NPI Research Note
US-China Relations Study Group
Russia: Caught between US-China Competition
Koizumi Yu
Project Assistant Professor RCAST,The University of Tokyo

Introduction: What is Russia’s view of the world today?
Although the theme of this paper is Russia’s view of US–China relations, before discussing themain topic, it is necessary to provide an overview of Russia’s view of the world in the early 21st
century to position US–China relations within a broad context. A wide range of studies havefocused on Russian government policy documents, such as the National Security Strategy, andstatements made by President Putin and other government leaders to piece together a picture of
the Russian view of the world. Below is a summary of their findings.
First, Russia considers the unilateral hegemony of the United States that emerged after theCold War to be a kind of “unipolar hegemony” to which it has expressed strong opposition. The
idea of the “multipolar world” upon which Russia has insisted since the late 1990s is aimed atoverturning this US “unipolar hegemony” and establishing a world in which there is cooperation
among the major powers, while ensuring that Russia (and other non-Western major powers)
maintains a certain degree of influence over the international order.
Second, Russia recognizes that the US “unipolar hegemony” has, since the late 2000s, enteredinto a period of decline. When seen from an absolute standard, in addition to the decline in USpower (particularly when one considers the effects of the 2008 financial crisis--the so-called“Lehman Brothers Shock”), there has also been a shift in the relative power balance due to theemergence of developing nations such as China, Russia, and India.
Third, despite this, it often goes unrecognized that the current circumstances are notnecessarily good for Russia. In addition to the United States’ insistence on maintaining its
hegemony and its concomitant refusal to accept any relativization of the power balance, this isdue to the fact that, since the 2010s, Russia has, once again, experienced stagnation, as evidenced
by economic, population, and science and technology indices. Generally speaking, although the-1-

world may be becoming increasingly multipolar, this may not be the factor that determines theend of US hegemony, and thus there is a sense of crisis in Russia today over the possibility thatRussia might not occupy any “pole” in the newly emerging global order. Since the Ukrainiancrisis, the United States has intensified its pressure on Russia diplomatically, economically, andmilitarily. The fact that this pressure is causing a great deal of damage to Russian power
reinforces this perception.

China as seen by Russia in 2020
The issue is China’s position within these circumstances. In contrast to Russia’s stagnation,
China has continued to rise throughout the 2010s, and currently its GDP is the second highest in
the world (according to statistics released by the World Bank, China’s GDP is approximately
US$14,300,000,000,000,

whichisabout

8.4times

Russia’s

GDPofroughly

US$1,700,000,000,000), and its population has reached 10 times that of Russia. In terms ofcutting-edge technologies, such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and space exploration, China ison par with the United States, but Russia lags far behind in both investment and global share. Ithas been thought that Russia’s last remaining advantage is its military power (particularly interms of nuclear weaponry and military technology), but Russia is losing to China even in thisfield (except in some highly specialized areas) because China has rapidly developed its scientificand industrial capabilities and increased its defense budget.
Therefore, Russia is falling behind China in addition to lagging behind the United States. At
the same time, given that the US–Russia relationship has become increasingly tense, China andRussia have become increasingly close (particularly since 2014). This is likely because as its
relationship with the United States and other Western nations has deteriorated and its exports ofenergy resources—which is one of its major sources of foreign currency—and investments haveslowed, China is probably faced with a situation in which it has no choice but to seek alternatives.
Is it possible, then, that Russia could become China’s junior partner?
Many experts in Russia have maintained that this is not only possible, it has already takenplace to a certain extent, and the number of those in Russia who hold this view is increasing
annually. However, when comparing to the relationship to the US, the view that a junior partner
to China is not an unacceptable situation is gaining consensus.
First, since Russia shares an overland border with China that spans 4,000km, and because
there are major power differences between the two countries, conflict between them would entail-2-a much more serious security risk than conflict with the West. Therefore, if accepting Chinese
leadership does not expose these threats, Russia would calculate that this would be to theiroverall advantage. Second, China and Russia share the same view of national politics because
they both have authoritarian political systems, and thus, unlike the West, China would not
demand that Russia democratize (which would mean the overthrow of the Putin regime). In thissense, China would be the most reassuring partner and is advantageous also because it would
help Russia maintain its sphere of influence in many countries that also have authoritarianpolitical systems. Furthermore, China has not sought (for now) to expand its military andpolitical blocs but has instead made inroads into the former Soviet Union centering on theeconomy.
Thus, even if it would be uncomfortable for Russia to become China’s junior partner, many
have begun to recognize that this would be a relatively viable option for Russia.

How does Russia view the US-China relationship?
Now, we will take up the main theme of this paper, which is how Russia views current US–China
relations.
As mentioned above, the rise of China is generally considered a positive development
vis-à-vis relativizing US “unipolar hegemony.” Nevertheless, this would not necessarily be so ifthe United States and China were to engage in bilateral cooperation (i.e., a G2) or if it were toseem a realistic possibility that China would replace the United States as the country with global
hegemony. The rise of China is acceptable to Russia today because China has a tense relationshipwith the US and therefore needs Russia.
Seen from another perspective, one could imagine a scenario in which Russia reconciles with
the West on the condition that it keeps a distance from China. In fact, one could interpret theTrump administration’s 2020 G11 proposal as an effort to create distance between China andRussia.
Nevertheless, Russia has indicated that it will reject the G11 proposal, and therefore it isdifficult to imagine that this is a practical political agenda. Even if Russia were to return to theG11, it would simply mean that Russia had once again become a junior partner of the West, andit would likely also lead to even cooler relations with China. If Russia were to once again
become a junior partner of the West, its voice in international affairs would be as weak as it had
been during 1990–2000, it would be subjected to demands to democratize, and it would be-3-

exposed to the threat of NATO’s eastern expansion. Furthermore, such a move would not evenensure the removal of the sanctions under which Russia is suffering. As long as the West did notoffer appeasement conditions to Russia that far outstripped a simple invitation to rejoin theG11—for example, the removal of sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, which is the engine of its
economy, or the promise that NATO would not be expanded (i.e., something like Yalta 2,
recognizing Russia’s claim to the same sphere of influence that the former Soviet Unionhad)—Russia would have little motivation to reverse its course of cooperation with China.
In other words, the fact that the United States has indicated concern over the possibility thatRussia may become China’s close junior partner acts as collateral that Russia could use to its
advantage when dealing with the West.
In January 2020, Russian President Putin proposed that a P5 Summit be held as a way to allow
the leaders of the five permanent members of the United Nations to meet and discussinternational security issues. The objective of this was probably to allow China and Russia toreposition themselves as the powers responsible for the formation and maintenance of thepost-WWII order, rather than the powers that are working to “change the status quo” of theinternational order.
However, while four countries besides Russia did not reject this proposal out of hand, they did
not seem very enthusiastic either. The question facing the world today is whether the US-centricorder (the post-Cold War order) that arose after the post-WWII order will be maintained orwhether a new order (either a G2 or a US–China cold war) in which China plays a larger role
will arise. This is because interest (by countries other than Russia) in a classic post-war order
based on the Yalta system is low. Thus, for Russia the only realistic option would be to follow
China, although the degree to which that would happen remains a debatable issue.

October 12, 2020-4-