Question of Guilt:
Japan’s Foreign Ministry &Its War Responsibility

By Seishiro Sugihara
Translated by Norman Hu

The Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

Copyright ©2016 by Seishiro Sugihara.
Originally published in the Japanese language as Gaimusho no tsumi wo tou: Yahari
Gaimusho ga Nihon wo dame ni shite iru.
by Jiyusha, Tokyo, Japan 2013.
All rights reserved, including the rights ofreproduction in whole or in part in any form.

ii

Z Table of Contents

Foreword by Hideaki Kase

iv

Author’s Preface

viiiTranslator’s Notex

Chapter 1

The Incompetence and Culpability of Japan’s Foreign
Ministry: The Prewar Period

1

Chapter 2

The Incompetence and Culpability of Japan’s Foreign
Ministry: The Postwar Period

36

Chapter 3

The Reality Behind the Foreign Ministry and the Skills
Expected of Diplomats

56

Chapter 4

Reforming the Foreign Ministry: General Issues

85

Chapter 5

Reforming the Foreign Ministry: Special Issues

122

Afterword
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

142
148
152
157

iii

Z Foreword

The diplomatic services of Japan and the United States have one thing incommon: the Japanese Foreign Ministry is sometimes referred to as Kasumigaseki(literally, “gate of fog”) and the U. S. State Department, sometimes as “Foggy
Bottom.”Another thing they share is diplomats from both countries are disliked by
officials from other government agencies.
Perhaps it is a diplomat’s fate that, to become an expert about a foreigncountry, he or she invariably succumbs to that country’s charms. It is remarkably easy
to fall into the trap of becoming an advocate for that foreign country.
Immerse yourself as a diplomat in the language and culture of a country in thesouthern seas, for instance, and you may find yourself developing a strong affinity forthat country, including perhaps the custom of “head hunting.” Become preoccupiedby that country, and you may even forget Japan’s national interest. It is a pity thatmany in our Ministry of Foreign Affairs have fallen victim to this lack of clarity about
national allegiance.
At the outset of the Takeo Fukuda cabinet (1976-1978), when I was 41, I was
asked to arrange final preparations ahead of the first Fukuda-Carter summit. I
received the title of Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, and set off for Washington.
I became acquainted with Senator Humphrey, former Democratic vicepresident and a mentor to President Carter; and with Professor Brzezinski, special
adviser in the National Security Council during the Carter administration.
After the cabinet was launched, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sunao Sonoda asked
my advice whether there was anything suitable to use as a centerpiece for the jointstatement to cap off the Japan-U.S. summit.
I gave Secretary Sonoda a “secret formula” to use. The prime minister
apparently agreed, saying, “That’s it!”
But I also met up with the Foreign Ministry’s American Affairs Bureau Chief
Toshio Yamazaki. He proceeded to tell me “such a thing isn’t possible,” and gave me
the cold shoulder. As the summit approached I asked to see the talking paper, namely
the record of meetings between the two countries thus far, but my request was flatly
refused.
I urged that we “share the burden of duties,” but from start to finish I was
rebuffed at every turn.

iv

I flew to the remote town of Plains, Georgia, outside Atlanta. This was thehometown of President-elect Carter, and where the president-elect had established his
administration’s transition office.
At Plains, I got to know people in his entourage, such as Miss Lillian, thepresident-elect’s mother; Hamilton Jordan, the incoming administration’s WhiteHouse chief of staff; Jodi Powell, White House press secretary; and Billy Carter, thepresident-elect’s brother. I became close friends with his sister Ruth, who doted on
the president-elect.
As for the talking paper, Foreign Minister Iichiro Hatoyama showed it to me
before I left for Washington, so that was no longer a problem.
In any case, I wasn’t able to leave for Washington immediately because of
lecture commitments I had made the previous year; I made it to Washington the day
before the prime minister and his party arrived, and did the rounds of the WhiteHouse, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Before my departurefrom Japan, we had brought everything together by phone, so it was more of a recap.
The next day, I met up with the prime minister and his party in front of theWhite House, and reported that everything had gone well.
In the joint statement to emerge from the Fukuda-Carter talks, in the end mysuggestion became the central feature.
As an advisor to Foreign Minister Sonoda over the course of two cabinets, I
often accompanied him to the United States.
For some reason we got on quite well, even though he was in the “dove”
faction, and I was considered a “hawk.” Sonoda would call the bureaucrats at theForeign Ministry “perfectly logical idiots.”
Some time later, I went ahead to help lay the groundwork for a defense
technology exchange agreement to be signed in Washington by Defense Secretary
Kazuho Tanigawa and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, but I was
exasperated by the Foreign Ministry whose jealousy even led to outright interference.
The Japanese Defense Agency’s Washington office was located in the Watergate
building, infamous for the Watergate scandal, but Defense officials stationed in D.C.
bypassed the Japanese embassy when contacting the Defense Agency’s home officein Tokyo.
I received my final appointment during the Nakasone cabinet, with the title ofspecial advisor to the prime minister. So I have a lengthy relationship with theForeign Ministry.
Even now, I still visit Washington from time to time. I am invited to parties at
the homes of administration officials or friends who are members of Congress, andmay find myself sharing a table with diplomats from various countries. But not once
have I ever met a Japanese diplomat at one of these gatherings. To pass Japan’s seniorcivil service examinations means immersing yourself to the exclusion of everythingelse, including developing social skills; so this social awkwardness leads to few
invitations.
In Japan these days, overemphasis on cramming in education produces too
many unrefined men and women.
I have been acquainted with Donald Rumsfeld, defense secretary during theFord administration, since his days as a member of Congress. Kenneth Adelman was
an assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld.

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When the Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter defeated President
Ford, Mr. Adelman became a researcher at the Stanford Research Institute’s Strategic
Studies Center, but was recalled during the first Bush administration to become
deputy ambassador to the United Nations.
Adelman recalled angrily that, “during the previous administration, I phoned
many times to arrange meetings with Japanese diplomats, but none were ever willingto meet with me. When I became an ambassador to the United Nations, they wereinsistent about a meeting, but no-one wanted to see them. They would only associatewith those who were of suitable rank.”
During the Fukuda cabinet I served as director of the Security and Strategy
Research Center of Japan, which had been created by Asao Mihara, the directorgeneral of the Defense Agency. It was something that had been passed down by
Michita Sakata, the Defense Agency’s director-general during the previous Mikicabinet.
As such, Director-General Sakata would sometimes ask me to accompany him
when visitors came from abroad. Each time, the Foreign Ministry would send a young
novice secretary to interpret.
Watching from the sidelines, I was appalled at their poor grasp of English.
They would frequently make mistakes, but I kept quiet because my corrections would
have damaged many a promising career.
Any Japanese with a passion for the English language should exercise adegree of caution. Foreign languages are merely tools, and should be treated as such.
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, who actually hailed from the Ministry of
Finance and not the Foreign Ministry, was a typical example. He was well-known for
showing off by holding an English-language newspaper under his arm. But during his
tenure as prime minister, he infuriated the New York Times and other parts of theAmerican media when he stated, in English, that he “wanted to show compassion for
the United States.” He had mistakenly used the word “compassion” when what hereally meant was “sympathy.”In August 1992, the Miyazawa cabinet individually invited fourteen experts tothe prime minister’s official residence, to canvass their opinions on the Emperor’s trip
to China. I was one of those experts.
I voiced the opposing view, saying that when His Majesty travels abroad, hegoes in order to represent Japan and celebrate that country, but this would beinappropriate in a country like China and its domestic human rights record.
The month before, Mr. Tarui, a section head at the Foreign Ministry’s China
desk, came to my office to plead with me. “I studied abroad in China at government
expense. Since those days, I vowed to devote my life to Sino-Japanese friendship.
When you go to the prime minister’s residence, please don’t oppose the Emperor’svisit to China.”
When I asked him about the issue of the suppression of human rights in China
since the Tiananmen Incident, he declared unapologetically that “even before
Tiananmen there was no such thing as human rights.” And on the issue of China’s
nuclear testing, he replied that, “the military did it without listening to the central
government.”“Your vow to devote your life to Sino-Japanese friendship,” I said, “is apersonal decision, but has nothing to do with the national interest of Japan.” When I
told him, “I intend to oppose the Imperial visit to China,” his shoulders drooped, andhe left, quite dejected.
vi

It was an unfortunate example of someone becoming a mouthpiece for a place
where they were once posted.
The criticism of the Foreign Ministry running through this book by Mr.
Sugihara is penetrating; he sheds a welcome light on many issues, and holds thereader in breathless suspense.
The author is thoroughly familiar with Japan’s diplomatic history since the
Meiji period when the country opened up to the outside world, and has looked closely
into the serious errors committed by our Foreign Ministry. I would like to take thisopportunity to attest to the author’s brilliant insights.
My hope is that this book shall be widely read, to help put right the diplomacyof our country.

Hideaki Kasevii

Z Author’s Preface

My objectives for publishing this book are twofold. One of these will be to
hold the Foreign Ministry to account for its many mistakes and lack of good
judgement. The other is the Senkaku Islands issue, which currently presents a
dilemma for Japan.
On April 6, 2012, during a visit to the United States then Tokyo governor
Shintaro Ishihara announced the capital city’s plans to purchase the Senkaku Islands.
Almost immediately donations began pouring in, amassing a vast sum. China, in turn,began to kick up a fuss.
So on July 7, the Japanese government announced a policy of nationalization.
In the end, it was decided the nation would make the purchase, thus settling the issueof who would buy the Senkaku Islands.
If Tokyo had made the purchase, effective control of the Senkaku Islands
would have been settled beyond question, because of plans to build infrastructure
there such as, at the very least, a typhoon shelter for Japanese fisherman. Fearing this,
China’s Foreign Ministry must have confidentially informed Japan’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs that it was preferable to have the nation rather than the capital makethe purchase, and thereby maintain the status quo where no structures of any sortwould be built. What is not clear though is which of the two diplomatic services,
China’s or Japan’s, came up with the idea of the Japanese national government
making the purchase. But it is almost certain there was solid agreement between the
two that all would be well so long as the purchase was made by Japan’s national
government.
From the nation’s point of view, and in the long term, it would have been
better if Tokyo had made the acquisition, and strengthened effective control over thearea through Governor Ishihara’s plans. Purchase by the Japanese government gives
China direct leverage, and makes strengthening effective control all the more difficult.
But if Tokyo had made the purchase, and if through the city’s plans an actual recordof effective control had been set, the Chinese government’s leverage over Japan’snational government would have been greatly reduced. So in the long term, purchaseby the Tokyo government would have been much better for Japan. However, Japan’s
Foreign Ministry colluded with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to force thenation to make the purchase. It can be argued that, from the Japanese public’s point ofview, even this incident reveals the true nature of Japan’s Foreign Ministry to work
against the national interest.
In any case, it was evident that the Foreign Ministry had “selfish motives” tocrush plans by Tokyo to make the purchase, stemming from its deep-rooted hostility
towards Governor Ishihara. Besides, even if it is unclear which side first broached theidea of the Japanese government making the purchase, as a result Japan has been put
in the position of having to beg for instructions from China.

viii

However from China’s overall perspective, the plan for the Japanese
government to purchase the Islands, compared to the Tokyo plan, gives theimpression of an even stronger countermeasure against China. Consequently, theentire Chinese government, including the military, has not quieted down.
Because it has exacerbated the problem by doing the Chinese Foreign
Ministry’s bidding, Japan’s Foreign Ministry can no longer back down. Then-Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda did not revise the policy of having the national government
make the purchase, and stuck to the nationalization policy.
Japan maintains the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory, and claims that no
territorial dispute with China over Senkaku exists, and yet it takes no steps to enhance
its effective control there by, for instance, building a typhoon shelter for Japanesefisherman. Under the influence of Japan’s Foreign Ministry, who is in mortal fear of
China, it is only natural that such backsliding would occur. However, the Japanese
government still held rigidly to the nationalization plan, and went ahead with thepurchase. I have revealed how Japan’s Foreign Ministry was unyielding as it stoodsquarely behind the government.
For the Foreign Ministry, the problem of the Senkaku Islands was a minor
issue, but things like the process described above have become an opportunity for thisauthor to consider how to expose the reality of the Ministry to the public. My interestin Japan’s Foreign Ministry began in 1982 during the history textbook misinformation
controversy, but now that the Liberal Democratic Party has been returned togovernment, I would like the readers of this book to understand that Japan cannot be
revitalized without the LDP administration’s reform of the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps
no other book criticizes the Foreign Ministry quite as fiercely or stridently as this, inother words Japan’s Foreign Ministry may never have been the target of such harsh
criticism; but I urge readers to understand that Japan has no future if our Ministry ofForeign Affairs is not reformed on the basis of these criticisms.
Japanese modernization since the Meiji era has seen our government agencies
adopt various systems, but none has failed as miserably as that of the Foreign
Ministry. It is an unrivalled failure. How much have the people of Japan sufferedbecause of the Foreign Ministry’s present state of existence? It is my hope this bookwill explain the exact nature of the harm done to Japan.
I employ a narrative style where some incidents may be recounted several
times. However, each retelling of the same incident is done from a different
perspective, so there is no unnecessary repetition. The degree of overlap signifies
precisely the severity of each incident.
Finally, I would like to thank the diplomatic historian Hideaki Kase for kindly
agreeing to write the Foreword. It is my sincerest wish that, for the sake of Japan’s
rebirth, government officials and politicians, including Diet members and ministers ofstate, as well as the judiciary, will take time to consider the critical issues raised inthis book.

Seishiro Sugihara
January 2013ix

Z Translator’s Note

It is my privilege to have been asked to translate Seishiro Sugihara’s Questionof Guilt: Japan’s Foreign Ministry and Its War Responsibility from Japanese into
English. This is the first full length book to trace the incompetence and culpability ofJapan’s Foreign Ministry since its beginnings in the Meiji era. Although the Ministry
introduced an examination system in the 1870s based on models established inEurope and the United States to select and train staff, Sugihara shows how thisparadoxically produced a coterie of individuals dedicated to the pursuit of ministerialinterests over those of the Japanese people.
Most egregious of the Ministry’s blunders was its administrative mishandlingof the “final notice” to the United States that turned the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
surprise assault on Pearl Harbor into an unannounced “sneak attack,” and led to tragic
consequences for Japan. The author explains how this and other blunders were largely
due to the incompetence of Ministry staff, and to deeply flawed institutional,organizational, recruitment and training issues. He analyzes more recent bribery andembezzlement cases, and also shows how the Ministry has failed when reacting toexigent circumstances abroad such as efforts to evacuate Japanese nationals during
the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Critical of the Ministry’s attempts to enact internal
reforms, he makes recommendations to correct these flaws so that Japan may finallyconduct a decent and proper foreign policy that remains true to the national interest,
and to the people of Japan.
Conventional postwar multi-volume narratives of Japanese diplomacy havelargely portrayed the Foreign Ministry in a passive role during the events of the 1930s,
leading up to a war instigated exclusively by Japan’s two military services. This
paradigm has persisted and is perpetuated in treatments by insiders and former
diplomats, who largely take an uncritical approach to the Ministry’s actions in the
postwar era. Little has been made of the antiquated systems in place within the
Ministry, some of which have remained unchanged since their introduction in the
Meiji era, nor of the effect these structural and institutional problems have had on the
Ministry’s general performance. However, factional and policy disagreements overthe past decade have revealed unprecedented influence peddling and embezzlement
scandals, and triggered widespread scrutiny of the workings of the Foreign Ministryin greater detail than ever before.
In a welcome departure from such uncritical narratives, Sugihara has written
the first major work to examine the Foreign Ministry’s chronic weaknesses. He has
produced an unsanitized history of Japan’s diplomatic blunders and errors, from boththe turbulent decades leading up to war with the United States, and the postwar period
as Japan slowly reestablished its standing in the international community.
Sugihara has written extensively on the diplomatic history of Japan. Questionof Guilt can be viewed as the fourth volume of an unofficial “tetralogy” chroniclingxthe failings of the Foreign Ministry. The first book in this quartet is Japanese
Perspectives on Pearl Harbor (Asian Research Service, 1995), translated by
Theodore McNelly, and is a survey of media reports around the time of the fiftiethanniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The second is Between Incompetence andCulpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor
to Potsdam (University Press of America, 1997) where he examined in detail thecircumstances surrounding the bungling by diplomats at Japan’s Washington embassyon the eve of war that inadvertently turned the Imperial Japanese Navy’s assault on
Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.” This led him to examine more closely theadministrative and political record of Japan’s Foreign Ministry in the postwar period
to determine how officials assessed, recorded, concealed, and begrudgingly
acknowledged their culpability for this egregious error. The third book of the series is
Chiune Sugihara and Japan’s Foreign Ministry (UPA, 2001) which championed thecauses of individuals such as Chiune Sugihara (unrelated to the author, Seishiro, byfamily or marriage) and Naoya Nakano, two Ministry employees who followed theirconsciences to uphold the national interest over the narrower interests of the Foreign
Ministry, and were subsequently ostracized for their “insubordination.” He ties allthese threads together in Question of Guilt (the final volume in this tetralogy) to
produce an unprecedented survey of the failings of the Foreign Ministry, since its
beginnings in the Meiji period to the present day, and offers alternatives for futurereforms.
Sugihara has also written extensively on the Japanese education system, andthe significance of the Fundamental Law of Education, the emperor system, and theseparation of church and state in Japan. His work on jurisprudence, religious
education, and historiography in pedagogical studies was recognized by the Japan
Buddhist Education Association in 1998. He was appointed president of the JapaneseSociety for History Textbook Reform in 2011, and has recently shepherded a new
middle school textbook through the complicated authorization process, a book that
deals with these complex and controversial wartime, foreign policy and diplomatic
issues in a frank and principled manner. He is dedicated to the cause of overcoming
the tragic consequences of the war between Japan and the United States, anddemonstrates how, even in our fractious and turbulent world, erstwhile foes canindeed come together as true friends and allies.

Norman Hu
Translator
November 2016xi

Chapter 1
The Incompetence and Culpability of Japan’s Foreign
Ministry: The Prewar Period

1.1 What A Disgrace! I Came Back Because I Was Afraid Of ThisThe Foresight of Jutaro Komura
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902, and this was thanks to theforesight of Jutaro Komura. The prevailing view within the government to that time
followed the lead of the influential figure Hirobumi Ito, and was held by those who
believed Japan’s security rested with cooperation with Russia.
Besides the fact that Japan could not match Russia’s might, the rationale
behind cooperation with Russia was to acknowledge its special rights in Manchuria,
in exchange for recognition of Japan’s special rights in Korea and the Korean
Peninsula, and in its own way was quite realistic.
However, Jutaro Komura insisted on opposing this idea. It was true thatcooperation with Russia would bring temporary benefits, but wouldn’t produce longterm guarantees given Russia’s aggressive nature; moreover he pointed out that, as a
distinct disadvantage, ties with Russia would offend the Qing. On the other hand, ties
with the British would be useful in preserving peace in the Far East in the long termsince Britain’s purpose for being in Asia was to preserve the status quo for the benefitof commerce and profit, rather than territorial expansion. China under the Qing would
begin to trust the Japanese, and Japan’s business reputation would also improve; andeven as far as the economic development of Japan was concerned, it was more
beneficial to forge ties with Britain, rather than with Russia, which had control ofSiberia. And Komura was of the opinion that, if Japan was destined to clash with
Russia in the future, an alliance with Britain would be of great benefit to Japan.1

1

Hisahiko Okazaki, Komura Jutaro to sono jidai [Komura Jutaro and his era] (Tokyo: PHP
Kenkyujo, 2003), pp. 203-204.
1

During this period, Britain had been isolated internationally because of theBoer War, but it still had to prevent Russia from expanding its influence. The British,
who traditionally excelled at diplomacy, hoped to make allies in the Far East, andBritain made advances towards Japan in the hope of forming an alliance. Komura
realized there was more to gain by accepting Britain’s overtures, than bystrengthening ties with Russia. He showed great foresight.
At Komura’s insistence, Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and within
two years, clashed with the Russian Empire in 1904, plunged headlong into the
Russo-Japanese War, and ended victorious.
The war between Japan and Russia began in 1904, as is widely known.
Towards the end of a closely-fought struggle, Japan won a great victory on January 1,
1905, with the destruction of the Russian fleet concealed at Port Arthur, thanks to thecapture of the strategic stronghold of 203 Meter Hill. Gaining the momentum, Japan
went on to win the Battle of Mukden in March. In May, Russia’s Baltic Fleet arrived
in Japanese waters after sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, but the battleships
stationed at Port Arthur it had hoped to merge with had already been sunk. Even so, it
still projected a commanding presence. However, it was completely destroyed by theJapanese Navy’s Combined Fleet commanded by Heihachiro Togo. It was a victorythat stands out in the annals of world history.
It may be worthwhile to discuss this victory briefly. At the time, Japan did nothave sufficient capacity in ammunition or military personnel to continue the battle.
Conversely, Japan’s adversary Russia still had troops to spare to deploy against Japan.
But Russia was gripped by fear of revolution at home.
U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt chose his moment well to mediate forpeace. It is said that Roosevelt was impressed after reading Inazo Nitobe’s Bushido,
the Soul of Japan and became enamored with Japan, but this doesn’t necessarily mean
he mediated this peace while siding with Japan. He would also have kept U. S.
interests in mind, but in any case, given Japan’s situation his mediation couldn’t havecome at a better time.
But there was nothing coincidental about this situation. When war broke out
between Japan and Russia, the elder statesman Hirobumi Ito dispatched Kentaro
Kaneko, a good friend of President Roosevelt’s, to the United States. Thanks in partto Kaneko’s efforts, the president indicated to Kaneko in June 1904 to the effect that
he would be willing to mediate peace at a suitable time. In short, this is how
outstanding Japanese diplomacy was in this period. In a war that would decide thefate of the nation, it was as though the utmost consideration had been given to
produce the most favorable development possible for the Japanese side.
It wasn’t simply a question of diplomatic maneuvering, because even though
Russia had lost a series of battles against Japan, arguably it still had sufficientnumbers of elite troops to fight Japan. Despite having these troops in reserve, what
forced Russia to accept peace was its unease about a possible revolution unfolding at
home. Disturbances within Russia fomented by Colonel Motojiro Akashi and othersbrought about welcome results, and the “Bloody Sunday” incident occurred in
January 1905, an uprising of workers in St Petersburg.
Thus far Japan’s diplomacy, in the broadest sense of the word, had been
impeccable. At the peace conference that lasted about four weeks in the American
state of New Hampshire, Ambassador Plenipotentiary Jutaro Komura acquitted
himself admirably. The Japanese public was enraged Japan had received so little at2the peace conference despite winning the war, and held a protest rally in Hibiya Park,
giving rise to the Hibiya Incendiary Incident. However, Japan had exhausted its
supplies of troops and ammunition during the war effort, and with the advent of peace,
information about serious problems facing Japan’s combat readiness was withheld
from the public. The government had no choice but to wait for public anger to subside.
In any event, Japanese diplomacy to this point was outstanding. Foreign
Minister Munemitsu Mutsu devoted his life to the abolition of unequal treaties signed
at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate; and even during the First Sino–Japanese War(1894), his performance was exemplary. At the end of his memoirs Kenkenroku, adiplomatic record of the Sino-Japanese war, Mutsu wrote that the diplomatic policies
he pursued couldn’t be matched by any other.2 He was saying he wanted the reader tobelieve that his judgment in handling problems arising in any situation could not be
surpassed. In other words, his decisions were made in order to achieve the greatest
benefit for the Japanese state.
Deplorable Blunder by Jutaro Komura
It could be argued that Jutaro Komura, who revealed his superb skills while
securing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the peace accord between Russia and Japan,
performed outstandingly until the latter accord was reached. However, directly after
the Russo-Japanese accord was reached, Komura was to commit a terrible blunder forJapan.
Upon returning to Japan, Komura opposed a proposal for Japan and the UnitedStates to jointly run the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, put forward by Prime
Minister Taro Katsura and others with the American rail magnate E. H. Harriman. A
provisional agreement was reached under Katsura, but despite this being more or lessapproved as Japanese government policy, Komura overturned it. Komura’s main
assertion was that advantages gained by spilling the blood of Japanese soldiers should
be Japan’s exclusively, but this didn’t exactly sit well with the United States whose
good will had brought about mediation for peace, and rescued Japan from a difficult
situation.3
Had this plan to jointly operate the railway been realized, the extent of conflict
between Japan and the United States may not have been exacerbated when later
dividing up rights and interests in China. And it may also have meant that the Chinese
people, when it came to foreign troops stationed on their soil, may not have beensolely focused on Japan’s military as the enemy, or at least not to as great an extent asthey did. If Japan and the United States had jointly managed the railroad in Manchuria,

2

Munemitsu Mutsu, Kenkenroku, edited by Nobutoshi Hagihara (Tokyo: Chuokoron, 1984),
p. 260.
3
Shigeru Shiramatsu, Sono toki, kubo wa inakatta [Back Then There Were No Aircraft
Carriers] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2013) pp. 338-41. In this book about the “sneak attack” at
Pearl Harbor Shiramatsu writes that, when Franklin Roosevelt was younger, he heard from his
distant cousin President Theodore Roosevelt about Japan’s lack of cooperation with theUnited States following the conclusion of the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty, and argues that his
disliking of Japan was therefore not surprising.
3

rather than being at odds with each other, the two countries would have had to work
together to deal with domestic turmoil occurring later in China.
Japan was also indebted to Harriman because he had underwritten a large
amount of Japanese war bonds himself. Harriman, whose proposal for joint
management had been rejected, returned to the United States, and warned that an
ominous fate would later befall Japan.4 The tragedies visited upon Japan in the future
far outstripped the prediction made by Harriman.
What sort of serious reflection should Komura’s behavior have elicited? It’s
that debts owed to another country must be properly repaid. This was during the Meiji
period, when many Japanese still observed the tenets of Bushido, the way of thewarrior. However prewar Japanese foreign policy, including that during the Meiji
period, was inconsistent with Bushido in many respects. Don’t cower before thestrong, don’t lord it over the weak: that was the spirit of Bushido. At first glance,
prewar Japanese diplomacy involved not fawning upon a strong country because of
their strength, but also included the unwelcome habit of moving forcefully against
those in a weaker position. The diplomatic goal during the Meiji period was to abolishthe unequal treaties, and this mandated adopting a realistic approach, but at no time
did Japanese diplomacy become servile to achieve that. However, an arrogant andhighhanded attitude was frequently adopted towards vulnerable individuals andcountries.
Still, there were quite a few people who individually possessed thetemperament of Bushido. Couldn’t it be argued that diplomacy during this period
which disregarded Bushido and ignored debts of gratitude, became the cause of thetragedy in Japan that followed?
The sharp-eyed Komura should have realized it was a good idea to accept
Harriman’s proposal, even if only by anticipating that Japan and the United States
would not have been forced to become rivals over China, had the American’s
proposal been accepted. However, Komura resorted to a diplomacy that went against
the spirit of Bushido.
Japanese diplomacy, up to the moment that peace was concluded between
Japan and Russia, was as Munemitsu Mutsu had said: it followed a path that was
unmatched in its excellence. Nevertheless, Jutaro Komura’s behavior immediately
following the conclusion of that accord with Russia was ill-considered, and was the
beginning of Japan’s downfall.
According to a book by former Japanese diplomat Hisahiko Okazaki, Komura
heard about the Harriman proposal when he returned to Japan through the port of
Yokohama, and said, “What a disgrace! I came back even though I was ill, because I
was afraid of a situation like this.”5 The disgrace, though, was Komura himself.

4
5

Okazaki, Komura Jutaro to sono jidai, p. 357.
Ibid., p. 355.
4

1.2 The Foolish Twenty-One Demands
The Twenty-One Demands, Focal Point for Chinese Resentment
With the outbreak of the Great War in July 1914, there were in fact many
outstanding issues between China and Japan.
In January the following year, Japan slammed China with the so-called
Twenty-One Demands.
In February 1912, Yuan Shikai became president when the Qing dynasty fell,and China entered a period of instability. It is widely known the term “twenty-one
demands” was originally coined by China, and these “demands” were divided into
five groups, the fifth of which contained articles Japan hoped to attain from China
through suasion rather than force. In other words, the Chinese side began to misuse
the term “twenty-one demands” intentionally, but from the Japanese side it was morea case of “fourteen demands and a seven-item wish list.”
However, Japan clearly mishandled the timing and manner in which thedemands were imposed upon China. It seemed indeed like a golden opportunity forJapan to submit them in order to attain those demands, because the major powers
were preoccupied with the Great War and paid little attention to East Asia, and were
therefore unlikely to interfere. But from a long-term perspective, it wasn’t wise toincur the world’s distrust by taking advantage of the turmoil in China and acting like athief at a fire. And looking to the future, didn’t Japan actually lose more than it
gained?
Nor was unilaterally forcing the “demands” on China a good idea. When thesetwenty-one articles were first submitted to Yuan Shikai at the beginning of January
they were in the format of mere requests; but by May, and at the Chinese
government’s own request, they were lodged as a “final notice” or “ultimatum” tomake it easier for the Chinese government to accept.6 The fifth group of articles
detailing what Japan merely hoped to attain was eliminated, but the arrogant andunilateral imposition of this “ultimatum” soon became a target of hostility for thepeople of China.
On May 4, 1919, students from universities across Beijing gathered in
Tiananmen Square, and staged demonstrations that became known as the “May
Fourth Movement.” The demonstrations lasted slightly longer than a month. The
target of the struggle at this time was to abolish treaties listed in the Twenty-One
Demands.
Granted there were indeed many pressing issues between Japan and China at
the time, nevertheless the timing of its presentation, the unilateral way these“demands” were pushed on China, and the air of finality with which the “ultimatum”
was presented, left a deep legacy of trouble for later generations. They were truly
Twenty-One Foolish Demands.
While a lot of the responsibility for the Twenty-One Demands rests with
Shigenobu Okuma, it is undeniable that the Foreign Ministry, supposedly an

6Morinosuke Kashima, Nihon Gaiko shi 11: Shina Mondai [History of Japan’s Diplomacy
Vol. 11: China Issue] (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1971), p. 3111.
5

organization of professional diplomats, executed its diplomatic craft clumsily. Apartfrom the hugely ill-advised timing of the document’s presentation, and its formulation
as a set of “demands,” closer examination reveals it was naive diplomacy in theextreme to readily accede to, and then enact, the Chinese side’s request. Namely, tomake it easier to accept by using the format of an ultimatum and force it upon China.
Shigenobu Okuma was the prime minister at the time, and his minister offoreign affairs was Takaaki Kato. Born in 1860, Kato had no personal experience ofthe carnage from the late Edo period through the early years of Meiji; but Okuma, as apolitician of those times, experienced far more turmoil than even Hirobumi Ito and his
generation; and in an ever-changing political career, Okuma had served as foreign
minister and could also claim revision of the unequal treaties with the WesternPowers as an achievement. One wonders then why a man as capable as Okuma wasn’t
able to discern that the Twenty-One Demands were flawed, nor how flawed the
diplomacy to implement it was. Looking back in the context of Japan’s diplomatic
history, this surely arouses a sense of foreboding.
Criticism by Kan’ichi Asakawa
Now let me draw a quote from a book written in 1909 called Nihon no Kaki
[Japan’s Misfortune] by Kan’ichi Asakawa, which criticizes Japan’s foreign policy.
Asakawa was born in 1873 in Fukushima Prefecture, and at the age of 21 went abroadin 1894 to study in the United States at Dartmouth College. He continued his studies
at Yale University, earning a doctorate in history, and thereafter became a prominent
historian, teaching at both Dartmouth and Yale. Asakawa began to develop a harsh
critique of Japan for promptly losing its sense of humility in the wake of its victory in
the Russo-Japanese War. In 1909, Asakawa published Nihon no Kaki which severely
chastised the nation’s betrayal by Japanese diplomacy.
“Clearly China ought to be severely reprimanded for hurting ournational pride through its arrogance, irrationality, and stubbornness, but if we
respond in a high-handed manner, public opinion throughout the world will
sympathize with weak China and denounce strong Japan, and as a result it isundeniable China will take advantage of this to become even more intractable.
On the contrary, we ought to patiently offer our counsel, and expect nothing in
return for this effort, nor ask for obsolete rights and interests; and if China
reacts unreasonably like a child, or as cunning as a fox, we should respondmagnanimously, and only protest when we believe it will benefit China.” 7Asakawa’s astuteness cannot be praised enough. When Hitler was about toinvade Poland in 1939, he presented Britain and France, who had declared war against
Germany, with a temporary peace proposal. Asakawa wondered, even at this earlystage, whether Hitler might not kill himself in the end, thus shrewdly anticipating
Hitler’s suicide. 8

7

Kan’ichi Asakawa, revised by Kimiyoshi Yura, Nihon no Kaki [Japan’s Misfortune] (Tokyo:
Kodansha, 1987), p. 139.
8
Yoshio Abe, Saigo no Nihonjin - Asakawa Kan’ichi no shogai [The Last Japanese: The Lifeof Asakawa Kan’ichi] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004), p. 192.
6

From Japan’s perspective, China does indeed behave in a thoroughly
unreasonable manner. Sometimes Japan can become completely exasperated fromoutrage. However, China’s 5,000-year history has always been embellished bymurders and lies. With such an ignoble history, it would mean very little to China todeceive Japan. When interacting with such a China, what is the point of getting angry
over every little act of Chinese dishonesty? The issue is how to build a peacefulrelationship when dealing with this sort of China, and how best to pursue our national
interest.
During the chaos towards the end of the Qing dynasty, China was gasping forair. That being the case, Japan should have responded by contributing to China’s
rebirth as an orderly modern state. Japan could have avoided treating China so
unfairly, and especially not have behaved conspicuously when compared to the GreatPowers. Indeed if anything, Japan ought to have done no more or less than any of theother Powers. However Japan and China had a history of interaction spanning two
millennia, and from China’s perspective any action by Japan that harmed Chineseinterests, even if it differed little from that of the other Powers, would be seen to standout. But because Japan had belonged to China’s traditional cultural sphere, it would
have aroused particular hostility in the Chinese people even if Japan had acted justlike one of the other Great Powers.
Asakawa argued that since Japan and China had this sort of relationshipinitially, Japan ought to have taken this factor into account when building diplomatic
ties with China.
And then there’s Bushido. During the final years of the Edo period much
effort was expended trying to abolish the unequal treaties, a series of agreements that
had been ratified with no clear understanding of what they actually represented. Japanwas subjected to much humiliation because of those unequal treaties. That being thecase, Japan should not have subjected other countries to the same humiliation.
Bushido was revered in Japan by the people, and should have been carried throughinto Japanese diplomacy. This perspective has been consistently absent from Japanesediplomacy since the Meiji era.
Moreover, diplomatic bungling to the extent committed by Japan has rarely
been seen in other nations. During the two and a half centuries spanning the Edo
period, Japan did not forge relationships with other nations. As a result, Japan did notaccumulate any diplomatic skills. Japan created a ministry for dealing with diplomaticaffairs that in appearance seemed like a professional government agency, but in
substance lacked the true essence of a ministry capable of handling foreign matters.
This is how Japan’s failed diplomacy associated with the Twenty-One
Demands later became the cause of much anguish and suffering for the Japanesepeople.

1.3 We Will No Longer Deal with the Chiang Regime
The Foreign Ministry Promoted Statement “We Will No Longer Deal with the Chiang
Regime”
The February 26 Incident, an attempted coup of the Japanese government by
young Army officers, occurred in 1936. Koki Hirota was appointed prime minister on
March 9 to head a cabinet to deal with the situation.
7

On December 12 of the same year, the Xi’an Incident occurred in China.
Zhang Xueliang imprisoned Kuomintang (KMT) leader Chiang Kai-shek, who had
flown to Xi’an to rally Zhang and other members of the Northeast army to theleadership of the KMT regime. There were two rival centers of power in China at thattime: the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT felt a war withJapan would be unfavorable, and that suppressing the CCP should have priority.
Zhang Xueliang was ordered to subdue the CCP, and was specifically urged to do so,
however Zhang supported Communist calls for a united KMT-CCP front against
Japan, and placed Chiang Kai-shek under house arrest. The Communist Party’s Zhou
Enlai joined them at Zhang’s invitation, and Chiang Kai-shek was released after talks
resulted in an agreement to suspend their civil war and form a united front against
Japan.
While in CCP custody, it seems fortunate that Chiang Kai-shek was not killed.
The Xi’an Incident itself was instigated by Zhang Xueliang, but pressure to kill
Chiang Kai-shek came from troops loyal to Mao Zedong, leader of the CCP.
Apparently Chiang was spared because of the wishes of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
Stalin’s aim was to lure Japan’s army into China’s vast interior, to keep Japanese
troops away from the Soviet border. Stalin wanted a unified China, not a divided one,
to fight a war of resistance against Japan. So, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek began
negotiations. Chiang’s son, Ching-kuo, had been a student in Moscow for elevenyears, and was virtually a hostage. Chiang Kai-shek saw war with Japan as a path toself-destruction for China, and had no intention of launching a war of resistanceagainst Japan, but agreed to do so in exchange for his son’s life.9
Meanwhile in Japan as these global events were unfolding, on January 23,
1937, Diet member Kunimatsu Hamada of the Seiyukai Party criticized the military in
the lower house of the Diet during the so-called “heated exchange over hara-kiri”(hara-kiri mondo), and Army Minister Toshiichi Terauchi demanded the Diet’s
dissolution which resulted in the cabinet’s resignation. Prime Minister Hirota had
been criticized for reviving the “active duty system” (gen’eki bukan sei), previously
abolished by the Gombei Yamamoto cabinet in 1913, whereby only serving military
personnel could be appointed as Navy or Army ministers, but now Hirota suffered theconsequences of this reversal earlier than expected.
On February 2, Senjuro Hayashi was appointed prime minister, and formed
the new cabinet. As commander in chief of the Chosen Army in Korea during theoutbreak of the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Hayashi ordered his Korean-based troops
into Manchuria without authorization. Lower house elections were held shortly
thereafter, but due to a crushing defeat on May 31, the Hayashi cabinet was dissolved
after a mere four months.
In all this confusion, Fumimaro Konoe arrived on the scene carrying the hopesof the nation. The Konoe family, considered progressive, was the highest ranking of
the five regent houses in the Fujiwara clan; furthermore, Fumimaro had been amember of Ambassador Plenipotentiary Kinmochi Saionji’s delegation to the 1919

9

Shudo Higashinakano, “Nitchu zenmen senso no kakusareta shinso” [The Hidden Reality of
All-Out War between Japan and China] Shushin (February 2006), p. 9.
8

Paris Peace Conference, and was believed to have had a flawless political career.
Following the resignation of the Hayashi cabinet, Konoe stepped in to form the new
cabinet on June 4, 1937.
However, Konoe’s cabinet was dogged by misfortune. On July 7, barely amonth after the cabinet was formed, Japanese troops clashed with the Chinese army at
Lugouqiao Bridge on the outskirts of Beijing. This was the so-called Marco Polo
Bridge Incident. There is compelling evidence that the shots fired on the Japanesearmy which triggered this incident were the work of Communist troops, whose aim
was to incite the Japanese military and Chinese Nationalist troops to fight each other.
Thereafter, Japan and China fought a war that would continue until Japan’s
defeat in the Greater East Asia War. If in the very beginning Japanese troops had
captured the KMT government’s capital of Nanjing, the Nationalist government may
have capitulated and Nanjing would have fallen on December 13 during the advanceinto the city. However from the very start the KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek, who wasprepared for a protracted war, refused to surrender, and moved the capital to
Chongqing to avoid the full brunt of the Japanese Army. In fact amidst the growing
nationalism fueled by anti-Japanese sentiment, the KMT government through its
resistance was able to increase its support from the Chinese people.
It was under these circumstances that Konoe, on January 16, 1938, issued thestatement “We will no longer deal with the Chiang regime,” thereby terminating
negotiations with the KMT government.10
However, the real issue is whether the wording of the phrase “to no longer
deal with” was appropriate as diplomatic language. Another issue is whether such astrongly worded statement was indeed necessary, or if its intention was to mask theinability to resolve the China question because of the failure to capture the capital of
Nanjing and bring about the subsequent surrender of the KMT government. However,humiliating the KMT government only stiffened its resolve, and patriotic movements
fueled by anti-Japanese sentiment spread, actually increasing the Chinese public’s
support for the KMT government.
A unilateral declaration not to negotiate with one party to those negotiations
can only make it more difficult to resolve the situation, and turn that situation into aquagmire. The inherent failure of this statement was also clearly evident to somewithin Japan. The Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office certainly saw it thisway. Central figures in the Army were most concerned about the Soviet Union, which
was why war between Japan and China had to be avoided at all costs. The Army
resolutely opposed the statement “to no longer deal with the KMT government,” andperversely it was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who actively promoted it.
Imperial Army Voices Fierce Opposition to Statement
Shortly beforehand, on December 24, 1937, the Cabinet had approved a policy
statement titled “Outlines of Measures for the China Incident” (Shina jihen taisho

10

Shin’ichi Kamimura, Nihon Gaiko shi 20: Nikka Jihen ge [History of Japan’s Diplomacy
Vol. 20: The Sino-Japanese War, Pt. 2] (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1971), pp.
201-202.
9

yoko) which argued to the effect that little could be expected from negotiations with
the KMT government. As a result, on January 16 the following year, Konoe declared
Japan would “no longer deal with the KMT government,” but this had been thesubject of a heated discussion at an Imperial General Headquarters-Government
Liaison Conference the day before.
While Prince Kan’in Kotohito headed the Army General Staff at the time, theman actually in charge of operations was his deputy, Vice Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Hayao Tada. Koki Hirota, the foreign minister in Konoe’s cabinet, suggested
terminating negotiations because very little good faith could be seen in China’s replies.
Tada countered by saying they shouldn’t treat the KMT’s answer as completely
without prospects. Admiral Mineichi Koga, vice chief of the Navy General Staff,
agreed with Tada. Foreign Minister Hirota bristled with anger though, and said: “Inview of my lengthy experience as a diplomat, it is clear from the Chinese side’s
responses that they have no real desire for any peaceful resolution. Doesn’t Vice
Chief Tada have confidence in the foreign minister?” To which Hajime Sugiyama, thenotorious Army minister, threatened in a totally unprincipled display that, if theSupreme Command has no confidence in the foreign minister, it also has no
confidence in the government, and “either the Army General Staff can resign, or thecabinet can resign.” But despite the efforts of the Army and Navy general staffs, thestatement “to no longer deal with the KMT government” was released on January 16,
1938.11 Konoe soon became aware of the flaw inherent in this statement.
Regardless of whether the military came up with the proposal or not, it isproblematic that the foreign minister and the Foreign Ministry actively pursued thematter and overruled objections by the military.
During those years, the Chinese side would readily go back on its word or
break its promises, and it is undeniable this happened countless times to the sheer
exasperation of the Japanese side. However, from China’s perspective, it is also
undeniable there were many examples of incidents on the Japanese side, too, which
had obviously inflamed the Chinese people’s nationalism due to anti-Japanesesentiment, and would have made any peaceful resolution all the more difficult. For
instance, Japanese troops stationed in China would often disregard Tokyo’s directives,and expand the war front unnecessarily; or Japan would first force one demand on
China, only to increase this demand further at some future date. In terms of diplomatic
fundamentals, any statement removing altogether the KMT, a strong negotiating
counterpart for a peaceful resolution, from the negotiation process was surely
inconceivable under these circumstances.
Suppose the KMT government was to weaken and could no longer function asa partner for negotiations; even so, the future remained unpredictable, and it would
surely be common sense to retain the KMT as a negotiating partner to at least keep thechannels of communication open. Moreover, although many other political11

Kazuo Horiba, Nisshi jihen senso shidoshi, Meiji hyakunen shi sosho [Guided History to the
Sino-Japanese War, Meiji Centennial History Series] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1973), pp. 128-32;
Sankei Shimbun, December 10, 2000, “Shijo tsui taiken, ano senso, 207-kai: saigo no kizoku
Konoe no jiketsu” [Reliving That War in Print, Part 207: The Last Aristocrat, Konoe’s
Suicide].
10

organizations existed at this time, the dominant political force in control of China was
the Nationalist government. To declare no interest in negotiating with the KMT, waslike directly closing a key channel of communication for resolving the constant streamof problems arising between Japan and China.
Thereafter, an appreciation of the long-term view was abandoned even within
Japan itself; and without a sufficient grasp of the overall context, impulsive hardline
measures were bandied around, and hardliners took control of the political, militaryand civilian spheres. Relations between Japan and China developed undercircumstances where such hardline policies were impossible to keep in check. And thepeople of Japan were thrown down into the depths of despair.
Koki Hirota was sentenced to death at the Tokyo Trial after Japan lost theGreater East Asia War and was placed under U.S. occupation. He was the only
civilian among the seven men who received death sentences, but even though theTokyo Trial was a one-sided tribunal conducted by the occupying forces, it was
perhaps only natural that Hirota would be held to account by that tribunal. Because,
among other things, when he took over as prime minister after the February 26th
Incident, he revived the active duty system where only serving military officers could
be appointed to head the two service ministries. It could certainly be argued that if
you were to hold Hideki Tojo responsible for his involvement in the war, you could
similarly blame Hirota for his war responsibility, regardless of the degree of that
responsibility.
His wife Shizuko, saying she wanted to put her husband at ease, committed
suicide before his death sentence was carried out. Although this story of the love
between husband and wife is heartwarming and exemplary, still, it must be noted
quite unambiguously that as foreign minister, this professional diplomat pushed ahead
with the statement “to no longer deal with the Nationalist government” which anyone
could see was flawed, and threw the people of Japan down into the depths of despair.
And certainly, this author seeks to expose the problems within Japan’s Foreign
Ministry, so it is not something that can be glossed over.

1.4 Your Boys Are Not Going To Be Sent Into Any Foreign Wars
Roosevelt Pledges To American People Not To Take Country To War
In the fall of 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated the Republican presidential
candidate Wendell Wilkie to win an unprecedented third consecutive term aspresident.
In Europe, Hitler had already precipitated the start of World War II in
September 1939. And in September 1940, Japan, Germany and Italy signed the
Tripartite Pact. Therefore it goes without saying that Roosevelt was extremely
concerned about the war. Under pressure, Wilkie went on the offensive by claimingthat reelecting Roosevelt to a third term would get the United States embroiled in
hostilities. Faced by this crisis, Roosevelt made a bold concession.
The election was scheduled for November 5, but Roosevelt promised in aradio broadcast the week before (on October 30) that, “Your boys are not going to be11

sent into any foreign wars.” To emphasize the point, he repeated this promise: “I havesaid this before, but I shall say it again and again and again.”12
Thus Roosevelt won an unprecedented third term as president. This meant that
the United States could no longer get involved in any war under the Roosevelt
administration, no matter how concerned Roosevelt was about the war in Europe. The
American administration was committed to this framework. Unfortunately though, nota single reference material on the Japanese side prior to the outbreak of war between
Japan and the United States draws attention to this.
Roosevelt had been reelected to a third term, and a brutal war was alreadyunfolding in Europe; but what should we make of the fact that, between the moment
Japan and the United States began negotiations to avoid Japan’s possible involvement
in hostilities, and the eventual outbreak of the Japan-U.S. war on December 8, 1941
(Japan time), there are no Japanese documents making even the slightest reference tothis? It means that, over a considerable period, no analysis was ever made of thepolitical situation taking these factors into account, either in the Foreign Ministry’s
home office or its Washington embassy. This represents a severe dereliction of its
diplomatic responsibilities.
Every element of foreign policy must be based on sound judgments regarding
the long-term significance of individual events over an extended period of time.
However because Japan held talks in a haphazard manner without conducting
any such analysis, the American side had a free hand to treat diplomatic negotiations
to prevent war between Japan and the United States quite casually.
Diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States leading up to thehistoric outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, are a case in point. The Foreign
Ministry was set up at great expense, as was the Japanese embassy in Washington, butneither were able to prevent the people of Japan from plummeting into the depths ofdespair.
The German-Soviet War, A Lost Opportunity
Let me now demonstrate how incompetent Japan’s Foreign Ministry and its
embassy in Washington were in their failure to prevent the outbreak of war between
Japan and the United States.
On July 22, 1940, Fumimaro Konoe launched his second cabinet. He
appointed Yosuke Matsuoka as foreign minister. On September 27, Japan, Germany,and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact.
At the end of March 1941, Matsuoka toured Europe, and met with Hitler andMussolini. On his way back to Japan, he stopped over in Moscow, met with Stalin,and signed the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact. This neutrality alliance, in conjunction
with the Tripartite Pact, in effect produced a “quadripartite pact.” Matsuoka’s intent
was to gain leverage from the “quadripartite pact” to extract concessions from theAmericans regarding bilateral relations with Japan, and thereby avoid war between
Japan and the U.S. Arguably, from the perspective of avoiding war between Japan and

12James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 6.
12the U.S., it was in a sense a practical and compelling solution. In terms of Japanese
foreign policy, it was an uncharacteristically preemptive and dynamic act of
diplomacy.
However, what came next was hopeless. On June 22, 1941, war broke out
between the Soviet Union and Germany. When Japan and the Soviet Union signed aneutrality pact three months beforehand, the Soviet Union had previously endorsed a
secret protocol with Germany in September 1939, which approved the partitioning of
Poland. There was thus a loose association between the two countries, and Japan’s
non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was largely based on the type of broad
alliance that already existed between the Soviet Union and Germany. But whenGermany launched a war against the Soviet Union, any notion that a “quadripartite
alliance” could be used to extract concessions from the United States soon crumbled.
When war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union, there was amoment, a brief moment, when Japan might have obtained some concessions from theUnited States and avoided hostilities between them. In other words, if Germany wasto launch a war against the Soviet Union, Japan could also attack the Soviet Union
under the pretext provided by the Tripartite Pact. Alternatively, Japan could refrainfrom invading the Soviet Union, and stand by the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact. The
choice Japan made would be of vital concern to the Soviet Union in deciding theoutcome of its war against Germany. It would surely have had enormous influence
over the outcome of World War II. The United States viewed Germany with suspicion,and must have hoped wholeheartedly that Japan would remain neutral and not invade
the Soviet Union.
Japan should have been able to use this card to its advantage in its negotiations
with the U.S., and bring about peace between their two nations. Hypotheticalscenarios like these should surely have been considered within the Foreign Ministry
as a matter of course, but apparently there were no strategies devised regarding ahypothetical attack on the Soviet Union. This notion was obvious for the UnitedStates though, and in the end Japan was simply used as a means for the U. S. tobecome a belligerent in the war. Even here, it must be stressed how incompetent
overall the Foreign Ministry was.13

13

With the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union, Walter Adams,
assistant chief of the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs, wrote a
memorandum with suggestions for how the U.S. should deal with Japan. This is in stark
contrast to the strategic thinking of Japan’s Foreign Ministry, and clearly President
Roosevelt’s later actions took the suggestions in Adams’ memorandum into account. See U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. 4 The Far East,(Washington DC: GPO 1941) pp. 278-80.
[Washington, June 25, 1941.]“…From the short point of view, having in mind our very considerable interestin the maintenance of peace in the South Pacific, there would seem, at least
superficially, to be some merit in the idea of allowing Japan to attack Soviet
Siberia and thus to expend its military resources in that direction. From thelong point of view, however, having in mind our interest in defeating theforces of aggression as a whole, it is believed that the United States should
13Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka was responsible for Japan’s inaction at
this time, so to ouster the intractable Matsuoka, Prime Minister Konoe was forced todissolve this cabinet and form a new one. Under the Meiji Constitution, only truly
weak cabinets could be formed.
As soon as the third Konoe Cabinet was established, Japanese troops occupied
southern French Indochina on July 28, a region later to be known as South Vietnam.
Thanks to this incursion, on August 1 Japan was forced to swallow a complete oil
embargo imposed by the United States. The disturbing lack of insight by Japan’s
Foreign Ministry continued throughout this period, but the finer details will not be
discussed in this book. For a detailed analysis of those events, see my book Between
Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministryfrom Pearl Harbor to Potsdam (1997, University Press of America).
The Unattainable Summit Between Konoe And Roosevelt
Let us now focus our attention on the circumstances surrounding Konoe’s
proposal to Roosevelt for a U.S.-Japan summit meeting.14
Japan occupied southern French Indochina on July 28, 1941, and was hit by anoil embargo on August 1. Konoe panicked. In an attempt to escape this predicament,
on August 8 Konoe sent word to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he desired a

now endeavor to immobilize Japan both as regards an attack upon Siberia andas regards an attack against Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Moves or
gestures by the United States which would render Japan uncertain in regard to
the intentions of the United States in the South Pacific would operate in the
direction of preventing Japan becoming involved in Siberia….
“…There are suggested below certain possible further steps whichshould, if taken, tend to discourage military actions by Japan against Russia:(a) the immediate freezing of Japanese assets in this country would increase
Japanese uncertainty as to the intentions of this Government; (b) increased
restrictions upon the exports of petroleum products to Japan from the UnitedStates would further increase Japanese uncertainty; (c) there should be madeduring the next two or three months increased efforts to strengthen theposition of American, British and Dutch defenses in the Far East; (d) there
might be permitted to leak out hints of a cooperative defensive arrangement
between the American and British and Dutch armed forces in the Far East; (e)finally the United States might present to Japan in response to any overturesthat Japan might make, suggestions in regard to the restoration in the Pacificof the status quo at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. For example,
it could be suggested that the Japanese withdraw entirely form French
Indochina and from the islands of the South Pacific which Japan has recently
occupied, etc.”
14
On the matter of the summit meeting between Japan and the United States, and for a
detailed account of how Roosevelt and Secretary Hull toyed with Japan, see Seishiro Sugihara,
Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign
Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam, trans. Norman Hu (Lanham: University Press ofAmerica, 1997) (hereafter, BI&C), pp. 28-30.
14

U.S.-Japan summit meeting. But Hull already held Japan in contempt, and shunned
Konoe’s overtures.
Roosevelt, however, had other ideas. On August 9, 1941, Roosevelt met with
the British prime minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland and held
meetings from August 9 through August 12.
When Konoe sent word about a possible summit meeting with Roosevelt, he
was completely unaware of the talks being held between Roosevelt and Churchill, andwas pursuing a totally unrelated initiative; but with the announcement at sea of theAtlantic Charter on August 14, news of the secret Roosevelt-Churchill summit
became known around the world.
Roosevelt arrived back in Washington on the morning of August 17, anddespite it being a Sunday, invited Japan’s ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura to meet
him that very day. Roosevelt came straight to the point, and recalled that he, alongwith “the secretary of state, and you the ambassador, sir, we all very strongly aspire to
maintain the peace in the Pacific Ocean.”
Nomura took this as a friendly overture from Roosevelt, and enthusiasticallybroached the subject of Konoe’s summit meeting with the president. Roosevelt
responded positively, and asked whether Juneau, Alaska, around the middle of
October would be suitable. Even Secretary of State Hull, whose attitude had
considerably mellowed compared to their last meeting, said, “Come see me at any
time” when it was time for Nomura to leave.
It looked as though the Japan-U.S. summit meeting was a distinct possibility,
and that Japan and the United States were beginning to move towards a peacefulunderstanding. On August 28, Nomura met again with Roosevelt. He handed over amessage from Prime Minister Konoe, who was delighted at reports that Roosevelt had
accepted the proposal for a summit meeting, and also a document outlining theposition of Japan’s government that Roosevelt had requested at the previous meeting.
As he read Konoe’s message, the president “complemented the tone and spirit of it,”and then suggested a meeting of three or four days.
But there was a catch. That evening, Nomura paid a call on Hull who pointed
out that “if the discussions at the conference are not agreed upon, the results would be
deplorable, so I would like to arrive at an agreement concerning the general nature of
the talks.” Nomura conferred again with Roosevelt on September 3, who added that,“In both countries there is public opinion to be taken into account. Even if I made acompromise with Japan, in America there would be repeated demands on me to makeno changes in our previous policies.” Then, on October 2, the United States
government delivered a lengthy memorandum to Ambassador Nomura. The purposeof the memorandum was in fact to reject the proposed summit. “[T]he various broad
assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly
gratifying. [However, in] putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward othernations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurance with certain phrases theneed for which is not easily understood.”
It was a groundless accusation. The proposed meeting was stymied because ofthis false charge.
Konoe’s proposal for a summit meeting of course reflected the complex
situation within the Japanese government. While Konoe strived to bring about apeaceful settlement between Japan and the United States, it was hard to reconcile
opinions within the government, such as those of the Army and Navy. Public opinion15

also took a hard line. However without any change, Japan and the United States
would clash, and the outbreak of war would ensue. Konoe’s intention was to takealong top Japanese military leaders and hold discussions with the U.S. president,
establish the terms of the settlement and then obtain the Emperor’s sanction, thereby
turning it into national policy in one fell swoop.
So while it seemed quite reasonable for Hull to insist that “if the discussions at
the conference are not agreed upon, the results would be deplorable, so I would like toarrive at an agreement concerning the general nature of the talks,” in fact there werereasons why Konoe couldn’t go along with this.
Telegrams sent by the American Embassy in Tokyo to its home office inWashington were for the most part being decrypted by the Japanese Army. From theoutset Konoe’s plan was unlike that held by the Army and other military authorities,
and since it would be hard to ensure domestic support he tried to use the summit toresolve the issue at a single stroke. If Roosevelt had been given advance notice of the
proposal, the Japanese military would have decrypted the telegrams and been tipped
off. However Robert Feary, who worked under the U.S. ambassador to Japan Joseph
Grew, claimed that Konoe was boldly prepared to offer up a proposal the Americans
couldn’t refuse. Konoe made a serious attempt to bring about peace between Japanand the United States, but there was no way he could accept Hull’s demands for aprior “agreement concerning the general nature of the talks.” Indeed it could beargued that, had this prior agreement been possible, there would have been no needfor a summit meeting at all.
Then something unexpected happened at this time, and it is unclear whether it
occurred at Konoe’s direction, but I suspect not. For more detail on this matter, pleaserefer to my book Between Incompetence and Culpability.15
On August 6, the day Konoe approached Ambassador Grew with word of thesummit meeting, Konoe’s secretary Tomohiko Ushiba told one of Grew’s
subordinates that telegrams the U. S. embassy in Tokyo was sending to Washington
were being read by Japanese authorities. Ushiba was obliging enough also to explainthat there was still one code left that the Japanese had been unable to crack. Ushiba’s
disclosure was immediately relayed to the United States government. Therefore, we
can say categorically that Roosevelt and Hull definitely knew, at this time, that Japanwas decoding its diplomatic telegrams.
In which case, when Hull pointed out to Nomura on August 28 that, “if the
discussions at the conference are not agreed upon, the results would be deplorable, so
I would like to arrive at an agreement concerning the general nature of the talks,” itwould appear that Hull made this seemingly reasonable approach knowing full wellthat Konoe, on hearing this, could not possibly come on board. Given Roosevelt and
Hull’s elaborate approach to diplomacy, this interpretation is probably accurate.
It follows, then, that Roosevelt’s receptiveness to Konoe’s idea for a summit
meeting was from the start merely a gesture or ruse.

15

Ibid., pp. 49-51.
16

Further examination though shows that such a conference was never, from thevery beginning, destined to be held. Before returning from the Atlantic conference,
Roosevelt had already promised Churchill he would provoke Japan into a war.
He had in fact gone so far as to exchange drafts with Churchill regarding a“warning to Japan.” Which means that Roosevelt had no intention from the very
beginning to hold a summit meeting with Konoe. The historical record in the UnitedStates shows that Stanley Hornbeck, an advisor on political affairs to the State
Department, was strongly opposed to the summit, so it might seem as though
Hornbeck was the one who killed the idea. But the record merely makes this appear tobe the case, because Hornbeck’s disapproval emerged only after Roosevelt had gone
through the motions, and then rejected the idea. Meanwhile, Japan had alreadyselected its delegation, and even the ship it would travel in. However, from the very
start, there were no signs at all of such preparations by the U.S.16
So far, we have discussed how Roosevelt and Hull gave the Japanese side theimpression they were favorably disposed towards the summit meeting. As mentioned
earlier, Roosevelt had returned from secret talks with Churchill on the Atlantic, and sofrom the beginning was unlikely to agree to the summit with Konoe.17 Roosevelt
claimed he would “baby” Japan along. Feigning interest in the summit meeting with
Konoe was merely a part of that. But when Roosevelt returned after concluding theAtlantic meeting, this feigned gesture was needed not only to “baby” Japan along, butalso for another purpose.18
The top-secret meeting on the Atlantic became known publicly (while
Roosevelt was still at sea but on his way home) with the announcement of the Atlantic
Charter on August 14. That being the case, for the isolationists who opposed UnitedStates involvement in the war, this confirmed suspicions that a secret agreement ofsome kind may have been concluded. It was prudent in order to forestall atroublesome investigation to go through the motions of displaying an open andfriendly disposition towards Japan. Just as it had done at the conference with
Churchill, the United States appeared to have shifted its Japan policy towards
reaching a peaceful understanding.
After his return from the Atlantic conference, Roosevelt repeatedly explainedat press conferences, and even in a meeting with Congressional leaders, that there had
only been an “interchange of views” and that no special deal to get involved in the
war had been struck. The United States, he confirmed, was no “closer to entering thewar,” and that the chief dangers of early involvement in a “shooting war” lay in the
Far East.
And ostensibly, the idea of a summit conference between Japan and the UnitedStates was to be kept absolutely secret. But the idea for a summit was, in fact, openly
disclosed to American newspaper reporters. The United States would appear to beworking actively for a structure for peace if these deliberate (yet off-the-record)leaks—along with the announcement that any danger of war would arise in the Far

16

Ibid., p. 31; Sankei Shimbun, December 8, 1996.
Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1948), p. 244.
18
BI&C, pp. 32-34
17

17

East—made it look as though positive moves were being made towards a summit withJapan. Roosevelt could then dodge persistent cries that he might have made a deal
concerning the war in Europe. This is why Roosevelt, who arrived back in
Washington on the morning of August 17, invited Nomura to meet him that same day,despite it being a Sunday, and claimed to be favorably disposed towards a summit
meeting with Konoe. Setting up this fait accompli made it easier for Roosevelt to
respond to questions about the Atlantic meeting at the press conference the following
day. This is how Konoe’s proposal to the U.S. government for a bilateral summit
collapsed, and despite the lack of success it appeared to have been handled cordiallyenough. However, what are we to make of the fact that, afterwards, no-one
responsible for Japan’s diplomacy even suspected that Roosevelt’s initial display of
goodwill in accepting the proposal had been deceptive, an empty gesture? It was ameasure of Japan’s second-rate diplomacy.
With any failure one must retrace one’s steps, analyze the reasons for this lackof success, and learn some lessons. But no-one tried to clarify what the failure of thebilateral summit proposal meant, nor determine what structural relationships existed
in the negotiations between Japan and the U.S. The incompetence within Japan’s
Foreign Ministry and its embassy in Washington was horrendous. This was how theJapanese people were plunged into the depths of despair. In fact with regards to thissummit, apart from the foreign minister, few Japanese officials responsible forbilateral negotiations were even aware that Japan too was able to read the UnitedStates’s diplomatic telegrams. And none knew the U. S. government had been tipped
off that Japan was able to decrypt American diplomatic cables. So it was indeed
difficult to read any subterfuge into Roosevelt’s behavior. But even so, when
Roosevelt met with Churchill on August 9 and the Japan-U.S. summit became atalking point, Japan had not yet done anything so egregious as to anger the Americans.
Although “Guideline for the Execution of Imperial Policy” (“Teikoku kokusaku suiko
yoryo”), the decision to launch war against the United States in the final weeks ofOctober, was drawn up at an Imperial Council in the emperor’s presence on
September 6, from the outset Konoe was not disposed towards war, but had hoped toresolve these issues in a single stroke at a summit meeting with President Roosevelt.
So on the surface, at least, nothing further had been done to offend the United States.
That is to say, the situation remained unchanged between August when Roosevelt said
he accepted Konoe’s proposal for a summit, and the end of September when he turned
it down. Therefore, it is natural to suspect that his positive agreement in August to
attend a summit with Konoe was probably merely a disingenuous gesture.
Inability to Grasp Hidden Intent Behind Absurd Hull Note
The United States could not initiate hostilities. There was therefore arealization of the need to do whatever was necessary to provoke Japan to go to war,and the best chance for this finally materialized on November 26 when the so-called
Hull Note was thrust upon Japan.
The contents of the memorandum were extreme, and bore no resemblance toprior negotiations. Ben Blakeney, counsel for Japan’s defense at the so-called Tokyo18

Trial convened after Japan’s defeat, paraphrased American libertarian Albert Jay
Nock by claiming that “even the Principality of Monaco [and] the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg would have taken up arms” if they had received the Hull Note.19
However, no-one responsible for conducting Japan’s diplomacy was able todiscern America’s intent to provoke Japan into launching a war, even after receivingsuch an extreme memorandum.
To pull this off, Roosevelt and Hull naturally were quite ingenious in forcing
the issue. Some time prior to this, a cable was sent to Ambassador Grew as well as theAmerican ambassador to China, advising them of a decision not to submit aprovisional draft agreement (modus vivendi) which would sanction limited oil and rice
exports if certain conditions were met within a six-month deadline. This wasdecrypted by the Japanese Army, and its contents came to the attention of key militaryleaders and the foreign minister.20
Meanwhile in Japan the Konoe cabinet collapsed when the Japan-U.S. summit
meeting was rejected, so on October 18 Hideki Tojo was appointed prime minister,and formed a cabinet in which he appointed Shigenori Togo as the new foreign
minister. As a last ditch effort to bring about peace between Japan and the UnitedStates, two compromise agreements, the so-called Proposal A and Proposal B, weresent to Washington on November 4. Broadly speaking, the contents of Proposals A
and B roughly corresponded to the previous modus vivendi drawn up by the U.S. State
Department.
The decision not to submit this modus vivendi to Japan meant the U. S. would
be unlikely to accept either Proposal A or Proposal B. For the Japanese authorities,
this meant war should be launched as soon as possible. By decrypting the cable sent toboth Ambassador Grew and the U.S. ambassador to China, the Japanese military andthe Foreign Ministry were aware the U.S. was not going to submit this modus vivendi,
and should have known that any further negotiation was useless. And then, at this
precise moment, Japan was confronted with the Hull Note. The Hull Note was in fact
a permanent “basis for agreement” drawn up by State Department officials, which
was to accompany the previously-rejected modus vivendi. Since it was prepared inconjunction with the modus vivendi, the contents of the “basis for agreement” were
harsh. Even so, at this purely preparatory stage within the State Department, the19Nobuo Fuji, “Tokyo Saiban” wa shogen suru, gekan–Fucho ni owatta Nichi-Bei kosho,sono shinso ni semaru [The “Tokyo Trial” Bears Witness, Vol. 2: Approaching the Truth
about Japan-U.S. Talks Ending In Failure] (Tokyo: Kakubunsha, 1991), p. 179; International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings (Tokyo: 1946-1948), Defense summation, p.
43698.
20
BI&C, p. 48. Roosevelt and Hull informed Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, thatthey had decided not to present the modus vivendi to the Japanese, on the assumption that
America’s diplomatic cables were being decrypted by the Japanese side. The Japaneseintercepted and decoded this cable, and began to believe the Hull Note would be
Washington’s final proposal. Moreover, even though this modus vivendi was not going to bepresented, the Japanese were in effect led to believe that the Americans had considered a draft
agreement, and were conducting the talks with Japan in good faith; this would have made itdifficult for them to suspect that Japan was being goaded into launching a war.
19

section dealing with withdrawing troops from China featured an “exemption for
Manchuria.” However, the exemption was dropped from the actual Hull Note that wasforced on Japan, and this allowed a possible interpretation that Japan would have towithdraw its troops from all of China, including Manchuria.21
This ignored the progress of previous negotiations, and made it impossible forJapan to swallow. Foreign Minister Togo recalled that he “tried as it were to close myeyes and swallow the Hull Note whole, as the alternative to war, but it stuck in the
craw.” Japan’s war capacity was being sapped because oil supplies were dwindlingdaily thanks to an embargo enacted on August 1, and if war was inevitable it would bebetter to launch it as soon as possible. Under this pressure, the military was persuaded
to extend the negotiating period; but further talks only resulted in being confronted by
the Hull Note, so the Japan-U.S. negotiations had to be abandoned. By decrypting
America’s diplomatic cables, Japan knew beforehand that the preliminary draft
agreement (modus vivendi) would not be forthcoming; furthermore, the abruptlypresented Hull Note could only be interpreted as the U.S.’s final proposal, but was
unpalatable to the Japanese. It was unavoidable that launching into war seemed likethe only option.
Also, when Japan learned that the modus vivendi had been shelved, it becameaware that the U.S. too had looked into a preliminary draft agreement, making it evenharder to discern that Japan was being goaded by the United States into starting awar.22Given the cunning use of tactics like the Hull Note by the United States, one
might perhaps argue it was inevitable Japan would be completely outmaneuvered,
thanks to the incompetence of the Foreign Ministry who plunged the people of Japan
into the depths of despair.

Why Wasn’t The Hull Note Announced to the American Public?
But there was a catch. What would have happened if Roosevelt’s campaign
promise, during his bid for reelection to a third term, not to send America’s sons “intoany foreign wars” had been properly scrutinized, and the people of the United States
had been more conscious of the fact that, politically, the U.S. was unable to go to
war? Roosevelt’s attempts to goad Japan into hostilities is the corresponding corollary
to the American public’s anathema to war.
And consequently, what would have happened if the Japanese side had on its
own initiative revealed the contents of the Hull Note to the American public, andmade it plain that Roosevelt had forced impossible demands upon Japan? Shouldn’t

21

Yuzuru Sanematsu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso (1) [The Pacific War, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Misuzu
Shobo, 1968), pp. 157-58, 165-66; In a draft proposal for the Hull Note, dated November 22,
1941, the clause dealing with China clearly included a footnote “excluding Manchuria”; but
this was deleted from the actual Hull Note presented on November 26, leading to the possible
interpretation that Japan should withdraw its troops from all of China, including Manchuria.
22
BI&C, p. 48.
20

Japan have put Proposals A and B to one side, and announced that it wanted to find asmuch common ground as possible to avoid war?
On December 4, the American press leaked “war plans” secretly drawn up by
Roosevelt who had made a no-war pledge, and put the President into a difficult
situation.23 If the attack on Pearl Harbor had been postponed a couple of days,
Roosevelt may have had to actively pursue a peaceful settlement with Japan in orderto escape these problems. Two or three days could have transformed history forever.
Or if Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack had been rescheduled three days later, a peacefulsettlement between the two countries may have been reached, and the outbreak of war
between Japan and the United States may not even have happened. In fact, Roosevelt
prepared another personal telegram to the Emperor just before the outbreak of war—a
proposal more akin to the aforementioned modus vivendi—unlike the cable actuallysent which did little to help avoid war.24
Therefore, the fact that no thought was given to publicly leaking the Hull Noteto the American people when it was thrust upon Japan, attests again to the ineptitudeof Japan’s Foreign Ministry. Ministry personnel, both home office staff and those atembassies abroad, lacked the skills to analyze the “no war” promise Roosevelt madeto the electorate when he was reelected to a third term, or to calculate the restraints
this promise placed on American diplomacy, and then use this framework to interpret
events as they unfolded and formulate the most suitable response.
When the Foreign Ministry received the Hull note it was incapable, due to its
ineptitude, of devising an alternative proposal that could yet break the deadlock,therefore it could be argued that the Foreign Ministry threw the people of Japan down
into the depths of despair.

1.5 Couldn’t Predict The Predictable: Protracted War Meant Certain
DefeatForecast By Japan’s Army and Navy Regarding War With United States
The degree to which action was taken to block or avoid war between Japanand the United States, was proportional to one’s assessment of the probable progressand outcome of that war. Believing that any war would progress and conclude in agruesome and tragic manner only boosted one’s determination to evade hostilities,
whereas without such a view those efforts were commensurately diminished.
First, let’s examine the Army’s position. For a relatively straightforward
narrative, I refer the reader to Showa 16-Nen Natsu no Haisen [Defeat in the summer

23

Ibid., pp. 51-53.
Seishiro Sugihara, “Ruzuberuto no Showa Tenno ate shinden wa do natta ka?” [WhatHappened to Roosevelt’s Personal Telegram to the Showa Emperor?] Seiron, February 2009,
pp. 220-54. For the English translation, see “Last Secret of the Outbreak of War between
Japan and the United States: Developing Roosevelt’s Final Telegram to the Emperor of Japan”(http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_1/56_S4.pdf.)
24

21

of 1941] published in 1983 by Naoki Inose, later to become Governor of Tokyo
following the resignation of Shintaro Ishihara.25
In August 1941, roughly four months before the outbreak of war between
Japan and the United States, the Total War Research Institute organized a mock“cabinet” made up of researchers with an average age of 33, and concluded that Japan
would certainly lose the war. The Total War Research Institute, created in June 1940
by the Fumimaro Konoe cabinet, was formally established by Imperial Ordinance fourmonths later on September 30, and was tasked with conducting basic research on
waging total war.
The mock “cabinet,” set up on April 1, 1941, comprised 35 researchers wholooked into Japan’s total war from every angle, including military, economic, andideological. Their conclusion was roughly as follows.
If Japan was to launch a successful surprise attack strategy in the middle ofDecember, it might expect to take some early wins; however, resource-poor Japan
would have no chance of overall victory, the war would be protracted, and in the end
the Soviet Union would join the hostilities leading to defeat for Japan. So they
recommended war between Japan and the United States be avoided at any cost.
Isn’t this precisely how history later unfolded? On August 27 and 28, thesefindings were made known to a gathering of high-ranking individuals from the Army,
the Navy and the Cabinet Planning Board. Naturally, this also included Hideki Tojo,
the Army minister in the Konoe cabinet.
After listening to reports over the two days about Japan’s certain defeat in any
war with the United States, Tojo’s first observation was that “these were, after all,only desktop simulations.” But in an actual war, like Japan’s war with Russia, victory
was gained without certain knowledge of who would win. In war, things do notalways go to plan. In conclusion, he gave strict orders that the simulation be kept
absolutely secret.
The Japanese Army actively contributed to setting up the Total War ResearchInstitute, and deserves credit for researching Japan’s total war. However even after
being apprised of the findings of this research, it stubbornly insisted during the JapanU.S. negotiations that Japan would not withdraw troops from China; it put Prime
Minister Konoe, who strove to avoid war, in an awkward position; and in the end it
launched a war against the United States, and ignored the findings that war ought to
be avoided.
Konoe believed the Russo-Japanese War had been fought with some
expectation that Japan could win, and to a certain extent that the United States could
be called upon to mediate; but in the case of war with the United States, thoseconditions did not exist and he would not budge from his position that the outbreak of
war be avoided. In other words, he insisted Japan could not start a war whose
outcome was unforeseeable. It was, it has to be said, an astute assessment.26

25

Naoki Inose, Showa juroku-nen natsu no haisen [Defeat in the Summer of 1941] (Tokyo:
Sekai bunkasha, 1983), pp. 193-202.
26
Teiji Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro (ge) [Konoe Fumimaro, Vol. 2.], (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1952),
pp 385-86.
22

Army Minister Tojo, in contrast, pushed the prime minister into a difficult
position in the Japan-U.S. negotiations by maintaining that Japanese troops could
under no circumstances be withdrawn from China. This inflexibility on the Japaneseside regarding refusal to withdraw troops from China, in full knowledge of the Total
War Research Institute’s findings, resulted in an inexorable slide into war between
Japan and the United States.27
The Army was unsure when war might break out and had to galvanize thefighting spirit of the Japanese people towards war, but conversely, this act of stirring
the nation made the Army even more insistent it could not change course in China.
Nevertheless, Hideki Tojo and the Army must bear a heavy responsibility in thisregard, because they were aware of the Institute’s conclusions and should have based
their actions on these findings.
After the collapse of the Konoe cabinet, Tojo was appointed prime ministerand formed a cabinet on October 18, 1941. In response to the Emperor’s keen
determination to avoid war, efforts were redoubled to steer the Japan-U.S.
negotiations back towards peace, but ultimately the Army was unable to modify its
fundamental demands, and launched into war in December. Japan’s ability to wage
war was diminishing by the day due to an oil embargo placed on it by the UnitedStates, so if war was unavoidable it would certainly be better for hostilities to begin
sooner rather than later. But it is worth reiterating that, once Tojo and the Armylearned of the Total War Research Institute’s findings and the no-win scenario forJapan, their responsibility for not fully incorporating those findings into their war
strategy clearly cannot be set aside.
What was the Navy’s position? On October 12, 1941, with his cabinet on theverge of collapse, Prime Minister Konoe summoned the Army, Navy and Foreign
ministers, along with the Planning Board president, to a meeting at Tekigaiso, his
personal residence on the outskirts of Tokyo.
The Navy at this time faced the dilemma of wanting as far as possible to avoid
hostilities with the United States, but was unable to openly oppose the war. Its
approach was to leave any decision concerning war or peace to the discretion of theprime minister. 28
The Army’s position on this was that, if the Navy really did not want war it
was obliged to say so overtly, because it was difficult for the Army to take steps toevade war simply on the word of the prime minister.29 While the fate of the nation
hung in the balance, they tussled over some ridiculous rivalry concerning honor.
While the Navy believed Japan probably couldn’t win a war against the UnitedStates at this time, it still behaved in this stubborn manner; undeniably, then, the Navy
too must share in the blame. It is also problematic that throughout this period,
preparations were still in progress for Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan to attack Pearl
Harbor.

27

Ibid., pp. 378-85.
Ibid., p. 379.
29
Ibid., p. 387.
28

23

Yamamoto claimed on January 7, 1941, in a memorandum to then Navy
Minister Oikawa Koshiro that in any war with the United States, Japan’s first
offensive must be a violent and crippling blow to the enemy’s main fleet, todiscourage the United States and its people and break their morale.30
The Japanese Navy was not originally set up to conduct long-distance raids
like the Pearl Harbor attack. Since the Russo-Japanese War, the Navy was structured
solely on the assumption that enemy forces would be lured into Japanese waters
where they could then be destroyed. Moreover, the Naval General Staff’s table-top
simulations of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack strategy invariably ended in failure.31
Ultimately, Yamamoto browbeat the General Staff into approving execution of
his strategy for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.32 His October 24, 1941, memo,
months after gaining this approval, to the newly-appointed Navy minister Shigetaro
Shimada, claimed that “when the overall situation is taken into consideration, warwith America and Britain should still be avoided if possible; Japan must wait patiently
and bide its time, and the only thing that can save the situation now is the imperial
decision.”33 In other words, this hopeless war could only be circumvented by theEmperor’s decree.
This approach was quite unlike what he had written previously. Yamamoto
had served as a deputy minister of the Navy during the first Konoe cabinet in 1937,
and had originally been a proponent of preventing war with the United States. Thissame Yamamoto pushed ahead with the surprise attack strategy for Pearl Harbor eventhough simulations had shown it would fail; as execution of the plan approached, hesaid that the Japan-U.S. war should be prevented through an Imperial decision by theEmperor.
Perhaps nerves got the worst of him on the eve of such an ambitious
undertaking. How would Yamamoto have explained the contradiction of launching a
war that, if it could have been circumvented through an Imperial decision, shouldhave been avoided in the first place?

30

Seishiro Sugihara, Japanese Perspectives on Pearl Harbor: A Critical Review of Japanese
Reports of the Pearl Harbor Attack. trans. Theodore McNelly. (Hong Kong: Asian ResearchService, 1955), p.112.
31
Boeicho boeikenkyujo senshishitsu [The National Institute for Defense Studies Military
History Department] ed., Senshi sosho: Hawai sakusen [Military history series: Hawaii
operation] (Tokyo: Asagumo shimbunsha,1967), pp. 101-104; Kazutoshi Hando, “Shinjuwan
ware kishu ni seiko seri” [“We Have Succeeded in Our Surprise Attack at Pearl Harbor!”], in
J. Toyoda, T. Yoshida and K. Hando, eds., Yamamoto Isoroku: higeki no rengokantai shirei
chokan [Yamamoto Isoroku: The Tragic Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet](Tokyo: Purejidentosha, 1990), pp. 274-77.
32
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 295-303.
33
Yuzuru Sanematsu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso (2) [The Pacific War, Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Misuzu
Shobo, 1969), pp. 128-30. As an aside, Isoroku Yamamoto was granted an audience with theEmperor on December 2. However, he offered no particular opinions that day, since thedecision for war had formally been made in the imperial presence the previous day; Prange,
At Dawn We Slept, p. 432.
24

Gordon W. Prange, in his exhaustive study of the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor At Dawn We Slept, deals with this issue in the following manner: “If he had
enough weight to force-feed the Pearl Harbor scheme to the Naval General Staff, hemight have carried sufficient influence to persuade the Navy to refuse to sanction
hostilities that offered so little prospect of victory.”34 Surely no truer words have been
written.
While not strictly related to diplomacy, it is worth reconsidering that thetragedy of the first third of the Showa period—from the late 1920s to the mid 1940s—
arose because of the contrary behavior of individuals like this.
The Naivety of Shigenori Togo
Now, let’s examine what was happening at this time in the Foreign Ministry.
If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a more serious appreciation of the enormity of
war with the United States, it might have tackled peace talks with the U.S. more
keenly and with more vigor.
In truth, what understanding did Shigenori Togo, Japan’s last prewar foreign
minister, have towards the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States?35

34

Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 302-303.
Hideki Tojo formed a new cabinet on October 18, 1941. Shigenori Togo, Tojo’s
appointment for foreign minister, reportedly held the following tragic outlook on war between
Japan and the United States. See Tami Torii, Nichi-Bei kaisen no nazo [The Mystery of theOutbreak of War between Japan and the United States] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 1991), p. 219. Torii
describes Togo’s state of mind, as follows:“At the October 23 conference to review national policy, the ‘outlook for
the European war situation’ was examined. Togo’s position was ultimately
ignored, but he maintained that Germany would lose. Army Deputy Chief ofStaff for Military Operations Shinichi Tanaka summarized the remarks of theforeign minister in his diary, thus: ‘[Germany’s] chances next year are fiftyfifty, but the year after Britain will likely win.’
Then, Togo made the following sorts of remarks to [Marquis Koichi] Kido.
‘The United States cannot be defeated in battle. The Naval General Staff
has insisted repeatedly that we don’t know what will happen in 1944. The
chances of Germany gaining victory are slim. By 1944, I’m afraid Germany’s
entire theater of war will be hopeless.’ ”
However, after being confronted by the Hull Note, when war with the United States was
accepted as inevitable, [Togo believed] “the war might be protracted, but certain defeat isinconceivable” as I have discussed in the main text of this chapter.
Despite having such a prudent outlook at the time of his appointment, in the course of
performing his duties as foreign minister, Togo’s perspective gradually approached theopinion held by the military. This was because the Foreign Ministry, when it operated as anorganization, was unable to gather information in a purposeful manner, or conduct any
meaningful analysis. Ministry staff had the same potential as personnel from othergovernment departments when they joined the ministry, but it must be concluded that theinability of the Foreign Ministry to develop that potential speaks to a problem with thestructure of the organization itself.
35

25

However Togo’s acquiescence to the military’s position was not because his skepticism
regarding war with the United States had turned, irresponsibly, into an acceptance that war
was unavoidable. Undoubtedly, there was enough information about the military situation in
the Pacific area at the time to prevail upon the armed services. Shigeru Shiramatsu is theauthor of Sono toki, kubo wa inakatta [Back Then There Were No Aircraft Carriers]
published by Bungeishunju (see fn 3, above) which, at the time of its publication in 2013, wasthe most comprehensive examination of available historical materials. Shiramatsu wrote thefollowing about the military situation inn the Pacific area. What follows below is a lengthy,
but worthwhile, excerpt from his book.
However, the lack of organizational strength within the Foreign Ministry resulted in not
paying attention to Germany’s battle for Moscow, as alluded to above. Further, they neglected
to investigate the obvious fact that a protracted war would mean certain defeat for Japan. Also,
there is no evidence the Foreign Ministry studied the issue of how the American people would
react if war was started by an attack by Japan, something the Ministry surely should havetaken into consideration in the first place.
Nevertheless as far as Foreign Ministry headquarters was concerned, along with the Armyand the Navy, war would be launched on the assumption that prior notice would be given.
From Japan’s perspective, the most important thing was that the war between Japan and theUnited States be started in this way. Indeed, it was an absolute requirement. For Japan, there
were fundamental implications underlying this war. Put aside for the moment that it isdoubtful the Japanese side understood these essential implications underlying the war, once
hostilities actually started; however, in order to maintain that this war, subjectively at least,
was an unavoidable war of self defense, and was inherently a war of non-aggression, they had
to abide by international law until the very last moment. Nevertheless, an unimaginable seriesof administrative blunders at Japan’s Washington embassy turned the Japanese Navy’s
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor into an assault without advance warning, and the war was
launched with a “sneak attack.” This “sneak attack” destroyed the major premise of thisabsolute requirement, making Japan’s war against the United States an illegal one ininternational law both in name and in reality, and it can be argued that it effectively altered
the basic nature of this war. In any case, let us look at what Shiramatsu has to say about the
military situation at the time war broke out between Japan and the United States. (Shiramatsu,
Sono toki, kubo wa inakatta, pp. 11-12.)“Throughout the ages and across all lands, when countries in dispute go to
war as a last resort because they cannot reach a compromise, inevitably thefate of the nation is risked on the battle, and those solely responsible for the
lives and property of the people absolutely cannot afford to lose, because, as
the saying goes, for the winner might makes right. Of course the enemy’s
power must be measured against one’s own, but it is only natural to employ
any means to win, including provocation, economic blockades, espionage
activities, media manipulation, sham negotiations, decoy operations, and not
all these are to be considered subterfuge. To the contrary, broadly speaking
they are to be regarded as war strategy. On the other hand, this does not mean
Japan should go to war if it assumed defeat is inevitable. In anticipation of thismoment, the massive battleship ‘Yamato’ was completed on December 16,
1941, four years after work on building it began, and ‘Musashi’ was alsoscheduled for completion within six months of that. New and powerfulflagship aircraft carriers ‘Shokaku’ ‘Zuikaku’ were completed in quick
succession, in August and September 1941, also four years after work on them26

When I published Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the
Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam (University
Press of America) in 1997, I didn’t have a clear view of Togo’s attitude on the eve of
war towards hostilities with the United States. After the war, Togo wrote his memoirs
Jidai no Ichimen [Portrait of an era] during incarceration under charges levied against
him by the Tokyo Trial, in which he claimed he would “never forget the despair
which overpowered me. I had fought and worked unflaggingly until that moment [Ireceived the Hull Note]; but I could feel no enthusiasm for the fight thereafter....” “Itried as it were to close my eyes and swallow the Hull Note whole, as the alternative
to war, but it stuck in the craw.” This is how he described the way he eventually
yielded to the call for war by the military.36
However, what assumptions did Togo actually make about the war that brokeout with the United States in this manner? I was unaware at the time I wrote myprevious book that this issue was fully examined in an article published in the March2009 edition of the journal Bungei Shunju, by Chuo University’s Associate Professor
Motoei Sato entitled, “Togo gaisho wa Nichi-Bei kaisen wo soshi dekita” [Foreign
Minister Togo could have prevented the outbreak of war between Japan and theUnited States].37
Togo was counseled at the last moment by Naotake Sato, Japan’s wartime
ambassador to the Soviet Union, to try to evade hostilities, but Togo apparently
maintained his position that war was inevitable and couldn’t be avoided, claiming that“the war might be protracted, but certain defeat is inconceivable.”38
If you believed the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States was
unavoidable, then you had to actively go along with the military’s reasoning that war
be launched as soon as possible. But as far as the actual war with the United States
was concerned, it must be noted that while Togo’s assessment the war would be
protracted was correct, his judgment as foreign minister that it would not end in defeat
for Japan was clearly in error. In other words, it’s true Togo appreciated more thanmost the gravity of war with the United States, but as foreign minister it must be said
his level of understanding of the situation was naive in the extreme.
On this particular point, there is a familiar story of how Shigeru Yoshida paida call on Togo and advised the Hull Note was not an ultimatum, and to avoid war withbegan. Comparing their respective military strength, Japan had a total of 235
naval vessels to the United States’s 345, of which 158 belonged to its PacificFleet. Japan’s Combined Fleet boasted nine aircraft carriers, vastly
outnumbering the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s mere three. Almost two year’s worth ofoil had been stockpiled over the previous two years. Germany also had theupper hand against the Soviet Union. It was decided this war was a ‘golden
opportunity’ for victory if action was taken right away.”
36
BI&C, pp. 47-51.
37
Motoei Sato, “Togo gaisho wa Nichi-Bei kaisen wo soshi dekita” [Foreign Minister Togo
Prevented the Outbreak of War between Japan and the United States], Bungei Shunju, March
2009, pp. 306-19.
38
Ibid., p. 319.
27

the United States Togo simply had to resign as foreign minister.39 Togo knew at thetime from reading decrypted American diplomatic cables—actually deliberately
leaked by the American side on compromised codes for the Japanese to read—that theUnited States was not going to present any modus vivendi, so he believed war with theUnited States was unavoidable and had to be launched as soon as possible, and notsurprisingly he rejected Yoshida’s suggestion. Even if Yoshida, on the spur of the
moment, had counseled Japan should avoid war with the United States, his argument
did not specifically highlight the seriousness of the war itself, and so from the start
lacked any forcefulness. Not only that, he failed to detect the historical reality that theUnited States hoped to get drawn into the war by Japan, so naturally his counsel had
limited effect.
In short, as foreign minister Shigenori Togo had a very naive understanding of
the war between Japan and the United States. His appreciation that the war would be
protracted was reasonable, but it has to be said his belief that “certain defeat isinconceivable” was naive. Togo’s naive understanding undoubtedly reflected ageneral naivety in the Foreign Ministry. Although Togo had not been present when
the findings of the Total War Research Institute were made known in August earlier
that year, he should have somehow gotten hold of the report and made it theincontrovertible basis for negotiations with the United States. The fact that not theslightest evidence of this exists, again attests to the fateful lack of ability on the partof Togo and the Foreign Ministry.
For instance, even without knowledge of the findings of the Total War
Research Institute, the Foreign Ministry was the organ of government tasked withcarrying out Japan’s diplomacy, so it had a duty to conduct its own independent war
simulations for this colossal gamble to wage war against the United States. Set aside
for the moment the fact that, contrary to expectations, the Foreign Ministry didn’t
even attempt this; as Japan’s organ of diplomacy, it should have researched andanalyzed what effect waging war against the United States would have on the global
situation. If Japan launched a war against the United States, how would this affect therelationship between Germany and the United States? Was Germany really sure to
win its war against the Soviet Union, a conflict which more or less led to the outbreakof the Japan-U.S. war? The Foreign Ministry could have conducted its own
independent investigation and analysis, and conversely used these findings to press
the Army and Navy for clarification.
Germany’s war with the Soviet Union was already not going as the Germans
planned. As mentioned above, December 8, 1941, marked the start of the war between
Japan and the United States, but coincidentally it was also the day the German
military announced its suspension of hostilities on the Eastern Front, for all intents
and purposes a declaration of its failure to capture Moscow.40 The Foreign Ministry

39

BI&C, p. 50; Shigehiko Togo, Sofu Togo Shigenori no shogai [My Grandfather Togo
Shigenori’s Life] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993), p. 266.
40 Adolf Hitler’s Directive No. 39, dated December 8, 1941, begins as follows: “The severe
winter weather which has come surprisingly early in the East, and the consequent difficulties
in bringing up supplies, compel us to abandon immediately all major offensive operations and28

should share blame with the Army and Navy for not grasping the situation at all; but
as the organ specifically charged with Japan’s diplomacy, the Ministry’s failure toplay any role in making such subtle observations also clearly attests to its
incompetence.
Foreign Ministry’s Ineptitude in Japan-U.S. Negotiations
Viewed in this light one has to wonder, conversely, whether peace
negotiations with the United States held during Shigenori Togo’s time in officeweren’t actually rather amateurish. Let me elaborate on this matter.
When war with the United States was looming, Ambassador Saburo Kurusu
was dispatched to Washington on November 16 to assist Japan’s ambassador to theUnited States Kichisaburo Nomura. Togo cabled Nomura on November 4, to clarify
that Kurusu’s objective was to “assist you” and that he “is carrying with him no
additional instructions.”41 Assuming they believed Japan’s diplomatic traffic was stillsecure from American codebreakers, why was it necessary to deliberately send thiscable? Presuming they didn’t know of the security breach, there was no need todeliberately leak this information to Roosevelt and Hull, and disabuse them ofconcerns that perhaps Kurusu was arriving on some secret mission.
Moreover, after Kurusu arrived in Washington he used rudimentary codewords when telephoning home office in person to discuss the progress of thenegotiations with the United States, for example referring to Roosevelt and Hull as“Miss Kimiko” and “Miss Umeko” respectively. But the Foreign Ministry sent a table
listing these code words by an encrypted cable that was decoded the same day by theUnited States, allowing the Americans to immediately figure out the actual substanceof these telephone conversations.42 Although this list was cabled on the assumptionthat Japanese diplomatic codes were still secure, why didn’t Kurusu at the very least
simply carry the list with him when he travelled to Washington? Indeed, if Kurusu
was dispatched to the Japanese embassy in Washington to try to avert war with theUnited States, all sorts of advance preparations would have been made, so why didn’t
Togo and Kurusu devise their own private codewords, undetectable by the JapaneseArmy and Navy, and use them during emergencies when contacting each other? There
are no signs that any such preparations were made. As we have seen, the Foreign

to go over to the defensive.” For an English translation, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War
Directives 1939-1945 (New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1962), p. 165.
41
Yuzuru Sanematsu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso (1), p. 476; Shigenori Togo, Jidai no Ichimen[Portrait of an Era] (Tokyo: Kaizosha, 1952), p. 224; U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on theInvestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946),
part 12, exhibit no.1, p 97; Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan, trans. Fumihiko and Ben
Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p.153. There are slight differences
between the U.S. decoded intercept of this cable, and the version recounted in Togo’s
memoirs, but the gist is the same.
42
Yuzuru Sanematsu, ed., Taiheiyo Senso (1), p. 542; PHA, part 12, exhibit no.1, p 178.
29

Ministry’s handling of the negotiations between Japan and the United States wasclumsy.
The Japanese Army and Navy must both bear responsibility for the outbreakof war between Japan and the United States, but it is clear the Foreign Ministry too
must share a considerable portion of the blame. If you consider the Ministry, right
until the end of the talks, was unaware its diplomatic codes had been broken, and did
not work out that the United States behind the scenes hoped to be drawn into
hostilities by Japan, then you might conclude the Ministry deserves even greater
blame than the Army and Navy.

1.6 As A Diplomat, Why Should I Suicide?
How Significant Was Delay in Delivering “Final Notice” To U.S.?
On December 7, 1941, at 2:20 p.m. local Washington time, Japanese
Ambassadors Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu entered the office of Secretaryof State Cordell Hull. They were one hour and twenty minutes late for their scheduled
1:00 p.m. appointment.43
Before sitting down, Nomura explained first that his government had
instructed him to deliver the note at 1:00 p.m., but they were late because decryption
had taken longer than expected. Pointing to the clock, Hull asked Nomura “why hehad specified one o’clock in his first request for an interview.” Nomura replied that“he did not know, but that was his instruction.”
Hull had already read a decoded intercept of the Japanese cable containing thetext of this “final note,” so although initially he went through the motions of reading it,
as he progressed he put on a show of becoming steadily angrier.44
By the time he had finished, he exploded with rage.
“I must say...that in all my conversations with you during the last ninemonths I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely
by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen adocument that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined
until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering
them.”45

Nomura was about to say something, but Hull cut him short and nodded
towards the door for the two ambassadors to get out.46

43

Kichisaburo Nomura, Beikoku ni tsukaishite: Nichi-Bei kosho no kaiko [On a Mission to theUnited States: Reflections on Negotiations between Japan and the United States] (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1946), pp. 164-66; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (NewYork: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 1095-97.
44
Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1095-97.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
30

Hull then continued with this elaborate charade. He summoned a stenographer,and proceeded to dictate what he had said in parting to the two ambassadors. This wasto be used in future press conferences. The ambassadors in question, Nomura andKurusu, were as yet unaware that the U. S. government had already learned of theJapanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. So Hull had read through the noticeas though for the first time, presumably in full awareness of the Pearl Harbor attack.
Indeed, he already knew the document’s contents thanks to decoded intercepts ofJapan’s diplomatic cables; but since the fact that Japan’s diplomatic codes had beenbroken was classified, he had to pretend he was reading it for the first time. And thenhe cussed Nomura out. What he apparently said to Nomura, and later dictated to thestenographer, was likely something Hull had prepared in advance. They were not
impromptu remarks. Clearly, the shrewd hand of Roosevelt was at work here.
Looking at subsequent developments, his remarks were quite beneficial to theAmerican side.47
On the other hand, what about Nomura and Kurusu? They were still unawareof the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. It wasn’t until they returned to the embassy thatthey surmised Hull may have cursed at them in that manner after hearing news about
Pearl Harbor on the radio.48
When Nomura and Kurusu arrived back from the State Department, crowds
were beginning to form in front of the embassy. Among them were also newspaper
reporters. As Nomura and Kurusu entered the embassy building, they learned for the
first time that war had begun by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. For the first time,they realized why the Foreign Ministry’s home office had indicated this specific time
for delivering the document. The embassy was inundated with phone calls of protest.
Everyone was hurling abuse at Japan. Many newspaper reporters demanded
interviews, and some even barged into the embassy through an open side gate.49
Their failure to submit the designated document at the designated time meant
the Japanese Navy’s attack on Pearl Harbor came first, turning it into an attack
without warning.
Nomura was stunned. Despite all his efforts to bring about peace during theten months since his appointment to Washington in February that year, it ended in theoutbreak of war between Japan and the United States.
Not only that, what was the significance of Japan starting the war without any
advance warning? Unfortunately, Nomura was the sort who seemed to lack any
appreciation of the gravity of the situation. War broke out between Japan and theUnited States and Nomura was unable to achieve his original mission of bringing
about peace; but, be that as it may, serious errors occurred in the execution ofadministrative duties at the Washington embassy for which he bore direct
responsibility, and as a result the final notice was not delivered at the designated time,
and the Japanese military attacked the United States without prior warning.

47

Ibid.
Saburo Kurusu, Homatsu no sanjugonen: gaikokan hisshi [Thirty-Five Years of Vain
Endeavor: A Secret Diplomatic History] (Tokyo: Bunka Shoin, 1948), p. 127.
49
Noboru Kojima, Kaisen zen’ya [On The Eve of The Outbreak of War] (Tokyo: Shueisha,1973), pp. 316-17.
48

31

Anticipating this would anger the people of the United States, he should have
explained to the throng of American journalists at the embassy gates that thedesignated delivery time for the final notice was in fact 1:00 p.m., but due toadministrative delays it was delivered late. But it seems this was beyond Nomura’s
ability to grasp. With the outbreak of hostilities, the embassy was cut off from theoutside world. But at that precise moment, American reporters were crowding aroundthe gates of the Japanese embassy. It apparently never occurred to Nomura that heought to make the truth about the situation known to the press. Hypothetically, theAmerican public might have been persuaded Japan had not intended to launch a“sneak attack” if Nomura had realized what had happened and tried to explain things
in front of the embassy or, moreover, if he had assumed responsibility at the embassy
gates by shooting himself.
Because they were kept in the dark about the reasons for delaying the final
notice, along with some extremely shrewd manipulation by the United States
government, the American people believed Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was a deliberate “sneak attack,” and fought a war with Japan until August 15, 1945.
This is why the United States did not hesitate to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.
As has been shown above, it’s possible to discuss the consequences ofdelaying the delivery of the “final notice”; but as for the issue of the delay itself, thisis really not so straightforward. Even if the final notice had been delivered on time at
precisely 1:00 p.m., the American people may still not have accepted that the surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor hadn’t been a “sneak attack.”
The Japanese government considered the document in question, the “final
notice” signaling the start of hostilities, also to be a “declaration of war,” andtherefore from Japan’s point of view, logically it was crucial it be delivered at thedesignated time of 1:00 p.m. Hull said as much in his memoirs. “Nevertheless,knowing the importance of a dead line set for a specific hour, Nomura should havecome to see me precisely at one o’clock, even though he had in his hand only the first
few lines of his note, leaving instructions with the Embassy to bring him theremainder as it became ready.”50 This measure is obvious when you think about it andit’s worth pointing out that, the fact it did not even occur to Nomura or the
Washington embassy during such an urgent crisis, attests to their incompetence asJapan’s diplomatic representatives; but putting this aside for the moment, what would
have happened if the “final notice” had actually been delivered at precisely 1:00 p.m.?
Hull probably would have questioned the wording of the “final notice,” andstill have considered the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor as a “sneak attack.”
In other words, the “final notice” went into great detail about how the talks tothat point had been disappointing, and in conclusion merely referred to the outbreakof war as follows: “the Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby theAmerican Government, that in view of the attitude of the American Government, it
can not but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further
negotiations.” Reading this, Hull would have understood that Japan wanted toterminate the Japan-U. S. negotiations because there was no prospect of agreement,50

Hull, Memoirs, p. 1097.
32

but what if one considers that it didn’t actually read like a declaration of war, since
nowhere does it state “Japan reserves the right to act” or anything else resembling acall for war.51
But, another catch. Again, it involves considering the opposite. If the note had
been delivered on time at exactly 1:00 p.m., it would have arrived half an hour before
the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor regardless of any clever maneuvering by theUnited States government; it would then have been difficult to deny that the note
contained advance notice of the surprise attack, and when the American public turned
its attention to the massive losses at Pearl Harbor, suspicions would have been raised
as to what exactly their government had been up to during those thirty minutes, andperhaps the anger directed at Japan for its “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor may havebeen somewhat reduced. In which case, perhaps even the atomic bombings may nothave taken place.52
In any case, the problem really lies with the basic administrative errors thatcaused the delay in delivering the note. In fact, it is worth emphasizing that this sort ofincompetence was present on a systemic level within the Foreign Ministry and its
missions abroad.
We will not go into copious detail here about the events leading to the delay indelivering the note, since they have been explored elsewhere. When instructions camenot to employ local typists to process important documents from home office, the only
person qualified to type was First Secretary Katsuzo Okumura, who tapped at the keys
with one finger and typed extremely slowly. Of those qualified for diplomatic posting
to the United States, why couldn’t anyone type properly in English; and why did theonly person who could barely type at all do so laboriously by tapping at the keys one
finger at a time?
Taking Responsibility after Delaying Delivery of Final Notice
We will not describe in detail in this book the process by which the delivery of
the final note to the United States was delayed. Like one might forensically examine a
traffic accident, it is important to look at how Katsuzo Okumura, the official directly
responsible, was later held to account, but this will be examined in more detail in thenext chapter which deals with the postwar period.
I would like here to focus some attention on Nomura, even though he was not
responsible for either decrypting cables nor typing up documents. On a purely

51

BI&C, p. 60; Hull, Memoirs, p. 1095.
Sixteen hours after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, President Harry Truman informed
the nation that an atomic weapon had been detonated in Japan. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harborfeatures prominently at the beginning of this statement. Also, General George C. Marshall’s
Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, issued September 1, 1945, gives the “treachery” at Pearl
Harbor as reason for the use of the atomic bomb in Japan.
See, Harry S. Truman Library, “Army press notes,” box 4, Papers of Eben A. Ayers; George
C. Marshall, Biennial Reports of The Chief Of Staff of The United States Army to The
Secretary of War 1 July 1939-30 June 1945 (Washington DC: Defense Dept., Army, Centerof Military History, 1996), p. 185.
52

33

practical level, he was not to blame. However, he cannot escape responsibility for
negligence in the overall operation of the embassy. When the American people wereoutraged that the attack on Pearl Harbor was literally a “sneak attack,” thanks to thelate delivery of the “final notice” by about an hour and twenty minutes, at the very
least he had a duty to somehow inform them that the time specified for delivery wasin fact 1:00 p.m.
Blame for the ambiguous wording of the “final notice” so that it didn’t
actually read like a declaration of war, rests with the home office of the Foreign
Ministry, and not with Nomura as such. But not meeting the designated deadline
meant the war between Japan and the United States was based on a misunderstanding
and turned it into an appalling military campaign, and ordinarily, one might clearly
have expected Ambassador Nomura to consider killing himself. This was precisely
where the responsibility rested.
So on the evening when the Japanese embassy was cut off from the outside
world, various members of the embassy staff including Naval Attaché Ichiro
Yokoyama and Army Attaché Saburo Isoda took turns keeping watch outside
Nomura’s bedroom. Rumors circulated that Nomura might commit suicide out ofremorse. When Isoda later reported this to the ambassador, surprisingly Nomura
merely replied: “Why should I commit suicide? I’m a diplomat.”53 I was at a loss forwords when I learned of this. Nomura had originally been a Navy man; he was one of
the elite who had been a member of Japan’s delegation to the 1921 Washington Naval
Conference, and had served as a vice-chief of the Naval General Staff. He had also
served as foreign minister in the Abe cabinet of 1939. As a young man he had been anaval attaché at Japan’s Washington embassy, during which time he got to know
Roosevelt, then the U. S. navy secretary; this personal connection is why he wasselected in the first place for appointment as Japan’s ambassador in the 1941
negotiations with the United States.
He may not have had any responsibility for the wording of the “final notice,”but he was clearly to blame for not delivering this document at the designated time.
However, Nomura took no responsibility for this at all. If being a diplomat meant hedidn’t need to accept any responsibility, then it sounds like you could make any
blunder at all as a diplomat and never accept any blame. Upon reflection, this is to thecontrary rather insulting to serious diplomats.
In his memoirs, a hefty tome entitled Beikoku ni tsukaishite [On a mission to
the United States] published in 1946, Nomura mentions he was directed by theForeign Ministry home office to deliver the “final notice” at 1:00 p.m.—and initiallyan appointment with Hull was indeed made at this designated time—but regarding theactual time the document was delivered, Nomura merely claims that “it was delayed
due to problems with cable decryption and typewriting.” However, not one word iswritten about the fundamental reasons why this situation came about.54

53
54

Kojima, Kaisen zen’ya, p. 318.
Nomura, Beikoku ni tsukaishite, pp. 164-66.
34

After returning to Japan, he served two terms in the postwar era in the upperhouse of the National Diet of Japan. What really happened to his sense of
responsibility?
For a serious diplomat, Nomura’s statement repudiating the need to commit
suicide would have seemed ridiculous, but indeed, diplomats in the Foreign Ministry
since the Meiji period seemed to have lacked this sense of duty. It would be insulting
to serious hardworking diplomats to suggest that everyone in their profession isirresponsible, because not all diplomats are this way; but it is worth pointing out thatJapanese diplomats tend towards a lack of a sense of duty.
It could probably be said that Nomura became thoroughly infected with thisnegative behavior while he was in contact with the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps he had
difficulty accepting responsibility to begin with, but while exposed to the Foreign
Ministry, this part of his being undoubtedly became tarnished and took over the coreof his personality.


35Chapter 2
The Incompetence and Culpability of Japan’s Foreign
Ministry: The Postwar Period

2.1 “I Come Before You to Offer Myself to the Judgment of the Powers
You Represent”
Showa Emperor Makes Statement Admitting War Responsibility
Chapter 1 dealt with the issue of the responsibility of Foreign Ministry
officials for the “sneak attack” on Pearl Harbor in the prewar era, but the saga, sadly,
continues into the post-war period and is the focus of this second chapter. Though
only briefly touched upon previously, the official directly responsible for delaying thedelivery of the “final notice” was First Secretary Katsuzo Okumura who, on the eveof the outbreak of war, was absent from the embassy even though he had been
entrusted with typing out the decoded text of the document.
The next official to blame was Counselor Sadao Iguchi, the embassy’s generalmanager who, ahead of receiving the “final notice” from the Ministry’s home office,
was given instructions to “put the document in order and make every preparation topresent it to the Americans whenever you receive instructions,” but nonetheless did
not implement emergency measures within the embassy, and caused the error ofallowing Okumura to be absent from the embassy that evening. The manner in whichthese two individuals were treated after the war is a matter that warrants further
discussion.
On September 27, 1945, General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito held theirfirst meeting.
Officially at least, MacArthur then believed Japan had carried out a “sneak
attack” at Pearl Harbor in a deliberate and methodical manner, with regards to theassault that triggered the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States.
But since it was a war Japan could not possibly win, he was curious why they
had started the war in this reckless way.

36

During the meeting, the Emperor brought up the issue of the “sneak attack” at
Pearl Harbor. The record on the American side shows the Emperor at this time
revealed Tojo had “tricked” him.55 It is doubtful whether the mild-tempered Hirohito
would have used the term damasareta ("tricked”) in referring to Tojo, but at this timethe Emperor was clearly unaware why the “final notice” was delayed and had turned
the raid on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.” He must have thought it was a strategy
implemented as part of Tojo’s operational plans.
MacArthur was apparently trembling with excitement at meeting the Emperor,
because the latter’s statement taking sole responsibility for the war seems to havestemmed from their talk about the “sneak attack.” In his memoirs MacArthur recalled
the Emperor told him that, “I come to you, General MacArthur, to offer myself to the
judgment of the powers you represent as the one to bear sole responsibility for every
political and military decision made and action taken by my people in the conduct of
the war.”56 It was a solemn statement that acknowledged his responsibility as emperor.
Let me digress here slightly on whether or not the Emperor actually made thisstatement. For some time it was believed there was no official report of these remarksin the Foreign Ministry records. In 1988 the author Noboru Kojima, while notdisclosing his source, unexpectedly revealed that such a report indeed existed within
the Foreign Ministry. However, there were in fact no such remarks in this report.57
The Ministry had withheld these official records for quite some time, but finallyreleased them to the public on October 17, 2002. They revealed that the Emperor
appeared to have made no such statement.58 But on the issue of whether the Emperor
actually made such remarks, some time prior to 1965 Okumura who interpreted at thismeeting testified to Fumio Aoba, of the Japan Economic Research Council, that theEmperor had indeed made them. Some historians still openly maintain that theEmperor made no such statement, 59 but this degree of naivety in any historicalresearch is simply appalling. MacArthur had no motive to fabricate such a statement

55

BI&C, p. 142.
BI&C, p. 143; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p.288.
57
Noboru Kojima, Tenno to senso sekinin [The Emperor and His War Responsibility] (Tokyo:
Bungei Shunju, 1988), pp. 59-66.
58
On October 17, 2002, the Foreign Ministry formally declassified the minutes of the firstmeeting between Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur. The Emperor’s statement
apologizing for the “sneak attack” on Pearl Harbor was absent. But there is no doubt theEmperor did in fact make this statement regarding the “sneak attack.” See BI&C, pp. 141-144
59
An example of this is Showa Tenno Makkasa kaiken [The Hirohito MacArthur Meetings](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008), by Narahiko Toyoshita, a professor at Kansai University.
Toyoshita argues that Emperor Hirohito made no such apology regarding the “sneak attack”
at Pearl Harbor. See pp. 1-37.
Historical research into the Allied Occupation, a period which greatly affected thefate of Japan, is sadly of an inferior standard. Incidentally, the list of key references cited at
the end of his book neglected to include my publication Sugihara Chiune to Nihon no
Gaimusho (Tokyo: Taisho Shuppan, 1999), translated into English as Chiune Sugihara andJapan’s Foreign Ministry, (University Press of America, 2001). Perhaps this is to be expectedfrom research of this poor quality. See Toyoshita, Bibliography, pp. 5-8.
56

37

by the Emperor in his memoirs, an important insight into the record on the Americanside, so in any case it seems apparent the Emperor really did make these remarks.
Now who was this person chosen to interpret at the first meeting between theEmperor and MacArthur? Unsurprisingly, it was the aforementioned Katsuzo
Okumura. First Secretary Okumura was the one who was directly responsible for why
the Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been turned into a “sneak
attack,” and had gone out on the eve of war between Japan and the U.S., instead oftyping up the decrypted text of the “final notice” to the United States.60
This means that, while Okumura knew fully well that he himself had turned
the attack on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack,” he had interpreted remarks by theEmperor to the effect that Tojo had deliberately and methodically carried out thatassault.
How did such a strange turn of events come about? Obviously, Okumura did
not maneuver himself to be the interpreter at this meeting. Shigeru Yoshida, who had
succeeded Mamoru Shigemitsu as foreign minister, gave the orders for thisappointment on September 17. When Yoshida became foreign minister, he learned thetruth about the “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor. In fact, only a handful of people within
the Japanese government knew that the war actually started with this “sneak attack”
on Pearl Harbor, and had become the reason why the American military and people
yelled out “Remember Pearl Harbor” in fury and anger as they attacked Japan. If theJapanese people had been aware of the truth, they would also have been furious about
this blunder by the Foreign Ministry. Yoshida was trying to prevent the truth about
this truly egregious problem from spreading. He appointed Katsuzo Okumura, who
was directly responsible for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack,”
to be the interpreter at the first meeting between the Emperor and MacArthur when
this issue had to be explained, so that he could prevent the truth from getting out.
Yoshida certainly can’t be forgiven for trying to cover up the responsibility of
the Foreign Ministry, but his astonishing behavior in connection with this matter
continued. Okumura later served again as an interpreter between MacArthur and theEmperor, but he was sacked afterwards by the Foreign Ministry for leaking details of
those talks. However in October 1953, after peaceful relations with the United States
had been restored, Yoshida abruptly recalled Okumura to the Foreign Ministry andappointed him to the position of vice minister for foreign affairs.61
It was as though a sentry had fallen asleep on duty and missed the enemy’s
attack, leading to serious losses to the point of almost total annihilation. Surely that
sentry’s negligence would warrant his execution by firing squad.
On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Sixteen hours
later, U.S. President Harry Truman made an announcement that the atomic bomb had
been used, in which he said the Japanese “have been repaid many fold” for a war they
had begun with the surprise assault on Pearl Harbor.62 The first time the atomic bombwas used against humanity was inextricably connected with retaliation for the “sneak

60

BI&C, p. 141.
BI&C, p. 144.
62
See Chapter 1, footnote 52.
6138

attack” at Pearl Harbor. It is perhaps understandable that Yoshida may have been truly
alarmed by the enormity of this issue of responsibility, and would have wanted toconceal it. However, it was unforgivable that Yoshida went so far as to appoint the
culprit to vice minister, one of the highest positions within the Foreign Ministry, andto bestow the bureaucratic service’s highest honors upon him.
Shigeru Yoshida Promotes Culprit To Blame For “Sneak Attack” Vice Minister
This is not the only dubious act perpetrated by Yoshida. In September 1951,
Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but none other than Sadao Iguchi was
appointed as a member of the Japanese delegation. Iguchi, now a vice minister, hadbeen embassy counselor at the Japanese mission in Washington on the eve of theJapanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and had neglected to implement
emergency measures within the embassy despite receiving clear instructions from theForeign Ministry’s home office to “make every preparation.” He allowed Okumura
and other key staff members to leave the embassy that evening, and as a result there
were insufficient preparations for typing the “final notice.” Iguchi was another person
responsible for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.”
In other words, when the peace treaty came into force on April 28, 1952, andthe Occupation of Japan was lifted, these two individuals were appointed as viceministers around this time, and between the two of them, one of their careers wasbarely interrupted. Iguchi later went on to serve as Japan’s ambassador to Canada andthen the United States. In Okumura’s case, he was appointed ambassador to
Switzerland after resigning as vice minister, and remained for many years as anadvisor to the Foreign Ministry.63
In short, rather than hiding the two culprits responsible for the administrative
bungling that turned an assault not originally meant to be carried out without warning
into a “sneak attack,” Yoshida “concealed” them in plain view by elevating themwithin the ranks of the Foreign Ministry.
What were the dire consequences of this? The Japanese people could nolonger properly appreciate the tragic nature of this war.
In the United States, a Joint Congressional Committee consisting of Members
from both Houses started an investigation into the Pearl Harbor issue in the fall of1945 when the war was over. The majority of Members were Democrats whonaturally favored Roosevelt’s position, so there may have been some question about
impartiality; nevertheless, the investigation gathered together as much information as
possible, and focused on its study and examination. On the other hand, although Japansuffered so much tragedy, not once has a national commission been established to
study or examine that war. Although the focus of its attention may have been subject
to dispute, if there had been a proper examination of that war—for instance, a formal
investigatory commission at a national level—on the issue of why war had not been

63

Sugihara, Chiune Sugihara and Japan’s Foreign Ministry, p. 123.
39

evaded, some overall distinctions would at least have been drawn between where
Japan’s actions in the war were avoidable and where they were not.64
The very existence of such an investigation and its findings may have allowed
the people of Japan access to an automatic rebuttal to the so-called Tokyo Trial that,
objectively, deserves little recognition; and may have prevented the tragic phenomenon
we see today of the historical view which emanated from the Tokyo Trial. Regarding
the masochistic view of history that still pervades Japan six decades after the
Occupation, some Japan experts lament over the Tokyo Trial; but rather than criticize
the Tokyo Trial itself, shouldn’t we—the Japanese people, on our own—tackle theproblem of Japan’s language paradigm which cannot abandon the Tokyo Trial? And
shouldn’t more attention be paid to the root cause, namely that the Foreign Ministryconcealed its own war responsibility?
If a national commission had been established immediately following thelifting of the Occupation, and if it had clarified, even only partially, why war had notbeen avoided, the historical perspective of the Tokyo Trial at that point may havefundamentally passed into oblivion. At the very least, it would probably not be as
rampant as it is today.
We will not criticize Shigeru Yoshida too harshly here since he is not thecentral focus of this book, however Yoshida also missed an opportunity to revise theConstitution, and failed to establish a military. Looked at from this perspective, he
was undoubtedly the worst prime minister in the postwar era. We must reevaluate
Yoshida’s actions. The problems Japan suffers from today, including those of
constitutional reform and military rearmament, are a direct consequence of the actions
Yoshida did or did not take. Readers interested in reading more of my criticisms of
Shigeru Yoshida are advised to see Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing
the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam (UPA,
1997), and Hoshu no shimei [The Conservative Mission] (Jiyusha, 2011).65

64

In fact, during a cabinet meeting on October 30, 1945 under Prime Minister Kikujiro
Shidehara, a “Committee to Investigate the Great East Asian War” was established to
examine the causes and circumstances of the war. On December 15, the Occupation Forcesprohibited further use of the term “Great East Asian War”, so the body was renamed the“Committee to Investigate the War.” Shidehara assumed the role of committee president on
February 26, 1946. Later though, the Soviet Union was critical of the committee and called
for its dissolution; consequently, it was abolished on September 30.
During this period, the foreign minister was Shigeru Yoshida, who had also become
prime minister at the time of the committee’s abolition. Therefore he would have known that
establishing a committee of this nature around the time the Occupation was lifted would havebeen problematic. It is inconceivable that this simply did not occur to him. It can only beconcluded that Yoshida, who during this period had promoted the two culprits directly
responsible for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack” to the position of viceforeign minister, had deliberately derailed the committee. By promoting these two culprits tovice foreign minister, and awarding them the highest honors available to bureaucrats, heensured that such a committee could never be set up.
65
BI&C, pp. 141-160; Seishiro Sugihara, Hoshu no shimei [The Conservative Mission](Tokyo: Jiyusha, 2011), pp. 191-222.
40

Addendum: Vindictiveness toward Japan by U. S. Troops
Wipe Outthe Whole Nation

Percentage Who Would
Make the People Suffer
PlentyPunishthe Leaders Only

Officers

44 (15)16 (18)37 (64)

Enlisted men

61 (25)9 (6)26 (65)

Officers

35 (13)19 (20)43 (63)

Enlisted men

42 (22)9 (8)47 (68)67 (29)8 (4)23 (65)

Location and Rank of
United States Troops
A. Europe

B. PacificC. United States
Enlisted men

Notes: Surveys conducted in November 1943, and February-April 1944;
Number of divisions surveyed: Europe, 2; Pacific, 3; United States, 3;
Parentheses indicate percentages with respect to Germany.
Source: Stouffer, The American Soldier (Princeton, 1949), p. 158

This survey was carried out by Princeton University from March throughApril, 1944. At the time, American troops were unaware of the real reason for thedelay of Japan's “final notice” to the United States. Nor did they know President
Roosevelt, before the Japanese attack, had read decrypted intercepts of that document.
All the officers and men believed then that Japan had deliberately carried out a “sneak
attack.”The problem is however that 67 percent of officers and men on the home front,with no battle experience, hated their enemy so much they wanted to “wipe out thewhole Japanese nation.” By contrast, among forces in the Pacific who had actuallyengaged in combat with the Japanese, only 35 percent of the commissioned officers
and 42 percent of the non-commissioned officers and men expressed the desire to“wipe out the whole Japanese nation.” Although units actually fighting the Japanesemight be expected to hate their enemy more, in fact those still in the United States
who had yet to face the Japanese in the battlefield had more hatred for Japan.
When troops assigned to the Pacific arrived at the battlefield and saw thetremendous fighting spirit of the Japanese soldiers, they came to feel there wassomething to be said for Japan, even though they clearly did not understand it. There
was hatred, but also a begrudging understanding about the enemy.
41Consequently, officers and men on the U. S. mainland without such firsthandexperience could only rely on their impressions of the “sneak attack” on December 7,
1941. They could only react to the misleading impression they were led to believe by
Roosevelt; and in the end, this impression also became associated with the droppingof the atomic bomb.
This Princeton survey was first introduced in Japan by Noboru Kojima in his
book Gosan no ronri [The Logic of Miscalculation], published in 1987 by Bungei
Shunju. The original citation was omitted from his book, so in order to reproduce thesurvey in my 1992 overview of Japanese press reports on the 50th anniversary of thePearl Harbor attack—Sotenken - Shinjuwan 50-shunen hodo: Nani ga doko madewakatta ka—which I published through Morita Shuppan under the penname Makoto
Sugita, I approached Mr. Kojima who kindly advised the location of the originalreference at the National Diet Library.

Yoshida’s Sense of Responsibility Differed from that of Ordinary People
What are we to make of Yoshida’s behavior and the actions taken by Okumura
and Iguchi, examined here, as well as those of Kichisaburo Nomura discussed in theprevious chapter?
Nomura and the others committed the inexcusable administrative blunder ofdelaying the “final note” to the United States. And even though Nomura clearly knew
this became a major factor behind why the atomic bomb was used, what are we tomake of his insensibility to serve two terms in the House of Councilors, the upperhouse of the Japanese Diet? And as for Iguchi and Okumura, while not solely
responsible because their names were probably put forward by Yoshida, they had theimpudence to accept promotions to the position of vice foreign minister.
In other words, the sense of responsibility they had as officials or diplomats
within the Foreign Ministry clearly differed from that of the general public living in
the world around them.
There is bound to be rivalry between staff members in any government
ministry, and while furthering one’s career normally involves a degree of fairness,sometimes even unfairness, a degree of stiff competition is to be expected; however
this competition transforms itself to achieve the objectives of the ministry. For
instance the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry which regulates trade, fulfills
its duty as the ministry in charge of boosting economic growth while allowing suchcompetition over career advancement to take place.
The same applies for private corporations. Employees strive to advance theircareers while producing the economic value demanded of them by their companies.
However, the Foreign Ministry is quite different. It does not produce anything
concrete. What it does “produce” are stable relations administered by diplomats withspecific foreign countries. Moreover, this stability is merely limited to certain areas ofjurisdiction. They do not take the protection of the national or public interest into
consideration at all. And since Japanese diplomats only concern themselves withsecuring stability during their term in office, the foreign countries in question are also
not being taken seriously.
42In other words, the sense of responsibility of Foreign Ministry diplomats andofficials lies merely with satisfying their own needs. Those working now in theForeign Ministry would probably strongly disagree with these statements, but the end
result demonstrates the inherent truth behind them.

2.2 He felt Like Alice in Wonderland
Shigeru Yoshida Concealed the Foreign Ministry’s War Responsibility
On June 21, 1950, John Foster Dulles, then an advisor to the U.S. State
Department, arrived in Japan. It was only a matter of days before the Korean War
would break out (June 25). Dulles met with Shigeru Yoshida for the first time on June
22, and called for Japan to re-arm itself. Upon hearing this request Yoshida, a furious
opponent of rearmament, declared this was out of the question. He explained that
“Japan could afford neither the economic costs nor popular outcry rearmament would
entail. Dulles found the encounter unnerving; he felt, he later said, like Alice inWonderland.”66
The Allied Occupation was lifted on April 28, 1952, so what should Japan
have done when the nation formally and literally reemerged as an independent
country?
As is often said, Japan needed constitutional reform. Conceivably, theconstitution forcibly imposed by the Occupation forces, when Japan was deprived of
its independence, could have been revised in two ways: the first was to simply scrap
implementation of this enforced constitution, revert once again to the Meiji version,and use the procedures there to set up a new constitution; the second involved using
revision procedures set down in the new Constitution, which despite being forcibly
imposed during the Occupation was after all merely a reworked version of the Meiji
Constitution, and redraft a new one. Practically speaking though, the latter wasprobably the more realistic option. There were also two options regarding when thisrevision could have been done, namely either before or after the Occupation was
lifted; but in any case, constitutional reform should have been carried out around thetime the Occupation was lifted, in order to settle practical issues with the thenprevailing constitution.
Along with lifting the Occupation, the second requirement for a legitimate
independent nation was to create a military in order to protect itself through its own
might. The issue of conscription would have been a matter of some debate, but
regardless, as an independent nation Japan certainly had its own duty to build amilitary to defend the nation.

66

John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 18781954 (Harvard, 1979), p. 383; Miki Kase, Daitoryo ate: Nihonkoku shusho no gokuhi fairu[To the President: Secret Files of the Prime Minister of Japan] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha,
1999), pp. 58-59. In 1954 Dulles met with Yoshida during the Japanese prime minister’s visit
to the United States, and referred to him as “diminutive.” By contrast, Dulles described thenGerman Chancellor Adenauer as one of Germany’s greatest statesman since Bismarck.
43

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950. On July 8, MacArthur sent a letter
to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, directing Japan to create a National Police
Reserve of 75,000 men, and to boost the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000. In other words,
orders were given to establish a National Police Reserve consisting of a constabulary,rather than a military, to provide for Japan’s security. These orders were given at thebehest of Shigeru Yoshida.67
However, what was the mood of public opinion about rearmament at thistime? A survey published in the December 22, 1950 edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun
newspaper showed those in favor of rearmament (43.9 percent) clearly outnumberedthose who were opposed (36.7 percent). Another survey published in the Asahi
Shimbun on September 20, 1951, showed 71 percent of respondents agreed with theopinion that “Japan must build a military in order to defend the country on our own,”
compared to 16 percent who opposed it, showing an overwhelming majority in favorof rearmament. As far as public opinion was concerned, rearmament was a distinct
possibility. Clearly the Japanese people were more interested in hard realities thanabstract ideals. However, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida did not establish a military.
With the Occupation lifted, Japan’s task above all was to redeem its reputation,
damaged due to the war. During the Occupation, which began under the
misconception that the Japanese Navy’s “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor was adeliberate military strike, all responsibility for the war was pushed onto the Japaneseside. The Tokyo Trial was the ultimate expression of this and its judgment had weightunder international law, so the Japanese government was obliged to execute thoseverdicts after it regained independence.
Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that it was forced to accept the Tokyo Trial’s
historical interpretation. It had won back its liberty, and could freely choose how tointerpret recent events, based on the free will of the Japanese people.
In which case, it should have allowed some form of public debate about thewar, and clarified anew those aspects to do with Japan’s reputation. As discussed
above, constitutional revision and military rearmament would have done much torehabilitate Japan’s reputation; but regarding the historical interpretation that imposed
war responsibility completely upon Japan, it should have clearly and openly set out,
following a fair reassessment of the Japanese side’s position, a view of history
acceptable to the Japanese people.
Having just regained independence, and while under some obligation to
execute the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, it may have been unlikely Japan could directly
criticize those trial proceedings. However, it could probably have deduced for itself
that, at the very least, it did not have to simply accept the interpretation that Japan wassolely responsible for the war, as expressed in that judgment. Even if, for instance, it
was obliged to execute the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, Japan had regained its liberty
and should have been able to discuss, free from international constraints, why it had
been unable to avoid the war. In doing so, it would probably have been clearer whatblunders the Japanese Army and Navy made. However, at the same time, bungling by

67

BI&C, pp. 146-48.
44

the Foreign Ministry would also have been made obvious. The responsibility of themedia too, for fanning the flames of war, would have been clarified. Problems
inherent in Japan’s Imperial Constitution would also have been made more apparent.
And the responsibilities of the political parties would also have been clear.
If the war responsibility of each of these entities had been clarified in this way,then conversely, this might have shown that the war Japan had pursued actually
brought about a chance for independence for many nations in Southeast Asia; thiswould have revealed Japan too had made a contribution to the history of humanity
through this war.
As previously stated, and whatever one might say about restoring the nation’s
honor, the exercise of total freedom of speech may not have been possible, since
Japan had only recently regained independence and was obliged to carry out theverdict of the Tokyo Trial. But regardless of how imperfect that freedom of speech
may have been, there would certainly have been opportunities to reject theunreasonable and one-sided bashing Japan experienced under the Occupation. And it
would have offered evidence of actual independence.
However, such ideas did not occur to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. In fact,by concealing the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility from the public, Yoshidaconfined the Japanese people into a warped linguistic space; and by promoting the
culprits responsible for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack” to thehighest echelons of the Foreign Ministry, he locked the people into a national
construct from which there was no escape.68
For Yoshida, concealing the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility had priority
over protecting the honor of the nation. Therefore, restoring Japan’s honor would
never have occurred to him as far as the concept of war responsibility was concerned.
Nevertheless, Yoshida was quite foolish to assume he could promote theculprits responsible for the “sneak attack” on Pearl Harbor to vice foreign ministers,
and thereby forever conceal this blunder by the Foreign Ministry from public scrutiny.
After all, it has in fact left Yoshida open to accusations of “political crimes” such as
those made in this present book. It was a foolish secret to try to hide. Thinking hecould conceal matters in this manner reveals Yoshida’s utter shallowness.
There is an important caveat, however. The present book is being published in2013, more than sixty years after Yoshida committed these “political crimes,” but few
members of the Japanese public are aware of Yoshida’s wrongdoing. The
concealment of Yoshida’s war responsibility has apparently succeeded. Japan has
become the sort of society that might label any researcher of history, such as theauthor of this book, who questions Yoshida’s political responsibility or exposes his“political crimes” as bizarre. Such has been the effectiveness of Yoshida’s scheming.
Arguably though, conversely, this means the ridiculous distortions in present-day
Japan are clearly the product of Yoshida’s actions.

68

Ibid., p. 146.
45

2.3 “Has the Defense Agency ever apologized for the Imphal Campaign?”
Avoiding War Responsibility During 50th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor
In this section I’d like to relate my personal experience regarding how
distorted a government department the Foreign Ministry has become in the postwar
period, because it concealed from public scrutiny the administrative blundercommitted by its Washington embassy on the eve of war, which led to the assault on
Pearl Harbor being turned into a “sneak attack.” For more detail, see myaforementioned book, Between Incompetence and Culpability (UPA, 1997).
I have always had an interest in the “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor; so I closely
scrutinized reports appearing in newspapers and journals and those broadcast on
television in 1991, the fiftieth anniversary of that raid. I published a summary of myfindings under the penname Makoto Sugita in a book entitled, “Japanese Perspectives
on Pearl Harbor: A Critical Review of Japanese Reports on the Fiftieth Anniversaryof the Pearl Harbor Attack,” translated by Theodore McNelly (Asian ResearchService, 1995). That was how intrigued I was by the issue of the “sneak attack” at
Pearl Harbor. And while examining these media reports on the Pearl Harbor attack, I
discovered that the U.S. Congress, at a January 30, 1991 session, had designatedDecember 7 that same year—the fiftieth anniversary of the attack—as Pearl Harbor
Remembrance Day in the United States.
On the other hand in Japan where, even after five decades, responsibility forthe “sneak attack” had yet to be properly sorted out, there were no public events
organized as the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor approached. As the anniversary
loomed, the Japanese government was committed to complete inaction. And it wastherefore unable to do anything like apologize to the United States. While the Foreign
Ministry is quick to say sorry about most things, for turning the assault on Pearl
Harbor into a “sneak attack,” for this one thing alone, it was simply unable toapologize.
As the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor approached, Foreign Minister
Michio Watanabe remarked in an interview with the Washington Post on December
4th that, “we feel a deep remorse about the unbearable suffering and sorrow Japaninflicted on the American people and the peoples of Asia and the Pacific during the
Pacific War, a war that Japan started...because of the reckless decision of ourmilitary.”69 Clearly at the behest of the Foreign Ministry, this was a deliberate attempt
to obfuscate the problem of the unannounced attack at Pearl Harbor with the issue ofthe whole Pacific War.
Remarks by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa were in a similar vein. At apress conference on the evening of December 6, in connection with the fiftiethanniversary of Pearl Harbor Miyazawa explained that the Japanese are “deeply awareof the responsibility [for entering] World War II with the attack on Pearl Harbor, andwe inflicted unbearable damage and sorrow on the peoples of the United States, the69

JPPH, p. 9.
46

Pacific and Asia.”70 The Foreign Ministry created a scenario whereby the public wasprevented from scrutinizing that infamous administrative blunder.
In response to Miyazawa’s remarks, President George Bush, during acommemorative address at the Pearl Harbor Memorial, commented that “Today, allAmericans should accept Prime Minister Miyazawa’s expression of deep reflection
concerning the Pearl Harbor attack.” And in an interview with CNN, he said, “I donot think that a Japanese apology for the Pearl Harbor attack is necessary.” 71
However, Miyazawa declined to spell out his thoughts on Pearl Harbor. Needless tosay, the unannounced attack on Pearl Harbor, and the war between Japan and theUnited States, are two different things. Regarding Miyazawa’s remarks, behind thescenes the Foreign Ministry consistently engaged in a cover-up, and deflectedattention away from the matter over which it should have apologized.
If we evaluate the attack without warning on Pearl Harbor historically, theonly conclusion to be drawn is that it unnecessarily expanded hostilities, and madewartime negotiations to end the war much more difficult. For instance even if advancewarning had been given, the tragic nature of the Pearl Harbor attack meant the eventsof the devastating war that followed may still have been unavoidable; but without thestigma attached to the “sneak attack” there is a greater likelihood the war would haveended earlier. Immediately after the war, the Japanese side should have determined
the facts behind the “sneak attack,” which was linked psychologically to the droppingof the atomic bomb, and closely examined who was responsible.
The Foreign Ministry did not do this after Japan lost the war, nor did it makeany attempt to do so during the fiftieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack.
In other words, to conceal its war responsibility, the Foreign Ministry has
distorted Japan’s understanding of history. And it has become the organ of state
which transmits a masochistic view of history to the outside world.
Posing Questions to the Foreign Ministry
In any case, during my investigation of the Foreign Ministry’s responsibility
for turning the attack on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack,” I discovered that in 1991,
as the fiftieth anniversary approached, the Ministry still hadn’t publicly released any
materials related to this issue. So I talked the matter over at that time with Masumi
Inagaki, a reporter for Seiron magazine, and decided to pose a series of questions to
the Foreign Ministry.72
The rain fell hard and fast on the morning of October 15, 1992. While I
waited for Inagaki under an umbrella in front of the Foreign Ministry, I wasquestioned closely by a police officer in riot gear.
We went into the ministry building, and headed for the Public Relations
Division. The section head who came out to handle my inquiry glanced briefly at the70

Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
72
BI&C, p. 57.
71

47

heading of my question sheet, and immediately flashed a look of displeasure. He spatout a series of “rants.” For a moment, I couldn’t quite believe my ears.
Fortunately I can no longer remember the name of that section head, a career
diplomat, so there is no need now to deliberately conceal his identity. But I remember
his “rants” as clearly as if it had been yesterday. “Has the Defense Agency apologizedfor the Imphal Campaign?” And, “What’s the point of making an issue of what wasdone by the previous generation, our grandfathers and grandmothers?”73
The Defense Agency, now the Ministry of Defense, may have replaced theformer Japanese Army, but it is not the same government agency. And there has beena lively debate about the Imphal campaign, which has received more than enoughcriticism from historians. However, the Foreign Ministry is exactly the same organ as
it was previously; not once had it publicly released materials related to the “sneak
attack” at Pearl Harbor, and over five decades it had never apologized to the Japanesepeople, nor been criticized by the public.
I was appalled by this section head who behaved like this as soon as he met us,
even though it was clear we were there to research a magazine article. During my firstcontact with people there, I soon discovered just how abnormal career bureaucrats
within the Foreign Ministry were.
Fortunately, there were also some reasonable people in the Public Relations
Division. Overhearing the extraordinary exchanges of our conversation, Mr. Naoya
Nakano, the deputy head of this division, came out to accept the question sheet fromme. And although I had very few expectations, Mr. Nakano advised that, “An answer
will certainly be submitted.”74
Before continuing further, let me note a few things about Mr. Nakano. Thanks
to his efforts, the promise he made to provide answers to my question sheet was kept;
an official response from the Foreign Ministry, as will be discussed below, was sent toa mere university professor like myself. But in July 1996, this outstanding Mr.
Nakano, a career ministry official, committed suicide within the Foreign Ministry.
This most reasonable of officials was stifled to death by the Foreign Ministry.75
In any event, the title of my question sheet was “Questions Regarding the
Delay by Japan’s Embassy in the United States of the Notice for the Attack on Pearl
Harbor Fifty-One Years Ago.”73

Ibid. Note that the specific nature of these comments by the Foreign Ministry section head
were not included in my previous publications, neither the original Japanese text Nichi-Bei
kaisen iko no Nihon gaiko no kenkyu (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 1997) p. 105, nor the English
translation BI&C.
74
See Chiune Sugihara and Japan’s Foreign Ministry, pp. xlii-xliv, for a morecomprehensive account of Naoya Nakano. This English translation includes more detail thanthe original Japanese version, Sugihara Chiune to Nihon no Gaimusho (Tokyo: Taisho
Shuppan, 1999), pp. 223-224.
75
Ibid.
48

Declassifying Materials on the Pearl Harbor “Sneak Attack” Issue
First of all, I would like here to outline the “questions” on my question sheet.
They included four enquiries, which were as follows:76
Question 1: What is the Foreign Ministry’s assessment of the fact that thedelay of the notice of war by Japan’s embassy in the United States meant theJapanese government, unintentionally, launched an unannounced war upon the
United States which, during both the war with the U.S. and WW II, later
resulted in horrifying consequences?
Q. 2: Due to the fact that the delay of the notice of war by the Japanese
embassy in the United States caused such horrifying consequences, does theForeign Ministry feel it must apologize to the people of Japan?
Q. 3: Regarding the critical issue of the delay of the notice of war by theJapanese embassy in the United States, why, almost fifty-one years later, has
there never been a proper investigation to find out what the reasons were andwho was responsible? Furthermore, why have reports of the findings from thepartial internal investigation headed by Director General of the General
Affairs Bureau Katsuo Okazaki in 1946, as well as the findings from otherpartial investigations, never been made public?
Q. 4: What are the ministry’s thoughts about ongoing impressions that, with
an issue as critical as this, the Foreign Ministry has an unshirkable duty as the
responsible government agency to investigate what the causes were and who
was responsible? Moreover, if an investigation has already been scheduled,please advise when this will be and how it will be conducted.

For more detail about the Foreign Ministry’s responses to these four questions,please refer to my Between Incompetence and Culpability (UPA, 1997); however, asummary of those answers would reveal three main points.
First, its formal answer to my questions suggests the Ministry acknowledged
the importance of the issue, and handled the issue earnestly, albeit in its own way.
Second, we can concede that the Foreign Ministry basically acknowledged theblunder by Japan’s embassy in the United States fifty-one years earlier which caused
the Japanese government to unintentionally launch an unannounced attack upon Pearl
Harbor, and that this in turn produced the horrifying result of vastly more Japanesethan necessary losing their lives and assets. And third, what must be pointed out isthat, as of 1992, the Ministry had not implemented any positive measures to remedy
this matter, such as permit public access to the related materials.
Shortly thereafter, in June 1994, the Emperor and Empress paid a state visit to
the United States. It was widely reported that during their visit to the United States
they would go to Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, visit the Arizona Memorial, and pray for theAmerican victims of the Japanese Navy’s attack.

76

BI&C, pp. 57-60.
49

However, the Foreign Ministry had still not apologized to the people of Japan,
nor publicly released relevant materials, regarding the blunder by the Japanese
embassy in Washington which turned the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.”
At such a stage, it would have been unwise for the Emperor to pray only for the soulsof American troops who lost their lives. Wouldn’t the Imperial couple’s visit have, in
effect, been used to cover up the blunder by the Foreign Ministry?
While I touched upon these issues in my question sheet for the Foreign
Ministry, outlined above, I also brought up the issue of the ill-advised nature of theImperial couple’s visit to Pearl Harbor in the May 1994 edition of Shokun!, entitled:“Will His Majesty’s Visit to Pearl Harbor Become the Foreign Ministry’s Apology By
Proxy?” Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, the visit to Pearl Harbor by the Imperial
couple was canceled.77
Finally, on November 20, 1994, the Foreign Ministry declassified materials
related to its blunder which turned the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.”
At the same time as this release, and possibly because it was under attack by the
media over something for which it had never apologized, it made the following
statement regarding its official opinion on the matter.78
The Point of View of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
It is a fact that the delivery of the Memorandum to the United States, which
was to break off negotiations with that country, was delayed due to clericalmishandling by the Foreign Ministry of the time. It is extremely regrettablethat such a situation arose, and the Ministry feels that there is no room forexcuse.
The Foreign Ministry, having brought about such a regrettable outcome at a
critical time for the nation, has learned the lesson that such an event mustnever happen again in future, and strives to improve its operations system.

Although not an apology for the Ministry’s appalling lack of contrition oversuch a long period, it was formally at least an apology for the blunder itself.
Many of the facts concerning the Pearl Harbor “sneak attack” had alreadybeen uncovered by researchers, so not much new was learned from thedeclassification of materials at this time.
It should be recalled, though, that evidence has come to light revealing it wasPrime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who gave direct orders to have the Foreign
Ministry’s responsibility concealed.79 It is even clearer now how much of a villain andfool this Shigeru Yoshida was in the context of Japan’s history. At the same time it
also clearly gives some idea of how Japan’s “star” ministry, which took the lead in the
postwar era, promulgated a masochistic view of history, failed over such a lengthy

77

BI&C, pp. 73-83; Seishiro Sugihara, “Heika no Shinjuwan homon wa Gaimusho no dairi
shazai ni naranai ka” [Will His Majesty’s Visit to Pearl Harbor Become the Foreign
Ministry’s Apology By Proxy?] in Shokun! May, 1994, pp. 106-111.
78
BI&C, pp. 85-86.
79
Ibid., pp. 104-109.
50

period to express any regret, and pushed all responsibility for the war onto the former
Japanese Army and Navy, since these abolished military services could no longer
express any opposing argument.
In other words the Foreign Ministry, Japan’s “star” ministry which at firstglance appeared to be representing the nation, was actually unable to convey theproper version of history because it continued to hide its own war responsibility inthis way, and could only become the transmitter of a masochistic view of history to
the outside world.

2.4 “To advance friendship and goodwill with our Asian neighbors, Japan
must heed their criticisms and make necessary corrections”
Voluntary Corrections At Government Responsibility Despite Awareness Of
Misreporting
As mentioned in my 1997 publication, Between Incompetence and Culpability,
it was a scorcher of a summer in 1982. On June 26, the Japanese media all reported
the Ministry of Education had directed school textbooks to refer to the shinryaku(invasion) of China merely as shinshutsu ([military] advance). (The exception was the
Sankei Shimbun which began its reports on June 27.) Initially, it did not appear that amajor scandal would develop, but China later lodged a formal protest on July 26
through the Japanese embassy in Beijing. South Korea added its protest the following
day (July 27). The inflamed passions generated by this scandal rivaled even thesearing midsummer heat. Things finally settled down when Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kiichi Miyazawa made the following “remarks” [danwa] on August 26 concerning
the school textbooks in question: “From the perspective of building friendship andgoodwill with neighboring countries [in Asia], Japan will pay due attention to these
criticisms and make corrections at the Government’s responsibility.”80
Miyazawa also proposed, albeit informally, that “the authorization criteria will
be revised following deliberations by the Textbook Authorization Research Council,”which meant resolving the issue using procedures barely within the bounds of civil
law; in practice though, this measure transcended the law.
It is now generally appreciated that the June 26 press reports claiming that the
Ministry of Education had directed the “invasion” of China be referred to merely as amilitary “advance,” had been total misrepresentations by the media.81
On September 7, the Sankei Shimbun boldly issued the following apology:82
Due to Ministry of Education Authorization Procedure, Some Publishers Use Term
“Advance” instead of “Invasion” When Referring to Japan-China War
The present dispute over textbooks began when several newspapers,

80

Ibid., p. 130.
Ibid., pp. 130-131.
82
Ibid., p. 131.
81

51

including the Sankei Shimbun, made reports of this nature. But after reexamining the history textbooks in question, the term “invasion” had not infact been replaced by [military] “advance,” and previous reports were found tobe mistaken. The fact that these articles caused the issue to escalate into a
diplomatic dispute means we must bear an inordinate responsibility. We
deeply apologize to our readers, and also promise from now on topainstakingly strive to ensure “accurate reporting.”

In other words, the 1982 textbook dispute arose because of the false reports
made on June 26. But during the period when these false reports were accepted as thetruth, many Japanese indeed felt that things “had gone too far” and that Chinese andKorean anger was perhaps justified. These false reports triggered the “remarks by the
Chief Cabinet Secretary” and also the supra-legal measures subsequently taken.
When did the Ministry of Education discover that these June 26 reports, which
had caused the uproar, were actually incorrect? It should come as no surprise that the
Ministry’s Textbook Authorization Division already knew during the period between
the end of June and the start of July, 1982. Therefore on July 26, when China lodged
its formal complaint, it was already clear within the Ministry that the reports were
erroneous.
In other words, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa was already aware of thefacts of the situation when he made his “remarks.” The people of Japan, on the other
hand, were not. Although Miyazawa knew those reports had been incorrect, he did
nothing to correct them, and even based his “remarks” on them, thereby entrenching
the Japanese government’s position. Shouldn’t such a determination ultimately havebeen made by the government itself?83
Why didn’t the Ministry of Education, which was in charge of textbook
authorization, announce that those newspaper reports had no merit when China lodged
its official protest on July 26? Because it had been told to keep quiet by the Foreign
Ministry who felt that, even if the term “invasion” had not been changed to “advance,”
it would be put in an awkward position if too much was made of the issue. And since
diplomacy is generally the province of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of
Education acquiesced to this request in the misguided belief that its cooperation
would ultimately allow the matter to be resolved fairly.84
The Foreign Ministry capitalized on the Japanese people’s ignorance that thepress reports were mistaken. Aware that they were indeed false, the ministry
manipulated the chief cabinet secretary and forced the Japanese government to

83

The text of these “remarks” by the chief cabinet secretary contained untruthful “facts” andwas written in full knowledge that these “facts” were false; and because this lead to important
diplomatic decisions being made as a result, it is conceivable that the person who created thisdocument should have been held legally responsible for the crime of falsifying official
government documents. At this late stage, the statute of limitations may already have expired
to hold this person to account, but it would be interesting to speculate what might have
happened if, within a timely period after the “remarks” were made, that person had beenprosecuted.
84
BI&C, p. 132.
52

apologize to the government of China on the premise that the false reports were infact true.85
Let me add a brief observation. On July 27, the day after China lodged its
complaint against Japan, South Korea followed suit and lodged a complaint of its own.
But the fact is, the Korean government had carefully considered the Japanese
government’s prior stance, and decided to maintain its policy of avoiding diplomatic
disputes with Japan. However, day after day the fully-independent Korean press
continued to criticize Japan. If one believed those Japanese reports that the term“invasion” really had been changed to “advance,” then a press campaign in Korea of
this magnitude, given its domestic situation, was perhaps natural enough.
Nevertheless, the Korean government contained the Korean public’s rage and dealt
prudently with a Japanese government mired in crisis. But the Japanese Foreign
Ministry, by panicking at the first hint of any complaint from China, showed an utter
disrespect for the Korean government.86
Some astute decisions by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa
could have prevented the textbook dispute from ever happening. However, Japan’s
diplomacy often involves swallowing Foreign Ministry proposals whole, even though
they can hardly be considered to be proper statecraft, are at odds with the national
interest, and are bordering on criminal; nevertheless, they are blithely carried out.
It is understandable that Japanese diplomacy since World War II has not beenstraightforward because of the position in which the nation found itself after the war.
However, this alone does not explain Japan’s questionable postwar diplomacy. The
Foreign Ministry has managed Japan’s international relations while concealing its
own war responsibility, and this has made genuine diplomacy impossible.
One of the Foreign Ministry’s slogans is that it conducts diplomacy to protect
the national interest; but it has performed this task while keeping many secrets fromthe public, including its past war responsibility, and only by means of a diplomacy

85

Ibid. If the chief cabinet secretary decides to make such erroneous “remarks,” he should be
prevented from doing so, even if the administrative vice-minister, the most senior Foreign
Ministry official responsible for administrative affairs, is forced to resign. This would enable
the Foreign Ministry to meet the people’s expectations for the first time. Ryohei Murata,
Japan’s former ambassador to the United States, wrote that,“Affairs pertaining to before or during the war were formally dealt with in theTreaty of Peace and Friendship with respect to China, and the Treaty on Basic
Relations with respect to South Korea, therefore Mr. Miyazawa’s
commitments relating to matters of Japanese sovereignty were misguided, anda statement could simply have been issued to rescind them. What on earth
were the section heads in charge at the time within the Foreign and Education
ministries doing? To protect themselves and their careers, they were probably
unable to tell their bosses the honest truth: ‘Minister, I think that is in error.’This cowardice is inexcusable in government officials who are supposed toserve the public in a fair and impartial manner.”
See Ryohei Murata, Doko e iku no ka, kono kuni wa – Moto chu-Bei taishi,
wakamono e no yuigon [Where Is This Country Heading? Former U.S. Ambassador’s
Testament to the Youth Of Japan] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2010), p. 185.
86
BI&C, pp. 132-133.
53

imbued with a masochistic view of history. Ultimately, what the Foreign Ministrymeans by “the national interest” is actually its own interests; and in extreme cases, itmeans the interests of its officials, in particular its career bureaucrats.
One can only conclude that the organization bringing ruin to Japan is theForeign Ministry. In the light of its criminal diplomacy in blithely selling out Japan’s
sovereign right to determine its own education policy, as demonstrated in the textbook
misinformation controversy discussed above, one can only conclude the Foreign
Ministry is bringing ruin to Japan.
In response to Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa’s aforementioned August 26
remarks, the Ministry of Education devised the so-called “neighboring country clause”[kinrin shokoku joko] so that no authorization opinions would be appended topassages concerning Japan’s neighboring countries in history textbooks, and this isclear evidence of the Foreign Ministry causing harm to Japan.87
Plot to reject textbook by “Japan Society for History Textbook Reform”
There is another installment in the saga of the Foreign Ministry’s illegal
behavior concerning problems with textbook authorization. In June 1986, the highschool textbook Shinpen nihonshi [New Edition Japanese History] was mired incontroversy. Although the results of the textbook authorization process had been
published in the press, the textbook itself had yet to be released, so logically no-one
could have had access to it. Nevertheless, China lodged detailed protests against thisparticular textbook. Officially, China could not have obtained a copy of this textbook.
So China lodged its protest using what could broadly be described as “undisclosed
materials” to interfere in the authorization process. The Foreign Ministry’s primary87

The “neighboring country clause” [kinrin shokoku joko] referred to here is formally known
as the “school textbook authorization criteria” [kyokayo tosho kentei kijun] and was added tothe existing rules on November 24, 1982 by the Textbook Authorization Research Council, abody within the former Ministry of Education (now the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology), in response to the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s remarks earlier thatyear on August 26. It stipulates that, “textbooks ought to show understanding and seekinternational harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary historical events
involving neighboring Asian countries.”
At first glance, this clause does not appear to be problematic. One might think thisstipulation is only proper and the ultimate in common sense. However, by adding thisstipulation, the Textbook Authorization Research Council was forced to agree not to append“authorization opinions” (in other words, “an approval slip”) to matters pertaining to modern
and contemporary history. In which case, logically, passages written by textbook authors
deemed inconsistent with the national interest would not be approved, which amounts torelinquishing the nation’s sovereign right to approve matters relating to Japan’s recent history.
This stipulation is ludicrous in a sovereign nation governed by the rule of law.
In any case, regardless of whether or not the term “invasion” was replaced by[military] “advance” during the textbook authorization process, it must be concluded that, bybringing about the introduction of a damaging stipulation of this sort, the Foreign Ministry’s
crime at this time was egregious in the extreme.
54mission at the time ought to have been to support the Ministry of Education andadmonish China, but it did nothing of the sort at all. Indeed, to the contrary, it forced
the Ministry of Education to accept China’s demands.88
The Foreign Ministry’s intervention in the textbook authorization processcontinued. The “neighboring country clause” came into force; and in 1996, a time
when publishers could write history textbooks without censure, spurious descriptionsof the enforced mobilization of Korean “comfort women” began appearing
simultaneously in all junior high school history textbooks. Public anger mounted dueto the injustice of the situation. The “Japan Society for History Textbook Reform”
was specifically formed to produce a proper history textbook. In April 2000, a
textbook written by the Society was submitted for approval by the publisher Fusosha.
Eijiro Noda, a member of the Textbook Authorization Research Council and also aformer diplomat, took the initiative at this time to devise a scheme to ensure thistextbook would fail the approval process.89
On November 13, the Sankei Shimbun published a lead article on its front page
with the following headlines: “Junior High School Textbook: Former Diplomat
Committee Member Works to Block Approval; Foreign Ministry Bureaucrat
Suspected of Involvement; Concerns of China and Others Considered.” This former
diplomat, now a member of the Textbook Authorization Research Council, took it
upon himself to write and call other council members, urging them to make sure theFusosha textbook would not be approved.
Although the Foreign Ministry has a tremendous responsibility for the war, it
has efficiently hidden this without the slightest remorse nor any pangs of conscience;as a result, and with no concern for the nation’s honor, the Foreign Ministry schemes
to benefit itself by promulgating a masochistic view of history.
The interests of the Foreign Ministry are completely disconnected from theinterests of the nation and the people. These interests only involve enriching the wellbeing of its own Foreign Ministry officials.
The findings in this book have revealed for all to see that the Foreign Ministry
is leading Japan down the path to ruin. To revitalize Japan, it is absolutely clear that
the Foreign Ministry must be reshaped. Without a complete reorganization of the
Ministry, Japan cannot gain a new lease of life. It is crucial that the Foreign Ministry
be reformed.
88Nobukatsu Fujioka, Kyokasho saitaku no shinso – kakushite rekishi wa yugamerareru [The
Truth About Textbook Selection: How History Is Distorted] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2005),
pp. 93-96.
89
Ibid., pp. 98-102.
55

Chapter 3
The Reality Behind the Foreign Ministry and the Skills
Expected of Diplomats

3.1 Diplomats Must Respond Promptly And Have Strategic Vision
Diplomats Must Be Able To Respond Promptly
The skills required of any diplomat are the ability to respond in a timely
manner, and the aptitude for long-term strategic vision. What ties these two qualities
together, mentally, are a sense of patriotism, an understanding of “the national
interest,” and an innate sense of responsibility. Another way of describing their“office work” is that it involves the collection and analysis of information.
When examining the qualities and capabilities of diplomats in this light,
Foreign Ministry personnel, arguably, are generally lacking in these skills. This
doesn’t apply across the board to all Ministry personnel, since it’s true a small numberof them have outstanding talents and abilities. But as the saying goes, one rotten apple
can spoil the entire barrel; a large majority of Ministry employees are ill-suited for thetask, so the Ministry is very poor at conducting state affairs even though nominally itis the government organ charged with carrying out the nation’s diplomacy.
An example of this inability to work efficiently, previously examined in thisbook, can be found at the Washington embassy where typing of the “final notice” wasbotched on the eve of the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States in1941. The only career diplomat in the embassy at the time who was qualified to typein English was First Secretary Katsuzo Okumura. This example clearly pinpoints theinability by Japanese diplomats to work efficiently.
Because of the increasing importance of diplomatic cables in late 1941,
instructions had been issued by the home office to type them up using career
diplomats rather than locally-hired typists; and among the embassy’s career diplomats
only Okumura could type decently, but he was laboriously slow and could only stab at
the keys with his index fingers.
If all career diplomats had been able to type to an acceptable standard, the“final notice” would not have been delayed, even if, for instance, one member of staff
56

had gone out somewhere and had therefore been unavailable for typing duty. As such,
although war between Japan and the United States may not have been prevented, atleast the Japanese Navy’s strike at Pearl Harbor would not have been turned into a“sneak attack.” And as a result, the atomic bomb may not have been used. And
perhaps also, tragedies such as the Great Tokyo Air Raids might not have taken place,and the end of the war may have come much sooner.
As for the inability to make prompt decisions regarding office tasks, when
they realized that, on the tense morning of December 7, 1941 (U.S. time), the typing
at the Washington embassy was taking too long and the typed version of the cablemight not be delivered to the American side by the designated time, it wouldn’t havebeen inconceivable to decide to use a locally-hired typist to type the document, andthen detain that typist in the embassy temporarily to prevent a security leak, allowing
the typist to leave only after the document had been handed to the American side andmaintaining secrecy was no longer an issue. However, at the time this idea did noteven occur to any of the people involved. This is also part of the problem of theirinability to make split-second decisions about office tasks.90
What does this situation tell us? Diplomatic tests were first set up in 1893, andthe Foreign Ministry began to train diplomats in a contrived yet systematic manner.
Career diplomats who had undergone this training included those who were posted to90

An article by Masao Yagi, third secretary at Japan’s Washington Embassy in 1941,
appeared in the February 1995 issue of the magazine Bungeishunju entitled “Tai-Bei tsukoku
chien no zenshinso” [The Whole Truth About the Delay of the Notice to The U.S.]; and thiswas the last eyewitness account by an actual participant in those events because most of theothers had already passed away. It is an invaluable account of the office routine of Foreign
Ministry personnel. The crux of the problem was how staff reacted when they realized the“final notice” had to be delivered at 1:00 p.m., and were pressed to decide whether or not thisdeadline could actually be met. Yagi first pointed out that Katsuzo Okumura and Sadao
Iguchi were the two officials who bore the most responsibility, and he felt that “it was due toadministrative blunders made by these two, precisely because they worked for the Foreign
Ministry and not some other government department” (p. 186). He then points out that “uponsome serious reflection, if a clean copy of the first thirteen parts of the notice could not becompleted in time, they should have divided the document, and simply made a clean copy of
the remainder” (p. 190). And furthermore, “the problem was, when a specific time on that day
was designated for delivery, why wasn’t a determination made as to whether or not theywould make it in time, when it was clear the matter needed urgent handling” (p. 190). “WhenI think back on the situation, the officials in charge at the Japanese embassy back then lacked
the ability to manage and control embassy staff” (p. 191). “This inability to show leadership
was an inherent flaw in the Foreign Ministry” (p. 191), and this flaw “arose because after
officials entered the ministry there was no training at all in team work.” It bears noting that
Yagi astutely pointed out precisely where the Foreign Ministry needs reform.
In the light of Mr. Yagi’s assessment, one can’t help feeling anger towards theForeign Ministry for causing such a massive blunder at the time war broke out between Japanand the United States, and bringing such enormous harm to the people of Japan (or the peopleof the world, depending on your perspective); and to have concealed its responsibility for
this—while not undergoing any reflection—nor conducting any analysis at all so that such a
mistake can never happen again. If one traces the blame for this back to Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida, then he clearly deserves our condemnation.
57

English-speaking countries such as the United States without even the ability to typein English, meaning that their official training and education was without substance.
And regarding their ability to carry out office work in a prompt manner, it was not
successful at all.
It is no exaggeration that this poor training and education of diplomats since
the Meiji era was partly to blame for why the war between Japan and the UnitedStates became so brutal, and even why the atomic bomb was dropped.
Diplomats Must Have Capacity For Long-Term Strategic Vision
The following is a striking example of how the other essential skill for the
diplomat, namely the capacity for long-term strategic vision, was also sadly lacking.
In the fall of 1940, one year before the outbreak of war between Japan and the UnitedStates, President Roosevelt unambiguously pledged to the American people not totake the nation to war, and he subsequently won re-election to a third term. Thisperhaps meant the U.S. could no longer actively choose to participate in any conflict,but if it was determined to wage war it would have to be drawn into hostilities byanother party. However, if this was the case, no-one in the Japanese embassy inWashington put forward the advice that Japan would be wise not to be targeted bysuch an adversary and allow Japan to be sacrificed. If Japanese diplomats hadreceived training in long-term strategic thinking as part of their daily routine, or were
naturally gifted with such abilities, then perhaps war between Japan and the UnitedStates might not even have occurred. This would have been immediately apparent if
they had closely analyzed how Roosevelt had accomplished the amazing feat of being
reelected to the White House for an unprecedented third term.91
It highlights the fact that Japanese diplomats had not been trained in the skills
or practices needed for long-term strategic thinking, so necessary for a diplomat, norwere they naturally gifted with such abilities.
As discussed previously, another example of this inability to conduct longterm strategic thinking is that of Jutaro Komura who, on returning home from theUnited States after peace negotiations between Japan and Russia, rejected a proposal
from the American rail magnate E. H. Harriman to jointly operate the railway in
Manchuria, despite a provisional agreement already having been reached.
A debt of gratitude was owed to the United States, and whichever way you
look at it, Japan should have accepted Harriman’s proposal at this time. Acceptance ofthe proposal at this time, and operation of the railway in Manchuria jointly by theUnited States and Japan, may perhaps have meant the two countries would not haveclashed afterwards, and war may not have broken out between Japan and the UnitedStates.92
Nevertheless, Komura’s rejection of that proposal did not necessarily point toa lack of forward strategic thinking. If Komura had pursued cooperative efforts withother American financial conglomerates, there may still have been faint prospects of
preventing such deep antagonism between Japan and the United States, even without

91
92

See fn 35; Chapter 1.4.
See Chapter 1.1.
58

this joint undertaking with Harriman. But the facts of history show that, by rejecting
Harriman’s overture, the opportunity was lost to advance cooperative ties between
Japan and the United States, and gave rise to hostility between the two countries andeventually the outbreak of war.
This being the case, why did Komura reject Harriman’s proposal?
Conceptually, Komura would not have been completely unconcerned about future
relations between Japan and the United States. But he might well have been resentfulthat the provisional agreement had been arrived at during his absence. It may wellhave been a question of hubris.
The Twenty-One Demands forced on China in 1915 was another example of alack of long-term strategic thinking in Japanese diplomacy.
The “ultimatum” associated with the Twenty-One Demands was lodged at therequest of Yuan Shikai, who claimed it would then be easier for the Chinese side toaccept; however, while the Japanese side may have successfully realized thosedemands by doing precisely what Yuan had asked of it, what was the significance inthe long term? How would this situation later be written into Chinese history? The
future implications should have been examined. The historical record also shows
Yuan Shikai later outmaneuvered Japan, and fanned the flames of anti-Japanesesentiment by personally disclosing that Japan had forced these “demands” on China.
But even if one does not subscribe to this view, Japan should at least have considered
the long-term strategy of how such unilateral demands would have been received in
the wider world at that time, how the Chinese people would have received them, andhow these Twenty-One Demands would later be written into Chinese history or world
history. A politician with even the slightest expertise would easily have noticed that
the Foreign Ministry, staffed by supposedly professional diplomats, was more lacking
in judgment than elected officials.93
The January 16, 1938, declaration by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe “to nolonger deal with the KMT government” was a statement completely lacking in longterm strategy.
At the Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference theday before, the Army had vigorously opposed the statement, urging that it not bereleased. Vice Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Hayao Tada opposed Foreign
Minister Koki Hirota who had been taunting Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang
government. Admiral Mineichi Koga, vice chief of the Navy General Staff, agreed
with Tada. As noted earlier, Hirota bristled with anger, and countered: “In view of mylengthy experience as a diplomat, it is clear from the Chinese side’s responses they
have no real desire for any peaceful resolution. Doesn’t Vice Chief Tada haveconfidence in the foreign minister?” Certainly, a petty minor incident can often be
squelched quicker by a strong response than a weak one. However, by issuing thisstatement “to no longer deal with the KMT government,” Japan cut off allnegotiations with the most powerful party in China, even though the KMT did notnecessarily have control over the entire country at the time.94

93
94

See Chapter 1.2.
See Chapter 1.3.
59

If the Second Sino-Japanese War, which was triggered by the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, had not occurred, the war between the U.S. andJapan and the Great East Asian War may not have happened. At the time Konoe madethis statement, Japan was not in a position to ignore its limited national resources andembark on a protracted war. This being the case, relations with the KMT government
should not have been severed. The Army should have blocked the Foreign Ministry’splans, even if it had to assert its right of supreme command. But the foreign minister
got the assent of the army and navy ministers, and so the Army was no longer able toprevent it.
The approach of the foreign minister at this time gave no thought to how
events would begin to unfold thereafter, thanks to the lack of long-term vision by thetwo service ministers, and also the announcement of the statement that removed theKMT government as a negotiating partner. To some extent, Hirota was the ultimate
success who struggled his way up the ranks to eventually become foreign minister;
but he was clearly a failure as a diplomat, and was typical of the caliber of Foreign
Ministry officials of the day.
The Issue of Patriotism
Let us now turn to the issue of patriotism as a necessary attribute in a diplomat.
Obviously, patriotism is the love and feeling for one’s own country. It is anindispensible quality in a diplomat.
Members of the general public generally aren’t consciously patriotic. This isperhaps a shortcoming of the education system in Japan, which doesn’t deliberately
instill students with patriotism in schools.
But diplomats cannot be held to the same standard as the general public in thisregard. The duty of diplomats is to represent their country while negotiating withother nations, therefore they must manifest a clear and conscious loyalty to their own
country, and the sense of patriotism that this entails.
However, there is no trace whatsoever of patriotism being instilled in staff
during their employment and training in the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps this is based ona belief that patriotism should be a natural response rather than something deliberately
imposed, but diplomats are not the same as the general public. Diplomats, on behalfof their own country, must negotiate with foreign representatives, so they ought to be
consciously patriotic and must be keenly aware of the special characteristics of thehistory of Japan. In the training and education of diplomats, there is little teaching
about history. There are far too many diplomats with only a passing knowledge ofhistory, akin to the level of that of the general public. They must be made aware of theimportance, particularly in Japanese history, of the existence of the emperor in matters
including: the purpose of the emperor if he wields no political power; what he hascome to represent; and how the emperor has been significant over the course ofJapan’s history.95

95

There is a book available for those preparing to take the examinations to become a diplomat,
entitled Gaikokan no shigoto ga wakaru hon [Primer for Understanding the Work of a
Diplomat] published in 2002 by Hogakushoin. This primer was created in the private sector,
60

The Issue of the Concept of the National Interest
We now turn to the concept of the national interest, as it relates to problems
with the abilities of Japan’s diplomats. Specifically, this notion of the national interest
involves the protection of a country’s honor, and the safeguarding of the lives andproperty of its people. Diplomats try to express that patriotism through the work they
do on behalf of the nation. The longer term “concept of the national interest” is usedhere rather than simply “the national interest” in order to keep matters slightly
abstract, since “the national interest” may vary according to actual situations.
To illustrate this “concept of the national interest,” one has to look no further
than an example previously raised in this book, namely the way the Foreign Ministry
resolved the July 1982 textbook misinformation controversy. As previously indicated,
it was a really hot summer. The Japanese media mistakenly reported, without
foundation, that the Ministry of Education textbook authorization process had directedschool textbooks to refer to the shinryaku (invasion) of China merely as shinshutsu([military] advance), and in response China lodged a formal protest on July 26.
At this time, the Foreign Ministry was already aware that the reports were
erroneous, and pressured the Ministry of Education not to reveal this publicly; instead,
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa made certain “remarks” as if these false
reports were in fact correct. Miyazawa’s “remarks” included the comment that “Japan
will pay full heed to this criticism in promoting friendship and goodwill with the
nearby countries of Asia, and the government will undertake on its own responsibility
to make the necessary amendments”; the Foreign Ministry directed the chief cabinet
secretary to concede that “the government will undertake on its own responsibility tomake the necessary amendments” rather than informing the Chinese that it was asimple case of misinformation, and that what was reported by the media had not infact taken place.
It becomes only too clear how hopeless Japan’s long-term prospects are,because incidents like these show how school textbooks authorized in Japan will be
developed in the future, and how this in turn will distort Japanese education. However,putting aside for the moment the issue of the future of Japanese education, theand was not an official publication issued by the Foreign Ministry. However, the preface waswritten by Akitaka Saiki, a Foreign Ministry division head in the Personnel Section,
Minister’s Secretariat, therefore its contents could be seen as having the Ministry’s stamp of
approval.
Japanese culture is included in the material covering training and education. However
this only refers to things like flower arrangement and the tea ceremony, and cannot be thought
to examine in any depth what really constitutes the special characteristics of Japanese culture.
Furthermore, there is no emphasis whatsoever on things such as patriotism or the national
interest.
The magazine Weekly Shincho published a four-page article on October 1, 1987,
regarding the now-defunct diplomatic examinations, entitled, “ ‘Riso no gaikokan’ wo
motometa Gaimusho: Kotoshi no ‘shiken mondai’ ” [The Foreign Ministry’s Search for the
Ideal Diplomat: This Year’s “Exam Questions”]. The exam contents were found to beinadequate, and there were also problems with testing to determine the language skills
essential for a diplomat.
61

problem is that Japan’s “education sovereignty” or the sovereign right of Japan todecide its own policy on education through textbook authorization, has been casuallyhanded over to China and South Korea.
This aberrant behavior and decision making occurred because Foreign
Ministry personnel do not, in their daily routine, give any thought to what is in the“national interest.” On the other hand Education Ministry officials, while they don’t
consciously take into account the notion of “education sovereignty,” nevertheless try
to protect the integrity of the textbook authorization process and are consequently
more attuned to the “national interest.”"Education sovereignty” is not a term you come across every day, but uponreflection, every nation has the inherent right to educate its own citizens, and this isprecisely what the term means. When problems concerning Japanese education takeon an international dimension, staff in the Foreign Ministry, unlike those in othergovernment departments, must consider the question of “education sovereignty”;
however, they readily handed over control of Japan’s “education sovereignty” toChina and Korea without giving it a second thought. This shows that the ones wholeast understand what diplomacy means are the personnel in the Foreign Ministry.96
Problems with misinformation about school textbooks persist. The incident
concerning the misreporting about school textbooks led to the creation of a“neighboring country clause” in the authorization process. This clause provides aframework for the Foreign Ministry to issue recommendations to members of the
textbook authorization council. Within this framework, Eijiro Noda, a member of the
Textbook Authorization Research Council and also a former diplomat, took the
initiative to devise a scheme to ensure a textbook for middle schools—called
Atarashii rekishi kyokasho [New History Textbook] written by the Japan Society for
History Textbook Reform, and submitted for approval in April 2000 by the publisher
Fusosha—would not pass inspection. Noda’s actions were so unusual that even someofficials within the Foreign Ministry became suspicious of his behavior, andquestioned whether anything was actually wrong with this textbook. In any case, thisex-diplomat committee member contrived a situation during the authorization process,whereby the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform, who wanted to normalize
Japanese education, would be unable to publish its textbook. This clearly
demonstrates how little the notion of the “national interest” is identified with“education sovereignty.” One might even say this typifies diplomats in charge ofJapanese diplomacy.
There were further developments in Noda’s efforts to interfere with thescreening and approval process. Only 521 copies of “New History Textbook,” writtenby the Japan Society for Textbook Reform to protect Japan’s honor and promote thesound teaching of history, were selected by the Board of Education for use thefollowing academic year. This represents a pathetic 0.04% of the total number oftextbooks for the Japanese middle school student population of around 1.2 million; it
must be said that this wholesale rejection of the textbook, the product of much effort
to improve Japanese education, attests to the utter chaos in the sphere of education. A

96

See fn 87.
62

summit between the leaders of Japan and Korea was to be held in October that same
year, and Hitoshi Tanaka, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian
Affairs Bureau, prepared a list of anticipated questions and answers for Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi to use. In answer to any query as to why the acceptance
rate for “New History Textbook” was so low, the answer would have been that it was“a manifestation of the conscience of the Japanese people.” Fortunately, Prime
Minister Koizumi rejected this answer, and the matter passed without incident.97
Individuals are naturally ambitious, so an aspect of acting in the national
interest should be a matter of course for those who work at the Foreign Ministry; but
for a long time, Ministry personnel have not been taught to clearly consider the notionof what the “national interest” consists of, whether in vocational education, advanced
training, or their daily office routine. So not surprisingly, without this force of habit,
the “national interest” has no substance for Japanese diplomats. Respect for what is in
the “national interest” must be instilled on a daily basis.98
Problem of Sense of Responsibility
The third and final quality required in a diplomat, namely that of having a
sense of responsibility, is also a crucial matter. As discussed in the previous two
chapters, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Kichisaburo Nomura wasastonishingly unburdened by any sense of responsibility when, unaware of theJapanese Navy’s planned surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, he delivered Japan’s “final
notice” at 2:20 p.m. on December 7, 1941 (Washington time), approximately one hour
after hostilities had begun, and inadvertently turned the Navy’s assault on Hawaii intoa “sneak attack.”99
Nomura had no responsibility for the contents of the “final notice,” so there
was no need for him to accept any blame for what was contained in the notice itself.
However, he clearly had responsibility for ensuring the notice was delivered by the
1:00 p.m. deadline. As the highest-ranking official in the embassy, he was ultimately
responsible for this failure. His negligence meant Japan inadvertently launchedhostilities against the United States with a “sneak attack,” and the war became moretragic than was ever necessary. Nomura did not feel the slightest twinge of
responsibility that he was to blame for this.
As noted earlier, Nomura bore a large responsibility for this situation, but
stunned those around him who feared he might take his own life, by saying: “Whyshould I commit suicide? I’m a diplomat.”
Nomura was not a professional diplomat. He had spent most of his life serving
in the Navy. However, it is perhaps conceivable he didn’t have much of a sense of
responsibility even when he served in the Navy; because if he did have a strong senseof responsibility, he should have realized that—when he was about an hour latedelivering the “final notice” to Secretary Hull and returned to the embassy only tolearn the attack on Pearl Harbor had happened an hour before—his negligence had in

97

Kokumin Shimbun, January 25, 2002.
See fn 95.
99
See Chapter 1.6; Chapter 2.2.
98

63

fact turned the assault into a “sneak attack.” It did not even occur to him at the time toat least tell the American press the Japanese government had designated 1:00 p.m. forits delivery, but that it had been delayed roughly an hour because of blunders in theembassy. He even failed to try to inform the reporters thronging around the embassy
gates. Such a thought did not occur to him. He was not capable of it.
On August 6, 1945, sixteen hours after the atomic bomb had been dropped on
Hiroshima, President Harry Truman made an announcement that the Japanese “havebeen repaid many fold” for the “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor.100 Shortly after Japan’s
defeat in the war, General George C. Marshall cited the “treachery” at Pearl Harbor as
the reason for using the atomic bomb in Japan.101 Even though it was obvious there
was a direct link between Nomura’s responsibility for the “sneak attack” and the useof the atomic bomb, nevertheless after the war Nomura went on to serve two terms asa member of the House of Councilors, the upper house of the Japanese Diet. It can
only be concluded that he had zero, or better yet, less than zero sense of responsibility.
What must be reiterated here is that, around the time Japan signed the San
Francisco peace treaty and regained her independence in 1952, Counselor Sadao
Iguchi and First Secretary Katsuzo Okumura who were directly responsible for theadministrative blunder which turned the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack”,
both in fact took up positions as vice foreign minister, the highest rank within theForeign Ministry.
And they hadn’t pushed their way into those positions uninvited, but rather
had been appointed as vice foreign ministers by then-prime minister Shigeru Yoshida
who, as previously noted, was an abject fool. We will not discuss the foolishness of
Shigeru Yoshida here since he is not the central focus of this book, however readers
who wish to learn more about Yoshida’s fatuous side are invited to consult two of thisauthor’s previous publications: Between Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the
Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam (UPA, 1997),
and Hoshu no shimei [The Conservative Mission] (Jiyusha, 2011).102
As previously mentioned, when John Foster Dulles arrived from the UnitedStates to call for Japanese rearmament, Yoshida created a National Police Reserve
rather than an actual military, and this has led to the distorted Japan of today. Yoshida
bears great responsibility for concealing the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility,
and the abnormalization of Japanese history. In other words, Yoshida, critically, also
lacked a sense of responsibility. Any average politician would have known
instinctively, as prime minister when the peace treaty was signed, what ought or ought
not to be done; but fundamentally lacking any sense of responsibility, Yoshida could
only act on impulse.
Japanese leaders in recent years—Yukio Hatoyama in 2009, and Naoto Kan in
2010—have been harshly criticized as disastrous prime ministers, but since theirterms of office were brief, they could not be blamed for too many instances of
egregious misgovernment. However, Yoshida’s tenure coincided with that of the100

See fn 52.
Ibid.
102
See fn 65.
10164

lifting of the Allied Occupation, and he acted impulsively without any sense of
responsibility, failed to do what had to be done and instead did exactly what should
not have been done. As a result, Japan today is suffering as merely a half-fledged
nation. Looked at from this perspective, we can understand exactly how deplorable
and inept Yoshida was.
And Okumura, the culprit directly responsible for turning the assault on Pearl
Harbor into a “sneak attack”—which in turn was linked to the use of the atomic
bomb—accepted a promotion to vice foreign minister, the highest rank within theForeign Ministry, on Yoshida’s recommendation, even though he had directly
acknowledged during the Occupation his role in the debacle. What are we to make ofhis sense of responsibility at that time? There is clearly no excuse for this behavior.
While Kichisaburo Nomura’s lack of a sense of responsibility was also considerable,
the irresponsibility displayed by Katsuzo Okumura and Sadao Iguchi was second tonone.
In which case, we must rethink the consequences of when diplomats totallylack a sense of responsibility. In other words, this lack of responsibility by diplomatsmeans they have no concept of a national interest that must be protected, or that must
be realized. Without this concept of the national interest, they have no inkling that
there is indeed anything that must be protected or realized, and conversely this makes
it unlikely they would even develop a sense of responsibility. This is what it has cometo.
Kichisaburo Nomura treated the delay due to clerical bungling in delivering
the “final notice” to the United States as a purely factual matter; it was as though hehad given no thought whatsoever to, or had any feelings at all about, the significanceof his own responsibility for it. This being the case, it can only be concluded Nomura
never even considered what the national interest was that should have been
implemented.
If they gave no thought to what the national interest was in the usual sense,
then what was going on? What part of the national interest were they protecting, or
trying to implement? After due consideration, ultimately it must have been that they
were trying to maintain smooth and problem-free relations with the foreign country
where they were posted. When you think about it, it cannot be denied that the primary
goal for a diplomat is to bring about smooth and problem-free relations with theircountry of posting. However, protecting and implementing Japan’s national interest
should probably take priority over this. What are the consequences of maintaining
smooth and problem-free relations with a foreign country, if our diplomats don’t
understand they must first protect and implement Japan’s national interest? Ultimately,
this probably means that inviolable aspects of the national interest are casuallysurrendered in order to maintain peaceful relations. Without an understanding of thenational interest in the usual sense, this is probably inevitable because it matters little
to them to give away elements of Japan’s national interest. It never occurs to them
there are times when protecting and implementing the national interest in the usual
sense is more important than any breach in those peaceful relations. To that extent, itis precisely these Foreign Ministry employees who are no longer qualified to be
diplomats. Fundamentally, they lack a sense of responsibility.
What happens when friendly relations are maintained with the foreign countryof a diplomat’s posting, at the cost of undermining what is truly in the national
interest? In extreme cases, they have done their best if there is no trouble during the65period of their overseas posting, or on the occasions when they have dealings withthat country. From the diplomats’ perspective, there is nothing more to be said.
If this is the case, what ultimately does this mean for the diplomacy practiced
by Japan’s diplomats? Their form of diplomacy, in other words, is merely practiced to
gratify the needs of Foreign Ministry staff who are supposedly in charge of carryingout the nation’s diplomatic affairs. Without an abiding interest in what is truly in thenational interest, but only in arranging, for the duration of their tenure, smooth
relations with foreign countries or the country of their posting, Ministry staff
ultimately only focus on their own gratification. At such times, it could be argued that
Foreign Ministry staff, and career diplomats in particular, would in extreme situations
simply conduct the nation’s diplomatic affairs merely for the gratification of thesecareer diplomats. They do not possess any sense of responsibility at all.
Criticism of the Foreign Ministry has recently intensified, and diplomatic
examinations to select career diplomats, introduced during the Meiji era in 1893, were
finally abolished in 2000; however career diplomats who have passed these exams,
regardless of how incompetent they are, are nonetheless ultimately posted abroad
somewhere in the world to the position of ambassador. Bureaucrats in othergovernment ministries, even those who start off in the career stream, are eventuallyasked to terminate their employment as time progresses; every couple of years, only
one person is promoted to the highest bureaucratic position within the ministry,
namely that of vice minister—and when that person is promoted, all those whoentered the ministry in the same year or those in the career stream who never made it
to vice minister are, in principle, all forced to leave the ministry. But career diplomats,without exception, are promoted to ambassador in some foreign country or another,which is the rank equivalent to that of vice minister. It is apparent how much of aninterest group this coterie of career diplomats has become, when you see how
diplomacy is being performed to benefit this group of bureaucrats. There is no roomhere to nurture any sense of responsibility. For instance, up until the diplomatic
examinations were abolished, family clans spanning four generations since the Meiji
era have come to dominate the career stream for diplomats. This phenomenon would
be absolutely inconceivable in any other ministry.
How has diplomacy been carried out by these career diplomats who now form
their own interest group? They have dispensed with any sense of responsibility, which
in turn has erased their notion of the national interest; they will readily hand overwhatever is in the national interest in order to maintain trouble-free relations withforeign countries and those in which they are posted.
Problem of Masochistic View of History Deriving from Lack of Responsibility
This issue of diplomats and their lack of a sense of responsibility stems fromconditions related to Japan’s postwar status as a defeated nation, and has led to aneven more tragic situation. In 1945, Japan lost the war. The United States and China
were among the victorious powers. Although South Korea was not exactly one of thevictors, by gaining independence after the defeat of Japan, it too could be considered
as one of the victorious powers.
In other words, as far as Japan was concerned, these primary adversaries—the
U.S., China and Korea—were viewed from the onset as nations on the winning side,and Japan’s first diplomatic effort as a defeated country was to maintain peacefulrelations with such nations. Without an ounce of pride or any sense of responsibility,
66

Japan from the start conducted a form of diplomacy that was essentially selfdeprecating. It was thereby easier to maintain a peaceful and harmonious relationshipbetween the victorious powers and the defeated Japanese nation.
Moreover, the average diplomat could not acknowledge the Foreign Ministry’s
share in the responsibility for the recent war. They could only endorse the view thatthe military had unilaterally brought about this war, and moreover that it had been a
war of aggression. From today’s vantage point, even the general public has notnecessarily acknowledged the plausible explanation that perhaps Japan had legitimate
reasons for fighting that war, or that it wasn’t simply a war of aggression. This being
the case, even if the average diplomat believes the military started that war, andmoreover that it was a war of aggression, they have little concern about Japanesesociety. Typical examples of this were the casual betrayal of education sovereignty in
1982, when the “neighboring country clause” was established following the textbook
misinformation incident;103 and also in 2000, when attempts were made to fail certain
textbooks during the textbook approval process.104
But some discerning and competent diplomats are well aware of the Foreign
Ministry’s responsibility for that war. After all, wasn’t it the Foreign Ministry’s role
to prevent that war in the first place? Even if for instance it was the military who
initiated war hostilities, if the role of diplomacy is to interpret and predict the state ofglobal affairs, then surely it was the Foreign Ministry who should have been in theforefront of efforts to prevent that war. The failure to achieve this meant the Foreign
Ministry clearly shared some responsibility for that war.
Moreover, the war was not exclusively a war of aggression. It was
undoubtedly also partly a war of self-defense. And while not necessarily planned inadvance, the time had finally come in the twentieth century for racial discrimination,
something taken for granted by Americans and Europeans up until the nineteenth
century, to be abolished. It was time for the “white” colonial rule of regions occupiedby “colored” peoples, on the unquestioned basis of racial discrimination, to beabolished, and for these peoples to stand up. The war prosecuted by Japan had
elements of this struggle to eliminate racial discrimination.
An understanding of this should be possible for certain competent diplomats
within the Foreign Ministry. They ought to be able to understand the responsibility theForeign Ministry had for that war. However, this is not something they can ever speakout about.
Why is this? It is not as though the Foreign Ministry had simply forgotten its
war responsibility. It concealed the blunders committed by Kichisaburo Nomura,
Sadao Iguchi, and Katsuzo Okumura, and reprehensible as it may be, it has
systematically hidden the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility. And not only has it
hidden this. It played the public for fools, by allowing these men to rise to respected
positions in Japan, as a member of the House of Councilors, and vice foreign
ministers, respectively. Those within the Foreign Ministry who are aware of the
Ministry’s war responsibility, are unable to speak out on issues related to that war

103
104

See fn 87.
See fn 89.
67

responsibility. If they speak out, they are immediately stifled internally by the Foreign
Ministry.
Those who are aware of this strive to again pursue a diplomacy which placesemphasis on the national interest. By pursuing a diplomacy that protects the true
national interest, namely to preserve present-day Japan’s reputation and to protect the
lives and assets of the Japanese people, they conscientiously strive as individuals onbehalf of the people of Japan.
However, such conscientious efforts are barely discernible amidst theorganized coterie of diplomats who form their own interest group. Any individual
who tries to pursue an ethical diplomacy has no choice but to adapt to the interestgroup coterie of diplomats they find themselves alongside, an entire organization
which is, on the whole, without a sense of responsibility, and without any
comprehension of the national interest. As a result, the Foreign Ministry continues toexist as Japan’s organ of state that serves to promulgate a masochistic view of history.
This is in fact exactly what it has become.
It is undeniable the Foreign Ministry is doing irreparable harm to Japan. If thepeople of Japan can come to this realization, then it will be clear that the rebirth ofJapan will be impossible without a complete overhaul of the Foreign Ministry.

3.2 Retreat! Don’t React! Save The Protest For Later!
Northern Territories Dispute With Soviet Union
Let’s now examine actual cases that have occurred since the end of the war
and brought ruin to Japan, thanks to the duplicity, incompetence and ineptitude of theForeign Ministry, its employees and its diplomats. However, incidents discussed
previously in this book will not be revisited here.
First, let us turn our attention to the question of the Northern Territories. Since
the Edo period, the region known as the Northern Territories was undoubtedly an
inherent part of Japan. So even though the invasion by Soviet troops of southern
Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands after the defeat of Japan was sanctioned by the Allied
nations, the Northern Territories was a different matter entirely. Consequently, Soviet
troops apparently behaved fairly cautiously when occupying the Northern Territories.
The Soviet military offshore first checked carefully for signs of the American
Stars and Stripes or indications that the U.S. had stationed troops there, and confirmed
before making landfall there had been no American occupation.105

105

When Japan surrendered in 1945, the Soviet Union launched an invasion of the Kuril
Islands from the Kamchatka peninsula, which had been Soviet territory before the 1875
Treaty of St. Petersburg. It invaded as far as Uruppu, which had been the southernmost tip ofSoviet territory in the Far East before the Treaty of St. Petersburg, but came to a temporary
halt. A Soviet detachment sent from Sakhalin to Etorofu—south of Uruppu, and designated as
Japanese territory since before the Treaty of St. Petersburg—began their invasion only after
they had confirmed there was no American occupation there.
See Boei kenshujo senshishitsu [National Institute of Defense Studies Center for
Military History], Senshi shosho: Hokuto homen rikugun sakusen 2 Chishima, Karafuto,
68That being the case, it is conceivable that if for instance a resident of theNorthern Territories had drawn a picture of the Star-Spangled Banner and displayed it
prominently on a mountain peak so as to be visible from the sea, the Soviets might nothave invaded, and the Northern Territories may not even have become a problem.
Why didn’t this idea occur to the Foreign Ministry, and why didn’t it relay thisas a suggestion to residents in the Northern Territories? But it may be unreasonable togo this far in laying blame upon the Foreign Ministry. When Japan’s defeat was
imminent, the Foreign Ministry was under pressure to work out how to submit tooccupying American forces, and to circumstances that were changing by the day andfrom moment to moment, and it did not have the luxury to make sense of what was
happening in the Northern Territories or what measures it should have taken there. It
would not have been reasonable to expect such things of the Foreign Ministry, or its
staff, things that they were not normally capable of anyway.
But seven decades after the war, not the slightest progress has been made in
resolving the problem of the Northern Territories, and it is probably not unreasonable
to conclude that this is due to the Foreign Ministry’s incompetence.
Talks between Japan and the Soviet Union from July through October 1955,
conducted by the Ichiro Hatoyama cabinet, were aimed at normalizing relations
between the two nations, so it was perhaps unavoidable that the Northern Territories
dispute would be put to one side.
But maybe the reverse was in fact true. Perhaps priority should have been
given to resolving the dispute over the Northern Territories rather than normalizing
relations with the Soviet Union. Every year, the need for a Japan-Russian peace treaty
grew more urgent. Reaching a peace treaty between Japan and Russia was only amatter of time. However, the goal of resolving the dispute over the Northern
Territories was not going to be easy to achieve. Therefore, stern insistence by Japan torefuse to hold talks with the Soviet Union to normalize relations if the Northern
Territories dispute was excluded, might have meant resolution of the Northern
Territories issue could have been achieved at the same time relations were normalized
between Japan and the Soviet Union.
The next major opportunity to resolve the dispute was probably on October 11,
1993, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Japan following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Troubled by the failing Russian economy, Yeltsin was in desperateneed of Japanese economic assistance. Wasn’t this precisely the moment when Japan
should have gambled on the risk of rupturing diplomatic relations in order to resolve
the Northern Territories dispute? Moreover, assuming that the Northern Territories
dispute might not be resolved for a long time without conducting talks taking
diplomatic relations to the brink of rupture, shouldn’t Japan have been constantly
prepared for just such an opportunity to take those talks to the brink?

Hokkaido no boei [War History Series: Northeast Area Army Operations vol. 2 Defense of
Chishima, Karafuto and Hokkaido], (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1971).
69

Takeshima Islands Dispute With South Korea
How about the Takeshima Islands dispute? Shortly before the San Francisco
peace treaty was to come into effect South Korean President Syngman Rhee, partly
for domestic reasons, announced a unilateral “Peace Line” declaration on January 18,
1952, which included the Takeshima Islands in Korean territory. But this was at theheight of the Korean War, and both Japan and Korea were under the strict supervisionof the American occupation forces. This meant that the issue might have been easily
resolved through the intervention of the Occupation forces, and the U. S. government.
After the Occupation was lifted, Japan and South Korea then belonged to theliberal democracies under the broad leadership of the United States, and were
therefore obliged to amicably maintain friendly relations. Consequently, territorial
disputes between the two countries were not desirable. This author believes thatclearly there were problems with the negotiations conducted by Shigeru Yoshida, who
was serving concurrently as prime minister and foreign minister at the time. At therequest of the Japanese government, the Occupation authority issued statements
several times that the Takeshima Islands were in Japanese territory. However the
Syngman Rhee “Peace Line” was not rescinded, and the Takeshima Islands continued
effectively to be administered by South Korea; so it probably has to be concluded
there were fundamental problems with the negotiating approach of the Foreign
Ministry under the direction of Yoshida. Conversely, it is quite strange why this issue
was not resolved during the period of Occupation.106
The next major opportunity to resolve the Takeshima Islands dispute came in
1965, with the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and theRepublic of Korea. Eisaku Sato, prime minister at the time, failed to use thisopportunity to retake Takeshima, and indeed seems to have remained noncommittal.
Concluding the Treaty on Basic Relations was also significant then for Japan. But it
was even more urgent for Korea. It was undesirable to become embroiled in territorial
issues, out of consideration for the future relationship between Japan and South Korea.
This meant that the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations was the perfect chance toresolve this dispute. And it follows therefore that the issue regarding the TakeshimaIslands should have had a prominent place in the Treaty on Basic Relations. However,the Foreign Ministry chose to maintain an ambiguous stance at this time.

106

Syngman Rhee was the first president of South Korea, founded on August 15, 1948, andharbored an intense antipathy towards Japan. He established the so-called Syngman Rhee
Line on January 18, 1952, that incorporated Takeshima, an inherent part of Japan, into
Korean territory.
General Mark W. Clark succeeded General Matthew Ridgway as commander of theUnited Nations Command from 1952 through 1953 during the Korean War. He acted as anintermediary when President Rhee visited Japan on January 5-7, 1953, and met with Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida. However, Yoshida barely spoke to Rhee at the time, and the rareopportunity afforded by the visit was wasted. It was anticipated that Rhee’s visit to Japan
would be followed by a return visit by Yoshida to Korea, but this also never materialized. It isperhaps conceivable that this might have been a chance to resolve the Takeshima dispute.
See Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1954), pp.154-167.
70

Superficially at least, it could be argued that Prime Minister Sato was to blame
for this; but taking advantage of this opportunity would have been impossible anyway
for Foreign Ministry officials who did not undergo regular training in this type ofstrategic thinking. As a result, we find ourselves in the mess we are in today.
No Awards for Hero of KAL 858 Bombing Incident
On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Flight 858 exploded in mid-air off thecoast of Burma, killing all 115 people on board, including passengers and crew. The
plane was scheduled to fly from Baghdad to Seoul, via Abu Dhabi in the United ArabEmirates. In connection with this incident, a couple travelling together, who appeared
to be a Japanese man and his daughter, had disembarked the flight at Abu Dhabi, but
came to the attention of the Japanese Embassy in Bahrain who identified them assuspicious persons. An inquiry was requested to determine whether these suspicious
persons had entered Bahrain or not.
However, such inquiries are not usually responded to immediately. And in any
case, there is normally no way such matters can be examined straight away. In normal
circumstances, responsibility for the matter would be discharged by simply making a
few phone inquiries to bureaucrats in charge, and receiving the reply: “examined, but
status undetermined.”
If on this occasion, the Japanese embassy in Bahrain had adhered to standard
procedure, there would have been no particular scrutiny made of this father anddaughter travelling together, and history probably would have recorded that Japanesecitizens had perpetrated this incident. Relations between Japan and South Korea
would probably also have been thrown into chaos. As luck would have it though, theman posing as the “father” committed suicide by taking poison, but the “daughter”,
Kim Hyon-hui, survived and was arrested. It was ascertained from the woman’sconfession that North Korea had planned to disrupt the Seoul Olympics to be held in1988, the following year, by staging this incident to make it appear as though
Japanese citizens had carried it out.
At this time, Shojun Sunagawa, a non-career employee at Japan’s Bahrainembassy, made full use of their daily information network and confidential informants
to locate the hotel where the couple had been staying, and successfully detained themat the airport. Unfortunately, although the “father” managed to kill himself, details of
the plot were uncovered thanks to the arrest of Kim Hyon-hui; it was learned thatJapanese citizens were in fact not involved in this bombing, and the affair came to an
end without further consequences for Japan.107
There were problems though with the manner in which the Japanese Foreign
Ministry handled matters after this Kim Hyon-hui was detained. There were clear
suspicions at the time of her detention regarding the unauthorized use of a Japanesepassport. If this was the case, the culprit should have been transferred temporarily to
Japan, and interrogated by Japanese authorities. However, the Foreign Ministry107

Shojun Sunagawa later published a book regarding the downing of Korean Air Flight 858,
entitled Gokumitsu shirei: Kim Hyonhi kosoku no shinso [Top Secret Command: The True
Story behind Kim Hyon-hui’s Detention] (Tokyo: Nihon hoso shuppan kyokai, 2003).
71

approved her transfer to South Korea without any hesitation. It was later discoveredthat Kim Hyon-hi had learned Japanese from Yaeko Taguchi, a Japanese citizen who
was kidnapped from Japan by North Korea. If Kim had been transferred directly to
Japan, there was a chance that clues may have been discovered earlier about the
kidnapping issue.
Also problematic was the fact that Shojun Sunagawa never received proper
recognition for his remarkable efforts. One wonders about the extent to which
Sunagawa’s actions saved the nation’s honor. Career diplomats in the Foreign
Ministry could only be jealous of his outstanding achievement. They could only showscorn for this non-career official who had achieved something they themselves could
never realize. This coterie of career diplomats, so used to moving up in the world bynever falling foul of a demerit system, try to eliminate those outside this career stream
who actually attain real achievements. Afterwards, Sunagawa tried to clarify the
abduction issue and did indeed violate ministry directives by attempting unauthorized
contact with countries lacking diplomatic relations with Japan, but the Foreign
Ministry refused to overlook this and simply ignored his great achievement, andproceeded as usual to apply the demerit system to ignore the accomplishments of noncareer personnel.108 It is clear from this example that the Foreign Ministry has become
an organization that exists merely for the gratification of its career diplomats.
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. The lack of crisis
management at Japan’s Embassy in Kuwait at this time was too appalling for words.
A Japanese weekly magazine reported on the local situation. After theinvasion, Japanese citizens living in Kuwait began to flock to the embassy fromaround August 6, but the embassy had no private power generator, no emergency well
for water and no stockpiles of food. Arrangements were made to have these Japanesecitizens transferred to Baghdad on August 21, but when the destination was
unexpectedly changed en route, the embassy staffer in charge became completely
flustered, and was so distraught he was totally useless. It was later discovered he wasunable to contact the Japanese embassy in Baghdad, because he had not evenremembered to write down that embassy’s phone number.109
Meanwhile, at the Japanese embassy in nearby Bahrain—the same embassy
where Shojun Sunagawa had been involved with resolving the bombing of Korean Air
Flight 858—the ambassador and embassy counselor were absent during the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, so Japanese citizens wanting to flee had no access to information,and there was significant delay in providing official advice to evacuate the country.
Even though they had known about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait for about a week, theambassador was still on vacation, and the embassy counselor had returned to Japanfor a medical checkup.110

108

Ibid., pp. 13-18.
“Shakuho risuto sakusei de Nihon taishikan ga dai shittai” [The Japanese Embassy’s
Enormous Blunders in Drawing Up List of Releasees], Bungei Shunju, August 1997, pp. 201202.
110“Nihonjin wo migoroshi ni shita Nihon taishikan: Okure ni okureta taikyo kankoku” [TheJapanese Embassy that Left Japanese Citizens Stranded: Advice to Evacuate Seriously
Delayed], Shukan Bunshun, September 13, 2000, pp. 28-31.
109

72

It can only be concluded therefore that Japan’s diplomatic missions abroadcannot be relied upon in times of crisis, and that under pressure Japan’s diplomats
cannot fulfill the roles expected of them as diplomatic representatives.
The “Kono Statement” And “Comfort Women”
Let us now turn our attention to the comfort women issue, which made thenews on August 3 1993, decades after the war. As is already known, there are no facts
to corroborate that Korean women were forcibly detained as comfort women to go to
the front with the Japanese Army. This term jugun ianfu or “comfort womenaccompanying the army” did not even exist, historically.
Nevertheless, the expression in the so-called “Kono Statement” suggestingthat there had been enforced detention, was a political construct settling the matteronce and for all under the responsibility of the South Korean government, if theJapanese government recognized the “enforced detention.” 111 However, far fromsettling the matter, it has resulted in an excellent source of pernicious propaganda touse against Japan, and school textbooks must now also include this material. The
senior-ranking official responsible for this political decision at the time was Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono, but what were bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry
doing with regards to this matter?
The protest at the time under the responsibility of the South Korean
government to settle the matter once and for all was perhaps, to a certain extent, sothat it could also achieve the same outcome. This might have been quite unlike theexample given previously regarding Yuan Shikai who tricked Japan in 1915 into
presenting the Twenty-One Demands in the form of an ultimatum. But instead ofsettling the matter, it has created an unparalleled source of harmful disinformation.
Regardless of Korea’s position though, even a layman who knows nothing of
diplomacy could see what problems would later develop if you treat something thatnever existed as though it had existed, and freely admit to a crime that never happened.
Why do such things happen when matters are handled by bureaucrats who aresupposedly experts in diplomacy? Because the diplomats in charge of these matters
are incompetent and lack vision. This is how Japan is losing large swathes of its
national interest with each passing day.

111

Ikuhiko Hata, Ianfu to senjo no sei [Comfort Women and Sex on The Battlefield] (Tokyo:
Shinchosha, 1999), pp. 249-58; See also Ryohei Murata, Doko e iku no ka, kono kuni wa–
Moto chu-Bei taishi, wakamono e no yuigon [Where Is This Country Heading? Former U.S.
Ambassador’s Testament to the Youth Of Japan] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2010), p. 184.
Murata wrote that, “In other words, despite there being no facts to support the notion thatJapan forcibly abducted women who were Japanese or from the Korean Peninsula andpressured them into service, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono rashly and prematurely on behalfof the Japanese government publicly apologized to these ‘comfort women’ who neveractually existed.”73

Reexamining Japanese Embassy Hostage Crisis In Peru
Let us now turn our attention to the hostage crisis that took place at theJapanese ambassador’s residence in Peru, on December 17, 1997.
The long-suffering Japanese hostages were all rescued thanks to a raid by the
Peruvian Navy’s Armed Forces commandos, conducted on April 22 the following
year. Many people still remember the moving scene of the press conference withAmbassador Morihisa Aoki, puffing on a cigarette in the middle of billowing cloudsof smoke, shown on television shortly after the hostages’ release from their lengthy
confinement. By all appearances, Aoki was a typical example of the kind of diplomat
who passed the diplomatic exams. Although on the one hand it could be argued thatan incident of this kind could not be anticipated precisely because of its unexpectednature, however it is known that the terrorists broke into the ambassador’s residenceby blowing up the wall of an unoccupied residence next door. This means that, eventhough the neighboring property was known to be unoccupied, daily checks had notbeen made as to the status of that empty residence. The vigilance that was required ona daily basis was simply lacking.112
The luxurious condition of the ambassador’s residence was another surprising
thing learned from this incident. It might be argued that such magnificent official
residences were necessary during the era of imperialism to show off the splendor of
the home country to colonized lands, but it was truly questionable in 1997, on the eveof the 21st century, whether this was still really needed. This luxurious official
residence was later demolished, the vacant lot sold to a local real estate agent, andanother building erected in its place, but it remains an accurate picture of Japan’s
outdated Foreign Ministry.113
There were also problems with the Foreign Ministry’s handling of matters
following the hostage crisis at the ambassador’s residence in Peru.
After the crisis was resolved, the Ministry launched an official investigation
with a vice foreign minister acting as committee chairman. The Peruvian president
went through the motions of going along with the Japanese side’s insistence on
resolving the crisis with a peaceful solution, but in fact mobilized special commandos
to resolve the issue through force. The use of force during the president’s daring
assault was dangerous, but since the rescue of all the Japanese hostages unharmed wasconsidered nothing short of miraculous, this could not be easily pointed out. However,112

Shigeharu Aoyama, “Peru hitojichi jiken Gaimusho hokokusho zen hihan” [Complete
Condemnation of the Foreign Ministry’s Report on the Peru Hostage Crisis], Bungei Shunju,
August 1997, pp. 201-202. Ultimately, it would appear the Japanese government concluded
the affair without taking any action or becoming any the wiser. See also, Kyodo Tsushinsha
Peru tokubetsu shuzaihan hen [Kyodo Tsushinsha Special Peru News Team, eds.], Peru
Nihon taishi kotei hitojichi jiken [Hostage Crisis at the Japanese Ambassador’s Residence inPeru] (Tokyo: Kyodo Tsushinsha, 1997), pp. 284-306.
113
Japan’s embassy in Moscow was built in 2005 at a total construction cost of 10 billion yen,and features a swimming pool, tennis court, and Japanese garden. See Tsutomu Saito, “Taigu
dake wa senshinkoku nami da ga domeikoku ni sura suki wo tsukareru ‘kyojaku taishitsu’“ [Salaries of a Developed Nation, But with a ‘Weak Disposition’ Even Allies Take
Advantage Of], SAPIO, December 10, 2003, p. 85-87.
74

there was also no indication Japan sought to resolve the situation based on theinternationally-accepted approach of not negotiating with terrorists.114
The investigation’s report, compiled solely by parties connected to the Foreign
Ministry, was released on June 12 but failed to mention several critical points. The
most important point was that all fourteen members of the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement terrorist group that took the hostages and barricaded
themselves in the ambassador’s residence, were killed by the armed commandos.
According to Japanese hostages’ eyewitness accounts, a number of these terrorists
were tied up on the floor. The fact that all the terrorists nonetheless ended up dead,clearly means they were unlawfully killed. It is inexcusable for Japan, a country thatclaims to support human rights, to feign ignorance of this fact.115
Japan’s U.S. Ambassador Kunihiko Saito’s Debacle Over “Nanjing Incident”
The Foreign Ministry’s response to The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten
Holocaust of World War II, published in 1997 in the United States by ChineseAmerican Iris Chang, was also deplorable.
Thirty-four photos were reproduced in this book, but none were actuallyevidence attesting to the “Nanking Incident.” Chang gives several different figures forthe victim count: 430,000; 260,000; 227,000; and 370,000. This alone brings into
question the book’s reliability as little more than a work of propaganda, neverthelessthe book became a bestseller, and sold more than 120,000 copies in the first fourmonths after its publication in the United States. It has reportedly sold in excess ofhalf a million copies.116
But it is clear that what is today known as the “Nanjing Incident” was afabrication methodically constructed by the occupying forces during Japan’s
Occupation.117
On October 28, 2000, the Japan “Nanking” Society was founded, with Asia
University Professor Shudo Higashinakano appointed as chairman. This society’s
research activities were exhaustive, and demonstrated that, without exception, eachphoto exhibited at “The Memorial for Compatriots killed in the Nanjing Massacre by
Japanese Forces of Aggression” in Nanjing City was unrelated to the “Nanjing
Incident”; and proved that the term “Nanjing Incident” used to refer to the events after
the city fell on December 13, 1937, was unknown before the end of the Second World

114

Aoyama, “Peru hitojichi jiken,” pp. 202-204.
Ibid., pp. 208-210.
116
N. Fujioka and S. Higashinakano, Za reipu obu Nankin no kenkyu [A Study of The Rape of
Nanking] (Tokyo: Shodensha, 1999), p. 18.
117
Research by the Japan “Nanking” Society has demonstrated that, without exception, no
photo exhibited at “The Memorial for Compatriots killed in the Nanjing Massacre by
Japanese Forces of Aggression” in Nanjing City provided any proof of the existence of the“Nanjing Incident.” On April 10, 2005, Diet member Nariaki Nakayama clearly demonstrated
there was no “Nanjing Incident” by presenting a chart showing changes in Nanjing’s
population that had been officially published by the government of Nanjing City at the time.
115

75

War. It is now possible to say categorically that the “Nanjing Incident” was afabricated construct.118
Problems arose around the time Iris Chang’s book went on sale in 1997. The
Japan “Nanking” Society had yet to be formed, and the fabricated nature of the“Nanjing Incident” had still not been entirely substantiated. However, it was obvious
there had not been any massacre of the enormity—430,000, 260,000 or 227,000—
cited in the book. Even a cursory examination would have clearly shown that this wasa book written for propaganda purposes and lacking in credibility. In which case,what should have been done was to counter the propaganda effect of this book.
However, the Japanese Embassy in the United States did not react at all, andmaintained complete silence. In December 1998, Japan’s ambassador to the UnitedStates Kunihiko Saito finally refuted the book. He went on a television news show todebate Iris Chang. However Saito merely stated that the “Nanjing Incident” wasmentioned in Japanese high school textbooks, but failed to make the counterargumentthat this book by Iris Chang was a propaganda piece, and included many things thatwere completely without foundation. A seemingly competent official, Saito deftly
avoided giving the explicit apology from the Japanese government demanded by Iris
Chang, but his explanation hinged solely on the notion that there had indeed been a“massacre” but not a “great massacre.” His pitiful performance can still be seen today
on video-sharing websites like YouTube.
The Foreign Ministry is doing nothing at all to protect Japan’s honor regarding
this fabricated account of the “Nanjing Incident.” To this day, the Ministry’s website
has no specific refutation that the “Nanjing Incident” was a fabrication. It provides
itself with a convenient escape route by pointing to theoretical explanations from theJapan “Nanking” Society, but if the Ministry is going to take this approach, then it
really should conduct its own research study to rehabilitate Japan’s reputation. The
Foreign Ministry disseminates, around the world, the opinion that something“happened” when it didn’t actually happen.

118

The Japan “Nanking” Society was established on October 28, 2000, with Asia University’s
Professor Shudo Higashinakano as president, and was later dissolved on September 31, 2012.
The Society’s research results comprised a journal published in five volumes, which not only
dealt with disproving the existence of the “Nanjing Incident,” but also clarified the process bywhich the “Incident” had been concocted to appear as though it had actually occurred.
For a summary of the Society’s research development and results, the reader is advised toconsult three articles published in the fifth and final volume of the aforementioned journal,
Shudo Higashinakano, ed., Nihon “Nankin” Gakkai nenpo: Nankin “jiken” kenkyu nosaizensen, Heisei 20 nen ban (saishu kanketsu ban) [Annual Report of the Japan “Nanking”
Society: Front Line of Research on the Nanjing “Incident”, 2008, Final Volume] (Tokyo:
Tentensha, 2008). See: “Nihon ‘Nankin’ Gakkai nenpo, ‘Nankin jiken kenkyu no saizensen’somokuji ichiran” [Annual Report of the Japan “Nanking” Society, Overview of Front Line of
Research on the Nanjing “Incident”], pp. 26-27; “Nihon ‘Nankin’ Gakkai kaiho (kenkyu
happyo kankei) somokuji ichiran” [Japan “Nanking” Society Bulletin (Research Publications),
Overview], pp. 271-86; and Seishiro Sugihara, “Saishu kanketsu ban atogaki: Nihon ‘Nankin’
Gakkai hachinen no kenkyu seika wo sokatsu shite” [Afterword to the Final Volume:
Summary of Eight Years of Research Results of the Japan “Nanking” Society], pp. 287-317.
76

Just prior to the founding of the aforementioned Japan “Nanking” Society, it
was discovered on October 13, 2000, that Eijiro Noda, a member of the Ministry of
Education’s Textbook Authorization Board who had previously worked at the Foreign
Ministry, had taken steps to ensure that the middle school history textbook producedby the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform would fail the approval
process.119
The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform is a private organization
focused on issues to do with education, and was formed as a response to theappearance of references to “comfort women” appearing across the board in middle
school textbooks in 1996, because of the so-called “Kono Statement” made three
years earlier in 1993. The term jugun—literally meaning “accompanying the army”—
derives from the expression jugun kangofu to refer to the military nursing corps whichwere directly attached to combat units, and from the onset the expression jugun ianfu
or “comfort women accompanying the army” never actually existed. Private facilities
known as ianjo or “comfort stations” could be found near military garrisons, but“comfort women” as an institutionalized arrangement did not exist. Nevertheless,because of the “Kono Statement” references to “comfort women” appeared in all
middle school history textbooks simultaneously.
Outraged by these developments, the Japan Society for History Textbook
Reform was formed in 1997 to protect Japan’s reputation, and to produce a middle
school textbook paying more attention to Japanese culture and tradition. However, bydeliberately trying to fail this book, one wonders about Noda, this member of the
Ministry of Education Textbook Authorization Board who had previously worked at
the Foreign Ministry, and just how qualified he was to be a Japanese citizen. Since hewas the Foreign Ministry’s representative on the Authorization Board, this action
alone reveals clearly how anti-Japanese and anti-patriotic the Ministry is, and how
much the Ministry is in need of fundamental reform. Noda’s scheme was thwarted, ofcourse, thanks to the efforts of the Sankei Shimbun and other media who reported thestory.120

119

Nobukatsu Fujioka, Kyokasho saitaku no shinso: kakushite rekishi wa yugamerareru [The
Truth about Textbook Selection: How History Is Distorted] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2005),
pp. 98-102.
120
See fn. 3-2-16; Also, see N. Fujioka and A. Takamori, Sayoku to Gaimusho ni shogai
sareta “Atarashii rekishi kyokasho” no rekishi [History of the New History Textbook, andHow it was Sabotaged by the Left and the Foreign Ministry], in Japanism, October 2012, pp.
40-41; Sankei Shimbun, October 13, 2000. The “sabotage” referred to at this time was not
merely limited to the individual efforts of former Foreign Ministry employee Eijiro Noda, aproponent of the masochistic view of Japanese history. Apparently, an internal Ministry study
to disqualify the textbook was conducted by a group of staff at the division chief and assistantdivision chief level.
77

Katsutoshi Matsuo and Others Perpetrate Massive Embezzlement of Secret Funds
Let us now focus on a scandal involving the embezzlement of approximately
486 million yen from a secret Foreign Ministry fund by non-career official Katsutoshi
Matsuo, reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in an exposé on January 1, 2001.
Between October 1993 and August 1999, Matsuo headed the Foreign
Ministry’s Overseas Visit Support Division and organized a total of sixteen overseas
trips for the prime minister and other high-ranking officials. He was charged withembezzling 486 million yen out of the approximately 1.86 trillion yen he received outof discretionary funds from the prime minister’s office.121
The details of Matsuo’s case were shocking. It was scandalous how he used
the money he embezzled to purchase luxury apartments, golf club memberships, race
horses, and to pay for mistresses.
And this was not the only case of corruption uncovered at the Foreign
Ministry. Hiromu Kobayashi, a Ministry assistant director, and another Ministry
employee, along with two company employees in the private sector, were charged
with embezzlement when they padded expenses by approximately 22 million yen for
the Okinawa G8 Summit held in July 2000, for items including limousine hire. In July
the same year, the Foreign Ministry sacked Makoto Mizutani, Japan’s consul generalin Denver, Colorado, for misappropriating public funds. And in September, 2000,
Akio Asakawa, another Ministry assistant director, was arrested for embezzling funds
in excess of 40 million yen by padding hotel expenses in connection with the APEC
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit held in Osaka in 1995.122
When examining this series of Ministry fiascos, it is simply not enough toconclude it was brought about by a few delinquent individuals. The Matsuo andAsakawa incidents, for instance, involved the embezzlement of vast sums of publicmoney, so what are we to make of the fact that they went unnoticed for years? Would
it even be possible for such enormous amounts of public funds to be embezzled in any
other ministry? Nevertheless, the long-term and undetected misappropriation of vast
sums of cash in the Foreign Ministry continues to this day. It should be pointed outthat the Foreign Ministry is an organizational shambles.
Incompetence Of Japanese Consulate During Shenyang Incident
There was also an appalling incident that took place on May 8, 2002, in
Shenyang, China. I will provide a brief description of what happened for the benefitof readers unfamiliar with the details of this “Shenyang Incident.” The incident
involved five North Korean asylum seekers, including a female child, who attempted
to enter the grounds of the Japanese consulate in Shenyang to seek aid; a violent
struggle unfolded between the North Korean family group as they desperately tried to
get through the consulate’s gates, and armed Chinese security guards who tried todrag them out. In the end, the refugees were arrested and failed in their quest for

121

Takao Toshikawa, Kimitsuhi [Secret Funds] (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2001), pp. 22-25.
Katsuyuki Yakushiji, Gaimusho: gaikoryoku kyoka e no michi [The Foreign Ministry: How
to Boost Its Diplomatic Prowess] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), pp. 87-89.
12278

asylum. At the time, these scenes were broadcast on Japanese television day afterday.
The Japanese vice counsel, Ken Miyashita, made a brief appearance to retrievea cap dropped by one of the armed guards, but did not reach out a helping hand to thechild or her family. It was likely that asylum seekers like these who were captured byarmed Chinese police would be repatriated to North Korea. The incident
unintentionally exposed the shameful reality of Japanese diplomacy.
However, was this vice consul being particularly negligent as a Japanesediplomat? Not at all. Miyashita’s actions in fact demonstrated a pattern of behavior
that had been passed down from his senior colleagues in the Foreign Ministry.
When having to deal with exigent circumstances, the received wisdom of
diplomats in Japan’s Foreign Ministry is to stick to the following behavioral
guidelines: “Retreat!”; “Don’t React!”; and “Save The Protest For Later!”123 Ah-hah!
So this is how Japan’s diplomats minimize any harm to themselves.
At such critical times, they simply don’t care how much the national interest is
involved, or how much of the national interest is sacrificed. This mantra—“Retreat!”;“Don’t React!”; “Save The Protest For Later!”—simply guarantees the personal
protection of diplomats themselves. As diplomats, this is why the accumulation of
wisdom and the gathering of information are virtually impossible.
At its core, the Foreign Ministry’s duties are determined by a demerit system.
While on the job, you don’t want trouble with your country of posting. So wheneveryou become embroiled in any sort of incident, deal with the problem by running away
and avoiding a response, and make your protests later. This sort of diplomacy is
precisely a matter of diplomats working solely for the benefit of diplomats.

3.3 What Is The Point Of ODA?
Three Aspects Of ODA
Finally, while not related to specific incidents, let us examine problems withJapan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to clarify just how incompetent andappalling the Foreign Ministry is.
Japan’s international aid in the 21st century is donated entirely in good faithand without regard to benefitting Japan’s own national interest, and should be
acknowledged as a positive contribution towards the economic development ofunderdeveloped and developing nations, and improving the lives of their people.
But to donate ODA to countries who are themselves giving aid to othercountries, or who are clearly promoting anti-Japanese education in their own
country—to use taxes collected from the Japanese people in this way is surely abetrayal of the people of Japan. Japan’s initial involvement with ODA was in 1954
when development aid, intended as a form of war reparation, was donated to Burma(now Myanmar) at the same time a peace treaty was signed. The aid package had

123“Haji wo shire! Gaimusho: ‘Nigero,’ ‘Taio suru na,’ ‘Kogi wa ato de suru’!” [Foreign
Ministry, Own Your Shame!: “Retreat!”; “Don’t React!”; and “Save The Protest For Later!”],Sunday Mainichi, June 2, 2002, pp. 28-32.
79

three elements—repayable aid (so-called yen loans); grant aid; and technicalcooperation—and not only the Foreign Ministry but up to ten other Japaneseministries were closely involved, including the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministryof International Trade and Industry. Of these government agencies, the Foreign
Ministry took a central role; however because of its incompetence this donation of
ODA did not benefit the national interest in any broad sense of the term, but was
simply wasted and had the opposite effect intended.
Effectively, Japan’s postwar ODA, with the Foreign Ministry playing a central
role, had three different aspects: war reparations; returns for the domestic economy;
and the pursuit of the national interest. First, as an aspect of donating development aid,
it goes without saying that “war reparations” meant Japan, as one of the defeatednations in the war, could in a broad sense pay back the countries on the winning side.
Next, “returns for the domestic economy” was another aspect of ODA, and meant thataid funds would be used to place orders with Japanese-affiliated businesses orpurchase goods from Japanese companies, and Japanese enterprises would receive
knock-on benefits from the donation of ODA. This created huge areas of concessions
and vested interests, but the present book is not the place to directly address this issue.
However, there were many points where clearly the responsibility of the Foreign
Ministry must be brought into question. Finally, to “pursue the national interest”
means securing support for Japan’s foreign policy from recipient countries, orcreating Japan-friendly social conditions in those countries. ODA was originallyintended to be carried out precisely as a means of pursuing the national interest.
Where this has not been the case is due to the odious nature and deplorable
incompetence of the Foreign Ministry who was put in charge of ODA.124

124

Tomokazu Ohosono, “Nihon no ODA wa ‘sengo baisho’ gata kara ‘kokueki tsuikyu’ gatani tenkan subeki da” [Approach for Japan’s ODA Must Switch from ‘Postwar Reparation’ to‘Pursuit of National Interest’], SAPIO, December 10, 2003, p. 92. Ohosono sums up Japan’s
ODA prior to 2003 as follows:“Unable to contribute internationally through military force, theeconomic cooperation and global contribution underlying Japan’s ODA in asense represents its contribution to maintaining [Japan’s] security. This ispartly the rationale for why, in the 1990s, Japan boasted the world’s largest
commitment of ODA.
However, this myth surrounding ODA and Japan’s reliance on thismyth, has already revealed contradictions that have resulted in failure. There
are five major reasons for this.
1) The ‘window display’ advertising a ‘peace constitution that does
not maintain a military’ is a sham;
2) ODA to Japan’s Asian neighbors has come to represent postwar
reparations;
3) Japan’s status as an ‘economic superpower’ hangs in the balance;
4) Japan’s ODA focuses on economic infrastructure, and has become
a way to ‘export public works’; and
5) Corruption of the Foreign Ministry which controls ODA through its
diplomats, who have mistaken ‘diplomatic privilege’ to mean they are a‘privileged diplomatic class.’ ”
80ODA As War ReparationsFirst, let us examine the issue of reparations to the winning nations. Underinternational law, defeated countries are generally obliged to pay compensation to
those countries on the winning side. The Allied Powers who concluded the 1951 San
Francisco peace treaty with Japan waived all reparation claims; but Japan paidcompensation to many Asian countries who signed bilateral peace treaties that madeprovisions for such claims. Some believe one aspect of ODA serves as an extension of
those post-war reparations. To a certain extent, because Japan was one of the defeatednations it is perhaps inevitable some would naturally believe this. Japan is an apology
culture with a spirituality that values saying sorry, so from this perspective too, somebelieve that paying war reparations was the natural thing to do.
However, a line should have been drawn here in considering ODA as anextension of postwar reparations. Charges of various sorts have been made against
Shigeru Yoshida in this book, but the Foreign Ministry launched into the postwar
period by pushing its own war responsibility onto Japan’s prewar military forces, anddeceiving the Japanese people by acting as though it had no responsibility for the war.
Which means that the Foreign Ministry could only regard that war as a war of
aggression. If the Foreign Ministry had launched into the postwar period with a clear
acknowledgement of its own war responsibility, it may have been in a position tovoice subjects essential for Japan, for instance that there were elements of that war
which were unavoidable, or that it was partly aimed at awakening the peoples of Asia
and liberating colonized lands. But under the leadership of Shigeru Yoshida, theForeign Ministry carried on after the war as though it had no war responsibility at all,and did nothing except push all blame for that war upon the former military forces;
consequently, it became impossible to argue the case for any nobler aspects related tothat war. The harm done to the Japanese people would have been relatively minor if agovernment organ other than the Foreign Ministry, for instance the Ministry of Health,
had behaved in this manner. But because the Foreign Ministry represents Japanabroad as its instrument for foreign relations, it does enormous damage to the interestsof the people of Japan by employing a masochistic view of history while conducting
diplomacy with the outside world. It cannot make statements on a national level about
the nobler causes related to that war. The Japanese people are being made to shoulder
the burden of the misguided way the Foreign Ministry carried on after the war.
In other words, the element of ODA that represents war reparations was one
aspect of international relations for a defeated Japan, but the Foreign Ministry used it
for its own purposes, to expand its masochistic view of history through the postwar
structures of Japan’s defeat, and to secure its own position. The Foreign Ministry used
its important role of conducting diplomacy to become the government institution
promulgating Japan’s spirit of atonement for the war to the outside world, but
subsequently became the broad amplifier of a masochistic view of history.
ODA As Return For Japanese Economy
Let us now turn our attention to the issue of the aspect of ODA that brings a
return for the domestic economy. ODA for roads, bridges, transportation and energy
infrastructure places orders with Japanese-affiliated companies, and this expenditure
has certainly contributed to the growth of Japan’s economy. But this created large
areas of concessions and special interests, and the corruption brought about by the81interference of politicians. Compared to bureaucrats in other ministries, those in theForeign Ministry know little about domestic politics, but this is a trait they sharesomewhat with politicians. It is easy for politicians to interfere with Foreign Ministry
ODA. This makes it easy to develop cozy relationships with private companies. And
it can also be difficult for the Japanese public to monitor.
A “people power” revolution occurred in the Philippines in February 1986.
Long-serving president Ferdinand Marcos was ousted from the country, and then
Corazon Aquino became president. And it emerged that Japanese companies had paidhuge “rebates” (bribes) to Marcos in the form of yen loans. Naturally, this was also amajor issue for the Japanese Diet.
What role in this did the Foreign Ministry play at the time? It tried to stifle
suspicions over ODA, and to prevent the truth from being exposed. The Foreign
Ministry made sure the truth was not conveyed to the Diet by pressuring the newlyappointed President Aquino with words to the effect that, “Japan and the Philippines
must work together in the future,” and forcing her to choose between renewing or
suspending aid.125 Incidents like these that occur abroad are difficult for the Japanesepublic to scrutinize in any case, but on top of this the Foreign Ministry, a state organ,
invokes the practice of “diplomatic secrecy” to cover things up.
ODA As Means To Pursue National Interest
What about the side of ODA as a means to pursue the national interest? The
focus of our attention is inescapably drawn to the miserable failure of ODA to China.
During a visit to China in December 1979 Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira remarked
that, “it is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of not only Japan, but also
the Asia-Pacific region, that China is stable and that cordial bilateral relations exist
between Japan and China,” and pledged to launch ODA contributions to China. How
are matters now between Japan and China, three and a half decades later?
In 2001, Ponoma College professor David Arase published a report for the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., and observedthat the pillar of Japan’s diplomacy towards China, namely its ODA donations, had
not obtained the desired results and had simply failed.126 That report was publishedover a decade ago.

125

Kansuke Watanabe, “ODA giwaku wo fusatsu shita Gaimusho no kyoken taishitsu wo tou:
Akino daitoryo wo dokatsu” [Questioning Foreign Ministry’s Bullying Posture in
Suppressing ODA Scandal: President Aquino Threatened], Shukan Post, November 14, 1986,
pp. 214-219.
126
Yoshihisa Komori, “Chugoku bakari ka Betonamu de mo! ‘ODA gaiko’ wa muyo nochobutsu to kashite iru” [Not Only China But Vietnam Too! ‘ODA Diplomacy’ Has Becomea White Elephant], SAPIO, December 10, 2003, pp. 88-90. Komori introduces an American
who pointed out the failure of Japan’s ODA to China, as follows: “A U.S. scholar has also
concluded that Japanese ODA has failed as a diplomatic strategy towards China. In January
2001, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, chartered by the U.S. Congress,
published a special report on China in which Professor David Arase, from Ponoma College in
Claremont, California, contributed the opening chapter, ‘Sino-Japanese relations: the view
from Japan and implications for U.S. policy.’ Professor Arase is an expert on Japanese
82

The most regrettable period of Japan’s ODA policy towards China has been
since 1989, when the Tiananmen Square Incident occurred and Jiang Zemin became
general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. With no qualms at all, Jiang
introduced an anti-Japanese bias into the education system. The Foreign Ministry did
not utter one word of protest at the time, but simply stood by and didn’t even try tosuspend Japan’s ODA contributions. It failed to predict how Japan-China relations
would progress if this anti-Japanese sentiment was allowed to continue in this manner.
With sufficient foresight, there would have been ways to bring an end to theenormous amounts of ODA in order to counteract this bias slightly, however it
attempted no such measures at all.
Executing people is a routine part of the political culture of China, unlike inJapan where it is extremely rare, and while both countries belong to the “Chinesecharacter cultural sphere” they are as different as night and day. There is surely
something about China, with its deeply-ingrained great-power mentality, that makes it
rather unapproachable. As such, it could potentially become very anti-Japanese.
However, if even the slightest anti-Japanese tendencies take root in this way, thedonation of ODA loses its meaning. Therefore discrete moves must be taken to
gradually bring an end to the policy of donating ODA to China. These measures
should have been put into place in 1979, when ODA to China first began. But theForeign Ministry was incapable of this sort of long-term vision. If it had this capacity,
it would have embraced from the very start a policy of reducing donations of ODA
when China showed even the smallest sign of being less than appreciative. If thisapproach had been taken, Chinese gestures of appreciation for ODA from Japan
would have made a more lasting impression on the Chinese people.
What did Chairman Mao Zedong say to Kozo Sasaki, then a member of theJapan Socialist Party, during the latter’s visit to China in 1964? Mao’s response to
Sasaki, who apologized for “the great disruptions caused to everyone by Japanesemilitarists during their invasion of China,” was as follows: “If the Imperial JapaneseArmy had not occupied the greater part of China, the struggle to unite the Chinese
people would not have been possible, and the Chinese Communist Party probably
wouldn’t have been able to seize power. Japanese militarism brought about significant
benefits to China, thanks to which the Chinese people were able to assume power.
Without the Imperial Japanese Army, it would have been impossible for us to takecontrol.”127
It is understandable that Japanese diplomacy might find itself tossed about by
a monumentally self-righteous China, but when it does not do what needs to be done

foreign policy and international relations in East Asia. His conclusion was that Japanese ODA,
the pillar of Japan’s diplomacy towards China, had for the past two decades failed to achieve
its initial aims, and had ended in failure.” See David Arase, et al., Amy McCreedy, ed.,China-Japan Relations: Old Animosities, New Possibilities (Washington D.C.: Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2001).
127
Tokyo Daigaku kindai Chugokushi kenkyukai yaku [Tokyo University Modern Chinese
History Study Group, trans.], Mo Takuto shiso (ge) [Thoughts of Chairman Mao, vol. 2](Tokyo: San-ichi Publishing Co., 1975), p. 187.
83

and merely cowers in fear, one can only wonder whether the Foreign Ministry is evenworth keeping.
Currently in 2014, China is achieving remarkable economic growth and has
become the second largest economic power in the world, so does Japan really stillneed to donate ODA? Why is it still necessary to donate ODA to China when China
itself is donating aid to other countries? Japan’s Official Development Assistance
Charter, approved in 1992 and revised in 2003, seeks to promote democratization andpays heed to expansion of military spending in recipient nations. Thus China is clearly
moving in the wrong direction even as far as the “Charter” is concerned, so why
should Japan still donate ODA to China?128
By maintaining ODA to China, Japan’s Foreign Ministry continues to betray
Japan and its people. Which country does the Foreign Ministry actually work for?


128

Apart from ODA, other outstanding problems with China include contradictions inherent
in the question of abandoned chemical weapons. Chemical weapons belonging to Japan at thetime of its defeat were transferred to China’s People’s Liberation Army; and even though the
PLA abandoned these weapons by burying them in the ground, Japan must bear the expense
for their disposal. In 1999, the governments of China and Japan signed the Memorandum on
the Destruction of Japanese Discarded Chemical Weapons in China. See Masanori Mizuma,“ ‘Iki kagaku heiki’ wa Chugoku ni hikiwatasarete ita: Nokotte ita heiki hikitsugisho” [SoCalled Abandoned Chemical Weapons Were Transferred To China: Handover Report On
Weapons Left Behind], Seiron, June 2006, pp. 48-61.
84Chapter 4
Reforming the Foreign Ministry: General Issues

4.1 The Problem With Japanese Diplomats
Expected to be able to respond promptly
To be serious about revitalizing Japan, urgent consideration must be given toreforming the Foreign Ministry.
First, there is the problem with Japanese diplomats. 129 The professional
diplomat system dates from 1893 in the Meiji era. The employee structure within theForeign Ministry was revised, establishing the title of “diplomat”; Jutaro Komura,then the envoy to Qing China, and Hara Kei of the Rikken Seiyukai (Friends ofConstitutional Government) political party, among others, declared that “those whohave not passed examinations qualifying them as diplomatic or consular staff may not
be appointed as diplomats or consuls.” In 1894 they conducted the first examinations
for diplomats and consuls, which produced four successful candidates.
From the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate through the early Meiji era, Japan’sinternational relations were managed by individuals who had not passed these
specialized examinations nor received expert training; so could we now expect
diplomats who had the benefit of this expert training to achieve better diplomatic
results?
Clearly not. As this author has frequently pointed out in the preceding chapters,
it is astonishing that, on the eve of war between Japan and the United States, the first
secretary went out instead of typing up the “final notice” that had arrived from thehome office; and the embassy counselor neglected to put the embassy on emergency
alert despite being cabled to “make every preparation to present it to the Americans

129

For a simple overview of how diplomacy has evolved throughout human history, see
Atsuhiko Yatabe, Shokugyo toshite no gaikokan [Diplomacy as a Profession] (Tokyo:
Bungeishunju, 2002), pp. 12-35.
85

just as soon as you receive instructions.” What should be noted here is that thefollowing day when this notice was being typed up, the home office had ordered local
typists not be used for security reasons, and the only career diplomat qualified to typeat all was this same first secretary, but he could only do so extremely slowly by
jabbing at the keys one finger at a time. What are we to make of this?
In other words, a diplomat who had passed the official examinations and hadreceived specialized training, was sent to the United States but was unable to typeproperly in English. This means that the system put in place in 1893 to train andeducate diplomats was clearly flawed even when it came to issues of such anelementary nature.
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, atomic bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final stages of the war, despite Japan having lost theability to wage war any further, and due in large part to the Japanese Navy’s “sneak
attack” at Pearl Harbor.130 In light of the clerical blunders that inadvertently led to the“sneak attack,” the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was surely
caused by these amateurish diplomats trained and educated in the system devised in
1893.
As discussed in Chapter 3, what is needed in a diplomat is the ability torespond in a timely manner, and the aptitude for long-term strategic vision.131 The
ability to respond in a timely manner means that, for instance, diplomats posted to theUnited States ought to be able to type competently in English. In spite of this, those
appointed as first secretary and embassy counselor were unable to type at all. Thismatter alone tells us how unsophisticated the training and education of diplomats was.
Though the Japanese Navy differed somewhat, in the past those in theJapanese Army’s military academies who pledged to become future officers, had toundergo training that made them start out as a second-class private before moving up
the ranks. In other words, those who wanted to become officers were forced first to
familiarize themselves with the Army’s lowest rank and carry out the duties of a
private, before they could receive training to be an officer. Naturally, the training of
diplomats should have followed a similar course.
In 1893, when the diplomatic examinations were established, separate
examinations were implemented for embassy secretaries and temporary staffers.
Examinations were divided into three grades—known today as Level 1 Managerial(career track), Level 2 Specialist, and Level 3 Administrative—but those in the career
stream should have been forced to first undergo training in administrative duties likepart-timers, before being allowed to be trained and educated as diplomats. Ironically,
if this training and education had been carried out as should have been required, theatomic bombs may not have been dropped on Japan.

130

See Chapter 2.1 “I Come Before You to Offer Myself to the Judgment of the Powers You
Represent”; and Chapter 3.1 “Problem of Sense of Responsibility.”131
See Chapter 3.1.
86

Negotiating Skills Expected of a Diplomat
Let us consider here what professional expectations we might have of a
diplomat who has passed through this sort of examination system.
A diplomat represents his or her own nation when negotiating with othercountries, and when doing so has a major role in ensuring relations with those othercountries go smoothly. To do this, a certain level of negotiating skill is required. And
at the core of this negotiating skill is a talent for languages. In principle this meansmastering foreign languages to a certain degree, but also being adept to some extent atapplying knowledge of universally-accepted norms of diplomatic behavior. But thisdoes not mean creating a system where too much emphasis is placed on these skills,
so that other abilities, for instance the ability to type, are delegated entirely toancillary part-time staff.
In the early Meiji period, few Japanese were fluent in foreign languages, letalone had knowledge of diplomatic protocols as well, so it was problematic finding
anyone who on top of this excelled at clerical duties; therefore, one might concede adiplomatic system was needed which employed support staff to handle such detailed
administrative skills. But when you think about it, can a diplomat skilled atnegotiation be entirely without any office capabilities at all? Can a training regime
actually cultivate the type of diplomat who is skilled only in negotiation, and has todelegate detailed office work to a subordinate?
It can only be concluded that diplomats trained since 1873, based on suchassumptions, were flawed from the very beginning. Although fluency in a foreign
language might be necessary to conduct negotiations, such fluency does notnecessarily mean competency in all aspects of conversation in that particular language.
For instance, even Japanese people fluent in Japanese will be ignorant about
conversations regarding medical treatments if they are not doctors; similarly, theywould be unable to comprehend professional meetings on economic issues without abackground in economics. In other words, language proficiency alone does notguarantee expert negotiating skills.
Negotiations are conducted over concrete issues involved in those negotiations,
so only someone fully versed in issues to do with trade and commerce, for example,
would have the necessary skills to conduct such negotiations.
According to an ancient Chinese idiom, “a 3-inch tongue can be more
powerful than a million soldiers.” During the Warring States Period (453–221 B.C.),
Mao Sui was a house guest staying with Ping Yuanjun, a member of the Zhao royalfamily. At that moment, a large army from the state of Qin attacked Zhao, andsurrounded the capital. Whereupon Zhao tried to resist this attack by forming an
alliance with the great kingdom of Chu. Ping Yuanjun was the one sent to bring thisabout. However the person who actually negotiated the alliance was Ping’s house
guest Mao Sui, who until then they had thought of as merely an ordinary fellow.
When discussing the matter with the King of Chu, Mao Sui demonstrated how Chu
needed an alliance to save itself because ancient precedents showed how the powerful
kingdom of Chu would invariably lose when waging war against Qin. The story tells
how Mao was able to bring about an alliance by swaying the King of Chu, who at firstwas completely disinterested. Mao Sui’s negotiating skills are extolled in theexpression, “a 3-inch tongue can be more powerful than a million soldiers.” But Mao
Sui had a natural talent for this fine negotiating skill, and had not mastered it throughany specific training. Furthermore, he argued his case with extensive knowledge of87

the various relationships between the states of Zhao, Qin, and Chu. No-one could
simply be taught such negotiating abilities in a classroom.
It can’t be denied outright that basic negotiating skills might be developed
through training and education, namely through general language acquisition andgeneral bargaining exercises. Nevertheless, fundamentally there is no level ofclassroom-based training that can reproduce the professional standards required of a
diplomat.
Some forms of training and education for Japanese diplomats and consuls do
indeed take place when we examine their postings to Europe and the U.S., and there
are cases where such diplomatic training occurs in-house. For instance, teachers who
are now sent abroad to Japanese schools in foreign countries receive induction
training for such foreign placements, so in that sense, diplomatic training andeducation already exists.
But it’s worth reiterating that, essentially, negotiating skills are not somethingthat can be taught within a training and education facility. People born with innate
talents tend to accumulate practical experiences through daily life.
A general overview of the history of the Foreign Ministry reveals that, up until
around the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japanese foreign policy was
exemplary. Japan’s foreign affairs were conducted by people without any formal
training in diplomacy. Japanese diplomacy began to deteriorate only after so-called
professional diplomats took over the handling of Japan’s foreign policy.
Although towards the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japanese authorities
presided over the debacle of unequal treaties being forced upon Japan, those who
were responsible for Japan’s foreign relations, without exception, demonstrated asuperior diplomatic sensitivity. Without doubt, officials involved in diplomacy at thistime may have had a local advantage because they were dealing with familiar
domestic Japanese issues; but they handled these negotiations well despite their lackof specialized diplomatic training or education. This may have been because thenegotiations were assigned to individuals who had superior negotiating skills, after
they had initially mapped out foreign policy options by widely canvassing opinion.
To this extent, the system established in 1893 to train and educate diplomats
produced no tangible results in Japan’s diplomatic record, and was a failure from thestart because it merely copied the outward format of diplomatic training facilities in
the West.
Shortage of Successful Diplomatic Exam Candidates Also ProblematicWith such a poor reputation Japan’s diplomatic training and education system,
along with its prominent and supposedly rigorous entrance examinations, was finallyabolished in 2000 after drawing heavy and protracted criticism. Twenty-one people—
seventeen men and four women—passed the final diplomatic exam. Only one out ofroughly 41 candidates was successful.
The number of successful candidates was rather small, compared to the total
number of more than 4,000 employees working in the Foreign Ministry. In fact, thelow number of successful examination candidates, who later go on to become career
diplomats, also demonstrates the flaw in this diplomat system in use since the Meiji
era. Such a low pass rate guarantees that, barring unforeseen incidents, those who pass
the diplomatic examinations will later go on to become ambassador to some country
in the world just before retirement. The diplomatic examination is the arrangement
88which produces a “privileged class” who are treated like feudal lords, and at the end
are promoted to the rank of ambassador. In other words, limiting the number ofcandidates passing the examination guaranteed worldly success for all, and createdthis “privileged class.”
A phenomenon has arisen, quite spontaneously, where these privileges arehanded down from parents to their offspring. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, asurvey conducted in 1994 found a number of diplomats who belonged to family clans
spanning four generations.132 Ambassador Morihisa Aoki, remembered for puffing on
a cigarette during a 1997 press conference after being released from the hostage crisisat the Peruvian ambassador’s residence, comes from a clan which boasts four
generations of ambassadors, including his mother in whose footsteps he has followed.
It cannot be substantiated that candidates with Ministry familial ties
automatically pass the Foreign Service exam, but perhaps there is a natural tendency
over time for something approaching this situation to arise. In fact, past application
forms provided by the Foreign Ministry’s personnel department included a column toindicate whether a candidate had any relatives in the Ministry.133 As argued in Chapter
3, it’s no exaggeration that Japan’s diplomacy has been carried out to benefit career
diplomats.
As mentioned above, the so-called diplomatic exam was abolished in 2000.
New recruits are now found through the general national civil service examination.
This open recruitment system for diplomats has recently brought into question
whether professional diplomats are even necessary, not only in Japan but also abroad.
George F. Kennan was a well-known and leading figure in American diplomacy
during the pre- and post-war eras, and in an essay for Foreign Affairs in 1997, hevoiced the opinion that we now live in an age of “diplomacy without diplomats.” To
support this opinion, he argued that the role of the U.S. National Security Council,
which answers directly to the President, has grown; the number of staff stationed
abroad working for other departments and agencies of the federal government has
increased; and overseas exchanges by municipal and local authorities, as well asprivate enterprises, have expanded. This has produced a situation where professional
diplomats who have received traditional training are rendered virtually unnecessary.
When considering the future role of Japan’s diplomats, serious heed should be paid to
Kennan’s view.134

132

Reiko Tamura, “ ‘Gaimusho-keibatsu’ no kenkyu” [Study on the Foreign Ministry andFamily Clans], in Foresight, September 1994, p. 121.
133
M. Suzuki and T. Kubota, “Pekin ‘Nihon taishikan’ dogeza gaiko no ichibu shushi” [AllThe Details about the “Feeble Diplomacy” of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing], in Shokun!
January 1997, p. 48.
134
See George F. Kennan, “Diplomacy Without Diplomats,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 1997. Kennan, a leading figure in American diplomacy, pointed out thatthe position and relative importance of America’s professional diplomats have declined,leading to a situation where diplomacy can be carried out even without diplomats.
See also, Frank Carlucci, chair; Ian Brzezinski, director, State Department Reform(Wash. DC.; Council of Foreign Relations Press) February 2001. This 45-page report waspresented to Secretary Powell advising that, as of 2001, the State Department was unable to89

Generous Conditions for Diplomats Conversely Obstructs Development of Abilities
We move now to the subject of working conditions abroad. Foreign service
personnel, not only those in the career stream such as ambassadors or envoys, but also
including consuls and other specialist staff working in missions abroad, are all
broadly considered “diplomats,” and those who work abroad are given overly
generous financial compensation, which conversely results in an inability to further
develop their diplomatic skills.
If Foreign Ministry staff are placed abroad and start working in diplomatic
missions overseas, and if they are appointed to developing countries, they sometimes
receive an overseas assignment allowance equivalent to nearly twice the base salary
for working in Japan. Moreover, because they are not stationed in Japan, they are notsubject to Japanese resident taxes. Nor are embassy personnel required to pay taxes intheir host country, so they virtually avoid paying tax altogether. They can alsopurchase many goods that are tax-exempt, that is, exempt from customs duty andconsumption tax. They also receive housing allowances on top of this.135
In other words, a posting abroad including housing allowances can sometimes
mean an increase in annual income by three fold, and sometimes even four fold or
more. For instance, there was a case from a decade ago where a posting to Warsaw,
Poland, meant an increase in annual income by five and a half fold.136
Reasons for providing such generous stipends abroad appear to include
concerns over dangerous conditions in the country of posting or the degree of
personal inconvenience; but being constantly prepared for such dangers andunexpected incidents seems to justify the logic that staff posted abroad are on call 24hours a day.
What happens when staff join the Foreign Ministry, work abroad for a few
years, and develop a taste for these generous conditions? As diplomats working

handle America’s diplomatic needs in the 21st century, because of antiquated facilities andequipment, and staff shortages. It claimed that no other government department was in needof as much improvement as the State Department, and called for urgent reform.
135
Tsutomu Saito filed a two-part article in the Sankei Shimbun (June 21-22, 2001, evening
edition) on the luxurious buildings and facilities at the Japanese embassy in Moscow, and thegenerous staff conditions, at the time.
Prominent scientists in Russia only earned the equivalent of less than 30,000 yen permonth, where average housing costs were around 3,000 yen per month; however, housing
allowances for Japanese embassy staff ranged from the upper threshold of 840,000 yen for theembassy counselor, to 730,000 yen (first secretary), 660,000 yen (second and third
secretaries) and 580,000 yen (other staff). They were also paid allowances for working
abroad—embassy counselor: 570,000-650,000 yen; first secretary: 440,000-500,000 yen;second and third secretaries: 360,000-390,000 yen; and other staff: 310,000-330,000 yen—inaddition to their regular salaries being paid in Japan, which remained virtually untouched.
Moreover, they received two month’s paid leave in Japan after being stationed in Moscow foreighteen months, which even embassy staff thought was “strange.”
136
Sankei Shimbun, August 3, 2001, “Tokken kaikyu no koshi kondo: ‘Kikoku sureba hakyu
nanda’ “ [Privileged Class Mixes Up Private and Public: “I’m Paid a Pittance If I Go Home.”]90

abroad they even enjoy a variety of diplomatic privileges, including being immune
from arrest if they commit a crime.
Under these circumstances, they can’t do their work properly. No matter what
they do, they still earn five times more than what they would in Japan. Which means
they lose focus, and their will to work hard is sapped.
Statistically, even those working in dangerous regions are not that much at risk
from upheavals. Although diplomats are subject to a 24-hour workday system toaccount for unforeseen incidents, similar systems are in place in Japan to covervarious professions including the police and Self-Defense Force personnel. Even
during off duty hours, these personnel must make their whereabouts known so they
can be recalled for emergencies. Applying these same conditions to diplomats,
Foreign Ministry staff should only be paid for three eight-hour shifts, namely only
three times their current salary in Japan. Why are diplomats allowed to enjoy suchoverly-generous compensation arrangements? Clearly the Foreign Ministry must beforced to reveal its true colors to the people of Japan.

4.2 The Problem With Diplomatic Missions Abroad
Diplomatic missions abroad antiquated“Housing allowance: early 20s, 580,000 yen; middle-aged, 800,000 to 1.2
million yen. Paid leave: after six months work, 2 weeks; after 18 months, 8 weeks.
Place of employment: Moscow.”“This is no advertisement for a blue-chip corporation. These are some of the
maximum thresholds for allowances for the “privileged” class of diplomats at Japan’sembassy in Russia. Last April (2000) housing allowances rose across the board by 60
percent, and more than three out of five Japanese diplomats in Moscow were moved
into new accommodation. This supports a truly extravagant lifestyle, given that evenprominent scientists in Russia may earn a monthly salary of less than 300,000 yen,and only spend on average around 3,000 yen per month on housing.”
These are the lead sentences from an article lambasting the Foreign Ministryby reporter Tsutomu Saito, in the June 21, 2001, evening edition of the Sankei
Shimbun newspaper. We discussed the problems with Japanese diplomats in theprevious section, so let us now turn our attention to issues with the Foreign Ministry’s
diplomatic missions abroad.
The Foreign Ministry uses the diplomatic mission as a base of operations to
conduct its diplomacy abroad. There are three types of diplomatic mission: embassy,
consulate general, and permanent mission; and Japan has around 200 diplomatic
missions around the world. An embassy formally represents Japan in its host country,
and is typically located in the capital city. Heading the embassy is the ambassador
who represents Japan in the host country, and below that is the minister, theembassy’s “number two.” On the other hand, consulates are located in large cities
around the world where Japanese companies are active or where there are many
Japanese nationals, and in the main provide consular services. Consular services
include providing documentation to Japanese citizens living abroad regarding
marriages and births; extending support and aid to Japanese citizens caught up inincidents; and issuing visas to foreign nationals wishing to enter Japan. The consul
general is in charge of the consulate general, and below that is the consul.
91At present, Japan has just under 120 embassies and fewer than 70 consulates.
However embassies also provide consular services, so the total number of offices thatprovide consular support equals the total number of Japan’s diplomatic missions
abroad.
This author poses the question whether Japan’s diplomatic missions abroad,and its embassies led by ambassadors, function properly; but clearly, the answer is no.
As described above, a career diplomat who passes the current foreign service
exams will invariably go on to become an ambassador in some country in the world.
This means that Foreign Ministry personnel in the career stream are often stationed at
Japanese embassies around the world, without knowledge of the language, culture orpolitical situation in their country of posting. A small number of ambassadors areindeed appointees, as are representatives posted abroad by other government
ministries and private enterprises. Therefore, it would not be entirely out of thequestion to select an individual as ambassador who, from the beginning, understands
the language, culture and political situation in the country of posting. However since a
career diplomat is always guaranteed posting as an ambassador somewhere, and issubject to personnel decisions that take no account of the specialized knowledge andskills needed in the host country—something clearly required of a professional
diplomat—then these personnel decisions do not necessarily match an ambassador toa host country.137
While on the subject of ambassadors, they have the prerogative to issue astatement of opinion on behalf of the country they represent. Under international law,ambassadors also have the authority to independently make a declaration of war. Are
Japanese embassies, under ambassadors in possession of such enormous authority,
fully capable of functioning properly? The answer is, clearly not.
An ambassador sent to a country without a complete understanding of thelocal language, culture and political situation is supported by embassy staff, under the
direction of the embassy counselor, whose role is to assist the ambassador. The
complement of embassy staff will include diplomats who have passed the diplomatic
examinations and belong to the career stream; below them, those who have passed
examinations in specialized qualifications; and further below, those with Level 3
administrative qualifications.
Discrimination based on these three ranks seems to be more extreme at
diplomatic missions abroad than it is at the Foreign Ministry’s home office in Tokyo’s
Kasumigaseki district.138 Specialists may be stationed abroad for lengthy periods, but
despite becoming experts in the language, culture and political situation in theircountry of posting, and accumulating excellent skills and notable achievements, inprinciple they will never be promoted within the Ministry to positions such as bureau
chief or ambassador. Conditions for Level 3 administrative staff are even more
restrictive.

137

Yoshihisa Komori, Bokoku no Nihon taishikan [Japan’s Embassies and the Ruin of the
Nation] (Tokyo: Shogakukan 2002), pp. 98-174.
138
Komori, Bokoku no Nihon taishikan, pp. 191-192; Yoshihisa Komori, “Kaseki no yona
mibun sabetsu” [Fossil-Like Discriminatory Status System], Sankei Shimbun, October 29,
1997.
92

While on the subject of discrimination among Ministry staff stationed abroad,curiously the wives of diplomats also used to be ranked according to their husbands’
importance and not by their own age or experience. The Foreign Ministry used toissue a bulky pamphlet entitled “Rules for Diplomatic Wives” (Zaigai kokan fujin no
kokoroe). It was scrapped in 2001 because of its extremely anachronistic nature, buteven now “training courses for wives” can be taken before these women go abroad.
Classes in local customs and etiquette are probably necessary, but the aforementioned
pamphlet also taught the correct ranking of diplomatic wives, and accordingly, theirrequired dress code and appropriate use of language.139
A system designating a wife as an accessory to her diplomat husband wasclearly no longer acceptable in the world of diplomacy in the 21st century. But thefact that a ranking “system” like this was still being taught in Japan until the
beginning of this century clearly shows how out of step Japan’s diplomatic missions
abroad have been.
Moreover, Japan’s network of diplomatic missions established overseas in the
postwar era has found it increasingly difficult to implement Japanese diplomacy, eventhough ambassadors wielding immense authority, but without an understanding of thesituation in their host nations, are ably supported by competent staff within thosemissions.
For instance, military attachés stationed at the embassy are sent by the
Ministry of Defense. In prewar Japan, these were known as “military officers on
assignment” (chuzai bukan). Their main duties were to gather military intelligence intheir host country, and to quickly transmit this back to the Ministry of Defense as
defense information. In 1955, one year after the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), theMinistry of Defense’s predecessor, was set up, the Foreign Ministry and the JDA
exchanged a memorandum requiring that military attachés not transmit
communications directly to the JDA. In other words, without permission from theambassador military attachés could no longer transmit defense information directly
back to Japan. Instead, this information would be sent to the Foreign Ministry’s homeoffice, thus often there would be a further delay of several days before it would arriveat the Defense Agency.
An ambassador who had just arrived at a posting would have little knowledgeof the situation in the new host country and in a sense was at their weakest; and yet it
was frequently the case that embassy staff under the ambassador’s considerable
authority were unable to send valuable information they had gathered back to Japan.
And even if this information did get sent back to Japan, it often arrived at the relevant
department after it was no longer useful.
This inefficient system was partly revised in 2003 for military attachés only,
whose messages are now automatically and reliably forwarded by the Foreign
Ministry to the Defense Agency.140

139“Gaikokan fujin no karei na ‘oshigoto’: ohana toban, otto no joretsu ga tsuma no joretsu”[The Wonderful “Work” of the Diplomatic Wife: The Flower Arranging Roster, and Being
Ranked by Your Husband’s Rank], AERA, June 30, 1997, pp. 42-45.
140
Tsutomu Saito, “Taigu dake wa senshinkoku nami daga domeikoku ni sura suki wotsukareru ‘kyojaku taishitsu’ “ [Wages of a Developed Nation, But with a ‘Weak Disposition’93Improvement of Educational Training Needed
Let us now consider how Japan’s outdated diplomatic missions abroad can berevitalized, and how their operation can be improved.
First, we must start by reviewing the Ministry’s in-house training andeducation. As discussed in Chapter 1, on the day war broke out between Japan and theUnited States—December 7, 1941 (U.S. time)—orders were given to type up the“final notice” to the United States; but among the career diplomats at the Washington
embassy, only one person was even capable of this. And this person’s typing
technique was poor, because he could only stab at the keys one finger at a time. It wastherefore impossible to complete the typing by the designated deadline, and thedelivery of the “final notice” was delayed; this meant that the Japanese Navy’s attack
on Pearl Harbor inadvertently occurred before the “final notice” could be delivered.
There would have been ample time had the typing been started the previous night.
However with the proper training and education of career diplomats in basic typing
skills, the document could very easily have been typed up by the designated deadline
even if the typing hadn’t been done the night before; and the delivery of the “final
notice” would not have been delayed.141
Did the Foreign Ministry duly reflect on deficiencies like this, andsubsequently revise its postwar training and education system? It can only beconcluded that such revisions have not taken place. The Ministry’s incompetence anddysfunctionality can only be products of the in-house training and education of its
three classes of employees; but there has never been any mention in the postwar era ofa reassessment to bring about reforms targeting prewar training and education.
Level 3 administrative staff currently undergo intense training in English andthe use of personal computers. While they serve in diplomatic missions abroad, they
are also trained in administrative skills such as correspondence, accounting, anddocument processing.142 The point to be made here is that career diplomats (Level 1)
and specialists (Level 2) should also undergo training similar to that of Level 3 staff,
and be required to achieve at least a passing grade. In addition, career diplomats
should also undergo training similar to that received by specialists, and be required toachieve at least a passing grade. Specialist staff include those responsible for security,communications, medical health, transportation, housing, supplies, and those whoplan and coordinate the ambassador’s commitments, namely, those who provide
logistical support; to be able to make proper diplomatic decisions, it is essential that

Even Allies Take Advantage Of], SAPIO, December 10, 2003, p. 86; “Boeicho nimo
shunsoku joho” [Prompt Information for Japan Defense Agency Too], Sankei Shimbun, May
8, 2003.
141
See fn. 90.
142
In a commercially-available exam primer for prospective diplomats, training in skills suchas correspondence, accounting, and document processing are clearly specified for Level 3
candidates, but these skills are not specified at all for Level 1 candidates. See Hogakushoinhenshubu [Editorial Board Hogakushoin], Gaikokan no shigoto ga wakaru hon [The Book on
How to be a Diplomat] (Tokyo: Hogakushoin, 2002), pp. 34-40.
94

an ambassador have some experience with, and a basic understanding of, these
specialist duties.
The same is true regarding diplomatic missions abroad. There are individual
differences between Japan’s diplomatic missions abroad, and the way each embassy
conducts its business varies considerably. In order for an ambassador to become
familiar with the operation of a particular embassy, they must become involved in all
aspects of the embassy’s running. The ambassador must spend time at the front
counter, even if its only for two or three days, and get hands-on experience in issuingvisas to develop a thorough knowledge of embassy operations. It would also be an
opportunity to get to know local conditions in their country of posting, as well as
become acquainted with staff on the front line of embassy operations. Those at the top
must familiarize themselves with all aspects of how the embassy works.143
Diplomatic Mission is a Piece of Japan Abroad
The improvements discussed above are not enough to revitalize the operationsof diplomatic missions abroad and boost their functionality. Under international law
the diplomatic mission, whether it be an embassy or a consulate, is not subject to thelaws of the host country; it is, so to speak, a part of Japan that is like an enclave in aforeign territory. Although exaggerating the situation somewhat, the diplomatic
mission must cover all the functions of the state.
For instance, there is an official known as the “officer in charge of security
measures in the diplomatic mission abroad” (zaigai kokan keibi taisakukan (security
measures officer)). In other words, this official carries out the work that would be
handled by the National Police Agency in Japan. They must handle terrorist threatsagainst the embassy, as well as the incidents of crime (not infrequent) within the
mission’s grounds. A doctor with the title “medical affairs officer” (imukan) is also
stationed there, and is responsible for managing the health of embassy staff, but may
also be called upon to minister to Japanese citizens living in the host country.
A diplomatic mission abroad, viewed in this light, is clearly a small enclave ofJapan, and is expected to operate as a separate national entity, regardless of its
reduced size.
This means that the “security measures officer” must be personally responsiblefor devising countermeasures against the remote chance of a terrorist attack, andoverseeing and conducting annual anti-terrorism drills for all embassy staff including
the ambassador. In the case of the “medical affairs officer,” they must be personallyresponsible for establishing protocols to handle cases of sudden illness, and143

It is surprising that there is no specific training to boost the versatility of staff to handle
such a wide range of duties; and as discussed in Chapter 4.3 “12. Strengthening Policy
Conception” below, the Foreign Ministry does not employ the ringisei system used in othergovernment agencies. Ringisei, a group-centered decision making process, is a method
whereby a department will circulate a consultative paper on a particular matter to otherparallel departments for consent before finalizing a proposal for determination by those above.
Although time-consuming, this method produces a high probability that few problems willarise in practice because other departments have also been consulted.
95

conducting annual emergency-measures drills. Those involved in consular affairs
have a duty to safeguard the lives of Japanese citizens residing in the host country. In
which case, annual drills should probably be conducted to search for missing persons
in that country. In times of war or terrorist attack, Japanese citizens will naturally
gather at the Japanese embassy; so it is undoubtedly the duty of officials in charge ofconsular affairs to make preparations to cope with this.144
In other words, every duty section within a diplomatic mission abroad must
devise its own contingency plan for how to deal with emergencies should they arise,and carry out annual drills in preparation.
As the embassy’s highest authority, the ambassador should take part inconsultations for formulating these contingency plans, and give the go-ahead for the
execution of drills. And on the day of the drill itself, even the ambassador must follow
the orders of the person designated as being in charge.
The diplomatic mission abroad is in an environment where anything that could
possibly happen in the home country—even extremely rare situations—might also
happen in the host country. Drills must be carried out to establish how to respondflexibly should unexpected upheavals occur, and to seriously consider how theprestige and integrity of the diplomatic mission can be upheld. In times of crisis,
people find it virtually impossible to do things not part of their normal routine.
Previous participation in a drill clearly allows staff to respond to extreme
circumstances in a more organized manner, and the operation of the diplomatic
mission is improved considerably. As described in Chapter 3, the clumsy response ofJapanese embassy staff in 2000 during the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait was
deplorable.145
Acts of crime and terrorism happen infrequently, but it is not unusual for
Japanese citizens living abroad to go missing or become embroiled in incidents, so
drills should be conducted under the direction of the officer in charge to ensure theentire diplomatic mission is in a position to respond immediately, depending on thescale of the incident. Staff at diplomatic missions abroad should not only be wellacquainted with duties they themselves are responsible for, but to some extent be able
to handle aspects of all duties in the mission. A small complement of staff at themission must carry out the duties equivalent to a small national entity, so not only
must they be acquainted with their own specialist work, they must also familiarize
themselves with all other mission duties, even if only peripherally. Above all, what isrequired of Foreign Ministry personnel sent abroad to work is flexibility with regards
to their duties. In this sense, one might say it is vital to insist that a newly-appointed
ambassador become familiar with the business of issuing visas when arriving at theirpost.
In view of the importance of this matter, such training should beinstitutionalized at the Foreign Ministry’s Kasumigaseki home office, and reports on
this training should be demanded on a regular basis. The home office could
occasionally send undercover agents abroad to pose as missing persons, as part of a

144
145

Komori, Bokoku no Nihon taishikan, pp. 68-77.
See fns. 109, 110.
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diplomatic mission’s training exercises to conduct searches for them. By so doing, theability of diplomats to do their jobs quickly at missions abroad will probably beboosted dramatically.146

4.3 Overall Problems With The Foreign Ministry
Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi’s “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry”
Let us now finally turn our attention to Kasumigaseki, location of the Foreign
Ministry’s home office, and begin our critique of overall problems with the Ministry.
In July 2002, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi presented a report on a
“Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” (Gaimusho kaikaku ni kansuru “kaeru kai”)
drawn up by an advisory panel chaired by ORIX Corporation Chairman Yoshihiko
Miyauchi.147 Kawaguchi’s predecessor was Makiko Tanaka, who served under Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi. On January 1, 2001, when Tanaka was foreign minister,it emerged that Katsutoshi Matsuo, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Overseas Visit
Support Division, had embezzled close to a total of 500 million yen, and later a seriesof massive scandals were revealed one after another. Then in March 2002, one monthafter Kawaguchi was appointed as foreign minister, Muneo Suzuki, a Diet lower
house member, was involved in a bribery scandal concerning the selection ofcontractors for work on four Russian-held northern islands off Hokkaido, and wasforced to leave the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); he was later arrested in June.
And as discussed in Chapter 3, on May 8 there was the appalling incident regarding
five North Korean asylum seekers in Shenyang, China.
The Foreign Ministry faced a barrage of criticism. It was under thesecircumstances that Kawaguchi, shortly after her appointment on February 1 that same
year, launched her “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” to reform the Ministry,
and was presented with its final report on July 22.

146

One might assume that, potentially, Foreign Ministry employees are now able to performwith distinction since the complex foreign service tests have been replaced by the general
national civil service examination. However, these employees still can’t put their abilities touse once they enter the organization because of problems with the way the Ministry is
structured. We soon discover serious defects in systems to do with, for instance, training, duty
performance, and personnel. Even though a blunder of such colossal proportions wascommitted at Japan’s Washington Embassy on December 7, 1941 (U.S. time), no institutional
assessment or reflection was ever carried out to prevent such a mistake from happening again;
and it can only be concluded that the lack of any such willingness to do so within the Foreign
Ministry is the reason why it lags so extraordinarily far behind Japan’s other government
agencies. See fn 90.
147“Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” [Gaimusho kaikaku ni kansuru “kaeru kai”] is thetitle given by the American Embassy, Tokyo, Japanese morning press highlights, August 22,
2002, p. 4.
See http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/kai_genjo/change/saishu.html for theJapanese version of the final draft. (Retrieved on September 1, 2014.)
97

This author believes the reform plan was still inadequate, and didn’t get to theheart of the problems with the Foreign Ministry.148 Nevertheless, there were some
useful aspects. There has at least been some surface probing around the issue of theantiquated nature of the Foreign Ministry. This decidedly shallow reform paper madeno mention of problems such as the overly-generous allowances given to staff
working abroad; but an examination of the issues it addressed and the suggestions it
made provides an understanding of how the Foreign Ministry is mired in an
antiquated amateurism. Let us examine the issues here, as they appeared in this report.
The report put forward twelve items, outlined below:
1. Elimination of undue pressure
2. Elimination of apologetic elitism, and client orientation
3. Rebuilding personnel system
4. Thorough protection of confidentiality
5. Making ODA efficient
6. Ensuring efficient use and transparency of Foreign Ministry budget
7. New relationship with NGOs
8. Rebuilding public relations and canvassing systems
9. Reviewing services and personnel in embassies, etc.
10. Transparency of policymaking process, etc.
11. Developing independent management systems
12. Strengthening policy making

1. Elimination of undue pressure
The following points appear under this heading:
1.1 Clarification of first contact rule
1.2 Installation of the policy affairs headquarters

148

As discussed in fn 146, Ministry employees now have the potential to perform with
distinction. It is therefore problematic that even the combined effort of these employees does
not result in a competent Foreign Ministry.
The proposals for reform drawn up by this “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry”
are to a certain extent ideas that anyone could come up with, and don’t really include
proposals that get to the fundamental issues. In other words, it shows there is a complete lackof expertise, both in and outside the Foreign Ministry, on how to transform it into a competent
government agency. It reveals that the Ministry itself rarely considers serious proposals forreform. Moreover members of the public outside the Ministry, who seldom have any contact
with this government agency, are also unable to devise concrete proposals that are incisive.
However this author is not implying through these observations that suggestions
made by the “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” have no value at all. For the time being,
those who have dealings with the Ministry now should indeed put forward reform proposals
for what they deem necessary at the present time. This may include problems that, whencompared to issues faced by other government agencies, seem inconceivable and absurd.
Even though the Foreign Ministry lags far behind what is expected of a modern government
agency, this does not change the fact that it urgently needs revision and reform.
98Let us put aside the latter point, and take a closer look at 1.1.
When Diet lower house member Muneo Suzuki became embroiled in ascandal involving the Foreign Ministry, the “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry”
was assigned the task of creating a report that would consolidate comments submitted
by Diet representatives. The report would also record feedback from those within the
Ministry.
From the outset, Diet members have had no direct authority over the
recruitment and promotion of Ministry personnel, nor over Ministry regulation andsubsidies. However, the Foreign Ministry has been more susceptible to outside
interference than other ministries. There are two reasons for this. First, the Foreign
Ministry’s duties consist of conducting the nation’s relations with foreign countries
which, compared to those of other ministries, are relatively straight-forward. For
instance in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the work assigned
to each Ministry employee has its own particular requirements and specialized content.
Personnel decisions at METI are made on the basis of this premise, therefore carefulplanning of human resources is essential because positions cannot simply be filled
whenever and by whomever they choose. As a consequence, it is not easy for thoseoutside this ministry to interfere in personnel decisions. However, it is relatively easy
to make personnel changes at the Foreign Ministry because anyone can be brought into do the work there. Each section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does in fact
have its own area of expertise, but because there is no real depth to the execution ofthis work, personnel changes are fairly straightforward. One might say that this is anembarrassing reality for the Foreign Ministry. At diplomatic missions abroad,reassignments involving those with the expertise to collect and analyze high-value
information are not easy to carry out due to a lack of human resources; but these staff
movements are relatively easy for those doing light, uncomplicated administrative
tasks.
Second, the Foreign Ministry is easily subject to external interference, eventhough it is supposedly less susceptible due to the classified nature of its work; there
are many areas beyond the purview of the Japanese people because diplomacy deals
with the issue of foreign relations, so public scrutiny is in fact weak and this makes
the Ministry even more vulnerable to the involvement of Diet members.
Because of the above two reasons regarding why the Foreign Ministry is easily
subject to interference, the report advised that a document containing Diet members’comments on the matter be produced, and that all the responses by ministry personnel
to these comments also be recorded. This advice is of course absolutely correct, andthe recommendations of the report should be strictly observed.
However, it has been more than ten years since this report was published, andits not at all clear whether the recommendations were carried out. It can only be hopedthat this is not simply a matter of “out of sight, out of mind.”
While on the subject of external interference and meddling in the Foreign
Ministry, another situation comes to mind. In June 1987, China’s Deng Xiaoping(who no longer held any official positions) made what could be called a spurious
criticism concerning Japan over a trivial issue, to which then-Vice Foreign Minister99

Kensuke Yanagiya muttered something about whether the report had made its way up
to those who live “in the clouds.” It was a deeply regrettable remark to make as far as
Japanese diplomacy was concerned. As such, the Japanese government was forced toremove Yanagiya as vice foreign minister.149 This was a difficult call to make because
it was a political decision by the government; however if Japan had been in the habitof conducting proper diplomacy towards China, it would not have been necessary tosack a vice foreign minister on account of remarks such as these. It can only beconcluded that the Foreign Ministry, by not pursuing a proper diplomacy towards
China but habitually following a weak-kneed one, had invited its own misfortune.
2. Elimination of apologetic elitism, and client orientation
There were six points raised under this heading.
2.1. Provide Foreign Ministry officials with a sense of “mission”
2.2. Improve response of diplomatic missions abroad
2.3. Improve employees’ use of language
2.4. Abolish the provision of diplomatic passports to overseas trainees
2.5. Confirm there is no hierarchy among diplomatic wives
2.6. Comply with civil servant ethics laws and regulations

The first point—to provide Foreign Ministry officials with a sense of“mission”—is a matter of mental attitude, so as far as that’s concerned it’s probablyquite reasonable. The second point was already discussed earlier in this chapter, so we
can omit it here. Now, what is meant by improving employees’ use of language in
2.3? It seems likely this concerns ending the practice of ambassadors calling eachother “Mr. Ambassador,” and of requiring Japanese citizens abroad to address them as“Your Excellency.” The interim assessment for the report stated that, “The accruingof these seemingly small gestures, such as insisting upon formal greetings on arriving
and leaving the office, is closely related to improving motivation.” It is quite apparent
how aberrant the Foreign Ministry has become, from its beginnings in the Meiji era,
as a place of work.
The abolition of diplomatic passports to overseas trainees, referred to in 2.4, isaimed at doing away with diplomatic privileges for young employees who are sent todiplomatic missions abroad for training. Conferring diplomatic immunity to those intraining also clearly demonstrates how that training fails to instill a sense of pressure
because of the Foreign Ministry’s lax mentality.
Confirmation that there is no hierarchy among diplomatic wives, referred to in
2.5, was discussed earlier in this chapter; it concerns the issue of forcing diplomatic
wives at missions abroad into a hierarchy based on their husbands’ ranks, and is anantiquated system that designates women as accessories to men. The Foreign Ministry
used to issue a pamphlet called “Rules for Diplomatic Wives,” and although it is no149

Yukan Fuji, June 21, 1987.
100

longer current, it was previously used as the basis for training. This had no place inthe conduct of proper diplomacy by diplomats.150
Compliance with civil-servant ethics laws and regulations, referred to in 2.6, isonly common sense; but conversely, the fact that what is “common sense” has to bedeliberately spelled out reveals that, overall, Foreign Ministry staff are in fact not incomplete compliance.
3. Rebuilding personnel system
The following items are raised here.
3.1. Total competitiveness3.2. Establishing personnel system with fairness, objectivity, transparency,
and predictability
3.3. Drastic overhaul of training programs
3.4. Review of personnel structure
3.5. Personnel structure at Home Office
3.6. Review of vacation system, etc.

Total competitiveness, referred to in 3.1, is an attempt to boost
competitiveness among personnel, and should bring about improved staff
performance. In particular, although there is a relatively small number of personnel inthe career stream who have passed the Foreign Service exams implemented in the past,
the number of ambassadorial posts around the world vastly outnumber the number ofdivision chiefs at the home office. When personnel in the highest-ranked positions
outnumber lower-ranking ones, this is called a reverse pyramid. Those in the career
stream and in ambassadorial posts definitely constitute a reverse pyramid lacking incompetition, and after entering the career stream they lose all incentive to improve
themselves, which constitutes a major reason for the stagnation of Japanese foreign
policy.
As previously stated, the diplomatic exams were abolished in 2000. Successful
applicants were instead selected from among those who passed Level 1 of the general
national civil service examination, however the problem will persist if the number ofsuccessful candidates hired is kept low.
The report recommends a predetermined proportion of ambassadorial posts,
namely one in five, be filled by Level 2 specialist personnel. There seems to be someresistance among career diplomats within the Foreign Ministry to accept thisrecommendation of 20%, however if greater numbers of successful Level 1 candidates
are hired and perform specialist duties competently, then these candidates should
probably be promoted. Under those circumstances, and as a purely objective
assessment, there would seem to be no need to reassess the number of successful
Level 2 candidates as a proportion of the total. There will be successful Level 1
candidates who don’t pass the Level 2 specialist examinations, but regardless of the
proportion, even those who pass the Level 2 examinations should be approved if they150

See fn. 139.
101

can perform their specialist duties competently. After all, shouldn’t the Ministry’s
employment guidelines be fair and rigorously competitive?151
Furthermore, it should be made easier for those from other government
agencies to enter this competitive workplace.
Regarding the establishment of a personnel system with fairness, objectivity,transparency, and predictability, as referred to in 3.2, the report recommends
expanding the recruitment system, refining personnel evaluations, and abolishingnepotism by incumbent staff.
However, while it is obvious that personnel decisions should be fair and basedon ability, some allowances probably need to be made for the Foreign Ministrybecause, compared to other government agencies, its personnel administration is facedwith certain difficulties.
Many Foreign Ministry officials work at the approximately 200 diplomatic
missions around the world, and they vastly outnumber those who work at the homeoffice. How is it even possible to objectively evaluate the performance of so many
staff working at Japan’s numerous diplomatic missions abroad? Somehow evaluations
become solely based on interaction with a particular member of staff, and the process
becomes highly susceptible to favoritism and personal connections.

151

See Komori, Bokoku no Nihon taishikan, pp. 266-72.
Employing non-career diplomats in one-fifth of all ambassadorial posts may haveseemed like a decisive move, however only a small number were chosen from the 1,500 or soin the non-career stream, and the selection was made by career diplomats which ultimately
preserved the dominance of the career stream. In fact in December 2001, under the previous
foreign minister Makiko Tanaka, criteria for appointing non-career diplomats above those in
the career stream were so unclear they were considered unfeasible, and it was decided toreplace this with a system inviting applications from within the Ministry. The
recommendation by the “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” to employ non-career
diplomats in one-fifth of ambassadorial posts clearly represented a U-turn.
Komori points out that when the U.S. State Department appoints diplomats, nodistinction is made between the career and non-career streams. He argues that with regards toJapan’s non-career diplomats, “apart from eliminating the difference between Level 1 andLevel 2, the Foreign Ministry has made no real reforms.”
With respect to the adoption of this open recruitment for ambassadors describedabove, a search to see whether anyone within the career stream had come up with such
recommendations uncovered only one person. This was Atsuhiko Yatabe, the author of
Shokugyo toshite no gaikokan [Diplomacy as a Profession] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2002). Mr.
Yatabe recommended that qualifying exams open to all be held for important Ministry posts,
and a personnel advisory committee be set up within the Ministry consisting of staff
representatives to ensure fairness and transparency of personnel decisions. This committee
would hold (strictly) closed meetings to consider the list of applicants for each post,
determine the most suitable candidates from the list submitted, and report several names to avice minister or a chief secretary; the personnel administrator would then consider this report,
and determine the successful candidate from these and other applicants. Yatabe argued that
this would stimulate the willing participation of senior personnel while the rank and filewould feel less constricted, and the atmosphere in the Foreign Ministry would be vastly
improved. See Yatabe, Shokugyo, pp. 208-212.
102

Assuming this is the case, there is probably no choice other than to assess staff
performance by things such as specific tests, more so than in other government
agencies.
Also, this author has argued elsewhere in Chapter 4 that various drills should
be routinely carried out at diplomatic missions abroad. The execution of these drills
would be easily scrutinized, and should probably be used as a component for any
evaluation.
An important element of objective personnel evaluations for staff at Japan’s
approximately 200 diplomatic missions abroad is to strictly reward good work andpenalize those who perform poorly. Recognizing good performance and disciplining
poor behavior does not mean doing so on a trivial level. Upon actual inspection of theForeign Ministry’s record, those who clearly deserved to be penalized have escaped
punishment, while those who clearly merited being rewarded have failed to berecognized.152
An example of this occurred after Japan’s defeat: the culprit who, on the eveof the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, went out instead oftyping up Japan’s “final notice” to the United States, inadvertently turned theJapanese Navy’s assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.” This in turn was
inextricably linked to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, he
was promoted to vice foreign minister and was awarded the highest honor to be
conferred upon administrators, the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
This really turned the situation on its head. The diplomat who did not put the
Washington embassy on emergency alert despite receiving orders to do so, and who
negligently allowed the official responsible for typing the “final notice” to go out andneglect his duties, was also promoted to vice foreign minister and awarded the Grand
Cordon.153
On the other hand, the specialist diplomat Chiune Sugihara who saved thelives of 6,000 Jews was dismissed from the Foreign Ministry, not because he hadviolated regulations by issuing them visas, but ostensibly on account of retrenchment
due to overstaffing. He was given a sum of money and a letter of appreciation when
he retired, by Administrative Vice Minister Katsuo Okazaki; but afterwards, theForeign Ministry consistently avoided honoring Sugihara for his heroic efforts. The
Ministry intended to keep ignoring him, no matter how well-known he became in therest of the world. It was only in 2000, fourteen years after Sugihara passed away, that152

See Chapter 3.2 “ No Awards for Hero of KAL 858 Bombing Incident.”
Conversely, the chief cabinet secretary who discovered the misappropriation of secretfunds in 1997, and successfully eliminated all evidence of this on an institutional level, wasappointed as Japan’s ambassador to the United Nations five year’s later in 2002. The U.N.
appointment was clearly a reward for “distinguished service.” See “Gaimusho ‘kimitsuhi dekan-kan settai’ no gizo kosaku naibu bunsho suppa nuki” [Exposing Internal Report on
Diversionary Tactics Re: Officials Entertaining Officials with Foreign Ministry Secret Funds],
Shukan Posuto (Weekly Post), August 2, 2002.
153
See Chapter 2.1 “Shigeru Yoshida Promotes Culprit To Blame For ‘Sneak Attack’ Vice
Minister.”103the Foreign Ministry honored him by installing a commemorative plate at its
Diplomatic Archives, formerly known as the Diplomatic Record Office.154
Recent examples of professional negligence include the ambassador’s absencefrom the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait during the Iraqi army’s invasion on August 2,
1990. At the Japanese Embassy in nearby Bahrain, the ambassador and embassy
counselor were also absent. Furthermore, on August 9, 1991, in the Soviet Union,
hard-liners placed President Mikhail Gorbachev under house arrest. The ambassadorof the Japanese Embassy in Moscow was also absent during this incident. Thoseabsent from their posts included some who had legitimately returned to Japan for
medical treatment, but if the ambassador must go home due to incapacitation at such a
critical time in the host country, a replacement should be appointed immediately.
Therefore, for its negligence the home office could rightly be admonished for lacking
a sense of urgency. But this author is taking issue with something much broader inscope. If an ambassador is absent from his post when such momentous events are
occurring in their host country, this means that the embassy’s everyday information
gathering is insufficient, and that crisis preparations in the middle of this emergency
have been completely overlooked. For this to happen to an ambassador during theirperiod of tenure is an unmitigated disgrace. There ought to be some sort ofdisciplinary action. However, no punishment whatsoever was meted out.155
On the other hand, as previously discussed in Chapter 3, when a Korean Air
Lines jet was blown up on November 29, 1987, Shojun Sunagawa, a specialist
investigator working at Japan’s embassy in Bahrain, discovered that North Korean
perpetrators had posed as Japanese citizens, and this led to an arrest. However,Sunagawa was later found to have acted illegally, and not only did he receive noaward, he was dismissed from the Foreign Ministry and then completely cast aside. If
a perpetrator hadn’t been arrested at this time, it would have looked as though thisincident had been carried out by Japanese citizens, just as North Korea had planned,
and this would have left a huge blemish on Japan’s diplomatic reputation with regards
to its relations with South Korea. Moreover, considering that the arrest of Kim Hyonhui for this crime considerably advanced progress on the issue of the abduction ofJapanese citizens in North Korea, Sunagawa’s contribution was worthy of thePeople’s Honor Award. The Foreign Ministry pursues the sort of diplomacy thatreadily abandons someone like Sunagawa, so ultimately it can be argued that the
Ministry carries out diplomacy for the benefit of its regular staff, in particular those in
the career stream.156
To improve fairness, objectivity, transparency and predictability within the
Ministry regarding personnel, systems for rewards and punishments must be clearly
established.
Exactly as the report indicates in 3.3, training programs should be drasticallyoverhauled, but at the top of the list must be improving the quality of language
training. In the pre-war era when very few Japanese were fluent in foreign languages,

154

See Seishiro Sugihara, Chiune Sugihara and Japan’s Foreign Ministry (Lanham:
University Press of America, 2001).
155
See fn. 110.
156
See fn. 152.
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one might conclude that the Foreign Ministry’s in-house language training was
somewhat necessary; however nowadays, when superior language skills are expected
and there are any number of people in the general population who are fluent in foreign
languages, such in-house language training cannot produce results to the required
standard, and is probably not useful. That is to say, there are plenty of Japanese who
are fluent in foreign languages. If such people with foreign language fluency were
tested and then hired, there would be no need for training in foreign languages in thefirst place. Also, this report indicates that private corporations, internationalorganizations and others also provide outside training, but for diplomats, gaining
experience in the Foreign Ministry’s workplaces abroad is essential. Foreign Ministry
officials have a reputation for being less than punctual—consistently arriving late formeetings, for instance—but this also indicates the aberrant nature of employment
practices in the Ministry workplace. It should be pointed out that they must be madeaware of the typical pressures experienced by Japanese employed in other workplaces.
Incidentally, although training and education in the Foreign Ministry is also
important for other reasons,157 this report makes no mention of it.
As touched upon earlier in this chapter, these days many officials from othergovernment agencies are being called upon to work in diplomatic missions abroad.
Moreover, even outside the diplomatic mission, for instance at Japanese schools
abroad, many individuals are being brought in to work, almost in the role of public
servants. These quasi-public servants working abroad almost certainly require basic
training in the language, culture, local conditions and customs of the host country.
The Foreign Ministry should probably be required to provide training facilities for thispurpose, in order to boost the efficiency of Japanese working abroad.
3.4, the review of personnel structure, and 3.5, the personnel structure at theHome Office, relate to the question of organization and duty consignment within theForeign Ministry’s personnel section, and probably don’t require further discussion
here.158
However 3.6, the review of the vacation system, is important. Up to thepresent time, a period of two month’s paid leave in Japan has been approved for those
who have worked eighteen months in countries designated as hazardous to health,such as China. While the designation of “hazard” has also been inconsistent, even if a

157

Emphasis placed here on training and education refers not only to improving generaladministrative skills and versatility in various duties, as outlined in Chapter 4.2“Improvement of Educational Training Needed.” Training and education to improve theseabilities are necessary, but this author is placing additional emphasis on the need to boost thesense of patriotism and an understanding of the national interest, in order to produce
competent Foreign Ministry personnel able to meet the expectations of the Japanese public.
On these particular issues, the “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” makes few
suggestions of any substance.
158
The report touches upon issues such as expanding the current personnel system; effectively
using human resources by placing the right person in the right position to surpass job
performance boundaries; and increasing staff numbers to meet personnel shortages. However,
it is rather superficial and makes no recommendations regarding any specific initiatives. See
fn. 151.
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country is considered to be a genuine health hazard, to a certain extent it is possible inthis information age to manage health issues remotely. Even in situations requiring
repatriation to Japan for a checkup at a medical facility, one week is ample time forthis. The number of medical officers at diplomatic missions seems to be on the rise,
but since health care can now be handled remotely, this absurd system from bygone
days should probably be abolished immediately. To the contrary, it is precisely
because the Foreign Ministry is paralyzed with regards to its obligation to conduct
diplomacy on behalf of the people, that such outdated institutions remain in placerather than being abolished.
4. Thorough protection of confidentiality
The three items in this section are as follows:
4.1. Reaffirm employees’ utmost discretion in handling all intelligence (nondisclosure externally of any information obtained on the job)
4.2. Review “rules for protection of secrets”
4.3. Take measures to actively release information while maintaining
confidentiality

All three issues will be discussed together, but it should be noted that manythings must remain confidential during diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, it is only
right that the Foreign Ministry exercises extreme caution to ensure confidentiality.
However with respect to how Japan’s Foreign Ministry actually does this, is it
enough merely to point out problems of a theoretical nature?
Under the guise of confidentiality, should information the public deserves toknow be concealed, thereby allowing the pursuit of a warped diplomacy? On thecontrary, in order to pursue this warped diplomacy, doesn’t the Foreign Ministry infact cover up and refuse to release information the public has a right to know, andbrazenly carry out the resultant warped diplomacy?
As mentioned in Chapter 3, suspicions arose in 1986 concerning ODA“rebates” when Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos fled the country. At the time theForeign Ministry tried to conceal the matter by invoking diplomatic confidentiality.159
There are also some noteworthy examples from more recent years. One of these took
place in 2010, namely the “Chinese Fishing Trawler Seizure Incident.” On
September 7, a Chinese fishing trawler operating illegally in disputed waters wasordered to leave by a Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel, and tried to escape by ramming
the Japanese vessel. Naturally, the trawler was boarded and its captain was arrested
and detained for prosecution. Initially, the Japanese government proceeded strictlywith the judicial process in a circumspect manner, in accordance with the laws ofJapan. However, after succumbing to heavy-handed pressure from the Chinese
government, it released the captain and allowed him to return home, even though thematter was still pending. At this point, the Japanese government stubbornly put ablanket ban on all media images of the entire collision. The decision to impose this159

See fn. 125.
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ban came more from Yoshito Sengoku, then chief cabinet secretary, and othergovernment leaders than it did from the Foreign Ministry, so they must bear a greater
burden of responsibility; but the Foreign Ministry cannot escape its share of the blame.
The fishing trawler’s second collision was intentional and serious enough todamage a mast on the Japanese patrol vessel’s deck, so obviously the trawler captainshould have been arrested; video footage of the incident should have been released togive the Japanese public enough information to make up their own minds, so thatproper diplomacy could be pursued.
Responding to the government’s blanket ban policy, on November 4 Masaharu
Isshiki, an exasperated Japan Coast Guard officer, deliberately leaked key portions of
the video footage so the Japanese public could see for themselves.
Formally, Mr. Isshiki could have been punished for being a public servant who
disclosed confidential information; but there was no justification in the first place forthe government decision to ban the release of this material. And China had pursued anunjust diplomacy.
One must keep in mind that the Foreign Ministry’s duty to protect confidential
information is also used as a pretext to carry out an unjust and improper diplomacy.
Moreover, it’s also worth considering that the current Foreign Ministry,arguably third-rate at best, frequently responds in a certain way when the following
situations arise. That is, when information the Foreign Ministry should naturally havegathered and analyzed is lacking due to its lack of competence, it asserts it has a duty
to protect confidential information and acts as though it in fact has the information. It
pretends to have this confidential information even though it has nothing at all. And itlies about the fact that there has been a dereliction of duty.
On the subject of maintaining secrecy, the Ministry hides things from thepublic that it considers top secret, and also conducts an arrogant type of diplomacy as
far as the people are concerned. Admittedly, in principle there are cases when
diplomacy is carried out where certain things must be kept absolutely secret. However
there are situations when an impartial explanation can bring the public completely onside, but the Foreign Ministry will keep things secret anyway; it is as though the
Ministry feels it can act arrogantly towards the public because it has exclusive accessto privileged information.
Also, an extension of this behavior is that the Ministry carries out “diplomacy
by secret accord”—important items of agreement are placed in a separate secretdocument and concealed from the public—for the foolhardy reason that it’s too
difficult to get the Japanese people to understand. It blithely concludes secret accords
over diplomatic matters that, because of their importance, ought to be put before thepeople in an impartial manner to gain public assent, but in the Diet and other settings,
explanations continue to be given that are at odds with the facts. Acting this way may
bring about an easy fix for some diplomatic matter, at least temporarily, but does not
nurture any resolve or sense of responsibility towards the public with regards toJapan’s diplomacy. As a result, Japanese diplomacy shows contempt for the public.
In addition, the report presented to Foreign Minister Kawaguchi has thefollowing phrase: “Structure within the Ministry needs to be bolstered when there isan actual, or even suspected, breach of confidentiality.” This is important because theForeign Ministry is not an environment which rewards good conduct while punishing
bad.
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Incidentally, the report also suggests “the positive implementation of open
systems for diplomatic records.” On this particular point, the Foreign Ministry should
be commended.
Government agencies in Japan maintain considerable quantities of documents,
but uphold a Confucian tradition dating from the Edo era—whereby “the people canbe made to follow, but can not necessarily be made to understand”—that makes themrather indifferent to opening up these archives to the public. But in modern societies,
where the people have a civic duty to engage constructively in politics, documents
concerning previous political affairs must not only be preserved but also actively
made available to the public. Based on this suggestion, in 2009 the Foreign Ministry
enacted, albeit belatedly, the “Public Records and Archives Management Act,” the socalled official documents management act. Quite early on the Foreign Ministry
realized the importance of making diplomatic documents open to the public, and set
up its diplomatic archives in 1971. It has striven hard to publish valuable diplomatic
documents from the Meiji era and beyond. This is definitely to be commended.
5. Making ODA Efficient and Transparent
Four points are listed here.
5.1. Measures to ensure transparency of selection and implementation process
for grant aid
5.2. Measures to broaden monitoring and verify effectiveness of ODA
5.3. Measures to achieve public accountability regarding debt forgiveness foryen loans
5.4. Measures to ensure transparency of selection and implementation process
for ODA

Issues concerning ODA were previously discussed in Chapter 3, so let me
touch on more specific problems to do with the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) and the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV).
Under the foreign minister’s authority, JICA strives for international
cooperation through person-to-person contact, and many Japanese work oncooperative projects abroad. Among these is JOCV, established in 1965. JOCV
accepts applications for volunteers from people aged between 20 and 39, to take partin a variety of support activities.
However, what has long been a problem for JOCV volunteers is that after
returning, they are unable to find employment, and many are unable to readjust to life
in Japan. At first glance they seem to be in the full bloom of youth, but the reality isquite different. Returning to Japan, there are no job openings; those who do find work
cannot adapt to their organizations, and many fail when it comes to humaninteraction.160

160“Seinen kaigai kyoryokutai wo konna ni daraku saseta ‘baramaki’ “ [How “Handouts” toJapan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers are Corrupted], Shukan Shincho, September 6, 2000,
pp. 34-38.
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Despite the lofty ideals of raising Japan’s profile by carrying out cooperative
projects abroad through human contacts, the results do not match these ideals because
the Foreign Ministry, as an organization and government agency, does not have deeproots within Japan itself.
This author can’t help thinking therefore that, whether it be for JICA or JOCV,
there are a vast number of opportunities outside Japan which call for teachingpositions in one form or another, where instruction of some sort could be given.
In which case, more effort should be made to connect these opportunities witheducational institutions in Japan. There is virtually an unlimited number of teachersavailable in Japan who can teach about any job or business, whether it be in technical,
business or other specialized high schools, or universities.
Sending them abroad through an educational organization or agency would
bring concerns about reemployment, and also the quality of teaching skills, to an end.
At the same time, for these teachers it would be a significant way to broaden theirtraining and study of new knowledge. Rather than standing at a lectern one’s entire
life, time abroad during a long teaching career can also benefit teachers by providing
a welcome break as well as an opportunity for further training and study on new
vocational fields. Further, it will make them more effective teachers. And as teachers,
if they apply the leadership skills they have gained in this way, they will make a muchgreater contribution than those currently volunteering with JOCV.
When considering the relationship between ODA and education, aid fordeveloping infrastructure such as roads and dams is of course also significant; but interms of Japan’s national interest to develop long-term friendly relations withrecipient countries, it might be worthwhile to consider the option of donating funds toinstitutions of higher education in these countries, to support courses and institutes
that teach Japanese language and culture. If teachers from higher education
institutions in Japan are dispatched to teach abroad periodically and on rotation,
wouldn’t this also result in improvements to higher education in Japan? By so doing
isn’t it possible that, in the future, a great many leaders who are favorably disposed
towards Japan might be nurtured in these recipient countries?
The reason why ideas like these never even occur to the Foreign Ministry is
because it has not put down roots in Japan itself; and on a daily basis, othergovernment agencies in Kasumigaseki, where most of Japan’s cabinet ministry offices
are located, manifest their lack of respect for the Foreign Ministry.
6. Ensuring efficient use and transparency of Foreign Ministry budget
First, let us list the points made under this heading.
6.1. Review of budget expenses
6.2. Implementation of accountability for compensation expenses
6.3. Review of procurement procedures
6.4. Improvement of budget spending procedures
6.5. Tightening audits
6.6. Early implementation, etc., of training courses
6.7. Improving accounts

One can immediately see by looking at these seven headings how sloppy theForeign Ministry’s accounts are. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, it was revealed109

on New Year’s Day 2001 that Katsutoshi Matsuo, a non-career Foreign Ministry
official, had embezzled close to a total of 500 million yen, and this showed just how
sloppy the Ministry’s accounting was. Moreover, this incident made the Japanesepublic aware of how amateurishly organized the Foreign Ministry was as a publicagency. But of course, this did not happen all at once. Matsuo became head of theForeign Ministry’s Overseas Visit Support Division in 1993, and the embezzlement
occurred over a period of six years.161
Even so, the fact that a total of 500 million yen was embezzled before anyone
noticed can only mean that, as an organization, the Foreign Ministry was clearly not
up to standard.
Along with tightening the audit itself (Point 6.5), the prompt implementationof training regimes (Point 6.6) is intended to improve the audit process. Concerning
accounting practices within the Foreign Ministry, payment of funds to Japan’s
diplomatic missions abroad varies according to different and specific local practices
in each country; furthermore, the reality is these missions are scattered across theworld, so it is understandable that auditing them from Japan is all the more difficult.
However, when it was discovered in 1993 that the accountant at Japan’s Australianembassy had diverted public money for private use, the Ministry’s home office sent
an internal inspection team. They intended to take measures against him, but theaccounting officer in question (a first secretary) escaped punishment by claiming that
he was merely “exposing unauthorized use of secret funds.” 162 This makes it
abundantly clear the Foreign Ministry as an organization is not run properly because,even when accounting irregularities that occur on a daily basis are discovered, they
are not dealt with correctly.
But this is not all that is inexcusable when it comes to the Foreign Ministry’s
bookkeeping and accounting.
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that “compensation expenses” areindeed necessary, namely, budget items used in the course of carrying out diplomacythat cannot be explicitly declared, or simply known as “secret funds.” After Matsuo’s
embezzlement was uncovered, it was reported in the press in 2001; the Ministry set
aside 5.56 billion yen in secret funds for diplomacy, of which 2 billion yen was paid
annually to the prime minister’s official residence. The Chief Cabinet Secretariat at
the prime minister’s residence also received secret funds, amounting to an estimated1.62 billion yen. The Foreign Ministry paid an additional 2 billion yen to this, making
the secret funds from the Chief Cabinet Secretary a total of 3.62 billion yen.163
Understandably, the Foreign Ministry had hoped that the Chief Cabinet
Secretary would overlook the incident. With neither talent nor ability, it still wanted
to exert an influence in the Japanese government comparable to other agencies, so it
made payments to the Chief Cabinet Secretary in expectation of the Secretariat’s
protection. This is how the Ministry developed a masochistic diplomacy, and this is
not something the Japanese public can tolerate any longer.

161

See fn. 121.
Ibid., p. 122.
163
Ibid., pp. 192-93.
162

110

7. New relationship with NGOs
There are two items under this heading.
7.1. Measures to strengthen cooperative ties with NGOs
7.2. Measures to build foundations to support NGO activities

Human society will become more international and global, and it is inevitablethat international exchanges will also flourish in the private sector. It is important that
the Foreign Ministry, charged with handling Japan’s foreign relations, nurtures NGOs
(non-governmental organizations) and establishes cooperative ties.
We shouldn’t reject efforts made by JICA and JOCV, as mentioned previously
in Point 5 (“Making ODA Efficient and Transparent”) and also in the section dealing
with ODA, to dispatch people to further international cooperation; but doing sothrough the private sector, rather than direct involvement by a government agency
like the Foreign Ministry, is often more efficient and can yield greater results. In
addition, the knowledge gathered in that manner can provide serious food for thought
regarding the Ministry’s international cooperation projects.
Therefore, the report’s recommendations—the importance of measures tostrengthen and support new ties with NGOs—are well founded.
8. Rebuilding public relations and canvassing systems
There are two items under this heading.
8.1. Expanding the public relations system
8.2. Strengthening canvassing systems

What stands out in this section is the recommendation to bolster the role of thepress secretary.
Normalizing the announcement of situation reports and policy lines throughthe press secretary integrates information released by the Ministry, and increases the
Ministry’s sense of urgency regarding policy decisions. Currently in the Foreign
Ministry, some departments gather good intelligence and analyze it, but frequently
this is not reflected when essential policy decisions are made, and these efforts end up
being wasted. If the press secretary were to announce the views of the Foreign
Ministry as a normal procedure, then he or she would have to attend important
meetings when these views are determined; confirmation of those policy decisions by
the press secretary should then evoke the authority of someone who was a party tothose decisions. This will contribute to raising the competence of the Foreign Ministry.
In addition, this section also suggests greater emphasis on opinion-canvassing
activities such as town meetings. Direct exposure to the public’s voice in this way
may bring an end to the Ministry’s all too frequent and thoroughly ridiculous
masochistic policies. The reason the Ministry has, to this day, blithely pursued thesemasochistic policies is because it has had few opportunities for contact with the public,
and has therefore also felt little need to fulfill its responsibility to them.
9. Reviewing services and personnel in embassies, etc.
The following two items appear in this section.
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9.1. Diplomatic missions abroad, overview
9.2. Consular services

9.1, namely the issue of diplomatic missions abroad, was discussed in detailearlier in this chapter.164 However, I would like to expand on a few points here. At
Japan’s diplomatic missions abroad, and at embassies in particular, there are a number
of officials who have been dispatched from other government agencies. Because
being in the career stream is standard practice in other agencies, those posted from
elsewhere are granted the status of third secretary while at the embassy. These
individuals from other ministries also receive additional generous stipends forworking abroad, and tend to assimilate quite readily to the lazy atmosphere in theembassy. Perhaps phrasing the situation in this way does a disservice to workers
among those on loan from other ministries who actually work hard, but because of theoverly generous conditions provided by the Foreign Ministry, these people findthemselves unable to criticize the place they are on loan to, and soon blend incompletely. Enjoying favorable treatment that can include pay for working abroad
totaling five times their annual salary, along with a convenient and comfortableworking life made possible by a strict class system consisting of career officials,
specialists, and local hires, respectively, means that career officials on loan from otheragencies find themselves unable to voice any strong criticism even when confronted
by questionable situations. In effect, many of these officials from other agencies enjoy
a luxurious and lengthy vacation.165
As previously mentioned, embassies and consulates are like foreign enclavesof Japan abroad. To stretch the point somewhat, an embassy has a small populationand must carry out all the tasks to be found in any nation state. This means that eventhird secretaries dispatched from other government agencies for instance, must have aminimum level of familiarity with all the operations in the embassy. They should bemade to perform some consular or security duties shortly after arriving for duty.
These third secretaries on loan from other agencies should also receive someminimum training in Japan to prepare them for life in their overseas posting, and thisis probably also true for others, such as those from JICA.
Just as those dispatched from other agencies say little on their return to Japan
about the problems they have personally witnessed at diplomatic missions abroad,there is a device in place that ensures Diet members and politicians are also reluctant
to overtly criticize the Foreign Ministry.
This device is mentioned in the report submitted to Foreign Minister Yoriko
Kawaguchi, namely the so-called convenience provision paid to Diet members on
overseas business trips. The importance of Diet member diplomacy—where
influential Japanese lawmakers travel abroad and meet with high-ranking government
officials in other countries—is undeniable. However, some Diet members travel
abroad without any particular business except to meet and greet prominent foreign
officials, and pose for two-shot photos; frankly, this is merely to provide a good

164
165

See Chapter 4.2.
Ibid.
112

anecdote to tell later in their constituency. Arranging these meetings is highly
embarrassing for Japanese ambassadors abroad, even if they are coerced, whenholiday snapshots are the only outcome of such meetings. Some blame lies withJapanese lawmakers who take foreign trips that don’t really qualify as “Diet member
diplomacy,” but it’s a problem when this activity becomes normal procedure,embassies are forced to attend to even the private requests of these Diet members, andthis phenomenon in fact becomes normalized. It is for this reason the report seeks an
end to support for private requests; but the issue I raise here is that, as a result of thislavish catering to lawmakers’ private needs, an arrangement has evolved whereby
Diet members who personally witness the Foreign Ministry’s woeful state, and that ofits diplomatic missions abroad, don’t criticize it. This is also something the publicmust consider when scrutinizing the Foreign Ministry.166
In 9.2, regarding consular services, the following statement is included: “UseJapanese citizens acquainted with local conditions to handle activities to protect
Japanese nationals.” Presumably, this was partly meant to provide a life line to JOCV
which was coming to the end of its run. This is perhaps inevitable in some respects,
but shouldn’t diplomats in the career and specialist streams themselves be trained inthese abilities in the first place? It is worth reiterating here that, at least once a year,
various drills involving the entire embassy should be held including exercises to look
for Japanese nationals who have gone missing. On these occasions, third secretaries
on loan from other government agencies should also be mobilized to carry out minor
roles in these drills.167
10. Transparency of policymaking process, etc.
10.1. Freedom of information and accountability
10.2. Policy evaluation
10.3. Policy to take external opinions into account10.4. Other items

Based on the spirit of laws governing information disclosure, in principle
everything must be made available, while things not made available are theexceptions to the rule. However, as previously discussed, it has to be assumed thatcertain diplomatic matters must remain secret. This does not mean therefore that
secret accords can be casually signed, however confidentiality must obviously bemaintained during the course of negotiations. The issue in question is after what
period of time such confidential matters may be disclosed.

166

The so-called convenience provision for Diet members at diplomatic missions applies
when members themselves initiate trips overseas, but also applies in cases where they areinvited abroad, for instance to visit China by the Chinese government. The invitation may
come from the Chinese government, but as a rule the embassy ultimately must also provide
them with assistance. For the most part trips to China consist of banquets and sight-seeing,
nevertheless the diplomatic mission must still contribute a convenience provision, which adds
to its already heavy burden.
167
See Chapter 4.2 “Improvement of Educational Training Needed.”113

Policy evaluation is a difficult undertaking, but in order for the Foreign
Ministry to become a competent diplomatic agency with a long-term vision, oral
histories as described in 10.2 are probably an effective means to achieve this.168
Generally speaking, retired diplomats will respond to questions about diplomatic
matters in which they were personally involved, and the knowledge they gained isrecorded and handed down to posterity. In addition, those appointed as ambassadors
to represent Japan in the world’s leading powers must be required to publish memoirs.
When diplomats have only recently retired, there may indeed be confidential mattersthat shouldn’t be disclosed; but even taking these sensitivities into account, these
memoirs should be published officially so that future generations of diplomats, aswell as the Japanese public, can benefit from this knowledge and see how they
discharged their responsibilities in representing the nation.
By so doing, knowledge about our foreign policy towards each country will be
accumulated, and the long-term outlook essential for Japanese diplomacy will be finetuned.
In 10.3, which is concerned with subjecting policy to external opinion, it isdescribed how the system of “Advisers to the Foreign Ministry” will be scrapped.
There is a bitter tale in the postwar annals of Japan’s Foreign Ministry
regarding this system.
As mentioned previously in this book, on the eve of war between Japan andthe United States in 1941, Katsuzo Okumura was the culprit to blame for going out
and not typing up the “final notice” to the United States; as a result it was notdelivered at the designated time and inadvertently turned the Japanese Navy’s assault
on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.” When the Occupation was lifted in 1952,
Okumura was appointed to the position of vice foreign minister by Shigeru Yoshida,and in the end was awarded a Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, afirst class honor reserved for administrators and diplomats.169 After resigning from his
position as vice foreign minister on March 18, 1955, Okumura stayed on for sometime as an adviser to the foreign minister. Looking back again at the Foreign
Ministry’s appalling post-war history, Okumura’s appointment as a senior adviser

168

An oral history entails a person very familiar with certain historical events interviewing
someone who was involved in shaping that history, and recording that individual’s responses
regarding their involvement in, and knowledge of, those events.
There is great significance in requiring those who served as ambassadors and envoys,
and were involved to some extent in shaping history, to leave behind an oral record that canbe handed down as an intellectual heritage for successive generations. In addition, theinterviewer must also have a thorough understanding of those events, and therefore has togather together substantial intellectual materials; cultivating the skills to be an interviewer ofthis nature is also of great importance for the training of diplomats.
169
See Sugihara, Chiune Sugihara and Japan’s Foreign Ministry, p. 123.
Although this reference portrays these particular advisors to the Foreign Ministry in anegative light, the inspection of diplomatic missions abroad is essential for the Ministry’s
future existence. According to Atsuhiko Yatabe, who was ambassador to a number ofcountries, expert and effective inspection requires setting up an advisory group of people whoserved within the Foreign Ministry as ambassadors, ministers or consuls. See Yatabe,
Shokugyo toshite no gaikokan, pp. 216-17.
114

adds an extra dimension to this appallingness. This system of appointing advisers to
the foreign minister needs to be scrapped. This goes without saying.
10.4 is concerned with other items, including developing the internal reporting
system.
This reports recommends that a system be established for those who havesuspicions that Ministry regulations are being violated.
No matter which government agency is involved, whenever misconduct occurs
the first impulse within the organization is to try to hide it. For minor matters, covert
efforts will be made to correct the situation and make it appear as though nothing
untoward has happened; in cases of a more serious nature, an inconspicuous remedy
will be applied, and the person who caused the incident will be discreetly disciplined
somehow. However, if the situation is so serious that it can no longer be covered up,
the situation will be handled publicly, and proper punishment will be meted out.
Failure to do so would implicate the organization itself in the wrongdoing, and resultin it committing unpatriotic actions.170
Unfortunately in the case of the Foreign Ministry, there are also cases the
public never hears about; and an incident that would be handled as a serious scandal
in other government agencies has come to be treated by the Foreign Ministry as aminor misdemeanor. This is why it wasn’t possible to prevent the huge embezzlement
fraud perpetrated by Katsutoshi Matsuo that was exposed in 2001. The lack of a fullydeveloped internal reporting system also played a strong role.
In fact, in the Foreign Ministry where personnel decisions have until now been
driven by cronyism, it has not been unusual for members of staff who are“whistleblowers” to become mired in difficulties themselves instead.
Outstanding organizations have a proper internal reporting system as a matterof course. Excellent performance is rewarded while wrongdoing is punished, and thepunishment meted out is fair and in proportion to the gravity of the offense. Proper
handling of both good and bad behavior, and rewarding conduct on the basis of its
merits, is indispensible in an outstanding organization.171
11. Developing crisis management systems
11.1 Consular services
11.2 Crisis management

170

See fn. 152. Those within the Foreign Ministry who commit the unpatriotic act ofdestroying large amounts of incriminating evidence are perversely promoted for their“distinguished service,” and in fact receive awards.
171
Initially, organizations created by people function correctly and competently because they
fairly and properly reward good behavior and punish wrongdoing. The reason the Foreign
Ministry hasn’t functioned properly until now is because it has not followed the correct
application of rewards and punishments. See Chapter 3.1 “Problem of Sense of Responsibility”
and Chapter 3.2 “No Awards for Hero of KAL 858 Bombing Incident.”
115

11.1, regarding consular services, has been handled in Point 9. Crisis
management is dealt with here again, but in the context of protecting Japanesenationals.
Nowadays with the dramatic increase in the number of Japanese travellingoverseas, the Foreign Ministry’s consular services are more important than ever.
Therefore, this report suggests that the Foreign Affairs Training Institute be scrappedin favor of setting up a “Consular and Diplomatic Academy.” This academy would
have departments for consular and diplomatic studies, and courses in consular studies
would specifically train students to become consuls. With the growing importance ofconsular services nowadays, this suggestion probably has merit. However, this does
not alter the fundamental principle that all embassy staff should be familiar with
consular duties to a certain extent. There is no need for all personnel at diplomatic
missions abroad to be as familiar with these duties as professional consular officers
themselves; however, at missions with concerns about incidents requiring a unified
embassy response to protect Japanese residents for instance, there are times when all
staff must work together to undertake crisis management operations.172
While establishing a new academy may be a good idea, viewed in this lightshouldn’t the existing Foreign Affairs Training Institute be retained to carry out shortterm training courses? Indeed, officers seconded from other government agencies
should also receive advance training in Japan. Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Training
Institute might also be kept open to train, for example, teachers sent overseas by the
Ministry of Education to teach at Japanese schools abroad. And some form of training
courses should even be made available for those from NGOs.
An academy would not only be useful for vocational training and education, it
could also function as a facility for advanced research related to diplomacy.
Recommendations for the establishment of a diplomatic graduate school are made in
Point 12 below, but this is probably for the purpose of improving research into
diplomatic affairs.
11.2, regarding crisis management, proposes that the Foreign Ministry, likeother government agencies, puts in place a department to deal with unforeseeable acts
of international terrorism. It suggests that the Minister be presented with aninvestigation report, and findings and recommendations regarding all possible crisis
management scenarios. Naturally this has already been done in other government
agencies; but it is clear that such a report had not been prepared as of 1990, forinstance, when the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait on August 2, and the Japanese
Embassy in Kuwait was without an ambassador. It may probably be assumed that noformal record of findings or recommendations was retained. This is likely because
approximately a year later, on August 19, 1991, President Gorbachev of the former
Soviet Union was placed under house arrest, and again the Japanese ambassador was
similarly absent from the Moscow Embassy.173
The report recommended boosting the numbers and placement of security
officers and security guards. An obvious recommendation was that, “the officer in

172
173

See Chapter 4.2 “Improvement of Educational Training Needed.”See fn. 152.
116

charge of security procedures stationed in the diplomatic mission’s security officeshould be seconded from the Japan Defense Agency or the National Police Agency,
etc.” This suggestion had merit, but there was an air peculiar to the Foreign Ministryof palming this responsibility off. The diplomatic mission abroad is like a Japanese
enclave in the host nation, but the Ministry lacks the perspective that it should be able
to cope with all the tasks found in any self-governing entity. Those working at
diplomatic missions must carry out a wide range of duties, and while each individual
has their own area of expertise, they must also be able to perform other tasks under
the guidance of officials who have professional training in those tasks. With regards
to crisis management, drilling for emergency situations can instill a sense of urgency.
In times of danger all the mission’s energies must be brought to bear; this is why
regular training exercises are essential to integrate the entire staff to manage any crisis.
Training exercises help develop a sense of urgency by going through procedures atleast once, and this fosters the ability to cope during times of actual crisis.174
This sort of perspective is completely lacking in the report, and the report
itself is overly sympathetic to the Foreign Ministry and gives it too much discretionover reform. Crisis management conventionally demands the systematic handling of
emergencies, and as a part of that, training on a daily basis.
12. Strengthening policy conception
The following items are listed.
12.1. Enhancing the authority and function of the Foreign Policy Bureau
12.2. Enhancing the function of the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau
12.3. Positive application of “Policy Evaluation”
12.4. Introduction of Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
12.5. Strategic and active utilization of the Japan Institute of International
Affairs12.6. Trial introduction of U.S. State Department-style “Dissent Channel”
12.7. Strengthen cooperation between policymaking and public relations
12.8. Encourage self-development and maintain training programs for Foreign
Ministry staff
12.9. Share policy information and know-how, etc.
12.10 Strengthen summit diplomacy system
12.11 Other items

The Foreign Ministry is in charge of Japan’s diplomacy, so naturally it must
be exceptionally competent in planning diplomatic policy. Therefore it must be
accustomed to collecting and analyzing information on a regular basis, and be capableof having a long-term outlook. However, up until now diplomats in the Foreign
Ministry have had little talent, even though they are supposed to be the front line inJapanese diplomacy, and have not developed the skills expected by the public.175

174
175

See Chapter 4.2 “Diplomatic Mission is a Piece of Japan Abroad.”
Yoshihisa Komori, Bokoku no Nihon taishikan, pp. 278-83.
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The capability of the Foreign Ministry as an organization lies in the individual
talents of its employees at both the home office and diplomatic missions abroad, andis potentially vast; but at the same time, it is unable to overcome these sorts ofproblems because of systemic defects.176
12.1 includes a suggestion to “announce the merging of the principal chiefclerks of regional and operational bureaus with the Foreign Policy Bureau.”12.2 has a suggestion for “dual appointment of regional coordinators forregional bureaus and the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau.” Regional bureaus are
offices that handle affairs by region, including Asian and Oceanian, North American,
or Latin American and Caribbean Affairs. This was a suggestion to appoint personnel
to positions of chief clerks and regional coordinators, namely two positions in theForeign Policy Bureau and the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau respectively.
What this tells us, conversely, is that until then, information obtained bybureaus specific to each region had not been utilized in determining important policies.
To the contrary, it also reveals that the following is likely. Namely, even though it isof course essential to determine important policy by involving all departments of theForeign Ministry, there was no such horizontal policy-making mechanism, andtherefore decisions concerning overall Ministry policy were sometimes based solely
on the one-sided judgment of particular departments.177
In fact if you examine the Foreign Ministry’s long history, you won’t find thegroup-centered decision making process, or ringisei, used in other government
agencies, nor apparently is there anything which resembles an overall ministerial
meeting to decide Ministry policy.178

According to Komori, Japan’s Washington Embassy even employs private Americancompanies to translate speeches by the Japanese prime minister or foreign minister into
English. Not only are embassy staff incompetent when it comes to performing routine
administrative skills in a timely manner, career diplomats are also inept when it comes todrawing up a draft for the prime minister or foreign minister’s speech in English, whichsurely should be one of their basic skills. Naturally, no other developed nation orders this sortof work from private companies.
Because officials within the Foreign Ministry have the potential to excel and yet are
unable to develop these skills, it can only be concluded there must be serious problems with
the Ministry’s organization itself.
176
Although Ministry personnel must pass difficult examinations and therefore are potentiallyvery talented, the fact that they fail to become competent staff members in a competentorganization surely points to problems with the way the Ministry is organized. In summary,this is probably caused by the lack of: (a) training systems which develop the ability toperform routine administrative skills in a timely manner, including the versatility to carry out
a variety of duties; (b) advanced training systems which revolve around patriotism and thenational interest; (c) a system which fairly rewards good behavior and punishes wrongdoing;and (d) a system which combines expertise and knowledge during the decision-making
process.
177
See fn. 176.
178
Gaimusho gaikoshiryokan Nihon gaikoshi hensan iinkai [Foreign Ministry Diplomatic
Archives Japanese diplomatic history compilation committee] ed., Shinpan Nihon gaikoshi
118

Ringisei is a decision-making mechanism unique to Japan that occurs ingovernment agencies, whereby lower-level sections create drafts on various issues
that are circulated to other sections to reach a consensus; these are then submitted tohigher-level sections to obtain approval. Although it is a time-consuming way tomake decisions, coordinating with other sections minimizes problems during actual
operations.
In the case of the Foreign Ministry, the relevant section creates a draft andsubmits it directly to the section above for approval, and in principle policy decisions
are made quickly. However, because there is no horizontal coordination with othersections, policy decisions are made without the benefit of superior knowledge gainedby other sections. Problems might not occur if section supervisors are talented, andthere is the added advantage of speed; but given the unremarkable abilities ofsupervisors found in the Ministry as a rule, there is a definite disadvantage to notreflecting the better practices of other sections.
When an organization convenes a meeting of all its lower-ranking sections,giving each an equal voice, they can often come up with better ideas than if each wasleft to work things out alone because, as the old adage goes, “two heads are better
than one.” These “horizontal” forums, or meetings where relevant officials of various
ranks are brought together, seldom happen in the Foreign Ministry. It is as thougheach individual works in their own section like the proverbial octopus trapped in a pot,
and their only connection with the overall organization is through contact with their
immediate supervisor. They have no idea what work their colleagues, similarly
isolated, are doing, nor do they have any obligation to assist their coworkers no matter
how busy they are.
In 1997, this author summarized the situation at Japan’s Washington embassyon the eve of war between Japan and the United States in a book entitled Between
Incompetence and Culpability: Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministryfrom Pearl Harbor to Potsdam (University Press of America). It is my impression
that, if meetings of the relevant officials had been held regularly under the direction ofAmbassador Nomura to share intelligence, a more meaningful outcome would havebeen reached. There is little evidence that meetings between Ambassador Nomura andthose below him were ever held at the embassy. We are left with the impression thatwhen Nomura did indeed meet with a subordinate, it was usually with this individualalone, and only to discuss the work this person was responsible for.
In the United States, by contrast, President Roosevelt and key government
leaders met frequently; and in the State Department under Secretary Hull, there wereapparently regular meetings of relevant officials from the various divisions involved
in handling problems between the United States and Japan.
Ultimately, even if exceptionally capable officials and diplomats in theForeign Ministry collect and analyze excellent sources of information, andaccumulate outstanding intelligence, it is all too easy for these efforts to remain

jiten [Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History, new edition] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan,
1992), p. 162.
119

unexploited. Furthermore, this state of affairs tends to discourage Ministry staff anddiplomats from developing their potential.
Incidentally, what follows below might seem counterintuitive, but Foreign
Ministry employees, including its diplomats, formally must not involve themselves inpolicy decisions regarding diplomacy; it seems however the opposite is true.
As public officials the primary duty of Foreign Ministry employees, including
diplomats at missions abroad, is to maintain political neutrality and to offer fairminded and unbiased advice to policy makers, and this is a role they must take toheart. They cannot be the ones making the decisions. The person making decisions forthe nation regarding diplomacy is the foreign minister, and ultimately the prime
minister. Low-ranking Ministry officials cannot make policy decisions; rather,
Foreign Ministry policy is determined by their supervisors who in turn must answer totheir supervisors. Those formulating policy must have good judgment, and be able todetermine the best foreign policy; similarly, the duty of the Foreign Ministry
employee and diplomat is to utilize outstanding intelligence and analysis, and employ
a long-term perspective based on the accumulation of this knowledge to provide
invaluable insights and advice.
For instance, in 1993 when Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono apologized toSouth Korea for the forced confinement of comfort women despite there being nosuch occurrences, it was the primary duty of Foreign Ministry personnel, based on
their expertise and regardless of the risk, to prevent Kono making such apologetic
remarks because they should have foreseen that, even though relations between Japanand South Korea might seem to quiet down temporarily, this apology would do great
harm to bilateral relations in the long term.179
Although policy decisions were ultimately made by Chief Cabinet Secretary
Kono and above him Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, on those occasions when they
pursued mistaken policies it was the duty of Foreign Ministry personnel, as public
servants, to use their broader knowledge to prevent this, and to persuade them todecide upon and implement correct policies.
However, the reverse is in fact true. When this issue regarding the forced
confinement of comfort women arose, it was actually the Foreign Ministry that
promoted the release of Kono’s remarks. In 1982, the media misreported that the term
“advance” had been substituted for “invasion” in high school textbooks by the Boardof Education examination committee, and the Foreign Ministry in full knowledge thatsuch had not been the case insisted that Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa apologize
to China and South Korea, and forced the Ministry of Education come up with the socalled “neighboring countries clause.” Furthermore in 2000 Eijiro Noda, a former

179

See Chapter 3.2 “The ‘Kono Statement’ And ‘Comfort Women’.”The so-called “Kono Statement” apologizes for something that is inconsistent withthe facts; even if there were examples of cases that deserved an apology, this is no longer
legally necessary according to the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and theRepublic of Korea. Indeed, an apology should not be given. But nevertheless, if an apology is
to be given, one ought to consider what the consequences will be. As we look toward thefuture, what is required of Japan’s diplomats, as professional agents of diplomacy, is to havethe insight not to further aggravate Japan-Korea relations.
120Foreign Ministry diplomat, schemed to bring about the failing of a junior high school
history textbook edited by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, anorganization that strived to produce a version of history Japan could be proud of.180
The Foreign Ministry has pursued a diplomacy directly opposed to thenational interest, by committing the crime of selling out Japan’s sovereign right todetermine its own education policy. In other words, Foreign Ministry personnel havecontinued to press policy makers to make policy decisions that are totally contrary to
the national interest.
Regarding the Ministry’s part in determining a number of deplorable foreign
policy decisions, the report produced by “The Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry”
under the direction of Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi fails to even mention whatrole the Ministry played. Therefore it can be concluded that the report only addresses
superficial problems in the Foreign Ministry.



180

See fns. 89, 120.
121

Chapter 5
Reforming the Foreign Ministry: Special Issues

5.1 The Awful State of the Foreign Ministry
Awful State of Foreign Ministry Due to Incompetence of its Officials
This final chapter will summarize the points made in this book, and also allow
an opportunity for the author to offer ideas on how to reform the Foreign Ministry.
The Foreign Ministry is the only government agency whose name remains
unchanged since the start of the Meiji era. Even the present-day Ministry of Finance(Zaimusho), the most quintessential of Japan’s government agencies, changed its
name from its former designation Ministry of the Treasury (Okurasho). The only
government agency dating from the beginning of the Meiji period that has notchanged its name once is the Foreign Ministry. Endowed with this unbroken tradition,
does the Foreign Ministry actually meet the expectations of the Japanese people? This
book is a critique on how the Ministry is far from meeting those expectations, and has
in fact done the exact opposite. In other words it is a call to transform this government
agency, responsible for conducting the nation’s foreign relations, into a genuine
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that can indeed meet the people’s expectations.
Some Ministry officials apparently believe that the Foreign Ministry can nolonger continue on its present course, but have given up hope that it can bechanged. 181 However, I urge these officials too to consider how and where theForeign Ministry is flawed, and how and where it can be reformed.

181

To address reform of the Foreign Ministry following the discovery of huge internal
scandals, a group was set up within the Ministry called “Kaeyo! Kawaro! Gaimusho”[Change it! Let’s change! Foreign Ministry of Japan] which enlisted the voluntary
participation of over 200 young Ministry staff ranked section chief or below. This groupsubmitted a report in August, 2002.
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Japan is an island nation set somewhat apart geopolitically from the Chinese
mainland. For that reason, Japan never went to war with the various ethnic groups on
the Asian mainland, apart from exceptional periods such as the Mongolian invasions.
Consequently, until its defeat in the Second World War, Japan had never been forced
to pursue any full-scale diplomatic efforts that were a matter of life or death.182
Historically at least, until this defeat Japan had never been conquered evenonce by external forces, and was able to develop a history where it could solve its
problems domestically. The fact that the Yamato Court, the first unifiers of Japanese
territory, survives today into the 21st century as the Imperial House of Japan attests to
how relatively peacefully Japan’s history has unfolded.
With periodic dynastic changes, wars have been waged endlessly on the
Chinese mainland, and vast numbers of people have frequently been killed. While inclose proximity to the Chinese cultural sphere and its constant violence, the Japaneselearned many things from that civilization; nevertheless, in stark contrast, Japan

Highlighted in the report was a lack of sufficient policy debate, and how work is
carried out without a clear sense of purpose. It adeptly described the reality of how business isconducted in the Foreign Ministry at the present time, and conveyed a refreshing awareness ofthe problem.
According to the report: “In the Foreign Ministry, decision making is carried out forvarious matters that arise on a daily basis, however it is questionable whether the decisions
over these various matters are made with adequate discussion and debate according to theirimportance.” Unlike Point 10 made by the “Forum to Change the Foreign Ministry” thatcalled for public transparency of the policymaking process, this more recent report called for
greater transparency concerning policy decisions for staff within the Ministry itself. From theperspective of Ministry staff, current workloads involve doing their utmost to attend tovisiting dignitaries while processing everyday routine matters, without any involvement indetermining what direction policy should be taken. It is only natural that staff would demand
more transparency in the policymaking process, and that this be done with more discussion.
According to Atsuhiko Yatabe:
The majority of ambassadors stationed abroad are, to varying degrees, rather
frustrated that the home office does not pay them enough attention, nor show
them enough interest. It is not much different even among staff at the homeoffice, of whom 90 percent have no idea about what goes on in the upperechelons…. As a result, those at the top are also unaware of what is happening
below. Much has been observed recently about the lack of transparency inmatters relating to corporate management, but the lack of transparency within
the Foreign Ministry at present is almost equivalent to flying blind. The moodthere is cold, and there is no human communication.
See Yatabe, Atsuhiko, Shokugyo toshite no gaikokan [Diplomacy as a profession] (Tokyo:
Bungeishunju, 2002), p. 206.
182
The diplomatic system was formally organized as a part of international law amidst thecomplex diplomatic arrangements found in Europe and the United States; Japan belonged to
the Asian cultural sphere which had not developed such international accords, and did nothave much diplomatic experience, so although it copied the outward form of this diplomatic
system, it was unable to assimilate its essence.
123

constructed a unique culture and developed a distinctive history where killing wasextremely rare. It would be fair to say that no other country has developed such a
progressive society where wars were so infrequent, and murders so few.
There are very few societies like Japan’s that have developed a culture where
forgiveness is granted if a person apologizes for the wrong they have done. An
apology in Europe or the United States leads immediately to the question ofcompensation; perhaps Japan was the only society that developed a culture where
forgiveness was given if someone admitted to their wrongdoing, where their state ofmind alone was the issue.183
This was the Japan that, during the late Edo period, opened up to the world
without adequate national defenses, and was forced to start dealing with othercountries and enter into diplomatic negotiations. Geopolitically, Japan at this time was
located at the furthest reaches of the Far East, and was the last to face incursions by
the Western powers; this made it easier for Japan to escape the fate of being occupiedor colonized by other countries. Nonetheless, from the end of the Edo period to theearly years of Meiji, Japanese diplomacy was not particularly lacking in any respects.
Signing the unequal treaties was a serious error, but Japanese diplomacy thereafter,
until the end of the Russo-Japanese War, revolved around abolishing those treaties
and clearly demonstrated much wisdom.
Generally speaking, the poor state of the Foreign Ministry became noticeable
after professional diplomats, who had passed the diplomatic examinations inaugurated
in 1894, took sole charge of Japanese diplomacy. At the outset, the format of Japan’s
diplomatic examinations was modeled after foreign systems, and even the Foreign
Ministry itself was established by following the example of foreign services in othercountries; but as discussed above, Japan until then had little experience with foreign
relations, so although the Foreign Ministry was a virtual copy of agencies in othercountries, it was unable to recreate their essential character and ultimately remained
an empty shell.184
The police and military forces were also modeled after those in various foreigncountries, but Japan was able to create an excellent constabulary and armed military
because of the samurai ethic dating from the Edo period, and its broad experience ingoverning the people.
In historical terms, Japan’s two military services should rightly be blamed inperpetuity for leading the nation into a war that should never have been waged;
however it can also be argued that, in the annals of human history, the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy deserve their place among the few militaries in the worldthat have been upstanding and have maintained a high level of morale.

183

When someone does something wrong, it is a special feature of Japanese culture that they
can be forgiven if they apologize with due contrition. This pattern of behavior may bereferred to as an “apology culture.” One might think this “apology culture” is something thatthe whole world ought to share. However, in contemporary international relations,apologizing for the small part you may have played in a transgression is taken as an
assumption of guilt for the entire incident. To the contrary, saying sorry is simply not done
anymore in international relations. See fn. 179.
184
See fns. 182, 183.
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Foreign language experts are needed during diplomatic negotiations. This wasparticularly the case during the first half of the Meiji era when few Japanese could
freely converse in English or other European languages, therefore a demand existed
for people who had mastered Western tongues. In order to ensure there were enoughdiplomats who had mastered foreign languages, foreign service examinations were
held and specialist training was introduced; however as discussed in Chapter 4, is itreally possible to become a diplomat simply through deliberate training andeducation? Is it possible to train people in genuine negotiating skills merely in aclassroom? The failing of the Foreign Ministry lies in the mistaken notion that, byimplementing the diplomatic examinations, training and education would
automatically produce the desired abilities. It takes experience to refine negotiatingskills, and expertise can be developed over time, but in fact, innate personal qualities
play a major role. And generally speaking, the conduct of negotiations is not an end in
itself. It is a question of matching the “what” of those negotiations with their “why.”
In which case, the notion that you can test for diplomats able to negotiate
professionally, or train and teach them in a classroom to do so is, in hyperbolic terms,
like trying to build castles in the air. The success of diplomatic systems in the West is,
to a certain extent, due to historical legacies; from a young age people there areexposed to other languages, and this makes the burden of having to become proficientin foreign languages lighter than that of the Japanese diplomat.
Moreover the Japanese diplomatic system was launched in 1894 during the
Meiji era, and tightly restricted staff intake; nowadays those who pass the foreign
service examinations are no longer subjected to rigorous competition for the rest of
their lives, and can expect to top off their careers by being promoted to ambassador insome country in the world. It’s ludicrous that, simply by passing a diplomatic
examination once in their early 20’s, someone can receive automatic promotions
through their entire lives.
The diplomatic examination system was the result of efforts by Jutaro Komura
and Takashi Hara, but the diplomat system has clearly failed. Among the government
agencies created by the Meiji government it is undoubtedly the Foreign Ministry,where diplomats play a central role, which has been the biggest failure. By
deliberately cultivating individuals with inferior diplomatic skills as diplomats, andbuilding a completely amateurish organizational structure, the Foreign Ministry is agovernment agency that cannot possibly perform the sort of diplomacy expected by
the Japanese people. The Meiji government established various government agencies
modeled after their Western counterparts, but because Japan had little experience in
conducting relations with foreign countries it did not have the knowhow orunderstanding of how to create a foreign service; it was, and remains today, the Meiji
government’s worst failed government agency, and continues to sow the seeds ofdisaster for Japan.
Of course compared to other ministries, it is also true that the Foreign Ministry,
because it is responsible for Japan’s diplomacy, faces a variety of constraints.
Diplomats are scattered around the world conducting Japan’s foreign relations, andperform their duties beyond the scrutiny of the Japanese public: as a result no-one ispresent to review their activities. Therefore, it is perhaps inevitable that they become
indifferent about producing actual diplomatic results. However, the competitionstifling system that limits the number of successful diplomatic examination
candidates; the rigid class system that divides staff into three distinct tiers; the fact
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that merit is not rewarded and incompetence goes unpunished—all thesearrangements deliberately put in place by the Foreign Ministry are probably what
prevent it from functioning normally.185
Furthermore, while typical government agencies in Japan manifest an irontriangle composed of industry groups, bureaucrats, and politicians (or special-interest
Diet members), without its own “industry” the Foreign Ministry has a rather simple
structure compared to other large government agencies. This simplicity, perversely,
retards the Ministry’s ability to hone its diplomatic skills, and it often finds itself
lagging behind other government agencies when pursuing essential diplomatic
matters.186
In addition, this simplicity also means it is quite susceptible to interference
from politicians and Diet lawmakers. Because it has no “industry,” things areuncomplicated but conversely readily subject to meddling, and the Foreign Ministry is
unable to carry out diplomatic tasks that need to be done. This fact must also not bedisregarded when reflecting on the Foreign Ministry. It is certainly true too thatinterference by politicians has distorted Japanese diplomacy, and the sorry state ofthat diplomacy is not entirely the doing of the Foreign Ministry; in fact paradoxically,
it could be said that the Ministry at times has actually been a victim of thisinterference.187
But there is a maxim in the study of politics that says: without the talents of its
bureaucracy, no nation may rise to superior heights. In other words if a nation’s
bureaucrats execute their duties in a principled manner, then sooner of later thatnation will excel; ultimately no nation can become outstanding without the skills of its
officials. In which case, the deplorable state of Japanese diplomacy is directly related
to the inferior quality of its diplomats, the employees of the Foreign Ministry; and it
can only be concluded that they are the ones who have brought about the Ministry’s
lamentable situation. The diplomatic matters pursued by the Foreign Ministry areperhaps somewhat distorted by politicians and Diet members, but this is merely thereason why the Ministry habitually pursues those sorts of diplomatic matters. The
deplorable state of Japanese diplomacy itself can be directly attributed to the Foreign
Ministry’s own substandard quality, and its disappointing staff. Even if a talented
diplomat or employee with a sense of mission emerges, the Ministry makes it

185

See fn. 176.
Yakushiji, Katsuyuki, Gaimusho – gaikoryoku kyoka e no michi [The Foreign Ministry:
How to Boost Its Diplomatic Prowess] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), p. 104; Hyodo,
Nagao, “Gaimusho yo, shimeikan wo torimodose” [Hey Foreign Ministry - Get back yoursense of purpose!], in Chuokoron, April 2002, p. 139.
187
Hyodo, Nagao, “Gaimusho yo,” pp. 138-140. The Foreign Ministry has very little directinteraction with the Japanese public, so even personnel matters are largely beyond public
scrutiny; as a result, the Ministry is easily subjected to interference by the foreign minister ofthe day or Diet members. Moreover, since there are few jobs that must be filled by staff withspecial expertise, this creates situations where Diet members can easily intervene in personnel
decisions. As a result, the Ministry is susceptible to meddling by lawmakers and politicians,
and sometimes finds itself getting into hot water.
186

126

impossible for that person to make a contribution. We can only sympathize withtalented people like Naoya Nakano, who was discussed in Chapter 2.
Ultimately, it is the limited abilities of diplomats and employees of theForeign Ministry that stymie reform of the Ministry.188

5.2 Clarify The Foreign Ministry’s War Responsibility
Foreign Ministry Clearly Has War Responsibility
The deplorable state of the Foreign Ministry is not something that began only
recently. As mentioned previously, the Ministry has suffered from chronic
weaknesses dating back to when the diplomatic examination system was establishedduring the early Meiji era.
However, this weak state has deteriorated drastically, especially during thepostwar period. Why has there been such a drastic decline? What has caused thisdrastic decline? Let us consider for a moment the source of the problem.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the poor state of the Foreign Ministry dates back to
before the Second World War. Following the signing of the Russo-Japanese Peace
Treaty in 1905, Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura rejected an offer from American rail
magnate E. H. Harriman to jointly manage the railway in Manchuria, and created afactor contributing to rising tensions between Japan and the United States.189 In 1915,
Japan aroused the unmitigated antagonism of the Chinese people through its TwentyOne Demands on China. 190 In 1938, disregarding strident opposition from theJapanese military, Prime Minister Konoe destroyed any opportunity for negotiations
between Japan and China by saying he would “cease from henceforward to deal with[the Nationalist] Government,” and made reconciliation between the two nations
impossible.191 The ultimate example of its poor state was the Ministry’s failure to
avoid the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States because of its inability
to discern the latent intent of the Roosevelt administration, despite the president’s
pledge in the fall of 1940 in his re-election campaign for a third term “not to send
your sons to war.” In the end, it even brought about unambiguous disgrace to Japanby delaying the delivery of the “final notice” to the United States.192

188

This is not to say that the potential capabilities of Ministry staff from the outset are lacking.
Foreign Ministry personnel must pass difficult examinations similar to those taken by otherpublic officials, so initially they possess the same potential level of competence. But after
joining the Foreign Ministry, with its burdensome history and stifling inertia, they begin topick up this behavior and their abilities begin to diminish. And while there are alsoorganizational problems, this environment kills even the desire to carry out reform, andForeign Ministry personnel become less competent than their counterparts in othergovernment agencies.
189
See Chapter 1.1 “Deplorable Blunder by Jutaro Komura”.
190
See Chapter 1.2.
191
See Chapter 1.3.
192
See Chapter 1.4.
127

The deplorable state of the Foreign Ministry has persisted uninterrupted in thisway since the prewar period. But in 1982 after the war had long been over, simply
because the media had incorrectly reported that the term “invasion” had been replacedwith “[military] advance” during the screening of Japanese high school text books, theForeign Ministry in complete knowledge that this had been misreported, coerced thechief cabinet secretary to make a statement to rectify this as the responsibility of theJapanese government, and forced the Ministry of Education to create the so-called“neighboring countries” clause, whereby inspection comments would not be appended
to descriptions in textbooks pertaining to Japan’s neighbors. Sovereignty over theauthorization of Japan’s school textbooks was handed over to foreign countries. In
1993, despite the lack of cases of enforced abduction of comfort women in Korea,
they coerced Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono to issue a statement saying there
had been, and to apologize to Korea.193
Is this really the diplomacy of an independent sovereign nation? In every
respect, this sort of diplomacy is diametrically opposed to the national interest. As one
might expect, one can find no examples in Japan’s prewar foreign relations of this sortof diplomacy that runs counter to the national interest. Japan’s regrettable prewar
diplomacy led to the failure to prevent an avoidable war in the mid-Showa period andbrought great harm to the Japanese people, but nevertheless there were no cases where
diplomacy was carried out that sold out or opposed the national interest.
Let me define what I mean when I refer to diplomacy that runs counter to thenational interest. Broadly speaking, diplomacy usually refers to a country’s interaction
with other lands in pursuit of its own national interest; but what I am concerned withhere is not this broad definition, but a narrower, stricter sense of the “national interest.”
When it comes to issues such as the TPP, or Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership, it is not easy to determine whether support would enhance or harm thenational interest. The subject matter agreed upon in the TPP may vary significantly,
however nothing will directly impinge on national sovereignty; it will merely be acase of choosing between various options. Any choice will likely have a positive
impact upon Japan’s prosperity, although the precise nature of this cannot be knownat the present time. At present, it is nothing more than a matter of Japan choosing
between various options.
However, even though there was no factual basis for claims that the term“invasion” had been replaced by “[military] advance,” an apology was made taking
national responsibility to correct this, and the “neighboring countries” clause wasdevised that did not allow examination opinions to be appended to descriptions inhigh school textbooks regarding Japan’s neighbors; this clearly gave away
sovereignty over Japan’s textbooks. It should therefore be concluded that this act of“diplomacy” was criminal in nature. Also, even though there were no cases ofcomfort women being forcibly abducted, an apology was issued as if there had been;
this too was a criminal act of “diplomacy” that caused unwarranted harm to thenation’s dignity.

193

See Chapter 2.4, and Chapter 3.1 “The ‘Kono Statement’ And ‘Comfort Women’ ”
128

Why has Japan’s postwar diplomacy become like this? Without clarifying thismatter and offering possible solutions for improvement, genuine reform of theForeign Ministry that gets to the heart of the matter will not be possible. Without
introducing this genuine reform, any such hopes of revitalizing Japan will be little
more than wishful thinking.
Now why has the state of the Foreign Ministry become even more deplorable
in the postwar era? Obviously those in the know are perfectly aware why this is so,but it’s worth reiterating here that it is because the Ministry is mired in a so-calledmasochistic view of history. We need to clarify why the postwar Foreign Ministrybecame so attached to a masochistic view of history that denigrates our own country.
When Japan lost the war and began to reemerge during the postwar era, there
were concerns that the Foreign Ministry, along with the military, would also be held
responsible for the war and be dismantled by the Occupation Forces. The Foreign
Ministry played a leading role in Japan’s exit from the League of Nations in 1933, andas previously mentioned was the main impetus behind the 1938 Konoe Statement to“cease from henceforward to deal with [the Nationalist] Government,” so the Ministry
cannot avoid its share of the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1941 between
Japan and the United States either. During the war the United States was under the
impression the delivery of Japan’s “final notice” had been deliberately delayed; theForeign Ministry’s war responsibility was clear, so naturally the Occupation Forces
contemplated dismantling it.194
However, the Foreign Ministry manipulated the situation with consummate
skill. It pushed all responsibility for the war onto the dismantled Army and Navy, andbecame the point of contact for negotiations between the Japanese government andthe Occupation Forces.195
The Foreign Ministry was a government agency that behaved like a complex
organism, and had a life of its own. Naturally it fought to survive. This was inevitable.
The Foreign Ministry also suffered setbacks: many of its diplomatic missions wereclosed; employees at diplomatic missions were withdrawn; and excess staff had to belaid off. Like other government agencies, the Foreign Ministry too tasted thebitterness of defeat.
Nevertheless, the Ministry wanted at least to escape being dismantled as anorgan of government. To that end, it had no alternative but to do all it could for thetime being to push responsibility for the war onto the dismantled military services.
Temporarily at least, it was perhaps inevitable that the dismantled Army and Navyrather than other government agencies would be offered up like human sacrifices totake sole responsibility for the war.

194

The Japanese government was deprived of all its diplomatic rights, and forced to close
every one of its diplomatic missions and embassies around the world. See Tadakatsu Suzuki,ed., Nihon gaikoshi dai 26-kan: Shusen kara kowa made [The Diplomacy of Japan, Vol. 26:
From War’s End until Peace] (Tokyo: Kajima kenkyujo shuppankai, 1973), pp. 59-68.
195
Ibid.
129

Shigeru Yoshida, Perpetrator of Actual Political Crimes
However, this is not all the Foreign Ministry did. Even thereafter, the Ministry
placed its war responsibility beyond the purview of the Japanese public. Thus it
confined the people of Japan into a warped linguistic space, and resolutely committed
acts of betrayal against the public.
To conceal its war responsibility from the Japanese people, and to ensure after
the Occupation was lifted that the Foreign Ministry itself would never have toacknowledge its own war responsibility, the culprit directly to blame during theoutbreak of war with the U. S. for delaying the “final notice” was promoted to theposition of vice foreign minister, its highest administrative rank, and was also retained
as a ministry adviser after he resigned as vice foreign minister. The Ministry clearlycommitted anti-patriotic acts. The Ministry undertook these sorts of acts of betrayal,even under circumstances where it could have unambiguously acknowledged that thedelay in delivering the “final notice” was a major factor behind the dropping of theatomic bombs on Japan.196 Diplomats are usually kept away from the general public,
and they took advantage of the public’s ignorance of these facts to elevate the very
person responsible to the position of vice foreign minister, and entrenched theconcealment of its war responsibility by covering up its blame on an institutional level.
Because of this, conscientious diplomats and officials who later emerged within the
Ministry were unable to discuss the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility.
It can be argued with some certainty that, if the Foreign Ministry had pursued
the diplomacy one might rightly expect from a foreign service, war between Japanand the United States would not have broken out. Some events which contributed
directly to the war, such as the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the China Incident(1937), were exclusively the responsibility of the Japanese military; however, if theForeign Ministry had the capability normally expected of a diplomatic service, andhad gathered and analyzed intelligence and adopted a sensible longterm outlook, it
would at the very least have been able to prevent war from breaking out between
Japan and the United States.
In order to resurrect the postwar Foreign Ministry, the public must first be
informed unambiguously of its war responsibility, and the Ministry itself must makean explicit admission regarding this. 197
Also, the public must be made completely aware of the Foreign Ministry’s
grave errors in promoting the culprit directly to blame for the delay in delivering the“final notice” to the United States to the most senior administrative position within

196

See Chapter 3.1 “Problem of Sense of Responsibility.”
Even former diplomat Ryohei Murata—who stridently called for Japan to be liberated fromthis masochistic view of history, and for the need to have a legitimate diplomacy that protects
the national interest—has never touched on the issue of the Foreign Ministry avoiding its war
responsibility. Murata, Ryohei, Naze Gaimusho wa dame ni natta ka—Yomigaere, Nihon
gaiko [Why has the Foreign Ministry Gone Wrong—Revive Japanese Diplomacy!] (Tokyo:
Fusosha, 2002); Doko e iku no ka, kono kuni wa–Moto chu-Bei taishi, wakamono e no yuigon[Where Is This Country Heading? Former U.S. Ambassador’s Testament to the Youth Of
Japan] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 2010), etc.
197

130

the Ministry, bestowing upon him the highest honors available to public
administrators, as well as retaining him for many years as a ministry consultant; andalthough roughly six decades have passed since these events, the Ministry itself mustacknowledge these errors and formally apologize.
Even though Katsuzo Okumura, the person in question, has already passed
away, there is no need to exhume his corpse and whip it three hundred times, as wasdone in China in ancient times. What is important here is not Okumura the individual,
but rather that the Foreign Ministry as an organ of state must acknowledge it
previously committed an act of betrayal of this nature against the public, andapologize as an organization and as an institution. Without this apology, regardless ofwhatever high-minded utterances the Ministry might make about conducting reforms
or promising to mend its ways, such pledges cannot ring true. If the Ministry is toactually make a fresh start as an organ of state, and as an institution, it mustacknowledge these acts of betrayal against the Japanese people, and formallyapologize.198
No decent person who was even offered the position of vice foreign ministerwould consider accepting it if he or she clearly knew they were directly responsible
for the delay in delivering the “final notice” to the United States at the time of theoutbreak of war, and that this delay was a major factor behind the dropping of theatomic bombs on Japan. It would be inconceivable to anyone except a completely
irresponsible diplomat; it must be conceded though that Okumura neither took the
initiative nor orchestrated his own promotion to vice foreign minister. Someone else
committed this political crime as it were, someone with full knowledge of the facts,and did so precisely because he had full knowledge of the facts; he promoted theculprit responsible for the blunder to vice foreign minister in order to prevent theJapanese public from discerning the war responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, which
had been involved in that blunder, and to prevent the Ministry itself acknowledging
this of its own accord. Naturally, this person was Shigeru Yoshida, the prime ministerat the time.199
It bears repeating that this single incident alone is enough to show what afoolish leader Yoshida was. How could the argument ever be made that he was a great
leader with good judgment and a deep sense of responsibility? He gave no thought at
all to how concealing the Foreign Ministry’s war responsibility as the nation entered
the postwar era would distort Japan; how can Yoshida be called a great leader when
all he considered was the reputation of the Foreign Ministry? Yoshida perpetrated amajor political crime against the Japanese people.
I have expressly used the term “political crime” here. The term is not appliedfiguratively. Rather, I mean this to be a genuine crime. The term “crime” usually

198

The Foreign Ministry as an institution must apologize to the people, because it iscontinuing to bring harm by carrying on its duties without settling past problems for which it
must admit its guilt. This is also only natural because Japan is an “apology culture.”199
See Chapter 3.1 “Problem of Sense of Responsibility.”.
131

refers to an act that transgresses natural law. When alluding to a “political crime,” thisrefers to an act that transgresses natural law in a political sense.200
Hitler’s adoption of the slaughter of the Jews as government policy was
obviously a crime. Furthermore, U.S. President Roosevelt’s use of questionabletactics to sacrifice the lives of many American troops at Pearl Harbor by not
informing military commanders stationed there of known intelligence about theJapanese Navy because he wanted to bring the U.S. into the war, was also a criminal
act. There would have been no question of any crime if Roosevelt had been
completely unaware of intelligence about the Japanese Navy; but from this author’s
perspective, if he at the very least knew with some certainty of Japan’s intention tolaunch a war, but did not immediately inform the U.S. Army and Navy authorities at
Pearl Harbor of this explicitly, then it can be argued with conviction that his actions
bordered on criminal. In wartime, troops are sometimes used as decoys. There aretimes too when the troops to be sacrificed are kept in the dark about it. There are also
instances during the brutality of war when this might not even be considered a crime.
But, to use troops as decoys without their knowledge during the outbreak of a war isdefinitely a political crime. Ignoring a vow to the American people to avoid hostilities,
and yet to go to war regardless is, in itself, politically permissible and not a crime. But
it is indefensible when the nation is still at peace to use troops as decoys on the eve ofwar without their knowledge, and this should be considered a political crime.
As for the war itself, rather than imposing disciplinary action for somethingdeserving of the firing squad, Shigeru Yoshida promoted the culprit responsible fordelaying the delivery of the “final notice” to the United States to the highest
administrative rank within the Foreign Ministry, and awarded him the highest honors
available to administrators; this act of denying the public a fair view of history clearly
was an unforgivable political crime against natural law.
In any case, has anyone publicly pursued this undoubtedly heinous crime ofbetrayal perpetrated in the past by the Foreign Ministry, including Shigeru Yoshida,against the Japanese people and sought an apology? Can anyone make the Foreign
Ministry itself acknowledge that its war responsibility, even in the prewar period, wasno less serious than that of the military?
There is no shortage of Diet members who are sincerely devoted to Japan. It
only needs one of them to take up this challenge. They must take the lead and press

200

Politics is the practice of guiding the nation with the hope of bringing happiness to thepeople. Those involved in politics are called upon to make decisions and take action, and havea broad range of choices available to them. From a certain perspective, it may seem as though
there are no limitations and anything is possible. Nevertheless, upon further reflection, there
are decisions and actions that should never be taken, and ought to be considered criminal.
Even regarding actions that should never be taken in terms of political responsibility, there arecountless instances when these are merely foolish decisions or actions and would not be
considered criminal; indeed the vast majority of these cases could not be thought of as
criminal. However, among those decisions and actions that are politically inadvisable, someare clearly crimes that should never be committed. In other words, “political crimes” really do
exist. Although humanity has yet to completely define what a “political crime” is, it will
surely become steadily clearer with the advance of human civilization.
132

the Foreign Ministry for answers. Otherwise, reform of the Foreign Ministry will be
impossible. Consequently, reform of Japan will also be impossible.201
What would happen if the Foreign Ministry simply acknowledged its crime,
and also admitted it had just as much war responsibility before the war as the militaryfor hostilities? To the contrary, if the Foreign Ministry acknowledged its central rolein the responsibility for the war, it might be possible to begin to talk about theinevitability of that war from Japan’s perspective, and the valid elements of the noble
cause Japan pursued for that war at the time.
By so doing, won’t it be released from its obsession with this masochistic viewof history? Won’t it stop pushing all responsibility for the war onto the military, andno longer be able to regard that war solely as an aggressive war, as it has done so far?
And won’t it be able to openly discuss legitimate elements of that war from Japan’s
perspective, and be released from this masochistic view of history?
In order to free the Foreign Ministry from this masochistic view of history, it
must first stop running away from its war responsibility; and the Ministry itself as
well as the Japanese people must be made to recognize that the Foreign Ministry
played a pivotal role in the reprehensible culpability for the war.202

201

As discussed in fn 186, even today the Foreign Ministry is susceptible to interference byDiet members and politicians. That is to say, the Foreign Ministry has not carried out alegitimate diplomacy in the postwar era and has continued to betray the hopes of the public,
and successive ruling political parties must bear enormous responsibility for allowing thissituation to persist. This state of affairs must be universally acknowledged. And if the Foreign
Ministry can be so easily swayed in this manner, then reform should be relatively
straightforward.
However, the ruling party has to deal with immediate diplomatic challenges and must
exert itself to resolve them, so it is conceivable that it may not have adequate time to reformthe Foreign Ministry.
If this is the case, the opposition parties should assume the role of guiding reform of
the Foreign Ministry. Diplomatic affairs, so important to Japan, have been neglected by theForeign Ministry; and although ruling parties have allowed this situation to persist, they are
not the only ones responsible here. Much responsibility also lies with the opposition parties.
When reviewing the miserable state of the Foreign Ministry in the postwar era, forinstance when the culprit to blame for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack”
was appointed vice foreign minister by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, this situation could
have been avoided if the opposition had been keeping a sharp eye on matters and had exposed
it. The Foreign Ministry was forced to adopt a masochistic view of history because this culprit
was appointed vice foreign minister; but because the Socialist Party, the opposition party at
the time, also held this masochistic view of history, it lost all desire to investigate the matter.
Even among members of the public that supported the ruling party, there were very few who
would have been aware of this inexcusable appointment, and there were probably few within
the opposition party who would have noticed it; but because this appointment was so
indefensible, the opposition must bear a lot of blame for not pursuing it.
202
The belief endorsing the Tokyo Trial as the source for the masochistic view of history
currently pervading Japan, is now gaining more credence among the Japanese public. Indeed,
when the Occupation was lifted in 1952 and Japanese sovereignty was restored, the Japanese
government was legally required to implement the judgment of the Tokyo Trial; at least133

5.3 Basing Policy Decisions on the General Will
What Is Diplomacy Based on the General Will?
As previously discussed, the Foreign Ministry must free itself from its
masochistic view of history if it is to truly benefit the Japanese people and be reborn
and start anew. To do this, the Foreign Ministry must acknowledge its own war
responsibility, and must be forced to admit that shortly after the war ended a politicalcrime was committed which betrayed the Japanese people, namely that Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida appointed to vice foreign minister the culprit responsible
for turning the assault on Pearl Harbor into a “sneak attack.” What follows now isbased on the premise that matters like these have been resolved; I will set out somepersonal thoughts in the concluding section of this book on how Japanese diplomacy
must be conducted, and some suggestions for reforming the Ministry.
While this may seem somewhat of a digression, I would like to present thecase for that of the general will made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Du contratsocial ou Principes du droit politique [Of The Social Contract, Or Principles of
Political Right] (1762). According to Rousseau, in theory humans ultimately cometogether based on principles of freedom and equality, and abide by commitments
agreed to by all to create a national political body. Although by nature human beings
are not born with equal mental and physical capabilities, they form communal
societies or nations based on a contract to provide equality in freedoms and rights.
This is Rousseau’s theory on the social compact. In fact there are no concrete
procedures for drawing up a contract which is conceived only theoretically; in acountry once arrived at, the people are no longer separate individuals but collectively

Japan’s sovereignty was undeniably returned, albeit somewhat constrained by the Trial’s
verdict. No amount of complaining about how unjust the Tokyo Trial was can change thatfact. At the present time there are no legal remedies to address this injustice; and it would
simply be inconceivable to go to war in the 21st century to invalidate it.
Does this therefore mean the Tokyo Trial should exert a permanent restraint upon
Japan? Viewed from the long-term perspective of human history, such a thing would be
unthinkable. Even legally, there are strict statutes of limitation involved, and above all, people
in every country around the world have the freedom of “historical recognition” (in otherwords, they have complete freedom from past restraints as a human right.) As a sovereign
nation, and with this freedom of historical recognition, the people of Japan have theprerogative to use this freedom to liberate themselves from the constraints of the Tokyo Trial.
That is to say, although the Occupation Forces compelled Japan to implement theverdict of the Tokyo Trial even after the Occupation was lifted, there is no point blaming
them for the fact that Japan is still bound by the Tokyo Trial and is unable to break away fromits historical view. Japan’s present-day failure to free itself from the constraints of the Tokyo
Trial and to break away from its historical view are solely due to insufficient efforts by theJapanese people themselves.
What is extremely regrettable is that the Foreign Ministry, an organ of the Japanesestate, has concealed its own war responsibility. The author recommends that the reader
reacquaint themselves with the case made in Chapter 2.1 “Shigeru Yoshida Promotes Culprit
To Blame For “Sneak Attack” Vice Minister.”134

become sovereign, and moreover they each become public citizens able to administer
the nation, and become sovereign citizens (shinmin) of the state in abidance with therule of the nation.203
It is here that he called the community’s united will to administer the nation,
namely this community, the general will. Of course, the general will is not the diverse
opinions of every individual citizen, nor is it the collective will derived through theconglomeration of these diverse opinions. Rather, it is the will of the entire nation as
indivisible sovereign.204 However, the general will defined in this manner cannot
necessarily be objectified nor identified precisely. Nevertheless, this definition does
include the notion of the will belonging to the community that is the nation, andcertainly includes the notion of the interests of the entire country, namely the national
interest.
Diplomacy, the communication of this interest to foreign countries, must intheory be based on the general will. Or more to the point, it must correspond precisely
to that general will. And it must not be contrary to the interests of national sovereignty
after integrating the will of the entire populace, in other words, the national interest.
However, as with general will, there is not necessarily any unique definition
for national interest. Even for issues where it is questionable whether diplomacy is
pursued in the national interest—such as the 1982 affair over high school history
textbooks, when there had been no factual basis for reports that the term “invasion”
had been replaced with “[military] advance” and yet educational sovereignty was
given away “to rectify this as the responsibility of the Japanese government”—there
may be instances when the argument could be made that this was indeed in thenational interest. For instance, if a temporary but necessary measure was taken to
avoid a war and prevent the loss of millions of lives, it could well be argued thiswould preserve the national interest by saving the lives and property of the Japanesepeople. Therefore the case can be made that, strictly speaking, the national interest
from the people’s perspective is an imprecise concept.
However for the type of diplomacy that could only be described as being
contrary to the interests of the nation under normal circumstances, if a Foreign
Ministry official notwithstanding carries it out in the national interest, then thisofficial has a duty to explain how it is indeed in the nation’s interest. Otherwise, such
diplomacy in the long run becomes something that is entirely for the benefit ofForeign Ministry employees, and has no connection with the general will. It becomes203

It is worth noting that the term shinmin (sovereign citizen) is used in present-day Japan,
and corresponds to kokumin (national citizen) as used in the pre-war Meiji Constitution in theexpression: Tenno ni chujitsu naru kokumin (citizens loyal to the Emperor). This
stigmatization explains the tendency to avoid the use of shinmin nowadays in Japan, but it isused here to denote the people of a country who are subject to the authority of the state amid
the various relationships the people have with that state; it is a bona fide term used in politicalscience.
204
Hiraoka, Noboru, ed., Sekai no meicho 30 Ruso: Ruso no shiso to sakuhin [Classics of theWorld, Vol. 30, Rousseau: The Thoughts and Works of Rousseau] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha,
1966), p. 32.
135something that is determined by special interests to benefit employees of the Foreign
Ministry. This is obviously something that harms the interests of the whole nation.
Difficulty Grasping General Will
A wartime example can make it easier to understand what is meant by“difficulty grasping the general will.” For example, even if the majority of the
population want war and it is clear the overall will of the people approves, it does notnecessarily follow that war represents the general will. War is in reality the practice of
deception, and those on the side of justice may not necessarily win. Furthermore,
although certain victory in a war might be predicted based on preliminary calculations,
the winner may wind up being the loser due to unforeseen events. To be involved insuch a war, one cannot say exactly what is meant by the general will, and it is
impossible for the people to know what it is in advance. Nevertheless, there are times
when a nation must fight, and the general will must affirm the act of war. This is acertainty.
Thus a nation’s history is molded in this way, but diplomacy is the
manifestation of the will of one country towards another, and must be based on thegeneral will of the people; indeed, it can probably be asserted it must manifest thegeneral will itself.
Let’s consider diplomacy from the perspective of the issue of maintaining
security when the nation is involved in war.
An important objective of nation formation is to protect the lives and assets of
the overall population which comprises each individual citizen as well as eachassociation of individuals; therefore, it goes without saying that maintaining security
by avoiding wars that could devastate many lives and assets is crucial for the nation.
Also effective in maintaining security is cooperation with other countries to ensurecollective security. But collective security through cooperation with another nation is
not attained by simply selecting any country to cooperate with. This choice is basedon geopolitical and historical constraints. Japan and the United States are linked
through the terrible war they fought with each other; and Japan had no choice but toaccept the collective security extended by the United States after it lost the war andsubmitted to the American occupation. After the war, if part of Hokkaido had been
occupied by the Soviet Union, those under Soviet occupation would have had nochoice but to accept the collective security provided by the Soviets; it must be stressed
there would have been no freedom to choose otherwise. When considering national
security, namely the general will involving issues to do with the people’s lives andassets, it is obvious that geopolitical and historical factors play important roles.
General Will For Postwar Japanese Diplomacy
Thus we can see how the general will associated with diplomacy exists undergeopolitical and historical constraints, so let us now consider the general will for
postwar Japanese diplomacy, which commenced after a terrible war between Japanand the United States, and Japan’s defeat by the Americans.
For the facts about the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, I
refer readers to my other publication Between Incompetence and Culpability:
Assessing the Diplomacy of Japan’s Foreign Ministry from Pearl Harbor to Potsdam(University Press of America, 1997) where I demonstrate how Japan clearly was136

outmaneuvered by the United States into starting the war.205 The war between Japanand the United States was one that broke out because Japan was duped by an
American government that clearly revolved around President Roosevelt. But this is
not to say that the United States was malicious. Roosevelt also misled the American
people, and enticed Japan into starting the war; but having been deceived, Japan mustalso bear some responsibility. In the world of politics the trickster may be
reprehensible, but the one succumbing to trickery is also to blame.
In any event, both Japan and the United States engaged in this vicious andbloody war. Japan was defeated, and then endured an occupation. And consequently,
only the Japanese side was forced to shoulder responsibility for the war. With thepassage of time and through the process of sorting out the facts of history, mistakes
made by the United States became apparent; but such clarity could not be expected
immediately after the war had ended, and secure in the belief that it had fought a justwar, the United States placed all blame for the war on the Japanese side.
As a nation whose duty it was to protect the lives and assets of its people, forthe time being Japan had no choice but to resign itself to accepting this unilateralshifting of blame. Under those temporary conditions, it was not a question of whether
it was “right” or not. What was then “right” was the matter of Japan’s continued
survival. Sometimes, indeed perhaps always, a nation must make a start from suchhorrendous beginnings.
If that is the case, what was the general will with regards to Japan’s postwar
diplomacy, given the need for the nation to start again after the reality of a war with
the United States? Wasn’t it to press for a peaceful reconciliation with the UnitedStates, and to restore Japan’s honor? The United States may have made mistakes withregards to the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, but Japan also

205

It was actually the Japanese government that desperately tried to avoid the outbreak of war
between Japan and the United States during the month or two before the start of hostilities on
December 8, 1941 (Japan time). Conversely, it was clearly the US government that had hoped
for war with Japan. According to U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, on November 25 at a
meeting of the War Council, President Roosevelt remarked that, “the Japs are notorious formaking an attack without warning.” (Stimson, Diaries, Nov. 25, 1941.) And the U.S.
government held a wealth of information relating to the Japanese government, compared towhat its counterpart in Japan had about the American government. Had the U.S. government
made full use of this information, it could easily have avoided war with Japan. Nevertheless,the fact that war broke out between Japan and the United States reveals just how much the
U.S. government at the time had hoped for war. In other words, it is clear that the outbreak of
war came about as a result of the U.S. government’s efforts to lead the Japanese government
on.
However, the observation above does not mean therefore that Japan had no
responsibility for the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. Prior to that,Japan had carried out a great many flawed policies and measures; furthermore, even if theJapanese government had been duped into launching a war with the United States, in therealm of foreign relations the side that is duped must also share the blame.
And yet, regardless of how hostilities came about, this does not change the fact thatJapan launched the war without notice during negotiations for peace through its attack on theAmerican military base at Pearl Harbor.
137

committed serious errors. Shouldn’t the two nations have acknowledged each other’s
mistakes, and used this to seek a closer relationship? In addition, Japan owes a debt ofgratitude to the United States for sending large quantities of food and other materials
when many Japanese risked starvation due to food shortages during the postwar
occupation. Even if, for instance, the Occupation Forces also had the ulterior motiveof merely pacifying the occupied population, it does not alter the fact that this action
saved the lives of many Japanese. In which case, when circumstances no longer
required Japan to temporarily and unilaterally bear sole responsibility for the war inorder to promote peaceful reconciliation with the United States, didn’t the role ofrestoring Japan’s honor in fact belong to the Foreign Ministry who was in charge of
foreign relations?
To some extent it was inevitable the Occupation Forces would rightly believethat all fault lay with Japan, since the United States’s view immediately after the war
was that Japan had deliberately launched a “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor. This is
why seven defendants at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), established by order of General
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied powers, were given the death
sentence and executed. But later, MacArthur stated that the Tokyo Trial had been a
mistake, and after he had been relieved of his position as supreme commander, hetestified before the U.S. Congress that Japan’s war had been motivated by selfdefense.206
This being the case, shouldn’t the Foreign Ministry’s true postwar mission androle have been precisely to overturn the historical perspective of the Tokyo Trial,
namely the point of view which unilaterally placed all blame for the war on Japan?
However, the Ministry itself portrays the war as a war of aggression and assigns all
war responsibility to the former military; furthermore, in order to conceal its own war
responsibility, it promoted the culprit to blame for the unprecedented blunder ofdelaying the delivery of the “final notice” at the time of the outbreak of war to viceforeign minister, the highest administrative position within the Ministry, and awarded
him with the highest honors available to administrators. These actions were clearly abetrayal of the Japanese people, and in order to draw their attention away from this, it
has pursued a diplomacy contrary to what should have been its true postwar
mission.207
In other words, the Foreign Ministry played a pivotal role in pushing all blame
for the war onto the former military, and promoted the very person responsible for ablunder that was a factor behind the dropping of the atomic bombs to vice foreign

206

United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Inquiry into the militarysituation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur from his assignment in that area (Washington, DC: Ward and Paul, 1951), p. 57.
207
For further details, see: Chapter 2.1 “Shigeru Yoshida Promotes Culprit To Blame For‘Sneak Attack’ Deputy Minister”; Chapter 2.2 “Shigeru Yoshida Concealed the Foreign
Ministry’s War Responsibility”; Chapter 2.3 “Avoiding War Responsibility During 50th
Anniversary of Pearl Harbor” and “Declassifying Materials on the Pearl Harbor ‘Sneak
Attack’ Issue”; Chapter 2.4 “Plot to reject textbook by ‘Japan Society for History Textbook
Reform’ “; Chapter 3.1 “Problem of Masochistic View of History Deriving from Lack ofResponsibility”; and Chapter 3.3 “ODA As War Reparations.”138

minister, while even awarding him the Grand Cordon of the highest honors available
to administrators; doesn’t this mean the Ministry has pursued a diplomacy which runs
counter to the general will of the Japanese people? Perhaps more to the point: was theForeign Ministry, which committed these sorts of objectionable acts under the
Occupation, even capable of developing a foreign policy based on the general will?
Therefore, on this particular issue too, the Foreign Ministry must once and for all takethe plunge and squarely acknowledge its war responsibility.
Establish Ad Hoc Foreign Affairs Consultative Council
Finally, we must ascertain how the general will manifests itself as it pertains toforeign relations based on a fair-minded diplomacy, and consider ways to bring it tolight. As previously explained, the general will is not easily identified, but we are nottotally without the means to shed some light on it.
During moments of crisis, matters relating to education—normally under thejurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(previously, the Ministry of Education)—can be examined via consultative councils
established by the ruling Cabinet to allow deliberation by the nation as a whole.
Bringing together a broad cross-section of society to examine the issues, suchcouncils were set up several times before the war; and during the postwar era too, theJapan Education Reform Council was established during the Occupation, and the Ad
Hoc Council on Education was set up in 1984 by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.
In 2000, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established the National People’s Council on
Education Reform, a small-scale, private advisory body to the prime minister.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set up the Education Rebuilding Council in2006 during his first cabinet, and reestablished this council in 2013 during his second
cabinet to take action to revive the nation’s education.
In other words, Japanese diplomacy should express the general will of theJapanese state; therefore, once a decade (or every other decade) a broad cross-sectionof society must be brought together to discuss this, by establishing for instance an ad
hoc council on diplomacy. The matter of the state of diplomacy in Japan must bepresented to the people for deliberation. Even though the Foreign Ministry is beset bymany problems, no deliberative council of this nature has been established even oncesince the Meiji era. This is also why the Foreign Ministry has been unable to improveits competence, even though it has long been wracked by problems since Meiji.
If the Foreign Ministry had been required to explain the status of Japanesediplomacy before such a council, it probably wouldn’t have committed the truly
nonsensical diplomacy of apologizing to China and South Korea even though themedia had incorrectly reported in 1982 that the term “invasion” had been replacedwith “[military] advance” during the screening of Japanese high school text books.
Furthermore, diplomatic moves in 1993 to apologize to South Korea despite the lackof cases of enforced abduction of comfort women also probably wouldn’t have
happened. And Shojun Sunagawa, a Ministry employee at Japan’s Bahrain embassy
who had made possible the arrest of North Koreans posing as Japanese citizens
implicated in the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air Lines jet, would probably not havebeen dismissed from the Foreign Ministry without even receiving any recognition.
Moreover, in 1989 the Tiananmen Incident occurred in China and Jiang Zemin
became general secretary of the Communist Party; in order to circumvent public
criticism of Tiananmen, later in 1994 the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic
139

Education” (Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao) was promulgated in China. When ananti-Japan bias started to develop in Chinese education, a reasonable case could
probably have been made regarding what the point was in continuing Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to a country that promoted this sort of anti-Japan bias
in education, and aid would likely have ended. This should have been an obvious
conclusion, because ODA originally was intended as aid to strengthen friendly ties.
When an aid recipient begins to skew education against Japan as a matter ofgovernment policy, what was the point in continuing such aid? If a request had been
made at this time to terminate this anti-Japan bias as a condition for continuing ODA,
perhaps the anti-Japan sentiment in Chinese education may not have been so virulent.
China’s anti-Japanese education policy is not only troublesome for the people ofJapan, but clearly presents an unfortunate impediment for the Chinese people also,
because it gives rise to a widespread and counterproductive anti-Japanese sentiment.
Furthermore, if an ad hoc consultative council for diplomacy were to beconvened to give expression to the views of the entire nation, then enlightened
opinions would probably be voiced on ways to improve projects under the Foreign
Ministry’s jurisdiction that don’t produce results, including problematic organizations
like the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) which have had little success.
Also, it would probably be easy to enlist the cooperation of the Ministry of Education
regarding the promotion, etc., of higher education in partner countries to disseminateawareness of Japanese culture amongst their future leaders. All the wisdom of thenation pertaining to diplomacy could be fully mobilized.
The following notions are also conceivable. Hideaki Kase, a commentator on
diplomatic affairs, chairs the “Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact”[Shijitsu wo sekai ni hasshin suru kai]. The Society disseminates information to therest of the world about exceptional historical events in Japan to restore the nation’s
honor. Despite funding difficulties, it tries its utmost to produce and disseminate
English translations of valuable works involving Japan’s reputation, and where
necessary, translations in Chinese and Korean. However, on reflection, shouldn’ttasks like this actually be carried out directly by the Foreign Ministry itself? In
situations where direct involvement is not possible, surely the Ministry should makeformal budget provisions to support such work? And if even this is deemed
impracticable, couldn’t it at least apply some of its vast secret discretionary funds?
With regards to disseminating information to restore Japan’s honor, it could beargued that the Foreign Ministry is doing the exact opposite. The National Archives ofJapan has a special online database called “The US-Japan War Talks as seen in
official documents.” The online site publicly lists and displays official documents
regarding negotiations between Japan and the United States relevant to the war
between the two nations.
I would ask the reader to access the “Bibliography” section of this databasewhich lists a selection of other reference materials pertaining to the Japan-U.S.
negotiations. Although many works are cited here, my own publication from 1997—
Nich-Bei kaisen iko no Nihon gaiko no kenkyu [Research on Japanese diplomacy since
the outbreak of the Japan-U.S. war] (published by Aki Shobo)—is conspicuously
absent. This book was the revision of a 1995 monograph from the same publisher—
Nichi-Bei kaisen to Potsudamu sengen no shinjitsu [The Truth about the outbreak of
war between Japan and the United States and the Potsdam Proclamation]—where I
revealed for the first time that Japan was also able to some extent to decode and read140

U.S. diplomatic cables. It was translated into English in 1997 as Between
Incompetence and Culpability (UPA). There are also Chinese and Korean versions of
the book.
Although perhaps somewhat immodest to profess here, my research exploredin great detail the extent to which Japan was tricked by President Roosevelt, and has
been cited in works published in the United States that have examined the war withJapan. However, as might be expected, my book harshly criticized the JapaneseForeign Ministry. No doubt, this is why it is absent from the Ministry’s
aforementioned database of reference materials pertaining to the Japan-U.S.
negotiations. Such conduct is inexcusable in an official organ of state. Although this“Internet exhibition” was not directly produced by the Foreign Ministry and appears
to have been created by a private organization, it is apparent that the Ministry still
exerted some influence over the outcome. This is how anti-patriotic the present
Foreign Ministry is, and how removed it is from the general will of the people. It
bears elegant testimony to the fact that, once a decade (or every other decade), an ad
hoc consultative council on diplomacy reporting directly to the Cabinet must be
installed, to allow full public consultation on matters relating to the conduct ofJapanese diplomacy.208

208

In the end, it is easy for the Foreign Ministry to become complacent because it has very
little contact with the general public on a daily basis. At the same time, the Ministry is so
immersed in Japan’s “apology culture” and particular social conditions that it tries to solve
any issue that arises by immediately apologizing. Although the Ministry, the organ of state
specializing in foreign relations, should be well aware that apologies must not be given out so
readily, it will manifest Japan’s “apology culture” and effortlessly offer an apology to try totemporarily resolve things. Ironically, it should now apologize unreservedly for concealing its
own war responsibility and forcing the nation to adopt a masochistic view of history.
However, what happens if an apology is offered when it really shouldn’t be made in
the first place? It harms the honor of the Japanese people. It damages their ethical principles.
But the harm done is not restricted to the people of Japan. In a society where it is acceptedthat the appropriate response to an apology is forgiveness, such apologies are a function ofthat society’s decency; but in a society where this is not the case, an apology can stir up
feelings of loathing in the one receiving it, and prompt thoughts of retaliation. Ultimately, themorale of the person getting the apology will also be devastated.
Diplomacy must be pursued while giving due consideration to the nation’s honor.
This is true for every country in the world. Every government must maintain the country’s
honor on behalf of its people. Every country has an organ of state responsible for its
diplomacy, which gives expression to the nation’s honor. In Japan, this is the Foreign
Ministry, which is riddled with an excess of problems. The Japanese people are not the only
ones being harmed by these problems. Many other countries are also damaged by them.
Therefore, reform of the Ministry is not solely a pressing issue for the Japanese people.
Even if we accept that reform of the Foreign Ministry is essential, an examination of
its track record since the Meiji era shows we cannot expect the Ministry to undertake athorough overhaul of itself. It is up to the people of Japan to place the Foreign Ministrysquarely in their sights, and boldly carry out a program of reform. It therefore follows thatsomething like a nationwide ad hoc consultative council on diplomacy is absolutely
imperative. Moreover, the initiative for this must be taken by the parties in opposition.
141

Afterword(1) At the outset this book was not written as a formal piece of research, butrather as an expression of my own personal views. This is why the original Japaneseversion was not produced with footnotes. I wrote it as a position document based onmaterials I was already familiar with.
However when I sent this “position document” to Mr. Norman Hu, thetranslator of two of my previous books, he suggested that readers outside Japan may
not have considered the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States or
issues related to postwar Japan from this perspective, so I promptly decided to havethis work translated into English and make it accessible to a non-Japanese readership.
It was therefore decided to provide footnotes, but also supplementary notes to explain
aspects of Japan that may not be widely known to readers outside Japan. They should
therefore be able to deepen their understanding of these issues by perusing the notes
individually while absorbing the main body of text.
There is something else I would like to bring up regarding the translation ofthis book. I am a patriot, in the sense that any one would feel loyal towards their own
country. This being the case, the question arises as to why I would reveal the
shameful behavior of Japan’s Foreign Ministry to people around the world. However,as I touched upon in Chapter 4.1 “The Problem with Japanese Diplomats,” it will
become problematic for traditional bodies charged with foreign affairs to handle all
aspects of diplomacy in the future, even for instance the State Department in the
United States. In 1997, the Republic of South Africa recalled its diplomats stationed
in Japan who specialized in traditional diplomacy, and replaced them with thosespecializing in economics. This means that the role of the traditional diplomat is being
called into question around the world.
There is a serious lesson that must be learned here which can greatly benefit
the whole world, namely that during the development of the modern state in Japan
since the Meiji Restoration, the training of diplomats failed miserably; their lack ofability brought about war between Japan and the United States, a war that absolutely
could have been avoided if Japan’s diplomats had been of a higher caliber. I want topoint out here that this was one of my aims for having the book translated into English.
In addition, the “afterword” produced for the Japanese version deals with othermatters that may be of less interest to readers outside Japan, so it has not beentranslated here.

142

(2) Incidentally, the footnotes included in this translation of my “position
document” offer some explanation of Japan’s “apology culture,” but I ask for thereader’s indulgence to allow me to elaborate on this issue here.
When there is a scandal in Japan, those who are even marginally involved with
causing that scandal are required, due to Japan’s “apology culture,” to first offer anapology. These people, no matter how marginal their involvement, then proceed toapologize. By so doing, the person offering the apology attains an honest state ofmind, and cleanses themselves spiritually. This “apology culture” is also an ethos thatabhors deceitfulness, so after the apology is made, the person receiving the apology
will offer their forgiveness. In fact, they are obliged to offer their forgiveness. In thisway, once there is an apology, the situation is resolved for the time being. In Japan’s
civil courts, no matter how large the amount of compensation for damages is asked,
apart from deciding how the compensation is to be determined, when there is an
insistence on seeking an apology, it is a reflection of the significance of the“apology.” In such cases, forgiveness will naturally be granted.
This “apology culture” is essentially an admirable aspect of human culture.
But the corresponding feature of this, namely the forgiveness that comes as a responseto the apology, enriches its effectiveness. No matter how much anyone might believethat human civilization will one day progress to this stage of development, it will not
be easy to achieve given the present state of international relations.
Nevertheless, something remarkable occurred recently with regards to this
“apology culture.” It was widely reported around the world that on May 27 this year
(2016), 71 years after the atomic bombings, the president of the United States visited
Hiroshima, laid a floral wreath at the memorial cenotaph, and spoke with survivors
who attended the ceremony. While speaking with them, he hugged one survivor inparticular who had examined the cases of American prisoners of war who also died in
the blast.
At this time, survivors did not ask for an apology from President Obama. Overthe course of this 71-year period since the bombs were dropped, the United States has
also had its reasons for being unable to apologize; and yet, survivors solemnly
welcomed the fact that the president visited Hiroshima, laid a wreath at the monument
for the victims, and prayed for the spirits of the dead.
With respect to the use of the atomic bombs, surely a crime against humanity,
this has brought about reconciliation between the side that used the bomb and the sidethat was bombed, and it was a confirmation of efforts to ensure that atomic bombs
would never be used on humanity for a third time. Arguably, this has enabled Japanand the United States to reach a new perspective over the dropping of the atomic
bombs.
It is a pity then to raise the following matter after such moving sentiments, butSouth Korea before the whole world has fervently denounced the actions of theJapanese Army more than 71 years ago regarding the comfort women issue.
Although it’s clear there were indeed comfort women associated with theJapanese Army more than 71 years ago, there are no facts to support their forced
abduction through violence by the Japanese authorities. Moreover, the comfort
women issue was not a problem only for the Japanese army; the question of soldiersand sex has been a universal problem in armies everywhere since the dawn of history.
This issue with the comfort women took place more than 71 years ago, and was notcaused by Japanese people under the age of 71, who account for the majority of the143population, nor against Korean people under the age of 71, similarly the majority of
their population. Despite this, why has the Japanese Army been singled out for
perpetrating this issue with groundless claims about forced abductions, and been
subjected to continual criticism even though more than 71 years have passed? Despite
criticism domestically in both Japan and South Korea, an agreement was reached at a
meeting between their foreign ministers on December 28, 2015; agreement wasreached on the understanding that the comfort women issue was “resolved finally andirreversibly,” and it was confirmed that both would “refrain from accusing or
criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community.”209 But it
remains to be seen whether South Korea’s accusations against Japan will actually stop.
In fact, how odd is this sort of demand for an apology? This abnormal
behavior is of course damaging to Japan, but at the same time it is also damaging andvery harmful to South Korea.
What I would like the reader to consider here is how the issue of apologies canrange from the sublime to the base and vulgar.
Incidentally, South Korea’s endless accusations regarding the comfort womenissue stem from fabrications presented as the truth in Japan by Seiji Yoshida (nowdeceased) who claimed, in 1982 in the Asahi Shimbun, that Japanese authorities held
comfort women hunts, committed acts of violence against Korean women, abducted
them and forced them to become sex slaves. If these statements had been true, andforced abductions had indeed taken place, to a certain extent the anger of the Korean
people would have been inevitable. But within a few years Yoshida’s statements wereproven to be total fabrications. In spite of this, the Asahi Shimbun did not publish aretraction. As a consequence, accusations in South Korea about the comfort women
began to escalate over time. The Asahi Shimbun finally published a retraction in
August 2014, acknowledging that historical events in Yoshida’s statements had not infact occurred. This was 32 years after Yoshida’s first statement in the Asahi Shimbun.
What must really be pointed out here is the issue of what Japan’s Foreign
Ministry did about it. Even after it became clear to the Ministry that Yoshida’s
statements were fabrications, and during the period when disgraceful things about
Japan’s reputation with no factual basis were presented as the truth and spread aroundthe world, it said and wrote absolutely nothing to correct this misunderstanding.
Ultimately, if the Asahi Shimbun is the main culprit for causing so much anger
over these groundless accusations, then it must be said the Foreign Ministry was a
coequal culprit by keeping quiet and ignoring the matter all this time. This matterdamaged Japan’s national interest, and at the same time also undermined South
Korea's national interest.
It is a sad reality in postwar Japan that there are anti-patriotic Japanese whotake pleasure in damaging Japan’s reputation and as a result cause trouble for othercountries, and as a Japanese citizen myself, I can’t help feeling apologetic about thisto the outside world; although it is an arduous task, I feel I must point out how theForeign Ministry has thoroughly failed to fulfill its proper role, namely to protect

209

See http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html for the joint Japan-ROK
statement. (Retrieved on June 30, 2016.)
144

Japan’s honor. Not only does this damage Japan’s national interest, it also causes noend of trouble for all other nations around the world. I believe that publishing thismanuscript of mine has become a matter of growing importance.
(3) Lastly, I would like to present here an essay I wrote in the May 17, 2016
edition of the newspaper Sekkai Nippo, ten days before the aforementioned visit byPresident Obama to Hiroshima, entitled: ‘President Obama’s Hiroshima Visit: The
Japanese Seek No Apology.” Although somewhat lengthy, this essay should also help
the reader to understand some of the issues raised in this book.
President Obama’s Hiroshima Visit: The Japanese Seek No Apology
US President Barack Obama decided to visit Hiroshima on May 27, 2016.
The previous year, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the atomic
bombings, I co-authored a book with American historian Harry Wray in which, forthe first time, a Japanese and an American examined differences in perspective inJapan and the United States over the bombings. Published by Nisshin Hodo, Nihonjinno genbakutokaron wa kono mama de yoi no ka [Is it fine to keep up the Japanesetheory of Atomic Bombings? - The first U.S.–Japan dialogue over atomic bombings]
surprisingly may have played a role in President Obama’s decision to visit Hiroshima.
Initially, this book focused on Wray’s assertion regarding how it was troubling
the Japanese people were convinced that, even though it was unnecessary to use theatomic bombs to keep the Soviet Union in check during the postwar period, thebombs were dropped anyway; they were completely unwilling to recognize how theuse of the atomic bombs saved the lives of many, and prevented the tragedy of Japan
becoming a partitioned nation through the intervention of the Soviet Union.
Indeed, if the nuclear test conducted on July 16, 1945 had failed, and atomic
weapons had not been developed, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki would have beenbombed. Instead, a decisive battle for the Japanese home islands would have been
inevitable; this would have resulted in the death of innumerable Japanese andAmerican troops, the Soviet Union would almost certainly have invaded, and theJapanese nation would have been partitioned.
However at the moment the atomic bomb was dropped on August 6 that year,
U.S. government leaders, through decryptions of Japanese diplomatic cables, were
well aware that Japan had resolved to surrender and had asked the Soviet Union to
mediate. The Soviet Union itself had also informed President Truman of this request,
so it was unmistakably clear. In other words, there are clear grounds for the Japaneseside’s rebuttal that the bombings were unnecessary, because the U.S. dropped thebombs even though it knew unequivocally about Japan’s intention to surrender.
Why has each side rejected the other’s interpretation, even though both sides
are basically correct?
The ultimate answer lies with the unconditional surrender formula devised byPresident Roosevelt. At Yalta in February 1945, at the point when the Soviet Union’s
invasion of Japan had been agreed upon, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill145

suggested to Roosevelt that, if it was made clear the Soviet Union was to join the war
against Japan to bring about its surrender, wouldn’t this make possible an early end to
the war? But Roosevelt firmly rejected this.210
Roosevelt passed away suddenly on April 12. Truman became president, but
had no choice other than to continue pursuing the unconditional surrender formula.
This was because the American people strongly backed it.
Why did the American public have such strong support for the unconditionalsurrender formula? It was because of their anger over the “sneak attack” at Pearl
Harbor by the Japanese Navy that started the war between Japan and the United States.
The “final notice” to the United States was supposed to be delivered thirty
minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor; but due to administrative blunders at
Japan’s Washington Embassy, it was handed over about an hour after the surprise raid
had already started. Roosevelt was aware in substance that the delayed delivery had
been due to office errors, but not a single member of the American public knew. This
is why they were convinced that Japan had carried out a cowardly “sneak attack” aspart of their military strategy.
Ultimately, this is the reason war continued until the atomic bombs were used.
Shortly after the second bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki, Truman announced thefollowing in a radio address: “We have used it against those who attacked us without
warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executedAmerican prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying
international laws of warfare.”211 The “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor was clearly
linked to the atomic bombings.
Nevertheless, if Roosevelt had not devised the unconditional surrender
formula, war probably wouldn’t have continued until the atomic bombs were dropped.
On the other hand, one problem remains unresolved in Japan. The culprits
responsible for the delayed delivery of the “final notice” that lead to the war
developing as tragically as it did, were never called to account. To the contrary, after
the war the two people who were directly responsible were promoted toadministrative vice foreign ministers and awarded the highest honors, a situation thatstands to this day.

210

U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Malta and
Yalta, 1945 (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 285-86.
“The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia
could be persuaded to join…in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan tosurrender unconditionally…. Japan might ask…what mitigation…would be extended to her if
she accepted the ultimatum…but there would be no doubt that some mitigation would be
worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so muchblood and treasure would be poured out….
“The President…doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on theJapanese [who would be] unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all of theirislands had felt the full weight of air attack.”
211
Truman, Harry S., Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference(August 9, 1945). See Truman Library, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/?pid=104. (Retrieved on June 29, 2016.)
146

While the Japanese side was still dealing with this problem, President George
H. W. Bush on the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1991 stated, “I
do not think that an apology for the Pearl Harbor attack is necessary.”212
It may not be comparable with the Pearl Harbor issue, but it is unlikely our
nation would have asked for an apology when President Obama visited Hiroshima.
No apology has been asked for so far, nor is it likely it will be sought in the future.
Moreover, the Japanese people know perfectly well that an apology coerced is not atrue apology.
We merely ask that the President visits the memorial cenotaph for the atomic
bomb victims, pray that such weapons never again be used against humanity, andfrom the perspective of a citizen of the world offer prayers to the victims who
suffered the ultimate baptism by fire.

212

In an interview given to CNN. Reported by the Sankei Shimbun, December 9, 1991.
147

Glossary

Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao 爱国主义教育实施纲要
Akashi Motojiro 明石元次郎
Aoba Fumio 青葉翰於
Aoki Morihisa 青木盛久
Asakawa Akio 浅川明男
Asakawa Kan’ichi 朝河貫一
Atarashii rekishi kyokasho 『新しい歴史教科書』
Beikoku ni tsukaishite 『米国に使して』
Bushido 『武士道』
Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋経国
Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石
Chu 楚
chuzai bukan 駐在武官
damasareta 騙された
danwa 談話
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平
Gaimusho kaikaku ni kansuru “kaeru kai”「外務省改革に関する『変える会』」
gen’eki bukan sei 現役武官制
Hamada Kunimatsu 浜田国松
Hara Kei 原敬
hara-kiri mondo 腹切り問答
Hatoyama Ichiro 鳩山一郎
Hatoyama Iichiro 鳩山威一郎
Hatoyama Yukio 鳩山由紀夫
Hayashi Senjuro 林銑十郎
Higashinakano Shudo 東中野修道
Hirota Koki 広田弘毅
Hirota Shizuko 広田静子
Hoshu no shimei 『保守の使命』
ianjo 慰安所
Iguchi Sadao 井口貞夫
imukan 医務官
Inagaki Masumi 稲垣真澄
148

Inose Naoki 猪瀬直樹
Ishihara Shintaro 石原慎太郎
Isoda Saburo 磯田三郎
Isshiki Masaharu 一色正春
Ito Hirobumi 伊藤博文
Jiang Zemin 江沢民
Jidai no Ichimen 『時代の一面』
jugun ianfu 従軍慰安婦
jugun kangofu 従軍看護婦
Kan Naoto 菅直人
Kan’in(nomiya) Kotohito 閑院宮載仁
Kaneko Kentaro 金子堅太郎
Kase Hideaki 加瀬英明
Kato Takaaki 加藤高明
Katsura Taro 桂太郎
Kawaguchi Yoriko 川口順子
Kenkenroku 『蹇々録』Kim Hyon-hui 金賢姫 김현희
kinrin shokoku joko 近隣諸国条項
Kobayashi Hiromu 小林裕
Koga Mineichi 古賀峯一
Koizumi Junichiro 小泉純一郎
Kojima Noboru 小島襄
Komura Jutaro 小村寿太郎
Kono Yohei 河野洋平
Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿
Kurusu Saburo 来栖三郎
Mao Sui 毛遂
Mao Zedong 毛沢東
Matsuo Katsutoshi 松尾克俊
Matsuoka Yosuke 松岡洋右
Mihara Asao 三原朝雄
Miyashita Ken 宮下謙
Miyazawa Kiichi 宮沢喜一
Mizutani Makoto 水谷周
Mutsu Munemitsu 陸奥宗光
Nakano Naoya 中野直也
Nihon no Kaki 『日本之禍機』
Nitobe Inazo 新渡戸稲造
Noda Eijiro 野田英二郎
Nomura Kichisaburo 野村吉三郎
Ohira Masayoshi 大平正芳
Oikawa Koshiro 及川古志郎
149

Okazaki Hisahiko 岡崎久彦
Okazaki Katsuo 岡崎勝男
Okuma Shigenobu 大隈重信
Okumura Katsuzo 奥村勝蔵
Ping Yuanjun 平原君
Qin 秦
Rikken Seiyukai 立憲政友会
ringisei 稟議制
Saionji Kinmochi 西園寺公望
Saito Kunihiko 斎藤邦彦
Sakata Michita 坂田道太
Sasaki Kozo 佐々木更三
Sato Eisaku 佐藤栄作
Sato Motoei 佐藤元英
Sato Naotake 佐藤尚武
Sengoku Yoshito 仙石由人
Shigemitsu Mamoru 重光葵
Shimada Shigetaro 嶋田繁太郎
Shina jihen taisho yoko 「支那事変対処要綱」
Shinpen nihonshi 『新編日本史』
shinryaku 侵略
shinshutsu 進出
Showa 16-Nen Natsu no Haisen 『昭和 16 年夏の敗戦』
Sonoda Sunao 園田直
Sugihara Chiune 杉原千畝
Sugihara Seishiro 杉原誠四郎
Sugiyama Hajime 杉山元
Sunagawa Shojun 砂川昌順
Suzuki Muneo 鈴木宗男
Tada Hayao 多田駿
Taguchi Yaeko 田口八重子
Tanaka Makiko 田中真紀子
Tanigawa Kazuho 谷川和穂
Teikoku kokusaku suiko yoryo 「帝国国策遂行要領」
Tekigaiso 荻外荘
Terauchi Toshiichi 寺内寿一
Togo Heihachiro 東郷平八郎
Togo Shigenori 東郷茂徳
Tojo Hideki 東条英機
Watanabe Michio 渡辺美智雄
Yamamoto Gombei 山本権兵衛
Yamamoto Isoroku 山本五十六
Yamazaki Toshio 山崎敏夫
150

Yanagiya Kensuke 柳谷謙介
Yokoyama Ichiro 横山一郎
Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂
Yuan Shikai 袁世凱
Zaigai kokan fujin no kokoroe 『在外公館夫人の心得』
zaigai kokan keibi taisakukan 在外公館警備対策官
Zhang Xueliang 張学良
Zhao 趙Zhou Enlai 周恩来

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Abbreviations:
BI&C: Sugihara, Between Incompetence and Culpability
JPPH: Sugihara, Japanese Perspectives on Pearl Harbor

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156

IndexA
active duty system (gen’eki bukan sei), 8
Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao (1994), 140
Akashi, Motojiro, 2
Akihito1994 visit to Pearl Harbor cancelled, 50
Aoki, Morihisa, 74
family background, 89
Asahi Shimbun
1951 poll favors rearmament, 44
Asakawa, Akio
embezzlement scandal, 78
Asakawa, Kan'ichi, 6Atarashii rekishi kyokasho(2000, Japan Society for History Textbook
Reform), 62

B
Beikoku ni tsukaishite (1946, Nomura), 34
Bush, George H.W.
Japanese apology for Pearl Harbor
unnecessary, 47
Bushido, spirit of, 4Bushido, the Soul of Japan (1899, Nitobe), 2

C
Chiang, Ching-kuo, 8Chiang, Kai-shek, 8, 9Ddamasareta (tricked), 37
Du contrat social ou Principes du droit
politique (1762, Rousseau), 134
Dulles, John Foster
1950 visit to Japan, 43

F
Feary, Robertinsight on Konoe’s intentions, 16Foreign Ministry, 67
1893 examination system, 87

1982 forces Japan to needlessly apologize
to China, 52
1994 declassifies materials on sneak attack
blunder, 50
2000 Meiji exam system abolished, 66, 88
blames former military solely for war, 67
corrupting influence of generous staff perks
abroad, 90
diplomats are privileged class, 89
discrimination among staff abroad, 93
evades war responsibility, 129
first established in Meiji, 85
hierarchy among diplomats’ wives, 93
how to revitalize operations abroad, 95
ignores national interest, 62
lack of long-term vision, 60
must pursue the national interest, 135
Forum to Change the Foreign Ministrylist of 12 items on report, 98

GGaimusho kaikaku ni kansuru kaeru kai (Forumto Change the Foreign Ministry), 97
gen’eki bukan sei (active duty system), 8
Gosan no ronri (1987, Kojima), 42

H
Hamada, Kunimatsu, 8
hara-kiri mondo (1937), 8
Harriman, E.H., 3
Hayashi, Senjuro, 8
heated exchange over hara-kiri (1937), 8
Hibiya Incendiary Incident (1905), 3
Higashinakano, Shudo, 75
Hirohito
accepts responsibility for war, 37
first meeting with MacArthur, 36
unlikely to use term damasareta (tricked),37
Hirota, Koki, 7
no longer deal with Chiang regime, 10
Hull, Cordell
Nov. 26 memorandum (Hull Note), 18
pretends to berate Nomura and Kurusu, 30
stymies Konoe-Roosevelt summit, 15

I

misappropriation of funds, 78
Mutsu, Munemitsu, 3

Iguchi, Sadao
blame for causing sneak attack, 36
imukan (medical affairs officer), 95
Isshiki, Masaharu
leaks video footage of errant Chinese
trawler, 107
Ito, Hirobumi, 1, 2NNakano, Naoya, 48
National Archives of Japan
ignores work critical of Foreign Ministry,140
Nihon no Kaki (1909, Asakawa), 6
Nitobe, Inazo, 2Noda, Eijiro, 62
Nomura, Kichisaburo
ineptitude, 29
Konoe summit with Roosevelt, 15
lacked sense of responsibility, 63late delivery of final notice, 30
washes hands of blame for sneak attack, 34
Northern Territories, still disputed by Japanand Russia, 68

JJapan apology culture, 124
Japan Defense Agency (JDA)
messages abroad routinely delayed byForeign Ministry, 93
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
108
Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers(JOCV), 108
jugun ianfu (comfort women), 73

O

K

ODA (Official Development Assistance)
as means to pursue national interest, 82
as return for Japanese economy, 81
as war reparations, 81
Okazaki, Katsuo
1946 internal investigation, 49
and Chiune Sugihara, 103
Okuma, Shigenobu, 6
Okumura, Katsuzo
blame for causing sneak attack, 36interprets at Hirohito-MacArthur meeting,38
Outlines of Measures for the China Incident(1937), 9

Kaneko, Kentaro, 2Kase, Hideaki, 140
Kato, Takaaki, 6
Katsura, Taro, 3
Kawaguchi, Yoriko, 97
Kenkenroku (1923, Mutsu), 3
Kennan, George F.
1997 essay on diplomacy without diplomats,89
Kim Hyon-hui, 71
kinrin shokoku joko (neighboring countryclause), 54
Kobayashi, Hiromu
embezzlement scandal, 78
Komura, Jutaro
Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), 1
opposes Manchurian rail proposal, 3Kono Statement (1993), 73
Konoe, Fumimaro, 8
summit with Roosevelt, 15
Kuwait Embassy of Japan
1990 state of chaos, 72

P
Peru Embassy of Japan, hostage crisis, 74
Point of View (Foreign Ministry)
1994 apology for sneak attack blunder, 50

Q
Questions Regarding the Delay (1991,
Sugihara), 48

M
MacArthur, Douglas
first meeting with Hirohito, 36
postwar admission Tokyo Trial was a
mistake, 138
Mao Sui, 87
Marco Polo Bridge Incident (1937), 9
Matsuo, Katsutoshi, 97, 110
embezzlement scandal, 78
Matsuoka, Yosuke
ousted in 1941, 14
quadripartite pact, 12
medical affairs officer (imukan), 95
Miyauchi, Yoshihiko, 97
Mizutani, MakotoRringiseiabsent in Foreign Ministry, 118
Roosevelt, Franklin D.
baby Japan along, 17
Dec. 4 war plans leaked, 21
reelected to third term, 11
Roosevelt, Theodore, 2
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 134
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 2

158

S

Twenty-One Demands (1915)
Foreign Ministry policy blunder, 5

Saito, Kunihikomishandles Iris Chang debate, 76
Sankei Shimbun
2001 expose on diplomatic perks, 91
security measures officer (zaigai kokan keibi
taisakukan), 95
Shenyang Incident (2002), 78
Shina jihen taisho yoko (1937), 10
shinmin (sovereign citizen), 135
Shinpen nihonshi (1986, Japan Society for
History Textbook Reform), 54
shinryaku (invasion)
1982 mistaken media reports on term in
textbooks, 51
Shokugyo toshite no gaikokan (2002, Yatabe),102
Sugihara, Chiune, 103
Sunagawa, Shojun, 104
no recognition for, 71
Suzuki, Muneo, 97

UUshiba, Tomohikoleaks that U.S. codes broken, 16VVindictiveness toward Japan by U. S. Troops(Stouffer), 41

YYamamoto, Isoroku, 24
Yamato Court, 123
Yanagiya, Kensuke
remark about Deng Xiaoping, 100
Yatabe, Atsuhiko, 102
Yomiuri Shimbun
2001 embezzlement expose, 78
Yoshida, Shigeru
appoints Okumura to interpret at HirohitoMacArthur meeting, 38
conceals in plain view culprits responsible
for sneak attack, 39
covers up Foreign Ministry’s responsibility
for Pearl Harbor sneak attack, 38
ignores 1950 rearmament request, 44
political crimes, 45, 131
Yuan, Shikai, 5T
Tada, Hayao, 10
Takeshima Islands, still disputed by Japan andSouth Korea, 70
The Rape of Nanking (1997, Chang), 75
Togo, Heihachiro, 2Togo, Shigenori, 25
Tojo, Hideki
ignores findings of Total War ResearchInstitute, 23
Total War Research Institute, 22
Truman, Harry
atomic bombings in part retaliation for
Pearl Harbor, 38

Zzaigai kokan keibi taisakukan, 95
Zhang, Xueliang, 8159