Japan Border Review, No.Summary
6 (2016)

Summary
Analysis of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict off the Paracel Islands in 2014
SATO Koichi

China’s survey of mineral resources in the sea surrounding the Paracel Islands from May to July
2014 became the center of public attention. China sent the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981, its most upto-date facility. The Vietnamese government, the U.S. government, and the Japanese government
denounced China’s unilateral action. It was also opposed by the Vietnamese government’s ships andfishery boats in the sea area surrounding the Paracel Islands. The Chinese government dispatched
China Coast Guard (CCG) patrol vessels, transportation ships, and fishery boats to defend the oil rig,
and the survey ended suddenly in July, one month earlier than originally scheduled.
This article is composed of seven parts. The first part provides an introduction to the incident. The
second part reviews the legal aspects of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracel Islands, andthe implied interpretation of China’s U-shaped line in the South China Sea. The third part provides
general information on China’s motivation and the decision-making procedures behind this survey.
The author attaches importance to the Chinese leader’s ambition to be a maritime power, as not
only Hu Jintao but also Xi Jinping have mentioned this. The fourth part provides information on the
fragmented nature of China’s bureaucracy. Some leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) andthe ministry of foreign affairs were less enthusiastic about the survey.
The fifth part provides information on the responses of the Vietnamese government and nation,neighboring ASEAN countries, and external powers like the United States, Japan, and India. Stepby-step diplomatic pressure from the U.S. President and senators, and Vietnam’s tough response to
China, seemed to be effective against China’s offensive posture. Chinese communist party leaders
were shocked to learn that the Vietnamese communist party secretary-general, Nguyen Phu Trong,
had called for preparation for war against China.
The sixth part provides details on the sudden completion of the Chinese rig’s operation, and ananalysis of the reasons behind China’s withdrawal of the oil rig.
The seventh part offers concluding remarks, providing some aspects and lessons for Vietnam
and China. Drawing from Vietnam’s experience, it also offers some lessons for Japan regarding111

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the Senkaku Islands. The writer highlights the significance of the hot-line between China andVietnam, and concludes that a future hot-line between Japan and China is a necessary measure, but
is not enough to prevent a Chinese offensive. We, the Japanese, require a more active and feasible
deterrent capability through our own means, and through the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Negotiating Ethno-Religious Boundaries andMultidimensional Connectedness
among Yunnanese Muslims in the Thai-Myanmar Borderland
WANG-KANDA Liulan

This paper describes the dynamics and survival strategies employed to maintain ethnoreligious boundaries while focusing on the relationships among ethnic groups, particularly of the
Yunnanese Muslims who migrated from China, in the Thai-Myanmar borderland, a region which
has experienced the repeated ebb and flow of numerous ethnic groups. From the late 19th century
to the first half of the 20th century, Yunnanese Muslims were the main group in the Thai-Myanmar
borderlands responsible for interregional trade and formed commercial cooperative communities.
However, around the middle of the 20th century, many Yunnanese Muslims crossed over the borderfrom Myanmar to Thailand as a result of the civil war and establishment of the new government
in China. Although the Yunnanese Muslims had fled China to seek peace, they were thrust in the
midst of a civil war and cold war conflict waged by the Chinese Nationalist Party, which consisted
primarily of Han Chinese, and found themselves under a military political rule in which their ethnic
identity was largely repudiated. Meanwhile, the host country, Thailand, which was facing the threatof the cold war and communist powers, intensified its control of the border region and the ethnic
minorities residing there, including the Yunnanese Muslims. Furthermore, as a result of efforts by
the Thai government to promote assimilation under secular authority and to bring religions under
governmental control, the Yunnanese Muslims were confronted with challenges to their religious
identity. Even under such circumstances, the Yunnanese Muslims continued to strengthen networks
based on principles rooted in their Chineseness and, at the same time, to exercise their Islamness
by connecting with other South Asian Muslims across ethnic boundaries. As a result, they managed

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to maintain their religious boundaries as Muslims while both developing ethnic networks andpreserving their distinctive culture. Thanks to their skill in negotiating ethno-religious boundaries,
the Yunnanese Muslims have been able to cross over existing ethnic boundaries and to increase theirreligious and ethnic presence in a foreign country. The Yunnanese Muslims represent an exampleof migrants who have not unilaterally assimilated into the host society but have instead developed
a survival strategy based on the establishment of multidimensional connections and the making ofautonomous choices while navigating various international and inter-ethnic relationships.

A Study on the Legend of Nichiji’s Mission in Karafuto:
Characters and Social Influences of the ‘Hokushin [Northern Advance]’
Theories in the Empire of Japan (1)ITANI Hiroshi
Nichiji was one of the six main pupils of Nichiren in the thirteenth century. In 1295, 13 years after
his master Nichiren’s death, Nichiji took a missionary journey to somewhere, and was never heardof again. However, there was a legend within the Nichiren sect for generations after that Nichiji hadreached Yuan Dynasty China via Hokkaido, Karafuto (Sakhalin), and the delta area of the Amur, andthat he had proselytized there.
After the Russo-Japan War, some modern Nichiren believers (Takanabe Nitto and membersof his group) tried to demonstrate and verify the legend of Nichiji in order to use it as historicalevidence for Pan-Asianism. By the 1920s, they had visited and investigated all the places along
the imaginary route supposedly taken by Nichiji. As a result, they found several of Nichiji’s ‘holy
relics’ and monuments, while publishing articles to disseminate Nichiji's attainment. Through theirstories, Nichiji became not only one of the earliest missionaries abroad, but also a symbol of Japan’scultural conquest of Northeast Asia. However, most historians today dismiss the authenticity of thislegend because all of the evidence regarding Nichiji could have been fabricated by these discoverers
or followers of modern Nichiren.
Based on the above legend, this paper makes the following two points about ‘Hokushin [Northern
Advance]’ theories in the Empire of Japan.
(1) ‘Hokushin’ theories should be categorized into three groups in view of the transition visible

111Summaryin Japan’s strategy. Group A: theories and stories rooted in Japan’s traditional policy of defense,
named ‘hokumon-no-sayaku [key and chains of the northern gate]’, against Russia’s advance south.
Group B: ‘Hokushin’ theories as the alternative strategy to Japan’s ‘Nanshin [Southern Advance]’
after the Russo-Japan War. Group C: theories of expansion into Russian territory after the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917.
(2) Stories about Nichiji’s mission circulated differently in the continental colonies (China,
Mongolia, and Korea) and northern areas (Karafuto and Hokkaido). In the continental colonies, theNichiji legend didn’t spread beyond believers of the Nichiren sect. In Karafuto, on the contrary,islanders in 1920s and 1930s hoped a ‘new history’, including the Nichiji legend, would support
their own historical legitimacy (as all were post-1905 newcomers). Therefore, the legend of Nichiji
was gradually accepted as a ‘true and new history’ of their own. Two monuments were importantin changing legend into historical fact. 1) A large stone in Ako (a small village on the western coastof Karafuto) engraved with the holy mantra ‘Namu-myoho-rengekyo,’ supposedly by Nichiji, wasprotected as historical heritage although it lacked credibility. 2) The statue of Nichiji erected in
Toyohara in August 1930 by believers of the Nichiren sect in Karafuto.
In conclusion, this paper indicates that ‘Hokushin’ theories are useful as a key concept for themodern history of Imperial Japan and its relations with Northeast Asia.

Geopolitics in Turkey:
Between State Theory and Critical Theory
IMAI Kohei

This paper examines the aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism. In light of
its specific geographical situation, geopolitics has been often used as a means of explaining Turkey’s
diplomatic behavior. Consequently, Turkish International Relations (IR) scholars have applied anddeveloped concepts of geopolitics. This trend has been strong since the early 2000s and there are
two reasons for this.
First of all, non-Western IR has recently emerged as one of the hottest topics in IR. Several
scholars, especially from non-Western countries, have attempted to show original concepts, specificmethods of the acceptance process, and advanced dimensions of IR in their own countries. Scholars

111Summaryin Turkey are no exception. For Turkey, geopolitics is a concept that represents originality.
Secondly, Ahmet Davutoğlu, an expert in IR, has applied his thoughts on geopolitics to actual
foreign policy. In 2001, he published Strategic Depth, which suggested, from the perspectivesof geopolitics and history, the ideal diplomacy routes Turkey should pursue. After winning theelection on November 2002, the Justice and Development Party promoted Davutoğlu to a Foreign
Policy Advisor. He served as Foreign Policy Advisor from 2002 to 2009 and also served as Foreign
Minister from 2009 to 2014.
The acceptance of geopolitics in Turkey is classified into two theories. The first theory is “state
theory,” and explains the characteristics of Turkey’s geopolitics. This paper analyzes three conceptsof state: “insulator state,” “liminal state,” and “cusp state.” According to Barry Buzan and OleWæver, an “insulator state” is defined as a state that is positioned between two different regionswith regard to security, “but not strong enough to unify its two worlds into one.” A “liminal state” isdefined as a state that is a suffering from mismatches between its identity and geopolitical position.
For example, Australia has a European identity but is positioned in an Asian/Pacific region. Turkey
is also categorized as a “liminal state” because of its multiple identities. Generally, the “liminal
state” concept connotes a negative meaning. The “cusp state” concept literally focuses on regional
cusp countries such as Turkey. In contrast to “liminal state,” a “cusp state” enjoys a positive
geopolitical position. According to Philip Robins, the particularities of the diplomatic behavior of“cusp states” include the promotion of linkages between different regions, playing the role of amediator, and playing a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy.
The second theory concerning the acceptance of geopolitics in Turkish academism is criticalgeopolitics. According to John Agnew, critical geopolitics investigates and clarifies the geographicalassumptions and designations that are involved in the creation of world politics. Gearóid Ó Tuathail(Gerard Toal) classifies critical geopolitics into four parts: 1) formal or “wise-man” geopolitics,
which is the geopolitics interpreted by decision makers or intellectuals; 2) practical geopolitics,
which is a diplomatic practice based on particular geopolitical situations concerning topics suchas formal geopolitics; 3) mass geopolitics, which is popular in specific geopolitical thinking; 4)structural geopolitics, which concerns the structural changes of international systems and how theyaffect formal and practical geopolitics.
Turkish scholars like Pınar Bilgin, Murat Yeşiltaş, and Meliha Altunışık use formal andpractical geopolitics to explain Turkish foreign policy. However, from the perspective of criticalgeopolitics their analyses remain incomplete. Concerning formal geopolitical analysis, there arethree weaknesses: 1) their study of the intellectuals and decision makers who place importance on
geopolitics are limited, 2) they downgrade the concept of “Neo-Ottomanism,” which was advocated111Summary

by Turgut Özal in the early 1990s, and 3) Yeşiltaş and Altunışık explain the diplomacy of Davutoğlu
in a positive manner; their explanation is not critical analysis but problem-solving analysis. There
are also three problems in relation to practical geopolitical analysis: The first is the validity of using
geopolitical analysis for explanations. For example, “Sever Syndrome” or threat perception from the
USSR is more suitable for Turkish foreign policy analysis. They also disregard the impact of the endof the Cold War, which is a second problem; the end of the Cold War triggered a dramatic change
in Turkish foreign policy. This phenomenon diminished the threat of the USSR and opened new
diplomatic opportunities in Central Asia, the Balkan Peninsula, and the South Caucasus. The thirdproblem is the stagnation of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy toward the Mıddle East, as highlighted by the
Syrian Crisis.
This paper discusses two theories of aggressive acceptance of geopolitics in academism in Turkey.
As mentioned above, the acceptance and the application of geopolitics in Turkey is still unfinished.
At the very least, expanding the “cusp state” concept in state theory and critical geopolitical analysis
is essential for developing a Turkey-specific IR.

Survey of Former Japanese Residents and Their Descendants
on the Northern Territories Issue
Alibay MAMMADOV

Research conducted in the past 10 years on the Northern Territories Issue (the Kuril Islands
dispute), a territorial problem between Japan and Russia, has not paid sufficient attention to theviews of former Japanese residents and their descendants. Consequently, my research aims to fill thisgap by gathering data from former Japanese residents and their descendants regarding the Northern
Territories. Data was collected in September 2014 through a questionnaire survey conducted of 49
ex-islanders, with the collaboration of Chishima Renmei in Sapporo and Nemuro.
The results showed that the majority of ex-islanders and descendants (84%) think that the entiretyof the disputed territory (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, Habomai) are very important for them. Only
14% supported the Japanese government’s policy against Russia. 65% were opposed to it. Also, amajority (74%) of ex-islanders did not support Japan’s policy towards the Northern Territories.
Only 25% hopes that a solution to the territorial issue is possible. 24% believes that making the111

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most of the trust between the leaders of Japan and Russia could ensure an effective resolution of the
dispute. And they see this as a key to a peace treaty between the two countries.
Only 39% supported the theory of returning the four islands to Japan. 47% did not support thistheory. Less than 50% answered that they are ready to return to live on the islands making up theNorthern Territories. A majority (78%) of these said that they are ready to live together with Russian
residents.
These findings indicate that at the present time it is really difficult to solve this problem. There
are differences between the positions of the Japanese government and ex-residents on the territorial
dispute. It seems that the Japanese ex-residents’ position on the issue is more realistic and clear than
the government’s. It can be concluded that there is no necessity of continuing to argue for the returnof all four islands to Japan.

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