 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

Moody's related publications» Credit Opinion: Government of Iceland - A2 stable: Regular update, 23 August 2022
» Issuer In-Depth: Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Annual credit analysis, 29 July 2022
» Sector in-Depth: Banking - Iceland: Iceland Macro Profile: Strong -, 24 May 2022
» Rating Methodology: Rating Methodology: Sovereigns, 22 November 2022
To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this report and that more recent reports may be available. All
research may not be available to all clients.

7

29 November 2022

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update

MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

SOVEREIGN AND SUPRANATIONAL© 2022 Moody’s Corporation, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Moody’s Analytics, Inc. and/or their licensors and affiliates (collectively, “MOODY’S”). All rights reserved.
CREDIT RATINGS ISSUED BY MOODY'S CREDIT RATINGS AFFILIATES ARE THEIR CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDITCOMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES, AND MATERIALS, PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND INFORMATION PUBLISHED BY MOODY’S (COLLECTIVELY,“PUBLICATIONS”) MAY INCLUDE SUCH CURRENT OPINIONS. MOODY’S DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUALFINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT OR IMPAIRMENT. SEE APPLICABLE MOODY’SRATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS PUBLICATION FOR INFORMATION ON THE TYPES OF CONTRACTUAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS ADDRESSED BY MOODY’SCREDIT RATINGS. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICEVOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS, NON-CREDIT ASSESSMENTS (“ASSESSMENTS”), AND OTHER OPINIONS INCLUDED IN MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS ARE NOTSTATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. MOODY’S PUBLICATIONS MAY ALSO INCLUDE QUANTITATIVE MODEL-BASED ESTIMATES OF CREDIT RISK AND
RELATED OPINIONS OR COMMENTARY PUBLISHED BY MOODY’S ANALYTICS, INC. AND/OR ITS AFFILIATES. MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER
OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE OR PROVIDE INVESTMENT OR FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER
OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT AND DO NOT PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR SECURITIES. MOODY’S CREDITRATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS DO NOT COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INVESTOR.
MOODY’S ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS AND OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLISHES ITS PUBLICATIONS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING
THAT EACH INVESTOR WILL, WITH DUE CARE, MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE,HOLDING, OR SALE.
MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS, AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY RETAIL INVESTORS AND IT WOULD BE
RECKLESS AND INAPPROPRIATE FOR RETAIL INVESTORS TO USE MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS OR PUBLICATIONS WHEN MAKINGAN INVESTMENT DECISION. IF IN DOUBT YOU SHOULD CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL ADVISER.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROTECTED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, COPYRIGHT LAW, AND NONE OF SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE COPIEDOR OTHERWISE REPRODUCED, REPACKAGED, FURTHER TRANSMITTED, TRANSFERRED, DISSEMINATED, REDISTRIBUTED OR RESOLD, OR STORED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE
FOR ANY SUCH PURPOSE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN ANY FORM OR MANNER OR BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER, BY ANY PERSON WITHOUT MOODY’S PRIOR WRITTENCONSENT.
MOODY’S CREDIT RATINGS, ASSESSMENTS, OTHER OPINIONS AND PUBLICATIONS ARE NOT INTENDED FOR USE BY ANY PERSON AS A BENCHMARK AS THAT TERM IS
DEFINED FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES AND MUST NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT COULD RESULT IN THEM BEING CONSIDERED A BENCHMARK.
All information contained herein is obtained by MOODY’S from sources believed by it to be accurate and reliable. Because of the possibility of human or mechanical error as wellas other factors, however, all information contained herein is provided “AS IS” without warranty of any kind. MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However,
MOODY’S is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process or in preparing its Publications.
To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability to any person or entity for any
indirect, special, consequential, or incidental losses or damages whatsoever arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any
such information, even if MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors or suppliers is advised in advance of the possibility of such losses ordamages, including but not limited to: (a) any loss of present or prospective profits or (b) any loss or damage arising where the relevant financial instrument is not the subject of aparticular credit rating assigned by MOODY’S.
To the extent permitted by law, MOODY’S and its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, licensors and suppliers disclaim liability for any direct or compensatory
losses or damages caused to any person or entity, including but not limited to by any negligence (but excluding fraud, willful misconduct or any other type of liability that, for the
avoidance of doubt, by law cannot be excluded) on the part of, or any contingency within or beyond the control of, MOODY’S or any of its directors, officers, employees, agents,
representatives, licensors or suppliers, arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use of or inability to use any such information.
NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY CREDITRATING, ASSESSMENT, OTHER OPINION OR INFORMATION IS GIVEN OR MADE BY MOODY’S IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATSOEVER.
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt securities (including
corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferred stock rated by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. have, prior to assignment of any credit rating,agreed to pay to Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. for credit ratings opinions and services rendered by it fees ranging from $1,000 to approximately $5,000,000. MCO and Moody’s
Investors Service also maintain policies and procedures to address the independence of Moody’s Investors Service credit ratings and credit rating processes. Information regarding
certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities, and between entities who hold credit ratings from Moody’s Investors Service and have also publicly
reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%, is posted annually at www.moodys.com under the heading “Investor Relations — Corporate Governance —Director and Shareholder Affiliation Policy.”
Additional terms for Australia only: Any publication into Australia of this document is pursuant to the Australian Financial Services License of MOODY’S affiliate, Moody’s InvestorsService Pty Limited ABN 61 003 399 657AFSL 336969 and/or Moody’s Analytics Australia Pty Ltd ABN 94 105 136 972 AFSL 383569 (as applicable). This document is intended
to be provided only to “wholesale clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. By continuing to access this document from within Australia, yourepresent to MOODY’S that you are, or are accessing the document as a representative of, a “wholesale client” and that neither you nor the entity you represent will directly or
indirectly disseminate this document or its contents to “retail clients” within the meaning of section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. MOODY’S credit rating is an opinion as tothe creditworthiness of a debt obligation of the issuer, not on the equity securities of the issuer or any form of security that is available to retail investors.
Additional terms for Japan only: Moody's Japan K.K. (“MJKK”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody's Group Japan G.K., which is wholly-owned by Moody’s
Overseas Holdings Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of MCO. Moody’s SF Japan K.K. (“MSFJ”) is a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of MJKK. MSFJ is not a Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”). Therefore, credit ratings assigned by MSFJ are Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings. Non-NRSRO Credit Ratings are assigned by anentity that is not a NRSRO and, consequently, the rated obligation will not qualify for certain types of treatment under U.S. laws. MJKK and MSFJ are credit rating agencies registeredwith the Japan Financial Services Agency and their registration numbers are FSA Commissioner (Ratings) No. 2 and 3 respectively.
MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) hereby disclose that most issuers of debt securities (including corporate and municipal bonds, debentures, notes and commercial paper) and preferredstock rated by MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) have, prior to assignment of any credit rating, agreed to pay to MJKK or MSFJ (as applicable) for credit ratings opinions and services
rendered by it fees ranging from JPY100,000 to approximately JPY550,000,000.
MJKK and MSFJ also maintain policies and procedures to address Japanese regulatory requirements.

REPORT NUMBER

829 November 2022

1350286

Government of Iceland – A2 stable: Update following methodology update