CO M PR EH EN S I V E
S T R AT EG I C PA R T N ER S :ASEAN and Australia
after the first 50 years
2024
Nicholas Farrelly / Lina A. Alexandra / Sharon Seah / Kimly Ngoun

ASEAN matters to Australia. If you look up
from Australia, up north, you see the ASEAN
nations at the centre of our region. That’s why
it’s so important for us to continue to engage,
and so important for us to build on our
long-standing partnership.
Senator the Hon Penny Wong,
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs

The vision and passion of young people
across the region fills me with optimism forthe next fifty years of ASEAN-Australia relations.
It is a joy to see the openness, kindness, andrespect we hold for one another and an honour
to witness connections formed and strengthened
that will impact our shared future. The best partis that we are only just getting started.
Ms. Racheline Tantular,
Chief Executive Officer, ASEAN-Australia
Strategic Youth PartnershipWith this 50th anniversary we are no longer young:you know that you have survived and achieved
quite a bit through years of collaboration. We showthat we have been agile, productive and adept
enough to deal with the issues. For us, Australia
has been one of the most loyal Dialogue Partners.
Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar,
Research Professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences◀C over: University of Tasmania students working with partners,
including Universiti Sains Malaysia, in Balik Pulau, Malaysia,
January 2024. As part of the University of Tasmania’s UniGO
program, supported by the Australian Government’s New
Colombo Plan, they studied sustainable ecosystem management
across the ASEAN region. © Australian Volunteers International

2

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSAustralia was the first ASEAN Dialogue Partner
and the first Comprehensive Strategic Partner.
This speaks volumes of the importance of these
dialogue relations. And we are now talking
about how to cooperate across the Asia-Pacificand the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Australia was one of the most active of the
Dialogue Partners of ASEAN. If we wanted tomove something then Australia was not justactive, but the diplomacy was also first class.
Australia was full of ideas in those days. There
was a natural partnership with Australia.

H.E. Dr. Cheunboran Chanborey,
Cambodian Ambassador to Australia

Mr. Peter Ho,former Head of the Singaporean Civil Service

Ultimately the 50th anniversary is a celebrationof where we are in our close relationship.
Australia has reinvented the way it has engaged
with the ASEAN region. Australia builds its
relationship based on strong trust and lot of
empowerment in its development of programmes
for the region. Very few Dialogue Partners canmatch this level of deep empowerment andprioritisation of what ASEAN needs.

What makes the ASEAN-Australia
relationship so special is the decades longpeople-to-people connections that have
driven economic, cultural and education links.
The next step for Australia is for Australianbusiness to seize the opportunities offeredacross the ASEAN region. How business answers
this call, and utilises these opportunities,
will shape Australia for decades to come.

H.E. Satvinder Singh, Deputy Secretary General of
ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Secretariat

Mr. Glenn Keys, Chairman, Aspen Medical,
and Chair, Australia-ASEAN Council Board

Australia is proud of the breadth of ourcooperation with ASEAN over the past fifty years,
now embodied in our Comprehensive StrategicPartnership. At this historic milestone, we will
outline our vision for how, together, we canaddress shared challenges and shape our region.

When ASEAN was set up in 1967 it was
all so different. Since then, ASEAN has
had a huge role in stabilising the region.
It ensures greater coherence, seeks toresolve issues, and offers structure for
economic advances.

Ms. Michelle Chan,
Australia’s Senior Official for ASEAN

Mr. Ric Smith,former Australian Secretary of Defence

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS

3

Overview
The 50th anniversary of partnership between the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia in 2024 is amajor milestone. In 1974, Australia became ASEAN’s first formal
Dialogue Partner. Now, as one of ASEAN’s first Comprehensive
Strategic Partners, an enhanced relationship established in
2021, ASEAN and Australia share deep commitments to building
strong and lasting strategic, economic and cultural links.
The anniversary is an opportunity to take stock of the history
and future direction across many areas of cooperation.
This report explores Australia’s partnership with ASEAN through an up-to-date
stocktake of the major activities that support economic, socio-cultural andpolitical-security ties. It also analyses the appreciation of this work within the
ASEAN Secretariat, and among other significant ASEAN and Australian
stakeholders from government, business and civil society.
The report has been co-produced with key ASEAN partners and draws on
a wide range of Australian and ASEAN expertise. Through consultations,interviews, roundtables and events, the authors have sought to generate adeeper appreciation of the history of the dialogue partnership, while also
looking to the political, economic and cultural issues over the horizon.
Further conversation on ASEAN-Australia connections will benefit fromappreciating the current picture of cooperation and the various perspectives
in Australia and ASEAN on the value of these linkages, while also considering
the next wave of shared ideas for the future of this important relationship.
The report offers recommendations for the future of the ASEAN-Australia
partnership to support deliberations in the 50th anniversary year and beyond.

4

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSContents
About the authors

6

ASEAN perspectives on Australia

31

Long-term priorities

31

Executive summary and recommendations

8

Perspectives across the region

31

Recommendations

9

Risks and challenges

32

Opportunities for the future

33

ASEAN in Australia’s changing foreign policy

34

Today’s partnership

10

Australia and ASEAN in a changing world

10

Learning to work together

12

ASEAN Centrality

34

Understanding ASEAN-Australia relations

13

Building shared futures through ASEAN

36

Three ASEAN Community pillars

14

Priorities for Australia in Southeast Asia

36

Complexities of diplomatic engagement

15

Australia’s commitment to Southeast Asia

17

Recommendations for the future38

Opportunities for Australia and ASEAN

38

Note on sources

45

References

46

History of ASEAN-Australia relations

18

Early years, 1967–1974

18

Growing partnership, 1974–1995

20

Expanding connections, 1995–2007

21

Strategic collaboration, 2007–2020

21

Responding to change, 2020–2024

22

Priorities for cooperation

25

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership25

Track 1.5 and Track 2 Diplomacy

26

People-to-people and diaspora links

28

Business engagement, investment and trade28

Nicholas Farrelly, Lina A. Alexandra, Sharon Seah and Kimly Ngoun,
Comprehensive Strategic Partners: ASEAN and Australia after the
first 50 years, Hobart: University of Tasmania, 2024.
This report was produced with funding support from theAustralian Mission to ASEAN, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Australia. The views expressed in this publication
are not necessarily the views of the Australian Government.
Copyright 2024
Layout by Calli Crump
Printed by Mercury Walch, February 2024

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS

5About the authors

Professor Nicholas Farrelly

Ms. Sharon Seah

Professor Nicholas Farrelly is a Pro Vice-Chancellor at the
University of Tasmania, Australia. He has previously held
senior academic positions at the University of Tasmania,
as Head of Social Sciences, and at the Australian
National University, where he was Associate Dean in
the College of Asia and the Pacific. After graduatingfrom the ANU in 2003 with the University Medal in
Asian Studies, he completed his M.Phil and D.Phil at
the University of Oxford. In 2006, Professor Farrelly
co-founded New Mandala, a website which went on to
become a prominent public forum in Southeast AsianStudies. He has published widely on regional political,
cultural and security issues. Professor Farrelly currently
serves on the board of the Australia-ASEAN Council
and as a Director of Australia’s National Accreditation
Authority for Translators and Interpreters.

Ms. Sharon Seah is concurrent Coordinator of the ASEAN
Studies Centre and the Climate Change in Southeast
Asia Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute(formerly the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) in
Singapore. Prior to academia, Ms. Seah spent 15 years
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National
Environment Agency of Singapore. Her researchinterests are focussed on ASEAN, multilateralism, ruleof law, and climate change. Ms. Seah graduated witha Masters in Public and International Law from the
University of Melbourne in 2018. She is co-editor of 50
Years of ASEAN and Singapore (World Scientific: 2017)
and editor of Building a New Legal Order for the Oceans(NUS Press: 2019) for Tommy Koh. She is also the leadauthor of The State of Southeast Asia Survey Reports
and the Southeast Asia Climate Outlook Surveys.

Dr. Lina A. Alexandra

Dr. Kimly Ngoun

Dr. Lina A. Alexandra is Head of the Department ofInternational Relations in the Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS) based in Jakarta, Indonesia.
CSIS is one of Indonesia’s oldest think tanks andprovides leadership for a wide range of policy debatesin Indonesia and across ASEAN. She obtained her
Masters of International Studies, specialising in Peace
and Conflict Resolution in 2006, and PhD in 2020, bothfrom the School of Political Science and International
Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.
Dr. Alexandra also holds the position as the Coordinator
for the CSIS Myanmar Initiative Programme. Her
research interests include Indonesian foreign policy,
conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacebuilding,human rights, and atrocity prevention in Southeast Asia.

Dr. Kimly Ngoun was Director of Research and Chief
Editor at the Asian Vision Institute in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, between 2019 and 2023. He was previously
a Lecturer in English and International Relations at
the Royal University of Phnom Penh, and a translator
and interpreter at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia. He holds a PhD in Political Sciencefrom the Australian National University, a Masters inSoutheast Asian Studies from Chulalongkorn University
in Thailand and did his undergraduate studies in
Education at the Royal University of Phnom Penh.
Dr. Kimly has published widely on topics of conflictand culture across the Southeast Asian region andspecialises in the understanding of Cambodia’s
place in a rapidly changing region.

▶ Australian medical aid to Cambodia provided during the COVID-19 global pandemic. © Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
6

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS

7

Executive summary
and recommendations
ASEAN and Australia have worked closely together for fifty years, fostering a cooperative
partnership which supports the peace and prosperity of dynamic societies increasingly
defined by their inter-connectedness.
In 1974, ASEAN and Australia agreed the first formal
dialogue partnership in a model of cooperation thathas proved remarkably resilient and wide-ranging.
Australia’s early commitment to ASEAN’s success –based on political and diplomatic engagement thatsignalled increasing confidence with Australia’s own
place in the world – provides the foundation for thecontinued expansion of bilateral and multilateralties across Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s track record ofstabilising the region is based on its ability to develop
new models for diplomatic and political cooperation,
while building frameworks for shared economic
development that have contributed to increasing
prosperity for many of the region’s 670 million people.
ASEAN has also increased its own strategic weight,
with unparalleled convening and normative power in
the Indo-Pacific, while grappling with an increasingly
complex set of internal priorities and external demands.
With the fiftieth anniversary of ASEAN-Australia
dialogue partnership in 2024, a wide range of historicaldynamics, current areas of mutual interest, andopportunities for future engagement need to beconsidered closely. The reality for Australia is that its
relative importance to ASEAN has shifted over the
decades, from rhetorical support in the early daysof ASEAN’s establishment to active and intensive
engagement today. ASEAN’s members also pursue theirown active foreign policy and economic development
priorities. ASEAN convenes discussions, including withexternal partners like Australia, that allow for deepreflection, considered debate, and even for significant
disagreement. While detractors will continue to findfault with its approach, we argue that ASEAN models
of inclusive diplomacy need to be understood carefullyon their own terms.
Australia, perhaps more than some others, hasbeen prepared to watch, learn and then engage inways that have built a significant set of relationships
and trust across Southeast Asia and with ASEAN
sustained throughout five decades of social, economic
and strategic change. The 2021 agreement of aComprehensive Strategic Partnership between ASEAN
and Australia is a strong endorsement of this modelof diplomatic and people-to-people ties coupled withpractical cooperation responding to ASEAN priorities.

8

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSOver the past fifty years, Southeast Asia has changed
dramatically. To start, the ASEAN grouping has
expanded from five to ten members, with Timor-Leste
set to achieve full membership in the years ahead.
Then there is the fact that economic development
across ASEAN has been remarkable – with total GDP
expanding to over $3 trillion in 2024, up from $600
billion in 1994, and an estimated $50 billion in 1974. Sixof Australia’s top fifteen trading partners are membersof ASEAN and the ASEAN grouping is Australia’s second
largest trading partner, ahead of both the United States
and Japan. Recent Australian Government statements
highlight the ambition to further expand on thislevel of economic enmeshment. Invested: Australia’sSoutheast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, a major
Australian Government report launched in 2023, setsout substantial recommendations to support trade andinvestment, with priority put on agriculture and food,resources, the green energy transition, infrastructure,
education and skills, the visitor economy, health, thedigital economy, professional and financial services,and creative industries.

It is clear that Australia and ASEAN
should continue to work together as
closely as possible: we are facing sharedchallenges, and we have shared interests
in a peaceful, inclusive, prosperous region.
The history of ASEAN-Australia relations
has proven that we are all far more
successful when we work together.
Such work is a reminder that the steady, incremental
evolution of Australia’s cooperation with Southeast Asia
and ASEAN as an institution has tended to be the mosteffective strategy for all sides. The ASEAN-Australia
dialogue partnership has created conditions for thedevelopment of mutual trust, the evolution of technicaland cultural practices that help reinforce modes ofcooperation, and the expansion, over time, of joint work
into an ever-increasing range of activities. The fact that
Australia also enjoys particularly strong bilateral ties
across Southeast Asia has contributed to this success.

Over time, Australia’s closest relationships within
the region have also evolved in response to different
strategic and economic opportunities. In this respect,
the decades of effort summarised in this report are areminder of the way that diplomatic cooperation – andthe people-to-people ties that sustain such diplomacy– only succeeds with constant attention to relationships,
contexts and shared priorities.
Taking stock after fifty years of working together
means looking at the way that investments have been
made, while also considering, carefully, the creationof this shared culture of cooperation. Thinking ahead,
it is important to consider some of the models of
engagement that will help to sustain a peaceful andprosperous region for many years to come. ASEAN
also has its own capacity issues, with increasing
engagement from many different partners. Australia
will therefore need to continue its pattern of co-designand cooperative development at a time when ASEAN
itself faces new pressures and demands operationallyand strategically.

Recommendations
1. Establishment of an ASEAN-Australia Centre
Australia and ASEAN would both benefit greatly fromthe establishment of a future-focussed, analyticallyminded and commercially-oriented ASEAN-Australia
Centre, drawing strength from existing institutions
and proven models of cooperation.

2. Integrated model of ASEAN-Australia
youth leadership
Better integrating cohorts of high-potential future
leaders from ASEAN and Australia, creating ashared sense of purpose, direction and belonging,and providing opportunities for them to build
long-term partnerships.

3. D
 igital economy transformations
and knowledge sharing
ASEAN and Australia can continue to strengthen
cooperation in cybersecurity, cyber-governance andcyber-technology, and also around the regulationand management of social, political and economic
progress in the digital age.

4. Shared innovation on climate change
and the energy transition
With the long-term planning and supply chain shifts
required for the next phase of the energy transition, it
should be possible to use both ASEAN and Australianexperience to promote cooperation on different
initiatives, including on linking physical infrastructure,promoting sustainable financing, and harmonisationof standards.

5. Strengthen Timor-Leste as a new
ASEAN member
From both Australian and ASEAN perspectives, thereis broad-based support for Australia to offer advice andresources to help Timor-Leste become a productive
member in ASEAN, and to sustain its engagement
over the years ahead.

6. Deepen and broaden Australia’s
ASEAN diplomacy
The current assessment in ASEAN capitals is that
Australia is a trusted and energetic partner. Thereis scope to broaden the level of engagement acrossthe Australian Government through formal Senior
Official and ministerial engagement in all sectors.

7. C ontinue to invest in Indo-Pacificsecurity and ASEAN Centrality
With ASEAN now embracing the Indo-Pacific concept
for its own strategic deliberations, Australia can play a
key role in the discussions that will help to safeguard
regional peace and prosperity.

8. Investments in peace, security anddevelopment cooperation with
ASEAN’s newer members
By leveraging its expertise and resources, Australia
has an opportunity to contribute significantly to theregion’s development, aligning its efforts with
ASEAN’s goals and priorities to ensure sustainable
and inclusive growth.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS

9

Today’s partnership
Australia and ASEAN in a changing world
After fifty years of dialogue partnership, ASEAN andAustralia enjoy a close, wide-ranging and fruitfulrelationship across multiple themes and shared priorities.
Engagement by Australia in the region’s economic,
socio-cultural and political-security architecture is more
expansive than ever, and recent significant investments
in building joint capabilities, especially under the termsof the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive StrategicPartnership agreed in 2021, provide a strong grounding
for the further enhancement of this foundational
regional partnership. In the decades since Australia
became its first formal Dialogue Partner, ASEAN has
expanded its own membership from five to ten, with
Timor-Leste set to achieve full membership in the years
ahead. This prospect is a further signal, for Australian andSoutheast Asian policymakers and analysts, that longterm connections, especially those that are sustained
through periods of difficulty, can support successful
and creative diplomatic, economic and social outcomes.
Today’s tapestry of ASEAN-Australia ties needs tobe considered at the multilateral, bilateral, local andindividual levels. The multilateral dimensions draw
their strengths from trade and commercial linkages,
a well-established portfolio of regional dialogue on
security and defence issues, as well as a very wide
range of educational, cultural, political, artistic, research,innovation and technological ties. At the bilateral level
the intensity of current engagement between Australia
and the ten countries of ASEAN has generally expanded
significantly in recent years.

These relationships are strengthened by the diasporiclinks between Southeast Asia and Australia. Over 1.1
million Australians declared Southeast Asian heritage
in Australia’s 2021 census. There are also large Australian
citizen populations in most ASEAN countries, especiallyin Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, withthose individual connections buttressed by a diverse
portfolio of ASEAN and Australian educational, economic
and cultural investments.

“In 100 years, ASEAN will be here,
Australia will be there, we need to
be able to work together.”Dr. Piti Srisangnam, Executive Director,
ASEAN Foundation

The development of formal Australian ties to ASEAN
over the past fifty years came after the abandonmentof the White Australia Policy in 1966, and the end ofAustralia’s involvement in the Vietnam War in 1973.
Since then, Australia has sought to develop deeper
relationships with ASEAN, initially focused on thefive members – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, thePhilippines, and Thailand – that established the grouping
in 1967. While building strong bilateral relations witheach ASEAN member, Australia has also been supportiveof the multilateral institutionalist ambitions at thecore of regional diplomacy. As Sally Percival Wood(2014: 13) described, the “expanding network of formal
engagement is valuable on both a functional basis andin terms of guaranteeing Australia’s ongoing goodwill
and cooperation with its region”.

▼A ustralia’s Assistant Foreign Minister, Tim Watts MP, hosted the launch of the Aus4ASEAN Scholarships 2023 at Old Parliament House, 9 August 2023. © DFAT

10ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS▲A ustralian Prime Minister, The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, with ASEAN Leaders at the 3rd Annual ASEAN-Australia Summit in Jakarta, 7 September 2023.
© ASEAN Indonesia 2023

ASEAN’s expansion to include Brunei in 1984, followedby the inclusion of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar andCambodia in the 1990s, has helped tailor a model of
diplomatic engagement across a diverse range ofpolitical and economic systems. Together, the ten
countries of ASEAN have confronted challenges fromthe East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, throughto terrorist attacks, global economic upheavals, supply
chain disruptions and, most recently, the COVID-19
global pandemic and now the military coup in Myanmar.
ASEAN’s responses to these challenges reflect a modelof diplomacy which puts a high value on consensus,
avoids public disparagement, and seeks to balancea wide range of internal interests. While ASEAN’s
expectations are that each country is treated equally
by external partners, the reality is that ASEAN itself is
a complex grouping of different interests, friendships,
histories, languages, economic connections, strategic
priorities, and societal challenges. The fact that the initial
five ASEAN members have now been joined by five
more countries is itself a remarkable story of creative
collaboration, with Timor-Leste on a roadmap to becomeits 11th member (see discussion in Lin, et al, 2024).
ASEAN has also, at the institutional level, helped toframe broader diplomatic efforts to ensure the“centrality” of its role.

Under the principle of “ASEAN Centrality”, the grouping
prefers a model of engagement that avoids interferencein each other’s internal affairs, while also seeking
sustainable region-wide outcomes that generate sharedbenefits for all ASEAN members. In many respects, themodel has worked to a remarkable extent. The fact, as
outlined by leading Southeast Asia analyst Susannah
Patton (2022: 5), is that:	In 1980, Australia’s economy alone was around85 per cent of all the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies combined.
Even excluding ASEAN’s newer member statessuch as Vietnam, these combined economies
are now around twice as large as Australia’s.
At the same time, significant differences between
regional economies and the competitive nature of
global commerce ensure that discussions about greater
integration and cooperation at the regional level are
informed by national and local priorities. On strategic
issues there are similar complexities. The art of ASEAN
diplomacy is ultimately in the management of thesedifferences and the development of shared awarenessabout the value of working together across languages,
religions, cultures and histories (see Acharya, 2012).
By creating a joint model of diplomatic action, ASEAN
has also helped to define the management of bilateralchallenges among its members, while also setting
expectations for the security, economic and diplomatic
engagement of external partners.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS11▲ F ormer Australian Ambassador to ASEAN, H.E. Will Nankervis, meets with the President of Timor-Leste, H.E José Ramos-Horta, 13 December 2023.
© Australian Mission to ASEAN

Learning to work together
Part of the success of the ASEAN-Australia partnership isbased on recognition, among generations of Australianand ASEAN decision-makers, that long-term discussion
and joint activity requires open communication, realisticplanning, a sense of common purpose, and ambitions
for beneficial outcomes to be shared. Australia has,in this respect, learned much from its work with thecountries of ASEAN, building deep people-to-people andgovernment-to-government links, while also helping todevelop a model of regional engagement of significant
value to all stakeholders. As Catherine Renshaw explains(2018: 169), “successive Australian Governments haveviewed ASEAN and its many extended groupings as a
key vehicle for promoting and nurturing the principles
of cooperative regionalism”.
Considering the development of this model ofcooperative regionalism, distinguished Australian
foreign policy practitioner, Allan Gyngell, argued,“The Australia-ASEAN story has been long andpositive” (2022: 18). From his (2022: 16) perspective:	Australian policymakers and commentators
sometimes talk about “ASEAN” as a collective
name for the whole region, but it is also importantto understand the role of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations because it is so intertwinedwith the way individual members think about
the world and act in it.

12

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSThis point is sometimes overlooked by critics of theregional grouping. ASEAN is not simply its Secretariat
and the annual cycle of official meetings. It has, more
broadly, encompassed conceptual and strategic
priorities that have shaped the way that Southeast Asianleaders and officials, and to a varying extent the wider
regional population, define themselves and see theworld. It is common, nowadays, to see ASEAN-themed
advertisements and to find the region with a common
set of shared narratives, if not always a shared identity.

“ASEAN has also become central toAustralia’s relations with Southeast Asia.
In 1974, Australia became the first externalcountry to develop a formal multilateralrelationship with ASEAN. Australia as a
Dialogue Partner has, since 1980, taken
part in consultations at the time of ASEAN’s
annual Foreign Ministers’ meetings andhas many other sectoral consultations.”
Dr. Frank Frost, historian of ASEAN-Australia
relations (2016: 2)

Among ASEAN leaders and policy practitioners there
is understandable pride in the successes achieved
collectively, and in concert with Dialogue Partners, butthey are also attentive to the challenges ahead. How
Southeast Asia manages strategic tensions is now widely
discussed as the primary challenge facing the regionalgrouping. There are also significant environmental andeconomic issues that receive priority both from theASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta and also across ASEAN
capitals. The need for countries such as Australia tomaintain their engagement with these issues at themultilateral and bilateral levels has been articulated
many times over the decades. For example, in a speechdelivered at the University of Sydney in October 1988,
titled ‘What ASEAN is and What it stands for”, the then
ASEAN Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino (2008:22), argued:	Wherever possible and appropriate, countries suchas Australia, too, need to get behind the effort tostrengthen the cohesion of ASEAN through support,
for example, for the regional, in addition to the strictly
bilateral, dimension of their relations withthe countries of Southeast Asia.
In managing these different levels of interaction,
Australia has developed its own repertoire of foreign
policy concepts and tools, some of which take theirdirect inspiration from what has been learned through
ASEAN. As Gyngell (2022: 7) explains, “With the creation
of…ASEAN…Australia had to learn how to deal effectively
with regional institutions.”
Indeed, the complexity of ASEAN is a day-to-day reality
for diplomats, officials, analysts, policy advocatesand a wide range of other stakeholders who directly
engage with its many different arms. It is apparent,
for instance, that many successes have been forgedby strong inter-personal ties: between politicians,
government officials, scholars and others. In this context,
according to one senior ASEAN diplomat, “working level
personalities really matter…strong personal dynamics
being important”. Over time they learn how best to build
coalitions and generate opportunities for cooperation.
Their successes – which are usually the product of carefuland sustained engagement and compromise – are theoutcome of a specific model of regional engagement
which is attentive to Southeast Asia’s history, its many
cultures, the varying strengths of its members, and thespecific contexts in which decisions need to be made.
As ASEAN’s longest standing Dialogue Partner, Australia
plays its part in this system – seeking ways to influence
outcomes that are both attentive to interests within
Southeast Asia, while also looking towards outcomesthat are relevant for Australia’s changing foreign policy.

1

Beyond Australia, ASEAN has now developed formal
dialogue partnerships with a further ten partners, whileembracing Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with
Australia, China, India, Japan and the United States, andsoon the Republic of Korea. The further maturing ofAustralian engagement, especially through the work of
the Australian Mission to ASEAN, which was establishedin 2013 and is based in Jakarta, will require attention tohistorical dynamics and current trajectories.
In this context, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno
Marsudi stated in 2023 that, “We have high expectations
for Australia to become a positive force in the regionand support ASEAN’s centrality in shaping regional
dynamics.” This report is therefore both a stocktake ofthe development of ASEAN-Australia relations over five
decades but also, importantly, an analysis of how theComprehensive Strategic Partnership can be further
developed and articulated in the years ahead.

Understanding ASEAN-Australia relations
Fifty years of close diplomatic engagement between
ASEAN and Australia means that there is a significant
amount of reflection and analysis on this important setof relationships.1 Within Australia and across Southeast
Asia there are longstanding communities of government
officials, academic researchers, think tank analysts
and regionally-oriented journalists who have mademajor contributions to how we understand regional
complexities and the specific role ASEAN plays inregional and global affairs.
Within ASEAN, there are also important debates
about the institution’s role, its future priorities and its
engagement on specific issues, such as disputes in
the South China Sea and the management of MekongRiver resources. ASEAN, like its Dialogue Partners,
also faces questions about the best approach toa range of humanitarian and security challenges
within and beyond its borders. Since its February 2021
military coup, Myanmar has been a particular focus ofregional diplomacy, with the challenges faced in theimplementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus
raising questions about the region’s abilities to manage
significant political and security issues. The lack ofconsensus on how best to respond to conflicts inother parts of the world, whether in Eastern Europe or
the Middle East, is a further consideration for ASEAN
leaders. The expectation that ASEAN uniformly agrees
on the biggest questions is being tested by challenges
from near-and-far, including, for example, how best to
manage strategic competition in the South China Sea.

Including important contributions from Frost, 2016; 2014; Percival Wood and He, 2014; Roberts, 2012; Okamoto, 2010; Richardson and Chin, 2004;
Lawe-Davies, 1981; see also Astanah Abdul Aziz and Milner, 2024, for recent analytical attention from ASEAN-Australia viewpoints.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1 3

Three ASEAN Community pillars
ASEAN diplomacy is structured around its three pillars:
economic, socio-cultural and political-security, each ofwhich shapes the functions of the ASEAN Secretariat in
Jakarta and an annual calendar of both official and lessformal interactions. More generally, the developmentof these pillars has proved essential to ASEAN’s
coherence and to the expansion of its ambitions. In
Jakarta, the ASEAN Secretariat reflects these concepts
in its organisational structure, and much of the workof ASEAN and its partners is defined by theircontributions to “the pillars”. The structure allows forsome level of local, national and indeed regional reinterpretation, and over time key ASEAN voices havedefined and then re-defined the requirements ofthe pillars. Dialogue Partners, such as Australia, areencouraged to align their engagement with ASEAN tomatch the requirements of these three pillars and thenewer ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).

For external partners, the three pillars make it possible toappreciate ASEAN and its ambitions for a consolidated
ASEAN Community, while remaining attentive to the
expectations of its bilateral relationships and indeed thechanging shape of global geopolitics. For Australia, theprojects and activities agreed under the Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership are actively developed to align withthe pillars, with the need for attention to the increasingly
complex issues defined as “cross-pillar” for current andfuture ASEAN work.
To understand these dynamics, it is worth considering
the perspectives of a group of senior Southeast Asian
officials. According to a senior diplomat based inSoutheast Asia interviewed for this report, “Comparedto other Dialogue Partners, Australia is one of themost active.” He went on to explain that the “art of
ASEAN diplomacy rests on unity in diversity, following
the ASEAN Charter, and positive ways to cooperate to
discuss issues internally”.

▼N ew Colombo Plan 2024 Scholars. Over 40 of these DFAT-funded New Colombo Plan Scholars will be studying and completing internships in countries across theASEAN region. © New Colombo Plan

14

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSOffering some further context, a current senior
Southeast Asian diplomat noted that getting agreement
on new initiatives within the three pillars is “not so
difficult when Australia proposes something”. This isa regular theme of discussion, with another diplomat
explaining that “not only is Australia our first Dialogue
Partner, not only now up to fifty years, but it is how wework together…especially when it comes to developing
creative ideas”.

Complexities of diplomatic engagement
Australia maintains bilateral diplomatic missions acrossSoutheast Asia, with Embassies, High Commissions,
Consulates-General and Consulates in 19 locations in theten ASEAN countries, and an Embassy in Timor-Leste.
Southeast Asia is, by far, the region of greatest diplomatic
resourcing for Australia and hosts several of the largest
Australian Embassies globally.

It is also home to the Australian Mission to ASEAN,
which is based in Jakarta where the ASEAN Secretariat is
headquartered. In Canberra, the Office of Southeast Asia
in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade draws
together the Southeast Asia Maritime Division, Southeast
Asia Regional and Mainland Division, and Southeast Asia
Strategy and Development Division. Beyond the Foreign
Affairs portfolio, there are linkages with ASEAN acrossindustry, education, defence, competition, trade andeconomic, security, and immigration portfolios,
among others.
The complexity of the bureaucratic arrangements arethemselves important to note, whether in Canberra, in asingle Australian Mission in Southeast Asia, or indeed at
the interface with the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN’s
ten member governments.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1 5

▲A ustralia’s 29th Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull AC, and ASEAN Leaders at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Sydney, 17–18 March 2018.
© ASEAN-Australia Special Summit 2018

The multilateral and bilateral machinery that generates
the ongoing momentum for ASEAN-Australia relations isitself a significant achievement, and it is on the basis that
this machinery is working well that further ambitions canbe achieved. In developing this report, the assessment
from stakeholders in Australia and across ASEAN was
largely positive. Many explained that the expansionof the Australian Mission to ASEAN to implement theComprehensive Strategic Partnership and the bolsteringof its Jakarta-based team has improved Australia’s
capacity to engage effectively, promptly and at therequisite scale with key ASEAN stakeholders.
This has occurred in a context where recent geostrategicchanges have highlighted tensions within ASEAN,
and where some Southeast Asian stakeholders are
particularly concerned about unproductive competitive
dynamics. For some, “the common motivator”, according
to one senior Southeast Asian official, “is not to becomea satellite of China”. One key analyst from Indonesia
highlighted, “Within ASEAN it is hard to find a common
position with Dialogue Partners” on issues like Myanmar
and the South China Sea, and also on Ukraine andconflict in the Middle East. From their perspective, the“ten countries in ASEAN all will therefore have different
priorities with China, with the China factor, but also
individual factors”. Another analyst explained that within
ASEAN it is “challenging to have a common position on
anything…but we all want peace, prosperity and security
in the region, and between dialogue partners”.

16

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSAs one long-time Australian observer of ASEAN
explained, “there is now no alternative where everyone
can meet and talk in this way.” He went on to argue that“any viable regional organisation is never going to be
perfect”. The same theme is explored by Singaporean
practitioner-analysts, Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery
Sng, in their important book, The ASEAN Miracle:
A Catalyst for Peace, where they observe:	ASEAN never progresses in a linear fashion…
Yet miraculously, when one takes a longer view,
analyzing progress decade by decade, ASEAN’s
forward progress becomes visible. Despite its many
imperfections, it keeps moving forward. (Mahbubani
and Sng, 2021: 3)
They go on to explain how “like any living organism,
ASEAN faces the threat of mortality” (Mahbubani andSng, 2021: 177). From their perspective, both internaland external challenges require constant attention. Yet
Mahbubani and Sng (2021: 232) conclude by arguing:	It is vital to emphasize that ASEAN will succeed
imperfectly….ASEAN’s movements are often erraticand never proceed forward in a straight line.
However, these imperfections only reinforce themessage of hope that ASEAN provides. If such animperfect corner of the world can deliver both peace
and prosperity to its 625 million citizens, the rest of
the world can surely replicate ASEAN’s imperfectrecord. This is the ultimate paradox of the ASEAN
story: its strength lies in its imperfections.
Another Southeast Asian analyst of these issues makes
the argument even more strongly: “it will never be
perfect, that’s the point of it”.

Australia’s commitment to Southeast Asia
The imperfections of ASEAN receive plenty of attention
from both Southeast Asian and Australian analysts.
Indeed, the standard critiques of ASEAN practice –the counterpoints to the paradox thesis advanced by
Mahbubani and Sng – are heard regularly. Nonethelesswithin Australian foreign policy circles there is wideranging appreciation of the tally of ASEAN successes.
Allan Behm, a retired Australian official and former
advisor to the current Foreign Minister, argues(2022: 234):
	Although it is fashionable for some Westerncommentators to deride ASEAN as a grouping thattalks a lot and does very little, the fact that it has
been able to maintain a strategically stable region
for nearly five decades is a political triumph.
Such assessments provide the evidence for Southeast
Asian stakeholders who now argue that “Australia has
succeeded in being able to understand the region”.
According to one senior ASEAN diplomat, Australia is“not threatening or dictating, that is the success; you
try to really understand how to engage with us”.
The breadth and complexity of Australia’s engagementwith the countries of Southeast Asia is also widely
noted. As the same diplomat suggested, thepartnership between Australia and ASEAN is “notjust government to government, but also business tobusiness, academicians, students and individuals”. A key
Cambodian analyst argued that “cooperation between
ASEAN and Australia is not a matter of choice, it is amatter of necessity”. The goal, from their perspective,
is to build “open, inclusive regionalism”.

The suggestion is that the concept of “strategic
equilibrium” allows for “Australia to have a more activerole”. As a Southeast Asian diplomat explained, theapproach taken in ASEAN is “co-creation, cooperation,
analyse the situation, and not to make decisions thatwould be detrimental”.
In response to these ASEAN preferences, and in different
ways across the decades, Australia’s international
relations and foreign policy have been shaped by thechanging circumstances presented across Southeast
Asia. There have been periods when countries in theregion have been deemed threatening to Australia’sinterests. At other times opportunities for economic
and people-to-people exchange have proved
remarkably resilient, even through times of tension
and disagreement. The advice from a leading ASEAN
official is that “Australia has successfully managed its
relationship with each Member State, with attention to
the fact that one of the strategic points is how Australia
should go about engaging with ASEAN”.
This focus on the practicalities of multilateral andbilateral engagement is a key theme for any discussionof Australia’s future engagement with ASEAN, especiallyon evolving political, security and economic issues. As
former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalagawa(2018: 224) argues in his fascinating book, Does ASEAN
matter? A view from within, “among the many futurechallenges that ASEAN is likely to encounter, is how toattain equilibrium between the seemingly conflicting
demands of a state-centric and people-centric ASEAN”.

▼R eception event to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Australia’s support to ASEAN in countering trafficking in persons, 28 November 2023.
© Australian Mission to ASEAN.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1 7

History of ASEAN-Australia relations		
Early years, 1967–1974
The formation of ASEAN was a response to the strategic
conditions of the Cold War, drawing together leadersand officials from Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand. At the time, these fivecountries were seeking a model to work together more
effectively and limit the prospect of conflict within
the region. War in Indo-China, as well as the local andregional tensions unleashed by decolonisation, meantthat many doubted the long-term viability of the nascentorganisation. Previous efforts to bring together different
configurations of Asian nations had struggled. One
leading Southeast Asian commentator explained how,in the early years, he “was a critic but admits that it hasgone better than expected, we have actually achieved
so much”.
Despite some cynicism, Australia was an early supporterof the ASEAN ambition, committing resources and ideas
to help buttress its development. At the beginning,in 1967, both the Prime Minister and Leader of the
Opposition spoke positively of their hopes for thegrouping. As Allan Gyngell (2021: 36) writes of ASEAN
at its establishment:
	The Australian Government welcomed the neworganisation but, especially because of the neutralist
sentiments in the preamble, no serious thought
was given to Australian membership. It was hard atthat stage to see whether ASEAN would develop far,but it represented a new sort of homegrown Asian
regionalism to which Australia would soon haveto respond.
According to the leading historian of ASEAN-Australia
relations, Frank Frost (2016: 1), writing in Engaging
the neighbours: Australia and ASEAN since 1974, theestablishment of ASEAN in 1967 was marked by both
positive endorsements from Australia andsome hesitation:
	There was at that time good reason to doubt
whether ASEAN would become a durable regionalorganisation. Its founding members…were highly
diverse. They were rivals and in some cases recent
enemies. Previous efforts at indigenous regional
cooperation and organisation in Southeast Asia had
not succeeded.
And yet it has proved possible for ASEAN to flourish,
expand and now take on a key position globally.

“In 1974 everything was different…and fifty
years is a long way, which is something weshould cherish and celebrate.”
Senior ASEAN diplomat, 2023

It was under the government of Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam, elected in 1972, that Australia sought to engage
with ASEAN more formally, becoming its first official
Dialogue Partner. According to Frost (2016: 25), “After
assuming office, Whitlam moved quickly to assert theimportance for his government of Southeast Asian
relations and multilateral cooperation.” For Australia, theopportunity to engage with ASEAN was immediately
judged valuable and, in time, it became an “article offaith”, according to one Australian foreign policy veteran,that working with ASEAN was “vitally important for allof us”. As Gyngell (2021: 112) explains:	In April 1974 Australia became the first non-member
state to establish formal relations with ASEAN,
providing aid to the group as a whole. The processof engagement continued under (Prime Minister
Malcolm) Fraser with the establishment in 1977of an annual ASEAN-Australia Forum. Australia’s
experience formed the template for ASEAN’s
relations with other countries and helped provide
the building blocks for a broader relationshipbetween it and the outside world.
What has been important, as explained by a senior
ASEAN analyst, is that while there have been “lots of
ups and downs, and at certain times issues affect ourpartnership, such as geopolitical issues, geoeconomics
circumstances, there is a fundamental commitment towork together”.

“ASEAN has been much less about what
it can do than about what it can preventfrom happening – schisms and divisions
in the region and any return to inter-state
conflict. For this reason, it can be difficult
to recognise all that ASEAN has achieved.”
Allan Gyngell, former senior Australian Government
official (2022: 16-17).

▶A
 SEAN-Australian joint economic research projects meeting at the Australian National University, Canberra, 1983.
© Image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. NAA: A6180, 13/4/83/1.

18

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1 9

▲A SEAN journalists visit the World Expo ‘88 site, 1987. © Image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. NAA: A6180, 1/5/87/3.

Growing partnership, 1974–1995
From the 1970s through to the 1990s, ASEAN andAustralia needed to manage a range of issues, including
some early tensions. The end of the Vietnam War createdconditions for further engagement between Australia
and the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. It was aperiod, as explained by Rhondda Nicholas, when theview that “Australia needs ASEAN more than ASEAN
needs Australia [had] become a well-worn cliche in
diplomatic and other informed circles” (1983: 153).
There were significant economic and politicaldevelopments that required deft handling on all sides,with a dispute over civil aviation policies, the response to
the Indo-China refugee crisis, and the management ofconflict in Cambodia all needing attention. At the time,some analysts offered bleak assessments of the futureof ASEAN-Australia relations, in a climate of significant
great power competition and what was perceived asdiminishing Australian influence (see discussion inLim, 1984). Yet, according to Frost (2016: 54), the fuller
historical record shows that:	In its response to the refugee crisis, Australia had lentvaluable support on an issue of major concern to allof the ASEAN members, and it had demonstrated acapacity to make a contribution towards participatingin the resolution of a serious regional problem.

20

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSAustralia’s credibility as a reliable partner became more
important than ever when, through the 1980s, ASEAN
needed to respond to “the conflict over Cambodia[which] became the dominant political, diplomatic andsecurity problem in Southeast Asia” (Frost, 2016: 56). Frost(2016: 78) goes on to explain how:	Without the dialogue and communication between
Australia and ASEAN, and with Indonesia inparticular, the peace process might well not havebeen developed. The issue of Cambodia was asubstantial instance where Australia and ASEAN
cooperated on a major issue of security and regional
concern and achieved a significant outcome.
While committing significant intellectual andorganisational resources to this long-term work there
was also pragmatic Australian responsiveness to ASEAN
needs. As a senior ASEAN statesman explained, it was“always possible to get the Australian Government toquickly consider project X or Y” compared to some otherpartners which “took years”.
Then, with the end of the Cold War, there were newopportunities for Australian diplomacy in ASEAN, withthe step-by-step expansion of the regional groupingto Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. As Frost(2016: 4) explains:	From the late 1980s, in the context of the declineof Cold War confrontation, relations with ASEAN
were central in Australia’s contributions to the
Cambodian peace process and to the developmentof two new regional groups to enhance economic
and security cooperation, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) grouping and the ARF [ASEAN
Regional Forum].
Australia worked very creatively to see the ARF
established at a time when other ASEAN Dialogue
Partners were reluctant to see a loose organisation
emerge (for historical discussion see Haacke andMorada, 2010). Yet what was described by a senior
Australian official as a “mood of optimism” created thespace for an approach to confidence building, preventive
diplomacy and conflict resolution that could be “built
around ASEAN”. Expanding on this point, Allan Behm
(2022: 174) argues:	As a multi-level forum for discussion, including
discussion with external parties (such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum provides), the association [ASEAN]
is a critical component of South-East Asia’s way of
doing business. Indeed, the habit of consultationand conversation offers a critical method for issue
and problem resolution in a time of disruption
and uncertainty.
It is the gradual evolution of this inclusive model ofregional diplomacy that has also offered Australia thechance to often have a seat at the table.
Expanding connections, 1995–2007
The expansion of ASEAN in the 1990s was a key period
for broadening Australia’s engagement with thecountries of Southeast Asia. The emergence of new
economic hubs, including the so-called “Asian tigers”,
was accompanied by greater ambitions to develop theopportunities arising from the end of the Cold War. As
Gyngell (2021: 212) has explained, “The ARF’s role wascircumscribed by the caution of its ASEAN core.” Yetit was also during this period that, according to one
Southeast Asian security analyst, “ASEAN kept the lid
on all types of conflict, and of all the different models of
diplomacy this one happened to work”.
A key example was the management of the politicaland security situation in Indonesia from the late 1990s
onwards, leading to the independence of Timor-Leste.
While there were a range of short-term difficulties,
especially in Indonesia-Australia relations, Frost (2016: 118)
explains how:	In the longer term… the process of independence for
East Timor [Timor-Leste] gradually removed an issue
that had been a major obstacle and cause of tension
in the Australia– Indonesia relationship since the1970s and this assisted in improving the climate forAustralia’s ASEAN relations.

Closer security connections then emerged when,from 2001, Australia and Southeast Asia began tocollaborate on counter-terrorism issues. There is now
an annual ASEAN and Australia counter-terrorism
dialogue. Like in some other sensitive areas, “most of
the cooperation on terrorism in Southeast Asia wasbilateral”, however, according to Frost (2016: 124), “thisincreased contact extended the sense of mutual interest
between Australia and many ASEAN members.” During
this period, Australia also worked to support ASEAN’s
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December
2004, committing substantial resources and technicalassistance, much of it under the auspices of ASEAN. In
2005, Australia was a founding member, with ASEAN, of
the East Asia Summit, which is now the region’s premierleader-level forum for strategic discussion.
Strategic collaboration, 2007–2020
It was through the next phase of collaboration between
ASEAN and Australia that the emerging scope of today’s
activities became more apparent. During these years,
the countries of Southeast Asia also faced a range ofpolitical, economic and humanitarian challenges. From
the response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar followed by
the country’s gradual political liberalisation, through tothe global financial crisis, and the rising assertiveness ofChina in regional affairs, this was a period of significant
change for ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners.
It was also during these years that Australia nominatedan Ambassador to ASEAN who was, from 2008, a “senior,
Canberra-based diplomat whose duties would include
participating in meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat andin other regional ASEAN meetings” (Frost, 2016: 148).
Gillian Bird, the first Australian Ambassador for ASEAN,
used a 2010 speech at the Institute of Southeast AsianStudies in Singapore to explore the theme of “Australia
and ASEAN: 35 years on”. In the same year, the ASEANAustralia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) cameinto force, with a more recent upgrade of this agreement
widely welcomed by ASEAN analysts who suggest it is
the “best quality FTA in the region”.
By 2013, the Australian Ambassador was based
permanently in Jakarta, the same year that ASEAN
and Australia celebrated 40 years of partnership with asummit in Naypyidaw, Myanmar. Speaking at the Foreign
Service Institute in Manila in 2015, Australian Ambassador
to ASEAN, Simon Merrifield, explained how:	A key feature of our future relationship with ASEAN
will be the culture of two-way partnership. This notion– that Australia has much to learn from our friends inthe region – underpins the thinking behind the New
Colombo Plan, our scheme to provide opportunities
to young Australians to live, study and work in Asia.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 2 1

From this time onwards, the expansion of Australianengagement with ASEAN has continued, with a growing
team based in Jakarta. In 2015, the Australia-ASEAN
Council was established with a mandate to “generate
opportunities that deepen cultural understanding,cooperation and connections with ASEAN member
countries”. As Australia’s next Ambassador to ASEAN,
Jane Duke, remarked at a business conferencein Adelaide in 2017, “we can’t rest on our laurels.
Competition for influence in ASEAN is rising. We
need to continue to work more creatively to standout as a partner of choice.”This increased tempo of multilateral cooperation was
further marked by the 2018 ASEAN-Australia Special
Summit in Sydney. During this period, according to
Allan Gyngell (2021: 381), “The idea that ASEAN shouldbe central to the structure of Asian institutions took
on a greater urgency as a stabiliser for Australia in the
rapidly changing Indo-Pacific.” As long-time ASEANwatcher Malcolm Cook has explained, the “ASEANAustralia Special Summit in Sydney in March 2018
was the definitive symbol of ASEAN mattering more
for Australian diplomacy in Southeast Asia” (2021: 8).
Writing after the Special Summit, Huong Le Thu, astrategic analyst with deep experience across Southeast
Asia, struck a more cautious note when she argued
that “Canberra would also be best advised to ponder
over ASEAN’s needs and expectations surroundinga partnership with Australia… Australia needs acomprehensive, lasting and coordinated Southeast
Asia policy” (2018: 32).

Responding to change, 2020–2024
Australia’s engagement with ASEAN was designated asa Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2021, the firstagreement of its type. ASEAN currently has only five suchagreements – with Australia, China, United States, India
and Japan – among its eleven Dialogue Partners. Thisagreement was achieved with speed and precision, astrong signal of the high regard in which Australia is heldby ASEAN members and within the ASEAN Secretariat.
A key figure in the ASEAN Secretariat suggests, “TheAustralian Mission to ASEAN listens and moves quickly
and is empowered to move on things within their own
system.” Another key Jakarta-based figure explained,“The way [Australia] works is what distinguishes you,partly because you are comfortable supporting somethings step-by-step.” It is this well-balanced approach
which has now created a model of cooperation which
has generated significant benefits for ASEAN and
for Australia, and which provides the foundation for
future cooperation. This includes the establishment of
the Aus4ASEAN Futures Initiative, which is driven by
ASEAN priorities and now has a dedicated Aus4ASEAN
Futures Office at ASEAN Headquarters. As a former
ASEAN senior official explained, “When working withus, Australia uses existing structures. We don’t need toreinvent the wheel.”▼ S ecretary-General of ASEAN, Hartono Rekso Dharsono, with Australian Ministers Andrew Peacock and Mick Young in Indonesia, May 1977.
© Image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. NAA: A6180, 5/5/77/3.

22

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSForeign Minister, Gareth Evans, opens Eyes on ASEAN exhibition in Melbourne, 1994.
▲ Australian© Image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia. NAA: A6180, 18/10/94/10.

The COVID-19 global pandemic brought a temporary
pause to much of the easy flow of people-to-people
engagement between Australia and ASEAN. For long
periods from 2020-2022, national and local borders
impeded the movement of travellers and businesspeople and required new approaches and systems toensure health and economic security. Many Australians
and Southeast Asians could not enjoy their usual rangeof easy linkages to each other. It was also a period ofsignificant technological innovation, with some ASEAN
countries leading the world in their pandemic responses,
managing complex social and humanitarian issues,
while maintaining commercial linkages.

“There is a very strong brand for Australia
working in Southeast Asia where we focus
on ground up interests. Per capita Australia
is the largest donor to ASEAN. But mostimportantly Australia is always available
when urgent support is needed.”
ASEAN official, 2023

Nonetheless, official diplomacy and a multitude of
informal people-to-people links were maintained
during this period. ASEAN-Australia relations, including
Leader-level interactions, shifted online, where social
distancing could be maintained throughout periodsof significant social change.

Australia and the countries of ASEAN also cooperated
closely on a range of COVID-19 responses, including
the acquisition, purchase, mutual swap and, in somecases, gifting of vaccines; technical cooperation on
epidemiological and economic responses; and the
management of challenging logistical and trade issues.
The fact that during this period ASEAN and Australia also
agreed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signals
a shared commitment to managing challenging issues
effectively. In this context, total Official Development
Assistance flows from Australia to Southeast Asia andEast Asia have increased to an estimated $1.24 billion
in 2023-24 (up $8.7 million from $1.23 billion in
2022-23), with Southeast Asia bilateral programs at$610.5 million in 2023-24, allocations to Southeast Asia
regional programs at $62.5 million, and allocations to
ASEAN and Mekong programs at $102.4 million.

“What Australia has done so far has
been the ideal thing, we can nurture thissuccess together and we can continue onwhat we have achieved, with no negativity
especially in the last decade.”
Senior ASEAN diplomat, 2023

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 2 3

24

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSPriorities for cooperation
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
The 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP)
between ASEAN and Australia is a further indicationof the growing and vibrant interaction across multiple
domains of activity. Like other ASEAN CSPs, theagreement with Australia builds on decades ofcooperation in a wide range of fields. A senior Southeast
Asian diplomat describes the current relationship as“very intensive and very useful” in a context where“having worked together for fifty years and beyond, theComprehensive Strategic Partnership is something verysignificant, and it shows that the commitment from
Australia is genuine”. In this context, they explained that
it will be “up to all of us to look into the future”.
With the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
as a new consideration in ASEAN-led mechanisms, it
is apparent that Australia’s elevation to CSP status hasenhanced the visibility of key activities and is widely
considered a substantive further enhancement to therelationship (see Sukma, 2019; 2023). In terms of the CSP,
another senior ASEAN diplomat “firmly believes all of
our cooperation is advancing together…and we value
and appreciate that Australia was our first dialogue
partner”. The current level of economic cooperation
raises other questions, with challenges now receiving
high-level Australian Government attention. What is
intriguing in this context, as noted by a leading ASEAN
analyst, is that “ASEAN is more about norms and values,
less about hard security and free trade”. ASEAN analyst
Hoang Thi Ha assessed that “there is more to the sharedinterests between ASEAN and Australia in shaping the
Indo-Pacific order than meets the eye” (Ha: 2018, 7).
There are new channels for cooperation too. For instance,
ASEAN has begun to engage with other key multilateral
institutions through the AOIP such as through
Secretariat-to-Secretariat agreements with the Indian
Ocean Rim Association and the Pacific Islands Forum.
Political-Security
ASEAN’s cooperation with Australia under this pillar
is wide-ranging, with the ASEAN-Australia Counter
Trafficking Program as the largest component currently,
with its twenty-year track record of cooperation
marked in 2023. The program collaborates with ASEAN
to strengthen criminal justice systems, ensure justpunishment of traffickers and protect the rights ofvictims of trafficking. According to Danielle Alford, wholeads the work of project partner DT Global in Asia,“Australia has a long history of working with ASEAN tocombat human trafficking – spanning more than 20
years…During this time, the partnership has continued
to mature to now focus on advancing human-rights
based approaches and promoting gender-equality
and inclusion in counter-trafficking responses.”

The ASEAN-Australia Political Security Partnership,
which was implemented from 2019 onwards, has a
specific focus on cybercrime and other transnational
crime, countering radicalisation and violent extremism,
maritime security, and women, peace and security.
Australia also supports human rights dialogues andactivities, as well as capacity-building support for
Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN.
Economic
Australia’s development cooperation has been foundedon the economic pillar - primarily through the AANZFTA
Economic Cooperation Support Programme and theASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program,
through its two phases. Today, the largest activity related
to economic cooperation is these programs’ successor:
the Regional Trade for Development Initiative which
supports implementation of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and AANZFTA, which was
upgraded in 2023. The Aus4ASEAN Futures Initiative
is similarly focussed on significant economic projects
across ASEAN. Other key projects in recent years havefocussed on COVID-19 recovery, digital trade standards,
food security, bio protection and invasive species, andagricultural value chains. Australia also provides funding
for the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East
Asia, a Jakarta-based think tank affiliated with ASEAN.
Socio-CulturalDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia enhanced
its existing health cooperation with ASEAN, offering
substantial financial and technical support for theregion. Through the socio-cultural pillar, Australia is also
a significant contributor to the soon-to-be-establishedASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies
and Emerging Diseases, to help enhance regional
capacity to prepare for, prevent, detect and respondto pandemics. Australia supports a strand of work on
health cooperation which is specifically focused on
reducing the risk of pandemics from zoonotic diseases
using One Health approaches. Australia also funds
key activities on labour migration as well as genderequality and disability inclusion, to support equitable,
inclusive and stable growth in the region. As Panudda
Boonpala, Deputy Regional Director, ILO Regional
Office for Asia and the Pacific, has said, “Effective
governance of labour migration benefits the lives andlivelihoods of millions across the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia’s long-term commitment to ILO’s flagship
TRIANGLE in ASEAN programme helps us deliver thisin the ASEAN region.” The ASEAN Coordinating Centre
for Humanitarian Assistance also receives funding tosupport its response to humanitarian crises in Myanmar,and for strengthening the Centre’s capability to respondeffectively to human-induced crises, including conflicts.

◀A ustralian Prime Minister, The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, with Indonesian President, H.E. Ir H Joko Widodo, at the 3rd Annual ASEAN-Australia Summit
in Jakarta during Indonesia’s 2023 ASEAN Chair year, 7 September 2023. © ASEAN Indonesia 2023

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 2 5

“People on the street see ASEAN as
a community of leaders, so we needmore that is focussed on a communityof peoples.”Indonesian analyst of ASEAN, 2023

Aus4ASEAN Initiatives
With the initiation of the Comprehensive StrategicPartnership, ASEAN and Australia are implementing a
set of further activities under the Australia for ASEAN(Aus4ASEAN) banner, building on earlier strategic
collaborations. This includes the Aus4ASEAN Futures
Initiative, an ASEAN-driven fund which supports
ASEAN-led projects that respond to ASEAN-ledpriorities. Proposals for projects funded by the Futures
Initiative are considered by the Joint Planning andReview Committee, which brings together senior
ASEAN officials to make consensus decisions. In
some key instances, small projects funded under thesecond phase of the ASEAN-Australia Development
Cooperation Program have now led to expanded
activities. Australia supported the development of theASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality, a study on the
ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement, andis also providing support to the ASEAN Secretariat’s
Analysis and Monitoring Capacity on the AOIP. Other
work deals with maritime connectivity, tariff regulations,
unique business identification number guidelines,
and the ASEAN Sustainable Urbanisation Strategy.
Australia is also assisting with longer-term planningincluding through the development of the ASEAN
Plan of Action on Science, Technology and Innovation,
as well as the preparation and implementation of theASEAN Economic Community Post-2025 Agenda. Other
Aus4ASEAN programs included the Aus4ASEAN Digital
Transformation and Skills Initiative, and 100 Aus4ASEAN
Scholarships commencing in 2023 which support
emerging leaders from across ASEAN to undertake
postgraduate study in fields that support the AOIP.

Track 1.5 and Track 2 Diplomacy
Importantly, there is a much broader story of ASEANAustralia cooperation, including the many different
diplomatic engagements that occur outside official
channels. Australia has now built up a long tradition ofregular engagement through its think tanks, universities,
community and arts organisations, political parties, andhumanitarian and religious groups. These engagements
are sometimes supported by government, but manyof the linkages are, in fact, the product of individual orgroup relationships developed, in many cases, over long
periods of time between Australia and ASEAN members.

The range of Track 2 diplomatic work between Australia
and ASEAN is worth considering in more detail. Some
examples include the Australian Committee of theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,
which has been based for many years at the Australian
National University, and the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Dialogue convened by the Institute for Strategic
and International Studies in Malaysia and Asialink at the
University of Melbourne. These organisations, like others,
regularly engage senior counterparts from across ASEAN
while also building pathways for the emergence of future
leaders. Many of those emerging leaders can then be
found making major contributions through the Australia
Indonesia Youth Association, the Australia Vietnam
Leadership Dialogue, and the alumni associations ofAustralian universities, among many other activities.
As one of the contributors to these types of programs
explained: “ASEAN youth want to travel and do cultural
exchange. They are not afraid to engage.”“I don’t want to see ASEAN as a community
where some dominate…it is our utopia.”
ASEAN youth leader, 2023

To fulfill this appetite for engagement, the ASEANAustralia Strategic Youth Partnership, which was initiatedby alumni of the New Colombo Plan, has grown to be asignificant contributor to informal diplomatic links. With
over 300 members and participants each year from allparts of Australia and from every ASEAN member, it isa unique platform for coordinating young leaders who
have already demonstrated their personal commitment
to advancing ASEAN-Australia ties. As one ASEAN youth
leader explained:	Having another party involved is very helpful for us
because even ourselves in ASEAN, we don’t knoweach other. So, there is a chance to build a bridge
where Australia can also help us to better figure
ourselves out.
The impression from youth leaders is that while “they aretrying so hard” to make an active contribution they findthat it is not always possible for people in senior positions
to “hear us” and so when it comes to, for instance, theASEAN Secretariat – “it is hard for us to understand how
our generation can take over these positions”. This is anarea where further ASEAN-Australia cooperation could
be valuable. Another format for this type of interaction is
the Australia-ASEAN Emerging Leaders Program, which
is a well-curated leadership development opportunity
for ASEAN and Australian social entrepreneurs. In bothinstances, funding from the Australia-ASEAN Council has
proved a useful catalyst.

▶A ustralia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, and ASEAN Secretary-General, H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, open the Aus4ASEAN Futures officeat the ASEAN Secretarait, 12 July 2023. © DFAT

26

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 27

People-to-people and diaspora links

Business engagement, investment and tradeThroughout the decades of ASEAN-Australia
cooperation, migration from Southeast Asian countries
to Australia has grown to become a major element
supporting people-to-people linkages. While theseflows of migrants may have started relatively small,by 2021 over a million Australian citizens have a family
connection to the ten countries of ASEAN. Large
numbers of people with links to Vietnam, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Indonesia and elsewhere now call Australia
home. There is also a significant Australian diaspora
spread across ASEAN, with many Australians living andworking in Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia,
in particular. Increasingly, members of this Australiandiaspora also have Southeast Asian heritage, showcasing
Australian multiculturalism to the region in all of its
diversity. The impression that this generates, according
to another youth leader, is that “Australia is really open,with good work-life balance, and a business culturethat brings people together”. It is regularly noted in
discussions across the region that an increasing numberof senior Australian leaders, across all sectors, havestrong connections to Southeast Asia, including
the Foreign Minister, the Hon Senator Penny Wong.

In 2023, the Australian Government launched a new
strategy for expanding two-way trade and investment
with the region by its Special Envoy for Southeast Asia,
Nicholas Moore AO. In the context of the AANZFTA
and RCEP, the Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia
Economic Strategy to 2040 report identifies long-term
ambitions for greater two-way trade and investment
cooperation. It offers analysis and recommendations on
the further development of economic relations between
Australia and Southeast Asia, highlighting the need toraise awareness, remove blockages, build capability
and deepen investment. The report is based on theview, widely shared across ASEAN and in Australia, that
economic engagement is not as strong as it could be.
As one business leader argued:	From an Australian perspective, Southeast Asian
economic success is absolutely in our interests.
A rich and prosperous region would then needmore of what we have. By contrast, a poor,
unhappy region is a disaster for Australia.
The currently favourable conditions across most of
ASEAN, which have encouraged significant investmentsfrom around the world, do not appear to have generated
the same level of enthusiasm among Australianbusinesses, which the Invested report seeks to address.

“Australia is very diverse, whichmakes Australians very open-minded
about collaboration.”
ASEAN youth leader, 2023

▼A
 ustralia-ASEAN Council Board Member Tamerlaine Beasley with grant recipients from the ‘Australia-ASEAN Virtual International Business Plan Competition’,3 July 2019, UNE Sydney, Parramatta Campus. © Tamerlaine Beasley28

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS▲ F ormer Australian Ambassador to ASEAN, H.E. Jane Duke, with Australia-ASEAN Council Board Members and Heads of Mission from ASEAN members in Sydney,
May 2017. © Tamerlaine Beasley

In some cases, it appears that out-dated information
distorts assessments of the risks and potential
rewards. As the business leader went on to say aboutsome of their counterparts across the senior ranks ofAustralian businesses:
	The ones who end up coming to Southeast Asia are
self-selected. The government needs to articulate thevision and educate boards and investors that it is in
the national interest for us to expand our presencein Southeast Asia.
In response, Invested has 75 recommendations forgovernment, business and the wider community, mostly
focussed on what Australians can do to advance their
engagement with Southeast Asia. A leading Southeast
Asian analyst said in response:	Invested 2040 is very helpful to set up thefoundations to get things done because it signals
the [Australian] government’s strong intent. However,there is a risk of a lack of follow through, with
communications now quiet. How well it ultimately
lands will depend on the follow up.
Some examples of key recommendations are to develop
a whole-of-nation plan to strengthen Southeast
Asia literacy in Australian business, government, theeducation and training system, and the community.
The Australian Government has also committed to a
new Australia-Southeast Asia business facilitation
initiative to undertake sectoral business missions
and build the capability of business chambers.

Invested also recommends that Australia should develop
a strategy to engage with Australia’s Southeast Asian
diaspora to inform efforts to deepen SME business links
with the region. Other points relate to the education,
infrastructure, energy and tourism sectors.
One of the elements of this story that has received thegreatest attention in Invested is the establishment of
new investment ‘deal teams’ for Southeast Asia, which
are designed to blend private sector and AustralianGovernment capabilities to provide outward investment(including financing) services. Aligned to much of
the feedback about Australia’s long-term successeducating generations of ASEAN leaders, the report
also emphasises that the Australian Government should
do more to coordinate a whole-of-nation initiative
to better engage Southeast Asian alumni, including
through what is proposed to be a scheme for connecting
alumni with Australian and Southeast Asian businesses.
Such work can build on initiatives from the AustraliaASEAN Council in recent years, including its support
for the Australia-ASEAN Emerging Leaders Program
which brings together young social entrepreneurs.
The Australia-ASEAN Chamber of Commerce’s regularsurvey of Australian business opinion also helps to shape
an appreciation of the region with attention to specifichistorical, economic and national trends.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 2 9

30

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSASEAN perspectives on Australia
Long-term priorities
ASEAN policymakers and analysts offer a wide rangeof perspectives on Australia and its contributions, pastand present, to the Southeast Asian region. It helps
that many Southeast Asian leaders, officials, academics
and commentators have personal experience, often
as students, in Australia. They therefore appreciate thecomplexities of the Australian story and understand thedifferent geographical, cultural, economic and strategic
rationales for Australia’s engagement with their own
country, and the wider region. As one ASEAN analyst
with a PhD from a top Australian University explained:“Dialogue Partners need to be critical, reminding ASEAN
of its own principles, values and commitments.” Anotherformer student in Australia noted, “Australia and ASEAN
have achieved a lot at the elite level. There needs to be
more attention on implementation at the popular level
where there is potential for disharmony.” And another
Australian alumna clarified how “Australia has been oneof the most loyal Dialogue Partners” in a context where“ASEAN is important, but bilateralism is also important…
one cannot replace the other”.
For ASEAN’s analysts, one area of long-term interest
and occasional tension is Australia’s alliance relationshipwith the United States, especially with the further
development of relations in the Quad and through
AUKUS. 2 As one Southeast Asian analyst explained,“Australia has been so proud to be an annex of the US
in this part of the world.” While they thought that thisstrong historical commitment was understandable,another person interviewed for the project argued,“Australia has an interest in showing up as an Asian
power, not just as a western power at the bottomof Asia.” Expanding on this point and offering some
guidance for Australians, Mahbubani and Sng (2021:
81) argue:	If ASEAN were to fall apart, one of the biggest losers
will be Australia. If ASEAN were to do well, Australians
would be among the biggest beneficiaries. All this ispatently obvious. This is why this book needs to beread and understood by all Australian policy makers,
present and future.
On the same theme, another Southeast Asian analyst
insisted, “When Southeast Asia is stable, Australia
is stable…which is a miracle given….we have the full
diversity of political systems: sultanate, democracy,socialist, etc.”

The biggest difference between Australia
and other Dialogue Partners is that Australia
is in the region, and so is China. There
are therefore economic links and peopleto-people links. For instance, between
Singapore and Australia there are diasporasthat are shared and there is therefore avery close connection.
Singaporean youth leader, 2023

Appreciating the diversity of ASEAN members and theirrange of different priorities, the link between bilateraland multilateral diplomacy is crucial for more fully
appreciating Australia in ASEAN visions. As a former
Indonesian security advisor explained, the “AustraliaASEAN relationship is perfectly fine as it is, but bilaterally
there is so much to work on”. Much of the discussion
about Australia and ASEAN is, in practice, therefore
focussed on national and local issues where Australia isjudged to have a particular interest working closely withcertain Southeast Asian partners. This can introduce
issues with the expectation from some Southeast
Asian analysts that Australia needs to continue tooffer “diplomatic gestures to show that it believes in
ASEAN processes – be patient, tactful”. Within ASEAN
there is a deep appreciation that, as noted by a former
ASEAN Secretary General, “strategically there is a rolefor Southeast Asia to exist between the two giants
China and India”. From this vantage, “the challenge is todevelop as ASEAN as part of a tripod in the Asia Pacific”.
How this tripod is configured requires attention to
emerging issues.

Perspectives across the region
Questions about the place of Australia within the region
draw out a range of different perspectives, and it isimportant to emphasise that there is no single view on
how Australia best engages ASEAN in the long-term.
On the one hand, there is the assessment offered byformer Singaporean diplomat turned analyst, Kishore
Mahbubani (2022: 89), who recently assessed:
	The Australia-ASEAN relationship remains
positive. But Australia shouldn’t assume that
it will automatically remain positive. Australia
will have to work hard to keep it positive.

◀U niversity of Tasmania and Van Lang University students participating in a ‘Sustainable Development Goals Hackathon’ in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,in January 2024. Over 80 students and staff from both Universities worked together across a four-day program. Van Lang University students fromthe winning Hackathon teams will visit the University of Tasmania to continue their environmental focus. © University of Tasmania2 he Quad is the name of a diplomatic partnership that brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States through their sharedTcommitment to an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. The Quad’s origins date back to collaboration
after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced theircollaboration through AUKUS, which is a new capability partnership. The first major initiative of AUKUS is to support Australia acquiring
conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines, with other elements focussed on technical and defence cooperation.

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 3 1

▲A ustralia hosts ASEAN officials for the 36th ASEAN Australia Forum in Melbourne, ahead of the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in 2024, 5–6 February 2024. © DFAT

The reality, according to one ASEAN emerging leader,is that “we have a very positive sense of Australia, but
the Australia-ASEAN relationship isn’t something that
immediately comes to mind”. The reason for this, hesuggests, is that so much geopolitical discussion isframed around the United States and China, and so
there is simply less space to consider some of the otherimportant relationships that help to support Southeast
Asia’s success, such as the enduring ASEAN-Australia
partnership. In this context, he says that the fact Australia
is “showing up is very important for creating networks”.
Where there is perhaps the greatest divergence ofviews on the role of ASEAN-Australia relations is noton geographical lines, but rather a divide that has
emerged between generations. The emphasis among
established analysts and policymakers is understandably
on sustaining institutional linkages and in maintaining
high-level connections to bind Australia and ASEAN
together. The success of this approach is apparent. As
one senior figure noted, “What role Southeast Asia plays
is important for Australia. A disinterested or passive
ASEAN is not good for Australia.” Kishore Mahbubani
has recommended that “on major foreign policy issues[Australia] could, as a standard procedure, ask how closeor divergent its position will be from the ASEAN position”(2022: 85).
On the other hand, young leaders who have contributed
to this report have emphasised the need for deeper
linkages among emerging leaders and for a more
coherent set of opportunities to build joint ASEANAustralia capabilities. They are most focussed on
environmental, social, and human rights priorities.

32

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSTheir view is, ultimately, that there is much more to bedone to strengthen the Socio-Cultural pillar of ASEAN.
They are almost all heavily focussed on the need tofind more innovative and creative ways to connect andexchange. Many had their earliest experiences of ASEANAustralia engagement during the COVID-19 pandemic,
confined to home and connected to the world throughteleconference technology.

“ASEAN countries need to prove themselves
worthy to become strategic partners for
middle and even major powers, precisely
because of certain qualities that make themequal, which in this case is by being a strong,cohesive and responsive organisation.”
Dr. Lina Alexandra, leading Indonesian analyst (2021: 3)Risks and challenges
Three levels of risk to the future success of ASEANAustralia relations deserve closer scrutiny. First, there isthe consistent commitment from Australia, with manyassessing that Australia has rarely, if ever, proved asattentive to Southeast Asia as it has done in recent years.
Southeast Asian analysts wonder whether this level ofenthusiasm, resourcing and engagement survives any
significant geopolitical or economic shock. For now, theyraise gentle questions about the viability of Australianengagement at a time when migration, terrorism andstrategic competition are, once again, prominent inAustralian public debate.

“It is natural that relations between Australia
and ASEAN should be good. We take this for
granted. And we take for granted that it will
still be in good in the future. But might it
not be so good?”
Senior Indonesian analyst, 2023

Second, there are the internal issues for ASEAN that canundermine its effectiveness and the capacity of external
partners to work effectively within its model of inclusive
regional diplomacy. The unresolved and interlinked crises
in Myanmar – security, political and humanitarian – arethe most obvious illustration of the challenges for ASEAN
when things go badly wrong. As a Southeast Asian
analyst explained, “If the reforms are not successful in
ASEAN, then what do we fall back on?” While Mahbubani
and Sng tend to offer a positive appraisal of ASEAN’s
historical and future roles, they also warn, “ASEAN
should psychologically prepare itself for some surprising,perhaps even shocking, resurfacing of long-buried fault
lines” (2021: 196).
Third, there are the challenges of engaging with great
power competition in the years ahead. As a senior
Australian business figure noted:
	There is also a fair bit of negativity about ASEAN andpredictions of its demise. Yet the management ofconflict in Southeast Asia, where they are able to keep
conflict under control in a quiet and understated way,is crucial. We have often desperately underestimatedthe value of ASEAN for managing China. There is an
assumption that because in Southeast Asia they’re
not shouting we assume they are subservient.
Then, as Sebastian Strangio (2022: 47), an Australianjournalist based long-term in Southeast Asia, hasalso argued:	Even as ‘ASEAN’ has grown to become a synonymfor ‘South-East Asia’, the bloc’s increased political
diversity has made it trickier to agree on key issues.
Currently, the ten ASEAN nations differ considerablyon the question of China, and, in particular, on theSouth China Sea disputes.
Across the decades, in Palmer and Reckford (1987: xiv)
and Frost (2016), there are careful appraisals of how
ASEAN has managed relations with major powers, with
ASEAN subject to challenges around how to navigate
the decline in global leadership by the United States in
its role upholding the rules-based order. It has led to asituation where, as Frost (2016: 191) describes:
	Pluralism in conceptions of ‘region’ reflects thechallenges of an environment of overlapping andcompetitive interests and at times of severe tensions
among the major powers. In this environment, no
individual major power would be acceptable toothers as a sponsor or leader in regional institutions,especially in relation to security issues.

The fact that Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and thePhilippines all have overlapping sovereignty claims in
the South China Sea and disputes with China over its
maritime claims sharpens the types of calculations that
far-sighted diplomacy and strategy should keep in mind.
Indonesia too has objected to certain Chinese activities
within its exclusive economic zone in the southern partof the South China Sea.
The risks, of course, are that Southeast Asian countries
could misjudge their own skill at handling the prioritiesof powerbrokers in Beijing and Washington. While thatrisk cannot be ignored, perhaps the more prudent
Australian approach is to spend as much time as possible
listening to the thoughtful ASEAN voices considering
their own futures adjacent to China attendant with therisks of a shrinking US security umbrella. But one fail-safe
approach would be for Australia to continue to upholdthe principles of international law together with ASEAN
countries against any rising tides of revisionism.

“Something will happen in terms of crisis
management, and the question is how
quickly can we deal with a crisis…it should
not be too long.”
Long-time ASEAN observer, 2023

Opportunities for the future
In this dynamic context, debates about structureand strategy within ASEAN will continue, with thegrouping needing to find effective ways to maintaincohesion while responding effectively to a wide rangeof challenges. Some of its members will continue toargue for innovation and reform, while others will becontent to gradually consider evolving circumstances.
As a long-term ASEAN-watcher based in Jakarta
explained, “ASEAN is formed by crisis, and it does
adapt, and it is forced to find new ways to respond tochallenges.” The fact that the grouping contains suchdiversity of political, cultural, economic and strategic
conditions will ensure the need for ongoing negotiationand flexibility. It is these characteristics which haveshaped ASEAN’s development since 1967. Australia,
arguably more than other partners, with its turn towards
embracing greater diversity from the 1970s, has shown aconsistent ambition to support this approach and learn
from ASEAN’s experiences. Careful planning around
opportunities for the future of ASEAN-Australia relations
therefore needs to start with an awareness that over the
past fifty years, through ASEAN, Australia has developed
its own appreciation of the value of regional multilateraldiplomacy. A question that is often raised is should
Australia aspire to membership of ASEAN. According toa former senior ASEAN official, “Indeed, Australia could
be a natural part of ASEAN, but it is technically better tocontinue the current role.”

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 33

ASEAN in Australia’s changing
foreign policy
ASEAN Centrality
There are, by now, a set of strong traditions andprinciples about the tone of Southeast Asian diplomacy.
In ASEAN there is a preference to avoid open conflicton ideological or self-interest grounds. Instead, theexpectation is for mutual patience and grinding
compromise, with the possibility of falling back on
uncomfortable contradiction. This model has generated
a successful expansion of economic opportunity for theregion’s 670 million people and a period of peacefulcoexistence perhaps never previously sustained in thisregion in recorded history. For that, ASEAN diplomats
are justifiably proud and perhaps the message for
the Australian public is that further commitments tobuttress this model will pay handsome returns in theyears ahead.

“Areas of potential collaboration include
health, technologies of the future, English
language and technical training, andanything else that allows Australia to bepart of the conversations about what
Southeast Asia wants to do in the future.”
Australian business leader, 2023

The development of Australia’s foreign policy forSoutheast Asia, and specifically for engaging with
ASEAN, has been a step-by-step process, over decades,
creating confidence within Australia and across theregion. Australia has embraced the guiding principles
of ASEAN diplomacy, including the key concept of“centrality”. As Tan See Seng, a leading Singaporean
analyst has explained, “Centrality, as such, is theassumption that the Association should rightfully be thehub of and driving force behind the evolving regionalarchitecture of the Asia Pacific” (Tan, 2012: 26). Thatarchitecture now includes the East Asia Summit, theASEAN Regional Forum, and a variety of other ASEAN“plus partners” meeting formats, convened at a range oflevels including regular leader-level engagements.
Yet within ASEAN some of the debates about how tobest shape the region’s future are loud and vibrant.
To consider the Indonesian foreign policy landscapeis to grapple with, for instance, the longstanding callfrom Rizal Sukma, a former Executive Director of theCentre for International and Strategic Studies in Jakarta,
and a former Indonesian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, for consideration of a “post-ASEAN foreign
policy” (Sukma, 2012). As Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto(2017) summarises:	There have been calls for Jakarta to contemplatea ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’, introduce ASEANminus-X or voting mechanisms, or focus onalternative multilateral groupings that can better
fit Indonesia’s strategic preferences.
According to a well-placed analyst in Jakarta, any
discussion in Indonesia about foreign policy “beyond
ASEAN” simply reflects a “feeling of frustration among
the largest member of ASEAN if ASEAN is unwilling tomove forward, then there is a serious danger of losinginterest in ASEAN”. If a post-ASEAN strategy were to becontemplated, then the question must be: which poweror organisation will take the place of ASEAN? For now,
the only viable pathway for the rest of ASEAN’s Member
States, without the capacity to contemplate such a
possibility, is to continue to maintain that precarious
balance of accommodating regional interests for thesake of survival and in so doing, enhance ASEAN’s
agency in decision-making (for historical context
and critique see Lim, 1998). To do so, ASEAN needs
mechanisms to manage differences and to deal withthe sometimes divergent needs of its members. Someof these dynamics will likely never be resolved. As one
Southeast Asian analyst explained:	Within ASEAN, maritime Southeast Asia looks at
mainland Southeast Asia as a different world, andthe fact is that maritime and mainland histories don’tintertwine, and the region has separate histories.
Australia’s strong connections with both maritime andmainland Southeast Asia is, in this context, noted as asignificant benefit of its engagement with ASEAN. There
are few other countries with such obvious interests in all
corners of Southeast Asia.

“ASEAN multilateralism is founded ina model of cooperation where ASEAN
provides the central platform for a rangeof other regional bodies, including theASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus 3,
and the East Asia Summit. Australia is
deeply committed to this model.”Former Australian Ambassador to ASEAN,
H.E. Will Nankervis, 2021▶A
 ustralia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, speaks at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, 12 July 2023. © DFAT34

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 35

▲ T he Hon Anthony Albanese, Prime Minister of Australia, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, Mr. Nicholas Moore, Australia’s Special
Envoy for Southeast Asia, and Indonesian dignitaries, including Mr. Asjad Rasjid, Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, at the launchof Invested: Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040 in Jakarta, 6 September 2023. © DFAT

Building shared futures through ASEAN
Attention to managing different perspectives is also
relevant to ASEAN’s engagement with Australia.
Among both ASEAN and Australian analysts there isappreciation that there will not always be agreement
on issues of significance, but that there is now along history of productive interaction. For Australia,
questions of democratic and humanitarian values cancomplicate both multilateral and bilateral engagements.
At the same time, for ASEAN, Australia is sometimes
expected to play a useful role helping to translate its
institutional and cultural perspectives to its close allies
and partners in other parts of the world. Indeed, while
Gyngell (2022: 19) argues, “The ASEAN way – low-keyed,allusive, indirect – is not Australia’s”, it appears that,over time, Australia has become more comfortablewith the diplomacy modelled by ASEAN. Increasingly,
Australian Governments prefer to find outcomes that
rely on coalitions of shared interest and long histories
of productive collaboration. Noting the value of suchapproaches, the message from one senior Indonesiananalyst was that “Indonesia has ASEAN-ised theIndo-Pacific strategy”.
There is now the opportunity to continue building on theComprehensive Strategic Partnership and its structured
approach to managing dialogue and joint activity.
How might this be done? According to Allan Behm
(2022: 266):

36

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS	For Australia, a serious diplomatic investment
on ASEAN and its institutions is a no-brainer, yet
we potter around the edges of the association,
substituting action with soothing words.
A major Southeast Asian policy advisor and analyst
explained that the “most we can do is manage potential
conflicts”. Taking up this theme, Kishore Mahbubani(2022: 89) writes:	The best vision would be to position Australia as
the natural bridge between the East and West.
And to achieve this role, it must be accepted as apartner by both the East and the West, as ASEAN
is. It can be done.
An emerging Australian analyst of ASEAN affairs goeseven further, suggesting that:	Australia, at the government level, and in terms ofwhat our universities do, needs to be much more
flexible, with the recognition that Australia within
Southeast Asia is really not that important in thescheme of things.

Priorities for Australia in Southeast Asia
Over the past five decades, Australia has increased andexpanded its ambitions for cooperation with ASEAN.
The next steps in this relationship can obviously build on
the foundations that are now well-established. Careful
diplomacy, broad ambitions, and a sense of sharedpurpose have shaped a remarkable story of crosscultural engagement.

As Australia’s Ambassador to ASEAN accredited in 2024,
H.E. Tiffany McDonald, has emphasised, “we have somuch to point to in terms of the success of the ASEANAustralia partnership – but also so much to look forward
to for the next fifty years and beyond. Our collaboration
truly is going from strength to strength”.
For the future, there are reasons to imagine that
Australia will need to continue to innovate to ensurethat it remains a partner of choice in what will always
be a rapidly changing region. In the specific context of
ASEAN-Australia relations, Mahbubani and Sng argue
that a “geopolitical buffer that ASEAN could develop is a
closer partnership with Australia and New Zealand” (2021:
192). Maintaining awareness of these realities is a crucial
starting point. As Allan Gyngell argues in his conclusion
to Fear of Abandonment, “Everything Australia wants
to accomplish as a nation depends on its capacities tounderstand the world outside its border and respondeffectively to it” (Gyngell, 2021: 408).
Some parts of Southeast Asia know only too well the tollof military conflict, with ongoing conflict in Myanmar,and historical conflicts in Thailand, the Philippines
and Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, carrying
serious local and regional consequences. The violence
unleashed since Myanmar’s 2021 coup is a further
reminder of what can happen when a period of relative
stability ends abruptly.

Avoiding such conflict is a foundational ambition for
the ASEAN grouping, which has navigated regionaland global storms since its inception. As we look ahead,continuing to develop Australia’s engagement withthe conflict resolution mechanisms of ASEAN should
remain a core priority of both Australian and Southeast
Asian foreign policies, and a primary goal of regional
diplomacy. How the countries of the region work
together to manage our most challenging security,
economic and social issues will be the test for the next
fifty years.

“A… long-term theme in Australia’s ASEAN
relations is that cooperation has worked
best when Australia has been able tooperate in collaboration with key membersof ASEAN in developing policy initiatives.”
Dr. Frank Frost, historian of ASEAN-Australia
relations (2016: 192)

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 37

Recommendations for the future
Through official statements, and in many other forums, ASEAN and Australia, andindividual Southeast Asians and Australians, highlight ambitions to work together
even more collaboratively and intensively in future.
As this report has explained, there are an increasing
range of initiatives and activities which maintain
Australia’s long-term commitments to ASEAN’s
development. It is important that recommendations
about the next stage of engagement build on thesestrengths and remain attentive to capacity and policy
priorities within Australia and across ASEAN.

In practice, there will likely remain a range of different
vehicles for engagement, including various official
and semi-official groupings. Under its auspices an
ASEAN-Australia Centre would be well-placed to curate
an ASEAN-Australia Think Tank Network for regional
dialogue that focuses on strategic issues and regional
economic cooperation.

In highlighting a selection of recommendations for
future activities, we have drawn on insights frominterviews and discussions about where Australia has– both historically and today – proved successful in
its engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia.
These strengths provide a strong foundation for further
discussion and for the consideration of ideas that canhelp to shape the future of ASEAN-Australia ties.

In concert with the new ASEAN-Australia Centre,
existing groupings like the ASEAN-Australia Chamber ofCommerce, and other business-oriented organisations,would be able to work to promote the understandingof Australia among Southeast Asian and Australianbusiness leaders. The Centre would also have as part ofits mandate a portfolio of awareness-raising activities toinform the Southeast Asian and Australian publics about
the value and direction of their “fifty plus” yearsof partnership ties.

Opportunities for Australia and ASEAN
1. Establishment of an ASEAN-Australia Centre
Australia has a constellation of universities, think tanks,
community organisations and other stakeholders thatare deeply committed to further developing ASEANAustralia relations, with many links to key institutions
across Southeast Asia. Australia and ASEAN would bothbenefit greatly from the establishment of a futurefocussed, analytically-minded and commerciallyoriented ASEAN-Australia Centre. It could assist with
fostering educational linkages, including throughschools in Australia and ASEAN, as well as promoting
cross-cultural ties. There are already successful models inAustralia, such as the National Foundation for AustraliaChina Relations and the new Centre for Australia-India
Relations. ASEAN has existing models of supporting
ASEAN Centres with some of its Dialogue Partners,
such as the ASEAN-Japan Centre, the ASEAN-Korea
Centre and the ASEAN-India Centre, as well as the new
U.S.-ASEAN Centre, a partnership with Arizona State
University. There is also the successful model of theASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institutein Singapore.
One incremental approach would build on the AustraliaASEAN Council’s existing mandate, potentially in acontext where the new Centre grows to be hosted by anumber of Australian institutions. The long-term model
might also require a small physical footprint in ASEAN,
probably in Jakarta, to help support coherent long-term
collaboration. Like in other realms, there will remain aquestion of how much an ASEAN-Australia Centre would
do to support specific bilateral relationships.

38

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS

2. Integrated model of ASEAN-Australia
youth leadership
Through the Australia Awards, the Australia for ASEAN
Scholarships, the New Colombo Plan and otherschemes, Australia has invested heavily in developing
educational linkages with the countries of Southeast
Asia. Australia is a top education destination for many
ASEAN countries and has nurtured, over decades,
cohorts of Southeast Asians who have been educatedin Australia. What is currently lacking is a model tobetter integrate these cohorts, creating a shared senseof purpose, direction and belonging, and providing
opportunities to high-potential future leaders to build
connections from a young age. The ASEAN-Australia
Strategic Youth Partnership is a positive example of what
can happen when young leaders come together to shareexperiences, learn from experts, and share programsof interest to a wide range of people from both ASEAN
members and from Australia.
The systematic management of alumni associations
is one way to promote educational linkages between
ASEAN countries and Australia, such as those highlighted
by Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic
Strategy to 2040. As one example, the Australian Alumni
Association of Cambodia has organised events, often
in partnership with the Australian Embassy in Phnom
Penh, which bring together its members and maintaintheir relationships with Australia. Some of its members,
upon the completion of their studies in Australia, havebecome successful in their home country and assumed
leadership positions in the private and public sectors.
The fact that it has a physical presence in Phnom Penhmakes it a focal point for many different activities.

▲A ustralia’s first resident Ambassador to ASEAN, H.E. Simon Merrifield, presented Letter of Credentials to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, H.E. Le Luong Minh,
1 October 2013. © ASEAN Secretariat

A further area worthy of exploration is tailored
scholarship support for policy and academic talent
in ASEAN countries to study and research on thedevelopment of Australian foreign policy, society andpolitics. Such leaders would be encouraged to sustain
career-long linkages between ASEAN and Australia,
building on aspects of the successful Australia-ASEAN
Emerging Leaders Program, which focuses on social
entrepreneurs, and on the range of activities convened
under the ASEAN-Australian Strategic Youth
Partnership banner.

“For young people in Southeast Asia,
individual level life in Australia is attractive
in terms of the culture, weather and thepeople. And so whether you were thinking
about the bilateral ties or about Australia at
the regional level it is really about people
and how do you facilitate their connections.”

With any such investments, it will remain important,from the beginning, to systematically manage
the alumni community. Ideally there will be more
opportunities for young leaders to contribute practicalpolicy recommendations to official processes at theASEAN-Australia interface. At the same time, it is worth
considering how Australia can ensure it remains an
open and accessible market for ASEAN talent. Many
stakeholders engaged throughout this report praised
Australia’s shift towards embracing working holiday visas
for young Southeast Asians, but also indicated that more
assertive programs to foster talent mobility – in both
directions – would be welcome.

ASEAN emerging leader, 2023

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 3 9

▲D uring the COVID-19 global pandemic the Australia-ASEAN Emerging Leaders Program convened online across Australia and around Southeast Asia to maintainclose people-to-people relations. © Elise Stephenson

3. Digital economy transformations
and knowledge sharing

4. S hared innovation on climate change
and the energy transition

ASEAN and Australia can continue to strengthen
cooperation in cybersecurity, cyber-governance andcyber-technology, and also around the regulationand management of social, political and economic
progress in the digital age. In the context of the ASEAN
Digital Economy Framework Agreement, Australia and
ASEAN should also consider cooperation in creating
shared digital infrastructure as a mechanism forenhancing digital technology cooperation but also forpromoting people-to-people digital linkages, andalso improving digital literacy and managing theproliferation of disinformation.

The challenges of climate change, decarbonisation,and sustainable green financing are a key theme in the
ASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality and in Invested:
Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.
Many stakeholders across ASEAN are interested in how
Australia and countries in Southeast Asia can cooperateon helping to develop a regional integrated smart power
grid and Electric Vehicle production ecosystem, and how
large-scale renewable energy linkages can be created.
This is judged a key area for the revitalisation anddiversification of Foreign Direct Investment, with clear
economic and social benefits locally and globally.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Australia-ASEAN
Academics Forum brought together innovators fromthe higher education sector to share lessons on digitalpedagogy and student engagement. Australia is also
currently committing resources to support Southeast
Asian governments to respond to cyber threats throughits Cyber and Critical Tech Cooperation Program. For
instance, there is the Cyber Bootcamp Project initiatedby the ANU National Security College and ANU Cyber
Institute. These efforts are crucial for building resilient
societies, and are a linchpin for the other positive
agendas, such as cooperation in climate and energy
transition issues, that ASEAN and Australia will wantto advance in the years ahead.

40

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS“Might there be ways to develop green
and blue economies? How do we explore
the vast potential of Australia
for renewable energy?”
Former senior ASEAN official, 2023

With the long-term planning and supply chain shifts
implied by the next phase of the energy transition, it
should be possible to use both ASEAN and Australianexperience to promote cooperation on different
initiatives, including on linking physical infrastructure,promoting sustainable financing, and harmonisationof standards. The concern in ASEAN is that many
Australian investors in the climate and energy sectors
remain focussed on local opportunities and haveoften struggled to fully appreciate the changes inSoutheast Asian economies over recent decades. Theenergy transition and related regulatory, financing andinnovation themes could be given extra prominence inthe forward planning of ASEAN-Australia cooperation.
Senior ASEAN figures are almost unanimous in theirassessment that this is a high priority across the region
and a clear area where cooperation with Australia willlead to long-term benefits for all involved.
5. Strengthen Timor-Leste as a new ASEAN member
From both Australian and ASEAN perspectives, there isbroad-based support for Australia to offer advice andresources to help Timor-Leste become a productive
member in ASEAN, and to sustain its engagement over
the years ahead. The Australian Government has alreadyallocated funding to support Timor-Leste to prepare
for membership, including through various capacity
building workshops and travel programs, and ASEAN
members are working hard to ensure Timor-Leste is set
up for success.

For Timor-Leste, there is also the need to build sufficient
capacity to participate in the more than 1500 ASEAN
meetings each year and to eventually host large
meetings, meaning that they will need to continuelearning by doing through coordinated capacitybuilding efforts of dialogue partners (Lin et al, 2024
:46). Australia’s sustained commitment to this process
will be crucial. Part of Australia’s involvement can help
to bolster intra-ASEAN mechanisms that will support
Timor-Leste’s success.
6. Deepen and broaden Australia’s ASEAN diplomacy
The current assessment in ASEAN capitals is that
Australia is a trusted and energetic partner. The fiftiethanniversary of Dialogue Partnership highlights many
aspects of this partnership. ASEAN engagement by
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Tradeis certainly broad and active. At the same time there
are questions raised about the whole-of-government
commitment from Australia and the need to ensurethat a broad-base of relevant Australian institutions
are involved. There is scope to broaden the level ofengagement by other ministries across diverse ASEAN
sectoral bodies through formal Senior Official andministerial engagement, given Australia can sometimes
be seen as lagging in this area in contrast to other
ASEAN Dialogue Partners such as China, Japan andthe Republic of Korea.

▼ T imor-Leste officials in a Diplomatic Training Programme supported through trilateral cooperation between Malaysia, Australia and Timor Leste, Kuala Lumpur,
September 2023. © Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations of Malaysia

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 41

Consistent interactions between a range of Ministries
and leaders are certainly desirable. It will also be
important that Australia looks to all of the aspects ofnational power and influence that can support longterm and effective engagement with ASEAN. Ideallyleaders at all levels and across all sectors within Australia– Australia’s state governments, universities, enterprises
and organisations of different scales – should have anappreciation of how their work in Southeast Asia cancontribute to, and is supported by, the evolving ASEANAustralia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
One area for further Australian investment instrengthening the work of ASEAN institutions, is theASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEANIPR). While it has great potential to produce practicalideas and approaches for how ASEAN can preventand manage conflicts, it currently lacks resources.
Another area is for Australia to step away fromvalues-based engagement and drill down into
principles-based engagement with the region whichaligns with Australia’s interests in upholding a rulesbased order. A focus on a principles-based approach
can provide much assurance to ASEAN countries.
7. Continue to invest in Indo-Pacificsecurity and ASEAN Centrality
ASEAN and Australia have a shared interest in a peaceful,inclusive, stable and prosperous region. They are also wellaligned in how to achieve such a region – by maintaining
and promoting agreed rules and norms, ensuring ASEAN
Centrality, looking at practical measures to preventand resolve conflict, and upholding the principles andpurposes of the UN Charter, ASEAN Charter, Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation and the AOIP.

42

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSAustralia can influence its partners to invest in IndoPacific security, including through the East Asia Summit.
Indeed, the East Asia Summit could be configured forbetter follow through on commitments made by leadersin the context of the AOIP.
With ASEAN now embracing the Indo-Pacific concept
for its own strategic deliberations, Australia can play a
key role in the discussions that will help to safeguard
regional peace and prosperity. Geopolitical tensions haveincreased in recent years, with implications for Australia
and across ASEAN. ASEAN stakeholders anticipate that
the Indian Ocean and Pacific Island regions will remain
important parts of this conversation, with Australia
therefore usefully positioned as a key partner.
Australia’s strong track record on rule of law puts it ingood stead to support the development of institutions
and governance mechanisms in ASEAN countries
at the national and regional levels. Investments instrengthening the rule of law in ASEAN countries will
benefit economy, society and security alike. Security
for ASEAN is, understandably, broadly conceived ascooperation on managing geopolitical tensions; disasterrisk reduction; pandemic prevention; humanitarian
response; food security, which is widely deemed a“comparative advantage of Australia”; and cyber security
and efforts to counter organised crime. Australia isjudged to be active on each of these issues and could
make further investments to support ASEAN priorities.
At the same time, ASEAN members have differing
assessments of the relevance of AUKUS and Quadminilateralism. Some suggest that these will, in time,
prove to be further well-accepted components of theregional architecture while others caution that Australia
will need to ensure it continues to explain its own
strategic and security priorities in ways that offer somelevel of reassurance to ASEAN partners.

On its side, the Australian Government will continue toexplain how the Quad insists on ASEAN Centrality andthat AUKUS makes Australia a more capable security
partner for the region. In this context, there is wide
agreement that maintaining a robust, rules-based
ASEAN-led regional architecture will remain crucial
for regional peace and prosperity.
8. Investments in peace, security and development
cooperation with ASEAN’s newer members
From the beginning of its cooperation with ASEAN,
Australia has been a key initiator and participant in awide range of multilateral and bilateral development
activities. Australia remains an active development
partner around the world, and has increasingly
prioritised opportunities to work closely with ASEAN andSoutheast Asia. An example is the Aus4ASEAN Futures
Initiative which supports ASEAN priorities, including theInitiative for ASEAN Integration to assist less developed
countries of mainland Southeast Asia to make themost of the potential benefits of regional integration.
By leveraging its expertise and resources, Australia has
future opportunities to contribute significantly to theregion’s development, aligning its efforts with
ASEAN’s goals and priorities to ensure sustainable
and inclusive growth.

Australia’s previous engagements in promoting security
and stability in conflict situations in Cambodia andTimor-Leste are seen as valuable precedents. These
engagements provide insights into the potential for
positive influence in similar situations, albeit with theunderstanding that Myanmar’s unique context requires
careful consideration. Myanmar’s evolving circumstances
will need to be examined closely as Australia supports
regional stabilisation, dialogue and peace-building work.
Australian engagement on Myanmar will therefore
need to remain attentive to ASEAN preferences withcareful study of those areas where any future Australian
contribution would be especially valuable.

“We need to be practical about the issues
and we should be able to support the people
on the ground. We do feel that Southeast
Asia needs to be peaceful and stable andthe more that Australia-ASEAN relations canbuild on that together the better it will befor everybody. The better that we manage
all of these challenges elegantly the morevaluable we will be for the world.”
ASEAN official, 2023

Australia’s role as a constructive partner in addressing
the complex challenges facing Southeast Asia is also
widely recognised among officials and analysts. Australia
is a long-term and widely trusted development partner
across the region. It is well understood that Myanmar’s
recent political and economic deterioration is a major
test for the region’s overall peace and stability withpotential spill-over risks to the rest of the region.

▼A ustralia’s Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon Tim Watts MP, signs the Second Protocol to Amend the Agreement Establishing theASEAN-Australia New Zealand Free Trade Area (the AANZFTA upgrade) alongside Brunei, Indonesia and New Zealand, in Semarang, Indonesia,
21 August 2023. © DFATASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 43

44

ASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARSNote on sources
This report benefits from interviews, discussions androundtables in Australia and across Southeast Asia.
Cooperation from a wide range of institutions, including
the ASEAN Secretariat and the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, has made it possible to develop
an up-to-date and wide-ranging analysis of the past,present and future of ASEAN-Australia ties. The authors

would like to thank the Australian Mission to ASEAN,
the board members of the Australia-ASEAN Council,
the University of Tasmania, the Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies (Jakarta), Griffith Asia Institute(Australia), the Asian Vision Institute (Phnom Penh),and ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore) for their
engagement with the report.

Discussions and interviews were conducted with a wide range of people including:
Dr. Shafiah Muhibat

Ms. Januaria Septiyani

Mr. Him Rotha

Dr. Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Ms. Mich Senghor

Mr. Ricardo Stevano Ruru

H.E. Allaster Cox

Mr. Andreas Zurbrugg

Mr. Kristoforus Adit

Mr. Aaron Connelly

Mr. Tim Paterson

Mr. Calvin Khoe

Mr. Evan Laksmana

Dr. Chheang Vannarith

Dr. Mutiara Pertiwi

H.E. M.I. Derry Aman

Ms. Sun Molika

Mr. Dandy Rafitrandi

H.E. Bovonethat Douangchak

Ms. Sella Ramadhani

Ms. Sarah Willis

Mr. Ric Smith

Mr. Andrew Japri

Ms. Caroline Scott

Professor Tony Milner

Ms. Claudia Wijaya

H.E. Satvinder Singh

Mr. Stephen Scott

Ms. Clara Yoshelina

Ms. Susan Jones

Professor Ian Hall

Mr. Reno Athallah

Mr. Jusuf Wanandi

Ms. Yan Sophorn

Mr. M. Salman Al Farisi

Ms. Su-Yin Lew

Mr. Hem Thel

Mr. Brama Yudha

Mr. Andrew Parker

Mr. Thong Mengdavid

Mr. Ilham Nasution

Mr. Ong Keng Yong

Ms. Hay Seangmey

Ms. Nadya Yulianto

Mr. Peter Ho

Ms. Oung Sivven

Ms. Tamerlaine Beasley

Mr. Nicholas Basan

Mr. Ton Linasopharith

Ms. Hayley Winchombe

Ms. Racheline Tantular

Ms. Kou Siekmouy

Ms. Rosie Vlahos

Mr. Tavis Tan

Ms. Samreth Chansereiroth

H.E. Dr. Cheunboran Chanborey

Mr. Dario Morosini

Mr. Pheng Thean

Mr. Ray Hervandi

Ms. Yeat Senghor

ASEAN- Australia Strategic
Youth Partnership, Singapore

H.E. Will Nankervis

Ms. Ung Sophealeak

Mr. Adrian Gilbert

Ms. Song Sokvimean

H.E. Megan Jones

Mr. Siek Ramekh

Mr. Cosimo Thawley

H.E In Sophal

Ms. Katty Danni

Mr. Lak Chansok

Mr. Glenn Keys

Mr. Soth Chhayheng

Ms. Bia Puspita

Mr. Him Reaksmey

ASEAN- Australia Strategic
Youth Partnership, Jakarta
ASEAN-Australia Strategic
Youth Partnership, Phnom Penh
Australia-Indonesia
Youth Association, Jakarta
Australian Mission to ASEAN◀ F lags of ASEAN and Australia. © DFATASEAN AND AUSTRALIA AFTER THE FIRST 50 YEARS 45

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