Russian Perceptions of Chinese Immigration: Between Alarmism and Utilitarianism
Serghei Golunov (Kyushu University)
Official statistics on the number of Chinese coming to Russia are often unreliable.
This means estimates are frequently given but these can vary greatly. The first kindof estimation is the alarmist estimation. According to this estimation, the number of12

Chinese coming to Russia rose from 1.5 to 12 million. Alarmists argue that Chinesealready prevail in some border areas of Russia. But usually no justification for thisclaim is provided.
The second kind of estimation is more moderate. According to this estimation, theaverage number of Chinese in Russia is between 200,000 and 600,000. Moscow isprobably the main point of destination for Chinese coming to Russia, because it offers
the largest opportunities. In terms of the sending region of China, Heilongjiang isin first place. It provides migrants to the Russian Far East, but some other regions
provide immigrants to the regions of the European parts of Russia.
The majority of Chinese immigrants to Russia are either short-term or seasonal. Thisis a particular characteristic of those Chinese immigrants who come to the Russian
Far East. It is also argued that there are no Chinese diaspora in the Far East, because
China is nearer so there is less need to consolidate. There is a Chinese diaspora in
Moscow that is a well-organized community, with financial services and media. Thesecommunities are isolated from the social environment because of poor command ofRussian, and limited acceptance of ‘strangers’ by Russians. However, there are still noChinatowns in Russian cities.
A large number of Chinese visitors are low-income rural dwellers. There are some
negative perceptions of these groups. According to some sources, the Chinese aresupposedly ill-mannered, unkempt, dishonest, and aggressive. These are supposedly
characteristic of rural uneducated Chinese immigrants to Russia. These characteristics
were extrapolated to Chinese as a whole in the 1990s. However, these stereotypes
gradually weakened as Chinese immigration flows diversified, and as more Russian
Far Easterners visited China.

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In terms of activities carried out in Russia, Chinese visitors can be divided into thefollowing groups:l Tourists
Tourists have generally been welcomed by Russian authorities since the 1980s. The
problem is group tourist trips quickly started to be abused for shuttle trade and illegal
employment. As a result, bilateral regulations for visa-free tourism and requirements
about minimal number of people in such tourist groups were tightened. In the 2010s,bilateral management and logistic efforts boosted the number of Chinese tourists
almost twofold.
l TradersThis category increased in importance in the 1990s. Some of them are shuttle traders.
Some bought goods imported by companies and were often involved in schemes toevade duties. The Russian government, however, toughened conditions for goods
imported by individuals. Consequently, in 2000 informal cross-border trade wascarried out mainly by Chinese companies that resorted to using Russian citizens rather
than Chinese borderlanders.
l Agricultural workers
The Chinese have a reputation for being an excellent agricultural workforce because
Russian agricultural workers are generally considered to be heavy drinkers. However,perceptions of Chinese farm workers are controversial. Some are said to have abused
harmful fertilizers to obtain more crops, leaving behind exhausted and contaminatedsoil. There is a trend of decreasing the number of Chinese agricultural workers in theRussian Far East.
l Construction workers
Construction workers are also considered to be a cheap and industrious workforce.
The number of Chinese construction workers started to rise in the 2000s. However,recently because of the Russian economic crisis and the crisis in construction, thenumber of Chinese has started to decrease.
l Students
Students are a very interesting case. Students generally are welcomed by Russian
universities. Russia is also willing to attract and to assimilate well-performing Chinese
students. The problem is that Russian higher education is considered as the cheaperand easier option for those who failed to enter decent Chinese or Western universities.
In many cases, even formally reputable Russian universities act as “diploma mills” forChinese students who don’t even know Russian by the end of their studies. I have met
many such Chinese students in Russia.
l Loggers
Loggers employed by Chinese-owned companies are also controversial. Suchcompanies are typically negatively framed in Russian sources as non-transparent,
predatory towards the environment, and involved in customs fraud.

14l Law-breakers
The most frequent kind of violation is of immigration regulations. Also, there is some
information about Chinese organized crime groups that are targeting fellow Chineseand being involved in gambling houses, brothels and extortion. Such criminals also
cooperate with Russian organized crime and corrupt officials.

Alarmist sentiments were extremely widespread in the 1990s, but centralization andestablishment of better relations with China softened them to some extent, but they
are still here.
There are roughly three peaks to alarmist statements about Chinese made by Russian
MPs of the State Duma (the lower house of parliament). The first peak is connected
to a Russian decision to cede some islands to China during territorial settlements. The
second peak is about Russian-Chinese agreements on development of the Far East,and the third peak is for facilitations of the visa regime for Chinese.
In Russia alarmism can be high and moderate. It can also be focused on current andon future trends. Most Russian scholars of China are not alarmist, or even moderate
alarmist, regarding past and future trends. In the first half half of the 1990s, Russianscholars of China frequently appeared in the media and significantly contributed toreducing or softening alarmist sentiments.
Here are some influential arguments regarding present alarmism. The first argument isthat the actual number of Chinese is supposedly huge. In some settlements it is said toexceed the number of local inhabitants. However, there is no evidence confirming thisstatement. The fact that the Russian-Chinese border is heavily patrolled is importantto remember.
The second argument is that Chinese tend to pursue short and long-term policiesof “creeping occupation” of the Russian Far East. In China there are some maps inwhich Russian territories are marked as belonging to China. Nevertheless, there is noserious evidence of such malicious policy. Also, Russian-Chinese relations are goodand China needs access to Russian raw materials rather than physical control overthese territories.
The third argument is that Russian policies allow China to bring its workforce andtake control of agricultural land. However, Russia needs this Chinese workforce tocultivate abandoned land.
Another argument is that Chinese immigration is harmful for economic and socialreasons. For example, that Chinese immigration encourages criminals to enter Russia,
and that agricultural and logging activities damage soil. However, the real problem is
Russian authorities who fail to regulate these activities.
The second kind of alarmism is future-oriented. Alarmists of this kind, including
some scholars, argue that the current situation is unproblematic but that things couldchange in the future. Such a change is especially likely if Russian-Chinese political
relations worsen, or if the economic conditions in China deteriorate. Nevertheless, we15

should remember that the Chinese population is aging and that recent Chinese policy
is increasingly oriented towards internal consumption. Also important is that Chinesesalaries are rising in comparison to Russian ones. These considerations will work toreduce labor immigration.
Now for a tongue-in-cheek look at some especially delirious statements by Russianpoliticians and experts about Chinese immigration. They include the following:1.

Russian girls who make love with Chinese boyfriends get venereal diseases thatcan’t be cured with domestic drugs. Chinese are also immune to these drugs.
Possibly such diseases were produced artificially to ensure the expansion ofChina.

2.

Russia removed nuclear mines on the former Soviet-Chinese border. Now, Russia
doesn’t know what to do there. It is very difficult to constrain the growth ofnumerous ethnic immigrants across multiple checkpoints. A possible responsefollowing such logic - nuclear mines for checkpoints.

3.

The census failed to detect 8 million Chinese immigrants, because a huge numberof them are living in the forests.

4.

An analysis by retired intelligence officers stated that there are 6.5 million
Chinese people in Russia. Most supposedly entered Russia illegally despite theRussian border being heavily protected.

5.

Finally, the government urgently needs to be pay attention to what is happeningin Siberia and the Far East. These territories are rapidly being populated by
Chinese citizens. Many women in the Far Eastern region have two husbands:
one Russian and one Chinese. The Russian one earns more money for the family,
the Chinese one educates the children and does housework. Furthermore, many
consider such relations normal. The author of this statement is Director of theDepartment of the Institute of Social Politics of the Russian Academy of Science.

My last point is about measures to counter Chinese immigration that have been
discussed or implemented. Statements have been made about toughening theimmigration regime, strictly observing quotas, and stopping shadow economicactivities. Some argue that Chinese immigration should be facilitated. Advocatesof facilitation argue that Russia badly needs a workforce so it should attract more
Chinese immigrants. In particular, Russia should look to attract skilled immigrants
and students. Russia should remove unnecessary bureaucratic barriers and do its best
to become more attractive for Chinese immigrants. This approach is assimilation.
and concerns educated people, specialists, and students. Russia should welcome
these categories of immigrants while being restrictive to others. Another approachis counterbalancing. According to this view, Russia needs Chinese immigrants but
it should also attract immigrants from other countries to counterbalance Chinese
immigration. Lastly, there is bilateral cooperation which involves cooperating with
China to regulate illegal immigration.
These are my conclusions. First, Russia’s attractiveness for Chinese labor immigrants
is decreasing because of the recent decline in the value of the Russian ruble. It is also
decreasing because of restrictive trends in Russian immigration legislation. At thesame time, the number of Chinese tourists is increasing. Second, China understands
Russian concerns and fostering Chinese immigration to Russia is not a priority forBeijing. Third, although popular alarmists’ sentiments against Chinese immigrationin the post-Soviet period have tended to decrease, such feelings still exist. Ironically,16

such sentiments are nearly inversely proportional to the number of Chinese actually
coming to Russia. Therefore, alarmist sentiments were intense in the 1990s, but now
they are probably at their lowest level. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese coming
to Russia is actually increasing. Nevertheless, alarmist sentiments are fueled by poortransparency in Russian-Chinese cooperation in the context of Russia’s eastern pivot.
They are also encouraged by internal interests. For example, those who address
the problem of resettlement of the Russian Far East cite Chinese expansion as one
argument for why money should be given to them.

Discussant’s Comments

Jong Seok Park (Kyushu University)
Regarding the first speaker’s presentation I’d like to raise several small questions andone big one.
First, two small questions: What do you mean by the term “first marriage”? Marriage
by who? Secondly, you describe the ‘feminization of immigrants’. Do you think thisis a new phenomenon, or not?
Secondly, my big question. I understand that your approach is strongly based on yoursense of altruism or idealism about this topic. Overall, I agree with your attitude andapproach, but I also feel some concerns about such an approach. There is a possibilityof demonizing men seeking foreign brides in South Korea and Japan. Conversely,
there might also be a possibility of victimizing female marriage migrants. I think suchmarriages are based on mutual interest and/or mutual consent. Your approach might
fail to capture the harsh realities of human life. For example, you assume that humanbeings should not be treated as a commodity. I agree with this but isn’t the essenceof marriage basically about commoditification? For example, you explained about aSouth Korean man who married a Vietnamese woman after only knowing each otherfor a few hours. What does this mean? This is a negotiation and a transaction. I think
we need to capture the harsh realities of human relationships. Only through such anunderstanding might we construct a better solution.
Now I will move on to the second presentation by Yuji Fukuhara and Mitsuhiro
Mimura. Firstly, I appreciate your hard-earned information about North Korean
workers in Mongolia. This kind of information is hard to get. As Yuji Fukuhara
explained, he had to use special connections to get this kind of information.
Now my comments and questions. I have a comment about naming. In the paper,
the authors simplified ‘North Korea’ to ‘Korea’. If you use North Korea to describe
Korea, and there is no reference to ‘South Korea’ then such a simplification is not aproblem. However, the paper also refers to South Korea. Korea and South Korea areeven used in the same sentence with Korea indicating North Korea. This is, I think,
not so desirable.

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