Netanyahu’s Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab
Relations from the Palestinian Issue
Published as part of the publication series:
Israel's Relations with Arab Countries: The unfulfilled Potential

Dr. Yuval Benziman

April 2018

Netanyahu’s Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab
Relations from the Palestinian Issue
Dr. Yuval Benziman*
April 2018
The claim that emerged in 2000 that Israel has “no Palestinian partner" to negotiate with on
the final status agreement has become a fixture in the Israeli public discourse ever since.
During the premiership of Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, the working
assumption was that even without a Palestinian partner, Israeli-Palestinian relations shouldchange. However, ever since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came to power, he has
been promoting an alternative political discourse and perception: it is possible to change
Israel’s regional reality by significantly improving relations with the entire Arab world, even
without making progress in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
This paper compares the discourse promoted by the Israeli government, especially by thePrime Minister, that seeks to create an alternative discourse with the one that prevailed until
a decade ago. The new discourse is constructed around two main pillars: hope for better
relations with the Arab world, but not for a real "peace" or "agreement", and the belief that it
is possible to promote such relations even without attending to the relations with thePalestinians. According to the new working assumptions of the Israeli leadership, this ispossible because the Arab world no longer takes interest in the Palestinian struggle as it didin the past, due to two reasons: first, the conflicts within the Arab world (especially the ShiaSunni conflict) push the moderate Arab states to view Israel as a partner rather than an
enemy; and second, because of joint regional interests.
This new perception has no ground to stand on since historically, the relations between
Israel and the Arab states have always depended on the Israeli-Palestinian relations. It also
overturns the Arab League Initiative, which Netanyahu once claimed was "dangerous to theState of Israel in its current form" (2007) and later claimed "Israel welcomes the spirit of the
Arab Peace Initiative" (2016). The "new" Netanyahu is willing to welcome the initiative as abasis for regional peace because he is ignoring its major requirement that an IsraeliPalestinian agreement be signed prior to the establishment of normal regional relations.
This article focuses on the discourse promoted by the Prime Minister and his surroundings
since they are the most dominant and central actors shaping the debate. Moreover, even
Netanyahu's political opponents find it difficult to create an alternative discourse: In theabsence of a Palestinian partner, who can oppose any strengthening of ties with the Arabstates? However, this discourse, sometimes consciously and overtly, tries to avoid the main
problem: without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel's relations with the Arab andMuslim world cannot be normalized. Therefore, this perception leads in practice to continued
attempts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of encouraging its resolution.

* Dr. Yuval Benziman is a lecturer in the Program in Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This article was written as part of a Mitvim Institute project that examined theunfulfilled potential of the relations between Israel and the Arab world.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

A. Background: A desire to change reality, and a belief that there is “noPalestinian partner”
Following the failure of the Camp David II Summit in 2000, the perception that there was “noPalestinian partner" for an agreement emerged. At the same time, however, the Israeli
leadership has adopted an approach according to which the conditions for managing theconflict should be changed. Prime Minister Sharon began building the separation wall, which
was officially erected for "security" reasons but also had clear political implications. Sharon
persisted in this path when he carried out the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Sharon's
logic was clear: "There is no partner" and yet we must change reality, therefore we must act
unilaterally. Thus, for example, he said on the Disengagement Plan in his October 25, 2004
Knesset speech:"The disengagement plan is not in place of negotiations and does not seek to freeze
the situation that will be created over time. It is an absolutely necessary step in asituation that does not currently allow for real negotiations for peace." 1
Prime Minister Olmert, who replaced Sharon after he became ill, continued this trend. Olmert
was elected prime minister while declaring that he would try to reach a negotiated agreementwith the Palestinians, but if unachievable, he would initiate a "realignment plan" in a similar(albeit broader) unilateral move to Sharon's. Thus, for example, Olmert said in a speech on
March 29, 2006, which became an appendix to the coalition agreement of the 31st
government he headed:"If the Palestinians wisely act soon, we will sit at the negotiating table to shape a new
reality in our region. If they fail to do so, Israel will take its fate in its hands and on thebasis of a broad national consensus and a deep understanding with our international
friends, first and foremost by the US and President Bush, we will act even in theabsence of agreement with them. We will not wait indefinitely. It is time to act.”2
Olmert said that "Abu Mazen is a legitimate partner,"3 and has said on several occasions
that he is a "partner for peace"4 who has always wanted peace talks.5 Olmert evennegotiated with him at the Annapolis conference in November 2007. However, Olmert also
claimed that the "realignment plan", is inevitable.6 Eventually, during his brief tenure he did
not actually carry out any move towards disengagement and failed to advance an IsraeliPalestinian agreement.
At the declarative level, similar to Sharon and Olmert, the perception underlying Prime
Minister Netanyahu's policy is that the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must bechanged. Netanyahu repeatedly declares his desire to conduct negotiations and has even
1 Sharon’s speech to the Knesset on the Disengagement Plan, October 25, 2004: "The Disengagement Plan is not in placeof negotiations and does not seek to freeze the situation that will be created over time. It is a step that is absolutely
necessary in a situation that does not allow for real negotiations for peace to take place."
2 "Appendix to the coalition agreement for the establishment of the 31 st government of the State of Israel", a speechdelivered by Acting Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, at Neve Ilan on March 29, 2006.
3 “Olmert: Abu-Mazen is a legitimate partner”, Nana 10, October 16, 2006.
4 “Olmert: Abu-Mazen is a partner for peace”, Walla, September 21, 2007.
5 For example, Olmert was quoted saying: “Do not tell me that there is no partner. Abu Mazen never supported terror [...]He opposed terrorism when Yasser Arafat ruled. He was in favor of peace talks when Arik Sharon was prime minister andwhen I was prime minister. He did not want the peace we want, but no one can tell me after hundreds of hours of talks that
he is not a partner." Yitzhak Benhorin, "Olmert: Abu Mazen Partner, Never Supported Terrorism," Ynet, March 27, 2012.
6 Roni Sapir, "Olmert: The Convergence Plan Is Inevitable," Ynet, June 14, 2006.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

made various (and sometimes contradictory) statements about the way he sees a future
Israeli-Palestinian agreement ("two states", "state minus" and so forth). Like his
predecessors, he too proposes changes to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the relations
between Israel and the region, when no Israeli-Palestinian agreement is in sight.
Netanyahu reflected this change of attitude when he was seeking to promote an economic
peace before reaching an Israeli-Palestinian political agreement. According to him, in 2008:"Economic peace is a corridor to the possibility of political peace in the future [...] It
does not make the negotiations on the permanent status agreement redundant but
creates the conditions to ripen the tool. An economic peace is a tool to reach politicalsolutions. The conflict with the Palestinians badly needs it […] it is true that it does
not solve the problem of national aspirations, but it should allow us to reach a dialogue
on national aspirations in a better situation."7
In his remarks, Netanyahu noted that a political agreement is a necessity, but thefoundations of his conception, as is the case with his predecessors, rely on the premise that
it is reasonable to assume that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement cannot be reached at thistime, therefore the reality should be changed even in its absence. About a decade ago,
Netanyahu believed that "economic peace" would change reality. In his view, during that
period at least, economic peace could also have contributed to changing the reality by "itsability to prevent a broad recruiting base for radical Islamic activists."8

B. The new discourse: "A great change" in the relations with the Arabworld without the need to progress in negotiations with the Palestinians
In the years since Netanyahu became head of the opposition, extensive changes have takenplace in the region: the Arab Spring, the disintegration of Iraq and Syria, the emergence ofa religious-political struggle between Sunni and Shi’ite states and forces, divided Palestiniansociety and institutions, and more. The Israeli political landscape has also changed, with
Netanyahu enjoying an almost undisputed rule with no strong opposition, a situation thatallows him to promote a political discourse that has very few opponents.
Since he assumed his role as prime minister, and especially in recent years, he also
promoted a discourse that is very different than the one held by previous prime ministers –claiming that it is possible to create cooperation with the Arab world even without
negotiations with the Palestinians. The summer of 2014 was a turning point in theacceleration of this narrative, following the failure of the talks led by US Secretary of StateJohn Kerry and the war in Gaza. Although this discourse is complex and convoluted, threemain arguments can be identified.
Argument No. 1: Relations with the Arab states, which "recognize that Israel is theirally",9 can be strengthened and a "very strong basis for relations" can be establishedwith them (but not peace)
The idea of "economic peace", promoted by Netanyahu in the past, has remained part of
the agenda that the country's leadership is trying to promote, but gradually, and even more
7 Ora Coren, “Netanyahu: ‘Economic Peace’, before Diplomatic Negotiations”, Ha’aretz, January 20, 2008.
8 “Netanyahu's speech at the 8th Herzliya Conference”, IDC Herzliya, January 20-23, 2008.
9 “Prime Minister Netanyahu's Speech at the UN General Assembly”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 22, 2016.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

so in recent years, it appears that Israel under Netanyahu's leadership has begun to create
an alternative political discourse. Underlying this discourse is the prevailing assumption
since 2000 that an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement is not possible. However, theinteresting thing in the new concept is that it sees possibility to strengthen relations between
Israel and the Arab countries, even without any progress in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
According to the new political-declaratory line, Israel does not have to deal with the IsraeliPalestinian conflict in order to enjoy regional cooperation with Middle Eastern countries andthe Arab world. Therefore, on the one hand, the new Israeli perception led by Netanyahu
continues the policy and declarations of both his predecessors: a change must be madeeven when having "no partner". On the other hand, however, Netanyahu's assumption –contrary to that of his predecessors – is that it is possible to change the relations with thecountries of the region even without changing Israel's relations with the Palestinians.
The idea of regional relations even without progress with the Palestinians is rooted in theworldview that the Arab world can be divided into the "axis of evil" and the "moderate axis,"or the "Shi’ite states" versus the "Sunni states". According to this view, the moderate/Sunnipart of the Arab world has similar interests to those of Israel, therefore cooperation can be
made. Moreover, one of the most common arguments in this context is that the moderate
Arab world fears radical Islam more than Israel. The new Israeli approach holds that the fearof the "axis of evil" and radical Islam, in the image of Iran, Hezbollah, Islamic State, andothers – which are a common enemy for both Israelis and most of the countries in the region– can produce extensive cooperation even if no solution is found for the Palestinian struggle.
To that we can add the events of the Arab Spring and the internal changes within the
countries of the region that cause their leaders great tension, and to the widespread
perception that the Palestinians are divided from within and lack a strong, cohesive
leadership. In such circumstances, whereby the regional leaders fear external terrorism andradical Islam, as well as the internal situation in their own countries, and combined with lackof trust in the Palestinian leadership, the ties with the moderate Arab states can bestrengthened significantly even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Thus, thecomponent of shared interests, especially security-related, is added to the paradigm ofeconomic peace.
An example of the new concept can be seen in the words of Yisrael Katz, Israel’s Ministerof Transport, Road Safety, and Intelligence, who outlined the following:"We are promoting a totally realistic vision, of connecting to the East, of the Sunnicountries that have a common interest with us [...] against both Iran and Daesh [...]
we give them a pathway to the Mediterranean, this is a strategic thing, and theAmericans give us their back on that […] at this point in time significant decisions canbe made. There are risks and there are opportunities. The risks are in the south [...]
Iran and Hezbollah. The opportunity is because of the common interest with thecountries of this region in creating a regional economic peace. It is possible to include
moderate Palestinians in this vision, it can be a very strong basis for a peaceagreement later on, that will be on a higher level. At the moment, we need tostrengthen our security and regional economic peace."10
Katz's remarks, which are very similar to those of Netanyahu, deal with the dramatic changethat may take place in the region, but it also embodies the understanding that full peaceagreements and normalization with the Arab world will not occur without an agreement with
10 “Vilenskiy and Bardugo,” Galei Zahal, March 2, 2017.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

the Palestinians. Therefore, Netanyahu and the officials surrounding him speak about a“corridor” that leads to peace, or about creating collaborations that can "serve as a verystrong basis for a higher-level peace". Thus, the aspiration is not an official peace but an
economic peace. It is not a final status document, but something that can lead to it in the
future.
Argument No. 2: The Palestinian issue is of interest to the Arab states “likeyesterday's news”
The new discourse is reflected in many statements made by senior figures in the Israeli
leadership. Most of them do not ignore the fact that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement should
be reached, or that there is a need for progress on this front, but instead explain that this isalmost impossible. In their view, the Arab world has already despaired of trying to resolve
the conflict as well, and the Palestinian struggle is not of interest to the Arab world and isactually a burden for the Arab countries.
Thus, for example, in July 2016, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee and former Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter said that "the Egyptians are interested in
the Palestinian issue like yesterday’s news".11 Dichter claimed that Egypt could significantly
help the battle between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but in his opinion the Palestiniancomponent is not at all important to them, and they only pay it lip service. Defense Minister
Avigdor Lieberman also claimed that the Arab world pays lip service to the Palestinian issue
and that it has no real and genuine concern for the Palestinian issue.12
The person leading this approach is first and foremost the prime minister himself. He, likethe ministers and Knesset members who surround him, does not claim that the Palestiniancomponent should be completely ignored. He also argues that in order to achieve regional
peace, the Israeli-Palestinian relations must be promoted. However, he declared that even
without progress with the Palestinians, there is already a fundamental change in Israel's
relations with the Arab world. In his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2016,
Netanyahu explained to his listeners that Israel's situation in the world is undergoing
dramatic changes. According to him, even the UN, which is so hostile to Israel, will soonchange its attitude since everyone is slowly recognizing that Israel is right. Speaking
specifically about the Arab world, Prime Minister Netanyahu said:"I will now surprise you even more. The big change in the attitude towards Israel istaking place elsewhere. It takes place within the Arab world. Our peace agreementswith Egypt and Jordan continue to serve as anchors of stability in the volatile Middle
East, but I must tell you this - for the first time in my life, many other countries in theregion recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally,
our common enemies are Iran, and Daesh, and our shared goals are security,prosperity and peace. I believe that in the coming years we will work together toachieve these goals, we will work together openly. Therefore, Israel's diplomatic
relations undergo no less than a revolution."13
In the same speech, Netanyahu claimed that he understood that the road to regional peacemust also pass through an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. He said:
11 “Hakol Diburim,” Reshet Bet, July 11, 2016.
12 Barak Ravid, "Lieberman Calls for Postponing the Vote on the Law to Legalize the Outposts until the End of Obama's

Office," Ha'aretz, December 3, 2016.
13 "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Speech at the UN General Assembly," Ibid.

6

Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue"Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and welcomes dialogue with
Arab countries to promote a broader peace. I believe that in order to fully achieve thisbroad peace, the Palestinians must be part of it. I am willing to resume negotiations
to achieve that already today. Not tomorrow, not next week, today!"14
Supposedly then, the Palestinian component is still necessary, but Netanyahu stresses thateven in the absence of progress, it can already be seen that "the greatest change in theattitude toward Israel [...] is taking place in the Arab world." In other words, the Palestiniancomponent is important but the good relations with the Arab world are already happening
without it, and we are witnessing a revolution in Israel's foreign relations even in the absenceof negotiations with the Palestinians.15
Argument No. 3: "Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative,"16 but isinterested in reversing its order
In a sense, Netanyahu's new political discourse is trying to turn the Arab Peace Initiative on
its head. If, in 2002, the Arab Peace Initiative offered Israel a deal according to which an
Israeli-Palestinian agreement could normalize relations between Israel and the entire Arabworld. Netanyahu’s new perception envisions strengthening the ties with the Arab world
even without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. In the Arab Peace Initiative, the IsraeliPalestinian agreement is a necessary condition for regional peace. The Israeli leadership
today believes that Israel's relations with the countries of the region can undergo dramaticchanges without this condition.
In fact, the assumption is that Israeli-Palestinian political development is possible only as
part of a broader and more comprehensive process of regional peace. The new claim is that
the Palestinian leadership, therefore, is unable to politically advance with Israel without thebacking of the moderate Arab world, therefore the only chance to bring the parties to thisstage is within a comprehensive process of regional peace. In other words, the agreementwith the Palestinians is not a condition for peace with the Arab world; it is part of it, andregional peace will not be the result of peace with the Palestinians, but peace with thePalestinians will be one of the outcomes of regional peace.
Historically, when peace in the Middle East or regional peace was mentioned, it wasunderstood that it would include and require an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Moreover,throughout the years of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, it was assumed
that without a solution to the Palestinian struggle, the Arab states would not agree toestablish meaningful ties with Israel. In support of this claim, let us remember that theEgyptian President Anwar Sadat conducted long and stubborn negotiations with Israel on
the fate of the Palestinians, even though the Israeli-Egyptian conflict was about the Sinai
Peninsula. Sadat refused to sign an Israeli-Egyptian agreement without including the
14 Ibid.
15 As noted, Netanyahu is not the only one to deliver dramatic descriptions of the new situation. Thus, for example, Maj.

Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, former head of the security-diplomatic wing at the Defense Ministry and one of the most influential
people in the Israeli security situation, said: "Today our relations with the Arab world are amazing. I am talking about
everything related to security and similar things [...] It is like a tree with one root, and in order to establish this wonder, wemust have a tree with many roots, which is a political settlement or a political process that leads to an agreement [...].
There is no alternative to this and it is impossible to avoid the Palestinians." (From: "Hakol Diburim", Reshet Bet, March 5,2017). Gilad also warned that without the "Palestinian component," it will not be possible to continue strengthening thevarious security partnerships. But he, too, spoke of a contemporary reality that is a "wonder" and “amazing”.
16 "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Speech at the UN General Assembly," Ibid.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

Palestinian component. He hoped that the annex to the Camp David accords – which dealt
with the Palestinian issue – would make the peace treaty acceptable and legitimate in the
Arab world (but was wrong in his assumption and was removed from the Arab League
following the peace treaty). King Hussein, despite ongoing relations between the Israeli
leadership and the Jordanian monarchy, did not sign an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty evenafter he relinquished the demand to get the West Bank back in 1988; It was only after Israel
signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians that it was possible to advance the official
relationship between Israel and Jordan. In addition, Israel's relations with some of the
Persian Gulf and North African countries were made possible only after the Madrid
Conference and the Oslo Accords, which are based on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
However, according to the new political discourse, the Palestinian component is no longer
seen as necessary to create a major change in Israel's relations with the Arab world. In thissituation, Netanyahu, who in the past opposed the Arab Peace Initiative, while saying that"in its current format [it] is dangerous to the State of Israel"17, can now say that "Israel
welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative."18
Traditional Perception

Fear of the“axis of evil”
and radical
Islam

Shared regional
interests

IsraeliPalestinian
peace
agreement

Regional
peace

New Perception

Fear of the“axis of evil”
radical Islamand internal
problems in
Arab countries

Shared regional
interests

No need in IsraeliPalestinian
diplomatic progress

Traditional Perception
Progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
is a necessary condition for normalization
with the Arab world
An Israeli-Palestinian agreement is of theutmost importanceRegional change,
economic peaceand security
cooperation

New Perception
Substantial changes can be made in IsraelArab relations without progress on thePalestinian issue
An Israeli-Palestinian agreement is one ofmany components of agreements between
Israel and the Arab world
The Arab world is committed to the The Arab world pays lip service to thePalestinian struggle
Palestinian struggle, but in practice it is notimportant to him

17 "Netanyahu: The Saudi Initiative is Dangerous for Israel and for Peace," Nana10 , June 4, 2007.
18 "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Speech at the UN General Assembly," Ibid.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

Regional peace with the Arab world will bebased on a peace agreement with thePalestinians, and will lead to a new Middle
East

In the absence of an agreement with thePalestinians and recognizing that there will
be no agreement with the Arab world
without it – the goal is to strengthen ties with
the Arab world, significantly change
relations with it, and create a corridor forreaching diplomatic solutions and regional
economic peace, without formal official
peace.

C. Netanyahu's regional discourse: "An unprecedented opportunity"
whose practical outcome is the continued management of the conflict
If we adopt Netanyahu's approach, there is no basis for one of the main accusations against
Israel since he was elected prime minister, according to which Israel does not initiate
diplomatic moves. Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres initiated the Oslo process; Ehud Barak
withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon, conducted negotiations with Syria, and conductednegotiations with the Palestinians at the second Camp David Summit; Sharon built the
separation wall and withdrew unilaterally from Gaza; and Olmert spoke of a convergenceplan. Netanyahu is accused of not initiating any diplomatic move, even though he repeatedly
declares that he wants to negotiate with the Palestinians. However, Netanyahu declares thatsignificant changes are indeed taking place: since the outbreak of Arab Spring, the chaos in
the Arab world has led the Arab countries to the understanding that Israel is their ally andnot their enemy. Netanyahu, who at first expressed great concern about the Arab Springand claimed that what is expected in the region is "instability and uncertainty," 19 started
claiming that the Arab states are ready to cooperate with Israel, strengthen ties with it andpromote joint initiatives. If so, then it cannot be said that Israel is not adapting its policy todevelopments that change the face of the region. Moreover, since the Israeli leadership sees
the Palestinian leadership as passive and unwilling to negotiate a final status agreement,
the ability to change the regional reality without a Palestinian partner can be considered a
diplomatic achievement. On Netanyahu's first visit to the US following the inauguration of
President Donald Trump, he even said:"If we can stop militant Islam, we can take advantage of an historic opportunity,
because for the first time in my life and for the first time since the establishment of
the State of Israel, the Arab states in the region do not see Israel as an enemy, butmore and more see us as an ally [...] an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen
security and promote peace, let us realize the opportunity together, let us strengthen
security, find new ways to peace."20
According to his approach, Israel has an unprecedented historical opportunity. However, it
requires seeking new ways to achieve peace, because the familiar path from the past, basedon an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, is not feasible. Yet Netanyahu too, according to his
own testimony, believes that these moves cannot lead to normalization of relations between
Israel and the Arab world. He wants to look for new ways toward peace, talks about a change
in the attitude of the Arab world to Israel, and describes a revolution in the attitude of the
19 Lior Lehrs, "The Darkness of Egypt or the Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse on the Arab Spring," the Mitvim

Institute, January 2013.
20 “Address by Prime Minister Netanyahu at a press conference with US President Trump," Prime Minister's Office,February 15, 2017.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

world toward Israel. But he also admits that the end of these processes will not be in peaceagreements with the countries of the Arab world. Such agreements will not be signed aslong as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved. Even if the premise is that the Arabworld only pays lip service to the Palestinian struggle, he himself said that "in order for us to
fully achieve this broad peace, the Palestinians must be part of it."21
Indeed, if proof is needed that even when we envisage a "historic change" in Israel's
relations with the Arab world, the Palestinian component cannot be ignored, on February
19, 2017, Ha'aretz reported that at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 intensive
negotiations were held to renew a regional peace initiative. The culmination of the talks wasa quadripartite summit meeting in Aqaba attended by the Israeli Prime Minister, the US
Secretary of State, the King of Jordan, and the President of Egypt. According to the report,
this renewed initiative, which did not succeed, was supposed to be part of a broad regional
move based on the Arab Peace Initiative, and Netanyahu asked that "senior representatives
from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Sunni countries" 22 join thediscussions. As stated, the move failed and Netanyahu's request was not answered,apparently because of the Israeli desire to advance relations with the Arab world without thePalestinians. Hence, even in 2016, there was no real reason to hope for a regional process
without negotiations with the Palestinians.

D. Conclusion
The outcome of the new governmental discourse led by Netanyahu is that it gives
justifications to the continued management of the conflict instead of resolving it. The Israeli
leadership proposes a political framework with four components: (1) Israel continues tooperate without a new political initiative; (2) The world in general and the Arab world inparticular, slowly understand that Israel is right; (3) In view of the events in the Arab world
and the weakness of the Palestinian leadership, and in view of shared interests, the Arabstates strengthen their ties with Israel; (4) Israel is lowering its expectations and under
existing circumstances no longer aspires to peace agreements and instead believes in
improving relations with the Arab world.
As far as the Israeli leadership is concerned, this diplomatic pattern does not require Israel
to change anything in its conduct. Cooperation with the Arab world and strengthening ties
therewith without having to pay any political toll are welcomed, of course. This is also hardly
contested in the Israeli discourse. The Left (which is very weak) does not object to thestrengthening of relations between Israel and the Arab world, and it seems that it is difficultfor its representatives to present the public with a claim that it is wrong to welcome
improvements in the relations between Israel and the Arab world. Even when there arevoices that emphasize that a regional peace will not be possible without the Palestiniancomponent, they are not opposed to strengthening ties with the Arab world in the absence
thereof.23 The Israeli right, even among those who do not think it is necessary to reach an
agreement with the Palestinians, is prepared to ignore the statements that in the future thePalestinian component must be taken into account, as long as the change in Israeli-Arabrelations today does not require any real political move.
21 "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Speech at the UN General Assembly," Ibid.
22 Barak Ravid, "Kerry presented Netanyahu with a regional peace initiative in a secret meeting with A-Sisi and Abdullah

about a year ago, the prime minister was reserved,” Ha’aretz, February 19, 2017.
23 See, for example, MK Nachman Shai's speech at the conference of the Regional Cooperation Lobby at the Knesset incooperation with the Mitvim Institute, July 20, 2016.

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Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

However, it seems that the governmental discourse that hardly has any opposition is only
an Israeli wish that cannot last for long. The Israeli leadership claims a change in the attitudeof the Arab world toward Israel – except that apart from the security community, who testify
to what only they are exposed to, it is difficult to know whether this is happening, and if so,
how significant this change is.24 Moreover, it appears that the cooperation is mostly in thecontext of security and not in a broader sense. If this is the case, it may be assumed, basedon past experience, that security cooperation will continue as long as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is conducted at a relatively low intensity. But during more difficult confrontations(which occur every two to three years in the past decade), and in the absence of formal
agreements between Israel and the Arab states, it is doubtful whether the Arab world will
demonstrate the change that the Israeli leadership claims is characteristic of its new attitude.
This was well expressed by one of those well-known officials, former Mossad chief Tamir
Pardo, who said:"The secret cooperation that is taking place is important [...] but it does not advance
anything in the regional context or in the context of legitimizing the State of Israel.
Secret ties [...] have a very interesting feature, they exist but can be stopped once
there are changes of interests, because they do not have, with regard to theirbackground and depth, they do not fit within the national narrative, and in the end
peace is made between countries, peace is made between communities, the gameof security organizations [...] it is good for its time."25
The events that took place in July 2017 on the Temple Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque were anotherexample of how the Arab and Muslim world leaders and the peoples of the region see theIsraeli-Palestinian reality. Even if collaborations do indeed take place at various security
levels, a public campaign such as the Israeli attempt to place a metal detector at theentrance to the Temple Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque, and their immediate removal following theuprising in the Muslim Arab world, demonstrated the inefficacy of such collaborations, if they
indeed exist. In addition, while the Israeli leadership claims that the moderate Arab world is
not interested in the Palestinian struggle at all, the past teaches us that the Palestiniancomponent was critical in establishing relations between Israel and the Arab states, and that
the Arab public is certainly mobilized for the Palestinian struggle.
There is one issue that seems to be agreed upon by all the parties involved (the Israeli
leadership, the Palestinians, the leadership of the Arab states, the Arab public, and the entire
world): without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there will be no regional peace.
This consensus raises doubts about the optimistic declarations of Israeli leaders about amajor change and revolution that are taking place when there are no Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations. If it is claimed that the Palestinians must be part of a regional peaceagreement, but at the same time there is also an attempt to remove them from the equation,
we are apparently witnessing the continued management of the conflict with the Arab world,
rather than attempts to advance its resolution. Managing the conflict without an attempt tosolve it – even prior to the age of “no partner” (starting in 2000) as well as in the period
following it, and before the Arab Spring (starting in 2010) and following it – means wars and
24 From the little we know, we can give a contrary example: The Israeli ambassador to Egypt was called back to

Israel for "security reasons" for a number of months at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, despite the apparently
very close security relations. See: Itamar Eichner and Yoav Zeitun, "The Israeli Ambassador to Egypt was Returned to
Israel due to Alerts", Ynet, February 14, 2017.
25 Tamir Pardo, speaking at the conference on "Making Safe Regional Peace" by the Knesset Regional Cooperation Lobby,
March 16, 2017. Later, the former head of the Mossad emphasized that "nothing will advance without the beginning of asolution to the Palestinian issue [...] There will not be anything regional, nothing regional, without a progress on thePalestinian issue."11

Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue

deaths. The alleged security cooperation between the Arab states and Israel will not last as
long as there are Israeli-Palestinian rounds of fighting; regional economic peace will notoccur without resolving the Palestinian issue; and the Israeli discourse that no longer aspires
to achieve peace agreements, but only a "corridor of change" will continue to perpetuate themanagement of the violent conflict instead of ending it.

Diplomatic
Development/Change
Israel-Egypt peace accordYear

The Palestinian Component

1979

Israel-Jordan peace accord

1994

The Arab Peace Initiative

2002

The Camp David accords deal with
Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Stripand the West Bank
The peace agreement was signed only
after the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo
Accords
An Israeli-Palestinian agreement will
enable the establishment of normal
relations between Israel and the entire
Arab world
Israeli perception that there is no
Palestinian partner, but that there is aneed to change the Israeli-Palestinian
reality
Israeli perception that it is impossible toreach a comprehensive peace with the
Arab world without an IsraeliPalestinian agreement, but that IsraelArab relations can be fundamentallychanged even without an agreement or
progress with the Palestinians

Unilateral disengagement from 2005
the Gaza Strip

Changes in the Middle East since
following the Arab Spring2014