AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPS

RIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security(Secretariat)

Editor:No. 171

Akio Watanabe

19 February 2013

Editorial Board:

PRIME MINISTER ABE AND PRESIDENTOBAMA CAN STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE

Hideki Asari
Masashi Nishihara
Taizo Yakushiji

Fumiaki Kubo

Online Publisher:
Yoshiji Nogami
President, JIIA

It is well known that President Obama named Asia
as America’s top foreign-policy priority inannouncing a major “pivot” or “rebalancing” toward
Asia. Japan has naturally welcomed this policy.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Reduced US defense spending is an issue of medium- to long-term
importance for Japan. Should the compulsory across-the-board spending cutsscheduled for March 1 of this year go into effect, US government expenditures
will be reduced by about $1.2 trillion over ten years, with half of that amount tocome from defense spending. There are some who contend there is little needfor concern even if these cuts are made (see, for example, Peter Singer,“Separating

Sequestration

FactsfromFiction,”

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer).
Nevertheless, Department of Defense officials have admitted that, if
sequestration goes ahead, they would be unable to carry out the fiscal measuresrequired for many aspects of the new Asia strategy (The New York Times, Nov.
18, 2012). The crux of the matter is whether the US will be able militarily to takethe steps required to counter the unmistakable upgrades in Chinese militarycapabilities.
Japan needs to recognize that severe fiscal restrictions on US defense
spending are likely to persist. No matter how the “fiscal cliff” is addressed, theoutcome will only be the difference between a cliff and a very steep downhill, so
the US military is seeking out of logical necessity to expand cooperative ties with
its allies and partners in Asia. The question is whether Japan can act sufficiently
in concert with the US.
From the Japanese standpoint, the territorial issues in the South China
Sea and the Senkaku Islands pose qualitatively the same challenge, i.e.,
whether to tolerate an attempt to alter the status quo either by faits accomplis orforce. The bedrock of the global order established after World War II was theview that such changes would not be tolerated, the fundamental principle beingthat dissatisfaction and disputes must be resolved peacefully through diplomaticnegotiations.
This is also the principle that the US has clearly asserted since
Secretary of State Clinton’s statement at the July 2010 ARF meeting. This
insistence on peaceful dispute resolution has extremely universal appeal, andJapan can expect to enjoy broad-ranging support as long as it adopts thisviewpoint in presenting its claims on the Senkaku issue. Although this view is

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

shared by the US, Australia, the Philippines, and others, it is not necessarily
shared by Europe. From time to time, it seems that even American journalists
have an incorrect understanding about the situation of the Senkaku Islands
dispute as a result of accepting without question the official explanation of theChinese government. More public relations activities will be required in thisregard not just in Europe or Asia but also in the US (necessitating an increased
budget for public relations). Incidentally, Japan has been working to resolve theNorthern Territories and Takeshima issues entirely through negotiations, and in
this sense Japan has been quite exemplary in its dealings on territorial issues.
The Obama administration initially adopted a softline policy ofconsultation and negotiation toward China, but eventually it came to embrace aview of China more hardline than those of its predecessors. The turning point
was the speech by Secretary Clinton mentioned above. We are not sure how
John Kerry, the new Secretary of State, regards China. He might be too prone tonegotiation, or he might be too focused on the Middle East. North Korea could
pose the first challenge for Secretary Kerry by conducting nuclear testing, but inthe longer term China will serve as the test of whether his world view is realistic
enough. At some point, President Obama may have to sit him down for a talk tomake sure they share the same views on important foreign policy issues.
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Japan faces
the danger of armed clashes over territorial issues (the disputes over Takeshima
and the Northern Territories, under South Korean and Russian administration
respectively, do not risk sparking armed conflict since Japan is committed tosettle these by negotiations, not force). The Abe administration must give carefulattention to its policy toward China. Determined efforts to enhance security as
well as changes to existing policies will undoubtedly be essential both to directly
defend the Senkaku Islands and to counter the rapid improvement in Chinese
military capabilities. Broad support and understanding for such steps will likely
not be hard to find inside or outside Japan. Building up the Japan Coast Guard,
increasing defense spending, bolstering Japan’s Security Council, improving
confidentiality law, and amending the government’s interpretations of the right of

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

collective defense are among the approaches that should be pursued,
approaches that will also be effective in bringing about closer ties with the US.
Particularly effective among these measures from a medium- tolong-term perspective would be amending the long-standing interpretations by
the Cabinet Legislative Bureau that the Japanese government cannot exercise
the right of collective self-defense; this would dramatically expand the scope
within which Japan can meaningfully support the US in security matters. Japan
should be aware it can make a strong case that it is already a very important allyfor the US and a cornerstone for US military deployment in Asia by providing theUS the crucially important right to use military bases in Japan not just to defend
Japan but also for “the peace and stability of the Far East.” If Japan makes up forthe current weak spots in the current alliance by adopting the measures
mentioned above, including the amended interpretation of the collective right toself-defense, it could enhance its value as an ally for the US.
There are other things, big and small, that Japan could do with the US.
There could be closer cooperation between the Japan Coast Guard and the US
Coast Guard, from exchanging expertise to placing American officers onJapanese ships as has been suggested by an American foreign policy expert(http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2013/extended-deterrence-and-secu
rity-in-east-asia). Japan could take a huge step forward by deciding even now tojoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Reflecting on Japan’s post-war success, one
cannot help but come to the conclusion that it was mostly an economic success,not a military success, attributable especially to trade in manufactured goods.
The times have changed somewhat, but Japan’s future success still rests on
engaging the outside world through trade and investment. By joining the TPP,
Japan could contribute to the formation of the emerging economic order in theAsia-Pacific region as well as bolster the multilayered alliance in terms ofsecurity, politics, economics, culture, and values.
At the same time, the Abe administration risks injecting confusion anddistraction into the message that Japan is seeking to convey to the rest of theworld if the prime minister leads a headlong charge on the “comfort women”
issue and other historical matters. Accurately conveying Japan’s position on the

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies“comfort women” issue to the rest of the world, while not impossible, is anextensive task that will take tremendous time and effort. Indeed, the topic shouldbe left at least partially to joint research efforts among historians and similar
endeavors. Mr. Abe could command the moral high ground by sticking to amessage of peaceful solutions, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation that is
applicable not just to the East China Sea but also to the South China Sea. His
success will rest at least partially on whether he can establish clear priorities in
his foreign policy agenda.

Fumiaki Kubo is a professor at the University of Tokyo and an adjunct fellow
at JIIA.

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