AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPS

RIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 219

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

30 October 2015

Editorial Committee:

AN INCOMPLETE “CORONATION”:
CHINA’S MILITARY PARADE ANDPRESIDENT XI JINPING’S US VISIT

Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:
Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIA

Kenji Minemura

・ What was the purpose of the military parade?
・ What does
indicate?

hismelancholic

expression

・ What kind of political backlash is possible?

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The unexpected presence of China’s most prominent retired official, moreso than any display of the latest weaponry and fighter jets, surprised onlookers
at the September 3 military parade. The onlookers were stunned when former
president Jiang Zemin mounted the podium at Tiananmen and took his placenext to President Xi since Jiang’s lack of appearance in public for nearly a year
had prompted Internet rumors that he was in poor health or had been arrested.
The appearance of Jiang on center stage, standing tall and looking proud,dispelled those rumors. During the parade, Xi would occasional turn and speakto Jiang, who seemed to be putting on a brave front, displaying an air that
seemed to be unconcerned about the rumors of his fall from the actual seat ofpower. Placing both hands on the railing and looked placidly down on the scene
below, Jiang displayed the same air of dignity he had when he retired ten years
ago. In contrast, Xi never let his stern expression slip, looking guarded during
what should have been his moment in the sun, removed the long shadow ofbehind the scenes powerbrokering that defines Chinese politics.
The beginning of 2015 marked a new phase of Xi’s grand plan to tighten
his grip on power. He had intensified the anti-corruption campaign he initiated in2012 by thwarting attempts by Jiang and other retired officials to interfere inpolitical matters and blocking similar moves by dissident factions within the party.
The military parade on September 3, legally designated as “Victory over JapanDay,” was intended to demonstrate his solid power base over both the military
and the party. His visit to the US to meet President Obama shortly thereafter
would show his fellow Chinese and the rest of the world his rise and prominence
as a global leader. This series of “coronations” was aimed at harnessing themomentum for this October’s Plenary Session, where “post-Xi Jinping”
appointments are to be discussed. In a democracy, the people’s mandate is
granted through the electoral process. Yet, in a one-party system, establishinglegitimacy is the most important factor in retaining political authority.
Xi’s careful planning remained on track until just before the parade. His
anti-corruption campaign had managed to unseat a number of Jiang’s right-handmen, casting doubt over Jiang’s influence. Additionally, a review article,
published in the August 10 edition of the People’s Daily, carried the tone of a

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

declaration of victory over Jiang: “Some leading cadres not only plant ‘trustedaides’ [in key positions] during their time in office to create favorable conditions inwhich they can exercise their power in the future, but also remain unwilling togive up control of important affairs in their former departments many years after
their retirement.”
This harsh criticism, clearly leveled at Jiang, coincided with the typicaltiming for the Beidaihe conference. This event had, until this year, reflected thelingering influence of the “gerontocracy,” led by Jiang and other retired senior
officials, through their say in key personnel assignments. Yet, according to one
Communist Party official, Jiang was not in attendance at this year’s conference.
As the sun was seemingly setting on the political life of the “emperor” who had
reigned as de facto powerbroker for a quarter-century, an ill-timed “accident”
occurred.
On August 12, more than 160 people were tragically killed in an explosion
at a chemical warehouse in Tianjin Municipality’s Binhai New Area industrial
zone, also host to a number of Japanese companies. Chemical plant explosions
subsequently occurred in other industrial areas, including Shandong and HenanProvinces. This proved to be a major blow to Xi’s ruling circle, who were alreadyunder intense pressure to enact economic countermeasures to address thesudden plunge in stock prices.
The military parade itself illustrated other legitimacy issues for Xi. Russia
and South Korea were the only major countries whose leaders were present.
The European and American leaders invited by China skipped the event, andeven Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe canceled his planned post-parade tripto China, a choice that erred on the side of caution.
During Xi’s visit to the United States, the summit meeting with President
Obama focused in great part on the cyberattacks in which Chinese involvement
was suspected. The tone of the meeting, along with the timing of the Pope’s firstvisit to the White House, left little opportunity to establish a more amicablerapport between the two nations. While officials from the Chinese government
had asked the US on several occasions to change the Pope’s itinerary, theirrequests fell on deaf ears.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Despite recent attempts to tighten his hold on the Party, none of Xi’s
aspirations have been ultimately realized. This has been corroborated by arelative of a former high-ranking Chinese official who noted that, “Xi encounteredpolitical backlash from Jiang and the powers close to him.” In the future, it ishighly likely that Xi will be compelled to tone down his anti-corruption campaign,
and will find it necessary to engage in “political coordination” with Jiang andother retired senior officials on key personnel and policy matters. With the 19thParty Congress scheduled for autumn 2017, the CCP is once again entering “aseason of politics.” One cannot help but note signs of a new struggle now thatthe “immortal emperor” has made a comeback.

Kenji Minemura is Washington Correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun. He hasserved as Beijing Correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun in 2007-13. He was aVisiting Scholar at The Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard Universityin 2013-14. He received the 2011 “Vaughn-Ueda international journalism prize”,
which was funded by donations from the widow of Miles W. Vaughan, a former vicepresident of United Press International (UPI), and Japanese media in 1950.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4