U.S. Sanctions against China Concerning
Human Rights Issues in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(U.S. Politics and Diplomacy Study Group)
Murakami Masatoshi
NPI Visiting Fellow
Associate Professor, Kogakkan University

1. Introduction
The Uyghur issue has become one of the key points of contention in current U.S.-China relations. In
the first U.S.-China telephone summit in February 2021, President Biden raised the issue withPresident Xi Jinping himself. From this fact, we can understand that the Uyghur issue has become asummit-level issue between the U.S. and China.
In Washington, interest in the Uyghur issue grew rapidly during the Trump administration, andfederal sanctions were imposed in the fall of 2019 for Uyghur-related human rights violations. On theeve of the end of the administration’s term, the Uyghur issue was recognized as genocide and crimes
against humanity, and this recognition became one of the milestones of the growing concern inWashington.
Regarding the process of how the Uyghur issue became a contentious issue in Washington,previous studies 1 have pointed out that related reports and commissioners of the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China (CECC) of the Congress and discussion by German anthropologist
and analyst Adrian Zenz may have influenced the process.
In this article, the author will discuss two main themes in relation to the Uyghur issue. First
discussed is the process by which the Uyghur issue, especially the first major problem of incarceration,
became an issue in Washington. The article will focus on the CECC, which has received little attention
so far, in addition to the federal government’s developments. Second, it will also discuss thepossibility that the Uyghur-related sanctions imposed by the U.S. government will affect thirdcountries, especially Japanese companies. In addition, a summary and analysis of the sanctions
imposed by the federal government is provided for reference.
2. The Uyghur Issue in Washington
The human rights issue in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has been widely discussedin Washington since around mid-2018, but prior to that, the CECC had put a spotlight on the issue.
For example, the following discussion is available. Mori Satoru, “Competition and Negotiation in U.S. Policy
toward China (Part 2) (in Japanese),” Toa, January 2020, p.71-72
11

How did this issue become a point of contention in Washington?
(1) Federal government
At a July 2018 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, Vice President Mike Pence referred to thedetention of hundreds of thousands or even over a million people.2 He also touched on the issue ofincarceration in a speech3 on China at the Hudson Institute in October of the same year. In December
2018, the Deputy Assistant Secretary gave a more specific figure of between 800,000 and 2,000,000
to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and that the U.S. government’s
assessment was backed by the intelligence community and open source reporting.4 It can be said thatthe federal government’s awareness of the issue of incarceration, together with a concrete
understanding of the scale, increased around mid-2018.
(2) CECC
On the other hand, it was the CECC that had taken a stronger interest in the Uyghur issue before thefederal government. In January 2018, CECC Chairman Senator Marco Rubio (Republican, Florida)
and Co-Chair Congressman Chris Smith (Republican, New Jersey) raised the alarm about humanrights violations in Xinjiang.5 In May 2018, the Jamestown Foundation released a report by AdrianZenz6 that estimated the scale of incarceration to be in the hundreds of thousands to over a million
people, which Senator Rubio described as groundbreaking. It was after the release of this report thatthe federal government began to pay more attention to the issue of incarceration, with reference to its
scale.
In July 2018, a public hearing focusing on the Uyghur issue was held for the first time since theestablishment of the CECC in 2001. In August 2018, CECC members sent a letter7 to the Secretariesof State and the Treasury, calling for the imposition of sanctions on XUAR Communist Party
Secretary Chen Quanguo and others. The letter was signed by 17 bipartisan members of the House“Remarks by Vice President Pence at Ministerial To Advance Religious Freedom,” July 26, 2018,https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-ministerial-advancereligious-freedom/
3 “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” October 4, 2018,https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policytoward-china/
4 “Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on
East Asia, The Pacific, And International Cybersecurity Policy, December 4, 2018,https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf
5 “Chairs Raise Alarm About Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang,” CECC, January 8, 2018,https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-raise-alarm-about-deteriorating-human-rights-situationin
6 Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Jamestown
Foundation, May 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaignin-xinjiang/
7 “Chairs Lead Bipartisan Letter Urging Administration to Sanction Chinese Officials Complicit in Xinjiang
Abuses,” August 29, 2018, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-lead-bipartisan-letter-urgingadministration-to-sanction-chinese22and Senate, including CECC members Senator Rubio and Senator Bob Menendez (Democrat, NewJersey).
In the CECC annual report released in October 2018,8 the issue of incarceration, which was not
mentioned in the previous year’s edition, was placed as the top theme related to the Uyghur issue,
and the previously mentioned report by Zenz was also introduced. Thus, it was in the first half of2018 that the Uyghur issue, particularly related to incarceration, became an issue in Washington, andthe CECC played an important role.
3. Implications for Japanese Companies
The author would like to examine the possibility that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. related to theUyghur-issue will affect third countries, especially Japanese companies. What are the implications
for Japanese companies regarding the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection(CBP) under the Department of Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS),
U.S. Department of Commerce?
(1) Injunction of imports related to forced labor
CBP issued its first Uyghur-related Withhold Release Order (WRO) in September 2019. After thepresidential election, the scope of the WROs expanded rapidly, and, in November 2020, cotton andcotton products produced by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and its
subordinate organizations began to be subject to WROs. In January 2021, all cotton and tomatoes
produced in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region became subject to the WRO.
In a related development involving Japanese companies, on January 5, 2021, imports of UNIQLO
CO., LTD. products were blocked at the Port of Los Angeles, which was revealed in May 2021.9 The
basis for the injunction was a WRO covering the XPCC in November 2020. A WRO is issued underSection 307 of the Tariff Act, which prohibits importing any products that were manufactured byforced labor. In response, UNIQLO announced its position that no forced labor had been found in theproduction process.10 Also in August 2020, CBP collected $575,000 from Pure Circle U.S.A. This isa case of collecting a fine for forced labor,11 and is an indication that more attention should be paid
to the issue.
Furthermore, in July 2021, the Biden administration released the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business
Advisory. The document was an updated version of the one released by the Trump administration in“IV. Xinjiang: Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2018,” October 10, 2018,https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/2018AR_Xinjiang_1.pdf
9“HQ H318182,” Customs Mobile, May 10, 2021,
https://www.customsmobile.com/rulings/docview?doc_id=HQ%20H318182&highlight=uniqlo
10 UNIQLO CO., LTD. “Statement Regarding Reports of UNIQLO Product Imports Blocked by U.S. Customs,”
May 25, 2021.
https://www.fastretailing.com/eng/sustainability/news/2105251100.html
11
CBP has the authority under the Tariff Act to impose civil penalties against importers who violate the law.
83July 2020; from now on, Japanese companies will be required to further scrutinize whether forcedlabor is part of their supply chain.
In June 2021, a WRO was issued to Chinese companies that manufacture raw materials for solarpanels. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region accounts for about 45% of the global share ofpolycrystalline silicon, a key component of solar panels.12 This poses a major problem for Japan,
which depends on China for nearly 80% of its solar panel imports.13 Under the Biden administration,
forced labor in the solar sector has become a new issue, and it is necessary to continue to monitor thescope of industries subject to sanctions.
(2) De facto embargo due to human rights issues
BIS made its first Uyghur-related additions to the Entity List (EL) in October 2019. This was the firsttime that human rights issues, not just Uyghur, were cited as a reason for inclusion; 14 however,additions to the EL due to Uyghur issues have continued under the Biden administration.
Prior permission is required for export, re-export, and domestic transfer of the listed items. Inpractice, however, many of the listed items are subject to presumption of denial, and their inclusionon the EL means a de facto export ban, effectively cutting off the path to business for those items.
Thus far, companies dealing in surveillance cameras, facial recognition, voice recognition, andgenetic analysis have been subject to the listing. It is likely that this reflects Washington’s awarenessof the issue of Beijing’s activity in building a surveillance state, and Chinese companies related tosurveillance technology may continue to be listed in the future. In addition to the Uyghur issue,
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. is also included on the list. It is essential for companies to check if
their business partners are listed.
The items that are involved or likely to be involved in activities that are contrary to the interestsof the U.S. in terms of national security or foreign policy are subject to the EL. However, as alreadymentioned, the scope of the EL has been expanding in recent years to include human rights issues,and it is necessary to pay attention to the possibility that new areas will be subject to the EL in thefuture.

Laura Murphy and Nyrola Elimä, “In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar SupplyChains,” Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, May 14, 2021,
https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/in-broaddaylight
13 Baba Miki, “Suspicion of forced labor in Chinese-made panels—Shadow cast by Xinjiang Uyghur issue on
solar power generation,” (in Japanese) Nikkei ESG, July 5, 2021,
https://project.nikkeibp.co.jp/ESG/atcl/column/00005/070100095/
14 Amy K. Lehr, “The United States Blacklisted 28 Chinese Entities over Repression of Muslim Minorities in
Xinjiang: What Does This Mean for Human Rights?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11,
2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-blacklisted-28-chinese-entities-over-repression-muslimminorities-xinjiang
124

References
Table 1: Authority, means, and basis of Uyghur-related sanctions
Authority

Means

Governing laws and regulations

U.S. Department of State

Visa restrictions
Entry banSection 212 of the Immigration andNationality Act, etc.

Office of Foreign Assets

Asset freeze

Global Magnitsky Act

Bureau of Industry andSecurity (BIS),
U.S. Department ofCommerce

Entity List (EL)

Export Administration Regulations (EAR)

U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP),

Withhold
Release Order

Tariff Act

Department of Homeland
Security(WRO)

Control (OFAC),
U.S. Department of theTreasury

Table 2: Visa restrictions and entry bans by the U.S. Department of State
October2019

Visa
Administration official(s) (specific Section 212 of the Immigration
restrictions names not disclosed)
and Nationality Act

July 2020

Entry bans Three administration officials(Chen Quanguo, etc.) + close
relativesSection 7031 of theDepartment of State, ForeignOperations and Related
Appropriations Act 2020

July 2020

Visa
Employees of Chinese companies
restrictions such as Huawei;
Human rights violations, not justthe Uyghur issue

Section 212 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act

December2020

Visa
Administration official(s) (specific Section 212 of the Immigration
restrictions names not disclosed);and Nationality Act

5Human rights violations, not justthe Uyghur issue
Table 3: Sanctions by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury
July 2020 (1)1 group
4 individuals

Chen Quanguo (XUAR Party Secretary)
Public security administrations and officials

July 2020 (2)1 groupXinjiang Production and Construction

2 individuals

Corps (XPCC)
and its executives

2 individuals

XPCC executives, public security officers

March 2021
(First issuance under
Biden administration)

The UK, Canada, and the EU
cooperated in launch of sanctions.
Table 4: Listing on the Entity List (EL) by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Departmentof Commerce
October 2019

28 groups

First time published on ahuman rights issue.

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region PublicSecurity Bureau
19 subordinate organizations
8 companies incl. HIKVISION, Dahua,SenseTime, Megvii, and iFlytek

May 2020

9 groups

Institute of Forensic Science, Ministry ofPublic Security of China, etc.
CloudWalk Technology, SenseNets, etc.

July 2020

11 groups

Subsidiary of BGIOFILM, etc.
Some call it the “Huawei

June 2021(First issuance underBiden administration)

5 groupsof genomics.”
XPCC
Solar-related 4 companies (Hoshine SiliconIndustry, etc.)

July 2021

14 groups

Information technology related companies

Table 5: Status of Withhold Release Orders (WROs) issued by Customs and Border Protection (CBP)61990s

7 cases in 1991; 13 in 1992; 4 in 1993
All of the above subjects are Chinese.
Congressional pressure was behind the use of the system.

2001-2015

NoneAfter 2016

Re-issueTable 6: Uyghur-related Withhold Release Orders (WROs)
September 2019

Hetian Taida ApparelMay 2020

Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories

June 2020

Lop County Meixin Hair ProductAugust-September 2020

6 groups incl. Lop County No. 4 Vocational Skills Education andTraining Center

Rapid acceleration after presidential election
November 2020

Cotton and cotton products produced by the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps (XPCC) and its subordinate
organizations

January 2021

All cotton and tomatoes produced in Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region

June 2021(First issuance underBiden administration)

Hoschine Silicon Industry

7