AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 204

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

27 August 2014

Editorial Committee:

XI JINPING’S NEW ASIAN SECURITY
CONCEPT

Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:

Seiichiro Takagi

Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIAThe “New Asian Security Concept” (NASC)
presented by President Xi Jinping in mid-May atthe Summit of the Conference on Interaction andConfidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in
Shanghai, represents China’s new initiative forconstructing a regional security architecture to itsliking. Although there are interesting similarities
between it and its predecessor, the New Security
Concept (NSC) presented in the mid-1990s, thedifference between them in both intention andcontext points to the characteristics andproblematic nature of China’s external behavior ina new regional power configuration.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The NASC is defined as “common, comprehensive, cooperative andsustainable” security for Asia and incorporates the NSC, which is characterized
as featuring “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.” The NSC
was presented in the context of redefining and strengthening the Japan-US
security alliance for the post-Cold War era with the 1996 Joint Declaration onSecurity, followed by the revision of the Defense Cooperation Guideline in 1997.
It incorporated the notion of cooperative security for the purpose of asserting thatmilitary alliances were a relic of the Cold War with no regional security role in thepost-Cold War era. Similarly, the presentation of the NASC was made in thecontext of the latest phase of the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance.
President Obama had visited Tokyo in April, and made an unequivocal statementthat the Senkaku Islands are covered by the Japan-US Security Treaty, which
represented the highest-level attempt to dispel Japanese uncertainty about thereliability of the alliance. Predictably, Xi’s speech criticized the military alliance as“not conducive to maintaining common security.” Just as the introduction of theNSC was synchronized with the declaration of strategic partnership with Russia,
which was intended to be a joint effort to counter the US’ post-Cold War unipolar
dominance, the announcement of the NASC was synchronized with the joint
announcement of further development of the China-Russia “comprehensivepartnership.”
The NSC functioned as the theoretical foundation for China’sengagement in multilateral security mechanisms. Its first presentation in 1996
coincided with China’s tactical shift from passivity to limited proactiveinvolvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the first summit of the Shanghai
Five, which was a predecessor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On
the other hand, the Xi Jinping speech included a regional security architecture
initiative. He proposed to enhance the capacity and institution building of CICA
and to explore the establishment of a regional security cooperation architectureon that basis. Just as the NSC was also an attempt to counter emerging
perceptions of a China threat in Southeast Asia, caused by Chinese occupationof the Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995, the NASC was also part of anattempt to quell objections to Chinese assertiveness in the South and East
China Sea, following up on the first work conference on peripheral diplomacy inOctober 2013.
Interestingly enough, while the NSC represented a multi-faceted effort tocounter US influence in Asia, China also tried to improve the ties with the US.
Having experienced serious tension with the US surrounding Taiwan’s firstpresidential election in March 1996, China quickly moved to welcoming the US
National Security Advisor’s visit in July and agreed to a strategic dialogue and an
exchange of visits by both presidents, which were realized in the following twoyears. Similarly, the presentation of NASC was preceded by Chinese appeals to

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

construct a “New Type of Major Country Relationship” with the US, which
culminated in the informal summit between Xi Jinping and Obama in Sunnylands
in June 2013.
In spite of these and other similarities, there are significant differences.
Even though the rejection of a role for security alliances, especially that between
Japan and the US, in Xi’s speech is not as pronounced as in the NSC, thedifference is more than offset by an appeal, reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine,that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems ofAsia and uphold the security of Asia.”
The exclusionist tone of the appeal is somewhat diluted by a statementthat countries in Asia must be committed to cooperation with countries in otherparts of the world and international organizations. However, Xi’s speech included
a proposal for transforming the CICA into a security dialogue and cooperation
platform for the whole of Asia and exploring the establishment of a regional
security cooperation architecture on that basis. CICA’s membership does covera wide geographical span from East Asia to Middle East but it only has 26 formal
members. Such key countries in East Asia as Indonesia, Philippines, Japan andMalaysia, as well as the US, a power with a presence in Asia, only haveobserver status. With the CICA having no track record and no realistic prospects
for a positive role in managing serious problems among existing members, suchas those between Israel and Palestine and between India and Pakistan, it isunlikely that most of the current observers will apply for full membership to make
CICA a true platform for the whole of Asia in the near future. Moreover, Xi’s
seriousness about its cooperation with other international organizations isquestionable because of his failure to mention key Asian platforms such as theARF and East Asian Summit as institutions that China supports.
Another important feature of the NASC is the emphasis it places ondevelopment, which is characterized as “the greatest security and the masterkey to regional security issues.” Its institutional manifestation is a proposal toestablish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was firstmentioned in Xi’s speech at the Indonesian parliament in October 2013. Given
the huge gap between the demand for infrastructure-building in Asia and thefunds available at existing international financial institutions, the presidents of
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank naturally welcomed theinitiative. However, China has not provided a convincing answer to the questionof how the role of the AIIB will differ from that of the Asian Development Bank.
The US has also openly questioned in July how the AIIB will be able to maintain“high standards of governance, environmental and social safeguards,
procurement, and debt sustainability”. At the ASEAN Plus Three meeting inAugust, the Japanese foreign minister reportedly questioned what kind of thevalue-added would be achieved by the AIIB and emphasized the importance of

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

loan provision based on the recipient country’s debt sustainability. The suspicionin many quarters is that China’s intention is to marginalize the influence of theUS and Japan in the Asian Development Bank. So far, Japan and the US havenot agreed to join the initiative.
These differences constitute important aspects of China’s current overall
assertive foreign behavior, which reflects their self-image of significantly
enhanced relative power vis-a-vis its neighbors and even the US. In the 1990s
China’s presentation of NSC was couched in a generally accommodative foreign
policy. The recent developments surrounding the NASC makes one wonder if
China has completely departed from this diplomatic approach.
Dr. Seiichiro Takagi is a Senior Adjunct Fellow at JIIA. Before moving to hiscurrent position in April 2011, he was professor at the School of International
Politics, Economics, and Business, The Aoyama Gakuin University (2003-2011),
and Director of the Second Research Department at The National Institute forDefense Studies(1999-2003). He is a specialist on Chinese foreign relations andsecurity issues in the Asia-Pacific region.Masayoshi Honma is Professor at The
University of Tokyo.

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