2. THE FIRST UNITED FRONT
Soviet overtures to Sun Yat-sen
In November 1921 the Comintern directed Dutch operative Maring (pseudonym of Henk
Sneevliet), an Asia specialist, to approach Sun Yat-sen. In a ploy meant to allay Sun’s wariness
about communism, Maring stressed the flexibility of the Soviet policies, maintaining that theiremphasis was not specifically on practicing communism, but on implementing a new economic
policy (NEP). It is obvious that Sun believed Maring and that the NEP piqued his interest. Sun
was obviously relieved that the NEP bore many similarities to Sun’s principle of livelihood, andjudging from what happened later, it made a deep impression on him.
A conversation between Maring and Sun revealed the yawning gulf between the worldviews of
the two men. Maring, obviously an espouser of the communist worldview, asked Sun why heprovoked revolution. Sun replied, “Because of my love for human beings.” Maring, baffled bySun’s response to his question, later told GMD official Zhang Ji, “He says he causes revolution
for the benefit of mankind, but if that is the case, his efforts will never succeed. We bring about
revolution because we despise the human race.”
Even on the basis of their starting points alone, Sun’s Three Principles and the objectives ofcommunism are as disparate as heaven and earth. Nevertheless, Sun was gravitating toward
cooperation with the USSR, meaning that he was willing to tolerate communism.
On January 26, 1923 the Sun-Joffe Manifesto was announced. (Adolph Joffe was a Soviet
diplomat.) The essentials of the four-page manifesto are as follows:
1. “Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actuallybe introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful
establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe who
is further of opinion that China’s paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve nationalunification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task he has assured Dr.
Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on thesupport of Russia.”1
2. “In order to clarify the situation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen has requested Mr. Joffe for a reaffirmationof the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government, dated September 27,
1920.2 Mr. Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Dr.
Sun Yat-sen that the Russian Government is ready and willing to enter into negotiation withChina on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which theTsardom imposed in China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to theMilton J.T. Shieh, The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents 1894-1969 (Jamaica, NY: St. John’sUniversity Press, 1970), 71.
12

Second Karakhan Manifesto.

1Chinese Eastern Railway (the management of which being the subject of a specific reference in
Article 7 of the said Note).”3
3. “[The realities of the Chinese Eastern Railway] situation point to the desirability of a modus
vivendi in the matter of the present management of the Railway.”4
4. “Mr. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen … that it is not and has never been
the intention or purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an imperialistic policy inOuter Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China.”5Once the Soviets had succeeded in insinuating themselves into Sun Yat-sen’s revolution plans
during negotiations between Sun and Joffe, they began work on a scheme whose objective was acollaboration between the three-year-old CCP and the GMD. Consequently, at the 3rd National
Congress of the CCP, held in June 1923, it was decided that the GMD was the driving force ofthe people’s revolution, and that the GMD and CCP would work together, forming the First
United Front. Apparently, the Chinese communists concealed their primary mission, thecommunization of China, and cast their lot with the GMD, whose objective was a bourgeois
democratic revolution. CCP members did this not of their own volition, but to comply with“tactical instructions” from the Comintern.6
Sun Yat-sen’s rose-colored view of communism
In August 1923 Chiang Kai-shek met with Soviet agent Maring under orders from Sun Yat-sen.
Chiang then visited the USSR as a member of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Mission to Soviet Russia, where
he observed the Soviet armed services and political processes, and Communist Party affairs; hereturned to China in December. His impressions of the USSR and the conclusions he reachedabout communism follow:
1. Tactics formulated for use against friends of the revolution are more numerous than those foruse against enemies of the revolution.
2. Soviet political organizations are “instruments of tyranny and terror, and basicallyincompatible with the Kuomintang’s political ideals.”7
3. Russian leaders have “not given up their aggressive designs on Outer Mongolia.”8
4. If I were asked to summarize my impressions from a three-month-long visit to the USSR, I
would say that once the Soviet communist regime becomes a strong presence, it may very
3Shieh, op. cit., 71-72.

4Ibid., 72.

5Ibid.

6Ōkubo Yasushi, Chūgoku kyōsantō shi (History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Hara Shobō,1971).
7Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957), 17.

8Ibid.

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well revive the political ambitions of the Tsarist era. In that case, the calamities that befall
our country and our people’s revolution may be immeasurable.
5. The Soviet Communist Party’s China policy is first to “convert the Northeast Provinces,Mongolia, Sinkiang [Xinjiang], and Tibet into parts of a sovietized domain. It may evenharbor sinister designs on China’s other provinces.”9
6. The Soviet “brand of internationalism and World Revolution are but Czarism by othernames, the better to confuse and confound the outside world.”10
7. Before I departed on my journey to the USSR, I was convinced that the offer of aid from theSoviet Communist Party to the GMD was motivated by a sincere desire to treat us as equals,and was certainly not tinged with selfishness or malice. However, as a result of myobservations in the USSR, those ideals and convictions evaporated like mist. I arrived at theconclusion that the United Front might help us to temporarily counter Western colonization
policies, but would never enable us to achieve independence or freedom. I also felt that thetactics and purpose of the Soviet “world revolution” posed a greater danger to national
independence movements in the Far East than Western colonization policies.
However, upon hearing Chiang’s reports about his trip, Sun Yat-sen told him that his views
about the future of Sino-Soviet relations were overly pessimistic and unsuited to the realities ofrevolution. Sun was convinced that the CCP could not succeed in sabotaging the national
revolution by launching a class conflict if the GMD took control. Furthermore, if the Northern
Expedition proved successful, attempts by the CCP to destroy the GMD would fail. The USSRwould eventually recognize the GMD as the only political party capable of leading the Chinese
revolution, and instruct the communists to join the GMD and obey its orders. Sun remindedChiang that the Soviets had already conceded that they would not be able to inculcatecommunism in China. Sun was unwilling to make any changes to the plan he had established for
the First United Front. Judging from Sun’s frighteningly optimistic perception of communism,
we can see how communist brainwashing quickly succeeded in penetrating the ranks of Chinese
leadership.
Once the GMD decided to admit communists, CCP members began to infiltrate its ranks. Somejoined on the basis of recommendations from other GMD members, others applied on an
individual basis, and still others enrolled in groups. However, some of those new members did
not divulge their communist affiliations for quite some time. In any case, not much time had
passed before most CCP members had insinuated themselves into the GMD.
GMD reorganization under Soviet direction
In October 1923 the USSR dispatched an individual to China who went by the name of Borodin.
His real name was Mikhail Gruzenberg, and he had been entrusted with a very importantmission. Borodin paid a visit to Sun Yat-sen, to whom he indicated several major flaws in theGMD: the lack of both a unified party organization and strict discipline, as well as the absence ofa popular support base. To become an effective revolutionary weapon, the GMD would need to
9Ibid., 19.

10Ibid.

3

correct those deficiencies. Borodin seduced Sun by telling him that the time had not yet come for
China to adopt communism, that the ultimate objectives of the CCP and the GMD were identical,
and that the CCP should submit to GMD leadership. Sun agreed with every one of Borodin’ssuggestions, and immediately appointed him his advisor. Meanwhile, as already stated, more andmore influential CCP members were joining the GMD. Sun Yat-sen decided to adopt Soviet andCCP tactics for his revolution. But first he addressed the reorganization of the GMD, on the eveof which he addressed party members. He told them that if they wanted to make the revolution asuccess they would have to learn from Russian-style methods, organizations, and training,adding that he hoped they would submit loyally to Borodin’s opinions. Toward the end ofOctober Sun Yat-sen established a provisional Central Executive Committee in Guangdong. He
then began work on the draft of a manifesto, on a platform, and on the reorganization of theGMD, with Borodin again serving as his chief advisor.
The historic 1st National Congress of the GMD took place in Guangdong from January 20 to 30,
1924. Important matters ruled on at that gathering are as follows:
1. Reorganization of the GMD
The new GMD, fashioned under the guidance and influence of Borodin and his group ofSoviet advisors, almost completely replicated the structure of the Soviet Communist
Party. To make the entire GMD into a monolithic, unified powerful combat unit, they
adopted pyramid-shaped centralized authoritarian rule with a committee system.
Incidentally, Sun stated that he was convinced that the Soviet Communist Party should beused as the model for GMD reorganization. He believed that the 1911 (Xinhai)
Revolution was unsuccessful because the wrong means had been used to bring it about,unlike the Russian Revolution that occurred six years later, using the proper methods.
2. GMD-CCP United Front
There were wide differences of opinion about the United Front within the GMD. Rightwing members like Feng Ziyou and Xie Yungbo felt uneasy about admitting communists
into the GMD, citing the saying, “Rent a garret to the CCP, and they will end up taking
over your whole house.” Anyone of sound mind would have harbored suspicions of anddoubts about the CCP, but at the 1st National Congress, Sun Yat-sen attempted toconciliate and persuade with the following:
The principle of livelihood, which our party already espouses, includes socialism,communism, and collectivism.11 … The policies that Russia is implementing at thistime are not pure communism, but simply policies intended to resolve problems
relating to livelihood. I would like my fellow GMD members to understand thatthere is absolutely no conceptual conflict between communism and the principle oflivelihood, only differences in scope.1211
Author’s note: Since the principle of livelihood incorporates socialism, and socialism incorporates
communism, communism is included in the principle of livelihood.

Sun Yat-sen, Zenshū (Complete works), Gaimushō Chōsabu yaku (trans. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Research Division).
124

Sun Yat-sen argued that since the principle of livelihood was equivalent to socialism, italso embraced communism. Not only was his reasoning erroneous, it was alsoexceedingly imprudent and irresponsible.
After all, in August 1924, the same year in which the 1st National Congress of theGuomindang was held, Sun addressed the cadets at Whampoa (Huangpu) MilitaryAcademy. For the first time he categorically criticized Marxism and elucidated thestandpoint of the Three Principles of the People vis à vis Marxism. Sun comparedhistorical materialism with the historical perception of his principle of livelihood. While
he denounced class struggle and advocated class collaboration, and indicated the errors inthe theory of surplus value, he provided evidence to the effect that capitalism will neverdisappear, and praised the Ford Motor Company and its production system, which hedescribed as ideal. Sun concluded by saying, “I have nothing but praise for Marx’s
scholarship, but cannot put Marxist methods into practice in China.” There are absolutely
no aspects of Sun’s Three Principles that reject private ownership. The Republic of China
Constitutional Draft, issued later by the Nanjing government, faithfully echoed the Three
Principles of the People, but was in no way superior to the Weimar Constitution.13 Theintrinsic differences and discrepancies between the Three Principles and communism areblatantly obvious. The story of the Second United Front lends credence to the argumentthat the First United Front was the first step of a process designed to achieve a
Comintern-CCP tactic: turning all of China communist. This would be accomplished bytaking advantage of the GMD’s strength, steadily communizing the GMD, and ultimately
dominating the Chinese revolution. There were some GMD members who were doubtful
and suspicious of the communists, men who opposed allowing communists to join theGMD, or who at least had enough foresight to demand clear requirements formembership in the GMD. Unfortunately, Sun Yat-sen failed to see through thecommunists’ far-reaching conspiracy.
Consequently, more and more CCP members joined the GMD, and ensconced themselvesin important GMD positions. For instance, the 24-member Central Executive Committee
welcomed three communists, among them CCP co-founder Li Dazhao and founding
member Tan Pingshan. Among 17 alternate members one finds the names of communists
Lin Boqu and Mao Zedong. Furthermore, in addition to communists being appointed tokey posts (Li Dazhao to head the Political Branch in Beijing; Lin Boqu, the GMD
Department of Peasants; and Tan Pingshan, the Organization Department), a great manyof them captured other important GMD positions, forming an influential core. There was,for all intents and purposes, a Communist Party operating openly within the GMD. The
GMD could not (and did not) operate on its own terms, and the people’s revolution could
not continue to be a gradual, moderate process. From then on, the GMD and the people’srevolution were at the mercy of the red demons residing inside them, and had no choice
but to rush full speed ahead over the violent, radical track the communists had laid.

13Takahashi Yūji, Son Bun (Sun Yat-sen) (Tokyo: Nippon Hyōronsha, 1944).

5

3. Founding of the Whampoa Military Academy
The third most important resolution made at the First National Congress of the GMD wasto establish a military school in Huangpu (Guangdong province) where Nationalist Army
officers could receive training. Preparations were made under Borodin’s leadership, using
financial aid from the Comintern. To train the cadets Soviet Army officer Galen(pseudonym of Vasily Blyukher) and many of his fellow officers were dispatched toChina. Of particular note is the political education of soldiers, in which party leadersparticipated; a Political Department was established for that purpose. An inaugural
ceremony was held in June 1924; Chiang Kai-shek was installed as superintendent, andhere, too, communist elements wormed their way in early on: Ye Jianying was appointed
deputy chairman of the Training Department, and Zhou Enlai deputy chairman of thePolitical Department.
4. Manifesto of the First National Congress
Before the curtain fell on the historic congress, its final tasks (determining the GMD
platform and publicly announcing the congress’ manifesto) were completed. The
manifesto consisted of three parts: (1) the present condition of China, (2) the principles ofthe GMD, and (3) the political platform of the GMD. The manifesto stressed theimportance of realizing Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles, which are described therein as
the principle of racial unity, the principle of popular sovereignty, and the principle of thepeople’s livelihood. It mentions two aspects of the principle of racial unity: the pursuit ofself-emancipation (independence for the Chinese people) and equality for all ethnicities
in China (how to behave toward ethnic groups in remote areas of former Qing territory).
About the second aspect, the manifesto states, “The Kuomintang solemnly declares that itrecognizes the right of self-determination of all the races within the country; and thatafter the success of the revolution against the militarists and the imperialists, a freely
united Republic of China, based on the free union of the races, will be established.”14
However, the promise of equality and self-determination for China’s minorities wasnever fulfilled. To this day, China has yet to recognize self-determination orindependence for the peoples of Xinjiang and Tibet, which is why independence
movements accompanied by bloodshed have been erupting in those regions. Moreover,after the demise of the Qing dynasty, the Chinese claimed even Manchuria as theirterritory. Later, when the Manchurian Incident occurred, they denied independence andself-determination to the Manchus, and clashed with the Japanese, who advocatedManchu independence. Today even the name “Manchuria” is nowhere to be seen. It has
been obliterated and replaced by “Northeast China.”
A noteworthy item in the platform of the GMD concerns foreign policy: “All unequal treaties,
such as foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, foreign control of customs, and all categories ofpolitical power exercised by foreigners in China and prejudicial to her sovereignty should be14T.C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928),264.

6

cancelled, and new treaties based on the principle of equality and mutual respect for thesovereign rights of both parties should be negotiated to take their places.”15
The inclusion of this language in the manifesto is a harbinger of the revolutionary diplomacy
conducted by China in later years. The manifesto itself was based on a draft prepared by
Borodin, and the Three Principles of the People that appear therein are said to be the greatest
common denominator between Comintern-CCP revolutionary theory and Sun Yat-sen’srevolutionary theory.

15Ibid., 267.

7