Impact of the integration processes in Europe on Belarusian regions

In general, the position of Belarus within the integration processes in Europe is quite
peculiar. It is schematically shown in the figure below:

EU

PolandBelarus

Russia.
Figure 4.

Belarus in European integration process

Belarus is affected by the two major integration processes: one is the enlargement of the EU, theother integration with the Russian Federation. Economic and political forces in Poland, the westernneighbor of Belarus, are directed westwards, to the EU. The forces in Russia, the eastern neighbor,
are also largely directed towards closer integration with Western Europe. Recent events andagreements (the Kaliningrad question, energy supplies, trade issues, etc.) show that Russian
leadership has been very successful in building fruitful collaboration with the EU. Unlike its
neighbors, Belarusian political and economic forces are directed eastwards. Only two westernregions that culturally have more in common with Western Europe (Poland in particular) than with
Russia have some forces that push the country towards the west. The position of Belarus therefore
contradicts the on-going processes in Europe.

The impact of EU enlargement on the Belarusian regions

Trade and investment flows show that economic interdependence between the Belarusian
regions and the candidate countries is quite weak. Therefore, the accession of Poland, Lithuania andLatvia to the European Union would hardly make a significant impact on the Belarusian economy ingeneral, although, as Belarusian experts claim, some strategic markets for certain major Belarusian
exports would probably be lost. Nitric and potash fertilizers that are now exported to Poland may be
faced with the EU antidumping duties upon accession (Rudenkov, 2003). Belarusian trucks that are
currently widely purchased by Latvian companies most probably would not meet EU standards andwould have to leave this market as well (Bogdankevich, 2002).
The EU enlargement may significantly affect only the western regions, Grodno and Brest,
because they have stronger ties with the candidates (Poland in particular).

The impact of the EU

enlargement in the western regions would be defined by the following factors:
1. Introduction of Schengen visas to enter Poland.
2. Development of border infrastructure; modernization of old border crossings and thebuilding of new ones.
3. Activities related to the EU regional policy in north-east Poland; investments from theStructural Funds.
4. Development of trans-border co-operation in the “Bug” and “Neman” euroregions.
5. New neighborhood policy of the EU.

Introduction of Schengen visas
The introduction of Schengen visas to enter Poland is often said to be the first negative
factor of EU enlargement. This measure would mainly affect the western Belarusian and the eastern
Polish regions. As mentioned above, many Belarusians who live in the border regions have been
involved in cross-border trade, and many small businesses in eastern Poland have been serving thosetrade flows. During the last ten years, the cross-border trade became one of the significant sources ofincome for certain companies in Poland, and, to a much larger extent, in Belarus. Therefore, theplanned introduction of visas aroused many fears among the population in border regions of the twocountries.
Analysis of this issue shows that the impact of the new border-crossing procedures on theeconomies of the Polish and Belarusian regions is very difficult to estimate. Currently it is agreed
that the single entry visas to Poland (and, accordingly, to Belarus) will cost E10, and the multiple
entry visas valid for one year E50. It should be said that the Polish government suggested mutually
issuing visas free of charge but the Belarusian government refused this(Romanchuk, 2003) .

In

any case, the cost of a visa would not become a serious obstacle for Belarusians if they decide to
travel to Poland. As for regular visitors such as private traders, E50 a year would be insignificant
among other expenses.
What is more important is the procedure of how the visas would be granted. If Poland
applies the criteria used by the current Schengen states (official invitations, proof of financial
self-sufficiency, and a bureaucratic routine at the embassies that cause long queues) cross-bordermobility would decrease significantly and the cross-border trade would slow down. The inability ofPolish authorities to establish an efficient visa procedure was probably the reason why the
introduction of visas for Belarusians was postponed until October 2003. The declarations of EU
officials and representatives of the Polish government underline that visas aim at ordering the bordercrossing and would not impede the movement of people. If these declarations match the reality, theintroduction of visas would not make any significant impact on regional dynamics either in Poland
or in Belarus.

Infrastructure development

A positive trend in border-crossing issues related to the EU enlargement is the developmentof border infrastructure, including the modernization of old border crossings and the building of new
ones. The EU finds it very important to keep its external borders transparent and efficiently managed.
Therefore the Union has been financing modernization of its future borders via pre-accession aid in
Poland and the TACIS program in Belarus. New terminals and infrastructure are being built, whichshould at least decrease the queues at the border. Supposedly, the trade flows between the twocountries would become more intense, although any estimation is very hard to make as other factors(e.g. trade regime and business climate) would be crucial.

Only if the Belarusian government

creates the conditions by which Belarusian territory would become an efficient transit corridor forgoods delivered from the EU to Russia and back, would the developed border infrastructure becomea significant factor in the development of the western regions.

The EU Structural Funds in North-East Poland
It may be anticipated that activities related to the EU regional policy in north-east Poland
and, in particular, investments from the Structural Funds would have spillovers to Belarusian
territory. The major aim of the EU regional policy is the intensification of economic activity inregions that lag behind. This is done by investments to infrastructure development, training andre-training programs as well as the development of small businesses. It is now very hard to estimate
the potential effects of the EU regional policy in Poland, because detailed programs and financial
plans are still being worked out. In the optimistic scenario, the efficient actions of the Polishauthorities and the EU institutions would help to induce faster growth in the eastern Polish regions,and new businesses in search of better opportunities would invest in bordering Belarusian regions.
Indeed, the labor force in Belarus is relatively cheap and well trained. In the western regions people
speak Polish and the free economic zones that exist in the bordering regions may become very

attractive for investors. If this optimistic scenario would come to fruition in the years following 2004,
the western Belarusian regions would receive a strong positive impulse caused by the EU
enlargement.

Cross-border cooperation
Belarus participates in two euroregions, “Bug” (established in 1995) and “Neman”(established in 1997). Along with the two western Belarusian regions, Brest and Grodno, theeuroregions encompass bordering parts of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. Belarusian partners haveparticipated in a few common projects. For example, in the “Neman” euroregion these included: 1)
creation and networking of the Belarusian office of the “Neman” euroregion in Grodno (common
budget E196,928); 2) creation of a consulting service on small business development in Novogrudok,
Belarus (common budget E239,600); 3) training program on cross-border transport management andlogistics (common budget E175,200); 4) regional development and environment in the “Neman”
euroregion (common budget E989,560)1.
Officials from the Belarusian and Polish sides state that the “Bug” and “Neman”
euroregions have had very low efficiency in reaching their declared aims, in particular, indevelopment of transnational co-operation (Komornicki, 2002). One of the reasons for this is the
opposing political trajectory of the Belarusian leadership. In the existing circumstances,collaboration with the western European countries is not a priority, and relations with the EU are
more antagonistic than just cold. Secondly, decision-making in Belarus is very centralized so that
regional and local governments are extremely limited in their actions. The majority of strategic
decisions about intra-regional development have to be taken by the central government or require along procedure of agreement with all kinds of central authorities. Such circumstances erode the1Data obtained from the Office of the “Neman” Euroregion in Grodno.

initiative of the regional and local governments to carry out activities offered by the Polish and
Lithuanian partners in the euroregions.
Nonetheless, the euroregions give the EU an opportunity to engage Belarusian regional
elites in closer relations via cross-border cooperation initiatives. This becomes very important since
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Belarus and the EU was frozen in 1997. EU
support of the cross-border initiatives would grow as both Poland and Lithuania would become
eligible for INTERREG (Strand A in particular) and related programs (European Commission, 2003).
Since 1994, Poland obtained E311.15 million for cross-border cooperation and after accession thesefunds would be increased (Sadowska-Snarska, 2002). Belarusian partners would probably not be
eligible for INTERREG, but can be supported by TACIS Cross-Border Cooperation schemes.
There is a possibility that enhanced attention to the future neighbors of the EU would
increase the amounts spent for cross-border co-operation as well as stimulating the Belarusians totake an active part in the projects. The major effects of collaboration within the euroregions couldbe:•development of technical infrastructure, particularly in the cross-border area•

development of social infrastructure, cultural and educational exchange•

environmental safety and better spatial planning•some growth of cross-border trade and investment•

growth of tourism

These potential effects would occur in western Belarusian regions, but the spillover to other regions
would probably be minor.

The EU New Neighborhood Policy

One of the most important factors that would define the benefits and threats of theenlargement to neighboring states would be the future EU policy towards those neighbors. The
European Commission proposed a framework for the so-called “New Neighbourhood Policy”, which
outlines the future relations with the new neighbors of the EU. This document underlines theimportance of EU involvement in building fruitful collaboration with all neighboring countries, and,in particular, Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (European Commission, 2003). As stated in
the document, the Union is keen to support the development of a stable market economy, the rule oflaw, efficient administration, a clean environment, security, and other issues. Within this policy, theEU is able to go as far as offering full participation in the single market (free movement of goods,
services, capital and labor) without membership (European Commission, 2003).
The Commission stipulates that for Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, community,
EBRD and European Investment Bank (EIB) supported initiatives should be further developed.
While the central role played by the EBRD should continue to be supported, the EU could also
consider the progressive and targeted increase of EIB lending to Russia, and its extension to the
Ukraine, Moldova and, eventually, Belarus. In the Commission’s opinion the EU should ensure theInternational Financial Institutions take adequate account of the importance of spending on
education, health and social safety net provisions in their policies towards the neighboring countries.
It is further emphasized that Eastern neighbors should benefit from more direct grant aid and budget
support for tackling poverty, social and economic inequality and exclusion to achieve greater social
cohesion (European Commission, 2003).
What is important is that the Commission will consider the possibility of creating a new
Neighbourhood Instrument which builds on the positive experiences of promoting cross-bordercooperation within the PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG programs. According to the Commission,
this instrument will focus on trans-border issues, promoting regional and sub-regional cooperation

and sustainable development on the Eastern border.
The latter commitment would directly benefit the western Belarusian regions, and, inparticular, the activities carried out within the two euroregions. As detailed financial plans have notyet been elaborated, it is very difficult to estimate the potential effects on the development ofwestern regions. Most probably, the EU activities would help to induce growth in those areas, but a
lot would depend on the internal economic and political situation in the country at the time when the
programs would be realized.
In general, the assistance offered by the EU New Neighbourhood Policy is conditional on acountry’s progress. In other words, the EU would not pay if the country ‘does not behave’. That cancause a problem for Belarus as the country’s policies usually do no comply with EU expectations.
The Commission admits that relations with Belarus would not be easy:

The EU faces a choice in Belarus: either to leave things to drift – a policy forwhich the people of Belarus may pay dear and one which prevents the EU frompursuing increased cooperation on issues of mutual interest - or to engage, andrisk sending a signal of support for policies which do not conform to EU values(European Commission, 2003, p.15).

The impact of integration with the Russian Federation on Belarusian regions
The integration processes between Belarus and the Russian Federation started in 1995 whena customs union agreement signed by Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
came into force. The customs union appeared to be a mere political declaration as every country
continued to have an autonomous trade policy. This was justified when in 1998 Kyrgyzstan joined
the WTO without any settlement with its partners in the customs union.

Since 1995, Belarusian leadership, unlike any other CIS country, pushed for closer
integration with Russia. In 1996 the agreement on the Community of Belarus and Russia was signed;a year later, the Community was transformed into a Union of the two counties and, finally, in late1999 the Presidents signed the agreement on the Union State of Belarus and Russia.
It has been admitted by Belarusian and Russian economists that all those actions werenothing but political declarations. The majority of the documents signed under the framework of theUnion State did not contain any significant commitments. The integration rhetoric was a usefulpolitical and ideological instrument for both presidents Yeltsyn and Lukashenko. Yeltsyn wanted tokeep an ally at the time when all the other former Soviet republics turned away from Russia.
Lukashenko wanted cheap oil and gas, easy access to the Russian markets and, most significantly,
access to the Russian political arena (Tarasevich and Lobatch, 2001).
A politically not economically based decision to eliminate borders with Russia became very
harmful for the Belarusian economy in the long run. Apart from large volumes of “gray” trade that
undermined the competitiveness of local production and official importers, the resulting trade
diversion from more competitive markets froze the much-needed restructuring of the Belarusianstate companies. Besides, this ‘single vector’ policy led to a situation where 56% of Belarusian
foreign trade was done with Russia (100% of oil and gas imports), which made the Belarusian
economy extremely sensitive to decisions taken by the Russian government (Tarasevich and Lobatch,
2001).
Under President Putin, Russian policy towards Belarus became much more pragmatic. Putin
stopped all integration rhetoric by offering “the closest variant of integration” – incorporation ofBelarus into the Russian Federation. Although Lukashenko held it back, economic and politicaldependence on Russia have been forcing Belarusian leadership to take decisions that serve
exclusively Russian interests (Romanchuk, 2003).

In these circumstances Belarus is being forced to privatize the biggest and the most efficientstate-owned enterprises in the chemical, petrochemical and fuel industries and to invite investors
only from Russia. The chemical and petrochemical industry in Belarus represents an interest for theRussian investors. The equipment in those companies is not worn out compared to other Belarusian
industries; the companies are profitable and have potential for growth. Only big Russian oil and gas
companies (Gazprom, Lukoil, Itera, Surgutneftegaz, TNK) expressed an interest in buying thosecompanies. According to Belarusian and Russian experts, it is now a good time to buy cheaply thebest pieces of Belarusian state property (Grib, 2003). Belarus needs investments badly; it unlikelythat foreign companies would participate in tenders (the business climate in the country is ranked
very low, and important foreign investors, such as Ford, Ikea, and MAN already left the country).
Belarus is dependent on Russia and therefore Russian investors would have a priority in any case.
Big Russian oil companies have direct access both to Kremlin and Lukashenko, therefore they arequite sure that their interests in Belarus would be protected. To date, Russian companies have notacquired any shares of Belarusian property as they found the conditions set by the Belarusian
government to be not acceptable. Belarus has put itself in the situation where Russian companies
basically dictate the conditions for privatization. Now potential investors wait until the Belarusian
government suggests a better price for the property.
Big Russian companies choose certain factories for investment and the regional dimension
has never been present in the decision-making. Small and medium businesses do not find Belarus
attractive for investment; therefore, the regional factors for Russian investment in Belarus have not
yet appeared.
The currency union, which is being created, again, on the conditions of the RussianFederation would de facto seal the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation(Tereschenko, 2002). Substitution of the Belarusian ruble with the Russian currency would createmore threats than opportunities. Belarus would lose its own monetary policy that used to be muchsofter than that in Russia and would have to adjust to stricter rules. The Belarusian economy is not
yet ready to refuse devaluation as one of the most popular monetary policies. Introduction of Russian
ruble would probably create a shock that would drastically decrease the competitiveness ofBelarusian products in Russian markets and lead to severe economic and social consequences(Bogdankevich, 2002).

Following the logic of international experience, eastern Belarusian regions should havegained a lot from the integration processes with the Russian Federation. In Poland, the westernregions that were closer to the EU took the largest benefits out of the accession process.
Contradicting the Polish experience, Belarusian statistics show that economies in the eastern
Belarusian regions did not get any significant impulse for growth. The number of loss-making
companies increased, investments from Russia have been very low, and migration of labor has notbeen intensified. Open Russian markets did not bring significant advantage to the eastern regions as
the companies were not able to use the economies of scale and to earn money for reconstruction. The
turnover with Russia in those regions has not been stable, exports during the last few years havedecreased and prospects for the future are not optimistic at all as Russian products become more andmore competitive even within Belarus.
The price/quality ratio for most Belarusian products becomes less and less attractive for
Russian consumers. Modernized private companies in Russia start producing similar products at abetter price. Chinese and Korean exports to Russia of electrical devices in particular, put extra
competitive pressure on Belarusian goods sold in Russia. Belarusian products lose competitivenessat Russian markets because of growing inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises and theinadequate economic policy of the government2. Privatization was frozen in Belarus in the early
1990s, and the old industrial state-owned giants have seen very little modernization since then. The
socially-minded policy of the government obliged owners to keep all the workers in the companies
even though their duties were not needed any more. Loss-making production could not be closed;
instead, the companies strived for the state subsidies. The unfair tax system redistributed profits fromthe companies that have been doing relatively well to those that were in continuous loss. The
procedure of bankruptcy has never been initiated. Such a policy led to the situation where thecompanies could not save money to change obsolete equipment and introduce new, more efficienttechnologies. Foreign investors have been reluctant to participate in the state-owned businesses. In
these circumstances, the costs of production have been rising continuously but quality has not
improved since the mid-1990s. The economic policy of the government, the state regulation of prices
in particular, created a situation when even Belarusian beer makers (all of them are still state owned)
started to quickly loose markets to Russian and Ukrainian brands within Belarus (Romanchuk, 2003).
In some towns that are located close to the Russian border, small traders import bread, which is lessexpensive and of much better quality than that baked at the state-owned factories in Belarus.

In general, it appears like the western Belarusian regions gained more out of the eastward
integration process then the eastern regions. The number of loss-making companies in western
Belarus has been much smaller, and exports to Russia during the last five years have been morestable (Statistical Yearbook (2)). Actually, the western Belarusian regions lost more than they gained
from the relations between Belarus and Russia. An economic policy that was declared to serve theinterests of Russia discouraged Polish and Lithuanian companies from investing in Grodno and Brest.

2

Problems of Belarusian exports to Russia have been extensively discussed in Belarusskaja Gazeta(Belarusian Newspaper) and Belarusskij Rynok (Belarusian Maket) from 1999 – 2003.

These two regions have much in common with the two countries due to cultural and historic reasons.
Grondo and Brest were Polish territory before 1939; people there can speak Polish, most of them
regularly visit Poland and used to visit Lithuania before the country introduced visas. Despite this,
Polish and Lithuanian investors did not show any serious interest even in the free economic zones
created over the border in Brest (1996) and Grodno (2001).
Closer integration with Russia and the freeze of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreementwith the EU created trade diversion from Central and Western Europe to Russia. This had a harmful
impact on western Belarusian regions, because it undermined their economic potential. Companies
in Grodno and Brest were discouraged from keeping and extending their share in the morecompetitive, but very promising Polish and Lithuanian markets. Exports to Poland and Lithuania
demand higher standards and give more stimulus for technological innovations. In the late 1990s
Polish producers started to use western European technologies, and if trade flows between
neighboring Polish and Belarusian regions were developing, those technologies would have spilledover to Belarusia. Russian technologies are not that advanced and therefore trade with Russia did notenrich Belarusian companies with innovations. The open borders with Russia created an artificial
situation where the necessary macro- and microeconomic reforms in Belarus have been postponed(Zaiko, 2003). It can be said that “easy” exports to Russia largely absorbed the inevitableconsequences of the unreformed state owned economy.
The eastward policy of Belarus and disregard for Poland as an important trading partner
resulted in a rather protectionist trade regime on the Belarusian-Polish border. For example, thecitizens of Belarus (if they are not registered entrepreneurs) can import no more than 50 kilos of“manufactured goods” and 10 kilos of foodstuffs duty free. Each excessive kilo is due E2 euro ofcustoms duty. This means that a washing machine or a refrigerator becomes almost twice as
expensive in Belarus. As an outcome, a significant share of Polish imports slid to a “gray” sector. It

is quite astonishing that the share of Poland in the total official trade of the Brest region in
2000-2001 was merely 6.2 % and that of Lithuania only 1.4%. For the Grodno region the share of
trade with Poland and Lithuania during the same years was 9.2% and 6.7% respectively. For
comparison, the share of Poland and Lithuania in total Belarusian foreign trade is respectively 3.2%
and 2.3% (Table 7). These quantities are clearly too low for neighboring states.
The disadvantages of the western Belarusian regions also arise from another factor. The
greater the dependence of Belarus on Russia, the more decision-making on internal Belarusian issues
is done in Moscow. In these circumstances the EU-Belarus policy becomes largely a part of the
EU-Russia policy, which may disregard the specific problems of Belarus and undermine theefficiency of the EU assistance. The potential inadequacies would mostly affect the western
Belarusian regions because their relations with the enlarged EU, both cultural and economic, are thestrongest in comparison to other Belarusian regions.
Closer integration with Russia would lead to a situation where exports of the eastern regions
to the enlarged EU would drop almost to zero. In other words, the way the integration with Russia
has been implemented facilitated the deterioration of the Belarusian economy. In Poland, on thecontrary, enhanced integration with the EU induced additional impulses for economic growth.