Thё

BiFth Of BELIEF(Kepercayaan): The Struggle of the Minority Relig

ions in lndonesia
Masato Fukushima

Draft for the 15th Taniguchi international symposium on ̀ The Spirit
Cult and the Dynamism of Popular KnOwledge in Southeast Asia,' atthe National Museum of Ethnology, osaka。

November 1991

Note: This was a draft intended for the publication of the collocted papers fromthe symposium from the University of Singapore Press, which did hot materialize
due to the editor's personal problem.

The Birth of Belief(Kepercayaan):The StFuggle of the Minority ReligiOns in

lmOnesia.
ぬ sato FtWSIIm

lnstitute of Orienta1 011ture
Tokyo lhiversity

Anthropologists nOwadays have begun tO direct ILore attention tO theinventiverless of what they have conventiOnally called iculture' Itradition' Or
areliglon・ . Recent buzzphrases like athe inventiOn of traditiOn。

(HObsbawm andRanger 1983), demonstrate our critical cOnsciOusness about the intricate
histOrical factors which Operate behind the titteless facade of these notiOns.
Stlch ainventionistic. approach, soIIteWhat in vOgue recently, is not cOnfilled toltradition', hOwevere Wagner, for instance, stresses the inventiOn Of culture
thrOugh the prOcess of anthrOp010gical inquiry itself (WagFler 1975). Aside frOIIL
such inventio■ ―by一 anthropo10gists type Of argu硼 ほnt, ranging frOm accusatory

analysis of the co10111ial past Of anthrOp010gy (Leclerc 1972)tO thesopisticated self― reflectiOn On the lcol■ structiOn Of the Otheri(Fabian 1983,
Thomas 1989), by way of ever sO fashiOnable FOucauldian anti‑10rietltalisIIL。

(Said1978), there is another line Of argument which emphasises mOre On the histOricaland Political factOrs, in Parallel with the grOwing cOncern among
anthropologists in regards to the rOle Of nationalism and the mOdern state forthe construction of these nOtionsi Stimulated by such studies asAndersonts(1983). Thus, for instance, IIoskins writes about the invention Of the
new natio■ al ̀herOes' in lndOnes■a, Of which One Of the lDain p01itical purpOses

is to create a new legitillnte natiOnal histOry as a visible story Of thenation's struggle against co10nialism (Hoskins 1987).

In this sense, any cultural research atteDpted in the cOILtempOrary

租odernnation state can■ ot avoid the question Of the state, because the state does nOt

Only endeavour tO keep its territOrial boundary by force, but is also Obliged tObuild up a nuiber Of symb01ic devices tO sustaiIIn its urlity in the face Of
ethnic diversity and POssible syttbolic disintergratiOn.

Hence to talk about ̀religiOn' which is the mはin fOcus Of this paper, anunderstanding of its relationship with state in the prOcess Of natiOn building
is Of essential importance. AlthOugh it is tempting tO cOnclude that a stateutilises religion as one of the mOst effective symb。 liC tools with which tO
integrate thewhole country, the reality is ■Ot as simplё as this. The

complexity arises when it is accepted that the clear― cut bOundary Of theconcept of areligion' is but acadeIILC aS Well aこpolitical artifact, and thatsuch invention Of areligiOnt itself can be the very fOcus of POlitical‑1‑

コan■ pulatiOn. This alsO signifies that the number of the Officially recOgnised

religi6ns varies accOrding tO hOw a state defines it̲ such pOliticalman■ pulatiOn is mOst visible when a state tries tO IIObilise the pOpulace under′the banne■ OF state religiono ln the time Of rapid modernisatiOn in ethnicly

highly hom^geniOus cOuntnes like

」apan, or to a lesser degtee Thailand, thegovernments adopted policies tO promOte the majOrity creed, ShintOi。 ..in 」
apan
and Theravada Buddhis■ ■n Thailand as de factO state religiOns. In 」apan, astate shintO shrine was built and the cOllective cult Of the emperOr as aliving god was established during war tim・Murakani 1986), while in Thailand,〈
the king Rama 6 Vajiravudh created a natiOnal ideo10gy which underscOred theunity Of NatiOn, Buddhism, and King as the core elenent Of Thai natiOnalislll(
Wyatt 1982: P.229, Vella 1978), and in the earlier cOnstitutiOn the word sasana(religion)autOmatically meant Theravada Buddhisn (ReynOlds 1978, P.■

36):

:

Su9h Policy, hOwever, is implimentable only when the majOrity ethnic or
religェ Ous grOup has paramOunt do■ LnanCe over the m己 nOrity groups. Even in Japan,
mユ nOFity

Christian groups, approxinately O.6Z Of the populatiOn, are highly

critidal of the remmants of the pre― war c01lective shi,tO cult (Iimura 199■).

In Thailand, the Muslim口 こnority in the south launched a sessessiOn movellnent
which Often inv01ved terrOrisIIn, and the centra1 80Vernment finally adopted amore conciliatory attitude tOwards them, thOugh the emphasis Of Theravada
Buddisn as the pillar Of the natiOn has nOt been much altered ( Dulyakasem
19845 Farouk ■984, PitsuWan 1985,■ 988)̲

What happens, then, tO the relationship between state and religiOn if acountry is far mOre diverse in ethnicity and culture? IndOnesia in sOutheast
Asia is a superb example of such ethnO― religiOus diversity, and the interactiOnbetween state and religiOn is far mOre cOmplicated than thOse tt have alreadymentiOned.

I will nOw trace the histOric develoPment Of the interactiOn between thesethree factors■n lndones■ a,i.e., the state, the dOm■ nant religiOn, andmonority religious practices. I PiCk up twO■■nor■ ty religiOns, namely Hinduis■

in Bali and̲、 ebatinan (」 avanese mysticism)in Java to shOw their histOricaltrajectOries in post― Independence era. The state gradually deve10ped a peculiar

definitiOn Of lreligioni(●gama)and

ibelief'( kepetcayaan)through theinteraction with lslam, the dO硼 dnant religiOn, which further mnde a great
impact On both minOrity religiOns. But a, Balinese Hinduism succeeded in beingtransfOrlned into one Of the state relig■

Ons, the 」avanese 卜ebatinan was g■ ven avery odd cate80ry,namely ibelief。 ,which reflects the ,OmpleXity Of interactiOnbetween state and religiOn. I will alsO shOw hOw thこ s new cate80ry has affected,
thrOugh administration, 回はss lnedia and educatiOn, the doctrinal and practical‑2‑aspects Of the activ■ ties Of thekebatinan fOl 10wers, particularly thOse ofsPir■ t cult, in Java.

Statistically speaking, abOut 85Z Of the lndOnesian populatiOn claim tO be
Muslimc, and this figure certainly gives an i口

pressiOn Of lslaコ 己c d6口己nance inlndonesia. But the religiOus reality is far frOn this, and confusiOn ar■ses as a
result of the gap between the statistics and the reality. In such ethnic grOups
as the Achenese and the Mは nangkabau in s‖ mntra and the Banjarese in KaliVn,ntan,

fOr instance, allegiance tO Islaln is undeniable, but in case Of thethe mOst popu10us, hence the pOlitically■Ost」avanese,dominant etlniC grOup in

lndones■ aぅ things are far ■10re cOmplicated.

」avanese religious histら ry is marked by its gradual shift frOn the Hindu―

Buddhistic periOd tO Isla五 frOm around 14 century. After the fal1 0f Majapahit

in east Java arOund 147o, the p01itical center mOved tO the nOrthern cOastal
areas where small Muslin states cOmpeted with each Other, finally the Mataram
Kingdom in sOuth central」ava attained hegemOny Over the■
lajOr part Of Java.
But this deve10pnent was paralleled with Dutch c010nial expansiOn, and after

several fissiOns and internecine war among royal families in which the Dutchshrewdly intervened, the Mhtaran kingdoIIL was cOnfined tO a sコ all Part Of south
centra l 」ava (Ricklefs 1981). The Dutch gradually transfOrmed the traditionalar■ stocrats calledpriyayi intO the part Of the■ r bureacratic apparatus(Sutherland 1979), and alsO cOnsciOusly segregated then fr。 ■ the On‑80ing
lslamisation in rural areas (Dhofier 1982). The salient lsla■
OphObia of the
Dutch encouraged the deve10pment Of the distinct aristocratic traditiOn Of theelabOrated m・ nner, exquisite art fOrm, and mystic traditiOn, the basis Of
kebatinan.

This peculiar polarisatiOn Of」avanesereligiOus traditiOn gave rise tO
various responses in the lndOnesian natiOnalist ■Ovement. SOme Of the leading
Muslilns insisted that the cOm■ ng lndOnesia shOuld be based On lslam because the

majOrity Of the lndOnesian populatiOn were Muslim。 . secular natiOnalists andChristians were opposed tO this and insisted on a cOmpletely secular state.
ThiS tug― of― war between the twO factiOns resulted in a peculiarly lndOnesiansOlutiOn, i.e., the five principle Of the state, called Pa,casila, which
consists Of the fo110wing five principles:

1.KeTuhana,ya,8 Maha Esa,Belief in One SupreIIle God.

2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab̲

Hunanitarianism which is just andcivilised.

３
４

Persatuan lndOnesia

the Unity of lndOnesia。

Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh

DemOcracy cOnducted with wisdOm,

hikmat kgoijaksanaan dalamin cOnsultatiOn and representation.

‑3‑

pemup立 塁 ュrattnノ perwa聾 lanI菫

5. Keadilan sOsial bagi sqlu=vh

Social justice fOr all the people Of

rakyat lndOnes■ alndones■ aHere yOu can clearly see the eclectic character Of these articles. But what
attracts attention in view of religiOuS ConnOtatiOn is that article One,■.e.,

the belief in One Suprene God. The Muslin leaders insisted that the wOrds one
Supreme Cod shOuld be replaced by the wOrd Allah, but this was refused by themほ jOrity

Of natiOnalists(1).

However, the newly… bOrn goverrment created a m・ n■ stry Of religiOn, which was

virtually■0■ Opolisedby (cOnservative)Muslins. Thus at state level, apeculiar cOmprollLLSe WaS reached between a desire fOr an lslamic state andsecularisn, represented by article One of Pancasila and the ttslaIIl― oriented

Ministry of ReligiOn. Islam's pOwer was shrewdlシ96五 fined tO the dOmain Of

religiOn, but there they prOcured a Official IIlpans to■mplement their religiOus

policy(Noer 1978).

CliffOrd ceertz fOund a polarisatiOn Of religiOus trend in」ava in ■952‑54

just before the first general electiOn(ceertz 1960). DOzens of p01itical
Parties lnushroomed, but the result was a victOry for fOur large parties, theNatiOnalist party, the COmmunist party ,and two Muslim parties of MhsyuIIn, andNachdlatul ulalna. What surpr■ sed the Muslim leaders was that the Muslin parties

could nOt attain a コajority: especially in 」ava, the fomer twO secular partiesdo□ こnatedin variOus places. This religiOus polarisatiOn beca爾

いquite m.nifest,

between OrthOdOx Muslinc and nOmュ nal Musliコ s even in all level of sOciety.

Let us nOw cOnsider the natiOnal religiOus pOlicy and its impact On口 こnority

religiOns. The establishment Of the Ministry of ReligiOn had a gradual, but
steady impact on the religiOus life Of lndOnesia. The early adコ dnistrative
structure clearly shOws the ParamOunt dOminance of sectiOns related to lslamdc
ad■ ■nist ratiOn,while the Christians, divided intO the CathOlics and theProtestants, were given Only One sectiOn each. Thus at the beginn■ ng, theMinistry of ReligiOn recognised Only twO religiOns and at first paid nO
attentiOn tO the others fOund in lndOnesia(NOer 1978, p.20).

The religious system in Bali is based On the extrmely developed syste■Of

temples and ritual cycles, a 10ng― standing tourist attraction. The impact Of
Dutch co10nisatiOn was sOmewhat lim崚 ted as compared tO」ava, and it was Only

after 1908 that the Dutch local Goveranent in Bali really gained a firm griP on
the island(Boon 1977, P.30, Anandakusuma 1979, P.37). SO in cOntrast w■

th 」ava,
where in 20th century a numbこ r Of lslamic refonlnst mOvements were launched(2),this traditiOnal system remnined cOIIIParatively untOuched until lndOnesian‑4‑Independence(Swellengrebel 1960,p.30, Ceertz 1973, pp.■ 81‑1825 1980, pp.8… 9),w■ ththe exception of a limited attempt by intellectuals to modern■ se it.

After lndonesian lndependence,the Balinese l・ Лders realised that they had beenleft in a′ Very awkWard Position under the newly established Ministry Of

Religion. In■952, the first

コュnister of religion decided to designate all

religions other than lslan and Christianity section H. This section was fomed

to deal with any sectS WhOse religious identity Was questionable. The local
goverFunent of Bali took a countenlleasure to establish the AutonO■ ous ReligiOus

Office(Kantor Agama Oton00■ ), and Various attempts Were fnnde to formulate
3Balinese religion' officially (HoWe11 1977, pp.151‑152).

It is arOund this time that C. Ceertz came to Bali and fOu,d a very
int̀姜 esting phenomenon. ne■nsists that traditionally the nain concern of theBalinese was to perfonll r■ tuals properly, not to elaborate doctrinal.exegesis.

He calls such prOpensity :orthopraxls. in contrast to orthodoxyl He obServed,

however, that this characteristic was gradually substitutè,by , newly
awakening consciousness of the doctrine itself. He describes argument in a
Oillage concerning the true nature of the deity of one of the temples there,
which struck hin as something very novel(Ceertz 1973).
Behind such newly emerging religious self一 consciosness, he saw the impact of

the Ministry of Religion. In 1950, a nこ ssion of the mこ nistry calIIle to Bali toinvestigate the nature of their religious PractiCe, asking such questions aslwhat is the name of the religion practiced in Balit,lln tems of belief in One

Cod, what kind of PhiloSOphy and theology does it have?'etco ln fact them■ nistry

gradually established the definition of 3religiOnl in accordance w■ thlslam, that is belief in one Supreme God, prophets, hOly scripture, confessiOn
Of faith, a fOrmalised

コにthod of prayer and so on. In view Of such definitiOnof ・religion', the daily practice in Bali might fall short Of being called a

religion. In quite a pOlytheic tradition, Which could be a Supremに God? AmOng
the centrifugal tradition Of various levels of Pr■ est, what would be the central
h01y scr■ pture? Tradition in Bali is what Combrich calls a coコ munal religion in

Durkheinian sense(Gombrich 1988, p.26), which is distinct from soteriology
representel by JudeO― christian tradition.

Despite such funda■ ental difficultyフ however, Balinese leaders tried
desperately to formulate the essence of Binduis■

in Bali in accordance w■ th the

Offic■ al definition Of relig■ on. A very anbiguous deity called Sang Eyang Widi,

which had been virtually unknown tO the general public and only apparent inhigh priests' esoteric religious texts was elevated to the po,ition of very
SuPreme Hindu God(SWellengrebel 1960, p.71; Forge ■980, p.229). Saints froln
Balinese history were chosen as equivalents to the prophets in lslam. And as
regards the holy scripture, efforts began to be mnde to comPile a standard text‑5‑

fOr Hindu teaching, are eveitually realised as uPadeca in 1967(HOwel1 1977,
p.232). ceertz argues that these changes are a prOcess Of ratiOnalisatiOn frOEll
the ritual― centered religious practices tO a

■Ore systematised, rationalised
religiOn, .and he called the whOle prOcess ̀internal convers■
9n:(ceertz 1973).

But what Ceertz Observed in 1958 was just a beginning of a long dralDatiCchange in the Balinese religiOus systemo At the end Of the same year, after
10ng debates between the

コ己nistry and the local authOrities, Hinduisn in Bali

was eventually recOgnュ sed as religiOn, and a ttindu sectiOn was established in
the m直 nistry. cOrresponding tO this change, the Hindu cOuncil called Parisada,

was established in Bali. This is an amalgam Of variOus preceding Hindu
organ■ satiOns, cOnsistin8 0f Brahmanical priests ( pedanda), lower caste temple

priests(pemangku)as well as iaymen(AnandakuSuma 1979, pp.76‑77). From theoutset the Hindu COuncil intended tO reform chaOtic religious practices in Baliby introducing standardiled dOCtrine, sIIDplifying the elabOrate ritual cycles,

and establishing a centralised hierarchy within the temple system. Mass worship
Of Sang Hyang Widi was introduced in the central temple built by the cOuncil in
Den Pasar,and sch001 religious educatiOn was alsO Prepared(HOwell■977, p.■ 53;

Forge 1980, p.229). such Policy, hOwever, was gr,cted by stubbOrn resistence by
the peOple. The mass wOrship tO sang Hyang widi was harshly criticised becauseof its political nature, and the attempt tO centralise the temple netwOrk wassuperseded by a newly emerging inter― regiOnal temple netwOrk created because of

the villagers' increasing cOncern abOut their ancestral temples(B00n 1977,
pp.217‑2■ 8)(3). The greatest irOnyっ

hOwever, was the centennial ritual called

Eka Dasa Rudra held fOr the purificatiOn Of the whOle island, Organised under

the guidance Of the cOuncil itselfo lt was held in 1963, but then MOunt Agung,generally believed tO be an extinct vOlcanO, suddenly erupted andコany people
died(Forge 1980, pp.227‑228). The subsequent massacre of cOmmunists after theso― called 30th Of september affair gave the Balinese a very strong■mpressionthat such serial disOrder was caused by the imprOper practice of the Eka ritual.

Hence the Council, desPite its principle Of the symplificatiOn Of ritual systems,
was f9rced tO repeat the Eka ritual in 1979 with the utxnOst effOrts tO h。

ld itsproper perfOnlance(FOrge 1980, pp.230‑231).

Thus, within Bali, the COuncil's effOrt tO simplify the Balinese religiOus
system faced diffiulties in prOgres,ェ ng further. But this is Only One side Of

the cOin. The fact that the Balinese ninduis.was recognised as one Of thestate religiOns gràually gave rise tO a new phenOmenan, ■̲e.,the emergence Of
Hinduism in places detached frOm its birthplace, Bali. The COuncil versiOn Of
rationalised Binduis■ , which was a prOduct Of the interactiOn between the state

definitiOn Of religiOn■Odelled On lslam and the Balinese religiOus reality,

failed tO prcllll10te itself within Bali, but nOw th趾

‑6‑s new Hinduisn finds its placebeyond that small lsland.

The struggle fOr the recognitiOn Of One's Own religiOn by the state is not
cOnfined tOノ Balinese ttinduism. SOme ethnic grOups in sOuth Kalilnantan,
collectively called Dayak (Ot DanuIIn, Ngaju, Luangan,Mhanyan)share a basic
cOs

10gy and religiOus practice based on shamans昭 腱

9875

cf. Scharer ■946). Under grOwing pressure froIIt thèbalian(weinstock■neighbOuring Banjarese
Musli・ nc, the Dayaks tried to establish the Dayak Alliance, whiqh was tacitly
suppOrted by the Dutch authOrites. After lndOnesian lndependence, the new
GoverIInlent wOuld ■Ot accept a claim fOr the establishment in the attm.‐

nistrative

divisiOn for the Dayaks, and they were fOrced to stay w■ thin the PrOvince Of
South Kalialnantan which is d。 ■inated by the Banjarese Muslims(Miles 1976,
pp.106‑1■ 5). The antagonism between them was further escalated when the so―called Darul― Islam (hOuse of lsla■ )■oveme■ lt erЧ pted in variOus part Of

lndonesia and began tO resist the 」avanese一 d9m旺 natÒ Centra1 80Vernment tO
establish arl lslam己 c state(Van Dijk 1987). In■957 after military clashes

between the Dayaks and the Banjarese, President sukarnO finally al10wed theDayaks tO establish the PrOvince of Central Kalinantan, and their religiOn,nalned Kaharingan, was authOrised as One Of the state religions. But in fact
Kaharingan was nOt recognised as a completely indepeFldent religiOn, but as apart of Hinduism (Weinstock■983, P.193)(4). The basis Of this identificatiOn

was the rather dubious argunlent that Kaharingan was One of the relllmants Of thepast Bindu― Buddhist era before the lndOnesian archttpellago was influenced bylslamo Now there was a happy reuniOn between Kahar■ngan and the real developed
Hinduism in Bali. Thus Kaharingan shrewdly escaped the peren■ al pressure of theBan」 arese Musl■ mq but then faced anOther pressure, that of the Hindu Counsil.

Weinstock witnessed twO very intriguing cases which indicate the On‑80ing
interaction between Dayaks and their new religiOus Patron(Weinstock 1983っ

pp.193‑195). One concerned the loca1 80Vernment Of central Kalimantan in
Parangkaraya. A number of Balinese wOrked there as bureaucrats, and they
actively IIlaintained contact with the leaders Of Kaharingan, successfully
persuading them tO gO tO Bali tO learn abOut the real ancestOr Of theirreligionっ gradually the Offices Of these leaders exhibited Balinese sculptures

rather than thOse of the Dayaks'. The Other was a meeting ILn Ampah city, held by

10cal leaders Of Klaharingan whO had recently returned frOm their Bali― tOur.

These leaders emphatically reported tO the public the simdlarity between
Kaharingan and Balinese Hinduis■ . And at the end of the report, they said thatas Kaharingan was now recognised as a fOrmal religiOn, they had tO behave
accordingly. Hence they started to pray quietly and a plate fOr cOntributions
was sent round̲ What they envisaged in cOnsidering the tenll ̀Official religiOn'‑7‑

was the nearby church, sO they rashly cOnclvded an initatiOn Of christiancustotts would be the best way to behave as fo1lowers Of a・fOrlml religiOn'。

This shOws that the expansiOn and influence of Hinduioll.was stili nOm直 nal, as
thds is also lhe caSe w■ th the TOraja of Central Sulawesi, well― knOwn fOr theirhighly developed 口Ortuary rituals (Yamashdta 1988, Pp.276‑277)(5), but in sOme

places, systematic intrOductiOn Of the Ⅱindu― Council versiOn Of reformed
Hinduism has already started, as can be seen in the case Of the Tenggerese,around Mt. BrollD in eastern Java. These peOple retain tO an extent their r■ tual―or■ ented religious syste■

originating fro■ the ヨindu,Mhjapahit era even after

the lslamこ satiOn Of 」ava. Thus their ritual cycle is distinct from the rest Of

the Javanese, and they call their system religiOn Of Buda(IIefner■985,p.4)。

This area becallne the best hiding place fOr lslanic guerrillas which led tO
pOliticO― religious tension between these Muslims and the reclus■

ve Tenggerese.
To gain a goveFnlllental prOtectiOn, they established cOntact with the Hindu
Council, and finally large number Of them cOnverted to Balinese B堕

nduism(Hefner

1985, pp.239‑241, PP.247‑249)。

What is striking about this case is the actual
histOrical cOnnection between the Tenggerese ritual system and that of theBalinese. The Tenggerese priests share the Kawi prayer w■ th Balinese ttdle rankPr■ eStS

Calledsengguhu. SOtte of the rituals in Tengger have the same nattes as

thOse in Bali, and they also share a number of ritual paraphernalia(Hefner ■985,
pp.271‑272; cf. H00ykaas 1964a, 1964b,■974). Thus the identificatiOn between

these twO religious syste口 疇 has sOnle factual ground, unlike Kaharingan. But thereligiOn that the Bindu Council intrOduced in Tengger was■ot the Hinduism

practiced in every day Bali, but a systelnatised, reforlned dOctrine Of Binduism.
At first the change was still

コinimal when the officals were Of Tengger Origin.

But in late 70's,teachers Outside Tengger whO had studied text一book EinduisEl at

sch001 and knew nOthing abOut the Tenggerese ritual cycle began tO teach at
sclloOl in Tengger. Their view Of Tengger religious Practice reflected therefO― st Muslim's v■ ew Of the strict separation Of religion and custOm, which
was lmplicitly intrOduced into Hindu Council's Own ideology of B匡 nduism. Thus
these teachers regarded the Tenggerese ritual system as merely custOm w■ thOut
any intrinsic religious value. They tried tO reduce the number Of rituals andintrOduced a mass Hindu prayer Of Bindu COuncil― style (Hefner 1985, pp.253‑254).
Hindu refontLSIll, WhiCh seellled to have failed in their hOllleland because of thepersistent ritualism in Bali, nOw fOund an ideal place fOr its realisatiOn. Thiscase clearly shOws the potential threat Of the pressure frOIIl the Hindu Council

which impOsed its newly built dOctrine on Other parts Of lndOnesia which
accepted Hinduis■ , such as the Dayaks and the TOrajas. Their religiOns mュ ght
have eschewed the grOnng pressure frOIll lsl,m since they were recOgnュ sed as part‑8‑

Of Hinduis■ , but Binduism itself had changed its character frOm its originalr■ tualisntO the systeIDatiC doctrine.

Here we can distinguish fOur levels Of meaning w■ thin the wOrd ̀ Hinduisml in
cont● mpOrary/工 ndOnesia. The first level is the indigenOus system Of ritual andpopular knOwledge in Bali which in fact is rather m■ sleading tO be called
Binduism as such, because of its utterly practical nature. The second level isthe rationalised fOrm Of this practical religiOn, which might be called・Baliism' as Ceertz Once naned it; This is a refonted versiOn Of daily practice,w■ th the elnphasis of dininishing the nllmher Of r■tuals, intergration Of chaOtic
temple systemq, constructiOn of the Parisada central temple, and wOrship Of

Sang Hyang Widi. Ceertzis arguШ ent of linternal conversiOn' chiefly cOncerns
w■ th thtts aspect of nindui、 ut. But the 9fficial recogn■

tiOn Of Bali Hinduism as
one of the state religiOn accerelated the separatiOn Of Hinduisn frOm its birthplace Bali, Hinduism being tra,sf9rmed intO a mOre universalistic,
soteriO10gical religiOn with standardised hOly scripture, systettatised dOctrine
in cOrrespondence w■ th lndian phi105ophy and a nI・・llher of new cOmpact rituals far

different fron thOse of the Overdevelopped indigenOus ritual cycles in Balinese
villages(6). This is a pOrtable Hinduism designed fOr nOn―

Balinese Hindus, andthis is what the Dayaks, the TOrajas and the Tenggerese are fOrced tO learn at

schOOl as nindui、 Щ writ large.

The fourth level is, as a matter of fact, yet tO cOme, but a glimpse of its
possibility can be seen in the case of a」avanese mystic called BaridjantO, whO

first fOunded the Javanese branch Of Par■ sada ■n Surakarta. He ■s a persOn whO
intrOduced H肛 nduism systematically after the sO― called 30th Of september Affair

in ■965, but finally separated hinself frOm the cOntro1 0f Balinese Parisada

and established 」avanOse versiOn of Hinduis■(LyOn 1977, HOwell ■977). His
criticis■ Of Parisada Hinduism, represented by the level three above, reveals

the peculiar nature of the natiOnal Hinduism in lndonesia, which cOuld not
avoid being influenced by the reformist versiOn Of lslan as a bidden paradigm.

Hardjanto believed that the official dOctrine Of Hinduism called UPadeca,published by Parisada in ■967, cOmpletely neglected the コにditative aspect Of
HinduisIIt, and Overemphasised the scripturalistic learning of the teaching

legitimised by Parisadao Since he detected the elements Of Middle一 eastern
mOnOtheis■ in Hinduism a la Parisada(IIowel l ■977, pp.233‑234), he eventually
decided tO set up an OrganisatiOn called
Sadhar Mapan( Sanaatana Dharコ ほ
MajaPahit dan Pancasila, Real ReligiOn Of Majapahit and Pancasila), tO embody
the authentic」avanese (esoteric or tantric)Hinduiolll, StreSsing the IIleditative

practice of the」avanese mysticism.

This is the product of hybridisatiOn between natiOnal reformュ st niduisIIIL andthe 10cal IIteditative tradition Of」ava, which shOuld be called the fOurth level‑9‑

Of Hinduis■ . This process Of hybridisation is still linited as a result Of

instfficient infiltratiOn Of the state Binduism intO the Dayaks, the TOrajas

and the Tenggerese, but the mOre firmly the religiOus educatiOn andadministration is established, the mOre explicitly such hybridisatiOn is
expected to be observable.

Such stratified descriptiOn Of Hinduism in lndonesia, hOwever, falls shOrt Of
grasping far ⅢЮre intricate netwOrk Of interaction within the frame of the newnation. The religiOus interactiOn between Bali and Other parts Of lndOnesia
cannOt s■ mply be exPlained by the fact that these 10calities accept blindly theofficial version of refOrllLLSt

ヨ匠nduisII■ .

Rather, we have tO pay attentiOn tO
other factOrs, such as the visual attractiveness Of Balinese ritual Systemc,
which has inspired nOn… Balinese v■ sitOrs such as the Dayaks and the Tenggeresew■ ththe idea that they share the same cultural backbOne witl the Balinese, 0て

the govermlental prOject of tOur■ s■ which strategically ide■ tifies TOraja with
Bali tO create the second tOur■ st attraction.

To put it in a nutshell, Hinduis■

in lndOnesia, ■hich Once was simply anallnalgam Of 10cal custOm and ritual cycles in Balinese villages, eventuallydeveloped a very complex structure as a result Of the recognitiOn by the
Coverrulent as one of the state religiOns, and in this prOcess, it draIIlatical lytransfon■ed the character frOIIL the first level up tO the hybrid leve1 0f fOur.

This is what did nOt happerl tO the Javanese religiOus traditiOn,‑10‑kebatinan.

In cOntrast with the dramatic change Of Hinduism in Bali,」avanese religiOn

ViS a ViS the state traced a quite different path. As I InentiOned,」avanesereligiOn can/be vaguely categOr■ sed as orthOdox lslan and」avanュ st nO̲l lsla町
the ltttter Of which sOme peOple think to be distil■ ct frO五 Islam. Thus thこ
struggle fOr the Official recOgn■tiOn of the 」avanese religiOus system cannOt be

the same as that Of Balinese Hinduis, because Hinduism in Bali can belegitinised by the very ex■ stence Of lndian Hinduis■, while Javanese religiOus
tradition cannOt find such cOrrespOndence in wOrld religiOn except lslam, andthe identificatiOn with lsl皿 was oYnctly what these 」avanist rejected tO accept.
Thus the strategy fOr these 」avanュ sts were tO acquire the official status fOrthe 」avanist religiOus traditiOn Outside the definitiOn Of religiOn. In factoutside the lnainstream lslam, there have been enOrIInous number Of religiOus

sects in Java; thOir religious practices shOw wide range of variety frOm
sophisticated metaphysical speculatiOn Of the nature of self and God influenced
by the rOyal a五 d the6sOphical traditiOn, tO praglnatic healing by IIlediulns
possessed by var■ ous spirits. such variOus religiOus traditiOn is 100sely calledkebalinap, originally frOm Arabic bathin, inner self, and usually translated
as 」avanese mysticisEl(7).

After lndOnesian lndependence, sOIne Of the political leaders whO had been
deeply invOlve̲d inkebatinan prOpOsed tO establish a goverrunetltal bOdy tO study

and practice the kebatinan traditiOn(8). But the Ministry Of ReligiOn was
clearly offended by such move■ lent, and was alsO alanlled by the rapid grOwth Of
kebatinan grOuPs which cOuited alII10st 360 in」ava in ■953(K.w.I. 1973, p.229)(9)。

FrOIn the begin五 ng they thOught that thes,kebatinan sects were ttrely de宙

frOm lslam, and kept a watch on then susPiciOusly.

ation

Kebatinan grOups On the other hand tried tO fO̲late the essence of kebatinan
distinct frOIIt the offical defin■ tiOn Of religiOn. They set uP an Organ■ztiOn

called the COInIIlittee fOr lndOnesian Kebatinan cOngress(B.K.K.I)to have acongress rOughly bianually. The arguIIcnts in the tteetings were devoted fOr hOw
to define kebatinan, sO the first tteeting in 1955 cOncluded that the essence ofkebatinan was:seDi i

ih, ramに imemayu hayuing bawana'(lT。
restrain yOur desire, POsitive in actiOn, making this wOrld Orderly. which is awell― knOwn 」avanese lIIlaxILEL of ideal cOnduct.)The secOnd fOnllulatiOn was in turn

̀Kebatinan adalah sumberasas dan sila Ke― Tuhanan Yang̲̲Mは ha Esa, untuk mencapaibudi luhur, guna kesempurnaan hiduP'(Kebatinan is the principle and the creed
Of 3Belief in one Supreme GOd' fOr the sake Of attaining high lnOrality and thecompletiOn Of life.: TO establish a new legal status, thesekebatinan leaders

Were faced with a number Of difficulties. One of such difficulties was whether
kebatin4n is a part Of the Javanese traditiOn Or sOIIlething mOre inter一‑11‑10cal(IndOnesian).The large majO五 ty Of these kebatinan sects are frclllll」

aVa,andthe first definitiOn cearly de■ Onstrates their cOnvictiOn of kebatinan as apart of the」avanese

culture. This pOsitiOn, hOwever, has shOrtcOIIlun■ngs. If

kebatinan i。 ′slmply identified with Javanese culture, it shOuld be cOntained in

the rather denigraded cOncept Of custOm, which manifestly has cOnnOtatiOn Of
inferiOrity tO religion. And the Ministry of ReligiOn

口こght be very happy thatkebatina, is after all just sOmething cultural rather than univeral. Thus suchblunt assOciation with Javanese cultvre ShOuld be avOided and replaced with
SOIllething based on the framo wOrk Of lndOnesュ

a̲ Thus we get the secOnd versiOnof defitiOn. This version has a clear shift Of emphasis, ■。w the definitiOn iswritten in lndOnesian rather than」avanese, and the relatiOn between kebatinan

and the first ite■ of Pancasila, i.e., the five principle of the state isrefered to. This subtle shift Of the emphasis predicts the line Of the whOle
arguШ 囀nt later, but at this stage, the defl■■tiOn is still quite abstract, as
compared tO the clear―cut 80al of Balinese Hinluism tO assi.nilate themoelves tO

the definitiOn Of religiOn stipulated by Muslinぐ.

Aside from the prOble■ Of its cultural backgrOund, they had tO deal withanother questiOn, whether kebatinan shOuld be called new religiOn (agalIIE baru)

9r not.Man…

groups Often used the tenIL religiOn(agama)1■

e religiOnof sabta Dantà but along with the crystalisatiOn Of the definitiOn Of Official

religiOn by the Ministry, the idea of new religiOn itself was forcibly
discarded. Thus in the secOnd COngress Of kebatinan, there emerged a new ideathat kebatinan is nOt new relig■ On as such, but a fOundatiOn which deepens Our

understanding of existing religiOns(lo). Thus they claimed that the essence Of
kCbatinan is Only fOunded on the belief in One God, irrespective Of its dOctrineor fOms Of wOrship. As the kebatinan congress is an amalga■

Of uiscellaneous

grOups, it mこ ght be wise and Practical tO define it as 100se as possible likethis fOr the sake Of s01idarity, but fOr thOse whO have established dOctrineand do nOt hesitate tO clain that theirs are also religiOn, th己s kind Of vague

definitェ On Was qu■ te dissatisfactOry. Thus the effOrt tO wOrk Out any cOherent

definitiOn Of ̲kebatinan was nOt really successful especially during sukarnO era.

But unlike the fol10wing periOd Of suhartO's new order, sukarnO t00k a rather
100se loisse4‑faire policy tO kebatina■

̲Sects, sO a number Of very radical,
P91iticised ke14tlnop Sects elnergedo A sect said that President SukarnO was anincarnation Of God, and his wOrds and deeds are identical "ith Godis(El H蹴

fiady

1977, pp.29‑31); another sect advocatё d that lslam is a religiOtt Of
c010nisation by the Arabs and that thereal Mecca is not Over there but ineast Java̲ The leader sat On Al―Qu・ ran in frOnt Of the public tO shOw
that this is just printed Paper and nOthing■ Ore(Tanah Air,
■951)(11). Suchchallenging attitute of these sects tO the established religion resulted in the」ember,‑12‑

radical cOnfrOntatiOn between theln and OthOdOx Muslims after sO―

called 30th Of
September Affair, which eventually led tO the dOwnfa11 0f sukarnO Govermnent.
The communist party was Officially bttnned and hundreds Of thOusands peOple wh。
were alleged,■ O be com■ unists Or symphasisers were killed by the nilitary andraging Muslim yOuth grOups. These radical kebatinan groups wete alsO suffered
Very IDuCh frOm such attack by Musli・ nぐ , Offically banned or fOrced tO convert(12)。

Muslim leaders expected a s■ 00th increase Of cOnverts tO Islan, but thereality was far frOnt its the numbeF of Christian cOnverts deve10pped
tapidly〈 Ricklefs■981,

p.273), and tO their surprise the convOrsiOn tO newly

recognised Hinduisl was alsO phenOmeFlal. CliffOrd ceertz at his revisit Of his
fOuner research site in east
thOusands Of」ava in 1970 was appalled tO find that there were」avanese Hindus there, which he says unthinkable in■952(Geertz1972)(13).

SIharto Government, hOwever, gradually revealed its Own kebatinan
Orlentation.At first, suhartO hinself is influenced by̲kebatinan(Jenkins 1984,
p1129‑36); One of his POlitical advisOr named SujOnO Humardani wa」'a well―knowrLspirit medium, thus nicknaIIted the minister of mysticism Or even Rasputin(McDonald ■980, chap.6)。 In additiOn, after virtually eradicating the cOInIIunist
elettnt in lndOnesian politics, the main target fOr the COvernコにmnt

in turn was
the politicised radical Muslim elelnent, and fOr the purPOse of the cOntainmentof such POtentially dangerOus POwer, it Was thOught tO be useful tO given a fu1l legal status.
― In ■970, the first symposiu■

on kebatinan was held after the suhartO era,
where a new legal strategy was prOposed by the chairman. That is, tO Inake use of
the semほ ntic ambuiguity Of the cOnstitutiOn of 1945 tO its extreme. The second
ite■ of the article 29, reads as fO110ws: The state guaranteep every citisen thefreedOm tO have one's Own religiOn alld tO wOrship accOrditlg tO religion and(its)belief(kepercayaannya itu)(14). The laot part Of the article issemantically ambiguous, its COllmon sensical reading lnght be laccOrding to
relig■ On and belief in it'。

But kebatinan sects read it as twO JuxtapOsingelements, i.e。 , religiOn and belief. With this selnantic trick, kebatinan sects

began a campaign that the status Of kebatinan had been legally guaranteed by theconstitutiOn, with the name Of belief. consequently, they replaced the wOrd
lebatinan w■ th a new wOrl kttpeFCayaan(belief), hence they called

thenselves as

belief grOups(aliran kepercayaaan).
As cOIIlpared to a rather s10ppy attempt tO define kebatinan during the SukarnOera, this new strategy was eventually based On more sOlid legal grOund. But thisalsO arOused very heated contrOversy and OppositiOn frOm the Muslins b10ck. lTO
recognise kebatinan and tO give it legal status llleans tO regress tO ani口̀Kebatinan is a degenerate fOnIL Of lslanic mysiticism。

‑13‑

こs■ ';

3 ̀There is a danger Of

In■ x■ng up the product Of hunan being w■ th God's revelatiOn'; isuch kebatinan

sects w■ ll destrOy the existent religiOus prder in this sOciety'..etc(15). Suchheated criticism, hOwever, could nOt prevent the term belief(kepercayaan)frOIn
being inserlё d in the outline of the NatiOnal POlicy in 1973, which IIleallt theoffical recOgn■ tiOn of the legal status Of belief. Bence the birth of belief.

But this success incurred backlush frOm the Ministry Of ReligiOn̲ since
kebatinan was difined not as something like new religiOn but as belief incontrast with religion,

コ正nistry

responsible fOr the belief grOups wOuld nO

10nger be the Ministry of ReligiOn. Thus the aメ ministration fOr the belief grOup

was transferred to the Ministry Of EducatiOn and culture,and up tO nOw they are
reSPOnsible fOr registering and coordinating the activities Of these kebatinan
sects.

This clear dichOtOmy Of religiOn and belief in ter■

5 of laW andadministratiOncOntinuOusly arouses a number Of prOblemst under the suhartO
government, religiOn became a must fOr every citizen: yOu are nOt a110wed nOt
to have a religion, bこ cause that lneans you are a cOmmunist. Hence religiOus
identity is very

■mportant fOrithe Official prOcedure, and yOu have tO fill theitem Of religiOn in your identity card.

As the identity card is cOncerned, the Government has already itlstructed tO
put the ttrk Of――
・ ― as the sig■

Of a fO110wer Of belief in the item Of

religiOn̲ This instructiOn is nOt carried Out at all at the 10wer level of theadministratiOn. A ttu■ or says that prOvincia1 80Verrllnents Of 」ava refused tO

enfOrce this, because Of sOme Officials. deep― r00ted prejudice against
kebatinan/belief. At disctrict Or v■ 1lage level, it is quite rare that Officials

understand the nteaning Of such strange sign, nOr do f0110wers Of kebatinan.
Thus it Often happens that the fOl10wers Of kebatina, are fOrced tO identify

themselves as Muslins, Or are suspected of being cOmmunists, eventuallyinterrogated by the police(■ 6).

The kebatinan sects, hOwever, has nO unifined stance on this POint・SOIE sects,

such as Sapta Danna,cla血 the complete independece and autOnOmy Of kebatinan,so thtts identity prOblem is a crutial point tO defend; OtherS like Subud, which

identify themselves as sOmething auxiliary tO the official religiOns, dO nOt
care ■uch even if they are cate80rised as Muslims. This dissaray of OPiniOn

within thekebatinan frOnt virtually weaken their power tO give unifinedpressure to the local govenment tO enfOrce the instructiOn frOIn abOve.

Another problem is the life cycle rituals. The COvernment enacted a new
marriage law which authOrises marriage outside the lslamic lawo cOnsequently,
non― Islamic marr■ age can be registered in Civil RegistratiOn office,

Musli■■Ot in thedOninated 10ca1 0ffice Of religiOn (KUA)any longer(McDOnald 1980,‑14‑

chap.6). After enactlnent Of this law, sOIne kebatinan sects began tO perfOrm
their cwn r■ tual fOr marr■ age (and funeral)distinct from the Ordinary Ones. FOr

instance, menbers of Sapta Darma, which tt have mentiOned, invented a c。 llective
meditati011tO ask God for blessing in place fOr the traditiOnal ceremOny. The
loca1 0ffttCe and Police put this in questiOn, and this inventiOn was eventuallybanned.

The Outline Of the National P01icy emphasised that belief is nOt allowed tO

aim to becOuc a religion. Then hOw abOut having its Own system of rituals
distinct frOm what are stipulated by the official religiOns? one Of the 10cal
leaders OF kebati璧 旱(17)thOught it natural fOr these sects tO have their Om

wedding and so on, partly because the new marriage law authOrises lnarriage
based on custom (adat― istiadat). But this inferrence was harshly criticised by
the M堕 nistry of ReligiOn On the grOund that this is an explicit attempt fOr thef0110wers Of kebatinan tO religionise their creed. It might sOund like a
sch01astic arguelllent whether such ritual cycles be10ng tO religion Or custOm,

but as the 」avanese traditiOnal life cycle ttittals are cOncerned, Islanicelements are inseparable part Of the whOle prOcё dure of custOmary r■ tuals. sO if

a kcbatinall sect tries to replace lslamic titual.s with their Own style, it
loOks as if they were trying tO replace custOImry rites w■

th their bizzare new
religiOus system. Here you can see the discrepancy between the state definitiOnof dichOtOmy Of religion and culture and that Of everyday life: kebatinan after

all, is rather cOnsciOusly built ide010gical system different frOIIIl daily
practices. In that sense, wedding and funeral carried Out by sapta Danna, fOr
instance, is a very new syste■ , and it is quite understandable that the Ministerof ReligiOn as well as 10cal Government Officials reacted susPiciOusly against
such invention.
DesPite such prOblellns, kebatirlan sects tried to establish finner grOund fOrtheir status: OrganisatiOnally, it is the establishment Of IPK, andideologically,cOnt■ nuOus effOrt tO clar■ fy the mean■ ng of belief.

SuhartO COverIIment encOuraged to establish a c00rdinating bOdy fOr kebatinangroups, which at first was called SKK( Secretar■ ate for C00peratiOn Of Belief),then after the legal authOrisatiOn Of kObatinan, HPK(AssOciatiOn Of Believersin One Supremに God). It is exPected that every Regency has its branch, arOund

which the daily activities of these kebatinan sects shOuld be c00rdinated. HPK
is under the umbrella of the lnassive cOve̲ental party naコにd Golkar (Functinal
GrOup)and HPK's persOnnel affairs are indirectly cOntrOled by its 10cal branch.

At the same timeヮ however, the 10cal branch Of the Ministry Of EducatiOn andCulture is wh01ly resPOnsible fOr registering and guiding

kebatinan grOups.In

additi9n, there ■s anOther Organ■ satiOn which is ■n charge Of kebatina■, i.e・ ,PAKEM(The office Of suveillance of SOcial Belief GrOups)which initially‑15‑

be10aged tO the Public prOsecutiOn Office, then reOrganised tO include the
Ministry of EducatiOn, the Ministry Of ReligiOn, the police and the army(K.W.I.
1973, p.231,p.235). This indicates the coveIIIment's ambivalent attitude tOwards
the pOssiblご deviatiOn Of kebatinЯ n. Thus the local ̲墨 g墜

型堕壺里■ pOlitics is basedon fOur Organ■ sations, i.e., HPK, the Ministry Of EducatiOn, GOlkar and PAKEM.
The balance Of power alII10ng these fOuF eleIInents differs enOmOusly in every

Regency. In case of Pati Regency, the mutual relatiOns ran very smoOthly: theOfficer Of culture 〈kasi kebudayaan)whO is respOnsible for registering andguiding kebatinan affair in the Ministry Of EducatiOn, was hinself a fO110wer Of
kCbatinan sect, and was very active tO guide the HPK meeting, while in cOlkar
there were sOtte local MP's whO were alsO kebatinan f。 110wers. In cOntrast, thesituatiOn in adjacent Kudus Regency faced a tOtal dissaray: The Offiここr Of
culture rS a Muslh antago通 stic tO kebatinan3 the first chainLan of HPK was
opposed ly■ kol■ linan or■ ented 10cal MP Of Golkar, whO nade a new Organ■

satiOnOut'￨̀e 9f HPK; LOcal COlkar was dOm己 nated by devOut Muslimq quite antagon■
stictO ke■ tina■ COnsequently there were several factiOns whO made a fuss t↓をwh。
と
would cOntrol IIPK.

Such picture Of cOnfusiOn arOund the 10cal politics Of kebatinan is a resuitof the heterogen■Ous religiOus convictiOns fOr the members 6f suchorganisatiOns resPonsible fOr kebatinan politics. sOmЮ OrthOdOx Muslitts arequite antagoniftiC t° Wards kebatinan, believing that it is Just a diSgusting
deViatiOn frO■ prOper religiOnso so they tend tO believe that their missiOn

Would be tO shOw these 10st sheep the r■ ght way, and when they h。
related tO

ld a 30bkebatinan affairs, they make effOrt tO urge then tO go back tO

Isla■ . Thus the stability Of 10cal

kehatinan politics relies heavily on the

proportion Of Muslims and kebatinan f0110wers in each OrganisatiOns.
The admこ nistrative confusion at the

local level, hOwever, is nOt a lnere

reflectiOn Of what Occurs at the central level:There the kebatiFlan leaders facea rather different prOblen tO sOlve, i.e.,the identity of belief. AlthOugh I

have deliberately used the term belief as an equivalent Of kebatinan tO
facilitate the comprehensiOn, in fact they are different, and the difference
grOws larger as the discussiOn gOes On at the center.
As l have m̲ntiOned, the cOncept Of belief is defined as sOmething which has alegal status parallel t0 0fficial religiOn. But as the substance is cOncerned,
there is IILllch ambiguity. AlthOugh the Official definitiOn Of belief stipulates

that this is a part Of indigenOus culture/custom, ■t never demOnstrates any
particluar 10cal culture existing in lndOnesia. Thus One cannot talk abOutin the name Of belief, because the fOnner is a distinctive 10cal

traditiOn…

Of 」ava, while the latter is just a legal term artificiallyfabr■ cated by the state. And what matters nOw at the centre‑16‑■s this cOncept Of

belief, nOt Of kebatinan.
Take natiOnal TV prOgranL for instance. There is a weekly prOgram naned Lecture

on ReligiOn, in which leaders Of each Offical religiOns talk abOut the essenceof their creed in half an hOur. But beside the five Official religiOns, there isanother prOgra■ named Lecture Oi Belief, given by the chai̲n Of central
IIPK,whO was a leader Of Sumarah, One of the IIIOst influential sects in Java(■

This Lecture On Belief attracted my attentiOn by its very lack Of substance.
What he emphasised under the narm Of belief was Only One thing,

8).

■.e., remember(Ingatloh Tuhan in lndonesian Or eling marang Gusti in」 avanese),and otherpart Of the lecture was quite abstract, al口 。st nothttng in cOntent. Alコ。st every
lecture was repretitiOus, w■ thOut any further nOtiOn Of cOncrete dOctrine,
duties Or cOsm010gy. This may reflect the dOctrinal simplicity Of suコarah, buthere we shOuld see the fundamental dil101na of the cOncept of belief̲
興Unlike the dOctrinal crystalisation Of Balinese Hinduism by m̲an6 0f cOpying
ISlaIIL and bOrrOw■ ng much elelnents frOm the ttndian classics, what belief has is

the cOncrete‐ LSCellaneous

sects which share nO dOctrinal unity. TO Inake thematter worse, the cOncept Of kebatinan̲in SukarnO era which still had a strOng
connOtation of」avanese culture, was replaced by mOre abstract cOncept Of belief.

Corlsequently the definitiOn Of belief cannOt rely on
any lOnger. NOw the nOtion Of belief is based On lndOnes■」avanese 10cal fOrnlulationa, nOt Java, and if its

definitiOn says that it be10ngs tO the doIInain Of culture/cust。

■, One has tO
shOw that there is a fundallletnal identity amOng cultures and custOms inlndonesia which guarantees the substantial unity Of belief in various
localities.
One Of the leaders Of HPK in the PrOvince of Central」ava̲tes as fo110ws=

Basicly before the arrival of Hinduisu t0 0ur archipellago, the lndOnesian
people had already had belief in One Supreme COd. It was nOt that lndonesian
people had anilnistic and polytheic wOrship fOr plants, stones and stars as has
been described as such by the authOrs On a― Lsm like wilken, Adriani, Kruyt andTaylor, but that lndOnes■an peOple had held ■OnOtheistic view... Plants, stOnes
and stars were not wOrshipped, but made m慮 ans fOr the belief in One COd(Toe10es
n.d.,4).

Thus before the existence Of the Offi,● l religiOns in lttdOnesia, they had
already shared a cOmmOn belief in One God, and he, fOr the purpose of prOv■

ng it,

picks up names Of deities in variOus cultures in lndOnesia svch as Maharaja
Kulung Rahum in Kalimantan, Puang Matua in Tora」

so fOrth(TOeloes n.d.,3). NOw the fOcus is nOt

a, Ratu Lang■ in Minabasa, and」avanese mysticislll but theallegedly cOml10n cultural heritage Of the lndOnesian people, and the Only thin

‑17‑

thread which binds them iS the nOtiOn Of belief in One COd.

This is why the TV lecture On belief is sO abstract, lacking in content. As
the state definitiOn of belief is depr■ ved of its Original 」avanese backgroundOf

What the cOImentatOrs can dO is tO Fepeat its legal basis, thatis …the first principle of Pancasila. But if the definitiOn 3f belief simply
relies On・ belief

in One Supreme Cod' without any particular dOctrinal

elabratiOn, it night be rather difficult tO cOnfine it within the realm Of
lndones・ n. In other wOrds, the phenOmena Of belief in One Suprelne cOd cannOt be

said to be particulary lndOnesian. And in fact in sO□ e cases, kebatinan sects
have already gone beyond the natiOnal bOrder tO spread a1l over the wOrld like

Subud. Even in case of Suntarah, there are already pOsitive approach tO
fOreigners and they prOvide a western instructor to teach fOreigners hOw tO
ueditate.
This tendency Of de― Indones■an■ satiOn〈 internationalisatiOn), hOwever, is Only
observable a■ Ong the large natiOn― wide kelatinan s,CtS' the mほ Ority Of the」Javanes, Кebatinan sects are still hedged arOund bジ the.r particular cultural

backgrOunds and cOmplex system Of doctrine. Such bifticatiOn Of belief between
the abstractive tendency at the leve1 0f Jakarta mOving away frOm particular

10cal diversity, and strengthened emphasis On the distinctiveness Of 10cal
traditiOn at the level of pheriphery, causes an acute prOblem in every day life,■.e., education.

The fact that a certa■ n creed is author■ sed by the state as

one Of the official religiOns dOes nOt Only

硼に an■s wr■ tten ■n the identity card, but alsO that one

that One's religiOus identity■s bestOwed the right tO havea proper religious educatiOn at sch001, which further implies the establishment

Of adequate religiOus textb00k, carriculum, and the sch001 fOr religiOus
teacherso Actually, the Hindu cOuncil cOmpiled the textbOoks which preciselyreflect the reforIInst ideo10gy, and Hindu teachers sch001s are instruIInental inproduc■ ng dogmatic コindu teachers spreading a11 0ver lndOnesia.

Thus if belief is giveln the equivalent legal status as religiOnっ。ne shOuld
alsO have a syste■ Of sch001 educatiOn fOr it, Otherwise children wOuld suffer

frOm educatiOnal vacuum. But then what tO teach? Eere the gap between the
abstract state definitiOn and the endless variety Of particular kebatin.n sects

give rise to a very cOncrete difficulty. It is Out Of questiOn tO teachchildren each dOctrines they belong tO, because the sch001 education needs tO
be standardised. Then shall we teachnOt cOnfined tO the」avanese traditiOn tO them? But belief is」avanese traditiOng rather, it is a national heritage bydefinitiOn. Thus we are fOrced to retreat tO the pOint Of vague state
definitiOn which is simply based On Pancasila. It lnight sOund like theeducatiOnal version Of TV lecture On belief, but here lies an intriguing
difference. At the leve1 0f educatiOn, there is ObligatOry curriculuIII nalllled
二 18‑

PMP(Pendidikan MOral Pancasila, EducatiOn Of Pancasila mOrality). Pupils haveto learn the five principles a10ng with subsidiary itemc to deve10p a firm
morality based on Parlcasila. And naturally the first principle, belief in one
Supr● InO cod,ノhaS already been included in this PMP. As a result, EDaginably it

would be lnOst difficult tO separate the first principle of Fancasila frOm therest and establish sOlnthing distinct fr。 ■ thds PMP.

This emphasis On the administrative cOnfusiOn may give the reader an
impression that as a lnatter Of fact, the notiOn Of belief has exerted nO
intrinsic eFfect on the content Of peOple's daily religiOus practice, Or shall工

say, Popular k■ Owledge, as a result Of its senantic ambiguity. I insist,hOwever, that this is■Ot the case. The fact is that the nOtiOn Of belief in One

Cod has been gradually affecting any tebatinan f0110wers whO Inハre Or less areconsciOus of the dOctrinal content of what they are practising. I will present

tWo cases of sPirit Cult grOup in Java tO shOw hOw the afOrementiOned notiO五binds their ttinline doctrine as well as everyday discOurse.

Tunggul sabda 」ati( TsJ,the Banner Of the Real Word)is one of such sPirit
cult grOups, which tt have exauned in Fukushima(1987). The head office Of thissect is 10cated in COmbOng, sOuthern part Of central

fOund in various parts of Central and East」ava, but the fO110wers are」ava. The leader Of this sect, an

Officia1 0f the local Goveranent Of GombOng, is a sPirit mediuIIn, pOssessed by
the sPirit Of S・ IIMr, an ugly but deeply beloved c10‑30d, who mainly appears■n」avanese and Balinese shadow theatre based On lndian epics and is alsO regarded

as the guardian sPirit Of」ava.

The prOblem the fol10wers Of such a spirit cult grOup are cOnfr6ited with ishOw tO reconcile the general definitiOn Of kebatinan as lbelief in one GOd'with their particular cOncern w■ th 10cal deities like sema士 . This is especiallyproblematic fOr these supporters Of spirit cult, because they often have strOng
self―awareness as kebatinan― f0110wers in cOrltrast vLth orthOdOx Muslims, hence

lnore

cOnsciOus of the official definitOn Of belief than phi10sOphy Oriented

synchretic mystics, as a result Of the sPirit cult being unacccPtable bylsladc OrthOdOxy.
To make a 10■ 8 StOry shOrt, the interpretive s。 lutiOn Of this prOblem amOng
the fOllcDwers Of TS」 are quite var■ ed: One Of the Official line of arguIIlent isthat SeEEr ELS a■eSsengerof God, and each cOuntry has her own messenger, whO

transm.ts the divine mossage tO the peOple. This definitiOn, hOwever, s硼

に1ls Oflslamdc OrthOdOxy, simply replacing PrOphet Muhallmad with the ethnic deitySe■lar. Others cOunterargue, InOre based On the widely accepted belief that God isbut anOther naIIle fOr the innermOst self, that senar grOws auto口 ほtically in Our
bOdy, and that when■ lan attains ultinate unificatiOn with Godフ

‑19‑

naturally Semarcan be united with the person in the form Of divine insight≦

wahyu). Thissuggests the virtual identity between COd and semar, thOugh they say Semar isreluctant to be called sO.

The fluctllatiOn Of the interpretatiOn between the superi血 pOsed Official
doctrine Of belief in one cOd and the particular cOncern fOr the 10rnl deities
is also reflected in their religious practices̲ As a spirit cult grOup, one Of
TSJ's IInin act■ v■ ties is a collective seance, in which senlar, thrOugh the nediun,

reveals prOphesies, tenders advices tO the attendants as tO their fOrtune,

health, fanily prOblem, and so fOrth. This wOrship Of semar, hOwever, iscounterbalanced with the emphasis On the practice of IIleditation as a fOrln Of
direct prayer tO God. But this emphasis, theoretically speaking at least, issonewhat confus■ ng, because ■f the■dea Of IIIteditatiOn as a direct

コほans Of
communicatiOn between lnan and God is accepted, there will be nO need Of any

med■ atOrs Or lnessengers. If yOu can cOntact w■

th God thrOugh meditatiOn, yOu do

not need Semar as a messenger 6f God any 10nger; if yOu succeed iIIL
counun■ cating Semar instead, you a136● ill nOtneed a sPirit medium. In any case,advocating the impOrtance of meditatiOn is somowhat self― defeating fOr such asPirit cult group as TsJ, and Ohё Of the lnain criticisIIIs made by the fe110w
kebatinan― fol10wers exactly is that the phenOmenOn Of spirit possession is nOt
in accOrdance with the idea1 0f kebatェ nan, ■.e., ultillate quietness Of theinner― self and unificatiOn between lnan and God. For thOse whO believe in thisideal, the spltrit cult just dOes nOt promOte the belief in one Codフ

butservility tO capricious, unreliable spirits. Faced with such criticis■, whatthe leaders can dO is tO deIIDnstrate spirit possession in public and tO appeal

fOr the popular support, rather than tO try tO cOnvince the susPiciOus fe110w
cr■ tics

that their stOry Of semar■s cOns■ stent w■ th belief in One cOd.

The discursive and/Or practical ambiguitttes WhiCh TsJ shOws is but a visible

case of clash between the state ideo10gy of belief in One COd embOdied with thepractice of IIleditatiOn as the■Ost impOrtant means, and the 10cal reality ofspir■ t cult nOt dininishttng its influence in sPite Of the incessant cr■

ticislnlnade by the high― brcw r4ystics and adnm口 nt OrthOdOx Muslimぐ ̲

But there is anOther case where the super■ mposed idea1 0f belief in one Cod
and the drive fOr spifit pOssessiOn are recOnciled sOm‐ what II10re successfully
than the awbard TsJ: Wiweka in surakarta described briefly in Fukushima(1989).
The ma■ n fOcus Of this sect is tO create a conditiOn Of sPir■t pOSSess■ 0■ by
IIleans Of IIleditative practices. A trainee sbOuld meditate tO get intO a trance,

guided by a trainer whO appeares tO be already pOssessed w■ th a certain」avanese

deity, sPeaking in Old fashiOned 」avanese like that Of the shadOw play
puppeteer ( dalang). When he successfully attains the trance, a vOice is
expected tO cOuに Out from his thrOat, which initially wOuld be upintelligible‑20‑

murmur. This state is called ・uniOn ■ystique', and when it reaches higher
degree of the un■ On, the vOice w■ 1l deliver a clearer message, just like thatof the trainer's.

It is qulte obviOus that these leaders of the grOup had suffered frOm
chrOnical spirit attack before they jOined the OrganisatiOn. And phenoIItenally
speaking at least, the behaviOur Of the meditators are exactly the saIDe W■ th thepossessed mediunO fOund in Other sects. But what draws Our attentiOn■s thatthe other― worldly voices the members produce while practising lleditatiOn are nOt

attributed to the exteriOr spirits. In place of explaining the phenOmenon in
terIIns Of spir■ t pOssess■ On, W■ weka emphas■ ses the lln.。 n betWeen man and God: bymeans of contr01ling the breath, the prana a la Yoga circulates in One's bOdy,
finally reacttng One's head when the u五 〇n五 th cOd is attained.Then the pranacomes down fron the head tO the throat, where■t prOduces a divine vo■ ce callednada sabda.
This is One of the rare cases where the dOminant and highly rigid discOurse of
belief in one cOd is sO硼 にhoW recOnciled with the general phenOmlenon Of spirit
possession. Here the general dOubt abOut the authenticity Of the vOice producedby spirit mediun is ingeIIOusly eluded by cOnstituting the voice nOt as the
product Of the exteriOr spirit but as the result of strengthening One's imer
self by llleans Of persOnal meditative endeavour. But such dOctrillal success isbut a rare case, and as a result, HPK meetings l attended were filled with bOthapparent unュ formュ ty of fOrmal discOurse as tO the nature of belief, and implicit

but clearly ineradicable dissension amOng spirit cult suppOrters, theOsOphicalhigh二 brOws, and s・・ni̲religiOus mEditatOrs.

The kebatinan traditiOn in」ava,

the largest and most influentia1 10cal
culture in lndonesia, has been cOnfrOnted with the prOblem Of identity as aresult Of the ambiguOus p01arisation in it. In one extrene, there has been
constant pressure frOm the OrthOdOx Muslims tO reduce it tO ttslam. As thepossibility Of the idea of new relig■ Ons was den■ ed, kebatilllan was fOrced tO begiven a rather cOntradicting definitiOn Of being something appertaining tO
culture, but legally equivalent to religiOn̲ This definitiOn is virtually■IncOmpatible with the orthOdOx Muslims'

conv■ ctiOn that culture is inferiOr tO

relig■ On, because the latter is created by God, while the fOmer is Just ahu■ lanPrOduct. As a result, the legal basis Of kebatinan cOuld be vulnerable

against the Muslims' criticisIL.
The other extre■ le is the pOssibility of identifying kebatin,n w■ th Hinduism.

This idea gained a certain alnOunt Of pOpularity after the 30th september Affairフ

which was seen in the Шほssive cOnversiOn tO it. HOwever, as Eardjanto pointed
out, this new llinduism cOmpletely lacks the meditative ele輌 いnt which is deeply‑21‑embedded in Javanese kebatinan. Thus the attempt tO identify kebatinan with
Official Hinduism was doomed tO be a fttilure.
Consequently, kebatinan shOuld struggle within the frallle Of culture. But as I
have m8ntiOned, on the One hand, there is a demand fOr belief tO be apperta■n■ ng
to culture and tO be equ■ valent with religiOn sini・ ltaneOusly, On the Other handっthere is a perenュ al tug― Of―war between particular 10cal cultures and demand fOrlndonesianisatiOn, The abstract legal derinitiOn of belief strengthens thepressure for lndOnesianisatiOn, and just like the」avanese language, which

failed tO be a national language insP■ te of its largest poPulatiOn,kebatinan
is fOrced tO reorganise itself within the cOntext Of lndOnesia. Thus at any
rate, kebatina cannOt find its clear― cut identity, and as a result, in thecenter leaders ШЮnmOtOnOusly repeat ・Remember COd', while in the cOuntries,
sects, institvtェ ons, Musl=・ nc and Christians keep On fighting a mこ 16e which leads

them tO■ Owhere.
To cOnsider the histOrical change of religiOus system under a strOng influencё

of the state like lndOnesia, the conventional analytical t001 1ike therationalisetiOn of religiOn Or any kind Of unilinear deve10pmental analysis
falls shOrt Of elucidating the cOmplexity Of the whOle cOnfiguratiOn Of■nterrelated factOrs. Thus, describing the religiOus change Of Balinese HinduioЩ

and 」avanese ■ebatinan s■ ■ply as ratiOnalisation wOuld miss the significant
difference Of these two patterns Of change.
What strikes mほ in case of lndOnesia is the crutial role Of the state in the

prOcess Of religiOus change. As l have emphas■ sed, in cOntempOrary lnd。

■es■ a,rel・ giOn is nOt just a persOnal chOice; rather it is a duty fOr a citisen tO

perform sO as to shOw that One■s ■Ot a commun■ st. Thus the system Of definitiOn

stipulated by the state is nOt s■ mply buried in thick legal dOcunents in thecenter, but structuralises citizens' lives by way Of variOus adm己nistrative

channels.

But such pressure to the individual tO hOld Offical religion dOes

■Ot simply
come frOn the state. Historically speaking, it is the cOnfrOntatiOn with lslam

which led variOus religiO― ethnic minOrities tO the refOnllulatiOn Of theirsymbolic system. The impact has been■ultiple and thrOugh variOus channels. on

the One hand, their virtual dOminatiOn Of the Ministry OF ReligiOn resulted in
the establishment Of the definitiOn Of religion in the mOde1 0f lslam, whichurged Balinese nindus and Buddhists tO transfOnlt their creeds intO sOIllethこngnew. On the other hand, variOus radical Muslim lnOvelnent frOIII Isla■

ic Allianceand Refor■ ■st lsla■ Movement in ■910's and 1920's(Alfian ■969; NOer 1973),

Dartul lslam and Other separatist ■OveIInents in sukarno era(van Dijk 198■

5

Harvey 1977), and the massacre Of cOIIllnunists after the 30th september Of 1965,‑22‑

gave cOnstant■mpact On m■ ■Or■ ty religiOns tO reOrganise their system by partly

incOrporating the very lslan己 c elements tO defend then frOm such pressure.
Baving said that, IndOnes■ a as a state shOws a peculiar character■its religiOu,′

poliCy. Despite Of the nOmュfactO impact On the religiOus pOlicy,工stic as tO

nal majOrity Of Muslims and its dendonesia is nOt an lslamdc state. NOr is

it an unyieldingly secular state where freedOm Of religion is cOmpletely
guaranteed. The founding pr■ nr,ple Of the Ftate, Pancasila, is itself a productOf cOmprOm■ se between lsla■ and variOus types of secular ide。 10gies. Thus thelndonesian P01itics Of religi6n is torn between var■ Ous dichOtOmOus P01arities,
such as religiOn vs. secular■ sln and its extreme versiOn, radical MOslelns vs,

Comttunists, religion vs. custom; 10Cal culture vs. IndOnesia,and s0 0rL. Under
the present Government, cOllununist elell■ ent is Officially deniedフ

and nOw thetarget is the Other side Of the cOntinvum, the element Of radical lslam. Isla■Lis acceptable when it is mOderate enOugh tO cO― exist with Other religi6ns.
ReligiOns in tun shOuld learn tO cO― habitate with 10cal custOns, namely belief.

And belief is legalised only when it is enOugh lndOnesianised. Thus the
Covernment's p01itical handling Of this enOrmOusly diverse lndonesia shOuld
depend On the tact Of subtle balancing between these dichOtOInOus pOlarities̲
But fOr the particular religiOns Or 10cal traditiOns which are fOrced tO live
under these variOus dichOtOIILouS tendencies, such cOnditiOn may systematicly
causes cr■ s■ s Of identity.
Thus Balinese Hindu seemO tO be tOrn into fOur parts, grOssly between the

refomed soteri01ogical ideo108y surviving Only in interregional area outside
Bali such as Kalinantan Oを Tengger, and persistent 10cal traditiOn Of rェ

tuali。 世

which resists further refOrmatiOn. In case Of kebatinan, Solne f。 110wers may feelthat what they learn is the unュ versal lnessage frOIII God, while others find theirpractice originates frOm purely 」avanese traditiOn. But both wOuld be quitedissatisfied tO find that the legal categOry of belief tO which they be10ng,
neither un■versal religiOn■s■Or particular 10cal culture. It shOuld be sOmething

inbetween, nam61y the lndOesian traditiOn.
Here lies a basic cOntradictiOn Of the relatiOn between natiOnali。 ̲, religiOn,

and local cultures. ReligiOn, by the lndOnesian definitiOn, shOuld beinternational, while culture is alsO by definitiOn 10cal, falling shOrt Of
being the foundatiOn Of natiOnal un■ ty. Thus for the ideo108iCal device tO un■ fy
lndonesia, sOllllething inbetween is needed, and that is the concept Of belief.

This is in a sense an ingeniOus cOntrivance, a mOdern myth, tO balance between
the twO polarities Of 10cality and internatiOnality. It is an indegenOus ideaof lndOnesians because it is embedded in 10cal cultures, but nOt specific tO
any particular One̲ Rather it is shared by all cultures, which is supposed toguarantee the basis fOr the cultural unity Of lndOnesia. Still, it is‑23‑■Ore than

」uSt Culture because it contains the element Of transcendentality, that isbelief in one supreme COd, thus cOuld be claimed that it is after allequ■ valent w■ th religiOns.

The prOblem′ bf this tactful seIIlantic lnaneuver is the fact that this is such an

empty nOtiOn. Any attempt tO fill this semantic vaccum by infusing
particularity in it faces the danger Of breaking the balance between 10cality

and internatin.lity. It is just like a hOuse Of belief in TamaFL Mini lndah
lndonesia, a natiOnal park Of m直 niatures Of lndOnes■ an cultures and religiOnsin 」akarta̲ Aside frOm the five religiOus buildings, there is a building which

represetlts belief, but it is just an empty place fOr meditatiOn, and no
decoratiOn, no particular symbOls nOr altars.

This emphasis On the emptiness Of the nOtion of belief sd far may lead you tOthittk that this is the sign Of defeat Of」 avanese kebatinan vis―

viS Islaln.But
it may be nOt. The particular emptiness Of the nOtiOn Of belief, in fact, may
reflect the nature Of the Javanこ sea―kebatinan itself. One Of the widely sharedcreed of kebatinen・ s a direct exper■ ence Of God by each persOn, and thedoctrine is, after all, just a by― prOduct Of such persOnal encOunter nth cOd.

In this particular sense, the nOtiOn Of belief in onё iSuprelne COd is quite

kebatinanlike. You can produce your Own doctr■ ne accOrding tO your Own
encounter with God, whatever the term IIlay lnean. Thus if yOu have a place tomeditate or to pray, the rest shOuld be dOne by the practitiOners themoelves,and in this sense, the dOctrinal emptiness Of belief or■

8■ nates frolll kebatinan

itself, and as 10ng as the nOtiOn Of belief is sustained by the cOvernment,
keba,in4n fO110Wers mュ ght survive sOIIlehow, thOugh nOt as agressively as the
Hindu COunc■ 1 .

‑24‑

Concluding remほ rks.

In a sense, what l have attempted tO describe here is the political aspect Of

the prOcess of canOnisation Of pOpular knOwledge and its reflective impact On
popular knOwledge itself. unlike the established religiOus text as TrittPitaka or
Al― Qur'an, neither the Ordinary Balinese nOr thepossess any kind Of established canOns」avanist Javanese did nOt

or systelnatised dOctrines, except fOr thelimited number Of esOteric Kawi texts fOr the high priests in Bali andmュ scallenious

dr■ veand scattered hOly writings fOr mushr00田 ユng sects ill

fOr the canOn■ satiOn resulted frOm the」ava. The

■nterference Of a number Of waves

Of different Origins, such as the neurOtic emphasis Of Pancasila fOr theguideline Of the eVery aspect Of daily life and the subsequent emphasis Of thereligiOus identity, the dOminance Of lslam in the Ministry Of ReligiOn, andconstant pressure from the radical Muslims tOwards Other religiOus grOups. But

the prereqvisite fOr the canOnisation is the Official authOrisatiOn Of thecreed as one Of the natiOnal religions, and in this light, the Balinese Hinduism,
the Javanese kebatinan, and Other llLnOrity religiOus systems have traced qtitこ
different paths. The success Of the canOnOsation Of the Balinesse HinduisIIlt has

its drawback, namely its failure to replace the pOpular knOwledge with mOre
rigOrOusly systematised textual Hinduis■,intended by Parisada initating
refOrln■ st Musliコ s in Java. COntrastively, the Dayaks, sOne part Of the TOrajas,
and the Tengerese, are forced t0 0fficially accept Hindu identity,as a result Of

their Own failure tO have their belief system authOrised as independent
religiOns. COnsequently, the disguised dichOtOmy Of religiOn and custOm,
Smug81ed frOm refOrmュ st lslan tO the Bヒ ndu cOuncil, legitimises the effOrt Of

the doctrinistic Hindu teachers tO abOlish the 10cal custOn tOtally under thepretext Of purifying their faith and intrOdicing the civilised■lanner.

The 」avanists have sOught fOr a legal 100phOle and their implicit but

undeniable cOntrol of the central Government a110wed them tO venture tO
establish their Own legal status Of kebatinan. But the intended canOnisatiOn
has been cOnfronted with a number of Obstacles nOt sO easy to hurdle. The legal

concept Of belief has latent functiOn

to give local knOwledge a chance tOsurvive the cOnstant pressure from the Official religiOns such as lslam andParisada Hinduislll , but this POssibility could be denied by the drive tO
establish the standardised POpular knOwledge fOr all the lndOnesians under thebanner Of Pancasila, and espec■ ally Of belief in one COd. The

which itself is an living encyc10pedia Of the」avanese」avanese kebatinan,

pOpular knOwledge,

therefOre occupys a very intriguing pOsitiOn in the lndOnesiai cultural politics

l on the one hand, its existence as kepercayaan is a symb01 0f the legal
autOnOmy Of POpular knOwledge(Or custom)vis―a一

vis the textual knOwledge

exelllplified with the Offical religions such as dOctrinal lslam夕‑25‑

On the other‐hand, there has been a cOnstant internal dissension between theOsOphica1 0r
aristOcratic high― brOws whO tend tO emphasise the self̲discipline,meditative

attainment, and their kinship with classical phislosophy Of life fostereとwithin the.FtaditiOn of the rOyal palace, and spirit cult f。

110wers whO are

Widely suppOrted by the pOpulace but generally played down by the mOre
sophttsticated kebatinan fO110wers. This means that the line Of divisiOn between

pupular a■ ld textual knOwledge can be p01itically drawn either between official

religiOn vs. 10cal custO■ ( 。r culture)Or between high̲brOw IIIteditatOrs and thef0110wers Of spirit cult within the definition Of custOm itself.

This pOlitical lnanipulatability 9f division between standard canOnicalknOwledge and peripheral pupular knOwledge has given rise tO a nu■
ber OfconfusiOn. FOr instance, the idea that the legal status Of belief as qustOm isguaranteed with reference tO the first itO■

。f Pancasila, ■.e。
, belief ill one
SupremE God, may possibly subvert the very fOullldatiOn Of the idea Of spirit

possessiOn itself, which is clearly seen in the cases like Ts」. FOr any systeIILOf 10cal POpular knowledge, therefOre, the mOst desirable scenariO is nOt Onlythat its identity as part Of kepetc五ソaan legally prOtect thenfrOm thepressure Of pr6selytising canOnicttli religiOns, but also that it can avOid any
excess■ ve standardisatiOn as Part Of the invented lndOnesian traditiOn mOdelledheavily On Pancasila and high― brOw

」avanists'Ineditative ideo10gy. In this sense,

the unsuccessful attempt to crystalise the definitiOn Of belief, hence thefailure tO canon■ se the standard dOctr■

ne proper tO IndOnesia, may eventualy be
the best politics Of culture for the 10cal popular knOwledge, as far as themacrO― POlitics is cOncerned.

‑26‑

Ю ttSThis is a much abridged and translated versiOn Of Fukushimほ( 1991). The secOnd
Part Of thiS paper On kebatinan in Java is based On the field wOrk undertaken
during the periOd 1983‑1985, in central 」ava. I an grateful fOr the financial
support from the INPEX FOundatiOn, and fOr the administrative support frOlll
Lembaga llll■ u,IPengetahuan lndOnes■ ヵ and Pusat studi Pedesaan dan Kawasan, Cadjah

Mada University. The earlier versiOn Of this paper was presettted at the study
CrOup On state and the Dynaコ 直cs Of NatiOnal culture in Oceania and SOutho■stAsia (chaired by PrOf. TeruO SekimOtO)and at the seコ dnar Of the SOciOlogy Of
ReligiOn, held by Dro Eileen Barker, The LOndon Sch001 0f EconOllacs. I thankthese chairpersOns and participants fOr their valuable cOmments. I alsO thankProfoShinji Yamashita and Mr KiyOshi Naka口 ura fOr the suggestiOn Of the lpaterial
on Toraja and Bali, Mr M堕 kotO Tsugnmi fOr his editOrial assistance, and all theparticiPants Of the SympOsium at the National Museum Of Ethn010gy fOr their
Valuable cOments and discussions.
l

As fOr the critical assessuent Of FOucault's nOtiOn Of POwer, see Hby(1986),
Said(■ 986), Minson(1986), Wickham〈■986).

POulantzas, a well一

knOwn neO―

Marxist theOrist, while admitting the partial advantage of his
ⅢdscrOscOPic
analysis Of pOwer, criticises hi■ as underestiコ ほting the rOle Of the statewith its repressive apparatuses based On physical viOlence(POulantzas■980,p.77). Smart, summarising POulantzas's POsitiOn, writこ
こas f。 11。 ws: ￨...

Poulantzas has suggested that nOt Only FOucault undetestillnated thesignificance Of sOcial class and class struggle but in additiOn he has

neglected the impOrtance of the state at the very time when its exPansiOn
and weight are assul■■ng prOpOrtiOns never seen befOre"'(SInart■983, P.■ o5).
Lenert and cillan make the sim直 lar point: lHis view Of the State is tOO
partial, to0 0verwhelmed by the gelleral ■echanis■ Of POwer―
knOwledge. But
the idea Of pOwer― knOwledge, precisely because it is general, dOes suggest asocio10gy of state power that wOuld Operate in the theOreticalspace'(Lemert & Gillan ■982, P.116). POulantsaz alsO points Out that the
Foucauldian inage of Omnipresence of power IIlay eventually invalidate any
resistance tO it suggested by FOucault himsё lf(Poulantzas 1980,p.79, p.149;
cf.Wickham 1986, pp.163‑165).

As regards the cOntrOversy On Pa,casila, see BOneff et al(1980),
Darmaputera(1988).
General histOrical account Of refOrmist lslam Inovement in I・
adones■ a can be
fOund in NOer(1973)。 As regards Muhamadyah, the leading refOrm■
st grOuP,
see Alfian(1969), Nakamura(1976).
Geertz argues that these changes are a prOcess Of ratiOnalisatiOn frOIn theritual― centered religiOus practices tO a mOre systematised, ratiOnalised
religiOn, and calls the whOle prOcess
inte‑l cOnversiOn''(Geertz 1973).
Boon emphasises 、he impOrtance Of the Pasek mOvement. lPasek is a Balinese

term fOr grOups with traditiOnal rights t0 10cal administrative
offices'(Boon 1977, p.17■ ). BOon points Out that there are twO mЮve̲IItents inrelatiOn w■ th the Pasek grOups1 0ne is tO reintegrate the 10cally scatteredmembers Of them; the other is fOr the nOn― Pasek peOple tO make themselves
part Of Pasek tO acquire the 10cal administrative office. FOr the latter
purpOse, the best thing tO dO is tO 口ake cOntact with the ancestral temples

‑27‑

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Staf(1967)gives an outline Of their dOctrinè Fukushima(1988)deals with
12

13

10cal kebatinan sect, in Pati Regency.
The subsequent chrOn010gica1 0utline of the histOry Of kebatinan POlitics in
the COvernment dur■ ng pOst― Independence era, frOm BKKI t。
日PK, is based,
except where Otherw■ se stated, On KWE(1973, pp.223‑27), Mulder(■978, pp.■ ‑8),
Toeloes .d。 ),TakahasL(1989,pp.63‑68).

The statistics On kebatinan sects, hOwever, is rather unreliable. see
Takahashi(1989, p.71), though the table shOwn there is far frOmcomprehens■ ve or accurate.

14This is a stateIItent IILade by the chairman Of BKK工, wOngsanegara(KW1 1973,

p.■ 8■ ).

15

The fOrmer One is called Adari (Agama DjaWa Asli Republik lndOnesia, The
ReligiOn of lndigenOus 」ava of lndOnesian Republic)initiated by Mangun
WidjojO in Yogyakarta. The latter Agana lslam Sejati (True lslalll), founded
SuwarsO ■n cirebon。
Fukushiコ ほ(1991, pp.162‑166)takes up six Of such radical kebatinan sects,

16

including examples shOm aboveフ dur■ ng the sukattnO era.
FO110wing ζebatinan sects are sOme examples Of thOse which were officiallybanned: Pransuh/Adam Makrifat, due tO its allegea cOllaboration withlndonesian COmmunist Party (Kedaulatan Rakyat,■966)5 Agama Suci(Holy

ReligiOn), due tO having insulted lslam(El Hafiady 1977, p.56). AgaIDa sapta
Darma was temporary suspended by the Governnlent because they uζed the term
agama(religion)as part Of their nallle(El Hafiady 1977, pp.56‑57). By 197■
the banned sects cOunted 167 grOups(El Hhfiady1977, p.144).
17 HardjantO, Inentioned abOve, was One of the figures respOrlsible fOr suchrapid spread Of Hinduislll in 」ava. LyOn, analysing the factOrs which
contr■ buted tO the rapid grOwth Of Hinduism amOng the lndOnesian NatiOnalist
Party (PNE)fO1lowers in Klaten, central Java, Observes as f0110ws:,

Negative reactiOn tO Muslim pressures and the desire of the PNI tO
maintain in sOme way the structural identity Of party Organization within
the rural area of Klaten, bOth cOntributed greatly tO the early development・ ・of Hinduism as a IIlass mOveIIIlent. organized PNI OppOsitiOn tO Islam, bOth On
political and religious grOunds, was the mOst impOrtant sOurce Of IInOtivatiOnin drawing HinduisIIll the leadership necessary fOr its OrganizatiOnal
deve10pment and spread. And, Hinduism was an ideal s01utiOn tO the
pOlitical and religious bind in which the PNI fOund itself, fOr H宝nduismprovided a religiOus alternative tO Islam, and Parisada nindu Dharma
provided an alternative OrganizatiOnal basis fOr anti̲Isl・ mic action(LyOn

1977, pp̲94‑95).

In additiOn, it alsO shOuld be taken intO accOunt that the general feelingof anxiety abOut the ambiguity Of the legal status of kebatinan at thattim唸

prOmpted cOnsiderable nuiber Of its latent fO110wers tO accept Hindu■dentity fOr secur■ ty reasons.
18 The Original provisiOn gOes as f0110ws: ̀Negara me,jamこn kem・ rdekaan tiap一
tiap penduduk untuk ■9型 elvk agaIIanya masing― masittg dan untuk beribadat
menurut agaコ ほnya dan kepercayaannya ■tul.
19 Heated debate On the nature Of kebatin。
■/belief are recorded in variOus
newspapers and magaz■ nes dur■ ng that perILod. Such cOntroversy, hOwever, had‑29

already initiated before the New Order: EI Hafiady cOmplies the cOntroversy
gotton intO Kedaulatan Rakyat fOrln 196■ t0 1963, and pOints indicated in
the text had alreay been made by the critics Of 、
ebatinan(EI Bafiady,■ 977,
pp.12■ ―■56). Rasjidi, one Of the prom.nent cOnservative Muslin intellectuals,
exPlicitly argues thatkebatinan is a degenerate fOnn Of lsl月 mic mysticism in
巨s b00年 (Rasjtti■ 977;cfo warsitO et al.■ 973)
20 This prOble■ Of identity card was virtually thOught tO be a symb01 0f
hardship that such kebatinan sects were confronted with while l cOnducted
field research in Kudus and Pati during years 1983‑1985。
21 TOeloes, one Of the prOm■ nent leader Of a 10cal branch Of HPk (PrOvince Of
central 」ava).
22 They are devotees of bOth sukarnO's IIlarhaen■ sm and TS」 mentioned be10w in
the ma■ n text。
23

Thё whole picture Of the pOlitical antagon■ sln in Kudus and Pati arOund 1983‑

85 was, hOwever, far t10re entangled than sketched in the lnain text, whichw■ 1l be analysed further in anOther paper.
24 As regards the detailed accOunt of Sulurah's inv01veIIlent in HPK p01itics,
see Stange(1980).
25 The cOntrast between the self― cOntr01 and trance is an ubiquitOus thelne
among,50utheast asian countries. Tanabe(199■ )points out that this,dichOtOmy
Overlap with the gender differentiatiOn, namに ly the self― cOntr01ling male■onk vs.fe■ale spirit medium, while Ackenman(in this v01ulle)vividly shOws
the doctrinal cOntradictiOn between decOnstructive Tibetan tantrェ c Buddhism
and the experience Of trance within the discOurse of a newly emerging cultleader in Mhlaysia.In」ava,the equivalent Of the Buddhist self― awarenessis the idea1 0f the inner quietness ( tentremュ ng batin)and subsequentacquisitiOn Of pOwer, cOntrasted with sPirit POssession. Keeler describes
WidcSpread lnalignance tOwards lnediullns (prewangan)among the SOuth,central
Javanese(■ 987:p11■ 2‑124), and l suspect that is because the area is■Ostheavily dyed with the semェ ー。fficial kebatinan dOctr■ Ile emarlating frOm theroyal palace. SOEle alSO insist that wOman is■Ore

prOne tO be possesed dueto their internal weakness, aFld Keeler deve10ps an argument Of genderdifferentiatiOn in terln Of language, potency and status, コほillltaining thatthe 」avanese women are less cOntrained by the fonllality of linguistic
etiquette, thus freer to ettpress their emOtiOns, due tO their status being
dependent On that Of Elen's(Keeler 1990). I have the ittressiOn, hOwever,that this cOntrast is less established in the area l studied, because thespir■ t mediums l have encOuntered in 」ava were all IIlale and explan.tiOn was
not particularly made as to the gender factOr fOr sPirit pOssession.

‑30‑

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