(Preliminary and Incomplete)
August 2023

Empirical Evaluation of CBDC in Cambodia
Kenichi Ueda (The University of Tokyo, ABFER, CEPR, and TCER) *and Chanthol Hay (National University of Battambang and Save the Children)

Abstract
Cambodia is one of the two first countries that adopted retail CBDCs in October 2020. We
conducted a survey in the summer of 2022, roughly two years after the introduction of the
CBDC, called Bakong. Bakong is offered in two currencies, Khmer Riel and the US dollar, as
Cambodia has been highly dollarized. We propose simple predictions on the usages of
Bakong from the viewpoints of three kinds of substitutions: substituting paper money, bankdeposits, and international currencies. While the first and the second effects are common to
any CBDCs, the third one is specific to Bakong. Unlike typical local currency CBDC, US
dollar Bakong may substitute Khmer Riel more. In our survey, we found some evidence forall these predictions.

JEL Classification Numbers: E42, F33
Keywords: Bakong, CBDC, dollarization, money substitution, bank deposits*

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed any institutions that theauthors have been affiliated with. This paper is conducted as a part of the Digital Economy Project, led by the
Kenichi Ueda, at the University of Tokyo, and funded by donations from the Silicon Valley Fund as a part of
the University Blockchain Research Initiative (UBRI) backed by Ripple. We also acknowledge financial support
from CARF at the University of Tokyo. We would like to thank Liliya Repa for her excellent research
assistance.

1

I. INTRODUCTION
A retail CBDC may substitute three existing “money,” i.e., paper money, bank deposits, andforeign currencies. Depending on which substitution occurs, a retail CBDC could bring either
benefits or costs to a country. We empirically investigate these substitution effects of a retail
CBDC using an actual retail CBDC introduced in a prototypical developing country,
Cambodia. Such empirical research exists few, if not none, to the best of our knowledge, atthe time of our survey conducted in mid-2022, but designed in late 2021, about a year after
Cambodia introduced its CBDC.1
Many seems to start with a naïve view on CBDC: Compared with paper money (M0), a retail
CBDC is expected to lower the costs of issuing (or printing) for the authority once it isdeveloped with some sunk costs. For the citizens, a CBDC should also bring moreconvenience to carry around, though anonymity and privacy may be lost depending on legal
protections. Overall, a retail CBDC should be beneficial from the viewpoint of substituting
paper money.
Compared with bank deposits (M1), a retail CBDC in practice asks people to possesstransaction-purpose liquidity accounts at the central bank. This option of having a very safe
central bank account should be quite attractive for a depositor who has such a liquidity
account (e.g., a checking account) at a private sector bank, in particular, during a period offinancial turmoil.
However, this would create a problem in both short and long run. In the short run, rapid
money transfers from private sector banks to the central bank would create a massive banking
crisis (Brunnermeier and Niepelt 2019; Keister and Sanches 2018). In the long run, afinancial system without private sector banks implies, either the economy would lack any
bank loans or rely on loans from the central bank (or the government).2 If the former
happens, the economy would result in lower growth with little financing for long-term
investments (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). If the latter happens, the economy would resemble

1

Due to COVID-19 pandemic, our implementation of survey was delayed at least a half year.
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2020) conder that the central bank can monopolize deposits and then let money
lenders and investment funds take care of corporate finance, though I doubt if the social welfare is maximized insuch a system. Chiu et al. (2019) argues in a country like Canada where a few big banks seem to enjoy
oligopolistic rents, CBDC could be a good competitor in the market to lower such inefficiency.
22that of the Soviet Union, which was quite inefficient. This concern about a retail CBDC
substituting bank deposits seems a sufficient condition for preventing introduction of a retail
CBDC, at least directly issued by the central bank.3 More recent argument is to place CBDC
as a part of all decentralized finance (DeFi), which is digital, distributed ledger, based financesystem (Aquilina et al. 2023).
The third substitution could happen against foreign currencies. This is especially important
for a small open developing country. As a typical developing country still relies substantiallyon seigniorage as a part of its fiscal revenue (Khan et al. 2023), keeping its local currency isimportant for the welfare of its citizens. This monetary sovereignty issue seems indeed wellrecognized in many countries when Facebook tried to issue Libra, and especially in Asian
countries when China is experimenting with its retail CBDC with Alipay, which is a Chinese
payment network, already set up in many Asian countries.4 If it is threatened by thecompetition from a foreign currency (or a crypto-currency), a country could benefit fromissuing a retail CBDC to defend its monetary sovereignty and keeping seigniorage.
Cambodia is a typical developing country, perhaps except that it has been suffering from defacto dollarization. While Bahama, the other country that adopted a retail CBDC around thesame time, October 2020, uses Bahamian dollar (called Sand dollar in its CBDC form) that ispegged to the US dollar (i.e., a sort of de jure dollarization), Cambodia does not make its
local currency, Khmer Riel, hard-pegged to the US dollar. Hence, Cambodia’s case is defacto dollarization and interesting to see the CBDC’s effects on substitution between the local
currency and the international hard currency. Also, while Bahama is a small island country
relying on tourism, Cambodia is a more typical developing country, which has been rapidly
growing since the 1990s by industrialization though tourism seems also sizable (Figure 1).
The intrusion of the US dollar into Cambodia is quite large compared to any other South-East
Asian country, or any other countries, which do not adopt the US dollar as the official

3

Stable coins backed by the bank deposits, which is insured by the deposit insurance and (somewhat) by thelender of last resort function of the central bank, could be considered as an indirect retail CBDC as protected by
the authority. This indirect retail CBDC would preserve bank deposits.
4
Alipay is run under a private sector company, Alibaba. However, it has been said that a Chinese authority
gained substantial control power on Alibaba in recent years.

3

currency.5 This is perhaps due to the prolonged political and civil unrest. The unrest may be
traced back in the late 1960s and ended only in the late 1990s. It brought the UN andinternational NPO activities coupled with the US dollars into the country.
By 2020, in Cambodia, about 80 percent of bank deposits are contracted in US dollars (USD,
Figure 2). Anecdotal evidence suggests loans are also made in US dollars about the similar
percentage. By the way, salaries are also mostly paid in US dollars by relatively large firms
and foreign firms, while those are paid in the local currency, Khmer Riel, for government
employees and small business workers (Hay 2020).
More importantly, in our survey in 2022, payments are also more than 60 percent done in US
dollars. In an earlier survey conducted in the Autumn of 2020 in a similar manner (Hay2020), the use of the local currency, Khmer Riel, is mostly concentrated in small transactions.
It is implied by the prices quoted in KHR is relatively cheap in the survey for shops in Phnom
Penh, the capital city (Figure 3). This is because the USD paper money (larger than or equal
to one dollar) is circulating in Cambodia but not the USD coins. Still, there are many things
that are sold under one US dollar. For those items, people need to use Khmer Riel.6
Here, we see one specific substitution effect of a retail CBDC, unique to Cambodia Bakong:
Bakong may eliminate the use of the local currency, Khmer Riel, even more. The perverse
effect of Cambodia Bakong stems from the fact that Bakong is issued in two currency units,
KHR and USD. People can use USD Bakong even for smaller denominations than one dollar,
for example, 25 cents. While we explain more about Bakong in the next section, we believe it
important to note here that this specific substitution is opposite to the typical motivation of asmall open country to issue a retail CBDC to defend its local currency against the US dollar,
or any foreign currencies and cryptocurrencies.
In summary, we have three hypotheses, two of which are common to all the retail CBDCs,
and one is unique to Cambodia’s Bakong.
5

One of the authors of this paper, Hay, summarized well about Cambodia’s de facto dollarization in his Ph.D.
thesis (Hay 2020) under the supervision of the other author, Ueda. The description and figures on dollarization
are largely based on it.
6Note that there is at least one other reason to use Khmer Riel lies in the supply side: The salaries ofgovernment employees are paid in Khmer Riel. As for the private sector, foreign firms and big local firms pay
salaries in US dollars, while small local firms pay in Khmer Riel as described above already (Hay 2020).

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•

H1: Retail CBDC substitutes M0, paper money.

•

H2: Retail CBDC substitutes M1, bank deposits (or more broadly private sector
payment tools like debit cards and QR code-based payments)•

H3: Bakong substitutes Khmer Riel against the US dollar.

We find supporting results for all the hypotheses in logit analyses using our own survey. Notethat those predictions, especially H1 and H2, are consistent with key theoretical papers
described above as well as with many policy-oriented documents and academic reviews when
the discussions became popular in 2018 to 2020 (e.g., Adrian and Griffoli 2019; Auer andBoehme 2020; BIS 2018, 2019; Boar, Holden and Wadsworth 2020; Griffoli et al. 2018;
Townsend 2020; Yanagawa and Yamaoka 2019) and the discussions still continue (e.g.,
Khan et al. 2023; Aquilina et al. 2023; Ueda 2022). As for H3, again, it is specific to
Cambodia. In any case, when we start the survey in October 2022, we do not find any
empirical papers on wide-use retail CBDC based on a field survey.
II. BAKONGThe National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) officially launched the CBDC, called Bakong, on
October 28, 2020. NBC began its CBDC project in 2016 with the inauguration of the Project
Bakong, named after a temple of the ancient Khmer Empire. In 2017, the NBC selected
Hyperledger Iroha, a blockchain platform that Soramitsu, a private company of Japan,
maintains and develops for its retail CBDC.7 The NBC and Soramitsu team collaborated forthree years to implement the project Bakong.
The Bakong system is designed to upgrade a legacy interbank transfer system (FAST) by
replacing its relational database with the Iroha distributed ledger, which is resilient by design
against hardware failures, tampering, and cyberattacks.8 In this sense, Bakong is also awholesale CBDC, not only a retail CBDC. Note that a wholesale CBDC refers to a payment
system used in interbank transfers. Traditional payment systems (of any countries) are known

7

Soramitsu is led by founder Kazumasa Miyazawa, who spend many years in Sony and developed a contactless
payment system (FeliCa), now widely used in Japan (e.g., SUICA) as well as worldwide (e.g., Apple’s iPhone).
However, Bakong is a QR code-based system, not a FeliCa based system.
8
Iroba distributed ledger is developed by Soramitsu and donated to Hyperledger Project, which is a collection ofopen source blockchain applications.

5to be costly and to take substantial time to complete a transaction. However, if using
blockchain-based technology, it could transfer money rapidly and securely with little cost.9
Three official objectives of the Cambodian CBDC are listed as follows when it was
introduced: (1) promoting the use of Cambodian Riel and reducing dollarization; (2)preventing the spread of COVID-19; (3) promoting financial system efficiency, resilience,and inclusion. They were mentioned by Chea Serey, director general of central banking at theNBC, during the launching ceremony as follows: “I hope the official launch of Bakong
system today will help to promote social welfare and also prevent the spread of that disease
through facilitating e-payment from person to person seamlessly without involving cash.”
People who have smartphones can download the Bakong App at home to store digital KHR
and/or digital USD wallets if they have (1) a national identity card; (2) a telephone number;(3) a current selfie photo to put in the system. Users of this mobile app can make payments
and transfer money from their e-wallets by scanning QR codes or tapping their phone
numbers.
By the way, many commercial banks in Cambodia had already introduced their own
smartphone apps, similar to the Bakong App. People can use those private sector banks’ apps
to pay at shops. Also, people can use those private sector banks’ apps to transfer money toother banks. For example, ABA bank has its own ABA App. People can use theirsmartphones to transfer money from ABA bank to another bank such as Acleda bank. In thiscase, the interbank transfer portion can be done through the wholesale part of Bakong, if
chosen by senders over the traditional interbank transfer system (FAST). Cambodia
introduced this wholesale Bakong at the same time of the retail Bakong.
From the retail users’ point of view, Bakong App has 4 main functions. Send, Receive, QR
Pay, and Deposit, in either KHR or USD.
a) Send: is used for transferring money to a receiver’s Bakong account, by using thereceiver’s phone number.10
9Evaluating specific technology is beyond the scope of this paper and, as such, we cannot say this is always
true.
10
The fee structure of sending money is the following as of May 2023. No fee is charged for sending moneyfrom a Bakong account to another Bakong account. A fee of 0.5 USD is charged if the money transfer between
50 USD and 500 USD is done from an ABA bank account to a Bakong account. The fee varies by banks and

6b) Receive: is used for receiving money from a sender. A receiver needs to show only
his/her own QR code to the sender for making a transaction.
c) Deposit: is used for transferring money from a Bakong account to a bank account if
the bank partners with the Bakong App system.
d) QR Pay: is used for paying money to the receiver by QR code by scanning the QR
code of the receiver.
Among above four functions, (a), (b), and (c) are categorized as money transfers, which may
use wholesale Bakong even by a transfer between the two commercial banks (i.e., (c)function). In this sense, users of Bakong, including the wholesale portion, is considered to bequite large. Indeed, it reached to half the population by the time of our survey (Nikkei Asia,
January 4, 2022).11
However, its actual usage related to payments at retail shops (i.e., (d) function) is less known.
Below, our analysis based on our own field survey focuses on the actual use of Bakong as aretail payment tool. By the way, functions (a) and (b), money transfers between two Bakong
accounts can be also considered as retail CBDC. Later, we also investigate Bakong usage as aretail money transfer tool.
Note that, regarding the USD wallet of Bakong, NBC seems as if issuing the US dollar.
Indeed, theoretically, it is creating USD liquidity in the same way as a commercial bank in
the US, getting deposits of paper US dollars and giving depositors USD units in deposit
accounts. Only a fraction of the received US dollars by a US commercial bank are depositedin the US Federal Reserve System as bank reserves (“fractional reserve banking”), and the
USD deposit amounts less bank reserves are considered to be created by the commercial bank(“inside money”). NBC appears to operate the same way regarding the USD wallet ofincreases with the amount of money to be transferred. If the amount of money to be transferred is 700 USD
from an ABA account to a Bakong Account, the fee is 1 USD. But, the fee is zero if the amount is less than orequal to 50 USD. Between two commercial bank accounts, for example sending money from ABA to Phnom
Penh Commercial bank via the wholesale Bakong, a fee of 0.5 USD is charged if the amount is less than 500
USD. This fee increases with the amount of money to be transferred. If the amount is 600 USD to be transferredfrom ABA to Phnom Penh Commercial bank, the fee will be 1 USD.
11
Recent figures do not show much difference. Most major financial institutions, namely 46 institutions,
including commercial banks, specialized banks, microfinance institutions and payment service providers, havelaunched the Bakong payment system (Khmer Time, March 20, 2023). About 8.5 million accounts have beenusing Bakong e-wallets (The Phnom Penh Post, February 22, 2023). This is about half of the country’s
population, which is the same as Nikkei Asia (January 4, 2022), a year ago.

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Bakong. The only difference seems that it has foreign reserves (presumably mostly in US
treasury bonds) in its own hands, rather than bank reserves at the US Federal Reserve
System.
Obviously, NBC is not a customer of the US Federal Reserve System, which plays the role ofthe lender of last resort, nor a member of the US FDIC. This implies a USD Bakong is not
likely as stable as US commercial bank deposits. On the other hand, getting USD paper
money in the hands of NBC, as much as it can do, may be regarded as a way of eliminatingde facto dollarization in Cambodia, especially if the trust in USD Bakong eroded sometime in
the future. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on theempirical evaluation of acceptance of the retail CBDC in Cambodia. For those interested in
the above-mentioned stability issues, please see the companion paper (Ueda 2023).
III. SURVEY
Between July 2022 to August 2022, we conducted an online survey (though with some faceto-face interviews) for individuals, solicited through SNS services, mainly Facebook.12
Survey includes many questions, on the use of Bakong App and other digital or electronic
payments, as well as characteristics of individuals. The total sample size was 827.
By design, this is not a random sampling. Those who surveyed need to have access to theinternet and are most likely to own smartphones. Those surveyed also need to understandwhat digital payments and Bakong are. They need to connect to major SNS services. Thoserequirements, perhaps, easy for people living in any advanced countries, but not so easy for
those in developing countries like Cambodia.13
We ask 46 questions in the survey for individuals. Not all questions got many answers,
especially detailed ones. For this paper, we utilize about a dozen questions which got

12

The survey questions are jointly written by two authors, Ueda and Hay. The survey was managed by Hay with
employing interviewers, who were mostly students at the National University of Battambang. By the way, we
also conducted direct interviews with shop owners between March 2022 to April 2022, but we do not utilize
much this portion in this paper. Note that, due to COVID-19 pandemic, these interviews were delayed from ouroriginal research plan.
13
Besides the restrictions due to COVID19 pandemic, this was also one of reasons that we did not design our
survey as random sampling.

8sufficient amounts of answers. Table 1 shows definition of our variables. Table 2a shows key
statistical summary of those variables and Table 2b shows correlations among them.
Notably, more than 1/2 of our sample has college degree (Education in Table 2a).14 However,Cambodia as a whole, only about 10 percent of the population have college degrees
according to the World Bank database.15 This implies that our sample are quite skewed
towards highly educated people, and thus that our results are likely biased towards more
acceptance of any digital payment systems than population average. At the same time, if weselected sample randomly, sizable portion of them might not have access to financial services
as well as to the internet, and also have difficulties to understand our questions regarding theuse of digital payments and transfers.
Table 2a shows that those who prefer to pay in digital (Digital Preference) are about 30
percent, while those who have ever experienced to pay in digital (Digital Experience) areabout 60 percent. Overall, 20 percent of our sample ever used Bakong for the retail payments.
Again, this is likely to overestimate the use of Bakong in retail payments.
Note that our survey on shops, conducted separately in earlier 2022, shows that only 0.3
percent of 359 retail shops in Phnom Penh accepts Bakong Pay, the smallest among any
digital payments. On the other hand, ABA Pay is most widely accepted at about 80 percent of
shops and Acleda Pay is the second at about 40 percent of shops.16 Any credit cards
acceptance comes the third, at about 16 percent of shops, while Alipay is at the penultimate at
0.8 percent of shops.17 Overall about 20 percent of shops do not accept any digital orelectronic payments.
These results of the shop survey reflect that each “Pay” service usually requires a different
QR code of the same shop shown at the store counter. For a typical traditional small shop, the14Hereafter capitalized and italicized words are used for variables we used.
At data.worldbank.org, we look at the variable named “Educational attainment, at least completed short-cycle
tertiary, population 25+, male (%) (cumulative) – Cambodia,” which is available for 2014 (8.5 percent) and2015 (9.4 percent), originally comes from UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The tertiary school enrollment in
2021 is about 13 percent according to data.worldbank.org. Note that we accessed the World bank data site on
May 25, 2023.
16
ABA bank is a Canadian bank operating in Cambodia, while Acleda bank is a domestic bank.
17
Alipay is provided by Ant Financial, a Chinese firm, a part of Alibaba group. We also include Apple Pay
provided by Apple, an American firm, and Pay Pay provided by Softbank, a Japanese firm, as both are supposed
to be active in Cambodia. However, no shops in our sample replied to accept those two payment tools.
15

9counter is so small that can show only a few QR codes. On the other hand, a shop in amodern shopping mall could show more QR codes at its counter. Those modern shopping
malls sell higher-priced goods compared to traditional markets or roadside shops, and thus
may select naturally certain types of customers (e.g., richer and more educated).
In any payment tools, including paper money, those who are more likely to use the US dollar(USD user in Table 2a) compared to Khmer Riel is about 60 percent in our sample. This
seems consistent with our shop survey, which reveals that about 40 percent of shops show
price tags only in USD, about 30 percent in KHR, and about 30 percent in both USD andKHR.
Note that the Bakong_USD variable also captures USD users but only when using Bakong.
Bakong USD users are about 2/3 (=0.134/0.197) of Bakong users. This is a bit higher than
the general USD users (60 percent) described above. This is consistent with hypothesis H3, aperverse substitution effect of KHR over USD by Bakong.
Other variables in Table 2a show the characteristics of individuals. Due to our survey design,
most people, about 80 percent, live in the capital city, Phnom Penh, an urban area. Others canbe regarded as living in a rural area. Male/Female is self-explanatory, as well as Age variable.
Working (about 70 percent) includes full-time students with paid jobs and excludes retired
people. Again, the online questionnaires are disseminated originally from the university, fulltime students (i.e., unemployed if without paid jobs) are likely overrepresented. Public
servants are about 10 percent, excluding those who work for NPOs. While workers at (mostlyinternational) NPOs and large companies are paid in US dollars, public servants are paid in
Khmer Riel, naturally preferring retail payments in Khmer Riel.
IV. LOGIT ANALYSIS ON RETAIL PAYMENTS
A. Hypothesis H1 on Paper Money
Regarding hypothesis H1 (substitution of paper money by CBDC), although with quite abiased sample, we investigate if actual usage of any digital payments is different frompreference and if Bakong users give more tendencies towards actual usage.

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We first look at the preference to use digital payments by conducting the following logit
model (H1.a). Table 3 column (1) shows the result.
Prob(Digital Preference) = Logit(Bakong users, USD users, Individual characteristics)
Then, we also look at whether the actual use of Bakong is associated with the use of any
digital payments by conducting the following logit model (H1.b). Table 3 column (2) shows
the result.
Prob(Digital Experience) = Logit(Bakong users, USD users, Individual characteristics)
In Table 3 column (1), most of our samples reply to those basic questions to construct thevariables here, so 805 samples out of 827 are utilized. As predicted, Bakong users are more
likely to prefer to use digital payments. This seems remarkable given the fact that Bakong is
not accepted at many shops in our shop survey.
Table 3 column (2) shows the result with almost the same sample size, 800. Note that, wecannot directly test hypothesis H1. Instead, to assess hypothesis H1, we compare this resultcolumn (2) against column (1).
Like in Table 3 column (1), Bakong use is associated positively with digital payment
Experience (column 2). Same as in column (1), the result seems consistent with a policy
objective: Bakong can facilitate cashless transactions. However, we have to be aware thatreverse causality may be a possibility, that is, people with a stronger Preference orExperience of digital payments use Bakong more (with likely other kinds of digital andelectronic payments). The coefficient is almost twice stronger for Experience (column 2) thanfor Preference (column 1), so Bakong is likely to promote the actual use of any digital
payments. Still, directly testing H1 is difficult.
However, an interesting picture emerges comparing Preference (column 1) and Experience(column 2) results by looking at individual characteristics. In Table 3 column (1), those who
are Educated, Working, and Public Servants are more likely to prefer to use digital payments.
USD users are especially fond of using digital payments as predicted. But, Table 3 column(2) show mostly similar but a slightly different result. Although Educated, Working, and USD
11users are more likely to have Digital payments Experience, Public Servants are no longer thecase. Also, younger (less Aged) people have more Experience to use any digital payments
though no Age-dependent difference in Preference. In other words, older generations appear
to feel some barriers to start using digital payment systems.
More importantly, living in Phnom Penh is strongly associated with the Experience of digital
payments, though it does not affect the Preference. This implies the existence of somefrictions in rural areas to financial inclusion regarding digital and electronic payments. As the
economy develops and urbanization progresses, people in the current rural area are expected
to use cashless payments much more than now when they see more shops accepting digital
payments.
B. Hypothesis H2 on Private Sector Banking
Regarding hypothesis H2 (substitution of bank deposits by CBDC), as discussed already, we
cannot investigate bank deposits directly but can look into the use of other payment tools thatare linked to commercial bank deposits. Here, we investigate how Bakong users are different
from users of any other digital payments that are led by ABA Pay and Acleda Pay.
Here, we focus on those who are using any digital payment tools. This gives us a smaller
sample size of 484. Among them, some people use Bakong. Table 3 column (3) shows theresult.
Prob(Bakong users in digital payment users) = Logit(USD users, Individual characteristics)
To assess hypothesis H2, we compare the column (3) results to column (2) results. Similar toany digital payment experience (column 2), more Educated people use Bakong more though
Working status no longer matters in column (3). Also, Age dependency shows the opposite
association. Older people tend to use Bakong more among digital payment users (column 3),
although younger people are more likely to have experience using any digital payment tools(column 2) as described above.
More importantly, Phnom Penh dummy has a negative sign, though at a 10 percent level ofsignificance, in column (3). This is also the opposite of column (2), experience with any

12digital payment tools. In other words, among those who are already using (and able to use)
digital payment tools, Bakong is more widely used in rural areas. For rural areas where fewer
digital payment tools are available at shops, the Bakong payment system has been likely to beinstalled. Perhaps, there is less network externality established by ABA Pay or other private
sector payment methods, and QR codes on shop counters are not so crowded in rural areas.
Overall, older people and rural people seem to use digital payments because they use
Bakong. This result fills the gap between column (1) and (2) described already, that is, older
as well as rural people do have similar preference to use digital payments but have lessexperience of actual usage. The result is consistent with a view that obtained in the previous
section (discussion on hypothesis H1): older people and rural people tend to trust the central
bank more than the private sector. Introduction of Bakong appear to encourage those people
to use any digital payment tools. This is consistent with the policy agenda of financial
inclusion regarding digital payments.
Yet another important result here is that USD users are not significantly associated with
Bakong users among those who are already using any digital payment tools. USD users thus
appear indifferent using Bakong or other digital payment tools.
C. Hypothesis H3 on US Dollar
In the end of discussions on hypothesis H2, we noticed that, among digital payment users,
USD users treat Bakong indifferently among any other digital payment tools. A further
question is that, if we focus on Bakong users only, whether USD users have different
characteristics or not. We investigate this below as looking into hypothesis H3 (substitutionof KHR by USD Bakong). As we focus on Bakong users only, sample size shrinks to 148 inthe logit analysis below. The result is shown in Table 3 column (4).
Prob(USD Bakong users among Bakong users) = Logit (Individual characteristics)
Note that any tendencies we found for USD Bakong users may be just the same as USD usersof any digital payment tools, like ABA Pay. So, to assess hypothesis H3, we conduct a
companion logit analysis as below, focusing on those who have ever used digital payments,

13the same focus group as in column (2) with sample size of 484. The result is shown in Table
3 column (5).
Prob(USD users) = Logit (Individual characteristics)
Importantly, Phnom Penh dummy has a significantly positive sign in both columns (4) and(5) of Table 3, thought the effect is somewhat stronger for Bakong USD users. However,unlike more general digitization of payment systems (discussion in H2), USD usage isdifficult to predict from the coefficient on Phnom Penh dummy here.
The positive sign on Phnom Penh should reflect supply and demand effects. Firms in Phnom
Penh may pay in US dollars more likely than in the rural area. This apparently creates more
supply of USD liquidity for Phnom Penh citizens. It is difficult to predict if this tendency of
paying wages in USD continues or not. However, this tendency, after correcting for otherindividual characteristics, should be theoretically the same for both Bakong USD users andgeneral USD users.
As for the demand side, it may be likely to reflect the fact that more shops accept Bakong or
any digital payments like ABA Pay in Phnom Penh than in rural areas. Many shops sell cheap
items, which are priced below one US dollar. Also, a combined pay of several US dollars
plus several hundred KHR is not an exception. As such, without digital payment tools, people
need to use Khmer Riel paper money and coins, but with digital payment tools like Bakong
and ABA pay, people can pay all in US dollars. This creates demand for USD-denominatedBakong and any other digital payments like ABA Pay more than USD paper money.
Table 3 column (4) shows that Age and Education are not significant, while column (5)shows their significantly positive coefficients. In other words, older and more educatedpeople tend to use US dollars in general, but no such differences are found for Bakong USD
users. This might be consistent with a policy objective: The introduction of Bakong mightlower USD usage in the future. However, it is likely the opposite in a detailed look of theresults. Younger and less educated people are using Bakong USD more than they do otherpayment methods. After all, Table 2a shows, as discussed already, that Bakong users tend to
pay in USD more (68 percent) than the whole sample (60 percent USD users).

14Note that wealth might be an issue here. Although Working status is controlled and thus
income somewhat, wealth is not controlled due to no available data. As such, the young andless educated perhaps correlated with less wealth and, accordingly less use of US dollar bankaccounts. Bakong accounts, unlike private sector banks like ABA bank and Acleda bank,
may promote unbanked people to use more digital payment tools. However, it is not the caseat least for education regarding general use of digital payments as well as Bakong as shownin column (2) and (3) of Table 3. Though somewhat true for younger people for general
digital experience (column 2), but it is not the case for Bakong (column 3). As such, thewealth effect is difficult to be confirmed and applied to explain the USD usage.
One anomaly is a significantly negative association found for the Public Servant dummy for
Bakong USD users (column 4 of Table 3). This might seem consistent with the fact thatpublic servant wages are paid in Khmer Riel. However, if so, we should see such a significant
coefficient for general USD users (column 5) and perhaps also for Bakong users, regardlessof USD or KHR, (column 3). But, they are both insignificant. Together with the only
positive significant coefficient is digital payment Preference (column 1), not Experience(column 2), public servants may indeed want to promote Bakong, especially KHR Bakong.
But, why it appears only in Bakong usage, not in other digital payments (columns 2 and 5) isa puzzle.18
D. Looking at Differences
Unfortunately, we did not conduct a randomized experience on allocating Bakong, nor havepanel data before and after the introduction of Bakong. However, Digital Payment
Preference can be used as a reference point for actual Digital Payment Experience since theircorrelation is only about 0.5 (Table 2b).
Table 4 column 1 shows the result of a Logit estimation using the difference of Experience
minus Preference as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the same as in
Table 3 columns 1 and 2 described in the previous section. Notably, the use of Bakong is not
significantly explaining the difference between Experience and Preference. However, Phnom18

One possible conjecture is that, perhaps, public servants might be more careful on selecting KHR when using
Bakong than when using private sector payment methods. Note that, as described already, a Bakong account islinked to a national identity card.

15

Penh, Age, and Working are significant factors, as they would be expected by comparing theresults of Logit regressions separately conducted for Preference (Table 3 column 1) andExperience (Table 3 column 2).
In other words, for Hypothesis 1, the overall results stay the same. Specifically, relative to thepreference of using digital payments, living in Phnom Penh and Working fosters more actual
uses of digital payments while Age seems a barrier to adopting digital payments. Here,Bakong does not appear influencing the actual use of digital payments beyond preference.
To see more carefully the effects of Bakong on the use of digital payments, presumably
against paper money, we conduct a similar Logit analysis but now include interaction termsof all the independent variables and Bakong. Table 4 column 2 shows the result. For noninteraction terms, the results are essentially the same as in column 1 explained above. Twointeraction terms are significant, USD user*Bakong and Public Servant*Bakong. Because
Bakong users, by definition, have Digital Payment Experience, the negative coefficients of
the interaction terms imply that they do prefer digital payments (the negative sign before
Preference should be flipped with a negative coefficient). In other words, Bakong users who
are also USD users prefer digital payments more. The preference for digital payments is alsostronger for Bakong users who are Public Servants. In other words, Bakong appears topromote the use of digital payments, in particular among public servants and among USD
users.
Regarding H2, substituting private financial services, we now look at only those who
preferred to use digital payments. Among them, the question is who are actually using digital
payments, especially Bakong. To be comparable to Table 4 column 2, we define theindependent variable as Experience – Preference again, and show the result in Table 4
column 3. In this restricted sample, Age remained negative, though at 10 percent significancelevel, keeping showing an age barrier to adopt digital payment technology. Phnom Penh andWorking are no longer significant while Public Servant turns positively significant at 10
percent level.
Importantly, among the interaction terms, Age*Bakong is the only variable that issignificantly positive though at 10 percent level. This implies that Bakong promote older

16

people’s use of digital payments against the age barrier found for digital payments tools ingeneral. This is consistent with findings in the section B on H2.
Lastly, regarding H3 (substitution of KHR), we restrict the sample to those who use digital
payments, and then look at the difference between Bakong USD users and general USD users
for any payment tools. Note again that Bakong USD users are defined as those who use
Bakong for payments, more often with USD wallets than with KHR wallets. We find one
significant variable, which is Phnom Penh. This is consistent with section C above. However,other variables, that is Age, Education, and Public Servants, do not explain the difference
between general USD users and Bakong USD users. Hence, Phnom Penh variable is more
likely to be interpreted as a shortage of shops accepting Bakong, relative to other forms ofdigital payments, in rural areas, rather than wages payments.
V. LOGIT ANALYSIS WITH MONEY TRANSFERS
Our survey also includes questions about money transfers, similar to those about retailpayments. The retail money transfer function may be more utilized because it is closer to thewholesale function of Bakong, which is undoubtedly successful as explained in the
introduction. Indeed, the descriptive statistics (Table 2a) show about 25 percent of our sample
use Bakong for retail money transfers while about 20 percent use Bakong for retail payments.
As such, the retail payment function may be used with some delays by those who become
accustomed to money transfers using Bakong directly.
Here, we test the following additional hypothesis regarding the effects of Bakong use in retailmoney transfers on Bakong use in retail payments:•

H1’: Bakong use in retail money transfers accelerates H1 (retail CBDC to substituteM0, paper money).

•

H2’: Bakong use in retail money transfers accelerates H2 (retail CBDC to substituteM1, bank deposits)•

H3’: Bakong USD use in retail money transfers accelerates H3 (Bakong to substitute
Khmer Riel against the US dollar).

17

Regarding H1’ and H2’ on retail payments, we add the variable, MTBakong, which takes one
if a person uses Bakong for money transfers. The result is shown in Table 5 columns 1 and 2.
MTBakong is not significant in column 1 (H1) but it is positive at the 10 percent significancein column 2 (H2). Other coefficients are essentially not changed, except that Public Servant
in column 2 (H2) becomes insignificant (from positive 10 percent significance).
In other words, H1’ is rejected. People use Bakong more when transferring money, but they
are not affected by these experiences when deciding to use Bakong in retail payments ingeneral.
However, H2’ is supported. The experience of Bakong in money transfers appears to
persuade people to use Bakong more in retail payments for those who prefer to use any
digital payment tools.
Regarding H3’ on payments in USD versus KHR, we add the variable, MTBakongUSD,
which takes one if a person uses USD Bakong more than KHR Bakong when transferringmoney. Again, we restrict the sample to those who use digital payments, and then look at thedifference between Bakong USD users and general USD users for any payment tools. Notethat the, among Bakong users in money transfers, USD is the dominant currency choice as it
is chosen by 3/4 (=0.186/0.245) according to Table 2a.
Table 5 column 3 shows that MTBakongUSD is negative and statistically significant. So, H3’
is rejected. Bakong USD in money transfers does not increase USD usage in retail Bakong
payments. This may show a substitution effect in Bakong USD use between money transfers
and retail payments. For example, those who (need to) transfer money to relatives in rural
areas in USD Bakong may have less USD Bakong in hand to pay for retail shopping. By theway, as for other variables, before including MTBakongUSD, only one is significant, which is
Phnom Penh, but now, Working and Education also become positive and significant to
explain the difference between general USD users and Bakong USD users.

VI. CONCLUSION
We have three hypotheses, two of which are common to all the retail CBDCs, and one isunique to Cambodia’s Bakong.
18•

H1: Retail CBDC substitutes M0, paper money.

•

H2: Retail CBDC substitutes M1, bank deposits (or more broadly private sector
digital and electronic payment tools)•

H3: Bakong substitutes Khmer Riel against the US dollar.

Although we could not test them with clear identification, we conducted logit analysis basedon our own field survey conducted in summer of 2022. Sample size is about 800. It is not
random and skewed towards Phnom Penh residents, highly educated, and those who haveaccess to internet and SNS services. Still, we could say that we found some supportive
evidence for all the above hypotheses.
Hypothesis H1 seems to hold: Bakong appears to promote digital payments against paper
money. Experiences of any digital payment tools are skewed towards Phnom Penh andyounger people, while preferences are not. Hence, some frictions are suspected regarding
inclusion to digital payment systems, in particular, for older population and in the rural area.
In such an environment, Bakong usage is strongly associated with digital payment
experiences twice as much as preference, consistent with our conjecture that Bakong
promotes digital payments. Moreover, Bakong users have more digital payment experience
relative to their preference, if they are public servants or are customed to pay in US dollars in
any forms.
Hypothesis H2 seems to hold: Bakong appears to appeal to those who are not typical users ofother (private sector) digital payment tools. This is implied by our finding that characteristics
of Bakong users are quite different from those who have used any forms of digital payments.
In particular, among those who have ever used any forms of digital payments, Bakong
reaches more to rural areas and older populations, easing frictions to inclusion. Even after
considering preference for digital payments, the age barrier to actually use digital payments islowered with Bakong.
Hypothesis H3 is difficult to reject: Regarding dollarization, Bakong does not seem
improving the situation. The usage of USD Bakong relative to KHR Bakong is higher than
the general tendency of USD usage in any retail payments. In particular, USD Bakong areused by the young and less educated, who are not typical users of US dollars.

19

A puzzle remains that the public servants use USD Bakong much less than general
population. This may not be a puzzle given their salaries are paid in Khmer Riel. However,they do not show any difference from other populations in choosing US dollars in other formsof retail payments.
However, Phnom Penh appears as the only significantly positive factor to explain differences
between Bakong USD users and general USD users in any digital payment tools. Hence, ashortage of shops accepting Bakong, relative to other forms of digital payments, in rural area,
is acting like a barrier rather than wages payments. In other words, more acceptance of
Bakong by shops would accelerate more usage of US dollars.
Bakong is said to be used widely in wholesale interbank transfers. It is thus not surprisingthat Bakong is used (a bit) more also in retail transfers. And, we find evidence that such
Bakong use in money transfers seem to accelerate the adoption of Bakong in retail payments
against other digital payment tools, provided by private financial institutions. However,Bakong USD use in money transfers does not accelerate dollarization in Bakong retailpayments.

Reference
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Agur, I., Ari, A. and Dell’Ariccia, G. (2019) “Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies,”
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on Central Bank Digital Currency,” BIS Papers, No. 107.

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Chiu, J., Jiang, J. H., Davoodalhosseini, S. M. and Zhu, Y. (2019) “Central Bank Digital
Currency and Banking,” Society for Economic Dynamics Meeting Papers, No. 862.
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Digital Currency: Central Banking for All?” NBER Working Paper, No. 14337.
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Hay, C. (2020) Essays on the Macroeconomic Effects of Dollarization on Cambodian
Economy, Ph.D. dissertation, the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo.
Kahn, C., Singh, M., and Alwazir, J. (2022) “Digital Money and Central Bank Operations,”
IMF Working Paper, WP22/85.
Keister, T. and Sanches, D. R. (2019) “Should Central Banks Issue Digital Currency?” FRB
Philadelphia Working Paper, No. 19-26.
Townsend, R. M. (2020) Distributed Ledgers: Design and Regulation of Financial
Infrastructure and Payment Systems, MIT Press.
Ueda, K., (2022) Kinyu System no Keizaigaku (in Japanese), Nihon-Hyronsha.
Yanagawa, N. and Yamaoka, H. (2019) “Digital Innovation, Data Revolution and Central
Bank Digital Currency,” BOJ Working Paper, No. 19-E-2.

21

Figure 1. Cambodia’s GDP per capita, Real GDP Growth, and Industry Shares in GDP

Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Cambodia

22

Figure 2. Dollarization and exchange rate

Source: The National Bank of Cambodia

Figure 3. Prices quoted in USD and KHR in Shops in Phnom Penh

Source: Hay (2020).
Note: The red line shows 4000 KHR, which is about one USD.

23

Table 1 Definition of Variables
NameDefinition

USD user

Dummy, defined "1", USD or Equally convenient; "0" Khmer Riel.

Digital Preference

Dummy, defined "1" if respondent prefer digital payment; "0" for cash or indifference.

Digital Experience

Dummy, defined "1" if purchasing goods and services, ever used digital payment; "0"otherwise.

BakongDummy, defined "1" Bakong users any response for questions on currency preference;"0" otherwise.

Bakong USD user

Dummy, defined "1", Bakong users who perfer USD; "0" otherwise.

MTBakong

Dummy, defined "1" Bakong uses any response for questions on currency preference
in money transfers; "0" otherwise.

MTBakongUSD

Dummy, defined "1" Bakong users for money transfer in USD; "0" otherwise.

Phnom Penh

Dummy, defined "1", if respondent identifies a place he/she stays as a "Phnom Penh"(used as a proxy for urban area identification); "0" - "Not in Phnom Penh" (rural).

Male/Female

Dummy, defined "1" for male and "0" for female.

Age

Actual value variable defines age of respondent. It ranges between 16-72.

Working

Dummy, defined "1", for all categories of respondents who has paid job, including:
Paid employee or worker, Employer or Manager, Self-employed or business owner,
Full time student with paid job, Farmer; "0" for all other categories.

Public Servant

Dummy, defined "1", Public Institutions; "0" otherwise.

Education

Dummy, defined "1", if respondent hold PhD, master or Bechelor Degree; "0"otherwise.

Sourse: Survey on dollarization and digitalization in payment in Cambodia

24

Table 2a Statistical Summary of Variables

USD user
Digital Preferences
Digital Experience
BakongBakong USD user
MTBakong
MTBakongUSD
Phnom Penh
Male/Female
Age
Working
Public Servant
Education

Obs
826
817
813
827
827
827
827
827
826
822
825
827
821

Mean Std. dev.
0.613
0.487
0.297
0.457
0.592
0.492
0.197
0.398
0.134
0.341
0.245
0.431
0.186
0.390
0.819
0.386
0.414
0.493
31.082 11.761
0.728
0.445
0.104
0.305
0.553
0.497

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
72
1
1
1

Sourse: prepared by author, based on the survey on dollarizationand digitalization in payment in Cambodia.

Table 2b Correlation of Variables
USD user
USD user
Digital Preference
Digital Experience
BakongBakong USD user
MTBakong
MTBakongUSD
Phnom Penh
Male/Female
Age
Working
Public Servant
Education

10.2603*0.3255*0.1675*0.1895*0.1749*0.2403*0.2280*0.0336-0.02910.0695*0.0730*0.2547*

DigitalDigitalPreference Experience10.4750*0.3385*0.3437*0.3284*0.3026*0.05070.0602-0.1036*0.0746*0.2256*0.3771*

1
0.3357*0.2975*0.3002*
0.3342*0.1852*0.1240*-0.2301*0.1381*0.1834*0.4283*

Bakong10.7947*0.7627*0.7078*0.0202
0.0958*-0.06110.01360.2096*
0.3577*

Bakong
MTBakong
MTBakong
USD user
USD

Phnom
Penh

Male/
Female10.6079*0.6773*0.0749*0.0291-0.03120.0711*0.1099*0.2889*10.1218*-0.1295*-0.1253*-0.0144
0.2220*1-0.0930*-0.0357
0.0874*0.2050*1
0.8387*0.057
0.1082*-0.1087*-0.0010.1831*0.3809* indicates 5 percent level of significanceSourse: Survey on dollarization and digitalization in payment in Cambodia

25

10.0720*0.0835*-0.05260.0809*0.0914*
0.3359*Age

Working10.1098*0.0824*-0.4320*10.0704*-0.2129*

PublicServant

10.2251*

Table 3. Logit on Retail Payments – Benchmark

Bakong
USD user
Phnom Penh
Male/Female
Age
Education
Working
Public Servant
const.

DigitalPreference

DigitalExperience(1)
1.048***(4.911)0.878***(4.180)-0.186(-0.708)-0.103(-0.560)-0.004(-0.429)1.597***(6.491)0.721***(3.339)0.768**(2.727)-3.046***(-6.567)(2)
1.942***(5.459)0.911***(4.977)0.722**(2.923)0.039(0.211)-0.0257**(-2.789)
1.452***(6.298)1.534***(6.724)0.782(1.896)-2.127***(-4.829)

BakongBakong USD

USD users

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.330
(1.243)-0.791*(-2.392)-0.001(-0.005)
0.0379*(2.572)
1.933***(5.608)-0.163(-0.604)
0.446(1.527)-2.980(-4.839)

1.553**(2.915)-0.646(-1.571)
0.041(1.488)0.549(0.766)
1.141*(2.424)-1.597**(-3.237)-2.084(-1.770)

1.258***(4.105)-0.298(-1.335)
0.0592***(3.552)
0.972***(3.626)0.733**(2.723)(-0.628)(-1.823)-2.711***(-4.313)

148
0.000
0.156

484
0.000
0.086

Obs.
805
800
484
Prob > chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
0.217
0.285
0.108
z statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

26

Table 4. Logit on Retail Payments – Looking at Differences
Digital Experience Digital Experience− Preference− Preference
Bakong
USD user
Phnom Penh
Male/Female
Age
Education
Working
Public Servant(1)-0.070(-0.335)0.147(0.843)0.817***(3.311)0.251(1.565)-0.0320***(-3.563)0.289(1.419)0.651**(3.285)0.028(0.102)

USD user * Bakong
Phnom Penh * Bakong
Male/Female * Bakong
Age * Bakong
Education * Bakong
Working * Bakong
Public Servant * Bakong
const.

-1.316**(-3.235)(2)
1.188(1.036)0.352(1.812)0.809**(2.827)0.266(1.450)-0.0335***(-3.348)0.274(1.238)0.838***(3.625)0.404(1.126)-1.379**(-2.908)
0.023(0.038)-0.246(-0.609)
0.021(0.838)0.038(0.053)-0.770(-1.586)-1.162*(-1.967)-1.561***(-3.356)

Obs.
792
792
Prob > chi2
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
0.05620.073
z statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

27

Digital Experience− Preference(for Preference=1)(3)-19.180(-2,026.000)-1.414-(0.878)-0.363-(1.353)0.070-(0.869)-0.158*-(0.094)
1.591-(1.243)1.679*(-0.940)-1.100(-1.799)16.260(-2,026.000)
0.201(-1.669)
0.233*(-0.139)-

Bakong USD user
− USD user
(4)0.917**(3.159)0.069(0.361)0.008(0.660)-0.380(-1.628)0.176(0.729)-0.143(-0.506)-2.874(-2.093)
1.101(-2.308)-0.591(-1.160)

177
0.156
0.1918484
0.124
0.0218

Table 5. Logit on Retail Payments – including Bakong Use in Money Transfers
Digital Experience Digital Experience− Preference− Preference
Bakong
USD user
MTBakong (Bakong Use in
Money Transfers)

(1)
0.018
(0.060)0.150(0.860)-0.114(-0.410)(2)1.240(1.070)0.353(1.820)-0.090(-0.320)

Digital Experience− Preference(for Preference=1)(3)-21.108(-0.012)-1.147(-1.269)
1.608*(1.688)

MTBakongUSD (Bakong USD
Use in Monety Transfers)
Phnom Penh
Male/Female
Age
Education
Working
Public Servant(4)-1.005***(-4.870)0.820***(3.320)0.253(1.570)-0.0320***(-3.570)0.299(1.460)0.653***(3.290)0.031(0.110)

USD user * Bakong
Phnom Penh * Bakong
Male/Female * Bakong
Age * Bakong
Education * Bakong
Working * Bakong
Public Servant * Bakong
const.

Bakong USD user
− USD user

-1.317**(-3.240)

0.812**(2.840)0.267(1.450)-0.0336***(-3.350)
0.282(1.260)0.839***(3.630)0.410(1.140)-1.373**(-2.890)0.022(0.040)-0.243(-0.600)
0.021(0.840)0.049(0.070)-0.770(-1.590)-1.171*(-1.980)-1.559***(-3.350)

Obs.
792
792
Prob > chi2
56.23072.920Pseudo R2
0.05640.0732z statistics in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

28-0.793(-0.567)0.054(0.060)-0.180*(-1.849)
0.000
1.282
(1.041)1.419(1.469)-1.232(-0.670)
16.417(0.009)0.270(0.009)0.247*(1.725)0.000-2.514(-1.204)
0.000
1.823
(0.743)0.893***(4.450)0.043(0.280)0.008(1.150)0.639***(3.330)0.360*(2.070)0.052(0.200)-1.374***(-3.770)

177
19.5620.223

484
52.9500.047