CHAPTER 4

Simulated U.S. and Chinese
Nuclear Strikes
The analysis of the numbers, characteristics and deployment of the strategic
nuclear forces of China and the United States presented in this study raises thequestion of what would be the consequences if these forces were ever used. A
nuclear exchange between the United States and China is clearly a remotepossibility – a situation would have to arise that exceeded any crisis of the Cold
War. Ironically, success of a nuclear deterrent strategy is measured by the factthat weapons are never used in the first place. Nevertheless, the nuclear capabilities of China and the United States are assessed by their respective politicaland military leadership in part by the measures of targeting and how effectively
targets are destroyed. This chapter explores the consequences of two nuclear
strike scenarios: An attack by U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles on
China’s long-range ICBMs (DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2), and a strike by Chinese
forces on cities in the continental United States.
Even a rough comparison of the nuclear forces of China and the United Statesraises basic questions about their deterrent relationship, as the United Statescurrently possesses overwhelming nuclear superiority. The United States has inexcess of 2,000 warheads capable of hitting China on short notice. A small
percentage of the U.S. arsenal could be targeted against all Chinese strategic
nuclear systems, Command and Control (C2) sites and major conventional
military assets. Although not thought to be part of the current U.S. war plans,an even smaller percentage of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could be targetedagainst Chinese cities to cause massive civilian and industrial damage.
China deploys an estimated 20 ICBMs capable of targeting U.S. cities. In the
future, the U.S. National Missile Defense system may undermine China’s
nuclear deterrent against the United States. Given the imbalance of forces, howeffective would a first strike be against China’s long-range ICBMs, and what174 | Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council

would be the effects on Chinese civilians and the environment? Some haveargued that “the United States [today] stands on the verge of attaining nuclear
primacy” and “could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of
Russia or China with a nuclear first strike.” 486 But our realistic calculations ofwhat effects would occur if only a few Chinese ICBM warheads survived
indicate that the United States would need to have complete confidence that apreemptive strike had managed to destroy all of China’s long-range missiles.

Calculating the Effects of Nuclear Weapons
In order to quantitatively explore these scenarios in greater depth, we utilized a
combination of Geographical Information System (GIS) software, including
GoogleEarth and the U.S. government computer code, Hazard Prediction
Assessment Capability (HPAC versions 3.2.1 and 4.04).487 Scenarios that can be
simulated using HPAC include the use of a radiological, biological, chemical or
nuclear weapon, accidents involving such weapons, and accidental releases at
WMD facilities. For this study we utilized the component models of HPAC that
calculate the effects of nuclear explosions and are based on legacy codedeveloped during the Cold War. Casualties are calculated in HPAC using the
LandScan world population database developed by the U.S. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory.488
HPAC version 4.04, the Nuclear Weapons Special Edition (NWPNSE) model
calculates the effects of a single nuclear explosion, for example, terrorists using
a nuclear device in an urban setting. Interestingly, at least one previous versionof HPAC (version 3.2.1) had a nuclear weapons model that wascompatible with DOD nuclear targeting software. The parameters of a nuclear
strike – including the latitude and longitude of the ground zero, weapon yield,
height-of-burst and fission fraction – could be read from a “strike file” tocalculate the combined effects of as many as 8,000 nuclear detonations. Figure
86 displays an example of a STRATCOM-formatted strike file provided as asample file in the HPAC help documentation. The coordinates of the groundzeros are listed in the first column – actual ICBM silos in Russia.489

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 175

Figure 86:
STRATCOM-Formatted Nuclear Strike File For HPAC

A STRATCOM-formatted nuclear strike file for input to HPAC. The columns of numbers refer to thecoordinates of the target, nuclear explosive yield, height-of-burst and other weapon and target parameters.

We created sets of such strike files for the scenarios modeled in this chapter tomore efficiently track various parameters. For example, one key variable for fallout calculations are the prevailing winds at elevations from ground level to the
top of the initial “mushroom cloud.” HPAC provides both historical weather
data and the capability to access real-time meteorological data and forecasts
from both classified and unclassified DOD servers.

Scenario One: U.S. Nuclear Strike Against Chinese
Long-Range ICBMs
In the first hypothetical nuclear attack scenario, U.S. ballistic missile
submarines stationed in the Pacific Ocean fire Trident II D5 submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at Chinese DF-5A missile silos. As discussed
above the U.S. Trident force has evolved to become the main element in U.S.
nuclear war plans against China. U.S. long-range bombers based in the Pacificregion or flown from the United States would require a relatively long time toreach their targets and would have to penetrate China’s airspace. The U.S.
ICBM force, based in silos in the upper Midwest, would have to over-fly Russia
and risk triggering the remnants of the Soviet early-warning system, or worse.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. nuclear forces have been shifted to the
Pacific in the form of additional Trident SSBNs based at the Submarine Base at
Bangor, Washington. For these reasons we developed a scenario involving a
Trident strike against the DF-5A, the sole Chinese nuclear weapon system capable of hitting the continental United States (CONUS) and China’s primary
deterrent against the United States.

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U.S. Trident SSBNs based at the Naval Submarine Base Bangor in Washington
deterrent patrols in the Pacific Ocean, and cover targets in China and in the
Russian Siberian and Far East regions. The missiles on two submarines on Hard
Alert are within range of their targets and ready for launch with short notice (on15-minute launch readiness). Each submarine is loaded with 24 missiles with up
to six warheads each for a total of as many as 288 warheads on patrol at a given
time. Additional deployed submarines could be placed on Hard Alert within relatively short time.
For this scenario we have chosen a hypothetical deployment area for U.S. ballistic
missile submarines, as the actual deployment areas of these boats are classified. We
chose the hypothetical deployment area to surround the island of Hawaii. Figure 87
shows a map of the bathymetry of the Pacific Ocean (light blue lines) overlaid withthe hypothetical deterrent patrol area shown in red. This hypothetical deterrent
patrol area measures 386,100 square miles (1 million square km) and the center ofthe patrol area is approximately 1,860 miles (3,000 km) from the vessels’ homeportat Naval Submarine Base Bangor.
Figure 87:
Hypothetical U.S. SSBN Deterrent Patrol Area in PacificHypothetical U.S. ballistic missile submarine deterrent patrol area (in red) avoids overflying Russian with
Trident II D5 SLBMs in a potential strike on China’s DF-5 ICBMs. U.S. SSBNs regularly make port calls to
Hawaii, sometimes San Diego, and occasionally Guam, as part of the Strategic Continuity of Operations (SCOOP)
exercise program that practices forward refit of the submarines in case their main base at Bangor is destroyed.

The targets for these nuclear submarines include the DF-5A ICBM silo launcharea at Lunoning (in China’s Henan Province). The Luoning DF-5A launch

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 177group is reportedly “buried deep in the mountains 150 miles (240 km) east of
Xian … near the town of Luoning.”490 These targets are approximately 4,350
miles (7,000 km) from the hypothetical U.S. SSBN deployment area andTrident II D5 launch site. The time-of-flight of the U.S. Trident SLBMs to theChinese targets would be therefore be about 30 minutes.491
Unfortunately we have not yet positively identified Chinese silo locations basedon the available GoogleEarth high-resolution imagery or additional QuickBird
imagery purchased from DigitalGlobe for this project. Above-ground structuresassociated with an ICBM silo may not be readily apparent even at the resolution
offered by the QuickBird satellite. For example, Figure 88 shows a GoogleEarthhosted QuickBird image of a U.S. and Russian ICBM silo, where the location
was previously published in the START data exchange.
In order to construct specific silo target locations for a U.S. hypothetical nuclear
attack scenario against the Chinese DF-5 force, we used satellite imagery datafrom GoogleEarth combined with map data from the Operational Navigation
Chart (ONC) map series published by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Figure 89 displays a map of 20
hypothetical silo target locations overlaid on a GoogleEarth background, consisting of NaturalVue (a 49-foot (15-meter) resolution LandSat composite) and aswath of QuickBird imagery 2.3-foot (0.7-meter) resolution). The hypothetical
Chinese silo targets at Luoning were selected with a separation distance ofapproximately 6.2 miles (10 km), consistent with the separation distance of U.S.
and Soviet-built ICBM silos presumably to preclude the possibility of one
attacking warhead damaging more than one target silo.
A fundamental parameter of a nuclear strike scenario is the height-of-burst(HOB) of the attacking warheads. The HOB, along with the nuclear warhead
yield and accuracy, determines the probability of achieving a certain level ofdamage to a target, referred to as the “kill probability” or “PK.” It is known that
the ICBM silos in the United States and Russia have been engineered towithstand a certain amount of damage from nuclear attacks. Indeed, for the mostmodern, hardened Russian ICBM silos the target must effectively lie in thecrater created by the nuclear explosion to achieve a high kill probability. In general,
to destroy a hardened silo it is necessary to attack with an accurate, high-yield
nuclear weapon detonated on the ground.

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Figure 88:
Satellite Images of U.S. and Russian ICBM Silos

U.S. and Russian ICBM silos as seen in QuickBird high-resolution satellite imagery provided by GoogleEarth.
The upper figure Minuteman III ICBM Silo #E-11 in McLean County, North Dakota associated with 91st
Space Wing at Minot. The lower figure is SS-19 Launch Group #4, Silo #8 at the Kosel’sk missile field locatedapproximately 155 miles (250 km) south-west of Moscow. The United States and Russia provided each other
ICBM silo coordinates and other data as part of START I.
Images: GoogleEarth/DigitalGlobe

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 179

Figure 89:
Hypothetical DF-5A Silo Targets

Hypothetical Chinese DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) missile silo targets near the city of Luoning. Image from
GoogleEarth (note the swath of high-resolution QuickBird imagery covering the city of Luoning and extending south-east). This image is centered at 34.35 North, 111.49 East. The headquarters of the second artillery
corps group which mans the ICBMs is reportedly located at Luoyang.
Image: GoogleEarth/DigitalGlobe

In a 2001 report, NRDC used the Pentagon’s own methodology to calculate theprobability of achieving severe damage to Russian ICBM silos in strikes by U.S.
attacking warheads.492 The report found that both ground bursts and multiple
strikes were necessary to achieve a high probability of destroying the newest
hardened Russian silos with W88 or W76 warheads. We do not know thehardness of Chinese DF-5A silos, but given their design and construction in thelate 1970s and 1980s, we assume that Chinese silos are hardened to at least theextent of first or second generation Russian ICBM silos.
The HOB of a nuclear detonation also is an important factor determining theintensity and extent of fallout. If a nuclear explosion occurs above a certain
altitude – and the resulting fireball is well above the surface of the Earth – then theradioactive debris from the explosion is in the form of very light particles that arelofted high into the atmosphere, circulate around the hemisphere in which the
explosion takes place, and return to the Earth days or weeks later much weaker anddiluted. If the nuclear fireball touches the Earth’s surface then the radioactive debris
from the explosion mixes with material gouged from the ground and the resulting
heavier radioactive particles are deposited in the region of the explosion.493 For a

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455 kt nuclear explosion (the yield of the U.S. W88 warhead) the threshold for
fallout is a HOB of 2,116 feet (645 meters), and for a 100 kiloton nuclear explosion(the yield of the U.S. W76 warhead) the threshold for fallout is 1,135 feet (346meters).494 These HOB thresholds are much higher than required to severely damage known ICBM silos, so our scenario assumes ground bursts in the nuclear strikes.
Our base case for this hypothetical scenario examines the consequences of 20 W88
warheads (each W88 warhead has a yield of 455 kt) striking the hypothetical
DF-5A silo targets as ground bursts. We examined additional cases that looked atvariations in the number of attacking W88 warheads and the use of lower-yield(100 kt) W76 warheads.
We begin to examine the results of the HPAC calculations with the first case:
20 Trident W88 warheads attacking 20 DF-5A silos. As noted above, theselection of ground bursts maximizes the extent of fallout. We sampled historical
weather data for the region around Luoning for each month of the year, andfound that the prevailing winds blow the fallout east-south-east of the silotarget locations. It should be noted we did not include elevation data in thesecalculations. For lower-yield weapons this approximation would have a significant effect on the fallout pattern in a mountainous region (the radioactivity
could be contained by mountains in the path of the drifting fallout cloud).
However, for a warhead yield of 455 kt the height of the “mushroom cloud”
reaches approximately 39,370 feet (12,000 meters), and for a warhead yield of
100 kt the cloud height is calculated to be 29,530 feet (9,000 meters).495
According to GoogleEarth’s elevation data the height of the mountains flanking
the city of Luoning only reaches approximately 5,900 feet (1,800 meters).
The effects of a nuclear explosion are commonly divided into “prompt” effects
and fallout. The prompt effects are the blast wave (including high winds),
thermal (heat) radiation, and the initial radiation, which is a burst of neutrons
and gamma rays occurring within the first minute after the nuclear explosion.
Fallout may continue as long as 24 hours after the nuclear explosion and potentially cover a much larger area than impacted by the prompt effects. In HPAC,
casualties are calculated separately for prompt nuclear weapons effects and for
fallout, and under separate input assumptions that people exposed to the nuclear
weapons effects are either inside building structures (sheltered) or out in the
open. In general, casualty estimates from prompt nuclear effects are slightly higher
for people in structures and casualty estimates from fallout are much higher for
people out in the open. These trends are reflected in the current calculation.

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 181

Roughly 100,000 casualties from prompt nuclear effects are estimated for nearby
populations – 6.2 to 12.4 miles (10 to 20 km) from the target silos. For people out
in the open at the time of the attack, and estimated 75 percent of the casualties
would be fatalities, while for people in building structures at the time of theattack, 40 percent of casualties would be fatalities. HPAC’s estimate of prompt
casualties clearly relies on the rough assessment of the region’s population in
LandScan – the zone within 6.2 to 12.4 miles (10-20 km) of the hypothetical silo
locations does not include any major towns as viewed in GoogleEarth.
However, the most widespread result of the attack would be fallout. The extent
of the fallout pattern is determined by the quantity of radioactive material producedin the explosion and the prevailing wind speed and direction forelevations reached by the initial fallout cloud. For all HPAC cases run, we foundthat the historical data on prevailing winds in the region blew fallout in aneasterly-south-easterly direction. For the months of March and February, we
found that higher-speed winds created a longer, narrower fallout pattern, and forother months crosswinds widened and shortened the fallout pattern. Given that acrisis leading to a nuclear strike on these Chinese targets could occur in principle at any time, either fallout pattern could be relevant to a casualty analysis.
With respect to the accuracy of the fallout calculation, the zones of more intense
fallout are more accurately reproduced with fallout codes by comparing themwith measured fallout patterns from the U.S. and British above-ground nuclear
testing program. This is in part because the zones of more intense fallout occur
closer to the ground zero sooner after the nuclear explosion – involving less spatial and temporal variations in the prevailing winds and modeling the behaviorof relatively heavier fallout particles.
Table 18 lists the health effects for a given radiation exposure (REM). The outputof the HPAC calculations used in the study integrated the dose to people overthe first 48 hours after the strike. Much of the radiation dose to survivors would
occur in this time period, as the intensity of the fallout radiation drops to one
percent of its initial value after two days (of course for the most intense zones offallout – more than 100 times the threshold for health effects – continued exposure
would be dangerous). Long-term effects of fallout include contamination of theenvironment and agriculture, displacement of refugees – many of whom would
require medical attention and access to uncontaminated food and water, and theconcentration of fallout in “hot spots” over time from precipitation, as occurredin the Chernobyl accident.

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Table 18:
Effects of Radiation496
Dose range(REM free air)Onset & duration of initial symptoms

Medical care & disposition0 – 70

6 - 12 hr; none to slight transientheadache, nausea; vomiting in 5% at
upper end of dose range.

No medical care, return to duty.

70 – 150

2 - 20 hr; transient mild nausea andvomiting in 5 - 30%.

No medical care, return to duty.

150 – 300

2 hr - 3 days: transient to moderate nausea
and vomiting in 20-70%; mild to moderate
fatigability and weakness in 25 - 60%.

3 - 5 wk: medical care for 10 - 50%.
High end of range death in > 10%.
Survivors return to duty.

300 - 530

2 hr - 3 days: transient nausea &vomiting in 50 - 90%; moderate
fatigability in 50 - 90%.

2 - 5 wk: medical care for 10 - 80%.
Low end of range < 10% deaths; high end
death > 50%. Survivors return to duty.

530 - 830

2 hr - 2 days: moderate to severe nausea& vomiting in 80 - 100%. 2 hr - 6 wk:
moderate to severe fatigability andweakness in 90 - 100%.

10 days - 5 wk: medical care for 50 - 100%.
Low end of range death > 50% at 6 wk.
High end death for 99%.

830 - 3000

30 min - 2 days: severe nausea, vomiting,fatigability, weakness, dizziness,disorientation; moderate to severe fluid
imbalance, headache.

1000 REM: 4 - 6 days medical care for100%; 100% deaths at 2 - 3 wk.
3000 REM: 3 - 4 days medical care for100%; 100% death at 5 - 10 days.

3000 – 8000

30 min - 5 days: severe nausea, vomiting,fatigability, weakness, dizziness,disorientation, fluid imbalance, headache.

4500 REM: 6hr to 1 - 2 days; medical carefor 100%; 100% deaths at 2 - 3 days.

over 8000

30 min - 1 day: severe prolonged nausea,
vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness,disorientation, fluid imbalance, headache.

8000 REM: medical care
immediate - 1 day;
100% deaths at 1 day.

In the case of 20 W88 warheads detonating on the Luoning ICBM silos, wefound that the combined fallout patterns would create hazardous conditions
reaching over 620 miles (1,000 km) from ground zero. Fallout zones where the48-hour dose to exposed people exceeds 150 REM would cover 12,360 to 21,620
square miles (32,000 to 56,000 km2). In those zones, survivors would experience
severe radiation sickness from hours to days after the explosion, or death. This
land mass exceeds the area of the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut. The
fallout zone for a 48-hour exposure exceeding 450 REM (death 50 percent
likely) cover 6,950 to 14,670 square miles (18,000 to 38,000 km2), and the mostintense zone of fallout exceeding 600 REM (death likely) would cover an areaof 4,633 to 5,405 square miles (12,000 to 14,000 km2). The two types of fallout
patterns (June and December or all other months of the year) calculated for the
20 W88 are shown in Figure 90.
The calculated numbers of casualties depends strongly on whether people downwind of the nuclear explosions are sheltered for the first 48 hours after the attack

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 183

Figure 90:
Fallout Patters For Hypothetical U.S. Strike On Chinese DF-5A Silos

Calculated fallout patterns from the 20 W88 warhead strike on the DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) silos at Luoning
for winds typical of December (above) and June (below). Note: The precise locations of Chinese DF-5A silos
are not known.

184 | Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council

or are out in the open. The average dose received is likely to be some averaging of
the two estimates, as survivors move to other areas. A smaller variation in thenumber of calculated casualties results from monthly changes in the average
prevailing winds. We found that winds typical of the months of March andDecember more efficiently dispersed the fallout from the nuclear strike. Figure 91
plots the calculated casualties as a function of month of the year and sheltering.
The average number of casualties under the assumption of no sheltering would be
18 million, and the average number of casualties – assuming all people weresheltered in structures – would be 4.7 million. Thus because the strike occurs in asparsely populated area, more than 98 percent of expected casualties would arise
from fallout instead of the prompt nuclear effects of blast, thermal radiationand initial radiation. For unsheltered people, we found that two-thirds of thecasualties would be fatalities, while in the calculation assuming sheltering, only 20
percent of the casualties would be fatalities.
Figure 91:
Casualties From U.S. Strike Against Chinese DF-5A Silos

Casualty calculations from a hypothetical U.S. strike with 20 W88 warheads against 20 DF-5A Luoning silos.

If we assume that the net result of the strike is an average of the two assumptions
regarding sheltering, then the expected fatalities from the strike on the Luoning
silo field by 20 U.S. W88 warheads would be 3.5 million, and the number of
injuries (predominantly radiation sickness) would be 7.7 million.
The base case for the strike on the Luoning DF-5A silos involved a total yield of
9.5 Mt. We also considered the use of two or three times as many W88 warheads

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 185

and the use of the W76 warhead instead of the W88. Therefore, these othercases looked at total nuclear explosive yields of 2 Mt through almost 30 Mt.
Table 19 illustrates the casualty calculation given these other cases.
Table 19:
Casualties For Variations of U.S. Hypothetical Strike
Against Chinese DF-5A Silos
Targets

Number and Typeof Attacking
U.S.Warheads

Total Yield of Average
Nuclear Strike Casualties

Average
Fatalities

Average Injuries(radiation sickness)

20 DF-5A silos

20 W76 Warheads

2.0 Megatons1.58 million

460,000

1.12 million

20 DF-5A silosand 20 decoy silos or multiple strikes
on silos

40 W76 Warheads

4.0 Megatons

2.85 million

900,000

1.95 million

20 DF-5A silosand 20 decoy silos or multiple strikes
on silos

W76 Warheads

6.0 Megatons

4.0 million

1.3 million 2.6 million

20 DF-5A silos– Base Case

20 W889.5 Megatons11.2 million

3.5 million 7.7 million

20 DF-5A silosand 20 decoy silos or multiple strikes
on silos

40 W8819 Megatons20.3 million

7.7 million 12.5 million

20 DF-5A silosand 20 decoy silos or multiple strikes
on silos

60 W8828.5 Megatons26.2 million

11 million

15.2 million

As would be expected, the numbers of casualties from a nuclear strike on the
missile silos at Luoning increases with larger weapon yield because more fallout
would be produced. Most of the casualties are predicted to occur in three
Chinese provinces: Henan (where the silo targets are located), Anhui and
Jiangsu. For the largest-yield case considered – 60 W88 warheads – the 50 REM
contour would extend to the city of Nanjing.
Depending on the U.S. estimate of the hardness of the Chinese DF-5A silos,
more than one attacking warhead could be allocated to each target.
Furthermore, the Chinese may employ “decoy” silos that do not contain missiles
but may nonetheless be targeted by U.S. forces. Assuming 14 percent (2/14) of
all 400 W88 in the U.S. arsenal are on the two SSBNs on Hard Alert patrol in
the Pacific, then approximately 60 W88s are available on short notice (the lastcase considered in Table 19). A larger number of W76s would be available, and186 | Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council

these are being retrofitted with a ground-burst capability to enhance theireffectiveness against a wider spectrum of targets (see Chapter 3).
The overall effect of these calculations is that a highly accurate, counterforce
strike against the 20 Chinese ICBMs capable of attacking the U.S. homeland
would cause millions of casualties and radioactive contamination over a verylarge area. Other basic questions about a U.S. strike against Chinese DF-5A
ICBMs that are not answered in this study include: How does the flight time of
U.S. SLBMs compare with Chinese early warning and launch preparedness? How
far apart are the DF-5A targets spaced – are the distances between targets greaterthan the “footprint” of the MIRVed warheads from one U.S. SLBM? Could someof the Chinese targets be on the “wrong side of the mountain” with respect to U.S.
targeting (i.e., the mountains obstruct a direct hit)? Could the Chinese forces rideout a strike and successfully launch missiles weeks or months later?

Scenario Two: Chinese Nuclear Strikes Against U.S. Cities
China’s main nuclear deterrent against the United States has been described asa retaliatory minimum deterrent against countervalue targets with forces on very
low or no alert. “Retaliatory” and “countervalue” refer to the fact that the
Chinese nuclear doctrine is one of no-first-use, and consistent with that statedpolicy, the Chinese nuclear weapons capable of attacking the continental
United States are not of a quantity or an accuracy that could threaten U.S.
nuclear forces, but instead would be capable of targeting population centers.
We calculated the effects of a Chinese strike against U.S. cities with warheads
from the 20 DF-5A ICBMs that were hypothetical targets in the scenario
discussed above. We did this analysis to better quantify China’s current
deterrent against the U.S. homeland and examine different potential future
Chinese nuclear force postures against the United States. We also exploredparameters of the calculation, such as missile range, warhead yield, and warheadheight-of-burst and targeting.
In Chapter 2 we quoted a range for China’s DF-5A ICBM of at least 8,000 miles(13,000 km). Assuming a circumpolar trajectory for the missile, Figure 92
illustrates which areas of the United States are within range assuming the
DF-5A is launched from silos near the city of Luoning in China’s Henan
Province. A range of at least 6.835 miles (11,000 km) is required to put cities atSimulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 187

risk on the West Coast and in the north-central region of the United States. A
range of 7,456 miles (12,000 km) puts cities on the East Coast at risk, including
New York City and Washington, D.C. If the range of the DF-5A exceeds 8,000
miles (13,000 km) then all of the continental United States could be targeted.
Note that a near-polar intercontinental ballistic missile trajectory toward theUnited States from Luoning is the shortest distance but would necessitate an
overflight of Russia and possibly activate Russia’s early warning system. Missile
trajectories from China to the continental United States which do not overfly
Russia would require a range exceeding 10,560 miles (17,000 km).
Figure 92:
DF-5A Ranges to U.S. Cities

DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ranges to major U.S. cities assuming an ICBM trajectory that traverses the North Pole.

The yield of the warhead mounted on the DF-5A is believed to be from 3 Mt to
5 Mt – a substantially higher-yield warhead than the U.S. W88 or W76. In
HPAC, the effects of a nuclear explosion in the 3 Mt to 5 Mt range on a city are
estimated from an extrapolation of the effects seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
but the damage due to fire storms from such a high-yield nuclear explosion may
be more pervasive.497
It is unknown whether the Chinese warheads on the DF-5A can be fuzed todetonate as a ground burst. The U.S. nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki at the end of World War II were fuzed to detonate at an altitude ofapproximately 1,640 feet (500 meters) to maximize the area exposed to the blast

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wave produced in the nuclear explosion. The DOD defines the “optimum heightof burst” as: “For nuclear weapons and for a particular target (or area), the heightat which it is estimated a weapon of a specified energy yield will produce acertain desired effect over the maximum possible area.” 498 In the case of the “FatMan” and “Little Boy” nuclear weapons dropped on Japan, a height of burst of
1,640 feet (500 meters) maximized the area exposed to 10 pounds-per-squareinch (psi) for nuclear explosive yields of about 15 kilotons, and the radius of acircle exposed to 10 psi or greater from these nuclear explosion is calculated to
be about 0.62 miles (1 km). In the case of a 4 Mt weapon, the optimum heightof burst to maximize an area exposed to 10 psi or greater is 9,840 feet (3,000
meters), and the radius to which 10 psi extends is 3.9 miles (6.2 km). Table 20
contrasts the effects of a Hiroshima nuclear bomb with that of the 4 Mt
warhead on the Chinese DF-5A.
Table 20:
DF-5 Warhead and Hiroshima Bomb Parameters
Chinese DF-5A(CSS-4 Mod 2)

U.S. “Little Boy”
as at Hiroshima

Ratio: DF-5A
Warhead/Little Boy

Yield

4 Megatons(4,000 kilotons)

15 kilotons

320 times greater yield

Optimum Height of Burst(to maximize area subject to10 psi or greater blast)

3,000 meters

500 meters

6 times higher altitude for
optimum height of burst

Area subject to 10 psi or
greater blast overpressure

121 square km(6.2 km radius)

3 square km(980 meter radius)

40 times the area
exposed to high blast

Area subject to >25 cal/cm2 thermal flux

3.1 square km(1 km radius)

707 square km(15 km radius)

228 times the area exposedto very high thermal flux

Area subject to >10 cal/cm2 thermal flux

2,000 square km(25 km radius)

9 square km(1.7 km radius)

218 times the area exposed
to high thermal flux

Area subject to 50 rads
initial radiation

9 square km(1.7 km radius)

11.3 square km(1.9 km radius)

About equal areas exposed
to initial radiation

Calculated Fatalities:
Los Angeles, CA

2.8 – 3.0 million

33,000 - 58,000

About 65 times the total
fatalities in LA

Calculated Casualties:
Los Angeles, CA

4.6 – 4.8 million

94,000 - 115,000

About 50 times the total
casualties in LA

Calculated Fatalities:
New York, NY

2.9 – 5.0 million

175,000 - 240,000

About 19 times the total
fatalities in NYC

Calculated Casualties:
New York, NY

7.7 – 7.8 million

322,000 – 366,000

About 22 times the total
casualties in NYC

The calculated effects of a single 4 Mt nuclear airburst over a major U.S. city are
staggering. Figure 93 illustrates the combined nuclear explosive effects of blast,thermal radiation and initial radiation in the form of an overall probability ofSimulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 189

being killed or injured while inside a building structure at the time of the explosionin New York City (top) or Los Angeles (bottom). An inner zone of near complete
destruction (more than 90 percent casualties) would extend 16.2 miles (10 km)
from ground zero, and blast and fire damage would extend as far as 21.8 miles(35 km) or more from the ground zero. A blast wave as strong or stronger thanthat directly under the Hiroshima explosion (35 psi) would cross the islandof Manhattan. A firestorm could potentially engulf all of New York City
or Los Angeles.

Figure 93:
Nuclear Explosive Effects of DF-5 Strikes Against
New York and Los Angeles

The output from an HPAC calculation showing the combined nuclear explosive effectsof blast, thermal radiation and initial radiation created by a hypothetical detonation of a 4
Mt Chinese nuclear warhead on New York City (top) and Los Angeles (bottom).

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Using HPAC, we calculated the combined effects of 4 Mt nuclear detonations
on 20 populous U.S. cities, including Washington, D.C. From 15.8 million to
26.1 million fatalities and 40.6 million to 41.3 million casualties would result.
We found that varying the yield of the Chinese DF-5A nuclear weapon from
3 Mt to 5 Mt only changed the predicted casualties by 10 percent – any
multi-megaton weapon threatens a large urban area. The results also wererelatively insensitive to varying the commonly-estimated accuracy (Circular
Error Probable, or CEP) of these weapons.
Figure 94 plots the numbers of casualties and fatalities from a Chinese strike as afunction of the number of U.S. cities attacked. Using HPAC, we found that the
average number fatalities per attacking weapon is about 800,000, and the average
number of casualties per weapon is about two million for these nuclear airbursts.
It is evident from this analysis that the threat of even a few weapons reaching theUnited States should serve as a robust deterrent. U.S. war planners would haveto have complete confidence in the success of both a counterforce strike against
the DF-5A launchers and the capabilities of a National Missile Defense (NMD)
system, otherwise a huge toll would be exacted on the United States.
Figure 94:
Casualties and Fatalities From 20 DF-5A Airburst
Attacks on US Cities

A plot of the number of casualties (red) and fatalities (blue) as a function of the increasing number of U.S.
cities (x axis) attacked by 4 Mt warheads delivered by Chinese DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBMs, assuming asheltered population at the time of the airburst strikes. The calculated numbers of casualties would be a factorof two to four times higher if the attacks were ground burst and cause very widespread fallout contamination
throughout the United States and in Canada (Figure 95).

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 191

We also explored the effects of fallout, should the Chinese warheads be detonatedas ground bursts. Because ground burst significantly increases radioactive fallout,
they represent worst-case scenarios. Figure 95 illustrates the pervasive reach of
the fallout clouds from such a scenario: The total yield of this attack is 80 Mt –about 10 times more powerful than the U.S. strike considered above. The
calculated numbers of casualties are two to four times higher than for the air
burst scenario (Figure 94), and very widespread fallout contamination would
occur across the United States and Eastern Canada.

Figure 95:
Fallout From Attack On 20 US Cities With
20 DF-5A 4-Mt Ground Burst Warheads

Effects of fallout from attacking 20 U.S. cities with 20 Chinese DF-5A missiles with 4 Mt warheads as groundbursts. The figure was created using the HPAC plotting routine, where the color scale at right refers to thehealth effects of exposure to a given level of fallout over the first 48 hours after the strike. Winds typical of themonth of December were used in this calculation.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, China is developing a new ICBM, the DF-31A,
that the DOD projects will become operational sometime before the end of thedecade. At first the mobile DF-31A is expected to supplement the silo-based
DF-5As, but may eventually replace the older missiles altogether. As asolid-fueled missile, the DF-31A will have less throwweight than the DF-5A andtherefore be forced to carry a smaller warhead to reach targets throughout
the United States. The yield of the DF-31A warhead is not known but 200 kt to
300 kt is probably a reasonable guess.

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The U.S. intelligence community estimates that by 2015 China will deploy 75 to
100 warheads “primarily targeted” against the United States. As described in
Chapter 2, the lower end of this estimate envisions a mix of 20 4-Mt warheads on
DF-5As and 55 250-kt (our yield assumption) warheads on DF-31As (see Table 4
in Chapter 2). By adding 55 250-kt warheads to the existing 20 4-Mt warheads in
its arsenal, China can potentially use the 250-kt warheads to hold at risk an
additional 55 U.S. cities with populations ranging from 250,000 to 750,000(Austin, Memphis, Tucson, Atlanta, etc.) while continuing to hold at risk thelargest U.S. metropolitan areas with the 4-Mt warheads (New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, etc. – cities with a population in the range of 750,000 to several million).
The casualties from a countervalue strike with these 75 warheads (93.75 Mt total
yield, air burst) would cause a total number of casualties in excess of 50 million, orover 16 percent of the current U.S. population.499
Although such an increase in China’s countervalue deterrent capability (above
the current 20 4-Mt warheads, 80 Mt total yield) would put many more U.S. cities
at risk, it would not significantly increase the number of casualties in the strikes
calculated in Figure 94. The reason is that there are only a limited number of verylarge metropolitan areas and that – once they have been destroyed by the
4-Mt warheads – the additional 250-kt warheads would have to be targeted on
smaller cities causing comparatively fewer additional casualties. Of course launching more missiles also would mean more warheads reaching their targets, assuming
each missile has comparable vulnerability of pre-emptive destruction, probabilityof technical failure or interception by the U.S. National Missile Defense system.500
Another option is that China decides to deploy multiple warheads on its DF-5A
missiles, a possibility frequently highlighted by news media and private analysts.
This scenario also is the basis for the high-end of the U.S. intelligence community’s
estimate of 100 Chinese warheads primarily targeted against the United Statesby 2015. With such a force consisting of 20 DF-5As and 40 DF-31As (all with
250-kt warheads for a total yield of 25 Mt), a quantitatively lower yet qualitatively
similar countervalue deterrent capability (20 million to 30 million casualties)
could be achieved by targeting the additional 25 250-kt warheads on the current
target set of the largest U.S. metropolitan areas and hold medium-sized cities atrisk with the other 55 warheads. Interestingly, this high-end projection for
China’s deterrent would cause the least total casualties of the three potential
future scenarios for China’s nuclear forces structure considered here, yet potentiallydamage a larger set of urban areas and so still pose a robust deterrent to U.S.
nuclear use.

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 193

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is of course also a possibility that the U.S.
intelligence community’s projection of 75 to 100 Chinese warheads “primarily
targeted” against the United States by 2015 turns out to be wrong, and that China
instead decides to replace the DF-5A with the DF-31A on a one-by-one basis. To
examine such a scenario and its effect on China’s deterrent, we ran the HPAC
code using the same U.S. city targets as in the DF-5A countervalue strike scenario
above. The optimum height of burst for a 250 kt warhead (16 times smaller than
the 4 Mt warhead on the DF-5A) to maximize the area exposed to 10 psi or greater
overpressure is 4,593 feet (1,400 meters). For airbursts, we found that about 12
million casualties would result from the use of 20 250-kt warheads on 20 U.S.
cities, including 3 million to 6 million fatalities. If these 250 kt warheads were
detonated as ground bursts, the fallout patterns shown in Figure 96 combined withthe prompt nuclear effects would produce from 6 million to 8 million casualties.
Figure 96:
Fallout From Attack On 20 US Cities With DF-31A
Ground Bursts Warheads

Effects of fallout from attacking 20 U.S. cities with 20 Chinese DF-31A missiles with 250 kt warheads as ground bursts. The figure was created using the HPAC plotting routine, where the color
scale at right refers to the health effects of exposure to a given level of fallout over the first 48 hours
after the strike. Winds typical of the month of December were used in this calculation. A total of 6
million to 8 million casualties would result.

Discussion of Nuclear Strike Simulations
The nuclear strike scenarios presented in this chapter using the HPAC computer codeprovide insight into what is certainly the most significant and problematic aspect of
the current nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and China.

194 | Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council

From the perspective of Chinese nuclear war planners, the destruction inflictedby just a few DF-5A ICBMs delivering their warheads to their intended city
targets ought to represent a robust deterrent. From these calculations, which
Chinese war planners can easily do themselves, it becomes apparent why China
determined that its relatively small number of ICBMs is an adequate deterrent
against the United States and anyone else. The Chinese deterrent may be called“minimum,” but there’s nothing minimum about the destruction it can inflict,and a no-first-use policy could naturally evolve from a quantitative assessmentof the nuclear weapons effects.
The forthcoming modernization of the Chinese ballistic missile force with theintroduction of the DF-31, DF-31A and JL-2 will significantly affect the deterrent
against the United States. But not in ways normally assumed in the publicdebate. A “several-fold” increase in the number of warheads “primarily targeted”
against the United States would not also result in a “several-fold” increase in thenumber of casualties that China could inflict in the United States. Our calculations
described above show that if China decided to deploy the maximum number of
warheads envisioned by the U.S. intelligence community (100) due to thereplacement of large-yield warheads with smaller-yield warheads, the results
would be a nearly 70 percent reduction of the total megatonnage on the force anda 25 percent to 50 percent reduction in the number of potential casualties resulting
from a countervalue strike against the continental United States. Although thisought to be more than adequate to deter the United States (or anyone else) fromusing nuclear weapons against China, it suggests that the objective of the current
Chinese modernization may not be so much to increase the threat as to ensure
the continued effectiveness of the force.
From the point of U.S. nuclear planners, it may not matter much whether China
can hit the United States with 94 Mt or 25 Mt. Their job is to implement WhiteHouse guidance and hold Chinese nuclear forces at risk. Yet the hypothetical
Chinese strike scenarios described above underscore that even a pre-emptive U.S.
first strike against China’s DF-5A ICBMs would need to disable all of the missile
silos (and in the future all of the DF-31As as well) or risk a retaliatory Chinese
attack on U.S. cities resulting in millions of casualties. The fallout from such a U.S.
strike – even against purely military targets in a remote area – would cause millionsof civilian casualties and widespread radioactive contamination across three large
Chinese provinces. As if such a level of destruction would not be sufficient to deter
the Chinese leadership, the 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60)

Simulated U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Strikes | 195

ordered the U.S. military to broaden nuclear targeting against Chinese facilities,
and the U.S. Navy has since moved several strategic submarines from the Atlantic
into the Pacific, upgraded the submarines to carry the more accurate Trident II D5
missile, and begun equipping W76 warheads with a new fuze to enable the weapon
to strike a wider range of targets. The effects from a wider U.S. attack against
China’s entire nuclear force structure and political leadership would be significantly
greater than the scenario described in this report and also result in fallout on alliedcountries in the region.
Other potential scenarios, that are not examined in this report, include a U.S.
strike on all of China’s offensive nuclear forces and leadership, a U.S. limited
regional strike on Chinese forces off Taiwan, a Chinese strike against U.S. basesin the region as part of a retaliatory strike against the continental United States,
and a Chinese limited strike against U.S. bases in the region in a conflict overTaiwan. Below such levels are potential uses of nuclear weapons in limited tacticalstrikes under the assumption that the other side will not be prepared to escalate
to strategic nuclear use.
The U.S. counterforce strategy is based on the deployment of advanced weapons
and planning capabilities that make it possible to target military facilities rather
than cities as the Chinese are believed to target with their countervalue strategy.
STRATCOM reportedly has concluded that countervalue targeting violates theLaw of Armed Conflict (LOAC):
Many operational law attorneys do not believe “countervalue” targeting[against selected enemy military and military-related activities, such asindustries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the enemy’s
ability to wage war]…is a lawful justification for employment of force,much less nuclear force. Countervalue philosophy makes no distinction
between purely civilian activities and military related activities and could
be used to justify deliberate attacks on civilians and non-military portionsof a nation’s economy. It therefore cannot meet the “military necessity”
prong of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Countervalue targeting
also undermines one of the values that underlies LOAC – the reductionof civilian suffering and to foster the ability to maintain the peace after
the conflict ends. For example, under the countervalue target philosophy,
the attack on the World Trade Center Towers on 9/11 could be justified.501

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Whether STRATCOM rejects countervalue targeting or not, the calculations
cited above about the effects of the nuclear strikes do not even begin to describe
what would actually occur if nuclear weapons were employed. The EMP
produced by just two 4 Mt high-altitude atmospheric explosions, for example,
would disable communications and electronic equipment across the entire
United States. Several million Chinese expatriates also would die in a Chinesecountervalue attack against U.S. cities. Even if the United States conducted afirst strike on China’s long-range ICBMs, and there was no immediate retaliation,
there would still be massive suffering for refugees. And when this unprecedented
humanitarian crisis was broadcast back to the United States, the social andeconomic chaos that would follow from Americans fleeing cities in fear of aneventual Chinese retaliatory strike would deepen the suffering.
Regardless of intentions and moral values, however, the simulations underscorethat both a Chinese countervalue strike and a U.S. counterforce strike (evenmore so the expanded targeting directed by PDD-60) would inflict millions ofcivilian casualties and fatalities. If this is not sufficient to deter either side, it ishard to imagine what would.