CHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN JAPANESEKOREAN RELATIONS
1.

KOREAN XENOPHOBIA AND COMPLACENCY

Modern Sino-Japanese relations begin on equal footing
Anyone who believes that relations between Japan and China at the beginning of themodern era were confrontational is terribly mistaken. This revelation may surprise somereaders, but Sino-Japanese relations in the modern era started off on an equal footing.
Doubters would do well to peruse the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871,
the first treaty, and an equal treaty at that, concluded between the two nations.
During the Edo era (1603-1868), the relationship between Japan and China was handled
by private individuals. In August 1870, by which time Japan had decided, once and for all,to proceed with the Meiji Renovation, the first step toward modernization, the Japanese
proposed establishing diplomatic relations with China, but were rebuffed. However,
diplomats Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan pressed the Qing court to accept Japan’s
proposal, explaining how China would benefit by inaugurating commerce with Japan,
which was on its way to becoming a modern nation. The court finally acquiesced andnegotiations between the two nations commenced in May of 1871; the Sino-Japanese
Friendship and Trade Treaty, comprising 18 articles, was signed in July 1871. The
provisions of the treaty, which extols the friendship between Japan and China, areexpressed in highly refined language. For instance, here is Article 1:
Relations of amity shall henceforth be maintained in redoubled force
between China and Japan, in measure as boundless as the heaven and theearth. In all that regards the territorial possessions of either country the two
Governments shall treat each the other with proper courtesy, without theslightest infringement or encroachment on either side, to the end that there
may be for evermore peace between them undisturbed.1

Unlike treaties concluded in later years, written in hackneyed legalese, the cultivated turnsof phrase in this treaty harbor the promise of cordial relations for all eternity.
An important aspect of the 1871 treaty was the acknowledgement of mutual
extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, which made it an equal treaty. With consularjurisdiction, if a Japanese commits a crime in China, the Japanese consul reserves the rightto judge him in accordance with Japanese law; similarly, if a Chinese commits a crime inJapan, the Chinese consul has the right to judge him in accordance with Chinese law.
Treaties that afford consular jurisdiction to one party, but not the other, are unequal treaties.
Commercial treaties concluded during the Ansei era (1854-60) between Japan and theWestern powers (the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Russia, and France) were called unequal1

https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18710913.T1E.html (retrieved 07/2022).

1

treaties because (in addition to their failure to grant tariff autonomy to Japan), they did notgrant the right of consular jurisdiction to Japan.
The various treaties signed between China and the Western powers subsequent to theOpium Wars were also unequal treaties that put China at a disadvantage. For that reason,
Japan would have preferred to enjoy the same rights as the Western powers did via theirtreaties with China. But Japan’s wishes came to naught, since its national strength wasmarkedly inferior to that of the Western powers, as was its diplomatic prowess.
In any case, the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty served as the starting point forformal Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, which had ceased to exist after the Muromachiera (1336-1573). The 1871 treaty is of great significance because it placed the two nations
on an equal footing. If the 1st Sino-Japanese War had not broken out 23 years later, thattreaty would likely still be in force today. and perhaps the two nations would have beenable to sustain a peaceful relationship. However, all treaties between two warring nations
automatically become null and void as soon as hostilities commence. And that became thefate of the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871.
It was replaced by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which wasconcluded in 1896. This was an unequal treaty, differing from the previous treaty in several
ways, e.g., granting extraterritoriality only to Japan, and not granting China tariff autonomy.
Differences of opinion and disagreements on these matters surfaced during attempts torevise the treaty. The failure to resolve them became an enormous problem that culminatedin the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Perhaps the seeds of that incident were already being
sowed during the 1st Sino-Japanese War.
The difference between the 1871 and 1896 treaties reflected the shift from a relationshipbetween equals to an unequal relationship. The direct cause of that shift, unequivocally,
the 1st Sino-Japanese War. Then, why did that war break out? Does Japan bear the
responsibility for its inception? Or was it China? Or Korea?
Korea rejects Japan’s diplomatic overtures
It was the Korean problem that led to the 1st Sino-Japanese War. However, no discussionof that conflict can take place unless we are familiar with the relationship between Japanand Korea at the time.
Relations between Japan and Joseon Korea had broken off as a result of two campaigns
against Korea2 ordered by Imperial Regent Toyotomi Hideyoshi. In 1607, after his death,
Shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu succeeded in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Korea.
Subsequently, Korea dispatched emissaries to Japan on a regular basis (Korean delegations
visited Japan 12 times) until 1811. Thereafter, Korean envoys delivered tribute to Tsushima,a Japanese island located between Japan and Korea. The Shogunate often thought about

2

Bunroku (1592) and Keichō (1598) campaigns.

2reestablishing diplomatic relations, but distracted by other problems both at home andabroad, let the matter languish.
After the Meiji Renovation began, the plan was for interchange between Japan and China
to take place with Korea as the intermediary, as it had previously. In January 1868 the new
government sent notifications to some nations announcing the restoration of imperial rule.
But the notification to Korea was sent through Sō Yoshiaki, daimyō (lord) of Tsushimadomain, who had been serving as the intermediary between Japan and Korea. He was also
asked to deliver a message from the Japanese government stating its desire to reestablish
diplomatic relations. However, the Koreans refused to accept the message. The reason
given for their refusal was that the message from Sō contained several Chinese charactersthat did not appear in previous missives of that sort. They were the characters representing
Imperial House of Japan, imperial decree, and imperial court. Additionally, the seal theJapanese had affixed to the message was a new one, replacing the one that had been
supplied by Korea.
For nearly 500 years, ever since Taejo, the first king of the Joseon dynasty, decided tosubmit to Ming China at the end of the 14th century, Korea had pledged allegiance toChina. In fact, the name Korea (then Joseon, Chosun, or Choson) was chosen by China.
Since Korea was a tributary state of China, in the minds of the Koreans, the Chinesecharacters to which they took offense could be used only when referring to China.
The reason given by the Koreans for rejecting Japan’s overtures was the departure fromtraditional formalities and language. But when a system of government changes, it isreasonable to make adjustments that affect politics and diplomacy, be they cosmetic orotherwise. After all, strict adherence to old traditions makes renewal impossible. The
other nations of the world recognized Japan’s new government. Even China, known forclinging stubbornly to tradition, entered into diplomatic relations with Japan three years
later, in 1874, as already stated. But Japan’s closest neighbors, the Koreans, wereincapable of comprehending Japan’s renovation, no matter how many times it was
explained to them. This misunderstanding marked the beginning of the unfortunate
history of relations between the two nations.
Koreans apprehensive about becoming Japan’s servantsThen, in March of 1869, in an attempt to clear up any misunderstandings, the Japanese
government submitted a rebuttal to the Koreans. It said that, as the Koreans were wellaware, Japan’s emperor had presided over the national administration of Japan for morethan 2,000 years. The Chinese character for emperor was used now because changes had
occurred, and the emperor had personally taken charge of the government. From now on
the imperial government would handle diplomatic matters, which had previously been
entrusted to the Tsushima domain. A new seal had been created as a symbol of Japan’s
sincere desire for cordial relations with Korea.
The Koreans continued to spurn Japanese overtures, insisting that the Japanese wereusing the Chinese characters for emperor and imperial decree because of their fixation on3

making Korea Japan’s servant. Here is an excerpt from one of their deceptive highranking Korean officials who obviously had underlying motives.
We must never tell [the Japanese] that we would prefer not to enter into
diplomatic relations with them. We should base the justification for our
stance on time-honored custom. Using ambiguous, equivocal language, wemust declare that although we are not opposed to being on amicable termswith our neighbors, we are wedded to the traditional ways. We shall state
and restate our response in the vaguest manner possible, and await arejoinder from the other party. Should the Japanese become impatient andbreak off the negotiations, then they shall have to bear the responsibility forthe consequences. At that juncture, our only choice shall be to devote ournational strength to waging war.3

Today one of the popular opinions among Korean historians is that the Japanese used theword emperor because they wanted to enslave Korea. If that had been the case, then why
would the Japanese have used the following language in the Treaty of Ganghwa, concluded
eight years later (and said to have been forced upon the Koreans)? There was no need for
the Japanese to use such language if it did not say what they meant.
ARTICLE I.
Chosen [Korea] being an independent state enjoys the same sovereign rights
as does Japan.
In order to prove the sincerity of the friendship existing between the nations,
their intercourse shall henceforward be carried on in terms of equality andcourtesy, each avoiding the giving of offence by arrogance or manifestationsof suspicion.4

A more serious problem lay in the fact that over several hundred years, Korea had
become the servant of Ming and Qing China.
Korean stance: inflexible and obtuse
This was hardly the first occasion on which the Koreans had rejected attempts to establish
friendly relations. Two years earlier, in 1866, an incident had taken place involving the SS
General Sherman, an American merchant vessel. When the ship arrived at a location near
Pyongyang on the Taedong River, its captain requested provisions and fuel, and permission
to engage in commerce. The Koreans refused, destroyed the General Sherman by ramminga burning fireship into it, and killed its entire crew. In the same year the Koreans repelleda French fleet that had arrived at Ganghwa Island to protest the murder of nine French
3
Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai Nissen kankei no kenkyū (A study of modern relations between Japan and
Korea) (Seoul: Office of the Governor-General of Korea, 1940).
4

https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18760226.T1E.html (Treaty of Ganghwa is also
known as Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Corea)(retrieved 07/2022).

4

missionaries. At that time, King Gojong’s father, who was known as the Daewongun, wasacting as regent for the young monarch, and thus was in control of state affairs. His policies
were vigorously and staunchly exclusionist and isolationist. The tragic history that was tounfold between Japan and Korea, the former open and progressive and the latter closed andinflexible, was already incubating.
In September 1869 the Japanese government transferred jurisdiction over diplomatic
matters relating to Korea from the So family to the Foreign Ministry. It made perfect sense
for Japan, which had taken the first step toward becoming a modern nation, to dispensewith diplomacy conducted by private individuals and unsupported by treaties. In Decemberof that year the government dispatched two Foreign Ministry staff members, Sata Hakubō
and Moriyama Shigeru, to Busan. Their mission was to request a response to the diplomatic
message announcing the renovation, but the Koreans refused to cooperate. In March of
1870, having observed conditions in Korea, Sata returned to Japan and presented amemorial to Foreign Minister Sawa Nobuyoshi. In it Sata wrote: “They are arrogant andegotistical. No matter how hard we try to make them understand, they will not listen.” Satasuggested that the deadlock with the Koreans could not be overcome unless Japan sent 30
battalions of soldiers to Korea to convince them. His conclusion, which he reached after
personally observing the Koreans and the situation in their country, was a radical one: senda military expedition to Korea.5
Sata’s 30-battalion suggestion was derided, then died a quiet death. But his stance certainly
deserves our attention because it was not a reactionary one. Sata advocated punitive action
after having carefully observed and experienced first-hand the unvarnished relationshipbetween the two nations from the viewpoint of a diplomat.
The Japanese government did not adopt a militaristic policy toward Korea. In October 1870
it dispatched envoys to Korea, who carried with them a letter from the foreign minister
requesting diplomatic relations. This was the first such message that did not involve themediation of the So domain. It did not contain the Chinese characters for emperor, imperial
edict, or imperial court, but the Koreans rejected it nonetheless. They insisted that allnegotiations be done as before through the So domain. After waiting in Busan for morethan a year, the delegation returned to Japan empty-handed. During that time, theDaewongun erected anti-appeasement stelae in all eight of Korea’s provinces, exacerbating
xenophobia and anti-Japanese sentiment among the Koreans.

5

Tabohashi, op. cit.

5

2. THE OPENING OF KOREA
Saigō seeks justification for punitive expedition against Korea
In 1872 the Japanese government terminated the arrangement whereby all interchange with Korea
was handled by Sō daimyō, and took charge of all negotiations with Korea. The Koreans reacted
to this change by engaging in cruel, ruthless behavior. For instance, they blocked deliveries offirewood, coal, and provisions to the Japanese Pavilion in Choryang, Busan, where Japanesediplomats lived and worked when they visited Korea. In 1873 exclusionist sentiment grew evenmore malevolent; in addition to preventing supplies from reaching the Japanese Pavilion, theKoreans demonstrated their hatred of Japan openly by posting anti-Japanese notices in front of thepavilion’s gate. When news of those actions reached Tokyo, the desire to launch a punitive
expedition against Korea immediately intensified.
Chancellor of the Realm Sanjō Sanetomi prepared a draft proposal in which he was critical of the
Koreans: “Not only did they fail to respond when we acted in good faith, but they exacerbated thesituation by adopting an arrogant, insulting attitude.” He recommended dispatching sufficientArmy and Navy personnel to protect Japanese nationals residing in Korea, and sending envoys to
Korea, instructing them to negotiate with the Koreans and convince them that the Japanese position
was the correct one.
The draft proposal contained two articles, one concerning the dispatching of troops, and the othersending a special envoy. However, Councillor Saigō Takamori rejected the first one, and approvedof the second. Saigō’s reasoning was: “If we send troops immediately, the Koreans will fear they
are being subjugated by Japan. This would be a bad beginning because it would be inconsistent
with our esteem for Korea. We must first dispatch a responsible envoy plenipotentiary who will
explain Japan’s intentions to the Koreans providing ample justification, and convince the Korean
officials to see the error of their ways.”6
Saigō volunteered himself as envoy plenipotentiary, and said that he would not be accompanied
by military personnel, not even one soldier. Armed only with the knowledge that he was right anda sense of justice, he would arrive in Hanseong (present-day Seoul) and negotiate. If his efforts
were unsuccessful (if the Koreans remained attached to their arrogant stance and killed him), thenand only then should Japan send troops to Korea.
Seikanron (literally “advocacy of a punitive expedition against Korea”) is often misunderstood.
Saigō subscribed to Bushido, the samurai code of chivalry, but he had no interest in conquests ofany sort. According to Uchimura Kanzō’s Representative Men of Japan, “Saigō had very strong
ethical objections to starting a war for the sole purpose of conquest. He never enjoyed crushing
the weak. Saigō said that George Washington was his hero; he detested Napoleon and others of
his ilk. These facts alone prove that Saigō was not a slave of base ambition.”7

6

Uchimura Kanzō, Representative Men of Japan, trans. Inamori Kazuo (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2003).

7

Ibid.

6

This passage offers a superb description of Saigō’s disposition. Because he did not want to wage
an unjustifiable war, he emphasized the necessity for a justifiable pretext for dispatching troops;
to that end he was even willing to sacrifice his own life. One of the teachings that form Saigō’s
legacy states: “Diplomatic interchange cannot be accomplished unless we tread the path ofrighteousness and are willing to sacrifice our lives in the course of representing our country.”8
By advocating what he did, Saigō was practicing what he preached.
Japan: modern-age pioneer of East Asia
The meaning of the term seikanron, which has an assertive ring to it, becomes clear only when we
understand it within the context of the grand foreign policy that the Japanese of the late shogunate
and early Meiji eras envisioned. For instance, Satō Nobuhiro, Yoshida Shōin, and otherintellectuals active at the close of the Tokugawa shogunate are remembered for having championed
the quest for hegemony over the Asian continent. They were opposed to passive resistance in theface of the rapid inroads made by Western powers, but in favor of accomplishing an Asian revival
through the establishment of a robust overseas Japanese presence that would check whiteimperialism.
By the middle of the 19th century, Japan’s neighbors were in a deplorable state. Senescent, sickly
China lacked the energy needed to resist Western colonialism. The Koreans knew that their nation
was a tributary of China; however, they knew nothing about the world situation. Wallowing in
ignorance, they were completely unaware of the looming menace from the Western powers.
Japanese intellectuals of the late shogunate were without any doubt whatsoever, the modern-age
pioneers of East Asia. They and they alone, in that region, were not only aware of the threat fromthe West, and but also issued warnings about that threat. Except for Japan, all of Asia was in
decline – asleep, as it were. It was the inevitable course of history that its foreign-policy philosophy
placed Japan in a position of leadership. When a void, powerless area is surrounded by aggressive,
intimidating forces, it is devoured, subsumed. East Asia’s only hope for withstanding and repelling
enemy attacks was forging a strong union with a strong leader.
Here I would like to mention that in the mid-19th century, toward the end of the shogunate, aKorean Confucianist scholar named Yi Hang-no advanced a school of thought known as wijeon
cheoksa (defend justice and expel evil). By this he meant upholding Confucianism and expelling
Christianity. In 1866, when American and French battleships arrived in Korea, Yi presented his
extremist, exclusionist argument to the king: “By battling the pirates we can protect Korean
Confucianism, but if we allow ourselves to become acquainted with foreign bandits, humankind
will descend into the realm of brutes.”9 This rigid ideology was handed down to Yi’s followers,
and cast a long shadow on the evolution of modern Korean. According to one Korean scholar, thisSaigō Takamori, Nanshū ō ikun (Teachings of the late Nanshū) (Tokyo: Kadokawa, 2017); Nanshū was
Saigō’s pen name.
8

9Kang Jae-eun / Kang Chae-on, Chōsen no jōi to kaika: kindai Chōsen ni totte no Nihon (Korea’s exclusion offoreigners and the flourishing of Korean civilization: Japan from the standpoint of modern Korea) (Tokyo:
Heibonsha, 1977).

7

philosophy was in no way exclusionist. Rather, it advocated politics, diplomacy, and society. PanAsianism, based on the bonds of loyalty among Korea, China, and Japan in the face of Western
aggression encroachment on Asia. Unfortunately, Japan’s treachery gave rise to rifts among thethree nations.
However, the Japanese had realized that one means of resisting the Western powers was totemporarily acknowledge Japan’s impotence in the face of Western power, bow to it by opening
its doors, and embrace modern civilization. They had also realized that joining hands with Korea
and China in the spirit of Pan-Asianism was an impracticable proposition. After all, Korea wasstill under the thumb of the self-righteous wijeong cheoksa mentality, and China was still clinging
to imperious Sinocentrism. The unbridgeable gap in awareness of the world situation among thethree nations was enough to convince Japanese intellectuals of the late shogunate and early Meiji
era that any revival of East Asia must be led by Japan.
It is mistaken to call Saigō’s advocacy of a punitive expedition against Korea an aggressive
ideology; that it is a mistake will become self-evident. Unlike a scholar’s abstract musings, Saigō’s
ideas about policy were rooted in an acute awareness of the world situation.
In 1871 Saigō had sent Army Maj.-Gen. Kirino Toshiaki to Hokkaido on an inspection tour. He
also drafted a plan that would help Japan prepare for a southward Russian advance; it involved
securing territory in Karafuto (present-day South Sakhalin) and the Primorskaya Oblast. In 1872
Saigō dispatched Army Lt. Col. Kitamura Shigeyori and Major Beppu Shinsuke to Korea on an
inspection tour. He also sent Ikenoue Shirō of Kagoshima and Takeichi Seikan of Tosa as
representatives of the Foreign Ministry to Manchuria, on whose soil no Japanese had previously
trod, instructing them to familiarize themselves with military geography (for strategic purposes),politics, the financial situation and even manners and customs. In early 1873 he instructed Army
Maj. Kabayama Sukenori and Naval Secretary Kodama Toshikuni to visit South China and Taiwan
to observe the situation there. Saigō’s foreign-policy perspective extended not only to the Northand the Asian continent, but also farther afield, to the South.
Korea was not the only territory Saigō was watching. Therefore, we can only understand hisargument in favor of a punitive expedition against Korea as part of an ambitious East Asian policy.
Ganghwa Island Incident
Saigō Takamori’s proposal to launch a punitive expedition against Korea was defeated by Iwakura
Tomomi and his confederates, whose response was, “Dispatching an emissary to Korea would bepremature, as our domestic affairs are not yet in order and there are frequent disputes with Russia
over Karafuto (Sakhalin).”10 As the events that ensued (the departure of Saigō and his sympathizers
from the imperial court in protest) are well known, I will not discuss them here. However, an
unforeseen incident led to the resolution of the Korean problem, for the time being at any rate.

Kawamichi Rintarō, Saigō “seikanron”no shinsō: rekishika no kyokō wo tadasu (The truth about Saigō’s
advocacy of a punitive expedition against Korea: correcting historians’ fiction with fact) (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan,
2014).
108

The Japanese battleship Un’yō, on a mission to explore sea routes on the west coast of Korea,
approached Ganghwa Island on September 20, 1875. Its captain had planned to request drinking
water, but was greeted by sudden, intense shelling from a fort on the island.
Since the Korean government had been given a Japanese flag, Un’yō Captain Inoue Yoshika
hoisted his flag on the mast, but the Koreans continued to fire at the Japanese. The Un’yōcounterattacked and sent a landing party ashore, which captured the fort and confiscated the guns.
The battleship then returned to Nagasaki.
News of the incident was met with an outcry when it reached the Japanese government. Officials
proposed sending an emissary to confront the Koreans. With everyone in agreement, a decision
was made to dispatch Kuroda Kiyotaka, head of the Hokkaido Development Commission, having
invested him with full powers. In February 1876 a Japanese delegation went to the Ganghwa
government office, where they discussed Korea’s rejection of Japanese diplomatic messages andthe assault on the Un’yō with Korean officials (also with full powers). The Koreans offered avariety of excuses, but in the end, agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and, on
February 27, the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 was concluded. This was Korea’s first treaty with aforeign nation. Incidentally, when Saigō heard of the Japanese Navy’s use of force on Ganghwa
Island, he was disappointed, saying “What a shameful manner in which to treat friends!”11
Korean history books describe the Ganghwa Island Incident as having been deliberately
engineered by Japan with aggressive intentions.12 But historical fact is never so simple. Here I
would like to provide a brief explanation of the events that culminated in that incident.
In 1874, the year after those who favored a punitive expedition against Korea were outnumberedby their opponents, rumors were circulating round Busan: (1) the Daewongun’s influence waswaning, and (2) King Gojong now controlled the reins of power and was making reforms. It sohappens that at just about that time the Japanese government had been planning to send Foreign
Ministry Councillor Sō Yoshiaki, who had a long-standing relationship with the Koreans, to Korea
to attempt to make some headway with establishing diplomatic relations. First, in June they
dispatched Foreign Ministry staff member Moriyama Shigeru to Busan to assess the politicalsituation.
Moriyama negotiated with Korean advisers at the Japanese Pavilion in Choryang. For the first time,
the Koreans officially recognized and received a Japanese Foreign Ministry staff member. In
September, the Koreans told Moriyama they would approve the Japanese proposal stating thatJapan wanted to make peace. The Japanese were to send a new diplomatic message, which the
Koreans would accept. During the negotiations Moriyama delivered Japanese flags and the naval
ensign to the Koreans and asked that an official announcement be made to coastal areas to theeffect that Japanese vessels should be protected.
11

Kawamichi, op. cit.

12

One of many similar accounts appears in (Yi Ki-baek) Lee Ki-baik, New History of Korea, trans. Edward W.
Wagner (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

9Thus, it seemed as though diplomatic relations between the two nations would, at long last, becomea reality. In October Moriyama returned to Japan and submitted his report. In February of 1875 hereturned to Korea, this time as an attaché, bearing letters from the foreign minister and thecouncillor. He requested a reply, but the Koreans reneged on their previous promises and, evenmore astonishingly, voiced objections to the fact that the Japanese delegation had traveled on asteamship and that its members had entered the banquet hall through the main gate in formal
Western-style dress; the Koreans refused to negotiate. They had previously demonstrated their
fixation on tradition, but this was taking things to the extreme. This about-face in the Korean stanceoccurred because the Daewongun and his cronies had regained their position of power, returned to
the royal palace, and were bolstering the exclusionist policies of the Korean court.
Moriyama berated the Koreans for their betrayal and breach of promise, but to no avail. There wasalmost no hope of resolving the problem through an exchange of letters. Even at the Korean court,
the King and Queen Min seemed anxious to avoid a confrontation with Japan, and though they
seemed somewhat willing to compromise over dress regulations and the format of official letters,
the overweening stance remained uncompromisingly exclusionist.
In June the Koreans announced that interchange with Japan would be handled in the old way, andthat not only dress code, but also any approach that broke with tradition would not be countenanced.
Consequently, Moriyama was unable to submit the letter from the Foreign Minister, and theagreement reached the previous September could not go into force. On September 20, Moriyama
received orders to return home; he departed on the following day, but the Ganghwa Incident
erupted on the very day he received those orders.
Biased textbooks distort history
I have already described the facts about the Ganghwa Island Incident and the resulting JapanKorea Treaty of 1876. Article I of the treaty proclaims that Korea is an independent state. Articles
IV and V state that, in addition to Busan, two additional ports will be opened up for commercial
purposes. Article X grants Japan consular jurisdiction in Korean ports that have been designatedfor commercial intercourse. Consular jurisdiction (also known as extraterritoriality) means that if
a Japanese resident commits a crime against a Korean, the Japanese consul will pass judgment on
the case.13
At first glance this might seem like an unequal treaty. However, during the Tokugawa era, any
Japanese who committed a crime in Korea was handed over to the administrator of the JapanesePavilion. The administrator would mete out a punishment according to the criminal’s social class,or have the criminal transported to Tsushima, where the daimyō would decide the criminal’s fatein accordance with laws and regulations prevailing in Tsushima. In fact, even before the restoration,
Japan had enjoyed extraterritoriality in Korea for many years. The stipulations in the 1876 treaty
were simply a matter of codifying customs that had endured for many years. For that reason, theKoreans deemed consular jurisdiction to be fair, and accepted it without argument.

13

https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18760226.T1E.html (retrieved 8/2022).

10

The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 permitted Japan to establish a legation in Seoul and restored, atleast temporarily, diplomatic relations between the two nations, which had ceased since the end of
the Tokugawa Shogunate.
Readers may wonder why I have devoted so much space to the Ganghwa Island Incident and the1876 treaty. They will understand once they have read the following account of the incident froma history textbook.
In 1868 the Japanese government, seeking to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Korea, took the upper hand. However, the Koreans wanted the relationship between
the two nations to remain as it had been in the past, and clung to its isolationist
policies. Within the Japanese government, some elements advocated a punitive
expedition against Korea. Subsequently, when the Ganghwa Island Incident
occurred in September 1875, Japan adopted an unyielding stance, and in Februaryof 1876 forced the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 on the Koreans. The treaty statedthat Korea was an independent state that enjoyed the same rights as Japan. But incompelling Korea to open its doors and to agree to consular jurisdiction, Japan was
imposing an unequal treaty on Korea, the same type of agreement that Japan itself
had signed with the Western powers.14

This account appears in Sanseidō Japanese History. Accounts of the incident in other textbooks
are virtually the same. Some of them add that the incident was the first phase of Japaneseadvancement into the Asian continent. I think readers will view this account seems overly
simplistic and arbitrary.
It would have us believe that the 1876 treaty was an unfair agreement that the Japanese, spurredby their determination to make inroads into Asia, forced the Koreans to sign under the threat ofmilitary action. To maintain that the treaty had its footing in aggressive aims is to parrot the content
of Korean history textbooks.
It is indeed disappointing that the Ganghwa Island Incident could not be resolved without a militaryconfrontation. But it is important to remember that prior to the incident, for nine long years
beginning with the first year of the Meiji era, the Japanese explained the renovation that had
occurred in Japan time and again, and proposed establishing diplomatic relations time and again,
only to reach an impasse because of Korean isolationism and conservatism. Biased accounts in ahistory textbook — accounts that omit pertinent events — do not represent history in its true form.
As I have demonstrated, the course of events was far too complicated to place responsibility on
Japan and Japan alone.

Inagaki Yasuhiko et al., Sanseidō Nihon shi santeiban (Sanseidō Japanese history, third edition) (Tokyo:
Sanseidō, 1985); first edition appeared in 1981.
1411

3. KOREA: CAUGHT BETWEEN PROGRESS AND SUBSERVIENCEThe Imo Incident
Now I shall describe how the Japanese-Korean relationship unfolded subsequent to the Ganghwa
Island Incident. After diplomatic relations had been established, the influence of the Daewongun
and his old-guard followers was waning, while that of Queen Min and her fellow progressives wason the rise. Eager for Korea to modernize as Japan was doing, the queen sent a sizable delegation
to Japan in 1881. The Koreans, determined to accomplish military reforms, asked Sub-Lt.
Horimoto Reizō, a Japanese Army engineer, to help them build a modern army between the endof that year and spring of the following year.
The old guard, particularly soldiers dismissed during the military reforms, resented thisprogressive trend. In July 1882 the delivery of those soldiers’ salaries (in the form of rice) was
delayed, and an uprising ensued. Seizing upon this opportunity, the Daewongun encouraged themutineers. Joined by rioting civilians, they murdered a great many Japanese and stormed theJapanese legation. They then broke into the palace and killed some of the queen’s chief retainers,
as well as Sub-Lt. Horimoto, though the queen somehow managed to escape with her life. China
sent approximately 5,000 troops to Korea to quell the uprising. The Chinese kidnapped the
Daewongun and took him to Baoding, where he was detained. The uprising came to be known as
the Imo Incident.
As a means of settling the incident, the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1882 was concluded on August 30.
The Koreans agreed to punish the wrongdoers severely, to pay Japan indemnity amounting to¥500,000, to accept the stationing of Japanese soldiers in Seoul to guard the Japanese legation
there, and to send an envoy to Japan to apologize.15 The ringleaders of the uprising were punished,
the queen returned to the palace, and the anti-appeasement stelae installed by the Daewongun were
removed. In October a Korean delegation headed by special envoy Pak Yong-hyo traveled to Japan,
where an apology was offered, thus settling the incident. The Koreans had agreed to pay the¥500,000 in reparations over a period of five years, but later asked for permission to pay it over 10
years; the Japanese agreed. It is noteworthy to mention that in 1889, after the Koreans had
submitted two payments of ¥50,000 each in 1887 and 1888, the Japanese government forgave theremainder (¥400,000), so that the Koreans could use it to make domestic reforms. They also gave
the Koreans a steam launch and two mountain guns.
Toadying to China
The Imo Incident provided an excellent opportunity for the Chinese to gain control of Korea. In
its aftermath 3,000 Chinese troops remained in Korea, where they oversaw Queen Min’s rebuildingof the Korean government. In the meantime, the queen abandoned her plans to emulate Japanesereforms, instead espousing sycophancy to China (sadaejuui in Korean), choosing policies thatwere China-dependent. She remodeled the Korean government bureaucracy after the Chinesesystem. At China’s prompting, the two nations signed the China-Korea Treaty of 1882, which
reinforced the suzerainty relationship, with China as the suzerain and Korea, the tributary state. It
15

https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18820830.T1J.html (in Japanese) (retrieved 08/22).

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gave Chinese, as citizens of the suzerain, the right to reside, conduct business, and travel freely in
Korea. Appointed as diplomatic advisers were Ma Xiangbo, a Chinese, and Paul Möllendorf, aGerman recommended by the Chinese. Korea’s modern military units were placed in thejurisdiction of the commander in chief of the Chinese troops stationed in Korea.
China had now gained control of Korean military and military affairs. But the Chinese were still
not satisfied. To prevent the Japanese from acquiring any advantage in Korea, they directed Korea
to enter into commercial relationships with the nations of Europe and the US. Pitting one barbarianstate against another was a time-honored Chinese diplomatic artifice. Between 1882 and 1884
Korea signed commercial treaties with the US, the UK, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France.
With the conclusion of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876, Korea had opened its doors to the world.
Normally, events like this would have provided the impetus for modernization, but a combinationof China’s resistance to modernization and Korea’s own conservatism delayed the modernization
process for quite some time.
Japan supports Korean Enlightenment Party
Any discussion of Korean independence activists necessarily includes Kim Ok-gyun and Pak
Yong-hyo. As already stated, Pak was part of the Korean delegation that traveled to Japan after
the Imo Incident to apologize. Kim Ok-gyun, who later formed strong ties with Japan, wasanother member of the party. Unlike the Conservative Party, which relied heavily on China, Pak
and Kim were members of the Enlightenment Party, which had chosen Japan’s modernization as
its model. Its objectives were the achievement of modernization and independence for Korea.
Pak and Kim approached prominent Japanese reformer Fukuzawa Yukichi, and asked him for
guidance. Fukuzawa lectured them on the significance of independence and suggested that they
establish a school specializing in Western learning as a way to nurture the human intellect; healso advised them to publish a newspaper. This is precisely what Fukuzawa had done in Japan,
but would have been extremely difficult to accomplish in Korea. However, Inoue Kakugorō, oneof Fukuzawa’s disciples, had been invited to advise the Korean government. He established the
Office of Culture and Information, which edited and published the Hanseong Weekly Bulletin.
Its inaugural issue appeared in November 1883. It was Korea’s first newspaper.
Upon Fukuzawa’s recommendation, Kim Ok-gyun arranged for more than 40 Koreans to study inJapan in early 1883. Half of them enrolled in the Toyama Army Academy and the other half invocational schools. Later Japanese teachers helped them acquire knowledge needed to support
military and industrial modernization in Korea. During this period, the Korean Enlightenment
Party depended on Japan for support, and Japan spared no effort in guiding and educating them.
Korean reform attempts fail: Gapsin CoupBut because of Queen Min’s enmity of the Enlightenment Party, its members never received
appointments to important government posts. Therefore, their plans for modernizing Korea madeless progress than they had hoped. Such was the situation in December 1884, when China was
defeated in the Sino-French War. The Enlightenment Party took advantage of this opportunity byattempting to rid Korea of the Conservative Party. On December 4, with support from Japan, Kim
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Ok-gyun and Pak Yong-hyo staged a coup d’état at a banquet celebrating the establishment of anational post office. Enlightenment Party members killed several leading members of the rival
Conservative Party and established a new government on December 5. On December 6 they
announced a 14-point political-reform program. Some of the important points were: (1) abolitionof tribute and empty formalities, (2) abolition of aristocratic descent groups, (3) abolition of
eunuchs, (4) establishment of a police force to prevent thefts, and (5) establishment of a royal
bodyguard.
However, under the advice of Chinese military advisor Yuan Shikai, the Conservative Party asked
China to send troops to Korea. The elite Chinese troops invaded the palace, and the coup wasreversed. During the turmoil the Japanese legation was burned down, and a great many Japanese
residents, including women, were massacred. This chain of events is referred to as the Gapsin
Coup. In defeat, Kim Ok-gyun, Pak Yong-hyo, and other key members of the Enlightenment Party
sought refuge in Japan.
The coup was a conflict between Japan and China; it was ultimately settled with the Conventionof Tsientsin (Tianjin), concluded in April of the following year (1885). The treaty was signed andsealed by Ito Hirobumi, representing Japan, and Li Hongzhang, representing China. The real
beneficiaries of this conflict were the Western powers, especially Russia. Ito signed the treaty
because he knew that Japan and China needed to work in close cooperation if further advances of
those powers were to be forestalled.
According to the convention,(1) Both Japan and China would withdraw their troops from Korea within four months.
(2) Korea would be responsible for training its troops and maintaining public order. A thirdparty nation would train the Korean troops; neither Japan nor China would participate insuch training.
(3) If Japan or China were to send troops due to unrest in Korea, the nation sending troops was
obligated to notify the other in writing before the fact, and withdraw those troops as soon
as the unrest was quelled.16
Both Japan and China removed their troops from Korea in accordance with the convention(however, reports have it that the terms of the treaty notwithstanding, the Chinese secretly kept
more than 200 soldiers in Seoul). Still, Korea had certainly not achieved independence. Yuan
Shikai was ensconced in Seoul, having been appointed Chinese Plenipotentiary. Besides puttingpressure on Korea and interfering in its affairs, by establishing a Chinatown in Seoul he protected
Chinese merchants but oppressed Japanese and Korean tradesmen.
Russian encroachment commences
After the abortive Enlightenment Party coup, the Chinese were partially successful in blocking
Japanese inroads into Korea. However, they were now faced with a new threat that had
materialized in Korea, namely Russia. In its determination to restrain Japan, China had created this16

https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pw/18850418.T1E.html (retrieved 08/2022).

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particular threat by turning Korea into a lamb ready to be devoured by the Western wolves. Now
the Chinese tactic of pitting one barbarian state against another was beginning to backfire. China
has adopted foolish plans that wreaked havoc on the Far Eastern political situation too many times
to enumerate, and this was certainly one of them.
After Russia signed the Russia-Korea Treaty of 1884, a commercial pact, Karl Ivanovich Weber
became Russian ambassador to Korea. Weber soon used ingenious methods to ingratiate himself
with the Korean court, and succeeded in expanding Russian influence there. At the same time,after the Convention of Tsientsin was concluded, the Chinese intensified their interference in
Korean domestic affairs, as already stated, which caused the Conservative Party to turn against
them, and turn toward Russia, contrary to Chinese designs.
To suppress the pro-Russia ambience in the Korean court, the Chinese allowed the Daewongun,
whom they had been holding in custody, to return to Korea in 1885. They also seized control of
Korean customs affairs. Moreover, when diplomatic advisers like Möllendorf began to lean toward
Russia, the Chinese dismissed them one after another. Although China had compelled Korea tosign treaties with the Western powers, it made every effort to protect its suzerain status, forexample, by obstructing Korean attempts to dispatch envoys to those nations in 1887, a striking
inconsistency.
The UK, as well as China, sensed the new threat from Russia. At that time, the British wereenmeshed in border wars with the Russians in Afghanistan. They also needed to halt the progressof Russian encroachment in the Far East (the Russians were advancing southward, threatening
China and Korea). In April 1885, without warning, a British fleet occupied Geomun Island, acritical passage for Russia’s Pacific Fleet, located on the southern tip of Korea. Startled by the
UK’s bold move, the Russians issued a protest through China and Korea, and announced that if
the British continued to occupy Geomun Island, they would occupy part of the Korean peninsula.
After negotiations that dragged on for two years, China convinced the Russians to promise not to
occupy any part of Korea whatsoever. By way of guarantee, the British fleet withdrew from
Geomun Island in 1887. The British occupation of that island shows clearly how great a threat
Russian encroachment posed to the Far East. Moreover, Korea’s inability to deal effectively with
intrusion from and disputes with third-party nations indicated the complexity and tragic nature of
the Korean problem.
Korea’s tendency to lean on Russia continued to grow. In 1888 the Russia-Korea Commercial
Convention was signed. As a result, in 1889, Kyonghung in northeastern Korea opened up to tradein 1889, and a Russian concession was established there. Additionally, Korea allowed Russians
free passage along the Tumen River. This was the same tactic used 30 years earlier, when Russia
concluded the Treaty of Aigun with China. This gave the Russians the right to navigate the inland
waters of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and paved the way for incursions into Manchuria.
Fifteen years prior to that, Saigō, nursing his wounds after failing to win support for a punitive
expedition against Korea, made the following remarks to Suge Sanehide, a chief retainer of Shōnai
domain (today Yamagata prefecture). Suge had traveled to Kagoshima to pay him a visit:“Eventually Russia will attack Japan, coming by way of Manchuria and Korea. This will be the15second Mongol invasion, and Japan’s survival will be at stake.” But the scenario that could realize
Saigō’s greatest fear was already materializing in Korea.
4. STATE WITH LITTLE DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE
Kim Ok-gyun: sustained or manipulated?
As I have already mentioned, Kim Ok-gyun, one of the leaders of Korea’s Enlightenment Party,
failed in his attempt to stage a coup d’état (the Gapsin Coup), and fled to Japan with Pak Yonghyo and other comrades. I would like to recount a bit more of Kim’s story.
Again and again, the Korean government demanded that Japan arrest and extradite Enlightenment
Party members. However, the Japanese government considered them political refugees and refused
to send them back to Korea. At first Kim was transported to Chichijima in the Ogasawara
archipelago, but found life on an isolated island monotonous and asked to be accommodated
elsewhere. The government moved him to Hokkaido.
While Kim was living on Chichijima, Kurushima Tsuneki 17 of Gen’yōsha (the Black Ocean
Society, a Pan-Asianist organization) and other Japanese intellectuals made the long trip to
Ogasawara to console Kim and keep him company. When Kim arrived in Hokkaido, he received
the good offices of relatives of Hokkaido Agency Director Nagayama Takeshirō and others. Kim
was ostensibly living in Hokkaido, but he spent a good part of his time in Tokyo.
The Japanese government gave the political asylum-seekers from Korea a monthly stipend of ¥15
while they lived on Chichijima, and ¥50 after they moved to Hokkaido. Since a civil servant’s
starting salary was ¥30 at that time, this was a very generous amount. In any case, it was a rare
government that paid a monthly salary to political refugees.
In 1890 Kim was permitted to reside in Tokyo, where he enjoyed staunch support from, and thecompany of, distinguished government officials and private citizens like Inoue Kaoru, Gotō
Shōjirō, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Tōyama Mitsuru.
However, at about the same time, assassins sent by the Korean government began to stalk the
refugees. In March 1894, over the objections of Tōyama and other partisans, Kim was lured to
Shanghai. On March 27, the day after his arrival there, he was shot to death by Hong Jong-u, oneof his traveling companions.
Kim’s body was loaded onto a Chinese warship and taken to Korea. The Korean government
proceeded to dismember the corpse, severing the head, arms, and legs from the trunk(disememberment was one form of capital punishment used in Korea at the time). The head andextremities were put on display for several days, and then paraded around all eight provinces. The

Kurushima later opposed Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu’s decision to extend the terms of unequal
treaties with Western nations; he tossed a bomb into Ōkuma’s carriage and then took his own life. Ōkuma survived.
17

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torso was thrown into the Han River. Kim’s father was executed, his younger brother died in prison,and his grief-stricken mother committed suicide.
Given that Kim’s remains were taken to Korea aboard the Weijing, a Chinese vessel, and that Li
Hongzhang sent a telegram to the Korean king congratulating him on Kim’s assassination, it issafe to assume that Li was involved in the plot to kill Kim. Fukuzawa Yukichi expressed the
feelings of the Japanese people about Kim’s murder: “I cannot forgive the actions of the Chinese,”
adding his fears that “from now on the Japanese will be even more suspicious of Korea and China.”
As Fukuzawa feared, once the news about the Korean government’s abuse of Kim’s corpse andChina’s praise of the assassination and its perpetrator became known, the Japanese public wasindignant. Kim Ok-gyun’s funeral was held on May 20 at Asakusa Hongan Temple. It was amagnificent, solemn ceremony attended by Kim’s friends and acquaintances.
Kim’s grave is located at Shinjo Temple in Hongō, Tokyo. Kim’s friend, photographer Kai Gunji,
retrieved some of Kim’s hair from the gibbet and brought it back to Japan; it was buried in Kim’s
grave. The splendid gravestone is more than 2m high, and on its face is incised “Grave of Kim Okgyun of Korea” in large block characters.
Next to it is a smaller gravestone belonging to Kai Gunji. Kim’s gravestone is larger than thegraves of Japanese within the temple precincts. Gravestones as imposing as his are unusual in
Japan.
Once, during a debate with a Korean historian about the history shared by Japan and Korea, I
suggested that Kim’s grave “tells the story of the hopes of Japanese patriots and some Koreans for
Pan-Asianism.” The Korean historian’s rebuttal? “No, it tells us that Kim Ok-gyun was someone
who could be manipulated.”18
Japanese of good will enthusiastically befriended and supported Kim Ok-gyun precisely because
they had grand goals: first, an independent Korea, and if at all possible, an Asian revival in which
Japan, Korea, and China would join together and lead an effort to counter the Western colonizers’
stranglehold. The Japanese supported Kim because they viewed him as a comrade in their quest
for Pan-Asianism. Those who claim that the Japanese manipulated him prove only that they are
ignorant of a concept that was an important historical theme at the time.
Korea was a hotbed of domestic discord then, thanks in no small part to the conservatives, who
seemed to have lost interest in the pursuit of independence. The Japanese, in their recognition thatbringing about reforms in Korea was the necessary first step toward an Asian revival, werecertainly not mistaken.

Nakamura Akira, “激突！日韓大討論” (Confrontation! Great debate between Japan and Korea) Bungei
shunju, December 1986.
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The Japanese say that they sustained Kim Ok-gyun, while the Koreans say that we manipulated
him. These disparate locutions perfectly reflect the difference between Japanese and Korean
historical awareness.
Abandoning Asia: bidding farewell to bad company
It was March 1885, not long after the Gapsin Coup, when Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Argument inFavor of Abandoning Asia” appeared in Jiji shinpō (Current events). An excerpt follows:
When our thoughts turn to Japan’s foreign policy, we must realize that Japan does
not have the time to wait for China and Korea to acquire modern civilization to theextent where Japan can join with them in encouraging the growth of Asia. Instead,Japan should separate itself from its declining neighbors and cast its fate with theenlightened nations of the West. There is no need to afford special consideration to
China and Korea simply because they are our neighbors. We should treat them as
the Western nations do. If we prolong amicable relations with bad company, we shallultimately be compelled to share their dishonor. I hereby sever my ties with ourdisreputable Asian friends.19

This is Fukuzawa’s resolute announcement stating that he is parting ways with China and Korea.
The Gapsin Coup had prompted him to write uncompromising editorials destined for Jiji shinpō
advocating war against China. They were often blocked by censors, who in fact sometimes
threatened to rescind Jiji shinpō’s publication rights. However, when the incident was settled with
the Convention of Tsientsin, and Japan seemed to have washed its hands of Korea for the mostpart, Fukuzawa was unhappy. Not long thereafter, when the British occupied Geomun Island,
Fukuzawa published an editorial bearing the title “Congratulations to the Korean People on the
Ruin of Their Country.” As a result, he was ordered to shut down Jiji shinpō, a bitter experiencefor him.
This was the same Fukuzawa who, after the Imo Incident, was so generous with guidance andsupport for the modernization of Korea through members of the Enlightenment Party. And it was
the same Fukuzawa who said, “I am completely sympathetic with the Korean people.” Then why
did he do an about-face and launch invective against Korea?
It must have been the rigorous standards of independence and self-respect Fukuzawa applied toindividuals and nations that prompted him to desert China and Korea. He certainly believed it wasnecessary to protect Japan’s independence by halting the rapid advances of Europe and the US on
Asia, and by exhorting Japan’s neighbors to modernize and gain independence. In Fukuzawa’seyes, it was not enough for only Japan to be independent. He explained his thoughts using a fireprevention analogy.
Let us turn our thoughts to preventing fires. Suppose I dwell in a stone house, but
my neighbor’s house is a ramshackle wooden building. Is my mind at ease? No,
surely not, because if I wish to ensure that a fire will not spread to my house, I must
Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Datsu-A ron” (Argument in favor of abandoning Asia), Jiji shinpō (Current affairs),
March 1885.
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support my neighbor by speaking to him and convincing him to build a stone house
exactly like mine. Or if the circumstances are right, I might build one for him. I
would do so not out of affection for my neighbor, nor out of dislike, but because of
my fear that fire might spread to my house.20

A clear-cut statement, if there ever was one. But given the situation, there was no choice; survival
was at stake. This was Meiji Japan’s desperate journey toward the ability to defend itself, toward
greater strength, toward independence. It is this sense of urgency that gave rise to slogans like“enrich the nation, strengthen the military,” “civilization and enlightenment,” and “promoteindustry.”
Fukuzawa wrote, “Those who lack the will to gain independence do not truly love their country.”21
He must have believed that a people without a strong desire for independence would never rouse
their compatriots to take part in a struggle for it.
I am aware of critics who maintain that Fukuzawa was contemptuous of Asia, and link his remark
with the ideology of aggression and imperialism. Yes, it is true that when we read his harsh
criticism of China and Korea in “Abandoning Asia,” it is easy to point out the absence of the spiritof universal brotherhood or love for his neighbors. But Fukuzawa was not a Utopian pacifist. He
was a realist and an ardent advocate of independence. In the face of the aforementioned criticism,he provided an answer:
You may hear pronouncements like the following: “Our responsibility as membersof the human race goes beyond winning independence for our country and only ourcountry. We must set our sights on other noble, eternal objectives.” Those who speakthese words are, of course, right. However, given the state of the world today, it is
too soon to discuss lofty aspirations in connection with interchange among nations.21

Fukuzawa had no use for irresponsible, empty arguments. He disliked vague debates that veered
away from the situation at hand. For that reason, the moment he realized that, given the situationin China and Korea for the previous 20 years, it would be impossible to rescue them, he decided
that the only hope for the survival of his beloved country, Japan, was to bid farewell to “badcompany” and go it alone.
I have already described the bad company. There was arrogant China, convinced that it was thecenter of the world, and determined to keep Korea in its clutches. Then there was conservative
Korea, ever vacillating between submission and rebellion, where squabbling between the
Daewongun and Queen Min never ceased; the Koreans submitted to China at times, seemed partial
to Japan at others, and welcomed Russia at still others. If Japan continued to associate withneighboring states that did not hunger for civilization and refused to understand the importance of20

Fukuzawa Yukichi, Jiji shōgen (Commentary on current affairs). September 1881.

21

Fukuzawa Yukichi, Outline of a theory of civilization, trans. David A. Dilworth and G. Cameron Hurst (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2009).

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independence, it would soon join them in ruin. Unsurprisingly, Fukuzawa shunned such a fate. We
must keep all these factors in mind when we read “Abandoning Asia.”
Those who attempt to use “Abandoning Asia” to justify claims that subsequent Japanesecontinental policy was aggressive and imperialistic are laboring under a fantasy that disregards thehistorical situation described in that editorial. Japanese continental policy subsequent to the 1st
Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War was driven by the reality and logic ofinternational political dynamics, which had changed since 1885. To hold Fukuzawa responsible isto espouse a false doctrine that loses sight of the unpredictability of historical development.

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