Starfield Technologies, LLC

Certificate Policy
andCertification Practice Statement(CP/CPS)

Version 5.0
August 1, 2023

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
iStarfield CP-CPS v5.0

Table of Contents
1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Overview ..............................................................................................................................1
1.2 Document Name and Identification .....................................................................................1
1.2.1 Document History ....................................................................................................... 1
1.3 PKI Participants ...................................................................................................................4
1.3.1 Certification Authorities ............................................................................................. 4
1.3.2 Registration Authorities .............................................................................................. 7
1.3.3 Subscribers .................................................................................................................. 7
1.3.4 Relying Parties ............................................................................................................ 7
1.3.5 Other Participants........................................................................................................ 8
1.4 Certificate Usage ..................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses....................................................................................... 8
1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses ......................................................................................... 8
1.5 Policy Administration ..........................................................................................................81.5.1 Organization Administering the Document ................................................................ 8
1.5.2 Contact Person ............................................................................................................ 8
1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy .................................................... 9
1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedure ............................................................................................ 9
1.6 Definitions, Acronyms, and References .............................................................................91.6.1 Definitions and Acronyms .......................................................................................... 9
1.6.2 References ................................................................................................................. 14
1.6.3 Conventions .............................................................................................................. 17
2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES .................................... 18
2.1 Repositories........................................................................................................................18
2.2 Publication of Certification Information ............................................................................18
2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication .....................................................................................18
2.4 Access Controls on Repositories .......................................................................................18
3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION......................................................... 19
3.1 Naming ...............................................................................................................................19
3.1.1 Types of Names ........................................................................................................ 19
3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful ............................................................................ 19
3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ............................................................ 19
3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ............................................................ 19
3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names ............................................................................................... 19
3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks ............................................. 19
3.2 Initial Identity Validation ...................................................................................................20
3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ............................................................. 20
3.2.2 Authentication of Organization and Domain Identity .............................................. 21
3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity........................................................................ 28
3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information ........................................................................ 28
3.2.5 Validation of Authority ............................................................................................. 28
3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation ......................................................................................... 29
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....................................................29
3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key.............................................. 29
3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key After Revocation............................... 29
3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ................................................29
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4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................ 30
4.1 Certificate Application .......................................................................................................30
4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application .............................................................. 30
4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities .................................................................. 30
4.2 Certificate Application Processing ....................................................................................30
4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions ......................................... 30
4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ................................................... 31
4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications ................................................................. 31
4.3 Certificate Issuance ............................................................................................................314.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance................................................................... 31
4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate .............................. 31
4.4 Certificate Acceptance .......................................................................................................32
4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........................................................... 32
4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA ................................................................... 32
4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................. 32
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage ..........................................................................................32
4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......................................................... 32
4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage ...................................................... 32
4.6 Certificate Renewal ............................................................................................................33
4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...................................................................... 33
4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal...................................................................................... 33
4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ................................................................. 33
4.6.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber ........................................... 33
4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate..................................... 33
4.6.6 Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA .................................................... 33
4.6.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................. 33
4.7 Certificate Re-key ..............................................................................................................34
4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ........................................................................ 34
4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ............................................. 34
4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests .............................................................. 34
4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber ........................................... 34
4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate ................................... 34
4.7.6 Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA .................................................. 34
4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................. 34
4.8 Certificate Modification .....................................................................................................34
4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate Modification ............................................................... 34
4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification ............................................................. 35
4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......................................................... 35
4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber ........................................... 35
4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate ...................................... 35
4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ................................................... 35
4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities ............................. 35
4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension .............................................................................35
4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation .................................................................................. 35
4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation .................................................................................. 39
4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request............................................................................ 39
4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period ............................................................................ 40
4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request .............................. 40
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4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties ........................................... 41
4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency .......................................................................................... 41
4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs (if applicable) ............................................................ 41
4.9.9 On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability .................................................... 41
4.9.10 On-line Revocation Checking Requirements............................................................ 41
4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available ............................................ 42
4.9.12 Special Requirements Regarding Key Compromise................................................. 42
4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension .................................................................................. 42
4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension .................................................................................. 43
4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request............................................................................ 43
4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period .................................................................................... 43
4.10 Certificate Status Services .................................................................................................43
4.10.1 Operational Characteristics ....................................................................................... 43
4.10.2 Service Availability .................................................................................................. 43
4.10.3 Optional Features ...................................................................................................... 43
4.11 End of Subscription............................................................................................................43
4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery .................................................................................................44
4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices ...................................................... 44
4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices .............................. 44
5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS ........................ 45
5.1 Physical Controls ...............................................................................................................46
5.1.1 Site Location and Construction ................................................................................. 46
5.1.2 Physical Access ......................................................................................................... 46
5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning ..................................................................................... 46
5.1.4 Water Exposures ....................................................................................................... 46
5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection.................................................................................. 46
5.1.6 Media Storage ........................................................................................................... 46
5.1.7 Waste Disposal.......................................................................................................... 47
5.1.8 Offsite Backup .......................................................................................................... 47
5.2 Procedural Controls ...........................................................................................................47
5.2.1 Trusted Roles ............................................................................................................ 47
5.2.2 Number of Persons Required Per Task ..................................................................... 47
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role ...................................................... 47
5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties ......................................................................... 48
5.3 Personnel Controls .............................................................................................................48
5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements ........................................ 48
5.3.2 Background Check Procedures ................................................................................. 48
5.3.3 Training Requirements.............................................................................................. 48
5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements .................................................................. 49
5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ..................................................................... 49
5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions ......................................................................... 49
5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements ..................................................................... 49
5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel ...................................................................... 49
5.4 Audit Logging Procedures .................................................................................................49
5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded ........................................................................................ 49
5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log.................................................................................... 50
5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log ................................................................................ 50
5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log ............................................................................................ 51
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5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures .................................................................................. 51
5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) ....................................................... 51
5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject ..................................................................... 51
5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments ........................................................................................ 51
5.5 Records Archival ...............................................................................................................52
5.5.1 Types of Records Archived ...................................................................................... 52
5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive .................................................................................... 52
5.5.3 Protection of Archive ................................................................................................ 52
5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures ...................................................................................... 52
5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records .......................................................... 52
5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External) .................................................... 52
5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information............................................. 52
5.6 Key Changeover.................................................................................................................53
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..................................................................................53
5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures ...................................................... 53
5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted ................................... 53
5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures ............................................................ 53
5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster .................................................... 53
5.8 CA or RA Termination ......................................................................................................53
6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS ..................................................................... 55
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation .................................................................................55
6.1.1 Key Pair Generation .................................................................................................. 55
6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .......................................................................... 55
6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ................................................................. 55
6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ............................................................. 55
6.1.5 Key Sizes .................................................................................................................. 56
6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking ....................................... 58
6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes ................................................................................................. 58
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls .......................58
6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........................................................ 58
6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control ............................................................................ 58
6.2.3 Private Key Escrow................................................................................................... 59
6.2.4 Private Key Backup .................................................................................................. 59
6.2.5 Private Key Archival................................................................................................. 59
6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module ................................... 59
6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module ........................................................... 59
6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Keys .......................................................................... 59
6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key ........................................................................ 59
6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key ........................................................................... 60
6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating .................................................................................. 60
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ...........................................................................60
6.3.1 Public Key Archival .................................................................................................. 60
6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods ................................... 60
6.4 Activation Data ..................................................................................................................61
6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation............................................................. 61
6.4.2 Activation Data Protection ........................................................................................ 61
6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data ............................................................................. 61
6.5 Computer Security Controls ..............................................................................................61
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6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements .............................................. 61
6.5.2 Computer Security Rating......................................................................................... 61
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls ...........................................................................................61
6.6.1 System Development Controls ................................................................................. 61
6.6.2 Security Management Controls................................................................................. 62
6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls .................................................................................... 62
6.7 Network Security Controls ................................................................................................62
6.8 Time-Stamping ..................................................................................................................62
7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES .......................................................... 62
7.1 Certificate Profile ...............................................................................................................62
7.1.1 Version Number ........................................................................................................ 62
7.1.2 Certificate Extensions ............................................................................................... 62
7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers ..................................................................................... 62
7.1.4 Name Forms .............................................................................................................. 63
7.1.5 Name Constraints ...................................................................................................... 67
7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier ........................................................................... 67
7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension ..................................................................... 68
7.1.8 Policy Qualifier Syntax and Semantics..................................................................... 68
7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension ....................... 68
7.2 CRL Profile ........................................................................................................................68
7.2.1 Version Number ........................................................................................................ 68
7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions ............................................................................... 68
7.3 OCSP Profile......................................................................................................................70
7.3.1 Version Number ........................................................................................................ 70
7.3.2 OCSP Extensions ...................................................................................................... 71
The singleExtensions of an OCSP response MUST NOT contain the reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21)
CRL entry extension. ............................................................................................................ 71
8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS .......................................... 72
8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment......................................................................72
8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor ....................................................................................72
8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity .......................................................................72
8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment .........................................................................................72
8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency ...........................................................................72
8.6 Communication of Results.................................................................................................73
8.7 Self –Audits .......................................................................................................................73
8.8 Specification Administration .............................................................................................73
8.8.1 Specification Change Procedures ............................................................................. 73
8.8.2 Publication and Notification Policies........................................................................ 73
8.9 CPS Approval Procedures..................................................................................................73
9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS .......................................................... 74
9.1 Fees ....................................................................................................................................74
9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ....................................................................... 74
9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees ............................................................................................. 74
9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees ........................................................ 74
9.1.4 Fees for Other Services ............................................................................................. 74
9.1.5 Refund Policy............................................................................................................ 74
9.2 Financial Responsibility.....................................................................................................74
9.2.1 Insurance Coverage ................................................................................................... 75
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9.2.2 Other Assets .............................................................................................................. 75
9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities .................................................... 75
9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information ............................................................................75
9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information ........................................................................... 75
9.3.2 Information not Within the Scope of Confidential Information ............................... 75
9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information .................................................. 75
9.4 Privacy of Personal Information ........................................................................................76
9.4.1 Privacy Plan .............................................................................................................. 76
9.4.2 Information Treated as Private.................................................................................. 76
9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private .............................................................................. 76
9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information........................................................... 76
9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ....................................................... 76
9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process ...................................... 76
9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances ........................................................... 76
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights ...............................................................................................77
9.5.1 Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information .................................... 77
9.5.2 Property Rights in the Agreement............................................................................. 77
9.5.3 Property Rights to Names ......................................................................................... 77
9.5.4 Property Rights in Keys and Key Material ............................................................... 77
9.6 Representations and Warranties .........................................................................................78
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties ......................................................................... 78
9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties ......................................................................... 79
9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties.............................................................. 80
9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties......................................................... 80
9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants ............................................. 80
9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties..................................................................................................81
9.7.1 Fiduciary Relationships ............................................................................................ 81
9.8 Limitations of Liability ......................................................................................................81
9.9 Indemnities .........................................................................................................................83
9.9.1 Indemnification by Starfield ..................................................................................... 83
9.9.2 Indemnification by Subscribers ................................................................................ 83
9.9.3 Indemnification by Relying Parties .......................................................................... 84
9.10 Term and Termination .......................................................................................................84
9.10.1 Term .......................................................................................................................... 84
9.10.2 Termination ............................................................................................................... 84
9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival .......................................................................... 84
9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ...............................................85
9.12 Amendments ......................................................................................................................85
9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment ........................................................................................ 85
9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period ......................................................................... 85
9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed ............................................... 85
9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions ...........................................................................................85
9.14 Governing Law ..................................................................................................................85
9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law .....................................................................................86
9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions...................................................................................................86
9.16.1 Entire Agreement ...................................................................................................... 86
9.16.2 Assignment ............................................................................................................... 86
9.16.3 Severability ............................................................................................................... 86
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9.16.4 Enforcement .............................................................................................................. 86
9.16.5 Force Majeure ........................................................................................................... 86
9.17 Other Provisions.................................................................................................................86
10 APPENDIX A – CERTIFICATE PROFILES .............................................................. 88
10.1 Root CAs............................................................................................................................88
10.1.1 Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority .................................................................. 88
10.1.2 Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G2 ................................................................. 89
10.1.3 Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority................................................................ 89
10.1.4 Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G2 .............................................................. 90
10.1.5 Starfield Services Root Certification Authority ........................................................ 91
10.1.6 GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority - G5................................................................ 91
10.1.7 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G5 ................................................................. 92
10.1.8 GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority – G6 ............................................................... 92
10.1.9 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G6 ................................................................. 93
10.2 Issuing CAs ........................................................................................................................95
10.2.1 Starfield Issuing (subordinate) CAs .......................................................................... 95
10.3 Cross CA Certificates ........................................................................................................96
10.3.1 Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
96
10.3.2 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority98
10.3.3 Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority + Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority
100
10.3.4 Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Starfield Class 2 Certification
Authority 101
10.3.5 Certainly E1 + Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 ........................ 103
10.3.6 Certainly R1 + Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 ....................... 104
10.4 End Entity SSL Certificates .............................................................................................105
10.4.1 Go Daddy Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates ...................................................... 105
10.4.2 Starfield Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates ......................................................... 108
10.4.3 Go Daddy Issuing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates ............................................. 111
10.4.4 Starfield Issuing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates ................................................ 114
10.5 End Entity Code Signing Certificates ..............................................................................117
10.5.1 Go Daddy Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates ...................................................... 117
10.5.2 Starfield Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates ......................................................... 119
10.5.3 Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority – G2 AND Go Daddy Secure Extended Validation
Code Signing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates................................................................. 121
10.5.4 Starfield Secure Certificate Authority – G2 AND Starfield Secure Extended Validation
Code Signing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates................................................................. 123
11 APPENDIX B: TEST SITES ...................................................................................... 125

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1 INTRODUCTION
Starfield Technologies is an innovator in the field of Internet foundation services, providing
advanced software and Internet solutions critical to the building of online presence and ecommerce.
The Starfield Public Key Infrastructure (“Starfield PKI”) has been established to provide a variety
of digital certificate services.

1.1

Overview

This Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) describes the practicesof the Starfield PKI and applies to all Certification Authorities (CAs) within the Starfield PKI
hierarchy. This CP/CPS is applicable to all entities with relationships with the Starfield PKI,
including Policy Authorities (PAs), Certification Authorities (CAs), Registration Authorities(RAs), Subscribers, and Relying Parties.
The Starfield PKI conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for theIssuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates as well as Guidelines for Issuanceand Management of Extended Validation Certificates published at
http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any inconsistency between this document andthose Requirements, those Requirements take precedence over this document. The
following policy identifiers are managed in accordance with these requirements:
2.23.140.1.2.1, 2.23.140.1.2.2, 2.23.140.1.2.3, and 2.23.140.1.1
Note: References to Baseline Requirements sections are denoted in short form using the section
number. For example [BR 3.2.2.1] denotes section 3.2.2.1 of the current revision of the Baseline
Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly Trusted Certificates.

1.2

Document Name and Identification

This document is formally referred to as the “Starfield Certificate Policy and Certification
Practice Statement” (Starfield CP/CPS). Starfield CAs issue certificates in accordance withthe policy and practice requirements of this document.
The OID-arcs associated with this document are 2.16.840.1.114413 and 2.16.840.1.114414.

1.2.1 Document History
Version
3.12

Effective Date
August 15, 2017

Change Summary•
Added this changelog

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Version

Effective Date

3.12.2
3.13
4.0
4.1

November 9, 2017
September 18, 2018
September 27, 2018
May 14, 2019

4.2

March 11, 2020

4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7

May 26, 2020
June 19, 2020
July 23, 2020
July 30, 2020
August 31, 2020

4.8

September 30, 2020

4.9

October 21, 2020

4.10

April 19, 2021

4.11

June 10, 2021

4.12

July 9, 2021

4.13

September 8, 2021

4.14
4.15
4.16

October 15, 2021
November 29, 2021
March 9, 2022

4.17

June 17, 2022

4.18

November 11, 2022

Change Summary•
Updated 3.3.9 to state that Starfield now relies on 3rd party data sources to identify high risk
requests•
Updated section 4.1.1 to confirm that Starfield now processes CAA records•
Corrected the 3.1.8 section to reference valid subsections•
Reformat to RFC 3647 Part 1•
Reformat to RFC 3647 Part 2•
Added text to sections 1.4 and 1.4.1•
Updated section 9.8•
Updated to reflect Mozilla Root Store requirements•
Updated section 3.2•
Updated section 7.2 to show both versions of CRL•
Updated section 4.9.4 in accordance to BRs•
Removed the G3 and G4 roots from 1.3.1, 3.2.2.4.9 and Appendix A•
Updated link to repository in section 2.1•
Updated section 6.3.2 to reflect 398 day maximum validity period•
Updated section 2.1 to reflect updated repository link•
Updated 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2 to remove reason code 6•
Updated section 3.2 to add link to agency disclosure list•
Updated sections 10.4 and 10.5 to reflect SHA2•
Updates section 8.6 to acknowledge new audit requirements•
Added section 9.16.5 Force Majeure•
Updated sections 1.6 and 4.9.1 to add definitions and details to revocation•
Updated section 1.5.2 with more clear instructions for Certificate Problem Report•
Updated section 4.2.2 to indicate that SOD is also applicable to Code Signing•
Updated section 5.4.3 to reflect the 7 years retention period for audit log•
Updated section 1.4 to indicate Code signing EOL as of May 30, 2021•
Updated section 4.9.12 to specify methods used to demonstrate private key compromise•
Updated section 1.4 to reflect Code Signing policy updates in relation to Code Signing EOL•
Updated section 1.5.2 to reflect new company address•
Updated section 3.2.2 header to include Domain•
Added section 3.2.2.4.20 TLS Using ALPN (Ballot SC33)•
Removed Code Signing references in the following sections: 1.1, 3.2, 4.2.2, 6.3.2, 7.1.6, 8.7,
10.2•
Updated section 10.5 in relation to Code Signing EOL•
Updated section 10.4 to reflect removal of OU (Ballot SC47)•
Ballot SC48 clean up:oReplaced all instances of Fully Qualified with Fully-QualifiedoAdded and updated some definitions in 1.6.1oUpdated applicable sections under 3.2.2.4 to replace instances of label(s) with
Domain Label(s)•Added subsections to 7.1.4 Name Forms: 7.1.4.1, 7.1.4.2, 7.1.4.2.1, 7.1.4.2.2, 7.1.4.3,
7.1.4.3.1.
•
Added 3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP Address, and 3.2.2.6 Wildcard Domain Validation.
Re-numbered Data Source Accuracy to 3.2.2.7.
•
Updated sections 4.9.7, 4.9.10, 7.2.2.1, and 7.2.2.2 regarding OSCP and CRL timeframes.
•
Updated sections 3.2.2.4.18 and 3.2.2.4.19 regarding redirects and Wildcard Domain Names•
Updated sections 3.2.2.4.20, 3.4, 4.2.1, 4.2.3, 4,9.2, 4.9.3, 4.9.7, 4.9.10, and 9.1.5 to accountfor Certainly CPS alignment.
•
Cleaned up formatting in sections 1.5.3, 1.6, and 8.6.
•
Fixed references in sections 2.3, 6.1.1, 6.1.6, and 6.2.1.
•
Updated section 4.9.1 and subsections, to be in-line with BR formatting, and include
timeframes.
•
Updated audit log retention in section 5.4.3•
Updated section 9.9 to include indemnification by Starfield•
Added definition of Application Software Supplier in section 1.6•
Corrected spelling mistake in 1.3.1•
Added Certainly to 1.3.1 diagram•
Increased diagram sizes for readability•
Added 2 new roots to 10.1•
Added 2 new Cross CA Certs to 10.3

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Version
5.0

Effective Date
August 1, 2023

Change Summary•
Added Appendices for Test Sites, adjusted formatting of appendices•
Added Definitions and Acronyms in 1.6.1 to align with CA/B forum definitions as well as
ensure all acronyms used are pre-defined•
Updated reference URLs within this document to display the Section name as well as thesection number•
Introduced [BR X.XX] formatting to delineate CA/B Forum alignment sections from CP/CPS
sections•
Updated formatting: Section indentation, table formatting, font styling•
Added new Section 3.2.2.8 CAA Records•
Added text to Section 5 for BR alignment•
Added References to new Section 1.6.2•
Added clarifying text to 4.2.1•
Added lastUpdate/nextUpdate clarification to 4.9.7•
Added bullet expansion to 5.4.1 for CA/B alignment•
Added 1.6.3 Conventions•
Added 7.2.2 text and modified 7.2.2.1 and 7.2.2.2 for CAB alignment•
Added 7.3 text for CAB alignment•
Updated 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2 for CAB alignment

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

1.3

PKI ParticipantsThis CP/CPS is applicable to all certificates issued by Starfield CAs within the Starfield PKI.
This document defines the specific communities for which a specific class or type of
certificate is applicable, specific Starfield PKI practices and requirements for the issuance andmanagement of such certificates, and the intended purposes and uses of such certificates.

1.3.1 Certification Authorities
Starfield Certification Authorities (CAs) perform the following general functions:• Create and sign certificates• Distribute certificates to the appropriate Subscribers and Relying Parties• Revoke certificates• Distribute certificate status information in the form of Certificate Revocation Lists(CRLs) or other mechanisms• Provide a repository where certificates and certificate status information are
stored and made available (if applicable).
Obligations of the CAs within the Starfield PKI include:• Generating, issuing, and distributing public key certificates• Distributing CA certificates• Generating and publishing certificate status information (such as CRLs)• Maintaining the security, availability, and continuity of the certificate issuanceand CRL signing functions• Providing a means for Subscribers to request revocation• Revoking public-key certificates• Periodically demonstrating internal or external audited compliance with this
CP/CPS.
Within the Starfield PKI, there are two general types of CAs: Root and Issuing CAs.
Currently, the Starfield PKI hierarchy consists of the CAs in the diagrams below.
Relationships between these CA certificates are represented in the following diagrams:

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Starfield Class 2
Certification Authority(SHA-1)

Starfield Secure
Certification Authority(SHA-1)

Cross-signs Starfield Root
Certificate Authority - G2

Cross-signs Starfield
Services Root Certificate
Authority - G2 (operatedby Amazon)

All types of SSL and codesigning certificates (SHA1)

Go Daddy Class 2
Certification
Authority (SHA-1)

Go Daddy Secure
Certification
Authority (SHA-1)

Cross-signs Go Daddy
Root Certificate
Authority - G2
Starfield Services Root
Certificate Authority(SHA-1)

All types of SSL andcode signing
certificates (SHA-1)

Cross-signs Starfield
Services Root Certificate
Authority - G2 (operatedby Amazon)

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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Starfield Root
Certificate Authority G2

Starfield Secure
Certificate Authority G2

Starfield Secure CodeSigning Certificate
Auhtority - G2

Starfield Secure
Extended Validation
Code Signing CA - G2

Cross-signs CertainlyIntermediate E1 andCertainly intermediate
R1

All types of SSL andcode signing
certificates

Go Daddy Root
Certificate Authority G2

Go Daddy Secure
Certificate Authority G2

Go Daddy Secure
Code Signing
Certificate Authority G2

Go Daddy Secure
Extended Validation
Code Signing CA - G2

All types of SSL andcode signing
certificates

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

1.3.2 Registration Authorities
Registration Authorities (RAs) evaluate and either approve or reject Subscriber certificate
management transactions (including certificate requests, renewal and re-key requests,
and revocation requests). Starfield serves as the sole RA for the Starfield PKI.
Obligations of the Registration Authorities (RAs) within the Starfield PKI include:• Obtaining a public-key from the Subscriber• Identifying and authenticating Subscribers in accordance with this CP/CPS• Verifying that the Subscriber possesses the asymmetric private key corresponding
to the public-key submitted for certification• Receiving, authenticating and processing certificate revocation requests• Providing suitable training to personnel performing RA functions.
For the Starfield Root CAs the Subscribers are Subordinate CAs that are under the controlof Starfield. Accordingly, the RA function for these CAs is performed manually byauthorized Starfield PKI personnel.
For the Starfield Issuing CAs, the RA function is performed by Starfield using a
combination of automated and manual processes.

1.3.3 Subscribers
For the Root CAs, the Subscribers include subordinate CAs. For Starfield Issuing CAs,
Subscribers typically include organizations and individuals.
Obligations of Subscribers within the Starfield PKI include:• Generating or causing to be generated one or more asymmetric key pairs• Submitting public keys and credentials for registration• Providing information to the RA that is accurate and complete to the best of the
Subscribers’ knowledge and belief regarding information in their certificates andidentification and authentication information• Taking appropriate measures to protect their private keys from compromise• Promptly reporting loss or compromise of private key(s) and inaccuracy ofcertificate information• Using its key pair(s) in compliance with this CP/CPS.

1.3.4 Relying Parties
Relying Parties include any entity that may rely upon a Starfield certificate for purposes ofdetermining the organizational or individual identity of an entity providing a web site,data encryption, digital signature verification, and user authentication.
Obligations of Relying Parties within the Starfield PKI include:
Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

•••Confirming the validity of Subscriber public-key certificates
Verifying that Subscriber possesses the asymmetric private key corresponding to
the public-key certificate (e.g., through digital signature verification)
Using the public-key in the Subscriber’s certificate in compliance with this CP/CPS.

1.3.5 Other Participants
Not applicable.

1.4

Certificate Usage

Starfield offers TLS Certificates in the following levels of assurance:
Assurance Level
Basic and Medium Assurance
High Assurance
Extended Validation

Certificate Validation Type
Domain Validation (DV)Organization and Individual Validation (OV)
Extended Validation (EV)

Note: As of May 30, 2021, Starfield no longer issues High Assurance Code Signing Certificates and will
no longer update this CP/CPS for Code Signing related changes to the Baseline Requirements. CodeSigning references were removed in v4.12. Refer to Certificate Policy and Certification PracticeStatement v4.11 in Starfield’s Repository, for most recent policy containing Code Signing references.

1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses
A certificate issued by Starfield shall be used only as designated by the terms of this
CP/CPS and any service agreements. However, the sensitivity of the information
processed or protected by a Certificate varies greatly, and each Relying Party mustevaluate the associated risks before deciding on whether to rely on a Certificate issued
under this CPS.

1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses
As defined in the applicable Subscriber Agreement.

1.5

Policy Administration

1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document
This CP/CPS is administered by the Starfield Governance and Policy Committee.

1.5.2 Contact Person
Starfield Technologies, LLC
2155 E Warner Rd.
Tempe, AZ 85284
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Phone: 480-505-8800
E-mail: practices@starfieldtech.com
In case of a Certificate Problem Report, that concerns a key compromised certificate, a
mis-issued certificate, or any other type of suspicious activity with a certificate, contact
us at (480) 505-8852, or practices@starfieldtech.com.
The Starfield Governance and Policy Committee consists of representatives fromexecutive management, corporate security, PKI operations, and legal.
Obligations of the Starfield Governance and Policy Committee (GPC) include:• Approving and maintaining this CP/CPS• Interpreting adherence to this CP/CPS• Specifying the content of public-key certificates• Resolving or causing resolution of disputes related to this CP/CPS• Remaining current regarding security threats and ensuring that appropriate
actions are taken to counteract significant threats.

1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy
The Starfield Governance and Policy Committee determines the suitability of a CPS for thepolicy based on the results of independent audits.

1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedure
All changes to this document are approved by a quorum of The Starfield Governance andPolicy Committee.

1.6

Definitions, Acronyms, and References

1.6.1 Definitions and Acronyms
Term

AcronymDefinition

AICPA

A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, politicalsubdivision, or any entity operating under the direct control of a Government Entity.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Affiliate

American Institute ofCertified Public
Accountants
ApplicantApplicant Representative

Application‐Layer Protocol
Negotiation
Application Software
Supplier

ALPN

The natural person or legal entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate.
Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber.
A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the
Applicant, or an authorized agent who has been delegated authority to represent the
Applicant.
A TLS Extension that includes the protocol negotiation within the exchange of hellomessages.
A supplier of Internet browser software or other relying‐party application software that
displays or uses Certificates and incorporates Root Certificates.

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Term

Acronym

Attestation Letter

Audit Period

Audit Report

Authorization Domain
Name
Authorized PortAND

Base Domain NameBR

[BR X.X]
Certificate Authority
Authorization
CA Key Pair

CAA

Certificate
Certificate Data
Certificate Management
Process
Certificate Policy

CP

Certificate Problem Report
Certificate Profile

Certificate Revocation List

CRL

Certificate Signing Request

CSR

Certification Authority

CA

Certification PracticeStatement
Canonical NameCPS

Code Signing Certificate
CompromiseCountry

A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer,
government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for suchinformation.
In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day ofoperations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as
the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA.) The coverage rules andmaximum length of audit periods are defined in Section 8.1 Frequency or
Circumstances of Assessment
A report from a Qualified Auditor stating the Qualified Auditor’s opinion on whether anentity’s processes and controls comply with the mandatory provisions of these
Requirements.
The FQDN returned in defined processes to obtain authorization for inclusion in a
Certificate.
One of the following ports: 80 (http), 443 (http), 115 (sftp), 25 (smtp), 22 (ssh).
The portion of an applied‐for FQDN that is the first Domain Name node left of aregistry-controlled or public suffix plus the registry‐controlled or public suffix. (e.g.
“example.co.uk” or “example.com”). For FQDNs where the right‐most Domain Namenode is a gTLD having ICANN Specification 13 in its registry agreement, the gTLD itself
may be used as the Base Domain Name.
Starfield’s vetting process that verifies an Applicant’s access to the domain.

Basic Assurance
Baseline Requirements

Definition

CNAME

Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
Certificates published by the CA/Browser Forum.
References to Baseline Requirements sections are denoted in short form using thesection number. For example [BR 3.2.2.1] denotes section 3.2.2.1 of the current
revision of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly
Trusted Certificates.
A DNS Resource Record defined further in RFC 8659.
A Key Pair where the Public Key appears as the Subject Public Key Info in one or more
Root CA Certificate(s) and/or Subordinate CA Certificate(s).
Digital record that contains information such as the Subscriber’s distinguished nameand public key, and the signer's signature and data.
Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant orotherwise) in the CA’s possession or control or to which the CA has access.
Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, andhardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a
Repository, and revokes Certificates.
A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particularcommunity and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.
Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud,
compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.
A set of documents or files that defines requirements for Certificate content andCertificate extensions in accordance with Section 7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles,
e.g. a Section in a CA’s CPS or a certificate template file used by CA software.
A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created anddigitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.
A message sent to the certification authority containing the information required toissue a digital certificate.
Certificate Issuing entity defined further in Section 1.3.1 Certificate Authorities of thisdocument.
One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are
created, issued, managed, and used.
A DNS resource record to provide the canonical name associated with an alias namefurther defined in RFC 2181 Section 10.1.
A certificate issued to an organization for the purpose of digitally signing software.
A loss, theft, disclosure, modification, unauthorized use, or other breach of security
related to a Private Key.
Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a
Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

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Term

AcronymDefinition

Country code top-leveldomainCross Certificate

ccTLD

An internet top level domain reserved for a country or dependent territory.
A certificate that is used to establish a trust relationship between two Root CAs.

Custom Certificate

A certificate profile defined for a specific, non-standard usage.

Delegated Third Party

Distinguished Name

DN

A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA but is authorized by the CA, andwhose activities are not within the scope of the appropriate CA audits, to assist in theCertificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA
requirements found herein.
A globally unique identifier representing a Subscriber.

Doing Business As

DBA

An entity name or trade name used for Subject Identity Information

Domain Authorization
Document

Documentation provided by, or a CA’s documentation of a communication with, aDomain Name Registrar attesting to the authority of an Applicant to request a
Certificate for a specific domain namespace.
The Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contract (or theequivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or ina DNS SOA record.
A portion of an FQDN further defined in RFC 8499 Section 2

Domain Contact

Domain Label
Domain Name

An ordered list of one or more Domain Labels assigned to a node in the Domain Name
System.
The set of all possible Domain Names that are subordinate to a single node in the
Domain Name System.
Sometimes referred to as the “owner” of a Domain Name, but more properly the
person(s) or entity(ies) registered with a Domain Name Registrar as having the right tocontrol how a Domain Name is used, such as the natural person or Legal Entity that islisted as the “Registrant” by WHOIS or the Domain Name Registrar.
An entity that manages the reservation of internet domain names.

Domain Namespace
Domain Name Registrant

Domain Name Registrar
Domain Naming Service

DNS

Expiry Date
Extended Validation

EV

Fully-Qualified Domain
Name
Generic top-level domain

FQDN
gTLD

Government Entity

Governance and Policy
Committee

GPC

Hardware Security
ModuleHigh Assurance

HSM

Internal Name

International Organizationfor Standardization
Internationalized Domain
NameInternet Assigned Numbers
Authority
Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names andNumbers

ISO
IDN
IANA
ICANN

An internet service used to map IP addresses to domain names.
The “Not After” date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate’s validity
period.
Certificate issued under the Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation Certificates published by the CA/Browser Forum.
An absolute Domain Name that includes the Domain Labels of all superior nodes in theInternet Domain Name System.
A category of top-level domains maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority.
A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similarelement of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country(such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).
The Starfield committee which creates and maintains the policies related to theStarfield Public Key Infrastructure. Also known as the Policy Authority Committee(PAC).
A specialized computer hardware system designed to securely store encryption keys.
Starfield’s vetting process that verifies the identity of the individual or organization thatrequested the certificate and access to the domain.
A string of characters (not an IP address) in a Common Name or Subject Alternative
Name field of a Certificate that cannot be verified as globally unique within the public
DNS at the time of certificate issuance because it does not end with a Top Level Domain
registered in IANA’s Root Zone Database.
An independent, non-governmental international organization with a membership of
167 national standards bodies.
An Internet domain name that contains at least one label displayed in software
applications, in whole or in part, in non-latin script or alphabet.
The organization responsible for overseeing the allocation unique names and numbers
used in technical standards.
The nonprofit organization overseeing the use of internet domains.

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Term

AcronymDefinition

Internet Protocol

IP

A network layer communications protocol used for addressing and routing.

IP Address

A 32-bit or 128-bit number assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol forcommunication
The person(s) or entity(ies) registered with an IP Address Registration Authority as
having the right to control how one or more IP Addresses are used.
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or a Regional Internet Registry (RIPE,
APNIC, ARIN, AfriNIC, LACNIC).
An entity that issues certificates.

IP Address Contact
IP Address Registration
Authority
IssuerIssuing CA

Key Generation Script

In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could beeither a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.
A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an
unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.
A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

Key Pair

The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

LDH Label

The label form and syntax definition for host names further defined in RFC 5890 Section
2.3.1
An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity orother entity with legal standing in a country’s legal system.
Starfield’s vetting process that verifies access to the domain.

Key Compromise

Legal Entity
Medium Assurance
National Institute ofStandards and Technology
Non-Reserved LDH Label

NIST

Object Identifier

OID

Onion Domain Name
Online Certificate Status
ProtocolOCSPOSCP Responder
P-LabelPlace of Business
Policy Authority

PA

Policy Authority
Committee

PAC

Private Key

Public Key

Public Key Infrastructure

PKI

Public Suffix List

PSL

Publicly-Trusted Certificate

US Government Department of Commerce agency for advancing measurements,
science, and technology.
Non-Reserved LDH labels are the set of valid LDH labels that do not have "--" in thethird and fourth positions as defined in RFC 5890 Section 2.3.1
A unique identifier issued to an organization by IANA.
A Fully Qualified Domain Name ending with the RFC 7686 “.onion” Special-Use Domain
Name.
A standardized query/response protocol whereby a client can request the status of agiven Certificate and be given a response that will indicate whether the Certificate isvalid or revoked.
An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its
Repository for processing Certificate status requests.
A XN-Label that contains valid output of the Punycode algorithm as defined in RFC 3492
Section 6.3.
The location of any facility (such as a factory, retail store, warehouse, etc.) where theApplicant’s business is conducted.
The entity responsible for identifying and maintaining requirements for a Public Key
Infrastructure
The Starfield committee which creates and maintains the policies related to theStarfield Public Key Infrastructure. Also known as the Governance and Policy
Committee (GPC).
The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used tocreate Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that wereencrypted with the corresponding Public Key.
The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding
Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created withthe holder’s corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can bedecrypted only with the holder’s corresponding Private Key.
A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used tofacilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates andkeys based on Public Key Cryptography.
A list of usable domain suffixes as defined by ICANN.

Random ValueA Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate
is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.
A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2
Identity/Qualifications of Assessor.
A value specified by a CA to the Applicant that exhibits at least 112 bits of entropy.

Registered Domain Name

A Domain Name that has been registered with a Domain Name Registrar.

Qualified Auditor

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Term

AcronymDefinition

Registration Authority

RA

Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects ofCertificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may
assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When “RA” isused as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply aseparate body, but can be part of the CA.
An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Informationthat is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments asreliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant
obtaining a Certificate.
A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone
number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant
Representative.
An individual or entity that acts in reliance on a Certificate or digital signatureassociated with a Certificate.
An agreement which specifies the stipulations under which a person or organizationacts as a Relying Party.
An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as
Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status
information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.
A publication in a series from the principal technical development and standards-setting
bodies for the Internet, most prominently the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
A value, derived in a method specified by the CA which binds this demonstration ofcontrol to the certificate request.
Either a Random Value or a Request Token, together with additional information thatuniquely identifies the Subscriber, as specified by the CA.
A person or organization which is given permission by Starfield to sell products to
Subscribers
An IPv4 or IPv6 address that is contained in the address block of any entry in either ofthe following IANA registries:

Reliable Data Source

Reliable Method ofCommunication
Relying Party
Relying Party Agreement
Repository

Request for Comment

RFC

Request Token
Required Website Content
Reseller
Reserved IP Address

https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-specialregistry.xhtml

Root CA
Root Certificate
Secure Socket Layer

SSL

Starfield
Starfield PKIStart of Authority

SOA

Subject

Subject Alternative Name
Subject Identity
Information
Subordinate CA
Subscriber
Subscriber Agreement

SAN

https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-specialregistry.xhtml
The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application
Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.
The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate
verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.
Deprecated transport layer protocol for securing communications. Acronym is still usedin lieu of TLS, the superseding protocol. In the context of this document, SSL implies
TLS.
Starfield Technologies, LLC, and its resellers.
The Starfield Public Key Infrastructure that provides Certificates for individuals andentities.
A DNS resource record containing administrative information about the base DNS zone
marking the start of the zone of authority.
The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the
Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control andoperation of the Subscriber.
Optional certificate extension defined in RFC 5280.
Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does notinclude a Domain Name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject
commonName field
A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another
Subordinate CA.
The individual or entity that has been issued a Certificate and is authorized to use thePrivate Key that corresponds to the Public Key in the Certificate.
An agreement which specifies the stipulations under which a person or organizationacts as a Subscriber.

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Term

AcronymTechnically Constrained
Subordinate CA Certificate
Terms of Use

Trustworthy System

Transport Layer Security

TLS

Unified Communications
Certificate
Unregistered Domain
Name
Valid Certificate

UCC

Definition
A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settingsand Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA
Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.
Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued inaccordance with these Requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of
the CA or is the CA.
Computer hardware, software, and procedures that are: reasonably secure from
intrusion and misuse; provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct
operation; are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and enforce
the applicable security policy.
Protocol used for secure communications over the transport layer of networking
leveraging encryption and certificates.
Certificate that includes multiple Fully-Qualified Domain Names in the Subject
Alternative Name extension used for unified communications.
A Domain Name that is not a Registered Domain Name.
A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

Validation Specialist

Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these
Requirements.
From RFC 5280: “The period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive.”

Validity Period
WHOIS

A query and response protocol that is widely used for querying databases that store theregistered users or assignees of an Internet resource such as a domain name.
A Certificate containing at least one Wildcard Domain Name in the Subject Alternative
Names in the Certificate.
A string starting with "\*." (U+002A ASTERISK, U+002E FULL STOP) immediately
followed by a Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
A subset of LDH labels further defined in RFC 5890 Section 2.3.1.

Wildcard Certificate
Wildcard Domain Name
XN-Label

1.6.2 References
ETSI EN 319 403, Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider
Conformity Assessment - Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing
Trust Service Providers
ETSI EN 319 411-1, Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security
requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General
requirementsETSI TS 102 042, Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements forcertification authorities issuing public key certificates.
FIPS 140-2, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication - Security
Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.
FIPS 140-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication - Security
Requirements For Cryptographic Modules, Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, March 22, 2019.

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FIPS 186-4, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication - Digital SignatureStandard (DSS), Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards andTechnology, July 2013.
ISO 21188:2006, Public key infrastructure for financial services – Practices and policy
framework.
Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, Version 1.7
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-Network-SecurityGuidelines-v1.7.pdf.
NIST SP 800-89, Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature
Applications
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-89/SP-800-89_November2006.pdf.
RFC2119, Request for Comments: 2119, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels. S. Bradner. March 1997.
RFC3492, Request for Comments: 3492, Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode forInternationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA). A. Costello. March 2003.
RFC3647, Request for Comments: 3647, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework. S. Chokhani, et al. November
2003.
RFC3912, Request for Comments: 3912, WHOIS Protocol Specification. L. Daigle.
September 2004.
RFC3986, Request for Comments: 3986, Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic
Syntax. T. Berners-Lee, et al. January 2005.
RFC4366, Request for Comments: 4366, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions,
Blake-Wilson, et al, April 2006.
RFC5019, Request for Comments: 5019, The Lightweight Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments. A. Deacon, et al. September
2007.
RFC5280, Request for Comments: 5280, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. D. Cooper, et al. May 2008.
RFC5890, Request for Comments: 5890, Internationalized Domain Names forApplications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework. J. Klensin. August 2010.
RFC5952, Request for Comments: 5952, A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text
Representation. S. Kawamura, et al. August 2010.
RFC6960, Request for Comments: 6960, X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP. S. Santesson, et al. June 2013.
RFC6962, Request for Comments: 6962, Certificate Transparency. B. Laurie, et al. June2013.
RFC7231, Request For Comments: 7231, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1):
Semantics and Content. R. Fielding, et al. June 2014.
RFC7482, Request for Comments: 7482, Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Format. A. Newton, et al. March 2015.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

RFC7538, Request For Comments: 7538, The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status Code308 (Permanent Redirect). J. Reschke. April 2015.
RFC8499, Request for Comments: 8499, DNS Terminology. P. Hoffman, et al. January
2019.
RFC8659, Request for Comments: 8659, DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA)
Resource Record. P. Hallam-Baker, et al. November 2019.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities, SSL Baseline with Network Security, Version 2.5,
available at https://www.cpacanada.ca/-/media/site/operational/ms-memberservices/docs/webtrust/wt100bwtbr-25-110120-finalaoda.pdf.
X.509, Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (08/2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, Information
technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attributecertificate frameworks.

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1.6.3 Conventions
Terms not otherwise defined in these Requirements shall be as defined in applicableagreements, user manuals, Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements, ofStarfield.
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD","SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in these Requirements shallbe interpreted in accordance with RFC 2119.
By convention, this document omits time and time zones when listing effective
requirements such as dates. Except when explicitly specified, the associated time with adate shall be 00:00:00 UTC.

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2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1

Repositories

In providing Repository services, obligations of the Starfield PKI include:• Storing and distributing public-key certificates (where relevant)• Storing and distributing certificate status information (such as CRLs and/or online
certificate status)• Storing and distributing this CP/CPS and subsequent updates.
• Storing and distributing the Relying Party and Subscriber agreements.
The Starfield Repository is located at https://certs.secureserver.net/repository

2.2

Publication of Certification Information

The Starfield repository shall contain the current and historical versions of this CP/CPS, afingerprint of the Starfield Root CAs, current CRLs for the Starfield CAs, and otherinformation relevant to Subscribers and Relying Parties. This CP/CPS is structured inaccordance with RFC 3647 in alignment with the most recent published version of the CA/B
Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
Certificates

2.3

Time or Frequency of Publication

This CP/CPS is updated and published on no less than an annual basis. CRLs and OCSP
responses are published in accordance with Section 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency andSection 4.9.10 On-line Revocation Checking Requirements.

2.4

Access Controls on Repositories

Read access to the Starfield repository is unrestricted. Write access to the repository is
restricted to authorized Starfield PKI personnel through the use of appropriate logical access
controls.

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3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
3.1

Naming3.1.1 Types of Names
All certificate holders require either a Distinguished Name in the Subject field that is incompliance with the X.500 standard for Distinguished Names, or a set of Subject
Alternative Name values in the Subject Alternative Name extension. In the case where
subject identity information is contained solely in the Subject Alternative Nameextension, the Subject field of the certificate shall be empty. The Starfield PKI approvesnaming conventions for the creation of distinguished names and Subject Alternative
Name values for certificate applicants.
The Issuer and Subject Distinguished Name fields for Certificates issued by Starfield are
populated in accordance with Section 7.1 Certificate Profile.

3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful
For Starfield PKI certificates that contain a Distinguished Name in the Subject field, said
Distinguished Names shall be meaningful. For Starfield PKI certificates with an empty
Subject field, any information contained in the Subject Alternative Name extension may
or may not be meaningful depending on the type and intended use of the certificate.

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers
For Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs), Starfield may include the Punycode
representation of the name(s) in one or more Subject fields.

3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms
Refer to Section 3.1.1 Types of Names

3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names
Refer to Sections 3.1.1 Types of Names and 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role ofTrademarks.

3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication and Role of Trademarks
Certificate Applicants are prohibited from using names in their Certificate Applications
that infringe upon others’ Intellectual Property Rights. Starfield does not verify whether a
Certificate Applicant has Intellectual Property rights in the name appearing in a Certificate
Application nor does Starfield arbitrate, mediate, prosecute, or otherwise resolve any
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dispute concerning the ownership of any domain name, trade name, trademark, orservice mark. Starfield may, without liability to any Certificate applicant, reject orsuspend any Certificate application because of such dispute.

3.2

Initial Identity Validation

For Basic and Medium Assurance Domain Validated SSL Server Certificate Subscribers,
Starfield verifies the following:• the individual requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) that are
specified in the certificate application using the methods described in Section 3.2.2.4
Validation of Domain Authorization or Control.
For High Assurance Organizational Validated SSL Server Certificate Subscribers, Starfield
verifies the following:• the individual requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) that are
specified in the certificate application using the methods described in Section 3.2.2.4
Validation of Domain Authorization or Control.
• the individual requesting the certificate is authorized to do so by the organization
named in the certificate using the methods described in Section 3.2.5 Validation of
Authority• the organization name represents an organization validated using the methods
described in Section 3.2.2 Authentication of Organization and Domain Identity.
For Extended Validation SSL Server Certificate Subscribers, Starfield verifies the following inaccordance with the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management ofExtended Validation Certificates:• Legal Existence and Identity• Assumed Name (optional)• Physical Existence• Operational Existence (if records indicate that the organization is less than three
years old)
• Domain ownership or exclusive right to use• Name, title, and authority of contract signer, and certificate approverNote: Effective as of 1 October 2020, before using an incorporating or registration agency forvalidation of an Extended Validation Certificate, that agency is disclosed publicly via
https://ssltools.godaddy.com/compliance/Approved_Incorporating_and_Registration_Agencies.xlsx .
This document, Approved Incorporating and Registration Agencies, contains the name of theagency, jurisdiction(s) and website information as well as a document history including version
numbers and publication dates for all edits.

3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key
The Subscriber’s certificate request must contain the public key to be certified and bedigitally signed with the corresponding private key.
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3.2.2 Authentication of Organization and Domain Identity
3.2.2.1

Identity

If the Subject Identity Information is to include the name or address of an organization,
Starfield verifies the identity and address of the organization and that the address is
the Applicant’s address of existence or operation using documentation provided by, or
through communication with, at least one of the following:
1. A government agency in the jurisdiction of the Applicant’s legal creation,
existence, or recognition;
2. A third party database that is periodically updated and considered a Reliable
Data Source;
3. A site visit by Starfield or a third party who is acting as an agent for Starfield; or
4. An Attestation Letter.
Starfield may use the same documentation or communication described in 1 through 4
above to verify both the Applicant’s identity and address, or Starfield may verify theaddress of the Applicant (but not the identity of the Applicant) using a utility bill, bankstatement, credit card statement, government-issued tax document, or other form ofidentification determined to be reliable.

3.2.2.2

DBA/Tradename

If the Subject Identity Information is to include a DBA or tradename, Starfield verifies
the Applicant’s right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:
1. Documentation provided by, or communication with, a government agency inthe jurisdiction of the Applicant’s legal creation, existence, or recognition;
2. A Reliable Data Source;
3. Communication with a government agency responsible for the management ofsuch DBAs or tradenames;
4. An Attestation Letter accompanied by documentary support; or
5. A utility bill, bank statement, credit card statement, government-issued tax
document, or other form of identification that the Starfield determines to bereliable.

3.2.2.3

Verification of Country

If the subject:countryName field is present, then Starfield shall verify the country
associated with the Subject using one of the following:
1. The IP Address range assignment by country for either
a. The web site’s IP address, as indicated by the DNS record for the website, orb. The Applicant’s IP address;
2. The ccTLD of the requested Domain Name;
3. Information provided by the Domain Name Registrar; or
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4. A method identified in Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.

3.2.2.4

Validation of Domain Authorization or Control

Domain names included in the Subject Common Name or Subject Alternative Name
fields of an End Entity Certificate may be Fully-Qualified or wildcard. Wildcard
certificates are validated in accordance with [BR 3.2.2.6].
Verification of domain name access is performed when a domain name is first
requested for a certificate in a given customer account.
Verification of domain name access may be performed when a Subscriber requests therenewal of a certificate in accordance with Section 4.6 Certificate Renewal.
In compliance with the CA / Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuanceand Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, for each Fully-Qualified Domain
Name listed in a Certificate, Starfield confirms that, as of the date the Certificate wasissued, the Applicant either is the Domain Name Registrant or has control over the
FQDN by using one or more of the following methods:
Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact
For certificates issued prior to August 1, 2018 confirming the Applicant as theDomain Name Registrant directly with the Domain Name Registrar by determiningthat the domain was registered using the same account as the certificate.
Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact
Communicating a Random Value via email, fax, SMS, or postal mail to a Domain
Contact and receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value to therequest for approval.
Phone Contact with Domain Contact
Confirming the Applicant's control over the requested FQDN by calling the Domain
Name Registrant's phone number and obtaining a response confirming theApplicant's request for validation of the FQDN.
Note: Starfield will NOT perform validations using this method after May 31, 2019.
Completed validations using this method SHALL continue to be valid for subsequent issuance
per the applicable certificate data reuse periods.

Constructed Email to Domain Contact
Communicating with the Domain’s administrator by (i) using an email address
created by pre-pending ‘admin’, ‘administrator’, ‘webmaster’, ‘hostmaster’, or‘postmaster’ in the local part, followed by the at-sign (“@”), followed by an
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Authorization Domain Name, (ii) including a Random Value in the email, and (iii)
receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value.
Domain Authorization Document
For certificates issued on or after August 1, 2018, this method is not used forvalidation.
Agreed-Upon Change to Website
Having the Applicant demonstrate practical control over the FQDN by placing aRandom Value generated by Starfield on an online web page located at /.wellknown/pki-validation/ on the Authorization Domain Name that is accessible by the
CA via HTTP/HTTPS over an Authorized Port.
Note: Starfield will NOT perform validations using this method after June 3, 2020. Completed
validations using this method SHALL continue to be valid for subsequent issuance per theapplicable certificate data reuse periods.

DNS Change
Having the Applicant demonstrate practical control over the FQDN by confirming thepresence of a Random Value generated by Starfield in a DNS TXT or CAA record for
an Authorization Domain Name or an Authorization Domain Name that is prefixedwith a Domain Label that begins with an underscore character.
If a Random Value is used, Starfield or Delegated Third Party SHALL provide a
Random Value unique to the certificate request and SHALL not use the Random
Value after (i) 30 days or (ii) if the Applicant submitted the certificate request, thetimeframe permitted for reuse of validated information relevant to the certificate.
IP Address
No IP address certificates are issued under this CPS.
Test Certificate
Starfield does not validate domain authorization or control by confirming presence of a Test
Certificate.

TLS Using a Random NumberThis method of domain validation is not used.
Any Other Method
This method of domain validation is not used.
Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact

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Confirming the Applicant is the Domain Name Contact directly with the Domain
Name Registrar by determining that the domain was registered using the sameaccount as the certificate.
Email to DNS CAA Contact
This method of domain validation is not used.
Email to DNS TXT Contact
This method of domain validation is not used.
Phone Contact with Domain Contact
Confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by calling the Domain Contact’s
phone number and obtain a confirming response to validate the ADN. Each phone
call MAY confirm control of multiple ADNs provided that the same Domain Contact
phone number is listed for each ADN being verified and they provide a confirming
response for each ADN.
In the event that someone other than a Domain Contact is reached, Starfield MAY
request to be transferred to the Domain Contact.
In the event of reaching voicemail, Starfield may leave the Random Value and theADN(s) being validated. The Random Value MUST be returned to Starfield approve
the request.
The Random Value SHALL remain valid for use in a confirming response for no morethan 30 days from its creation.
Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, Starfield MAY also issue
Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the Domain Labels of the validated
FQDN. This method is suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.
Phone Contact with DNS TXT Record Phone Contact
This method of domain validation is not used.
Phone Contact with DNS CAA Phone Contact
This method of domain validation is not used.
Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2
Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by verifying that the Request
Token or Random Value is contained in the contents of a file.

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1. The entire Request Token or Random Value MUST NOT appear in the request
used to retrieve the file, and
2. The CA MUST receive a successful HTTP response from the request (meaning a
2xx
HTTP status code must be received).
The file containing the Request Token or Random Number:
1. MUST be located on the Authorization Domain Name, and2. MUST be located under the “/.well-known/pki-validation” directory, and3. MUST be retrieved via either the “http” or “https” scheme, and
4. MUST be accessed over an Authorized Port.
If the CA follows redirects, the following apply:
1. Redirects MUST be initiated at the HTTP protocol layer.
a. For validations performed on or after December 1, 2021, redirects MUST be theresultof a 301, 302, or 307 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7231, Section
6.4, or a 308 HTTP status code response, as defined in RFC 7538, Section 3.
Redirects MUST be to the final value of the Location HTTP response header, as
defined in RFC 7231, Section 7.1.2.
b. For validations performed prior to December 1, 2021, redirects MUST be theresult of an HTTP status code result within the 3xx Redirection class of status
codes, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4. CAs SHOULD limit the accepted status
codes and resource URLs to those defined within 1.a.
2. Redirects MUST be to resource URLs with either the “http” or “https” scheme.
3. Redirects MUST be to resource URLs accessed via Authorized Ports.
If a Random Value is used, then:
1. The CA MUST provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request.
2. The Random Value MUST remain valid for use in a confirming response for no
more than 30 days from its creation.

Note:*For Certificates issued prior to December 1, 2021, Starfield MAY also issue Certificates forother FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable forvalidating Wildcard Domain Names.
*For Certificates issued on or after December 1, 2021, Starfield MUST NOT issue Certificatesfor other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN unless Starfield performs
a separate validation for that FQDN using an authorized method. This method is NOT
suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME

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Confirming the Applicant's control over a FQDN by validating domain control of the
FQDN using the ACME HTTP Challenge method defined in section 8.3 of RFC 8555.

Note:*For Certificates issued prior to December 1, 2021, Starfield MAY also issue Certificates forother FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN. This method is suitable forvalidating Wildcard Domain Names.
*For Certificates issued on or after December 1, 2021, Starfield MUST NOT issue Certificatesfor other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN unless Starfield performs
a separate validation for that FQDN using an authorized method. This method is NOT
suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

TLS Using ALPN
While the issuing CAs under Starfield’s direct control, do not use this method ofvalidation, Certainly issuing CAs MAY confirm the Applicant’s control over a FQDN byvalidating domain control of the FQDN by negotiating a new application layer
protocol using the TLS Application‐Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Extension[RFC7301] as defined in RFC 8737. The following are additive requirements to RFC
8737
Note: Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, Starfield MUST NOT issue
Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN unless
Starfield performs a separate validation for that FQDN using an authorized method. Thismethod is NOT suitable for validating Wildcard Domain Names.

3.2.2.5

Authentication for an IP Address

No IP address certificates are issued under this CPS.

3.2.2.6

Wildcard Domain Validation

Before issuing a Wildcard Certificate, Starfield MUST establish and follow a
documented procedure that determines if the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain
Name in the Certificate is “registry‐controlled” or is a “public suffix” (e.g. “*.com”,“*.co.uk”, see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation).
If the FQDN portion of any Wildcard Domain Name is “registry‐controlled” or is a"public suffix”, CAs MUST refuse issuance unless the Applicant proves its rightful
control of the entire Domain Namespace. (e.g. CAs MUST NOT issue “*.co.uk” or“*.local”, but MAY issue “*.example.com” to Example Co.).
Determination of what is “registry‐controlled” versus the registerable portion of aCountry Code Top‐Level Domain Namespace is not standardized at the time of writing
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and is not a property of the DNS itself. Current best practice is to consult a “public
suffix list” such as the Public Suffix List (PSL), and to retrieve a fresh copy regularly.
If using the PSL, a CA SHOULD consult the “ICANN DOMAINS” section only, not the“PRIVATE DOMAINS” section. The PSL is updated regularly to contain new gTLDsdelegated by ICANN, which are listed in the “ICANN DOMAINS” section. A CA is notprohibited from issuing a Wildcard Certificate to the Registrant of an entire gTLD,
provided that control of the entire namespace is demonstrated in an appropriate way.

3.2.2.7

Data Source Accuracy

Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, Starfield evaluates the source
for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification. Starfield
considers the following during its evaluation:
1. The age of the information provided,
2. The frequency of updates to the information source,
3. The data provider and purpose of the data collection,
4. The public accessibility of the data availability, and
5. The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.
Databases maintained by Starfield, its owner, or its affiliated companies do not qualify
as a Reliable Data Source if the primary purpose of the database is to collectinformation for the purpose of fulfilling the validation requirements under this section.

3.2.2.8

CAA Records

As part of the Certificate issuance process, the Starfield MUST retrieve and process
CAA records in accordance with RFC 8659 for each dNSName in the subjectAltName
extension that does not contain an Onion Domain Name. If the CA issues, they MUST
do so within the TTL of the CAA record, or 8 hours, whichever is greater.
This stipulation does not prevent the CA from checking CAA records at any other time.
When processing CAA records, CAs MUST process the issue, issuewild, and iodef
property tags as specified in RFC 8659, although they are not required to act on thecontents of the iodef property tag. Additional property tags MAY be supported, but
MUST NOT conflict with or supersede the mandatory property tags set out in thisdocument. CAs MUST respect the critical flag and not issue a certificate if theyencounter an unrecognized property tag with this flag set.

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RFC 8659 requires that CAs “MUST NOT issue a certificate unless the CA determinesthat either (1) the certificate request is consistent with the applicable CAA RRset or (2)an exception specified in the relevant CP or CPS applies.”

Note: Starfield does not issue certificates for Onion Domain Names

3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity
For High Assurance Individual Subscribers, Starfield verifies the following:• the individual requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) that are
specified in the certificate application using the methods described in Section 3.2.2.4
Validation of Domain Authorization or Control.
• the identity of the individual named in the certificate application using the following
methods:o Starfield verifies the Applicant’s name using a legible copy, which discernibly
shows the Applicant’s face, of at least one currently valid government‐issued
photo ID (passport, drivers license, military ID, national ID, or equivalent
document type).
o Starfield verifies the Applicant’s address using a form of identification that
the CA determines to be reliable, such as a government ID, utility bill, or bankor credit card statement.
o Starfield verifies the certificate request with the Applicant using a Reliable
Method of Communication.

3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber Information
Not applicable.

3.2.5 Validation of Authority
If the Applicant for a Certificate containing Subject Identity Information is an organization,
Starfield uses a Reliable Method of Communication including email, telephone, and postal
services to verify the authenticity of the Applicant Representative’s certificate request.
Using a Reliable Method of Communication, Starfield establishes the authenticity of thecertificate request directly with the Applicant Representative or with an authoritative
source within the Applicant’s organization, such as the Applicant’s main business offices,
corporate offices, human resource offices, information technology offices, or otherdepartment Starfield deems appropriate.
In addition, Starfield has a process that allows an Applicant to specify the individuals who
may request Certificates. If an Applicant specifies, in writing, the individuals who may
request a Certificate, then Starfield does not accept any certificate requests that are
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outside this specification. Starfield will provide an Applicant with a list of its authorizedcertificate requesters upon the Applicant’s verified written request.

3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation
Refer to Section 10.3 Cross CA Certificates for all cross certificates that identify the CA as
the Subject.

3.3
Identification and Authentication for Re-key
Requests
3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key
Subscriber requests for routine re-key are authenticated using a shared secret.

3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-key After
Revocation
The process for re-key after revocation of a Subscriber certificate is complete reenrollment, which requires the generation of a new Subscriber key pair and the reperformance of the initial Subscriber identification and authentication procedures
specified in Section 3.2 Initial Identity Validation.

3.4
Identification and Authentication for Revocation
RequestSection 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension describes requirements for identification
and authentication of revocation requests.
When revocation is initiated by Starfield, identification and authentication is not required.

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4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONALREQUIREMENTS
4.1

Certificate Application

Certificate applications must include all information required by the relevant Starfieldcertificate application form.

4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application
Either the Applicant or an authorized Certificate Requestor may submit certificate
requests.
Starfield maintains an internal database of all previously revoked Certificates andpreviously rejected certificate requests due to suspected phishing or other fraudulent
usage or concerns and uses this information to identify subsequent suspicious certificate
requests.

4.1.2 Enrollment Process and Responsibilities
Enrollment requires a completed certificate request, acceptance or execution of a
Subscriber Agreement, and a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) containing the public key
to be signed.

4.2

Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions
When a certificate application is received, Starfield performs the validation required forthe type of certificate in question as described in Section 3.2 Initial Identity Validation.
Prior to issuing a certificate, Starfield processes RFC 6844 Certificate Authority
Authorization (CAA) records for each FQDN in the certificate according to therequirements defined in the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted Certificates. Starfield recognizes the following set of issuer domainnames in CAA "issue" or "issuewild" records as permitting certificate issuance:• godaddy.com• starfieldtech.com
Starfield will only use documents and data to verify certificate information that is inaccordance with the maximum time permitted for reuse as per the Baseline
Requirements (BR) and the Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation Certificates.
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Starfield relies on internal and 3rd party data to identify high risk Certificate requests prior
to the Certificate’s approval and denies these requests and/or subjects them to additionalverification procedures.
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) containing mixed character sets within a label
may be subjected to additional verification procedures.
In cases where the certificate request does not contain all the necessary information
about the Applicant, the Starfield shall obtain the remaining information from theApplicant or, having obtained it from a reliable, independent, third-party data source,
confirm it with the Applicant.

4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications
Starfield will reject any Certificate application that cannot be verified. Starfield may also
reject a certificate application if Starfield believes that issuing the Certificate could
damage or diminish Starfield’s reputation or business.
Starfield enforces separation of validation duties to ensure that no one person can singlehandedly validate and authorize the issuance of EV Certificates.

4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications
Certificate applications made to CAs under Starfield’s direct control may be rejected if
domain validation is not completed within 45 days from certificate request. The RA canchoose to extend this timeframe on an individual basis.

4.3

Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance
Certificates are generated, issued and published only after the RA performs the required
identification and authentication steps in accordance with Section 4.2.1 Performing
Identification and Authentication Functions and Section 3.2 Initial Identity Validation.

4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance ofCertificate
Subscribers are notified of issuance via email or API methods.

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4.4

Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance
A Subscriber’s receipt of a certificate and subsequent use of the key pair and certificate
constitute certificate acceptance. By accepting a certificate, the Subscriber:• Agrees to be bound by the continuing responsibilities, obligations and duties
imposed by this CP/CPS,• Agrees to be bound by the Subscribing Party agreement, and• Represents and warrants that to its knowledge no unauthorized person has hadaccess to the private key associated with the certificate, and• Represents and warrants that the certificate information it has supplied during theregistration process is truthful and has been accurately and fully published within
the certificate.

4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA
CA certificates are published in the Starfield repository.
All SSL certificates are published in one or more publicly accessible Certificate
Transparency (CT) logs.

4.4.3

Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other
Entities

No Stipulation.

4.5
4.5.1

Key Pair and Certificate Usage
Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Subscriber obligations for protection of private keys and usage restrictions are listed in
the relevant Starfield Subscriber Agreement.

4.5.2

Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Relying Party obligations for verification of public keys and usage restrictions are listed in
the Starfield Relying Party Agreement.

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4.6

Certificate Renewal

4.6.1 Circumstance for Certificate Renewal
Certificate renewal, defined as the process whereby a new certificate with an extended
validity period is created for an existing Distinguished Name, is permitted for CA
Certificates.

4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal
Either the Applicant or an authorized Certificate Requestor may submit renewal requests.
Starfield maintains an internal database of all previously revoked Certificates andpreviously rejected certificate requests due to suspected phishing or other fraudulent
usage or concerns and uses this information to identify subsequent suspicious certificate
requests.

4.6.3

Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Subscribers are permitted to reuse a previous certificate request to replace an expiring or
expired Certificate. Where the Subscriber holds a Certificate and the initial Subscriber
identification and authentication process (as described in Section 3.2 Initial Identity
Validation) has been performed within the maximum time permitted for reuse as per the
Baseline Requirements (BR) and the Guidelines for the Issuance and Management ofExtended Validation Certificates, Starfield may authenticate a renewal certificate request
using a shared secret. Starfield will require re‐verification and if Starfield believes that the
information has become inaccurate.

4.6.4

Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Subscribers are notified of issuance via email or API methods.

4.6.5

Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

As described in Section 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance.

4.6.6

Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

As described in Section 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA.

4.6.7

Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other
Entities

No Stipulation.
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4.7
4.7.1

Certificate Re-key
Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

Subscribers are permitted to submit an unlimited number of requests to re-key any valid
Certificate during the validity period of the Certificate. After re‐keying a Certificate,Starfield may revoke the old Certificate in up to 72 hours.

4.7.2

Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

Starfield, the Applicant, or an authorized Certificate Requestor may submit re-key
requests.

4.7.3

Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

Re-key requests generally follow the process used for renewals (as described in Section
4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests).

4.7.4

Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Subscribers are notified of issuance via email or API methods.

4.7.5

Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed
Certificate

As described in Section 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance.

4.7.6

Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

As described in Section 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA.

4.7.7

Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other
Entities

No Stipulation.

4.8

Certificate Modification

Starfield defines certificate modification as the issuance of a new certificate with somechange to information contained in the certificate such as the addition or removal of a SAN.

4.8.1

Circumstance for Certificate Modification

Subscribers are permitted to request an unlimited number of modifications to any valid
Certificate during the validity period of the Certificate.
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4.8.2

Who May Request Certificate Modification

Starfield, the Subscriber, or an authorized Certificate Requestor may request
modification.

4.8.3

Processing Certificate Modification Requests

Modification requests generally follow the process used for renewals (as described in
Section 4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests).

4.8.4

Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

Subscribers are notified of issuance via email or API methods.

4.8.5

Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

As described in Section 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance.

4.8.6

Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

As described in Section 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA.

4.8.7

Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other
Entities

No Stipulation.

4.9

Certificate Revocation and Suspension

Starfield supports certificate revocation for all Starfield CAs. Starfield does not support
certificate suspension.

4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation
4.9.1.1

Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

Starfield SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and using the corresponding CRL
Reason from Section 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions if one or more of thefollowing occurs:
1. The Subscriber requests in writing that Starfield, without specifying a reason,
revoke the Certificate (CRLReason “unspecified (0)” which results in no
ReasonCode extension being provided);

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2. The Subscriber notifies Starfield that the original certificate request was not
authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason 9,
privilegeWithdrawn);
3. Starfield obtains evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key corresponding to
the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason 1,
keyCompromise);
4. Starfield is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily
compute the Subscriber’s Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate,such as a Debian weak key, see https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys(CRLReason 1,
keyCompromise);
5. Starfield obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization orcontrol for any Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate
should not be relied upon (CRLReason 4, superseded);.
Starfield may revoke a certificate within 24 hours and will revoke a Certificate within 5days and use the corresponding CRLReason if one or more of the following occurs:
1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 Key
Sizes and Section 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checkingof this CP/CPS (CRLReason 4, superseded);
2. Starfield obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused (CRLReason 9,
privilegeWithdrawn);
3. Starfield is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its
material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use(CRLReason 9, privilegeWithdrawn);
4. Starfield is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully‐
Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legallypermitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant’s
right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement
between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the
Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason 5,
cessationOfOperation);
5. Starfield is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used toauthenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully‐Qualified Domain
Name (CRLReason 9, privilegeWithdrawn);
6. Starfield is made aware of a material change in the information contained in
the Certificate (CRLReason 9, privilegeWithdrawn);
7. Starfield is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance withthese Requirements or this CP/CPS (CRLReason 4, superseded);
8. Starfield determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in
the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason 9, privilegeWithdrawn);
9. Starfield’s right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or isrevoked or terminated, unless Starfield has made arrangements to continue
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maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which
results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
10. Revocation is required by this CP/CPS for a reason that is not otherwise
required to be specified by this section (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which
results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or
11. Starfield is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the
Subscriber’s Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the
specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1,
keyCompromise).
If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject to these Requirements and was either
issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the
CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6). If a CRL entry is for a Certificate subject
to these Requirements, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6).
If a reasonCode CRL entry extension is present, the CRLReason MUST indicate themost appropriate reason for revocation of the Certificate.
CRLReason MUST be included in the reasonCode extension of the CRL entry
corresponding to a Subscriber Certificate that is revoked after July 15, 2023, unless the
CRLReason is "unspecified (0)". Revocation reason code entries for Subscriber
Certificates revoked prior to July 15, 2023, do NOT need to be added or changed.
Only the following CRLReasons MAY be present in the CRL reasonCode extension for
Subscriber Certificates:
keyCompromise (RFC 5280 CRLReason #1): Indicates that it is known or suspected that
the Subscriber’s Private Key has been compromised;affiliationChanged (RFC 5280 CRLReason #3): Indicates that the Subject's name orother Subject Identity Information in the Certificate has changed, but there is no cause
to suspect that the Certificate's Private Key has been compromised;superseded (RFC 5280 CRLReason #4): Indicates that the Certificate is being replaced
because: the Subscriber has requested a new Certificate, the CA has reasonable
evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully‐qualified
domain name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon, or the CA has
revoked the Certificate for compliance reasons such as the Certificate does not comply
with the Baseline Requirements or this CP/CPS;
cessationOfOperation (RFC 5280 CRLReason #5): Indicates that the website with theCertificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the Certificate, or if the Subscriber nolonger owns or controls the Domain Name in the Certificate prior to the expiration of
the Certificate; or
privilegeWithdrawn (RFC 5280 CRLReason #9): Indicates that there has been asubscriber-side infraction that has not resulted in keyCompromise, such as theCertificate Subscriber provided misleading information in their Certificate Request or
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has not upheld their material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms ofUse.
The Subscriber Agreement, or an online resource referenced therein, MUST inform
Subscribers about the revocation reason options listed above and provide explanation
about when to choose each option. Tools that the CA provides to the Subscriber MUST
allow for these options to be easily specified when the Subscriber requests revocationof their Certificate, with the default value being that no revocation reason is provided(i.e. the default corresponds to the CRLReason “unspecified (0)” which results in noreasonCode extension being provided in the CRL).
The privilegeWithdrawn reasonCode SHOULD NOT be made available to the
Subscriber as a revocation reason option, because the use of this reasonCode isdetermined by the CA and not the Subscriber.
When a CA obtains verifiable evidence of Key Compromise for a Certificate whose CRL
entry does not contain a reasonCode extension or has a reasonCode extension with a
non-keyCompromise reason, the CA SHOULD update the CRL entry to enter
keyCompromise as the CRLReason in the reasonCode extension. Additionally, the CA
SHOULD update the revocation date in a CRL entry when it is determined that theprivate key of the certificate was compromised prior to the revocation date that isindicated in the CRL entry for that certificate.
Note: Backdating the revocationDate field is an exception to best practice described in RFC
5280 section 5.3.2; however, these requirements specify the use of the revocationDate field to
support TLS implementations that process the revocationDate field as the date when theCertificate is first considered to be compromised.

4.9.1.2

Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

Starfield will revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or moreof the following occurs:
1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing(CRLReason "unspecified (0)"which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);;
2. The Subordinate CA notifies Starfield that the original certificate request was
not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason 9,
privilegeWithdrawn);
3. Starfield obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA’s Private Key corresponding
to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer
complies with the requirements of Section 6.1.5 Key Sizes and Section 6.1.6
Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking of this CP/CPS(CRLReason 1, keyCompromise);
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4. Starfield obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused(CRLReason 9,
privilegeWithdrawn);
5. Starfield is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance withor that Subordinate CA has not complied with this document or the applicable
Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement(CRLReason 9,
privilegeWithdrawn);
6. Starfield determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is
inaccurate or misleading(CRLReason 9, privilegeWithdrawn);
7. Starfield or the Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has notmade arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the
Certificate(CRLReason 5, cessationOfOperation);
8. Starfield’s or the Subordinate CA’s right to issue Certificates under these
Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless Starfield has madearrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository(CRLReason"unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in
the CRL); or
9. Revocation is required by Starfield’s CP/CPS(CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which
results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL).

4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation
Subscriber certificate revocation can be initiated by the Subscriber, Starfield, the IssuingCA, or authorized Resellers. Additionally, revocation requests can be initiated by anyone
who can access the ACME API endpoint that can complete the revocation procedures in
Section 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request.

4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request
Starfield maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation
requests and related inquiries.
Revocations may be requested:• by Subscribers via their online account, which are authenticated using a sharedsecret; or• by Subscribers using the appropriate ACME API endpoint, if they can sign the
revocation request with the associated account private key; or• by anyone who can access the appropriate ACME API endpoint and sign a
revocation request with the private key associated with the certificate; or• by anyone who can access appropriate ACME API endpoint and demonstrate
control over all domains in the Subject.
If the revocation request cannot be authenticated using a shared secret or through the
ACME endpoint, the RA must perform sufficient procedures to authenticate the
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revocation request in accordance with Starfield’s revocation request processing
procedures.
For reporting suspected private key compromise, certificate misuse, or other types offraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other type of suspicious
activity with a certificate, contact Starfield at practices@starfieldtech.com.

4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period
Starfield validates automated revocation requests (i.e., where a shared secret is correctly
provided) on receipt. Starfield commences the validation of non-automated revocation
requests within one business day of receipt.
Starfield immediately processes authenticated revocation requests. A certificate’s
revoked status is reflected on a CRL and in an OCSP response published at intervals
specified below. Revoked certificates are listed in the CRL and in OCSP responses until
the certificate expires, with the exception of Code Signing certificates which are retainedon the CRL and in OCSP responses for 10 years after the latter of certificate revocation or
expiration.

4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation
RequestWithin 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, Starfield will investigate thefacts and circumstances related to a Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary
report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate
Problem Report.
After reviewing the facts and circumstances, Starfield will work with the Subscriber andany entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice toestablish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which Starfield
will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or
revocation-related notice to published revocation MUST NOT exceed the time frame set
forth in Section 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate. The date selectedby Starfield will consider the following criteria:
1. The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers andRelying Parties);
3. The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or
Subscriber;
4. The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement
official that a Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than acomplaint from a consumer alleging that they didn't receive the goods they ordered); andCopyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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5. Relevant legislation.

4.9.6

Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

Relying Parties are required to check certificate status using the applicable CRL and/or
OCSP before relying upon a certificate.

4.9.7

CRL Issuance Frequency

CRLs for CAs under Starfield’s direct control are issued in accordance with the following
table:CA TypeRoot CAs
Issuing CAs

CRL Publication Frequency
Every 365 days or less and upon certificate revocation
Every 10 days or less

The value of the nextUpdate field MUST NOT be more than 365 days beyond the value ofthe thisUpdate field for Root CAs and 10 days for Issuing CAs.
If Certainly publishes a CRL, they will do it in compliance with the CA / Browser Forum
Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates,
and their CP/CPS.

4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs (if applicable)
No Stipulation.

4.9.9 On-line Revocation/Status Checking Availability
Relying Parties are required to check certificate status using the applicable CRL and/or
OCSP before relying upon a certificate.
OCSP responses conform to RFC6960 and/or RFC5019. OCSP responses either:1.
Are signed by the CA that issued the Certificates whose revocation status is being
checked, or2.
Are signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA thatissued the Certificate whose revocation status is being checked.
In the latter case, the OCSP signing Certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocspnocheck, as defined by RFC6960.

4.9.10 On-line Revocation Checking Requirements
OCSP responders operated by Starfield support the HTTP GET method, as described in RFC6960
and/or RFC5019.
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The validity interval of an OCSP response is the difference in time between the
thisUpdate and nextUpdate field, inclusive. For purposes of computing differences, adifference of 3,600 seconds shall be equal to one hour, and a difference of 86,400
seconds shall be equal to one day, ignoring leap‐seconds.
For the status of Subscriber Certificates and Subordinate CA Certificates:• Starfield OCSP responses have a validity interval between 24 and 96 hours.
• Starfield updates the information provided via an OCSP at least eight hours prior
to the nextUpdate.
If the OCSP responder receives a request for status of a certificate that has not been
issued, then the responder does not respond with a "good" status.

4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available
Starfield does not require OCSP stapling.

4.9.12 Special Requirements Regarding Key Compromise
There is no deviation from the certificate revocation or Certificate Problem Report
procedures specified above when the revocation of a Subscriber certificate is due toprivate key compromise.
Parties may use the following methods to demonstrate private key compromise:•••

Submission of the private key
Submission of a CSR signed by the private key
Submission of a revoke request following the procedures defined in Section 7.6 of
RFC 8555 requiring signing the revocation request with the compromised key

If a key compromise is successfully proven, Starfield will revoke the certificate according
to the specifications in Section 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension.
In addition to the procedures specified above, if deemed necessary, Starfield uses
commercially reasonable efforts to notify potential Relying Parties if Starfield discovers,or has reason to believe, that there has been a compromise of a Starfield CA private key.

4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension
We do not perform certificate suspension.

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4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension
Not applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request
Not applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period
Not applicable.

4.10

Certificate Status Services

4.10.1 Operational Characteristics
Starfield publishes certificate status information via CRL and OCSP. Revocation entries
remain on the CRL and OCSP responses until after the certificate’s expiration date.
Starfield published both full master CRLs and partitioned CRLs. URLs to partitioned CRLs
are included in the certificate and master CRLs are published on the Starfield repository.

4.10.2 Service Availability
Starfield’s CRL and OCSP services incorporate a distributed design intended to provide
24x7 availability.
The Starfield PKI allows Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Vendors, andother third parties to report complaints or suspected Private Key compromise, Certificate
misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to
Certificates via email as published in the Starfield repository.
Starfield maintains a continuous 24/7 ability to respond to any high priority certificate
problem reports and to revoke certificates in accordance with Section 4.9 Certificate
Revocation and Suspension and/or report the problem to law enforcement officials.

4.10.3 Optional Features
No Stipulation.

4.11

End of Subscription

No Stipulation.

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4.12

Key Escrow and Recovery

4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices
The escrow of CA and Subscriber private keys, for purposes of access by law enforcement
or any other reason, is not supported by the Starfield PKI.

4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy andPractices
No Stipulation.

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5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONALCONTROLS
Starfield SHALL develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive security program designed
to:
1. Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Certificate Data and Certificate
Management Processes;
2. Protect against anticipated threats or hazards to the confidentiality, integrity, andavailability of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes;
3. Protect against unauthorized or unlawful access, use, disclosure, alteration, or
destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;
4. Protect against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, any Certificate Data or
Certificate Management Processes; and5. Comply with all other security requirements applicable to Starfield by law.
The Certificate Management Process MUST include:
1. physical security and environmental controls;
2. system integrity controls, including configuration management, integrity maintenanceof trusted code, and malware detection/prevention;
3. network security and firewall management, including port restrictions and IP addressfiltering;
4. user management, separate trusted-role assignments, education, awareness, andtraining; and5. logical access controls, activity logging, and inactivity time-outs to provide individual
accountability.
Starfield’s security program MUST include an annual Risk Assessment that:
1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorizedaccess, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or
Certificate Management Processes;
2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into
consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management
Processes; and3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology,
and other arrangements that Starfield has in place to counter such threats.
Based on the Risk Assessment, Starfield SHALL develop, implement, and maintain a security
plan consisting of security procedures, measures, and products designed to achieve theobjectives set forth above and to manage and control the risks identified during the Risk
Assessment, commensurate with the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate
Management Processes. The security plan MUST include administrative, organizational,
technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the Certificate Data andCertificate Management Processes. The security plan MUST also take into account thenCopyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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available technology and the cost of implementing the specific measures, and SHALL implementa reasonable level of security appropriate to the harm that might result from a breach of
security and the nature of the data to be protected.

5.1

Physical Controls

5.1.1 Site Location and Construction
Starfield PKI systems are hosted and managed using secure facilities in the Phoenix,
Arizona and Ashburn, Virginia metropolitan areas with multiple levels of physical access
controls.

5.1.2 Physical Access
Production Starfield PKI systems are housed in a secure facility requiring two factor
authentication and dual control access to any physical device in the CA environment.
Physical access to the CA facility is automatically logged and video recorded on a 24x7
basis. Physical access to the CA facility is monitored 24x7 by onsite security personnel.

5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning
The supply of power to Starfield CA systems is protected through the use of UPS systems
and generators. Climate control systems have been implemented to ensure that thetemperature within the CA facility is maintained within reasonable operating limits.

5.1.4 Water Exposures
The CA hosting facilities have been verified to reside outside of any designated 100-year
flood plain.

5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection
The Starfield CA hosting facility is equipped with a smoke detection system and a preaction dry pipe fire suppression system.

5.1.6 Media Storage
Media containing production software, production data, and system audit information isstored secured with appropriate physical and logical access controls designed to limit
access to authorized personnel.

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5.1.7 Waste Disposal
Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal. Media used to collector transmit sensitive information are rendered unreadable before disposal. Other waste
is disposed of in accordance with Starfield’s normal waste disposal requirements.

5.1.8 Offsite Backup
Offsite backup media are stored in a physically secure manner using a bonded third-party
storage facility.
Cryptographic devices, smart cards, and other devices that may contain private keys or
keying material are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance the manufacturers’
guidance prior to disposal.

5.2

Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted Roles
All Starfield personnel involved in the operation of the Starfield PKI are considered toserve in “trusted roles.” Within the Starfield PKI, the following trusted roles exist:• Security, responsible for establishing and monitoring compliance with security
policies, procedures, and standards.
• Engineering/Architecture, responsible for the design and development ofStarfield PKI systems.
• PKI Operations, responsible for administering, maintaining and monitoring thesystems supporting the Starfield PKI.
• Key Management, responsible for management of cryptographic materials.
• RA Operations, responsible for processing certificate requests and revocation
requests.

5.2.2 Number of Persons Required Per Task
Cryptographically sensitive operations within the Starfield PKI such as CA key generation,
CA key recovery, CA key activation and CA system configuration require the participationof multiple “trusted” individuals in accordance with Section 6.2.2 Private Key MultiPerson Control. Other operations may require only one trusted individual.

5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role
Each person performing a trusted role within the Starfield PKI must be authorized bymanagement to perform such functions and must satisfy the personnel requirements
specified in Section 5.3 Personnel Controls.

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5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
Approval of EV certificate requests must be performed by a person other than the one
who verified the information in the request.

5.3

Personnel Controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements
The recruitment and selection practices for Starfield PKI personnel take into account thebackground, qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements of each position,
which are compared against the profiles of potential candidates.

5.3.2 Background Check Procedures
Background checks are performed prior to their commencement of employment with
Starfield. Such checks include criminal record and may include other items as applicableto the role.
Starfield employees are required to sign a nondisclosure agreement and are required toadhere to Starfield PKI policies and procedures.

5.3.3 Training Requirements
All Starfield PKI personnel receive on the job training covering some or all of the following
topics as relevant to their role:• Basic PKI concepts• This CP/CPS• Documented Starfield PKI security and operational policies and procedures• The use and operation of PKI system software• Common threats to the validation process including phishing and other social
engineering tactics
Starfield requires all validation specialists to pass an examination provided on this
CP/CPS, the Guidelines for Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates
and the Baseline Requirements (BR) prior to validating and approving the issuance ofCertificates.
Starfield documents that each validation specialist possesses the skills required by a task
before allowing the validation specialist to perform that task.
Starfield maintains records of training and ensures that personnel entrusted withvalidation specialist duties maintain a skill level that enables them to perform such duties
satisfactorily.

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5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements
Starfield PKI personnel receive formal or informal training on the use of deployed PKI
products and Starfield PKI policies and procedures at the time a PKI role is first granted
and annually. Security awareness campaigns are ongoing.

5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence
No Stipulation.

5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions
In accordance with corporate polices, appropriate disciplinary actions will be taken for
unauthorized actions or other violations of Starfield PKI policies and procedures.
If a person in a trusted role is cited by Starfield management for unauthorized orinappropriate actions, the person will be immediately removed from the trusted role
following identification of any unauthorized actions. After management has reviewed
and discussed the incident with the employee involved, management may reassign that
employee to a non‐trusted role, dismiss the individual from employment, or take anyother actions as it deems appropriate (and subject to restrictions under applicable laws).

5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements
Starfield PKI may employ contractors as necessary. Where contractors are used by theStarfield PKI, they are subject to qualifications and background check procedures
comparable to those specified in Section 5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
Requirements and Section 5.3.25.3.2 Background Check Procedures, respectively.

5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel
Starfield PKI personnel are required to read this CP/CPS. They are also provided with
Starfield PKI policies, procedures, and other documentation relevant to their job
functions.

5.4

Audit Logging Procedures

5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded
The Starfield PKI logs the following events:• CA certificate and key lifecycle management events including:- Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction;- Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;- Approval and rejection of certificate requests;- Cryptographic device lifecycle management events;
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Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists;
Signing of OCSP Responses; andIntroduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate
Profiles.
CA and Subscriber certificate life cycle management events- Requests for certificates, renewal, re-key, and revocation- Successful or unsuccessful processing of requests- Generation and issuance of certificates- Revocation of certificates- Issuance of CRLs and generation of OCSP entries- All verification activities required by applicable guidelines; and- Date, time, phone number used, persons spoken to, and end results ofverification telephone calls
Security-sensitive operating system events- Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;- PKI and security system actions performed;- Security profile changes;- Installation, update, and removal of software;- System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;- Firewall and router activities; and- Entries to and exits from CA facility
CA facility entry/exit.
Separation of validation duties between multiple RAs for Extended Validation
certificates
-

•

•

•
•

All audit logs include, at a minimum:- Date and time of entry- Identity of the persona and entity making the journal entry- Description of entry

5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log
Audit logs are reviewed on an as-needed basis.

5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log
Audit logs are retained as follows:

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Log Type
Logs of CA key management activity

CA system logs of certificate management activity
Operating system logs
Physical access system logs
Manual logs of physical accessLogs of all certificates, revocations and documentation
relating to verification of certificate requests
Video recording of CA facility access

Retention Period
2 years after the later of the following:• the destruction of the CA Private Key; or• the revocation or expiration of the final CA
Certificate in that set of Certificates that have an
X.509v3 basicConstraints extension with the cA
field set to true and which share a common Public
Key corresponding to the CA Private Key;
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years after the expiration of the subscriber
certificate
90 days

5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log
Production and archived logical and physical audit logs are protected using a combinationof physical and logical access controls.

5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures
Audit logs are backed up on a periodic basis.

5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External)
Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application, network, andoperating system level. Manually generated audit data is recorded by Starfield
employees.

5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing Subject
Where an event is logged by the audit collection system, no notice is required to be given
to the individual or system that caused the event.

5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments
Starfield performs periodic vulnerability assessments of its PKI environment
including:•External vulnerability scans are conducted on at least a quarterly basis. Testing
includes applications publicly available.
•
Internal vulnerability scans of internal PKI networks are performed on at least aquarterly basis.
•
Annually, a penetration test of the entire Starfield PKI is conducted which
includes tests of customer facing applications, the certificate vetting application, andcritical PKI infrastructure. Critical and high vulnerabilities identified as part of the
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assessment are documented and tracked to completion. The results of such assessments
are used to enhance the security of the environment.
Upon completion of each assessment, a Corrective Action Plan will be developed tomitigate any pertinent security issues (i.e., findings) and associated risks identified by theassessment. Critical vulnerabilities that are discovered should be mitigated within 96
hours of discovery. In the event that the issue cannot be mitigated with 96 hours, theissue must be documented with justification of the delay and a timeline for completion.

5.5

Records Archival

The Starfield PKI maintains an archive of relevant records for each CA.

5.5.1 Types of Records Archived
Starfield maintains an archive of logs that include the recorded events specified in Section
5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded.

5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive
Starfield retention period for archives it is made in accordance with Section 5.4.3
Retention period for audit log

5.5.3 Protection of Archive
See Section 5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log.

5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures
Starfield maintains copies of its archived records at separate locations.

5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records
Starfield PKI system clocks are synchronized with a third-party time source. Automatedjournal entries include a system generated date and time field. Manual journal entries
include a manually entered date and time field.

5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)
No Stipulation.

5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information
No Stipulation.

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5.6

Key Changeover

Starfield CAs will stop issuing certificates and will be re-keyed or terminated before themaximum key usage period for certificate signing is reached in accordance with Section 6.3.2
Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods. The CA will continue to sign andpublish CRLs until the end of the CA certificate lifetime. The key changeover or CA
termination process will be performed such that it causes minimal disruption to Subscribers
and Relying Parties. Affected entities will be notified prior to the planned key changeover.

5.7

Compromise and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures
Starfield has documented business continuity and disaster recovery procedures designed
to notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying
Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure. Starfield
performs tests, reviews, and updates to these procedures at least annually. These
procedures meet the requirements in [BR 5.7.1].

5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are
Corrupted
Starfield performs regular system backups that can be utilized to recover in the case ofresource, software, or data corruption. Starfield also keeps copies of CA private keys in asecure off-site location.

5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures
Starfield has implemented a combination of physical, logical and procedural controls toguard against CA key compromise. In the event of a known or suspected CA key
compromise, Starfield management will assess the situation and determine theappropriate course of action.

5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster
Starfield maintains a disaster recovery plan and performs periodic testing of the plan toensure its effectiveness in the event of a disaster.

5.8

CA or RA Termination

In the event that it is necessary to terminate the operation of a Starfield CA, Starfieldmanagement will plan and coordinate the termination process with its Subscribers andRelying Parties such that the impact of the termination is minimized. Starfield will provide as
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much prior notice as is practicable and reasonable to Subscribers and Relying Parties andpreserve relevant records for a period of time deemed fit for functional and legal purposes.
Relevant certificates will be revoked no later than the time of the termination.

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6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
6.1

Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key Pair Generation
Starfield CA key pairs are generated in and protected by hardware security modules
certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3. CA key pair generation requires the participation ofmultiple trusted employees.
Subscriber key pair generation is performed by the Subscriber. It is recommended that
the Subscriber use a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified cryptographic module for key generation.

6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber
Starfield CA key pairs do not require delivery as they are generated and managed by theStarfield PKI. As Subscriber key pairs are generated by the Subscriber, there is no private
key transportation requirement.

6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer
CA certificate requests are generated and processed by Starfield employees using acontrolled process that requires the participation of multiple trusted individuals. CA
certificate requests are PKCS #10 requests and accordingly contain the requesting CA’s
public key and are digitally signed by the requesting CA’s private key.
For Subscriber certificate requests, the Subscriber’s public key is submitted to the CA
using a certificate request signed with the Subscriber’s private key. This mechanism
ensures that:• the public key has not been modified during transit and• the sender possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.

6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties
The Starfield Root CA is made available to Relying Parties through its inclusion in common
browser software.
The Starfield Root CA certificates may also be downloaded from the Starfield repository.
A 256-bit SHA-256 hash of the Starfield Root CA certificates is posted in the Starfield
repository so that users may verify the authenticity of the Starfield Root CA certificates.

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6.1.5 Key Sizes
Starfield CA key pairs used to issue certificates after January 1, 2012 are 2048 bit or
higher RSA keys. Subscriber key pairs in certificates issued after January 1, 2012 are 2048
bit or higher RSA keys.
Certificates meet the following requirements for algorithm type and key size.

6.1.5.1

Root CA Certificates

Digest algorithm
Minimum RSA modulus size (bits)
ECC curve
Minimum DSA modulus and divisor
size (bits)***Validity period beginning on or
before 31 Dec 2010
MD5 (NOT RECOMMENDED), SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512
2048**NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048 N= 224 or L= 2048 N= 256

Validity period beginning after 31
Dec 2010
SHA-1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA512
2048
NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048 N= 224 or L= 2048 N= 256* SHA-1 MAY be used with RSA keys in accordance with the criteria defined in Section 7.1.3.
** A Root CA Certificate issued prior to 31 Dec. 2010 with an RSA key size less than 2048 bits
MAY still serve as a trust anchor for Subscriber Certificates issued in accordance with these
Requirements.
*** L and N (the bit lengths of modulus p and divisor q, respectively) are described in the Digital
Signature Standard, FIPS 186-4.

6.1.5.2

Subordinate CA Certificates

Digest algorithm
Minimum RSA modulus size (bits)
ECC curve
Minimum DSA modulus and divisor
size (bits)***Validity period beginning on or
before 31 Dec 2010 and ending on
or before 31 Dec 2013
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA512
1024
NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N= 256

Validity period beginning after 31
Dec 2010 or ending after 31 Dec
2013
SHA-1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA512
2048
NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048 N= 224 or L= 2048 N= 256* SHA-1 MAY be used with RSA keys in accordance with the criteria defined in Section 7.1.3.
*** L and N (the bit lengths of modulus p and divisor q, respectively) are described in the Digital
Signature Standard, FIPS 186-4.

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6.1.5.3

Subscriber Certificates

Digest algorithm
Minimum RSA modulus size (bits)
ECC curve
Minimum DSA modulus and divisor
size (bits)***Validity period ending on or
before 31 Dec 2013
SHA1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA512
1024
NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048, N= 224 or L= 2048, N= 256

Validity period ending after 31 Dec
2013
SHA-1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA512
2048
NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521
L= 2048 N= 224 or L= 2048 N= 256* SHA-1 MAY be used with RSA keys in accordance with the criteria defined in Section 7.1.3.
*** L and N (the bit lengths of modulus p and divisor q, respectively) are described in the Digital
Signature Standard, FIPS 186-4.

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6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking
Starfield generates CA Key Pairs using secure algorithms and parameters based on current
research and industry standards. Starfield uses a cryptomodule that conforms to FIPS
186‐4 and provides random number generation and on‐board generation of up to 4096‐
bit RSA Public Keys and a wide range of ECC curves.
Starfield checks Subscriber RSA public keys to ensure value of this public exponent
equates to an odd number equal to three or more.

6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes
Key pairs may be used as follows:
EntityRoot CAs
Issuing CAs
Subscriber

Permitted Key Usage
Signing of certificates for Subordinate CAs and other purposes as required for theStarfield PKI and CRLs.
Signing of certificates for Subscribers and other purposes as required for theStarfield PKI and CRLs.
Server authentication, digital signature, key encipherment, data encryption.

The key usage extension is set in accordance with the certificate profile requirements
specified in Section 7.1 Certificate Profile.

6.2
Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls
6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls
The Starfield PKI uses cryptographic modules that are certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 andmeet industry standards for random number and prime number generation.

6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control
The Root CA is operated in offline mode. The participation of multiple trusted employees
is required to perform sensitive CA private key operations (including hardware security
module (HSM) activation, Sub-CA certificate signing, CRL signing, CA key backup, and CA
key recovery).
The Issuing CA is operated in online mode. The participation of multiple trusted
employees is required to perform sensitive CA private key operations (including HSM
activation, CA key backup, and CA key recovery).

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6.2.3 Private Key Escrow
The escrow of CA and Subscriber private keys, for purposes of access by law enforcement
or any other reason, is not supported by the Starfield PKI.

6.2.4 Private Key Backup
Backup copies of CA private keys are stored in encrypted form using cryptographic
modules that meet the requirements specified in Section 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module
Standards and Controls.
Once a CA has reached the end of its maximum usage period as defined in Section 6.3.2
Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods, HSMs containing the CA
private key will be zeroized and/or securely destroyed.
Subscriber private keys are not backed up by the Starfield PKI.

6.2.5 Private Key Archival
Once a CA has reached the end of its maximum usage period as defined in Section 6.3.2
Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods, HSMs containing the CA
private key will be zeroized and/or securely destroyed.
Subscriber private keys are not archived by the Starfield PKI.

6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module
CA private keys are generated and used only within hardware cryptographic modules
meeting the requirements of Section 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls.
The private key exists outside hardware cryptographic modules only in encrypted form.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module
CA private keys are stored within hardware cryptographic modules meeting therequirements of Section 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls.

6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Keys
Hardware modules used for CA private key protection utilize an activation mechanism as
described in Section 6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control.

6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key
CA private keys are de-activated by securing the partition on the HSM device.

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6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key
CA private key destruction requires the participation of multiple trusted Starfield
employees and approval from Starfield management. When CA key destruction isrequired, CA private keys will be completely destroyed through zeroization and/or
physical destruction of the device in accordance with manufacturers’ guidance.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
Refer to Section 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls.

6.3

Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public Key Archival
Copies of CA and Subscriber certificates are archived in accordance with Section 5.5
Records Archival.

6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
For Starfield PKI CAs and Subscribers, key and certificate usage periods meet thefollowing requirements.
EntityRoot CAs
Issuing CAs
Subscribers

Maximum Key Usage
Period (for certificate
signing)*
15 years
20 years
N/A

Subscriber Certificates
Basic and Medium Assurance Domain Validated SSL
Server Certificate
High Assurance Organizational Validated SSL Server
Certificate Subscribers
Extended Validation SSL Server Certificate Subscribers

Maximum Key Usage
Period (for CRL signing)

Maximum Certificate
Validity Period

20 years
25 years
N/A

30 years
20 years
398 days

Maximum Certificate Validity Period
398 days
398 days
398 days* Maximum Key Usage Period does not apply to certificates that serve an infrastructure
purpose, such as OCSP Responder certificates or Timestamp Authority certificates.
Timestamp authority certificates have a maximum validity period of 135 months.

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6.4

Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation
HSMs used for CA private key protection are configured to require multiple key
shareholders as described in Section 6.2.2 Private Key Multi-Person Control.

6.4.2 Activation Data Protection
The activation materials are used only when needed and stored in a secure site when not
in use.

6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data
No Stipulation.

6.5

Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements
Starfield’s systems maintaining CA software and data files are secure from unauthorizedaccess. In addition, access to production servers is limited to those individuals with avalid business reason for such access.
Starfield’s production network is separate from other components. This separation
prevents network access except through specific application processes. Starfield has
sophisticated access control technologies in place to protect the production network fromunauthorized internal and external access and to limit network activities accessing
production systems. Access controls in use include, but are not limited to, multifactor
authentication.

6.5.2 Computer Security Rating
No Stipulation.

6.6

Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System Development Controls
All CA software is developed in accordance with documented Software Development Life
Cycle processes. Reviews of all changes are made during multiple points of the softwaredevelopment. Approval to deploy changes requires multiple individuals. All code isverified, using digital signatures and hashing, before being deployed into the production
CA environment.
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6.6.2 Security Management Controls
Starfield has tools and processes in place to control and monitor the configurations of the
CA systems. Starfield validates the integrity of all software before release into
production.

6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls
No Stipulation.

6.7

Network Security Controls

The Starfield network is secured through the use of preventative (properly configured
routers and firewalls) and detective controls (monitoring systems). Starfield performs all CA
and RA functions using networks secured in accordance with the Starfield Operations Guide
to ensure the systems are secure.

6.8

Time-Stamping

Starfield maintains Network Time Protocol (NTP) enabled devices which use the GPS system
to synchronize its clock. The servers, via NTP, then synchronize their system clock to thesedevices which are used to generate time stamps.

7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
7.1

Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version Number
Starfield issues X.509 Version 3 certificates.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions
Extensions used in Starfield certificates are documented in Appendix A.

7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers
Starfield signs certificates with the following algorithms:• Sha1RSA* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5• sha256RSA 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11• ECDSAsha384 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3

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* CAs do not issue OCSP, or Subscriber SSL Certificates utilizing the SHA‐1 algorithm.

7.1.4 Name Forms
7.1.4.1

Name Encoding

Every Starfield certificate is uniquely identified by its Subject and incorporate a unique
identifying serial number. Starfield certificates support name chaining as specified in
RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.4.

7.1.4.2

Subject Information - Subscriber Certificates

By issuing the Certificate, the Starfield represents that it followed the procedure set
forth in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement to verify that, as of
the Certificate’s issuance date, all of the Subject Information was accurate. Starfield
SHALL NOT include a Domain Name or IP Address in a Subject attribute except as
specified in Section 3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control ..
Subject attributes MUST NOT contain only metadata such as ‘.’, ‘-’, and ’ ’ (i.e. space)characters, and/or any other indication that the value is absent, incomplete, or not
applicable.
Subject Alternative Name Extension
Certificate Field: extensions:subjectAltName
Required/Optional: RequiredContents: This extension MUST contain at least one entry. Each entry MUST be oneof the following types:•dNSName: The entry MUST contain either a Fully‐Qualified Domain Nameor Wildcard Domain Name that the CA has validated in accordance with
Section 3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control. Wildcard
Domain Names MUST be validated for consistency with Section 3.2.2.6
Wildcard Domain Validation. The entry MUST NOT contain an Internal Name.
The Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or the FQDN portion of the Wildcard
Domain Name contained in the entry MUST be composed entirely of LDH
Labels joined together by a U+002E FULL STOP (“.”) character. The zero‐
length Domain Label representing the root zone of the Internet Domain
Name System MUST NOT be included (e.g. “example.com” MUST be encoded
as “example.com” and MUST NOT be encoded as “example.com.”).
Effective 2021‐10‐01, the Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or the FQDN portionof the Wildcard Domain Name MUST consist solely of Domain Labels that are
P‐Labels or Non‐Reserved LDH Labels.

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•IPAddress: The entry MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 address that the CA has
validated in accordance with Section 3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP
Address. The entry MUST NOT contain a Reserved IP Address.

Subject Distinguished Name Fields
a. Certificate Field: subject:commonName (OID 2.5.4.3)
Required/Optional: Deprecated (Discouraged, but not prohibited)
Contents: If present, this field MUST contain exactly one entry that is one of thevalues contained in the Certificate’s subjectAltName extension (see Section
7.1.4.2.1 Subject Alternative Name Extension). The value of the field MUST be
encoded as follows:•If the value is an IPv4 address, then the value MUST be encoded as an
IPv4Address as specified in RFC 3986, Section 3.2.2.
•If the value is an IPv6 address, then the value MUST be encoded in the text
representation specified in RFC 5952, Section 4.
•If the value is a Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name,then the value MUST be encoded as a character‐for‐character copy of thedNSName entry value from the subjectAltName extension. Specifically, all
Domain Labels of the Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or FQDN portion of the
Wildcard Domain Name must be encoded as LDH Labels, and P‐Labels MUSTNOT be converted to their Unicode representation.
b. Certificate Field: subject:organizationName (OID 2.5.4.10)
Required/Optional: Optional.
Contents: If present, the subject:organizationName field MUST contain either
the Subject’s name or DBA as verified under Section 3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename.
Starfield may include information in this field that differs slightly from theverified name, such as common variations or abbreviations, provided that
Starfield documents the difference and any abbreviations used are locally
accepted abbreviations; e.g., if the official record shows “Company Name
Incorporated”, Starfield MAY use “Company Name Inc.” or “Company Name”.
Because Subject name attributes for individuals (e.g. givenName (2.5.4.42) andsurname (2.5.4.4)) are not broadly supported by application software, Starfield
MAY use the subject:organizationName field to convey a natural person
Subject’s name or DBA.
c. Certificate Field: subject:givenName (2.5.4.42) and subject:surname (2.5.4.4)
Required/Optional: Optional.
Contents: If present, the subject:givenName field and subject:surname field
MUST contain a natural person Subject’s name as verified under Section 3.2.3
Authentication of Individual Identity. A Certificate containing a
subject:givenName field or subject:surname field MUST contain the(2.23.140.1.2.3) Certificate Policy OID.
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d. Certificate Field: Number and street: subject:streetAddress (OID: 2.5.4.9)
Required/Optional:
Optional if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname field are present.
Prohibited if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName, andsubject:surname field are absent.
Contents: If present, the subject:streetAddress field MUST contain the Subject’s
street address information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
e. Certificate Field: subject:localityName (OID: 2.5.4.7)
Required/Optional:
Required if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname field are present and the subject:stateOrProvinceName field isabsent.
Optional if the subject:stateOrProvinceName field and thesubject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, or subject:surname
field are present.
Prohibited if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName, andsubject:surname field are absent.
Contents: If present, the subject:localityName field MUST contain the Subject’s
locality information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity. If thesubject:countryName field specifies the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of XX in
accordance with Section 7.1.4.2.2 (g) Subject Distinguished Name Fields:
postalCode, the localityName field MAY contain the Subject’s locality and/or
state or province information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
f. Certificate Field: subject:stateOrProvinceName (OID: 2.5.4.8)
Required/Optional:
Required if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname field are present and subject:localityName field is absent.
Optional if the subject:localityName field and the subject:organizationName
field, the subject:givenName field, or the subject:surname field are present.
Prohibited if the subject:organizationName field, the subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname field are absent.
Contents: If present, the subject:stateOrProvinceName field MUST contain the
Subject’s state or province information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
If the subject:countryName field specifies the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of
XX in accordance with Section 7.1.4.2.2 (g) Subject Distinguished Name Fields:
postalCode, the subject:stateOrProvinceName field MAY contain the full name of
the Subject’s country information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
g. Certificate Field: subject:postalCode (OID: 2.5.4.17)
Required/Optional:
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Optional if the subject:organizationName, subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname fields are present.
Prohibited if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, or
subject:surname field are absent.
Contents: If present, the subject:postalCode field MUST contain the Subject’s zipor postal information as verified under Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
h. Certificate Field: subject:countryName (OID: 2.5.4.6)
Required/Optional:
Required if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName, or
subject:surname field are present.
Optional if the subject:organizationName field, subject:givenName field, andsubject:surname field are absent.
Contents: If the subject:organizationName field is present, thesubject:countryName MUST contain the two-letter ISO 3166-1 country code
associated with the location of the Subject verified under Section 3.2.2.1
Identity. If the subject:organizationName field is absent, thesubject:countryName field MAY contain the two-letter ISO 3166-1 country code
associated with the Subject as verified in accordance with Section 3.2.2.3
Verification of Country. If a Country is not represented by an official ISO 3166-1
country code, Starfield MAY specify the ISO 3166-1 user-assigned code of XX
indicating that an official ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code has not been assigned.
i.

Certificate Field: subject:organizationalUnitName (OID: 2.5.4.11)
Required/Optional: Deprecated.
Prohibited if the subject:organizationName is absent or the certificate is issued
on or after September 1, 2022.
Contents: Starfield SHALL implement a process that prevents an OU attributefrom including a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or othertext that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless Starfield has
verified this information in accordance with Section 3.2 Initial Identity Validationand the Certificate also contains subject:organizationName, subject:givenName,
subject:surname, subject:localityName, and subject:countryName attributes,
also verified in accordance with Section 3.2.2.1 Identity.
Note: As of July 16, 2021, Starfield no longer includes the OU field on Subscriber
Certificates.

j. Other Subject Attributes
Other attributes MAY be present within the subject field. If present, otherattributes MUST contain information that has been verified by Starfield.

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7.1.4.3
Subject Information - Root Certificates and Subordinate CA
Certificates
By issuing a Subordinate CA Certificate, Starfield represents that it followed theprocedure set forth in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement toverify that, as of the Certificate’s issuance date, all of the Subject Information was
accurate.
Subject Distinguished Name Fields
a. Certificate Field: subject:commonName (OID 2.5.4.3)
Required/Optional: RequiredContents: This field MUST be present and the contents SHOULD be an
identifier for the certificate such that the certificate’s Name is uniqueacross all certificates issued by the issuing certificate.
b. Certificate Field: subject:organizationName (OID 2.5.4.10)
Required/Optional: RequiredContents: This field MUST be present and the contents MUST containeither the Subject CA’s name or DBA as verified under Section 3.2.2.2
DBA/Tradename. Starfield may include information in this field thatdiffers slightly from the verified name, such as common variations or
abbreviations, provided that Starfield documents the difference and any
abbreviations used are locally accepted abbreviations; e.g., if the official
record shows “Company Name Incorporated”, Starfield MAY use“Company Name Inc.” or “Company Name”.
c. Certificate Field: subject:countryName (OID: 2.5.4.6)
Required/Optional: RequiredContents: This field MUST contain the two‐letter ISO 3166‐1 countrycode for the country in which the CA’s place of business is located.

7.1.5 Name Constraints
Starfield does not perform name constraints.

7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier
Starfield uses the following certificate policy oids in end-entity certificates:• Medium Assurance certificates - 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1 and2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.1• High Assurance Server certificates - 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.2 and2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.2

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•Extended Validation certificates - 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3 and2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension
No Stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy Qualifier Syntax and Semantics
Starfield certificates include a link to our repository where this CPS and other applicableagreements may be viewed.

7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies
Extension
No Stipulation.

7.2

CRL Profile

7.2.1 Version Number
Starfield issues version 1 and 2 CRLs.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions
1. reasonCode (OID 2.5.29.21)
If present, this extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
If a CRL entry is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross
Certificates, this CRL entry extension MUST be present. If a CRL entry is for a
Certificate not technically capable of causing issuance, this CRL entry extension
SHOULD be present, but MAY be omitted, subject to the following requirements.
The CRLReason indicated MUST NOT be unspecified (0). If the reason forrevocation is unspecified, CAs MUST omit reasonCode entry extension, if allowedby the previous requirements. If a CRL entry is for a Certificate not subject tothese Requirements and was either issued on-or-after 2020-09-30 or has a
notBefore on-or-after 2020-09-30, the CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold(6). If a CRL entry is for a Certificate subject to these Requirements, the
CRLReason MUST NOT be certificateHold (6).
If a reasonCode CRL entry extension is present, the CRLReason MUST indicate
the most appropriate reason for revocation of the certificate.
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2. issuingDistributionPoint (OID 2.5.29.28)
Effective 2023-01-15, if a CRL does not contain entries for all revoked unexpired
certificates issued by the CRL issuer, then it MUST contain a critical Issuing Distribution
Point extension and MUST populate the distributionPoint field of that extension.

7.2.2.1

Root CAsThe following CRL profile is used for root certificates in the Starfield PKI.
Field
Signature
IssuerThis Update (Effective Date)
Next Update
CRL extensions (V1 and V2)
CRL Number
Authority Key Identifier
Revoked Certificates

CRL Entry Extensions V1 and V2 andoptional for any given CRL entry)
CRL Reason CodeInvalidity Date

Description
SHA-1 or SHA-256
Subject of the corresponding root certificate
Date and time of CRL issuance.
365 or less days after This Update.
Unique value for each CRL issued by the corresponding root
certificate.
SHA-1 hash of the public key of the corresponding root certificate
List of information regarding revoked certificates. CRL entries
include:• Serial Number, identifying the revoked certificate
Revocation Date, including the date and time of certificate
revocation

One of the following bold reason codes:
unspecified(0)
keyCompromise(1)
cACompromise(2)affiliationChanged(3)
superseded(4)
cessationOfOperation (5)removeFromCRL(8)privilegeWithdrawn (9)aACompromise(10)
A GeneralizedTime denoting the effective time when the given
serial number is to be considered invalid.

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7.2.2.2

Issuing CAs

The following CRL profile is used for Starfield Issuing CAs.
Field
Signature
IssuerThis Update (Effective Date)
Next Update
CRL extensions (V1 and V2)
CRL Number
Authority Key Identifier
Revoked Certificates

CRL Entry Extensions V1 and V2 andoptional for any given CRL entry)
CRL Reason CodeInvalidity Date

7.3

Description
SHA-1 or SHA-256
Subject of the corresponding Issuing CA certificate
Date and time of CRL issuance.
10 or less days after This Update.
Unique value for each CRL issued by the corresponding Issuing CA
certificate.
SHA-1 hash of the public key of the corresponding Issuing CA
certificate
List of information regarding revoked certificates. CRL entries
include:• Serial Number, identifying the revoked certificate• Revocation Date, including the date and time of certificate
revocation

One of the following bold reason codes:
unspecified(0)
keyCompromise(1)
cACompromise(2)affiliationChanged(3)
superseded(4)
cessationOfOperation (5)removeFromCRL(8)privilegeWithdrawn(9)aACompromise(10)
A GeneralizedTime denoting the effective time when the given
serial number is to be considered invalid.

OCSP Profile

If an OCSP response is for a Root CA or Subordinate CA Certificate, including Cross
Certificates, and that certificate has been revoked, then the revocationReason field within
the RevokedInfo of the CertStatus MUST be present. The CRLReason indicated MUST
contain a value permitted for CRLs, as specified in Section 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry
Extensions.

7.3.1 Version Number
Starfield OCSP responses conform to version 1 of RFC 6960.

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7.3.2 OCSP Extensions
The singleExtensions of an OCSP response MUST NOT contain the reasonCode(OID 2.5.29.21) CRL entry extension.

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8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
8.1

Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

The Starfield PKI is subject to an annual WebTrust for Certification Authorities (WebTrust forCAs) examination. The Starfield PKI is also subject to an annual WebTrust for Extended
Validation (WebTrust for EV) examination, as it relates to the issuance of Extended
Validation certificates from the Starfield issuing CAs.

8.2

Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

Auditors demonstrating proficiency in public key infrastructure technology, information
security tools and techniques, security auditing, and the third-party attestation function shallperform the annual WebTrust for CAs and WebTrust for EV examinations. The audit firmmust be currently licensed to perform WebTrust for CA audits and WebTrust EV Program
audits, be a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), andmaintain professional liability/errors & omissions insurance with policy limits of at least one
million United States Dollars ($1,000,000.00) in coverage.

8.3

Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

The entity that performs the annual audit shall be organizationally independent of Starfield.

8.4

Topics Covered by Assessment

The scope of the annual audit shall include the requirements of this CP/CPS, CA
environmental controls, CA key management, and certificate life cycle management.

8.5

Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

Significant deficiencies identified during the compliance audit will result in a determinationof actions to be taken. The Starfield Governance and Policy Committee makes thisdetermination with input from the auditor. Starfield Management is responsible for
ensuring that corrective action plans are promptly developed and corrective action is taken
within a period of time commensurate with the significance of such matters identified.
Should a severe deficiency be identified that might compromise the integrity of the Starfield
PKI, Starfield Management will consider, with input from the auditor, whether suspension ofStarfield PKI operations is warranted. Should a severe deficiency be identified that might
compromise the integrity of a particular CA, Starfield PKI Management will assess whether
suspension of the particular CA’s operations is warranted.

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8.6

Communication of Results

Compliance audit results are communicated to Starfield Management and others deemed
appropriate by Starfield Management. Starfield makes letters showing compliance withannual external audit reports publicly available in the Starfield repository(certs.secureserver.net/repository). Starfield ensures that audit results are communicated ina manner that is compliant with [BR 8.6].

8.7

Self –Audits

On at least a quarterly basis, Starfield performs regular internal audits against a randomly
selected sample of at least three percent of its SSL/TLS Server Certificates issued since thelast internal audit. Self‐audits on server Certificates are performed in accordance with
Guidelines adopted by the CA / Browser Forum.

8.8

Specification Administration

8.8.1 Specification Change Procedures
Modifications to this CP/CPS are approved by the Starfield Governance and Policy
Committee and become effective upon publication in the Starfield repository.

8.8.2 Publication and Notification Policies
This CP/CPS and subsequent revisions are published in the Starfield repository inaccordance with Section 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities Starfield maychange this document at any time without prior notice.

8.9

CPS Approval Procedures

See Section 8.8.1 Specification Change Procedures.

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9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
9.1

Fees

9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees
Starfield and Customers may charge end-user Subscribers for the issuance, management,
and renewal of Certificates.

9.1.2

Certificate Access Fees

Starfield reserves the right to charge a fee for making a Certificate available in a
repository or otherwise.

9.1.3

Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

Starfield does not charge a fee as a condition of making the CRLs required in a repository
or otherwise available to Relying Parties. Starfield reserves the right to charge a fee forproviding customized CRLs, OCSP services, or other value-added revocation and status
information services. Starfield does not permit access to revocation information,
Certificate status information, or time stamping in its repository by third parties thatprovide products or services that utilize such Certificate status information without
Starfield’s prior express written consent.

9.1.4

Fees for Other Services

Starfield licenses this CPS under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-ND 4.0) license.

9.1.5

Refund Policy

Subscribers may request a refund directly through the entity the certificate waspurchased from, and will be subject to the entity’s refund policies.

9.2

Financial Responsibility

Subscribers and Relying Parties shall be responsible for the financial consequences to such Subscribers, Relying Parties, andto any other persons, entities, or organizations for any transactions in which such Subscribers or Relying Parties participate
and which use Starfield Certificates or any services provided in respect to Starfield Certificates. Starfield makes norepresentations and gives no warranties or conditions regarding the financial efficacy of any transaction completed utilizing
a Starfield Certificate or any services provided in respect to Starfield Certificates and neither Starfield nor any independent
third-party RA operating under a Starfield CA, nor any Resellers, Co-marketers, nor any subcontractors, distributors, agents,
suppliers, employees, or directors of any of the foregoing shall have any liability except as explicitly set forth herein in
respect to the use of or reliance on a Starfield Certificate or any services provided in respect to Starfield Certificates.

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9.2.1

Insurance Coverage

No Stipulation.

9.2.2

Other Assets

No Stipulation.

9.2.3

Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities

No Stipulation.

9.3
9.3.1

Confidentiality of Business Information
Scope of Confidential Information

Sensitive Starfield PKI information must remain confidential to Starfield. The following
information is considered confidential to Starfield and may not be disclosed:• Starfield PKI policies, procedures and technical documentation supporting this
CP/CPS• Subscriber registration records, including:- Certificate applications, whether approved or rejected- Proof of identification documentation and details- Certificate information collected as part of the registration records, beyond
that which is required to be included in Subscriber certificates• Audit trail records• Any private key within the Starfield PKI hierarchy• Compliance audit results except for WebTrust for CAs audit reports which may be
published at the discretion of Starfield Management

9.3.2

Information not Within the Scope of Confidential
Information

This CP/CPS and Certificates and CRLs issued by Starfield are not considered confidential.
Subscriber certificate status information is made available to Relying Parties through theuse of CRLs and OCSP.

9.3.3

Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

No Stipulation.

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9.4
9.4.1

Privacy of Personal Information
Privacy Plan

Starfield processes personal data in accordance with the privacy policy posted here:
https://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc?pageid=PRIVACY&isc=gdbbc687

9.4.2

Information Treated as Private

See Section 9.4.1 Privacy Plan.

9.4.3

Information Not Deemed Private

See Section 9.4.1 Privacy Plan.

9.4.4

Responsibility to Protect Private Information

See Section 9.4.1 Privacy Plan.

9.4.5

Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

See Section 9.4.1 Privacy Plan.

9.4.6

Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

As a general principle, no document or record (including registration records) belonging
to or controlled by the Starfield PKI is released to law enforcement agencies or officials
except where the law enforcement official is properly identified and where the release of
specific information is:• required by applicable laws or regulations• pursuant to a subpoena or order of a court or other government or regulatory
authority with which Starfield is legally obligated to comply• pursuant to a demand made by any government regulatory agency or authority
with jurisdiction over Starfield.
As a general principle, no document or record belonging to or controlled by the Starfield
PKI is released to any person except where:• a properly constituted instrument requiring production of the information is
produced and• the person requiring production is a person authorized to do so by a court of law
and is properly identified.

9.4.7

Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No Stipulation.
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9.5Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual Property Rights among Starfield PKI Participants other than Subscribers andRelying Parties are governed by the applicable agreements among such Starfield PKI
Participants. The following subsections apply to Intellectual Property Rights in relation to
Subscribers and Relying Parties.

9.5.1 Property Rights in Certificates and Revocation Information
The Intellectual Property Rights pertaining to the Certificates of CAs and revocation
information that are issued by CAs shall be retained by those CAs. Provided theCertificates are reproduced in full and that use of such Certificates is subject to the
Relying Party agreement, Starfield and Subscribers grant permission to reproduce anddistribute the Certificates on a nonexclusive royalty-free basis. Starfield and Subscribers
shall grant permission to use revocation information to perform Relying Party functions
subject to the applicable Relying party agreement or any other applicable agreements.

9.5.2 Property Rights in the Agreement
Starfield PKI Participants acknowledge that Starfield retains all Intellectual Property Rights
in and to this CPS.

9.5.3 Property Rights to Names
Certificate applicants retain all rights, if they have any, in any trademark, service mark, ortrade name contained in any Certificate Application and distinguished name within any
Certificate issued to them. Starfield retains all rights it has in any trademark, service
mark, trade name, or other identifying trade symbols that it owns.

9.5.4 Property Rights in Keys and Key Material
All Key Pairs corresponding to Certificates of CAs and end-user Subscribers are theproperty of those CAs and end-users, regardless of where they are stored physically, andthose persons retain all Intellectual Property Rights in and to those key pairs. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, Starfield’s Root CA Public keys and the root
Certificates containing them are the property of Starfield. Starfield grants licenses tosoftware and hardware manufacturers to reproduce such root Certificates to place copies
in trustworthy hardware devices or software. Finally, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, Secret Shares of a CA’s private key are the property of the CA, and the CA
retains all Intellectual Property Right in and to such Secret Shares.
The following are the property of Starfield:• This CPS• Starfield-specified Certificate Policies
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•
•
•
•
•

Policies and procedures supporting the operation of the Starfield PKI
Starfield-specified Object Identifiers (OIDs)
Certificates and CRLs issued by Starfield CAs
Distinguished Names (DNs) used to represent entities within the Starfield PKI
CA and infrastructure key pairs

9.6

Representations and Warranties

9.6.1

CA Representations and Warranties

The warranties, disclaimers of warranty, and limitations of liability among Starfield, its
Resellers, and their respective Customers within the Starfield PKI are set forth andgoverned by the agreements among them. This document relates only to the warranties
that certain CAs (Starfield CAs) must make to end-Subscribers receiving Certificates fromthem and to Relying Parties, the disclaimers of warranties they shall make to those
Subscribers and Relying Parties, and the limitations of liability they can place on those
Subscribers and Relying Parties.
Starfield uses, and (where required) Resellers shall use, Subscriber agreements andRelying party agreements in accordance with Section 1.3 PKI Participants. These
Subscriber agreements shall meet the requirements imposed by Starfield (in the case of
Resellers). Requirements that Subscriber agreements contain warranties, disclaimers,
and limitations of liability below apply to those Resellers that use Subscriber agreements.
Starfield agrees to such requirements in its Subscriber agreements. Starfield’s practices
concerning warranties, disclaimers, and limitations in Relying Parties agreements apply toStarfield. Note that terms applicable to Relying Parties shall also be included in
Subscriber agreements, in addition to Relying party agreements, because subscribers
often act as Relying Parties as well.
Applicants, Subscribers, and Relying Parties acknowledge and agree that operations in relation to Starfield Certificatesand Starfield Certificate Applications are dependent on the transmission of information over communication
infrastructures such as, without limitation, the Internet,
telephone and telecommunications lines and networks, servers, firewalls, proxies, routers, switches, and bridges("Telecommunication Equipment") and that this Telecommunication Equipment is not under the control of Starfield or
any independent third-party RA operating under a Starfield CA, or any Resellers, Co-marketers, or any subcontractors,
distributors, agents, suppliers, employees, or directors of any of the foregoing. Neither Starfield nor any independent
third-party RA operating under a Starfield RA, or any Resellers, Co-marketers, or any subcontractors, distributors,
agents, suppliers, employees, or directorsof any of the foregoing shall be liable for any error, failure, delay, interruption, defect, or corruption in relation to a
Starfield Certificate, a Starfield CRL, a Starfield OCSP Response, or a Starfield Certificate Application to the extent thatsuch error, failure, delay, interruption, defect, or corruption is caused by such Telecommunication Equipment.

9.6.1.1
Starfield Certification Authority Warranties to Subscribers
and Relying Parties•

Right to Use Domain Name or IP Address: That, at the time of issuance, Starfield(i) implemented a procedure for verifying that the Applicant either had the right toCopyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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•

•

•

•
•

•
•

use, or had control of, the Domain Name(s) and IP address(es) listed in theCertificate’s subject field and subjectAltName extension (or, only in the case of
Domain Names, was delegated such right or control by someone who had suchright to use or control); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate;and (iii) accurately described the procedure in the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or
Certification Practice Statement;
Authorization for Certificate: That, at the time of issuance, Starfield (i)implemented a procedure for verifying that the Subject authorized the issuance of
the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request theCertificate on behalf of the Subject; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing theCertificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in Starfield’s Certificate
Policy and/or Certification
Practice Statement;
Accuracy of Information: That, at the time of issuance, Starfield (i) implemented aprocedure for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in theCertificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute);(ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately
described the procedure in Starfield’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification
Practice Statement;
No Misleading Information: That, at the time of issuance, Starfield (i) implemented
a procedure for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in theCertificate’s subject:organizationalUnitName attribute would be misleading; (ii)followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described
the procedure in Starfield’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification PracticeStatement;
Identity of Applicant: That, if the Certificate contains Subject Identity Information,
Starfield (i) implemented a procedure to verify the identity of the Applicant inaccordance with Section 3; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate;
Subscriber Agreement: That, if Starfield and the Subscriber are not Affiliated, theSubscriber and Starfield are parties to a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber
Agreement that satisfies these requirements, or, if Starfield and the Subscriber are
Affiliated, the Applicant Representative acknowledged and accepted the Terms of
Use;
Status: That Starfield maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current
information regarding the status (valid or revoked) of all unexpired Certificates;
and
Revocation: That Starfield will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasonsspecified in this document.

9.6.2

RA Representations and Warranties

No Stipulation.

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9.6.3

Subscriber Representations and Warranties

Subscribers are obligated by Starfield’s Subscriber Agreements to warrant that, among
other things:
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

All digital signatures created using the private key corresponding to the public key
listed in the Certificate belong to that Subscriber and the Certificate has been
accepted and is functional – it has not expired or been revoked - at the time thedigital signature is created,
No unauthorized users have had access to the Subscriber's private key,
All representations in the Certificate Application by the Subscriber are true,
The information from the Subscriber in the Certificate is true,
Any usage of the Certificate is for authorized and lawful reasons only, consistent
with this CPS,The Subscriber is not a CA but is an end-user Subscriber and is not using theprivate key
corresponding to any public key listed in the Certificate for purposes of digitallysigning
any Certificate (or any other format of certified public key) or CRL, as a CA orotherwise (with the exception of signing code with a Code Signing Certificate), andThe Subscriber is not using the Certificate Service in any way that infringes upon
the rights of third parties.
The Subscriber is not using their Code Signing Certificate to digitally sign hostile
code, including spyware or other malicious software (malware) downloaded
without user consent.

These requirements shall be in other Subscriber Agreements.

9.6.4

Relying Party Representations and Warranties

You warrant and represent that:(a) the Certificate is being used lawfully by You and with authorization;(b) You are using the Certificate in a Relying Party capacity;(c) You disclaim any fiduciary relationship between Starfield and any non-Starfield
Certification Authorities, and between You and any Subscriber; and(d) You understand that a Starfield Subscriber is solely responsible for the generation andsecurity of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key contained in the Subscriber’sCertificate, and that the Subscriber may have failed to keep the Certificate secure and if
so, the Private Key may have become compromised.

9.6.5

Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

No Stipulation.

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9.7

Disclaimers of Warranties

STARFIELD, ITS CAS, ITS RESELLERS, CO-MARKETERS, SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS,AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, AND EMPLOYEES MAKE NO REPRESENTATIONS AND EXPRESSLYDISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, TITLE, SATISFACTORY TITLE, AND ALSOINCLUDING WARRANTIES THAT ARE STATUTORY OR BY USAGE OF TRADE. STARFIELD MAKESNO WARRANTY THAT ITS SERVICE(S) WILL MEET ANY EXPECTATIONS, OR THAT THE
SERVICE(S) WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, TIMELY, SECURE, OR ERROR FREE, OR THAT DEFECTS
WILL BE CORRECTED. STARFIELD DOES NOT WARRANT, NOR MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONSREGARDING THE USE, OR RESULTS OF, ANY OF THE SERVICES WE PROVIDE, IN TERMS OF
THEIR CORRECTNESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, OR OTHERWISE.

9.7.1 Fiduciary Relationships
Starfield is not the agent, fiduciary, trustee, or other representative of Subscribers or
Relying Parties. Starfield’s Subscriber agreements and Relying party agreements shalldisclaim, to the extent permitted by law, any fiduciary relationship between Starfield or a
non-Starfield CA or RA, and between a Subscriber or Relying party.

9.8

Limitations of Liability

STARFIELD SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS OF CERTIFICATE SERVICES UNLESS DUE TO A FAILURE OR BREACH OF THE
CERTIFICATE ENCRYPTION.
THE TOTAL CUMULATIVE LIABILITY OF STARFIELD, ANY INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY RA OPERATING UNDER A STARFIELD CA,
ANY RESELLERS, OR CO-MARKETERS, OR ANY SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, EMPLOYEES, OR
DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING TO ANY APPLICANT, SUBSCRIBER, RELYING PARTY OR ANY OTHER PERSON, ENTITY,
OR ORGANIZATION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO ANY STARFIELD CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICES PROVIDED IN
RESPECT TO STARFIELD CERTIFICATES, INCLUDING ANY USE OR RELIANCE ON ANY STARFIELD CERTIFICATE, SHALL NOT
EXCEED (A) $0.00 USD FOR EACH BASIC ASSURANCE CERTIFICATE ("BASIC ASSURANCE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMIT"); (B)$10,000.00 USD FOR EACH MEDIUM ASSURANCE CERTIFICATE ("MEDIUM ASSURANCE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMIT"); (C)$25,000.00 USD FOR EACH HIGH ASSURANCE CERTIFICATE ("HIGH ASSURANCE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMIT"); OR (D)$50,000.00 USD FOR EACH EXTENDED VALIDATION CERTIFICATE ("EXTENDED VALIDATION CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMIT")(COLLECTIVELY, “CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMITS”). THESE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMITS SHALL APPLY PER STARFIELDCERTIFICATE REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS OR CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO
SUCH STARFIELD CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICES PROVIDED IN RESPECT TO SUCH STARFIELD CERTIFICATE. THE FOREGOING
LIMITATIONS SHALL APPLY TO ANY LIABILITY WHETHER BASED IN CONTRACT (INCLUDING FUNDAMENTAL BREACH), TORT(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), LEGISLATION OR ANY OTHER THEORY OF LIABILITY, INCLUDING ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL,STATUTORY, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, CONSEQUENTIAL, RELIANCE, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES.
STARFIELD, ANY INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY RA OPERATING UNDER A STARFIELD CA, OR DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE
FOREGOING SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO ANY SUBSCRIBER, RELYING PARTY, OR ANY OTHER PERSON, ENTITY, OR
ORGANIZATION FOR ANY LOSSES, COSTS, EXPENSES, LIABILITIES, DAMAGES, CLAIMS OR SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS ARISINGOUT OF OR RELATING TO ANY PROCEEDING OR ALLEGATION THAT A STARFIELD CERTIFICATE OR ANY INFORMATIONCONTAINED IN A STARFIELD CERTIFICATE INFRINGES, MISAPPROPRIATES, DILUTES, UNFAIRLY COMPETES WITH, OR
OTHERWISE VIOLATES ANY PATENT, TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT, TRADE SECRET, OR ANY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT OR
OTHER RIGHT OF ANY PERSON, ENTITY, OR ORGANIZATION IN ANY JURISDICTION.
SHOULD LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO A STARFIELD CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICES PROVIDED IN RESPECT TO
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A STARFIELD CERTIFICATE EXCEED THE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMITS, THE AMOUNTS AVAILABLE UNDER THE CUMULATIVEDAMAGE LIMITS SHALL BE APPORTIONED FIRST TO THE EARLIEST CLAIMS TO ACHIEVE FINAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNLESSOTHERWISE ORDERED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION. IN NO EVENT SHALL STARFIELD OR ANY INDEPENDENTTHIRD-PARTY RA OPERATING UNDER ANY STARFIELD CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY, OR ANY RESELLERS, CO-MARKETERS, OR
ANY SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, EMPLOYEES, OR DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING BE
OBLIGATED TO PAY MORE THAN THE CUMULATIVE DAMAGE LIMITS FOR ANY STARFIELD CERTIFICATE OR ANY SERVICESPROVIDED IN RESPECT TO ANY STARFIELD SERVER CERTIFICATE REGARDLESS OF APPORTIONMENT AMONG CLAIMANTS.
STARFIELD, INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY RAs OPERATING UNDER A STARFIELD CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY, RESELLERS, COMARKETERS, OR ANY SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, EMPLOYEES, OR DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE
FOREGOING SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, STATUTORY, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, INDIRECT,RELIANCE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF BUSINESS, LOSS OF
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, LOSS OF GOODWILL, LOSS OF PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, LOSS OF DATA, LOST SAVINGSOR OTHER SIMILAR PECUNIARY LOSS) WHETHER ARISING FROM CONTRACT (INCLUDING FUNDAMENTAL BREACH), TORT(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), LEGISLATION OR ANY OTHER THEORY OF LIABILITY.
THESE LIMITATIONS SHALL APPLY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF ANY LIMITED REMEDYSTATED HEREIN AND EVEN IF
STARFIELD OR ANY INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY
OPERATING UNDER A STARFIELD CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY, OR ANY RESELLERS, CO-MARKETERS, OR ANY
SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, EMPLOYEES, OR DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING HAVEBEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THOSE DAMAGES.
SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, SO THESE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE MAY NOT APPLY TO
CERTAIN APPLICANTS, SUBSCRIBERS, RELYING PARTIES, OR OTHER PERSONS, ENTITIES, OR ORGANIZATIONS. THE
DISCLAIMERS OF REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND CONDITIONS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY IN THISSTARFIELD CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT CONSTITUTE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE STARFIELD CPS, ANY
SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENTS, AND ANY RELYING PARTY AGREEMENTS. ALL APPLICANTS, SUBSCRIBERS, RELYING PARTIES,AND OTHER PERSONS, ENTITIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BUT FOR THESE DISCLAIMERS OF
REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY, STARFIELD WOULD NOT ISSUE
STARFIELD CERTIFICATES TO SUBSCRIBERS AND NEITHER STARFIELD NOR ANY INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATIONAUTHORITIES OPERATING UNDER A STARFIELD CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY, NOR ANY RESELLERS, CO-MARKETERS, OR ANY
SUBCONTRACTORS, DISTRIBUTORS, AGENTS, SUPPLIERS, EMPLOYEES, OR DIRECTORS OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING WOULD
PROVIDE SERVICES IN RESPECT TO STARFIELD CERTIFICATES AND THAT THESE PROVISIONS PROVIDE FOR A REASONABLE
ALLOCATION OF RISK.

9.8.1.1

Hazardous Activities

Starfield Certificates and the services provided by Starfield in respect to Starfield Certificates are not designed,
manufactured, or intended for use in or in conjunction with hazardous activities or uses requiring fail-safe
performance, including the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communications systems, air traffic
control, medical devices or direct life support machines. Starfield and any independent third-party RA operating
under a Starfield CA, and any Resellers, Co-marketers, and any subcontractors, distributors, agents, suppliers,
employees, or directors of any of the foregoing specifically disclaim any and all representations, warranties, andconditions with respect to such uses, whether express, implied, statutory, by usage of trade,or otherwise.

9.8.1.2

Other

Without limitation, neither Starfield nor any independent third-party RAs operating under a Starfield CA, nor any
Resellers or Co-marketers, or any subcontractors, distributors, agents, suppliers, employees, or directors of any of
the foregoing shall be liable to any Applicants, Subscribers, Relying Parties or any other person, entity, ororganization for any losses, costs, expenses, liabilities, damages, claims, or settlement amounts arising out of or
relating to use of a Starfield Certificate or any services provided in respect to a Starfield Certificate if:

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(i) the Starfield Certificate was issued as a result of errors, misrepresentations, or other acts or omissions of a
Subscriber or of any other person, entity, or organization;(ii) the Starfield Certificate has expired or has been revoked;(iii) the Starfield Certificate has been modified or otherwise altered;(iv) a Subscriber breached the Starfield CPS or the Subscriber's Subscription Agreement, or a Relying Party breached
the Starfield CPS or the Relying Party's Relying Party Agreement;(v) the Private Key associated with the Starfield Certificate has been Compromised; or(vi) the Starfield Certificate is used other than as permitted by the Starfield CPS or is used in contravention of
applicable law.

9.9

Indemnities

9.9.1 Indemnification by Starfield
Starfield shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless each Application Software Supplier
for any and all claims, damages, and losses suffered by such Application Software Supplier
related to a Certificate issued by Starfield, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory
involved. This does not apply, however, to any claim, damages, or loss suffered by such
Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by Starfield where suchclaim, damage, or loss was directly caused by such Application Software Supplier’s
software displaying as not trustworthy a Certificate that is still valid, or displaying as
trustworthy: (1) a Certificate that has expired, or (2) a Certificate that has been revoked(but only in cases where the revocation status is currently available from Starfield online,
and the application software either failed to check suchstatus or ignored an indication of revoked status).

9.9.2 Indemnification by Subscribers
Starfield's Subscriber Agreement and other Subscriber Agreements shall require
Subscribers to indemnify, to the extent permitted by law, Starfield and any non-Starfield
CAs or RAs against
any and all liabilities, losses, costs, expenses, damages, claims, and settlement amounts(including reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and expert’s fees) arising out of or
relating to any use or reliance by a Relying Party on any Starfield Certificate or any service
provided in respect to Starfield Certificates, including:•

Any false statement, omission or misrepresentation of fact that the Subscriber has
put on the Subscriber's Certificate Application,••

Any modification made by the Subscriber to the information contained in a Starfield Certificate,The use of a Starfield Certificate other than as permitted by the Starfield CPS, the Subscription agreement,
any Relying Party agreement, and applicable law,•

The Subscriber's failure to use a secure system, protect the Subscriber's private
key, or to otherwise take the precautions necessary to prevent the compromise,
loss,
disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the Subscriber's private key, or
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•

The Subscriber's use of a name (including without limitation within a common
name, domain name, or e-mail address) that infringes upon the Intellectual
Property Rights of a third party.

9.9.3 Indemnification by Relying Parties
Starfield's Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall require Relying
Parties toindemnify Starfield and any non-Starfield CAs or RAs against, to the extent permitted bylaw,
any and all liabilities, losses, costs, expenses, damages, claims, and settlement amounts(including reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and expert’s fees) arising out of or
relating to any use or reliance by a Relying Party on any Starfield Certificate or any service
provided in respect to Starfield Certificates, including:••

Any failure by the Relying Party to perform the obligations of a Relying Party,
Lack of proper validation of a Starfield Certificate by a Relying Party,•

Use of a Starfield Certificate other than as permitted by the Starfield CPS, the Subscription agreement, any
Relying Party agreement, and applicable law,
Failure by a Relying Party to exercise reasonable judgment in the circumstances in relying on a Starfield
Certificate.

•

•
•

9.10

Reliance by a Relying Party on a Certificate that is not reasonable under thecircumstances, or
The failure of a Relying Party to check the status of such Certificate to determine if
it is expired or revoked.

Term and Termination

9.10.1 Term
No Stipulation.

9.10.2 Termination
No Stipulation.

9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival
This CP/CPS shall be binding on all successors of the parties.
If any provision of this CP/CPS is found to be unenforceable, the remaining provisions
shall be interpreted to best carry out the reasonable intent of the parties. It is expressly
agreed that every provision of this CP/CPS that provides for a limitation of liability or
exclusion of damages, disclaimer or limitation of any warranties, promises or other

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obligations, is intended to be severable and independent of any other provision and is to
be enforced as such.
This CPS shall be interpreted consistently with what is commercially reasonable in goodfaith under the circumstances and considering its international scope and uniform
application. Failure by any person to enforce a provision of this CP/CPS will not be
deemed a waiver of future enforcement of that or any other provision.

9.11
Individual Notices and Communications with
Participants
Any notice, demand, or request pertaining to this CP/CPS shall be communicated either
using email consistent with this CP/CPS, or in writing. Electronic communications shall beeffective when received by the intended recipient.

9.12

Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment
No Stipulation.

9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period
No Stipulation.

9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed
No Stipulation.

9.13

Dispute Resolution Provisions

In the event of any dispute involving the services or provisions covered by this CP/CPS, theaggrieved party shall notify Starfield management regarding the dispute. Starfieldmanagement will involve the appropriate Starfield personnel to resolve the dispute.

9.14

Governing Law

The laws of the state of Arizona, USA, shall govern the enforceability, construction,interpretation, and validity of this CPS, subject to any limits appearing in applicable law, andregardless of contract or other choice of law provisions and without the requirement toestablish a commercial nexus in Arizona, USA. The choice of law is made to create uniform
procedures and interpretation for all Starfield PKI participants, no matter where they arelocated.
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This governing law provision applies only to this CPS. Agreements incorporating the CPS byreference may have their own governing law provisions, provided that this CPS governs theenforceability, construction, interpretation, and validity of the terms of the CPS separate andapart from the remaining provisions of any such agreements, subject to any limitations
appearing in applicable law.
Any applicable national, state, local and foreign laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, decrees,and orders including, but not limited to, restrictions on exporting or importing software,
hardware, or technical information shall apply to this CPS.

9.15

Compliance with Applicable Law

No Stipulation.

9.16

Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1 Entire Agreement
No Stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment
No Stipulation.

9.16.3 Severability
No Stipulation.

9.16.4 Enforcement
No Stipulation.

9.16.5 Force Majeure
Starfield shall not be responsible for any breach of warranty, delay, or failure in
performance under this CP/CPS that results from events beyond its control including, but
not limited to, acts of God, acts of war, epidemics, riots, power outages, fire,
earthquakes, floods and other disasters.

9.17

Other Provisions

Not applicable.
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Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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10 APPENDIX A – CERTIFICATE PROFILES
10.1

Root CAs

10.1.1 Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints
Authority Key Identifier

Subject Key Identifier

Description
V3
0 (0x0)
sha1RSAOU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
June 29, 2004 17:39:16 GMT
June 29, 2034 17:39:16 GMT
OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
RSA (2048 bits)

Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
KeyID: bf 5f b7 d1 ce dd 1f 86 f4 5b 55 ac dc d7 10 c2 0e a9 88 e7
Certificate Issuer:
Directory Address:
OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
Certificate SerialNumber=00
bf 5f b7 d1 ce dd 1f 86 f4 5b 55 ac dc d7 10 c2 0e a9 88 e7

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10.1.2 Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G2
The following certificate profile is used for the Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G2.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints (critical)
Key Usage (critical)
Subject Key Identifier

Description
V3
0 (0x0)sha256RSA
CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
S=Arizona
C=US
September 1, 2009 00:00:00 GMT
December 31, 2037 23:59:59 GMT
CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
S=Arizona
C=US
RSA (2048 bits)
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
keyCertSign, cRLSign7c 0c 32 1f a7 d9 30 7f c4 7d 68 a3 62 a8 a1 ce ab 07 5b 27

10.1.3 Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints

Description
V3
0 (0x0)
sha1RSAOU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
C=US
June 29, 2004 17:06:20 GMT
June 29, 2034 17:06:20 GMT
OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
C=US
RSA (2048 bits)
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None

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FieldAuthority Key Identifier

Subject Key Identifier

Description
KeyID=d2 c4 b0 d2 91 d4 4c 11 71 b3 61 cb 3d a1 fe dd a8 6a d4 e3Certificate Issuer:
Directory Address:
OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
C=US
Certificate SerialNumber=00
d2 c4 b0 d2 91 d4 4c 11 71 b3 61 cb 3d a1 fe dd a8 6a d4 e3

10.1.4 Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G2
The following certificate profile is used for the Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G2.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints (critical)
Key Usage (critical)
Subject Key Identifier

Description
V3
0 (0x0)sha256RSA
CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
S=Arizona
C=US
September 1, 2009 00:00:00 GMT
December 31, 2037 23:59:59 GMT
CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
S=Arizona
C=US
RSA (2048 bits)
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
keyCertSign, cRLSign3a 9a 85 07 10 67 28 b6 ef f6 bd 05 41 6e 20 c1 94 da 0f de

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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10.1.5 Starfield Services Root Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the Starfield Services Root Certification
Authority.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key Information
Extensions:
Key Usage (critical)
Basic Constraints (critical)

Description
V3
0 (0x0)
sha1RSA
CN= Starfield Services Root Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
ST=Arizona
C=US
June 2, 2008 00:00:00 GMT
December 31, 2029 23:59:59 GMT
CN= Starfield Services Root Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/
O=Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
ST=Arizona
C=US
RSA (2048 bits)

Authority Key Identifier

keyCertSign, cRLSign
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=Noneb4 c6 7f 1a 43 cc 9b 75 5d 2f c4 4b f2 8b 98 10 e9 f1 51 10

Subject Key Identifierb4 c6 7f 1a 43 cc 9b 75 5d 2f c4 4b f2 8b 98 10 e9 f1 51 1010.1.6 GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority - G5.
The following certificate profile is used for the GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority - G5.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Description
V3
13:7f:6d:56:eb:b7:14:c0:cf:c6:2d:bd:61:85:a0:42
sha256WithRSAEncryption
CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G5
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
C=US
June 21, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2042 00:00:00 GMT
CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G5
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
C=US

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FieldSubject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Key Usage(critical)
Basic Constraints(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier

Description
RSA (4096 bits)

keyCertSign, cRLSign
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
CF:CF:BB:19:B2:9F:F8:CB:F5:C2:9E:63:84:B1:7B:E6:17:07:31:58

10.1.7 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G5
The following certificate profile is used for the Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G5.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerDescription
V3
f0:f8:38:64:b9:0f:43:32:d1:bf:cb:19:1c:ae:8a:32
sha256WithRSAEncryption

Valid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Key Usage(critical)
Basic Constraints(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier

CN= Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G5
O= Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
June 21, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2042 00:00:00 GMT
CN= Starfield Root Certificate Authority – G5
O= Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
RSA (4096 bit)

keyCertSign, CRLSign
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
E3:11:A7:2D:79:1E:3D:11:54:C3:69:2D:6B:07:A9:F8:05:03:D9:30

10.1.8 GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority – G6
The following certificate profile is used for the GoDaddy Root Certificate Authority – G6.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier

DescriptionV3
18:3c:e3:59:e1:7c:f2:86:8c:65:a7:0a:46:e0:5c:c3
ecdsa-with-SHA384

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Issuer

Valid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Key Usage(critical)
BasicConstraints(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier

CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G6
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
C=US
June 21, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2052 00:00:00 GMT
CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority – G6
O=GoDaddy.com, Inc.
C=US
ECC, NIST P-384

keyCertSign, cRLSign
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
59:C1:AE:05:B3:82:9E:CB:31:C3:F5:9B:E3:18:BC:DD:C6:23:A9:BF

10.1.9 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G6
The following certificate profile is used for the Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G6.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Key Usage(critical)
BasicConstraints(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier

Description
V3
54:27:7b:51:ae:50:1f:7e:a4:51:82:3e:36:06:db:7c
ecdsa-with-SHA384
CN= Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G6
O= Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
June 21, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2052 00:00:00 GMT
CN= Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G6
O= Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C=US
ECC, NIST P-384

keyCertSign, CRLSign
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
1B:C1:8D:B1:2B:19:78:D7:FF:21:82:0C:DE:60:B8:54:0D:7A:93:CC

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Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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10.2

Issuing CAs

All intermediate certificates issued by any Starfield root certificate are available in the
Repository at https://certs.godaddy.com/repository.

10.2.1 Starfield Issuing (subordinate) CAs
The following certificate profile is used for Starfield Issuing (subordinate) CAs.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject
Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
Key Usage
Extended
Key Usage
Basic
Constraints
CRL
Distribution
PointsCertificate
Policies

Authority
Information
AccessAuthority
Key
Identifier
Subject Key
Identifier

Description
V3
Identifying number unique within the Starfield PKI
SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-384

Unique name matching the corresponding root certificate’s Subject
Not specified
Up to 20 years after Valid From dateUnique name for each Issuing CA
RSA (1024 bits), RSA (2048 bits), RSA (4096 bits) or ECC (384 bits)

Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
Optional.
When intended to sign SSL/TLS certificates: Server Authentication, Client
Authentication
Subject Type=CA
Path Length Constraint=None
Contains the URL of the corresponding root CRL[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=All issuance policies[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
URI pointing to Starfield Repository
URL of the appropriate OCSP responder

SHA-1 hash of the corresponding root certificate’s public key

SHA-1 hash of the certificate’s public key

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10.3

Cross CA Certificates

This section discloses all cross certificates that Starfield is aware of that list a CA covered bythis CPS as the Subject.

10.3.1 Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Go Daddy Class
2 Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the certificate which cross certifies the Go
Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 with the Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
root.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier
Authority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsDescription
V3
1b e7 15
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority
O = The Go Daddy Group, Inc.
C = US
January 1, 2014 07:00:00 GMT
May 30, 2031 07:00:00 GMT
CN = Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = USRSA (2048 bit) (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)

Subject Type=CA

keyCertSign, cRLSign3a 9a 85 07 10 67 28 b6 ef f6 bd 05 41 6e 20 c1 94 da 0f de
KeyID= d2 c4 b0 d2 91 d4 4c 11 71 b3 61 cb 3d a1 fe dd a8 6a d4 e3[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.godaddy.com
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = http://crl.godaddy.com/gdroot.crl

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FieldCertificate
Policies

Description[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=anyPolicy (OID: 2 5 29 32 0)[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:https://certs.godaddy.com/repository/

Note: The above certificate has been reissued. The prior instance is Valid From May 3, 2011
07:00:00 GMT, has the Serial Number 20 03, and includes Subject:
OU=https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/.

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10.3.2 Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Starfield Class 2
Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the certificate which cross certifies theStarfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 with the Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
root.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier
Authority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsCertificate
Policies

Description
V3
39 14 84
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C = US
January 1, 2014 07:00:00 GMT
May 3, 2031 07:00:00 GMT
CN = Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = USRSA (2048 bit) (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)

Subject Type=CA

keyCertSign, cRLSign7c 0c 32 1f a7 d9 30 7f c4 7d 68 a3 62 a8 a1 ce ab 07 5b 27
KeyID= bf 5f b7 d1 ce dd 1f 86 f4 5b 55 ac dc d7 10 c2 0e a9 88 e7[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfroot.crl[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=anyPolicy (OID: 2 5 29 32 0)[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
98

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Note: The above certificate has been reissued. The prior instance is Valid From May 3, 2011
07:00:00 GMT, has the Serial Number 20 06, and includes Subject:
OU=https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/.

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
99

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.3.3 Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority + Starfield
Services Root Certificate Authority
The following certificate profile is used for the certificate which cross certifies theStarfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 with the Starfield Services Root
Certificate Authority root.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier
Authority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsDescription
V3
30 dc a9sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority
OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L=Scottsdale
S=Arizona
C = US
January 1, 2014 07:00:00 GMT
May 30, 2031 07:00:00 GMT
CN = Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = USRSA (2048 bit) (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)

Subject Type=CA

keyCertSign, cRLSign
9c 5f 00 df aa 01 d7 30 2b 38 88 a2 b8 6d 4a 9c f2 11 91 83
KeyID=b4 c6 7f 1a 43 cc 9b 75 5d 2f c4 4b f2 8b 98 10 e9 f1 51 10[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfsroot.crl

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
100

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

FieldCertificate
Policies

Description[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=anyPolicy (OID: 2 5 29 32 0)[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/

Note: The above certificate has been reissued. The prior instance is Valid From May 3, 2011
07:00:00 GMT, has the Serial Number 20 06, and includes Subject:
OU=https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/.

10.3.4 Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 + Starfield
Class 2 Certification Authority
The following certificate profile is used for a certificate which cross certifies the Starfield
Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 with the Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
root.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier

Description
V3
00 d8 c9 33 43 fe 5d 39 29
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
C = US
September 2, 2009 00:00:00 GMT
June 28, 2034 18:00:00 GMT
CN = Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = USRSA (2048 bit) (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)

Subject Type=CA

keyCertSign, cRLSign
9c 5f 00 df aa 01 d7 30 2b 38 88 a2 b8 6d 4a 9c f2 11 91 83
KeyID=bf 5f b7 d1 ce dd 1f 86 f4 5b 55 ac dc d7 10 c2 0e a9 88 e7

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

FieldAuthority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsCertificate
Policies

Description[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://o.ss2.us[2]Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://x.ss2.us/x.cer
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = http://s.ss2.us/r.crl[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=anyPolicy (OID: 2 5 29 32 0)

Note: The above certificate has been reissued. The prior instance has the Serial Number 00 a7 0e 4a 4c
34 82 b7 7f and a Valid To date of June 28, 2034 17:39:16 GMT.

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
102

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.3.5 Certainly E1 + Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority G2
The following certificate profile is used for the certificate which cross certifies the
Certainly E1 with the Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier
Authority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsCertificate
Policies

Description
V3
00a207da718baba362
sha256WithRSAEncryption

CN = Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
June 22, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2032 23:59:59 GMT
CN = Certainly Intermediate E1
O = Certainly
C = US
ECC, NIST P-384

Subject Type=CA

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
0A:98:98:AE:4F:3A:D7:DD:67:86:E7:97:25:5A:9B:23:4F:5B:58:1D
keyid:7C:0C:32:1F:A7:D9:30:7F:C4:7D:68:A3:62:A8:A1:CE:AB:07:5B:27[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfroot-g2.crt.cer[1]CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL=http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfroot-g2.crl[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.49945.1.1
Qualifier:https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
103

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.3.6 Certainly R1 + Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority- G2
The following certificate profile is used for the certificate which cross certifies the
Certainly R1 with the Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public
Key Information
Extensions:
BasicConstraints(critical)
Key Usage(critical)
Subject Key
Identifier
Authority
Key
Identifier
Authority
Information
AccessCRL
Distribution
PointsCertificate
Policies

Description
V3
11831cde4cb573e5
sha256WithRSAEncryption

CN = Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
June 22, 2022 00:00:00 GMT
June 21, 2032 23:59:59 GMT
CN = Certainly Intermediate R1
O = Certainly
C = USRSA (2048 bit)

Subject Type=CA

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
BD:97:9D:df:A1:D8:1B:25:99:E3:0C:04:06:89:64:12:D7:65:24:C7
keyid:7C:0C:32:1F:A7:D9:30:7F:C4:7D:68:A3:62:A8:a1:CE:ab:07:5B:27[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfroot-g2.crt.cer[1]CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL=http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfroot-g2.crl[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=1.3.6.1.4.1.49945.1.1
Qualifier:https://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
104

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.4

End Entity SSL Certificates

10.4.1 Go Daddy Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates
The following certificate profile is used for Go Daddy branded Subscriber Certificatesissued from the Go Daddy Issuing CA. At a minimum, the following fields will be
populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerDescription
V3
unique value with 64-bits of entropy for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Valid From
Valid To
Subject (Medium
Assurance Certificates
Subject (High
Assurance Certificates

Subject (Extended
Validation Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints

serialNumber = 07969287
CN = Go Daddy Secure Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository
O = GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to the maximum permitted validity period at the time of issuanceafter Certificate issuance (depending on SSL certificate type).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
OU = “Domain Control Verified” or similar text indicating the assurance level ofthe certificate (on certificates issued prior to July 15, 2021).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s organization or individual name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA may
also be included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority or dateof incorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in the
CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

(critical)
Extended Key
Usage
Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsPath Length Constraint=None
Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment

Certificate
Policies (Medium
Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate
Policies (High
Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate
Policies (Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Authority
Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject
Alternative Name

Subject Key
Identifier
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.
2.4.2 (Extended

CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.godaddy.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gd_intermediate.crt
KeyID: fd ac 61 32 93 6c 45 d6 e2 ee 85 5f 9a ba e7 76 99 68 cc e7
Required, set to:
1. DNS=Fully-Qualified Domain Name of the Subscriber’s site, domainname remaining after removing “www.” from the left hand portion of
the Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
And/or:
2. DNS=domain name of Subscriber’s site, domain name of additionalsites which have undergone the following verification step as part of
the authentication process: the individual requesting the certificate
has access to the domain name(s) that are specified in the certificate
application (per 3.2.12)
160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate
One or more RFC 6962 Signed Certificate Timestamps

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Validation
Certificates)

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
107

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.4.2 Starfield Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates
The following certificate profile is used for Starfield branded Subscriber Certificates issued
from the Starfield Issuing CA. At a minimum, the following fields will be populated as
described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerDescription
V3
unique value with 64-bits of entropy for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Valid From
Valid To
Subject (Medium
Assurance Certificates
Subject (High
Assurance Certificates

Subject (Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key
Usage

serialNumber = 10688435
CN = Starfield Secure Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to the maximum permitted validity period at the time of issuanceafter Certificate issuance (depending on SSL certificate type).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
OU = “Domain Control Verified” or similar text indicating the assurance level ofthe certificate (on certificates issued prior to July 15, 2021).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s organization or individual name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA may
also be included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority or dateof incorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in the
CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsDigital Signature, Key Encipherment

Certificate
Policies (Medium
Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate
Policies (High
Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate
Policies(Extended
Validation
Certificates)
Authority
Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject
Alternative Name

Subject Key
Identifier
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.
2.4.2 (Extended
Validation
Certificates)

CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL =<current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.1[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sf_intermediate.crt
KeyID: 49 4b 52 27 d1 1b bc f2 a1 21 6a 62 7b 51 42 7a 8a d7 d5 56
Required, set to:
1. DNS=Fully-Qualified Domain Name of the Subscriber’s site, domainname remaining after removing “www.” from the left hand portion of
the Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
And/or:
2. DNS=domain name of Subscriber’s site, domain name of additionalsites which have undergone the following verification step as part of
the authentication process: the individual requesting the certificate
has access to the domain name(s) that are specified in the certificate
application (per 3.2.12)
160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate
One or more RFC 6962 Signed Certificate Timestamps

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
109

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
110

Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.4.3 Go Daddy Issuing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates
The following certificate profile is used for Go Daddy branded Subscriber Certificatesissued from the Go Daddy Issuing CA – G2. At a minimum, the following fields will be
populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number

Description
V3
unique value with 64-bits of entropy for each certificate issued by theIssuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject (Basic and Medium
Assurance Certificates
Subject (High Assurance
Certificates

Subject (Extended
Validation Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key Usage

CN = Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2
OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/
O = GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to the maximum permitted validity period at the time of issuanceafter Certificate issuance (depending on SSL certificate type).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
OU = “Domain Control Verified” or similar text indicating the assurance
level of the certificate (on certificates issued prior to July 15, 2021).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s organization or individual name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA
may also be included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority ordate of incorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in
the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management ofExtended Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution Points

Certificate Policies(Basic and Medium
Assurance Certificates)

Certificate Policies(High Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate Policies(Extended Validation
Certificates)

Authority Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Alternative
Name

Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.2 (OV) or 2.23.140.1.2.3 (IV)[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.godaddy.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt
KeyID: 40 c2 bd 27 8e cc 34 83 30 a2 33 d7 fb 6c b3 f0 b4 2c 80 ce
Required, set to:
1. DNS=Fully-Qualified Domain Name of the Subscriber’s site,domain name remaining after removing “www.” from the left
hand portion of the Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
And/or:
2. DNS=domain name of Subscriber’s site, domain name ofadditional sites which have undergone the following verification
step as part of the authentication process: the individual
requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) thatare specified in the certificate application (per 3.2.12)

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

Subject Key Identifier
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2(Extended Validation
Certificates)

160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate
One or more RFC 6962 Signed Certificate Timestamps

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Starfield CP-CPS v5.0

10.4.4 Starfield Issuing CA – G2: Subscriber Certificates
The following certificate profile is used for Starfield branded Subscriber Certificates issued
from the Starfield Issuing CA – G2. At a minimum, the following fields will be populated
as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number

Description
V3
unique value with 64-bits of entropy for each certificate issued by theIssuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Signature Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject (Basic and Medium
Assurance Certificates
Subject (High Assurance
Certificates

Subject (Extended
Validation Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key Usage

CN = Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2
OU=http://certs.starfield.com/repository/
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to the maximum permitted validity period at the time of issuanceafter Certificate issuance (depending on SSL certificate type).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
OU = “Domain Control Verified” or similar text indicating the assurance
level of the certificate (on certificates issued prior to July 15, 2021).
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s organization or individual name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
CN = domain name of Subscriber’s web site
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA
may also be included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority ordate of incorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in
the CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management ofExtended Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (ifapplicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)

Copyright © 2004-2023 Starfield Technologies, LLC All rights reserved.
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Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution Points

Certificate Policies(Basic and Medium
Assurance Certificates)

Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.1[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.1

Certificate Policies(High Assurance
Certificates)[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.2.2 (OV) or 2.23.140.1.2.3 (IV)

Certificate Policies(Extended Validation
Certificates)[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.1

Authority Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Alternative
Name[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfig2.crt
KeyID: 25 45 81 68 50 26 38 3d 3b 2d 2c be cd 6a d9 b6 3d b3 66 63
Required, set to:
1. DNS=Fully-Qualified Domain Name of the Subscriber’s site,domain name remaining after removing “www.” from the left
hand portion of the Fully-Qualified Domain Name.
And/or:
2. DNS=domain name of Subscriber’s site, domain name ofadditional sites which have undergone the following verification

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Subject Key Identifier
1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2(Extended Validation
Certificates)

step as part of the authentication process: the individual
requesting the certificate has access to the domain name(s) thatare specified in the certificate application (per 3.2.12)
160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate
One or more RFC 6962 Signed Certificate Timestamps

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10.5

End Entity Code Signing Certificates10.5.1 Go Daddy Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates
As of May 30, 2021, Starfield no longer issues High Assurance Code Signing Certificates,
however the following certificate profile was used for Go Daddy branded Subscriber
Certificates issued from the Go Daddy Issuing CA. At a minimum, the following fields
were populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key
Usage
Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsCertificate Policies

Description
V3
unique value for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

serialNumber = 07969287
CN = Go Daddy Secure Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository
O = GoDaddy.com, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to 39 months after Certificate issuance
CN = Subscriber's organization name
O = Subscriber’s organization name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
Digital Signature
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository

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Authority
Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Key
Identifier[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.godaddy.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gd_intermediate.crt
fd ac 61 32 93 6c 45 d6 e2 ee 85 5f 9a ba e7 76 99 68 cc e7
160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate

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10.5.2 Starfield Issuing CA: Subscriber Certificates
As of May 30, 2021, Starfield no longer issues High Assurance Code Signing Certificates,
however the following certificate profile was used for Starfield branded Subscriber
Certificates issued from the Starfield Issuing CA. At a minimum, the following fields were
populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key
Usage
Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsCertificate Policies(High Assurance
Certificates)

Authority
Information
AccessDescription
V3
unique value for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

serialNumber = 10688435
CN = Starfield Secure Certification Authority
OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository
O = Starfield Technologies, Inc.
L = Scottsdale
S = Arizona
C = US
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to 39 months after Certificate issuance
CN = Subscriber's organization name
O = Subscriber’s organization name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
Digital Signature
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com
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FieldAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Key
Identifier

Description[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sf_intermediate.crt
49 4b 52 27 d1 1b bc f2 a1 21 6a 62 7b 51 42 7a 8a d7 d5 56
160-bit SHA1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate

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10.5.3 Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority – G2 AND Go Daddy
Secure Extended Validation Code Signing CA – G2:
Subscriber Certificates
As of May 30, 2021, Starfield no longer issues High Assurance Code Signing Certificates,
however the following certificate profile was used for Go Daddy branded Subscriber
Certificates issued from the Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority – G2 or the Go Daddy
Secure Extended Validation Code Signing CA – G2. At a minimum, the following fields
were populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject (Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key
Usage
Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsDescription
V3
unique value for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Subject of corresponding Issuing CA certificate
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to 39 months after Certificate issuance
CN = Subscriber's organization name
O = Subscriber’s organization name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA may also be
included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority or date ofincorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in the
CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (if applicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (if applicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
Optional: Kernel Mode Code Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.1.1)
Digital Signature
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
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Certificate Policies(High Assurance
Certificates)

Certificate Policies(Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Authority
Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Key
Identifier

The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.4.1[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.24.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.3[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.godaddy.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name: URL=http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt
SHA-1 hash of the public of the corresponding Issuing CA
SHA-1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate

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10.5.4 Starfield Secure Certificate Authority – G2 AND Starfield
Secure Extended Validation Code Signing CA – G2:
Subscriber Certificates
As of May 30, 2021, Starfield no longer issues High Assurance Code Signing Certificates,
however the following certificate profile was used for Starfield branded Subscriber
Certificates issued from the Starfield Secure Certificate Authority – G2 or the Starfield
Secure Extended Validation Code Signing CA – G2. At a minimum, the following fields
were populated as described, in accordance with IETF RFC 5280.
Field
Version
Serial Number
Signature
Algorithm
Identifier
IssuerValid From
Valid To
Subject

Subject (Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Subject Public Key
Information
Extensions:
Basic Constraints(critical)
Extended Key
Usage
Key Usage(critical)
CRL Distribution
PointsDescription
V3
unique value for each certificate issued by the Issuing CA
sha256RSA (OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)

Subject of corresponding Issuing CA certificate
Date and time of Certificate issuance
A date up to 39 months after Certificate issuance
CN = Subscriber's organization name
O = Subscriber’s organization name
L = City/town
S = State
C = Country
O = Subscriber’s full legal organization name. An assumed name or DBA may also be
included
L = City/town of place of businessS = State of place of business
C = Country of place of businessserialNumber= Registration number assigned by incorporating authority or date ofincorporation or registration
businessCategory=vetting category used to issue certificate as defined in the
CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended
Validation CertificatesjurisdictionLocalityName= City/town of incorporation or registration (if applicable)
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName= State of incorporation or registration (if applicable)
jurisdictionCountryName= Country of incorporation or registration
RSA (2048 bits or greater)

Subject Type=End Entity
Path Length Constraint=None
Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
Optional: Kernel Mode Code Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.61.1.1)
Digital Signature
CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Point Name:
Full Name:
URL = <current CRL URI>
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Certificate Policies

Certificate Policies(Extended
Validation
Certificates)

Authority
Information
AccessAuthority Key
Identifier
Subject Key
Identifier

The specific URI will vary depending on certificate type and CRL scope.
[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.23.2[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.4.1[1]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.16.840.1.114414.1.7.24.3[1,1]Policy Qualifier Info:
Policy Qualifier Id=CPS
Qualifier:
http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/[2]Certificate Policy:
Policy Identifier=2.23.140.1.3[1]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com[2] Authority Info Access
Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/gdig2.crt
SHA-1 hash of the public of the corresponding Issuing CA
SHA-1 hash of the public key contained within this certificate

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11 APPENDIX B: TEST SITESThe URL’s for test sites can be found in the table below.
CA
GoDaddy
GoDaddy G2
Starfield
Starfield G2
Starfield
Services

Valid
https://valid.gdi.catest.g
odaddy.com
https://valid.gdig2.catest.godaddy.com
https://valid.sfi.catest.starfieldtech.com
https://valid.sfig2.catest.
starfieldtech.com

Revokedhttps://revoked.gdi.catest.godaddy.comhttps://revoked.gdig2.catest.god
addy.com
https://revoked.sfi.catest.starfiel
dtech.com
https://revoked.sfig2.catest.starf
ieldtech.com

Expiredhttps://expired.gdi.catest.godaddy.comhttps://expired.gdig2.catest.god
addy.com
https://expired.sfi.catest.starfiel
dtech.com
https://expired.sfig2.catest.starf
ieldtech.com
https://expired.sfs.catest.starfiel
dtech.com

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