THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY*

Sharun Mukand
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Dani Rodrik
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
U.S.A.
RevisedJune 2016* The first draft of this paper was written at the Institute for Advanced Study, to which we are
grateful for support. We also thank members of the IAS School of Social Science lunch table for
useful discussions, as well as Carles Boix, William Ferguson, Sumon Majumdar, Jan-Werner
Müller, Ira Katznelson, and commentators at presentations at Northwestern, London School of
Economics, the NBER, Brown, and WINIR-Rio for helpful suggestions.

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT
We distinguish between three sets of rights – property rights, political rights, and civil rights –and provide a taxonomy of political regimes. The distinctive nature of liberal democracy is thatit protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Whendemocratic transitions are the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly
about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights), they generically
fail to produce liberal democracy. This is because the minority has neither the resources nor thenumbers to make a contribution to the settlement. We develop a formal model to sharpen thecontrast between electoral and liberal democracies and highlight circumstances under whichliberal democracy can emerge. We show that liberal democracy requires quite special
circumstances: mild levels of income inequality as well as weak identity cleavages. We also
provide a new classification of countries as electoral or liberal democracies.
Sharun Mukand
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
s.mukand@warwick.ac.uk
Dani Rodrik
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
dani_rodrik@harvard.edu

I. Introduction
By many measures, democracy has conquered the world. Since the fall of the Berlin Wallin 1989, the number of democracies has risen rapidly and cross-national tabulations suggest
that, for the first time in history, more countries now qualify as democracies than as nondemocracies (Figure 1). Moreover, the discrediting of fascism and communism means that
democracy has no serious ideological competitors at present. Democracy, as a form of politicalrule, has become a true global norm.
While the spread of democracy is something to cheer about, the majority of new
democracies are electoral rather than liberal democracies. That is, they are political regimes
which allow political competition and generally fair elections, but exhibit considerable
violations in the civil rights of minority and other groups not in power. For example, Hungary,
Ecuador, Mexico, Turkey, and Pakistan are all classified as electoral democracies (according to
the Freedom House 1). But in these and many other countries, harassment of political
opponents, censorship or self-censorship in the media, and discrimination against minority
ethnic or religious groups run rampant.
Consider some examples from the OECD club of democracies. In Hungary, “Roma andother minorities have become frequent targets of harassment and of hate speech.” In Croatia,
the judicial system not only “moves slowly,” but “displays an institutional bias in favor of ethnic
Croat suspects.” Israel exhibits a wide range of civil-rights violations “related to minority rights
such as those accorded non-Jewish citizens, particularly Arab citizens, women’s rights, andregarding civil protest.” In Mexico, “in practice the Mexican military and other security forces
are notorious for breaching human rights and the courts do not provide adequate protection.”
In Turkey, “the rights of the defense, lengthy pre-trial detention and excessively long and catchall indictments” constitute major problems facing opponents of the government and membersof the Kurdish minority. 2 Elsewhere, in countries such as Russia and Venezuela, rights
violations are even more blatant, even though elections remain in principle free andcompetitive.
Fareed Zakaria coined the term “illiberal democracy” for political regimes such as thesethat hold regular elections but routinely violate rights (Zakaria 1997). More recently, politicalscientists Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010) have used the term “competitive
authoritarianism” to describe what they view as hybrid regimes between democracy andautocracy. Zakaria and others note that democracy developed in Western Europe out of aliberal tradition which emphasized individual rights and placed limits on state coercion. In
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, mass franchise arrived only after liberal
1

Freedom House, List of Electoral Democracies, downloadable from https://freedomhouse.org/reporttypes/freedom-world#.VVIZc5PVEZw.
2

The quotes come from the 2014 Civil Rights and Political Liberties Report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).

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thought had become entrenched. Most of the world’s new democracies, by contrast, emergedin the absence of a liberal tradition and did little to foster one. As the shortcomings of these
democracies have become more evident, it has become commonplace to talk about a“democratic recession” (Diamond 2015).
We provide in this paper an analytical taxonomy of political regimes, distinguishing inparticular between electoral and liberal democracy. We take the main distinctive feature of aliberal regime to be the restraints placed on those in power that prevent discrimination against
minorities and ensure equal treatment. 3 The restraints can be legal or administrative; they canbe maintained by constitutional strictures or self-enforcing agreements. What matters is thatthese checks, which we label “civil rights” for short, are effective in practice. Our focus issquarely on these missing restraints – the relative weakness of civil rights – in illiberal electoral
democracies.
We argue that the failure to protect minority rights is a readily understood consequenceof the political logic behind the emergence of democracy. What requires explanation is not therelative paucity of liberal democracy, but its existence – rare as it may be. The surprise is notthat few democracies are liberal, but that liberal democracies exist at all.
To make our point, we distinguish specifically between three sets of rights: property
rights, political rights, and civil rights. We define these as follows:•••

Property rights protect asset holders and investors against expropriation by thestate or other groups.
Political rights guarantee free and fair electoral contests and allow the winnersof such contests to determine policy subject to the constraints established byother rights (when provided).
Civil rights ensure equality before the law – i.e. non-discrimination in theprovision of public goods such as justice, security, education and health.

We classify political regimes according to which (combination) of these rights are provided. In
dictatorships, it is only the property rights of the elite that are protected. Classical liberal
regimes protect property and civil rights, but not necessarily electoral rights. Electoral
democracies, which constitute the majority of present-day democracies, protect property andpolitical rights, but not civil rights. Liberal democracies protect all three sets of rights. Note that
3

There is no single definition of liberalism. But as we discuss in section V below, historically liberalism grew out of
opposition to royal privilege and to discrimination against religious minorities. Most definitions emphasize that in aliberal democracy there are built in protections for the individual/minority against the tyranny of the ruler (thesovereign or the electoral majority, as the case may be). Classical liberals such as John Stuart Mill werepreoccupied with the “tyranny of majority” that they feared electoral democracies would produce.

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we operationalize the non-discrimination constraint under liberalism as equal treatment by thestate in public goods provision in different domains – legal, religious, educational, etc.
Each one of these rights has a clear, identifiable beneficiary. Property rights benefit
primarily the wealthy, propertied elite. Political rights benefit the majority – the organizedmasses and popular forces. And civil rights benefit those who are normally excluded from the
spoils of privilege or power – ethnic, religious, geographic, or ideological minorities.
When the propertied elite can rule on their own they establish an autocracy that
protects their (property) rights and little else. This has been the usual outcome throughout thelong arc of history. Mass democracy, on the other hand, requires the emergence of organizedpopular groups that can challenge the power of the elites. In the 19th and 20th centuries,
processes such as industrialization, world wars, and de-colonization led to the mobilization ofsuch groups. Democracy, when it arose, was typically the result of a quid pro quo between theelites and the mobilized masses. 4 The elites acceded to the masses’ demands that the franchise
be extended (usually) to all males regardless of property qualifications. In return, the newly
enfranchised groups accepted limits on their ability to expropriate property holders. In short,electoral rights were exchanged for property rights. 5
The defining characteristic of this political settlement is that it excludes the main
beneficiary of civil rights – the dispossessed minorities – from the bargaining table. These
minorities have neither resources (like the elite) nor numbers (like the majority) behind them.
So they do not have something to bring to the table, and cannot make any credible threats. The
political logic of democratization dictates the provision of property and political rights, but notcivil rights. As we formalize in section III, the provision of civil rights is costly to the majority andlargely unnecessary for the elite (who can pay for their own collective goods by extracting asurplus from the masses). Therefore the political settlement is one that favors electoral
democracy over liberal democracy.
By distinguishing explicitly among three groups and three associated sets of rights, ourframework helps explain why liberal democracy is such a rare beast. But liberal democracies do

4

There is an alternative strand of theorizing that views democratization as the result of inter-elite bargaining. For a
recent model in that tradition that addresses a puzzle similar to ours – why and when do we get a “minimal”
democracy characterized by competitive elections only – see Bidner, Francois and Trebbi (2015).

5This is essentially the account of the emergence of democracy that is provided, for example, in Acemoglu andRobinson (2009). See also Dahl (1971), Przeworski (1991), Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), and Boix
(2003) among others. In some of these works, the pact is implicit. Once the franchise is extended to the masses,
there must be limits to how much the majority can redistribute to itself; otherwise the tendency would be for theelite to be fully expropriated.

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exist, and the question is how they can ever be sustained in equilibrium. We discuss several
circumstances that can mitigate the bias against civil rights in democracies.
First, there may not be a clear, identifiable cleavage – ethnic, religious, or otherwise –that divides the majority from the minority. In highly homogenous societies, the “majority”
derives few benefits from excluding the “minority” from public goods and suffers few costs
from providing equal access. This may account for the emergence of liberal democracy, forexample, in Sweden during the early part of the 20th century or in Japan and South Korea more
recently.
Second, the two cleavages that distinguish the majority from the minority and the elitefrom the non-elite may be in close alignment. In such a case, the elite will seek both property
and civil rights as part of the political settlement with the majority. Think, for example, of theposition of the white minority government in South Africa prior to the transition to democracy
in 1994.
Third, the majority may be slender and need the support of the minority to mount a
serious challenge to the elite. Or there may be no clear-cut majority, with society characterized
by a preponderance of cross-cutting cleavages. 6 In these cases, repeated game incentives may
ensure that each group recognizes the rights of others in return for its rights being protected bythem. Lebanon’s “consociational” democracy may have been an example of this, before
differential population growth and outside intervention upset the pre-existing balance of power
among different religious denominations.
Saying more requires a specific model of democratic transition, which we develop in
section III. As the examples above make clear, there are two societal cleavages that play a
crucial role in our story. First, there is the divide between the propertied elite and the poor
masses. This is largely an economic divide and is determined by the division of land, capital andother assets in society, as well as access to the opportunities for accumulating those assets.
Standard class-based accounts of the dynamics of political regimes emphasize primarily thiscleavage. Second, there is a cleavage between what we call a majority and a minority. Thisparticular divide may be identity based, deriving from ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional
affiliations. Or it may be ideological – as with secular modernizers versus religious conservatives
in Turkey, and Western-oriented liberals versus traditionalists in Russia. (We will call thissecond cleavage an “identity” cleavage for short, but it should be kept in mind that the relevant
majority-minority cleavage will run often on ideological lines.) These two cleavages may align(as they did in South Africa), but more often than not, they will not. Their divergence is what
6

The role of cross-cutting cleavages in promoting tolerance was discussed in Lipset’s (1959) classic piece on thesocial preconditions of democracy.

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allows us to make an analytical and substantive distinction between electoral and liberal
democracy. 7
In our formal model, the majority-minority split exerts a variety of influences on theprospects for liberal democracy. First, and most crucially, it makes the majority favor electoral
over liberal democracy. By discriminating against the minority, the majority can enjoy more
public goods for itself. But there are effects that go in the opposite direction too. Under somecircumstances, the split can make the elite favor liberal democracy. We identify two suchconsequences. First, the rate of taxation is generally lower under liberal democracy as the
majority reap fewer benefits from redistributive taxation when they have to share public goods
with the minority. So the elite may support liberal democracy when the income/class cleavage
is very deep. Second, when the elite’s identity aligns with that of the minority, the elite have a
direct stake in civil rights too. These channels can produce a rich mix of results.
In the benchmark version of our model, we show that liberal democracy requires quite
special circumstances: mild levels of income inequality as well as weak identity cleavages. Thisis so despite the fact that we give the elite “agenda-setting” power by allowing it to move firstand force the majority to move second. When the class or the identity cleavage is large, either
the elite or the majority (or both) prefer alternative political regimes, and the prospects ofliberal democracy are thwarted.
Even though our model treats them parametrically, the class and identity cleavages arethemselves the product of historical and economic developments. In section V, we discuss theroles that these two cleavages have played in democratic transitions in history and acrossdifferent kinds of countries. We emphasize both ideational and material determinants. On theideational front, we focus on the evolution of liberalism in the West and its “compromise” withmass democracy and the expansion of the franchise. On the material side, we emphasize longterm economic and social processes – such as industrialization and decolonization – that served
both to create and temper, at different times, the cleavage between elites and non-elites.
We suggest that the differential fortunes of liberal democracy in Western Europe andthe developing world are related to the nature of dominant cleavages at the time of the social
mobilization that ushered in democracy. In the West, the transition to democracy occurred as aconsequence of industrialization at a time when the major division in society was the one
between capitalists and workers. In most developing nations, on the other hand, mass politics
7

In this paper we take the two cleavages as given and treat them parametrically. But we are well aware that classand identity cleavages are both at least partly “socially constructed,” and can be primed or manipulated forpolitical ends. Therefore, groups’ perceptions of where their interests lie can be endogenous to the political game.
A companion paper (Mukand and Rodrik 2016) formally models the role of ideas (cues, narratives, worldviews, etc.)
in shaping politically relevant cleavages. See also Rodrik (2014).

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was the product of decolonization and wars of national liberation, with identity cleavages as
the main fault line. Our model suggests that the second kind of transition is particularly inimical
to liberal democracy. It would take us far too afield to develop all these historical dynamics,
which are the subject of a huge literature. We will nevertheless provide a brief overview and a
few country vignettes to emphasize the potential usefulness of our particular framework.
The main innovation in our paper is to unpack the concepts of “democracy” and“liberalism” and to give civil rights an analytical standing co-equal to property rights andpolitical rights. To see the difference this makes, it is useful to compare our approach withstandard accounts of the emergence of democracy and liberalism.
The conventional treatment of democracy in the analytical political economy literature
focuses on the conflict between a wealthy elite and the organized masses (see for example
Przeworski, 2005 or Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009). This approach tends to bundle civil rights
with political rights. It provides an explanation for the origins of electoral democracy, but has
little to say on the provision of civil rights, when it takes place. 8 Standard accounts of theemergence of liberalism (which we review in section V), on the other hand, tend to bundle civilrights with property rights (as in Marshall 1949 or Fawcett 2014). They evade the puzzle of why
a society run by liberal elites would provide broad civil rights when the beneficiaries of suchrights are predominantly among the non-elites. The weakness of the political legs on which civilrights rest has been obscured by both kinds of bundling. In both cases, the result has been the
failure to ask the question, “where do civil rights come from?”
Another contribution of the paper is that we provide a parsimonious taxonomy ofpolitical regimes, both democratic and non-democratic. We accomplish this by distinguishingamong three groups (elite, majority, minority) and three kinds of rights (property, political, civil)
associated with various modes of taxation and public-goods provision (who determines the tax
rate, who pays the taxes, and how the public good is targeted). These distinctions allow us tocapture a wide variety of outcomes. The resulting taxonomy should be of independent interest,beyond our focus on liberal democracy. We also introduce new quantitative measures ofpolitical and civil rights, based on raw scores from the Freedom House (2005), that allow a
clearer distinction between electoral and liberal democracies than existing indicators.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first present our taxonomy of political regimes,
based on the three-fold distinction of rights we just discussed (section II). We next sketch a
simple formal framework to help us think through the circumstances under which liberal
8

As Acemoglu and Robinson note (2009, 26), in their framework a transition to democracy “shifts future politicalpower away from the elite to the citizens, thereby creating a credible commitment to future pro-majority policies”(emphasis in the original). Pro-majority policies, by their very nature, will discriminate against powerless minorities.

-7-

democracy, as distinct from illiberal or electoral democracy, becomes politically sustainable(sections III and IV). In the penultimate section (V), we relate our framework to the literature on
the history of liberalism and democracy and provide specific country illustrations. In section VI,
we conclude.

II. A Taxonomy of Political Regimes
We define liberal democracy as a regime in which civil rights are provided in addition toelectoral and property rights. We model civil rights in turn as the non-discriminatory provisionof public goods. We interpret the relevant public goods broadly, including justice and freespeech rights as well as education, health, and infrastructure. What sets liberal democracy
apart from electoral democracy in our framework is that an elected government cannot
discriminate against specific individuals or groups when it administers justice, protects basic
rights such as freedom of assembly and free speech, provides for collective security, or
distributes economic and social benefits.
Our treatment has the advantage that it provides a tractable approach for modelingliberal democracy and distinguishing it from other political regimes. Thinking of liberalism
broadly as non-discrimination allows us to sidestep debates about what are the “essential”
characteristics of liberalism. The principle of non-discrimination captures a substantial numberof liberalism’s characteristics, even if not all of them.
More specifically, our public good framework can be given concrete meaning in a
number of different ways. Rights of habeas corpus for an individual or aggrieved minority imply
non-discrimination in the administration of justice. Equal access to education, as in black girls
being allowed to attend schools in Alabama in the 1960s, requires non-discrimination in
education. Equal access by, say, South African blacks, to parks or public transport implies nondiscrimination in public infrastructure. Protecting the freedom of expression of a minority (e.g.
press freedom for Kurdish newspapers in Turkey) is tantamount to non-discrimination in speechrights. Our formulation is general enough to encapsulate individual and minority rights – insofar
as an individual constitutes a minority group of size one. Furthermore, it is sufficiently flexiblethat it can be applied to different country, cultural and historical contexts.
Our distinction between electoral and liberal democracies relies on the presumptionthat free and fair elections – the hallmark of electoral democracy – can be separated fromequal treatment and non-discrimination – the hallmarks of liberalism. It is possible to have one
without having the other. This presumption can be criticized. It may be difficult at times todisentangle certain civil rights from political rights. In particular, it can be argued that elections
cannot be entirely fair when the capacity of citizens to participate and compete in elections isconstrained – indirectly – by restrictions on their civil rights. Citizens who are deprived of, say,-8-adequate educational opportunities or the protections of the rule of law cannot be effective
participants in electoral contests.
This criticism has some validity. But we take it as a caution about the fuzziness inpractice between electoral and liberal democracies, rather than an objection that renders ourdistinction between the two regimes entirely invalid. Obviously, when discrimination in theprovision of basic public goods is so extreme that it tilts the electoral playing field decisively inthe direction of some groups, one cannot talk of democracy of any kind. But to require equalityof access across the full range of public goods as a precondition for free and fair elections
would also set too high a threshold. We treat electoral democracy as a particular kind of flawed
democracy, where the electoral majority gets to trample on the rights of the minority. We
mentioned in the Introduction some of the notable examples we have in mind: Russia, Hungary,or Turkey.
We now describe our taxonomy. We shall distinguish among different types of politicalregimes, based on the combinations of property/political/civil rights that are provided. For
simplicity, let us assume that we can treat each of these rights in a binary, all-or-none fashion;
they are either protected or not. This gives us eight possible combinations in all, shown in Table
1.
A regime in which none of these rights is protected is either a personal dictatorship, oran anarchy where the state has no authority (box 1). If property rights are protected but there
are no political or civil rights, the regime is under the control of an oligarchic elite and can be
described as a right-wing autocracy (box 5). A regime that provides political rights but notproperty or civil rights would be controlled by the effective majority, resembling perhaps
Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat (box 2). A regime that provides only civil rights, on theother hand, is hard to imagine – the only box for which we are at a loss for label (box 3).
Consider now political regimes that provide two out of our three sets of rights. When
property rights are missing but political and civil rights are provided (box 4), we get a
democratic version of communism – what Marx had in mind for the long run (even thoughcommunist regimes turned out quite differently in practice). When political rights are missing
but property and civil rights are protected (box 7), we have what we might call a “liberal
autocracy.” Until the extension of the franchise to most males in the late 19th century, Britain
stood as an example of this type of regime. There are few, if any contemporary variants (seebelow). When civil rights are missing but property and political rights are protected, we haveelectoral or illiberal democracies. As we argued in the introduction, a large share of today’s
democracies, particularly in the developing world, are in this category. Finally, a politicalregime that provides all three sets of rights is a liberal democracy (box 8). Our focus will be on

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the circumstances that permit the emergence of this kind of regime, as distinct from electoral
democracies.
Based on unpublished scores used in the construction of the Freedom House (FH) index
of democracy, we have computed indicators of political and civil rights for 196 countries. 9 Our
political rights index is the unweighted average of raw FH scores for free and fair elections for
executive and legislative elections (A1 and A2). The civil rights index is the unweighted averageof raw FH scores for the independence of judiciary (F1), rule of law (F2), and equal treatment(F4). Both indices range from 0 (minimum rights) to 1 (maximum rights). (We do not develop aproperty rights index, since it is not at the center of our analysis.)
In Figure 2, we show the distribution of these indicators across 196 countries for 2014.
The main takeaway from the figure is that the countries tend to do much better in providing
political rights than in providing civil rights. In fact, the modal value for political rights is close to1, while the modal value for civil rights is less than 0.4. (The median values are 0.75 and 0.50,
respectively, for political and civil rights.) One implication is that while all countries that do wellon civil rights also do well on political rights, the reverse is not true.
We then use an arbitrary cut-off point of 0.8 to assign countries to different types of
democracies. A country where political rights exceed 0.8 but civil rights fall short of thatthreshold is an electoral democracy. A country which passes the threshold in both political andcivil rights is a liberal democracy. For 2014, this yields a list of 45 electoral democracies and 46
liberal democracies (shown in Table A.1). Since it is very rare for countries to provide civil but
not political rights, we have only one instance of what we have called “liberal autocracy,”
namely Monaco.
Our measure yields roughly as many liberal democracies as electoral democracies.
However, the liberal democracies tend to be the older, better established democracies in our
9

We thank Bret Nelson of Freedom House for making available to us the raw scores used in calculating democracy
indicators in Freedom House (2005 and various years). Most measures of democracy that are currently used inempirical work tend to combine aspects of what we have called political and civil rights (see for example Barro[1996], Boix [2003], Acemoglu et al. [2014]). The Polity and Freedom House democracy indicators on which suchanalyses tend to be based do make some relevant distinctions. For example, the Polity IV database contains
separate measures for “executive constraints” (XCONST) and “regulation of political participation” (PARREG).
These map somewhat loosely into our civil and political rights, but the correspondence is weak at best. For
example, the constraints covered under XCONST include not just parliaments or the judiciary, but also militaryelites or “councils of notables” (Marshall et al. 2014, p. 24). Freedom House (FH) makes a distinction between“political rights” and “civil liberties” which is even closer to the one we have in mind here. But here too there aresome choices that seem out of place from our perspective. For example, the FH indicator of “political rights”
covers corruption and transparency in the operation of the government, while “civil liberties” include questions
about property rights and absence of economic exploitation. So we have preferred to construct our own indices ofcivil and political rights, based on specific FH raw scores that map more directly into our conceptual framework.

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list of countries. Using Polity IV’s measure of the number of years since regime change, themedian age of a liberal democracy is 61 years, versus 23 years for electoral democracies. Thereis in fact only a single liberal democracy in our list that is younger than 20 years, namely Estonia.
The vast majority of the newer democracies are electoral democracies. 10
We will also distinguish in our framework between three groups in society, associatedwith each set of rights:
1. A propertied elite, whose primary objective is to keep and accumulate their assets(property rights);
2. A majority, who want electoral power so they can choose policies that improve theireconomic conditions (political rights);
3. A minority (ethnic, linguistic, regional, ideological), who desire equality under thelaw and the right not to be discriminated against in jobs, education, etc. (civil rights).
We shall be more specific about the utility functions of each of these groups below.
The presence of these groups is a consequence of two kinds of cleavages in society. One
cleavage separates the wealthy (propertied) elite from the non-elite. This is essentially an
economic or class divide. The second cleavage separates the majority from the minority on thebasis of some salient identity marker. This marker may relate to ethnicity, religion, language,
region, or ideology. Obviously, there may be more than one such cleavage. But we shall focus
on a single identity cleavage, distinct from class/income, to keep things tractable. We will callthese two the class and identity cleavages, for short.
What we shall show is that (a) the depth of these cleavages and (b) the magnitude ofrelative numbers on either side have a direct bearing on the sustainability of different types ofpolitical regimes.

III. A Formal Framework(a) The basics
We label the three groups in society with the subscript 𝑖𝑖, with 𝑖𝑖 taking one of the threepossible values e (elite), a (majority), and b (minority). Members of each group derive utility
from their (after-tax) income 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 and from consuming a public good 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 .

(1)

10

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 .

One caveat here is that Polity IV does not have values for “durable” for all of our countries.

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We normalize the economy’s total output to 1, with the pre-tax/transfer shares of the elite andnon-elite given by 𝛼𝛼 and (1-𝛼𝛼), respectively. Total population is assumed to equal a mass of 1+ ε,
where the elite constitute a minority ε of the population but control more than half of pre1

tax/transfer output (𝛼𝛼 > 2). The non-elite have mass of 1 and are split between a majority and a1minority, with population shares n and (1-n), respectively (n > 2). 11 In the absence of any taxes
1or transfers, 𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼 and 𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎 = 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼). The gap between 𝛼𝛼 and 2 is a measure of the class(income) cleavage.

We model the identity cleavage by assuming groups exhibit differences in the type of
public good they prefer. The type of public goods is indexed by 𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. The three groups’
ideal types are given by 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [𝑒𝑒, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏]. The utility derived from the public good thus depends
both on the aggregate expenditure on it and on the type of public good that is provided.
There is a deadweight loss associated with the provision of public goods, which
increases with the level of expenditures and the gap (from the perspective of each group)
between the type that is provided and the preferred type. Denoting total expenditure on the
public good by 𝑟𝑟, the utility derived from the public good is thus expressed as follows:(2)𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟 − {1 + |𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃|} 2 𝑟𝑟 2,

where 𝛾𝛾 parameterizes the magnitude of the deadweight loss relative to the direct benefits
associated with public goods provision. Note that deadweight loss is minimized, but noteliminated, when 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 . We shall normalize the majority’s preferred public good bytaking 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 = 1.

A political regime allocates power across the three groups and defines the institutional
constraints on policy. In particular, the political regime in place the determines (i) how the
public good is financed (whether through general taxation or the extraction of a surplus fromthe non-elite), (ii) the level of expenditures on the public good, and (iii) the type of public good
provided. This specification provides us with a parsimonious framework to distinguish between
different kinds of democracies and non-democracies.
In a right-wing autocracy, political power rests with the elite who make all thesedecisions: they can extract resources from the non-elite (while avoiding being taxed) and they
can set the level and type of spending on public goods to maximize their utility. In a liberal
autocracy, the elite remain in the driving seat, but they cannot discriminate against any
11

We note a sleight of hand that simplifies our exposition in what follows. Technically, in all our subsequent
computations we need to divide total elite income α by its mass ε>0. It is convenient for expositional purposes toassume this mass ε is arbitrarily close to (but less than) one, though the median voter remains a member of the
majority non-elite (which has mass of one).

-12-

particular group either in terms of taxation or the nature of public good provided. In anelectoral democracy, it is the majority’s prerogative to select an economy-wide tax rate. And
the majority can also choose the type of public good, disregarding the minority’s wishes
completely. In a liberal democracy, the majority retains control over the tax rate, but theycannot discriminate against the minority. Accordingly, they provide a public good which lies
somewhere in between the majority and minority’s ideal types. Other details about the politicalregimes will be provided below.
It bears emphasizing that we formalize civil rights, or the liberal element in liberal
democracy, in a particular way. We take protection of civil rights to correspond to equal
treatment in the provision of the public good. The public good in this context can beinterpreted quite broadly. It could refer to health, education, and public security, as well as theadministration of justice. There are other elements of civil rights, such as free speech andfreedom of assembly, which may not fit comfortably under this definition. We do not claim that
our treatment is exhaustive. Just as the median voter theorem fails to capture certain aspectsof electoral democracy, our notion of equal-provision of public goods may miss aspects ofliberal democracy. Our only claim is that we are capturing an essential element.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we shall derive the different groups’ payoffs
associated with the political regimes in Table 1, conditional on each regime being the one inplace. Next, we will discuss the equilibrium selection of political regimes – that is, how society
ends up in or the other of the regimes.
(b) The payoffs
To avoid a tedious exposition, we focus in detail only on regimes in which property
rights are protected. We shall discuss the outcomes in the absence of property rights briefly atthe end of the section. The mathematical results for the payoffs are summarized in Table 2.
Consider first the right-wing autocracy case (box 5 in Table 1). This is the regime inwhich property rights are the only rights protected. We assume the elites can extract a share 𝜎𝜎of the non-elites’ pre-transfer income (1 − 𝛼𝛼), for a total expenditure on public goods of
𝑟𝑟 = 𝜎𝜎(1 − 𝛼𝛼). They can also select their preferred type of public good, 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 . The rate ofextraction 𝜎𝜎 is determined by maximizing the elite’s utility function 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜎𝜎(1 − 𝛼𝛼) −
𝛾𝛾

2

2

�𝜎𝜎(1 − 𝛼𝛼)� (where RA stands for “right-wing autocracy”). 12 This yields(3)1

𝜎𝜎 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛾𝛾(1−𝛼𝛼).

Substituting this expression back in 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 gives us

-13-

(4)

1

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 + 2𝛾𝛾.

The non-elites are excluded from public goods in this political regime. It is only theirincome that is affected, which is reduced by the amount extracted by the elites:(5)

1

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) − 𝛾𝛾.

Move next to the electoral democracy case (box 6). The level and type of public-goods
provision are now chosen by the majority. Civil rights are not protected, which we model as the
majority being free to select public goods targeted solely at their preferences (𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 = 1). The
minority can be discriminated against by disregarding their public-goods preferences. To
finance the expenditure on public goods, the majority in turn set an economy-wide tax rate (𝜏𝜏)𝛾𝛾

by maximizing their utility 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜏𝜏) + 𝜏𝜏 − 2 𝜏𝜏 2 . This yields:

(6)

𝛼𝛼

𝜏𝜏 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝛾𝛾 .

Substituting this back to 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 , we get the equilibrium payoff for the majority(7)

1

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝛾𝛾 𝛼𝛼 2which is clearly larger than in the RA regime (eq. [5]).

The payoffs for the other two groups (the elite and the minority) can be solved bysubstituting (6) into their respective utility functions. This yields the following results:
(8)
(9)

𝛼𝛼

𝜃𝜃

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝛼𝛼 − (2𝛼𝛼 − 1) 𝛾𝛾 + 2𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒 𝛼𝛼 2𝜃𝜃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝛾𝛾𝑏𝑏 𝛼𝛼 2

We note a couple of things about this equilibrium. First as long as the minority’s
preferred public good differs from the majority’s (𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 < 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 = 1), the minority end up doing
worse under ED compared to the majority (compare eqs. [9] and [7]). This is the result of the
majority discriminating against the minority by disregarding the latter’s preferences over thetype of public good. The deeper the identity cleavage, measured by 1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 , the higher the costthe minority suffers in the absence of civil rights, defined in this particular way.
Second, the elite suffer two distinct costs in the ED equilibrium relative to RA. They now
both pay net taxes and consume fewer public goods. The first of these effects is captured with1

the middle term in eq. (8). (Recall that 𝛼𝛼 > 2.) The second effect can be observed by comparing
the public-goods terms in eq. (8) and (4).

-14-

We now turn to the liberal democracy case (LD, box 8). In this equilibrium, the majority
can still choose 𝜏𝜏 freely to maximize their utility, but they cannot discriminate in public-goods
provision. We assume that the type of public-good provided lies somewhere between the ideal
types of the majority and minority: 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃̅, with 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 < 𝜃𝜃̅ < 1. For example, 𝜃𝜃̅ might be a
population-weighted average of the two groups’ preferences (𝜃𝜃̅ = 𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝑛𝑛) 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 ). Setting𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃̅ , the expression for the majority’s utility in this case is given by 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜏𝜏) +𝛾𝛾
𝜏𝜏 − 𝜏𝜏 2 (2 − 𝜃𝜃̅). The tax rate that maximizes this is:
(10)

2

𝛼𝛼

𝜏𝜏 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛾𝛾(2−𝜃𝜃�).

Note that 𝜏𝜏 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 𝜏𝜏 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 since the majority now derives fewer benefits from expenditures on public
goods, which, in a liberal democracy, they have to share with the minority (cf. eq. [6]).
Plugging (10) in the utility functions of the three groups, we then derive the equilibrium
levels of utility of the three groups:
(11)
(12)
(13)

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼 −� −�𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 −𝜃𝜃��(2𝛼𝛼−1) 𝛼𝛼
3−2𝜃𝜃
+
𝛼𝛼 2
2
�
�
2𝛾𝛾(2−𝜃𝜃)(2−𝜃𝜃) 𝛾𝛾
1𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝛾𝛾(2−𝜃𝜃�) 𝛼𝛼 2𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + �

� +𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏3−3𝜃𝜃12� ) 𝛼𝛼� � 2𝛾𝛾(2−𝜃𝜃
2−𝜃𝜃These expressions look complicated, but they have straightforward interpretations. First, notethat the majority are worse off in the LD equilibrium compared to the ED equilibrium (compare
eqs. [12] and [7)). This is a direct implication of the provision of civil rights to (or sharing of
public goods with) the minority in the former case. The presence of a minority reduces thegains to the majority from taxing the elite in LD. To that extent it ameliorates class conflict.13
Second, it can be checked that the minority are better off in the LD equilibrium compared to ED,
for the same reason (eq. [13] versus [9]). The greater the identity cleavage between the
majority and the minority (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 ), the larger are both of these effects.
As for the elite, the movement from electoral to liberal democracy generates two
distinct effects. First, there is a beneficial effect from the reduction in the taxes they have to
pay. To see this, compare the middle terms in eq. (11) and (8), remembering that 𝜃𝜃̅ < 1.
Second, there is an ambiguous effect arising from the change in the type of public good that is

13

There is some literature that discusses how identity cleavages may soften class-based politics: voters who view
themselves as members of a particular, say, ethnic group may vote alongside other members of the group, manyof whom may also be rich. See Roemer (1998), Shayo (2009), and Huber (2014). In our framework, the causal
channel is different, and operates through diminished incentives for public-goods provision.

-15-

provided (captured by the last terms in eqs. [11] and [8]). If the elites share an identity with theminority, the second effect becomes an unambiguous benefit as well. We can say more about
the relative magnitudes of 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 by considering two polar opposite cases.
(i) Elites share identity with the majority (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 = 1). In this case, the comparison between
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 and 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 depends on how large the class cleavage is. For relatively mild levels of inequality(12 < 𝛼𝛼 < 23), 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 < 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and elites prefer electoral democracy. When the income/class gap isbigger, 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and elites prefer liberal democracy. The intuition is as follows. Wheninequality is mild, the elite get taxed relatively little, and the fact that they get their preferredvariety of public good in ED makes up for the higher tax rate under LD. When inequality is high,on the other hand, it is the tax rate that matters more, and the elite would rather have thelower taxes in LD, even if that means a more poorly targeted public good.
(ii) Elites share identity with the minority (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 ≪ 1). Consider an extreme version of this
scenario where 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 = 0. In this case, elites would get no public goods under ED at all, so they
unambiguously prefer LD to ED. And this is true regardless of the depth of the class cleavage.
More generally, the closer the elite and minority identities are aligned and the deeper theidentity cleavage, the more likely that the elites prefer LD to ED.
So far we have discussed three out of the four regimes in which property rights areprotected. The remaining possibility is the combination of property rights with civil rights, aregime that we called “liberal autocracy” (LA). In this case, we assume elites are the ones that
set the tax/extraction rate (as in RA), but they do not exclude non-elites from the benefits ofthe public good and they tax themselves as the rest of society. The equilibrium tax rate,
denoted 𝑡𝑡, is(14)

𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =

1−𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾

,

which is smaller than the extraction rate under right-wing autocracy (RA, see eq. [6]). This tax
rate is also smaller than the outcome under ED (see eq. [6], recalling that 𝛼𝛼 >12). The associatedutility levels for the three groups are
(15)
(16)
(17)

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝛼𝛼 +(1−𝛼𝛼)22𝛾𝛾

1−𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + {(3𝛼𝛼 − 1) − |1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 |(1 − 𝛼𝛼)} 2𝛾𝛾

1−𝛼𝛼𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + {(3𝛼𝛼 − 1) − |𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 − 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 |(1 − 𝛼𝛼)} 2𝛾𝛾 .

The non-elites prefer LA to RA since they get some public goods in the first case. But
from the perspective of the majority ED dominates both, since it is the majority that sets the tax

-16-

rate under ED. The best possible outcome for the majority under LA occurs in the limit casewhen the elites and the majority have the same identity (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 = 1) and there is perfect equality(𝛼𝛼 = 12). In that case, it can be checked that the majority do equally well under ED and LA. But
under all other circumstances, 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 . The gains to the majority from moving from LA to ED
are increasing in the wealth and identity gaps.
Unlike the majority, the minority can be better off under LA compared to ED. This isbecause the minority do not do that well with the public good when the majority selects its
type and discriminates against the minority. When the identity cleavage runs deep, this raises
the possibility that the elite may coopt the minority against the majority and forestall theemergence of democracy (ED) by offering LA instead.
To complete the description of the various political regimes, we need to specify also
what happens when property rights are not protected (boxes 1-4). For purposes of the
discussion that follows, we do not need to describe each one of these cases separately. We justneed to say something about the payoffs in case the non-elite succeed in expropriating the elite.
For concreteness, let us call this the dictatorship of the proletariat case (DP). We assume aportion 𝜑𝜑 of the economy’s productive capacity is destroyed or becomes useless in the process.
Elites’ utility is driven to zero, while utility levels for the non-elite depend crucially on the
deadweight loss parameter 𝜑𝜑:
(18)

(19)
(20)

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1 − 𝜑𝜑𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 1 − 𝜑𝜑.

We now have all the detail we need to compare payoffs across different types ofregimes. Where we end up in equilibrium, however, will also depend on the likelihood that
non-elites can successfully expropriate the elite and the nature of the game being played
among the groups. We discuss these in the next section.

IV. Determination of Political Regimes
In this section we examine political transitions from a right-wing autocracy. We areinterested in analyzing whether electoral democracies are more likely to emerge than liberal
democracies, and the conditions that help push the transition in one direction or the other. We
begin by recognizing that our analysis may be affected by the details of how we specify the

-17-game between the various players (e.g. the nature of bargaining, coalition formation and sidepayments). Accordingly, in subsection (a) we impose only a minimal structure to analyze the setof feasible political transitions. We demonstrate that under reasonable conditions, theparameter space that yields liberal democracy is narrower than that which generates electoral
democracy. In subsection (b) we use a specific game structure to examine political transition
under a benchmark set of parameters.
We should state at the outset that our focus is on the constellation of interests thatmake different regimes possible, rather than on questions of credibility or commitment.
Loosely speaking, we assume that any political regime that is feasible ex ante is sustainable expost – either through repeated game incentives operating in the background or throughinstitution-building that makes departures from political settlements costly. This is not tobelittle the importance of credibility and enforcement problems in political agreements.
However, these problems are rather transparent in our case, and not much is gained by
explicitly formalizing them. In particular, we conjecture that the effect of credibility problems is
to undercut liberal democracy further. The majority and the elite always have more power torewrite the rules ex post. We push such issues aside to examine the set of constitutive
agreements that are interest-compatible (even if not always dynamically consistent). Therefore,
we assume that 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is sufficiently large, where 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the dead-weight of reneging on a politicalregime j that is adopted and replacing it with a political regime k where j,k ∈ {𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿}. This
assumption has the merit of allowing us to focus in the most transparent manner on the
maximal set of parameters under which liberal democracy may emerge.
(a) Political transitions to democracy: the feasible set
The status-quo regime is right-wing autocracy (RA) in which elites have property rights
and control the polity. The transition is triggered by structural changes in the economy ortechnological (or other) shocks that make it easier for the majority (either alone or in coalition
with a minority) to threaten a revolution against the elite’s hold on power. We distinguishbetween two scenarios. The first is the case where the elite faces a credible threat of revolution
from the majority group alone (either because the minority is politically “passive” or too small
to matter). In the second case a successful revolution requires participation by both the
majority and the minority.
In order to systematically analyze these two cases separately we make the following
assumptions. The number of participants in the revolution must exceed the threshold level𝑛𝑛∗ ≤ 1 before a revolution can be launched. We further assume that (1 − 𝑛𝑛) < 𝑛𝑛∗ , so that theminority can never mount a revolution on their own. Once initiated, a revolution has a fixedprobability 𝜌𝜌 of success. If the revolution is successful, the elites are expropriated and thepayoffs are as shown in eqs. (18)-(20). If the revolution is unsuccessful, the majority obtains a

-18-

utility of 0 (and the elite continue to reap 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ). Note that the status quo regime RA is the only
equilibrium outcome when the expected payoff from a successful revolution are sufficiently low.
The necessary condition for any other regime to emerge in equilibrium is:(21)𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 .

Substituting from (5) and (19), this requires 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝜑𝜑) > (1 − 𝛼𝛼) − 𝛾𝛾1. When this inequality isviolated, non-elites can never credibly threaten to revolt as their expected utility would be
reduced relative to the status quo. Higher inequality (i.e., larger 𝛼𝛼) as well as a lower
deadweight cost 𝜑𝜑 (e.g. organizational cost of revolution) will make revolution more likely. Thissuggests that the elite is more likely to be willing to abandon RA in favor of an alternative
regime, when the class/income cleavage is higher.
Consider now the possibilities when equation (21) is satisfied and there is a realprospect of a political transition away from the right wing autocratic status quo. We areinterested in examining the circumstances under which liberal democracy emerges when theminority is politically irrelevant for the revolution (i.e., 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗ ) and when it is not (i.e. 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗ ).
We consider each of these two cases in turn.
(i) 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗

In this case the minority do not have any strategic importance as a driver of politicalchange. It is only the preferences of the elite and majority that count towards any negotiatedsettlement. As suggested earlier, the specific outcomes of any settlement will naturally dependon the particulars of the game that is laid out. We can, however, say something about
equilibrium regime formation by ruling out the emergence of political institutions that violate
participation constraints or are clearly dominated for both the majority and the elite.
First, the equilibrium regime must yield utilities that are not below the elites’ andmajority’s reservation level of utilities. In other words, in any negotiated political transition theparticipation constraint for both the elite and the majority should be met. Denoting equilibrium
utility with an asterisk, the majority’s participation constraint is simply:(22)

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎∗ ≥ 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 .

Secondly, we define a Pareto domination criterion in regime selection. In particular, we
assume that a political regime will not emerge in any reasonable equilibrium if there is analternative regime that is preferred by both the majority and the elite. Such a regime will be
Pareto-inferior from the perspective of these two groups, who can both do better by moving to
the alternative. We can now state:

-19-

Proposition 1. When 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗ , and under the assumption that any negotiated political transition
satisfies the two restrictions just stated, there exist parameter combinations under which ED will
emerge and LD will not. The reverse is not true.
This proposition formalizes the intuition that LD has more demanding prerequisites than
ED. Both the participation constraint and the Pareto-domination criterion suggest thatelectoral democracy is more likely than liberal democracy to emerge in any negotiated politicaltransition.
Consider first the majority group’s participation constraint expressed by eq. (22). Since
the majority always prefers ED to LD, the condition is satisfied more easily for ED than it is for
LD. In particular, there are parameter combinations such that(23)

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 > 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 .

When these inequalities hold, the majority would reject revolution when it is offered ED but notwhen it is offered LD. However, it is not possible for the majority’s reservation utility to be
bracketed by 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 in the opposite direction. So the majority would never reject ED
when it is willing to accept LD. This is the first source of the asymmetry between the two
regimes.
Next consider the Pareto-domination criterion. Since ED is the majority’s most preferredregime, it can never be Pareto dominated. LD, by contrast, is neither group’s most preferredregime. Further, there are parameter combinations under which 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 so that the elite
prefers ED to LD. This ensures that LD, unlike ED, can be Pareto dominated, and is the secondsource of asymmetry.
Consider the circumstances under which ED is preferred by the elite to LD (𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 >𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) and is therefore the Pareto-preferred regime of both the majority and the elite. There are
two factors at work that shape elite preferences over this particular choice. First, they get taxed
more in ED than in LD. The importance of this effect increases as the class cleavage (measured
by 𝛼𝛼) grows bigger. Second, depending on their identity, they bear a benefit or a cost. Whenthe elite share an identity with the majority (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 ≈ 1), they do better in ED on account of thiseffect, as they benefit, along with the majority, from discrimination against the minority in theprovision of the public good. Hence, when inequality is not too high and there is no identity
cleavage separating the majority from the minority, LD will be strictly dominated by ED.
(ii) 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗

Now the majority needs the minority to tag along in order to induce the elite to accept aregime other than RA. This transforms the minority into a strategic actor, and potentially both

-20-sources of asymmetry discussed previously disappear. (The reservation utilities are now
different, however, since neither of the non-elites can mount a revolutionary challenge on itsown.) The specifics, again, will depend on how the game is mapped out. But we can make two
broad generalizations that apply regardless of the game form.
First, the minority has some power now, and this means they are more likely to get an
outcome favorable to them. However, and this is the second point, this need not guarantee
democracy, liberal or otherwise. The minority is generically better off in LD than in ED. But as
we discussed previously, under some conditions they can do even better under LA compared to
ED. The deeper the identity cleavage between majority and minority, the more likely is thelatter scenario. This creates room for the minority to enter an alliance with the elite as opposedto the majority. In other words, the minority can be co-opted by the elite. This results in LA
rather than LD.
These considerations suggest that electoral democracy will emerge in a much wider setof circumstances than liberal democracy. But the precise nature of the equilibrium when theelite and the non-elite are strategic players remains unclear. Accordingly, we delineate below a
simple game where all the key players act strategically and examine the political regimes thatarise in equilibrium.

(b) Political transitions and regime selection: An equilibrium analysis
We begin by describing the timing of the game. In most respects, we retain the
structure described above and assume that at the beginning of the first period the RA regime is
no longer viable, i.e. 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (= 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (= 𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ). On observing the prospect of revolution,
the elite move first and offer a regime in the set {𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿}. The majority move next, andthey either accept the regime offered, or they mount a revolution. Finally, the minority move
last, and they decide either to join the revolution or to stay put. If the majority accepts the offer
of the elite, the political regime is adopted. However, if the majority does not accept thepolitical regime on offer, it launches a revolution that is successful with positive probability. In
the last period, payoffs of the elite, majority and minority are determined. 14
Remember that 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0 (eq. [18]). Therefore, as long as at least one of the three
regimes {𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿} yield utility to the elite that exceeds (1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , the elite always preferto stave off revolution by introducing a new political regime. Whether they can successfully do
14

For simplicity, we truncate the game at the end of this period. An equivalent assumption is to ensure that 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 issufficiently large so as to ensure that there will not be any incentive to renege on any political regime that is
adopted in the future.

-21-so, however depends, on whether the majority can reap a utility that exceeds its reservation
utility under an attempted revolution, 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 . If such a regime exists, there will not be arevolution attempt on the equilibrium path of the game. Otherwise, the elite cannot prevent a
revolution, and with probability 𝜌𝜌 the equilibrium ends up in DP.

To examine as transparently as possible how the equilibrium depends on the interactionof the identity cleavage with the income/class cleavage 𝛼𝛼, we restrict the parameter spacesomewhat. We assume that the elite share an identity marker with the majority (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 = 1), while
the majority-minority identity cleavage is large (𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 0). We set the type of public good under LD
in the mid-point of the range (𝜃𝜃̅ = 0.5). Finally, the figures we will use to characterize theequilibria are drawn assuming 𝛾𝛾= 2, 𝜑𝜑 = 0.3 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0.5. This is a useful benchmark that
simplifies the characterization of possible equilibria, as we shall see. Other parameter
combinations could produce different equilibrium configurations. But the intuition behind otherpossibilities is easy to develop once we work through this particular case. We shall briefly
mention some of the extensions below.
Figures (3)-(5) show how the utilities of the three groups vary with 𝛼𝛼 under the selectedparameters. We shall use these figures to examine the equilibria for different ranges of theincome/class cleavage. As usual, we work backwards, considering the minority’s decision first.
We distinguish again between the two cases 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗ and 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗ .
(i) 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗

In this case the majority have the numbers to mount a revolution and the minority’s
decision is of no consequence. Neither the elite’s nor the majority’s actions in prior stages isaffected by what the minority does. (Remember that (1 − 𝑛𝑛) < 𝑛𝑛∗ .) So the equilibriumoutcome is invariant to what happens at this last stage.
Moving back one stage, the majority will accept any regime that yields utility higher
than its expected utility when it attempts a revolution, 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝜑𝜑). This reservationlevel of utility is shown in Figure 3 by the flat line. When 𝛼𝛼 is beyond a threshold 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (around
0.8 in our example), there is no such regime and the game will end in a revolution attempt. In
other words, when the income/class cleavage is sufficiently deep, even if the elite were to offer
ED, this would not satisfy the majority’s participation constraint and the majority would bebetter off trying to mount a revolution.
As we can see from Figure 3, there is a minimum threshold 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 below which the
majority will accept any of the offers in the set {𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿}. Between 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , there isalso an intermediate threshold 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which defines the following two additional zones: between

-22-

𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the majority is willing to accept either LD or ED, but not LA; and between 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
and 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , the majority is willing to accept only ED.

In the first stage of the game the elite will offer the regime that yields it the greatest
utility, given the choices of the majority described above. Note from Figure 5 that the elitealways (at least weakly) prefer LA to the other two regimes. The ranking of ED and LD in turndepends on whether 𝛼𝛼 is larger or smaller than the critical level 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ . When 𝛼𝛼 < 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ , the elite
prefer ED to LD. When 𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ , the elite’s preference switches to LD. We note also that 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ <𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (cf. Figs. 2 and 4).
We can now state the equilibrium of the game.

Proposition 2. Under the sequence of moves described above and the parameter assumptions
stated, the equilibrium configuration of the political regimes is as follows:(i) when 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , the elite offer LA and the majority accepts it;(ii) when 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the elite offer LD and the majority accepts it;(ii) when 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , the elite offer ED and the majority accepts it;(iv) when 𝛼𝛼 > 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , the majority mount a revolution regardless of what the elite offer.

Notice that when the income/class cleavage is large (but not so large as to induce themajority to revolt), we get ED as the equilibrium outcome rather than LD (zone (iii)). This is soeven though the elite prefer LD to ED for larger 𝛼𝛼 (> 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ ). In this zone, it is the participation
constraint of the majority that binds, and it is their preferences that dictate the outcome. For
low 𝛼𝛼, on the other hand, the elite can get away with LA, and do not need to offer LD.

Hence, the proposition highlights an interesting implication of our analysis. It shows thatthe region in which LD emerges as an equilibrium is squeezed from below by the availability ofLA (which satisfies the elite’s incentive constraint) and from above by ED (which satisfies the
majority’s participation constraint).
We note further that the LD zone is smaller or larger depending on the nature ofidentity cleavages. In the benchmark case examined here we assumed the elite share an
identity marker with the majority (𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 = 1), while the majority-minority identity cleavage is large(𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 0). Two other cases are particularly relevant, in light of our discussion in the next section.

First, when the elite share an identity with the minority they would prefer LD to ED for alarger share of the parameter space. In Figure 5, 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒∗ moves to the left (becomes smaller) as

-23-𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 gets closer to 0. If, for whatever reason, LA is ruled out, this makes LD an equilibrium forlower levels of 𝛼𝛼 than in our benchmark case.

Second, when the identity cleavage between majority and minority gets smaller, themajority’s preference for ED over LD becomes weaker. In Figure 3, the LD schedule moves
closer to the ED schedule, expanding the zone in which LD is the equilibrium, and shrinking thezone in which ED emerges. In the limit, when 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 = 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 1 (no identity difference among the nonelite), the two schedules overlap completely. Both of these cases render LD more likely. Hencethe emergence of liberal democracy requires both mild inequality (low 𝛼𝛼) and the absence oflarge identity cleavages (proximity between 𝜃𝜃𝑎𝑎 and 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 ).
We do not develop these cases in detail, but we will refer to them when we discuss thehistorical and country evidence in the next section.

(ii) 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑛𝑛∗

Working backwards again, the minority can now make a difference by joining therevolution, if the majority have launched one. They will do so if and only if they are not offereda regime that improves their utility compared to the expected utility they get under an
attempted revolution. And in the previous stage, the majority will launch a revolution only
when they know the minority will subsequently join them.
From the perspective of the elite, in the first stage of the game, the constraints are now
looser than in the previous case with 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 𝑛𝑛∗ . That is because the threat of revolution can be
thwarted by offering enough to either the majority or the minority. So the elite will do at least
as well here as in the previous case.
Despite these differences, under the parameters we selected – and in particular theassumptions that 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 0 and 𝜃𝜃̅ = 0.5 – it turns out that the equilibrium is unaffected when thesize of the majority falls short of the minimum threshold required for revolution. This is mainly
because LD and LA yield identical payoffs to the majority and minority, eliminating theadvantage that the elites would have in general by being able to split the “coalition.” We briefly
discuss the details.
Revolution now requires that it be the dominant strategy for both the majority andminority. The range of 𝛼𝛼 for which this is true is given by 𝛼𝛼 > 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚[αmax, αmaxa𝑏𝑏 ]. In other words,
in general the elite can avoid revolution for a broader range of income/class cleavages. Under
our parameters, αmax
> αmaxa𝑏𝑏 , so the operative limit remains the majority’s upper threshold.

At the lower end of the range for 𝛼𝛼, there is scope for the elite to co-opt the minority byoffering LA, as we discussed earlier. As can be seen from Figure 4, for 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , this strategy

-24-

works and prevents the minority from teaming up with the majority. Since liberal autocracy
produces identical payoffs to the minority and majority under our parameters, we have 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , and the boundary for LA remains unchanged as well.

Consider next what happens when 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Note first that 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , asboth of these refer to utilities under LD where the outcomes are identical for the majority andminority under our parameters. With this in mind, there are two zones in this interval: (i)𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , and (ii) 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . In the first of these, the majority
prefers both ED and LD to revolution, while the minority prefers only LD to revolution. In thesecond, the majority prefers ED to revolution, while the minority strictly prefers revolution. The
elites will then offer LD in the first zone and ED in the second.
Hence the equilibrium configuration of the regimes is identical to the previous case, andis as stated in Proposition 2.

V. Historical discussion and country cases
We now provide some historical context and a few country vignettes to illustrate andenrich our conceptual framework.
It has become common to treat “liberal democracy” as a single political package. But its
two ingredients have different origins, social bases, and political implications (Plattner 2010,
Fukuyama 2014). As a system of thought, liberalism grew out of the Protestant reformation andthe religious wars that followed. 15 It emphasized opposition to religious monopoly, tolerance,and equal treatment by the state regardless of religious beliefs (Ryan 2012, p. 7). Its firstimportant political victory was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, in which the landed
gentry succeeded to place limits on the power of the sovereign, with the subsequent Bill of
Rights (1689) codifying those restraints. John Locke (1632-1704), who lived through the
Glorious Revolution, is considered the first important theorist of liberalism. Classical liberalism
reached its apogee with John Stuart Mill’s (1806-1873) book On Liberty, published in 1859.
While democracy has roots in ancient Greece, its modern variant emerged out of thesocial mobilization sparked by the Industrial Revolution in Britain and other parts of Western
Europe. As farmers moved to the cities and were transformed into factory workers, thepossibilities of mass collective action increased and organized labor became a political force.
The push for democracy during the 19th century was essentially a demand for the expansion of
15

There is a question as to whether liberalism is a specifically Western invention. Sen (1999) argues that the ideasof religious tolerance and acceptance of diversity are ingrained in non-Western cultures as well.

-25-

the franchise to the non-propertied. This was a struggle that took a century or longer, with
universal suffrage achieved in Western Europe and its offshoots by the early to mid-twentiethcentury. The role that industrialization – and the associated emergence of the bourgeoisie andproletariat – played as the instigator of modern democracy is a common theme running
through accounts of democracy, from Barrington Moore’s (1966) classic work to more recent
analyses of democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe (Collier and Mahoney1997).
As this capsule history suggests, liberalism preceded electoral democracy in the West.
Early liberals were propertied elites, landed gentry, and wealthy taxpayers whose primaryobjective was to prevent the crown from exercising arbitrary power over them. It was the ruleof law they were after -- not the sharing of power with the masses. Indeed, classical theorists ofliberalism were quite nervous about expanding the franchise and worried about its
consequences. Government was too important to be left to common people, whose judgment
was fickle and untrustworthy. And contemporary developments seemed to justify their fears. In
France, the extension of the vote to all males in 1848 enabled Louis Napoleon to woo thepeasantry and paved the way for his personal dictatorship. Alexis de Tocqueville had written
disparagingly about the “tyranny of the majority” in the United States. Mill picked up on de
Tocqueville’s discussion and argued that the principles he enunciated in On Liberty “did not
apply to people who could not benefit from rational discussion” (Ryan 2012, p. 29). Among suchpeople were the populations of 16th century Britain, 18th century Russia, and of course theIndians of his day (over whom Mill took a hand in ruling as an official of the East India
Company).
The fact that early liberals in the West were in large part the wealthy property-owning
elite led to the bundling, in the minds of subsequent analysts, of two kinds of distinct rights:
property rights and civil rights. The opponents of absolutism by the crown and the church wereafter both sets of rights. This peculiar, and peculiarly British, history does not fit the experienceof other, especially non-Western countries very well. In particular, the elite would often turnout to be interested primarily in property rights. Civil rights were for others, chiefly ethnic,
religious, or other minorities.
This conflation of property and civil rights can be seen in T.H. Marshall’s (1949) classic
account of the historical development of rights. Marshall divides rights into three categories: heargues civil rights came first, followed by political, and then social rights. His political rights
category aligns with ours as it refers largely to rights deriving from the franchise. His social
rights refer to benefits provided by the state under welfare state arrangements. His civil rights,
meanwhile, encompass both our property and civil rights. For Marshall, protection of property
rights was one of the rights necessary for individual freedom; it was of the same nature as the

-26-

protection of free speech, non-discrimination on the basis religion, and the right to justice. It isclear that Britain’s history led Marshall and others to treat the pursuit of civil rights as an elite
project. By the time Somers (1994) reviews Marshall’s treatment nearly half a century later,
property rights is so taken for granted that it has dropped out of Marshall’s definition of civilrights.
When Western liberals eventually came to accept democracy, it was, as Fawcett (2014)
portrays it, a grudging concession. Fawcett writes of the decades between 1880 and 1914 as
the period in which liberals made peace with democracy. As part of the compromise, liberals
gave their support to the expansion of the franchise. They yielded to popular sovereignty overdomains such as education and ethics in which they previously had a monopoly. In return, they
hoped that popular forces would accept “liberal limits on the authority of the people’s will”(Fawcett 2014, 144). Thus was born liberal democracy.
However, one of the predictable consequences of mass franchise was that liberals
proper lost power to mass based political forces. In Britain the Liberal Party experienced adramatic decline before World War I as the Labor Party gained ground, and would henceforth
be condemned to remain a third party at best. In Germany, by the 1890s the liberals were“squeezed between the world’s largest, best organized labor movement and the world’s largest,
best organized Catholic Party” (Fawcett 2014, 170). Mass democracy in time also generated
justifications for itself – such as the “national will” or the “vanguard party” of the proletariat -that departed significantly from liberal tenets (Müller 2011, p. 3). During the interwar period,
economic depression greatly accelerated the decline of liberalism. Mass based politicalmovements steeped on the highly illiberal ideologies of fascism and communism swept throughcontinental Europe.
But liberal democracy would experience a rebirth in the West after the Second World
War. Part of it was of course the discrediting of fascism and Nazism. But in countries where
liberalism had preceded democracy, liberal democracy would prove remarkably resilient. The
welfare states of the postwar era were based on a very different type of bargain between
employers and employees – providing the latter with much expanded social rights – but they
were constructed on the same elite/working-class cleavage that had instigated the 19th century
rise of democracy in the West. Some would say that these regimes had given up on liberalism in
expanding the economic and social powers of the state. But judged by criteria such as the ruleof law, non-discrimination, and equality in the distribution of public goods, the welfare states ofEurope and North America were indeed liberal democracies.
In other, non-Western parts of the world, mass politics arrived typically as aconsequence not of industrialization, but of de-colonization or wars of national liberation. It
wasn’t economic change and the rise of factories that spurred social mobilization, but national

-27-

struggles against colonizers or foreign enemies. So the relevant cleavages were from the very
beginning based on ethnicity or nationality rather than class or economic status. This was
reinforced by the fact that colonizers had often codified and deepened pre-existing identity
cleavages and allied themselves with some, often minority ethnicities against others in order tofacilitate their rule.
The nationalist movements of the developing world more or less all claimed to be
democratic in some fashion – even those who ascribed explicitly to socialist or communist
ideology. But theirs was a democracy that was based largely on identity cleavages. It was
explicit about the “people’s” right to rule over ethnic-religious-linguistic minorities or defend
against a presumed external enemy. It was unlikely to promote liberal practices and prone todeteriorate into electoral democracy or worse.
So if the liberal component of liberal democracy never took hold in much of the world,
the reasons are probably both ideational and structural. On the ideational front, countries Asia,
Africa, and Latin America lack a tradition of liberalism and liberal ideas. Unlike in the West,democracy and mass politics arrived in these countries before liberalism.
On the structural front, democratic mobilization took place along quite different
cleavages. In the West, democracy arrived when the dominant cleavages were the classdifferences created by industrialization. As our model suggests, under those conditions theelites preferred liberal democracy (to electoral democracy), while for the majority thedifferential gains from electoral democracy (relative to liberal democracy) were minor. In thedeveloping world, democracy came when the dominant cleavages were identity-based. As
Fatton (1990, 457) puts it in the African context:
Because of its colonial legacy and its peripheral-dependent nature, African capitalism
has failed to generate the development of both a hegemonic bourgeoisie and a strong
proletariat - the two classes whose conflicts and confrontations are critical in striking
the political compromises and bargains necessary to the establishment of liberal
democracy. The absence of these confrontations and conflicts has prevented the growthof liberalism with its ideological and legal emphasis on individual rights, civil liberties,
and freedom of association.
In those circumstances, groups that control political power had a strong incentive to pursue
illiberal policies that discriminate against minorities. Another, more recent trend that weakens
the prospects for liberal democracy in the developing world is the onset of premature deindustrialization, as documented in Rodrik (2015).

-28-

Against this baseline set of predictions, it is useful to consider some specific counterexamples of liberal democracy in the developing world. Their particular circumstances help
underscore the importance of the enabling factors that we have emphasized in the paper.
South Korea. After a brief and troubled experience as a democracy in the 1950s, South
Korea was ruled with a firm hand by military dictators throughout the 1960s, 1970, and much of
the 1980s. The early to mid-1980s was a period of increasing repression of opposition groups. It
was a broad coalition of workers and students that agitated for and eventually obtained
democratic elections against that background. A group of labor unions had created a
democracy alliance in 1984, and they were subsequently joined by student groups, opposition
politicians, and even religious leaders across the spectrum. The democratic transition occurredin 1987, following mass rallies and demonstrations by workers and students.
It is not uncommon for governments to be brought down by mass demonstrations.
What is striking is that in the Korean case this produced a political system, which within two
decades, was widely recognized as a Western-style liberal democracy. In 2015, the country
ranked 25th out of 102 countries in fundamental rights according to the World Justice Project(WJP 2015, 27), ahead of the United States and just behind Chile (see Botero and Ponce 2012
on the WJP methodology). As one analyst has put it, Korea’s democratic transition is as
miraculous as its economic transformation (Chaibong 2008).
Korea fits rather well in our story. First, it is a country that is remarkably homogeneousin terms of language and ethnicity (if not religion). The main identity cleavage on which theauthoritarian regime relied to mobilize domestic support was the military threat posed by thecommunist regime of North Korea. But the nationalist line lost its appeal over time as aconsequence of the differential economic progress of the two halves of the Korean peninsula.
Given the gains in the South and the economic decline of the North, the idea that the North
posed a serious threat and should be viewed in antagonistic terms became anachronistic overtime.
Second, Korea experienced significant industrialization, with more than a quarter of thelabor force in manufacturing by 1987. This is reminiscent of the Western experience in the 19th
century, where democratic mobilization took place against the background of the Industrial
Revolution. The similarity is further highlighted by the fact that workers and labor unions
played a leading role in the democracy movement in Korea.
In sum, we would argue that Korea’s liberal democracy has much to do with the relative
absence of identity cleavages and the leading role played by the labor movement in mobilizing
against the military/industrial elite.
Lebanon. Lebanon may be an odd country to bring up as an example of liberal
democracy in view of hard times which have befallen the country’s political system. But prior tothe civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, it was a model democracy in a region sorely
lacking in liberal politics. It could be listed, without any justification of sorts, alongside

-29-

Switzerland and Austria as a liberal democracy (Lehmbruch 1967) and as a successful example
of a “consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1969).
In terms of identity cleavages, Lebanon probably represents the polar opposite of South
Korea. It is a mosaic of religions and ethnicities. The country is divided between Christians andMuslims, with each major religion in turn divided among different denominations (Maronite,
Greek Orthodox, Shia, Sunni). It has a history of providing each religious community its own
autonomy going back to the millet system under the Ottomans. The modern consociational
regime was created in 1943 by a national pact between the Muslim and Christian communities.
What is distinctive about this regime is that public offices are explicitly apportioned among
religious denominations. At the apex of the political system the Presidency was allocated to a
Christian Maronite, the Premiership to a Muslim Sunni, and the Speakership to a Muslim Shiite.
This principle extended downwards to other government positions.
As Lijphart (1969, 218) noted, a key feature that makes such a regime sustainable is thatno single group has a majority and therefore can expect to retain power indefinitely in electoralcompetition (see also Dixit, Grossman, and Gul 2000 for a formal analysis). Any group thatwants access to power must rely on the cooperation and goodwill of at least some of the others.
Furthermore, no single group is close to having a majority either. The latter rules out the shortrun temptation of manipulating the rules for permanent advantage. The Lebanese example
corresponds loosely to the case in our model where the “majority” is not strong enough toattain power and needs the “minority” to go along with it. 16 Such cases are generically more
conducive to liberal democracy.
The reasons behind the decline of Lebanon’s democracy are also telling. The principal
cause behind the civil war was the influx of Palestinian refugees from Jordan, which altered thebalance between Muslims and Christians. There had not been a census since the 1930s andthere was already a sense that the existing distribution of political power was short-changing
the Muslims. With the influx of Palestinians, the consociational regime became unsustainable
and civil war erupted. External intervention by the Israelis and Syrians, with each supporting
their own client groups, was a further destabilizing factor.
Liberal democracy along consociational lines relies on a knife-edge sort of expectations– that none of the groups have the numbers or the power to prevail over the rest. It is not clear
whether the Lebanese case would have lasted for long in view of the fragility of such regimes inchanging environments. Large-scale demographic shocks and external intervention certainly did
not help.
South Africa. In 1994, South Africa transitioned to democracy, thanks to a negotiatedsettlement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the white minority government.
This was a landmark pact, as the elites who ran the apartheid regime had so much to lose. They16

We have only two groups in our model, which is an artifact of having a single identity cleavage. To track the
Lebanese example more closely we would have to consider multiple identity cleavages. But the logic is astraightforward extension of our majority-minority framework.

-30-

had long controlled not only the instruments of power, but also the economic wealth of thecountry. There was a huge economic gap between the whites and the disenfranchised blacks.
Expanding the franchise might have been expected to produce vastly redistributive policies, if
not outright expropriation of the white minority.
In the event, South African democracy produced only moderate amounts ofredistribution. The ANC government did institute measures that gave blacks a greater share ofownership of the capital stock and produced a black wealthy elite. But the economic interestsof the whites were largely unaffected, an outcome that Inman and Rubinfeld (2012) attribute to
the peculiar federal arrangements that were negotiated during the transition. More to thepoint, in the context of the present analysis, is that South Africa emerged largely as a liberal
democracy. The South African polity has operated under considerable strain, and has often
strayed from its liberal principles. (A recent example is the treatment of immigrant workers.)
Nevertheless, the country is generally considered one of two liberal democratic successes in
Sub-Saharan Africa, alongside Ghana (Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2003). Given the history of
institutionalized discrimination under apartheid and the large majority the ANC has enjoyed inparliament since 1994, this is a remarkable achievement.
The key in South Africa was that the whites were a distinct minority on the identity
dimension. In terms of our model, the elites were keenly interested in protecting not just theirproperty rights, but also their civil rights. As the distinguished South African jurist Richard
Goldstone (1997) put it, “without some guarantee of protection for the rights of minorities, theprevious ruling white minority government would not have relinquished power to an inevitably
black-controlled majority government.” The ANC, with its early focus on human rights, had infact adopted a Freedom Charter containing elements of a bill of rights as early as 1955. Therewas widespread agreement by the early 1990s that a bill of rights had to be part of the newsettlement. The 1996 constitution eventually included a detailed bill of rights that enshrined
civil rights in the constitution and prohibited discrimination, while leaving room for affirmative
action.
The South Korean, Lebanese, and South African cases offer three different paths
towards liberal democracy. They each rely on somewhat special circumstances: industrialization
driven labor mobilization in a society lacking distinctive identity cleavages (South Korea since
the late 1980s); multiple identity cleavages that deny any single group the hope that it could
claim and cling to power on its own (Lebanon during the 1950s and 1960s); and a major identity
cleavage that aligns neatly with the wealth/class cleavage, leaving the elite in dire need of bothproperty and civil rights protection (South Africa since 1994). The South Korean pattern is theone most reminiscent of the traditional Western path to liberal democracy. The other two relyon particular identity cleavage configurations. It could be surmised that they are genericallymore fragile as a result.

VI. Concluding remarks

-31-

Our focus in this paper has been on the constitutive bargains that lie at the origin ofdifferent political regimes, liberal democracy in particular. It goes without saying that suchbargains can obsolesce over time. Class and identity cleavages evolve as a result of exogenousdevelopments in the economy and society as well as political strategies pursued by groups
contending for power. Commitments made during negotiated pacts and written into law andenshrined in institutions may prove unsustainable, when one of the groups – the elite or the
majority – perceives clear gains from rewriting the rules through opportunistic behavior.
Problems of self-enforcement are endemic in political systems.
The emergence of liberalism has been discussed to date mostly in the realm of thehistory of ideas. The political economy literature on democratic transitions, meanwhile, haslargely conflated electoral democracy with liberal democracy. Our aim in this paper was topartially fill in the blind spots that were created as a result. We have stressed that liberal
democracy is a special beast. It does not arise if it is not based on a particular politicalconfiguration. Liberalism must have political legs – in addition to normative appeal – to get any
mileage. And the political-strategic conditions that are generally held responsible for the rise of
democracy tend to produce electoral rather than liberal democracy.
The crucial building bloc of our analysis is a taxonomy of political regimes, based on atripartite division of rights: property rights, political rights, and civil rights. We have argued thatthese rights operate across two fundamental types of cleavage in society: an elite/non-elitecleavage that is largely economic or class-based, and a majority/minority cleavage that typicallyrevolves around the politics of identity. Property rights are important to the elite; politicalrights empower the majority; and civil rights protect the minority. Liberal democracy requires
all three sets of rights, while the bargains that produce electoral democracy generate only the
first two.
Democratic transitions rely on the resolution of conflict between the elite and themasses. Our central message is that in the presence of additional cleavages – identity cleavages
in particular – this resolution does little, in general, to promote liberal politics. The stars mustbe aligned just right for liberal democracy to emerge. The rarity of liberal democracy is not
surprising.

-32-

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0

20

40

60

80

100

-35-

1800

1850

1900
year

# of democracies

1950

2000

# of non-democracies

Figure 1: Numbers of democracies and non-democracies since 1800
Note: Data are from Polity IV (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). “Democracies” arecountries that receive a score of 7 or higher in the Polity’s democ indicator (which takes values between
0 and 10), while “non-democracies” are countries with a score below 7.

.4

.6

.8

1

1.2

1.4

-36-

0

.2

.6

.4

.8

1

x
political rights

civil rights

Figure 2: Distribution of political and civil rights across 196 countries, 2014
Note: Based on raw scores from Freedom House (2015). “Political rights” refer to free and fair elections(A1 and A2); “civil rights” combine measures of independent judiciary (F1), rule of law (F2), and equal
treatment (F4).

-37-

Figure 3: Utility of majority under different political regimes

-38-

Figure 4: Utility of minority under different political regimes

-39-

Figure 5: Utility of elite under different political regimes

Table 1: A taxonomy of political regimes

property rights

nocivil rights
yesnopolitical rights
no
yes
(1)
(2)
personal
dictatorship
dictatorshipof theor anarchy
proletariat(4)(3)
democraticn.a.
communism

Yes
political rights
no
Yes
(5)
right-wing
autocracy(6)
electoral/illiberal
democracy(7)
liberalautocracy(8)
liberaldemocracy

-41Table 2: Payoffs in equilibria where property rights are protected

political rights

no

no

yes

(5)
right-wing autocracy (RA)(6)
electoral democracy (ED)𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼 +12𝛾𝛾𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) −𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) −civil rights

𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼 − (2𝛼𝛼 − 1)1𝛾𝛾𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) +1𝛾𝛾

𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) +yes(1 − 𝛼𝛼)22𝛾𝛾

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + {(3𝛼𝛼 − 1) − |1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 |(1 − 𝛼𝛼)}

1 2
𝛼𝛼
2𝛾𝛾
𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 2𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(8)liberal democracy (LD)(7)
liberal autocracy (LA)𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼 +𝛼𝛼 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 2+𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾 2𝛾𝛾𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼 −1 − 𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾

𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + {(3𝛼𝛼 − 1) − |𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 − 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 |(1 − 𝛼𝛼)}

1 − 𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(2𝛼𝛼 − 1) 𝛼𝛼 3 − 2𝜃𝜃̅ − �𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒 − 𝜃𝜃̅ � 2+𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝜃𝜃̅ )2(2 − 𝜃𝜃̅ ) 𝛾𝛾

𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) +1𝛼𝛼 22𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝜃𝜃̅)3 − 3𝜃𝜃̅ + 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏
1
𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) + ��
𝛼𝛼 2
2 − 𝜃𝜃̅
2𝛾𝛾(2 − 𝜃𝜃̅)

Table A1: Classification of democracies, 2014
Electoral Democracies

Liberal Democracies

Argentina

AndorraAntigua and Barbuda

Australia

Bulgaria

Austria

BelizeBelgium

Bolivia

BahamasBrazilBarbados

BhutanCanadaBotswana

Switzerland

Colombia

Chile

Dominican Republic

Cabo Verde

Ghana

Costa Rica

GreeceCyprusGrenadaCzech Rep.

GuyanaGermany

Croatia

Dominica

Indonesia

Denmark

India

Spain

IsraelEstonia

Italy

Finland

JamaicaFranceSt. Lucia

Micronesia

Lesotho

United Kingdom

LatviaIreland

Moldova

IcelandMongolia

Japan

Namibia

Kiribati

PanamaSt. Kitts and Nevis

Peru

Liechtenstein

PolandSouth Korea

Paraguay

Lithuania

Romania

Luxembourg

SenegalMarshall Islands

El Salvador

Malta

Serbia

Mauritius

Sao Tome and Principe

Netherlands

Suriname

NorwaySlovak Republic

New Zealand

Timor-Leste

Palau

Tonga

Portugal

Trinidad and Tobago

San Marino

-43Tunisia

Slovenia

TurkeySwedenUkraineTuvaluSt. Vincent & Grenadines

TaiwanSouth Africa

Uruguay
United States

Source: Based on Freedom House (2015) raw scores.
See text.