Teaching Guide for Transformative
Experience

PurposeThis is a guide to help instructors teach transformative experience.
It comes in two parts. Part I is on transformative experience and the challenge to rational
choice. Part II is on transformative experience and authenticity.
The first part of the guide begins with a general section, which covers the basic concepts. It
then continues with a section for graduate courses, which goes into more detail. It ends witha reading guide, split into resources for undergraduate and graduate readers.
The second part of the guide also begins with a general section and ends with a reading
guide. But neither section is divided into undergraduate and graduate parts. The difficultyof the issues depends a great deal on students’ prior knowledge, so it is left to the instructor’s
judgment to tailor the material to the ability of her class.

Part I. Transformative Experience and the Challenge to
Rational Choice
What is a Transformative Experience?
It’s useful to distinguish between three different kinds of experience that are transformative.
1. An experience is epistemically transformative if the only way to know what it is liketo have it is to have it yourself.
Examples. Trying a fruit you’ve never tasted before; seeing a color for the first time.
12. An experience is personally transformative if it changes your point of view, including
your core preferences.
Examples. Taking a college course; reading powerful fiction.
3. An experience is transformative if it is both epistemically and personally transformative.
Examples. Becoming a parent; fighting in a war; undergoing a religious conversion;
going to college; embarking on a career; becoming bereaved.

The Challenge to Rational Choice
You could choose to have a transformative experience arbitrarily. For instance, you could flip
the coin and undergo the experience if and only if the coin lands heads. But it’s important
to us to make choices rationally. Transformative experience poses a challenge for rational
choice. The challenge has three main dimensions.
1. Informed choice. By definition, a transformative experience is epistemically transformative. So you cannot know what it will be like to have the experience before you haveit yourself. This poses a problem for rational choice: we want our rational choices tobe informed. This requires knowing about the options available to choose from. But it
seems impossible to make an informed choice about a transformative experience—until
you’ve experienced it, you can’t know what it’s like!
Example. Suppose you’re choosing which of two fruits to try, and you’ve nevertasted either before. Since you don’t know what either tastes like, how can you
rationally choose between them?
2. Conflicting preferences. By definition, a transformative experience is personallytransformative. So if you have undergo the experience, your preferences will change. But
if rational choice requires choosing according to your preferences, you face the problemof which preferences should guide your choice: the before-transformative-experience
preferences, or the after-transformative-experience ones?
Example. Suppose that at the moment you like staying out late and leading a wild
life. If you become a parent you’ll stop doing these things, but you’ll also come toprefer early nights and a more restrained existence. In choosing whether to becomea parent, should you be guided by your pre- or post-parenthood preferences?

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3. Different selves. By definition, a transformative experience is personally transformative.
So there is some reason to think that you will have a different self if you undergo theexperience. After all, your point of view and core preferences will be different. Thisposes a challenge for rational choice because it’s not clear that what happens after thetransformative experience to some other self can be relevant to your current choice.
But if what happens after the experience isn’t relevant to making the choice, what isrelevant?
Example. Suppose you’ve been drafted into the military and are choosing whether
to avoid the draft by leaving the country. It’s plausible that, once you’ve beendrafted and experienced combat, you will have a different self. But then it seems
that what happens to that future soldier, who is not identical with your current
self, cannot matter to your choice of avoiding the draft. If that’s right, on what
basis can you make the choice?

For Graduate Courses
The challenge posed by transformative experience to rational choice can be sharpened bydeploying standard decision theory.
Standard Decision Theory
This is a theory about choosing in conditions of uncertainty. It models rational choice under
uncertainty on gambling on games of chance. A good way into standard decision theory is by
way of an example.
Coin Toss
Someone offers you a chance to play a game concerning the outcome of a coin toss. You
pay $1 to play.1 You call Heads or Tails. If the coin lands how you called it, you getyour $1 back. If the coin lands the other way, you get nothing.2 Should you play the
game? If so, how should you bet? We approach these questions in steps.
First, consider the three possible acts you can perform: betting Heads; betting Tails; notplaying. Second, consider the possible outcomes of each act. For betting Heads they are:1

This example has the vice of being somewhat dull, but this is compensated by the virtue of being simple
and clear.
2
We assume that, if tossed, the coin must land exactly one of Heads or Tails.

3the coin lands Heads; the coin lands Tails. The outcomes for betting Tails are similar.
And there is only one outcome for not playing. Third, consider the net payoff of eachoutcome. If you bet Heads and the coin lands Heads, you win $1 but you had to pay $1
to play, so the net payoff is $0; if you bet Heads and the coin lands Tails, your payoff is−$1: you lose $1. The payoffs are reversed for betting Tails: $0 when the coin lands
Tails, and −$1 when it lands Heads. Finally, if you don’t play you neither win nor lose
anything. So your payoff is $0.
The next-to-last step is to work out the expected value of each outcome. Let o1 . . . on
be the outcomes of a possible act, A. And let ui and pi be respectively the payoff andPprobability conditional on A of oi . The expected value of A = ni=1 ui × pi . In words,
the expected value of a possible act is the sum, for each possible outcome, of the productof the payoff that the outcome yields and the likelihood of its occurring given A.
Let’s apply this to Coin Toss. Assume that the coin is fair. Then the expected value of
betting Heads = (0.5 × $0) + (0.5 × −$1). The expected value of betting Tails is also−$0.50 = (0.5 × −$1) + (0.5 × $0). Finally, if you don’t play the probability is 1 thatyou’ll have a payoff of $0. So the expected value = (1 × $0) = $0.
The final step: choose the act with the highest expected value. In Coin Toss, this is notplaying. So you should refrain from playing the game.
In Coin Toss, the ‘goodness’ of an outcome was measured by its monetary payoff. But toapply standard decision theory to rational choices that don’t involve money, we need a moregeneralized notion of goodness. We associate with each outcome a number that measures
its utility. The utility of the outcome is the goodness of that outcome, whatever form that
goodness takes: money, tastiness, self-worth, pleasure, and so on.
Putting all this together, we have the following procedure for rational choice given bystandard decision theory.
1. List the possible acts you can perform.
2. For each such act, list the possible outcomes of that act.
3. For each such outcome, list botha. Its utility, andb. The probability that the outcome occurs conditional on the act being performed.
4. For each outcome, compute the product of the numbers obtained in 3a and 3b.

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5. For each act, sum the products associated with the outcomes to obtain the act’s expectedvalue.
6. Perform the act with the highest expected value. (If there is a tie, perform any of theacts that tie for the highest expected value.)
Precisifying the Challenge Posed to Rational Choice
We can use the machinery of standard decision theory to make the challenge posed bytransformative experience to rational choice much more precise. Here are the sharper versionsof the three challenges we considered before.
1. What are the utilities? Since the experience is epistemically transformative, theutilities associated with it partly depend on what it’s like to have that experience. But
then they can only be known by having the experience. So when we’re trying to apply theprocedure for rational choice, it’s unclear what utilities to associate with the outcomesthat involve transformative experience.
Example. The utility of trying a new fruit depends on what it’s like to taste thefruit, and so can be known only by actually trying it.
2. Which are the utilities? Even if we knew what it would be like to have the transformative experience before undergoing it, we may have two competing collections ofutilities associated with the experience: those of your “before-self” and those of your“after-self”. These utilities may conflict. If so, which should you use to guide your choice
when using standard decision theory?
Example. Your pre-parenthood self may assign a much lower utility to quiet night at
home than your post-parenthood self. Which utility should you use when calculating
expected value?
3. Which outcomes are relevant? A transformative experience may change the selfthat you are. So the outcomes associated with the experience may not involve yourcurrent self. If they involve some other self, why are these outcomes relevant to the
choice that you make now?
Example. If you join the military you may end up becoming a very different self.
But why are outcomes involving that other self relevant to your current choice?

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Reading Guide for Part I
Undergraduate
Transformative Experience• Chapter 1 of L.A. Paul. 2014. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
• Frank Jackson. 1986. “What Mary Didn’t Know”. Journal of Philosophy 83(5):291–295.
• Joshua Rothman. 2015. “Seeing and hearing for the first time, on YouTube”. The
New Yorker. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/
seeing-and-hearing-for-the-first-time-on-youtube• Michael Specter. 1999. “The dangerous philosopher”. The New Yorker. Available at
http://www.michaelspecter.com/1999/09/the-dangerous-philosopher/
Personal Identity• Alison Gopnik. 2015. “How an 18th-century philosopher helped me solve my midlife
crisis”. The Atlantic. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2015/10/how-david-hume-helped-me-solve-my-midlife-crisis/403195/• Eric T. Olson. 2008. “An Argument for Animalism”. In Metaphysics: The Big
Questions. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell.
• Sydney Shoemaker. 2008. “Personal Identity: A Materialist Account”. In Metaphysics:
The Big Questions.
The Challenge to Rational Choice• Chapter 2 of Paul. Transformative Experience.
• Ruth Chang. 2014. “How to Make Hard Choices”. TED. Available at https://www.
ted.com/talks/ruth_chang_how_to_make_hard_choices
Solutions to the Challenge to Rational Choice• Chapter 4 of Paul. Transformative Experience.

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Graduate
Transformative Experience• Barnes, E. 2015. “Social Identities and Transformative Experience”. Res Philosophica
92(2): 171–187.
• ———. 2015. “What You Can Expect When You Don’t Want to be Expecting”.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(3): 775-786.
The Self• Dennett, D. 2014. “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity”. In Self and Consciousness:
Multiple Perspectives. F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D. Johnson (eds.). New York: Psychology
Press.
• Chapter 9 of Ismael, of J.T. 2016. How Physics Sets Us Free. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
• Kovacs, D.M. 2016. “Self-Made Peopl”. Mind 125(500): 1071–1099.
• Chapter 4 of Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
• Ninan, D. “Persistence and the First-Person Perspective”. Philosophical Review 118(4):425–464.
• Strawson, G. 2004. “Against Narrativity”. Ratio 17(4): 429–452.
• ———. 2012. “I and I: Immunity to Error through Misidentification of the Subject”. In
Immunity to Error through Misidentification: New Essays. Simon Prosser and François
Recanati (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Velleman, D. 1996. “Self to Self”. Philosophical Review 105(1): 39–76.
• Whiting, J. 1986. “Friends and Future Selves”. Philosophical Review 95(4): 547–580.
Decision Theory• Chapter 9 of Brian Weatherson’s Decision Theory book. Available at http://brian.
weatherson.org/424/DTBook.pdf• Greaves, H. and Lederman, H. Forthcoming. “Extended Preferences and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Well-Being”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Challenge to Rational Choice7• Afterword of Paul. Transformative Experience.
• Chang, R. 2015. “Transformative Choices”. Res Philosophica 92(2): 237–282.
• Lewis, D. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety 63: 113–137.
• Harman, E. 2009. “ ‘I’ll be glad I did it’ Reasoning and the Significance of Future
Desires”. Philosophical Perspectives 23(1): 177–199.
• Sunstein, C.R. 2014. “The Limits of Quantification”. California Law Review 102(6):1369–1422.
Solutions to the Challenge to Rational Choice• Collins, J. 2015. “Neophobia”. Res Philosophica 92(2): 283–300.
• Pettigrew, R. 2015. “Transformative Experience and Decision Theory”. Philosophy andPhenomenological Research. 91(3): 766–774.

Part II. Authenticity and Transformative Experience
In Transformative Experience and follow-up work, L.A. Paul raises concerns about thepossibility of authentic choice in the context of transformative decision making. She endorses
authenticity as an ideal, argues that the ideal is threatened by transformative choices, andproposes her own solution to the puzzle that threatens the ideal.
One way of teaching this aspect of Paul’s work is by raising and discussing each of thefollowing questions: What is the ideal of authenticity? What threatens it? Can it be saved?
As we’ll see, Paul has her own, distinctive account of authenticity. Her own account may or
may not resonate with everyone. And those who have familiarity with historical authors on
authenticity may be especially opinionated about it. Either way, it should be useful to saysomething about the history of the idea. Engaging with Paul on what authenticity amounts
to and whether it is worth promoting can be especially engaging for students.

8What is Authenticity?
Let’s start by distinguishing three related ideas.3
1. Autonomy. This is self-governance: the use of one’s own mental faculties generally,
and reasoning especially, to guide oneself in matters of thought and action.
2. Authenticity. This is self-governance with special emphasis on the discernment, cultivation, and expression of one’s deepest and most important passions, motivations, values,
and so on.
3. Paul-Authenticity. This is authentic self-governance informed by knowledge undersubjective modes of presentation, that is knowledge via experiential or imaginative
acquaintance with the objects of deliberation.
These notions are useful to keep separate for both historical and theoretical reasons. With
respect to the latter, one can reject authenticity as an ideal without rejecting commitment toself-governance more generally. Or one might reject the demands of Paul-authenticity in somecases without rejecting another version of authenticity in the same cases (e.g., perhaps one
thinks Heidegger-authenticity or Sartre-authenticity or Varga-authenticity, etc., is better).
Moreover, authenticity is closely related to the concept of autonomy, which is most familiarfrom the writings of Kant. But whereas Kantian autonomy tends to emphasize reason andprinciples that could be affirmed by any rational agent properly exercising her cognitive
capacities, the ideal of authenticity places emphasis on which principles an agent can affirm
as her own, and thus on what makes someone truly individual.
Historically, authenticity has often been associated with the work of existentialist authors.
While Paul acknowledges some degree of fellowship with their outlooks, she also signals an
intentional departure in her account.4 The distinctive element of her account consists in
Paul-authenticity’s requiring special, first-personal familiarity with the outcomes of a decision
about which one is deliberating. This knowledge of the outcomes under the “subjective modeof presentation” enables Paul-authentic decision making.
It’s also worth noting that Paul’s account of authenticity links it closely to imagination.
3

These definitions are not intended to be fully precise and are meant to be compatible with the widearray of theories fleshing out the first two notions. On autonomy see Christman (2005); on authenticity see
Varga and Guignon (2016); for Paul’s views see especially Paul (2015a, 483–484, 493), but also Paul (2014,
105–131) and Paul (2015c, 769–799).
4
For distinctiveness, see Paul (2015a, 484–484) and Paul (2015c, 798). For general agreement with theexistentialist outlook, see Paul (2104, 130). For a recognition of both continuity and departure see Paul(2015a, 493).

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Imagining what it is like to undergo some experience is the primary epistemic route to thekind of knowledge needed to Paul-authentic choices: knowledge of the relevant outcomesunder the subjective mode of presentation.

What Threatens Authenticity?
Transformative Experience
1. Epistemic Alienation. The epistemically transformative nature of a transformative experience interposes a barrier between the deliberator and knowledge under the subjectivemode of presentation of the possible outcomes of the decision. Paul-authenticity requires
such knowledge, and so it seems impossible to make decisions about transformative
experiences in a Paul-authentic way.
2. Metaphysical Alienation. Any account of authenticity seems to require that thedeliberator’s self is preserved through the decision. But the personally transformative
nature of transformative experiences means precisely that the deliberator’s self will change
if she undergoes the experience. Paul herself uses what we might call a “Replacement
Model” of transformative experience, according to which new, distinct selves emerge asa result of transformative experiences.
Competing Ideals
3. Rationality vs. Authenticity. It’s not clear what we should do our deepest desires(authenticity) conflict with the best available evidence (rationality) for what to expectfrom potential choices, when that evidence is of a third-personal nature.
Let’s unpack these threats to authenticity more carefully. The first threat is the moststraightforward. It threatens Paul-authenticity and can be motivated by any number ofthought experiments. For instance, you can plausibly Paul-authentically choose to move toanother city in your own country, especially a city where you’ve spent some time before. But
it’s seemingly impossible to imagine the possible outcome of moving to another country witha very different language and culture from your own, say, San Francisco vs. Ulaanbaatar.
This blocks access to knowledge of the outcome under the subject mode of presentation, andso precludes a Paul-authentic choice.
The second threat can be a little harder to motivate. Paul’s own account is helpful here (see10especially Paul 2015c). Another helpful move is to make explicit Paul’s distinction between
personal identity and self-identity, which has previously been made by David Velleman (1996)
and Parfit (1986). Though the distinction is contested, it is helpful to grant it for the sake ofinterpreting Paul and the challenges posed by transformative experience to authentic choice.
An alternative motivation for the second challenge is to invite students to reflect on common
reports of life-changing events. These reports often talk of becoming another person, or inPaul’s framework, another self. If we take such reports straightforwardly and seriously, thenany choice that might result in such a retrospective report threatens to bring the deliberator’scurrent self to an end. The problem is that authenticity, which promotes cultivation andexpression of one’s self, should almost always recommend against something that would bring
one’s self to an end.5
The third threat arises due to a clash of two distinct kinds ideals of decision making. Outcome
ideals focus solely on the consequences of decisions; process ideals concern ways of making
decisions. Standard decision theory seems to be an outcome-oriented decision theory. Whatmatters is maximizing expected value, which arises only when one assigns the correct
quantities to the values and probabilities associated with the possible outcomes of the acts
under consideration. So process matters, if at all, only insofar as one should employ themost reliable processes for getting right the relevant values and probabilities. But what
happens when the most, or the only, reliable methods are third-personal, that is gained
through testimony or scientific research? Should a person ever defer to such methods when
they conflict with her own first-personal knowledge of her desires and motivations?

Can Authenticity be Saved?
From Epistemic Alienation
Although you can’t know what it’s like to taste durian ahead of time, its flavor shares featureswith other foods that you are knowledgeable about under the subjective mode of presentation.
For instance, it is juicy, fruity, and sweet. So perhaps if we cast our imaginative gaze broadly
enough, we may be able to get enough of a sense of what durian tastes like to be about toPaul-authentically decide whether to try it or not. This widened perspective may generalize
5

Though not always. Just as it can sometimes be rational in extreme situations to choose death, so might
it sometimes be authentic to choose self-annihilation.

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to other kinds of transformative experience.6
Paul’s (2014) own “discovery solution” appeals to more general aspects of experience to
may be drawn on when making transformative choices. She proposes that we attend to thediscovery aspects of previous transformative experiences in order to judge what it might belike to undergo a new one. In particular, new kinds of phenomenal qualities are revealed tous whenever we undergo transformative experience, and Paul argues that we are in a position
to Paul-authentically judge how much we value such discovery.
From Metaphysical Alienation
Paul intends the discovery solution to apply here as well. One extends the value of discovering
new phenomenal qualities to discovering completely new preference-structures or ways of
being.
From Competing Ideals
Paul also intends the discovery solution to resolve the conflict between authenticity andrationality. Since the value of discovery can be both rationally and authentically assigned,
there is no need to rely only on third-personal data when making a transformative choice.

Problems with the Discovery Solution
Here are some problems that have been raised for the discovery solution. Students will often
come up with some or all of them, or even others entirely, so it’s a good idea to let them doso.
Continuing Competition. There’s no guarantee that the recommendations of discovery
will align with third-personal data on the effects of a transformative choice. So the questionof how to adjudicate conflicts between first-personally represented values (no matter how
rational and authentic) and the predictions of third-personal data may remain unanswered.
Disinterest in Discovery. What about agents for whom the value of discovery (whether
for or against) is peripheral—it’s just something they don’t care about? It seems odd to
6

Paul (2014) notes that current work on hierarchical Bayesian modeling may illuminate whether and how
people generalize from their experiences in ways that allow for Paul-authentic decisions.

12require them to accept that they are missing out on the only, or at least one of the mostimportant, dimensions along which to deliberate about transformative choice.
Gravity. Undergoing a transformative experience will typically have many effects, both foroneself and for others. The discovery solution seems to ignore the weight of these effects.
Moreover, the ideal of authenticity has been criticized for being overly individualistic (Vargas
and Guignon 2016). Focusing exclusively on personal discovery at the expense of the many,
profound interpersonal consequences of transformative experience is perhaps an instance of
this broader problem. If right, this motivates exploration of alternative theories of authenticity
that seek to make it more interpersonal (Taylor 1991; Vargas and Guignon 2016).
Guidance. The value of discovery per se cannot recommend any transformative experience
over another. Perhaps it might if you had reason to believe that one transformative experienceoffered more discovery than another. But where would such information come from? If fromthird-personal sources, then the discovery solution is not a purely Paul-authentic solution.
And is it really plausible that someone strongly valuing discovery ought always to prefer thetransformative experience that offers the most discovery, no matter its other effects?
Indeterminacy and Self-Determination. Are the effects of transformative experience
immediately and fully determinate? Consider learning to like new things, or becoming
more discriminating in one’s perceptual capacities (e.g., wine tasting, reading X-rays, etc.).
Moreover, we’re more active in determining the effects of transformative experience than the
discovery solution (or the problems it addresses) acknowledges. Whereas Paul-authenticity
seems to deny this by demanding determinacy in the effects of novel experiences, other theories
of authenticity might accommodate indeterminacy and understand authentic approaches totransformative experience in a more active, self-creating way.
Replacement Revenge. If transformation really involves replacement of the self, and ifthat blocks the possibility of authenticity, how could an appeal to any value help (except
maybe valuing replacement itself)? But discovery is a value of the pre-transformation self.
Note also that if the replacement model is correct, the self that values discovery undergoes atmost one experience from which they can glean the value of transformation discovery. Is thatenough of a base to project to future transformative experiences?

Alternative Approaches
The discovery solution can help motivate alternative ways of looking at the entire framework
surrounding transformative experience, enabling consideration of the phenomenon from new13

angles. Here are a few suggestions.
Accepting Autonomy. Reliance on third-personal data is unavoidable and indispensable
in life. But autonomy can be secured by reflective determination about which sources ofdata an agent relies on—which external authorities are most reliable, and so on. So perhaps
autonomy is all that can or should be valued in decision making. In other words, perhaps
attention to transformative experience demonstrates that Paul-authenticity is an unattainableideal.
Authenticity without Subjective Knowledge. Perhaps there ways of being authentic
when Paul-authenticity is precluded. Pursuing this alternative involves engaging with othertheories of authenticity.
Developmental Model. Perhaps transformation can, at least sometimes, be developmental.
That is, rather than being replaced, the transforming self develops in a fundamental way.
If this is possible, then the problem of metaphysical alienation is avoided. Nonetheless, atheory of what such development is would be required.
Neglected Routes. Perhaps thinking that judging the value of X must proceed either via
first-personal experience with X or via third-personal data concerning X is a false dichotomy.
For instance, one doesn’t need to be able to perform an activity to recognize expertise in it
or to recognize the value in achieving excellence in the activity. What Michael Jordan did
was valuable, and I can recognize its value, even though I don’t what it is like (under the
subjective mode of presentation) to play basketball—or do anything else—at that level of
excellence.
So, grant that Paul is right that one cannot generalize from experiences of X to experiencesof Y, when Y reveals novel phenomenal qualities. But it doesn’t immediately follow that itis never possible to generalize from the experience of X to the value of Y. For instance, theexperience of becoming an expert in something can lead me to value expertise generally. Such
generalization might go even further: perhaps the experience of being a child in a healthy,
loving, flourishing family can justify the judgment that being a parent in a healthy, loving,flourishing family is very valuable and admirable.
Virtues of Uncertainty. Surely it is a virtue to be able to identify and accept unavoidable
uncertainty. But striving for Paul-authenticity might lead to demands for illusory certainty
and so lead to self-deception, and thereby inauthenticity. Consider that almost everyone
has had the experience of first-personally presented desires misleading them, or of pursuitsthat don’t turn out to be as fulfilling than expected. So we should be able to recognize fromour own experience that Paul-authentic mental status can mislead and so must fall in line
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alongside all other sources of fallible evidence. We may not like it that external sources cansometimes be more accurate about our probable futures states than we are. But perhaps
that’s just something we have to learn to live with.

Reading Guide for Part II
Authenticity• Frankfurt, H. 2005. “Taking Ourselves Seriously”. In Taking Ourselves Seriously andGetting it Right. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Guignon, C. 2004. On Being Authentic. London: Routledge.
• Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton
University Press.
• Parfit, D. 1986. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
• Paul, L.A. 2015a. “Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies”. Res Philosophica
92(2): 473–545.
• Paul, L.A. 2015b. “Précis of Transformative Experience”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41(3): 760–765.
• Paul, L.A. 2015c. “Transformative Experience: Replies to Pettigrew, Barnes, andCampbell”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41(3): 794–813.
• Paul, L.A. 2014. Transformative Experience. Oxford University Press.
• Taylor, C. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Varga, S. and Guignon, C. 2016. “Authenticity”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2016 ed). E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/sum2016/entries/authenticity/• Velleman, J. D. 1996. “Self to Self”. The Philosophical Review 105(1): 39–76.
Autonomy• Christman, J. 2015. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 ed). E.N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/autonomy-moral/
Existentialism15• Crowell, S. 2016. “Existentialism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring2016 ed). E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/
entries/existentialism/• Guignon, C. 2003. The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Heidegger, and Sartre. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Heidegger, M. 1962. Being and Time. Tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.
New York: Harper and Row.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New
York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Sartre, J-P. 1992. Being and Nothingness. Tr. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington
Square Press.
Imagination• Ninan, D. 2016. “Imagination and the Self”. In Amy Kind (ed.) The Routledge
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Reynolds. S. N. 1989. “Imagining Oneself To Be Another”. Noûs 23(5): 615–633.
The Self• See Reading Guide for Part I.

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