国際的な巨大災害と防災の観点・日本との比較

サッパシー アナワット
suppasri@irides.tohoku.ac.jp
http://www.tsunami.civil.tohoku.ac.jp/hokusai3/J/people/member/anawatto.html

東北大学 災害科学国際研究所
災害リスク研究部門 津波工学研究分野
2018年8月7日
1

Contents• Introduction of IRIDeS• UNISDR and UNDP related activities• 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami• 2011 Floods in Thailand• 2013 Typhoon and storm surge in the Philippines• 2014 Earthquake in Thailand

Introduction of IRIDeSIntroduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Research group on disaster prevention
and management
 To prepare for the recurring Miyagi offshore
earthquake, an organization was formed toengage researchers working on [Disaster],[Disaster Prevention], and [Disaster Mitigation]
 Taking advantage of Interdisciplinary (Humanities,
Science, Engineering, and Medicine) disasterprevention research in Tohoku University
 From 2007 to 2011, 8 departments and about 50
faculty members- Center of Northeast Asian studies- Disaster Control Research Center- Research Center for Prediction of Earthquakes andVolcanic Eruptions- Institute of Development, Aging and Cancer- Graduate School of Engineering- Graduate School of Science- Graduate School of Letters- Graduate School of Law- Graduate School of Economics- Graduate School of Information Science

Formal Director
Prof. Arata Hirakawa(History)

Present Director
Prof. Fumihiko Imamura(Tsunami Engineering)Research group on disasterprevention and management

4Introduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Establishment of IRIDeS• To-date disaster mitigation efforts not sufficient• Recent mega-disasters around the world• Interdisciplinary collaboration necessary
From 2012

University efforts before 2011

Development of disasterprevention technologies
Earthquake and tsunami prediction
and modeling technologies →Tsunami modeling technology
transferred to over 30 countries• Developing early warning technologies• Enhancing seismic performance ofstructures（宮城県沖地震対策）
学際防災研究•• Disaster Control Research Center[1990]• Graduate school of science andgraduate school of engineering[2006]• Research group on disasterprevention and management[2007]The 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake Disaster• Complex mega disasterinvolving a megathrustearthquake,
great
tsunami, and nuclear
power plant accident• Revealed the limits andweaknesses of the stateof the art of science andtechnology

Establishment of IRIDeS• Rebuilding
disaster
mitigation
infrastructure based on lessons learned
from the 2011 event• Supporting the affected areas• Enhancing
disaster-resiliency
andperformanceof
multiple-fail-safe
systems in rural and urban areas• Comprehensive study of the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake andTsunami disaster• Establishing disaster medicine andmedical health care systems focusedon catastrophic natural disasters• Developing a digital archive for passing
on the lessons learned from the postdisaster reconstruction in rural andurban areas

5

Introduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Logo IRIDeS Iris, Iris laevigata or Japanese Iris
 Symbol of hope and nobility
Logo meaning Overturning the Japanesecharacter meaning disaster「災」= reconstruction and sustainable
and resilient societies
 Purple is the color of the Tohoku
University
 The Iris is the symbol of “hope”
and “dignity”

6Introduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Outline of the institute
Human andsocialresponse

Regional andurban
reconstruction

IRIDeS

Hazard andriskevaluation

Endowedresearch

Disasterscience
Disastermedicalscience

Disasterinformation
management andpublic collaboration

The action-oriented research of IRIDeS focuses on;① Investing the physics of global scale natural disasters such as mega-earthquakes, tsunamis andextreme weather② Reconstructing disaster response and mitigation technologies based on the lessons of the 2011
Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami disaster③ Inventing “Affected Area Supportology” in the aftermath of natural disasters④ Enhancing disaster-resiliency and performance of multiple-fail-safe systems in regional and urban
areas⑤ Establishing disaster medicine and medical service systems towards catastrophic natural disasters⑥ Designing disaster-resilient societies and developing the digital archive system to pass the lessons
7from the disasters

Introduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Academic partners

Signatories of the joint statement for international
research collaboration at the Tohoku forum forinternational research collaboration on 11-Mar
2012

University of California,
Los Angeles, USA
University of New South Wales,
Australia
Tsinghua University andSichuan University, China
University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA
Harvard University, USA
University of Florence, Italy
German Aerospace Center, Germany
University College London , UK
Istanbul Technical University, Turkey
University of Tokyo, Japan
Kyoto University, Japan
Kobe University, Japan
Fukushima University, Japan
Niigata University, Japan
Nagoya University, Japan
8

History

1611 Keicho Sanriku tsunami

Geological science

Engineering
91700 Cascadia tsunami

est. year

Interval(years)1700 AD-

1310 AD390

810 AD500

400 AD410

170 BC

570

600 BC

430

10

Selected projects
Integrated sciences for reconstruction after the2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami

11Introduction of IRIDeS, Tohoku University
Lessons learned from recent disasters
2013 IRIDeS Fact-finding
missions to Indonesia

2014 IRIDeS Fact-finding
missions to the Philippines

12

UNISDR and UNDP related activities

New International Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
Promote International Movement on Disaster Risk Reduction- Too late to respond to disasters- Paradigm shift to reduce disaster risks
Source: Yuichi Ono, Assistant Director and Professor, IRIDeS, Tohoku University

14

Toward the 3 rd WCDRR 2015 in Sendai
IRIDeS’s HFA IRIDeS Review Report
Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake
During that decade, the Great East Japan
Earthquake with Mw 9.0 occurred on March 11,
2011. We must learn from such devastating
experiences for the sake of future societies. To thisend IRIDeS issued “HFA IRIDeS Review Report
Focusing on 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake” in
October 2013 in terms of HFA guidelines from theacademic viewpoints of professors at IRIDeS to
disseminate the event’s lessons learned. This
review analyzes the five goals of the HFA from aunique perspective. It highlights good practices andproblems and recommendations that can be takenin the future.
15

Bitter lessons learnt from the 1970 East
Pakistan Cyclone
producedCyclone Preparedness Programmein Bangladesh - 1971

Cyclone Preparedness Program
Early Warning System, flags and laud speakers,
International Cooperation, Shelter, Evacuation, Public
Awareness and Education, Volunteers, Community-based
strategy, traditional knowledge, protecting animals, etc.

The Pakistan/Bangladesh Tragedy
triggered a new global movement tomanage disasters
from
Disaster management
toDisaster reduction

UN and international organizations such as International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) supported by member countries raised voice toreduce disasters before they hit
1971 Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO)
1990-99 International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) --- with asecretariat for a 10-year term
1992 Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) established and the UNDRO wasunited1997 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established andthe DHA was united
1994 Japan hosted a first World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Yokohama -- Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action --- culminating the IDNDR movement
Late 1990s IDNDR malfunctioned (then, WB, IFRC, UNDP – struggled forsupremacy)
2000- International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

2000- International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)
2005 Japan hosted a second World Conference on Disaster
Reduction in Kobe, Hyogo Framework for Action2015 Japan hosted a third World Conference on Disaster
Risk Reduction in Sendai, Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction (SFDRR) (refined framework and targets)Value of the SFDRR
A negotiated document though the UN process- committed by 187 countries

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030
Adopted by 187 countries at the World Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction, 18 March 2015
I.

Preamble

II. Expected outcome and goal
Seven targets

III. Guiding principles
IV. Priorities for action
Priority 1: Understanding disaster risk
Priority 2: Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk
Priority 3: Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience
Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response,
and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction

V. Role of stakeholders
VI. International cooperation and global partnership22

Where is science in the SFDRR?
APRU!

Who wants to commit in the implementing the SFDRR in
the area of science and technology?

IRIDeS!

23

1. Global Centre for Disaster Statistics
Launch of the Global Centre for Disaster Statistics during
the WCDRR in Sendai (15 March 2015)24

Background of GCDS
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and theInternational Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS) at
Tohoku University jointly announced the establishment of the Global
Centre for Disaster Statistics (GCDS) in March 2015 during the Third
UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) in
Sendai.
Voices of support and expectation to this initiative were received,
including the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
Establishment
ceremony of
GCDS at the
WCDRR

UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon’s speechat Tohoku University
Symposium Forum heldin the WCDRR

25

Purpose of GCDS
At the WCDRR a new framework Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 20152030 (SFDRR) was adopted by 187 countries
including seven global targets.
In addition, Post-2015 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) were adopted in September 2015
with 17 global goals and 169 targets.
These targets include reducing the disastermortality, number of affected people, and the
direct economic losses.
Therefore, development of sound disaster loss
and damage system in no longer a choice but a“Must thing” for countries.

SFDRR Targets that can bemonitored by the GCDS

Mortality

Yes

Number of affected
peopleYes

Direct disaster economic
loss

Yes

Damage to criticalinfrastructure

Yes/
No

# of countries with DRR
strategies

NoInternational cooperation

No

Access to multi-hazard
early warning system anddisaster risk information
and assessments

No

26

Structure of GCDS
Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction

UNISDRUN
Contribution

UNDP

UNDP

SupportBureau for Policy andProgramme Support• Technical advice• Quality assurance

Country Office• Support to developmentof national disasterdamage and loss
databases• Policy advice• Institutional capacity
development

Countries• Develop and utilize
national disasterdamage and loss
database

IRIDeS

2030 Agenda for
Sustainable
Development
ESCAP

International Research Cooperation
Institute of Disaster
Science• Management(Operational support, Budget allocation)• Research and analysis

Cooperation

ICHARM
ADRC• Archive data
• Scientific analysis• Visualization of disaster
information with GIS• Research on innovative modules• Assist generating policy
Information recommendations

Global Database

JICA

Japan International
Cooperation Agency
International Centre for
Water Hazard and Risk
Management

Global Centre forDisaster Statistics

Data

Economic and Social
Commission for Asia andthe PacificSupportAsia Disaster
Reduction Center

IRP

International Recovery
Platform

Private Sector• Fujitsu• Pacific Consultants
and so on.
27

Pilot countries of GCDSThe GCDS is now conducting case studies in the following sevenpilot countries. In addition, Japanese cases will also be examinedsoon.

Seven Pilot Countries
Indonesia

Sri Lanka

MyanmarCambodia

Maldives

Nepal

Philippines28

Expectation of GCDS
2020.Jan - 2030.Dec
Data from each country

Eachcountry①Data migration or synchronize
Global Database
Backup function②Data extraction for analysis

20 countries
after 2020

ﾊﾞｯｸｱｯﾌﾟｾﾝﾀ

GCDS cloud

7 pilot countries
by 2020

Common for all countries

Analysis by researchers at Global Center

UNDP/Tohoku Univ.
Propose to countries
Establish disasterpreventive plan
- Budgetary plan

Executionof planEachcountry29

Future Actions after the UN WCDRR(2)•World Bosai Forum (tentative)- Continue discussions generated during the 3rd United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction.
- Theme: The broad setting of disaster risk reduction and recovery- Periodic meetings (once every two years) in Tohoku and Sendai to contribute to the efforts for disaster risk reduction in Japan and overseas
while continuing the support for the recovery of Tohoku.
- Planning creative events such as plenary meetings, symposiums and exhibition and think together with the government, international agencies
including the United Nations, companies, academia, NGOs and citizens- Collaboration with ISDR and Global Risk Forum (Davos)
Association of Pacific Rim
Universities (APRU) MultiHazards Program30World Tsunami Awareness Day
In December 2015, the UN General Assembly designated 5
November as World Tsunami Awareness Day.
World Tsunami Awareness Day was the brainchild of Japan,
which due to its repeated, bitter experience has over the years
built up major expertise in areas such as tsunami early warning,
public action and building back better after a disaster to reduce
future impacts.
The date for the annual celebration was chosen in honor of the Japanese story of “Inamura-no-hi”,
meaning the “burning of the rice sheaves”. During an 1854 earthquake a farmer saw the tide receding, asign of a looming tsunami. He set fire to his entire harvest to warn villagers, who fled to high ground.
Afterwards, he built an embankment and planted trees as a buffer against future waves.

Sea walls
1854
tsunami1946
tsunamiDistributions of the historical and future events

Seismic gap

Hazards from the last 400 years
1600-1969（64 events）

1970-2016（39 events）
Over 2 m

Atlantic Ocean

AlaskaCascadia
South
America

Damaging tsunamis that exceeded 2 m can beseen virtually everywhere, especially along the
Pacific Rim including 1700 Cascadia (M9.0), 1755
Lisbon (M8.5), 1833 SW Sumatra (M8.3), 1868
Peru (M8.3), 1906 Ecuador (M8.8) and 1960 Chile(M9.5).

Only two major events, the 2004 Indian Ocean(M9.3) and Great East Japan (M9.0), classified asrecent damaging tsunamis that exceeded 2 m andcaused global impact meanwhile no major
damaging tsunami in the east Pacific and Atlantic
Ocean.

This observation demonstrates the importance of assessing or recognizing the hazards basedon historical events beyond recent experiences.
33

Hazards from the future events
Aleutian

Philippines
Central America
SW Pacific

New Zealand

Tsunami amplitude (m)34Web GIS (esri Japan): tsunami amplitude

http://www.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=858c422f0d3644f492a8104a9deed001

35

Web GIS (esri Japan): tsunami arrival time

http://www.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7ea0485f8eb940ac9888239bf5b2178b

36

2004 Indian Ocean tsunami

Contents• Tsunami warning• Disaster education• Tsunami memorial• Housing reconstruction

38

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and aftershocks

Source: NOAA tsunami event database39

Importance of education

EX: Tsunami warning on 11 April 201226 Dec 2004
11 April 2012
M9.0 Dip-slip fault M8.6 Strike-slip fault

No tsunami butvery serious
traffic jam

40V (%)
0
0
0
0
25
25
25
25
50
50
50
50
75
75
75
75
100
100
100
100

E (μ)
(min)
30
60
90
120
30
60
90
120
30
60
90
120
30
60
90
120
30
60
90
120

F (%)

Traffic jam after warning

23%
26%
30%
34%
9%
14%
21%
26%
7%
10%
16%
22%
6%
10%
16%
21%
7%
11%
15%
22%

Real situation in 2012

“V” ratio of using cars, one car four
persons, “E(μ) ” average starting timeof evacuation and “F” fatality ratio

Patong beach,Phuket41

Thai Warning System
Construction Model

A1:
Dept.
MineralResources
A2:
Royal
Irrigation
Dept. (RID)

A5:
Seismological
Bureau ofTMD

A6:National
DisasterWarning
CenterCA7:
TV Pool,Warning tower,
Gov. Info Network,
etc.

A3:
Thai
Meteorological

Dept. (TMD)
A4:Royal Forest
Dept.
4
2

(Leelawat et al, 2015)

Tsunami warning systems> 300 alarm towers

Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard
Early Warning System for Africa
and Asia

Source: Ekmahachai (2013)

National Disaster Warning Center
43(NDWC), Thailand

Oversea Sources• Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC)• Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA)• United States Geological Survey (USGS)• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)• European - Mediterranean and Seismological Center (EMSC)• Malaysian Meteorological Service (MMS)• Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC)• German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ)• Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS)(Leelawat et al, 2015)

44

Buoy location

4
5(Ekmahachai , 2013)

Broadcasting Mediums• SMS (>= 20M numbers)•

Subdistrict
Administrative Office inRisky area(271 stations)• Direct call center(8 lines)•

Local alarm tower (654
towers) and village radio(1,590 devices)• E-mail•News call center ‘192’(70 terminals)•

Government Information
Network•

Smart Phone server(600,000 licenses)•

Web EOC• Automatic FAX(16 machines)• TV Pool• Alarm tower(328 towers)• Warning box at City
Hall (166 boxes)
46(Leelawat et al., 2015)

Disaster reduction class in ASEAN countries

Banda Aceh, Indonesia (Two schools × two times = 200 students)

Phuket, Krabi and Bangkok(Eight schools = 400 students)

Layte Island, the Philippines (Four schools = 200 students)

47

Lessons from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
in rebuilding of the school- At the time of the 2004 tsunami, the school had only two stories and the tsunami
was higher than the school.
- The school was then rebuilt with three stories. In case of earthquake and tsunami,
they will gather at the third floor.
- In case the school got some damages or the estimated tsunami is higher than thethird floor, we organized a drill so that they can evacuate to the hill behind.
48

Remaining geological evidences and evacuation facility

49

Tsunami memorial: T. 813 boat

2009

2013

2015

50

Tsunami memorial: Two fishing boats and tsunami signs
In 2013

In 201351

Housing issues / evaluation of new houses after the tsunami

1.

Tsunami hit the villages anddestroy houses.

1

2. Emergency shelter

3. Temporary house2

3

Most residents in Namkem area evacuated to temporary shelter at SAO (Sub district
Administrative Organization) Baan muang and stay at temporary shelter for 6 months, duringthat time rescue and cleaning continued in the Tsunami damaged area with the assistance ofmany organizations and volunteers.
52Housing issues / evaluation of new houses after the tsunami
ProvideThese shop house types are priority for resident who haveland title. Government can build the new house on their land
immediately. But house is quite small and material is notgood quality. Most villagers complain that they have torenovate, fix the roof or extend the house later. In manycases users change the donated house to be storage or otherfunction.

The houses and lands were provided by government andrelocated 10 km away from Namkem. This place is far fromthe sea and located in a non-tsunami risk area according torisk map. Most of resident don’t know each other before andrandom receive house.

3

4

Non-relocate

Relocate21This group of resident have land right and negotiate withgovernment to have money instead of provide house because
not satisfy with design of PNR house and don’t want torelocated. They got haft of the provided house price, usedtheir own money to top up and buy material together, design
house according to each family need and build by themselves.

This groups of villagers who previously lived in slum area andhave no land titles, they were living in rental houses. After the2004 tsunami most villagers were afraid of tsunami so theywanted to move a little far from the sea but still in Namkem
area. Now they have land sharing and pay rental fee every
months after 15 years they will have land right ownership.

Self-built

53Conclusions• Tsunami warning
 Greatly improve of the warning time from 20 min at the beginning to
5 min since many years ago.

• Disaster education
 Importance of media for warning dissemination and basic knowledge
on fault mechanisms/tsunami characteristics.

• Tsunami memorial Need great effort of maintenance and attraction.

• Housing reconstruction
 A challenge in applying the lessons to reconstruction of future events.
54

2011 Floods in Thailand

1942年洪水氾濫，ラーマ5世像とアナンタ・サマーコム宮殿（旧国会議事堂）

Rojana Industrial Park (11:43, Oct. 21, 2011) 提供：JICA(9:24, Dec. 01, 2011)

Rojana Industrial Park (11:41, Oct. 21, 2011) 提供：JICA(9:27, Dec. 01, 2011)

Ayutthaya (11:46, Oct. 21, 2011) 提供：JICA(Dec. 8, 2011)

Flood in Thailand The 2011 greatest flood on records brought 813 dead and 3 missing
nationwide (as of Jan. 8, 2012; Thai Ministry of Interior, 2012).
 The area of damaged agricultural land throughout Thailand peaked at 18,291
km2 (as of Nov. 14, 2011; Thai Ministry of Interior, 2012).
 In the industrial sector, 7 industrial estates and 804 companies were struck
with inundation damage, and of those, 449 companies were Japanesecompanies (Japan External Trade Organization, 2011).
 The World Bank (as of Dec., 2011) estimates total loss of 1.36 trillion baht
(approx. 3.5 trillion yen) due to this flood. This is the 4th economic amount ofdamage in the world that are the East Japan great earthquake, the hurricane"Katrina", and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
 Japanese nonlife insurance company pays 900 billion yen to a Japanesecompany.
 It was greatly exceed 600 billion yen of payment to companies for the East Japan greatearthquake.

Past flood in the Chao Phraya river

チャオプラヤ川流域における過去の洪水

CHAO PHRAYA RIVER BASIN (CPRB)• Largest basin in
Thailand• C.A. 157,925 km2• 29 provinces• Almost 30% of thecountry’s area

63

CHAO PHRAYA RIVER BASIN (CPRB)ver

Nakhon Sawan
iver
Tha Chin R
erraya Riv
Chao Ph• Bhumibol Reservoir wasconstructed in 1964 on
ping river.
• Sirikit Reservoir wasconstructed in 1977 on
Nan river.

Pa Sak River

Bhumpol Dam

Sirikit Dam

i
Yom R

•
• The Wang (11,708 km2)
• The Yom (24,720 km2)
• The Nan (34,557 km2)

Basin Area：162,800 km2

Ping River

The Ping (36,018 km2)

Pa Sak Dam

100
Ayutthaya
Bangkok

0(km)

Figure 1. Diagram of the Chao Phraya River64
watershed.

The Chao Phraya River watershed Basin Area：162,800 km
is divided into an upper watershed
and lower watershed by thenarrowed section at Nakhon Sawan.

Nakhon Sawan

Sirikit Dam

Pa Sak River

Bhumpol Dam

iver
Tha Chin R
erraya Riv
h
P
o
a
h
C

In upper watershed, Ping River,
Wang River, Yom River, Nan River
flow down from the northern
mountain system and join together
at Nakhon Sawan.

iver
Yom R

Ping River

2

Pa Sak Dam

100
Ayutthaya
Bangkok

0(km)

Figure 1. Diagram of the Chao Phraya River
65
watershed.

Reservoirs
Kiew Kar Mha
171 (MCM)
RID
Kiew Lom
112(MCM)RID

Sirikit
9,510(MCM)
EGAT

Bhumibol
13,462(MCM)
EGAT

Kaew Noi
766(MCM)RID

Tab Salao
160(MCM)RID

Chao Phraya
Barrage
RID

Krasiao240(MCM)
RID

Pasak
960(MCM)
RID

Total 25 Billion m3

Large-scale reservoirs
BhumibolName

Bhumibol
SirikitIrrigation
Irrigation
PurposePower Generation Power Generation
Flood Control
Flood Control
Under Operation by
EGAT
EGAT
River
Ping
Nan
Drainage Area(sq. km)
26,38613,130
Annual Inflow(MCM)
5,256
5,600
Annual Inflow(mm)
199.2
427.5
Storageat max. waterlevel(MCM)

13,462

10,508

ResevoirSurface Area(sq. km)

316.0

260.0

Dam Type

Gravity Arch

SirikitEarthfill67

Flat topography (1)

阿武隈川
最上川
利根川
北上川

Chao Phraya

0
0

200

吉野川

信濃川

阿賀野川
天竜川

木曽川

荒川

500

神通川
富士川

安倍川
手取川

Altitude(m)

1000

常願寺川

Flat topography (2)(3)
極めて平坦な地形

Nakhon Sawan City

400
600
Distance from River Mouse(km)

Ping
Wang
Nan
Yom
800

Rainfall condition in 2011
 In 2011, the highest values during
1982-2002 were recorded in July and
The exceedance probability of this rainfall is 2 %,September.
andit can be regarded as a 50-year probability
rainfall.
Monthly rainfall exceeded the period
average monthly rainfall during 19822002.
 The total rainfall during the rainyseason was 1,439 mm, which was
143 % of the period average total
rainfall.
Monthly and rainy season rainfall for Cho Phraya River
watersheds from May to October in 1982–2002 and 2011.
Dashed line indicates the average for the period 1982– 2002,
bar frame and amount of rainfall indicates the highest rainfall
in 1982–2002 and 2011. Monthly and total rainfalls were
calibrated from 15 weather stations of the Thai Meteorological
Agency using the Thiessen method.

Climate Condition (1)12
2011年台風4号（ハイマー[HAIMA]）
2011年6月24日～26日

2011年台風8号（ノックテン[NOCK-TEN]）
2011年7月30日～8月3日

タイ北部で発達した強い低気圧
8月10日～12日，15日～19日
9月8日～12日

Climate Condition (2)43
2011年台風18号（ハイタン[HAITANG]）
2011年9月27日～28日

5

2011年台風19号（ナルガエ[NALGAE]）
2011年10月5日～6日

2011年台風17号（ネサット[NESAT]）
2011年9月30日～10月1日

5 Typhoons andstrong low pressure
attacked during Jun.
and Oct.

73

Rough estimation from the water budget(Ratio of normal
average of
rainfall; %) Rainfall = Evapotranspiration + Runoff + Infiltration
 In the normal year, evapotranspiration [ET] is 70 %of rainfall.

100 – 30 = 70
↓Japan143 – 30 = 113

Runoff

Evapotranspiration

143 % ofnormal average of rainfall

rainfall ET Runoff

100 – 70 = 30↓
143 – 70 = 73243(=73/30) % ofnormal average of river discharge

74River discharge at Nakhon Sawan
 The total discharge in 2011 was 32.6 billion m3, which was 232 % of
the period average in 1956-1999.
 Total discharge recorded in the flood year of 1995 was 23.5 billion m3,
which is 167 % of the period average in 1956-1999. (Applying runoff
estimation from the water budget, the runoff is estimated to be 151 % in 1995.) 2011年洪水2011

1995年洪水1983年洪水1956-1999平均値

1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Total discharge of the Chao Phraya River at Nakhon Sawan from June to October in 1956–1999 and2011. Dashed line indicates the average for the period 1956–1999, and dot line indicates total
discharge in 2011. Bar frame indicates the top 5 total discharge events in 1982–2002 and 2011.

Bhumibol dam

75

Maximum Storage
Capacity 13.5 km3

Sirikit dam

Maximum Storage
Capacity 9.5km3

The two dam reservoirs stored approximately 10
billion m3, which is an amount equivalent to twothirds of the total flood volume, and this effectively
mitigated the flooding.

Dam reservoir operation77

 Is there any better dam reservoir operation to mitigate flood
damage in 2011?
 To more mitigate flood damage, we need to reduce the storage water before
August when it starts to inundate at the downstream of the dam reservoirs.
 If we could forecast rainfall condition in 2011, we might make more flood
capacity at dam reservoirs.

 However, seasonal weather forecasting is still within a researchphase and is difficult to incorporate into operational use.
 In Japan, the flood capacity at the dam reservoirs are previously
prepared by the release for flood control when the flood isforeseen.
 It is capable of accurate weather forecast on -1 week scale and have theflood capacity at the dam reservoirs in the flood season.

Conclusions
The 2011 Chao Phraya River flood was caused by highseasonal rainfall. Increased rainfall by 143% overdoubled runoff.
Chao Phraya river is gently sloped and wide watershed,
and thus daily and/or weekly heavy rainfall are notcaused a gigantic flood like 2011.
The spatiotemporal scale of floods in Thailand are quite
different from Japanese floods which are caused by -1
week heavy rainfall such as typhoons.
It is necessary to recognize that a flood prediction andpreparation of flood prevention on the spatiotemporal scale
are also completely different according to it.
78Retention pond
(Monkey cheek)

http://thailand.prd.go.th/file_content/images/1272100505p.jpg

Floodway79
http://tunnellingjournal.com/news/files/2011/12/Bangkok-tunnel.jpg

Monkey Cheek](2)モンキーチーク[Monkey Cheek](3)New operation rule curve of thereservoirs after the 2011 great flood
Bhumibol

Lower and upper rule curves were decreased during the wet period inorder to prepare the large flood such as 2011 flood, but lower rulecurves were increased during the dry period in order for the sufficientwater use. This implies a complicated gate operation would be required.

Historical operations of Bhumibol dam
reservoir
Bhumibol

There were severe drought periods in CPRB and historicalstorages were below the lower rule curve at many years.

Historical operations of Bhumibol dam
reservoir
Bhumibol
Former rule curve

New rule curve

The Bhumibol Dam reservoir would be unable to
avoid the shortage of the water storage, especially
under the new rule curves.

Accumulated inflow of the Bhumibol
dam reservoir
Bhumibol

Accumulated inflow over a year could not reach required
lower rule curve storage at severe drought years.

2011

2015

2011 Central Thailand Flood

90% of damages and losses are PRIVATE SECTOR (Manufacturing sector)
BUT covered less than 0.1% of flooded area

National Level DRR related laws and regulations
The 11th National Economy and Social Development Plan Happy society with fairness and resilient Build a secure natural resources and environment base by
supporting community participation and improving resilient

Master Plan on Water Resources Development
 Action plan for short term
 Action plan for long term

National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (2010 – 2014)
 Prevention and impact reduction
 Disaster emergency management

 Preparedness arrangement
 Post disaster management

Strategic National Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction (2010 – 2019) Form under Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) Participation of multi-stakeholders

Thailand Policies for DRR(National Reform Commission)• DRR is a national priority for all levels• Identify, assess and monitor disasterrisks and enhance early warning andpreparedness.
• Use knowledge, innovation andeducation to build cultures of safety
and resilience at all levels.

Sub-committee for DRR• Build up Risk Awareness at all levels• Public participation in DRR• Facilitate Technology and Informationtransferred• Organization structural reforms to facilitate
exchanges, actions and implementations• Make/amend related laws and regulations tofacilitate DRR in all levels/risks

Community’s Role
• Understand the disaster risks and ensure that they can protect
and make themselves safe to minimize losses and damage when adisaster strikes.

PASSIVE ROLE
Wait for help
No preparedness
Lack information, etc.

PRO-ACTIVE
ROLE
Learn the risks, Networking
Preparedness, Build sustain
Acquire information
Inclusive innovation, etc.

How to Transfer/Modify/Include …
Knowledge/Information/etc. so that Community
does understand and aware of their risks
Simple community based risk mitigation
countermeasures with appropriate early warning
system and community planning
Sustain some basic community functions during
disasterPartial self-recovery technology
Safe structures are long term benefits though alittle bit more costly at present

Flood Prevention Projects
COUNTRY LEVELIMPLEMENTATION OF

FAIL : BECAUSE OF NO SPECIFIC PLANING AND NO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

MAIN DIFFICULTIES
Have to sacrifice some areas to safe the others
Massive and full scale public hearing
and public participation
Proper compensation/subsidiary andpost-supporting program
2011 floods, a few concrete scientific and engineeredcountermeasures were proposed but all were rejected

The new ideas to implement water
resource project

Private
sectors
Group of
Universities

Public Sectors

Innovation, Knowledge, Financial,
Feasibility, Laws, Impacts, etc.

NGOs

Form Multi-Levels
Community Networks
INCLUSIVECOMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Multi-Levels/areas
Mater Plans

Aids during acutephase of disaster

Build/affirm
resilience campus

Disaster Resilient
University group

Public Awareness

General DisasterCourses

Groups of
Universities

Student activities
Training
Research
Development

Policies
Risk
Reduction

Advanced/Multidisciplinary curriculums
Innovation/Knowledge

Recoveries

Cooperation andExchanges

APRU MH Group
Local/Private sectors

NAN Provinces Agenda

2011 : Alarm, Alert andPreparation were given a
week before flooded
Vulnerable people were
evacuated.

2006

2011

How to make it being sustainable ?
How to make it being learnt, improved and shared through generation?

Formation of NAN AGENDAวาระน่าน ๒๕๕๖ - ๒๕๖๐ “สร้างเมืองน่านน่าอยู่ คู่ป่าต้นนํา”“Cultural City and Watershed forest”• Form structures/agencies for drawing Intensive
community participation of all levels and ages at allstages Family, Schools, NGOs, etc.
• Knowledge Management  Learning Community• Transparency, Integrity, Accountability in all levels
and stakeholders• Inclusive : Technology and People• How to stay with the risks; Appropriate and proper
engineered infra-structures, well prepared society,etc.

Community Participation
Community Based
Project Initiation
Survey and design bygovernment agencies
Community wide hearing
Material procurement(Government)
Labor and construction
by people in the related
community

2013 Typhoon and storm surge
in the Philippines

Super Typhoons in the past
+ 7,000 dead by the typhoon in 1897
and recorded in a plaque in Tanauan
Catholic Church+ 15,000 dead by the typhoon in 1912
+ Low possibility for sand deposits byhistorical typhoons because of thesevere coastal erosion.

Catholic Church in Tanauan

Track of Typhoon Yolanda

Summary of Damage by Typhoon Yolanda• Casualties : 6,069 individuals were reported dead ,
27,468 injured and 1,779 are still missing• Damaged Houses : The number of damaged houses are
1,140,332 houses• Totally = 550,928• Partially = 589,404
Source :NDRRMC Update on Typhoon Yolanda As of Dec 16.2013, 6:00am

Vulnerability of the coastal zone

Google map around Tacloban city before Yolanda

Houses were concentrated in the coastal shorelines because ofsmall or no payment for land owner.

Vulnerability of the coastal zone (Olavo et al., 2014)
Google/Digital/Globe

Google/Digital/Globe

BeforeBeforeGoogle/Digital/Globe

Google/Digital/Globe

www.baronservices.com.

After

After

Hazard maps prepared before the Haiyan andstorm surge limit base on our findings (Tanauan)
3 km from the coast !!

Surveyed
JSCE

Source: Tanauan town

byWater stop here

116

What kind of houses they are living now

117What kind of houses they are living now

118

Where they are going to live in the future

119Where they are going to live in the future120

Reasons for magnification of damage due to Yolanda• Large Hazard
Super typhoon (Category 5)
Worst path to the densely populated area andgeneratesignificantly high surges and waves in the coastal
area• Concentration of population in the coastal area
• Weak mitigation system in terms of hard and soft
measuresvulnerable buildings

PAGASA Warning Records
11:00, 5th Nov., Weather Advisory #1
10:30, 6th Nov., Weather Advisory #2
23:00, 6th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #1
5:00, 7th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #2
11:00, 7th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #3
17:00, 7th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #4
20:00, 7th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #4-a
18 hr
23:00, 7th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #5
2:00, 8th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #5-a
5:00, 8th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #6 Landfall
11:00, 8th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #7
17:00, 8th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #8
23:00, 8th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #9
5:00, 9th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #10
11:00, 9th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #11
15:30, 9th Nov., Severe Weather Bulletin #12

those living in coastal areas under signal #3 and #2 are alerted
against storm surges which may reach up to 7-meter wave height.

Questionnaire survey (Jibiki et al., 2014) 10 barangays in 3 sites

Ratio[%]
Ratio

Brgy. 1&4
(green part)Brgy. 2

TaclobanBrgy. 87
(green part)Brgy. 89

 Coastal area
 Damages: The death andmissing ratio

Brgy. San Fernando
Brgy. Baras (yellow part)

Palo

Brgy. San Joaqin
Brgy. Santa Cruz
Brgy. Calogcog
Brgy. San Roque(green part)

TanauanDistribution of the death and missing
ratio of each Barangay in survey area.
Respondents were selected depending on barangay damage in the coastal areas and population
conditions of generation and gender in Philippines.

Terminology: Storm Surge VS Tsunami

 Understood the meaning of “Storm Surge” before
Yolanda?
 Yes = 12.8%
 If you heard it was "tsunami", evacuated toanywhere else except your house?
0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

Definitely
Could not judge
No idea

60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

Possibly
Did not evacuate

Questionnaire survey - Results • 641 valid respondents in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan• About 30% of the respondents did not evacuate to anywhere outside of theirhouses.

• Reasons for evacuation– Heard that super typhoon was coming– Felt that wind is getting stronger and stronger– Order from Barangay leader• Reasons for not evacuated– The wave should not be that large– My house was strong enough– Wanted to protect my house/belongings• Many peoples do not understand “what a storm surge is”• TV and Radio are the main sources of information on typhoon

Questionnaire survey - Summary • Warnings were transferred relatively well to the coastal barangays• TV, Radio and barangay leaders played important roles for theevacuation
However,• many people did not possess an accurate picture of the event andunderestimate the impact from Yolanda• many people do not understand “what a storm surge is”• Some people wanted to protect their house/belongins

Evacuation facility• Evacuation facilities
Many facilities such as Tacloban convention center, Leyte
convention center, schools, churches were not appropriate
for the evacuation (Near sea side, severely damaged bystrong wind, etc.).

Tacloban Convention Center

Leyte Convention Center (Palo)Recommendations•

Storm surge hazard maps should be updated and developed in coastal areas in thePhilippines under the worst scenario considering the impacts of climate change, worst path,land use/cover change, etc. And those hazard maps should be provided to local
communities.

•

Seawalls should be reconstructed and multiple countermeasures such as combinations ofseawalls, tide-water control forests, no building zones, etc. should be developed from theview point of efficiency, low cost and easy maintenance.

Recommendations•

Selection and construction of suitable evacuation centers and places. However, it is not easy
for the government to provide safe place for 200,000 people living in coastal areas of
Tacloban city during the super typhoon.

•

Education and training to emphasize the urgency of evacuation, especially for the barangay
leaders (local communities).

•

Upgrade of an early warning system for storm surge inundation (Downscale to thecommunity level).

•

Warning transfer system in the local communities (Barangay level). Barangay leader’sleadership for the evacuation and information from media are important.

Tsunami VS Wind wave
+ 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami and 2011 Haiyan typhoon are one of thebiggest disaster in the world in the last five years.
+ Both of hydraulic characteristics are significantly different(e.g., water driving power (straight and circle), wave period (long, short) ).

TsunamiWind wave
Washnigton University

Tsunami VS Storm surge (boulders)+ 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami and 2013 Haiyan typhoon are one of thebiggest disaster in the world in the last five years.
+ Both of hydraulic characteristics are significantly different(e.g., water driving power (straight and circle), wave period (long, short) ).

Tsunami VS Storm surge (sand deposits)+ Ancient tsunami deposit and storm deposit are useful for estimating
their recurrences intervals and magnitudes.
+ Distinguishing tsunami and storm deposits was important forunderstanding of ancient events from the deposit.
2004 IOT Tsunami sandAD 1300–1450 Tsunami
Jankaew1et al. 2008, Nature

Differences in flow depths, inundation distances, and sediment-transportdistances for sand beds deposited by (A) tsunamis and (B) coastal storms.
Morton et al. 2007, Sedimentary Geology

Method: Water height and area survey
We recognized water height andinundation area based on water markand interviewing to the local people.

Depth
3.8 m

Method: Geological survey+ We conducted geological survey from 8th to 11th May 2014.
+ We set 3.4 km long transect in Tanauan and 1.4 km long transect inTolosa from coastline to inundation limit.
+ We dig 41 small trench and observe thickness, grain size andsedimentary structures of Haiyan storm deposit.

Tanauan transect (3.4 km)

Tolosa transect (1.4 km)

Method: Geological survey+ We conducted geological survey from 8th to 11th May 2014.
+ We set 3.4 km long transect in Tanauan and 1.4 km long transect inTolosa from coastline to inundation limit.
+ We dig 41 small trench and observe thickness, grain size andsedimentary structures of Haiyan storm deposit.

Storm sand(5 cm)
Land
Soil (before storm)

Result: Characteristics of Haiyan storm sand
+ Grain size and minerals of storm sand were similar with that ofbeach sand and dune sand.
+ Storm sand should be sourced from beach or dune sand.
+ Thickness of storm sand was 80 cm at a maximum.

Storm sand(80 cm)Storm sand(10 cm)Result: Distribution of Haiyan storm sand+ Haiyan storm sand generally thinned landward.
+ The sand limited 0.2 km inland in Tanauan transect with 3.4 km long
+ The sand limited 0.1 km inland in Tolosa transect with 1.4 km long

Sand thickness (cm)80
70

Inundation distance: 3.4 km

60

Sand distribution: 0.2 km

50

TanauanInundation distance: 1.4 km

40

TolosaSand distribution: 0.1 km

30
20Landward thinning

10

TanauanTolosaOthers

0
0

500

1000

1500
2000
2500
Distance from the coastline

3000

3500

Result: Comparison between Haiyan storm sandand Tohoku-oki tsunami sandHaiyan storm sand extended up to about 0.2 km inland.
Tohoku-oki tsunami sand extended up to about 3.0 km inland
80

TanauanSand thickness (cm)70

Tolosa60

Others50

Sendai Plain

40

Haiyan storm

Japan tsunami

30
20
10
0
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Distance from the coastline

3000

3500

Result: Sand limit vs Water limit
TsunamiInundation distance ~2.5 km: Water Sand (sand/water: 92-99%)
Inundation distance 2.5km~: Water ≠ Sand (sand/ water: 55-74%)
Storm
Water ≠ Sand
Sand Layer Limit (km)(sand/water: 7-8%)

5

1:1 line

Wide Plain
Narrow Plain
Steep Valley
Gentle Valley
LagoonPrevious Studies
Storm

4

3

2

Haiyan

1

0
0

1

2

3

4

Inundation distance (km)5

Method: Numerical modeling
We run Delft-3D and SWAN
together for numerical calculation.

Large domain

Domain ：0.01°> 0.002° > 0.0004°
Calculation time：2014/11/6～2014/11/9
Delft-3D(hydrodynamic model) calculates
water level and current fields.

SWAN(spectral wave model) calculates
wave field.

We investigated the relation
between the storm wavehydrodynamic features and storm
wave sediment characteristic.

middle domain

small domain

Method: Numerical modeling

Level(m)Tanauan transect

5
4
3
2
1
0
0

1000

2000

3000

4000

Distance from shoreline(m)We used typhoon track data from JMA(Japan Meteorological Agency) and estimatedwind field(Holland., 1980, Fujii et al., 1986) .

1. We estimated maximum bed shear stress due to storm wave.
2. We estimated wave velocity and flow depth across the Tanauantransect and investigated the relation between the storm wavehydrodynamic features and storm wave sediment characteristic .

Result: Numerical modeling
1. We estimated maximum bed shear stress.
08-Nov-2013 05:00

08-Nov-2013 06:00

08-Nov-2013 07:00

08-Nov-2013 08:00

08-Nov-2013 09:00

08-Nov-2013 10:00

maximum bed shear stress is high on coastline.
→Sand dune on the coastline was eroded and transported inland.

Result: Numerical modeling

04
2Maximum velocity

9

Maximum flow depth

6
3

0
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

0
3500

Flow depth(m)Velocity (m/s)

Sandthickness (cm)2. We estimated wave velocity and flow depth across the Tanauan transect.
20
TanauanTolosa10Distance from the coastline (m)The flow depth is decreasing landward.
→The sand thickness is correlated with the flow depth as in the caseof the tsunami (Goto et al., 2014).

Discussion

Storm sand

Inundation distance

Max 5-6 km

Tsunami sandMax 3 km

Max 0.2 km

Inland sand extent between tsunami and storm could be
impacted by stream power related to wave period (wave duration)(Tsunami: shallow-water waves, with long periods and wave lengths)(Storm: wind-generated waves, with short periods and wave lengths)

2014 Earthquake in Thailand

Two earthquakes in 2011 and 20142011 EQ
2014 EQ

Magnitude
6.8
6.3

Depth (km)10
7.4

Deaths> 150 (1 in Thailand)
2

2011

2014

146

Situation after four years

An example of damage evaluation

An example of non-engineered house

An example of damaged building

An example of rebuilt house147

Situation after four years

Rebuilt school

Damaged pagoda (> 700 years)

Earthquake learning space

Damaged pagoda hospital

148

レポート
２カ国以上への被害・影響を起こした海外での災害を選択し、以下の項目ごとに議論して下さい。
1) 何故このような広域被害が発生したのか？
2) 関係機関が緊急対応した中で、上手くいったこと
3) 次の同じような災害が発生するまで、改善するべきこと
4) それら「上手くいったこと」と「改善するべきこと」について、
日本の防災対策と比較する
フォーマット: ４ページ以内、スタイルは自由
言語: 日本語・英語
提出〆切: 2018年9月7日
提出先: suppasri@irides.tohoku.ac.jp

ReportSelect one disaster that caused damage or impact to more than one
country (not in your country) and discuss following issues.
1) Why such widely damage and impact occurred
2) What are good practices
3) What are lessons to be improved4) Compare these good practices and lessons with disastermitigation in your country
Format: Within four pages, no specific format
Language: Japanese or English
Deadline: 7 September 2018
Submit to: suppasri@irides.tohoku.ac.jp