CHAPTER 7 THE ILLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
3. LAWLESSNESS AND VIOLENCE IN THE “REAL” CHINA
Three competing governments
At the Washington Conference the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty agreed to “respect thesovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China,” as wellas the “principles of the Open Door.” Needless to say, the main purpose of the treaty was todiscourage Japanese advancement into Manchuria, Mongolia, and China.1 The US, the hostnation of the Washington Conference, had embraced an extremely optimistic presumption, i.e., ifconstraints were placed on Japanese activity there, China would suddenly transform itself into amodern sovereign nation. But post-Washington-Conference China, the “real” China, tore thatrose-colored forecast to shreds. The US was visualizing the ideal China, not the real China. TheWashington Conference moved forward on the basis of that delusion, and established theWashington system. The Japanese were far less optimistic — they saw China for what it was.
Unfortunately, Japan was overpowered by the idealistic Americans’ diplomacy. What was thepolitical situation in China after the Washington Conference? It was chaotic and disunified, dueto (1) strife among warlords’ militias, and (2) the communist movement.
Soviet overtures to China began with Lev Karakhan’s manifestos (issued in 1919 and 1920). Ten
years had passed since the 1911 (Xinhai) Revolution, but China remained disunified. Conflicts
among warlords raged, and the May Fourth Movement (1919), had ignited the bitter flames ofnationalism. This state of affairs made China the perfect breeding ground for communism. And
inevitably, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) was founded in July 1921.
Meanwhile, the warlords were battling fiercely. In April 1922 the 1st Zhili-Fengtian War wasfought. Wu Peifu of the Jilin militia defeated Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian militia; Zhang fled toManchuria. But in May, the undaunted Zhang issued a declaration of independence in connection
with the three eastern provinces that comprise Manchuria: Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. At
this point China had three governments (one in Beijing, another in Guandong, and a third inFengtian). Less than three months after the Nine-Power Treaty was signed in Washington, China
had unraveled into three regimes. The “ideal China” that the Washington Conference hadenvisioned proved to be a delusion, one of China’s own making. Since, at that time, there was noother nation with three governments, we must conclude that China did not qualify as a nation.
Regular Chinese soldiers indistinguishable from bandits
Local rebels’ frequent acts of violence against foreigners illustrate the barbarous nature of China
at the time. I shall describe one of them, referred to in the Western world as the LinchengOutrage.
In May 1923, near Lincheng on the Tianjin-Pukou Railway in Shandong province, a horde ofbandits attacked an express train bound for Tianjin from Pukou. The bandits took as hostages
1Ibid.

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more than 20 citizens of the UK, the US, France, Italy, Denmark, and Mexico, whose numbers
included women and children, thereby temporarily capturing the world’s attention. The hostages
were confined to a mountain fortress used by the bandits. The bandits demanded that theircontingent be reorganized into a regular army unit. The Chinese government responded byassigning military status to more than 2,000 bandits who possessed guns and organizing theminto a brigade headed by a bandit chief. After the government promised the remaining bandits
that they would be given travel money and exempted from punishment, the hostages werereleased.
This was a shocking incident, especially to foreign residents of China. They were pessimistic
about China’s future, some even proposed scrapping the Nine-Power Treaty as it applied toChina. There were debates among foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing suggested that there be
joint policing of China by the world’s powers. Japan, however, was strongly opposed tointernational supervision of China and lobbied against it, fearing that such an arrangement might
result in the partitioning of that nation. But the Japanese lack of reverence for the spirit of theWashington Conference, as demonstrated during the resolution of the Lincheng Outrage, seemed
to cause the other powers to view Japan with distrust.2
Reorganizing bandits into regular army units is an astonishing concept, but the bandits did have aprescribed military training program. Moreover, they had a command hierarchy and were inpossession of a great number of weapons. Therefore, it was less expensive to “purchase” groupsof bandits than to undergo the not insignificant expense of purchasing weapons and training
regular soldiers. However, yesterday’s bandits may have been transformed into today’s regularsoldiers, but that does not mean that they forsook their customary criminal activities and became
upstanding citizens. Once a bandit, always a bandit. Furthermore, in China, where there was noconscription system in place, it was customary to hire coolies when the need arose to recruitsoldiers, given the salary and other benefits (or lack thereof) offered. Young men from goodfamilies simply did not serve in the military. Consequently, there was little distinguishable
difference between bandits and regular soldiers, as far as character and behavior were concerned.
That is why in China one of the perquisites of being regular soldiers in wartime of war was theopportunity to plunder areas they were stationed in or passed through. In peacetime, when pay
tended to be insufficient, such behavior was generally tolerated. Bandit-soldiers commonly
engaged in their customary practice of looting, but they also attacked and even slaughtereddefenseless people wherever they went. They also solicited “contributions” from local chambersof commerce or similar organizations when they withdrew from a locale. They were often
exempted from punishment when they looted, and it was not unusual for them to collect hugeamounts of money as a reward for leaving an area.3

2Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), ed., “Rinjō jiken”(Lincheng outrage) in Nihon gaikō shi jiten (A lexicon of Japanese diplomatic history) (Tokyo: Ōkurashōinsatsukyoku (Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance), 1979.

Kijima gaikō kenkyūshitsu (Kijima diplomatic research institute), ed., Haigai Shina no kaibo (Anatomy ofxenophobic China) (Tokyo: Kokusai Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1937).
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The Chinese aphorism “Good iron is not used to make nails, and good men do not becomesoldiers” aptly illustrates the abysmally inferior quality of Chinese soldiers. We must rememberthat the poor performance of Chinese units due to lack of leadership and their tendencies toward
plundering, violence, and slaughter was, in large part, the cause of most of the conflicts between
China and other nations. Therefore, the challenge of finding effective ways to contend with
Chinese troops, and to protect foreign residents from their acts of violence was a huge cause ofconcern to the Japanese government. It was also the reason for dissimilarities in domestic
opinion, as well as the difference between the China policy of Japan and that of the other powers.
Manchuria’s de facto independence
In 1924 the GMD (Chinese Nationalist Party) decided to join with the CCP (Chinese CommunistParty) to form the First United Front. The CCP immediately got to work, making full use of thename, and at the same time launching a concerted effort to splinter the GMD’s internal workings
and ultimately topple the party.
In that same year, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and China. On May
31, 1924 two treaties between the two nations were signed: (1) The Sino-Soviet Agreement on
General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between the Republic of China and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, and (2) Agreement for the Provisional Management of theChinese Eastern Railway. The first pertained to the establishment of diplomatic relations, and thesecond, to joint operation of the railroad.
However, what we need to be mindful of is that, on September 20 of the same year, Zhang
Zuolin’s Fengtian government concluded an identical agreement with the Soviets pertaining tooperation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. What are we to make of this? The Lytton Report,
which evaluated the Manchurian Incident (1931) for the League of Nations, offers the following:
In July 1922, when [Zhang Zuolin] failed to establish his authority south of theGreat Wall and saw his rivals taking control of the Peking Government, herenounced allegiance to the Central Government and maintained complete
independence of action in Manchuria until he extended his authority south of theWall and became master of Peking as well. He expressed his willingness to respectforeign rights, and accepted the obligations of China, but he requested foreign
Powers to negotiate henceforth directly with his administration in all mattersconcerning Manchuria.
Accordingly, he repudiated the Sino-Soviet Agreement of May 31st, 1924, thoughvery advantageous to China, and persuaded the U.S.S.R. to conclude a separateagreement with him in September 1924. It was virtually identical with that of May
31st, 1924, with the Central Government. This fact emphasized Chang Tso-lin’s[Zhang Zuolin’s] insistence on the recognition of his complete independence ofaction, both in domestic and foreign policy.4

Commission of Enquiry, Earl of Lytton, Situation in Manchuria: Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry(Geneva: League of Nations Publications, 1932), 28;43

The fact that Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian government signed an agreement exactly the same as thatsigned between China and the USSR tells us that Zhang was stating, in no uncertain terms, thatthe three eastern provinces (Manchuria) were independent of China. It also tells us that the USSR
recognized Manchuria as an autonomous region controlled by the Fengtian government andindependent of the Chinese Central Government. Zhang Zuolin, who in the preceding year, hadissued a declaration of independence for Manchuria, in 1924 was now making that sameassertion via diplomatic means.
The Chinese maintained that the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) were Chinese territory, andlater complained of Japanese aggression when Manzhouguo was founded. But the truth is thatthe two aforementioned agreements prove that, as early as 1923-24, Manchuria was already anautonomous region not under the control of the Chinese Central Government. If Manchuria wasindeed part of China, then the objectives of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Washington
Conference, both of which had sworn “to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and theterritorial and administrative integrity of China,” were proven to be illusions.
Japan supports tariff autonomy for China
One of the agreements concluded at the Washington Conference was the Treaty Between theNine Powers Concerning the Chinese Customs Tariff. That agreement called for the holding ofthe Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, which commenced on October 26, 1925
in Beijing. Thirteen nations participated: Japan, the UK, the US, France, Belgium, Denmark,Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and China. The treaty stated that theprimary objective of the Special Conference was to agree upon matters relating to the revision ofthe Chinese customs tariff, with a view toward increasing the annual revenue of the Chinese
government.
The Chinese delegation, intoxicated by nationalistic fervor, was scheming to restore tariff
autonomy in one fell swoop at this conference. But neither the UK (nor the US, which had inprinciple supported Chinese demands for the restoration of Chinese national sovereignty at theParis Peace Conference and the Washington Conference) had any intention of agreeing
immediately to the new Chinese demands. The UK delegation stated that they were opposed to
the Western powers’ addressing this topic until China had quelled internecine warfare,demonstrated that it was capable of protecting the lives and property of foreign residents, andhad succeeded in functioning like a unified, independent nation. The US (and the UK) stated thatthe minimum requirement for Chinese tariff autonomy was the elimination of the lijin, aninterprovincial tariff.
The Japanese, on the other hand, approached the conference with a plan that agreed with thedesires of the Chinese for tariff autonomy. At the opening ceremony, Hioki Eki, the head of theJapanese delegation and minister plenipotentiary, delivered a speech that supported Chinesedemands, no doubt at the behest of Foreign Minister Shidehara,.
Hioki began his speech by referring to events that occurred after Japan opened itself up to theworld, an era during which Japan did not enjoy tariff autonomy.

4The Japanese people, dissatisfied as they were with such arrangements, 5 weresensible of their own shortcomings. They perceived that the weakness of theirinternational position was but a result of their internal weakness. They saw thefutility of all attempts to remove the effect without removing its cause. In thisconviction they set to work silently, steadily, resolutely, with their eyes fixed upon
the completion of all reforms needed in their domestic administration.
(…)
China is still following the same path that we once pursued. The difficulties, theembarrassments and the perplexities that confront China to-day have once been ours.
The Japanese Delegation will approach the problems before this Conference withsympathy and understanding and with intimate apprehension of the Chinese position.
I am happy to state at the outset that the Japanese Delegation are fully prepared toconsider in the friendliest way the question of tariff autonomy which appears in theagenda presented by the Chinese Delegation.6When the speech ended, the head of the Chinese delegation conveyed his appreciation to Hioki.
At the Washington Conference, a surtax had already been agreed upon, i.e., 2.5% on ordinary
goods, and 5% on luxury goods. However, at the Special Conference, the Chinese delegation,
dissatisfied with such a low rate, demanded a much higher surtax. Their demand precipitated adifference of opinion between China and Japan, which was unwilling to accept anything otherthan the Washington surtax rate.
Since at that time it seemed that there was no end in sight to internecine strife, fueled by battles
between warlord militias, the participating delegations began to feel reluctant about immediate
implementation of an import surtax; the conference seemed about to dissolve any number oftimes. Then, in April 1926, the government led by Duan Qirui collapsed because of a coupd’état, and Beijing was plunged into anarchy. On July 3 the conference was postponed until suchtime as a legitimate government was established in China.
Lack of faith in China causes Washington-Conference spirit to founderJudging from the situation prevailing in China when the Special Conference on the Chinese
Customs Tariff was taking place, not to mention the discrepancies among participating nations as
far as China policy was concerned, the spirit of the Washington Conference seemed to havefoundered in the short space of three years.
Even the Americans were quite pessimistic about China, concluding that it had in fact descended
into anarchy. For instance, after touring South China, Ferdinand L. Mayer, counselor at theAmerican Legation in Beijing, recommended that the “US cease to cherish the myth of China’s

5Hioki was referring to extraterritoriality and a disadvantageous customs tariff.

6“Tariff Conference Opened with Great Ceremony,” The North-China Herald, 31 October 1925.

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territorial and administrative integrity and deal individually with the various ‘semi-autonomous
regions’ into which the country was divided.”7
Also, back in the US, Washington government officials were now gloomy about China’s future.
Nelson Johnson, head of the State Department’s Far Eastern Division, wrote the following in apersonal letter: “History … will record that Chinese would-be nationalists did what the UnitedStates tried to prevent, namely, divided China. One looks in vain for Jeffersons and Franklins
capable and unselfish enough to bring these people together.”8
Other nations’ wariness of China can also be perceived from the conclusions arrived at by theCommission on Extraterritoriality in China, which met at about the same time as the Special
Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff. Participating nations were in agreement that it would
not make sense to put an end to extraterritoriality, at least not right away. According to a reportissued by the Commission in September 1926, China would first have to establish “a unifiedsystem of laws, judicial independence from military authorities and executive branches ofgovernment, and extension of the system of modern courts, prisons, and detention houses.”9I believe I have demonstrated that, a mere four years after the Washington Conference, theworld’s faith in China as a nation was plummeting rapidly. The spirit and ideals of that
conference had clearly disintegrated. Japan took the initiative in supporting China’s demands fortariff autonomy at the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff. That gesture changed
Chinese sentiment toward Japan for the better, at least temporarily. Furthermore, the decision tosupport China in its quest for tariff autonomy certainly served as a stepping stone to the signingof the Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the US and China on July 25, 1928, as well as
subsequent similar agreements with other nations. It was typical of what was referred to at thetime as “Shidehara diplomacy.”
Unfortunately, Japan’s diplomatic efforts on behalf of China elicited no corresponding
repayment. In 1927, the year following the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff,
instead of thanks, what a now red China offered to Japan were violent, hateful campaigns like theNanjing and Hankou incidents.

7Iriye Akira, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), 83.
8Ibid., 84.
9Ibid., 87.

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