Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Explorations in Economic History
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eehStates and economic growth: Capacity and constraints☆
⁎

Noel D. Johnson, Mark Koyama

Center for Study of Public Choice, Carow Hall, George Mason University, VA 22030, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O

ABSTRACTJEL classiﬁcation:
O10
O43
N40
H10

State capacity has become one of the most discussed concepts in development economics andpolitical economy. In this survey we argue that the study of economic history provides vital
insights into the process through which modern states have acquired ‘state capacity’. Byevaluating the process of state building across a range of diﬀerent countries in Europe and Asia,
we are able to ‘decompress’ the relationship between state capacity and economic growth. Our
analysis emphasizes the variegated nature of the state building process. We focus on recent
research that helps to elucidate the mechanisms that relate state capacity to economic growth.

Keywords:
State capacity
Economic history
Fiscal capacity
Legal capacity
Rule of Law

1. Introduction
Today's richest countries possess both sophisticated market economies and powerful, centralized, states. In contrast, the poorest
people in the world tend to live in regions with dysfunctional markets and weak or failed states. This divergence between wealthysocieties with strong states and poor economies with weak states is a comparatively recent phenomena. As late as 1800, the majorityof the world's population lived in poverty and political authority across most of the world was dispersed and fragmented.
Since 1800, the developed world has experienced a twin revolution. Living standards in rich countries today are unimaginable toa person living in the premodern era. The average individual in the developed world is between 10 and 15 times richer than his
ancestors. Alongside this unprecedented increase in wealth, the transformation in the scope and scale of the state has also beenremarkable. OECD countries today tax between 20–40% of GDP. By contrast, preindustrial societies rarely succeeded in taxing morethan 5% of GDP.
Recent scholarship in both political economy and development economics has emphasized the importance of state capacity in
explaining why some countries have succeeded in achieving economic development whereas others have not. This literature points to
the role of state capacity in explaining the durability of institutions that are both conducive to markets and to economic growth. It
has been established that the richest countries in the world are characterized by long-lasting and centralized political institutions(Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda and Putterman, 2007; Borcan et al., 2014; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011, 2013; Dincecco and Kat,2014); that poverty is particularly widespread and intractable in countries that lack a history of centralized government (Herbst,
2000; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013) and are internally fragmented (Michalopoulos andPapaioannou, 2014); and countries with weak state capacity are particularly vulnerable to civil war and internal conﬂict (Blattman
and Miguel, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011). This literature recognizes both that predatory behavior by states is frequently a cause☆
We'd like to thank Hans Joachim-Voth, Tuan-Hwee Sng and John V.C. Nye for helpful comments and conversations. Some of the material in Section 4 appears inanother paper authored by Johnson entitled ‘Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evidence from France’.
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: njohnsoL@gmu.edu (N.D. Johnson), mkoyama2@gmu.edu (M. Koyama).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.11.002
Received 1 December 2015; Received in revised form 12 July 2016; Accepted 29 November 2016
0014-4983/ © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Johnson, N.D., Explorations in Economic History (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.11.002

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

of economic stagnation and that well-functioning states can provide the institutional framework necessary for sustained economic
growth.
State capacity describes the ability of a state to collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide public goods. As a concept, it has
its origins in the work of political scientists and ﬁscal sociologists (Tilly, 1975, 1990; Skocpol, 1985; Mann, 1986; Ertman, 1997) who
in turn built on a tradition in German scholarship associated with Otto Hintze and Joseph Schumpeter.1 More recently, it has also
entered the lexicon of development economists, international agencies, and mainstream economics (for a recent survey, see
Bardhan, 2015).2 This essay seeks provides a historical analysis of the rise of high-capacity states in Europe and the rest of the world.
It further aims to better understand the relationship between state capacity and the emergence of modern economic growth.3
Understanding economic history is critical for comprehending the importance of state capacity. In historical terms, theemergence of well functioning states is a relatively recent phenomenon. For many premodern polities, even the term state is ananachronism: there was no state in much of Europe prior to the late middle ages. Otto Heinze observed that feudal rulers ‘lacked theattributes of sovereignty—that is, independence beyond its borders and exclusive rights within them’ (Hintze, 1906, 1975, p. 192). In
medieval Europe, characterized by fragmented political authority, overlapping and competing legal jurisdictions, and privatearmies—the modern concept of a state—has little empirical purchase (Strayer, 1970). The word ‘state’ only came to acquire its
modern meaning in English at the end of the sixteenth century (Skinner, 2009). This was not merely a semantic change; when ‘theword ‘state’, l'etat, stato’ or Der Staat came into usage in the early modern period it was ‘a word for a new political experience’(Oakeshott, 2006, p. 361).
State capacity can be thought of as comprising two components. First, a high capacity state must be able to enforce its rules
across the entirety of the territory it claims to rule (legal capacity). Second, it has to be able to garner enough tax revenues from theeconomy to implement its policies (ﬁscal capacity). State capacity then should be distinguished from either the size or the scope ofthe state. A state with a bloated and ineﬃcient public sector may be comparatively ineﬀective at implementing policies and raising
tax revenues. Furthermore, historians agree that the eighteenth century British state had high state capacity even though it played avery limited role in the economy. Similarly, state capacity requires a degree of political and legal centralization, but it should not be
identiﬁed with political centralization per se. The rulers of feudal society in which many legal and ﬁscal choices were devolved to
local lords indeed had low state capacity. But the concentration of political authority in the center may cause ineﬃciencies andthereby undermine state capacity (Oates, 1999). As Weingast (1995), argues, federalized states have provided conducive
environments for both eﬀective governance and economic development.
We begin by surveying the history of state development ﬁrst in early modern Europe and then in other parts of the world (Section2). The path to high state capacity was diﬀerent in diﬀerent parts of Europe and we argue that these diﬀerences had important
implications for subsequent economic and political developments. In East Asia, the failure of imperial China to invest in state
capacity led in part to the economic and political disasters China experienced between 1850–1950, while the comparatively higher
level of state capacity in Tokugawa Japan set the stage for that country's successful program of modernization and economic growth.
Meanwhile many of the problems that beset sub-Saharan Africa can be traced to weak and fragmented states.
Having established a correlation between the rise of state capacity and modern growth in Section 2, in Section 3, we evaluate
possible causal mechanisms linking state capacity with modern economic growth. We provide several historical case studies in which
the rise of more eﬀective states in early modern Europe lead to greater market integration, better enforcement of the rule of law, andto the establishment of a common national identity.
In Section 4, we explore what factors have enabled some societies to successfully build eﬀective states. We connect the economic
history literature on state capacity with the literature on the deep determinants of development. One insight from recent research on
the deep determinants of sustained economic growth is that both geography and population level characteristics, such as the level ofhuman capital or the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, are important predictors of development and the eﬀectiveness ofpolitical institutions. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude by pointing out areas for future research.

2. Diﬀerent paths to the modern state
Recent work by Besley and Persson (2011) has drawn attention to an important correlation between per capita GDP andmeasures of state capacity, usually deﬁned as per capita tax revenues. This positive correlation is robust and holds over a wide range
of deﬁnitions of ‘state strength’. This ﬁnding is part of a wider reappraisal of the concept of state capacity. For example: Acemoglu
et al. (2014, p. 1) note that ‘[i]t is now widely recognized that the weakness or lack of ‘capacity’ of states in poor countries is afundamental barrier to their development prospects. Most poor countries have states which are incapable or unwilling to provide
basic public goods such as the enforcement of law, order, education and infrastructure’.
This new emphasis on state capacity developed out of the widespread acknowledgement that economic and political institutions
1
See the essays collected in Hintze (1906, 1975) and Schumpeter's classic essay which distinguished between medieval domain states and the modern tax state(Schumpeter, 1954, 1918). The seminal survey of the history of the state by Finer (1999a,b,c) also deserves acknowledgement.
2
The concept of state capacity ﬁrst attracted attention from development scholars in the context of the debate concerning the role played by ‘developmental states’in East Asian economic growth (see Wade, 1990; Haggard, 2004). Alongside there theoretical contributions of Besley and Persson (2009, 2010, 2011) there are someother theoretical contributions to this nascent ﬁeld including McBride et al. (2011) and Herrera and Martinelli (2013).
3
Relatedly, Dincecco (2015) surveys recent work on the rise of eﬀective states in Europe. Philip Hoﬀman's Presidential Address to the Economic History
Association also calls for economic historians to focus on questions of how politics shape economic outcomes, observing ‘we still know too little about what determines
the laws, regulation, and policies that states adopt or what goods and services they furnish’ (Hoﬀman, 2015a, p. 305).

2

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

are critical determinants of economic growth (see, among others, North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981, 1990; Acemoglu et al.,2005a; Greif, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Institutions matter because they structure the incentives that direct economic
activity into either socially productive or unproductive ends. Thus, rather than focusing on whether or not a particular policy was
beneﬁcial or not, the ‘institutional turn’ directed attention to how particular political or economic institutions provided the necessary
preconditions for economic growth to take place, ﬁrst in western Europe and then in other parts of the world.4 However, theinstitutional literature raised a further puzzle: if there is a degree of consensus about which institutions led to the emergence ofsustained economic growth, what enabled some societies to adopt growth-enhancing institutions, but prevented other societies fromdoing so?
State capacity provides one answer to this question. Economies governed by strong, cohesive, and constrained states are better
able to overcome vested interests and avoid disastrous economic policies, while societies ruled by weak states are prone to rentseeking, corruption and civil war. State capacity, therefore, can complement market-supporting institutions in providing a conducive
setting for economic development. This insight was understood by Adam Smith who noted the importance of the provision of peace,justice, and easy taxation (Smith, 1763). But it has only returned to the forefront of discussions in economic history anddevelopment economics in the past few years.
Rulers in early modern (1500–1800) Europe built state capacity in the pursuit of state power and victory in war. Prosperity andeconomic development were largely means to this end; they did not anticipate the possibility of modern economic growth. Many of
their policies were destructive in the short-run. Contrary to the claims of heterodox development economists like Chang (2002),
there are few clear-cut examples of successful state-led ‘industrial policy’ in this period.5
As Adam Smith also understood, powerful states can also impede economic growth and produce economic stagnation. The link
between greater state capacity and sustained economic growth is contingent: it depends on whether state policies complement
markets and market-supporting institutions. The experience of the twentieth century teaches that attempts to build state capacity inthe absence of the rule of law or a market economy have failed to generate sustained economic growth.6 And it should go without
saying that there are drawbacks as well as advantages to ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott, 1999).
The recognition of the importance of state capacity in discussions of economic development and political economy is welcome. In
contrast to a recent focus on the clinical role of economists in designing experiments that enable the evaluation of micro-level policy
interventions, shifting the spotlight to state capacity obliges economists to engage with the wider concerns of social scientists inquestions of state formation and political order, questions which are invariably illuminated by a knowledge and understanding of
history.
2.1. Investing in state capacity in Europe
The ﬁrst role for economic history in this literature is well established: to provide data for the rise of state capacity over the longrun. The European State Finance Database and the research of numerous scholars means that it is now possible to trace the rise incentral government revenues in major western European states from the mid-seventeenth century onwards (Bonney, 1995;
Dincecco, 2009; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013). For precociously centralized states like England it is possible to recreate tax revenue
back to the middle ages (Barratt, 1999; O'Brien and Hunt, 1999).
Tax revenue per capita is a commonly used metric of ﬁscal capacity. Fig. 1 plots the growth in ﬁscal revenues for a selected
number of European states between 1500 and 1900. One interpretation of Fig. 1 is that the increase in tax revenues per capita acrossthese polities suggests that state capacity increased equally across them over the period. Behind the aggregate data presented inFig. 1, however, lies a considerable amount of variation in the institutions responsible for the rise of state power. Diﬀerent countries
have experienced diﬀerent political histories and, hence, diﬀerent paths to modern statehood. It is therefore necessary to better
understand the individual historical experiences of diﬀerent European states.
Tax revenues per capita do not tell the entire picture. It is possible for a state with decentralized ﬁscal institutions (e.g. tax
farming) to extract just as much revenue from its population as a state with a ﬁscal bureaucracy. Importantly, however, there will be
no incentives in the former state to impose more general rules, whereas in the latter there is. One contribution of the historicalliterature on state capacity has been to unpack the details surrounding ﬁscal and legal institutions so that we can dig below thestandard metric of taxes collected per capita.
The complexity of the state-building process is revealed, for example, in the British case. By the eighteenth century, the Britishﬁscal military state was capable of mobilizing tremendous resources through taxation and borrowing (Brewer, 1988; Vries, 2015).
The British state is held up as a success story in the literature in institutional economics because it combined high ﬁscal capacity withconstraints on the power of the sovereign and some measure of the rule of law (North and Weingast, 1989; Barker, 1995; Weingast,
1995; Acemoglu et al., 2005b; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). But what accounts for its success? How was it able to build a modern
state that had both high ﬁscal capacity and rule of law?
In answering these questions historians have placed considerable weight on the importance of the long history England, if not
4
The inﬂuence of the institutional literature (particularly North, 1981, 1990) after the collapse of Communism can perhaps be attributed to the fact that it provides
both an explanation for why economies that rely on government planning are likely to fail and why attempts to import any isolated institution on its own, such asprivatization or the price mechanism, may be ineﬀective (Boettke, 2001).
5
See Juhász (2016) for analysis of a possible example of infant industry protection from the Napoleonic period.
6
To take a contemporary example, a recent study utilizes a synthetic control approach to estimate the sizable economic damage caused by chavezismo in Venezuela(Grier and Maynard, 2016).

3

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

100

200

300

FranceAustria0

Tax Revenues Per Capita

400

EnglandSpain
Prussia

1500

1600

1700
Year

1800

1900

Fig. 1. Log Tax revenues per capita for ﬁve European powers. Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2013).

Britain, had as a coherent and comparatively centralized polity. The following statement is representative: ‘Seventeenth century
English governments …were fortunate to inherit a very long tradition of political integration and eﬀective centralized rule. Despitewell-developed localist sentiment and county loyalties, early modern England was a unitary state. No ethnic or territorial enclaves
existed where the central government's writ did not run’ (Prest, 1998, p. 16). According to this argument, due to the underlying
homogeneity of its land and people, England possessed both a uniﬁed legal and ﬁscal system from the middle ages onwards.7 This
made England a uniquely coherent and congruent medieval polity.8
In Parliament, it possessed a national representative body (in contrast to the regional and provincial estates and assemblies ofFrance and Spain) and a comparatively uniﬁed political elite (Mokyr and Nye, 2007). Recent accounts stress the ability of themedieval English monarchs to utilize Parliament in order to administer their realm. Due to the costs of information, Stasavage(2010) observes that representative institutions functioned best in smalll polities. Geographical compactness gave England an
advantage over France as the latter kingdom was simply too large to be governed by a single representative body. Boucoyannis(2015) argues that it was the power of the English monarch to compel attendance in Parliament that ensured that it was a
representative body. The formation of a nationwide and representative Parliament enabled English rulers such as Edward I to raise
substantial tax revenues and to compete with the more powerful rulers of France on the continent.
The precocious centralization of English ﬁscal and legal institutions helped to ensure that a coalition in favor of restraining thepower of the monarch could be built, and thus made possible a dramatic increase in the military capacity of the English state at theend of the seventeenth century. The classic contribution of North and Weingast (1989) emphasized the importance of the impositionof constitutional constraints after 1688 in reining in the power of the monarchy as a precondition for the subsequent success of the
English (and after, 1707, British) state and economy. Although this view was met by considerable criticism by historians (e.g. see theessays collected in Coﬀman et al., 2013), it remains inﬂuential as a broad outline. The current consensus among economic historians
modiﬁes it by emphasizing the importance of the Civil War and Commonwealth periods (1642–1660) as a watershed in both theconstitutional and ﬁscal history of England (O'Brien, 2011; Jha, 2015) and by stressing the important role played by political elites
and the formation of political parties in producing a political equilibrium during the period 1690-1720 which limited the power ofthe crown while granting the state previously undreamt of powers to raise taxes, spend, and borrow (Carruthers, 1996; Stasavage,
2002, 2003; Cox, 2016).
It is evident from Fig. 1 that the advent of Parliamentary supremacy following the Glorious Revolution enabled a dramaticincrease in state capacity. After the Glorious Revolution and Act of Union, Britain became a ﬁscal military state raising taxes on anhitherto unprecedented scale (Hoppit, 2000; O'Brien, 2011) and incurring tremendous debts (Dickson, 1993, 1967; Ventura andVoth, 2015). Moreover, contrary to the received wisdom, the state that arose after 1688 did not so much increase protection forexisting property rights but reordered them, in many cases dismantling or discarding preexisting feudal or customary property rights
in favor of property rights that were suitable for investment in commercial agriculture or for exploiting land for industrial purposes(Bogart and Richardson, 2009, 2011).9
North and Weingast (1989) saw 1688 as making a constitutional watermark leading to the better protection of property rights
and the rule of law. Subsequent research has overturned many aspects of this thesis. In the century and a half following 1688, rules
and laws did become more general. But the process was saw numerous setbacks. Although as Brewer (1988) documented, the excise

7
The Anglo-Saxons established a relatively centralized monarchy in the ninth and tenth centuries which was then taken over largely intact by the Norman rulers(Campbell, 2000, p. 10). A common set of customs was imposed in the reign of Edward I (r. 1275–1307) (Gras, 1912, 1918). The Anglo-Saxon legal system wasoriginally fragmented and decentralized but after the Norman conquest it was brought under a common law in the reign of Henry II (r. 1154–1189) (Berman, 1983,
pp. 445–458). This was arguably possible due to the strength of the English monarchy (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Barker writes: ‘The common law, a body of law
common to the whole of England as opposed to variable local custom was necessarily a product of centralization’ (Barker, 1995, p. 181). Arthur Hogue observed that‘[t]he exceptional strength of Angevin monarchy was essential for the development of a body of common law for the entire realm’ (Hogue, 1966, p. 33).
8
The medieval English kingdom was a geographically compact polity. However, even in England the power of the government was limited by geography. Royalauthority was strongest in the densely population south-east. Areas like Northumberland, Cornwall, and the marches of Wales remained much more loosely governed.
9
Brewer (1988) coined the term ‘ﬁscal-military state’ to describe the Hanoverian polity that emerged in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. More recent work has
traced back the origins of this ﬁscal military state to the 1680s (Pincus, 2009) or the 1640s (O'Brien, 1988, 2001, 2011).

4

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

was modernized and bureaucratized in the period following 1688, the rest of the British state remained patrimonial in organizationand modernization was a slow and gradual process—an open examination for entrance into the civil service was only introduced in
1870. In the sphere of business organization, the ability to form joint-stock companies was severely limited by the Bubble Act of1720 and incorporation laws only began to be liberalized in the 1820s with the full legalization of joint-stock companies waiting until
1844 (Harris, 2000). Similarly, laws restricting religious freedom remained in place through the eighteenth century (see Machin,1999). Nevertheless, the increase in state capacity was accompanied by a general movement towards what North et al. (2009) call
‘open access’.
One reason England was able to develop ﬁscal capacity in such a precocious manner was due to the relative homogeneity of its
people and geography from very early on. Comparing the historical experience of England and Spain, Voth (2016) argues that where
there was more initial heterogeneity, the state building process developed very diﬀerently. England was able to successful build state
capacity in part because of its higher level of initial cohesion. Johnson and Koyama (2014b) argue that tax farming was more
persistent in France than in England because local economic conditions in France varied much more: it was the low level of initialheterogeneity in England that made it more cost eﬀective for English monarchs to switch away from tax farming towards directcollection of excises and customs taxes earlier than did France or other European countries. Gennaioli and Voth (2015) place asimilar emphasis on homogeneity in their study of the impact of military competition on the incentives of rulers to invest in state
capacity. They argue that in initially more homogenous countries like England, the intensiﬁcation of military competition after 1500
produced a clear incentive to invest in state capacity. However, in heterogenous kingdoms like Spain or Poland, where it wasinherently more diﬃcult and costly for rulers to invest in centralization than it was in England, this incentive did not necessarily exist
and attempts to overcome vested local interests risked destabilizing the entire kingdom.
In contrast to England, medieval France was a collection of feudal appendages, loosely held together by their loyalty to the crown(Goubert, 1969; Major, 1994; Collins, 1999). Diﬀerent principalities and kingdoms were added to the possessions of the French kingthrough warfare and marriage alliances, over the course of the middle ages: Dauphiné in 1349, Burgundy in 1477, Provence in 1486,
Brittany in 1532, Franche-Comté in 1678 to give just some examples.
Consequently, the French experience of state building diﬀered from the English experience. In the face of far greater resistancefrom local power holders, it was signiﬁcantly more protracted and drawn out. Even after Francois I (r. 1515–1547) passed a series ofreforms designed to centralize and standardize his kingdom, diﬀerent ﬁscal and legal systems held sway in the pays d'élection where
the king was able to levy direct taxation from the pays d'état where he had to negotiate with local elites.10 This legacy meant that
France remained legally and ﬁscally fragmented until the French Revolution (Rosenthal, 1992). Nevertheless, as a historical
tradition going back to Tocqueville (1998) has emphasized, ancien regime France did witness considerable increases in state capacity
during the seventeenth century (Bonney, 1999; Collins, 1995; Johnson, 2006; Johnson and Koyama, 2014b) and, as we will discussin Section 3.5, these played an important role in setting the stage for the subsequent development of a national identity which
underlay the introduction of a constitution and rule of law.
Investment in state capacity also took place in Prussia and in the Habsburg empire during the eighteenth century, prior to theimposition of constraints on the executive. Prussia is viewed by historians as a ﬁscal-military state par-excellence, established by theforce of will of the Hohenzollern dynasts (Brewer and Hellmuth, 1999). It rose to great power status in part because the rulers wereable to invest in ﬁscal capacity and establish a powerful standing army.11
In Tilly's (1990) terminology, states like Prussia and Russia followed more coercive paths to modern statehood. Due its small
population, the Prussia state initially relied on local conscription in combination with foreign mercenaries to boost the size of its
army. A canton based system of recruitment was implemented in 1733 mandating the recruitment of a certain number of peasantsfrom each canton (Büsch, 1997). Often viewed as the ﬁscal military state par excellence, the level of bureaucratization in eighteenth
century Prussia is sometimes exaggerated in historical accounts. The Prussian state was able to dramatically increase tax revenues
while continuing to rely on tax farming until the end of the eighteenth century (see Kiser and , 1994).
The Russian experience after the reforms of Peter I was still more coercive, as peasants were conscripted for life-long service inthe army and the nobility obligated to serve the state (Duﬀy, 1981; Dukes, 1990).12 The diﬀerent road to modern statehood followedby Eastern European society has long led political scientists and historical sociologists to speculate about how this made them more
susceptible to autocracy in the twentieth century (e.g. Moore, 1966).
Attempts to build state capacity faced similar barriers in the Habsburg empire, a large empire that ruled over numerous
ethnicities and linguistic groups. This ethnolinguistic diversity posed further challenges to the process of establishing a modern
state.13 Nevertheless, like their rivals in Britain, France, and Prussia, the Habsburg rulers were able to build state capacity. The
reigns of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II saw many reforms that laid the foundation for a modern state. These included a large
scale administrative reorganization in 1749 and several attempts to limit ecclesiastic privileges and submit church lands to taxation.
This culminated in a major tax reform based on a new land survey in 1789. The legal system was similarly standardized: laws against
superstition and magic were passed in 1755, ending witchcraft trials, while in 1768 seigneurs lost the ability to impose capital10

For more on legal fragmentation within early modern France and the cost it imposed see Hamscher (1976).
Georg Heinrich von Berenhost, personal adjutant to Frederick II, was the ﬁrst person to make the oﬀ-repeated observation that ‘the Prussian monarchy is not acountry which has an army, but an army which has a country, in which, as it were, it is just billeted’.
12
In these examples, therefore, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP serves as a lower bound on the ability of early modern states to mobilize resources.
13
This contrast should not be overdone. In the ﬁrst part of the seventeenth century the Hohenzollern possessions shared little in common; they were culturally andpolitically disparate. Brandenburg was commonly known as ‘the sand-box of the Holy Roman Empire’ for the poor quality of its soil. Prussia had been ruled by Poland
for a century and fell outside of the Holy Roman empire.
115

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

punishments in their courts. The crown outlawed judicial torture in 1776. These reforms were described by R.H.W. Evans as ‘[p]iece-meal but concrete and remarkably far-reaching’ (Evans, 1991, p. 189).
Joseph II implemented still more radical, centralizing reforms. A professional bureaucracy was established and German madethe oﬃcial language of all administration. These oﬃcials were trained in Vienna and had a reputation for implementing rules
impartially. Edicts were passed granting toleration for Protestants and Jews. And while Maria Theresa's reforms respected thedistinctive character of each of her realms, Joseph II sought to forge these separate territories into a unitary state. His policies were
only partially successful and his more radical plans were reversed by his successors. Nevertheless, one historian has noted that as aresult of these reforms: ‘[a]t least in the Habsburg hereditary lands the notion of legal sovereignty of a central authority which alone
could command obedience had made inroads into a concept of law which only guaranteed particular and personal privilege’ (Hutton,1980). The experiences of Prussia and the Habsburg lands thus diﬀer from that of England. The initial heterogeneity of the former
made establishing eﬀective ﬁscal and legal institutions a more arduous process. Consequently, the transition to state institutions
capable of implementing more general rules occurred later than in England. This would have consequences for the experiences ofthese countries in the twentieth century.
In contrast, Spain, long held up as the epitome of an overbearing and absolutist state in which the weight of government
regulations and ﬁscal oppression brought about economic stagnation and decline, is now seen in the literature as exemplifying thecosts associated with the failure to build a centralized state.
The concept of state capacity sheds light on this failure. Historians such as John Lynch and John Elliott have shown that while
the Spanish monarchs of the sixteenth and seventeenth century possessed great personal authority and wealth they were unable tobring about the creation of uniﬁed ﬁscal and legal institutions across the diﬀerent parts of their realm (Elliott, 1992; Lynch, 1992).
The state-building eﬀorts of the Spanish monarchy were largely conﬁned to Castile. Elsewhere, in Aragon in the sixteenth century,
for instance, ‘semi-independent lords exercised numerous feudal rights to the detriment of the crown and their vassals, where
Castilians were debarred from oﬃce, where laws were diﬀerent and independently administered, and where taxation was checked by
the cortes’ (Lynch, 1992, p. 290). The overall thrust of this recent research is that the reasons for the ultimate failure of the Spanish
empire lay not with proﬂigate borrowing or overspending, as is advanced in traditional accounts, but lay instead on the revenue sideand the failure to create a uniﬁed ﬁscal state (see Drelichman and Voth, 2014).14
Further evidence for this is provided by the work of Grafe (2012), who characterizes Spain as a confederation of urban republics.
These city republics, along with local elites and landholders, were able to maintain their ‘liberties’ into the early modern period.
Internal custom barriers impeded trade. Indirect taxes were collected and spent at the local level. It was only on the accession of the
Bourbon dynasty that there was an attempt to fully unify the separate Spanish kingdoms. Building on the work of Epstein (2000),
Grafe (2012) sees the failure to establish a centralized state in Spain as at the heart of an integration crisis that limited thedevelopment of a single market economy in the Iberian peninsular. Even when the Bourbon rulers did attempt to increase taxes inthe eighteenth century, they failed in their attempt to impose a common tax (the contribucìon unica) on the entire country (Tortella
and Comin, 2001, p. 159). A recent treatment by Hough and Grier (2015) extends this analysis to consider the consequences that the
weakness of the Spanish state had for the institutions it imparted to its colonies in the New World.

2.2. Investing in state capacity outside of Europe
What about the experience of states outside of Europe? A literature inspired by Montesquieu (1748, 1989) and Wittfogel (1957)
attributes the failure of economic development to occur in Asia to despotic states that taxed excessively and made property rights
insecure (e.g. Jones, 1981; Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Landes, 1998). The rulers of the great empires of Asia were certainly
immensely powerful individuals capable of mobilizing huge resources for monumental building projects and for warfare on atremendous scale. Indeed, the Qianlong emperor commanded an army whose nominal size exceeded a million individuals.
Nevertheless, the ability of the rulers of premodern empires to eﬀectively ‘govern’ their territories was limited. Qing China was highlybureaucratized by premodern standards yet the size the imperial bureaucracy was tiny relative to China's population and in relation
to the vast territories that were claimed by the Qing rulers. Similarly the Ottoman emperor ruled a vast realm and in principle his
power was absolute. But even at the height of Ottoman power, there were many parts of the empire such as Egypt, North Africa, andIraq, that were highly autonomous while even within the core of the empire, the discretionary power of the emperor was quite
limited.15 Moreover, throughout this period the Ottoman ﬁscal system was highly decentralized (Balla and Johnson, 2009; Karaman
and Pamuk, 2010; Coşgel et al., 2009; Coşgel, 2015).
Similarly, recent scholarship has established that taxes in China were low (Ma, 2011, 2012, 2013; Rosenthal and Wong, 2011;
Sng, 2014; Vries, 2015; Ma and Rubin, 2016). This had positive eﬀects as the policies of the Qing state did not impede theeﬀectiveness of the market in goods and services (Pomeranz, 2000; Shiue and Keller, 2007; Li et al., 2013). However, many aspects
14
The view that the decline of Spain was due to excessive borrowing is present in many traditional accounts such as Kennedy (1987) but it has been overturned byDrelichman and Voth (2010, 2011, 2014).
15
The limited power of emperor within the Ottoman empire has been discussed frequently in the historical literature. For example Shaw writes: ‘The nature of the
Ottoman system in fact left the sultan with very limited power. First of all, the scope of his authority was limited to functions involving the exploitation of the empire's
wealth, promoting the institutions and practices of Islam and the other religions of his subjects, expanding and defending the territory of the empire, and keeping
order within it. Therefore, signiﬁcant aspects of Ottoman life were left to be dealt with autonomously, not only by millets but also by the guilds, the corporations, thereligious societies, and the other groups forming the corporative substructure of Ottoman society … And it was only in the nineteenth century, as the result of Westerninﬂuence, that Ottoman government in fact secured the kind of autocracy and centralized power that Europe traditionally assumed it had (Shaw, 1976, p. 165).

6

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyamaof the eﬀectiveness of the Chinese state in the early modern period remain subject to debate. It is a matter of some contention
whether or not the low taxes collected by the Chinese state reﬂected low ﬁscal capacity or a reliance on Confucian ideology. Kent
Deng refers to ‘under governance’ in terms of the reigning political ideology observing that ‘[h]]eavy taxation remained politicallytaboo’ (Deng, 2015, p. 328). Rosenthal and Wong (2011) write that the ‘Chinese logic for successful state maintenance … emphasized
light taxation and generally tried to avoid interfering with commerce’ (174).16 Sng (2014), on the other hand, compellingly argues
that the low amounts of tax revenue collected by the central government in Qing China reﬂect the fragile political equilibrium that
the Qing rulers faced in governing such a large empire using premodern technology. The Qing state relied on a land tax based on aﬁxed amount due each year based on the value of land.17 The collection of this tax gave a large amount of discretion to the local
oﬃcials who extracted bribes or otherwise manipulated the process for their own beneﬁt. Sng (2014) develops a formal model which
predicts that where the principal-agent problem facing the ruler was more severe, the weaker was the ruler's ability to tax. Consistent
with this model, he presents evidence that taxes were signiﬁcantly lower in areas further from the capital and that they declined
signiﬁcantly from the mid-eighteenth century onwards.18 Vries (2015) similarly interprets the low taxes collected by the Qing state
as reﬂective of a low-state capacity political equilibrium. In ongoing work Ma and Rubin (2016) formalize this idea in a more generalmodel that explains why Chinese rule choose not to invest in ﬁscal capacity.19
There is little evidence that the average Chinese paid a price for the failure of the Qing empire to build a ﬁscal military state in theeighteenth century. On the contrary, the economy continued to expand during the High Qing period (1680–1794). Chinese peasantspossessed secure property rights in land (Pomeranz, 2000). The importation of new world crops and the implementation of double
cropping enabled agricultural production to increase inline with the population (Yang, 2014). However, the weakness andvulnerability of the Qing state became evident in the nineteenth century as it failed to respond to aggression from Western colonial
powers from the 1830s onwards, while its failure to maintain internal order resulted in the Taiping Rebellion (see Kuhn, 1980).
Japan also ceased to face geopolitical competition after paciﬁcation at the end of the sixteenth century and as a result there waslittle incentive to build a ﬁscal-military state during the early modern period. However, unlike China, Japan was able to centralized
its governing institutions and invest in ﬁscal capacity once it awoke to the threat posed by the West in the mid-nineteenth century.
The Japanese state played a crucial role in the rapid expansion of the railway network and research by Tang (2014) suggests that thisinfrastructure spending had a causal impact on ﬁrm capital and on the overall eﬃciency of the economy. Sng and Moriguchi (2014)
and Koyama et al. (2015) argue that this was because Japan was relatively compact geographically and, as a consequence, its elites
were able to coordinate on a program of modernization. Thus Japan was able to rapidly build a modern state that was capable ofimitating and adapting successful policies from the West. This enabled them to both defend themselves from the potential threat ofWestern imperial aggression and to implement policies that allowed them to experience rapid catch-up growth during the twentiethcentury. In contrast, the tremendous size of the Qing empire made it diﬃcult for the state to penetrate into local society in every
corner of the country for the maintenance of local order and the implementation of reform policies (Kuhn, 2002).
The analytical lens provided by the concept of state capacity is also useful for understanding patterns of economic development inmodern East Asia. Building on a long standing debate about the impact of colonial rule in East Asia (Kohli, 1994; Haggard et al.,1997), recent research applies more rigorous econometric techniques to better identity the eﬀect of past investments in state capacity
on current outcomes. Mattingly (2015) studies the impact of Japanese colonialism on state building in Manchuria. The Japanese
invested in state capacity but governed through extractive institutions. Relying on the fact that the provincial borders between
Manchuria and nearby Inner Mongolia were drawn to divide a previously uniﬁed and homogenous region, Mattingly (2015)
implements a regression discontinuity design that compares Manchuria with neighboring areas in Inner Mongolia. He ﬁnds thatJapanese rule was associated with both higher state capacity and higher levels of economic development and that these advantages
persist to this day. Dell et al. (2015) also use a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of state building in Vietnam. Theyﬁnd that villages in Northern Vietnam ruled by a bureaucratic, Chinese-style, state in 1698 both have higher state capacity and tax
compliance today and are more prosperous than those areas that were ruled in a less formal and more patrimonial way by the
Cambodian empire.
Lu et al. (2016) study the importance of state capacity for China's more recent economic history. Focusing on Sichuan, Lu et al.
(2016) instrument for state capacity by collecting data on the path of the Central Red Army during the Long March. They show thatcounties along the path of the Red Army had more Communist party members. If the path taken by the Red Army was conditionallyexogenous, controlling for geographic factors, it should only aﬀect future development outcomes via its impact on local state
capacity. They ﬁnd that their measure of stare capacity—the number of party oﬃcials—is positively correlated with several measuresof economic development including grain output growth per capita, education outcomes, and local infrastructure after the
introduction of market reforms in 1978. The number of party oﬃcials had a negative impact on grain output prior to 1978. Theyinterpret this ﬁnding as consistent with the argument that state capacity has a positive impact on development when it complements
16

Also see Wong (2001, pp. 76–77).
It was only after 1850 that the Qing state introduced an exercise tax or internal tariﬀ, the Likin, the receipts of which were spent locally. This tax was initiallyintroduced to pay for the armies required to defeat the Taiping Rebellion and is seen as marking a switch to greater political decentralization and internalfragmentation within the Qing empire.
18
Sng notes that ‘Low taxation in Qing China is often seen as a direct consequence of its adherence to the Confucian ideal of benevolent rule. However, the Qing
state's tax revenue was too small to be explained by ideological beliefs, since Confucianism promoted a tax rate of 10%’ (Sng, 2014).
19
Similarly the ability of the Chinese state to provide public goods such as granaries and ﬂood relief is seen by some scholars as evidence of the eﬀectiveness of theChinese state during the High Qing period (1660–1794) (e.g. Wong, 1997, 2012). For example, Rosenthal and Wong (2011) claim that ‘the Chinese state managed tohelp maintain waterways, manage water-control works for irrigation, and build massive granary reserves and other projects that helped promote material security andeconomic growth’ (175). Others, however, see these eﬀorts as sporadic failures which we not sustained by the Qing state in the nineteenth century (Vries, 2015).
17

7

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

markets, as has been the case in the post 1978 reform period, but that it has no such positive eﬀects when the state attempts tosubstitute directly for the market.
Many of the economic problems that beset African economies today can be attributed to weak and predatory states (e.g. Bates,2008). Much of the recent research that has explored the history of state building in Africa attributes the weakness of modern African
states to the slave trade and to the subsequent practices of colonial regimes. Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
established that the slave trade had negative causal impact on African institutions, led to a culture of mistrust, and may haveundermined the formation of states in the precolonial period. The colonial regimes employed extractive systems of taxation but also
provided little in the way of administration or public goods (see Herbst, 2000; Frankema, 2010, 2011). Frankema (2011), forexample, characterizes the ﬁscal regime of British Africa as minimizing eﬀort rather than maximizing revenue. The amount of tax
revenue extracted by colonial states in Africa was typically low and eﬀorts to build ﬁscal bureaucracies were extremely limited(Frankema and van Waijenburg, 2014). Huillery (2014) details a similar failure to invest in state capacity in French West Africa andshows that the costs of the small colonial states that did exist fell on the African population.20 However, this does not mean that theﬁscal burden imposed by these states was light; van Waijenburg (2015), for example, draws attention to the extensive use of forcedlabor in colonial French Africa.
Other factors also help to explain the weakness and fragility of African states. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013) emphasize the importance of pre-colonial ethnicity-level institutions in determining modern levels of state
capacity. Fenske (2014) provides econometric evidence in support of Bates's (1983) argument that in precolonial Africa centralizedstates were more likely to emerge along ecological divides in order to safeguard and promote trade. The most striking diﬀerence
between Africa and Europe, however, is in the diﬀerent role played by warfare in the process of state building.
An extensive literature has establish the importance played by warfare in the rise of state capacity in early modern Europe (e.gTilly, 1990; Besley and Persson, 2011, 2013; Dincecco and Prado, 2012; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Hoﬀman, 2015a). In subSaharan Africa, however, recent work suggests that warfare did not lead to the establishment of strong or more consensual states,
but rather was associated with state weakness (Dincecco et al., 2015). As new sources of data become available, and as scholars
innovate through, for instance, the use of ﬁeld experiments (see the work discussed in Section 4.2), we expect more research to focus
on the sources of persistent state weakness across much of sub-Saharan Africa.
In contrast, the United States greatly expanded its state capacity in the second part of the nineteenth century in the wake of theAmerican Civil War. Economists have traditionally viewed the rise of the state in late nineteenth century America as a response to
the tremendous growth of the US economy in this period (i.e., Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). Recent research, however, points to a
positive role for state capacity laying the preconditions for the increase in innovation that drove the late nineteenth century
acceleration in economic growth. Acemoglu et al. (2016) use the number of postal stations as a proxy for the ‘infrastructural power’of the state. They argue that the development of a nation-wide postal system provided the necessary institutional preconditions forinnovation in late nineteenth century America. Preliminary empirical analysis suggests a positive relationship between patents andthe number of post oﬃces.21
3. State capacity and modern economic growth
We can now review the mechanisms connecting the rise of state capacity with the onset of modern economic growth. On the faceof it, the nature of the relationship between state capacity and economic growth in the preindustrial period is far from obvious.
Higher taxes and debt are not normally a recipe for economic development. Moreover, in the modern development literature thebeneﬁts of state capacity are often associated with eﬀective provision of public services such as education, health, and of basic
infrastructure, such as roads or electricity.22 But the states of early modern Europe did not in general make large-scale investments
in education or infrastructure until after 1800. The revenues generated by the increased ﬁscal capacity of European states after 1500
was predominantly spent on warfare rather than on other public goods.23
3.1. Protection from external predation
Perhaps the most important function of the state is to provide defense. Frequently this is defense against aggression by otherstates. Premodern polities were often at war. In the early modern period, particularly bellicose states like Russia and France were at
war more often than they were at peace (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013). Warfare was economically costly, typically involving thedevastation of agriculture land—as in the chevauchée of the Hundred Years War, for example—and often the destruction of towns
and cities that resisted a siege.24 It seems likely that the ability of early modern states after 1700 to establish territorial borders and20
This research has also revealed variation and heterogeneity within Africa. French and British colonial states in Africa was remarkably similar but there wasvariation within each colonial empire. British rule was more extractive in East than in West Africa and only in Mauritius did the state invest in ﬁscal capacity and build
a bureaucracy (Frankema, 2011).
21
Other recent work on the American experience studies the impact of state development on public health Troesken (2015) argues that in the American case there
was a trade-oﬀ between the constitutional provisions that protected federalism and gave rise to economic and political freedom and public health.
22
Recent research investigating the causes of bureaucratic performance and infrastructure spending includes Rasul and Rogger (2016), Burgess et al. (2015).
23
Defense is usually viewed as a public good. However, warfare in this period was partly a private good from the perspective of rulers, who enjoyed the glory it gavethem, but rarely bore the cost of losing a war (see Hoﬀman and Rosenthal, 1997; Hoﬀman, 2015b). One of the few exceptions to the absence of government provided
insurance or public goods was the English Poor Law (Greif and Iyigun, 2013).
24
The destructiveness of medieval war is evocatively and powerfully described by Sumption (1990).

8

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

limit the destructiveness of warfare played an important role in allowing Smithian economic growth to take place.
This is supported by recent scholarship from other historical periods. Classicists such as Ober (2015) suggest that classical
Greece witnessed a period of sustained economic growth. Similarly, there was intensive growth in medieval Europe, particularly inthe city states of northern Italy (see Fouquet and Broadberry, 2015). However, these ‘growth eﬄorescences’ were brought to an end
by external invasion because these prosperous city states were not large or powerful enough to defeat the forces of Macedon andRome or Spain and France.25 Economic growth in the absence of suﬃcient state capacity was not self-sustaining precisely because
economically successful societies attracted predators. This problem is akin to the ‘violence trap’ discussed by Cox et al. (2015).
Greater state capacity enabled the states of western Europe to escape from this violence trap in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
The Dutch Republic was the most prosperous economy of the early modern period and some economic historians have detected
the origins of modern growth there (see de Vries and van der Woude, 1997; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012). The slowdown of
the Dutch economy after the end of the seventeenth century was largely due to the burdens imposed by ﬁghting a series of costly wars
against the France of Louis XIV. In contrast, greater state capacity undoubtedly played an important negative role in protecting
eighteenth century England from a similar experience, enabling it to conduct a second hundred years war with France at the sametime as undergoing the industrial revolution. Can we go further and articulate a positive role for the state in helping to provide someof the preconditions for modern economic growth?
3.2. States and markets as complements
Another mechanism is the complementarity between market performance and state capacity. Well functioning markets are not
only required for allocative economic eﬃciency, they also provide the necessary conditions for sustained economic growth over time.
But markets cannot operate in an institutional vacuum. They require property rights that are well deﬁned and enforced and rely on
governance institutions that can arbitrate claims and disputes.
Governance institutions do not have to be provided by a state—that is by an organization that claims a monopoly on thelegitimate use of force within a circumscribed territory. Historically there are many instances of market actors developing their own
governance mechanisms in the absence of state enforcement through private-order arrangements (Greif, 1989, 2006; Clay, 1997;
Clay and Wright, 2005; Leeson, 2014; Stringham, 2015). A considerable volume of trade took place in the middle ages without
relying on enforcement by any single political authority. The state is certainly not required for either impersonal trade or for the
emergence of rules of behavior and the rule of law. What the historical record suggests, however, is that during the relevant centuries
prior to the industrial revolution, commerce and trade came increasingly under the purview of the public-order institutions.26 An
account of the onset of modern economic growth in western Europe cannot therefore abstract away from the greater role played bypublic order institutions during this time period.
The rise of more powerful states led to greater market integration. Economic historians have long pointed out that markets inmedieval and early modern Europe were fragmented (Heckscher, 1955; Epstein, 2000). Transport costs were high, particularly foroverland transport: it was rarely economical to move bulky goods like grain far by road as the price would double every 250 miles(Masschaele, 1993). But these barriers were not only technological; they were also institutional. Internal trade barriers and tolls
ensured that transactions costs were high and were responsible for impeding trade in all European countries (Dincecco, 2010).
Various studies have attempted to quantify the extent of market integration in early modern Europe (Shiue and Keller, 2007;
Bateman, 2011; Chilosi et al., 2013; Bernhofen et al., 2016). This research shows that, in general, markets only became fully
integrated in the nineteenth century. But there was a movement towards greater integration in the early modern period driven by anumber of factors, including improved road networks, canals, and a decline in the violence associated with warfare after theseventeenth century.Among the most important factors was the role played by powerful states like France and Prussia in suppressing
the attempts by local elites to extract rents. Two examples illustrate this point: tolls along the river Rhine and the Zollverein tradeunion.
The role tolls played in stiﬂing trade along the river Rhine was studied by Heckscher (1955). Trade ﬂourished along the Rhine
during the medieval commercial revolution as it was a vital conduit for commerce between the North Sea and western Germany (seeLopez, 1971). As the volume of trade grew, a number of diﬀerent cities and principalities bordering the river established tolls along
it. Trade taxes were important as local rulers and princes within Germany lacked the capacity to impose other taxes on their own
population (Middleton, 2005). Agricultural output remained diﬃcult to tax because output was low and local landowners werepowerful, while the cities were strong enough to assert their independence from the territorial rulers. The river traﬃc, in contrast,
was comparatively easy to tax: ‘the carriers could not well conceal the quantity or value of their cargos; if they had no money to pay,
the toll-man took payment in kind’ (Clapp, 1907, p. 6).
In the medieval period the Holy Roman emperor and the electors who owned lands bordering the Rhine attempted to regulate
and limit the rights to collect tolls. However, as the power of the emperor declined, the number of tolls and other charges multiplied(Spaulding, 2011, p. 204). This situation reached a nadir after the end of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). The decline of imperial
25
Some economic historians have speculated that Song China achieved something comparable to an industrial revolution in the eleventh and twelfth centuries but
this prosperity was similarly ended by external invasion ﬁrst by the Juren and then by the Mongols (see Jones, 2003, 1988). The vulnerability of China to externalinvasion and the role played by these invasions in generating stop-start growth is explored in Ko et al. (2017). The term ‘growth eﬄorescences’ was introduced byGoldstone (2002).
26
For a survey see Ogilvie and Carus (2014). The does not preclude a move towards less reliance on third-party enforcement in the future.

9Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

authority gave ‘the princelings of the numerous principalities and powers along the Rhine free hand to ﬁll their coﬀers by tapping theshipping as they pleased’ (Clapp, 1907, p. 5).
These tolls were high and variable. Rates were not published, rather they varied by type of cargo and ‘judgement andcorruptibility of the oﬃcials’ (Clapp, 1907, p. 7). The rate at which luxury goods like wine was taxed vastly exceeded the rate at whichcheaper and more perishable goods were taxed.27 Spaulding notes that ‘most rulers actively sought to keep the level of their tolls
secret’ but that, in any case, ‘the tolls actually paid resulted from on-the-spot negotiations between captains and toll collectors’(Spaulding, 2011, p. 210). Consequently each toll collector had the discretion to practice price discrimination which made it
extremely diﬃcult for merchants to plan since they could not anticipate the charges they would be obliged to pay: ‘a cargo upstream
from Rotterdam could never tell what new toll stations had been erected or what would be charged this trip at the old ones’ (Clapp,
1907, p. 7).
There were approximately 62 customs posts on the entire Rhine in the late middle ages. In the sixteenth century a merchant paid
tolls at 31 points between Basel and Cologne or one every nine miles (Heckscher, 1955, p. 57). By the 1690s it was claimed that there
was a toll station every 6 miles along the Rhine (Ozment, 2004, p. 126). The total number of toll stations is unknown. Clapp reportsthat there 31 toll stations between Strasburg and Emmerich alone on the Dutch border in 1790. Between Mainz and the Dutch
border the authority to levy tolls lay in the hands of the Electors of Hanover, Mainz, the Palatinate and Trier, as well as the King ofPrussia, the Prince of Hessen-Rheinfels, and the cathedral chapter of Cologne (Spaulding, 2011, p. 213). The Archbishop of Mainz
was notorious ‘for extorting more at his seven toll stations, averaging one for every 15 kilometers (9 miles), than any other owner’(Heckscher, 1955, p. 57).
One problem with this proliferation of tolls was that it diverted trade to more costly inland routes. For example, it was cheaper tosend goods overland and then along the river Weser to Bremen than along the direct route north (Clapp, 1907, p. 10). This is aclassic illustration of the problem of double marginalization. Each toll collector did not take into account the eﬀect that his toll would
have on the overall level of commerce on the river. As a result, tax rates were too high and trade too low from both a private andsocial perspective.
The ﬁscally ineﬃcient old regime on the Rhine was shattered by the events that followed 1789. French armies invaded in 1794and occupied the Rhineland for the next two decades. This invasion marked ‘a decisive break with the past, as centuries of traditional
institutions, ways of thinking and acting were swept away’ (Diefendorf, 1980, p. 23). This is consistent with the argument developedby Acemoglu et al. (2011) that the French invasion of Germany provided the conditions required for sustained economic growth byreplacing wholesale the extractive institutions of the ancien regime. It is also inline with the formal model developed by Gennaioli
and Voth (2015) who show how the pressure of war could make it incentive-compatible for some, but not all, European states toovercome local rent-seeking arrangements and centralize their ﬁscal systems. In addition to getting rid of serfdom, abolishing guild
restrictions, and emancipating Jews, the French eliminated the majority of tolls and standardized the regulation of the river(Spaulding, 2011). This involved creating a modern ﬁscal bureaucracy to collect the taxes. Spaulding reports that ‘trade volumes
increased dramatically along the entire length of the Rhine’. The volume of trade moving through Cologne increased from just ‘1.5
million hundredweights (50 kg.)’ in 1789 to ‘5,239,972, an increase of 346 percent’ in 1807. In Mainz, he reports a 400% increase(Spaulding, 2011, p. 217). This success was continued by the Prussian administration who inherited it following the defeat of
Napoleon and the Rhine became an increasingly important commercial artery in the nineteenth century as the German economy
expanded.
A parallel development occurred with the abolition of tariﬀ barriers between the German states in the nineteenth century.
The fragmented nature of the Holy Roman Empire resulted in a proliferation of trade barriers during the early-modern period.
The idea behind a customs union, or Zollverein, was an attempt to reduce these trade barriers and integrate regional markets.
It was driven by the regional hegemon, Prussia, and built on the earlier (1818) abolition of internal tariﬀs within Prussia(Huning and Wolf, 2016). In this respect, the Zollverein represented an attempt by Prussia to economically unify Germany
under its own leadership.28 Using data on wheat prices, Keller and Shiue (2014) ﬁnds that the formation of the Zollverein
reduced price diﬀerentials by as much as 30%. Additional changes such as the introduction of railways and other institutional
reforms further facilitated market integration.29 Together, these two case studies provide important examples of how in theearly modern period state power could knock down barriers to market integration and thereby help pave the path for Smithian
economic growth.
3.3. A more eﬀective bureaucracy
Since Weber (1922, 1968), scholars have claimed that an eﬀective and impartial bureaucracy is a key distinguishing feature of themodern states that arose in Europe after 1800. Yet the link between the establishment of a modern bureaucracy and sustained
economic growth is certainly not obvious. Sustained growth began during the eighteenth century in England and in the nineteenth
century in North America—prior to the development of a modern bureaucracy in either country. Imperial China had a professionaland meritocratic bureaucracy from the Song dynasty onwards (Chen et al., 2016). Moreover, we are familiar with the failure of27
A cask of wine traveling from Mainz to Cologne, a journey of 115 miles, might have to pay 32 imperial thalers in tolls while a ton of herrings would only pay 8
thalers (Clapp, 1907, p. 10).
28
Prussia strove to break apart rival customs unions such as the Mitteldeutsche Hanndelsverein (Ploeckl, 2013, p. 389). Ploeckl (2015) analyses this developmentusing a model of coalition externalities.
29
This is consistent with the more microlevel analysis of Ploeckl (2013) of impact of the Zollverein on market access and investment in Baden.

10Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

economic planning by bureaucrats in Communist and other socialist economies.30 Bureaucracies suﬀer from a range of informationand incentive problems (Tullock, 1965). Similarly, claims that planning and industrial policy played a crucial role in the growth of
the East Asian tigers, for instance, have been shown to have been overblown (e.g. Haggard, 2004).
What, then, is the connection linking a functional bureaucracy to economic growth? Several points deserve emphasis. The ﬁrst isthat, whatever the range of services a state is expected to provide, it is imperative that it provide those services eﬀectively.31 The
quality of a bureaucracy matters even if the scope of state activty is tightly constrained. Second, states that possess an eﬀective
administrative machinery are better able to overcome vested interests and resist rent-seeking by losers. Research by Acemoglu andRobinson (2000) and Coşgel et al. (2012) among others has shown that attempts by potential losers to block reforms or innovations
have played an important role in impeding economic growth. A third important channel concerns the ability to raise taxes in a waythat does not generate large deadweight losses. States with high ﬁscal capacity can raise revenue in ways that do not create large
distortions in relative prices (Lindert, 2004). The shift from reliance on corvée labor and conscription as practiced by many
premodern regimes to regular taxes was similarly eﬃciency enhancing. Collecting taxes in this way requires a bureaucracy that is
impartial and not excessively corrupt.32
In Europe, the development of formal bureaucracies was a gradual process that only culminated in the second part of thenineteenth century. But it had deep roots. In the German territories, the emergences of formal bureaucracies was a development of
the older cameralist tradition (Backhaus and Wagner, 1987). And it built on the medieval spread of universities across Germany.
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) detail how a papal schism in the fourteenth century led to the formation of universities acrossGermany. They show that a high proportion of these graduates were legal scholars who took jobs in public administration. Dittmar
and Meisenzahl (2016) further show that those cities in Germany that adopted compulsory schooling laws during the Reformation
both produced a large number of notable individuals, many of whom were oﬃcials and bureaucrats, and also grew faster in the
period between 1600 and 1800.33 As Ertman (2005, p. 170) writes, it ‘was from this large pool of available talent … that rulers drew
their new corps of oﬃcials’. By the eighteenth century, increasingly professionalized administrative states had sprung up acrossScandinavia and Germany (see Ertman, 2005, pp. 169–172).
The creation of these administrative and bureaucratic states in northern and central Europe did not translate into rapid economic
growth during the early modern period—the Holy Roman Empire remained an economic backwater during this period—but it did
leave a legacy that has proved important in modern times. And it helped to produce a culture and tradition of good governance thatmatters today. Becker et al. (2016) study the modern legacy of the bureaucratic reforms implemented in the Habsburg empire by
Joseph II. Using a regression discontinuity design and looking across borders within modern Eastern European countries they ﬁndthat areas that had been ruled by the Habsburgs are associated with less corruption and higher levels of trust today.
3.4. General rules and rule of law
State capacity, as we have noted, need not promote economic growth. States with high capacity can pursue destructive economic
policies. Rather the point is that state capacity can be beneﬁcial for growth when the state is constrained by law. One of the reasonsfor this is that high capacity states have the ability to enforce general rules. This ability is closely linked to what social scientists
typically mean by rule of law.
Though the concept is much older, the term rule of law was made prominent by Dicey (1908). Rule of law was brought to theforefront of the discussion in economics and political science in the work of North (North, 1990) and in discussions of postCommunist transition before receiving renewed focus in the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (see Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2005b). For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) rule of law is often associated with ‘inclusive institutions’, or constraints on the power ofthe government. This is consistent with the legal literature on rule of law, which tends to emphasize the importance of general andstable rules.34 Hayek (1960) points out that since general rules are predictable they enable individuals to plan their lives aroundthem which, in turn, maximizes the scope for individual freedom and limits the arbitrary power of rulers. North et al. (2009) discuss
the importance of the rule of law in the context of the emergence of open access orders in which individuals and organizations areequally able to enter markets and compete irrespective of their personal connection to those in power. Following these authors, we
adopt a minimal deﬁnition of rule of law as being the degree to which a society is governed by general rules which are applied to all
30
The work of von Mises (1922) and Hayek (1948) makes it clear that bureaucrats are unable to eﬀectively ‘plan’ economic growth or development. See White(2012, pp. 3267) for a comprehensive summary of this debate and White (2012, pp. 246–274) for analysis for economic planning in developing economies such as
India.
31
By eﬀective provision, we mean that public goods are delivered in a cost-eﬀective and non-corrupt manner. It is important to note that contra- Samuelson(1954), it is not the technical characteristics of a good that determine whether it has to be provided publicly. Characteristics of public goods such as the degree of
excludability are institutionally determined. In many societies and at many points in time goods usually regarded as public goods today were provided privately (e.g.
light houses (Coase, 1974), or, policing (Koyama, 2014)). In our view, state capacity does not refer to the range of services a state provides but rather to how eﬀectively
it is able to do those services it is responsible for providing.
32
Control over corruption is a crucial part of the story as bribes introduce uncertainty into transactions between individuals and the state. They are a tax on small
business or individuals otherwise unable to get around them and tend to favor monopolies and big players (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). An established tax bureaucracy
thus plays an important role in minimizing the negative impact of the state on economic activity.
33
To establish the causality, they use plague occurrence during the crucial decades leading up to the Reformation, as instrumental variable. Outbreaks of theplague destabilized local elite making both the adoption of Protestantism and new compulsory schooling laws more likely.
34
Lon Fuller, for example, provides a procedural deﬁnition of rule of law which requires (1) legal equality in the sense that all individuals are equally subject to thelaw; (2) open and clear deﬁnition of the law; (3) laws that are stable over time; (4) a transparent and law making process that is guided by general rules; (5) an
independent judiciary; (6) open access to the courts and other legal institutions; (7) rules that apply uniformly to all individuals (Fuller, 1969).

11

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

citizens equally.
Low capacity states are unable to implement or enforce general rules. While high capacity states do not necessarily enforce
general rules, the historical record suggests that as rulers invested in capacity, they were often confronted with strong incentives tomake their rules more general. This was often simply because the costs of applying centralized ﬁscal and administrative rules toheterogenous populations were lowered when those rules and institutions were made more general. Examples include the Edict ofVillers-Cotterêts of 1539 introduced in France during the reign of Francis I (r. 1515–1547) or the Code Louis introduced by theministers of Louis XIV (r. 1642–1715); these edicts were introduced to strengthen the power of the French monarchy but they had
the side eﬀect of standardizing legal institutions across the country (Hamscher, 2012).35
3.5. Nation-building
Early modern states resembled stationary bandits to use Olson's memorable phrase (McGuire and Olson, 1996). They taxed andthey made war. And they relied on popular acquiescence rather than popular support. An important achievement of the mostsuccessful modern states after 1850 is that taxation came gradually to rest on quasi-voluntary compliance. This achievement was
based on the perception that modern states were legitimate in the eyes of a majority of their populations. The legitimacy of a state
depends on the beliefs of individuals. Scheve and Stasavage (2012) argue that mobilization for war played a crucial role in theestablishment of inheritance taxes because warfare generated both a need for revenue, and a sense that the rich should contribute
ﬁnancially, if others were contributing through military service. Legitimacy requires an ideology. But individuals have to be able tocoordinate on and share this ideology. This requires publicizing the aims and purposes of the state. Or it can involve hijacking
existing legitimating values such as nationalism or religion. Nationalism has been a particularly eﬀective ideology around which
modern states have coalesced (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1991).
Development economists have pointed out that heterogenous preferences—often a synonym for the absence of a common
national identity—are generally associated with lower public good provision, greater risk of civil war, and lower incomes (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999, 2003; Arbatli et al., 2015). In contrast, more homogenous preferences lower the costs ofpublic good provision and make it easier for individuals to coordinate on collective decisions (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, pp. 113–
116). These arguments are extremely relevant for economic historians.36
This suggests that the emergence of eﬀective states is predicated on a degree of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity.
State building had to be accompanied by nation-building. The most successful modern states like Britain and France developed
as nation states while larger multi-ethnic states like the Habsburg, Ottoman and Tzarist empires proved less successful andeventually disintegrated. But cultural, linguistic, and to an extent ethnic homogeneity are themselves variables that can beshaped by policymakers.37 And, with this in mind, a growing literature investigates the interaction between state capacity andnational identity.
Alesina and Reich (2015) develop a model to study the conditions under which a ruler or ruling elite will invest in
homogenizing the preference of the population. They argue that the threat of democratization provided an important
inspiration for rulers to instill common national preferences. The model they build allows for several possibilities including that
where rulers do not instill national preferences but prefer to ‘divide and rule’, the common strategy adopted by European rulers
in their colonies.
Nation-building policies such as the introduction of compulsory education require a certain level of state capacity. Therefore,
attempts at nation-building will be limited or absent in states that lack capacity. Rulers possessing lower state capacity will be more
likely to rely on methods based on the principle of divide and rule than will rulers with higher state capacity.
3.6. Fiscal Capacity and National Identity in Ancien Regime France
The relationship between investments in state capacity and nation-building was not limited to the post-1800 period. Johnson(2015) provides a speciﬁc example of how investments in ﬁscal capacity from ancien regime France was causally related to increases
in support for national policies. Alexis De Tocqueville in The Old Regime and the French Revolution argued that many of thedemocratic and constitutional reforms of the Revolution were made possible by the policies of Bourbon monarchs during theprevious century, policies which undermined the institutions of the feudal regime. The monarchy was able to increase its ﬁscal andlegal capacity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Root, 1987; Kwass, 2000; Johnson and Koyama, 2014b). Johnson(2015) argues that one unintended consequence of the extension of the state capacity of the monarchy was that the new institutions
introduced replaced and made obsolete pre-existing feudal institutions. This, in turn, shifted the attention of both nobles and nonnobles away from local interests and towards the business of reforming national institutions.
Johnson (2015) exploits the internal variation in state capacity at the end of the eighteenth century in France created as aconsequence of reforms made in 1664 by Louis XIV's ﬁnance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. He created a customs union which35

See the discussion in Johnson (2013) and Johnson and Koyama (2014b).
Recent work by Hao and Xue (2016) shows that ethnic fractionalization as measured by surname distance in China was associated with the under-provision ofschools in the early twentieth century.
37
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not exogenous but rather the product of past developments some of which are associated with explicit programs of nationbuilding by the state (see Alesina and Reich, 2015) while others were the product of spontaneous developments such as those associated with the rise of print media asemphasized by scholars of nationalism such as Anderson (1991).
36

12

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

Fig. 2. National Identity in the 1789 General Cahiers. Darker color represents greater identiﬁcation in the Cahiers by the Nobility and Third Estate with either the‘King’ or ‘France’ according to Hyslop (1934). Each grid point in the map is assigned a value based on the inverse-weighted distance of surrounding 12 cities that sent
in Cahiers (exponent of distance used is the default of 2). The Cinq Grosses Fermes region is delineated in red and treated as a barrier.

encompassed about half of the regions controlled by the monarchy.38 As Colbert was a mercantilist, a prime objective in creating thiscustoms area, known as the Cinq Grosses Fermes, was to facilitate internal trade and tax external trade. Royal authority was used
wherever possible to suppress internal feudal taxes and regulations inside the CGF. Royal taxes were raised both on goods traded
across the border of the customs union as well as within its borders (See, e.g., Heckscher, 1955, pp. 103–106; Bosher, 1964).
Johnson (2015) calculates that in 1784, taxes collected per capita were on average 40% higher inside the CGF than outside.
Johnson (2015) tests Tocqueville's hypothesis using data from the Cahier des Doléances. These were a set of documents whichLouis XVI requested to be submitted from every town in France on the eve of what would become the French Revolution in 1788.
Each Estate (clergy, nobles, and everyone else) wrote down the ‘grievances’ they wanted to be discussed at the upcoming Estates
General. Hyslop (1934) surveyed the General Cahiers, constituting 200 regions in France, and created codes for each coveringvarious forms of local and national institutions mentioned in them. For instance, she recorded whether a speciﬁc Cahier requested
more uniform weights and measures, wanted the same law for all estates, wished to abolish feudal dues, wished to abolish serfdom,
or requested a more uniform legal code. Johnson (2015) investigates an index which reﬂects the degree to which each region's
complaints reﬂect national or local concerns. The index runs from 1 to 3 where 1 represents local concerns and 3 represents thestrongest concern for national issues such as the desire for uniform weights and measures.
Fig. 2 provides evidence that Tocqueville was correct to claim that being subject to more centralized institutions had the eﬀect ofshifting people's attention away from local and towards more national concerns. It shows the relationship between stated aﬃliation
with national institutions from the Cahiers des Doléances and whether a region was subject to the strong institutions of themonarchy within the Cinq Grosses Fermes. Each dot represents a city from which the Cahiers have been coded for each of theEstates. The solid line represents the border of the CGF region. Each pixel in the map is shaded based on the inverse distanceweighted value of the index of support for national institutions. Darker colors represents greater support for national institutions. As
is clear from Fig. 2, there is a stark discontinuity in support for national institutions at the border of the CGF. Using a regression
discontinuity framework, Johnson (2015) shows that this discontinuity is economically signiﬁcant and robust to controlling fornumerous geographic, political, and cultural variables. Cities inside the CGF aﬃliated more with national than local institutions in
1789 and were also richer in 1817–21. Furthermore, the source of this income diﬀerence can be traced to the willingness of theseregions to use formal ﬁnancial institutions and to contribute towards public goods. In the case of France, the development of ﬁscal
capacity by the absolute monarchy was a necessary step towards generating support in the general population for broader-based and
38
The Provinces excluded from this customs union were Angoumois, Artois, Auvergne, lower Navarre, Béarn, Brittany, Cambrésis, Foix, Dauphiné, Flanders,Forez, Franch-Compté, Gascony, Guyenne, Hainaut, Ile-de-Rhé, Ile d'Oléron, Languedoc, Limousin, Lyonnais (in parts), Marche, Provence, Roussillon, Rouergue,
Saintonge, and Vivarais. The core provinces of this customs union were based on the regions of ﬁve tax farms created during the late middle ages. These historical tax
farms were known as the (1) traite foraine, le rêve et le haut passage de Champagne et de Normandie, (2) la traite foraine de Normandie, (3) le traite domaniale deChampagne, Picardie, Normandie, et Bourgogne, (4) la douane de Lyon, and (5) les droits d'entrée sur l'épicieries, drogueries et grosses denrées. In 1589 René Brunet
managed to consolidate them under a single owner. This consolidation was achieved during a very active period of wars of religion by Henri III (r. 1574–1589) who
desperately needed the revenues (Roux, 1916, pp. 70–73). As such, the explanation for the boundaries of the Cinq Grosses Fermes (or Five Big Farms) in Colbert'stime is likely attributable to a short-run desire by monarchs in the sixteenth century for increased lending through the tax farms to satisfy their borrowing needs(Johnson and Koyama, 2014a).

13

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

more inclusive institutions which were conducive to stable economic growth.
Taken together, this work provides evidence that high capacity states in Europe contributed to economic development through arange of channels: they made economies more robust to negative shocks such as warfare, helped to integrate domestic markets andlaid the foundations for relatively impartial bureaucracies and the rule of law. Furthermore, as part of a self-reinforcing process,state-building itself helped previously heterogeneous population to coalesce around common goals such as the provision of moregeneral rules. However, these mechanism do not, by themselves fully explain how these states achieved developed capacity in theﬁrst place. In the next Section, we turn to the deep determinants that help to explain why state-building eﬀorts have succeeded insome parts of the world but have been less successful elsewhere.
4. Deep determinants of eﬀective states?
What enables some societies to build eﬀective states—states that are able to provide basic public goods but which are constrained
and limited in scope and scale? To address this question we review recent ﬁndings from the literature in growth economics andpolitical economy and suggest how these can inform economic historians working on the topic of state capacity.
4.1. State antiquity
Many recent ﬁndings emphasize the importance of deep, underlying determinants for modern economic and political outcomes.
Comin et al. (2010) show that the level of technological development in 1500 strongly predicts incomes today. Going from having
none of the available technologies in 1500 to having all of them increases per capita GDP by a factor of between 5.9 and 13.3.
Reviewing these and other instances of long-run persistence, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) note that a long history of statehood is
one of three factors, alongside geography and the agricultural transition that have been shown to be robust in explaining modern
development.
Empirical studies of the origins of economic growth frequently use the measure of state antiquity devised by Bockstette et al.
(2002) as a proxy for state capacity. Bockstette et al. (2002) and followup studies (Chanda and Putterman, 2007; Putterman andWeil, 2010) employ the simple idea of calculating for each modern country how much of that country had been ruled by agovernment above the tribal level for each ﬁfty year period going back to the year 0 and whether or not that state was a domestic one
or a foreign imposition. This gives a rough indicator of the extent to which a country has a history of indigenous statehood. They ﬁndthat state history in 1500 best predicts modern development.39
Putterman and Weil (2010) innovated by adjusting this measure of state history to reﬂect the state history of the populations thatcomprise modern states. This measure, which gives a much higher measure of state history to countries settled by European
colonialists like the USA and Australia, is associated with better political institutions today as reﬂected in standard measures such as
executive constraints, expropriation risk, and government eﬀectiveness.40,41.
These studies are highly intriguing but they remain cross-country exercises that inevitably lack the richness that historical studies
can bring to the question of the relationship between states and economic development. For a closer picture we need more microlevel historical studies and we need to pay attention to the mechanisms and channels linking a history of statehood to modern
outcomes.
4.2. Culture
Culture is the second factor that deserves emphasis. A recent literature has established the importance of culture as an importantvariable that is amenable to serious scientiﬁc study. Several insights can be gleaned from this line of research. First, cultural values
can be extremely persistent as shown by work by Guiso et al. (2006, 2008), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Voigtländer and Voth(2012), Alesina et al. (2013), and Grosjean and Khattar (2014), among others. Second, as modeled in theoretical papers on theintergenerational transmission of values, an important mechanism for cultural persistence is the incentives that parents have to
inculcate culture values in their children (see Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Third, there is a complementarity between cultural values
and institutional change which oﬀers the potential to provide a powerful explanation of why attempts to reform institutions
sometimes succeed and sometimes fail (Greif, 1994; Tabellini, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
One hypothesis that deserves further investigation is that there is a cultural element to building eﬀective states and that a historyof political independence or self-government can be important in determining that capacity to build state capacity today. There issome research along these lines. Tabellini (2010) discusses evidence that a tradition of inclusive political institutions has shaped
culture in Europe at a regional level. Guiso et al. (2016) provide evidence that cities in northern Italy with a history of political39

In 1500 representative indices for state antiquity include: Ethiopia=1, China=0.906, Spain=0.562, USA and Australia=0.
Borcan et al. (2014) extend the measure of state antiquity back to the origins of states and of agriculture. They ﬁnd an inverse u-shaped relationship. Stateantiquity has a non-linear relationship with economic development: that is while state history has a strong positive association with modern development, statehistory squared has a highly negative relationship with modern development. This is true both within, as well as between, continents: the modern day countries withthe oldest states in the world are doing less well than their neighbors with less state antiquity. Intriguingly, they argue that this non-monotonic relationship was
already in place by 1500.
41
In their original analysis Bockstette et al. (2002) discounted this measure so that more recent experiences of statehood mattered more than did distant episodes.
In Borcan et al. (2014) they weigh all periods equally.
40

14

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

independence in the middle ages have higher levels of civic capital today as measured by the number of non-proﬁt organizations per
capita and levels of organ donation.
Conversely this mechanism can work in the opposite direction. A legacy of autocratic or extractive institutions can undermine
prosocial values. Lowes et al. (2016) combine anthropological evidence with the innovative use of ﬁeld experiments to show that theexistence of the Kuba Kingdom in the Congo has apparently crowded-out pro-social norms among their modern descents who steal
more and contribute less in a series of experimental games than do the descents of their stateless neighbors. Xue and Koyama (2016)
study the legacy of persecutions in Qing China. They ﬁnd that persecutions reduced the number of charitable organizations at a local
level and left a long-lasting impact on both local public good provision and on cultural attitudes to political activism and the state. A
better and more nuanced understanding of culture will allow us to better understanding of when and where it plays an importantrole in shaping state development.
4.3. Civil society
This discussion connects the state capacity with the literature on civil society and social capital. Building on the insights of deTocqueville (2000), social scientists such as Putnam (1994) and Fukuyama (1995) stressed the importance of social capital for the
success of liberal democracies.
Their work raises the question of the relationship between the level of social capital in society and the capacity of its political andstate institutions. In their analysis of the transition between ‘natural states’ and ‘open-access orders’, North et al. (2009) placeconsiderable importance on the ability of open-access orders to allow organizations to emerge that are independent of the state. This
is in contrast to natural states that repress such organizations and view civil society as a threat to their political power.
Social capital and the state are often modeled as substitutes (e.g., Aghion et al., 2010). Recent research points towards importantcomplementarities between an eﬀective state and social capital. Acemoglu and Robinson (2016) focus on the coevolution of state andsociety in outlining the path to inclusive institutions. They argue that a ﬂourishing and rich civil society was both a perquisite forsuccessful state development and an important complement to it: ‘[the] capacity of the state and the organization of society fed oneach other in a synergetic way’. Applying this argument to the English case we studied in Section 2.1, they argue that ‘Tudor statebuilding, for example, was facilitated by the fact that civil society had social norms to discipline it. Society demanded that the state
dispense justice and poor relief. Just as society impacted the state, so the state impacted society’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2016, p.
15). This is an important argument because it points out that eﬀective states coevolved with richer and developed civil societies andmarket economies over the course of European history. It suggests another reason why attempts to transplant either markets or
democratic institutions into societies which have not experienced such developments often fail.
More research, however, is required to clarify the relationship between social capital and state capacity. Studying the institutionsof chiefs in Sierra Leone, Acemoglu et al. (2014) ﬁnd areas which are controlled by a small number of chiefs tend to have higher
rather than lower social capital suggesting that in those areas, tightly-knit elites are able to use existing social capital to bolster theirposition. Satyanath et al. (2016) similarly show that it is naive to assume a simple causal relationship from social capital to inclusive
political institutions; in Germany it was in areas with higher density of associations that the Nazi party was most successful.
5. Concluding comments
In this essay we reviewed the contributions of recent scholarship in economic history to our understanding of the role of the statein economic development. In the literature in development economics and political economy it is now commonplace to acknowledge
that ‘history matters’. We have argued that it is important to ‘decompress’ history in order to fully understand the evolution ofmodern states and the relationship between state building and economic growth. To this end, our analysis has focused on speciﬁcchannels through which an appreciation of economic history can shed light on the process of state-building and economic growth.
The ﬁrst lesson that we draw is that the process through which modern states were established varied greatly. The English casestudy points to the importance of securing constraints on the executive power of the king (North and Weingast, 1989; Acemoglu
et al., 2005b). However, constraints on royal authority did not prevent, and indeed contributed to, the decline of Poland-Lithuania inthe early modern period. Therefore, we have drawn attention to the alternative paths followed by France, Prussia, and the Habsburg
empire in building modern states. This process was often violent and costly but, as we have argued, drawing on evidence from theﬁscal management of the river Rhine and the emergence of the Zollverein, it left an institutional legacy that was favorable tosubsequent economic growth.
Comparative research on state-building in other parts of the world such as Asia and Latin America is in its infancy, but we believethat it will generate insights that will be relevant for contemporary policymakers as well. States in East Asia modernized in response
to geopolitical threats from the western powers. In the post-independence period one of the greatest challenges facing countries in
sub-Saharan Africa has been that of building eﬀective states.
A second point made clear from our survey is that economic development and state-building are both lengthy and gradualprocesses. This means that the deep past continues to matter for modern development opportunities. In a celebrated article, Lucas(1993) drew a comparison between the Philippines and South Korea. Both were poor countries in 1960 but in the subsequent
decades Korea grew at over 6% while the Philippines grew at less than 2%. This contrast, he argued, could be called miraculous
because it meant that Korea became a rich world economy while the Philippines remains mired in poverty and he drew attention tosome of the policies and institutions that made it possible.
However, there were underlying diﬀerences between the two countries that were masked by their similar levels of per capita GDP
15

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

in 1960. In particular, the history of state centralization was very diﬀerent in both places. Korea had a long history of continuous
statehood prior to colonization by the Japanese and division after World War 2, while, in contrast, throughout Philippine history
political authority was rarely extended beyond the environs of Manila. Despite having comparable GDP in 1960, the tasks of building
a modern economy and achieving sustained economic growth was always going to be much more diﬃcult in the Philippines than inSouth Korea. Going forward, this suggests that an understanding of how modern states arose and built ﬁscal and legal capacity
should shed light on the feasibility of programs to reform economies, introduce privatizations, or take measures against corruption.
As we have noted, the link between state capacity and economic growth that we observe historically is a contingent one. The
origins of modern economic growth are to be found in the expansion of market exchange and trade that gave rise to a moresophisticated and complex division of labor that rewarded innovation and to the cultural and potentially non-economic factors that
helped spur innovation (Howes, 2016; McCloskey, 2016; Mokyr, 2016). The importance of the rise of high capacity states to thisstory is that these states helped to provide the institutional conditions that either enabled growth and innovation to take place or atleast prevented their destruction through warfare or rent-seeking.
The emergence of sustained economic growth in the nineteenth century was associated with strong but limited states. Twentiethcentury ambitions to use state power to remold societies either ended in failure or were at least partially reversed. We have focusedon the recent literature linking the rise of the modern state to positive economic outcomes, but do not want to give the impressionthat we are neglecting how easy it is for governments to destroy economies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Easterly, 2001). Bringing
together insights from the state capacity literature with the political economy literature on government failures is a fruitful avenue
for future research. We have also left for further work, the relationship between the rise of modern states and investments in publichealth and education from late nineteenth century onwards, two other important channels that link state capacity to long-run
economic success. Finally, we suggest that the long-run relationship between culture, social capital, identity, and state capacity has
only just begun to have been studied and awaits much future research.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Cantoni, Davide, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A., 2011. The consequences of radical reform: the French Revolution. Am.n Econ. Rev. 101 (7),3286–3307.
Acemoglu, Daron, Chaves, Isaías N., Osafo-Kwaako, Philip, Robinson, James A., 2014. Indirect rule and state weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in comparative
perspective. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, Daron, Moscona, Jacob, Robinson, James A., 2016. State capacity and American technology: evidence from the 19th century. American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, Forthcoming.
Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A., 2000. Political losers as a barrier to economic development. Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (2), 126–130.
Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A., 2012. Why Nations Fail. Crown Business, New York.
Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A., 2016. Paths to inclusive political institutions. Mimeo.
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A., 2001. The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. Am. Econ. Rev. 91 (5),1369–1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A., 2005a. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.), Handbookof Economic Growth 1. Elsevier, 385–472, (chapter 6).
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James, 2005b. The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change, and economic growth. Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (3),546–579.
Aghion, Philippe, Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre, Shleifer, Andrei, 2010. Regulation and distrust. Q. J. Econ. 125 (3), 1015–1049.
Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio, Wacziarg, Romain, 2003. Fractionalization. J. Econ. Growth 8 (2), 155–194.
Alesina, Alberto, Reich, Bryony, 2015. Nation Building. NBER Working Papers 18839, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano, Paola, 2015. Culture and institutions. J. Econ. Lit. 53 (4), 898–944.
Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano, Paola, Nunn, Nathan, 2013. On the origins of gender roles: women and the plough. Q. J. Econ. 128 (2), 469–530.
Alesina, Alberto, Baqir, Reza, Easterly, William, 1999. Public goods and ethnic divisions. Q. J. Econ. 114 (4), 1243–1284.
Anderson, Benedict, 1991. Imagined Communities: Reﬂections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso Books, London.
Arbatli, Cemal Eren, Ashraf, Quamrul H., Galor, Oded, 2015. The Nature of Conﬂict. NBER Working Papers 21079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
Backhaus, Juergen, Wagner, Richard E., 1987. The cameralists: a public choice perspective. Public Choice 53 (1), 3–20.
Balla, Eliana, Johnson, Noel D., 2009. Fiscal crisis and institutional change in the Ottoman Empire and France. J. Econ. Hist. 69 (03), 809–845.
Bardhan, Pranab, 2015. State and development: the need for a reappraisal of the current literature. Journal of Economic Literature. Forthcoming.
Barker, J.H., 1995. Personalinsert a space hereliberty under the common law of England, 1200–1600. In: Davis, R.W. (Ed.), The Origins of Modern Freedom in theWest. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 178–202.
Barratt, Nicholas, 1999. English royal revenue in the early thirteenth century and its wider context, 1130–1330. In: Ormrod, M., Bonney, M., Bonney, R. (Eds.),
Crises, Revolutions, and Self–Sustained Growth. Shuan Tyas, Stamford, Lincolnshire.
Bateman, Victoria N., 2011. The evolution of markets in early modern Europe, 1350–1800: a study of wheat prices. Econ. Hist. Rev. 64 (2), 447–471.
Bates, Robert, 1983. Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Bates, Robert H., 2008. When Things Fell Apart, State Failure in Late-Century Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Becker, Sascha O., Boeckh, Katrin, Hainz, Christa, Woessmann, Ludger, 2016. The empire is dead, long live the empire! long-run persistence of trust and corruption
in the bureaucracy. Econ. J. 126 (590), 40–74.
Berman, Harold J., 1983. Law and Revolution, the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachuestts.
Bernhofen, Daniel, Eberhardt, Markus, Li, Jianan, Morgan, Stephen, 2016. The evolution of markets in China and Europe on the eve of industrialisation. Mimeo.
Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten, 2009. The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation, and politics. Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (4), 1218–1244.
BesleyBesley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten, 2010. State capacity, conﬂict, and development. Econometrica 78 (1), 1–34.
BesleyBesley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten, 2011. Pillars of Prosperity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Besley, Timothy, Persson, Torsten, 2013. Taxation and Development. CEPR Discussion Papers 9307, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Bisin, Alberto, Verdier, Thierry, 2001. The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences. J. Econ. Theory 97 (2), 298–319.
Blattman, Christopher, Miguel, Edward, 2010. Civil war. J. Econ. Lit. 48 (1), 3–57.
Bockstette, Valerie, Chanda, Areendam, Putterman, Louis, 2002. States and markets: the advantage of an early start. J. Econ. Growth 7 (4), 347–369.
Boettke, Peter, 2001. Calculation and Coordination. Routledge, London.
Bogart, Dan, Richardson, Gary, 2009. Making property productive:reorganizing rights to real and equitable estates in Britain, 1660–1830. Eur. Rev. Econ. Hist. 13(01), 3–30.
Bogart, Daniel, Richardson, Gary, 2011. Property rights and parliament in industrializing Britain. J. Law Econ. 54 (2), 241–274.

16

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

Bonney, Richard, 1995. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c.1200-1815. Clarendon Press, OUP, Oxford.
Bonney, Richard, 1999. Economic Systems and State Finance. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Borcan, Oana, Olsson, Ola, Putterman, Louis, 2014. State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six Millennia, Working Papers in Economics 602,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
Bosher, J.F., 1964. The Single Duty Project: a Study of the Movement for a French Customs Union in the Eighteenth Century. University of London Press, London.
Boucoyannis, Deborah, 2015. No taxation of elites, no represenation: State capacity and the origins of represenation. Polit. Soc. 4 (3), 303–332.
Brewer, John, 1988. The Sinews of Power. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Brewer, John, Hellmuth, Eckhart, 1999. Rethinking Leviathan: the Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany. Oxford University Press, Oxford. German
Historical Institute in London.
Buchanan, James M., Tullock, Gordon, 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.
Burgess, Robin, Jedwab, Remi, Miguel, Edward, Morjaria, Ameet, Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2015. The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya. Am.
Econ. Rev. 105 (6), 1817–1851.
Büsch, Otto, 1997. Military System and Social Life in Old-regime Prussia, 1713–1807: the Beginnings of the Social Militarization of Prusso-German Society.
Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J..
Campbell, James, 2000. The Anglo-Saxon State. Hambledon and London, London.
Cantoni, Davide, Yuchtman, Noam, 2014. Medieval universities, legal institutions, and the commercial revolution. Q. J. Econ. 129 (2), 823–887.
Carruthers, Bruce G., 1996. City of Capital: politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Chanda, Areendam, Putterman, Louis, 2007. Early starts, reversals and catch-up in the process of economic development. Scand. J. Econ. 109 (2), 387–413.
Chang, Ha-Joon, 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder — Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press, London.
Chen, Ting, Kai-sing Kung, James, Ma, Chicheng, 2016. Long live Keju! the persistent eﬀects of China’s imperial examination system. Mimeo.
Chilosi, David, Murphy, Tommy E., Studer, Roman, Coşkun Tunçer, A., 2013. Europe's many integrations:geography and grain markets, 1620–1913. Explor. Econ.
Hist. 50 (1), 46–68.
Clapp, Edwin J., 1907. The Navigable Rhine. Houghton Murray Company, Boston.
Clay, Karen, 1997. Trade without law: private-order institutions in Mexican California. J. Law, Econ. Org. 13 (1), 202–231.
Clay, Karen, Wright, Gavin, 2005. Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush. Explor. Econ. Hist. 42 (2), 155–183.
Coase, R.H., 1974. The lighthouse in economics. J. Law Econ. 17 (2), 357–376.
Coﬀman, D'Maris, Leonard, Adrian, Neal, Larry, 2013. Questioning Credible Commitment: Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism. Macroeconomic Policy
Making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Collins, James B., 1995. The State in Early Modern France. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Collins, James B., 1999. State building in early-modern Europe:The Case of France State Building in Early-Modern Europe: The Case of France. In: Lieberman, V.
(Ed.), Beyond Binary Histories: Re-imagining Eurasia to c.1830. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 159–190.
Comin, Diego, Easterly, William, Gong, Erick, 2010. Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC? Am. Econ. J.: Macroecon. 2 (3), 65–97.
Coşgel, Metin M., 2015. The Ottoman empire. In: Monson, A., Scheidel, W. (Eds.), Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 404–428.
Coşgel, Metin M., Miceli, Thomas J., Rubin, Jared, 2012. The political economy of mass printing:Legitimacy and technological change in the Ottoman empire. J.
Comp. Econ. 40 (3), 357–371.
Coşgel, Metin, Miceli, Thomas, Ahmed, Rasha, 2009. Law, state power, and taxation in Islamic history. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 71 (3),704–717, (The Economic Performance of Civilizations: Roles of Culture, Religion and the Law).
Cox, Gary W., 2016. Marketing Sovereign Promises: Monopoly Brokerage and the Growth of the English State. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cox, Gary W., North, Douglass C., Weingast, Barry, 2015. The violence trap: a political-economic approach to the problems of development. Working Paper, Hoover
Institution, Stanford University.
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 2000. Democracy in America, introduced by Harvey C. Mansﬁeld, Delba Winthrop, edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
de Vries, Jan, van der Woude, Ad., 1997. The First Modern Economy: success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815. Cambridge UP,
Cambridge, U.K..
Dell, Melissa, Lane, Nathan, Querubin, Pablo, 2015. State capacity, local governance, and economic development in vietnam. memo.
Deng, Kent, 2015. Imperial chinaunder the song and late qing. In: Monson, A., Scheidel, W. (Eds.), Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 308–342.
Dicey, A.V., 1908. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. MacMillan and Co. Limited, London.
Dickson, P.G.M., 199, 3, 1967, The Financial Revolution in England. Gregg Revivals, Aldershot.
Diefendorf, Jeﬀry M., 1980. Business and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789–1834. Princeton, New Jersey.
Dincecco, Mark, 2009. Fiscal centralization, limited government, and public revenues in Europe, 1650–1913. J. Econ. Hist. 69 (1), 48–103.
Dincecco, Mark, 2010. Fragmented authority from ancien régime to modernity: a quantitative analysis. J. Instit. Econ. 6 (03), 305–328.
Dincecco, Mark, 2015. The rise of eﬀective states in Europe. J. Econ. Hist. 75 (03), 901–918.
Dincecco, Mark, Katz, Gabriel, 2014. State capacity and long-run economic performance. Economic Journal, Forthcoming.
Dincecco, Mark, Fenske, James, Gaetano Onorato, Massimiliano, 2015. Is Africa diﬀerent? Historical conﬂict and state development. Working Paper.
Dincecco, Mark, Prado, Mauricio, 2012. Warfare, ﬁscal capacity, and performance. J. Econ. Growth 17 (3), 171–203.
Dittmar, Jeremiah, Meisenzahl, Ralf R., 2016. State capacity and public goods: Institutional change, human capital and growth in early modern germany. CEPDiscussion Paper 1148, Center for Economic Performance.
Drelichman, Mauricio, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2010. The sustainable debts of phillip ii: a reconstruction of castile's ﬁscal position, 1566–1696. J. Econ. Hist. 70 (4),813–822.
Drelichman, Mauricio, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2011. Serial defaults, serial proﬁts: returns to sovereign lending in habsburg spain, 1566–1600. Explor. Econ. Hist. 48(1), 1–19.
Drelichman, Mauricio, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2014. Lending to the Borrower from Hell. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J..
Duﬀy, Christopher, 1981. Russia's Military Way to the West, Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700–1800. Routledge Kegan & Paul, London.
Dukes, Paul, 1990. The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613–1801 2nd edn. Routledge, London.
Easterly, William R., 2001. Elusive Quest for Growth: economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Easterly, William, Levine, Ross, 1997. Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. Q. J. Econ. 112 (4), 1203–1250.
Elliott, John H., 1992. A Europe of composition monarchies. Past Present 137, 48–71.
Epstein, S.R., 2000. Freedom and Growth, the Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300–1700. Routledge, London.
Ertman, Thomas, 1997. Birth of Leviathan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ertman, Thomas, 2005. Building states—inherently a long-term process? An argument from comparative history. In: Lange, M., Rueschemeyer, D. (Eds.), States andDevelopment: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance. Palgrave MacMillan, London, 165–182.
Evans, Robert H.W., 1991. Maria Theresa and Hungary. In: Scott, H. (Ed.). Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe.
Houndmills, UK, pp. 189–208.
Fenske, James, 2014. Ecology, trade, and states in pre-colonial Africa. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 12 (3), 612–640.
Finer, S.E., 1999a. The History of Government from the Earliest Times vol. I. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Finer, S.E., 1999b. The History of Government from the Earliest Times vol. II. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Finer, S.E., 1999c. The History of Government from the Earliest Times vol. III. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Fouquet, Roger, Broadberry, Stephen, 2015. Seven centuries of European economic growth and decline. J. Econ. Persp. 29 (4), 227–244.
Frankema, Ewout, 2010. Raising revenue in the British empire, 1870–1940: how ‘extractive’ were colonial taxes? J. Glob. Hist. 5,17Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

447–477, (URL: 〈http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S1740022810000227〉).
Frankema, Ewout, 2011. Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: maximizing revenue or minimizing eﬀort? Explor. Econ. Hist. 48(1), 136–149.
Frankema, Ewout, van Waijenburg, Marlous, 2014. Metropolitan blueprints of colonial taxation in British and French Africa, c. 1880–1940. The J. Afr. Hist. 55,
371–400.
Fukuyama, Francis, 1995. Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. The Free Press, New York.
Fuller, Lon L., 1969. The Morality of Law. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Gellner, Ernst, 1983. Nations and Nationalism 2nd edition (2008) edn. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Gennaioli, Nicola, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2015. State capacity and military conﬂict. Rev. Econ. Stud. 82 (4), 1409–1448.
Gennaioli, Nicola, Rainer, Ilia, 2007. The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa. J. Econ. Growth 12 (3), 185–234.
Glaeser, Edward L., Shleifer, Andrei, 2002. Legal origins. Q. J. Econ. 117 (4), 1193–1229.
Glaeser, Edward L., Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. The rise of the regulatory state. J. Econ. Lit. 41 (2), 401–425.
Goldstone, Jack A., 2002. Eﬄorescences and economic growth in world history: rethinking the “rise of the west” and the industrial revolution. J. World Hist. 13 (2),323–389.
Goubert, Pierre, 1969. L'Ancien Règime, Paris.
Grafe, R., 2012. Distant Tyranny: markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650–1800, Princeton Economic History of the Western World. Princeton University
Press.
Gras, Norman S.B., 1912. The origin of the national customs-revenue of England. Q. J. Econ. 27 (1), 107–149.
Gras, Norman S.B., 1918. The Early English Customs System. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
Greif, Avner, 1989. Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi traders. J. Econ. Hist. 49 (4), 857–882.
Greif, Avner, 1994. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society:a historical and theoretical reﬂection on collectivist and individualist societies. J. Polit. Econ. 102(5), 912–950.
Greif, A., 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
Greif, Avner, Iyigun, Murat, 2013. What Did the Old Poor Law Really Accomplish? A Redux, IZA Discussion Papers 7398, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Grier, Kevin, Maynard, Norman, 2016. The economic consequences of Hugo Chavez: a synthetic control analysis. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 125 (C), 1–12.
Grosjean, Pauline, Khattar, Rose, 2014. It’s Raining Men! Hallelujah?, Discussion Papers 2014-29, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2006. Does culture aﬀect economic outcomes? J. Econ. Persp. 20 (2), 23–48.
Guiso, Luigi, Sapienza, Paola, Zingales, Luigi, 2008. Alfred Marshall Lecture Social Capital as Good Culture. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 6 (2–3), 295–320.
Guiso, Luigi, Sapienza, Paola, Zingales, Luigi, 2016. Long-term persistence. Journal of the European Economic Association, Forthcoming.
Haggard, Stephan, 2004. Institutions and growth in East Asia. Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 38 (4), 53–81.
Haggard, Stephan, Kang, David, Moon, Chung-In, 1997. Japanese colonialism and korean development: a critique. World Dev. 25 (6), 867–881.
Hamscher, Albert N., 1976. The Parlement of Paris After the Fronde, 1653–1673. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Hamscher, Albert N., 2012. The Royal Financial Administration and the Prosecution of Crime in France, 1670–1789. University of Delaware Press, Newark.
Hao, Yu, Xue, Melanie Meng, 2016. Friends from afar: migration, cultural proximity and primary schooling in the Lower Yangzi, 1850–1949. Explorations in
Economic History, Forthcoming.
Harris, Ron, 2000. Industrializing English Law: entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720–1844. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hayek, F.A., 1948. Individualism and the Economic Order. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Hayek, F.A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Routledge, London.
Heckscher, Eli F., 1955. Mercantilism vol. I. George Allen & Unwin LTD, London, (translated by E.F. Soderlund).
Herbst, Jeﬀrey, 2000. States and Power in Africa: comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J..
Herrera, Helios, Martinelli, César, 2013. Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity. Econ. Theory 52 (1), 165–186.
Hintze, Otto, 190, 6, 1975, Military organization and the organization of the state. In: Gilbert, F. (Ed.). The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 178–215.
Hobsbawm, Eric, 1991. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hoﬀman, Philip T., 2015a. What do states do? Politics and economic history. J. Econ. Hist. 75, 303–332.
Hoﬀman, Philip T., 2015b. Why Did Europe Conquer the World?. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Hoﬀman, Philip T., Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 1997. The political economy of warfare and taxation in early modern Europe. In: Nye, J.V., Drobak, J. (Eds.), The
Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. Academic Press, San Diego, California, 31–55.
HogueHogue, Arthur R., 1966. Origins of the Common Law. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis.
Hoppit, Julian, 2000. A Land of Liberty? England 1689–1727. Clarenden Press, Oxford.
Hough, Jerry F., Grier, Robin, 2015. The Long Process of Development: building Markets and States in Pre-Industrial England, Spain, and their Colonies. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Howes, Anton, 2016. The improving mentality: innovation during the British Industrial Revolution, 1651–1851. Mimeo.
Huillery, Elise, 2014. The Black Man's Burden: the cost of colonization of French West Africa. J. Econ. Hist. 74 (01), 1–38.
Huning, Thilo R., Wolf, Nikolaus, 2016. How Britain Uniﬁed Germany: Geography and the Rise of Prussia after 1815. Mimeo.
Hutton, Olewn, 200, 0, 1980, Europe: Privilege and Protest 1730–1789. Blackwell, Oxford.
Hyslop, Beatrice, 1934. French Nationalism in 1789 According to the General Cahiers. Cambridge University Press.
Jha, Saumitra, 2015. Financial asset holdings and political attitudes: evidence from revolutionary England. Q. J. Econ. 130 (3), 1485–1545.
Johnson, Noel D., 2006. Banking on the king: the evolution of the royal revenue farms in old regime France. J. Econ. Hist. 66 (04), 963–991.
Johnson, Noel D., 2015. Taxes, national identity, and nation building: evidence from france. GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15–33.
Johnson, Noel D., 2013. Legal centralization and the birth of the secular state. J. Comp. Econ. 41 (4), 959–978.
Johnson, Noel D., Koyama, Mark, 2014a. Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France. Explor. Econ. Hist. 51 (1), 1–20.
Johnson, Noel D., Koyama, Mark, 2014b. Taxes, lawyers, and the decline of witchcraft trials in France. J. Law Econ. 57.
Jones, Eric L., 1981. The European Miracle 3rd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Jones, Eric L., 1988. Growth Recurring. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Jones, Eric L., 2003. The European Miracle 3rd edition. CUP, Cambridge, U.K..
Juhász, Réka, 2016. Temporary protection and technology adoption: evidence from the napoleonic blockade. Mimeo.
Karaman, K. Kivanç, Pamuk, Şevket, 2010. Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500–1914. J. Econ. Hist. 70 (03), 593–629.
Karaman, Kivanc, Pamuk, Şevket, 2013. Diﬀerent paths to the modern state in Europe: the interaction between warfare, economic structure and political regime. Am.
Polit. Sci. Rev. 107 (3), 603–626.
Keller, Wolfgang, Shiue, Carol H., 2014. Endogenous formation of free trade agreements: evidence from the Zollverein's impact on market integration. J. Econ. Hist.
74 (04), 1168–1204.
Kennedy, Paul, 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 1500–1980. Vintage Books, New York.
Kiser, Edgar, Schneider, Joachim, 1994. Bureaucracy and eﬃciency: an analysis of taxation in early modern Prussia. Am. Sociol. Rev. 59 (2), 187–204.
Ko, Chiu Yu, Koyama, Mark, Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2017. Uniﬁed china; divided Europe. Int. Econ. Rev..
Kohli, Atul, 1994. Where do high growth political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea's “developmental state”. World Dev. 22 (9), 1269–1293.
Koyama, Mark, 2014. The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution. Public Choice 159 (1), 277–298.
Koyama, Mark, Moriguchi, Chiaki, Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2015. Geopolitics and asia’s little divergence: a comparative analysis of state building in China and Japan after
1850. memo.
Kuhn, Philip, 1980. Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

18

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

Kuhn, Philip A., 2002. Origins of the Modern Chinese State. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.
Kwass, Michael, 2000. Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-century France: liberté, égalité, Fiscalité. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Landes, David, 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Abacus, London.
Leeson, Peter, 2014. Anarchy Unbound. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Li, Jianan, Bernhofen, Daniel M., Eberhardt, Markus, Morgan, Stephen, 2013. Market integration and disintegration in Qing dynasty China: evidence from timeseries and panel time-series methods. Working Paper.
Lindert, Peter H., 2004. Growing Public: social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lopez, Robert S., 1971. The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350. Prentice Hall, New York.
Lowes, Sara, Nunn, Nathan, Robinson, James A., Weigel, Jonathan, 2016. The evolution of culture and institutions: evidence from the Kuba kingdom. Memo.
Lu, Yi, Luan, Mona, Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2016. The eﬀect of state capacity under diﬀeremt economic systems. Mimeo.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1993. Making a miracle. Econometrica 61 (2), 251–272.
Lynch, John, 1992. Spain 1516–1598: from Nation State to World Empire. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
Ma, Debin, 2011. Rock, scissors, paper: the problem of incentives and information in traditional Chinese state and the origin of Great Divergence. Economic History
Working Papers, 152/11.
Ma, Debin, 2012. Political institutions and long run economic trajectory: some lessons from two millennia of Chinese civilization, Technical Report 8791, CEPR.
Ma, Debin, 2013. State capacity and the great divergence: the case of Qing China. Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 54 (56), 484–498.
Ma, Debin, Rubin, Jared, 2016. Strong states and weak administrative capacity. Memo.
Machin, Ian, 1999. British catholics. In: Liedtke, R., Wendehorst, S. (Eds.), The Emancipation of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 11–33.
Major, J. Russell, 1994. From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: french Kings, Nobles & Estates. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Mann, Michael, 1986. The Sources of Social Power vol. I. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Masschaele, James, 1993. Transport costs in medieval England. Econ. Hist. Rev. 46 (2), 266–279.
Mattingly, Daniel C., 2015. Colonial legacies and state institutions in China: evidence from a natural experiment. Comparative Political Studies, Forthcoming.
McBride, Michael, Milante, Gary, Skaperdas, Stergios, 2011. Peace and war with endogenous state capacity. J. Conﬂ. Resol. 55 (3), 446–468.
McCloskey, Deirdre N., 2016. Bourgeois Equality. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
McGuire, Martin C., Olson, Mancur, 1996. The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the invisible hand and the use of force. J. Econ. Lit. 34 (1), 72–96.
Michalopoulos, Stelios, Papaioannou, Elias, 2013. Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development. Econometrica 81 (1), 113–152.
Michalopoulos, Stelios, Papaioannou, Elias, 2014. National institutions and subnational development in Africa. Q. J. Econ. 129 (1), 151–213.
Middleton, Neil, 2005. Early medieval port customs, tolls and controls on foreign trade. Early Mod. Eur. 13 (4), 313–358.
Mokyr, Joel, 2016. Culture of Growth. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Mokyr, Joel, Nye, John V.C., 2007. Distribution coalitions, the industrial revolution, and the origins of economics growth in Britain. South. Econ. J. 74 (1), 50–70.
Montesquieu, Charles de, 174, 8, 1989, The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. translated by Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, Harold S.
Stone.
Moore, Barrington, 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Beacon Press, Boston MA.
North, Douglass C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Norton, New York, U.S.A..
North, Douglass C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK.
North, Douglass C., Weingast, Barry, 1989. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England. J.
Econ. Hist. 49, 803–832.
North, Douglass C., Wallis, John Joseph, Weingast, Barry R., 2009. Violence and Social Orders: a Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
North, Douglass C., Thomas, Robert Paul, 1973. The Rise of the Western World. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K..
Nunn, Nathan, 2008. The long-term eﬀects of Africa's slave trades. Q. J. Econ. 123 (1), 139–176.
Nunn, Nathan, Wantchekon, Leonard, 2011. The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa. Am. Econ. Rev. 101 (7), 3221–3252.
Oakeshott, Michael (2006), Lectures in the History of Political Thought, edited by Terry Nardin and Luke O’Sullivan edn, Imprint Academic,Exeter.
Oates, Wallace E., 1999. An essay on ﬁscal federalism. J. Econ. Lit. 37 (3), 1120–1149.
Ober, Josiah, 2015. The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
O'Brien, Patrick K., 1988. The political economy of British taxation. Econ.Hist. Rev. 41 (1), 1–32.
O'Brien, Patrick K., 2001. Fiscal exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European Rivals from Civil War to Triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo. LSE Working Paper.
O'Brien, Patrick K., 2011. The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional ﬁscal state and its possible signiﬁcance for the precocious commercialization andindustrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson. Econ. Hist. Rev. 64 (2), 408–446.
O'Brien, Patrick K., Hunt, Philip A., 1999. England, 1485–1815. In: Bonney, R. (Ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c.1200–1815. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 53–101.
Ogilvie, Sheilagh, Carus, A.W., 2014. Institutions and economic growth in historical perspective. CESifo Working Paper No. 4861.
Ozment, Steven, 2004. A Mighty Fortress. Harper, New York.
Pincus, Steve, 2009. 1688: the First Modern Revolution. Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Ploeckl, Florian, 2013. The internal impact of a customs union; Baden and the Zollverein. Explor. Econ. Hist. 50 (3), 387–404.
Ploeckl, Florian, 2015. The Zollverein and the Sequence of a Customs Union, School of Economics Working Papers 2015-02, University of Adelaide, School of
Economics.
Pomeranz, Kenneth, 2000. The Great Divergence, China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Prest, Wilfrid, 1998. Albion Ascendant. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Putnam, Robert D., 1994. Making Democracy Work: civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Putterman, Louis, Weil, David N., 2010. Post-1500 population ﬂows and the long-run determinants of economic growth and inequality. Q. J. Econ. 125 (4),1627–1682.
Rasul, Imran, Rogger, Daniel, 2016. Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service. Economic Journal,
Forthcoming.
Root, Hilton L., 1987. Peasants and King in Burgundy: agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism. University of California Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1978. Corruption: a Study in Political Economy. Academic Press, New York.
Rosenberg, Nathan, Jr., Birdzell, L.E., 1986. How the West Grew Rich, the Economic Transformation of the Industrial World. Basic Books, New York, U.S.A..
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 1992. The Fruits of Revolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, Wong, R. Bin, 2011. Before and Beyond Divergence. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Roux, Pierre, 1916. Lesfermes d'impôts sous l'ancien régime. Rousseau et cie, Paris, France.
Samuelson, Paul A., 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Rev. Econ. Stat. 36 (4), 387–389.
Satyanath, Shanker, Voigtländer, Nico, Voth, Hans Joachim, 2016. Bowling for fascism: social capital and the rise of the Nazi party. Journal of Political Economy,
forthcoming.
Scheve, Kenneth, Stasavage, David, 2012. Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 106, 81–102.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 195, 4, 1918, The crisis of the tax state. In: Peacock, A.T., et al. (Eds.). International Economic Papers, number 4, London. translated by
Wolfgang F. Stolper and Richard A. Musgrave.
Scott, J.C., 1999. Seeing like a State: how Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. The Institution for Social and Policy St Series. Yale
University Press.
Shaw, Stanford, 1976. The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Empire of the Gazis: the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808 vol. I.

19

Explorations in Economic History (xxxx) xxxx–xxxx

N.D. Johnson, M. Koyama

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Shiue, Carol H., Keller, Wolfgang, 2007. Markets in China and Europe on the eve of the industrial revolution. Am. Econ. Rev. 97 (4), 1189–1216.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W., 1998. The Grabbing Hand: government Pathologies and their Cures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Skinner, Quentin, 2009. A genealogy of the modern state. Proc. Br. Acad. 162, 325–370.
Skocpol, Theda, 1985. Bringing the state back in; strategies of analysis in current research. In: Evans, P.B., Rueschemeyer, D., Skocpol, T. (Eds.), Bringing the State
Back In. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 3–44.
Smith, Adam, 1763. Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2014. Size and dynastic decline: the principal-agent problem in late imperial China 1700–1850. Explor. Econ. Hist. 54, 107–127.
Sng, Tuan-Hwee, Moriguchi, Chiaki, 2014. Asia's little divergence: state capacity in China and Japan before 1850. J. Econ. Growth 19 (4), 439–470.
Spaulding, Robert Mark, 2011. Revolutionary france and the transformation of the Rhine. Cent. Eur. Hist. 44, 203–226.
Spolaore, Enrico, Wacziarg, Romain, 2013. How deep are the roots of economic development? J. Econ. Lit. 51 (2), 325–369.
Stasavage, David, 2002. Credible commitment in early modern europe: North and weingast revisited. J. Law, Econ. Org. 18 (1), 155–186.
Stasavage, David, 2003. Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Stasavage, David, 2010. When distance mattered: geographic scale and the development of European representative assemblies. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 104 (4),625–643.
Strayer, Joseph, 1970. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Stringham, Edward, 2015. Private Governance: creating Order in Economic and Social Life. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sumption, Jonathan, 1990. The Hundred Years War I: trial by Battle. Faber & Faber, London.
Tabellini, Guido, 2008. The scope of cooperation:values and incentives. Q. J. Econ. 123 (3), 905–950.
Tabellini, Guido, 2010. Presidential address: Institutions and culture. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 6 (2–3), 255–294.
Tang, John P., 2014. Railroad expansion and industrialization: evidence from Meiji Japan. J. Econ. Hist. 74, 863–886.
Tilly, Charles, 1975. Reﬂections on the history of European state-making. In: Tilly, C. (Ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 3–84.
Tilly, Charles, 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Blackwell, Oxford.
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1998. The Old Regime and the Revolution 1. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Tortella, Gabriel, Comin, Francisco, 2001. Fiscal and monetary institutions in spain (1600–1900). In: Bordo, M.D., Cortées-Conde, R. (Eds.), Transferring Wealthand Power from the Old to the New World. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 140–186.
Troesken, Werner, 2015. The Pox of Liberty: how the Constitution Left Americans Rich, Free, and Prone to Infection. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
TullockTullock, Gordon, 1965. Bureaucracy. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, IN.
van Waijenburg, Marlous, 2015. Financing the african colonial state: the revenue imperative and force labor. African Economic History Working Paper Series No. 20/
2015.
van Zanden, Jan Luiten, van Leeuwen, Bas, 2012. Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807. Explor. Econ. Hist. 49 (2),
119–130.
Ventura, Jaume, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2015. Debt into growth: how sovereign debt accelerated In: Proceedings of the ﬁrst industrial revolution. University of Zurich,Department of Economics Working Paper 194.
Voigtländer, Nico, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2012. Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of Anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany. Q. J. Econ. 127 (3), 1–54.
Voigtländer, Nico, Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2013. Gifts of Mars: warfare and Europe's early rise to riches. J. Econ. Persp. 27 (4), 165–186.
von Mises, Ludwig, 192, 2, 1936, Socialism. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis. translated by J. Kahane.
Voth, Hans Joachim, 2016. Debt, default and empire: state capacity and economic development in England and Spain in the early modern period. Economic History
Review, Forthcoming.
Vries, Peter, 2015. State, Economy, and the Great Divergence: Great Britain and China, 1680s–1850s. Bloomsbury, London.
Wade, Robert, 1990. Governing the Market. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Weber, Max, 192, 2, 1968, Economy and Society. Bedminster, New York.
Weingast, Barry R., 1995. The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development. J. Law, Econ. Org. 11 (1), 1–31.
White, Lawrence H., 2012. The Clash of Economic Ideas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Wittfogel, Karl, 1957. Oriental Despotism: a Comparative Study of Total Power. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Wong, R. Bin, 1997. China Transformed: historical Change and the Limits of European Experience. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Wong, R. Bin, 2001. Tax resistance, economy and state transformation in China and Europe. Econ. Gov. 2 (1), 69–83.
Wong, R. Bin, 2012. Taxation and good governance in China 1500–1914. In: Yuan-Casaliia, B., O'Brien, P.K., Comin, F.C. (Eds.), The Rise of Fiscal States: a Global
History, 1500–1914. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 353–378.
Xue, Melanie Meng, Koyama, Mark, 2016. Autocratic Rule and Social Capital: Evidence from Imperial China. Working Paper.
Yang, He Helen, 2014. The impact of intensive farming on land tenure: evidence from confucius's manors. China Econ. Rev. 8 (279–289).

20