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Nuclear Non-proliferation：the Current Situation and Challenges
KONDO Shunsuke, Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission of Japan

Introduction
It is a p leasure for me to be particip ating in this sp ecial symp osium commemoratin g theth
50 anniversary of the IAEA. Taking this op portunity, I would like to exp ress, on behalf ofAtomic Energy Commission of Jap an, my heartfelt thanks to the IAEA for lon g-standin gservices that the IAEA has extended to Jap an.
So lon g as nuclear weapons remain, there is a risk that they would be used by design or
accid ent and any such use would be catastrop hic. Reco gnizin g this risk, international
community had the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap ons (NPT) enter into
force in 1970 as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime to anchor
humanity’s efforts to curb nuclear p roliferation and move towards nuclear disarmament.
For over 30 y ears, the NPT has been the center and foundation of an interlocking networkof agreements, organ izations, and international arrangements designed to slow down thefurther spread of nuclear weap ons.
It is no secret, however, that the nuclear non-proliferation regime today faces a broad arrayof challen ges such as a ren ewed will on the p art of a few states and extremist group s toacquire nuclear weap ons and the emergence of clandestine nuclear p rocurement networks.
As we see the renewed interest in nuclear p ower on the p art of many countries, it becomeseven more imp ortant that we have strong mech anisms in place to minimize the risks ofnuclear proliferation.
In my presentation this afternoon, I will offer a brief p icture of current situation andchallen ges in global non-p roliferation efforts such as nuclear disarmament, nuclear
verification, and p hysical p rotection. I will finish my remarks by touching on some actionsof the IAEA to be strengthened for the future of nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear Disarmament
When the NPT Review and Extension Conference without vote extended the treaty
indefinitely in 1995, it did so on certain conditions. One of the main conditions is that theNuclear Weap on States (NWS) should give a p led ge to speed up the implementation of1

Presented at the Sp ecial Sy mposium for the IAEA 50th Anniversary, held at Hotel
Aomori in Aomori, Jap an on April 11, 2007.

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their commitment to p ursue nuclear disarmament, in cludin g the conclusion of theComp rehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nu clear exp losions. TheCTBT was concluded in 1996 but it has not entered into force y et because it still requires
the ratification of 10 of the 44 states whose ratification is needed for the treaty to becomeeffective.
A Fissile M aterial Cut-off Treaty aims to suppress the emergence of n ew NWS by bannin g
the p roduction of fissile materials and to restrict the p roduction of nuclear weapons byNWS. It is regarded as a practical and substantial multilateral measure for nuclear
disarmament and non-p roliferation, which the international community should p ursue
followin g the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. The negotiations, however, have not y etcommen ced.
Desp ite these deadlocks, the international co mmunity should work for a new momentum on
nuclear disarmament, makin g the North Korean nu clear test exp losion a wake-up call, as
non-p roliferation and disarmament are complementary , not sep arate, goals. At the sametime, p ending such time as the CTBT legally enters into force, a moratorium on
nuclear-weap on-test exp losions should be continuously affirmed and all NWS should
proclaim their serious intention to diminish the role of the nuclear weap ons in their security
and foreign p olicies.
Nuclear Verification
The IAEA is the competent authority resp onsible for verifying and assurin g comp lian cewith Non-Nuclear Weapon States’(NNWS’s) commitments to renounce the acqu isition andpossession of nuclear weap ons under the NPT. Therefore, all NNWS are required under theNPT to sign and brin g into force safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Currently 154
NNWS have brou ght comp rehensive safeguards agreements into force and the IAEA has
continued to p rovide assurance to the effect that no nuclear material that has been declaredand p laced under its safeguards has been div erted for any exp losive purp oses or forpurp oses unknown.
Allegations of nuclear development by Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s jolted theinternational commun ity into urgently considering way s and means to strengthen thesafegu ards sy stem. The Board of Governors of the IAEA app roved the M odel Additional
Protocol to Safegu ards Agreements in 1997.
Only when a state has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an add itional
protocol in force, the IAEA is in a p osition to reach a conclusion that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials and nuclear activities in the state. By reaching thisconclusion in a given state, the IAEA is able to use its resource more efficiently byimp lementin g integrated safeguards in the state.
As of June 2006, integrated safeguards are b ein g fully imp lemented in nine states,2

includin g Jap an. It is particularly significant in the case of Jap an, as Jap an has the largest
and most comp lete nuclear fuel cy cle activities amon g non nuclear weap on states.
The chief p roblem concern in g the additional p rotocol is that it has not been universallyapp lied. Today only about 80 countries have additional p rotocols in force. For the nuclear
non-p roliferation regime to be regarded as cred ible, comp rehensive safeguards agreement
together with the additional p rotocol must be regarded as the univ ersal standard for nuclear
non-p roliferation commitments to be verified.
The world community has exp erienced three cases of non-compliance with the NPT
safegu ards agreements, namely, Iraq, Iran and the North Korea. In p articular, the nuclear
test by North Korea, which is a matter of grave concern, is a serious challenge to the NPTregime. Nevertheless, it can be said that the p olitical reality of these cases hav e made clear
the critical imp ortance of the IAEA verification activities in decidin g the course of action to
be taken by international community .
Nuclear S ecurity
Effective sy stems are required to p rotect nuclear material in use, storage and transport andnuclear facilities from theft and sabotage both for non-p roliferation and radiation safety
purp oses. The resp onsibility clearly rests with governments for ensuring that such systems
are p rop erly established and operated. Therefore the IAEA has develop ed for member states
the recommend ations for the phy sical p rotection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities,
which was first published in 1972 and have b een rev ised five times since then.
Regarding to international transp ort of nuclear material, the imp lementation of effective
phy sical p rotection sy stems is of direct concern to the shipp ing, receivin g, and transit states.
This is the reason why the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(CPPNM), which entered into force in 1987, ob liges States Parties to implement sp ecificprotection measures for nuclear material in international transp ort and to criminalize certain
nuclear material related offenses. With the p urpose of further strengthening theseinternational efforts, the Convention was amended in 2005 to mak e it legally bindin g forStates Parties to p rotect nuclear material in use, storage and transp ort and nuclear facilities
against theft and sabotage and to criminalize an act of sabotage against nuclear facilities asa p unishable offense.
Furthermore, deep ly concerned about the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, many of theworld nations have agreed to develop p artnership against the sp read of weap ons of mass
destruction, their delivery means and related materials. The United States initiated
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 to interdict illegal transfers and transportationof such weap ons and materials. The UN Security Council adop ted in 2004 Resolution 1540
requirin g states to increase security for weap ons and materials and enact strict exp ortcontrols. International Convention for the Supp ression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism wasadop ted in 2005 based on the recognition of the urgent need to enhance international3

coop eration between states in devising and adop ting effective and p ractical measures forthe p revention of such acts of terrorism and for the p rosecution and p unishment of theirperp etrators.
Actions for Future
I hop e that desp ite quick and short, this overview of the some asp ects of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts have clearly shown the imp ortant roles that theIAEA has been p lay ing for the glob al non-p roliferation regime. Takin g this into
consideration, I would like to p oint out, in the followin g, some actions to strengthen theIAEA as a gu ardian of nu clear non-p roliferation.
Multilateral approach to nuclear fuel cycle: IAEA Director General ElBaradei app ointed
in 2004 an international group of exp erts to consider possible multilateral app roaches to thenuclear fu el cy cle, as such multilateral ap p roaches have the p otential to p rovide enhanced
assurance to the international co mmunity that the most sensitive p arts of the civilian
nuclear fuel cy cle are less vulnerab le to misuse for weap ons p urp oses, while removin g themotivation and the justification for each country to have its own capability, through assured
access to the resources, and with the benefits of cost-effectiveness and economies of scale,besides.
The Group identified a number of options in terms of p olicy, institutional and legal factors
for those p arts of the nuclear fuel cy cle of greatest sensitivity from the point of view ofproliferation risk. They considered, as a framework, assurances of services, conversion ofexisting national facilities to multinational facilities, and construction of new joint facilities.
It is rational for the IAEA to take up the work to develop a mechan ism to assure the sup p lyof nuclear fu el, as the first step. Six uraniu m enrichment service exp orting nations jointlytabled at the IAEA a concep t for a multilateral mech anism for reliable access to enrichmentservices for nuclear fuel. Jap an also tabled a p rop osal to establish a sy stem in which as
many countries as p racticable register their nuclear fuel sup p ly cap ability in the various
elements of the front-end of fuel cy cle, starting fro m uran ium ore sup p ly to fuel fabrication
to the IAEA, and the IAEA disseminates information on the market situation based on thisrep ort so as to increase the transp arency of the market, as a comp lementary sy stem to thesix-nation p rop osal in which the IAEA p lay s the intermediary function should market fail invarious juncture of fu el cy cle activities. A special event was held durin g the last General
Conference of the IAEA to facilitate discussion of these and other prop osals and now theSecretariat is study ing issues related to the modalities and criteria for p ossible assurance
mechan isms accep table to all users of nuclear energy.
Research for non-proliferation: New and changin g challenges ask the IAEA to p romoteresearch and dev elop ment for nuclear non-p roliferation. For examp le, in order to
imp lement safegu ards for new facility typ es and new op erating conditions, and to revise
them for the introduction of integrated safeguards, dev elop ment of novel technolo gies4includin g those for the detection of undeclared activities and those with enhanced
cap abilities in the area of environmental samplin g are in need. It is also essential to dev elop
new technologies for information co llection and analy sis as the information is at the heartof modern verification activities and the amount of information available is constantly
increasing.
Furthermore, the develop ment of more p roliferation resistant nuclear energy systems,
includin g relevant technolo gies of the nuclear fuel cycle is promoted inside and outside of
the IAEA. As an issue in such efforts is how we can achieve significant advances inproliferation resistance of such sy stems by furnishing intrinsic characteristics like easin essof detection and extrinsic measures like easiness of safeguards in an op timal manner, theIAEA should be a p artner of such efforts from the early stages of develop ment to identify
needs for innovation and clarify the issues to be resolved in a timely manner.
Education on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: The education on nuclear
disarmament and non-p roliferation is, I believe, one of the most imp ortant actions for future.
The overall objective of the education is to imp art knowledge to ind ividuals to emp ower
them to make their contribution, as national and world citizens, to the achievement ofnuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Each country should be encouraged to sp onsor,
in coop eration with the IAEA, trainin g, fellowship s, and awaren ess p rograms forresearchers, en gineers, scientists, and other academics in areas of scien ces and techno lo gies
relevant but not limited to treaties and agreements on nuclear non-p roliferation and nuclear
disarmament.
I believ e that these actions will strengthen the IAEA. And I believe that the strengthening of
the IAEA is a must to the world community as its resp onsibility for the assurance of
non-p roliferation shared with the world community is surely increasing and this assurance
is vital to ensure that the Atoms are used only for p eace.

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