THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
NAKAMURA AKIRA, PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF DOKKYO UNIVERSITY(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)

PART 1: PREFACE AND TABLE OF CONTENTSPREFACEHow should we define the Greater East Asian War?
The belief that it was a war of aggression waged by Japan has come to dominate world
public opinion, but this question continues to fester in the minds of innumerable Japanese
who are searching for honest answers. This book, in which I offer some explanations andnew perspectives, is my attempt to shed some light on that conflict.
There is no shortage of academics and commentators who, immersed in the relentlessmasochistic direction that postwar historical perception has taken, continue to blindly
embrace the judgments handed down by the IMTFE. To make matters worse, these same
individuals delight in triumphantly and smugly enumerating, to anyone who will listen, theblunders and errors made by their native land: Japan bears sole responsibility for theGreater East Asian War. They boast of being “progressives” because they write books,
even history textbooks, that portray Japanese history in the worst light possible.
This writer believes that the great majority of wars stem from complex historicalcircumstances and causes. For that reason, I refuse to accept any historical perception thatunilaterally denounces Japan. Wars erupt for a plethora of trivial, cumulative, and variousreasons. Everywhere in the annals of history we find seeds of problems that developed intowars. We also find some that found a peaceful resolution. For the Greater East Asian War,
where do we draw the fine, dividing line between war and peace? It is my intention to use
a macroscopic approach to explore this quandary and to contemplate the meaning of thatconflict. What distinguishes my book from others on this subject is my effort to give Japandue credit for its good-faith, sincere attempts to achieve peace, even if they came to naught,
washed away like writing in sand when the tide comes in. In the end, a writer’s objective
in reexamining history is validation of his own convictions. At the same time, any reader
with an open mind should realize that I have not glorified the war beyond its reality.
Headlines like “Nanjing Massacre Claims 300,000 Victims,” a criminal charge and an
absurd fantasy, continue to appear in our newspapers in mammoth typefaces thatpractically scream at the reader, even today. Trumped-up war-crimes accusations also
continue to accrete. Today no one has the backbone to come to speak out in support ofour country. Instead, Japan’s unprincipled academics, writers, and journalists trip overeach other in their rush to broadcast their approval of accusations from abroad, thus1

slandering and betraying their homeland. Millions may oppose me, but I shall raise myvoice in defense of my native land when the truth is on my side.
It was this wretched state of affairs that compelled me to take up my pen and produce myfirst booklet. Nothing could please me more than the knowledge that students (Japan’sfuture leaders) might read it as they would a textbook, and that it might nurture an accurate
understanding of history, and inspire love and respect for Japan.
This writer’s love for his country is boundless. I respect not only the notion of a peacefulJapan, but also the memory of the heroes of the past who fought with all their might andgave their lives for that Japan. A peaceful Japan is very dear to me, but equally dear are thedeeds of those men who fought brilliantly and gave their lives for their country and theJapanese people.
Generations upon generations of heroes have sacrificed their precious, irreplaceable
lives defending these islands—Mitsui Koshi (1883-1953)
My heart is with those many brave souls who gave their lives for their country over theyears, certainly not with those who revile and slander their native land because it wasdefeated in war. I firmly believe that it behooves those who have the good fortune to beborn, live out their lives, and die here to repay their debt by striving to eradicate false
charges against Japan. And though countless works on this topic have already been
published, I have taken the liberty to bring my book into the world as well.
A brief mention of terminology: my personal and professional preference for accurate
historical terminology compels me to use terms like Greater East Asian War. I haveeschewed postwar neologisms like Pacific War and Fifteen Years’ War. For the same
reason, my choice of names like China and Republic of China has been dictated by context
and my desire for historical accuracy.
Now I shall describe the course of events that led to the publication of this book. I beganwork on a booklet intended as a study guide for my university students on July 15, 1982;
it was published in October of the same year. Then I embarked on the preparation of
three additional booklets, which were completed in November, 1984; all four volumes
bore the title Study Guide to the Greater East Asian War. Work on the fifth volume,begun in September 1984, was completed in three and one-half years, on March 9, 1988;
it filled 1,400 pages of manuscript paper. I decided against having the fifth volume
printed because of its extraordinary length. Instead, I decided to combine all five booklets
into one book intended not only for students, but also for the general reader. I began therewriting process on March 10, 1988, the day after completing the fifth volume. Afterrewriting for almost a year, I was fortunate enough to be offered an opportunity to have
my booklets serialized in the monthly magazine Shokun!, published by Bungeishunju
Ltd. For that purpose I used, for the first time, a title that had been on my mind for sometime: The Road to the Greater East Asian War. The response to the series, which2

appeared over six months between the May 1989 and October 1989 issues, was excellent.
I was reminded that this was what the Japanese people were longing to learn about. Since
there was not enough material in the series for a book, I began writing again once the last
installment had appeared, adding approximately 1,000 pages. I was very pleased thatwhat had begun life as a study guide was now, after eight years of work, a proper book!
In connection with the writing of this book and its publication, I am indebted to a great
many people. But I am especially grateful to Professors Kobori Keiichiro (of TokyoUniversity) and Nagoshi Futaranosuke (of Takachiho University of Commerce) for theirthoughtfulness in providing me with the opportunity to publish this work in book form. Iwould also like to thank the members of the 1st Infantry Regiment Veterans Association(China Garrison Army), who were kind enough to share their exceedingly valuable
recollections of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
Special thanks must be proffered to Otsuka Kenzo, who was attached to Infantry Brigade
Headquarters, China Garrison Army, during the period when both the Marco Polo Bridge
and Tongzhou incidents erupted, for his thoughtfulness and generosity. Mr. Otsuka
provided me with copious advice, as well as reference material, records, translations –enough to fill a book. These are first-rate resources, and they are particularly valuable since
he was on the scene when the incidents occurred. The material he gave me is a product of
his extensive knowledge of China, prodigious memory, and inquiring mind. I deeply regretthat I was able to use only a portion of it in the preparation of this book.
I also offer my heartfelt gratitude to Aizawa Hiroaki (president of Tendensha PublishingCo.) who, day and in a gesture uncommon in this day and age, had the generosity of spirit
to offer to publish this book, as well as to Tendensha’s editor in chief, Yuhara Masataka,
who painstakingly organized my voluminous manuscript.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife for her assistance. She set aside her household
responsibilities to read each installment of the Shokun! Series before it was submitted forpublication, and with great good humor!
Nakamura Akira

3TABLE OF CONTENTSPREFACEINTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL CONTROVERSIESCHAPTER 1: THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.

KOREAN XENOPHOBIA AND COMPLACENCYTHE OPENING OF KOREA
KOREA: CAUGHT BETWEEN PROGRESS AND SUBSERVIENCESTATE WITH LITTLE DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER 2: THE 1ST SINO-JAPANESE WAR
1.
2.
3.
4.

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES AND COURSE OF THE CONFLICTCHINESE ATROCITIESTREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI; THE TRIPLE INTERVENTIONKOREA AND THE 1ST SINO-JAPANESE WAR

CHAPTER 3: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

HIGH COST OF THE TRIPLE INTERVENTION
US EXPANSION INTO THE PACIFIC; OPEN DOOR POLICYRUSSIA’S SOUTHWARD ADVANCE; ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCETWO NATIONS’ LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVALTHE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLERUSSO-JAPANESE WAR VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD HISTORYCHAPTER 4: THE BEGINNINGS OF DISCORD BETWEEN JAPAN AND THEUS1.
2.

BATTLE FOR RAILROAD SUPREMACY IN MANCHURIAUS ANTI-JAPANESE EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES AND PRACTICESCHAPTER 5: JAPAN AND WORLD WAR I
1.
2.
3.
4.

A SECOND LOOK AT THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDSLANSING-ISHII AGREEMENTTHE SIBERIAN INTERVENTIONTHE TRAGIC NIKOLAYEVSK INCIDENTCHAPTER 6: US RETALIATION: WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE
1.
2.

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCECONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFERENCECHAPTER 7: THE ILLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
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2.
3.

TRAJECTORY OF US ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIONSCOMMUNIZATION OF OUTER MONGOLIAATROCITIES OF THE “REAL CHINA”

4CHAPTER 8: REVOLUTIONARY CHINA AND COMMUNISM
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2.
3.

COMMUNIST IMPACT ON A CHINA IN TURMOILFIRST UNITED FRONTCHINESE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACIES; COMMUNIST-NATIONALIST ANTAGONISMCHAPTER 9: CONTENDING WITH RED CHINA / CHINA’S COMMUNISTS
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

THE NANJING INCIDENTSHIDEHARA’S IDEALISTIC DIPLOMACY VS. REALITYTANAKA DIPLOMACY: REACTION TO NORTHERN EXPEDITIONTHE TANAKA MEMORIAL HOAXTHE JINAN INCIDENTTHE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

CHAPTER 10: THE MANCHURIAN / MUKDEN INCIDENT
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

TENSIONS IN MANCHURIA; LIUTIAOGOU INCIDENTQUARTER-CENTURY BUILDUP [OF ANIMOSITY?]OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICTTRUTH ABOUT THE MANCHURIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTDOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CAUSES OF THE CONFLICTWAS MANCHURIA PART OF CHINA?
THOUGHTS ON THE CONFLICT AND THE FOUNDING OF A NATIONCHAPTER 11: JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS: NORTH CHINA
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

THE TANGGU TRUCE
IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSUMEZU-HE AGREEMENTNEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING PRIME MINISTER HIROTA’S THREE PRINCIPLESNORTH CHINA AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT; HEBEI AND CHAHAR AUTONOMOUS

GOVERNMENTS

CHAPTER 12: CHINESE CIVIL WAR AND THE XI’AN INCIDENT
1.
2.
3.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK’S IDEOLOGY AND POLICIESCOMINTERN MACHINATIONSXI’AN INCIDENTCHAPTER 13: WHAT TRANSPIRED AT MARCO POLO BRIDGE
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2.
3.
4.
5.

HOW THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT UNFOLDEDFABRICATION OF THE “JAPANESE PLOT” THEORYTHE REAL INSTIGATORSJAPANESE EFFORTS TO CURB EXPANSIONTONGZHOU INCIDENTCHAPTER 14: WAR SPREADS FROM SHANGHAI TO NANJING
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2.
3.

FAILURE OF THE FUNATSU PEACE INITIATIVEBATTLE OF SHANGHAICAPTURE OF NANJING

5CHAPTER 15: REEXAMINING THE NANJING “MASSACRE”
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2.
3.

THE NANJING “MASSACRE” AND THE IMTFEDOUBTS ABOUT MASSACRE ACCUSATIONBREEDING GROUND OF THE MASSACRE MYTH

CHAPTER 16: EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE WITH CHINA
1.
2.

THE TRAUTMAN MEDIATIONWANG JINGWEI: THE TRAGIC FATE OF A TRUE PATRIOTCHAPTER 17: THE BATTLE AGAINST COMMUNISM
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

GROWTH OF RED FASCISMJAPAN-GERMANY ANTI-COMINTERN PACT: BARRIER AGAINST COMMUNISMBROKEN NON-AGGRESSION PACTBURGEONING SOVIET MILITARISM
CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT: USSR PROVOKES JAPANNOMONHAN INCIDENTCHAPTER 18: JAPAN’S RESPONSE TO WORSENING JAPAN-US RELATIONS
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3.
4.
5.
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8.

EXPANSION OF US NAVY
QUARANTINE SPEECH AND USS PANAY INCIDENTJAPAN-US RIVALRY OVER OPEN DOOR POLICYECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN; AMENDMENT OF NEUTRALITY ACTNEGOTIATED JAPANESE ADVANCE INTO NORTHERN FRENCH INDOCHINA
JAPAN-NETHERLANDS NEGOTIATIONS; PRESSURE FROM US AND UKRECOGNITION FROM WANG REGIMETRIPARTITE PACTCHAPTER 19: JAPAN-US NEGOTIATIONS
1.
2.
3.

NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE AND STALLJAPANESE ADVANCE INTO SOUTHERN FRENCH INDOCHINANEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USCHAPTER 20: JAPAN’S PEACEMAKING EFFORTS FAIL
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7.

TOJO CABINET’S PEACEMAKING EFFORTSUS OFFICIALS’ IMPATIENCE TO GO TO WARJAPAN DEMONSTRATES WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISETHE HULL NOTEPEARL HARBOR: A SURPRISE ATTACK?
WHO WELCOMED THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES?
DECEMBER 8 AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLEEPILOGUE: REASSESSMENT OF THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WARINDEX6