The Impacts of Colonial Institutions on Gender Equality

A ThesisPresented to
The Faculty of International Social Sciences
Gakushuin University

byIyoko Someya
December 2023

© 2023
Iyoko Someya
All rights reserved.

1

Abstract
This paper examines whether past institutions affect current gender inequality (measured by Women,
Business and the Law Index) in 63 former colonies by considering government effectivenessthroughout the past two decades. Also, the early settlement of Europeans and the level of democracy
at the year of dependence are used as instruments for past institutions, assuming that those factors
contribute to current governance and, thereby institutions. By conducting a cross-sectional analysis
and a panel data analysis separately, it turned out that (1) the quality of current institutions is significant
for determining WBL in neo-Europes and Africa, while (2) female representation in the labor force aswell as national parliaments are crucial in the long term. In addition to result (1), the analysis
also confirms path dependency of institutions and the influences that may affect gender equality atpresent, though mostly limited to neo-Europes. These results suggest that institutions might not be the
top priority if a gender-equal society is intended, but the influences from the past remain in countries
having the strongest connection with its former suzerain. Moreover, as the previous literature claims,
increasing female representation in politics and the labor market will be the impetus for equality.

Keywords: Gender equality; Women, Business and the Law Index (WBL); Colonial institutions;
Governance
JEL Classification Number: C12, C31, C33, C36, D02, D63, Z132

Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge Professor Tomohiko Inui at the Faculty of International Social
Sciences, who had kindly instructed me in writing this thesis. I would also like to sincerely thank myfamily and peers for their heart-warming encouragement.

3Section I: Introduction
There is gender inequality in numerous perspectives: political representation, norms, education, labor
force participation, earnings, and so on. Though being argued against by some studies, gender equality
is not only crucial from an ideological point of view but also contributes to improving the efficiencyof the overall economy. Previous research showed that there was a mutual causality between women’s
empowerment and economic development (Duflo, 2012). Approximately 40% of the growth in U.S.
market GDP per capita was explained by removed barriers against women and people of color in thelabor market and education (Hsieh et al., 2019), and regional differences in economic growth werealso partially attributable to gender gaps in employment (Klasen and Lamanna, 2009). On a householdbasis, the effects of unearned income on a family’s health became larger when mothers controlled andallocated the income (Thomas, 1990). A more recent study by Malapit et al (2015) also revealed thatthe empowerment of women in agriculture improved children’s height along with dietary diversity in
Nepal. Recently, Claudia Goldin’s winning the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences also shed light on
women’s participation and presence in economic activities.
Despite all the advantages and necessity, the current situation has been problematic globally.
Estimation by the World Economic Forum shows that 131 years are needed to completely close thegender gap; for the Middle East and North Africa, it will take 152 years (World Economic Forum,2023). Another indicator of gender parity, which is the Women, Business and the Law Index publishedby the World Bank (hereafter WBL Index) also depicts a regionally dispersed progress in institutional
equality of gender. In the WBL Index, the main focus is whether women are ensured to exert the samerights as men in the following eight domains: mobility, workplace, pay, marriage, parenthood,entrepreneurship, assets, and pension. Figure 1 illustrates the trends of the WBL Index in several
regions with total performance below the global average, while Figure 2 is the breakdown of eachindicator in 2023. Though with differences among achievement in the subindices, these regions are all
far from parity.

4

Figure 1: WBL Index (2023) and progress over time

Source: World Bank (2023).
Notes: EAP=East Asia & Pacific, SAR=South Asia, MENA=Middle East & North Africa.

Figure 2: Performance by indicators and regions (2023)

Source: World Bank (2023).

As mentioned above, there are various ways to consider the issue. Literature in economics
provides us with especially detailed and abundant analyses regarding the effects of disparity, as will
be reviewed later; however, less attention is paid to the causes, i.e., what has led to the current situation.
The problem is, that if we do not clarify the causes, the antidotes might be, if not totally, ineffective.
5

To consider the causes of a certain phenomenon, I would like to refer to path dependency. In terms of
economics, one well-known example of path dependency is the prevalence of the QWERTY keyboard
articulated by David (1985) and Arthur (1989), showing the sequence of changes that led to its wide
adoption. The key here is that once such a path is established, the dominant choice will no longer
change even if more efficient technology (in this case, a more convenient arrangement of the keyboard)
appears. Several studies in politics applied this concept and suggested that institutions are formed
within the realm of shared cognitions, as exemplified in Katzenstein’s work (1996) which discussed
the impacts of social norms on political interests and eventually the Japanese security policy.
Thus, investigating the history of gender equality provides us with its path, and enables us
to figure out whether there was path dependency. If so, policies to achieve gender equality should also
take into consideration society-specific factors such as norms and institutions resulting from history;
if not, we shall confirm that the path to gender equality is not narrowed by the past, and there must beother impetus of equality. In this paper, I will try to analyze the historical causes of institutional genderdisparity at present, and the predominant purpose of this research is to reveal the influences brought
by former suzerains to the (in)equality of gender in former colonies.
There are two reasons to focus on former colonies. Firstly, the majority of them are still
categorized as developing countries and often suffer more from the gender gap, though with some
exceptions such as the United States and Australia. Secondly, Thelen (1999) pointed out thatexogenous shocks cannot be ignored when considering the formation of institutions. Colonialism isby no means a phenomenon that occurred within those countries, but rather a system exogenously
introduced. Therefore, examining colonial impacts on institutions may also provide some implications
regarding the extent to which endogenous reforms are effective.
Before moving to the next section, I will discuss the importance of research combining
distinct fields or frameworks. Historical factors, which are the focus of this paper, are sometimes
deemed too ambiguous to quantify. Also, due to the tendency to focus on specific and individual
contexts, a historical approach might seem inadequate for deducing generalizable principles.
6

Nonetheless, the explanation regarding development in institutionalism by Thelen (1999, p.370) seems
reasonable enough for the author to combine historical context with an empirical approach, thereby
trying to figure out general patterns and causes of change. The following quote also implies thepossibility of inter-disciplinary research:
The walls dividing the three perspectives (note: different schools in institutionalism, withfocus on rational choice, history, and sociology respectively) have also been eroded by“border crossers” who have resisted the tendencies toward cordoning these schools offfrom each other and who borrow liberally (and often fruitfully) where they can, in orderto answer specific empirical questions.

Also, research on economic history has been made of most of the existing archives to provide insights
based on quantitative methodologies. For instance, Acemoglu et al (2002) delved into the impacts ofcolonial institutions on GDP, using figures of European settlement, constraints in executive, anddemocracy in 1900 to analyze institutional differences, which will be explained later in Section II.
The next section reviews previous literature regarding the institutional influences on gender
parity and the impacts of colonial institutions respectively. Section III explains the data andmethodology adapted, followed by Section IV which deals with the results of the analysis. Lastly,
Section V concludes and provides some points for discussion.

Section II: Literature Review
II.A: Institutional influences on gender equality
This subsection aims to review the reasons institutions have been deemed crucial for gender equality.
To begin with, it is worth recognizing how disadvantageous institutions have hindered women fromobtaining power, or more simply, employment. According to Goldin (2021), ‘marriage bar’ in the
United States, namely government institutions that allowed schools and enterprises not to hire married

7women or dismiss women if they got married, had been an obstacle for them to build careers until thiskind of ‘hire bar’ and ‘retain bar’ were abolished at the beginning of 1950s.
Institutions detrimental to women would hamper their success; likewise, ones preferable tothem would reduce gender disparity. In terms of the gender wage gap, Baker et al (2023) confirmed
the effectiveness of pay disclosure in narrowing the gap in Canadian universities and colleges. The
difference-in-difference analysis revealed that the disclosure laws reduced gender pay disparity among
university professors and staff by approximately 20-40%, and the effects were larger if institutes were
early adapters of the laws due to the larger pay gap existed at the time when wage transparency was
not yet introduced. Other studies also suggest similar results that pay transparency contributes toclosing the gender gap in wages (Bennedsen et al, 2022), and the Salary History Ban (SHB), which
prohibits employers from gaining information regarding employees’ past or present wages, waseffective for increasing women’s salary relative to men (Hansen & McNichols, 2020).
Secondly, studies have shown that government endeavors such as the well-known
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs improved women’s household bargaining power. The
beneficiaries of CCT programs are those below the poverty line and strictly fulfill the conditions
regarding their health and schooling of children. CCT programs are shown to bring an increase in
women’s income along with their bargaining power within the household, thereby reducing the risk of
domestic violence against women in Uruguay (Borraz & Munyo, 2020). Their study was in line withthe theory on household bargaining power and domestic violence, which suggests a reduction inviolence against women in accordance with a smaller gender wage gap (e.g., Aizer, 2010). Therefore,
it is reasonable to argue that institutions can be both building blocks and stumbling blocks for gender
parity. The next subsection deals with literature regarding how colonial institutions have influenced
current institutions.

8II.B: Impacts of colonial institutions on the present
Previously the positive and negative roles of institutions are discussed. Undoubtedly, it is preferable
to acquire institutions to encourage growth and equality, but we need to notice that the quality ofcurrent institutions is not independent at the time of measurement, and a careful investigation of theinstitutions’ origins is called for. Historical influences are considered crucial for formulating current
institutions, as will be discussed hereafter.
Acemoglu et al (2002) explained the difference in GDP per capita among 64 former colonies
using protection against expropriation risk and postulated that the disparity in property-related
institutions originated from the colonial era. When a colony was difficult for the Europeans to settle,
they simply aimed to utilize the resources, so that the colony became an ‘extractive state’; on the other
hand, in ‘settler colonies’ where Europeans settled, they introduced their institutions, which were moredeveloped concerning property rights protection. He set early settlers’ mortality as an exogenous
variable to estimate the existence of European settlement, thereby the impacts of colonization on earlyinstitutions. The result of his analysis was that settler colonies enjoyed higher per capita GDP even at
the end of the 20th century.
Regarding the colonial influences on gender equality, there is a bunch of research from thestandpoint of case studies. Here, I will summarize research on the United States (Glenn, 2015), India(Chatterjee, 1989), and Zaïre (Yates, 1982). Firstly, according to Glenn (2015), perceptions of genderwere created under settler colonialism in the US. As white settlers needed to occupy the land in the
New Continent and dwell, both indigenous and foreign people were deemed threatening, andespecially the former group was the object of exclusion. In that process, the settlers also introduced
extreme gender differentiation as they perceived it as a symbol of civilization. The result ofdifferentiation based on both gender and race was the concept of weak white women who needed
protection and subjugated women of other races who were often subjected to sexual violence. The
study demonstrated how settler colonialism brought about the formation of race and gender thatremains today and corresponds to Acemoglu’s framework that settlers introduced their institutions that9

have long-lasting effects, but different from his argument since it was in an aspect of gender and racial
norms.
The example of India by Chatterjee (1989) was similar in a way considering the role ofcolonization in forming the inferiority of women relative to men. In the colonialist discourse, specificrituals such as widow burning were chosen in order to prove the inferiority of traditional culture, sothat the settlers could justify their domination and ‘civilization’ of Indian people. Westerners back inthe 19th century regarded Indian women as unfree and oppressed. This kind of perception did not
directly form the status of women in Indian society; however, it is interesting to note that nationalism,
which is on the opposing side of colonialism, also did not assume women to act independently, butrather assigned them “a place, a sign, and an objectified value”. A similar ‘civilizing task’ also existed
in the Belgian Congo, or Zaïre. Yates (1982) pointed out that women have had traditional gender roles,
which had been rather diverse because of the variety in ethnic groups; while the framework of extreme
Catholicism introduced to the country assigned more restricted roles to them. Colonization, thus, led
to a ‘double bind’ of women under both traditional and colonial norms. These examples illustrated
how colonization affected gender norms in different colonies through the propaganda of civilization,and implied the possibility of colonial institutions affecting gender equality in the colonized societies.

Figure 3: The possible mechanism of colonial, current institutions, and gender parity

Phase 1:
Colonial Institutions

Phase 2:Current Governanceand Institutions

Phase 3:
Legal gender parity(WBL)

To the best of the author’s knowledge, though, current literature has not yet empiricallyrevealed the colonial impacts on gender parity in a unified framework covering the full spectrum of
former colonies. As mentioned in the previous subsection, institutions can both improve or worsen the10situation for women. Also, this subsection reviewed studies regarding colonial impacts on both
institutions and gender. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize the following mechanism (Figure 3).
If colonial institutions affect the quality of current institutions regarding economic activities,
the question is whether such effects also exist in legal and political institutions that may affect gender
parity and linger until the present day. Although colonial discourse was the main focus of the casestudies mentioned above, they did not pay enough attention to institutions. For an attempt to reveal
the relationship between institutions and gender parity, I set the null hypothesis (𝐻! ) and alternative
hypothesis (𝐻" ) as follows:
𝐻! : Colonial institutions have no effects on gender equality in former colonies, because they do notaffect current institutions at all.
𝐻" : Gender equality is partially attributable to colonial institutions due to its influences on current
institutions.

Section III: Methodology and Data
Figure 4: Former colonies covered in this paper

11Source: MapChart 1
First of all, this paper deals with two sets of analyses using both cross-sectional and panel data, in therange of 63 former colonies and their suzerains displayed in Figure 4; also, the list of countries issummarized in Appendix 1. Some former colonies such as the Philippines and (part of) China are notincluded in the sample, since the data on early European settlers’ mortality, which will be used in the
cross-sectional analysis, was not available in these countries.
It is due to constraints in the number of observations and the difficulty of observing timeseries trends in the cross-sectional data that a set of panel data between 1996 and 2022 is also analyzed.
I apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to the former dataset, as was in Acemoglu et al (2002);
for the latter set of data, I adopt fixed and random effects models, using Wu-Hausman test to clarify
which method is applicable. The equations for 2SLS are (1), (2), and (3) are below:(1)

𝑊𝐵𝐿# = 𝛼 + 𝛽" 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# + 𝛽$ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠# + 𝛽% 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛# +𝛽& 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦# + 𝛽' 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦# + 𝜀#(2)

𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# = 𝛼 + 𝛾" 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# + 𝑿𝒊 ′ + 𝜀#(3)

𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠# = 𝛼 + 𝜏" 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦# + 𝜏$ 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑿)𝒊 + 𝜀#In the framework I postulate, equations (2) and (3) are the instruments for (1) and (2),respectively, and 𝑿𝒊 denotes a vector of variables that affects both instruments. Here, the second termin equation (1) represents the scores for ‘Government Effectiveness’ in the World Development
Indicators (hereafter WDI), as it refers to perception regarding “the quality of public services, thequality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality ofpolicy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to suchpolicies” (World Bank, 2023). This variable ranges from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 and is standardized.
According to Dejardin (2009), policies to ensure access to public resources and education, public

1

https://www.mapchart.net/world-subdivisions.html.

12health care, and pay equity are required to improve social inequalities. Implementation of these kindsof policies, along with institutions that improve gender disparity mentioned in Section II, should fallin this indicator. If this variable is statistically significant, gender equality is related to institutional
quality, and phases 2 to 3 in Figure 3 will be proved.
The next term is the percentage of female members in the national parliament, followed by
the gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education of females, both extracted from WDI. Having female
representation in politics is thought to have positive impacts on empowering women and easing theconstraints on their life chances (Kabeer, 2005). Also, the reason for considering education as acontributing factor is because I assume a potential relationship between empowerment througheducation and gender parity, referring to Duflo (2012). It is necessary to note that the gross enrolment
rate calculated by the World Bank may exceed 100% since it divides the number of students enrolled
by the population of a certain age group (World Bank, n.d.). Additionally, two dummy variables arefor controlling the possible region-dependent and religion-dependent factors: Figure 2 indicatedregional differences in WBL, and we might also expect disparity based on religions. For instance,
Cooray and Potrafke (2010) showed that culture and religion, especially beliefs in indigenous religions
and Islam were the main reasons for an unbalanced girls-to-boys enrolment ratio in primary andsecondary education.
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 in equation (2) is again ‘Government Effectiveness’ in WDI, but at an
earlier stage, which is 1996. Two terms at the right-hand side of equation (3) indicate whether
democratic institutions are brought into the colonies by observing democracy in the year of
independence, which is taken from the Polity III dataset constructed by Jaggers and Gurr (1996), andthe mortality of early European settlers taken from Acemoglu et al (2002). In the previous section, thepossible route through which settler mortality affects institutions is discussed.
The equation for the panel data analysis is as follows:(4)

𝑊𝐵𝐿#* = 𝛼 + 𝛽" 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒#* + 𝛽$ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠#* + 𝛽% 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒#* +𝛽& 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛#* + 𝛽' 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒#* + 𝛽+ 𝐹𝐷𝐼#* + 𝜀#*13Inflows of foreign direct investment are added because some empirical studies suggest either a positiveor negative relationship between FDI and gender equality (eg: Braunstein, 2006). Moreover, women’slabor force participation positively affects their social position including household bargaining power,
which has been constantly claimed not only by empirical analyses such as Friedberg and Webb (2006)
but also by individual episodes (Kabeer, 1997). Hence, women being able to earn incomes throughparticipating in labor and especially through working in sectors with higher wages may have stronger
power within the household. Considering the WBL index also includes household aspects, thesevariables are supposed to be influential. Lastly, lag terms are used as instruments for explanatory
variables to address reverse causality.
The following tables and figures contain additional information regarding the variables.
Tables 1 and 2 respectively list the definition and summary statistics of the variables used in the crosssectional analysis, while Tables 3 and 4 are those of the panel analysis. Figure 5 shows the distributionof the WBL Index in the panel data, which is close to a normal distribution with some outliers, andFigures 6 to 8 depict the correlation and dispersion of the main variables.
Table 1: List of variables in the cross-sectional analysis
Variable
wbl1322
gv_ef1322

Definition
Average of the Women, Business and the Law Index between 2013 and2022
Average of the score for "Government Effectiveness" between 2013 and 2022

africa_dummy

Average of the percentage of national parliament seats held by women
between 2013 and 2022
Average of female gross enrolment rate of tertiary education between 2010
and 2019
Takes 1 if the colony is an African country

mc_dummy

Takes 1 if the majority of population has Christian Faith

neoeu_dummy

The U.S., Canada, Austalia, New Zealand, Argentina, Uruguay=1

democlosindep

Democracy score at the year of independence, ranges from 0-10

fs_civillaw

Takes 1 if former suzerain was a civil law country

fs_lnsetmor

Log of early settler mortality

gv_ef96

Score for 'Government Effectiveness' at 1996

fparl1322
ter_fe1019

Note: All the tables and figures hereafter are made by the author.
14

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the cross-sectional data

VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

wbl1322
gv_ef1322
fparl1322
ter_fe1019
africa_dummy
mc_dummy
neoeu_dummy
demclosindep
fs_civillaw
fs_lnsetmor
gv_ef96

63
63
62
55
63
63
63
61
63
63
63

73.88
-0.233
23.26
34.56
0.444
0.587
0.0952
3.016
0.603
4.651
-0.180

14.30
0.873
11.08
31.98
0.501
0.496
0.296
3.663
0.493
1.262
0.871

29.38
-2.067
2.894
1.929
0
0
0
0
0
2.146
-1.650

98.50
2.218
48.23
135.4
1
1
1
10
1
7.986
1.993

Table 3: List of variables in the panel data analysis
Variable

Definition

wbl

Women, Business, and the Law Index (0~100)

gv_ef

Score of 'Government Effectiveness'

flfp

Labor force participation rate, female (% of female
population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate)
Proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments (%)
Gross enrolment ratio, upper secondary, female (%)

fparl
enrol_ups_fe
emp_srv_fe
fdi_inEmployment in services, female (% of female
employment) (modeled ILO estimate)
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)

ge_educ_tgdp

Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP)

15

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the panel data

VARIABLES

(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

wbl
gv_ef
flfp
fparl
enrol_ups_fe
emp_srv_fe
fdi_inge_educ_tgdp

897
809
897
825
897
897
897
694

67.87
-0.133
50.04
17.42
57.14
57.72
3.842
4.141

16.01
0.852
15.49
10.15
33.99
25.51
5.244
1.492

26.25
-1.735
11.76
0.615
0.948
8.937
-10.61
1.151

97.50
2.232
84.30
53.08
155.9
95.93
41.53
8.561

Number of c_id

54

54

54

54

54

Figure 5: Distribution of WBL

16

Figure 6: WBL and government effectiveness

Figure 7: WBL and the proportion of female members in the parliament

17

Figure 8: WBL and labor force participation

Lastly, one thing to note is that suzerain states in this paper refer to the latest suzerains rather
than the earliest settlers, as it is more natural to deem that the influence of the latest dominating power
would keep influencing the dominated power rather than the earlier dominating states. Although thedata for settler mortality is constructed using records between the seventeen and nineteenth centuries,
a period at which the nationality of early settlers might differ from later suzerains, I assume that oncethe position of ‘extractive state’ was set, such a status would remain even if another state became theruler afterward.

Section IV: Results
The results are divided into two subsections, as there were two distinct sets of analyses.
IV. A: Cross-sectional data

18

Firstly, the results of the 2SLS and ordinary least squares (OLS) method for different categorizationsof countries are summarized in Table 5. Referring to equations (1) to (3) in the previous section, pastinstitutions in 1996, the level of democracy at the year of independence, and early settler mortality are
instruments for current Government Effectiveness. From the result of the Wu-Hausman test, the 2SLS
method applied to the base sample and the sample without neo-Europe countries shown in the firsttwo columns. Contrarily, in the sample consisting of African countries and non-British former colonies,
the results of 2SLS were not valid. Accordingly, an OLS analysis is conducted and the results are in
the last two columns.

Table 5: 2SLS and OLS results(1)
2SLS
Base Sample
Government effectiveness, average between 2013
and 2022% of parliament seats held by women, average
between 2013 and 2022
Female gross enrolment rate of tertiary education,
average between 2010 and 2019
Africa dummy
Mainly Christian dummyIntercept
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations

7.251**(3.657)0.121(0.152)-0.055(0.092)-5.137(3.599)13.009***(3.286)69.130***(5.158)0.480
0.426
54.000(2)
2SLS
Without
Neoeuropes
5.864(4.673)0.136(0.163)-0.051(0.125)-5.777(3.822)12.657***(3.489)68.579***(6.195)0.390
0.320
49.000

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS
Former suzerain
African countries
adopting civil law
15.084**-1.737(6.194)(6.669)-0.0280.158(0.243)(0.207)-0.2400.023(0.174)(0.121)-15.018***(5.196)
6.307
2.017(4.942)(4.932)78.738***74.554***(9.583)(8.040)
0.307
0.434
0.174
0.330
26.00033.000Though 2SLS was applicable, the coefficient of determination for all the columns is at a
relatively lower level, which implies that the majority of differences in WBL is due to other overlookedfactors. From column (2) we see that except for neo-Europes, path-dependent government
effectiveness is not the main driver for higher WBL, namely legal equality of gender. In other words,
for outliers such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, the impacts of colonial settlement werelong-lasting, while for other countries such effects were negligible. The strong significance and large19coefficient of the Christian dummy, however, are consistent in both columns and for countries withdominant Christian beliefs, the score of WBL is better by approximately 13% than other countries. It
is worth mentioning that institutions are not helpless for women in African countries, but theeffectiveness of government seemed not to depend on the colonial history. In those countries,
improvement in government effectiveness by 1 led to a 15% enhancement in WBL, but the difference
is not driven by instruments regarding colonial institutions. Here is an incongruity between thegenerally accepted belief of colonial influences on institutions, pointing to a further question of how
the current institutions are formed. Since this paper mainly focuses on the contributing factors of WBL,
the argument regarding contributing factors of institutions will be beyond the scope, but it is probableto refer to literature on institutionalism such as Hodgson (1998). Also, the argument of Besley and
Persson (2009) provides valuable insights regarding how the state capacity is formed historically.
Another notable result is the insignificance of religion in Africa, contrasting the colonial discourse ofcivilization through technology and religion.

Table 6: OLS results with gv_ef1322 as dependent variable
Dependent Variable: Government Effectiveness,average between 2013-2022

Government Effectiveness at 1996
Former suzerain adopting civil law (=1)
Log of early European settler mortality
Democracy at the (closest) year of (since) independence
Africa dummy
Mainly Christian dummyIntercept
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Base sample

Without
Neoeuropes

African countries

Former suzerain
adopting civil law

0.845***(0.065)-0.102(0.150)-0.001(0.035)0.003(0.020)-0.227**(0.099)-0.152(0.095)0.165(0.234)
0.851
0.834
61

0.811***(0.078)-0.128(0.160)0.006(0.040)-0.005(0.023)-0.229**(0.104)-0.166(0.101)0.155(0.252)
0.768
0.739
55

0.623***(0.108)-0.092(0.196)-0.007(0.051)-0.012(0.027)-0.054(0.131)-0.299(0.332)
0.623
0.537
28

0.676***(0.101)-0.009(0.047)0.044(0.054)-0.318**(0.141)-0.311**(0.146)0.134(0.256)
0.674
0.623
38

Institutions in Africa are exogenous, but by no means free from path dependence. Based onlinear regressions setting current institutions as the explained variable, past institutional quality
20explains more than half of the variance in the current effectiveness of government (Table 6). If thecolonial impacts are ruled out, then it is necessary to find more effective instruments of past institutions
and reveal the factors behind institutional quality in the past.
Combining these results from the cross-sectional analysis, it is possible to argue that colonial
impacts exist especially in neo-Europe countries, but for other countries, the factors to promote genderequality lie somewhere else, which could be another reason for conducting a panel data analysis.
Although not dependent on colonial history, institutions are also crucial for gender equality in Africancountries. What is more, religions have larger and more significant impacts on the performance of
WBL in non-African countries. In countries whose suzerain adopted civil law, the effects of religion
are slight, while the continent dummy becomes crucial. The reason for significance of continent
dummy might be related to the fact that not many settler colonies were set in African countries. At any
way, there is a need to unravel the mechanism of religious impacts on gender parity as well as therelationship between colonialism and missionary work, for instance how the prevalence of missionary
work and construction of churches in the past affects current gender norms.
In the next section, we will check whether the results from a longer period will provide
similar findings.

IV. B: Panel data
The results of the random effects and fixed effects model are summarized in Table 7, with controls for
year-fixed effects. First and foremost, the Hausman test proved that the fixed effects model is more
precise so I will adopt the results displayed in the latter two columns. The finding consistent withcross-sectional data is that ‘Government Effectiveness’ does not show significance in either of them.
Instead, labor force participation of women and the proportion of females in the parliament were
having consistent impacts on WBL; the industrial structure measured as the ratio of female workers in21

the service industry is significant in the fixed effects estimation before controlling for year effects andis more valid than the educational indicator. Also, the non-significance of education is consistent with
the OLS regression of the cross-sectional data, probably because of the relative prevalence of
education, and the possibility that even if women are educated, they have no political representationand thus are not able to improve their social status. Concerning the insignificance of FDI, one
possibility is that foreign firms and investors base their decisions on the evaluation of the current
situation rather than trying to thoroughly change institutions, norms, and other gender-related factors.

Table 7: Results of random and fixed effects model

Government effectivenessLabor force participation (% of female ages 15+)
Political representation (% of parliament seats held
by women)
Gross enrolment ratio of upper secondary
education (female)
Employment in services (% of female employment)
FDI inflows (% of GDP)
Government expenditure on education (% of GDP)Year dummyIntercept
Number of observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Random effectRandom effect

Fixed effect

Fixed effect-0.098(1.408)0.467***(0.058)0.471***(0.038)0.040**(0.020)0.207***(0.055)0.006(0.067)0.304(0.251)1.156(1.424)
0.398***(0.061)0.388***(0.042)-0.014(0.023)0.133**(0.058)0.008(0.065)0.329(0.246)-1.922(1.722)0.581***(0.072)
0.498***(0.041)
0.032(0.021)0.129*(0.073)0.003(0.068)0.297(0.258)-0.784(1.626)0.432***(0.074)0.397***(0.043)-0.037(0.023)-0.086(0.084)0.024(0.065)0.210(0.248)

No

Yes

No

Yes

20.675***(4.801)463

31.238***(5.468)463

19.659***(5.848)463

43.910***(7.339)463

In column (4) where year effects are added to the country-fixed effects, female labor force
participation and political representation remain significant, while the impacts of employment in thetertiary sector do not. Given the adjusted R2 in Within effect is around 0.583 in the FE model with ayear dummy and the other two indicators of R2 are rather low, this model is optimal for interpreting
the reasons behind changes in WBL within a country, rather than describing international differences.
22

Thence, we can deduce the insights for countries to improve gender equality. Countries may expect
approximately a 1% increase in the WBL index by raising labor participation or political representationof women by 2.5%. Enabling more women to participate not only in the household but also in society
will bring equality and a more comfortable society for all of us who enjoy the fruits of production andeconomic growth.
Before ending this paper, I will briefly summarize the main message and discuss someunresolved issues and improvements for future studies.

Section V: Conclusion and Discussion
In summary, while the effect of government effectiveness was limited, the proportion of female
members in the parliament, which was not significant in the cross-sectional analysis, had soundinfluences on the dependent variable in the panel data analysis. The seemingly contrasting results fromcross-sectional and panel analyses might be attributable to the distinct characteristics of the two typesof analyses, and the selection of instruments, but the results from both sets of analyses were similar inthat they revealed “other possibilities” for gender equality: it is not the far past of institutions and thecolonial era, but the present of women participation in the society that counts.
Still, there are several issues regarding the data and the results of estimation. Firstly,
government effectiveness may not satisfactorily represent the quality of institutions, although that was
the most appropriate variable within the governance indicators, and governance and institutions areclosely related (United Nations, 2015). Secondly, WBL is not able to detect women’s strategic
activities in society under rigid gender norms and inequality. For instance, though previous studies
have shown that gender inequality in education prevails in countries with Islamic beliefs (Cooray andPotrafke, 2011), Muslimah (Muslim women) do not necessarily suffer from lower autonomy andpower within their communities (Morgan et al, 2004). Id est, the focus of this paper is to find23

underlying causes of legal and institutional inequality, but individual contexts are abstracted. Lastly,
the marginal effects of women’s participation in politics and the labor force remain to be revealed.
Some may argue that gender inequality is rooted in culture and religion and is not easily
altered. This is true to some extent; nevertheless, research has shown that traditions and customs arealterable through policies (e.g., Bau, 2021). It is often easier to attribute what we cannot immediately
deal with to a perplexing black box, but if a homo economicus compare the utility of doing so andfinding solutions, she will soon realize what the dominant strategy should be. Also, to boost women’ssocial participation, institutions are needed.

24Appendix
Appendix 1: List of 63 former colonies analyzed in this study (with former suzerain)

Country

FormersuzerainCountry

FormersuzerainCountry

Formersuzerain

Algeria

FranceEthiopia

Italy

Nicaragua

Spain

AngolaPortugal

Gabon

FranceNiger

FranceArgentina

Spain

GambiaBritainNigeria

Britain

Australia

Britain

Ghana

BritainPakistan

Britain

BahamasBritain

GuatemalaSpain

PanamaSpain

Bangladesh

BritainGuineaFranceParaguay

Spain

Bolivia

Spain

GuyanaBritain

Peru

Spain

BrazilPortugal

Haiti

FranceSenegalFranceBurkina Faso

FranceHonduras

Spain

Sierra Leone

BritainCameroon

FranceHong
Kong
SAR, China

Britain

Singapore

Britain

CanadaBritain

India

BritainSouth Africa

Britain

Chile

Spain

Indonesia

Netherlands

Sri Lanka

Britain

Colombia

Spain

Jamaica

Britain

Sudan

BritainCongo, Dem.
Rep.

Belgium

Kenya

BritainTanzania

BritainCongo, Rep.

FranceMadagascar

FranceTogo

FranceCosta Rica

Spain

Malaysia

BritainTrinidadTobagoCote d'Ivoire

FranceMali

FranceTunisia

FranceDominican
Republic

Spain

Malta

Britain

UgandaBritain

Ecuador

Spain

MexicoSpain

United States

Britain

Britain

MoroccoFranceUruguay

Spain

Spain

New Zealand

Britain

Vietnam

FranceEgypt,Rep.

Arab

El Salvador

25

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