Chapter 2

The Russian Far East’s
Security Perspective:
Interplay of Internal and External
Challenges and Opportunities
Sergei Sevast’ianov

The Evolution of Regional Threat Perceptions
The main regional security threats to the Russian Far East in the 1990s
mostly had been of a traditional character and were perceived to be:• potential armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula;• military growth of China and its hypothetical conflict with
Taiwan;• tension with Japan over unresolved territorial disputes;• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and illegalarms trade.
However, in the post cold war era the spectrum of most criticalsecurity threats in the world as well as in the Asia Pacific (in myanalysis I mostly include East Asian countries and the Russian Far
East’s territories as a geographical part of this subregion) became much
more diversified. Nowadays, various religious and separatist
movements manifest themselves through acts of terrorism, while theproliferation of WMD, local conflicts, drug trafficking, organized crime,
piracy, and ecological and epidemic disasters are also very serious
threats.
In the globalized world the priority of the above-mentioned threats
is becoming very fluid and constantly changing. For example, in 2003
and 2004 the most urgent security threats for East Asia could beconsidered as terrorism, the crises in Iraq and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the SARS outbreak.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

After the events of 9/11 almost all experts agree that the mostserious threat arises from international terrorism. Unfortunately, East
Asia is not immune from the threats of international terrorism, andrecent outbreaks of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines andThailand illustrate this point. Terrorist groups usually have close ties
with criminal elements all over the world. It is very difficult to trace
them, and the only possible way to counter that challenge is through amultinational format.
Terrorism took a new dimension after the attacks of 9/11, when it
became clear that al Qaeda provided resources, training, and brought
new tactics of universal jihad to different parts of the world. As a result,
there is more cooperation among the governments in East Asia, while
counter-terrorism training centers are being established in the region.
However, this cooperation has a long way to go, and terrorism willremain a long-term regional challenge.
The crises in Iraq and the DPRK are both producing serious
anxieties for security in East Asia. Though there were no criticalthreats to social stability in Muslim countries in the region, the Iraqi
war clearly reinforced negative feelings around the region of theUnited States as a unilateralist power. The SARS outbreak in the springof 2003 created widespread panic in East Asia, proving that virtually
every year brings with it a new medical threat, while some otherdiseases, like HIV-AIDS, remain long term challenges.
As far as the Russian Far East territories are concerned, during thelast several years both the spectrum and priority of security threats forthem have also changed, the most urgent being either internal(declining socioeconomic situation, negative demography, etc.) or
para-military in character (terrorism, illegal migration and fisheries,etc.). However, the classical military menace of nuclear arms
proliferation (the DPRK issue) as well as the globalization era
connected geopolitical threat for the Russian Far East to be excluded
from East Asian and Northeast Asian political and economic
integration processes are also considered critical.
In spite of the fact that in 2003 the Russian economy grew at adecent rate of 7 percent, the long awaited economic structural reforms
aimed at overcoming Russia’s over-dependence on extracting andexporting raw materials have yet to be implemented. In order to double- 22 -

The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

Russia’s gross domestic product by 2010 (the objective announced by
Vladimir Putin in May 2003) the Russian economy needs to grow atleast 8 percent annually. However even such an annual rate is notenough for Russia to compete adequately in the global economic
environment and to radically improve Russian standards of living(more than 31 million people in the Russian Federation live below theofficial poverty level of $70 per month). In other words, for thenear-to-medium term the most critical threat for Russia is its
inadequate pace of economic development.
In fact, in his May 2004 annual address to the Federal Assembly
Putin defined Russia’s most urgent priorities as follows: 1• to double Russia’s gross domestic product by 2010;• to decrease poverty and increase the population’s well-being;• to modernize the Armed Forces.
However, outbreaks of terrorism unprecedented in scale andcruelty in the Caucasus and Moscow in August-September 2004
became the most negative feature of the Russian domestic scene.
Several grave versions of transport terrorism in August were followedby the unprecedented act of terror in Beslan (Northern Osetia) on
September 1 when a group of international terrorists seized a publicschool and took more than one thousand hostages. As a result of theterrorists setting off a series of explosions and shootings, about 350
innocent people, mostly school children, were killed.
As Americans did on September 11, 2001, Russians foundthemselves in another country in September 2004 after realizing the
cumulative effects of unprecedented acts of terrorism that challenged
the whole Russian state and nation. Finding a systemic answer to thehighly increased challenge of international terrorism became the mosturgent national priority in Russia.
Considering the Russian Far East territories, the declining
socioeconomic situation (in comparison to other parts of Russia it ismuch worse) is of special importance. Mostly it has to do with the factthat tariffs on energy, fuel, transportation, etc. are over two times
higher here than in other parts of Russia thus making local production
uncompetitive. Such a situation triggered a prolonged negative
1

Vladimir Putin, “My dolzhni rasti bistree,” Parlamentskaia gazeta, May 27, 2004.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

demography (over the last 15 years the Russian Far East has lost morethan one million people, and its population now is only 6.7 million)
that, according to the presidential representative in the Far Eastern
District, General Pulikovskii, finally materialized as the most criticalthreat to the sustainability of that part of Russia.2
In fact, 6.7 million is the size of a medium Chinese city, whilst inneighboring Chinese provinces the population is more than 140 million.
With such a critical geopolitical disparity, one must think seriously
how to arrange effective immigration mechanisms to control the flowof incoming foreign citizens.
Another recent estimate (in this case by the high level
representative of the Russian Federal Assembly and Chairman of theFederation Soviet on Defense and Security, Viktor Ozerov) concerning
regional security threats faced by the Siberian Federal District
practically coincided 100 percent with the assessment proposed by
Pulikovskii for the Russian Far East. In an interview Ozerov admitted
that Siberia (especially its eastern part) is seriously under-populated,and mentioned the negative demography (due to dominating flows of
the Russian population’s migration to the European part of the country),high transportation tariffs (leading to the autonomy of Siberian
economic processes) and uncontrolled Chinese immigration as themost critical threats to national security in that part of Russia.3
The above-mentioned changes in threat perceptions are leading to
new roles that should be performed by the Armed Forces. Some of the
new tasks of the Russian Navy and new Armed Forces’ operational
concepts have been demonstrated during recent strategic military
exercises held in the Russian Far East in August 2003 and in June 2004.
Both exercises have also become a good showcase of Moscow having
a much more positive attitude toward implementing confidencebuilding measures in security (CBMS) in Northeast Asia.

2
3

Konstantin Pulikovskii, “Partnerstvo bez ogliadki,” Parlamentskaia gazeta, April
27, 2004.
Viktor Ozerov, “Sibir’iu dolzhna ukrepliat’sia derzhava,” Parlamentskaia gazeta,
April 29, 2004.

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

Russian Input to Security in East and Central Asia
Russia’s position in world affairs today is mostly determined bydomestic policy aimed at transformation into an economically effective
state. This is why Moscow is primarily focused on increasing Russia’s
influence in its more immediate region of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) with the key strategic goal to form a real joint
economic zone with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
Another major goal is to further deepen military and political
integration between Russia and the five other CIS countries in theframework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). At
an April 2003 Summit Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formally created the CSTO, which willattempt to provide a more efficient response to strategic problems
confronting member states, specifically terrorism and drug trafficking.
Its Joint Staff became operational in January 2004 with the principal
task of forming the organization’s military structure and controlling its
rapid deployment force to be stationed at a Russian military base at
Kant in Kyrgyzstan.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central
Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) are also becoming important
political instruments for Russia to sustain her influence in Central Asia.
At a June 2004 Summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, six SCO member
states (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan) signed intergovernmental organizational documents, andofficially started its first project – the SCO Regional Antiterrorist
Structure (with its main thrust to coordinate joint efforts to stop thegrowing traffic of drugs from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and othercountries).
In October 2004 Russia joined CACO (it was formed in 2002 by
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to support security
and economic cooperation in Central Asia), and signed an interstateagreement with Tajikistan that envisages forming a Russian militarybase in Tajikistan on the basis of her 201st infantry division. So now
Russia has two military bases in Central Asia (the other one is an air
force base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan) that are becoming criticalcomponents of the regional collective security structure and joint rapid- 25 -

Sergei Sevast’ianov

deployment force. Such an increased Russian military input
demonstrates that Moscow is ready to pay a high price to counter
terrorism, drug trafficking and other critical security threats at a long
distance from its own border.
Taking into account her priorities, Moscow’s ability to influence
conflicts, such as in Iraq or the DPRK, are to some extent limited.
Nevertheless keeping with its commitment to control WMD, Russia
will continue trying to avert nuclear crises with Iran or the DPRK, butwill oppose the use of force against them.
In spite of disagreements over Russia’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), Russia’s opposition to further NATO and
EU enlargement, and serious disagreements over Iraq, Moscow is
consolidating mostly economics-oriented relationships with the US andthe EU. In the future Moscow will continue to do its best to develop
equal partnership relations with the US (mostly in counter terrorism,
nonproliferation of WMD, and trying simultaneously to sustain
Russian economic interests in Iraq, Iran, and the DPRK) and theEuropean Union (by trying to form four joint spaces in such areas as:
economics, external security, democratic freedoms and humanitarianties). Moscow will use the Russia-NATO Council and the Russia-EU
Forum to minimize its political and economic risks posed by NATO(for example, US plans to shift its forces stationed around the globe, insome cases bringing them closer to Russia’s borders) and the EU (notto change the former Berlin wall to some new Schengen or other wall)
expansion to the East.
The Asia Pacific region will remain another main focus of Russian
foreign policy, because Moscow is very interested to use its increasing
economic potential to contribute to the development of the Russian Far
East and Eastern Siberia.
Moscow is doing her best to achieve regional stability on abilateral and multilateral basis. Just recently Putin mentioned that
Russia would continue to develop political and economic dialog withsuch large partners as the US, China, India, and Japan, making special
emphasis on implementing transborder regional cooperation.4 Besides,
Moscow is actively participating in APEC and the ASEAN Regional
4

Vladimir Putin, “My dolzhni rasti bistree,” Parlamentskaia gazeta, May 27, 2004.

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

Forum, and trying to play a positive role in the ongoing Korean
Peninsula security negotiations in multilateral track 1 and track 2
formats.
China
For a number of security and economic reasons, Russia’s policy in Asia
gives priority to its partnership with China. In October 2004 Putin
made a historic visit to China that helped to finish 40 years ofnegotiations that led to final demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer-long
Russian-Chinese border, and also to agree with Beijing on Russian
WTO membership terms. Though Moscow made small territorialconcessions, the improved spirit of the bilateral relationship would
guarantee much better political and economic cooperation perspectives
that are manifested in a Russia-China Action Plan for 2005-2008
signed in Beijing by the Presidents of both countries.
Moscow and Beijing have already become partners instrengthening stability in adjacent regions, such as Central Asia (theShanghai Cooperation Organization) as well as on the Korean
Peninsula (six-party talks). Beijing is gradually increasing its role inmultilateral security and economic cooperation by making suchcontributions as proposing to invest a billion US dollars to stimulate
trade and economic cooperation between SCO member-states, and byarranging a constant negotiation venue (Beijing) for six-party talks.
Beijing is not satisfied with the Russian government’s decision to
construct an oil pipeline route going from Taishet (Eastern Siberia) to
Nakhodka (Sea of Japan). However, Russia is eager to invite Chinese
investors to discuss a possibility to finance construction of a special
off-shoot (to Daqing, Northern China) from the main pipeline going to
Nakhodka.
In 2000-2005, the overall value of Russian arms exports to China
is projected to be $5-6 billion. As a result, to some extent China
depends on Russian military technology, whilst military sales to China
have become important for the survival of the Russian Far East
military-industrial enterprises, making some regional countries a little
apprehensive. However, it is important to point out that Russia does
not sell China any armaments of the strategic offensive character.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

Russia has very serious economic interests and increasing tradewith China (for example, in 2003 the Russian-Chinese foreign tradeturnover reached a record $17 billion, and in 2004 it is expected toreach as high as $22 billion, while during his recent visit to China
Putin declared that in the future it should reach an unprecedented $60
billion). For the last several years Russians have complained that
Chinese exports have mostly consisted of raw materials, thus making it
unprofitable. In the years 2003-2004 the situation showed signs ofimproving when Chinese businessmen began considering opportunities
and making real investments in several joint industrial complexes in
the Russian Far East with an emphasis on timber processing and othersectors.5
As far as the Chinese illegal migration threat is concerned, several
considerations should be taken into account. Most representatives of
Moscow and the regional political elite are sure that Russia needs aforeign labor force to help master her vast territorial spaces in the
Russian Far East and Siberia. The issue is how to construct adequate
laws and then implement an effective immigration policy. 6 Putin
expressed the same view saying that “Chinese migration to the Russian
Far East is neither good nor evil, but an objective process. However,
the regional labor market should be regulated in such a way that
Russians have priority in getting jobs in comparison to representativesof other nations.”7
Taking all these factors into account China will continue to be themain focus of Russian policy in the Asia Pacific. Russian-Chinese
relations will lack the previous geopolitical romanticism about an
alliance relationship and will be characterized by more pragmatic
economic considerations in the future. However, that effect should not
impede mutually advantageous economic and trade ties at the regional

56
7

At a recent Russia-China investments Forum in Khabarovsk in June 2004,
Chinese businessmen signed several joint agreements with their Russian partners
for the sum of $700 million – see: “‘Skazano – sdelano’ – obeshchaiut kitaitsy,”
Zolotoi Rog, June 15, 2004.
Viktor Ozerov, “Sibir’iu dolzhna ukrepliat’sia derzhava,” Parlamentskaia gazeta,
April 29, 2004.
“Voprosi v lob,” Vladivostok, August 29, 2002.

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

and transborder levels, and numerous joint projects of that kind should
flourish.
Japan
A positive trend in Russia’s bilateral relationship with Japan was
manifested in a Japan-Russia Action Plan signed by Putin and Koizumi
Junichiro in 2003. Koizumi successfully lobbied for a change in themain route of the oil pipeline from Angarsk to Primorskii krai (with abranch to Daqing, China), where Tokyo can get more reliable access to
Russian energy resources.
The Russian-Japanese foreign trade turnover in 2003 reached thedecent level of $5 billion, and in 2004 bilateral relations continued todevelop in a favorable way. However, the recent improvement of
economic ties and the numerous bilateral negotiations did not bringprogress in resolving their territorial dispute.
At the moment both sides are not ready to soften their position on
the issue. In this context Putin’s position is clear. Just recently heappointed Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov (well known for his toughstance in the Russian territorial dispute with Ukraine over the Crimea
Peninsula) as a head of the Russian part of the “Wisemen Council”
proposed by Koizumi during the latest APEC Summit in Thailand(October 20-21, 2003) to facilitate negotiations on the territorial issue.
Koizumi’s recent trip (September 2, 2004) on a patrol boat to oversee
several islands belonging to the so-called “Northern territories” did notserve to improve bilateral ties. Nevertheless, what counts is that evenin such an environment both countries now agree to continue thedialog on the territorial dispute while making serious efforts to expand
mutual ties in security, economics, education, culture and other spheres.
For example, in the defense area, the Russian Navy made theirown impressive input into improving bilateral relations. In 1998, thefirst joint Russo-Japanese search-and-rescue (SAR) naval exercises
were held in the Vladivostok area. Another breakthrough happened in
September 2000 when Maritime Self-Defense Force ships (the firstever foreign Navy ships in the post Soviet era) visited the Kamchatka
Peninsula. Finally, in August 2003 the Japanese Navy took part in a
strategic exercise held in Russian Far East waters.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

This positive trend in bilateral relations is expected to continue, as
Russia launches several major projects to develop its regional
infrastructure in which Japanese capital and technology could play animportant role, while Japan seeks political support from Russia on
issues such as North Korea’s nuclear programs as well as thediversification of its energy resources.8
The USTaking into account that the US is a critical player in this field, it isworth noting that US politics in Asia did not seem to contradict any
critical Russian interests in the region. On a number of diplomatic
issues, they have effectively coincided. For example, Moscow
appreciated US financial assistance in dealing with Russia’s nuclear
submarine waste. The only visible problem in bilateral relations in Asia
is the US-Japanese effort to install Theater Missile Defense.
During most of the last decade Russian-American militarycontacts in the Asia-Pacific have been positive, including conducting aseries of search-and-rescue exercises, amphibious disaster relief
exercises, and others. However, it is worth mentioning that during thesame period Russian-American military cooperation in the Asia Pacific
had played a secondary role in comparison to bilateral relations in the
Atlantic. Thus at several times worsening of the latter relationship had
made Pacific ties a hostage of that negative impact (for example, theKosovo crisis, NATO enlargement and other events that haveeffectively blocked bilateral military cooperation in the Asia Pacificregion).
The recent war in Iraq has clearly demonstrated that America’s
bellicose declarations concerning the so-called “Axis of Evil” countries
were not mere rhetoric, but a real part of a new Bush Doctrine. Taking
into account that the DPRK (with which Russia has a common border,
and where Moscow has legitimate interests) is also on that list of suchcountries, it is of critical importance for Russia to prevent the US fromusing the Iraqi model to solve the Korean Peninsula issue.

8

Sergei Sevast’ianov, Chapter on Russia, in Charles Morrison ed., Asia Pacific
Security Outlook, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 164.

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation in Economics and Security
and the Korean Peninsula Issue
The most striking recent development in Russia’s regional cooperation
is in the area of energy policy. In October 2003 Russia became for the
first time the world’s largest oil producer (8.5 million barrels of oil perday), replacing Saudi Arabia. Addressing participants at the APEC
Summit in Bangkok the same month, Putin announced that Russia wasprepared to contribute to a new energy and transportation configurationin the Asia Pacific. He urged foreign businesses to invest in the gas andoil industry in Siberia, and announced that one of the largest natural
gas liquefying plants in the world would open in 2007 on Sakhalin
Island. Russia’s growing potential in the Asia Pacific is also
demonstrated by the ongoing international debates on routes for the
Eastern Siberia oil pipeline and alternative ways of connecting
Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean railroads. However, the North
Korean nuclear crisis has inhibited several countries from moving
actively into major infrastructure projects in the Russian Far East andEastern Siberia.
This consideration is a major reason why Russia seeks to improve
the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. After a decade of being
largely excluded from the negotiation process,9 recent Russian-DPRK
summits have been helpful in reestablishing Moscow as one of theprincipal players on the Korean issue. Becoming an official participantof the six-party talks, Russia proposed a package approach inmultilateral negotiations to achieve such final purposes as:
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, observance of WMD
non-proliferation, and providing the DPRK with security guarantees
and economic assistance. As a first step to achieve that, Russia
proposed to freeze the DPRK nuclear programs and to place themunder International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control whilst
ensuring a steady supply of energy and economic assistance to the
DPRK. By 2005 inexpensive energy produced at Bureia hydropower
9

Russia had never been a part of KEDO (the Korean Energy Development
Organization with the US, Japan, ROK, EU and DPRK as members), or the
four-party talks (US, China, ROK and DPRK).

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

station (Amurskaia oblast) will be brought through a high voltage
electric circuit to Russian Far East Primorskii krai bordering DPRK
territory thus making Russian participation in supplying affordable
energy to that country a very practical option.
In fact, China has recently developed a much more positive
attitude toward multilateralism in dealing with the Korean Peninsulaand other regional security problems. Such a trend could lead to crucialchanges in the format and the role of multilateral organizations dealing
with the security of Northeast Asia in the future.
Recent (August 2003) strategic exercises in the Russian Far East –including a scenario in which Pacific Fleet ships stopped a hypotheticalNorth Korean vessel carrying a nuclear weapon, and an episodedevoted to stemming the possibility of 100,000 DPRK refugees at theRussian border – have signaled to Pyongyang that continuing its
nuclear weapons programs may undermine its relationship with
Moscow.
As predicted by security experts, the basic parameters of anagreement concerning the DPRK nuclear proliferation issue, meetingthe articulated needs of the US and DPRK, can be identified. A breakthrough may occur as a result of negotiations, but the most criticalissue is whether Washington would be ready to wait long enough tomake that happen.
The absence of positive movement may eventually rekindle acrisis, and the White House may be tempted to adhere to the “BushDoctrine” that has been recently applied in Iraq. According to that
doctrine the US has the right to preemptively attack states that
presumably support terrorists and pursue WMD.
If normalized, such an American position would move theprincipal authority regarding the use of force away from centralizedinternational institutions like the UN. This may well create a situationin which the deployment of lethal force in self-defense becomesindeterminate. For example, both Iran, having much stronger ties withterrorists than Iraq, and the DPRK that allegedly possesses WMD and
has a track record of selling missiles, fit quite readily as legitimate
targets within the framework of the new Bush Doctrine.
One more critical worry about the Bush Doctrine is that otherstates may follow the American lead and preemptively attack their foes

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective(for example, any of the Korean states may attack each other, China
could attack Taiwan, etc.) undermining the whole international security
system.
During the debates over the new Doctrine Washington declaredthat it preferred a diplomatic mode in settling the Korean Peninsula
crisis. Yet, on the second day of the latest war against Iraq, ananonymous American official was quoted by the New York Times assaying that “This is just the beginning. I would not rule out the same
sequence of events for Iran and North Korea as for Iraq.” In this newworld order environment, in February 2003 Japan warned that it would
launch a preemptive military action against North Korea as aself-defense measure if the DPRK were to “resort to arms against
Japan.”
From the Russian standpoint, due to such an American approach tohandling international security issues, the situation on the Korean
Peninsula has become most worrisome and is posing a real threat to thesecurity of Russian Far East territories. To downplay this dangerous
trend provoked by the new Bush Doctrine, countries should establish
reliable global and regional systems of counteraction.

Pacific Fleet Status and Recent Military Exercise Threat
Assessments
The Pacific Fleet has always been a valuable asset for Russia in
implementing her regional security obligations. As then-Pacific Fleet
Commander (now Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy) Admiral
Vladimir Kuroedov declared in November 1996 that the Pacific Fleet’s
main operational tasks were:10• to maintain nuclear deterrence;• to defend Russian territory;• to secure the Russian Federation’s economic zone;• to protect the sea lines of communication; andto conduct “show-the-flag” missions in the ocean areas of
10 Vladimir Kuroedov, “Russian Security Politics and Its Role in Building Trustamong Asia-Pacific Nations” (paper presented at the Fifth Western Pacific Naval
Symposium, November 25-27, 1996, Tokyo).

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

strategic importance (including port visits, joint exercises, andpeacekeeping missions).
To accomplish these tasks, the Pacific Fleet had different types ofsubmarines, surface combatants, auxiliary vessels, sea aviation, amarine core, shore missiles, and artillery units.
Furthermore, since the end of the cold war the Pacific Fleet has
been a valuable asset to Russian diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, and agreat number of foreign naval vessels have visited Vladivostok. PacificFleet ships have also visited many countries, and the first visits paid tosome of them, especially to the United States (1990), China (1993), theRepublic of Korea (ROK) (1993), and Japan (1997), were real
breakthroughs in reestablishing bilateral relationships after many yearsof confrontation and distrust. Those visits were supplemented bybilateral communications, joint maneuveres, and SAR exercises thus
contributing to increased trust and interoperability between the Russianand foreign navies. This means that if a multinational search-andrescue or a UN-led naval operation against pirates or to confront someother threats were necessary in the Asia Pacific, the Pacific Fleet (if theoperation coincided with Russia’s national interests) could allocate
ships.
Several changes in regional security threat assessments have been
openly demonstrated during strategic exercises that have been arrangedin the Russian Far East in August 2003 and June 2004.
First of all, we can consider positive changes in the Russian
approach to CBMS, in which exercises became an excellent example.
The information about exercise plans and goals had been distributed
well in advance. Naval ships from Japan and the ROK had been invited
and were able to take part in some of the exercise’s episodes.
Secondly, detailed information concerning three phases of theAugust 2003 exercise (aims, tasks, dates, number of participating ships,
auxiliary vessels, aircraft, helicopters, military and civilian personnel,etc.) had also been published.
The most “revolutionary” feature of the 2003 exercise was the factthat only 25 percent of the tactical episodes were devoted to classicalmilitary issues such as bombing surface combatants, landing marines,
etc. Most parts of the episodes were devoted to countering so-calledparamilitary threats, such as fighting terrorists, piracy, poaching in- 34 -

The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

economic zones, countering ecological threats as a consequence ofaccidents at sea, etc.
One of the tactical episodes was devoted to stemming some
100,000 refugees from a neighboring state (taking into account that it
was arranged in the Khasan area, the scenario envisioned theimmigrants would come from the DPRK). Several episodes have been
proposed to train military personnel to fight terrorists. According to
one possible scenario, a strategic bridge is seized by terrorists, and inanother a train with radioactive fuel is seized.11
The most recent strategic exercise, Mobility 2004, arranged inJune was devoted to improving interoperability of the Armed Forces(in other words, to urgently deploy by air the most combat ready troops
from the European parts of Russia to its Far Eastern part to react to any
negative changes in the security situation).
Overall, the above-mentioned exercises have demonstrated several
new trends in military training, including the urgent need for morecooperation and interoperability between armed forces andnon-military structures to counter new regional threats, as well as theneed for increasing the Armed Forces transportation capability tourgently deploy troops from one part of Russia to another.

CBMS in the Nuclear Safety Sphere
A great number of the Pacific Fleet’s decommissioned submarines arestill waiting for dismantlement and deactivation of their nuclear
reactors. Substantial nuclear waste stocks at Bol’shoi Kamen(Primorskii krai) also need to be processed. Due to the Fleet’s financial
problems and lack of adequate technical facilities, the above-mentioned
problems can not be completely solved in the immediate future. That
was why the United States and Japan, concerned with nuclear safetyissues, have proposed to offer help and allocated money to solve theproblem. In 1999 the “Zvezda” ship repair yard management signed
two documents with official representatives of the above-mentioned
countries, and in 2003 the whole complex (US Department of Defense
funded technical shore base at “Zvezda and the Japanese-funded11“Khronika chrezvychainogo polozheniia”, Vladivostok, August 29, 2003.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

floating filtration plant “Landysh”) finally became operational.12 In
2004 Russia has continued to cooperate with the US and Japan inefforts to dismantle its Pacific Fleet nuclear submarines and to process
nuclear waste, whilst Australia joined the “Global Partnership”
program allocating Russia $10 million for nuclear submarines’
utilization.
That joint project’s implementation will lead to several positive
outcomes. First, it will improve safety and help ease the ecologicalsituation of the Sea of Japan. Secondly, the project has a profoundsocioeconomic dimension creating new jobs in the city of Bol’shoi
Kamen, where “Zvezda” is the largest industrial enterprise.

Conclusion
Negative demography and underdevelopment of vast territories are
considered the most critical internal security threats for both theRussian Far East and Siberia.
Instability of the Korean Peninsula is the most serious external
security threat for the Russian Far East territories. It could be assessed
as having two layers:• the threat of a direct military conflict bringing a whole array ofnegative consequences such as possible nuclear radiation of
territories, a mass flow of DPRK refugees, etc.;• the geopolitical threat of prolonged blocking of plans forconstructing Northeast Asian international transportation
corridors, gas and oil pipelines (that should go through the
Korean Peninsula) thus increasing the possibility of the Russian
Far East territories’ exclusion from the Northeast Asian
integration processes.
In this situation the main strategic long-term task for Russia is topreserve the territorial integrity of its Far East and Siberia. Both China(as a prime source of labor force) and Japan (as a main source offinancial capital) are equally important partners for Moscow to solve
this historic mission. To achieve its goals Russia would try to attract

12“Radiatsiia pod kontrolem”, Vladivostok, April 10, 2003.

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The Russian Far East’s Security Perspective

foreign workers, but will do its best to arrange an efficient policy tocontrol Chinese immigration.
Considering Japan, Russia may propose to give Tokyo politicalsupport on issues such as preventing DPRK nuclear programs, and will
attract Japan with the possibility of diversifying its energy resources
whilst trying to solve the territorial issue on the basis of mutual
concession.13
To strengthen its political weight on the Korean Peninsula, Russia
will take a more proactive stand in solving this security issue in a
multilateral format (from Gorbachev’s time Vladivostok has been
waiting for a chance to become a place where Northeast Asian security
is discussed at track 1 level). Moscow could provide some efficient
input to satisfy DPRK energy needs, as well as to propose cooperationin developing DPRK infrastructure thus giving way to Northeast Asianstrategic projects to build pipelines and expand transportation networks
through DPRK territory.
Joint efforts by the US and Japan to help Russia in dismantling
nuclear submarines and processing nuclear waste became a real input
to the future safety of the Russian Far East and Northeast Asia. This
positive experience in executing CBMS in the sphere of nuclear safety
is a sound manifestation that it is worth trying to use the multilateralmodel to develop and realize CBMS to solve the Korean Peninsula
issue.
Most episodes of the recent strategic military exercises in the
Russian Far East have been devoted to countering so-calledparamilitary threats, such as fighting terrorists, stemming refugees
from neighboring countries, countering poaching in economic zones,
as well as ecological threats as a consequence of accidents at sea, etc.
The above-mentioned diversification of security threats is criticallyincreasing the need for cooperation among regional governments thus
demonstrating an urgent necessity to form an intergovernmentalorganization to counter regional security challenges. The six-party
13 In November 2004 Putin proposed to settle the dispute in a compromised fashionon the basis of the Joint Declaration signed by Japan and the USSR in 1956. He
confirmed Russian readiness to fulfill that obligations, and to transfer Shikotan
and Habomai islands to Japan upon signing of the bilateral Peace Treaty.

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Sergei Sevast’ianov

talks may become a prototype of such a track 1 security cooperation
organization for Northeast Asia.
As the dependence of Asian economies on external energy
increases, cooperation in supporting energy security is becoming an
issue of growing weight in key bilateral relationships in the
Asia-Pacific (Russia-China, Russia-Japan, China-Japan, US-Russia,etc.). In this context a proposal of forming a Northeast Asia Energy
Forum is considered as a very fruitful one due to the capacity of such a
track 1 organization to make a substantial input to regional security.
From the Russian standpoint, to downplay current dangerous
trends provoked by the new Bush Doctrine, a global system ofcounteraction against modern threats should be established. Actually it
already exists – it is the United Nations, with its unique characteristicsof legitimacy, universality and experience.
The formation of this new global system has already successfully
begun. Its prototype may become the international antiterrorist
coalition, and the network of global and regional mechanisms built by
its participants. The experience gained in the establishment andfunctioning of this coalition can be used to work out the main
guidelines to secure mankind against a much wider range of challenges
and risks. It is obvious that the new system must be global, embracing
all security problems, capable of making comprehensive decisions, anduniversal as regards to its membership. Finally, it should become astandard of international legitimacy relying on international law, above
all, the UN Charter.

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