AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 198

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

15 May 2014

Editorial Committee:

NEW QDR, NEW NDPG, AND NEW
DEFENSE GUIDELINES

Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:

Sugio Takahashi

Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIA

From late 2013 to early 2014, Japan and the US
rolled out new capstone documents for defense
and security strategy. On December 17, 2013,
Japan released the National Security Strategy, theNational Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG),
and the Medium Term Defense Program. Thesedocuments established being a “proactivecontributor to peace based on the principle ofinternational cooperation” as the new foundation
for Japan’s national and international securitystrategy. Following these documents, on March 4,2014, the US released its Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), which reaffirmed that a “rebalanceto Asia” is a key part of US defense strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

This new QDR (QDR2014) is the fifth QDR since the first QDR wasreleased in 1997. According to Title 10 of US Code Section 118, which
determined the mandate of the QDR, the Department of Defense is required toexamine national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,infrastructure, budget plans, and other elements of the defense program for thenext 20 years. In short, QDR is expected to be a document to bridge strategy
and budget. Except for QDR 1997, which mentioned the end of the “procurement
holiday” and partly discussed challenges for investment strategy, however, noQDR has deeply discussed budget plans. In this sense, while it might be stillinsufficient, QDR 2014, self-described as a “budget-informed, strategy-driven”
document, is closer to the statutorily-required QDR than previous QDRs except
the 1997 version. This QDR is strongly connected with the FY2015 budget
proposal and warns that this budget proposal can deal with security challenges
in the current world but another sequestration will endanger the US’ capability torespond to such challenges, even though the draft of QDR 2014 itself does notinclude specific budget plans.
In the context of the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, there
are three important points in QDR 2014. First, it mandates continuation of the“rebalance to Asia,” in line with the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) releasedin January 2012. Contrarily, QDR 2010 presented a strategy to “rebalance” theposture for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (QDR 2010 refers to“rebalance” 49 times in this context, and QDR 2014 refers to “rebalance” 75times). In a sense, the DSG-QDR2014 version of “rebalance” is to re-transform
US defense strategy to the pre-9/11 period when no massive stabilization
operation requirement existed. In this sense, QDR 2014 has some degree ofsimilarity to QDR 2001, which emphasized the importance of the Asia-Pacificregion and the anti-access threat now called anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
threat.
Second, QDR 2014 presented the notion of a “new presence paradigm,”
including additional naval forces, new combinations of forces to support
steady-state and contingency requirements, regionally-focused forces, jointtraining facilities, and access agreements. Like the notions of “dynamic defense

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

force” in Japan’s NDPG 2010 and “dynamic joint defense force” in NDPG 2013,
this new paradigm captures the US military presence in a more dynamic context
than the traditional notion of military presence, which mainly focuses on static
aspects such as the number of troops. As NDPG 2013 emphasizes, “gray zone”
security challenges are especially serious issues in the current Asia-Pacificregion. Making this “new presence paradigm” effective in dealing with suchchallenges should be treated as a high priority on the policy agenda.
Third, QDR 2014 expressed deep concern about the rising threat ofhigh-end A2/AD capability, and it named China as a country seeking such acapability. How QDR 2014 and the FY2015 budget proposal demonstrateconcrete ways and means to deal with such an A2/AD threat is a very importanttopic in Asia-Pacific security. In studying that, looking at the actual capabilities
indicated by budget proposals would be much more important than rhetoricallyanalyzing the language of the QDR. In short, the FY2015 budget proposal
requested much more money for procurement and R&D programs to counterA2/AD

capabilities(maritimeintelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance,unmanned strike, and long-range strike capabilities) than the budget for FY2014
allocated. For example, the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillanceand Strike (UCLASS) system, known as X-45 during the research phase, got
about $120 million in FY 2014 and about $400 million was requested in theFY2015 proposal, the MQ-4 Triton maritime surveillance unmanned aerialvehicle got about $50 million in FY2014 and about $530 million was requested
for FY2015, and the Long Range Strike system got about $360 million in FY2014
and about $910 million was requested for FY2015. This budget allocation
uptrend for such capabilities in a period of defense austerity suggests that theseprograms for counter-A2/AD capabilities are highly prioritized in the current USdefense budget.
The two defense strategic defense documents of Japan and the US,
NDPG 2013 and QDR 2014 respectively, address security challenges in theAsia-Pacific in similar ways but with different nuances. First, NDPG 2013
emphasizes the necessity of dealing with “gray zone” security challenges in theregion. While QDR 2014 does not explicitly use the term “gray zone” (QDR 2010

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did mention it), it minted the expression “new presence paradigm,” which will
work to manage “gray zone” security challenges (or “phase zero operations” inUS military jargon). Second, QDR 2014 emphasized the need to deal withhigh-end A2/AD threats. While NDPG 2014 does not explicitly mention specificways to counter such threats, it prioritizes capability development for air andmaritime superiority and notes the importance of base resiliency. These efforts
play important roles in developing a counter-A2/AD defense posture.
Following the release of these documents, which demonstrate the realitythat Japan and the US share national security challenges and the importance ofcollaborated efforts, Prime Minister Abe and President Obama had a summit
meeting on April 24th 2014 at which these two leaders agreed to commit “tobuilding an even more robust and effective Alliance.” One concrete item in
implementing their commitment is the ongoing consultation to revise theGuidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. Through this process, the twocountries need to work hard to develop robust and effective cooperation to deal
with both “gray-zone” security challenges and high-end A2/AD threats.

Sugio Takahashi is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studiesand currently with Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Planning of Ministryof Defense.

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